

**CRISIS RESPONSE PLAN
FOR
DROUGHT NEEDS IN CY 2000**

**U. S. AGENCY
FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN ETHIOPIA**

(USAID/ETHIOPIA)

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List of Acronyms

BHR/FFP	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance/Food For Peace
BHR/OFDA	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Development Assistance
DAP	Development Activity Proposal
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
EFSRA	Ethiopian Food Security and Reserve Administration
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
EPI	Expanded Program of Immunization
ETA	Expected Time of Arrival
EU	European Union
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	Food For Work
GFDRE	Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GHAI	Greater Horn of African Initiative
IDP	Internally Displace People
JTO	Joint Transport Operations
KAT	Kenbata and Hadiya
LITS	Logistics Information and Tracking System
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCH	Mother Child Health
NGO	Non Government Organization
PA	Peasant Association
PAA	Previously Approved Activity
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Support Office/East and Southern Africa
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
SCF/UK	Save the Children/UK
SERA	Strengthening Emergency Response Ability
SNNP	Southern People Nation and Nationalities
TDA	Tigray Development Agency
UNCTAD	United Nations Committee for Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Project
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
WFP	World Food Program
WFP/FAT	World Food Program/Food Aid Transport
WTOE	World Food Program Transport Operations in Ethiopia

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. CY 2000 Needs

On average, historical food aid in Ethiopia has been around 500,000 plus mts per year. However, CY 1999 needs were 679,450 mts or approximately 180,000 mts over an average year. Since the CY 1999 needs were closer to 700,000 mts, and were under resourced, a significant portion of those needs will be carried over in to CY 2000. Therefore, CY 2000 food aid needs are projected to range between 800,000 and 1,000,000 million mts due largely to chronic, long-term malnutrition, recent droughts, and poor harvests over the past several years which have reduced the capacity of vulnerable families to respond to the current climatic shocks.

Taken in this context, the 1998 and 1999 climate shocks also affected the ability of the local population to support the chronically food insecure and destitute needs (through gifts and labor opportunities) as they suffered their own loss of assets and coping mechanisms. Government and development agencies were also unable to support increasing needs with longer-term programs and this placed a significant percentage of the communities' lives in imminent danger, resulting in an enormous expansion of need, and subsequently the dilution of distribution rations.

Recently, the UN Emergency Coordinator for the UNDP stated that pockets of first-time needs have emerged in Illubabor and Jimma, areas that have never before been affected. Judging from DPPC's November "bridge appeal," which requests 260,069 mts to meet the needs of some 5.7 million persons for the period January – March CY 2000, emergency needs are assured in CY 2000 to be significantly higher than in CY 1999 (679,450 mts). In fact, multiplying the first quarter needs by four results in food requirements of over 1 million mts for CY 2000. These needs are well above the food assistance needed for the 315,000 internally displaced people. Despite the fact that Ethiopia and Eritrea are at war, there is no evidence to suggest that needed resources are being diverted from the current food emergency or, if the conflict was not ongoing, that the severity of the drought crisis would be less.¹

(Note: While the Government of Ethiopia (GFDRE) does have ongoing appeals for assistance to both the drought affected and the war displaced, it makes a clear distinction between the two appeals, enabling donors to better monitor the use of their donations.)

B. 1999 Response Successful but Needs Strengthening in CY 2000

The poor Meher harvest of 1998 and gross under-estimation of food needs, together with the failure of the Belg rains in 1999, pest infestation, and other unfavorable factors resulted in enormous food aid needs on a scale not seen recently in Ethiopia. Following numerous assessments and donor conviction that, indeed, the needs were acute, a robust response began in May 1999. By August, food and non-food contributions met 94.5% and 50% respectively of the requirements identified. Clearly, the collective efforts of the Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE), Donors, UN and NGOs in 1999, coupled with the loans by the Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA), averted the threat of a "famine-like" situation and significant loss of human life. The amount of food available at the EFSRA till

¹ Mission has updated its contingency plan for the IDPs as summarized in Annex B

the end of CY 1999 is so low that only 100,000 mts will be carried over into CY 2000. This tonnage will meet the food needs of only 2.2 million persons for three months, or less than half or 40% of the DPPC's estimated needs for the first quarter (Jan - March, 2000 bridge appeal).

C. Constraints to responding effectively

Targeting

While the 1999 outcome to date represents a partial success story, methodologies of identifying vulnerable people need to be strengthened. Differentiating between chronic and transient needs is essential to addressing targeting issues. While corrective measures to deal with this contentious issue are underway, targeting must be given higher priority in CY 2000 to improve the effectiveness of aid donations and meet increased levels of needs. In this regard, DPPC is moving forward on the national targeting guidelines while sponsoring an integrated approach (Government, Donors, NGOs) to conducting the upcoming national crop production and supplies assessment beginning mid November 1999.

Logistics

Increased logistical capacity in the immediate-term will be critical to an effective response to identified CY 2000 needs. Eighteen months after the onset of the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia continues to struggle with replacing the importation and transportation capacity it lost along with access to the ports of Assab and Massawa. Additionally, the Logistics Information and Tracking System (LITS) designed to monitor the use and performance of food aid transport operations from Eritrean ports to primary warehouses and distribution sites is no longer in use by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). While seventy-eight percent (78%) of the food required for the period June – September 1999 was delivered via Djibouti to meet estimated CY 2000 needs, the off-take capacity of the Djibouti port needs to be increased and/or other options, such as accessing the Berbera port, need to be considered. In addition, repayments to the EFSRA must be accelerated and delivery of food aid to distribution sites via main routes must be significantly improved.

D. Summary of recommendations

- Front-load CY 2000 deliveries via Food for Peace contributions to DPPC and WFP "bridge appeals".
- Tranche USG food contributions (USDA and FFP) through DPPC, WFP and NGOs equally and monitor the call forward of WFP refugee and development food programs to minimize bottlenecks.
- Support increased logistic efforts in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Berbera (i.e. minimize potential port(s) and internal logistics bottlenecks.
- Provide full rations and an improved food basket as well as the inclusion of supplementary food for malnourished children, pregnant women and lactating mothers to maintain and improve nutritional levels.
- Maximize the capacity of the humanitarian community to respond to increased needs in a timely manner.
- Evaluate ongoing development programs in drought affected areas to determine

possible changes that can be made to increase their effectiveness at reducing vulnerability and promoting recovery.

- Provide rapid training to Zonal and District early warning and targeting authorities through the USAID/Ethiopia funded SERA project.

E. Schedule of Key events

November 3 - November 24:	FAO National crop assessment
November 5:	Issuance of the DPPC "bridge appeal"
November 15:	Issuance of WFP emergency drought operation extension
November 20:	Issuance of WFP emergency displaced operation extension
November 19 - December 11:	DPPC/MOA/WFP/Donor national crop production and needs assessment
November 26-28:	WFP Regional Logistics Seminar in Addis
November 28-30:	WFP Horn of Africa Country Directors meet in Addis
January 10:	Results of joint assessment completed
January 20:	Issuance of DPPC CY 2000 Appeal
January 28:	Issuance of UN Country Team Appeals for drought affected and displaced
January 30:	Revision and update of USAID/Ethiopia contingency and action plan for drought and displaced populations

II. BACKGROUND

A. Objective

The objective of the USAID/E crisis response plan is to assess the overall food outlook and to provide reasonable estimations of food and non-food needs for CY 2000 and outline a robust USG response in order to:

- save lives and alleviate suffering among the most vulnerable through *emergency assistance*
- prevent “at risk” populations from sliding into destitution through *mitigation efforts* and thus maintain their productive assets.

