



**TERMINATION
PHASE-OUT
STUDY
PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT**

ZAIRE

660-11-710-014

JUNE 1974

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER.</u>	<u>page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
A. Terms of Reference	1
B. Conduct of Study.....	1
II. SUMMARY.....	3
A. Internal Security Situation.....	3
B. Observations and Conclusions.....	3
C. Recommendations.....	3
III. INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES.....	5
A. Gendarmerie Nationale.....	5
1. Organization.....	5
2. Brigade Mobile.....	7
a. Kinshasa.....	7
b. Lubumbashi.....	8
3. Traffic Management.....	10
4. Immigration.....	11
5. Criminal Investigation.....	12
6. Records.....	12
7. Training	12
a. In-country Schools.....	13
b. In-Service.....	15

c. U.S. Training.....	18
d. Training Directorate.....	19
8. Logistics.....	20
9. Motor Maintenance.....	21
10. Civil Disturbance Unit.....	25
11. Tanganyika Sector.....	26
12. Communications.....	26
B. Coastal River and Lake Guard.....	33
IV. THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM.....	36
A. Background.....	36
B. Objectives and Goals.....	37
C. Resources.....	38
1. U.S.....	38
2. Host Country.....	39
D. Observations and Conclusions.....	40
V. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	43

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

	<u>page</u>
A. Ex-NATIONAL POLICE RANKS.....	47
B. Ex-GENDARMERIE RANKS.....	48
C. GENDARMERIE NATIONALE STRENGTH.....	49
D. GENDARMERIE NATIONALE ORGANIZATION.....	50
E. GdN ORGANIZATION PROPOSED BY PSD.....	51
F. KINSHASA MOBILE BRIGADE ORGANIZATION.....	52
G. LUBUMBASHI MOBILE BRIGADE.....	53
H. LESSON PLANS.....	54
I. PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION.....	56
J. GUIDELINE PAPERS.....	57
K. TEXTS AND MANUALS.....	58
L. PSD LIBRARY.....	59
M. COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD ORGANIZATION.....	63
N. CRLG LAKE TANGANYIKA DETACHMENT.....	64
O. PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING.....	65
P. COMMODITY PROFILE.....	66
Q. PARTICIPANT TRAINING.....	67

ABBREVIATIONS USED

CRLG	Coastal River and Lake Guard
DDN	Department of Defense
D-G	Director-General
GdN	Gendarmerie Nationale
GOZ	Government of Zaire
IPA	International Police Academy
MOI	Ministry of Interior
POI	Program of Instruction
RMTT	Rural Mobile Training Team
ROZ	Republic of Zaire
RPU	Research and Planning Unit
SOS	Senior Officer Seminar
TCN	Third Country National
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Terms of Reference

U.S. Public Safety assistance has been provided to the Government of Zaire (GOZ) to develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of its civil police forces. At the project's initiation and during its progress, mutually agreed objectives and courses of action were established, and at times adjusted to achieve the overall goals as well as to accommodate changing situations in the country. Both host country and U.S. resources were programmed and employed to jointly strive toward these goals.

Due to U.S. congressional action, the continued input of U.S. Government resources planned for this project must be terminated sooner than planned and prior to the achievement of the goals and objectives which were mutually established by the two governments.

It is therefore the purpose of this report to note the progress made thus far and to enumerate what remains to be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals. The report also includes recommended actions which the GOZ should take, employing their own resources, but under the circumstances excluding in-country assistance by the U.S.

B. Conduct of the Evaluation

The team was composed of the following members:

Mr. Jeter L. Williamson	OPS/W
Mr. Peter F. Hurst	OPS/W

After reviewing pertinent policy and background documents in Washington, the team arrived in Kinshasa on June 14, 1974 to begin its in-country evaluation and remained until June 28, 1974. The evaluation was conducted by interviews and discussions with persons from the U.S. country team and GOZ officials.

This program was the object of an in-depth evaluation in July-August, 1973. The resultant report of that evaluation made several recommendations for future action on the then valid premise that the Public Safety Program would continue. It further recommended that such assistance be continued through FY 1976, at which time an orderly phase down would begin with project termination at the end of FY 1977.

This was considered to be a reasonable time frame in which to achieve the goals and objectives which the evaluation team recommended in view of the needs which it felt then existed.

The team conducting the current phase-out evaluation saw no purpose in repeating to any great degree the information contained in the 1973 report. To do so would merely be unnecessary repetition with little real value. Instead, it elected to update what has transpired in the intervening year, describe the activities of the Government of Zaire, point out the accomplishments and shortfalls, provide a recap of the inputs of U.S. resources and their utilization and recommend to the GOZ for their consideration those actions which the team feels it may want to take in furthering the upgrading of its civil law enforcement agencies.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY

A. Internal Security Situation

There has been no significant change in the situation since the 1973 evaluation. It was reported to the team however, that since the government has focused attention on the problem of increased criminality there has been a reduction of crime in the Kinshasa area.

B. Observations and Conclusions

There have been identifiable successes in achieving the goals set as a result of the 1969 evaluation. The newly formed Gendarmerie Nationale has made progress in meeting its responsibilities to providing better police service to the citizenry of Zaire. Excellent evidence of this is to be found in remarks from U.S. Embassy officials who commented on the noticeable improvements in the presence, appearance and attitudes of uniformed policemen in Kinshasa. Redirection of activities and establishment of new priorities and goals as identified in the 1973 evaluation were never allowed to develop as the termination of Public Safety assistance came too soon thereafter.

This termination is particularly untimely in Zaire in view of the comparative newness of its two civil law enforcement agencies, the need for advice and assistance and their receptivity to such assistance.

Undoubtedly, without this assistance the Gendarmerie Nationale and Coastal River and Lake Guard will maintain a reasonable level of effectiveness, but progress will be predictably slower because of its absence.

C. Recommendations

There are specific recommendations in Section V of this report which the GOZ may want to consider. Most of them revolve around carefully planned courses of action resulting from in-depth

study of all available data. To this end a properly selected, well trained unit to gather facts, analyze them and develop alternative courses of action for the Director General's consideration would seem the most logical approach. The team recommends that this be done as soon as possible to preclude delay in furthering the objectives of the GdN.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

Civil law enforcement in the Republic of Zaire is provided by two forces: the Gendarmerie Nationale (GdN), and the Coastal River and Lake Guard (CRLG). Areas of responsibility are divided between these two organizations along lines which are in general geographic.

The CRLG has responsibility for the 1,410 miles of coast, lake and river borders plus the 1,035 miles of inland waterways. The remainder of the Republic, both urban and rural, is the responsibility of the GdN. Both of these organizations were described in some detail in the 1973 evaluation and only such treatment will be given in this document as is deemed necessary to the purposes of the Public Safety phase-out study.

A. Gendarmerie Nationale

1. Organization

The GdN was formed in its present structure in August, 1972, by Presidential Decree. This Decree combined into one national police organization the two forces of the then existing national police and the Gendarmerie. At the time the National Police had responsibility for police services in urban areas while the Gendarmerie, a para-military organization, was assigned to police the rural areas.

At the time of the amalgamation the national police had a force strength of approximately 20,000, the Gendarmerie 6,600. Attachments A and B reflect the strengths and rank structures at that time. Simultaneously with the combining of these forces 3,334 personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, were selected out for a variety of reasons. This resulted in a new Gendarmerie Nationale organization which by July, 1973, consisted of 24,273 personnel, 1,099 of whom were commissioned, 23,174 enlisted. The team was informed that these figures are still valid and a breakdown by ranks is reflected in Attachment C.

The organizational structure was a combination of military and civil concepts as shown in Attachment D. This organization remains in effect at the time of this writing. The same basic TO exists on a smaller scale in each of the nine police regions, made up of the eight provinces and Kinshasa.

It becomes immediately obvious that some refinement of the organizational structure is in order and such was anticipated as the new GdN settled into its role as the one nationwide civil police organization. This was a matter which was to be studied by the GdN command with assistance from PSD advisors. It was discussed during the 1973 evaluation, agreed upon in principle, but before any definitive action could be taken the announcement came of the termination of Public Safety assistance. This was indeed unfortunate as the opportunity to be of real service to the newly organized GdN was thus precluded. The Table of Organization recommended by PSD is shown in Attachment E.

In discussions on the subject of organization and management the team suggested to the Director General formation of a Research and Planning Unit, staffed with intelligent, trained young officers, could make a notable contribution to the organization's future by gathering and analyzing information and data on a myriad of activities and then translating the results into plans for action.

He was well aware of the usefulness of such a unit and had already given considerable thought to the matter. The team recommends that this be followed through and in different sections of this report will refer to needs which lend themselves to such study. It is noted that the heretofore mentioned PSD recommended TO included such a unit.

The size and geographical distribution of the GdN makes obvious the fact that the comparatively small Public Safety effort could not spread itself across the board. Instead, efforts were directed to several jointly selected activities which would have maximum affect. Each of these, the accomplishments and shortfalls, will be discussed.

2. Brigade Mobile

(a) Kinshasa

The Brigade Mobile is in effect primarily a radio patrol unit whose main objective is the suppression and prevention of crime in the city of Kinshasa. It was created with the assistance and guidance of USAID/PSD in 1969 as the result of an OPS evaluation team recommendation of that same year.

Results and public reaction have both been good and it can be said in the main that it has been a successful project. It has not, however, been without problems, almost all of which revolve around an inability to keep a sufficient number of vehicles in an operable condition. This will be commented on later in this report.

The unit has a current total strength of 252 officers and men from which are fielded 3 shifts of 40 men each on patrol. For purposes of patrol the Kinshasa area is divided into 7 beats, or patrol zones. In the original plan each of these zones was to be covered by two patrol units around the clock on each of the three shifts (Attachment F).

In the first year of operation such was the case. Since that time however, again due to deterioration of the fleet, coverage falls way short of this mark. At the time of this study the total operable fleet consisted of 8 vehicles of which only 3 or 4 were in service on any one shift.

