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FINAL Report

ADP Final Evaluation Team Integrated Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusions

by

USAID

in the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

January 10 – April 18, 2010

This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared under contract with Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. through USAID's Afghanistan "Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking" (SUPPORT) project. The report was prepared by John Schamper

This evaluation was

Contracted under USAID Contract Number: GS-10F-0466P

(Order Number: 306-M-00-07-00502-00; Task Order Number 2007-012)

**Afghanistan Services under Program and Project Offices
for Results Tracking (SUPPORT)**

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Executive Summary

Introduction: USAID awarded three livelihoods projects in February 2005 for north-eastern Afghanistan (ALP/N), eastern Afghanistan (ALP/E) and southern Afghanistan (ALP/S). Total expenditures and termination dates for the livelihoods programs were as follows: ALP/N: \$60.0 million, February 2009; ALP/E: \$60.0 million, June 2009; and ALP/S: October 2009, \$166.1 million). The ADPs had two broad objectives from the outset: (a) increased licit economic growth; and (b) reduction in poppy cultivation by promoting high value crops and other activities as alternatives to poppy cultivation. Many of the ALP activities were directly agriculture and agribusiness-related, and many were not, with the largest group of non agriculture activities falling into the category of infrastructure. The general rubric of rural economic development does, however, encompass nearly all activities done under the ADPs.

Performance of ALPs: Findings of the ALP Final Evaluation Team are that, while the ADPs were worthwhile, in terms of rapid start programs for short-term impact much more could have been achieved with qualitatively better design and implementation. For reasons cited in this report, performance by the ADPs was varied, with high achievements by particular ADPs in some areas, lesser achievements in others, and unacceptable performance in some. Additionally, the Team has serious reservations over the sustainability of even the best achievements under the ADPs.

Rapid Impact Activities: ADPs undertook a number of activities that were intended to rapidly bring cash into communities, rehabilitate vital infrastructure, and assure some level of benefit from the ADPs to a large number of beneficiaries. These included irrigation canal cleaning done with cash-for work and distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer. Such programs were not intended to be sustainable and accomplished their objectives in terms of short-term stimulus to local economies.

Implementation Problems: Aside from security-related difficulties, implementation problems included rapid turnover in key personnel both with USAID and ALP contractors, a change in authority by USAID subsequent to procurement actions for the ADPs to make sub-grants under MOBIS contracting rules, later reversed; lack of experience commensurate with responsibilities by some USAID Cognizant Technical Officers CTOs and insufficient direct oversight in the form of site visits and contact time with contractors and local government by CTOs to appreciate on-the-ground realities.

Economic Growth and Poppy Reduction Activities: In terms of objectives for economic growth and reduction in poppy cultivation, some of the best accomplishments of the ADPs are in the area of horticultural crops, annual and perennial. The ALP found, however, serious deficiencies in procurement and distribution of perennial horticultural planting material, including mislabelling of species, as well as lack of technical support to farmers investing in orchards. Since tree crops take 5 years to bear fruit, these deficiencies are not readily apparent to the casual observer, as yet. Annual horticultural crops were found as a viable economic alternative to poppy cultivation in ADP intervention areas.

Agribusiness Development: In general, actions to support agribusiness were deficient in terms of achieving integrated support of marketing chains, and buy-in by agribusiness operators to ALP interventions. ALP actions to develop agribusiness were generally singular actions of support by sub-contractors with insufficient linkages within the value chain. The ADPs were found to have been parsimonious to excess with long term technical assistance that could have avoided problems in procurement and distribution of horticultural planting materials and development of marketing, processing and packaging, and transportation channels for increased horticultural produce.

Strategic and Programmatic Recommendations: Among strategic and programmatic recommendations of the ALP Evaluation Team are the strengthening of development interventions in irrigation and natural resources management, integrated agribusiness support and increased technical support to farmers and use of agricultural finance for medium and long-term lending to support innovations that are demonstrably profitable.

Recommendations for Activity Design: Recommendations related to activity design include reconsideration of interventions for low resource communities having difficult access, activity-based budget as a tool to improve decision-making by management; consideration at the design stage for more outcome indicators; adequate technical support for agricultural and agribusiness activities foreseen from the design stage; and consideration for design of vertical development interventions to achieve improved management focus and the benefits of specialization in implementation of integrated activities.

Recommendations for Management of Implementation: Management recommendations include more careful selection of CTOs for experience commensurate with responsibilities for oversight of a large project, for management continuity for both CTOs and COPs with more attention to personnel selection and, for CTOs of assignments within USAID, consideration for organizing any ADP-similar interventions under “regional development authorities” or “regional development organizations” to achieve better targeting of assistance, along with improved directions to contractors regarding host government relations and a more active role for USAID employees in host government relations. In the case where ADP-similar interventions were implemented under RDAs, USAID personnel would take the lead in host government liaison not only in locations where ADPs were headquartered, but also in other provinces both to assure priorities in interventions and to avoid a single provincial government from “owning” the project.

Lessons Learned: Lessons learned from implementation of the ADPs include the need to think through “next steps” in development interventions, providing adequate technical support to activities and avoiding activities where it cannot be provided, maintaining liaison with host government organizations, however weak in material terms, investing in outcome indicators for improved management, and oversight of large projects by experienced USAID personnel.

I. OVERVIEW- THE THREE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMS

The three livelihoods programs were launched in 2005, and operated chronologically as follows:

Livelihoods Program	Operation Dates begin-end	Prime Contractor	Total Expenditures (\$million)
ALP/E	2/05-6/09	DAI	\$118.4
ALP/N	2/05-2/09	PADCO	60.0
ALP/S	2/05-10/09	Chemonics	166.1

Areas of Operation: ALP/E was headquartered in Jalalabad and principal operations were in Nangahar Province, with limited activities in Kunar, Nuristan and Lagham provinces. The operational area for ALP/N was Badjakstan, Takhar and Kunduz provinces with headquarters in Faisabad. ANP/S was headquartered in Kandahar, with most operations in Kandahar and Helman provinces, and limited operations in Urzughan Province.

Objectives of ADPs: The ADPs had two principal objectives which were: (a) achievement of increased sustainable economic growth; and, (b) reduction in poppy cultivation by offering poppy growers profitable alternative crops.

High Differentiation of ALP Operating Conditions: It should be noted that the respective ADPs operated in considerably different environments for the conduct of operations and for developing alternative livelihoods activities, notably:

- ALP/E was situated directly on the main trade route from Kabul to Pakistan, which considerably improved accessibility for developing export opportunities for agriculture; additionally, the marketing and commercial infrastructure in the area was strong at the beginning, providing a strong base for developing agricultural and non agricultural marketing and export opportunities.
- ALP/S operations were in the heart of the largest irrigated perimeter in Afghanistan, built by USAID in the 1960s. Normally, the region is also well situated for marketing and export of agricultural produce; however, pervading insecurity acted as constraint on the development of marketing during implementation of the ADP.
- ALP/N is located in a remote region of Afghanistan with limited transportation access to markets in the south and to export markets in Pakistan and India. In addition, the region has a harsh winter climate that limits both agricultural and construction activities during approximately one-half of the year. Badjakstan province is also a net importer of food and exporter of labor to other provinces in Afghanistan and to Iran.

As will be seen below, the three considerations above influenced both the operations and relative success of the respective ADPs.

II. FINDINGS

A. Farm Production, Income, Employment and Income and Related Agribusiness

Improvements through four types of agricultural activities: All three ADPs were found to have had a positive influence on farm production, income, employment and income. ALP activities for improvements in these parameters were principally through 4 categories of agricultural activities:

- Distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer;
- Development of high value crop production;
- Livestock development including veterinary services, poultry, and lamb fattening;
- Demand-side improvements through development of agribusiness and marketing.

Wheat Production: Production increases through distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer occurred in two ways: (a) vertically, through use of certified, higher yielding seeds, as well as fertilizer, with area planted unchanged; and, (b) horizontal expansion of area through improved availability of seed and fertilizer. Estimation of accretion in wheat production due to the distribution programs is problematic, since it is unknowable what seed farmers would have utilized in the absence of the distribution programs and how much fertilizer would have been independently procured and used by farmers. However, generally, use of certified seed itself generally results in a 30 percent yield increase, and use of fertilizer together with certified seed and improved practices can double production. Additionally, precipitation has a major influence on wheat yields in Afghanistan; very favourable rainfall had the result of wheat yields almost doubling on dry land production in 2009, and increasing by about 20% on irrigated land. Wheat is a relatively low value crop and its inclusion as an alternative crop to poppy can be questioned on that basis. However, the following also pertain: (a) wheat has a non economic value to the Afghan population via food security; (b) provision of wheat seed and fertilizer helped Afghan authorities re-establish their credibility as service providers, especially since distribution of seed and fertilizer by the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) , and (3) the seed and fertilizer distribution programs served to strengthen agribusiness supply chains from certified seed production and procurement of fertilizers through to distribution, which could benefit only wheat production but other crops as well.

