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Program Title: Transitional Shelter Assistance in Sri Lanka
OFDA Grant No.: 386-G-00-05-00051-00
Country: Sri Lanka
Type of Disaster: Tsunami
Time Period: 15 January to 31 October 2005



I. COVER SHEET

Organization: Shelter for Life International
502 E. New York Ave
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USA

Project Title: Transitional Shelter Assistance in Sri Lanka

Grant Number: 386-G-00-05-00051-00

Country/Region: Sri Lanka, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Baddacaloo Districts

Project Dates: 15 January – 31 October 2005

Report Date : January 31, 2006

Donor: OFDA/USAID

Budget: USD \$1,026,185

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The goal of this project is to sustain life, reduce human suffering, and mitigate homelessness for the survivors of the December 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka through a transitional shelter and sanitation initiative.

This project targeted the shelter, sanitation, and income-generation sectors and included the following objectives:

- Enable the construction of 2,000 emergency shelters with locally-purchased, reusable materials;
- Enable the construction of 500 latrines;
- Provide temporary employment opportunities for local laborers.

SFL assumed that the project could be completed successfully as proposed if the following conditions did not occur:

- Deterioration of the security situation making it unsafe for SFL staff to work;
- Rapid inflation of labor and material costs locally in Sri Lanka;
- Significant devaluation of the dollar against local currency;
- Severe environmental conditions which limit or prevent project implementation;
- Uncooperative government authorities and other stakeholders.

III. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

A. AREAS OF ACTIVITY

Sri Lanka was devastated by a 20-year war that ended in 2003. The main concentration of war activities were in the north and east of the country. When the tsunami hit, there were already many thousands of war IDPs living in substandard camps. The tsunami disaster overwhelmed a government which was already struggling to provide adequate housing to those affected by war. The Sri Lankan government planned to move those who lost houses in the tsunami into new IDP camps. This was coordinated under the supervision of a Government Agent (GA) office in each district.

However, officials soon realized that there was insufficient availability of suitable land to relocate IDPs for up to a two year period, which is how long the Sri Lankan Government estimates it will take for permanent housing reconstruction to be completed. Many displaced families were relocated to substandard temporary tent camps on private land. SFL worked with the GA's and DS offices to help those that lost their homes outside the buffer zone to move back to their own land.

Originally, SFL planned to work in Mullaitivu and Trincomalee on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka. In consultation with USAID/OFDA, SFL opted to modify the project location after assessing the security and political situation in Mullaitivu. Coordinating closely with USAID/OFDA, SFL conducted an assessment of Ampara and Batticaloa; the

Government Agent (GA) in those districts had requested SFL's assistance and the two locations were also selected for project implementation.

In Trincomalee, UNHCR and UNICEF played an integral role in making the shelter and sanitation initiative a success. They were able to come alongside the GA's office and guide them on how to efficiently work with the international community because the small district government offices did not have the capacity to coordinate effectively in the shelter and sanitation sector. However, in Ampara, there did not seem to be a strong working relationship between UNHCR and the GA's office. For the first six months after the tsunami, there was a lot of confusion between the strategy of the local government, UNHCR, and the international community.

The final project took place in three districts and seven DS Divisions on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka as detailed in the table below:

No.	District	DS Division	Shelters	Latrines	Beneficiaries
1.	Trincomalee	Town and Gravets	45	10	185
		Kinniya	283		1156
		Kuchaveli	264	54	953
2	Ampara	Kalmunai	199	44	859
		Thirukovil	165	38	354
		Pottuvil	201	40	722
3	Batticaloa	Valachenai	157	29	354
	TOTAL		1314	215	4583

B. ASSESSMENT AND SURVEILLANCE DATA

1. Beneficiary Assessment and Selection

Immediately following the tsunami, the Sri Lankan government took responsibility for coordinating all NGO activities and beneficiary assignments. They registered all tsunami victims and issued them identification cards verifying that they were tsunami victims. Through the Government Agent (GA) office, NGOs were allocated beneficiary lists and were assigned geographic areas. This process proved to be long and complicated, and SFL was allocated a series of beneficiary lists over a number of months. SFL conducted needs assessments in Trincomalee, Ampara, and Batticaloa based on the final beneficiary lists assigned to SFL by the Government Agent (GA) office.

