



**TERMINATION  
PHASE-OUT  
STUDY  
PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT  
PHILIPPINES**

**MAY 1974**

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523**



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER</u>		<u>page</u>
I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	Summary.....	3
III.	Internal Security Situation.....	5
IV.	Security Forces.....	7
	A. Philippine Constabulary.....	7
	B. National Bureau of Investigation .....	8
	C. PC Metrocom.....	8
	D. Local Police Forces.....	10
	E. National Police Commission.....	11
	1. Police Training.....	14
	2. Police Improvement.....	18
	3. Communications.....	24
	4. Records.....	34
	a. Crime Statistics.....	35
	b. Police Selection.....	37
	c. Salary Subsidy.....	38
	d. Administrative Information.....	39
	e. Research and Planning.....	40
	f. Other Activities.....	41

5.	Narcotics Enforcement.....	42
	Situation.....	42
	Enforcement Agencies .....	43
	1. Constabulary .....	44
	2. National Bureau of Investigation .....	47
	3. Anti-Smuggling Action Center.....	48
	4. Local Police Teams .....	50
	Public Safety Narcotics Project.....	51
	1. Training.....	52
	a. In-Country .....	52
	b. U.S. Training.....	54
	2. Commodity Support.....	54
	3. Technical Assistance.....	55
	4. Funding.....	55
V.	The Public Safety Project.....	56
	A. Description .....	56
	1. History.....	56
	2. Objectives and Goals .....	58
	3. Resources .....	59
	a. Technicians .....	59
	b. Commodities .....	60

1

c. Participants..... 61

d. Contract Services..... 61

e. Host Country Contributions ..... 62

B. Observations and Conclusions..... 64

Recommendations..... 68

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

	<u>page</u>
A. Persons Contacted.....	71
B. Manila Crime Statistics .....	74
C. Proposed Metropolitan Police District.....	75
D. National Police Commission Organization .....	76
E. Map Showing Regional Academies Locations .....	77
F. Areas and Personnel Served by Regional Academies....	78
G. Training Academy Commodities.....	79
H. Basic Police Course Curriculum .....	80
I. Personnel Trained by Regions.....	84
J. Special Training Courses Completed.....	85
K. Resident Advisor Assignments .....	86
L. Police Improvement Sub-project Agreement.....	87
M. Sampling of LECS Radio Traffic.....	89
N. Transceivers Procured Through Trust Fund.....	90
O. Trust Fund Balances.....	91
P. CED Organization .....	93
Q. LECS Counterpart Funding .....	94
R. LECS Implementation Procedure .....	96

S.	LECS Locations.....	100
T.	Police Improvement Communications.....	102
U.	Narcotics Communications.....	103
V.	ASAC Seizures.....	106
W.	Narcotics Teams Operational.....	107
X.	Narcotics Teams Planned FY 74.....	108
Y.	Narcotics Teams Arrests and Seizures.....	109
Z.	Narcotics Training Course Content.....	113
AA.	Public Safety Advisor Assignments.....	118
BB.	Participant Training.....	119
CC.	Public Safety Project Funding Table.....	121
DD.	Local Government Funding.....	122

ABBREVIATIONS USED

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AID	Agency for International Development
ASAC	Anti-Smuggling Action Center
CANU	Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
CED	Communications & Electronics Department
DDB	Dangerous Drugs Board
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
GOP	Government of the Philippines
IPA	International Police Academy
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
LECS	Law Enforcement Communications System
MAP	Military Assistance Program
NAPOLCOM	National Police Commission
NBI	National Bureau of Investigation
NISO	U.S. Naval Investigative Service
NPA	New People's Army
OPS	Office of Public Safety
OSI	Office of Special Investigation (USAF)
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PSD	Public Safety Division
RASAC	Regional ASAC
USAID	AID Mission to the Philippines
USG	U.S. Government

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. Terms of Reference

U.S. Public Safety assistance has been provided to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of its civil police forces. At the project's initiation and during its progress mutually agreed objectives and courses of action were established and at times adjusted to achieve the overall goals as well as to accommodate changing situations in the country. Both host government and U.S. resources were programmed and employed to jointly strive toward these goals.

Due to U.S. congressional action, the continued input of U.S. Government resources planned for this project must be terminated sooner than planned and prior to the achievement of the goals and objectives which were mutually established by the two governments.

It is therefore the purpose of this report to note the progress made thus far and to enumerate what remains to be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals. The report also includes recommended actions which the Government of the Republic might take, employing their own resources, but under the circumstances excluding in-country assistance by the U.S.

#### B. Conduct of the Study

The Evaluation Team consisted of:

Jeter L. Williamson	-	OPS/W
Paul Katz	-	OPS/W

After reviewing pertinent documents in AID/W the team arrived in Manila on April 19, 1974, and remained until May 9, 1974, for on-site visits and discussions. Discussions

were held with both GOP and USG officials concerned with the Public Safety Project. A list of persons contacted is shown in Attachment A.

Visits were made to project activities in Manila, Angeles and Davao. All persons contacted were extremely helpful in the discussions.

## CHAPTER II

### SUMMARY

#### A. Internal Security Situation

Although faced with dissident activity in some areas, the major civil police concern is with normal criminal activity. Imposition of martial law on September 21, 1972, resulted in an abrupt halt to a rising crime rate, particularly in crimes of violence. This was due partially to the picking up or surrendering of over one half million loose firearms.

As the economy continues to expand, prices of basic commodities rise and wage scales remain static, crimes against property can be expected to escalate accordingly.

#### B. Observations and Conclusions

The comparatively minimal input of U.S. resources has been effectively used in working toward achievement of mutually developed project goals. The Government of the Philippines has set internal peace and order as a priority and has given support to its law enforcement agencies accordingly.

Through support to the National Police Commission, major accomplishments have been possible in the upgrading of local police departments. Given the awareness of the NAPOLCOM of the problems and their demonstrated capability to develop and implement solutions the police service can be reasonably expected to continue improving proportionate to government support.

It is not certain exactly where the creation of a National Police Force stands or what form it will eventually take. One can only hope that whatever the final decision it will have undergone serious in-depth consideration of all possible factors and that the police will remain predominantly civilian in structure and be oriented toward serving the civilian population.

C. Recommendations

Current directions in which police service improvement is moving are such that no recommendations are in order for any major changes. Recommendations made in Section VI for the most part are directed at continued emphasis on supporting on-going efforts aimed at building an effective and efficient civil police service.

## CHAPTER III

### INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION

Subsequent to the declaration of martial law on Sept. 21, 1972, the internal security situation in the Republic underwent a marked change. Prior to this time, principal threats came in the form of urban and student unrest manifested by demonstrations against the government. Student activism was serious and led to the destruction of property and physical injury to a large number of persons.

This type of activity abruptly ceased under martial law. Principal problem areas are now in Northern Luzon where the New Peoples Army, a Maoist oriented group, was initially most active. Currently, their activities are at low ebb due to several positive government programs designed to neutralize their functioning. Elements of the NPA are reported to have also migrated from Northern Luzon to the Bicol Region, where isolated incidence and recruitment attempts have been reported. The most widespread internal security problem currently facing the Republic concerns dissident activity in the Mindanao Region and the Sulu Archipelago. Although many of the incidents currently taking place are attributed to ethnic, political, and religious differences, some of the activities are more criminal in nature. The so-called Muslim dissidence is not new however. Most serious problems have been reported in the Jolo, Basilan, Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur province areas. The City of Jolo was recently 90% destroyed by fire as a result of dissident action.

Other minor factions now exist, however, their activities are at a minimum.

Since martial law, reported crimes against persons in the Manila area are about half of the former level. Much of this is attributed to the large scale roundup of loose firearms. An incredible 570,000 plus units were confiscated or voluntarily surrendered. Removal of this quantity of weapons has to affect the rate of crimes of violence.

With a creeping rate of inflation crimes against property in the urban areas is on the upswing, currently reported at about 75% or more of the pre-martial law level; the Manila area figures reflect a 14% decrease (Attachment B).

References to 'martial law' deserve comment and observations. While it is true in a strictly legal sense that by Presidential Order Martial Law is in effect, it is not the situation that the term usually brings to mind. Civilian police forces continue to provide police services, public confidence in them is greatly improved, criminal charges are processed through a civilian-oriented criminal justice system, foreign tourists overcrowd transportation and hotel facilities, rarely does one see a military presence, and then usually in the form of a single or perhaps two constabulary soldiers.

What one observes is a far cry from the mental image one would get reading of 'martial law' from afar.

## CHAPTER IV

### SECURITY FORCES

Various elements which make up the police/security forces of the Republic of the Philippines have been sufficiently described in detail in previous documents and a repetition would serve no useful purpose in this report. A brief description will be given instead merely to set the stage for further discussion on the AID participation in upgrading the Republic's internal security posture.

There are three major elements which provide in varying degrees police services to the people of the Republic:

#### A. Philippine Constabulary (PC)

With a history dating back to 1901, this paramilitary organization is a regularly constituted branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with a total strength of approximately 27,000. It is organized along strictly military lines and for purposes of administration, divided into four geographic PC zones, each under the command of a general officer PC Zone Commander.

Not only the organization, but its personnel, training and equipment are traditionally military. This military character has been equally recognized by both the GOP and USG for purposes of US military assistance. Personnel, both officer and enlisted, are recruited and trained through the AFP and assignments are subject to transfer to and from other branches of the AFP.

Conditions in certain areas of the Republic which are faced with dissident or insurgent activity require the services of an organization such as the PC and it is a necessary element of the internal security forces, but its primary role is more accurately described as light infantry than civil police.

It does perform some civil police functions such as a highway patrol, some investigations of crime and patrol of rural areas not otherwise covered by local civil police forces. But reference to the PC as a national police force is not entirely accurate.

B. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

The NBI is exactly what its name implies, a nation-wide investigative branch of the Department of Justice. Its approximately 350 sworn agents are supported by a staff of something like 1000 technical and clerical personnel.

In addition to its own investigations, it has over the years provided technical support services to local police forces. It operates an excellently equipped and competently staffed laboratory capable of conducting all types of forensic examinations. Over the years, it has attempted to establish and operate a nation-wide criminal records and identification system. This effort, although extremely important to the police service, has been less than successful due to a lack of interest and cooperation on the part of local police forces.

Until assumption of nation-wide training responsibility by the NAPOLCOM, the NBI provided what was perhaps the only professional level training available to local police forces. This was done through its National Academy in Manila and mobile training teams responding to individual city or municipality requests. While admittedly a small effort in view of the totality of untrained police personnel, it was a step in the right direction and successful so far as it went.

C. PC-METROCOM

The PC-Metropolitan Command (Metrocom) was created pursuant to an Executive Order of the President on July 14, 1967 to complement and

supplement police forces within the greater Manila area in their campaign against all forms of criminality.

METROCOM is a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Constabulary and is considered on the same level of a constabulary zone command. The strength of the unit is currently estimated at 2,000 men.

On August 20, 1968 a memorandum of agreement between the Commanding General, METROCOM, and the chiefs of police of the Manila metropolitan area established and defined the relationship between METROCOM and the police agencies concerning mutual cooperation. This memorandum establishes the principle that:

1. It is a general rule that law enforcement is the primary responsibility of city and municipal police departments within their respective jurisdictions;
2. The PC-Metropolitan Command shall be an augmentation force which will assist or supplement the local police forces in the maintenance of peace and order within the metropolitan area; and
3. The chiefs of police of the city/municipality to which patrol elements of the PC-Metropolitan Command are attached shall have command, control and direction of such patrol elements.

Prior to the declaration of martial law, this arrangement was generally successful. The assignment of significant numbers of Metrocom personnel to other tasks, however, caused the dilution of manpower and transport capability which were available to respond to police requirements for assistance. Generally speaking, its patrol role in the metropolitan area received low priority. Units seem to prefer a static posture in keeping with its military orientation.

With the advent of martial law, the visability of METROCOM dramatically increased. They played a key role in the implementation of martial law procedures in the metropolitan area. In the performance of their duties they cross political subdivision boundaries without problem since their jurisdiction is throughout a metropolitan area comprised of 4 chartered cities and 13 municipalities stretching from Valenzuela in Bulacan to Cavite City.

Upon instruction of the President in November 1972, an Inter-Agency Committee on Metropolitan Manila, chaired by Dean Carlos Ramos of the University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, developed a plan which among other things called for the forming of a Metropolitan Police Department encompassing the 4 cities and 13 municipalities making up the greater Manila area (Attachment C). Subsequently, the President decreed that there will be a National Police Force. The creation of the Metropolitan Manila Police under the national police concept was ordered with the METROCOM designated to be its nucleus and the Commanding General to be the Chief of the Metropolitan Manila Police Force. Initially, for a period not to exceed 2 years, the administrative control of the concerned departments will remain with the individual municipal and city governments. Full operational and administrative control will then pass to the Manila Metropolitan Police Command.

D. Local Police Forces

Every city and municipality throughout the Republic maintains its own independent police department. There are currently 64 chartered cities and 1,447 municipalities with such forces estimated at a 37,000-man total. These will range in size from the 3,100-man Manila Police Department to forces of only a few, with the greater percentage of such forces numbering 20 or fewer men.

These are the forces which provide the bulk of the Republic's police services. As late as 1969, 66% of these men had received no police training whatsoever. The remaining 34% had received some training, in most instances a maximum of two weeks. Correcting this condition was a major objective of the USAID Public Safety/National Police Commission Project.

From the mix and organizational character of these forces, it is obvious that any police assistance effort could not involve itself with all police forces throughout the Republic. Some 1500 forces from a like number of political subdivisions makes this too apparent to warrant discussion.

This same division of authority has historically created problems and situations long recognized by the Government of the Philippines. There was no uniformity of standards for employment, salary ranges at great variance and standards of performance even more so. Lack of coordination and cooperation between agencies worked only to the advantage of the criminal element.

The Police Act of 1966 attempted to overcome some of these conditions through creation of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). For the period under review, FY 1969-1973, this agency has been the principal counterpart agency of the USAID Public Safety Project. All projects and sub-projects have been planned and implemented jointly through the NAPOLCOM.

E. National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)

The National Police Commission was created in 1966 as a result of the passage of a law known as the Police Act of 1966. Its objectives were to improve the organization, administration and operation of local police agencies. The Police Act of 1966 provided for the creation, within the Office of the President, of a Police

Commission consisting of a Chairman and three Commissioners. It has several powers and duties, the principal ones follow:

1. To advise the President on all matters concerning police.
2. Examine and audit, on a continuing basis, all aspects of local police agencies throughout the country.
3. To organize and develop police training programs and to operate police training academies.
4. Establish a system of uniform crime reports.
5. Establish minimum standards of equipment and uniform departmental organization.
6. Conduct entrance and promotional examinations.
7. Budget and disburse subsidy funds to qualifying police departments.

From its creation until 1973, at no time were all three Commissioner positions filled. At that time, the number was increased to five and all were filled. Current membership of the Commission is:

1. Chairman Juan Ponce Enrile, Secretary of National Defense;
2. Carmelo Agbayani, Colonel, PC, concurrently advisor to the President on Military Affairs;
3. Brig. Gen Fidel Ramos, Commanding General, PC;
4. Jolly R. Bugarin, Colonel, PC, retired, Director NBI;
5. Alejo Cuntapay, Colonel AFP, retired.

The permanent staff consists of 127 professional positions organized into four major services and 4 major services and 4 major operational branches each headed by an Assistant Commissioner. Services are: Planning; Financial & Management; Personnel; and, Administrative; Branches are: Communications; Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence; Legal Affairs; and, Police Training. The further breakdown of these services and branches is shown in Attachment D.

The majority of these positions are filled by lawyers and retired military personnel with an almost complete absence of civil police expertise. As far as the team was able to determine, only two staff members have had any extensive civil police experience. A better balance of background and experience between civil and military expertise would seem in the best interest of the formulation of policy and operational procedures for the civil police forces of the Republic.

On balance, however, actions taken by the Commission in discharging its assigned duties have been successful. It has succeeded in developing standards for the selection, appointment and promotion of police personnel. It has planned and implemented nine regional training centers offering basic training to all local police forces, developed a capability as a repository collator and distributor of crime statistics for the Republic, and made impressive strides in implementing the subsidy provisions of its responsibility.

Public Safety assistance has been involved in these activities, which are in four major categories: Training; Police Improvement; Communications; and, Records. Each of these is described in the following portion of this report.

## 1. Police Training

### a. Objective

To assist in developing and implementing a uniform and comprehensive nation-wide police training program to contribute to increasing the police capability to enforce the law and maintain public order.

At the project's inception in Fiscal Year 1969, 66% of the police force had not received any type of training while 34% had received some training, but only on an ad-hoc basis, using borrowed facilities, and consisting of maximum course lengths of two weeks.

The program for correcting this situation and meeting the training objective was designed to provide or assist in developing the essentials necessary to support the Police Commission in centralizing control and administration of an intelligently conceived and professionally administered series of training courses. The basic requisites were physical plants (academies) for training, standardized programs of instruction, supporting manuals and aids, selected training commodities, and adequate local training staffs. The physical plants were planned for construction at each police improvement city so that the academies could fill the training needs of the cities and the cities could serve as on-the-job training sites for trainees at the academies. Under this concept, 9 regional police training (Attachments E and F) academies and one provincial training center (Rizal Province) were constructed. They are as follows:

#### (1) Central Luzon Region

Located at Fort Bonifacio, Rizal Province, the academy services thirteen provinces plus fourteen cities with a total police strength of 11,384. The capacity of the academy when it was first opened in December 1968 was 100, but because of its location in a high police population area and its use as the site for specialized training courses for police from throughout the Republic, it has been expanded until it now can accommodate 600 trainees at a time. To date, it has trained

5,845 Basic Police Science trainees (3-month course) and 6,146 trainees in specialized courses of various types and lengths. At inception, the academy was provided the standard commodity package of training equipment and materials valued at \$14,070 and since (FY 1973) has been provided additional commodities consisting of laboratory equipment to outfit a training laboratory, public address equipment, and additional audio-visual equipment to the sum of \$9,400. The standard package of commodity support to each academy is shown in Attachment G.