It was a part of the original plan that the Kinshasa Brigade Mobile would be a pilot project and the experience therefrom would serve as guidelines in the formation of similar units in other important urban areas. The first of these was to be in Lubumbashi where PSD assistance would also be rendered, after which the others would be accomplished by the GdN itself without PSD input. Subsequently, the Lubumbashi unit was formed.

The experiences gained from these two projects, although each was extremely successful, so pinpointed the problems of logistics and maintenance that further expansion was wisely postponed. The team feels that this decision was proper until such time as these problems can be successfully overcome.

At the time of the 1973 evaluation it was learned that vehicles were being used only one shift per day which cut deeply into the number available for each shift patrol. A recommendation to review this practice was acted upon and with PSD assistance a system of shift change vehicle inspections was adopted which allowed for better utilization of available equipment.

The 1973 evaluation commented on the soundness of a retraining program which was underway at the time. It was learned in the current study that this continued and at present all personnel have completed such training.

Also the 1973 study found that only 8 of the 32 precincts had radio contact with the Mobile Brigade operations center. The number of precincts has now been increased to 24. Fourteen of these have radio contact which in the opinion of the GdN covers all of the more important precinct locations.

(b) Lubumbashi

The Brigade Mobile in Lubumbashi was the first attempt to transplant the operational model which was first developed in Kinshasa to another urban area. The expansion of this program was first set forth in the FY 1970 PROP, and was based on the excellent results that were realized from the first model in the capital city. The PROP proposed that this program be expanded to Lubumbashi in FY 1971, and then to Kisangani and Bukavu in FY 1972, and then a fourth key city in the interior in FY 1973. Thus far the only unit that has been established is this unit in Lubumbashi, which has taken over two years to develop. As pointed out earlier in this section, further expansion has been indefinitely postponed.

Development of this program began in January 1971 with the arrival and assignment of a Public Safety Advisor to Lubumbashi in the region of Shaba. This advisor immediately began to implement the three-phase execution of establishing the Brigade Mobile as proposed in the PROP. Actual implementation began, starting at an absolute zero. None of the support facilities necessary to an operation of this type were available. A motor maintenance facility and a radio maintenance shop were built literally from zero. The Kasapa school was renovated, and POI's and lesson plans were developed for the Brigade Mobile training course.

Unfortunately, when the recruits for this organization were received in Lubumbashi, it was found that only 58% had received any training and most of those had received what little they had prior to 1968, when the level of training was not really adequate. It was then determined that it would be necessary to begin with basic training and then advance through the actual Brigade Mobile training.

Finally in April 1973, after more than two years in the developmental stage, the Brigade Mobile became operational. The organization was composed of four shifts of 23 men each, including the shift commander and his driver, for a total organizational strength of 100 men and three commissioned officers. The city of Lubumbashi is divided into eight patrol zones, each patrolled by one unit. Two additional units were assigned to highway patrol type duties bringing the total number of units to ten per shift (Attachment G).

As is the case in Kinshasa, the Brigade Mobile Lubumbashi is separate from the territorial or GdN assigned to police the city, but the Brigade Commandant does answer directly to the Regional Commander of the GdN, and the Brigade is supportive of the efforts of the other GdN units assigned to the city.

At the time of the 1973 evaluation additional personnel were in training to increase the TO to 179 men and 18 officers. The team was informed that the complement of enlisted personnel had indeed been increased to 177, but the commissioned officer number had fallen way short of the target with only 4 assigned.

On balance, the Brigade Mobile is an effective unit. However, further development is being hindered by a lack of support on the part of the GOZ. The motor maintenance facility is operational and capable of maintaining the mobile fleet of the Brigade; however, spare parts are lacking and many vehicles sit for long periods of time awaiting the arrival of parts from Kinshasa. The communications repair facility is established and at present is manned by a Filipino contract technician, again, a lack of spare parts and Zairois technicians prevent complete effectiveness. Point to point communications within the region have been established by the TCN by salvaging and repairing equipment that was deemed irreparable. This was done by cannibalization and sheer genius.

A language lab has been established by again taking irreparable equipment discarded by the U.S. Military Mission and renovating it. This, plus English classes, has developed an English capability among the officer ranks which now qualifies them to attend the IPA English classes. In essence, everything that has been accomplished has been through the efforts of the advisor and his counterparts without assistance from Kinshasa. The last problem of consequence that must be solved is the headquarters facility in Lubumbashi.

The 1973 evaluation pointed out the sub-standard conditions of this facility and the team at that time was informed that plans were underway for a new building. This has to date not been accomplished.

Summary

The concept of providing quick and competent response to citizens' needs in urban areas where crime is greatest cannot be argued against. The Brigade Mobile is one excellent way to do this, but it is not in itself a panacea. It should be augmented by types of coverage.

Based on its observations at the time, the 1973 evaluation team recommended joint action by the GdN and PSD to begin pilot projects involving walking and bicycle beats and strategically located kiosks in radio contact with the Brigade Mobile Communications Center.

As with most of the other recommendations this never got off the ground because of the phase out of Public Safety assistance. The concept and recommendations still remain valid, it is yet another important task for the proposed RPU to study and develop plans.

3. Traffic Management and Control

The 1973 evaluation team had found in their travels throughout the ROZ that there existed a tremendous need for improved traffic management, control and enforcement. At that time the GdN did not have the capability nor resources necessary to accomplish the above goals in any of the regions - not even in the capital city of Kinshasa. This problem had manifested

itself wherever the team travelled; accidents along the road were commonplace rather than a rarity.

As a result of this obvious need which had not been addressed by USAID/PSD, other than having provided some commodity support in the form of motorcycles and safety equipment, the 1973 team recommended that an in-depth study of traffic conditions within the ROZ be jointly conducted by the Brigade Routiere and PSD. This study was to have developed traffic statistics in all regions of the ROZ upon which several courses of action could be presented to the D-G of the GdN for implementation aimed at improvement of the worsening situation.

Preliminary discussions were underway between the Brigade Routiere and PSD when the congressional mandate to phase out Public Safety assistance was announced. The timing of this announcement and the reduction of the PSD staff prevented implementation of the recommendation.

4. Immigration

In early 1973, an OPS TDY Immigration Specialist did an in-depth study of Zaire's immigration procedures and submitted recommendations for sweeping changes.

The 1973 evaluation team was informed that the GdN had agreed to adopt the bulk of these recommendations and, as a first step, 87 immigration personnel were, at that time, in a special training class at Matete School. This group did complete the training as scheduled in September 1973, at which time implementation of the new procedures was to have begun.

The OPS/TDY Specialist returned to Zaire at GOZ request on November 18, 1973 for a period of 30 days to assist in the implementation phase. The TDY Advisor assisted in (1) developing immigration forms which were being printed, (2) finalizing plans for control of incoming passengers and rearrangement of work areas for immigration, public health and national bank agents, (3) prepare detailed lookout/alert system, (4) advised the new immigration service director on the various responsibilities of his office, and, (5) assisted in revising the immigration laws.

The final report of the OPS TDY Specialist also included a recommendation that the Director of the new immigration

service receive an observation/training program in order to have an overall picture of the magnitude of his new task.

For reasons beyond the scope of PSD nothing further has been done to implement the recommended changes.

5. Criminal Investigation

The 1973 evaluation team found from available information this activity to be somewhat unclear in delineation of authorities and responsibilities. The team recommended that in view of the constant comments on a "Rising Crime Rate," some attempt by PSD should be made to assist in establishing competent criminal investigation units in the regional commands and assistance provided in development of training materials in investigation techniques.

PSD was successful in developing a program of instruction which was translated and provided to the GdN. The timing of the phase out of overseas Public Safety assistance unfortunately did not allow sufficient time to complete implementation of this recommendation.

6. Records

The 1973 evaluation team found that records were being kept in some fashion, however, were not being utilized as a management tool. In fact, the January 1972 Decree requiring all Zairians to change their names would have all but invalidated any previous personal history records. The team then recommended that PSD suggest the beginning of a basic records system to the GdN, pointing out the uses as management and investigative aids, and assist in developing very simple forms.

In the time remaining PSD obtained, translated and provided GdN with a basic records management system, complete with proposed forms.

7. Training

Training continues to be a critical need of the GdN. While progress continues in this area, the task ahead remains great.

Training in which PSD has been involved has consisted of in-country training schools, other specialized training, Mobile Training Teams and participant training in the United States, most at the International Police Academy. Each of these efforts will be discussed.

(a) In-Country Schools

Prior to 1960 there were 6 police training schools. Subsequent wartime conditions which existed over the next 3 years took their toll and all schools were closed with the exception of Kaspas School in Lubumbashi. Some were reopened only to be closed again until at present only two are in actual operation.

(1) Matete School - Kinshasa

Matete School was reopened in April 1964 and trained a small group of recruits destined for the Kinshasa Police. A small number of Congolese and Belgian Commissaires gave the teaching. The physical condition of the school was poor because of its abandonment in 1962. However, the required repairs were made by PSD. By October 1964, the school was restored sufficiently to begin a course for officers. Five Nigerian instructors were assigned to the school in mid-1964. PSD advisors also gave courses at the school. Additionally, beds, uniforms, kitchen materials, typewriters and other equipment were furnished by PSD. Many problems were experienced at this time, such as a lack of discipline and no adequate standards for recruitment, resulting in the majority failing to receive passing grades.

At the beginning of 1965, additional instructors arrived. Shortly afterward an accelerated course was established for officers of the police in the Kinshasa area who had not received required training. During 1965 and 1966, recruit and officer courses were given at Matete.

In 1965 it was found that because of the expansion of activities at the Matete School, enlargement was necessary. PSD arranged for the construction of 16 groups of apartments for lodging of students, doubled the size of the administrative complex and renovated the mess hall and classrooms. All this was finished by the beginning of 1966. In late 1966 a pistol firing range was begun and finished about October 1967.

