



**TERMINATION
PHASE-OUT
STUDY
PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT
PANAMA**

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**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523**



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Terms of Reference	1
B. Conduct of the Study	1
II. SUMMARY.	2
A. Internal Security Situation.	2
B. Political Situation.	2
C. Canal Zone	3
D. The Public Safety Program.	3
E. Observations and Conclusions	4
III. INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION.	7
A. History.	7
B. Security Situation	7
IV. PANAMA NATIONAL GUARD.	9
A. Organization	9
B. Training	11
1. Recruit Training	12
2. Training Facility.	13
3. Training Aids.	13
4. Academy Expansion.	14
5. Internal Functions	14
6. Administrative Manual.	15
7. Staffing Proposal.	15
8. Summary.	15
C. Mobile Training Teams.	16
D. National Department of Investigations.	16
E. Criminal Identification Division	18
1. Chemical Laboratory Section.	18
2. Ballistics Section	19
3. Fingerprint Section.	19
4. Photographic Section	19
F. Panama City Police	19
G. Patrol Operations.	20
H. National Department of Terrestrial Transportation and Traffic	21
1. Highway Patrol Division.	21
2. Traffic Division	21

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. Marine Operations	22
J. Panamanian Air Force	22
K: Narcotics	23
1. Situation	23
2. Problem	23
3. USG Narcotics Control Assistance	24
4. Enforcement Units	24
5. Commodities	25
6. Training	26
V. PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM	27
A. Description	27
1. Technicians	29
2. Participant Training	29
3. Commodities	30
4. Host Country Contributions	31
5. Excess Property Program	31
6. Assistance from Other Donors	32
B. Observations and Conclusions	32
VI. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM	36
A. Origin	36
B. Mission	36
C. Operations	37
D. Present Status	37
E. Future Status	38
F. Resources	38
G. Foreign Military Sales	38
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS	39

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

		<u>Page</u>
A	Military Zones	42
B	National Guard Organization Chart.	43
C	National Guard Personnel Breakdown	44
D	GN Police Academy (ACAPOL) Organization Chart.	45
E	ACAPOL Training Syllabus	46
F	ACAPOL Training and Projections.	49
G	Proposed ACAPOL Organization and Staffing.	51
H	GN National Department of Investigations (DENI) Organization Chart.	52
I	Commodity Profile and Expenditures	53
J	OPS Sponsored Training for GN.	54
K	Public Safety Funding.	55
L	Chronological Record of OPS TDY Assistance	56
M	Customs Narcotics Section Organization Chart	58
N	Record of PSD Technicians Assigned to Panama	59
O	MAP Funding.	60
P	Crime Statistics - Panama City - Military Zone I	61
Q	Persons Contacted.	62

ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS USED

ACAPOL	Police Academy (Academia de Capacitacion Policial)
ACS	Action Coordinating Subcommittee
CA	Civic Action
CAP	Central America and Panama
CIM	Center for Military Training (Centro de Instruccion Militar)
CONUS	Continental United States
CZ	Canal Zone
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (USG)
DENI	National Department of Investigations (Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones)
EPP	Excess Property Program
FAP	Panamanian Air Force
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GN	National Guard (Guardia Nacional)
G-Staff	General Staff of the GN: G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and G-5
GOP	Government of Panama
IAPA	Inter-American Police Academy
IPA	International Police Academy
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MILGP	Military Group
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NCAP	Narcotics Control Action Program
OPS	Office of Public Safety
PJG	Provisional Junta Government
Panama Battalion	The National Guard's 400 man peace-keeping force provided to the UN for Middle-East duties
PSA	Public Safety Advisor
PSD	Public Safety Division
PSO	Public Safety Officer
SAP	Security Assistance Program
SCIATS	Small Craft Inspection and Training School
TDY	Temporary Duty
TO	Table of Organization
USCS	United States Customs Service
USCINCSO	U. S. Commander-in-Chief Southern Command
USCOMMILGP	United States Commander of Military Group

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Terms of reference

U. S. Public Safety assistance has been provided to the Government of Panama to develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of its civil police forces. At the project's initiation and during its progress mutually agreed objectives and courses of action were established and at times adjusted to achieve the overall goals as well as to accommodate changing situations in the country. Both host government and U. S. resources were programmed and employed to jointly strive toward these goals.

Due to U. S. congressional action, the continued input of U. S. Government resources planned for this project must be terminated sooner than planned and prior to the achievement of the goals and objectives which were mutually established by the two governments.

It is therefore the purpose of this report to note the progress made thus far and to enumerate what remains to be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals. The report also includes recommended actions which the Government of Panama should take, employing their own resources, but under the circumstances excluding in-country assistance by the U. S.

B. Conduct of the Study

The termination phase-out study team consisted of the following members from OPS/W:

Caesar P. Bernal, OPS/W
Robert A. Phippen, OPS/W

The team arrived in Panama City on March 31, 1974 and departed on April 12, 1974. Generally, the conduct of the study entailed three stages with the first consisting of the usual preliminary review of program documents and Desk contacts in AID/W. The second stage was totally conducted during the 13 days in the Republic of Panama underscored by a series of meetings and discussions with both USG and GOP officials with emphasis on officers from the Republic of Panama National Guard (Guardia Nacional de la Republica de Panama). These visits included the GN Headquarters in Panama City and its units and a one day field trip to the Military Zone Headquarters in the City of Colon on the North Coast. The third stage was the completion of the study which took place in AID/W.

In conformity with established procedures, the team discussed findings of a general nature with officials of the GN and the USAID.

II. SUMMARY

A. Internal Security Situation

A summation of the internal security situation of Panama reflects a low level of violent crimes and a moderate level of passive crimes. The general ambiance of the capital city area appears to be tranquil and law-abiding with a prevalent attitude of civic obedience. The rural area situation differs in that certain sectors have enclaves of unemployment and/or underemployment with the inherent problems but these are exceptions rather than the norm.

The National Guard considers the increasing use of drugs as their primary enforcement problem with international prostitution in second place. The drug of major abuse is and will continue to be the use of marihuana; however, cocaine abuse is increasing significantly. Concerned National Guardsmen point out the development of a drug sub-culture among the youths in Panama due to the enhanced availability of marihuana and cocaine from domestic or other sources and to the tendency of the younger generation to emulate their international peer groups. Panama's role as an international commercial center and crossroad of airline and sea travel makes it an entrepot for the movement of illicit drugs. Modern communications, rapid transportation, international banking provide the ambiance for unobtrusive deployment and movement of people, to wit, traffickers.

The potential for widespread disorder exists, however, the probability for this volatile situation erupting is hinged to the progress on the Canal Treaty negotiations.

B. Political Situation

Brigadier General Omar Torrijos has been Panama's chief political figure since October 11, 1968, when the National Guard ousted the government of President Arnulfo Arias in a bloodless coup. In 1972, elections were held to elect representatives from each of Panama's 505 municipalities (corregimientos) or districts to form a National Assembly of Community Representatives which has a broad range of consultative and representative functions. Although the Assembly elected a President and Vice-President, it voted in 1972 to give the powers of Chief of Government to General Torrijos.

General Torrijos' goal is to integrate all Panamanians, including the previously marginalized lower class and peasants, into active participation in the economic and political life of Panama and thereby create a unified nation. To accomplish this, his Government has been implementing domestic reforms and given emphasis to rural development. The political base of the Government has been strengthened

by a labor code, construction of low-cost housing, educational reforms, advances in public health, improved public administration, and a prosperous economy. Reforms have, in general, been introduced cautiously in order not to disturb Panama's growth as an important banking, financial and tourist center.

The Government has broad support in the middle and lower classes. Such opposition that occasionally is manifested comes from members of the upper class oligarchy which was displaced from power in 1968. Through the development of strong nationalist and reformist policies and programs, the Government has been able to incorporate into constructive activity those individuals and groups which in some other Latin American countries have gravitated toward extremist and, in some cases, terrorist activities. In Panama, the energies of these individuals are being applied in agrarian reform and other developmental projects, and Panama has been able to avoid the violence that other countries with similar problems have experienced. The security task of the National Guard, therefore, has been made much easier by the reformist policies of the Government.

C. Canal Zone

The events and incidents resulting from past relations and negotiations between the GOP and USG concerning the Canal Zone and the Canal itself are well known.

The 500 square mile area that comprises the Canal Zone in the center of the Republic provides space for the Canal itself, the governing and operational elements required for the furnishing of the Canal, the Headquarters for the U. S. Southern Command, the Inter-American Air Force Academy and a number of other U. S. military training and support elements. Additionally, there are business establishments and housing for the 40,000 American civilians, military personnel and 12,000 Panamanian employees.

D. The Public Safety Program

The broadly stated objective of the Public Safety program to improve the overall capability of the National Guard remains unfulfilled although progress has been made during the life of the project as described elsewhere. Improved police operations brought about through continued PSD advice and training would certainly have better prepared the civil police elements of the National Guard to handle possible confrontations during the negotiations period.

The National Guard occupies a unique position in that two USG agencies have been providing assistance for better than a decade. By virtue of the GN's duality of mission which maintains a quasi posture in both police and military responsibilities, the

Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Public Safety Division (PSD) find themselves working with, training, advising and providing material for the same personnel and confronted with not too dissimilar problems.

Although the GN contends their resources are 80 to 90% functionally committed to civil police type responsibilities, the USG assistance efforts do not bear this out. A comparison between total funding to date in providing training and material indicates the MAP has been favored with a 7:1 ratio in the training sector and a 4:1 ratio in commodities. Concomitantly with the disparity in funding levels, the MAP has a 3:1 ratio in the technician staff. The two programs have provided the GN approximately \$6.5 million in training and material through FY 74 (see attachments K and O).

To arrive at a just evaluation of the project, consideration was given to the retarding (if not disruptive) effect of in-country events which occurred within the life of the project. The riots of January 1964 with the resultant break in U. S./Panama relations occurred at a time when real progress was being made. It is a credit to the PSD staff that the Highway Patrol training continued and the Patrol Forces training began as planned prior to the riots.

Four years later the coup of October 11, 1968, took place and once more relationships had to undergo adjustments while sub-projects were revised, developed or suspended and the GN consolidated its position and determined new direction. A year later, in December of 1969, a mini-coup and counter-coup occurred which did nothing to enhance program continuity.

Since mid-1972, the PSD found itself limited in its area of police assistance activity resulting from the expressed desires of the U. S. Ambassador and the USAID Director to concentrate on training.

Thus, the PS program did not have a continuous flow for the twelve year period but rather three increments of roughly four years each. This does not imply that PS was unique in this respect as other Mission projects were subjected, to some degree, to the same retarding factors. However, in the case of police assistance, the repercussions were more pronounced due to the GN's status in GOP affairs.

