

**DEMOCRACY FELLOWS PROGRAM**

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**FINAL PROGRAM REPORT**

**JUNE 15, 1995 – JUNE 14, 2005**

**USAID Project Office:** Office of Democracy & Governance, DCHA  
Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

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## WORLD LEARNING DEMOCRACY FELLOWS PROGRAM

**Overall Goal:** To build a cadre of field-experienced technical experts committed to careers in democracy and governance.

**Overall Purpose:** To identify, place and supervise junior and mid-level experts in assignments that contribute to democracy programs in developing countries, and to the career development and commitment of the fellows.

This report documents the Democracy Fellows Program's (DFP) program operations for the past ten years under NMS Cooperative Agreement No. AEP-A-00-95-00024-00, and previously under initial Cooperative Agreement (No. AEP-5466-A-00-5024-00), effective June 15, 1995.

- At close-out, the Agreement Officer for the Democracy Fellows Program was:
  - Joseph Lentini (Office of Acquisition & Assistance (M/OAA)).
- At close-out, the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) was:
  - Susan P. Pologruto, Office of Democracy & Governance, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA).

World Learning's principal program implementation staff over the life of the Democracy Fellows Program included:

- |                             |                                                                                    |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| • <b>DAVID BURGESS</b>      | <b>Program Director (1995-2001)</b>                                                |
| • <b>JENNIFER MCCASKILL</b> | <b>Associate Program Director (1995-2000)</b>                                      |
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| • <b>DAVID PAYTON</b>       | <b>Program Director (2001-2004)</b>                                                |
| • <b>ELLEN GARRETT</b>      | <b>Associate Program Director (2000-2004) and<br/>Program Director (2004-2005)</b> |

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND PROGRAM OVERVIEW

In 1995 World Learning launched the new USAID Democracy Fellows Program, designed to build a cadre of field-experienced technical experts committed to careers in democracy and governance. The program's stated purpose was to identify, place and supervise junior and mid-level experts in assignments that contribute to democracy programs in developing countries, and to the career development and commitment of the fellows. The program was intended, in part, to help meet the growing demand for qualified democracy specialists, as USAID and other international development agencies began expanding their activities in the fields of democracy and governance. The program was also designed for Democracy Fellows to assist USAID and other international development agency projects and activities by providing technical expertise in democracy and governance.

During the years from 1995 to 2005, World Learning successfully implemented the Democracy Fellows Program, providing important field experience to some 55 professionals, simultaneously supporting the fellows' commitments to careers in international democracy and governance, and benefiting the USAID Missions and offices where the fellows served. During their fellowships, these World Learning Democracy Fellows developed and strengthened their expertise in international democracy and governance, and provided crucial assistance and expertise both to USAID democracy and governance teams, and to local democracy organizations and institutions in over twenty countries.

Starting in 1995, the Democracy Fellows Program proved to be extremely popular and successful, both among USAID Missions in every region, and with USAID Bureaus in Washington. Democracy Fellows recruited by World Learning not only demonstrated their value to the USAID units where they were assigned, but also developed professional reputations as highly capable technical experts in the burgeoning field of international democracy and governance. Indeed, during the ten-year life of the program, USAID sponsoring units offered fellowship extensions to over 90% of World Learning's Democracy Fellows. This is an enviable extension rate that reflects substantial satisfaction with the program both by sponsoring units and by the individual Fellows. Many Democracy Fellows received multiple fellowship extensions, with some serving in USAID for as many as four years. In addition, when Democracy Fellows finally completed their service, nearly every former fellow found many opportunities for full-time employment in international democracy and governance and related career fields.

World Learning assigned more than half of all Democracy Fellows overseas, in USAID missions and – in the early years – with a variety of democracy-related local institutions, NGOs and host country universities and law faculties. The remaining Democracy Fellows served with USAID/Washington regional and functional bureaus and offices, and with other U.S. government agencies, such as the international programs and liaison unit of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. A roster of all World Learning Democracy Fellows and their assignments and years of service is attached to this report (**Attachment A**).

World Learning ensured that each Washington-based Democracy Fellowship also included meaningful opportunities for the fellow to gain substantial practical field experience in democracy, civil society and related work in emerging democracies. Indeed, the overseas work accomplished by Washington-based Democracy Fellows has been of considerable importance to USAID Missions, and to the accomplishment of field support functions of USAID's democracy and governance units in Washington.

Individuals who have served as World Learning Democracy Fellows later joined the U.S. government through many routes, working with USAID offices such the Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau (DCHA) and its Office of Democracy and Governance; the USAID Policy and Program Coordination Bureau (PPC); the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Bureau; USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI); and numerous USAID missions (e.g. Angola, South Africa, Cambodia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, REDSO/East Africa, Iraq and Ukraine). Almost ten percent of alumni Fellows have been selected for USAID's New Entry Professionals program (NEP).

Other Democracy Fellows have been employed in the Department of Homeland Security; the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Rights and Labor; and the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs. A recent review of USAID's professional staffing indicated that 20% of former Democracy Fellows were working in USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance alone. Outside government, Democracy Fellows have found post-fellowship positions in a broad range of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), NGOs, international development companies, law firms, international contractors, and international development organizations.

At least ten of the 55 former Democracy Fellows have served as PSC or direct hire Democracy and Governance staff members in USAID Missions following their fellowships. These fellows have been assigned to overseas posts ranging from Angola, Eritrea and Nigeria, to Indonesia, Cambodia and the Dominican Republic. World Learning itself has offered employment to 10% of the former Democracy Fellows, including positions as Chiefs of Party, Democracy Advisors, Project Consultants, and Country Representatives. Other U.S. and international PVOs have similarly recognized the value of former Democracy Fellows, and the field experience that they have gained from their fellowships.

Several Democracy Fellows returned to the academic world after their fellowships to complete doctoral or law degrees, or to resume their teaching, research and writing careers with the benefit of invaluable field experience that they gained from their Democracy Fellowships.

These many program accomplishments were facilitated by World Learning's equally successful implementation and management of the Democracy Fellows Program. World Learning was responsible for the myriad policy, program, administrative, managerial, financial, logistics and personnel functions necessary to implement this global program. These functions included:

- Developing program materials and advertising for applications;
- Recruiting a diversity of applicants;
- Reviewing and qualifying applications;
- Developing and maintaining applicant databases, accessible through multiple search variables;
- Screening, interviewing and selecting candidates;
- Nominating finalist candidates to USAID;
- Selecting individual finalists;
- Identifying and negotiating suitable fellowship assignments;
- Coordinating, and assisting USAID in drafting initial Fellowship Terms of Reference;
- Matching candidates and fellowship opportunities;
- Reviewing and negotiating fellows proposed workplans;
- Facilitating Secret-level National Security Clearances for Democracy Fellows;
- Orienting, testing and training new fellows;
- Monitoring and providing on-going oversight of fellows;
- Disseminating and sharing fellows' work and fellowship reports;
- Soliciting and coordinating mentors for Democracy Fellows;
- Providing financial and administrative support and supervision for fellowships;
- Negotiating and paying monthly fellowship stipends, benefits and allowances;
- Managing global safety, security and morale issues for fellows;
- Coordinating fellows' program and professional travel in accordance with USAID and World Learning policies and regulations;
- Arranging various global insurance coverages for fellows;
- Purchasing appropriate fellowship equipment;
- Managing fellowship support funds, payrolls, procurement and individual reimbursements and budgets;
- Providing administrative, travel and logistic support for fellows;
- Making travel, insurance and other direct vendor payments
- Conducting annual Democracy Fellows Program Conferences for fellows and mentors;
- Counseling and advising Democracy Fellows on their independent professional work products;
- Conducting periodic internal program evaluations and USAID information needs;
- Establishing and maintaining electronic and other communications with all fellows and sponsoring units;
- Fulfilling USAID and World Learning periodic reporting requirements; and
- Performing special program reporting for USAID's Global and Management Bureaus, for individual Missions and sponsoring USAID units, and for USAID/DCHA/DG.

In accomplishing these functions over the years, World Learning consistently managed USAID program funds carefully and economically. Over the life of the program, and at each fiscal and programmatic interval, World Learning attained the program's results under budget, and ahead of schedule. When the program ended in June 2005, World Learning was able to

return almost \$344,000 to USAID to use with the successor program, allowing that activity the opportunity for a rapid start-up.

As with any decade-long activity, the Democracy Fellows Program evolved considerably over the years. World Learning collaborated closely with USAID to modify and implement the program so it would succeed in light of the fluctuating funding constraints, agency policies, and program realities that guided its implementation. Significant program changes ranged from defining and refining appropriate types of placements and responsibilities for fellows, to increasing or decreasing the size of the Democracy Fellows Program and the number of fellows to be supported, to modifying the sources of funding for individual fellowships.

As the Democracy Fellows Program evolved, the nature, experience and seniority of individual Democracy Fellowships also increased. During the program's early years, for instance, the majority of Democracy Fellows were junior or mid-level fellows. Their fellowships were generally limited to two years in duration, in order to expand the number of qualified individuals who could serve as Democracy Fellows. By the time the program concluded, the last group of fellows was comprised primarily of senior or mid-level fellows. Most of those individuals had previously acquired important USAID and other democracy and governance field experience before becoming Democracy Fellows; at the program's conclusion about half of the final fifteen fellows had already served for one, two or even four years as Democracy Fellows. As the fellows increased in both seniority and longevity, annual per fellowship costs also trended up, although the program always remained well within its program budget.

Throughout the program's life, World Learning staff fielded and supported every Democracy Fellowship, domestic and international, including both new fellows and extensions. The Democracy Fellows Program managed the transition when fellows ended their service, negotiated and administered fellowship extensions, and processed normal fellowship terminations and new starts. World Learning's program staff also modified the overall candidate recruitment, nomination and selection processes to meet varying candidate supply and demand factors, as well as to address the regulatory and programmatic expectations of USAID and individual sponsoring units. These efforts included developing and improving materials and procedures to implement the program's solicitation, advertising, recruitment, application, nomination, selection, and fellowship oversight functions.

In administering the program and providing oversight of each fellowship, World Learning provided a range of services from initial recruitment, through the transition to alumni fellow status. World Learning recruited applicants widely, and continually (open program solicitations), as well as individually for specific fellowships requiring particular skill sets, foreign language capabilities, or specific professional or geographic expertise. Once fellowship finalists were nominated and selected, the Democracy Fellows Program staff routinely and efficiently addressed a wide range of logistic, financial, administrative, visa, transportation, medical, and communications issues in all regions of the world. World Learning's Democracy Fellows Program staff handled these matters skillfully and effectively, while also managing a number of particularly sensitive program or personnel issues, fellows'

personal emergencies and medical evacuations, and the evacuation of several fellows from conflicts in fragile or failing states, or other dangerous situations.

World Learning communicated and coordinated continually with potential and eventual applicants, candidates, fellows, sponsoring Missions, mentors, and the many individuals designated as USAID Cognizant Technical Officers. This on-going collaboration and coordination facilitated understanding of what the Democracy Fellows Program was (and was not), as well as consensus on appropriate individual fellowship program descriptions and work plans. This highly collaborative approach helped to identify and resolve potential misunderstandings before they became more serious conflicts or problems. Over the life of the program, only two fellows were involuntarily terminated from the program.

The Democracy Fellows Program maintained effective electronic, voice and mail communications for its Democracy Fellows, and managed global financial arrangements in support of all fellows, including fellowship travel, stipends, benefits and allowances. Through its corporate Sponsored Program Services Office, World Learning also provided USAID's financial management offices with regular quarterly financial reporting in accordance with World Learning's Cooperative Agreement with USAID. Throughout the duration of the Democracy Fellows Program, World Learning provided USAID with financial and accounting data information and services on demand, along with travel advances, vouchers, budget data and expense reports for all fellows, whether in Washington, D.C. or overseas.

After ten years, World Learning now closes its implementation of the USAID Democracy Fellows Program with an abiding sense of accomplishment – by the fellows and by the Democracy Fellows Program as a whole. The accomplishments of the program, and the individual and collective achievements of the Democracy Fellows, reinforce the extraordinary importance of the fellows' work, and highlight the Democracy Fellows Program's value as an investment in USAID's mission to promote democracy around the globe. Indeed, the stark realities that today link national security with USAID's mission to advance democracy globally, also serve to demonstrate the salience of the Democracy Fellows' efforts to promote a more democratic world. USAID's *Strategic Plan* puts it plainly: "A more healthy, educated, democratic, and prosperous world – in short, a better world – will also be more stable and secure."<sup>1</sup>

World Learning's role in identifying and supporting a cadre of democracy experts engaged in the pragmatic work necessary to reach such a lofty goal remains as clear and essential today as it was in 1995, when World Learning joined with USAID to launch the Democracy Fellows Program. During the past decade the World Learning Democracy Fellows Program has proved to be a significant asset for USAID. The program provided a sound foundation for many future democracy projects and other fellowship programs, and clearly accomplished the program's intended goal of building a highly regarded cadre of field-experienced technical experts committed to careers in democracy and governance.

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<sup>1</sup> USAID Strategic Plan FY 2004-2009, p. 18

## II. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

### A. Program Goal:

*To help support a cadre of experienced U.S. technical experts committed to careers in democracy and governance, in order to assist in the promotion of U.S. democracy and governance efforts, and to increase the number or expertise of people working in the field.*

In achieving the fundamental goal of the Democracy Fellows Program, World Learning awarded 55 fellowships to candidates from an extremely broad range of personal and professional backgrounds. (Three fellows served in two different Democracy Fellowships.) Throughout the program, World Learning was particularly committed to assuring that its recruitment and nomination efforts yielded not only a sufficient quantity of qualified applicants to meet USAID's program goals, but also included candidates who represented the full diversity of America, as well as "the best and the brightest" that America has to offer.

The Democracy Fellows Program website was an invaluable resource for applicants and Democracy Fellows alike (see below for Democracy Fellows' discussion boards, etc.). After it came on-line, the website averaged over 12,000 visits per year, with some seven hundred prospective applicants downloading fellowship application materials each year. World Learning also mailed out and distributed several hundred program application packages annually, resulting in hundreds of very well-qualified eligible candidates. World Learning used a variety of pro-active approaches to encourage applications from women and members of minority and under-represented populations.

These efforts met with success, as one-third of the applicants nominated for fellowships were minority candidates, and a substantial majority of candidates that World Learning nominated for Democracy Fellowships were women. Indeed, female Democracy Fellows outnumbered male fellows by nearly 2 to 1. Of course, the number of fellowships awarded each year varied, depending upon funds availability and demand from sponsoring USAID units, and the number of Democracy Fellows who continued their service through extensions of their existing fellowships. Over the life of the program, the number of fellows serving each year ranged from a low of 10 Democracy Fellows at start-up in FY-1996-1997, to a high of 19 different Democracy Fellows during FY-1999 and FY-2001. In most years, USAID personnel ceilings limited the size of the program to 14 fellows or fewer at any one time. In total, World Learning Democracy Fellows provided USAID with the equivalent of more than 90 years of democracy and governance expertise under the program.

Democracy Fellows served USAID in many key areas, adding significantly to the technical agenda and intellectual leadership necessary for USAID to provide effective democracy and governance programming. Democracy fellows assisted USAID, both in Washington and in the field, in advancing cross-cutting approaches towards democracy's role in solving major societal and developmental problems. Their technical assistance on many of USAID's leading

democracy and governance initiatives was also marked by a number of innovative and cross-sectoral approaches. Democracy Fellows contributed to USAID's reputation and success in its democracy and governance responsibilities, while at the same time building valuable career experience across the entire span of democracy and governance topics. These efforts have been especially important in the fragile and failing/failed states that comprise so much of USAID's democracy and governance portfolio.

The wide array of activities carried out by Democracy Fellows reflects the versatility of World Learning's Democracy Fellows Program, and the extraordinarily complex and challenging democracy development issues facing USAID and the world. Of profound importance over the years has been the consolidation of expertise that Democracy Fellows have provided to USAID Missions and Bureaus. For example, the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance places a high priority on providing relevant, state-of-the-art training courses for its democracy officers in the field. Many Democracy Fellows over the year have designed, led or co-facilitated sessions of technical relevance to USAID Democracy and Governance Program Officers, Mission Directors, New Entry Professionals, overseas democracy officers, and interested US PVO and NGO personnel. In all cases, the Democracy Fellows' participation in democracy training sessions was well-received by USAID and other participants.

#### **B. Program Evolution**

As the program evolved, certain features and functions were modified, dropped, adapted or expanded. For instance, World Learning's initial program proposal had anticipated a range of activities that, in the end, could not be launched absent a substantial commitment of USAID core funding. For example, the first class of Democracy Fellows was recruited through a process that provided an independent review of applicants by experts in international development, democracy, and governance. These review panels rated and ranked candidates according to their personal qualifications, their relevant experience, their career promise, and the merits of their fellowship proposals. This review also included applicants who proposed to serve as Democracy Fellows in institutions and host-country organizations outside USAID. This approach proved not to be sustainable.

The program's consistent success over the years was based in part on well-organized and efficient program management and administrative support to the fellows. Indeed, solid program management was fundamental to achieving the program's purpose. World Learning routinely, and successfully, provided an extensive range of global support services for individual fellows in some of the most complex physical and operational circumstances.

#### **C. Program Funding**

USAID modified the initial program funding model because subsequent Democracy Fellows were to be funded exclusively by the specific USAID organizations where they were assigned. Additionally, it became clear that a fellowship program which was driven by the supply-side (i.e., by the supply and career promise of interested candidates, and the quality of their

proposals) was necessarily predicated on the availability of sufficient core funding from headquarters to subsidize at least some fellows in the field. The availability of such headquarters funding would encourage field units to sponsor Democracy Fellows who would, in part, be serving broader long-term headquarters objectives of human resource development and cross-fertilization, in addition to the short-term program needs of the missions where the fellows were assigned. By the end of the program's first year of operation, USAID funding realities meant that Democracy Fellowship assignments were limited to those USAID Missions and Bureaus that could fund the direct costs of an individual Democracy Fellowship, and also bear a proportionate share of the program's general implementation costs.

#### **D. Collaborating Implementing Partners**

USAID funding limitations also obliged World Learning to terminate planned collaborative arrangements with its four intended partner organizations:

- the University of the District of Columbia [UDC], for assistance in minority recruiting;
- the Center for the International Exchange of Scholars [CIES], for assistance in candidate and proposal review, and negotiating the international assignment of fellows;
- Volunteers in International Assistance [VIA], for the placement of fellows in democracy related activities within international organizations, PVOs and host country NGOs; and
- the School for International Training [SIT], for assistance with the academic and career development components of the fellowships, the establishment of the planned International Democracy and Governance Resource Center, and the program's fundraising/sustainability assistance.

Nonetheless, World Learning achieved noteworthy success in accomplishing the program's main goal: to expand the number and capabilities of technical experts in the field of Democracy and Governance. When the program began, USAID's own democracy and governance program officers were frequently career foreign service officers who had been transferred from other program areas such as health, agriculture, education or economic development. Over time, the program helped to develop higher levels of specific expertise.

#### **E. National Security Clearances**

During the final four years of the Democracy Fellows Program, World Learning assumed responsibility for processing and obtaining security clearances, or conversions of existing security clearance conversions, for Democracy Fellows. Each fellow serving with USAID was required to obtain a "Secret" security clearance, or an appropriate temporary waiver, before World Learning could award that fellowship. Democracy Fellows Program staff coordinated closely with the relevant federal security clearance offices that handled background investigations and clearances, as well as with their security counterparts within USAID. Once Democracy Fellows completed their fellowships, they were removed from World Learning's list of active clearances.

The length of time that it took to obtain security clearances for a new Democracy Fellow was quite difficult to predict, and at times had an adverse impact on the placement of fellows. Some nominated candidates found that they could not financially afford to wait for a clearance or a waiver, and were obliged to accept other employment and decline the fellowship. Similarly, some Missions or sponsoring units found that they could not wait until a fellow received a security clearance, and decided to implement their programs using other manpower sources. World Learning's coordination with the Defense Security Service was generally effective, and as a rule helped to avoid most such problems.

#### **F. Fellowship Mentoring**

The initial Democracy Fellows Program also envisioned utilizing mentors and advisors from academe, think tanks and international organizations outside USAID to provide Democracy Fellows with intellectual advice and career mentoring. Funding constraints led to these functions being provided by USAID supervisors in the particular field and headquarters assignments where each fellow was to be placed. Limited funding also precluded the program from establishing a contemplated International Democracy and Governance Resource Center for fellows and other practitioners in this new professional field. Instead, to avoid duplication and to maximize USAID's returns, democracy and governance resources were consolidated and offered through USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) and other agency efforts, rather than through a Democracy Fellows Program activity.

#### **G. Nomination and Selection of Candidates:**

World Learning's program staff worked closely with sponsoring USAID units and Missions, as well as with the CTO, to identify suitable candidates for each new Democracy Fellowship, whether located in Washington, D.C. or overseas. Depending on applicant response and availability, World Learning typically nominated at least three – and often five or more – qualified candidates for each prospective fellowship. Efficient, consistent, and open communication among all concerned generally allowed the Democracy Fellows Program to find the appropriate fit of candidate to fellowship which met the sponsoring unit's personnel and program needs.

In most instances, USAID units approached the Democracy Fellows Program with fairly well-defined scopes of work that fit within program requirements. On other occasions, however, sponsoring units sought fellows for assignments that were unsuitable, or were outside the scope of the Democracy Fellows Program. Although most USAID Missions and offices accepted the program's nomination process for fellowship candidates, some sponsoring units rejected all nominees, and World Learning DFP therefore expanded its search to find a candidate with a specific skills mix and work profile. In several instances, of course, the sponsoring USAID unit had already identified the particular individual whose qualifications most closely matched its program needs. In these cases, to ensure the best possible fit, World Learning agreed to nominate such individuals as requested by USAID, provided that the individual in fact applied to the program. To assure the credibility and transparency of the

fellowship program, World Learning believes that the best practice is to ensure that the pre-selection of individuals by the sponsoring unit should truly be an exception.

#### **H. Democracy Fellowship Terms of Reference and Fellows' Workplans**

As each new Democracy Fellowship was initiated, World Learning staff assisted USAID in drafting the initial Terms of Reference for the particular fellowship, and coordinated the programmatic approvals, funding and other administrative and management issues that attended launching any new fellowship. In preparing new Democracy Fellows for their assignments, World Learning focused on both the substantive and the logistical/financial aspects of each fellowship. Democracy Fellows Program staff helped new fellows to develop their fellowship workplans, and to identify and articulate their proposed professional work products. The requirement for fellows to complete a fellowship work product was intended to encourage each Democracy Fellow to make a meaningful contribution to the field of democracy and governance. These work products could include substantive reports, analyses, research, curricula, articles, book chapters or similar publications or products that would represent a tangible outcome of each fellowship. The Democracy Fellow's workplan served as the foundation and guide for each fellow's assignment and contribution to the sponsoring USAID unit. The wide scope of Democracy Fellows' activities also demonstrated the complexity of the fellows' work and the relevance of democracy and development to larger questions of societal roles and responsibilities.

World Learning's efforts were structured to ensure that before commencing the fellowship, each Democracy Fellow had a written workplan that set out the main objectives, planned results, expected approaches and outcomes, and the reporting and other requirements that would guide the fellowship. World Learning assisted fellows and sponsoring units in developing and negotiating these workplans, and in reaching mutual agreement within the terms of the Democracy Fellows Program and USAID policy.

In World Learning's experience, the development and negotiation of a written fellowship workplan before the fellowship was awarded was the single most important objective measure of how successful a particular Democracy Fellowship was likely to be. While most Democracy Fellowships were quite successful, the fellowships that resulted in the greatest satisfaction for the fellows, and for the sponsoring USAID units, were those that were launched from a solid foundation of well-defined expectations, agreed to in a written workplan. Conversely, in World Learning's view it was not merely a coincidence that the few fellowships that terminated early were assignments where the fellowship finalist and the sponsoring unit had declared their agreement on the terms of the fellowship, without having actually discussed and negotiated the substance and expectations of the fellowship, or having developed a sound written workplan before the fellowship commenced.

Given the frequent reassignment of domestic and overseas USAID personnel, a well-crafted fellowship workplan also helped to avoid misunderstandings or miscommunications when personnel were reassigned, and Democracy Fellows found themselves working with new supervisors and colleagues. Of course, the fellowship workplans were not set in stone, and

World Learning expected and required that they be reviewed and revised as necessary, and at least quarterly.

### **I. Orientation of New Democracy Fellows**

World Learning conducted Orientation Programs for all new fellows, facilitating their transitions into their fellowships, and into their placements in various USAID Missions and Bureaus. To orient new fellows World Learning developed, and then regularly reviewed, revised and expanded, a comprehensive *Democracy Fellows Program Handbook*. That volume contained not only relevant World Learning and USAID policies and procedures, but additional democracy and governance resources and reference materials, along with administrative forms, examples, instructions, and so forth. The Democracy Fellows Program also arranged highly regarded seminars on the taxation of fellowships and of fellows serving abroad.

### **J. Annual Democracy Fellows Conferences and Career Development**

To help strengthen the commitment of Democracy Fellows to careers in international democracy and governance, World Learning conducted annual Democracy Fellows Conferences, and organized electronic discussion boards and list-serves that allowed fellows throughout the world to share their professional research, analyses, observations and technical expertise. The annual conference or retreat was generally held in conjunction with the USAID Democracy and Governance Partners Conferences and workshops. The Democracy Fellows conferences welcomed fellows and alumni input, and invited external democracy and government practitioners from academe, think tanks, institutes, US PVOs, and government, including the White House, National Security Council, State Department and Congress. These programs typically offered fellows a dynamic range of topics, such as fellow-to-fellow and alumni connections, Democracy Fellows Program communications, life as a fellow at USAID, life beyond the fellowship, and issues related to navigating the bureaucracies of World Learning and USAID. World Learning attempted to maintain a balance between programmatic presentations and fellowship-related issues.

The Democracy Fellows Program also offered fellows in-service seminars and professional career development opportunities to advance their careers in international democracy and governance, and provided modest funding for professional development. Fellows used these funds to subscribe to journals in their fields of endeavor, to attend professional conferences and workshops, and to further develop their careers. It should be noted that this program feature was not found in some other USAID-supported fellowship programs. As a consequence, World Learning frequently was called upon to explain and justify this aspect of the Democracy Fellows Program to sponsoring units.

## K. Democracy Fellows' Compensation

Over the years the compensation of Democracy Fellows also evolved. In the initial plan, junior-level Democracy Fellows were to have predominated, with stipends that were quite modest, and roughly equivalent to the stipends offered in academic fellowship programs such as the Fulbright program. Early on, USAID asked World Learning to increase the amount of stipends at all fellowship levels, and to implement the program so that it would supply a greater number of mid-level and senior candidates. This modification resulted in sponsoring units being supplied with fellows who were more capable of immediately contributing to the unit's project portfolio, albeit while increasing the program's expenses.

Two other related concerns arose during the program, both involving Democracy Fellows' compensation. The first issue was the periodic occasion when a USAID official negotiated salary and benefits with an individual Democracy Fellow, typically offering compensation that was outside the parameters authorized by World Learning and the Democracy Fellows Program. This situation was addressed individually as it arose, with World Learning staff or the USAID CTO usually advising the USAID official that such matters were exclusively within the purview of World Learning as the implementing organization. Still, the problem arose with some regularity over the ten years that the program operated. World Learning recommends that USAID training for program officers might include a component that explains how the agency's various fellows may differ from personal service contractors or other personnel assigned to USAID.

The second situation involved the fact that there were sometimes significant disparities in USAID authorization of discretionary benefits for different Democracy Fellows, and for people in different USAID-funded fellowship programs. This issue arose in three separate contexts: (a) when World Learning was asked to pay additional or significantly different benefits to Democracy Fellows at different locations; (b) when World Learning was asked to pay different benefits to Democracy Fellows assigned to the *same* location; and (c) when the terms of service or benefits offered by World Learning to Democracy Fellows at one Mission were not available to fellows of other USAID-funded fellowship programs at that same post (or vice versa).

The difference in compensation and benefits paid to fellows at different Missions was readily resolved by World Learning in light of inherent and usually obvious differences in costs of living, housing, transportation and communications, living amenities, etc. On occasion, however, a particular USAID Mission would grant an allowance (e.g., shipping of household effects), which was not authorized for any Democracy Fellows at any posts.

The concern over different treatment of Democracy Fellows who were assigned to the *same* post usually required intervention by the CTO to assist World Learning in ensuring that Democracy Fellows were treated equitably.

The situation of different benefits and conditions of service for different fellowship *programs* was generally not resolved. Resolution of this type of issue will most likely require systemic reform by USAID. For example, USAID may consider establishing the level of stipends, benefits, and other compensation that would be standardized across all USAID-funded fellowship programs. USAID's Management Bureau completed some studies of USAID-supported fellowship programs in 1997 and 1998, but each fellowship program retains its own compensation package and terms of service for its fellows.

A final economic issue was the amount of the stipends paid to Democracy Fellows at different levels of seniority and of longevity. To address these issues in a way that avoided perceptions of favoritism or personal bias, World Learning developed a standard and comprehensive process for establishing the initial salary and compensation levels of new Junior- Mid- and Senior-level Democracy Fellows. This process was generally tied to the *General Schedule (Not Including Locality Rates)* issued by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, for federal employees, and used objective criteria (e.g., educational degrees, years of directly related experience, etc.) to establish each individual's fellowship level and initial salary.

Within each of the three fellowship levels (Junior, Mid- and Senior), an individual's salary was determined by reference to prior earnings (USAID Form 1420), if any. If a new fellow had no comparable or appropriate prior earnings history, that individual received the base salary for the particular fellowship level. This pay schedule had both salary floors and ceilings, tied to the GS Schedule. World Learning believes that creating this type of formal and transparent system for determining Democracy Fellows' pay was an important element in avoiding any appearance or perception of favoritism and bias with regard to fellows. Pursuant to USAID guidance, Fellows received substantial salary increases (e.g., 10% -15%) if they extended their fellowships into a second or third fellowship year, subject to a fixed ceiling of \$87,400 for any Democracy Fellowship stipend.

#### **L. Post-Fellowship Career Opportunities**

As the Democracy Fellows Program progressed and grew into a valued institution, USAID and other U.S. Government agencies found that former Democracy Fellows offered a wealth of experience and expertise to support U.S. foreign assistance and foreign policy efforts. The numbers of former World Learning Democracy Fellows who have worked – and who continue to serve – in government positions attest to this singular success.

Outside government service, Democracy Fellows have found post-fellowship employment in a broad range of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), NGOs, international development companies, law firms, international contractors, and international development organizations, including:

- The Asia Foundation
- Deloitte & Touche Consulting
- QED Group

- The AfroBarometer
- Ashoka
- The National Center for State Courts
- Checchi & Company Consulting
- PACT
- Counterpart International
- The World Bank
- The U.S. Peace Corps
- Pragma Corporation
- International Rescue Committee
- World Learning, and
- The International Labor Organization.

Former World Learning Democracy Fellows have also found employment at universities such as:

- |                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Purdue     | <input type="checkbox"/> Texas          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dartmouth  | <input type="checkbox"/> Michigan State |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Harvard    | <input type="checkbox"/> South Florida  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Penn State | <input type="checkbox"/> Maryland       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> NYU        | <input type="checkbox"/> American       |

#### **M. Program Evaluation**

World Learning's financial systems and records have been audited annually over the ten years that the Democracy Fellows Program has operated, and in several years the program was specifically reviewed in depth by USAID or independent audit firms. No significant audit issues were ever reported. USAID has not conducted an external program evaluation of the Democracy Fellows Program, but World Learning regularly performed its own assessments and evaluations. Each Democracy Fellow was asked to submit reviews of the Democracy Fellows Program and its various components, along with periodic (e.g., Quarterly) performance reports on fellowship activities, summarizing successes and challenges, as well as career development issues and concerns. These reports served as analytical barometers of fellowship success. In addition, World Learning asked sponsoring USAID units and missions to review the fellow's reports for their own information and program management and planning, and to help guide the fellow's future performance. World Learning also used these reports to assess the particular Democracy Fellow's career development and accomplishments. Fellows were required to obtain USAID concurrence on any substantive proposed revisions to work or travel plans. In addition, World Learning maintained continual communication and collaboration with the program CTO, to ensure that the Democracy Fellows Program consistently met USAID's needs and expectations.

World Learning, of course, used other formal and informal methods to monitor and assess each Democracy Fellowship, and the overall Democracy Fellows Program. Feedback from both Democracy Fellows and sponsoring Missions was positive. World Learning believes that

this record of satisfaction reflects its steady efforts to be responsive to the needs of the Democracy Fellows and their USAID sponsors. The program's assigned CTO and other USAID staff regularly provided advice and guidance on a variety of programmatic issues over the course of the program, making World Learning's overall implementation more responsive and successful.

### **III. RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **A. General Recruitment:**

As the Democracy Fellows Program evolved from a program driven primarily by the supply side (i.e., by candidates and their proposals), to one driven primarily by the demand side (i.e., by the program needs of sponsoring Missions), World Learning recognized that the viability of fellowship applications declined rapidly. Applications from candidates seeking a fellowship that would allow them to carry out their own proposed projects, research, or other activities had tended to remain viable for approximately 12-18 months. Conversely, applications to be entered in a generic "Democracy Fellowship database," from which candidates might be nominated for a possible unspecified future Democracy Fellowship, tended to become outdated and stale after only 3-6 months. Consequently, in order to have a usable database of viable candidates for potential future fellowships, it is recommended that recruitment for demand-side fellowships be conducted continuously. Alternatively, if USAID sponsoring units are able to provide sufficient lead time, an implementing organization such as World Learning can advertise and recruit against a specific fellowship statement of work.

#### **B. Minority Recruitment:**

From the first day of the program, World Learning and its Democracy Fellows Program staff placed considerable emphasis on ensuring equal opportunity for all qualified applicants. This approach relied, in part, on the equitable review of all candidates for every Democracy Fellowship, including fair consideration of those applicants who came from less traditional backgrounds, or whose academic, personal and work experiences were comparable to, but also different from, the backgrounds of personnel traditionally hired by USAID. The final selection of minority candidates for Democracy Fellowships over the years did not always match the success that the program experienced in recruiting qualified minorities and other under-served populations. USAID may wish to explore in the future effective measures that will convert minority applications and nominations into fellowship awards.

#### **C. Fellows' Compensation:**

USAID may wish to reconsider the relative impediments or merits of standardizing pay levels, compensation, and allowances and benefits among its various fellowship programs. USAID may also wish to consider the efficacy of encouraging fellowship implementing organizations to establish transparent and objective compensation schemes, similar to those developed by World Learning, or as provided in the Federal General Schedules.

#### **D. Fellowship Workplans:**

World Learning believes that the development of a substantive written workplan – before the fellowship commences – was an essential ingredient in nearly every successful Democracy Fellowship. In contrast to some other fellowship programs, World Learning required its fellows to develop relatively detailed workplans that demonstrated to USAID their mutual understanding of the purpose, parameters and particulars of each Democracy Fellowship.

#### **E. Hallmarks of Successful Fellowships:**

Over the years, Democracy Fellows, USAID and World Learning staff regularly consulted to improve the Democracy Fellows Program, and to maximize the benefits that accrued to both USAID and the individual fellows. The following factors were generally considered to be the most important elements contributing to the success of the Democracy Fellows Program:

- Fellows' freedom, independence, and flexibility;
- Fellows' community and camaraderie – Networking and support for fellows and alumni;
- Practical fellowships – Fellows' knowledge and skills were valued and fellows could apply them to meaningful problems of democracy;
- Professional advancement and development for fellows;
- Responsiveness of World Learning staff;
- Combined practical and analytic work in a fellowship; and
- Opportunities for learning.

#### **IV. SUPPLEMENTARY PROGRAM MATERIALS**

Copies of these Democracy Fellows Program materials may be found in a series of attachments to this Final Program Report:

- Attachment A: Roster of World Learning Democracy Program Fellows
- Attachment B: Chart of Democracy Fellows
- Attachment C: Democracy Fellows' Reports

**ATTACHMENT A**

## ROSTER OF CURRENT AND FORMER DEMOCRACY FELLOWS

### A. Current Democracy Fellows

1. **Kevin Bohrer**  
USAID/Kenya  
Nairobi, Kenya (04/01/2003 – 06/14/2005)

Dr. Bohrer's arrival in Kenya coincided with the launch of the Kenyan National Constitutional Conference, an historic undertaking that will result in a new Kenyan Constitution. Dr. Bohrer was certified as an official observer of the Conference, and attended several sessions.

During Dr. Bohrer's fellowship, the majority of his efforts have been spent preparing the Mission's anti-corruption action plan and initiating discussions between the Mission's democracy and governance partners and the implementers of the Mission's HIV/AIDS program. In his work on USAID/Kenya's anti-corruption portfolio, Dr. Bohrer provided commentary on the first two drafts of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs' draft strategy for judicial and legal reform and anti-corruption activities. He also took a lead role in preparing USAID/Kenya's anti-corruption action plan and funding proposal, which was subsequently funded.

2. **Laura Burnham**  
USAID/REDSO  
Nairobi, Kenya (06/01/2004 – 06/14/2005)

Ms. Burnham's fellowship with USAID/REDSO focuses on conflict prevention, mitigation, and response (CPMR) and good governance. Her main objective is to promote CPMR and good governance in cross-border conflict zones in ways that strengthen the capacity of civil society, government, and traditional stakeholders to better design, coordinate, implement, and monitor CPMR activities. Her efforts will be geared to enabling these stakeholders to participate in early warning and response systems and advocate for their peace and security at local, national, and international levels.

Ms. Burnham is examining social capital and the CPMR approach to mediating conflict in the pastoralist areas of the Karamoja and Somali clusters where institutions are nascent or often non-existent, where resource scarcity continues to catalyze conflict, and where the gap between state and people is filled by community-based initiatives that build trust through building institutions and organizations. In this context, Ms. Burnham will link the mission's Conflict Management Index to her research on social capital.

**3. John Granville**  
**USAID/SFO**  
**Sudan and Nairobi, Kenya (1/20/2005 – 6/14/2005)**

John's fellowship focuses on community participation in government and NGO capacity building in South Sudan. Using tools such as community needs assessments and interactive problem solving models, John works to create collaboration and cooperation between citizens and government. In March, John attended the Association for Media Development in South Sudan (AMDISS) conference. Currently, he is working to bring radios to the population of South Sudan in order to maximize the impact of USAID's broadcasting initiatives in the region.

John is a former Peace Corps volunteer and has worked in Sudan as a consultant for USAID and GOAL-Ireland. With GOAL, he designed and implemented an HIV/AIDS Participatory Action Assessment. He has studied as a Fulbright Fellow and received a MA in International Development and Social Change from Clark University in 2003.

**4. Andrew Green**  
**Strategies Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (05/01/2004 – 06/14/2005)**

Dr. Green began his fellowship in May 2004 with the Strategies Team in Washington, DC, with the goal of implementing the latest initiative under the Strategic Operations Research Agenda (SORA), a research design intended to analyze the impact of democracy-promotion programs. The SORA project was designed to provide systematic evaluation of democracy-promotion programming, to assist DCHA in tailoring programs to account for specific contexts, and change the focus of others as necessary.

Dr. Green's fellowship will operationalize the research design developed by the Social Science Research Council for program analyses. This will include determining the methodology, administrative requirements, personnel, and level of effort needed to create a base from which to evaluate future democracy and governance programs.

**5. Shanthi Kalathil**  
**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (01/15/2004 – 06/14/2005)**

Ms. Kalathil's fellowship focuses on developing new research and analytical approaches to media assistance in the context of democracy development. She provides technical assistance to the DG office in the area of media issues and how such issues fit into the broader foreign policy arena.

A major initiative for Ms. Kalathil was to research and co-author an assessment report on USAID media assistance activities in Indonesia. Ms Kalathil traveled to Indonesia in February-March to carry out a broad assessment of USAID media assistance since 1998. The report that emerges from this trip should form part of an ongoing assessment of USAID's global media assistance programs that is being directed by Krishna Kumar (from USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) office). The report is currently in the process of being edited.

The report identifies key challenges for Indonesia's media sector, which at this point include building constructively on the gains made post-1998 and ensuring that these freedoms are not eroded by the passage of various restrictive media laws. More specifically, the recently passed Broadcasting Bill contains a number of troubling provisions that could open the door to a rollback of press freedom. Civil society groups that Ms. Kalathil interviewed noted that while overt threats to freedom of expression and to continuing professionalization of journalism in Indonesia have declined, more subtle threats – such as those involving litigation or interpretation of legislation – are on the rise. With regards to assistance strategies, media professionals noted that while USAID assistance had been helpful by providing training during the early stages of media liberalization, a more long-term institutionalization of domestic training capacity would ensure that the benefits of assistance outlasted donor grants.

**6. David Kupferschmidt**  
**CAPEL/IIDH**  
**San José, Costa Rica (2/22/2005 – 6/14/2005)**

David is the rare Democracy Fellow whose fellowship is hosted outside of USAID. His fellowship takes place through the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights (IIDH) and its arm for electoral and political party reform, known as CAPEL. David's efforts focus on finalizing and implementing CAPEL's plan for political party reform in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, David served as Executive Director of Harvard's Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. Between 2000 and 2003 he was Chief of Party for USAID's Elections and Political Processes Project in Kyiv, Ukraine. He holds a JD from UC-Berkeley and an MA in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School at Tufts University.

**7. Preston Pentony**  
**USAID/Angola**  
**Luanda, Angola (1/7/2005 – 6/14/2005)**

Preston assists USAID's Angola Mission to carry out its planning, implementing and monitoring of activities supporting democratic governance.

Preston has extensive field experience, including service in East Timor, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. In Timor he offered research and policy guidance on a variety of democracy and governance related fronts including civil society development, post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration, evolution of new police and military units and political party development. Preston received his Masters of Public Affairs from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in 1999.

**8. Caroline Sahley**  
**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/01/2002 – 06/14/2005)**

Dr. Sahley's Fellowship took an important turn this year, as she led a cross-sectoral working group on governance and food security, a joint DG and Food for Peace initiative to develop programmatic recommendations for addressing food security issues from a governance perspective.

The hypothesis driving this work is that underpinning many of the technical problems that lead to food insecurity (such as food distribution problems, inefficient markets, lack of inputs, poor infrastructure), are deep-seated governance problems. Dr. Sahley co-drafted a research framework that outlines an approach for investigating the links between governance and food security. The framework was widely distributed for comments and then field-tested in Nicaragua. Dr. Sahley led the team in Nicaragua assessing questions of how food security is influenced by governance factors such as policy failures, ineffective institutions, poor leadership, and conflict. The team's report systematically reviewed the policies, actors, and institution, as they affect Nicaragua's food security situation.

The framework tool will be revised to reflect the lessons learned from Nicaragua, and then field-tested again. The research findings have broad implications that may inform democracy and governance and other USAID programs working on food security, and the hope is that the instrument will be used by missions to identify options and make sound decisions about food security programming.

Carol received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the London School of Economics, and has worked in Ethiopia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, Ukraine, and Zambia.

**9. Angana Shah**  
**USAID/DCHA/DG – Rule-of-Law Team/US Courts AO**  
**Washington, DC (10/11/2004 – 6/14/2005)**

Angana serves as a liaison between USAID's Rule-of-Law Team and the Administrative Office of the US Courts (AO) in order to help these different arms of the US Government prioritize and harmonize their rule of law programming.

Her work and consultancies with the American Bar Association, Bearing Point, the International Law Institute and DPK Consulting have taken her to Armenia, Mongolia, Macedonia and Bulgaria. She received her JD from the University of Michigan in 1993.

**10. Julie Werbel**  
**Governance Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (08/23/2004 – 06/14/2005)**

Ms. Werbel is assisting the USAID Governance Team in the design and development of a coherent security sector reform (SSR) program, with the aim of helping define and articulate its role in security sector activities.

As Ms. Werbel explores the areas in which USAID might operate, her work will lead to a plan that proposes a mission and vision for an SSR program, identifies its functional requirements, and proposes appropriate programming and activities. In doing so, Ms. Werbel is identifying the key trends in the security sector reform field and highlighting USAID's comparative advantage. She is examining the latest research and SSR-related programming in order to make sound recommendations regarding the technical component of the SSR program. Of course, effective communication with key stakeholders, relevant audiences and potential detractors is critical to the long-term success of any new program. Consequently, Ms. Werbel will be including an array of USAID offices, Interagency actors, international experts, and Congressional staffs, among others in her work.

**11. Maryanne Yerkes**  
**USAID/DCHA/DG – Civil Society Team**  
**Washington, DC (10/18/2004 – 6/14/2005)**

Maryanne's fellowship aims to strengthen civil society and advance the effectiveness of civic education programs.

Maryanne worked extensively in Eastern Europe before joining the Democracy Fellows program. She paid special attention to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in that region, working and consulting for Oxfam America, United States Institute of Peace, Women in Black and American University's Summer Peacebuilding Institute. She holds an MA in International Peace and Conflict Resolution from American University.

## **B. Former Democracy Fellows**

### **1. Cynthia L. Ambrose**

**Rule of Law Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (12/15/1999 - 05/04/2001)**

Cynthia Ambrose served her fellowship with the Rule of Law Team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, located in Washington, D.C. Cindy's fellowship focused on three areas: research and analysis, program development and support, and field support. Her projects included organizing and developing a curriculum for USAID's Democracy and Governance (DG) Training Conference, working with the National Center for State Courts on completing a Case Management/Tracking Guide for DG officers in the field, and assisting the field in developing programs and a democracy strategy for Nigeria. In addition, Cindy's regional assignments included Africa for rule of law, and South Africa for democracy and governance in general.

Cindy received her B.A. in political science from the University of Maryland, a J.D. from Thomas Cooley Law School, and an L.L.M in international development from Georgetown Law. Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Cindy worked as an attorney in Maryland, specializing in government relations and legislative law. Prior to her work in private practice, Cindy worked for the Federated States of Micronesia in Kosrae. Her work in Kosrae was with the legislative branch. In addition, while in Kosrae, Cindy taught advocacy and writing courses at the College of Micronesia and authored a chapter on issues affecting women in the South Pacific.

### **2. Nicole C. Barnes**

**USAID Mission  
Pretoria, South Africa (04/15/1999 - 11/30/2000)**

Nicole Barnes served her fellowship with the Democracy and Governance Team at USAID's Mission in Pretoria, South Africa. She worked with the Local Governance Unit of the DG Team on the implementation of an \$18M, five year bilateral agreement with the South African Government to strengthen local government capacity. Nicole primarily focused on assisting the Mission with identification and monitoring of key policy studies for the South African government, largely related to local government finance issues. In addition, she has worked directly with a limited number of municipalities to facilitate their assistance from USAID.

Nicole earned her Masters in City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she studied fiscal decentralization and poverty alleviation. Prior to her fellowship, Nicole worked in Cape Town, South Africa's largest township, to investigate strategies for private sector investment in low income communities. She has also worked on fiscal decentralization research and training in Uganda, and taught in a historically disadvantaged high school in rural South Africa.

**3. Michael Bak**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Jakarta, Indonesia (11/1/2000 - 05/18/2003)**

Michael Bak served his fellowship with the Democracy and Governance Team (referred to as the Office of Civic Participation and Transition) at the USAID mission in Jakarta, Indonesia. Michael served as the team's advisor on Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation, with a focus on peacebuilding and reconciliation to provide analytical and program advice to the CPT/Conflict team in identifying and disseminating "best practices" in this sector. He also conducted analytical conflict flashpoint studies and integrated new knowledge into future programs.

Michael received his M.A. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in 2000. Before joining the Democracy Fellows Program, he worked as a consultant for the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

**4. Robert R. Barr**  
**Strategies Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/01/1997 - 08/31/1998)**

Robert Barr completed his fellowship with the Strategies team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. His focus was on the development of indicators of democracy in USAID's programs on democracy and governance. Specific fellowship activities included developing and testing democracy indicators in the field, and assisting the Center with writing and editing a comprehensive handbook on democracy indicators.

After completing his fellowship, Rob returned to the University of Texas to continue working on his Ph.D. in Comparative Politics/International Relations, a program he began before becoming a Democracy Fellow. His research focuses on the effects of corruption on the style of governance and the process of reform in Latin America. His Master's thesis was titled "Alternatives for the Left: The Strategic Decisions of the Chilean Socialist Party." Rob has taught classes in the politics of environmental issues, U.S. foreign policy, and the role of the military in Latin America. He has also authored several papers on economic reform, drug-trafficking, and privatization in Latin America.

**5. Bradley D. Bessire**  
**USAID/Cambodia**  
**Phnom Penh, Cambodia (05/01/2001 - 01/03/2003)**

**USAID Office of Women in Development**  
**Washington, DC (08/15/2000 - 02/28/2001)**

Bradley Bessire served his fellowship with the USAID mission in Phnom Penh, working with the Democracy and Human Rights Program. His work focused on several areas: protection of human rights, rehabilitation of the judicial sector, efforts to combat trafficking in people, support of the commune elections, and assisting the coordination and development of the new DHR interim program strategy.

Bradley Bessire served his first fellowship with the Office of Women in Development in USAID's Global Bureau, while also working with USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance. His primary activities include the development of a women's property rights program as well as projects focusing on legal literacy.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Bradley worked at law firm that works exclusively in Native American rights. He earned his J.D. at American University's Washington College of Law where he also participated in the International Human Rights Clinic. Prior to beginning law school Bradley worked and traveled extensively in Southeast Asia and Central America, where his work ranged from teaching English in Seoul, Korea to setting up a shelter for street girls in Managua, Nicaragua.

**6. Gary A. Bland**  
**Governance Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/08/1998 - 09/30/2001)**

As a Fellow in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, Gary Bland served as a decentralization advisor and a member of the Governance team. He helped to train USAID DG officers, working to build intra-agency coordination on decentralization and local government, and working closely with missions to help improve programming in this area. His fellowship research project focused on the emergence of local democracy in Latin America.

Gary is a specialist in decentralization and the development of local government. He holds a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to becoming a Democracy Fellow, he served as a legislative assistant in the House of Representatives and senior program associate at the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Gary's democracy work has focused on Latin America and he has consulted with USAID, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme.

**7. Stephen M. Brager**

**Governance Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (05/19/1997 - 05/18/2001)**

Stephen Brager served his fellowship with the Governance team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. Stephen examined various issues in good governance, including legislative strengthening, government integrity, decentralization and local governance. He previously worked on civil-military relations, transitions, and conflict mitigation. In addition, he assisted in the development of training programs for USAID staff in issues of democratization.

Stephen earned his M.A. in political science at the University of California at San Diego. Before beginning his Democracy Fellowship, he worked as a Research Intern at InterAction examining the role of NGOs in strengthening civil society. He was a Teaching/Research Assistant in U.S. politics, international relations, security issues, comparative politics and ethnic conflict at the University of California at San Diego. Stephen has lived in Brazil, Chile, Israel and Spain. His interests cover a wide range of topics, including rule of law, civil-military relations and civil society.

**8. Lisa M. Cannon**

**Development Resources Centre  
Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa (10/29/1996 - 10/28/1997)**

Lisa Cannon served her Democracy Fellowship with the Development Resources Centre (DRC), a South African NGO located in Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa. The DRC serves as a network organization for South African NGOs. During her fellowship, Lisa worked on issues of financial sustainability for NGOs. In particular, she assisted in improving the organizational management capacities of the member organizations, in developing a network of NGOs, in facilitating partnerships with the corporate sector, in increasing citizen support and involvement, and in developing NGO fund-raising strategies.

Lisa has an Ed.M. in International Education from Harvard University and B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown. She has worked in Armenia, South Africa, and several countries in Central America. Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Lisa was an organizational development consultant for NGOs, and helped train Peace Corps Volunteers. After she completed her fellowship, Lisa worked as a short-term consultant for World Learning. Since returning to the U.S., she has accepted a position with Ashoka, a non-profit organization that awards grants to support social entrepreneurs and civil society organizations.

**9. William Cartwright  
USAID/Guatemala  
Guatemala City, Guatemala (09/27/2004 – 01/14/2005)**

William Cartwright's fellowship with USAID/Guatemala focused on anti-corruption efforts and specific analyses of democracy and governance issues in Guatemala and the Central America and Mexico (CAM) region, with the understanding that problems erupting in the neighboring countries could spread insecurity, and the possibility of a "domino affect." A significant part of this fellowship sought to coordinate CAM multi-country efforts and bilateral initiatives, to assist in achieving USAID/Guatemala's targets of a strengthened rule of law, and greater transparency and accountability of governments.

