


# USG Integrated Strategic Plan for Somalia

2001-2003



*October 25, 2000*


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## Executive Summary

The Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for Somalia, 2001-2003, describes the objectives and desired results to be achieved by all US Government agencies implementing assistance programs in Somalia, including several bureaus and offices of the State Department and USAID.

Somalia in the year 2000 is a very different place from the Somalia seen by Americans in 1993. The chaos that followed the massive UNOSOM intervention has been replaced by security and stability in some areas of the country and glimmers of hope for peace in the rest. Current USG policy calls for a "building-blocks" and peace dividend approach. The rationale for U.S. engagement is clear. First, the Presidential Greater Horn of Africa Initiative seeks to bring stability and security to the region. Second, humanitarian concerns compel the U.S. to address the needs of vulnerable groups affected by conflict and drought. Third, it is particularly timely for the U.S. to be engaged with and influence various regional administrations, including what is being called the Transitional National Government, as they emerge. A key aspect of USG policy is that warlords should be marginalized from all assistance programs and external support.

The U.S. assistance program seeks to reward civil society and participatory governance structures in areas of relative stability and to ensure that continuing instability in parts of Somalia does not spread to other countries in the Horn. It also provides emergency and humanitarian relief to vulnerable peoples in a manner that promotes development rather than dependency. This "bottom-up" approach, focused on civil society and encouraging partnerships with local civil authorities, fosters local and regional leadership structures that can provide the foundation, region by region, for a potentially stable future national government.

The Somali peace conference held at Arta, Djibouti, from March-August 2000 demonstrates that progress is possible. However, the Transitional National Government that was named at Arta must establish its credibility inside Somalia and reach agreements with Somaliland, Puntland, and other regional administrations, which opposed the process. The international community must carefully consider support for the Transitional Government but also continue to reward stable regions for what they have achieved. Such a measured and equitable approach can help promote unity and return the country to a state of peace and a transition from relief to development.

This strategy revision builds on the U.S. strategic plan in effect from 1997 to the present. One of the objectives -- meeting critical needs of vulnerable groups -- is retained from the earlier strategy. Two new objectives place greater emphasis on helping to promote the expansion of democratic process in the country and a speedier transition from relief to development. They should promote hope -- the notion that a post-conflict Somalia will offer a brighter future for its citizens. The proposed Special Objective acknowledges that USG policy toward Somali could change in the wake of the Djibouti Initiative and the conclusion of the Arta conference. In this case, the US assistance program will likewise need to change based on the new policy directions determined by Washington. The strategy document suggests some possibilities for assistance targeted at helping the transitional authority.

Strategic themes include Somali solutions to Somali problems; support for the role of civil society; appropriate roles for the private and public sectors; effective humanitarian assistance that promotes a transition to development; a more prominent role for women; and targeted development assistance to foster and reward stability.

The potential for a new administration to bring changes to foreign affairs agencies and the foreign affairs budget was fully considered in strategy deliberations. Because the Somali people are so tired of conflict, a new administration will enjoy a special opportunity to help promote peace, reconciliation, and economic development in Somalia and the Greater Horn. Judicious U.S. assistance can help remove Somalia from the international dole and provide its people with the dignity fostered by democracy, self-reliance, and a return to the path of development.

In this context, the Integrated Strategic Plan for Somalia, 2001-2003, proposes the following results framework:

<b>Goal</b>	<b>A More Secure, Less Vulnerable Somalia in Transition towards Sustainable Development</b>
<b>Strategic Objective 4</b>	<b>Improved Capacity for Local Governance and Conflict Mitigation</b>
<b>Strategic Objective 5</b>	<b>Increased Opportunities for More Productive Livelihoods</b>
<b>Strategic Objective 6</b>	<b>Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups</b>
<b>Special Objective 7</b>	<b>Foundation Established for Emerging Somalia Administration to Consolidate Transition</b>

Program resources required to implement the strategy are estimated at about \$25 million per year, including emergency assistance, food aid, refugee assistance, development assistance, human rights and self-help funds, and mine action funds. All figures are illustrative. The strategy will be implemented by a multi-agency team, with the locus of management at the Somalia Country Program Team based in Nairobi, Kenya and backstopped by Washington staff. Implementation in the field is carried out by international non-government organizations and public international organizations operational in Somalia. U.S. assistance is coordinated with the multi-donor, multi-agency Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB).

Part I of the strategy document describes the environment and background for providing assistance, USG policy and rationale for engagement, results of assistance to date, and constraints and opportunities identified by our partners. Part II presents the assumptions, parameters, links between USG agencies, operating principles utilized by the ISP Core Team to make strategic choices, the results framework, and illustrative approaches and activities. Part III sets forth the roles and responsibilities of the various USG agencies, funding tables, procurement plans, contingency planning/vulnerability analysis, environmental analysis, and the performance monitoring system.


The annexes contain a description of the strategic directions considered but not chosen by the ISP Core Team; a list of Somalia program staff; an overview of other donors' programs and plans; a bibliography of key documents; a table of illustrative indicators to measure progress towards achievement of the strategy; a matrix showing the legislative framework within which the Somalia program is authorized and implemented; and copies of two guidance cables which provide planning parameters.

## Glossary

BHR	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response
CDC	Community Development Committee
DA	Development Assistance
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ESF	Economic Support Funds
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit of FAO
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
MPP	US Country Team Mission Performance Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OFDA	USAID Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
OFDA/ARO	USAID/OFDA Africa Regional Office
PL-480	Public Law 480, authorizing Food Aid Assistance
PMA	State Department Bureau for Political Military Affairs
PRM	State Department Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration
RRA	Rahanweyn Resistance Army
REDSO/ESA	USAID Regional Economic Development Services Office/ East and Southern Africa
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SNA	Somali National Alliance
UNCU	United Nations Coordination Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance
WFP	World Food Program









## **I. ENVIRONMENT AND RATIONALE FOR ASSISTANCE**

### **A. Background**

Somalia in the year 2000 is a very different place from the Somalia seen by Americans in 1993. The chaos that followed the massive UNOSOM intervention has been replaced by security and stability in some areas of the country and glimmers of hope for peace in the rest. The country appears to be divided into four distinct areas.

The northwest has successfully established a civil administration that has maintained security and stability. Declaring itself the independent Republic of Somaliland in 1991 (though not recognized internationally), it has in the intervening years experimented with different forms of governance that mix the traditional clan balance and bargaining with institutions familiar in a liberal-democratic state. In these conditions the economy, led by the private sector, has flourished. Though affected by potential bans from clients, livestock exports through the port of Berbera have increased and numerous home-grown trades and industries, particularly telecommunications, have been established. Much has been accomplished with local resources and participation from Somalis in the diaspora. Refugees in camps across the border in Ethiopia are returning, many to the capital of Hargeisa, which offers more opportunity than rural areas.

In August of 1998, clans and their militias in the northeast established an autonomous civil administration under the name of Puntland State of Somalia with its capital in Garowe. Puntland intends to rejoin a future national Somali state if it is sufficiently federal and decentralized. Puntland has done well from the diversion of trade patterns away from Mogadishu's large ports and has utilized the revenues from the port of Bossaso to finance security costs and minimal staffing for the civil administration. It has also created autonomous and semi-autonomous road and water authorities that rely on user fees to cover operations and maintenance that are carried out by private management firms. The population of Puntland has been augmented by migrants and displaced from other regions of Somalia, transforming a region that was an isolated backwater prior to the civil war.

Areas in the central regions of Mudug, Galgaduud, Hiran, Bay, and Bakool also enjoy a certain amount of stability. In Bay and Bakool, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) created a civil administration in 1999 following recapture of the regions from the Somali National Alliance (SNA). A nascent civil administration is coordinated by the RRA. Similarly, there is a nascent civil administration created by the clans in Hiran region, and processes leading to creation of civil administrations are underway in other regions.

In the south and in the area around Mogadishu, conflict continues, ranging from battles between various warlords and militias for specific towns to low-level conflict, including looting, hijacking, hostage-taking and other violent crimes. Cease-fires and peace agreements occasionally reached among the warlords are soon undermined by shifting alliances. The Al-Ittihad Islamic militia also play a major role in the south. These uncertain conditions adversely affect vulnerable households, but security and access for the international community is limited. The international community seeks to marginalize the warlords, who appear to be less influential with urban residents and to have lost much support of Mogadishu businessmen. Nonetheless, some warlords remain well-armed and are still players able to affect the turn of political events.

The year 2000 has increased hope that country-wide peace is just around the corner. The President of Djibouti's peace initiative, announced at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1999, led to a peace conference held in Arta, Djibouti from March to August 2000. The Arta conference began as a civil society initiative and later incorporated clan leaders, politicians of the former Siad Barre regime, and some warlords who participated as individuals rather than faction leaders. Intensive negotiations culminated in the adoption of a transitional charter for a national government, the creation of a clan-balanced transitional national assembly, and the election of a

transitional president, all mandated to carry out a 3-year transition towards establishment of a national federal government for all of Somalia. A major task for the Transitional Government will be to convince the civil administrations in Somaliland, Puntland, and Bay and Bakool regions to join a federal or confederal national government. The numerous failures of national Somali peace processes in the last decade lead many in the international community to regard the latest effort with caution. By the end of October 2000, official recognition of the Transitional Government has come only from Djibouti and Sudan. This suggests that the pace of peacemaking and reconciliation may be fluid during the three-year strategy period.

Whether progress towards peace and restoration is rapid or slow, Somalis face a difficult road to recovery. In the 1980s, Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world. The destruction and looting of nearly all infrastructure during the civil war and subsequent conflicts has put Somalia at the absolute bottom of UNDP's Human Development Index. Average life expectancy in 1998 was between 41 and 43 years; the maternal mortality rate is 160 per 100,000; the adult literacy rate barely 15%; and 25% of children never reach five years of age. In a few areas, mines or fear of mines continue to inhibit investment and productivity. More importantly, most militias in the South have not been demobilized – thereby feeding a crime problem that cannot be handled by the weak law enforcement and judicial administration or by traditional clan-based methods. Security and access continue to be the most challenging obstacles in the implementation of humanitarian and development programs in southern Somalia. These conditions have kept approximately 140,000 refugees in camps in northern Kenya and 200,000 in camps in northeastern Ethiopia. Resettlement programs from Ethiopia have met with some success, though a portion of the repatriating refugees accept the benefits package and use it to settle in the ethnic Somali region of Ethiopia. The near-total closure of education systems during the civil conflict has created a "lost generation" of Somalis without primary education. Others with education and skills have fled the country and constitute a widespread diaspora in East Africa, the Middle East, the United States and a scattering in other regions of the world. It is estimated that the diaspora sends \$300 million per year to their families in Somalia, funds which were used to finance arms purchases and clan battles but now are being increasingly invested in productive enterprises in the stable areas in the north.

## **B. USG Policy and Rationale for Engagement in Somalia**

The paramount goal of U.S. policy in Somalia is to encourage the return of Somalia to the international community as a legitimate and reliable member. The U.S. strategy for promoting peace and reconciliation in Somalia has been based on the building-block, peace-dividend approach, which rewards the accomplishments of regional administrations – relative stability, militia disarmament or control, expanded civil society, participatory governance structures, and personal security. This strategic approach also seeks to ensure that continuing instability in parts of Somalia does not spread to the stable areas or other countries in the Horn. This "bottom-up" approach is intended to shore up local and regional leadership and administrative structures – the "building blocks" – that can provide the foundation, region by region, for a potential future national government. U.S. policy also seeks to isolate the warlords and their militias, to diminish their influence, and to deny them the benefits of assistance programs.

What is the rationale for U.S. involvement in Somalia? What is the U.S. national interest? Several justifications can be offered. One, the Presidential Greater Horn of Africa Initiative was conceived to address the problems of conflict and food insecurity, in order to end strife and bring stability to the region. Engagement in Somalia supports U.S. Greater Horn objectives. Second, the humanitarian problems wrought by the failed Somali state, continued conflict, and recurrent drought requires a wealthy and benevolent U.S. to respond to the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children. Third, the U.S. has an opportunity to influence various regional administrations, including the clan coalitions that have effected a fragile stability and the newly-constituted Transitional National Government. Fourth, geopolitically, the northern Somali territories sit on Gulf of Aden through the Suez Canal. Unfriendly Somali administrations could join with other elements hostile to U.S. interests and disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, particularly the vital oil supplies which the Gulf War sought to protect.

Finally, the financial and psychological costs of prolonged emergency and humanitarian assistance are usually much higher than development assistance, which promotes self-reliance and hope for a better future rather than dependency.

### **C. Some Results of USG Assistance**

In response to the waves of humanitarian crises that have engulfed Somalia since 1991, the international community has saved millions of lives in Somalia despite difficult conditions. The United States has been the major contributor to this effort, including the UNOSOM Operation Restore Hope intervention of 1992-95. Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. has remained a major donor in Somalia, providing emergency, humanitarian, refugee, and development assistance of about \$25 million annually, second only to the European Union.

U.S. assistance began shortly after Somalia's independence from Italy and Britain in 1961. During the cold war, the U.S. provided increasing support until the Siad Barre government became a close ally of the Soviet Union. After the 1978-79 Ogaden War with Ethiopia and the Mengistu regime in Addis became a Soviet client state, Somalia once again became important to U.S. interests in the region and U.S. assistance increased. At its peak, the United States was providing \$82 million per year in development assistance, economic support funds, and food aid. Sectors of intervention included agriculture, livestock, water, health care delivery, human capacity development, privatization, and major port construction activities. A retrospective look at U.S. assistance conducted in 1994 identified several lessons that have been incorporated in the elaboration of the proposed 2001-2003 strategy: small community-based projects achieved the best results and U.S. interests and objectives should be explicit.

As armed resistance to the Barre regime increased in the late 1980s, leading to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and the rise of warlords, U.S. assistance was devoted to supporting the extensive relief efforts of the international community. The drought and famine of 1992, following several years of low rainfall and increased vulnerabilities of poor households, caused a major food crisis. The humanitarian community and the UNOSOM military intervention, which included U.S. troops, successfully delivered the aid to the most vulnerable, saving millions of lives. However, the operation turned in 1993-94 to political and military objectives in an effort to reconstruct a Somali state. The constancy of the warlords and their apparent support by nationalistic Somalis led to the withdrawal of UNOSOM in 1995 and left international NGOs and UN agencies to make their own arrangements with warlords and militias for delivery of relief aid.