E. Observations and Conclusions

The FY 75 Development Assistance Program (DAP) addresses the conclusions of the PS program evaluation conducted in January 1973 and states the existing project achieved substantial progress toward the goal of assisting the development of the GN into a more

humane, responsible and effective police service. Concurrently, the previous evaluation recommended the continuation of the PS program beyond its FY 74 termination date on the fact that the U. S. had continuing interest in the development of the GN's civil police skills to a level where law enforcement is equitably and effectively administered in Panama. The topic of continuation is now moot.

The accomplishments noted in the terminal evaluation study underscored the following activities:

1. Reorganization of parts of the Panama City Police.
2. Creation of the Operations Control Center.
3. The establishment of five additional precinct stations in the capital designed to bring police services closer to the citizenry.
4. Expansion of the civil police training facilities, ACAPOL.
5. Continued support of the GN's civic action activities.
6. Provided technical assessment for commodity support to recipient GOP entities in narcotics enforcement.
7. Developed narcotics training courses which have been integrated into the ACAPOL training curriculum.

The terminal evaluation team noted certain areas in the sub-project activities which had not attained the accepted level of responsive initiative by the GN. They are addressed briefly as follows with in-depth explanation in Chapter V.

1. Motor vehicle maintenance: Vehicle maintenance throughout the GN has yet to be institutionalized.
2. Criminal investigations: DENI has not yet reached the desired level of a professional investigative agency.
3. Handling of criminal complaints: The complaint system presently utilized by GN and DENI tends to dissuade citizen's complaints (due to the antiquated method of resorting to a formal appearance at the central station before follow-up investigations are performed).
4. Inspection staff: Internal investigations are generally handled at Military Zone level with no centralized authority in existence to make objective and impartial inquiries of possible malfeasance, misconduct or other irregularities.

5. Police Operations Control Center: The POCC although completed per se through much effort and some funding has not attained its full intended utilization. The general staff has never fully accepted the need for the Center's continuous operation.

6. Police Planning Unit: The GN continues to plan on an ad hoc basis with long range planning completely escaping their consideration. (The argument presented by the GN thus far has been that they are too small for the luxury of such specialization and the G-staffs are responsible for planning and research).

III. INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION

A. History

The Republic of Panama forms the land connection between North and South America. The country has a total area of 29,208 square miles, slightly smaller than South Carolina with a population of 1.5 million (1972 est.) and its capital is Panama City located on the Pacific Coast. The principal highways unite the Pacific side of Panama from Costa Rica to 40 miles east of Panama City, and the two coasts are united by a highway between Panama City on the Pacific and Colon on the Caribbean.

Panama's population of 1.5 million is the smallest of the Latin American countries with a density of 48 persons per square mile and a high population growth rate. About one third of the people live in the two major cities of Colon and Panama. The culture, customs and language of the Panamanians are basically Spanish. English is widely understood due to the influence of the many Americans in the Canal Zone, American business interests, tourism and many English speaking Panamanians of West Indian descent.

Panama achieved independence from Spain in 1821 and thereafter joined the Confederation of Greater Colombia; Panama declared its independence from Colombia in 1903. The post-World War II era brought an elected President in 1952 and following the assassination of the President in 1955, presidential elections were held at four year intervals until October 11, 1968 when the National Guard assumed the powers of government, following a peaceable overthrow of the President Arias regime.

Brigadier General Omar Torrijos Herrera, Commander of the National Guard, emerged as the leader after the establishment of a Provisional Military Junta in October of 1968 and a subsequent new constitution provided for the election of local community representatives to form an Assembly. The first Assembly was elected in 1972 and the current President of the Republic, Demetrio B. Lakas, was the first President elected by the Assembly though General Torrijos remains as the Commander-in-Chief of the GN. The Assembly in one of its first acts approved a resolution designating General Torrijos "the highest leader of the revolution" and granted him powers to govern the country for the ensuing six years.

B. Security Situation

In relation to some other Latin American countries, Panama has had comparative freedom from internal security problems. The proximity of U. S. armed forces stationed in the Canal Zone has

served as a deterrent to attacks by a foreign power. Although there have been political coups and attempted coups in the history of the country there have not been the violent and frequent overthrows of governments that have occurred elsewhere. The opportunity has always existed for demonstrations and propaganda campaigns directed at the U. S. presence in the middle of the country and actions of this nature have occasionally occurred.

Panama does not have a high incidence of criminality according to GN officials contacted. The available crime statistics substantiate this claim (attachment P). The GN's admitted areas of concern in their enforcement efforts are related to suppression of prostitution and narcotics control.

IV. PANAMA NATIONAL GUARD

Since the Panamanian October Revolution of 1968, the National Guard (GN) has been prepared and conditioned to assume a major role as nation builders and developers. The 7,856 man unit is militarily structured and within the Latin American context presents a military posture for all intents and purposes. However, it is a multi-purpose unit charged with the responsibilities usually designated to the army, the air force, the navy, the coast guard and the police with no distinction in its personnel in regards to their internal and/or external security mission. In the case of the Panama City Police, a definite distinction has been allowed due to compelling circumstances. For example, a senior National Guard major is actually designated as the chief of police although he is the commander of the military zone (see attachment A).

A. Organization: The National Guard is a unified force with broad functions, therefore, it is impossible to describe the organization in police terms alone. The personnel are considered interchangeable and transfers are effected even in the cases of those who have received specialized training. Given its small size and broad responsibility the GN has developed expertise in improvisation. It is significant that all personnel in the GN are volunteers who are provided with a vertical promotion opportunity (see attachments B and C).

Command Structure: The "Commander-in-Chief" of the National Guard is General Omar Torrijos Herrera who originally presided over the Provisional Junta Government (PJM) shortly after the October Revolution. There is a Deputy Chief and a Chief of Staff who supervise and coordinate all functions of G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and G-5 staffs. It should be noted the main thrust of PSD activities has been focussed in the G-3 sector and limited to this area since mid 1972.

With the exception of the Deputy Chief of the GN who is a full colonel, the Chief of Staff, the G-Staff and the Commander of the National Department of Terrestrial Transport and Traffic (DNTTT) are all Lieutenant Colonels. The National Guard Table of Organization in relation to grades, ranks and pay is found in attachment C.

For reasons known best to the GN Command Staff, they are very adamant in underscoring the policy that the Guard devotes 80 to 90 percent of its resources, time and efforts in a civil police profile to maintain law and order. Despite the talk about the primacy of the civil police type functions, the initial training of the guard recruit consists of twelve weeks of military training conducted under the auspices of the Center for Military Instruction (CIM). On balance, the guardsman assigned to the police sector

receives an additional twelve weeks of training at the Police Academy (ACAPOL). It is significant that relatively few guardsmen have received this training since ACAPOL is new.

Command Staff Function: The organization of the National Guard is similar, at its highest echelons, to that of a U. S. Army division. While most company size units have dual functions (police/military), there are some which are totally police oriented such as Coiba Island Prison guards, the Highway Patrol and Traffic Divisions (DNTTT) and the Panama City Police Department.

The staff functions are described briefly as follows:

Chief of Staff: The Chief of Staff is a Lt. Colonel who serves as the coordinator for staff functions and reports directly to the Deputy Chief of the GN.

G-1: His areas of concern pertain to administration and personnel with additional responsibilities in social welfare, legal assessment, military health and barber shops.

G-2: This section has expanded responsibilities as it handles all national intelligence and investigations. Additionally, the G-2 is responsible for immigration, arms control and residency permits. The G-2 also exercises direct control over the National Department of Investigation (DENI) which maintains police records and is charged with investigating all alleged crimes and turning over evidence, prisoners and its documents to the prosecuting attorney for judicial processing. DENI also has the responsibility for controlling illicit drug traffic.

G-3: In the absence of units higher or larger than a company, the G-3 is not only a staff officer but is in the direct chain of command as the senior officer to whom the commanders of the five rifles companies (captains) report. As an adjunct to his training and operations responsibilities, the G-3 directly controls the Panamanian Air Force (FAP), the marine operations, the Center for Military Instruction (CIM) and the Police Academy (ACAPOL).

G-4: The G-4's logistics responsibility include the finance section, vehicle maintenance and the transportation company.

G-5: This staff position was filled recently. Civic action is an area in which the General is personally very active and devotes much of his time to travelling through the countryside listening to the peasants and trying to solve their problems by issuing orders on the spot.

DNTTT: The National Department of Terrestrial Transport and Traffic is commanded by a Lt. Colonel who has staff status at same level of the G-staff.

Below the G-staff the major operating units are five rifle companies which tend to be predominately military in pattern and function. Each one of the nine provinces of the Republic of Panama constitutes a Military Zone (numbered from I thru X) with the exception of Panama City and its province which headquarter two Military Zones (see attachment A). If the zones are not primarily police-oriented they are at least mixed and the Zone Commander (normally a major) is one of the most powerful provincial officials. The Zone Commander provides full police services including the operation of detention facilities and has DENI and DNTTT personnel attached to his command. Each military Zone Headquarters is located in the capital city of the province and may have as many as twelve detachments within the zone usually commanded by young and junior GN personnel either in the officer or NCO level. The military zone structure with its civic action program and full police responsibility has strengthened GN ties to the small communities in remote and inaccessible areas.

B. Training

The National Guard Police Academy (ACAPOL) is the only civil police school in Panama. There is no military academy though there is a well-structured military training system. ACAPOL is headed by a Director, with rank of Major, and his Deputy, an Inspector assigned from the National Department of Investigations (DENI). Both officers are graduates of the International Police Academy (IPA). The Director reports to the Chief of G-3, Operations and Training. During the period of time the terminal evaluation was conducted, the three regularly assigned officers were out of the country on the United Nations truce mission assigned to the Sinai Desert. They are due to return to their assignments in May upon completion of their six month tour of duty in the Sinai. The organization chart of ACAPOL is shown in attachment D.

ACAPOL was established February 20, 1970, following the recommendations of USAID/PSD. National Guard personnel have since been trained in comprehensive courses such as basic police training, and advance police administration for officers while many others were exposed to specialized courses in such subjects as Police Community Relations, Traffic, Narcotics, Driver Training and others. The basic police course for enlisted personnel totals twelve weeks or 480 instruction hours and is considered to be a sound basic police course consistent with USAID standards. To date ACAPOL has graduated a cumulative total of 1,108 GN personnel who were specifically assigned to civil police functions. During the first quarter of CY 1974, a total of 148 GN personnel have completed courses at ACAPOL. It is significant this amount of graduates at this early date exceeds the total number of trainees in CY 1973.

In CY 1972, 20 officers were given a 16 weeks specialized police administration course totaling 640 classroom hours. The ACAPOL Acting Director hopes that in the future all officer candidates will be required to attend this course. The revised officer course curriculum is considered adequate to the needs of the National Guard. Course outlines covering the general content of basic and specialized courses are shown in attachment E.

