



**TERMINATION
PHASE-OUT
STUDY
PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT**

BOLIVIA

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MAY 1974

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523**



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MAY 1974

RICHARD P. RAUGI

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Terms of Reference

U.S. Public Safety assistance has been provided to the Government of Bolivia to develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of its civil police forces. At the project's initiation and during its progress mutually agreed objectives and courses of action were established and at times adjusted to achieve overall goals as well as to accommodate changing situations in the country. Both host government and U.S. resources were programmed and employed to jointly strive toward these goals.

Due to U.S. congressional action, the continued input of U.S. Government resources planned for this project must be terminated sooner than anticipated and prior to the achievement of these goals and objectives mutually established by the two governments.

It is therefore the purpose of this report to note the progress made thus far and to enumerate what remains to be accomplished in order to achieve project goals. The report also includes recommended actions which the Government of Bolivia should take, employing its own resources, but under the circumstances excluding in-country assistance by the U.S.

B. Conduct of Study

The study conducted by Richard P. Raugi, OPS/W, began on 5 May 1974 and ended on 11 May 1974. Evaluation material was gathered from interviews and discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel, Bolivian Government officials and visits to police installations located in La Paz. Travel into the interior was not feasible due to the limited time available for completion of this study.

Sincere appreciation is expressed to all persons contacted who were most cooperative and helpful. (Ref: Attachment A).

Prior to returning to Washington, the writer discussed the findings with Mission A.I.D. Deputy Director, Program Officer and Public Safety Officer.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY

A. Internal Security Situation

A major threat to Bolivia's internal security is the marked increase in urban crimes which is attributed to an exorbitant rise in staple food prices and a migration of peasants to urban areas that compounds the existing critical unemployment.

An organized guerrilla movement prevalent during the early 1960's has apparently been abolished. Student unrest is limited to infrequent non-violent strikes and labor strikes are minimal.

B. Observations and Conclusions

The evaluation focused primarily on the National Police Headquarters and principle departments that have received US assistance since 1957:

National Guard - Guardia Nacional de Seguridad Publica

National Directorate of Investigations (DIN) - Direccion de Investigacion Nacional

Traffic Department - Direccion Nacional de Transite

US commodity and technical assistance have been well received and were utilized advantageously by Bolivian counterparts. There is some concern regarding maintenance of operable equipment and replacement of worn out equipment. There are 118 jeep type vehicles assigned to activities responsible for patrolling major urban areas. Sixteen of the vehicles are more than ten years old and 7 are not salvageable.

For the most part, planned program targets and objectives have been achieved on schedule since PSD was reestablished in Bolivia in 1970. A primary goal, manpower development through academic training, has progressed satisfactorily as is explained in item D, Section IV: Expansion of the Basic Police School will enable an increase in the number of recruits trained each year, thereby insuring a reservoir of trained manpower.

C. Recommendations

Detailed recommendations for the Government of Bolivia to consider are to be found in Section VI of this report. The major thrust of the recommendations is in five areas: training, motor maintenance, communications, patrol operations and narcotics control. A shortage of funds coupled with improper deployment of personnel and a scarcity of qualified technicians are underlying factors that affect each area.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL SECURITY

Internal security of the country rests primarily on the ability of the Bolivian National Police and other Government agencies to protect the citizens and their property from attack by lawless elements, insurgents and external forces.

Mob violence and overt insurgency such as political assassinations, kidnappings and robbery have almost vanished. Recently there has been a marked increase in crimes against persons and offenses which involve the loss of personal property. A lack of systematic records precludes an accurate portrayal of criminal acts throughout the Republic. A senior police officer stated that in his opinion the rate of increase in crimes against persons and property is alarming and does constitute a major threat to the stability of the nation.

The few demonstrations by students and labor unions in recent months were orderly and authorities were able to contain the protesters. However, climbing staple food prices and food shortages created an inflationary condition that is potentially dangerous. A dissatisfied populace may trigger a great number of disorderly outbursts and agitated protests will ensue. One such incident occurred 21 January 1974 after the government announced an almost 100% increase in the cost of bread, flour, sugar, rice and noodles. Peasants blockaded roads and isolated the city of Cochabamba for several days thereby paralyzing all commerce until government officials declared a state of siege on 28 January.

Cultivation of coca plants is a major threat because organized crime is attracted by the profit potential of illicit cocaine alkaloids. More detailed information regarding this subject is reflected in Section H, Chapter IV.