(2) Central Visayan Region

Located at Cebu City, Cebu Province, the academy services three provinces with a total police strength of 2116. The academy, with a capacity of 200, has since it opened in January 1969, trained 1,793 Basic Police Science trainees. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(3) Northern Mindanao Region

Located at Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental Province, the academy services fourteen provinces with a total police strength of 3,143. The academy, with a capacity of 140, has trained 1,470 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in January 1969. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(4) Eastern Visayan Region

Located at Tacloban City, Leyte Province, the academy services five provinces and Camotes Island with a total strength of 1,676. The academy, with a capacity of 100, has trained 1,099 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in August 1969. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(5) Western Visayas Region

Located at Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Province, the academy services seven provinces with a total police strength of 3,658. The academy, with a

capacity of 160, has trained 1,780 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in December 1969. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(6) Bicol Region

Located at Legazpi City, Albay Province, the academy services six provinces and selected municipalities from Northern Samar, the remainder of which are served by the Eastern Visayas Regional Academy at Tacloban. The total police strength of the area served is 1,585. The academy, with a capacity of 100, has trained 1,365 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in January 1970. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(7) Northern Luzon Region

Located at Bauio City, Benguet Province, the academy services sixteen provinces with a total police strength of 4,648. The academy, with a capacity of 110, has trained 1,459 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in December, 1970. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(8) Western Mindanao Region

Located at Zamboanga City, the academy services seven provinces and two cities with a total police strength of 1,701. The academy, with a capacity of 100, has trained 622 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in December 1970. It should be noted that due to insecure conditions in the area, the academy was closed at the middle of FY 1973 and not reopened till the middle of FY 1974. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

(9) Southern Mindanao Region

Located at Davao City, the academy services three provinces and Davao City with a total police strength of 1,332. The academy, with a capacity of 200, has trained 390 Basic Police Science trainees since it opened in April 1973. It has been provided the standard commodity package.

Permanent staffs at each of these are NAPOLCOM personnel, instructors for the most part are guest lecturers drawn from persons available in the area. All financial support to the academies, including subsistence of the trainees, is NAPOLCOM provided. Through September 30, 1973, the GOP funded costs for this training has run a total of ₱ 13,545,172 (\$2,052,299).

b. Rizal Police Training Center

Although not a NAPOLCOM regional center per se, this facility serves the same purpose and functions in exactly the same manner with some differences which will be described. Located in Marikina Municipality, Rizal Province, it receives no budget support from the NAPOLCOM. Instead, it is supported by the budget of the Governor of Rizal Province who wanted to accelerate and expand on the training of the approximately 2,800 policemen in that province.

There is no permanent staff assigned, all are part-time on detail from other agencies and instructors are all guest lecturers. Given the number of agencies in the immediate area, the selection is excellent.

Its capacity was recently expanded to 85 since moving to new quarters in 1971. Since its beginning in May 1968, it has graduated 16 classes with a total of 1,076 having completed the basic course.

The team was informed that an additional Regional Academy was planned to be located in Isabela Province to serve Northeastern Luzon. This is planned to get underway by mid summer 1974.

The major activity at each of these academies is to give basic training to all police personnel throughout the Republic. The basic course is a well designed 12 weeks curriculum involving 648 hours of supervised activity. A full description of the course is shown in Attachment H.

To date, a total of 15,823 policemen have completed the basic course. This represents approximately 49.6% of those to be so trained. In addition to this basic course, other specialized training of varying lengths and in a variety of subjects are held as time and space permit.

Attachment I shows the geographical distribution of those trained to date; Attachment J lists the special courses completed to date.

c. Public Safety Assistance

Public Safety Advisors have been assigned in varying numbers to this sub-project from 1969 through FY 73. Several of these were resident in the areas (Attachment K) where they served as advisors to both the Police Improvement and Training sub-projects.

The Chief Training Officers at each of the academies has received U.S. training as a USAID/Public Safety participant. Two received this training prior to the FY 1969 beginning of the sub-project, seven have been so trained since then.

Commodity assistance has been provided during the life of the sub-project as reflected below:

<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
42,000	78,000	78,000	33,400	9,000	\$240,400

2. Police Improvement

This sub-project, which was begun in FY 69, was designed to assist in the development of selected police departments to serve as models to other departments. In order to maximize this utilization, the cities selected were those contiguous to the Regional Training Centers whereby the trainees do on-the-job training and observation in the model city police.

Eight cities were thus chosen:

- |                   |              |
|-------------------|--------------|
| 1. Cagayan de Oro | 5. Cebu      |
| 2. Bacolod        | 6. Baguio    |
| 3. Legazpi        | 7. Zamboanga |
| 4. Tacloban       | 8. Davao     |

The first step was a comprehensive in-depth survey of each of these 8 departments by joint NAPOLCOM/PSD study team. As a result of these studies, recommendations were developed for improvement in areas of: organization and management; records and identification; traffic management; criminal investigation; patrol operations; and logistics.

These recommendations were then presented by the joint team to the Mayor, City Council and Chief of Police in every city concerned. If, after review and study, the local officials concurred in the recommendations and agreed to work toward their implementation a sub-project agreement was signed with recommendations implementation as project goals. Such was the case in all eight cities. A sample of the standard form used in each is shown in Attachment L.

a. Progress

These sub-projects were in the main begun and terminated in accordance with the originally set time frames. There were the normally to be expected time slippages caused by training dates, construction, arrival of equipment, etc., but these did not adversely affect the successful completion to any great degree. Two possible exceptions to this general condition are Zamboanga and Davao where due to late starting dates, the FY 1973 termination date was not completely realistic.

It should be noted, however, that despite this handicap both these cities have, as of the team's visit, progressed to a satisfactory level, particularly in Davao due largely to enthusiasm and efforts of local officials. Zamboanga was temporarily slowed due to the absence of a permanent chief of police, but it too has now reached a satisfactory level, albeit some months after formal termination of the project.

Scheduled initiation and termination dates by city are shown below:

<u>City</u>	<u>Initiation (FY)</u>	<u>Termination (FY)</u>
Bacolod	1969	1972
Cagayan de Oro	1969	1972
Baguio	1970	1973
Legazpi	1970	1973
Tacloban	1970	1973
Cebu	1970	1973
Zamboanga	1971	1973
Davao	1972	1973

During the entire implementation phase of this sub-project, individual city progress was subjected to continued advice, assistance and monitoring by Public Safety advisors and NAPOLCOM officers. At varying times during the program, PS advisors were assigned tin residence in some of the cities as shown in Attachment K.

Progress was from good to excellent with only one exception, Cebu City, where non-compliance with terms of the agreement resulted in the project being terminated in March, 1972, and programmed commodity assistance reprogrammed to other projects.

Samplings of comments from the chiefs of police, mayors and other city officials and the general public all indicated a noticeable degree of improvement in police effectiveness and public confidence.

b. U.S. Assistance

U.S. assistance has consisted of technical advice, training and commodity support. In the areas of technical advice and participant training, it is impractical to attempt a costing figure for this sub-project per se.

Advisors were assigned more than one responsibility cutting across all four of the sub-projects and to calculate the percentage of time spent on each, when they are so closely interrelated, serves no real purpose.

The same is true of participants programmed for U.S. training. Usually a PIO/P included participants from two or more sub-projects reflecting a total cost and breaking out individual pro-rata shares again would serve no useful purpose. There were a total of 12 officers so trained from the various sub-project cities.

Commodities, however, were more clearly identified for each sub-project. Over the life of the Police Improvement Sub-project, the following funds were obligated for this purpose:

FY 1969	\$ 37,200
FY 1970	202,400
FY 1971	195,600
FY 1972	64,700
FY 1973	17,600
TOTAL	<u>\$ 517,500</u>

Commodity support consisted of a general mix of civil police equipment such as vehicles, communications, investigative aids, office equipment, personal gear and training supplies. Quantities of each were apportioned to individual cities according to needs of the sub-project.

c. Evaluation

Aside from the continuing monitoring of progress during implementation, a final overall review was conducted of each city at termination of the sub-project. Results of these are shown in the following:

Bacolod City

Of the 82 recommendations for improvement, a December 1972 review showed 45 to have been fully implemented. Of the remainder, all were either partially implemented or had been tried and found to be inappropriate for local needs. Project objectives have been met.

### Baguio City

This city responded outstandingly to the task of implementing the survey recommendations. Of 169 recommendations for improvement, a review in April 1973 showed 130 to have been fully implemented. Of the remaining 30, several were partially implemented as far as conditions would permit or were impractical. Project objectives have been met.

### Cebu City

Of the 151 recommendations for improvement, a February, 1973 review showed 71 to have been fully implemented, the majority of which were those which did not have a major impact on improvement of the department. Project activities were not considered to have been met. This project had been terminated a year prior for non-compliance with terms of the agreement.

### Legazpi City

Of the 127 recommendations, 80 were found to have been fully implemented in a January, 1973 review. Of the remainder, partial implementation consistent within available assets or needs was accomplished. Some were outside the ability or authority. Project goals are considered to have been met.

### Tacloban City

Of the 160 recommendations, a review in February, 1973 showed 87 to have been fully implemented, 61 partially implemented depending upon need and available assets. Of those remaining, some were outside police control or required legislative action. Project goals are considered to have been met.

### Zamboanga City

Of the 232 recommendations, 201 were found to have been fully implemented and 4 partially implemented in an April, 1974 review. Of the 27 remaining, many required legislative changes.

Even so, officials expressed a continuing interest in working toward their eventual implementation. This represents an exceptional effort and project goals are considered to have been met.

#### Davao City

Of the 216 recommendations, a review in April, 1974 showed 199 to have been implemented, 16 in various stages of implementation. This is an excellent showing and project goals are considered to have been met.

#### Cagayan de Oro City

There were a total of 103 recommendations presented. An April, 1974 review showed that of this number 97 had been fully implemented, 5 partially so and only 1 on which there had been no action. Project goals are considered to have been met.

In addition to the eight cities described under the Police Improvement Sub-project, an ad-hoc activity was undertaken in FY 72 to work with local officials in upgrading the police departments in the cities of Angeles and Olongapo. These localities have special problems due to their proximity to the U.S. military bases of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. This is particularly true in Angeles City where an estimated 7,000 U.S. military and dependents live in off-bases housing.

The Olongapo activity was limited to police communications for city procured vehicles while that in Angeles was somewhat broader. Through acquisition of excess property vehicles and USAID procured communications equipment, the patrol and traffic activities were expanded. Part-time technical assistance was provided by a Manila based Public Safety Advisor who assisted in departmental reorganization and the conduct of a series of in-service training courses for department personnel.

### 3. Communications

#### Background

In the early phases of the Public Safety program little emphasis was placed by the U.S. and the GOP on the overall improvement of law enforcement communications capabilities. This is highlighted when we compare the \$40,000 allocated for telecommunications equipment during the period of 1957 to 1966 and the \$1,400,000 expended by USAID during 1967 to 1974.

Telecommunications assistance prior to 1966 was directed towards assisting the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), establish an inter-provincial network tying the NBI headquarters in Manila with their 19 regional and sub-regional offices. Twenty (20) High Frequency Single Sideband (HP/SSB) transceivers were provided by USAID in 1957 for this purpose and are still in operation today. In addition, 9 UHF/FM transceivers were provided to connect the NBI and several city and municipality law enforcement agencies within the greater Manila area.

An in-depth study of the GOP law enforcement agencies, NBI, Philippine Constabulary (PC), and the Bureau of Customs as well as many city and municipal police departments was conducted the latter part of 1966. This study, forwarded to USAID in 1967, identified law enforcement communications problems throughout the Philippines and outlined recommendations to resolve them. The problems identified at that time were:

- a. The lack of a reliable country-wide point-to-point law enforcement telecommunications system;
- b. The operation of separate and duplicate telecommunications systems by the NBI, PC, and Bureau of Customs, all of which provided marginal service;
- c. The lack of adequate police communications in the large cities; and

- d. The lack of any form of communications in the majority of the municipalities.

It was recommended that a Public Safety telecommunications advisor be assigned to assist the Police Commission (PolCom) accomplish the following:

- a. Establish a single integrated country-wide law enforcement communications system (LECS).
- b. Integrate to the extent necessary the communications systems, personnel and equipment of all national, city and municipal law enforcement agencies to accomplish this objective.
- c. Improve liaison and information exchange between civil and national law enforcement agencies.
- d. Establish a single nationwide law enforcement teletype network.
- e. Provide to each of the city and municipality law enforcement organization VHF/FM portable transceivers.
- f. Provide the PC and NBI with compatible VHF/FM portable transceivers.
- g. Establish a country-wide Law Enforcement Communications Organization.
- h. Establish provincial maintenance and training facilities and train technical and operational personnel.

A Public Safety telecommunications advisor was assigned to USAID/Philippines in September 1967. From 1967 to 1969, the advisor and his POLCOM counterpart expended considerable effort to integrate existing law enforcement telecommunications systems and form a single Law Enforcement Communications Organization. A committee was formed for this purpose at the direction of the Secretary of Defense and included the telecom advisor and POLCOM representative. A comprehensive report and implementation plan was compiled by the committee and forwarded to the Office of the President for review and action. It is understood that although the integration concept was endorsed by the committee and the Office of the President, it was never implemented. This can be attributed to the reluctance on the part of many senior GOP officials to relinquish positive control over their own separate telecommunications facilities, personnel, and equipment.

The NBI, PC, and Bureau of Customs continued to operate independent and parallel telecommunications systems connecting their headquarters in Manila with their subordinate offices in most provincial capitals. Thus, to prevent duplication of equipment, facilities, and personnel USAID concentrated its support through the Police Commission to cities and municipalities where communications capabilities were virtually non-existent.

In early 1968, the US and GOP placed emphasis on obtaining improved communications in the cities and municipalities throughout the country. USAID initially allocated \$36,000 for the "Rizal Pilot Project," which provided seven municipal law enforcement agencies located in the greater Manila area with basic mobile and portable radio communications equipment. An additional \$292,000 allocated for the purchase of 732 VHF/FM portable transceivers started the Provincial Law Enforcement Communications System project on its way.

Prior to the establishment of the first Provincial LECS (Negros Occidental in March of 1969) intra-provincial communications capabilities were in the most part non-existent.

In the few instances where commercial telephone facilities were available, they were found to be unreliable and in most cases inoperative. Consequently, urgent messages were handcarried between municipalities, almost invariably arriving too late to be useful. It was not uncommon to hear of serious incidents several days after the fact. Municipalities which have received radio transceivers through the Provincial LECS program no longer experience this problem.

Provincial LECS are basic radio networks in which a transceiver is placed in each municipality and city. A coordinating center is established in close proximity to the office of the provincial governor. A mobile radio is also installed in the provincial governor's official vehicle and can in an emergency be utilized as a mobile coordinating center.

During severe flooding in Central Luzon in 1972, the "LECS" remained the sole means of communications between isolated municipalities. Hundreds of messages were transmitted daily, reporting flood situations, coordinating the activities of relief teams, arranging medical evacuation flights, etc. In 1973, severe flooding of several provinces took place. The Governor of the Province of Capiz stated that the LECS functioned throughout this critical period, was responsible for saving many lives and was the principal means of coordinating GOP and US disaster relief activities during and after the flooding. Although the LECS was primarily intended to service law enforcement agencies, it has developed into an administrative tool of the local governments. For the first time in the history of many provinces, official communications are handled with dispatch between the provincial capital and remote municipalities. Provincial engineers, health teams, fiscals and municipal mayors do not hesitate to conduct official communications through the "LECS." Several provincial governors interviewed have stated they could no longer administer the needs of their provinces without this direct communications. This is reflected by a traffic study which shows that of the average number of radio messages passed over the Provincial LECS

system, 79% was for administrative purposes (public health, social welfare, community development), 17% were for public service (fire, medical, road reports) and less than 4% were for police activities (Attachment M).

The improved provincial communication capabilities have resulted in significant recognition both from the US and the GOP. Many municipal and provincial governments recognized the requirement for more than the "bare bones" equipment support provided by USAID, and have purchased with their own funds additional communications equipment, extending the LECS in some cases to the barrio level. This equipment has been purchased through a USAID U.S. Dollar Trust Fund Agreement. USAID has purchased and is processing more than ₱1,423,232 (\$221,539) worth of communications equipment through this type agreement. Attachments N and O reflect trust fund activity.

#### Trust Fund

A US Dollar Trust Fund was established within USAID as a means wherein local governments participating in the LECS project could purchase additional equipment and spare parts from the United States utilizing local currency. The trust fund is processed in the following manner:

1. Requirements for equipment and/or spare parts are determined by the local government. Advisory assistance from USAID and NAPOLCOM is provided.
2. Purchaser is advised of landed Manila cost.
3. Trust Fund Agreement signed.
4. Peso check is forwarded to USAID.
5. Purchase order is issued by USAID to manufacturer.
6. Items are shipped to USAID wherein they are released to the purchaser.

Additionally, GOP funds were provided in support of the LECS. A listing of these by location is shown in Attachment P.