In 1966 more uniforms, audio-visual aids, other teaching materials, vehicles and bicycles were furnished by PSD. At the beginning of 1967, there were 14 foreign instructors in place - 3 Belgians, 6 UN and 5 Nigerians.

Late in 1967, the Nigerians left and the UN decided to close down their police assistance program. By March, 1968, only the Belgians remained.

In late 1970, after study by PSD, it was decided to again renovate the entire school. This was begun in April, 1971 and a water reservoir system installed. All the work was finished by September, 1971.

The Matete School has operated continuously since then, although never to capacity until recently.

At the time of the team's visit there were 300 students attending 3 different courses: Immigration, In-Service and Adjutants. This 300 appeared to be about the maximum number the school can accommodate.

The evaluation team in 1973 were briefed on plans to expand the school facilities to accommodate 700 live-in students, but no progress has been made to achieve this expansion. The pistol range however, had been renovated since the 1973 visit and the reloading operation which was just getting underway at that time is now in full and successful operation.

(2) Kasapa School - Lubumbashi

As mentioned earlier this is the only school which has operated continuously. Although heavily damaged by the combat that took place in and around the school, it continued to function and maintained its high academic level. In 1964-65, to assist the functions of the school, PSD arranged for the renovation of all buildings and furnished beds, kitchen equipment, vehicles, audio-visual aids, other teaching material and replaced other equipment stolen during the fighting. In 1967, by order of the MOI, the school was closed. Upon reopening in early 1969, it was designated to be only for recruit, NCO and special training. It has graduated several recruit classes since then.

The physical plant at Kasapa is quite a contrast from that of Matete. The grounds are spacious, some buildings in good repair, others in need of repair, but all in an impressively clean and orderly condition.

In 1973 the evaluation team found that support from Kinshasa to this school was woefully inadequate, resulting in considerably less than maximum utilization.

The water situation was critical, budgetary support for food was insufficient and even that almost always unduly long in coming, housing was available for less than half of the classroom capacity, only 2 of the 8 officer positions were filled, there was a shortage of ammunition for firearms training on the pistol range.

There has been some progress since that time. The water situation has been improved, there are now 5 officers assigned and the ammunition problem has been overcome through USAID/PSD provision of hand operated reloading equipment and the services of a PS TDY technician to assist in the installation and training in its use.

At the time of the 1973 evaluation that team was informed of plans to reopen the Kapalata School in Kisangani in early 1974. The team recommended that in view of support and personnel problems existing in the two already operating this should be reconsidered.

The GdN apparently concurred in this recommendation as the reactivation of Kapalata has been indefinitely postponed.

(b) In-Service and Specialist Training

PSD has been active in a variety of training activities of the specialist and/or in-service types. This training has covered a wide spectrum of activities and individual courses would run from a one-day session up to several months. Perhaps the most ambitious of these were the Mobile Training Teams and the Senior Officer Seminars. Each of the various efforts will be commented on separately.

(1) Rural Mobile Training Teams (RMTT)

The RMTT concept was initiated in mid-1969. After discussions with Zairian and Belgians, it was determined that there were approximately 16,000 enlisted men in the National Police that had received little or no basic police training. It was felt that the two schools in operation could not handle a problem of this magnitude. The Training Directorate, assisted by their American and Belgian advisors, decided that by taking the training to the men the problem would be solved. Thus the RMTT concept was begun.

It was decided to begin with a pilot project in the Bas-Zaire. A headquarters staff was organized, a pilot team chosen and preparations were begun to equip the team, prepare a program of instruction, lesson plans and logistic support. It was also decided that, since little French was spoken by the proposed students, the classes would be conducted in either Lingala, Swahili or Tschiluba. The work of this group culminated in the establishment of a pilot RMTT in Matadi in November 1969. After months of close observation, RMTT's were placed into operation in all provinces by June 1970. Because of the large number of police, two teams were assigned to Shaba Province. The project proved to be very successful, and a 94-hour basic course was given to over 15,000 personnel. The program was phased out as completed shortly after the fusion of the GdN/NP.

(2) Senior Officer Seminars (SOS)

As with the RMTT, a group of concerned Zairois, Belgian and American advisors found that senior officers in the police were sadly lacking in executive and leadership skills. The Training Directorate, assisted by Belgian and American advisors, in early 1971 began planning for this activity. The SOS concept evolved, which would bring together twenty senior officers for a one-week seminar at an isolated spot. They would be relieved of all duties, live in and indulge in seminar activities for one week from 0800 hours until 2200 hours each day. Many subjects were presented and discussed to improve their leadership and executive skills.

An example of the enthusiasm of the National Police was that the first seminar, which took place at Thysville in November 1971, was chaired by the Deputy Inspector General. After this successful beginning, a second SOS was held

in Lubumbashi in July 1972. A third SOS was planned but was cancelled when the fusion of the GdN/NP took place. A total of 40 officers were so trained.

The lack of management skills which precipitated this training still exists, and with a new organization in the formative stage training of command level officers is more important than ever. Recognizing this, the GdN in April, 1974, conducted such a seminar for 20 of its command level officers. This was done strictly by the GdN itself with no PSD input.

(3) Miscellaneous Specialized Training

A number of personnel have received training in a myriad of subjects for varying lengths of time. These are reflected in the following which were reported in the 1973 evaluation report. PSD has not been involved in any such training since that time:

Riot Control (Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kisangani and Kinshasa, one day).....	989
<u>Communications Training</u>	276
Mobile Radio Operators.....	136
CW Operators (Kinshasa) 6 months.....	91
Refresher Communications Training.....	29
Motorola Technician Course 12 weeks.....	10
SSB Tech. Repair Course 3 weeks.....	10
Physical Training Inst. Course(Kitona.....	15
(13 students for 6 months - 2 for one year)	
Motorcyclist Training(Kinshasa) 16 weeks..	19
Mechanics Training (Kinshasa).....	18
Mobile Patrol Training (Kinshasa and Lubumbashi) Includes Refresher Equip	
Mobile Retraining.....	247
Ministerial Guard Training.....	50
Secretarial Course (Kinshasa) 6 months....	30
Airport Security (Kinshasa) Civilians 6 months.....	50
English Language Training.....	43

TOTAL 1,747.

Recap In-Country Training:

RMTT	15,000
SOS	40
Specialized	1,747

TOTAL 16,787

With the minimal time remaining the PSD staff felt that maximum use could be made thereof in preparing lesson plans, programs of instruction and informational guidelines for use by the GdN in its own efforts. The team concurs that this was a good decision.

In this regard lesson plans were developed, translated into the French language on a total of 76 subjects, programs of instruction in English for 21 courses. Lists of these are shown in Attachments H and I. Guideline papers were prepared and translated into French on 14 areas of management and administration, one of which was a guide to organization and administration containing 21 sections. A list of these papers is shown in Attachment J. Also, turned over to the GdN were some 34 texts and manuals plus the PSD library consisting of 136 volumes. These titles are reflected in Attachments K and L.

(c) Participant Training in the United States

USAID/PSD has programmed training in the United States for a total of 166 GdN personnel. Of this number, 132 still remain in the service. A recap of this training is given below:

	<u>Total</u> <u>Trained</u>	<u>Total Still</u> <u>In Service</u>
Telecommunications Maintenance	26	23
Senior Officers Course	1	1
Crowd Control	17	13
English General Course	2	2
French General Course	102	86
Police Executive Training	17	6
Narcotics Management	1	1
TOTALS	<u>166</u>	<u>132</u>

NOTE: These figures do not include those from the CRLG who are covered elsewhere.

PIO/Ps have already been forwarded to AID/W for 29 participants utilizing FY 74 funding. These are programmed as follows:

English General Course	8
French General Course	19
Senior Officers Course	2

Upon completion of training for these officers the number of U.S. trained still in the service should reach approximately 161. This should provide an excellent nucleus of potential instructor cadre. An in-depth study of the utilization of these officers would be a good task for the Research and Planning Unit if and when activated.

(d) Training Directorate

Prior to May 1973, all GdN training activities were a part of the B-3. Acting on PSD advice, in May 1973 a Training Directorate was created at the major staff level.

The 1973 evaluation found the organization to be awkward with five sections and 11 Bureaus. The staff then consisted of one officer and 4 minor employees. The team recommended that every possible effort be made to develop the Training Directorate as soon as possible into a capably staffed viable organization.

The GOZ has since taken two steps which resulted in nullifying any progress in developing the Training Directorate.

1. GdN appointed a well trained major who had completed the six-month retraining course at Kitona Army Base as Chief of the Training Directorate. With the assistance of PSD five additional personnel were assigned, one of whom is to handle all participant training and PSD has trained this officer in selection, processing and pre-departure training for future participants.
2. During April 1974, the Training Directorate Chief received orders transferring him to the DDN.

This has returned the Training Directorate to the less than satisfactory situation existing at the time of the 1973 evaluation. The importance of a well organized, staffed and functioning Training Directorate must receive strong emphasis from the D-G of the GdN in order to achieve his training goals.

8. Logistics

As reported by the 1973 evaluation report this is perhaps the greatest deficiency in the entire GdN structure with two major factors contributing to the problem.

First, the paucity of transportation facilities within Zaire defies the imagination. The road network which existed prior to 1960 has received little attention since that time and has deteriorated to the point that it can hardly be considered as a means. The railroad system connects only a few locations, is slow and unreliable. The same can be said for the one commercial airline in country. In some parts of the country, notably between Kinshasa and Kisangani, slow river transportation is available.

The second factor contributing to the logistics problem is an organizational, or management, one. Like all the other headquarters elements of the GdN at this time, the logistics section is in a state of flux and understaffed. In some ways this is an advantage. This condition could, and should, provide an excellent opportunity to shape it into a meaningful operation which would service all units at a reasonable degree, something sorely lacking at present.

