



**TERMINATION
PHASE-OUT
STUDY
PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT
URUGUAY**

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**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Terms of Reference

U. S. Public Safety assistance has been provided to the Government of Uruguay, to develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of its civil police forces. At the project's initiation and during its progress mutually agreed objectives and courses of action were established and at times adjusted to achieve the overall goals as well as to accommodate changing situations in the country. Both host government and U.S. resources were programmed and employed to jointly strive toward these goals.

Due to U.S. congressional action, the continued input of U.S. Government resources planned for this project must be terminated sooner than planned and prior to the achievement of the goals and objectives which were mutually established by the two governments.

It is therefore the purpose of this report to note the progress made thus far and to enumerate what remains to be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals. The report also includes recommended actions which the Government of Uruguay should take, employing their own resources, but under the circumstances excluding in-country assistance by the U.S.

B. Conduct of the Study

The general study was conducted by:

Albert L. Bryant, OPS/W

The telecommunications portion of the report was prepared by PSA Lucien Gormont, OPS/W, during March/April, 1974.

After reviewing pertinent background documents in Washington and discussions with Mr. Harry Jacobson, LA/APU, the evaluator arrived in Montevideo on May 5, 1974, and remained until May 24, 1974, for the in-country survey. This evaluation was conducted by interviews and discussions with numerous persons from the U.S. Country Team, Uruguayan Government officials and on site visits to Uruguayan police units. Additionally, pertinent documents which had been prepared by the Public Safety Division were reviewed and contributed greatly toward the preparation of this report.

The visits included Ministry of Interior, Montevideo Police Headquarters, Support Groups Headquarters, Drivers School, Radio Patrol, Republic Guard, Metropolitan Guard, Security Division Headquarters, Communications Center, Special Prevention Headquarters, Organization and Methods Section, Directorate of Intelligence and Information, Police Garage, Narcotics Branch, Colona Departmental School in La Paz.

All persons contacted were frank and helpful in discussions.

Prior to departure the team discussed findings of a general nature with officials of the Ministry, Montevideo Police, U.S. Embassy and the USAID.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY

A. Internal Security Situation

There are two basic threats to the internal security of Uruguay. The first is the urban terrorist threat. While the large scale capabilities which previously existed have been greatly reduced, these groups still have the capability of isolated acts of terrorism such as assassinations.

The second threat is that of increasing criminality, particularly among the youth of the country. This is seen as a result of the current economic problems being experienced in Uruguay.

B. Observations and Conclusions

The modest input of USG resources to the police service of Uruguay has been well received and utilized.

Jointly planned goals and objectives were well conceived and, despite the many problems encountered during the life of the program, a good rate of achievement was gained. As a result of the increase in terrorist activities, additional objectives were included in the Public Safety program to support the police in their efforts against the terrorist groups. As a result of the diversion from original program goals, there is some shortfall in program goals. Specifically identified in this category are central records, organization and administration and patrol operations.

C. Recommendations

Detailed recommendations for GOU consideration are to be found in section VI of this report. The major thrust of the recommendations is in three areas: organization, training and mobility. The major points of each will be discussed briefly in this summary.

1. Organization and Administration

These deal with the creation of a Planning and Inspections Division, reorganization of the MPD, reorganization of the records system and telecommunications service.

2. Training

These deal with immediate construction of the new National Police School, expansion of the Montevideo Departmental School and specific improvements in training.

3. Mobility

It is recommended that training be accomplished in garage management and that the fleet be standardized.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION

The problems of the internal security situation have been well documented in past reports; so the historical background of the urban terrorist movement will not be repeated here.

At the present time, it is the considered opinion of police officials that the terrorist movements in Uruguay have been dealt a severe blow and that these organizations no longer have the capability to conduct subversive activities similar to those experienced from 1969 through 1972. It is conceded that, while these illicit groups still retain the capability to undertake isolated acts of terrorism such as assassinations of government officials or foreign dignitaries, they can no longer kidnap and detain for long periods of time.

The 1973 statistics provided by the Montevideo police indicate that common crimes rose by 40% in 1973 in comparison with 1971. Crimes against the person more than tripled and offenses against property increased almost 15%. GOU officials also pointed out the shift between the incidence of burglaries and armed robberies. In the past, burglary has been the major crime problem for the police but there is now a trend toward armed robbery and, it is noted that more of the offenders are juveniles. This is causing great concern in police circles. A great part of the rise in these crimes can be attributed to the current economic situation of the country. It is difficult to earn a living sufficient to cope with the inflation rate. Police officials see this as the prime cause for the increase noted.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

A. General

The National Police Service was established by law on December 18, 1829. The Constitution of 1830 recognized the responsibility of the Chief Executive for public order and internal security, and authorized him to appoint chiefs of police. Subsequent to that time a series of laws and decrees have established the organization and administrative procedures of the police. The most recent affecting the police is Law No. 13, 963 of May 1971 known as "the Police Organic Law," which establishes the current organizational structure, entrance requirements, personnel regulations, retirements, etc. The passage of this law was a major step toward the professionalization of the Uruguyan police and was, in part, a result of cooperative efforts of the Uruguyan police and the Public Safety Division. Studies are currently underway to modify the Organic Law to further improve overall operations. The police is a centralized service of national character responsible to the Minister of Interior. Its responsibilities are listed as the maintenance of public order, the prevention of crime, the investigation of crime, and the protection of the free exercise of individual rights.

The Republic of Uruguay is divided into nineteen political subdivisions called Departments. The police in each Department is headed by a chief who is appointed by and who is directly responsible to the Minister of Interior. The police are supported from the national budget which establishes personnel strengths, salaries and emoluments for each departmental police force and provides for equipment, supplies and maintenance for their support. The basic responsibility for countering subversive activities was divided between the military and police under armed forces command (joint forces) in September 1971 by Presidential Decree.

B. Organization

The national organization of the police under the Ministry of Interior is set forth in the Police Organic Law as follows:

- 1) National Inspectorate of Police
- 2) National Directorate of Intelligence and Information (NDII)
- 3) National Directorate of Technical Police
- 4) Chiefs of Departmental Police Forces and their Staffs
- 5) Inspectorate of Police Schools and Courses
- 6) National Police School
- 7) National Directorate of Firemen
- 8) National Directorate of Highway Police
- 9) Police Medical and Social Assistance
- 10) Procurement & Inventory Control Office
- 11) Property Office
- 12) Officers Qualification Board
- 13) Others as Necessary

While the Organic Law shows nationalization of the Police School, Technical Police, and Intelligence Directorate, in reality only the Police School is national in character. The DNII and Technical Police still remain under the direct control of the Montevideo Police Chief but with national jurisdiction and will, until such time that facilities, budget, procurement, and regional offices can be provided for by the GOU.

1. The Montevideo Police Department (MPD)

The Montevideo Police Department is commanded by a Chief of Police who answers directly to the Minister of Interior. The current chief is an army colonel who has had many years experience in police assignments.

Organizationally, the force is comprised of six major elements and some fourteen lesser units which report directly to the Chief or to the Assistant Chief. Geographically, the force is distributed in a headquarters, three paramilitary units which are separated physically from headquarters, and 28 district stations. Organizational charts of the MPD appear as attachments C-1, C-2, C-3.

The heads of the following divisions, sections and staff report directly to the Chief of Police: Special Staff, Qualifications Commission, Legal Office, Republic Guard, Metropolitan Guard,

Medical Service, Private Secretariat. The divisions and sections which report directly to the Assistant Chief of Police are: Patrol Divisions, Administrative Division, Division of Legal Affairs, Judicial and Administrative Affairs Division, Accounting Division, Investigations Division, General Secretariat, Treasury, and Organization and Methods Unit. Many of these contacts are also made through the Administrative Coordinator or the Executive Coordinator.

The roles and missions of each of these units is described as follows:

Special Staff. The Special Staff, composed of officers detailed from the Army, serves in an advisory capacity with no responsibility for operations. Principal functions of this group are to serve as an intelligence and analysis unit of the Chief of Police during periods of civil disturbance, to counsel on police tactics in the control of such disturbances, to maintain the departmental armory and repair weapons, and to provide firearms training.

Qualifications Commission. This Commission is responsible for reviewing applications for employment and qualifications for promotion. It also certifies appointments and assignments of all personnel. Nominations and recommendations are subject to the approval of the Chief of Police.

Legal Office. The Legal Office is responsible for the review of judicial decisions relative to criminal convictions. It is also the office which is the custodian of criminal records.

National Technical Police, (Crime Laboratory). This group of 24 people are under a Director who is a Chemical Engineer and devotes about half of his time or more to this position. He recently completed an IPA one-month training - observation course in the administration of a criminal laboratory. The Technical Police are called to the scene of major crimes to gather, handle and process evidence.

They have recently received 10 narcotic field testing kits, and will conduct a course of training of about 1-2 months for representatives of the 18 Departments and the Montevideo Police. They are also training a police dog to locate marijuana in a vehicle, suitcase, or other hiding place.

Patrol Division. Principal duties of this Division are to maintain law and order, prevent and repress crime, and apprehend offenders. Organizationally, the Division is composed at headquarters, consisting of the office of the Director, a correspondence and records unit, and a guard detail; and several services which are subordinate administratively but physically are in various quarters apart from headquarters.

The patrol force is deployed in twenty-eight District Stations within each of which are posts commanded by four inspector-12 hour shifts. For administrative purposes, the districts are formed into three zones, each commanded by an assistant inspector.

Traffic Department. Operating as a subordinate unit of the Patrol Division, this Montevideo Police Traffic unit cooperates closely with the Montevideo Municipal Traffic Department. Intersection and parking control are the primary duties of the Police unit; vehicular registration and related matters concern the Municipal unit.

Administration Division. Consisting of three principal offices - Central, Personnel, Supplies. The Administration Division is commanded by a Director and an Assistant Director.

Central Office. Administrative proceedings which pertain to personnel are concerns of this Office. Duties include processing, preparing and recording personnel actions, preparing necessary documentation for retirements, maintaining time and attendance reports, filing all reports regarding auto accidents which involve the police, and managing the sale of products from police farms.

Personnel Office. The principal duty of this Office is to compile personnel records. Reports are prepared for the Ministry of Interior that relate to personnel actions involving transfers, new hires, dismissals, retirements, and on-duty accidents. Other records which are maintained pertain to personnel conduct, disciplinary actions, promotions, qualifications, meritorious service awards, notices of sickness and detention.

Supplies Office. Subdivisions within this Office are: Distribution, Administration, Police Farms, Warehouse, Secretarial, Contract and Purchases, Machine and Equipment, Printing, and Depots.

Legal Affairs Division. A Director and an Assistant Director command this Division. It is composed of the following offices: Police Prison, Department of Statistics, and Microfilm Section.

Police Jail Section. The custody, care and welfare of detained persons are the concerns of this section.

Statistical Section. This section maintains administrative, operational and fiscal statistics for the Department. It compiles all criminal, non-criminal and traffic accident statistics for the Montevideo Police. The various police divisions submit the statistical data on specially devised forms.

There is no centralized national file or systematic method at the national level for collecting, collating, or exchanging statistical information among the nineteen police departments.

Microfilm Section. Specifically, this Section is charged with microfilming all dossiers which are within the General File of the Montevideo Police. The films are filed for ready availability of the various police divisions who request their use.