### Counterpart Activities

The GOP in creating POLCOM in 1966 included a Communication and Electronics Department (CED). This department was headed by an Assistant Commissioner who was also assigned the counterpart responsibilities to the Public Safety telecom advisor.

In 1967, the POLCOM CED personnel were responsible for the installation and maintenance of the Metropol radio network connecting the cities and municipalities within the greater Manila area. In early 1968, they were responsible for the successful implementation of the Rizal Pilot Project. At that time, the total CED authorized strength was seven men.

In 1970, to provide the increased technical support and supervision to the expanding Provincial LECS project, the POLCOM CED staff was increased to 23 positions.

In December 1973, the Police Commission was reorganized and designated the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), at which time the CED became a Communications Branch with 48 positions authorized (Attachment P). Many of these positions are vacant because of low salaries. The chief of the Communications Branch continues to hold an Assistant Commissioner rank and reports directly to the NAPOLCOM Chairman.

The NAPOLCOM Communications Branch budget for FY 68 through FY 74 was approximately \$95,000. This figure represents the salaries, per diem, and travel and does not include any physical facilities.

### Storage of USAID Funded Commodities

Problems were experienced with the NAPOLCOM retaining USAID funded transceivers in their warehouse until the project site was ready to absorb these units. Because of pressures brought to bear by NAPOLCOM officials and other

national governmental entities, a number of transceiver units were diverted to uses for which they were not intended. These units were ultimately recovered and installed in the LECS project, however, it was a lengthy process.

To avoid repetition of this problem, USAID has for several years retained the communications equipment in the USAID warehouse until the project site was ready to absorb these items. Equipment was released by USAID directly to the LECS provincial accountability officer.

The above problems were not experienced in storing the communications equipment at NAPOLCOM warehouse once the equipment was signed for by the provincial accountability officer and become the property of the province.

#### National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

In 1969, USAID provided the NBI 35 VHF/FM portable transceivers to support their field operations. This equipment was identical to that provided under the Provincial LECS and police improvement project. These units greatly assisted the NBI in their field operation and was considered instrumental in their largest narcotic seizure of some P500,000 worth of heroin.

No additional USAID commodities have been provided the NBI because of their acquisition of large number of Japanese vehicles and radio transceivers through the War Reparations Program.

#### Philippine Constabulary

USAID has provided neither technical nor commodity assistance to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Some assistance was given the PC by the Joint US Military Assistance Program (JUSMAG). A close relationship exists between the roles of civilian police authorities and the Philippine Constabulary particularly in the provinces, therefore, it has been necessary that USAID maintain liaison with PC and JUSMAG communications personnel. Particular emphasis has been placed on interfacing the provincial LECS and PC Provincial command.

The matter of frequency management and distribution has greatly been facilitated by the close relationship between USAID/NAPOLCOM and the PC. The PC received 441 MAP funded communications transceivers identical to that provided by USAID for the LECS program. During this period the PC availed itself of the USAID/NAPOLCOM technician training program. Ten (10) PC enlisted men were trained and are now capable of repairing the MAP provided equipment. These technicians are now being utilized by the PC as instructors for their own technician training programs.

### Training

#### a. Local

Early in 1968, USAID and POLCOM undertook the task of preparing within POLCOM a communications cadre which would, in turn, train radio operators and technical personnel to support the various USAID telecom projects that would follow. At least half of the NAPOLCOM communications branch are now utilized as instructors. They are supplemented at the NAPOLCOM communications school by a wide variety of instructors from other Philippine Government agencies, technical institutes, ex-participants and the private sector.

#### b. Participant

(1) In 1972, a USAID participant attended an eight months advanced telecommunications maintenance training course in the U.S. This participant has since functioned as chief of maintenance in NAPOLCOM's Communications Branch.

(2) No members of NAPOLCOM have been exposed to formal training in management and administration of communications systems. The only participants sponsored for a telecom management course by USAID were one from the NBI and one from the Manila Police Department in 1968. These men assist NAPOLCOM in their training efforts from time to time. Telecom management training becomes a major importance with the phase out of advisory assistance.

## Accomplishments

### a. General

The telecommunication efforts of the Public Safety Program in the Philippines are unique and have proved to be extremely successful. They have generated participation in the program by the GOP at the national, provincial, city, and municipal level at a magnitude not normally found in most other activities. The average financial contributions of participating Philippine government agencies was approximately 36% of the 53 completed provincial LECS projects which amounted to \$530,093 as opposed to the USAID contribution of \$937,000. Percentages ranged from a high of 92% for Agusan del Sur to 6% for Ifugao. Attachment Q depicts the funds provided by both USAID and the GOP by location.

### b. Telecom Project Management

Telecom project management has been outstanding. The project implementation procedures developed and followed are described in Attachment R. It is believed that the rigid adherence to these procedures has been the principal reason for the success of the LECS project.

### c. Law Enforcement Communications System (LECS)

(1) Fifty-three (53) provinces now possess an intra-provincial communications capability (See Attachment S). Two thousand one hundred twenty-nine (2,129) radio transceivers have been installed in some 1,146 city and municipal police departments.

(2) An additional 143 radio transceivers are in the process of being installed in 6 provinces. Two hundred three (203) radio transceivers are in USAID warehouse and many of these will be installed prior to project termination.

(3) Nineteen (19) basic city police communications systems were established (See Attachment T).

(4) The Metropol radio network was expanded to include the capitols of the 6 provinces surrounding the greater Manila area.

d. Training

(1) A NAPOLCOM training school has been established at Fort Bonifacio. This school has trained 152 technicians to maintain the USAID provided communications equipment.

(2) More than 6,000 men and women have attended 3-day radio operator training sponsored by NAPOLCOM.

e. Maintenance Facilities

(1) Full maintenance facilities were established in each of the 53 provinces receiving communications equipment.

(2) Basic radio repair shops were also established in 8 municipalities/cities where a large amount of USAID provided equipment was concentrated and additional facilities were warranted.

(3) Each maintenance facility is staffed by technicians who are funded by the provincial government in the case of provincial LECS and by the city in the case of police improvement sites.

(4) The number of technicians varies with the number of municipalities in the province and the corresponding number of radio transceivers. Of the 53 provincial LECS operational to date, 43 employ two technicians each, while the remaining 10 provinces contain 8 or less municipalities and therefore employ one technician each.

Telecommunications Support for Narcotics  
Enforcement Activities

a. Background

To date, \$115,000 has been expended for telecommunications equipment to support the narcotics enforcement activities. Of the 169 radio transceivers ordered,

74 have been installed in 14 cities, 11 are in stock, and 81 are due in-country in early May (See Attachment U).

One (1) base station, one (1) mobile and two (2) hand-held radio transceivers are allocated to each 5-man city police narcotic team. Where more than one team is equipped in a city, additional base stations are not provided. The radio transceivers provided by USAID for this purpose are identical to or in the case of the hand-held portables utilize the same circuitry as that equipment provided under the Provincial LECS sub-project. No maintenance problems are anticipated since each of these cities have technicians trained on this equipment by NAPOLCOM and sufficient spare parts are on hand.

USAID has followed the successful procedures established for the Provincial LECS program in distributing the telecommunications equipment purchased with narcotics funding. These procedures require that the radio technician of the city receiving the equipment come to Manila to obtain the transceivers from USAID. The transceivers are then checked and aligned using NAPOLCOM facilities and later installed in the city by the technician.

#### 4. Records

The title of this sub-project is somewhat misleading as it involved considerably more than merely police records as the title implies. It also included several management and personnel systems development which should have lasting impact on overall management and administration improvement. It began in February, 1969, and was terminated with the departure of the PS advisor at the end of FY 73.

The purpose of this sub-project was to assist the GOP in the establishment of a series of law enforcement information systems. Key among these was the computer-based information processing system that will provide the basis for long-range planning and decision making for the Police Commission.

The sub-project included Technical Support under which priority was given to development of a computer-based management information system for the government; increased responsiveness of the Police Commission service-oriented systems to the needs of its customers, the police; information being made available to national and local police agencies requiring it; and, the Police Commission developing a management approach to problem solving utilizing contemporary management techniques, i. e., Management by Objective or GPOI (goals, purposes, objectives, indicators).

Therefore, the sub-project consisted of several activities, each of which will be discussed separately.

a. Crime Statistics

It is hardly worthwhile to attempt developing a case for the need for accurate crime data and records. The essentiality thereof to sound police management is well established. Since inception of Public Safety assistance in 1957, attempts have been made to centralize and upgrade this function; but for a variety of reasons, principally lack of funds and internal cooperation, progress was minimal.

By way of historical background, a 1964 survey of the NBI Clearance and Identification Division resulted in a project to assist in upgrading that unit. In October, 1965, an advisor was assigned to assist in implementing the following major recommendations of the 1964 survey:

- (1) reorganize the division
- (2) develop standard operating procedures
- (3) establish a fingerprint processing system.

The proposals were accepted by the Director of the NBI. The division was reorganized, procedures established, and a backlog of work of 50,000 units eliminated by June 1966. At this point in the history of the project, the

Director of the NBI was relieved. For the next 18 months, there was an officer-in-charge of the bureau. There was a de-emphasis placed on the needs of the division and it suffered accordingly.

During the period 1967 over 1966, the fingerprint workload increased 57%. On January 8, 1968, because of a lack of direction, the backlog that had been totally eliminated in June 1966 had risen to 131,000 units.

In 1969, a sub-project agreement between the new Director of the NBI and the Police Commission was signed in an effort to provide new thrust in the identification project. A recommendation was made in the PAR dated March 9, 1972 to eliminate the project. While the expectations originally envisioned were not totally achieved, the system developed did permit the expansion of the workload 135% without additional personnel. The system designed was directed primarily toward the collection of criminal fingerprints and their processing. The realities of the situation were and still are that there is a tremendous public demand on the processing of civilian clearances. While the US objectives as originally envisioned were only partially achieved, the demands placed upon the system for civilian clearances have been met.

During this period, until 1970, the NBI also collected crime statistics, but for the most part participation by local forces was insufficient to be of more than minimal value.

In 1970, the Police Commission assumed operational responsibility for the collection of crime statistics. By 1971, 66% of the police departments were reporting to NAPOLCOM. Although the quality of the reporting is described as only fair, this was a tremendous step forward. By 1972, the number of departments reporting had risen to 80%. This high degree of compliance is directly attributed to the salary subsidy requirement.

Then a rather interesting development occurred. Through a bureaucratic oversight, a circular from NAPOLCOM to police departments was worded as

to cause recipients to draw the inference that submission of crime reports was not an essential requirement to receiving the salary subsidy. Submissions for 1973, fell off to 48.9%. This trend continued until a low of 26.5% was reached by February, 1974.

A circular letter has since been distributed setting the requirement straight. An interesting observation can be drawn from this experience. It is obvious that local chiefs of police still do not view crime figures and statistics in their true value as a management tool and the sole reason for their submission is to qualify for the subsidy. This point should be stressed in future training sessions.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that the NAPOLCOM has developed a system for collection and analysis of crime figures and as time goes on their value will be hopefully recognized. This is a major accomplishment.

b. Police Selection

In 1969, the Philippine Congress passed a bill signed into law by the President which tasked the Police Commission with responsibility for testing and selection of policemen through application of a standardized nation-wide procedure.

In addition to developing eligibility lists for new policemen, they also prepare and administer promotional examinations. These are held twice each year, in December for patrolmen and June for promotion in the following locations:

Manila	Zamboanga
Cebu	Baguio
Davao	Tacloban
Legazpi	Cagayan de Oro
Iloilo	

To date, a total of 31,998 applicants have taken the patrolman's entrance examination. Of this number, 13,615 or 42.5% were declared eligible for employment. Since inception of the procedure, four promotional examinations have been held. Policemen taking these examinations

total 17,598, of which 3,124 or 17.8% were declared eligible for promotion.

The law requires that all appointments and promotions be made from these eligibility lists. The appointing authority, usually the mayor, is not required to select from the top of the list, just so the individual appears thereon. It further requires that he submit a request to employ which must be approved by the NAPOLCOM after checking against the eligibility lists. Failure to follow this procedure not only voids the department's eligibility for salary subsidy, the appointing officer can be prosecuted for making an illegal appointment.

c. Salary Subsidy

In 1970 legislation was passed authorizing payment of salary subsidies to police personnel not receiving minimum salary. These are national budget funds paid to local city or municipality police forces. Minimum salaries are set by law for different classes of cities and municipalities. The minimum wage law, however, makes exceptions for those whose financial condition makes such levels unreasonable. The subsidy payment is 50% of this figure as it applies to the particular locality.

Eligibility to receive the subsidy is based upon the department meeting set levels of several criteria pre-determined by the NAPOLCOM. One of these is that members of the department be trained, either through the basic course at one of the Regional Academies or through previous recognized training courses.

To avoid inequities which would result through individuals having to wait a period of perhaps years before training space becomes available, the system takes this into consideration. It provides that the subsidy be paid from the effective date even though this requirement has not been met, provided it is due to an unavailability of space at one of the academies. However, when the department is notified of an available training space at a specific time, failure to report results in further subsidies being canceled.

There is another interesting feature in this plan. Obviously, cities and municipalities which had, on their own, brought police salaries up to, or in excess of minimum wage levels would in effect be penalized through loss of the 50% salary subsidy otherwise payable. In such instances they too receive the 50% minimum wage subsidy for their police personnel, subject to certain restrictions as to use of such funds.

These payments may not become a fungible part of the local budget, but must be specifically used for purposes prescribed by the NAPOLCOM. These are: to increase the size of the police force, increase salaries of policemen or other improvement of police services, all subject to NAPOLCOM approval and audit.

In February 1971 the NAPOLCOM began payments of subsidies, retroactive to 1970. At the time of this writing, they had made payments up to date through December, 1972, and current plans are that by 1975, all prior years will have been paid and the accounts will be current. Considering the tremendous workload and limitations of appropriated funds this has been a remarkable achievement. Subsidy payments made to date represent a total expenditure of ₱82,606,248 (\$12,515,795).

d. Administrative Information System

This system was designed to enable the NAPOLCOM to analyze and review activities of the 1,500 police departments and some 37,000 local police personnel.

Forms for the input information on both departments and individuals have been designed, distributed and more than 90% have been returned. Of 1,515 departments, 1,392 have responded and 33,641 individuals forms returned.

They are currently in the process of a manual interpretation and transfer to computer cards to develop profile information.

e. Research and Planning

This activity is to provide for a series of continuing reports which allow evaluation of goals and effectiveness of specific programs and other endeavors.

The first such study conducted was an evaluation of the basic training course conducted at the Regional Training Academies. From this, there developed a data base as to the relative values and interests in the various subjects which is of use in redesigning future courses.

Another project underway is an attitudinal study to measure public attitudes toward the police in several representative localities. The raw information has been collected and was being processed at the time of the team's visit. Several others are on the drawing board, such as:

- (1) Determining the relevance of the police examinations to the job to be performed.
- (2) A study of offenders and victims of crimes.
- (3) An assessment of performance of policemen with different academic backgrounds.
- (4) A study of police performance in selected cities and municipalities.
- (5) Collection of data on the need for a police college.
- (6) Tabulation of crime volume in Metropol for CY 74.

It is obvious that the NAPOLCOM is well aware of the limitless value of research and moving ahead to make use thereof.

f. Other Activities

This agency has been tasked with a variety of other activities such as computerizing payments to 387 pensioners, payments of health and death benefits and micro-filming of volumes of old records. Already some 8,500 personnel files have been reduced to microfilm. As have the files in 513 administrative cases. Under current plans all certificates of examination ratings are to be similarly treated.

All of the foregoing systems utilize the Philippine Government National Computer Center which became operational in 1969, and was made available to NAPOLCOM in 1970. For this service, computer time is charged at the rate of ₱400 per hour.

Through USAID assistance, the NAPOLCOM provided \$82,350 in commodity assistance to the National Computer Center which in turn provided technical assistance and time for the following programs:

<u>System</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Police Application and Examination	₱250,736
Individual Police Subsidy	117,859
Police Statistics	20,807
Crime Statistics	<u>82,371</u>
TOTAL	₱471,773 (\$71,481)

The commodities to the Computer Center consisted of: key punch machines, cards, tapes, file cabinets, score sheets and other miscellaneous supplies.

g. Public Safety Assistance

Public Safety assistance to this sub-project consisted of the services of one Public Safety advisor from February 1969 to June, 1973 training of 2 participants in the United States and commodity support as shown below:

<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
\$6,000	75,400	76,000	67,000	37,000	\$261,400

## 5. Narcotics

As the Narcotics Enforcement Project is scheduled to continue it was not in strict terms a part of the phase-out evaluation. However, the team felt it worthwhile to take advantage of its presence and evaluate the project as to its progress to date.

### Situation

This project was developed to assist with control of narcotics and dangerous drugs in the Philippines directly and concurrently support international narcotics control programs. In the Philippines until recently drug abuse has not been considered a serious problem, but it has been spreading rapidly during the last few years among Philippine youth. Officials estimate that 200,000 Filipinos regularly use some narcotic or dangerous drug, of whom 10,000 are opium or heroin addicts. Present indications are that there is an upswing in the use of marijuana, LSD, and other hallucinogens. With a long coastline, lack of enforcement funds and inadequately trained and equipped personnel, and because the problem is still a new one for the Republic, expectations are that the Philippines has a problem which could escalate sharply over the next couple of years -- especially as it becomes a more attractive target for international syndicates as crackdowns take place in Hong Kong, Turkey, and Indochina.

