



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

SOUTHERN SUDAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS PROGRAM (SSTAP)

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MOEST)

8 AUGUST 2009

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International.

SOUTHERN SUDAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS PROGRAM (SSTAP)

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MOEST)



A Subsidiary of Coffey International, Ltd.

Management Systems International

Corporate Offices

600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024



Contract No. DFD-I-00-05-00251-00, Task Order No. 2

Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT)

DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

Project Data Table	iv
Acknowledgements	vi
Project Location – Southern Sudan	vii
Glossary	viii
Acronyms	xi
Executive Summary	xiv
Background.....	xiv
Recommendations.....	xvi
Introduction	1
1.1 Context.....	1
1.2 Program Description: Phases 3 and 4	2
II. Purpose and Methodology	5
2.1 Purpose.....	5
2.2 Summary of the Methodology	5
III. Findings and Conclusions	7
3.1 TAP Management	7
3.2 Partnership	14
3.3 Impact (Short Term Effects)	19
3.4 Peace Dividend & Conflict Sensitive Analysis.....	21
3.5 Capacity Enhancement Approach.....	23
3.6 Gender.....	25
3.7 Risks & Unanticipated Negative External Developments	26
3.8 Sustainability	28
IV. Recommendations	30
V. Lessons Learned	32
Annex 1: Scope of Work	33
Annex 2: Schedule of Consultations	46
Annex 3: Expanded Discussion of the Methodology Approach	57
Annex 4: TAP Implementation Phases 2005-2011	61
Annex 5: Likhert Scale Scoring of TAP Implementing Principles (from 2007 PMP)	62
Annex 6: Expanded Discussion on Risk Management	66

Annex 7: MonitorING and Evaluation – Additional Information	68
Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support.....	68
Annex 9: Case Study - Generating Income to Support the Operational Activities of the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education, Southern Sudan.....	70
Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System.....	73
Annex 11: Draft Content for MoE ST-SMoE Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)	82
Annex 12: Other Equity Considerations.....	84
Annex 13: Organizational Development Tracking and Planning Tool (Draft 2 080109)	86
Annex 14: Indicators.....	102
Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile.....	105
Annex 16: TAP Model Stakeholder Map.....	108
Annex 17: Upper Nile Most Significant Change Story	109
Annex 18: Proposal Submission and Funding Request Tracking Form.....	113
Annex 19: Ministry of Education Profiles by State	114
Annex 20: Bibliography.....	139

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Head Teachers Workshop In Yambio, Western Equatoria State. June 2009	ii
Figure 2: Head Teachers Workshop in Yambio, Western Equatoria State. June 2009.....	ii
Figure 3: “We listened to the Government when they told us we should send our children to school.” (Mary, a pastoralist and mother of four children - near Rumbek, Lakes State). July 2009.....	iii
Figure 4: Outdoor study session at home near Rumbek, Lakes State. None of the boys has a complete set of textbooks for his grade level.	iii
Figure 5: Map of Southern Sudan (Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).....	vii
Figure 6: TAP Hub-Satellite Management Structure.....	4
Figure 7: AED TAP Mid-Term Evaluation Areas of Focus	5
Figure 8: TAP Implementation Phase 2005-2011.....	61
Figure 9:Histogram representing overall scoring of Implementing Principles (from 2007 PMP).....	62
Figure 10: Illustration of data discrepancies between reports.....	68
Figure 11: Example table which could be used for M&E data. Organised by actual/target value, quarter, fiscal year and grouped by province, indicator.....	65
Figure 12: Ms Nama R. Bullen Beshir, Director General-Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education, with Ministry cafeteria workers as they get ready to serve lunch. June 2009. (Photo by Valerie Haugen)	72
Figure 13: Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education Conference Hall and home of the Ministry cafeteria. June, 2009. (Photo by Valerie Haugen)	72
Figure 14: There Is Positive Feedback From The Ground On The Transparency Of The New System – Wes Senior Management And Payroll Unit With The Smoe’s First Payroll On The New System. (Photo by Kathryn Johnston).....	75
Figure 15: Correspondence between IDF and TAP Organizational Development Tracking & Planning Framework Categories.....	86
Figure 16: Maturity score totals across all functional areas, by state.	100
Figure 17: Maturity score totals across all states, by functional area	100
Figure 18: Drilling down into Lakes State having the highest maturity score total across functional areas.	101
Figure 19: Drilling down into Unity State having the lowest maturity score total across functional areas.	101
Figure 20: Indicator 1 total number of administrators and officials trained.	102
Figure 21: Indicator 1 by sex.	102
Figure 22: Indicator 5 total number of teachers/educators trained.	103
Figure 23: Indicator 5 by sex.	103
Figure 24: Indicator 9 total number of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials provided.	104
Figure 25: Indictor 11 laws, policies, regulations and guidelines developed or modified.....	104
Figure 26:Average months in executive and senior management positions.	105
Figure 27:Number of executive and senior management staff by sex and state.	105
Figure 28: Executive and senior management appointments by sex and state.	106
Figure 29: Gap between CV stated expertise and ToR required expertise.	106
Figure 30: DTA time on task.	107
Figure 31:TAP model stakeholder map.	108
Figure 32: SMOe proposal submission and proposal success data form.	113

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Field Work Master Schedule, Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP): June 17 – July 31, 2009	46
Table 2: Interview Focus Areas & Target Group Emphasis	59
Table 3: Options for Escalating Levels of Support.....	68
Table 4: Payroll Run Data.....	77
Table 5: Progress at a Glance.....	78
Table 6: Organizational Development Tracking & Planning Framework	87

**FIGURE 1: HEAD TEACHERS WORKSHOP IN YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE.
JUNE 2009**



**FIGURE 2: HEAD TEACHERS WORKSHOP IN YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE.
JUNE 2009**



FIGURE 3: “WE LISTENED TO THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY TOLD US WE SHOULD SEND OUR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL.” (MARY, A PASTORALIST AND MOTHER OF FOUR CHILDREN - NEAR RUMBEK, LAKES STATE). JULY 2009



FIGURE 4: OUTDOOR STUDY SESSION AT HOME NEAR RUMBEK, LAKES STATE. NONE OF THE BOYS HAS A COMPLETE SET OF TEXTBOOKS FOR HIS GRADE LEVEL.



PROJECT DATA TABLE

Program Name	South Sudan Technical Assistance Program to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology	
Region/Country	Africa/Southern Sudan (Geographic Area 650)	
Program	Bi-lateral under Strategic Objective A12/A055	
Government of Southern Sudan Counterpart	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST)	
Funder	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	
Managing Contractor	AED (Academy for Educational Development)	
Agreement Information	<p>Leader Cooperative Agreement No. GDG-A-00-03-00008-00 (2005)</p> <p>Associate Cooperative Agreement No. 650-A-00-07-00004-00 (August 6, 2007)</p> <p>Modification #01 Associate Cooperative Agreement No. 650-A-00-07-00004-00 (June 18, 2007)</p>	
Key Program Dates	TAP Impact Evaluation Mission	TBD
	TAP Phase 2 Mid-Term Evaluation Mission	June 21-July 11, 2009
	TAP Phase 2 Award Period	June 18, 2007 to September 17, 2011 ¹
	SSTAP Phase 2 Design	May 2007
	SSTAP Phase 1 Implementation Period	September, 2005 to June 17, 2007
Total Contract Value (2005-2011):	US\$17,624,752	
(As of March 2009):	US\$17,624,752	
(As of June 18, 2007):	US\$8,499,534	
(As of August 6, 2007):	US\$7,999,534	
(As of March 2006):	US\$1m	
(As of September 2005):	US\$0.5m	
Evaluation Provider	MSI (Management Systems International)	
	MTE Team Members:	<p>Dr. Valerie Haugen (External Evaluator/Team Leader)</p> <p>Dr. Robert Gurevich (External Evaluator)</p> <p>Mr. Hakim Monykuer (Executive Secretary, MoEST)</p> <p>Mr. Pia Philip (Education Project Management Specialist,</p>

¹ TAP documentation cites different starting and ending points for Phase 2. The USAID Associate Cooperative Agreement dated August 6, 2007 specifies the time period of June 18, 2007 to September 17, 2011 on the signature page, however page 17 of the ACA nominates July 1, 2007 to September 20, 2011. Other TAP documentation uses September, 2007 as the start date.

	USAID) Ms. Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, USAID/MSI) Mr. Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, AED)
MTE Mission Site Visits	Southern Sudan States of: Central Equatoria, Lakes States, Warrap, Western Bar El Ghazal, Western Equatoria

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) Team would like to thank the personnel of the Government of Southern Sudan, in particular the many individuals in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and the State Ministries of Education (SMoE) who gave so generously of their time and who provided the Team with excellent and candid commentary. The Team would also like to extend its sincere thanks to the students, school personnel and community members who shared their perspectives on education in Southern Sudan. The feedback on SSTAP enabled the MTE Team to examine the felt changes resulting from the Program and to construct recommendations for the final two years of Program implementation.


Special thanks are extended to personnel from the donor and development partner community whose views also helped to inform a more complete understanding of the context in which TAP is being implemented and the changes beginning to emerge because of TAP, particularly at the state level due to the work of TAP personnel from the Academy for Educational Development (AED). Without this professional and collegial assistance to the Team and willingness to participate in a collaborative manner in the conduct of the MTE, the effectiveness of the Team and the final product would have been reduced.

The Team would like to thank the staff of Management Systems International (MSI) for their dependable and accommodating assistance with strategic guidance, administrative aspects and on-the-ground logistical assistance, especially Ms. Ami Henson (SUPPORT Chief of Party) and Ms. Ashley Wax (Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Expert) for their excellent preparation work setting the parameters of the MTE prior to the full Team's mobilization.

And, last, but most certainly not least, we would like to commend those colleagues who participated as full members of the Mid-Term Evaluation Team—Mr Hakim Monykuer (Executive Secretary, MoEST), Ms Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, USAID/MSI), Mr Pia Philip (Education Project Management Specialist, USAID) and Mr Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, AED TAP). The contributions of Ms Inez Andrews (Agreement Officer Technical Representative, USAID) and Dr Grace Akukwe (Chief of Party, AED TAP) were especially invaluable.

PROJECT LOCATION – SOUTHERN SUDAN

FIGURE 5: MAP OF SOUTHERN SUDAN (SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS)



GLOSSARY²

Term	Definition
Capability	The collective ability of a group or system to do something either inside or outside the system. ³
Capacity	The overall ability of organizations or systems to add value to others. ⁴
Collaborative Evaluation	A collaborative evaluation “implies a varying level of involvement that considers the extent to which program staff and other stakeholders should be included as part of the evaluation team...is often empowering to participants...(and) enhances their understanding of evaluation so they gain new skills...promotes utilization of evaluation findings” ⁵
Conflict Sensitivity	“...the ability of an organization to develop and use the sum of its human and organizational capital to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts on the conflict dynamics of the environment(s) where it works. This means and awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, and the likelihood of further conflict, and its likely severity; and the capacity to work with all parties to minimize the risk of further conflict.” ⁶
Counterpart Relationship	“A counterpart is an individual or a collectivity (e.g., a group or even an organization) who contributes to a relationship designed to exchange knowledge and support as part of a deliberate effort to induce development results in a partner country.” ⁷
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance—progress in achieving objectives, standard of outputs, extent of benefit to the target population.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results—timeliness and appropriateness of preparation and implementation processes, including appraisal and peer review; standard of the contract and activity implementation by the contractor; strength of partner government support and the value of dialogue in country; USAID management including risk management and use of external expertise; activity monitoring and communication.
Endogenous Processes	Capacity processes that appear to be essentially internally-driven (by the organization), and not driven by the concerns of an external donor.
Evaluation	A social science activity directed at collecting, analysing, interpreting and communicating information about the workings and effectiveness of social programs.
Gender Equality	Gender equality means that women and men enjoy the same status. Gender equality means that women and men have equal conditions for realizing their full human rights and potential to contribute to national, political, economic, social and cultural development, and to benefit from

² A number of these definitions, including those for Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Lessons Learned and Sustainability, are taken from Ausguide, AusAID.

³ Baser, Heather and Morgan, Peter (2008)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ O’Sullivan, Rita M. (2008)

⁶ Waqo, Halakhe and Onyango, Rachael (2008). Conflict Sensitive Programming. Kenya Humanitarian Forum, OCHA

⁷ Morgan, Peter (2008)

Term	Definition
	the results. Gender equality is therefore the equal valuing by society of both the similarities and differences between women and men, and the varying roles that they play. ⁸
Gender Equity	Gender equity is the process of being fair to women and men. To ensure fairness, measures must often be available to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from otherwise operating on a level playing field. Equity leads to equality. ⁹
Impact	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended—inter alia, impacts may be economic, institutional, technological, environmental, socio-cultural, gender-related; measurement of extent of impacts (if possible, a cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken); effect on...development policies.
Institution	Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They are the ‘rules of the game’ in a society, the rules that facilitate human interaction and societal life. They are the arrangements human have made for governing their lives...They may be formal arrangements, such as legal systems and property rights, or informal arrangements, like moral standards. In some cases, they take the form of implicit work views or mental maps, i.e., cognitive frameworks for looking at the world around you. These arrangements or institutions operate at different levels, ranging from an international level (such as trade arrangements) to community and individual levels (for instance, the values that determine the way in which people interact with each other). ¹⁰
Institutional Development	Institutional development is the processes by which institutions evolve and perish, i.e., ongoing endogenous and autonomous processes in society. ¹¹
Lessons Learned	Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with activities, programs or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently lessons learned highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design and implementation that affect performance, outcome and impact.
Organization(al) Development	The practice of changing people and organizations for positive growth which can take on many forms including, but not exclusively, team-building, organizational assessments, career development, training, e-learning, coaching, innovation, leadership development, talent management, change management. ¹²
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies—relevance of the activity’s objectives (i.e., Were they clear, realistic and measurable?); adequacy of documented activity design to achieve objectives.

⁸ Status of Women-Canada (1996) Gender-Based Analysis: A Guide for Policy-Making.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) (no date provided). Institutional Development: Learning by Doing and Sharing. Maastricht, Netherlands: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poverty Policy and Institutional Development Division (DSI/AI).

¹¹ Ibid. Also, for an excellent historical perspective on Organizational Development and Institutional Development, see van der Velden, Fons and Leenknecht, Anne-Marie (2006) Facilitation of Organizational Change: Beyond Organizational and Institutional Development. Contextuals No. 5 December.

<http://contextinternationalcooperation.files.wordpress.com/2007/12/contextuals-no-5.pdf> Accessed from Lae, Papua New Guinea at 10:50am August 7, 2009.

¹² <http://www.odportal.com/OD/whatisod.htm> Accessed from Sydney, Australia at 9:00am July 16, 2009.

Term	Definition
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed—sustainability of benefits (technological, social, environmental, gender); sustainability of institutional capacity; maintenance of future recurrent budget (financial sustainability).
Workforce Development	Those activities that increase the competence of individual staff so that they can contribute effectively to the public service throughout their whole working life and which simultaneously increase the capacity of public service agencies to adopt high-performance work practices that support their staff to develop the full range of their potential skills and value.

ACRONYMS

Acronym	Description
ACA	Associate Cooperative Award
AED	Academy for Educational Development
AIR	American Institutes of Research
AOTR	Agreement Officer Technical Representative
AP	Annual Plan
AQF	Australian Qualifications Framework
AQTF	Australian Qualifications Training Framework
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CA	Cooperative Award
CBTF	Capacity Building Trust Fund
CDC	Community Development Center
CE	Capacity Enhancement
CEC	County Education Center
CEQ/CE	Central Equatoria State
COP	Chief of Party
COTR	Contracting Officer Technical Representative
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSPM	Conflict Sensitive Program Management
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DC	District of Columbia
DG	Director General
DSTP	Diaspora Skills Transfer Program
DTA	Diaspora Technical Assistant
EDC	Education Development Center
EEQ/EES	Eastern Equatoria State
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Program

Acronym	Description
ERDF	Education Rehabilitation and Development Forum
ESP	Education Strategic Plan
F/C/R	Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations
F2F	Face to Face
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FMIS	Financial Management Information System
FMS	Financial Management System
FTP	Fast Track Teacher Education and Training Program
FY	Fiscal Year
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GEE	Gender Equity through Education Project
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ICT4D	Information and Communication Technologies for Development
ICT4E	Information and Communication Technologies for Education
ID	Institutional Development
IDF	Institutional Development Framework
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRI	Interactive Radio Instruction
LLG	Local Level Government
LTTA	Long Term Technical Assistance
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoLPS	Ministry of Labor and Public Service
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSI	Management Systems International

Acronym	Description
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTE Team	Mid-Term Evaluation Team
NBeG	Northern Bahr El Ghazal State
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OD	Organizational Development
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PMP	Program Monitoring Plan
PU	Program Unit
RFP	Request for Proposals
RTO	Registered Training Organization
SAP	State Advisors Program
SCF	Save the Children
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SMoE	State Ministry of Education
SOW	Scope of Work/Statement of Work
SSTAP/TAP	South Sudan Technical Assistance Program
STA	Senior Technical Advisor/ State Technical Advisor
STTA	Short-Term Technical Assistance
TA	Technical Assistance
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Education Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WBeG	Western Bar el Ghazal State
WEQ/WE	Western Equatoria State

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

Conflict, natural disasters, famine and policies and practices antithetical to development have severely affected Southern Sudan's social, political and economic structures. Southern Sudan currently has the lowest Human Development Indicators in the world and 85-90 percent of the population cannot read or write. Since the mid-1990s, education (and other services) has been provided largely by international organizations. Currently, the drop in the number of organizations providing assistance, the shift from humanitarian relief to development assistance programs and the decrease in aid funding overall compound the new Government of Southern Sudan's (GoSS) challenges to establish its core organizations and systems and operationalize a decentralized structure. At present, United States Government (USG) assistance places a strong emphasis on building peace dividends such as sustained and comprehensive improvements in social services (health and education), economic growth and democratic governance. At present, only USAID through the Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (TAP),¹³ UNICEF, and the SCF Alliance have technical and/or program personnel located in all or nearly all of the states.

Methodology

A formative and collaborative Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of TAP Phase 2 was conducted from June 21 to July 11, 2009. The MTE Team consisted of two external evaluators, Dr Valerie Haugen (Team Leader) and Dr Robert Gurevich, as well as Mr Hakim Monykyuer (Executive Secretary, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology - MoEST), Mr Pia Philip (Education Project Management Specialist, USAID), Ms Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, MSI for USAID) and Mr Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, AED TAP). The Team visited five states, Central Equatoria (CE), Lakes, Warrap, Western Bar El Ghazal (WBeG) and Western Equatoria (WE), and met with nearly 180 stakeholders from the GoSS Parliament, MoEST, State Ministries of Education (SMoE at state and local government levels), students and community members and development partner organizations. The Team also reviewed a range of GoSS and United States Government (USG), TAP and international primary and secondary source documentation. A range of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods using customized instruments as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGD), Mini-Focus Group Discussions (MFGD) and Key Participant Interviews were used.

Program Description

In September, 2005, USAID established the EQUIP2 Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (TAP) to build the capacity of the newly created Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in priority areas of policy development and implementation, planning and budgeting, and program implementation. The Academy for Educational Development (AED) and its partners, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and (until 2008) the American Institutes for Research (AIR), are the TAP implementing agencies. TAP Phases 1 and 2 are best described as four phases. Phases 1 and 2 (2005-May 2007) focused on establishing the "machinery of government" necessary for the newly-created central level Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, primarily through short-term technical assistance (STTA). Phases 3 and 4 represent a shift to long-term technical assistance (LTTA) working to build capacity at the sub-national level in State Ministries of Education headquarters (HQ) and county development/education centers (CDCs/CECs). Phase 3 (June 2007-May 2008) is best described as the "1 STA: 2 SMoE Model" and consisted of four AED-contracted

¹³ TAP is variously referred to in documentation and by stakeholders as "TAP", "SSTAP", "SAP" (State Advisors Program). For the purposes of the MTE Report, "TAP" will be used.

Senior Technical Advisors¹⁴ (STAs--one of whom functioned as Chief of Party), two MoEST-contracted STAs financed out of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and a small number of administrative personnel. Phase 4 (June 2008-September 2011), the “2 LTTA: 1 SMOE Model”, currently consists of pairs of LTTAs co-located in each state. Staffing overall consists of the LTTAs--11 STAs of whom eight are AED-contracted and three are MoEST-contracted and 10 Diaspora Technical Assistants (DTAs)--and several administrative staff in Juba and some states, for a total of 33 personnel.

Embedded within the design of Phases 3 and 4 (formerly Phase 2) was a critical assumption that the Fast Track Teacher Education and Training Program (FTP)¹⁵ pilot would be scaled up and rolled out. Wide-scale FTP implementation would – it was assumed – contribute to the specific development impacts of improving access to basic education and improving the quality of education services to help achieve the GoSS target of providing basic education to 55 percent of children by 2011. TAP’s funding has increased since 2005 and is now just over US\$17m, of which \$8m is allocated to Phase 2. TAP is scheduled to end on September 17, 2011.

Most Significant Findings, Conclusions and Impact

AED has done a commendable job fulfilling the terms of its contract, working with MoEST and development partners and increasingly with SMOEs, and has contributed significantly to the development of the education sector, particularly at the central level. To date, AED has met or exceeded its targets for all indicators, with the exception of gender (see figures in Annex 14: Indicators) As of July 2009, all but two (one STA to be contracted by MoEST and one DTA to be contracted by AED) of the 21 TA personnel have been recruited and are established in their respective SMOEs. Management systems to support these personnel have been established and are being refined. The TAP management structure itself has evolved into a highly decentralized model consisting of a “hub” (the TAP head office in two separate administrative locations in Juba and 11 ‘satellites’ (distinct implementation locations in 10 states and the central MoEST in Juba). This expansion was accomplished largely during a change in Chief of Party (COP) personnel. It is to the credit of the incumbent COP that she managed to oversee the TAP scale-up just as she was taking up the COP role.

The AED team has demonstrated an ability to adapt to the rapidly changing environment of Southern Sudan. There is clear evidence that at the state level TAP has generated a great deal of excitement and good will and that the Program is filling a large gap in expertise. The Program is having a catalytic effect on as well as assisting SMOEs to: (i) increase the professionalism of SMOEs generally, (ii) take a leadership role with development partners, and (iii) increase the productivity of those partner government personnel who interact most consistently with STAs and DTAs. Benefits accruing include increased capacity in planning, understanding and using education data, using the new payroll system, working collaboratively with colleagues and development partners, using computers and the Internet, and “self-management”.

A number of factors appear to have combined to reduce the potential impact of TAP Phases 3 and 4 and the related peace dividend being derived from the Program. They include:

1. The negative outcome of a critical project design assumption that had (incorrectly, as it turned out) anticipated external funding becoming available to leverage MDTF resources needed to scale-up and roll out the FTP. There does not appear to have been adequate risk mitigation solutions (having a “Plan B” on hand) to respond quickly to this important development. On the other hand – and to their credit – USAID and AED have demonstrated a solid collective capacity for adaptive management by recognizing this development in Modification 03 of Associate Cooperative Agreement (650-A-00-07-00004-00). It is not clear if the mitigating approach articulated in

¹⁴ Senior Technical Advisors are variously referred to in documentation as State Advisors (SA). For the purposes of the MTE Report, the terms, “Senior Technical Advisor/STA”, will be used.

¹⁵ The FTP incorporated both formal and non-formal (Alternative) education teacher training.

Modification Three will be sufficient to meet the challenge of the critical design assumption not manifesting, but it is an important step in the right direction and TAP does appear to be finding its feet in terms of a revised strategic approach;

2. The initiation of Phase 4 only a very short time after Phase 3 had begun. This required a nearly quadrupling of TA personnel (from six to 21 STAs and DTAs) in a limited time frame and captured the time and effort of the COP at an operational level;
3. The inability of MoEST to mobilize programs and disburse funds under the MDTF Phase 1. Without the MDTF funds and programs, SMOE personnel have little opportunity to manage any aspect of education except salaries (and even this is problematic) and no way to “learn by doing” except through the occasional opportunity provided by development partners to be involved in implementation of their respective programs. This situation has also affected the TAP design logic--capacity enhancement in education management and program management through the FTP pilot structure and instruments; and
4. Emphasis on “one-on-one” coaching rather than more current capacity enhancement directions that “share the TA wealth” more broadly.

While some of these factors were not within TAP’s sphere of management control and some were unavoidable, nonetheless, they provide clear illustrations of some of the contextual challenges.

AED TAP has 28 months remaining to ensure that the benefits derived through the Program will be sustained. The incumbent COP is now turning her attention toward the strategic dimension and putting in place processes and structures to help TA personnel ensure that capacity of individuals at the state and county levels is enhanced and that a common core of critical functions, systems and processes are established across all SMOEs. In the immediate future, TAP needs to address several management issues related to work conditions (including some contractual concerns, particularly with regard to the DTA contract and DTA recruitment and retention and rest and relaxation conditions) and TA personnel inputs sacrificed due to area insecurity considerations. TAP also, at a minimum, needs to demonstrate progress on several strategic issues including: (i) gender equity; (ii) conflict sensitivity; (iii) the role TAP will play in assisting SMOEs to manage and leverage development partner funds, programs and opportunities, especially given the absence of GoSS monies and programs; (iv) the role TAP will play in helping SMOEs cope with a potentially overwhelming infusion of funds and programs once the MDTF becomes functional; and (v) monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The MTE Team has some concerns about the value for money/rate of return derived from using LTTA personnel to address the more ‘mundane’ capacity enhancement competencies (such as time management, meeting behaviors, managing one’s work, computer literacy, etc.).¹⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategy

- Recommendation 1: Request AED TAP to review and refine the draft Memorandum of Understanding (see Annex 11: Draft Content for MoE ST-SMOE Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)) clearly articulating expected roles and responsibilities and agreed strategies to resolve issues and to present it to MoEST, state governors and SMOEs for consideration as a concept and potential action.
- Recommendation 2: Request AED TAP to articulate its approach (including an action plan) to progressing the anticipated partnerships between State Ministries of Education and donor/development partners and between TAP and other USAID nominated

¹⁶ Please refer to a separate document, the Addendum to the Mid-Term Evaluation, for further details on this issue.

activities (BRIDGE, GEE and IRI) and ensure that TA personnel and SMOE personnel are familiar with and supportive of the directions proposed.

Human Resources

- Recommendation 3: Request AED TAP-Washington to re-assess the level of TAP Hub (central program office) resourcing and to specifically 'uncouple' the Chief of Party (COP) role from the Senior Technical Advisor role with both becoming separately staffed, full-time positions. The MoEST Senior Technical Advisor position should only be staffed once Recommendation 6: has been accomplished.
- Recommendation 4: Request AED TAP to resolve outstanding personnel well-being and contractual issues, including re-visiting and refining position descriptions.
- Recommendation 5: Request AED TAP to identify and implement a strategy to support current TA personnel on the job including, at a minimum Option 1 and considering Options 2 and 3 (see Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support), particularly if additional financing becomes available.
- Recommendation 6: Request AED TAP to discuss fielding a short-term technical expert to provide advice to MoEST on a strategic approach to ensure the identification, recruitment, utilization and management of TA that fits with the evolving needs of both the MoEST and the GoSS Parliamentary Committee for Education.

Impact

- Recommendation 7: Request AED TAP to immediately draft: (i) a sustainability and exit strategy taking into account TAP's ending date of September 2011 as well as the long-term considerations associated with a realistic capacity building time frame (conservatively 10-20 years) and (ii) a standard risk management matrix.
- Recommendation 8: Request AED TAP to incorporate conflict sensitive analysis into its programming, utilizing one of the many tools available and to report on the cumulative amount of time TA personnel are kept off or are limited on the job due to insecurity since this factor has significant implications for TAP impact.
- Recommendation 9: Request AED TAP to introduce a Program Logical Framework or Results Framework that grounds qualitative findings in empirical data and sound research methods and improves monitoring and evaluation to take into account: (i) a clear M&E approach (and ideally a framework)¹⁷ and (ii) analyses and meta-analyses of data and inclusion of these findings in reports.
- Recommendation 10: Request AED TAP to articulate a gender and development support strategy in collaboration with GEE that is informed by the work being undertaken by GoSS bodies, other development partners, and projects.

¹⁷ For an example of a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, see Annex 7: MonitorING and Evaluation – Additional Information

INTRODUCTION

1.1 CONTEXT

Sudan is the largest country in Africa and is classified as a 'rebuilding country' under the United States Government's (USG) current strategic framework. Historically Sudan has been divided into the North, with its close ties to Egypt and its predominantly Arab and Muslim population, and the South, with its predominantly black, Christian and Animist population. From 1898 to 1954, the two parts of the region were administered separately by a British-Egyptian pact in which 'no-go' zones between North and South were imposed. The administrative situation and the no-go zones both served to exacerbate the separateness of the North and South. The First Sudanese War began shortly before independence in 1956 and lasted for 17 years followed by a 10-year period of peace. The Second Sudanese War began in 1983 and ended some two decades later on January 9, 2005 with the official signing of the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Of Sudan's 54 years of nationhood, 38 years have been consumed by war. The Nairobi CPA grants a six year interim period of autonomy to Southern Sudan and an internationally monitored referendum in 2011 to determine its future direction; sharing of common wealth; and resolution of the Abyei conflict through self-determination.

Southern Sudan's population is estimated at 9 -12 million¹⁸ people along with an additional four million people who are living as Displaced Persons in Northern Sudan or as refugees elsewhere. It is estimated that around 95 percent of Southern Sudan's population was displaced due to the Second Sudanese War, and generations of Sudanese have been born into or lived during decades of violent conflict. Along with natural disasters, famine and policies and practices antithetical to development, conflict has severely affected the South's social, political and economic structures. Southern Sudan currently has the lowest Human Development Indicators in the world and 85-90 percent of the population cannot read or write.

Since the mid-1990s, education (and other services) have been provided largely by international organizations. Currently, the drop in the number of organizations providing assistance, the shift from humanitarian relief to development assistance programs, and the decrease in aid funding overall compound the new Government of Southern Sudan's (GoSS) challenges to establish its core organizations and systems and operationalize a decentralized structure. At present, United States Government (USG) assistance places a strong emphasis on building peace dividends such as sustained and comprehensive improvements in social services (health and education), economic growth and democratic governance. At present, only USAID through the Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (TAP),¹⁹ UNICEF, and the SCF Alliance have technical and/or program personnel located in all or nearly all of the states. USG assistance places a strong emphasis on building peace dividends such as sustained and comprehensive improvements in social services (i.e., health and education), economic growth and democratic governance.

State Ministry of Education (SMoE) funding for education is provided almost exclusively by GoSS through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) or the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST). The national primary education budget has been in decline since the CPA went into effect with current per student expenditure at around US\$45 per annum. It is estimated that around 95 percent of the GoSS education budget is spent on salaries, with the remaining five percent going to administrative costs. There is little evidence of operational funds except through the funding of proposals submitted occasionally to development partners by SMoEs.

The Sudanese place a high value on education. But the 2008 education census (with a commendably high compliance rate across the South) data show the magnitude of the challenges facing the Government. As of

¹⁸ The current census estimates the figure around 10 million; however, some disagreement remains.

¹⁹ TAP is variously referred to in documentation and by stakeholders as "TAP", "SSTAP", "SAP" (State Advisors Program). For the purposes of the MTE Report, "TAP" will be used.

April 2008, primary school enrolment was estimated to be between 1.7 and 2.1 million students with ever-increasing numbers of students (particularly over-age students who comprise 90 percent of the primary education student population) enrolling in and attending makeshift schools. For example, the primary education pupil:teacher ratio averages 50:1, but some state averages are much higher (for example, 170:1). Gender equity is steadily improving in primary grades 1-4 with three girls for every five boys on average although some states are doing better while others are doing worse. The pupil:textbook ratio has improved on average, albeit slowly, but learning materials are still inadequate by almost any standard. Over 65 percent of primary school teachers have had little or no training²⁰ with only seven per cent having had at least one year of training. An estimated 90 percent of teachers are competent in Sudanese Arabic, but only about 20-30 per cent of teachers have even rudimentary English language skills.²¹ Despite this language deficit, GoSS policy now makes English the medium of instruction from grade 4 onwards. Some education statistics are much better in the secondary education sub-sector, but this is probably largely due to the sub-sector's small student population. As the primary education completion rates improve, secondary education will likely come under stress.

Although the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Secretariat of Education went to great efforts to create and implement a strategy for providing basic education and life skills training during the past war, in this immediate post-conflict period, the education sector is still in a formative state both in terms of the capacity to manage education service delivery to the current primary education student population and to expand the provision of quality education to any Southern Sudanese interested in learning. Since the signing of the CPA, the fundamental building blocks of the sector have been put in place, specifically, the: (i) establishment and staffing of the newly-established Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the State Ministries of Education; (ii) development of a number of necessary legislative, policy and other documents including the draft Southern Sudan Education Act (2008); (iii) establishment of the "educational cycle or ladder" of eight years of primary (basic) education for learners aged six to thirteen (but also including Non-Formal Education), four years of secondary education and four years of tertiary education; and (iv) the establishment of sector planning and development mechanisms such as the Education Rehabilitation and Development Framework meetings and thematic working groups.

SMoE personnel from the state and local level government (LLG) offices tend to have little involvement with schools, not because of a lack of interest, but largely because they lack transport and/or are unsure of their roles as administrators and managers. Most education officers and head teachers do not have even minimum academic and professional qualifications or experience. While there is evidence of strong leadership in the education sector in some states, these leaders also tend to be vulnerable to the changing political scene including wide-scale, sweeping changes of administrators in some SMOEs. These displacements create significant challenges to building the strength of the sector. The upcoming general elections in February, 2010, may result in a further disruption of key education management personnel. Until recently, many development partners have largely provided their own stand-alone solutions to education service delivery, at best only informing SMOEs of their activities and at worst bypassing the Government altogether. This scenario exacerbates the already daunting challenges facing the new ministries. In addition, formal or informal access by education managers to technical expertise is increasingly limited as development partners withdraw.

1.2 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: PHASES 3 AND 4

In September, 2005, USAID established the EQUIP2 Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (TAP) to build the capacity of the newly created Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in priority areas of policy development and implementation, planning and budgeting, and program implementation. An Associate Cooperative Agreement (650-A-00-07-00004-00) was signed on August 6, 2007, by USAID and the Academy for Educational Development (AED), and Modification 01 (signed May 8, 2008) was established to

²⁰ These education statistics are taken from an untitled synopsis provided by the AED EMIS advisor and based on 2008 education census data derived from the education database developed with UNICEF support.

