


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**EVALUATION  
Public Safety Program**

**ZAIRE**

**JULY 13, 1973-AUGUST 4, 1973**



**Agency for International Development  
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
Washington, D.C.**

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
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**ZAIRE**

**JULY 13, 1973-AUGUST 4, 1973**

Prepared by:

J. L. Williamson	OPS/W
C. D. Cowles	AID/W
R. H. Robinson	OPS/W
H. D. Miller	OPS/W




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
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
  
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CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTION

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Terms of Reference upon which the study was based were stated in State 048367, dated March 15, 1973, as amended by Kinshasa 2259, dated March 20, 1973, and are:

- A. With the guidance and assistance of Ambassador and Country Team, review U.S. interests in Zaire's stability, internal security situation, requirements for police services, and role of Gendarmerie pertaining thereto.
- B. Against this backdrop, examine project activities in depth; measure degree to which objectives established by ProAg have been reached; assess effectiveness of U.S. resource inputs; review current program planning; to recommend degree and scope of future U.S. Public Safety aid in furthering U.S. objectives.
- C. To allow foregoing measurements, assess new Gendarmerie organization to include: Administration, Management, Training, Patrol, Communications, Transportation, General Police Operations and Responsiveness in the use of resources.
- D. Particular attention will be directed to the Coast, River and Lake Guard project; to measuring the interest on the part of the GOZ for U.S. Public Safety assistance; the operational relationship of the Gendarmerie to other GOZ security forces; and the feasibility of GOZ-funded technical assistance.





## CHAPTER II

### SUMMARY

#### INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT

The threat to internal security at present is manifested in the rapid rise in criminality due in part to the mass migration of youth from the rural to the urban centers. This has resulted in a lack of employment opportunities and is one of the primary causes of social unrest and the increasing crime rate. The external security threats posed in the Public Safety Evaluation Report of November/December 1969 have diminished and are no longer considered as immediate or serious in nature. A new problem area is, however, being created in the Shaba Region. With the planned expansion of private sector interests in the development of new mines and hydroelectric facilities, potential lucrative targets are being created which will inevitably draw the attention of the criminal elements.

#### U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

The Republic of Zaire is a key factor in the development of a stable and progressive African continent. It is a growing industrial and consumer market of interest to U.S. producers, as well as a prime source of strategic minerals to which U.S. access is of considerable importance.


Because of its historic leadership of those nations promoting the territorial integrity and stability of Zaire, the United States enjoys a unique opportunity to influence policy and programs.

It is to the U.S. interest in Africa to assist Zaire and its continued achievement of internal peace and security which in turn is heavily dependent upon its civil law enforcement agencies.

Because of recent reorganization changes within the law enforcement structure of the Republic of Zaire, new, and in some instances different, approaches to assisting these efforts are in order. The team considers that with a redirection of effort this can be accomplished within current levels of the program and recommends that these levels be maintained until the end of FY 1976, at which time an orderly phase-out should be started with completion by the end of FY 1977. There is a possibility of some minor residual effort being required into FY 1978 but this cannot be realistically predicted at this time.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The threat of external inspired subversion existing at the time of the 1969 evaluation has since diminished.
2. Criminality has risen at an alarming rate over the past two to three years. This increase is at a time when Zaire's economic growth has begun to show progress and unless checked can seriously affect continued growth.
3. Aware of the seriousness of this problem, the GOZ has taken positive steps by a complete reorganization of its civil law enforcement agencies.
4. The rate at which these new forces progress will be largely dependent upon outside technical assistance.
5. The United States is in the best position to supply this assistance and it is in the U.S. interests in Zaire to do so. Considerable progress by the Public Safety Project is evident, but much remains to be done if the desired professional police levels are to be achieved.
6. A redirection of goals and realignment of effort by the Public Safety Project in Zaire, coupled with the existing high degree of receptivity by ROZ officials, makes the present size of the program adequate to fill this need.



CHAPTER III

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon observations contained in subsequent sections of this report, the team recommends actions described in the following sections:

Section A is primarily for AID use, but may be discussed with GOZ counterparts in whatever context the USAID deems best suited.

Section B is to be considered suitable for release to the GOZ.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U. S. ACTION

It is recommended that:

BRIGADE MOBILE

1. The Municipal advisory position be replaced by a Regional advisory position. In changing the job requirements of this position, the advisor will then divide his time equally or as required between the city police of Kinshasa and the Brigade Mobile. The Regional Advisor's counterpart should be the Regional Commander, who commands tactically both the Brigade Mobile and the Gendarmerie units assigned to police the City/Region of Kinshasa.
2. The Mission insist that the GOZ live up to the commitments agreed to in support of this project as is outlined in the ProAg of 70-71-72.

- 
3. Pilot projects be started in Lubumbashi with AID funding for commodities, e.g., bicycles and FM-1 radios for kiosks, using GOZ funds for kiosk construction.
  4. Pilot projects be developed for similar activities in other urban areas.

#### TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL


5. The Brigade Routier, in conjunction with the Public Safety Division, conduct an in-depth study of traffic conditions within the Republic of Zaire. This study should include traffic statistics for all regional capitals based on the number of vehicles, amounts of lives lost, property damage incurred, methods of control and enforcement and the judicial processes.
6. Based on this study, PSD formulate several courses of action to improve this worsening situation and present them to the Commandant GdN for implementation. Technical assistance as required during the implementation stages should be provided by PSD/Kinshasa.

#### NARCOTICS

7. The Country Team encourage the GOZ to enact strict legislation governing the sale of dangerous drugs.
8. USAID and PSD request a criminalist for 60-90 days TDY to work with the Mama Yemo Hospital laboratory personnel in upgrading its assistance to the police.

#### IMMIGRATION

9. PSD monitor the immigration implementation process, lending whatever assistance and advice they can.
10. USAID and PSD consider the TDY Records Specialist as recommended in the Immigration Study.



CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

11. PSD suggest to the GdN a procedure for establishing investigator units in the regional commands and assist in developing training materials in investigative techniques for the units.

RECORDS

12. PSD suggest the beginning of a basic records system to the GdN, pointing out the uses as management and investigative aids, assist in developing very simple forms. This would be started with the Brigade Mobile units in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi as models.

TRAINING

13. Necessary arrangements be made to have the reloading operation installed and working at Kasapa School. (This was discussed with PSD and plans formulated to begin shortly after the team's departure.)
14. Proposed U.S. participant training plans be restudied and realistic plans developed which are oriented toward actual needs in the new organization. Pressure should be applied to assure that upon return officers are used for the positions for which they were trained.
15. PSD made every possible effort to develop the Training Directorate as soon as possible into a capably staffed viable organization.

GENDARMERIE MOTOR MAINTENANCE SHOPS

16. PSD consider, if possible within ceiling limitations, a one tour assignment of a Logistics/Motor Maintenance Vehicle Advisor to assist the GdN in protecting a sizeable investment. This objective can be accomplished through instituting proper methods of procurement control and utilization of parts, training of personnel and other facets of motor maintenance management.

17. TDY services of a Motor Maintenance Specialist be requested immediately for a period of from 90-120 days. The primary task of this man would be to develop a properly researched and well thought out item-by-item listing of spare parts based on use factors and from this recommend parts procurement policies. If at all possible, it would be advantageous to do this prior to the ordering of the proposed additional sedans.
18. A study be conducted and a proposal made therefrom to institute a special skills pay increment plan for motor maintenance personnel.


TANGANYIKA SECTOR.

19. PSD assign an advisor to this unit in its initial stages of training, organizing and implementing its operation. This assignment should be for so long as an actual need exists, up to a period of one year. The team also feels that this assignment can be filled from the present PSD staff level through a realignment of duties in the Kinshasa complement.

COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD (CRLG)

(Garde Cotiere Fluviale et Lacustre)

20. The PS Maritime Advisor confine his efforts to across the board training and exert maximum effort in that direction. There are sufficient well trained 'GL personnel in boat handling; the TCN's can meet the other mechanical skills needed.
21. Key personnel at command level be selected for advanced training with the USCG schools, and training arrangements be made. This is of necessity a long range program, as it would involve language training of up to six months in-country and up to three months in the U.S. prior to the actual training. Therefore, it should be started as quickly as possible.

- 
22. PSD attempt to follow through on the non-shipment of parts by Swiftships, Inc., even up to involving the Embassy Commercial Attache.

#### GdN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

23. A minimum of two supervisors be selected for in-country training in Telecommunications Management. The course should be conducted by the PSA (Telecommunications) in the French language.
24. No additional telecom technician personnel be scheduled for training in the United States.
25. AID provide a Telecommunications Advisor until the end of FY 1975, at which time the need for an advisor could be reassessed.
26. For FY 1974, an open end PIO/C be issued for \$5,000 for emergency purchases of electronics materials and spare parts.

#### CRLG TELECOMMUNICATIONS

27. Continued employment of the present number of TCN's be considered as necessary input for another five years.
28. The incumbent PSA assigned to assist with CRLG telecommunications operations immediately begin training someone in Telecommunications Management. It is recommended that the Warrant Officer who is in charge of the Kinshasa RCC be selected, and that he be placed on temporary duty at Kalemie. Practical application of the training should be related to the management of the Kalemie telecommunications operation with the usual advice from the PSA. If feasible, the Warrant Officer should become the PSA's counterpart.
29. AID continue to fund for spare parts and some test equipment, for an approximate amount of \$5,000. Future year funding should be commensurate with the growth of CRLG telecommunications systems.

[REDACTED]

PROGRAM - GENERAL

30. The current level of 11 Public Safety Advisors be maintained, but restructured as discussed in Section VI.B., Staff Requirements.
31. PSA's take the five-day course on Project Management and Evaluation on home leave or prior to assignment to USAID/Z.
32. At least one PSA have some O&M skills so that he may assist the GdN budget office on a limited basis.
33. USAID examine alternative methods of providing local currency support to the project.
34. USAID explore the possibility of the GdN expanding the child feeding and nutrition programs to civilians in selected areas as a measure of improving police community relations.
35. PSD, in consort with the U.S. Embassy and the GOZ, explore fully the possibility of contracting for regularly scheduled charter aircraft to provide for more frequent TDY's and inspections to field units of both the GdN and the CRLG.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOZ ACTION

It is recommended that:

1. Key staff and command positions of the GdN be filled as quickly as possible and the bureaus and sections properly staffed.
2. The GdN consider adopting a uniform distinctly different from that of other uniformed services of Zaire.

[REDACTED]

BRIGADE MOBILE

3. A phased three-year vehicle procurement plan be established to eliminate the necessary requirement for purchasing a complete fleet of vehicles at any one time.
4. Procurement of vehicles be standardized with a high percentage of the vehicles being Jeep Commando type vehicles 4x4 station wagons, for use in the African quarters. Sedan type vehicles should specify heavy duty equipment: brakes, shocks, tires, etc.
5. The GOZ support the Brigade Mobile Operations with sufficient funds and commodities to assure the continued improvement and effectiveness of this unit.
6. The Directorate of Training work in concert with Public Safety Training/Kinshasa and other government agencies in an effort to expedite the standardization of Programs of Instruction, lesson plans and other course materials for nationwide distribution.
7. A logistical support system be developed in Kinshasa in concert with the logistical personnel in Lubumbashi to assure that sufficient spare parts are on hand and available for immediate repair of both vehicles and communications equipment.
8. GdN telecommunications personnel be transferred to Lubumbashi from Kinshasa and begin assuming the responsibility for repairs and thereby gradually eliminate the necessity of a TCN assignment.
9. During the period of re-equipping and retraining, and with 50% of the force being absent from regular duty, the Brigade Mobile and the motor vehicle maintenance unit place a high priority on getting at least seven vehicles per shift on the street. If necessary, the permanent assignment of vehicles should be suspended, and utilized on a 24-hour basis until such time as either the remaining vehicles are repaired or a new fleet is acquired.

10. With the advisory assistance of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi Regional advisors, a study of need based upon past and future experience be conducted to establish a statistical data base to determine crime trends and to assure proper manpower resources allocation to those areas of highest crime incidence.
11. The concepts of foot and bicycle patrol and kiosk operation be explored in the GdN for use in urban areas.

NARCOTICS

12. The GdN establish and maintain records of narcotics violations, addicts, arrests, confiscations, etc., as a tool for measuring trends and as investigative aids.
13. The GOZ enact strict legislation governing the sale of dangerous drugs.
14. Those laws controlling dangerous drugs which are on the books be enforced.
15. Through use of the returned GdN participant trained in narcotics management, lesson plans be developed to be used in all officer training courses.

TRAINING

16. The necessary renovations and construction be initiated to bring the Matete and Kasapa Schools up to proposed capacity.
17. An instructor's training course begin as soon as possible to flesh out the staffs of these two institutions, enrolling as much as possible IPA graduates, particularly those who are not currently in key positions. Another prime source of good instructor personnel would be young, intelligent former Gendarmerie officers who have received training in Belgium.

- 
18. A member of the PSD staff be sent on TDY to Kasapa School for at least 30 days, accompanied by a GdN staff officer of some influence, to study in depth the support problems of that school and then develop and implement corrective action.
  19. Any further commitment of assets to the planned Kapalata School be suspended until recommendations 16, 17 and 18 are accomplished.
  20. Rural Mobile Training Team concept be reactivated and courses of instruction expanded to include not only the basic in-service training but specialized subjects as well, e.g., traffic control, investigative techniques, preventive maintenance, supervision, reporting, etc. These are more illustrative than recommendations. A study of actual needs should determine subject matter.
  21. Senior Officer Seminars be reactivated. At the present time of reorganization, more than ever the need for such training is great, plus the opportunity to shape ideas and action rather than attempt to change them later.

#### GENDARMERIE MOTOR MAINTENANCE SHOPS

22. The GdN adopt a practical family of vehicles of as few body types as possible and standardize on one make for each type.

#### TANGANYIKA SECTOR

23. The GOZ create a special Tanganyika Zone which will be a separate administrative zone and will include all of the territory now known as the Tanganyika Sector. This zone should be commanded by a Gendarmerie officer who will have complete control of all gendarmes assigned to the sector both tactically and administratively.
24. All personnel to be assigned to this sector be selected from Gendarmerie personnel originating from this general area; they should be specially trained prior to assignment in the zone in Public/Community Relations and Civic Action programs.

25. The Gendarmerie within the zone initiate and implement civic action programs to assist the local populace in every way possible and to change the repressive image that the GOZ now has in this area.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL - MOBILE BATTALIONS - PROPOSED

26. In lieu of forming a new mobile battalion as an elite strike force unit, additional personnel be added to the Brigade Mobile and expanded to battalion strength and the Brigade Mobile then be trained in civil disturbance control techniques so that they may be utilized in regular law enforcement activities during times of tranquility and mobilized as a special strike force during times of civil disturbance.
27. This enlarged or expanded Brigade Mobile be organized into four equal shifts combining both a mobile vehicle patrol and foot patrol throughout the city.
28. Based on crime statistics, the mobile battalion or selected elements of that battalion be utilized in saturation patrol and selective enforcement in high crime incidence areas.
29. The expanded mobile battalion be equipped with conventional police equipment including civil disturbance control equipment and the vehicles provided for this unit should be of the multi-purpose 4-wheel drive, all-terrain type vehicles such as the Jeep Commando station wagon. This equipment should be purchased on a two to four-year phased purchase plan so that the total stock will not require replacement at any one time.

COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD (CRLG)  
(Garde Cotiere Fluviale et Lacustre)

30. An instructor cadre of 10 to 15 be selected immediately and begin instructor training. This should not await completion of the training center, but utilize whatever facilities can be made available.

- ████████████████████
31. Additional effort be exerted for OJT assignment with the TCN's of additional personnel with mechanical aptitude.
  32. CRLG headquarters, with PSD assistance, develop simple, yet accurate, reporting forms for activities and incidents and assist in implementing them in the GL. This assistance should include using the reports as bases for developing a statistical data base as a management tool.

#### GdN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

33. Training of radio operators begin immediately.
34. The GdN immediately arrange for generator mechanic training for five personnel.
35. Two technicians be transferred to Lubumbashi.

#### CRLG TELECOMMUNICATIONS

36. To meet immediate manpower requirements, semi-skilled technical personnel should be sought from outside the CRLG. The services of three more electronics technicians and one more generator mechanic should be obtained.
37. There is an immediate need for one more telecommunications manager for the Lake Tanganyika operation.
38. Future CRLG expanded operations will require additional technical personnel. CRLG should immediately recruit personnel who are interested in becoming electronics technicians, electricians, generator mechanics, and radio operators. As a starter, 15 men should be recruited, of whom

[REDACTED]

ten are to be future electronics technicians and five, generator mechanics. Also, 20 men should be sought to fill the need for radio operators. With the assistance of the PSA (Telecommunications) CRLG should locate an in-country school that can commence the training.

39. In anticipation of a future requirement for telecommunications, two more men should be developed for the Zaire River operation.



## CHAPTER IV

### THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY

The potential external threats posed in the Public Safety Evaluation Report of November/December 1969 have now diminished to the point that they can no longer be considered as threats to the political or economic stability of Zaire.

The tensions reported in 1969 between the then Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola have now dissipated to a peaceful but cautious co-existence. The "Rebel" activity in the Eastern Provinces has now deteriorated to the level that, depending upon the person being interviewed, those left are bandits, remains of rebellious elements or dissident tribesmen who just want to be left alone. Nevertheless, the potential threat, regardless of source, does exist, but at present is under control. However, the seriousness of this threat is reportedly exacerbated by heavy-handed tactics of Army Forces now assigned the responsibility for control of the area. The GOZ is aware of this problem, and at the time of the team's visit was preparing to replace Army units with GdN forces in an attempt to gain the allegiance of the populace through a service-oriented civil police force.

The most serious threat to internal security, from the law enforcement point of view, is the rapid increase in criminality within the major urban centers. During the past two to three years, this increase in the crime rate has been demonstrated by the introduction of crimes of violence committed with firearms, semi-organized criminal bands, a plague of thefts and other crimes.

This rapid increase in crime can be attributed to several factors, the most important of which is the urban migration of the youth from the countryside. This mass migration has resulted in an unemployment rate that is impossible to estimate and is further compounded by the social unrest created by the lack of employment

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
opportunities. This situation poses a very real threat to the GOZ, that could manifest itself in the form of mass demonstrations against the government, in addition to increases in criminality.

The full impact of this urban migration upon the social/economic stability of the GOZ is yet to be felt. President Mobutu, however, has foreseen the potential of this threat and the importance of a just and effective police force. In August 1972, he moved to integrate the Gendarmerie Nationale and the National Police into a national civil police force in an attempt to improve the minimal police services being provided to the people. The roles and missions of this new force were redefined and the organization restructured with the Commanding General of the Gendarmerie answering directly to the President in his role as Minister of Defense.

The new Gendarmerie Nationale, after a gestation period of one year, is still in the throes of reorganization and is not yet capable of coping with the present threat posed by criminality and the social unrest caused by the lack of economic opportunity within the country.

A special problem is now developing from the present expansion of private sector interests in the Shaba Region. In the development of new copper mines and hydroelectric facilities and the resulting large influx of foreign families - in this instance largely Americans - a prime target is created for criminal attacks such as is endemic in all less developed countries. The growth and success of these ventures will largely depend upon the degree of security which the GOZ is able to afford to these installations, their employees and families.

[REDACTED]



## CHAPTER V

### INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

The Public Safety Project in Zaire concerns itself with two internal forces: the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Coastal River and Lake Guard. For reasons which become clear in the ensuing report, a stylistic evaluation of progress against stated specific goals or targets was not deemed in most instances to be the best approach for this study.

Instead, the team elected to study in some depth each of these two organizations - their component sections - and thusly recommend actions for improved future effectiveness.

#### A. GENDARMERIE NATIONALE

##### INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 1972, a decree was issued by the President of Zaire which abolished the then existing National Police organization and combined all of its personnel and resources with the already existing Gendarmerie Nationale (Annex C). In so doing, a new National civil law enforcement organization was formed. This force retains its previous name of the Gendarmerie Nationale (GdN) and is charged with responsibility for civil law enforcement and the maintenance of order nationwide throughout the Republic of Zaire.<sup>1</sup>

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1

Prior to the amalgamation of the two forces on August 30, 1972, the responsibility for law enforcement was divided between the Gendarmerie Nationale and the National Police. The Gendarmerie was at that time responsible only for law enforcement outside the incorporated urban areas whereas the National Police were responsible for the urban centers.

Before proceeding further into any evaluation or discussion of the newly created force or the Public Safety efforts to assist it in its formulative development, several very pertinent explanatory observations and conclusions are in order.

On the whole, the integration and reorganization of these two organizations appear to be a major step toward achieving an effective national civil law enforcement capability within the Republic of Zaire. Unfortunately, this integration/reorganization process has not been without problems, and the organizational structure is still in a state of flux. This situation caused some problems for the evaluation team, in that it found that many of the activity targets and goals whose progress the team has proposed to evaluate were no longer valid.

In most instances, these targets and goals had been conceived on the premise that the GdN reorganization process would be completed expeditiously. Thus far this has not been the case.

Some of the support type activities (i. e., motor maintenance, communications, etc.) have continued to function, and for the most part are quite satisfactory. These ongoing activities were evaluated in depth and will be discussed in detail later in this report.

In the areas of policy, management, organization and training, the team found a completely different situation and these were the areas in which primary targets and the major thrusts of Public Safety program planning were directed. These targets and goals were almost completely invalidated by the amalgamation process and the slowness of the GOZ in implementing the reorganization.

Therefore, the team was unable to evaluate the rate of success in achieving progress in these very critical fields of endeavor because the indicators of progress, the targets and aspired-to goals set forth in the PROP's and ProAg are no longer valid and will have to be modified and redirected before being applicable to this new organizational structure.

[REDACTED]

In the development of the new Gendarmerie organization, there are two major problem areas which have slowed down the institution building process. These problems have, in turn, complicated and caused other slowdowns, but all are traceable to the following two causes:

The first of these problem areas is the rather vague, undefined command structure of the GOZ and the determination of exactly where within that structure the GdN is located. After lengthy discussions with representatives of the GOZ and the Public Safety staff, it appears on the surface that in that portion of the organizational structure which affects the GdN, the Commanding General of the GdN answers and is responsible directly to the President in his present role as the Minister of Defense. If this were true, there would be no problem of command and control; however, on closer inspection of the overall organizational structure, one finds that this does not always pertain in actual practice.

As an example of the above problem, the team found that within the GOZ command structure there is a position designated as the "Capitaine General." The responsibilities and authority of this position are elusive and difficult to delineate or even define, but its effects are at times very real. The Capitaine General at present claims, and has attempted to exercise, control over the GdN through the regional military commanders even though, according to the organizational structure of the GOZ, he has no direct line of responsibility or authority over the GdN or its regional elements. (Refer to Annex C-1.) This tends to make the regional GdN commanders understandably uncertain as to who their commander really is.

This situation is not confined just to the regional level but on occasion affects the GdN at the national level as well. An outstanding example of this problem is illustrated by an order issued by the Capitaine General requiring that all former National Police officers of 2nd Lieutenant rank and above attend a six-month training course at the Kitona Army Base to bring their level of expertise up to the level required for Gendarmerie commissioned officers. Results are illustrating that this decision was well founded, and the results will be discussed later in this report. What is disturbing, however, is the dual control over

the GdN graphically demonstrated by this incident.

This is a critical point which must be resolved and deserves every effort to encourage a quick resolution and a precise definition of command authority at all levels.

The second condition which has affected the direction and progress of this Public Safety program is the inability, or procrastination, on the part of the GdN to fill key positions with qualified personnel of rank commensurate with the responsibilities of their position. This lack of "qualified" high ranking officers is due to the retraining of all National Police commissioned officers. The positions they previously held are not being filled by permanent assignments but are being held by extremely competent young officers. Unfortunately, their ranks are not commensurate with the position and they are all filling these positions on an "acting" interim basis. Permanent assignments to these key positions are not expected to be finalized until the last of the former National Police officers have completed their retraining course, and are either graduated or selected out.

These two affecting factors have created numerous problems which have seriously interfered with the development of the new GdN organization. However, the Public Safety staff have been assisting the GdN in this development and shortly after the formation of the new GdN began redirecting their priority activities toward working with the senior staff levels in developing sound organization and management practices and procedures, operational policy guidelines, systems for measuring effectiveness and the introduction and development of other management tools. These first efforts have been an excellent start and if continued will have a lasting effect on the long range institutionalization of the GdN. However, until such time as the counterparts with whom the advisors work are of sufficient rank and have the authority to implement and follow through with execution of new policies and procedures, the impact of future planning will be minimal.

This existing situation is not all bad, even though it is to varying degrees retarding the rate of expected progress at this time; prospects for the long range future are very encouraging. The young, low ranking officers who are temporarily filling the key

[REDACTED]

staff positions are bright, progressive, energetic and receptive to advice and counsel. These qualities are well recognized by the Commanding General of the GdN, and he is constantly tasking them and their Public Safety advisors with staffing out solutions to management problems. These staff recommendations and solutions are then forwarded to the C.G. for discussion, approval and for future implementation, which the General assures will be accomplished in due time.

When examined in detail, the GdN Commanding General's reasons for temporarily filling these key positions with junior officers are sound. First, he recognizes and has confidence in their ability to develop sound policy guidelines. Second, before filling these positions with permanent appointees, he wants to be absolutely sure that he has the best man for the job. This decision must, unfortunately, be held in abeyance until such time as an additional number of ex-National Police officers have completed their re-training course.

This delay in appointing permanent staff officers is unfortunate, but necessary. At the time of the amalgamation of the two forces, there were approximately 500 officers of 2nd Lieutenant rank and above available for integration within the new organization. For a variety of reasons, ranging from incompetence to age, only slightly more than half were accepted and their ranks confirmed. These were divided into three groups and were scheduled to attend the previously described special six-month retraining course at Kitona Army Base. The first course began in November 1972, the second in July 1973 and the third and final course is scheduled to be completed in July 1974.