The U.S. military personnel and their dependents at Clark and Subic bases also provide a continuing target for suppliers of all varieties of narcotics and dangerous drugs. To the extent that these are readily available and promoted, there is a dangerous environment for such personnel. Conversely, to the extent that these servicemen and other relatively affluent users demand drugs, they contribute to the environment in which drug supply can be extremely elastic. A major objective of this project is to reduce the availability and use of dangerous drugs in areas contiguous to U.S. military installations to a level at which it is no longer significant. While this project will encourage establishment of an effective and total systematic control (production, processing, trafficking, and consumption) ultimate success will of course depend on

efforts and activities beyond the scope proposed herein. Other cooperation, e. g., international (especially regional), Philippine military, and private family actions will all have to contribute to what is in essence a growing global problem. The contribution of this project to the overall effort is a hoped for immediate impact on stemming narcotics production use, sale, and disrupting the processing and flow from and within the Philippines.

The assumption is made that a preemptive enforcement program may be successful in containing the problem before it reaches proportions similar to those experienced in the US and other countries. It is also assumed that police action will have only limited effectiveness unless there is continuing public pressure within the Philippines for eliminating drug traffic.

In designing this project, it was recognized that the nature of the problem in the Philippines is still somewhat obscure and that successful attainment of project objectives may require additional activities or even new related projects. This project is essentially limited to assisting selected Philippine law enforcement groups carry out action programs for curbing drug abuse over the next three years.

The narcotics problem in the Philippines at present revolves mainly around marijuana, which is the most abused drug. Second in importance are over-the-counter drugs which are fairly easily obtained. Heroin has diminished to manageable proportions primarily due to the arrest and seizure of a long-standing heroin laboratory in September, 1972.

#### Enforcement Agencies

The primary agency responsible for formulating narcotics policies throughout the Philippines is the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), created in 1972. It is composed of the Secretaries of Health as Chairman, Justice, Defense, Education, Finance, Social Welfare; the permanent consultant is currently the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. The DDB is USAID/PS's counterpart agency for the Narcotics Enforcement Project.

There are primarily four national agencies that are responsible for narcotics enforcement investigation in the Philippines. They are: National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which controls the 29 cities and municipalities that are being supported by the USAID Narcotics program; the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), also assisted by the USAID Narcotics Project; the Philippine Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), which as of FY 74 will be assisted by the USAID Narcotics project; and the Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC), which also as of FY 74 will be USAID Narcotics Project assisted.

a. Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU)

The Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) was created on February 16, 1972, by General Order No. 211, NPC, as a special section of the Philippines Constabulary (PC).

CANU's primary mission is to enforce the dangerous drugs law. Its purpose is to prevent and control drug abuse by means of an integrated program encompassing law enforcement, community information, education, treatment, and rehabilitation. In pursuing its activities in these five fields, CANU is specifically charged with investigation and enforcement of law violations; the direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of narcotics intelligence; maintenance of narcotics records and statistics; provision of technical assistance to all Constabulary and police units on narcotics matters; maintenance of close coordination with civilian and police agencies in prevention and control of drug abuse; and limited treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers.

CANU is the national police agency with the specific task of implementing the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The proclamation of martial law (Presidential Proclamation No. 1081, of September 21, 1972), as implemented by General Orders No. 2-A, subparagraph 17, reinforced CANU's basic authority by vesting in the Secretary of National Defense the authority to arrest or cause to arrest and take into custody all violators of the

Dangerous Drugs Act. The Defense Secretary on October 23, 1972 officially emphasized CANU's vital role in the national campaign against drug abuse in a policy speech delivered to the First ASEAN Expert Group Meeting on the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse. In addition, the Defense Secretary has designated the commanding officer of CANU as his permanent representative to the Dangerous Drugs Board, the highest policy-making and coordinating body in the prevention and control of drug abuse in the Philippines.

Initially manned by 13 officers and 63 enlisted personnel, CANU has been reorganized and expanded during its 21 months of existence to 35 officers, 149 enlisted personnel (included 3 women), and 21 civilian employees. CANU Headquarters is in Camp Crame, Quezon City, the national headquarters of the PC. Since its inception, CANU has been commanded by the constabulary officer who prepared the initial staff study proposing the creation of such a unit.

He is assisted by a deputy and executive officer, a legal officer, and a budget and fiscal assistant. The unit has five branches: administrative, narcotics detection, narcotics investigation, information and education, and treatment and rehabilitation. The operational element for enforcement is the detection branch of 14 officers and 64 men, including eight field teams and four special operations teams of six men each.

The investigative branch responsible for intelligence has seven four-man teams and detention section. The 21 civilians in CANU are mostly employed in the medical and the rehabilitation sections of the treatment and rehabilitation branch and in information and education work. They operate CANU's rehabilitation center at Camp Crame. CANU is slowly but steadily growing. In its Five-Year Action Program a target was initially set of 800 law enforcement personnel trained as narcotics investigators by 1977.

All CANU's detection and investigation teams are currently based at Camp Crame in the Manila area. These teams are deployed as needed on a temporary basis into the four PC zones. For example, a team operated for several months in Olongapo City in cooperation with the narcotics squad of the Olongapo City Police and the office of the U.S. Naval Investigative Service (NISO) at Subic Naval Base. The narcotics situation in the vicinity of the naval base has shown clear improvement in recent months as a result of this concentrated attention and coordinated activity in Olongapo.

On an as-needed basis there have been similar assignments in the vicinity of Clark Air Base through coordination with Angeles City PD and USAF OSI. It is expected that the situation will continue to improve in the vicinity of Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base as CANU units are better trained and equipped to operate in cooperation with the Olongapo and Angeles City narcotics squads.

It should be noted, however, that a proposal is under study to deploy teams on a permanent basis throughout the Republic.

CANU has been conducting its own training program but has received no professional input from outside the organization. One CANU officer has attended the 10-week course at the International Police Academy in Washington. DEA and USAID/PS officials who have observed CANU units believe additional training in narcotics investigation skills and techniques is essential. It is proposed that all investigators in CANU's present six-man field teams take the 4-week narcotics training at the National Police Academy as soon as possible and that all newly formed CANU teams include only those who have had this specialized training.

Whenever a CANU field team has received its specialized training it is proposed to equip it in the same fashion as the narcotics enforcement teams of other agencies, i. e., with vehicles, communication facilities, test kits,

cameras, binoculars, and hand cuffs. CANU's proposed expansion envisages at least 19 field teams by 1975. Commodity support to these teams would be provided as they are trained. Although the Mission had planned earlier to support 12 CANU teams in FY 74 that number has now been reduced to 8 because of the shortness of training time available this fiscal year. At the time of the team's visit, the sub-project agreement was under discussion. The remaining 11 teams would be supported in FY 75 as they are trained. In addition, selected CANU personnel would be designated to receive specialized training at DEA and IPA schools in Washington.

Proposed assistance to CANU is restricted to the enforcement teams and consists of technical communication facilities, vehicles, basic photographic equipment, office equipment (file cabinets, a duplicating machine, and typewriters), narcotics test kits, and miscellaneous enforcement gear identical to that supplied other police narcotics teams.

b. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

This organization consists of a headquarters unit in Manila and 11 regional offices throughout the Philippines. This is the central criminal record agency for the Philippine Government. The Narcotics Unit is located in the central headquarters and operates on an as-needed basis to the 11 regional areas. It has an authorized strength of 25, but currently only 8 are so assigned. A sufficient number have completed training to staff the unit up to that agreed upon in the sub-project agreement, but this has not been done pending completion of rehabilitation of the 5 excess property vehicles to be supplied through USAID. Assurance has been given that the TO will be met at that time. The NBI maintains the national criminalistic laboratory in Manila and USAID supported narcotics identification laboratories in Cebu and Davao. These laboratories provide service free of charge to all civilian law enforcement agencies. The Director of the NBI serves as the permanent consultant to the Dangerous Drugs Board.

c. Anti Smuggling Action Center (ASAC)

Executive Order Number 11, dated February 24, 1966, created under the Department of Finance the Anti-Smuggling Action Center with the following duties:

- (1) To receive, gather, collate and evaluate all information relative to smuggling and otherwise act as the intelligence arm of the government in the anti-smuggling campaign.
- (2) To coordinate with national and local police agencies so as to effect the apprehension of the offenders and confiscation of smuggled goods.
- (3) To perform such other functions as may from time to time be assigned to it by the President or the Secretary of Finance.

With a staff of 984 its organization consists of four major headquarters divisions and 13 regional centers (RASAC) located at strategic points throughout the coastal areas of the Republic. There are 15 anti-narcotics teams of 5 men each. Two such teams are assigned to the Intelligence Division ASAC Manila and one each to the 13 RASACs. These teams were organized as a result of the passage of RA 6425, described later.

Initially, the main targets of the organization were taxable goods brought into or taken out of the country without paying the full taxes and duties (Technical Smuggling) and Blue Seal Cigarettes (Pure Smuggling). However, higher authorities have authorized the organization to include illegal logging, illegal entrants, hot cars, gun-running and illegal trafficking of narcotics and other prohibited drugs as targets of its anti-smuggling operations.

Considering that narcotics are brought into the country through smuggling channels the organization has deemed it necessary to give emphasis to the illicit trafficking of drugs and consider it among the target priorities as part of the nationwide campaign against this ever-growing menace to the nation. It has intensified its coordination with all other law-enforcement agencies as well as other government agencies and civil organizations in the concerted drive against drug abuse. ASAC has also joined the Philippine panel which discusses the narcotics problems with other ASEAN nations.

ASAC operations involving narcotics target objectives have been simple or sophisticated depending upon the nature and extent of target involvement in the activity. It normally ranges from the employment of a single or individual operator, to the small independent group - a team. A team is augmented by other team or teams in cases where targets are well organized syndicates. A mission order stating the nature and objectives of the mission is given to an individual or a team, following up a given target.

With the passage of RA 6425 known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972" the different teams of narcotics operatives doubled their effort in combating syndicates dealing in drugs.

The teams are composed of operatives of the organization with only a few members having undergone formal training on narcotics identification and investigation. This is one of the major problems. Other problems encountered by the teams include lack of necessary tools and equipment, like fast vehicles, communication sets, field testing kits and high powered firearms. Notwithstanding these limitations, the teams have been credited with numerous major apprehensions and interceptions.

Smuggling has historically been an accepted way of life in certain sections of the Republic and developing information and intelligence extremely difficult. In view of this it is interesting to note that where narcotics are concerned, this does not hold nearly so true. GOP efforts to alert and educate the public to the dangers of drug abuse have succeeded in developing a level of concern which has

resulted in more citizens being willing to come forward with information. Additionally, ASAC has developed a system of payment of rewards paid in proportion to the amount of the seizure.

The nature of ASAC operations is such that their arrests are targetted against larger scale dealers and normally involve larger quantities of illegal drugs. Attachment V reflects quantities and types seized in the period since passage of RA 6425 (March 30, 1972) and March 31, 1973. (1974 figures not yet available).

d. Local Police Teams

As commented on throughout this paper, the bulk of law enforcement in the Republic is carried out by the more than 1500 local police forces. It was therefore not only practical, but essential that any degree of success in narcotics law enforcement heavily involve these forces.

Implementation of this involvement has been built around a 5-man team concept which would appear to have considerable merit. Cities and municipalities to be thusly involved are selected by joint NAPOLCOM/PSD study of several factors. These include: total population, police department strength, high school and university or college enrollment and current narcotics intelligence.

Currently there are 24 such cities and municipalities with a total of 42 of the 5-man teams. Sixteen of these teams were formed in FY 72, the remaining 26 in FY 73. An additional 5 are programmed for FY 74. A list of the teams by location follows:

Manila	12 teams	Malabon	1 team
Quezon City	4 teams	Baguio	1 team
Paranaque	1 team	Olongapo	1 team
Caloocan	1 team	Angeles	1 team
Pasay	1 team	Batangas	1 team
Marikina	1 team	Legazpi	1 team
Makati	3 teams	Tacloban	1 team
Pasig	1 team	Bacolod	1 team

San Juan	1 team	Cebu	1 team
Las Pinas	1 team	Cagayan de Oro	1 team
Mandaluyong	1 team	Zamboanga	1 team
Navotas	1 team	Davao	1 team

The cities planned in FY 74 are: Butan, Cabanatuan, Dagupan, Naga and Iloilo, each to have one 5-man team. Attachment W shows the geographical location of teams currently in being, Attachment X. shows those planned for FY 74.

Operational effectiveness of these teams has been spotty, due in part, if not largely, to the fact that the training is relatively new. One would hope that as the injection of better trained personnel becomes felt, a corresponding upgrading of the enforcement effort will develop.

Seizures of illegal narcotics and arrests for calendar year 1973 are shown in Attachment Y.

It is interesting to note that of the 2909 persons initially apprehended, cases were filed against 1255, or roughly 43%. Of this number, 60 had been dismissed and 22 convicted according to the latest information available at the time of the team's visit. The remaining 1173 cases were still pending.

Cursory examination of the data points out rather obvious need for improvement in two areas: quality of arrests and more accurate and timely reporting. The team feels that these should be given priority attention by the Narcotics Advisor. The reporting form referred to elsewhere in this section should assist greatly in this effort.

#### Public Safety Narcotics Project

USG support of and participation in the narcotics suppression program in the Republic of the Philippines is coordinated under the direction of the DCM in his role as Chairman of the Mission Narcotics Control Committee. This group is comprised of representatives from all interested elements of the Country Team including Embassy, USAID, DEA and U.S. Military, each with an assigned role in the overall plan.

Responsibilities of the USAID/PS Narcotics Enforcement Advisor are generally to assist the GOP law enforcement agencies in developing and upgrading managerial and operational effectiveness in enforcing narcotics laws. This is accomplished through technical advice, equipment and training, both in-country and in the United States.

(1) Training

a. In-Country

All in-country training of narcotics enforcement personnel is conducted under the aegis of the NAPOLCOM at its Fort Bonifacio Training Center. From inception to present there have been four courses of 4 weeks duration conducted for a total of 505 students.

This is a comprehensive course which includes a variety of narcotics enforcement investigative techniques such as: drug identification, handling of evidence, court procedures, surveillance, undercover techniques, recognition of drug addicts, treatment and rehabilitation, narcotics field testing, search and seizure, techniques of arrest, use of equipment, all of which are additionally covered by practical exercises. A copy of the course content is shown as Attachment Z.

It is interesting to note that in the first class the instruction was heavily supported by USG guest lecturers from OSI, NISO, DEA and PSD. The requirement for this participation has decreased progressively as Filipino instructors have been developed, particularly through use of returned participants from U.S. training. This trend has continued to the point that the most recent class was conducted mostly by Filipino instructors with only an occasional need for an American guest lecturer.

Throughout this entire effort the USAID/PSD Narcotics Enforcement Advisor has played a leading role. Not only as an instructor and assisting in development of the courses, but in preparing handout materials as well. In this effort alone, he has prepared

and reproduced for distribution material on some 113 subjects, involving 678 pages given to each student. A film library of 40 films is used for both training and public education. A slide series of 200 slides has been prepared for use in the training schools, plus establishment of a reference library for use by enforcement agencies.

He also developed a comprehensive report of seizure form which has been officially adopted for use by all police departments. Adoption of this form will assist greatly in compilation of narcotics information and intelligence.

Aside from this training for all personnel assigned to Narcotics Enforcement Teams, other courses have been conducted at the NAPOLCOM Academy to meet specific needs.

For example, a problem of abuse of over-the-counter drugs was surfaced and much of the problem attributed to less than adequate enforcement of existing laws by an understaffed DDB, who have the enforcement responsibility. In response to this problem, the NAPOLCOM designed a special course for 34 men in Narcotics Compliance. The DEA conducted the course in October 1973, at GOP request.

Upon completion of the special 6-day compliance course, the 34 men were deputized by the DDB as Food and Drug Administration Investigators who are now authorized to investigate any wholesale drug company, retail drug store, hospital, pharmacy or doctor suspected of abusing the license to dispense legal narcotics and dangerous drugs.

In February, 1974, a regular course was conducted for 69 men from cities and municipalities too small to support a 5-man team and thus not a part per se of the Narcotics Enforcement project. The purpose of this effort was that 2 or 3 trained men in these localities would be able to identify problems and then call for assistance from neighboring larger cities where trained and fully equipped narcotics enforcement units were available.

A block of 20 hours has been added to the curriculum at the Fort Bonifacio and Rizal Training Academies for all students in the Basic Police Course. Plans are underway to do likewise in the other eight academies.

b. U.S. Training

Programming of Filipino police participants for Narcotics enforcement training in the United States began in September 1972, when 6 participants attended a 9-week course in Narcotics Enforcement Support at the International Police Academy.

From that date to present, a total of 41 participants have been so programmed, with 10 of those undergoing training at the time of this writing.

(2) Commodity Support

Built around the 5-man concept a standardized package of equipment has been developed as shown below:

Base Station	1 per city/municipality
Mobile Station	1 per team
Hand-held	2 per team
Vehicle (type dependent upon location)	1 per team
Binoculars	1 per team
Camera	1 per city/municipality
Revolver	1 per man
Narcotics test kit	2 per team
Handcuffs	1 pr. per man
Miscellaneous equipment and supplies, such as books, films, office office equipment.	As needed

The total cost of such a package runs an average of approximately \$8,000 for one team and approximately \$7,000 for additional teams in the same city or municipality.

It should be noted that this same commodity package developed for local police teams is also used for national agency teams as well. This is a well thought out equipment package which meets basic requirements adequately.

In the 3 year period, FY 72-74, a total of \$643,000 has been programmed for the narcotics commodity support, as shown below by year:

FY 1972	\$170,000
FY 1973	208,000
FY 1974	<u>265,000</u>
TOTAL	\$643,000

(3) Technical Assistance

One Narcotics Enforcement Advisor has been at post since August 1972, devoting full time efforts to advising and assisting all of the various units described in the preceding sections. It is planned to continue his services in this capacity.