In 1997, the U.S. elaborated a three-year plan for providing assistance in Somalia. The overall goal of the plan was "A Less Vulnerable, More Self-Sufficient Population", with a focus on the delivery of humanitarian assistance through disaster assistance, food aid, and refugee assistance, and limited development assistance to stable areas. The program consisted of two Strategic Objectives and one Special Objective:

- SO 1: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Targeted Areas
- SO 2: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups
- SPO: Increased Community Capacity to Meet Their Own Needs

The program was largely successful in Strategic Objectives 1 and 2 and is on-track in the Special Program Objective, as detailed in the Somalia Results Review and Resources Requests (R4s) submitted in 1999 and in 2000. Reliable data supplied by partner agencies for the R4 reports highlight major accomplishments. Under SO 1, 148,852 hectares were irrigated through the rehabilitation of 3,125 kilometers of irrigation canals; 139,873 vulnerable farm families received seeds; and 18,874 farmers received agricultural loans and achieved a 97% repayment rate. Major accomplishments under SO 2 include the delivery of food aid to 2,448,977 vulnerable persons; decreased food transportation losses from 27% in 1996 to <1% in 1999, due to improved food delivery mechanisms; and better-targeted emergency food aid with Food For Work projects supporting community-

implemented, sustainable-oriented self-help projects. Health services increased the percent of children under 12 months fully vaccinated from 30% to 67%, and water resource rehabilitation or development provided 1,328,272 people with access to potable water.

Major accomplishments of the Special Program Objective include considerable improvement in the organizational capacity of Somali NGOs and in the capacity of several nascent local administrations, including the regional administrations of Somaliland and Puntland, to provide services to their citizens and collect revenue. CARE's institutional capacity assessment tool showed an increase from 66% to 83% of local NGO partners rated as competent. Finally, 10,153 non-agricultural loans were provided to entrepreneurs.

## **D. Constraints and Opportunities for Relief and Development**

The inter-agency strategy development team conducted a series of meetings and consultations with numerous partners in Somalia and in the international community during the elaboration of this document (see Section II.B). Partners were asked their views on relief and development in Somalia and realistic opportunities for assistance over the strategy period. Their responses were factored into strategy deliberations and, as appropriate, included in the plan. These extensive consultations helped identify a number of key constraints to providing assistance to Somalia.

### **1. Key Constraints**

- a. **Conflict**: Continued clan conflict, particularly in southern Somalia and in Mogadishu, makes investment in development inappropriate in much of the country and requires humanitarian intervention from the donor community for vulnerable populations. The lack of security hinders access and makes it difficult for the international community to reach the most vulnerable peoples and significantly adds to the cost of relief. It also makes adequate monitoring of activities very difficult. Security costs are also a major constraint for Somali businesses seeking to invest and grow. The numbers of weapons that remain in the hands of militia in southern Somalia will continue to slow the process of reconciliation, compromise security, and inhibit development.
- b. **Fledging civil society institutions**: Under the Barre regime, civil society organizations were rare. The state controlled almost all activities and only a handful of local NGOs, mainly professional organizations existed. Since the fall of Barre's government, civil society organizations have flourished, particularly in the North, with support from donors funding activities like USAID's Somalia Partnership Program. Local NGOs, business and professional associations, and community-based committees and organizations need to be nourished to promote the expansion of democratic process in Somalia.
- c. **Lack of economic opportunities**: The Somali economy is based essentially on livestock production and export and, to a lesser extent, on crop production and export. Variations in the rainfall regime renders production uncertain. The potential for recurrent bans on livestock imports by Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Gulf State clients makes even the mainstay of the economy vulnerable. Unexploded ordinance reduces the availability of productive land, even in the more secure areas of northern Somalia. The lack of availability of venture capital for small and micro-businesses limits the options of an entrepreneurial population.
- d. **Destroyed or deteriorating infrastructure**. The damage done to physical assets during the past 10-12 years has been devastating and made Somalia even poorer. The cost of reconstructing major infrastructure is prohibitive. Somalia's lack of access to international financial institutions for loans to cover the cost of infrastructure rehabilitation is an impediment to reconstruction. USAID must focus its limited financial resources on small-scale, community-level facilities such as schools, health clinics, irrigated cropping perimeters, or livestock quarantine and veterinary structures. An exception might be made in the case of potable water systems, which can simultaneously

promote improved health and sanitation, economic activity such as crop and livestock production, civil society expansion, and conflict reduction or mitigation.

e. Limited role of women in the economy and civil society: Women are the focal point of provision of services to households, especially in times of conflict and crisis. Somali clan structure and practice sometimes relegates women to a minor role in community deliberations about resources when nearly all policymakers and decision-makers may be men. This is an important constraint to effective design and implementation of development programs but also affects the delivery of emergency and humanitarian relief, especially where the targeted beneficiaries are women and children.

f. Low level of skills and education. The "lost generation" of Somalis who have not received primary education during the many years of civil conflict constitutes a major constraint. Many of the skilled and educated fled the country during the past decade. Over recent years, some vocational training has been financed by donors, especially in the health and water sectors, but training has not been based on workforce analysis, nor has the training been adequately formal and professionalized. Hence, many efforts to establish vocational training facilities have failed. Finally, reconstruction and rehabilitation of primary, secondary and tertiary education systems has only recently begun. Infrastructure, teaching and administrative staff, and equipment and materials are major requirements that donors must address so that another generation of Somalis does not miss the education and training necessary to expand democratic process and revitalize the economy.

## 2. Opportunities

The strategy recognizes that the opportunities cited below are tempered by continued uncertainty of politics and weather.

a. Conflict fatigue and areas where security prevails: Somaliland and Puntland have made impressive achievements in ending conflict, professionalizing their security forces, removing weapons from public places, and convincing militias to disband. By the same token, the success and popularity of the Arta Conference demonstrates that Somalis are tired of conflict. The stability achieved in the north and the potential for similar accomplishments elsewhere present the international community with opportunities to make development investments. The progress made in Somaliland, Puntland, Bay, and Bakool, and in Arta shows the international community that Somalis are capable of making peace and turning to positive politics and business. Donors can build on that progress and help to expand the areas that are secure and stable by shifting their assistance from short-term relief and emergency support to long-term development projects.

b. Chance to work with and influence responsive Somali administrative structures: The total destruction of the central government has provided Somali citizens with the opportunity to create or revitalize governance structures on their own terms that meet regional needs (including clan balance) and are dependent on civil society for their support. The regional administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, Bay and Bakool, and the Transitional National Authority constitute the potential "building blocks" for a reunified Somalia.

c. Entrepreneurial drive, self-reliance, and independence: The progress made in the north in the last few years during a decline in foreign assistance and a ban on livestock imports in Arabia demonstrates that Somalis at home and in the diaspora have resources, that they are willing to invest in for-profit ventures and to contribute to public projects. Local NGOs in the northeast have seen dramatic increases in community contributions to water and agricultural rehabilitation projects, including cash contributions. The traditional trading economy of Somalia is being revived and offers many opportunities for growth in a trade-oriented global economy.

d. Changing gender roles: The civil conflict has effected substantial change in the role of women. One commonly-stated view is that the man who had a daughter could survive the poverty and deprivation wrought by

the many years of conflict. Women have become active entrepreneurs to help feed their families. Women have also increased their participation in development, usually at the prompting of the international community, which supports projects that require community participation. And women were among the prime civil society movers of the Djibouti peace process and will occupy 10% of the seats in the transitional national assembly. This evolution offers opportunities for the assistance program to both support and build on the new strengths of women.

## II. INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN

### A. Parameters, Assumptions, and Operating Principles

#### 1. Parameters

The following parameters were provided in two cables, State 140925 dated 24 July 2000, and State 158341 dated 18 August 2000, copies of which are seen at Annex 7.

a. **Funding levels:** USAID's Africa Bureau has advised that development assistance resources will probably be straight-lined at \$3 million per year for the strategy period. The Bureau for Humanitarian Response has unofficially advised that uncertainty governs annual resource levels for emergency and food aid assistance which could decrease in FY 2001 and beyond, subject to the caveat that levels may increase or decrease depending on need and availability.

Two Department of State bureaus expected to provide funding during the strategy period have not indicated potential levels. The strategy team has thus included illustrative figures in the budget tables that approximate annual levels over recent years. The Bureau for Population Migration and Refugees supports refugee resettlement and reintegration via funding for the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. The Bureau for Political Military Affairs has provided direct support for mine action programs.

USAID's Africa Bureau also provided guidance indicating that the Somalia program operating expense budget will not increase over the life of the strategy. The Somali team is thus urged to fund staff requirements with program resources to the extent possible.

Section III.B contains summary funding tables.

b. **Analyses:** State 158341 asked the strategy development team to integrate several analyses into the document which would indicate the potential for convergence with the Greater Horn of Africa strategic objectives; directions for HIV/AIDS activities; gender concerns, with a special focus on women's leadership roles and integration in program and organizational structures; how continued conflict may affect the strategy and its implementation; and how tropical forests may be affected by proposed activities. The strategy development team has endeavored to respond to this request. In the case of the tropical forest analysis, the USAID Regional Environmental Advisor has proposed that Somalia be exempted from the requirement to conduct a Tropical Forestry and Biodiversity analysis. The justification is presented in the Environmental Analysis seen in Section III.E.

#### 2. Assumptions

The assumptions listed below – expected trends in Somalia that are outside the span of control of implementing USG agencies – underlie the strategic plan for Somalia for 2001-2003. Alternative scenarios in which these

assumptions do not bear out, and planned reactions, are described in Section III.D. (Vulnerability Analysis/Contingency Planning).

- a. **Trend towards increasing stability.** The political situation will continue on its current trend towards consolidation of civil administration over larger areas of territory. Reconciliation efforts will continue and result in governmental authorities recognized by a critical mass of Somalis, which will in turn give momentum to further negotiations for a national or federal government. Though the outlook is bright at the time that this strategy is being developed, prudence demands that this three-year strategy make no assumptions about an immediate achievement of peace nor seek to determine the conditions necessary for achieving a functioning, representative federal government recognized by all Somalis. The current regionally-based civil administrations – the “building blocks” – will continue to play a key role in ensuring security and stability for many Somalis and other areas of Somalia will seek to emulate their success. The marginalization of the warlords will continue.
- b. **Complex emergency continues.** There will continue to be emergencies – climatic or man-made – over the next three years that will weaken the capacities of Somali households already living on the margin. The strategy assumes that below-normal rains, localized flooding, and other natural disasters will cyclically befall Somalia. Because clan conflict will continue, localized displacement will still occur. Levels of vulnerability in Somalia will range from a “structural level” estimated by our partners at 500,000 persons to higher levels around 1,000,000 people in times of emergency over the next three years. Security conditions will remain uncertain in some areas, making implementation costly.
- c. **Increased external economic investment.** As expansion and consolidation of civil administration continues, there will be increased interest, involvement and investment of the Somali diaspora. Conflict and emergencies will cause set-backs but the trend for the next three years will be positive.
- d. **Increasing civil society participation.** Communities will continue to actively participate in rehabilitation, development, and governance issues, and increasing community contributions in cash, security, labor or in-kind will be seen. There may be more democratic space in the south and center due to the success of the peace process in Djibouti.
- e. **Women's roles and participation expanding.** Women will claim a greater voice in politics and civil society commensurate with their increasing economic weight. But Islamic radicalism, which in recent years has manifested itself in Somalia as a cultural phenomenon more than a political movement, may be a factor that will try to limit women's roles.
- f. **Policy and legal context:** The current policy emphasis on the “building blocks” and providing a peace dividend to stable areas will not radically change when the next U.S. administration takes office in January 2001. Similarly, it is expected that the legal framework described in Annex 5 will not change.

### **3. Links With Other USG Goals and Plans**

This strategy supports and complements the following USG goals and national interests:

**International Affairs Strategic Plan:** The ISP fits within two U.S. national interests: Democracy and Human Rights, and Humanitarian Response. The ISP addresses three of the strategic goals of the International Affairs Strategic Plan: Economic Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and Democracy and Human Rights.

**Regional Performance Plan:** The ISP conforms to the regional MPP, which mandates that the Missions work to improve regional stability. Successful efforts to improve stability and lessen vulnerability in Somalia will have spillover effects in the region.

**Mission Performance Plans:** There is no Mission Performance Plan specifically for Somalia because there is no resident mission. However, sections of Performance Plans for Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and various bureaus in the Department of State relate to Somalia. The proposed strategy conforms to the content and objectives of these elements of other plans.

**USAID Goals:** The ISP addresses two of USAID's goals: "Democracy and Governance Strengthened" and "Lives Saved, Suffering Associated with Natural or Man-Made Disasters Reduced, and Conditions Necessary for Political and/or Economic Development Re-established".

**Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.** The ISP converges with the GHAI strategy and operating principles. The proposed strategy will contribute to GHAI SO 1, "Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Regional Food Security", by continuing to assist Somalis with improving the infrastructure and services necessary to get the economy back on its feet and thereby reduce dependency on foreign food assistance. The ISP will also contribute to GHAI SO 2, "Strengthened African Capacity to Respond to Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Conflict", by addressing the causes of one of the longest, most intractable conflicts in the Horn of Africa through improving Somalis' governance and conflict mitigation systems, especially in the stable areas where Somalis have themselves reached peace agreements and established security and stability. The strategic planning process has drawn upon all five of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative's operating principles: (a) African ownership; (b) strategic coordination among partners and USG agencies; (c) linking relief and development; (d) regional perspective; and (e) promotion of stability, as well as the GHAI emphasis on convergence at the regional level.

**REDSO/ESA Strategic Plan.** The objectives of the Somalia Integrated Strategic Plan converge with the three objectives of the recently approved REDSO/ESA strategy. The USAID program in Somalia recognizes that tackling food insecurity (REDSO's SO5) means improving the availability of, the access to and the utilization of food. This is demonstrated by the range of production, infrastructure rehabilitation (including irrigation, water and sanitation facilities) and enabling environment activities being proposed under the different SOs. The need for conflict management (REDSO's SO 6) through improved governance, particularly over access and use of resources, is explicitly identified as SO4 in the Somalia program. Finally the Somalia program also addresses the need to improve health care (REDSO's SO 7).