High Value Crop Production: All three ADPs were involved in development of high value crop production with the most impressive results achieved in ADP/E in the area of annual horticultural crops, the profitability of which was determined to be fully competitive with that of poppy production. The evaluation of perennial horticultural crops posed particular problems since trees generally bear fruit only after five years, and no ALP-assisted orchards are yet in production. Nonetheless, this report provides production and profitability models that show perennial horticulture production

competitive with poppy. Several important qualifications need to be considered for this finding on horticultural crops:

- **Deficiencies in procurement of trees and root stock:** Deficiencies by a partner organization occurred at the procurement stage for root stock and fruit trees. There may have been importation of certain diseases not yet present in Afghanistan. In addition, misidentification and/or errors in procurement occurred such that trees distributed to farmers were not those that were ordered for, and promised to, farmers. Also fruit trees unadapted to Afghanistan's climate, and thus unsurvivable, such as mango, were procured and distributed. ALP/N procured apricot trees of a variety of untested commercial success in Afghanistan as opposed to the variety demanded by farmers.
- **Deficiencies in technical support for annual and perennial horticultural crops and for nursery development:** Both nurseries and orchards require highly specific skills for cutting and pruning, cultivation practices, disease control and prevention, budding operations, grafting and assuring soil nutrition. Nurseries are high complicated businesses requiring both technical skills and planning ability, particularly in anticipating customer demand. In the case of annual horticultural crops under intensive production pest and diseases tend to become a problem after several years and need to be managed via integrated pest management (IPM), chemical products or a combination of both and technical support to farmers is required. The ALP Final Evaluation Team found lack of technical support a major impediment to the continued development of high value horticultural crop in Afghanistan, and that the capacities for technical support via the GOA, the private sector, and private sector associations need to be improved to assure its continued development. Many of the problems in both technical and procurement areas appear to have been the result of insufficiently qualified technical personnel within the ADPs themselves, and excessive reliance on subcontractors who themselves were insufficiently supervised by the ADPs. For example, the presence of a highly qualified internationally recruited horticultural expert could have been sufficient to avoid mistakes in procurement of types and varieties of fruit trees. A highly qualified expert in nurseries could have contributed greatly to nursery development one of the pillars for support to farmers growing horticultural crops. Technical-level horticultural personnel could have trained farmers, association personnel, and extension agents in horticultural practices.

Importance of Accessibility and Resources for Success of High Value Crops as an Alternative to Poppy and Poppy Reduction Strategies in Remote, Resource-Poor Areas: Annual horticultural crops in ADP/E were seen as most successful, particularly in those areas with high accessibility for marketing such as parts of the ADP/E region located in proximity to main roads. Accessibility to commercial marketing is influenced by terrain, the presence of serviceable roads, distance to markets, and security conditions. Normally, the ALP/S region has good access to both domestic and export markets, but security conditions for commercial marketing are poor and the unproblematic marketing of poppy, which is a low volume, high value crop, is cited as an important reason for agricultural producers choosing poppy cultivation. In contrast, in the ADP/E intervention area, groups of farmer who formerly cultivated poppy and who were now cultivating

annual horticultural crops were interviewed and these maintained that they were actually better off financially with the annual horticultural crops. However, high value crops were found by the

ALP Evaluation Team of limited usefulness in inaccessible, resource-poor areas that are far from food self-sufficiency and that have poor prospects for marketing of agricultural produce, and that rely mainly on export of labor and other activities in their survival strategies and that a menu of activities other than high value crops is necessary to provide disincentives to poppy production in those areas. Such a menu might include education (to export more qualified labor), basic health services (to reduce burdens of illness), nutrition (for a more productive work force), potable water, artisanal production of non agricultural goods, as well as such improvements in the productivity of the agricultural resource base that can be achieved.

Further Qualifications on Findings for Development of High Value Crops as an Alternative to Poppy Cultivation: The favourable findings of the ADP Final Evaluation Team for horticultural crops are qualified by a number of considerations that have implications for GOA capacity building and donor assistance:

- **Agribusiness and Marketing Development for Fresh and Semi-Processed Produce:** Observations by the ADP Evaluation Team of the current price environment for both annual and perennial horticultural crops were highly favourable for the profitability of these crops. However, worldwide, development of these crops reaches a point where supply encounters a highly inelastic demand, at least for domestic markets, and where price falls precipitously, with all the attendant consequences on producer incomes. That scenario would entail even more serious consequences in Afghanistan since these crops are at the center of strategies to reduce poppy cultivation. Continued market development, particularly for exports, is thus seen as essential for maintaining alternative high value crops in a poppy and poverty reduction strategy. As regards the sustainability of exports, experience with ADP/S is not favourable: exports increased while subsidized by ADP/S trade facilitation and supply of packaging materials, and fell off sharply when the subsidies ended. The indication is that the agribusiness export industry will need further development to reach a self-sustaining stage in market development such that precipitous fall in farm prices and incomes from horticultural crops does not occur. World The need for continued develop of marketing via agribusiness support programs. Without continued development of markets, there is risk of dramatic reduction of price for horticultural crops and increase in incentive to grow poppy. Agribusiness will also be relied upon for continued supply of pest and disease control products as well as planting material, and continued market development, particularly for exports.
- **Development of Food Processing Industry:** A strategy employed worldwide to avoid precipitous decline in prices for fresh produce is processing of produce into canned and frozen products. In some cases, these products are also prime candidates for export, as is the case with pomegranate juice in Afghanistan. The food processing industry in Afghanistan needs development and promotion whether through domestic operators or foreign partners. At present, domestic

operators appear too weak to form partnership arrangements with foreign companies on an equal basis, and the industry itself, including industry associations needs further development. A further key constraint is in financing. Afghanistan is perceived as a high-risk environment by both domestic and foreign operators, which discourages investment. Establishing an agribusiness and food processing financing facility could serve to relieve that constraint.

- **Capacity building in GOA regulatory services for phytosanitary certifications:** Penetration into many export markets will require strengthening of the technical expertise and credibility of GOA phytosanitary export certifying services. It is unlikely that the reach of Afghan exports will extend beyond the Indian subcontinent and Dubai unless phytosanitary services are strengthened, and it is possible that even markets in Dubai and the Indian subcontinent could be lost if phytosanitary controls for those markets are strengthened.
- **Reduction in Non Tariff Trade Barriers:** According to observations made by the QDP/S Evaluation Team, an important non tariff trade barrier for access to markets in India and Pakistan are regulations that require transport in-country by national firms. Attendant unloading and reloading is onerous in cost, and costs are further increased by higher levels of damaged product. This is an area for productive trade negotiations between the countries via finding solutions such as mutual acceptance of truck safety inspections and insurance certifications.

B. Further Observations concerning the ADPs and Agribusiness based on Findings

ADP Final Evaluation Team findings are qualified in the area of agribusiness by the following considerations:

- **Market Failure in Privatization:** Failure of the ADPs to meet certain market tests in privatization, including for a state-of-the-art horticultural packing facility by ADP/E and the failure of poultry feed fabrication facilities done by ADP/S. Also, it is unclear at the present time whether the hatchery developed by ADP/S can be successfully privatized.
- **Lack of Evidence for “Buy-in” by Agribusiness firms:** Lack of evidence of real “buy-in” by the agribusiness trade in ADP activities. ADP involvement with agribusiness, such as in the procurement of fruit trees and some poultry interventions, was done by subcontractors charged with very specific tasks, such as fruit tree distribution, but having very little to do development of the agribusinesses themselves. In many respects, agribusiness development represents the “next stage” for alternative crop strategies, and a vital, rapidly developing agribusiness sector is needed to sustain an strategy based on high value crops as an alternative to poppy. Agribusiness development, as such, appears to have been marginal, at best in ADP implementation.
- **Missed Opportunities for Sustainability via Association and Cooperative Development in Agriculture and Agribusiness**

Associations and cooperatives of farmers and agribusiness firms can play an important role in sustainability by providing services to members and through joint exploitation of business opportunities. Such organizations also provide the great advantage of the potential for being self-sustaining without reliance on subsidies from the badly strapped GOA. Generally, the problem with both farmer associations and cooperatives is the same: the organization is put together as one whose primary purpose is to receive government or donor assistance, and the development problem consists in developing a service menu that will sustain the organization. For agribusiness, the problem is somewhat different. Private operators are accustomed to operating on their own and not relying on government subsidies or cooperation with others to succeed. Agribusiness management personnel need to see the potential benefits of association and cooperation in service such as information provision, technical training of personnel, industry standards, product promotion and standards, joint approach to government in solving regulatory problems, interface with agricultural finance institutions, etc. ADP/N initially embarked on a cooperative development strategy, but, on USAID/Afghanistan instruction desisted from developing cooperatives after one year, far too short a period to have any impact. From available evidence, ADP implementation was weak in developing self-sustaining agricultural and agribusiness organizations. Further, deficiencies in this regard can be traced to lack of priority for such development and the absence of qualified international, regional and national personnel to engage in such organizational development.

Conclusions: ADP actions to strengthen agribusiness were seen as partial and fragmented with few results in terms of strengthened private sector associations that would carry on activities on a sustainable basis. Evidence suggests too many activities were undertaken by TDY specialists who may have been qualified in areas such as packaging or export marketing, but who had insufficient time in-country to appreciate the economic, social, cultural, and operational environment for their interventions. Further agribusiness development is seen as essential in sustaining a strategy for economic growth in the agricultural sector and a strategy for poppy reduction based on high value crops.

C. Budget Analyses

Aside from a high level of security expenditures for some ADPs, budget analysis revealed little that was remarkable for livelihoods projects, considering that operating costs in Afghanistan are high. The expenditure of \$12 million, initially budgeted at \$5 million, by ADP/S for an airport runway at Laskhar Gah was unusual for a livelihoods project, although the expenditure may eventually improve livelihoods in the region through improved commercial access. Cash-for-work and distributions of fertilizer and seed directly benefited residents of ALP operational areas, whereas program operations expenditures were of indirect benefit. It is further noted that while, in some cases, infrastructure expenditures for the ADPs exceeded those for agriculture and agribusiness, that the most infrastructure expenditures still fell within the general rubric of rural development. Further, it is also seen that often the best investment that can be done for agriculture in particular locales is by way of investment in infrastructure vitally needed to improve access for marketing of agricultural produce or for improving rural assets, such as irrigated land.