(4) Funding

The FY 1972 - 1974 period of total life of the project to date reflects a total U.S. appropriation of \$832,000, broken out as shown below:

	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US Technician Costs	-0-	29,000	56,000	85,000
Participant Training	60,000	-0- <sup>1/</sup>	31,000	91,000
Commodities	170,000	208,000	265,000	643,000
Contract	-0-	12,000 <sup>2/</sup>	-0-	12,000
Other	-0-	1,000 <sup>3/</sup>	-0-	1,000
TOTALS	\$230,000	\$250,000	\$352,000	\$832,000

<sup>1/</sup> Sufficient funds carried over from FY 72

<sup>2/</sup> Contract Secretary

<sup>3/</sup> Printing

## CHAPTER V

### THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT

#### A. Description

##### 1. History

Public Safety assistance to the Philippines was initiated in FY 1957 as the result of a survey of police services made in 1955 by a University of Michigan Public Administration contract. The jointly developed program was directed to the improvement of the National Bureau of Investigation.

From 1957-1966 the emphasis of U.S. assistance was directed towards increasing the operational and training capabilities of the NBI. Included was improvement in records and identification and criminal records procedures. Assistance was also provided in the form of commodities and technical advice for the improvement of the NBI Crime Laboratory.

In 1966 a program was initiated with the Manila Police Department which lasted until 1968. These projects were carried out through technical assistance input of technical advisors numbering from a minimum of one to a maximum of eight at various times during the 1957-1968. Total cost for the 11-year period amounted to \$1,845,800.00, broken down as follows:

<u>Technical Assistance</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Participants (209 US and Third)</u>
\$518,000	\$971,000	\$357,000

The NBI records system was reorganized, new reporting systems were implemented, and updated techniques adopted. The NBI Laboratory was improved to the degree that at the termination of the project it was considered one of the best in Southeast Asia. NBI regional offices were established in thirteen locations throughout the country to provide nation-wide coverage. NBI/USAID ambulatory teams conducted training

courses on a limited basis reaching a small percentage of local police personnel. USAID assistance to the NBI enhanced its increasing operational capability so that at the end of the project it was regarded as the most effective investigative arm in the Philippines and one of the best in Asia.

In 1964, an OPS team surveyed the Manila Police Department. In 1966, a project agreement was signed and by September 1967 a staff of eight Public Safety Advisors was in place. Although the project was prematurely terminated in June 1968 because of a disagreement between the Manila Police Chief and the Mayor, several accomplishments were noted. The MPD was substantially reorganized along functional lines. A teletype communications system utilizing excess property was installed by USAID technicians. A training course was initiated to provide basic recruit training.

During the month of October, 1967, officials of USAID met with President Marcos' representatives to discuss ways and means by which USAID could assist in government efforts to eliminate lawlessness. USAID agreed to participate in a pilot project which would concentrate U.S. technical assistance and limited commodity support into a few municipalities of one province. In order to test the effectiveness of this type of assistance, Rizal Province was selected for the purpose. Five municipalities were identified for the purpose of the project.

Funding was as follows:

Technicians	-	\$ 137,500
Commodities	-	161,100
Participants	-	15,000
TOTAL		<u>\$ 313,600</u>

Given the short life of this project (1967-1969) limited but identifiable progress was made. In FY 1968, a provincial training academy was established in the Rizal Province. All municipalities participating were in various stages of implementation of the reorganization of their departments in conformity with the Police Manual. Centralized records systems were completed, and training resulted in

higher clearance by arrest rate. Specialized units for crowd control, vice, juvenile, and intelligence were established. Most patrol activities were augmented with vehicles provided by USAID and municipal governments. USAID-funded basic photographic laboratories were installed in each municipality. The degree of success varied from municipality to municipality and reflected the spirit of cooperation and the quality of leadership of those municipal officials involved. The highest level of achievement was shown in Marikina and San Juan.

It was the success of this experiment which served as the foundation for the development of the Internal Security Project.

From July to October, 1966, an OPS team surveyed the Philippine law enforcement situation. The resulting report was presented to the President of the Philippines in February, 1967, but little action was taken on it until 1968 when the government directed the Peace and Order Coordinating Council and the Police Commission to coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement agencies in a concerted drive against lawlessness. Concomitantly, the Public Safety USAID assistance was redirected from the NBI to the Police Commission in order to develop and implement a 5-year (FYs 1969-73). The Internal Security Project targetted on the improvement of local police forces.

Activities referred to as prior to the FY 69 Internal Security Project have been covered in detail in previous documents and are only mentioned here to set the chronological stage. This report therefore concerns itself only with this latter project.

## 2. Objectives and Goals

With the phase-out in FY 69 of the Manila Police Department and National Bureau of Investigation Projects, the Internal Security Project was started. Working directly with the National Police Commission as a direct counterpart, the long-range overall goal was the improvement of the effectiveness of law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice.

It was structured to work with the NAPOLCOM through four sub-projects, each with its individual goals. Each of these has been covered in more detail in other sections of this report. The sub-projects and their major objectives were:

- a. Training - Development and implementation of regional training designed to provide maximum instruction to local police forces in basic, supervisory, in-service and specialized courses through the establishment of ten regional training centers.
- b. Police Improvement - The development of a number of local forces into efficient and professional departments to serve as models to other departments and to serve in a supporting role to regional training centers for on-the-job training.
- c. Communications - The development of civilian law enforcement communications systems with priority on provincial and municipal systems.
- d. Records and Identification - The development within the municipalities of effective records systems capable of meeting local and national needs and the development of a uniform nation-wide crime reporting system.

Each of these and their progress to date have been covered in detail under Chapter IV of this report.

### 3. Resources

#### a. Technicians

During the period under review, FY 69-FY 73, the number of advisors at post at any one given time fluctuated from 6 to 8 with the 8 figure being fairly constant from FY 70 through mid-FY 73.

The types of advisory expertise represented during this period covered a wide spectrum of police disciplines with heaviest emphasis on training. As pointed out earlier, however, the training advisors served in a dual role of generalists in advising chiefs of police in the Police Improvement Sub-project. Total technicians cost was \$1,031,400.

Attachment AA shows advisor assignments by time and position title for the entire life of police assistance in the Republic of the Philippines.

b. Commodities

Total funding for commodities for the 5-year period totaled \$2,292,600. These were distributed among the sub-projects as shown below:

Commodities By Sub-Project  
FY 1969 - 1973  
(\$000)

<u>FY</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Police Improvement</u>	<u>Communi- cations</u>	<u>Records</u>	<u>Total</u>
1969	42.0	37.2	275.1	6.0	360.3
1970	78.0	202.4	187.0	75.4	542.8
1971	78.0	195.6	258.0	76.0	607.6
1972	33.4	64.7	278.2	67.0	443.3
1973	<u>9.0</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>275.0</u>	<u>37.0</u>	<u>338.6</u>
TOTALS	240.4	517.5	1273.3	261.4	2292.6

Excess Property

In addition to project funded commodities, quantities of U.S. owned excess property were obtained and turned over to the GOP for utilization by various police elements. This equipment was obtained from a variety of sources, both U.S. military and USAID excess property.

It consisted of a wide variety of items, the largest single category being vehicles which accounted for approximately 25% of the total, the remainder being assorted office equipment, furniture, building supplies, and communications gear.

The figures below show by fiscal year the original acquisition cost of equipment thus obtained:

FY 69	\$ 510,083
FY 70	2,856
FY 71	55,607
FY 72	263,934
FY 73	<u>160,166</u>
TOTAL	\$ 992,646

The reader should be reminded of the misleading nature of these figures, however. They represent the cost of the items at the time of original procurement by the using U.S. agency and value at the time of acquisition by USAID several years later is a small fraction of that figure. In most instances, the status of the equipment was such that the using agency no longer considered it useable and only through Philippine police labor and ingenuity was it rendered serviceable and put to a useful purpose.

c. Participants

Prior to the FY 69 project, a total of 205 participants had received training in the United States. Since inception of the Internal Security Project in FY 69, an additional 81 have been programmed for US training at a cost of \$168,800. A listing of these by year and by types of training is shown in Attachment BB.

d. Contract Services

The only contract services funding was an expenditure of \$7,100 in FY 72 for secretarial services.

A complete breakout of funding by year and by category of the \$3,501,400 total for the 5 years is shown in Attachment CC.

e. Host Country Contributions

GOP funding for this project has consisted of two general categories, or more correctly, from two sources: National government budget; and local governments' budget.

In the second category, local governments, figures as to what amounts were expended in support of the Police Improvement sub-project are of necessity approximate and include such items as equipment and supplies, transportation of trainees to the Regional Academies, construction and in some instances, they contributed to construction cost of the Regional Academies. The estimated total for all eight cities is ₱1,801,000. A breakdown by city is given in Attachment DD.

Locally provided funding is more specifically documented in the communications Sub-project and is shown in Attachment Q by locality in the total sum of \$454,197, or 32% of the total cost. It should be noted that this figure does not include the initial and continuing costs of technicians required in each locality to service and maintain the equipment.

National budget figures are considerably more and embrace contributing support to all of the sub-projects. (FY- 70-74).

In the Police Training Sub-project, total funding provided has amounted to ₱37,100,193 (\$5,621,141). A further breakout of these funds follows:

1. Land and Buildings

a. Fort Bonifacio	₱ 12,562,595
b. Bacolod	956,567
c. Cebu	1,075,181
d. Baguio	2,225,996

e. Cagayan de Oro	1,571,865
f. Legazpi	1,675,381
g. Zamboanga	1,429,539
h. Tacloban	1,056,084
i. Davao	<u>225,000</u>

SUB-TOTAL            ₱ 22,778,208  
(\$ 3,451,243)

2. Equipment  
(for distribution to all academies)

₱ 804,436  
(\$ 121,884)

3. Maintenance and Operating Costs  
(includes subsistence for trainees)

₱ 11,613,851  
(\$ 1,759,674)

4. Salaries of staff

₱ 1,903,698  
(\$ 288,439)

TOTAL    ₱ 37,100,193  
(\$ 5,621,241)

Other funding costs incurred by the GOP in connection with overall project goals are not easily nor accurately definable by specific activity. Such things as salaries, facilities, maintenance, operating costs, etc., cover all activities as well as some which are non-project related. The best estimate of costs as do relate to project oriented objectives are:

1. NAPOLCOM General Administration

a. Personnel Services	₱ 5,091,517
b. Maintenance and Operation	4,185,155

c. Equipment 257,500

SUB-TOTAL P 9,534,172  
(\$ 1,444,571)

2. Salary Subsidies P 82,604,248  
(\$ 12,515,795)

Recap of GOP project related costs

1. Training 37,100,193  
2. Police Improvement 1,801,000  
3. Communications 2,997,700  
4. NAPOLCOM 9,534,172  
5. Salary Subsidies 82,604,248

TOTAL P 134,037,313  
(\$ 20,308,683)

Thus we see that the total GOP funding support of the project in the amount of \$20,308,683, when compared with the USG input of \$3,501,400, amounts to 85.3% of the total.

B. Observations and Conclusions

In general terms, project goals and objectives have in the main been achieved. This has been due in large part to the degree to which the GOP responded in the joint development and implementation of these goals and objectives.

Establishment of and support to the National Police Commission has resulted in a degree of police services improvement throughout the Republic which a decade ago would have been virtually impossible. Many of the previously existing conditions which adversely affected the status and effectiveness of local police forces have been dramatically reduced and efforts to inject constant upgrading continue. This certainly bodes well for the future of civil law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines.

Uniform standards for employment and promotion have been adopted, are being enforced and the political patronage system which historically plagued the police service and retarded professionalization is being replaced by this approach. Salaries have risen to a more equitable level through the subsidy process and is resulting in a better caliber recruit. Police personnel are receiving training which is professionally administered and geared to make them better able to provide higher level services to their respective communities; and through the processes of evaluation and research, constant improvement of the training and its relevance to the job it is keeping pace with changing conditions.

Thus, we see the unqualified, untrained and underpaid policeman being replaced by one who can earn the respect and confidence of the public through giving them the service they require and to which they are entitled.

Accomplishments to date are impressive. But the very nature of law enforcement is such that one can never sit on past successess and even hesitate planning for the future and continued improvement. In this vein, the NAPOLCOM may want to consider methods for continuing the training process of men after return to their departments.

One such method which comes to mind is periodic in-service training within the departments themselves. As trainees undergo courses at the Regional Academies, those among them could be identified as having potential instructor capabilities. Issuance of periodic training bulletins by the NAPOLCOM for use in every department would do much to serve this need for continued in-service training.

Another need, and one which the NAPOLCOM is already well aware of, is for an institution of higher learning for career professional police officers at the command and administrative levels. The establishment of a Police College to fill this important need is of priority. It should serve a multi-purpose in including both short and long term courses, siminars and even undergraduate work in all phases of police management and administration.

No attempt will be made to present a lengthy discourse on the mechanics of developing such an institution, the capability to do so exists in the NAPOLCOM with assistance from the College of Public Administration and other Philippine Government agencies. This is merely to underline the need.

Another thought which comes to mind is that, given the role played by the Philippine Constabulary in certain law enforcement responsibilities, training of its personnel in civil police methods would seem in order. It would, therefore, appear logical that PC personnel be required to attend the Basic Police Course given at the Regional Academies.

All of this adds up to rather impressive progress to date, but what of the future? Given continued support, the NAPOLCOM has developed and continues to expand an expertise and capability as the prime coordinating force in bringing about continuing upgrading and professionalization of law enforcement throughout the Republic.

There now appears on the horizon a National Police Force. On September 6, 1973, at the occasion of the observance of the National Police Commission Anniversary, the President directed that the Chairman of the NAPOLCOM, Director of the NBI, and Chief of PC develop a plan to incorporate all police agencies into a National Police Force. Just what form this agency will take is unknown, and the purposes of this report are not such that the matter be explored.

There are, however, certain observations which are deemed germane. The major advantages to a national force are: 1) uniformity of standards in personnel matters such as recruitment, training, promotion, salaries, disciplinary actions, benefits and retirement; 2) uniformity in standards of performance through departmental regulations and inspections; 3) avoidance of duplicatory support services; 4) centralization of procurement procedures, to name a few.

Conversely, there are disadvantages worth noting: 1) A line of command by-passing local authorities all too often leads to less than satisfactory conditions which will vary from one locality to another depending almost solely on personalities.

2) This same command line tends to develop more responsiveness to higher headquarters and less to the public. In a public service oriented activity such as law enforcement must be, this detracts from police effectiveness. 3) Citizenry in any given locality view the police as outsiders sent to repress rather than assist and develop resentment instead of cooperation. 4) Centralized bureaucracy usually becomes multiplied several times over. 5) It tends to become more military in nature than civil, to name just a few.

Neither side of the coin as mentioned in the foregoing is detailed or by any means all inclusive. It merely proposes to point out the multiplicity of factors involved in the creation of such a force.

Interestingly enough, many of the items on the 'pro' side of the ledger have been or are being accomplished through the present use of the NAPOLCOM. In view of this, the GOP may want to consider the possibility of modified or alternative approaches. For example, a system whereby city departments remained autonomous subject to enforcement of provisions of the Police Act of 1966 by NAPOLCOM while the rural areas, including smaller municipalities, were serviced by a national force, including a paramilitary capability in those areas which required such a force. The Regional Academies would continue to provide the training for all police personnel.

This is but one of perhaps several alternatives which could be considered. Again, this report does not presume to recommend solutions on this point, but rather to point out the desirability of in-depth consideration of every alternative.

## CHAPTER VI

### RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the foregoing study the team offers the following recommendations for consideration by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It is recommended that:

#### Training:

1. Once the major task of giving basic training to all police personnel is completed, a concentrated effort be made to increase in-service and specialized training.
2. Supervisory and mid-level management training be given a high priority in this training.
3. The Training Branch of the NAPOLCOM develop a system of preparing and distributing on a regular periodic basis training bulletins to be used by all local departments for their own in-service, roll call type training.
4. The GOP give full support to the establishment of a Police College to develop qualified police officers at the Command and Administrative level.
5. Philippine Constabulary personnel be scheduled for the basic police course at the Regional Academies.
6. The NAPOLCOM and the USAID establish a formal arrangement for the selection and processing of participants for U.S. training.

#### Records

7. The need for accurate crime statistics be re-emphasized and, lacking local police voluntary compliance, positive steps be taken to enforce the requirement for timely and accurate submissions of the required data.

8. A renewed effort be made to develop a national repository of criminal records information. While the NAPOLCOM is not operational in nature, it may be the only agency which can require and get the necessary involvement of all forces.
9. The NAPOLCOM establish as a long-term goal a system of promotion examinations becoming more competitive in nature with the selection being restricted to higher scoring candidates.
10. As a lower priority, the same principle be applied to initial employment of police recruits.
11. Research efforts be fully supported as an essential ingredient of overall improvement of police effectiveness.

#### Communications

12. The USAID program Narcotics Fund support to provide a full-time Filipino technician to continue the methods successfully used in installation and maintenance of USG provided Narcotics Enforcement telecommunications equipment.
13. Due to his demonstrated capability and familiarity with the project, the USAID employ in this capacity the technician currently serving as Administrative Assistant to the Narcotics Enforcement Advisor.
14. Technical and management assistance required be provided through TDY services of a U.S. technician on an as-needed basis.
15. The USAID program 2 participants from the NAPOLCOM Communications Branch to attend the 12 weeks course in Telecommunications Management conducted at the International Police Academy in Washington.