To accomplish this will require considerable advice and assistance. It will require advice in applying in-country conditions to procurement lead times, scheduled reordering, stockpiling at perhaps more than one regional location and all of the many elements of good supply management that can be instituted only with a high degree of logistics management expertise.

The 1973 team felt that the magnitude and importance of this activity warranted the assignment of a one-tour logistics specialist in lieu of one of the then existing generalist positions. The USAID concurred, the SPAR developed, but the matter was overtaken by subsequent events. The need for improvement in this area is still a critical one.

During the team's stay the Chief of GdN logistics returned from the United States where, as a member of a Police Executive Tour, his programming had included emphasis on logistics management. This exposure will hopefully be of value to him in his assigned task to reorganize and systematize the GdN logistics activity.

9. Gendarmerie Motor Maintenance Shops

Maintenance and repair of GdN vehicles were to have been conducted in the main at the central garages, one in Kinshasa and one in Lubumbashi. These installations were so located in consonance with the majority of the GdN rolling stock. In other areas, where vehicles were few and scattered, the maintenance and repair functions were to be performed by whatever means were available to GdN in that area.

Kinshasa Facility

This is the largest of the two shops with responsibility for a fleet of approximately 320 vehicles. This well equipped and designed facility was established by the United Nations to support their project vehicles. As the UN phased out, the GdN was gradually phased in until in 1973 the garage was turned over to GOZ GdN.

The 1973 evaluation team reported the following:

(a) 31% of the fleet was deadlined due to unavailability of spare parts. Most of the parts were on order, however, delivery schedules were long and uncertain.

(b) The inventory of vehicles consisted of between 30 to 40 different types, makes and models. The process of ordering and stocking spare parts was obviously complicated.

(c) Vehicles purchases through A.I.D. assistance included a 10% spare parts complement. Unfortunately, selection of parts was based upon the suppliers' recommendation rather than on actual use experience based upon conditions existing in Zaire. This resulted in a several years' supply of some parts and a critically short supply of others which were dissipated quickly.

(d) Parts which were then on hand were properly segregated, stored and carried on a Kardex-type stock card. A large assortment of parts had been left behind by the UN were being retained in the stock room. These parts were incompatible with the GdN fleet and were completely useless to GdN.

(e) The shop commandant had given the impression of being knowledgeable, sincerely eager to run a good shop and had done the best he could under adverse conditions. He understood the importance of, and was attempting to implement, good preventive maintenance.

(f) The staff consisted of 110 personnel, 20 of whom were mechanics of various levels of skill. The remainder were assigned a variety of other tasks not requiring a high level of skill. Six of the better mechanics, including the commandant, had recently been trained in advanced repair and maintenance of automatic transmissions at the General Motors plant in Belgium. These men were then conducting daily training classes to upgrade other personnel. There were four Filipino technicians employed at the shop.

(g) The mechanics assigned to the shop were GdN EM drawing only regular EM pay and allowances. In order to insure retention of these skilled personnel and encourage the acquisition of these skills PSD had attempted to have the GdN implement an increased pay policy, but were not successful.

Lubumbashi Facility

All factors considered, this is an impressive installation, faced with the same basic problems as those of the Kinshasa facility. With minimal equipment and spare parts, an able and energetic commandant seemed to have done a remarkable job of keeping as much rolling stock as possible in operation.

The 1973 evaluation team reported the following:

(a) The work force consisted of 31 mechanics, 16 of whom were in training at Kitona. There were two TCN's, one Filipino and one Belgian, employed at the shop.

(b) Procedures for stock control, inspection and work orders were proper and working. The garage had the capability for all echelons of repair, including body work, and had been performing well with the limited resources available.

(c) Having recognized the importance of training, the commandant held, and often conducted, a 30 minute roll call training session each day for all mechanics. He had also attempted to institute driver training, in order to prevent driver created repair problems, but had not received the requested vehicles.

The 1973 evaluation team made the following recommendations and PSD or GdN has taken the action indicated.

Recommendation: A one tour assignment of a logistics/motor maintenance vehicle advisor to assist the GdN in protecting a sizeable investment through instituting proper methods of procurement control and utilization of parts, training of personnel and other facets of motor maintenance management.

Action: USAID/Z had ammended the SPAR to meet this recommendation and OPS/W was in the process of assigning a logistics/motor maintenance vehicle advisor to PSD/Kinshasa when the congressional action was announced thereby nullifying implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation: TDY services of a motor maintenance specialist be requested immediately for a period of from 90-120 days to develop a properly researched and well thought out item-by-item listing of spare parts based on use factors and from this recommend parts procurement policies.

Action: The services of a TDY motor maintenance specialist was immediately requested and a Public Safety Advisor arrived in Kinshasa on September 1, 1973 for a 75 day period. An in-depth study and evaluation of the requirements for vehicle spare parts, vehicle maintenance and required technical support was conducted. The report was translated into French and provided to the D-G of the GdN on March 11, 1974.

Recommendation: A study be conducted and a proposal made therefrom to institute a special skills pay increment plan for motor maintenance personnel.

Action: PSD continued attempting to have the GdN implement an increased pay policy, but have been unsuccessful as of this time.

Recommendation: The GdN adopt a practical family of vehicles of as few body types as possible and standardize on one make for each type.

Action: D-G of the GdN has formulated a 5 year vehicle procurement plan and has chosen General Motors vehicles as the standard make. Sedans will be the Nova II equipped with heavy duty electrical system, cooling system and suspension systems. Presently 4 such vehicles are in-country and an additional 40 are enroute. Selection of General Motors was very wisely based on the current construction of a GM assembly plant in Zaire (scheduled for completion in September 1974) and their willingness to stock spare parts for the GdN fleet, thereby substantially reducing delivery time.

The report by the OPS TDY Advisor made the following recommendations and GdN has taken the action indicated.

Recommendation: Dispose of the large assortment of unusable spare parts left behind by the UN by sale and utilize the funds received to procure critically needed spare parts for the existing fleet.

Action: GdN B-4 located a buyer for the unusable spare parts, however, the price is in dispute. This situation has been forwarded to higher levels for resolution.

Recommendation: GdN commence disposal action on the wrecked, uneconomically repairable and cannibalized hulks of vehicles littering the maintenance shops then utilize the funds received to procure new vehicles or critically needed spare parts.

Action: GdN B-4 has commenced disposal action, however, the exact status of the action could not be determined.

Recommendation: GdN, following guidelines in the report, begin assembling spare parts use factors to use as a base for parts procurement policy.

Action: GdN has decided to await completion of the disposal action before compiling the necessary use factors to develop a sound parts procurement policy.

The final evaluation team strongly endorses a unilateral action taken by the D-G of the GdN as regards TCN's working at the motor maintenance facilities. The contract between 5 Filipinos and GOZ strictly forbids them to engage in repairing vehicles. Their sole responsibility will be to conduct training classes for GdN mechanics. The classes are to consist of 150 hours instruction for 10 men at a time. The proper usage of a valuable asset to increase the skills of GdN personnel exhibits sound management practices.

10. Civil Disturbance Control - Mobile Battalions (Proposed)

The proposed formation of nine mobile battalions which were to have the sole responsibility for civil disturbance control has not been realized. The battalions, comprised of some 560 Gendarmes, were to have been funded by the GOZ/Gendarmerie Nationale at a total cost of approximately \$6,649,106. Training, equipping and implementation of the battalions, one each in Kinshasa and the eight provincial capitals, were to have begun in early 1974 and be completed in early 1976.

Former IPA graduates who have received civil disturbance control training were to have been formed into a committee with the responsibility of forming and conducting a program of instruction for the officers and men of the mobile battalions. USAID/PSD/Kinshasa had recommended to the DG of the GdN that the secondary roles and missions of this force should be.

- (a) as a mobile strike force to combat sharp rises of criminality;
- (b) to augment on a continuing basis other units such as the Brigade Mobile in high crime areas;

- (c) for special security details for visiting persons of importance and parades, etc.;
- (d) used in event of disasters to assist and protect citizens affected.

PSD had also agreed to assist the GdN in developing specifications and the actual procurement of equipment from U.S. sources to be completely funded from the GOZ budget. At about the time final approval was being given by the GOZ they were informed of the impending withdrawal of Public Safety Advisors and no further steps were taken.

The team was unable to learn just what steps the GdN will take in the entire matter, whether or not they will go ahead with procurement or from what sources.

11. Tanganyika Sector

The 1973 report devoted a section to describing conditions in this area of the Republic and commenting favorably on a GOZ proposal to replace the Army in the area with GdN.

The team was pleased to learn that this was in fact effected in January 1974. Additionally a special unit was established within the Office of the President to develop a civic action program within the Tanganyika area. This too is now underway.

12. Communications

The 1973 evaluation reported on an in-depth look at the communications sub-project and made several recommendations for future action. Termination of U.S. assistance shortly thereafter obviously precluded action on most of the recommendations.

Information contained in the above referenced report will not be repeated here as it would serve no real purpose to do so. Instead, the team believes that the purposes of this study will be best served by describing the activities within the telecommunications sub-projects, accomplishments and the some inevitable shortfalls. To that end the sub-project has been divided into 14 activities, their status as of April 1, 1971, and the status as of the departure of the PS Telecom Advisor in April, 1974.

a. National Point-to-Point Radio Net

(1) April, 1971

The network consisted of 25 SSB radios, 6 years old, 19 of which were in operation. They were suffering from poor maintenance, the emergency generators unreliable for the same reason, there were very few spare parts available for the radios.

(2) April, 1974

The old tube type radios were phased out and replaced with Motorola SA 100 which were purchased by the GOZ through the local Motorola dealer. The contract provided for spare parts and a 30 day maintenance course in the equipment for the police technicians.

Twenty five radios have been installed. The remaining 20 of what is to eventually be a 45 point network are on hand. Expansion of the net is awaiting GOZ purchase of generators for those locations in which there is no central power available. Specifications for the generators have been developed, the procurement is pending.