**10. Carrie S. Chernov  
USAID Mission  
Asuncion, Paraguay (01/31/1997 - 05/07/1997)**

Carrie Chernov served her Democracy Fellowship with USAID/Asuncion, where her assignment included a wide range of democracy assistance. Specific program areas included: strengthening the capacities of grassroots organizations and NGOs; facilitating private and public partnerships and working accords; supporting Paraguay's efforts in decentralization and local governance; encouraging local civic participation and the development of NGO advocacy skills; and advancing civic education, legal reform and environmental issues. Following the conclusion of her fellowship, Carrie worked for a law firm in Paraguay focusing on NGO advocacy and legal assistance.

Prior to her fellowship, Carrie's career included work as Counsel and Professional Staff Member, US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. She was Legislative Assistant for Congressman James Scheuer, and a Consultant on sustainable development with the World Resources Institute. Other positions included Associate Attorney and Legal Consultant with several prominent Washington, DC litigation and environmental law firms; and General Counsel and Business Analyst for an international investments and operations firm. She earned an LLM. in International and Comparative Law at Georgetown University; a J.D. from New York University; and a B.A. (Honors) in History from Brown University. Carrie had previously lived in Spain and the United Kingdom, and has traveled to Botswana, Costa Rica, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

**11. Dawn P. Emling**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Pretoria, Republic of South Africa (04/26/1997 - 04/25/1998)**

Dawn Emling served her Democracy Fellowship with the USAID Mission in Pretoria, South Africa. There she worked on conflict resolution issues with local NGOs. In addition, Dawn worked closely with USAID/Pretoria's Community Development Foundation Program. During her fellowship, Dawn researched, compiled and edited a forthcoming book of essays by host-country NGO leaders, assessing South African mediation and conflict resolution programs. She also developed an extensive working bibliography on conflict resolution issues. After completing her fellowship, Dawn accepted a position focusing on democracy and governance issues with the USAID Mission in Jakarta, Indonesia.

Dawn received her M.A. in international development from American University in 1993. Before joining the Democracy Fellows Program, she worked as an International Programs Coordinator at the National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law (NICEL). Dawn has lived in both South Africa and Nigeria. Her interests include legislative reform, women's groups, democratic initiatives, advocacy and civil society.

**12. Holly Flood**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Asuncion, Paraguay (05/15/1999 - 01/23/2001)**

Holly Flood served as a Democracy Fellow with the USAID Mission in Asuncion, Paraguay. She focused on decentralization of health services, strengthening local government, and strategic planning of democracy and governance programs. Holly acted as liaison between USAID/Asuncion and USAID contractors which are implementing health decentralization programs. Holly also provided technical assistance to USAID/Asuncion during its strategic planning process. Holly viewed her fellowship as an opportunity to gain experience applying her skills in program management and strategic planning to the field of democracy and governance.

Holly earned her M.A. in International Affairs at George Washington University. Before beginning her fellowship, Holly was Regional Director for the International Rescue Committee, overseeing the resettlement of refugees. Previously, she served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Paraguay. Holly is proficient in Spanish and also speaks Guarani and Portuguese. Her interests include civil society, elections, international human rights, public administration, and public health.

**13. Leonora Foley**  
**USAID/REDSO**  
**Nairobi, Kenya (01/15/2001 – 10/31/2003)**

Leonora Foley served her fellowship with the USAID mission in Nairobi, Kenya. Ms. Foley acted as a resource person on conflict resolution issues to REDSO/ESA teams; provided services to bilateral AID missions on conflict resolution and democratization issues, particularly in non-presence countries (NPCs); and assisted in the development of local professional and organizational capacity in conflict resolution.

Prior to her Democracy Fellowship, Lee completed her M.A. in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Her work experience includes positions with the Harvard Institute for International Development, as well as the American Refugee Committee.

**14. Leslie L. Gottert**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Antananarivo, Madagascar (11/1/1999 - 09/30/2001)**

Leslie Gottert served as a Democracy Fellow with USAID's mission in Madagascar. She focused on assisting USAID's efforts to strengthen civil society and to support Malagasy efforts to increase the responsiveness and accountability of democratic institutions in Madagascar.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Leslie worked as a Consultant and Trainer with various USAID contractors and grantees in Madagascar and Cameroon. Previously, she co-founded Development Graphics, a communications design firm in Benin. She also directed the English Language Program in Benin for the U.S. Information Agency. Leslie is fluent in French and has traveled extensively in West Africa. Her interests include conflict resolution, civil society, and governance. Leslie earned her M.A. in Conflict Resolution at Antioch University; she also holds a B.A. in Studio Art from Brown University.

**15. J. Michele Guttmann**  
***Corporacion Participa***  
**Santiago, Chile (09/28/1996 - 09/27/1997)**

Michele Guttmann served her fellowship with *Corporacion Participa* in Santiago, Chile. *Participa* is a highly regarded Chilean NGO whose programs focus on civic education. It conducts training programs in voter education, advocacy, and legal and judicial reform. During her fellowship, Michele worked with *Participa*'s advocacy training program and its Global Women in Politics program. She also provided the staff of *Participa* with professional advice on ways to increase citizen participation throughout civil society. Since she completed her Democracy Fellowship, Michele has worked as a consultant with a number of USAID contractors on democracy and governance issues.

Michele earned both her J.D., and a B.A. in Modern Languages, at the University of New Mexico. Before beginning her Democracy Fellowship she practiced law in an Albuquerque, NM law firm where she was a principal. She has lived in Ecuador, and has traveled to Europe and the Caribbean.

**16. Linn A. Hammergren**  
**Rule of Law Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (04/01/1996 - 11/2/1998)**

Linn Hammergren completed her fellowship with the Rule of Law team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. Her focus was on the effectiveness of recent USAID and other rule of law programs, especially in Central and South America and the Caribbean. During her fellowship she developed a series of manuals on judicial training, code reform, and efforts to establish or strengthen prosecution and public defense functions. She also wrote a paper on the socio-political significance of rule of law reforms in Latin America, and helped to promote a network of scholars, advocates and practitioners interested in rule of law issues. Since completing her Democracy Fellowship, Linn has worked at the World Bank on governance issues.

Linn earned her Ph.D. and M.A. in political science from the University of Wisconsin. Her B.A. is from Stanford University. Linn has lived in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela, and previously has received fellowships from the Vanderbilt Center for Latin American Studies, and the Social Science Research Council. She is fluent in Spanish. Her interests cover a range of topics including justice system reforms, national integration and the development of civil society, comparative legal systems, and local governments and decentralization.

**17. Elizabeth I. Hart**

**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (10/21/1996 - 10/31/1999)**

Elizabeth Hart worked with the Civil Society team of USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. Liz pursued the relationship between economic and political liberalization, as well as the roles of the private sector and labor in civil society, and the processes of economic and political reform. During her fellowship she also assisted the Democracy Center in the development and presentation of a series of democracy and governance training workshops to provide technical guidance to USAID Missions. After completing her Democracy Fellowship, Liz accepted a position as a Democracy Officer with the USAID Mission in Lagos, Nigeria.

Liz received her Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University in 1996. The topic of her dissertation was liberal reform in Ghana. Liz has also authored publications on democratic reform in Africa, and politics in Kenya. She has traveled and worked in a number of African and Asian nations, particularly in Ghana.

**18. Abigail Horn**

**Bureau for Latin America & Caribbean, USAID  
Washington, DC (02/22/1999 - 09/30/1999)**

Abigail Horn worked with USAID's Latin America Bureau in Washington, DC. Abby focused on USAID's anti-corruption initiatives in that region, providing technical input for the Bureau's anti-corruption programming. In addition, Abby also helped to restructure a USAID program on financial integrity. At the conclusion of Abby's fellowship, the USAID Latin America Bureau hired her as a democracy advisor.

Abby earned her M.I.A. from Columbia University in economic and political development, with emphasis on Latin America. Before beginning her fellowship, she was a Fulbright Scholar for one year in Chile. While there, she researched student political participation since Chile's transition to democracy, and worked with the civic group *Participa* conducting civic and human rights education programs. Abby also interned with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, updating and editing their book *Nuclear Thresholds*. She has lived in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Her public policy interests include civil society, NGO networks, elections and anti-corruption efforts.

**19. Abigail Horn**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Asuncion, Paraguay (10/01/1997 - 01/31/1999)**

Abigail Horn completed her initial Democracy Fellowship with the USAID Mission in Asuncion, Paraguay in January 1999. Abby was centrally involved with Mission programs supporting both Paraguay's recent elections, and national anti-corruption efforts. She worked on anti-corruption efforts, voter education, electoral administration and monitoring, political party development, and judicial strengthening. She also helped Paraguayan NGOs on training methods, approaches, and in addressing problems in civic education and capacity building, particularly with the Paraguayan branch of Transparency International.

Abby earned her M.I.A. from Columbia University in economic and political development, with emphasis on Latin America. Before beginning her fellowship, she was a Fulbright Scholar for one year in Chile. While there, she researched student political participation since Chile's transition to democracy, and worked with the civic group *Participa* conducting civic and human rights education programs. Abby also interned with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, updating and editing their book *Nuclear Thresholds*. She has lived in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Her public policy interests include civil society, NGO networks, elections and anti-corruption efforts.

**20. Ann C. Hudock**  
**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (01/01/1998 - 12/31/1998)**

Ann Hudock served her fellowship with the Civil Society team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. Ann's focus was on the development of government laws and regulations governing the NGO sector, as well as on media development and the role of media in civil society. After completing her Democracy Fellowship, Ann accepted a position as a Human Rights Officer with the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. She later accepted an appointment as Special Assistant to the State Department's Undersecretary for Global Affairs.

Ann received her Ph.D. from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom. During her fellowship she has aimed to apply her prior academic work to the policy-making process in the United States. She is a member of the Development Studies Association and National Union of Journalists, and has won several awards including a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship, a Regional Award from Soroptimist International, and the Marj Heyduck Journalist of the Year Award. Ann has lived in Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom, and has worked in Central America, Mongolia, South Africa and the Gambia.

**21. Brian D. Kelliher**  
**Foundation for Human Rights Initiative**  
**Kampala, Uganda (10/12/1996 - 10/11/1997)**

As a Democracy Fellow, Brian Kelliher worked with the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI), in Kampala, Uganda. FHRI monitors human rights abuses and the development of legal protections of human rights. During his fellowship, Brian assisted in the training of paralegals, laid the groundwork for a moot court competition to improve Ugandan legal advocacy and representational skills, designed a curriculum for a paralegal training program, and conducted community outreach and education programs. Brian also assisted in networking with other human rights groups in the region.

Before joining the DFP, Brian worked as an Attorney-Advisor in the U.S. Justice Department's Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals. He returned to the Justice Department at the conclusion of his Democracy Fellowship. Brian has a J.D. from George Washington University and graduated in political science from the University of Michigan. Brian previously interned with GWU's Community Legal Clinic and the D.C. Superior Court. He was a Public Interest Law Fellow with Harlem Legal Services, Inc., and a Fellow with the University of Namibia's Human Rights Documentation Center. In an internship with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Brian helped to train South African election monitors in preparation for that nation's 1994 elections.

**22. Patricia J. Kendall**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Jakarta, Indonesia (03/16/1997 - 11/30/1999)**

Patricia Kendall served her fellowship with the USAID Mission in Jakarta, Indonesia. She concentrated on issues of legal and judicial reform, the legal aspects of economic reform, and the development of NGO advocacy and organizational capacities, as well as legal issues relating to democratic participation and human rights. Her Democracy Fellowship has served as a transition from her background as a trial lawyer in constitutional and civil rights law, to the field of international law, and towards efforts to build democratic institutions. Since completing her fellowship, Patty has worked both in the U.S. and in Indonesia as a short-term consultant to USAID contractors in the field of democracy and governance.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Patty was Assistant Corporation Counsel and Supervisory Attorney for the City of Chicago. She holds a J.D. from the University of Illinois and a Master's degree in higher education administration from Vanderbilt University. She has traveled to Australia, Europe, Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as the former Soviet Union. Patricia's interests include the constitutionality of government practices, rule of law, human rights, legal issues relating to women and minorities, and law enforcement.

**23. Sepideh Keyvanshad**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Moscow, Russia (07/1/1999 - 09/15/2000)**

Sepideh Keyvanshad served her fellowship with the USAID Mission in Moscow, Russia. Sepideh concentrated on issues of anti-corruption, strengthening the Russian judicial system, and building respect for human rights. She used her Democracy Fellowship to gain experience working with USAID in the field of democracy and governance. After completing her fellowship, Sepideh entered USAID's New Entry Professional (NEP) Program.

Sepideh earned her J.D. at the University of Illinois. Prior to becoming a Democracy Fellow, she worked as a Project Coordinator for the National Center for State Courts. She has also been a consultant for the World Bank. Sepideh has lived in Haiti, Mexico, Russia, and Iran. Her interests include administration of justice, conflict resolution, rule of law, human rights, and civil society.

**24. Mark Koenig**  
**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (11/1/2000 – 6/15/2003)**

Mark Koenig served his fellowship with the Civil Society team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, located in Washington, D.C. The focus of Mark's fellowship was to conduct research and write technical guides analyzing the best practices and lessons learned from USAID media programs. His work compared USAID media programs with experiences from such other media sector donors as OSI, the World Bank, British DFID and the Ford Foundation, but also addressed larger theoretical issues that importantly shape media development work: e.g., the linkages among press freedoms, media sector development, advertising sector development and economic growth.

Mark holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. He has a diverse background that includes serving as a visiting lecturer at Northwestern University, Duke University, and the University of Maryland at College Park. He has also served as Senior Media Advisor for USAID/Russia.

**25. James P. Kuklinski**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Pretoria, South Africa (04/1/1999 - 07/13/2001)**

James "Jaime" Kuklinski served as a World Learning Democracy Fellow with USAID's mission to South Africa. The majority of his work involved assisting the mission with the design and implementation of a \$9 million six-year results-oriented program to strengthen South African civil society and government partnerships for improved policy development and service delivery. In addition, Jaime provided oversight for a senior executive cooperative educational program between Harvard and the University of Witwatersrand (WITS) to provide management capacity to high level managers from the public, private, and public enterprise sectors. He assisted USAID with the management of a grant to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) that promoted public participation in policy formulation and strengthening of democratic pluralism and governance systems. As Activity Manager for the USAID/US Embassy-Public Affairs Section Transitional Support Funds (TSF) Program, Jaime helped to design US and South African exchange activities that support USAID's Democracy and Governance objectives.

Jaime earned his MBA at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in California, where he developed a passion for international economic development and an appreciation for the need for strong alliances between government, private industry and civil society. Jaime served on four occasions as an international elections polling station supervisor with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Armenia. As US Peace Corps Country Director in three African nations, Jaime supervised volunteer efforts that brought together civil society, government, and the private sector for purposes of local community development. Before beginning his Democracy Fellowship, Jaime worked as an international relief logistics delegate for the American Red Cross both in Honduras and at the home office in Washington, DC.

**26. Carolyn J. Logan**  
**REDSO/ESA – Greater Horn of Africa Initiative**  
**Nairobi, Kenya (12/01/1997 - 07/31/2000)**

Carolyn Logan served her Democracy Fellowship with USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Offices for East and Southern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. Carolyn worked in the areas of regional democratic transitions, crisis prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution. She used her Democracy Fellowship to complete her own transition from the field of engineering to a career in policy and democracy and governance.

Carolyn received her M.A.L.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University in 1996. After completing her Democracy Fellowship, she returned to Tufts to finish her Ph.D. in international relations, a program she began before becoming a Democracy Fellow. Previously, Carolyn spent several years as a professional in water resources management in India, Lesotho, Rwanda and Somalia. She is especially interested in the relationship of indigenous practices to questions of political conflict, participation and representation.

**27. Kimberly Ludwig**

**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (02/01/2001 - 05/15/2002)**

Kimberly Ludwig served a Democracy Fellow with USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance/Civil Society team. In her fellowship she assisted in designing and implementing civil society development strategies. These included exploring synergies between the Africa Bureau and the Civil Society team, identifying opportunities for collaboration and contributing to the Civil Society team's knowledge of African affairs and current programs, and improving the advocacy roles and organizational capacity of Civil Society organizations.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Kimberly was Assistant to USAID/Zambia's DG Advisor, and worked as a consultant for the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. In this activity, funded by USAID's Southern African Regional Democracy Fund, Kimberly evaluated citizen's attitudes and interaction with democracy, government, and the economic system in six countries in Southern Africa. She has authored several papers on issues of democratization and political representation in Zambia. Kimberly is proficient in French and Bemba and holds a Ph.D. from Michigan State University in Political Science.

**28. Corbin Lyday**

**Strategies Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (09/1/2002 - 12/05/2003)**

Dr. Corbin Lyday's fellowship concluded in December 2003. While Dr. Lyday did not complete a full second year, the work he completed on patronage and political clientelism was a focal point for DG officers' training in 2003, and will influence DCHA's views in future democracy-promotion efforts. This course included the results of a DG assessment in Tanzania, which had used the Patronage Toolkit. The larger point of the Toolkit is to understand how informal systems of governance and reciprocity affect formal institutional behavior, and how to effectively program around them. While the effectiveness of the Toolkit depends heavily on the commitment of an individual mission to understanding the nuances of democratization in a country, as well as the expertise and professionalism of those carrying out the assessment, the results of the training showed great mission sensitivity to the first reason for undertaking a patronage diagnostic: to be certain existing programs are not doing inadvertent harm.

Corbin holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Michigan, and a B.A. in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley. Prior to starting his fellowship, Corbin had extensive experience with USAID, including serving as a Senior Policy Analyst for the Office of Democracy and Governance for seven years, as well as the Senior Democracy Advisor for the Office of Women in Development at USAID.

29. **Michael R. McCord**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Asmara, Eritrea (01/01/1997 - 05/31/1998);**  
**USAID/AFR**  
**Washington, DC (08/18/1998 - 09/30/1998)**

Michael McCord served his fellowship with the USAID Mission in Asmara, Eritrea where his work emphasized support for the rule of law and democratic elections. He also strengthened local legal training and judicial resources. His efforts included developing a curriculum and teaching a course on "Law and Development" at Eritrea's national law school, and publishing several articles on law in East Africa. His Democracy Fellowship was interrupted when the USAID Mission was evacuated due to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Following his return to the U.S., Mike was awarded a short-term extension of his fellowship, and he worked with Mission personnel who were temporarily based in Washington, DC. There he helped to analyze and design programs supporting the improvement of human capacity in Eritrea's government institutions. After he finished his Democracy Fellowship, Mike accepted a position focusing on democracy and governance with the USAID Mission in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

Mike earned his J.D. from the University of Oregon, and his B.A. in economics from California State University in San Diego. He previously served with the International Rescue Committee in Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire, where he was a refugee program officer.

30. **Sharon L. Morris**  
**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/1/2000 - 09/30/2001)**

As a Democracy Fellow in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, Sharon Morris worked with the Civil Society team. She examined the ways in which local civil society groups interact with international partners during the process of democratization and democratic consolidation. In particular, she focused on how this interaction influences the stability and content of the new democratic regime.

Sharon holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Before beginning her Democracy Fellow, Sharon worked as a Research Associate for The MacArthur Foundation, managing grants in the areas of U.S. foreign policy, media, and globalization. She also conducted research on various aspects of civil society and international security. Sharon's interests include civil society, civil-military relations, and conflict in transitional states. She has worked in Nigeria and Senegal and lived in France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Sharon is proficient in French and also speaks some Arabic.

**31. Brian C. Murphy**  
**USAID/REDSO/ESA**  
**Nairobi, Kenya (02/01/1996 - 03/31/1997)**

Brian C. Murphy completed his fellowship with USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa, and the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, in Nairobi, Kenya. The objective of Brian's fellowship was to support the growth of democracy in the many transitional and emerging democracies supported by REDSO. Specific goals included assessing the legal and judicial systems of countries within the region; making recommendations and proposals for reform and/or technical assistance; and consulting with legal and judicial officials on conflict resolution and alternative dispute resolution. Since completing his Democracy Fellowship, Brian has worked as a consultant on democracy and governance issues with contractors for USAID and other donor organizations.

Brian received a J.D. from the University of Virginia, and an A.B. in government from Harvard University. His prior federal career included many years as an attorney with the Administrative Conference of the U.S., and extensive service with the Federal Bar Association's international initiatives in support of emerging democracies. His interests include conflict resolution, litigation reform and alternative dispute resolution, administrative law, and international trade regulation.

**32. Paul Nuti**  
**Strategies Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/1/2002 - 07/31/2003)**

Paul served his fellowship with the Strategies team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, located in Washington, D.C. In collaboration with Democracy Fellow, Dr. Corbin Lyday, Mr. Nuti acted as the point-person for designing and vetting an innovative approach to confronting clientelism and patronage in USAID democracy programs. Mr. Nuti contributed an anthropologist's perspective to analyzing one of the "most pernicious of development problems" and helped set the stage for field-based testing of a the clientelism/patronage assessment methodology in Tanzania.

Paul has over eleven years of experience in project leadership, management, development, and evaluation for democracy/governance, human rights, and international development organizations. He has served as Chief-of-Party and Country Director of Macedonia for the Institute for Sustainable Communities. Paul holds an M.A. in Anthropology and International Development from George Washington University.

**33. Peggy Ochandarena**  
**Rule of Law Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance/  
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts**  
**Washington, DC (07/15/2002 – 03/17/2004)**

Peggy served her fellowship with the Rule of Law team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, located in Washington, DC, in conjunction with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Through her fellowship, Peggy advised the Committee on the purpose and status of rule of law development programs funded by USAID, with special emphasis on judicial sector reforms; and facilitated the provision of Committee resources/expertise to assist USAID missions and the DG/Rule of Law Team in carrying out program objectives which involve judicial reforms.

Peggy holds a J.D. from Georgia State University, a M.S.W. from Boston College, and a B.A. from Gordon College. Prior to becoming a Democracy Fellow, Peggy served as Court Counsel for the Palau Supreme Court, as well as Legal Counsel the House of Delegates in the Republic of Palau.

**34. Shally Prasad**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Jakarta, Indonesia (01/1/1999 - 05/31/2002)**

Shally Prasad served her fellowship with the Democracy and Governance Team (referred to as the Office of Civic Participation and Transition) at the USAID mission in Jakarta, Indonesia. Shally focused on developing and implementing training programs in organizational assessment and capacity building for Indonesian civil society organizations (CSOs), as well as providing training and technical assistance on gender issues. She developed and pilot tested training programs in organizational development and gender; facilitated several workshops on organizational development and gender issues for CSOs and USAID; conducted Training-of-Trainers sessions in organizational self-assessment; and institutionalized training programs through Indonesian training organizations.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Shally worked in India and Washington, DC with several women's advocacy organizations addressing violence against women, women's political participation and women's human rights. While in India, she conducted primary research on women's access to health and legal services, and the role and impact of the police and judiciary in asserting women's legal rights. Shally earned her Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the University of Michigan in 1992. Shally speaks Hindi and Bahasa Indonesia, and has traveled throughout Europe, India, Nepal, and across Southeast Asia.

**35. Keith Schulz**

**Governance Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (11/01/2000 – 06/11/2004)**

Keith Schulz served as a Democracy Fellow with the Governance team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance. His work supported activities that build upon and improve the Center's capacity to act as a technical resource on legislative strengthening issues. In particular, Keith conducted research in order to determine the correlation between USAID-funded assistance and legislative performance. He also developed and implemented a training program on legislative strengthening for both new and experienced democracy and governance officers.

Prior to becoming a Democracy Fellow, Keith worked on several USAID-funded legislative strengthening and rule-of-law projects. He also served as a Legal Advisor for The Asia Foundation's Legal Development Project in Cambodia. Previously, he was the Deputy Legislative Counsel in the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the State of California. Keith has worked in the West Bank/Gaza and Cambodia. He is proficient in Spanish and speaks some Arabic and Khmer. Keith holds a J.D. from the University of San Diego School of Law, and is currently working toward a Master's degree in International Policy and Practice at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

**36. Ronald G. Shaiko**

**Elections Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (12/08/1997 - 11/07/1999)**

Ronald Shaiko served his fellowship with the Elections and Political Processes team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. Ron was involved with all aspects of elections programs including political party development, civic education and elections administration. He used his Democracy Fellowship to supplement his academic background with practical experience in the field of democracy and governance.

Previously, Ron was an Associate Professor of Government at American University, where he taught courses on U.S. government, lobbying, political parties, legislative behavior and political leadership, and worked as a consultant on a USAID-sponsored legislative strengthening project in West Bank/Gaza. Ron also served as an expert on U.S. government for USIA's International Visitors Program, and consulted as a media pollster and political analyst. His Ph.D. (political science) is from Syracuse University. Since completing his Democracy Fellowship, Ron returned to American University, but is also working as a consultant with ARD, a USAID contractor in the field of democracy and governance.

**37. Robin S. Silver**

**Strategies Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance  
Washington, DC (05/1/1999 - 04/30/2001)**

As a Democracy Fellow in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, Robin Silver served as a member of the Strategies team. She worked on managing for results initiatives, developing qualitative performance measures and strategies for promoting democracy. Prior to becoming a Democracy Fellow, Robin worked as a Senior Associate in Integrated Democracy Studies in USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE). Her focus was democracy promotion in post-conflict societies.

Robin holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley and an AB from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School. As a Fulbright Scholar, she completed a study on state policies toward immigrant and refugee populations in the Middle East and Europe. Robin has taught at the University of Oregon, Grinnell College and the University of Maryland-Baltimore County. Her research and publications have encompassed public sector reform and decentralization, the development of nation-states, and performance measurement.

**38. Sara Steinmetz**

**Democracy Office, USAID Bureau for Policy & Program Coordination  
Washington, DC (01/06/1997 - 01/05/1999)**

Sara Steinmetz served as a Democracy Fellow in the Democracy and Governance Office of USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination. She applied her previous research to policy analysis, focusing on the degree of and potential for democratization in host states. She examined the extent to which basic institutions and fundamentals of a democratic political system and culture exist, the degree to which government is transparent, and the level of NGO participation in the policy-making process. One of Sara's particular interests was the democracy transition in Indonesia, and its relationship to local NGOs. Since completing her Democracy Fellowship, Sara has worked with the USAID Mission in Jakarta, Indonesia, and has continued work on a book on democracy and governance.

Sara has a Ph.D. in international relations/comparative politics/political and economic development, and an M.A. in international relations, from New York University; her B.A. is from the City University of New York. She is interested in public policy analysis, political science research, civil society and democratic initiatives. Sara previously worked with the Carnegie Corporation of N.Y. and with the UN Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.

**39. Mark Thieroff**  
**Tolerance Foundation**  
**Prague, Czech Republic (09/30/1996 - 09/29/1997)**

Mark Thieroff served his fellowship at the Tolerance Foundation, a non-governmental organization based in Prague, Czech Republic. The Tolerance Foundation supports the prevention of human rights abuses through education and public awareness programs. Mark's fellowship concentrated on the Foundation's "Article 8 Project," addressing the citizenship rights of Roma people living in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Some of his specific activities included locating victims of abuse; investigating, verifying and documenting their cases for possible presentation to the Czech courts and/or to the European Commission of Human Rights; identifying local lawyers willing to provide legal assistance on a *pro bono* basis; and networking with other organizations involved in related human and civil rights areas. During his Democracy Fellowship Mark published several important articles on the legal situation affecting ethnic Roma, and helped to prepare a landmark legal case before the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic.

After completing his Democracy Fellowship, Mark decided to attend law school at the University of Minnesota for additional preparation for a career focusing on international human rights. Mark completed his M.A. in international relations at Yale University, and a B.A. in German Language and International Studies at the University of Miami. He has special interests in international human rights, minority issues, transitional and social justice issues, international law, and NGO development.

**40. Gene Ward**  
**Elections Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/01/2000 - 6/1/2003)**

Gene Ward served as a Democracy Fellow with the Elections team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance. The focus of his fellowship was campaign finance, and he developed a handbook on *Money and Politics* for USAID. Gene also provides support to USAID's field missions in the area of elections and campaign finance in particular.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Gene worked on USAID-funded local government and legislative strengthening programs in Indonesia and Angola. Previously, he was elected as a Member of the Hawaii House of Representatives and as a State Delegate to two national conventions. In addition to his work in the field of democracy and governance, Gene is an expert on small business development. He has worked as a consultant on small business development with the United Nations on several occasions, and was part of the U.S. delegation at APEC talks on Small and Medium Enterprise Development. Gene has worked in Bhutan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Vietnam, Kenya, and Malawi. He is proficient in Malay/Indonesian and Vietnamese. Gene holds a Ph.D. in Business Sociology from the University of Hawaii.

**41. Caryn Wilde**  
**USAID Mission**  
**Moscow, Russia (05/01/2001 – 05/13/2005)**

Caryn Wilde served as a Democracy Fellow with USAID's mission in Moscow, Russia. The focus of her fellowship was NGO development across Russia. Her work included analyzing and making recommendations for directing future U.S. assistance to support NGOs that contribute to a participatory civil society. This included providing NGOs working on democracy, business and economic reform, and social sector reform with resources and information relating to strategic planning, NGO board development, fundraising, public relations, organizational restructuring, and staff development and training.

Before becoming a Democracy Fellow, Caryn worked as the principal of an international consulting firm that focused on best business practices for emerging NGOs in the CIS, including transferring and adapting western models to promote sustainable organizational development. Caryn has also done independent consulting projects on women's economic empowerment, rule of law/human rights, independent media, and civil society. She is proficient in the Russian language, and holds a MPA from the University of Minnesota.

**42. Dwayne Woods**  
**Civil Society Team, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance**  
**Washington, DC (09/15/1999 - 08/14/2000)**

Dwayne Woods served his fellowship with the Civil Society Team in USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance in Washington, DC. Dwayne's focus was on measuring the impact of civil society advocacy groups on their governments and societies. During his fellowship, Dwayne assisted the Center with conducting and writing civil society assessments in three countries: Mozambique, Mali, and Kenya. He also helped design and present the civil society team's segment of USAID's Democracy and Governance Training Workshop. Since completing his Democracy Fellowship, Dwayne has returned to his faculty position at Purdue University's Department of Political Science.

Dwayne earned his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago. He has received numerous grants and fellowships, including at the post-doctoral level, in support of his scholarship, and has authored several articles on civil society and labor issues in Italy and African nations. In his academic research, Dwayne has focused on the contributions of labor unions and rural associations to the democratization process in Sub-Saharan Africa. Dwayne is fluent in French and Italian. His interests include civil society, governance, NGOs, comparative politics, and democratic initiatives.

**ATTACHMENT B**



**ATTACHMENT C**

**Democracy Fellow FINAL REPORT**  
**April 2003 – June 2005**

**Professional Goals** (as cited in Program Description)

As a Fellow, I assisted USAID/Kenya in the achievement of their Strategic Objective 6: Sustainable Reforms and Accountable Governance Strengthened to Improve the Balance of Power among the Institutions of Governance. Throughout this endeavor, I also improved my own skills as a field-based development specialist, deepening my understanding of the practical challenges associated with program implementation, and contributing to a growing body of best practices for achieving participatory good governance. More specifically, I:

- Advanced my practical and professional expertise in the promotion of transparency and accountability;
- Improved my technical competency in relation to multi-sectoral approaches to addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic;
- Expanded my range of technical proficiency, with opportunities to pursue pioneering and creative approaches to encourage partnerships between citizens and government;
- Applied and assessed theoretical models and academically-grounded approaches to foster democratic political development and institution building in a transition environment;
- Broadened my exposure to, and contacts with, experts on Kenya, African development, good governance, and civil society strengthening; and
- Deepened my understanding of the Kenyan political, economic, social, and cultural contexts.

**General Description of Fellowship**

The Democracy Fellows Program provided me with very rewarding opportunities to work with the USAID/Kenya Mission, Kenyan CSOs, and Kenyan government counterparts. The Kenya specific context, however, presented a series of challenges to the success of the USAID/Kenya Democracy and Governance program, while the Government of Kenya (GOK) progress on anti-corruption and good governance wavered throughout the Fellowship. Of the four Fellowship Objectives that guided my assistance to the USAID/Kenya DG team, I focused the majority of my efforts on Objectives #1 and #2: overall support to the achievement of the Democracy and Governance SO; and specialized support to the anti-corruption portfolio. While the GOK may not have advanced the good governance agenda as far as projected, I was able to play a critical role in the support that USAID provided to several key anti-corruption entities and to the innovative multi-donor engagement with the first Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in Kenya – the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector Reform Programme. Conversely, Objective #3 – improving the multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS – proved to be problematic as a multi-sectoral response requires the sustained participation of multiple sectors. However, with the attention of the Mission's health team focused on

planning and implementing the new (and monetarily overshadowing) Presidential Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the promotion of synergies between our programs was episodic at best. Nonetheless, as a revised AIDS Bill is presently being prepared for presentation to Parliament, there is renewed interest in collaboration between the DG and health teams. Finally, Objective #4 addressing the monitoring and evaluation of the USAID anti-corruption portfolio was a moving target throughout the Fellowship period since USAID performance was dependent upon GOK performance. As the need for continued pressure on the GOK to move forward with a reform agenda became increasingly apparent, my final efforts as a Fellow concentrated on re-programming towards the non-governmental sector a portion of the support that had originally been slated for GOK anti-corruption programs. Over the next few years, USAID/Kenya anticipates fostering a new cadre of civil society leaders to advance the cause of transparency and accountability in Kenya.

### **Progress and Challenges Combating Corruption**

Following the installation of the NARC Administration with its pledge of rooting out corruption, USAID support to the GOK expanded to include the new Department of Governance and Ethics (DGE) within the Office of the President and the Department of Public Prosecutions' (DPP) specialized unit on anti-corruption, economic crimes, and serious fraud. Both the DGE and the DPP are participating institutions in the GOK's Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme. As a Fellow, the majority of my efforts were devoted to assisting the DGE and to coordinating development partner support to GOK anti-corruption efforts through the GJLOS Reform Programme.

USAID support to the DGE enabled the Department to become one of the most prominent actors in GJLOS. The DGE quickly asserted itself as the leading anti-corruption body of the GOK, filling a vacuum created by long delays in appointing and approving key staff for the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). In collaboration with the Kenya chapter of Transparency International (TI/Kenya – also a USAID/Kenya grantee), the DGE hosted an international experts meeting in October 2004 on the challenges that “new governments” face when tackling corruption following a political transition. At a time when counter-reformers within the GOK were exerting pressure to slow the progress of anti-corruption investigations, the conference helped maintain public support for anti-corruption programs and reinforced the need for high-level political commitment if an anti-corruption program is to succeed.

Unfortunately, by the end of the Fellowship, USAID's key GOK partner – the Department of Governance and Ethics – had ceased to function following the resignation in February 2005 of the John Githongo, the Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics. One of the lead Kenyan civil society anti-corruption champions, Gladwell Otieno, the Director of TI/Kenya, was also forced to resign by a pro-government board of directors in April. Finally, Philip Mugor, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the third key reformer that USAID had identified for support in the anti-corruption arena, was fired in May. USAID/Kenya interprets these events as evidence of having supported

the most dynamic, and, therefore, controversial, advocates for the promotion of good governance and improved transparency and accountability.

Following the resignation John Githongo and the subsequent inactivity of the DGE, the GOK's commitment to anti-corruption reform has been increasingly questioned. A replacement PS has not been named, most of the activities of the DGE were either abandoned or transferred, and the Thematic Group on Ethics, Integrity, and Anti-Corruption has been inactive. The approval of the Medium Term Strategy (MTS) for the GJLOS Reform Program was delayed, largely due to demands from civil society and development partners for a more explicit focus on anti-corruption in the strategy logframe and anticipated results. The MTS has now been approved by both the GOK and the development partners, while the KACC, which has finally put in place its core technical staff, will begin to chair the Thematic Group on Ethics, Integrity and Anti-Corruption. It seems that the DGE has ceased to play any substantive role in the GOK's anti-corruption efforts, while some of the DGE's activities such as the creation of a Public Complaints Unit/Ombudsman and an Asset Restitution Unit, lie dormant.

A focus on anti-corruption also dominated the Consultative Group meetings in April 2005. Responding to accusations that the NARC Administration was not fulfilling its pledge to combat corruption, the GOK prepared a draft anti-corruption Action Plan, outlining the steps to be taken over the next 12 months. The Action Plan has not yet been finalized. While the draft identified critical reform efforts, such as procurement reform, it did not articulate clear roles or responsibilities for the actual implementation of any new policies or legislation.

As there are fewer opportunities for the USG to strengthen or assist GOK institutions engaged in combating corruption, USAID intends instead to focus greater attention on strengthening civil society groups demanding increased GOK accountability and transparency, as well as on non-governmental watchdog groups. With a recently passed Financial Management Act, for example, and a pending Procurement Reform Bill soon to be debated in Parliament, new opportunities for CSOs to monitor GOK performance are on the horizon. Similarly, the launch in 2004 of a Constituency Development Fund that is distributed through the National Assembly has presented yet another avenue for CSOs to track national budget expenditures and service delivery.

### **Fellowship Objectives: Progress and Impact**

**[NB: details focused on period covering 01 October, 2004 – 14 June, 2005]**

Objective 1: Support the achievement of the DG SO6 "Sustainable Reforms and Accountable Governance Strengthened to Improve the Balance of Power among the Institutions of Governance"

#### Activities:

- Developed strong working relationships with DG team members.
- Collaborated regularly with other USAID/Kenya SO teams.

- Dialogued with US Embassy colleagues.
- Increased USAID/Kenya coordination and information sharing with USAID/REDSO.
- Developed working relationships with USAID implementing partners, the Kenyan NGO community, GOK counterparts, and other donors.
- Provided USAID/Kenya with written or oral summaries of meetings or conferences attended, along with and copies of distributed materials. Shared relevant information gained through reading, interviews, and personal contacts as appropriate.
- Provided substantial technical guidance to the Ministry of Finance in preparing the GOK's first Concept Paper in application to the USG Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program Concept Paper.
- Participated in design and financing meetings for Kenya's participation in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
- Participated in Parliamentary post-budget workshop for Committee Chairs (follow-on to "pre-budget" workshop); liaised with Parliamentary Investment and Accounts Committees' members (two principle oversight committees of Parliament).
- Provided technical input to Advisory Team to the Joint Review Meetings of the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector Short Term Priorities Programme.
- Participated in both the first and second Joint Review Meetings of the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector (GJLOS) Short Term Priorities Programme
- Participated in both the first and second Stakeholders Meetings for the development of the GJLOS Medium Term Strategy.
- Critiqued the new Africa Bureau Strategic Framework document, including extensive consultation with REDSO and SFO colleagues and feedback to USAID/W.
- Participated in DG Team and USAID/Kenya Mission-wide retreats.
- Completed two one-week trainings in Acquisition (contracts) and Assistance (Grants and Cooperative Agreements) to become certified as a Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO).
- Consulted with both USAID/Kenya and DCHA/DG colleagues in Washington to design an expanded civil society strengthening and sub-grants program.
- Attended WL Democracy Fellows Retreat.

Results:

- Led DG Team discussion considering shift from direct grant management to the creation of an umbrella arrangement to provide capacity building services and to manage sub-grants to local CSOs [see attached action memo and decision matrix].
- Prepared Program Description for \$2.5M Civil Society Strengthening and Sub-Grants Program to be implanted through a Leader With Associates Cooperative Agreement [*not attached due to procurement sensitivity*]

- Extensive consultation and commentary (along with other development partners) resulted in version VI of the GJLOS Medium Term Strategy (MTS). The MTS has been endorsed by the GOK, civil society, and development partners, paving the way for next four years of funding and implementation [see attached USAID GJLOS briefer, USAID comments on the MTS v.2, and Joint Development Partner comments on the MTS v.3].
- After consultation with USAID/REDSO, USAID/Kenya cleared for approval the Regional Integrity Program focused on reducing corruption in the transport sector along the Northern Corridor.
- Kenya remains eligible for the MCA Threshold Program after submitting and initial concept paper.
- Completed required CTO courses and obtained USAID CTO certification.

**Objective 2: Design and coordinate USAID/Kenya's anti-corruption portfolio**

**Activities:**

- Assessed and evaluated the existing transparency and accountability policies and activities of the GOK.
- Exchanged information with local NGOs and other donors regarding anti-corruption programming, e.g., Transparency International-Kenya, Center for Governance and Development, UK's Department for International Development (DFID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the European Union (EU).
- Served as the principal communication channel between USAID/Kenya and the GOK Department of Governance and Ethics (DGE).
- Attended GOK meetings of Thematic Group #1 (Ethics, Integrity, and Anti-Corruption) of the GJLOS, reported progress to the bilateral donors, and advised USAID on challenges and opportunities for engaging further directly with the GOK on fighting corruption.
- Provided extensive technical assistance to the Advocates Complaints Commission in designing and refining a strategic plan and associated funding proposal for training and capacity building.
- Participated in DCHA/DG stakeholders' workshop to design an assessment framework to apply the Agency Anti-Corruption Strategy.

**Results:**

- Completed program design, in collaboration with the DGE, for the national Asset Restitution Unit, the baseline survey for National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee, and the Scope of Work for the DGE e-government launch.
- Advanced development partner harmonization by completing matrix of ongoing and proposed donor support to the GOK's efforts to combat corruption, including commitments to the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission [see attached letter to the KACC and Development Partner Support Matrix].

- Completed technical assistance to the Advocates Complaints Commission to prepare and present a two-year funding proposal to the GJLOS basket-fund. The proposal was approved and implementation has begun.

Objective 3: Improve USAID-sponsored multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS in Kenya

Activities:

- Coordinated and integrated USAID-sponsored programs in both HIV/AIDS and democracy and governance.
- Facilitated dialogue, alliances, and activities among donors, NGOs, and the GOK, focusing on good governance and HIV/AIDS.
- Participated in GOK Office of the President brainstorming sessions to consider options for linking HIV/AIDS awareness/prevention/care/treatment concerns with good governance initiatives throughout the Executive branch.

Results:

- Formalization of the involvement of the USAID/Kenya Office of Population and Health (OPH) team in the USAID-sponsored Legislative Strengthening Program, particularly in the area of HIV/AIDS. The second phase of the USG assistance to the Kenyan National Assembly includes jointly funded activities involving the provision of technical expertise on HIV/AIDS (e.g., awareness and prevention, analysis of national budget impact and issues, and human rights implications), as well as specific performance targets linked directly to the OPH Intermediate Results.

Objective 4: Develop and implement performance methodologies and indicators (qualitative and quantitative) to measure program impact of USAID anti-corruption portfolio

Activities:

- Proposed and refined draft indicators.

Results:

- Prepared anti-corruption elements of USAID/Kenya Annual Report.
- Completed separate reporting requirements for the Africa Bureau Anti-Corruption Initiative [see attached ACI Reporting for FY 2003 funds, Success Story, and Milestones Update].
- Suggested indicators to the ACC for the M&E of their GLJOS-supported activities.
- Reviewed and critiqued draft indicators for anti-corruption and good governance elements of the GJLOS.

**ACTION MEMORANDUM TO THE OFFICE CHIEF,  
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, USAID/KENYA**

From: Kevin Bohrer, DG Officer

Subject: Award of Civil Society Strengthening Leader With Associate Cooperative Agreement under SO#006: Sustainable Reforms and Accountable Governance Strengthened to Improve Balance of Power Among the Institutions of Governance

Date:

**I. Action:**

You are requested to approve this Action Memorandum and sign the attached MAARD to authorize the Contracting Officer to award a Civil Society Strengthening Leader With Associate cooperative agreement to [XXX] for an initial three year program.

**II. Background and Discussion:**

Since 1996, USAID/Kenya has been supporting Kenyan civil society through a small grants program (averaging \$100,000 - \$200,000 per CSO for 15-18 month grants). This support to civil society constituted the core of the USAID/Kenya Democracy and Governance program until the election of the NARC government in December 2002. As KANU exerted Executive branch dominance prior to these elections, the direct engagement of the USAID Democracy and Governance program with GOK institutions was limited to the Parliament and the Electoral Commission. Beginning in 2003, however, while the fundamental DG strategy remained intact, USAID/Kenya began working directly with additional GOK institutions, particularly those involved in the promotion of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, including the Department of Public Prosecutions, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Department of Governance and Ethics. Working with new partners within the GOK has increased significantly the workload for the DG team. At the same time, USAID/Kenya is about to launch a political parties strengthening program, which will further increase the team's responsibilities.

To date, the DG team has managed directly all of its grants to civil society. However, given the increased workload for USAID/Kenya associated with the expansion of direct GOK engagement, the launch of a sub-grants program through a single Cooperative Agreement Recipient will ensure that Kenyan CSOs continue to receive USAID Kenya financial support as well benefit from a more comprehensive training and capacity building component. USAID/Kenya anticipates that, by working through the Recipient, the Mission will be able to extend support to new and emergent CSOs that would

otherwise not be eligible to receive direct USG funding. USAID/Kenya also anticipates that a single award to the Recipient will yield a more efficient means of channeling support to CSOs. [See attached table summarizing the DG Team's Consideration of Continuing to Award and Administer Individual Grants to CSOs

v. Engaging an Umbrella Mechanism to Implement a Sub-Grants Program.]

The Recipient will manage and oversee a sub-grants program for national-level Kenyan CSOs. Through the Recipient, USAID/Kenya support to civil society will be extended to organizations that are registered as NGOs or Associations, as well as to other non-state actors in the civil society arena such as research institutes, think tanks, religious organizations, unions, and other not-for-profit issue-based groups.

The first round of sub-grants, to be awarded in 2005, will support CSOs proposing to achieve positive policy change and improve national discourse, including the monitoring of GOK progress, on the following issues: the GOK's "zero tolerance" anti-corruption programs; transparency in GOK budgeting; procurement reform; whistleblower protection; greater access to information; economic reforms; judicial reforms; and gender inclusion.

The Recipient will also coordinate and implement a training and capacity building component to strengthen CSOs' management, administrative, and technical skills.

The annual number of sub-grants will depend upon the proposed budgets of the sub-grantees, but approximately 7-10 sub-grants per year are envisioned. Of the initial amount, \$[XXX] will be reserved for the training and capacity building elements of the program. An additional \$[XXX] may be available each year throughout the life of the program.

**III. Funds Availability:**

A total of \$[XXX], consisting of \$[XXX] in FY 03/04/05 ESF funds, \$[XXX] in FY 04 Anti-Corruption Initiative DA funds, and \$[XXX] in regular FY 05 DA, is currently available to fund this cooperative agreement.

**IV. Authority:**

Pursuant to ADS 103.3.8 and ADS 103.3.11.1, AFR Mission Directors have the authority to implement approved strategic, special and support objective grants and contracts including the authority to approve other implementing documents in connection therewith. The Mission Order on Delegation of Authority re-delegates this to Direct Hire Office Chiefs. Therefore, you have the authority to approve this Action Memorandum and to sign the attached MAARD to authorize the Regional Contracting Officer to award this cooperative agreement.

**Summary of DG Team's Consideration of:  
Continuing to Award and Administer Individual Grants to CSOs**

v.

**Engaging an Umbrella Mechanism to Implement a Sub-Grants Program**

Individual Grants		Umbrella Mechanism	
Pro	Con	Pro	Con
Current relationships with grantees are very positive / we know the grantees by managing them	Very management intensive / less time for CTOs to concentrate on grantees' programs / less time for CTOs to focus on the substance of their technical backstop	Less management intensive / more time for DG staff to know the technical aspects of grantees' programs / more time for DG staff to do the substantive (and more interesting) work we were hired to do	Distance from grantees / Umbrella is intermediary for daily interaction
The RFA review process informs DG team of current trends and thinking in civil society		DG team can still participate in grant application review and selection	
We would save money by continuing to manage grants directly / we could award more grants		We can afford this now with 1.75 M available for civil society support	Costs – Overhead and pass-through fees reduce amount avail for grants How many grants would we be able to support?
What changed? The DG team decided against an umbrella in 2000, so what is different now? We don't have more grants – or money for civil society – than we did before, so we have the time for direct grant management / GOK management burden will reduce in 1-2 years (????)		Although the fundamental DG strategy is the same, our partners have expanded. New work directly with GOK is very management intensive (e.g., DPP) – a lot of new time and energy in these relations. We are also adding a new political party strengthening program, and, with the approaching 2007 elections, we will	

		<p>only have more work, not less. Regarding funding, by reprogramming our ESF, we actually do have more money than before for civil society support, and we would be expanding the number of grantees. Also, the potential Umbrella organizations are already present in Nairobi, so start-up costs would be reduced from previous assessments.</p>	
<p>Mortgage: what is the sustainability of engaging a 3<sup>rd</sup> party to manage our grants?</p>		<p>No mortgage / we have enough funding to establish at least a two year relationship – extensions could be possible, but not required</p>	
<p>Kenyan civil society is sophisticated – they do not want to be controlled</p>		<p>For sub-grants, the umbrella is a pass-through, not a control, especially since DG team can participate in tech reviews / Umbrella can hire local staff, who can provide training and support to CSOs as they request it.</p>	
<p>CTOs are engaged &amp; busy &amp; responsible</p>		<p>Yes, and having an umbrella would allow everyone to do more of the real technical work we were hired to do.</p>	
	<p>FY 05: Approximately 7-10</p>	<p>1 contracting action for grants and</p>	

	contracting actions for grants; 1 contracting action for training	training
	FY 06: If DA restored, another RFA and 5 (?) new contracting actions.	No RFA and no contracting action in FY 06. Umbrella could absorb additional funding and offer additional grants.
	RFA will take long to compete and complete	Buying into mechanism will be faster
	If we do a separate assessment first to inform the RFA, this will take even longer	Assessment could be the first task of the Umbrella / Umbrella could also do a needs assessment of grantees after awards are made
	Pipeline problems	Only one pipeline to monitor and manage / money would not be lost if grantee does not spend it (reprogram through Umbrella)
		Flexible: 1) would allow for future DG funding to be programmed without additional competition or contracting actions; 2) could promote synergies with other SOs (thematically and with funding contributions); 3) would allow USAID to work with new partners that are too small, financial unsophisticated, or not registered.

		M&E – Umbrella could be tasked with conducting CSO evaluations (e.g., advocacy scale, or strength/sustainability index, or whatever we want) and compiling data for AR	
		Entity with knowledge of grantee needs will be able to supply training and capacity building	
		Umbrella prime brings additional experience and technical expertise of “subs” or “associates” that can be drawn upon to assist the grantees	

## **Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme**

GJLOS is a Government of Kenya sector-wide reform programme to promote effectiveness, accessibility, accountability, and efficiency in the delivery of justice and the rule of law in Kenya.

Under the GJLOS Reform Programme, GOK institutions are grouped to address sector constraints through seven Key Result Areas, each convened by a GOK official, namely:

<b>Key Result Area</b>	<b>Convener</b>	<b>Dev. Partner Rep.</b>
Ethics, Integrity, & Anti-corruption	PS Governance & Ethics	USAID/CIDA
Democracy, Human Rights, & Rule of Law	Chair KNCHR	SIDA
Justice, Law, & Order	Registrar of High Court	UNDP/DFID
Public Safety & Security	PS Provincial Admin.	DFID
Constitutional Development	Chair Kenya LRC	CIDA
Quality Legal Services	Solicitor General	WB/SIDA
Leadership & Change Management	PS MoJCA	GTZ/SIDA

### **Goal**

Improve the quality of life for the people of Kenya, especially the poor and vulnerable.

### **Vision**

Ensure a safe, secure, democratic, just, corruption free, and prosperous Kenya for all.

### **Mission**

Transform and strengthen sector institutions for efficient, accountable, and transparent administration of justice.

### **Duration**

GJLOS is a five-year program. It was launched through a Short Term Priorities Programme (STPP), running November 2003 – June 2005. A follow-on Medium Term Plan is being reviewed and finalized; it will carry the GJLOS program through June 2009.

### **Participating Agencies**

GJLOS currently involves 32 GOK departments and agencies. As a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), these departments and agencies are drawn from: The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs; The Ministry of Home Affairs; The Office of the President; The Attorney General's Office; and The Judiciary.

GJLOS also includes several Commissions: The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission; The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights; and The Law Reform Commission.

Relevant **Civil Society Organizations** and the **Private Sector** are also key to the process. Both civil society and the private sector have been involved in the planning stages of GJLOS; modalities for their participation in implementation are still being developed.

### **Development Partners**

Seventeen development partners have united to support the programme. They have all signed a Joint Statement of Intent that commits signatories to coordination, information sharing, and joint semi-annual reviews. Development partner monthly meetings are convened through the LIMID-T sub-group on Legal Sector Reform. The Legal Sector Reform Group is co-chaired by SIDA and World Bank. USAID is the Deputy Chair.