This training course is resulting in the selection out of officers who cannot meet the higher physical or academic standards of the Gendarmerie. As an example, of the nine Lt. Colonels assigned to the first course, seven failed to survive the screening and were selected out. Sixteen other officers of lower ranks were likewise found unqualified and were terminated. Of the total number of 77, only 68.6%, or 54 officers, graduated and returned to service.

Simultaneous with this retraining of ex-National Police officers, an in-depth review and evaluation of all GdN personnel dossiers

[REDACTED]

is underway. These two processes must be completed before firm permanent appointments to key positions can be expected. At the time of the team's visit no one contacted, either GOZ or U.S., could give a firm target date for completion.

The latest date would be in July 1974 when the final retraining course would be completed. However, the concensus is that some permanent assignments will be made in the interim as officers complete the retraining and their dossier review is completed. The second class, consisting of 197 officers, was in training at the time of the team's visit and scheduled to graduate in November 1973.

The selection out process has not been confined to commissioned officer personnel, but to EM as well. The total number of former NP personnel of all grades, either selected out or retired, is 3,334. Current strength (July 31, 1973) of the new GdN is 24,273 - 17,669 ex-NP and 6,604 ex-Gendarmerie.

A breakdown by ranks is shown in Annexes D, E, and F.

Despite the built-in frustrations caused by the uncertainty of the situation and the future, one cannot help being impressed with the determination of the Commanding General to develop the best possible cadre of key command and staff officers, and the thoroughness with which he is pursuing this goal. This certainly bodes well for the future success of the organization and fortunate indeed is the fact that Public Safety Advisors are on the ground and available to assist in developing guidelines and procedures during this critical formative stage. (This is an opportunity often wished for and rarely encountered in foreign assistance - a chance to develop an institution from the very foundation up.)

Over the years, during the life of the Public Safety program, many excellent individual operational assets have been developed, along with various support elements and activities, which have certainly been improved. The problem now confronting the GdN and Public Safety is to assure that these assets will be properly utilized within the newly developed organization. If properly done, the lasting effect on Zaire's civil police posture will be of utmost importance, and the results should be excellent.

[REDACTED]

This synoptic description of the current situation in the GdN is deemed by the team to be absolutely essential in setting the stage for their subsequent study. In effect, it casts a somewhat different light on the entire spectrum of problems and existing conditions which made the evaluation of this project in the truest sense, impractical. Rather, to meet these abnormal conditions the study must be modified into a combination evaluation/survey. Evaluation of many activities and progress toward achieving stated goals could be measured; others are wrapped up in the ongoing reorganization process now underway in the GdN, and are not only impossible to gauge but in actuality are rendered invalid. Activity targets and goals must be reformulated to meet the needs of this new organization. Courses of action must be modified and redirected to have an impact and be effective. Thus, the requirement for this modified evaluation/survey report.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Prior to the reorganization and subsequent amalgamation, there were two major independent law enforcement agencies in the Republic of Zaire. Both were charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order, the protection of life, limb, and property and the performance of miscellaneous community services and other functions that are normally considered within the police domain.

Of these forces, the National Police was the largest with a force strength of approximately 20,000 personnel. This force, until recently, was poorly trained and equipped, and had a limited effectiveness. In recent years, Public Safety assistance succeeded in making substantial progress in upgrading this force and its operational capability.

The primary responsibility of the National Police as described was the provision of police services to the urban centers of the Republic and their area of jurisdiction was limited only to the incorporated cities, leaving the remainder of rural areas to the Gendarmerie.

The Gendarmerie Nationale was a force of approximately 6,000 to 7,000 men. It was organized as a paramilitary law enforcement

organization within the Army of Zaire, was patterned after the Gendarmerie of Belgium, and was considered to be an elite group. This was a carefully selected, well trained organization specifically charged with the same roles and missions as the National Police, but restricted to operating only within the unincorporated or rural areas.

In 1972 on August 30, President Mobutu became somewhat dissatisfied with the minimal level of police services being provided to the people of Zaire, and in a rather quick and somewhat surprising move decreed that the two forces be amalgamated into one National Civil Police organization. This decree abolished the National Police and integrated the personnel and other resources into the Gendarmerie Nationale. The Gendarmerie was removed from the Army and was formed into an independent civil law enforcement agency reporting directly to the President in his role as the Minister of Defense. As its new commander, the President appointed a former Surete officer, Brigadier General Singa, who was just returning from his assignment as the Ambassador to Uganda.

The GdN at the national headquarters level is organized with the usual staff and line components (Annex G). This same organizational structure is repeated in each of the nine police regions, which include Kinshasa and the eight provinces.

In addition, the urban centers have a traffic control unit and present planning is for a mobile brigade to be established in several of the major cities. Mobile Brigades are currently operational in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi and a third is planned for Kisangani. Current planning beyond this point is too vague to evoke further comment.

The operational and support units of the GdN with which the Public Safety project is involved will be covered in detail later in this report.

1. BRIGADE MOBILE

KINSHASA

The Brigade Mobile of the Gendarmerie Nationale is a mobile tactical unit whose primary objective is the prevention of

[REDACTED]

crime in the city of Kinshasa. This unit was originally organized by the Government of Zaire under the guidance of the Public Safety Division of the USAID Mission in Kinshasa as a pilot program with future plans to transplant this concept into the other urban centers of the Republic of Zaire.

The Brigade Mobile is composed of three shifts, with a total of 272 men with 40 men per shift on patrol (Annex H). As a pilot program, established in 1969, the results were deemed by the Zairoise to be extremely effective. The concept was then transplanted in Lubumbashi in 1973 with future plans for additional Brigades in the other major urban centers of the country. After the creation of the Lubumbashi Brigade, future Brigades would be established without PSD assistance, but they will be monitored for effectiveness and efficiency.

The Brigade Mobile was originally organized as an integral part of the National Police of Zaire, but in August of 1972, with the integration of the Gendarmerie and National Police, the unit was then absorbed into the new organization. Administratively, the Brigade draws all of its support from the parent organization, the GdN, but tactically takes its direction from the regional commander of the Kinshasa region<sup>1</sup>, and is an independent entity from the police assigned to the normal law enforcement functions within the city.

The Region of Kinshasa is divided, for the purposes of the Brigade Mobile, into seven patrol zones or beats. Original planning called for each of these beats to be covered by two patrol units twenty-four hours per day. When the Brigade was originally established in 1969, this was indeed the case. However, during the past four years this number has constantly deteriorated to the point that at this time the Brigade can muster only three or four vehicles for each shift. The remainder of the fleet is deadlined and is being cannibalized to keep these few vehicles running.

A number of factors have contributed to this condition. The vehicles themselves are a standard model U.S. compact type of vehicle which is not constructed to withstand the usage to which police patrol vehicles are subjected. Specifications should have included

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<sup>1</sup>The Region of Kinshasa encompasses the entire city of Kinshasa and is considered as a city and a region.

[REDACTED]

the heavy duty package usually found on police vehicles, such as springs, shock absorbers, brakes, tires, etc. Spare parts are a particular problem. First, the initial order would have best been based upon use factors in Zaire as opposed to a manufacturer's choice which is based upon normal use on U.S. roadways. But spare parts will not in themselves solve the complete problem. Some new vehicles are needed now.

The vehicles were procured on a one-time basis with no planned phased replacement schedule resulting in most of the fleet wearing out at the same time. Future vehicle purchases, beginning immediately, should be made on a scheduled, staggered basis with one third of the fleet being replaced each year.

Vehicles of the Brigade Mobile are at this time utilized only one shift per day, as each vehicle is assigned permanently to one driver and is only utilized during his tour of duty. The driver is held responsible for the vehicle and its maintenance, and during his off duty hours the vehicle is stored at the Brigade Mobile headquarters. Those personnel not having a vehicle assigned, or one that is deadlined, are now being used in a selective foot patrol in various parts of the city. In addition, the GOZ is taking advantage of this lack of mobility and during the period that the Evaluation Team was in country, 50% of the available manpower was on detached service to attend an in-service training program. This course is a retraining program in patrol tactics, community relations, general police and/or gendarmerie subjects and discipline.

In spite of this decrease in available manpower due to the ongoing training program and the lack of mobility available to the Brigade Mobile, police response is good. The average response time to any call, anywhere in the city of Kinshasa, is reported to average approximately five minutes. Work loads for the Brigade are light with an average of ten felonies per 24-hour period during the week and 25 to 30 felony calls per day on weekends and holidays.

This minimal work load is not really indicative of the present crime rate in the city of Kinshasa; rather, it is due to the lack of communications within the city and the difficulties that are encountered in trying to report an incident to the police. This

[REDACTED]

is especially true in the so-called African quarter or cite, where one must either find a business establishment that is open and has a telephone or walk to the nearest precinct station to report the offense. In the latter case, the precinct personnel will in all probability handle the case, unless it is a serious and violent incident where reinforcements may be necessary. In the majority of the precincts, it will be obligatory that if any police response is made the precinct will do it because they are completely without any communications to either Gendarmerie headquarters or the Brigade Mobile. Out of a total of 32 precincts, approximately 25% have radio communications with the operations center. USAID/PSD is now in the process of rectifying this situation and in the immediate future all of the precincts will be in contact with the Gendarmerie operations center which is located in the headquarters of the Brigade Mobile.

In essence the Brigade Mobile in Kinshasa is doing an outstanding job with the resources that it has available to it. The effectiveness and efficiency of the organization is at present being hindered by its dependence on the vehicle maintenance center which does not have the spare parts to repair the vehicles. During the periods when the Brigade Mobile was able to mount an adequate number of patrol units for duty, the effects were obvious. The crime rate in the city diminished, but during the past ten months, it is estimated that the crime rate has risen some 5000%. This rapid rise cannot all be attributed to the lack of police patrol but a significant percentage is directly related to the lack of a police presence.

#### LUBUMBASHI

The Brigade Mobile in Lubumbashi was the first attempt to transplant the operational model which was first developed in Kinshasa to another urban area. The expansion of this program was first set forth in the FY 1970 PROP, and was based on the excellent results that were realized from the first model in the capital city. The PROP proposed that this program be expanded to Lubumbashi in FY 1971, and then to Kisangani and Bukavu in FY 1972, and then a fourth key city in the interior in FY 1973. Thus far the only unit that has been established is this unit in Lubumbashi, which has taken over two years to develop.

Development of this program began in January 1971 with the arrival and assignment of a Public Safety Advisor to Lubumbashi in the region of Shaba. This advisor immediately began to implement the three-phase execution of establishing the Brigade Mobile as proposed in the PROP. Actual implementation began, starting at an absolute zero. None of the support facilities necessary to an operation of this type were available. A motor maintenance facility and a radio maintenance shop were built literally from zero. The Kasapa school was renovated, and POI's and lesson plans were developed for the Brigade Mobile training course. Unfortunately, when the recruits for this organization were received in Lubumbashi, it was found that only 58% had received any training and most of those had received what little they had prior to 1968, when the level of training was not really adequate. It was then determined that it would be necessary to begin with basic training and then advance through the actual Brigade Mobile training.

Finally in April 1973, after more than two years in the developmental stage, the Brigade Mobile became operational. The present organization is composed of four shifts of 23 men each, including the shift commander and his driver, for a total organizational strength of 100 men and three commissioned officers. The city of Lubumbashi is divided into eight patrol zones, each patrolled by one unit. Two additional units are assigned to highway patrol type duties bringing the total number of units to ten per shift (Annex I). As is the case in Kinshasa, the Brigade Mobile Lubumbashi is separate from the territorial or GdN assigned to police the city, but the Brigade Commandant does answer directly to the Regional Commander of the GdN, and the Brigade is supportive of the efforts of the other GdN units assigned to the city. The planned Table of Organization calls for a total of 179 men and 18 officers, and supposedly these personnel are now in training and will be made available soon.

All in all, the Brigade Mobile is well on the way to becoming an effective unit. While inspecting the Brigade Mobile headquarters, the team was informed that since inception of the unit armed robberies and burglaries had been drastically reduced. Although there were no statistics to support this, the Public Safety Advisor substantiated it by his own knowledge of several

[REDACTED]

organized gangs having been apprehended. However, development is being hindered by a complete lack of support on the part of the GOZ. The motor maintenance facility is operational and capable of maintaining the mobile fleet of the Brigade; however, spare parts are lacking and many vehicles sit for long periods of time awaiting the arrival of parts from Kinshasa. The communications repair facility is established and at present is manned by a TCN; again, a lack of spare parts and Zairois technicians prevents complete effectiveness. Point-to-point communications within the region have been established by the TCN by salvaging and repairing equipment that was deemed irreparable. This was done by cannibalization and sheer genius. A language lab has been established by again taking irreparable equipment discarded by the U.S. Military Mission and renovating it. This, plus English classes, has developed an English capability among the officer ranks which now qualifies them to attend the IPA. In essence, everything that has been accomplished has been through the efforts of the advisor and his counterparts without assistance from Kinshasa. The last problem of consequence that must be solved is the headquarters facility in Lubumbashi. It is unfit for human habitation, much less to be the headquarters of the Brigade Mobile. Space for offices and operational bureaus is deficient. In essence, the building should be condemned or completely renovated. Plans have been drawn for a new building and bids were called for. An engineer was sent from Kinshasa to study the bids and make approvals but instead he tore up the bids and requested resubmission. All of these problems boil down to one - lack of support!

### SUMMARY

The concept of providing quick and competent response to citizens' needs in urban areas where crime is greatest cannot be argued against. The Brigade Mobile is one excellent way to do this, but it is not in itself a panacea. It should be augmented by other types of coverage.

In every city visited by the team, a uniformed patrolman, except at fixed traffic points, was a rarity. There are three additional types of service which should be explored and, to the degree possible, implemented.

First of these is the age-old practice of walking beats which have proved their value through the history of municipal policing. Business districts and areas containing places of public patronage should by all means be so covered. These can be in singles or pairs, this decision to be based upon actual conditions and needs.

Patrol by bicycle offers several advantages. It is quiet, inexpensive and covers considerable territory. Residential areas vulnerable to burglary should be so patrolled at least from 2000 hours to 0600 hours. This, too, can be in pairs or singles, the needs dictating the assignment.

In areas where public communications are either non-existent or scarce, intermittent placement of small police kiosks, or outposts, is a must. These should be occupied also from 2000 hours to 0600 hours as a minimum and ideally equipped with small transceivers netted either to the precinct or the Brigade Mobile Communications Center. The latter is probably the best arrangement to provide quick response to requests for assistance.

Through application of sound management, manpower for these activities should pose no problem. One excellent source would be to draw on the proposed CDU personnel during such times as they are not actually mobilized as a unit.

The team feels that pilot projects of the above-described activities should be started, preferably in Lubumbashi. This should provide the information and experience base necessary to then expand to other cities such as Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bukavu, and so on.

## 2. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

The team found in travelling throughout the Republic of Zaire that there exists a tremendous need for improved traffic management, control and enforcement. At present the GdN does not have the capability nor the resources necessary to accomplish the goals mentioned above in any of the regions - not even in the capital city of Kinshasa. This problem manifested itself wherever the team travelled; accidents along the road were commonplace rather than a rarity. As an example, in the Region of Haute Zaire, there were estimated to be only 200 vehicles in the entire

[REDACTED]

region, yet during the month of June there were 15 accidents, including two fatalities.

As a result of this obvious need which was not being addressed by the USAID/PSD, other than to provide some commodity support in the form of motorcycles and safety equipment, the team requested information regarding any available traffic statistics. The only statistics received were provided by the Garde Routier in Kinshasa, which is presently being commanded by a Belgian advisor. The statistical data were well presented and complete (refer to Annex J) and illustrated vividly the urgent requirement for Public Safety assistance in this area.

During the month of March 1973 (most recent data available) in the city of Kinshasa, there were 540 accidents, involving 838 vehicles, which resulted in 17 dead, 57 seriously injured, 193 injured. The monthly figure was staggering, and when compared against the total number of accidents during 1971 and 1972, it can be noted that there was a 50% increase in the accident rate over those two years. As an example, in 1971 there were 4,628 accidents involving 3,579 vehicles or, out of the estimated 55,000 vehicles, one vehicle out of every 8.7 was involved in an accident. These accidents resulted in 117 killed and 1,232 injured. In 1972, there was a total of 6,671 accidents involving 4,074 vehicles or, of the estimated 57,500 vehicles, one vehicle out of every 11.6 vehicles was involved in an accident. During 1972, this resulted in 155 killed and 1,792 injured. At the present rate of increase, it can be assumed that the number of accidents that can be expected to occur in Kinshasa during 1973 will be approximately 10,000, or 16.5% of the total estimated number of vehicles in just the city of Kinshasa, and in 1974 approximately 15,000. This prognosis is based on data prepared by the GOZ, which estimated an annual increase in population in the city of Kinshasa of 40%, and an annual increase in vehicles of 5%. In 1969, Kinshasa was reported to have 50,000 vehicles registered in the city. Based on the above increase factors, the Brigade Routier now estimates that there are on the order of 61,000 vehicles in the city and suburbs of Kinshasa.

3. NARCOTICS

ZAIRIAN DRUG LAWS

The use of drugs and the commerce of drugs is illegal in the Republic of Zaire. The laws, which were written during colonial times, were written in such a form that only people of color were punishable under these laws. The laws establishing punishments for those trafficking in drugs or narcotics were passed in 1903; however, these laws were updated in 1967 so that at the present time anyone living in the Republic of Zaire can be punished for either using or trafficking in drugs or narcotics. These laws are hardly ever enforced by law enforcement agencies.

HISTORY OF DRUG USE

The use of marijuana has long been a social and tribal habit; however, the users of marijuana have hardly ever been required to obtain medical assistance because of overdose. The use of pills and hallucinogens has never been a problem among the local Zairians. There are indications that this may be becoming a problem among the European community. So far this has not been a serious problem in the American community. Marijuana, commonly thought of as an old man's disease or old man's habit, has not been the reason for any concern among the authorities. However, authorities believe that some accidents and some illnesses can be attributed to the use of marijuana. No methodical studies or records have ever been kept. Until recently, seldom was there any disciplinary action taken against those using marijuana. As of the present time, there is still a lack of enforcement in this area. Many sentinels and other night time workers are users of marijuana.

Large areas are being cultivated solely for the purpose of growing marijuana. This is rapidly becoming a matter of concern among government circles, and it is expected that in the near future there will be some legislation forbidding the cultivation of marijuana.

The team found it extremely difficult to obtain any accurate information on the subject of hard drugs. First, there were no

[REDACTED]

statistics available and second, from the very absence of first-hand knowledge and recorded data, it would not appear that hard drugs are at this time a problem of any magnitude.

The most seemingly knowledgeable person on this subject was Dr. Robert Close, Director of the Mama Yemo Government Hospital, who stated that narcotics use was, indeed, on the upswing and that recently he had treated a few cases of hard drug usage, non-Zairois, but he, too, had no statistics at hand.

The interview with Dr. Close covered other subjects as well, and will be discussed separately at the end of this section.

#### CURRENT AVAILABILITY

Drugs, in many categories, but particularly marijuana, are easily obtained in Kinshasa or any other city in the interior of the Republic of Zaire. Some hard drugs are available through purchase at local drug stores and even though a doctor's prescription is required, most Europeans find that it is quite easy to buy these drugs through dishonest pharmacists. There has been no systematic effort on the part of the government to apprehend distributors or consumers. Retail outlets for drugs are not being subjected to inspection or inventory. The use of marijuana and the use of depressants and hallucinogens as reported have shown an increase in recent months, although these are opinions, not recorded data. It is possible that because of the recent worldwide publicity being given to the use of drugs, the youth are so intrigued by the possible dangers involved that they are starting to experiment. This could be a very serious danger in the Republic of Zaire because of the easy access to drugs.

#### CURRENT ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE

Until recently the National Gendarmerie has looked upon marijuana users as harmless, and no action has been taken against the users nor against the peddlers. Recent articles by the press concerning drug abuse have stirred the National Gendarmerie to take some definite steps in apprehending a small number of peddlers, but this can hardly be called a drive or a definite step in curtailing the sale of marijuana, since it can be easily obtained

at many restaurants and bars in the city. Recently, newspaper articles spurred the Revolutionary Party Youth Wing into action and they have started a campaign to pick up all users as well as peddlers. In their forays around the city, they have picked up many peddlers as well as users. However, it must be pointed out that reportedly even the JMPR are not over zealous in these efforts. The National Gendarmerie has just begun making a record of those persons arrested who are under the influence of drugs. Included in this are persons who are involved in vehicle accidents suspected to be under the influence of drugs. Alcohol is included in these records. Recently, one member of the National Gendarmerie attended a course in narcotics management at the International Police Academy. This course, though sponsored by the Agency for International Development, had a strong input from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. It is expected that this officer will be assigned to a key position to further the control of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

#### FORENSIC PROBLEMS

Dr. Close, previously referred to in this section, is an American physician who is not only the Director of Kinshasa's largest and most modern hospital, but also the personal physician of President M'obutu. In the meeting with him, he not only touched on the subject of narcotics, but on other topics affecting the police as well.

He stated that his institution is performing over 500 autopsies per year, approximately one-third of which are deaths from causes not obvious which require further examination. Many of these, he stated, were suspected poison victims, a wide variety of indigenous poisons being readily available in Zaire.

He has a well equipped medical laboratory, trained pathologists and technicians, but does not have skilled toxicology expertise available and requested assistance in this field. He also stated that alcohol-caused accidents (see section on Traffic) are a large percentage of the total, and that facilities to administer quick and simple tests would be of great assistance to the police.

What he actually wants is a trained criminalist to spend some time with his lab people, assist in broadening their own knowledge in

[REDACTED]

the forensic fields, suggest types of additional training they might pursue and advise what, if any, additional equipment he might need to render his institution of more value to the police.

The team feels that an OPS criminalist on TDY for this would be worthwhile. To be of maximum value he should have some French language capability.

#### 4. IMMIGRATION

In early 1973, an OPS/TDY Immigration Specialist did an in-depth study of Zaire's immigration procedures and submitted recommendations for sweeping changes.

The team was informed that the GdN had agreed to adopt the bulk of these recommendations and, as a first step, 87 immigration personnel were in a special training class at the time of the team's visit to Matete School. This group is scheduled to complete the training in September 1973, at which time implementation of the new procedures is scheduled to begin. The proposed new TO&E is attached at Annex K.

#### 5. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

As PSD is not involved in this phase of the police activity, the team made only a cursory enquiry into its functions and operation. From the information available, it appears to be a somewhat fuzzy area, with unclear delineation of authorities and responsibilities. There is one group assigned with the Special Branch, another group as a separate unit which, in only the very loosest terms, might be likened to a Detective Bureau.

It appears to the team that with constant comments on a "rising crime rate," (despite even a basic set of figures) follow-up investigations of criminal offenses should be considered an important facet of the police process.

The team feels that some attempt should be made to establish a competent criminal investigation unit and an effort made to assist with their training.

## 6. RECORDS

The use, in fact absolute need, for good records as a management tool is too much a truism to comment further. What records are kept are not being used for such purposes. Of the dozens of GdN installations visited, not one had the normally expected simple spot maps, incident charts, etc. The closest seen was in Kisan-gani when the Traffic Chief did have his monthly accident figures listed on a blackboard.

Use of simple, basic report forms, manually tabulated monthly statistics, comparative graphs and incident spot maps are elementary requirements for even rudimental management. There will never be as opportune a time as the present for beginning these.

In the developing organization of the GdN, it should not be too difficult to convince the Command level of their value in the immediate and long range future. The recent (January 1972) decree requiring all Zairians to change their names would have all but invalidated any previous personal history records.


It behooves the PSD to suggest these principles to the GdN command.

## 7. TRAINING

Training of GdN personnel is at this point one of the most critical needs of the organization. Although much progress has been made since the 1969 evaluation, there remains a mammoth task ahead.

As with all other facets of the newly organized GdN, training has not progressed spectacularly. But it should be noted that several positive steps have been taken, both in actual implementation and future planning.

Prior to the creation of the GdN, the training efforts of PSD were confined to the then existing National Police (NP) and considerable progress was made. This effort involved several forms. These were Police Training Schools, other specialized training, Mobile Training Teams, and participant training in the United States, primarily at the IPA.



## BACKGROUND

Before 1960, Police Schools were established in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Luluabourg, Bukavu and Lubumbashi. Each school served to train police in the six provinces which existed at that time. Between 1960 and 1963, all police schools were closed except Lubumbashi.

In 1963, the Minister of Interior ordered that all means be taken to open the police schools. The first was to be the reopening of the Kinshasa School which would become a National Police School. It would serve all the Zaire except the three provinces of ex-Katanga (now Shaba), which were being served by the Lubumbashi School. It was also decided to open the remaining four schools as quickly as possible. Belgium, the United Nations and Nigeria promised to furnish instructors, and PSD promised to fund the repair of the schools and furnish vehicles and training materials.

Much later, in 1965, other discussions took place which established the principle that the schools of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi would become National Police Schools and would be the only schools for training Police Commissaires. Also, the training of recruits and NCO's would take place in the capitals of the newly formed provinces. The other four schools at Kisangani, Mbandaka, Bukavu and Luluabourg would be Regional Police Schools and furnish recruit and NCO training to their ex-provinces. The MOI decided in 1965 that the six schools would be consistent in adopting standardized training and management procedures to assure the effective utilization of manpower and material resources.

### MATETE SCHOOL - KINSHASA

Matete School was reopened in April 1964 and trained a small group of recruits destined for the Kinshasa Police. A small number of Congolese and Belgian Commissaires gave the teaching. The physical condition of the school was poor because of its abandonment in 1962. However, the required repairs were made by PSD. By October 1964 the school was restored sufficiently to begin a course for officers. Five Nigerian instructors were assigned to the school in mid-1964 to teach sports and drill. Two UN instructors arrived in September 1964. PSD advisors also gave courses at the school. Additionally, beds, uniforms, kitchen materials,

~~RESTRICTED OFFICIAL USE~~

typewriters and other equipment were furnished by PSD. Many problems were experienced at this time, such as a lack of discipline and no adequate standards for recruitment, resulting in the majority failing to receive passing grades.