The GA initially asked SFL to provide shelters for 264 beneficiary families in three different locations in the Ampara district. In July 2005, the GA requested that SFL build another 201 shelters. The GA also asked SFL to provide shelters for 157 beneficiary families in Valaichinai, a division of Batticaloa. These beneficiaries had originally been

allocated to the Lions Club, who had not fulfilled their agreement with the GA. By August 2005, the GA requested that SFL build shelters for an additional 392 families in Kinniya, Kuchaveli and Town and Gravets. This assignment occurred because a number of local NGOs and community organizations had not fulfilled their commitments.

SFL conducted needs assessments in Trincomalee, Ampara, and Batticaloa based on the final beneficiary lists assigned to SFL by the Government Agent (GA) office. Based on original beneficiary assignments and beneficiary data collected during the SFL needs assessments, the GA finally authorized a total of 1,314 beneficiary families to SFL, equaling 4,583 people. The actual family size average was smaller than SFL's original estimate of 4.8 people per family. Sadly, the actual 3.5 family size average was likely due to the significant number of deaths caused by the tsunami.



SFL's door-to-door assessments were designed to determine the needs and vulnerabilities of the assigned beneficiary families in the three assigned districts. Staff also coordinated with village leaders and elders to determine the type of shelters most suitable for the beneficiaries.

The assessments measured vulnerability and need levels for the assigned beneficiary households. This comprehensive survey instrument was canvassed to one or more adult household members by teams comprising of two trained male surveyors. The assessment form included questions to verify their tsunami assistance identification number against the assigned beneficiary list. It also asked questions about household vulnerability factors (e.g. female heads of households, unemployed, elderly, etc.). A copy of the survey instrument is included in the annex of this report.

Trincomalee District. The Trincomalee District has a population of 340,159, of which 30,574 families (126,679 people) were affected by the tsunami. A reported 967 people were killed and 8,665 houses damaged. According to UDA statistics published in the TAFREN report (May 2005), Trincomalee had 8,665 houses damaged by the tsunami and over 35 INGOS and NNGOS responding to emergency shelter needs.

Kinniya is primarily populated by a large Muslim community; prior to the tsunami, livelihoods were primarily based on agriculture and fishing. Most of the families owned their land outside of the tsunami buffer zone. The initial assessment verified that all assigned families qualified as vulnerable and in need of assistance.

Kucheweli primarily consists of a Tamil community, including many war IDPs who had recently been relocated into the area by UNHCR before the tsunami. The group suffered the loss of family members, possessions, and livelihoods for a second time. However, those that resided outside the buffer zone were able to maintain their government-issued land deeds and as a consequence, were able to build a new transitional shelter with the assistance of SFL.

Ampara and Batticaloa. The total population of the Ampara District is 589,344, with 38,000 families (193,000 people) affected by the tsunami. A reported 10,436 people were killed in the disaster, along with the destruction of 27,562 homes. The community was divided into, half Muslim and half Tamil.

In Batticaloa, 255,000 people of its 486,447 population were affected by the tsunami. A total of 3,177 people were killed in the disaster, 56,938 were displaced, and a total of 17,708 homes were destroyed. We worked with Tamils who were relocated to donated land and all received land ownership deeds from the GA's office.

2. Surveillance Data to Measure Results

Weekly Reports. Written weekly reports by the Project Supervisors and the project office were mandatory and once compiled, were sent to SFL headquarters on a weekly basis. Regular staff meetings for all the field staff as well as regular meetings between the Country Director and field supervisors ensured that a weekly update was kept both verbally and in written form. These meetings helped staff monitor the project progress and effectiveness.

Database. From the first phase of the project, SFL created and maintained an updated ACCESS database (soft as well as hard copy). This database had detailed information about each beneficiary according to their name, father name, district, government-issued tsunami beneficiary number, employment status, gender of the beneficiary, beneficiary number, and vulnerability status. The data also contained a record of all beneficiaries who were later rejected because they relocated and could not be found.