Judicial and Administrative Affairs Division. This Division is composed of four sections: Judicial, Arrest and Seizures, Judicial Deposits, and General Records.

Judicial Section. Duties of this Section are: to analyze information in all criminal cases, to maintain close liaison with the courts and other authorities (Streets and Highway Department, National Customs Directorate, Immigration, Municipality of Montevideo) who refer the enforcement of fines and other penalties to the Judicial Section.

Arrests and Seizures Section. This Section maintains both a card index of persons sought for arrest and a file containing court orders of arrest. In efforts to locate wanted persons, this Section furnishes information to national and foreign courts and to Chiefs of Police in Uruguay. Information is also supplied to the Police Technical Service which issues Uruguayan identity cards and provides certifications of police records for immigration and passport purposes. When a court desires to have a person taken into custody, the request is made to this Section which sends the warrant to the Investigations Division for execution.

Judicial Depository Section. Not only is this Section responsible for the care and custody of found or recovered stolen property, but also for determining the validity of claims for property in its possession.

General Records Section. The records section is responsible for the care, custody and preservation of all documents and registry books that are used in the Montevideo Police Department. This Section provides copies of reports for various divisions of the Department and other governmental agencies, upon request. Daily police bulletins are compiled and filed in this Section. Records concerning houses of prostitution and gambling are indexed and maintained in the general file of this Section; both activities are sanctioned by law in Uruguay.

Accounting Division. This Division comprises correspondence, Bookkeeping, Paymaster, Inventory, Comptroller, and Social Benefits sections. Duties of the Social Benefits unit are to collect fines which are levied administratively by the Montevideo Police and to record court transactions which pertain to traffic offenses.

Investigations Division. This Division of the Montevideo Police Department is responsible for investigating all crimes which are considered as major misdemeanors and felonies that occur in Montevideo.

Subject to direction by the Assistant Chief of Police, the Investigations Division consists of eleven specialized sections which are under the integrated command of four Section Officers, namely a Director, Deputy Director, and two Inspectors of Police. The specialized Sections are: Crime Prevention and Criminal Investigation (crimes such as forgery, counterfeiting, bribery); Vigilance Services (homicide, burglary, accidents, etc.); Public Order (bigamy, narcotics, poisoning, etc.); Intelligence and Liaison Services (crimes against the sovereignty, peace and order of the Republic); Theft and Robbery; INTERPOL; Foreigner and Transient; Motor Vehicles (auto theft); Technical Police Institute (crime scene searches, etc.); Records and Fingerprints; Photography; Criminal Identification; Document Examination; Identi-Kit; and General Services.

In Montevideo proper, all criminal cases are the responsibility of the Investigations Division with one exception; namely, initial Investigations resulting from on-view arrests by the Patrol Division.

National Police Academy. The Police Training Academy for the Montevideo Police Department was established in 1943. The Police Academy was given National responsibility for police training under the Police Organic Law of May 1971. The National Police Academy Director reports directly to the Minister of Interior, and has been given the responsibility for the inspection and evaluation of all Police training conducted by the 18 Interior Department Training Schools. The Director of Training supervises Academy operations. The Academy Secretary manages all correspondence and maintains various records as well as the library.

Purchasing, disbursing and operations are controlled by the Administrative Section.

An Office of Education includes a Director of Studies who controls the professional staff. There are three divisions, each with a Chief of Instruction: Officer Qualification Courses for Promotion, Officer Cadet Program, School for Recruits and Promotion. Professional instructors from outside the Department frequently are used.

The Dispensary provides medical attention to trainees who are not in need of hospitalization.

The current inspections functions of the MPD is carried out at unit level in all echelons. In effect, each commander is responsible for inspecting his own unit. There is no assurance under the current system, that the Chief of Police is receiving accurate reports of departmental performance and readiness.

One of the more important units of the MPD is a small group created upon recommendation of PSD called Organization and Methods Section (O&M). This is a five man planning unit which has produced some outstanding work on plans for reorganization of the department and has conducted studies of other management problems. While this group is performing well, it is too limited in its scope and manpower to supply the needed planning for the department. To fulfill this need, as well as that of an inspections

staff answering to the Chief, a Division of Planning and Inspections should be created within the MPD. The O&M section could be absorbed by this division as one of its sections.

A comprehensive analysis of the operational divisions will appear under the appropriate section of this report.

The organizational structure of the MPD has been the subject of recent studies by the Organization and Methods Unit and recommendations are pending regarding a reorganization of the force. It is sufficient to state here that such reorganization is absolutely necessary to improve the performance, resource and manpower utilization and general administration of the force. More specific recommendations will appear in appropriate sections of the report.

2. The Interior Police Departments

The Interior Police Departments are organized along similar lines to the MPD with the same general responsibilities but are narrower in scope in accordance with the Police Organic Law. The Interior Departments are organized as follows:

- a) The Chief and Deputy Chief
- b) General Secretariat
- c) Directorate of Security and Investigations
- d) Directorate of Administration
- e) Departmental Qualification Board (for troop level personnel)

In general, the capabilities and problems of the Interior Departments are quite different than those of the MPD. There have been major improvements, however, in training for the interior police with the creation of a school in each Department.

Patrol in the rural areas is sometimes performed by motor vehicles, bicycles and foot patrol but more commonly, the police receive citizen complaints at headquarters. The capital cities of all

Departments are linked by a HF/SSB circuit with the Ministry of Interior. There is a basic interdepartmental network which links each Department headquarters with its various precincts.

3. Highway Patrol

The National Directorate of Highway Patrol is directly responsible to the Minister of Interior, and has nationwide jurisdiction. In practice, however, its activities are limited to the main highways within 150 kilometers of Montevideo due to limitations of manpower and equipment. Plans are currently under study to expand the service nationwide. An organizational chart of this unit appears as Attachment D.

C. Personnel

The 19 Departmental police forces of Uruguay, including the national directorate have a combined strength of 19,897 including civilian employees. Of this total, over 7,000 are stationed in Montevideo and the balance distributed throughout the country. The distribution of forces appears as Attachment E,

The police budget now being proposed shows an increase of 1,877 personnel or about a 5% increase in total strength. At this time, the personnel strengths of the police forces are deemed adequate but better utilization of the available manpower would add greatly to force effectiveness.

The budgetary allocations for the police have not changed significantly in the past five years due to the fact that the Uruguyan national budget is based on a five year cycle. There is, however, a new budget currently pending. The police budget is limited in its scope. It covers only salaries, some money for construction costs and a small amount for day to day operations and small purchases. All capital items of equipment are drawn from the national budget. The police, therefore, must compete with all other branches of the government and items are approved on the basis of priority. Until very recently, the police have not enjoyed a high priority and therefore have not fared well compared to other branches of the government. With such a system, there is no way that the police can produce any meaningful long range plans for capital development. Until such time as a separate budget is allocated, it will continue to be a hit and miss proposition which is not conducive to good management practices.

Another situation which has compounded the problem of meeting the police's material requirement is the non-availability of foreign currency in country. Virtually all police equipment and supplies must be imported and the lack of foreign currency to make these purchases preclude this option.

If the currently proposed budget is approved, the police salary structure will be greatly improved and will be on approximately the same level as that of the military. The scale which follows shows the current salary, by rank, and the proposed salary in Uruguyan pesos:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Current Salary Per Mo. (Uruguyan Pesos)*</u>	<u>Proposed</u>
Chief of Police	330,000	605,000
Asst. Chief of Police	313,700	575,000
Inspector 1st Class	277,500	510,000
Inspector	241,200	445,000
Sub-Inspector, Major	223,100	410,000
Commissioner, Captain	205,000	370,000
Sub-Commissioner, 1st Lt.	170,000	305,000
Officer Inspector, 2nd Lt.	140,000	250,000
Officer Assistant	127,500	220,000
Officer Sub-Assistant	115,100	200,000
1st Sergeant	110,200	180,000
Sergeant	99,200	162,000
Corporal	88,500	134,000
Agent 1st Class	75,700	110,000
Agent 2nd Class	72,000	100,000
Cadet	25,000	40,000

*Uruguyan Peso 1300 to US \$1.00

Even if approved, the salary increase for the police will do no more than bring them back to even keel in view of the high rate of inflation in Uruguay. The salary rate will, at least, enable the police to be more competitive in recruitment of the type of individuals they desire for police service.

D. Logistics and Supplies

The difficulties of logistics and supplies are tied directly to the problems already discussed in the budget procedure. Almost all capital items required by the police are of foreign manufacture and require foreign currency, usually dollars, for procurement. In the past, this problem has been somewhat negated by the use of the Trust Fund set-up through A.I.D. in which the GOU could deposit Uruguyan pesos and dollars were made available for foreign purchases. With the termination of the Trust Fund arrangement, the police must again compete for the limited amount of foreign exchange available. The procurement process is demonstrated in Attachment F.

This is the system of the entire GOU and not just the police. It is again linked to the budgetary system of the GOU and is not conducive to capital development and planning.

E. Training

A major goal of the Public Safety program since its inception has been the development and improvement of the training capabilities of the Uruguyan police. In this area, one can see major progress and accomplishment, not only in Montevideo but in the 18 departments of the interior as well.

The National Police School was created by the Police Organic Law of 1971. Prior to that time it was known as the Professional Training Institute and was for training only officer personnel of the Montevideo Police Department. With the nationalization of the facility, a new role and mission was assigned. The school now trains officer cadets for all departments of the Republic, conducts promotional courses and had recently prepared a Superior Officer's course which will be presented for Commisaries and Sub-Commisarios below the age of 40 years. The National Police School is also responsible for the supervision of the Departmental training schools and divisions throughout the country.

The National Police School is currently located in the same facility originally designed to accommodate 30 cadets in 1943. The current cadet corps in residence numbers 171. In addition to these, there is a promotional course currently in session and

the first Superior Officer Course is meeting in the cadet day room. This course has been cut to three months duration because of the crowded conditions but plans call for a full nine month course in CY 1975.

The cadet training course is of three year duration at which time the cadet is commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the Police. The current attrition rate of the police nationwide requires 150 new officers per year. With the current capacity of the school, 75 is the maximum that can be graduated per year. To offset this deficit, a special one year course is offered for qualified 1st Sergeants who are then commissioned 2nd Lieutenants.

In FY 1974 the National Police School acquired 3 hectares of land in the outskirts of Montevideo. Plans for the construction of a new school were completed but the project was not given sufficient priority by the GOU to receive funds for construction. This was a great blow to those who have planned and designed the new facility and who are well aware of the great need for its construction. Once completed, the new facility is designed to house 300 cadets and graduate an estimated 100 officers yearly. If and when constructed, plans are to retain the current facility for presentation of the Superior Officer's course and promotional courses.

The planned school remains inadequate to provide the necessary number of trained officers (allowing for the attrition thus far experienced). Nevertheless, the new facilities would represent a significant, though partial, step towards resolving the manpower needs. The construction of this new facility is deemed absolutely essential if the National Police School is to carry out its mission.