16. Although any input of U.S. assistance is now precluded, the 1967 AID/OPS survey recommendations for a nation-wide communications service for all law enforcement agencies are still valid and consideration should be given to establishment of such a system.
17. In the establishment of a long-lines communications system as recommended above, provisions be made for tie-in with provincial LECS coordinating centers.
18. Both national and local governments continue the purchase of equipment to expand the basic provincial LECS to include key entities such as provincial engineering teams, community/provincial development offices and critical barrios.

#### General

19. In-depth studies of every possible alternative be made in connection with the proposed National Police Force, taking due notice of the important role of the NAPOLCOM as demonstrated by achievements to date.

PERSONS CONTACTED

PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

Brig. Gen. Manuel Salientes	Undersecretary, Dept. of National Defense
Col. Jose Salido	Special Assistant to the Secretary of National Defense on Police Matters
Hon. Cornelio S. Villareal	Governor, Capiz Province
Dr. Carlos Ramos	Dean, College of Public Administration, Univ. of the Philippines
Hon. Luis Santos	Mayor, Davao City

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION

Atty. Carmelo L. Agbayani	Commissioner
Atty. Vicente Carag	Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
Atty. Sergio Go	Asst. Commissioner, Planning
Atty. Arsenio Concepcion	Asst. Commissioner, Training
Atty. Alfredo Pagulayan	Asst. Commissioner, Inspection, Intelligence, and Investigation
Atty. Santiago Mandi	Asst. Commissioner, Administration
Col. Sixto de Leon	Asst. Commissioner, Communications
Mr. Amando Concepcion	Asst. Chief, Financial Management
Mrs. Maria Luisa Dimayuga	Training Coordinator

ATTACHMENT   A

Mr. Abelardo Tesoro

Asst. Chief, Inspection  
and Investigation

Mr. Mamerto Bermudez

Asst. Chief, Admin. Services

Col. Federico Langit

Office of Chief, PC

CENTRAL LUZON REGIONAL ACADEMY

Brig. Gen. Benjamin Reyes

Superintendent

Mr. Antonio Rodriguez

Asst. Chief, Training  
Officer

Mr. John Castro

Academic Director

DAVAO REGIONAL ACADEMY

Major Virgilio Javier

Chief Training Officer

RIZAL TRAINING ACADEMY

Atty. Tiburcio Hidalgo

Superintendent (on loan  
from NEDA)

Captain Carlos Javier

Chief of Police Marikina

Mr. Juan Magdatu

Training Coordinator  
(on loan from NBI)

Chief Isidro Gatmaitan

Chief of Police, Davao City  
PD

LTC. Roque N. Boquiren

Chief, Operations Bureau,  
Davao PD

Lt. Gregorio Lazarraga

Chief, Narcotics Div.,  
Angeles PD

Colonel Moises Llauder

Chief of Police, Angeles PD

Capt. Francisco Tanjuakio

Inspector, Angeles PD

Capt. Mariano Carbungo

Chief, Admin. Bureau,  
Angeles PD

Lt. Leonardo Yambao

Commander, Precinct 3,  
Angeles PD

Sgt. Orlando Macaspac

Chief, Narcotics Div.,  
Angeles PD

Col. Constancio Domingo

Chief Signal Officer, PC

Col. Vincente Natividad

Chief Communications,  
Presidential Security

U.S. GOVERNMENT

Embassy - USAID

Thomas C. Niblock

Director, USAID

John P. Hummon

Deputy Director, USAID

Arthur H. Boehme

Program Officer, USAID

Thomas Timberman

Political Officer, U.S.  
Embassy

Michael G. Picini

Regional Director, DEA

James L. McMahon

Public Safety Officer

Edward R. Bishop

Public Safety Advisor/  
Training

Frank R. Smith

Public Safety Advisor/  
Communications

Robert D. Long

Narcotics Enforcement Advisor

U.S. MILITARY

Colonel Forest Singhoff

Commander, OSI, USAF

Colonel William J. Cummings

Chief, Ground Forces  
Division, JUSMAG

Ltc. Roger Cook


Deputy Co, OSI, USAF

CITY OF MANILA  
 Comparative Crime Statistics  
 One Year Period Preceding Martial Law  
 (September 21, 1972)  
 and  
One Year Period Following

	<u>BEFORE</u>	<u>AFTER</u>	<u>% + or -</u>
<b>I. Crimes Against Persons</b>			
1. Murder	722	214	- 70.3%
2. Homicide	747	357	- 52.2%
3. Aggravated Assault	130	168	+ 29%
4. Other	<u>94</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>+ 9.5%</u>
TOTAL	1,693	842	-50.2%
<b>II. Crimes Against Property</b>			
1. Robbery	5,423	3,901	- 28%
2. Theft	4,109	4,377	+ 6.5%
3. Other	<u>3,021</u>	<u>2,296</u>	<u>- 24%</u>
TOTAL	12,553	10,774	- 14%
<b>III. Firearms Violations</b>			
1. Illegal Possession	249	38	- 84.7%
2. Concealed Weapon	<u>1,394</u>	<u>359</u>	<u>- 74.2%</u>
TOTAL	1,643	395	- 75.8%

Note: Other lesser crimes have followed a similar trend with an overall decrease of 18%.

ATTACHMENT B




KEY:

- 1. Valenzuela
- 2. Caloocan
- 3. Malabon
- 4. Navotas
- 5. Quezon City
- 6. Manila
- 7. San Juan
- 8. Marikina
- 9. Mandaluyong
- 10. Pasig
- 11. Makati
- 12. Pasay
- 13. Pateros
- 14. Taguig
- 15. Paranaque
- 16. Las Pinas
- 17. Muntinlupa

PROPOSED GEOGRAPHICAL  
REDISTRICTING OF THE  
METROPOLITAN MANILA  
AREA

Organizational Chart

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION




-46-

ATTACHMENT D

\*Chairman shall be concurrently Executive Officer

# NAPOLCOM REGIONAL TRAINING CENTERS



ATTACHMENT E

REGIONAL POLICE ACADEMIES  
AND  
AREAS SERVED

<u>Academy</u>	<u>Provinces</u>	<u>Cities</u>	<u>Police Strength</u>
1. Northern Luzon Baguio City	16	7	4,648
2. Central Luzon Fort Bonifacio-Manila	13	14	11,834
3. Bicol Legazpi City	6	3	1,585
4. Central Visayas Cebu City	3	9	2,116
5. Western Visayas Bacolod City	7	11	3,658
6. Eastern Visayas Tacloban City	5	3	1,676
7. Northern Mindanao Cagayan de Oro City	14	7	3,143
8. Western Mindanao Zamboanga City	7	9	1,701
9. Eastern Mindanao Davao City	3	1	1,332
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>31,693*</b>

\*All localities have not as yet complied with reporting strengths to NaPolCom. This total figure is estimated at approximately 37,000.

ATTACHMENT F

REGIONAL TRAINING ACADEMIES  
BASIC COMMODITY PACKAGE

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>COST</u>
1. Firearms & Marksmanship training equipment	\$1,909.10
2. Photographic - Cameras, Accessories, and developing equipment	634.71
3. Training Aids - Traffic, Criminal Investigation, Fingerprint	976.65
4. Audio Visual - Recorder, Projectors, PA System	1,602.99
5. Reloading Equipment	443.15
6. Office Equipment - Typewriters, Duplicators, Transformers	1,596.75
7. Transportation - Vehicle	3,200.00
8. Books	707.33
9. Sub-total raw cost of materials	11,070.69
10. PCHT @ 27%	2,999.05
11. Grand Total	14,069.74

Besides the listed items, a small package of Riot Control Equipment Weaponry and Munitions was provided to each academy. These items, however, were furnished under a special \$75,000 allotment of funds in 1969 and 1970 and were not originally intended for or provided to the academies. The RC material was procured and provided to a number of cities at a time when civil disorder was anticipated and was intended for operational use of the cities. When the disorders failed to materialize, the equipment provided to the cities wherein an academy was located was turned over to the academy to hold for possible future use and for training.

An additional approximately \$15,000 total was used to procure books for the academies' libraries.

ATTACHMENT G

## POLICE RECRUIT TRAINING COURSE

The whole course consists of lectures, conferences, demonstrations, practical exercises, field trips, training films, examinations, physical training and other field activities. Eight (8) hours of instructions and two (2) hours of field exercises are presented each day plus four (4) hours every Saturday for ceremonies, inspections or field trips. Six hundred forty-eight (648) hours for a period of twelve (12) weeks are required to complete this training course.

This program is organized into ten (10) divisions. Each division contains several subjects or related materials. Each subject is devoted to one phase of police work.

	<u>SUBJECTS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
I.	<u>GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS</u>	64
	1. Introduction to a Police Career	2
	2. History of the Police System	2
	3. Law Enforcement Code of Ethics	4
	4. Police Public Relations	4
	5. Psychology in Law Enforcement	2
	6. Police Act of 1966, Police Manual, Rules and Regulations and Other Orders	6
	7. Police Records	4
	8. Report Writing	6
	9. Use and Care of Police Equipment	2
	10. Police Signal Communications	2
	11. Police Weapons and Marksmanship	20
	12. Communism	4
	13. Organizations and Functions of the Police Commission, NBI, and the PC	6

ATTACHMENT H

II. LAWS AND LEGAL PROCEDURES

92

1. Criminal Law	34
2. Criminal Procedure, Mock Trial, and Courtroom Behavior	20
3. Criminal Evidence	20
4. Special Laws:	
a. Civil Service Law	2
b. Firearms and Explosive Laws	2
c. Land Transportation and Public Service Laws	2
d. Labor and Tenancy Laws	2
e. Customs and Immigration Laws	2
f. Fisheries Law	2
g. Games and Forestry Laws	2
h. Internal Revenue Code	2
i. Election Law	2
5. City or Municipal Ordinances*	

III. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, TECHNIQUES and PROCEDURES

55

1. Introduction to Criminal Investigation	2
2. Crime Scene Search	6
3. Notes-taking and Sketching	6
4. Crime Photography	4
5. Collection, Handling and Preservation of Evidence	6
6. Traces and Sources of Information	8
a) Background Investigation	
b) Police Intelligence	
7. Observation and Description	3
8. Surveillance and Undercover Work	8
9. Interviews and Interrogation	12

\*For local application. Time taken from Training Director's Time.

IV.	<u>INVESTIGATION OF SPECIFIC OFFENSES</u>	30
1.	Arson Investigation	4
2.	Homicide Investigation	8
3.	Theft, Robbery and Estafa Investigation	6
4.	Narcotics Investigation	4
5.	Traffic Accident Investigation	8
V.	<u>SCIENTIFIC AIDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION</u>	46
1.	Dactyloscopy	12
2.	Forensic Ballistics	4
3.	Questioned Documents	4
4.	Forensic Chemistry	14
5.	Medico-legal Aspects of Investigation	10
6.	Lie-Detection and Instrumental Detection of Deception	2
VI.	<u>POLICE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES</u>	78
1.	Patrol Procedures (Foot and Mobile)	8
2.	Roadblocks	4
3.	Pursuit Driving and Stopping-Approaching Violators	6
4.	Raids	4
5.	Vice and Rackets Control	4
6.	Juvenile Control	8
7.	Traffic Control	6
8.	Control of Civil Disturbances	30
9.	Handling and Escorting of Prisoners, Suspects and Insane Persons	4
10.	VIP Security	4

VII.	<u>CIVIC-ACTION SUBJECT</u>		22
	1. First Aid, Hygiene and Sanitation	12	
	2. Hog and Poultry Raising	6	
	3. Track Gardening	4	
VIII.	<u>PHYSICAL TRAINING</u>		120
	1. Physical Conditioning	60	
	2. Defensive and Disarming Tactics	30	
	3. Police Drill, Inspection and Formations	30	
IX.	<u>IN/OUT PROCESSING</u>		56
	1. Administrative In-Processing	8	
	2. Opening Ceremonies	4	
	3. Academic Orientation	2	
	4. Staff Briefing	4	
	5. Graded Examinations	24	
	6. Administrative Out-Processing	8	
	7. Rehearsal for Graduation	2	
	8. Graduation	4	
X.	<u>TRAINING DIRECTOR'S TIME</u>		<u>85</u>
	TOTAL . . . . .		648

POLICE PERSONNEL TRAINED

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>	<u>BASIC COURSE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>OTHER COURSES</u>
1. Baguio	4,648	1,459	31.4	-0-
2. Fort Bonifacio	11,834	5,845	49.4	6,046
3. Legazpi	1,585	1,365	86.1	28
4. Cebu	2,116	1,793	84.7	658
5. Bacolod	3,658	1,780	48.7	459
6. Tacloban	1,676	1,099	65.6	76
7. Cagayan de Oro	3,143	1,470	46.8	457
8. Zamboanga	1,701	622	36.6	62
9. Davao	1,332	390	29.3	293
TOTALS	31,693	15,823	49.6% <sup>70</sup>	8,079

GRAND TOTAL RECEIVING TRAINING -- 23,902

NAPOLCOM ACADEMIES  
SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Chiefs of Police	1,481
Crowd Control	2,274
Instructors	17
Investigation	599
Supervisors	201
Traffic Supervision	216
Advanced Management	68
Advanced Administrative	<u>54</u>
TOTAL	4,910

In addition to those above, there have been a variety of other courses for police and other government officials in a total of 3,169 for a grand total of 8,079 trainees in other than the Basic Course.

ATTACHMENT J

RESIDENT ADVISORS TO THE  
POLICE IMPROVEMENT SUB-PROJECT

Davao (also covering Zamboanga)	October 1971 - November 1973
Cagayan de Oro	October 1969 - July 1971
Legazpi	January 1970 - April 1971
Baguio	July 1971 - July 1972
Cebu (also covering Bacolod & Tacloban)	August 1969 - June 1972

These resident advisors served also as advisors to the Regional Training Academies in their respective areas of assignment.

ATTACHMENT K

SUB-PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POLICE  
COMMISSION AND \_\_\_\_\_ CITY FOR POLICE  
IMPROVEMENT

Objective

The overall objective of this Sub-Project Agreement is to strengthen and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the \_\_\_\_\_ City Police Department and to professionalize law enforcement work.

Responsibilities

The Police Commission and the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly undertake the following:

1. assist the \_\_\_\_\_ City Police Department in the development and implementation of the Police Improvement Program pursuant to the Project Agreement between the Agency for International Development and the National Economic Council signed on October 26, 1969; and,
2. subject to the terms and conditions of said Project Agreement, provide commodities the specific type and quantity of which are as determined by the POLCOM/USAID in-depth survey.

The City of \_\_\_\_\_ agrees to perform the following:

1. implement the specific recommendations of the Police Commission resulting from the POLCOM/USAID survey report of 1970;
2. provide funds for the cost of customs clearance, delivery from Manila to the project site, installation, operations and maintenance of the commodities, and to use them exclusively in the performance of duties by members of the \_\_\_\_\_ City Police Department;
3. integrate the local training unit to the POLCOM Regional Training Academy to facilitate the training of its members under the Chief Training Officer of the Police Commission, to provide in the Police Department "on-the-job" training for participants attending the POLCOM Regional Academy and to defray expenses incidental thereto excluding that for food and lodging. The prescribed course shall be determined by the Police Commission on recommendation of the \_\_\_\_\_ City Police Department;

ATTACHMENT L

4. require all members of the force to attend the training courses of the POLCOM Regional Academy on the basis of schedules arranged and convenient to the force; and
5. establish a records and accounting procedure for the commodities as prescribed by the Police Commission which will inspect the proper use of said commodities.

The City of \_\_\_\_\_ agrees further that the commodities will not be transferred, encumbered, disposed of or diverted for use of other government officials or offices and agencies or private person or persons.

Where it has been determined that the commodities are not properly utilized in accordance with the conditions provided herein, or where the specific recommendations for police improvement are not substantially implemented, or where the integration of the local training program with the POLCOM Regional Academy is not effected, the City of \_\_\_\_\_ agrees that POLGOM/USAID may change, modify or divert such commodities to other law enforcement agencies.