Monitoring Reports. The project supervisor and Country Director conducted frequent and random field inspections. In each of these visits, SFL staff documented any shelters or latrines that were sub-standard. Activities not meeting design standards were immediately referred to the site supervisor responsible for that area. On reaching the project office, SFL facilitated discussions between the responsible parties and appropriate action was taken to correct as much as was possible at that point of time in the construction. If the problem were with the contractor, he was contacted to discuss the issues and to correct them.

Apart from this, the field officer responsible for the construction would monitor construction progress along with the site supervisors to assess the following:

- Quality of materials provided by contractor
- Workmanship
- The integration of local technology
- Conformity to the prescribed floor plan of 200 ft.²
- Compliance with Sphere Standards in latrine placement


Certifications. Beneficiaries receiving latrines and transitional shelter assistance signed an acceptance letter certifying their receipt of assistance and their gratitude for the help provided. Also, field supervisors requested confirmation letters from the GA's office in that the work was completed satisfactorily to their requirements.

Distribution of Work. Responsibility for supervision, monitoring, and evaluation was divided among the following:

- The Country Director was responsible for the overall supervision of the project and working with contractors.
- The International Project Supervisor was responsible for supervising the field staff, implementing the project, informing and obtaining permissions from the various local Government Agencies, selecting beneficiaries, coordinating with the NGO community and UN agencies, monitoring material quantities and construction quality, and writing reports and human-interest stories.
- Field Supervisors were responsible for the day-to-day monitoring of the field staff.
- Field Staff was responsible for surveying and monitoring project sites and for distributing all material packages.
- The Warehouse Manager was responsible for receiving and inventorying all materials needed for distribution and building.
- The Database Manager was responsible for maintaining the beneficiary and survey database as well as writing reports.
- The Administrative Assistants were responsible for designating identification numbers to beneficiaries and for maintaining records of all beneficiaries who received assistance as well as general support.
- The Finance Administrator was responsible for all financial matters.

C. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF TARGETED AND REACHED POPULATION

SFL targeted vulnerable people displaced by the tsunami, including the elderly, female heads of household, large families, families with disabled members, widows, and families that had deeds to land outside the buffer zone that was affected by the tsunami. The pie graph below shows demographics and vulnerability factors selected by district. As seen below, each of the families fit into at least one of the categories detailed above.



No. Families 1,314 No. Beneficiaries 4,583



D. TOTAL NUMBER OF TARGETED AND REACHED BENEFICIARIES

1. Summary of Beneficiaries Served

SFL’s originally proposed to directly benefit a total of 2,000 families (an estimated 9,600 people) with the provision of shelters and latrines. The GA was unable to assign SFL 2,000 beneficiary families, and thus project fell short of achieving the target number shelters.

However, the final total number of families benefiting from this grant exceeded SFL’s original goals. SFL assisted a total of 2,498 families: 1,314 families received new shelters (415 of whom also received latrines), 324 additional families benefited from the cash-for-work program, and an additional 860 families benefited by receiving income as general laborers. Based on the reduced actual average family size of 3.5, the total number of people benefiting from the USAID project is estimated at 8,743.


2. Summary of Labor Hired Locally

SFL was able to provide temporary employment for a total of 1,510 people, of which 860 were contract laborers, from the local market for construction purposes. An additional 650 people were also hired under the cash-for-work initiative. A great portion of all the laborers employed under the project came from the tsunami affected communities. The table below details the construction laborers hired for this project:


Company / Work	Local Market	Skilled Laborers	IDP's	TOTALS
Engineering innovators / Transitional Shelters 604	100	85	120	305
Engineering innovators / 125 Latrines	60	50	60	170
Mercy Foundation /Transitional Shelters 146	80	30	50	160
Mercy Foundation / Latrines 33	20	10	10	40
SFL / Transitional Shelters 564	30	50	10	90
SFL/ Latrines 77	1	4	0	5
Shelter Metal Frame Fabricator	50	20	20	90
TOTALS	341	249	270	860

3. Summary of Project Impact


After staff completed final inspections and approved the new shelters and latrines, SFL conducted a household impact survey. It is significant to point out that 41% of the beneficiaries indicated that the SFL project improved the quality of their lives compared to their pre-tsunami lives.