At the beginning of 1965, more UN instructors arrived. Shortly afterward an accelerated course was established for officers of the police in the Kinshasa area who had not received required training. During 1965 and 1966, recruit and officer courses were given at Matete.

In 1965 it was found that because of the expansion of activities at the Matete School, enlargement was necessary. PSD arranged for the construction of 16 groups of apartments for lodging of students, doubled the size of the administrative complex and renovated the mess hall and classrooms. All this was finished by the beginning of 1966. In late 1966 a pistol firing range was begun and finished about October 1967.

In 1966 more uniforms, audio-visual aids, other teaching materials, vehicles and bicycles were furnished by PSD. At the beginning of 1967, there were 14 foreign instructors in place - 3 Belgians, 6 UN and 5 Nigerians.

Late in 1967, the Nigerians left and the UN decided to close down their police assistance program. By March 1968 only the Belgians remained.

In late 1970, after study by PSD, it was decided to again renovate the entire school. This was begun in April 1971 and a water reservoir system installed. All the work was finished by September 1971.

The Matete School has operated continuously since then, although never to capacity.

#### KASAPA SCHOOL - LUBUMBASHI.

As mentioned earlier the Kasapa School was the only one to continue to function without closing. It operated with a corps of Belgian and Zairian instructors. Training was provided for recruits, NCO's, officer candidates and for officers already in service.

~~RESTRICTED OFFICIAL USE~~

[REDACTED]

Although heavily damaged by the combat that took place in and around the school, it continued to function and maintained its high academic level. In 1964-65, to assist the functions of the school, PSD arranged for the renovation of all buildings and furnished beds, kitchen equipment, vehicles, audio-visual aids, other teaching material and replaced other equipment stolen during the fighting. In 1967, by order of the MOI, the school was closed. Upon reopening in early 1969, it was designated to be only for recruit, NCO and special training. It has graduated several recruit classes since then.

In late 1971, it was decided to renovate the school, enlarge the administrative complex and messing facility, construct a water reservoir and install a pistol range. This work was begun in January 1972 and is nearing completion. When finished it will increase the administrative and feeding capacity to 500 students. It will be necessary in the future to build dormitories and augment the classroom space to increase the lodging and teaching facilities to 500 students.

#### KAPALATA SCHOOL - KISANGANI

This school was reopened in August 1965. It was ruined by the fighting and renovated by the Zairian Government. Although this work restored the buildings, the school still had no water nor electricity. PSD arranged to bring in water and electricity and furnished materials such as desks, other classroom equipment, audio-visual aids, kitchen material, uniforms and vehicles. Many problems were associated with the school, a lack of qualified instructors, poor recruitment standards, and payment of students. Help was promised from the UN and Nigerians in the form of instructors, but none were furnished. Because of these problems, very little training was accomplished. In 1967, during the mercenary rebellion, much damage was inflicted upon the school and all of the equipment was stolen. To date the school has never realistically opened. It has been designated, along with Kasapa and Matete, to be a National Gendarmerie School solely for retraining.

#### REGIONAL SCHOOL AT MBANDAKA

This school graduated its last class in 1964, was reclosed in 1965 because its installations were requisitioned by the provincial administration. It was planned to construct another school at

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MBandaka. PSD was to furnish the funds and the UN and Nigerians were to furnish instructors. However, none of this ever took place. One vehicle and uniforms were furnished by PSD.

It is not planned to reopen a school at MBandaka.

#### REGIONAL SCHOOL AT BUKAVU

This school was reopened in 1965 for the training of recruits. It managed to train one group of recruits but was hampered by the fact that most were illiterate. Additionally, all of the school buildings were in disrepair and decaying. Plans were made for the Travaux Publique to renovate the buildings, and the purchase of necessary equipment was arranged. Unfortunately, the mercenary rebellion occurred and the buildings were destroyed, and what equipment remained was looted. There are no present plans to reopen a school at Bukavu.

#### REGIONAL SCHOOL AT LULUABOURG

Never reopened. The school was transformed into a police camp. No school is planned presently for Luluabourg.

#### CURRENT STATUS OF SCHOOLS

##### MATETE SCHOOL

This school is currently in operation, albeit in a rather limited fashion. At the time of the team's visit, two courses were in session - 87 students were undergoing Special Immigration Training in preparation for implementing OPS recommendations for improved immigration procedures, and 17 newly commissioned lieutenants were attending a special in-service course prior to being confirmed as officers.

The Commandant stated the capacity as 350, but this would certainly be crowded. All facilities are in run-down, but clean condition, reflecting an effort to maintain an orderly facility. A large segment of the facility is being used as police housing by what seems to be an inordinate number of people.

He briefed the team on plans for renovation and expansion which, if implemented, would result in a first class institution with a

[REDACTED]

capacity of 700 live-in students. If a serious retraining effort is undertaken this would not be overly large.

The pistol range was in poor condition, but the team was informed that plans and funds have been approved for renovation, which should be completed within the next two months.

There were two operations at this school which impressed the team. The first is a modest, but adequate, off-set printing set up. It includes the equipment and personnel to meet all printing requirements for the school. Personnel were trained by USIS at PSD request, and have the capability to perform all necessary processes such as the photography, plate making and printing, including simple color separation. This can be utilized to great benefit in producing texts, handouts and other training materials.

Also in the process of development during the team's visit was a simple, but adequate reloading shop for .38 spl ammunition. A TDY technician from OPS was instructing in the equipment's use and training school personnel to take over the entire operation. The benefits from this activity are self-evident. The cost of reloads versus imported ammunition in Zaire will be approximately 18%, providing for more and better firearms training.

#### KASAPA SCHOOL

The physical plant at Kasapa is quite a contrast from that of Matete. The grounds are spacious, some buildings in good repair, others in need of repair, but all in an impressively clean and orderly condition.

Its current capacities are classroom facilities for 250, but housing and messing for only 100. Plans have been submitted for increasing the total capacity to 600 live-in students, a realistic size if continuous in-service training is to be carried out.

At the time of the team's visit, it was operating at its full housing capacity with a class of 97 Brigade Mobile trainees.

Its problems, and there are many, can be summed up in one word - support - or rather, the lack thereof. For an institution of this size, headquarters has supplied only two full-time instructors.

The Commandant, an energetic and impressive young officer with excellent Belgian training credentials is meeting this problem by assigning additional instruction duties to the entire staff, including himself. His estimate, and repeated request, for immediate present needs is eight additional instructors.

The school is on a tight water ration, at times completely without water, due to the lack of support from Kinshasa headquarters. They were all but out of food, also due to no headquarters support. The Commandant was promised 15,000Z (\$30,000) a month for total operating costs, this was cut to 10,000Z, and he received a grand total of 6,500Z for the past three-month period, a shortage of 23,500Z. They were at the time of the visit forced to obtain food on credit; this was extended to about its limit.

The pistol range is well designed and in excellent condition. A class was on the range at the time of the visit; procedures and range discipline were outstanding. Again, the specter of no support. In order to conduct at least part of the firearms training necessary to this class they were dipping into an already meager supply of service ammunition on a "promise" of replacement.

The team raised the question of a reloading operation similar to that at Matete School upon their return to Kinshasa. It was learned that the equipment is in storage there. It was suggested to PSD that they take advantage of the OPS TDY technician then in country to assist in training the personnel for an immediate installation.

#### KAPALATA SCHOOL

At the time of the evaluation, this school was not operational. Plans are to open it in early 1974.

In view of the woefully inadequate support given to Kasapa, the dearth of instructor personnel, compounded by the fact that transportation to Kisangani is considerably worse than to Lubumbashi, there is some doubt as to the ability to get this installation off the ground, or, in fact, if the attempt should even be made at this time.

[REDACTED]

## IN-SERVICE AND SPECIALIST TRAINING

PSD has been active in a variety of training activities of the specialist and/or in-service types. This training has covered a wide spectrum of activities and individual courses would run from a one-day session up to several months. Perhaps the most ambitious of these were the Mobile Training Teams and the Senior Officer Seminars. Each of the various efforts will be commented on separately.

### RURAL MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (RMTT)

The RMTT concept was initiated in mid-1969. After discussions with Zairian and Belgians, it was determined that there were approximately 16,000 enlisted men in the National Police that had received little or no basic police training. It was felt that the two schools in operation could not handle a problem of this magnitude. The Training Directorate guided by their American and Belgian advisors decided that by taking the training to the men the problem would be solved. Thus the RMTT concept was begun. It was decided to begin with a pilot project in the Bas-Zaïre. A headquarters staff was organized, a pilot team chosen and preparations were begun to equip the team, prepare a program of instruction, lesson plans and logistic support. It was also decided that, since little French was spoken by the proposed students, the classes would be conducted in either Lingala, Swahili or Tschiluba. The work of this group culminated in the establishment of a pilot RMTT in Matadi in November 1969. After months of close observation, RMTT's were placed into operation in all provinces by June 1970. Because of the large number of police, two teams were assigned to Shaba Province. The project proved to be very successful, and a 94-hour basic course was given to over 15,000 personnel. The program was phased out as completed shortly after the fusion of the GdN/NP.

This is a good concept and should be continued. Not only for basic in-service training, but in advanced or specialized subjects as well. Transportation being what it is in Zaïre, this type of training is far more feasible than attempting to move large numbers of men to a permanent training site. It has the added advantage of being far less costly, not just for the travel, but for board and lodging of the students as well.

SENIOR OFFICER SEMINARS (SOS)

As with the RMTT, a group of concerned Zairois, Belgian and American advisors found that senior officers in the police were sadly lacking in executive and leadership skills. The Training Directorate, guided by Belgian and American advisors, in early 1971 began planning for this activity. The SOS concept evolved, which would bring together twenty senior officers for a one-week seminar at an isolated spot. They would be relieved of all duties, live in and indulge in seminar activities for one week from 0800 hours until 2200 hours each day. Many subjects were presented and discussed to improve their leadership and executive skills. An example of the enthusiasm of the National Police was that the first seminar, which took place at Thysville in November 1971, was chaired by the Deputy Inspector General. After this successful beginning, a second SOS was held in Lubumbashi in July 1972. A third SOS was planned but was cancelled when the fusion of the GdN/NP took place. A total of 40 officers were so trained.

The lack of management skills which precipitated this training still exists, and with a new organization in the formative stage training of command level officers is more important than ever. Effort should be exerted to not only reinstate the Senior Officer Seminars, but to increase the number and frequency.


MISCELLANEOUS SPECIALIZED TRAINING

A number of personnel have received training in a myriad of subjects for varying lengths of time. These are reflected in the following:

Riot Control (Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kisangani and Kinshasa, one day) . . . . . 989

Communications Training

Mobile Radio Operators (Kinshasa) 1 day	136
CW Operators (Kinshasa) 6 months	91
Refresher Communications Training	29
Motorola Technician Course 12 weeks	10
SSB Tech. Repair Course 3 weeks	10




Physical Training Inst. Course (Kitona) . . . . .	15
13 students for 6 months - 2 for one year	
Motorcyclist Training (Kinshasa) 16 weeks . . . . .	19
Mechanics Training (Kinshasa) . . . . .	18
Mobile Patrol Training (Kinshasa and Lubumbashi) .	247
Includes Refresher Equipe Mobile Retraining	
Ministerial Guard Training . . . . .	50
Secretarial Course (Kinshasa) 6 months . . . . .	30
Airport Security (Kinshasa) Civilians 6 months . .	60
English Language Training . . . . .	<u>43</u>
TOTAL	1,471

Recap In-Country Training:

RMTT	15,000	(of this number, 6,612 did not receive certificates due to illiteracy)
SOS	40	
Specialized	<u>1,471</u>	
TOTAL	16,511	

PARTICIPANT TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES

USAID/PSD has sponsored training in the United States for a total of 151 NP officers. Of this number, 115 still remain in the police service. A recap of this training is given below:



<u>Course</u>	<u>Total Trained</u>	<u>Total Still In Service</u>
Telecommunications Maintenance	31	22
Senior Officers Course	1	1
Telecommunications Management	1	1
Special Actions Course (Riot Control)	16	13
English General Course	2	2
Maritime Law Enforcement	4	3
Police Executive Training	14	7
Narcotics Management	1	1
French General Course	<u>81</u>	<u>65</u>
TOTALS	151	115

Many of these officers offer an excellent potential for a much needed instructor cadre, and effort should be made to so utilize as many as possible.

TRAINING IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Since 1963 until 1967, 60 participants, officers and warrant officers attended training in Belgium. This included nine months of infantry officers training and nine months at the Royal Gendarmerie School and was a well rounded curriculum of both military and civil law enforcement studies.

Training in Belgium was resumed in 1968 with four or five officers per year being sent to the Royal Gendarmerie School.

TRAINING DIRECTORATE

Prior to May 1973, all GdN training activities were a part of the B-3. Acting on PSD advice, in May 1973 a Training Directorate was created at the major staff level. This was a good move, but unfortunately it exists only on paper. A somewhat awkward organization with five sections and 11 bureaus, there is question as to its practicality. (See Annex L.) The whole thing is academic, however, as at the time of the evaluation it was staffed by one officer and four minor employees of clerical or custodial duties.

This entire matter is of sufficient importance to warrant continued effort to first shape the Directorate into a workable and practical organization, staff it with capable people and then get it functional. In the interim, direction and support of training efforts are less than satisfactory.



## 8. LOGISTICS

This is perhaps the greatest deficiency in the entire GdN structure with two major factors contributing to the problem.

First, the paucity of transportation facilities within Zaire defies the imagination. The road network which existed prior to 1960 has received little attention since that time and has deteriorated to the point that it can hardly be considered as a means. The railroad system connects only a few locations, is slow and unreliable. The same can be said for the one commercial airline in country. In some parts of the country, notably between Kinshasa and Kisangani, slow river transportation is available.

The second factor contributing to the logistics problem is an organizational, or management, one. Like all the other headquarters elements of the GdN at this time, the logistics section is in a state of flux and understaffed. In some ways this is an advantage. This condition could, and should, provide an excellent opportunity to shape it into a meaningful operation which would service all units at a reasonable degree, something sorely lacking at present.

To accomplish this will require considerable advice and assistance. It will require advice in applying in-country conditions to procurement lead times, scheduled reordering, stockpiling at perhaps more than one regional location and all of the many elements of good supply management that can be instituted only with a high degree of logistics management expertise.

The team feels that elimination of a logistics advisor position was ill-timed and it should be reinstated. This is commented on more specifically in the section on Staffing.

## 9. GENDARMERIE MOTOR MAINTENANCE SHOPS

Maintenance and repair of GdN vehicles is conducted in the main at two central garages, one in Kinshasa and one in Lubumbashi. These installations are so located in consonance with the majority of GdN rolling stock. In other areas where vehicles are few and scattered the maintenance and repair functions are performed by whatever means may be available to the GdN in that area.

KINSHASA FACILITY

This is the largest of the two shops with responsibility for a 320-vehicle fleet. This facility is well equipped and designed. It was originally established by the United Nations to support their project vehicles. As the UN phased out, the GdN was gradually phased in until in 1973 the garage was turned over to the GOZ GdN.

At the time of the team's visit, 100, or 31%, of the fleet was deadlined due to unavailability of parts. This lack of spare parts is caused by a combination of factors. Although many, if not most, of the required parts are on order, delivery schedules are long and uncertain. As the inventory of vehicles consists of between 30 to 40 different types, makes and models, the process of ordering, to say nothing of stocking, spare parts is obviously complicated, almost to the point of impossibility. Much of the incredibly large variety was brought about by segments of the fleet having been obtained from several donors of different nationalities. This obviously made any attempt at standardization of the GdN fleet impossible. Additionally, many of these vehicles were donated without any supply of spare parts. With the donor vehicle supply about completely phased out, a serious study of standardization on as small a family of vehicles as possible is in order.

Those vehicles which were procured through AID assistance very wisely included a 10% spare parts complement. Unfortunately, the selection of parts was based upon the supplier's recommendation rather than on actual use experience based upon conditions existing in Zaire. The result has been that there is a several years' supply of some items and a critically short supply of others which was dissipated quickly. The GdN is currently in the process of procuring at least 40 vehicles of U.S. origin. A serious study should be conducted to determine actual spare parts as opposed to the manufacturer's standard package. This study would be based on prior actual use experience.

Parts which are now on hand are properly segregated, stored and carried on a kardex-type stock card. While inspecting the stock room, the team was shown a large assortment of parts which were left behind when the UN turned over the shop. These parts are for vehicles which the UN otherwise disposed of, and are not in

the GdN inventory, making retention of the parts completely useless. These should be disposed of in whatever manner would best benefit the GdN.

The team was impressed with the interest, willingness and apparent ability of the shop Commandant. He gave the impression of being knowledgeable, sincerely eager to run a good shop and seemed to be doing the best he could under the adverse conditions. He understands the importance of good preventive maintenance and is attempting to implement it as much as possible. He should be encouraged.

His staff consists of a total complement of 110 personnel, 28 of whom are mechanics of varying levels of skill. The remainder are assigned a variety of other tasks not requiring a high level of mechanical skill. Through a PSD-instigated arrangement with the General Motors representative in Kinshasa, six of the better people, including the Commandant himself, recently received advanced training in the repair and maintenance of automatic transmissions at the GM plant in Belgium. These men are now conducting daily training classes to upgrade other personnel. There are also four Filipino technicians employed at the shop.

The team noted that the mechanics assigned to the shop are GdN EM drawing only regular EM pay and allowances. PSD personnel informed the team that they had attempted to have the GdN implement an increased pay policy, but were not successful. Many police departments throughout the world have incentive pay increments for special skills, thereby not only encouraging its personnel to acquire such skills, but also better insuring their retention of much needed personnel. PSD should pursue this point, keeping in mind, however, the importance of safeguards against assignment by favoritism instead of rigid testing for pre-set standards.

#### LUBUMBASHI FACILITY

All factors considered, this is an impressive installation, faced with the same basic problems as those of the Kinshasa facility. With minimal equipment and spare parts, an able and energetic young OSO Commander seems to be doing a remarkable job of keeping as much rolling stock as possible in operation.

His work force consists of 31 mechanics, 16 of whom were in the Kitona training session at the time of the team's visit. He also

has two Third Country technicians, one Filipino and one Belgian. Procedures for stock control, inspection and work orders are proper and working. The garage has the capability for all echelons of repair, including body work, and is performing well with the limited resources available.

The garage commander recognizes the importance of training and holds a 30-minute roll call training session each day for all mechanics. The commander, being a trained mechanic, conducts many of these sessions. He also recognizes the fact that improperly trained drivers create many of the repair problems. He wants and has requested vehicles with which to institute driver training. These have not been provided.

In summation, this is a facility with good potential and should be properly supported.

10. TANGANYIKA SECTOR (PROPOSED)

The Tanganyika Sector is described as being an undefined area of land bordering along the western shores of Lake Tanganyika, which is purportedly inhabited by bandits, or rebels or dissidents, or none of the above, just tribesmen who wish to be left alone. The label of the inhabitants depends strictly upon who happens to be describing the situation. In any event, it is a troubled area. At present the area is controlled by the Army, which is responsible for maintaining order, and the enforcement of civil laws. According to several reports, the methodology utilized by the Army is somewhat harsh and drastic. Due to this troubled and potentially serious situation, the GOZ is considering the replacement of the Army troops with the GdN in this area, and they will be completely responsible for the maintenance of law and order. At present a time frame was not available, as the decision to act must be made at the highest level.

Initial planning for the Garde Lacustre included this substitution of the GdN for the Army stationed in the Tanganyika Sector. It was planned that the GdN would work in concert with the Garde Lacustre, and in addition to the maintenance of order and the enforcement of laws, would act as a land-based back-up force for the Garde Lacustre in their intervention of illicit smuggling and immigration activities. A telecommunications network has already been planned to facilitate this operation, and will be implemented as soon as the GdN moves into the area.

[REDACTED]

In concept the team is in full agreement with the proposed planning to replace the Army with civil law enforcement units, and this can be an excellent opportunity for the GdN to change the repressive image that the GOZ has in this area. The sensitivity of this area cannot be over-emphasized; neither the GOZ nor the Belgians before them were able to control the inhabitants of this region. Now the GOZ has the opportunity to change this image by instituting fair and equal enforcement of laws, and through comprehensive community relations and civic action programs change the attitudes and loyalties of these people and bring them not under the control of the government but under its protection.

To achieve these goals the Gendarmerie Nationale personnel that are selected for this very sensitive assignment should be trained for both community relations and civic action programs. This training should be accomplished prior to the insertion of Gendarmerie personnel into the Tanganyika Sector. To assist in the initial development and training of these personnel, PSD/Kinshasa should assign an advisor with experience in rural patrol operations, community relations and civic action to work with the Training Directorate in Kinshasa. Upon completion of the preliminary training program, this advisory effort should be continued in the actual on-site implementation of the field program for as long as necessary to assure success of the program.

If and when this proposed substitution becomes a reality, there are two very important factors that will affect the outcome and should be considered. The most important factor is that the Tanganyika Sector transgresses three regional boundaries, and under normal operating conditions the gendarmes assigned to each of these regions would be under the tactical and administrative control of the regional Gendarmerie Commander. This would make overall coordination of the Tanganyika Sector next to impossible and would certainly hinder the successful implementation of this extremely important project.

The second factor that will influence the success or failure of this project is the selection of personnel assigned to this very sensitive operation and the training that they receive prior to being assigned to the Tanganyika Sector.

11. CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL - MOBILE BATTALIONS  
(PROPOSED)

The Commanding General of the National Gendarmerie has proposed that the GOZ GdN develop nine mobile battalions beginning with the first unit being formed in Kinshasa as a pilot project, then to be expanded into the other eight regions. These battalions would have sole responsibility for civil disturbance control and will be composed of approximately 560 gendarmes (Annex M).

This mobile battalion project will be entirely funded by the Garde National and is proposed to begin in early 1974 and the Kinshasa battalion completed in August of that year. The target date for completed training and execution or implementation of the other eight battalions in the provincial capitals is projected for 1975 (Annexes N and O, Projected Target Dates).

The equipment necessary to equip just the proposed Kinshasa mobile battalion will require approximately \$738,798 of GdN funding (see Annexes P, Q, and R). It is requested that USAID arrange for the purchase of this equipment through USAID/OPS channels, and that USAID assist by providing technical assistance and limited training equipment for this project. USAID/PSD/Kinshasa recommends that for the pilot project a training committee should be established consisting of former IPA graduates who have received civil disturbance control training in the United States. These men would be responsible for the preparation of subject lesson plans, visual aids, schedules, etc., and would then conduct the training for the officers of the mobile battalion. Following this training course the battalion officers under the guidance of the training committee would be responsible for training each company within the mobile battalion. After the basic training, advanced civil disturbance control training would be given to the mobile battalion along with daily in-service training (see Annex S, POI prepared by USAID/PSD/Kinshasa).

USAID/PSD/Kinshasa recommended to the CG of the GdN that the secondary roles and missions for this force be as follows:

- [REDACTED]
1. As a mobile strike force to combat sharp rises of criminality.
  2. To augment on a continuing basis other units such as the Brigade Mobile in high crime areas.
  3. For special security details for visiting persons of importance and parades, etc.
  4. Used in event of disasters to assist and protect citizens affected.

## 12. BUDGET

As the team travelled from the capital we found the lines of authority becoming increasingly indistinct and the financial and logistical support becoming more and more haphazard as the distance from the center increased. As this lack of support had a serious adverse impact on the effective operation of the GdN, the team took a cursory look at the budgeting process of the GOZ in general and of the GdN in particular.

The GOZ budget is prepared by individual ministries which then negotiate with the Ministry of Finance on their final allocations. However, tables of organizations and allocations of functions either do not exist or are unclear. The number of government employees is also apparently unknown particularly with respect to contract personnel and employees stationed in the provinces. With inadequate communications and the incredible difficulties in travelling, this is not difficult to understand. Also, it is not improbable that lists of employees contain a good bit of double counting.

As a result the National budget is neither a line item nor a program budget, but gives estimates by very large categories which are probably determined roughly within the ceiling given by the size of the relatively realistically estimated revenues, and by past allocations. Even though the budget document is still far from being a useful document for policy purposes, it has improved in the past few years. For example, the total information of the recurrent budget for Defense Nationale in 1969 was three lines and two figures:

"4. <u>Défense Nationale</u>	<u>Credits</u>	<u>Total</u>
Cabinet		
Arme Nationale Congolaise	Z23.772.377	
Police des Mines	Z 250.129	Z24.022.506"

By contrast, the Defense Nationale budget had grown to 12 lines and nine figures by 1971.

Ministries regularly run through their credits ahead of time and they get additional allocations if the money is available. If no additional money is available, expenditures are controlled by simply postponing payments rather than eliminate them. It is reported that agricultural extension agents, for example, become useless because they get no transport allocations. Reportedly some teachers at the university and in the schools have not been paid for several months. The amount of unpaid bills and the arrears of salary payments are not known. These become a burden on the next budget and lead in some cases to an immediate increase in foreign indebtedness and to inflationary financing. Although there has been progress in the budgeting process, more sophistication and discipline is needed.

The GdN budgetary process was complicated by the merger of the National Police and the GdN in August of 1972 which meant that 1973 was the first combined budget. The GdN budget office issued a budget call soon after the merger but the returns were so spotty the operational budget was drawn up by the central office. Unfortunately, no capital budget was prepared for 1973 which means no funds are available through normal channels for the GdN capital items. This is having an adverse effect on a wide range of GdN activities, including construction and vehicle replacements for the Brigade Mobile. However, if the President authorizes these expenditures they will be made, whether they are contained in the budget or not.

The 1973 GdN budget was submitted to the Ministry of Finance through the Ministry of Defense. The GdN budget officers believe they will be able to submit the 1974 budget directly to the Ministry of Finance bypassing Defense. After the budget is approved, the GdN is fairly autonomous with little or no interference from either Defense or Finance.

[REDACTED]

The approved operational budget totaled Z9.7 million for 1973. This is about 10% less than requested and comes to about 4% of the total government operating budget. This is about the same amount that has been approved in prior years for the law and order function. Implementation, however, has been uneven. Allotments from the Ministry of Finance are not always made in a timely manner and the GdN allotments to the province are often delayed. As mentioned above, these delays have adversely affected GdN operations.