USG efforts in collaboration with other donors should:

- meet minimal requirements to sustain life of the most vulnerable populations
- minimize potential port (s) and internal logistic bottlenecks
- maximize capacity of all stakeholders to respond to increased needs in a timely manner
- encourage the GFDRE to give priority to the transport and distribution of humanitarian assistance
- strengthen effective targeting of resources
- encourage transparency of operations between the Government and humanitarian community

B. Problem Statement

Although referred to as drought related, the 1999 food shortage is a result of several climatic shocks and the cumulative effect of loss of coping mechanisms, poverty, and under-nutrition in Ethiopia. Heavy rains, hail, and frost at the end of the 1998 Meher season significantly reduced crop production, resulting in a significant over-estimation of the 1998 Meher production and an under-estimation of those in need. This was followed by the failure of the 1999 Belg rains, which affected more than 2.2 million persons. The failure of the Belg rains also significantly reduced land preparation and planting long cycle crops for the Meher season. Combined with food insecurity among the pastoralists, and needs of some 315,000 internally displaced persons along the disputed border, needs are spread throughout the country.

Deteriorating socio-economic conditions

According to USAID field visits and nutritional information provided by UNICEF and SCF/UK, “pockets” of malnutrition continue despite efforts to meet acute food needs of the population affected by the drought and the special nutritional needs of the most vulnerable.

While some progress has been made in preventing further deterioration of malnutrition, through general distribution and the provision of some supplementary food, the absence of a national surveillance system has hindered efforts to target food resources effectively. To accommodate increased need, individual rations went from 15kg/p/p/m to 12.5 kg/p/p/m and, in some cases, were further diluted to 6-7kg/p/p/m. Local leaders in affected areas are hard-pressed to give food only to the vulnerable, i.e. those who have no animals. "People at risk", those with few chickens or a goat, will become as vulnerable as the most needy in a matter of a few months if they do not receive food aid. Furthermore, those who have oxen are relied upon to provide plowing. If they do not receive some assistance (food or inputs) they are forced to sell their animals and the entire community suffers as a result. Faced with the dilemma of deciding "who is at risk," local leaders opted to cut ration sizes to distribute to more people.

Further complicating the current situation is the history of under-nutrition, wasting and stunting prevalent throughout Ethiopia. Frequent food shortages as a result of natural disasters, poor eating habits and poverty in Ethiopia have resulted in a mortality rate of over 195 per thousand births for children under-five, growing chronic malnutrition and destitution. Other studies have revealed that as many as 47% of the children are underweight, 8% wasted and 64% stunted.

Access to potable water is extremely limited. Although water could likely be a critical need for some drought affected populations (pastoralist in Borena and Somali regions), assumptions under this crisis response plan do not include the failure of the CY 2000 Belg, Pastoral and Meher rains. Grazing land is also extremely scarce or non-existent at this time, and many of the herds in the Borena area already appeared wasted. Livestock deaths have already been reported. There is serious concern about the immediate future should the rains fail completely.

The current emergency has resulted in worsening terms of trade between cereals and livestock. The most vulnerable were forced to sell their few remaining animals at drastically low prices to meet household food requirements. In some cases animals were in such weakened conditions that farmers are not able to sell them for any price in the market.

Lack of purchasing power also exacerbates the situations leading the vulnerable people to sell their rations in order to secure other basic household items and social services such as health and education.

Large-scale stress migration has been used as an extreme coping mechanism by some of the vulnerable since December 1998. While migration subsided during the Meher agricultural season and as a result of increased food deliveries to the most affected areas, migration may be expected to resume again following the Meher harvest (November 1999). Without food aid and other programs in place, stress migration could become a "front burner" issue in CY 2000.

These deteriorating socio-economic conditions have resulted in a serious loss of productive assets, an ever-increasing population in need of emergency food aid, stress migrations and malnutrition.

As a result of these factors, estimated drought relief needs in 1999 increased from 2.5 million persons in January 1999 to some 4.6 to 5 million in June 1999 and to more than 6.6 million

persons in October 1999. DPPC and the international community are currently responding to the needs of more than 5.7 million (per bridge appeal) drought affected persons throughout Ethiopia. Populations now under stress can be found in both areas considered traditionally food deficit as well as in new (generally productive) areas affected by unseasonable periods without sufficient and/or with excessive rains. The table below indicates the number of people in need and amounts of food assistance for the period June – December 1999:

Description	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Belg 99	2,000,000	2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000
Meher 99	2,600,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	3,400,000	3,300,000	3,150,000	880,000
Pastorals					1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000
Total	4,600,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,600,000	6,600,000	6,450,000	4,180,000
Mt/Req	69,000	75,000	75,000	84,000	99,000	96,750	62,700
Total							561,450*

*** Total metric tons requirement June-December is 561,450**

As a result of the significant spike in needs, the Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA) has been called upon to extend substantial loans and will likely carry-over into CY 2000 with a level of 100,000 mts, substantially below its 357,000 mts capacity. Without timely repayments, the EFSRA will not be in a position to respond effectively to needs in early CY 2000.

C. Food Availability

As has already been stated, targeting both at the macro and micro level has been difficult as needs are widely spread throughout the country. The general population in drought affected areas is facing significant food shortages and lack the purchasing power to meet household food needs.

Emergency food assistance in Ethiopia during serious food shortages should not only save lives and alleviate suffering but also preserve the populations' productive assets. If food aid is not provided to protect the productive assets of families, then assistance programs will have to move to response-type operations where all efforts will have to be channeled to only saving lives. Between June – September 1999 a total of 236,997 mts (cereals) have been delivered as follows (including April and May pre-positions):

Region	June	July	August	September	Total
Tigray	4,607	4,607	5,752	8,746	23,712
Afar	2,420	2,822	0	2,002	7,244
Amhara	29,975	29,088	34,088	32,974	126,125
Oromia	7,147	13,188	14,241	11,669	46,245
SNNPR	6,714	6,929	5,518	5,566	24,727
Hareri	0	166	166	0	332
Dire Dawa	0	556	530	526	1,612

Somali	0	0	0	7,000	7,000
Total	50,863	57,356	60,295	68,483	236,997

The above represents the total relief delivered by DPPC, WFP and NGOs during these months. On average, DPPC provided 53 percent of the above commodities to end distribution points, with the remaining balance of 47 percent undertaken by WFP and NGOs (REST, LWF, CRS, OXFAM, SOS, SCF/UK and others). The total combined effort met 79% of the total food aid requirements for the period June – September as originally identified in the June appeal.

Those who are determined to be in need of emergency food assistance in Ethiopia are generally targeted with 15 kgs/p/p/m of cereals, providing the recommended 2100 kcal necessary to maintain nutritional levels. Distributions since June are estimated to have provided 6 to 7-kg p/p/m following re-distributions among the vulnerable populations, or 840 - 980 kcal p/p/m.