### **Funding**

The GJLOS Reform Programme is jointly funded by the GOK and International Development Partners. Development partners have committed approximately Ksh.2.5 billion to support the initial STTP portion of GJLOS. Some development partners have pooled their resources in a Basket Fund. Others are providing support directly to GOK agencies participating in GJLOS. The Basket Fund is managed by KPMG, an internationally recognized Financial Management Agent (FMA), and amounts to over Ksh 1.5 billion for the STTP through June 2005. The FMA is responsible for the procurement of all basket-funded commodities and services. Non-basket development partner support is currently pledged at Ksh 1 million for this same period.

#### *Basket*

Austria, Canada (CIDA), Denmark, Finland, Germany (GTZ), Netherlands, Norway, Sweden (SIDA), UK (DFID)

#### *Non-basket*

Italy, EU, Germany (GTZ), UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, UNODC, USAID, World Bank

### **Programme Coordination Office (PCO)**

The GJLOS Reform Programme is coordinated by the Programme Coordination Office under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Funded through the Basket Fund, the PCO consists of a Chief Technical Coordinator, a Strategic Planning and Budgeting Specialist, an Information and Communications Specialist, and a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, along with a one GOK Liaison Specialist provided by the MOJCA. The PCO is presently revising the Medium Term Plan and will provide leadership throughout the implementation process.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

An Advisory Team is currently preparing a common set of indicators, along with baselines and targets, to track GJLOS progress.

### **USG contribution to GJLOS**

To date, USAID has pledged the following:

Department of Public Prosecutions – \$622,500

Department of Governance and Ethics – \$750,000

Furthermore, to ensure coordination with the other development partners, USAID regularly attends the Legal Sector Reform Group meetings. USAID is the development partner representative to the Key Result Area of Ethics, Integrity, and Anti-Corruption, and also participates in Key Result Areas of Justice, Law, and Order and Leadership and Change Management.

K Bohrer, 13 Jan 2005

## Comments on MTS v.2

p.1 Intro	How does the MTS contribute to the creation of a nation-wide “private culture that respects integrity, justice, human rights and the rule of law”?
p. 13 discrimination related to gender	“Over 50% of the Kenyan population...” what does this have to do with gender?
	[the following comments address a concern that “governance” broadly – good governance, which includes fighting corruption – gets lost later in the document. It is highlighted in the early text, especially in references to the ERS (e.g., p.7 “governance theme” including “ethical participatory governance”), but as we move to KRAs we focus a lot on management (and internal processes) of institutions (perhaps with the hope that better managed institutions give us good governance, although that may not necessarily happen). Do we need to retain “governance” in the visions, missions, purposes, themes, etc... to ensure that we don’t lose sight of it?
p. 19 Section 2.2	Vision of GJLO as a sector: “a safe, secure, just and prosperous Kenya for all” – what happened to “democratic” and “corruption free” – these were included in the vision previously (e.g., see GJLOS folder from Mombasa Review Meetings). Also, how does this vision coincide with the MOJCA vision of “a just, democratic, corruption-free and prosperous Kenya”?
p. 19 Section 2.2	Mission: “to reform and strengthen sector institutions for efficient, accountable and transparent administration of justice” – how does this relate to the MTS “programme purpose” of “improved delivery of Justice, Safety and Security and Human Rights”? Seems like to we have too many, and overlapping, layers of GJLOS v. MTS vision v. mission v. purpose.
pp. 6,7 v. p. 19,24	The earlier text emphasizes: “without governance, justice, safety and security, there is no government” (p.6); and “ethical, participatory governance” (p.7), but governance is later lost (p.24). We end up just with just improved delivery.
p. 19 shared values	Shouldn’t there be a value about involving citizens? Embracing the demand side of need to reform?
p. 20,21	“Increased openness, transparency, and accountability.” “it is necessary to carefully oversee the manner in which GJLOS institutions...”, “independent external oversight bodies...” Where does this oversight fit into the KRAs? Is it captured in the MTS? On p. 21, “initiatives that seek to increase accountability, transparency and independent oversight of

	GJLOS institutions..." are assigned to Priority 1. That's great, but, again, how do oversight bodies -- especially independent (and also including non-governmental?) fit into the MTS?
p.25 OVIs	[Corruption specific] -- do we also care if grand corruption is reduced? This wouldn't be captured under a specific institution b/c the KBI measures citizens' interactions with the institutions. Nor would we capture corruption in procurement throughout the system, again b/c most citizens would not encounter this directly (except for vendors).
p. 27 KRA 2	[general comment about corruption] -- as constituted, this KRA will address prevention much more than enforcement or restitution. Maybe that's okay since this is a broad institutional reform program, mostly targeting the processes.  Will the TG's have the option of also establishing OVIs around their respective themes? TG1, for example, could have more corruption related indicators. Although we don't want too many indicators, and too much of an M&E burden, would TG-specific indicators help maintain the bonds that have held the TGs together by providing common rallying points to which all participating GOK units contribute?
p. 31 KRA 5	Sub-indicator #2: This might not apply to all participating institutions. Some GJLOS institutions do not have community-level programs. Maybe that's okay.
p. 33 Risk Management	Result 2 -- Assumption: "those institutions which should be independent are independent" -- does this include financial independence? E.g. the KNHRC -- will they become their own accounting officer?
p. 35 diagram	1) To be honest, non-basket donors also interact directly with individual GJLOS institutions (see also diagram, p. 39, unless development partners are included in NSAs). 2) Thematic Groups are not "for" Key Result Areas This brings up the bigger issue of how TGs will interact/relate to the KRAs. This will need to be clearly articulated so that participating institutions understand how they contribute to the OVIs, while also participating in TGs.
p. 36 Thematic Groups	(same as above) "These TGs have the role...in their respective Key Thematic Areas (KTAs)..." So are there still target outputs and outcomes in each KTA? Are these based on each participating institution's workplan? [Also, NB: it is very confusing now to have KTAs and KRAs]
p. 37 Thematic Groups	Question: Is this one incorrect? Are TG conveners still responsible for achieving KRAs, which are different from the KTAs? E.g., "The convener of each TG...mandated to lead in the achievement of the target outputs and outcomes in that key result area." How could that be? Won't conveners of TGs will

	be contributing to many/all KRAs?
p. 40 diagram	This makes my head spin – is this really the planning and management cycle?!
p. 43 Summary Cost Estimates	How could this possibly have been calculated? A single institution might contribute to all KRAs. Was a portion of each institution budget estimated to contribute to each of the different KRAs? This makes no sense to me.
Annex 5 – 2.4 Roles and Responsibilities	Thematic Working Groups – “critically reflect on progress towards achieving outputs related to their specific theme” – this role needs to be VERY CLEARLY described for the conveners and members, especially as it differs from the OVIs of the KRAs.
Annex 6 – 1.c.	Update Stakeholders – is this where Parliament comes in? Review meetings very clearly raised the need to include Parliament in outreach/education efforts.
Annex 6 – 2.A.	Audience groups – again, Parliament – are they included in “iv. Political entity/policy makers”? If so, let’s go ahead and identify them.
Annex 7	Corrections: National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee Governance and Ethics/OP

06.06.05

**GOVERNANCE, JUSTICE, LAW AND ORDER SECTOR REFORM  
PROGRAMME (GJLOS)  
MEDIUM TERM STRATEGY 2005/2006 – 2008/09: VERSION 3  
JOINT DEVELOPMENT PARTNER COMMENTS**

We congratulate the Government of Kenya (GoK) on the production of the Medium Term Strategy, version 3 (MTS 3). The GJLOS Development Partners are pleased to see a significantly strengthened document, especially in the areas of reform orientation, mention of the integration of GJLOS within the Government of Kenya's annual budget process and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and strengthening of the performance indicators. Many Development Partners are ready to support GJLOS MTS; however, challenges remain to be resolved before a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) for GJLOS is a reality. Some of these concerns were also raised at the recent GJLOS Second Programme Review held in Mombasa on 18-20 May 2005. In particular, the following need to be addressed:

- The GJLOS MTS3 as currently formulated is not yet a SWAp but rather a step towards a SWAp as it is not fully aligned and integrated with GoK mainstream planning, financial, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation processes, including the MTEF;
- The GoK needs a clear policy statement for the sector that will prioritize GJLOS outcomes and thus will guide the prioritisation of workplan activities;
- There is a need to strengthen the log frame and performance indicators; and
- In the longer term, work towards implementing the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to which both the GoK and the Development Partners have agreed.

**The MTS3 is a significant step on the journey towards a full-fledged SWAp**

There is some confusion about the meaning of a sector-wide approach or a SWAp. The GoK has enabled the various departments and institutions working within the justice sector to coordinate and avoid bottlenecks. However, a SWAp is more than coordination; it is about developing a single GoK-led sector policy and expenditure program, which Development Partners can then support. GJLOS as it currently stands is not yet a full-fledged SWAp but a programme moving towards a SWAp. Nonetheless, the GoK has made significant progress: government is in the lead and there is a coordinated approach to justice. In the short term, the GoK needs to develop policy priorities across the GJLOS. Indicators of progress towards relying on the GoK's financial management and procurement procedures could be developed throughout the course of the MTS. To become a full-fledged SWAp, another key factor will be the demonstrated commitment from GoK employees for whom GJLOS reform is currently an "add on" to their core functions, and not a new way of working. We recognize that this attitudinal change will take time.

In the longer term, there is a need to locate the GJLOS MTS within the purview of a **comprehensive GoK governance framework** that involves full participation of all line Ministries as well as the Ministries of Finance and Planning. Such a framework would be situated between the ERS and the GJLOS MTS, articulating governance issues relevant across government functions, not just to GJLOS departments and institutions.

### **Policy prioritisation**

The MTS is an excellent opportunity for the GoK to set out its coherent reform agenda and prioritised activities across the sector, addressing in a programmatic (rather than institutional) manner the systemic issues facing the sector. A SWAp has the potential to drive reform forward through two interlinked mechanisms –

- Setting challenging but **specific and limited** outcomes for the sector, with indicators and targets (which will be the highest level indicators in the log frame); and
- Identifying a **prioritised and costed** programme of activities clearly linked to the policy priorities.

Prioritisation should include consideration of key issues identified in the previous reviews. We congratulate the GoK on taking into account stakeholder input and highlighting anti-corruption as a Key Result Area. This is also consistent with the GoK's National Anti-Corruption Action Plan. As the review team recommends, the MTS should articulate the key outcomes of the programme. We understand that there has been progress on this issue and that these priorities will be clarified in MTS 4.

### **The MTS should focus on pro-reform allocation of GoK resources to the sector through the MTEF / budget allocation process**

The budget and the MTEF are currently the GoK's processes for determining significant allocations of resources to and across the sector. The GoK's contribution to the sector far outweighs that of Development Partners, and the allocation of these resources has the potential to be an effective driver for reform (both through the allocation of resources to the sector, and the re-allocation of resources within the sector).

To address resource allocation issues, the following points should be addressed over the course of MTS implementation:

- First, all GJLOS departments and institutions need to identify and deal with recurrent expenditure issues in the sector. As it stands, the budgets are confined to development expenditure only;
- Second, the GJLOS departments and institutions need to address the scope for efficiency savings within the sector. International SWAp experience shows this can be a powerful driver of reform. The PER process has already identified some efficiency savings issues - better use of prison farms, and enhanced collection of court fines and fees:

- Third, the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order sector needs to be positioned as an MTEF sector, or at least as a recognised sub-sector. MTS3 acknowledges the need to strengthen coordination with the MTEF process, including through becoming a member of the budget working group. The departments and institutions in the GJLOS do not entirely coincide with the PSLO working group institutions and this is detrimental to the programme. The issue should be addressed with the Ministry of Finance. Ideally, the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order sector will replace the PSLO sector. GJLOS departments and institutions must *comprise* the budget working group, rather than merely being *represented* in the group. It is recognised that this ideal state of affairs is likely to be a process; and
- Fourth, recognising that integration with the GoK's resource allocation processes is likely to be a process, the MTS could provide a plan towards this integration. Possible ways forward, apart from securing Ministry of Finance agreement that Governance, Justice, Law, and Orders sector is an MTEF sector, could include, for example: joint / sectoral budget submissions to the Ministry of Finance; and securing agreement of the Ministry of Finance that efficiency savings realised in the sector can be retained and re-allocated across the sector.

### **The log frame and performance indicators require further strengthening**

It is important to get the log frame right because it is the key tool for monitoring and evaluating the impact of the programme. As requested by the GoK, we are attaching some suggestions that could be included in the MTS4 log frame. Performance indicators for all key GJLOS areas that the GoK has identified as priorities need to be included in the log frame. In inclusion of a key result area focused on anti-corruption, for example, is a welcomed addition to the log frame. It is also suggested that achieving the alignment of the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order sector with the MTEF resource allocation schema should be a key performance indicator in relation to result 6 – effective management of the GJLOS programme. Similarly, the key upper-level indicators from the Financial and Legal Sector Technical Assistance Programme (FLSTAP) should be included to ensure that the FLSTAP is fully integrated with GJLOS.

### **Partnership commitments under the Paris Declaration**

The GOK and the majority of GJLOS Development Partners (both basket and earmarked) committed to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness on 2<sup>nd</sup> of March of this year. The Declaration calls upon all of us to harmonize and align aid delivery and to accelerate the pace of change by implementing, in a spirit of mutual accountability, the Partnership Commitments and to measure progress against 12 specific indicators. We will forward these indicators separately to the PCO and the Advisory Team, so that the progress of GJLOS towards these commitments can be realised and measured. A reasonable timeframe may be to begin consideration of these commitments by the next programme review.

Justice Aaron Ringera  
Director, Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission  
Integrity Centre  
Valley Road / Milimani Road Junction  
PO Box 61130  
00200, Nairobi

RE: Development Partner Support for the KACC

Dear Justice Ringera,

The Development Partners committed to supporting the Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme would like to congratulate you on your appointment and the steps you are taking to institutionalize and develop the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. We recognize that there are multiple GOK institutions and bodies dedicated to fighting corruption in Kenya and that the KACC will play a critical role in advancing the GJLOS commitment to transparency and accountability.

This letter and attachments are intended to provide a brief overview of the Development Partners' current and planned support to the anti-corruption elements of the GJLOS reforms, to indicate how the KACC may access financial and technical assistance through the GJLOS programme, and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Program Coordination Office (PCO), the Financial Management Agent (FMA), and the Thematic Groups and their conveners. [Attachments: Current and Planned Development Partners support for Anti-Corruption elements of GJLOS; TORs for PCO, FMA, and Thematic Groups]

Please note that among the seventeen Development Partners who have signed the Joint Statement of Intent (JSI) in support of the GJLOS programme, some partners have contributed towards the formation of a basket fund while others are engaged in bilateral agreements with the GOK departments and agencies implementing the GJLOS. Some Development Partners are providing funding both through the basket and also through separate agreements. Financing for basket-supported activities is arranged through the FMA (using the GJLOS Procurement Guidelines), while non-basket Development Partners enter into direct funding arrangements with GOK departments and agencies. [Attachments: JSI, GJLOS Procurement Guidelines]

Several Development Partners are keen to support the KACC (see attached table). However, to avoid confusion and redundancy at this early stage, we have decided not to engage in any new individual financial and/or technical support agreements with the KACC until the KACC has had the opportunity to consider and articulate its needs through a strategic plan. The strategic plan will assist the Development Partners in better understanding the KACC's priorities and will allow us to respond to KACC's assistance requests in a consolidated and coordinated manner, thus promoting necessary synergies and avoiding possible overlaps.

We recognize that the KACC was in a transitional stage when the GJLOS programme was launched, and, consequently, only a limited range of KACC activities were included in the Short Term Priorities Programme (STPP) and its corresponding workplans for 2004-2005. The follow-on Medium Term Strategy (MTS), however, is currently being reviewed. The MTS will be finalized by the end of February, with implementation to begin in July. We encourage the KACC to participate fully in the MTS review process, as well as in the preparation of the associated workplans. Although the KACC strategic plan may not be finished by the time the MTS is finalized, we would like to suggest that the KACC, at a minimum, submit to the PCO notional line items for anticipated support needed during the life of the MTS (2005/6 – 2008/9), and in particular, for inclusion in the first year workplans. While the MTS is a broad strategic document, precise activities for each year will be determined in annual workplans and should be consistent with the KACC own strategic vision.

Finally, since the MTS implementation will not begin until July, the Development Partners are ready to offer support to the KACC now for short term, clearly defined, priority actions, such as strategic planning consultations and/or initial start up costs. We would like to reiterate, however, that the Development Partners, all working together, would appreciate receiving any such requests for assistance in a coordinated manner so as to ensure the optimal use of resources and to avoid the duplication of efforts. We would thus suggest that the KACC direct messages and requests for Development Partner assistance to USAID, Donor Representative to Thematic Group #1 on Ethics, Integrity, and Anti-Corruption [Sheryl Stumbras, Democracy and Governance Office Director, USAID, PO Box 30261, Nairobi, 00100 / Tel: 862400 / [sstumbras@usaid.gov](mailto:ssumbras@usaid.gov)].

We look forward to working with you.

Respectfully,

Annika Nordin-Jayawardena  
Embassy of Sweden  
The Lead Donor, Development Partners Legal Sector Reform Coordinating (LSRC)  
Group

CC: PS MoJCA  
PS G&E  
LSRC group members

Development Partner Support for GJLOS Anti-Corruption Efforts  
2004 – 2005/06

**I. By Development Partner**

**Basket Fund**

2004

KSH 26,568,000 – International Anti-Corruption Experts Meetings

KSH 33,533,000 (remaining in STPP)

2005 – Increase % of Basket Fund contribution towards Anti-Corruption (GOK MDAs participating in TG1)

**CIDA**

2004 (ongoing)

KSH 700,000 – National Anti-Corruption Campaign (strategic planning exercise)

2005 (Jan-June)

\$100,000 - \$200,000 (6 - 12 M KSH) (in addition to basket contribution) to anti corruption initiatives. "Notional" commitment only, dependent on development of appropriate requests, proposals, and approval of Project Review Committee.

**DANIDA**

2005

KSH 73,161,831 – Proposed support to KACC

**GTZ**

2004

KSH 3,261,435 (10/03 – 05/04): DGE (Wealth Declaration newspaper campaign, PCU team building/strategy workshop, infrastructure & IT)

KSH 1,087,145 (10/2003 – 01/2004): MOJCA (Harambee Task Force)

KSH 3,261,435 (6-10/2004): DPP (Policy and Delegation Instruments)

2005 (+/-, for Jan-Dec)

KSH 16,307,177 – DGE, Anti-Corruption Campaign, MoJCA and DPP. KACC as well.

**Norway**

US\$ 1 M (7 M Norwegian Kroner) - KACC specifically (Investigation unit) – or – perhaps through the Basket Fund

### **UNDP**

KSH 23,000,000 (09/2004 – 06/2005): KACC – support for training of new staff.

Funded by Denmark (KSH 19,000,000) and UNDP core funds (KSH 4,000,000).

KSH 8,050,000 -- Police - anti-corruption training. The funds go directly to the Police (Thematic Trust Fund – monies from Norway).

We have also indicated to PS for G&E and TI-Kenya that we would be interested in cooperating with them. Although both may have sufficient funding at the moment, something could come up in 2005.

### **UNODC**

KSH 50,312,500 – Judiciary -- “Strengthening the integrity and the capacity of the court system in Kenya” -- period of two years. Model project developed by group of Chief Justices primarily from Africa and Asia under UNODC’s Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC).

KSH 2,213,750 – KACC -- Asset Recovery – conduct an in-depth needs assessment (training and other capacity building measures) of relevant Kenyan authorities, in respect of asset recovery. Experts from UNODC headquarters, Vienna, will undertake assessment.

### **USAID**

2004

KSH 64,400,000 – DGE (Institutionalization, Capacity Building, Communications/Outreach, Baseline survey, PCU)

KSH 50,071,000 – DPP (Anti-Corruption, Economic Crimes, Serious Fraud, Anti-Money Laundering Unit)

2005

KSH 120,750,000 – KACC/DGE (Asset Restitution)

KSH 40,250,000 – KACC

KSH 36,225,000 – ACC

KSH 16,100,000 – EMU

KSH 50,715,000 – DGE (2<sup>nd</sup> year)

KSH 52,325,000 – DPP (2<sup>nd</sup> year)

### **World Bank**

KSH 9,579,500 – National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee. Equipment, training, reports

KSH 21,010,500 – KACC. Capacity building, training, research, M&E, advisory services)

KSH 7,245,000 – Judiciary. Technical advisory service to anti-corruption courts

KSH 4,025,000 – AG/Civil Litigation Dept. Technical advisory services and training

## II. By GJLOS Institution Involved in Anti-Corruption Activities

Institution/ Program	Committed Development Partner – Amount - Description/Dates	Planned/Notional
KACC	Norway – US\$ 1M – Investigation Unit	DANIDA – 5M DKK (2005)
	UNDP – US\$ 306,666 – training new staff	USAID – US\$ 500,000
	World Bank – US\$ 261,000 - Capacity Building (training, research, M&E, advisory services)	USAID – US\$ 1.5 M – KACC/DGE (Asset Restitution) CIDA – (portion of \$100,000 – 200,000) – (by June 2005) GTZ – (portion of EUR 150,000) – (by Dec 2005) UNODC – US\$ 27,500 – Asset Recovery
National Anti- Corruption Campaign	CIDA – KSH 700,000 – strategic planning	GTZ – (portion of EUR 150,000) – (by Dec 2005)
	World Bank – US\$ 119,000 -- Equipment, training, reports	CIDA – (portion of \$100,000 – 200,000) – (by June 2005)
	USAID – US\$ 145,523 (via DGE) – Baseline Survey	USAID – ???
Police	UNDP – US\$ 100,000 – anti-corruption training	
DGE	USAID – US\$ 800,000 – Establishment, Capacity Building, Communications/ Outreach, Baseline survey, PCU	GTZ – (portion of EUR 150,000) – (by Dec 2005)
		UNDP – ???
		USAID – US\$630,000 – (2 <sup>nd</sup> year)
DPP	USAID – US\$ 622,000 – Anti-Corruption Unit	GTZ – (portion of EUR 150,000) – (by Dec 2005)

		USAID – US\$ 650,000 –(2 <sup>nd</sup> year)
Judiciary	World Bank – US\$ 90,000 – Technical advisory service to anti-corruption courts	UNODC – US\$ 625,000 – increased integrity & capacity of court system
AG	World Bank – US\$ 50,000 – Civil Litigation Dept; Technical advisory services and training	
Other		USAID – US\$ 450,000 – ACC USAID – US\$ 200,000 – EMU
???		CIDA – (portion of \$100,000 – 200,000) – (by June 2005)  GTZ – (portion of EUR 150,000) – (by Dec 2005)  UNDP – ???  Japan – ???

## Kenya - ACI FY 2003

### I. Narrative

#### Introduction

The ACI funds were used to support the establishment, strategic planning, institutionalization, and launch of activities for the Department of Governance and Ethics (DGE).<sup>1</sup> The DGE is a new Kenyan institution, responsible for coordinating the GOK's anti-corruption efforts. These initial funds underwrote the costs for both the start up of the DGE and the first year implementation of the DGE's four-year Strategic Plan.

#### Background & Context

With the change of Administrations in January 2003, the Government of Kenya pledged a high level of political will and commitment to the promotion of transparency and accountability. In support of this commitment, USAID/Kenya expanded its DG activities to address the theme of anti-corruption more directly. USAID primarily focuses on assisting the GOK to develop some of its key anti-corruption and rule of law departments/institutions, most notably the DGE, which is led by the Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance who reports directly to the President.

The GOK commitment has been evidenced by its development of a sector-wide approach, referred to as "Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme" [see attached annex for further description of the GJLOS Reform Programme]. As the convener for the GJLOS Thematic Group on Ethics, Integrity, and Anti-Corruption, the DGE is a relevant, motivated, and capable partner for USAID. Discussions of potential USAID support to the DGE began with the creation of the office in early 2003, continued through extensive consultation in early 2004, and resulted in the DGE's Strategic Plan 2004-2007. USAID envisions supporting the DGE for the entire duration of the DGE's strategy, however, funding has currently been committed for only the first year of their strategy.

#### Description of Program

The DGE Strategic Plan details the Department's needs and proposed activities in order to provide effective leadership to the GOK on policies, strategies, and issues of good governance, accountability, transparency, and anti-corruption reform across all GOK institutions. The first year of USAID assistance to the DGE is concentrated in five areas:

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<sup>1</sup> Please Note: USAID/Kenya is reporting on \$750,000 of FY 2003 ACI funds. The time period covered in this reporting, however, spans from the initial approval of funding in July, 2003 to 30 September, 2004, thereby aligning this initiative reporting with the Agency Annual Report for FY 2004. For complete performance data on related non-ACI funded activities, please refer to the forthcoming Annual Report, which will be completed after the submission of this ACI report.

- 1) Provision of a strategic planning and management consultant to help launch the Department's priority activities, prepare annual action plans for the life of the strategy, and develop appropriate monitoring and evaluation plans;
- 2) Internal capacity building and institutionalization the Department, including the core costs for 5 of the DGE's 21 staff members: 2 Law and Policy Development Specialists, 2 Law and Policy Research Assistants, and a Financial and Establishment Advisor;
- 3) Systems analysis for a Public Complaints Unit, design and operationalization of data management system, and launch of a public awareness program;
- 4) Design and launch of communications, outreach, and public relations efforts, including multi-media programs and website; and
- 5) Design and implementation of a baseline survey for the National Anti-Corruption Campaign.

**By the end of the first year of the Strategic Plan, the DGE anticipates that it will have:**

Increased institutional capacity of the DGE; Enhanced public awareness of DGE's functions and programs; Operationalized the Public Complaints Unit; Increased public engagement in anti-corruption and good governance issues; and Established benchmarks, indicators, and targets for measuring progress of the National Anti-Corruption Campaign.

**Coordination with other USAID/Kenya sponsored Anti-Corruption Activities:**

In addition to the DGE, USAID/Kenya's anti-corruption portfolio also includes assistance to other GOK partners as well as ongoing civil society support. In alignment with the GJLOS reform programme, the Mission is funding the new Anti-Corruption, Economic Crime, Serious Fraud, and Asset Forfeiture Unit in the Department of Public Prosecutions. USAID's civil society program also focuses on strengthening the advocacy and public awareness capacity of groups that demand and promote increased transparency and accountability, most notably the Kenya chapter of Transparency International (TI-Kenya), one of the most respected, energetic, and innovative anti-corruption advocates in Kenya. Other civil society partners with an anti-corruption agenda are: Center for Governance and Development; Institute of Economic Affairs; Kenya Institute of Supplies Management; Kenya Leadership Institute; Center for Law and Research International; and International Commission of Jurists-Kenya Section.

## **II. Progress on Indicators**

[see attached "ACI Reporting Form"]

## **III. Year 2 Indicators**

As noted above, USAID/Kenya coordinates its anti-corruption support to the GOK through the GJLOS Programme. The seventeen development partners supporting the GJLOS have agreed to report on a common set of 20 indicators. It is anticipated that two of these indicators will focus on anti-corruption progress. USAID/Kenya expects to use the jointly agreed upon GJLOS anti-corruption indicators to report on the highest order results, at the Strategic Objective level, of its anti-corruption programming. The indicators are being developed by an Advisory Team in collaboration with both the GOK and the development partners. A review meeting is scheduled for mid-December, 2004, at which time the indicators and targets should be finalized. As USAID/Kenya had suggested previously, a credible and reliable source for these indicators may be the Kenya Bribery Index (KBI), which is produced annually by the Kenya chapter of Transparency International. The two most likely indicators are the *incidence* and *frequency* of corruption as actually experienced by Kenyan citizens. As the KBI is usually released in February, USAID/Kenya would be able to report on 2004 progress in the next ACI report due in November 2005.

Additional indicators will be derived as the DGE implements its Strategic Plan, which includes the development of its own monitoring and evaluation plan. Furthermore, when the National Anti-Corruption Campaign Baseline Survey is completed, a set of benchmarks, indicators, and targets will be available.

## **IV. Additional Information**

Please see attached:

- ACI Reporting Form
- Success Story: Kenyan Public Sustains Demand for Anti-Corruption
- Kenya Anti-Corruption Milestones Update, September 2004
- Governance, Justice, Law, and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme Overview

## ACI Reporting Form – Kenya FY 2003

Type of Program	Sector	ACI funding	Other funding for this activity?	Description of Project	Indicators and results
Strengthening Department of Governance and Ethics	DG	\$750,000	\$86,700 DA	USAID supports the Strategic Plan of the Department of Governance and Ethics (DGE). Elements include: establishment and operations; institutionalization and internal capacity building of staff; communications and outreach program; systems design and launch of the Public Complaints Unit; and baseline survey for the National Anti-Corruption Campaign.	<p>[Please Note: In FY 2003 we cannot report a quantifiable change in corruption. Working with a new GOK institution, the program focused on establishing the enabling environment to achieve the GOK anti-corruption priorities.]</p> <p>Indicators of the DGE's progress are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Designed and launched 4-year Strategy</li> <li>o Hired 20 staff members</li> <li>o Renovated and equipped offices</li> <li>o Appointed and serving as convener of national GOK Thematic Group on Ethics, Integrity, and Anti-Corruption</li> <li>o Drafted and negotiated GOK's first three international mutual legal assistance agreements</li> </ul>
Strengthening Department of Public Prosecutions	DG	none	622,500 ESF	USAID support focuses on promoting professional prosecution of criminal cases – specifically through establishing and operationalizing the newly constituted Anti-Corruption, Economic Crime, Serious Fraud and	[This activity began in FY 2004. The specialized Unit for Anti-Corruption, Economic Crime, Serious Fraud and Asset Forfeiture has been established and curriculum development for the specialized training is

				<p>Asset Forfeiture Unit. The program will contribute towards: improved case tracking, monitoring and evaluation; specialized training and other technical assistance; purchase of library reference materials, equipment, and software.</p>	<p>underway. Indicators are under development. Please refer to the Annual Report for further details.)</p>
Strengthening Civil Society	DG	none	260,000 DA	<p>USAID support to civil society organizations enhances advocacy capacity and increases public demand for anti-corruption reform.</p> <p>Specific themes include: promoting judicial reforms by conducting research on the economic implications of corruption in the Judiciary; lobbying for the enactment of key anti-corruption legislation related to freedom of information, procurement, privatization, and banking reforms; building and strengthening anti-corruption coalitions in the civil society, private, and public sectors; conducting research to establish benchmarks of integrity and efficiency in public organizations; and increasing professionalism and effective anti-corruption measures among procurement managers.</p> <p>Grantees are: Transparency International-Kenya:</p>	<p>[The performance of these civil society organizations is evaluated annually using an advocacy index. Data is currently being collected for inclusion in the Annual Report. Please refer to the Annual Report for the most recent data.]</p>



### **Success Story: Kenyan Public Sustains Demand for Anti-Corruption**

In 2002, Kenyans eager for change elected a new President and a new government after 24 years under President Moi and the KANU party. Widely known to be one of the countries most corrupt countries in Africa, and indeed the world, Kenya had a fresh opportunity to promote transparency and accountability. The new National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government, having campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, took office in January 2003 and began creating the institutional and policy framework necessary to achieve “zero tolerance” for graft. With the newly formed Department of Governance and Ethics (DGE) headed by a Permanent Secretary (PS) reporting directly to the President, it seemed that the NARC was devoting real political will to combating corruption.

USAID joined the anti-corruption battle by supporting the fledgling but well respected DGE, while also continuing to support the civil society groups that advocate for increased public transparency and accountability.

But as is often experienced in political transitions, corruption fights back, counter-reformers resist innovation, and the window of opportunity to effect real change quickly closes. Allegations of corruption within the NARC administration surfaced, progress investigating past corruption slowed, while the internal political maneuverings of NARC stalled the adoption of a new Constitution. Although President Kibaki began his tenure with solid popular support, Kenyans began to question the ability – and even the intention – of the government to root out corruption.

By June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2004 – the unmet deadline for the government to enact a new Constitution – the President announced a cabinet reshuffle, incorporating many opposition leaders in an attempt to strengthen the NARC’s political allegiances. While these movements were controversial, it was the transfer of the PS for Governance and Ethics, the head of the DGE, out of the Office of the President that provoked cries of protest from civil society. One previous and three current USAID grantees – Transparency International-Kenya, the International Commission of Jurists, the Kenya Human Rights Commission, and the Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers – staged a media blitz, including press conferences and full-page newspaper declarations, citing the transfer of the PS as evidence of the NARC’s “fading political will to fight corruption.”

The voices of civil society were soon joined by severe critiques from the diplomatic community. The proposed move of the PS was seen as an attempt by the counter-reformers to close the window on tackling graft. But Kenyans had already waited far too long for the anti-corruption war to begin. They were not about to lose this battle. Public outcry continued, and, within days, State House issued a clarification, stating that the PS was retained “in the Office of the President, to continue coordinating his work in the Department of Governance and Ethics, especially in the fight against corruption that remains a firm and top priority for President Mwai Kibaki.”

The retention of the PS in the Office of the President is a victory for both civil society and all Kenyans. Although the war against corruption will be a long uphill struggle, civil society is positioned to maintain pressure on the NARC Administration to reform, while also promoting dialogue with the genuine government reformers. Throughout the battles, USAID supports these crusading Kenyans, both within and outside of government, to advance the anti-corruption agenda.

## Kenya Anti-Corruption Milestones Update, September 2004

### 2003

- Enacted Public Officers Ethics Act (requires civil servants asset disclosure)
- Enacted Economic Crimes and Anti-Corruption Act (established Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission)
- Signed and ratified UN Convention Against Corruption
- Signed African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
- Published report on judicial corruption, launching a "radical surgery" of the Judiciary. Of 23 judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal named in the report, 17 resigned or retired. Of 82 magistrates named, 36 were fired.
- Removed 5 heads of parastatals amidst allegations of graft
- Suspended all government procurement officers suspected of improper conduct
- Initiated Goldenberg Commission (investigating major Moi-era graft) and Land Commission (investigating land grabs)

### 2004

- Began implementation of the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GLO) reform program, which includes the GOK's strategy for promoting ethics, integrity, and anti-corruption
- Hired Ernst International to investigate billions in looted assets from Moi regime
- Nairobi city councilors ordered to repay millions from falsified expense claims
- Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee begins more aggressively questioning senior GOK officials linked to improperly let tenders, e.g., \$87 M Anglo Leasing scandal (to provide secure passports and establish forensic laboratories)
- DGE remains in OP after cabinet re-shuffle and following sharp criticism from the diplomatic community and civil society
- National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee members appointed, including GOK, civil society, and private sector representatives
- KACC Director and 3 key staff appointed

### Recent High Profile Actions

- Businessman Ketan Shroff and former National Bank boss Wellington Oluo each imprisoned for 2 years for embezzling \$1.4 M in a scheme to import taxis to Kenya from London
- Former National AIDS Control Council director Margaret Oachara sentenced to one year imprisonment for abuse of office and fraud
- \$ 6 M returned to Kenyan Central Bank following revelations of Anglo Leasing scandal
- 5 senior GOK officials removed from office (3 fired/3 suspended) for their ties to the Anglo Leasing scandal
- 3 Kenya Pipeline Company officials sent on compulsory leave in order to facilitate investigations of a controversial \$25 M contract



## OVERVIEW

In the past three months I have continued in my capacity as team leader for the Somali cluster activities, as well as taken on various other tasks parallel to my objectives to provide strategic advice to RCMG as well as technical leadership. Some of these tasks include work on the Performance Monitoring Plan and Results Framework, contributions to the Program Narrative for the Annual Report, team leader for the Karamoja cluster activities, and acting member of the working group on Somalia policy and programming.

In September and October I attended the second and third phases of the Africa Bureau Evaluation Training course in Mali and Ghana, which proved to be a useful if not exhaustive process. The course itself was challenging and highly relevant to USAID evaluations of programs, regardless of the sector being evaluated.

This quarter the greatest challenge in the RCMG office has been staff turnover. The RCMG team leader (Ned Greeley) left in August, as I mentioned in my first quarterly report, and his replacement didn't arrive full time with the conflict office until the end of October. Additionally, in October the two senior Cognizant Technical Officers (CTO) also gave notice of their impending departure. The most senior FSN left in the beginning of November (resulting in my taking on the team leader for the Karamoja cluster activities) and the American Senior Conflict Advisor plans to leave at the end of December.

According to my original work plan and objectives, I am fully aligned with my expectations in 4 of the 5 objectives. The research aspect of the fellowship has yet to take hold as I have been inundated with team responsibilities in the face of high staff turnover in the RCMG office as well as ongoing uncertainty about the relevance of 'social capital' to conflict programming in the form of the "Peace Capacities Index" introduced through the RCMG office. However, in light of recent developments in the peace process in Somalia, and with the encouragement of the REDSO director, I plan to undertake a study on the role of Civil Society and Media in Somalia.

## FELLOWSHIP OBJECTIVES

**AIMS OF THE FELLOWSHIP:** In addition to accomplishing REDSO/ESA objectives in the area of CPMR and governance, the Fellowship will accomplish the following:

### **Objective 1: Strategic Advice**

Advise on, and take part in, the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs for achieving REDSO/ESA/RCMG's objectives in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) and good governance.

### **Objective 2: Contribute to Capacity Building**

Focus on promoting CPMR and good governance in cross-border conflict zones in ways that strengthen the capacity of traditional, civil society and government stakeholders to better design, coordinate, implement and monitor CPMR activities, participate in early warning and response systems and advocate for their peace and security at local, national and international levels.

**Objective 3: Technical Leadership**

Provide technical leadership for the REDSO team in addressing issues of CPMR, stability, governance and developmental rehabilitation in the Somali Cluster (NE: Kenya, southern and eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti).

**Objective 4: Research**

Conduct research on effective approaches to building the capacity of African Organizations in the area of locally owned and initiated conflict prevention and mediation techniques, corresponding to USAID/REDSO/RCMGs Strategic Objective 6 regional program "More Effective Management of Conflict by African Organizations."

**Objective 5: Team Member and Fellowship Duties**

Fulfill responsibilities outlined in the fellowship TOR as a REDSO team member and a Democracy Fellow.

**MONTHLY ACTIVITIES****SEPTEMBER**

In September I continued coordinating the Somali cluster activities, providing technical leadership and working closely with the conflict advisor from DAI. We were involved most specifically in helping our partners develop proposals guidelines, criteria for selection, and scope of their activities. There has been extensive involvement by DAI in the proposal development phase, because of this we have been delayed slightly, although all parties agree that the end product will be stronger as a result of this capacity building approach.

In preparation for the annual report the team has also been laboring over its Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) and results framework. This activity coincides with my objective of providing strategic advice to the RCMG office. The process has by no means been smooth or easy. Early on I was tasked to lead a sub-working group on the indicators and results framework. This has been a surprisingly challenging task. The work itself hasn't been overwhelming, instead it has been a process laden with extensive discussion and deliberation, primarily due to the fact that RDMG itself is a bit ambiguous in its approach to cross-border conflict in the region and each staff member is interested in contributing to the product. I also worked quite intensively to adapt REDSO's Partner Institutional Viability Assessment tool to use with the partners as we worked to build their capacity. I presented the conclusion of my work at the RCMG/DAI retreat in the end of September.

On Friday, September 24<sup>th</sup> RCMG, along with DAI, held a one day retreat that compelled the team to address this weakness as well as other pending issues. Again, I was instrumental in organizing the event, including preparation leading to the retreat and facilitation of sessions.

As an essential part of the Africa Bureau Evaluation Course, in the last week of September I traveled to Mali where, as part of a 6 member team, I conducted an evaluation of community schools

programs funded by USAID. This was an excellent opportunity to get actual field based experience in Evaluation, as well as see another region of Africa. The week in Mali greatly tested my rusty French speaking skills, which I also appreciated as I look ahead to possible work in the Francophone parts of Africa.

## **OCTOBER**

In October activities with our partners in the Somali cluster began to take shape. We received a concept note which was to be adapted to two proposals by the NGO Consortium, based in Gedo, Somalia and the Mandera District Peace Committee, situated in Mandera, Kenya. Soon after the concept note was received my counterpart returned to Mandera to assist the partners in formulating their ideas for project implementation.

On October 21, four persons from the partner organizations were invited to Nairobi to meet the DAI team. In this meeting we reviewed the concept paper and proposals from the two partners, agreed on the criteria for the selection of the cross border CPMR activities, the proposal format and the next steps to implementation. In addition, each organization underwent a financial viability assessment to ensure it would have the capacity to manage USAID funds. It is notable that Ramadan began in the middle of the month, affecting the enthusiasm from partners.

In the end of October I returned to Accra, Ghana for the third phase of the Africa Bureau Evaluation course. In this week we presented our findings and the draft final report which had proven to be intensively collaborative with other team members, all 5 of whom (in my case) lived and worked in West Africa. A small proportion of my office was spent working on the evaluation report for the course. The teams synthesized comments from course participants and submitted a final report after they returned to their respective missions.

## **NOVEMBER**

As November arrived, work surrounding the Annual Report intensified. Small groups within the conflict office met almost daily to review indicators, results frameworks, Data Quality assessments and reporting matrixes.

In addition, I have been involved in a Somalia Policy and Program Assessment and usually attend the Somali Country Team meetings. In light of recent "successes" with the Somali Peace Talks held almost entirely in Kenya, there has been significant interest in Somalia again. In November I spent time reading the assessment and in meetings about it. In the coming months I plan to undertake a Civil Society and Media study which will complement the assessment.

The third primary task I have been involved in is the ongoing strategic advice and support for cluster activities. After the departure of the FSN senior advisor on conflict, I have assumed responsibility for managing both programs (the Somali Cluster as well as the Karamoja cluster.) This has meant significant time reading project documents and talking with those previously involved in the Karamoja cluster in order to catch up as quickly as possible. The matrix attached below gives an outline of activities undertaken with our partners on the cross-border conflict program, implemented by DAI.

<b>Timeframe</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Outputs and Remarks</b>
July 2004	Initial consultation Workshop in Mandera with stakeholders from Mandera and Gedo region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Task Team formed</li> <li>• 2 Proposals prepared</li> </ul>
August 2004	Proposals reviewed in Nairobi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proposals were not clearly demonstrating linkages outlined in consultation workshops</li> <li>• Outline for a joint concept paper was sent</li> </ul>
August 2004	Dekha to Mandera	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint concept paper further developed</li> </ul>
September 2004	Initial review of concept paper Institutional viability assessment Presentation of concept note at USAID/DAI retreat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreement reached on the way forward and next steps for action</li> </ul>
21 October 2004	Meeting in Nairobi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proposal format, financial viability assessment, criteria for prioritizing activities.</li> </ul>
28 <sup>th</sup> October 2004	Sharing the Concept note and Share the outcomes of the meetings with MPDC and NGO Consortium	Minutes of the meeting, comments and additional issues to be incorporated into the concept note
30 to 31 <sup>st</sup> Oct 2004	Proposal preparation and timeline - (include in the proposal all issues that will strengthen the capacity of individual/organisations – Why the training? And get the feedback from the participants) Minutes of the meeting/preparation of MOU between EPAG and NGO Consortium)	Draft Proposal and budget/MOU – Circulation
7 <sup>th</sup> November 2004	Circulation and comments on the proposal with budget and comment on the MOU	Stake holder, dekha and martin comments
7 <sup>th</sup> November 2004	Peer review mechanism of the proposal MDPC and NGO Consortium.	
8 <sup>th</sup> November 2004	Draft Proposal/Budget –Decision makers approve (MPDC/NGO Consortium –	<b>Minutes of the meeting and final draft to be sent to DAI</b>
12 <sup>th</sup> November 2004	Submit Proposals	
26 <sup>th</sup> November 2004	Feedback from DAI	

## REVISIONS/TRAVEL PLANS

As I previously mentioned, the research component of my fellowship has changed significantly in light of my interests, as well as the needs of the RCMG office. In the next quarter I will be engaging in a study that looks at Somali Civil Society and Media. The study will involve bringing an expert in post-conflict civil society to Nairobi for a few weeks in the next month or two. Previous to her arrival, I will be assisting in writing the scope of work for the study.

### ANTICIPATED TRAVEL

(NOVEMBER 2004 - FEBRUARY 2005)

DATE	LOCATION	PURPOSE
06 December - 09 December	Eldoret, Kenya	2 <sup>nd</sup> Consultation for 2 <sup>nd</sup> Karamoja sub-Cluster A 2-day workshop on the development of peace-building proposals in the Turkana-Pokot-Sabiny Conflict
December	Moyale/Wajir/Jisirsu Kenya	1 <sup>st</sup> Consultation for 2 <sup>nd</sup> Somali sub-Cluster We are still in negotiations regarding our 2 <sup>nd</sup> sub-cluster.
January	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Possible trip to CHEWART's secretariat
January - February	Karamojong Cluster	Consultations for 2 <sup>nd</sup> Karamoja sub-cluster partners (ongoing)
January - February	Somali Cluster	2 <sup>nd</sup> Consultation for 2 <sup>nd</sup> Somali sub-cluster

## OVERVIEW

In the past three months I have continued in my capacity as team leader for the Somali cluster activities, and in the absence of a Karamoja cluster team leader I have assumed a more involved role in the activities of that region. After the December 17 deadline for the REUSO annual report, and the Christmas and New Year's holidays, the office slowly came back to life in the first weeks of January. Additionally, I continued participating in the Somalia programming and policy working group as the newly elected Somali Transitional Federal Government made plans to return to Mogadishu.

In January the majority of my time was spent on my primary objective of technical leadership in the Somali and Karamoja clusters. I traveled to Eldoret, Kenya in December and Awassa, Ethiopia in February to attend the cross-border consultation meetings for two sub-clusters in the Karamojung.

In my last quarterly report I noted that I was well on target to meet 4 out of 5 objectives in my original work plan. At that point I had yet to address the fourth objective, independent research. I was able to fulfill this objective in February as I engaged in a three week study of Civil Society and Media in Somalia in collaboration with a civil society and media expert from Kosovo. The study was intense yet has been well received by those interested within the mission.

This quarter, staffing in the team came together in a slightly more encouraging manner than last quarter, although the imminent departure of the Senior Conflict Advisor loomed ahead of us. The new SO team leader has brought continuity and a more "team" oriented approach, which has been a much needed and appreciated role.

## FELLOWSHIP OBJECTIVES

**AIMS OF THE FELLOWSHIP.** In addition to accomplishing REDSO/ESA objectives in the area of CPMR and governance, the Fellowship will accomplish the following:

### **Objective 1: Strategic Advice**

Advise on, and take part in, the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs for achieving REDSO/ESA/RCMG's objectives in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) and good governance.

### **Objective 2: Contribute to Capacity Building**

Focus on promoting CPMR and good governance in cross-border conflict zones in ways that strengthen the capacity of traditional, civil society and government stakeholders to better design, coordinate, implement and monitor CPMR activities, participate in early warning and response systems and advocate for their peace and security at local, national and international levels.

### **Objective 3: Technical Leadership**

Provide technical leadership for the REDSO team in addressing issues of CPMR, stability, governance and developmental rehabilitation in the Somali Cluster (i.e. Kenya, southern and eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti).

### **Objective 4: Research**

Conduct research on effective approaches to building the capacity of African Organizations in the area of locally owned and initiated conflict prevention and mediation techniques, corresponding to USAID/REDSO/RCMG's Strategic Objective 5 regional program "More Effective Management of Conflict by African Organizations."

### **Objective 5: Team Member and Fellowship Duties**

Fulfill responsibilities outlined in the fellowship TOR as a REDSO team member and a Democracy Fellow.

## MONTHLY ACTIVITIES

### **DECEMBER**

The overriding business in December was the Annual Report, not only for RCMG but for USAID missions across the globe. I offered writing and analytical expertise to the process, and spent a significant amount of time with various team members working through the data we had collected throughout the year. In this way I provided both technical leadership as well as capacity building within the team.

Our cross border programs in the Somali and Karamoja clusters continued to move forward at a slow and sometimes overly meticulous pace, and the strategic advice I continued to offer was useful to both USAID and our implementing partner, Development Alternatives, Inc (DAI).

The USAID/Washington office also introduced the Fragile States Strategy during this time. By the middle of December Africa Bureau had invited all missions to participate in the DCI/Conflict Section Working Group. Field participation and engagement were essential to this process, because the Africa Bureau strategy is intended to provide guidance about the goals, objectives, priorities, and future funding levels for DCI and conflict-related programs in Africa. I was involved in reviewing these documents as they were distributed to the various missions, again these activities leading themselves to strategic advice.

I also completed the scope of work for the Somali Civil Society and Media assessment in December.

## JANUARY

January was a quiet month in RCMG in the wake of the holidays as well as the annual report, which was due the week before Christmas. I spent most of the month gathering documents for the Somali Civil Society assessment and finalizing the scope of work.

The regional anti-corruption specialist was finalizing her strategy in January. In mid fiscal year 2004 the RCMG office, in collaboration with Food Security, was tasked with implementing a 1 million dollar program linking corruption with conflict in the Horn of Africa. As a member of the team tasked with advising the team on anti-corruption initiatives, I met frequently with the senior advisor as well as the larger anti corruption team during this month.

## FEBRUARY

Plans for the second sub-cluster activities in the Somali Cluster have been delayed due to the complexities of working with the Ethiopian government on cross-border issues. A larger question of inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia was recently reopened as pro-Ethiopian president Abdullahi Yusuf was voted into office. Most recently, the African Union proposal of sending Ethiopian peace-keeping troops to Somalia, coupled with the United States' statement discouraging front line state peace-keeping troop deployment to Somalia have caused tension between the new nations. We are planning meetings at the end of March that will hopefully ease concerns about the activities we are going to be undertaking in that region. This should lead to movement on the activities.

The majority of my time in February was consumed by the Civil Society and Media assessment of Somalia. This exercise, as I have mentioned throughout the report, proved to be challenging intellectually as well as a real boost in the everyday activities I am undertaking by advising on the cross-border activities. We have submitted a document for review, and I will be using this document (in a somewhat similar format) for the research component of the fellowship. The

assessment, unfortunately a desk study as American's continue to be restricted from travel to Somalia, was well received throughout USAID/REDSO.

Timeframe	Activities
06 - 08 December 2004	Consultative meetings in Eldoret, Kenya with Turkana, Sabung, Pokot, Pasi
17 December 2004	Annual Report Due to USAID/W
January 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Anticorruption meetings</li> <li>* Finalization of SCW for Somalia Civil Society and Media Assessment</li> <li>* Research - Somalia CS/Media Assessment</li> </ul>
04 February 2005	Arrival of Civil Society and Media expert from USAID/Kosovo
07 February - 24 February	Somalia Civil Society and Media Assessment
22 February 2005	Presentation and discussion of Findings - Somalia CS&M Assessment
15 - 19 <sup>th</sup> February 2005 Consultative Meetings (Awoosa)	* In collaboration with Oxfam UK, looking at possible cross-border conflict programs in S.Omo Ethiopia and NW Kenya

### REVISIONS/TRAVEL PLANS

With the completion of the Somalia Civil Society and Media Assessment, I have been spending more time offering recommendations for programming possibilities for both media and civil society programs in Somalia. This expanded role has challenged me and gives me an extra push within the parameters of the fellowship.

As the RFA for the democracy fellows program is being decided in Washington I remain very interested in extending for a second year and expanding my fellowship responsibilities to include advising on the Somalia Civil Society and Media programs. This would in no way hinder my original interests as a Democracy Fellow, and will in fact serve to enhance it.