One of the impeding factors to increased officers' training is the number available as there are only 193 lieutenants, 51 captains, 20 majors, seven lieutenant colonels and one colonel in the entire National Guard force (total 272). Any attempts to conduct training courses for a sizeable number of officers would disrupt the command structure. The record shows that only one officer has attended the Senior Officers' Course in the IPA and this was prior to 1966. The GN general staff and Public Safety Division have coordinated in an effort to remedy this situation. Recently a lieutenant colonel was nominated for an IPA Senior Course and OPS/W has concurred.

The Director and Deputy Director are the only resident faculty members at ACAPOL. All other instruction is presented by GN personnel from outside the Academy. This includes limited instruction provided by Public Safety advisors, local university professors and outside consultants. However, the bulk of the instruction load is carried by officer members of the GN who have full time assignments in some other GN activity. This faculty situation is unsatisfactory as there can be no real direction in coordination of teaching or standard preparation of lesson plans which now depend on the individual skills and interests of the lecturers. A permanent instructional staff recruited from within the GN to provide a professional faculty to meet the needs of the Academy would be preferable.

1. Recruit Training

Recruits entering the GN begin by receiving 12 weeks of Basic Military training offered at the Basic Training Center located at Rio Hato. The military basic training process usually weeds out 30% of the recruits. Police basic training is offered at a point in an individual GN's career which may occur immediately following graduation from the basic training or after several years of service.

The police training nominee is placed on written orders and reports to ACAPOL the day prior to the first scheduled class. He is housed at a distant police precinct and transported by an ACAPOL bus to classes daily. ACAPOL class sizes vary in numbers of persons attending but usually average 50 to 60 students (12 week course). Personnel assigned to police training are usually in the 18 to 25 year age bracket and should have a minimum of a sixth grade education. There have been exceptions as some students possess less than this

minimum education. Experience has shown the individuals made a poor showing and were either excused from class or did not attain the necessary academic standing required for graduation. Following graduation from ACAPOL, trainees are assigned to various units throughout the Republic where they are expected to fulfill police duties.

2. Training Facility

The ACAPOL is located in a congested area of Panama City in a two-story building with a basement. Part of the building consists of the social club for the GN including a swimming pool. It is located facing Panama Bay and at times high waters from the sea stop the self-defense training which is conducted in the basement. Plywood flooring sections have been placed in the basement but sea water has caused considerable damage.

There are a total of three classrooms. The main classroom will easily accommodate 50 to 60 students and could hold twice that number for special occasions. Another classroom is located on the first floor adjacent to the swimming pool. This room's use is limited due to its quite long and narrow shape plus its proximity to the swimming pool causes a major distraction. The language classroom has been well located and equipped with good lighting, seating and individual study sections.

The classroom for language training has 26 tape recording instruments installed in separate booths for the purpose of English language instruction. To date, seven officers and enlisted men have completed training in the English language. The results were reported as fair/good depending upon the individual. Sixteen additional tape recording units are in storage at ACAPOL but cannot be installed for lack of space. They are considered as spares. All tape equipment came from U. S. excess property and MILGP sources. All courses previously offered including projections for balance of CY 74 and numbers of personnel trained at ACAPOL is presented in attachment F.

3. Training Aids

The PSD has furnished training aids including motion picture projectors, slide projectors, overhead projectors and some Regional Training Aids Center textbooks. Those in the school were all in operating condition and appeared to be well maintained. USAID/PSD procured and has in-country, one 50 passenger bus for use at the Academy and two four-wheel drive wagons for the rural mobile training teams together with training aids for the latter.

4. Academy Expansion

ACAPOL severely limits the capacity of the GN to accomplish the required training goals because of structural limitations as well as an unsatisfactory location. There are no resident facilities at the present location, thus the students must be quartered at a substantial distance from ACAPOL. Additionally, students must also go to the Tocumen Airport area for their police firearms training.

To deal with these problems, a Public Safety Advisor from the IPA, made a study and submitted a report dated March 27, 1972, recommending the Academy be relocated to the Olympic range near the Tocumen Airport. The expansion of existing facilities in conjunction with those available at the adjoining GN camp was recommended. There is also a possibility of utilizing the nearby sports arena swimming pool for the athletic and rescue training.

The Academy director has requested \$50,000 for the expansion project at the Olympic Range. Funds have not been approved and are reportedly in pending status. USAID/PSD and the evaluation team concur in these recommendations subject to the necessary allocation of funds by the GOP.

5. Internal Functions

In addition to those general considerations which must be treated in describing the present police training situation, the question of planning and the proposed development of a permanent and adequate training concept should be considered first. The general policy statement echoed by the GN on their 80 to 90 percent civil police functions is not consistent with the support accorded ACAPOL.

Because of various difficulties surrounding the use of numerical data ACAPOL sponsored a marginal number of courses in CY 73 that resulted in graduating only 70 students. In the previous year 611 students were trained. It appears that either interest in police training waned or the GN emphasized much more interest in military training. To provide training viability, the GN will have to energize interest and support in sufficient quantity to permit the establishment of ACAPOL as a permanent institution based on sound principles of management and organization. The focus of official attention should be directed on ACAPOL as a meaningful and critical focal point of learning.

The GN command is obviously concerned with training. It is stressed at all levels. The team recognizes that approximately \$350,000 is budgeted for training on the basis of the entire GN and since ACAPOL is only one internal section of G-3, there is no specific budgetary breakout for police training.

6. Administrative Manual

The development of an administrative operations manual is recommended. This would outline in specific terms those principles of proper management and organization vitally necessary and provide direction for closer control of staff operations. The manual would cover such functional areas as: supervision of training; program planning; total utilization of the academy's facilities; budgetary requirements; maintenance of Academy building and equipment; methods of rating students; preparation of visual aids and other artwork; preparation of statistical and other related data; modernize, update and revise lesson plans. A well planned and prepared administrative manual in close coordination with the G-3 Section, would provide assurance of an efficient well-managed and standardized on-going police training program for the future.

7. Staffing Proposal

A proposed organizational and staffing structure at ACAPOL is suggested based on present and future training needs discovered during briefings, individual discussions and visits with GN and PSD personnel. The GN should provide an instructor staff on a full time basis as opposed to drawing on the rank/file GN and DENI personnel to lecture during a specific period of training.

The PSD developed staffing proposal is offered as a reference work and guide for GN use in meeting necessary training goals established by the Command (see attachment G).

8. Summary

Historically, the GN has attained growth increases in tranches not compatible with its ability to absorb the training demands. As an aftermath to the violent disturbances in 1964, two 500 men groups were recruited into the GN to bolster its effectiveness. Again in 1967, an additional 1,000 men were recruited to bring the GN to its present strength of 7,856 (attachment C).

If the GN intends to pursue its announced goal of recruiting an additional 600 men by the end of CY 74, once again the training capabilities will be overly taxed. This situation is further compounded by the attrition/replacement loss of three to five percent per year confined mostly to the Guardsman and Corporal ranks.

The total number of recruits to be trained in remainder of CY 74 approximates 800 guardsmen. Based on the 60 student limit ACAPOL can absorb within a 12 week training period, the GN's plans to subject all guardsmen to civil police training at ACAPOL must be considered an impossible task unless present facilities and resources are expanded.

C. Mobile Training Teams (MTT)

ACAPOL's staff coordination with the GN G-3 Section and USAID/PSD has resulted in forming two mobile training teams. They are prepared to travel to distant and remote rural areas where police training courses will be offered to GN personnel who have never received police training elsewhere. Each team consists of three GN personnel with two instructors holding officer rank and one driver.

This training concept is scheduled to begin 13 May 1974 with PSD provided equipment for the two mobile teams. In part this equipment package consists of two Jeepster Wagoneers, portable electric generators, 16 mm movie projectors, 35 mm slide projectors, portable movie screens, and other instructional material.

Currently, three courses of instruction have been selected and cover the fields of:

1. Police Operations
2. Agricultural Law
3. Introduction to Narcotics

Each of the three courses are of one week duration or 30 instruction hours. Attendance is limited to 30 students.

The training teams will remain in one rural location for three weeks teaching a different course of instruction each week. Following a one week block of instruction, a different 30 man group will attend the next one week block on a different course of instruction. Thus, at the end of the three week period, 90 students will have been trained in three separate police subjects. The three 30 man groups will later be rotated in such a manner to receive the two other courses when the MTT returns.

Following the three week stint in one location, the training team will return to ACAPOL for one week for resupply and rest. After one week this entire process is then repeated in a different rural area.

D. National Department of Investigations (DENI)

The National Department of Investigations (DENI) is headquartered in an antiquated two story building in a congested area of the capital city. The DENI personnel have national jurisdiction in all investigations throughout the Republic for major crimes and subversive activities. The present total manpower of DENI is approximately 325 employees. Since 1968, DENI has operated under the direct control of

the National Guard G-2 although its personnel are considered civilians. Prior to 1968, DENI was a political entity and its personnel were selected on the basis of political favoritism rather than qualification and training (for DENI organization chart, see attachment H.)

The current problems confronting DENI consist of: 1) inadequate floor space to maintain files, records and offices for its investigative units; 2) limited investigative expertise available amongst its detachments assigned to the provincial capital cities; and 3) marginal opportunity for career development and advancement.

While the functional problem of floor space may be resolved by present GN plans to add an additional story to the present structure, the operational problem in the interior will require greater training efforts to upgrade the DENI's effectiveness equitably throughout the Republic. Insofar as the terminal evaluation team could determine during their visit to Military Zone II (Colon), the DENI detachment finds itself in a situation whereby its criminal investigators are tasked with the responsibility to investigate all types of major crimes which are usually outside their area of expertise. Subsequently, the investigation is cursory, the compiling of evidence is erratic and the judicial process suffers.

Although DENI personnel are considered to be generally better selected than National Guard personnel, the opportunity for career development and advancement is limited. Poor pay, weaknesses in training and lack of civil service system, which would offer tenure and career development, are major obstacles toward developing DENI into a viable institution. It should be noted there is a retirement system in effect but it is subject to political whim and does not provide the stability necessary for development.

The DENI is currently headed by a civilian director with two years experience and a deputy director with 20 years experience in criminal investigations. Functionally, DENI is divided into twelve divisions with detachments in nine capital cities in the ten military zones (see attachment A). DENI divisions are divided as follows:

1. Security and INTERPOL
2. Tocumen Airport
3. Communications
4. Homicide
5. Narcotics
6. Fugitives

7. Investigations
8. Common crimes
9. Central records
10. Criminal identification
11. Crime laboratory
12. Photographic laboratory

The PSD has provided a modest amount of commodity support as a pump-primer in transportation, communications and basic investigative equipment. DENI has funded their major material needs but problems still prevail in transportation and communications requirements. Their present facilities and resources are not adequate to meet their functional requirements.

The PSD has made a major thrust in upgrading and professionalizing the DENI through the development and integration of special training courses conducted at ACAPOL for the criminal investigations sector of the National Guard. This effort includes specially designed courses in the field of narcotics enforcement.