²¹ MSI. (2008) Mid-Term Evaluation of the USAID-funded Interactive Radio Instruction Project.

support decentralization and systems development through capacity enhancement in six (initially) SMOEs, specifically building state level personnel's skills in: (i) planning and budgeting, (ii) establishing and managing a financial management system, (iii) implementing, and (iv) monitoring and evaluating the activities associated with teacher education and training.²²

TAP is located under USAID's 'Investing in People' objective which supports the delivery of critical social services, including education and health, and builds institutional capacity. TAP also aligns with USAID's Fragile State Strategy with its four inter-related priorities to: (i) enhance stability, (ii) improve security, (iii) encourage reform, and (iv) develop the capacity of institutions. TAP also aligns with Government of Southern Sudan directions articulated in the 2005 Interim Constitution and the MoEST Policy Framework (2006-2007). The Interim Constitution includes statements on education (33.1-2), individuals with special needs (34.1-2), women (20.1-5), English and Arabic as the official working languages of Government and higher education (6.2) and on decentralization (Chapter 3, especially 52.1-2 on inter-governmental linkages). The MoEST Policy Framework presents a vision, mission, and goals, principles and strategies for developing the education sector, including enhancing educational planning systems and improving education management systems.

Under the Associate Cooperative Agreement, AED provides management oversight for TAP and ensures the overall technical and financial integrity and adherence to the terms of the Cooperative Agreement. AED fields all long term technical assistance (LTTA) personnel and is the official conduit for communications between TAP and USAID. AED's TAP partners, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and (until late 2008) the American Institutes for Research (AIR) provide most of the targeted short-term technical assistance (STTA) personnel in the areas of teacher in-service education and curriculum development and gender respectively. In Phases 1, 2 and 3, there was a good deal of interaction between AED and IRC (and AIR) in the fielding and management of STTA. IRC is funding one STA position and the IRC representative attended the July 6-9, 2009 Quarterly Workshop in Juba.

TAP Phases 1 and 2 are best described as four phases.²³ Phases 1 and 2 (2005-May 2007) focused on establishing the "machinery of government" necessary for the newly-created central level Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) primarily through short-term technical assistance (STTA). Phases 3 and 4, the subject of the MTE, represent a shift to LTTA working to build capacity at the sub-national level in State Ministries of Education (SMoE) headquarters (HQ) and county development/education centers (CDCs/CECs). As TAP's implementation profile has expanded, so has its budget. The Program's initial budget in 2005 was US\$5m and this has increased to US\$17.6m for the October 2005 to September 2011 time frame. US\$8m (just under half of the total funding envelope of TAP) or around US\$2m per annum is currently being disbursed under Phases 3 and 4.

Phase 3 (June 2007-May 2008) is best described as the "1 STA:2 SMoE Model" of four AED-contracted Senior Technical Advisors (STAs)²⁴ (one of whom functioned as the Chief of Party), two MoEST-contracted STAs financed out of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and a small number of administrative personnel. Phase 3 has been described as a 'lynchpin program in ensuring that educational services more rapidly reach the local level throughout Southern Sudan". It continued activities in the areas of education policy, planning, budgeting and management and also introduced a focus on policy implementation over policy development and building a "common core" of capacity in planning, logistic, financial and monitoring and evaluation systems specifically associated with teacher development programming.

²² While the ACA itself is not specific about teacher education and training, the AED Associate Award Application makes it very clear that the provision of TA is intended to strengthen the teacher education and training system and the targeted common core functions are located under this umbrella.


²³ In order to make the dynamic evolution of the Program more explicit the Mid-Term Evaluation Team has re-classified TAP into four phases (see Figure 8: TAP Implementation Phase 2005-2011). This re-classification will be used for the purposes of this MTE Report.

²⁴ Senior Technical Advisors are variously referred to in documentation as State Advisors (SA). For the purposes of the MTE Report, the terms, "Senior Technical Advisor/STA", will be used.

Phase 4 (June 2008-September 2011), the “2 LTTA:1 SMOE Model”, consists of pairs of STAs and DTAs that are co-located in each SMOE. Personnel consist of 11 STAs (eight AED-contracted and three MoEST-contracted), 10 Diaspora Technical Assistants (DTAs) and a number of administrative staff based in Juba and some states bringing the total to 33 personnel. The majority of TAP TA personnel (18 including the COP/MoEST STA) are funded through USAID development assistance funds and three STA positions are contracted through MoEST and financed under the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). This arrangement is discussed in greater detail in section 3.2 Partnership. AED provides technical oversight for all TA personnel. Phase 4 therefore represents an even greater intensification of the sub-national focus.²⁵

Under Phase 4, the TAP management structure has evolved into a highly decentralized model consisting of a “hub” (the TAP head office in two separate locations for administration and for Technical Assistance to MOEST in Juba), and 11 ‘satellites’ (distinct implementation locations in 10 states and the central MoEST in Juba). (See Figure 6 below.)

FIGURE 6: TAP HUB-SATELLITE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE



The Chief of Party (COP) supervises and evaluates all staff, prepares reports (written and oral) for and liaises with USAID, AED Headquarters (AED HQ) in Washington DC, development partners and other GoSS ministries (such as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning-MoFEP) and undertakes any additional responsibilities necessary for the successful implementation of TAP. The TAP Hub: (i) provides technical guidance to the Program, (ii) provides oversight of the activities of the TA personnel through review of written and oral reports and field visits, (iii) identifies and recommends personnel for AED/HQ, USAID and GoSS approval, (iv) reports to USAID and other donors, (v) maintains financial records and reports, (vi) provides orientations and training to field staff, (vii) supervises Juba Hub office activities, and (viii) undertakes any other necessary activity management functions. Four AED HQ staff provide varying levels of support on financial, programmatic and technical contractual and administrative matters. The US-based staff coordinates reporting to USAID.


²⁵ This situation is discussed in greater depth in section 3.7 Risks & Unanticipated Negative External Developments and Annex 6: Expanded Discussion on Risk Management

II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of the mission was to conduct a review of TAP experience to date. Two aims of the MTE findings, conclusions and recommendations were to provide input to: (i) improve and enhance the implementation of TAP and (ii) help ensure the greatest positive impact with the strongest likelihood of the sustainability over time of the benefits derived from the Program. Specific areas of investigation requested by USAID Sudan are found in Figure 7 (below). In addition, the findings have been used to suggest avenues for Program alteration and/or additional support, should funding become available from USG.

FIGURE 7: AED TAP MID-TERM EVALUATION AREAS OF FOCUS



The MTE Team was asked to address 14 evaluation questions under three focus areas: (i) project design, (ii) project implementation, and (iii) project impact to date. For a consolidated list of the evaluation questions, please refer to Annex 1: Scope of Work. The outcomes of the MTE mission were presented in a series of informal de-briefings for Government and TAP personnel and in a formal de-briefing to GoSS and USG stakeholders and other interested parties on July 9, 2009 at MoEST in Juba. A draft Mid-Term Evaluation Report was submitted for comments to GoSS, USAID and AED through MSI on July 20 with the final report submitted March 2010.

2.2 SUMMARY OF THE METHODOLOGY²⁶

A formative and collaborative Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of TAP was conducted from June 21 to July 11, 2009. The MTE Team consisted of two external evaluators, Dr. Valerie Haugen (Team Leader) and Dr. Robert Gurevich as well as Mr. Hakim Monyker (Executive Secretary, MoEST), Mr. Pia Philip (Education Project Management Specialist, USAID), Ms. Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, MSI for USAID) and Mr. Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, AED TAP). The Team visited five states, Central Equatoria (CE), Lakes, Warrap, Western Bar El Ghazal (WBeG) and Western Equatoria (WE), and met with nearly 180 stakeholders from the GoSS Parliament, MoEST, SMOEs (state and local government levels), students and community members and development partner organizations²⁷ A range of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods using customized instruments as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGD), Mini-Focus Group Discussions (MFGD) and Key Participant Interviews were used. Primary and secondary sources were reviewed, most notably, GoSS and USG documentation, TAP reports and reference material on capacity building, education in conflict-affected contexts, conflict sensitive analysis and technical assistance as a form of aid (see Annex 20: Bibliography) Analyses of the data were undertaken

²⁶ See Annex 3: Expanded Discussion of the Methodology Approach.

²⁷ Annex 3 provides a complete list of participant groups and the evaluation areas explored with each group. The Matrix of Areas of Focus by Participant Group was developed in close consultation with USAID, GoSS and AED.

in an iterative manner throughout the field work with a Team workshop to draft preliminary Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.

III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

3.1 TAP MANAGEMENT

3.1.1 Program Office

Findings: TAP overall has grown rapidly since October 2005. During TAP Phases 3 and 4, staff increased from 6 STAs to 21 STAs/DTAs, requiring commensurate scaling up of supervisory and administrative requirements, including management of 11 separate imprest accounts. The Program has just recently (and for the first time) achieved a near full (barring one STA yet to be contracted by MoEST) complement of TA personnel. The highly-decentralized “Hub-11 Satellites” management model (13 locations including two Hub offices, MoEST and 10 SMOE sites), while appropriate to the Program needs, presents particular challenges given the lack of infrastructure in and distances between sites. In consequence, communications, travel and ongoing face-to-face contact with and between TAP personnel are constrained. For most of the period, the TAP Hub has been housed in very cramped office space on the campus of the MoEST, where working conditions were abysmal. To address this situation, TAP management recently rented additional office space, meaning that the COP will be dividing her time between both sites.

TAP-Hub personnel put in long work weeks in order to keep up with the demands of the Program. Both the COP and the Operations Manager put in up to 30 hours of overtime per week on a regular basis. The COP spends 70 percent of her time on TAP management and 30 percent on MoEST advisory support. The increasing management load has been flagged a number of times by AED in quarterly and annual reports. Despite the long work weeks, the current COP is not well-known among many SMOE personnel interviewed and they viewed the lack of visibility as a deficit. TA personnel also were eager for more contact and several TA personnel who have been placed in precarious positions professionally and personally also felt a greater management presence would be of benefit. Discussions with TAP Hub and AED HQ personnel and a review of AED documentation indicate that AED is aware of the need for additional support and has responded to the increased workload by staffing three additional FTE positions, including creating an Operations Manager position to relieve some of the administrative pressure on the COP. AED also may begin quarterly visits to Juba.

Conclusions: Clearly, the management and administrative personnel involved in TAP since 2005 are highly competent and the willingness to ‘go the extra mile’ to ensure the Program is functional is commendable. The hands-on TAP experience of Dr Akukwe, the incumbent COP, as the STA for Western Bahr El Ghazal and Northern Bahr El Ghazal SMOEs is a definite advantage. The rapid expansion of TAP required a COP who could ‘hit the ground running’, which Dr. Akukwe was able to do. However, while AED has been proactive identifying solutions to the TAP Hub management challenges, the levels of staffing and support are still not adequate, with management and administrative personnel being overworked. In addition, the requirement that the COP perform two demanding roles has negatively affected the visibility of the COP and TAP itself across a wide range of stakeholders, including all SMOE Headquarters (HQ) officials and staff, State Parliament Education Committee members and development partners within the states. It is an important aspect of TAP implementation. The regular presence of the COP can also provide a measure of protection for TA personnel who may occasionally be placed in precarious or undesirable situations and can be an effective tool for protecting the aid investment and for motivating stakeholders to take equal if not greater measures to ensure TAP’s success. Although AED has tried to alleviate the workspace limitations, inadequate Program facilities have certainly hampered implementation and while the procurement of a second office premises alleviates space issues somewhat, it also introduces the burden of working between two Hub locations.

3.1.2 Human Resource Management

Fit of Personnel Backgrounds to Position Descriptions

Finding: On the basis of in-depth interviews with 11 of the TA and other TAP personnel, as well as observations of TA personnel during field work, TA personnel on the whole appear to be competent, highly-motivated, and committed professionals. Two external stakeholders noted that the quality of TA personnel has been improving. The TAP Hub is having good success attracting interested Southern Sudanese from the diaspora (albeit primarily male) for DTA positions and females for STA positions.

The qualifications and experience cited in the Associate Cooperative Agreement (ACA) and those contained in the AED TAP advertisement and position descriptions and in the curriculum vitae (CVs) of a number of TA personnel display discrepancies. The ACA is much more explicit about the types of specialization expected (a graduate degree specializing in general education or education planning or related fields such as statistics, administration and finance or related fields such as economics; or curriculum development or related fields such as teacher training and 5+ years in policy development in the education sector or related experience) whereas the TAP advertisement and position description is less so (particular skills and experience in an area such as educational planning, finance and budgeting, teacher professional development, curriculum development, or monitoring and evaluation). In large part, the STA and DTA position descriptions are identical except that: (i) the DTA is being supervised and the STA is supervising and (ii) the DTA position does not require an advanced (master's or doctorate) degree. Again, there are differences between the ACA Modification #01 and the TAP position descriptions for DTAs.

A review of the biographical sketches of potential state advisor candidates listed in the ACA Application (pp. 12-13) shows that the four individuals listed all have qualifications and practitioner experience in education administration/management and match very closely the ACA requirements. A gap analysis was undertaken of the targeted knowledge, skills, experience and qualifications²⁸ in various TAP-related documentation and those that can be easily extracted from the CVs of most of the current STAs and DTAs.²⁹ This was supplemented by interviews with half of the STAs and DTAs (see Figure 29, Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile). The analysis indicates that few of the STAs have qualifications in education administration and management and/or in-line practitioner experience as administrators or managers in education systems. Most STAs do not have qualifications or in-depth practitioner experience in capacity development (CE) and/or organizational development (OD)³⁰ as a field of endeavor or in monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Several STAs have experience in teacher training (although not necessarily in teacher education systems development) and curriculum development or have other skills relevant to the education sector more broadly (e.g., gender and child/human rights).

The nine current DTAs are Sudanese nationals who have spent significant periods of time abroad and who bring work experiences gained in a number of countries. At a minimum, DTAs have a bachelor's degree, and in some cases a master's degree, in a range of fields, although not usually in education. Since it was initiated in August 2008, the DTA initiative has seen a good deal of personnel turn-over. Several individuals interviewed noted that even though DTAs are assumed to have the language, and socio-cultural skills to enable them to quickly integrate into and communicate with counterparts as well as the community at large, they often need support transitioning to work and life in Southern Sudan.

Every GoSS staff person interviewed indicated that the need and demand for external knowledge and assistance is enormous. Two development partner representatives interviewed indicated that they had

²⁸ In reviewing the CVs, the Team looked for evidence of academic qualifications or targeted training in specific fields as well as evidence of solid experience in the relevant fields. The Team gave credit for qualifications and/or experience even when the evidence was quite limited and, if anything, erred on the side of generosity and caution in the event that the CVs were not able to accurately portray academic and professional backgrounds.

²⁹ Not all CVs were provided to the MTE Team.

³⁰ One STA has an advanced degree in OD and significant levels of professional experience in this field in a range of contexts and should be put to great use in a broader advisory and support capacity for other TA personnel.

provided feedback that the Scope of Work was too broad and that a pool of individuals with particular specialist skills (e.g., in financial management systems) was needed in addition to the STA/DTA pool.

Conclusions: TAP has an opportunity to put the motivation, commitment and experience of its current TA personnel to good use to develop a sound implementation model appropriate for this early stage of TA to all SMOEs. Introducing TA personnel to, training them in, and supporting the use of excellent CE, OD and ID practices and resource materials could significantly benefit TA personnel (and SMOEs) who may not have a great deal of experience in these areas.³¹ For a more extensive discussion of CE and additional support options, please refer to 3.5 Capacity Enhancement Approach (p. 47) and Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support.

Recruitment of TA with the same skills elaborated in the ACA is difficult because of the context of Southern Sudan (as verified by several individuals interviewed). Accordingly, AED could have flagged the risk and articulated risk mitigation strategies to ensure that all or a majority of STA personnel recruited had profiles similar to those individuals included in the ACA Application and that DTAs whose profiles more closely matched the skills identified in the position description were recruited.³² Alternatively, USAID could have been notified and consulted regarding the difficulties in finding individuals with the appropriate background and experience once the recruitment program got underway and the problem became apparent. As Figure 29 in Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile shows, the qualifications and experience of the TA personnel in the core fields of greatest need with respect to TAP Phase 4 are lacking. A number of both STA and DTA personnel have experience in teacher training, which was the designated area of focus under TAP Phase 3. However, with the stalling and eventual elimination of the Fast Track Program (FTP including Alternative Education Systems development) as a TAP focus, this experience base is no longer as important.

In the medium term, given the complex challenges of capacity enhancement, organizational development and institutional development over time, there will likely be a demand from SMOEs for individuals with strong professional and academic backgrounds in specific technical areas, especially administration/management of education systems (including strategic planning and education finance), statistics, education research, and monitoring and evaluation (as a field of expertise, not just as an activity). This shift will be increasingly important as SMOEs mature and enter into medium- and long-term vision-setting and education budgets expand.

Work Conditions

Findings: Sudan is classified as a hardship post. STAs and DTAs work in very difficult environments, often with extremely limited basic necessities and support systems, in a context itself places heavy demands on TA personnel. According to one DTA, “Everyone wants a piece of me!”³³ TAP makes a good effort to address these challenges, for example by helping STAs to find the most secure housing available. AED has hired a security consultant to develop a security plan and, with USAID’s agreement, is hiring a security manager as well. The COP also makes occasional visits to each state and has accompanied many TA personnel to their respective sites and introduced them formally to the Minister and their counterparts in the SMOEs. TA personnel come to Juba for quarterly meetings and this opportunity is welcomed and appreciated. Occasionally TA personnel are grounded in Juba or the state capital due to insecurity issues. When this happens, TAP management has acted proactively to ensure that they contribute to other work, for example, drafting the Education Act. Nonetheless, and despite these efforts, isolation, insecurity, the limited time

³¹ See, for example, the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) (no date provided) “Institutional Development: Learning by Doing and Sharing”. Maastricht, Netherlands: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poverty Policy and Institutional Development Division (DSI/AI).

³² The MTE Team in no way wishes to imply that current TA personnel are deficient as professionals. The point being stressed is a potential mismatch in qualifications and experience between those required to develop an organization’s capacity to perform and those possessed by current TA personnel and what steps need to be taken to ensure a positive outcome all around.

³³ MTE Team field notes.

allocation for rest and relaxation³⁴ were consistent issues for all TA personnel interviewed. AED has raised the issue of extra leave with USAID, requesting 10 additional leave days in order to take full advantage of the four rest and relaxation trips provided by AED annually. However, to date, USAID grants four travel days per year.

AED utilizes two different contracting modalities for STAs and DTAs (even though the position descriptions are almost identical, as noted above). STAs (including the COP) work under a formal contract of unlimited employment with AED, with AED providing written notification to overseas personnel regarding their activity end date. The DTA element has its origins in the Diaspora Skills Transfer Program (DSTP) and was incorporated into TAP at the request of MoEST. Several individuals interviewed believe that the TAP DTA element is based on the same underlying purpose as the DSTP--to encourage Diaspora individuals to return and assist in the development of Southern Sudan. DTAs work under a consultant agreement with AED for six-month periods with a rolling option that is renewable at AED's discretion. DTAs interviewed had a number of concerns about the terms of their contracts. They are concerned about being paid in Sudanese pounds instead of dollars, as many still have families overseas and payment in local currency impairs their ability to provide them adequate financial support. They feel that the title, "Assistant", makes their work appear to have less value and some refer to themselves as 'consultant' rather than 'assistant'. They feel they have no leverage to negotiate with AED for what they consider to be more equitable terms of service and are uncertain about the way in which their work is evaluated. Several STAs and DTAs felt uncomfortable raising concerns about their contractual arrangements with TAP management. TAP management, including the current COP, has endeavored to address DTAs concerns about the currency of payment. AED HQ is also looking into a different contracting mechanism for DTAs, including contracting them as employees. TAP-Juba is constrained by both Sudanese labor laws and AED regulations.

STAs submit monthly and quarterly summary reports. DTAs submit bi-weekly reports and monthly work plans to the COP after sign-off by the STA. Performance of DTAs in particular is based on documentation. The incumbent COP developed a performance assessment protocol for the DTAs that was unable to be used since, contractually, the DTAs are consultants not employees. The COP has a set of internal metrics that she uses to evaluate DTA performance including the quality of the work, the enthusiasm of the individual, and his/her motivation to be mentored. Several STAs and DTAs felt STAs had a great deal of power in DTA performance evaluation and felt a DTA could be "here today and gone tomorrow". The COP conducts a formal annual performance evaluation of each STA. At least 12 individuals interviewed, including SMOE personnel, suggested that the SMOE should also have a role in contributing to the monitoring and evaluation of TA personnel performance.

TAP personnel interviewed have different views on the STA-DTA relationship. The MTE Team could not locate any particular documentation that explains the capacity enhancement (CE) approach for DTAs, but AED HQ stated that the intention has been to phase out STAs overtime and have the DTAs take over that role. Some personnel consider the STAs and DTAs as professional equals. STAs and DTAs work hand-in-glove, learning from and supporting each other. Others note that the STA and DTA each concentrates on his/her own work but that the DTA gets a stamp of approval from the STA on reports and work plans. Still others feel the STA is the technical expert and supervisor to whom the DTA defers.³⁵ In several SMOEs, the DTA received little mention. Many personnel said they were aware that there was a new face around, but they

³⁴ For example, the maximum time allowed between DTA contract end dates and contract renewal is ten days. DTAs are concerned about the inflexibility of this policy. One DTA had to return to work while still recovering from a health problem that had both physical, psychological and emotional aspects in order to not lose the contract.

³⁵ For example, according to one DTA, "X (the STA) checks that our work plans align and reports to AED whether I have done the work. Now, I see X (the STA) as my boss. I always have to go to X (the STA) if I want to do anything." In addition, in some cases, the arrival of an STA after long periods of the DTA operating autonomously has resulted in the marginalization and loss of face of the DTA. One DTA said, "Prior to Y (the STA) coming in, I was doing AED's work at the Ministry and when Y (the STA) came in, the Ministry was confused and thought I'd been demoted. I had been working with the Director General and then suddenly the Director General was going to Y (the STA) and leaving me out."

thought the DTA was a new staff member and they were not sure what the individual was doing. In two states, the DTA was well-known and the STA was seldom mentioned.

Conclusions: Southern Sudan's classification as a hardship post is appropriate. The challenging conditions exacerbate task of providing ongoing and on-site technical assistance. TAP management has shown due diligence in its attempts to resolve many of the contractual concerns through the orientation process and subsequent face-to-face and email discussions. But for whatever reasons, most TA personnel interviewed are still not clear or are unhappy about a variety of these issues, which is having a negative impact on attitudes. The intention to provide additional opportunities for personnel interaction is mentioned in TAP documentation, but this has not occurred to date. Better utilization of personnel skills and knowledge across the Program has significant implications not only for working conditions and morale but also for staff development, building professional networks between personnel and minimizing redundancies in work outputs. These aspects all in turn have a tremendous influence on the quality of the services delivered and the overall impact of TAP. AED's stated intention to phase out the STA positions by shifting responsibility to provide high quality skills and knowledge to the DTAs has serious implications for DTA capacity enhancement. In addition, the turn-over of DTA personnel needs further investigation and action to ensure that appropriate personnel are both recruited and retained. Disruption in staffing means a loss of aid investment and potential negative repercussions for SMOEs.

Clearly discriminating between the roles and expectations of the STA and DTA positions and using transparent and appropriate performance evaluation processes should resolve most of the issues mentioned above. The question of DTA Capacity Enhancement (and to what end) needs to be resolved. If DTA CE is to be provided, a clear strategy for enabling CE in an effective and efficient manner needs to be introduced. DTA CE and supervision should not be the responsibility of the STAs given the already heavy demands on their time.

3.1.3 Deliverables

Findings: According to the quantitative data reported and on a purely numerical basis, AED is demonstrating more than adequate or adequate progress. Of the five indicators that TAP has monitored since 2005 to March 2009,³⁶ the outputs delivered consist of the following:

Indicator 1: 292 (63 females) administrators or officials trained.

Indicator 5: 1,967 (278 females) teachers/educators trained.

Indicator 9: 1,747 textbooks and teaching and learning materials developed and provided.

Indicator 11: 77 laws, policies, regulations, guidelines developed or modified to improve equitable access to quality of education services.

Indicator 10 (education systems/policy reform): evidence consists of narratives of activities being undertaken and these narratives demonstrate that there is a good deal of work being undertaken.

Custom Indicator 1: 497 hours of one-on-one contact time.

Custom Indicator 2: 2 out of 11 sets of results from Institutional Development Framework administration.

The quality of the technical, resource, reference and training documents produced for Government purposes and for TAP capacity enhancement is high (for example, materials produced for the July meeting were exceptionally well done) and TAP documentation provided to USAID is generally professionally presented, comprehensive, and delivered on time. Despite limited funds, group training is being undertaken. TAP is

³⁶ Please refer to Figure 18- Figure 22, Annex 14: Indicators for a chronological visual representation of outputs including disaggregation by sex.

frank about its successes and failures in delivery and critically analyzes the potential contributing factors. The MTE Team reviewed a number of the capacity enhancement materials and found that a near-native level of reading proficiency would be required to understand the materials. Based on a thorough review of TAP reports, which is supported by TA personnel interview data, there appears to be duplication of the types of documents being produced and, in some cases, a replication of documents that are already held by the MoEST that were developed under prior STTA or LTTA (see 3.5 Capacity Enhancement Approach for a more detailed discussion). There are some issues with consistency of data (see 3.1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation).

Conclusions: As far as meeting the annual deliverable target numbers, TAP is clearly doing its job and the quality overall of deliverables is high. For example, the Lessons Learned (QR 2 2009) are especially good. Female targets is an issue (please refer to 3.6 Gender) and there should be further examination of critical documents, particularly policies (that can have a significant potential for good or harm).³⁷ Some training methods and materials may not reflect sound adult education theory and practice³⁸ or require advanced reading skills, thus limiting wide accessibility. Given that only some of the TA personnel have backgrounds in adult education, TAP may wish to monitor training programs being provided more closely for quality and to ensure content does not overlap that of other development partners.

3.1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

Findings: The AED approach to monitoring and evaluation of TAP is articulated in the 2007 Program Monitoring Plan (PMP) -- which is currently being revised -- and the 2008 Annual Report. Some indicators have been dropped due to circumstances deemed beyond TAP's control or added in an effort to identify data that will enable more effective capture and representation of TAP achievements. Since June 2007, TAP has introduced several quality assurance measures including: (i) fielding an STTA M&E specialist to examine TAP data quality, storage, etc.; (ii) refining the source data quality instruments to be used across all TAP sites in Quarter 2 2009; (iii) adopting and adapting the Institutional Development Framework; (iv) developing an Individual Capacity Assessment (ICA); developing administration protocols for the IDF and ICA; and (v) establishing a full-time M&E specialist position. AED has made a good and consistent effort to provide: (i) both tabular and prose accounts of progress against the indicators, (ii) a clear rationale for indicator changes, and (iii) a comprehensive lists of activities undertaken and documents and materials produced. AED also shows evidence of a desire to improve M&E. For example, it introduced a benchmarking scale for TA personnel to use to rate progress and a summary table of the outputs achieved in a given year of implementation.

TAP has documented a number of M&E issues including: (i) the disjuncture between the data used as evidence of progress and the attribution of outcomes/results in SMOEs and MoEST on the basis of this evidence; (ii) the lack of fit between USAID's requirements for accounting for training provided and TAP's approach to capacity enhancement; and (iii) holding AED accountable for outputs that are dependent on other stakeholders. In general, the manner in which progress is reported varies somewhat from document to document. Apparently, there have been changes in USAID reporting requirements and AED has attempted to respond accordingly.

The various TAP documents nominate a number of areas to monitor and evaluate ranging from USAID outputs-based indicators (1, 5, 9, 11), to a set of working principles, to 'results' (that are in effect more a set of tasks for TA personnel than development results), to development outcomes/impact. However, it is only the quantitative output indicators (1, 5, 9, and 11) that are consistently reported against based on valid and reliable data. Indicator 10 (education systems/policy reform including progress against any mission level outcome or impact indicators) is addressed through description or narrative in periodic reports but without

³⁷ For example, the introduction of a policy placing a per capita fee placed on students by one SMOE and a policy introducing English at a different grade level than the Education Act indicates were both developed with TAP TA assistance and both different from GoSS policy.

³⁸ Also referred to as "andragogy."

any clear qualitative analytical methodology underpinning the narrative. The MTE Team could not locate documentation or data that showed that results statements are derived from sound qualitative research methods.³⁹ TAP uses proxy indicators (apparently output-based indicators) such as TA personnel time spent coaching SMOE officials and on dealing with Internet connectivity as evidence of the expected result, “facilitate communication and information exchange...”⁴⁰ Anecdotally, several individuals interviewed said they ‘felt’ communications had improved; however, the Team did not have time to collect empirical data that could have been used to triangulate the interview data.⁴¹ Although the ACA and the PMP⁴² note that TAP will contribute to development impact, to date there is no evidence of data being targeted and analyzed to attempt to substantiate a link between TAP inputs and outputs and the targeted development impact. For example, the statement is made that “The Technical Assistance Program develops policy documents, research, frameworks and guidelines that are incorporated into GoSS-MoEST policy or SMOE plans and have had an impact on improving equitable access to or the quality of education services (emphasis added)”.

Some areas nominated for TAP to report on have not yet been addressed in documentation. The ACA (p. 16) states that, “In addition to standard reporting requirements...the grantee will undertake a longitudinal study (emphasis added) to track the impact of the program on Technical Assistance (sic) to MoEST” and the 2007 PMP (p. 3) states that, “TAP will be monitored for the success of following (several key programming principles) and a narrative with back-up evidence will be provided to assess whether the TAP has used these principles as guides to program implementation”. The longitudinal study has not been undertaken and the key programming principles are not listed and reported against consistently.

There is currently little evidence of any depth of analysis. For example, a comprehensive table (QR 2 2009, p. 13) records data on one-on-one contact time, but there is no analysis of these data. An analysis would have shown that about one-quarter (or 120 hours) of 474 hours of one-on-one contact time was spent with only two individuals. There are numerous discrepancies in the figures reported against the quantitative indicators.⁴³ The outputs of only one or two TA personnel can meet the targets for a given indicator. For example of the 31 outputs targeted for Indicator 11 (number of laws, policies, regulations or guidelines) for FY2009, half (15) have already been produced by one STA with another 10 produced by a second STA.

Conclusions: On the basis of interviews with several personnel, there is clearly a great deal of effort being put into data collection, and AED has made efforts to ensure the quality of its M&E processes and data. Personnel also put a great deal of time into reporting and TAP is making an effort to provide comprehensive reporting on implementation and progress against indicator targets to USAID. AED has also pointed out a number of issues associated with the M&E approach and USAID requirements and has attempted to find

³⁹ Qualitative description would be based on qualitative data and analyses of these data using standard qualitative methods.

⁴⁰ The 2009 Annual Plan states that, “In the last year, since the State Advisors have been in place, there is a noticeable improvement in communications although they (sic) are still very weak.”

⁴¹ Given that improved communication is an assumed result, the link between the input of TA personnel (time spent addressing Internet connectivity and time spent coaching), the output (number of SMOE personnel coached and demonstrating competence) and the expected result (SMOE personnel increasing their efficiency and communication between education personnel increasing), not only do the inputs need to be tracked, but the outputs need to be identified (x number of personnel for y number of hours) and the results/outcomes need to be substantiated by some type of evidence base (for example, through surveys, tallies of email traffic over a given period, etc.). Without this chain of logic in data, the narrative about results is predominantly based on assumptions and feelings. For most of the results or implementation principles to be validated, there are specific indicators that could be identified and there is not necessarily a need to use proxy indicators. Regardless of whether TAP has control over the outcomes, evidence of effectiveness of the inputs and outputs is found in the outcomes being realized and these can be monitored and evaluated. Therefore, although the view that inputs and outputs are proxy indicators is valid, increased efforts to investigate outcomes/results empirically would not go astray.

⁴² “TAP activities and results will be monitored and evaluated according to whether the activities planned above have been completed, whether the quality has been of a high standard and whether there has been an impact on equitable access to education and improvement of quality of education.” (2007 PMP, p. 8)

⁴³ See Annex 7: MonitorING and Evaluation – Additional Information

solutions to mitigate the problems. For example, TAP is attempting to address correlation and attribution through custom indicators such as the One-on-One Contact Time and the revised IDF. Although TAP has dropped two indicators, reports note that data on the indicators will continue to be collected. This is sensible. If TA personnel are able to play a pivotal role in assisting SMOEs to lead strategically, harmonize resource envelopes, and ensure state-wide coverage through development partners, there is no reason why TAP could not claim development partner quantitative data as its own (flagging the development partner, of course) since benefits derived have come about because of TA personnel inputs.

Unfortunately, despite the effort being made, M&E overall is still in a nascent state as a tool for Program planning and management. This situation may be attributed in part to fact that the overall USAID program and, therefore TAP, is transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance. Issues may also be attributed to the excessive demands on management and administrative personnel since Phase 3 began, the absence of a staff person with M&E expertise, and the evolving nature of TAP itself. Nonetheless, as M&E reporting currently stands, it is difficult to get a clear picture of where consistent progress is being made across the Program. The benchmarking scale and table (for example, in the 2008 Annual Report and the 2009 January-March Quarterly Report) is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough and is difficult to interpret with respect to results over time within a particular state and across states. The descriptions of the points on the benchmarking scale do not allow easy and objective discrimination between the respective points. If the benchmarking scale does continue to be used, it might be useful to consider the payroll system reporting table developed by Booz Allen (see Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System) in order to make improvements. However, if the MTE Team's proposed revision of the IDF which now includes a more discriminating benchmarking scale (as suggested by the) is adopted, the TAP benchmarking scale may not be needed. Lastly, there is also a real danger to capacity enhancement in all 10 SMOEs when the work of only a few TA personnel can be equated with all the designated program deliverables/targets being met for that area. A good quality M&E approach could help reveal such issues.

3.2 PARTNERSHIP

The partners with which TAP is expected to collaborate are numerous and varied (see Figure 31 in Annex 16). The various development organization stakeholders and the relationship bases range from strategic (USAID and MoEST) to technical (MoEST) to operational (USAID projects, MoEST-MDTF, CBTF) to a combination thereof (IRC, SMOEs, UNICEF, NGO Partners).⁴⁴ Indeed, some partnerships are multi-faceted, as in the case of MoEST. Some partnerships are more advanced and others are being established.