Today, under the direction and supervision of the National Police School and with assistance from the PSD/USAID, each Department has a school. These schools are operated for the primary purpose of providing recruit training for enlisted personnel. They are also responsible for in-service training for enlisted personnel and officers. However, except for special cases, in-service training programs have not been conducted in Montevideo or the other Departments. Training within the MPD has been decentralized and programs are presented when the need arises within the various units. Recruits participate in a three month training course at the Departmental school and, upon completion, are assigned to the units for which they enlisted. Thereafter, they

receive no formalized training until they become eligible to attend a promotion course. Occasionally, units within the department conduct training courses; these programs are prepared and presented by unit personnel. Until recently there was no coordination of such training. The Montevideo Police Departmental School currently graduates 420 recruits per year. Additionally, promotional courses for non-commissioned officers are presented there. These are run on a one-half day basis for three months.

The facilities are overcrowded for the student population. There is, however, room for expansion of the facility and this is considered a necessity if the school is to provide the type of training required.

To bring about the desired coordination and standardization of training within the MPD, a Training Division has been created and the Departmental School made the unit responsible for the conduct of all recruit and in-service training. Specialized training for tactical units will continue to be administered in the unit's facilities but supported and supervised by the school director.

Another area found lacking in the training programs is that of training evaluation. No system exists for feedback from the line command to the training schools. In this respect, school officials are operating in the dark in that they are not sure the training being provided is of the type needed for proper field performance. Some method of training evaluation must be implemented if full benefit is to be obtained from the effort.

Participant training provided through the Public Safety program has contributed greatly to the success of the overall training effort in Uruguay. The utilization of IPA trained instructors is excellent. Currently, the Directors of the National Police School, the Montevideo Departmental School and nine other Departmental Schools are IPA graduates.

While there are still some tasks to be accomplished in the training area, one can readily see that great progress has been made.

F. Operations

1. Urban Policing

The patrol responsibility is divided amongst several units of the force. The largest unit, in terms of manpower, is the Directorate

of Security with all of the 28 precincts (Commisarios or Seccionales) under its control. Much of the patrol is done on foot, but each precinct does have a motor patrol capability. A radio patrol force of 27 available vehicles is under the administrative control of Directorate of Support Groups and has patrol responsibilities in the downtown areas of Montevideo. The operational control of this unit rests with the Central Communications Center in the main police headquarters. The Metropolitan guard, the Republic Guard and the Special Security Support Group also conduct patrol activities in selected sectors of the city based upon incidence of crime. In these cases, patrol is carried out in 8-10 men groups which are transported to the area, perform foot patrol for a determined period of time, and are then moved to another point to repeat the process.

It is obvious that there is a serious problem of overlapping of responsibility and jurisdiction with respect to patrol activities in Montevideo. This problem has been under study by the Organization and Methods Unit. A reorganization plan has been developed by this group and, if adopted, will greatly reduce the current overlap problems and will provide for a more efficient use of manpower and resources.

In the Interior Departments, some motorized patrol capability does exist but it is more common to find police responding to citizen complaints from the police station. Foot patrols are utilized to a great extent in those areas and are deemed adequate for the existing problems in most areas.

2. Rural Policing

Patrol in the rural areas is the responsibility of the Departmental forces. These are further broken down into stations, sub-stations and posts. Many are manned by 2-3 men who perform their duties on foot, bicycle, motor vehicles and in some instances, on horseback. However, common crimes do not appear to be a problem at this time in these areas and the existing conditions are deemed adequate.

3. Border Patrol

The Departments which border on neighboring countries are experiencing smuggling problems but there is no defined effort to deal with the problem. The Departmental schools in these areas are including courses in their curricula which deal with border control but the utilization of this training remains

a hit and miss proposition. Four officers have specialized in Border/Customs Control following IPA General Course training.

4. Police Intelligence

Internal security investigations and intelligence was the responsibility of a unit under the Criminal Investigations Division in 1965. At that time it became evident that terrorist activity was on the increase and a proposal for creation of a separate division was made. In 1966 the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII) was formed. Included in the Police Organic Law, the DII became a national agency in 1971 and was renamed the National Directorate of Information and Intelligence (NDII).

To date, this division still remains under the direct control of the Chief of Police of Montevideo but does carry out its mission nationwide. When the budget allows, the division will become national in reality. The NDII has jurisdiction in the following categories of offenses:

- a. Crimes against the sovereignty of the state and against the establishments and personnel of foreign states.
- b. Crimes against the internal political order of the state.
- c. Crimes against the public peace.
- d. Crimes against public security.
- e. Labor conflicts.

In 1972, Public Safety terminated its technical assistance to the NDII.

5. Criminal Investigations

a. Criminal Investigations Division

Criminal investigations have improved steadily from onset of the program. In-service training, specialization courses, PSD advisory assistance and US/IPA courses were largely responsible for the advancements made.

Pronounced success was evident in the field use of scientific aids; additionally, continued reliability on a progressive Police Laboratory has provided exceptional results in evidence processing and analysis which has facilitated its evaluation.

USAID/Public Safety Division reported, "An indication of investigative effectiveness has been a decreased rate in burglary offenses and increased case clearance. Investigative operations became effective in recovery of stolen property and making successful arrests to the point that it caused a variance in criminal activity." "Lately, a continued wave of armed robberies of individuals and business establishments has been keeping the Investigations Division exceptionally busy. Clearance rates for these crimes is normal but prevention techniques are still below the desired level."

b. National Directorate of Technical Police (NDTP)

Originally organized in 1939 it was a dependency of the Investigations Division. In 1968 the Police Laboratory received technical assistance and was surveyed by a Public Safety Advisor. As a result USAID also provided limited commodity assistance. In 1971 the Montevideo Police Laboratory also became a national institution. Today it is known as the National Directorate of Technical Police, (NDTP). Its workload has increased since it now conducts examinations for the entire country. With the new NDTP becoming a national entity it also assumed a very important function. It now is in charge of the Criminal Identification Records for the nation.

The PSD sponsored assistance has resulted in improvement of weapons identification, some chemical exams of evidence, fingerprint identification, photography section, identikit, narcotics identification and to a limited extent, records.

An evaluation of the MPD records and identification procedures was conducted by PSA John H. Doney in 1974. In this report recommendations were made that the records system be centralized, that a records management specialist be trained and placed in charge of this activity, that programs be developed for records disposal and for improved physical security. Mr. Doney also suggested courses of action to improve the internal mail system, statistical reporting, the processing of requests for national identification cards, the personnel file system, and the preparation/maintenance of police operations report. (Ref: "Evaluation of Records and Identification Procedures, Montevideo Police Department, Uruguay," John H. Doney, March-April 1974). In connection with the recommended reorganization of the records system, Mr. Doney identifies a need for Records Management training for officers involved in this area.

An additional training need which has not been met is that of training at least two persons in questioned documents examinations. This is a critical need and must be serviced. Additionally, requests for training in the field of police photography have been received. With existing facilities at the IPA, such a request could be serviced.

An additional duty has been added to the NDTP as of March 1, 1974. They will begin training military school cadets in the field of criminalistics.

6. Riot Control

There are two major units within the MPD which are specially trained in riot control.

The Republican Guard is a mounted police unit with a strength of 600 men and approximately 200 horses. The Metropolitan guard numbers 500 men at the current time and is a paramilitary force. Both of these units are highly trained and are maintained in a constant state of readiness. Approximately 50% of the personnel of these units are immediately available for duty at any time.

These two forces are augmented by the Special Prevention Squad of the Security Division which has a strength of 300 men. This unit does perform security functions for police installations, foreign embassies and other governmental buildings.

At the present time, the Republic Guard and Metropolitan Guard are, in alternate months, providing a guard detail of 130 men for the Libertad Prison where the MLN terrorists are confined. Other than this assignment and some other fixed guard duties, there is no real mission for these groups. They are maintained on a standby basis for riot control. No police department, regardless of its size and budgetary allocations, can afford to maintain three separate units of this type. For better utilization of manpower, equipment and budgetary resources, PSD has recommended that one such unit be formed from the three mentioned here. The new single unit should then be utilized to supplement the patrol activities within Montevideo and be subject to immediate call for riot control duties. It is recognized that these units, particularly the Republic Guard, are traditional units which perform ceremonial functions. So that this traditional identity is not lost, consideration should be given to maintaining one company of mounted police in the new unit.

Today the riot control units of the police are considered to be adequately prepared and equipped to deal with any disturbance in a limited time. Reorganization would not impair this capability and would greatly improve the utilization of available manpower in accomplishing the total police mission.

The planning staff of the MPD is currently reviewing this recommendation and may, in the near future, present it to the Minister of Interior for his consideration.

7. The Support Groups

This unit is under the Operations Division of the MPD and is responsible for several functions, both support and operational. The units which respond to the chief of the Support Groups are:

a. Radio Patrol - Administrative control rests with the Support Groups but operational control is maintained by the central communications center at Police Headquarters.

b. Canine Corps - A group of 120 men and 35 dogs utilized on foot patrols, motorized patrol and special situations such as tracking.

c. Driving School - Trains all police drivers and all cadets from National Police School.

d. Female Police Corps - The female police are utilized for dignitary protection, in transportation terminals, jail facilities and some administrative functions. The corps numbers 130 at the present time.

e. Traffic Police - Numbering 800 men, this unit provides point traffic control throughout Montevideo. Traffic patrol activities are practically non-existent and accident investigation usually consists of reports taken at the precinct stations. There is a definite need for reorganization and training in this area so that the traffic function can be performed by the unit which has the responsibility by law. An accident investigations unit should be formed and properly trained as soon as possible. Guidance for such activity could be gained through IPA training with a specialization in traffic for officers selected to head such a unit.

f. Police Garage - This facility will be discussed under the section of this report on Mobility.

g. Training Division - All training activities of the department are the responsibility of the Training Division. A Director of this Division has not yet been named and the responsibility currently rests with the Chief of Support Groups.

h. Telecommunications - A complete evaluation of the telecommunications system of the Uruguyan police was performed by PSA Lucien V. Gormont from March 18 to April 26, 1974. Mr. Gormont's report and recommendations appear as Attachment H.

It has been recognized that the support groups are a mixture of operational and administrative responsibilities. The proposed reorganizational plan for the MPD would correct this situation and should be implemented as soon as possible.

8. Mobility

Another major thrust of the Public Safety effort has been the augmentation of patrol capabilities in Uruguay. At the time of the pre-project survey, there were 94 vehicles in the MPD, 80 of which were operational. There has been a great increase in mobility, not only in Montevideo but throughout the 19 Departments.

The fleet is currently being renewed. Some 300 vehicles have been purchased from Brazil and Argentina and are currently being put into service in Montevideo and the other Departments. Older vehicles are being withdrawn from service and auctioned to provide funds for additional purchases.

A major problem effecting the mobility of the police in Montevideo has been the inadequacy of the police garage. This facility is charged with the responsibility of all major repairs for the MPD fleet.

Due to a lack of organization, good management practices, budget, and technical capabilities, the garage was unable to fulfill its mission. As a result, individual units have developed their own garage facilities and are performing major repairs.

For the past year an Army Major has been assigned as Chief of the Police Garage. He has made obvious gains in putting the facility in order and increasing its productivity. He has organized the functional sections and is making good use of the available space. As a result, the productivity of this unit has increased. Since this man is assigned on a temporary basis, it is mandatory that someone be trained to replace him.

At least two police officers should be sent to Motor Vehicle Management training as soon as possible so that the momentum gained in the past year is not lost. This training was programmed for the School of the Americas in Panama but was not accomplished due to U.S. congressional action regarding police training overseas.