E. Criminal Identification Division (CID)

The Criminal Identification Division (CID) is responsible for providing DENI with scientific assistance in the fields of fingerprints, forensic chemistry, firearms identification and photography. Presently, CID has the adequate instrumentation and staff of technicians generally able to meet most of the demands being made. Of paramount importance is the lack of sensitization in the field to the meaningful application of science to criminal investigations in civil police services. Organizationally, the CID is divided into four sections as follows:

1. Chemical Laboratory Section

This section has the responsibility of performing all chemical and microscopic analyses of physical evidence submitted. According to DENI officials the present chief technician is professionally competent and expeditiously submits the results on the lab findings within three days after receiving the evidence and in many cases on the same day. Statistics indicate that approximately 75 percent of the examinations are related to identification of drugs with marijuana examinations having an eight to one ratio over cocaine examinations and other forms of drugs.

The team concluded that the physical facilities and equipment are adequate to handle the current work load. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis of suspect narcotic substances can be performed in compliance with present judicial requirements for prosecution purposes.

2. Ballistics Section

This section is responsible for the expertise related to firearm investigations and registrations. Although there is no full time examiner on the staff, the examinations are conducted by the division chief himself and an assistant. This section's case load consists principally of two types of examinations; the first is standard firearm identification based on the microscopic comparison of fired bullets and cartridge cases; and the second consists of test firing of submitted weapons for firearms registration purposes.

3. Fingerprint Section

The fingerprint classification utilized by DENI is based on the Henry system. The Public Safety Division has trained four fingerprint classification technicians in the U. S. The fingerprint cards are divided into two main groups, criminal and civil, with 400,000 sets of impressions in the criminal files and approximately 800,000 sets in the civil files. Additionally, a latent print file is maintained from criminal scene investigations submittals.

4. Photographic Section

This section consists of two photographers who are on call around the clock. Their main function includes scientific, identification and field photography.

In sum, there should be a general awareness instilled in all GN personnel on the meaningful application of science to criminal investigations. This broad philosophy should be channeled through the ACAPOL as a conditioning process tied in with all training conducted therein.

F. Panama City Police

The province of Panama is divided into Military Zone I and Military Zone X (attachment A) with the capital city of Panama in Military Zone I. The Military Zone Commanding Officer has a dual title of Zone Commander and Chief of Police of Panama City. The present Zone Commander is an IPA graduate. The Panama City police consists of a uniform force of 1,100 men and has police responsibilities for the metropolitan capital area with a population of approximately 500,000

people. Panama City is considered a banking and business center connecting the Americas. The Chief of Police underscored his two main problem areas were narcotics and prostitution as the crime statistics indicate a low level of criminal acts.

One of the objectives in the revised PROP of 1971 indicated the need to assist in establishing a civil police organization within the GN based on civil police concepts and standards. To this end the Public Safety Division initiated the Panama City police reorganization project. The following accomplishments were noted:

1. Development of the reorganization plan for the Panama City police, December 1971.
2. Training of selected Panama City police officers at the International Police Academy.
3. Upgrading of patrolman standards for the Panama City Police as a pilot project..
4. The establishment of an additional five police precincts to serve key areas in the capital city area.
5. The training and equipping of a 100 man tactical unit to handle civil disturbances in the capital city area.
6. Restructuring mobile patrol districts for improved and more effective coverage.
7. Training of police patrol drivers to improve driving ability and patrol functions.

The terminal evaluation team concluded there was a pervasive police presence in certain high visibility areas, however, fixed posts appeared to constitute the preponderant police presence with some foot patrols in the central sector. On balance, since the public does not differentiate between the GN military patrols and GN police patrols, it can be assumed that GN presence in general is a major factor in the low incidence of criminal activities. The Panama City Chief indicated his concern on increasing the number of patrol vehicles per shift from its present level of ten to fifteen during peak activity to 20 to 30, but he could not foresee this accomplishment in the next two years.

G. Patrol Operations

A major thrust in PSD activity has been to instill a concept of pervasive uniformed patrol presence as the best deterrent to criminality. Participant selection has been channeled to support this activity as reflected by the 22 IPA General Course graduates with specialization in

patrol operations. Essential equipment was provided consisting of some vehicles, mobile transmitters and emergency equipment (see attachment I). Presently the Panama City Police has vehicular and foot patrols which provide a uniformed police presence in the urban area. The vehicle patrol functions outside the capital city in the other Military Zones are limited if Military Zone II is a typical example. Most of the patrol functions in the interior are performed through foot patrols in the urban areas and in pick-up type vehicles or Jeeps in the rural areas. Hopefully, the patrol concept developed by PSD for the Panama City pilot project will be capitalized by the GN and similar projects will be developed throughout the Republic.

H. National Department of Terrestrial Transportation and Traffic (DNITT)

The Traffic Division and Highway Patrol are separate units of the Department of Terrestrial Transportation and Traffic situated in the same building but with different roles and missions. Whereas the DNITT is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, the two divisions are commanded by GN captains. Their total national strength is approximately 325 Guardsmen with 70 percent of them stationed in the Panama City area.

The DNITT has a traffic control center in the central headquarters in Panama City. A traffic control map has been completed which indicates traffic flows based on vehicle counts to assist in better organizing traffic enforcement. The radio control room is adjacent to this center.

1. Highway Patrol Division

The Highway Patrol Division is commanded by a captain who attended the General Course at IPA in 1964 with traffic specialization. The PSD has assisted in the development of the Highway Patrol Division since its inception by providing technical advice and commodity support. In 1964, AID/PSD provided 28 vehicles. In the ensuing years these vehicles have been replaced by the GOP and presently the vehicular fleet consists of 56 vehicles including one ambulance and three wreckers. The Highway Patrol has the responsibility for patrolling all paved roads including the Pan American Highway through Panama. Its additional responsibilities include firefighting, contraband control, licensing/inspection functions involving protection of natural resources and animal transport, common crimes, and vehicle weight control.

2. Traffic Division

The Traffic Division, also commanded by an IPA graduate, has the responsibility for the control of traffic in the city of Panama. Its present vehicular fleet consists of 36 Volkswagens and 33 motorcycles, all radio equipped. Both Divisions of DNITT have their own maintenance facilities.

The Traffic Division performs pervasive patrol services throughout the capital city area and is noted for its quick response time to motor vehicle accidents. Additionally, the point control provided by traffic officers throughout the capital city area indicates a high level of performance which provides an expedient traffic flow.

The DNTTT has a manual of rules and regulations which is used as a basis for all their personnel training presently conducted through ACAPOL.

I. Marine Operations

The Marine Operations Division of the GN formally began on January 17, 1969. It was formed to provide a conventional Coast Guard and Marine Police operation to do coastal as well as high seas patrol out to the 200 mile limits of the sea established by Panama. They conduct marine police operations in the rivers and harbors and perform police functions in the areas such as Darien and the Panamanian islands where the only access is by boat or air. Also included are air-sea rescue service, contraband control and maintenance of navigational aids. A major civic action program is carried out in the remote areas where Marine Operations provide heavy cargo transport service for civilians to places where commercial transport is not available. This is reimbursed to the GOP on an actual operational cost basis.

Marine Operations consists of 172 personnel including two captains and four lieutenants. The marine element is equipped with ten amphibious and patrol boats plus one speed boat. The larger boats (LCM's) are used for cargo transport, civic action efforts and to transport personnel and prisoners. Their principal advisor is the MILGP.

Recruits entering the Marine Operations must either be experienced seamen or graduates of the GOP Civil Nautical School. They have the same recruit requirements as the other members of the GN. Trained technicians are difficult to retain due to pay differentials in civil life. The ACAPOL has been used occasionally for recruit training, in addition to the Small Craft Inspection and Training School (SCIAT) of the U. S. Army in the Canal Zone. Other instruction has been given to 17 Guardsmen in the U. S., Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela in naval institutions. Two Marine Operation officers attended an IPA General Course in 1973 with special tours included to observe Coast Guard and port facilities and operations.

J. Panamanian Air Force (FAP)

The Panamanian Air Force (FAP) is at present performing principal functions parallel to that of a conventional police air wing. The force is advised by the USMILGP. U. S. training is MAP

funded in order that the pilots may get the best training available and also to form a standardized nucleus of pilot capability since many of them have trained in other Latin American countries with varying standards and methodology.

FAP has shown rapid growth from a PSD provided single-engine airplane to a total of 21 aircraft of which five are helicopters. The balance are fixed wing aircraft ranging from single engine light planes to a DC-6B. Grant assistance from the MAP program provided to FAP from FY 70 through FY 73 approximates \$1.825 million. The total funding is divided into 86 percent for material and 14 percent for training. The FY 74 funding level for the FAP is expected to follow the pattern of previous years.

The mission of the Air Force is closely tied to civic action in remote areas and also provides immediate transport capabilities for emergencies. Likewise, the aircraft are used for transport purposes including a large number of senior officer inspections and visits to the interior.

The principal thrust of the Military Assistance Program for FAP assistance now is in spare parts, communications, procurement and maintenance.

K. Narcotics

1. Situation

The international narcotics traffickers have taken advantage of the many facilities which make Panama a center for legitimate international commerce between nations by utilizing it as a transit point, staging area and negotiating site. Due to its geographical features, Panama is a significant entrepot for illicit heroin and cocaine shipments destined for the U. S. On the matter of soft drugs, the climate and terrain conditions favor Panama as a significant producer of marihuana. In the past, the GOP tolerated the illegal use of marihuana but in recent years, the enforcement efforts have stiffened. Since inception of the USG's formal narcotics control assistance program for Panama which dates to 1972 the progress made by the GOP has been gradual with a significant increase in the enforcement sector in the past nine months.

2. Problem

The major problem has been Panama's well established commercial environment which has been utilized advantageously by the illicit international narcotics traffickers. It offers the would be traffickers (professional or amateur) a wide variety of air and sea transport, modern communications facilities, similar monetary system

and further compounded by the preponderance of U. S. citizen's presence both civilian and military, due to the Canal Zone.

On the domestic side, the GN indicated their concern on the significant shift to cocaine usage within the younger generation along with the proliferation of marihuana in all levels of their society.

The immediate bilateral objectives have been to develop cooperation and coordination of GOP enforcement units to reduce the flow of narcotics through Panama. Ultimately, as enforcement pressure increases, it is hoped that the flow of hard narcotics can be eliminated and greater efforts may be applied to the elimination of marihuana production in the Republic.

3. USG Narcotics Control Assistance

The bilateral cooperative efforts engendered through a narcotics program Project Agreement will be entering the third year at end of FY 74. Thus far, the U. S. inputs have consisted of a modest amount of essential commodities, resident technical advisory assistance through the PSD and both in-country and U. S. training for GN and Customs personnel. The total funding for FY 73 and 74 approximates an expenditure of \$96,500 with a projected level for FY 75 not exceeding the previous year.