3.2.1 TAP-MoEST Partnership

Findings: The TAP-MoEST partnership is well-advanced. In all phases, but particularly in 1, 2 and 3, there has been significant strategic, technical and operational collaboration in order to establish MoEST structures, systems and documentation (such as the drafting the Education Act in Phase 3). On a technical and operational level, the development and implementation of the FTP pilot in all 10 states and Abyei during Phase 2 was particularly notable. Phase 4 strategic and technical collaboration has included the MoEST STA (who is the COP for TAP) working with the Director of Human Resources to develop a proposal for a graduate diploma program in education management. MoEST leadership has responded to TAP management concerns and put a process in place that should enable the MoEST STA to access and work with targeted personnel. MoEST identified a new MDTF manager, who has established a good working relationship with the COP/STA. Most recently, MoEST ensured that an Executive Secretary, Mr Hakim Monykuer, participated on a full-time basis on the MTE mission. TAP continues to extend invitations to MoEST personnel for SMOE site visits and strategic workshops, but to date MoEST personnel have not taken up the opportunities.

⁴⁴ The contractual relationship between AED/TAP and USAID is discussed in an earlier section.

These interactions aside, it was unclear to the MTE team how the Terms of Reference for support provided by the Senior Technical Assistant to MoEST differed from other central level TA (which, typically, also has capacity enhancement orientation) and, consequently, what specific benefits were derived from the TAP TA.

The collaboration between TAP/USAID and MDTF/MoEST on shared funding for the STA positions was intentional, with USAID funding seven and MDTF/MoEST funding three (in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Lakes). However, as of now, only two MDTF/MoEST-funded positions have been filled, and the partnership progress has been disappointing. There have been many difficulties, including delays in recruiting and fielding STAs once contracted; delays in STA payments (which has curtailed STA effectiveness, and even their presence in their respective states); and the STA precedence (perceived or actual) of MoEST tasks over their contractual obligations to the states. Major tensions have been created because, while administratively obligated to MoEST, MDTF/MoEST-funded STA are technically obligated to TAP and therefore are expected to take technical supervision from the TAP COP. Ultimately, however, TAP has had very little influence on these STAs.⁴⁵ In addition, the MDTF/MoEST STA contract has different terms from the AED contract, which further complicates matters. For example, MDTF/MoEST-contracted STAs do not have access to vehicles or drivers. Neither do they have training stipends. Accordingly, TAP pays for these items in order to level the playing field. In interviews with the MTE team, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Lakes SMOE personnel expressed frustration because they feel their states are being “punished” or penalized by weak MoEST leadership in the matter of STAs.

Conclusions: Collaboration on MoEST-specific tasks has been strong across all TAP phases. It is clear that MoEST respects and appreciates TAP and its personnel and that (with the exception of the MDTF/MoEST TA positions) a good working relationship has been established. Nevertheless dependence upon other actors – especially during the last two phases of TAP -- has had a deleterious impact on TAP’s ability to undertake activities and ensure the quality of the program. MoEST’s failure to appoint someone to manage its three STA positions has exacerbated tensions between the states and MoEST, introduced an unintended aspect of favoritism into the Program, and, ultimately, compromised the sustainability of TAP benefits in three states. Clearly, the effort to harmonize investments and responsibilities is not working as successfully as required to promote uniform capacity enhancement. TAP and MoEST will need to address and resolve these issues expeditiously if TAP is to stay on track.

The failure to scale-up and roll-out the FTP and introduce a graduate diploma in education management (also an MDTF/MoEST effort managed by the latter) have definitely limited the potential impact of TAP. The FTP was particularly important because of the impact it had on the overall design of TAP Phases 3 and 4 as well as the anticipated implementation of the Phases. Teacher education (via the FTP processes piloted and refined under Phase 2) was to form the foundation of Phases 3 and 4.⁴⁶ The “failure to launch” of the MDTF-financed successor project undermined the critical programmatic assumption and derailed TAP’s strategic approach. As this situation has come to light, TAP and USAID have begun to adopt management approaches to adjust to this reality.

Finally, the lack of a clear strategy for effectively using the MoEST Senior Technical Advisor is liability. It may be the case that, under TAP’s descriptive umbrella as a ‘capacity enhancement’ activity, the TOR should be revised to focus on facilitating and monitoring strengthening of systems vertically (as in the case of the payroll system and the EMIS) with the TA playing a strategic organizational development role by assisting MoEST to identify areas where specific technical expertise is required.

⁴⁵ This was clearly demonstrated by the noticeable absence of one of the MoEST-contracted STA from the foundational intensive four-day workshop for STAs, DTAs and Directors of Planning in Juba at the beginning of July, 2009.

⁴⁶ AED Associate Award Application (May 29, 2007), p. 11. In fact, the primary MoEST-related task of the COP was to “provide technical coordination of the teacher development core component of the Program” and the Program Implementation component of Phases 3 and 4 focused on teacher education.

3.2.2 AED TAP-USAID Project Partnerships⁴⁷

BRIDGE (Building Responsibility for the Delivery of Government Services)

BRIDGE a very new program, having only begun this year. It is being implemented in Northern Bar El Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap States. It is an integrated program that aims to strengthen state and local governments in their efforts to decentralize and deliver basic services, provide tangible peace dividends, and increase economic opportunities. Specifically mandated to collaborate closely with MoEST at the GoSS, state, county, and payam levels, BRIDGE focuses efforts at the county level and currently works in two counties in each state. BRIDGE is also expected to work closely with development programs, whether supported by USAID or other donors. It has a Juba-based Education Coordinator, tasked with overseeing these responsibilities. Specific BRIDGE activities include: SMOE personnel training in management, gender and English; in-service teacher training, school curriculum rollout, textbook distribution, expansion of the USAID-supported interactive radio instruction programs, Parent-Teacher Associations and Boards of Governors training and support and activities to make schools 'girl-friendly' schools to reduce the incidence of gender-based violence (GBV) in schools.

GEE (Gender Equity through Education)

GEE is implemented throughout the GoSS ten states and the Three Areas. Its goal is to reduce financial, socio-cultural and institutional barriers to gender equity in education. This goal is being accomplished by reducing financial, infrastructure, social and institutional barriers that prevent females from attending secondary schools and becoming teachers with scholarships at the core of the project. During FY08 USAID placed two technical advisors in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) Gender Equity and Social Change Directorate to build capacity to: (i) increase the number of female teachers, (ii) raise awareness of and support for girls' education at central and sub-national levels, (iii) design and implement appropriate policies, and (iv) integrate gender into all aspects of education planning and program implementation. GEE focuses on advocacy, community mobilization and training for MoEST staff as well as leadership training at the state level.

Findings: There are commonalities of focus and intention between TAP and BRIDGE education and gender activities and, now that there is a consistent STA and DTA presence in each of the BRIDGE states, increasing levels of interaction are being realized. Initial misunderstandings over the primary focus of TAP support (at the state level) and BRIDGE (at county levels and below), have been worked out in a collaborative manner and appear to be working on the ground. TAP's focus on basic education aligns well with the GEE focus on secondary education. TA support at central and state levels is mutually reinforcing and, as far as the MTE Team was able to establish, well-coordinated. The respective COPs of TAP and GEE are in close touch over matters of mutual concern and share material and approaches (such as the IDF) across the two programs. TAP documentation focuses on girls and female teachers, as does GEE documentation.

Conclusions: BRIDGE and GEE both include a "bottom-up" focus while TAP mainly works from the top down. The orientation to different ends of the development spectrum can be used to good effect if collaboration is strategic, carefully planned, and well-executed. The presence of BRIDGE and TAP personnel on the ground in three states should enable significant synergies to be identified and built into implementation approaches. In addition, BRIDGE has the operational funds that TAP lacks, making the collaboration all the more important for TAP. For those states in which BRIDGE does not operate, other opportunities for collaboration and development must be found. As noted, GEE also has advisors in MoEST. If GEE, through its central level TA, is able to articulate particular systems, strategies and processes for dissemination and embedding at the sub-national level, TAP TA personnel could be of great assistance in

⁴⁷ Other USAID education projects include HEAR (Health and Education Reconciliation Program), which operates in the Three Area -- and perforce has little direct interaction with TAP -- and SSIRI (Southern Sudan Interactive Radio Instruction.) Of all these the closest linkages appeared to be with BRIDGE and GEE. Nevertheless, time constraints prevented an in-depth exploration, so the depth of findings and conclusions is limited.

much the same way that they have been to the Booz Allen payroll systems roll-out and the UNICEF EMIS roll-out. TAP assistance to help SMOEs operationalize BRIDGE and GEE activities should mean that TAP can claim and report on some of the successes and results, especially related to teacher training and curriculum and textbook distribution (that correspond to two of TAP's previous indicators).

3.2.3 AED TAP-Donor Partnerships

Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF)

Findings: The collaboration between Booz Allen and TAP in the roll-out and institutionalization of the payroll system financed under the Capacity Building Trust Fund follows a structured approach⁴⁸. In brief, the Booz Allen consultant briefs all TAP TA personnel prior to their mobilization to their respective state and made a PowerPoint presentation detailing specific ways and means for TA personnel to support the payroll system roll-out and institutionalization on both a strategic and an operational level. TA personnel have also participated in state-level training sessions and subsequently used this knowledge to support the SMOEs on an ongoing basis. The MTE Team found solid evidence that a number of TA personnel are devoting significant amounts of time to supporting the new payroll system in the states. According to several individuals interviewed, there has been a gradual move towards payroll in terms of the tasking of the TA personnel by TAP. There is, however, evidence that TA personnel are taking on more than support roles. For example, according to one STA, "In my SMOE, two people were trained in payroll and one disappeared. Now people come to me."

Conclusions: The collaboration between TAP and Booz Allen is an excellent model (provided the inherent risks are mitigated) and shows how SMOE TA personnel can play a very practical and extremely important role in helping to 'institutionalize' new systems, processes and procedures. The payroll system dissemination and capacity enhancement process itself provides an exemplary model for how vertical systems integration can be undertaken. Given TAP's familiarity with the model, the approach may be able to be utilized for introducing other innovations coming either from the center or from one state to all other states.

UNICEF

At the central level, UNICEF has been designated as the lead development partner in the education sector and has played a key role in establishment of 11 technical working groups. The groundwork is being laid for a sector-wide approach in education (or at least a sub-sector wide approach in general education). This direction is being reflected at the state level where UNICEF undertakes an annual micro-planning process with each state and county that is also supposed to involve all development partners in order to produce state and county level Annual Work Plans. While these Work Plans at present only designate SMOE and UNICEF funding envelopes, they do cover both organizational development/capacity enhancement types of activities as well as education development projects. Some TA personnel have found that SMOEs are not accessing the approximately US\$100k available annually under the Work Plan and TA personnel are increasingly playing a role in helping SMOEs to request the funds.

Although to date TAP has not attempted to build on UNICEF state- and county-level efforts through the TA personnel in a more formalized manner, UNICEF occupied a prominent place in the July 6-9, 2009 Quarterly Workshop conducted by TAP. A number of plausible avenues for increased collaboration were identified, including building from the Annual Work Plans (AWPs) developed by UNICEF with SMOE personnel already operational in the states and counties. Most TA personnel are already assisting SMOEs in the micro-planning process and are also introducing departmental and individual planning, so building from the AWP would be a logical next step in strengthening and imbedding planning processes.

⁴⁸ See Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System for an in-depth description of the payroll system roll-out and institutionalization process.

The EMIS activity has been ongoing for some time with USAID, and subsequently UNICEF, funding.⁴⁹ The annual Education Census implementation was shifted to UNICEF during TAP Phase 2. In 2008, the AED-UNICEF EMIS team trained designated SMOE personnel as EMIS focal points and provided two computers per state for processing and analyzing EMIS data. Now there is solid evidence of some TA personnel supporting the use of the EMIS and assisting in the preparation for and conduct of the annual Education Census. For example, a number of SMOE personnel from across the five SMOEs visited by the MTE Team emphasized the important role that TAP TA personnel are playing in helping some SMOE personnel to use data effectively. Many SMOE personnel mentioned how proud they are that they can present their own statistics on their states to MoEST and other SMOES and that this development came about largely due to the help of the TA personnel. Indeed, the July 6, 2009, presentations prepared for and presented to the MTE Team bear out the statements made to the Team in the field. Other development partners also have remarked on the changes in the SMOEs with respect to data, and some of these changes can be attributed to TA personnel. For example, one development partner from Lakes State noted that, “Things have improved so much in the last year (2008-2009). I remember when I wasn’t able to get data from the Ministry. Now, since last year, I am able to get data. Right now, with a phone call to the Director General, I can get accurate information. And some people are starting to use computers very effectively.”

Conclusions: The collaboration between TAP and UNICEF has been very productive to date and the relationship is likely to grow even stronger, which will certainly be a boon to the SMOEs. TAP and UNICEF are in the process of establishing a more strategic and practical partnership with respect to activities at the state level. This bodes well for the states since UNICEF is currently the major source of non-governmental funding at that level. UNICEF is also apparently going to use SMOE Annual Work Plans (that, under TAP assistance, should begin to reflect all development partner activities and funding) rather than the more restricted plans developed during annual micro-planning meetings.

3.2.4 TAP-NGO Partnerships

Findings: TAP collaborates at an operational level with a variety of NGO partners as TA personnel are increasingly instrumental in helping to make coordination between the SMOEs and development partners a reality. All TA personnel are supporting the SMOEs to take an active leadership position rather than a passive recipient role in harmonizing and rationalizing various development organizations’ education sector activities, initially through mapping the inputs and program targets. For example, Save the Children-Sweden in Lakes State noted that since the TA personnel were fielded, the collaboration between the SMOE and the development organizations in the State has improved. Coordination meetings are now held and systems and processes are beginning to be harmonized. As a result of the Lakes State Education Sector Working Group meeting, the Catholic Diocese is now using the Government’s examinations instead of administering its own tests. NGO partners in two other states also attributed noticeable positive changes in coordination to the presence of the TA personnel, particularly with respect to ensuring that the agreed quarterly meetings occur and in helping to increase the professionalism of SMOE staff. TAP documentation also details a number of instances of collaboration on a state level with NGOs. Specific noteworthy efforts include the collaboration in WBeG State between TAP, Intermon and Oxfam on gender.

A major pillar of the ACA Application was the strategic role that TA personnel were to play in helping SMOEs to rationalize and harmonize the in-service teacher education program with MoEST leadership and noted that “The present system is largely ad hoc and run by NGOs. MoEST will have to collect data systematically on the teacher in-service activities of the NGOs, evaluate the quantity and quality of programs, and integrate all existing in-service into a MoEST and state-ministry led comprehensive South Sudan-wide program” (p.6). Given that MoEST teacher education activity has stalled, it is not clear what role TAP TA personnel are now to play regarding NGOs generally, aside from ensuring that coordination meetings are ongoing. The Application also notes that “as new staff are hired, trained and placed in schools by the states,

⁴⁹ The USAID Sudan Basic Education Program implemented by CARE developed the precursor to the EMIS, which was called the Annual Education Census. Later, AED developed the EMIS with UNICEF funding.

NGOs will gradually shift their role from service provider to capacity builder. EQUIP2 can help facilitate this transition at the central and state levels...” (p 5); however, it is not clear in subsequent TAP documentation whether NGOs themselves have this view or how, in light of the shift away from teacher development, TAP will now play a role.

There is some evidence that, with respect to in-service teacher education/training, TAP may be proliferating rather than rationalizing efforts as was originally intended in the TAP design. TAP documentation and interviews with some TA personnel indicate that TA personnel have been developing teacher training and teacher resource materials and have been involved in teacher training (particularly of head teachers). The data indicate that these efforts are not necessarily being undertaken in collaboration with NGOs that already may be undertaking similar endeavors. TAP collaboration to date also appears to be limited to international NGOs. There is no mention in documentation of engagement with local NGOs.

Conclusions: The requirement in the Cooperative Agreement for TAP to collaborate with a complex mix of organizations and activities (USAID and otherwise) places additional responsibilities on a Program that is already administratively demanding. However, this requirement also provides benefits and opportunities which, if managed well, could expand the impact of TAP on the ground. While synergies are increasingly being identified and built upon, a more systematic approach to managing collaboration is needed so that SMOEs are not overwhelmed by a capacity enhancement “tug-of-war”. TA personnel could play a critical role helping SMOEs to manage the interests of various development partners in building sub-national capacity.

3.3 IMPACT (SHORT TERM EFFECTS)⁵⁰

Findings: The MTE Team used the following⁵¹ as evidence of short-term impact.⁵²

Changes in awareness, knowledge and attitudes of SMOE personnel

Increased feelings of confidence, competence, pride and accomplishment. For example, SMOE leadership feel competent at the ‘national’ level and with development partners.

Raised levels of excitement among many SMOE HQ personnel about their jobs.

Changes in the interests and stated intentions of SMOE personnel

Many SMOE HQ personnel are showing an increased interest in what other staff are doing. Upper Nile SMOE has introduced bi-weekly staff meetings (see Annex 17: Upper Nile Most Significant Change Story).

Beginning to ‘think’ as an organization (through the analysis, self-reflection and sharing of viewpoints in a constructive fashion that are part and parcel of the application of the IDF).

Some personnel are starting to challenge ‘silos’, information-guarding and top-down decision-making.

At least two (and likely more) personnel per SMOE have gained and are using basic computer literacy skills.

Some SMOE personnel are saying they intend to be more like the TA personnel with respect to work habits, knowledge and general professionalism.

⁵⁰ Please also see Annex 5: Likhert Scale Scoring of TAP Implementing Principles (from 2007 PMP).

⁵¹ Online source: http://www.talkingquality.gov/docs/section5/5_2.htm, accessed June 22, 2009 10:00pm Juba, Southern Sudan.

⁵² Specific areas of change were mentioned frequently by those individuals who have had one-on-one involvement with TA personnel.

Changes in short-term or intermediate behavior of SMOE personnel

Improved work habits. In several SMOEs, personnel noted that staff are now coming to work on time and staying the whole day. One SMOE has instituted a sign-in/sign-out process. Staff are also working more systematically and productively due to individual and departmental work plans.

Improved writing skills (i.e., reports and proposals). Personnel who have access to and have been supported in using technology are continuing to use technology on the job.

Improved understanding of planning (at the individual, departmental and organizational levels) and use of this understanding to make plans.

Improved response to MoEST requirements. According to His Excellency (HE) Undersecretary William Ater, for the first time in five years, all SMOEs submitted their Annual Plans to MoEST on time. According to one SMOE, “Microplans used to be done mid-year. Now we plan early and this change is due to TAP.”

Improved communication with MoEST through TAP TA personnel as information conduits and also as a result of TA personnel attention to Internet connectivity issues.

Improved development partner cooperation and coordination. While there has always been the expectation that SMOEs will have regular coordination meetings, in most SMOEs, this did not become a reality until TA personnel began to assist SMOEs to take a leadership role. One STA created a Development Partner Profile pro forma that has been used in at least two other SMOEs as part of a development assistance mapping exercise.

On an organizational level, the outcomes include the following:

Improved efficiency. For example, one Examinations Department Director has cut back his examinations preparation time from one month to one week. Last year, TA personnel helped him to use technology on the job; this year, he has been able to go it alone.

Improved communication.

Improved organizational learning and behavior. In the two SMOEs where it has been used, the IDF has been a catalyst for helping personnel think critically about the SMOE.

Improved credibility of SMOEs among education stakeholders (national and international).

There is evidence in all SMOEs that the strengthening of some systems at the headquarters level is beginning to be realized. For example, the vertical roll-outs of the payroll system (see Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System), the teacher head count, the education census and the EMIS and their impact is attested to by all SMOEs. There is evidence in all SMOEs of systems strengthening on a horizontal level, for example, all SMOEs stress the positive effects of the focus on departmental and individual work plans, computer literacy, coordination and sector meetings). Other focus areas can be characterized more as “pockets of progress” (gender, strategic planning, and systematic development partner collaboration) where it is not possible to substantiate broad gains across all SMOEs.

There is a great deal of demand for opportunities to engage with the TA personnel; however in the five SMOEs visited, TA personnel tended to engage regularly with only a small number of personnel, typically directorate heads. Engagement with deputy directors was less frequent and with other personnel it was infrequent, even though much of the CE content is generic enough to benefit most if not all HQ and county personnel. For example, all SMOE personnel interviewed indicated that each person is responsible for planning and budgeting as well as program implementation—it was only the scale of the responsibility that varied. A number of SMOE personnel are disgruntled at not having the same opportunities other colleagues

have had and nearly half of the SMoE HQ personnel⁵³ interviewed do not believe that TAP has had any significant impact on the SMoE or on they themselves.

Conclusions: Without a doubt, the presence of TA personnel has had a catalytic and motivational effect on the SMoEs, and there are certainly success stories highlighting the positive short-term effects of TAP (particularly on individuals). There are also indications that TAP is having an impact on the SMoE as an organization. For example, the payroll system and teacher head count processes and the uptake of EMIS appear to be quite strong and look like they will be sustained (provided additional staff are trained). Part of the success can be attributed to TAP TA personnel. Other successes are primarily focused at the individual (SMoE HQ personnel) level, but it is not possible to make generalizations about the individual personnel benefiting except to say that some directors, but not all and not necessarily those in the same positions across SMoEs, are benefiting or benefiting to the same degree. This situation is not necessarily surprising for reasons addressed earlier in the Report. It was difficult to get a sense of whether TAP's catalytic effect will continue as SMoEs become used to TA personnel. On the basis of international experience in organizational and institutional development, TA personnel will need to build the commitment to and momentum for change early on so that they do not become the de facto prime movers.

The ACA states that at the end of the four years it is expected that the 'basic functions of the departments in which TA is provided will be established', but the failure to roll out the FTP has left this objective unclear. One could extrapolate from the list of TA expected results, but not everything on that list is necessarily a basic function of a particular department. Increasing the access by greater numbers of SMoE personnel to structured sessions on areas of widespread interest and need (with small group work and one-on-one follow-up) will enhance the short-term effects of TAP and increase the likelihood of sustainability. The challenge will be to clearly identify and ensure consistent, broad-based development of new core areas (not necessarily those targeted in the FTP roll-out) in all SMoEs. Despite challenges, in the past year, TAP has nonetheless demonstrated an admirable capacity to adapt to this post-FTP reality.

3.4 PEACE DIVIDEND⁵⁴ & CONFLICT SENSITIVE ANALYSIS

Findings: All SMoE personnel interviewed point to the increasing demand for schooling. These findings back up public opinion polls conducted by USAID. SMoE personnel are eager to train and support in-service teachers, construct schools and provide teaching and learning materials for classrooms. There is evidence that a small amount of funding is available from NGO partners and TAP is beginning to pay greater attention to partnerships in order to overcome these deficits⁵⁵. Education funding across the states is not systematic or uniform and it was obvious to AED TAP management early on in Phase 3 that the lack of operational and development funds in SMoEs severely limited the amount of assistance that TA personnel could provide to their respective SMoEs, particularly in extending the benefits of the TA beyond SMoE HQ to local levels of government.⁵⁶

Consequently, AED in consultation with USAID earmarked an annual discretionary fund of around \$30,000 per SMoE for TA personnel to use to support TAP interventions, in particular, formal training at the local government levels. No other regular, predictable funds are available under TAP. The ACA Application notes that TA personnel would assist SMoEs to submit successful proposals to external funding bodies, in order to "leverage funding". The view was that financial and other resources to support teacher development could be captured. The MTE Team attempted to collect data from all TA personnel on proposals submitted and

⁵³ SMoE HQ personnel are those personnel who are working at the state level as opposed to the county level and below.

⁵⁴ The 'peace dividend' is included in the Scope of Work under impact assessment; however, since it is such a critical area, it has been addressed in its own section rather than being included in the 'Impact-Short-Term Effects' section.

⁵⁵ See 3.2 Partnership, for a discussion of collaborative efforts at the county and payam levels between USAID BRIDGE and TAP in some states.

⁵⁶ This issue has been raised consistently in numerous AED reports. For example, Quarterly Report January-March 2008 notes that, "The SMoEs' programs have been reduced to a hand-to-mouth operation, with no money for any other expenses beyond staff salaries".

funded (see Annex 18: Proposal Submission and Funding Request Tracking Form), particularly with TAP assistance. While the return rate was low (two SMOEs), on the basis of the returned forms, a review of TAP documentation, and interviews with personnel from the five SMOEs, the fund-raising element has not been realized to any significant extent. At this point in time, there is no evidence to indicate that TAP is using a strategic approach to help all SMOEs ‘unlock’ existing financial or other resources in the sector. Proposal development as a means of leveraging funding is more or less ad hoc and not systematic across the SMOEs as well.

There are stirrings of interest in good governance that could be attributed to TAP. Many SMOE personnel across all states feel, and anecdotal evidence from other stakeholders indicates, that the mere presence of the TA personnel has had an impact on contributing to the notion of what it means to be a civil servant. TA personnel in general are seen as role models for good professional behavior. The introduction of the Institutional Development Framework (revised by AED) in several SMOEs is seen as a big step forward because the IDF self-assessment requires personnel to think critically about the SMOE, break through work silos and function as a learning organization. The development of job descriptions and individual and departmental work plans has helped personnel understand their areas of responsibility and accountability and to have a sense of purpose. As noted earlier, some TA personnel have invested significant amounts of time on payroll issues, including the teacher head count. Several SMOE personnel stated that the head count innovations from TA personnel and assistance with the payroll system was increasing transparency and accountability. The Warrap State STA has begun to engage with Parliamentarians, which is a first for TAP at the state level. However, several TA personnel interviewed feel ill-equipped to deal with issues of poor governance such as nepotism, lack of transparency in acquitting development partner funds, and appropriation and misuse of equipment provided by donors. At least two TA personnel have been placed in delicate situations.

There are instances where SMOEs are providing services effectively and with TA personnel assistance (such as getting books into schools.) But, according to some SMOE personnel interviewed, the SMOE rarely if ever gets the credit, in large part due to the branding requirements of (non-TAP) development partners. Furthermore, several stakeholders interviewed believe that the type of external assistance provided to Southern Sudan for so many years has eroded the notion of self-sufficiency and created a dependency syndrome. They believe the challenge now is to re-invigorate the community’s belief in the state and community action.⁵⁷ Community development is an area of focus on TAP’s 2009 work plan.

AED TAP documentation gives no indication that a conflict-sensitive lens or analysis has or is being applied to TAP programming decisions or implementation. Southern Sudan is still a conflict-affected context and there are also numerous areas in various states that suffer from “insecurity”.⁵⁸ TAP documentation details (although not systematically and cumulatively) a number of instances where insecurity has resulted in personnel being evacuated, kept away from their state, or restricted in their movements. This documentation is backed up by interviews with TAP personnel. Many states have one or more counties that are insecure. In Western Equatoria State, for example, TA personnel cannot go beyond a four-mile radius of Yambio.⁵⁹

A major constraint to realizing a peace dividend is the impact that the payment (or lack thereof) of salaries is having on teacher (and administrator) motivation and commitment. The problem has become so severe that

⁵⁷ For example, His Excellency (HE) MoEST Undersecretary William Ater noted that before the war, “Parents and communities were responsible for 85 percent of the costs of education. They built the classrooms, they paid the teachers in-kind by farming the teacher’s land or collecting sorghum and they made sure the kids were in school. We used cow skins as blackboards and local materials as chalk. Then -- (name deleted intentionally) came in with its assistance and people’s mindset began to change.”

⁵⁸ “Insecurity” can mean anything from inter-ethnic conflicts among pastoralists to cross-border incursions by militant groups from other countries to ongoing conflict in the North-South border areas to the garden variety of crime (break-ins, muggings, etc.).

⁵⁹ Interestingly, TAP documentation on the FTP pilot noted successful delivery in Abyei, a chronically conflict-affected area. There may be particular lessons to be learned from this experience.

teachers have gone or are on strike in a number of states and in some places violence has resulted in individuals being killed. At a minimum, striking teachers are not in their classrooms. Students are left without teachers, and parents are feeling the frustration of promised services not delivered. This, along with insufficient funding for operating costs and new investments, is beyond TAP control.

Conclusion: Because the Government is failing to provide adequate resources (not compensated for by funding from other sources, most particularly the MDTF), TAP is at risk of not contributing as fully as it might towards achievement of the peace dividends. TAP's contribution to "durable stability", decentralization and development impact are compromised by the lack of funds to undertake the anticipated teacher education and training programs and the lack of political will to roll out the FTP (see 3.7 Risks & Unanticipated Negative External Developments). At this point in time, and until additional funds start to flow or collaboration between SMOEs and development partners becomes more strategic, TAP is in effect in a period of "arrested implementation." TAP is able to make important contributions by on advising the central level and the state level, but it cannot make linkages to lower levels of the system and there are few chances for SMOE personnel to test out new capacities and demonstrate their ability to perform (which is an accepted proxy indicator for capacity development). New teachers are not being trained in sufficient numbers to have an impact on access to education, and this presents a disconnect in delivering the anticipated peace dividend. Furthermore, existing teachers are not upgrading their skills, so the quality of education has little chance of improving. In light of the current resource-constrained environment, TA personnel must treat leveraging of funds and facilitating of CE opportunities for SMOE personnel with greater urgency and systematization. Furthermore, Southern Sudan has a mixture of contexts—from former garrison towns to pockets of insecurity to peaceful areas--in which education services need to be delivered. This contextual complexity makes the task of the SMOE even more challenging and it needs to be highlighted, understood, and planned for appropriately and strategically. Certainly many SMOE personnel and a number of TA personnel have had experience with education delivery in conflict-affected contexts, either directly or through interactions with development agencies and community members have memories of self-sufficiency and community-managed education. Given the grim international statistic that 40 to 50 per cent of peace agreements collapse within five to 10 years of being signed with the subsequent return of war⁶⁰, these experiences need to feed into how TAP operates.⁶¹

3.5 CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT APPROACH

Findings: The capacity enhancement (development) approach promoted is primarily one-on-one through informal mentoring and/or coaching. However, TA personnel also engage in limited formal training of groups, particularly personnel from the county, payam (education managers and inspectors) and even school levels (head teachers). Unfortunately, the learning by doing on-the-job (OTJ) training that was to accompany the FTP scale-up using already trialed processes and systems has not been undertaken for reasons detailed previously. Data collected by the MTE Team and documented in TAP reports show that SMOE personnel at all levels are eager for opportunities to learn. In the words of one STA, "The work plan development workshop...was very well-attended and the content of the training well-received. ...SMoE staff are ready and 'starving' for such learning opportunities. The workshop was six hours long excluding one hour for lunch. No incentives were provided, yet there was highly impressive participation by ministry staff members".⁶² The Phase 4 Model is enabling STAs to have a greater influence on the respective SMOE through continuity, follow-up and timeliness and in allowing STAs and DTAs to work more strategically together.

⁶⁰ International Alert. (2008) Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Recovery and Growth. International Alert Investing in Peace Briefing paper Issue No. 1, Sept 2008.

⁶¹ A possible source of funding is the Sudan Recovery Fund which is described as, a fund to "accelerate recovery in Southern Sudan through high-impact, quickly disbursed projects. The Fund focuses on four key areas: a) consolidating peace and security; b) delivering basic services; c) stabilizing livelihoods; and d) building capacity for decentralized and democratic governance". (Taken from Allocation Proposal Sudan Recovery Fund Round III June 2009)

⁶² TAP Quarterly Report, January-March 2008, p. 14.

AED HQ supports TA personnel with reference materials and TAP Juba places materials that have been created by the TA personnel on a web site that is specifically for TAP personnel. The Education Management Toolkit developed by MoEST under the USAID Sudan Basic Education Program (SBEP) is used by TAP in an effort to “rein in all the disparate capacity building education management materials and use a common core. It is used for group trainings. The Toolkit doesn’t provide templates and this is a big, gaping hole”.⁶³

According to all STAs and DTAs interviewed, each creates her/his own materials from scratch or by adapting reference materials and there is little sharing back and forth of materials created or opportunities to share problems and solutions. All interviewees have a view similar to those of two TA personnel who said, “We should have a standard strategy for the materials—you can’t just be dealing with things randomly and all of us developing our own materials. There is no consistency...It seems we are having a ‘cafeteria-style’ program”; “I have written (X) policies. I haven’t seen anyone else’s policies and I don’t know if they have seen mine”; and, “We are inventing and creating on the spot...we were trained on how to report on the USAID format. We were not given any formal training on how to do the work of AED in the field”.⁶⁴ TAP management believes that TA personnel are not duplicating efforts but are adapting resources already developed by TAP personnel.

Furthermore, TA personnel interviewed tended to have varying descriptions of their roles. Some are more complete and accurate than others. The ACA Application (p. 4) states that, “...TAP will need to continue to strike a balance between being responsive to multiple requests to assist daily operations of MoEST and accomplishing program objectives and deliverables (emphases sic). The program must be responsive to ad hoc requests within MoEST and the state ministries, but this cannot eclipse the basic work and goals of the program” (emphasis added). There is some evidence of increasing tendency for TA personnel to be placed in a vulnerable position due to their desire to build relationships, establish themselves as credible actors within and advocates for the SMOE and to step into the breach because they want to help. A number of TA personnel and other stakeholders note that TA personnel are being pulled in many directions and are being used as “walking ‘in-boxes’” for central to state level communications, in-line personnel, typists and editors among others.⁶⁵ (See Figure 30 in Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile.)

All TA personnel interviewed believe there should be more formal and informal opportunities to interact as a group as well as in STA-specific and DTA-specific fora. TAP management believes that most TA personnel use and adapt materials developed during the various TAP Phases, including the current one. TAP documentation was reviewed and an analysis was undertaken of the extent to which TAP (and other Sudan-based) materials that have been produced are being taken up both vertically and horizontally. The analysis shows that while there is some evidence of interface vertically, it is limited. Horizontal interface is even more limited.

The opportunity to learn to use computers is extremely popular and has resulted in significant benefits for some individuals (and to SMOEs more generally), as has support provided in resolving Internet connectivity issues. However, the cost of the one-on-one approach for particular skills (such as computer literacy) is high. For example, assuming that the 25 hours of one-on-one computer training provided to six males during January to March 2009 was provided by STAs, then basing a calculation on the annual STA financial package, the 25 hours of training for six individuals was provided at a cost of US\$4,250 in total or US\$708 per participant.⁶⁶ However, computer literacy is fairly easy to teach and lends itself to group learning, so holding classes is likely far more cost effective.

⁶³ MTE Team field notes.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Morgan (2008) notes that in smaller organizations it is not uncommon for TA to become general purpose providers and this is especially the case when the assistance being provided is for more general and less specific tasks.