#### **4. Operating Principles**

The following operating principles were used by the ISP Core Team to make strategic choices and will continue to be observed during implementation:

- a. **Transition from relief to development.** Humanitarian assistance will continue to be provided to those in greatest need, and most non-food emergency assistance will continue to be targeted to women and children. Development assistance, on the other hand, will be targeted to the most stable areas of Somalia.
- b. **Service provision in the private sector, system coordination in the public sector.** The strategy will work within the predominant political economy of Somalia, which sees private sector firms providing nearly all services and the nascent public sector intending to take on a regulatory and coordination role. In the same vein, development of the public sector will be done with private sector promotion in mind.
- c. **Women's participation.** The assistance program will promote increased women's participation in civil society and economy that is commensurate with their new roles after 10 years of conflict and disaster. The assistance program will also ensure that it does not cause backsliding or regression of the progress made by Somali women in that time.

d. **Consultation with beneficiaries.** The ISP Core Team recognized that Somalis must have a voice in planning and implementing the strategy. The team also recognized that it must allow for Somali-style processes, which do not necessarily mesh well with Western-style timetables and explicit milestones leading to planned achievements. At the same time, the assistance program will strive to be clan sensitive.

e. **Partnerships with communities.** The strategy will be implemented in those Somali communities and civil administration areas that are willing to contribute and participate. Those that are not willing to contribute and participate will not receive assistance. In areas of critical humanitarian need, populations should still be willing to participate in decision making, ensuring security, and contributing, when appropriate. There will also be an emphasis on small community-based projects and promoting private-public partnerships in order to avoid the errors of previous development programs in Somalia. Keeping projects small helps to ensure that communities stay involved and have a greater role than the donor, and allows for more rapid learning of lessons for future programming.

f. **Fostering Somali capacities across all programs.** Somalis have demonstrated that they are capable self-starters. The assistance program will seek to equip Somalis with the right tools to plan and manage their rehabilitation and development. Supporting partnerships between Somali communities and the Somali diaspora for productive development investment can greatly increase the leverage of limited development dollars and lead the way to sustainability. Employment-generation opportunities should be promoted whenever possible. This operating principle applies particularly to those programs that support rehabilitation (such as food for work vs. free food distributions) but also applies to establishing a base for future development, such as through promotion of artisans' and skilled workers' associations.

g. **Realistic expectations of partner capabilities:** Our partners in the international community are on the front lines of implementing programs in Somalia, often in high-risk conditions. While we seek to achieve ambitious results with our funding, we will always consult with our partners about what is possible and what is achievable.

h. **Importance and fragility of the physical environment:** The assistance program will (i) increase awareness by promoting the mainstreaming of environmental consciousness in decision-making and (ii) build the capacity of the population to be less vulnerable to environmental degradation.

## **B. Beneficiaries, Partners and Other Donors, and Coordination**

### **1. Beneficiaries**

The primary beneficiaries<sup>1</sup> of the USG assistance program in Somalia are individuals, especially women and children, of households in targeted areas where the assistance program provides direct benefits, e.g., health, water and sanitation services; strengthening of capacities in these service-provision systems as well as in governance systems; and rehabilitation of public goods such as infrastructure. Secondary beneficiaries are personnel in institutions, organizations, and firms that benefit from the improved enabling environment for their activities.

Each of the funding sources that contribute to this integrated USG strategic plan targets specific groups in Somalia. Beneficiaries of the humanitarian assistance program primarily consist of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children, who are adversely affected by conflict or natural disaster and unable to meet basic needs for survival. While these target groups have in recent years been concentrated in the south and center of Somalia, the

<sup>1</sup> Per the Automated Directives System Glossary, USAID defines "customers" as the beneficiaries of the assistance program. Therefore this section meets the ADS 201 requirement to define the "customers" of the strategy.

humanitarian program also assists vulnerable groups in the northwest and northeast, when appropriate. Beneficiaries of the food aid program are members of communities where food needs assessments have determined that the need is the greatest and there is sufficient access and security to distribute food. Beneficiaries of the development assistance program are primarily economically active individuals in communities, firms, and institutions in stable areas where levels of access and security are sufficient to obtain a positive long-term return on investment of development resources. The development program currently works largely in the northwest and northeast of Somalia, though it may expand in central, and possibly southern Somalia as conditions improve. The refugee assistance and resettlement programs funded by DOS/PRM and other donors target refugees in camps across the border in Kenya and Ethiopia and reintegrated refugees who have been resettled inside Somalia. BHR/OFDA funds will also assist Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia. The Democracy and Human Rights projects and Self-Help projects managed by Embassy/Djibouti are targeted on civil society organizations managing small projects in Somaliland.

## **2. Partners and Other Donors**

The US Government assistance program in Somalia is implemented in the context of a multi-partner, multi-donor effort to provide humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance to vulnerable people who have suffered from conflict and natural disasters. The international community implements relief, rehabilitation and development programs, most focused on humanitarian assistance to meet critical needs of vulnerable groups. Many of our partners participated in the preparation of this strategy, including international organizations (OAU-IBAR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNDP/WSP, FAO, UNCTAD, WFP, and ICRC), international NGOs (Adventist Development Relief Agency, AMREF, CARE, Concern Worldwide, International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, International Medical Corps, Norwegian Peoples' Aid, Progressive Interventions, and World Vision) and other donors (including the European Union, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, France, and Sweden).

During the two-week strategic planning workshop, the ISP team met with and listened to partners with specific sectoral expertise or interest based in Nairobi. Consultations focused on health and water, food security, capacity-building and governance, humanitarian programs and IDPs, and economic rehabilitation. The ISP team asked partners to tell us of their plans for the next three years, to identify the priority constraints to relief and development in Somalia, to suggest realistic opportunities for activities and interventions by the USG assistance program, and to propose measurable results for achievement within the three-year strategy period. During this same period, the ISP Core Team divided into three groups to conduct a field visit to Somaliland, Puntland, and Bay and Bakool regions, in order to hear the views of the regional civil administrations and implementing partners in the field. The ISP Core Team then utilized the inputs of the partner meetings, the field travel and strategic planning sessions to prepare a first draft of the results framework, which was presented to all the partners for revisions and suggestions on September 11. The partners made changes to the Intermediate Results statements and suggested numerous potential indicators for measurement of the Strategic Objectives. A second draft was prepared based on the partners' reactions and suggestions. An additional month was provided for partner reaction and input prior to the formal REDSO/ESA review and approval of the ISP. This positive and open relationship with our partners will be continued as we implement the ISP.


An overview of other donor programs is provided in Annex 3.

## **3. Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB)**

USAID has also helped establish a unique and fairly effective donor coordination group known as the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The SACB is comprised of some 150 organizations, including multilateral and bilateral donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs. An Executive Committee coordinates responses to sensitive issues like access and security. For example, an attack on one implementing agency may result in an

SACB Executive Committee proposal for a suspension of all assistance to the location or region of the offense. The SACB has established sector committees -- governance, food security and rural infrastructure, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education -- to promote coordinated, cost-efficient, and effective programs. The committees seek to standardize policies, technical approaches, and data collection, and to monitor the quality of interventions. However, SACB decision-making is consensual and non-binding which sometimes constrains its operations. Reform of the SACB to make its coordination role more effective is being considered, but the broad range of interests and objectives of its members makes change a slow process. The U.S. is committed to continuing to operate within the SACB context. Selective reform of the organization and better coordination of field-based personnel and activities will receive greater emphasis during the strategy period. The U.S. may have to change its low profile stance and assume a more aggressive role in the SACB to effect better coordination and promote USG objectives.

## RESULTS FRAMEWORK CHART



### C. Results Framework and Illustrative Approaches

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Goal: A More Secure, Less Vulnerable Somalia in Transition towards Sustainable Development</b></p>
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The goal of the Somalia Integrated Strategic Plan is “A More Secure, Less Vulnerable Somalia in Transition towards Sustainable Development”. Achievement of the strategy’s objectives will contribute to realization of this goal in Somalia in the next 5-10 years. This goal statement reflects a shift in emphasis of the USG assistance program. The previous goal statement, “A Less Vulnerable, More Self-Sufficient Population”, no longer sufficiently encapsulates the changes that will be seen in Somalia in the next 5-10 years, should the strategic plan be successful. The change in goal statement reflects the progress that has been made in much of Somalia in the last three years in establishing security and stability and thereby generating hope for a real transition. The USG assistance program will promote this transition whenever and wherever possible, within the limitations of funding and access and security constraints. It is expected that the transition will be achieved largely by Somalis themselves and that the USG and other donors will contribute in areas of comparative advantage where targeted assistance is appropriate and effective.

To accomplish this goal within 5-10 years, the U.S. will work to achieve three strategic objectives over the period 2001-2003 in the areas of productive livelihoods, improved governance and conflict mitigation, and meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups. For each of these objectives, the strategy identifies intermediate results necessary for their achievement. Finally, a special objective is proposed to allow for assistance to the newly established Transitional National Government in areas not covered by the other strategic objectives.

There are specific causal linkages among the three strategic objectives. Opportunities for productive livelihoods will be more numerous and have greater potential for success in stable areas. Since much of the instability seen in Somalia since the civil war has been generated by competition for resources, the security agreements now holding in several regions of the country can be consolidated through governance and conflict mitigation systems that function efficiently and effectively in managing public resources. Individual citizens can thereby plan for the future, invest in improvements to their livelihoods, and undertake projects collectively.

In this context, farmers, pastoralists and urban residents can invest in more sustainable methods of production, including improved appropriate technologies. Conversely, as opportunities increase and the economy grows, governance systems will have a better chance of acceptance and financing by skeptical citizens. But even as stable areas continue on this trajectory towards sustainable development, the most vulnerable cannot be left behind, or else the inequity of different rates of development will spark new conflict and destroy the progress already made. Improvements in the health, water and sanitation services provided to targeted vulnerable populations, especially women and children, can increase productivity and remove a source of conflict. Improvements in health, water and sanitation and other rehabilitation activities also offer a venue for participation by civilians in governance systems, which, this strategy argues, then contribute to reducing and preventing conflict.

**Strategic Objective 4: Strengthened Capacity for Local Governance and Conflict Mitigation****a. Background**

There is a great opportunity for Somalis to build on the strengths demonstrated during their political trauma of the last decade. Some regions of the country have successfully reestablished security and stability, revitalized the traditional economy, and launched new enterprises -- all without the support or constraints of a national government. In the cases of Somaliland and Puntland, security has been achieved through peace agreements that established civilian administrations and subsumed militias to the authority of the new administration. Minimal governance structures have been established, and minimal services are provided to citizens, financed by rudimentary revenue collection systems. In Somaliland, a parliament exists, consisting of a lower house of elected representatives and an upper house of high-ranking clan elders who also serve to adjudicate conflicts.

Communities continue to function in traditional governance systems involving clan elders and *diya*-paying groups (for compensating victims of crimes). In those communities where donors undertake rehabilitation and development projects, an increasing emphasis is being placed on the community contribution to the activity (with cash, labor, security or in-kind) and community participation in the planning and maintenance aspects. These usually take the form of water management committees, or health committees, with the donor requiring a minimum participation or quota of women members. Partners report that these efforts have paid off, with Somalis increasingly contributing and participating in rehabilitating and maintaining collective public goods.

Local non-governmental organizations formerly had a bad reputation in Somalia since many were created in the heyday of foreign assistance during the UNOSOM operation when donor agencies looked for local implementation partners. At the same time, militias formed NGOs to take advantage of an exception to UNOSOM weapons policies. Today, some Somali NGOs have benefitted from capacity-strengthening and are viewed as effective implementors. Still, they are limited in their abilities to exert influence on public authorities, who view with jealousy the NGOs' favored status with the international community. And NGOs are just beginning to assume an advocacy role to improve governance. Many NGOs consist of members of one clan or sub-clan, which seems appropriate in the Somali context and allows them to operate in tandem with their beneficiary communities, but is a potential constraint on a broader scope of action and on an advocacy role beyond expressing the interests of the sub-clan.

**b. The Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results**

Strengthening the capacity for local governance and conflict mitigation will be critical for continuing Somalia's transition towards sustainable development. Peace processes at the national level have often failed to resolve the issues fueling conflict among Somalis, even with good will and facilitation by neighboring states and the international community. True reconciliation and agreement on ways to share resources and mitigate conflict can best be reached at the local and regional level, as a foundation for national reconciliation. Transparent and fair participatory systems for managing community resources should help to reduce conflict and channel disputes into a forum for resolution acceptable to all parties. As security and stability becomes more widespread, the incentive for better governance and more robust conflict mitigation systems will lie in maintaining the conditions for a viable trading economy, which, in turn, requires lower security and transport costs. To that end, nearly all actors (including private firms, the nascent public authorities, community leaders and NGOs) should be drawn into the process of establishing governance and conflict mitigation systems during the on-going transition. Those actors

who profit from the current chaos (including the warlords, their militias, and importers of drugs and arms) must be excluded.

Activities under this strategic objective will therefore be targeted on helping different political actors participate in developing and testing governance and conflict mitigation systems. Of particular importance is expanded participation by Somalis in civil society, particularly marginalized groups, including women, minority clans, IDPs and resettled refugees.

Work in this Strategic Objective will be largely focused in the stable areas where civil administrations and civil society have begun to establish themselves and begun to interact with the vibrant, dominant private sector, though work in other areas is not ruled out as conditions change during the strategy period.

This strategic objective will be advanced through accomplishment of three intermediate results: broader, more effective participation of civil society organizations in local governance; increased partnerships among private sector, public sector, and civil society; and enhanced institutional foundation for rule of law.

#### **Intermediate Result 4.1: Broader, More Effective Participation Of Civil Society Organizations In Local Governance**

By assisting NGOs to become more representative of marginalized groups, the assistance program can both broaden the support of the NGOs and increase the voice of the marginalized groups. Building the capacity of NGOs to be more effective organizations, especially as implementors of relief and development activities, will allow them to stake a claim to a greater role in governance.

The key activity for achievement of this Intermediate Result will be USAID's Civil Society Expansion Program, a follow-on to the Somali Partnership Program. This three-year small-grants program will promote linkages between NGOs, local authorities, and communities as they undertake rehabilitation and development projects in agriculture, promotion/privatization of livestock and economic growth activities, and maternal health initiatives. The USAID grants will be made via a cooperating partner who will provide capacity-building support and training to sub-grantees and to local authorities.

Other illustrative approaches include small grants to human rights organizations and activities through the Democracy & Human Rights Fund and Self-Help Funds managed by US Embassy/Djibouti; leadership training for women; negotiation skills and advocacy training for civil society organizations; direct promotion of community dialogue on development, rehabilitation and governance issues (through the War-Torn Societies Project); and NGO strengthening activities that complement the Civil Society Expansion Program.

#### **Intermediate Result 4.2: Increased Partnerships Among Private Sector, Public Sector, And Civil Society**

The incentives for reform of governance systems will be based on business opportunities and creating an enabling environment that allows for reduced security costs and reduced risks to investment.

Key issues will be efforts by the nascent civil administrations to exercise oversight of communities and businesses in areas under their control without the ability to enforce regulation. If a transitional national government establishes itself, there may be an attempt to standardize regulations across regions, following the current pattern of more uniform regulations within areas under a civil administration.

The primary activity for achievement of this Intermediate Result will be the Civil Society Expansion Program, described above. The linkages created by this program among local authorities, NGOs, and communities will serve to assist Somalis with sorting out the appropriate role of each type of institution and, if successful, will be developed into partnerships that endure after the grant funds are expended. These partnerships may be expressed in terms of community contracts with water or health service providers, including firms and local and international NGOs. Other illustrative approaches may include capacity-building support or technical assistance for partnerships between business and professional associations and local authorities to improve the enabling environment for productive enterprises as well as basic service provision. Technical support in capacity-building could be provided to autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies managing resources in stable areas, i.e., water, port, road, and electricity authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. For example, autonomous authorities have been formed to oversee urban water services in Somaliland and Puntland and could benefit from assistance in implementing contracts with private management companies to operate and maintain the water systems for a percentage of the revenue.