The GdN budget officers were willing to answer all questions and freely opened their books to show both the process and the actual line items. They have just recently switched to a computer operation and are having the normal shakedown problems. There are only 7-8 line items for each region and, because of the reorganization, no time series were available for analysis. The team got the impression that coordination between the PSD and the GdN budget office has been minimal but the GdN officers would be very willing to discuss budgetary problems, particularly as they affect the project. It is recommended PSD assign this coordination responsibility to a Public Safety Advisor who has some experience in organization and methods. A high degree of sophistication would not be required.

GdN budgeting is probably no worse than that of other government entities and perhaps better than that for education and agriculture. Although the merging of the National Police with the GdN distorts comparisons, it appears that both the NP and the GdN have been reasonably well funded. Overall government expenditures have been increasing since 1967 and the internal security share remained fairly constant at about 4% of the total budget. Thus, while the GdN budgeting process is not good, it rates high within the budgeting processes of the country.

As the GdN continues to modernize and expand its need for financing will increase. The replication of the Kinshasa Brigade Mobile in other urban areas will require both capital investment and significant recurring costs. Neither the PSD nor the GdN has considered the magnitude of recurring costs nor the GOZ ability to absorb these costs. For example, General Singa's staff made a detailed presentation to the team on training,

staffing, equipment, and capital requirement costs for creating a riot control force in Kinshasa and other urban areas. This presentation contained no mention of replacement costs or recurring costs. The team recommends that PSD introduce these costs concepts in the GdN's planning efforts.

### 13. PRESCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAM

Although not a part of the PSD program, GdN involvement in a preschool child feeding project impressed the team with its potential as an image building civic action endeavor. For that reason the program was explored and the results deemed worth including in this report.

Under a modest AID incentive grant of \$78,000 (CSD 2749), the Catholic Relief Services is operating a preschool nutrition program in Zaire. By the end of 1972 the program was reaching 17,433 preschool age children and 13,483 mothers.

The purpose of the program is to prevent children's diseases, identify children with diseases, follow the growth of each child, provide nutritional education for the mothers, and provide training in sanitation.

Mothers bring their children age three months to five years to the clinics each month. The children are weighed by a nurse and examined by a medical or para-medical officer. The weights are recorded on individual cards. During this examination, identifiable cases of malaria, worms, and anemia are treated at the clinic. Children suffering from more serious illnesses are referred to pharmacies or hospitals, as available vaccinations are provided on a somewhat irregular basis.

Mothers are given lectures on children's nutritional needs and demonstrations on the uses of locally available foods. Various local foods are chosen for these demonstrations, those that are necessary for these demonstrations, those that are necessary for children and those needed for pregnant and lactating mothers. Flannelgraphs and pictures are used to give examples of diet preparations. Some of the centers are using slides on nutrition and health care. These have proved very successful in that they captivate the attention of both the mother and the child.

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The operators at the clinics have been trained by CRS through seminars. Four such seminars were given in 1972 providing training in how to operate preschool clinics, the use of visual aids, preparation of food stuffs (local and PL 480) and in general methods of teaching and reaching illiterate mothers.

As an incentive each mother is given a modest amount of PL 480 Title II foods each month. In the past this has been milk, or CMS or corn meal, depending upon availabilities. Irregularities in supplies of Title II foods have had an adverse effect on the program. For the future, it is planned to standardize on five pounds of corn meal per month. If a child does not gain weight and is not sick, it is assumed the mother is either selling the food or giving it to other members of the family. In these cases, the family is reportedly dropped from the program.

The program has been highly successful and very popular. On the whole they have been established within an existing institutional framework such as National Gendarmerie (GdN) camps, military bases, or with trade unions. However, eight clinics were set up in areas extremely overcrowded with exceptionally poor medical facilities under the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry provided each center with a dispensary, a coordinator, and an instructor. The Ministry has credited these clinics with a remarkable change in the birth/death rates of infants in these areas.

A modest program in East Zaire was interrupted in July and August of 1972 by the arrival of 50,000 refugees from Burundi. Nevertheless, three operating preschool clinics were established in the area with the food coming in through Tanzania and the direction from Bukavu.

There are active clinics in sixteen GdN camps providing service to 1,777 mothers and 3,514 preschool children. These clinics are popular and the GdN would like the coverage to be expanded.

The Public Safety Evaluation Team made a surprise visit to Camp Lufungula on the morning of July 18 to observe the program in action. When we arrived there were about 100 mothers and 200 children participating. There was a long orderly line of mothers taking their children to be weighed. Weights were recorded by the supervisor on weight cards. A spot check of these cards indicated they were filled out correctly and were

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up-to-date. There was a considerable amount of friendly rivalry among the mothers on the monthly weight gain of their children.

In another area of the compound, a GdN nurse, trained in nutrition in one of the CRS nutritional seminars, was giving a nutritional demonstration. A few simple teaching aids were in evidence. The day's demonstration was showing how to prepare caterpillars so that they could be digested by infants. The caterpillars are first fried, then ground into powder and sprinkled over a cooked vegetable. The resulting concoction neither looked nor smelled very appetizing but was eaten by the children and the nurse assured the team it was very good for them. Dry milk was being distributed and we were informed all of the mothers knew how to prepare it.

The mothers and children appeared to be clean, healthy, and dressed in brightly colored clean clothes. The people appeared to be in good spirits and there was an almost carnival atmosphere. A half dozen GdN officers were watching the show but did not participate. The clinic was run completely by GdN personnel. There was no CRS supervisor at the site although we were told she had visited the site earlier in the day to distribute the milk. The clinic had all of the outward appearances of a highly successful and popular project.

Very little statistical work has been done in these clinics. Although the weight cards contain a wealth of information, there are no adequate base lines and there are no current plans to collate this data. The data could be transferred to punch cards fairly easily, and it is not too late to start collecting base line data. The team will bring this deficiency to the attention of TAB/N.

The possibility of replication of these clinics appears to be very good. The team understands the GOZ will discuss this with CRS and the Mission. The team did not discuss expansion with any GOZ personnel.

We understand the USAID is considering using these clinics for the new family planning program and that CRS has no objection.

[REDACTED]

It might be possible for the GdN to expand these clinics to include some of the civilian population. A particularly inviting target would be East Zaire where the GdN will be taking over the police function from the military. This is an area where there is considerable civic unrest and the relationship between the government and the people has been uniformly bad. This might be a good opportunity to improve the image of the government in general and the GdN in particular at a relatively modest cost.

While not underestimating the logistics problem of getting food into the interior, CRS has proved it can be done. This suggested expansion has not been discussed with the GOZ whose full support would be a sine qua non. The GOZ would have to provide internal transport and the instructors. AID would provide for the PL 480 food and perhaps the Peace Corps could assist in the coordinator role.

#### LIST OF CLINICS AT GdN CAMPS

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Mothers</u>
Lufungula	738	337
Lemba	601	280
Matete	424	193
Chanic	83	36
Kasa-Vubu	74	30
Kintambo	297	140
Ndolo	153	50
Ndjili	92	40
Nsele	32	15
Matadi-Mayo	34	14
Mont Ngafula	36	19
Lemba	37	17
Matadi	402	256
Soyo	202	140
Ango	185	140
Kolo-Kolo	<u>124</u>	<u>70</u>
TOTALS	3,514	1,777

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B. COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD (CRLG)  
(Garde Cotiere Fluviale et Lacustre)

BACKGROUND

Although Zaire is basically a land-locked country with only approximately 30 miles of ocean coastline, its navigable waterways are considerable. There are 2,445 miles of such waterways with an increasing volume of traffic. Of this total, 1,410 miles, more than one fourth of its entire border area, constitute international boundaries. Of the nine countries bordering Zaire, navigable waterways form at least a part of the boundary with seven (Annex T).

The terrain of much of the land borders is such that these water boundaries become the more accessible routes for border violations such as the illegal ingress and egress of persons and goods. Aside from illegal activities, much of the republic's legal activities, such as fishing and transport of cargo, are conducted thereon. These are attended by the usual governmental responsibilities of enforcing regulations, safety and rescue.

At the time the concept of a waterways guard force was advanced, there existed a problem of infiltration of armed subversives and bandits from outside Zaire's borders. This was taking place via waterway borders. In August 1970, as a result of President Mobutu's state visit to the United States, a request for U.S. assistance in developing a waterborne guard force was agreed to. The CRLG was created by Presidential Decree on November 9, 1970 (Annex U).

While that specific threat has all but dissipated at the present time, there is no assurance it will not at a future time reappear. The other problems and responsibilities not only continue, but are increasing.

Smuggling across Zaire's water boundaries is somewhat unusual in that the most serious movement is out rather than in. The GOZ being one of the world's prime diamond producers, much of its income is derived therefrom. The mining and sale are subjected to government regulations (Annex V).

[REDACTED]

Although arriving at accurate estimates of the amount of diamonds leaving illegally is difficult, there is little doubt that it is a sizable amount. From unrelated sources, the team received the estimated figure at 20% of the total production. An interesting and significant fact is that in the most recently available export figure from Congo Brazzaville appears the listing of diamonds as an item with an estimated value of \$15 million. This is interesting in that that country is not a diamond producer; significant in that the diamonds referred to are logically assumed to have been smuggled out of Zaire via water.

Other diamonds, plus gold and cotton, are being smuggled into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania via water. This constitutes a sizable loss to Zaire's economy. Admittedly, a water patrol force is not in itself the complete solution to the problem of outward smuggling of resources, but it is without question one important and necessary step.

Approximately 390 miles of Zaire's eastern boundary is Lake Tanganyika. This huge body of water forms over half the border with Burundi, the entire border with Tanzania and much of the economy of eastern Zaire is dependent upon the lake. Lake fishing is a sizable industry of the region; a major trade route for cargo is through Tanzania by rail and thence into Kalemie via ship.

These activities impose two important responsibilities on the Government of Zaire - enforcement of laws and regulations and safety of persons. The CRLG is the government agency to whom these responsibilities have been assigned.

#### ORGANIZATION

The CRLG is organized along rather simplified direct command lines. The headquarters staff element consists of the usual four sections - N-1, personnel; N-2, intelligence; N-3, operations; and N-4, logistics. The line element is divided into three segments - Coast Guard, Lake Guard and River Guard. Of these, only the Lake Guard (GL) is currently operational (Annexes W and X).

[REDACTED]

The GL organization follows in principle that of the CRLG headquarters and the future plans call for four operational detachments, one for each of Lakes Tanganyika, Kivu, Mobutu and Amin. Only the Tanganyika detachment is in actual being at this time. It should be noted that current plans for establishing the other three lake detachments envision use of several boats currently under GL control. These include two ordered turned over by the Customs Department and four Russian-built craft which were confiscated. All are to be overhauled and refurbished for this purpose.

The foregoing explains why the major portion of the subsequent discussion will focus generally on the GL and more specifically on the Lake Tanganyika Detachment.

#### PERSONNEL

Colonel Kwima, CRLG Commandant, stated to the team that personnel problems were his greatest concern. While his assignment of priority to this facet reflects sound thinking on his part, closer inspection of the operation reveals a high percentage of capable and energetic people within the organization.

Current strength of the CRLG is 402, 155 of whom are assigned to the GL in Kalemie, 30 at the port of Banana. Breakdown by ranks is given in Annex Y.

It is a new unit, one given a high presidential priority, and therefore has enjoyed a good selection of officers and men being transferred from the army. The boat commanders have also received officer training in Belgium, some as much as six years. A total of 139 officers and men were sent in groups to Mare Island, California, for training in small boat handling and familiarization with the various types of equipment to be installed on the boats.

Receptivity of this training was certainly evident to the team during its stay. The team was met at Kalundu by one of the patrol boats and made a nine-hour trip down Lake Tanganyika to the Kalemie base. The boat was in an excellent state of cleanliness and all mechanical and electronic gear properly working and maintained.

[REDACTED]

The crew was obviously knowledgeable and competent, handled the boat and its equipment professionally. At first glance, the discipline seemed rather casual, but as time went on it became obvious that a stricter degree of discipline was not really necessary. Every member of the crew knows his job perfectly and performed it well without the necessity of barked orders. Everything seemed to be done in proper sequence and with competence. The manner in which the boat was brought alongside another on the lake for transfer of supplies and people and docked in a tight berth at Kalemie reflected real professionalism.

### TRAINING

The above described training of the initial crews got the unit operational in quick time. The long haul training of replacements and additional personnel is an item which deserves immediate attention and action. To assist in accomplishing this there are presently assigned two U.S. Public Safety Advisors and five Filipino technicians with assignments as follows: one Public Safety Telecom Advisor, one Public Safety Maritime Advisor, one TCN Docks and Shipyard Technician, one TCN Engineman, one TCN Logistics Specialist, and two TCN Electronics technicians.

At the time of the team's visit, training was limited to on-the-job training in the several technical and mechanical skills. This is progressing satisfactorily, but is not of sufficient magnitude to meet needs either current or future. This was attributed to a slowness on the part of CRLG headquarters in supplying trainees.

Little or nothing has been done to meet the requirements for other training in the management and operational fields. The Public Safety Advisor has developed POI's and lesson plans, the translation task is almost finished, but there are no definite plans for the start of such training. The reason, or excuse, whichever is more correct, given for the delay is that of awaiting completion of a training center. The training center is part of an enormous complex now under construction, with total completion scheduled for February 1975. The training cannot wait that long and every effort should be exerted to provide interim courses.

EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

The boat inventory of the Lake Tanganyika Detachment consists of six Harbor Police/Customs type 65' launches. A detailed description of these craft is contained in Annex Z.

Although not pertinent to this report, the process of getting the boats on the lake is sufficiently interesting to warrant a brief description. It does illustrate two points - (1) the determination of the GOZ to establish the GL and (2) the extreme difficulties encountered in moving supplies and equipment within the GOZ.

There were no means possible by which to transport the boats intact by either land or water to the lake. They were cut into sections, flown to the site and then rewelded together.

The Techrep team arrived in Kalemie in August 1971. The first boat arrived by air in September, the remaining five in October. By January 1972, all had been reassembled, engines inspected and tested in February, and the boats commissioned by President Mobutu in March. Shakedown cruises were made in April and May 1972; the GL became operational.

This unusual process was successful, but costly to the GOZ. Techrep costs were \$125,000, transportation costs \$778,166, for a total cost of \$903,166.

Inspection of these boats was a surprise for the team. The boat on which the trip was made was expected to be in good shape, and, as previously described, it most certainly was. The surprise was to find the remainder of the fleet equally so. One was encountered on the lake on patrol about one and a half hours out of Kalundu. The remaining four were at the dock in Kalemie. Hulls, decks, and equipment were clean and in working order. One was in for an engine overhaul, the work being done by GL mechanics under guidance of the TCN Engineman.

Headquarters buildings and the Command Operations Center are temporarily located in buildings at the dock awaiting completion of permanent quarters in the complex under construction. Somewhat cramped and makeshift, these facilities are nevertheless being maintained and utilized well (photo, Annex AA).

[REDACTED]

The new complex under construction removes any doubts one might have as to the permanency or future plans of the organization. It will provide family quarters for all personnel, both officer and enlisted, GL headquarters, training center, dependents' school, medical and recreation facilities.

All buildings are of prefab concrete construction with slabs being fabricated on site by an Italian contractor using Zairois labor. Construction began in April 1972, with EM housing given first priority. These are being erected at the rate of one duplex every two days. The EM housing is scheduled for completion in January 1974, the entire complex in February 1975.

#### MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS

At present all mechanical maintenance and repair is done in place on the boat. This is adequate for the time being as the equipment is fairly new and repairs for the most part relatively minor. In anticipation of future needs, they have wisely started on a major repair shop.

At the time of the team's visit, one boat was in for an engine overhaul. Upon going into the engine, it was discovered that a leak had developed causing fuel to run into the engine oil resulting in considerable damage. They were in the process of removing it to the shop as work was too extensive to be done on board.

Interesting and gratifying was the fact that GL personnel who have been undergoing OJT with the TCN were performing the entire job. Aside from those being so trained, others are undergoing OJT in welding and other required skills.

At Kalemie are drydock and cradle facilities owned by CFL which are available on a rental agreement with GL personnel doing repairs.

A critical problem is a lack of tools and spare parts. These were provided for in the original contract with Swiftships, Inc. According to the GL Commander, they have been paid for but efforts to have the company ship them have to date failed. He made a specific point of requesting the team's assistance in this matter.

The amount of parts involved was given at \$178,000. This matter should be pursued and although the funds were entirely GOZ, it is a U.S. company and PSD should give whatever assistance it can.

### OPERATIONS

Patrols and operations are divided into three categories: Normal Patrol, Combat Patrol, and Special Mission. All operations are planned and plotted by the N-3, who also has the authority to alter plans as needs may arise.

Normal Patrol is precisely what the name implies. Exact data were not available beyond the fact that a minimum of one boat is at all times, 24 hours per day, 365 days per year, on patrol. On such patrols, a boat will remain on the lake four to five days with the crew working in shifts. Duties are to check vessels for proper papers, illegal cargo and passengers, enforce commercial fishing laws, assist vessels in distress, interdict rebel or bandit groups, etc.

Figures and data are incomplete, but even the sketchy figures which were available indicated some good work on the part of the GL. In the past year, approximately 300 fishermen were rescued from 10 sinking ships. It is noteworthy that in October 1972 the GL received an official letter of appreciation from the Kalemie Fisherman's Association for their outstanding rescue work.

Twenty boat captains have been apprehended on charges of smuggling to and from Tanzania. An additional eight specialized small smuggling boats have been apprehended. These are 9-ton capacity boats with powerful engines, especially designed for the smuggling trade. In these apprehensions the engines are confiscated and all captured items turned over to Customs officials at Kalemie.

Combat Patrol is the designation of those operations in support of the Army campaign against rebel bands still operating sporadically and on a small scale in the lake border area north of Kalemie. No figures were available on such operations.

[REDACTED]

Special Missions cover a wide range of activity, every type of operation not included in the foregoing two categories. They may be escort duty, special rescue missions, transport of VIP's (the nine-hour trip of the team was listed as a Special Mission), interdiction of goods or people in response to special intelligence, etc. There were no figures available as to numbers of missions or hours involved in this category of mission.

An outstanding example of Special Mission work occurred during the team's stay. On the night of July 29, high winds came up on the lake which caused several boats to flounder. The Detachment Commander dispatched GL boats to render assistance. Five boats which had been set adrift were recovered, 15 persons rescued up to this writing. The GL was continuing the operation.

The team feels that failure to keep accurate records and statistics is a shortcoming which should be addressed. It was fairly clear that the GL is, in fact, doing a creditable job on the whole, much better than its sketchy statistics would reflect. PSD advisors should work to convince the GL of the value of accurate and complete records and assist in devising simple report forms which lend themselves to ready analysis. Such information would be invaluable to both management and operations.

It would provide the necessary tool for devising new and improved patrol methods, preparing budget items, justifying personnel and materiel and the numerous other benefits derived from good record-keeping.

## C. COMMUNICATIONS

### 1. GENDARMERIE NATIONALE

#### BACKGRO UND

Telecommunications assistance has been an element in the development of the internal security forces in the Republic of Zaire. AID has assigned, on a continuing basis, a Public Safety Advisor (Telecommunications) from 1964 to the present. A substantial amount of communications equipment, U.S. Grant, was provided during the period FY 1964 to FY 1972. The equipment is utilized in long and short haul point-to-point communications networks and two-way mobile and fixed networks in urban areas.

The life of telecommunications equipment, depending upon usage, is approximately five to eight years. In 1973, the GOZ, utilizing their own funds, commenced a program to replace worn out equipment and to upgrade and extend networks.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS

a. Telecommunications Directorate, Organization and Staffing

The Directorate is located at Gendarmerie Nationale headquarters in Kinshasa and it is headed by a Chief (rank of Major) who reports to the Chief of Staff. The Directorate is composed of four divisions, Engineering, Operations, Logistics/Maintenance, and Research/Planning (Annex 1), that provide support for the entire GdN telecommunications operations. This support includes training of technicians/operators, assignment of all personnel and management of the telecommunications systems. The overall number of personnel is 166. Of this number, there are 88 radio operators, 21 technicians, 25 administrative and supply personnel, 3 generator mechanics and 29 supervisors of various ranks. Major equipment, replacement materials, and spare parts for the repair of equipment are provided by the Directorate. Day-to-day administration and general supervision of personnel assigned to the regions is the responsibility of Regional Commanders.

b. Existing Telecommunications Networks and Facilities

(1) Long Haul Point-to-Point Networks

There are nine civil police administrative regions, and direct communications exist between Kinshasa GdN headquarters and the other eight regions (Annexes 2 and 3). Within each region there are networks that provide communications between Region Headquarters and sub-region locations. At the present time, there is a total of 32 radio stations. The networks are scheduled to be expanded to 45 stations in 1974 (Annexes 4 to 13).

In each Region Headquarters and sub-region locations, there are installed high frequency (HF) equipment capable of single sideband (SSB) voice and telegraphy (CW) operation. The RF power output

is generally 100 watts with some installations providing 1000-watt output. Four operating channels are utilized on selectable upper and lower sideband frequencies.

There is a partial commercial communications backup to the GdN radio networks. Teletype equipment leased from ONZPT (National Post and Telephone Organization) provides communications between GdN headquarters (Kinshasa), Lubumbashi and Kisangani through ONZPT facilities.

(2) Short Haul Point-to-Point and Two-Way Mobile Networks

Very high frequency/frequency modulation (VHF/FM) radio networks for point-to-point and mobile operations are located in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. These networks tie Commissariats (precincts) together and also enable the headquarters of the Brigade Mobile and Brigade Routier (traffic) to communicate with mobile units.

A variety of VHF/FM equipment, operating on low and high band frequencies, is utilized in these networks. In both Kinshasa and Lubumbashi there are radio repeaters that provide excellent coverage for two-way communications.

The evaluation reports of 1967 and 1969 indicate that ten other cities, in addition to Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, had VHF/FM radio networks installed. The circa 1962 equipment consisted of RCA Fleetline base stations, RCA Super Carfone and LD line mobile stations, and Radio Speciality Mini Pak II and Motorola PT 300 Walkie Talkies. Because of inadequate spare parts, a shortage of skilled police technicians, inability to pay for maintenance contract services, and poor transportation, these networks in the ten cities deteriorated to the extent that they all became inoperative. Most of the equipment was removed from the cities. Some of the worn out equipment was cannibalized, and the parts were used to rehabilitate selected radio sets that had repairable faults. The restored equipment has recently been utilized to expand VHF/FM networks in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi and also reestablish nets in three cities in the Shaba Region.

Presently, there are 94 installations in Kinshasa, 42 in Lubumbashi, and 8 installations in the Shaba Region (Annexes 14 to 19).

c. Radio Communications Centers Operations

(1) Long Haul Point-to-Point Networks

To control the HF-SSB networks, there are Radio Communications Centers (RCC) located at the GdN headquarters (Kinshasa) and in each of the other eight regional headquarters.

The hours of operation are from 0730 to 2100 daily, except during emergencies when the hours are extended. The RCC's conduct regular schedules with the stations in their networks. Transmissions are by telegraphy, and there are standard operating procedures that require all outgoing and in-coming messages to be prepared on a special form.

Message counts for GdN headquarters operations were provided for the period of January through July 1973. Average monthly messages were 240 sent and 375 received. For the same time period, a sampling of the monthly message activity for the other eight regions revealed that each region averaged from 20 to 125 sent and 40 to 105 received. An average message contained 42 words.

The ONZPT teleprinter service, available at GdN headquarters, Lubumbashi and Kisangani, is seldom used, and it was reported that at each location an average of five or six messages are sent and received during a month. ONZPT charges are based on the word count of the message sent.

(2) Short Haul Point-to-Point and Two-Way Mobile Networks

There are four RCC's in Kinshasa, one in Lubumbashi, and one each for the small nets in three cities in the Shaba Region. Visits were made to RCC's in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, and it was observed that the dispatchers and operators of fixed and mobile stations demonstrated good discipline while on the air.

The RCC's for the Brigade Mobile and Traffic Police networks in Kinshasa keep a brief log of the messages sent and the

[REDACTED]

disposition of each radio assignment. Information was not available on the number of messages handled. None of the RCC's have installed message recording equipment.

In Kinshasa, there was not much activity observed at the Brigade Mobile RCC. This was apparently due to the small number of police vehicles on the street. During one daytime shift, it was noted that only three vehicles were available for service.

The posts and camps and precinct VHF/FM radio networks are primarily utilized as a back-up to a poor public telephone system. There is no actual control by the RCC of the message traffic.

The Kinshasa Brigade Mobile RCC has a dispatcher's console and vehicle status board. There is no special set up for a complaint room, and there are only three public telephone lines into the RCC.

The Lubumbashi Brigade Mobile RCC is a temporary installation. However, there are plans for construction of a new headquarters building and the RCC will be installed there.

#### MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

There are three GdN electronics repair shops in Zaire - the inter-region HF-SSB radio shop at Limite (Kinshasa), the Brigade Mobile shop in Kinshasa and the repair shop in Lubumbashi.

The shops located in Kinshasa are equipped with high quality electronics test equipment that enables a skilled technician to perform adjustments and repairs of the radio equipment now utilized in the GdN telecommunications networks. The shop in Lubumbashi is similarly equipped except for two needed test sets, a HF signal generator and a frequency measurement meter.

With the assistance of the TCN's, three assigned to Kinshasa and one assigned to Lubumbashi, the Zairois technicians can handle repairs of any kind. There are four installation teams, each composed of one TCN and three Zairois, that have worked together for more than six months. Each team is capable of installing a complete radio station, which includes locating antennas,

[REDACTED]

installing the radio set, providing the necessary power connections, and final tune-up of the equipment. The teams are presently engaged in replacing worn out HF-SSB radios and upgrading antenna systems.