CHAPTER IV

CIVIL SECURITY FORCES

A. National Police

1. Mission

The Bolivian National Police is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and is charged by the constitution to: 1) preserve public order; 2) defend society through its specialized agencies, and 3) enforce laws.

2. Organization

The National Police consist of three elements: 1) the National Guard, 2) National Directorate of Investigation (DIN) and 3) the Traffic Police (Attachment B: Organizational Chart). The principal roles, functions, strengths and weaknesses of each element are reflected in subsequent sections E, F, and G of this chapter.

Deployment of police personnel (officers, enlisted men and civilians) appears to be based on the high crime rate and importance of government activities. Half of the uniformed force and about 60% of the plainclothes investigators are assigned to La Paz that has about 700,000 inhabitants. Rural and other urban areas are neglected as a result of this concentration of police elements.

The initial survey, conducted in 1956, disclosed that the Bolivian National Police was fragmented. Each of the principle elements; 1) the Corps of National Police and Carabineros, 2) the National Traffic Police, and 3) the Political Police, functioned as an independent force. Interdepartmental communication, coordination and cooperation were limited or nonexistent.

During the life of the program the Office of Public Safety has focused on the formulation of measures designed to correct weaknesses in the organizational structure and effect a realignment of functions, thereby creating an efficient, unified law enforcement

agency under a single commander - the Director General of the National Police. Objectives and goals designed to bring about the needed changes were formulated and specific recommendations were made to the Minister of Interior.

In January 1965, during the time the program was dormant, the Corps of Police and Carabineros was abolished and the National Guard and the Directorate of Criminal Investigation were established. In theory the three major departments were subordinate to the Director General of the National Police. In practice they remained autonomous and the line of command between the departments and the Minister of Interior bypassed the Director General of the National Police.

At the conclusion of the program the conditions outlined above still exist. The commander of the National Police has line control over the entire police force but exercises only staff control over the Traffic and Investigations Departments in La Paz. Because of inaccessibility and limited communications he has no control over the elements of these two departments that are in the interior.

The National Police's administrative staff has recommended organizational changes that will improve the chain of command thereby centralizing authority and eliminating duplication of effort. Hopefully, the proposals will be approved by the Minister of the Interior and implemented in the near future.

B. Personnel

The National Police is a volunteer force staffed by career officers and senior NCOs but the working policeman is recruited on a one year basis. Although the attrition rate is unknown, police authorities admit that the annual turnover of the lower enlisted grades, unlike that of officers and NCOs, is quite high due to inadequacy of pay and allowances, unwillingness to work in rural areas and the lack of fringe benefits. Recruiting requirements are: 1) certificate of military service; 2) simple literacy examination; 3) stringent physical examination; 4) birth certificate and, 5) age 19-30 years. Actual strength at the time of the survey was 8,332 officers and enlisted men. A breakout by grade and department is indicated in Attachments C and D. The use of project trained manpower is found to be superior.

C. Transportation

A dire shortage of transportation hampers the operational effectiveness of the National Police and is considered to be a major deficiency. The fleet, consisting primarily of jeeps and trucks, is barely adequate to police urban areas. Outside the cities, law enforcement personnel must walk or travel by privately owned vehicles or bicycles. The Bolivian Military Air Transport Service is used for official air travel within the country.

A modest vehicle maintenance shop was recently established in La Paz. It is staffed by three mechanics who attended an A. I. D. sponsored auto maintenance course in Panama in 1973. Four trainees are undergoing on-the-job instruction that is conducted by two mechanics. The other mechanic is assigned to the radio patrol division where he inspects, services and maintains assigned vehicles or sends the vehicles to the main shop for further action.

D. Training

Prior to 1956, most police training was on-the-job training. Enlisted men received about 4 months training in field units under the direct supervision of a capable policeman or NCO. When the training stint was completed, the individual was assigned to a permanent unit for duty. Officers underwent paramilitary training at the cadet college.

The major thrust of the PS program has been to improve operational effectiveness. The principle vehicle used was the upgrading of individual skills through participant and in-country training. Since the start of the program in 1957, PS technicians have been involved in all facets of training such as planning and construction of facilities, establishment and management of institutions; preparation of programs of instruction and lesson plans based on assessments of police operations; training trainers; formal classroom presentation by individual advisors and the acquisition of training aids and academic materials.

As of 1 February 1974, over thirteen thousand commissioned officers and enlisted men have undergone special or recruit training. Most of this achievement can be traced to the PS program. For further information see Attachment G.