### **Intermediate Result 4.3: Enhanced Institutional Foundation for Rule of Law**

Conflict mitigation and improved governance relies on functioning systems for resolution of disputes and enforcement of laws. This is a gaping constraint in Somalia today as clan-based systems have failed in the conflict zones and judicial systems are only getting started in stable zones. Work under this Intermediate Result will target opportunities for accelerating establishment of judicial systems enforcing civil law.

Within the context of the UNDP's Civil Protection Program, which seeks to build the capacity of the civil judicial system in Somaliland (without creating future obstacles to Somali unity), the USG will support establishment of functional judicial facilities in Somaliland and other areas by October 2003 through technical assistance, including training of judges and clerks, rehabilitation of court facilities, and provision of a minimum of equipment and office supplies to support the justice system. Other donors to the UNDP program will finance re-establishment of a code of law based on the three pillars of Somaliland law (sharia, codified law, and customary law); establishment of a trust and curricula for a training institute; and establishment of a system for alternative sentencing. UNDP is also involved in similar programs in other areas, including Puntland, in conjunction with other agencies.

#### **c. Performance Measurement of the Strategic Objective**

The following indicators are proposed as measures of progress towards achievement of the strategic objective. These will be refined into more or different indicators that are measurable, reliable and for which data can be collected on a timely basis.

- International partner NGO Capacity assessment score for local NGOs
- Number and scope of Public-Private Partnerships
- Number of functioning judicial facilities in target areas

The first indicator is a solid measure of the abilities of NGOs to manage their affairs and achieve their objectives, and is therefore a useful measure of the effectiveness of civil society organizations. The second indicator will track the establishment, nature, magnitude, and respect of partnerships and service agreements. The third indicator measures the functioning civil judicial facilities in stable areas, and begins at a baseline of zero.

**Strategic Objective 5: Increased Opportunities for More Productive Livelihoods****a. Background**

The Somali economy (as shown in Map II) has long been dependent primarily on pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood systems with some dry land and irrigated settled agriculture, particularly in the riverine areas. Even before the civil conflict, the country rarely produced a surplus of food crops, but the predominance of the livestock sector in the economy allowed Somalia to be food self-sufficient in good years. USAID recognizes that food insecurity remains an issue in Somalia today and the new program tackles it through a range of activities in each of the Strategic Objectives. USAID supports the three elements of food security, availability, access, and utilization through its programs. Availability is addressed through support to rehabilitate and/or privatize agriculture and livestock production systems, including infrastructure improvements such as irrigation systems, provision of seeds and tools, or veterinary services. Programs in the areas of health, sanitation and nutrition, including provision of food aid to the most vulnerable improves the utilization aspect of food security. SO 5, as proposed, will focus on the access side by emphasizing increased opportunities for more productive livelihoods, including some of the infrastructure rehabilitation already mentioned and other interventions to strengthen the enabling environment for productive activities.

Currently, the Somali food economy relies on production of livestock for consumption (meat and milk) and export to the Middle East and South Asia for income; production of cereals in the central and southern river valleys; and production of vegetables and fruits in gardens near sources of water. As the economy in the north has recovered, it has demonstrated that other sectors can provide incomes and jobs in Somalia. The telecommunications sector has boomed in Somaliland and Puntland, as have transport and provision of health services. The ports of Berbera and Bossaso are handling an increasing volume and variety of goods, despite major rehabilitation requirements. Some schools are functioning, though without adequately trained teachers, equipment, or textbooks. Other sectors grew in association with the civil conflict, including increased importation of *qaat* and weapons, though the future of both is uncertain and neither provides a source of income to typical households.

There remain several key constraints to economic growth and broad-based income-generation.

Roads, irrigation systems, bridges, schools, hospitals, office buildings – much of the basic infrastructure of Somalia – was destroyed or looted in the civil war and the ten years of conflict since. Maintenance has been difficult for all but the most vital elements of infrastructure (such as wells and boreholes) and even those have deteriorated over time.

The few services that exist for businesses and farmers are established on the traditional Somali model of extended family relationships, which allows them to function but limits their prospects for growth. For example, the financial sector is vibrant but somewhat informal in all regions of Somalia. It is largely driven by remittances from the diaspora and foreign exchange from donor projects. The ISP team heard anecdotal evidence that the diaspora is now providing remittances in larger batches, rather than monthly payments, in order to help their families make small-scale investments in productive activities. This is a positive development that suggests that financial intermediaries focused on helping small and micro-enterprises could do well. But the risks of setting up shop as a financial intermediary are daunting. There exist only two Somali currencies – the Somali shilling and the Somaliland shilling – but their values fluctuate due to rumors of counterfeiting, production of the notes by private firms, and past attempts by warlords to introduce new currencies in the areas under their control. Major transactions are conducted in US dollars.

The lack of a recognized central government – or international recognition of the government in Somaliland – severely constrains the ability of Somali firms to obtain credit and enter into contracts for trade with markets in developed countries. Instead, Somalis rely on informal firms and trading networks in foreign ports, often with the facilitation of resident Somalis.

The continued presence of mines and unexploded ordnance, and the fear that certain areas contain mine fields, is a key constraint on improving opportunities for productive livelihoods.

Each of these key constraints can lead donors to target their interventions on the most high-potential opportunities in the most productive sectors.

## **b. The Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results**

Increasing opportunities for productive livelihoods means providing targeted assistance to entrepreneurial Somali individuals and organizations with a vision and risk-taking attitude and that launch activities that will expand the economy. Through use of all the funding sources that comprise the USG assistance program, work under this strategic objective will include targeted interventions in high-impact activities that can demonstrate the benefits of peace in the stable areas and reduce vulnerabilities in the conflict and transitional areas.

Work in this Strategic Objective will be largely focused in stable areas where conditions for investment by private sector entrepreneurs are attractive, enhanced by the establishment of civil administrations, relative security, and nascent civil society. However, work in other areas is not ruled out if conditions change to become more enabling during the strategy period.

The Strategic Objective will be advanced by accomplishment of three intermediate results: improved infrastructure and services for productive enterprises; economic targets of opportunity exploited; and increased areas where UXOs are no longer a threat.

### **Intermediate Result 5.1: Improved Infrastructure and Services for Productive Enterprises**

As mentioned above, infrastructure in Somalia was largely destroyed or looted in the civil war and subsequent conflicts, or has suffered from deterioration due to lack of funds for maintenance. While large-scale reconstruction is unlikely at present, targeted rehabilitation can serve to re-invigorate the economy by increasing productivity of firms and individuals. For example, in recent years the U.S. assistance has helped to rehabilitate irrigation canals in southern Somalia, enabling farmers to irrigate more land, produce a higher volume of cereals, and lessen vulnerability to food insecurity through increased consumption or increased incomes. Similarly, the U.S. and the European Union have financed emergency rehabilitation of roads in Somaliland and Puntland with a view to improving the efficiency of food aid deliveries to famine-stricken Ethiopia. The road improvements helped to reduce transport costs for livestock producers and traders in these regions as well as in Ethiopia, thereby increasing incomes and reducing food insecurity. Similarly, provision of micro-enterprise and micro-credit services in refugee resettlement programs has helped to ease their return and can serve to jump-start provision of these services by indigenous firms.

Illustrative activities for achievement of this intermediate result include:

- rehabilitating irrigation canals, roads and river embankments as well as anti-erosion works targeted to areas where productivity will be increased as a result of the rehabilitation and the community contributes with labor, security or cash;

- rehabilitating water and sanitation structures under the same conditions (also see SO 6, IR 6.2);
- multiplication and distribution of improved (drought-resistant) seeds and farmer training and extension;
- providing micro-credit and micro-enterprise services to returning/resettled refugees;
- rehabilitating ports and capacity-building/ institutional strengthening of port authorities;
- strengthening private animal health service-delivery; and
- improving of the enabling environment for productive activities (also see SO 4, IR 4.2).

### **Intermediate Result 5.2: Economic Targets of Opportunity Exploited**

Currently, the Somali economy is overly dependent on livestock exports<sup>2</sup>. While trade of goats, cattle, sheep and camels to the Middle East and South Asia serves as an excellent source of income, over-reliance on a single sector is risky. For example, in 1998, Saudi Arabia banned livestock exports from Somalia on fears of animal epidemics, specifically rift valley fever. This ban was lifted in 1999 but still remains controversial. A new ban was imposed in September 2000. Some claim that Somali livestock were not affected by the disease, others that the motivation for the ban was entirely political, and yet others that there was no enforcement and thus there was no real ban at all. In any case, the effect on the economies of Somaliland and Puntland was dramatic. As exports fell, incomes of producers, brokers and traders dropped. It is therefore widely recognized that diversification should be promoted, within the limits of the fragile Somali environment, to reduce overdependence on livestock exports.

Opportunity sectors identified by our partners include hides and skins, minerals, construction (e.g., low-cost housing), mortgage finance, gums and resins (including distillations and by-products), bee products, food processing (e.g., Somali dried bananas), cosmetics, fisheries, and telecommunications. Donors are wary of some of these sectors (e.g., construction) but can work in many others. In order to advance this Intermediate Result, the assistance program will seize opportunities as they arise for promoting linkages among Somali and American businesses to exploit trade opportunities. Criteria used for selecting opportunities will include: (a) a broad benefit for small businesses and organizations rather than firms already established in other sectors; (b) women's enterprises will receive priority; (c) the donor will have a minority contribution in the program, i.e., more than 50% of the investment will come from other partners.

Illustrative approaches for achievement of this intermediate result include:

- Facilitating Somali-American business links, possibly through USAID's Global Technology Network
- Identifying venture capital opportunities
- Linking small-scale Somali businesses within the region

### **Intermediate Result 5.3: Increased Productive Areas Where UXOs Are No Longer a Threat**

An important element in increasing confidence for individuals and firms to invest in productive activities will be removing the threat – real or imagined – of mines and unexploded ordinance (UXOs) in selected areas of Somalia. Past experience with the process of undertaking mine surveys and raising community awareness about mines has demonstrated that much of the hectareage people thought was mined in fact is not. Rather, accidents have been caused by UXOs that can be easily removed. Hence, the threat of mines, if only psychological, can be diminished and land returned to productive uses. Past experience in Somalia has shown that mine removal is not always

<sup>2</sup> A Horn of Africa livestock import ban was declared by Arab and Gulf States in September 2000, which is expected to have a serious impact on the Somali economy. Although Somalis have had experience dealing with previous livestock bans (1998/99), the duration and implications of the current ban were not yet clear when the ISP team completed this document.

necessary in areas where surveys indicate there are mines – saving considerable time and money. Actual de-mining is not necessary to restore confidence. Simply fencing off mined areas serves to increase community awareness of the problem and thereby reduce fears. Confidence also gets a boost from the rubble clearing activities that are a by-product of de-mining activities. Activities include Level I and II site surveys, landmine and UXO removal and disposal, community mine awareness, cross-border mine awareness, and capacity strengthening activities for the Somaliland Mine Action Committee (SMAC), Somaliland National Demining Agency (NDA), and other demining agencies as appropriate and when established.

The USG has supported mine action programs, including UXO surveys, de-mining and mine awareness education, and community mobilization, through its refugee and emergency programs. It is proposed that the U.S. continue support for mine action activities in the future through the State Department's Political Military Affairs Bureau.

An illustrative approach for achievement of this intermediate result include:

- Mine action, which is inclusive of community mine awareness activities as well as de-mining activities and removal of UXOs.

### **c. Performance Measurement of the Strategic Objective**

The following indicators are proposed as tentative measures of progress towards advancement of the strategic objective:

- Increase in number of hectares planted attributable to canal rehabilitation
- Increase in road traffic on rehabilitated roads
- Diversity of products exported from stable areas
- Number of hectares freed from mines (or the threat of mines) and UXOs for productive activities

These indicators are not fully satisfactory. They will require some refinement. For planning purposes, they constitute a series of proxy indicators that will demonstrate whether the components of activities under this Strategic Objective are successful in improving the lives and possibilities of Somali individuals and communities. The first and second indicators are measures of the effect of infrastructure rehabilitation activities, in this case, irrigation canals and roads. These will signal increases or decreases in economic activity resulting from program interventions and should likewise signal whether opportunities have increased or decreased. They will not measure impact. The third indicator will measure the result of Somalis taking advantage of economic targets of opportunity, though it does not capture entrepreneurial activities serving the Somali market, focused as it is on exports. Finally, the fourth indicator is a measure of the output of mine action activities and is presumed to signal an increase in opportunities as more land area becomes available to Somalis wishing to engage in agriculture or business. The strategy implementation team will try to refine these indicators so that the achievements of results under SO 5 can be reported with a reasonable level of confidence.

**Strategic Objective 6: Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups****a. Background**

Even as progress is made towards peace and recovery, Somalis continue to be precariously vulnerable to climatic and man-made disasters. Vulnerable populations are estimated by our partners to be at a "structural level" of 500,000 persons, a figure that can increase to more than 1,000,000 in times of extreme crises.

Somali systems for coping with these recurrent disasters are still weak. Health services are provided mainly where they are supported by the international community. Most water sources, including wells, ponds and boreholes, are operated and maintained by Somali individuals and communities but only at a minimum level of maintenance. Sanitation infrastructure and services are entirely provided by donors. Response to food crises usually involves movement to areas that may have seen better rainfall for pasturage or to food distribution points. Targeted food aid will be necessary throughout the strategy period.

**b. The Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results**

This Strategic Objective, which is retained from the 1997-99 strategy, will be advanced through delivery of health, water and sanitation, food assistance, and capacity-building services to vulnerable Somali households. Because the security situation in the most heavily populated areas of Somalia -- Mogadishu and other coastal cities -- remains tenuous, the ISP team chose not to change this objective to a more ambitious result with greater long-term impact. Rather, retention of the current strategic objective reflects the continued political uncertainty, the fragility of progress made in recent years, and the recognition that the civil conflict and natural disasters have had a fundamental long-term impact on vulnerable households and Somali service-provision systems.

Work in this Strategic Objective will be largely focused in the most vulnerable areas -- currently, and most probably over the mid-term, the south and center of Somalia. Work in other areas can not be ruled out as conditions change during the strategy period.

Achievement of this strategic objective will be advanced through four intermediate results: improved quality and availability of health care services; increased access to safe water and sanitation; effective targeting and delivery of food aid to vulnerable groups; and increased capacity for disaster preparedness and response.

**Intermediate Result 6.1: Improved Quality and Availability of Health Care Services**

The USG assistance program currently supports, through several implementing agencies, the provision of basic primary health care services via health posts and maternal-child health centers. The ISP team observed that the current program emphasizes providing basic care in as broad a geographic area as possible. The revised strategy will emphasize two health care activities: (i) increasing availability of health care services by providing minimum basic care in new areas as they become accessible due to increased security; and (ii) improvement in the quality of health care provided in existing health facilities. Improving quality will involve increasing and improving supervision of health facilities and introducing new primary health care services, including HIV/AIDS awareness activities, female genital mutilation (FGM) prevention and eradication, and reproductive health. The program will respond to health emergencies within the context of this intermediate result.