D. Government of Afghanistan Involvement

Findings are that GOA involvement at the provincial level was the strongest for ALP/S and the weakest for ALP/N. In the case of the latter, bitter complaints were lodged with the ADP/N Evaluation Team over deficiencies in collaboration by the ALP/N implementer, PADCO. All the ADPs appeared to be deficient in pursuing fruitful collaboration where it could have occurred. For example, prospects for sustainability could have been enhanced by training of local technical extension staff. ALP/E may have been able to undertake a collaborative program with Nangahar University in areas such as demonstrations and field trials that would have both strengthened ALP operations and Nangahar University's institutional role in supporting agricultural development. The weaknesses of the Provincial Development Councils in fulfilling their role are well known. However, there appears to have been little effort by the ADPs to assist the ADPs in becoming stronger stakeholders via, for example, short-term training or provision of technical assistance.

E. Major Implementation Problems

ADP implementation was affected, in some cases, seriously, for particular ADPs, by a series of implementation problems originating with USAID, the contractor, or both:

- **Change in MOBIS Rules:** ALP implementation was impeded at the outset by a change in MOBIS rules, later reversed, according to which sub-grants could not be made under MOBIS contracts. The effect on ALP/N was particularly damaging since the contractor, PADCO, had engaged the Aga Khan Foundation as a sub-grantee under its contract both for micro-hydroelectric works, and also for that organization's knowledge of the operating environment of north-eastern Afghanistan, its logistics base, and its data base of governmental, NGO, and business contacts there.
- **High Turnover of Key Personnel:** A second major source of implementation problems was exceptionally high turnover in both Chiefs of Party (CTOs) and in USAID Cognizant Technical Officers (CTOs). Also, certain CTOs also appeared to lack experience commensurate with responsibilities for managing a large project, particularly in forwarding critical information to USAID management on a priority basis for decision making, and in differentiating their role in project implementation from that of the COP. The effects of high turnover among key personnel for both ADP/S and ADP/N delayed project implementation, caused deficiencies in building a knowledge base for operating in these difficult environments, and impeded implementation planning and execution.
- **Failure to Align Funding Availability with Implementation Schedule:** A third source of implementation problems, particularly for ADP/N was in failure to align availability of funds with the activity level of the project. This was a particular problem for ALP/N because the harsh winter climate limits construction activities during nearly one-half of the year. USAID departed from usual the forward funding standard of 18 months, reducing it to 9 months, creating a funding constraint for ALP/N during seasons when it could undertake infrastructure construction activities.

- **Limited Site Access:** A fourth set of implementation problems was found to revolve around very limited on-site access by USAID CTOs, and sometimes ALP personnel as well, to project sites. The result was reflected in sometimes poor appreciation of on-the ground realities, failure to recognize implementation problems in a timely manner, and qualitatively poor information flow to senior management.
- **Partner and Sub-Contractor Selection and Supervision:** A fifth source of implementation problems occurred with prime contractors in the selection and supervision of sub-contractors and implementing partners. The ALP Final Evaluation Team observed severe deficiencies in procurement and distribution of perennial horticultural planting material and in, in the case of ALP/N, unacceptably poor work on some infrastructure projects.

F. Sustainability Issues

General: The most serious reservations of the Final Evaluation Team for the overall investment value of the ADPs in the area of sustainability. Food-for-work and wheat seed and fertilizer distribution programs were never designed to be sustainable and were implemented for other valid reasons. In the area of infrastructure, provision for maintenance, particularly for roads appear non existent. High value crop production, perhaps the ADPs' best achievement, may not be sustainable without technical support and continued market development. In some cases, the ADPs failed to pursue sustainability where opportunities were present, such as collaboration with GOA technical services, engagement of local institutions, assistance to PDCs in planning, and in the development of sustainable agricultural producer and marketing organizations. The following generic concerns pertain:

- **Lack of forward planning, or “thinking through the next step:”** Particularly with regard to high value crops, and the need for continued onward development of agribusiness to support increased production by farmers without disincentives from falling prices appears to have received little consideration. Most high value crop actions appear as singular actions to increase production without regard to marketing prospects.
- **Failure to embed agribusiness development actions in the agri-business community and improve prospects for sustainability via development of private associations:** The case of fruit and vegetable packing associations and poultry development could be taken as examples. Privatization of a packing house for fruits and vegetables and of a feed mills and a hatchery for poultry appear to have been afterthoughts, only considered toward the end of projects, whereas potential for privatization needed to have been rigorously considered at the beginning. The feed mills have already failed, and the privatization of the hatchery is not assured. Other development actions in the agribusiness area appear to have been partial and fragmented; for example, export development done by ADP/S appears to have collapsed since the effort lacked “ownership” or “embedding” with the local agribusiness community.

- **“One-off” development actions where sustainability was apparently not a concern:** Irrigation canal cleaning appears to have been pursued with community and local organization commitment to maintain canals. Most road construction appears to have been done in a similar manner, without firm commitment from either local authorities, or communities for maintenance. In the case of cobblestone roads, the problem appears to have been aggravated by poor customer acceptance of the product.
- **Lack of pursuing sustainability where it could have been pursued:** Sustainability dependent on financial support from the GOA has admittedly poor prospects. However, development of private farmer associations, cooperatives, and private business associations that could be sustainable on their own was little pursued. To some extent, this problem may have been driven by the metrics for the ADPs, where efforts to develop these organizations were not rewarded.

G. Replicability and Models for Scaling Up

The ALP Final Evaluation Team finds the following actions priority for replication subject to a number of qualifications:

Irrigation Rehabilitation: More and better irrigation infrastructure directly improves rural assets and productive base and increases demand for labor. However, erosion of traditional authorities for rural resource management, including irrigation, points to the need to develop new systems for maintenance, distribution and pricing of water. Similarly, traditional allocation mechanisms for water between upstream and downstream users have weakened and new mechanisms are needed to avoid conflict at the community level. Watershed management is a major concern for the sustainability of irrigation systems and needs to be addressed, recognizing the long term nature of the effort. Finally, better indicators are needed to accurately reflect the impact of donor interventions in irrigation.

Non Irrigation Infrastructure: While several manifest failures occurred for infrastructure done by ALP/N, ALP/E demonstrated that high quality construction of infrastructure can be done by mainly Afghan engineers properly supported and supervised. Deficiencies in Provincial Planning Councils suggest that approvals for infrastructure investments need to be carefully screened for potential contribution to economic growth and, if possible, strategically to other development investments.

High Value Crops: Some of the best ALP successes are in this area, and the Evaluation Team believes further expansion is possible for high value crops provided that interventions are qualitatively improved via technical and agribusiness support. Available evidence suggests that farmers having invested in orchards should receive technical support on a priority basis and that the next priority would be technical agribusiness support for both annual and perennial horticultural crops.

Veterinary Services: Incomes of many rural Afghan residents, particularly those in lower socio-economic categories, depends as much on animal production as crop production. ALP/N implemented a veterinary health program that is near sustainable and could be replicated in other areas of Afghanistan.

Women’s Activities: ALP/E women’s activities with fish were found to be highly successful, and point to generic determinants for success in women’s activities that are economically related: (a) ownership of the activity by women; (b) profitability; and, (c) adequate technical support for the activity. “Tunnel” vegetable gardening in the north was found well accepted and profitable, and had an important positive effect on household nutrition since a significant part of production from the technology was consumed in the household.

H. Economic Impact – Infrastructure Investment

The ALP Evaluation Team found infrastructure investments generally well chosen, and normally productive against standard criteria for evaluation. Certain worst case outcomes were observed with ALP/N where two investments in micro-hydroelectric facilities that are inoperable, a road that has deteriorated to practically pre-investment after only one season condition due to poor work, and a power canal that has never operated, is breached, and potentially dangerous due to possibility of collapse. Those works are, however, exceptions to the fact that as a rule, infrastructure works were well selected and are yielding acceptable internal rates of return. It should be noted that internal rate of return and calculation of cost-benefit ratios that were calculated by the Final Evaluation Team could be adversely affected without proper maintenance due to early reduction in benefit streams.

I. Operations and Maintenance – Infrastructure Investments

According to the IMF, total budgetary resources of the GOA amount to 7.7 percent of GDP, whereas GOA payroll costs alone are 7.8 percent of GDP. The implication of those numbers for operations and maintenance budgets by the GOA are enormous: the GOA, aside from resources provided by donors in one form or another has no resources for operations and maintenance, or for an investment budget. In other words the lack of maintenance of ADP investments represents more the norm than the exception in Afghanistan. The situation will hopefully change in the future as the GOA develops its fiscal system, but for the present, GOA maintenance will depend on donor flows that can be used for that purpose, with all the difficulties for planning that are implied.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Programmatic & Strategic

1. Actions to Increase Operation Efficiency Irrigation Systems and Irrigated Area

Primordial Strategic Importance of Irrigation: Irrigated land in Afghanistan accounts for 80 percent of value-added in the sector, but total irrigated area is presently only about 60 percent of the 1975 level according to MAIL and World Bank figures. Additionally, only about 10 of irrigated perimeters are operating at full engineering efficiency against a world wide norm of 50-60 percent for countries with agricultural sectors heavily

dependant on irrigation. With population growth estimated at a minimum of 1.99 percent per annum, irrigated area per capita for Afghanistan has declined by approximately one-half during the last 35 years. The consequences for food security are extremely serious: in a normal crop year, Afghanistan produces only about one-half of its grain requirements. Additionally, food security depends on income, and in a country that is 75 percent rural, the irrigated agricultural sector is failing to produce the jobs necessary to avoid rising unemployment and underemployment. Afghanistan remains about 75 percent rural; the decline of irrigated area is felt through reduced job opportunities, declining household resource base, and reduced food security in the same areas where donor assistance is trying to reduce poppy production and other forms of lawlessness. Other the effects of decline in irrigated area are the following:

Principal reasons for decline of irrigated sector: Decline of the irrigated agricultural sector is tied by most specialists to insecurity in Afghanistan after 1975. Maintenance of both village and large scale system declined as did the authority of traditional irrigation management systems, leading in some cases to conflicts between upstream and downstream water users.