A maintenance program has been established with an adequate amount of technicians trained and assigned.

b. Kinshasa Brigade Mobile Radio Net

(1) April, 1971

Twenty FM-VHF low band radios had been provided for this net. Six of these were at the time installed in vehicles, only 3 of which were in operating condition. The remaining 14 were out of service due to a combination of inadequate spare parts and an inability of the technicians to perform necessary repairs. The low band was unreliable due to lack of range and skip interference.

(2) April, 1974

The low band system has been replaced with 45 MOTRAC high band FM sets which were purchased by the GOZ. As with the nation-wide system the contract with Motorola

provided for a 30 day training period and adequate spare parts. The net includes a repeater system which, coupled with the high band frequency, has resulted in superior range and elimination of the skip interference.

The total number of radios has at no time been installed due to the fluctuating number of vehicles in service at any given time. This has varied from a high of 22 to a low of 3. At present however, an additional 44 vehicles for the Mobile Brigade are in shipment which will utilize the entire inventory of radios plus more.

A Kinshasa Zone maintenance facility is in operation and staffed with one Filipino and 8 GdN technicians. This facility should have little difficulty in accomplishing the additional installations. There is an adequate supply of spare parts in stock.

The old phased out system was repaired at this facility and placed in service in a traffic net in Kinshasa.

c. Motorcycle Traffic Radio Net - Kinshasa

(1) April, 1971

Twenty FM-VHF low band radios had been provided for this net. Of this number only 4 were installed and operating. 13 were out of service due to a lack of spare parts and inability of the technicians to perform the necessary repairs. The remaining 3 were damaged beyond repair by accidents and fire.

(2) April, 1974

All 17 radios are in service and operating with one or two in the shop at any given time for service or repair. A maintenance program has been established, there is an adequacy of spare parts in stock. Constant repair and alignment of the radios is required due to the rough streets and operating conditions.

d. Traffic Vehicles Radio Net - Kinshasa

(1) April, 1971

This net was non-existent.

(2) April, 1974

This net was established using the phased out radios described in (b) above. From the 20 radios so removed 16 serviceable sets were produced. Only 2 or 3 are in use at any given time however, due to a high rate of deadlined vehicles caused by a combination of accidents and a lack of vehicle spare parts at the garage facility.

e. Precinct Radio Net, Point-to-Point - Kinshasa

(1) April, 1971

Sixteen tube type FM-VHF low band radios had been provided for this net. Six were in operation, 10 were in the shop awaiting parts and repair.

(2) April, 1974

The entire inventory was reworked and at one time all 16 were operative. As of April, 1974, only 9 were in service due primarily to a lack of transportation for technicians to provide necessary service to aging equipment.

At the time of the team's visit a jeep type vehicle had been assigned and necessary repairs made to bring this number up to 14.

This entire net is to be phased out and replaced with 34 FM 5 radios thus providing communications with all precincts, not just selected ones as at present. Radios for this purpose are now in country awaiting installation.

f. Brigade Mobile Radio Net - Lubumbashi

(1) April, 1971

This net was non-existent

(2) April, 1974

Twenty FM-VHF high band radios were provided by USAID and installed when the vehicles arrived in early 1973. It is operating successfully, there is an adequate supply of spare parts to keep it so.

g. Commissariat Radio Net - Lubumbashi

(1) April, 1971

This net consisted of approximately 50 FM-VHF low band radios, both mobile and base station, which had been installed in the mid to late 1960s. The entire net was inoperative and the sets had been placed in dead storage.

(2) April, 1974

This obsolete equipment of the vibrator/tube type turned out to be in generally good condition after alignment as it had been in actual operation only a short time before it failed due to lack of maintenance. Through cannibalization 25 sets were placed in service during 1972-1973. Another 23 sets could be made useable if cables and control heads could be obtained.

Because of age and obsolescence parts for this equipment are generally unavailable. Motorola - Israel is attempting to provide, at no cost to the GOZ, used cables and control heads for the 23 sets. The entire system should be phased out soon due to the unavailability of parts.

h. Stock Records and Warehouse System

(1) April, 1971

No such systems existed

(2) April, 1974

All items are entered on stock record cards reflecting proper levels, reorder point, source, etc. Inventory is taken bi-annually. Parts are kept in a numbered bin system, the warehouse has been air conditioned to enhance the life and condition of radio parts.

i. Telecommunications Repair Facility - Kinshasa BM

(1) April, 1971

Three empty rooms in the Brigade Mobile building had been designated for this purpose. Equipment consisted of one operative calibrated signal generator, 4 frequency meters,

one Simpson 260 meter and 4 calibrated signal generators; all inoperative.

(2) April, 1974

All the meters and signal generators have been repaired and put into service. The entire facility has been refurbished into a modern shop, complete with all necessary benches, tools, stock bins and additional equipment added, consisting of a frequency meter, frequency counter and associated test equipment plus regulated power.

j. Telecommunications Repair Facility - GdN, Kinshasa

(1) April, 1971

This facility per se was not in existence at the time. There was use being made of a former U.S. owned facility which had been declared excess.

(2) April, 1974

As the USG had no immediate use for this property at the time it was agreed to allow the GdN temporary use of it to develop an urgently needed repair facility with the understanding that as soon as they were able to acquire their own space it would be move.

Subsequently an adequately designed shop was developed, complete with benches, tools and test equipment. It has functioned well and at the time of the team's visit was in the process of being moved to GdN property.

k. Telecommunications Repair Facility - Lubumbashi

(1) April, 1971

This facility did not exist at the time.

(2) April, 1974

There is now a complete shop with work bench, tools and a binned stockroom. It is fully equipped with

regulated power, calibrated signal generator, frequency counter and associated test equipment.

l. Technician's Training

(1) April, 1971

Although there were technicians who had been trained, there was no continuing in-service or on the job training to keep them updated.

(2) April, 1974

Eleven additional technicians completed U.S. training and all personnel have had at least 24 months of on the job training conducted by Filipino contract technicians. The level of ability has, in the opinion of the U.S. communications advisor, doubled in the three year period.

m. Management Training for Senior Officers

(1) April, 1971

There was no program to train telecommunications managers.

(2) April, 1974

Failure to achieve progress in this activity is perhaps the greatest deficiency in the sub-project. This fact was mentioned in the 1973 evaluation. The advisor did develop a program of instruction for a management course, but for one reason or another a class was never formed.

n. Improve Overall Administrative Procedures of the Directorate of Telecommunications

This objective is directly related to number m. above, although development of skilled managers in the communications field would not in itself assure improvement in overall administrative procedures. It involves the entire spectrum of GOZ procedures in the fields of personnel management logistics, budget, etc. There has been little improvement in these areas and this

would seem to be a priority task for the Research and Planning Unit; to examine the entire picture of administrative procedures, identify those which are obsolete or otherwise retarding progress and develop alternative plans for solutions to the problems.

Summary

On the whole much has been accomplished in the field of telecommunications. Systems have been designed, installed and are working. Maintenance facilities have been established, equipped, staffed with trained technicians and keeping the equipment in operation. Management and administrative procedures need improvement as a priority. It can be predicted with reasonable certainty that unless this is done much of the progress in other fields will begin to slip.

B. Coastal River and Lake Guard (CRLG)

Background

The CRLG was created by Presidential Decree number 70-060 on November 9, 1970. In August of that same year, as a result of President Mobutu's state visit to the United States, agreement was reached for U.S. assistance to this force through the Public Safety Program.

The 1973 evaluation discussed the CRLG in some detail, it will not be repeated here except for purposes of clarity or where changes have occurred since that time.

Organization and Personnel

There have been no changes of consequence in either the organizational structure or the personnel assigned to it. Organization charts of the CRLG and the Lake Guard Detachment at Lake Tanganyika are shown in Attachments M and N.

Training

As a prerequisite to successful formation of the new unit 139 officers and men were sent in groups to Mare Island, California, for training in small boat handling and familiarization with the various types of equipment to be installed on the ships then under procurement. This training was at no cost to the USAID.

An additional 11 officers were programmed by USAID/PSD for training in the United States, jointly funded by the USAID and the GOZ. The fields of training and the numbers therein are shown below:

Telecommunications Management	1
Telecommunications Maintenance	1
Executive Training	3
Border/Customs Control	2
Maritime Law Enforcement	4
TOTAL	<u>11</u>

In country training activities in the CRLG have never really progressed to the degree required. For the most part it has consisted of limited on-the-job training in technical and mechanical skills through working with the 5 Filipino contract technicians employed by the CRLG at its Kalemie base.

At the time of the 1973 evaluation that team was told that a more formal program of training was awaiting completion of a large training/headquarters complex, then under construction and due for completion in early 1975.

It was the feeling of the evaluation team at that time that training could not be realistically postponed for such a period of time and recommended that interim arrangements be made. Programs of instruction were developed, lesson plans written and indeed, some effort made in that direction. But for a combination of reasons, not the least of which was the untimely departure of the Public Safety advisors, little was actually accomplished.

Communications

The 1973 evaluation covered in detail the CRLG communications situation, accomplishments, problems and recommended corrective actions. From the best information currently available those observations retain their validity. It should be noted however, that additional training of telecommunications personnel was started during the period since the 1973 study.

By way of recap, major accomplishments are:

1. Communications have been established between Kinshasa and Kalemie utilizing high frequency equipment capable of both single side band voice and telegraphy.
2. Patrol boats based at Kalemie are equipped with both VHF/FM and HF-SSB transceivers. This allows for communications with the Kalemie Headquarters at any range by using the HF-SSB for distances of more than 40 miles and the VHF/FM for lesser distances.
3. Radio communications centers have been established at Kinshasa and Kalemie.
4. Maintenance and repair shops have been established, equipped and staffed at both Kinshasa and Kalemie.