ANTICIPATED TRAVEL

(MARCH 2005 - MAY 2005)

DATE (2005)	LOCATION	PURPOSE
07 - 13 April	Depart to USA	Annual Leave
14 - 17 April	Washington, DC / Williamsburg, VA	Democracy Fellows Annual Retreat
17 April	Travel to Marrakech, Morocco	Annual Leave
21 - 23 April	Marrakech, Morocco	International Media Conference
24 April	Travel to Nairobi, Kenya	Annual Leave
25 - 29 April	Nairobi, Kenya	Annual Leave
02 May	Nairobi, Kenya	Return to USAID/REDSO
May 2005 (possible)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Consultations with USAID/Ethiopia and partners for activities in the Somali cluster
May 2005 (possible)	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	CEWARN strategic planning meetings
May 2005 (possible)	Boya, Ethiopia	Consultation workshop with local partners for programming in the Somali cluster. Cross border initiatives in Ethiopia - Somalia

WORLD LEARNING  
DEMOCRACY FELLOWS PROGRAM

*Final Report*



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*Fellowship Duration: 01 June 2004 ~ 14 June 2005*

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### ACRONYMS

ICAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
CEWSM	Conflict Early Warning Mechanism
COMESA	The Common Market for East and Southern Africa
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa
ROMS	Regional Economic Management and Governance Office

09/10

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Throughout the world, the forces linking conflict, poverty and development are being explored and debated. Numerous widely accepted paradigms describe the ways in which conflicts are caused in such phenomenon as resource deprivation, 'cultures' of conflict (versus 'cultures' of peace), religious doctrine, or the availability of arms. Although these aspects are often embedded in the causes of conflict, as the most marginalized groups in the Horn of Africa those who suffer its effects are primarily women, youth and the elderly. The RCMC peace building program is directly addressing these challenges through various activities in the Horn of Africa aimed toward strengthening institutional capacity to identify, prevent, mitigate and respond to deadly conflicts, particularly in the zones that lie along the borders of the countries in the region. Characterized by recent and protracted conflict, emergencies and warfare, these countries fall into the categories of fragile, failed, failing, and recovering states—including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Uganda.

This report is a summary of my tenure as a Democracy Fellow for World Learning, supporting the USAID/REDSO/ESA Regional Conflict Management and Governance (RCMG) office in Nairobi, Kenya. As a Democracy Fellow I was part of a small team working towards the strategic objective "More Effective Management of Conflict by African Organizations." Our approach aims to enhance capacity of African organizations on the intergovernmental, regional, national and local levels. While our primary implementing partner is Development Alternatives, Inc (DAI), we also provide direct support to a number of regional bodies. USAID/REDSO builds African capacity in the aforementioned levels through support to the IGAD Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) and COMESA's Peace and Security Desk (intergovernmentally); the National Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR) policy formulation process (national); and support to local cross-border peace building initiatives in the Somali and Karamojong Clusters (local). Annex 1 contains a map of the region and the cluster areas. Annex 2 is a schematic illustrating our strategy that I developed in my first weeks as a democracy fellow.

As the conflict Democracy Fellow, my goals and objectives were to support the RCMC office to address the root causes and forces of conflict in the region. Overall, I feel I not only completed the objectives of the fellowship, I also exceeded my own expectations of my contribution to the regional conflict office. I have been able to provide technical assistance in the programs within the office, keep myself grounded in the local approaches to peace building and conflict mediation, and maintain the flexibility within the team to support offices within the broader REDSO mission. The parameters of the fellowship also allowed adequate flexibility in my duties for professional development opportunities outside of the region, namely the "Government Integrity and Anti-Corruption" course in Kampala, the Africa Bureau Certificate in Program Evaluation course in West Africa, and a media and governance conference in Botswana.

This report addresses efforts towards my professional goals and objectives, performance methods and activities, and outcomes and impact.

## 2.0 FELLOWSHIP GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

### PROFESSIONAL GOALS

*2.1 To further my understanding of and competence in the field of international governance and democracy in order to address development challenges throughout the Horn of Africa.*

When I look back to my first week as a Democracy Fellow in the conflict office of REEFSC, one year ago, I am overwhelmed by how much I have learned. My competence as a contributing member of the team increased exponentially each month. Due in part to the flexible parameters of the fellowship, as well as the trust and confidence of the RCMG team, I have taken advantage of the opportunities that have arisen over the months. For example, I attended an integrity course in Uganda, an Evaluation course in Ghana, a democracy and media conference in Morocco, and led an assessment of Civil Society and Media in Somalia. None of these direct activities were clearly articulated in my work plan, however they all contribute to my overall understanding of and competence in the field of international governance and democracy.

*2.2 To contribute to building the long term stability and durability of African based organizations, and subsequently Africa as a whole, by bringing together diverse stakeholders throughout the region who are invested in building a more peaceful and cohesive Africa.*

A significant proportion of my fellowship involved offering technical advice to the cross border initiatives the RCMG office is currently undertaking through its implementing partner, DAI. While I was originally to contribute primarily to the Somali cluster programs, the Karansoja cluster leader left her position in November. Subsequently, I was asked to provide guidance and technical advice to both clusters, which was logical as the program strategy is the same in both clusters. In my second year I am confident I will continue to offer advice to both clusters as my role in offering technical advice has been instrumental in accomplishments to date.

In my capacity as conflict and program advisor, I have direct contact with stakeholders from varying tribes and clans, as well as representative groups including elders, youth, women's groups and religious leaders. The initiatives aim to build African capacity to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict in the region. The consultations and the initiative building process allow interaction between the most vital of the community representatives in a forum specifically dedicated to conflict analysis. This has been one of the aspects of the fellowship that has been the most rewarding for me as it has allowed for direct intervention and involvement in a process. My experience previous to the democracy fellowship -- working for local NGOs and grassroots organizations and living in Muslim countries for 5 years -- has also allowed me to be comfortable and approachable in these settings.

### 2.3 To apply my previous experiences with African based organizations at the grassroots level to influence policy and practice as they are conceptualized at the donor level.

Of my three broad professional goals, this goal was significant for me as it speaks to both my personal beliefs and my professional principles for working within the USAID/donor structure. As I began the fellowship, the entirety of my experience had been working with local communities and NGOs in the US, Morocco and Somaliland. These experiences were all with 'grassroots' organizations and communities, and as I embarked on the fellowship I wanted to be sure to not lose sight of my priority for local community interests. As I transitioned from the local (recipient) to the bilateral (donor) level, my primary concern was that I would lose sight of the reason we are working in international development and my core emphases would make this position difficult.

As it turned out, I made a conscious effort to look at the initiatives and the work we were doing from a balanced perspective. Today, I remain the person on the team that continues to ask what the best allocation of monies is, if our priorities are with the people working "on the ground" and what we are doing to contribute to building African capacity to manage conflict. In this way I do believe I am making a contribution, however small it is, to policies and practice at the donor level. That being said, there is always more that can be done to bridge the divide between governments and people.

The five objectives of the fellowship are addressed in the following sections. Performance Methods and Activities

- Objective 1: Strategic Advice
- Objective 2: Contribute to Capacity Building
- Objective 3: Technical Leadership
- Objective 4: Research
- Objective 5: Team Member and Fellowship Duties

## 3.0 PERFORMANCE METHODS AND ACTIVITIES

### FELLOWSHIP OBJECTIVES

In addition to accomplishing broad REDSO/ESA objectives in the area of CPMB and governance, the Fellowship aimed to accomplish the following specific objectives:

#### 3.1 OBJECTIVE 1: STRATEGIC ADVICE

Advise on, and take part in, the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs for achieving REDSO/ESA/RCMG's objectives in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMB) and good governance.

In the first weeks as a Democracy fellow with RCMG I was involved primarily in refining the strategy for the PEACE - MAC (Peace in Eastern and Central Africa - Managing African Conflict) program. After reading the assessment and strategy as outlined by DAI, I spent the first weeks of the fellowship creating a schematic which is now used when presenting the program to partners and stakeholders. This schematic is attached in annex 2.

Over the past year I have periodically been involved in the consultation process with relevant stakeholders at the local level in our "Problem Solving Initiatives." Often I am awakened the realities of life at the volatile cross roads of three countries - whether on the Katana or Somali cluster. In addition, my eyes have been continuously opened not only to the issues confronting people each day, but also the extensive work that the peace committees and informal groups were engaged in. My role during these visits was to assess the current context of the cross-border conflicts, to facilitate the conflict analysis, and to work with the DAI counterpart to help future project partners understand the joint RCMC/DAI strategy for addressing the conflicts in the region.

### 3.1 OBJECTIVE 2: CONTRIBUTE TO CAPACITY BUILDING

Focus on the special issues associated with promoting CPMR and good governance in cross-border conflict zones that enable the strengthening of appropriate capacity (indigenous as well as non-traditional) that empower stakeholders within these border areas to better advocate for their peace and security at local, national and international levels.

Through offering strategic advice to DAI, and by participating in the meetings on the ground, I have contributed to the capacity building in the cross-border conflict zones. Using our fundamental approach to the "capacity building" aspect of the strategy, our visits to the field have been in multiple stages and with varying levels of input from myself and/or DAI. As an overall approach to my work, I have been outspoken about the importance of indigenous and non-traditional capacities to address conflict in these volatile pastoral areas. At the same time, we are teaching our partners processes from the mundane administrative aspects of project planning to more complex CPMR skills.

My role as a team member in the RCMC office is also a capacity building position. Because I have the advantage of not being anyone's supervisor, and not being supervised by anyone, I have been able to be a mentor to locally hired staff who won't feel threatened, anxious, or stressed by my advice. The RCMC office is comprised of a small team, and the complexities of conflict programming requires personnel with particular skills. In Kenya, people with these skills are limited, so it is often necessary to train team members to be more effective and better understand their responsibilities within the RCMC team. I feel I have been able to do this, although not to the extent I would like to.

### 3.3 OBJECTIVE 3: TECHNICAL LEADERSHIP

Provide technical leadership for the REDSO team in addressing issues of CPMR, stability, governance and developmental rehabilitation in the northern part of the Horn, including NE Kenya, southern and eastern Ethiopia, and Somalia (the Somali cluster).

As the Democracy Fellow, this objective was directly linked to the RCMC office's needs. I have been able to offer technical and strategic advice to various tasks within the office, including the annual report, results framework, the performance and monitoring plan, the RCMC Peace Capacities Index, the Partner Institutional Viability Index, the RCMC assessment, the anti-corruption strategy, Somalia civil society, and media programming, and Burundi activity design (to name a few).

One responsibility outlined in the democracy fellow's TOR describes the complexity of working in fragile, failing, failed and recovering states. The truth is becoming a programming reality as today many of the USAID bilateral missions are being asked to coordinate within a newly released "fragile

states strategy." Throughout the year I remained a central voice in the complex analysis of fragile states and developing programs in these contexts.

#### 3.4 OBJECTIVE 4: RESEARCH

Conduct research on effective approaches to building the capacity of African Organizations in the area of locally owned and initiated conflict prevention and mediation techniques, corresponding to USAID/REDSO/RCMG's Strategic Objective 6 regional program "More Effective Management of Conflict by African Organizations."

The above stated research topic was revised early in my tenure as a democracy fellow with RCMG. When I started the fellowship, the team leader explained that this research had essentially been undertaken by a previous democracy fellow, and that it would be more beneficial to the office if I considered other topics. I spent a significant amount of time at that juncture, looking at the 'Peace Capacities Index', a 'baby' of the team leader and an approach to conflict systems that attempted to quantify the social capital (or lack of) involved in local peace building initiatives. Coincidentally, I have had an academic interest in Social Capital for years and this idea greatly interested me. Unfortunately, when the team leader retired so did the Peace Capacities Index, as it had met with significant resistance within the mission. At that point I was discouraged from pursuing an independent or academic research on the model.

Soon after this second setback, the director of the regional mission (REDSO) approached me and asked if I would be interested in leading a study of Civil Society and Media in Somalia as a predecessor to an activity design. I gladly led this assessment with a Kenyan colleague who had particular expertise in both Civil Society and Media programs, which coupled well with my experience in and knowledge of Somalia/land. The Kenyan and I worked for three weeks in February and completed our assessment in the beginning of March. Today, the 30 page document forms the basis for the USAID/REDSO Liaison Presence Countries office's Somalia Civil Society and Media program.

#### 3.5 OBJECTIVE 5: TEAM MEMBER AND FELLOWSHIP DUTIES

Fulfill responsibilities outlined in the fellowship TOR as a REDSO team member and a Democracy Fellow.

The fellowship TOR offers a broad menu of possible tasks assigned to a democracy fellow. I was able to address the bulk of the responsibilities outlined in the document. Professionally, I am a person more satisfied with a job if I have many things going on at the same time. Working in the regional office (dealing with many different countries, different conflicts and different projects) has suited me very well. The TOR is attached in annex 3.

At the same time, the TOR (and in fact the broad purpose of the democracy fellows program) clearly articulates the fellow's own growth in the field of Democracy and Governance, USAID policies, and career development. These objectives have undoubtedly been a large part of the fellowship experience. In essence it is the 'on the job' training aspect that I have benefited the most from.

Many of the opportunities to attend trainings (such as the integrity training in Uganda and the Evaluation course in West Africa) and conferences (the media conference in Morocco) have also contributed to building my own capacity toward a career in CPMR and good governance.

## 4.0 OUTCOMES AND IMPACT

There are a number of learnings that I will carry forward with me in peace programming in the future. The themes of these lessons learned have come directly from our partners and their experiences. Yet, as these themes have emerged, we have been able to share them with the partners and reiterate the importance of learning for their own peace programming.

An example of these lessons are outlined below, followed by Guiding Principles for Cross Border Peace-Building and Conflict Transformation.

### 4.1 THEMES OF LESSONS LEARNED

#### • The importance of parallel peace building programming

In conflict work it is vital to have a clear strategy and not to lose sight of the importance of either. The partners need to be addressing the long term, root causes of the conflict in the region as well as working with a rapid response mandate in immediate crises. The recent violence in the Mandera/Galbe regions are a prime example of the need for this type of vision in the heat of crisis.

#### • Resources for rapid response

As we have begun incorporating into proposals in the Karunguung cluster, the partners on the Mandera/Galbe subcluster recognize the need for resources to address conflict as they arise. They are currently considering adjusting their budgets accordingly.

#### • Internalization of a process

As a capacity building oriented program, we are faced with a challenging question: how do we get the implementing partners, some of whom have had a significant amount of CPMP training, to stop doing "business as usual" and truly take hold of a peace building process that involves a problem solving element and extensive participatory analysis of the attitudes, behaviors and context in the conflict?

#### • Use of "peace programs" to promote violence

In the Somali context the potential for NGOs and CBOs to be co-opted by their clansmen, and subsequently used to perpetuate instead of mitigate conflict is very real. Currently our partners are struggling with their role as neutral actors, with relatively significant resources, in a very contentious and violent conflict system.

#### • Importance for clear roles for all

Our partners on both sides of the border are learning the importance of clear roles for all involved in the program. On the NGO consortium side, the program manager has been taking the personal responsibility of negotiating the peace instead of managing the process. On the MDPC side, there is still some overlap and confusion over Mandera Women for Peace and the Mandera District Peace Committee. This confusion has caused a bit of misunderstanding but also the opportunity for learning.

#### • Focusing on both the INTERNAL and the EXTERNAL

As our partners continuously remind us, it is essential to focus on the cross-border elements of the conflict (externals) as well as the internal dynamics within each country. Another interpretation of the internal/external debate is the varying roles one can play in peace building when wearing an "internal" hat as well as the things that can sometimes be accomplished more readily by an "external" actor. In addition, to readily recognize the changing roles of oneself in the dynamics of conflict and peace building work.

## 4.2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS BORDER PEACE-BUILDING AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

*Peace-building interventions should be:*

- **RESPONSIVE** and **ADAPTABLE** to the dynamic nature of conflicts
- **COORDINATED** in the across border activities
- A **COLLECTIVE** responsibility
- **INCLUSIVE** by involving local leaders, traditional structures and administration in the implementation of the resolution, as well as those on the periphery to buy into the process
- **INNOVATIVE** by maintaining multiple strategies
- **COMMITTED** to by the individuals and communities throughout the process
- **PROACTIVE** by encouraging individuals and organizations to take initiative to address conflicts as they arise
- **AWARE** of the different roles and limitations of each actor in a conflict

*Peace Building Strategies should:*

- Place **COMMUNITY** needs ahead of individual gains
- Build **TRUST** and confidence as an important component
- Enhance **ADVOCACY** at the local, national and intergovernmental levels through documentation and dissemination of information to educate a wider audience
- Endeavor toward **SUSTAINED INTERVENTION** and engagement in peace-building as a best practice in order to produce change *now* time. Monitoring and follow-up of the implementation of resolution is essential
- **ACKNOWLEDGE** the essential role of women as peace-builders
- Ensure **CROSS-CUTTING** themes are addressed in a conflict zone
- Create mechanisms for **REFLECTION** and **LEARNING** from obstacles

## 5.0 TRAVEL

### 5.1 ANTICIPATED TRAVEL

At the beginning of the fellowship, I had anticipated the following travel:

1. Broad travel to the Somali cluster areas to meet with the organizations that work with the ICACG office.
2. Workshop series to be held in Addis Ababa (print blocks) and/or in region
3. Ongoing travel to these areas to fulfill objectives of the fellowship, including meetings including but not limited to: USAID and CEWARIN offices in Addis Ababa, as well as relevant regional organizations in the Great Lakes region.

LOCATION	NO. OF VISITS	NO. OF DAYS
Northern Kenya	5 days x 5 visits	25 days
South & Eastern Ethiopia (including Addis Ababa)	5 days x 5 visits	25 days
Somalia (regions to be determined)	2 visits x 5 days	10 days
Great Lakes Region	2 visits x 5 days	10 days
Washington DC/SIT (???)	1 visit x 10 days	10 days

### 3.3 ACTUAL TRAVEL

See travel clearance requests for detailed travel and activity schedules.

Program	Location	Dates
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultative workshop with partners (1<sup>st</sup> Somali sub-Cluster) Mandera (Kenya)/Gedo (Somalia)</li> <li>• Meeting with coordinating mechanism: Wajir</li> </ul>	Mandera and Wajir, Kenya	23 <sup>rd</sup> - 30 <sup>th</sup> July 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International Law Institute Course in "Government Integrity and Anti-Corruption"</li> </ul>	Kampala, Uganda	2 <sup>nd</sup> - 14 <sup>th</sup> August 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USAID/ Africa Bureau "Certificate Program in Evaluation"</li> </ul>	Accra, Ghana Bamako, Mali Accra, Ghana	28 <sup>th</sup> Aug - 4 <sup>th</sup> Sept 2004 24 <sup>th</sup> Sept - 3 <sup>rd</sup> Oct 2004 25 <sup>th</sup> - 29 <sup>th</sup> Oct 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultative workshop with partners (2<sup>nd</sup> Karamoja sub-Cluster) Pokot (Uganda)/Sabay/ Turkana (Kenya)</li> </ul>	Eldoret, Kenya	5 <sup>th</sup> - 9 <sup>th</sup> December 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultative workshop with partners (3<sup>rd</sup> Karamoja sub-cluster) South Omo (Ethiopia)/Turkana (Kenya)</li> </ul>	Awassa, Ethiopia	13 <sup>th</sup> - 19 <sup>th</sup> February 2005
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• World Learning Democracy Fellows Retreat</li> </ul>	Williamsburg, VA	14 <sup>th</sup> - 16 <sup>th</sup> April 2005
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International Media Development Conference</li> </ul>	Marrakech Morocco	21 <sup>st</sup> - 23 <sup>rd</sup> April 2005
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultative workshop with partners (2<sup>nd</sup> Somali sub-cluster) Wajir East (Kenya) / Lower Juba (Somalia)</li> </ul>	Wajir, Kenya	16 <sup>th</sup> - 19 <sup>th</sup> May 2005


## 6.9 CONCLUSION

As I have described throughout this report, I have met the goals and objectives of the democracy fellowship over the past year. I have contributed to the needs of the regional conflict management and governance in a variety of ways, through the activities I anticipated in my original work plan as well as through some unanticipated activities. The flexibility of the fellowship has been an ideal combination of past experience and new skills, which I believe will serve as a excellent segue into the larger field of governance and democracy.

I am now embarking on a second year as a democracy fellow with RCDC. I have had conversations with the team leader as well as the regional director and deputy director regarding my work in my second year. There is a general consensus that we are all, including myself, looking forward to me taking on more responsibility and expanding my original work plan to ensure the best use of my skills and proficiencies in the field. Many of these skills I have acquired in my first year as a democracy fellow. I am looking forward to the challenge.


ANNEXES

ANNEX I - MAP OF KARAMOJA AND SOMALI CLUSTERS




**KARAMOJA CLUSTER**  
NW Kenya  
NE Uganda  
SE Sudan  
SW Ethiopia

**SOMALI CLUSTER**  
NE Kenya  
SE Ethiopia  
Somalia



ANNEX 2 -- SCHEMATIC OF CMG STRATEGY



SOMALI AND KARAMOJA CLUSTER STRATEGY  
USAID/RCMG - DAI

## ANNEX 3 - DEMOCRACY FELLOW TERMS OF REFERENCE

### TERMS OF REFERENCE DEMOCRACY FELLOW FOR REDSO/ESA/ REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE OFFICE

**OVERVIEW:** USAID/REDSO/ESA/RCMG is the sponsor/host organization. It is carrying out a number of activities in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region to strengthen institutional capacity relevant to improving the identification, prevention, mitigation and response to deadly conflicts particularly in the zones that lie along the borders of the countries in the region. These countries states fall into the categories of fragile, failed, failing, and recovering states and characterized by recent or ongoing complex emergencies and warfare. They include Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The remaining states of Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti continuously contend with violence on their borders. REDSO/ESA requests a Democracy Fellow to be available for work within the region, and based in Nairobi, Kenya, preferably by 3/2004. The Fellow should be at mid career level or higher, have extensive training and analytical and programming experience in Africa and in states undergoing political transitions associated with deadly conflicts.

**RESPONSIBILITIES:** The Fellow's major responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Advise on, and take part in, the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs for achieving REDSO/ESA/RCMG's objectives in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) and good governance. In particular, for CPMR, assist in 1) strengthening capacity of regional CPMR organizations, both governmental and non-governmental; 2) developing and implementing means for identifying, assessing and disseminating CPMR effective approaches such as the media (especially broadcasting), faith-based initiatives, and indigenous problem-solving dialogues; 3) building civil society networks, civil society/government partnerships, and official institutional frameworks for achieving wider, synergistic impact in CPMR and good governance; and, 4) helping to operationalize these CPMR tools in the target cross border zones that are part of RCMG's SO 6 regional program.
- Recognizing the complex nature of fragile, failing, failed, and recovery states, the Fellow will provide assistance in shaping new approaches to integrating USAID and partner resources, in particular, the Fellow is expected to take the technical lead for the REDSO team in addressing issues of CPMR, stability, governance and developmental rehabilitation in the northern part of the Horn, including NE Kenya, southern and eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. This is a remote, poor area of arid and semi arid lands and predominantly pastoral livelihoods.
- Serve as resource person advising on CPMR and good governance, including topics such as rule of law, anti-corruption, public/private/civil society partnerships and governmental reform for REDSO/ESA sectoral teams, USAID bilateral missions, and countries with USAID management offices based in the USAID complex in Nairobi. REDSO/ESA has

special management responsibilities for USAID activities in fragile, failing, and recovering states, including Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

- Provide services to bilateral USAID missions and partners that accelerate understanding and utilization of REDSO/ESA/RCMG's Strategic Objective 6, *Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region*. Also provide assistance in designing and implementing Scopes of Work and Conflict Vulnerability Assessments (CVA) as required. Note the CVA is required for development of new USAID country strategy. Utilize the analysis and information gained from executing these tasks to enhance USAID bilateral programming, in particular, by incorporating a CPMR perspective in relevant programmatic USAID activities.
- Focus on the special issues associated with promoting CPMR and good governance in cross-border conflict zones that enable the strengthening of appropriate capacity (indigenous and non-traditional) that empower stakeholders within these border areas to better advocate for their peace and security at local, national and international levels. In this process, learn and apply USAID procedures and tools for monitoring, reporting and evaluating results, including the Performance Monitoring Plan. A special function will be the identification and reporting of success stories that represent to non-development professionals in a succinct, graphic and compelling manner the impact of CPMR and good governance programming.
- Build effective relationships with other USAID and donor entities working in these areas, especially those working in related development sectors (food security, HIV/AIDS), and including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition Initiatives, Food for Peace, and intergovernmental, governmental, civil society, and private sector organizations.
- Review and comment on CPMR documents, strategic plans, results packages, and implementation of CPMR activities, and utilize knowledge, skills and experience gained to prepare a written report of substantial relevance especially in meeting the emerging challenges of CPMR and anti-corruption programming in the region.

**AIMS OF THE FELLOWSHIP:** In addition to accomplishing REDSO/ESA objectives in the area of CPMR and governance, the Fellowship will accomplish the following:

- Increased knowledge of the Fellow about strategies to address fragile, failing, and recovering states and the effect of relief and development assistance on conflict and the potential for conflict in the region - including the tools of basic and operational research, vulnerability assessments and portfolio analyses, and CPMR pilot activities.
- Involvement of the Fellow in developing local professional and organizational capacity - including individuals and indigenous CPMR institutions and practices - to foster sustainable relationships and thereby increase the likelihood that the benefits of the Fellow's efforts will last beyond the term of the Fellowship.
- Application and further development of the Fellow's knowledge and skills in a new setting to increase commitment of the Fellow to a career in CPMR and good governance, especially in relation to developing the sustainable capacity and effectiveness of civil society institutions like the media and faith-based organizations.

- Completion of several substantial critically-assessed professional-level case studies that can serve as the basis of reporting on program impact definable during the Fellowship to advance the field of CPMK and governance, and the Fellow's post-fellowship career.

#### REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

- Fellow will work with the Chief of the Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office of KEDSO/ESA.
- Fellow will report on progress quarterly. Report will include a revised program description and plan detailing goals, objectives, activities, outcomes, accomplishments, problems and results of the fellow's activities. A final report within 30 days of Fellowship conclusion is required, in addition to the substantial independent work.

**QUALIFICATIONS:** A Master's degree and minimum five years related to the field of DC/Conflict is required. It is highly preferable that a candidate has training and work experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, preferably in the Greater Horn and among pastoral groups; training and work experience relevant to addressing issues related to fragile states (i.e., fragile, failing, failed, and recovering), in designing and implementing field programs in CPMK and in DC; in working not only with civil society but also governmental and intergovernmental organizations and partnerships, and in monitoring and evaluating such programs. Language skills appropriate to the Horn are preferred, e.g., Kiswahili, Amharic, Somali, or French, as is evidence of strong oral, writing and other documentation skills.

Fellow-29-3-04

# FINAL REPORT

## World Learning Democracy Fellowship Program

### USAID/Guatemala

To / A: Ellen Garrett

From / De: Bill Cartwright

Date / Fecha: April 27, 2004

Re: / Asunto: Final Report

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#### Introduction

My World Learning Democracy Fellowship (Fellowship) began in September 2004 with the signing of the official agreement in Washington D.C. I was given the Fellowship to work with the Office of Democratic Initiatives ("ODI") at USAID/Guatemala's offices in Guatemala City. Prior to the signing of the agreement, a work plan was developed in cooperation with the Deputy Director of USAID/Guatemala, Todd Amani. In developing the work plan USAID/Guatemala's interests and the reality of the current situation in Guatemala had to be analyzed.

The reality of Guatemala today was quite different than ten years ago. In 1996 the Peace Accords were signed in Guatemala, thus officially ending its nearly 35 year old civil war. The civil war was particularly brutal, characterized by massive human rights violations that have resulted in several high profile cases involving international crimes against humanity charges and allegations of genocide. Particularly affected during the war and still the victims of marginalization and discrimination is the indigenous population, which makes up approximately 40% of the population. Beyond open military conflict, many of the problems that directly affected Guatemala and its population during the civil war still persist today. These include: rampant levels of corruption and a lack of transparency; a lack of security and uncontrollable organized and gang crime activity; judicial inefficiency and a weakened rule of law (despite large international investment); an enormous disparity of wealth; a lack of basic services (e.g. potable water, a strong infrastructure and sanitation services); and a lack of confidence in governmental institutions.

At the time of my arrival I analyzed USAID/Guatemala's reality. USAID/Guatemala was completing its fiscal year, completing its five year long-term development plan, planning and budgeting its next fiscal year and planning and budgeting its next five-year plan. To close and open the annual and five-year programs several major documents had to be drafted within about two months: 1) the Portfolio Review which each area (including ODI) which had to be developed and presented to the country Director, Glenn Anders; 2) the Annual Report for Washington D.C. due in mid-December; 3) the Performance Monitoring Program ("PMP"), which consists of a list of indicators with baselines goals for the upcoming year and long-term programs; 4) a monitoring system to keep track of indicators to ensure that baselines and targets were being met; and several new documents required by USAID/Washington.

In the specific situation of ODI at the time of my arrival, the Human Rights program and the Civil Society programs were being closed out. The previous Rule of Law work was in the process of being modified and expanded in order to reflect current trends, interests and needs. Three new programs were being developed to replace closed out programs for ODI's next five year long-term development program. The new ODI programming fell under Strategic Objective #1 "Ruling Justly: More Responsive, Transparent Governance" ("SO1"). SO1 consisted of the following programs: 1) the Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability program; 2) the Rule of Law program; and the Governance program.

Also upon my arrival the office was also undergoing major staff changes and replacements. One Cognizant Technical Officer ("CTO") for human rights had left, two other CTOs (Rule of Law-Oscar Chavarria and Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability-Carla Aguilar) had been working with USAID for about or less than three years, the Director of ODI, Sharon Van Pelt, had been designated approximately a year earlier, a long-time program assistant had left and a new (extremely experienced and invaluable USAID office manager was assigned a month after I arrived). The CTO for the Local Governance program, Alfredo Calderon, was hired about a month after I arrived. These ODI staffing changes greatly affected the composition of the office, particularly given that the staff was composed of seven or eight people. Another major change that was (and I believe still is) being negotiated was the decision to change USAID/Guatemala as the regional headquarters for USAID in the region to USAID/El Salvador. This would require broader administrative staff changes. There was some confusion at first as to the new structure taking shape in USAID/Guatemala, however, since I was new to the post and everyone else was newer or relatively new to their posts I tried to jump on board as fast as possible. This required me to learn "AID-speak" and AID procedures as quickly as possible. Many of the terms and significance of the reporting documents procedures were new to me.

I presented myself for work within days of signing the Democracy Fellowship agreement in Washington D.C.. USAID/Guatemala's Director, Deputy Director and ODI were a bit unprepared for and surprised by such a rapid arrival. I had understood that once the terms of an agreement with World Learning were agreed upon that there would be a delay in my arrival to allow for following-up on loose ends at previous projects and time to pack and move. However, due to the short term of the Democracy Fellowship and the probable end of the Democracy Fellowship Program itself, a rapid deployment was necessary. It turned out that the three new program areas were still in the bidding process and that final decisions were not made as to which firms would be designated the implementing partners. Since this

bidding and negotiating process is extremely confidential I was not a participant in the proceedings. The CTOs and the Director of ODI handled this process. It was not until mid-December that all of the implementing partners were chosen and that short and long-term work plans were being negotiated. At the time of my departure in late January 2005, the designated implementing partners designated for ODI's for Fiscal Year ("FY") 2005 (which began October 1, 2005) new projects had either yet to sign final contracts or had yet to initiate any substantive work in the three programs despite the fact that first quarterly progress reports would soon be due. Of the now closed out programs, Civil Society had a small extension until March 2005 for a Youth at-Risk program and the Human Rights program implementing partner on a regional socio-political and economic regional survey requested and received a no-cost extension until the end of November 2004 to submit deliverables. Also, although not specifically a part of the Human Rights program, a long-term body exhumation program was given additional funding for the next three years to continue its efforts to help identify victims of the bloody civil war. Another State Department grant provided up to \$100,000 for DNA testing due to the fact that as time goes on the bodies will become more and more difficult to identify.

My original Democracy Fellowship work-plan had my time divided into several innovative areas including: developing ways to avoid regional duplication of resources and to promote cross-border cooperation in areas AID-funded countries had in common (e.g. anti-corruption, local governance etc); developing ideas to promote cooperation between USAID/Guatemala's different program areas where there was an overlap or duplication of activities (e.g. ODI's Local Governance and the Health and Education area); working with ODI officers in areas where assistance may be needed; and researching and drafting analytical studies of substantive issues that could assist future development plans for USAID/Guatemala and the other regional democracy offices.

Between the time the Democracy Fellowship work-plan was developed and my arrival in Guatemala, political, geographic and economic changes had take place throughout the region. I already have mentioned changes within USAID/Guatemala and ODI that also occurred. These changes were discussed within ODI and at higher levels and my work-plan had to be somewhat modified to reflect the new situation. As stated above, new substantive work had not yet begun when I arrived nor at the time of my departure. As a result I was initially assigned to work on drafting the Portfolio Review and the PMP and ODI indicators. I was to coordinate this work with the new office manager and the CTOs since their substantive and financial input was necessary to meet the new official reporting prerequisites for these documents. The CTOs at this point were extremely busy closing out old programs and beginning new programs. It was at times difficult to get their time to gather information for inclusion into the documents but they were flexible and willing to meet before or after work or even weekends. I got the distinct impression that the CTOs did not fully understand the true purpose of the documents and also that they felt they were tedious and more administrative in nature and therefore beyond their responsibilities. At first the terminology and significance of the documents was new to me but as time passed on I was learning a lot about USAID and its procedures. Also, despite being new to the office, new USAID requirements for each document and the addition of yet more required documentation put everyone in the office in an uncertain state as to what exactly was being requested and why.

I feel that nonetheless, working and developing these documents was on the balance a positive experience since I had never worked within USAID. The following sections enter into more detail as to the nature of these documents as well as other areas I worked with during my time as a Democracy Fellow with USAID/Guatemala.

## Regional Cooperation and Development

One of the most interesting aspects of the Fellowship was the possibility to promote coordination with other USAID Democracy Offices in the region that worked in areas of common interest. This would avoid the duplication of resources and allow some form of uniformity in dealing with such areas as anti-corruption and local governance. For Central America, the Central American and Mexico ("CAM") initiative contemplates such cross-border cooperation between the USAID Missions on several issues.

For many years such cross-border cooperation has been discussed. I was truly excited about the possibility of utilizing the CAM initiative to help develop region-wide projects in Central America. The CAM initiative contemplates work in six countries: 1) Mexico; 2) Guatemala; 3) El Salvador; 4) Honduras; 5) Nicaragua; and 6) Panama (Belize and Costa Rica have no bilateral programs with USAID). Technically the initiative still exists although I saw little or no regional initiatives actually taking place. Upon my arrival it did not take me long to realize that individual country Mission needs and individual Mission Director interests varied country to country. Most cross-border cooperation programs were dictated and funded by Washington USAID rather than by individual country USAID Mission Directors as I had originally understood.

However, as stated above, a holdover from the now closed out Human Rights program was a regional socio-political and economic survey of countries in the region. Since the CTO for the Human Rights program left five days after I arrived and I had this regional component in my Fellowship description, I was assigned to work with this study until it was completed. As stated above the implementing partner supervising the program requested and received a 30 day no-cost extension allowing the deadline for submission of deliverables to be November 31, 2004 rather than October 30, 2004.

The study was/is called the Democracy Indicators Monitoring System survey (DIMS). There were three types of surveys conducted in the DIMS study, regional, national, and over-sampling reports. The DIMS regional and country reports for 2004 cover eight countries, including the all six contemplated in the CAM initiative: 1) Mexico; 2) Guatemala; 3) El Salvador; 4) Honduras; 5) Nicaragua; 6) Panama; 7) Costa Rica; and 8) Colombia (Belize still excluded). The current 2004 DIMS studies covered the 2002-2004 time periods. The surveys were also conducted in 2004 in Bolivia and Ecuador (for the Andean Region) and the Dominican Republic for the Caribbean. The hope is to include at least one country from the southern cone and Brazil to be able to have an Americas survey. Funding for the DIMS study did not come at the initiative of the CAM countries' USAID Mission Directors but rather from the Washington USAID Latin American division (LACAP).

DIMS country, regional and over-sampling studies for 2004 were conducted via an Indefinite Quantity Contract ("IQC") via an implementing partner and then subcontracted to Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University ("Mitch") and then subcontracted again to individual survey organizations and companies in each of the DIMS participating countries. Mitch designed and conducted many such surveys in the region. The studies use detailed scientific calculations to calculate a vast array of perceptions on state institutions, economics, local governance, corruption, crime, security issues, rule of law issues, and electoral and political party reform. Unfortunately in the past individual DIMS/Country surveys could not be used to compare the perceptions of one country of the region to another since the surveys were originally not developed, conducted or analyzed in a uniform fashion. Fortunately for the 2002-2004 surveys a uniform system was developed throughout the region and allows for comparison of progress in one country compared with other CAM countries for at least this latest 2004 study. Guatemala has been conducting DIMS/Country surveys for the last ten years.

The procedures, questionnaire and analysis utilized for the 2004 DIMS surveys in the region were systematized during two regional Democracy Officer meetings which were held with the implementing partners, Mitch and the subcontracting survey companies in each individual country. In the last meeting in August 2004, the Democracy Officers of the region met in Panama to discuss the overall CAM initiative and to review the individual CAM country plans. The meetings did not result in overall closer cooperation since each USAID Mission continued to raise issues special to their own programs and perceived individual country needs. I would like to emphasize that USAID/Guatemala's ODI intermediate results and indicators coincide with the CAM initiative proposal and to the extent possible will continue to propose cross-border cooperation with the other CAM countries in areas of common interest.

As a result of these individual needs and interests some over-sampling surveys were developed (only Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Colombia wanted such surveys and in the end Colombia did not complete the study). These were tailor made smaller surveys that addressed country-specific issues. Later analysis showed that the over-sampling reports were very different in structure, substance and design and that no regional conclusions could be made on the specific over-sampling topics. In Guatemala's case the quality of the over-sampling report was not very good and the ODI Director and I worked closely with the local survey NGO in charge of actually conducting the survey and several drafts were passed back and forth throughout December 2004 until a final copy was accepted by USAID/Guatemala.

After going through the DIMS files it became apparent that Guatemala, as the regional USAID coordinating office, was responsible for receiving: a DIMS/Country report for each participating country; a DIMS/Regional report comparing the individual DIMS/Country reports (and therefore CAM country reports); a "lessons learned" report from Mitch to improve the quality of the surveys in 2006 (if the Mission Country Directors agree); and DIMS/Over-sampling reports from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia. From the day of my arrival there were several questions and doubts regarding the implementing partner's contractual obligations with USAID/Guatemala. Some of the concerns included: 1) the number of copies and format of these reports (hard or PDF) that had to be delivered to USAID/Guatemala; 2) the specific deliverables individual countries'

Democracy Officers were receiving; the languages used in these various DIMS reports; 3) the reports that still had not been completed; and 3) whether the implementing partner complied with its sometimes ambiguous contractual obligations; and 4) the mixed communication due to work conducted by an implementing partner; the subcontractor, Mitch, and eight sub-subcontractors working independently out of eight different countries.

I reviewed the rather large case file and mapped out the study and the implementing partner's contractual obligations. I submitted detailed summaries and came to the conclusion that despite some confusion that the implementing partner had complied with its obligations with the exception of the requirement of public seminars in Washington D.C. and in a Latin American country to disseminate the results of the surveys. I made recommendations for future DIMS studies such as streamlined communications (avoid CTO changes when possible and communicate directly with the implementing partner and require that partner to communicate with its subcontractors and sub-subcontractor); English and Spanish translations for all deliverables; studying the utility of over-sampling reports and ensure the organization to conduct the over-sampling surveys; and enforcing much higher uniform quality control by the contracting company (the sub-subcontractors in each country used a uniform questionnaire, however, the quality of the reports themselves varied country to country). I also reported that the "lessons learned" report submitted by Mitch was a ten page unsolicited bid to USAID by Mitch for a new project with about a page of commentary on the need to make public and disseminate and publicize the results of the recent surveys. There also was no follow-up DIMS or CAM country meeting of Democracy Officers to review the 2004 results or to plan for a 2006 DIMS survey. I was told that another study would either have to again be paid for by Washington AID or the Mission Directors would have to agree to work together again.

I closely analyzed the entire set of reports regarding Guatemala and was overall very impressed with the results. I previously have worked with Gallup on a Presidential poll in Costa Rica and was impressed with the scientific standards used for accuracy. The Guatemalan reports were revealing in many surprising ways. The Regional Report was equally impressive, however, it was mistakenly not required that it be translated to Spanish, virtually eliminating its utility. I also discovered from ASIES, the Guatemalan sub-subcontractor, that the software for the DIMS/Country and Regional studies was easy to use. I sent out a USAID/Guatemala Mission-wide invitation to participate in the training of use of the software and how to utilize it to seek specific information from the DIMS surveys for 2004. The information is rich and goes far beyond what was delivered in the published reports. Many other variables could be analyzed that would allow regional or inter-departmental USAID cooperation in future development initiatives. I received approximately 15 responses from the various areas in USAID/Guatemala and was working with ASIES to conduct such a training, acquire the software necessary at the AID/Guatemala Mission and to transfer all of the data from all of the 2004 surveys to USAID/ Guatemala. Logistics for the trainings were in full preparation at the time of my departure and were scheduled for late January 2005.

At the same time, Mitch's suggestion in his "lessons learned" report regarding the dissemination and publication of the results of the survey were taken to heart by the USAID/Guatemalan Mission Director. I developed a power point program and held an in-Mission brown bag on various areas presented in the Guatemalan surveys. The presentation

was well received and I began negotiations with ASIES to present public presentations to donors, government officials and perhaps in municipalities (the obligation that the implementing partner had not comply with). One of the ASIES experts was contacted to present the information and a tentative early May date was scheduled to begin the speaking tour. After my departure I am not sure of the results. Plans were also made to publish the reports on the internet for maximum utilization.

I feel the DIMS studies were of extremely high quality, very useful tools for future development planning and investment and that they were not extraordinarily expensive. I think it is one of the best AID projects I have seen. I could submit a copy of my power point presentation and remarks on some unexpected Guatemalan results if World Learning would like. An independent consulting firm was contracted in Washington D.C. to review and comment on the quality of the DIMS surveys, and that firm concluded that the design, implementation and analysis of the surveys were of the highest quality. I can forward World Learning an electronic copy of the DIMS/Guatemala survey if so desired.

Beyond the DIMS surveys I was only informed of one other cross-border cooperation effort between individual Democracy Officers, and at the time of my departure it was still in the negotiation process between the only countries that agreed to participate such a regional effort, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. This was for the Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability Program and I was not invited to participate in the negotiations since they were considered extremely confidential. During my Democracy Fellowship I noticed that many delays and problems were not exclusively the result of problems with implementing but rather resulted from the desires and needs of the individual country Democracy Officers and CTOs in the various USAID Missions of the region. As stated above, I saw little possibility during the time of my Fellowship for further Regional Cooperation.

I am not sure if there were other regional initiatives in the works. I was not informed if there were. I found this unfortunate since the regional cooperation aspect of my Democracy Fellowship was extremely interesting for me. It must also have been of interest to World Learning, and at the time USAID/Guatemala, since \$15,000 was budgeted into my Fellowship budget for this reason. Within the first few days of my arrival I mentioned this budgeted amount to the ODI Director, however, she dismissed it as of no real value at that point to even investigate cross-border areas particularly since USAID/Guatemala was in the process of "reporting" my help was needed elsewhere. Here I disagreed and thought arranging a group Democracy Officer meeting or at least meeting with some of the Democracy Officers to revitalize the CAM initiative would have been beneficial.

### **Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP)**

In addition to the DIMS surveys, I was almost immediately assigned to develop the various sets of indicators ODI had to monitor for the upcoming FYs, starting first by completing and submitting the PMP. The draft PMP I was originally given was first drafted the previous year and was basic and incomplete. During my time as a Democracy Fellow I continuously updated the PMP indicators as each of the SO1 programs developed. I developed and

submitted a detailed matrix of the updated indicators, those responsible for monitoring each indicator and where results were to be reported. The development of the indicators included: the identification of the category of the indicator; its unit of measure; the source and frequency of the information to monitor the indicator was available; the person or CTO responsible to monitor the indicator; Baselines and Targets; the monitoring method and where the information would be reported; and miscellaneous notes. Again, I had to work closely with the CTOs and the Director of ODI on each indicator.

The draft PMP I was originally given contained approximately 18 indicators, including: Government Effectiveness; Judicial Performance; Government Responsiveness; Government Transparency; Legal and Judicial Performance; Judicial Responsiveness; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACC) Compliance (this indicator was still impossible to monitor at the time of my departure); Budget Transparency (no existing organization was actively analyzing this subject in Guatemala at the time of my departure); Local Government Resource Management; Local Government Accountability; Corruption Victimization; Percentage of Cases Conducted Through Proper Oral Hearings; Number of Crime Initiatives Implemented; Municipalities with Improved Public Services; Number of Signed Agreements with Municipalities; Civil Society Organizations Implementing Social Auditing Programs; and Critical Transparency Laws Developed and Presented to Congress (still being developed at the time of my departure). As of late January 2005 there were two other indicators still being discussed and modified for the PMP.

Although all of the approved indicators listed in the PMP must be monitored in various ways, usually five or six indicators are placed in the Portfolio Review and they must, in accordance with USAID regulations, be published in the following year's Annual Report. Due to the ambiguity of various PMP indicators and the fact that the FY2005 substantive work had not yet begun, baseline starting success levels and future target goals were difficult to guarantee or even estimate. In the new Rule of Law, Local Governance and Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability programs, which officially began in October in 2004 various circumstances made it virtually impossible to establish even baselines until at least September 2005, therefore passing the October 1 FY2006 deadline for any indication of improvement for next year's Portfolio Review and Annual Report. To demonstrate improvement in the three new programs for FY2005, four new "easier" indicators were created that would show short-term results. These were added to the December 2004 Portfolio Review and Annual Report and will allow a progress report for the FY2006 Annual Report.

In December 2004, the State Department required all areas of USAID to set indicators for specific areas that it intended to use in a systematized manner on a worldwide basis sometime in the future (no date has been set and circumstances for such uniformity obviously can change rapidly). There were four indicators in the charts sent to USAID/Guatemala that affected ODI and in some separate manner had to be monitored. The purpose of this exercise was unclear to everyone, however, the indicators were included in the matrix I developed. During the internal Portfolio Review, the USAID/Guatemala Deputy Director instructed ODI to also monitor several new areas internally to see if progress in the new programs was being made (e.g. monitor the drafting of new anti-corruption legislation).

In all there were close to thirty indicators of one type or another that are to be monitored at least during FY2005. There has been great debate as to the category a specific indicator could fall into (e.g. intermediate or context etc.). I analyzed the USAID manual on indicators and the context indicator is one where the USAID Mission has little or no control over the improvements or setbacks of a specific indicator (e.g. crime victimization). In my observation, USAID has little control over whether any of the indicators will show improvement or not. I feel this way perhaps because I was new to AID but I was assured by the ODI Director that this was not the case and that context indicators were the weakest and least sought after of the indicator types. The dense manual I read on indicators was not much more revealing and certainly was not a page turner. Analyzing the many indicators could be considered interesting in analyzing trends yet I felt that the extra work on an already reduced ODI staff and CTOs may be more burdensome than beneficial to demonstrate any real change in programming results. The atmosphere seemed to be that the only really important indicators were those placed in the Portfolio Review. Again, perhaps due to my lack of years of experience I may be wrong but I would not like to think that creating indicators for the sake of it was worth the resources to properly conduct follow-up.

I submitted my most updated indicator lists and matrix to the ODI Director prior to my departure. I do not know what the final versions of the above mentioned indicators contain. I also am not sure if this is an internal document but I am sure it would be available to World Learning if requested.

### **Portfolio Review & Annual Report**

The Portfolio Review is a document closing out a prior fiscal year's programs and assessing that year's progress in ongoing projects. The document is also a tool used to design plans for future years. The rules of drafting the document are very strict and must be adhered to in order to create each Annual Report. Unfortunately both reports are due almost simultaneously after the beginning of each new Fiscal Year, October 1. In ODI's case the situation was compounded by the completion of two of its three programs, the modification of a third, the addition of two new programs and a stalled negotiation process with implementing partners. The delays in the negotiation, bidding and work-plan were the result of outside elements. The CTOs and the Director of ODI were constantly trying to expedite the process and pressuring to make sure everyone was clear on what obligations, responsibilities and results were expected. The ODI Director constantly submitted constructive criticism and pressured the relatively new CTOs to make progress in the new FY2005 programs. Obviously with three new long-term programs beginning simultaneously there would be delays but the programs were beginning to be extensive and concrete results were required.

The Portfolio Review is a financial and substantive report of what was completed in the last FY and under the rules of this year's guidelines what targets are to be expected in FY2006 and FY2007. As mentioned above, the indicators mentioned in FY2005's Portfolio Review will have to be reported on in the next FY's Annual Report. Indicators were selected carefully to show positive results. Additionally, this year's FY2005 guidelines required that

results and expectations within the Portfolio Review be placed under specific supplied strategic objective indicators categories. I believe the categories numbered 1-35.

The following is a brief summary of just some of the work completed in FY2004 and in some way reported in the Portfolio Review as results in the FY2005 reports. I have broken the results down by specific goals achieved that fell under specific programs. Where possible I describe an individual program's progress on its own. This is not a comprehensive list of the results achieved in FY2004. Like the PMP I am sure a copy of the Portfolio Review would be available from USAID/Guatemala if requested by World Learning.

**Civil Society Program:** In FY2004 the Civil Society Program worked in four main areas: 1) Combating Ethnic Discrimination and Racism; 2) Public Security (*also mentioned below*); 3) Congressional Strengthening; and 4) Transparency and Anti-Corruption. The Program's long-term planning was developed to promote eight Civil Society Organizations (CSO) coalitions to promote democracy in Guatemala. By the end of FY 2004 all eight were functioning and now have the potential to continue to function without further USAID support in the upcoming fiscal years. To achieve this goal, USAID/Guatemala developed a new and vibrant program that permits CSOs open and free participation in the national political process. The eight CSOs worked together with the Government of Guatemala (GOG) institutions and were each assigned twenty one target goals, of which USAID/Guatemala planned to fulfill fifteen. By the end of FY 2004 all fifteen goals were achieved. In combating ethnic discrimination, several CSOs (e.g. PAQ'UCH) developed a proposal to reform the Judicial System so as to include indigenous customs and practices in its procedures. As part of the 1996 Peace Accords, USAID/Guatemala supported the development of a national Public Policy Proposal for Combating Ethnic Discrimination. Furthermore, USAID/Guatemala's continued work in crime prevention opened the way for the inauguration of "Casa Joven Eddy Gomez". The Center is a self-help and training facility for disadvantaged youth. Based on this experience democratically elected Guatemalan President, Oscar Berger, donated a Presidential Property, similar to the U.S.' Camp David, to a coalition of CSOs in order to open a new center for youth at-risk. During FY2004 USAID/Guatemala continued its efforts to improve transparency and effective governance. The Civil Society program directly funded the "Transparency Coalition" which strives to improve the transparent selection process of the Controller General of the Republic which will hopefully result in the eventual transparent selection of all public servants. The non-governmental organization (NGO) coalition "Citizen Observer" composed of several core groups that monitor the progress of the draft Freedom of Information Law will increase support for future transparency and anti-corruption legislation in Guatemala.

**Electoral Support:** USAID/Guatemala supported many initiatives to ensure that the 2003 elections were fair and transparent. The heated and sometimes violent last elections ended in a closely contested second round of voting. During the second round, USAID/Guatemala again supported local election observation efforts called "Mirador Electoral" (or quick count) that helped confirm the official results and gave the Guatemalan people confidence in the electoral process. In the Electoral Process' Final Report, statistics showed that the whole electoral process was fair and that

voter turnout had significantly increased in comparison with previous elections. The data in the Final Report was supported by the Organization of American States' ("OAS") Technical Assistance program (in cooperation with USAID/Guatemala) in the OAS' final report to the Guatemalan Supreme Electoral Tribunal in its final report.

**Youth At-Risk Program/Crime Prevention:** On September 22, 2004 a new cooperative agreement was signed to implement USAID/Guatemala's "Crime Prevention for Vulnerable Youth Alliance". This Program was funded by the Global Development Alliance Secretariat and ESF USAID-Guatemala Funds the agreement inaugurated an eighteen month Program that will end on March 2006. This Program is oriented to promote public/private alliances between organizations that support crime prevention activities and help produce new jobs and training for vulnerable and at-risk youth. The Program will work in five select areas and will provide technical assistance to collaborating local partners to address the expected impacts of the results of field activities (e.g. reduction of crime victims in selected areas and the implementation of effective, sustainable crime prevention programs). The program's technical assistance approach is based on a long and deep experience between Guatemalan CSOs and a long-term U.S. implementing partner. (USAID's implementing partner). The public name of the Program is "USAID Youth Alliance Program".