Since the arrival of Public Safety in 1956, the curriculum, methods of instruction and training facilities have improved vastly. More in-service training is conducted by the academy, select courses have been established for many technical skills, unit schools have been activated and officers are being sent abroad for training.

Officers assigned to the National Guard must successfully complete three years of instruction at the Cadet Academy which offers a well implemented program in all police disciplines and academic subjects. Graduates are commissioned second lieutenants.

Officers aspiring for promotion to major must successfully complete the one year course offered at the Captain's School.

Public Safety programs have emphasized in-service training and the establishment of special unit schools such as the Captain's School, Superior Officer's School and Basic Police School.

In-country training facilities located in the La Paz area are:

- 1) A military type cadet college was in operation in 1956. Through Public Safety efforts in 1963, a new facility was constructed by USAID using counterpart funds. The college is proportionately staffed; well equipped and can accommodate 100 students. This is a three year accredited college and graduates are commissioned second lieutenants.

- 2) The Captain's School for the National Guard is a one year course for captains who are eligible for promotion to major. The facility is furnished meagerly and consists of one classroom that can accommodate only 40 students and a combination auditorium-cafeteria. The Captain's School is staffed by seven officers. Students eligible to attend are captains with at least 3 years in grade, an unblemished record of service and a minimum of eight years service.

- 3) The Superior Officers School is two years old and officers a two year course to senior officers who must pass college level examinations to enter. It can accommodate 20 students and is staffed by six officers. Students must maintain a passing average or are dropped from training thus affecting their future promotions. This facility is extremely small with one classroom and two faculty offices. It is sparsely furnished with borrowed furniture.

4) The basic Police School recently inaugurated through the perseverance of Public Safety Advisors, accommodates 50 enlisted students and is staffed by six officers. The four month course consists of all police disciplines. In order to graduate students must maintain a passing average. Graduates are encouraged to continue study privately. Upon receipt of high school diplomas they become eligible to enter the Cadet College. The facility is an antiquated frame building without kitchen or bathrooms. Personnel must bathe in the river that is approximately 1 mile distant and must use the toilet facilities of the nearby cadet college. There are no beds and the students sleep in sleeping bags on the wooden floors. The school's facilities are wholly inadequate.

Since the inception of the A. I. D. Public Safety program, 175 officers have been trained abroad.

Numerous graduates of the Inter-American Police Academy in Panama, and the International Police Academy in Washington, D. C., have been promoted and occupy key positions in the police department. However, more of these officers should be utilized in functions that provide training to enlisted personnel. For details of third country and USAID funded training in the US see Attachment G.

The training program, while fulfilling current minimal requirements, should be augmented and expanded on a nationwide basis through the use of mobile training teams composed of qualified and highly motivated instructors.

E. National Directorate of Investigations (DIN)

This element is responsible for the investigation of crimes nationwide and also conducts political investigations. The present strength is about 1,607 officers and men who are deployed throughout the Republic (Attachment D: Personnel Distribution/Pay and Allowances). The major functional departments are:

Personnel Division
Administrative Division
Operations Division
Non-Criminal Identification Division
Intelligence Unit
Radio Section
Crime Laboratory
INTERPOL

The two principle operating elements are (1) the Criminal Investigation Branch - which is commanded and staffed by career police officers; in addition to investigating common crimes, the branch is frequently required to assist in the investigations of political offenses; (2) the Political Investigation Branch - most of whose assigned personnel are untrained political appointees is responsible for handling these investigations.

When the PS program was reactivated in August 1970, the US Mission/Bolivia restricted the amount and type of support for DIN. Limitations were imposed because of DIN's responsibility to investigate political offenses and the intermarriage of the two principle operating elements. Ensuing PS support consisted of technical advice to activities concerned solely with criminal investigations and providing limited laboratory equipment.

The Office of Public Safety has recognized the professional shortcomings of DIN and recommended to the Minister of Interior: 1) that a career police officer be assigned to command DIN; (Historically, the commander has been a military officer.) 2) that the Political Investigation Branch be divorced from DIN and placed under the jurisdiction of the Investigation Service of the Ministry of Interior.

The crime laboratory and the records and identification sections are the nucleus of a promising system. The leadership appears to be good. Additional training and equipment are required.