At each of the shops, there is an electronics parts and materials storeroom. A TCN, who is also an experienced electronics logistician, has trained several Zairois to work as logistics clerks. The clerks are responsible for all stored items and their distribution. All incoming items are posted on cards (Kardex), and a well run stock control system has been established. A card indicates the type and quality of items on hand, the storage bin or shelf location, cost of the item, date of input to storeroom, distribution date, normal levels, and reordering point. When the Brigade Mobile shop was visited, a card was pulled at random and the item was located on the proper shelf. The quantity stored checked accurately with the information on the card.

The acquisition of materials and spare parts now on hand resulted initially from AID procurement of major equipment in the past years. Subsequent needs for parts were met by open-end purchases. The FY 1973 Type "O" PIO/C obligated \$5,000 for procurement of spare parts and test equipment.

The GdN has moved forward in acquiring major equipment with their own funds as indicated by a 1972 purchase of 40 HF-SSB transceivers.

The Chief of the Telecommunications Directorate has forwarded to the GdN Commandant a proposed budget for 1973. It is a special budget for the purchase of major radio equipment, spare parts, technical publications, test equipment and generators. It also includes a request for TDY funds for the GdN technicians. The total funds requested amount to 82,000 Zaires (U.S. \$164,000); however, a firm decision on the budget has not been given. Further delays in approval can result in logistics problems, particularly the replenishment of spare parts.

### TRAINING

Information derived from previous survey and evaluation reports indicate a steady increase in the number of trained

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

telecommunications technicians. There were three Zairois police technicians on the staff in 1963. This was increased to six in 1967 and 15 in 1969 and now to 21 in 1973. All of these technicians received six months of training in the United States. An additional seven men were trained in the United States; however, three resigned and four have been assigned to other duties.

The former participants developed their technical knowledge to qualify for U.S. training through earlier attendance at FAZ and the Organization Nationale Zairoise Poste et Telephone (ONZPT) schools. These schools are still available to GdN personnel.

Various practical electronics training programs in the installation and maintenance of equipment were arranged by the advisors. In recent years, for example, Motorola conducted a six-month course in VHF-FM two-way radio for eight students and a three-week course in HF-SSB radio for six students.

From 1964 through 1971, various telecommunications advisors provided on-the-job (OJT) training for the GdN technicians. Since 1971, TCN's have taken over the OJT, with the advisor occasionally engaging in technical discussions and demonstrations.

Since 1964, 100 radio operators were trained in-country. The police or ONZPT conducted the training, and the courses were generally six months in length. Training was given in telegraphy, procedures and care of radio equipment and generators (first echelon maintenance). Operator training is not being given at the present; however, the GdN has training equipment on hand and classes can be conducted when the need arises.

In the past, Zairois police personnel were not qualified because of a lack of English or an insufficient knowledge of electronics to attend the Telecommunications Management courses sponsored by AID in the United States. Therefore, the development of a telecommunications manager was primarily the result of an advisor's contacts and discussions with his police counterpart.

The present advisor has not been able to proceed with this development effort because his counterpart has been attending the ONZPT radio school in the mornings for two years. His

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afternoons were occupied with normal administrative duties, and he was not available to work with the advisor. However, the requirement does exist for telecommunications managers, and training of suitable personnel should be arranged by the advisor.

GENERAL OVERALL OBSERVATIONS, ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SPECIFIC GOALS AND CONCLUSIONS

The accomplishments toward achieving the goals indicated in the PROP's for FY 1969 and FY 1970 were used as a basis to evaluate the telecommunications sub-project.

Goal - To improve the maintenance capability of the police through OJT and participant training programs.

Accomplishments - The extent of the training provided resulted in an increase of GdN technicians from six in 1967 to 21 in 1973. Training was received in the United States and followed up by practical maintenance courses conducted in-country by Motorola. There is also a continuing OJT program provided by TCN's. The effectiveness of the overall training efforts is quite evident in that the GdN technicians, with guidance from the TCN technicians, can maintain the telecommunications equipment.

Goal - Develop new maintenance facilities to replace existing inadequate repair arrangements and establish storeroom and stock control systems.

Accomplishments - Three radio repair shops, two in Kinshasa and one in Lubumbashi, were established. Each shop has sufficient test equipment to perform all required maintenance. Storerooms were established with the shops and training was given to GdN personnel who had complete responsibility for stock control and record keeping.

Goal - To moderately expand radio networks in support of rural and municipal police operations.

Accomplishment - A program has been initiated to replace unreliable HF-SSB equipment used in the countrywide, long haul radio networks. GdN-funded radio sets are being utilized and,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to date, 18 have been installed. Plans call for the original system of 32 stations to be expanded to 45, all with new equipment.

VHF/FM (high band) radio networks have been established in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi for the support of Brigade Mobile (BM) operations. In Kinshasa, the dispatcher facility, base station, and repeater were installed and operational by April 1971. The Lubumbashi installation was completed in May 1972 before the arrival of the BM vehicles.

Older VHF-FM (low band) equipment, formerly used in a mobile operation, was reworked and installed in a Traffic Police radio network in Kinshasa.

Goal - To establish TCN assistance.

Accomplishment - Four TCN's were employed to work with the GdN in FY 1971. Initially, AID funded the TCN contract; however, in FY 1974, the GdN has taken over the financial obligations of the contract. The PSA assisted the GdN in the preparation of the contract to assure that it was equitable to all concerned.

Goal - To develop a police capacity to support, manage, evaluate, and improve police communications systems.

Accomplishments - The specifics of the cited goal are related to an organization's capability to provide overall management of its telecommunications systems.

Excluding fiscal matters, it can be said that a successful telecommunications operation is the result of the competency of the management personnel. At the present time, the GdN counterpart of the PSA (Telecommunications) is the only officer who possesses telecommunications management experience. It was reported that this experience is very limited. His ability to administer and provide technical guidance falls short in meeting the management demands of the GdN telecommunications operations.

In an attempt to improve his knowledge of telecommunications, this officer has been attending the ONZPT radio school for two

years. During this period, the PSA has had little opportunity to work with him, and consequently development of this officer's management expertise has been retarded.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that the GdN does not have the management capacity that was desired as a goal of this sub-project.

### SUMMARY

As pointed out, in several locations the GdN utilizes the ONZPT teletype system. Consideration was given to the possibility of the GdN leasing teletype circuits. This idea was ruled out because the ONZPT does not have teletype terminals in all locations where the police have command and operational responsibilities. It can be said that the use of HF-SSB in a primary countrywide communications system for the GdN is as valid today as it was in 1963 when the system was first installed.

The VHF/FM communications system developed to support the Brigade Mobile operations in Kinshasa was well conceived. In the implementation of the system, the GdN was able to obtain a very favorable site for the repeater and its antenna. The equipment is installed in the Hotel Inter-Continental, a multi-story building. The system provides very satisfactory communications; however, its effectiveness will be fully realized when more of the BM vehicles are placed back into service.

In Lubumbashi, the Brigade Mobile utilizes a VHF/FM (high band) communications system that is similar to the one in Kinshasa. The dispatching arrangements are temporary and the facility will be moved to a new building. The system greatly assists the police in carrying out its mission.

High marks should be granted to the GdN for their efforts in attempting to restore the posts and camps VHF/FM (low band) network in Kinshasa. The system consists of rehabilitated 1962 vintage mobile type radio sets that operate from car batteries. It has been reported that the radios frequently become inoperable, thus resulting in unreliable communications. During 1972, 28 FM-5 transceivers, with AC power supplies, were procured to upgrade the network. These sets are still in the warehouse.

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They should be immediately installed to replace the obsolete equipment.

The GdN has 21 telecommunications technicians, and this number is considered more than adequate to staff the existing repair shops. There are plans to establish Mobile Brigade operations in other cities. If this occurs, additional shops will be required to maintain the radio equipment that is utilized in the mobile operations. Some of the 21 GdN technicians can be reassigned. A redistribution of the TCN's would also be required. For example, the shops in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi would each need one TCN, thus releasing two TCN's for other shops. It is believed that in a year or two, some of the U.S. trained technicians would be able to maintain radio equipment without too much reliance on a TCN.

With the assistance of the TCN's there are few maintenance problems that cannot be handled by the GdN technicians. This situation has relieved the telecommunications advisor from duties to personally "keep the equipment operable." With this responsibility removed, a redirection of the advisor's efforts is in order.

A very real manpower deficiency exists in the field of telecommunications management. To correct the deficiency, GdN technicians should be trained to become managers. From the group of 21 technicians, there should be several who are qualified to undergo the training.

## 2. COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD

### BACKGROUND

Telecommunications is an important element in the development of law enforcement organizations. Since the establishment of the CRLG, the U.S. Government has provided telecommunications advisory services and a modest quantity of communications equipment.

There were delays in realizing an impact in the telecommunications support of CRLG operations because initially two U.S. telecommunications advisors assigned to the CRLG detachment at Kalemie remained there for an average of only five months. A full-time

advisor was not available for approximately six months and the present (third) advisor arrived at post on May 1, 1973.

Two TCN electronics technicians were assigned to the CRLG at Kalemie through a contract funded by AID/Kinshasa from FY 1971 through FY 1973. Beginning with FY 1974, the CRLG budget has funded the contract under which the TCN specialists are employed.

### TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS

#### Telecommunications Directorate, Organization and Staffing

The Directorate is located at CRLG headquarters in Kinshasa and it is headed by a Chief (rank of First Lieutenant) who reports to the CRLG Commandant (Annex 20).

The Directorate is composed of four sections - Maintenance, Operations, Logistics and Wire (Telephone). All operational and logistical support for CRLG telecommunications countrywide is provided by the headquarters Directorate.

Personnel assigned to the Lake Guard Command and the Lake Tanganyika Detachment are supervised by the commanders of these organizations. The total number of CRLG telecommunications personnel is 40, which includes radiomen, electronics technicians, electricians, and supervisors (Annex 21).

#### Existing Telecommunications Networks and Facilities

High frequency (HF) equipment, capable of single sideband (SSB) voice and telegraphy (CW) operation, are utilized to communicate between CRLG headquarters in Kinshasa and the Lake Guard Command at Kalemie (Annex 22). The equipment in both locations has an RF power output of 1,000 watts and operates on four channels utilizing upper and lower sideband frequencies.

On each of the six patrol boats, based at Kalemie and patrolling Lake Tanganyika, the equipment consists of very high frequency/frequency modulation (VHF/FM) transceiver, direction finder, depth finder, 400-watt HF-SSB transceiver, and radar (Annex 23). The boats communicate with the Detachment Radio Communications Center by HF-SSB, voice or CW, when more than 40 miles

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miles away from Kalemie. For distances less than 40 miles, the VHF/FM transceiver is used.

### Radio Communications Center Operations

There are two Radio Communications Centers (RCC), one each located at Kinshasa and Kalemie.

The Kinshasa RCC, installed in the CRLG headquarters building, is manned by radio operators who are on duty from 0730 to 2100 daily. Radio contacts are made on specific schedules except during emergencies and special occasions. The receiver is always "on" and ready to receive during periods between the scheduled contacts. The radio operators are supervised by a Warrant Officer.

The Kalemie RCC is located at the harbor and it controls point-to-point and ship-to-shore communications for the Lake Tanganyika Detachment. The radio operators are on duty during all hours that the boats are on patrol. Contacts with Kinshasa are made on a regular schedule; however, the receiver is "on" in case non-scheduled communications occur. The center is supervised by a Master Sergeant.

The Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) for RCC operations require all messages to be written on a special form and then given to RCC for transmittal. Received messages are likewise prepared on the form.

The HF-SSB message traffic handled at Kinshasa RCC is very light and it was reported that an average monthly load is 80 messages received and 105 messages sent. The Kalemie HF-SSB traffic load averages 140 received and 175 sent. Contents of a message average 40 words (groups). VHF/FM operational traffic at Kalemie is logged but a message word count is not recorded because the contacts consist of brief conversations.

### MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

In Kinshasa, the CRLG headquarters repair shop and the RCC are in the same room. There is an RF signal generator, a volt-ohm-milliammeter, and some hand tools, which are

inadequate for the maintenance of the HF-SSB equipment in use.

Plans have been prepared to establish a repair shop on the grounds where the CRLG warehouse is located three miles from CRLG headquarters. It was reported that the PSA (Telecommunications) assigned to Kinshasa advises the CRLG in the type of test equipment required to outfit an electronics shop. To date, no action has taken place to acquire the test equipment.

There were some equipment maintenance problems when the HF-SSB equipment was initially installed. However, since that time the equipment which consists of complete HF-SSB installations at Kinshasa, Kalemie and Banana has been operable (Annex 24). The exact number of failures experienced in the past is not known because statistics were not available.

The Warrent Officer (WO) in charge of the Kinshasa RCC also doubles as the technician assigned to maintenance.

All electronics materials arriving in Zaire and destined for the CRLG pass through the Kinshasa headquarters supply office before being shipped to Kalemie. No spare parts are retained and, if at a later date parts are needed by Kinshasa, they are returned from Kalemie.

At Kalemie, the electronics repair shop is located at the Lake Tanganyika Detachment Headquarters. The shop is in one large room and it is equipped with test equipment and tools required to service all the electronics equipment installed on-board the patrol boats and on shore.

There are two TCN's assigned to this repair facility. In regard to CRLG electronics staff, at the present time there is only one technician. However, in August one other technician will report for duty when he completes his U.S. training.

Spare parts, which consist of those furnished when the equipment was procured, are stored in a separate room adjacent to the Kalemie repair shop. A logistics clerk is responsible for stockroom activities as well as preparation of purchase orders, receipt of incoming materials and distribution. A card file system is

[REDACTED]

used for stock control. All purchase orders are sent to CRLG headquarters, Kinshasa, for processing.

### TRAINING

Few electronics personnel are on the CRLG technical staff. As indicated above, there are only two technicians in the entire organization.

The one technician presently at Kalemie trained in-country with the FAZ. The second technician will complete a 26-week advanced telecommunications training program at the Sylvania Technical School, Waltham, Mass., in August 1973 (AID participant). He will be assigned to Kalemie.

In Kinshasa, the 1st lieutenant who commands the Telecommunications Directorate completed a participant program in Telecommunications Management, 26 weeks, at Sylvania in 1973.

All radio operators, shore based and shipboard, were trained either in the FAZ or in the former National Police. The CRLG is not presently conducting training for operators.

### GENERAL OVERALL OBSERVATIONS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF SPECIFIC GOALS, AND CONCLUSIONS

A summary of the FY 1973 ProAg (Project Activity No. 660-11-710-014-1) covering the telecommunications activity states that the principal objectives of the contribution by AID are to assist the GOZ in their programs to:

1. Complete CRLG communications systems and facilities at Lake Tanganyika.
2. Establish a CRLG logistics/supply operation for telecommunications.
3. Develop CRLG capabilities to effectively utilize, maintain and repair communications and navigation equipment and provide a limited quantity of communications items.

Status of the objectives are as follows:

Objective 1 - After a rather slow start, due in part to an unusual number of changes in Public Safety Advisors (Telecommunications) assigned to advise the CRLG, the electronics repair facility and the communications center (RCC) at Lake Tanganyika (Kalemie) were installed. Additionally, equipment was installed at the RCC in Kinshasa and at a CRLG post in Banana, Bas Zaire Region. When the facilities at Kalemie and Kinshasa were visited, the HF-SSB equipment was observed to be in excellent working condition. All of the equipment was installed in a professional manner and in accordance with accepted engineering practices.

Objective 2 - The Kalemie materials and spare parts stockroom was established, and an excellent stock control system has been initiated and is managed by a CRLG NCO. Problems, however, arise when replacement parts are requested. The requests invariably are not expeditiously acted upon by the Logistics Section at the CRLG headquarters. There have been delays of four to six months before processed purchase orders were finally sent to the supplier.

A bad situation exists because Scientific Radio (SR) spare parts are not immediately available to maintain the HF-SSB equipment installed at Kinshasa and Banana. Parts for SR equipment, as stated before, must be obtained from the stocks in Kalemie. Shipment to Kinshasa is a problem because of infrequent airline flights. In regard to the SA-100 transceivers, the Motorola Company in Kinshasa stocks an adequate number of spares that can be procured readily when a purchase order is presented.

Objective 3 - AID accomplished its objective to provide a limited quantity of communications items, primarily radio and electronic shop equipment. Acquisition of the equipment was timely and the value was \$51,000.

Observations were made of the communications and navigations equipment installed on the patrol boats and at the RCC's located in Kalemie and Kinshasa. The equipment was effectively utilized.

The PSA (Telecommunications) and the TCN's have initiated a preventive maintenance program that is being carried out by CRLG technicians.

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Full capability of the CRLG to maintain the communications and navigation equipment has not been realized; however, there has been some progress toward this objective. When unusual equipment failures occur, the repairs are performed by CRLG technicians under the guidance of a TCN. The CRLG technicians are improving and their steadily increased skills enable them to repair some of the inoperable equipment without TCN assistance.

### SUMMARY

The success to date of the overall CRLG operation is in part a result of the effectiveness of the Public Safety Telecommunications sub-project. Inspection of the Kalemie and Kinshasa shore base radio stations revealed that they are well equipped and are capable of providing reliable communications. The CRLG radio operators are experienced and perform their duty with efficiency.

The repair shop at Kalemie is equipped with all the necessary test sets to maintain and repair the radio equipment that is used. CRLG technicians were observed making repairs and alignment tests under the guidance of a TCN. Spare parts are stored properly, and good stock control practices are carried out.

Taken as a whole, it can be said that the Kalemie and Kinshasa telecommunications facilities and technical personnel, Zairois and TCN, provide adequate support to the Lake Tanganyika patrol operations of the scope undertaken at the present time. However, it is understood that the patrol boats will become more active on this lake in the near future. This activity will place a strain on the electronics equipment and more frequent servicing of the equipment can be expected.

There are only two Zairois technicians, and to meet the near future needs for more electronic technicians the CRLG should immediately obtain additional personnel. Ex-FAZ and Gendarmerie Nationale (GdN) personnel who are semi-skilled technicians would be an asset to the staff.

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The CRLG has long range plans to establish patrol operations on other lakes and rivers. The expansion of activities will involve an increase in the number of boats, land facilities, and electronic equipment. Additional personnel will be required to install and maintain the radio and navigation equipment. Therefore, some consideration should be given to future technical staff requirements.

In order to achieve a high degree of technical skill, the electronics technicians should be provided advanced training. The type of advanced telecommunications training desired for CRLG personnel is not available in the United States because such training is not taught in the French language. It is possible that the training can be provided by Belgian schools, and this source should be investigated for Third Country Training.

There is an immediate requirement for a trained telecommunications manager for the Lake Tanganyika operation. The only trained telecommunications manager on the CRLG staff is the present Chief of the Telecommunications Directorate, and his services are needed in Kinshasa. The Zairois technician who will soon complete an advanced telecommunications technician course in the United States would make an excellent candidate to train for management responsibilities. Also, the Warrant Officer who is in charge of the Kinshasa RCC should be considered for management training.

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## CHAPTER VI

### U.S. SECURITY PROGRAMS

#### A. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

##### SETTING

Because of its size, its stable government, its strategic position in the heart of Africa, and its known wealth and potential power, the Republic of Zaire is a key African country. As a consequence of these factors, Zaire can and is contributing in a positive and constructive way to the development of a stable and progressive African continent, which in turn can contribute to greater peace and security in the world.

The Zaire also represents a growing industrial and consumer market of interest to U.S. producers. Moreover, as the source of two-thirds of the world's cobalt and industrial diamonds and a major producer of copper, it is in the interest of the U.S. to maintain access to these strategic minerals in Zaire.

Thus, U.S. policy toward Zaire is based on the proposition that a politically stable and economically prosperous Zaire is of substantial importance to the U.S., as well as to Africa, and that the U.S. has a continuing stake in the country and its future development.

Since Zaire became independent in 1960, the USG has been in the forefront of those nations seeking to promote the independence, territorial integrity and stability of Zaire by assisting in the development of institutions which are responsive to the needs of the Zairian people. As a result of this historical commitment to the development of Zaire, the U.S. enjoys a prestige and goodwill which gives it a unique opportunity to influence policy and programs.

From 1960 to 1965, when President Mobutu came to power, Zaire was torn by chaos and rebellion. Since 1965, by utilizing the army as his primary instrument, President Mobutu has given Zaire a high degree of internal security and peace which contrasts dramatically with the first five years of turmoil and insecurity. Without this internal security and peace, U.S. interests and objectives in and for Zaire would be unattainable.

President Mobutu has recognized the limitation of the army as an institution for preserving internal security. On July 31, 1972, he signed an Ordinance which created a unified National Gendarmerie out of the previously separate National Police and Gendarmerie. This step was taken to strengthen the police forces of the country and to make them more effective in dealing with internal security problems and protecting citizens and their property.

#### ZAIRE OBJECTIVES

Although the GOZ does not have a development plan or a formal statement of goals a number of guidelines or broad objectives were prepared for the first meeting of the Consultative Group held in May of 1971. These included:

- a. Establishment of a strong central authority to transcend regional and tribal rivalries, to promote national identity and unity and to assure security and order in the country;
- b. A rate of growth in domestic product of about 6% annually in the next few years which would raise income throughout the economy;
- c. Improvement in the management of the economy through reorganization of existing institutions and procedures, creation of new ones, and progressive replacement of expatriates by nationals;
- d. Prevention of food shortages in urban centers by increasing agricultural production while reducing food imports;

- 
- e. Development of the poorest areas of the country, particularly the Kisangani region in the northeast; greater emphasis on growth of the regions other than the two existing growth poles of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, the center of the copper region of Shaba.

There is a high degree of correlation between the GOZ goals and those of the USG as one of our basic objectives in Zaire is the establishment of a unified and viable nation, capable of maintaining political stability, internal security and a reasonable rate of social and economic development.

### THE NEED

The need for efficient police forces is growing. Migration to the cities has created a serious problem of unemployment and underemployment of youth in the cities and the level of crime has increased concomitantly. Continued uncontrolled urban migration is virtually certain.

In contrast to their urban brothers, the rural people have been largely neglected by the government and have frequently suffered at the hands of undisciplined troops. There is thus a real need for a trained and disciplined police presence in the rural areas of the country to help to bring more effective government to them.

As the number of motor vehicles in Zaire increases, particularly in the cities, the need has grown for a specially trained police organization to control and regulate motor vehicle operations on the highways and city streets. The accident rate is inordinately high in Zaire.

There is also a need to control and supervise the extensive lakes and rivers which serve as the main arteries of commerce within the country, and also constitute 1,410 miles of Zaire's international boundaries. Smuggling is a particular problem and the GOZ has acknowledged a serious loss of potential revenues through the smuggling of diamonds and other valuable products abroad.

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

With few exceptions nationwide police effectiveness is inadequate. The Gendarmerie and the CRLG are new law enforcement agencies and are in the process of organizing to meet the new or expanding functions. While they are seriously attempting to meet these responsibilities, management systems are virtually non-existent, personnel have little or no professional training, operational procedures either do not exist or are inadequate, and logistical support is inadequate.

Left to themselves it is doubtful if Zaire could maintain the level of law enforcement that they now have. They are aware of this problem and are purchasing technical assistance in the form of having third-country nationals. In addition, the Belgians have 32 advisors on board and have done a modest amount of training of GdN personnel at the Gendarmerie Academy in Belgium. With this level of outside technical assistance, the GdN could probably maintain its present level of effectiveness and also make some slow improvements. U.S. assistance is critical in institutionalizing improved police procedures and acceleration and development process.

PROJECT PURPOSE

The purpose of the Public Safety project is to assist the GOZ to develop an efficient, effective national law enforcement organization in terms of manpower, management systems, and police service. The achievement of this purpose will assist in the attainment of both the GOZ and USG goals as, in order for the objectives of political stability and economic growth to be accomplished, an environment of internal security must be established and maintained. The importance of such an environment cannot be overemphasized as without internal security, which implies at least a minimal measure of law and order, it is not possible to create or maintain a unified and economically viable nation. Development and security are closely related. Insecurity will retard or preclude development and without at least minimal development to provide employment for the growing population, and particularly to the rapidly expanding urban sector, order and stability are next to impossible.

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The GOZ is aiming at effective police operations functioning out of all eight regional capitals and Kinshasa, providing police protection, for the first time, to the vast majority of the population. Our project supports this objective with the added caveat that the interface between the police and the people be favorable.

### SUMMARY

With few exceptions, nationwide police effectiveness is inadequate. The GdN and the CRLG are new law enforcement agencies and are in the process of organizing to meet the new or expanded functions. While they are seriously attempting to meet these responsibilities:

- management systems are virtually non-existent.
- personnel have either limited or no professional training.
- operational procedures either do not exist or are inadequate or antiquated.
- logistic support is woefully inadequate to meet current enforcement requirements.

The lack of law enforcement in rural areas, as described in the Public Safety Survey of 1969, remains basically unchanged. However, the GOZ has centralized all civil law enforcement responsibilities in the GdN and the CRLG. President Mobutu, in recent speeches, has placed increased emphasis on the enforcement of civil law. The role of the army is being redirected from police duties to defense. The GOZ seriously desires a more effective police operation and is prepared to back this desire with both manpower and money. They also want and will use continued U.S. support for this effort.

In summary, U.S. interests and objectives in Zaire cannot be achieved without adequate internal security. It has been the policy of the USG to assist the GOZ in its efforts toward nation building and economic and social progress and a Public Safety program has been a key element of this policy. Continuation of an AID Public Safety program, assisting the Gendarmerie

[REDACTED]

Nationale to assume primary responsibility for all public security in situations short of a large scale insurrection is in our interest, as is continued PSD assistance to the Coastal River and Lake Guard.

B. THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

HISTORY

The Public Safety Program was initiated in the then Democratic Republic of the Congo in September 1963 with the assignment of one advisor to the country. Since implementation of the program the size of the project had been predicated on the desire to maintain a minimal U.S. presence in the country with the understanding that Belgian and United Nations technician efforts should serve as the primary support action. In line with this predication, at the time of the 1967 evaluation, the PSD staff had been increased to six advisors with a total funding of \$413,000. Total funding as of that time, since program inception, was \$2,346,000.