⁶⁶ TAP management believes that the computer training is conducted for groups, however, three TA personnel and the Quarterly Report 2 2009 (p. 8) described the computer training being provided as one-on-one with one person noting that the lack of computers makes this necessary.

Conclusions: The intention underpinning the co-location of technical personnel at the sub-national level as a CE strategy is sensible as there is clearly a need and a high demand for external technical assistance in the states (as well as at the center). While TAP's identified deliverable targets are being met, there is a good deal of time spent responding to ad hoc requests and/or on areas in which TA personnel have particular expertise, while the 'central core' (particular functions and systems) is only beginning to be addressed in a strategic and focused manner.⁶⁷ In addition, TA personnel and the SMOEs do not believe that the TA personnel should be associated with particular departments (as the CA implies). These constraints need to be dealt with and the COP is beginning to take things in hand. It may be necessary to establish some type of 70:20:10 rule (70 percent of time spent working with SMOEs on a targeted core of functions addressed in common by all SMOEs, 20 percent of time on needs unique to the specific SMOE and 10 percent of time responding to ad hoc requests).

Supporting the counterpart relationship at all levels and encouraging TA personnel to be conscious of and generate efficiencies (whether through a reduction in duplication of efforts or an expansion of learning opportunities to a wider group⁶⁸) places an additional requirement on the Hub personnel. They must be well-informed about the current literature and effective practices surrounding capacity enhancement (development), organizational development and institutional development and the monitoring and evaluation of such and be able to turn this knowledge into viable support. More successful TA programs have begun to move beyond the traditional 'one-on-one' model to more complex team-based and even network approaches.⁶⁹ These approaches 'spread the wealth' (i.e., have a multiplier effect) and have a greater likelihood of benefits being sustained.

3.6 GENDER

Findings: Two aspects of gender have been taken into consideration in the MTE: AED's internal treatment of gender, and the treatment of gender within the Southern Sudanese context. Regarding the former, among TA and AED HQ personnel associated with TAP, 50 percent are female (12 out of 24). In addition, the last three COPs (from Phases 2, 3 and 4) have been women. Five out of nine STAs and two out of nine DTAs are female. AED is aware of the potential for gender-based violence (GBV) and has taken measures to ensure that all personnel are protected. To date there have been two known incidences of gender-based harassment or violence. In one instance, AED reacted appropriately; however in the other instance, there was a view expressed that the response was not adequate. Some TA personnel feel that female TA personnel experience more challenges in the workplace.

TAP documentation indicates that the Program will address gender equity and will support the Directorates of Gender Equity and Social Change and one of the key programming principles is "Encouraging the access and success of girls in school and female teachers as education professionals will cut across all programs" (2007 PMP, p. 3). A number of the Program reports mention specific activities related to gender and development in some of the states. For example, in Unity State, TA personnel worked with the SMOE on the recruitment of qualified teachers, with female teachers being given priority. TAP was also instrumental in ensuring that gender was addressed in the (pending) Education Act. TAP also collaborates with NGOs and

⁶⁷ The following findings may also be of interest to TAP. In a recent in-depth study of extensive provision of TA personnel and counterpart relationships in Papua New Guinea, Morgan (2008) found that "TA in general and counterpart relationship had difficulty in addressing capacity development effectively even at the level of individuals. Simply put, they were frequently unclear about how to bring about the evolution of complex institutional and organizational change (emphasis added). The evidence about the contribution of counterpart relationships to bigger systems change in the public sector in PNG remains mixed at best...(the) more typical pattern (is) pockets of progress overshadowed by a lack of consolidated progress (emphasis added) in health service delivery outcomes."

⁶⁸ For example, a greater return on investment may come from TA personnel locating and negotiating a deal with Internet cafes where there is a bank of computers that could potentially be rented for a part of each day in order to enable more staff to learn and even do some of their work provided they had access to a flash drive which is portable and relatively inexpensive.

⁶⁹ Morgan, Peter (2008)

USAID's GEE and BRIDGE projects (see 3.2 Partnership). Because TAP no longer has a major formal role in teacher education, the responsibility for keeping gender equity front and center falls exclusively on GEE.

While a consistent effort is made to disaggregate data by sex and targets have been set, there is no written gender strategy in place that consistently guides and shapes TAP efforts. According to TAP documentation, targets for female participation under the respective outputs-based indicators are not being met (see Annex 14: Indicators) and the access of SMoE females to TA personnel is limited. For example, out of 474 one-on-one contact hours between TA personnel and SMoE personnel, at best nine hours (just over 1 percent) and at worst 4 hours (under 1 percent) was devoted to women. Put another way, out of 172 individual staff benefiting from the one-on-one contact time, only six (or 3 percent of) individuals were women (Quarterly Report 2 January-March 2009).

Conclusions: AED is clearly aware of gender issues and has taken steps to ensure that females are represented among TAP personnel and that female personnel are safe. TAP's staffing profile is gender-balanced overall. There is an imbalance in the DTA group and the reasons for this as well as potential solutions need to be identified. TAP's position on gender-based harassment or violence and its responses to any such incidents should also be reviewed and revised if necessary. Examination of any special challenges faced by female TA personnel in the workplace may need further investigation and a course of action as well.

While there is evidence of some attention to gender by TA personnel in some SMoEs, the emphasis has been somewhat spotty and lacks a clear agenda.⁷⁰ MoEST and SMoEs are facing difficulties bringing females into ministry positions, teaching and PTAs and bringing girls into classrooms. For example, executive or management positions that are held by women are almost exclusively in the Directorates of Gender Equity and Social Change and Preschool/Early Childhood Education⁷¹ (see Annex 14: Indicators). These are directorates that tend not to be targeted by TAP personnel, according to information provided by both TA and SMoE personnel interviewed during the five SMoE site visits. TAP needs a focused strategy to break through the barriers to achieving gender equality, especially in those states that do not have GEE and/or BRIDGE activities but that may have NGOs implementing gender activities. TAP needs to broaden the scope of gender considerations to women in decision-making positions and helping SMoEs achieve the 25 percent target.

3.7 RISKS & UNANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

3.7.1 Risks

Findings: Although TAP documentation does identify or at least imply some critical assumptions in the Program design, there is no formal, standard, regularly updated risk management matrix that grades risks for likelihood of occurrence and identifies mitigation responses. The Lessons Learned (QR 2 2009, p. 10) are actually more significant risks, from which lessons learned could be derived. The critical design assumption of the Program -- that GoSS/MDTF funding for teacher training and textbooks would materialize -- was actually flagged in the ACA Application (p. 5) and has been raised consistently in documentation since mid-2007. The collapse of the FTP occurred early in TAP Phase 3 implementation and, while indicators have been adjusted with USAID concurrence, the larger picture for TAP design has not yet been resolved.

There are other significant risks, not only to TAP implementation, impact and sustainability, but to the stability of Southern Sudan itself. Paramount among these are the upcoming February 2010 general elections and the 2011 referendum.

⁷⁰ As noted in Quarterly Report 2 2009, p. 10.

⁷¹ Out of the ten states, one (Warrap) has a female minister of education and one (Western Equatoria State) has a female director general. There is greater representation of women in the lower tiers of the organization in some SMoEs, for example in the inspector ranks, although incomplete data do not allow a conclusive statement across the SMoEs in this regard.

Conclusions: The lack of a formal risk management matrix may be a liability to Program implementation and results. It is also clear that risk mitigation strategies associated with TAP's most critical assumption are proving to be inadequate. For example, AED cannot continue to subsidize the on-the-ground TAP training provided by TAP personnel in collaboration with some SMOE personnel nor can TAP be held accountable for system strengthening with no practical way to test out the extent to which systems have been strengthened.

While the effects of the general elections may be able to be mitigated to some extent by a sound sustainability strategy, there is little that TAP can do to quell the uneasiness surrounding the referendum. TAP could be instrumental in helping SMOEs establish some quick and visible wins so that confidence of the general public in the Government is increased and firmly establish some of the key functional areas. However, the larger issue of providing increased access to improved education services is clearly beyond the mandate of TAP. It may also be beyond the capacity of the states themselves and rest with GoSS.

3.7.2 Unanticipated Negative Developments

Findings: At the central level, the genesis of Phases 3 and 4 appears to have been demand-driven, with a great deal of interaction between MoEST, USAID and TAP Phase 2. However, at the state level, TAP has been a supply-driven modality, with SMOEs being consulted about what their needs are and then informed through written materials and presentations about TAP Phases 3 and 4. There is some evidence that the interplay between TA personnel and SMOEs fluctuates between a supply-driven and a demand-driven approach, and that this has been the case with the MoEST –TAP relationship to a certain extent as well. Several TA personnel noted that there has been a gradual shift in the SMOE personnel-TA personnel relationship with SMOE personnel becoming more proactive. One STA noted, "I'm beginning to see the culture of the Ministry changing. Now people, instead of saying, 'What should we do?' are saying, 'This is what we would like to do. What do you think?'"⁷²

The requirement that TAP demonstrate its effectiveness by ensuring that the GoSS produces policies is emerging as a liability. TA personnel, for the most part, are not specialists in public policy development (including the policy development cycle). There have been instances where TA personnel input has resulted in the development of policy that is contrary to or deviates from national policy. There is no evidence that: (i) policies being put forth are produced as initial drafts and then revised on the basis of specialist input or (ii) identification of policies to be developed is fully tested against related policies at the national or sub-national levels. Finally, there is also no evidence of any mechanisms for monitoring the implementation and effects of these policies.

Conclusions: The shift toward greater proactivity and direction-setting by SMOE personnel is desirable and should be encouraged by TA personnel. However, involvement of TA personnel in policy development at the state level (especially when this requires a specialized area of expertise) is not advisable due to the potential for negative consequences if policies are of poor quality and/or do not consider all potential implications. The repercussions for reversing a bad policy decision include compromising the credibility of the SMOE and TA personnel and violating the public's trust in the SMOE. The repercussions for putting in motion a policy that is contrary to GoSS policy with TA personnel assistance also may be significant. The GoSS Interim Constitution emphasizes the expectation that different levels of government will work to support each other. Establishing 'renegade' policies goes contrary to this expectation and subverts in a destructive manner the decentralization agenda. While the push by many states to move ahead on setting policies where GoSS efforts have been weak or delayed is understandable, However, TAP has to proceed cautiously to balance state-level demands with the bigger picture.

⁷² MTE Team field notes.

3.8 SUSTAINABILITY

Findings: TAP's partnership efforts are extensive and the benefits of the processes for engagement are starting to bear fruit. Attention is now being given to the uptake of the Institutional Development Framework across SMOEs as a tool to guide TA personnel support and as an instrument SMOEs can utilize over time for organizational development analysis and planning.

TAP Phases 3 and 4 will run for four years. International literature urges donors to set time frames of not less than 10 years and more realistically, 15-20 years as the time frames for capacity enhancement initiatives. Realistically, although Phase 3 began in June 2007, full-scale (or nearly full-scale) implementation will only be possible for 28 months (June 2009 to mid-September 2011) under the current time frame. It is only very recently (mid-2009) that the TA pool has a near-full complement (minus one GoSS-contracted STA) of personnel. Moreover, since the first SMOE STAs and DTAs were fielded in October 2007, many of the states have had inconsistent TA inputs. The reasons include: (i) numerous TAP personnel changes (particularly in the DTA ranks); (ii) shift from the Phase 3 to the Phase 4 Model (and changes in TAP coverage and staffing ratios); (iii) issues with GoSS management of GoSS/MDTF STAs; and (iv) insecurity. TAP management recently began to work on an exit strategy. However, there is no mention in the documentation of a sustainability strategy.⁷³

Sweeping changes in SMOE personnel have occurred in some states (for example, Western Bahr el Ghazal), during the tenure of TA personnel. In other states there has a stable core of personnel for lengthy periods of time (see Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile). The available quantitative data do not show any consistent patterns or trends except that there may be a tendency to retain personnel through lateral transfers or promotions.

Conclusions: TAP's challenge, in the very short implementation time remaining, will be to ensure that the processes for guiding systems' vertical integration (both downwards from the center, but also upwards from the state) are sufficiently embedded within MoEST departments so that the linkages between the center and the sub-national levels continue to be realized as new systems, approaches and processes are developed. TAP's challenge at the sub-national level is to sufficiently embed SMOE processes that will enable systems': (i) vertical integration; (ii) horizontal integration (across a given SMOE); and (iii) horizontal integration between SMOEs.

Ideally, a sustainability and exit strategy should be fleshed out that can inform an activity's design so that it is clear what needs to be put into motion at the beginning, the middle and the end of implementation to maximize sustainability. There is no recognized and binding agreement between the states and the central level regarding roles and responsibilities with respect to TAP implementation and post-TAP sustainability of benefits.⁷⁴ International and MTE Team experience with technical assistance as a form of aid repeatedly reveals the loss of benefits following the departure of TA personnel. A sustainability strategy would help safeguard against this possibility.

Although SMOE personnel may be shifted from one position to another, personnel may not necessarily be lost to the sector or even SMOE headquarters. Such cases are a boon to the sustainability of benefits. However, there is also the need for expanding access to TA personnel under a 'sharing the wealth' approach

⁷³ An exit strategy typically would deal with how equipment and other materials will be handed over and how the activity will be closed down. A sustainability strategy typically would present a vision and a practical plan for ensuring sustainability of benefits and, in the case of TA, an approach for 'weaning' organizations off of the TA.

⁷⁴ The Ministry of National Education (MONE) in Indonesia uses these types of agreements between itself and the governor of the province or district in which MONE itself or MONE with development partners are investing in education development, for example, in school construction. When the governor does not ensure that the terms of the agreement are being honored, MONE sends a representative to explore the situation and attempt to resolve it and if the governor does not remedy the situation, MONE institutes financial penalties by withholding central level funds that should be flowing to the province or district. This approach works very well and very few governors re-neg on their agreements.

versus the current one-on-one principle. Under an expanded access approach, even if individual SMOE personnel are moved or removed, a critical mass of individuals will remain within the organization.⁷⁵ A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), similar to the example given in Understanding between MoEST and a respective state government and some could help protect the aid investment during implementation and potentially after TAP.

Given the constraints listed above, one of two things needs to happen—either the TAP time frame needs to be extended to enable the Program to have some chance of realizing its ambitious aims or the expectations of what TAP can contribute in the current time frame need to be modified. In either case, a set of clear organizational development targets — the ‘common core’ --needs to be specified along with the manner in which these core targets will be achieved. The Organizational Development Tracking and Planning Instrument⁷⁶ (refer to Annex 13: Organizational Development Tracking and Planning Tool and the TAP July 2009 workshop session on the IDF should have a positive impact on both TAP implementation as well as the post-TAP phase.

⁷⁵ This would be further enhanced if combined with assistance for succession planning in SMOEs.

⁷⁶ The “OD (Organizational Tracking and Planning Instrument)” is the name given to the IDF revision by the MTE Team.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategy

- Recommendation 1: Request AED TAP to review and refine the draft Memorandum of Understanding (see Annex 11: Draft Content for MoE ST-SMoE Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)) and to present it to MoEST, state governors and SMOEs for consideration as a concept and potential action.
- Recommendation 2: Request AED TAP to articulate its approach (including an action plan) to progressing the anticipated partnerships between State Ministries of Education and donor/development partners and between TAP and other USAID nominated activities (BRIDGE, GEE and IRI) and ensure that TA personnel and SMOE personnel are familiar with and supportive of the directions proposed.

Human Resources

- Recommendation 3: Request AED TAP-Washington to re-assess the level of TAP Hub (central program office) resourcing and to specifically 'uncouple' the Chief of Party (COP) role from the Senior Technical Advisor role with both becoming separately staffed, full-time positions. The MoEST Senior Technical Advisor position should only be staffed once Recommendation 6: has been accomplished.
- Recommendation 4: Request AED TAP to resolve outstanding personnel well-being and contractual issues, including re-visiting and refining position descriptions.
- Recommendation 5: Request AED TAP to identify and implement a strategy to support current TA personnel on the job including, at a minimum Option 1 and considering Options 2 and 3 (see Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support), particularly if additional financing becomes available.
- Recommendation 6: Request AED TAP to discuss fielding a short-term technical expert to provide advice to MoEST on a strategic approach to ensure the identification, recruitment and utilization of TA that fits with the evolving needs of MoEST and the GoSS Parliamentary Committee for Education.

Impact

- Recommendation 7: Request AED TAP to immediately draft: a sustainability and exit strategy taking into account TAP's ending date of September 2011 as well as the long-term considerations associated with a realistic capacity building time frame (conservatively 10-20 years); and, a standard risk management matrix.
- Recommendation 8: Request AED TAP to incorporate conflict sensitive analysis into its programming, utilizing one of the many tools available and to report on the cumulative amount of time TA personnel are kept off or are limited on the job due to insecurity since this factor has significant implications for TAP impact.

- Recommendation 9: Request AED TAP to introduce a Program Logical Framework or Results Framework that grounds qualitative findings in empirical data and sound research methods and improves monitoring and evaluation to take into account: (i) a clear M&E approach (and ideally a framework)⁷⁷ and (ii) analyses and meta-analyses of data and inclusion of these findings in reports.
- Recommendation 10: Request AED TAP to articulate a gender and development support strategy in collaboration with GEE that is informed by the work being undertaken by GoSS bodies, other development partners, and projects.

⁷⁷ For an example of a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, see Annex 7: MonitorING and Evaluation – Additional Information

V. LESSONS LEARNED

- A hub-satellite program management/delivery model requires a strenuous effort to manage and should be resourced accordingly.
- A challenging living and working environment requires special management flexibility.
- The lack of a risk management matrix that commits the various stakeholders to agreed mitigation strategies is the most significant risk to activity implementation and impact.
- The absence of a sustainability and exit strategy that informs both the design and implementation stages of an activity heightens the risk that benefits will not be sustained.
- A capacity enhancement program design should incorporate a medium to long term (at a minimum, 10 to 20 years) time frame, given the current research on organizational development and change in developing countries.
- A policy on gender is a necessary, but not sufficient, element for realizing gender equality.
- Even limited learning and innovation opportunities in an environment affected by protracted conflict can lead to big results and have a significant multiplier effect⁷⁸.
- Capacity enhancement needs to be embedded within a Theory of Change/systems thinking paradigm to affect real change at the individual and organizational levels and to influence the enabling environment.
- Reinforcing strengths works--it empowers, motivates and taps into creativity.
- The natural tension faced by TA personnel to serve a variety of purposes -- including general supervision, gate keeping, gap filling and task accomplishment – complicates achievement of intended program results.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ See Annex 9: Case Study - Generating Income to Support the Operational Activities of the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education, Southern Sudan.

⁷⁹ Morgan, Peter (2008) Improving Counterpart Relationships in Papua New Guinea: A Study for the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Australia. Canberra, Australia: AusAID.

ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK

Draft Scope of Work
14 May 2009

Management Systems International (MSI) SUPPORT Project with USAID/Sudan¹

Mid-Term Collaborative Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Program (TAP) Phase II

Implemented by Academy for Educational Development (AED)

(Estimated start date: June 2009)

1. Introduction and Background

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, borders nine countries, and has a population estimated at 40 million on the eve of the first census to be conducted in decades, which took place in April 2008 with the results yet to be released. The current southern Sudan population is estimated at 10-12 million people, with an estimated four million others displaced to northern Sudan and living as refugees outside the country. Southern Sudan has suffered from decades of underdevelopment, war, famine, drought and flood, resulting in the devastation of the South's economic, political and social structures. The southern Sudanese people lack basic health and education services and the infrastructure needed to build a thriving economy and functioning state. Since the mid-1990s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and international humanitarian relief agencies became the prime providers of an array of much needed services.

After decades of civil war, parties to Sudan's north-south civil war signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January of 2005. The CPA is comprised of six interlocking agreements related to wealth and power sharing, the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) that provides southern Sudanese with representation in the national government, a resolution of conflicts in the oil-rich border regions between northern and southern Sudan (known collectively as the "Three Areas"), the creation of a southern Sudanese government and state governments with appointed leadership until elections in 2009, and the establishment of a six-year interim period after which the citizens of southern Sudan will vote on whether to remain a part of unified Sudan or secede to create an independent state.

¹ MSI holds a 3-year contract to provide Mission-wide support to USAID/Sudan in program and project evaluation and designs, MIS management, translation services, facilities management, VIP hosting, and research. An in-country team, based in Khartoum and Juba, provides these services, supplemented by short-term technical assistance.

Prior to the signing of the CPA and since, USAID has provided extensive humanitarian assistance in southern Sudan and the Three Areas mainly by supporting the non-government organizations providing basic services. In addition, since signing of the CPA USAID began to fund development assistance programs that focus on assisting the new Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to establish its core institutions and systems and begin producing much anticipated peace dividends, i.e. sustained and comprehensive improvements in basic services such as health and education, economic growth, and democratic governance.

Along with significant challenges facing Sudanese in their transition from war to peace are a number of opportunities to assist them in their endeavor. Despite the signing of the CPA, Sudan remains a vulnerable state. Its children, many of whom are orphans, returning refugees and ex-combatants, are particularly at risk – especially in the Three Areas (South Kordofan, Abyei, and Blue Nile). It is essential that displaced and other affected people, particularly orphans and ex-combatant youth be safely reintegrated into their communities. Those communities will need assistance. In the case of South Sudan's youth, affected by the many conflicts and tensions during the past 21 years, the provision of basic education is critical to providing a solid foundation upon which their future success and contribution to society can be based. The provision of schooling can also be seen as a tangible result of the "peace dividends" expected by Sudanese citizens and, in turn, will contribute to stabilization in the region. Durable stability is contingent upon demonstrative and observable change "on the ground" and education, valued highly among the Sudanese, is both a necessary and visible symbol of that change.

In many areas in the South, primary health and education services have been almost exclusively externally funded. Since the mid-1990s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies offering humanitarian relief became the prime providers of an array of much needed services. As peace is consolidated in the South, USAID will continue to support a responsible transition from emergency to development assistance that will seek to improve access to and quality of primary education in the longer term. Education and health activities are supported by investment in other essential services, such as water and sanitation, in an effort to rebuild local communities, reduce tensions, and provide the much sought-after peace dividends.

USAID Education and Country Strategies

Under the United States Government (USG) Strategic Framework, education falls under the *Investing in People* objective which includes health and education and institutional capacity building in these areas. In 2005, the Sudan Mission developed and approved a new strategy based upon a Fragile States concept which placed primary importance on nurturing achievement of a just and lasting peace through the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It has two strategic objectives (SO): (i) averting and resolving conflict and (ii) promoting stability, recovery and democratic reform in South Sudan.

USAID Education Program for Southern Sudan: Overview

The Education Portfolio contributes to both SOs through activities which bolster confidence in the CPA and government's capacity to deliver social services and peace dividends. It helps to establish the foundations for an effective, equitable and quality education system. It supports capacity building for the education officials that make and implement policies in an effort to secure effective functioning of the system in the longer term. It works to improve service delivery at the community level throughout the South (including Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states), promote access to primary grades 1-8, English language competency, equitable access and education opportunities for girls, teacher training, and primary school construction.

Technical Assistance Program (TAP)

Introduction

The Academy for Educational Development (AED) leads the USAID-funded Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (TAP) with EQUIP2 partners the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and American Institutes of Research (AIR).² The USAID/EQUIP2 Associate Award for TAP Phase I began in August 2005. TAP Phase II began in September 2007, and will continue for four years until September 2011. Between August 2005 and September 2007, TAP worked to build capacity at the Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (GoSS-MoEST) in Juba. The program expanded in FY08 to nine State Ministries of Education (SMoEs) and in FY09 to all ten.

Program Objectives and Linkages to Education and Country Strategies

TAP contributes to the USG education strategy of Investing in People by supporting a comprehensive set of activities that strengthen the government's capacity to manage the education system. These activities consolidate, build upon, and expand accomplishments under previous USAID education programs. Specific program objectives are strengthening capacities at both central and state levels to develop the policies, plans, programs and implementation capabilities that increase access to and the quality of education in Southern Sudan. TAP also supports the Mission's Country Strategy. It contributes in a fundamental way to the goals of good governance and decentralized provision of social services. It helps to expand and deepen peace dividends through the promotion of the critical-thinking, problem-solving, and communication-based learning that are essential to the development of democratic principles, practices, and institutions. Finally, it addresses the sources of fragility by building a responsive, transparent and accountable government capable of delivering education services in the longer term.

TAP Capacity Building Approach and Implementation Framework

TAP's concept of capacity building is envisioned in terms of action and performance – what individual professionals and groups of professionals can accomplish when the institutions that are designed and ordered to promote effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and sustainability within a work culture that expects and rewards good performance. In education, the ultimate measure of good performance is the ability to support expanding and improving education at the local and school level: i.e. teachers teaching and students learning.

TAP is a labor intensive effort comprising primarily short and long term technical assistants. FY09 the highly successful State Advisors Program expanded so that one Senior Advisor (SA) and one Diaspora Technical Assistant (DTA) were placed in each state, in addition to the MoEST Senior Advisor who sits in Juba. Short term specialized support is also being provided on the basis of the needs identified with MoEST.

² AIR, which had been scheduled for a limited amount of short-term technical assistance in TAP, withdrew from participation in the program during discussions preceding the cooperative agreement modification.

TAP's capacity-building model incorporates learning-by-doing, on-the-job training, and mentoring by highly qualified professionals who are embedded in the ministries. TAP does not have budget for a comprehensive set of formal training activities (i.e. workshops, materials development, or study-tours), therefore advisors work along side ministry officials to leverage other donor and NGO funds for implementing activities. Having the advisors and assistants fully integrated into ministry structures working side-by-side with education officials on a daily basis allows maximum interface and knowledge transfer in an actual working environment.

The TAP implementation framework guides all activities and provides the structure for demonstrating progress and measuring results. This framework ensures a consistent approach and a set of core activities across all states while allowing for responsiveness to the priorities of individual states.

TAP comprises two closely related program areas: 1) Education Management and 2) Program Implementation. Within them all activities are implemented according to a seven-step sequence which ensures a uniform approach and the basis for assessing effectiveness of inputs:

1. Needs assessment carried out
2. Goals and strategies developed together with SMEs
3. Training plan developed (direct training and indirect training)
4. Training activities carried out documenting timing, materials, training approaches, etc.
5. Results/Impact recorded
6. Follow-up planned and/or carried out
7. Documents or deliverables submitted

Program Activities and Beneficiaries

A. Education Management activities support:

- (1) systematic annual planning and budgeting;
- (2) effective financial management;
- (3) a transparent and payroll system;
- (4) thorough documentation and record keeping;
- (5) rationalized approaches to task management;
- (6) appropriate organizational structures;
- (7) effective staffing and institutionalized performance evaluation;
- (8) a computer literate staff;
- (9) coordination of development partners;
- (10) gender equity across the education sector;
- (11) enactment of the Education Act.

B. Program Implementation activities

- (1) state-supported fast track teacher training initiatives;
- (2) building community support for education;
- (3) enhancing school supervision;
- (4) improving textbook distribution;
- (5) improving examination protocols.

These activities are designed to build capacity to manage education projects effectively. In 2007 - 2008, efforts focused on launching teacher training and alternative education programs supported by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). These projects stalled, however, so were dropped by TAP at the end of 2008 in favor of a variety of other program areas, including:

TAP's direct beneficiaries are MoEST and SMoE education officials; indirect beneficiaries include all education staff and, ultimately, students in both formal and non-formal education programs.

Tracking Progress and Results

The TAP approach to monitoring progress and measuring results incorporates the following:

1. Tracking progress towards achievement of TAP capacity-building objectives via 4 benchmarks:
 - The proposed activity is discussed, agreed upon, and an action plan is developed with education officials;
 - The activity initiated and established;
 - The activity is ongoing and initial institutionalization is in evidence;
 - The activity is fully institutionalized and likely sustainable after TAP support ends.
2. Meeting standard USAID Performance Management criteria under the *Investing in People* objective and the Basic Education element through USAID's target-based indicator approach;
3. Meeting customized performance indicators that have been identified and designed to address the specific institutional development and capacity building objectives of TAP;
4. Working within the USAID Institutional Development Framework (IDF) to capture and document progress from a broader (i.e. multi-sectoral) perspective; and
5. Ensuring that the results required under the TAP Cooperative Agreement are reflected and used as guidelines to program implementation.

2.Evaluation Purpose

While it will be relevant to determine whether significant progress has been made in producing promised deliverables and indicating where impacts are occurring, this is not an impact evaluation. It is a formative mid-term evaluation, the primary intent of which is to help USAID, MoEST and AED learn from experience to date and consider what can be done to improve the chances of success in the remaining time of the project. More specifically, the evaluation report should specify the TAP model and determine if it is a reasonable approach to the needs it seeks to address, if it has a reasonable chance for success as it continues to evolve, and how it can be improved moving forward to achieve significant, sustainable success at important scale.

3. Evaluation Questions

The following questions should be addressed by the evaluation team, in light of the purpose described above:

Project design

1. How well does TAP fit within USAID's education strategy generally and its education strategy for Africa specifically? How well does TAP correspond to the GoSS/MoEST strategies and desired direction for education in Southern Sudan?
2. Specify the TAP capacity building approach. Is the model, as currently evolving, having success (in improving individual skills and fostering institutional capacity gains), given the current stage of the project [see also Evaluation Question 8, below]? Does the model have the potential to achieve significant impact? Recommendations should be provided on what elements should be modified/cut/added to improve the approach.
3. Describe and assess the measures being undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the capacities being developed under TAP. What are the constraints to sustainability, and what can TAP do to mitigate them?

Project implementation

4. How successfully State Advisors and DTAs managing the interface with ministry to promote human and institutional capacity strengthening?
5. Is TAP progress to date in meeting the deliverables of the Cooperative Agreement (as amended) and TAP's implementation targets (as specified in project documents) on track for the project's current stage of implementation? Describe any areas of concern or of accelerated success in implementation.
6. Provide a brief description of the program outcomes, deliverables, and products. Assess the quality of the deliverables to date. Identify particular strategies, activities, or programs that are effective and describe why they have worked.
7. TAP's approach to undertaking and measuring capacity building has evolved and been refined over the last two years. How has this affected the program? Is it cast at the appropriate level (that is, where data emerging from the system are used and the monitoring and evaluation system are well understood by all TAP advisors/assistants and their ministry counterparts)?
8. Is the activity effectively addressing gender issues such as inclusiveness, training and promotion, and the gender gap in MoEST and the SMoEs? If not, why not? What are the areas for improvement?
9. What are the key *external* opportunities/constraints that TAP has leveraged/suffered from in implementation and have TAP's responses to these external realities been appropriate? Among others, please consider especially relationships and experience with the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), Education Management Information System (implemented by AED and funded by UNICEF), and the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF, particularly with regard to payroll systems improvement).

10. Assess the quality and performance of AED in managing implementation of TAP. What are the team's strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement with respect to contract management and communications with USAID, GOSS and stakeholders?
11. Identify the best and worst practices, success stories, and testimonials. Are there important lessons to be learned, and is there a story which can best demonstrate to the U.S. Congress lasting impacts from the project?

Project impact to date

12. Have TAP interventions resulted in significant organizational capacity improvements and skill enhancements?
13. Is this activity rendering a clear CPA "peace dividend"? To what extent has TAP enhanced understanding and institutionalization of the elements of good governance (transparency, responsiveness, accountability) and effective decentralized delivery of education services?
14. Is the program on track to be effective in improving the capacity of the MoEST to provide high quality education services and institutionalizing a decentralized approach to education service?

4. Methodology

The External Evaluators will be provided the following materials before arriving in Sudan:

- Project quarterly reports, annual reports, and inception reports
- Project Monitoring Plans
- Data from Institutional Development Frameworks completed for the project
- A listing of Activities completed or underway, by state, for the program
- USAID Strategic Framework for Investing in People Basic Education
- USAID Fragile States Framework
- MoEST Strategy Document
- Table describing states' strengths and weaknesses in capacity improvement response
- List of TAP activities in each state

They will be expected to be familiar with this information prior to arriving in Juba. They should also consider contacting AED's team in Washington to learn more about the TAP model and how it has been applied elsewhere.

A Team Planning Meeting (TPM) will be held upon arrival in Juba to agree on how the team will work together, how they will interact with the client and other stakeholders, and to develop a work plan and finalize a Travel Schedule. At the heart of the effort will be to conduct visits to four sites TAP is active (Juba, plus three other states in Southern Sudan). To maximize the efficiency of the team, the travel will most likely be by charter plane, so travel arrangements to targeted states will be made in advance of the team's arrival.

During the TPM the team will finalize the methodology to be used and produce the evaluative instruments to be employed. We expect, however, that in addition to basing the evaluation's findings on interviews and review of project documents, the team will also utilize the following simple approaches:

- Development of an interview guide to ensure that the correct evaluation questions are being addressed to the appropriate individuals and that they are being posed and recorded consistently. This is particularly important due to the diverse composition of the team and the limited time at each site;
- Case studies will be completed of key activity areas (such as payroll assistance, or planning assistance) in targeted states; and
- Focus groups will be arranged in Juba of State Advisors, Diaspora Technical Advisors, and GoSS/MoEST Focal Points near the end of the field work.

Once the methodology has been finalized at the TPM it will be shared with USAID as part of the work plan approval process.

5. Evaluation Team

Team Composition

USAID Sudan is conducting the Mid-Term Review of TAP in a collaborative manner to maximize USAID, GoSS and AED learning opportunities. Accordingly, the team will be comprised as follows:

- Two External Evaluators (skill sets detailed below), provided by MSI
- One representative of USAID
- One representative of GoSS/MoEST
- One representative of AED

Additional inputs may come from other staff from these agencies, as needed, and as coordinated by the respective team member.

USAID's representative may be a person from the Sudan Education Team or a USAID Financial Analyst with expertise in assessing program budgets and expenditures. GoSS/MoEST and AED may choose their representatives as they see fit, but persons selected should have experience with similar education and capacity building programs in Sudan. Given the significant contributions to the team expected from each team member, all are expected to be available to participate throughout the evaluation period.

Team Member Roles and Responsibilities

USAID, GoSS/MoEST, and AED team members will provide historical, contextual and programmatic background information that will inform the assessment. They will be expected to participate in the Team Planning Meeting (TPM), field visits, interviews, brainstorming on Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations, and in the frequent reflections on evaluation learning, often occurring after a long day of interviews and traveling. These individuals participate as representatives of their respective organizations and are expected to share their learning with their home organizations so that all three key organizations are kept abreast of progress. It may well happen that the External Evaluators will ask USAID, MoEST, or AED representatives to be excluded from certain portions of interviews in order to ensure candid responses.