F. Traffic Department

The Traffic Department is headed by a Director General in La Paz. Its responsibilities include traffic enforcement, accident investigation, intersection control, vehicle licensing and inspection. Grades and salaries of the 1,296 man force are comparable to those of the National Guard (Attachment C: Personnel Monthly Pay and Allowances). It possesses only a limited preliminary and practically no follow-up investigative capability. The traffic police unit has a fair capability for traffic control within La Paz city. Performance is handicapped by a lack of adequate training and a shortage of weapons, communications and transportation.

G. National Guard

The National Guard was created by Supreme Decree No. 07016 in January 1965. The organization parallels classic military lines with Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Logistics Divisions. Also, on the same level are Civic Action, Public Relations and the Fire Department.

The National Guard has national jurisdiction and authority and is responsible for providing uniformed police services throughout the Republic. Specific functions are law enforcement and patrol services in urban and rural areas, control of civil disturbances and demonstrations, border control, operations and prison guard service. Most of the 5,429 man force is assigned to the La Paz area (Attachment C: Personnel Monthly Pay and Allowances). The enforcement services provided in urban areas are minimal and coverage in the interior is considered inadequate. As with other law enforcement activities, the National Guard has been plagued by a chronic lack of funds and a shortage of equipment. The patrol commander is constantly realigning operations in order to improve police services in La Paz. He, too, is hampered by inadequate transportation, poor communications and a shortage of personnel.

The National Guard is unable to patrol the international borders in an effective manner because of inferior training and a shortage of equipment.

Mobility is deficient since only 15 vehicles are assigned to the National Guard for patrolling the 10 zones in La Paz city. The patrol force operates two 12 hour shifts daily. Each shift consists of 5 mobile patrols and 3 standby vehicles that are not radio equipped. Systematic mobile patrols are scheduled but not carried out because of a fuel shortage. Generally, patrols stand by in designated areas awaiting service calls.

H. Narcotics

Narcotics suppression is a major concern. While the production, sale, transport and use of the coca leaf in Bolivia are legal, it is illegal to process or extract the alkaloid from the leaf. The best areas for growing the coca bush are the Yungas area of La Paz and Cochabamba. The leaves are harvested, dried and compressed into 50 lb. blocks that are transported by truck or railroad to markets, groceries and restaurants throughout the country. A great percentage of the coca

finds its way into illicit factories where the alkaloid is extracted from the leaf and reduced to crystals. Refinement of two hundred pounds of leaves produces one kilo of cocaine. Bolivian officials estimate 50 kilos of cocaine are exported monthly to the US via Peru, Chile, Argentina or Brazil. Despite the narcotics control unit's lack of resources there has been a marked increase in seizures and arrests during the past two years.

A direct result of the 1970 Public Safety Narcotics survey was the activation of the Bolivian Narcotics Bureau (BNB) in February 1971. The activation and operation of the BNB was opposed by DIN INTERPOL, the police agency that was previously responsible for narcotics investigations.

The first twelve men assigned to the BNB attended an 80-hour Public Safety-sponsored narcotics training course. A.I.D.-funded communications and training equipment, jeeps, cameras, etc., were allotted to the BNB. Persistent urging by USAID Public Safety resulted in the transfer of BNB to the National Guard Radio Patrol Section under the operational control of the Director General. The number of BNB operations continued to be limited because of inadequate funds and retention of the vehicles by INTERPOL.

BNB became fully operational in June 1972 when PS provided \$19,000 to cover operations and administrative support for a six month period. By astute planning and frugality, BNB made these funds last for two years. Agents were able to travel into the interior and follow up leads on cocaine sellers and clandestine laboratories. Currently BNB is the most effective narcotics enforcement unit in Bolivia. In addition to a marked increase in the number of arrests and seizures, many persons have been arrested for attempted bribery of BNB agents.

The Narcotics Law that was promulgated in January 1972 directed that the BNB be responsible for all narcotics investigations. However, INTERPOL, National Intelligence Service and Criminal and Political Investigative Branches continue to investigate incidents involving narcotic agencies. Only direct intervention by the Presidential Palace will stop this overlapping of functions.

Through CY 1972, 94.070 kilograms of cocaine sulfate and chlorohydrate were confiscated. During CY 1973, 139.157 kilos were confiscated and in the first quarter of 1974, narcotics agents seized 47.942 kilos, arrested 202 suspected cocaine traffickers and destroyed 89 clandestine factories.

I. Riot Control

The riot control unit is a well trained, quick reaction force that has a strength of 350 men. There is a shortage of individual and organizational type equipment. A recent inspection disclosed a dangerously low level of expendable riot control items. The unit is housed together with the National Guard Radio Patrol.