Note: A survival ration should provide 1900 kcal (OFDA field operations guide)

1. Status of food stocks

Current stock status of the Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA) stands at 70,833 mts of cereals for borrowing (against an approved EFSRA level of 357,000 mts). While the EFSRA began extending significant loans as early as April 1999, deliveries and repayments just began in September. As a result, the EFSRA stock at the end of CY 1999 will only be able to meet the food needs of some 2.2 million persons for a three-month period. Continued heavy use of the EFSRA, late repayments and delayed CY 2000 contributions against early needs could result in the cessation of food distributions and lead to significant migration and deaths unless donors respond robustly to needs in the first quarter of CY 2000.

EFSRA	September	October	November	December (estimated)
Stock on hand	81,884	108,124	81,352	112,089
Repayments	73,256	28,556	99,487	39,562
End of month stock	155,140	136,680	180,839	151,651
Planned withdrawal	47,016	55,328	68,750	50,865
Balance	108,124	81,352	112,089	100,786

2. Meher production prospects (late September through early December)

Based on several recent visits in the central, western and northern long-cycle crop producing areas, it is estimated that a significant reduction of maize and sorghum is expected at the national level. Crop reduction could range from a serious and significant loss of 650,000 to perhaps one million mts compared to last year.

The late start and irregularities of the Meher rains delayed land preparation and planting of short cycle crops over most of the northeastern highland parts of the country and led to less application of fertilizer. These conditions led farmers to substitute lower yielding short cycle crops for long cycle and higher yielding maize and sorghum crops. Farmers also abandoned some parts of their

farms that are usually used for long-cycle crops. Moreover, widespread pest infestation has damaged crops and forced farmers to replant, particularly in the east, south and central parts of the country.

3. FEWS weather forecasts

The Meher rains began one to two months late, following the failure of the Belg rains. Then the rains lessened in early September, becoming light and isolated in East Tigray zone, and totally ceased after the first week of the month. In mid September rains became even less frequent with more dry conditions in South Tigray and North Wello. Central and East Tigray, Wag Humra, most of North Wello, South Wello have received below average rainfall until the end of September, while parts of West Tigray, North Gondar and West Gojjam continued to receive close to normal precipitation.

4. GFDRE early warning

The Government's early warning systems are specifically designed to track short-term impacts of disaster events rather than long-term, slow onset trends. Ideally, the system should provide ample time for reporting and response to severe crisis. In the current context, it is clear that there were indications from FEWS that a significant food shortage was taking place in many areas of the country and that there was timely early warning in some areas. The difficulty was a serious over-estimation of crop production and a pervasive under-estimation of those in need of food aid over time. This resulted in an initial low appeal figure, limited donor response until June 1999, and an inability to fully meet urgent needs once they became apparent. Taken together, these factors suggest the monthly food needs outlined in the following table.

Estimate of CY 2000 Food Needs (cereals) for the Drought affected areas in Ethiopia

Description	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Belg 1999	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000	1,300,000						
Belg 2000										1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Meher	600,000	600,000	600,000	2,500,000	3,700,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000
Pastorals	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000						
Total	3,100,000	3,100,000	3,100,000	5,000,000	6,200,000	7,000,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	5,500,000	5,500,000	5,500,000	1,000,000
MT/REQ	46,500	46,500	46,500	75,000	93,000	105,000	67,500	67,500	82,500	82,500	82,500	15,000
Total												810,000*

*** Total estimated metric tons requirement January - December is 810,000**

Note, Should the Pastoral and Belg rains fail, needs would increase to 1.5 million persons per month for the period January - June 2000 (pastoralists) and to 2.2 million persons for the period June - December 2000 (Belg). CY 2000 needs would increase to approximately 970,000 mts.

D. CONSTRAINTS (TARGETING, MONITORING AND LOGISTICS)

Targeting

Food aid targeting is a serious issue of urgent interest for a number of converging reasons. On the one hand, the GFDRE policy commitment to reducing food aid dependency and cutting free distribution whenever possible makes it even more important that limited quantities of food expected for the future be effectively concentrated on those who need it most. In particular the new policy's emphasis on channeling relief food through Employment Generation Schemes (EGS) demand a close study of the targeting options for such projects. On the other hand, targeting was difficult because of dilution of rations caused by; (a) either a gross over-estimation of harvest or an under-estimation of needs; (b) the inability of destitute, poor and middle income families to meet household consumption requirements; and (c) the lack of capacity by local officials to target, monitor and report. The selection of beneficiaries at the Wereda level and below was seen as "a gray area" making it difficult to account in any detail for the end use made of the substantial resources distributed.

Monitoring

Distribution monitoring has been made difficult by the fact that PA and Wereda level distributions are monitored by the local officials, and information is collected, and not passed up to the zonal, regional and central level authorities. There is a need to develop a reporting system so that information can be easily accessed at the regional and central level. This information must present the total number of persons that benefited from food distributions versus food allocation quantities and destinations.

Monitoring capacity on the part of local officials is further restricted by the fact that limited resources have been targeted to the zonal and wereda levels. Local authorities lack resources to institute minimal tracking and monitoring systems, including insufficient vehicles, computers and basic guidelines.

Logistics - ports

Djibouti

Since the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, the Assab and Massawa ports have been closed to Ethiopian cargo, and Djibouti has become the *de facto* principal port for Ethiopian imports and exports. The sudden shift of traffic to Djibouti has resulted, at times, in considerable congestion at the port given its limited off loading capacity to handle the anticipated large food aid and commercial cargo. The port's current capacity can handle an estimated 100,000 plus mts per month of bulk commodities. However, as a result of continuing "slippage" in estimated time of arrivals (ETAs) of donor shipments, Djibouti has really not been fully tested as of yet.

Also it is estimated that as much as 280,000 mts of fertilizer will be imported through Djibouti in CY 2000, of which up to 60 to 70% will be imported between January and May (or almost

33,600 to 39,200 mts per month). However, fertilizer shipments will not likely be equally tranced. A more realistic level of fertilizer imports for the period January – May is 50,000 - 60,000 mts per month, leaving some 40,000 to 50,000 mts of port capacity available for the handling of food aid.

Assuming that some 280,000 mts of fertilizer will be imported in CY 2000, and up to 1.13 million mts of food aid and commercial bulk cargo, a total of 1.41 million mts will be imported into Djibouti in CY 2000 (see table). As the importation capacity through Djibouti is estimated to be 100,000 mts plus per month (or some 1.2 million mts per year) the current capacity of Djibouti is exceeded by some 210,000 mts.

2000 Imports	Estimated level
Fertilizer	280,000
Emergency food aid*	600,000
Development food aid	180,000
Refugee food aid	68,000
Commercial bulk cargo	80,000
EFSRA Repayments	200,000
Total	1,408,000

*Note. While food needs of up to 800,000 mts are envisaged for CY 2000, it is expected that only 600,000 mts will be imported. The balance of the food needs will be met by borrowings from continuing EFSRA repayments made available by the Donor community between January and December 2000.

Berbera

While the port of Berbera handled 229,760 mts of commercial imports in 1997 and has the additional capacity to handle at least 15,000 - 20,000 mts of food per month (along with the exportation of animals), it continues to be immensely underutilized. And while it does appear to be viable as an entry port to Ethiopia, for a portion of the required food aid shipments, there are a number of concerns including limited transport capacity and deteriorating roads. As it stands, unless donors are prepared to address the trucking capacity and road constraints, high costs could limit the use of Berbera. These issues should be addressed before planning to utilize Berbera on a regular basis.

Berbera has six berths of which five are alongside and one Ro-Ro measuring a total of 650 meters. Although vessels of up to 20,000 mts are considered appropriate (given the ports depth and berthing lengths), in practice shipments range from 10-16,000 mts. Ideally, vessels should have their own gear to discharge bulk cargo.