Public Safety Role

USAID assistance to the CRLG has been minimal, particularly when viewed in the totality of the development of the organization. Technical assistance has consisted of a maximum of two advisors at any given time, some \$51,000 in communications equipment and the training of 11 participants in the United States. All other costs for facilities, personnel, equipment and supplies have been GOZ funded. Boats alone, for example, purchased from US sources cost \$3,399,978. Add this to other costs such as construction, other equipment, supplies, personnel, etc., and the total is rather impressive. While exact figures were not available the best estimates available would indicate a GOZ input of more than 95% of the total.

At the time of the 1973 evaluation both advisor positions were filled. However, this condition was short lived. In September, 1973, the maritime advisor departed Kalemie and was subsequently terminated. In March, 1974, the communications advisor also departed, there has been no Public Safety assistance to the CRLG since that time.

CHAPTER IV

THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

A. Background

The Public Safety Program was initiated in the then Democratic Republic of the Congo in September 1963, with the assignment of one advisor. At the time of the 1967 evaluation the PSD staff had been increased to six advisors. Total funding, from inception to that time was \$2,346,000.

In 1969 a second evaluation of the program was conducted and the decision made to focus PSD support on achievement in four high impact areas: 1) accelerated training of National Police personnel through the use of Rural Mobile Training Teams 2) establishment of a motorized police patrol operation; 3) continued development of police communications for Kinshasa; and 4) development of a maintenance facility in Kinshasa and the training of garage personnel, both mechanics and supervisors.

Accomplishment of these goals was based on a five year program (through FY 1975) and the recommendation made to increase the advisory staff to eight in order to administer the recommended program.

In November 1970, the Coastal River and Lake Guard (CRLG) was formed by decree and additional PSD assistance provided in the form of two advisors, training and some commodity support, primarily in telecommunications.

Progress has been made in achieving the goals set in the four high impact areas. There are operating mobile patrols in both Kinshasa and Lubumbashi; there is a more efficient network of telecommunications in operation nationwide and in Kinshasa; the Rural Mobile Training Team was very successful, having been phased out in November, 1972, after successfully bringing training to 15,000 of the estimated 16,000 having little or no training; police garage and maintenance facilities are in operation in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi although efficiency is handicapped by a lack of logistical support.

Then in August, 1972, elimination of the National Police and Gendarmerie and integrating both into a new civil police organization, the Gendarmerie Nationale (GdN) was decreed. This development created new challenges and requirements for the Public Safety Program.

As a result, another evaluation was conducted in August 1973, to assess the effectiveness of U.S. inputs to date, examine the project activities and the degree to which objectives had been reached and assist in establishing new goals and objectives responsive to the needs of the two new organizations, the GdN and the CRLG.

This evaluation disclosed the need for considerable assistance in developing organizational and managerial progress within the GdN and a receptivity to such advice and assistance. It was in fact a rare opportunity to render a service which would have lasting impact on the internal security posture of a friendly nation.

The evaluation team made a number of recommendations, both for U.S. and GOZ action. Unfortunately, little action on these ever got off the ground. The final report reached the USAID in October, only one month before the November Congressional Joint Conferees' action terminating Public Safety assistance. The first Public Safety Advisors began leaving Zaire in December.

Those remaining in the ensuing few months attempted to effect as much improvement as they could under the circumstances, and indeed, enjoyed some success. But for all practical purposes any further progress was doomed.

B. Objectives and Goals

Goals and objectives of the Public Safety Program in Zaire have undergone several revisions because of changes in conditions within the Republic and its civil law enforcement agencies.

For example, goals set in the beginning of the program in FY 64 during a period of active rebellion could not be expected to be the same as those in the peaceful and rapidly developing Zaire of today.

Therefore, the 1969 evaluation resulted in establishing the four priority goals previously described. Establishment of the CRLG in 1970 required modifying goals to accommodate certain needs of that new organization. Then the creation of the GdN in 1972 required that a fresh look be given with a view to redirection of goals geared to the needs of that organization with an emphasis on management and institutionalization. Hence the 1973 evaluation which recommended courses of action with these objectives in mind.

The primary objective of the Public Safety project has always been improvement of the ability of the Government of Zaire to develop the effectiveness and professionalization of its civil law enforcement agencies, provide a more efficient and effective police service to its citizens and maintain an environment of internal security necessary for the achievement of political stability and economic development. Goals established in the various sub-projects have been designed to contribute to achievement of this objective.

C. Resources

1. U.S.

(a) Technicians

During the life span of the Public Safety Program the input of technicians authorized varied in accordance with the goals established by the U.S. Mission in Zaire from a low of one technician to a high of eleven technicians of which 10 positions were filled. The areas of specialized assignments included (1) Chief Public Safety Officer, (2) Deputy Chief Public Safety Officer, (3) PSA Generalist, (4) PSA Municipal, (5) PSA Training, (6) PSA Maritime and (7) PSA Telecommunications.

The 1973 evaluation team recommended that a change in specialized assignments of the in-country technicians be made to assist in the initial organization, policy development and training of the newly created GdN. USAID/Z and PSD were in the process of implementing the recommended realignment and redirection of effort at the time that the phase out of Public Safety overseas activities was announced.

The total cost for technicians during the life of the Public Safety project amounted to \$2,357,000, which is shown by year and amounts in Attachment O.

(b) Commodities

During the entire period of U.S. commodity in-pu of the total amount obligated \$2,452,758 was expended, these commodities were in the categories of (1) transportation, (2) communications, (3) weapons, including non-toxic crowd control supplies and protective equipment; and (4) training and other general police type supplies and equipment. A breakdown by year and by category is shown in Attachment P.

(c) Participants

A total of 177 participants have received training in the United States during the life of the Public Safety Program at a total cost of \$771,000. This figure does not include the group training of 139 CRLG officerd and men in 1971. A breakdown by type of training is shown in Attachment Q.

Future training needs should be determined by the GdN as they become known with a concentration on management level and in the field of training, at both instructor and management levels.

(d) Other Costs

This fund covered support activities of the Public Safety Program such as local hires (typists & translators, etc.) and those activities in support of U.S. direct hire technicians (housing, in-country travel, etc.) An amount of \$243,000 was funded for the entire period of the Public Safety Program. The funding per FY is shown in Attachment O.

2. Host Country

The team was unable to obtain complete funding figures for the GOZ input during the entire period of the Public Safety program. GOZ records did not lend themselves to extracting this kind of information. PSD records had been packed for shipment at the time of the team's visit. The few examples listed will clearly

indicate that this was a joint program, not just a U.S. input.

a. Coastal River and Lake Guard

As described in that section GOZ costs are estimated at approximately \$5,000,000 which represents 95% of the total. If one adds to this the estimated 6 to 8 million dollars in construction costs the USG input becomes negligible by comparison.

b. Participant Training

The GOZ funded travel costs for the participants amounted to \$238,896 or 23% of the total.

c. Commodities - GdN

For reasons stated above exact data was not available. However, from knowledge of several specific transactions conservative estimates of these alone amount to approximately \$482,000 in commodities from U.S. sources within the past year alone. The total figure over a longer period would naturally be several times this figure. The whole point being that the GOZ bore the bulk of the cost.

3. Contracts

The GOZ funds for 11 Filipino technicians at an estimated annual cost of \$130,816.

D. Observations and Conclusions

In assessing the overall successes or shortcomings of Public Safety assistance to the GOZ one must consider two factors: One, the degree of overall improvement achieved in Zaire's civil law enforcement agencies; and, two, achievement of specifically stated objectives and goals. Such an approach is necessary due to the conditions and situations which required changes in stated goals.

Looking first at the broad picture, overall improvement is obvious. A largely untrained and ill equipped national police force, supplemented in much of the rural areas by army forces, has been replaced by a civilian service oriented Gendarmerie Nationale

designed to bring better police services to the populace in both urban and rural areas.

Progress is being made in training and equipping this force to enable it to discharge its responsibilities more effectively. This is a lengthy, never ending process, but a start has been made in the right direction.

The goals set as a result of the 1969 evaluation have in the main been achieved. A Rural Mobile Training Team activity was implemented and training carried to 15,000 men as a result. Motorized patrol operations have been launched in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. These units are providing citizens of the two cities a degree of service previously unavailable. True there are yet many problems to be overcome, but an excellent beginning has been made.

Communications systems are operational from headquarters to regions and within the two cities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Maintenance and repair facilities have been established, equipped and staffed and are performing adequately.

Vehicle maintenance shops are in operation, equipment installed and personnel assigned. Problems, mainly of a logistics nature, are serious, but again, a start has been made in the right direction.

Creation of the coastal river and Lake Guard in 1970, and the Gendarmerie Nationale in 1972, created a need for development of new goals. The 1973 evaluation was to assist in doing just that. Priority areas of needed improvement were identified and jointly agreed upon, GOZ receptivity to advice and guidance was excellent. A three year Public Safety assistance program was recommended which would have been a rather unique opportunity to have significant impact on assisting to institutionalize a professional civil law enforcement structure in a friendly country at minimal cost to the USG.

Unfortunately, timing was such that little was accomplished. Both the GOZ and PSD began with enthusiasm to develop joint plans of action for the ensuing three years based upon the report which was transmitted to them in October 1973. Then as planning had barely got underway they were informed that not only would the plans not be carried out, but that all Public Safety assistance was

to be terminated. Their bewilderment is understandable.

The first Public Safety advisor departed post in December, 1973, others followed at intervals, by the time the phase out evaluation team arrived in mid-June, 1974, only one remained in Zaire. He is scheduled to depart in early, July 1974.

The GdN is aware that it needs assistance and advice in the mammoth task of restructuring its organization, it had looked to the United States to provide that assistance. It must now rely on its own resources to accomplish the task.

The team feels that perhaps the most logical way to fill this void is to create within the Director General's office a Research and Planning Unit staffed with young officers of intelligence, initiative and imagination. Such officers are available within the GdN, it just remains to so assign them and begin the process of developing courses of action. The team recommends that this be done.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon observations contained in previous sections of this report, the following recommendations are offered for GOZ consideration.