J. Communications

A nationwide, 18 station radio network using 100 watt single side band radios provides voice communications between the National Police General Directorate at La Paz and subordinate commands. The equipment is in poor condition and provides only marginal communications.

The sole police communication repair facility is located in a 12' x 12' room on the third floor of Police Headquarters. The furnishings are meager and repair equipment consists of a few old spare parts, testing equipment; a small work bench, storage rack, small cabinet and a few hand tools.

Funds have not been made available for procurement of badly needed spare parts. Normally, when telecommunications equipment fails, technicians are compelled to cannibalize other units or components in the shop in order to obtain the needed parts. As a last resort emergency purchases are authorized.

CHAPTER V

THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

A. Description

Upon request of the Bolivian Government (GOB) OPS/AID, Washington, D.C. conducted a survey of the National Police in August 1956. The Public Safety Program got underway with the arrival of the first advisor in April 1957. Over the next seven years joint planning and improved management, coupled with training and the receipt of commodities, increased the operational effectiveness of the National Police. Due to internal affairs the Public Safety Program lapsed into a state of inactivity in November 1964. This dormant condition prevailed until December 1966 when the GOB requested that the program be revitalized. Beginning in mid 1967, the reestablished program helped the police recover their capacity to provide law enforcement services. In late 1969 the program suffered another setback that continued until July 1970. After a period of concerted negotiation, specific joint objectives were established and a modest program was instituted and continued until termination in mid 1974.

From inception to the present, in terms of USG inputs, this has been a very modest program with funding over the 17 year period totalling \$2,553,000. Of this total 29% has been for technicians' salaries, 12% for participant training, 43% for commodities and 16% for other costs (Attachment F: funding breakout).

At the time of Public Safety's arrival the performance of the national law enforcement activities was considered poor in comparison to similar US agencies. It was felt that many of the deficiencies could be corrected through fiscal action by the government and reorganization of the major police elements. Other deficiencies could be resolved by the gradual modification of traditional concepts and attitudes. Definite improvements have been made in all areas. Formal training in new methods, techniques and procedures has been greatly intensified with a corresponding advance in individual efficiency. Lack of funds continues to be a significant problem.

The police image has improved. An active group of enlightened, dedicated police officers are converting the department into a professional civil force, thereby enhancing public trust and confidence.

1. Technicians

During the life of the project the following individuals were assigned to Bolivia as technicians:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Echols, Lee	Feb. 57	May 59
Salseda, Michael N.	Feb. 57	Jan. 62
Morris, Rex D.	Sep. 61	Jul. 63
Cleary, Vincent W.	Mar. 63	Oct. 64
Mann, Robert	Jul. 63	Jan. 64
Leondris, Nicholas	Jan. 64	Sep. 66
Jackson, Jacob	Jan. 64	Aug. 64
Matos, Jorge	May 64	Dec. 64
Murray, Hugh E.	Aug. 66	Aug. 68
Reinhart, James L.	Sep. 67	Jul. 69
Hinojosa, Jose A.	Dec. 67	Nov. 69
Phillips, Allen R.	Aug. 68	Jul. 69
Dela Torre, David	Aug. 70	Mar. 74
Ruiz, Anthony A.	Aug. 70	Oct. 72
Arroyo, David S.	Oct. 73	Jun. 74

2. Commodities

Total expenditures for commodities over the 17 year period has been \$1,090,000. The largest single category of commodities has been police weapons, the remainder for transportation, communications, crime detection aids, riot control, training aids, spare parts and office equipment. A general breakout is shown in Attachment E.

3. Participant Training

This component of the project, while costing only a total of \$295,000 in USG funding, has perhaps had the greatest impact on the project. As of 30 September 1973, a total of 175 Bolivian National Police personnel have received training in the United States or third country through Public Safety programming. Of the total 73 were trained at the International Police Academy.

The mix of specialized skills involved has covered a wide spectrum designed to meet the diversified requirements of the National Police. The degree to which the GOB and Public Safety identified needs and planned training to meet those requirements are reflected in the types of training programmed. Those are reflected in Attachment G.

4. Host Country Contributions

In the past contributions to the Public Safety program by the Bolivian Government had been limited almost entirely to the provision of manpower to the various projects.

B. Observations and Conclusions

Some goals, established after the Public Safety program was reinstated in 1971, have not been fully accomplished primarily because of the non availability of funds. Most of the GOB police budget is required to pay personnel salaries and allowances. The remainder is insufficient to meet other important needs. Much headway has been made in the fields of training, motor maintenance, patrol operations and in particularly the control and suppression of narcotics. An effective communications system including spare parts and a fully equipped maintenance facility has not been developed.