Illustrative activities include:

- Increasing the number of health facilities in newly accessible areas
- Providing basic services: maternal-child health, expanded program of immunization, curative, preventative
- Providing other services: HIV/AIDS awareness, FGM eradication, reproductive health
- Making essential drugs available
- Training staff
- Increasing quality of supervision in health facilities

### **Intermediate Result 6.2: Increased Access to Safe Water and Sanitation**

The USG assistance program currently supports rehabilitation of existing water resource and sanitation facilities, and construction of new facilities, in areas of vulnerable populations. The sustainable operation of water and sanitation facilities is a direct function of community participation and contribution in the construction or rehabilitation activity. A typical intervention sequence includes large meetings with the entire community to identify and verify the need for the project and their plans for contribution; selection by the community of a water management committee to represent them; detailed planning of the project and its aftermath by the implementing agency and the water management committee; provision of the community contribution during construction (as cash, materials, labor, security, or a combination of the above); maintenance and revenue collection by the water management committee; and community meetings to determine uses of the collected revenue. The previous ISP called for achievement of water quality at the high standard of potability, but for this ISP our partners have recommended that we instead be realistic and seek to reach a standard of safe water in general and potable water when possible. Several key partners -- UNICEF, ADRA, NPA, and ACF -- also noted that seeking to reach a potable standard would require a significant increase in the amount of quality testing of water after projects are completed.

Illustrative activities include:

- Formation and training of community management structures
- Construction and rehabilitation
- Differentiation of water sources for humans and animals

### **Intermediate Result 6.3: Effective Targeting and Delivery of Food Aid to Vulnerable Groups**

Emergency food aid constitutes the largest portion of the USG assistance program. It is delivered, through CARE, to needy households in southern and central Somalia through food for work programs that construct or rehabilitate infrastructure for productive enterprises (see SO 1, IR 1) or through free distributions and supplementary feedings. An estimated 140,000 households will benefit from USG food aid during the strategy period.

Food aid distributions are a challenge in Somalia. The task is particularly affected by the influence of the warlords since the end of the UNOSOM intervention. Food aid deliveries have often suffered losses in transport, due to warlord control of the ports, militia poaching en route and at delivery points, road blockades, and banditry. USAID has endeavored to exclude warlords or warlord-controlled transporters from participating in food distribution efforts. A recent reform by CARE and WFP has helped to limit losses by requiring transporters to provide a bond for the value of the food. For any lost food, the transporter is held responsible. This has placed the responsibility on avoiding hijackings on the shoulders of the transporters. Further reforms will seek to improve the accountability systems of local NGOs participating in food aid distribution. Improved targeting and registration has been a trend among donors to Somalia in recent years and will continue. The USG may increase its participation in

supplementary feeding during the strategy period if it can be tightly targeted on highly vulnerable mothers and children.

Illustrative activities include:

- Providing food for work, highly targeted free distributions, and supplementary food
- Improving accountability in food distribution systems
- Improving targeting and registration
- Supporting nutritional aspects of food ration, especially supplementary feeding

#### **Intermediate Result 6.4: Increased Capacity for Disaster Preparedness and Response**

The U.S. supported capacity strengthening for disaster preparedness in the previous strategy. Several activities will be continued during the 2001-2003 strategy period. Specific activities are aimed at improving the effectiveness of Somali and international responses to complex emergency and individual disaster episodes. Training in special emergency interventions will be provided. Support will also continue for the FEWSNET early warning system, which works in tandem with the FAO's Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU). The US will continue to contribute financially to logistical operations for the United Nations and partners for humanitarian interventions in Somalia and to the SACB for donor/partner coordination.

Illustrative activities under this Intermediate Result will include the following:

- Improving the ability of indigenous and international NGOs to respond to disaster
- Supporting an early warning system able to identify vulnerable groups (FEWSNET/FSAU)
- Provision of logistical support to INGOs and LNGOs to improve access
- Supporting the operation of the SACB secretariat

#### **c. Performance Measurement of the Strategic Objective**

The following indicators are proposed as measures of progress towards achievement of the strategic objective. These are the same indicators that were used in the 1997-99 strategy. They have proven to be reliable.

- Number of people with access to safe water and sanitation
- Number of beneficiaries accessing basic health care
- Percent of target health centers receiving 90% of essential drugs on time
- Percentage of target infants fully vaccinated against 6 key diseases
- Number of vulnerable people who received appropriate food aid in an agreed-upon time

While no one single indicator can measure whether or not the critical needs of vulnerable groups are being met, a collection of indicators can demonstrate the impact of the assistance program on beneficiaries. The number of people with access to safe water and sanitation and the number of beneficiaries of basic health care services can be measured in target areas where the international community is operating. Immunization coverage rates and food aid beneficiaries are regularly measured by partners.

A large number of indicators are available to program managers, such as nutritional data and infant and maternal mortality rates in selected locations, that can be useful for signaling trends in the health status of Somalis. However, they may not be useful to measure the attribution factor -- that is, sustainable results which can be

reasonably attributed to USG-supported programs -- and are therefore not proposed herein as measures of performance under this objective.

### **Cross-Cutting Intermediate Result: Improved Collection, Analysis and Dissemination of Information**

While preparing this strategic plan, the ISP Core Team found that all three strategic objectives included intermediate results and activities associated with improving the flow and usage of information for relief and development in Somalia. The team decided to label this a crosscutting intermediate result, which will be achieved through all three strategic objectives.

Illustrative activities can include:

- Surveying for health status, water supply, and nutritional data
- Promoting uniformity in collection methodology, analysis, and dissemination of information
- Assessing vulnerability
- FEWS NET/FSAU data collection and analysis for famine early warning
- Promoting private sector information intermediaries (e.g., chambers of commerce, professional associations)

### **Special Objective 7: Foundation Established for Emerging Somalia Administration to Consolidate Transition**

#### **a. Background**

This Special Objective is proposed as an element of the strategy should the US government decide to provide assistance to the Transitional National Government (TNG) created as a result of the Djibouti Initiative and the Arta conference. If the TNG is able to establish itself as a credible entity worthy of support, the U.S. could potentially fund programs and activities within the "building blocks" policy framework and within the scope of the strategic objectives and intermediate results described herein. If, however, USG policymakers determine that additional assistance should be provided specifically for political strengthening of the transitional government, then this Special Objective would be the appropriate vehicle for such funding. Note that the proposed illustrative budget tables do not include funds targeted especially at the TNG. Funds to support the TNG will have to be additive. The tables include a line item for Economic Support Funds, but no number is inserted.

#### **b. Achievement of the Special Objective and Illustrative Activities**

Achievement of this objective will entail successful design and implementation of a political transition program expected to last approximately three years. The Transitional Charter agreed upon in Arta, Djibouti, envisions establishment of additional institutions beyond the parliament and presidency already created. Included is an independent judiciary, a council of ministers including a prime minister, a house of traditional leaders, a national army, and other central government functions (including audit, public prosecutor, accountant general, central bank, and attorney general). It is clear that creation and substantiation of these institutions will take time and money and cause consternation to the established civil administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. Other events which are key to the transition are demobilization and disarmament of the clan militias; preparation and approval of a permanent constitution; and a referendum on that constitution followed by elections for the parliament and presidency. Unlike many transitions which are focused on achievement of milestones in a timetable, this Somali

transition is likely to be focused on relationships and bargaining among the clans that will not obey any kind of schedule. Special assistance to create an atmosphere for elections and assistance to prepare for elections to legitimize a successor to the TNG can be offered through specialized partners like the National Endowment for Democracy. This will require a Washington decision and an infusion of funding to support the task.

Spokespeople for the Transitional National Government have requested capacity-building assistance for establishment of its institutions. This is a request the US could support immediately -- with additional funding -- through several UN projects that already exist and to which USAID currently provides assistance. These mechanisms include, for example, the Capacity-building Facility, which can provide training for civil servants, and the Civil Protection Program that targets the justice system for improvement. The UNICEF water resource development program to which USAID contributes could manage additional funds to enable the TNG to undertake "confidence-building measures" to demonstrate the benefits -- the peace dividend -- that an end to conflict can deliver. Or, rather than supporting the establishment and consolidation of the authority of the transitional government, the USG assistance program could provide limited, targeted assistance via this Special Objective to activities that promote positive negotiations and peace processes between the established regional civil administrations and the new transitional government. The IGAD peace secretariat could be the organization through which such funds for peace and reconciliation activities might be channeled.

Another option that can be considered to support the consolidation of the new government would be use of the remaining \$11 million in a trust fund called the Police and Civil Justice Program, managed by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs and left over from the UNOSOM operation. There remains a \$6.7 million USG contribution to this fund, which, with interest accruals, may be currently as much as \$9 million. Other donors who contributed include Japan, the Nordic countries, and other smaller donors. While the parameters for programming these funds are currently unclear, the ISP team believes that some of these funds could be used to help the transitional authority reestablish judicial systems in civil law and to finance the militia demobilization and reintegration programs that will be necessary to ensure a sustainable peace in the southern and central regions. It should be noted that Somaliland, and more recently the Government of Djibouti, have apparently applied on separate occasions to the UN to utilize these funds and been turned down. The ISP team recommends that these funds be programmed with special political sensitivity and should benefit the stable areas of Somaliland, Puntland, and Bay and Bakool, as well as areas which the TNG may administer. Washington will have to clarify the availability, weigh possible options, and make decisions regarding the use of the trust funds.

### **c. Performance Measurement of the Special Objective**

Possible indicators of the success of the political transition include:

- Somaliland, Puntland and the Transitional Government reach an accommodation on a decentralized federal system of government without resorting to violence
- Transitional government holds free and fair referendum on a new constitution for the federal government.

### III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

#### A. Management Organization and Relationships

This Integrated Strategic Plan will form the basis for a management agreement for implementation in an integrated fashion by several USG agencies. All participating agencies are expected to concur with the objectives of the ISP and to program assistance for their achievement within the limitations imposed by uncertain resource availability. The ISP recognizes the important contributions to be made by all the agencies involved in the Somalia program, and stresses the collaborative nature of providing assistance to Somalia to achieve USG objectives. It is expected that the level of collaboration and cooperation that prevailed during the preparation of this plan will continue throughout the three-year implementation period. The roles of participating agencies and officers are described below.

**The Somalia Country Program Team (CPT)** is charged with day-to-day planning, field coordination and oversight, monitoring, and reporting on U.S. assistance. Members of the CPT include Nairobi-based staff from the Non Presence Countries (NPC) unit of USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), and the Africa Regional Office (ARO/OFDA) of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR). State Department team members include the Somalia Watcher and the Refugee Coordinator attached to Embassy Nairobi. REDSO's Food for Peace (FFP) Office plans and requests emergency food assistance in conjunction with Washington FFP officers.

Though the locus of activity and management responsibility is in Nairobi, Washington-based staff make key contributions to the planning and management of the Somalia assistance program, particularly for humanitarian assistance and refugee programs. For example, the BHR staff (including OFDA and FFP) responsible for backstopping Somalia in Washington are indispensable members of the Country Program Team and are in regular contact with the Nairobi-based staff.

REDSO's Non Presence Countries unit NPC manages the production of the annual program documents for the Somalia assistance program (Congressional Presentation, budget justification, Results Report). Other units prepare separate reports. The Africa Regional Office of BHR/OFDA reports on emergency assistance and REDSO's Food for Peace Office reports on food aid. The Embassy Refugee Coordinator reports on refugee assistance.

**Washington-based agencies and units** -- the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State's Bureau for Africa (AF); Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM); Bureau for Political Military Affairs (BPMA); and the National Security Council provide policy direction in consultation with USAID's Africa Bureau (AFR) and Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR, which includes the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Food for Peace-- OFDA and FFP). The various bureaus also allocate resources from different accounts.

**U.S. Embassy State Department officers based in Nairobi and Djibouti** are responsible for monitoring Somalia policy and maintaining diplomatic contact with civil administrations. Embassy/Djibouti has a "watching brief" for northwest Somalia while Embassy/Nairobi has a similar "watching brief" for the rest of Somalia. In addition, the Regional Refugee Coordinator, also based in Embassy/Nairobi, provides recommendations on resource allocations and monitors refugee programs financed by State's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration. A Somalia Inter-agency Working Group in Nairobi is chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya.

**The Somalia Desk Officers in State and USAID** fulfill important roles in informing US policy deliberations and monitoring implementation. USAID's Somalia Desk Officer in AFR/EA is a key member of the Somalia Country Program Team and is the focal point for Washington backstopping, results reporting, and notifications to Congress. The Somalia Desk Officer in the Department of State's Office of East Africa Affairs plays a similar role, particularly with regard to high-level policy and decision-makers in the U.S. government.

**Administrative support** is provided by members of the Expanded Somalia Team based in the field and in Washington. Procurement services for emergency assistance is provided by USAID's Washington Office of Procurement. Procurement services for development assistance are furnished by REDSO's Office of Procurement. Accounting for development assistance is done by the Nairobi Regional Financial Management Center (RFMC) while accounting for disaster assistance and food aid is maintained at BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP offices in Washington. Legal services for development assistance are furnished by the Regional Legal Office staff in REDSO. Budget planning for development assistance is provided by REDSO/ESA Program Office and the USAID Africa Bureau Development Planning Office.

**Technical support** is sourced both from REDSO and from Washington. REDSO provides regional technical experts in conflict prevention, food security, health, and gender analysis. BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP in Washington provide technical backstopping for the humanitarian assistance. Expertise in conflict prevention, governance, health and agricultural production is also provided by USAID's Africa Bureau Sustainable Development Office and the Global Bureau. Technical backstopping and program support is likewise provided by USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service and State Department's Bureau for Population Refugees and Migration, including the Refugee Coordinator in Embassy Nairobi.

The table seen at Annex Two provides a view of staff resources necessary for the proper planning, management, monitoring, and reporting of the Somalia assistance program.

## **B. Funding**

All figures are notional. Some offices, such as USAID's Africa Bureau regarding development assistance, provided firm budget planning parameters. For illustrative purposes, annual funding projections start from a basis of FY 2000 levels and from informal communications with other USG agencies. Variations may be expected due to a change in policy direction, changing emergency or humanitarian needs, or changing resource availability. The strategy team is aware that International Disaster Assistance funding allocations for Somalia may significantly decrease because of diminished resource availability or complex disasters that occur elsewhere which could require immediate attention. Likewise, food for free distribution to needy people may decrease because of good harvests. As security is improved and extended to other areas of Somalia, development assistance might be expected to increase, depending on availability and USG national interest. The strategic objectives have been conceived to accommodate increased or diminished funding levels.

Sources of funds are expected to be USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response; Africa Bureau; and Global Bureau; and the Department of State's Bureau for Population, Migration, and Refugees and Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. During the review and approval of the REDSO/ESA strategy in August 2000, it was decided that USAID development assistance for Somalia would be allocated to a separate Somalia Operating Year Budget (OYB), rather than through the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) budget line. Therefore, a separate Congressional Presentation will describe the Somalia program, including tentative resource levels from all sources, per the illustrative table below.