The primary objective of the PSD project has been, and still is, the improvement of the ability of the government of the country to maintain internal security through establishment of various PSD sub-projects as well as providing advisory assistance, participant training in the United States and a minimum amount of commodities. A large number of these sub-projects achieved the desired results and the improvement, though somewhat limited as a result of internal unrest, was obtained.

In 1969, at the request of the American Ambassador, a second evaluation of the Public Safety program was made and progress, as noted above, was considered substantial. To enhance this progress, it was decided as a result of the evaluation to focus PSD advisory support on achievement of four high impact areas: (1) accelerated training of National Police through the use of Rural Mobile Training Teams, (2) establishment of a police motorized patrol operation, (3) continued development of police communications network for Kinshasa, and (4) development of a maintenance facility in Kinshasa and training of garage supervisory and repair personnel. The PSD program was based on a five-year effort (through FY 1975) and a recommendation was made to increase

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the PSD staff to eight advisors in order to administer the increased responsibilities. Funding for the total program was estimated at slightly in excess of \$3,659,000.

In November 1970, the CRLG (Coastal River and Lake Guard) was initiated by decree and advisory support was provided along with minimum commodity support particularly in telecommunications. The PSD advisory staff was increased to ten to provide the required additional technical support.

Some progress has been made in achievement of goals in the four high impact areas. There is an established, operating mobile patrol in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi; there is a far more efficient network of telecommunications in operation both in Kinshasa and nationwide; the RMTT program is considered one of the more successful programs initiated within the Zaire, having been phased out in November 1972 after successfully training better than 15,000 policemen out of the estimated 16,000 having little or no police training; a police garage and maintenance facility is in operation and functioning in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi though efficiency is handicapped by the lack of parts and tools.

Progress would, it is felt, have been measurably greater but for the change, in August 1972, eliminating the National Police and the Gendarmerie and creating, under the Department of Defense and answering to the Minister of Defense (the President), a new organization, the National Gendarmerie. The resulting confusion, inherent in a change of this magnitude, created difficulties in providing assistance to the new organization. Chief among these difficulties has been the continued interference by the Military in the civil law enforcement role of the National Gendarmerie.

ZAIRE PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING  
 FY 1969 through FY 1972  
 (\$000)

	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>4-Year Total</u>
Technicians	229	205	275	342	
Participants	65	74	82	115	
Commodities	84	80	186	125	
Other Costs	-	21	21	70	
FY TOTALS	378	380	564	652	1,974

PROJECT PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

The team found that the PSD project suffered from a certain lack of focus. Individual efforts were going forward effectively but there was some lack of cohesiveness and the individual assignments were not always integrated into a team effort. Part of the problem could be traced to incomplete planning, a failure to test the validity of key assumptions and some rather tenuous linkages between inputs, outputs and project purpose.

The planning, design and implementation of the project have not been completely staffed. Although general long term goals have been established for the project, the team was not always able to find meaningful bench marks or time-phased targets for the work being done, so that progress toward achievement of targets could be evaluated. USAID/Z has not followed the Agency's design or evaluation system (M.O. 1026.1) for this project. A logical framework to assist in testing project design has never been submitted. A Project Implementation Plan has never been prepared. The only Project Appraisal Report submitted for this project was prepared in November of 1969. Job descriptions and anticipated work accomplishments for the individual advisors lacked both precision and follow-up. Coordination with the significant Belgian assistance program to the GdN appeared to be minimal. While adherence to the Agency's PAR/PIP/PROP system would not in itself solve these problems, the system is designed to surface such problems in a timely manner.

It was noted that none of the USAID staff, including PSD staff, have taken the Agency's Project Design and Evaluation Training Course offered by the Washington Training Center several times per year. It is recommended that at least one member of the Program Office and one member of the PSD staff take this course as soon as possible. Some other members of the Mission could profit from this course, and it could be taken either during home leave or prior to assignment to post. Alternatively, the Mission may wish to have this training conducted at post for all Mission members. This can be arranged through a formal request to AID/W - PPC.

[REDACTED]

It is recommended that a PIP and logical framework be prepared for this project in conjunction with the PROP revision that will be required for the recommended restructuring of the project.

The FY 1973 project documentation has improved over FY 1971 and FY 1972, but still needs to pay further attention to describing specific targets and measurable results. The obligations of each party are clearly spelled out in the agreement, with the exception of the use of counterpart and matching funds. Although the amount of such grants and the procedures for their use were clearly specified, the purposes for which the funds are to be used were left vague to allow for maximum flexibility. On the whole, the GOZ has not honored the requirements of the project agreement for the provision of matching funds and the provision of counterpart funds has been spotty and slow. The advisability of including requirements in the agreement that historically have not been honored is subject to question.

Counterpart fund availability for the PSD project will soon be exhausted. Requirements of \$1.2 million were included in the FY 1972 ProAgs (subject to the availability of funds), and \$1.4 million included in the FY 1973 ProAg. Only \$430,000 was available to cover the FY 1972 obligations and none is available for the FY 1973 requirements. Future generations of counterpart funding are highly problematical.

Although the system works imperfectly, some counterpart funds are available to the advisors to assist them in carrying out their responsibilities. The ability to tap this source of funds greatly enhances the effectiveness of the advisors as to some extent the advisors can by-pass the inadequate and cumbersome budgetary procedures. An examination of alternative ways to maintain this effectiveness in view of the imminent exhaustion of the counterpart funds should be undertaken on an urgent basis.

#### PSD STAFF REQUIREMENTS

##### 1. Current

The USAID/Kinshasa/PSD staffing pattern consists of 11 positions, 9 of which are filled by direct hire PS Advisors, one contract employee and one position is vacant. This position now

[REDACTED]

vacant was created for a Generalist Advisor to be stationed in the Eastern Zaire area. This position is discussed later. Currently three advisors are in regional locations, the remainder in Kinshasa.

Positions and general duties are as follows:

1. Chief Public Safety Officer
2. Deputy Chief Public Safety Officer  
GdN and CRLG command levels, Special Staff
3. Generalist Advisor  
GdN Deputy Commander, B-4
4. Generalist Advisor  
B-1, B-2, B-3
5. Training Advisor  
Training Directorate, Matete School
6. Municipal Advisor  
Kinshasa Region, Brigade Mobile
7. Communications Advisor  
Telecommunications Directorate
8. Regional Advisor  
All elements Shaba Region, Kasapa School,  
Lubumbashi
9. Communications Advisor  
CRLG, Kalemie
10. Maritime Advisor  
CRLG, Kalemie
2. Proposed

The team feels that the currently programmed eleven Public Safety Advisors are sufficient to meet advisory needs of the GdN and the CRLG. The draft PROP for FY 1974 attempts

[REDACTED]

to make a case for a sizable increase in advisor personnel; this was to some degree supported by a request made to the team by the Deputy DG of the GdN when he stated a need for a permanently stationed advisor in each of the nine police regions. (At present, there is one assigned to the Kinshasa Region and one to Shaba Region.)

The team agrees that such expansion would be perhaps ideal and no doubt fruitful in upgrading the force. But at the same time, it is not deemed essential and it is felt that by careful realignment of duties and better utilization of advisory time, the major objectives can be achieved within the current staff strength.

The prime thrust of the program at this time is to assist in the initial organization, policy development and training of the newly created Gendarmerie Nationale. At no time during the history of the program has the opportunity for long lasting impact of Zaire's civil police posture been greater. Therefore, a major advisory effort should be directed, as it presently is, at the policy making level.

As important as it is, however, such effort is largely academic unless there is implementation of newly developed policies and procedures coupled with systematic follow-up to assure adherence thereto. It is at this point that field or operational level advisory services are important, but the team does not feel that full-time presence in the various regions is absolutely necessary.

A more practical procedure would be to provide this level of advice through extended TDY's to the field by headquarters based PSD Advisors, but only in company with their high level headquarters staff counterparts. Several purposes would be thusly served: (1) Only if accompanied by officers of authority would the advisor's efforts to influence action be of maximum benefit; (2) It would serve as a furtherance of OJT for the senior officer in learning how to assess field commanders' actions and thereby create less dependence upon the advisor's expertise; and (3) It eliminates the need for full-time advisors at the field level.

The realignment of advisors' duties and redirection of effort should, and properly so, be done on the scene within the USAID/ PSD in consonance with the developing GdN organization. Aside from this overall realignment, there are some assignments which

the team does recommend: (1) Change the already approved and funded Generalist position to that of a Motor Maintenance/Logistics Specialist for a one-tour assignment; (2) From the PSD/Kinshasa headquarters complement, make one advisor available for the Lake Tanganyika Sector for a maximum period of one year (both of these assignments are discussed in the respective sections of the report); and (3) Replace the position of Deputy Chief with an O&M qualified Generalist. The team envisions the primary duties of this position as advising the general staffs of both the GdN and the CRLG in matters of budget, planning, organization, management, etc. The team cannot justify a position of Deputy Chief as a full-time assignment. During such times as the Chief may be absent the O&M Generalist could be expected to assume the acting role.

The team feels that the previously discussed periodic visits to the field commands are an essential part of the development process and should be given a higher priority than the ad hoc basis on which they are presently being done. One of the reasons for infrequent trips is the less than desirable level of transportation facilities within the GOZ.

The team was unable to gather firm figures on previous year costs for internal commercial air travel by PSD advisors and GOZ counterparts, but given the high cost of travel within Zaire, a cost study seems to be in order. Simultaneously, a study should be made into the possibility of regularly pre-scheduled contract aircraft on a once or twice per month schedule.

Thought should also be given to a joint use and joint payment possibility between the Embassy, USAID and the GOZ. Advantages would be many, cost probably no more, and possibly less, than those currently being expended.

#### PARTICIPANT REQUIREMENTS

Since the beginning of the program through March 1973, a total of 151 participants have received training in the United States. This figure does not include the group training of 139 CRLG officers and men who were initially trained in small boat handling in 1971. A breakdown by type is shown in Annex BB.

Because of the reorganization currently underway, the team was unable to obtain accurate information as to the current assignments of these personnel.

The Mission proposes an average annual requirement for 27 participants through FY 1975. While this overall figure does not appear excessive, there is no indication that it is in fact based upon preplanned needs. For example, it reflects an annual input of five telecommunications technicians. The team cannot justify this requirement. As will be discussed in the Telecommunications section of this report, those already so trained, if properly utilized and coupled with in-country training, are sufficient to meet the requirements.

Other training needs should be determined by requirements of the new organization as they become known with a concentration on management level and in the field of training, at both instructor and management levels.

It is felt that a maximum of 20 participants per year should meet these requirements amply and the team so recommends.

#### COMMODITY REQUIREMENTS

A need for high cost U.S. funded commodity input does not exist in the Zaire Public Safety program. There is, however, a real requirement for continued provision of modest amounts of commodities for such categories as communications equipment and maintenance, vehicle maintenance parts and equipment, training aids and supplies, and, small amounts of individual equipment for demonstration purposes in proposed model programs.

Exact costing of these items is best left to the PSD in Kinshasa. A total figure of \$125,000 per year for FY 1974 through FY 1976 is deemed adequate and reasonable for this purpose and is so recommended.

#### C. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The armed forces of Zaire consist of a 45,000-man army, of which its 750-man air force is an element. It is for the most part an infantry level force with little armor heavier than that

normally considered infantry. It is an all volunteer force as Zaire does not have a conscription law. It is dispersed geographically in seven military regions.

Assistance to the armed forces is provided by five donor nations, including the United States. Each of these will be commented on briefly.

U.S. military assistance has existed continuously since the original agreement in July 1963. It has never been a large effort, consisting of 64 officers and men at peak, and its current complement is 21, made up of eight officers and 13 EM. In the period FY 1963 to FY 1970, total MAP grant assistance totaled \$28.86 million; such assistance was discontinued at the end of FY 1970.

Since that time all material input has been through Foreign Military Sales. The current fiscal year's programmed FMS level is at \$3.5 million, a like figure planned annually through FY 1979. U.S. military advisory efforts are directed to three areas - ground and air transport, communications and logistics.

The other military advisory efforts are:

1. A Belgian mission of 216 personnel advises the Department of Defense (DDN) and the training centers.
2. An Italian mission of 91 advises the Air Force, both in pilot training and maintenance.
3. A nine member Israeli team has been advising the airborne element. This activity is being phased out in the current year, a sufficient number of airborne troops and instructors having been trained.
4. A U.K. mission of 9 personnel is serving as advisors in combat engineering.



## CHAPTER VII

### OTHER DONORS

Other than rather minimal assistance from Belgium, there are no other sources of aid to the GOZ civil police forces.

Belgian assistance takes two forms - training in Belgium and the furnishing of advisors. The training at present consists of some four or five GdN officers per year being sent to the Royal Gendarmerie School in Belgium.

It should be noted that while the term "Advisor" is applied to those personnel assigned to the GdN, it is not a correct description of their duties. They are, in fact, operational in the various branches and sections of the organization.

At present there are 14 civilians, all former National Police Advisors, who are being terminated at the end of their current tours. The first to leave in August 1973, the last in November 1974. None will be replaced.

Eighteen career Belgian Gendarmerie Warrant Officers are similarly assigned. It is noteworthy that none are above the Warrant Officer rank. Three of these (assigned to the Presidential Guard) are scheduled to be terminated by October 1973. There are no plans presently for the termination of the remaining 15. Distribution of these personnel is shown below:

DISTRIBUTION OF BELGIAN ADVISORS

	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Gendarmerie</u>
Administrative B-1 and B-4	4	1
Headquarters Staff B-2 and B-3	2	1
Training		
Directorate	1	0
Schools	2	7
Regions		
Kinshasa	3	1
Other	2	3
Presidential Guard	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS	14	18

PERSONS CONTACTED

AMERICANS

H. E. Sheldon Vance	U. S. Ambassador
Mr. Michael Newlin	DCM
Mr. Hermon Davis	USAID Director
Col. Patrick Neilond	DAO
Lt. Col. David Glamm	Air Attache
Lt. Col. Robert Smith	ZAMISH
Mr. James Kelly	USAID Program Officer
Ms Carol Adelman	USAID Program Office
Mr. James Graham	USAID Program Office
Mr. Arthur Thompson	USAID Controller
Maj. Baxter Snider	ZAMISH
Maj. James Nynk	ZAMISH
Mr. John Salmon	POL U. S. Embassy
Mr. Lawson Mooney	Catholic Relief Service
Mr. Charles Leister	Chief, Public Safety Division
Mr. Arthur Garza	Deputy Chief, Public Safety Division
Mr. Edward Merseth	Public Safety Division
Mr. Frederick Powell	Public Safety Division
Mr. Guy Gibson	Public Safety Division
Mr. John Means	Public Safety Division
Dr. Robert Close	Director, Mama Yemo Hospital
Mr. Frank Crump	Consular Officer, Kisangani
Mr. David Loving	Consular Officer, Bukavu
Mr. Robert Jacobs	Vice Consul, Lubumbashi
Mr. Gilbert Johnson	Vice Consul, Lubumbashi
Mr. John Toole	Public Safety Division - Kalemie
Mr. Claude LePendu	Public Safety Division - Kalemie
Mr. Roy Hatem	Public Safety Division - Lubumbashi

GENDARMERIE NATIONALE

Brig. Gen. Singa	C. G. GdN
Col. Ngoy	Deputy Commander, GdN
Capt. Musinge	B-3
Capt. Tshikudi	B-4
Maj. Mulendi	Chief, Telecom Directorate
Maj. Congold	Chief, Training Directorate/Matete School

[REDACTED]

PERSONS CONTACTED (cont.)

Capt. Kusaby	Chief, Motor Maintenance - Kinshasa
Capt. Ngoy	Deputy CO, Matete School
Lt. Ndikumia	Commander, Kinshasa Mobile Brigade
Capt. Kabangu	Acting Commander, Haute Zaire Region
Major Lufungula	Commander, Kisangani Sub-Region
Major Tawaba	Acting Commander, Kivu Region
Major Ngomba	Commander, Shaba Region
Lt. Kisimba	Commander, Lubumbashi Mobile Brigade
Lt. Soza	Acting Commandant, Kasapa School
Oso Kimana	Chief, Motor Maintenance - Lubumbashi
Major Mumba	Budget Office
Capt. Komba	Budget Office
Lt. Tshindigi	Chief, Telecom, Shaba Region
Adj. Mwamba	Chief, Telecom, Haute Zaire Region
MSgt. Kabdngo	Acting Chief, Telecom, Kivu Region

COASTAL RIVER & LAKE GUARD

Col. Kwima	Commandant
Maj. Mondonga	Deputy Commandant
Capt. Kaba	N-3
Capt. Tumba	N-4
Capt. Katele	Chief, CRLG Commo
Capt. Mongoy	N-2
Capt. Mavua	N-1
Maj. Mbenza	Commandant, Lake Guard
Capt. Diamonika	Lake Tanganyika Deputy Commander
Capt. Manata	Operations Officer, Lake Guard
Lt. Lukanda	CRLG Telecommunications
Sgt. Munangi	Chief, Lake Guard, Telecommunications

OTHER GOZ OFFICIALS

Mr. Assumani	Regional Commissioner, Haute Zaire
Col. Bansenga	Chief of State, Military Region 3, Haute Zaire
Col. Zonga	Acting Commander, Military Region Kivu
Mr. Salumu	Commissioner, Kalemie Sub-Region

[REDACTED]



PERSONS CONTACTED (cont.)


BELGIAN ADVISORS

Mr. Reconnu	Matete School
Adc. Massaux	Kasapa School
Adj. Somville	Kasapa School
Mr. Jean Brissont	GDN Budget/Finance



ABBREVIATIONS USED

ADC	Belgian Warrant Officer Rank
ADJ	Belgian Warrant Officer Rank
CDC	Civil Disturbance Control
CDU	Civil Disturbance Unit
CFL	Government Organization for Rail & Water Transport
CRLG	Coastal River and Lake Guard
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DDN	Department of Defense
FAZ	Zaire Armed Forces
FAZA	Zaire Air Force
GdN	Gendarmerie Nationale
GF	River Guard
GL	Lake Guard
GOZ	Government of Zaire
IPA	International Police Academy
JMPR	Revolutionary Party Youth Wing
NP	National Police (Abolished in 1972 when the new GdN was created)
OJT	On-The-Job Training
OSO	Acting Warrant Officer
POI	Program of Instruction
RMTT	Rural Mobile Training Team
ROZ	Republic of Zaire
SODEMAZ	Air Charter Company (also services FAZA)
SOS	Senior Officers Seminar
TCN	Filipino Technician
ZAMISH	U. S. Military Mission to Zaire



GENDARMERIE NATIONALE  
DECREE

O. L. 72/041 Establishing the Organization  
of the National Gendarmerie

Unofficial Translation

Republic of Zaire  
Department of National Defense  
Cabinet

Communique to the Press


The Cabinet of the Department of National Defense announces the following:

On August 30, 1972, the President of the Republic signed Ordinance-Law No. 72/041 establishing the organization of the National Gendarmerie. The dispositions of this ordinance will become effective gradually under directives of the Department of National Defense and of the Commandant of the National Gendarmerie. The units and present services of the National Gendarmerie and of the ex-National Police of Zaire will continue to function until the new order.

For the National Council of Defense

signed

Chief of the Cabinet Molongya Mayikusa  
Brigade General



Ordinance-Law No. 72/031 of 31/07/72 Establishing Institution of  
a National Gendarmerie for the Republic of Zaire.

The President of the Republic,

In accordance with the Constitution,

In accordance with law No. 72-007 of July 3, 1972, authorizing  
the President of the Republic to take, pursuant to Article 52 of the  
Constitution, measures under domain of law,

Directs that:

Article 1:

A National Gendarmerie is instituted for the Republic of Zaire.

Article 2:

The National Gendarmerie is an integral part of the Armed  
Forces of Zaire.

Article 3:

The National Gendarmerie alone will assume all the missions  
formerly assigned to the present Gendarmerie and to the National  
Police.

Article 4:

The initial Constitution of the National Gendarmerie includes  
all elements of the present Gendarmerie and certain select agents  
of the National Police.

Article 5:

The administration and management of the National Gendarmerie  
belong exclusively to the Minister of National Defense who can  
delegate all or part of his powers.

Article 6:

All equipment and materiel presently used by the Gendarmerie and by the National Police are transferred to the National Gendarmerie.

Article 7:

The overall command of the National Gendarmerie is conferred upon a senior or general officer of the Armed Forces of Zaire who carries the title of Commandant of the National Gendarmerie.

Article 8:

An ordinance-law will establish the organization and implementation and determine the regular and special missions of the National Gendarmerie.

Article 9:

Until the promulgation of the ordinance-law establishing the organization of the National Gendarmerie, the implementation of the Gendarmerie of the Armed Forces of Zaire and that of the National Police remain temporarily in effect, except that which concerns the general inspection of the National Police and the detachments under command of the Commandants of the Military Regions of the Armed Forces of Zaire.

Article 10:

The dispositions of legislative ordinance No. 081/188 of May 11, 1960, used by the Force Publique to maintain peace and public order will remain temporarily in effect until promulgation of the ordinance-law establishing organization of the National Gendarmerie of Zaire.

Article 11:

The members of the National Gendarmerie are administered by the Statute of the Officers and Sub-Officers of the Armed Forces of Zaire.

They are subject to military jurisdiction for infractions of any nature that they can commit.

Article 12:

The Minister of National Defense is responsible for the execution of the present ordinance-law which is in effect upon the date of his signature.

Executed at Kinshasa,

date \_\_\_\_\_

signature \_\_\_\_\_

MOBUTU SESE SEKO  
General of the Armed Forces

Ordinance-Law No. 72-041 of August 30, 1973, Establishing  
Organization of the National Gendarmerie of Zaire

The President of the Republic

In accordance with the Constitution,

In accordance with Law No. 72-007 of July 3, 1972, authorizing  
the President of the Republic to take, pursuant to Article 52 of  
the Constitution, measures under domain of law;

In accordance with Legislative Ordinance No. 081/188 of  
May 11, 1960, regulating use of the Force Publique to maintain  
peace and public order;

In accordance with Ordinance-Law No. 72-031 of July 31,  
1972, establishing institution of a National Gendarmerie for the  
Republic of Zaire, specifically in its Article 8;

Upon proposal of the Branch of the National Executive Council  
responsible for National Defense;

Directs that:

Section I: General Dispositions

Article 1:

The Gendarmerie is a force instituted to guard the public  
security and to assure maintenance of order and execution of the  
laws.

A continuous and preventive surveillance constitutes the  
essence of its service.

Its purview extends throughout the entire extent of the territory  
of the Republic.

Article 2:

The Gendarmerie must assist anyone in danger who requires  
its help.

Article 3:

The general dispositions of the military laws and regulations are applicable to the National Gendarmerie except the modifications and exceptions that its organization and the mixed nature of its service render necessary.

Article 4:

Militia of the Gendarmerie who are officers of the Judiciary Police in general capacity or officers of the Judiciary Police in restricted capacity must take oath before entering service before the Counsel of War sitting in public audience.

Article 5:

Members of Gendarmerie, even alone, are qualified to intervene and act in uniform or civilian status, except that in the latter case, they must justify their status.

Section II: General Organization

Chapter I: Composition

Article 6:

The National Gendarmerie includes:

- A general Command assisted by a Chief of Staff whose headquarters are located in the Capital;
- Regions of the Gendarmerie comprised of land and mobile units;
- Judiciary Detachments;
- Schools;
- Special units or services.

Article 7:

The forces of the National Gendarmerie are placed under the orders of a senior or general officer of the Gendarmerie who carries the title of Commandant of the National Gendarmerie.

He reports directly to the Branch of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense.

Article 8:

In each Region, the Gendarmerie forces are placed under the authority of an officer of the Gendarmerie bearing the title of Regional Commandant of the Gendarmerie and assisted by a Chief of Staff.

Article 9:

The Region of the Gendarmerie comprises land units, mobile units as well as special services.

Article 10:

The land units of the National Gendarmerie are divided as follows:

- One or several battalions of the Gendarmerie, for each Region commanded by an officer of the Gendarmerie.
- One land company of the Gendarmerie for each Sub-Region.
- One land section of the Gendarmerie for each zone.
- Several land sections of the Gendarmerie form a land platoon of the Gendarmerie.

Article 11:

Specialized elements exist in the different echelons of this organization:

- At the national echelon, a central records office and a foreign records office;

- At the regional echelon, a regional records office;
- At the company echelon, a motorcycle brigade, one or more special brigades of research and surveillance, one or more road brigades, one or more air or marine transport brigades.

Other units or special services of the Gendarmerie can be organized upon decision by the member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense.

Article 12:

The brigade of air transport is responsible for surveillance of both civil and military air traffic and particularly with investigation of air pirates.

It also furnishes all required assistance to customs officials.

Article 13:

The river or lake marine brigade is responsible for the security and policing of ports.

It controls persons and commerce in the center and subject areas of the ports and controls installations and docks.

It furnishes all required assistance, in conformance to the laws, to customs officials.

Article 14:

The special brigade for research and surveillance is responsible for actively investigating persons charged or wanted for serious crimes and of surveilling suspects in particular.

Article 15:

The Highway Patrol is responsible primarily to investigate violations of the laws and regulations of the Traffic Police and of road traffic.

~~UNITED OFFICIAL USE~~

## Chapter II: Personnel

### Article 20:

The conditions of recruitment of the militia of the Gendarmerie are determined by the member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense.

### Article 21:

The National Gendarmerie is composed of officers, sub-officers, non-commissioned officers, and gendarmes.

Officers, sub-officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of other armed forces can be assigned to service in the Gendarmerie.

### Article 22:

The officer and subaltern manpower level is determined by the member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense who also determined their distribution by rank.

## Section III: Mission of the Gendarmerie

### Chapter I: General Dispositions


### Article 23:

The functions of the Gendarmerie have both a preventive and a repressive character.

They are divided into regular and special functions.

Regular missions are those of daily operation or of determined periods not requiring any request of judiciary, administrative civilian or military authorities.

Special missions are those undertaken under orders, requisitions or requests for assistance.



Article 16:

The mobile units of the Gendarmerie are responsible for supporting the land Gendarmerie in execution of all missions under purview of the present Ordinance-Law and particularly with respect to the maintenance and reestablishment of public order whenever it is threatened.