At the present time the Chief of the Garage estimates that 20% of the fleet is on deadline. He stated that in the past it ran as high as 40% but with the new vehicles, the situation has improved. He did state that a major problem for the garage was the lack of standardization of vehicles in the police. It is difficult enough to obtain parts for any repairs but the task becomes even more difficult when parts must be obtained for the many varied makes of cars utilized by the police. This situation could be greatly resolved by standardization of equipment.

9. Narcotics

With increased pressure on international narcotics traffickers from law enforcement agencies in other countries the possibility has existed since 1971 that Uruguay could be used as a transshipment country for illicit narcotics traffic to the U.S. Foreseeing this possibility, the USAID/PSD encouraged the GOU to organize a unit specialized in narcotics investigations and intelligence.

The host country, moreover, recognized the need for revising and updating related legislation and in 1974 through Presidential Decree established greater control on the sales, delivery and storage of psychopharmacological drugs. They needed a statistics for the purpose of determining the extent of narcotics/drugs abuse at a local level. A specialized DNII unit was established to compile the needed data as well as handle all matters related to narcotics, i. e., international cooperation and local control.

Uruguay's police, especially in Montevideo, initiated narcotics investigations as early as 1966. This came about through PSD sponsored training as related to that part of the PSD's assistance to police criminal/internal security investigations.

Initial efforts involved the use of PSD trained detectives in this field to be integrated into existing vice units. A segregated records category for narcotics/drug law violators was also put into use.

By January 1973, a small, hand picked group of men from NDII had been organized and were working with US agents on US related cases. Office space was selected at the Montevideo police headquarters, remodeled and equipment was provided by USAID on a "Grant-In-Aid Basis" By May 1, 1973 the Narcotics Brigade was officially recognized.

Its primary mission is the gathering of narcotics intelligence on a national and international level. Occasionally it has also participated in narcotics law enforcement. Today it is under the direct supervision of the NDII Director and through him answerable to the Montevideo Chief of Police and Minister of Interior. There are currently twelve men assigned to this unit but plans calls for an increase of personnel to about twenty.

All personnel assigned have received training at IPA, DEA or in special regional schools conducted by DEA.

CHAPTER V

THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

A. Description

As the result of a pre-project survey conducted in March 1964, a Project Agreement was signed on November 19, 1964, establishing a Public Safety project for FY 1964. The first resident Public Safety Advisor arrived in February 1965, to begin project activities with the Uruguayan Police Departments.

From inception to the present, in terms of USG inputs, the Public Safety program in Uruguay has been a modest effort with expenditures through March 31, 1974 totalling \$2, 275 million. Of this total 38.9% has been for technicians' salaries, 20.1% for participant training, and 39% for commodities. A complete breakout of funding is reflected in Attachment I.

The program in Uruguay can be counted as very successful despite the many problems encountered during its course such as public disorder, insurgency and terrorism, which delayed full implementation of program goals. The initial survey identified three basic areas for concentration of effort that would have a more widespread impact throughout the country. These goals were mutually agreed upon by the GOU and the USG and actively pursued until early 1969.

1. Technicians

During the life of the project there have been a total of 12 Public Safety advisors assigned to the program. From 1968 to early 1972, the program was staffed by a total of 4 advisors. Since February 1974, only two advisors remain to complete the project. The advisors assigned and their tenure are shown below:

1) Adolph Saenz, CPSA	Feb. 1965 - July 1969
2) Caesar Bernal, PSA/T	Sept. 1965 - March 1970
3) William Cantrell, PSA/INV	July 1966 - Feb. 1969

4) Julian Lindenauer, PSA/G	Oct. 1968 - Nov. 1969
5) Daniel Mitrione, CPSA	July 1969 - Aug. 1970
6) Richard Martinez, PSA/G	Nov. 1969 - Aug. 1971
7) Richard Biava, PSA/T	May 1970 - July 1972
8) Lee Echols, PSA/G,	July 1970 - Jan. 1972
9) Roy Driggers, CPSA	Nov. 1970 - Sept. 1972
10) Jose Hinojosa, PSA/G	Aug. 1970 - Feb. 1974
11) Jorge A. Matos, PSA/T	June 1973 - June 1974
12) Charles C. Guzman, CPSA	Sept. 1972 - June 1974

AID/OPS has over this period responded to request for TDY services to assist in specific technical matters. These for the most part were of short duration averaging 24 days. There have been 24 such TDYs, for a total of 578 days.

2. Commodities

Total expenditures of commodities through March 31, 1974, have been \$886 thousand. The largest single category of commodities has been in communications, followed by vehicles and training equipment.

These items were procured through OPS/W Technical Services Division. A breakout by year and category is shown in Attachment J.

3. Participant Training

Participant training has been a most important facet of the Public Safety program in Uruguay and probably has had the greatest impact on the overall project. A total of \$455 thousand in USG funding has been utilized for this purpose through March 31, 1974. As of that date, all Uruguayan police officials have received training in the United States and third countries through Public Safety programming. Of these 155 are graduates of the International Police Academy (IPA); the remaining 56 received US training in specialist fields.

The great degree of planning and identification of training needs by the GOU and PSD is reflected in the wide spectrum of training programs utilized throughout the project. These are identified in Attachment K.

2. Patrol services have been greatly improved in both the urban and rural areas. For more efficient operation, however, a reorganization of the patrol structure is required. This is currently under study upon recommendation of PSD.

3. Criminal investigations have steadily improved from the onset of the program. However, the police are still lacking in training and administrative procedures in this area.

4. The development of a national central records system has not been accomplished. A TDY was recently completed to assist in this project.

5. Telecommunications has been improved. However, there is still a need for improved management techniques and maintenance capabilities.

6. While the police mobility has been greatly improved, there are two basic deterrents to an optimal mobility status. There is still an insufficient number of units per shift during peak crime hours and inefficient backstopping by the police garage.

7. A programmed Planning and Research Division has not been established.

8. Studies are currently underway to improve the administration and organization of the police but this goal has yet to be attained.

9. The riot control capabilities of the police has been improved and successfully tested.

10. The capability of the police to combat subversive forces has been enhanced and greatly contributed to the success of the joint police/military operations against subversive organizations.

11. A Narcotics Unit has been established and training for the members of the unit has been accomplished.

Utilization of returned participants is excellent. For instance, over 40 of them are currently occupying administrative or command level positions in the Uruguayan police forces. Almost all of the police instructors utilized in the National Police School and in the Departmental Schools are IPA graduates. Those who have received specialized training in fields such as ordinance, telecommunications and audio-visual communications are in corresponding technical positions.

4. Host Country Contributions

During the life of the program a substantial contribution toward implementation of project goals has been made by the GOU. Through the Trust Fund account a total of \$1,329 million was spent for commodities compared with a USG input of \$886 thousand over the last 10 years. Additionally, an approximate \$1,248 million in GOU funds were used during the program for technical support, construction, commodities outside of trust fund purchases and other costs.

B. Observations and Conclusions

With some exceptions noted below, the goals and objectives of the Public Safety program in Uruguay have had a great measure of success despite the intervening problems encountered during the life of the project. It is well documented that the program objectives were delayed and in some cases neglected during the peak years of Tupamaro activity.

The status of major goal accomplishments may be described as follows:

1. Considerable progress has been made toward the improvement of training in all of the 19 Departments. There are still inadequacies in the areas of in-service training and in the training of enlisted personnel. Plans for the new National Police School are completed but funding is not available for construction of this sorely needed facility.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon observations contained in preceding sections of this report, the following recommendations are offered for GOU consideration:

It is recommended that:

A. Organization and Administration

1. The Montevideo Police Department give priority to establishing a Planning and Inspections Division answering directly to the Chief of Police. This unit would absorb the current Organization and Methods branch.
2. As a first priority, the Planning and Inspections Division conduct a study of all departmental orders and establish a Manual of Orders which will serve as the official guidelines to all police activities.
3. The current proposals for reorganization of the MPD be implemented.
4. The three tactical units, Metropolitan Guard, Republic Guard and Prevention Squadron be combined into one Division with approximately 700 personnel.
5. A comprehensive study of manpower distribution be conducted to ascertain whether available personnel are being properly utilized.
6. The budgetary procedures of the GOU make long range planning impossible. Efforts must be made to correct the system to permit a separate budget for the police.
7. The recommendations made by PSA Doney in his report be implemented as quickly as possible.
8. The recommendations made by PSA Gormont be implemented as quickly as possible.

B. Training

9. Top priority must be given to the construction of the new National Police School to enable this essential element to fulfill its mission.
10. The present Montevideo Departmental School be enlarged to provide adequate space for additional classrooms, a library and storage.
11. In-service refresher courses of at least one week duration be developed and made mandatory once a year for patrolmen.
12. Personnel assigned to special units, such as investigators and radio patrolmen be required to attend specialized courses prior to commencing duties with their sections.
13. The Regional Training courses inaugurated for instructors be continued on an annual basis.
14. A training evaluation mechanism be developed to assure that training courses are responsive to needs of line units.
15. A move be initiated to standardize the police fleet to simplify procurement of parts and repair.

PERSONS CONTACTED

USG Officials

Honorable Ernest V. Siracusa
Honorable James C. Haahr
Steven Campbell
Colonel Raul Garibay, USA
Charles Guzman
Lt. Col. Jesse Haynes, USA
Leonard I. Horwitz
Jorge Matos
Joseph A. McNulty
Russell E. Olson
Robert Prieto
Ralph Saucedo
Captain Francis R. Walsh, USN


Ambassador
DCM, U. S. Embassy
U. S. AID Program Officer
Army Attache
Public Safety Officer
USMILGRP
U. S. AID Representative
Public Safety Advisor
Security Officer
Political Officer
U. S. Consul
Chief Agent, DEA
Defense Attache

GOU Officials

Rodrigo Acosta
Col. Alberto O. Ballestrino
Insp. Antonio Piréz Castagnet
Insp. Victor Castiglioni
Insp. Aldo H. Conserva
1st Sgt. Julio C. Curutchet
Insp. Rimel Echevarria
Insp. Guillermo Fontana
Comisario Pablo Gargiulo
Insp. Uruguay Genta
Sub-Comisario Hugo Campos Hermida
Insp. Caffera Lanza
Insp. Venancio P. Quintana Lopez
Insp. Juan Maria Lucas
Insp. Medardo Martinez
Comisario Jose V. Mockford
Insp. Waldemar Ordoqui
Lt. Col. Gervasio Somma
Comisario Maximo Costa Rocha
Insp. Jose L. Mobilio Torres
Major Luis Vazquez
Insp. Dante S. Vescia


Dir. Gen., Ministry of Interior
Chief, Montevideo Police Department
Deputy Chief, MPD
Director, DNII
Dir., National Police School
Instructor, Colonia School
Director, Support Group
Colonia Departmental Inspector
Montevideo Dept. Police School
Commander Guardia Metropolitana
Chief, Narcotics Squad
Dep. Chief, Canelones Police Dept.
Director Technical Police
Chief Prevention Gr. Security Div.
Director Security Division
Chief Codes & Communications MPD
Deputy Director, NPS
Commander Guardia Republicana
Chief, Organization & Methods Section
Deputy Director Support Group
Chief of Police Garage (CAYMA)
Director of Investigations