Logistics - transport

As crop production in fertile areas has significantly improved between 1993 and 1997 through the use of increased quantities of fertilizer and improved farming techniques, the Government and donor community have focussed their efforts on longer-term food security and development issues. This effort to shift from “relief to development” led to the “shedding” of NGO and

Donor agency "relief armor" (trucking capacity, emergency relief and distribution/monitoring capacity) and transfer of this capacity to the Government (DPPC) to deal with emergency situations. While donor endeavors to increase crop production and the Government's disaster management capacity have been partially successful, the readiness of the larger relief community to deal with a significant food crisis in Ethiopia generally has diminished.

Relief transport operations in CY 1999 consisted of significant deliveries to strategic warehouses and distribution centers along the main roads almost exclusively with long-haul vehicles. This resulted in distribution points located far from vulnerable beneficiaries and forced some needy families to walk long distances to receive food distributions. While some progress has been made in moving distribution sites closer to those most in need, given the likely increase in bulk volumes next year along with increased needs throughout the country, both long and short-haul transport vehicles may not be sufficient to meet all needs. More worrisome is the possibility of acute "famine-like" food shortages in areas that are only accessible with short-haul vehicles. Should the Meher production be significantly lower than average production estimates (8.5 million mts), the current distribution system may be required to come well off the main routes to provide food for those in desperate need.

Experience of previous years suggests that effectively managed relief food distribution is vital if mass migration from the worst affected rural areas is to be averted. To be effective, food aid must be made available in the right quantities, at the right time and in the right way. It is often critical that the pre-positioning of relief supplies in remote areas begin before the onset of rains and that there is adequate provision of short-haul transport capacity in "off-road" areas on a seasonal basis.

Long-haul

Estimates of long-haul vehicles currently available within Ethiopia total 2,425, of which only 75%, or 1,820 trucks are operational at any one time. Of this amount, up to 25% are being used for other transport requirements, leaving just 1,365 long-haul vehicles and a capacity to move 1.228 million mts per year (1,365 trucks x 30 mts x 2.5 trips per month x 12 months). Considering 1999 importation level of 1.175 million mts (1.408 million mts less local purchase and expected imports through Berbera in CY 2000) there is an available 53,000 mts per year in long-haul capacity. This excess capacity, however, could be wiped out with the loss of one long-haul truck.

Short-haul

Overall, it is estimated that there are some 3,131 short-haul vehicles in Ethiopia, of which 75% are estimated to be in service at any one time (leaving just 2,348 trucks available). With an average payload capacity of 10 mts, and assuming an average of 2.5 trips per month, 2,504 trucks can move 58,706 mts per month (or 704,472 per year). Given the magnitude of the anticipated over 810,000 mts of food aid requirements, there could be a lack of short-haul trucking capacity to transport food aid to distribution sites.

E. RESPONSES (TARGETING, MONITORING AND LOGISTICS)

Targeting

Mission will partially fund the development and implementation of the National Food Aid Targeting Guidelines. The guidelines should ensure:

- the really needy are assisted, and the less needy do not benefit unfairly
- scarce resources are used in such a way that they have the greatest impact on the problem to be addressed and,
- dependency and economic disincentive effects are minimized

Monitoring

Mission, in collaboration with other donors, has been discussing better ways of reporting on actual numbers of beneficiaries. The DPPC is being assisted to design a reporting system that enables donors to more accurately assess the impact of emergency food aid.

Through USAID/Ethiopia's SERA project, DPPC's capacity to address monitoring issues at the zonal and wereda levels will be strengthened.

Logistics - port

One of the most effective ways to ensure the timely delivery of food to those most in need is to begin programming a proactive response to:

- (a) increase food aid arrivals and minimize dependence on the EFSRA;
- (b) increase the capacity of the Djibouti port and support alternative importation corridors; and
- (c) facilitate efficient use of internal transport capacity and systems.

1. Food aid arrivals for the first quarter

The most important step to ensure that the relief operations continue on the best possible footing and minimize significant withdrawals from the EFSRA is to anticipate needs for the first six months of CY 2000. Doing so will significantly contribute to moving food already within Ethiopia (from the EFSRA) to needy beneficiaries without fear of late repayments (and therefore delayed withdrawals and untimely deliveries). USAID and other donors should be prepared to approve and deliver a significant amount of additional food aid in a timely manner to avoid that pipeline gaps and allow the EFSRA to build up stocks early in CY 2000.

2. Ports (Djibouti and Berbera)

Increasing the capacity of Djibouti and Berbera ports to receive, off-load, store and transport food into Ethiopia is critical in the immediate-term. Equally important is coordination and the tranching of food aid arrivals to accessible ports as monthly needs require and capacities allow. Planned arrivals of emergency food aid shipments in CY 2000 must take into consideration

seasonal fertilizer and commercial wheat imports, as well as import of development food aid, food for refugees/IDPs, and repayments to the EFSR in order to minimize congestion.

While the ports of Masawa, Assab, Port Sudan and Mombasa need to be considered as alternatives to Djibouti should the scenario outlined below be exceeded, accessibility and security are significant constraints for the first two (at least in the short-term), and distance and cost for the last two.

a. Djibouti

The port of Djibouti's current capacity can handle an estimated 100,000 plus mts per month of bulk commodities through the port. However, as a result of continuing "slippage" in estimated time of arrivals (ETAs) of donor shipments, the handling capacity of Djibouti port has really not been fully tested as of yet. This capacity can be significantly improved by supporting the World Food Program (WFP) Special Emergency Operation (SEO) for Djibouti. The SEO requests donor support to undertake port rehabilitation activities (at berth 13), the erection of additional temporary storage facilities along-side the WFP warehouse (across from berth 15) and provides additional logistic staffing in Djibouti and Addis Ababa. Maximizing the capacity of the port of Djibouti can also be realized if:

- good working vessels of 20-25,000 mts capacity are utilized and are fitted with appropriate offloading gear to maximize and supplement the capacity at the port
- vessel arrivals are closely coordinated among donors to ensure that ships are suitably staggered to fully utilize multiple berths (maximizing discharge capacity and avoiding congestion)
- storage, in addition to direct delivery, is used to maximize offloading and use of available trucking capacity
- the WFP food aid transport system (FATs) is utilized to the greatest extent possible

It is expected that emergency, refugee, development and EFSR repayment deliveries for the period September – December 1999 will average some 102,086 mts per month as follows:

Month	Djibouti	Berbera	Total
September	84,359	0	84,359
October	77,165	16,660	93,825
November	117,346	16,670	134,016
December	96,146	0	96,146
Total	354,113	33,330	408,346

b. Berbera

On October 12, 1999 a European Union shipment of 16,000 mts bagged wheat bound for Ethiopia docked in Berbera and was discharged at a rate of about 1,200 mts per day. This

shipment is one of three EU food shipments for Ethiopia being imported in 1999 for a total of 50,000 mts.

As per the RESDO/ESA report (Suther), USAID/Ethiopia recommends that USAID support an incremental approach to using Berbera until systems are worked out. Once systems are in place and working relatively smoothly, shipments could be increased, especially if Djibouti should become overwhelmed.

Note. Additional detail of the capacity of the Berbera port can be found in the USAID/Ethiopia Road Transport Study of November 1998 and in the RESDO/ESA report dated 25 October 1999 (Suther).