**Local Governance:** In FY2004 USAID/Guatemala continued its efforts to promote increased citizen participation and to strengthen local governments in Guatemala as part of its overall Civil Society program. As part of its long-term goals Local Governance was a particularly successful program. USAID/Guatemala originally targeted ten pilot communities to implement a new Municipal Code and to restructure the socio-political hierarchy of community governance. By the end of FY 2004, fifteen, rather than ten, communities were fully functioning under the newly developed Municipal Code. The program was also successful in that it created a 4% municipal increase in basic services coverage (potable water, sanitation, etc.). Additionally the Program created an average of a 25% increase in municipal tax base funding and collection. In FY2004 local elections resulted in a change in municipal authorities that had not yet received USAID/Guatemala training. Despite the change in local authorities, new training was required and progress in the consolidation process continued. Additionally USAID/Guatemala began and will continue work to systematize a new Civil Registry system in order to properly document important areas such as national identity and birth and death certificates. Of the fifteen successful municipalities, five pilot communities were given software to create a systematized civil registry system. The success of these five communities will be replicated in coming years.

**DIMS Reports (see above):** The national Guatemala DIMS, the regional DIMS and the Guatemalan over-sampling surveys for 2004 were released in October 2004. These surveys are not directly indicative of the success of any specific USAID/Guatemala sponsored project but rather comment on the mood of Guatemalans and citizens of the region on various socio-political and economic issues. It is hoped that the Mission Directors of the region will feel that these

surveys are an invaluable tool and that the surveys will be repeated on a regional basis for the 2004-2006 period.

The following is a brief description of some of the work hoped to be completed in FY2005 for the new three programs under SO1 (Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption, Transparency Accountability and Local Governance). Under this year's guidelines for drafting the Portfolio Review and the Annual Report, USAID required that the Portfolio Review include future target results for each of the three new programs for FY2006 and FY2007. Because at the time of my departure these programs had not yet begun significant substantive work I feel that the targets included in the Portfolio Review were somewhat unreliable, almost "guesstimates", and therefore I will only give a brief description of some of what is hoped in FY 2005. Again I will describe the desired results both in terms of activities and where possible programs.

**Rule of Law:** In FY2005 the expansion of more efficient procedures in pre-trial proceedings will be implemented, translating into a more law abiding process for both victims and defendants. As a result, less time consuming and more effective legal proceedings are expected. In order to meet this goal, technical assistance will be provided to the Judiciary, the Public Ministry and the Public Defense Institute, so that they can develop and consolidate the tools needed to adequately conduct oral hearings, create management and monitoring systems, utilize alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution, strengthen disciplinary systems, and create professional career structures (as opposed to short-term political posts). The geographical scope of FY2005's assistance will cover at least 14 departmental 2 municipal jurisdictions. Also in FY2005, Crime Prevention activities will begin in the said jurisdictions, promoting actions that would reduce the opportunity for criminal activities. The program plans to improve recreation programs and public services in order to provide good lighting, better parks and crime awareness activities. A sub-award program will be designated in order to provide CSO expertise, oversight and participation in crime reduction efforts.

The new Rule of Law program will help continue to promote and protect human rights and equal access to justice, however, in very different ways from the now closed out Human Rights program. In FY2005 funds will be invested to improve the Human Rights Ombudsman's (HRO) capacity to follow-up on alleged violations of human rights. The Due Process Unit of the HRO office will undergo a process of strengthening and training, so that they will be better able to collect, analyze and systematize information and define institutional policies regarding due process.

**Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability Program:** During FY2005 technical assistance will be provided to national authorities, such as the Presidential Transparency Commissioner, the Congressional Probity Committee, the Controller General Office and the Anti-Corruption unit of the Public Ministry. Technical assistance will focus on the promotion and development of a National Transparency/Anti-Corruption Agenda and to promote Guatemalan compliance with the IACC. Guatemala's compliance with the IACC will be evaluated by the follow-up mechanism established within the treaty by the Organization of American States OAS in early 2005. Guatemala is a party to the treaty. Recommendations by the OAS

committee will be submitted to the GOG, and USAID/Guatemala will support oversight for compliance of the treaty. Technical and financial support will be provided to key local partners to develop similar oversight activities and to promote social audits through a special grants fund. Special activities will be developed to promote transparency of public expenditures through the final ratification of a long delayed Freedom of Information Law.

**Local Governance and Decentralization:** Building on the success of projects in FY 2004, USAID/Guatemala will continue its efforts to promote strong local governance in years to come. In FY 2005 an expanded and improved strong municipal government will be promoted in order to provide increased basic services and proper tax collection in at least ten new municipalities. The program will enhance coordination between local governments and the private sector (e.g. the national network "Grupo Gestores" –a public interest citizen group– and private business interests). The Program will also provide support for multi-disciplinary governmental teams to implement and follow up on the GOG's decentralization process, with emphasis on collaboration between GOG social program destined funds and municipalities. USAID also plans to promote better dialogue between national and local actors for the implementation of the new municipal tax code.

**Strengthen Democratic National and Local Governance Institutions:** The program will work effectively with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to implement and enhance tax collection and strive for an increased tax base in 15 additional municipalities. The program will collaborate with the MOF and the National Institute for Municipal Development (INFOM) to establish Municipal Financial Management Units (AFIMS) and Municipal Audit Units. In FY 2005, the Program hopes to provide more training for the National Association of Municipal Mayors (ANAM) and the Guatemalan Association of Indigenous Authorities and Mayors (AGAAM) in order to allow CSO participants greater participation on public policy issues.

**Strengthen Democratic National Governance Institutions:** In November 2004, the Congressional Technical Assistance Program presented a draft reform to the Ley Organica del Congreso (the Congressional Rules of Procedure) to the Congressional Management Board. Next steps include the need to adjust some of the terminology of the draft Bill and to submit it to the Congressional floor for final approval. The Congressional Technical Committee, working with USAID/Guatemala, is the committee responsible for the technical accuracy of the Bill. The reform is politically sensitive at this moment and it will need not just political will but also a strong consensus in order to pass. USAID/Guatemala will support the Congressional Technical Committee and the Management Board in its efforts by providing them with technical assistance and training on how to draft legislation. These reforms will make Congress a much more transparent and efficient institution and will also modify the decision making policy previously established. The Program will reinforce the political management of Congress and help to institutionalize political parties and the political process. The Congressional Management Board was to hold elections in January 2005 but they still had not been held as of my departure. Regardless of the results of the election

USAID/Guatemala intends to move forward and expects to work with the new Management Board to ensure the approval of the reforms.

**Promote and Support Free and Fair Elections:** In working towards fair and transparent 2007 general elections, USAID/Guatemala is providing technical assistance to the Congressional Electoral Reform Committee. In early 2004, a reform to the Electoral Law was passed by the Congress. However, the reform did not address such important issues as democratization of the political parties (e.g. primaries and a broader voter representation), campaign finance issues or the participation of indigenous peoples and women in the electoral process. The reform was passed without any consultation with CSOs and as a result USAID/Guatemala will help develop a data base of CSO initiatives that already exist in this area. These activities will be developed by supporting local NGOs, such as "Accion Ciudadana", which has vast expertise in the field. Although the purpose of this program is to support the elections to be held in FY 2007, funding was expected to end in May, 2005, and barring the arrival of new funding the program may be closed out. I have no updated information as to whether such funding was renewed.

**Youth At-Risk/Crime Prevention Program (also mentioned in the above 2004 summary):** During the first year of implementation, the USAID Young Alliance Program was expected to develop and improve a methodology focused on strengthening local Councils for Crime Prevention (CPSs) or to create new ones when necessary. Technical assistance was to be provided to local CSO and local government authorities to develop and implement community-based crime prevention activities and centers of training and self-help for vulnerable and at-risk youth. National and local alliances with private sector and non-profit organizations were to be developed to support and provide self-sustainability to these efforts. The Program worked with the local coalition APREDEF, a longtime partner of USAID/Guatemala CSP in this area. Training to enhance local capacities was to be provided to local partners. A short-term extension of these efforts and activities has been granted by USAID/Guatemala. However, barring the arrival of new or renewed funding, the program is scheduled to end in March 2006. I have no updated information as to whether new funds were found to continue the program.

**Exhumation Project:** This program was previously managed under the now closed out Human Rights program. The civil war left many unidentified bodies in many yet to be exhumed mass graves. The majority of the victims were indigenous and as part of their culture and religion recovering their dead family members brings closure to the painful events that occurred during the war. Although not specifically a part of the Human Rights program, the body exhumation program was given additional funding for the next three years to continue its efforts to help identify victims of the bloody civil war. Another State Department human rights grant provided up to \$100,000 for DNA testing due to the fact that as time goes on the bodies are becoming more and more difficult to identify.

As with the PMP, the Portfolio Review was a complex, detailed and extremely regulated document that consumed much of my time during my stay as a Fellow. The documents were constantly updated. However, it was an excellent exercise in learning the internal

workings of USAID. Given the short staffing, cooperation and long hours were required to accomplish these goals.

I suppose my only problem with helping to draft the documents was more technical than substantive. Due to initial security clearance problems and internal USAID/Guatemala misunderstandings there was a short delay in getting me full access to the building and more importantly getting me on-line with USAID/Guatemala. I therefore used my personal laptop for a time. When I was given on-line privileges I was given a computer that had serious defects that caused the machine to crash or revert updated documents to older versions. This was very frustrating and I worked closely with the Mission's Information Services who could provide no explanation other than some virus. Information Services even changed the hard drive. I was promised an updated machine but the machine was never delivered. On my last day at USAID/Guatemala, Information Services again had to ask me not to use my computer for fear of losing the latest documents I was working on. Fortunately hard copies were kept of all updates. During lapses where I could not use my work computer, I would at first use my personal laptop but after a series of robberies within the USAID/Guatemala building, including a laptop, I refused to bring my computer back into the building until locked cabinets were installed.

### Inter-Departmental Cooperation

During my Fellowship there was much talk of having the different SOs within USAID/Guatemala cooperate in areas of common interest. This was an extension of the cross-border CAM initiative mentioned above. During the reporting period mentioned above a first meeting of members of the various SOs was set for January to investigate possible overlap in programming and cooperation opportunities. The idea was to intensify cooperation to avoid duplication of resources and to give USAID/Guatemala a more unified image to the public. The Mission Director strongly supported this initiative. I worked closely with the CTO for the Local Governance program to organize the meeting and establish the forum. The meeting was a success and it looked like there was definite overlap in areas such as health and education with local governance. The CTO presented a compelling case for cooperation between various aspects of the SOs. It was agreed that due to the diversity of work being conducted, cooperation would not be possible most of the time, but at least the SO officers should decide on geographic areas of common concern and work together in those. It was always understood that I was not a CTO, and it was made clear that all correspondence I helped work on would be signed by the CTO and that presentations (both internal and external) regarding any of the three new ODI programs would be presented by the CTO in charge. As I stated, I was aware that I was not a CTO but this yet again seemed to distance me from participation in what I considered part of my Fellowship work description. I really felt that I should at least fully understand the work and obligations of a CTO in order to assist them when needed. An opportunity arose in January 2005 when a CTO training seminar was held in the capital for new CTOs. It started early and allowed the CTO to continue work part of the day. I requested to participate in this training; however, the ODI Director did not think it was necessary. Although disappointed I did not make an issue of the reply.

Within ODI itself I was able to participate with the CTOs and the implementing partners for the Rule of Law program and the Youth-At-Risk short-term program. The ODI Director felt that there was a duplication of resources in the proposed work plans and that the implementing partners had to work together to rectify the situation. Through two group meetings an agreement was established with some minor modifications to the Youth-At-Risk program. This was a success and I hoped to be able to participate in similar collaborations in the future.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plans**

As stated above, from September through December 2004 the three main programs of SO1 had yet to begin any substantive work. That remained true as of my departure at the end of January 2005. A very positive aspect for the Democracy Fellowship was that work had begun on the Monitoring and Evaluation plan (M&E) of some of the implementing partners. By mid-December 2004 only the Rule of Law and the Youth-At-Risk programs had draft annual work plans and M&E plans. At the time of my departure I still had not seen any final annual work plans or M&E plans for the Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability or the Local Governance programs. These two SO1 programs were still being negotiated.

Beyond assisting the CTOs by reviewing their individual work plans, I more importantly was assigned to review the implementing partner's M&E plans. It was crucial that the M&E plans included the indicators mentioned in the Portfolio Review and other required indicators (both short-term and long-term).

In the Rule of Law case, I worked closely with the CTO and the implementing partner. One of the indicators was missing in the M&E plan and had to be incorporated. The CTO also developed an extremely complex monitoring system that would require a large amount of resources in order to comply. I discussed the matter with the ODI Director and I met with the implementing partner's program designer. We agreed on a new, easier structure that was acceptable to both the partner and the CTO. I also requested that a native English speaker translate the annual work plan and the M&E plan since they were extremely difficult to read and the original translator did not use proper technical terminology. Unfortunately no one at the implementing partner's office was a native speaker. Due to the long delays in initiating the substantive work for the Rule of Law program, I suggested that the backstop for the implementing partner in Washington D.C. fly down and do the translation quickly. This request was not received very happily. This was just prior to Christmas. The implementing partner had until January 15 to make the requested modifications and USAID/Guatemala had until January 30 to make final comments. As of my departure at the end of January 2005, I was not given a revised M&E document for the Rule of Law program to review.

The Youth-At-Risk situation was much easier. The program was to run for a very brief period. I worked closely with the CTO and the work plan was very easy to understand. I carefully reviewed the M&E plan to establish that the above mentioned duplication of resources (basically both the Rule of Law and Youth-At-Risk programs doing similar

activities) had been corrected and that all of the required indicators were incorporated. The wording of one of the indicators had to be changed.

My work with the CTOs in this area was very interesting and much more substantive than the drafting of administrative reports. Fortunately most of the reporting was completed by mid-January and although I was responsible for updating indicators when possible, it looked as though I would finally be working more closely with CTOs on substantive issues. Unfortunately, the premature termination of my Fellowship pre-empted this possibility.

### Studies into Program Specific Areas

Just prior to Christmas of 2004 I had conversations with the ODI Director regarding the modifications that had to be made in my original Fellowship work plan due to the realities and changes in the ODI office. I was scheduled to work the holidays. The reporting phase of ODI that I entered into upon my arrival was coming to a close which would free up more of my time to concentrate on areas of interest to me that would be beneficial to USAID/Guatemala and ODI. During the holidays it was suggested that I think of substantive areas in which I could do research and draft studies that would help USAID/Guatemala in future development plans. Due to amoebic dysentery and food poisoning contracted over the holidays I was out of commission for a while. However, I did think of three areas of concentration that I would like to have begun researching.

1) I hoped to receive the DIMS software training in January to find actual areas of common interest in the region in order to revitalize the CAM initiative. As far as I was concerned CAM still existed but almost exclusively on paper as a concept. I felt that with solid research, cross-border cooperation between regional Democracy Officers or USAID Missions would be possible.

2) With my human rights background and MINUGUA's recent pullout from Guatemala, I hoped to work more closely with the small, yet very important exhumation program. Closure would be important and supporting the program would be a good barometer of monitoring the Guatemalan people's perception of the Peace Accords. In this area I would also have liked to have continued research on reparations in post-conflict countries. It would be important to see how other post-conflict countries handled the reparations issue since the Civil Patrols (PACS) in Guatemala were causing violent demonstrations to gain the reparations promised to them during the conflict.

3) I was very interested in the Youth-At-Risk program. I have always worked with immigration/asylum issues, and even from my time as Deputy Director of the International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University College of Law, the issue of deporting gang members from the U.S. to their or their parents' home country was considered a problem that should be analyzed. Some seven years later we are realizing that the deportation of gang members from the U.S. to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador has cause a drastic increase in crime activity and organized crime violence. Young "gang bangers" born and raised in the U.S. know of only one job

when they arrive in these foreign countries, and they form their own gangs. Violence is soaring in Guatemala and the U.S. has even put a travel advisory on the country. I proposed to study the effects of these deportations, particularly since now that the U.S. government is concerned about the insecurity these gangs cause in the region. Recommendations could be made to analyze and perhaps modify the deportation process.

It is odd but I submitted in writing these suggestions (in writing since my computer was unusable that afternoon) on the same day I received a copy of Sharon's January 13, 2005 request to the USAID CTO for World Learning Cooperative Agreement in Washington stating she could no longer support my Fellowship in her office, thus basically ending my Democracy Fellowship.

## Conclusions

Many of my conclusions are incorporated directly into the report itself. Overall I feel the Democracy Fellowship was very positive and I deeply appreciate and am honored that I was offered the possibility to participate. I had wished that the program would last a year but understood from the beginning that funding restrictions required it to end early and that it was most likely that the Democracy Fellowship program would not be continued for at least a year after the June deadline. I certainly hope this is not the case. I think it is a great program. During the time I worked with USAID/Guatemala I feel that I learned a lot about the workings of AID and had the opportunity to work with and meet both new people to USAID and long-term employees. Their views and opinions helped change my view of the overall USAID programming and decision making process.

On a constructive criticism note (not anyone's fault), I feel I arrived at a very turbulent time for ODI and was somewhat left on my own to learn the ropes. The Director of ODI provided some general support, and the CTOs gave me what time they had, but it was a very busy time with three new programs and the priority of administrative reporting. This modified my Fellowship work plan but I still feel it was an excellent learning experience. Perhaps communication could have been better.

The early termination of my Fellowship came as an utter shock to me since nothing had been brought to my attention prior to this. I realized that since there was so little time left for the Democracy Fellowship program, a transfer would be impossible, and to continue working in an office where the Director did not support me was also impossible. At a meeting with the ODI Director and USAID's regional General Counsel I suggested that I leave early. I am sure that was the ODI Director's intent. I have read and reread the ODI Director's memo and still am personally offended at its ambiguous and often factually incorrect nature. I have to admit that I considered it highly unprofessional. Much to the General Counsel's relief I did not go tit for tat on the contents of the memo which would only have reduced the meeting to a he said she said conflict that would not be constructive and be very unproductive. The General Counsel drove with me to my apartment after the meeting and thanked me for the way I handled the situation.

I would like to reiterate my gratitude and thanks to everyone at World Learning for their support. If you need any further information or have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Best regards,

John M. Granville  
World Learning Democracy Fellow  
USAID/Sudan  
January 20, 2005 - June 14, 2005  
Final Report

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## Background to the Sudan Program

At the time of the 2005 peace agreement, Sudan's civil war was the longest-running in the world. It began in 1983 as a war between the Government of Sudan (GoS) in the north and the southern forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), primarily due to disputes over natural resources, ethnicity, and religion. The fighting has divided the country along racial and political lines and has impoverished the people of Sudan. Sudan's extreme poverty is exacerbated by a lack of arable land and potable water, health services and health awareness education, and by a general breakdown of customs and social structures. As a result of the protracted conflict, there are 4 million displaced persons and refugees from Sudan.

The United States Government (USG) has been the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Sudan over the last two decades, providing US \$1.4 billion in humanitarian and development assistance since 1990. The relationship between the USG and the GoS has changed considerably since the start of the US-led war on terrorism and the emergence of the US as a leading actor in the inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) process. From 2001, the USG has led international efforts to increase humanitarian access, reinvigorate the Kenya-led IGAD negotiations, and ensure that ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreements were established and monitored. Preparation for a comprehensive peace includes a heightened US involvement in the peace process that has been matched by new development programs in opposition-held areas of southern Sudan. Since late 2002, US assistance has continued through the Sudan Peace Fund and through the Office of Transition Initiative's (OTI) South Sudan Transition Initiative. Both programs support local peace processes, civil society organizations, access to public information, accountable and legitimate civil authorities, and a number of education and economic development activities.

The context for US assistance in southern Sudan changed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005. The CPA calls for the two opposing sides to become the Government of National Unity (GNU) and a Government of South Sudan (GoSS). This will allow for southern autonomy during a six year period to provide support to the governance structures of the new GoSS at all levels, including not only the civil administration systems at national and local levels, but also the governance frameworks encompassing the Constitution and laws of the land. In addition, the CPA calls for elections in 2009 and a referendum in 2011. The referendum will determine whether Sudan separates into two sovereign nations or becomes united as one. Although many international donors support unity, including USAID and the first

Vice President of Sudan, Dr. John Garang, the leader of the SPLM party, the great majority of Sudanese residing in the South favor separation. The current peace agreement is the fifteenth signed between the GoS and the South, and, since the 14 previous agreements have all been dishonored, a great deal of mistrust exists between the south and north. The central government will need to demonstrate its commitment to the 2005 CPA and to the development of the South throughout the next six years in order for southerners to come to support unity.

### **Fellowship Objectives**

To meet Strategic Objective (SO) 5 as laid out in the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Interim Strategic Plan for Sudan, *More Responsive and Participatory Governance*, I have assisted USAID/Sudan's efforts to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations. To achieve this goal I have conducted research, provided support to team members, monitored and evaluated the Democracy and Governance (DG) Program Design, and fostered an open and reflective environment that maximizes USAID's impact on democracy and good governance for the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).

The following four objectives have served as the foundation of my proposed task model:

#### **Objective 1: Research**

Examine primary data to gain a better understanding of USAID's DG initiatives and principles, and to explore the existing capacity of civil society organizations (prior to implementing the DG's design program)

#### **Objective 2: Strategic Advice**

Participate in and advise on the design implementation, analysis, and evaluation of objectives and strategies to contribute to the preparation of a scope-of-work, (for what?) as well as to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations.

**Objective 3: Measure Strategic Objective (SO) and Intermediate Result (IR) Impact**  
Assist USAID's DG Office in developing performance measurement indicators (qualitative and quantitative) to strengthen accountability and to track institutional progress and growth in capacity for civil society organizations.

#### **Objective 4: Team Member and Fellowship Duties**

Fulfill responsibilities outlined in the fellowship terms of reference (TOR) as a USAID/Sudan team member and a Democracy Fellow.

## Challenges to Democracy and Governance Fellowship to Date

I was selected in January 2005 by World Learning to be the Democracy and Governance (DG) Fellow for the Sudan Field Office. I spent a significant part of the first half of my fellowship with USAID on developing a better understanding of USAID's DG Framework and how USAID's democracy objectives and key democratic rule of law, political processes, civil society and governance concepts could be applied for the greatest impact in Sudan. The comprehensive peace agreement signed in January 2005 imposes three significant challenges for democracy and governance in southern Sudan: SPLM's transitioning from a guerilla movement to a political party, building consensus on the type and form of government, and supporting effective governance. Building a consensus on the constitutional arrangements of the government includes making choices about the type of political system, relative powers and roles, and the rules governing representation in government.

Consensus is critical to establishing a government that is legitimate in the eyes of the people of southern Sudan. By promoting greater participation and responsiveness, the USAID DG program is helping to create a foundation for democratic governance in southern Sudan through its support of the drafting and ratifying of an Interim National Constitution (INC) that reflects the will of the people. The INC will provide a legal foundation for the GoSS and pave the way for its difficult transition from a guerilla

movement to a civil administration. The picture (to the left) of the twelve member constitutional technical drafting committee has 4 women, and 8 men, including a disabled man. This committee is being supported through technical assistance provided by USAID's democracy and governance team and NDI. The committee is committed to incorporating the views of citizens throughout southern Sudan into the Interim National Constitution through NDI's focus group dissemination. The committee recognizes and supports cultural and religious diversity.



The Constitutional Technical Drafting Committee for southern Sudan, NDI, World Learning DG Fellow and USAID.

We are also providing technical assistance to the legislature to facilitate

an enabling environment for an effective and functioning GoSS. We further support the development of competitive and democratic political parties in preparation for the upcoming elections and to avoid the temptation to duplicate previously undemocratic structures. The DG team also supports the establishment of a vibrant and inclusive civil society by strengthening the institutional capabilities of nascent civil society organizations to work across ethnic, social and regional divisions and to address the

problems of women and marginalized groups. The goal of these programs is to create a more responsive and participatory government in the South. My responsibility as a fellow focused largely on designing a media program, assisting the development of a civil society program, and providing technical support to the US Census Bureau as well as the New Sudan Center for Statistics and Evaluation (NSCSE).

In addition to developing a better understanding of USAID's democracy and governance framework, I have fulfilled a number of other tasks. I have developed a professional niche in designing media programs in a post-conflict setting by broadening my exposure to and contacts with media experts, and by attending international media workshops and conferences in Nairobi, Kenya and Marrakech, Morocco. The Association for Media Development (AMDIS) conference in Nairobi exposed me to the cast of characters involved in developing media programs throughout southern Sudan. I also got a view of what the SPLM--the future GoSS--hold as its vision for the future of media in southern Sudan. It became clear from the participants' comments that improved broadcast and printed newspaper media coverage will be critical for informing southern Sudanese about the terms of the CPA, health awareness messages, the use of oil revenues, etc.

The current lack of access to information was discussed in March at the Association for Media Development in southern Sudan (AMDIS) conference. The purpose of the conference was to discuss priorities to be presented at the donor conference in Oslo, to provide a forum for the GoSS to discuss its vision for independent media, and to create an independent body to represent media programming in South Sudan. Conference-goers concluded that news is not reaching the majority of people in South Sudan. One of the main issues discussed by the media professionals is this lack of information in South Sudan and the degree to which this gap creates distrust and suspicion. All of the AMDIS Conference agreed that a window of opportunity exists to support the overall peace process by providing both the GoSS and southern citizens with a means for conveying essential information and exchanging ideas. However, this window is not indefinite. To assist in educational and health developments, continued peace, stability, and communication across the more than 80 multi-lingual ethnic communities, it is critical that radio distribution be made a key priority for USAID as it works toward its strategic objective for South Sudan. The SPLM supported these initiatives, but raised concerns regarding the notion of independent media. The GoSS has been supporting state-controlled Radio Omdurman, which broadcasts news from Khartoum. Its signal can be received throughout Sudan, and, in the past, this station has broadcasted information designed to create divisions and conflict throughout the South. The SPLM would like to combat such propaganda, and is concerned that free and independent media in the south would not permit them to do so. After attending this conference I made recommendations that USAID work closely with the SPLM/GoSS in drafting a regulatory framework and media law that will support open and independent media.

The IREX Conference in Morocco provided me with a greater understanding of the most appropriate instruments (CA grant, RDC, etc.) to be used when designing a media program. I was also able to gain a better understanding of the media work that has

been accomplished in other post-conflict countries, and to tap into such resources as the International Center for Journalists (ICJ). The center has agreed to send a night fellow, an experienced journalist for six months to southern Sudan to train southern Sudanese in journalism. This program will be particularly useful to OTI and its future support of media development through the introduction of local FM stations. One of the biggest challenges to developing southern Sudan is the lack of capacity, which the ICJ could help the citizens overcome.

Aside from conducting the research detailed above in Objective 1, in April 2005 I presented a concept paper, originally developed for the Sudan Field Office (SFO), to the Office of Coordination Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). My paper focuses on 1) the amount of USAID funds dedicated to the media in southern Sudan to date, 2) the impact of radio provision, and 3) the cost of maximizing our investment through the purchase and distribution of radios. In addition, the paper focuses on the GoSS's inability to communicate with its people. One of the main challenges facing the GoSS is their lack of ability to communicate across a vast land with non-existent infrastructure. The resulting inability to disseminate information on how oil revenues will be used, for instance, creates suspicion and mistrust. Nationwide radio addresses will be a critical tool for the SPLM in their new role as the GoSS. These will provide both the GoSS and southerners with a means for conveying essential information, exchanging ideas, and demonstrating transparency and accountability. By effectively communicating their policies GoSS can establish a level of transparency in their leadership and build a common vision of unity for the future.

I have presented strategies for developing a media program for South Sudan to the Assistant Administrator for Africa and the office of Conflict, Mitigation and Management (CMMA) in March 2005. OTI has raised a number of concerns over the last 12 months about radio procurement and distribution, which, unfortunately, has delayed the procurement process. Recognizing these concerns, I have communicated with a number of missions including Niger, Liberia, East Timor, Mali and Kosovo to learn from their past experiences. I have also worked closely with OTI and its implementing partners to learn from their experiences with developing media programs in South Sudan to better understand concerns related to distribution, and to propose strategies that will address these concerns. For example, one critical lesson learned from other missions' experiences is that distribution efforts must be coordinated with implementing partners. A coordinated effort will provide us with greater ability to monitor and evaluate distribution.

As a result of these efforts, funding for a media program has been approved. Through my research I determined that 461,238<sup>1</sup> radios are needed to increase communication and awareness of the peace process, improve HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, increase access to education, especially for girls, enhance demobilization by exchanging radios for guns, and provide information to returnees and the displaced. These 461,238 radios will reach more than 3.2 million households. In addition to the

<sup>1</sup> 200,000 radios will be distributed in and around the 300 schools that USAID is building, 241,238 will be earmarked for information to returnees and the displaced, and 20,000 will be used for DDR.

radio program, my assessment has contributed to the development of creative targeted programs like a gun-for-radio exchange program, returnee programs, and girls' education programs.

Using lessons learned from previous distributions by other USAID missions, I have plans to begin a pilot distribution of 600 radios in southern blue Nile. The radios have been funded by World Learning's Democracy Fellowship Program, and I have determined that these radios should be used for educational purposes since education was identified as the number one development priority by the citizens who participated in the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) focus group, which published "On the Threshold of Peace: Perspectives from People of the New Sudan" in October 2004. I will work with EDC and CARE to train teachers and students on how to use and maintain the solar powered/wind up radios by linking the distribution to their Interactive Radio Instruction program. This approach will ensure that the DG Office achieves its Intermediate Result of "enhanced access to independent information," as well as permit our partners to achieve their programming objectives and ensure that radios are distributed in a systematic way. For instance, EDC has explained to USAID that increased access to radios will greatly enhance their educational programs and also expand the number of Interactive Radio beneficiaries not only to include formal classroom instruction but also to fast track teacher training, the development through radio-credit bearing courses and parent and adult learning groups<sup>2</sup>. In EDC's past experience this expansion has occurred in countries where radios are more readily available. Upon completion of this pilot project using the 600 radios, we will broaden our scope based on available funding. If we do not have enough funds to purchase all 445,000 radios, we will focus on obtaining enough funds to support IDP returns as a first priority. Distributions<sup>3</sup> and training of radio usage will be coordinated and managed by the GoSS in close coordination with EDC, UNDP's DDR Unit, and OCHA. Female headed households will be given priority during distribution to ensure that women have increased access to information.

I have also helped to develop a Request For Applications (RFA) in support of our efforts to increase the capacity of the civil society, reviewed the responses to the civil society RFA, developed the performance monitoring plan for tracking performance, supported the US Census Bureau so that they can undertake the population census of southern Sudan in support of the upcoming election, and provided programmatic advice as well as impact assessment based on targeted indicators to both the media and civil society programs.

<sup>2</sup> NDI Education has plans to build 310 schools throughout South Sudan, and Interactive Radio will be the basis for instruction.

<sup>3</sup> The quantities of radios needed for increased access to information and sustained educational programming (300,000), returnees (125,000), the rehabilitation of soldiers (20,000), and communication and the peace process (190,000) were determined based upon information provided by EDC, UNDP/OCHA, NDI and the UN's DDR Office.

In March 2005 I attended the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) training, and became a certified CTO. The training provided me with insight into USAID's assistance and acquisition procurement policies. Although I have not been permitted to act as a CTO, given my status as a fellow, this opportunity has allowed me to provide assistance in determining the most appropriate instrument to be used when designing Request for Applications (RFA) and Request for Proposals (RFP).

### Unity Verses Separation

I believe that one of the biggest challenges facing USAID and its democracy and governance program for Sudan are the US restrictions on providing development assistance in the north. The USG's policy is designed to make unity more attractive throughout the interim period (the next six years). However, if we do not have access to the north and we continue to support programs that promote democracy and governance only in the south, we will not be working toward real unity. Many of our current programs in the south require collaboration with the north. For instance, we are supporting the US Census Bureau to work with the New Sudan Center for Statistics and Evaluation (NSCSE) to conduct a census in southern Sudan before the elections in 2009. The United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA) and the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) will be conducting the census for the north. If the US Census Bureau and NSCSE are unable to provide technical assistance to the program in the north, it will be impossible to assure a quality and standardized survey that is acceptable as a National Census. In addition, we will be unable to provide technical assistance in support of the Government of National Unity. I believe that until these restrictions are lifted, we will be unable to make unity more attractive.

### Conclusion

The Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM have signed a peace agreement that paves the way for the formation of the GoSS. Along with this greater prospect for stabilization and peace, taking the opportunity to plan and put in place democracy and anti-corruption initiatives will be essential to the overall progress toward peace and development.

I have learned a great deal from working as a World Learning fellow and as a team member of USAID's Democracy and Governance program for Sudan. My experience as a Democracy Fellow with World Learning has greatly enriched my knowledge of the necessary steps and elements for establishing a responsive, participatory and democratic government from scratch. Further, it has reinforced my belief that the success of humanitarian and development assistance without democracy and governance is unlikely. Such assistance will only address the immediate needs of a community or country. The biggest challenge for Sudan has not been a lack of resources, but an undemocratic central government. The international community has sent approximately \$1 million per day to Sudan for the past 15 years, yet there is no infrastructure and no lasting development has taken place. The GoSS has benefited from \$1.2 million dollars a day in oil revenue, but the great majority of this revenue has

been used to sustain the civil war. Democracy and good governance in Sudan can allow the people to benefit from their resources and provide food security, education, health care, and more. A window of opportunity exists in Sudan to support the creation of responsive and democratic governments, and despite the numerous challenges I believe that USAID's DG program has taken a critical leap from focusing solely on the immediate needs to supporting effective and sustainable change.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge and thank World Learning for this tremendous experience, in particular Ellen Garrett and Christopher Saenger in the Democracy Fellows Program Office. They both have been extremely supportive, and more than willing, throughout the course of my fellowship, to provide me with any information, guidance and/or assistance.

### Fellowship Progress Report for May-July 2004

Although democracy programs have an extensive history as a foreign assistance priority, there have been to date no systematic and rigorous analyses to evaluate which types or sequences of programming best promote democratic development. The Strategic Operations Research Agenda (SORA), begun approximately three years ago by USAID's Democracy Office, is intended to facilitate such research so that the results could be utilized to help the Office revise its activities by ending ineffective programs, tailoring some to account for specific contexts, and changing the focus of others as necessary. As a Democracy Fellow, I will play a key role in implementing the latest initiative under SORA, a research design that is intended to analyze the impact of democracy-promotion programs. The conduct of these analyses by USAID is also a critical step toward firmly establishing the relatively new field of applied democratic development, which melds insights from the academic, policy, and practitioner worlds to improve foreign assistance policy.

The Democracy Fellowship offers me an unparalleled opportunity to advance my professional goal of combining scholarly research and policy-oriented projects, while at the same time it allows me to contribute to the advancement and improvement of democracy promotion policy. My existing academic experience with quantitative and qualitative research on regime change, democratic development, and civil society will be augmented by applied experience from research on key programmatic activities. The Democracy Fellowship will be superb foundation for a career as a policy analyst or advisor on democratic development and foreign assistance.

The dominant activity during my Democracy Fellowship will be the full operationalization of the research design developed by the Social Science Research Council for program analyses. This design, which envisions a combination of longitudinal country case studies and comparative sub-sectoral analyses, is an important starting point for the generation of new knowledge in applied democratic development. More broadly, though, I will play a role in incorporating methodological design in other aspects of USAID's activities. Another principal activity will be to engage the broader democracy promotion policy community outside the USG, but this is to extend beyond the academic community to include other development agencies and develop avenues for the sharing of or collaborating on research on applied democratic development.

The objectives guiding the Democracy Fellowship include:

- 1) To assume a leadership role in the development and implementation of the research design for analyzing a wide variety of democracy promotion programs;
- 2) To coordinate and participate in briefings related to the program evaluation project;
- 3) To develop other institutional learning processes related to the use of research methodology or data sets;
- 4) To serve as the principal democracy and governance backstop for one or two USAID missions; and
- 5) To exercise technical leadership in an area of democracy and governance that may be useful for advancing applied research in democracy promotion.

Meeting these objectives will obviously entail coordinating related activities within USAID, the USG, and broader academic and international development agency circles.

As of the end of the first quarter, work is proceeding largely according to plan, but the pace is often determined by constraints common to large bureaucracies: a certain amount of inertia, the need to develop consensus among a broad scope of relevant personnel, and urgent demands for involvement in fulfilling last-minute requests from other units in the Agency.

**Objective #1: Assume a leadership role**

A large portion of my time was devoted to this objective, to good effect for the Office and for me professionally. *First*, during this quarter I wrote and revised upon feedback a four-page statement of the general goals and objectives of the SORA project as a whole (see enclosed). This document was intended to be and has been used as an introduction/overview of the project to interested parties in the Agency, other USG agencies, multilateral organizations, and thinktanks. The development of the statement was my first introduction to the need to integrate activities in terms of broader Agency initiatives, and to stake out the extent and limits of the team's work. *Second*, I also worked closely with one of my team members to develop the first scope of work for the SORA project, the quantitative analysis portion, and to identify/compare/justify different specific contracting mechanisms. Coming to grips with the conflicting demands of the Agency budgeting environment, lead times for soliciting and reviewing proposals, and the nature of different mechanisms provided key insights into the contracting functions of the Agency. *Third*, I began reviewing past multi-case studies of USAID democracy-promotion programs, including but not limited to selection criteria, in advance of drafting the second scope of work for the qualitative analysis portion; this review highlighted some of the pitfalls of working via consensus. *Fourth*, I served on a proposal review committee for the second Analytical Services IQC, which was an invaluable opportunity to learn about the contracting process and specific contractors in this business.

**Objective #2: Coordinate and participate in briefings**

As a team, we conducted briefings for all team leaders and Office management, and then incorporated their feedback in the drafts of the first and second scopes of work. We also briefed DCHA Senior Staff and key personnel from PPC and OTI. Such consensus building exercises are key to achieving ambitious goals in the Agency.

**Objective #3: Develop other institutional learning processes**

I assisted in the annual DG Officer training in June, walking attendees through the elements of the DG Assessment Framework, which forced me to digest and comprehend the framework quite rapidly.

**Objective #4: Serve as principal DG backstop**

No country backstop was assigned to me in the first quarter. I did, however, coordinate with the Africa Bureau to review an unsolicited proposal from Afrobarometer, resulting in full or partial funding for six countries including oversampling (see *Frontlines* copy)

**Objective #5: Exercise technical leadership**

I summarized or circulated copies of recent relevant research (see CGD and article pages). I presented my research on post-communist civil society development at the ISTR conference in Toronto, and am currently revising it for journal submission (see enclosed). I have prepared budget data summaries or trends as needed for MCA and portfolio reviews.

## I. SORA Goals, Objectives, and Activities

Although democracy programs have an extensive history as a foreign assistance priority, there have been to date no systematic and rigorous analyses to evaluate which types or sequences of programming best promote different aspects of democratic development. The Strategic Operations Research Agenda (SORA), begun approximately three years ago by USAID's Democracy & Governance (DG) Office, is intended to facilitate such research to help the DG Office revise its activities by ending or revising ineffective programs, adding new programs, integrating better design and evaluation into programs, and engaging in dissemination and learning activities with a wider policy community.

This is also a critical step toward firmly establishing the relatively new field of applied democratic development, which melds insights from the academic, policy, and practitioner worlds to improve foreign assistance policy. There is tremendous interest for such analysis among USAID counterparts in other countries, USG, multilateral institutions, and policy leaders, and therefore there are significant prospects for collaboration and data-sharing.

The **GOAL** of the work to be conducted under SORA is to provide analytical support and generate data and findings that will improve USAID's democracy and governance programs and strategies.

The **OBJECTIVES** and **ACTIVITIES** of this work over the next 4 years are:

- A. to **analyze** the impact of past democracy programs by
  1. conducting a cross-national analysis using a database of subsectoral information, democratic development indicators, and other measures of contextual and endogenous factors, and
  2. combining that analysis with qualitative assessments of program impact in 20-25 countries and with comparative analyses of "best" practices for select activities;
- B. to **maintain and expand** the database and analytical scope by
  1. updating the data from external sources of information on democracy and governance,
  2. integrating better-quality data on program impact from Mission activities, and
  3. generating new data, survey results and analyses as required for DG-initiated projects;
- C. to **disseminate** results of the above analyses
  1. internally by incorporating findings into training materials, conferences, and presentations, and
  2. externally by engaging a wider community of development agencies, policy leaders, scholars, and practitioners through publications and fora; and
- D. to **incorporate** analytical findings into program activities by
  1. recommending programmatic improvements based on analyses.
  2. providing guidance and support to operating units on how to improve the measurement and evaluation of impact, and
  3. verifying that recommended program changes stemming from analyses have the desired improved impact.

### A. Analysis of Past Programs

Any effort to improve the substance and utility of democracy programs in the future must begin with an analysis of whether, how, and under what circumstance past programs had an impact. Initial design efforts recommended a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, and a subsequent pilot initiative produced six country case studies and two comparative syntheses, using the Analytical Services IQC to contract work to MSI and ARD. It became clear, however, that a revised and more rigorous approach was needed to fully achieve the goals and objectives of SORA.

In 2003 a contract was awarded to the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) to determine the methodology, administrative requirements, personnel, and level of effort needed to properly implement a new approach to program evaluation. The resulting *Evaluation Plan for USAID Democracy & Governance Activities* recommended a two-track approach consisting of cross-national quantitative research and in-depth qualitative country-level research. It is critical to employ multiple research methods, recognizing that no single analytical method provides sufficiently reliable and informed guidance on DG programming. Moreover, by gathering and examining data at both levels, meaningful and comparative conclusions about country-, subsector-, and activity-level programs across regions can be drawn.

#### 1. Quantitative (Cross National) Analysis

The first analytical track is a cross-national analysis that would compile a database of variables on subsectoral information, indices of various aspect of democracy and governance, and other metrics of contextual or exogenous factors. This analysis should provide valuable guidance on whether and under what circumstance USAID programs had an impact, including at global and regional levels; provide insights into each of the four subsectors at global and regional levels; and assess the impact of other donors and exogenous factors. Specific analytical tasks are:

- Concept operationalization
- Collection and management of data
- Cross-national analysis
- Reports and dissemination

#### 2. Qualitative (Country Level) Analysis

Although the quantitative analysis covers almost all countries in the world, the second analytical track is a qualitative analysis of 20-25 countries where USAID has been active. This analytical track combines country-level expertise with DG-established criteria for program impact assessment to enrich the cross-national analysis, and adds comparative activity analyses to uncover "best" practices. Specific tasks for this analysis are:

- Country and criteria selection
- In-depth data gathering and analysis
- Identification of common activities for closer analysis
- Reports and dissemination

***B. Maintain and Expand the Database and Analytical Scope***

Analyzing the impact of past democracy programs will generate insights important for revising DG programs, but maintaining the resulting data and conducting further analyses would lead to continuing contributions to the efforts of the Office. There are three discrete activities necessary for sustaining a rigorous analytical base:

**1. Updating Data**

The database of variables must be updated periodically as such external sources as the World Bank, Freedom House, and Polity release new data. At the same time, data on the activities of other development agencies will also be collected and added to the database.

**2. Integrating Better-Quality Data**

The ability to improve and expand analytical scope is only possible when better quality data on Mission activities are added to the database. The increasing use of measurement tools in program activities represents a tremendous opportunity to generate a host of new data elements to analyze for improving DG Office activities. Similarly, survey data collected at a regional level (Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer) could be added to allow for analyses adapted to regional needs.

**3. Generating New Data, Surveys and Analyses**

Iterations of existing analyses will be performed using updated and new data in order to provide timely and expanded insights, which is necessary to identify trends and the effectiveness of prior program changes. Surveys such as Afrobarometer may be conducted periodically in each region. Additionally, new projects initiated by DG teams could examine specific trends in democracy programming and thereby offer strategic insights for the DG Office and Missions to act upon.

***C. Disseminating Findings***

Disseminating findings from analytical work is critical to SORA's capacity to make a valuable contribution to the DG Office. Dissemination activities include not just internal publications, training materials, and presentations, but also publications and outreach oriented to a broad external community.

**1. Internal Dissemination**

Dissemination of findings must take place through a variety of means if they are to have the desired impact on program activities and DG Office strategies. Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses of past democracy programs will generate research reports that will, of course, be the subjects of presentations and workshops for DG, USAID, and USG personnel. Iterative, new, and more focused analyses will also generate publications, presentations, and workshops that would provide value to DG Office personnel.

## 2. External Dissemination

The nature and substance of analyses under SORA would be of tremendous interest to a large number of such external actors as other development agencies, policy leaders, scholars, and practitioners. External dissemination should therefore include presentations and workshops for that audience, as well as collaborative workshops when possible. Such activity should not be limited to Washington venues, but extend to the locations of other development agencies, too.

### ***D. Incorporating Findings***

A key objective for meeting the goal of improving programs and strategies is to incorporate analytical insights into the concepts and praxis of DG Office activities.

#### 1. Recommending Programmatic Changes

Findings from the analysis of past democracy programs and from subsequent analyses will drive recommendations for changes to programs.

#### 2. Providing Guidance and Support

This is the set of activities with the most potential to affect DG Office and Mission efforts. First, findings from analyses must inform and change DG training materials, so that an ever-growing proportion of the DG cadre will have absorbed the information as part of the regular training process, thereby institutionalizing learning. Second, the SORA team will produce training modules and materials focusing on how to add or improve measurement of impact, including templates for commonly-used methodologies. Finally, the SORA team will provide technical leadership to missions as a means to promote the adoption of measurement tools, to improve their utility, and to add new data elements for further analyses.

#### 3. Verifying the Impact of Program Changes

It is equally important to ascertain if the recommend changes did indeed improve program impact. Iterative analyses as described above will provide the type of insights needed to verify the substance and effect of policy change.

### **Fellowship Progress Report for August-October 2004**

Although democracy programs have an extensive history as a foreign assistance priority, there have been to date no systematic and rigorous analyses to evaluate which types or sequences of programming best promote democratic development. The Strategic Operations Research Agenda (SORA), begun approximately three years ago by USAID's Democracy Office, is intended to facilitate such research so that the results could be utilized to help the Office revise its activities by ending ineffective programs, tailoring some to account for specific contexts, and changing the focus of others as necessary. As a Democracy Fellow, I will play a key role in implementing the latest initiative under SORA, a research design that is intended to analyze the impact of democracy-promotion programs. The conduct of these analyses by USAID is also a critical step toward firmly establishing the relatively new field of applied democratic development, which melds insights from the academic, policy, and practitioner worlds to improve foreign assistance policy.

The Democracy Fellowship offers me an unparalleled opportunity to advance my professional goal of combining scholarly research and policy-oriented projects, while at the same time it allows me to contribute to the advancement and improvement of democracy promotion policy. My existing academic experience with quantitative and qualitative research on regime change, democratic development, and civil society will be augmented by applied experience from research on key programmatic activities. The Democracy Fellowship will be superb foundation for a career as a policy analyst or advisor on democratic development and foreign assistance.

The dominant activity during my Democracy Fellowship will be the full operationalization of the research design developed by the Social Science Research Council for program analyses. This design, which envisions a combination of longitudinal country case studies and comparative sub-sectoral analyses, is an important starting point for the generation of new knowledge in applied democratic development. More broadly, though, I will play a role in incorporating methodological design in other aspects of USAID's activities. Another principal activity will be to engage the broader democracy promotion policy community outside the USG, but this is to extend beyond the academic community to include other development agencies and develop avenues for the sharing of or collaborating on research on applied democratic development.

The objectives guiding the Democracy Fellowship include:

- 1) To assume a leadership role in the development and implementation of the research design for analyzing a wide variety of democracy promotion programs;
- 2) To coordinate and participate in briefings related to the program evaluation project;
- 3) To develop other institutional learning processes related to the use of research methodology or data sets;
- 4) To serve as the principal democracy and governance backstop for one or two USAID missions; and
- 5) To exercise technical leadership in an area of democracy and governance that may be useful for advancing applied research in democracy promotion.

Meeting these objectives will obviously entail coordinating related activities within USAID, the USG, and broader academic and international development agency circles.

As of the end of the second quarter, work is proceeding largely according to plan, but the pace is often determined by constraints common to large bureaucracies – a certain amount of inertia, the need to develop consensus among a broad scope of relevant personnel, and urgent demands for involvement in fulfilling last-minute requests from other units in the Agency – as well as Agency-specific obstacles stemming from problematic budget and procurement systems implementation.

#### **Objective #1: Assume a leadership role**

A large portion of my time was devoted to this objective, to good effect for the Office and for me professionally. *First*, I worked closely with my team members to re-design the the first scope of work for the SORA project, the quantitative analysis portion. The first effort to procure research services through the MOBIS contract mechanism was not successful, but we identified a cooperative agreement in EGAT that would enable us to award a grant to appropriate academic researchers. *Second*, I began revising the core database of USAID budget obligations, which gave me tremendous insight into the limitations of USAID budget and procurement systems. I learned a great deal about the functioning of USAID in post-communist states when I began disaggregating regional-level “pots” of funding to the country level. I also began disaggregating grants given to ACILS to the country level. I explored OECD/DAC data on the activities of donor agencies, including USAID; the latter two activities have helped me develop into one of the world’s foremost experts on DG assistance by bilateral donor agencies. Finally I began developing a “foreign policy priority” indicator based on USG foreign assistance data, which will be necessary for the quantitative analysis phase of SORA. *Third*, I continued reviewing past multi-case studies of USAID democracy-promotion programs, including but not limited to selection criteria, in advance of drafting the second scope of work for the qualitative analysis portion; this review highlighted some of the pitfalls of working via consensus. *Fourth*, I was an active participant in the final steps toward selecting new holders of the the second Analytical Services IQC, which was an invaluable opportunity to learn about the contracting process and specific contractors in this business.

#### **Objective #2: Coordinate and participate in briefings**

As a team, we conducted further briefings for all team leaders and Office management, and then incorporated their feedback in the drafts of the second scope of work.

#### **Objective #4: Serve as principal DG backstop**

I was assigned to be the principal DG backstop for Albania at the end of the second quarter, and began attending weekly meetings in the E&E Bureau and following news dispatches. In addition, I provided important feedback on the methodology of surveys funded by USAID/Rwanda.

**Fellowship Progress Report for May 2004 – April 2005**

Although democracy programs have an extensive history as a foreign assistance priority, there have been to date no systematic and rigorous analyses to evaluate which types or sequences of programming best promote democratic development. The Strategic Operations Research Agenda (SORA), begun approximately three years ago by USAID's Democracy Office, is intended to facilitate such research so that the results could be utilized to help the Office revise its activities by ending ineffective programs, tailoring some to account for specific contexts, and changing the focus of others as necessary. As a Democracy Fellow, I will play a key role in implementing the latest initiative under SORA, a research design that is intended to analyze the impact of democracy-promotion programs. The conduct of these analyses by USAID is also a critical step toward firmly establishing the relatively new field of applied democratic development, which melds insights from the academic, policy, and practitioner worlds to improve foreign assistance policy.

The Democracy Fellowship offers me an unparalleled opportunity to advance my professional goal of combining scholarly research and policy-oriented projects, while at the same time it allows me to contribute to the advancement and improvement of democracy promotion policy. My existing academic experience with quantitative and qualitative research on regime change, democratic development, and civil society will be augmented by applied experience from research on key programmatic activities. The Democracy Fellowship will be superb foundation for a career as a policy analyst or advisor on democratic development and foreign assistance.

The dominant activity during my Democracy Fellowship will be the full operationalization of the research design developed by the Social Science Research Council for program analyses. This design, which envisions a combination of longitudinal country case studies and comparative sub-sectoral analyses, is an important starting point for the generation of new knowledge in applied democratic development. More broadly, though, I will play a role in incorporating methodological design in other aspects of USAID's activities. Another principal activity will be to engage the broader democracy promotion policy community outside the USG, but this is to extend beyond the academic community to include other development agencies and develop avenues for the sharing of or collaborating on research on applied democratic development.

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- 5) To exercise technical leadership in an area of democracy and governance that may be useful for advancing applied research in democracy promotion.

Meeting these objectives will obviously entail coordinating related activities within USAID, the USG, and broader academic and international development agency circles.

Work proceeded largely according to plan during my first Fellowship period, but the pace was often determined by constraints common to large bureaucracies -- a certain amount of inertia, the need to develop consensus among a broad scope of relevant personnel, and urgent demands for involvement in fulfilling last-minute requests from other units in the Agency -- as well as Agency-specific obstacles stemming from problematic budget and procurement systems implementation.

### **Objective #1: Assume a leadership role**

A large portion of my time was devoted to this objective, to good effect for the Office and for me professionally.

*First*, during this year I wrote, contributed to, or revised upon feedback a series of documents necessary for introducing the project to interested parties in the Agency, other USG agencies, multilateral organizations, and thinktanks. This included a four-page statement of the general goals and objectives of the SORA project as a whole, a long list of illustrative inquiries, hypothetical findings of SORA, and a PowerPoint presentation outlining the SORA effort as a whole. The development of these documents provided key lessons on the need to integrate activities in terms of broader Agency initiatives, and to stake out the extent and limits of the team's work.