Diversity of irrigation systems and need for new management and technical support systems: An important complication for irrigation system rehabilitation is the diversity of systems present in Afghanistan, from large scale irrigated perimeters such as that of Helmand, as well as a range of traditional systems including underground lateral catchments of water (Karez) and dispersed small scale perimeters, many of which were constructed by hand. It would seem unlikely that traditional water management systems as well as maintenance techniques will be restored to status quo ante following 35 years of civil strife. The implication is that new systems for both management and technical support will have to be developed, such as water users associations, technical support for irrigation maintenance via GOA services, as well as methods of management, including user fees.

Need for Broad Support of Irrigation: A systemic approach is required for developing the irrigated sector in Afghanistan. Assistance is needed in local governance structures for irrigation management, technical training at all levels from extension personnel trained to assist communities with small, hand built systems and karazes, to highly qualified engineers. Additionally, proper irrigation system management requires meteorological, hydrological, gauging data and snow pack data for proper system operation and optimal results in irrigated agriculture. Infrastructure needs to be built and personnel trained to produce all such data. For example, in countries such as Morocco, irrigation system managers are able to advise farmers before planting of crops on water availability such that farmers make crop planning decisions based on the information. Irrigation systems need to be further supported by economic analysis to reveal optimal investment decisions, for example, when are laser-levelling techniques and lining of irrigation canals economically profitable over other investments.

Opportunities for donor collaboration: Considerable investments in the irrigation rehabilitation are being funded by the World Bank with a cost to date averaging about \$1500 per hectare, although the World Bank notes that it is funding projects that represent the “low hanging fruit” for irrigation system rehabilitation. The Asian Development Bank will be funding a major system in eastern Afghanistan. In general the International Financial Institutions (Ibis), due their experience in the area, have a comparative

advantage in funding large scale irrigation investments, sometimes called the “hardware” of irrigation systems. USAID, on the other hand, is often considered to hold a comparative advantage in the institutional development, or the “software” for such systems, including the development of water user associations and institutions for the training of technical personnel in irrigation. It would appear that cooperation and coordination between the Ibis and bilateral organizations could be of mutual benefit in achieving the objective of rehabilitating Afghanistan’s irrigated sector.

2. Natural Resource Management

Natural Resources Management (NRM) presents itself as a needed “companion” activity for a

broad based effort to rehabilitate and develop Afghanistan’s irrigation system since sustainability of investments in irrigation infrastructure dements heavily on management of the natural resource base, mainly the watershed, but to some extent use of ground water resources as well. NRM is also linked to water policy issues between rural and urban areas, a matter likely to become of increasing importance.

Afghanistan has lost nearly half of its forest cover during the last 25 years while many upper grassland areas in watersheds are overgrazed and sometimes used, inappropriately, due to steep slopes, for dryland agriculture. Competing uses for dryland areas has resulted in conflict in certain areas, as has competition between upstream and down stream users of surface water.

Neglect of the natural resource base threatens the sustainability, and therefore the profitability of investments in irrigation through silting of irrigation works due to soil erosion and flooding that destroys infrastructure due to inability of upper portions of water sheds to retain water. Decreased water retention capability also threatens ground water sources for irrigations as well as any household uses associated with groundwater.

The sources of decline in the condition of Afghanistan’s watersheds are many, but can be summarized as: (a) conflict-related, in northern Afghanistan Soviet forces cut down forest near to transport routes to decrease cover for attacks by insurgents, and the local population lost discipline in maintaining forests when they witnessed the Soviets destroying them; additionally, with conflict, the traditional authority for maintaining forests was weakened; (b) increasing population pressure against a limited natural resource base; (c) weakening of all governmental structures and authorities that could have been used to maintain the natural resource base.

After 35 years of conflict and neglect, the developmental work required to establish natural resource management systems in Afghanistan is enormous. It must also be recognized that such efforts will be building on a very weak base, and that absorptive capacity for assistance in the area will remain limited until that base is strengthened. The following are suggestions as to what a comprehensive approach toward NRM would look like in the initial stages: (a) where possible, efforts to increase “community ownership” of resources since communities have a strong interest in locally available natural resources; additionally, such efforts are not dependent on GOA financial support, which is likely to be scarce for a long time to come; (b) strengthening of NRM in technical education, and of NRM awareness in general education; (c) launch the beginnings of NRM planning for

watersheds in Afghanistan; and (d) undertake some NRM activities, at least on a pilot basis, in priority watersheds.

3. Agribusiness Support

Increased support to agribusiness can be seen both as a “defensive strategy” to protect USAID’s very considerable investments through the livelihoods programs in agriculture, notably since, as cited in this report, increased supply of horticultural products will eventually cause precipitous decline in their price as present markets become saturated. As an “aggressive strategy” continued development of agribusiness will build on the base of actions already undertaken by the livelihoods projects and undertake the necessary “next steps” for agribusiness development, while capitalizing on Afghanistan’s natural comparative advantage in a number of horticultural agricultural products.

Based on the findings of the ADP Final Evaluation Team, it is suggested that a national agribusiness project be undertaken as a “stand alone” (or vertical) activity in order to achieve focus. Additionally, care would need to be taken recruit well qualified technical staff, international, regional and local, committed to “embedding” agribusiness technologies and practices in Afghanistan over a significant period of time and in full appreciation of the on-ground realities of Afghanistan.

4. Technical Support Capability for Agriculture

A number of agricultural production activities in the alternative development programs were found to have been launched without adequate technical support. This problem needs to be addressed in a systemic manner with attention and resources directed toward the sources of technical support for agriculture such as technical schools and colleges as well as the strengthening of existing extension services. The problem can also be addressed to some extent via the private sector by programs to strengthen technical knowledge of agricultural input suppliers, including in the use of agricultural chemicals.

The measures outlined above would necessarily be effective only in the medium-to-long term. Based on the findings of the ADP Evaluation Team, strengthening of technical support to farmers for perennial horticultural crops cannot wait for the medium-to-long term, and needs of perennial horticultural producers must be met now, given the agronomic facts of perennial horticultural production. Accordingly, it is recommended that USAID direct resources to strengthening services for perennial horticultural producers in the short term through new or existing activities.

5. Agricultural Finance

It is noted by the Final Evaluation Team that provision of credit is used by the Opium Cartel as an incentive to lure farmers into poppy production. Since the approach of the alternative livelihood programs was to lure farmers away from poppy production, the immediate question would appear to be whether agricultural credit programs could not be used to “compete” with Opium Cartel suppliers of credit. However data and observation suggest the matter would not be simple for the following reasons: (a) aside from the Opium Cartel, there is a vast informal system of rural credit in Afghanistan and it operates through agricultural input suppliers, money lenders and suppliers of household products; (b) a formal agricultural credit system could not compete with the Opium Cartel

on low transactions costs and immediate availability of credit; (c) a formal, sustainable agricultural credit system would take very significant time to build, especially in view of confusion of clients over the difference between donor grants and loans that have to be repaid, and the time required to train a professional cadre of loan agents. The suggestion is that building a national agricultural credit institution would be a worthy goal for the medium-to-long term.

Afghanistan is considered a high risk environment and, the effect of that is make rare medium-to-long term finance, as opposed to finance for annual crop lending or commercial and trading activities having rapid turnover in sales. Normally, a creditworthy farmer should be able to finance an investment such as an orchard, and agribusiness operator, and industrial investment such as a processing plant or transportation equipment. Facts for rural finance in Afghanistan suggest the following:

- Avoid meeting head-to-head competition from the Opium Cartel in the finance of agricultural production;
- Direct available lending funds to medium-to-long term loans for innovative activities (for Afghanistan) that have proven profit potential;
- Begin building a national agricultural finance institution for annual crop lending to farmers recognizing that development of the institution will require considerable time before it can have significant national impact.

The strategy outlined above would offer several advantages:

Avoidance of failure through haste and neglect of on-the-ground realities in launching a national agricultural finance institution. Such a failure could cause a setback for agricultural finance for decades to come.

As regards a disincentive to poppy production, avoidance of head-to-head competition with the Opium Cartel in short term agricultural finance, a competition that would likely be lost for the reasons cited, and following a more clever approach of undermining the Cartel through improved economic opportunity made available by medium-to-long term finance.

Directing most available lending funds toward the area of agricultural and agribusiness finance where funds are most scarce, medium-to-long term lending.

B. Design

1. Approach to Non Viable Communities

Afghanistan is 75 percent rural and many communities in outlying areas of the country can be considered as “non viable” in economic terms since (a) land/population are extremely adverse and such communities may produce less than half the food they need to survive; food self-sufficiency for these communities is not on the horizon even with substantial increase in crop yields; and (b) these communities are scattered, with difficult access and consequently

they are poor prospects for high value crops and agribusiness development. Such communities survive by external resource transfers in one form or another, and it appears labor export with remittances to the home community is the most common means. These communities cannot be reached through programs and strategies designed to achieve high economic growth, but rather through survival strategies that improve the quality of life and prospects for people, particularly young people living in them. Interventions in such communities might include education (to export more qualified labor), clean water and sanitation (to reduce the burden of disease), nutrition (for a healthier population), and artisanal non agricultural production (to reduce underemployment).