The External Evaluators will take the lead in conducting the evaluation, leading interviews, framing the analysis, facilitating group discussion and consensus, preparing for the debriefing, and drafting the evaluation report. One of the External Evaluators will serve as the overall Evaluation Team Leader. The Evaluation Team Leader will take full responsibility for managing the team, organizing its work, and ensuring quality control and delivery of a final report acceptable to USAID. Precise division of labor among the two External Evaluators will be determined at the TPM.

Between the two External Evaluators, the following capacities must be brought to the team:

1. Strong skills in assessment and analysis of USAID capacity building and institutional development projects in the education sector;
2. Extensive experience working in Africa and/or similar post conflict environments;
3. Expertise building effective systems for decentralized provision of education services in a similar – and preferably African – context;
4. Experience leading participatory evaluations, or at least evaluations where evaluation teams include critical stakeholders as active participants, or significant experience as a facilitator; and
5. Experience arranging meetings, setting up travel schedules for field visits, reporting on meeting outcomes, and generally managing the logistics of the review (although significant logistical assistance will be provided by the SUPPORT team in Juba).

Note: MSI's field office in Juba will be responsible for travel arrangements (travel, housing in the field, etc.) for the USAID and GoSS/MoEST team members. MSI will fund travel-related costs for the GoSS/MoEST team member, but not for the USAID team member.³ MSI and AED will jointly arrange all meetings for the team, in coordination with GoSS/MoEST. The team will be provided office and meeting space, as needed, at SUPPORT's Juba Office Compound.

6. Report Production and Format

The team will present for approval by USAID a draft outline of the report during its first week in country.

The report must:

- Distinguish clearly between findings, conclusions (based strictly on findings) and recommendations (based clearly on the reports findings and conclusions);
- Comply with all instructions of the SUPPORT Project's "Evaluation/Special Study Quality Management Guide" and meet the specific requirements of the "Evaluation Report Review – Score Sheet", contained therein;
- Include a Table of Contents; a list of acronyms; an Executive Summary of no more than three pages; a section describing the project to be evaluated and purpose of the evaluation; a section on the methodology employed, including relevant skill sets of the evaluators;
- Include any annexes the team considers useful to the reader, such as an annex listing Useful Tools and Products emerging from TAP that should be repackaged and produced for wider distribution to other USAID-funded implementing partners in Sudan; and
- A copy of this SOW as an Annex.

³ If the USAID representative is an Institutionally-Contracted Staff member provided by MSI, his/her travel costs will be provided by MSI separately.

A formal debriefing will be provided to USAID, AED and the GOSS, its timing indicated in the Activities and Timing section, below. The team will present key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations for comment from the stakeholders. The team will record all relevant feedback from the meeting and will respond to all comments in completing its draft reports. The External Evaluators need not include all suggestions in the report, but must consider such suggestions in finalizing its Draft Report.

An electronic (in MS Word) and five copies of the Draft Report will be presented to the AED/TAP team in Juba (one copy) and the USAID/Sudan Mission (four copies) prior to the departure of the Team Leader. The document will not exceed 30 pages, excluding annexes.

Each of the Mission and AED will submit its comments on the draft report *electronically* to MSI's COP – using the “track changes” and “comments” functions in MS WORD as much as possible. The Mission will receive ten paper copies of the final report as well as an electronic version, once the Mission has accepted the product.

7. Activities and Timing

Prior to arriving in Juba, the External Evaluators will have familiarized themselves with the background material provided to them. They should also consider contacting AED's team in Washington to learn more about the TAP model and how it has been applied elsewhere.

All team members should be present for the TPM, initial briefings and discussions with USAID's Education Officer and team and other Mission officers, as well as AED and GoSS/MoEST officials. A Work Plan and travel program for the in-country visit as well as the subsequent report writing period will be submitted to USAID for approval during the first few days of work in Juba. The Work Plan will also include a schedule for periodic MSI and USAID progress reports and possible submissions of specific work products, as determined by the parties. A tentative work calendar is presented at the end of the SOW.

Approximately four days prior to departure the Evaluation Team will present to USAID, AED, and the GoSS an out-briefing, with supporting documents. The Draft Evaluation Report will be submitted prior to the External Evaluators' departure from Juba.

Each of the Mission and AED will submit its comments on the draft report within ten work days of receiving the draft report. The Final Report will be submitted to USAID ten work days after the Team Leader's receipt of USAID's and AED's final written comments on the draft.

It is envisioned that the External Evaluators will be in Sudan the entire duration of the evaluation's in-country component, i.e., three weeks (six-day work weeks are authorized). In addition to travel days, an additional two days are provided for the External Evaluators to complete reading and processing all background information prior to departure for Sudan. Three additional days for the Team Leader are provided for him/her to finalize the report. (See above graphic presentation.)

Projected Level of Effort (LOE) and Timeline

Tasks (Both External Evaluators, unless otherwise noted)	Work Days (5-day weeks in Sudan, 5 in USA)	Timeline for Completion
Initial Preparation Review advance background documents and SUPPORT Project's Evaluation and Special Study Guide, make travel preparations, and travel days to Juba.	5	June 2009
In-Country Evaluation Initial briefings, meetings, field visits, draft report preparation and debriefings	18	July 2009
Return travel	2	July 2009
Final Report Preparation in U.S. Incorporate collective Sudan feedback, complete final report, and submit to USAID Health/Education Team Leader.	1 each and 4 for Review Team Leader	August 2009
Total for each Evaluation Team member	26	
Total for Evaluation Team Leader (3 additional days)	29	

Deliverables

- A draft work plan
- A schedule of travel and key activities
- Interim progress briefings to MSI and the Mission, as determined during the TPM
- Preliminary report outline
- Out-briefing, with supporting documents
- Draft report
- Final report

Compliance to USAID Regulations

The Review Team will ensure that the evaluation is fully compliant with the terms for Project Evaluations contained in the USAID Automated Directives System (ADS) Series 203 and other relevant regulatory requirements, as may be determined by USAID. Additionally, the Team will utilize MSI's "SUPPORT Evaluation/Special Study Quality Management Guide." The Guide will be presented to the Team members prior to their initial MSI briefing in Washington.

Tentative Work Schedule

The following pages present a tentative work schedule for the assignment.

JUNE 2009

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday																																																																																									
	1	2	3	4	5	6																																																																																									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13																																																																																									
14 Flag Day	15	16	17 Preparation day	18 Preparation day	19 Travel day	20 Travel day																																																																																									
21 Team arrives in Juba; TPM begins	22 TRM is completed	23 Juba Meetings (USAID, MoEST, AED)	24	25 Travel to one of the States	26	27																																																																																									
28	29 Travel to second State	30																																																																																													
		May 2009 <table border="1"> <tr><td>S</td><td>M</td><td>T</td><td>W</td><td>Th</td><td>F</td><td>Sa</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td></tr> <tr><td>10</td><td>11</td><td>12</td><td>13</td><td>14</td><td>15</td><td>16</td></tr> <tr><td>17</td><td>18</td><td>19</td><td>20</td><td>21</td><td>22</td><td>23</td></tr> <tr><td>24</td><td>25</td><td>26</td><td>27</td><td>28</td><td>29</td><td>30</td></tr> <tr><td>31</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </table>	S	M	T	W	Th	F	Sa						1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31							July 2009 <table border="1"> <tr><td>S</td><td>M</td><td>T</td><td>W</td><td>Th</td><td>F</td><td>Sa</td></tr> <tr><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>10</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>12</td><td>13</td><td>14</td><td>15</td><td>16</td><td>17</td><td>18</td></tr> <tr><td>19</td><td>20</td><td>21</td><td>22</td><td>23</td><td>24</td><td>25</td></tr> <tr><td>26</td><td>27</td><td>28</td><td>29</td><td>30</td><td>31</td><td></td></tr> </table>	S	M	T	W	Th	F	Sa			1	2	3	4		5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31		Notes: www.usrbid2.com © 2007 Verter42 LLC
S	M	T	W	Th	F	Sa																																																																																									
					1	2																																																																																									
3	4	5	6	7	8	9																																																																																									
10	11	12	13	14	15	16																																																																																									
17	18	19	20	21	22	23																																																																																									
24	25	26	27	28	29	30																																																																																									
31																																																																																															
S	M	T	W	Th	F	Sa																																																																																									
		1	2	3	4																																																																																										
5	6	7	8	9	10	11																																																																																									
12	13	14	15	16	17	18																																																																																									
19	20	21	22	23	24	25																																																																																									
26	27	28	29	30	31																																																																																										

JULY 2009

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
			1	2	3	4 Independence Day
			Travel to third State		Return to Juba to analyze and begin to write	
5	6 Begin to draft F/C/R	7 Focus groups	8 Finalize F/C/R	9 Debriefing	10 Write	11 Write
12 Hand in Draft Report Travel home	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26 Parents' Day	27 USAID and AED submit written responses to Draft Report	28	29	30	31	
		June 2009 S M T W Th F Sa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30		August 2009 S M T W Th F Sa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31		Notes: www.veter42.com © 2007 Veter42 LLC

ANNEX 2: SCHEDULE OF CONSULTATIONS

TABLE 1: FIELD WORK MASTER SCHEDULE, SOUTHERN SUDAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SSTAP): JUNE 17 – JULY 31, 2009

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
Wednesday – Sunday: June 17-21				
	Val/Bob	MTE Team External Personnel	Preparation and Travel	Home Base & International
Sunday: June 21				
AM	Val/Bob	MTE Team External Personnel	Travel to Juba, Southern Sudan (Arrive 11 am, June 21)	Travel
PM	Val/Bob/Ami/Ashley	MTE Team External Personnel MSI Sudan Personnel	TPM Day 1 Briefing by MSI Preparation for TPM Day 2	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Monday: June 22				
9:00 – 12:00	Val/Bob/Ami/Ashley/Grace/Hakim/Katie/Inez/Peter/Pia	MTE Team External Internal Personnel MSI Sudan Personnel	TPM Day 2 Review work tasks Review document outline (drafts) Agree on approach to field work Products developed—Report Outline, Getting to Answers, Work Plans (master and individual)	MSI (Juba Office)

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
1:00 – 4:30	Val/Bob/Ami/Ashley	MTE Team External Internal Personnel MSI Sudan Personnel	AED Washington teleconference	MSI (Juba Office)
Tuesday: June 23				
9:45-1:15	Val/Bob/Ami/Ashley/Grace/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team External Internal Personnel MSI Sudan Personnel	TPM Day 3 Instrument development Interviewees determined Interview process and protocol developed and discussed	MSI (Juba Office)
1:15-3:30	Mr. Peter Malnak	USAID Director	Welcome by USAID Director	USAID Compound (Juba)
	Ms. Casey Chu	USAID Democratization/Governance TL	USAID directions in Southern Sudan Exploration of Democratization and Governance directions and lessons learned in capacity development	
	Ms. Ruth Buckley	M&E Specialist and Bridges TL	Understanding of USAID M&E directions and expectations regarding the MTE	
Wednesday: June 24				
9:30-4:30	Central Equatorial State Ministry of Education personnel Mr Kanju Yakuma, DTA Mr Christopher Kenyi, STA	Central Equatoria State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Central Equatoria State Ministry Of Education

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
4:30-5:30	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	De-brief CES interviews Finalize paperwork and trip plans	MSI (Juba Office)
Thursday: June 25				
7:30-10:30	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Fly to Yambio, Western Equatoria State	Juba Airport
10:00-4:00	Western Equatorial State Ministry of Education personnel Dr Charles Kanyarusoke, STA Ms Lucy Vivian Elipaza, DTA Ultimate Beneficiaries	Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Western Equatoria State Ministry Of Education (Yambio)
Friday: June 26				
10:00-4:00	Western Equatorial State Ministry of Education personnel Dr Charles Kanyarusoke, STA Ms Lucy Vivian Elipaza, DTA Ultimate Beneficiaries	Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant Ultimate Beneficiaries	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Western Equatoria State Ministry Of Education (Yambio)

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
4:00	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Return to Juba	Western Equatoria State Airport (Yambio)
Saturday: June 27				
8:00-9:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team External Personnel	Desk Work	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Sunday: June 28				
9:00 – 5:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team External Personnel	Desk Work (nominally day off; not in actuality)	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
5:00-7:30	Dr Grace Akukwe Ms Arushi Terway	AED TAP Chief of Party and GoSS MoEST STA AED TAP Manager, Washington DC	Perspectives on TAP from management side	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Monday: June 29				
8:00 – 10:00	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Fly to Lakes State	Juba Airport
10:00-4:00	Lakes State Ministry of Education personnel Mr Gol Ayie Jal, DTA Ultimate Beneficiaries	Lakes State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant Ultimate Beneficiaries	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Lakes State Ministry Of Education (Rumbek) Counties/Schools

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
Tuesday: June 30				
8:00 – 4:00	Lakes State Ministry of Education personnel Mr Belay Hagos, STA Mr Gol Ayie Jal, DTA Ultimate Beneficiaries	Lakes State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant Ultimate Beneficiaries	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Lakes State Ministry Of Education (Rumbek) Counties/Schools
4:30	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Travel to Airport	Lakes Airport (Rumbek)
5:00	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Arrive in Wau, Western Bar el Ghazal	Western Bar El Ghazal Airport (Wau)
Wednesday: July 1				
8:00 – 4:00 Val (continues on to Juba with plane; rest of team carries out Western Bar El Ghazal and Warrap field work)	Western Bar El Ghazal State Ministry of Education personnel Ms Leila Bogoreth, STA Mr Simon Amos Duku, DTA Ultimate Beneficiaries	Western Bar El Ghazal State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant Ultimate Beneficiaries	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Western Bar El Ghazal State Ministry Of Education (Wau) Counties & Schools

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
Thursday: July 2				
8:45	Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Travel to Airport	Western Bar El Ghazal State Airport (Wau)
9:00	Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Travel to Kuajok, Warrap State	Warrap State (Kuajok)
10:00-4:00	Warrap State Ministry of Education personnel Ms Heidi Eschenbacher Mr Simon Deng Ultimate Beneficiaries	Warrap State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant Ultimate Beneficiaries	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Warrap State Ministry Of Education (Kuajok) Counties & Schools

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
9:00 – 6:30 (Val's meetings)	Mr Garang Akok Mr Edward Kokole Mr Vincent Damata Ms Esther Akumu Mr Fahim Akbar Ms Joyce Yawa Mr Charlie Goldsmith Dr Grace Akukwe	Director, Human Resources (GOSS MOEST) A/Director General, Quality Promotion and Innovation MDTF Financial Management Specialist MDTF Coordinator UNICEF-funded AED EMIS Specialist STA-Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei States, MDTF-funded AED TAP Chief of Party and State Technical Adviser-GOSS MOEST	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from AED personnel side	Ministry Of Education, Science & Technology , Juba
Friday: July 3				
9:30 – 4:00	Warrap State Ministry of Education personnel Ms Heidi Eschenbacher Mr Simon Deng Ultimate Beneficiaries	Warrap State Ministry of Education Director General, Department Heads, Deputy Department Heads & Section Heads, Non-Managerial Staff AED State Technical Adviser AED Diaspora Technical Assistant Ultimate Beneficiaries	Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry side Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side Perspectives on MDTF and on MDTF-funded portions of TAP Perspectives on CBTF (payroll) Perspectives on EMIS and roll-out to states	Warrap State Ministry Of Education (Kuajok) Counties & Schools
5:00	Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	Travel to Wau, WESTERN BAR EL GHAZAL STATE	Western Bar El Ghazal State (Wau)

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
9:00 – 5:00 (Val's Juba Meetings Schedule)	Dr Sibeso Lusawata Honorable Nartisio Mr Gerahun Gebru	UNICEF Chief of Education Head of Education Committee-Parliament MDTF Officer	Perspectives on TAP from development partner side Perspectives on TAP from GOSS Parliament side Perspectives on TAP collaboration with MDTF	Juba
Saturday: July 4				
9:00 – 11:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team	Desk Work Prepare for STA/DTA/Directors of Planning Workshop	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
11:00 – 12:30	Ms Inez Andrews	USAID TAP TL and COTR	Informal debriefing on Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations	USAID Compound
12:00 – 1:30	Dr. Charles Kanyarusoke	AED State Technical Adviser, Western Equatoria State	Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
1:30 – 5:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team	Desk Work Prepare for STA/DTA/Directors of Planning Workshop	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Sunday: July 5				
8:00 – 9:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team	Preparation Day (nominally a day off, but not in actuality)	Jebel Lodge (Juba)

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
Monday: July 6				
9:00 – 11:00	STAs, DTAs (32) Directors of Planning (10)	AED TA Personnel State Ministries of Education	Workshop to test out MTE Team’s data and initial conclusions on TAP with receiving ministry and TAP TA personnel Supplementing data gathered during field work	New York Hotel (Juba)
12:00-5:00	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	F/C/R Workshop	MSI (Juba)
Tuesday: July 7				
8:15 – 5:54	Val/Bob/Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team	F/C/R Workshop	MSI (Juba)
6:00 – 9:00	Dr Grace Akukwe Mr Jino	AED TA Personnel	Supplementing data gathered during field work	Thongpiny (Juba)
Wednesday: July 8				
9:00 – 5:45	Val/Bob	MTE Team (External)	Prepare for De-Briefing Meeting	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
5:00 – 6:00	Directors of Planning (10)	GoSS SMOEs	De-briefing on Preliminary F/C/R	New York Hotel (Juba)
6:00 – 7:30	AED management personnel STAs DTAs	AED Personnel	De-briefing on Preliminary F/C/R	New York Hotel (Juba)

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
Thursday: July 9				
9:00 – 3:00	Val/Bob/Katie/Inez/ Ami/Ashley	MTE Team (External) USAID Personnel MSI Personnel	Prepare for De-Briefing Meeting	MSI (Juba)
3:30 – 5:30	USAID GOSS DONORS/DEVEL OPMENT PARTNERS	USAID GOSS DONORS/DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS	De-briefing of MTE Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations	MoEST (Juba)
Friday: July 10				
9:00 – 5:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team (External)	Prepare Draft Report	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Saturday: July 11				
9:00 – 5:00	Val/Bob	MTE Team (External)	Prepare Draft Report	Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Sunday:, July 12				
	Val/Bob	MTE (External)	Depart Juba (Travel Days)	Juba Airport
Monday: July 13				
	Val/Bob	MTE (External)	(Travel Days)	
Tuesday: July 14				
	Val/Bob	MTE (External)	(Travel Days)	

 DATE	 NAME/DETAILS	 ORGANIZATON/POSITION	 FOCUS AREAS	 LOCATION
Saturday: July 18				
9:00	Val (1pm Sydney time)	MTE Team (External)	Send penultimate draft Report to Internal Team	Sydney
Sunday: July 19				
9:00	Hakim/Katie/Peter/Pia	MTE Team (Internal)	Send comments on penultimate draft to Val & Bob by 1:00pm Juba time	Juba
Monday: July 20				
(COB Juba time)	Val/Bob	MTE Team (External)	Submit draft Report to MSI	Sydney Asheville
Wednesday: July 22				
	Inez Andrews	USAID/Team Leader	Provide comments on draft Report to MSI	Juba
	Katie Johnston	USAID/MSI Senior Education Specialist		
	Grace Akukwe, et al.	AED Management		
Friday: July 24				
	Ashley Wax	MSI/Planning & M&E Adviser	Provide consolidated comments on draft Report to Val and Bob	Juba
Tuesday: July 28				
	Val	MTE Team (External)	Submit final Report to MSI	Sydney

ANNEX 3: EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF THE METHODOLOGY APPROACH

The Mid-Term Evaluation was a formative evaluation study that utilized a collaborative approach⁸⁰ guided by the two external evaluators with the input of representatives from the three key organizations involved in TAP: GoSS-MoEST, USG-USAID and AED. The collaborative nature of the evaluation was an intentional decision made on the basis of enhancing stakeholder understanding and ownership of the MTE findings and conclusions as well as commitment to implementing the proposed recommendations.

Participants

The Team canvassed a wide range of TAP stakeholders in the course of the MTE, predominantly in five states selected by USAID, GoSS and AED prior to the mobilization of the Team. The states' selection was based on a range of considerations including (but not limited to) the stage of development of the SMOE, extent of TA inputs, and safety and travel concerns. Nearly 180 individuals representing numerous agencies, organizations and perspectives and holding a variety of positions were interviewed. From June 24 to July 7, 2009, the Team spent one to two days with State Ministry of Education officials and staff, TAP personnel and other stakeholders in each of five states (Central Equatoria, Lakes, Western Bahr El Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Warrap). After the field visits, the Team had the opportunity to meet Directors of Planning, STAs and DTAs from all 10 states during the TAP Quarterly meeting which was held in Juba from July 6-9. The Team also met with senior officials from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the head of the GOSS Parliamentary Education Committee. See the "Matrix of Areas of Focus by Participant Group" (below) which provides a complete list of participant groups and the evaluation areas explored with each group. This table was developed in close consultation with USAID, GoSS and AED.

Data Collection and Analysis

Qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed. These data were gathered using a variety of research methods including Focus Group Discussions (FCG) with structured questionnaires and individual participant interviews using semi-structured questionnaires. Quantitative data were collected concerning length of service, rankings on extent of knowledge about TAP and extent of interaction with TAP personnel, proposals submitted to and/or financed by external funding bodies. Primary and secondary sources were also utilized, most notably, GoSS and USG documentation, AED-TAP reports and reference material capacity building, education in conflict-affected contexts, conflict sensitive analysis and technical assistance as a form of aid generated through Internet searches. A list of pertinent primary and secondary sources can be found in Annex 20: Bibliography. Care was taken to ensure that data were triangulated and discrepant cases identified and explored. Analysis of the data was undertaken in an iterative manner throughout the field work, culminating in a two-day Team workshop to agree on Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (FCR).

Consultations were undertaken primarily in a face to face (F2F) mode with a few interviews conducted via telephone. During the un-structured and semi-structured individual interviews and the FGDs and mini-FGDs, participants were asked to respond to a series of topical areas and the interviewers then followed up with open-ended probe questions.

⁸⁰ A collaborative evaluation "implies a varying level of involvement that considers the extent to which program staff and other stakeholders should be included as part of the evaluation team...is often empowering to participants... (and) enhances their understanding of evaluation so they gain new skills...promotes utilization of evaluation findings". (O'Sullivan, Rita G. 2004)

Integrity of the Data: Validity and Reliability

Data were captured in note form with strict attention paid to recording the informant's speech exactly. Where the speech or the meaning was not clear, the Team sought clarification with non-leading, non-evaluative follow-up questions such as, "Could you explain in another way what you mean?" or "Did you mean X or Y or something else?" During mini-focus group and focus group interviews, the Team ensured that all informants had an equal share of time to provide their opinions. As the interviews progressed, the Team identified emerging themes or patterns and verbalized these, checking with the informant(s) for their agreement or disagreement. Data were triangulated to the greatest extent possible in order to address issues of data integrity so that the findings/patterns that emerged were not the views of isolated individuals.

The participation of the Managing Contractor during consultations did not affect the Team's objectivity and the Team was sensitive to any indications from beneficiaries and stakeholders about an unwillingness to be frank in front of the Contractor representative. The external evaluators undertook the interviews of AED Senior Technical Advisors and Diaspora Technical Assistants, however, in order to ensure that these individuals were not compromised in any way.

Limitations of the Research

The determination of visit sites was made prior to the arrival of the external evaluators and without their input. While this was not ideal, the Team was obliged to use the locations that had been nominated. There do not appear to have been any negative repercussions resulting from this situation.

Time did not allow for the testing of any interview protocols or questionnaires before their use; however, care was taken to ensure that the interview protocols were progressively refined over the course of the field work while at the same time ensuring that the reliability and the validity of the data being collected were not compromised.

The Team also endeavored to ensure that the participant groups were consistent across the different sites; in most cases, it was not possible to guarantee that all targeted participants attended the FGD sessions or individual interviews.

A further limitation was the amount of time allocated to each site visit. This limitation had repercussions for the number of informants with whom the Team was able to consult and resulted in some un-evenness in the profile of the participants across sites. While the Team does not believe the inconsistencies in the pool of participants has had any significant negative impact on the findings, conclusions and recommendations, nonetheless, such a situation is not desirable and could have implications for the integrity of the data and the subsequent analysis.

Lastly, although recognized qualitative research methods were used to gather data, the analysis of the qualitative data was not a pure qualitative analysis in which a strict capture of the numbers of participants responding in the same manner was undertaken and results tallied and tabulated. Rather, the analysis was somewhat more relaxed as a result of the constraints of time and the newness of some Team members to rigorous research methodologies. Emerging patterns and trends were identified by individual team members and verified or discounted by other team members and data were continuously triangulated in an effort to counteract any laxity in rigor.


TABLE 2: INTERVIEW FOCUS AREAS & TARGET GROUP EMPHASIS

Focus	USAID-TL Education	USAID-Peter TL DG,	GoSS-Parliament	GoSS-Finance & Public Sector (central and state levels)	GoSS-MoEST (Counterparts)	GoSS-MoEST (Non-counterparts)	GoSS-County	AED Management Personnel	AED-TA Personnel	Partners-World Bank (Collaborator), Winrock (USAID) Oxfam (AED Wau), EDC (USAID), IRC (AED)	WB	Relations-UNICEF, CBTF	Ultimate Beneficiaries (Students, Parents, Teachers, Administrators)
Alignment with Government (GoSS and USG)	XXX		XXX	XXX	XXX			X	XX			XX	
Management-Effectiveness	XXX			XX	XXX	XX		XXX	XXX	XX		XX	XX
Management-Efficiency	XXX			XX	XXX	XX		XXX	XXX	XX		XX	XX
Partnerships (USAID GoSS-AED; MDTF; EDC; Winrock; Oxfam)	XXX			XX	XXX	XX		XXX	XXX	XXX (Winrock)		XX	
Relationships (UNICEF)	n/a				XXX		XX	XXX	XXX	XXX	X	XXX	XX
Quality (documentation/reporting, personnel, products, M&E, ...)	XXX				XXX			XXX	XXX		XXX	XX (CBTF)	X
Inclusion (gender, disabilities, other equity considerations)	XXX		XX	n/a	XXX		n/a	XXX	XXX	XX		XX	XXX
Peace Dividend/Conflict Sensitivity	XXX	XX	XX		XXX			XX	XX		XX	XX	XX
Impact	XXX		X	X	XXX	XXX	X	XXX	XXX	XX		XXX	XX

Focus	USAID-TL Education	USAID-Peter TL DG,	GoSS-Parliament	GoSS-Finance & Public Sector (central and state levels)	GoSS-MoEST (Counterparts)	GoSS-MoEST (Non-counterparts)	GoSS-County	AED Management Personnel	AED-TA Personnel	Partners-World Bank (Collaborator), Winrock (USAID) Oxfam (AED Wau), EDC (USAID), IRC (AED)	WB	Relations-UNICEF, CBTF	Ultimate Beneficiaries (Students, Parents, Teachers, Administrators)
Sustainability	XXX				XXX			XXX	XXX				XX
TAP Approach (design integrity, appropriateness/relevance)	XXX		XX		XXX	XX		XXX	XXX	XX		XX/X	XXX


ANNEX 4: TAP IMPLEMENTATION PHASES 2005-2011

FIGURE 8: TAP IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2005-2011




ANNEX 5: LIKERT SCALE SCORING OF TAP IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES (FROM 2007 PMP)

FIGURE 9: HISTOGRAM REPRESENTING OVERALL SCORING OF IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES (FROM 2007 PMP).




1. GoSS-MoEST leadership of Southern Sudan TAP will ensure integration, coordination and sustainability.



At this point in time (mid-way through the activity implementation), although the executive appreciates and works well with TAP management and the STA, there is no strong evidence that individuals and/or systems are being put in place that could ensure that TAP strategic approaches to capacity enhancement and organizational development vertically as well as horizontally are becoming embedded at the central level. A counterpart has not yet been nominated and TAP STA-MoEST does not interact closely with other MoEST external TA.

2. The Southern Sudan TAP for 2007 will build, strengthen and expand on earlier 2006 activities.



To a certain extent this is the case. TA personnel in all states are now consistently helping to progress the payroll system, to expand the understanding of and to embed sound planning processes, to extend the use of the EMIS for a range of purposes (including planning) and to strengthen coordination, collaboration and communication between and across levels of the education system and with development partners. A few TA personnel draw on prior documentation and instruments developed during Phases 1 and 2; however, many develop their own materials from scratch. The foundational element (the FTP) of TAP Phases 3 and 4,

however, is defunct and TA personnel have therefore lost the tried and tested systems, processes and instruments that were meant to be rolled-out and scaled up across the 10 states.

3. TAP is primarily a capacity-building program. Capacity building is seen as being accomplished effectively through on-the-job training, or learning by doing, an effective approach to adult learning and a way of implementing programs immediately rather than delaying until formal training is completed.

Strongly Agree	Agree Somewhat	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Strongly Disagree
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The principle itself is commendable and TAP has made significant progress in implementing the principle with a limited number of individuals in each SMOE headquarters—an in-built restriction due to the emphasis on one-on-one coaching/mentoring as a key element of the on-the-job/learning by doing principle will limit the impact of TAP and will potentially affect sustainability of benefits. This principle assumes that capacity enhancement can and should be implemented through a focus on the individual; however, it does not take the development of the organization or the institutions that impact on the individuals and the organization into account. This is a liability and a risk.

4. Southern Sudan TAP will coordinate and collaborate with USAID and other donor- funded education in Southern Sudan.

Strongly Agree	Agree Somewhat	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Strongly Disagree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Partnerships at the state level are becoming increasingly functional as TA personnel assist SMOE personnel to take a leadership role in harmonizing sector activities through: development partner registration, mapping development partner activities, ensuring that the scheduled routine meetings occur and that the SMOE leads the meetings, encouraging partners to get involved in annual planning, budget transparency, and dealing with underserved areas. Partnerships at the central level which have an impact vertically are increasingly becoming more strategic. The collaboration on payroll systems (Booz Allen), on EMIS, the education census and teacher head count (UNICEF) and combined USAID project (TAP, BRIDGE, GEE, SSIRI) leaders' meetings to identify state level collaboration are noteworthy.

5. Technical assistance under Southern Sudan TAP must remain fluid and flexible given the fluid situation in Southern Sudan and the changing priorities of the ministry.

Strongly Agree	Agree Somewhat	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Strongly Disagree
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

TAP has had to adapt quickly and flexibly to several changes in the enabling environment including USAID and GoSS decisions on Program directions and expansion and to a shift in the Phases 3 and 4 Program design logic due to central level issues in the utilization of the MDTF funds and program implementation. However, this principle should not be used by TAP as a rationale for uneven development of benefits and pockets of progress.

6. The Southern Sudan TAP will need to continue to strike a balance between being responsive to multiple requests to assist daily operations of MoEST and accomplishing program objectives and deliverables as agreed upon by MoEST, USAID and EQUIP 2.

Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Somewhat Strongly Disagree



The reporting processes in place for determining exactly where TA personnel are putting their efforts are still in a formative state. On the basis of evidence available, it appears that a core focus on some common activities is beginning to emerge (planning, payroll system, EMIS, computer literacy); however, the number of individuals benefitting is limited and the relinquishment of two indicators from TAP means that something else should be filling the void. Interviews with TA personnel make it clear that there is a fair amount of ad hoc undertakings as well as TA personnel focusing on their own particular areas of interest and strength. This tendency runs the risk of TAP's common core of activity(ies) being diluted.

7. The Southern Sudan TAP will continue to work to strengthen policy development, planning and administration, but with an increasing focus on the implementation of policies and plans (versus the earlier focus on policy and planning development and formulation).

Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Somewhat Strongly Disagree



This principle is in its early stages for several reasons including the lack of resources (TAP or SMOE as well as the lack of a consistent, strategic approach utilized in all SMOEs to capturing development partner resources in each state) for policy and program implementation and the absence of a clear "bottom line" negotiated with SMOEs that lays out the minimums that TAP will help all SMOEs accomplish. There is some evidence of a continuing emphasis on policy development; however, there is also evidence that policies already developed that relate specifically to organizational development (such as human resources policies, the organizational structure, etc.) are beginning to be implemented through TAP assistance. There are also discrepancies between what recent TAP documentation identifies as short-term aims for FY 2009 and what is detailed in USAID FY 2009 documentation and this can lead to confusion among stakeholders about the Program and in monitoring and evaluation.

8. Encouraging the access and success of girls in school and female teachers as education professional will cut across all programs.

Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Somewhat Strongly Disagree



TAP disaggregates data by sex and sets minimum targets for participation by females in Indicators 1 and 5. TAP has not yet met the female participation targets and TAP personnel are not having much success ensuring that female SMOE personnel have access to them. There is some evidence that gender will be taken more seriously in FY 2009. However, this principle needs to be adjusted to focus on gender and development broadly, not only on girl children and female teachers. TA personnel can play a significant role in enabling state leadership to progress and promote policies, practices and programs that open the door for women to participate and a strategic approach to this in collaboration with USAID's Gender Equity through Education Program which works closely with the Ministry for Gender Equity and Social Change is an obvious direction to pursue seriously.

9. Since implementation of funds are limited in TAP, the Program will work in a proactive and entrepreneurial way to leverage GoSS-MoEST and other donor funding, using these programs as capacity-building vehicles.

Strongly Agree

Agree Somewhat

Neither Agree or Disagree

Disagree Somewhat

Strongly Disagree



This principle has also emerged as TAP's most significant risk and the progress of TAP overall in this area is spotty. There is some evidence of some TA personnel assisting SMOEs to access one-off funding for small initiatives; however it is also evident that the approach overall and with individual SMOEs is ad hoc and not strategic and in a few cases, the lack of uptake of a proposal or the inability of TA personnel to follow-through on promises made is having a negative impact on the perception of a number of SMOE about TAP's viability and legitimacy.

ANNEX 6: EXPANDED DISCUSSION ON RISK MANAGEMENT

Although TAP documentation does identify some risks, there is no formal, standard regularly updated risk management matrix that grades risks for likelihood of occurrence and identifies mitigation responses. A “show stopping” risk—that GoSS and other donor funding for training would not be leveraged--materialized early on in TAP Phase 3 implementation and has continued since. This risk was actually flagged in the ACA Application (p. 5) and it has been raised consistently in documentation since mid-2007. It was not, however, part of a standard approach to risk treatment and the risk mitigation strategies that were identified were inadequate and not necessarily agreed to by stakeholders. The Application states that, “The proposed (TAP) budget has set aside a small amount of funds for each advisor to use when funding is delayed. However, the success of EQUIP 2 will depend on the ability to have access to other funding. If, for any reason, GoSS and other donor funding is not available, this may become a constraint on reaching program results (emphasis added) and USAID may need to consider increasing funds for training and other program costs.”