This agreement is entered into by and between the City of \_\_\_\_\_ represented by the City Mayor, and the Police Commission represented by the Chairman, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 1970, in the City of \_\_\_\_\_, Philippines.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Mayor

\_\_\_\_\_  
Chairman

\_\_\_\_\_  
City

**SAMPLING OF RADIO TRAFFIC  
CONDUCTED THRU PROVINCIAL LECS OVER A  
SIX (6) MONTH PERIOD**



Transceivers Procured Thru Trust Fund Account

PROCESSED

<u>Province/City/Municipality</u>	<u>FM-1</u>	<u>FM-5</u>	<u>FM-10</u>	<u>PC-230</u>	<u>HC-100</u>	<u>SSB</u>
1. Leyte		20				
2. Baguio	3		5			
3. Laguna	3	5				
4. Calamba, Laguna	5	5				
5. Pavia, Iloilo	2	4				
6. San Fernando, Pampanga	1	6				
7. Agusan del Sur		16				
8. Bulacan		2				
9. Camarines Sur		1				
10. Pangasinan		25				
11. Quezon City				54	4	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>14</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>4</u>	

BEING PROCESSED

1. Albay	3	3				
2. Barotac, Nuevo, Iloilo		4				
3. Cagayan de Oro City		3				
4. Camarines Sur	2					
5. Isabela		22				1
6. Iligan City	6	2				
7. Puerto Princesa City		4				
8. Zamboanga City	10	8				
9. Zamboanga del Sur	10	10				2
10. Zambales		10				
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>31</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>5</u>			<u>3</u>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<u>45</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>

SUMMARY

FM-1	45
FM-5	150
FM-10	5
PC-230	54
HC-100	4
SSB	<u>3</u>

TOTAL . . . 261

ATTACHMENT N

Statement of  
Balances of Dollar Trust Fund

PROCESSED

	<u>Amount Deposited</u>		<u>PO #</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Balance</u>
1. Leyte	₱65,000.00	\$10,101.00	92-91-2	\$9,658.74	549.90
2. Baguio Laguna	45,000.00) 25,000.00)	10,865.35	92-210-2	11,056.97	1,126.58
3. Calamba, Laguna Pavia, Iloilo	36,000.00) 19,300.00)	8,156.34	92-44-2	8,037.89	118.45
4. San Fernando, P.	24,100.00	3,716.87	92-592-2	3,716.87	-
5. Agusan del Sur	62,000.00	9,053.40	92-97-2	8,906.94	209.07
6. Police Commission					
a. Bulacan	13,100.00)				
b. Bataan	4,486.20)				
c. Camarines S.	10,000.00)				
d. Cotabato S.	5,600.00)				
e. Camiguin	1,700.00)				
f. Lanao del Norte	9,857.12)	29,862.42	92-383-3	21,566.20	
g. Misamis Occ.	5,000.00)				
h. Pangasinan	100,000.00)				
i. San Juan	2,728.38)				
j. Tarlac	2,726.70)				
k. Zambales	1,300.00)				
7. Police Commission					
a. San Juan	30,140.05)				
b. Bacolod	24,802.50)	13,727.80	92-88-4	7,705.87	
c. Pampanga	7,000.00)				
d. Cotabato	10,000.00)				
8. Quezon City	262,000.00	38,643.07	92-814-3 92-719-3	15,364.50 17,656.88	5,478.60
TOTAL . . . .	₱766,840.95	\$124,126.25			

ATTACHMENT O

BEING PROCESSEDAmount Deposited

9. Police Commission		
a. Zamboanga City	₱52,500.00	\$7,777.77
b. Zambales	46,000.00	6,814.81
c. Rizal	8,239.35	1,220.64
d. Barotac, Nueva	16,864.00	2,498.37
e. Iligan City	24,000.00	3,555.55
f. Isabela	100,000.00	14,814.81
g. Pampanga	5,000.00	740.74
h. Agusan del Norte	3,500.00	518.51
i. Davao Oriental	<u>6,000.00</u>	<u>888.88</u>


TOTAL . . . ₱262,103.35 \$38,830.08

10. Police Commission		
a. Capiz	20,000.00	2,985.07
b. Aklan	6,500.00	962.96
c. Surigao del Sur	6,000.00	888.88
d. Laguna	3,340.00	494.95
e. Puerto Princesa	15,200.00	2,251.85
f. Zamboanga N.	7,000.00	1,037.03
g. Cagayan	10,000.00	1,481.48
h. Palawan	10,000.00	1,481.48
i. Davao del Sur	6,500.00	962.96
j. Legazpi City	6,000.00	888.88
k. Zamboanga S.	10,500.00	1,555.55
l. Albay	29,256.88	4,334.35
m. Southern Leyte	7,000.00	1,037.03
n. Camarines Sur	6,500.00	962.96
o. Davao City	22,000.00	3,259.25
p. Davao del Norte	6,000.00	888.88
q. Zamboanga S.	95,570.00	14,158.51
r. Angeles City	7,000.00	1,037.03
s. Calocan City	44,320.00	6,565.92
t. Cagayan de Oro	22,000.00	3,259.25
u. Northern Samar	7,000.00	1,037.03
v. Bataan	6,000.00	888.88
w. Surigao del Norte	10,000.00	1,555.55
x. Bohol	15,000.00	2,222.22
y. Antique	5,600.00	829.62
z. Batangas	<u>10,000.00</u>	<u>1,555.55</u>

TOTAL . . . ₱394,287.70 \$58,583.12

GRAND TOTAL . . . ₱1,423,232.00 \$221,539.45

NAPOLCOM COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH



ATTACHMENT P

Provincial Law Enforcement Communications System  
Percentage of Counterpart Funding  
To USAID Support

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<u>Province</u>	<u>GOP Funds</u>	<u>USAID Funds</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>GOP %</u>
1. Negros Occidental	\$ 6,966	\$ 24,499	\$ 31,465	22%
2. Rizal	6,000	13,183	19,183	31%
3. Lanao del Norte	6,426	14,698	21,124	43%
4. Misamis Oriental	6,350	22,012	28,362	22%
5. Bulacan	7,797	17,253	25,050	31%
6. Laguna	10,824	21,263	32,087	33%
7. Tarlac	5,183	9,106	14,289	36%
8. Zambales	11,325	14,295	25,620	44%
9. Bataan	5,563	9,527	15,090	36%
10. Cavite	5,561	17,550	23,111	24%
11. Albay	9,280	18,574	27,854	33%
12. Cebu	7,251	17,074	24,325	29%
13. Leyte	17,251	18,599	35,850	48%
14. Agusan del Norte	4,440	6,877	11,317	39%
15. Iloilo	10,020	24,492	34,512	29%
16. Ilocos Norte	5,303	11,340	16,643	31%
17. Nueva Ecija	7,087	20,495	27,583	25%
18. Benguet	4,331	11,545	15,876	27%
19. La Union	5,240	14,717	19,957	26%
20. South Cotabato	5,397	10,570	15,967	33%
21. Camarines Norte	2,554	7,625	10,179	25%
22. Batangas	8,528	17,748	26,276	32%
23. Marinduque	3,241	5,208	8,449	38%
24. Camiguin	2,006	4,150	6,156	32%
25. Camarines Sur	8,717	22,300	31,017	28%
26. Palawan	7,844	20,412	28,256	27%
27. Pampanga	8,195	23,468	31,663	25%
28. Cotabato	10,305	23,059	33,364	44%
29. Misamis Occidental	5,582	12,970	18,552	30%
30. Sorsogon	2,818	12,292	15,110	18%
31. Kalinga-Apayao	5,357	16,096	21,453	24%
32. Ifugao	490	6,769	7,259	6%
33. Abra	3,862	16,594	20,456	23%
34. Pangasinan	20,682	18,337	39,019	53%
35. Ilocos Sur	7,554	20,373	27,927	27%
36. Capiz	9,201	12,771	21,972	41%
37. Davao Oriental	4,898	12,097	16,995	28%
38. Davao del Norte	7,037	13,630	20,667	34%
39. Antique	6,355	12,151	18,506	34%
40. Aklan	3,389	14,417	17,806	19%
41. Quirino	999	5,380	6,379	15%
42. Southern Leyte	5,364	12,317	17,681	30%
43. Nueva Vizcaya	2,905	8,966	11,871	24%
44. Zamboanga del Sur	22,449	20,504	42,953	52%

ATTACHMENT Q

	<u>GOP</u> <u>Funds</u>	<u>USAID</u> <u>Funds</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>GOP</u> <u>%</u>
45. Samar	\$ 5,397	\$ 17,710	\$ 23,107	23%
46. Northern Samar	8,729	17,014	25,743	33%
47. Catanduanes	3,871	13,401	17,272	22%
48. Agusan del Sur	11,684	898	12,582	92%
49. Davao del Sur	5,866	16,295	22,161	26%
50. Batanes	952	5,393	6,345	15%
51. Isabela	22,643	28,648	51,291	79%
52. Surigao del Sur	6,516	12,607	19,123	51%
53. Cagayan	7,350	18,580	25,930	28%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>380,935</b>	<b>787,849</b>	<b>1,168,784</b>	<b>32%</b>

City

1. Bacolod	5,861	6,498	12,359	47%
2. Silay	308	2,245	2,553	12%
3. Cagayan de Oro	5,590	6,199	11,789	47%
4. Iligan	4,027	2,701	6,728	59%
5. Legazpi	2,283	9,041	11,324	20%
6. Cebu	2,023	12,643	14,666	13%
7. Baguio	8,439	8,055	16,494	51%
8. Tacloban	2,318	8,104	10,422	22%
9. Zamboanga	10,724	8,977	19,701	54%
10. Olongapo	4,009	16,693	20,702	19%
11. Davao	10,124	19,637	29,761	34%
12. Angeles	4,786	15,321	20,107	23%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60,492</b>	<b>116,114</b>	<b>176,606</b>	<b>34%</b>

Municipality

1. Las Pinas	1,077	4,069	5,146	20%
2. Mandaluyong	769	2,306	3,075	25%
3. Marikina	2,462	12,620	15,082	16%
4. Navotas	767	2,105	2,872	26%
5. Paranaque	923	3,122	4,045	22%
6. Pasig	1,153	6,280	7,433	15%
7. San Juan	5,619	3,146	8,765	64%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,770</b>	<b>33,648</b>	<b>46,418</b>	<b>27%</b>

**GRAND TOTAL**                      \$454,197                      \$937,611                      \$1,391,808                      32%

## PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

1. Conference. A province is selected jointly by NaPolCom/ USAID to receive LECS support. A conference with cognizant local government officials is scheduled and attended by the provincial governor, members of the provincial board, and the mayors and chiefs of police of each city and municipality of that province. The USAID telecom advisor and his NaPolCom counterpart discuss in detail what the project consists of and what is required of the governor and mayors in the areas of costs, materials, and personnel.
2. Board Resolution. The provincial board must pass a resolution to assure that the Governor, Board members, and treasurer concurs in the support of the communications system. They must also agree to continue this support after the installation of the equipment. The resolution states that funds will be available as needed and that permanent positions will be immediately created for technicians.
3. Project Agreement. Following receipt by NaPolCom of the provincial board resolution, a sub-project agreement is signed by the Provincial Governor and the Chairman of the NaPolCom. The province then initiates recruitment action for radio technicians.
4. Technical Survey. NaPolCom and USAID conduct a study of each city and municipality within the province, to determine the type of communications (VHF/or SSB) equipment needed, the location of the radio transceiver and the type of antenna required. Concurrently, with the technical survey, applicants for the position of provincial LECS technician are tested and recommendations forwarded to the provincial governor. A list of locally available materials are given to the provincial engineer.
5. Technicians. Following examination and appointment, each technician must sign a minimum of two years contract with the provincial government. These men are then assigned to NaPolCom communications training school at Fort Bonifacio in Manila for a period of 8 weeks during which time they undergo intensive training on the specific radio equipment they will use. NaPolCom feeds and houses these men during

ATTACHMENT R

their training. The province pays the transportation costs and salaries. During the final two weeks of training, the radios which will be installed in the province, are released to the technician by USAID for alignment and preparation for shipment. The radios, then the property of the Provincial Government, are crated and retained at NaPolCom warehouse until such time as all project support requirements have been met. The technicians also assemble their own test equipment which they will utilize in performing maintenance.

6. Police Operator Training. Each city/municipal and provincial government must send a minimum of 3 people to attend a 3-day radio operators training seminar. NaPolCom instructors are sent to the provincial capitol to conduct this training.
7. Antenna Masts. The fabrication and installation of antenna supports are the responsibility of the provincial engineer or contractor. They are erected during the period the provincial radio technicians are being trained.
8. Storage Batteries. The provincial government purchases a storage battery for each fixed radio transceiver provided. Extra batteries are purchased in order to assure network operation during recharging of depleted batteries.
9. System Installation. Prior to releasing project commodities for transport to the province, USAID and NaPolCom conduct a final inspection in each province to determine that:
  - a. Operational and maintenance facilities are established;
  - b. All antenna masts are correctly installed;
  - c. A sufficient quantity of storage batteries are on hand and fully charged;
  - d. At least 3 men or women have been trained as operators for each fixed station; and
  - e. The trust fund agreement has been signed and a peso check for spare parts for the second and third years operation has been deposited with USAID.

10. Turnover. Following a reasonable period during which technical and operational problems, if any, are resolved, the LECSis officially turned over to the provincial government. From this point on, all expenses and personnel requirements are met by local governments, with USAID and NaPolCom performing periodic reviews of the effectiveness of the LECS.



STATUS OF PROVINCIAL LECS PROGRAM  
December 31, 1973

Operational - 53

Abra	Iloilo
Albay	Isabela
Agusan Norte	Kalinga-Apayao
Agusan Sur	Laguna
Aklan	Lanao Norte
Antique	La Union
Bataan	Leyte
Batanes	Leyte Sur
Batangas	Marinduque
Benguet	Misamis Occidental
Bulacan	Misamis Oriental
Cagayan	Negros Occidental
Camarines Norte	Nueva Ecija
Camarines Sur	Nueva Vizcaya
Camiguin	Palawan
Capiz	Pampanga
Catanduanes	Pangasinan
Cavite	Quirino
Cebu	Rizal
Cotabato	Samar
Cotabato South	Samar Norte
Davao Norte	Sorsogon
Davao Oriental	Surigao Sur
Davao Sur	Tarlac
Ifugao	Zambales
Ilocos Norte	Zamboanga Sur
Ilocos Sur	

In Process - 18

Bohol	*Negros Oriental
*Bukidnon	Quezon (includes Aurora Sub-Province)
*Eastern Samar	
Lanao del Sur	*Romblon
*Maguindanao	Siquijor
*Masbate	Sultan Kudarat
Mindoro Occidental	Sulu
Mindoro Oriental	*Surigao Norte
*Mountain Province	Tawi-Tawi
	Zamboanga Norte

Newly Created -- Basilan

\* Expect to finish before project termination.

ATTACHMENT S

# PROVINCIAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

BATANES (6) 153,450  
ESTABLISHED OCT. 1973

ILOCOS NORTE (1-19) 152 600  
ESTABLISHED APRIL 1971

ABRA (22) 153-125  
ESTABLISHED 31 DEC 72

ILOCOS SUR (34) 152 675  
ESTABLISHED 22 JAN 73

LA UNION (20) 152 500  
ESTABLISHED JUNE 1971

BENQUET (1-13) 152 600  
ESTABLISHED MAY 1971

PANGASINAN (2-45) 152 550-152 800  
ESTABLISHED 8 JAN 73

PAMPANGA (1-21) 152 800  
ESTABLISHED JULY 1972

ZAMBALES (1-13) 153 350  
ESTABLISHED MAY 1970

BATAAN (12) 153 750  
ESTABLISHED JULY 1970

CAVITE (3-19) 153 150  
ESTABLISHED MAY 1970

BATANGAS (1-30) 153 175  
ESTABLISHED JAN 1972


MARINDUQUE (7) 153 675  
ESTABLISHED DEC 1971

NORTHERN SAMAR (25) 153.325  
ESTABLISHED OCT. 1973

SAMAR (25) 153 450  
ESTABLISHED OCT. 1973

PALAWAN (1-19) 4466 0  
ESTABLISHED JUNE 1972

AKLAN (17) 152.775  
ESTABLISHED OCT 1973



\* WILL NOT BE ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO AUG. 17 1974

PROVINCE	CITY/MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPTS
COMPLETED ● 53	1148
ON - GOING ● 18	341
<b>TOTAL 71</b>	<b>1487</b>

POLICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

NUMBER OF TRANSCEIVERS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>FM-1</u>	<u>FM-5</u>	<u>FM-10</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Angeles City	15		15	30
2. Bacolod City	16	11		27
3. Baguio City	9		10	19
4. Cagayan de Oro City	9	13		22
5. Cebu City	17	24		41
6. Davao City	15	25		40
7. Iligan City	6	5		11
8. Legazpi City	12	16		28
9. Olongapo City	10		23	33
10. Silay City	3	5		8
11. Tacloban City	8		10	18
12. Zamboanga City	8	4	13	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>302</b>

RIZAL PILOT PROJECT

1. Las Pinas	4	9		13
2. Mandaluyong	4	4		8
3. Marikina	4	1	15	20
4. Navotas	4	5		9
5. Parañaque	3	7		10
6. Pasig	5	16		21
7. San Juan	4	7		11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>93</b>

**COST OF THE POLICE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT & THE RIZAL PILOT PROJECT**

Police Improvement Project - - - - \$118,117.86

Rizal Pilot Project - - - - - 35,789.13

**TOTAL - - - - - \$153,906.99**

ATTACHMENT T

TRANSCEIVERS IN USE  
BY  
NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT TEAMS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>TEAMS</u>	<u>BASE</u>	<u>MOBILE</u>	<u>HAND-HELD</u>
Baguio	1	1	1	2
Olongapo	1	1	1	2
Angeles	1	1	1	2
Manila	5	1	5	10
Quezon	2	1	2	4
Caloocan	1	1	1	2
Makati	2	1	2	4
Pasig	1	1	1	2
Zamboanga	1	1	1	2
Tacloban	1	1	1	2
Davao	1	1	1	2
Bacolod	1	1	1	2
Legazpi	1	1	1	2
Cagayan de Oro	1	1	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>		14	20	40

TOTAL TRANSCEIVERS IN USE -- 77\*

\*This number includes 3 additional Base/Mobile transceivers retained at USAID for distribution to coordinating agencies during joint narcotics enforcement operations.