2. Activity-Based Budgeting

In analyzing budget data, all three ADP evaluation teams found very partial data relating expenditures to activities. Expenditure data was rather grouped into aggregated categories, with some disaggregation possibly through examination of project reports and work plans. Better data linking expenditures to activities is important for a number of reasons: (1) when linked to outcome indicators, decision-makers can be provided with precise information on the cost of project achievements; (2) in situations where replication of certain activities is being considered by the financing organization, financial planning and management can be improved, and the project design process facilitated; (3) activity-based budgeting can improve internal project management and planning. In order to give activity-based budgeting the prominence it needs, it is recommended that provisions for it be included at the project design stage and be incorporated in any RFPs or other solicitation documents and be included in evaluation of contractor and grantee proposals.

3. Adequate Technical Support for Development Activities

The ADPs undertook an exceptionally broad range of activities from distribution of basic agricultural inputs to promotion of high value crops, agribusiness development, construction of roads, bridges, and flood protection works, poultry industry development, micro-hydro construction, veterinary health, and women's programs. In certain cases, activities were less than fully successful for evident lack of adequate technical support, and these include:

Micro-hydro for ADP/N; while installations were foreseen, only two were realized, and those are inoperational. In this case, the contractor lost its implementing partner for micro-hydro, Aga Khan Foundation due to a change in USAID regulations for sub grants under MOBIS (which was later reversed). The ADP contractor, PADCO, tried to fill the gap by hiring a Dutch engineer specialized in micro-hydro, but this individual lacked institutional support in conducting his work. The result was a less-than-successful by ADP/N in micro-hydro.

For ADP/E, fruit tree nursery development was adversely affected by lack of technical support in technical areas such as the grafting of trees. The presence of a long term qualified expert in nursery development could have contributed much to making the effort more successful.

Performance by ADP/E in distribution of fruit trees was adversely affected by evident lack of qualified expertise in procurement of fruit trees by an implementing partner. In this case, lack of expertise extended to lack of expertise by the implementing partner to recognize the type of tree that it was purchasing.

ADP/E supported operations of a state-of-the art packaging facility from fruits and vegetable exports that appears to lack adequate “buy-in” by commercial fruit and vegetable marketers. The consequence is that the facility is not commercially viable and that its future is unresolved (the land underneath the facility is owned by MAIL). A commercial buyer for the facility was solicited but eventually desisted from purchase or lease, and at last report, there are no other interested parties. On inspection, it would appear to have at least as a demonstration facility, but it does not appear to be used for that function. A long term qualified expert in fruit and vegetable export could have solicited interest in the facility in the agribusiness trade and worked to make it commercially viable.

ADP/S undertook a commitment to build a runway at Lashkar Gah with insufficient technical knowledge of construction standards for runway construction or certifications that were required. The result was a cost overrun of over 100 percent as well as strained relations with another donor, DFID, which was involved in the runway and airport construction effort. ADP/S clearly lacked technical expertise for runway construction at the outset of the effort.

The issues for sufficient technical support run in two directions, breadth of ADP activities, and inclusion of adequate technical support for activities, from the design stage through procurement and implementation:

Breadth of Activities: All ADPs engaged specialized partners in areas such as micro-hydro development, procurement and distribution of fruit trees, nursery development, etc. In theory, the specialized implementing partners should have been able to assure adequate technical support of the activities in question. However, the use of specialized implementing partners raises two issues: (a) qualifications of personnel offered by the partners; (b) the appropriate mix of short-term and long-term personnel offered by the partners, and in particular the ability of short-term personnel to assimilate particularities of the operating environment in Afghanistan so as to be effective; and, (3) For the primary contractor, whether sufficient expertise for management of the *type of contract* was represented on the management team. At the limit, inadequacies in implementation for the breadth of activities undertaken by the ADPs raises the question of whether USAID should look toward designing and financing more specialized projects with a narrower focus.

Technical Support: Operating costs for development activities in Afghanistan are extraordinary high by international standards, and the desire by both the USAID Mission and contractors to reduce and contain costs is understandable. However, inadequately supported activities can also lead to wasteful expenditure. Assurance of adequate technical support is the responsibility of USAID as well as contractors. Uneven performance by the ADPs provides evidence of inadequate technical support as well as detailed analysis of activities and outcomes. The

suggestion from the data and analysis of the ADPs is that adequate technical support was sacrificed to the object of cost containment. Additionally, inadequate technical support has sources other than cost containment such as the ability of contractors to field qualified experts for Afghanistan's difficult operating environment; in some cases, overall ADP may have been improved by eliminating activities that could not be adequately supported and

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reallocating funds to other areas where use of financial resources would have been productive.

4. Outcome Indicators

ADP indicators were a challenge to the evaluation team for several reasons: (a) in some cases indicators unreliable in showing ADP effort in certain areas. For example, during ADP/N implementation a segment of road construction in an area where construction was relatively easy due to level terrain was "exchanged" for a less lengthy segment in mountainous terrain where construction was extremely difficult and costly. A strict reading of the "metric" for road construction would indicate that ADP/N was "falling behind" or deficient road construction in "kilometres of roads constructed" was less than it should have been according to planning figures, whereas, in reality ADP/N had made an extraordinary effort in constructing the difficult segment. (b) In certain cases, indicators were found to be misleading. For example, with irrigated perimeters, the indicator "hectares of irrigated perimeters rehabilitated" was generally applied when marginal improvements were made to specific rehabilitation actions; in the case of cleaning an intake for an irrigated perimeter of 2000 hectares, the 2000 hectares would be considered "rehabilitated" when the intake itself was only one of the problems affecting the perimeter, and the effect of cleaning the intake only affected irrigable land in the perimeter marginally, perhaps by several hundred hectares; (c) in some cases, existing indicators lend themselves to exaggeration of project impact. To take an irrigation example, one year the intake might be cleaned for a 2,000 ha, perimeter, and 2,000 ha considered as "rehabilitated" while the following year, primary canals are cleaned and the 2,000 ha considered as "rehabilitated" again, while the following year, the secondary canals are cleaned and the 2,000 ha considered as "rehabilitated" again. At no point, in this case, is there consideration for an outcome indicator, such as "land irrigated in the perimeter," or an indicator that would measure the efficiency of the irrigated perimeter against an engineering norm.

The ADP Final Evaluation Team is well aware of the difficulties and costs of computing "outcome indicators" as opposed to "activity indicators." In the irrigation case cited either survey data would have to be collected for impact on the irrigated area a study of engineering efficiency of the perimeter undertaken. Both the survey and the engineering study would entail additional costs, while data on the size of the irrigated perimeter is without costs as is the data for the intervention itself, which is available from project management operations. However, "impact" is the justification for undertaking the irrigation investments, and cannot be accurately estimated without incurring the additional costs.

The ADP Evaluation Team is also aware that certain “USAID standard indicators” must be included for USAID-financed activities. However, inclusion of the “standard indicators does not preclude USAID from encouraging contractors, from the design stage and through procurement, to include more outcome indicators in their proposals and make allowance for the additional costs of procuring them. Ultimately, the “outcome” or “impact” indicators could pay for themselves by refining management decisions and, additionally, by providing a more secure basis for decision-making in planning, attract more financing for livelihoods activities.

5. Vertical Intervention Projects

The three ADPs implemented a wide range of activities related to agricultural production, agribusiness, infrastructure, including both roads and agribusiness facilities, as well as business training, along others. ADP evaluation data show an uneven performance by the ADPs with excellence in some areas with mediocre to poor performance in others. The wide range of activities of the ADPs is seen in the evaluation as both a strength and a weaknesses.

Strengths of Horizontally Organized Projects

- **Responsiveness to local needs:** A project having authorization for a wide range of activities have high potential for responding to local needs that can be similarly broad in scope.
- **Ability to respond to constraints with internal resources:** A development of a sub sector such as agribusiness may be highly constrained by poor road condition which that limits transportation of agricultural produce. A horizontally organized project would be able to respond to the constraint with internal resources and expeditiously relieve the constraint.

Weaknesses of Horizontally Organized Projects:

- **Lack of specialization:** A specialized project generally has the potential to become highly efficient in its particular area of expertise. A vertically organized specialized project in an area such as micro-hydro-electric installations can assemble the expertise required at every level of delivering such installations, including site survey, socio-economic considerations, operations and maintenance planning, procurement of appropriate equipment, possibly at lower costs since such a project would be doing installations countrywide, engineering personnel to supervise construction for installation of units, etc. By contrast, a non specialized project would, at best, be required to contract such services, which would not by itself assure high performance by the project in this area since the project would need internally the capability to supervise such contractors.
- **Higher unit costs:** Additionally any potential economies of scale in procurement would be forfeited for the non specialized project. Additionally, the non-specialized project would not benefit internally from

experience internally with hydroelectric installations since all services would be contracted externally.

Horizontally organized project would appear to hold the potential for achieving lower cost delivery. However, the strongest argument in favour of such project would appear to be low dependency on exterior services or infrastructure. Another approach for realizing the advantages of specialization and lower costs of vertically integrated project would be highly coordinated action by donors and between donors. In the agribusiness development case cited above, the road transportation constraint could be relieved by another project financed by the same donor, or by road construction by another donor.

B. Management and Implementation – USAID, Contractors and Grantees

1. USAID CTOs and Chiefs-of-Party for ADPs

Implementation of two of the three ADPs was adversely affected by extraordinary turnover in both USAID Cognizant Technical Officers (CTOs) and Chiefs of Party (COPs). Such turnover adversely affected implementation through discontinuity in project planning, insufficiently informed decision making, lowered quality of project reporting, insufficient appreciation of implementation problems and bottlenecks, and limited ability to interact with the host government and other development agencies in a continuous and reliable manner. In the case of COPs, high turnover indicates a type of “double institutional failure” in selection and approval since normally contractors examine with utmost care the qualifications for a COP, who also must be approved by USAID as part of the “key personnel” complement for the implementation team. In the case of the CTOs there is also evidence that certain did not have a level of experience commensurate with their responsibilities as managers of large USAID development interventions particularly as regards technical knowledge, the limits of their positions in offering “technical direction to contractors, principles in contract management, and for identifying priority decisions for central offices of USAID/Afghanistan, and for assuring that critical decisions were taken in a timely manner. USAID CTOs in Afghanistan undertake one-year tours, and consequently relatively high turnover is inevitable. However, certain corrective actions could be undertaken to address the problem, including: (a) double encumbering CTO positions as the end of a particular CTO’s tour-of-duty to avoid loss of important data and knowledge of implementation realities; and (2) encouraging more senior technical officers to accept CTO assignments for the larger development projects. In the case of COPs, expert advice for both contractors and USAID may be indicated to identify those qualities most desirable for the difficult and challenging operational environment in Afghanistan.