However, in recent discussions with WFP, it is anticipated that they will import up to 100,000 mts of food aid shipments through Berbera in CY 2000 to meet Somali refugee needs (35,000 mts), development (20,000 mts) and emergency drought needs (40,000 mts) for areas in the south of the country. In addition, the EU is expected to import an additional 33,000 mts through Berbera and purchase some 100,000 mts locally in CY 2000. Therefore, up to 233,000 mts will be imported through Berbera, or purchased locally. These efforts will reduce the total bulk imports to Djibouti for CY 2000 to 1.175 million mts leaving an additional capacity of 25,000 mts per year (assuming perfect coordination, tranching and prioritization of relief cargo). However, Djibouti's excess handling capacity is equivalent to one ship only, hardly significant given difficulties coordinating the arrival of all bulk commodities including emergency food.

Logistics - transport

1. Support the "fire brigade"

Over the last five years, like the privatization of long-haul vehicles, WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE), strategic short-haul fleets (mostly NGO) have been sold to the private sector or are currently pending sale. The last agency to sell its long-haul fleet to the private sector is the SCF/UK and Oxfam, JTO (Joint Transport Operation). This sale is expected to take place prior to the end of CY 1999. For the last 15 years, the JTO has been operating as a "strategic fleet" and has filled "gaps" that are left by commercial operators. In the last two years alone, the JTO truck fleet has delivered over 80,000 mts of relief food to more than 2 million beneficiaries. At the GFDRE's request in September, the JTO will sell off its long-haul fleet in the coming months.

With the expectation that CY 2000 food aid requirements will increase beyond needs in CY 1999 (of 680,000 mts), the JTO and the DPPC (GFDRE) have agreed to discuss, with strong support from the Amhara region, that the short-haul fleet remain intact. The "new JTO" of 25 short-haul, four-wheel drive trucks could continue to operate as a strategic stand-by capacity primarily for Amhara but also for other areas as necessary. Given that the maintenance of such a stand-by capacity will be critical to meet needs in CY 2000, there is an urgent need to obtain funds to enable the re-establishment of the JTO's capacity.

The JTO is also in negotiations with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) to provide management support to the DPPC logistics and transport unit. The joint efforts of DPPC and the JTO hope to re-establish the LITS (logistic information and tracking

system), which ceased operating following the closure of Assab and Masawa, and to monitor and program the overall availability of trucking capacity in Ethiopia. LITS will monitor Djibouti throughput and the use of trucking capacity, delivery performance, and support increased efficiency of logistic operations (both long and short-haul vehicles). This effort will also increase the DPPC's ability to effectively coordinate with WFP and improve the overall efficiencies of food aid deliveries to and throughout Ethiopia.

2. Other support

In addition to supporting the JTO's effort (short-haul capacity, the re-establishment of LITS and the provision of logistics and transportation management support), USAID/Ethiopia also proposes that the USG support increased deliveries in CY 2000 through appropriate improvements in the WFP/Ethiopia and Djibouti port capacity funded by OFDA. The Mission also proposes that improvements in the port of Berbera be supported by GHAI.

F. CURRENT USAID FUNDED DROUGHT INTERVENTIONS

USG funded interventions in FY 1999 through the Bureau for Humanitarian Response/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA), the Bureau for Humanitarian Response/Food for Peace (BHR/FFP), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) totaled US\$ 26,325,558. (OFDA situation report September 1999). Interventions include the following:

- 187,000 mts (39%) of emergency food aid contributions
- provision of supplementary food for malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women
- provision of temporary storage facilities in acutely affected drought areas
- nutritional monitoring and increased targeting activities in the most affected areas
- immunization programs, blankets and increased water and sanitation facilities for areas of heavy migration
- funds to increase coordination among UN agencies, and provide necessary reporting and analysis on the broader implications of the drought
- support through the USAID "Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities" project (SERA) funded by development assistance funds to improve GFDRE capacity for emergency response

G. INTERVENTIONS FUNDED BY OTHER DONORS

Other donors funded interventions in CY 1999 approximated US\$ 45,000,000 for the following interventions:

- 265,103 mts (56%) of emergency food aid contributions (includes WFP, EU and other bilateral donors)
- provision of supplementary food to malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women
- nutritional monitoring and increased targeting activities in the most affected areas

- immunization programs, blankets and increased water and sanitation facilities for areas of heavy migration
- 50,000 mts to expand the Emergency food Security Reserve (EFSRA) to 357,000 mts in November 1999. An additional 50,000 mts will be provided in September 2000.

H. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENCY NEEDS

GFDRE funded interventions in CY 1999 totaled approximately US\$ 19,000,000. Beyond the financial commitment of the GFDRE, it continues to cooperate closely with international relief agencies and partners to deliver assistance as quickly as possible to those in need (in some case, waiving customs duties). The GFDRE has demonstrated its commitment to the relief effort in the following ways:

- The GFDRE contributed 20,000 mts of food assistance, funded the transport costs of bilateral food aid contributions (estimated at 75,000 mts) and has diverted regular budget and development resources to cover seed and emergency food needs in drought affected areas.
- The DPPC and regional governments continue to partner with donor and relief agencies to assess and verify zonal estimations of emergency food needs. Since April 1999 an unprecedented number of joint assessments have been undertaken throughout the country.
- Targeting nationally has been prioritized to the most affected areas (i.e. Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray).
- The DPPC is now issuing a monthly delivery and distribution rack-up.
- The GFDRE has agreed to donor requests to issue a "bridge appeal" to meet urgent needs for the first quarter of CY 2000
- The DPPC has increased the level of its participation in the WFP shipping meetings.
- DPPC participated fully in a brief assessment in Djibouti with USAID/FHA staff during the arrival of 57,000 mts of Title II and III commodities in September.
- The GFDRE allowed NGOs to provide an estimated 60,000 mts of emergency assistance in 1999 in an effort to use all available capacity to meet urgent needs.
- Access is guaranteed to all parts of the country where drought needs are being experienced.
- Finally, the DPPC demonstrated remarkable logistics planning and implementation capacity in moving 53% of the 237,000 MT of relief food between June and September 1999.

III. SCENARIO FOR CY 2000 NEED

A. Scenario

- Food aid for 2.2 million Belg beneficiaries for the period January – June will be reduced by 40% as they will have benefited from some portion of the Meher harvest.
- Belg beneficiaries for the period September through December are estimated to be 1

- million persons as a result of an average harvest.
- September to December rains in pastoral areas will be 80% below normal affecting at least 1.2 million pastoralists and requiring food aid and water assistance for the period January – June.
- Delayed Meher rains and expected reduction of crops compared to last year will result in food aid needs for some 4.5 million persons for the period April – November.
- The seed deficit estimated at 160,000 mts, and debt owed by small farmers will remain a constraint to increased food production and recovery.
- Supplementary food needs continue to be substantial in CY 2000 and coordination and implementation mechanisms are improved to meet increased nutritional needs.
- Carry-over stocks within the EFSR remain just above the minimal required levels of 70,000 mts (or at 100,000 mts).
- Those for whom “food aid is requested” is likely to be significantly lower than the number of people actually in need of relief aid due to the limitations of the early warning system and efforts at the national level to reduce the general appeal requirements.
- The timing of food distributions to those most in need is critical to minimize migration.
- Targeting will remain problematic and nutritional monitoring will be a priority need.
- Critical interventions will be required to increase logistics and transportation limitations.
- Needs of the chronically food insecure and the destitute will continue to be substantial.