When asked if the new shelter improved security, 70% (915 families) said that felt more secure because of the new shelter. All the beneficiaries that SFL worked with had been in canvas tent camps where they did not feel secure and were constantly in fear of break-ins. In some cases men could not work because they had to stay in the camp to protect their belongings.



SFL also surveyed families to determine if the SFL project had improved the living conditions of beneficiary families. A total of 55% (714 families) indicated that their new shelter and latrine were better than what they had prior to the tsunami. These beneficiaries were either fishermen or unemployed before the tsunami and are amongst the poorest of families in Sri Lanka.



E. QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA THAT REFLECTS RESULTS WITH THE HELP OF INDICATORS

1. Transitional Shelters


A total of 1,314 families built their transitional shelters with materials supplied by SFL.

Shelter Design. In February 2005, UNHCR distributed a strategy document detailing suggested guidelines in the technical implementation of the transitional shelter program. This was quickly adopted by the local government and presented to the international community as implementation guidelines. SFL initially used these guidelines in designing an appropriate transitional shelter using traditional building techniques.

The most significant direction that these guidelines provided was that the shelter must not exceed more than USD \$350 to construct. It also maintained that organizations should follow international Sphere Standards for shelter construction. Sphere Standards

recommend 1.5 square meters to 3 square meters for shelters which would make the living area a maximum of 128 ft.² for a family of four.

After SFL survey teams had completed the beneficiary assessments, SFL designed a shelter that had a 200 ft.² covered area providing 144 ft.² of living space and a kitchen area of 56 ft.². The DS and beneficiaries requested an open walled kitchen, which was incorporated into the design. The frame for the shelter was constructed with galvanized dipped steel tubing which had to be imported from Pakistan. The brackets were welded to join the walls and roof together, allowing the beneficiary to easily dismantle and shift the shelter as necessary. Concrete anchors were dug two feet into the ground to help stabilize and bring strength to the structure during high winds.



Building Material Quantities

No	Shelter Materials	Unit/Family	Quantity
1	Cement	Bags	3
2	Cement blocks	1	124
3	Gravel	Cu. meter	3
4	½'' Steel Pipes 2mm	5.8 m	9
5	¾'' Steel Pipes 2mm	5.8 m	7
6	1 ¼'' Steel Pipes 2mm	5.8 m	2
7	1'' Steel Pipes 2mm	5.8 m	4
8	1 ½'' Steel pipes 2mm	10 m	1
9	Galvanized corrugated iron Sheets for roofing	8 feet 32 gage	16
10	Galvanized corrugated iron Sheets for walls	6 feet 32 gage	12
11	Door with hinges and lock	1	1
12	Net Covering		14m ½''
13	J Hooks for fixing roof and walls	3 ½'' long	100
14	Concrete anchors		6
15	Canvas for the ends		7 m ²

A two-inch concrete floor was provided to help keep the shelter clean and dry along with a two-foot high nib wall around the base of the stretcher to provide protection from snakes and surface flooding.



Shelter Construction. SFL contracted engineering fabricators to manufacture the frame of the first 564 shelter in Ampara and Trincomalee. Beneficiaries with masonry and carpentry skills were hired to construct the shelter under the guidance of SFL supervisors trained in this type of construction.



Trincomalee



Ampara

SFL provided two types of the roofs depending on beneficiary preference. In Trincomalee District, all of the beneficiaries wanted tin roofs, but in Ampara they wanted kadjan (thatched) roofs, which is the local custom for low cost housing. SFL also provided 1,314 shelters with netting for the air ventilation gaps between the roof and the walls. This helped to keep birds and small animals out of the shelter. Also, SFL provided plastic tarps to be utilized during rainy weather.



Ampara



Trincomalee

SFL built 564 shelters like these in the first four months of the project.

Design Changes. In June 2005, six months after the tsunami, UNHCR announced that regardless of beneficiary family size all shelters must be 200 ft.² of enclosed living area. Consequently, SFL was required to make all shelters the same size even if the families did not want the front four feet enclosed. Since the design change was implemented six months into the project, there was a dramatic effect on the total shelter cost. The overall cost of the shelter changed from USD \$450 to USD \$515.



The new design is a 200 ft.² enclosed living area with a wooden lockable door

Shelter Upgrades. The table below details the building materials used to accommodate the UNHCR directive to upgrade all shelters to 200 ft.² enclosed living area. The upgrades cost an additional USD \$65 which include material and labor.