2. USAID Funding Cycle

Examination of reports and conduct of interviews for ADP/N indicated a problem between the conduct of project activities, which as heavily dictated for ADP/N by seasonal considerations due to cold climate there, and the USAID funding cycle. Further, available information suggests this problem was aggravated of USAID

departing from the traditional standard of 18 months of forward funding for projects in favour of a 9-month standard. For ADP/N, the effect of this situation was unavailability of funds during seasons where certain work, such as road building, could be undertaken and limited availability of funds during those periods. One effect was that some construction activity was undertaken during inclement weather with the quality of work adversely affected. The ADP Final Evaluation Team recommends the issue of forward funding be re-examined by USAID with a view toward achieving an improved correlation between funding needs and availability.

3. Organize Assistance under Regional Development Authorities:

Need for more specialization: The ADP Final Evaluation team noted strong social and ethnic and geographical disparities between the three ADPs, the need for specialized interventions based on particularities of each, and less than desirable level of collaboration between provincial governments and development councils and at least two of the three ADPs. Organization of ADP as regional development authorities (RDAs) could present several advantages:

Differentiated Poppy Reduction Strategies: The ADP Evaluation Team noted a sharp contrast between the profile for poppy production between the northern and eastern Afghanistan, on the one hand, and southern Afghanistan on the other. In southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand province, the percentage of farmers growing poppy is very high, at 80, percent, and only in the 1-2 percent range in the east and the south. While production of poppy in the north and the east has declined remarkably in recent years, it should be noted that inspection of UNODC data for poppy production shows that reduction can recover or fall within a short period of time. Consequently, a poppy reduction strategy includes keeping poppy-free provinces in status as well as continuing to work toward achieving poppy free status for those provinces with low levels of production. In southern Afghanistan, poppy production is openly grown in large irrigated perimeters in a social environment where only 27 percent of the population is defined as “having access to land;” the implication is that most poppy is actually cultivated by landless laborers. In northern and eastern Afghanistan, poppy production is grown in remote outlying areas by farmers following what appears to be a poverty avoidance or debt reduction strategy. Furthermore, the concentration of poppy production in southern Afghanistan is increasing; four provinces in southern Afghanistan accounted for 42 percent of poppy cultivation in 2005, and account for 84 percent of poppy cultivation now. The strategic implications for alternative livelihoods programs important: in southern Afghanistan, alternative livelihoods programs need to be very closely linked to measures to restore rule-of-law, while in northern and eastern Afghanistan, the programs need close linkage to poverty alleviation. Poppy is grown by relatively large farmers, who use hired labor in southern Afghanistan, and this type of farmer responds well to commercial incentives; by contrast, poppy is grown by small farmers in northern and eastern Afghanistan and this type of farmer responds to survival incentives. By implication, once security is restored in southern Afghanistan such that agricultural produce can be marketed, livelihoods programs could be highly successful by offering profitable alternatives; at the same time, survival incentives are needed for remote areas of northern and eastern Afghanistan which, due to

inaccessibility, do not have much potential for marketing of agricultural produce or expansion of licit crops. If development assistance were to be organized under RDAs, the nature of interventions defined in collaboration with Afghan institutions, as well as other stakeholders, would likely be highly different in the two cases, and the nature of skill sets represented in the respective RDAs highly differentiated as well.

Inclusion of local government institutions: The RDAs would have an explicit charge for liaison and coordination with provincial governments and development councils; Afghan input into development interventions would be assured from the start.

Improved field coordination: Field-based, the RDAs would be well positioned for coordinated and cooperative actions with other development agencies, including PRTs, other donors, and independently operating NGOs.

Supervision of RDAs and information flow to USAID/Kabul: USAID/Kabul would maintain supervision of the RDAs as well as approvals of any commitments by them, yet be able to look to the RDAs for guidance in intervention priorities.

Service provision to RDAs by USAID/Kabul: The RDAs could be supported by USAID/Kabul via contracting, accounting and technical services for the design and evaluation of interventions, procurements, including those through USAID mechanisms such as ICQ's, as well as for "buy-in" for certain projects that USAID/Kabul may wish to launch nationwide in such areas as health, governance, rural electrification, education, and capacity building of Afghan national institutions.

Potentially, assistance organized under regional development authorities could combine the advantages of vertically organized project assistance with that of horizontally organized assistance. A regional development authority with broad assistance authorities could be highly responsive to development needs in the region. It would serve for oversight and liaison of national projects implemented within the RDA as well as for RDA-specific activities. However, the RDA would have to have particular attributions to realize the advantages of vertically organized projects:

- **Broad Authority:** Responsiveness to needs in the region would indicate a broad mandate to operate in numerous, but not necessarily all, depending on circumstances, development sectors.
- **Sizable Regions including Numerous Provinces:** Achieving economies of scale in different assistance areas would dictate the need for RDA serving large, while developmentally relatively homogeneous regions.
- **Careful Attention to Design, Including Internal Organization and Governance of the RDA:** The danger for an RDA would be from its potential "capture" by a narrow interest group, whether political economic or tribal. The governance of an RDA would have to be carefully thought

out, and the RDA given broad instructions for keeping development assistance funding within certain objectives.

- **Increase “Demand-driven” character of assistance:** Given the ethnic and geographical diversity of Afghanistan, it is likely that 5 or 6 relatively homogeneous regions could be defined in which RDAs would operate. Internal staff of the RDAs would operate to increase “demand driven” character of USAID assistance by assuring assistance was responsive to local needs. Development activities by the RDAs would be contracted, with staffing of the RDAs heavily dependant on the nature of assistance undertaken and the need to have personnel with the skills necessary to supervise contracting work that was undertaken.

Activities not included in the RDA-Approach: While holding the potential for achieving specialization and economies of scale, supplying demand-driven assistance and being responsive to local needs, RDAs would not have the potential for addressing Afghanistan’s developmental needs in a number of areas, including:

- **Sustainability, where sustainability is contingent on national capacity building:** Numerous areas would lie outside of an RDA’s purview, including national institutions that train technicians and professionals in various sectors. Other examples could be drawn in the health sector and in national educational institutions.
- **Governance, except local governance and civil society strengthening:** An RDA would be ill equipped to deal with problems rooted in national structures including the judiciary and executive branches. At the same time, it could provide valuable assistance in local governance and strengthening of local civil society organized for community development or strengthening of the private sector.
- **National Regulatory Functions:** An example would be phytosanitary controls and regulations done by MAIL, customs services, etc.

USAID Management of an RDA: The RDA would rely on USAID/Kabul for all legal and contracting work as well as for specialized assistance in technical areas. It would support USAID/Kabul’s activities in the region in areas falling outside of its own responsibilities.

4. Host Government Relations

With the exception of ADP/S, interviews conducted in the field indicated a far lower level of information flow and collaboration between the ADPs and host government offices, including the provincial development councils. On interview, provincial government officials said they understood the need for USAID to control project expenditures, but expressed the need for being informed of what the ADPs were doing, and the desire to be included in some way in intervention decisions.

The matter of host government relations exceeds contractor responsibilities and extends to USAID itself, which normally relies on CTOs for assuring that host government relations are properly and productively handled.

While the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Government of Afghanistan are well known, host government relations are important for success of current operations as well as sustainable development for the following reasons:

- In many cases, as with roads and other infrastructure, host government approval is required on acceptance documents for finished works.
- Provincial Development Councils have responsibilities for planning and coordination of development activities and are inhibited in doing their work if they are uninformed of some of the most important development activities in the province.
- While the ADPs did not have a direct charge for host government capacity building, collaboration with GOA services could have contributed to sustainable results in a number of areas, such as agricultural extension, simply by inclusion in activities.
- While not being able to provide material support to the ADPs, host government organizations could have contributed in a number of other ways, including local contacts, customs and practices, priorities as seen from provincial offices, information needs. In summary, much productive collaboration could have occurred without incurring significant expenditure or resource commitment.

It is recommended that USAID strengthen instructions to contractors for collaboration with the host government in any new ADP-similar programs, as well as to CTOs for host government liaison, and provide the necessary resources, in particular by way of “contact” time for doing so. If the RDA concept described above, USAID field personnel would have a prime role in liaison with PDCs, in the province where any USAID activity was headquartered, but also for other provinces included in the RDA.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

The following “lessons learned are derived from findings by the Final ADP Evaluation Team and also derive from recommendations found in this report.

- Exercise of care in thinking through next logical steps in development actions.
- Proper technical support of activities and avoidance of activities that cannot be properly supported.
- Keep implementers, including USAID oversight personnel, close to the activities.