B. Proposed level of USG food assistance

1. General food assistance

In order to meet critical needs in CY 2000, it is recommended that the USG initially plan on providing approximately 40% of the requirements of the 800,000 mts of estimated food needs. This amounts to 330,000 mts. It is recommended that this amount be provided according to the quarterly schedule in the following table. Therefore, third and fourth quarter shipments should be adjusted on the basis of revised needs in June 2000 and other donor contributions. Other donors will provide the remaining balance (60%) of some 470,000 mts.

	1ST QTR		2ND QTR		3RD QTR		4TH QTR		Total
	FFP	USDA	FFP	USDA	FFP	USDA	FFP	USDA	
DPPC	30,000	0	0	30,000	0	50,000	0	45,000	155,000
WFP	20,000	0	0	25,000	0	25,000	0	25,000	95,000
NGOS	20,000	0	20,000	0	20,000	0	20,000	0	80,000
Total	70,000	0	20,000	55,000	20,000	75,000	20,000	70,000	330,000

(130,000 MT – BHR/FFP and 200,000 USDA)

A robust USG response to needs in the 1st quarter of CY 2000 and anticipated needs for the 2nd quarter will allow for timely withdrawals of the EFSRA and timely repayments to ensure that adequate food aid is available in-country should needs rise dramatically after June.

A carry-over balance of 52,000 mts of food from FY 1999 USDA 416 (b) will be provided to DPPC during the first months of CY 2000 to finalize the expected 90,000 mts contribution, and

to replenish EFSRA draw downs made in late 1999. Therefore, FFP is being requested to provide the first tranche of CY 2000 emergency commodities.

Assuming that WFP takes responsibility for the mobilization of 30% of the identified needs (or 240,000 mts cereal requirements), and the USG provides 40% of the WFP appeal, approximately 96,000 mts would be provided to WFP. As the WFP bridge appeal is currently being approved for 60,000 mts, it is proposed that FFP provide 33% of that amount, or 20,000 mts in the first quarter of CY 2000.

As it currently stands, no capacity is available in January for the import of additional food aid through Djibouti. However, part of projected shipments for January includes 38,000 mts from USDA carry over from the FY 1999 416 (b) program. An estimated 25,000 to 50,000 mts may be available in February and up to 50,000 mts in March. Further updates on planned shipments for the first quarter of CY 2000 will be made available, as information is known.

2. Supplementary food

In the short-term and due to the special food needs of children under-five, lactating mothers and pregnant women, it will be necessary to supply significant amounts of supplementary food in CY 2000. This must be combined with efforts to improve targeting and ensure that full rations are distributed and well monitored.

Assuming that a monthly average of 4.8 million persons will require food aid, it is estimated that as many as 1,440,000 or 30% will be in need of supplementary rations. The estimated need for blended food for the period January – December (assuming a ration for 3 kgs/p/p/month) is, therefore, estimated to be 4,320 mts per month. It is estimated that some 1,500 mts (35%) monthly can be provided locally (famix) so an additional 1,128 mts (40%) of blended food will have to be provided by in-kind contributions (or 13,536 mts for the period January through December 2000).

3. Alternatives food commodities

As has been demonstrated in many emergencies worldwide, the provision of “self targeting” commodities (commodities equally nutritious, but with less market value and appeal) should be considered for operations in CY 2000. Sorghum for example could be provided in lieu of wheat to increase the level of food that ultimately remains for household consumption.

C. Proposed level of USG non-food assistance

It is estimated that up to US\$ 3.75 million in non-food assistance will be required in CY 2000 to meet emergency needs identified above. The following is an illustrative breakdown of those requirements and the proposed level of USG assistance.

Intervention	Total cost In US\$	USAID support in US\$	Percent
Migration	600,000	200,000	33%
Agriculture	4,000,000	1,000,000	25%
Pastoralist (including water)	2,000,000	800,000	40%
Logistics	3,500,000	750,000	21%
Health/Nutrition	2,000,000	800,000	40%
Targeting/Monitor/Eval	1,000,000	200,000	20%
Total	13,100,000*	3,750,000	29%

* Compiled from EUE/UNDP, WFP, DPPC situation reports

After discussions with BHR/OFDA/W and BHR/OFDA/ARO, it is proposed that BHR/OFDA supported non-food programs focused on health, nutrition and monitoring, pastoralist needs (including the provision of water and mitigation efforts), migration, agriculture and logistics (through WFP SEO Djibouti operation and the JTO short-haul program). Together with other funds from USAID/Ethiopia (to support LITS and targeting efforts) and GHAI (Berbera), logistics and targeting will be adequately addressed to meet increased needs in CY 2000. (per the preliminary discussion of November, 1999 with OFDA/WA and OFDA/ARO)

Should the above scenario take place the provision of non-food assistance could be equally demanding as food needs. Examples of possible non-food interventions are as follows:

- Provide increased water supply, medical kits, sanitation facilities, blankets, plastic sheeting, jerry cans and immunization.
- Agricultural support: seeds, money for oxen and tools
- Pastoralist support (including livestock marketing interventions)
- EPI (expanded program of immunization) and malaria control
- Emergency water point rehabilitation and sanitation
- Increased numbers of temporary storage, increased port and trucking capacity
- Provision of supplementary foods, continued support for nutritional and targeting programs
- Capacity building: support for increased targeting efforts at the zonal/district level
- Increased monitoring by US NGO partners

The illustrative list of non -food needs will be updated in late January following appeals from DPPC, UNICEF and FAO.

D. Continue development programs

Given the Mission's Title II effort to shift NGO programs from "relief to development" over the last three years, and the NGO communities limited capacity (surge or otherwise) to meet emergency needs, USAID should consider a "measured" response to NGO emergency proposals. This approach will ensure that the NGOs do not stray from the development priorities of their DAPs and PAAs, but are part of the overall USG response to emergency needs while maintaining their development projects.

As it currently stands, USAID/Ethiopia is expecting to receive NGO proposals totaling 100,000 mts. These proposals will be made by the NGO consortia (70,000 mts), which include CRS, CARE, World Vision and SCF/US, and an additional proposal from REST (30,000 mts). Based on concerns about NGO capacity and need, the Mission proposes that the consortia proposal be supported initially at the 85% level (or for about 60,000 mts) and that the REST proposal be supported at 66% (or for 20,000 mts). This maybe revised upward or downward, depending on the results of the January assessment.

E. USAID/Ethiopia funded development programs

USAID/Ethiopia, through the SERA project will fund increased targeting efforts at the zonal/weredas level and provide support for the re-establishment of the LITS through the "JTO – DPPC" collaborative effort. An estimated US\$ 300,000 in DA funds will be provided in CY 2000.

F. GHAI funded programs

It is recommended that GHAI seriously consider providing funds to the United Nations Committee for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to increase the effectiveness of the Berbera port. Not only will this investment directly benefit Somaliland, it will also provide additional capacity to support emergency food needs in Ethiopia and more generally, support regional trade.