Section IV describes proposals to utilize additional funds within these or other sources, should they become available. Each year the allocation of funds strategic objectives may change, depending on the circumstances.

Note that the Somalia program does not have a separate operating expense budget. Funds for Somalia operating costs are sourced from an aggregate REDSO operating expense budget.

### Illustrative Funding Sources and Level of Funds

#### **Total Illustrative USG Funding for Somalia**

Sources of Funds	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	ISP Total
USAID/BHR/OFDA	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000	24,000,000
USAID/BHR/FFP (food aid)	7,000,000	7,000,000	7,000,000	21,000,000
State/PRM (refugees)	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	15,000,000
State/PMA (mine action)	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	4,500,000
*USAID AFR (development)	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	9,000,000
State/ESF (political)	TBD	TBD	TBD	
DCOF/War Victims	0	0	0	
USAID/DHRF and Self-Help	200,000	200,000	200,000	600,000
<b>Fiscal Year Totals</b>	<b>24,700,000</b>	<b>24,700,000</b>	<b>24,700,000</b>	<b>74,100,000</b>

#### **Illustrative Breakdown of Funding by Strategic Objective**

Strategic Objective	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	ISP Total
SO 4	1,700,000	1,700,000	1,700,000	5,100,000
SO 5	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000	24,000,000
SO 6	15,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	45,000,000
SPO 7	TBD	TBD	TBD	
<b>Fiscal Year Totals</b>	<b>24,700,000</b>	<b>24,700,000</b>	<b>24,700,000</b>	<b>74,100,000</b>

#### **Illustrative Breakdown of Africa Bureau Funding by Strategic Objective**

Programming of AFR Funds	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	ISP Total
SO 4	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	4,500,000
SO 5	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	4,500,000
SO 6	0	0	0	
SPO 7	TBD	TBD	TBD	
<b>Fiscal Year Totals</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>	<b>9,000,000</b>

## **C. Procurement**

Current legislation requires that development assistance be programmed through international organizations (IOs) and international private voluntary organizations (PVOs) via grants and cooperative agreements. Though legislation does not so require, emergency assistance and food aid is generally programmed through such organizations, which currently operate in Somalia. Some USAID management support services will be funded under direct Personal Services Contracts with USAID's REDSO, executed by the Office of Procurement or Executive Office. It is expected that the majority of development assistance awards will be executed by the REDSO Office of Procurement.

Disaster assistance funds will be granted to partners following Request for Assistance Applications or on receipt and review of an unsolicited proposal. All disaster assistance awards will be executed from USAID's Office of Procurement in Washington. Awards to organizations providing assistance to refugees will be made by the State Department in Washington.

Note that current grants do not need to be modified to implement this strategy.

## **D. Vulnerability Analysis/Contingency Planning**

This section addresses USAID's requirement that strategies include a vulnerability analysis that addresses the potential for conflict and indicates how conflict may affect the proposed strategy. Because conflict and potential conflict dominate programming decisions in Somalia, this vulnerability analysis has been combined in a single section with contingency planning for deteriorating and improving scenarios.

The assumptions of this ISP (Section II.A) foresee a continuation of political conflict and emergencies caused by conflict and natural disasters. By making these two assumptions, the strategy has already incorporated a level of conflict and displacement into the USG's planning for the assistance program over the next three years. This vulnerability analysis/contingency plan therefore considers a number of variations in these assumptions and compiles them into three possible scenarios: strategy assumptions, a deteriorating scenario, and an improving scenario. The possible factors that contributing to these scenarios and programming contingencies are described in the following chart. Continued or increased conflict can constitute a serious political vulnerability factor, which may indeed be generated by opposition to the new Transitional National Government in various regions of Somalia. A particularly sensitive factor that can substantially affect economic output and export earnings is Somalia's -- especially the northern regions -- dependence on livestock exports to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf States.

<b>Strategy Assumptions</b>	
<p><b><u>Factors:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Trend towards stability.</li> <li>b. Complex emergency continues.</li> <li>c. Increased external economic investment.</li> <li>d. Increasing civil society participation.</li> <li>e. Women's roles/participation expanding.</li> <li>f. Implementation remains costly.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Programming:</u></b></p> <p>Results Framework as elaborated in this ISP.</p> <p>Potential additional funding to support the Transitional National Authority, depending on determination of US national interest and resource availability.</p>
<b>Deteriorating Situation</b>	
<p><b><u>Factors:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Political or resource-based conflict spreads out of the south and center to northeast and northwest; stable areas become unstable.</li> <li>b. Regional conflicts outside Somalia flare up.</li> <li>c. Successive rain failure/drought.</li> <li>d. Vulnerable population increases to &gt;1.5 million.</li> <li>e. Large-scale population displacement.</li> <li>f. Access limited and insecurity increased.</li> <li>g. Ban on livestock imports from the Horn of Africa.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Programming Alternatives:</u></b></p> <p>Increase humanitarian relief, food assistance, and refugee programs (within implementation limitations of our partners).</p> <p>Decrease or postpone development assistance, mine action, and ESF-funded programs.</p> <p>Focus capacity-building activities on disaster mitigation and preparedness of Somali firms and organizations.</p>
<b>Improving Situation</b>	
<p><b><u>Factors:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Transitional government reaches accord with Puntland and Somaliland on a federal national government.</li> <li>b. Warlords sufficiently sidelined or integrated that serious demobilization of militias can begin.</li> <li>c. Large-scale voluntary return of refugees from camps in Kenya.</li> <li>d. More newly accessible areas due to increased security and stability, possible due to increasing numbers of "building blocks" under civil administration.</li> <li>e. Agricultural production in south and center increases.</li> <li>f. Livestock exports increasing, or stable</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Programming Alternatives:</u></b></p> <p>Increase PRM resettlement programs and monitor vulnerability status of returnees and host populations.</p> <p>Increase mine action activities to free productive land.</p> <p>Support demobilization and reintegration of militias.</p> <p>Encourage expanded partnerships with Somali diaspora for investments in enterprise and public goods.</p> <p>Work with new administrations on development planning and humanitarian relief targeting. Increase development funding to provide a "peace dividend" to additional secure "building block" areas</p>

## **E. Environmental Analysis**

Because Somalia has been in civil war and subsequent conflicts for 10-12 years, recent data and analysis on the condition of the environment are very limited. Thus this analysis focuses instead on possible risks to the environment during the coming three years and ways to mitigate the impact of the ISP program on the environment.

### **1. Risks to the Environment in Somalia**

Somalia is an arid country that suffers from low and erratic rainfall. It covers an area of 628,000 square kilometers, about the size of California and Arizona combined. While up-to-date population figures for Somalia are unknown and subject to considerable debate, UN agencies estimate a total population of 6-7 million. Perhaps as much as two-thirds of the population lives in the southern and central regions. Somalia's economy is largely dependent on production and export of livestock that feed on pasturage in the interior steppes. Pastoral groups move their herds according to the four seasons, two rainy seasons interspersed with two dry seasons. Somalia's coastline stretches for about 1,800 miles, with Mogadishu and smaller ports linking the country to markets in the Middle East and South Asia.

Key environmental threats in Somalia include soil erosion and desertification, inadequate water supplies, deforestation near populated areas, and overgrazing on the uniformly arid vulnerable lands, exacerbated by displacement of livestock and populations following conflict (Idawo 1997). Other environmental issues include insufficient environmental services in the urban areas, mismanagement of land tenure, and an inadequate system of protected natural areas. Environmental stresses are recognized to frequently be a contributing factor to the recent series of conflicts and humanitarian emergencies in Africa. The widespread depletion of soil fertility, inadequate protection of environmental quality and inequitable distribution of economic benefits are all important sources of environmental stress in Africa. It has been reported that Somalia is under-going a long-term trend away from pastoralism to agro-pastoral practices in which more people are sedentary for longer periods of the year. A trend toward increasing urbanization may have been accentuated by recent droughts and famines and the insecurity associated with the civil war. Food security and health conditions have also been severely impacted, and the prospects for sustainable growth have been undermined.

The ISP design team determined that it was not appropriate, nor possible under the circumstances, to conduct an up front Tropical Forestry and Biodiversity Analysis (as recommended in the parameters cable 00 State 158341) at this time, even as a desk exercise. This is for the following reasons:

Somalia, being a small non-presence country in transition, and in part still mired in crisis, is not subject to the same a priori strategic planning requirements as a sustainable development mission (see ADS 201.5.5d, Exceptions and Special Cases). Somalia is not considered by USAID to be a globally "key country" in biodiversity, tropical forestry, or global climate change (ADS Handbook 01: Policy. III. Guidelines for Developing USAID Strategic Plans). Per the same guidance, "scarcity of USAID resources" can justify the decision not to formulate an environmental strategic objective, even in the face of serious development constraints in the sector. Only approximately 12% of the FY 2000 budget for Somalia involves Development Assistance funding, which is likely to be representative of the proportion of DA funding during the ISP period. Other donors, such as the EU, are making investments, for example, in natural resources management (including livestock) and environmental health, with greater funding than what USAID is able to bring to bear.

On the other hand, the approach promoted within this ISP is to integrate environmental protection principles and practices into all SOs' programs (see below). In addition, five IEEs have covered Somalia programs in the past six years, and the new programs under the ISP will be designed with environmental documentation and procedures applied to the operating contexts.

The programs this ISP intends to support will help to address or reduce such factors. Implementation of the ISP will consider programs that simultaneously bolster more than one core element of sustainable development. Some examples of opportunities for synergies include working on specific local concerns (e.g., land and water distribution, pest management, and community forestry) in an integrated manner that assures participation by all affected sectors and that creates a sustainable institutional framework. Likewise, integrated approaches will be promoted in the humanitarian assistance programs, which will seek to conserve existing economic assets and systems to the extent present.

## **2. Environmental Impact of the Somalia ISP Program**

**SO 4, Improved Capacity for Good Governance and Conflict Mitigation.** Activities under SO 4 are expected to have few if any direct or indirect negative environmental consequences, because the bulk of USAID-funded activities will focus on increasing participation and strengthening civil society organizations; promoting partnerships between civil society (especially communities), the private sector and the public sector; and strengthening judicial institutions. To the extent assistance is provided for biophysical actions such as court construction, or under grants programs to support economic rehabilitation, these programs will be small in scale with very minimal risks. In any case, grants administrators will have at their disposal an environmental screening tool and guidelines so as to promote best practices and avoid harm.

It should be noted that civil society groups often include environmental agendas, which may provide useful entry points for operationalization of self-governance principles, as a number of practical management issues and conflicts revolve around universally tangible issues of access to and management of natural resources. Participation of communities in the co-management of natural resources (land, water, harvestable plant materials, wildlife, livestock, crop health, etc.) is an excellent way to imbed self-governance principles at the grass roots level.

**SO 5, Increased Opportunities for More Productive Livelihoods.** Activities under SO 5 are expected to have minimal impact on the environment, but the SO will include a range of relatively small-scale activities with varying potential to affect the biophysical environment, mainly in IR 5.1 (infrastructure and services for productive enterprises) and IR 5.2 (economic targets of opportunity). If rapid economic growth occurs in the context of a transition with little policymaking and a regulatory framework in place to manage and mitigate environmental consequences, there is risk that significant environmental damage may be done.

Of particular note in terms of potential environmental impacts are agricultural and pastoral activities, whose potential impacts include loss of vegetation, soil degradation, and water course siltation and pollution. Increases in livestock production may lead to unsustainable herd sizes and more overgrazing, though when export markets work unfettered by bans (imposed by importers over disease concerns such as Rift Valley fever), or other problems, the offtake should minimize the potential for overgrazing. Improved access to markets, through rehabilitation of roads and ports, could help minimize overgrazing problems. Given the ecological fragility of Somalia, and the already degraded state of some areas, close attention must be paid to avoid practices that lead to further degradation. Road construction (using both development assistance, FFP and OFDA resources) presents a number of potential negative environmental impacts such as degradation of soil and water resources (associated with road construction and maintenance); deforestation and loss of biodiversity (associated with urbanization and resettlement, for example); and increased spread of disease. Road projects will need to be associated with expert engineering,

planning and monitoring; priority will be given to repair of existing roads before new roads are proposed. Rehabilitation and construction of irrigation canals also must be associated with adequate participatory planning so as to avoid resource conflicts, inappropriate livestock access, putting marginal areas (e.g., due to soil fertility deficiencies) under production, and similar problems. If programs are devised that may require support to crop or livestock pest management, the proposed activities will first be subjected to analysis under the USAID Pesticide Procedures (22 CFR 216.3(b)).

The specifics of the activities remain to be devised, but as they are designed, appropriate environmental screening, mitigation and monitoring steps will be incorporated into design and implementation. Even at the RFA stage, respondents will be asked to identify how they intend to integrate environmental considerations.

**SO 6, Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups.** Of the activities to be carried out under this SO, the only ones which will likely involve biophysical actions (and thus the potential for unintended environmental consequences) will include health care services (IR 6.1), water and sanitation (IR 6.2) and food aid (IR 6.3, especially to the extent that they involve food-aided development activities). None of these activities are expected to have significant direct effects on the environment, however, in that appropriate mitigation measures are expected to be routinely invoked. Degraded or substandard infrastructure, such as pit latrines and wells, should be improved on existing sites to minimize risks of contamination and further disturbance of the water or soil resources upon which they depend. The delivery of water and sanitation services should follow established norms and guidelines while providing the maximum benefits to human health.

Should the use of insecticide treated bed nets be considered in a malaria control initiative, this use should be linked to the action plan for mitigation measures identified in the USAID/Africa Bureau Programmatic Environmental Assessment of ITN and malaria control, being prepared in 2000. Likewise, attention should be paid to the proper disposal of biohazardous wastes where this is a pertinent issue.

**SPO 7, Foundation Established for Emerging Somalia Administration to Consolidate Transition.** Activities under SPO 7 should have little or no negative environmental impacts since the bulk of USAID-funded activities will focus on political relationships and organizations rather than physical interventions that might affect the environment.

Program synergies and integration could be promoted under the Special Objective as opportunities arise. For example, by support to the development of a Somali national environmental action plan. The Somaliland Ministry of Rural Development and Environment has already prepared a draft "Environmental Management Policy of Somaliland," with an Annex on National Environment Action Plan and Strategy to Combat Desertification (May 2000). IUCN has been active in this sector in various ways (see References).

### **3. Procedures for Avoiding and Mitigating Environmental Impact**

USAID through REDSO assumes responsibility for introducing appropriate environmental review and decision-making capacity to the partners implementing USAID-assisted activities. This includes assisting in the preparation of Initial Environmental Examinations and/or Requests for Categorical Exclusion for each S.O. in the ISP. The emphasis is upon planning, monitoring and mitigation by our partners. Sub-grantee partners are assisted in designing activities that take into account potential environmental impacts and their mitigation, including prevention and avoidance, and have implemented the activities with an environmental monitoring system in place. The partners will be introduced into environmentally sound design and implementation through the Africa Bureau and REDSO Environmental Capacity Building course (ENCAP). This will introduce the use of a USAID approved screening form and reporting form, which partners will use to categorize and if necessary modify activities, to ensure that unintended impacts are identified and minimized. The Regional Environmental Office will make

periodic field visits to Somalia, and consultations with partners and sub-grantees, to provide support for the compliance of activities and associated mitigation and monitoring.