- Entertain productive relationships with host government organizations, especially those involved in planning and that can facilitate activity implementation.
- Invest in outcome indicators and activity-based budgeting to provide management with essential information for decision-making.
- Provide USAID oversight personnel with experience commensurate with responsibilities.
- Recognize limitations of sub-contracting for activities that must be integrated within particular sub-sectors based on knowledge of sub-sector as well as social, economic and contextual considerations.
- Pursue sustainability wherever it can be pursued.
- Make accurate assessments of client needs, including those economically disadvantaged.
- Recruit qualified personnel committed to activities and the continuity of their implementation and assure continuity of project oversight and management by these individuals.
- Develop realistic but flexible implementation plans and avoid implementation on an ad-hoc basis.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

AFGHANISTAN

ANNEX A

OFFICE OF AGRICULTURE (OAG)

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FINAL EVALUATION

STATEMENT OF WORK

I. INTRODUCTION

Having objective, rigorous, and regular evaluations of the performance and impact of USAID's development programs is essential to understanding the extent to which we are achieving or not achieving results. Evaluations are a principle means for understanding the results of our development programs and for helping the USAID/Afghanistan Mission – and the Agency - learn and change.

Afghanistan is USAID's largest mission with a budget of over \$2.1 billion. As a major foreign policy priority, USAID's assistance programs in Afghanistan are receiving increasing scrutiny from a variety of stakeholders both in Afghanistan and in Washington. Increased monitoring, evaluation, and oversight of our programs are vital to ensuring continued success. USAID/Afghanistan recognizes and is emphasizing the importance of proper oversight and evaluation of its programs to ensure efficient and effective use of resources and maximize its development impacts.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This is a combined final evaluation of the three recently completed USAID-funded Alternative Development Programs (ADPs) in the Northern, Southern, and Eastern regions of Afghanistan. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the impact and effectiveness of implementation of the ADPs. While these three programs were separate and distinct, they were intended to achieve the same goals and objectives. Many of the same components, implementation methods, and interventions were used by each project. The main difference was geographic focus and different implementing organizations.

Because of these program similarities, USAID would like to carry out the final evaluations at the same time so that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations can be integrated to identify common strengths, weaknesses, areas of success or failure, and other implementation issues and problems across the three programs. Gaps and weaknesses will be identified in the projects' design processes, interventions and implementation methods, management structure and processes, funding mechanisms, and collaboration and coordination with other projects or key organizations. Recommendations will focus on how these issues can be addressed in new projects.

Based on the evaluation research and data analysis, this evaluation will help USAID management understand what has worked, what has not worked, and why. Lessons learned and best practices identified will pinpoint areas for improvement and help in

determining which components have contributed the most and least to achieving the projects' results and the reasons for success or failure. Conclusions and programmatic recommendations will inform the design process for follow-on programs and help management in deciding whether to continue, revise, or discontinue existing components or add new areas of assistance.

Further, USAID is expecting a significant increase in agricultural development funds in the Fiscal Year 2010 budget cycle and beyond, and thus, management wants to ensure the efficient and effective use of U.S. taxpayer funds for maximum results in rebuilding the agricultural sector in Afghanistan.

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the evaluation will also contribute to learning for the broader development community and key host-country organizations by stakeholder participation and dissemination of findings to a broad audience of other donors, government counterparts, and other partners.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECTS TO BE EVALUATED

All of the ADPs began in February 2005 and lasted for approximately four years. Because these three programs represent a significant investment of USAID resources it is imperative to determine whether they achieved their intended results and to identify lessons learned and best practices that can inform future programming. USAID is in the process of developing and designing new projects as follow-on and complementary activities to these three large and complex programs.

USAID awarded three Alternative Development Programs (formally called Alternative Livelihoods Programs) in February 2005; one each in the Northern, Southern, and Eastern regions of Afghanistan. All ADPs were implemented over a four-year period and ended in 2009. ADP/North was valued at \$60 million and was implemented by AECOM International (formally PADCO) and ended in February 2009. ADP/South was valued at \$166.1 million and was implemented by Chemonics International and ended on October 31, 2009. ADP/East was valued at \$118.4 million and was implemented by Development Alternatives (DAI) and ended on June 30, 2009. The total value of these three contracts was \$344.5 million.

The principal goal of the alternative development programs was to accelerate broad-based, sustainable regional economic development in ways that provide new opportunities for the Afghan population to seek livelihoods in the licit economy. The alternative development programs had two overall strategic objectives:

- Help accelerate licit economic growth and business activity in selected provinces in which poppy cultivation is thriving.
- Help provide an immediate alternative source of income to poor households whose livelihoods depend, directly or indirectly, on the temporary opium economy.

The main development problem that the ADPs attempted to address was to revitalize and expand the licit economy by providing licit alternatives to poppy cultivation. The development hypothesis was that creating viable business and income generation

opportunities in the licit economy would provide farmers with alternatives to growing poppy. In other words, if given a choice, farmers would choose not to grow poppy if legal and viable alternatives existed.

The ADPs utilized a wide and integrated mix of activities and interventions to achieve these goals and objectives including:

- Infrastructure improvements such as irrigation system rehabilitation and road rehabilitation
- Cash-for-work programs
- Agricultural development programs, including horticulture (fresh fruits and vegetables), support for staple crops such as wheat, demonstration farms, and technology transfer.
- Introduction of new crop varieties and new production techniques
- Seed and fertilizer distribution programs
- An extensive amount of training
- Tree planting, orchard development, and nursery establishment programs
- Livestock and animal health programs
- Agribusiness and business/private sector development programs that focused on agricultural processing and packaging facilities.
- Poultry industry programs such as feed and forage programs, breeder farms, and feedlots.
- Market development programs providing assistance such as agricultural trade fairs, market group formation, market information systems, and assisting in accessing export markets.
- Women's programs

All of the ADPs used many if not all of the above implementation methodologies to achieve their objectives. The intended beneficiaries of these programs were small and medium-sized farmers in the targeted poppy growing areas.

2.1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

What impact did the Alternative Development Programs have on agricultural production in the three geographical areas? The intended analysis shall provide a breakdown into the following sectors:

- Horticulture such as fruits, nuts, dried fruits, and vegetables
- Wheat and cereal grains
- Livestock and poultry

What impact did the ADPs have on farm income? Assess the change in net income (revenues minus costs) of participating farmers from the baseline year of 2005 to 2009.

What impact did the ADPs have on employment? Did growth in the agricultural sector in the targeted areas increase demand for farm labor? What was the impact on farm wages?

To what extent did the ADPs contribute to a decline in opium production? How many hectares in the poppy growing areas were converted to alternative crops? Analyze the contribution of the ADPs to the overall USG counternarcotics strategy. How effective

were the ADP conditionality agreements whereby farmers agreed to not grow poppy in return for receiving ADP assistance?

Provide a detailed analysis of the project budgets and expenditures. How were budget funds allocated? Include information on dollars spent, broken down by activity, the personnel who worked on the activity, timing of the activity, and the organizations involved in implementation.

What percentage of the project budgets directly reached the intended beneficiaries?

Did the economic benefits generated by the ADPs justify the cost of the programs?

What were the underlying strategies for promoting alternative development? What were the activity design processes? How were Afghan knowledge and experiences incorporated into the planning, design, and implementation of activities?

What was the level of government commitment and involvement?

What factors affected the performance and impact of the ADPs? Aside from security, what were the major implementation problems or constraints that limited progress?

Did any of the initiated activities and services such as information, training, technical assistance, demonstration farms, extension services, etc. continue after the end of external support? What actions and plans were put in place to ensure sustainability?

What successful activities/models can be scaled up and replicated in other areas of the country?

Evaluate the economic impact on farmers, families, and communities resulting from ADP investments in infrastructure such as the following:

- Road construction and rehabilitation projects, such as the ADP/East Malil and Panangzai road projects and others. What was the impact on transportation time and costs and on the amount of produce transported to market?
- Irrigation canal construction, rehabilitation, and cleaning activities, such as the irrigation system rehabilitation in the central Helmand Valley, and others.
- Micro-hydro power plant projects, such as those in the East and in Lashkar Gah.
- Market renovations such as the ADP/East renovation of the Jalalabad market.

For all types of infrastructure projects, what mechanisms are in place to provide operation and maintenance services?

Describe the approaches to, and analyze the impact of ADP agricultural training, demonstration farms, agricultural research (introduction of new varieties), extension, technology transfer, and information dissemination programs. How was the training delivered? What was the level of quality, effectiveness, and satisfaction? What was the impact on technology adoption and on-farm yields? Disaggregate the training data by type, gender, technical area, length, province, etc.

Analyze the performance and impact of the improved seed and fertilizer distribution programs. Describe in detail how these programs operated. How were beneficiaries selected and what criteria were used? Describe the certification process used to ensure the quality of seeds and fertilizers. What was the impact on the adoption of new agricultural techniques? What was the impact on wheat and vegetable production and yield per jerib? How effective were the free and partial payment voucher programs at reaching intended beneficiaries and covering the entire communities? Was a marketing system in place to handle the increased level of production?

Describe the strategies for supporting and developing orchards, tree planting, and nursery development. Analyze the performance of the orchard development, tree planting initiatives, and nursery establishment programs. What was the impact on production and income generation? To what extent can/did these products serve as an alternative crop and source of income to poppy?

Assess the alternative development programs impact on agricultural exports. Were new markets created for horticulture products? Were new industry standards established for the grading, sorting, packaging, and storage of fruits and vegetables?

How did the agribusiness, processing, and poultry programs perform and what did they accomplish based on the following criteria?

- Growth of private sector firms in the form of increased sales
- New business startups
- Employment generation
- Private sector investment and industry growth

How did the vocational, business training, and textile industry programs perform and what did they accomplish based on the following criteria?

- Growth of private sector firms in the form of increased sales
- New business startups
- Employment generation
- Private sector investment and industry growth

How effective were the projects' efforts to include women? To what extent did the ADPs contribute to women's employment, income generation, and empowerment?

How were farmers and agricultural workers affected by the increased use of chemical pesticides? Were farmers and communities aware of the health hazards and environmental impact of pesticides? What safety procedures were followed to mitigate the effect on human health, soil, and water supply? What alternative pest management techniques were pursued prior to the use of chemicals?