G. Logistics

As was the case over the last six months, long-haul vehicles will have to be used for the importation of bulk goods from Djibouti as well as the delivery of more than half of the monthly food requirements for needy beneficiaries. Not only will this require the prioritization of available long-haul trucks for importation and food deliveries, but other alternatives will be required as previously stated. Should the scenario outlined be realized or exceeded, the following will be necessary to increase overall importation and transportation capacity for relief operations:

- Increased discharge capacity and use of storage in Djibouti.
- Increased use of Berbera, as well as the possible use of Assab and Massawa, Port of Sudan and Mombasa as necessary and appropriate.
- Increased use of the WFP FATS (food aid and transport system) and weeding-out of non-performing through-bill-of-lading operations.
- Support to WFP's trucking fleet and "the new JTO" to: increase the general capacity of relief importation operations; better monitor and program the use of long and short-haul vehicles; and increase coordination through improved use of information.

Considering that WFP is responsible for importing at least 40% of the food aid required for CY 2000 (through emergency, refugee and development operations, as well as for repayment to the EFSRA), it is extremely important that its capacity be maximized. It is also extremely important

that WFP's operations receive support generally and that WFP take the lead in the identification and use of importation alternatives. WFP's logistics and relief operations were a critical part of the overall success in meeting needs in CY 1999.

To the extent possible the USG should re-evaluate the use of through-bill-of-lading arrangements and use of other transport carriers (including DPPC sub-contractors) who do not perform adequately or strictly conform to the use of direct delivery methods. These non-performing carriers should be replaced with those agencies that have demonstrated their ability to move food effectively and efficiently.

The EU should be formally commended for the foresight in using Berbera and the purchase of food locally. The effort of the EU in CY 1999 reduced the use of Djibouti by some 100,000 mts and significantly contributed to the local economy. The EU should be encouraged to continue its efforts in CY 2000.

ANNEXES

A. (30-60-90 day plan)

30 days

November 19 through December 11, 1999 USAID/Ethiopia will be participating in the Joint DPPC/MOA/WFP/Other Donors* and NGOs food supply and needs assessment throughout Ethiopia. As information is made available and assessment results are known, USAID/Ethiopia will report accordingly.

The USAID/E Food for Peace Officer will join an abbreviated inter-agency team to review the Crisis Response Plan in Washington. Following this review, the team will recommend an initial response to estimated needs for the first quarter of CY 2000 and USAID/E will begin preparing the groundwork necessary for an appropriate response to meet critical needs beyond the first quarter.

Mission placed a short-term port monitor in Djibouti to report on in-coming USG shipments, coordinate off loading operations and provide weekly reports.

Mission will hire a short-term food aid logistics consultant to provide an action plan for CY 2000 for aid deliveries.

*FAO conducted its annual national crop assessment November 3 -24. FAO's assessment will be integrated into the joint DPPC/MOA/WFP/Donor crop production and needs assessment. Final results of the assessments will be released January 10th.

60 days

Beginning January, it is expected that the results of the upcoming DPPC/FEWS/WFP/Donors and NGO assessment will be known and that a formal appeal by the GFDRE will be issued. At that time, the assumptions made under this crisis response plan and needs for the first six months

of CY 2000 will be updated. The Mission will also submit an update of the USAID/Ethiopia November 1998 Crisis Response Plan for displaced persons at that time.

- Mission will formally request the remaining USDA section 416 (b) contribution for FY 1999.
- Mission will also request an initial USDA contribution for FY 2000
- BHR/FFP responds to DPPC and WFP carry-over appeals
- Short term food aid logistics consultant will be hired

90 days

By February 20, 2000, it is anticipated that appropriate offices in Washington (BHR/FFP, BHR/OFDA, AFR/EA and USDA) will be able to begin delivering on the needs identified including the following:

- Initial food aid contributions from the Office of Food for Peace (FFP)
- Initial logistic and non-food support through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
- Amendment of the FY 2000 USDA – DPPC agreement for the provision of additional commodities for the period April – December
- NGO consolidated emergency response proposal developed and approved (if required)

USAID/Ethiopia will also be in a position to:

- allocate DA resources available through SERA (Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities) to increase the effectiveness of targeting operations
- fund a full-time monitor in Djibouti to report on in-coming USG shipments, coordinate off loading operations and provide bi-weekly reporting

B. IDPs/peace scenario

Status of IDPs

The displaced population has generally stabilized at about 315,000 people and remains localized south of the affected areas along the disputed territories in Tigray Region. According to DPPC's figures, the majority of the IDPs is found in Tigray and has reportedly been "successfully" integrated into host communities. While the displaced populations have survived remarkably well during the past 18 months, the loss of migration labor, cross border trade and stress on the host population and basic infrastructure, are of concern.

In addition, populations in camps in Western and Central Tigray are host to 78,451 IDPs (or 23.7%), of whom 35 percent, or 27,457 are estimated to be "at risk" and highly vulnerable groups (children under five, lactating and pregnant women). Needs of those in displaced camps are especially important given that they depend almost entirely on external donor assistance.

The food ration is the major, and often only, source of food for the displaced households with limited assistance from host populations. Where no source of income is available, relief food is often monetized to cover non-food requirements for displaced households. In such cases, around 10 kg per person is consumed with the remainder being sold to purchase coffee, sugar, salt, and chilli peppers (necessary food enhancers) and for grinding and transporting the relief grain.

Households seem to be surviving on small rations with no appreciable problems in terms of malnutrition for children. However, micronutrient malnutrition remains a concern since the bulk of distributions to date have been almost entirely cereals. There have been no major outbreaks of illness, but diarrheal diseases and malaria are being closely monitored.

According to an SCF/UK report (funded by USAID) while access to health care is generally good with most children immunized in recent weeks, water and sanitation is a serious concern and also needs to be monitored.

Effect on host communities

Apart from the immediate survival needs of the IDPs, an additional humanitarian concern is the impact of this group on the communities into which they have been absorbed. The "hosting" policy is already taxed and may not prove viable as the on going conflict continues to stress the already vulnerable communities.

Overall, the host communities require upgrading of health services, water and sanitation facilities, additional shelter, supplementary food sources, additional education and environmental mitigation efforts. Close monitoring of the situation remains essential to head off epidemics and the further erosion of social systems. According to the SCF/UK survey, the effect of the war on the non-IDP population (host and non-host) is as follows:

- Migration labor opportunities in Eritrea are zero
- Pressure for grazing and fodder for livestock; water (for animals and humans) and health services (IDPs are said to receive priority at clinics) is increasing;
- Higher population densities are increasing sanitation problems, affecting particularly children and the elderly
- Host population assets have been depleted/are eroding in support of the IDP population through gifts of clothes, lending utensil, and a significant amount of food assistance

Mines

It is estimated that close to 600,000 anti-personnel, anti-tank mines and unexploded ordinances have been laid along the disputed border area (with some 250,000 mines estimated to be within the Badme area alone and more in the eastern areas). The presence of mines across farmlands has meant that the majority of internally displaced people from western Tigray (some 116,416) have not been able to return to their homes.

The consequences of IDPs status quo are: (a) increased pressure on infrastructure and resources

in host communities; (b) extended dependency on external aid; and (c) reduced agricultural productivity leading to escalating food insecurity.

Peace Scenario

If the border dispute is resolved through diplomatic initiatives then it will take a minimum of six months for returning IDPs to start anew.