ATTACHMENT A



ATTACHMENT B

MONTEVIDEO POLICE DEPARTMENT
 COMMAND STRUCTURE




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ATTACHMENT C

*Effective 1 January 1973 was placed directly under the Ministry of Interior


MONTEVIDEO POLICE DEPARTMENT

OPERATIONS




* Will be placed directly under the Ministry of Interior

MONTEVIDEO POLICE DEPARTMENT
ADMINISTRATION



HIGHWAY PATROL



POLICE STRENGTH AS OF 30 APRIL 1974

<u>Departments</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Non Comm. Officers</u>	<u>Agents</u>	<u>Total Uniform</u>	<u>Total Civilian</u>
Artigas	51	59	506	616	19
Canelones	72	131	804	1007	23
Cerro Largo	55	48	542	645	21
Colonia	40	49	481	570	19
Durazno	45	39	409	493	14
Flores	22	26	248	296	21
Florida	33	50	410	493	19
Lavalleja	43	40	364	447	21
Maldonado	46	58	508	612	17
Paysandu	54	56	486	596	24
Rio Negro	41	35	350	426	18
Rivera	71	88	581	740	16
Rocha	46	36	415	497	19
Salto	51	50	518	619	25
San Jose	45	34	337	416	20
Soriano	47	31	421	499	12
Tacuarembó	59	53	544	656	23
Treinta y Tres	46	32	368	446	18
TOTALS	867	915	8,292	10,074	349

Montevideo

Republican Guard	575	Under Montevideo Police until	
Metropolitan Guard	675	Dec. 31, 1972 after which will be	
Uniformed	4,670	directly under the MOI.	
Investigations	550		
Administrative	948	National Police Academy	125
Canine	120	National Intelligence	485
Support - Female	130	National Technical	
Traffic	800	(Crime Lab. etc.)	24
Other	100		634
	<u>8,568</u>	Total Montevideo	9,202

In addition there are 171 cadets and 108 recruits undergoing training in Montevideo

ATTACHMENT E

TERMINATION EVALUATION REPORT

FOR

URUGUAY PUBLIC SAFETY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Lucien V. Gormont
Telecommunications Advisor
Office of Public Safety
Agency for International
Development
Washington, D.C.

ATTACHMENT G

TABLE I

SERVICES USING RADIO PATROL CHANNELS

Command Units
Republican Guard
Prevention and Specialized Groups
Traffic Police
K-9 Corps
All 28 Montevideo precincts
Automotive supply and maintenance
Investigations
Metropolitan Guard
National Police School
Penal Institute
Woman Police Corps

Also used as link with:

Ministry of National Defense
Navy Command
Air Force
Marines
Fire Department
All 28 Montevideo precincts
A number of other precincts outside Montevideo
and the American Embassy

TABLE 2POLICE - COMMUNICATIONS EXPENDITURES (in thousands)

<u>Year</u>	<u>U. S. (PIO/C)</u>	<u>GOU-Trust Fund</u>	<u>Other</u> (approximate)
1965	139		
1966	16		10
1967	6		10
1968	19		50
1969	49	9.2	25
1970	40	54.7	25
1971	126	215.4	
1972	-	2.9	15
1973	4.5	46.3	
1974	4		15
	<u>403.5</u>	<u>328.5</u>	<u>150</u>

TABLE 3TABULATION OF RADIO EQUIPMENT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MINISTRY OF INTERIOR</u>			<u>MONTEVIDEO POLICE</u>		
	<u>Units in Service</u>	<u>Units Dead Ended</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Units in Service</u>	<u>Units Dead Ended</u>	<u>Total</u>
FM-1	60	4	64	33	4	37
FM-5 (Hallicrafter)	406	10	416	151	1	152
FM-5 (Motorola)	10	7	17			
COMCO VHF	8	0	8			
G. E. Co. VHF	8	0	8			
MOTOROLA	12	1	13			
SSB (Aerotron)	19	2	21			
SSB (SA3-Sa 100)	48	12	60			
MOTOROLA PT-300				27	-	27
GE - MASTER				117	3	120
MOTOROLA - MOTRAC				7	2	9
MOTOROLA - CONSOLETTTE				32	-	32
MOTOROLA - COMPA STATION				8	-	8
MOTOROLA - REMOTE CONTROL				6	-	6
MOTOROLA - DISPATCHER				23	9	32
TOTAL:			<u>607 units</u>			<u>417 units</u>

TABLE 4YEARLY MESSAGE FLOW TO AND FROM MONTEVIDEOMINISTRY OF INTERIOR NETWORK

<u>Year</u>	Number of Messages		<u>Total</u>
	to	from	
	<u>Montevideo</u>		
1958	4,078	588	4,666
1959	14,827	8,780	23,607
1960	19,986	12,948	32,934
1961	22,042	8,469	30,511
1962	40,046	24,096	64,142
1965	24,840	5,040	29,880
1966	41,055	5,554	46,609
1967	12,938	7,635	20,573
1968	29,243	8,540	37,783
1969	30,123	7,515	37,638
1970	15,000	5,092	20,092
1971	35,847	11,759	47,606
1972	38,438	13,465	51,901
1973	25,926	17,489	43,415

FORWARD

In response to a request from the Ministry of Interior, Government of Uruguay, and with the concurrence of USAID/Montevideo, a review of the Communications Dependencies of the Ministry of Interior was conducted from March 18 to April 26, 1974 by Mr. Lucien V. Gormont, Telecommunications Advisor, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.

This review is based on visits to the Ministry of Interior Radiocommunications Service Unit, the Montevideo Police Radio Unit, the Fire Department, several locations in the interior and to many other Radio Units attached to the Ministry of Interior.

The excellent cooperation received from all ranks greatly facilitated the success of this mission.

I. SUMMARY

The assistance offered by the USAID/Montevideo Mission to the police communications field has been considerable and has substantially increased the Uruguayan police communications capability. However, it failed to meet the more fundamental objectives of OPS programs, which is to ascertain the establishment of a well-defined communications unit operating an integrated, organized and efficient police communications system.

Indeed, much equipment has been provided (\$404,000 U.S. contribution, \$328,000 ROU Trust Fund obligations, \$150,000 ROU other sources) with which important and useful networks have been installed. Unfortunately, the insistent refusal by the Mission, to establish a Public Safety telecommunications advisory position did not allow the program continuity nor the specialized supervision so necessary to weld all these networks into a cohesive radio system. The eight TDY assignments to Uruguay sprinkled from 1965 to 1974 could not possibly provide the technical, engineering and management skills so badly needed then, and now.

The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for all police activity in Uruguay, including police communications. Yet, in spite of this unity of mission, four police communications centers have developed, two of which are major ones: the Ministry of the Interior Radiocommunications Service and the Montevideo Police Radio Unit. The other two are minor dependencies of the Fire Department and of the Intelligence Unit. All operate independently from each other, within their own facilities and separate repair shops, developed different (and inefficient) operating procedures, and are funded from different, generally inadequate, budgets.

Some of the shortcomings which result from such a decentralization can easily be listed: duplication of efforts and resources, inadequate or non-existent logistic policies, unused equipment, untrained personnel, loss of management information, little or no long-range planning, general inefficiency.

The first essential step towards the elimination of these problems is the creation of a strong, centralized Communications Directorate, reporting to either the Director General (Ministry of Interior) or to the Director of Administration. The recommended Directorate would be responsible for all communications activities within the Ministry and would provide communications services to all police organizations and units within Uruguay. The need for such an integration cannot be overemphasized at this time, as is evidenced by the following description of the most important networks.

By far the most effective network is the Rural Police Network, operated by the Ministry of Interior Communications unit, and tying interior police centers to Montevideo through a combination of HF Single Side Band and VHF (OPS/FM) equipment. Considered the best network in the country, it serves a very useful police and humane service. Its effectiveness can be improved by converting the HF portion to VHF, in order to increase the quality, security and reliability of circuits. At least 50% of this conversion can be made with equipment on hand. However, planning, particularly in the area of frequencies and facilities, is needed in order to integrate other police units (highway patrol, intelligence, etc.) into this network.

On the other hand, the Highway Patrol network, another Ministry of Interior responsibility, is much below the efficiency and reliability standards required. Primarily equipped with HF/SSB mobile transceivers, it should be converted to VHF as soon as possible in order to provide the capability essential to the efficient operation of a modern Highway Patrol unit. Furthermore, the network should be conceived in such a manner as to be able to operate with the Rural Network, if needed.

As for the Montevideo Police Radio Unit, its principal responsibility is a Radio Patrol operation, currently dispatching 27 vehicles divided into three shifts. This operation will expand to 69 vehicles later in 1974, and to 180 units by 1976. In addition to this, the Radio Unit provides communications service to another 17 non-patrol police units.

The present structure of the Montevideo Police Communications Unit will not permit the orderly growth of the system to meet the requirements of the increased fleet: operating channels must be added, control consoles must be designed to facilitate the dispatcher's task, operating procedures must be vastly improved, personnel must be added and trained thoroughly.

The Fire Department, which in Uruguay is a tactical unit, with police rank and integrated in the Ministry of Interior, operates an antique communications system. Equipment is at least twenty-five years old, repair facilities are minimal, budget support is non-existent. The Intelligence Unit is beginning to modernize its equipment, principally as a result of the recent insurgent problems. Both units would benefit greatly from communications integration with the rest of the police.

Maintenance personnel is generally competent, but could use specialized training. Maintenance facilities are adequate, but should be expanded and modernized. Much would be gained by pooling all these resources into one well-planned centralized repair shop, available to all services.

By far, the worst problem affecting all technical communications personnel is the low rank and corresponding low pay associated with their jobs. It is indeed difficult to justify how police functionaries performing menial tasks (sweepers, barbers, office clerks) can hold on the average two to four ranks over highly qualified, hard-to-get and to-keep, radio technicians.

To summarize, there is still much to be done. The recommended technical improvements are within the reach of the Ministry of Interior aptitudes. On the other hand, the management changes needed require a strong manager, cognizant and well adapted to the many intricacies of the Uruguayan administrative process.

II. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Organization

There is not one, but four public safety communications units in Uruguay, all under the Ministry of the Interior, and each endowed with totally independent operating centers, repair shops, budgets and logistic channels.

Specifically:

The Ministry of Interior Telecommunications Service, which is responsible for the Police Rural Networks, the Highway Patrol, and the Ministerial Network, and the Command Network.

The Montevideo Police Radio Unit which is responsible for the Radio Patrol Network, the Administrative Network and 12 other services.

The Intelligence Unit.

The Fire Department.

The organigrams of figures 1, 2 and 3 are extracted from the complete Ministry Organizational description, and shows the division of the communications function among several units. This practice, resulting from a desire to maintain operational control over all elements within a unit, leads to gross inefficiencies when carried to the service functions and results in:

a. Duplication of Efforts and Resources.

Montevideo houses four repair shops, of which two - at the Ministry of the Interior and at the Montevideo Police Headquarters - are well equipped and adequately manned, while the other two - Fire Department and the Intelligence Unit - are primitive obsolete facilities; yet all four maintain similar types of radio equipment for the same Ministry.

b. Lack of Long-Range Planning

Each communications service examines its own needs independently from the other, and in view of its limited financial resources and technical abilities, only tries to fill immediate needs. Complex telecommunications equipment is selected from catalogs without the benefit of engineering or management studies, and often are tacked on to existing networks. The result is an inoperable bank alarm system, a Radio Patrol channel shared with 12 other services, unused equipment, etc. Careful long-range planning, which would obviate this shortcoming, is done sporadically in one of the units only.

c. Inadequate Budgetary Support

At the time of this writing, only the Ministry of Interior Radiocommunications service enjoys an assigned yearly communications budget. It appeared for the first time on the ledgers in 1971 and covered approximately \$70,000. The Montevideo Police has none, and acquires new equipments from the Nation's General Fund. Consequently, the normal acquisition cycle for the Montevideo Police is about three years, versus nine months to one year for the Ministry of Interior.