TAP funds to advisors now amount to approximately US\$30,000 per SMOE to subsidize training activities, particularly at the county and payam levels. Although their job descriptions require that TA personnel assist SMOEs to develop proposals in order to increase the resource base of the education sector at the state level to implement programs (originally to implement the FTP in particular), the manner in which the TA personnel provide proposal development assistance is ad hoc and there is no monitoring of the success rate. It also appears that a number of TA personnel are not aware that assisting their SMOE to leverage MoEST and donor funding to carry out training outside SMOE HQ is a vital pillar of the TAP design for which they should be held accountable.

As it also turns out, resourcing of education at the state level is a major problem and consists of both a lack of resources (financial and otherwise) and the unpredictable and unreliable flow of resources from both GoSS and donors alike. Education financing has dropped from donor commitments of US\$150m to US\$50m and the Global Economic Crisis has had an impact on national funding. In many states, UNICEF is functioning as the de facto bankroller for the education sector providing the only relatively reliable and stable annual source of education finance for non-salary expenditures (at least in those states that make the effort to access the available funds).

This lack of financing affects not only TAP results but also the design of Phases 3 and 4, which is based on a strategy built around “teacher development. with a concrete set of tasks around which to begin building the capacity of the SMOESTSs (sic) and the County Education Offices to set up planning, logistic, financial and monitoring and evaluation systems (emphasis added) that will support activities to improve teaching and learning in schools”⁸¹ TA personnel were to enable the development of the teacher education system by scaling up the Fast Track Program pilot using tried and tested instruments and processes. The inability to undertake the scale up means that TAP has lost the centerpiece of its strategic approach and must now establish a new direction. It also means that TAP now faces the challenge of “retro-fitting” a new direction and existing personnel to the changed context. The change in the context also means that the tried and tested TAP instruments, processes and systems associated with delivering in-service education/training are of little use at this point in time.

It is clear that the lack of a formal risk management matrix is a liability to program implementation and results. It is also clear that certain “show stopping” risks have eventuated and that the associated risk mitigation strategies identified are inadequate. For example, AED cannot continue to subsidize TAP training and TAP cannot be held accountable for system strengthening when there is no practical way to test out the extent to which the systems have been strengthened.

⁸¹ ACA Application, p. 6.

It appears that since the demise of the Fast Track Program the TAP focus has shifted toward a broader focus on organizational development overall, although TAP documentation does not use this terminology or specifically articulate the shift in focus. While the core areas of education planning (which should now include strategic planning as well as the more concrete annual work plan development), education financial management (an area that should include budgeting, accounting, modeling, audit and control), education statistics and monitoring and evaluation (that should now include the organizational and sectoral level, not just at the activity implementation level) remain as areas of focus, they are no longer necessarily being addressed under and oriented specifically around teacher education/training systems development. The loss of the FTP and its associated instruments, processes and procedures means that TAP is essentially starting from scratch with respect to resources that have been tested out across the SMOEs that TA personnel can apply consistently. This current situation makes the collaboration with other partners who have tested instruments, processes and procedures especially important (please see section 3.2, Partnership and Annex 10: TAP Case Study – Education Payroll System). TAP must carefully manage this strategy “retro-fit” or there could be repercussions for the Program’s legitimacy. TAP should assess the extent to which current TA personnel can contribute on more than a rudimentary basis to organizational development and system strengthening and determine an efficient and effective means for supporting TA personnel in this changed role.

International literature on capacity development repeatedly stresses the importance of ‘performance’ (i.e., the practice of capacity) and, indeed, the AED design document assumes that SMOE personnel would have the opportunity to apply their new knowledge and skills. However, aside from a few centrally-driven initiatives,⁸²⁷⁰ application of capacity is nearly impossible in Southern Sudan at the present time given the limitations of education financing and provision of other resources.

⁸² The payroll system roll-out from the center to the sub-national levels and implementation at the sub-national level is working because there are resources for intensive and focused training, ongoing follow-up and oversight, and provision of equipment that is vital to the system’s implementation.

ANNEX 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

FIGURE 10: ILLUSTRATION OF DATA DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN REPORTS

Data Sources	Indicator 1: Number of Administrators and Officials Trained							
	2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
Quarterly Report II (2008-2009)			100 total: 90M/10F	115 total: 100M/15F	320 total: 272M/48F	64M/5F	450 total: 338M/112F	
Quarterly Report I (2008-2009)					400 total	90 total		
Annual Work Plan (2008-2009)							400 total: 338M/112F	
Annual Report (2007-2008)	18 total: 10M/8F	18 total: 18M/0F	100 total: 90M/10F	130 total: 111M/19F	290 total: 215M/75F		400 total: 280M/120F	

FIGURE 11: EXAMPLE TABLE WHICH COULD BE USED FOR M&E DATA. ORGANISED BY ACTUAL/TARGET VALUE, QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR AND GROUPED BY PROVINCE, INDICATOR.

Fiscal Year		2006-07				FY Total		2007-08								FY Total		2008-09								FY Total		
		Quarter		Q3				Q4		Q1		Q2		Q3				Q4		Q1		Q2		Q3				Q4
[T]arget/[A]chieved		T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T	A	T
Indicator 1	Total	1366	1042	1009	898	2375	1940	190	230	190	170	190	205	190	190	380	395	250	100	270	210	270	295	290	300	1890	2610	250
Total	Male	646	495	551	301	1197	796	100	120	100	90	100	105	100	100	1003	1069	150	0	150	100	150	145	150	160	946	1380	150
	Female	720	547	458	597	1178	1144	90	110	90	80	90	100	90	90	1309	1246	100	100	120	110	120	150	140	140	944	1230	100
Central Equatoria	Male	70	57	46	68	116	125	98	59	11	98	33	6	39	11	72	17	87	63	39	92	13	20	72	16	87	118	8
	Female	82	50	51	99	133	149	93	64	60	99	79	90	74	91	153	181	44	19	89	13	26	21	57	95	60	86	27
Eastern Equatoria	Male	29	63	76	50	105	113	99	55	22	16	1	43	76	90	77	133	46	37	69	36	52	73	80	33	105	180	65
	Female	56	18	6	58	62	76	19	15	17	58	91	81	84	97	175	178	54	80	47	18	70	43	76	8	88	117	37
Jonglei	Male	95	2	11	24	106	26	72	82	16	12	12	25	96	8	108	33	2	17	81	41	54	4	23	5	18	172	90
	Female	3	92	16	33	19	125	26	87	19	64	49	71	66	15	115	86	14	7	20	81	90	84	40	57	35	160	64
Lakes	Male	45	84	92	25	137	109	43	89	92	15	26	16	64	80	90	96	77	39	66	98	41	58	27	82	34	124	94
	Female	99	13	49	10	148	23	73	59	41	62	94	50	35	47	129	97	75	39	77	86	61	91	73	93	74	87	82
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Male	19	88	28	16	47	104	33	35	56	22	36	45	17	57	53	102	61	42	19	25	42	11	18	61	83	106	47
	Female	37	48	95	93	132	141	35	83	19	97	78	71	75	55	153	126	68	33	92	23	48	63	49	76	101	60	76
Unity	Male	32	51	91	9	123	60	1	77	4	74	92	37	7	94	99	131	40	65	46	94	65	41	14	92	151	89	94
	Female	82	24	35	10	117	34	79	89	60	34	59	17	6	7	65	24	85	64	1	10	54	75	19	74	144	116	97
Upper Nile	Male	94	26	10	18	104	44	18	34	94	18	5	95	70	24	75	119	19	80	41	1	39	39	30	34	37	155	42
	Female	75	90	66	20	141	110	99	66	24	99	28	47	86	98	114	145	47	38	54	14	99	81	86	33	28	143	38
Warrap	Male	93	54	31	17	124	71	56	53	50	75	89	4	46	49	135	53	99	39	8	18	63	75	92	43	173	158	3
	Female	95	33	46	47	141	80	43	8	13	19	40	100	12	60	52	160	31	79	43	61	96	90	2	33	148	162	47
Western Bar El Ghazal	Male	71	57	33	43	104	100	40	90	43	78	53	85	30	78	83	163	4	66	80	75	43	47	86	50	74	106	53
	Female	97	79	13	100	110	179	89	13	45	2	75	34	79	85	154	119	45	59	50	51	3	13	83	39	118	152	40
Western Equatoria	Male	84	8	48	9	132	17	9	73	38	55	83	74	53	25	136	99	6	20	66	40	14	36	87	86	121	150	53
	Female	43	61	65	67	108	128	10	63	30	13	76	84	77	39	153	123	97	43	26	68	27	24	7	25	77	115	68
MoEST	Male	14	5	85	22	99	27	37	17	60	34	29	36	46	87	75	123	56	98	57	33	27	34	10	43	63	22	76
	Female	51	39	16	60	67	99	14	76	94	63	43	3	3	4	46	7	28	28	62	79	96	29	9	65	71	32	49
Indicator 5	Total	145	47	47	69	192	116	16	72	87	114	126	121	126	45	252	166	87	98	147	109	122	67	110	112	232	179	2
	Male	100	45	23	34	123	79	14	6	84	86	80	42	65	11	243	145	67	6	92	54	48	15	85	27	292	102	1
	Female	45	2	24	35	69	37	2	66	3	28	46	79	61	34	112	207	20	92	55	55	74	52	25	85	174	284	1
Indicator 9	Total	16	79	83	97	99	176	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	30	30	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	6000	6000	1500
	Units	16	79	83	97	99	176	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	60	60	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	6000	6000	1500

Example of a Viable Monitoring and Evaluation Framework:

Logical Framework ² Objectives	Data			Human Actors			Timing/Schedule		
	OVI	Method	Analysis	Subject	Responsibility	Client	Capture	Interrogation	Dissemination
GOAL To improve the quality of and access to basic education in Southern Sudan	X percent change by 2011 in number of girls and number of boys entering Grade 1 X percent change by 2011 in the number of girls and the number of boys completing Grade 8 X percent change by 2011 in student scores on national standardized tests	EMIS data National achievement test score data	Interrogation of EMIS and achievement test data	Children of primary education ages Children taking national achievement tests		SMOEs USAID	Annually beginning month/year	Month/year	Month/year

¹ This Monitoring and Evaluation Framework pro forma was developed and is solely owned by Dr Paul Crawford, AID-IT, and should only be used with his permission.

² Please note that no Logical Framework has been developed upon which to base this example of a possible M&E Framework template and in this respect, the cart is being put before the horse.

1

Logical Framework Objectives	Data			Human Actors			Timing/Schedule		
	OVI	Method	Analysis	Subject	Responsibility	Client	Capture	Interrogation	Dissemination
PURPOSE To enhance the capacity of the Ministries of Education to deliver basic education services to their constituencies	(Outcomes QVIs—example: Managers keep regular work hours 90 percent of the time)	Ministry work hours log			Directorate of Administration and Finance	Ministry USAID	Month/year	Month/year	Month/year
COMPONENT 1: Competency-Based Training									
OUTPUT 1.1 Frontline Management Certificate IV X National and state education managers trained in Certificate IV Frontline Management workplace-based training	X percent of education managers successfully complete Cert IV Frontline Management training	Workplace-based training records	Interrogate training records	Workshop participants	Directorate of XX	Ministry USAID	On-going in scheduled workshops	Quarterly	Month/year

2

ANNEX 8: OPTIONS FOR ESCALATING LEVELS OF SUPPORT

Any of the options for escalating levels of support or any pieces of the options can be taken up immediately, provided funds are available. In the MTE Team’s view, Option 3 is the most desirable since it provides an opportunity to engage with the MoEST and SMOEs as organizations and to address the development and demonstration of competencies at all levels of the organization, not just with individual staff within an SMOE (the current CE approach).

TABLE 3: OPTIONS FOR ESCALATING LEVELS OF SUPPORT

Considerations	Option 1	Option 2	Options 3
	Split the COP and MoEST STA role.	Incorporate the changes recommended in	Incorporate the changes recommended in
TA Staffing	Fund the additional STA to bring total to 10 (not 9). Delay placing a new STA in MoEST until there is a clear and strategic approach to the use and management of TA inputs in MoEST.	Option 1 Take over contracting and management of the two current GoSS-contracted STAs. Provide an STA to work in a strategic ‘diagnostic’ advisory role across the levels of the system (Parliamentary Education	Options 1 & 2.
	Make better use of current STA & DTA areas of specialization in the interests of benefitting all SMOEs. ⁸³	Committee to MoEST to SMOEs to CECs) in order enable the identification of and strategizing on bottlenecks in the sector.	
Additional Elements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incorporate regular vertical (personnel from various positions within a respective SMOE and across SMOEs) and horizontal slice workshops (for SMOE personnel in the same positions) according to the topic and the CE need. (Ensure that succession planning is taken into account in these workshops.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incorporate changes recommended in Option 1. Orient TA personnel toward their areas of strength and field a small team of experts in the core TAP areas that works across all 10 states on a rotating basis and that brings specialist skills to the states in support of the STAs and DTAs (similar to the CBTF model which has core experts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incorporate changes recommended in Options 1 & 2. Undertake a Request for Proposals (use a faster procurement method) for a provider to introduce the Australian Qualifications Training Framework or another mechanism of similar quality and content that meets the needs of the context. This mechanism should be introduced at MoEST and selected higher-

⁸³ This is not a new element. The Associate Cooperative Agreement Application and October 2006-September 2007 Annual Report (p. 11) both mention this intention. For example, the AP states that, “Although the advisors will be assigned primarily to one state ministry, they will have outreach responsibilities to ministries in neighboring states”.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide targeted training and ongoing support for STAs & DTAs in the core TAP areas (education planning, education finance and budgeting, M&E, capacity enhancement). • Recruit and field STTA in ICT4D/ICT4E in resource-constrained contexts to develop an ICT strategy that can be used across SMOEs to address immediate and longer-term information and communications technology needs in a systematic, cost-effective and sustainable manner (obviously, it would be anticipated that the Strategy would be funded at some point). • Ensure that SMOEs are accessing operational funds sufficient to enable them to progress TAP benefits and, if necessary, establish a TAP Program Development Fund with clear guidance on its use (approximately \$70,000 per state per annum). 	<p>doing outreach and quality assurance on a regular basis).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As per the Associate Award Application (p. 7), recruit and field short-term • specialists with advanced qualifications and significant levels of experience that work with selected groups across all SMOEs in the areas of high importance (for example, capacity building, gender and other equity considerations, adult education, language education). The composition of this team can vary as needs change. 	<p>performing SMOEs initially, then expanded to other SMOEs based on lessons learned. (Please refer to Addendum to the Mid-Term Evaluation.)</p>
Cost Implications	Minor	Medium	Major

ANNEX 9: CASE STUDY - GENERATING INCOME TO SUPPORT THE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SOUTHERN SUDAN

The Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education has successfully generated regular income through a series of innovations including: a) construction and subsequent rental of a conference hall; b) fitting out and operation of a cafeteria on the Ministry's grounds for employees and conference attendees; and c) the production and sale of tamper-proof photo identity cards for Ministry employees.

The Context

A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on January 9, 2005, between the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan. The CPA includes (among other things) equal shares in oil, the revenue of which provides the bulk of the domestic financial resources for the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). However, recently, oil revenue has fluctuated significantly in the global economic crisis and there has consequently been a sharp reduction in budgets for the GOSS national Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST-Juba) and for the State Ministries of Education (SMoEs). Beginning in June 2006, states have only been receiving fund transfers from GoSS for salaries (Chapter One expenses). No operational funds have been received for services and development activities (Chapter Two and Chapter Three expenses) which means there are no funds to build or repair schools, buy teaching and learning materials or cover transportation costs for school inspection or travel on official business. Rather than being held hostage to the funding crisis, the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education (WES SMoE) took a proactive stance and developed its own supplementary sources of income.

The Solution: Income Generation Initiatives

In 2007, in an effort to deal with the severe and fluctuating budgetary resource constraints, the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education began looking for ways to raise operational funds as well as to gently enforce the new government policy for an eight hour work day. The idea of generating income was proposed to the (then) State Minister of Education by the (then) Director for Administration and Finance. The Director suggested that the surplus that remained after all teachers' salaries were paid should be used to construct a conference hall in preparation for the first Education Rehabilitation and Development Forum (ERDF) meeting in 2007. The hall was completed on time and the ERDF conference generated 2,934 Sudanese pounds (USD 1,200).

The next income generation initiative was the construction of a cafeteria. Some of the funds from the ERDF conference were used to pay for construction and equipment. Currently, the cafeteria serves food prepared by four local women to 20 -30 customers five days per week. The cafeteria generates on average approximately 1125 Sudanese pounds (US\$432.69) gross per week and nets 906 Sudanese pounds (US\$382) after the cost of the cooks' salaries (210 Sudanese pounds per cook) and foodstuffs (around 9 Sudanese pounds/\$US3 .46) is deducted.

Ministry identity cards are the third innovation. A diaspora SMoE employee brought the idea to the SMoE. A small amount of money was invested to buy the necessary equipment and now each card is sold for 30 Sudanese pounds (US\$11.53).

Benefits of the Innovations

Conference Hall. The Conference Hall is a free, comfortable and available venue for Ministry meetings, MTE interviews and staff formal or informal get-togethers. It also exposes other ministries to the Ministry of

Education and its personnel. Currently, the occasional rental of the conference hall generates 122.24 Sudanese pounds (US\$50) per day.

Cafeteria. In addition to the income generated, the on-site cafeteria has the additional advantage of reducing long lunch breaks and the frequent failure to return to work after having lunch away from the Ministry compound. In the past, most staff would leave for lunch at 1:00 pm and not return to work at 2:00 PM or at all during that day. Now there are very few problems with staff attrition.

Identity Cards. The identity cards are easy to carry, easy to replace and protect the SMOE staff person from having his/her identity stolen or used because each card has the individual's employee id number and a photo.

Funds generated from these innovations enabled Ministry personnel to visit all schools and teachers as part of the recent teacher verification exercise.

Financial Controls

Money generated from the cafeteria, the sale of the identity cards and the rental of the conference hall is kept in the Ministry's safe. Financial records are subject to both internal and external audit. The Director General is the only person with access to the safe and funds are removed only with the agreement of other senior managers.

Long-Term Prospects

This initiative began in mid-2007 and continues with difficulty. The cafeteria has served fewer customers this year than previously because of a downturn in the economy. Furthermore, Ministry personnel may be reluctant to spend money buying their lunch since they are not receiving their salaries on a regular basis. This situation will eventually have a direct impact on amount of income generated from the cafeteria.

Dissemination of the Innovation

All State Ministries of Education are faced with the same budgetary constraints. However, to date, no other SMOE has adopted income generation strategies of the type initiated by the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education.

FIGURE 12: MS NAMA R. BULLEN BESHIR, DIRECTOR GENERAL-WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, WITH MINISTRY CAFETERIA WORKERS AS THEY GET READY TO SERVE LUNCH. JUNE 2009. (PHOTO BY VALERIE HAUGEN)



FIGURE 13: WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION CONFERENCE HALL AND HOME OF THE MINISTRY CAFETERIA. JUNE, 2009. (PHOTO BY VALERIE HAUGEN)



ANNEX 10: TAP CASE STUDY - EDUCATION PAYROLL SYSTEM

Introduction and Background

A key element in any public sector reform is ensuring a standardized and transparent payroll system. In Southern Sudan, under the previous, paper-based system, states submitted new pay sheets each month. This had multiple problems. It was difficult to spot changes to the rosters. Omissions were common and calculation errors could easily creep in. There was only one (paper) copy of paid pay sheets., and these were not always returned to MoEST. It was difficult to reconcile actual headcounts with the nominal roll data (i.e. individuals registered as education staff with the public service) and almost impossible for the Ministry of Labor and Public Service (MoLPS) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) to conduct audits

In 2007 – 2008, GoSS moved to reform its approach to payroll, beginning with the education sector. A proposal was put forth to the Capacity Building Trust Fund and, in February 2008, Booz and Company was hired to assist with the headcount process and development of a new computerized payroll system. Thus, MoEST became the pioneer in developing the new system, which has since been tested and rolled out to all 10 states. This system is widely regarded as so successful that it is being adopted by other GoSS ministries.

Payroll System Development and Roll-out

In February-March 2008, MoEST undertook a headcount of teachers and education officials. The results of this exercise were used in setting conditional grants (direct transfers from GoSS to the states). In May 2008, MoEST began to trial a new excel-based computerized payroll system. A Payroll Unit was also established in MoEST in October, headed by a Deputy Director and staffed by three analysts. The purpose of this Unit was to support roll out and implementation of the new system in all ten states. This roll-out/implementation activity included both formal training for staff of SMOEs as well as periodic field visits by the MoEST Payroll Team to ensure the smooth functioning of the process. States are now required to report monthly and the Unit itself conducts frequent site visits and produces an update every week (Attachment 1).

The advantages of the new system are clear. First and foremost, it is more transparent and easy to administer than the previous approach. It is computerized and calculations are automated. Any changes are supported by a 'change form' so that any alterations can be analyzed using computerized matching. The same base data are used every month, so omissions are unlikely. All information is readily accessible and can be shared with multiple recipients by email. A continuous reconciliation between headcounts and nominal role data is possible. Paid pay sheets are signed in duplicate, allowing MoLPS and MoFEP to perform their audit function.

According to the implementers, the new payroll system has allowed MoEST greater visibility regarding how much the states are paying and to whom. It also has offered quick wins in terms of:

- Demonstrating transparency of government
- Speeding up the payment of staff
- Increasing confidence in government processes
- Freeing up staff time from payroll administration (which could consume 2 full weeks of every month)
- Presenting information in a format that facilitates screening and other reform activities.

Finally, there has been considerable positive feedback from SMOEs that the new system is an improvement over the old one. This finding was reinforced during the MTE site visits.

FIGURE 14: THERE IS POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE GROUND ON THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE NEW SYSTEM – WES SENIOR MANAGEMENT AND PAYROLL UNIT WITH THE SMOE’S FIRST PAYROLL ON THE NEW SYSTEM. (PHOTO BY KATHRYN JOHNSTON)



Role of TAP in the Implementation of the New Payroll System

It is clear that consistent support from top levels of Government, a strong Payroll Unit at the center, and well-trained staff at all levels are the sine qua non for development an effective payroll system. Staff need good computer and spreadsheet skills, experience working in accounts and payroll, the capacity to train, persuade, and mentor others, and the ability to be model the attitude and behavior of a qualified, motivated and honest civil servant for others.

Booz and Company has done a commendable job in establishing the architecture for the computerized system, providing formal training for staff in the use of the computerized system, assisting MoEST to follow up on the implementation of the payroll system and generally helping to institutionalize the process. But what has been the role of TAP in implementing the payroll system? This was a question the Mid-Term Evaluation team put to finance and accounting staff in several State Ministries of Education. Interviewees noted that STAs and DTAs attended the formal training course conducted by Booz and Company and developed a thorough understanding of processes and procedures. While in some SMOEs staffs are not turning to TAP advisors for technical help on payroll – seeking help instead from the Payroll Unit in MoEST--they have come to look to TAP advisors for other things, such as informal training, mentoring, and role modeling. In other SMOEs, because TA personnel participated in the training sessions provided at the state level, SMOE are looking to TA personnel for help. In one SMOE, due to the loss of one of the two SMOE personnel

trained in the payroll system, the TAP STA is being used as a stand-in. TA personnel have also provided an element of moral support for those trying to change outmoded – and easily corrupted – payroll practices. As ‘outsiders working on the inside’, TA personnel have been able (albeit informally and unofficially) to add an element of independent oversight to adoption of the new process, thus reinforcing changes to both mindset and process.

New Payroll Process: Impact and Outcome

The Mid Term Evaluation reinforced the finding that SMOE finance and accounting staff prefer the new payroll system. They find it more streamlined and, in general, easier to use than the previous paper-based system. Some interviewees commented that the new payroll system has “put an end to corruption.” There have been problems with naming conventions, however, but these issues could be resolved with support from those working on EMIS. Also, the deductions that appear on the pay sheets are often confusing for staff members who themselves may not understand why the money has been subtracted from their salary and therefore cannot explain the reason to others. This in turn affects the credibility of the new system.

Of course, no discussion of the roll out of the payroll system would be complete without touching upon the broader issues of headcounts, the impact on the conditional grant process, and the timely and full payment of staff. Implementation of the education payroll system in the ten states revealed that SMOEs are paying roughly 24,000 teachers (not the 33,000 appearing on earlier rosters). In addition, there are roughly 3,000 officials and 6,500 “unclassified.” No state is paying the number of teachers reported in the headcount; in percentage terms, Western Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria are the closest to paying the headcount figure. A number of states are paying materially fewer teachers than the number for which there was budgeting. Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and Central Equatoria fall in this category. The implication here is that these states either over-reported on teacher numbers or are failing to get pay through to all teachers who should be paid. Although not fully substantiated, in Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal there appears to have been over-reporting, whereas in Central Equatoria it appears that there is a significant number of teachers who are working (i.e., in church schools), but who are not being paid.

It should be noted, furthermore, that all states are using significantly more of their budget to pay officials and ‘unclassifieds’ than was intended or is desirable. It is estimated that 70% of salary funds are spent on teachers, 20% on officials, and 10% on unclassified staff. This is one factor that has caused a number of states to pay a percentage of basic pay – among them two with relatively well- developed management processes (Lakes and Western Equatoria). Arguably, because of their honesty in the headcount process, these two states lost out in the 2009 allocation of conditional grants.

For obvious reasons, the implementation of the new payroll system has presented complex problems at the state level. Combined with the adverse impact of the Global Financial Crisis, the salary issue has become a real hot potato. Each State Ministry visited sought to address problems over payment of salaries in different ways. Some paid only a portion (65 – 90% in the States visited) and/or delayed payments (which were also received late from GoSS). Other SMOEs undertook to rid their roles of unclassified staff and rationalize the ranks of managerial and official staff by downgrading pay grades of teachers and other staff. Still others addressed budgetary shortfalls by shifting some of the financial burden to parents. One state visited introduced a policy that requires families to pay 25 Sudanese pounds per student per academic year. Despite the creative (and, in some cases counterproductive) strategies emerging, teachers and education managers across Southern Sudan are becoming increasingly frustrated over the salary issue and teacher strikes have been increasingly reported.

The following is an example of a weekly report provided to the MoEST Undersecretary. The format and the intention could be of use in helping AED TAP to systematize and scale up its assistance in critical areas of organizational development requiring the uptake and strengthening of systems vertically and horizontally. This type of tool could also be of great use to enhance the consistency of approach and treatment of the common core of areas to be addressed within each SMOE through TAP.

TABLE 4: PAYROLL RUN DATA

Payroll unit weekly report number	29
Date	10/7/09
Period covered	23/6/09 to 10/7/09
Report prepared by	HF, DJ, AM, MLL
Report approved by	MLL

TABLE 5: PROGRESS AT A GLANCE

	Existing pay lists analyzed?	Tools set up for new system on agreed lists?	Counties briefed?	First month pay sheets printed?	First month paid?	Summary Notes
CEQ						MLL, DJ and HF met with SMoE management on Fri 3/7. DG agreed that payroll should be implemented for June salaries (only April has been paid so far), that a test-run of pay sheets should be printed immediately and checked against personnel records. Printing of pay sheets to start this week (7/7).
EEQ						Successful visit by MLL resolved issue of 484 ‘volunteers’ recently screened by SMoE. SMoF have agreed that these staff should be added to the payroll.
Jonglei			SMoE Directors briefed			Pay sheets printed for March but not April. Former Minister authorized use of new system but implementation is being blocked by the DG. MLL and DJ to travel to Bor to discuss this with new Minister.
Lakes						May salaries have been paid (on 1/7) but not using the payroll tool because Payroll Manager, Jibril Chol, was on leave during May. JC promises to use new system for June salaries!
NBeG						Reports from NBeG indicate that while all technical work has been completed, implementation of the new system (in which the pay sheets are actually used rather than just printed out!) has yet to take place. AM is visiting Aweil this week to investigate.
Unity						May salaries not yet paid because conditional grant still to be released. Pay sheets for May printed last week (2/7). April salaries paid through a committee organized by SMoF.
UNS						SL and AT visited Malakal to discuss delayed implementation of payroll system. AT also went to SMoF who agreed to release results of screening today (6/7). PU to follow rate of progress by telephone.
Warrap						All 6 counties and headquarters on new system for May salaries. Successfully paid using new pay sheets.

WBeG						c.300 unproductive staff removed from the payroll, allowing SMOE to pay salaries at higher percentage. PIT also introduced at rate of 10%, leading overall to slight fall in take-home pay.
WEQ						May to be paid at 80% with “top-up” of 100k SDG from Governor’s office. MoF audited education and rejected payroll system because they said it wasn’t done in proper accounts format. June is being prepared by hand!
MoEST						May salaries paid.

Executive Summary

- Payroll Unit has visited a number of states during the period of this report.
- Eastern Equatoria SMOF agrees to add nearly 500 'volunteer' teachers to the payroll.
- Upper Nile remains a serious concern as they are still yet to provide full details as to who is on the payroll. Implementation here is stalled.
- Jonglei State also behind in implementation but have agreed to make necessary progress to use new pay sheets for July salaries.
- Staff also visited NBeG, WBeG and Warrap resolving numerous small issues in the payroll implementation.

Eastern Equatoria

Martin Luther Lukudu, 25-26th June

- Martin Luther travelled to Torit to discuss outstanding issue of 484 'volunteer' staff whose addition to the payroll had been refused by the SMOF.
- MLL met with DGs Education and Finance and obtained agreement that these staff should be added to the EEQ payroll with immediate effect.

Central Equatoria

- Full implementation in CEQ still progressing, but at an unacceptably slow pace.
- Having printed pay sheets with new system for March salaries, SMOE senior management chose to reverse recent successes in implementation and go back to previous 'manual' system for the April salaries, following a series of complaints that some names had been missed off the payroll. SMOE failed to notify the MoEST Payroll Unit of this decision until after the event.
- With this in mind, MLL, DJ and HF met with new DG, D/ Primary, D/ Admin & Finance, and D/ Accounts on Friday 3/7. After a lively discussion, in which D/ Accounts sought to blame GoSS staff for the confused state of affairs, DG conceded that it was up to his staff to resolve these problems, with support from the PU, and agreed to MLL's suggested approach to fix current problems, which involved:
 - Obtaining a copy of latest, cleaned payroll lists from Charles Adiya at CEQ MoFEP. Print these lists and cross-check against most recent personnel records. Identify any discrepancies and resolve so as to establish a final, agreed payroll list. D/ Accounts to be in charge of this process.
 - Any corrections to be fed back into payroll tool, and printed on quadruplicate paper. June salaries to be paid using the Payroll Tool.
- As of morning of 8/7, PU/CEQ SMOE had obtained latest payroll lists and had printed these for cross-checking, led by D/ Accounts. Deadline set for completion of this process by end of this week (10/7).

Western Equatoria

- Reports have reached Payroll Unit staff that regression may be taking place, in which the WEQ SMOE senior management have decided to revert back to the old system.

- SMOE claim that a team of auditors from SMOF has rejected the pay sheets and automated summary sheets. After repeated requests from PU for more information on this, SMOE have yet to provide a convincing explanation as to why they feel it is necessary to take this course of action when the payroll system is working well in other areas of South Sudan.
- H.E. Minister of Education, GoSS has been alerted to this situation and intends to call WEQ Minister of Education to express his concern at this state of affairs.
- PU to send a team, including MLL or AM, to Yambio at the earliest opportunity to resolve this problem. Upper Nile

Simon Lewis and Achire Tito, 27th June to 2nd July

- Implementation of new payroll system remains stalled. PU staff have now visited Malakal on a total of nine occasions – more than any other state
- AT and SL met with the DG, who claimed that the delays were result of SMOF failing to release results of recent screening. On previous visit by MLL, PU was provided with a full list of names but this was not differentiated by school, county, or payam so is of limited use.
- AT and SMOE D/ Planning & Budgeting went to SMOF who were promised release of this information by Monday 6/7 but as of Wednesday 8/7 no information has been released supposedly because the responsible official is away in Khartoum.

ANNEX 11: DRAFT CONTENT FOR MOE ST-SMOE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the Technical Advisors Program is an important element to consider as TAP progresses. The reasons for an MOU are several:

1. It will help ensure that AED is not put in the difficult roles of being watchdog and advocate.
2. It will help ensure that the responsibility for the success of a development assistance program ultimately rests with the receiving Government and its personnel.
3. It will help eliminate any lack of clarity or confusion regarding which organization is responsible for what.
4. It will allow for a clear pathway to identifying (and rectifying) any instances where one or another of the signatory organizations does not live up to its commitment(s).
5. It makes all parties' responsibilities visible and clear.

GoSS-MoEST

- MoEST Undersecretary will have the primary responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Technical Advisors Program.

MoEST Undersecretary will ensure that the SMoE is honoring its commitments under this MOU and, in the event that the State (Governor or SMoE) is not honoring its commitments, MoEST will confer with USAID regarding next steps.

- MoEST Undersecretary will identify and attend to any elements that put the Technical Advisors Program at risk, including any issues associated with the MoEST itself.
- MoEST Undersecretary will move toward incorporating the cost of the TA personnel into its own budget.

GoSS-SMoE

SMoE Minister and Director General will put a temporary freeze on personnel movement (particularly senior and middle managers) while the capacity enhancement investment is being undertaken and for a period of at least two years following the investment.

SMoE Minister and Director General will put in place and implement a succession-planning strategy so that opportunities for the future are made available to females, younger people and other groups.

- SMoE Director General will participate in the recruitment and selection of Senior Technical Advisors and Diaspora Technical Assistants.
- SMoE Director General will take the lead in supervising, reporting on the inputs and judging the quality of the work of Senior Technical Advisors and Diaspora Technical Assistants.

SMoE Minister and Director General will ensure that SMoE personnel participate consistently and regularly in learning opportunities being provided through the Technical Advisors Program.

SMoE Minister and Director General will identify and attend to any elements that put the Technical Advisors Program at risk, including any issues associated with the SMoE, the MoEST or the broader enabling environment.

- SMOE Minister and Director General will move toward incorporating the cost of the TA personnel into its own budget.

GoSS-State Governor and Parliament

- The Governor will ensure that the SMOE honors its commitments under this MOU.
- The Governor is ultimately responsible for the MOU on behalf of the State.