Urban policing is conducted by all elements of the national police. Equipment is lacking, particularly arms, riot control, vehicles and communications. No teletype system links departmental forces to La Paz and the mobile radio system is limited.

Patrolling, investigations, records and identification are weak.

The civil disturbance capability of the National Police is good.

Host country officials indicate the most pressing problem in rural law enforcement operations is a lack of vehicles and communications. In some regions, messengers and/or civilian telegraph services are used to communicate with regional headquarters.

Overall, the public image of the National Police is fair.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

Narcotics

1. Immediate selection of additional personnel to bring the Narcotics Division to full authorized strength of twenty eight men. All personnel should be specially selected, trained and equipped to carry out this high priority mission.

Communications

2. Formal identification by technicians of all equipment, components and spare parts required to repair, maintain and operate police communications.
3. Procurement of equipment, spare parts and components needed to maintain the nationwide system.

Training

4. Selection of a cadre of instructors and formation of mobile training teams to train policemen assigned to the interior.
5. Optimum use of international training institutions (i. e., IPA, FBI, Narcotics and Customs) should continue.
6. In-country physical facilities should be expanded to meet training needs and provide other services that will promote students' well being. The training budget must include funds for furnishings, equipment, visual aids, administrative supplies and health and welfare services and equipment.

7. The Basic Police School should be capable of training a minimum of 200 students per trimester instead of only 50. Funds should be allocated to build a new facility or expand the present school.
8. Student selection should be made on a nationwide basis.

Patrol Operations

9. National Guard patrol services should be given financial priority by the GOB in order to purchase vehicles, communications and repair equipment that is needed to carry out an effective law enforcement program that will prevent crime and protect persons and property.

Motor Maintenance

10. Train and assign at least six additional mechanics to the automotice repair shop. Funds must be provided to purchase a tow truck, tools, testing equipment and spare parts required to provide preventative maintenance on a continuing basis.

PERSONS CONTACTED

Embassy of the United States of America

Ambassador William P. Stedman, Jr.
Mr. Arthur W. Mudge, AID Deputy Director
Mr. Frank W. Brecker, Assistant Director, Program Office
Mr. Angel M. Diaz, Deputy Program Officer
Mr. Frank Ravendal, Political Officer
Mr. Fred La Trash, Political Officer
Mr. David Arroyo, Public Safety Officer
Mr. Frederico Murillo Valle, Public Safety Division Technician

Government of Bolivia

Cnl. Pablo Caballero Diaz
Commandante General de la Policia Nacional

Cnl. Emilio Pelaez Ortiz
Director General de la Guardia Nacional

Cnl. Emilio Arce Zapata
Jefe del Departamento de Relaciones Publicas
del Comando General de la Policia

Cnl. Napoleon Vilaseca Velez
Director de la Escuela de Capitanes

Major Luis Arce Ferrufino
Jefe de Transportes de la Guardia Nacional

Mayor Jaine Ferrel Aneiva
Director de la Escuela Basica

Cnl. Juan Bustillo Gallardo
Director de la Academia de Policia

Cnl. Edgar Rendon Paravicini
Commandante del Regimiento #1

Mayor Jose Avalos Vera
Commandante de Radio Patrulla


ATTACHMENT A

Guido Lopez Villegas
Jefe de la Oficina de Narcoticos

Mayor Hugo Borda Borda
Jefe de Operaciones de la
Oficina Nacional de Narcoticos

Dr. Gaston Ledezma Rojas
Sub Secretario de Justicia

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE



NATIONAL POLICE

Uniform Personnel Monthly Pay and Allowances (Bolivian Pesos)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>National Guard</u>	<u>Traffic Dept.</u>	<u>Salary</u>	<u>Bonus</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Housing</u>	<u>Total Per Individual</u>
Colonel	102	1	210.00	2155.00	655.00		3020.00
Lt. Col.	171	8	190.00	1875.00	655.00		2720.00
Major	159	31	180.00	1585.00	655.00		2420.00
Captain	216	100	170.00	1445.00	655.00		2270.00
1st Lt.	161	103	160.00	1305.00	655.00		2120.00
2nd Lt.	260	53	150.00	1115.00	655.00	54.00	1920.00
Warrant Officer (Sr)	102	17	116.00	1095.00	655.00	54.00	1720.00
Warrant Officer	205	111	112.00	899.00	655.00	54.00	1570.00
Sergeant (1st)	137	95	102.00	609.00	655.00	54.00	1420.00
Sergeant (2nd)	161	32	101.00	510.00	655.00	54.00	1320.00
Corporal	238	100	100.00	436.00	655.00	54.00	1245.00
Private	3517	645	91.00	390.00	655.00	54.00	1190.00
TOTAL	5429	1,296					

Present rate of exchange is 20 Bolivian pesos to 1 US \$.