Cement Blocks	- 45 Nos.
Cement	- 1 ½ Bags
Sand	- ½ Tractor load
G. I. Sheets	- 08 Nos.
Kadjans	- 30 Nos.
Door	- 01 Nos.
U Hooks	- 25 Nos.
T Hinges	- 02 Nos.
Lock	- 01 Nos
Wood (Timber)	
2" x 2" (7') Door post	- 01 Nos.
2" x 1" (6 feet)	- 03 Nos.
2" x 1" (4 feet)	- 04 Nos.


2. Latrines

SFL originally sought to build 500 latrines, equaling one latrine for every four shelters built. That objective was based on the initial assumption that all shelters would be constructed in IDP camp settings. With the Sri Lanka government coordinating all beneficiary assignments, SFL was only allocated families who were able return to their own land. In many instances, assessments indicated that old latrines could be cleaned and reused. However, there were some areas where the tsunami had completely



destroyed the latrines, requiring full replacement. In partnership with UNICEF, SFL was able to construct 200 permanent latrines for 200 families in Kinniya, Trincomalee district.

The latrines in Trincomalee were permanent facilities based on the UNICEF design. The building consisted of plastered masonry block constructed on a poured cement slab with a wooden door. Refuse was collected in a septic tank.



latrine 15% did not need a



In consultation with the remaining beneficiaries, 215 emergency latrines were constructed in a central place so that four families would share the facility. This turned out to be a good way to encourage community collaboration and stretch limited resources. SFL provided 215 emergency latrines in Trincomalee, Ampara and Batticaloa. These emergency latrines were built from tin sheets connected to a wood frame. Refuse was collected in a soak pit.



Each latrine cost a total of USD \$48 to build and was built by contractors.

3. Cash for Work

The tsunami destroyed the livelihoods of thousands of people who were left with no way of making an income through traditional methods such as fishing and agriculture. For a long time after the tsunami people that had been fishermen all their lives were now afraid to return to the waters. Also, agricultural laborers lost their crops in the tsunami. Displaced and vulnerable people needed hope and a way to feed their families with something other than handouts.

As part of the cash-for-work program, SFL hired 650 beneficiaries who were made unemployed as a direct result of the tsunami for two projects. The first project was the clearing of land in order to make it suitable for construction. Second, SFL identified beneficiaries with masonry and carpentry skills during the needs assessment conducted at the beginning of the project. SFL employed a total of 650 people in the cash-for-work

initiative for a total of 8,779 man days. A total of 324 of the laborers were also beneficiaries who received SFL shelters.



Beneficiaries that took part in the cash for work program benefited by earning an income and receiving skills training. SFL staff trained beneficiary laborers in new masonry and carpentry skills. SFL also hired women as laborers whenever possible, with a total 8% female work force.

F. SUCCESSES ACHIEVED

- SFL assisted a total of 2,498 families with shelter, sanitation, or income-generation assistance
- SFL enabled 1,314 families (4,583 people) to return to their land and rebuild a shelter.
- SFL enabled the construction of 200 permanent latrines and 215 emergency latrines.
- SFL employed 650 people for the cash-for-work program, helping an additional 324 families (an estimated additional 1,134 people) who were not direct beneficiaries of the shelter and sanitation program.
- SFL supplied training to cash-for-work beneficiaries, developing their construction skills and increasing their prospects for future income-generation.
- SFL employed an additional 860 people for construction activities, representing an estimated 3,010 people.
- Because the program was extended, SFL was able to help families who did not receive a shelter because they were on a beneficiary list of a local NGO's that were over extended.

- Our shelters were well built; in Trincomalee, SFL shelters were some of the few that survived the November monsoon.
- SFL helped build the capacity of three local NGOs: Mercy Foundation (Trincomalee), the Women's Development Center (Ampara), and Shadow (Ampara).
- SFL built strong relationships with local government authorities in Trincomalee.

G. CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTERED AND ADJUSTMENTS MADE

1. **Tax Complications.** SFL understood that USAID had a fifty-year tax extension agreement with the government of Sri Lanka that included their partners. For unknown reasons to SFL, the government of Sri Lanka did not recognize this agreement in the case of the tsunami. In attempts to resolve the problem, SFL coordinated with USAID, who advised SFL to wait until a final decision was made. Unfortunately, the Vat tax issue took five months to resolve and the delay put SFL in a very difficult situation with the local government. The local government withheld the allocation of more beneficiaries because they did not believe we would begin work. Staff continued to promise that SFL would start building shelters, but unable to supply a start date for many months. In some instances, SFL staff members were even subjected to abuses from local officials and from other agencies. If it were not for UNHCR in Trincomalee intervening on our behalf with government officials, SFL would not have been able to continue work there. Sadly, in Ampara SFL received very little support from UNHCR.

Adjustment. The Vat tax issue was finally resolved in mid July and SFL was registered as a tax exempt organization. SFL was then able to obtain the services of a contractor and commence with the work.

2. **Beneficiary Selection.** As previously described, the coordination of shelter beneficiaries between the government and NGOs proved to be very challenging and complicated. Through the Government Agent (GA) office, NGOs were allocated beneficiary lists and were assigned geographic areas. This process was very long and very difficult, as there were many national and international NGOs competing for beneficiaries. There were months of delays waiting for the GA to assign SFL its beneficiaries. It was also discovered that the GA was assigning beneficiaries to NGOs who did not have funding, and there were cases of duplication. SFL staff spent a significant amount of time and resources ensuring that SFL was assigned discrete beneficiaries. In the end, the GA only authorized 1,314 beneficiary families to receive shelters from SFL. This allocation fell short of our target goal of 2,000 shelters.

Adjustment. SFL coordinated with the GA and other parties, eventually receiving a series of beneficiary allocations over a number of months. SFL staff conducted thorough beneficiary assessments to ensure that services were not duplicated.

3. **Project Timeline.** The project implementation date as per the proposal was mid January 2005 through June 2005. The project did not start to gain full momentum until July for the following reasons:

- A lack of suitable land upon which to construct shelters and latrines
- A delay in construction while USAID and the Ambassador of the United States worked with the President of Sri Lanka to resolve the issue over VAT tax.
- The relocation of SFL's project area from Mullaittivu to Ampara.

Adjustment. Two no-cost time extensions were requested and obtained, changing the finish date to October 31, 2005.

4. **Project Location.** In the first few months after the tsunami, there was a lot of confusion over the Sri Lankan government's recovery strategy. It was not clear what department of the government was in charge of the shelter and sanitation initiative. GA offices seemed overwhelmed by the incredible need of the people and the response by the international NGO community. There were also problems resulting from the many newly formed local NGOs who had political connections.

In the process of issuing beneficiary families to NGO's there was definitely a move by the GA offices in Trincomalee and Ampara to favor local NGO's over INGOs, even if the local NGO did not have funding for project implementation. For example, the 751 shelters SFL built from July to the end of October had originally been allocated to local NGOs that did not have the money to construct shelters and latrines.

Compounding these problems, the establishment of a "buffer zone" along the coast caused a lot of confusion and anxiety to the beneficiaries. Both NGO's and beneficiaries did not know how the new regulation of the 200 meter buffer zone would affect them.

Adjustment. SFL coordinated with the local government, USAID, the UN, and other agencies in finalizing the project location. In the end, SFL was able to only work with beneficiaries who owned land outside of the buffer zone.

5. **Inflation.** Inflation had a big impact on the project as building material and labor costs continued to rapidly rise throughout the project. To our knowledge, there is not an officially published inflation figure, some estimates place the number at around 70% (cited at a UNDP coordination meeting in Colombo).

Adjustment. This and adjustment to the size of the shelters forced SFL to revise the original per unit cost of building shelters, to \$515 per unit. USAID field

officers have been made aware of this situation and their permissions for adjusting the final output was secured.

6. Beneficiary Participation. During the length of the implementation of the project some of the beneficiaries refused to contribute towards the construction of their latrine or transitional shelter assistance unless they were paid.

Adjustment. SFL was forced to pay some of the beneficiaries through the cash for work program.

7. Further Needs

In our impact data survey we asked the question of the beneficiaries what are they still needing in the future. The results of the survey are detailed in the chart below.