Assumptions

- 100,000 IDPs will be able and willing to return to their homes within approximately three months after the hostilities end. Because of significant land mine placement, the bulk of displaced will not be able to immediately return to their homes.
- Infrastructures (schools, health posts, water supply systems, etc.) will have been damaged and/or destroyed and will require rehabilitation.
- Most returnees will still have possession of relief supplies (blankets, household utensils and plastic sheeting) and therefore additional inputs will be minimal
- Current partners implementing emergency programs can make the transition to rehabilitative efforts
- Returnees will have missed opportunities for main harvest production
- Livestock numbers will be reduced significantly
- The Ethiopian Government will follow established Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) Policy
- The Ethiopian Government will agree to use some development resources for rehabilitation activities

The following activities will need to be put into effect immediately:

- de-mining operations
- provision of seeds and tools and draft animals
- reconstruction of schools, water and sanitation systems, roads and health facilities
- replacement of school equipment and educational materials
- restocking of medical and pharmaceutical supplies.

Food needs

Under this scenario, most displaced beneficiaries will continue to require some food assistance through the October 2001 harvest. Assuming that the displaced persons do not increase for any reason, food assistance will need to reach areas closer to the border for a period of at least 6 months for those resettling populations. The remaining displaced populations will continue to need assistance until it is safe to return to their homes.

Non-food needs

Water points will require rehabilitation. There are 32 documented (mapped) water points in the

occupied areas, of which we expect 50% (16) to be in need of repair. The cost of the rehabilitation of one water point is estimated at a minimum of US\$ 500.

Shelter and Household

Houses have reportedly been destroyed and communities will need reconstruction assistance. Provision of plastic sheeting/tents will be necessary as people rebuild homes. Housing material (minimal sheeting will be required) will have to be provided (tools, straw, mud bricks, wood poles). The estimated, minimum average cost of a small rural home in Tigray (24-30 square meters) is the equivalent of US\$ 285.00. If a total of 50,000 family homes needed to be rebuilt from scratch, the cost would be approximately US\$ 14,250,000. In addition a limited number of household utensils and stoves will need to be supplied.

Health

Health posts/clinics will need to be rehabilitated and supplied with medicines and equipment. There are 3 health stations (serving 10,000 people each) and 1 hospital in the previous occupied zone in Tigray. Re-supply of medicines and equipment, if not full rehabilitation will be required. The UNICEF basic kit for 10,000 people for 3 months, inclusive of handling costs is US\$ 5,000. Each health post would require 4 kits for a 1-year supply.

Other

Schools – there are 30 schools in the occupied areas (within a 10 km radius of the border) and we expect the majority of these to have been destroyed or require some structural rehabilitation. In addition, educational materials will need to be replaced in all schools. The total cost for construction, furniture and equipment of a primary school (grade 1-8) is estimated at US\$ 71,428. Reconstruction of all schools in the affected areas would cost approximately US\$ 2,142,840.

Agriculture – Agricultural implements, seeds, tools and livestock (draft animals) will be essential start-up contributions for the displaced who have lost their assets. Considering the displaced number who would require the most assistance (also those currently targeted for food aid) at least 272,000 people (or 54,400 families would require agricultural aid).

1 oxen @ \$ 114 x 54,400	= \$ 6,201,600
60 kg seeds @ \$ 39 x 54,400	= \$ 2,121,600
150 kg fertilizer @ \$ 50 x 54,400	= \$ 2,720,000
Basic tools @ \$ 8.50 x 54,400	= \$ 4,624,000
Total for basic ag-rehab package for 272,000	= \$ 15,667,200

Note. Community social structures have suffered during displacement. Leadership issues may have evolved during times of acute stress and help in the rebuilding of these structures may be required. Logistics to support resettlement of up to 315,000 people, rebuilding of community structures and credit would be required. De-mining operations will be required, especially in

those areas where Ethiopia and Eritrean troops are now concentrated. Although an estimated 300,000 Ethiopian troops have been mobilized to the border, the limited duration of the conflict may or may not warrant support specific to demobilization.

Proposed USAID Response

Food

USAID would provide one-third of the food requirement for at least a period 6 months. Food would be programmed through WFP and/or REST resettlement and rehabilitation program. Resettlement of families (rebuilding homes, community infrastructure) and support to farmers (distribution of seeds, farming implements) could also be programmed through REST and/or appropriate UN agencies.

Water and Sanitation

Funding could go to REST and UNICEF to assist government efforts in the rehabilitation and purification of water points. The Mission would request OFDA funding for the first phase of these rehabilitative efforts, including a detailed catalog of the water points' conditions and an inventory of parts needing repair (estimated cost US\$ 3,000). The second phase would include the actual repair of the wells. Funding from other sources will need to be identified.

Health

Through the USAID/Ethiopia bilateral health program, USAID/Ethiopia could provide up to US\$ 500,000, if requested by the GFDRE, to assist the Regional Bureaus to address areas of concern.

Education

If requested by the GFDRE, the USAID/Ethiopia Education program could provide funding (\$ 714,280) to TDA for the rehabilitation of 10 of the estimated 30 schools that have been destroyed or damaged during the conflict.

Agriculture

USAID/Ethiopia would request BHR/OFDA to partially fund the cost of tools, seed and fertilizer components of the agriculture-rehab package, excluding the oxen component (\$ 9,465,600).

USG responses to date for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

- US \$25,000 disaster fund was channeled through DPPC on July 9, 1998.
- 36,000 blankets and 16,132 MT of food channeled through the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) in September 1998.
- 12,600 MT of food through WFP for the Internally Displaced Persons operation was contributed in May 1999.

- On July 14, 1999 the USG contributed an additional 3,000 MT of food to the WFP operation for IDPS.
- On August 13, 1999 the USG contributed US \$278,231 to SCF/UK for the purchase of 450 rolls of plastic sheeting for the IDP's and nutritional surveillance programs targeting displaced children.

Replacement for the food lost in Assab

- USAID provided 42,400 mts for the replacement of commodities lost in Assab. Of this amount 22,800 mts reimbursed loans from the EFSR and 19,600 mts met immediate needs.

Bilateral food aid for FY 1999

- 25,000 MT of Title III bilateral food aid that the GFDRE targeted in drought affected areas.
- 82,650 MT of development food channeled through eight private voluntary organizations (PVO) working in drought prone areas of the country.

Response to the drought

- US \$ 25,000 disaster fund was contributed to Catholic Relief Services (CRS) for the purchase and distribution of famix to feed malnourished children, lactating mothers and pregnant women in drought affected areas.
- On July 14, 1999 the USG contributed 28,000 mts of food through WFP for drought affected.
- On August 2, 1999 the USG contributed another 80,000 MT of wheat for drought affected people. Transportation, handling and distribution of the food will be managed by DPPC.
- On August 13, 1999 the USG granted US \$ 347,409 to SCF/UK to undertake a nutritional survey and distribute supplementary food to children in North, South Wello and East Harerghe
- On August 13, 1999 the USG contributed 21,000 mts of food assistance to WFP. The USG also provided US \$ 400,000 for the procurement of Famix for distribution to malnourished children, lactating and pregnant women.
- On August 13, 1999 the USG granted US \$ 300,000 to UNICEF to provide measles vaccine, 12,000 blankets and improve safe drinking water and urban sanitation in areas of population migration.
- On August 13, 1999 the USG donated 15,100 mts of food assistance and 15,000 blankets to Catholic Relief Services (CRS) valued at US \$ 7,614,800.

Total food assistance

- Over the past year the USG has pledged and/or delivered 310,000 MT of food for Ethiopia valued at more than US\$ 80 million.