NATIONAL POLICE

Department of Investigations Monthly Pay and Allowances (Bolivian Pesos)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Salary</u>	<u>Bonus</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Housing</u>	<u>Total Per Individual</u>
Inspector General	4	210.00	2155.00	655.00		3020.00
Inspector	16	190.00	1875.00	655.00		2720.00
Chief Commissioner	40	180.00	1585.00	655.00		2420.00
Commissioner	88	170.00	1445.00	655.00		2270.00
Sub-Commissioner	182	160.00	1305.00	655.00		2120.00
Detective (1st Class)	208	150.00	1115.00	655.00		1920.00
Detective (2nd Class)	271	116.00	705.00	655.00	54.00	1530.00
Detective (3rd Class)	164	106.00	545.00	655.00	54.00	1360.00
Investigator	634	91.00	390.00	655.00	54.00	1190.00
TOTAL	1607					

Present rate of exchange is 20 Bolivian pesos to 1 US \$.

MOLIVIA

Commodity Profile

FY 62	\$190,000	12,000 Grenades, CN including projectiles Radio spare parts & misc. electrical equipment 12 Vehicles 6 Base radio stations and equipment 250 shotguns; 500 revolvers; other misc. weapons & am Excess property
FY 63	\$250,000	1 Beech aircraft 36 Vehicles 6 Base radio stations Lab and photo equipment Investigation kits 11 Motorcycles 28 Mobile radio units Radio spare parts, test equipment Misc. electrical equipment
FY 64	\$360,000 (*)	1,250 Carbines, .30 cal. 200 Revolvers, .38 50 Guns, CN 1 Motorcycle 2 Outboard motors 6 Generators and misc. equipment Misc. NEC items 1 Wrecker 650,000 rds. carbine ammo 100,000 rds. ammo .38 1,200 CN proj. 2-19' Boats 18 Portable radios Misc quartermaster items 18 SSB manpack radios 17 Trucks 1 Bus
FY 65	\$ 52,000	4,000 Grenades 2,000 Grenades, CN 300 Masks, CN 500 Cannisters, CN
FY 66	\$ 0	

*) Additional funds provided under Supporting Assistance Agreement

ATTACHMENT E

Commodity Profile

FY 67	\$ 41,000	1 wagoner auto
		500 revolvers
		75,000 rounds .38 ammo
		Aircraft engine and spare parts
		Surplus: 660 blankets
FY 68	\$ 28,599	5 Trucks/Cargo
		300 Cartridges, Training
		1,900 Grenades, Training
		900 Projectiles, Training
		250 Gas Masks
		2 Reloading Equipment Units w/furnaces
FY 69 - Vehicles	\$ 0	14 Films
Telecom	0	43 Gas Guns
Weapons	32,978	1,008 Tear Gas Projectiles
General	<u>1,500</u>	250 Gas Masks
Total	\$ 34,478	200 Smoke Grenades
FY 70 - Vehicles	\$ 68,850	1,500 Tear Gas Grenades
Telecom	30,585	504 Tear Gas Projectiles
Weapons	48,657	600 Revolvers P .38
General	<u>7,550</u>	50 Shotguns 12 ga.
Total	\$155,642	3,000 Shotgun shells
		1,750 Grenade launcher cartridges
		20 Jeeps
		2 lots Jeep spare parts
		4 File cabinets
		22 FM-1 Radios
		25 FM-5 Radios - 15 jeep, 5 gw, 5 siren
		4 lots Radio spare parts
		15 Sirens
		15 Red Emergency Lights
		3 HF-SSB Transceiver <i>Marco</i>
		2 Tape Recorders
		1 Slide Projector
		2 Instamatic Camera
		1 16 mm projector
		1 lot police lab equipment

Commodity Profile

FY 71 - Vehicles	\$21,075
Telecom	-
Weapons	40,325
General	<u>2,700</u>
Total	\$64,100

2,000 Tear gas grenades
 4,488 Tear gas projectile
 1,000 Shot shell, 12 gauge
 20 Safety shields
 20 Launcher grenades
 2 Jeeps
 2 Trucks, 1-1/2 ton
 1 Truck van, 3/4 ton
 1 lot Vehicle spare parts
 50 Handcuffs
 30 Revolvers
 4 kgs Pistol powder
 1 Bullet Mould, 10 cavity
 20 CS Primers (pistol)
 1 lot Lab supplies
 1 Movie projector
 1 Overhead projector
 10 Mx. Targets
 1 lot Fingerprint supplies.