The PSD has been serving as the narcotics project manager in addition to handling commodity procurements, developing narcotics training courses for the ACAPOL and coordinating participant training of selected personnel in the U. S. On balance, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) through its three resident agents has been working closely and effectively in conformity with their operational role with the narcotics enforcement elements.

4. Enforcement Units

~~Presently, there are a total of three elements specifically~~ tasked by the GOP to investigate narcotics cases. It should be noted that all GN personnel are responsible for the enforcement of all laws including narcotics and duty-bound to take action regardless of their assignment. The three enforcement elements are briefly described as follows:

a. G-2 Narcotics Section: The present G-2 of the GN reserves the prerogative to assume direct responsibility for any narcotics case through his own in-house investigators. This situation prevails albeit the DENI Narcotics Section does, in fact report to and is under the G-2.

b. DENI Narcotics Section: The Narcotics Section consists of 18 DENI detectives commanded by a GN officer. This unit is presently quartered in the same building with other DENI bureaus thus sharing the same shortcomings on space, congestion, privacy and other functional deficiencies (see attachment H for DENI organization). DEA has developed good rapport with the Narcotics Section as evidenced by progressive improvement in narcotics arrests and seizures.

During the period January to September in 1973, the DENI Narcotics Section averaged 28 marihuana and four cocaine arrests per month.

Since mid 1973 the local press began to publish arrests of Panamanian citizens for narcotics violations and broadly proclaimed the drug traffic as a threat to their own society. According to GOP press releases more than 100 narcotic traffickers have been committed to the Coiba Penal Colony for two years per offense since August 1973.

c. Customs Narcotics Section: At the behest of the former U. S. Customs agent who is presently the DEA senior agent in charge (SAIC) the Panamanian Customs created a special narcotics enforcement unit. Under the present GOP structure the Customs Service is subordinate to the Ministry of Finance (equivalent to U. S. Treasury Department). The commander of the Customs Narcotics Section has 23 agents assigned to three regional offices deployed in Colon, David and Bocas del Toro. The Panama City contingent is considered headquarters staff, however, they have concurrent responsibilities at the international airports in the Province of Panama. Although the Customs Narcotics Section is going through the initial development phase, the commander has a proposal to expand the services and make it truly national by covering every customs station with a narcotics investigator. Attachment M depicts the present Customs Narcotics Section organization with the proposal for national coverage.

The team concluded it was premature to qualify the Customs Narcotics Section's effectiveness, however, their potential for international narcotics interdiction given the nature of their mission is considered very favorable.

5. Commodities

The commodities provided under the USG narcotics control assistance program has consisted thus far of a modest amount of essential equipment. The pattern is not too dissimilar with other country programs and reflects upgrading transportation, telecommunications, investigations and training capabilities all narcotics control related.

6. Training

The narcotics training for Panamanian enforcement types has encompassed personnel from the GN and Customs, both in-country and in the U. S. under sponsorship by DEA (formerly BNDD), U. S. Customs and AID's Office of Public Safety since inception of narcotics control assistance program.

a. DEA has trained four participants at their International Training Institute (ITI) course and will have trained 142 participants in-country through their two week course conducted by ITI training teams by end of FY 74.

b. U. S. Customs has trained a total of seven participants in their two and five week courses in the U. S. Additionally, they have trained a total of 72 participants in their two week customs courses conducted in-country.

c. The OPS through the International Police Academy (IPA) has trained 12 participants in a ten week Police Management Support Course with Narcotics Orientation in the U. S. and coordinated training for an additional eight participants in narcotics specialization prior to the USG's commitment in 1972. Through its resident advisors, the PSD has assisted in developing curricula, provided equipment and provided technical expertise designed to integrate narcotics courses permanently in the syllabus at ACAPOL. The first narcotics course conducted at ACAPOL graduated 35 participants and a second class is programmed for CY 74. As an addendum to the training effort the ACAPOL Mobile Training Teams are scheduled to provide a one week narcotics course to groups of 30 participants in the interior commencing in mid 1974. ACAPOL's narcotics related training and projections are depicted in attachments E, F and G.

In 1972 OPS/W responded to a PSD initiative pertaining to a GN hosted narcotics seminar to be conducted in Panama City. A PSA criminalist was sent on TDY to conduct a basic drug identification seminar for a total of 16 technicians in attendance who represented forensic chemistry expertise from seven Latin American countries. The PSD effort was instrumental in placing international focus on the narcotics problem by underscoring USG concern.

V. THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

A. Description

The Office of Public Safety conducted a pre-project survey of the National Guard in September 1958 to determine its operational status and develop recommendations for bilateral consideration to improve its capabilities. The program initiation date is reflected as June 1959 but the first resident advisor was not assigned until 1961. The program was curtailed as a result of the 1964 riots but was later reinstated.

In the 1964-1965 period, the Public Safety program was expanded in the amount of \$2.1 million (AID/W funded) to reinforce the counter-insurgency capabilities of the GN as a result of the violent disturbances in 1964. Included in this assistance was budgetary support for an additional 1,000 members of the GN which were organized into five companies. The total expenditures since 1961 including FY 74 reveals a funding level of \$1.822 million (see attachment K).

Since 1967 to the present, the U. S. assistance was reduced to a discreet level due to among other factors the sequence of political events which placed the National Guard in control of the Government. In March of 1970, General Torrijos personally requested PSD to concentrate and energize their efforts to improve the capabilities of the GN to carry out their police responsibilities with emphasis in police training and technology. The PSD working with the Panama City Police developed a reorganization plan for the capital city, assessed police training needs, and programmed eight senior officers from the Panama City Police, including the Chief, to attend various types of courses conducted by the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington. The average FY expenditure for the past 14 years reveals a funding level of \$130,000 with 42% to defray direct hire technician costs:

In January of 1973, an AID/W Evaluation Team conducted an evaluation of the PS program to ascertain project progress and develop recommendations apropos for the future direction (if any) of the program. The Evaluation Team recommended the continuation of the PS program through FY 75 with the same level (three) of resident PS advisors. There was a transitional period of four months between March to July of 1973, when the Public Safety Officer (PSO) was transferred and eventually replaced in July by the present PSO.

In order to define the project activities since the previous evaluation, it should be noted the PSD's efforts were limited to training related activities at the Police Academy (ACAPOL) of GN personnel engaged in or to be assigned to civil police type duties since mid 1972. Funding for FY 74 was provided for participant training and a modest commodity program. The PSD staff had other responsibilities under the Narcotics Control Action Program, participation in the Excess Property Program (EPP) and in the Action Coordinating Sub-Committee (ACS). There has been little other advisory effort provided to the GN except on an ad hoc personal relationship basis usually in the course of daily contacts with GN counterparts.

During the last quarter of CY 73, the U. S. Ambassador requested a talking points paper from the incumbent PSO for his presentation to General Torrijos which addressed the following broad topics related to the recommendations in the unpublished evaluation report of 1973:

- ACAPOL and training
- the Panama City Police Department
- the Operations Control Center
- Inspections Staff
- Planning and Research Unit
- Civil police management and administration

However, follow up discussions with General Torrijos were curtailed as the Mission was notified by AID/W of the impending Congressional action to terminate the overseas police training programs. Prior to this notification, the PSD had provided a copy of the same paper to the Acting G-2 who in turn had provided a copy to the Chief of Staff. Due to the absence of the G-3 who is due to return from the Sinai Desert in May the Acting G-3 has not committed himself on the GN position.

Concurrently, with the imminent demise of the overseas police assistance programs was the tremendous drain of GN personnel resulting from General Torrijo's commitment to the UN in November to provide a 400 man National Guard peace-keeping force for the Middle East (Sinai Desert truce area). As a result, GN found itself totally involved in a selection process of personnel, adapting to battalion size unit requirements including training and equipping considerations. The UN tour in the Middle East is for six months and once more the GN is preparing another 400 man unit for rotation to the Sinai Desert in May. Albeit all of the GN officials contacted stated this had not caused a diminution of their civil police services, the loss of 800 men (12 percent of total) would tend to refute that judgment. Additionally, the 800 man total assigned to the Sinai or in preparation

now for rotation does not include the demands on the training and support cadres for this significant mobilization of GN forces. How much longer the GOP can support this activity through the GN with its limited resources is not known.

PSD had been working with three key officials of the (IN. (the G-3, the ACAPOL Director and Deputy Director) who are presently in the Sinai Desert assignment. In spite of this adverse situation, PSD, working through the ACAPOL Acting Director at Lieutenant level has had notable success thus far in the first quarter of CY 74 in implementing the training programs discussed and approved the previous year. The critical point on continuity may well be reached in May when the overseas GN unit is rotated and the absent staff officers resume their duties.

In summary, a greater number of civil police training courses have been presented and a greater number of personnel have been trained in the first quarter of CY 74 than in all of 1973 (see attachment J).

1. Technicians

A total of ten direct hire resident advisors have been assigned to Panama since inception of the project in 1961. With the exception of a Regional Records Advisor who was assigned from 1965 to 1967, the advisor expertise has consisted mainly of technical assistance in the field of training and generalist activities. The names, positions and dates of advisor assignments are in attachment N.

As an adjunct to resident advisory assistance, OPS/W coordinated a total of 37 TDY's for a total of 299 days during life of the project. These TDY's were predicated on PSD technical requirements in the development of and giving impetus to the program's sub-project activities with priority accorded to telecommunications, immigration, records, customs, and border patrol including in-country consultations. The most recent TDY's performed focused on narcotics records (Winn Report, March 1974) and telecommunications (Naurocki Report, February 1973).

Another telecommunications TDY is scheduled prior to the phaseout to evaluate the Central America and Panama (CAP) network. A chronological record of OPS TDY assistance to the Panama National Guard indicating dates, purpose, names and length is in attachment L.

2. Participant Training

The terminal evaluation team discussed the topic of future participant training at the International Police Academy during lengthy sessions with the Acting G-3, the Panama City Chief of Police and

other key officers from the operations and training sector. The GN generally underscores the need for international training for its personnel but specifically and historically has relied on the IPA and its predecessor, the Inter-American Police Academy (IAPA) formerly located in Fort Davis (Canal Zone) to provide civil police training and orientation. Suffice to say that General Torrijos is an IAPA graduate in civil police training courses as are 294 other GN officers who have graduated from either the IAPA or the IPA.

The GN does not foresee any impediments to future participant training as during the life of the project the procedures involved have been established. On the Mission side, the local hire program office has had considerable experience working with the National Guard, being familiar with GN procedures, knowing the G-3 staff and having maintained liaison with them for a number of years. On the subject of IPA training courses announcements, the GN officers indicated this could be published in the IPA Review periodically with official notification via the Mission channels. In sum, the GN officials at all levels expressed a strong desire to continue IPA participant training.