Other radio units have simply not been able to purchase new equipment in many years, or have obtained it from private sources.

d. Inadequate Operating Procedures

Procedures are generally slow and time-consuming, records are made but never tabulated for management purposes. Yet the trends shown by such tabulations would evidence serious difficulties and indicate solutions.

Procedures are different in all units, yet similar functions are required from each.

None of the units have ever prepared an Operation Manual and no guidelines exist for communication procedures, the level of the personnel required and the extent of the training needed to develop it.

e. Uncoordinated Spare Parts Acquisition

Spare parts stocks are dispersed throughout all units and their replenishment is uncoordinated. Acquisition procedures are consequently diverse, as is the size and source of the corresponding funding. There is no logistical system, depletion rates are usually guessed at, and orders are based on memory, or on total exhaustion of certain stock items. Local, one-piece purchases are frequent, and therefore expensive.

B. Networks and Equipment

a. General

The communications capability of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is centered on two totally independent units, the MOI Telecommunications Service, and the Montevideo Police Radio Center. Both have grown significantly since 1965, and are the only units to have received support from USAID/Montevideo.

b. Ministry of Interior

Specifically, the MOI Telecommunications Service operates the following networks:

The Rural Network connecting Montevideo to Police Centers in the Interior.

The Highway Patrol Network.

The Interministerial network.

The Command network, now used for maintenance.

c. Montevideo Police Radio Center

The Montevideo Police Radio Center operates the following networks:

- The Radio Patrol network.
- The Administrative network.
- The Technical Police network.
- The Investigations network.
- The Embassy network.
- Other minor networks, detailed in Table I.

d. Cost

These networks deploy equipment, acquired as from 1965, at the following cost (detail in Table 2).

USAID Grants	\$404,000--
GOU Trust Fund obligations	328,000--
Other GOU sources	150,000--
	<hr/>
(Approximately)	\$882,000--

A list of the equipment utilized appears in Table 3.

C. Ministry of Interior: Rural Network (fig. 4)

a. General Description

The Rural Network is the principal communications function offered by the Ministry of Interior Telecommunications Service. It is intended to link Montevideo to 18 Departmental Police Headquarters (Jefaturas de Policía) in the interior and those in turn to the Police Precincts (Comisariás), sub precincts (sub-comisariás) and detachments (destacamentos) within their territorial jurisdictions.

This network grew in three phases:

Phase 1. Installation, in the early-thirties, of HF/AM equipment in Montevideo and all departmental headquarters.

Phase 2. Replacement, in 1966 of these obsolete units with HF/SSB units.

Phase 3. Extension using 17 VHF transceivers of this service in 1967 to precincts, sub-precincts and detachments, increasing to a total of 689 OPS/FM-5 and OPS/FM-1 radios in 1974. This expansion is still in progress and, at the time of this writing, is about 60% complete.

b. Effectiveness: Montevideo to provincial headquarters circuits.

This portion of the rural network provides one HF/SSB circuit to 18 provincial headquarters.

The service provided is often the only reliable one available to the communities thus linked. It is a slowly growing service (see Table 4); and 90% of its messages are purely police related: an average of 3,000 messages a year fall in a public relation, humanitarian life-and-death category. The 1973 message load was 43,500 messages (average length: 40 words), which is equivalent to approximately 120 messages per 24 hour day. This performance, sufficient for the current needs, is limited by:

1. Inadequate Operating Room. It is a small room (18' x 9'), crowded by equipment (two inoperative Farinon racks, one HF transceiver, 1 VHF console, 1 OPS/FM-5 base) and by two to four operators.

A much larger room is being readied for this purpose, but will not be available for some time. If suitably designed, it will provide a much needed improvement.

2. Noisy Operating Procedures. Two and sometimes three circuits are operating simultaneously. Yet, none of the operators use headphones; consequently loudspeakers are blaring and operators are shouting. Requests to repeat are frequent and slow down the operation.

3. Voice Transmission. All communications are handled by voice, and transcribed by hand or typewriter. Morse code transmission, which would increase operating speed, reduce noise and interference problems, and improve message security is not used.

4. Messenger Delivery. Approximately half of the traffic handled by the MOI message center is to or from the Montevideo Police, 10 city blocks away. Deliveries are made by messengers, several times a day, thus adding delays and endangering security. Three teletype machines have been provided by OPS in order to resolve this difficulty approximately two years ago, but are not yet installed.

5. Propagations Difficulties. The distances from the 18 Departmental headquarters to Montevideo vary from 30 to 300 miles, and the same HF frequency cannot be used simultaneously for all locations. Operators must frequently change channels and simultaneous monitoring of the entire network from a single operating position is not practical, since certain calling stations could conceivably not be heard.

c. Effectiveness: OPS/FM Rural Extension

This extension ties in the above 18 departmental Police Headquarters to precincts, sub-precincts and detachments located within their department. A total of 833 locations are currently considered for service, requiring the following number of OPS/FM radios (figure 4):

Departmental Police HQ base	18
Vehicle of Departmental Police Chief	18
Vehicle of Departmental Deputy Chief	18
Precincts	247
Vehicle of Precinct Chief	247
Sub-Precincts	83
Detachments	303
	<hr/>
Total:	934
	<hr/>
Available or on order	689
	<hr/>
Shortage:	245

This portion of the rural network has been in operation since 1967 and has proven extremely effective. It is probably the best communications network in the country. It was noted that this success prompted many requests for similar service by other police units; if indiscriminately fulfilled, without the benefit of careful system planning, the resulting uncontrolled growth would tax the worthiness of the system, of the operators, and of the maintenance personnel.

d. Ministry of Interior - Ministerial network

This network, anchored on the Ministry of Interior, provides emergency communications between the Presidency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Montevideo Police and the Ministry of Defense.

Provided through a USAID grant, it was installed in 1967. It still operates satisfactorily, none of the units having ever required repair. This does not justify however, the total lack of preventive maintenance noted for these units.

e. Ministry of Interior - Command Network

This network, also anchored on the Ministry of Interior provided selective call communication to the Chiefs of National Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Presidency and the General Prefect. However, these units, installed in 1967, are now shelved; the frequency is currently used by the Telecommunications Service Chief to provide a maintenance network.

f. Highway Patrol Network

This network is the technical responsibility of the MOI Radiocommunications Service Unit. The Highway Patrol Radio Center has a building of its own, which also houses vehicle records. The Highway Patrol Command is in another building. No means of communications, other than the very unreliable city telephone system, exists between the two buildings.

The Highway Patrol radio communications are extremely poor. The bulk of the radio traffic is carried by an HF/SSB network on one frequency only. Three more are available, but are inoperative due to a shortage of spare parts. It is unlikely the additional frequencies would appreciably improve the situation, due to the operating difficulties normally associated with an HF/SSB system operated on short distances from a moving vehicle. Signals are weak, interferences and background noises are high.

One VHF/FM channel (OPS/FM-5) has been added in 1970 to improve the operation at close range. The improvement was considerable but limited to a few miles, and far from sufficient to provide the coverage required.

The record keeping system is complicated and time consuming. All is done by long hand, in note books. Many cross-references are made, as many other note-books.

All calls are recorded, as they should be. However, they are recorded in their entirety, occasionally creating a two-page record. No forms, codes, abbreviations are used to simplify this work. Not even the workshift change procedure benefits from a simple printed form, and each time a new shift takes over, a half-page memorandum - occasionally longer - is typed to signify and detail this thrice-daily event.

g. Ministry of Interior - Control Links

In 1967, four Farinon multiplex Radio Racks were provided to establish control circuits between the Ministry of Interior Radio Center, its Receiving Site at Melilla, and a proposed transmitting site.

The transmitting site was never built; the radio receiving link was installed in 1967 but is now inoperative (no spare parts); this circuit is currently provided by wire lines.

h. Ministry of Interior - Maintenance

1. Repair Shop and Test Equipment. As in all other aspects of Uruguayan Police Communications, USAID's main contribution was the acquisition, through various grants, of important pieces of test equipment, complemented by a few GOU purchases.

The shop is small, but well equipped, and capable of performing accurate work; however, test equipment needs to be modernized and more pieces added in order to cope with the increased size of all networks.

2. Technical Personnel. The technical staff consists of eight technicians, working in two shifts. None have been trained in the U.S., and their technical abilities vary greatly from one individual to another. Training is done on the job, under the guidance of senior personnel. A few are capable of a high standard performance. Unfortunately, these technicians are underpaid in relation to other Uruguayan Police officers. The rank of most of these qualified technicians is two to four stripes below that of policemen performing non-skilled menial tasks (office cleaners, office clerks, barber, secretaries) and their pay (\$120 to \$150 per month) correspondingly lower. Morale is consequently low, dissatisfaction expressed frequently, and the work output is affected.

3. Records. A few records are kept, but are rarely used to improve maintenance. Although the required data is carefully gathered on fairly complete trouble tickets, neither failure rates, failure trends, repair cycles, dead ended unit inventories, etc., are determined. Yet, this data are essential to determine mean-time between failures, routine maintenance cycles, minimal and maximal stock levels, workshop efficiency, equipment obsolescence and other important management information.

4. Routine Maintenance. There is no routine preventive maintenance program. Sets are operated until failed; several networks have never been checked since their installation in 1966. The reasons given are lack of transportation means and personnel, to which we must add the lack of appreciation for its need.

D. Montevideo Police Communications System

a. Mission and Responsibilities

The Montevideo Police Communications units, although a part of the Ministry of Interior, operate in total independence from the Ministry of Interior Radiocommunications service. It supervises its own repair and operating center, specifies its own operating routines and tries to generate its own budget.

The Radio Operating Center acts somewhat as a Radio Patrol Dispatching Unit. Citizens call this Center directly, but the process is slow and often requires patience. The Center handles at this time, 27 radio controlled vehicles, in three shifts. Vehicles and equipment now on order will increase this number to 69 in late 1974. Plans from 1975 - 1976 call for a total of 110 radio-cars and 70 radio controlled motorcycles. However, patrols are only responding to calls and consequently serve a very limited and simplified purpose. As a result, other functions have been added, and the Center is really a coordinating Center for the several other police services mentioned previously.

The communications of all these services have not been integrated into a coordinated system, but rather tacked onto the two Radio Patrol channels. Interference, incorrect channel usage, difficult operating procedures resulted from such practice.

The Radio Center is also responsible for the monitoring of several Bank Alarm Systems, located in two rooms. This system is extremely inefficient and almost totally unreliable.

b. USAID Participation

The participation of USAID/Montevideo consisted of several equipment drops, generally preceded by a brief planning TDY, which were used to:

1. Establish, in 1965 the Administrative Communication Network.

2. Provide, in 1965, a tactical communications capability to the Republican Guard, the Metropolitan Police, the Reserve Forces and to several Command Units.

3. Provide in 1971-1972 a communications capability for the Investigations Police, the Technical Police, the Security Police and other key police services.