The Governor and the Education Committee of Parliament will identify and attend to any elements that put the Technical Advisors Program at risk, including any issues associated with the State, the SMOE, the MoEST or the enabling environment in general.

USG-USAID (through AED)

USAID through AED will continue to provide the services comprising the Technical Advisors Program on the understanding that Government of Southern Sudan organizations benefitting from the Program honor the commitments included in this MOU.

- USAID through AED will respond to any issues raised regarding the implementation of the Technical Advisors Program and resolve those issues with the appropriate parties.

Signatories

State Governor: _____

Undersecretary for Education: _____

State Minister for Education: USAID Representative: _____

Date _____

ANNEX 12: OTHER EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS

Ethnicity

Findings: While the MTE team was able to gather data on the general ethnic composition of each state, no data were available about the ethnic composition of education personnel or students. Anecdotally, the Team was told that ethnicity is a factor in the assignation of jobs and there is apparently a tendency in some states to favor individuals who have English language skills, even though both English and Arabic are considered to be languages of the workplace. For example, although the ACA stresses that advisors with dual language skills are preferred, most of the STAs are not fluent in Arabic. Western Bar El Ghazal represents an interesting case. When the incumbent COP began as an STA there, according to Quarterly Report (January – March 2008, p. 12), “There is a heavy Arab influence in the state reflected in the use of Arabic as the preferred language of governance and educational instruction within the state. This is having a tremendously negative impact on education service delivery and other areas of educational management. Consequently, a greater effort is needed in WBG to facilitate the transition from GoS governance processes to that of GoSS”. Recently, the State Ministry of Education underwent a massive re-shuffling and has apparently largely replaced Arabic speakers in management positions with English language teachers.

Conclusions: Ethnicity and language are likely to be significant, yet inadequately understood variables and the dynamics associated with power and control can make or break the potential for development assistance to be effective.⁸⁴ Assumptions regarding the ability of TA personnel to ‘hit the ground running’ may need to be tested and support provided as and where needed. Given that the GoSS Interim Constitution includes a clear message on official languages and on equity, it would also be sensible for TAP to help ensure that TA does not marginalize or reward one group(s) over another. This issue of privilege and decision-making power also has implications for a conflict-sensitive approach as well (see section 3.4, Peace Dividend & Conflict Sensitive Analysis).

Recommendation: Request AED TAP to identify ways and means of mitigating risks associated with ethnic, cultural and language differences between TA personnel and stakeholders/beneficiaries.

Findings: The laws on pension and retirement have yet to be enacted. While the team did not collect data on the ages of senior administrative staff, based on observations in the five states visited, older personnel (males predominantly) were well-represented, especially in the senior and middle management ranks of SMOEs. Apparently, many SMOE state and county level administrators are former head teachers or teachers. Younger people are under-represented in management positions. TA personnel are beginning to recognize that adults of different ages may need to be supported differently. For example, according to one DTA, “In Southern Sudan, it’s not very easy working here because of the lack of education. You just have to bring things down to the level where they are, especially the older staff. You have to take people step by step. But once they understand, then it is easy.”

Conclusions: Older personnel represent a unique resource to the administrative system because of their prior experience and previous training. Recognizing the different learning styles of adults of different ages. In addition, recognizing the organizational skills required to administer a school, for example, and highlighting the transfer of those skills to one’s work in the SMOE is important. Ensuring that younger personnel are incorporated into CE opportunities is also important.

⁸⁴ Morgan, Peter (2008). A PNG study on technical assistance and counterpart relationships found that “many of the key GoPNG systems were informal...they did not lend themselves easily to TA understanding and support. Understanding how country systems actually did work and why could be a huge challenge for new TA staff. ...Many counterparts were frustrated by the lack of local knowledge of culture and systems of TA personnel and indicated that the first few months were often spent getting the TA personnel up to speed on GoPNG systems”.

Recommendation: Request TAP to explore with SMOEs how best to utilize the cadre of experienced, older individuals before the pension and retirement laws are enacted and to explore the best avenue for working with SMOEs to introduce succession planning.

Individuals with Disabilities


Findings: Southern Sudan has been almost continuously at war for several decades and war takes its toll on a population. However, the MTE Team was not able to gather any substantive data on People With Disabilities. It should be noted, however, that based on findings from other conflict-affected contexts, the levels of psychological distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder which has a significant impact on the ability to learn and retain information, are typically much higher than those of the general population.

Conclusion: The Team could draw no conclusions with respect to services needed to support this population. This is an area that will require exploration.

Recommendation: As one possible step in the right direction, request AED TAP to liaise with the OECD to explore the potential for using the OECD 's 10 question survey and methodology to determine levels of disability based on a sample of the population. There may be potential for this survey to be administered along with the education census.

ANNEX 13: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRACKING AND PLANNING TOOL (DRAFT 2 080109)

FIGURE 15: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN IDF AND TAP ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRACKING & PLANNING FRAMEWORK CATEGORIES



(Revision #2 of the Institutional Development Framework)

Maturity Rating Scale Key:

0 = Nothing Happening (No Maturity)

1 = Starting to Stir (Nascent Maturity)

2 = About Halfway There (Partial Maturity)

3 = Nearly There (Near Maturity) 4,5 = We've Made It! (Full Maturity)

TABLE 6: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRACKING & PLANNING FRAMEWORK

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
MANDATES & CORE FUNCTIONS			
<p>ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE [MANDATES & CORE FUNCTIONS]</p> <p>0 = Ministry has no apparent organizational structure</p> <p>1 = Ministry has a mandated organizational structure, but it is not operational</p> <p>2 = Ministry has an operational organizational structure that is limited in its completeness (i.e., half or less than half of the positions are filled)</p> <p>3 = Ministry has an operational organizational structure that is moderately complete (i.e., more than half, but not all positions are filled OR there are more positions than are mandated by GoSS MOEST)</p> <p>4 = Ministry has a fully operational organizational structure (i.e., all mandated positions and only mandated positions are filled)</p>		<p>Hard and soft copy of the SMoE organogram</p> <p>Organogram is visible to staff and visitors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the organogram include all levels of state government in the general education sector (from Minister to lower levels at county and payam)? • Does the Ministry have its organogram in a visible place? • Does the Ministry update the organogram on a defined regular basis? • Is there an employee who is responsible for updating and posting the organogram?

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
SECTOR PLANNING			
<p>STRATEGIC PLAN</p> <p>0 = Ministry has no Medium Term (3-5 year) Education Strategic Plan</p> <p>1 = Ministry has a Medium Term Education Strategic Plan, but the Plan is not current</p> <p>2 = Ministry has a Medium Term Education Strategic Plan that is current, but it has not been prioritized and/or costed</p> <p>3 = Ministry has a Medium Term (3-5 year) Education Strategic Plan that is current but it is not widely understood or used across the Ministry</p> <p>4 = Ministry has a current, prioritized, costed Medium Term Education Strategic Plan that it uses to guide annual planning</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of past and current ESPs</p> <p>Each department has hard and soft copies of the past and current ESP(s) in an accessible place</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry have a mission statement that guides strategic plans? • Do all ministry staff know what a Medium-Term Education Strategic Plan is? • Do all departments understand their responsibility to contribute to developing the ESP? • Do all departments participate in developing the ESP? • Does each department develop its contribution to the ESP based on the assessed need? • Does the Ministry have and use a process for reviewing its progress on the implementation of the ESP? • Are work plans developed every 3 to 5 years? • Does the Ministry get assistance to do a quality check on the ESP to make sure it is a sound Plan? • Does the Ministry submit its ESP to MoEST on time?
<p>ANNUAL PLAN</p> <p>0 = Ministry has no Annual Plan</p> <p>1 = Ministry is using an Annual Plan, but it is not for the current year</p> <p>2 = Ministry is using a current Annual Plan, but it is not linked to the Medium-Term Strategic Plan</p> <p>3 = Ministry is using a current Annual Plan that is</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies past and present APs</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of past and present department work plans and micro plans</p> <p>Each department has a copy of the Ministry's past and present APs and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do all Ministry staff know what an Annual Plan is? • Do all departments understand their responsibility to develop their own annual work plan and micro plans? • Do all departments participate in developing the Annual Plan? • Is the Annual Plan developed at the same time each year? • Does each department develop its internal

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>linked to the Medium-Term Strategic Plan, but it has not been costed</p> <p>4 = Ministry is working from a current, costed Annual Plan that is linked to the Medium-Term Strategic Plan</p>		<p>the department's own work plan in an accessible place</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • work plan based on the assessed need? • Does the Ministry have and use a process for assessing the quality of the Ministry's • Annual Plan and the department work plans before they are implemented? • Does the Ministry have and use a process for reviewing its progress on the implementation of the Annual Plan? • Does the Ministry submit its AP to MoEST on time?
[DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES]			
<p>0 = All decision-making authority rests with the Minister or Director General</p> <p>1 = All decision-making rests with the Senior Managers (Director level and above)</p> <p>2 = Executive level and senior management level delegate decision-making to the next level down</p> <p>3 = Senior and middle managers involve other levels of personnel in decision-making, but ultimately make all decisions themselves</p> <p>4 = Decision-making authority is delegated to the appropriate levels across the institution</p>		<p>Documented process for judging the effectiveness of the delegated decision-making</p> <p>Data on file providing evidence of the status of delegated decision-making</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does every Ministry employee know who to report to and who reports to her/him? • Are decisions and actions based on the SMoE organizational structure? • Is the 'chain of command' clearly understood and followed by all employees? • Are decisions that are within an individual employee's authority referred to her/him? • Are directors empowered to make strategic decisions? • Are important decisions made in a participatory manner?
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS			
<p>ADMINISTRATIVE/OPERATIONS MANUAL [MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS]</p> <p>0 = Ministry has no administrative or operations</p>		<p>Administrative Manual is available in hard and soft copies in all departments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are all Ministry personnel familiar with the Administrative Manual and do they understand its role in their work? • Has the Administrative Manual been tested and revised on

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>manual</p> <p>1 = Ministry has an administrative or operations manual available, but it is not current or it is not being used</p> <p>2 = Ministry has a current administrative or operations manual, but it is not being used</p> <p>3 = Ministry has a current administrative or operations manual, but it is only used by some personnel</p> <p>4 = Ministry has a current administrative or operations manual and it is being used widely by personnel</p>			<p>a regular and predictable basis?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry have an approved data storage and data retrieval system? • Is there a process in place to monitor and report on the use of the Internet to the Director General on a regular basis? • Does the Internet function? • Do all Ministry personnel have SMoE email addresses that they use?
<p>COMMUNICATION [PUBLIC INFORMATION DISSEMINATION & PUBLIC PARTICIPATION]⁸⁵</p> <p>0 = Ministry has no communication strategy</p> <p>1 = Ministry has a communication strategy, but it is not current or it is not being used due to problems with information dissemination</p> <p>2 = Ministry has a current communication strategy, but it is not being used due to problems with technology</p> <p>3 = Ministry has a current communication strategy, and it is being used somewhat although problems with technology interfere with information</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of the SMoE and school budgets posted in public place</p> <p>Radio broadcasts are heard</p> <p>Other media are evident</p> <p>Information and telecommunications equipment are available and in good condition</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry have a Communication Strategy and does it include opportunities for regular interaction with and input from all types of stakeholders, including children? • Does the Ministry update the • Communication Strategy and annually and monitor and evaluate the Strategy on a regular basis? • Is the public provided with information regularly and efficiently? • Are there formal procedures for obtaining public input? • Is input from civil society and citizens incorporated into

⁸⁵ Since this category covers two of the IDF categories under one umbrella, for the purposes of reporting to USAID, this category should probably be weighted to be equivalent to a score of up to 8.

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
dissemination 4 = Ministry has a current communication strategy and it is being used widely with few if any problems with technology			the SMoE's activities? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are SMoE and school budgets posted in a public place?
FMS/FMIS [FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT-BUDGETS] 0 = Ministry has no financial management system (paper-based or computer-based) 1 = Ministry has a non-standard type of financial management system in place, but it is not in use 2 = Ministry has a non-standard type of financial management information system and it is in use 3 = Ministry has a standard type of financial management system in place, but it is not in use 4 = Ministry uses a standard type of paper-based financial management system 5 = Ministry uses a best practice, industry-strength, computer-based financial management information system that is integrated with the GoSS MoEST FMIS		Financial management processes are documented and available in hard and soft copies Public information made available to the public by radio, signs and other means of communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the Ministry have a plan in place to generate income? Does the Ministry have an sound approach for making sure that effective budgets are put together for submitted proposals? Does the Ministry have and use a process for making sure the requirements are met for the budgets? Does the Ministry seek out available funders? Does the Ministry have a strategy for long-term operational sustainability and is it clear who takes on this responsibility? Does the Ministry have a plan in place for continuing programming? Does the Ministry have a clear picture of where the different funding sources for education are coming from? Are the actual ministry expenditures within 10% of the budget? Does the Ministry report to the public and the Parliament on its budget expenditures?
EMIS 0 = Ministry has no education management information system or databases 1 = Ministry has an education management		Documentation on use of the database is available in hard and soft copies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the Ministry have an approved data storage and data retrieval system? Do most Ministry personnel understand and use the

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>information system or databases in place, but it is not in use OR is not used effectively OR it is not secure (backed up; protected)</p> <p>2 = Ministry has an education management information system or databases in place that is secure, but it is only used by a few people at the state level</p> <p>3 = Ministry has an education management information system or databases in place that is used by most personnel at the state level</p> <p>4 = Ministry uses a best practice, industry-strength education management information system in place that is used by most personnel at the state level and education administrators and teachers at the county, payam and school levels</p>		<p>A number of individuals can demonstrate effective use of the EMIS and/or databases</p>	<p>education information database?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do all Ministry personnel have SMoE email addresses that they use? Is there a process in place to monitor and report on the use of the Internet to the Director General on a regular basis? Are issues with the EMIS resolved quickly and using appropriate practices?
<p>ICT4E (Information & Communication Technologies for Education)</p> <p>0 = Ministry has no ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy</p> <p>1 = Ministry has an ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy, but it is not current AND/OR it is not operational</p> <p>2 = Ministry has a current ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy, but it is not operational</p> <p>3 = Ministry has a current ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy and it is operational in some parts of the State</p> <p>4 = Ministry has a current ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy and it is operational across the State Final Draft</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of the ICT4E Policy or Strategy available</p> <p>Information and telecommunications equipment are available and in good condition</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the Ministry utilize multiple types of ICTs for administration, teaching and learning? Does the Ministry train a critical mass of individuals who understand how to produce and use materials for administration, teaching and learning using various ICTs? Does the Ministry put aside funds to ensure personnel (at all levels of the system) have ongoing access to the Internet or other technologies? Does the Internet function and do all Ministry state and local level administrators have SMoE email addresses that they use regularly? Is there a process in place to monitor and report on the use of the Internet to the Director General on a regular basis? Does the Ministry have and use an ICT equipment

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
			<p data-bbox="1354 334 1940 391">maintenance budget and is the budget sufficient for the maintenance needs?</p> <ul data-bbox="1308 418 1969 651" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="1308 418 1902 448">• Are ICT issues resolved quickly and appropriately? <li data-bbox="1308 475 1969 565">• Does the Ministry have a sound plan and process in place for protecting ICT equipment (taking into account the harsh physical environment)? <li data-bbox="1308 592 1969 651">• Does the Ministry have a process and an adequate budget in place for maintaining its

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

<p data-bbox="107 745 642 834">RECRUITMENT, SELECTION and PERFORMANCE [HUMAN RESOURCES-STAFF; HUMAN RESOURCES-SYSTEMS]⁸⁶</p> <p data-bbox="107 855 655 945">0=Ministry has no transparent, merit-based process for recruitment, selection AND/OR performance assessment</p> <p data-bbox="107 966 655 1110">1=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process for recruitment, selection and an objective and transparent performance assessment process, but in actuality, recruitment, selection and performance assessment are used rarely</p> <p data-bbox="107 1131 655 1248">2=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process for recruitment, selection and an objective and transparent performance assessment process that is used occasionally</p>		<p data-bbox="886 745 1274 894">Public information is available in hard and soft copies on recruitment, selection, performance assessment, GoSS labor law on employee rights and responsibilities</p> <p data-bbox="886 959 1266 1049">Job descriptions are found in the Administrative Manual in hard and soft copies</p> <p data-bbox="886 1114 1260 1172">Each employee has a hard copy of her/his job description</p> <p data-bbox="886 1237 1278 1261">Employee rights and responsibilities</p>	<ul data-bbox="1308 745 1986 1237" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="1308 745 1913 803">• Are hiring and promotion decisions are based on the approved MoEST structures? <li data-bbox="1308 831 1969 920">• Are people hired or promoted based on the match of their skills, knowledge and demonstrated ability with the job requirements? <li data-bbox="1308 948 1986 1006">• Is there a well-understood , transparent and fair process for assessing an employee’s performance? <li data-bbox="1308 1034 1969 1092">• Do employees understand their rights and responsibilities under GoSS labor law? <li data-bbox="1308 1120 1866 1149">• Is there a process in place to handle grievances? <li data-bbox="1308 1177 1969 1237">• Do the positions within the SMoE structures have job descriptions and have those descriptions been shared with
---	--	--	--

⁸⁶ Since this category covers two of the IDF categories under one umbrella, for the purposes of reporting to USAID, this category should probably be weighted to be equivalent to a score of up to 8.

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>3=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process for recruitment, selection and an objective and transparent performance assessment process that is used in most cases</p> <p>4=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process for recruitment, selection and an objective and transparent performance assessment process that is used in all cases</p>		<p>are found in the Administrative Manual in hard and soft copies</p>	<p>all staff?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are assigned tasks based on the job functions within the SMoE structures? • Is personnel restructuring undertaken strategically to ensure that the Ministry runs efficiently? • Do Ministry personnel have all the skills needed to carry out their respective jobs?
<p>SUCCESSION PLANNING</p> <p>0=Ministry has no succession plan</p> <p>1=Ministry has a succession plan, but it is not current AND/OR it is not in use</p> <p>2=Ministry has a succession plan that is current, but it is not in use</p> <p>3=Ministry has a current succession plan and it is being used by limited parts of the Ministry</p> <p>4=Ministry has a current succession plan and it is being followed across the entire Ministry</p>		<p>Public information (hard and soft copies) on capacity enhancement opportunities</p> <p>Documented process (hard and soft copies) for implementing succession planning kept in the Administrative Manual</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does every Ministry employee understand the concept of succession planning? • Do decisions and actions about capacity enhancement opportunities clearly take into account succession planning? • Is there a substantial increase over time in the types and numbers of employees able to participate in capacity enhancement activities? • Are employees aware of capacity enhancement opportunities that are available to them?
DIVERSITY and EQUITY			
<p>GENDER [DIVERSTIY-WOMEN]</p> <p>0 = Ministry shows no awareness of gender mainstreaming and/or the obligations under the CPA regarding gender</p> <p>1 = Ministry shows limited awareness of gender mainstreaming and/or the obligations under the Constitution regarding gender</p> <p>2 = Ministry has a gender mainstreaming strategy in</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy</p> <p>Public posting of progress toward gender equity</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does every Ministry employee understand the concept of gender equity and gender mainstreaming and the importance for the Ministry and for education development in Southern Sudan? • Do decisions and actions about capacity enhancement opportunities clearly take into account gender equity? • Is there a substantial increase over time in the number of female employees and female employees in middle and

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>place, but it is not operational</p> <p>3 = Ministry has a gender mainstreaming strategy in place and there is some evidence of operationalization</p> <p>4 = Ministry has prioritized gender mainstreaming and is operationalizing the gender mainstreaming strategy across the sector</p>			<p>senior management?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are the particular needs of women taken into account when planning capacity enhancement activities? • Are leadership and skills development provided specifically for female employees?
<p>INCLUSION [DIVERSITY ACROSS REGIONS]</p> <p>0 = Ministry shows no awareness of inclusion (linguistic and ethnic differences, People With Disabilities, etc.)</p> <p>1 = Ministry shows limited awareness of inclusion</p> <p>2 = Ministry has an inclusion strategy in place, but it is not operational</p> <p>3 = Ministry has an inclusion strategy in place and there is some evidence of operationalization</p> <p>4 = Ministry has prioritized inclusion and is operationalizing the inclusion strategy across the sector</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of the Inclusion Strategy</p> <p>Public posting of progress toward an inclusive workplace</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does every Ministry employee understand the concept of inclusion in the workplace? • Do decisions and actions about capacity enhancement opportunities clearly take into account inclusion principles? • Is there a substantial increase over time in the diversity of the Ministry personnel (from the Minister to teachers)? • Are the particular needs of People With Disabilities and people with different language backgrounds and skills and ethnic groups taken into account when planning capacity enhancement activities? • Does the Ministry encourage the use of both English and Arabic in the workplace?
SECTOR SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION			
<p>HARMONIZATION WITH GoSS/MoEST</p> <p>0 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) show no awareness of MoEST policy, legal and regulatory framework(s)</p> <p>1 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are aware of MoEST policy, legal and regulatory</p>		<p>Public information (hard and soft copies) on GoSS/MoEST policies, legislation</p> <p>Documented process (hard and soft copies) for implementing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does every Ministry employee (from Minister to teachers) understand GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation and what these mean for the her/him on the job? • Are all policies developed by the SMoE in line with GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation?

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>frameworks but they do not put them into action</p> <p>2 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are aware of MoEST policy and legal frameworks and try to put a few of the policies and legal frameworks into action</p> <p>3 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are aware of MoEST policy and legal frameworks and most people abide by them</p> <p>4 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are able to operationalize (put into intentional action) MOEST policy, legal and regulatory frameworks</p>		<p>succession planning kept in the Administrative Manual</p>	
<p>HARMONIZATION WITH COUNTIES/SCHOOLS</p> <p>0 = Local level education personnel show no awareness of MoEST and SMoE policy, legal and regulatory framework(s)</p> <p>1 = Local level education personnel are aware of MoEST and SMoE policy, legal and regulatory frameworks but they do not put them into action</p> <p>2 = Local level education administrators are aware of MOEST and SMOE policy, legal and regulatory frameworks and they put a few of them into action</p> <p>3 = Local level education administrators are aware of MOEST and SMOE policy and legal frameworks and they put most of them into action</p> <p>4 = Local level education administrators adhere to all MoEST and SMoE policy and legal frameworks and show strong evidence of putting them into practice</p>		<p>Public information (hard and soft copies) on GoSS/MoEST & SMoE policies, legislation in County Education Offices, Payam, Schools</p> <p>GoSS/MoEST & some policies, legislation in County Education Offices, Payam, Schools kept in Administrative Manual</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does every Ministry employee (from Minister to teachers) understand GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation and what these mean for the her/him on the job? • Are all policies developed by the SMoE in line with GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation? • Does the Ministry have processes in place to monitor compliance with policy and legislation?

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>HARMONIZATION OF PARTNERS [NETWORKING WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS]</p> <p>0 = Ministry is unaware of or not informed about all donor and development partner field activities</p> <p>1 = Ministry is informed about all donor and development partner field activities but is a passive recipient</p> <p>2 = Ministry registers all donor and development partner field activities</p> <p>3 = Ministry maps all donor and development partner field activities and works to eliminate redundancy/overlap, under-saturation and over-saturation</p> <p>4 = Ministry brings all donor and development partner activities and resources (including financial) under one common plan and resourcing envelope (SWAp) and utilizes funding and programs available</p>		<p>Annual published schedule of SMoE-donor/development partner meetings</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of development partner profiles and mapping are available in the Ministry and are distributed to development partners</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of coordination meeting minutes are chronological and are available</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry require all donor and development partners to register and declare their programs including budgets? • Does the Ministry have regular meetings with donor and development partners that are attended by the appropriate Ministry personnel regularly? • Does the Ministry take the lead in sector planning? • Does the Ministry work with donor and development partners to reduce or eliminate replication, build consistency in the types of materials used? • Does the Ministry understand the strengths and weaknesses of different donor and development partners and task them to provide assistance according to their strengths?
INNOVATION			
<p>0 = Ministry shows no evidence or awareness of or commitment to fostering innovation</p> <p>1 = Ministry shows little evidence or awareness of or commitment to fostering innovation (some talk, but no action)</p> <p>2 = Ministry shows an emerging evidence of and commitment to fostering innovation (a few innovative ideas are put into practice and supported)</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of documentation on innovations proposed, rejected, supported including financial records and records on impact of the innovation against education indicators</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of guidelines on how innovative ideas are selected, designed, implemented,</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry have a process for identifying and promoting innovative ideas? • Does the Ministry have a process for looking critically at innovative ideas and designing them carefully before any action is taken to implement the ideas? • Does the Ministry have a process for monitoring and evaluating and learning from the successes and failures of innovative ideas?

SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional Maturity	Rating (2009 Baseline)	Evidence	Quality
<p>3 = Ministry shows a firm commitment to fostering innovation (several innovative ideas are put into practice and supported)</p> <p>4 = Ministry shows strong evidence of fostering innovation and ensuring the dissemination of innovations (a number of innovative ideas are put into practice and supported and disseminated)</p>		monitored and evaluated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry fund and/or otherwise support innovative ideas? • Does the Ministry have a process for scaling up innovative ideas?

ACCOUNTABILITY [ANTI-CORRUPTION]

<p>0 = Ministry has no accountability system</p> <p>1 = Ministry has identified an accountability system, but it is not in line with GoSS instructions OR personnel do not use the system</p> <p>2 = Ministry has an accountability system in place that is in line with GoSS instructions and some personnel at the state and county levels are familiar with and use the system</p> <p>3 = Ministry has an accountability system in place that is in line with GoSS instructions and most personnel at the state and county levels are familiar with and use the system</p> <p>4 = Ministry has an accountability system in place that is in line with GoSS instructions, is used by all personnel (from Minister to teachers) and is monitored on a regular basis</p>		<p>Hard and soft copies of accountability system available in each department</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of annual reports (past and present) on accountability</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of an Annual Communication Strategy</p> <p>Public information (hard and soft copies and various media used) on accountability</p> <p>Hard and soft copies of reports on follow-up actions taken in instances where accountability is in question</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the Ministry track financial resources to ensure that personnel are held accountable? • Does the Ministry track its property and supplies? • Does the Ministry have a legitimate internal audit process that is used on a regular basis? • Does the Ministry have a legitimate external audit process that is used on a regular basis? • Does the Ministry record and monitor its successes and failures? • Does the Ministry have and use a process for anonymous reporting of suspected corrupt practices and does the Ministry follow up on these reports? • Does the Ministry report regularly and widely to the public on its successes or failures in delivering services promised and also on its successes and failures with anticorruption?
--	--	---	---

NB: The data presented in these bar graphs are based on the cumulative scores given during a pilot test of the revised Institutional Development Framework in Juba in early July 2009. The data are presented for illustration purposes only and are not to be quoted. These data are also not to and are not to be taken as a true or accurate accounting of the organizational development profiles of the MoEST or the SMoEs. It is expected that AED TAP should be able to provide these types of metrics and visualizations of baseline data

and progress in the MoEST and the SMOEs. Once the profiles provide a closer reflection of reality, at a glance, GoSS, USAID and AED should be able to see which SMOEs are doing outstanding work and in what areas and which SMOEs may be lagging behind.

FIGURE 16: MATURITY SCORE TOTALS ACROSS ALL FUNCTIONAL AREAS, BY STATE.




FIGURE 17: MATURITY SCORE TOTALS ACROSS ALL STATES, BY FUNCTIONAL AREA




FIGURE 18: DRILLING DOWN INTO LAKES STATE HAVING THE HIGHEST MATURITY SCORE TOTAL ACROSS FUNCTIONAL AREAS.





FIGURE 19: DRILLING DOWN INTO UNITY STATE HAVING THE LOWEST MATURITY SCORE TOTAL ACROSS FUNCTIONAL AREAS.



ANNEX 14: INDICATORS

FIGURE 20: INDICATOR 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS AND OFFICIALS TRAINED.




FIGURE 21: INDICATOR 1 BY SEX.




FIGURE 22: INDICATOR 5 TOTAL NUMBER OF TEACHERS/EDUCATORS TRAINED.




FIGURE 23: INDICATOR 5 BY SEX.




FIGURE 24: INDICATOR 9 TOTAL NUMBER OF TEXTBOOKS AND OTHER TEACHING AND LEARNING MATERIALS PROVIDED.





FIGURE 25: INDICATOR 11 LAWS, POLICIES, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED.



ANNEX 15: EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT STAFF PROFILE

FIGURE 26: AVERAGE MONTHS IN EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS.



FIGURE 27: NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT STAFF BY SEX AND STATE.




FIGURE 28: EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT APPOINTMENTS BY SEX AND STATE.⁸⁷






FIGURE 29: GAP BETWEEN CV STATED EXPERTISE AND TOR REQUIRED EXPERTISE.




⁸⁷ Thanks go to Ms. Kathryn Johnston (MSI Senior Education Specialist for USAID) for her work on Figure 28.

FIGURE 30: DTA TIME ON TASK.



ANNEX 16: TAP MODEL STAKEHOLDER MAP

FIGURE 31:TAP MODEL STAKEHOLDER MAP⁸⁸.



⁸⁸ Thanks go to Ms Kathryn Johnston for conceptualizing this visual representation of relationships.

ANNEX 17: UPPER NILE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE STORY

Our 'Most Significant Change Story' Upper Nile State, Southern Sudan

LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT TRAINING



Ms Odolo Ojulo Okoth Adkom, the Deputy Director of the Department of Gender & Social Change, is presented with her Certificate of Achievement from the DG of Upper Nile State, Mr William Gwang Deng Yor (Source: Mr T Haile Former STA to UNS 2008/09)

➤ What was it?

This training was delivered to 32 Education Managers from both the State and County-level in areas of leadership, educational management, decision-making process, teambuilding, interpersonal communication and effective listening.

➤ When did it happen?

This training was delivered by UNS's previous STA Tsehaye Haile in April 2008 over a one-week period.

➤ What was significant about it?

PROCESS It was the first time ever that both State Directors / Deputy Directors & the 12 County Education Directors had sat around the same table under the same roof to talk. The training sessions enabled shared discussions to take place about roles / responsibilities and expectations of Directors at State-level and of County Education Directors.

MTR of TAP June/July 09 Upper Nile State Most Significant Change Story

➤ What kind of change did this training bring about?

Deputy Director of Planning & Budgeting: Through My Eyes

The significant change for me was the process of bringing County and State together for the first time to do this kind of training. It opened all our eyes to other ways we could be working. Sharing experience was important, we need more opportunities to do this. There is a need to extend more of this kind of management/ leadership training to Head Teachers at both primary / secondary levels.

The STA: Though My Eyes

Thanks to some of the key messages that stuck from that training around communication / coordination across Departments / talking & listening, I found all Directors embracing of the decision to start a practice of **bi-weekly staff meetings**. The DG chairs, TA at this point writes and circulates the Minutes, one representative from each Department gives a brief update of no more than 3 points of what they have achieved, and what they are going to do. We will now work together to make this a regular activity, and not a 'one-off'. *(attached is supporting documentation of Agenda. This was drafted by the DG and refined by the TA with the DG's support)*

Deputy Director of Planning & Budgeting: A Final Word

Coordination & Communication *"Regarding our recently started Bi-Weekly Meetings - these are going to help us correct a couple of things. They'll give us a forum to share our department's plans, updates on where we are at, action points for the next meeting and lessons learned (sharing experience/information/knowledge.*

The TA is supporting us too in building bridges - to support us in improving on communications and coordination within the MoEST & between MoEST and Development Partners"



Government of Southern Sudan
Upper Nile State - Malakal
Ministry of Education, Science & Technology
Minister's Office



24th June 2009

TO: Directors / Deputy Directors MoEST Upper Nile State
FROM: DG William Gwang Deng Yor
RE: Bi-Weekly Director Meetings – All Departments must attend
CHAIR: DG William Gwang Deng Yor
AT: DGs Office

In order to improve internal communication and information flow within the MoEST, we ask you attend bi-weekly staff meetings of the Directorate. Please find the meeting schedule below.

At least ONE (1) representative from each of the five (5) Departments is required to attend. They must be prepared to give a quick update on their Department's recent activities and a brief update on their Department's plan for the following 2 weeks.

The Technical Advisor, Lucy Strickland, will use these meetings to also inform Directors of upcoming training workshops etc. The Directors should also use this forum to share information between departments.

We ask you to please attend and to be ON TIME – meetings will start punctually at **10:00am** to finish on time no later than **11:30am**. We assure you these meetings will be well-chaired, timely and informative. We understand your time is precious.

DATE	DATE	DAY & TIME
JUNE	30 th June	Tuesday 10am SHARP
JULY	14 th July	Tuesday 10am SHARP
	28 th July	Tuesday 10am SHARP
AUGUST	11 th August	Tuesday 10am SHARP
	25 th August	Tuesday 10am SHARP
SEPTEMBER	8 th September	Tuesday 10am SHARP
	22 nd September	Tuesday 10am SHARP
OCTOBER	6 th October	Tuesday 10am SHARP
	20 th October	Tuesday 10am SHARP
NOVEMBER	3 rd November	Tuesday 10am SHARP
	17 th November	Tuesday 10am SHARP
DECEMBER	1 st December	Tuesday 10am SHARP
	5 th December	Christmas Party

Morning Tea will be provided at these meetings.

Yours faithfully

William Gwang Deng Yor
Director General
MoEST Upper Nile State

Endorsed by H.E. Minister Mujkwan Kak Ajang Ajak

MTR of TAP June/July 09 Upper Nile State Most Significant Change Story

AGENDA 30th JUNE 2009

Date: 30th JUNE 2009

Time: 10:00 AM

Place: DG's Office

[
N.B. Minutes of the Meeting will be circulated to all Departments. Please take note of your Department's Action Points from today's meeting to report back on at our next meeting 14th July 2009.

10:00 DG opens the meeting

**10:05 –
10:55**

Directorate Updates

The Director or Deputy Director to give an update on the activities of their Department – what they have done this week & what their plans are for the following week. Each update allocated no more than 10 minutes.

Department of Planning & Budgeting Update

Department of Finance & Administration Update

Department of General Education Update

Department of Gender & Social Change Update

Department of Quality Promotion & Training Update

**11:00-
11:10**

DG's Update

**11:10-
11:15**

Technical Advisor's Update

**11:15 –
11:30**

AOB + Morning Tea (tea & snacks are provided)

ANNEX 18: PROPOSAL SUBMISSION AND FUNDING REQUEST TRACKING FORM

FIGURE 32: SMOE PROPOSAL SUBMISSION AND PROPOSAL SUCCESS DATA FORM.
SMoE Proposal Submission and Proposal Success Data Form (AED TAP Mid-Term Evaluation Mission)

Please include any Proposals submitted in the past 5 YEARS.