The investment in local capacity building embodied in this approach can help set the stage for longer-term sustainable local investment and natural resource management. Looking further into the ISP period, where an increasingly development-oriented umbrella grant approach is expected to continue, the environmental review process would seem to be the most appropriate strategy. Such an approach has the dual advantage of promoting sound environmental planning so that activities are less likely to adversely affect the environment, and also building local capacity.

Consistent with support to programs rising out of complex emergencies, a large component of the ISP depends upon resources other than DA, especially BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP Title II Emergency. These resources are technically exempt from environmental compliance. But the emerging consensus is that emergency and transition programs also need to scrutinize and anticipate environmental consequences of their actions. This is the more so in that the program is integrated and links relief to development. Consistent with the need for new and innovative approaches to humanitarian interventions, approaches will be sought to mitigate the potential for unintended environmental harm in ways that enhance the effectiveness of the assistance provided.

REDSO will promote an understanding of the environmental impacts and mitigation strategies related to the administration of food aid and relief assistance. Title II for Development PVOs have in recent years undergone intensive upgrading with respect to their compliance with USAID's Environmental Procedures (see the Environmental Documentation Manual for PL 480 Title II Cooperating Sponsors Implementing Food-Aided Development Programs, January 1999). Such tools likely can be adapted for the emergency and transition assistance modalities.

Finally, REDSO's Regional Environmental team will seek to provide support to Somalia in other ways, such by considering international environmental agreements as possible entry points for promoting regional approaches to environmental management, perhaps in conjunction with the Department of State Regional Environmental Officer based at the US Embassy in Addis Ababa.

## **F. Performance Measurement and Monitoring System**

The Somalia Country Program Team, including field staff in Nairobi and virtual members based in Washington, is responsible for measuring and monitoring performance of the strategic objectives and intermediate results in the Integrated Strategic Plan. The performance measurement and monitoring system already exists and need only be adjusted to fit the results and indicators of this ISP.

The illustrative indicators (see the chart in Annex 4) have been selected as most apt for directly measuring the results projections at a reasonable cost and within the manageable interest of USAID and its partners to collect the necessary data. Several of these indicators were also used as measures in the previous strategy period. Where direct or quantitative indicators were not possible, proxy (indirect) or qualitative measures are proposed. A number of the indicators have been gender-disaggregated to ensure that the assistance program captures any differences in effectiveness or impact by gender. In some cases, for new indicators, baselines and targets are yet to be established.

The illustrative indicators in the ISP were selected by working groups within the Somalia Country Program Team. Following approval of the ISP, program managers will work with partners and technical experts to finalize indicators, data collection systems, baselines and targets. Data is collected from USAID's partners and

beneficiaries through three channels: regular monthly/quarterly reports on progress of grants and contracts; field monitoring visits; and participation in various SACB committees and fora. Progress toward many indicators, along with implementation progress, will be tracked on a quarterly basis. The annual Results Review report for USAID/Washington will be prepared jointly by the Somalia Team in Nairobi, with REDSO/ESA taking the lead in preparing the document and BHR/OFDA providing much of the data and verification.

Most of USAID's partners in Somalia have information collection and management systems to monitor the progress of their programs. The international community also seeks to coordinate information systems through the SACB sectoral committees or through specific implementing agencies (e.g., FEWSNET and FAO/FSAU for food security data). An important objective of the Somalia team's cross-cutting intermediate result is, to the extent possible, promote uniformity among the various collection efforts to facilitate comparative analysis.

While current ongoing grants will not be modified to comply with this ISP, future grants will be reviewed with an eye to ensuring that results reporting under the grant/contract feeds into this ISP performance monitoring and measurement system. Performance monitoring of the Somalia assistance program will be continually refined throughout the strategy period. Via this process, the Somalia Country Program Team will endeavor to report achievements, and problems confronted, to keep Washington fully informed of implementation progress.

One constraint that affects performance monitoring is USAID's officers' inability to visit areas of southern Somalia and Mogadishu because of security risks.

#### **IV. OPPORTUNITIES TO UTILIZE INCREASED FUNDING**

This section describes how the Somalia ISP Team would utilize additional assistance resources, beyond the amounts described in the budget in Section III.B, to achieve the objectives of the ISP during the period 2001-2003. In order to plan development activities of at least medium-term duration (the life of the strategy), the Somalia ISP team assumes that additional funds should constitute an increase in annual budget levels from a specific source (such as DA or ESF), rather than a one-time infusion of funds (unless the latter can fully finance a medium-term activity). Nonetheless, the Country Program Team expects to be able to "modularize" activities to program additional funds that might be accorded to Somalia on a one-time basis.

In terms of the contingency scenarios described in Section III.D. of the ISP, the increases in assistance would take place in the context of a continuation of the status quo in Somalia or an improving scenario, but not a deteriorating scenario. As envisioned by the ISP Team, additional assistance will focus on the following activities by SO, in order of priority, and with a tentative cost estimate.

##### **A. Strategic Objective 5 Increased Opportunities for Productive Livelihoods**

###### **Education and Vocational Training:**

The ISP Core Team heard from many Somali partners and beneficiaries, as well as implementing partners in the international community, about the importance of education and vocational training for the future of Somalia. The Somaliland leadership specifically requested that, if the USG could only fund one sector, it should be education. Unfortunately, the ISP Core Team has determined that education interventions are beyond the manageable interest

of this strategy, given limited funds, limited time to demonstrate impact, and involvement of other donors. If additional funds were to become available, targeted education and training interventions would be a high priority. As described in the constraints section, education needs cover three sets of people: the "lost generation" that missed out on primary education during the civil war; the skilled and semi-skilled who received an education but are ten years out-of-date and need to sharpen their skills; and the next generation who will need a functioning primary and secondary system to avoid becoming another lost generation. Training of skilled Somali staff appears throughout the program, especially in the health and water sector, but vocational training targeted on the needs of businesses has been excluded. Should additional funds be available for the education sector, the ISP team would propose an assessment to be financed by the Global Center on Human Capacity Development (G/HCD) to examine needs in education (primary, secondary, and tertiary), analyze workforce requirements, and propose low-cost targeted interventions. The intent would be to complement the limited activities that other donors (UNICEF and UNESCO) are financing and help to revitalize and expand education, with a special focus on teacher training and vocational training. Of particular interest will be interventions that utilize information technology, such as distance-learning, which could prove to have a high return on investment in Somalia where communities are extremely isolated.

## **B. Strategic Objective 6**

### **Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups**

#### **HIV/AIDS Sentinel Surveillance and Awareness Activities:**

A limited KAP study conducted by UNICEF/WHO in Somaliland found the rate of HIV prevalence to be 0.8%. Prevalence rates are unknown in other areas. However, partner agencies in Somalia and Nairobi told the ISP team that Somali counterparts are not taking the possibly low prevalence rates with complaisance. There is an awareness among public authorities in the north that now is an appropriate time for information, education, and communication (IEC) activities to prevent the spread of the epidemic before it is too late. This attitude is appropriate given Somalia's past, and likely future, as a trading economy focused on moving goods between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East (and to a certain extent South Asia). The ISP team would therefore propose creation of an extremely modest sentinel surveillance system with sites in port towns and other major towns along functional roads in secure areas of the country. Simultaneously, private sector firms involved in the telecommunications industry could be trained in use of awareness media campaigns in other Islamic countries, and one test campaign could be run in each stable region of the country. It is presumed that any future media campaigns will be financed by external parties and implemented by the private sector in Somalia and therefore the training should start with them. Lessons can be learned from the activity currently underway at the port of Djibouti where US Embassy/Addis Ababa, WFP and Save-the Children/US are sponsoring an HIV/AIDS education program for approximately 2,000 drivers of food aid trucks. Performance measurement of these limited activities would include low-level accomplishment indicators on the establishment of the sentinel surveillance system, the participation in training sessions, and the existence of the media campaigns. If funds allow, a survey would be conducted after the media campaigns to learn about their effectiveness and reactions of Somali men, women, and youth.

#### **Displaced Children and Orphans/War Victims Fund Activities:**

It is believed that approximately \$500,000 in DCOF funds could be effectively utilized during each year of the ISP, if such funds were to be available. All children in Somalia can be considered in "especially difficult circumstances" but there are subgroups that have special social problems and are in need of special care, protection and in some cases, social reintegration, above the needs of children in general. According to the UNICEF Women and Children

Situation Analysis conducted in 1998, there are believed to be tens of thousands of displaced children and women living in squatter settlements in extreme poverty; many hundreds of children living on the streets or in orphanages; large numbers of physically disabled and mentally handicapped children, of whom few receive any rehabilitative care; and unknown numbers of children attached to militia groups.

In light of the needs identified by UNICEF and the Strategic Objectives of this ISP, the following are seen as the most important by the Somalia Country Program Team: activities supporting the demobilization and reintegration of former child combatants, activities strengthening family and community structures to care for war-affected children and youth, and activities meeting the unique non-physical needs of returning child refugees. The Somalia Country Program Team plans to discuss funding opportunities with DCOF staff. An important step in this process would be to carry out a needs assessment and prioritization exercise and the identification of viable partner organizations.

## Annex 1 Other Strategic Directions Considered

The ISP Core Team considered a wide variety of strategic directions and approaches. However, limited funds and the medium-term timetable deemed appropriate for a transitional strategy compelled the team to prioritize some strategic directions and reject others. Fortunately, the presence of many other donors and implementing partners with their own programs made it possible to rely on others to cover certain sectors. The section below highlights some of the other potential strategic directions that were considered and the team's rationale for not pursuing them.

**Increased security:** While security and access are major constraints to recovery in Somalia as well as for implementors of relief and development programs, the ISP Team did not believe that seeking to increase security was within its manageable interest, as far too many external factors beyond the control of any donor's intervention contribute to increases and decreases in security.

**Improved livestock production and marketing:** Because the livestock sub-sector is so vitally important to the Somali economy, especially the food economy as a source of income, the team considered veterinary health, marketing systems efficiency, and export facilitation interventions to help expand the sub-sector. However, it was determined that Somali expertise in this sector is much greater than anything that a donor could offer other than the interventions already provided by the European Union and OAU/IBAR. Therefore livestock activities will be limited to possible infrastructure and services activities under SO 1, IR 1 particularly improvement of animal health services delivery, especially through private sector mechanisms.

**Expanding or Improving capital markets:** Access to finance is a key short-term need for the economies of the northern areas of Somalia and a long-term need for the whole country. However, given public international financial institutions restrictions on aid to Somalia, insurance and bonding constraints, the apparently effective financial-transfer operations assisted by the Somali diaspora, the political complexities that govern the Somali economy, and USAID's resource limitations, the ISP team determined that interventions in the sector, other than perhaps a microfinance facility, were not feasible. However, were resources available, a modest venture capital fund for small entrepreneurs managed by a local private sector institution would be an attractive complement to microfinance and a boost to private sector endeavors.

**Supporting Secondary and Tertiary Education:** As described throughout the ISP, Somalia requires a major investment in education at all levels. An entire generation has been denied its opportunity for education. The ISP team considered making teacher training a priority and the rehabilitation of secondary and vocational schools as almost equally important. The team also considered providing modest support to the fledgling tertiary institutions recently created in Somaliland (in Boroma and Hargeisa), particularly to enhance their capacity to train teachers. However, the team determined that medium to long term interventions would be needed if USAID assistance were to be truly effective and that perhaps \$1 million per year might constitute a minimum amount of funds to employ. Given the limited funds currently expected to be available, it was decided that education should be retained as a "shelf" strategic objective for which an intervention package could later be elaborated, should funding become available. Primary and secondary teacher training and formal, secondary schooling, and formal vocational training would be the tentative priorities for an education strategic objective. (see Section IV).

## **Annex 2            Somalia Country Program Team**

### **CORE TEAM MEMBERS**

Mia Beers, Regional Advisor, OFDA/ARO  
Gerald Cashion, Somalia Country Program Coordinator, NPC/C  
Patrick Diskin, Food Aid Monitor, FFP  
Karri Goeldner, Activity Program Manager, NPC/C  
Jennifer Mulli, Program Development Assistant, NPC/C  
Robert Patterson, Embassy Nairobi Somalia Watcher

### **EXPANDED TEAM MEMBERS**

Jayne Carbone, Economic Growth  
Lynne Cripe, GHAI  
Karen Doswell, RLA  
John Dunlop, PHN  
Shirley Erves, PDI  
Rick Garland, PDI  
Greg Gottlieb, OFDA/ARO  
Ned Greeley, NPC/DGC  
Walter Knausenberger, Regional Environmental Advisor  
Ahsan Malik, RFMC  
James McNulty, Embassy Nairobi Refugee Coordinator  
Dennis McCarthy, Food Security Advisor  
Wanjiku Muhato, Regional Advisor on Gender Issues  
Mary Muiruri, GII Information Specialist  
John Munuve, NPC/C  
Dennis Nzilu, RFMC  
Michael Walsh, PRO

### **VIRTUAL TEAM MEMBERS (BASED IN WASHINGTON)**

Caroline Abla, BHR/OFDA  
Timothy Anderson, BHR/FFP  
Lily Beshawred, AFR/EA  
Kevin Bohrer, AFR/SD  
Ruth Buckley, AFR/DP  
Arlene Ferrill, AF/E  
Susan Jay, G/DG  
Robert Jenkins, OTI  
Ajit Joshi, AFR/SD

<b>Somalia Staff Table</b>			
<b>Agency, Office and Position</b>	<b>FT/PT on Somalia</b>	<b>Funding Source</b>	<b>Type</b>
<b>Embassy Nairobi</b>			
RSO	PT (5%)	OE	USDH
Political Officer	FT	OE	USDH
Political Assistant	FT	OE	FSNPSC
<b>Embassy/Djibouti</b>			
Ambassador	PT (25%)	OE	USDH
Political Officer	PT (20%)	OE	USDH
Consular Officer	PT (15%)	OE	USDH
<b>USAID/REDSO/ESA</b>			
Chief, Non-Presence Countries Office (NPC)	PT (30%)	OE	USDH
Secretary, NPC	PT (50%)	OE	FSNPSC
Activity Manager, NPC	FT (100%)	SOM PROG	USPSC
Program Assistant, NPC	FT (100%)	SOM PROG	
Democracy/Governance Advisor, NPC/DGC	PT (<10%)	REDSO Prg	FSN PSC
Regional Legal Advisor, RLA Office	PT (<10%)	OE	USDH
Regional Contracting Officer, PRO	PT (<10%)	OE	USDH
Project Development Officer, PDI	PT (<10%)	OE	USDH
Monitoring/Evaluation Specialist, PDI	PT (<10%)	REDSO Prg	USPSC
Regional Controller, RFMC	PT (<10%)	OE	USDH
Financial Analyst, RFMC	PT (<10%)	OE	FSNPSC
Voucher Examiner, RFMC	PT (<10%)	OE	FSNPSC
Health Advisor, PHN	PT (<10%)	REDSO Prg	USPSC
Regional WID Advisor, FS/EG	PT (<10%)	REDSO Prg	FSNPSC
Environmental Advisor, FS/E	PT (<10%)	REDSO Prg	USPSC
Private Sector Advisor, FS/EG	PT (<10%)	REDSO Prg	USPSC
<b>USAID/ARO/OFDA</b>			
Director	PT (10%)	BHR PROG	USPSC
Secretary	PT (10%)	BHR PROG	FSNPSC
Regional Advisor	PT(40%)	BHR PROG	USPSC
Regional Information Analyst	PT (5%)	BHR PROG	USPSC

## **Annex 3 Overview of Other Donor Assistance and Plans**

Somalia receives aid from a variety of sources. The international community has continued to provide humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia in an effort to mitigate the worst effects of the civil conflict and natural disasters that have affected vulnerable households. The majority of the assistance currently provided and planned is humanitarian in nature. The U.S. is a major donor, with assistance levels averaging \$25 million annually over recent years, second only to the European Union.