4. Provide in 1973, communications to the increased radio patrol operation.

5. Provide in 1965 and 1973 test equipment and tools for the repair shop.

These developments considerably improved police operations, as these new services were badly needed, and proved invaluable to combat the Tupamaro insurgency. A direct result of the insurgency was the sensitization of Montevideo Police management to the critical importance of effective communications. System proliferation and growth became very rapid and generated various systems problems related to organization, personnel, logistics.

c. The Communications Center

1. Facility - (Figure 5) The Communications Center is small, noisy, and when occupied by the required complement of seven people, crowded.

There are five operating positions: one is an ancient telephone switchboard, receiving citizen calls on nine lines, but capable of answering only two at a time; due to the

poor quality of the city telephone system, it is often difficult for a citizen to reach the Radio Center quickly.

One table handles the Administrative Network and another the Diplomatic and Army networks; the remaining two tables handle the Radio Patrols and all other functions.

2. Personnel - The personnel roster calls for 22 operators, in three shifts. Most operators belong to the three lowest police ranks; none have received formal professional training.

3. Supervision - The Communications Center has in effect two Chiefs. According to the Montevideo Police organigram (Fig. 3) the Radio Center is controlled by the Radio Patrol Chief. However, his official location is in the Patrol Command building a few miles away. His is a "line" function. The Communications Unit Chief, on the other hand, is responsible for a support function; repair and maintenance of radio and telephone equipment.

At this time, only one officer is appointed to handle both assignments; he spends the morning at the Patrol Command building and the afternoon at the Communications Center in the Headquarters building. Thus, most difficulties associated with such situations have been avoided, at the price of reduced supervision for each unit, and only temporarily; when a Communications Unit Chief will be appointed, the Radio Patrol Chief will be at the Patrol Command building at all times, while the Communications Unit Chief will indirectly command the Radio Control Center and the Radio Patrol personnel. Some confusion is to be expected.

d. Efficiency of Operations

The operating efficiency of the Radio Communications Center has been considerably increased throughout the last five years. A service is provided to all police units who want it, and communications are generally effective.

However, standards are still below those expected from a normal modern police operation. Principal problem areas are:

1. Inadequate telephone facility: Far too small to handle the needs of a city of the size of Montevideo.

2. Improper Channel Assignment: The channels assigned to Patrol Operations are shared by too many non-patrol users. Radio discipline is hard to maintain; a communication is often interrupted by a sender not realizing the channel is in use.

3. Complex Operating Procedures: A complaint is received by a telephone operator, who advises a dispatcher. No record is made at this point. The dispatcher must often, after assigning a vehicle, notify on another channel, the precinct involved. Once the operation is completed, the dispatcher notifies by phone, four other locations: the Chief's office, the Executive Coordinating Office, and Operations Chief and the Staff Coordinating Office. Then he must prepare a long hand report on a form which allows very little simplification of incident description and disposition. Only one code is available for such simplification, which is outdated and seldom used.

4. Noise level: It is high, particularly at a time when several radios operate simultaneously.

It is doubtful that this unit will be able to handle the increased traffic resulting from the impending expansion. A new area has been assigned to Radio Center. The move should coincide with a complete system redesign, and its planning should start immediately.

e. Maintenance

1. Repair Shop and Test Equipment: This shop has been equipped, mostly by USAID grants at the same time as the Ministry of Interior repair shop. However, unlike the Ministry of Interior shop, no further test equipment has been added to it since then.

2. Technical Personnel: At the time of this writing, 21 technicians are assigned to this shop. Their technical aptitude is uneven, but generally good. However, just as in the case of the

Ministry of Interior technicians, their rank is generally lower than that of equivalent personnel in other police services, and incentive for dedicated work is practically nil.

3. Records. Identical in purpose, but totally different from those of the Ministry of Interior repair shop. Here, also the information available in these records is ignored.

4. Spare parts. No logistic policy guides the acquisition of spare parts. Some parts are considerably overstocked, while others are totally depleted.

f. Budgetary Support

The Montevideo Police Communications Center does not have a budget. Monies for capital purchases are squeezed out of non-communications appropriations, or from a general fund.

Consequently, only small items can be purchased easily. Minor pieces, such as a control console, required three years to negotiate. Other intended purchases, such as a badly needed new telephone switchboard, or three replacement radios, had to be abandoned because of bureaucratic complications.

For the same reason, spare parts acquisitions cannot be adequately planned, and the process is often reduced to a single unit, rush purchase prompted by equipment failure.

g. Alarms

The Montevideo Communications Center is responsible for the supervision of the Bank Alarms. These are of two basic types:

1. Wire alarms, carried from location to the Center via city telephone wire. There are approximately 30 such units, and most are totally unreliable because of the extremely poor quality of the telephone service.

2. Radio alarms, provided through low band (40 MHz) VHF circuits. There are five such units, each provided by different manufacturers, each with a different alarm concept and display; electronic noise, heavy in this band, prompts frequent false alarms on certain units. The room in which the radio alarms are installed is unattended. Because of the false alarm situation, some are operated with sound devices disconnected.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General

Further expansions of the Uruguayan public safety communications plant are unavoidable. However, current management and engineering concepts will impede an orderly and efficient system growth.

A sound review is therefore in order before any new equipment is added to existing networks. Otherwise, the monies spent will not achieve the desired purposes.

B. Organization

There is no valid justification for the multiplicity of independent communications units within the Ministry of Interior.

A single centralized Communications Division must be created to handle all the communications activities of the Ministry of the Interior, and must include the Montevideo Police Communications Center, the Fire Department, the Intelligence Division and ALL OTHER units now operating autonomously or semi-autonomously.

Operational control over the operator performing tactical duties for a specific unit (dispatcher of radio patrol, radio-operator of riot control squad, etc.,) would of course be kept by the Chief of the unit concerned. However, the Chief of the recommended Communications Division, would be responsible, amongst other things, for the following:

- planning of all communications systems.
- acquisition, distribution, ownership and accounting of all communications equipment and spare parts.
- repair and maintenance of all communications equipment
- supervision of all maintenance and non-tactical operating personnel
- training of all tactical and non-tactical personnel
- budgeting records-keeping and other management responsibilities

- preparation and distribution of operating procedures for all police units, and enforcement thereof

C. Maintenance

a. For the sake of economy and efficiency, all maintenance facilities must be combined into one. A suitable building, conveniently located and easily accessible to police vehicles, must be habilitated for this purpose. All maintenance and repair activities would be centralized there, and would be available indiscriminately to all Public Safety services.

b. A system of preventive routine maintenance must be established to anticipate and reduce outage time, improve equipment efficiency and reduce maintenance cost.

c. Useful maintenance and operating records must be kept and submitted periodically for analysis.

D. Training

A Communications Training School must be included in the proposed Communications Division. It should be assigned a very broad training mission, specifically:

- Train maintenance personnel
- Train tactical and non-tactical operators
- Train radio dispatchers and radio patrolmen
- Train Management personnel

To this effect, two and preferably four senior officers of the Communications Division should attend, as soon as practical, the Telecommunications Management Course offered by the International Police Academy.

E. Planning and Budget

A long range communications development plan must be prepared by the recommended Communications Division. Specifically, the Division should determine as soon as possible:

- How many points are to be served in the interior and when.
- The quality, reliability and privacy of the communication desired.
- The planned growth of the vehicular fleets.
- The desired speed of the information flow.
- The number, quality and efficiency of the back-up equipment desired.

All of the Public Safety needs must be considered; Ministry of Interior, Montevideo Police, Intelligence, Fire Department, et al, and all networks must be considered as one system. Only in this manner will it be possible to eliminate the current discrepancies between the Ministry of Interior, who has almost enough up-to-date equipment, the Montevideo Police unable to plan for new equipment and the Fire Department, still using 25 year old radios.

Yearly budgets for capital development must be prepared in consequence, and the corresponding approval and acquisition cycles must be considerably reduced either by new improving existing routines, or by eliminating a number of unnecessary approvals and clearances from non-technical administration personnel.

F. Measurements

An adequate measurement system must be developed to assist in planning, budgeting and management. Of particular interest is data which allows to determine traffic flow and speed, station outage time, network and workshop efficiency, spare part consumption, desirable stock levels, equipment obsolescence, failure rates, routine cycles.

Only in this manner can logistic support be accurately gauged, training requirement adequately evaluated and overall performance properly assessed. Furthermore, data thus gathered and analyzed provides indisputable substantiation to budgetary requests.

G. Ministry of Interior Rural Network: Montevideo to
Departmental Headquarters.

The propagation difficulties outlined in paragraph II C. b. 5, can be eliminated by establishing a remote control station for Montevideo in the vicinity of Durazno, 110 miles away; the remote control circuits would be provided by the AID-provided Farinon equipment, currently in storage. This concept would:

a. Eliminate the necessity of operating simultaneously on several frequencies. (This has been verified by tests.)

b. Allow the gradual conversion of the network to VHF, a far more reliable and efficient communications means. At least six and possibly ten provincial HQs (total 18) can reach the Durazno area via VHF directly, as this town is located almost in the center of the country, on high grounds. Two or three repeaters would bring in most of the other stations.

c. When on VHF, two channels could be provided to the network:

1. Channel 1, for direct communications to Montevideo.

2. Channel 2, for intercity communications, controlled from Montevideo. All equipment can be OPS/FM-5 equipment (with PA-20 if needed) except at Durazno, where a receiver with high front-end selectivity is required. (See page 4 for simplified schematic).

The proposed new quarters for the control room should be occupied as soon as practical. Four interconnected and patchable positions should be established, to allow three operators and a supervisor to work simultaneously. Sound-proof individual booths should be avoided but operators must use headphones and lip microphones. The teletypes on hand must be installed as soon as possible to facilitate message flow and increase efficiency. Planning for this move should be undertaken immediately.

H. Ministry of Interior - Highway Patrol

This operation must be converted as soon as possible to VHF. This will entail two and possibly three repeaters (OPS/RU-6) as well as a two-frequency operation ability from the vehicle. In this manner, good communications will finally be possible for approximately 75% of the territory covered by the Highway Patrol. The vehicles assigned to the farthest points (northernmost portion of the country) would still be equipped with SSB equipment, until such time as VHF conversion in this area is justified by the needs.

An efficient operating procedure should also be rapidly developed, to be characterized by simplicity, and to be integrated into the rest of the system.

I. Montevideo Police

a. Operating Center

The new location available for the new operating center should be readied for the earliest possible occupation; this move will not be undertaken for a few months, but detailed plans for the new installation should be prepared immediately. The following recommendations should be considered.

1. Radio Patrol functions must be separated from all others.
2. Three operating channels should be assigned to Radio Patrol usage, instead of the current two. A fourth one should be reserved for a probable expansion on or about 1977. The three channels should correspond to three geographical zones, limiting patrol areas.
3. An emergency channel, operating on a separate frequency, should be made available to all patrol vehicles and to all other radio police services.
4. The Radio Center should be designed to contain five working positions and a command position. Future expansion to eight positions should be planned for.

Individual sound proof booths should not be used, but working positions should be ample and operators must use headphones and head microphones.

5. Non-patrol networks should be operated on a separate frequency and should be handled by a separate operator on a separate work position. Suitable patching facilities should enable any of these networks to be patched to a radio patrol dispatcher, if needed.