ATTACHMENT U

TRANSCEIVERS TO BE ISSUED  
TO NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT TEAMS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>TEAMS</u>	<u>BASE</u>	<u>MOBILE</u>	<u>HAND-HELD</u>
Manila	2	-	7	14
Quezon	2	-	2	4
Makati	1	-	1	2
Parañaque	1	1	1	2
Pasay	1	1	1	2
Marikina	1	1	1	2
San Juan	1	1	1	2
Las Piñas	1	1	1	2
Mandaluyong	1	1	1	2
Navotas	1	1	1	2
Malabon	1	1	1	2
Batangas	1	1	1	2
Cebu	3	1	3	6
NBI	5	1	5	10
<b>TOTAL</b>		11	27	54

TOTAL TRANSCEIVERS -- 92

TRANSCEIVERS PLANNED FOR  
NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT TEAMS WITH  
FY 74 FUNDS

<u>City</u>	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Mobile</u>	<u>Hand-Held</u>
Butuan	1	1	1	2
Cabanatuan	1	1	1	2
Dagupan	1	1	1	2
Iloilo	1	1	1	2
Naga	1	1	1	2
PC Anti-Narcotics Unit	8	3	8	16
Anti-Smuggling Action Center	5	3	5	10
TOTAL		11	18	36

TOTAL TRANSCEIVERS -- 65

ASAC SEIZURES  
April 1, 1972 - March 31, 1973


<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
1. Opiates	
Crude Opium	920.6 kg
Morphine Base	2.66 kg
Heroin bulk	64.06 kg
2. Marijuana	
Plants	25,096
Seedlings	17,304'
Seeds	10.61 kg
Dried Leaves	96.8 kg
Hashish	39.96 kg
Dried flowers	45.10 kg
3. Others	
Mandrax	327,800 Tablets

ATTACHMENT V

# FY 72-73


## NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT MANPOWER TEAMS AND LOCATIONS

### NOVEMBER



# FY-74

## MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND AGENCIES NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT PROJECTS



NARCOTICS TEAMS  
ARRESTS AND SEIZURES

<u>Locality</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Seizures</u>	
		<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Manila	549	Seconal	4 tablets
		Mandrax	5 tablets
		Optalidon	28 tablets
		Marijuana cigarettes	1,106
		Marijuana	1 gram
		Syringe	6
		Morphine cigarettes	1 pk
		Barbiturate	14 pcs.
		Hashish	3 blocks
		Hashish	3 tubes
		Sosegon	2 capsules
		Extraphoxyphone	3 amples
		Raw opium	600 grams
		Phenobarbital	270 tablets
		Seconal	3 capsules
		Equanil	4 tablets
		Amytal	317 tablets
		LSD-25	10 papers
Quezon City	173	Heroin	1.5 kg.
		Morphine	1.5 kg
		Amytal Sodium	63 tablets
		LSD	Several (?) tablets
		Mandrax	Several (?) tablets
		Seconal	Several (?) tablets
		Optalidon	Several (?) tablets
		Qualude	Several (?) tablets
Fadormir Ativan	Several (?) tablets		
Caloocan City	119	Marijuana	44 joints
		Marijuana	21 plants
		Herion	167 packets
		Optalidon	90 tablets
		Seconal	107 capsules

ATTACHMENT Y

		Biphетamine	6 tablets
		Theranal	12 capsules
		Valium 5	10 tablets
		Tropax 5	1 bottle
		Mercodol	50 bottles
Angeles City	129	Marijuana	30.9589 grams
		Opium	600 grams
		Herion	7 trays
		Hashish	2 bricks
		Mercodol	1 tablet
		Pento Barbiturate	5 ampules
Olongapo City	724		
Davao City	76	Marijuana	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ kilos
		Benzedrine	2 tablets
		Phenedrine	5 tablets
		Others	10 tablets
San Juan, Rizal	826	Phenobarbital	11 tablets
		Phenobarbital	16 capsules
		Marijuana cigarette	1
Paranaque, Rizal	5	Manicured Marijuana	7 bags
		Marijuana cigarettes	385
		Marijuana Paraphernalia	3
		Cigarette wrapper	1 bundle
Pasay City	11	Marijuana sticks	67
		Marijuana	2 plastic bags
		Theranal	1 papelitos
Legapi City	4		
Makati, Rizal	96	Marijuana sticks	3
		Marijuana seeds	several
		Marijuana dried leaves	$\frac{1}{2}$ kg
		Marijuana cigarettes	281
		Marijuana wrapper	31
		Marijuana butts	5
		Marijuana leads	8

		Barcarol	1 tablet
		Pantian	1 capsule
		GEA	42 tablets
		Nermi-Nex	1 tablet
		Mercodol	1 bottle
		Corex	1 bottle
		Barbiturate	10 capsules
		Amital	5 capsules
		Red Devil	2 capsules
		Gadexel	3 tablets
		Deck Herion	15
		Ativan	4 tablets
		Raw opium	$\frac{1}{2}$ kg
Marikina, Rizal	30	Marijuana	184 joints
		Optalidon	30 tablets
		Yellow jacket	8 tablets
		Bluebird one	4 tablets
Baguio City	42	Marijuana plants	75
		Marijuana sticks	28
		Opium poppies	90 plants
		Mercodol syrup	30 c.c.
		Barbiturates	19 tablets
Cagayan de Oro City	15	Ativan	4 tablets
		Cerax	2 tablets
		Dexedrine	1 tablet
		Mandrax	5 tablets
		Tonovan	6 pcs.
		Sosegon	2 vials
		Cantaridas	1
Cebu City	34	Marijuana plants	67
		Dried Marijuana leaves	72 lids
		Marijuana roaches	2
		Marijuana leaves	4 match boxes
		Marijuana cigarettes	2

Pasig, Rizal	30	Marijuana cigarettes	376
		Marijuana plants	11
		Seconal	1 capsule
		Mandrax	1 tablet
Zamboanga City	13		
Mandaluyong, Rizal	5	Marijuana	119
		Marijuana sticks	121 gms.
Navotas, Rizal	18	Marijuana sticks	22
Malabon, Rizal	3	Marijuana	1 plastic bag= 22.1553 gms.
		Marijuana roaches	13=0.7172 gms. 7=0.3188 gms.
Bacolod City	7	Marijuana	$\frac{1}{2}$ kg
		Suspected opium derivative	75 capsules
		Suspected barbiturates	5 tablets

Republic of the Philippines  
Office of the President  
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION  
Quezon City

NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS CONTROL  
AND INVESTIGATION COURSE NO. 7  
FORT BONIFACIO, RIZAL  
January 28 to March 1, 1974

January 24 to 27, 1974

8:00 - 5:00 p.m. REGISTRATION

28 January - Monday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m. Opening Ceremonies & Orientation  
1:30 - 3:00 p.m. Recognition, Definition & Extent of  
Drug Problem  
3:00 - 4:30 p.m. Historical Background of Drug Abuse  
in the Philippines

29 January - Tuesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m. Physical Development  
8:00 - 10:00 a.m. The Need for Specialized Narcotics and  
Dangerous Drugs Investigation  
10:00 - 12:00 p.m. Reasons on Causes of Drug Dependency  
1:30 - 3:00 p.m. Local Illicit Drug Traffic  
3:00 - 4:30 p.m. The international Illicit Drug Traffic

30 January - Wednesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m. Physical Development  
8:00 - 10:00 a.m. Profile of Drug Abusers  
10:00 - 12:00 p.m. Modus Operandi of Pushers  
1:30 - 4:30 p.m. Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972

31 January - Thursday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m. Physical Development  
8:00 - 12:00 p.m. Drug Origin and Classification and  
Drug Identification  
1:30 - 4:30 p.m. Drug Identification and Field Testing:  
Depressant, Stimulants, Hallucinogens  
and Diliriant

ATTACHMENT Z

1 February - Friday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Organization of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Units
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	The Role of Customs on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.	Social Aspects and Attitude Development in Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (Class #6 and 7 combined)

4 February - Monday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Treatment and Rehabilitation Program in the Philippines (Class #6 and 7 combined)
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Medico-Legal Aspects of Drug Dependency (Class #6 and 7 combined)
1:30 - 3:00 p.m.	International Drugs Control and the Role of the Dangerous Drugs Board (Class #6 and 7 combined)
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.	The Role of Police in Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (Class #6 and 7 combined).

5 February - Tuesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Therapeutic Indications & Methods of Administration of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Pharmaco-Psycho-Physiological Effects of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
1:30 - 3:00 p.m.	Community Drug Abuse Prevention Program (Class #6 and 7 combined)
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.	The Role of Schools in Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (Class #6 and 7 combined)

6 February - Wednesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	The Role of Mass Media on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Prevention and Control (Class # 6 and 7 combined)
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Martial Law and the New Society on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Prevention & Control (Class #6 and 7 combined)
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.	Training Films Projection (Class #6 and 7 combined)

7 February - Thursday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Sources of Information on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Investigation
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Clandestine Laboratories
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.	Interviews and Interrogations in Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs Cases (Class #6 and 7 combined)

8 February - Friday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Surveillance and Undercover Operation (Class #6 and 7 combined)
1:30 - 3:00 p.m.	Written Examination
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.	Class Organization (Election of Class Officer)

11 February - Monday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Mechanics of Arrest in Narcotics Cases
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Narcotics Raids
1:30 - 3:00 p.m.	Collection and Preservation of Narcotics Evidence
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.	Search & Seizures

12 February - Tuesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Procedures in Filing Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Cases and Testifying in Court (Class #6 and 7 combined)
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.	Crime Photography (Class #6 and 7 combined)

13 February - Wednesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Firearms Proficiency Basic Classroom (Class #6 and 7 combined)
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Briefing on Surveillance & Undercover Operation Practical Exercises (Class #6 and 7 combined)
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.	Moot Court on Narcotics Cases (Class #6 and 7 combined)

14 February - Thursday

8:00 - 7:00 p.m.      Surveillance and Undercover Operation  
Practical Exercises (Class #6 and 7  
combined)

15 February - Friday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.      Physical Development  
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.      Critique on Surveillance & Undercover  
Operation  
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.      Report Making on Narcotics Cases  
(Class #6 and 7 combined)  
1:30 - 3:00 p.m.      Written Examination  
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.      Training Films Projection (Class #6 and  
7 combined)

18 February - Monday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.      Physical Development  
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.      Briefing on Narcotics Raids Practical Exercises  
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.      Training Films Projection  
(Class #6 and 7 combined)  
1:30 - 5:00 p.m.      Narcotics Raids Practical Exercises  
(Class #6 and 7 combined)

19 February - Tuesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.      Physical Development  
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.      Critique on Narcotics Raids & Video  
Tape Showing  
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.      Briefing on Search & Seizures  
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.      Search and Seizures (car, place, person,  
etc.) (Class #6 and 7 combined)

20 February - Wednesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.      Physical Development  
8:00 - 4:30 p.m.      Firearms Proficiency Training (Basic-  
Slow Fire-shooting Range)

21 February - Thursday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.      Physical Development  
8:00 - 12:00 p.m.      Practical Examination on Field Testing  
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.      Training Film Projection

22 February - Friday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Drug Problem Presentations
1:30 - 3:00 p.m.	Written Examination
3:00 - 4:30 p.m.	Training Film Projections (Class #6 and 7 combined)

25 February - Monday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 4:30 p.m.	Firearms Qualification (Class #6 and 7 combined)

26 February - Tuesday

7:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.	Field Trips to Tagaytay and Trece Martires Rehabilitation Centers (Class #6 and 7 combined) with IPA & DEA graduates
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27 February - Wednesday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.	Report Presentation on Observations and Comments of Field Trips
10:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Resumae
1:30 - 4:30 p.m.	Final Examination

28 February - Thursday

5:00 - 6:00 a.m.	Physical Development
8:00 - 12:00 p.m.	Field Trips to Drug Laboratories (Class #6 and 7 combined) with IPA & DEA graduates
1:30 - 4:00 p.m.	Open Forum on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and Drug Problem Presentations (Class #6 and 7 combined)
4:00 - 5:00 p.m.	Staff Time (Graduation Preparations) (Class 6 and 7 combined)

1 March - Friday

10:00 a.m.	GRADUATION EXERCISES
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PHILIPPINES  
PUBLIC SAFETY MAN YEARS  
1956-1974

	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74		
WILLIAMSON	—————																				CPSA
BETSCH				—————																	CPSA
WHITMER				—————																	Training
MCAHON							—————														(CPSA) Training
HAMBLETON								—————													Training
SIMMLER								—————													CPSA
KREUTZER										—————				—————							R & I
HENSEL											—————										Crim
HOYLE												—————									LOG
SMITH, Wm													—————								Traf
RILEY												—————								Inv	
GUTH											—————			—————							Org & Admin
SMITH, Frank																					Commo
MERSETH															—————						Training
ROGERS															—————						Training
BOYCE																—————					Training
PHIPPEN																	—————				Training
BISHOP																	—————				Training
LONG																		—————			Narc
MOXLEY																		—————			Training
MAN YEARS	.5	1	1	1.5	2	2	1.5	2	2.5	2.5	4	6.5	6.5	6	7.5	8	8.5	7.5	2.5		73.5

ATTACHMENT AA

PARTICIPANT TRAINING IN THE U.S.

<u>FY</u>	<u>TYPE COURSE</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTENDED</u>
FY 69	IPA GOC	21
	Instructor Methods	(20)
	Traffic	(1)
FY 70	IPA GOC	5
	Instructor Methods	(5)
	Police Executive Training	<u>1</u>
		<u>6</u>
FY 71	IPA GOC	6
	Instructor Methods	(6)
	IPA SOC	2
	FBI NA	2
	Ammunition Reloading	1
	Police Executive Training	<u>2</u>
		<u>13</u>
FY 72	IPA GOC	9
	Criminal/Security Investigation	(2)
	Narcotics	(2)
	Traffic	(2)
	Instructor Methods	(3)
	IPA SOC	2
	Technical Investigation Course #5	<u>2</u>
		<u>13</u>
FY 73	IPA GOC	17
	Instructor Methods	(6)
	Criminal Security Investigation	(4)
	Police Community Relations	(1)
	Patrol Operations	(1)
	Traffic Control	(1)
	Records & Identification	(2)
	VIP Security	(2)

ATTACHMENT BB

FY 73

IPA SOC

4

Police Adv'd Telecom Technician Training

1

Police Records Management

2

Technical Investigation Course #7

3

Police Executive Training

1

28

INTERNAL SECURITY PROJECT

Funding FY 1969-1973  
((\$000))

	<u>69</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Technicians	137.7	188.2	211.5	237.4	256.6	1031.4
Participants	45.5	11.9	31.5	30.4	49.5	168.8
Commodities	360.3	542.8	607.6	443.3	338.6	2292.6
Contract Services <sup>1/</sup>	-	-	-	7.1	-	7.1
Other <sup>2/</sup>	-	-	1.5	-	-	1.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>543.5</b>	<b>742.9</b>	<b>852.1</b>	<b>718.2</b>	<b>644.7</b>	<b>3501.4</b>

<sup>1/</sup> Contract Secretary  
<sup>2/</sup> Invitational Travel Orders

ATTACHMENT CC

POLICE IMPROVEMENT SUB-PROJECT

City Contributions

Baguio (Started FY 70)

	<u>Police Budget</u>
70	₱ 982,500 -
71	1,241,200
72	1,008,950
73	<u>1,300,000*</u> Estimated
	₱4,532,650 = \$686,765

Land, construction, maintenance and operations of project items Trust Fund procurement. (\$8,000)  
Manpower, new headquarters under construction, estimated ₱388,000 @ ₱6.6 - \$1 = \$58,787.

Legazpi (Started FY 70) -

	<u>Police Budget</u>
70	₱ 267,750
71	409,800
72	475,000*
73	<u>510,000*</u>
	₱1,662,550 = \$251,901.51

Land, etc. ₱250,000 = \$37,878

ATTACHMENT DD

Bacolod (Project terminated FY 72)

	<u>Police Budget</u>
69	₱ 1,650,000
70	1,490,000
71	1,650,000
72	<u>1,500,000</u>
	₱ 6,290,000 = \$953,030

Land, etc. ₱50,000 = \$7,575

Cebu (Started FY 70, terminated March 1972)

	<u>Police Budget</u>
70	₱ 3,700,000
71	3,700,000
72	<u>3,950,000*</u> Estimated
	₱11,350,000 = \$1,719,696

Land, new jail, 6 vehicles - ₱150,000 = \$22,727

Tacloban

	<u>Police Budget</u>
70	₱ 372,450
71	415,160
72	425,000* Estimated
73	<u>440,000*</u>
	₱ 1,652,610 = \$250,395.45

Land, new building, etc. - ₱75,000 = \$11,363

Cagayan de Oro (Terminated FY 72)

	<u>Police Budget</u>
69	₱ 652,625
70	751,560
71	751,560
72	<u>775,000*</u> Estimated
	₱ 2,930,745 = \$444,052.27

Equipment, building improvement - ₱200,000 = \$30,303.00.

Zamboanga (Started FY 71)

	<u>Police Budget</u>
71	₱ 1,083,015
72	1,200,000* Estimated
73	<u>1,300,000*</u> Estimated
	₱ 3,583,015 = \$542,881.06

Equipment, building improvements, etc. - ₱160,000 = \$24,252.

Davao (Started FY 72)

	<u>Police Budget</u>
72	₱ 2,123,433
73	<u>2,500,000*</u> Estimated
	₱ 4,623,433 = \$700,520.15

Building improvement, equipment, maintenance -  
₱528,000 = \$80,000.

	<u>POLICE BUDGET</u>		<u>ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION FOR PROJECT SUPPORT</u>	
Baguio	₱ 4,532,650	\$ 686,765.00	₱ 388,000	\$58,787
Legazpi	1,662,550	251,901.51	250,000	37,878
Bacolod	6,290,000	953,030.00	50,000	7,575
Cebu	11,350,000	1,719,696.00	150,000	22,727
Tacloban	1,652,610	250,395.45	75,000	11,363
Cagayan de Oro	2,930,745	444,052.27	200,000	30,303
Zamboanga	3,583,015	542,881.06	160,000	24,252
Davao	4,623,433	700,520.15	528,000	80,000
	<u>₱36,625,003</u>	<u>\$5,549,241.43</u>	<u>₱1,801,000</u>	<u>\$272,885</u>