### **Coordination**

As described in Section II.B., the somewhat unique and fairly effective Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) is comprised of some 150 organizations, including multilateral and bilateral donors, UN agencies, and international and local NGOs. An Executive Committee coordinates among agencies on sensitive issues like access and security. SACB sector committees -- governance, food security and rural infrastructure, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education -- coordinate sector policy, planning, technical interventions, monitoring, and information gathering. The U.S. is a key member on all committees, though a lower-profile member of the Executive Committee. Although the SACB is constrained by a consensual decision-making approach, it is usually able to forge common agreement among its members. Selective reform of the SACB can make it more effective, but this may require the U.S. to play a more aggressive role on the Executive Committee.

### **Multilateral Donors**

The largest donor to Somalia is the European Union. Its program amounts to approximately Euros 50 million per year in several sectors throughout the entire country. Under the rubric of rural development, the EU works in livestock production and marketing, irrigation infrastructure, production of local varieties of seeds, contributions of food aid through WFP and international NGOs, and a contribution to the FAO's Food Security Assessment Unit. The EU is the major donor in the livestock sub-sector, which is one reason why USAID is not proposing major livestock interventions. Funding for physical infrastructure includes rehabilitation of roads, ports, and water and sanitation facilities. The EU also has programs in education, small and medium enterprises and employment creation, human rights, and provides technical assistance for the environment. EU funds are still being drawn down from the European Development Funds (EDF) II and EDF II allocations dating from the period when Somalia's national government was a participant in the Lome agreements. It is understood that there were no funds appropriated in EDF IV and EDF V because there was no government to work with. However, according to EU sources, Euros 10 million (about \$8.8 million) from EDF 6 and Euros 15 million (\$13 million) in rehabilitation funds may be committed to Somalia before the end of November 2000. In 2000, ECHO provided about Euros 4.5 million (\$4.2 million) and will likely commit about Euros 5.3 million (\$4.7 million) in 2001.

Several United Nations agencies contribute core funds to programs in Somalia and also benefit from extensive program funding from the donor community. As an indicative comprehensive funding level, the U.N. Combined Annual Appeal for 2000 was \$52 million. UNICEF is the largest implementor of relief programs in Somalia, working in health, water and sanitation, and nutrition in the south and center and on health, water, and education in the north. Other agencies such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also operate in Somalia. These agencies do IDP resettlement and rehabilitation, provide assistance to refugees, collect and analyze information vital to the famine early warning system, and implement education rehabilitation programs.

### **Bilateral Donors**

It has proven difficult to get an accurate funding breakdown from other bilateral donors, because of the varying time periods the funding covers, the implementation mechanisms (UN agencies or NGOs), and the objectives (i.e., categories) of funds. At USAID urging, the SACB has attempted to create matrices that identify sources and amounts of funds but thus far only the U.S. has been able to compile and share resource figures.

Besides the major contributions of the USG, the second largest donor after the EU, Italy's assistance levels have been running about \$8 million annually, making it the third largest donor. Sweden has provided an average of \$6 million over recent years, split about evenly between humanitarian relief and development assistance. The Netherlands assistance program also averages some \$6 million annually, also split between relief and development. Denmark furnishes an average of \$4 million per year, of which the majority has been targeted at development activities over the past two years, signaling a shift in Danish priorities. France provides no bilateral assistance to Somalia but notes that it provides, on average, 29% of the total allocations to the European Development Fund. Britain's DFID and Canada's CIDA provide small amounts of humanitarian assistance in the south and generally channel their funds through UN agencies (UNICEF and WFP) and international NGOs. According to an EU officer in Brussels, EU member states contributed about \$90 million in bilateral humanitarian assistance in 2000.

Arab League members constitute another source of assistance for Somalia. Though the Somali Aid Coordination Body attempts to ascertain the sources, amounts, and modalities of assistance provided to the various regions of Somalia, it has proven to be especially difficult to obtain information from Arab League member states on their assistance programming. At recent Arab League meetings, there have been discussions of pledges for the new Transitional National Government, yet only Sudan and Djibouti have formally recognized the TNG.

### **Non-governmental Organizations**

Some 150 international NGOs and PVOs implement activities in Somalia. Most receive grants and contracts from government donors and concentrate on humanitarian relief and rehabilitation projects, mainly in southern Somalia but in the north as well. Many of these organizations have access to private sources of funds through foundations, corporations, churches, and other grant-making agencies.

## Annex 4 Table of Illustrative Indicators

Result	Indicator	Definition and Unit of Measure	Baseline (year)	Target (year)	Source
Strategic Objective Four: Improved Capacity for Good Governance and Conflict Mitigation	Capacity assessment score for local NGOs	Use of capacity assessment tool in Civil Society Expansion program.		_____ (2003)	CARE
	Private-public-civil society partnerships	Number of community contracts and  Number of joint development plans		_____ (2003)	UN agencies, NGOs
	Judicial system facilities functional	Number of functioning judicial facilities in target areas		_____ (2003)	UNDP
Strategic Objective Five: Increased Opportunities for Productive Livelihoods	Increased agricultural activity	Increase in # of hectares planted attributable to canal rehabilitation		_____ (2003)	NGOs

<b>Result</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Definition and Unit of Measure</b>	<b>Baseline (year)</b>	<b>Target (year)</b>	<b>Source</b>
	Increased transport activity in stable areas	Increase in road traffic on rehabilitated roads in stable areas as measured by road authorities		_____ (2003)	
	Diversity of products exported from stable areas	Volume and value of non-livestock exports through ports of Berbera and Bosasso		_____ (2003)	UNCTAD
	Territory freed from mines and UXOs	# of hectares freed from mines and UXOs for productive activities		_____ (2003)	UN agencies, NGOs, Halo Trust
Strategic Objective Six: Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups	Access to safe water and sanitation	# of people with access to safe water and sanitation		_____ (2003)	UN agencies, NGOs
	Access to health care services	# of beneficiaries accessing basic health care		_____ (2003)	UN agencies, NGOs
	Efficiency of drugs distribution	Percent of target health centers receiving 90% of essential drugs on time			UNICEF, WHO, NGOs

<b>Result</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Definition and Unit of Measure</b>	<b>Baseline (year)</b>	<b>Target (year)</b>	<b>Source</b>
	Immunization coverage rates	% of target infants fully vaccinated against 6 key diseases		_____ (2003)	UNICEF, NGOs
	Efficient food aid delivery	Number of vulnerable people who received food aid in an agreed-upon time		_____ (2003)	UNICEF, CARE, NGOs
Special Objective Seven: Foundation Established for Emerging Somalia Administration to Consolidate Transition	Somaliland, Puntland and the Transitional Government reach an accommodation on a decentralized federal system of government without resorting to violence	Peace accords or other agreement documents demonstrate acceptance by all parties.	No. (2000)	Yes. (2003)	
	Transitional government holds free and fair referendum on a new constitution for the federal government.	Occurrence of referendum and verification by independent observers	No. (2000)	Yes. (2003)	

## Annex 5 Legislation Affecting Assistance to Somalia

<b>PROHIBITIONS</b>		<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Section 512 of FY00 AA -</b>	No assistance to country in default on loan made by US for 1 year or more. Prohibits DA and ESF to govt. and country.	Somalia became subject to Section 512 on January 21, 1990.	
<b>Section 620q of FAA -</b>	No assistance to country in default on loan made by US for 6 months or more. Prohibits DA and ESF to govt. and country.	Somalia became subject to Section 620q on July 21, 1989.	Within statute: Assistance resumed if loan repaid or President (delegated to SOS) determines assistance in US national interest
<b>EXCEPTIONS</b>		<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act -</b>	DA assistance permitted through PVOs and IOs notwithstanding other prohibitions.	In 1997 ISP approval cable, AA/AFR approved use of the Act for Somalia activities in ISP until such time as there is a resolution of Somalia's delinquent indebtedness.	FAA Section 496(e)(2) defines PVO. Africa Bureau invocation required as a policy matter.
<b>Section 522 of FY00 AA -</b>	Child Survival and Disease Prevention Activities have notwithstanding authority.		
<b>Section 543(a) of FY00 AA -</b>	Exception applies if A/USAID determines support to NGOs in national interest of US. Allows for ESF and DA.	No such determination has been made.	
<b>Section 614 of FAA -</b>	Exception applies if President determines important to US security interests. Allows for ESF and DA.	No such determination has been made.	
<b>Section 451 of FAA -</b>	Exception applies if President determines unanticipated contingencies. Allows for ESF and DA.	No such determination has been made.	
<b>PL 480 202(a) -</b>	Exception applies for provision of emergency food aid.	Emergency food aid currently provided in Somalia.	

\*BHR/OFDA has notwithstanding authority to use International Disaster Assistance Funds

## **Annex 6 Reference Documents**

The following documents were utilized for background information and analysis for this strategy.

Adventist Development and Relief Agency/Somalia, "Emergency Rehabilitation of Water Points, Bakool Region, Somalia". March 2000.

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## **ANNEX 7**

# **PARAMETERS CABLES**



Lasers:  
ACTION: AID REDSO DIR, NPC

DISSEMINATION: AA  
CHARGE: AID

VZCZCNAO474  
RR RUEHNR  
DE RUEHC #8341 2311309  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
R 181306Z AUG 00  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5850  
BT  
UNCLAS STATE 158341

ADM AID DIRK DJIKERMAN, JERRY CASHION, REDSO/ESA

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT: REQUIRED ISP ANALYSIS

REF: STATE 068544, STATE 140925

1. AFR CONCURS WITH REDSO/ESA'S REQUEST FOR A DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW 3-YEAR (FY01-04) INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN (ISP) FOR SOMALIA. GUIDANCE ON THE DIRECTION FOR THE ISP IS PROVIDED IN REFTEL STATE 068544.

2. REDSO/ESA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STAFFING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SOMALIA PROGRAM. THERE WILL BE NO INCREASE IN THE USDH OR OE LEVELS. THEREFORE REDSO IS ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE TO USE PROGRAM-FUNDED STAFF TO MANAGE THIS PROGRAM. IF REDSO/ESA SO CHOOSES, FOR THE PURPOSES OF TRANSPARENCY IN REPORTING TO USG STAKEHOLDERS, THEY MAY PROPOSE TO TREAT SOMALIA AS A SEPARATE OPERATING UNIT WITHIN REDSO ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED FOR THE SUDAN PROGRAM.

3. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSES REFERENCED IN STATE 140925. ARE REQUIRED. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE RESULTS ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE TEXT RATHER THAN STANDING AS SEPARATE ANNEXES.

- COVERGENCE WITH GHAI: THE SOMALIA ISP NEEDS TO ADDRESS CONVERGENCE WITH THE GHAI AND DEMONSTRATE HOW ITS SOS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE GHAI OBJECTIVES OF INCREASED FOOD SECURITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. IN

REDSO/ESA	
DATE RECEIVED	8/22/00
FILE CODE	PRM
ISSUE NO.	
Action	
DIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FM	
EN	
AG	
EC	
NPC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDO	
PH	
POI	
HASP	
GHA1	
ICT	
RCO	
RFMC	
RLA	
Reading file	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Chron	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
No. of copies	7
Reply Due	8/22/00
Action taken	
Action Date	
Initials	

ADDITION, THE ISP NEEDS TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE GHAI PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO APPROACHES TO RESULTS ACHIEVEMENT AT THE SO LEVEL. AVAILABLE REFERENCES INCLUDE THE GHAI STRATEGY, CABLE 1997 SECSTATE 213889 AND CABLE 2000 NAIROBI 7545.

- CONFLICT ANALYSIS: IN LIGHT OF SOMALIA'S HISTORY OF INTERNAL CONFLICT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH USAID GENERAL NOTICE OF 6/21/99, THE MISSION IS ASKED TO BUILD UPON EXISTING ANALYSES OF SOURCES OF CONFLICT AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA AND HOW THEY INFLUENCE THE MISSION'S STRATEGIC CHOICES. THIS EXERCISE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BOTH THE VARIOUS MPP'S COVERING SOMALIA AND THE ISP PROCESSES.

- GENDER INTEGRATION: IN ACCORDANCE WITH USAID GENERAL NOTICE OF 9/14/99, THE STRATEGY SHOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE HOW GENDER CONCERNS HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED. ADS 202 DEFINES GENDER INTEGRATION AS A FOCUS ON THE PARTICIPATION OF AND BENEFITS TO EACH GENDER IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, WHILE PROMOTING WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP OF AND EQUALITY IN PROGRAM AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES.

- TROPICAL FORESTRY ANALYSIS: THE MISSION IS REMINDED TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE OF THE NEW STRATEGY WITH REG. 216 AND TO UNDERTAKE THE ANALYSIS REQUIRED UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 119 OF THE FAA. AFR CAN PROVIDE COPIES OF THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION IF IT IS UNAVAILABLE AT POST.

- HIV/AIDS: AA/AFR HAS REQUESTED THAT ALL NEW STRATEGIES ADDRESS THE MULTISECTORAL IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS. THE SOMALIA ISP IS THEREFORE ENCOURAGED TO EMPHASIZE CROSS-SECTORAL LINKAGES OF HIV/AIDS PROGRAMMING IF THE LATTER IS UNDERTAKEN.

4. IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT ARISING OUT OF THE DJIBOUTI CONFERENCE REDSO/ESA IS ENCOURAGED TO EXPLORE THE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED AND TO PRESENT DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR ITS PROGRAM BASED UPON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE LONGER TERM OUTCOME.

LOY  
BT  
#8341  
NNNN