They are constituted in mobile battalions which are comprised of mobile companies and special services.

Article 17:

The judiciary detachments are attached to the Auditor General as well as the Military Auditor under the exclusive supervision of the latter.

They are responsible specifically for investigation and verification of crimes which come under military jurisdiction.

In addition, they are responsible for central intelligence with respect to the security of the armed forces.

Article 18:

The Garde Republicaine of Kinshasa constitutes a Region of the Gendarmerie commanded by an officer.

It is divided into two battalions:


- The Gendarmerie Foot Battalion
- The Gendarmerie Presidential Escort.

Aside from military assignments, it is specifically responsible for the Guard of Honor and for the security of the President of the Republic.

Article 19:

The administration and jurisdiction of the Gendarmerie units are determined by the member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense.





Article 24:

The objectives of both the regular and special missions is essentially to assure within all points of the territory of the Republic continual direct action of the judiciary, administrative and military police and maintenance and reestablishment of public order.

Article 25:

Any commander of a unit or detachment of the Gendarmerie can, when the means at his disposal become insufficient, request the assistance of other units of the armed forces or of elements of the Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution.

Any soldier of the Gendarmerie may, when he is attacked while on duty, request the assistance of persons present on the spot; these persons must comply with the request. In case of refusal, they are subject to penalty of penal servitude from one to seven days and a fine of 1 to 5 zaires or one of these penalties only.

Article 26:

In the exercise of their functions, the militia of the Gendarmerie may, in case of absolute necessity, use sidearms (i. e., baton or bayonet) or firearms:

1. when violence or assault and battery are exercised against them or against others;
2. when they cannot otherwise defend their post, the establishments, posts or persons under their jurisdictions.

Except for the disposition of the first paragraph, when, in the exercise of their functions, the militia of the Gendarmerie are responsible for dispersing mobs or putting down riots, they may, in case of absolute necessity, use sidearms (i. e., baton or bayonet) without preliminary request but they may not use firearms without preliminary request of the legal authority responsible for maintaining order.

Before any use of firearms, this authority will make three formal announcements in the following terms:

"Under order of law, firearms will be employed, all good citizens under cover."

The militia of the Gendarmerie can use firearms without preliminary request of the said authority at any time that persons forming a mob or responsible for a riot are in flagrante violation and cannot be suppressed except by the use of firearms.

Article 27:

Except for the dispositions of Article 26, any commandant of a unit or detachment of the Gendarmerie, under his own initiative or under request, in dispersing mobs, must, if the circumstances permit him, advise repeatedly in a loud voice the trouble-makers to disperse.

In the case of refusal to obey his injunctions, he can order the use of special, less offensive weapons other than bayonets or firearms.

Article 28:

The gendarmerie must try to seize the instigators of disorder and persons guilty of violations of penal law. Individuals apprehended must be removed as quickly as possible from the site of the trouble.

Chapter II: Regular Duties of the Gendarmerie

Section I: Judiciary, Administrative and Military Police

Article 29:

The Gendarmerie is responsible for preventing violations, for investigating them, for seizing and arresting the authors in the manner and according to the rules designated by law.

It has particular surveillance with respect to the laws and regulations of the general police.

Article 30:

It investigates and seizes persons caught in flagrante delict or pursued by public outcry.

It investigates persons whose arrest has been legally ordered and placed them at the disposition of the appropriate authority. It acts the same with respect to objects ordered seized.

Article 31:

The Gendarmerie apprehends any foreigner found in the interior of Zaire without a regular visa and immediately conducts him to the appropriate authority.

It can apprehend also, for the period necessary to verify his identity, any person whose behavior appears suspect to him or who is travelling without an identity card.

Article 32:

The Gendarmerie arrests persons in a state of intoxication who are wandering on a public road and places them out of harm's way under cases and rules governed by law.

Article 33:

The Gendarmerie prevents dangerous aliens from wandering, arrests them and places them immediately under the local civil authority.

It acts the same with respect to those indicated to them as wanted for having evaded alien establishments.

Article 34:

The Gendarmerie records by official statement the discovery of any individuals found dead or drowned. It advises the civil and judiciary authorities.

Article 35:

The Gendarmerie is responsible for the traffic police. It maintains,

[REDACTED]

at the same time, communications and free passage and assures free travel. It can hold for 24 hours any person who poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of this mission.

Article 36:

The Gendarmerie is responsible for the Courts and Tribunals Police. It assures the transfer of those detained, and their conduct to judiciary authority and their readmission to prison.

Article 37:

The Gendarmerie investigates deserters and military absent without leave from their units; it takes with regard to them measures prescribed by law and regulations.

Article 38:

The Gendarmerie assist the military police in the surveillance of those soldiers who are regular AWOLs.

They only execute this mission in those areas where the military police are not present or they are insufficient to fulfill the mission.

Article 39:

The Gendarmerie collaborates with measures taken to assure the mobilization of the army.


Article 40:

The Gendarmerie constantly assures the public peace. To this effect, it guards and controls large gatherings.

It advises of any gathering assembled without prior administrative authority.

Article 41:

The Gendarmerie disperses any armed mob. It also disperses any unarmed mob which tries to rescue prisoners or those condemned,



or which threatens the life of a person or attempts invasion, pillage or devastation of property.

It disperses armed mobs which oppose execution of the law, of a judgment or of a restriction.

It also disperses mobs assembled to protest a regulation or a police decision.

Article 42:

In the case of a catastrophe or great damage, such as floods, dam breaks, fires, the Gendarmerie arrives to the scene and warns the appropriate administrative and judiciary authorities.

While awaiting the intervention of these authorities, it takes proper measures to save individuals in danger, to protect the evacuation of persons and goods and to prevent pillage. Any commander of a unit or detachment of the Gendarmerie may requisition the personal services of individuals chosen to obey these requisitions and even furnish the means of transport and all other necessary objects to aid persons and protect property. Refusal to obey these requisitions is punishable by a penalty of one to seven days of penal servitude and a fine of 1 to 5 zaires or one of these penalties alone.

The Gendarmerie does not leave the scene except after ascertaining that its presence is no longer needed to protect property, maintain the public peace and arrest the authors of crimes directly or indirectly occasioned by the catastrophe or danger.


Article 43:

The Gendarmerie executes its regular duties, determined by the present Ordinance-Law, particularly through watches, patrols, investigations and in bush detail.

These different services are organized in such a manner that all localities are regularly surveilled.

Article 44:

During such service, the Gendarmerie makes inquiry of



authorities or any trustworthy person about crimes which have been committed, acts of nature affecting order, places of hiding of wanted persons or persons followed by public outcry, and even on any act of nature threatening public order and the internal security of the State.

Article 45:

Complaints and denunciations made to the Gendarmerie as well as information obtained and establishment made on the subject of crimes are the object of official statements which are transmitted to the proper authorities.

Section 2: Officers and Agents of the Judiciary Police

Article 46:

The militia of the Gendarmerie Nationale participates in the exercise of authority of the judiciary, administrative or military police as agents or officers of the judiciary police.

Article 47:

The officers and sub-officers of the Gendarmerie to whom this title has been conferred by joint order of the member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense and the member of the National Executive Council responsible for Justice are officers of the Judiciary Police in both general and restricted capacity.

All others are agents of the Judiciary Police.

Article 48:

Members of the Gendarmerie, officers of the Judiciary Police have authority equal to officers of the Judiciary Military Police.

In this capacity, they work under the control and directive of the Auditor General of the Armed Forces.

Article 49:

The officers of the Judiciary Police in restricted capacity have authority to establish all crimes punishable for a maximum of five years of penal servitude.

Article 50:

The militia of the Gendarmerie draw up official statements of all their operations, particularly those performed under requisition or special order, those crimes uncovered or denounced and all important events.

The official statements should state the facts clearly and precisely, in a manner to enlighten justice, without seeking to influence. They are drawn up validly by one gendarme. As the case may demand, they are valuable for information or provide evidence either for a case, or against, or pleas of guilt.

Article 51:

To establish official statements which constitute their operations relative to preliminary inquiries, the militia of the Gendarmerie maintain a record of declarations numbered and initialed which must be presented to the judiciary magistrates upon their demand.

The notebook must contain notation (with distribution restricted) of declarations received, determinations and operations performed and bear the signature of the investigators and the persons interrogated.

The official statements transmitted to the judiciary authority must duplicate the declarations and notations borne on the notebook.

Article 52:

In the exercise of their functions as officer or agent of the Judiciary Police, the militia of the Gendarmerie are placed in the first authority of each Tribunal of First Instance or of the Auditorat Militaire under the direction of the Procurer of the Republic and the Military Auditor. In the authority of each Court of Appeal under the surveillance of the Procurer General near the Court of Appeal. At the national echelon under the control of the Procurer General of the Republic or the Auditor General of the Armed Forces.

Chapter III: Special Duties

Article 53:

The Gendarmerie may be responsible for announcing and executing the mandates of Justice.



Article 54:

The Gendarmerie furnishes the guards, escorts and sentinels of honor for the authorities due these.

The member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense may make final determination with respect to these services.

Article 55:

The Gendarmerie may be requisitioned to lend assistance to the officers of the Judiciary Police.

Article 56:

The Gendarmerie assures maintenance and reestablishment of order when it is legally requested.

Article 57:

Any Gendarmerie force needed to maintain or reestablish public order is placed under the exclusive command of an officer or adjutant gendarme.

Article 58:

Without prejudice to obligations which for certain members of the Gendarmerie result in connection with their status as officer of the Judiciary Police, the action of the judiciary authorities with regard to the Gendarmerie is executed by means of requisition. These authorities can also, in order to execute duties they prescribe, make any recommendations and useful injunctions.

Article 59:

The Gendarmerie in general exercises its mission of maintaining and reestablishing public order in establishing patrols which assure the public peace, gather information and forestall the formation of illicit gatherings; in installing guard posts which assure the freedom of commerce and work, protection of persons and property; in establishing road-blocks; deploying reserves to scenes of trouble; finally to accomplish acts of the Judiciary Police.

Article 60:

Whenever the Gendarmerie is requisitioned to lend assistance to Judiciary Police officers, it assists them in order to protect them against violence and assault and battery which could be exercised against them and to relieve the difficulties which prevent them in accomplishing their mission.

Section IV: Duties of the Gendarmerie to the Authorities

Chapter 1: General Dispositions

Article 61:

The Gendarmerie does not address reports or communicate except to those authorities directly interested: to the judiciary authority for acts of a nature requiring pursuit; to the administrative authority for events of interest to public order or general security; the military authority for all events of extraordinary nature enumerated in Article 63 and for those concerning the military. If the events pertain to different authorities simultaneously, they must be executed simultaneously.

When multiple copies are made of a document, each of them bears, in the margin, notation of all the authorities to which it is simultaneously addressed; the authority to which the copy is destined is underlined.

Article 62:

The special events defined in Article 63 require reports sent to the member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense and to the various authorities with which the Gendarmerie has normal relations of service.

The interested authorities must be informed as quickly as possible of special events. To this effect, the commander of the unit or detachment of the Gendarmerie will use, particularly at the beginning, telegrams or telephoned messages, rather than by means of regular post when the circumstances indicate urgency.

All special events impose, in principle, that the commandant of the unit or detachment of the Gendarmerie visit the scene; if the acts

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are particularly serious or of interest to the administrative police or maintenance of order, the same obligation falls to the commandant of the battalion or region.

Article 63:

Events of a nature to require sending special reports can be listed in the following categories:

1. Events bearing the character of a true danger which necessitates prompt and decisive measures, either to bring aid to persons, or to protect persons and goods (floods, avalanches, landslides, railroad accidents, shipwrecks, explosions, fires, etc.)
2. Events of serious importance from the point of view of public order or state security necessitating special measures to maintain order (strikes, popular riots, anarchist attempts, conspiracies, provocations to revolt, discoveries of depots or arms or munitions, clandestine shops for manufacturing explosives, etc.)
3. Violations which, either by their frequency or the circumstances in which they are produced, or by the caliber of the persons causing them, have caused emotion and disquiet in regions or necessitate special measures (banditry, attempts against public functionaries, etc.)
4. Acts or maneuvers concerning national defense (espionage, attacks against posts or sentinels, military provocations such as indiscipline, desertion, etc.)

With respect to incidents involving the military or authored by them, the Gendarmerie will send the official statement establishing the facts to the Auditorate Militaire and will make a written report to the interested military authority. In emergencies, the commandant of the unit or detachment of the Gendarmerie concerned will precede the dispatch of the official statement by a verbal or telephoned account.

Chapter III: Assignments of Members of the National Executive Council

Article 64:

By the nature of its service, the National Gendarmerie, being under the orders of the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense, is placed in the assignments of the members of the National Executive Council responsible for the Interior and for Justice.

Section 1: Assignments of the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense

Article 65:

The Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense, has, in his assignments, the organization, the command, the regular execution of all parts of the service.

Recruitment of the Gendarmerie, training, advancement, leave, resignation from armed service, management of retirement and military compensation.


Internal order, military instruction, police and discipline of corps, uniforms, armament, deployment of units, bonuses, dress, equipment, use of force, administration and verification of accounts.

Control over the regional commandants of the Gendarmerie and inspection of officers; finally military operations of any nature.

Article 66:

Equally within the purview of the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense:

1. The military judiciary police held under the authority of the Auditor General of the Armed Forces.
2. The surveillance which the Gendarmerie is responsible for over the military absent without leave.

- 
3. Operations of the Gendarmerie with respect to administration of men from various reserves at their installations.
  4. Assistance which the Gendarmerie must bring for preparation of and, if space is available, to execute mobilization.

Article 67:

He immediately informs the members of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense of serious events of which he has a need to know under conditions given in Article 62.

Section 2: Assignments of the Member of the National Executive Council Responsible for the Interior

Article 68:

The objective of the administrative police is the peace of the country, maintenance of order and execution of laws and regulations of public administration; measures prescribed for its assurance derive from the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for the Interior.

It falls to the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for the Interior to give directives for the general police and advice to the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense.

Article 69:

Surveillance exercised by the Gendarmerie over restoring justice, beggars, vagabonds, disreputable characters, national suspects or those suspect of espionage, condemned escapees, and all other individuals subject to any other measure of general security, is the jurisdiction of the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for the Interior.

Section 3: Assignments of the Member of the National Executive Council Responsible for Justice

Article 70:

Services affecting the militia of the Gendarmerie when they act

under the code of penal procedure either as officers or as agents of the judiciary police, are the jurisdiction of the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for Justice with respect to common law and the jurisdiction of the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense with respect to military jurisdiction.

Section V: Relations of the Gendarmerie with Authorities

Chapter I: General Dispositions

Article 71:

For execution of service the members of the Gendarmerie are placed under the exclusive authority of their superiors of the Gendarmerie.

Chapter II: Requisitions Addressed to the Gendarmerie

Article 72:

Action of the administrative authorities legally responsible for maintaining order is exercised with respect to the Gendarmerie by means of requisition.

Article 73:

Each requisition must be written, noting legal disposition with respect to which it is made, indicating the purpose, date and bearing the names and capacity as well as the signature of the requesting authority.

Article 74:

In case of urgency, the Gendarmerie can be requisitioned by telephone or telegraph. This requisition must be confirmed as rapidly as possible in the manner stated in Article 73.

Article 75:

The requisitioned authority of the Gendarmerie may not dispute the reason for the requisition. It must execute it. But if the

requisition, although legal, appears to him patently abusive, he immediately informs the superior authority of the Gendarmerie of this through channels.

Article 76:

Requisitions with the aim to obtain assistance of the Gendarmerie for the purpose of maintaining or reestablishing public order are addressed to the commandant of the unit of the Gendarmerie within the command of the requisitioning authority.

Requisitions which have the aim to confer onto the Gendarmerie execution of a special mission which is limited are addressed to the commandant of the battalion.

Article 77:

Operations necessary for the execution of requisitions are led, under their responsibility, by the chiefs of the Gendarmerie who order movement of troops, deploy them, determine the importance and the nature of means of implementation.

Article 78:

Effects of the requisition cease when the requisitioning authority notifies in writing or verbally lifting the requisition to the authority of the Gendarmerie charged with its execution.

.. Chapter III: Relations with the administrative authorities responsible for public order

Article 79:

The administrative authority of the Gendarmerie must guard information which they receive on the subject of public order and which can give rise to precautionary or repressive measures.

The regional commandants maintain relations with these authorities as the circumstances demand.

Article 80:

When public peace is menaced, the authority of the Gendarmerie susceptible of being requisitioned must tighten contact with the administrative authority in order to coordinate dispositions to take and to prepare measures of execution.

Article 81:

During implementation of a requisition, the authority of the Gendarmerie must maintain liaison with the requisitioning administrative authority and keep it informed, barring absolute necessity, of the means of action which it proposes to execute.

On its side, the administrative authority must transmit to the authority of the Gendarmerie all information useful to the accomplishment of his mission.

Chapter IV: Relations with the Judiciary Authorities

Article 82:

The Gendarmerie must maintain constant liaison with the judiciary authorities.

It must inform, by special report, the Procurers General and the Procurers of the Republic of special events concerning public order.

Article 83:

The Gendarmerie cannot be charged with handing out citations to parties or witnesses except in cases of urgent or absolute necessity.

Article 84:

The judiciary detachments are placed, in the execution of their judiciary missions, under the surveillance of the Auditor General of the Armed Forces and the direction of the Auditeurs Militaires.

Article 85:

The Gendarmerie informs, by special report, the territorial

[REDACTED]

military authorities of all threats to the security of the armed forces, all propaganda inciting military indiscipline, as well as incidents involving these.

Article 86:

In case of events susceptible of seriously compromising public order or in case of serious or generalized trouble, the Gendarmerie informs the territorial military authorities, keeps them current of the events and furnishes them with data which permits them to take, in due time, measures preparatory to any requisition or to intervention of armed forces.

Article 87:

Any detachment of other armed forces called to intervene with the Gendarmerie to give force to law, is at the orders of the officer of the Gendarmerie if he is of a rank higher or equal to the commandant of the detachment. If the officer of the other armed forces is of a rank higher to the officer of the Gendarmerie, he continues to command the detachment of the armed forces. In any case, he must conform to the requisitions addressed to him by the officer of the Gendarmerie, who maintains direction of the operations.

The use of arms by the troops who do not belong to the Gendarmerie is, in this case, ruled by Article 26 of the present Ordinance-Law.

Article 88:

Each time that the territorial military authorities make a demand, the Gendarmerie furnishes the necessary detachments to assure the military police at places designated by these authorities.

Article 89:

In regions under siege, when the powers which are invested in the civil authority to maintain order and police are exercised by military authority, the latter may, in order to accomplish the mission, address to the Gendarmerie requisitions necessitated by the circumstances.

Article 90:

Officers of the Gendarmerie are subordinate to commandants of the Military Regions with respect to general discipline.

Article 91:

The Commandant of the Military Region who has temporarily at his disposition or under his direct orders a troop of the Gendarmerie may alone involve himself in its service.

Section VI: The Service of the Gendarmerie in Time of War

Article 92:

During time of war, the Gendarmerie participates in the territorial defense in accomplishing those missions incumbent upon it in time of peace.

Article 93:

In a state of war, the officers of the Gendarmerie depend, in the exercise of their regular functions, on the Military Region Commandants; also they must conform to the directives of the police involved with the security of the places and military posts.

Article 94:

Whenever an order addressed by these commandants to an officer of the Gendarmerie appears to him to be of a nature to compromise the service to which his subordinates are specifically affected, he is authorized to make reasonable protest. If the commandant believes he must maintain his order, the officer of the Gendarmerie must execute it; but he is accountable for it to the Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense.

Article 95:

Legislative Ordinance No. 081/188 of May 11, 1960, on the use of the Force Publique to maintain peace and public order is abrogated.

Article 96:

The Member of the National Executive Council responsible for National Defense is charged with the execution of the present Ordinance-Law which is effective immediately.


Executed at Kinshasa August 30, 1972

signed

MOBUTU SESE SEKO  
General of the Corps of the Army

For the National Council of Defense  
Chief of the Cabinet  
MOLONGYA MAYIKUSA  
Brigade General

**ACTUAL CHAIN OF COMMAND AS AFFECTS  
COAST RIVER-LAKE GUARD, & GENDARMERIE NATIONAL**



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

EX-NATIONAL POLICE  
Prior to August 1972  
(Old Rank Structure)

Grade

---

Inspector General .....	1
Inspector General Adj. ....	1
Principal Insp. ....	27
Inspecteur .....	57
Commissaire PP .....	36
Commissaire .....	113
Commissaire Adj. ....	128
S/Com P. P. ....	222
S/Com .....	200
S/Com Adj. ....	211
<hr/>	
SUB TOTAL OFFICERS	996
<hr/>	
Brigadier Chef .....	2,488
Brigadier .....	2,472
Brigadier Adj. ....	2,798
Agent P. P. ....	4,833
Agent .....	5,572
Agent Adjoint .....	775
<hr/>	
SUB TOTAL NCO & EM	18,938
<hr/>	
TOTAL NATIONAL POLICE	19,934

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EX-GENDARMERIE FAZ

Prior to August 1972

RANK STRUCTURE

GENERAL .....	0	
COLONEL .....	1	
LT. COLONEL .....	3	
MAJOR .....	4	
CAPTAIN .....	38	
LIEUTENANT .....	26	
S/LT .....	69	
ADJUDANT CHEF .....	9	
ADJUDANT 1ST CLASS .....	38	
ADJUDANT .....	105	
<hr/>		
SUBTOTAL		293
FIRST SGT. MAJ. ....	44	
SGT. MAJ. ....	531	
FIRST SGT. ....	142	
SGT. ....	1,881	
CORPORAL .....	2,130	
GENDARME 1ST CLASS .....	1,337	
GENDARME .....	246	
<hr/>		
SUBTOTAL		6,311
TOTAL		6,604
		=====

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GENDARMERIE NATIONAL  
PRESENT STRENGTH


31st JULY 1973

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
(New Rank Structure)

GENERAL .....	1
LT. COL. ....	8
MAJOR .....	31
CAPTAIN .....	61
LT. ....	88
S/LT. ....	158
ADJUDANT CHIEF .....	284
ADJUDANT 1st CLASS .....	288
ADJUDANT .....	180
<hr/>	
SUBTOTAL	1,099
FIRST SGT. MAJ. ....	1,406
SGT. MAJOR .....	2,513
FIRST SGT. ....	3,560
SGT. ....	7,360
CORPORAL .....	6,286
1CL GENDARME .....	1,803
2CL GENDARME .....	246
<hr/>	
SUBTOTAL	23,174
TOTAL	24,273


**PRESENT GENDARMERIE NATIONALE ORGANIZATION**



**BRIGADE MOBILE  
KINSHASA METROPOLITAN POLICE  
MOBILE PATROL ORGANIZATION  
(City is Divided into 7 Zones)**



# BRIGADE MOBILE—LUMBUMBASHI



142

Annex-1

[REDACTED]

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT STATISTICS


1971

	TOTAL	FATALITIES	SERIOUSLY INJURED	LIGHTLY INJURED	SERIOUS PROPERTY DAMAGE	LIGHT PROPERTY DAMAGE
Jan.	211	8	42	30	69	62
Feb.	219	5	37	27	86	64
Mar.	263	12	42	37	82	90
Apr.	376	6	52	55	96	167
May	269	10	43	17	99	100
June	413	9	57	51	98	198
July	496	10	53	61	128	244
Aug.	504	12	71	61	120	240
Sept.	561	12	69	51	120	309
Oct.	544	18	79	53	135	259
Nov.	542	6	55	53	145	283
Dec.	530	9	56	80	123	262
TOTALS	4,928	117	656	576	1,301	2,278

1972

	TOTAL	FATALITIES	SERIOUSLY INJURED	LIGHTLY INJURED	SERIOUS PROPERTY DAMAGE	LIGHT PROPERTY DAMAGE
Jan.	495	13	63	48	107	264
Feb.	428	13	62	57	94	202
Mar.	577	16	42	100	153	266
Apr.	509	14	67	63	86	279
May	492	13	67	38	90	284
June	701	7	57	111	112	414
July	693	13	48	98	87	447
Aug.	629	20	44	71	89	405
Sept.	561	11	58	60	66	366
Oct.	552	12	58	65	74	343
Nov.	504	10	48	49	65	332
Dec.	530	13	50	58	63	346
TOTALS	6,671	155	664	818	1,086	3,948


# PROPOSED GENDARMERIE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION ORGANIZATION



144


Annex-K

# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL (GDN) TRAINING DIRECTORATE



145

# ORGANIZATIONAL CHART-MOBILE BATALLION



# CDC PROGRAM—PROJECTED TARGET DATES—KINSHASA PILOT PROJECT

	73					74												75					76								
	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
<b>1. Planning, discussions and agreement re project</b>	→																														
<b>2. Selection of trng. committee</b>	→																														
<b>3. Preparation of POI, lesson plans, AVA's, schedules, etc.</b>					→																										
<b>4. Commence trng. of BN officers</b>								→																							
<b>5. Acquisition of necessary equipment</b> a) for Off. Trng. b) for Unit Trng.	→		→																												
<b>6. Begin unit trng.</b>												→																			



[REDACTED]