*Second*, I worked closely with my team members to develop the first scope of work for the SORA project, the quantitative analysis portion, and to identify/compare/justify different specific contracting mechanisms. I worked closely with my team members to re-design the the first scope of work when the first effort to procure research services through the MOBIS contract mechanism was not successful, but we identified a cooperative agreement in EGAT that would enable us to award a grant to appropriate academic researchers. Coming to grips with the conflicting demands of the Agency budgeting environment, lead times for soliciting and reviewing proposals, and the nature of different mechanisms provided key insights into the contracting functions of the Agency. I subsequently served as the only USAID-based voting member of the proposal review committee for the quantitative analysis grant, which runs from December 2004 to November 2005.

*Third*, I completed a massive revision, expansion, and augmentation of the core database of USAID budget obligations, which gave me tremendous insight into the limitations of USAID budget and procurement systems. I learned a great deal about the functioning of USAID in post-communist states when I disaggregated regional-level "pots" of funding to the country level. I also disaggregated funding through ACILS, CEPPS, Internews, IREX, and OTI to the country level. I explored OECD/DAC data on the activities of donor agencies, including USAID; the latter two activities have helped me develop into one of the world's foremost experts on DG assistance by bilateral donor agencies. Finally I began developing a "foreign policy priority" indicator based on USG foreign assistance data, which will be necessary variable for the quantitative analysis phase of SORA. The budget database has become the primary source of historic data on DG programming for the Office, the Agency, and even such other USG agencies as the GAO.

*Fourth*, I coordinated the selection and establishment of an Experts Group for review of work products by the grantees for the quantitative analysis phase of SORA. To date my team and the

experts have provided extensive feedback on the codebook and the analysis plan. Because of the need to make a second attempt to procure services for the quantitative analysis phase, preliminary analyses will not be available for review until shortly after this Fellowship year. At the close of this Fellowship year I am coordinating the establishment of an Advisory Board for the second phase of SORA, the multi-year, qualitative research phase, but this Board will not meet until shortly after this Fellowship year.

*Fifth*, as part of the effort to develop the second scope of work for the qualitative analysis phase of SORA, I reviewed past multi-case studies of USAID democracy-promotion programs, focusing specifically but not exclusively on selection criteria; this review highlighted some of the pitfalls of working via consensus. Development of the final version second scope was delayed by unanticipated difficulties in the development of the budget database and the extensive consultations within the Office and other Agency units, but a full draft was completed and reviewed by the Team, Office senior staff, and some Office technical staff. A pilot of data-gathering feasibility could not be conducted by the end of this Fellowship year.

*Final*, I served on a proposal review committee for the second Analytical Services IQC, which was an invaluable opportunity to learn about the contracting process and specific contractors in this business.

#### **Objective #2: Coordinate and participate in briefings**

As a team, we conducted multiple and extensive briefings for all team leaders and Office management, and then incorporated feedback in the drafts of the first and second scopes of work. Outside the Office, we have briefed DCHA Senior Staff, Sector Council members, and key personnel from PPC and OTI. One result of briefings with PPC/CDIE has been contributory funding for the second phase of SORA. Such consensus building exercises are key to achieving ambitious goals in the Agency, and I have learned valuable lessons about funding within the Agency.

The USAID budget obligations database I completed has proven to be tremendously useful to a wide variety of Office, Agency and USG actors. I have fulfilled requests for detailed data from the Rule of Law, Elections & Political Processes, Program, Governance, and Civil Society teams. In response to inquiries from appropriations staffers on the Hill, I have provided to Office management a large number of charts, graphs, and tables related to DG funding over time. In addition, an ongoing GAO audit of funding for support of independent media was made possible only by my efforts to identify such activity within a larger body of data on general civil society funding. I have also worked cooperatively with the E&E Bureau on media and overall DG budgets. Outside the USG, I have supplied data and charts to USAID's Legislative and Public Affairs unit in response to requests from the public.

Finally, with the assistance of MSI, I identified and then coordinated with the Netherlands Institute for International Affairs (the Clingendael Institute) to hold a workshop in March 2005 in The Hague on DG research and methodology. Participating organizations included USAID, Clingendael, Netherlands MFA, GTZ, SIDA, International IDEA, as well as prominent academics and political party foundation representatives. Margaret Sarles and I met with our counterparts at DfID in advance of the workshop, as they could not attend due to scheduling conflicts; CIDA could not attend due to travel budget restrictions. All invited participants were

provided with complete documentation from the workshop and are interested in continuing this effort, perhaps under the aegis of OECD/DAC GOVNET. This workshop was a key development for me, as I have had relatively little contact with other donor organizations, and thus the opportunity to interact and network is invaluable.

### **Objective #3: Develop other institutional learning processes**

I assisted in the annual DG Officer training in June 2004, walking attendees through the elements of the DG Assessment Framework, which forced me to digest and comprehend the framework quite rapidly. I have also been involved in developing a training module on the use of data and research methodology, to be used for the annual DG conference in early June 2005.

As a follow-on to my involvement with funding for Afrobarometer (see below) and other survey initiatives, I drafted language explaining the nature and value of over-sampling, which is available as technical guidance for missions.

### **Objective #4: Serve as principal DG backstop**

I was assigned to be the principal DG backstop for Albania at the end of the second quarter, and began attending weekly meetings in the E&E Bureau and following news dispatches. I participated in a review of the GOA's proposal to MCC for program funding, as well as the E&E Bureau's annual budget review process. An anticipated TDY to meet DG staff at USAID/Albania and familiarize myself with all facets of their DG programming, planned in conjunction with a technical assistance trip for legislative strengthening, was delayed until May, which is beyond the end of my first Fellowship year.

I coordinated with the Africa Bureau to review an unsolicited proposal from Afrobarometer, resulting in full or partial funding for six countries including over-sampling. I also reviewed the revised survey instrument and made recommendations for what programs and missions might benefit most from over-sampling. In addition, I provided important feedback on the methodology of surveys funded by USAID/Rwanda.

### **Objective #5: Exercise technical leadership**

I summarized or circulated copies of recent relevant research. I presented my research on post-communist civil society development at the ISTR conference in Toronto, and am currently revising it for journal submission. I have prepared budget data summaries or trends as needed for MCA and portfolio reviews, as well as a large variety of data users (see Objective #2).

**Fellowship Progress Report for 1 May 2004 – 15 June 2005**

Although democracy programs have an extensive history as a foreign assistance priority, there have been to date no systematic and rigorous analyses to evaluate which types or sequences of programming best promote democratic development. The Strategic Operations Research Agenda (SORA), begun approximately three years ago by USAID's Democracy Office, is intended to facilitate such research so that the results could be utilized to help the Office revise its activities by ending ineffective programs, tailoring some to account for specific contexts, and changing the focus of others as necessary. As a Democracy Fellow, I will play a key role in implementing the latest initiative under SORA, a research design that is intended to analyze the impact of democracy-promotion programs. The conduct of these analyses by USAID is also a critical step toward firmly establishing the relatively new field of applied democratic development, which melds insights from the academic, policy, and practitioner worlds to improve foreign assistance policy.

The Democracy Fellowship offers me an unparalleled opportunity to advance my professional goal of combining scholarly research and policy-oriented projects, while at the same time it allows me to contribute to the advancement and improvement of democracy promotion policy. My existing academic experience with quantitative and qualitative research on regime change, democratic development, and civil society will be augmented by applied experience from research on key programmatic activities. The Democracy Fellowship will be superb foundation for a career as a policy analyst or advisor on democratic development and foreign assistance.

The dominant activity during my Democracy Fellowship will be the full operationalization of the research design developed by the Social Science Research Council for program analyses. This design, which envisions a combination of longitudinal country case studies and comparative sub-sectoral analyses, is an important starting point for the generation of new knowledge in applied democratic development. More broadly, though, I will play a role in incorporating methodological design in other aspects of USAID's activities. Another principal activity will be to engage the broader democracy promotion policy community outside the USG, but this is to extend beyond the academic community to include other development agencies and develop avenues for the sharing of or collaborating on research on applied democratic development.

The objectives guiding the Democracy Fellowship include:

- 1) To assume a leadership role in the development and implementation of the research design for analyzing a wide variety of democracy promotion programs;
- 2) To coordinate and participate in briefings related to the program evaluation project;
- 3) To develop other institutional learning processes related to the use of research methodology or data sets;
- 4) To serve as the principal democracy and governance backstop for one or two USAID missions; and
- 5) To exercise technical leadership in an area of democracy and governance that may be useful for advancing applied research in democracy promotion.

Meeting these objectives will obviously entail coordinating related activities within USAID, the USG, and broader academic and international development agency circles.

## *Andrew Green - Final Report*

Work proceeded largely according to plan during my first Fellowship period, but the pace was often determined by constraints common to large bureaucracies – a certain amount of inertia, the need to develop consensus among a broad scope of relevant personnel, and urgent demands for involvement in fulfilling last-minute requests from other units in the Agency – as well as Agency-specific obstacles stemming from problematic budget and procurement systems implementation.

### **Objective #1: Assume a leadership role**

A large portion of my time was devoted to this objective, to good effect for the Office and for me professionally.

*First*, during this year I wrote, contributed to, or revised upon feedback a series of documents necessary for introducing the project to interested parties in the Agency, other USG agencies, multilateral organizations, and thinktanks. This included a four-page statement of the general goals and objectives of the SORA project as a whole, a long list of illustrative inquiries, hypothetical findings of SORA, and a PowerPoint presentation outlining the SORA effort as a whole. The development of these documents provided key lessons on the need to integrate activities in terms of broader Agency initiatives, and to stake out the extent and limits of the team's work.

*Second*, I worked closely with my team members to develop the first scope of work for the SORA project, the quantitative analysis portion, and to identify/compare/justify different specific contracting mechanisms. I worked closely with my team members to re-design the the first scope of work when the first effort to procure research services through the MOBIS contract mechanism was not successful, but we identified a cooperative agreement in EGAT that would enable us to award a grant to appropriate academic researchers. Coming to grips with the conflicting demands of the Agency budgeting environment, lead times for soliciting and reviewing proposals, and the nature of different mechanisms provided key insights into the contracting functions of the Agency. I subsequently served as the only USAID-based voting member of the proposal review committee for the quantitative analysis grant, which runs from December 2004 to November 2005.

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*Fourth*, I coordinated the selection and establishment of an Experts Group for review of work products by the grantees for the quantitative analysis phase of SORA. To date my team and the

experts have provided extensive feedback on the codebook and the analysis plan. Because of the need to make a second attempt to procure services for the quantitative analysis phase, preliminary analyses will not be available for review until shortly after this Fellowship year. Coordinated with the Experts Group for their advice on the preliminary analyses.

*Fifth*, as part of the effort to develop the second scope of work for the qualitative analysis phase of SORA, I reviewed past multi-case studies of USAID democracy-promotion programs, focusing specifically but not exclusively on selection criteria; this review highlighted some of the pitfalls of working via consensus. Completed the second scope of work for SORA, which covers the multi-year, qualitative research phase of the project; this was behind schedule due to unexpected difficulties in compiling the budget database needed for the quantitative phase of SORA and the need to consult extensively within the Office on the second scope of work. A three-country pilot was part of this scope of work and will be conducted in fall 2005. Coordinated the establishment of an Advisory Board for the second phase of SORA, the multi-year, qualitative research phase, but this Board will not meet until shortly after this Fellowship ends.

*Final*, I served on a proposal review committee for the second Analytical Services IQC, which was an invaluable opportunity to learn about the contracting process and specific contractors in this business.

#### **Objective #2: Coordinate and participate in briefings**

As a team, we conducted multiple and extensive briefings for all team leaders and Office management, and then incorporated feedback in the drafts of the first and second scopes of work. Outside the Office, we have briefed DCHA Senior Staff, Sector Council members, and key personnel from PPC and OTI. One result of briefings with PPC/CDIE has been contributory funding for the second phase of SORA. Such consensus building exercises are key to achieving ambitious goals in the Agency, and I have learned valuable lessons about funding within the Agency.

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conflicts; CIDA could not attend due to travel budget restrictions. All invited participants were provided with complete documentation from the workshop and are interested in continuing this effort, perhaps under the aegis of OECD/DAC GOVNET. This workshop was a key development for me, as I have had relatively little contact with other donor organizations, and thus the opportunity to interact and network is invaluable.

**Objective #3: Develop other institutional learning processes**

I assisted in the annual DG Officer training in June 2004, walking attendees through the elements of the DG Assessment Framework, which forced me to digest and comprehend the framework quite rapidly. I have also been involved in developing a training module on the use of data and research methodology, to be used for the annual DG conference in early June 2005.

As a follow-on to my involvement with funding for Afrobarometer (see below) and other survey initiatives, I drafted language explaining the nature and value of over-sampling, which is available as technical guidance for missions.

**Objective #4: Serve as principal DG backstop**


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**Objective #5: Exercise technical leadership**

I summarized or circulated copies of recent relevant research. I presented my research on post-communist civil society development at the ISTR conference in Toronto, and am currently revising it for journal submission. I have prepared budget data summaries or trends as needed for MCA and portfolio reviews, as well as a large variety of data users (see Objective #2).

**DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE BUDGETS, 1998-2004**  
(including Iraq & Afghanistan)





### Strategic and Operations Research Agenda (SORA)

#### Section 1: Core Work

Planning to Support International Development Programs  
Policy Analysis and Research  
Program Evaluation



### Common Limitations of Studies

- Definition of "policy," "program," "project"
- Choice of measurement
- Attribution to agency intervention
- Limited access to data, staff, beneficiaries
- Other social concerns, health, education, etc.



### Post Democracy Studies

Multi-Region

Single Country

Multi-Country

Multi-Region	Single Country	Multi-Country
• High level of generalization	• High level of detail	• High level of detail
• Limited ability to control for confounding	• Limited ability to generalize	• Limited ability to generalize
• Limited ability to control for confounding	• Limited ability to generalize	• Limited ability to generalize
• Limited ability to control for confounding	• Limited ability to generalize	• Limited ability to generalize



### Limitations of Post Democracy Studies

- Limited access to program evaluations
- Limited access to standard data
- Limited access to data analysis



### SGRA Goals and Objectives

- Analyze the Impact of Post Democracy Programs
- Monitor & Report Statistical Effects
- Incorporate Results in Programs & Training
- Disseminate Results to USAID and Others



### SGRA Research Project

- Analyze the Impact of Post Democracy Programs
- Monitor & Report Statistical Effects
- Incorporate Results in Programs & Training
- Disseminate Results to USAID and Others





### Qualitative Research Difficulties

- Common research design holds flexibility
- Availability of subjects, geographical
- Attribution: USAID or other donor agency?



### USAID Products

- Quantitative surveys possible
- Cross-country studies
- Country comparisons (within + across agencies)
- Quantitative analysis at sector level
- Cross-sectional analysis or comparison level
- Training



### Comments, Feedback, Input?

- Data on your agency's budget & program areas?
- Examples or recommendations for evaluation?

**Democracy Fellowship  
Final Report – January 2004 to June 2005**

**Shanthi Kalathil**  
World Learning Democracy Fellow  
USAID/Washington – Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance  
Office of Democracy and Governance, Civil Society Division  
January 2005-June 2005

## **Professional Goals and Fellowship Objectives**

*Over the course of the fellowship:*

When I began the Democracy Fellowship in January 2004, my overarching goal was to develop my own expertise in democracy and governance issues, in order to better understand how democracy promotion fits into broader strategic US foreign policy goals. In order to achieve this, I sought to become familiar with USAID procedures and mechanisms, develop new research and analytic approaches toward media and civil society assistance, and provide technical assistance and leadership to the DG office. Given that democracy promotion has become such a key component of US foreign policy, this turned out to be an excellent time to be a Democracy Fellow at USAID.

*Over the last contract period from Jan-June 2005:*

During this period of my World Learning Democracy Fellowship, I endeavored to broaden my experience in the fragile states arena while relating this to my ongoing work in the civil society division. At the outset, I chose to focus on fragile states because a) this focus provided an opportunity to become knowledgeable about an important part of USG foreign policy going forward; b) there appeared to be several opportunities to engage on these issues from a civil society and media perspective; c) this area of focus dovetails with my initial fellowship goal of incorporating the knowledge gained in the DG Office into a broader understanding of U.S. foreign policy-making. When beginning this period of the fellowship, I intended to focus on this issue by examining more closely the role of the media in fragile states: how it may provide early warning of states approaching fragility; its role in weakening or strengthening a fragile state; the part media plays in a post-conflict (or post-disaster) reconstruction situation; and finally, the programmatic options available to USAID in any of these situations.

### **Objectives:**

My objectives over the last six months of the fellowship were:

- 1) To understand in greater depth USAID procedures, funding mechanisms, contractors, analytical methods, and technical assistance strategies, in order to better analyze how civil society and media assistance contributes to democratization and better governance.
- 2) To develop new analytic approaches toward media and civil society programming, with particular emphasis on fragile states.
- 3) To assist the DG office through providing technical support to media activities as well as other Civil Society Division activities.

- 4) To gain a better strategic understanding of USAID's role in the foreign policy process, especially concerning USG interventions/actions in fragile states and the role of DG programming in these interventions.

**Methods, Activities, Outcomes & Impact: January-June 2005**

1) Understood in greater depth USAID procedures, funding mechanisms, contractors, analytical methods, and technical assistance strategies, in order to better analyze how civil society and media assistance contributes to democratization and better governance.

- a. Over the last six months, I worked on a number of projects that entailed gaining a greater understanding of USAID funding mechanisms, procedures, contractors, technical assistance strategies and analytical methods.
  - i. IREX Media Conference: I helped plan and execute the USAID-funded IREX International Media Conference, which took place this year in Morocco. The conference has traditionally been (in past years) limited to media professionals and USAID DG Officers from the E&E region, but with extra funding from the DG Office's Civil Society Division this year, the conference was able to incorporate a more global focus. In addition to conceptualizing the conference with colleagues from the DCHA and E&E bureaus. I also assisted with logistical details and was able to gain a better understanding of the different procurement issues involved with planning a large USAID-funded activity. At the conference itself, I met and renewed connections with a large number of people working in this field, including contractors, implementing organizations, journalists, USAID DG Officers, and others. I also chaired a session at the conference on business reporting.
  - ii. MEPI media consultation/activities: Building on the activities of the first year of the fellowship, I continued to stay involved in activities related to the development of the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). This included ongoing monitoring of MEPI's USAID-managed media and civil society-related regional projects, regular consultation meetings with the State Department, and gaining further experience and expertise in Middle East DG issues. Working on MEPI issues helped improve my understanding of procurement and contractual issues as well as the interagency process.
  - iii. The Civil Society division was deluged over the last six months with an unusual number of media-related requests for assistance, which contributed to my knowledge of USAID funding mechanisms and procedures, in particular. In addition, the GAO

- conducted a study of USG media assistance programs and required a substantial amount of support from DCHA/DG in terms of document provision, explanation, etc.
- iv. Planning of Annual DG Office Partners Conference in June 2005: This activity began to consume a great deal more time throughout April/May of 2005, including planning sessions for attending DG Officers and constant consultation on workshop design, speakers, etc. Although much of this was logistical, planning for the different panels involved thinking through current DG issues in the field, the academic world and the policy arena.
  - v. DG Assessment training: I attended a full-day training workshop on DG Assessment methodology, which further improved my understanding of DG Office technical assistance strategies.
- b. Backstopping: As the situation in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate over the first six months of 2005, I monitored the situation and assisted the mission virtually as needed. As newly minted China backstop for the DG Office, I was also able to draw on my existing country expertise to meet with State Department and other officials about USG democracy promotion strategies in China, with an eye toward keeping USAID informed.
- 2) Developed new analytic approaches toward media and civil society programming, with particular emphasis on fragile states.
- a. I conducted a literature review on the topic of media, civil society and fragile states, including existing academic and think tank literature, as well as USAID monitoring & evaluation documents.
  - b. Due to a number of pressing assistance requests from the field, delivery of the paper on media in fragile states was postponed. I anticipate that the paper, when completed, will still include major theoretical issues; different approaches; examples from case studies; sequencing and programmatic issues. Experience from recent TDYs to the West Bank and Aceh will be fed into the final paper.
  - c. Although the Civil Division convened several rigorous meetings on developing a technical assistance strategy with respect to fragile states, we did not move forward as quickly as I'd originally anticipated. The idea of conducting a series of case studies on civil society in fragile states was postponed.
  - d. As part of my fellowship objective to stay informed and connected, I attended a conference at the London School of Economics on media and fragile states. While in London, I also met with a number of other implementing organizations and donors such as DFID.
- 3) Assisted the DG office through providing technical support to media activities as well as other Civil Society Division activities.

- a. Analytic methods and technical assistance: While I had originally planned to devote the most significant percentage of my time during this second year of the fellowship to Washington-based analytical work, the unusual number of requests from the field meant that I spent a good deal of time on travel related to field-based technical assistance. TDYs to provide technical assistance included:
  - i. Jordan: Following up on a previous media assessment conducted for USAID/Jordan, I spent a few days in Amman working with the mission on a scope of work for its planned media activity.
  - ii. West Bank/Gaza: I traveled to West Bank/Gaza to lead a three-person media assessment team to conduct a study for USAID/WBG. My findings from this TDY contributed to the design of a potential media activity for the mission, and in addition provided important field findings for my ongoing research on media in fragile states.
  - iii. Indonesia/Aceh: I traveled to Jakarta to design a media strategy for USAID/Indonesia, with particular emphasis on possible media activities in the tsunami-affected region of Aceh. Again, the findings from this TDY also contributed broadly to my work on fragile state issues.
  
- 4) Gained a better strategic understanding of USAID's role in the foreign policy process, particularly with regard to USG interventions/actions in fragile states and the role of DG programming in these interventions.
  - a. I continued to represent civil society/media issues in the DG Office Fragile States Working Group, and attended other intra-agency and interagency meetings. The Bush administration has placed heavy emphasis on understanding and working in fragile states, as well as on democracy promotion. Consequently, this has been an excellent period to be involved in various discussions and processes in both areas. Moreover, because DG issues are also gaining greater prominence on the Hill, this period of the fellowship was very instructive in terms of understanding the foreign policy-making process in general and the interagency process in particular.
  - b. Through office discussions on the various roles of different USG agencies in the stabilization/reconstruction process, I gained valuable insight into how the USG functions (or plans to function) in these environments. In particular, I broadened my interaction with State/CRS during the period of the fellowship, discussing with them the prospect of adapting my research into media and fragile states into a workable outline to use for interagency planning processes.

**Methods, Activities, Outcomes & Impact: Entire Fellowship Period**

During the lifetime of the World Learning Democracy Fellowship, I engaged in a number of activities designed to contribute to my overarching objectives. Although not all of them will be detailed here, I will note a few of them here.

In the first stage (roughly three months) of my World Learning Democracy Fellowship, I concentrated on basic familiarization with USAID methodology, terminology, and culture. This required gaining a basic understanding of the procedures, mechanisms, contractors, analytical methods and technical assistance strategies of the DG Office, which – as someone coming from completely outside the US AID apparatus – took more time than I originally anticipated.

While doing this, I began to familiarize myself with how media and civil society assistance fits broadly into USAID democracy and governance programming. I did this primarily by immediately jumping into a media assessment trip to Indonesia. With team leader Krishna Kumar from USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) office, I traveled to Indonesia in February-March to carry out a broad assessment of USAID media assistance since 1998. While in Indonesia, I met with representatives of media organizations, government bodies, NGO leaders, implementers and others who are involved in the ongoing process of media reform. I also visited several radio stations to seek their feedback on USAID assistance and to get a sense of what they felt were the most pressing media issues going forward. The resulting assessment formed part of a series of "lessons learned" media assessment carried out by USAID/PPC.

Another quick introduction to USAID process and content came in the form of work on the 'background' section of the Iraq civil society RFA. Although I was not involved with the other parts of the RFA process, I was able to gain some understanding of the procedural aspects of designing large-scale assistance programs from a USAID perspective.

During the next six months of the fellowship, I concentrated on understanding the various strategies employed by USAID's media programs in different missions, and the different enabling and constraining features of each environment. On a TDY to Egypt, for instance, I helped the mission think through critical issues with respect to the possibility of developing a new media program.

I also sought to provide technical support to civil society division activities. This included developing Civil Society Division training materials, both for USAID New Entry Professionals as well as overseas-based DG Officers. Developing training materials, at least within the Civil Society division, entails a fairly rigorous process of session design and peer review. This also ensures that training materials are kept fresh and relevant to current DG issues.

During the latter part of 2004, I was able to offer much more technical assistance to the field, as well as participate in other technical leadership activities within the DG Office. In late September, for instance, I undertook a media assessment for USAID/Jordan that became the basis for subsequent media program design. I also attended a number of Washington-based and overseas conferences that helped me maintain contacts and stay current on issues relating to civil society, media, and democratization in general.

Particularly during the last quarter of 2004, I began to engage more substantially on issues related to fragile states, as this issue moved to the forefront of USAID strategic thinking. I also became more deeply involved in issues relating to the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative, as many of the programs in its political pillar were managed by the DG Office. Along with colleagues in the DG Office, I met regularly with MEPI officials to discuss ongoing and potential regional civil society/media programs in the Middle East/ North Africa region. I also participated actively in planning a joint USAID/MEPI high-level media workshop for the region's most prominent/active media professionals, held in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.

#### **Timelines and Level of Effort: Jan-June 2005**

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Q1</b>	<b>Q2</b>
Research/Participation in Fragile States Activities (media and civil society)	25%	40%
Media/Civil Society technical support	65%	40%
Backstopping	5%	10%
Meetings/Conferences	5%	10%

#### **TDYs Over the Course of the Fellowship**

Jordan, West Bank/Gaza, Israel, Egypt, UK, Austria, Belgium, Morocco, Indonesia, U.A.E.

#### **Concluding Thoughts**

In general, I felt I met and exceeded my fellowship objectives during the entire course of the fellowship. The fellowship helped deepen my technical expertise in civil society and media, and gave me a quick initiation into the processes, procedures, vocabulary and methodological practices of the DG Office. Essentially, I achieved three separate goals over the life of the fellowship: a) I became familiar with USAID and its practices; b) I contributed and benefited from technical expertise in media, civil society, and general DG issues; c) I gained a better understanding of the role of democracy and development in US foreign policy, and in particular, a better understanding of USAID's role in the interagency process.

I also gained a few things I did not expect, including a broader understanding of political issues in the Middle East and several opportunities to travel to that region. Backstopping assignments on the Africa regional team gave me the opportunity to learn more about important DG issues in Africa, particularly southern Africa. One issue I did not explore in as much depth as I initially expected was that of linkages between USAID's ICT programs and its DG programs; this was partly due to the amount of work I took on

within the DG Office, and partly due to USAID's stovepiping of technology and DG issues.

During the period from January to June of 2005, I felt I made progress toward gaining experience with technical assistance and developing new analytic approaches toward media and civil society programming in fragile states. I did feel that I spent more of my time than I had originally anticipated on technical/field support, but this was mitigated by the fact that all of my TDYs were directly related to my chosen area of focus for this portion of the fellowship, fragile states. Overall, however, I think the fellowship is not set up in such a fashion as to encourage fellows to engage in independent research. A large percentage of my time seemed to be devoted to "putting out fires" rather than engaging in methodically planned research and analysis. The net result of this is that fellows act more often than not as contractors rather than as scholars/fellows who are specifically there to contribute fresh ideas and perspective to the Agency.

Broadly, the fellowship contributed to my goal of understanding how democracy and governance programs interlock with broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. This knowledge will be valuable as I continue to pursue a career in international affairs.

**Fellowship Final Report**  
**Preston Hiroki Pentony**

**I. Professional Goals**

My professional goals entering the fellowship were to gain familiarity with USAID strategic planning processes. This was reflected in the principal objective of the fellowship description:

*To contribute to the development of the Mission's five-year strategic plan, ensuring that it meets USAID's worldwide objectives in democracy and governance, and provides for effective and efficient interventions for the promotion of democratic governance in the post conflict situation of Angola. It is envisioned that 60-80% of the Fellow's time will be devoted to this objective.*

However, because of decisions internal to the Angola mission and overall agency planning processes, the strategic planning process has been delayed, essentially making the fellowship description invalid.

Efforts to develop a new workplan were frustrating at times. This was due to several factors that include: the person who was the prime motivator in bringing a fellow left the mission before my arrival and conflicting information was received from DG SO staff and upper-level mission management. These challenges meant that I operated until the end of the fellowship without any type of final workplan or terms of reference, conducting activities on an ad hoc basis. Ultimately most of this work settled on activities related to elections scheduled for Angola next year, an area in which I already have substantial experience and no interest in pursuing professionally in the future.

**II. General Description of the Fellowship**

In the context described above, the main activities during my fellowship have been:

- Supporting the revision of the SO framework. At this point, the DG program is still operating under a framework developed in 2000, a time of humanitarian and emergency response and so does not adequately incorporate electoral activities already underway. I worked with USAID staff and partners to assist in the development of relevant sub-objectives and indicators.
- Conducting an analysis of electoral activities and the current political context in order to offer recommendations for electoral programming throughout the coming year.
- Conducting an analysis of the democracy and governance sector in general in Angola (a "think piece" as the mission phrased it, in order to offer

recommendations for longer-term DG programming apart from elections. This activity, and the previous one, involved extensive review of literature (USAID documents, scholarly articles, surveys and studies of Angola, World Bank and other international agency documents, etc), attending meetings outside of USAID, interviews with a wide spectrum of actors in Angola, liaising with embassy officials, and coordination with USAID staff.

### **III. Fellowship Objectives**

Please see section I above, **Professional Goals**. Although activities were conducted, these were not formalized into fellowship objectives.

### **IV. Performance Methods and Activities**

General methods are described above. More specifically, I would say that the approach utilized involved a telescoping approach. Issues were first examined from a broad academic level to determine general trends in scholarly thought and how they may be applied to the Angolan context. The USAID general documents were consulted to understand agency thinking and approaches, which were then compared to other relevant agencies such as UNDP and the World Bank. This was usually followed by a series of interviews with a wide range of actors active in Angola – civil society, representatives of State institutions, political parties, other internationals, etc.

Of course, the work regarding electoral activities was a bit more concrete than that involving the “think piece.” Electoral programming is already underway, and so suggestions developed relied a great deal on recent project documents and discussions with the CEPPS partners who USAID is supporting, as well as observation of activities. The final paper made suggestions focusing on ways to make the electoral work more of an indigenous effort, enhance the capacity building facet of such work, and address some political challenges confronting the sometimes sensitive programming area.

The “think piece” was by nature of a more conjectural nature, trying to make a determination as to what activities would be most effective in the long-run when the political landscape is still difficult to determine. The approach was as described above, but with special consideration given to implications of the USAID fragility framework (given that Angola has been classified as a State addressing issues of fragility) as well as the special considerations of oil dependent states, about which there is specialized literature. A draft copy of the paper is attached.

Attached is a report I prepared from a retreat conducted with partners to finalize the SO framework.

### **V. Outcomes and Impacts**

The outcomes were:

- I gained substantial knowledge of the particular situation in Angola. The FSN staff at the mission were particularly knowledgeable and helpful in this regard.
- Another outcome that contributed to my professional development was the knowledge gained about the challenges of working in resource dependent countries. The political and economic challenges of working in such situations are very different from other contexts where I have previously worked. I conducted extensive literature review about such situations, with particular attention to economic and statistical studies of the effects of dependency on primary resources on economic development, conflict, and democratization. I also conducted field work to determine how petroleum dependency, and the great amount of petroleum resources available to Angola, affects assistance from the international community in the country.
- A revised strategic framework for DG programming was developed in conjunction with USAID partners. Although it has not yet gone fully into effect it should help facilitate DG programming around the 2006 elections, ensuring that these efforts are consistent with broader USAID goals for DG programming in Angola. It has also helped monitoring and evaluation of projects by providing a common understanding of the programming among USAID and its partners, a cohesive framework for CEPPS partners and USAID as they revise ongoing programming and consider future initiatives, and a basis on which to coordinate with other international institutions supporting the elections.

At the time that the fellowship ended, USAID partners were already adjusting their monitoring mechanisms to ensure that reporting accurately and efficiently captured data related to USAID's goals and objectives for electoral programming. This included development of new indicators, including some comprehensive indexes that should provide a more comprehensive picture of USAID's impact on democratization through support for the electoral process in the areas of political party building, media, civil society, and support for State institutions. USAID DG partners working at the local community level outside of the capital also adjusted their programming and M&E mechanism to show the impact of programming at the sub-national level.

All of these should help USAID better measure the effectiveness and efficiency of its electoral programming, as well as provide useful information that will inform future programming decisions.

- The fellow developed a comprehensive analysis of the democracy and governance sector in general. The paper took a drilling down approach i.e. starting from a general discussion of democratization and good governance, moving towards literature and studies more specific to the Angola context (some economic considerations, Angola as a state confronting fragility, and its

status as a single resource dependent economy). The last sections are a discussion of possible implications of these for the Angola program that attempt to flow logically from the previous discussions. The first of these deals specifically with short term programming, particularly as related to the elections. The last section deals principally with possibilities for medium term programming.

I cannot make a determination as to the impact that this paper will have for Angola or the USAID mission, although if it was incredibly useful from a professional development standpoint. The mission itself provided little or no feedback during the development of the analysis, and gave only vague guidance as to what it should contain, what methods should be used, and what the ultimate purpose of the exercise was. The mission is currently undergoing various exercises to help inform eventual development of a new country strategic plan, including hosting of focus groups, and various types of assessments from USAID and outside contractors. I do not know how or if this paper will be an input into this process.

## **VI. Other Matters**

This section answers the additional questions asked for final reports.

*Which proposed methods were used? Did they achieve the anticipated outcomes?*

The methods used were described in section IV above. As this fellowship was less than 6 months, the methods changed little over time. The methodology was developed after very brief discussions with the DG team and the mission director.

Generally it is difficult for me to determine if they reached the anticipated outcomes from the USAID side, as it was never clearly articulated what the anticipated outcomes were. They did reach the outcomes that I set for myself and which are already described above. The work directly related to the electoral programming was probably the most useful to the mission, and was successful in helping the DG team articulate short and medium term objectives and indicators for electoral programming.

*Which methods were not used that were originally suggested, and why not?*

No methods were originally suggested.

*What experiences and outcomes were unanticipated in the program description but are still relevant to the fellowship? How did they contribute to the experience?*

As mentioned previously the entire program description as originally presented was not relevant by the time of my arrival in Angola, and an alternate was never developed. Activities were conducted on an ad hoc basis.

*How do you assess your performance as a professional within the field of democratization?*

I have a wide range of experiences that have provided me with a rich understanding of the field of democratization from a variety of viewpoints and programmatic areas. This ranges from direct project implementation experience in areas such as human rights and civil society through my work with NGOs, and I have broader macro policy experience in areas such as institution building, the security sector, media, etc through my experience with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Others can probably better assess my performance, but I have always received superlative performance evaluations in all of my positions. I feel comfortable operating in a variety of contexts and can converse knowledgably based on personal experience on most areas within the field of democratization.

*What competencies (skills, knowledge) do you anticipate developing in your future work?*

I intend to continue working in conflict/post-conflict situations, hopefully in the field of institution building or the security sector.

*Other issues.*

I would like to thank and commend World Learning. I always found them to be extremely supportive and professional in my dealings with them.

I would suggest that for future fellowship positions, if there are significant changes to the position as advertised before the fellow arrives on site, that the mission make every effort to inform the fellow of those changes. I understand the need for flexibility and for the fellow to support the work of the mission. However, there are degrees, and in the case of this fellowship position the mission was aware that the entirety of the advertised position would not be an accurate portrayal of the fellowship once I arrived. Such measures could help ensure the best match between position and candidate.

## VII. Attachments

### Retreat Report 28 February – 3 March 2005

#### A. SUMMARY

##### I. Objectives:

The objectives of the workshop were to:

1. Strengthen and regularize PMP data collection and indicator identification and analysis to ensure that all partners are presenting information in a uniform manner that reflects a common understanding of the indicators and overall DG Results Framework.
2. Develop a new Intermediate Result (IR) and indicators relevant to election activities.
3. Brainstorm on the current situation of democracy and governance and future directions for DG.
4. Meet with civil society organizations and political parties to assess the local DG environment in terms of changes that have occurred in the last three years and future perspectives.

##### II. Outcomes:

1. World Learning and NDI have been, and will continue to report across all of the indicators.
2. CRS and ADF will report on 6.1.1, 6.2.2, 6.3.1, and 6.3.2.
3. SCG will continue using their current tools to report against indicators 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and both indicators under 6.3.
4. Elimination of indicator 6.2.1 as it was felt to be redundant.
5. Revision of indicator 6.3.1 as per attachment 1.
6. Agreement on a new IR, and concurrent definition of election indicators. This does not preclude the possibility of more fine tuning following further discussion with partners.

*IR: Substantive constituency involvement in promoting competitive, transparent, and inclusive electoral processes*

*Definition: A competitive electoral process includes, but is not limited to, an election in which political parties or independent candidates have the right to compete openly in a process that is administered impartially. It also refers to the roles of institutions such as the electoral bodies and political parties. Constituencies should be knowledgeable about the electoral process and have the ability to influence party platforms and*

*political and policy decisions. They should also have the ability to monitor all aspects of the electoral process and publicize their findings.*

Indicators:

- 1. Number and variety of participants in public debate fora.*
- 2. Surveys of voter knowledge.*
- 3. Percentage of polling places covered by monitors and party representatives.*
- 4. Political party index (developed by IRI).*

There is also an indicator yet to be drafted. This sprang from an extended discussion of a possible indicator covering the registration process, with several offering the opinion that other aspects of electoral process monitoring should also be covered. *USAID agreed to include a new indicator that would capture such aspects and appropriate data collection methodology, based on a draft which NDI agreed to prepare. All of these indicators will be finalized in the two weeks following the workshop. Also USAID recommends merging of some of these indicators as detailed below in section I.*

7. Suggestions for future direction of the SO include issues such as: youth, security forces, local government, ensuring a constituency base for CSOs, reconciliation, information, education, parliament, and local research and analytic capacity.
8. Discussion with local civil society groups who stated that the human rights situation has improved somewhat in the province, but that these improvements are relative. It still lags behind Luanda, and is even worse in the interior of the province. Lack of access to information was highlighted. Political parties mentioned some instances of political intolerance and violence.

## **B. REPORT**

### **I. Background and Objectives**

The SO6 team and its partners participated in a retreat held from 28 February to 3 March in Lobito, Benguela Province. Attendees were:

Elias Isaac, USAID  
Eveline Viegas, USAID  
Domingos Menezes, USAID  
Preston Pentony, USAID  
Miguel Castanha, ADF  
Tito Faria, CRS  
Heather Kulp, SCG  
João Kambowela, IFES  
James Fisfis, IRI  
Ranca Tuba, IRI  
Isabel Emerson, NDI  
Barbara Smith, NDI  
Fern Teodoro, World Learning  
Miguela Kassule, World Vision

CRS graciously provided valuable logistical assistance to all of the participants through their Lobito office.

The format of the retreat sessions was generally a short presentation by one of the participants followed by discussion.

### **II. Sessions**

#### **A. Review of SO Results Framework**

USAID provided a summary of the current SO Results Framework, including a history of its development and an explanation that while it was originally designed for a five-year period, it will be extended through FY 06. These retreat objectives were developed as a result of several factors. As more time passes from the original development of the SO framework, it is important to ensure that all of the indicators are adequately addressed by partners' reporting. USAID expressed concern about a drop in the achievement of FY 04 indicator targets, which was not the result of lack of performance but rather an inability or failure to adequately capture appropriate data to feed into the indicators. For relatively new partners, such as CRS and ADF, the retreat was an opportunity to discuss how their activities fit into the framework and to become familiar with tools developed by other organizations for possible adaptation to their own monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Finally, as the SO framework was developed at a time of uncertainty regarding the elections, it was necessary to discuss how the electoral process would impact the framework. All of these factors were discussed with the goal of maintaining

the integrity and relevance of the SO framework, and to facilitate reporting that is timely, comprehensive, and responds to the IRs and indicators.

## **B. World Learning PMP Experience**

World Learning (WL) and National Democratic Institute (NDI), as participants in the development of the SO results framework, provided valuable insights into its history and adjustments that have been made over the past four years to capture and analyze data collected, taking into account changes in the environment, budget constraints and limited local market M&E capacity. WL presented 6 models used as part of their M&E system to report on achievements in terms of media and education efforts, CSO advocacy capacity, and government – constituency relations. Partners also presented methods and practices used, including involvement of local partners.

Models 1 and 2 deal with media related indicators. Despite the absence of a national media survey to capture number of people reached by media outlets as well as media coverage of key issues, WL explained that it is possible to capture some aspects of media coverage and felt that their instruments adequately address these aspects. These include data such as publication of their own materials, attendance at events sponsored by themselves or partner organizations, and media coverage of supported activities. Even if WL felt that many aspects cannot be accurately and comprehensively measured, models capture direct and indirect (e.g. print press) impact of USAID-supported activities. WL strongly recommended USAID to support a comprehensive media survey.

Models 4 and 5 deal with CSO activities, with number 4 measuring number of supported education efforts (workshops, debates, community meetings), and Model 5 measuring coalitions' advocacy capacity. It looks at the legal and activist aspects, and is done on a yearly basis. At this point (and in several subsequent sessions) it was suggested that Model 5 "Instrument to Evaluate the Advocacy Capacity of the Coalition" could be attempted for SCG's, CRS's and ADF's work with local partners.

There was a discussion of the models dealing with Government – Constituency relations, and IR 6.3 more generally. USAID expressed concern that data dealing with "Citizens' Perception of Government Responsiveness" has shown a decline over time in several key areas. *WL and NDI responded that they had reservations about IR 6.3 since the SO framework was developed. They thought that it was an entirely possible outcome that as constituencies become more acquainted with the Government and its policies, they could actually become more disenchanted and frustrated with lack of Government response. Increased availability of information and more contact does not necessarily translate into greater satisfaction.* Since some aspects are not addressed under the current indicator assumption and survey questionnaire, USAID recommends a revision of indicator 6.3.1 to reflect partners' inputs as well as a revision of the small-survey questionnaire to track changes in citizens' awareness on selected key issues and level of interaction with government for an appropriate evaluation of the level of government- constituency interactions (see suggestions in attachment 1).

WL questioned the relevance of indicator 6.2.1 which seems to provide redundant information. USAID agreed and pointed out that the emphasis is increasingly on CSOs' capacity to advocate, as covered by the CSO Advocacy Index. This is particularly true given the newly started activities, which will focus on groups' capacity to interact with citizens and collaborate with local governments. *Therefore, it was agreed that this indicator will be removed from the DG PMP.*

NDI also expressed that short funding horizons and local market constraints make M&E difficult. The funding horizons make long-term commitment to partners difficult, while the lack of local expertise makes doing appropriate surveys, et al prohibitively expensive. USAID responded that 3 – 10% of all budgets should be set aside for M&E. *Since concerns mostly arise at the analytical stage, it was agreed to conduct a joint review of data and its analysis at least once a year to avoid last minute questions at annual report time. The meeting has been scheduled for early November 2005.*

*Finally, it was agreed that WL will continue to respond to indicators at IR level (all of the indicators previously reported on minus 6.2.1) and will provide revised targets for FY 2005 to reflect the decrease in the number of supplements and radio activities.*

### **C. SCG PMP Experience**

SCG provided a short summary of their activities, which concentrate on conflict mitigation at the local level through such interventions as working with local media and training in conflict transformation. SCG echoed the previous discussion regarding the difficulties collecting data on media. Radio is the most important means people have of receiving information; however, numbers from station directors are not reliable. SCG recommended that USAID avail themselves of some sort of survey, and said that DFID is currently conducting one.

SCG stated that it is difficult measuring social change, and they have been examining the issue in ongoing development of their own new strategic plan. They also brought in an M&E consultant. Currently, SCG uses log frames, but is attempting to focus more on impacts, rather than outcomes (USAID encouraged partners to adopt a uniformed mechanism/tool for data collection and reporting). Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) is a good tool for less literate people. SCG also does a lot of focus groups, going back to the same people in order to track trends over time. Although the CSO's they work with do not do advocacy *per se*, a civil society index has been developed.

SCG expressed some concern that most of the indicators focus on outputs rather than impacts. This was followed by a lengthy discussion of an output versus an impact, with participants suggesting the replacement of the word *reached* by *impacted* on indicator 6.1.2 and 6.2.1. It was explained that USAID and partners were concerned that impact can only be measured over a long period of time and, given uncertainties at the time of PMP results development, did not want to be bound solely by impact. *WL argued that the "numbers" are still an important and valid indicator as long as they are linked to a valid data quality analysis.*

SCG agreed that they could report indicators 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.2.1 as well as the indicators for IR 6.3 using its own tools as well as presented models. Given the aforementioned difficulties gathering information on radio audiences, SCG did not feel they would be able to report against 6.1.3. USAID underlined the need for a comprehensive analysis of collected data to assess the impact of project activities.

#### **D. Catholic Relief Services' PMP Experience**

Catholic Relief Services' (CRS) activities are more recent than WL and SCG, having started only in October 2004. The project has two components. The first consists of promoting reconciliation and resolving conflict at the local level primarily through provision of training for community members. The second is an attempt to promote cohesiveness through people working to address difficulties affecting communities, through mechanisms such as small project identification and implementation and advocacy training at the local level. Political differences between the two largest parties have presented challenges in some areas where CRS is sometimes accused of being an agent for one party or the other. CRS is also doing PRA. It also completed a focus group study which examines traditional reconciliation mechanisms.

There was some discussion as to whether CRS could report also against 6.2.2 as CRS thought it possible but was not sure how CSO activity could fit within the advocacy index. *USAID emphasized the advocacy index should track changes at the local as well as national level and partners could revise CSO advocacy index to capture community level activities.*

*CRS agreed to report on indicators 6.1.1, 6.2.2, 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 and requested USAID support to develop its M&E systems. CRS will use the advocacy index based on a scale between 0 and 4. However, this index would have to be defined for community organizations, as opposed to NGOs and coalitions. Additionally based on the current advocacy index scale (attachment 2), CRS in partnership with ADF, will have to develop an index scale characterizing each development stage of community organizations.*

#### **E. ADF PMP Experience**

ADF's project is even newer than CRS, although similar in nature. ADF felt that data collection would be easier for them as they are working in fewer communities than CRS. ADF explained that it has a series of tools and indices for monitoring and evaluation and shared a draft plan for collection of data for indicators with specific targets for FY 2005 and 2006. *ADF will be collecting data on indicators 6.1.1, 6.2.2, 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. Given the nature of its project, ADF will not be responding to indicators 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 (dealing with media), but is willing to consider media coverage as appropriate to assess its project activities' impact. ADF will adapt and use models its own tools, feeding that information into the advocacy index.*

#### **F. IRI PMP Experience**

IRI provided a brief overview of their program, explaining the goal as increased key stakeholder engagement in the election process. This includes increased institutional capacity of political parties, increased political activism and participation, and consolidation of the national reconciliation process. This is done through working with political parties at the technical and tactical levels, including training such as platform development, communications, strategy development, etc. A national public opinion survey will be conducted later this year.

IRI faces several challenges perhaps unique to working with political parties, as opposed to civil society organizations. The main challenge is that the parties are more secretive, and so it is more difficult to know what is happening internally. *This affects ability to measure their institutional capacity. However, IRI uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures that attempt to address the representational nature and effectiveness of individual parties (including such factors as "bottom-up" operations, platform development, and democratic internal structures), and the health of the entire political spectrum.* Other aspects which are measured are sophistication of defense of interests between elections, and tactical defense of political interests. Some of the quantitative indicators include party registration numbers, election results (although IRI felt that this was not a good indicator by itself), and presence of functioning regional offices.

This was followed by a discussion of general political issues affecting the country and how these impact and are addressed by political parties. These included such topics as political violence and civil defense forces.

### **G. NDI PMP Experience**

NDI explained that part of their country activities include using the electoral process as a means of increasing citizens' participation. This includes such activities as assisting in advocacy efforts, providing training for observer groups, establishing and supporting electoral networks at national and provincial levels, and voter registration and election observation. They are working closely with IRI. Given the unique characteristics of the election in 1992, NDI did not feel that these provided appropriate baseline information for the next elections.

*NDI expressed the importance of working at the provincial level, although they will not be able to cover all provinces because of variations in the civil society environment and costs involved.* It expressed an interest in creating linkages with organizations such as CRS, ADF which are working at the local level. They will use a training of trainers methodology, but will not be able to focus on training at the provincial level and will focus more on provision of information.

NDI also expressed the need of having a donor coordination group on elections. USAID recommends the establishment of such group to share information of areas of support and maximize impact and donor community investment use. It also recommended creation of

a technical group composed of NGOs implementing elections activities to further technical coordination and to guarantee an appropriate geographic coverage.

## **H. IFES PMP Experience**

IFES provided a summary of the electoral process to date, including the developments regarding relevant legislation and the formation of the CNE. *Although it expects to work with the CNE, uncertainties regarding its formation make it difficult to speak about concrete activities at this moment.*

## **I. Discussion of New IR to Cover Electoral Programming**

USAID initiated the session by explaining the need for a new, temporary IR to cover electoral programming not contemplated by the current SO framework. USAID presented a draft IR and definition for discussion. They were adapted from the USAID Handbook of Democracy and Governance Indicators:

*IR: Substantive constituency involvement in guaranteeing transparent, inclusive and accountable electoral processes.*

*Definition: A competitive political process includes, but is not limited to an election in which political parties or independent candidates have the right to compete openly in a process that is administered impartially. It also refers to the roles of institutions such as the electoral bodies and political parties. Constituencies should be knowledgeable about the electoral process and have the ability to influence party platforms and political and policy decisions. They should also have the ability to monitor all aspects of the electoral process and publicize their findings.*

This was followed by a discussion of the word “guaranteeing” in the IR, with many participants concerned would bind them to results that dependent on factors outside their programming areas. Various alternate words were proposed, including “fostering” and “promoting.” Other slight changes were proposed to the IR, and it was agreed that new short term IR will be :

*Substantive constituency involvement in promoting competitive, transparent, and inclusive electoral processes.*

There was also a slight change to the definition. The word “political” was changed to “electoral.”

There was a lengthier discussion of the proposed indicators, which were:

*Related to advocacy:*

- 1. Number and variety of participants in public debate fora.*

2. *Public perception of electoral process (Can include questions on elections for focus groups)*
3. *Degree to which input and feedback by political parties, candidates, and civil society groups is considered by electoral authorities.*
4. *Degree of acceptance by civil society and political parties of electoral framework (This could be obtained from the public record or talks with the groups and parties)*

*Related to voter education:*

5. *# of people reached by civil society voter education efforts*
6. *Surveys of voter knowledge (might be difficult as it requires a baseline)*
7. *Existence of information gathering activities such as attendance at public fora, political rallies, party events, and educational programs by civil society groups.*

*Related to electoral process monitoring (which includes monitoring of campaigning, registration, the actual vote, tabulation, publication of results, challenge period, etc)*

8. *Access to all aspects of the electoral process by parties and civil society*
9. *Percentage of polling places covered by monitors and party representatives*
10. *Breadth of publication and dissemination of monitor findings (media coverage, number of attendees at events, etc)*

Some of the points raised during the discussion include:

- IRI felt that none of them adequately addressed capacity of political parties and suggested that their political party index would be an appropriate indicator for this. This index incorporates such factors as financial sophistication, existence of party platforms, and regional presence.
- There was some discussion of #4 with some participants offering alternative language dealing with compliance to codes of conduct. However, others felt that this dependent on factors outside the control of the program activities and ultimately most felt that it should be removed altogether.
- NDI wanted to ensure that #1 represented their efforts outside of the capital. Most agreed that the word “variety” covered regionality, among other characteristics.
- Several participants felt that #5 should be rephrased and integrated into existing indicator 6.1.2.
- Most participants agreed that #7 should be removed as it was not clear.
- *There was a lengthy discussion of #8 with some participants saying that it should be removed for the same reasons as #4. However, USAID and others felt that there should be some indicator that measured the degree and quality of civil society and political party involvement in all phases of the electoral process, including monitoring of the registration process, monitoring of CNE and Government performance, etc. There was discussion of various indicators related to the number of registrants and quality of the registration*

*process. However, there was some difficulty in articulating an indicator (or indicators) that would adequately capture this information but yet realistically reflect the ability of programming to impact those processes. NDI agreed to develop an alternative draft indicator for future discussion.*

To conclude, NDI agreed to respond to the following indicators:

- 1. Number and variety of participants in public elections fora, which will be disaggregated by gender, geographic focus and youth.*
- 2. An index to be developed which will measure CSO monitoring effectiveness.*
- 3. Surveys of voter knowledge*
- 4. Percentage of polling places covered by monitors and party representatives*
- 5. Political party index (developed by IRI)*

IRI agreed to respond to the following indicators:

- 1. Number and variety of participants in public elections fora*
- 2. Political Party Index.*
- 3. Index to be developed by NDI.*

However, USAID recommends a merging of some indicators to which both partners will be responding. It proposes that the factors covered by the indicators listed directly above could be combined into three broader indicators, which are:

- 1. Number and variety of participants in public elections fora, which will be disaggregated by gender, geographic focus and youth.*
- 2. Elections Index (to capture degree to which input and feedback by political parties, candidates, and civil society groups is considered by electoral authorities)*
- 3. # of people reached by civil society voter education efforts (which may include education and media efforts)*

Specificities of each partner activity will be addressed under indicator definition and assumptions. Participants agreed to finalize the IR and indicators within two weeks of the end of the workshop through subsequent meetings.