2.2 EVALUATION METHODS

A full evaluation methodology and data collection plan shall be submitted for USAID approval as the first deliverable of the evaluation. The evaluation plan will outline the research design for the evaluation and will specify the methods to be used to answer the evaluation questions. The evaluation plan shall list and describe the evaluation methods

to be used, the type of data collection methods that will be used, and from whom the data will be collected.

There are many data collection methods that can be used to complete this evaluation. The key will be to choose the methods that work best for the purpose of the evaluation and conditions in Afghanistan, while maintaining an acceptable level of reliability and rigor.

It is expected that this evaluation will draw on a variety of data collected strategies and a mix of methods such as the following:

- Methods for using existing data such as document review and re-analysis of existing data sets.
- Primary data collection using a variety of rapid appraisal techniques such as:
 - ❖ Key informant interviews
 - ❖ Focus group discussions
 - ❖ Community and group interviews
 - ❖ Observation techniques
 - ❖ Surveys - mini or larger scale surveys.

Other data sources may include:

- Baseline studies if available
- Project and beneficiary records
- Project data collection forms
- Review of project performance databases
- Sample surveys of farmers/beneficiaries
- Country agricultural statistics
- Photos
- Others as identified

The evaluation shall not rely solely on qualitative information such as from interviews. Objective and quantitative data collection methods shall also be used such as surveys and sampling and other numerical measurements to determine impact. Comparison control groups shall also be used as appropriate.

2.3 EXISTING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION SOURCES

Copies of existing project performance information and reports such as agreement documents, design and proposal documents, analyses and assessments, bi-weekly, quarterly, and annual reports; performance monitoring reports and PMPs; work plans; and any previous studies, assessments, and evaluations, including baseline data will be provided to the evaluation team.

III. TEAM QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPOSITION

USAID evaluation guidance for team selection strongly recommends that team members have credentials and experience in evaluation design and methods. The team leader must have strong team management skills, and sufficient experience with evaluation standards and practices.

The overall size and structure of the evaluation team will be determined by the contractor, satisfying the key personnel guidelines listed below. One possible way to structure the teams would be to have three smaller teams for each region supervised by an overall team leader. For example, nine team members; three per region, including team leader as part of one of the regional teams.

The recommended team size, qualifications and skills of team members, such as country and regional experience, evaluation methods and data collection skills, technical/sector knowledge, facilitation skills, management and leadership, language proficiency, gender mix, participation of USAID staff, partners, host government, and other stakeholders are outlined below.

Evaluation team composition and team member skills shall include the following:

- In addition to evaluation experience, the Team Leader will have strong management skills and a track record of delivering high quality products.
- An effort shall be made to include Afghans on the team.
- An effort should be made to include at least one woman on the team.
- Monitoring and evaluation skills and experience
- Consider drawing from a diverse mix of staff, such as local university specialists, members of the communities benefiting, host government personnel, USAID mission staff, NGOs, and the private sector.
- Ability to suspend judgment and remain objective
- Good communication and writing skills
- Strong analytical skills
- Ability to be flexible
- Technical/sector knowledge
- Good interviewing skills
- Language proficiency
- Geographic area knowledge
- Local and cultural sensitivity

3.1 QUALIFICATIONS OF KEY PERSONNEL

The following are the minimum number of key positions for this evaluation. The contractor may propose additional international and local Afghan personnel needed to conduct the evaluation.

Team Leader: The Team Leader is required to be an evaluation specialist and have at least 15 years of program evaluation experience, preferably with at least 5 years of international program evaluation experience. The Team Leader shall have at least a master's degree in a field related to evaluation or international development such as economics, agricultural development, political science, international development or another related social science discipline.

A PhD is highly preferred, but not required, as is educational and work experience focused on conducting qualitative and quantitative research. Experience conducting formal evaluations, leading evaluation teams, in program management, international

development, and specific experience managing and evaluating agriculture, rural development, and economic development programs is highly preferred.

Senior Social Scientist (SSS): This person shall have at least a master’s degree in a related discipline, a PhD is preferred but not required, and at least 10 years of quantitative and qualitative research methods experience. At least 5 years conducting evaluations, preferably in an international setting, is also highly desirable. Experience with rapid and participatory appraisal methods, sampling, surveys, and facilitating focus group discussions is highly desirable. Education and experience in disciplines such as economics, sociology, agriculture/rural development, political science, or a related discipline is desirable.

Agriculture and Agribusiness Specialist (AAS): This person will be the lead technical specialist and shall have at least 5 to 10 years experience in designing, implementing, and assessing agriculture and rural development and/or alternative development/alternative livelihood programs. A degree in Agricultural Economics is preferred. Regional and/or Afghanistan country experience is desirable.

Project Management/Institutional Specialist (PSI): This person shall have at least 10 years of applied experience with at least 5 years experience in project management, implementation and/or experience in capacity building and institutional development. Some experience with agricultural development projects would be a plus.

Three evaluation teams, each composed of three expatriates for each team with CCN translators will perform simultaneous evaluations of the three ADPs. The Team Leader will manage the overall effort and float between the three teams ensuring consistency and synergy. The Team Leader shall designate one member from each of the other two teams as a Team Manager. Each team is expected to travel extensively throughout their designated ADP Area of Responsibility (AOR) to address the questions mentioned above and achieve the overall goals of this final program evaluation. The Team Leader is also expected to travel throughout each ADP AOR.

Proposed Team Composition

North ADP	South ADP	East ADP	Team Leader
Team Manager/PSI	Team Manager/PSI	Team Manager/PSI	
SSS	SSS	SSS	
AAS	AAS	AAS	
1-2 CCN	1-2 CCN	1-2 CCN	1 CCN + Support Staff

Proposed LOE

Position & No.	US Prep Days LOE/STTA	Travel Days/STTA	Days LOE In-Country/STTA	Total LOE
1 - Team Leader	5	4	84	93
3 - Team Managers	4	4	84	92 x 3 = 276
3- SSS	3	4	84	91 x 3 = 273
3 - ASS	3	4	84	91 x 3 = 273
4-6 CCNs*	0	0	49	196
Total LOE				1,111

* SUPPORT may designate 2-4 LTTA staff to assist if available.

** Provides 15 weeks in-country

***** Please refer to attached Preliminary Schedule of Activities – the Team Leader will update this schedule on a weekly basis for USAID/A.**

IV. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The evaluation report shall include the following:

1. Title Page
2. Table of Contents
3. List of any acronyms, tables, or charts (if needed)
4. Acknowledgements or Preface (optional)
5. Executive Summary
6. Introductory Chapter
 - a. A description of the projects evaluated, including goals and objectives.
 - b. Brief statement of why the project was evaluated, including a list of the main evaluation questions.
 - c. Brief statement on the methods used in the evaluation such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.
7. Findings: Describe the findings, focusing on each of the questions the evaluation was intended to answer. Organize the findings to answer the evaluation questions.
8. Conclusions – This section will include value statements based on interpreting the facts and evidence and describing what the facts and evidence mean.
9. Recommendations – This section will include actionable statements of what needs to be done, consistent with the evaluation’s purpose, and based on the evaluation’s findings and conclusions. This section will provide judgments on what changes need to be made for future USAID agriculture programming. Since this is a combined final evaluation, this section can recommend ways to improve the performance of future USAID programming and project implementation; ways to solve problems these projects’ faced; identify adjustments/corrections that need to be made; and recommend actions and/or decisions to be taken by management.
10. Annex
 - a. Statement of Work
 - b. Places visited; people interviewed
 - c. Methodology description
 - d. Copies of all survey instruments and questionnaires
 - e. Critical background documents
 - f. Copies of any key documents reviewed

At least the Executive Summary shall be translated into Dari and Pashto local languages. The overall report shall not be more than 75 pages, not including annexes.

V. DELIVERABLES

1. **Detailed Inception Report and Evaluation Plan** covering (a) the overall design strategy for the evaluation; (b) proposed methodology, schedule for the data collection and analysis plan for the evaluation; (c) a list and contact information of the team members (an e-mail and telephone number for the team leader should be provided); and (d) the team’s schedule and itinerary for the evaluation shall be submitted within six days of the team’s arrival in Kabul.

2. **Interim Briefings** with USAID staff of the evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The contractor shall work closely with USAID during the planning and execution of the evaluation and conduct on-going meetings and briefings with USAID as needed and/or requested by the Mission.
3. **Stakeholders Briefings** - The Team Leader shall organize public stakeholders' briefings/meetings at the beginning, middle, and end of the evaluation to ensure proper participation. These meetings will take place both in Kabul and in the three regions. Other briefings shall be organized as required and in consultation with USAID.
4. **Draft Final Report and Draft Team Reports** – Each team member will produce a 15-25 page report, including a complete analysis of his/her designated area, as assigned by the Team Leader. This report will be used by the Team Leader to draft the final report and these individual reports will be annexed to the final report for information. The draft report shall be consistent with the report sections and format provided above. Length of the final report: Not to exceed 75 pages plus annexes and an Executive Summary. The draft report shall be submitted at least 18 days prior to the team's departure.
5. **Final Briefing** – The Team Leader shall prepare and present a Power Point final briefing to ADAG staff, key USAID staff and key stakeholders in Kabul as identified by the Mission.
6. **Final Evaluation Report** incorporating comments received on the draft report and during oral presentations/briefings. The final report shall be submitted at least three days prior to the team's departure. This scope of work shall be included in the final report as Annex I.

5.1 SCHEDULE:

The estimated timeframe for completion of this multiple evaluation effort is between Jan 4th – April 17th 2010. (15 weeks). A six day work week is authorized for this activity. The first week – Jan 4 – 8 shall be used by the team members for preparatory work before departing for Kabul.