FY 72 - Vehicles	\$ 59,000
Telecom	11,600
Weapons	26,936
General	<u>6,014</u>
Total	\$103,550

2 Trucks, Stake
 12 Trucks, 4x4 (Jeeps)
 1 lot Vehicles spare parts
 20 Radios, FM-5B
 1 lot Radio accessories
 20 Riot shields
 30 Carbines, 30 cal.
 1 Bomb squad body armor
 165 MX Primers (small pistol)
 6 kegs Pistol powder
 10 MX Targets
 200 stk Bullet lub
 84 Revolvers .38 cal.
 100 Riot helmets.
 2056 Tear gas grenades (CN)
 30 MX Cartridge cases
 27 MX .38 cal. ammo
 5 MX .30 lal ammo (carbine)
 1 lot Shop tools (vehicle)
 10 Emergency red lights
 10 Sirens

FY 73 - Vehicles	\$ 28,825.00
Telecom	-
Weapons	33,604.14
General	<u>4,075.00</u>
Total	\$ 66,504.14

6 Truck, utility 4 x 4
 1 Carryall 4 x 4
 4,488 Tear gas Projectile
 992 Grenade tear gas
 20 Gas gun
 100 Gas mask
 50 Revolvers .38
 8 Mx. Cartridge .31
 50 Pr Handcuffs
 5 Mx Shell shotgun
 2 M. Restraining Cuff disposable, Ny
 100 Haversack, munition
 100 Sleeping bags
 8 Typewriter 13", 16", 18"
 1 Calculator machine

PAST FISCAL YEARS' ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>FY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TECH</u>	<u>PART</u>	<u>COMMOD</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
63	\$413	\$41	\$25	\$250	\$97	
64	\$445	\$61	\$12	\$304	\$68	Inc. \$304 SA
65	\$104	\$46	\$4	\$52	\$2	Inc. \$53 SA
66	\$13	\$13				
67	\$62	\$14	\$7	\$41		
68	\$109	\$53	\$15	\$29	\$12	
69	\$117	\$72	\$13	\$32		
70	\$209	\$41	\$8	\$159	\$1	
71	\$133	\$55	\$9	\$64	\$5	
72	\$201	\$63	\$30	\$104	\$4	
73	\$225	\$99	\$13	\$111	\$2	

*Breakout from FY-57 to FY-63 not available for cumulative obligations.

ATTACHMENT F

TRAINING

<u>Place & Type of Training</u>	<u>Completed This Year</u>	<u>Cumulative Total to Date</u>
<u>USA</u>		
IPA General Course	0	31
Inter-American Police Academy, Panama	0	31
IPA Sr. Off. Course	0	3
Police Exec. Course	2	5
Narcotics	0	4
Narcotics Mgt. Course (IPA)	8	8
FBI-NA	0	1
Other Training	0	11
Bomb-Disposal - Panama	0	5
Pre-1962 Panama- Puerto Rico	0	19
Panama-Automotive Maintenance	4	4
		<hr/> 122
<u>Third Country</u>		
Narcotics (Paraguay-AID Sponsored)	3	3
Public Safety Training, Argentina, Chile & Cuba (Prior to '71)	0	50
		<hr/> 53
<u>In-Country</u>		
Enlisted Men's Basic Trng.	40	40
Police Cadet Training	45	420
Leadership (Advance) Trng.	29	131
Riot Control and Patrol Training (In-Service)	650	650
Radio Car Proc. & Tech.	45	45
Fingerprint Training	25	25
Narcotic Training	28	48
Traffic (In-Service) Trng.	180	180
Policewomen Corps on General Police Subjects	22	22
Superior Officers Course	0	0
Sup. Off. Admin. Course	23	23
		<hr/> 1,584
		<u>Sub-Total 1,755</u>
		<u>Training prior to 1971 11,419</u>
		<u>Grand Total 13,174</u>

ATTACHMENT G