#### **J. PMP Lessons Learned and Wrap-Up**

USAID explained that it would like a uniform methodology and strongly encourage the adoption of the tools and the use of scales and counting methodologies provided by NDI and WL to ensure consistent reporting. The shortfall in reaching some of the FY'04 targets and the importance of setting targets were reviewed once again. Partners agreed to submit revised targets for FY 2005 and 2006 within one week of the end of the workshop.

#### **K. SO Future Direction**

This session consisted of brainstorming regarding the shape of any future SO framework, with a focus on the post-electoral period.

- SCG said that future DG activities should include youth and security forces (civic ed and human rights training) as target groups.
- There was a general discussion of the need to focus on media work, after SCG suggested this as a key activity. Almost everybody was in agreement. The various weaknesses of the sector were discussed, including the lack of comprehensive media monitoring and evaluation, the difficulties obtaining accurate data regarding the population's information sources, and the need to use local languages. It was also suggested that media, as a sector, is enthusiastic about receiving training and other support.
- ADF emphasized that reconciliation is still important, as underlying community problems can undermine other development efforts. WL observed that conflict could actually be worsened by the elections.
- NDI suggested that after the elections, activities targeting the new legislature could be a valuable activity, especially work with its commissions.
- CRS said that more attention should be paid to good governance. There was some discussion of local government being a possible avenue for citizen engagement, especially in light of possible future decentralization plans.
- NDI mentioned the need to improve local analytical and research capacity, such as how to analyze a national budget. These skills are crucial to any advocacy campaign, but difficult to come by in Angola.
- The need to assist CSOs in becoming true constituency based organizations was discussed. Some participants observed that many local NGOs formed as service providers to address the humanitarian crisis, and that many actually represent few people. Some felt that widening of the constituency base was already occurring, but almost everyone agreed that ties to the local level should be improved.
- This was followed by an extended discussion of some of the unintended consequences of overall donor assistance paradigms, which some felt had actually weakened some promising local organizations and networks by diluting their focus and imposing onerous reporting burdens. In essence, they are victims of their own success as early promise attracted donor attention which threatens their long-term sustainability.
- SCG said that their strategic planning process indicated the need for development of institutional conflict resolution at the local level. Many offered similar opinions.
- WL was of the opinion that it is necessary to identify a few CSOs that can be substantially supported over a long period of time, so as not to spread resources too thin.
- In response to a question as to whether USAID should move to more Government support, NDI stated that other donors are already involved in

that area and USAID should pursue its comparative advantages and experiences.

- IRI cautioned against promoting civil society in a way or to a degree that they are more developed or encouraged to take on roles more appropriate for political parties.
- Disarmament was discussed. SCG said that although many say that they are in favor of disarmament in the abstract, local populations essentially view it as a security issue and a need to protect themselves and their property against others. This is especially true since State institutions offer them little protection.

#### **L. Meeting with Local CSO**

This meeting was held at the CRS office with various CSOs to assess changes in the DG environment at the provincial level. Some of the salient points raised include:

- Difficulties with access to information, especially in outlying areas of the province. Several of the participants were enthusiastic in their desire that Radio Ecclesia be allowed to operate in the province, as they felt State radio coverage was biased. Newspapers arrive late if at all, although some other publications such as *No Teu Voto* are received. Participants also lamented the lack of materials in local languages.
- Participants did feel that people are becoming more aware of their rights, and more willing to claim them. Several examples were offered. However, the improvements are relative and still lag behind Luanda.
- Queried about the human rights situation, participants said that there has been some improvement, especially in terms of freedom of expression. Again, the situation is not as good as Luanda, and is worse in the interior of the province. However, they felt that people needed more support and assistance when they did choose to assert their right to speak about issues of local concern.

#### **M. Meeting with Local Political Party Representatives**

Some of the most interesting points from the meeting with the political party representatives were:

- The weaknesses in information exchange between provincial and national party structures, and
- Their inability to dialogue in a substantive way on such topics as human rights and civil society.
- The lack of strategy and plan at the provincial level for the upcoming elections;
- Reports of some political intolerance and violence.

## C. ATTACHMENTS

### ATTACHMENT 1

<b>Strategic Objective 6:</b> Constituencies promoting democratic governance strengthened.				
<b>Intermediate Result 6.3:</b> Improved government-constituency relations				
<b>Indicator 6.3.1:</b> Constituency relations				
<p><b>A. Description</b></p> <p><b>Precise Definition of Indicator:</b> Change in constituencies' perceptions of government responsiveness to their needs and requests, as assessed through specific small surveys, pre- (for the baseline) and post-surveys of targeted citizen groups (in the Mission's geographic target areas and key democracy issues).</p> <p><b>Unit of Measure:</b> Rating scores of worse (-), same (0), and better (+)</p> <p><b>Disaggregate by:</b> Issues</p> <p><b>Management Utility:</b> This indicator is a qualitative tool to indirectly assess the status of government-constituency relations and the impact of USAID-activities on those relations. Analysis of collected data will allow evaluating the level of citizens' awareness and interaction with government. If the results are perceived to be negative by citizens, then it is likely that constituencies' knowledge has not improved and contacts with government are not fruitful due to the lack of appropriate space for citizens participation; or constituencies are increasingly knowledgeable on issues and government policies, and their needs and demands continue not to be considered in public policies. If results are perceived to be positive by citizens, then it is more likely that USAID' strategy of linking demand-side approaches to a focused supply-side response is appropriate. An increase in positive responses could indicate that constituencies are increasingly knowledgeable, increasing openings for their participation and an increasing inclusion of their needs and demands in public policies, as well as increased and productive contacts with government.</p>	<b>Unit of Measure:</b> Rating score			
	<b>Year</b>	<b>Planned</b>	<b>Actual</b>	
	Baseline		17	
	2003	+	0	
	2004	+	-	
	2005	+		
<p><b>B. Plan for Data Collection</b></p> <p><b>Data Collection Method:</b> A survey on Constituency perceptions through a set of questionnaires implemented by partners (<a href="#">see Annex 8 for more details</a>).</p> <p><b>Data Source(s):</b> World Learning, SCG, CRS and ADF.</p> <p><b>Timing/Frequency of Data Collection:</b> Annually</p> <p><b>Estimated Cost of Collection:</b> Minimal (already included in the budget for activities).</p> <p><b>Responsible Organization/Individual(s):</b> CTOs.</p>				

## **C. Plan for Data Analysis, Reporting and Reviewing**

**Data Analysis:** Analyzed in a comparative approach, relating two points in time and/or space to observe trends in aggregated change across all activities. Analysis conducted in November of each Fiscal Year in preparation for Annual Report.

**Presentation of Data:** Presented as an overall rating score of worse (-), same (0), and better (+).

**Review of Data:** Mission internal reviews

**Reporting of Data:** The SO6 Team will not include this indicator in the Annual Report.

## **D. Data Quality Issues**

**Date of Initial Data Quality Assessment:** March 2001 by Implementing partners and SO6 Team. .

**Known Data Limitations and Significance (if any):** The indicator is subjective and may lead to unreliable data collection. Government officials may be reluctant to respond/comment on the issue and citizens may be afraid to speak/comment freely.

**Actions taken/Planned to Address Data Limitations:** If the main players in the activities e.g. target citizens (CSOs) and more important government officials are not willing to respond/comment, a random survey may be conducted.

## **E. Performance Data Table**

**Method of Calculation:** Average number of positive responses to calculate the changes from one year to another.

**Notes on the Baselines and Targets:** Baselines were initially set in March 2001. After the PMP review and update process (July 2002), it was determined that the unit of measure was not adequate to characterize the baseline (initially established at 0 - same), because it is comparative in nature and baseline should be the starting point. In May 2002 and January 2003, partners established an accurate method to collect data in a systematic manner. Surveys are conducted focusing on the selected advocacy key issues and directed to a sample of citizens participating in the advocacy activities. The baseline of 17 was established as average number of positive responses from the surveys (**see Annex 8 for more details**).

## **F. Other**

**Comments:**

**G. This Sheet was last updated on:** March 1, 2004

Conteúdo do Inquérito		Inquérito		
		Sim	Não	Não sabe
1	Já ouviu falar de (assunto chave)?			
2	Para se manter informado sobre o assunto usa principalmente:			
2.1	A Rádio			
2.2	A Televisão			
2.3	A Imprensa Escrita			
2.4	Eventos da OSC			
3	Acha que existe um espaço para participação do cidadão sobre o assunto?			
4	Está ou Estaria interessado em participar em discussões/debates sobre o assunto?			
5	Já participou em encontros com o governo? Promovidos por:			
5.1	OSCs			
5.2	Governo			
5.2	Partidos políticos			
5.3	Autoridades tradicionais			
6	Acha que o assunto é abordado de forma compreensível?			
7	Considera-se informado sobre o trabalho do Governo no que diz respeito ao (assunto)?			
8	Sabe se o governo tem planos (estratégicos) para fazer face ao assunto?			
9	Acha que as necessidades do cidadão/comunidades são considerados nesses planos estratégicos ou em outras actividades do governo?			
10	Considera-se informado sobre a gestão/utilização dos fundos dedicados ao (assunto)?			
11	Acha que os planos e Leis criados/adoptados são aplicados na prática?			
12	O Governo tem respondido as propostas/pedidos apresentados pelo cidadão ou OSC?			

## D. ATTACHMENTS

### ATTACHMENT 2

#### **SO6: IR 6.2.1: Civil Society Organization (CSO) Advocacy Index**

**CSO Advocacy.** This CSO Coalition Advocacy Index looks at the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) coalitions to influence 1) citizens' awareness of key democracy and governance issues and 2) public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The Index focuses on the development of the Angolan CSOs by ranking the capacity of USAID supported CSO coalitions and then helps looking at the impact of established coalitions on CSO's activities or/and newly created coalitions.

**USAID/Angola Strategic Objective:** "Constituencies promoting democratic governance strengthened"

**USAID/Angola Intermediate Result:** "Improved civic advocacy on key issues"

Given the fluid and dynamic nature of the CSO sector, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore we do not attempt to break out the characteristics into distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into four basic stages, corresponding to numerical equivalents. The least developed/emerging stage corresponds to 0 - 1 points on the scale. It points out specifics of the Angolan CSOs, which have not yet experienced any kind of formal partnership. The developing stage corresponds to 1 - 2 points on the scale. Stage III corresponds to stage to 2 - 3 points characterizing consolidating aspects of CSOs coalitions. The most advanced stage corresponds to 3 - 4 points where CSOs are maturing in their capacity to advocate around specific issues but have not yet reached self-sustainability in all aspects.

#### **Stage I (0 -1 emerging):**

CSOs have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic and survival concerns are predominant for most citizens. There may be an increase in passivity, or fear within the general public. CSO activists are not able to articulate or identify mechanisms to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in "public policy" and activists do not understand concept of "public policy." Programmatic activities begin to introduce the importance of collecting empirical data and first-hand information in order to share facts rather than opinions with officials or concerned citizens. CSOs are on rare instances structuring reactive strategies.

#### **Stage II (1 - 2 developing):**

Recently established advocacy organizations develop and become active (still basically reactive) in response to identified issues, such as right of education, land rights or right to housing, that affect targeted groups in specific regions/provinces of the country. Organizations at Stage II may often present their concerns at central levels. Weaknesses of the legislative branch are increasingly accentuated, and activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies..."). Beginnings of alternative

policy analysis are found through national or international experts or organizations, universities or other institutions. There are beginnings of information sharing and networking between CSOs. Increasingly CSOs coalitions are strengthening their capacity to inform and advocate for citizens needs and towards the government responsiveness. Programmatic initiatives include support for training in advocacy techniques, coalition building, communication techniques, and policy analysis.

### **Stage III (2 – 3 consolidating):**

Advocacy organizations asserted themselves in CSO's environment and are "proactive" in response to specific issues, including issues that emerge during the transition: human rights, women's rights, decentralization of authority, transparency and accountability, etc. Organizations at this stage present their concern at local and central level providing empirical data to consolidate their strategy implementation. Their input positively influences citizens' participation and government demands for their contributions. Programmatic initiatives include sharing advocacy techniques with other organizations, strengthening coalition, monitoring and defending of specific issues and policy influence.

### **Stage IV (3 – 4 maturing):**

Organizations at this stage are in the process of maturing and are regularly "proactive," and present their concerns to the central and local Government. Their input positively affects policies, legislation, and regulations. Advocacy organizations, as well as business firms and other NGOs, are active in response to specific issues and broad interests. Linkages between international and local CSOs are regularly identified, and CSOs develop internal democratic governance structures. They increasingly invest with their own resources and seek additional funding to implement their activities. Programmatic initiatives include training in management systems, lobbying techniques, constituency development, and improved membership service delivery.

### **Rating system**

Level of capacity: each component/question listed under the headings will be scored according to a weighted system from 0 to 4:

- 0 no capacity, 1 emerging capacity, 2 developing capacity, 3 consolidating capacity and 4 good capacity.

The score of each heading equals the average of their components/questions.

Stage of development: corresponds to average of all headings.

For the question on gender, points will indicate whether or not, and how much, the coalition is incorporating gender into its programs/activities.

### Evaluation of Stage of development:

Implementing partners and coalition members with a mediation of an external moderator will twice a year score and evaluate the stage of development of each coalition and submit an analysis of coalitions' capacity to advocate around identified issues at Annual Report period. After data aggregation, the SO team will measure the progress of supported coalitions by comparing actual results to previous results.

**World Learning Democracy Fellowship  
USAID/ Office of Democracy and Governance  
Civil Society Division  
Caroline Sahley**

**PROGRESS REPORT 8/30/04**

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**I Professional Goals and Fellowship Overview**

My professional goals for this fellowship are to gain a strong theoretical understanding of the key issues in democracy and governance, as well as to develop practical and professional expertise in the field of democracy promotion. I hope to deepen my existing knowledge of civil society strengthening activities, while also gaining valuable exposure to related areas of democracy promotion, such of rule of law, governance, and political processes programming.

**II Fellowship Objectives**

My second year workplan outlined 3 key fellowship objectives:

- 1) To assist the Civil Society Division in developing and implementing its analytical and research agenda.
- 2) To support civil society programs in the field by providing technical assistance and advice to USAID missions and bureaus.
- 3) To provide technical leadership on key practical and conceptual issues relating to civil society strengthening and other democracy and governance issues.

Activities and impacts achieved under each of these three objectives are reviewed in turn below.

**III Performance, Activities, and Impact**

***1) To assist the Civil Society Division in developing and implementing its analytical and research agenda.***

The past semester has seen an intensification of my efforts on the Governance and Food Security initiative, including the first field test of the assessment tool. As a result, little time was available to advance the civil society analytical agenda originally outlined in my fellowship workplan for this year.

The most significant progress was made on the religious organizations analytical work. Over the past few months, I revised and expanded the training materials on working with

religious organizations in democracy and governance programs. The revised training materials have been applied twice this semester, at the democracy officers training in June 2004, as well as for the New Entry Professionals (NEP) training offered by the DG office. I have continued to expand the range of case material and overall materials on the general challenges and opportunities created by working with religious organizations.

One of the underlying goals of such a training course is to encourage democracy officers to understand and consider a wide range of civil society organizations when designing and implementing democracy programs. A relatively significant number of democracy officers have now participated in this training. This training unit has become a key part of our DG training for NEPs, as well as being part of our introductory and advanced training for DG officers.

The training unit includes short cases studies, a powerpoint presentation, a selected reading list, and talking points for a 2 hour session. It has helped the division push forward its analytical work on one of its priority areas - working with 'mass organizations'. I anticipate that this training unit will continue to be used by the division, even after my fellowship ends.

***2) To support civil society programs in the field by providing technical assistance and advice to USAID Missions and Bureaus***

A significant proportion of my time has been spent this semester providing technical assistance and support to USAID Missions and Bureaus. In August, I traveled to Serbia as part of a five-person team to conduct a mid-term review of the Community Revitalization through Democratic Action program. This program uses a community development model to build social capital and develop more democratic practices among the population. This is a large scale program, with five implementing partner organizations working throughout Serbia.

One of my roles on the team was to develop a framework for assessing the democratic impact of these activities at the local and national level. This five level framework outlined a range of possible democratic impacts one might expect from this type of program, on a sliding scale from the local level to the national level. This provided a basic structure for discussing the wide range of complex qualitative changes that this program is trying to achieve.

This framework has wider relevance than the Serbia program. I hope to explore future uses for this framework, including its possible application to the civil society strategy case studies which will be moving ahead in late winter. The use of a modified version of this framework could help ensure that a defined, comparative approach is applied to the different case studies.

In addition, I continue to backstop Peru. Peru underwent its intensive strategy review several months ago, and I was actively involved in reviewing the current program.

***3) To provide technical leadership on key practical and conceptual issues relating to civil society strengthening and other democracy and governance issues***

The majority of my time has been dedicated this final this final objective – providing technical leadership on practical and conceptual issues relating not only to civil society strengthening but also wider democracy and governance issues. Specifically, in this semester, I finalized the governance and food security pilot tool and tested it in the field. This marked an important accomplishment in the progress of this governance and food security initiative.

In May 2004, I traveled to Nicaragua as head of a four-person team to implement the governance and food security framework. The team was comprised of two food security experts, myself, and a DG consultant. The idea was to pair up a DG and food security specialist at all times for interviews and writing assignments.

The team spent three weeks in the field, and several weeks afterward writing a draft report. The report sought to identify the governance issues that most directly affect food security in Nicaragua. The project is based on the premise that food insecurity is not simply a result of natural resource management constraints, and climatic shocks, such as drought or flood. Food security is linked to governance issues, including policy failures, ineffective institutions, poor leadership and conflict. Political and economic exclusion, arguably, can contribute to making certain sectors of society vulnerable to food insecurity. The report looked systemically at the policies, actors, and institutions, as they affect Nicaragua's food security situation.

The Nicaragua report is currently being refined and revised before final dissemination. The next step will be to revise the assessment tool, and follow through with another field test. The findings generated by this research initiative have broad implications. They can inform not only democracy and governance programs, but may also have implications for other parts of the Agency working on food security. This initiative has brought together two sectors that are not normally explicitly coordinated together in mission strategies.

The overall goal of this initiative is two fold. First, the goal is to increase our understanding of how democracy and governance constraints affect the potential for countries to make progress toward achieving food security. A series of comparative case studies will help identify the nature of these constraints. Second, the assessment tool could form part of the 'DG toolkit', and could be made available for missions to use on an ongoing basis in future. The assessment tool will be modified to help missions identify options and make sound programmatic decisions.

**V Proposed Revisions to Program Description**

Proposed revisions to the program description are outlined fully in the Program Description for the third year of my fellowship. As such, they are not discussed here.

**World Learning Democracy Fellowship  
9/1/02-6/14/05**

**Civil Society Division  
Office of Democracy and Governance/ USAID**

**Caroline Sahley  
Final Report**

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**Professional Goals and General Description of Fellowship:**

My fellowship, based in the Civil Society Division of the Office of Democracy and Governance in USAID/Washington began in September 2002. The professional goals of my fellowship have been to,

- gain a strong theoretical understanding of the key issues in democracy and governance, as well as a comparative perspective on the challenges facing democracy in a wide range of political, economic, and social contexts.
- develop practical and professional expertise in the field of democracy promotion, by participating in a range of activities including program design, strategy review, activity evaluations, and democracy assessments.
- deepen my existing knowledge of civil society strengthening activities, while also gaining valuable exposure to related areas of democracy promotion, such of rule of law, governance, and political processes programming.

Only one element of my professional goals was dropped (deepen understanding of prospects for democratic reform in Muslim countries), in order to avoid being overextended in my analytical agenda. While the professional goals I developed for the fellowship remained largely unchanged over time, the objectives and activities I proposed and carried out did undergo considerable change. In some cases, activities proposed in my fellowship plan were not fully implemented, due to shifting Division and Office priorities (such as the civil society case studies). In other cases, activities were implemented that had not been anticipated at the outset of the fellowship year (such as the governance and food security study).

Overall, the fellowship succeeded in providing a wide range of opportunities to develop skills and experience in various aspects of democracy programming. Although I was assigned to the Civil Society Division, I worked on a wider range of issues, including

governance and food security. As a Washington D.C. based fellow, I was able to travel, conduct research and assist missions in Africa, Latin America, and Europe and Eurasia regions. This broad geographic coverage has helped me develop an invaluable comparative perspective on issues and challenges relating to democratization.

The fellowship has also allowed a useful balance between analytical work and practical experience in the field working with missions on democracy programming. This combination of analytical and research work, alongside participation in practical democracy programming, I feel has been one of the greatest strengths of the fellowship. As a fellow I have generally been able to reserve time for research and analysis, and my role in providing technical assistance to missions has encouraged me to think through the practical applications of my work.

Past reports have covered in some detail the objectives and activities pursued during my fellowship. Here I will review some of the more significant objectives pursued and activities undertaken (with a particular emphasis on the period since my last progress report) and will reflect on their outcomes and impacts.

### **Fellowship Objectives, Activities, Outcomes and Impacts**

*To assist the Civil Society Division in developing and implementing its analytical and research agenda.*

Early in my fellowship, I worked primarily on the Sectoral Evaluation Research Agenda (SORA) evaluation, being undertaken by the Office of Democracy and Governance to assess the impact of democracy programming. The SORA initiative evolved over time, with primary responsibilities for designing and managing the evaluation process being transferred to the Strategies Division. As a result, my involvement with SORA lessened over time. Still, I hope my early efforts contributed in some way to the debates within the Office surrounding the methodological challenges of evaluating democracy programs. In terms of my own professional development, participation in the early discussions of research design helped me sharpen and enhance my research methodology skills.

Another civil society analytical issue I addressed during my fellowship is the role of religious organizations in civil society programming. An important question identified by the Civil Society Division has been how to work with mass organizations, such as trade unions, student groups, and religious organizations. As part of this effort, I researched and drafted a series of case studies that demonstrate the different roles that religious organizations play in USAID funded democracy programming. In addition, I developed a set of training materials based on these findings, which has been implemented in both the New Employee Professional program, as well as the advanced democracy officer's annual training. One of the underlying goals of such a training course is to encourage democracy officers to understand and consider a wide range of civil society organizations when designing and implementing programs. It is my

expectation that these materials will continue to form part of the Division's portfolio of training resources.

Another analytical issue that I have touched on during my fellowship is the role of community based infrastructure programs as a democracy promotion strategy. As a member of an evaluation team of a community based infrastructure program in Serbia, I developed a framework to help assess the democracy related impacts of these types of programs. This in turn has contributed to wider discussions about the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of these programs.

I was also able to attend an international conference in Costa Rica which brought together researchers to discuss current issues in civil society. The opportunities to attend international conference helps us stay informed of current and cutting edge thinking in our fields. This in turn has helped us meet the needs of our host offices.

***To provide technical leadership on key practical and conceptual issues relating to civil society strengthening and other democracy and governance issues.***

The primary activity within this objective has been my leadership of the governance and food security initiative. In August 2003, I was asked to chair a working group on governance and food security. The objective of this initiative was to develop programmatic recommendations for addressing the governance constraints that perpetuate food insecurity. There is a growing awareness among practitioners and academics alike that food insecurity and famine is not simply the result of agricultural production problems or climatic shocks. Policy failures, ineffective institutions, poor leadership and conflict underpin many of the problems that affect food security.

As the working group began to discuss this issue, it became apparent that there was a need for field research to enhance the Agency's understanding of the complex links between governance and food security. Much of the existing literature that discusses these links remains at a too macro or abstract level to be able to base programmatic recommendations on. In response to this need, I developed a framework designed to guide an assessment of the governance links to food security at the country level. The framework was piloted in Nicaragua in May 2004 (see progress report 8/30/04 for more information), and the framework was subsequently revised and expanded.

The framework was piloted a second time in Malawi in January 2005. I led a four person team, which included representatives from the USAID Office of Food for Peace and the DCHA Office of Program, Policy and Management, to Malawi to carry out the assessment. We spent three weeks in the field, meeting with government officials, civil society representatives, donors and smallholders. A draft report has been completed and is currently being circulated for comment. In June 2005, the working group was reconvened to review the work produced to date and discuss the utility of this work to Agency policy and programming.

This work has the potential to impact not only DG programming, but also other food security programming within the Agency. The recently approved Food for Peace Strategy recognizes the role of poor governance and political risks in contributing to food insecurity. The document also mentions the assessment framework as a demonstration of the close collaboration between the Office of Food for Peace and the DG Office. It is hoped that this analysis can contribute to improved cross-sectoral programming and further collaboration on these issues. This work also has also furthered my professional development in several ways. I have gained a degree of expertise in a new and innovative area of international development and democracy programming. I also hope to be able to publish the two country case studies through the Development Experience Clearinghouse later this summer.

***To support civil society program in the field by providing technical assistance and advice to USAID mission and bureaus.***

While the first two objectives focused primarily on analytical work, the third focused on the provision of practical technical assistance to USAID missions. From Washington, I acted as backstop for Peru and Bolivia, participating in strategy reviews, annual report reviews, and providing general support to mission staff upon request. In the case of Bolivia, I provided four weeks of on-site support to the Mission in March 2005. This support included drafting a concept paper for a possible civic education program, reviewing a study on the future of political parties in Bolivia and assisting in the preparation of a strategic close-out report.

This on-site work with a mission has given me important insight into how USAID operates and implements its democracy programs. As such, it has been an important adjunct to the analytical work that has been the focus of my fellowship, and forms a key part of my professional development. Backstopping, in addition, provides an opportunity to become familiar with the entire range of democracy and governance activities in a country, as backstopping responsibilities are not limited to our primary technical area of expertise.

Other mission support activities include my participation on evaluation teams to Serbia and Romania. In both cases, I participated on a team conducting a mid-term assessment of a DG program. In Malawi, I provided assistance to the Mission in the development of a new program, while in Macedonia, I helped design a civil society assessment. In South Africa I advised on how justice sector NGOs could be incorporated into the wider civil society program.

**Final Reflections**

As this review of my fellowship objectives, activities and impacts illustrates, the democracy fellows program provided me with a unique opportunity to strengthen and

deepen my skills in the field of democratization. The diverse range of activities undertaken in the nearly three year fellowship gave me both a wide breadth of experience (geographically and thematically) as well as depth (on civil society and food security issues). It will allow me to position myself as an experienced professional in the democracy promotion field. Although my post fellowship plans are not yet determined, I do plan to remain as a practitioner in the DG field

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**WORLD LEARNING DEMOCRACY FELLOWSHIP**

**Final Report**

**October 1, 2003 – March 5, 2004**

**USAID/REDSO/ESA**

**Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office  
(RCMG)**

**SUE TATTEN  
World Learning Democracy Fellow**

## **INTRODUCTION**

This report serves as an early close-out summary for the Democracy Fellowship awarded to me for the period October 1, 2003 – September 30, 2004. The fellowship terminated on March 5, 2004 when I assumed a position as a Foreign Service Officer with USAID as of March 8, 2004. My time as a fellow has been extremely rewarding and I wish to thank the staff of World Learning and USAID for providing support to me during this period. I am most appreciative of this assistance from both organizations.

The report provided below will outline the activities I have participated in and how they have impacted on my professional goals, fellowship objectives, and output for the REDSO-ESA Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office in Nairobi, Kenya.

## **FELLOWSHIP GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

### **Fellowship Goals:**

1. To continue to promote social and economic justice through development interventions that improve the sustainable livelihoods of African peoples.
2. To engage in a process of mutual cooperation with stakeholders to build the capacity of institutional structures that will ensure that all peoples of Africa can enjoy the fruits of stable, democratic societies throughout the continent.
3. To refine my professional capacities as a development practitioner in the field of conflict and democracy/governance with particular focus on the African continent.

**My work as a Democracy Fellow has contributed to the attainment of the fellowship goals delineated in the original Program Description in a number of ways:-**

### **GOAL ONE**

- **Firstly, during the course of the fellowship I have continued to promote social and economic justice through support to a number of REDSO mission programs. I worked closely with teams in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia specifically on conflict alleviation or social justice promotion activities. I also served on the HIV/AIDS Task Force for REDSO promoting the integration of human rights and social justice considerations into the Strategic Objective framework for HIV/AIDS programming in the East and Southern Africa region. My work with local NGOs in Kenya have examined the intersection of social and economic justice and development interventions.**

## **GOAL TWO**

- **I worked closely with stakeholders, particularly Kenyans from North and Eastern Kenya, to design strategies that would promote peace and development. I also worked closely with the IGAD-sponsored CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) project to develop its conflict early warning capacity in this region. I hosted a dialogue meeting with over 70 stakeholders in the region to discuss collaboration with CEWARN and REDSO on improving conflict early warning capacity to avert violent conflict in regions that have been plagued by war and chronic instability due to violence. I've also worked with Kenyan conflict professionals on designing a national conflict framework that includes previously marginalized areas such as that of Northern Kenya. I have also advocated for the inclusion of indigenous and traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution into contemporary framework strategies to respond in a more responsive and inclusive manner to the achievement of peace in the region. This work will hopefully provide an institutional framework for sustainable peace over time.**

## **GOAL THREE**

- **Throughout the fellowship period, I have had an opportunity to enhance my skills in project development and understanding of USAID strategic objective frameworks. This will undoubtedly work to my advantage in my new position with USAID where I will be responsible for managing strategic objectives within the democracy/governance programmatic area. I was also fortunate to be able to work in Malawi with the Mission Democracy and Governance team on its access to justice program thus widening my scope of reference for further work in this field.**

## **Fellowship Objectives:**

- 1. Strategic Advice.** Advise on, and take part in, the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs for REDSO/ESA/RCMG's objectives in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation, and response (CPMR) and good governance.
- 2. Mission Services.** Provide services to REDSO's participating bilateral missions on CPMR and good governance as well as to sectoral teams and non-presence country teams (currently Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Djibouti) as requested.
- 3. Technical Leadership.** Team technical leadership in the Somali Pilot Cluster. Support the operationalization of the CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) in the Somali Pilot Cluster area.
- 4. Research and Legal Expertise.** Conduct research on and provide advice to the REDSO RCMG team in the area of legal issues and conflict.
- 5. Team member and Fellowship duties.** Fulfill responsibilities as a REDSO team member and Democracy Fellow.

## **PERFORMANCE METHODS AND ACTIVITIES**

### **Objective One - Strategic Advice**

Advise on, and take part in, the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs for REDSO/ESA/RCMG's objectives in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation, and response (CPMR) and good governance.

- Participate in RCMG activities that will promote:
  - o Strengthening of regional capacity of CPMR organizations
  - o Identifying, assessing, and disseminating of CPMR effective approaches such as media (e.g. radio broadcasting) faith-based initiatives, and indigenous methodologies
  - o Building institutional capacities of government and non-governmental structures and networks to achieve a broader CPMR impact
  - o Operationalizing CPMR tools in targeted cross-border zones that form RCMG's SO 6 regional program.
- Review and comment on CPMR documents, strategic plans, results packages, and implementation of CPMR activities.
- Utilize knowledge, skills, and experience gained to prepare a written report of substantial relevance especially in meeting the emerging challenges of CPMR and related governance programming in the region, e.g., anti-corruption, legal, etc.

### **Products/Outcome**

- Input into RCMG Performance Monitoring Plan – Continuous Assessment
  - o Lead role on Intermediate Result 2 – Expanded Application of Effective Approaches in Managing Conflict
  - o Defining and Implementing baseline and follow-on data collection methodologies
  - o Conducting and documenting data quality assessments

**I provided input into the PMP SO 6.2 and 6.3 specifically and was involved in designing new data collection methodologies to capture information to reliably inform the monitoring process. I worked closely with the RCMG team to design a "Peace Capacities Index" to measure certain capacities within conflict partners at the local levels and determine shortcomings and strengths within such partner organizations.**

- Contribution to the RCMG Annual Report for 2003

**My involvement in terms of contributing to the Annual Report for 2003 was minimal as I was in the U.S. attending the DG Officers and World Learning conferences. At the conference, I presented my work on indigenous methods of conflict resolution and traditional legal methods and their relevance to USAID democracy and governance activities. Since that**

time, I've been asked by the Rule of Law Team in AID/Washington to contribute to the discussions incorporating traditional and cultural law and practice into DG programming.

- Contribution to REDSO's Tri-annual Review -- Assessment of Programs from 2000 to Present

I provided input into the Tri-annual Review process and was able to contribute at the review process in Washington in March of this year. I received an award from the Director of REDSO for my participation and contributions to the Tri-annual Review exercise.

- Increased effectiveness of implementation of PEACE (Peace in East and Central Africa) activities

I've worked closely with the DAI (Development Alternatives International) team to develop the Scope of Work for the Somali Cluster and to provide networking capabilities for the team in carrying out its work. I've included the DAI team in all events involving the Somali cluster to ensure improved effectiveness of the PEACE program on the ground. I've also fostered linkages between the DAI team and the CEWARN project to ensure both a national and cross-border focus on conflict activities.

- Report on emerging issues in the region related to CPMR that will inform stakeholders on effective practices

While my short stay as a fellow will not result in a report on emerging issues in the region related to CPMR and effective practices, I have engaged in numerous dialogue meetings with USAID staff and local partners on this issue. Before departing for Washington, I was able to hold a stakeholders meeting at which leading members of the Northeast and Eastern Provinces were able to engage in dialogue with US Embassy and USAID personnel on issues related to conflict and peacebuilding. This meeting served as a catalyst for further meetings and discussions with US mission staff and members of parliament, delegates to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, local government officials, and the civil society community. The meeting was videotaped and presented to World Learning as a record of my fellowship contributions.

## **Objective Two - Mission Services.**

Provide services to REDSO's participating bilateral missions on CPMR and good governance as well as to sectoral teams and non-presence country teams (currently Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Djibouti) as requested.

- Serve as a resource person advising on CPMR and good governance for REDSO/ESA sectoral teams, USAID bilateral missions, and countries with USAID management offices based in the USAID complex in Nairobi (Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Djibouti), otherwise known as Non-Presence Countries. These services will be provided on an as needed basis.
- Also provide advice to bilateral USAID missions and partners that accelerate understanding and utilization of REDSO/ESA/RCMG's Strategic Objective 6. Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region.
- Provide assistance in the design and implementation of Scopes of Work and Conflict

Vulnerability Assessments (CVAs) as requested.

### **Products/Outcome**

Advice provided on CPMR to bilateral Missions and other USAID offices- As Requested  
Input into Scopes of Work and Conflict Vulnerability Assessment(s)-

**I have served on a number of TDY's for bilateral missions related to the area of conflict and governance as well as sectoral teams and non-presence country teams. I provided advice and guidance to the missions of Malawi and Ethiopia (two visits) and facilitated a one-day workshop for partners for the USAID/ Somalia team. In Malawi, I worked closely with the DG team to develop an RFA for an access to justice program. In Ethiopia, I accompanied the Africa Bureau Conflict Program Chief from Washington to update her on Ethiopia-related conflict issues. I also participated as a team leader on a conflict assessment mission focused on conflict program design for the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) for the USAID Ethiopia DG team. I worked with the REDSO and DAI teams to prepare a Scope of Work for DAI's assessment for the Somali and Karamojong Clusters.**

### **Objective Three – Team Leadership in the Somali Pilot Cluster.**

Support the operationalization of the CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) in the Somali Pilot Cluster area.

- Assume a leadership role for the team in the operationalization of the CEWARN mechanism in the Pilot area of the Somali Cluster. (This covers the Southern Ethiopia, Northern and Eastern Kenya, and Somalia regions).
- Build effective relationships with other USAID and donor entities working in the cluster on such development initiatives including Food Security, HIV/AIDS, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Food for Peace (FFP), and intergovernmental, governmental, civil society, and private sector organizations.

### **Products/Outcome**

- The CEWARN mechanism in the Somali Cluster has been provided support critical to its operationalization

**I organized, designed, and implemented a one-week assessment for the CEWARN team in Northeast Kenya to meet with government and non-government partners regarding the establishment of a conflict early warning mechanism in the cluster. Further, I organized and facilitated a dialogue session with CEWARN and key MPs and local partners from Northeast and Northern Kenya, areas where cross-border conflicts have been particularly menacing.**

- Improved coordination and sustainable networking among the stakeholders in the cluster

I have passed on a sizeable network of partners from various institutions, government and non-government, to continue the work of peacebuilding in the Somali Cluster. All of the contacts have been recorded and will be shared among network members for ongoing collaboration.

### **Objective Four - Research and Legal Expertise**

Conduct research on and provide advice to the REDSO RCMG team in the area of legal issues and conflict.

- Support relevant research on indigenous customary governance institutions and their impact on conflict
- Support relevant research on legal issues and conflict, particularly with regard to addressing structural issues of conflict
- Advise team and bi-lateral missions on legal issues and conflict

#### **Products/Outcome**

- Paper submitted to RCMG and World Learning on indigenous customary governance institutions

**Due to early termination of the grant period, this paper will not be forthcoming**

- Paper submitted to RCMG and World learning on legal issues and conflict

**Due to early termination of the grant period, this paper will not be forthcoming**

- Advisory assistance provided to missions on legal issues and conflict as requested

I provided direct assistance to the USAID Malawi Democracy Governance team on access to justice and indigenous legal issues. I also provided guidance to the REDSO Task Force on HIV/AIDs to ensure that human rights issues are incorporated into the programs supported by USAID, particularly with regard to employment and non-discrimination of those living with AIDs and their families. I've also had discussions with the SO6 conflict team on incorporating a human rights framework within its conflict activities. I also followed the Kenya Constitutional Review process currently taking place in the country and provided advice to the team on Land and Customary Law.

### **Objective Five - Team member and Fellowship duties**

Serve as a member of the REDSO RCMG team to improve its capacity and effectiveness, including through participation in monitoring and evaluation exercises and continuous assessment of programmatic interventions.

- Serve as an active member of the RCMG team in all of its programmatic activities
  - Fulfill the obligations assumed as a World Learning Democracy Fellow
- Participate in all monitoring and assessment activities of the RCMG team

#### **Products/Outcome**

- RCMG team has been enhanced through Fellow's participation

I certainly hope that the team has been enhanced by my participation and will continue to be in the future....we are just beginning! I have been privileged to serve this team and will miss them all more than words can say! Ned Greeley is the best mentor any conflict team member could have! Thanks Ned!

- All obligations to World Learning and REDSO have been fulfilled

Due to my early departure, I will not have fulfilled all of my obligations, i.e., reports on legal and indigenous methods of conflict resolution

- Enhanced monitoring and assessment capacities of the RCMG team and within CPMR as a sector

Although not my area of technical expertise, I did work with team members to develop new data collection methodologies for monitoring and assessment.

### Anticipated Travel

While I cannot provide more specific details regarding travel as this may depend on requests from Bi-lateral missions for my input, I will provide the following anticipated travel plans:

- Northern Kenya – 5 visits of approximately 5 days
- Ethiopia – 5 visits of approximately 5 days
- Washington, D.C. – Brattleboro VT – December 2003-January 2004
- Uganda – 1 visit for 5 days
- Somalia – 1 visit for 5 days

### Actual Travel

- October 2-3, 2003 – **Wajir, Kenya** – To meet with NGOs working on cross-border and national peacebuilding initiatives in the Northeast Province of Kenya
- October 6-10, 2003 – **Addis Ababa, Ethiopia** – Accompanied Sharon Isralow, Chief of Africa Conflict Office in Washington to meet with USAID/Ethiopia Democracy/Governance and Conflict mission
- November 3-11, 2003 – **Lilongwe, Malawi** – To design a request for application for Malawi's Access to Justice 'Tikambarane' program through USAID/Malawi's Democracy and Governance Office
- November 16-26, 2003 – **Addis Ababa and Southern Region, Ethiopia** – To design a concept paper for conflict strategy for Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR)
- December 2-13, 2003 – **USA** - To attend the USAID Democracy Governance Officers conference and World Learning Democracy Fellows Retreat in Washington, DC and Brattleboro, VT
- January 26-27, 2003 – **Kenya** - To attend the World Learning African Peace and Development Initiative (APADI) workshop for Ethiopians held in Naivasha, Kenya
- January 28-30, 2003 – **Kenya** - To attend REDSO Retreat in Nanyuki, Kenya

## **OUTCOMES AND IMPACT**

Although the World Learning Fellowship has been curtailed prior to the anticipated completion date, a number of outcomes and impacts of the fellowship have been realized including:

- **A strengthened network of pastoralist-focused stakeholders in Kenya including local and national actors such as NGO leaders, Members of Parliament, constitutional review delegates, educational specialists, and local community members.**
- **Improved relations between Kenyan pastoralist stakeholders and USAID/Kenya and REDSO staff**
- **Strengthened capacity of USAID/REDSO staff to understand cross-border conflict issues in Northern Kenya, Southern Ethiopia, and Southern Somalia**
- **Improved capacity of REDSO to provide conflict and justice-related services to USAID bilateral missions**
- **Strengthened capacity of the Democracy Fellow to understand the internal and external mechanisms of USAID/REDSO**

## **CONCLUSION**

Again, I would like to thank World Learning, particularly Dave Payton and Ellen Garrett, for their tireless efforts on my behalf. I have benefited enormously from this fellowship and am deeply saddened to have to leave World Learning at this time.....but hopefully my departure will serve as a means to provide continuous and effective development support to the peoples of Africa and other countries of the world....we are but one!!!! Asante sana, Ke a leboga, Zikomo, Amasegenalew, Geletomi.....THANKS!

## Democracy Fellow Progress Report for Julie Werbel

### Fellowship Objectives

The objective of this Fellowship is to design and develop a coherent security sector reform (SSR) program for USAID. Although the Agency has conducted civil-military relations and sporadic police assistance activities, it has not developed a comprehensive approach to the sector. To some degree, this has been dictated by legal and policy prohibitions. However, a number of other factors have prevented USAID from establishing a coherent SSR program: lack of familiarity with the field, divergent views on how best to approach the sector, and divided opinions about the appropriateness of USAID engagement in security-related issues in the first place.

Recently, the USAID Administrator directed the Agency to think more strategically about SSR and begin conducting relevant programming. His guidance, coupled with expected legislative relief with regard to international police assistance, has created an opening to advance an SSR agenda. In addition, the Agency's focus on fragile states and the connections between security and development create further openings for SSR. In short, while there are plenty of challenges, the timing of the fellowship is ideal.

### Professional Goals

As hoped, I have been able to capitalize on my past experience while developing new competencies in a range of relevant areas, such as rule of law, police administration, and foreign disaster response. The Agency is particularly interested in promoting better relations with the Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, I have begun to understand how USAID works and have developed positive working relationships across a number of different offices and bureaus.

### General Description of the Fellowship to Date

DCHA/DG divides its activities along three lines: technical leadership, cadre development, and field support. I have broken out my accomplishments to date using these categories. Given that the SSR program is brand new, most of my efforts have necessarily focused on providing technical leadership.

- **Technical Leadership:** Developed briefings, background documents, and training materials. Initiated a Security Sector Reform (SSR) newsletter series. Developed an engagement strategy for more effective cooperation with the Department of Defense (DoD). Initiated a *Security and Development* seminar series. Provided input and advice to the SSR Working Group. Conducted outreach activities within USAID (with DCHA/OTI, DCHA OFDA and PPC). Conducted external outreach activities with government officials (within State and DoD), academic experts, and potential implementers (including MPRI).

Dyncorps, Control Risk Group and others). Planned and conducted an extensive outreach tour to the UK for meetings with the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development. Wrote and delivered a presentation to an audience of practitioners and experts on the role of private military companies in SSR.

- **Cadre Development:** Developed and conducted training for New Entry Professionals (NEPs) and Presidential Management Fellows (PMFs) on SSR. Prepared and will conduct a background briefing on the DoD.
- **Field Support:** Provided advice and guidance to program backstops and Democracy and Governance (DG) officers in Liberia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Serbia.

### **Performance Methods and Activities**

I have attached samples of the documents I have put together since my fellowship began. These include two briefings, a newsletter, and a trip report describing my activities while in the UK.

### **Outcomes and Impact**

I have had some degree of success familiarizing my colleagues with SSR and USAID's potential role. However, I find that the Agency's somewhat cumbersome bureaucracy and its decentralized operational procedures present unexpected challenges with regard to program implementation. Because there has been no comprehensive SSR program to date, a number of different offices have moved ahead with activities that should fall into the SSR portfolio. While I have been able to forge greater collaboration among the different actors, some seem reluctant to relinquish their primacy. While this is not overly problematic, the underlying thesis of SSR is that engagement should be holistic, rather than piecemeal. The true measure of the program's success will be whether Missions choose to conduct SSR programming and "buy into" a proposed SSR contract mechanism. This mechanism, if funded, would be comparatively small, even by USAID standards so there may be some danger of raising expectations that cannot be met.

### **Proposed Revision to Program Description**

At this point, I have no revisions to propose.

## **Trip Report**

From 25-20 October, I met with representatives from the OECD, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID). Below are highlights of these meetings.

### **Key Findings**

- Her Majesty's Government (HMG) has two combined funding streams that support conflict-prevention activities in general and SSR in particular. They are the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). Funded at about £74M and £60M respectively, the funds cover overhead costs and some catalytic funding, but the mainstay of the financing for SSR activities comes from the field offices. Although HMG has not yet evaluated the effectiveness of the pooled activities, the resulting interagency communication and program harmonization has been outstanding.
- DFID suffers from the same divisions that USAID does with respect to SSR: The SSR program is separate from the Safety, Security and Accessible Justice (SSAJ) program which is separate from the Small Arms Light Weapons Program (SALW) which are all separate from general governance programs. Almost everyone I met with lamented the segregation and noted that they are attempting to collaborate more effectively across areas.
- Although HMG has been conducting SSR programming for several years, it too struggles with the challenge of turning policy guidance into effective practice. The immediate focus for the OECD will be to develop execution guidelines as a follow up to the DAC policy statement.

### **DFID SSR Program**

DFID has two full-time staff devoted to SSR. They are Graham Thompson, the SSR Advisor, and Ravi Khosla, the SSR Strategy Manager. Newcomer Graham is replacing retired Brigadier General Dick Bailey who initiated the program. The gravitas of a retired general helped establish DFID as a legitimate actor in the SSR arena. Initially, DFID had separate military and police reform programs, but its experience in Sierra Leone led them to address security as a collective whole. There is still residual separation between the two programs (even in location—SSAJ is housed in the main DFID building, while SSR is in the CHAD building), but they are working on more effective collaboration. Ravi and Graham are in the midst of updating the SSR strategy. (HMG seems to use strategy and program interchangeably. Each strategy includes program activities, timelines and funding.) Most activities are approved by DFID and executed by the Defence Advisory Team (DAT).

### **Defence Advisory Team**

Established in 1998 as a result of a newly defined *Defence Diplomacy* mission, the Defence Advisory Team is an interdepartmental team of experts funded by the combined

MOD-FCO-DFID Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP). Nigel Fuller heads the team. With a staff of 15 military and civilian personnel (including retired police officers, intelligence experts, and senior governance advisors), the DAT originally had a mandate to provide short-term assistance (up to three months) concurrently to three countries at a time. In practice, it does not usually spend three months in-country; instead it chooses critical entry points throughout the lifetime of an activity, and serves as a focal point for all aspects of defense management assistance. It aims to provide tailor-made recommendations and advice that focus on the centrality of good governance.

Its three core assistance programs include defense and security reviews; financial management; and civil-military relations. Requests for assistance come from HMG (such as support to the mission in Afghanistan); from regional desk officers in the MOD, FCO, or DFID; or from the in-country defense advisors or DFID representatives (95% of the requests come from this level). Although the DAT's overhead is financed through the GCPP, its country-based activities are funded through country strategies. The DAT is currently working or supporting work in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Uganda, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It is considering work in Nepal, Indonesia, Libya, and Pakistan.

Lessons learned to date: Over time, the DAT's mission evolved from defense to a wider security perspective (including policing and justice). As a result, it has had to bring in expertise in these areas. It also found that it needed to conduct better up front situational analysis in order to diagnose problems more effectively. The DAT also found that change management and communication skills were critical. Because SSR is often directed from the top (by a small cadre of leaders who may be pulled in a number of directions), middle managers who can implement the change process and deal with potential spoilers need to be developed. Another key lesson is the need to be culturally sensitive (for example, let the recipients choose their own timelines, even if they are slower than donors would like; be sensitive to oral traditions and don't force written documents).

#### **The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform**

GFN is a DFID-funded research team from Cranfield University that is co-located with the DAT. It has put together a network of practitioners from the developing world in an effort to influence policy and practice, build capacity, and share information. It publishes books, reports, surveys, and papers and contributes to strategy and policy formulation within DFID. The website is [www.gfn-ssr.org](http://www.gfn-ssr.org). The organization aims to reconcile indigenous transformation efforts with the "donor track." The board of advisors includes key Africanists (but not too many others regional partners). One of GFN's proposed missions is to influence other donors to develop related SSR work. GFN conducts a quarterly SSR Practitioner's Course which may be of interest to USAID staff. The next training will be held at the end of January 2005.

#### **Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW)**

DFID's SALW program has suffered from funding cuts over the last few years. At present, it has a three-year budget of £20M. (The FCO maintains its own destruction fund.) DFID SALW program focuses on two areas: support for international, regional

and national agreements and integration with other elements of HMG. The FCO has a policy committee on small arms that meets quarterly and includes all the major government players: the MOD, FCO, DFID, Home Office, Customs, and Intelligence services, but there is no clear mandate for the group. With regard to its primary focus, DFID supports national action plans that advocate whole of government approaches to small arms problems and tries to include all local and regional actors in mapping out each activity. The SALW team is currently gearing up for a 2005 preparatory conference for the 2006 review of the UN's program. They also hope to develop an ethical code of conduct for suppliers. Their key interlocutor in the USG has been a State Department staff member, Edward Peartree.

#### **Safety, Security, and Access to Justice (SSAJ)**

DFID's SSAJ program developed independently from its SSR program. It has lost considerable funding over the last few years and is still at risk of additional internal reorganization and downsizing. Unlike the SSR program, SSAJ's funding does not come from the GCPP. While it has conducted a number of programs worldwide, there remains a gap in its ability to draw evidentiary links between SSAJ programs and economic growth. SSAJ employs two levels of consultants to implement its programming: core consultants with expertise in safety, security, and justice sector work and specialized consultants in areas such as human rights or criminal codes. It has trained and educated a hand-picked group of international core consultants to execute programs that are in line with DFID's desires. USAID could (and should) call upon these pre-trained consultants for its own projects. I am awaiting a full roster of names and contact information.

Over time, the SSAJ program has realized that it needs to be part of a whole-of-government approach to safety and security. It also has realized that it requires the kind of specialized expertise that only retired police officers and former practitioners (lawyers, judges, etc) can provide. USAID may want to consider bringing on a retired police officer or ICITAP employee in the event that we establish a more robust police reform program.

#### **Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit**

The UK has established a new interdepartmental office akin to S/CRS to begin planning for post conflict reconstruction. Based in DFID, the unit is staffed by MOD, FCO, and DFID personnel. Paul Shulte, the Unit's head, will be traveling to the US in November. I will arrange meetings for him with interested USAID staff. The new unit will track with the Prime Minister's Strategy for Weak and Failing States (to be released in a few weeks). At present, the unit has a relatively small budget (£6M). Members of the team served on ORHA in the Pentagon as well as on the ground in Iraq. They were intimately involved in reconstituting the Iraqi police forces and have considerable SSR experience. Once fully staffed, PCRU will have approximately 40 people divided into several teams: Policy and Strategy, Operational Planning, and Response Management. Operational Planning will include experts in core planning, governance, security/justice, economy, infrastructure, and public and social services. Response Management will include personnel, finance, and logistics managers. The PCRU's objectives are to begin rehabilitation, but not conduct full-scale reconstruction. They hope to have full operating capability by mid 2006.