It is recommended that:

Research and Planning

1. The GdN implement a Research and Planning Unit, staffed with intelligent, trained young officers responsible for gathering, analyzing and translating information and data of GdN activities into action plans designed as management systems. Ideally this unit should report directly to the Director General.

GdN consider training R. P. U personnel as a unit to insure coordination of methodology and team work.

Organization

2. GdN utilize the R. P. U to continue refinement of the nationwide civil police organization into a modern, streamlined and effective civil law enforcement agency.

Brigade Mobile

3. GdN immediately address the major factor that prevents expansion of this successful project, i. e., the inability to maintain vehicles in an operable condition.
4. GdN initiate pilot projects on walking beats, bicycle beats and kiosks in radio contact with the operations room to supplement the Mobile Patrols.

Traffic Management and Control

5. GdN utilize the R. P. U to conduct an in-depth study throughout the ROZ and formulate action plans to improve this very serious situation.

Immigration

6. GOZ implement the recommendations contained in the OPS/TDY Specialist Report in an effort to improve the existing situation.

Criminal Investigation

7. GdN utilize the POI's provided by PSD in a training program for all investigators.
8. GdN utilize the R. P. U to develop and delineate the authorities and responsibility of each investigative unit.

Records

9. GdN adopt the basic records management system and forms proposed by PSD. The R. P. U should examine this system and modify it in accordance with existing GOZ laws.

Training

10. GdN continue their so far successful efforts in this area of critical need to maintain the established momentum.
11. GdN implement plans to expand the Matete School to accommodate 700 live-in students undergoing officer and specialist training.
12. GdN continue to improve the Kasapa training facility, both the staff and the physical plant, to realize the full potential of this school.
13. GdN reinstitute the RMTT's as a supplement to the training schools. This proven successful program should be utilized to continually upgrade the skills of all GdN personnel.

14. GdN continue to recognize the lack of management skills at the command level which is being addressed by the SOS.
15. GdN utilize the POI's, lesson plans and guidelines prepared by PSD in furtherance of the specialized training program.
16. GdN assign the R. P. U the task of conducting an in-depth study of present utilization of returned participants.
17. GdN emphasize the importance of the Training Directorate by assigning competent, well trained personnel to this vitally important function.

Logistics

18. GdN explore possibilities of using GOZ aircraft to transport critically needed supplies to various points within ROZ as required. The unreliability of existing transportation dictates the necessity for this action.
19. GdN profit from the logistics management training recently given the Chief of GdN logistics during his police executive tour. This training should be of value in his assigned task to reorganize and systematize the GdN logistics activity.

Motor Maintenance Shops

20. GdN immediately identify those vehicles not subject to deposit action and compile parts use factors for parts reordering and stocking. This is necessary to reduce the long deadline period of vehicles awaiting frequently used parts.
21. GdN assign R. P. U the task of developing an action plan based on the recommendations contained in the OPS/TDY motor maintenance specialist's report which included requirements for vehicle spare parts, vehicle maintenance and technical support.

22. GdN institute a complete driver training course with emphasis on preventive maintenance which should reduce the driver caused breakdowns.
23. GdN seriously pursue the implementation of a special skills pay program in order to retain the on-board highly skilled personnel.
24. GdN continue the vehicle fleet standardization policy now in effect. However, the life expectancy of each vehicle should play a more important role in the replacement policy than it now does.
25. GdN rapidly resolve the price dispute over the unusable U. N. spare parts and convert the receipts to critically needed spare parts and convert the receipts to critically needed spare parts for the existing fleet.

Communications

26. GdN purchase the generators required to complete installation of the National Point-to-Point Radio Network.
27. GdN complete installation of the new radios in the precinct radio net, Kinshasa.
28. GdN consider replacing the obsolete radios in the Lubumbashi commissariate radio net to provide reliable communications within the city.
29. GdN implement a telecommunications management and administration training program to protect the communication networks in existence and those of the future.

EX-NATIONAL POLICE

Prior to August 1972
(Old Rank Structure)

Grade	
Inspector General	1
Inspector General Adj.	1
Principal Insp.	27
Inspecteur	57
Commissaire PP	36
Commissaire	113
Commissaire Adj.	128
S/Com P. P.	222
S/Com	200
S/Com Adj.	211
SUB TOTAL OFFICERS	996
Brigadier Chef	2,488
Brigadier	2,472
Brigadier Adj.	2,798
Agent P. P.	4,833
Agent	5,572
Agent Adjoint	775
SUB TOTAL NCO & EM	18,938
TOTAL NATIONAL POLICE	19,934

ATTACHMENT A

EX-GENDARMERIE FAZ

Prior to August 1972

RANK STRUCTURE

GENERAL	0
COLONEL	1
LT. COLONEL	3
MAJOR	4
CAPITAIN	38
LIEUTENANT	26
S/LT	69
ADJUDANT CHEF	9
ADJUDANT 1ST CLASS	38
ADJUDANT	105
<hr/>	
SUBTOTAL	293
FIRST SGT. MAJ.	44
SGT. MAJ.	531
FIRST SGT.	142
SGT.	1,881
CORPORAL	2,130
GENDARME 1ST CLASS	1,337
GENDARME	246
<hr/>	
SUBTOTAL	6,311
TOTAL	6,604
	=====

ATTACHMENT B


GENDAEMERIE NATIONAL
PRESENT STRENGTH
31st JULY 1973

(New Rank Structure)


GENERAL	1
LT. COL.	8
MAJOR	31
CAPTAIN	61
LT.	88
S/LT.	158
ADJUDANT CHIEF	284
ADJUDANT 1st CLASS	288
ADJUDANT	180
<hr/>	
SUBTOTAL	1,099
FIRST SGT. MAJ.	1,406
SGT. MAJOR	2,513
FIRST SGT.	3,560
SGT.	7,360
CORPORAL	6,286
1CL GENDARME	1,803
2CL GENDARME	246
<hr/>	
SUBTOTAL	23,174
	24,273

ATTACHMENT C

PRESENT GENDARMERIE NATIONALE ORGANIZATION




GdN ORGANIZATION PROPOSED BY PSD



-51-

ATTACHMENT E


**BRIGADE MOBILE
KINSHASA METROPOLITAN POLICE
MOBILE PATROL ORGANIZATION
(City is Divided into 7 Zones)**



LESSON PLANS, TEXTS AND MANUALS IN FRENCH

1. Self Defense
2. Arrest and Search
3. Civic Education
4. Penal Code
5. Communications (Existing Systems)
6. Highway Code
7. Driving
8. Traffic Control
9. Brigade Mobile Vehicle Control
10. Riot Control
11. Juvenile Delinquency
12. Driver's Training
13. Vehicle Maintenance
14. Employment of Baton
15. Investigation
16. Preliminary Crime Scene Investigation
17. Courses Prepared by Mobile Training Team
18. Explosives and Bomb Disposal
19. Fingerprinting
20. Firearms
21. Forms
22. Glossary - Mil.
23. Identification
24. Internal Security
25. International Police Academy
26. Judiciary Organization
27. Kasapa Training Program
28. Training Program, Class Handouts, Lesson Plans, Methods of Instruction
29. Police Instructor's Techniques
30. Police Regulation Course
31. Public Order
32. The Organization and Administration of the Brigade Mobile
33. Report Writing
34. Public Relations
35. Crime Scene
36. Observation, Description and Identification
37. Telecommunications - General
38. Patrol Techniques
39. Training Programs
40. Vehicle Control

BRIGADE MOBILE—LUMBUMBASHI



-53-

ATTACHMENT G

41. History of Zaire
42. Zaire's Construction
43. Organization of the Brigade Mobile
44. Orientation
45. Police Ethics
46. Patrol Zones
47. Police Missions
48. Program of Instruction
49. Note Taking
50. First-Aid
51. Protection of Accident Scene
52. Report Writing
53. Resources Control
54. Systems Engineering of Training
55. Maintenance and Restoration of Public Order
56. Conducting Interviews and Interrogations
57. The Gendarmerie and Brigade Mobile Organizations
58. Crossroad Traffic Control
59. Firearms Management - Brigade Mobile
60. Self-Defense Course
61. The Gendarme
62. Crime Scene Protection Course
63. Military Law Code
64. Vehicular Patrol
65. Arrest and Search Techniques
66. Fire Brigade Course
67. Tactical Unit
68. Management and Group Control Psychology
69. Organization of a Staff and its Working Methods
70. Principles of Protection of the President and other Political Dignitaries
71. Course: a) Human Psychology in Riots, Disorders;
 b) Tactics and Methods Used by Rioters and Disturbers;
 c) Police Techniques to Prevent, Neutralize and Avoid Disorders and Riots and Rebellions.
72. So, You're Going to Write a Manual
73. Personal Security
74. Planning, Training and Operations Guide of the Military Counter-insurgency Force
75. Protection of Dignitaries
76. Instructor's Methods

PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH

1. Security Management Course
2. Supervisor Training Course
3. Military Police Officer Advanced Course
4. Law Enforcement Non-Commissioned Officer Advanced Course
5. Military Police Officer Orientation Course
6. Military Police Officer Basic Course
7. Criminal Investigation Supervision Course
8. Criminal Investigation Warrant Officer Advanced Course
9. Military Police Investigation
10. Law Enforcement Course
11. Revolver Marksmanship
12. Riot Control
13. Civil Disturbance Orientation Course
14. Correctional Administration Course
15. Foreign Student Orientation & Informational Objectives Course
16. Criminal Investigation Course
17. Civil Disturbance Orientation Course
18. Polygraph Examiner Refresher Course
19. Polygraph Examiner Training Course
20. Military Police Officer Advanced Course
21. Physical Security Course