Proposal Title	Proposal Focus Area (for example, Training Pre-School Teachers, Upgrading Libraries, etc.)	Support Requested (amount of money, amount and type of equipment, etc.)	Was 100% of the requested support provided? (If not, how much of the requested support was provided?)	Organization(s) to which the Proposal was submitted	Year(s) the Proposal was submitted	Indicate if the STA or DTA assisted with the Proposal

ANNEX 19: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION PROFILES BY STATE

1. Central Equatoria

Capital City: Juba

Population: 1,103,592 (2008 population and housing Census)

Major Ethnic Groups: Bari (90%), Kakwa, Kuku, Mundari, Pojulu and Yangbara. These groups speak similar languages.

Education Statistics

Category	Male	%	Female	%
Primary School	51,801	56	40,705	44
Secondary School	5,170	66	2,712	34
Alternative Education	4,593	48	4,975	52

Background Information on State

Central Equatoria State has an area of 22,956 km². It was formerly named Bahr al Jabal (River of the Mountains) for the tributary of the White Nile that flows through the state.

Special Education Factors to Consider

(No information provided.)

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender⁸⁹

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
Stephen Lemi	M	Minister	???	???
David Lowela L. Modi	M	Director General	2009	1
Juma Lupai Lemi	M	Acting Director, Administration and Finance	2008	15
Satimon El Hag	M	Director, Alternative Education Systems	2008	19
Wani Ladu Lobuju	M	Director, Examinations	2005	48
Elizabeth Philip	F	Director, Girls Education	2009	1
Monoah A. Mila	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	2009	1
Sarah Epiphanio	F	Director, Pre-School Education and Early Childhood Development	2004	60
Isidoro Asok	M	Director, Primary Education	2005	48

⁸⁹ Data on Deputy Director and other SMOE Headquarters positions were not able to be obtained from the TAP TA.

Ramadan Ali B	M	Director, Private Education	2009	1
Abukato Kenyi	M	Director, Publication Bureau	2009	2
Moses Joseph Kiri	M	Director, Secondary Education	2004	60
James Pitia	M	Director, Special Needs Education	2005	48 1
Sebit Lomoro	M	Director, Vocational Education	2009	

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	
STA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	X	X
DTA				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

Unknown

2. Eastern Equatoria

Capital City:

Population: 906,126 (465,365 Male and 440,761 Female) as per the 2008 population and housing census

Major Ethnic Groups: EES has 15 major ethnic groups, as follow: Lotuko, Madi, Acholi, Lokoya, Pari, Tenet, Lopit, lango, Dongothono, Logir, Buya, Didinga, Toposa, Gie, Anyangathom, Imotong, Lokwa, and Kachipo.

Education Statistics

Category	Number	Gender	Pupils		Teachers	
Primary	297	M	64216	61%	2536	88%
		F	40549	39%	358	12%
		Total	104765	100%	2894	100%
Secondary	11	M	2555	80%	117	80%
		F	958	20%	29	20%
		Total	3513	100%	146	100%
Alternative	55	M	5354	68	202	80
		F	2575	32	49	20
		Total	7929	100%	151	100%

Background Information on State

Eastern Equatoria state covers an area of about 82540 KM square in the south eastern corner of southern Sudan. Eastern Equatoria borders Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Internally, EES borders Jongolei state in the north and Central Equatoria state in the west.

Economically, most tribes in EES are agriculturists practicing mixed farming. However, the tribes of the greater Kapoeta are pastoralists. Animals kept include, cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys. The state also has potential minerals such as gold, petroleum, iron and cement reserves.

Special Education Factors to Consider

(No information provided.)

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
HE Francis Ben Ataba	M	Minister	2006	43
James Amoko James	M	Director General	2006	43
Cesar Ongworo	M	Dir. Admin & Fin	2006	43
Vitale Oyaha Odemi	M	Dir Budget & Plan	2007	31
Elizabeth Aliardo	F	Dir Gender & Soc	2006	43
Bertino Obiala	M	D/Private Schools	2006	43
Frederick Pasquale O.	M	D/General Education	2008	19
Allirido Allamson	M	D/Teachers Affairs	2006	43

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DTA				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

Unknown

3. Jonglei

Capital City: Bor

Population: 1,358,602 (2008 Census)

Major Ethnic Groups: Nuer, Dinka, Murle, Anyuak, Kachipo, Jie Education Statistics

Category	Male	%	Females	%
Early Childhood Development	982	45	1,218	55
Primary School	94,339	65	50,643	35
Secondary School	1,884	76	592	24
Alternative Education	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Tertiary Education/ Vocational	220	79	60	21

Background Information

Jonglei is the largest of the ten states of Southern Sudan with an area of 122,479 Sq. Kilometers. The state borders: Upper Nile to the North, Unity State to North West, Lakes State, to the west, Central Equatoria to the South, Eastern Equatoria State to the South East and the republic of Ethiopia lies to the East of Jonglei State.

Special Educational Factors to Consider

There is a significant shortage of schools and materials. Children attend school under trees in overcrowded conditions as enrollments increase.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
Mr. John Matien Kuol	M	State Minister of Educ.	June 2009	1
Mr. Aquila Kelei Madol	M	Director General	Jan. 2007	30
Majak Nhial Nyuon	M	Director of Administration and Finance	Jan. 2007	30
Fatumah Musa Aljak	F	A/Director Gender and Social Change	July 2007	24
Matthew Poul Ruot Kueth	M	A/Director for General Education	Dec. 2008	7
Paul Bul Yiyieth	M	Director Planning & Budgeting	Jan. 2006	42
David Dhil Chuol	M	Director Quality Promotion & Innovation	Oct.2006	33
Pajok Gai Ruei	M	Deputy Director, Administration and Establishment	June 2006	36
Rekeboam Kun de Nay	M	Deputy Director, Human Resources	June 2006	36
Peter Nyieth Guer	M	Deputy Director, Examaminations	June 2006	36
Garang Alier Cuor	M	Deputy Director, Gender Equity & Social	July 2007	24

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
Mr. John Matien Kuol	M	State Minister of Educ.	June 2009	1
Mr. Aquila Kelei Madol	M	Director General	Jan. 2007	30
Majak Nhial Nyuon	M	Director of Administration and Finance	Jan. 2007	30
Fatumah Musa Aljak	F	A/Director Gender and Social Change	July 2007	24
Matthew Poul Ruot Kueth	M	A/Director for General Education	Dec. 2008	7
Paul Bul Yiyieth	M	Director Planning & Budgeting	Jan. 2006	42
		Change		
Deng Jeroboam Machur	M	Deputy Director, Planning & Budgeting	June 2006	36
Grace Joshua Dau	F	Deputy Director, Preschool and Early Childhood Education	Aug. 2006	34
John Gor Gatluak Deng	M	Deputy Director, Primary Education	June 2006	36
Mach Ayak Lual	M	Deputy Director, Secondary Education	Jan. 2006	42
Dau Atem Bior	M	Deputy Director, Standards	June 2006	36
Pajok Puok Kachuol	M	Deputy Director, Statistics and Data Collection	June 2006	36
Kwer Dau Ngiwei	M	Deputy Director, Teacher Education and Training	June 2006	36

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA					x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DTA								X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Jonglei	Y	100%	0	No	The State covered the deficit with State funds

4. Lakes

Capital City: Rumbek

Population: 695,730

Major Ethnic Groups: Dinka Agar, Gok, Pakam, Apak, Atuote, Aliap, Ciech and Jur Bele Education Statistics

Category	Males	Females	Total
Schools			283
Teachers			2,400
Students	81,552	32,401	

Background Information

Lakes State borders six States in Southern Sudan; Jonglei to the west, Central Equatoria to the Southwest, Western Equatoria to the South, and Warrap and Unity to the North. .

The Dinka of Lakes State are among several closely related peoples living in Southern Sudan along both sides of the White Nile The Dinka maintain the traditional pastoral activities, but have added agriculture in some areas, growing grains, peanuts, beans, corn (maize) and other crops. Women perform most agricultural activities, although men clear forest for the gardening sites. There are usually two plantings per year The Dinka culture incorporates strategies for dealing with the annual cycle of one long dry season and one long rainy season.

Polygamy is the ideal for the Dinka, although many men may have only one wife. The Dinka marry outside their clan (exogamy), which promotes more cohesion across the broader Dinka group.

Special Educational Factors to Consider

The State Ministry of Education is temporarily housed in a building that is owned by the Rumbek Secondary School. It was used as a Headmaster's resident prior to the war. When war broke out in 1983; the building was deserted, In 2006, after the CPA, the building was assigned to the State Ministry of Education until a new Ministry headquarters building is constructed.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
Gordon Maker Abol	M	Minister	2007	32
Daniel Makur Dol	M	Director General	2006	42
Akuchwel Magot Ater	M	Director, Administration and Finance	2006	42
Marial Manesseh Makoi	M	Director, Examinations	2006	42
Rachel Yahasa Tombe	F	Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	2006	42
James Magok Ater	M	Director, General Education/Acting Director General	2006	42

Martin Manyang Mamur	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	2006	42
Jacob Wel Majak	M	Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	2006	42

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA					x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DTA			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Lakes State	Y	80%	1	No	Teachers' salary was increased from 75% of salary last year to 80%.

5. Northern Bahr El Ghazal

Capital: Aweil

Population: 3,500,000 and 720,898 by the 1983 and 2008 Population Census Ethnic Groups: Dinka and Luo

Education Statistics

As of May 2009, 150,124 students (108,164 boys and 41,846 girls) were enrolled in Pre-primary, Primary, Alternative Education System Centers and Secondary Schools in the State.

Level	No. of Schools	Enrolment		
		Male	Female	Total
Pre-primary	15	2,532	1,410	3,942
Primary	314	75,733	33,782	109,515
Alternative Educ. System	250	28,000	6,654	34,654
Secondary	17	1,899	114	2,013
Total	596	108,164	41,960	150,124

Background Information on State

The Dinka are the largest ethnic group and are nomadic pastoralists and also practice limited subsistence agriculture. The Luo practice subsistence agriculture. During the wet season (May to September) the Dinka graze their livestock close to their permanent homes. During the dry season (December to April) they travel great distances from their permanent homes seeking good pastures and water. Northern Bahr El Ghazal has experienced a series of long droughts which have had a significant impact on the population.

Two decades of war, unfavorable climate, cultural values and the lifestyle of the people present unique challenges to the overall development of the State, and specifically to the delivery of social services, including education.

Special Educational Factors to Consider

During the past two decades of war, the provision of education in Northern Bahr El Ghazal State deteriorated and many schools closed. The 2008 Southern Sudan Education Census generated data from 305 out of 325 Primary Schools. Of these, 275 classes were conducted in permanent classrooms, 374 were in semi-permanent classrooms, 70 were conducted in tents, 180 were in shelters with a roof only and 653 classes were conducted under trees. Most of the permanent and semi-permanent structures are dilapidated. In many upper primary classrooms, six or more pupils share one textbook and sometimes there are no textbooks at all. Teachers lack reference books and teacher's guides including syllabus and curriculum guides for the classes they teach.

Out of the 49 personnel at the SMOE headquarters, 44 are male and 5 are female. None of the females are in senior or middle management positions; however, several are in inspector positions.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position title	Total Months
Stephen Chol Ajongo	M	Minister of Education	12

Peter Lual Aleu	M	Deputy Director, Personnel	24
Kerubino Garang Akuei	M	Deputy Director, Primary Education	14
Akuar Gamar Ujiith		Deputy Director, Private Schools	3
Johnson Bol Dut	M	Director General	12
Sabrino Majok Majok	M	Director, Administration and Finance	12
Daniel Akol Diing Deng	M	Director, Alternative Educ. System	39
Caesar Atem Biajo	M	Director, General Education	11
David Kon Martin	M	Director, Higher Education	42
Mawien Goktung Mawien	M	Director, Quality and Innovation	5
Victorino Ken Akoon	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	12
Bol Angua	M	Deputy Director, Accounts	42
Peter Deng Mabior	M	Deputy Director, Alternative Education Systems	15
Bendeto Joseph Ubu	M	Deputy Director, Curriculum	180
Pasquale Apin Apin	M	Deputy Director, Early Childhood Education	4
Ruay Dut Akol	M	Deputy Director, EMIS	7
Jakuar Garang Aweech	M	Deputy Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	24
Santino Garang Amol	M	Deputy Director, Human Resource Management	276
Fastino Deng Apai	M	Deputy Director, National Languages	24
Peter Lual Aleu	M	Deputy Director, Personnel	24
Kerubino Garang Akuei	M	Deputy Director, Primary Education	14
Akuar Gamar Ujiith	M	Deputy Director, Private Schools	4
Nicola Bazilo	M	Deputy Director, Secondary Education	0
Adam Garang Wol	M	Deputy Director, Teacher Education	26

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				X	X	X	X
DTA								X	X	X	X	X	X	

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in November 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Northern Bar El Ghazal	Y	80	2	No	

6. Unity

Capital City: Bentiu Population: 853,000

Major Ethnic Groups: Nuer, Dinka

Education Statistics

Gender	Percentage
Male	65
Female	35

Background Information

Unity State has an area of 35, 956 square kilometers. Unity State borders North Sudan. Most inhabitants are pastoralists, with a small percentage of Afro-Arab traders. While the tribes are primarily pastoralists, they also grow subsistence crops in small quantities for domestic consumption.

The main ethnic tribes of this State are Nuers and Dinkas, along with small business communities from Darfur and Afro-Arabs tribes who live in the State's urban centers.

Unity State is one of the richest in South Sudan because of its oil reserves. [Special Educational Factors to Consider](#)

The overall numbers of primary schools is 66, although the estimated number is contained in the EMIS report is 120.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
??	M	Minister	??	??
Peter Dak Gatluak	M	Director General	10-2007	20
Robert Chuol	M	Director, Administration and Finance	6-2009	1
Aisha Shuleman Yasin	F	Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	6-2009	1
Wiyai Dak	M	Director, General Education	6-2009	1
Joseph Arok Malual	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	6-2009	1
El Tahib Awad	M	Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	6-2009	1
Kawai Baboth	M	Deputy Director, Administration and Finance	6-2009	1
James Bol	M	Deputy Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	6-2009	1
Yoanis Ganyang	M	Deputy Director, General Education	6-2009	1
Ramadan Thooak	M	Deputy Director, General Education	6-2009	1

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
??	M	Minister	??	??
Peter Dak Gatluak	M	Director General	10-2007	20
Robert Chuol	M	Director, Administration and Finance	6-2009	1
Aisha Shuleman Yasin	F	Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	6-2009	1
Wiyai Dak	M	Director, General Education	6-2009	1
Joseph Arok Malual	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	6-2009	1
Mathok Gasuwa	M	Deputy Director, Planning and Budgeting	6-2009	1
Daniel Manong	M	Deputy Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	6-2009	1
Abdel Gadir Manuel	M	Deputy Director, Standards and School Instruction (Planning and Budgeting)	6-2009	1

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA				x*	x	x	x	x	x				(X)	(X)
DTA				X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	

x = Time on the job is divided between two states. *Previous STA spent most time in other state X = Full time in one state only

Salary Status:

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Unity	Y	100%	0	No	

7. Upper Nile

Capital City: Malakal

Population: 1,924,000

Major Ethnic Groups: Nuer, Shilluk, Dinka, Maban, Others (Arabs)

Background Information

Malakal lies close to the border between north and south, and has had one of the more fragile security situations since the 2005 peace agreement brought an end to the civil war.

Education Statistics

County	No. of Schools	No. of Teachers	No. of Workers	Number of Students by Gender		
				Male	Female	Total
Malakal	33	518	192	8163	8003	16166
Manyo	20	234	68	4772	3258	8030
Renk	38	391	112	9909	8837	18746
Baliet	13	63	31	3798	2312	6110
Ulang	24	28	70	4473	2068	6541
Panyikango	21	214	151	4855	3243	8098
Fashoda	16	92	102	4303	2417	6720
Nasir	61	145	114	25144	13274	38418
Maluth	14	142	25	3785	3132	6917
Maban	25	64	23	5382	4897	10279
Maiwut	18	61	20	7313	4842	12155
Longchuck	8	60	24	3639	1908	5547
Total	294	2,012	561	85,536	58,185	143,727

School enrolment data for the 2008 academic year indicates an increase of 20% over the previous year. All counties have shown an increase in enrolment. Malakal, Naser and Renk counties are highest while Baliet, Ulang and Panikiyang trail far behind. The most disadvantaged areas are Ulang, Balietlet, Longchuck, Fashoda and, Maluth in part because they are among the most inaccessible areas during the rainy season. These areas also contain the largest number of IDP returnee settlers from the North as well as from neighboring countries.

Special Education Factors to Consider

The educational environment in Upper Nile State is characterized by clear signs of negligence and marginalization, wide geographic and gender disparities, dilapidated learning spaces, and a high percentage of unqualified teachers. During the war, major settlement centers were converted into military garrisons. The education sector and its institutions were hit hard during this time. Schools were converted into military barracks and residences for the army. Learning spaces were neglected with no repair or maintenance.

Since January 2005, the demand for education in the state has greatly increased surpassing the delivery capacity of the State Ministry of Education. In addition to the peace dividend following the comprehensive agreement, several factors have contributed to this increasing demand. The “Go To School Campaigns” and the influxes of large number of IDP refugee returnees are among the key factors that drive the school enrolment. Although school enrolment has shown significant increases, the availability of physical infrastructure has been insufficient to match demand. This has resulted in a high student classroom ratio of between 70 - 120 pupils per class.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Start Date	Total Months
H.E. Minister Mujkwan Kak Ajang Adung	M	Minister	2006 (January)	31
William Gwang Deng Yor	M	Director General	2008	17
Charles John	M	Executive Director	2007	31
Omac James (Patrick)	M	Secretary to the Minister	2007	32
Oyath Ayul Lual Ayik	M	Director, Administration and Finance	2009	1
Ernest Ajak	M	Director , Examinations	2008	16
Priscilla Kur Deng	F	Director, Gender Equity & Social Change	2007	31
Peter Oyiejo Martin Nyawello	M	Director , General Education	2008	17
Anthony Ajak Ajawin Deng	M	Director, Planning & Budgeting	2008	17
Lul Ruoi Dhol Dew	M	Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	2008	17
Lual Yiec Deng Mat	M	Deputy Director, Accounts (Seconded from MoF)	2009	6
Oyath Ayul Lual Ayik	M	Deputy Director, Alternative Education Systems	2006	41
Gwang Simon Aban Acobek	M	Deputy Director, Basic Education	2008	17
Chan Dak Padiet Kwathker	M	Deputy Director, Basic Education	2008	17
Mary Adwok Ayik Acient	F	Deputy Director, Civic and Peace Education	2008	13
Biel Ningkel	M	Deputy Director, Curriculum	2008	17
Aban Padiet Jago Jebor	M	Deputy Director, Data & Statistics	2009	7
James Ojwok Okich Yor	M	Deputy Director, Development Partners	2008	17

Rapahael Ocam Aban Angong	M	Deputy Director, Education Analysis	2008	16
Okac Jam Padilong Ajing	M	Deputy Director, Examinations	2008	16
Odolo Ojulo Okoth Adkom	F	Deputy Director, Gender Equity & Social Change	2008	17
Jacinta Adwok Akurkwac Aguret	F	Deputy Director, Girls' Education	2008	15
Rebecca Odhok Akoch Agyew	F	Deputy Director, Pre- Education and Early Childhood Development	2008	17
Elia Bwono Cirino Adiang	M	Deputy Director, Planning and Budgeting	2008	18
Othum Odhong Ayoker Deng	M	Deputy Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	Before CPA	77
Ahmed Sami	M	Deputy Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation- Inspection	2008	16
Orach Laa Matjok Nujkako	M	Deputy Director , ???	2008	16
Joseph Francis	M	Deputy Director, Personnel	2008	15
Abdala Jago Deng Nyibong	M	Deputy Director, Secondary Education	2008	16
Olany Ayik Akol Bashay	F	Deputy Director, Special Needs	2008	15
Wanh Opun	M	Deputy Director, Technical Education	2008	15
Aban Raphael Repi Kudit	M	Deputy Director, World Food Program	2008	17

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	X	X
DTA								x	x					

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning October 2007 funded through MDTF. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

Salary Paid	Percent of Salary Paid	Number of Months Salary Payments in Arrears	Personnel on Strike	Other Remarks
Yes	80	2	No	

8. Warrap

Capital City: Kwajok

Population: 972,000 in 2008 Census

Major Ethnic Groups: Dinka, Lou, Rek (est. 95%)

Education Statistics

Category	Number of Schools	Male	Female	Total Enrollment	Pupil – Teacher Ratio
Primary School	330	104,427	38,818	143,245	
Teachers		2,211	171	2,382	
Pupil – Teacher Ratio					1:60

Background Information on State

Founded in 1994, Warrap State is one of the newer states in South Sudan. It is the home of the President of South Sudan, Salva Kir. Previously Warrap State was part of Bahr El Ghazal (with its capital in Wau). Since it became the capital of Warrap State in 2006, Kuajok, has been growing rapidly.

Special Educational Factors to Consider

The Ministry of Education underwent major personnel realignments at the end of May 2009. The number of personnel were reduced and many were also reduced in grade at the headquarters, counties, payams and school levels. This action was undertaken after the State Minister of Education toured all counties during March and April 2009.

The Minister is the only female State Minister of Education. She assumed her position in July 2008.

The State Ministry is currently housed in trailers and has only 4 computers to meet its operational needs.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
Nyandeng Malek	M	Minister	July 2008	12
Lino Angok Kuec	M	Director General	March 2009	5
Majok Ayii Mawien	M	Director, Accounts	July 2008	12
Hassan Haroun Madeni	M	Director, Administration and Finance	March 2009	4
Kornelio Kang Lang	M	Director, Alternative Education Systems	???	???
Joseph Modesto Mahol Reng	M	Director, Establishment of Workforce	???	???
Dhang Chol Atem (former Director of Secondary Education)	M	Director, Examinations	May 2009	3

Mary Poni Zachariah	F	Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	???	???
Gardensio Gum (former Director General)	M	Director, General Education	May 2009	3
Achuil Madut Mayen	M	Director, Local Languages	May 2009	3
Martin Madut Mourwel	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	May 2009	1
Maria Achok Deng	F	Director, Preschool Education and Early Childhood Development	May 2009	3
Inyasio Mathuc Mabany	M	Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	March 2009	5
Andriano Kiir Ayuel (former Dir. Planning & Budgeting)	M	Director, Secondary Education	May 2009	3
Antony Akuein Deng	M	Director, Teacher Training	May 2009 (new post)	3
Wol Mayar Deng	M	Deputy Director, Administration and Finance	March 2009	1
Pasquale Reng Poul	M	Deputy Director, Establishment Workforce (now Associate Director)	(long time)	36
Alawwia El-Nour Adam	F	Deputy Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	May 2009	3
Marchello Longar Deng	M	Deputy Director, General Education	May 2009	3

AED Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA											X	X	X	X
DTA			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Warrap State	Y	100%	1	No	Teachers are calm but worried about the low pay at the lower salary grades (grade 15).

9. Western Bar El Ghazal

Capital City: Wau

Population: 333,000 in 2008 Census

Major Ethnic Groups: Dinka, Fartit, Luo

Education Statistics

Category	Number
Primary Schools	175
Males Enrolled	44,514
Females Enrolled	26,505
Total Enrollment	71,019
Teacher:Student Ratio	1:60

Background Information

Western Bahr el Ghazal State consists of three counties: Wau County, Jur River County and Raja County. There are 175 Basic Schools and 14 Secondary Schools (11 in Wau County and 3 in Raja County).

Special Educational Factors to Consider

The Ministry of Education is transitioning from Arabic to English as the language of instruction and the official language of the workplace in schools and offices. To effect this change, all senior staff of the Ministry of Education were replaced approximately three months ago with individuals who were former English teachers.

14 (26%) out of the 53 professional staff at headquarters level are female. Four out of 23 senior personnel (below) are female.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position Title	Position Start	Total Months
Valentino Yak Kon	M	Minister	July 2005	48
Abdallai Ali Abdallah	M	Director General	Jan 2009	7
Joseph Gabriel Yak	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	Jan 2009	7
Pasquina Mario	M	Deputy Director, Accounts	May 2005	50
John Gonyo Ali	M	Director, Admin & Finance	May 2005	50
Anthony Toka Abdallah	M	Director, Admin & Finance	Aug. 2008	11
Elias Eneriko Wandu	M	Director, Alternative Education Systems	2005	54
Donato Ugali	M	Director, Basic Education	Jul 2005	48

Pasquale Richard	M	Director, Establishment of Workforce	Jan 2009	7
Adam Jalal el Din	M	Director, Examinations and Curriculum	May 2005	50
Elizabeth Madena Simon	F	Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	April 2009	4
Alawia al Majeed	F	Director, Preschool and Early Childhood Education	May 2005	50
Clement Mayar	M	Director, Private Schools	Jul 2005	28
Mario Guma Gessi	M	Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	March 2009	5
Lewis Sabah el Kheir	M	Director, Secondary Education	Jan 2009	7
Peter Sebario	M	Director , Accounts	January 2008	19
Alberto Akwai	M	Deputy Director, Administration and Finance	June 2009	2
Simon Paul	M	Deputy Director, Alternative Education Systems	January 2008	19
Christina Avodio Rakhi	F	Deputy Director, Gender Equity and Social Change	July 2007	24
Lewis Sabah el Kheir	M	Deputy Director, General Education (also Director, Secondary Education)	Jan 2009	7
Mario Alex	M	Deputy Director, Planning & Budgeting	2005	54
Santo Wurukel	M	Deputy Director, Quality Promotion and Innovation	Jan 2009	7
Elizabeth Daniel	F	Deputy Director, Private Schools	April 2009	4

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			X	X	X	X
DTA					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning November 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Western Bar El Ghazal State	Y	95%	1	No	Teachers are not currently on strike. However, in 2007 both teachers and students demonstrated and destroyed property at the State Ministry of Education.

10. Western Equatoria

Capital City: Yambio

Population: 619,029

Major Ethnic Groups: Avokaya, Baka, Balanda, Mondo, Moru, Zande

Education Statistics

Category	Sex	Number	Trained
Students	Male	44,326	
	Female	35,247	
Teachers	Male	1,850	30%
	Female	323	
Schools		350	

Background Information

Western Equatoria State lies to the Western part of the Greater Equatoria Region and to the South of the Greater Bahr Al Ghazal Region. It shares borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the South, the Republic of Central Africa to the west and to the Lakes State to the north.

The population of Western Equatoria is 619,029 (2008 Census). The six major ethnic groups in the State include: Avokaya, Baka, Mondo, Moru, Zande and Balanda.

Nearly all the inhabitants of Western Equatoria are engaged in the agriculture sector, producing various food crops such as sweet potatoes, cassava, maize, rice, beans, etc.

Before the war, some commercial farming involving the growing and processing of cotton and teak was practiced. The successive national governments of the Sudan in Khartoum did not attempt to establish any small-scale agricultural industries in Zande land despite its richness in fruits and agricultural crops.

Special Educational Factors to Consider

WES is one of the first two states to adopt the new payroll system and the EMIS system has been set up and is being used to provide educational data. The State also has the highest number of schools (350) in Southern Sudan. Unfortunately most these schools are makeshift and operate under trees or in dilapidated structures. Education activities are hampered by the insurgence of the rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army. TAP travel is currently limited to a 4-mile radius around Yambio.

Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender

Name	Gender	Position/Title	Start Date	Tot. Months
Not provided	M	Minister	July 2009	0
Nama R. Bullen Beshir	F	Director General	August 2007	23
Not provided	M	Director, Administration and Finance	July 2009	0

William A. Baabe	M	Director, Alternative. Education Systems	August 2007	23
Wayo Hezekiah	M	Director, Basic Education	August 2006	42
Victor Kanga	M	Director, Examinations	August 2007	23
Gabriel Makana B.	M	Director, Planning and Budgeting	August 2007	23
Kunguru Stanley	M	Director, Quality Promotion & Innovation	September 2006	33
Stanley Diisi Enosa	M	Director, Secondary Education	August 2007	23
Richard Sereberani	M	Director, Sports and Physical Education	August 2007	23
Stewart Timon G.	M	Director, Vocational Training	July 2007	24
Yunis Aziza Yoramu	M	Deputy Director, Accounts	May 2004	72
John Wajo Larya	M	Deputy Director, Administration & Finance	January 2005	60
Francis Amuda	M	Deputy Director, Alternative Education Systems	August 2007	23
Dominic A. Ngbidig	M	Deputy Director, Examinations	November 2006	32
Rhoda Elisa Tata	F	Deputy Director, Gender & Social Change	August 2007	23
Daniel Warija	M	Deputy Director, Planning and Budgeting	August 2007	23
Mbembe Rukokau Paisayo	M	Deputy Director, Quality Promotion & Innovation	August 2007	23
William Bangafu	M	Deputy Director, Secondary Education	June 2007	23
Joseph A. Sume	M	Deputy Director, Sports and Phys. Ed.	August 2007	23
Zerufa Philip Ngaiyo	F	Deputy Director, Vocational Training	August 2007	23

AED Project Support

	2008							2009						
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	X
DTA					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

x = Time on the job is divided between two states and began in October 2007 X = Time on the job is full time in one state only.

Salary Status

State Name	Salary Paid – Yes/No	Percent of Salary Paid	No. of Months Salary in Arrears	Personnel on Strike – Yes/No	Remarks
Western Equatoria	Y	80%	3 months in arrears	Yes	80% of salary is being paid. However teachers claim 16 months of arrears must be paid before they return to classes

ANNEX 20: BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following publications and papers served as the major documents reviewed by the evaluation team in preparation for conducting the evaluation of the Academy for Educational Development's Technical Assistance Program.

1. Academy for Education Development. Annual Report 2006-September 2007
2. Academy for Education Development. Annual Report October 2007-Sept 2008
3. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan April-Dec 2006
4. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan October 2006-September 2007
5. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan September 2007-September 2008
6. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan October 2008-Sept 2009
7. Academy for Education Development. EQUIP 2 Sudan SoE White Paper: Phase 2 Planning March 2006
8. Academy for Education Development. Program Monitoring Plan (PMP) 2007
9. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: October 2005- December 2005
10. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: January-March 2006
11. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: April-June 2006
12. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: July-Sept 2006
13. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: October-December 2006
14. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: January-March 2007
15. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: March-June 2007
16. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: July-Sept 2007
17. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Oct-Dec 2007
18. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Jan – March 2008
19. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: April-June 2008
20. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: July-Sept 2008
21. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Oct 2008-Dec 2008
22. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Jan-March 2009
23. AusAID. AusGuideline 6.4: Promoting practical sustainability. Commonwealth of Australia. October 2005.
24. Baser, Heather and Morgan, Peter. (2008) Capacity, Change and Performance: Synthesis Report. Maastricht, Netherlands: ECDPM
25. Brinkerhoff, Derick. (2007) Capacity Development and Fragile States. Maastricht, Netherlands: ECDPM

26. Goodhand, Jonathan. (2001) *Conflict Assessments: A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka*. London, UK: University of London-King's College Centre for Defence Studies Conflict, Security and Development Group. ISSN 1475-2174: July.
27. Government of Southern Sudan Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. *Southern Sudan Education Act, 2008*.
28. Government of Southern Sudan Ministry of Education, Science and Technology *Policy Handbook*. January 2007.
29. International Alert. (2008) *Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Recovery and Growth*. International Alert Investing in Peace Briefing paper Issue No. 1, Sept 2008. Nairobi, Kenya/Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Africa Peace Forum/Project Ploughshares.
30. Lokuji, Alfred Sebit. (2006) *Building the Capacity for Sustainable Peace in Sudan: Paper #2 - Peace Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim Period in the Sudan*.
31. Management Systems International. *Evaluations/Special Studies Guide for Sudan SUPPORT Project*. 2008.
32. Memorandum of Understanding between United States Agency for International Development and the Government of South Sudan Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. May 12, 2006.
33. Missika-Wierzba, Bathylle and Nelson, Mark (2006) *A Revolution in Capacity Development? Africans Ask Tough Questions*. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute. Capacity Development Brief Number 16, May.
34. Morgan, Peter. (2008) *Improving Counterpart Relationships in Papua New Guinea: A Study for the Governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea*. Canberra, Australia: AusAID.
35. Morgan, Peter. (2002) *Technical Assistance, Correcting the Precedent*. Development Policy Journal, December.
36. O'Sullivan, Rita G. (2004) *Practicing Evaluation: A Collaborative Approach*. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: SAGE Publications
37. Rose, Pauline. (2006) *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education, University of Sussex. May.
38. SDC. (2006) *Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management CSPM: Integrating Conflict Sensitivity and Prevention of Violence into SDC Programmes*. Geneva, Switzerland: SDC.
39. Taddesse, Sam. (2009) *Discussion Paper: Thoughts on Institutional Capacity Building*. January.
40. United Nations Development Program. (1998) *Capacity Assessment and Development: in a systems and strategic management context*. Technical Advisory Paper No. 3: Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy. January.
41. United Nations Development Program. (2008) *Capacity Development Practice Note*. October.
42. UN-Habitat. (2009) *Mapping/Capacity Assessment of Local Organizations involved in Community Driven Development/Recovery in Southern Sudan*. May 25.
43. USAID. (2007) *Cooperative Agreement No. 650-A-00-07-00004-00 with Academy for Educational Development (with modifications)*.
44. USAID. (2007) *Women and Conflict: An Introductory Guide for Programming*. Washington, DC: USAID.

45. USAID. (2005) Basic Education Strategy <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/educationpolicy05.pdf>
46. USAID. (2005) Fragile States Strategy http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf
47. USAID. (2004) Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington, DC: USAID.
48. USAID. (2000) Recent Practices in Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS: Measuring Institutional Capacity. November.
49. USAID. Strategic Framework for Investing in People. <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2007/html/82981.htm>
50. Waqo, Halakhe and Oyango, Rachael. (2008) Conflict Sensitive Programming. Presented at the Kenya Humanitarian Forum, OCHA, August 15, 2008.
51. Watson, David. (2005) ECDPM Study on Capacity Change and Performance: Monitoring and Evaluation Aspects of Capacity and Capacity Development-Working Paper for a Discussion in a Workshop in 2006.
52. World Bank. (2005) OED Review of Bank Support for Capacity Building in Africa: Management Response.
53. World Bank. (2005) Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support.