An analysis of the participant retention quotient indicates the GN loss is minimal due, in part, to their career status. The participant expenditures since inception of project reveals a total of 372 trainees, at a cost of \$293,000 or approximately 16 percent of total funding. The four week specialization courses which succeed the 12 week general courses reflect 122 graduates to date with emphasis in criminal investigations, patrol operations, instructor methods, riot control, narcotics, traffic, dignitary protection and other specializations. A complete participant breakout is provided in attachment J with funding data in attachment K.

3. Commodities

The AID grant funded commodity support provided the GN since inception of the PS program represents a modest input of essential equipment. A review of the PROP and subsequent Project Agreements indicates the direct relationship of the material provided and the thrust of the sub-projects. In the main, the equipment supported patrol operations, riot control capabilities and telecommunications. Additionally, it served as a pump primer to upgrade training and provided some personal defensive essentials (see attachment I).

There were two peak areas of significant increases in commodity support. Attachment I reveals that in FY 64 - FY 65, the commodity expenditure funding levels of \$194,000 and \$231,000 reflected a major input during the initial stage of the program. In FY 67 the AID/W funding of \$500,000 for commodities marked the

highest level with a progressive steep decline to a very modest amount since. The FY 67 inputs were predicated on a substantial upgrading of GN capabilities as an aftermath of the widespread disturbance in the mid 1960's.

4. Host Country Contributions

The Public Safety program indicates GOP support in conformity with project agreements. Albeit, exact figures could not be provided as the GOP budget does not line item sub-project funding, the Mission provided a conservative estimate on host country contributions.

During the life of the project, counterpart funds in support of USAID Public Safety programs approximated \$950,000.

The four principle categories of in-kind funding are shown below:

Construction	\$ 70,000	7%
Commodities	590,000	62%
Travel	60,000	6%
Technical & Other	<u>230,000</u>	<u>25%</u>
	\$950,000	100%

5. Excess Property Program

Panama has been the recipient non-pareil in Latin America of excess property administered by the Mission. The acquisition cost figure through March 1974 was approximately \$2.8 million. The excess property consisted of the following:

a. Rolling Stock - sedans, 1/4 ton Jeeps, 3/4 ton trucks, 2 1/2 ton trucks, buses, heavy hoist trucks, fire engines

b. Wearing Apparel - fatigue uniforms, shoes, boots, raincoats, caps, belts.

c. Office Supplies - desks, typewriters, chairs, file cabinets, tables.

d. Field Equipment - stoves, cooking utensils, cargo packs, web belts, canteens, tents, blankets.

e. Other - LCM's, fire trucks, and ambulances.

6. Assistance from Other Donors

Panama's almost exclusive source of grant assistance for both the military and the police roles of the National Guard is the United States. Principally in the military area, Panama has received assistance in training from other Latin American countries. It is significant that all GN commissioned officers have attended military academies in other countries.

B. Observations and Conclusions

Originally, the goal of the Public Safety project was to create a separate entity within the National Guard specifically tasked to handle all civil police functions. Toward this end, the PS program addressed itself to the civil police orientation of the 1,100 men Panama City Police as a pilot project. The plan called for a shifting of efforts to other urban areas (e.g. Colon or David) contingent on progress in the capital city. This goal was revised in conformity with the changing situation as the GN consolidated its position and clearly indicated the basic structure of the GN would remain unaltered with a dual role concept inculcated at all levels.

Significant accomplishments during the life of the project are noted as follows:

In-country Training

Previous PSD attempts to meet the training needs were partially successful but did not achieve permanency. The establishment of the Police Academy (ACAPOL) by GN directive in 1970 marked a milestone in the institutionalization of a centralized civil police training entity.

Central America and Panama Telecommunications

~~The PSD, in coordination with the Central American~~
Republics established the CAP network for the intercountry exchange of criminal and subversive control information. The network has been operating since 1964 with periodic PS technical and modest commodity support. The CAP network provides typed message capability through radio-teletype.

GN Telecommunications

Pursuant to a telecommunications survey, the PSD presented recommendations to the GN and provided essential equipment designed to provide national linkage to strategic areas. Over the life of the project PSD inputs have diminished as GN procurements

have increased. Recently (CY 73), the GN purchased more than half a million dollars worth of equipment to expand and improve their commo capability. To best illustrate the self-help efforts of the GN since 1968, the following areas of improvement are noted:

- A new large capacity central telephone exchange (PABX) plant has been installed to serve the Central Headquarters.

- The GN Commo Division administers and operates a new international teletype section for in-country and worldwide printed message communications.

- Closed circuit television cameras are used to monitor entrances and facilities in their Central Headquarters.

- The GN Military Zone Headquarters in each of the nine provincial capitals is equipped with high-frequency SSB commo sets to permit direct contact with the GN Central Headquarters in Panama City.

- A new GN funded \$150,000 traffic control commo system with a modern control console has been installed and in operation for the Traffic Division.

In sum, the GN has attained an unprecedented level of self-sufficiency in telecommunications (Naurocki Telecom Survey - February 1973).

Aerial Capability

The PSD provided the GN a single engine aircraft for its initial air capability in 1964-1965 which subsequently developed into the GN's Air Force (FAP). This PSD initiative led to the infusion of MAP advisory and material support to a significant level (see Chapter IV - FAP). The GN is currently tasking and relying on the FAP ever increasingly in civic action projects throughout the Republic.

Coastal/River Patrol

The GN has provided certain maritime functions related to coastal and river patrols in the past. Under the Excess Property Program (EPP), the PSD assisted in the acquisition of LCM's and other nautical equipment to further improve this area of responsibility. Additionally, a number of selected GN officers were sent to the U. S. for coast guard type training under PS auspices. The MAP has added the services of a full time U. S. naval officer to provide technical assistance and now provides total support for this GN activity.

Panama City Police Patrol

PSD selected Panama City as a pilot project for a totally civil police oriented GN unit. The significance of police patrol operations was emphasized to the GN and rudimentary mobile patrols were established. Subsequently, PSD in coordination with the Panama City Police Chiefs assisted in the development of a reorganization plan which was presented to General Staff for approval. A number of the sub-projects had not reached their intended goals but the progress made thus far warrant their continuation.

Highway Patrol (DNTTT)

The GN sought and obtained PSD assistance in establishing, training and equipping a sector of the Traffic Division to become the first Central American Highway Patrol. PSD channeled advisory assistance, participant training in the U. S. and modest commodity support to induce GN inputs. Since its inauguration on March 20, 1964, the Highway Patrol has progressed to a permanent entity by providing effective and efficient services on the Panamanian highways including the Pan American Highway.

Increase of National Guard Strength

Past violent incidents in mid-60's demonstrated the GN's inadequacy to control widespread civil disturbances without a significant decrease in general police services. The U. S. position to increase the effective strength of the GN was implemented through the concerted efforts of the U. S. Embassy, USAID/PSD, U. S. Southern Command and USMIIGP. This effort resulted in recruiting, training and equipping two 500 men units to bolster the GN's strength.

In 1967 the USG provided direct budgetary support for an additional 1,000 man increase for the GN. The total cost for these activities approximated \$2.1 million which was AID/W funded. Greater emphasis on Civil Disturbance Control training was provided throughout the GN especially to units assigned to the capital city and its environs including the Rifle Companies which would serve as a back-up to the civil police units.

Mobile Training Team Concept

PSD introduced the concept of MTT's as a means to expand police training to units in the interior as a supplement to ACAPOL's activities. The GN recognized the MTT's utilization as an extension of ACAPOL's training responsibilities, but due to lack of budgetary support and paucity of qualified instructors implementation had been delayed.

Narcotics Control

The GOP's cooperative efforts were buffeted by a series of events which were given media notoriety during the initial stages in 1971 - 1972. In the ensuing period, the GOP's cooperation has increased due to a rising awareness of their international image and the predictable social repercussions inherent to a domestic drug problem. During a PS initiated Police Executive Tour in July of 1971 for the then Chief of G-3, OPS/W arranged high level meetings in Washington with USG officials to discuss narcotics matters of mutual interest to both countries. Subsequently, General Torrijos named the G-2 as the Narcotics Coordinator responsible for all domestic and international narcotics control and enforcement.

The PSD's participation in the furtherance of the narcotics program is well delineated in the NCAP. All of PSD's commitments have been completed or in the process of being completed in terms of local training, commodity procurement and a records system analysis. The ongoing PS narcotics related activity will be continuity of U. S. training for selected participants at IPA.

VI. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP)

A. Origin

In 1962, a modest Security Assistance Program (SAP) was initiated for the Panama National Guard (GN). This program was curtailed as a result of the 1964 riots but later reinstated and expanded to include support of the five infantry rifle companies, an engineer unit, a communications section, the motor maintenance facilities, the sea force and an air force.

As a result of the break in U. S.-Panama diplomatic relations in January 1964, the Army Attache Office in the Embassy was closed. When relations were normalized in May 1964, the U. S. Military Group (USMILGP) Commander assumed the protocol functions of the Attache for the U. S. Embassy and this is the present situation.

In 1969, an Air Force advisor was placed on temporary duty to the USMILGP to handle the increasing workload in support of the Panamanian Air Force (FAP). Eventually, this position was added in lieu of a veterinarian position. In 1972, positions were increased in the MILGP for a U. S. Naval Advisor to provide technical advice to Marine Operations of the GN (Operaciones Marinas), the Panama GN sea element and a USAF E-8 logistics advisor to the FAP.

The MAP has been in existence for 12 years since inception in 1962 with a total funding of approximately \$5.6 million for training and materiel. This breakout approximates 40 percent for training and 60 percent for materiel. FY funding figure totals and breakouts are in attachment O.

B. Mission

The Mission of the MAP is defined as follows:

1. In furtherance of the country plan, in the field of defense and internal security, provide advisory service, training assistance and support to the Ministry of Government and Justice.
2. As a member of the Country Team, provide military advice and planning assistance to and implement plans for the Chief of Mission.
3. As Commander of the U. S. Military Group (COMUSMILGP) represent the Secretary of Defense with the Government of Panama.

C. Operations

In accordance with the performance of its mission, the U. S. MILGP works closely with the Armed Forces of Panama, i.e. the National Guard. The National Guard organization is depicted in attachment B.

Primarily a paramilitary police force, the GN embodies all functions of city police, highway patrol, rural guard, FBI, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Air Force and Army. The major combat elements of the GN are:

1. Land Forces: 5 rifle companies (approximately 150 men each)
2. Air Element: (FAP) 16 fixed and 5 rotary wing aircraft (160 men)
3. Sea Element: (Marine Operations) 10 amphibious and patrol boats (172 men) plus one 20 foot speedboat (Port Captain)

The GN rifle companies are "light infantry" type with no artillery nor armor units. The heaviest weapon is the 60 mm mortar. The Sea Element of seven patrol craft (includes one 65 ft. cargo vessel and three LCM's) provide a modest capability for coastal patrol and surveillance and transportation of personnel and equipment. The two 103 ft. Vosper gunboats are in effect the most sophisticated armament possessed by Panama.