ATTACHMENT I

GUIDELINE PAPERS IN FRENCH

1. Organization and Function of a Police Planning and Research Unit
2. Description of Staff Study
3. Principles of Law Enforcement
4. Protective Security
5. Patrol Procedures
6. Gendarmarie Manual
7. How to Lay Groundwork for Better Delegation of Authority
8. Better Control in Management
9. Responsibility of the Police Administrator
10. The Development and use of Inspection in Modern Police Administration
11. Principles of Organization and Administration
12. How to Establish a System of Formal Directives
13. Model Police Budget
14. Organization and Administration Guide (21 Sections)

ATTACHMENT I

TEXTS AND MANUALS IN ENGLISH

1. First Aid - Basic Course
2. Criminal Investigation - Basic Training Course
3. Brigade Mobile Basic Training
4. Protective Service
5. Personal Security
6. Systems Engineering - Instructor Training
7. Criminal Investigation - Protective Services
8. Preparing of Statements - Police Investigation
9. Conducting Interviews and interrogations - Police Investigation
10. The Instructor's Guide
11. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces
12. Air Transportation Security
13. Specialization course - Protection of Dignitaries
14. Personal Security
15. So You're Going to Write a Manual!
16. Military Police Support in the Communications Zone
17. The Organization, Mission and Functions,
U.S. Army Military Police School
18. Professional Soldiers ... Professional Police
19. Instructor's Guide for Roll Call Training
20. Police Training Ranges Manual
21. Civil Disturbance Command Posts
22. Program of Instruction: Immigration Basic Course
23. Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action
24. Riot Control
25. Civil Disturbances & Disasters
26. Military Police in Stability Operations
27. Army Correspondence Course Program
28. Administration and Training Policies
29. MPOB Student Evaluation Plan
30. Systems Engineering of Training
31. Catalog of Courses - Military Police School,
Fiscal Year 1974
32. Army Correspondence Course Program, 1973-74
33. Identification of Drug Abusers and Processing
of Drug Abusers
34. Identification and Control of Personnel and
Material.

ATTACHMENT K

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION LIBRARY PRESENTED TO GdN

1. Police Management Planning
2. Public Personnel Administration
3. Police Administration
4. Municipal Police Administration (2 copies)
5. Municipal Finance Administration
6. British Police Administration
7. Patrol Administration
8. First Line of Defense-Instructor's Film Reference
9. The Police Role in Racial Conflicts
10. Campus Unrest
11. A Manual for Direct Action
12. Crowd Control and Riot Prevention
13. Community Relations and Riot Prevention
14. Riot Control - Material and Techniques
15. Police Radio Procedure Manual (Pamphlet)
16. Crime Investigation
17. Methods of Forensic Science, Vol. I
18. Methods of Forensic Science, Vol. II
19. Methods of Forensic Science
20. Changing Concepts of Crime and its Treatment
21. Masters of Deceit
22. New Horizons in Criminology
23. Introduction to Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
24. Juvenile Delinquency
25. Delinquency and Probation in California
26. The Handling of Juveniles From Offense to Disposition, Vol. I
27. The Handling of Juveniles From Offense to Disposition, Vol. II
28. The Handling of Juveniles From Offense to Disposition, Vol. III
29. Modern Learning Theory
30. Imperial Ethiopian Police
31. Police and Their Opinions
32. Practical Police Knowledge
33. Modern Law Enforcement and Police Science
34. Police Planning
35. Police Roadblock Operations
36. Police Systems in the U.S.
37. Elements of Police Science (2 copies)
38. How to Understand Facts and Write Effective Police Reports (2 copies)


ATTACHMENT I.

39. Police Operations, Policies and Procedures
40. No Second Place Winner
41. Police
42. Guide to Modern Police Thinking
43. Principles of Law Enforcement
44. Use and Care of Revolvers (Pamphlet)
45. Small Arms Ranges
46. Cal. .30 Carbines M-1, M-1A1, M-2 and M-3
47. Combat Usefulness of Shotguns (Pamphlet)
48. NRA Illustrated Firearms Assembly Handbook
49. NRA Illustrated Firearms Assembly Handbook, Vol. 2
50. Complete Guide to Handloading (2 copies)
51. Explosives and Homemade Bombs
52. Explosives and Bomb Disposal Guide
53. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare
54. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts
55. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency an Anthology
56. "Counterinsurgency" and Research in 1970
57. Counterinsurgency: Principles and practices in Viet-Nam (Pamphlet)
58. Counterinsurgency Warfare-Theory and Practice
59. The Police and Resources Control in Counterinsurgency (3 copies)
60. Criminal Investigation
61. Modern Criminal Investigation (REvised by O'Hara)
62. Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation
63. Practical Homicide Investigation
64. Techniques for the Crime Investigator
65. Essentials in Interviewing
66. Suspect Documents, Their Scientific Examination
67. Handbook of Criminal Investigation
68. Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act (Pamphlet)
69. The Administration of Civil Justice in England and Wales
70. Supervision in the Administration of Justice
71. Penal Code - California
72. Police Power and Individual Freedom, The Quest for Balance
73. CODE Penal
74. Fingerprints and the Law (2 copies)
75. Civil Rights and the Police
76. Tarif des Droits d'Entree Congo Belge
77. Criminal Law and Society
78. Evidential Documents
79. First Aid for Emergency Crews


80. Immediate Care and Transport of the Injured
81. The "Contextual Study" Method as a Device for Studying Limited War Strategies
82. Operations Against Irregular Forces
83. The Use of War Games in Command and Control Analysis (Pamphlet)
84. U.S. Army Special Warfare School International Police Academy, 22-24 March 1965
85. U.S. Army Special Warfare School IPA 19-21 October 1964, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina
86. The Contextual Study: A Structured Approach to the Study of Political and Military Aspects of Limited War
87. Police Patrol Readings
88. The Patrol Operation
89. ROLLEI - Photography
90. Jail Management - A Course for Jail Administrators, Books 1,2,3,4,5, & 6 (2 copies each)
91. Correspondence Course for Jailers Pamphlets 1 through 10
92. The Officer Speaks in Public
93. Officer, Tell Your Story - A Guide to Police Public Relations
94. The Police and the Public (Pamphlet)
95. Community Development - A Handbook
96. The Army Equipment - Record System and Procedures
97. Statistics Essential for Police Efficiency
98. The Science of Fingerprints
99. Principles of Human Relations
100. Psychology for Law Enforcement Officers
101. Supervisory Techniques
102. Front Line Leadership
103. Elements of Police Supervision
104. How to Supervise People
105. Uniform Definitions of Motor Vehicle Accidents (2 copies)
106. Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance (2 copies)
107. Uses of Skidmarks in Traffic Cases
108. Safety in Police Pursuit Driving
109. Index of Army Motion Pictures, Film Strips, Slides and Phono-Recordings
110. The Group Process as a Helping Technique
111. Audio Visual Materials
112. Training in Business & Industry
113. How to Teach Police Subjects: Theory and Practice
114. Training Key, Volume 1
115. Training Key, Volume 2
116. Training Key, Volume 3
117. Educational Films: Writing, Directing and Producing for Classroom, Television and Industry

118. Police Training in the U.S.
119. A Forward Look in Police Education
120. Marijuana - The Second Trip
121. Narcotics - An American Plan
122. Drugs - Medical, Psychological and Social Facts
123. The Drug Scene
124. Drugs for Young People, Their Use and Misuse
125. The Drug Dilemma
126. Resource Book for Drug Abuse Education
127. Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding
128. Narcotics and Narcotic Addiction
129. Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective
(2 copies)
130. Manual D'Instruction Pour Conditte et Entretien
Des Vehicules
131. Manual Du Propriataire Jeep-Universelle Modele CJ-3B
4 Roues Motrices
132. Operation and Organizational Maintenance 1/4 ton
4x4 Truck M38A1 and 1/4 ton 4x4 Front Line Ambulance
M-170 (2 copies)
133. Operation and Organizational Maintenance 1/4 ton
4x4 Utility Truck M-38
134. Cours Pour Mecaniciens Vehicules et Moteurs
Diesel (Pamphlet)
135. Operation of Transportation Motor Pools and Driver
Preventive Maintenance of Administrative Use
136. Automotive Repair and Management Survey

**COASTAL RIVER AND LAKE GUARD (CRLG)
ORGANIZATION CHART**



**Coastal River and Lake Guard
Lake Guard Detachment
Lake Tanganyika**



-64-

ATTACHMENT N.

*In Zaïre, as in Europe, it is customary to place the secretary in the organization chart.

PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING

FY 1964-1974

(\$000)

	Prior Years	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	TOTALS
Technicians	616	229	205	275	342	395	295	2,357
Participants	173	65	74	82	115	125	137	771
Commodities	1,966	84	80	186	125	101	-0-	2,542
Other Costs*	74	-0-	21	21	70	32	25	243
FY TOTALS	2,829	378	380	564	652	653	457	5,913

*Other costs include locally hired foreign nationals and portions of U.S. technicians support such as travel expenses and housing.

ATTACHMENT O

COMMODITY PROFILE - PUBLIC SAFETY ZAIRE

(\$000)

	<u>Prior Years</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
1. Transportation	1,150	60	42	63	54	47	1,416
2. Communications	442	1	21	77	25	19	585
3. Weapons (includes non-toxic crowd control supplies and protective equipment)	176	1	8	17	16	29	247
4. Training and Other General Police Type Supplies & Equipment	165	4	9	5	7	15	205
FY TOTALS	1,933	66	80	162	102	110	2,453

-66-

ATTACHMENT P

U.S. FUNDED PARTICIPANTS AT IPA

	<u>GdN</u>	<u>CRLG</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Crowd Control	17	0	17
Telecom	26	1	27
Instructor Methods	84	0	84
Patrol Operations	2	0	2
Traffic Control	2	0	2
Executive Training	17	3	20
Investigations	13	0	13
Reloading	2	0	2
Narcotics Management	1	0	1
Senior Officers	1	0	1
Telecom. Management	0	1	1
Border Customs	1	2	3
Maritime Law Enforcement	0	4	4
	166	11	177