6. Overflow position. This should be habilitated in emergency situations, to control a specific operation, or, to provide relief for other dispatcher.

7. Command console, now on order, should be used by the shift commander for supervision, assistance and control in major operations. It must be capable of patching into all other working positions as needed.

8. All working positions should be interconnected and patcheable.

9. A new telephone switchboard should be acquired; the telephone operator, after determining the value of a citizen's call, must be able to patch it to the corresponding dispatcher.

b. Operating Procedures

A detailed operating manual should be prepared as soon as possible. All procedures concerning citizen's handling, personnel attitudes, working manners and equipment handling should be examined carefully, simplified and standardized to conform with the recommended Communications Division usage.

c. Display Board

An improved display board, showing the status and assignment of each vehicle should be designed and installed in the new facilities.

d. Record

The present recording form should be replaced by a simple coded record card. The required information should be categorized and should require only a few easily codifiable entries. The pertinent information thereof could then be extracted, collated and used for management purposes.

e. Discipline

Radio discipline must be stringently enforced, and all dispatch positions manned at all times.

f. Security

Access to the Radio Center must be protected (steel door, peep hole and intercom) and restricted to the responsible personnel only.

J. Bank Alarms

In order to bring a reasonable degree of reliability to the bank alarm system, the following recommendations should be considered.

a. Alarm systems should be standardized. Specifications should be developed to insure a reliable system. Furthermore, the alarm presentation panel and mechanism should be the same for all manufacturers.

b. All alarms must be displayed in the same area of the same room, where they can be conveniently monitored by the responsible personnel.

c. Wire alarm systems must be discontinued, in view of the poor quality of the wire line provided by the local telephone company. In their stead, radio alarms should be used preferably in the high VHF or VHF frequency band.

FIGURE 1 - COMMUNICATIONS DECENTRALIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR




Figure 2

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR




Figure 3

MONTEVIDEO POLICE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT




Figure 4. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR - COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK




Figure 5

MONTEVIDEO POLICE RADIO CENTER




Figure 6

RECOMMENDED BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR RURAL NETWORK
CONTROL CIRCUITS - MINISTRY OF INTERIOR





Figure 7. RECOMMENDED LAYOUT FOR MONTEVIDEO POLICE RADIO CONTROL



PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING

Fiscal Year 1964-1974

I. OBLIGATIONS (x\$000)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>US Training</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Other</u>
1964	\$11.0	3.0	8.0	0	0
1965	287.9	19.0	12.4	256.5	0
1966	159.8	51.6	35.0	73.0	0.2
1967	188.6	70.2	32.3	82.6	3.5
1968	158.6	69.4	24.9	58.0	6.3
1969	224.7	104.6	43.8	73.7	2.6
1970	285.3	140.2	59.1	78.7	7.3
1971	618.6	142.4	66.1	394.0	16.1
1972	251.8	142.1	84.3	18.9	6.5
1973	227.0	105.6	97.3	17.8	6.3
1974	191.0	73.0	102.0	10.0	6.0
TOTAL	\$2604.3	\$921.1	\$565.1	\$1063.2	\$54.9

II. EXPENDITURES (x\$000)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>US Training</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Other</u>
1964	\$3.9	0	3.9	0	0
1965	22.3	14.1	7.6	0.6	0
1966	171.4	51.0	24.8	95.5	0.1
1967	250.8	60.1	25.0	164.4	1.3
1968	166.2	71.0	25.1	65.9	4.2
1969	213.0	94.7	33.2	81.2	3.9
1970	235.5	121.2	37.5	68.0	8.8
1971	580.9	159.1	83.7	323.1	15.0
1972	250.4	107.8	72.4	64.0	6.2
1973	236.6	132.2	85.7	12.1	6.6
1974	146.0	72.0	57.0	12.0	3.0
TOTAL	\$2275.0	\$883.2	\$455.9	\$886.8	\$49.1

ATTACHMENT H

TRUST FUND PURCHASES

Fiscal Year 1964-1974

(x\$000)

<u>Types of Commodities</u>	<u>Total</u>
Vehicles	\$888.0
Communications Equipment	273.2
Weapons and Munition	41.0
Riot Control Equipment	22.9
Investigations/Laboratory Equipment	2.2
Training Equipment	10.2
TOTAL	<u>\$1237.5</u>

URUGUAY

COMMODITY PROFILE

No Programs Prior to FY 1965

FY 65 \$257,000 1 Sedan
10 VHF-FM base station
Lot auto spare parts
30 gas masks and canisters
15 helmets
200 .38 ca. ammo (rds)
Lot reloading equipment
Lot electronic shop tools & equipment
Lot forceps misc.
2 VHF radio terminal
4 SSB receiver
2 generators
1 jeep wagoneer
2 VHF-FM radio terminal (excess)
1 multiplex (excess)
Additional funds (transportation)
200 grenades; CN
200 projectiles ;CN
50 cartridges
50 short range shells
10 FM-5 transceivers and equipment

FY 66 \$73,000 2 radio directional finders
1 16mm camera
2 ammo reloading equipment
25,000 cartridges, .38 cal.
100,000 primers
88 radio tubes
2 projectors
3 megaphones
500 revolvers
50 riot helmets
vehicle parts
vehicle spare parts
100 grenades, CN
batons, whistles, belts
3 radio transmitters
3 radio receivers
spare parts
50 shot guns, 12 guage

ATTACHMENT I

Commodity Profile

FY 67	\$82,000	6 Sedans 8 jeeps 1 jeep station wagon 1 bus 250 revolvers cal. .38 4 kegs powder 12 riot shields 4000 rds. 12 ga. shotgun ammo 325,000 pistol primers misc. spare parts - commo misc. equipment - crime lab. cups, canteens, covers, belts, etc.
FY 68	\$46,241 ¹	2 VHF-FM (base) 10 VHF-FM (portable) 10 generators 3 teletypes (excess property) 3 headsets 1 test set 16 tubes 10 antennas misc. accessories and spare parts 125 revolvers, .38 cal. 50 plastic shields 235 gas grenades 100 handcuffs 150 helmets 40 cartridge belts 50,000 rounds ammo, .38 cal. misc. excess property and traffic control items misc. photo lab supplies

Commodity Profile

FY 69 \$ 65,745

20 VHF-FM Mobile stations
 2 VHF-FM base stations
 5 VHF-FM Portable transmitters
 38 OPS/FM-5 signal frequencies
 4 OPS/FM-5 two frequencies
 29 high gain antennas
 11 PA/20 amplifiers
 3 VHF antennas
 14 coaxial cable kits
 300 riot control helmets
 50 riot shields
 50 gas masks
 1,000 flex cuffs
 55 emergency lights, roof bubble
 40 sirens for vehicles

FY 70 - Vehicles \$ 7,200
 Telecom 50,423
 Weapons 15,577
 General 5,778
 \$ 78,978

43 Revolver P .38
 50 Handcuff
 4 Rifle, cal. .225
 200 Helmets, Riot
 1 16mm projector
 1 Camera
 2 Slide projectors
 1 Transformer
 1 Mechanical duplicator
 68 VHF-FM 5
 2 lots Radio accessories
 5 lots Radio repair parts
 4 VHF-FM base station
 30 Radio antenna
 902 Tear gas grenade
 272 Tear gas projectiles
 1 lot Police lab equipment
 1 Bus

FY 71 - Vehicles \$229,621
 Telecom 154,000
 Weapons 3,525
 General 9,404
 Total \$396,550

65 Sedans (Ford Maveric)
 1 lot Spare parts
 65 Sirens
 30 Emergency lights
 35 Rotating red lights
 1 Cylinder reboring machine
 1 Valve seat grinder
 1 Hydraulic press
 1 Wheel balancer
 72 Radio VHF-FM mobile

Commodity Profile

FY 71 (continued)

- 7 VHF-FM base station
- 28 VHF-FM-1
- 66 VHF-FM-5
- 2 lots Radio spare parts
- 2 lots Radio accessories
 - 1 Signal generator
 - 6 12-Volt batteries
- 3 sets Armor plate
 - 7 Training film
 - 4 Photo safe lamps
 - 6 Contact printers
 - 6 Print dryers
 - 1 Identification kit
 - 3 Photo enlargers
 - 2 Cameras
- 300 Handcuffs
- 1 lot Miscellaneous photo equipment

FY 72 - Vehicles	\$ 2,038
Telecom	0
Weapons	1,455
General	<u>15,241</u>
Total	\$18,504

- 1 lot Gun parts
- 15 Fingerprint kits
- 10 Narcotic test kits
- 30 boxes Narcotic test tubes
 - 1 Camera, 35mm
 - 4 Projector, movie
 - 4 Projector, overhead
 - 8 Projector, still
 - 1 Flash unit, Strobosar
 - 4 Transformers
 - 51 Trainin films
- 1 lot Acoustical tile & paste
- 3 sets Armor plate
- 1 lot Photo_raphic device equipment
 - 1 Camera, I.D.
 - 1 Bus engine
- 1 lot Repair parts, vehicle

Public Safety
Commodity Profile

FY 73 - Transportation	\$ 2,650.00	1	Simulator, driving
Telecom	3,937.00	2	Reaction Times
Weapons	5,477.00	1	Evaluator, driver
General	<u>4,016.00</u>	1	Night Sight Meter
		6	Transformers
Total	\$16,080.00	1 LT	Driver Training Equipment
			* * *
		1	Multitester (260 AC/DC)
		1	" Carrying Case
		1 LT	Commo Testing and Repair
			Items
			* * *
		100 MX	Cartridge Cases, once-
			fired, .38 special.
		1 LT	Ammunition Reloading
			Equipment
		1	Reloader, .38 caliber
			cartridge
		1	Lubricator and Sizer
			* * *
		1	File, mechanized
		1	Transformer
		3	Kodak Visualmaker
		6	Projection Screen
		2	Carrying Case, Projection
			screen
		40	Fingerprint Magnifier
		40	Henry Disc
		40	Ridge Counter

PUBLIC SAFETY TRAINING, URUGUAY

I. <u>FISCAL YEARS</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Third-Country</u>	<u>Total</u>
1964	4	2	6
1965	5	0	5
1966	14	2	16
1967	13	0	13
1968	14	0	14
1969	19	3	22
1970	21	2	23
1971	22	0	22
1972	25	0	25
1973	35	5	40
1974	23	2	25
TOTAL	195	16	211

II. <u>SPECIALIZATION</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S. Training	195
IPA Senior Officers Course	(19)
IPA General Crse - Instructors Method	(51)
(do) - Criminal/Security Invest.	(28)
(do) - Investigative Management	(6)
(do) - Patrol Operations	(12)
(do) - Narcotics Investigations	(8)
(do) - Border Patrol/Customs	(6)
(do) - Riot Control	(9)
(do) - Traffic	(3)
(do) - Records/Identification	(2)
(do) - Dignitary Protection	(7)
(do) - Firearms	(2)
(do) - Community Relations	(1)
Police Executive Training	(17)
Narcotics Management Support	(6)
Radio Communications	(1)
Fingerprints	(1)
Terrorist Activities Investigations	(15)
Audio Visual Communications	(1)
Third-Country Training	16
Radio Communications, Argentina	(7)
Riot Control, Panama	(1)
Narcotics Investigations, Argentina	(5)
Narcotics Study Visit, Bolivia & Peru	(2)
Firearms, Panama	(1)

ATTACHMENT J