The bilateral agreement on the U. S. Military Mission's function gives the COMUSMILGP the responsibility to serve as the principle advisor to the Commander of the National Guard of Panama. The COMUSMILGP relationship to the two entities may be stated as responsible to the Minister of Government and Justice and reporting to and advising operationally the National Guard Commander on military matters.

D. Present Status

The FY 73 Security Assistance Plan for Panama was approved to provide a \$288,000 training program and a \$193,000 materiel program. Nearly one-half of the training program dollars were for CONUS training of nine Panamanian Air Force pilots and the remaining portion allotted to CZ training for approximately 200 members of the GN. The entire materiel program is for procurement of secondary items, i.e., spare parts. The FY 74 funding level of \$400,000 represents training and materiel costs only.

E. Future Status

Present plans and SAP programs for Panama for the FY 75 to 78 time frame call for a level of assistance approximating \$500,000 annually, divided nearly equally between training and materiel.

F. Resources.

During the interim four year period since FY 70 relief of MILGP from police and veterinary advisory roles coupled with advent of the Panamanian Air Force and increased priority on GN Marine Operations have resulted in resource realignment as shown for FY 74.

<u>Position</u>		<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Filled</u>
O-6	COMUSMILGP (U. S. Army Colonel)	1	1
O-5	Air Section Chief/Advisor	1	1
O-5	Army Section Chief/Advisor	1	1
O-4	General Staff Advisor	1	1
O-4	Logistics Advisor	1	1
O-3	Navy Advisor	1	1
SGM	Administrative Advisor	1	1
MSG	Army Logistics Advisor	1	1
MSG	Air Force Logistics Advisor	1	1
GS-6	Secretary/Stenographer	1	1
FSL-1/4	Admin-Specialist/Translator	1	1
	TOTAL	11	11

The present MILGP staff consists of six officers, three senior NCO's and two administrative employees for a total of 11 with no change in staffing level for the FY 75 to 78 time frame.

G. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

Recently, the USMILGP has become more involved in the processing of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for the National Guard. General Torrijo's commitment to the UN on providing a 400 man peace-keeping force for duty in the Sinai Desert has resulted in a \$1 million sale to equip and clothe the Panama Battalion. The overseas unit is due to complete the six month tour in May and the GOP is negotiating an additional \$200,000 FMS to equip and cloth 400 additional men.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The terminal evaluation team arrived at the following recommendations for GN consideration based on: 1) review of Mission-provided material; 2) review of previous unpublished evaluation study; 3) series of meetings with GN officers punctuated by candidness; 4) meetings with U. S. Mission representatives; 5) review of program documents and of paramount importance 6) the lengthy sessions with the Public Safety Division/USAID/Panama City.

It is recommended that:

Administration

1. The GN continue to develop the civil police orientation of the Panama City Police Department.

2. Meaningful attempts be made to inculcate the objective value of scientific investigations to all levels of the GN staff, rank and file.

3. The GN provide adequate line item budgetary support for the operation of ACAPOL.

4. A simpler process be developed for lodging of complaints for either passive or violent crimes conducive to encouraging the citizenry-at-large to report offenses against their person or property.

5. The GN continue to consider the establishment of a permanent planning and research unit concerned only with the civil police functions of the GN.

6. The GN establish an internal affairs and inspections unit reporting directly to the Deputy Commander of the GN to attain a centralized office solely responsible for conducting follow-up investigations.

Operations

7. The Operations Control Center should be utilized to its maximum potential by providing new quarters, adequate budgetary support, development of a Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) manual and periodic Command Post Exercises (CPX's).

8. The 1972 reorganization plan for the Panama City Police should be continued and completed with emphasis on the recommendations pertaining to utilization of manpower and improvement of patrol activities.

9. The DENI should be more integrated into the GN structure with vertical career development possibilities and accorded all emoluments on an equitable basis.

10. The GN should facilitate and encourage a uniform crime reporting system through DENI and its detachments designed to develop meaningful statistics in order to effectively project its functions.

Training

11. ACAPOL be given just consideration as the pivotal institution for all GN civil police training through budgetary, staffing and resources support.

12. The GN through ACAPOL should capitalize on the Mobile Training Team (MTT) concept as a viable extension of their formal training courses.

13. The GN through the Panama City Police should continue bilateral planning with the Canal Zone Police on mutual enforcement problems with emphasis on exploring possibility of joint patrols.

14. The GN through the G-3 charge ACAPOL with the responsibility to develop the projections (designating prospective candidates) for continuation of participant training at the IPA with a 12 month lead time.

Narcotics

15. The GN through the G-2 should be the central repository for compiling all narcotics related enforcement statistics on arrests, searches and seizures including the Customs inputs. This type information, if properly analyzed, is invaluable if effective courses of action in narcotics control are desired.

16. The GN should continue to mount intensive marihuana eradication campaigns periodically to coincide with harvest seasons.

17. The GN through the G-2 should consider the consolidation of the DENI, the G-2 and Customs narcotics intelligence files and channel more resources into narcotics intelligence gathering.

Comments


The Host Country's receptive attitude during the life of the project may best be described as appearing to fluctuate between an acceptable level to a high level of performance. There were time frames when the GOP's official posture towards the USG was not necessarily in consonance with or reflected by the counterpart's attitudes during those periods when bilateral relations were strained.

It is noteworthy that during those periods when critical incidents precipitated tenuous bilateral relations, the slippage factor did not cause a complete cessation of all on-going project activities. On balance, it should be noted the disruptions did cause a revision of time projections due to the retarding factor. A review of the program's history indicates that professional respect and rapport engendered between advisors and counterparts prevailed thus allowing some continuity despite several program interruptions. What the situation may be in the future under similar circumstances but with the preclusion of USG police advisory presence and technical assistance for the GN is best left to conjecture.

The evaluation team heard only praise for the professional competence of the PS advisory staff accentuated by personal admissions of close friendships fomented with the advisors and their families.

The team's summation of the program is tempered with the qualification that while most goals were at some stage of progression the evolution of the GN was making new demands on more sophisticated technical and advisory assistance.

PANAMA NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION CHART



-13-

Attachment B

1/ First Military Zone is Panama City Police
 2/ One of the rifle companies has as its primary mission a Riot Control Support responsibility.

PANAMA NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN BY RANK

<u>Grade or Rank</u>	<u>Number Personnel in Grade</u>	<u>1/ Basic Salary</u>	<u>Monthly Representational Allowance</u>	<u>Increment of Salary for Every Four Year Service</u>
Brig. General	1	1,000	250	10%
Colonel	1	750	250	10%
Lt. Colonel	6	650	200	10%
Major	20	500	150	10%
Captain	51	350	100	10%
Lieutenant	96	235	--	10%
Second Lt.	97	200	--	10%
Sub-Total	272			
<hr/>				
First Sergeant	2/	160	--	10%
3/ Sergeant	2/	140	--	10%
Corporal	2/	140	--	10%
Guardia	2/	140	--	10%
4/ TOTAL	<u>7,856</u>			

~~1/ 1 Balboa = U. S. \$1~~


2/ GN did not provide NCO & EM breakouts

3/ No difference in first three ranks (Guardia, Corporal and Sergeant).
The only benefit is the prestige to command.

4/ Total figure includes civilian administrative

Attachment C

ORGANIZATION CHART
 NATIONAL GUARD POLICE ACADEMY (ACAPOL)



-45-

ACAPOL CURRICULUM

The following illustrates current courses offered GN personnel at the Police Academy Facility. They are presented in course outline form:

I. Officers Administration Course

	<u>Hours</u>
Police Organization	12
Police Administration	20
Planning, Operation & Practical Exercises	100
Penal Code	30
Patrol Methods	40
Criminal Investigation Procedures	78
Correspondence & Records	14
Communications	6
Narcotics	40
Police Community Relations	30
Contingency Planning	6
Firearms	40
Personal Defense	112
Sports	80
Director's Time	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	640

II. Basic Police Course

	<u>Hours</u>
National Guard Organization	5
Penal Code	24
Laws of Arrest	10
Behavior and Conduct	15
Courtesy	10
Communication and Report Writing	15
Rules of Evidence	40
Foot and Car Patrol	50
Search	15
Seizure	15
Narcotics	30
Riot Control	20
First Aid	16

Attachment E

II. <u>Basic Police Course (cont'd)</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Police/Community Relations	40
Firearms	40
Traffic	40
Personal Defense	35
Sports	36
Director's Time	<u>24</u>
TOTAL	480

III. <u>Basic Course Criminal Investigation</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Criminal Investigation Importance	10
Methods of Investigation	10
The Investigator's Report	15
Basic Police Intelligence	17
Crime Scene Investigation	60
Description of Persons	20
Information Sources	14
Arrest, Search, Seizure & Retention of Items	40
How to Obtain Information from Persons	30
Surveillance	30
Narcotics	30
Basic Fingerprint Techniques	20
Personal Defense	40
Firearms	40
First Aid	20
Sports	60
Director's Time	<u>24</u>
TOTAL	480

IV. <u>Traffic Course</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Traffic Programs and Operations	40
Traffic Code	20
Intersection Control	20
Police Report Writing	15
Accident Investigation & Prevention	40
Arrest Procedures	18
Vehicle Fire Control	5
Survey Methods and Use of Statistics	5
First Aid	15
Firearms	20
Sports	30
Director's Time	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	240

V. Narcotic Familiarization Course

	<u>Hours</u>
International Traffic of Narcotics	1
Local Traffic of Narcotics	3
Panama Narcotics Law	2
Drug History	2
Narcotics & Drug Identification	3
Identification of Drug Traffickers	3
Identification of Addicts	3
Arrest, Search & Seizure	5
Use of the Laboratory	2
Firearms	5
Director's Time	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	30

VI. Police Community Relations Course

	<u>Hours</u>
Public Relations	5
Human Relations	5
Civic Responsibilities	6
Police Projects/Community & Aspects of Civic Action Program	12
Director's Time	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	30

VII. Driver Training

	<u>Hours</u>
Fundamental Principles of Automotive Equipment & Maintenance	3
Construction Familiarization	14
Familiarization with the Operation, Maintenance & Repairing of the Electric and Fuel Systems	14
Dangerous Conditions	20
Emergency/Medical Treatment	5
Loading & Traffic Rules	10
Reports	10
Director's Time	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	80