MOBILE BATTALION FUNDING - PART 1

NON - RADIO/VEHICLE EQUIPMENT  
CDC Kinshasa Pilot Project

<u>Description</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Cost ea.</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Personal Equipment per Man</u>			
Helmets w/face shield	560	36.00	20,160.00
Hand Cuffs, w/case	560	21.00	11,760.00
Riot Batons w/Baton Ring	560	5.40	3,024.00
Revolvers	560	60.00	33,600.00
Leather Goods	560	40.00	22,400.00
Ammunition	600	.05	30,000.00
SUB-TOTAL			120,944.00
<u>Equipment per BN</u>			
Field Glasses BN Commandant	1	100.00	100.00
SUB-TOTAL			100.00
<u>Equipment per Company (3 Cies - 9 Plts)</u>			
1 - Field Glasses Co. Cmdt	3	100.00	300.00
1 - Audio-Hailer	3	105.00	315.00
1 - Pepper-fogger w/10 qts CN, CS, Smoke & Flush	3	1,000.00	3,000.00
30- Illuminating Flares (3 Companies)	100	10.75	1,075.00
SUB-TOTAL			4,690.00
<u>Equipment per Squad (27 Squads in BN)</u>			
1 - Audio-Hailer	27	105.00	2,835.00
1 - 12 Ga. Riot Shotgun w/Grenade Launcher	27	150.00	4,050.00
1 - 37mm Gas Gun	27	130.00	3,510.00
1 - Haversack	27	7.00	189.00
10- Shields	270	50.00	13,500.00
15- Masks, Gas w/Cannister	405	30.00	12,150.00
30- Replacement Cannisters	810	5.00	4,050.00
120- 12 Ga. (5 boxes) shotgun shells #4 Buckshot	(box) 135	6.00	810.00
120- 12 Ga. (5 boxes cartridges for Grenade launcher)	(box) 135	12.00	1,620.00

50- Grenades, Instant Discharge, CN	1, 350	5. 50	7, 325. 00
50- Grenades, Instant Discharge, CS	1, 350	6. 30	8, 505. 00
50- Grenades, Instant Discharge, smoke	1, 350	4. 00	5, 400. 00
50- Grenades, Multiple Burst, CN	1, 350	11. 00	14, 850. 00
50- Grenades, Multiple Burst, CS	1, 350	12. 00	16, 200. 00
50- Grenades, Baseball type, CN	1, 350	8. 00	10, 800. 00
50- Grenades, Burning type, CN	1, 350	6. 30	8, 505. 00
50- Grenades, Burning type, CS	1, 350	6. 30	8, 505. 00
50- Grenades, Burning Type, Smoke	1, 350	3. 70	4, 995. 00
50- Projectiles, 75 yd., CN	1, 350	5. 20	7, 020. 00
50- Projectiles, 75 yd., CS	1, 350	5. 30	7, 155. 00
50- Projectiles, 130-170 yds., CN	1, 350	5. 20	7, 020. 00
50- Projectiles, 130-170 yds., CS	1, 350	5. 30	7, 155. 00
50- Projectiles, Blast Dispersion, 130-170 yd, CN	1, 350	5. 20	7, 020. 00
50- Projectiles, Blast Dispersion, 130-170 yd, CS	1, 350	5. 30	7, 155. 00
50- Projectiles, Super Long Range, 350 yds, CN	1, 350	11. 00	14, 850. 00
50- Projectiles, Super Long Range, 350 yds, CS	<u>1, 350</u>	<u>11. 00</u>	<u>14, 850. 00</u>
SUB-TOTAL			200, 024. 00

=====  
All Company, squad and personal equipment 325, 758. 00

  
MOBILE BATTALION FUNDING - PART 2

VEHICLE AND RADIO REQUIREMENT FOR CDC - KINSHASA PILOT PROJECT

UNITS	Jeep	3/4 ton Pickup	FM-5	FM-1	
<u>BN Headquarters &amp; Staff</u>					
Commandant	1		1		
Deputy Commandant	1		1		
S-1, S-2, S-3	3		3		
S-4	1	1	2		
	<hr/>				
<u>SUB TOTAL</u>	6	1	7		
<u>1st Company</u>					
Commandant, Company	1		1	1	
Commandants, Platoons (3)	3		3	3	
Squad Leaders (3 each Plt)		9		18	
	<hr/>				
<u>SUB TOTAL</u>	4	9	4	22	
<u>2nd Company</u>	<u>SUB TOTAL</u>	4	9	4	22
<u>3rd Company</u>	<u>SUB TOTAL</u>	4	9	4	22
Reserve (spares)	2	3	2	7	
	<hr/>				
<u>TOTAL</u>	20	31	21	73	

COST FACTOR

Jeeps, \$3,000 x 20	=	\$ 60,000
3/4 ton pick-up trucks, \$6,000 x 31	=	186,000
FM-5 Radios, \$700 x 21	=	14,700
FM-1 Radios, \$400 x 73	=	<u>29,200</u>
Vehicles & Radios Total	=	\$289,900

  
MOBILE BATTALION FUNDING - PART 3

SUMMARY - COST FACTOR

CDC - KINSHASA, PILOT PROJECT

JEEPS, 20	\$ 60,000.00
3/4 TON TRUCK-PICKUPS, 31	186,000.00
FM-5 RADIOS, 21	14,700.00
FM-1 RADIOS, 73	29,200.00
BN EQUIPMENT	100.00
COMPANY EQUIPMENT	4,690.00
SQUAD EQUIPMENT	200,024.00
PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	120,944.00
	615,658.00
20% TRANSPORTATION & OTHER CHARGES	<u>123,131.60</u>
TOTAL	\$738,789.60

=====

Cost Factor for all capitol cities including Kinshasa:

$$\$738,789.60 \times 9 = \$6,649,106.40$$

MOBILE BATTALION

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

COURSE TITLE

CONTROL OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES

LENGTH OF COURSE

15 WEEKS

STUDENTS

GdN personnel of all ranks assigned to Mobile Battallions throughout the country and meeting such other criteria as prescribed by the Commandant GdN.

OBJECTIVES

Objectives of this training will be the development within the National Gendarmerie, as well as the individual, of those necessary skills required by a modern police civic disturbance control unit. This training will further insure that selected personnel will have the training, knowledge and capability required to efficiently carry out their duties and responsibilities. These duties and responsibilities will include but not be limited to the humane containment of unlawful civil disturbances by the use of minimal force. Skills necessary to develop this capability will include: crowd control measures under the direction and coordination of both headquarters and field command posts, police intelligence, necessary police formations, use of the riot baton, use of chemical agents, and firearms training.

LOCATION OF TRAINING

Training will be conducted at locations designated by the Commandant GdN or his delegate.

TRAINING PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

Zairian instructors aided by assistant instructors under the supervision of the GdN training directorate. Each instructor will

be responsible for training of the student in both theory and practice with particular emphasis on the practical in regard to the use of the riot baton, formations required in controlling civil disturbances and the use of firearms. At all times the use of minimal and humane force will be stressed and emphasized to the utmost.

### TRAINING POLICIES

Training will be conducted so as to involve the greatest amount of student participation. Students will be dressed in a neat, clean uniform and will be punctual for all classes. They will be courteous, respectful and obedient to all staff and officers. All classrooms, living and messing facilities will be maintained in a clean and orderly manner. Periodic reports will be made to the Commandant GdN and infractions of rules and regulations will not be tolerated. Students successfully completing the course will have the course accredited to their individual service records.

### ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

Personnel undergoing training will be relieved of all other duties during the course and will be provided housing, transportation, equipment and necessary supplies.

### CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

Strict discipline will be enforced at all times during training and students will be required to conform to regulations. Inspection of progress of training will be conducted at the direction of the Commandant GdN.

### TRAINING COORDINATOR

The training coordinator will be responsible to see that all instructors and students are present and on time for all classes. He shall insure that instructors prepare all necessary training documents and materials prior to the beginning of each training session and that the Program of Instruction, training schedule and lesson plans are strictly adhered to and followed. He is to coordinate closely with the GdN Training Directorate in all training matters pertaining to the course.



Introduction and Orientation	1
Background of Insurgency	4
Police Administration	6
Police Operations	2
Police Training	2
Public Relations Program	3
Police Intelligence	5
Resources Control	3
Crowd Control	4
Mob Control	10
Formations	100
Chemical Agents	15
Use of Mechanical Dispersal Units	10
Use of Riot Baton	15
Firearms	240
Administration, Inspection, Exams	<u>80</u>
TOTAL	500
	15 weeks



AREAS OF PATROL - CRLG

The coast, lake and river area that should be patrolled comes to a total length of 2, 445 miles. The patrol areas are:

Lakes

390 miles of Lake Tanganyika:	90 mi borders <u>Burundi</u> ;	300 mi borders <u>Tanzania</u>
90 " " " Mweru	90 mi borders <u>Zambia</u>	
50 " " " Kivu	50 mi borders <u>Rwanda</u>	
50 " " " Mobutu	50 mi borders <u>Uganda</u>	
80 " " " Amin	80 mi borders <u>Uganda</u>	
<hr/>		
660 Total		

River

1225 miles River Zaire to Kisangani:	400 mi borders <u>Congo Brazzaville</u>
180 " " " from Ubundi to Kindu	
350 " River Ubangi to Bangue:	50 mi borders <u>CAR</u> ; 300 mi borders <u>Congo Brazzaville</u>
<hr/>	
1755 Total	

Coast

30 miles with Atlantic Ocean


Total

2, 445 miles of coast, river and lake navigable by boat

Of which

1, 035 miles are in the middle of Zaire

1, 410 miles are on the border: Uganda 130 mi; Rwanda 50 mi; Burundi 90 mi; Tanzania 300 mi; Zambia 90 mi; Congo Brazzaville 700 mi; Central African Republic 50 mi.

  
ORDNANCE LAW No. 70-060, NOVEMBER 9, 1970, CREATING  
THE COAST RIVER AND LAKE GUARD OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

See the Constitution, especially those articles 46 and IV of Title IX;

O R D E R

ARTICLE 1

A Coast River and Lake Guard is hereby created.

This guard is placed directly under the orders of the President of the Republic.

ARTICLE 2

The Coast River and Lake Guard is composed of the Coast Guard, the River Guard, and the Lake Guard.


ARTICLE 3

The headquarters of the Coast River and Lake Guard is established in Kinshasa.

ARTICLE 4

The missions of the Coast River and Lake Guard are as follows:

1. Surveillance of territorial waters;
2. The surveillance and protection of maritime traffic;
3. The protection and assistance of the fishing fleets;

- 
4. The assistance to ships and boats, both foreign and national, in times of difficulty or lost in the maritime waters, both international and national;
  5. Search and rescue of foreign and/or national aircraft which are lost;
  6. Assistance to the National Police of the Congo and Customs in the suppression of smuggling of contraband across international frontiers;
  7. Assistance to the services responsible for navigable waterways in hydrographic research.

ARTICLE 5

The commissioned officer personnel of the Coast River and Lake Guard are commissioned and assigned by the President of the Republic.

ARTICLE 6

This law is put into effect on the date of the signature.

Effective at Kinshasa on 9th of November 1970

/s/

J. D. MOBUTU  
LIEUTENANT - GENERAL

SMUGGLING - CRLG - Diamonds

Zaire is the world's largest producer of industrial diamonds, accounting for 45% of the world's production. The production of diamonds, chiefly in Kasai, exceeded 14 million carats in 1969 and 1970 and then declined to less than 13 million carates in 1971. The major producer is MIBA (Societe Miniere de Bakwanga - a company with a 50% government participation) and there are a number of small producers. Diamond exports account for almost 6% of total exports rising from \$33.9 million in 1969 to \$46.5 in 1970, and dropping back to \$32 million in 1971.

The decline in 1971 was caused by the strong competition by synthetic diamonds as well as by a resurgence of smuggling. Diamond smuggling, mainly through Brazzaville and Bujumbura, has troubled Zaire since before independence.

To curb illegal exports, the government opened a purchasing office in Tshikapa in late 1968 and reduced the export tax on diamonds handled by this office to 10% of the normal rate. As a result, the value of uncontrolled diamond exports dropped about 60% from 1968 to 1970. Since the Tshikapa office was closed in 1971, smuggling predictably increased. Although precise data is not available, illegal exports may have surpassed 4 million carats in 1971, as compared to 2.7 million in 1970. To check smuggling, the government has reopened the Tshikapa purchasing office and reinforced surveillance. The effect of these actions on the diamond trade are not yet known but it is expected legal exports will increase by 1-2 million carats per year.


Limited data available from Congo/Brazzaville supports the seriousness of the problem. According to the Minerals Year Books, published annually by the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the value of diamond exports, which entered Congo/B through illicit channels, totalled \$20.0 million in 1965 and \$15.2 in 1966. For both 67 and 68 the quantity was recorded as more than 4 million carats but no value figures were provided.

One of the justifications for the expansion of the CRLG capacity to the river borders was based on smuggling control and there is no question that smuggling does drain significant resources. However,

the most effective deterrent to smuggling is to reduce the economic incentives. This has been demonstrated in Zaire, in many other areas and over time. Decisions such as paying a fair price for diamonds in Zaire are not within the area of police control. Interdiction of the flow of diamonds along the long river borders do not appear to be within the police capabilities if the economic incentives for smuggling remain high.

There may be other and sound reasons why the USG should assist in the expansion of the CRLG's capabilities. The above is provided to suggest that the economic justification is not in itself a strong one.


**COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD (CRLG)  
ORGANIZATION CHART**



161

Annex—W

**Coastal River and Lake Guard  
Lake Guard Detachment  
Lake Tanganyika**



\*In Zaire, as in Europe, it is customary to place the secretary in the organization chart.



COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD  
PERSONNEL AS OF AUGUST 1, 1973

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number</u>
Colonel	1
Lt. Colonel	1
Major	3
Captain	24
Lieutenant	2
Sub-Lieutenant	8
Chief Adjutant	12
1st Class Adjutant	5
Adjutant	12
1st Sgt. Major	40
Sgt. Major	39
1st Sergeant	93
Sergeant	109
Corporal	37
1st Class Private	15
Private	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	402



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CRLG BOAT DESCRIPTION

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Twin screw aluminum 65' Harbor Police and Customs Launch

Overall length	65 feet
Length full load waterline	59 feet
Beam	18 feet
Displacement	32 tons

Manufactured by Swiftships Inc., Morgan City, Louisiana, USA.

ENGINES

General Motors 12 cylinder turbocharged diesel, Model 12V-71 TN, 900 HP

Two engines per boat, turn counterclockwise; both screws turn clockwise

One ONAN generator unit, 110/220 Volts

Fuel consumption 25 GPH at flank speed (25 knts); 15 GPH standard speed

PERFORMANCE

Loss in turning and center line thrust because of screws turning in same direction.

Max RPM set at 2100, at lake altitude of 773 meters - 21 knots speed

Loss of engine efficiency at 773 meters is less than 10%.

ORDNANCE (each boat)

1 81 mm mortar with 50 cal MG superimposed, located aft

1 single 50 cal MG on bow

2 Twin 50 cal MG on open bridge

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

- a. Raytheon Depth Alarm (USA)
- b. Raytheon DE 736 Depth Sounder (USA)
- c. Collins transceiver, HF-105 (USA)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (cont. )

- d. RCA CRM R6A receiver (USA)
- e. RCA Super Carfone 500 (USA)
- f. Anschutz Mark VI Gyro Compass (Germany)
- g. Decca Radar RM 916 (UK)
- h. Carrier air conditioner (USA)

MISCELLANEOUS


Fuel oil capacity 1500 gals. ; 4 tanks

Fresh water capacity 200 gals.

Lube oil capacity 30 gals.


COST

Total cost of six (6) boats and all equipment, transportation, Techrep, assembly, etc. U. S. \$3, 399, 978. Total cost was borne by GOZ.

  
U. S. FUNDED PARTICIPANTS AT IPA

TOTAL NO. OF PARTICIPANTS	NP	GDN	CRLG	TOTALS
	122	18	11	151
<u>Skills</u>				
Riot Control	16	0	0	16
Telecommunications	25	5	1	31
Instructor Methods	52	8	0	60
Patrol Operations	2	0	0	2
Traffic Control	2	0	0	2
Police Executive Training	8	3	3	14
Investigations	15	0	0	15
Reloading	2	0	0	2
Narcotics Management	0	1	0	1
Senior Officers	0	1	0	1
Telecom Management	0	0	1	1
Border/Customs	0	0	2	2
Maritime Law Enforcement	0	0	4	4

GENDAMARIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
ORGANIZATION CHART



Gendarmerie National Telecommunications  
Inter-Region Radio Networks

<u>Region</u>	<u>Distance (Kilometers) from Kinshasa</u>	<u>Equipment Installed</u>
<u>Kinshasa</u>		
Net Control		SA-100
<u>Bandundu</u>		
Bandundu	270	SSB-5
<u>Equateur</u>		
Mbandaka	675	SA-100
<u>Kasai-Occidental</u>		
Kananga	810	SSB-5
<u>Kasai-Oriental</u>		
Mbuji-Mayi	930	SSB-5
<u>Shaba</u>		
Lubumbashi	1, 575	SA-100
<u>Bas Zaire</u>		
Matadi	270	SA-100
<u>Haute Zaire</u>		
Kisangani	1, 230	SA-100

[REDACTED]

Kivu

Bukavu


1, 500

SA-100

NOTES:

1. SA-100 manufactured by Motorola; SSB-5 manufactured by RCA.
2. Kinshasa and Lubumbashi have one each Aerocom Model 10LA, 1000 wat Linear Amplifiers installed.
3. SSB-5s are scheduled to be replaced by SA-100s; Motorola equipment is now in-country.

# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTER-REGION RADIO NETWORK



Gendarmerie National Telecommunications  
Intra-Region Radio Networks

<u>Region</u>	<u>Distance (Kilometer) from Net Control</u>	<u>Equipment Installed</u>
<u>Kinshasa and Bas Zaire</u>		
Kinshasa Net Control		
Thysville	120	SA-100
Boma	300	SSB-5
<u>Bandundu</u>		
Bandundu Net Control		
Inongo	189	SSB-5
Kikwit	255	SSB-5
Ngungu	330	SSB-5
Kenge	195	SSB-5
<u>Equateur</u>		
Mbandaka Net Control		
Gemena	350	SA-100
Lisala	420	SA-100
Boende	279	SA-100
Bonsankusu	210	SA-100*
<u>Kasai-Occidental</u>		
Kananga Net Control		
Luebo	150	SSB-5
Port Frangui	270	SA-100 *
Tshikapa	195	SA-100 *
Tshimbulu	115	SA-100 *


Kasai-Oriental

Mbuji-Mayi Net Control

Lusambo	135	SSB-5
Kabinda	120	SSB-5
Mwene Ditu	120	SA-100 *
Lodga	285	SA-100 *

NOTES:

1. SA-100 equipment manufactured by Motorola; SSB-5 manufactured by RCA.
2. All SSB-5s are scheduled to be replaced by SA-100s in 1973.
3. SA-100 equipment marked with asterisk (\*) are in-country and they will be installed in the sub-regions indicated when generators are procured in early 1974.

  
 Gendarmerie National Telecommunications  
 Intra-Region Radio Networks

<u>Region</u>	<u>Distance (Kilometers) from Net Control</u>	<u>Equipment Installed</u>
<u>Haute Zaire</u>		
Kisangani Net Control		
Buta	255	SA-100
Isoro	375	SA-100
Bunia	570	SA-100
Ango	350	SA-100 *
Watsa	575	SA-100 *
Yangambi	120	SA-100
<u>Kivu</u>		
Bukavu Net Control		
Goma	115	SA-100
Kindu	315	SA-100
Uvira	115	SA-100 *
Beni	345	SA-100 *
<u>Shaba</u>		
Lubumbashi Net Control		
Kowelzi	225	SSB-5
Kalemie	675	SSB-5
Kamina	420	SA-100
Kapanga	675	SA-100 *
Sandoa	540	SA-100 *
Dilolo	585	SA-100 *
Manono	465	SA-100 *
Sakania	180	SA-100 *
Kipushi	30	VHF/FM


[REDACTED]

NOTES:

1. SA-100 and VHF/FM (B51AJB-1050A) equipment manufactured by Motorola. SSB-5 manufactured by RCA.
2. All SSB-5s are scheduled to be replaced by SA-100s in 1973.
3. SA-100 equipment marked with asterisk (\*) are in-country and they will be installed in the sub-regions indicated when generators are procured in early 1974.

[REDACTED]

# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS BAS ZAIRE REGION RADIO NETWORK




**LEGEND:**

———— EXISTING CIRCUITS


\*Kinshasa is both the Headquarters, Gendarmerie National and a Region in it' self.

**GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
BANDUNDU REGION RADIO NETWORK**




LEGEND:  
—— EXISTING CIRCUITS

# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUATEUR REGION RADIO NETWORK




LEGEND:  
—— EXISTING CIRCUITS  
- - - FUTURE CIRCUITS

# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS KASAI-OCCIDENTAL REGION RADIO NETWORK



# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS KASAI-ORIENTAL REGION RADIO NETWORK




LEGEND:

———— EXISTING CIRCUITS

- - - - - FUTURE CIRCUITS


# GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HAUTE ZAIRE REGION RADIO NETWORK



LEGEND:

- EXISTING CIRCUITS
- FUTURE CIRCUITS


**GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
KIVU REGION RADIO NETWORK**



**LEGEND:**

- EXISTING CIRCUITS
- - - -** FUTURE CIRCUITS


**GENDARMERIE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
SHABA REGION RADIO NETWORK**



**LEGEND:**  
—— EXISTING CIRCUITS  
- - - FUTURE CIRCUITS

[REDACTED]

## GENDARMARIE NATIONAL VHF/FM RADIO NETWORK KINSHASA BRIGADE MOBILE



Frequencies

Mobile - Channel A  
 Transmit, 170.200 MHz  
 Receive, 170.900 MHz


Channel B  
 Transmit/Receive, 170.900 MHz

Repeater - Transmit, 170.900 MHz  
 Receive, 170.200 MHz

Notes:

1. Several ministers and other high government officials are on this net.
2. \* Indicates portable radios, Motorola HT 200.
3. The number of mobile units in the net changes daily as vehicles are in and out of service for maintenance.
4. Motorola base stations, repeater, and mobile radios are installed.

GENDARMERIE NATIONAL VHF/FM RADIO NETWORK  
KINSHASA TRAFFIC POLICE




Notes:

1. "F" denotes Sedans and "JP" denotes Jeep - these vehicles are equipped with RCA Super Carfones, 100 watts.
2. "M" denotes motorcycles and General Electric radios are installed.
3. The CCR, Garage, and Pigeon-3 are equipped with RCA Basefones, 100 watts.

[REDACTED]

## GENDAMARIE NATIONAL VHF/FM RADIO NETWORK KINSHASA PRECINCTS



**Notes:**

1. All Base Stations are equipped with RCA Fleetfones, 30 - 40 watts.
2. The Radio Communications Center is equipped with a RCA Super Basefone, 100 watts.
3. A modified RCA Super Carfone, 100 watts, is installed as the repeater.

Gendarmerie National VHF/FM Radio Network  
Kinshasa Posts and Camps


1. Kimwenza (Kenge)
2. N'Dolo (Poko)
3. Maluku (Lusambo)
4. N'Sele (Boende)
5. N'Djili (Lukala)
6. Matete (Kasenga)
7. Lemba (Zongo)
8. Lufungula (Kigali)
9. Kokolo (Kabalo)
10. Boukin (Kindo)
11. Nojelo Binza (Kabindo)
12. Matadi Mayo (Goma)

All stations communicate with all others.

Frequency - Transmit/Receive, 45.900 MHz.

Equipment - RCA Super Carfone, 100 watts.

GENDARMARIE NATIONAL VHF/FM RADIO NETWORK  
LUBUMBASHI BRIGADE MOBILE



Frequencies

Mobile and Base Station

Channel A

Transmit, 155.000 MHz

Receive, 155.600 MHz

Channel B

Transmit/Receive, 155.600 MHz


Repeater

Transmit, 155.600 MHz

Receive, 155.000 MHz

Equipment: Base Station, Repeater and Mobile Radios are manufactured by General Electric.

**GENDAMARIE NATIONAL VHF/FM RADIO NETWORK  
LUBUMBASHI**




Frequencies

Channel A - Transmit/Receive 37.940 MHz

Channel B - Transmit/Receive 38.000 MHz

**Equipment:** The mobiles and base stations are rehabilitated circa 1962 Motorola Models B51AJB and T41GCV radios.


COAST, RIVER, AND LAKE GUARD  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATION CHART  
KINSHASA



CRLG Telecommunications Personnel

<u>Location</u>	<u>Supervisors</u>	<u>Electricians</u>	<u>Electronics Technicians</u>	<u>Radio Operators</u>	<u>Logistics</u>
Kinshasa Hq.	2	1	-	11	1
Banana, Bas Zaire	-	-	-	1	-
192 Kalemie, Sabah Region	4	2	2	15	1
Totals	6	3	2	27	2

# CRLG TELECOMMUNICATIONS RADIO CIRCUITS



[REDACTED]

Communications and Electronics Equipment  
Lake Guard Boats

Radar

The Decca model RM916 is a high resolution, navigational type radar with a remote PPI repeater.

Maximum RF transmit power: 3KW.  
Maximum reliable operating range: 25 nautical miles.  
Operating frequency: 9450 MHz.  
Power consumption: 230 watts at 24 VDC.

Direction Finder

Consists of a manually-operated loop antenna, compass rose and null meter. It is used in conjunction with an RCA marine HF receiver model CRM - R6A which covers a band of frequencies from 80 KC to 30,000 KC.

Communications

The RCA model super-carfone 500 provides ship/shore FM communications over a range of approximately 40 nautical miles.

Power output: 60 watts.  
Operating frequency: 46.00 MHz.  
Type modulation: Frequency modulated.  
Power requirements: 12 V. DC.

The Collins model 105 radio transceiver provides HF ship/shore communications. It utilizes a control panel which remotes all operator control functions including automatic channel selection.

Operating frequency range: 2 to 29,999 MHz.  
Output power: 400 watts PEP, 125 watts AM or CW.

Number of channels: 28,000.

Type modulation: SSB, AM and CW.

Input power requirements: 1700 watts at 24 V. DC.

### Depth Finder

The Raytheon model DE 736 depth sounder provides soundings to 60 fathoms. It operates on a frequency of 197 KC and it requires 12 V. DC input power.

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CRLG Telecommunications Networks  
Point-to-Point Equipment

<u>Location</u>	<u>Motorola SA-100</u>	<u>Scientific Transceiver 100 Watts</u>	<u>Scientific Linear Amplifier, 1000 Watts</u>
Headquarters Kinshasa	1	1	1
Banana, Bas Zaire	1	-	-
Kalemie, Sabah Region	1	2	1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~