ACAPOL TRAINING AND PROJECTIONS

The Academia de Capacitacion de la Guardia Nacional (ACAPOL) became operational February 20, 1970. The chart below illustrates courses offered by GN and persons trained from that date to present. Courses scheduled for remainder of CY 74 are projected at the end of this chart.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Course Title</u>	<u>Length (Weeks)</u>	<u>Total Trained</u>
<u>1970</u>			
May - Aug	General Course No. 1	16	84
Aug - Oct	General Course No. 2	16	94
<u>1971</u>			
Jan - Mar	General Course No. 3	8	42
Jan	Public Relations	2	32
<u>1972</u>			
Mar - Jul	Police Administration for Officers	16	20
Apr - May	Emergency Medical Treatment Course	6	24
Apr - Jun	General Course No. 5	9	70
Jul - Nov	Basic English Course	18	7
Jul - Sep	Preventive Maintenance for Mechanics Course	8	23
Aug - Sep	Traffic Supervision	5	36
Aug	Vehicle Maintenance & Police Orientation	1	30
Aug - Nov	Cooks Course	12	10
Jul - Aug	Orientation Training on Human Relations; Protection of Crime Scene	1	418
<u>1973</u>			
Jun - Aug	Basic Intelligence Course	8	32
Aug - Sep	Traffic Supervision	6	38
<u>1974</u>			
Jan - Apr	General Course No. 6	12	52
Jan	Techniques of Photography	1	25
Jan	Public Relations	1	36
Feb	Narcotics Control	1	35

Attachment F

The following courses are scheduled and pending for balance of CY 74:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Course Title</u>	<u>Length (Weeks)</u>
Apr	Driver Training	2
May - Aug	General Course No. 7	12
Jul - Aug	Traffic Course	
Jul - Nov	English Language	
Aug	Driver Training	2
Sep	Narcotic Course	1
Sep - Dec	General Course No. 8	12

PROPOSED ACAPOL ORGANIZATION & STAFFING

Director (Major)

Deputy Director (Inspector)

ADMINISTRATION

1 chief (Sgt)
 3 clerks (Sgt & Cpl)
 1 typist (Pvt)
 1 Chauffeur/clerk (Pvt)

Duties: budget preparation, housekeeping, maintenance, personnel supplies

FACULTY

1 chief instr (Capt)
 1 instr, patrol/trf (Lt)
 1 instr, pol. admin (Lt)
 1 instr, inv/narc (Det)
 3 part time instrs (civil)
 1 secretary (Pvt)

Duties: Instructors prepare/develop lesson plans, planning, program development

MOBILE TRAINING TEAM

1 supervisor (Lt)
 3 instrs (Lt)
 3 asst. instrs (Lt)
 1 logistician (Sgt)
 3 chauf/mechanics (Cpl)
 2 clerks (Pvt)

Duties: Plan, develop programs, instruct, evaluate & develop/revise course

TRAINING AIDS

1 chief (Sgt)
 2 technicians (Cpl & Pvt)
 1 clerk/printer (Pvt)


Duties: Design, production, distribution, manufacture

Officers 13
 Enlisted 17
 Civilians 3
 Total 33

-51-

Attachment G

NATIONAL GUARD
 NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATIONS (DENI)
 ORGANIZATION CHART




-52-

Attachment H

COMMODITY PROFILE
EXPENDITURES
(\$000)

<u>FY</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
1963	Telecom, excess property, training equipment, weapons	\$ 45
1964	Riot control, telecom, excess property	194
1965	Vehicles, books, investigation equipment, telecom, weapons, ammunition	231
1966	Riot control, telecom	46
<u>1</u> /1967	Riot control, weapons, vehicles, telecom	32
1968	Telecom and training equipment	20
1969	Vehicles, telecom, outboard motors	5
1970	Vehicles, telecom	20
1971	Vehicles, telecom	14
1972	Telecom, vehicles, training equipment	31
1973	Training equipment, telecom	31
1974	Training films, telecom, audio visual	<u>6</u>
TOTAL		\$669



1/ AID/W funded commodities for \$500,000 not reflected in Mission expenditures.

OPS SPONSORED TRAINING FOR GN
1963 - 1974

<u>International Police Academy</u>	209
Senior Course	1
^{1/} General Course	122
Management Support Course (Narcotics)	12
^{2/} Technical Specialist Training	46
Police Executive Training	28
<u>Inter-American Police Academy (Canal Zone)</u>	160
<u>FBI National Academy</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	372

General Course Specializations

Criminal Investigations	45
Patrol Operations	22
Instructor Methods	19
Narcotics (BNDD/National Training Institute)	7
Dignitary Protection	5
Border Patrol/Customs	2
All Others	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	122

Technical Specialist Training

Traffic Management	10
Communications	10
Bomb Control	7
All Others	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	46

^{1/} Specialization (3 to 4 weeks) follows 12 week Inter-American General Course
^{2/} Technical Specialist courses consist of 6 to 52 weeks training

PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING
(\$000)

FY	Technicians		Participants		Commodities		Other		Total	
	Obl	Exp	Obl	Exp	Obl	Exp	Obl	Exp	Obl	Exp
1963	21	22	42	7	397	45	109	--	569	74
1964	37	38	15	12	21	194	4	9	77	253
1965	49	43	42	30	28	231	6	13	125	317
1966	64	63	31	36	35	46	7	12	137	157
1967	67	63	39	32	33	32	2	5	141	132
1968	71	70	30	28	2	20	--	2	103	120
1969	65	70	26	20	25	5	12	--	128	95
1970	81	75	29	24	16	20	5	12	131	131
1971	84	84	36	30	31	14	12	11	163	139
1972	123	124	47	39	29	31	19	11	218	205
1973	121	126	35	35	6	31	2	7	164	199
<u>1/1974</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	863	778	407	293	629	669	178	82	2,077	1,822

1/ 1974 funding reflects Mission estimates for phaseout.

Attachment K


CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF OPS
TDY ASSISTANCE TO PANAMA GN

<u>Date</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Length (days)</u>
<u>1964</u>			
Mar	Consultation	T. Brown	5
Aug	Records	D. Greig	5
<u>1965</u>			
Mar	Telecommunications	A. Naurocki	2
May	Immigration	J. Caldwell	13
Jul	Immigration	J. Caldwell	4
Jul	CAP Conference	D. Powell	4
Aug	Customs	A. Mosser	21
Sep	Consultation	B. Engle	2
<u>1966</u>			
May	Immigration	J. Caldwell	6
Aug	Customs	J. Harmon	3
Aug	Consultation	L. Goin	5
Nov	Consultation	B. Engle	4
<u>1967</u>			
Apr	Immigration	J. Caldwell	4
Apr	Civic Action	E. Adkins	14
Apr	LACE Meeting (telecom)	P. Katz	2
Jul	Border Patrol	R. Elving	10
Oct	Records	A. Russell	5
Oct	Telecom	A. Naurocki	4
<u>1968</u>			
Jan	Consultation	B. Engle	1
Feb	Immigration	J. Caldwell	14
Apr	Records	A. Russell	6
Jun	Telecommunications	A. Naurocki	5
Oct	Telecommunications	A. Naurocki	10
<u>1969</u>			
Apr	Telecommunications	A. Naurocki	4
Apr	Immigration	J. Caldwell	2

Attachment 1.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Length (days)</u>
<u>1970</u>			
Jan	Immigration	J. Caldwell	17
Apr	Telecom/Survey	M. Seaton	8
Jul	Telecommunications	R. Tetaz	14
Aug	Immigration	J. Caldwell	6
Dec	Criminalistics	A. Jee	10
<u>1971</u>			
Feb	Telecommunications	A. Carpenter	5
<u>1972</u>			
Feb	Criminalistics	A. Jee	11
<u>1973</u>			
Jan	Program Evaluation	E. Adkins, et al	27
Feb	Telecom	A. Naurocki	15
<u>1974</u>			
Mar	Records (Narcotics	W. Winn	21
Apr	Terminal Evaluation	C. P. Bernal	13
		R. A. Phippen	
Apr	Telecommunications	A. Naurocki	5
		GRAND TOTAL	307

PANAMA CUSTOMS NARCOTICS SECTION
(ADUANA)



-58-

Attachment M

RECORD OF PSD TECHNICIANS ASSIGNED TO PANAMA

1961 - 1974

Name/Position	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Clifton Monroe Acting PSO	-----													
John Neely Public Safety Officer		-----												
Richard Biava Training			-----											
Arthur Russell Records				-----										
Lynn Lee Training						-----								
Robert Mann Generalist							-----							
Adolph Saenz Public Safety Officer									-----					
Paul HOFFEY Training											-----			
Richard Biava Generalist												-----		
James Reinhart Public Safety Officer													-----	

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDING - 1963 - 74

Military Assistance Program (MAP)

\$ (000)

<u>FY</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Materiel</u>	<u>Total</u>
1963	273	70	343
1964	102	138	240
1965	152	93	245
1966	211	340	551
1967	163	317	480
1968	86	136	222
1969	72	216	288
1970	140	684	824
1971	285	706	991
1972	258	252	510
1973	288	193	481
1974	250	150	400
Totals:	2,280	3,295	5,575

Note: FMS: Approximately \$ 1.4 million for Panama Bn U. N. assignment
MAP FY funding levels thru FY 77 projected at approximately same
level as past three years.

ATTACHMENT O

CRIME STATISTICS
 First Military Zone (Panama City)
 1971 - 1972

<u>Offense</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Thefts		591	674
Robberies		834	637
Assault		210	122
Purse Snatching		67	66
Swindling		86	77
Counterfeiting		40	38
Narcotics		238	235
Disturbing the Peace		1,836	1,038
Terrorists		113	86
Contraband		27	5
Illicit Games (gambling)		41	46
Clandestine Lottery		<u>26</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTAL		4,109	3,035

Note: 1973 statistics not available

PERSONS CONTACTED

USG Officials

Alexander Firfer
Col. Thomas A. Austin, III
John D. Blacken
Lt. Col. Sam P. Young, Jr.
Lt. Col. Cecil L. Wallis
George Rublee
Major Carlos Marxuach
Bernard Chapnick
Leland Riggs
James R. Reinhart
Paul Hoffey
Richard Biava
Sgt/Major George R. Havens

Mission Director
Commander, USMILGP
Political Officer, U. S. Embassy
USMILGP
USMILGP
Deputy Mission Director
USMILGP
Program Officer
DEA, Senior Agent in Charge
Public Safety Officer, USAID
Public Safety Advisor, USAID
Public Safety Advisor, USAID
USMILGP

Panama National Guard

Colonel Rodrigo Garcia
Lt. Colonel Florencio Flores
Lt. Colonel Manuel A. Noriega
Major Pacifico Saavedra
Major Tomas Douglas
Major Cecilio Fisher
Captain Aristides Hassan
Captain Juan Jose Salamanca
Captain Eugenio Corro
Captain Enrique Lin Yuen
Captain Eustabio Smith
Lt. Domingo Ocalagan
Lt. Nicasio L. Drake
2nd Lt. Calton Francis
Lt. Teodoro A. Alexander
Dario Arosemena

Deputy Commandant, National Guard
Chief of Staff
G-2
Acting G-3
Panama Police 1st Zone COP
Commander Zone II, Colon
Panama City Police (Watch Commander)
Director Communications
Chief Armory
Public Relations
Deputy Commander Zone II, Colon
Director CIM
G-1
Director ACAPOL (Acting)
FAP
Chief DENI

Panama Customs

Octavio Rodriguez

Chief of Narcotics, Customs
Division