### **Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)**

The GCPP is a jointly managed MOD-FCO-DFID mechanism for improving HMG's ability to prevent conflict through joint analysis, long-term strategies, and improved coordination. Spearheaded by former Minister Clare Short, the GCPP aimed to provide more flexible funding arrangements to avoid the transaction costs and delays arising from separate Departmental interventions. The GCPP has a limited mandate to conduct activities that directly contribute to conflict prevention. The pool does not represent all UK-funded conflict prevention activities. Excluded from funding are areas such as humanitarian relief, military equipment, major military operations (peace support and others), de-mining, counter-terrorism, and traditional governance activities (unless they clearly form part of a conflict prevention strategy).

Initiated in 2000, the GCPP absorbed existing conflict management work as its baseline and infused additional funding. The 04-05 budget is approximately £74M. While there is no overall conflict prevention strategy, the fund supports SSR (£5.1M), SALW (£6M), UN support (£9.5), and a number of country-specific programs such as Russia/FSU (£12.5M), Afghanistan (£17M), Iraq (£19M), India/Pakistan (£1.5M) among others. Afghanistan and Iraq pulled funding from other areas where HMG felt that it had not been as successful as it would have liked (e.g., Sri Lanka and India/Pakistan). Note that this funding is expressly for conflict prevention activities and is in addition to funding through traditional DFID country strategies. GCPP (and ACPP) funding is not considered ODA, but where DFID has the lead, the expenditures can be counted as ODA allocations.

A cabinet-level committee meets quarterly to approve the funding (the last meeting lasted 11 minutes). The GCPP steering committee manages the policy, prioritizes funding, and oversees strategy formulation. It includes representatives from all three departments who work well together. Strategy Management Teams include staff from the regional and functional offices in each department and have primary responsibility for designing and executing the activities. They work in conjunction with project management teams (which may include contractors, grantees, etc.) which may be located in the UK or in the field. Although coordination is excellent at the top levels of the management structure, there are cracks in the lower levels and communication between the departments has been less effective in the field.

Lessons learned: the GCPP conducted an external assessment of its program which found that the pool has been effective in developing collaborative relationships, but that it would benefit from stronger analytical frameworks. In addition, the departments' individual objectives are not easily reconciled into a shared conflict prevention strategy. Galvanizing political will for proactive conflict prevention has also been difficult. In retrospect, a key challenge will be rationalizing funding between the GCPP and the PCRU. The lesson for USAID is to consider how to fund activities throughout the fragile state continuum.

### **Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP)**

The ACPP was initiated at the same time as the GCPP, but was created as a separate fund because Africa was considered a priority area for HMG. The fund currently supports peace support operations and activities in Sierra Leone, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia (including British Military Assistance Teams, BMATs). The ACPP managers intend for the fund to be used to support innovation and incubate new approaches to conflict prevention. Once programs evolve into longer-term development activities, they move out of the ACPP and into the country-specific budget. Country requests for ACPP funding are coordinated among all three departments at the field level and approved by the Ambassador. Thirty percent of the ACPP is devoted to SSR activities (but that figure may be artificially high because of the BMATs).

There are some key differences between the GCPP and the ACPP. Unlike the GCPP management structure, the ACPP built upon existing relationships and procedures so it is more integrated with mainstream Africa programming. Country desk officers coordinate ACPP-funded activities rather than using a central steering committee. Whereas the GCPP has a multi-year budget (two years plus a notional third), the ACPP has an annual budget. The ACPP has greater flexibility than the GCPP in that it has only a four-month lead time.

Overall, the objective of the ACPP is to reduce the number of people that die from warfare. The Treasury Department seeks concrete measures of effectiveness and imposes targets on the pool. Although the ACPP can demonstrate that numbers have decreased (their figures do not include Sudan), they cannot connect the decrease to ACPP-funded programs. So far, the ACPP has been most successful in Sierra Leone, but there has been an extremely large influx of British funding and activities so it is difficult to single out ACPP activities.

Lessons learned: Because so much of HMG's activity in Africa is peace support operations, there is some strain between the ACPP and other PSO funding sources. The establishment of the PCRU may take some of the pressure off the ACPP to fund PSO and other response-related programming. The fund managers fear that it may be considered a slush fund if not properly managed.

### **Interview List**

Dylan Hendrickson, Senior Research Fellow, King's College London

Mark Downes and Edward Ball, OECD

Graham Thompson, Senior Security Sector Reform Advisor

Ravi Khosla, SSR Strategy Manager

Ann FitzGerald, Director, Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform

Nigel Fuller, Head, Defense Advisory Team

Angus Morris, DAT member

Wing Commander Ian Richardson, Joint Doctrine Center

Wing Commander Steve Cooke, JDC

Richard Haviland, SALW Advisor  
Charlotte Scawen, SALW Advisor  
Michael Anderson, Senior Governance Adviser  
Keith Mackiggan, Justice and Human Rights Advisor  
Judith Kent, DFID Governance Advisor  
John Kittmer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Int'l Policing and Civilian Placements,  
Richard Evans, Head ACPP  
Ian Wells, Conflict Advisor  
Ciru Mwaura, Conflict Advisor  
Judith Whiteley, Global Conflict Prevention Pool  
Eamonn Taylor, Pakistan Desk Officer  
General (Ret.) Eric Westrop, Control Risks Group  
David de Stacpoole, ArmorGroup

# Security Sector Reform Newsletter

VOLUME 1, November 2004

## Inside this issue:

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- DCHA/DG and the Security Sector
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## About the SSR Newsletter

Welcome to the first issue of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Newsletter. Over the last year, USAID has renewed its attention to the security sector by supporting the April 2004 OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) policy statement, creating an SSR Working Group, and establishing a full-time SSR Fellow in the DCHA Office of Democracy and Governance. While robust SSR programming is not yet under way, this publication will highlight some of USAID's innovative security-related activities, share updates as the program develops, and distribute relevant information to USAID employees both in DC and in the field.

## DCHA/DG and the Security Sector

By noting the link between security and development, members of the OECD/DAC opened the door to treating the security sector as a public policy and governance issue. Many donors have begun full-scale engagement with this sector. However, before USAID embarks on a similar course, it seems prudent to evaluate past

programming, identify the Agency's core competencies, ascertain how best to support field offices, and develop a strategic approach to the sector. Equally important, USAID will need to develop programming that promotes its overall objectives and adheres to the laws that govern its engagement with uniformed personnel. DCHA/DG, in partnership with other DCHA offices and PPC, has taken on this mission.

DCHA/DG is no stranger to security-related issues. In 1998, it issued a cooperative agreement to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to develop and conduct a pilot civil-military relations program. The program, which was active in Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Serbia, and Sierra Leone, sought to develop the roles and competencies of civilian government and non-government organizations in security and defense-related issues. Now complete, the NDI program offers successful lessons to draw upon as we expand USAID's involvement from civil-military relations to a larger security sector reform agenda.

DCHA/DG's next steps include developing a coordinated Agency and USG approach to security sector reform, incorporating the security sector into existing governance and conflict assessments, developing a security sector reform strategy, and fielding a pilot program in cooperation with other USG or donor agencies.

If you are interested in contributing to the development of this program, please contact Julie Vierbel at 202-713-1711 or via e-mail at [vierbel@usaid.gov](mailto:vierbel@usaid.gov).

## From the Administrator

Over the past year, the relationship between security and development has received increased attention within the international development community, the U.S. Government, and USAID. This relationship is a central component of the development challenge faced in our partner countries. I would like to highlight a few key events which have taken place in the course of our ongoing effort to integrate considerations of security into our development efforts.

This past April, I gathered with other development ministers at the High Level Meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to endorse a policy statement on Security Sector Reform and Governance (available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/58/31936662.pdf>). We agreed on the absolute centrality of security to our goals of poverty reduction and development, and on the corresponding need for effective and democratic reform of the security sector. Such reforms must include not only the military, but also the police, the judicial and legal systems, and other elements of the state and community that are charged with oversight of security forces. In April, donors also agreed to pursue a common approach to the security sector, including efforts to harness the capacities of all institutions of donor governments to maximize our effectiveness in responding to these challenges.

My commitment to the DAC led to the establishment of an informal working group, convened by PPC, to review our approaches to security sector reform. On July 27, this group hosted a roundtable discussion to consider USAID's experience, our capacity within the security sector, and the constraints on our work. The ultimate goal of this event was to reinvigorate our engagement in the security sector in a more strategic fashion, fully aware of the need for

close collaboration with partners inside the USG and among the donor community.

Opening this gathering of USAID senior managers and staff, I shared my conviction of the centrality of a stable and secure environment to the realization of all USAID's development goals. This linkage is obvious as I meet men and women displaced from their homes as the result of conflict and instability. In the growing season, many feel the tug to return to their villages, to resume their former lives and plant the crops to feed their families. But fear for their safety keeps them rooted in their transit camps. This harms not only the targets of violence, but also the whole society, which depends on agricultural production for its own welfare. Beyond the impact on a community's productivity, we also know that the failure to create the stability that allows people to return home can breed insecurity years into the future.

Promoting effective and responsible governance of the security sector in all its manifestations is a critical element of any program designed to help societies evolve in more secure, democratic, and prosperous ways. USAID has experienced some notable successes within the security sector and is engaged in critical continuing work. Our programs have promoted community policing to manage crime in Latin America, reintegration of former combatants in countries across Africa and Asia, and crucial progress tackling in anti-trafficking efforts and public corruption in Europe and Eurasia. Despite this, we recognize that USAID faces certain limitations to its programming in these areas; it is these limitations that we need to address in order to be most successful in our future efforts.

I have directed the Security Sector Reform working group to engage with the regional and pillar bureaus, General Counsel, and Legislative and Public Affairs in order to advance tasks and products indicated by the roundtable discussion. I anticipate

regular updates on their progress. These activities include the following:

- Agency-wide dissemination of research and analysis reflecting the linkages between security and development;
- An agency strategy that identifies those aspects of SSR where USAID is poised to assume technical and programming leadership, those capacities that USAID must expand to be a leader, proposals for legislative changes, and areas of SSR that require specific policy papers;
- Research and dissemination of findings related to Agency experiences and best practices in these programming fields.

As we consider USAID's strategy for addressing security sector reform, we will be working closely with partners in the Department of State, as well as in other agencies and the Congress—to review legislation and its impact on our work in order to determine how, as a government, the United States can best assist in this critical field. In particular, security sector reform is currently a central issue being pursued by the State-USAID Joint Policy Council.

I do not expect the road ahead to be a simple one but, given the strength of the linkage between insecurity and hindered development, I consider progress both necessary and inevitable. I look to you all to consider the role of security sector reform in meeting the objectives of your work, and to play an active role in the ongoing efforts to enhance the quality of the USG response to this critical issue.

Andrew S. Natsios

## Security Sector Reform Q&A

**Q: Why does USAID care about the security sector?**

A: Creating a safe and secure environment is a prerequisite for effective development

and poverty reduction, particularly in fragile states. Human security is largely dependent upon the state of the security sector. Unprofessional security forces impede development, discourage investment, enable corruption, and perpetuate poverty. A transparent and accountable security sector is a key element of a democratic government.

**Q: What do we mean by the security sector?**

A: The security sector includes the armed forces, the police, paramilitary forces, intelligence services, judicial and penal institutions, and elected and appointed civil authorities with responsibility for their control and oversight. Civil society actors engaged in security sector issues include the media, watchdog groups, academia, special commissions, community policing groups, human rights groups, and defense and research institutes.

**Q: What is security sector reform?**

A: Security sector reform focuses on transforming the security sector so that it delivers effective security to citizens in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms. The overall objective is to provide an effective and efficient public service that operates according to sound managerial principles, is transparent, and is accountable to civilian authority.

Security sector reform is not a new area. In fact, military train and equip programs date back to the earliest days of U.S. foreign assistance. What is new, however, is the idea of applying a development lens to the security sector. Today, SSR activities lie at the intersection of governance, rule of law, economic reform, post-conflict reconstruction, and traditional military and police reform.

**Q: How is security sector reform different from civil-military relations?**

A: A well-balanced civil-military relationship is critical to the establishment of democratic defense and security structures. But, civil-military relations is only one aspect of security sector reform, which also includes the establishment of disciplined, professional forces; effective management, oversight and execution of public safety programs; transparent and accountable budget management; judicial, legal and penal reform; and civil society education and training, among others.

**Q: What is a whole-of-government solution and why is it necessary?**

A: A whole-of-government solution means that donors must design interventions that engage all the relevant actors simultaneously rather than a subset of the security sector. Strengthening the police, for example, without similar efforts on behalf of magistrates, prosecutors, or judges may cause prison overpopulation without contributing to justice. To provide coordinated programming on the ground, however, donors will need to begin collaborating at home. Whole-of-government solutions begin with whole-of-government approaches.

### **The Security Sector Reform Working Group**

Chaired by PPC, the Security Sector Reform working group includes representatives from DG, OTI, CMM, and the regional bureaus. On 27 July 2004, the group conducted a day-long internal workshop that was attended by the Administrator, the regional DAAs, the GC, and other interested parties. The objective of the workshop was to take stock of the Agency's security-related programming and chart a course for the future. The group continues to meet on a regular basis to ensure the free flow of information about security sector-related items across all bureaus. Members of the SSR working group are currently advocating for a

constructive role for USAID in police assistance through the State/USAID Joint Policy Committee (JPC) which was launched earlier this year pursuant to the State/USAID Strategic Plan (see below for more detail).

For more information about the Security Sector Reform working group, please contact Melissa Brown at 202-712-1107 or via e-mail at mbrown@usaid.gov.

### **Update on Section 660**

FY05 marks a significant watershed for USAID support to police forces. The FY05 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill provides notwithstanding authority that essentially lifts key barriers to USAID engagement with police forces. The groundbreaking text is included below:

(a) **AUTHORITY-** Funds made available by this Act to carry out the provisions of chapter 1 of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, may be used, *notwithstanding section 660 of that Act*, to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of civilian police authority through training and technical assistance in human rights, the rule of law, strategic planning, and through assistance to foster civilian police roles that support democratic governance including assistance for programs to prevent conflict, respond to disasters, and foster improved police relations with the communities they serve.

(b) **NOTIFICATION-** Assistance provided under subsection (a) shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

While this language represents a major step forward for USAID, there are a number of things to keep in mind. First, the authorization does not apply to corrections personnel. Second, because the text was included in the Appropriations Bill rather than the Authorization Bill, Congress will

have to confer the authority anew each year. USAID will continue to advocate for an amendment to, or repeal of, Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

PPC and DG are currently developing guidance for USAID police assistance. Please check with Melissa Brown or Michael Miklaucic (mmiklaucic@usaid.gov) before embarking on any new activities.

## Workshop on Democratic Policing

In early October, the DCHA Office of Democracy and Governance hosted a day-long workshop on democratic policing. The well-attended internal event brought together participants from regional bureaus, PPC, OTI, CMM, and DG. The objective of the workshop was to develop a greater degree of sophistication about the issues, challenges, and opportunities associated with providing democratic police assistance.

Four well-known experts led each session. David Bayley, currently at SUNY Albany and perhaps the most prolific writer on police and justice reform, kicked off the meeting with an examination of democratic policing, its origins and its application. William Baker, who has been involved in law enforcement at the local, state, federal, and international levels for more than thirty years, shared some of the complexities surrounding U.S. involvement in police reform. Robert Perito, now at the United States Institute of Peace, served as acting director and deputy director of the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) for several years. He led a session exploring public security in fragile, failing and failed states. Finally, respected human rights activist Rachel Neild, who is currently managing a number of police-related programs for the Open Society Institute, pointed out some of the potential red flags that a USAID police assistance program might raise. The final session provided an opportunity to begin internal

planning for a more robust police reform agenda and to discuss the creation of a USAID primer on democratic policing.

Look for more information about the Workshop on the DG website.

## Spotlight On... Colombia

*USAID Colombia and Georgetown University help local government leaders rethink citizen security*

When the Colombian Government issued its ambitious new *Democratic Security and Defense Policy* in mid-2003, it sought to address security issues at every level of society. The groundbreaking policy seeks to combat political violence and narco-trafficking, ensure law and order, and provide citizen security over the entire Colombian territory. Unlike most other national security policies, the Colombian document calls on everyday citizens to play an active role in the promotion of local security by sharing information, participating in neighborhood watch programs, and collaborating with local authorities.

To help elected local government leaders contribute to this effort, the National Police Command, with the assistance of USAID and Georgetown University's Colombia Program, launched the nationwide *Departamentos y Municipios Seguros* program. With broad-based support from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the Ministry of Defense, and the Colombian Federation of Municipalities, the USAID-Georgetown program engages governors, mayors, city councils, departmental assemblies, and other public officials at the municipal and departmental level in an unprecedented partnership. As a result, local leaders have begun collaborating with both public security forces and citizens to devise innovative approaches to citizen security based on the precept of crime and violence prevention.

The USAID-Georgetown program has four main objectives:

- To help mayors and governors formulate and implement citizen security plans;
- To assist municipal and departmental governments in establishing information systems (crime and violence observatories)<sup>1</sup>;
- To improve horizontal and vertical inter-institutional coordination at local and intermediate government levels on security policies; and
- To strengthen constructive work relations involving local and departmental police commanders, elected officials at these levels, and civil society.

During its initial "Awareness and Commitment Creation" phase, the USAID-Georgetown program provided support to the National Police to conduct one national and eight regional workshops. The well-attended national kick-off meeting included governors and police commanders from all 32 Colombian departments, as well as the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defense, and the National Police Commander. More than 1,000 governors, mayors, police commanders, city council presidents, deputies, and other relevant officials from all departmental capitals and Bogotá attended the regional workshops.

Results of the *Departamentos y Municipios Seguros* program to date have been reported-out during two high-level working breakfasts hosted by the National Police Commander and involved the Minister of the Interior and Justice, the Minister of Defense, the Attorney General, the National

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the support for the Secure Municipalities and Departments program, USAID and Georgetown have helped to create seven municipal crime and violence information systems, or *observatorios*. Five additional municipal observatories and four new departmental-level observatories are also planned.

Federation of Municipalities, the National Federation of Departments, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and USAID Mission Director. In addition, in September, a two-day meeting was held in Washington, DC that brought together U.S.- based security analysts with the Commander of the Armed Forces, the National Police Commander, governors and mayors from select departments and cities to share lessons learned and discuss key program objectives and results. In all, the *Departamentos y Municipios Seguros* has touched more than 5,000 governors, mayors, city council presidents, and departmental police commanders throughout Colombia – and this is just the beginning. The second phase of the program is just starting and will involve the actual formulation of departmental and municipal citizen security and co-existence plans. Towards this end, the objectives of this phase are to strengthen the capacity of departmental level police and government officials to offer assistance to their respective municipal-level counterparts, and to "create space for the analysis of information, discussion and decision-making." USAID Colombia intends to continue its support of this innovative and successful program.

For more information about the *Departamentos y Municipios Seguros* program, please see:  
<http://www.policia.gov.co>

## Publications of Interest

Interested in learning more about security sector reform? Take a look at what the OECD and other donors are doing...

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf>

[http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/supporting\\_security.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/supporting_security.pdf)

[http://www.gtz.de/security-sector/download/GTZ\\_SSR\\_Engl.pdf](http://www.gtz.de/security-sector/download/GTZ_SSR_Engl.pdf)

<http://www.jcfssm.org/index.cfm>

**Caryn M. Wilde**

**Democracy & Governance Fellow  
USAID/Russia**

**2004 Semi-Annual  
Fellowship Progress Report  
May 15 - November 15**

**World Learning Inc.  
1015 15<sup>th</sup> St. NW, Suite 750  
Washington, DC 20005**

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## Democracy Fellow's Perspective

Is reality in the eye of the beholder?

At the same time, we are obliged to give a critical appraisal of the state of our democracy as well. It's obvious that the young Russian democracy achieved significant success as it was being established. Anyone who insists on not seeing this or who doesn't want to see it is not being entirely sincere. Creating a free society of free people is top priority.

Vladimir Putin  
President of the Russian Federation  
May 2004

Putin's supporters in Russia and the West can no longer justify this erosion of democracy as a necessary step to advancing economic reform. On the contrary, the lack of democracy is already beginning to infringe upon Russia's economic growth. If current trends continue, full-blown dictatorship in Russia is a very real possibility.

Michael McFaul  
Author & Senior Associate at  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
June 2004

Amidst this paradox of opinion, which is shared by many, USAID/Russia endeavors to develop a 5-Year Strategy. The Mission's objective is to strengthen relations between government, business, and nonprofit organizations, and to assist in bringing about a democratic civil society. I have been one of hundreds sharing expertise in the hope of overcoming the obstacles to reaching these objectives. Given current events, could it be that the real stumbling block to change is the multifaceted perception of *reality*?

"We don't see things as they are; we see them as we are."

Anaïs Nin

## **Professional Goals**

### **Objective #1**

To participate in Mission planning that will lead to the development of USAID/Russia's 5 Year Technical Assistance Strategy.

I strove to make contributions of intrinsic value to Mission's policy considerations. It was critical to provide up-to-date information regarding the development of Russia's third sector, the progress made by civil society organizations, and citizen attitude toward informal participation. I am confident that my ability to filter contemporary goals through the Russian context played a part in USAID's planning process.

### **Objective #2**

To examine Russian corporations' perception of corporate social responsibility, to examine community foundation initiatives, and to find a common link that encourages the sectors to work together.

I resolutely pursued a strategy intended to yield as much insight as possible about Russian corporations and community foundations. Today, I believe I understand significantly more about their point of view regarding one another, than I did six months ago. Although, I still think that they share a common goal, I have not come upon a methodology or argument that would convince them work together. Perhaps, only they can identify the common links that will result in their working together.

## **Personal Goals**

### **Objective #1**

To solidify my professional reputation and heighten my visibility as a development expert.

This objective is a 'work in progress'. I have established a reputation in international circles. Attending the DemNet conference in Sofia provided me with valuable 'face time' with USAID; however, my overall identity in the US is still rather weak.

## Activities, Performance Methods and Impact

The section is organized as a monthly overview of my activities, performance methods, and the impact of these activities on the Mission, key stakeholders, and me.

**May** – The fourth and last year of my Fellowship began on May 14<sup>th</sup>. While in the US, I met with experts about proposed changes to the tax laws and regulations governing the nonprofit sector. I queried my American colleagues on how these changes would affect the overall structure of the third sector. It is my understanding that nonprofits have operated with limited oversight since the sector first emerged. Sensational publicity about irregularities and possibly illegal activities has prompted a closer scrutiny of the sector. There are some who think that a reorganization of the third sector is warranted. From my perspective, as the US model is used to assist in the development of the Russian third sector, it is important to stay abreast of developments. As is my custom, I briefed the Mission on my findings.

In reading Fareed Zakaria's, The Future of Freedom---Illiberal Democracy At Home and Abroad, I found a pragmatic answer to the 'it's-all-about-democracy' dilemma in which I increasingly finding myself. Zakaria, Newsweek editor and political analyst for ABC News, said, "The use of liberal, such as, *a more liberal democratic society* suggests that democracy has gone from being a form of government to a way of life." He reminds the reader about the origin of concepts, such as, liberalism and democracy, and cautions us about the casual mixing of these words. One of the greatest impediments to successful third sector development, and one which I frequently encounter as an international development specialist, is *miscommunication* due to vague terminology. I make it a practice to share and/or clarify definitions of words and concepts, and to help arrive at consensus on use.

(Addendum B)

**June** – President Putin's comments regarding the Russian third sector, made during his State Address to the Parliament, caused anxiety among local CSOS and western donors. USAID/Russia/DI particularly scrutinized the following assertions:

There are thousands of citizens' associations and unions working constructively in our country, but far from all of them are geared towards defending people's real interests. For some of these organizations, the priority is rather different - obtaining funding from influential foreign or domestic foundations. For others, it is servicing dubious group and commercial interests. Moreover, the most acute problems of the country and its citizens remain unnoticed. I must say that when violations of fundamental and basic human rights and the encroachment of people's real interests are at stake, the voice of such organizations is, at times, not even audible at all. Actually, there is nothing surprising in that. They can not bite the hand that feeds them.

I participated in meetings where those comments were analyzed for their meaning, potential impact on the development of the third sector, and how US foreign assistance to our

partners might be affected. On an upbeat note, a pleasant reaction was observed at the Altai Civic Forum, which was held immediately after the President's speech. It was a meeting of the governor of the Altai region and local NGOs. According to longtime Siberian civic activist, Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, the governor expressed a positive attitude toward CSOs. He said, "We must learn how to meet our citizens' needs by working with NGOs." He asked questions and engaged in a lively dialogue. Unfortunately, an unpleasant reaction occurred in Southern Russia. Militia raided the office of a local NGO, and a threatening exchange took place. Since the President's speech, contradictory actions have taken place at the federal level, thus leaving CSOs with an even more precarious environment.

I participated in the 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the Partnership of Community Foundations, "The Path to the Future". It was hosted by the Charitable Foundation for the Development of the City of Tyumen, in Siberia. After listening to 16 community foundation reports, I determined that this vital segment of the third sector is still in the nascent stage. Some community foundations have established good relations with business, but not with local government; while for others, it is visa versa. With the exception of Togliatti (Volga District), which was Russia's first community foundation, none of the community foundations have managed to pull the whole concept together to achieve significant community transformation. A mutually supportive three-sector relationship in Russian communities does have the potential to make an invaluable contribution to regional economies and to improved quality-of-life. Unfortunately, there are substantial impediments to realizing this goal. A Ford Foundation representative shared his experiences in this sphere of activity. Ford has supported the development of community foundations over the past few years, and recently put a new offer on the table—3-year funding for a formal Community Foundation Partnership. Unfortunately, the 16 community foundations have not been able to agree on parameters for forming an umbrella structure. They perceive it to require relinquishing too much of their individual autonomy. With so many strong personalities and an inherent lack of trust, they will not easily arrive at an agreement to work together toward a common goal.

The Office of Democratic Initiatives assembled a team of experts that conducted a civil society assessment. I briefed several members of the team during the data gathering phase, and then carefully vetted drafts of their subsequent report. It was a professional success to have my feedback recognized. They appreciated my observations and clarification of issues, and the fact that I did not try to influence their conclusions or recommendations.

**July** – As work on the 5-Year Strategy continued, a corresponding project began in DI—the writing of a Strategy Vision Statement. This statement ultimately becomes part of the broader Mission strategy, but was also necessary for the development of civil society programs that will go into effect in the next few years. I participated in brainstorming

sessions and conducted research. My writing and editing skills were tapped for producing the final product.

I began the first of a series of interviews on corporate social responsibility (CSR). I singled out British American Tobacco (BAT), a joint venture; United Way of Moscow, a Russian nonprofit umbrella organization run by local businesses; and Charities Aid Foundation Russia, a local donor foundation. During these interviews, I confirmed my hypothesis that there is some purely voluntary and highly sophisticated corporate involvement in social issues. BAT recently introduced an employee contribution program in Moscow. Although, only in the first stage of implementation, results indicate that employees are willing to entertain the concept of payroll deduction for purposes of funding social projects. This enlightened corporate initiative is entirely voluntary, and exists in stark contrast to the social contributions that corporations have been (and are) obliged to provide. It is apparent to me that the future of the third sector is dependent on a corporate culture that is based on 'giving because it is wise business investment'. Olga Alekseeva, CAF Russia's executive director, confirmed this perception when she said, "The goal is to get CSR away from politics and out from under the pressure of the Kremlin. It is good business to be socially responsible. CSR is not charity or political patronage. Corporations need to stand together, as public opinion is a serious issue and attitude is deeply rooted in the culture." CSR has become fashionable, and the number of conferences and training sessions dedicated to it are growing.

Following President Putin's address to the Parliament, a wave of scathing articles about US donors appeared in the print media. The Embassy and Mission were hard-pressed to keep up with the increased volume of discourse. I decided to use my Russian lessons as an opportunity to try my hand at translation. Oleg Popov's article, "American Charitable Funds and Russian Human Rights Organizations," was an enticing prospect. The endeavor became far more than a linguistic exercise. While clarifying portions of the commentary, I was allowed to explore deeper into the multifaceted Russian culture. It was a personal success to be able to share the final product with colleagues at the Mission and Embassy. (Addendum D)

**August** – I was invited to participate in a donor briefing and strategy session hosted by UNDP. The new UNDP/Russia initiative, "Russia as an Emerging Donor (RUSAID)", was unveiled. UNDP representatives indicated that the government of Russia (GOR) was seeking assistance in establishing a national technical assistance agency. UNDP called the international development community together to discuss potential opportunities for collaboration. As I reflected on the initiative, I found it ironic that a country that considers itself ready to become a donor nation also has a considerable portion of its own population living at or below the poverty line. My hope is that, in the process of establishing RUSAID,

the GOR comes to a better understanding of civil society and the value of its own third sector.

I had the privilege of being the guest speaker at a Brown Bag Discussion at World Learning. I shared the process and the final results of the Russia report for the 2003 NGO Sustainability Index. It was a pleasure to engage the audience in a lively discussion about Russia's civil society. They proved not only interested, but very knowledgeable on the subject. As is my nature, I used this fortuitous opportunity to seek assistance from these experts. (Addendum E)

While in Washington, DC, I took advantage of the possibility to expand my research on CSR. I met with several foundations, think tanks, government bodies, and for-profits. A meeting and subsequent consultation with Preeti Shroff-Mehta, director of Civil Society and Social Change at WLID, was valuable in clarifying the process of reflecting and writing for publication. Following her advice, I increased the volume of literature review, and began the arduous process of articulating my theories and experiences on paper.

**September** – At the suggestion of Ms. Shroff-Mehta, I attended the 57<sup>th</sup> Annual United Nations DPI/NGO Conference, "Millennium Development Goals: Civil Society Takes Action." It was an extraordinary opportunity to observe and meet with civil society activists from around the world. I participated in sessions where models for mobilizing broader public support for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were debated. Under-Secretary-General, Shashi Tharoor said, "The involvement of civil society partners [more than 3,000 NGOs work directly with the UN Secretariat] in the MDG campaign is essential to its success." In a conference, such as this, one is reminded that CSOs not only have the right, but the responsibility to engage in public policy.

John P. Kotter, author of Leading Change: What Leaders Really Do, conducted a seminar in Moscow. I am an advocate of Kotter's theories on *change*, so I considered myself fortunate to participate in his lecture on *leadership*. What I found most interesting was the audience's reaction to Kotter's laid-back, interactive presentation style. Young professionals were challenged and seemed receptive to his methodology; while senior professionals appeared to be uncomfortable and felt their power threatened. Kotter stressed the importance of having a 'willingness and ability to keep growing'. He closed by saying, "I can't see how this world can survive without a vibrant Russia. There needs to be successful businesses in Russia, and then they need to expand beyond Russia."

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of September, a community in North Ossetia suffered an unimaginable tragedy. In the small city of Beslan, children, their parents, and teachers were taken hostage while attending the first day of school. During the three-day siege, hundreds were killed or injured. The hostility devastated not only the region, but the country. I had a strong personal reaction to this brutal act of violence. During 15 years of living and working in the CIS, I have learned that one of the most important days of the year is the first day of school.

Families spare no amount of expense or effort in preparing children for that day. The times I have walked amidst this annual ritual, I was caught up in the festive atmosphere. What happened in Beslan was horrific, and the psychological violation of innocents will linger for a long time to come. I felt a need to help ameliorate the terrible wrong, so I began to assist the Institute for Tolerance. They brought together public organizations, humanitarian foundations, unions, and associations to plan a civic action that might help to reduce the tension that was building in the nearby regions. In mid-April of 2005, a Youth Civic Forum will be held in Rostov-on-Don. It will be the result of collective civic participation. I look forward to taking an active part in the event.

A colleague and I spent the better part of September working with DI on a Civil Society Concept paper. The concept paper was the next stage after the DI Strategy Vision Statement. Once again, my extensive experience and reading was helpful to the development process. The concept paper will lead to the development of a Civil Society RFA.

**October** -- I participated in back-to-back conferences in Sofia, Bulgaria. The first was the European Foundation Centre Grantmakers East Group 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, "Sustainable Grantmaking." The highlight of the conference was the substantive input of Russian foundations. Regardless of the topic, participants hung on every word that came from the Russian donors. I marveled at the contrast between the GEG conference in Bucharest, Romania in 2001, when the Russian third sector was discussed by foreign donors; and four years later, when Russians took the lead, and their expertise was highly sought out.

The second conference was the 9<sup>th</sup> Regional Meeting of USAID Democracy Network and NGO Development Program Directors, "Watchdogs and Policy Actors in Democratic Transition." The conference focused on the role of civil society in addressing overall reform issues, particularly the increasingly critical role of domestic watchdog and policy actor in addressing the ongoing challenges of democratic consolidation. Once again, it was exciting to watch the Russians play the educative role. Their presentations outlined the realities of building a civil society in Russia and the CIS countries, and they made recommendations on how to develop the capacity of local organizations. The most poignant message was offered by Yuri Djbladzhe, "Do not give up on Russia because you consider it a *hopeless case and a failure!*"

**November** -- I attended the 8<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the American Evaluation Association, "Evaluation 2004--Theory, Method, Profession, and Practice--Fundamental Issues," in Atlanta, GA. During the three day conference, I selected lectures from a catalog of more than 350 sessions. It was exciting to participate in a session offered by a highly respected Moscow evaluator. Alexey Kuzmin's lecture entitled "Participatory Training Evaluation Method (PATEM)," is his own design and was well-received by the audience. I participated

in four days of evaluation training offered by some of the most prestigious trainers in the industry. I earned Certificates of Competency in Qualitative Methods, Utilization-focused Evaluation, and Moderator Training. I intend to continue my membership with the AEA, as I find their journals, training and conferences useful professionally. I have attempted to bring back the best of the information to my colleagues at the Mission. USAID is always searching for improved methods for monitoring and measuring program activity.

On November 13<sup>th</sup>, I began to work in Washington, DC. David Payton, director of the Fellows Program, connected me with Preeti Shroff-Mehta, director of Civil Society and Social Change. Ms. Shroff-Mehta has valuable experience assisting aspiring writers, and she graciously agreed to mentor me. More about this and other experiences, during my time in Washington, DC, will be recounted in the final report.

## **On-going Activities**

DIHR Activities – I provided consultation to the director of DI, my colleagues, and guests of the Unit on current events and civil society issues. I wrote several 'annual review' recommendations for co-workers. Russian colleagues came to me with career and project concerns, as well as future global development assistance questions. I was involved, to a lesser extent than in previous years, with quarterly, annual reports, budget and procurement reviews. I was highly involved in program development and 5-year strategy sessions.

(Addendum F)

### Missionwide Activity

I provided consultations to each of the Mission's Technical Offices. Continued to monitor websites, and forwarded relevant information to colleagues and partners. I reviewed and synthesized key points in books and articles, conducted research for staff on special topics, and wrote analytical commentaries. I met with and briefed several of the representatives for the Mission's 5-Year strategy preliminary planning session. As in the past, Mission colleagues were welcome to come to me for information or assistance.

Russian and International Community Activities – I maintained and developed new Russian and International civil society contacts. I attended local and international conferences to increase my knowledge, and to share findings with Mission colleagues. At every opportunity, I consulted with Russian and international experts on societal changes. I was contacted by other USAID missions and US foundations to provide information. I received requests for consultation from organizations outside the Mission, and a few inquiries were from entities in other countries.

## Revisions to Program Description

Following consultation with USAID/Russia/ODI, World Learning, and USAID/WDC, the Workplan was revised to allow a four-month term to be spent in Washington, DC or other international cities.

### USAID/Moscow

Let me say how grateful we at USAID/Russia are for World Learning's generous support for this fourth year of Caryn Wilde's fellowship in Russia. Caryn has been a guru for us, and we were glad to have invested in her first three years. We are fortunate to host her for this important final year, and recognize the importance of her using this time to bring together the many threads of her research, refine her findings through the screen of best practices and experience in the rest of the world, and emerge with state-of-the art conclusions, lessons and recommendations that will be valuable for NGOs, donors and governments in just about any country in the world.

We believe that, in order for Caryn to complete this final research and early writing and publishing phase effectively, she will need some extended time operating out of Washington, DC. It is only by basing herself there (or in some other international city with global development organizations), that she will be able to meet with, and travel quickly to, enough leaders in the field to refine her analysis and conclusions. Therefore, I would urge you to consider approving her spending a total of up to four months, 29 September 2004 – 31 January 2005, in the United States. Her final phase will be back here in Moscow.

Christopher M. Brown  
Director, Office of Democratic Initiatives  
USAID/Russia

### World Learning

Caryn has been an outstanding Democracy Fellow, and we've been very pleased with the role she's played for USAID/Moscow. We must commend you (USAID/Russia/ODI) for supporting her and taking appropriate advantage of her great strengths. We've spoken extensively with Caryn about this change in the locus of her fellowship and feel that it is reasonable and it makes sense. We support it.

David E. Payton  
Director, Democracy Fellows Program  
World Learning

### USAID/DC

I concur with the Mission's request.

Lenora Doores-Fendell  
Program Analyst, DCHA/DG  
USAID/RRB

## Tentative Fellowship International Travel

Russia – Seven (7) regional trips during a twelve-month period.

International – Five (5) international trips during a twelve-month period.

Destinations for international travel will be the following: NIS countries, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States.

Conferences, training, and public speaking opportunities may include: European Donor Conferences held in Eastern and Western Europe, Democracy and Governance Conference and Workshop, Democracy Fellows Conference, the American Evaluation Association Conference and Training, and the Independent Sector Conference, the Annual Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), or another of the same type.

## Democracy Fellows Program

Caryn M. Wilde

May 14, 2004 to May 13, 2005

New life is being breathed into USAID's commitment to reverse Russia's backsliding on democracy. Technical assistance to Russia will be aimed at moving the country toward a democratic transition threshold comparable to the Baltic States and several Eastern European countries. Key to the delivery of successful programming that achieves this goal is the design of USAID/Russia's 5-Year Strategy, 2005-2009.

USAID/Russia will engage in an intense period of planning for the 5-Year Strategy. It is essential that decision makers have a wide range of information at their disposal, an understanding of previous technical efforts, and an insider's view of the public's sentiment regarding democratization and mechanisms integral to a civil society.

Recent comments from the OSCE imply that during the past 11 years mechanisms vital to civil society and democracy have been put in place. An American expert on governance opined publicly that the March 14<sup>th</sup> presidential election signaled the end of Russia's transition to democracy, and that 'wherever [Russia] was going, it has arrived'. Performance indicators from Freedom House, which rate democratic tendencies, show a decline since 1991. USAID's 2003 NGO Sustainability Index will indicate a worsening environment for the third sector.

These statements beg for answers to a number of questions. The responses will be among the many subjects included in USAID/Russia's planning sessions, and will be central to developing a 5-Year Strategy.

1. Why aren't democratic principles and the accompanying mechanisms integral to a democratic culture taking root in Russian society?
2. What do Russians engaged in business consider being *socially responsible*?
3. How do civil society organizations envision Russia's future, specifically the third sector's role?
4. Are accurate measurement tools being used to quantify and qualify Russia's transit to a civil society?
5. What more can be done to assist Russia in reaching the democracy threshold of its more advanced neighbors?

### Statement of Professional Goals

#### Objective #1

To participate in Mission planning that will lead to the development of USAID/Russia's 5-Year Technical Assistance Strategy. Through participation, I will:

1. Contribute to the high level policy considerations that ultimately create a 5-Year Strategy during a crucial period of US-Russia relations; and
2. Provide expertise specific to democratization, civil society organizations, and informal citizen participation. My knowledge of the Russian context, as well as far beyond, has significantly increased over the three years I have been a Democracy Fellow.

## Activities

- To provide input in strategy planning sessions, by sharing insight acquired during the years I have been a Fellow at USAID.
- To provide expertise at roundtables and dialogues, such as the Carnegie Moscow, Association of Russian Managers, and Russian and Washington specialists.
- To participate on the 5-Year Strategy editorial committee, and support seamless integration of civil society principles throughout the Mission portfolio.
- To meet with Russian organizations, and attend local and international events that will provide useful information for the strategy planning process.
- To share methodology for measuring intangible and incremental change.

## Outcomes

- Contribution to Mission identification of a 5-Year Strategy, which is well suited to Russia.
- Interaction among the Office of Democracy Initiatives, the Office of Program and Project Development, and the Director's office that is fundamental to sound policy making.
- Mission develops concrete methods for integrating civil society principles throughout all technical office portfolios and partner's activities.
- Opportunity to provide technical assistance to community foundations and other similar CSOs, which eases social needs and improves Russian corporation's ability to be socially responsible.
- Increased awareness among Russian corporations and CSOs about the potential benefits of USAID's Global Development Alliance (GDA) program.
- Access to methodologies and tested technologies that will aid USAID's ability to identify and measure qualitative outcomes.

## Impact

USAID/Russia's 5-Year Strategy will incorporate targeted technical assistance that reinforces the principles of democracy and mechanisms integral to a democratic culture. New programs designed to build on the existing framework of a participatory society will result in strengthening an environment conducive to change. Successes can be maintained, sustained, and are more likely to become *irreversible*. USAID/Russia will have an expanded set of measurement tools with which to assess change (outcomes). Improved identification of those democratic organizations, practices, and principles that have gained legitimacy in Russian society will bring the 5-Year Strategy full circle.

## Objective #2

To examine Russian corporations' perception of corporate social responsibility, to examine community foundation style initiatives, and to find a common link that encourages the sectors to work together. Revealing Russian priorities will be accomplished through:

1. Examining corporate social responsibility in Russia's regions, and
2. Dialoguing with representatives of Russia's community foundations.

## Activities

- Interviewing Russian corporations about their experience and perception of *corporate social responsibility*.
- Analyzing independent data on the level of Russian corporate social responsibility.
- Interviewing Russian community foundations about their experience and perception of civil society.
- Connecting Russian corporations and community foundations for purposes of creating an awareness of how each are one-half of the same initiative.
- To record findings obtained through interviews, focus groups, and/or surveys regarding the prevailing view of Russian citizenship.
- To contribute findings to USAID/Russia for their use in developing the 5-Year Strategy.

- To maintain dialogue with other leading experts and key stakeholders engaged in development assistance to Russia.

### Outcomes

- A clearer understanding of how Russian business perceives its *social responsibility* and what business expects in exchange for its significant financial investment.  
For example: the distinction, if any, business makes between corporate responsibility and social responsibility; the corporation's right to a well-defined and well-managed social service infrastructure (government's duty); and increased public awareness and appreciation of the breadth of corporate Russia's contribution to improved quality of life.
- Specific data demonstrating how corporations meet their obligations in the community.
- Strengthened linkage between corporations and community foundations.
- Published findings regarding corporate social responsibility and community foundations in leading democracy/civil society oriented journals.
- Public speaking engagements—i.e. Institutions of higher education, think tanks or development conferences—on corporate social responsibility and community foundations.
- Informative briefings to the Mission on corporate social responsibility and community foundations.

### Impact

Russia's third sector is at a critical juncture in its battle for sustainability. The Russian government appears to be stalled in its transit to democracy, and offers little support to either of the other sectors. CSOs now stake their future on corporate philanthropy, which they perceive is still woefully inadequate. Business, pressured by the Russian government (administration) to be socially responsible, makes significant contribution to meeting social needs; however, contributions go largely unacknowledged or appreciated. Working in isolation, CSO and business efforts to establish an infrastructure to sustain and bring order to social activity are stymied. The answer lies in finding where the interests of the three sectors converge, and a mechanism called the community foundation.

Dialogue with Russian businesses and community foundations on what social responsibility means to them and how they perceive their rights and responsibilities in a civil society will make forging alliances possible. Findings will strengthen USAID/Russia's ability to direct technical assistance more effectively. Through publication and public presentations, my enriched understanding of Russian attitudes toward civil society can be shared with a broader audience.

## Statement of Personal Goals

### Objective

The 4<sup>th</sup> year is really about solidifying my professional reputation and heightening my visibility as a development expert. There is a need for consultants with a deep understanding of and connection to post-soviet societies to share what they have learned. I would like to put to good use the experience and knowledge I have acquired before and during the Democracy Fellowship., especially during the planning of the 5-Year Strategy.

### Activities

- To reflect on and write about what I am seeing and learning as I live in and travel throughout Russia.
- To address groups interested in knowing more about the mysterious Russian people.
- To participate in the planning meetings for the 5-Year Strategy, with the goals of observing and learning how policy is shaped and contributing meaningful input.
- To study Russian culture and the Russian language.

## Outcomes

- Publications that reflect what Russians have taught me about Russians.
- Public speaking engagements that share Russia's social, political, and economic reality, and help listeners reach an understanding that is useful in their work or in their life.
- Input of significance on the 5-Year Strategy.
- Improved ability to communicate with Russians in the Russian language.

## Impact

There is a need for 'social' translators. Those who intend to provide technical assistance or to do business in Russia need an insider's understanding of how Russians see their social, political, and economic reality. During my activities in the coming year, I will challenge people to think broadly, to analyze their paradigms, and to cause them to say, "Interesting, I didn't know that!" At the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> year Fellowship, I will be qualified to engage in a career of my choosing, and I will draw on the vast knowledge and experiences I have had during my Fellowship with USAID/Russia and World Learning.

The Mission's investment in my Fellowship contributes to a significant increase in expertise and knowledge. In turn, that capacity will be used to contribute to planning and creating the 5-Year Strategy. Essentially, it institutionalizes my working knowledge in a way that allows the Mission to move forward with me, and later without me. The strategic planning process capitalizes on my experience, but is a very different exercise than I have engaged in previously as a Fellow. The first two years were spent gathering data---listening, learning, and reporting back to the Mission---interpretative application. In the third year, I concentrated on the internal operations of USAID/Russia. The fourth year offers an opportunity to conduct interviews that elicit specific information that can be incorporated into developing a 5-year strategy, and form the basis for analytical application.

## Timeline and Level of Effort

Approximately 35% of my time will be spent in the Mission participating in the planning for the 5-year Strategy, and other in-house activity.

Approximately 30% of my time will be spent traveling: conducting interviews, collecting information, participating in sector events, and making public presentations.

Approximately 35% of my time will be spent writing for publication and public presentation.

## Fellowship Travel Plans

Russia – Seven (7) regional trips during a twelve-month period.

International – Five (5) international trips during a twelve-month period.

Destinations for international travel will be the following: NIS countries, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States.

- ✓ Conferences, training, and public speaking opportunities may include: European Donor Conferences held in Eastern and Western Europe, Democracy and Governance Conference and Workshop, Democracy Fellows Conference, the American Evaluation Association Conference and Training, and the Independent Sector Conference, the Annual Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), or another of the same type

## Liberty and Democracy

"The use of 'liberal', such as "a more liberal democratic society" suggests that democracy has gone from being a form of government to a way of life". Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek editor and political analyst for ABC News provides us with a reminder of the origination of words, and how differently we use them today.

**Liberty** – the freedom of the individual from arbitrary authority, which has usually meant, the brute power of the state. It implies certain basic human rights: freedom of expression, of association, and of worship, and rights of due process.

Greek root: everyone (male citizen) had the right to participate in the governance of the community. Liberty led to democracy.

Roman root: *libertas* – all citizens should be treated equally under the law.

**Democracy**: a government created by elections in which every adult citizen could vote.  
Greek root – Democracy means 'rule of the people'.

**Democratic** refers to the process of selecting a government. If a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, the US calls democratic. Therefore, authoritarian governments and dictatorships can be democratic. Hitler was elected by the people, thus technically, his assumption to power was democratic. Putin won his second term in an election: albeit under questionable circumstances according to the West.

**Democratization** – is the shift of power downward—hierarchies breaking down; closed systems opening; and pressures from the masses driving social change.

**Constitutional Liberalism** – refers to government's goals, or the basket of freedoms guaranteed by a constitution.

The West (specifically the US) has begun using the term 'liberal democracy'. In doing this, they combine free-and-fair elections and the freedom basket (speech, assembly, media, religion, etc).

**Liberal Democracy**: (western interpretation of democracy + liberty) a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.

## President Vladimir Putin

At the same time, we are obliged to give a critical appraisal of the state of our democracy as well. Is the political system in its current form an instrument of real people power? How fruitful is the dialogue between the authorities and society? It's obvious that the young Russian democracy achieved significant success as it was being established and anyone who insists on not seeing this or who doesn't want to see it is not being entirely sincere. Even so, our social structure is far from perfect and it has to be acknowledged that we are only just setting out. Without a mature civic society, there can be no effective solution to people's pressing problems. The quality of their daily lives is directly dependent on the quality of the social and political system. Here, too, we have a good many issues. I'd like to bring to mind the fact that all power means great responsibility above all else. It is inadmissible that civilized political competition should be replaced by a mercenary struggle for the status to levy tribute, that the financial side of political associations' activities should remain hidden from the public or that the market of electoral technology and lobby services should be primarily geared to the shadow sector and all this against a background of the depressing sameness of most party programs.

**A few words about non-political public organizations**, there are thousands of citizens' associations and unions working constructively in our country, but far from all of them are geared towards defending people's real interests. For some of these organizations, the priority is rather different - obtaining funding from influential foreign or domestic foundations. For others, it is servicing dubious group and commercial interests. Moreover, the most acute problems of the country and its citizens remain unnoticed. I must say that when violations of fundamental and basic human rights and the encroachment of people's real interests are at stake, the voice of such organizations is, at times, not even audible at all. Actually, there is nothing surprising in that. They can not bite the hand that feeds them.

Naturally, such examples can not serve as a reason for us to blame civic associations as a whole. I think that such negative phenomena are unavoidable and temporary. In order to curtail such phenomena and to invigorate a further growth of the institutions of civic society, one does not need to invent anything. Our own experience and experience gathered elsewhere throughout the world has already proven that a whole number of approaches are productive here. It is, thus, necessary gradually to transfer to the non-state sector the functions which the state should not carry out, or is incapable of carrying out efficiently. It also makes sense to make use of the experience of the work of public chambers, gathered in a number of Russia's regions. Such standing non-state organizations can ensure independent scrutiny of the most important regulatory instruments which directly affect the interests of the country's citizens.

Parties need to learn to come to power and to part with it. Political parties, too, ought to cooperate more closely with citizens' structures. Direct ties with people, with society, will help improve the quality of popular representation at all levels. Parties ought to be interested in swelling their ranks, strengthening their material base, their intellectual and personnel potential, in actively setting up factions in regional parliaments, taking part in the work of local government. Parties should increase the level of political culture, mastering the habits of dialogue with other parties and coalition activities. They should learn how to come to power and how to part with it, according to the will of the people.

Let me stress again that a radical revision of economic policies, any restrictions on civic rights and liberties, cardinal changes in foreign policy guidelines, any deviations from Russia's historical path which it has chosen and, I would put it more strongly, which it has achieved through suffering may lead to irreversible consequences and they must be absolutely ruled out. [Applause] Creating a free society of free people is top priority.

## Activity Report

**Article Review:** "American Charitable Funds/Foundations and Russian Human Rights Organizations"  
**Author:** Oleg Popov  
**Source:** <http://www/lebed.com/2004/art3651.htm> No 361  
**Translation:** Caryn M. Wilde, Democracy Fellow

**"It is he who pays, that orders the music."**

Long ago, work performed by dissidents and defenders of human rights was done for principle only. "I can not be silent." They were imprisoned, or in the best case, exiled. Today, this work which is called protection of human rights, not only doesn't send one to prison, but doesn't pay poorly either. American Foundations are paying for it. However, Americans do not pay those grants to everyone, but to those organizations that protect those "whom they need," such as Chechen separatists. Those organizations they don't need, such as, the Latvian committee for the rights of people who defends the rights of Russians living in Latvia, American foundations do not give grants. They say these organizations are Communist.

It is not necessary for American foundations to loudly proclaim who these (unfavored) organizations are, as Russian human rights activists know "who to defend" and who not to defend. For example, the leader of the Moscow Helsinki Fund, Liudmila Alekseyeva, along with the leadership of the MHF, "knows." In an open letter, they "advised" Serb human rights defenders to not condemn NATO bombing, as these bombs fell on their heads. ([www.ihf-hr.org](http://www.ihf-hr.org)) But what is she to do when six of the ten donors of MHF are leaders of NATO countries? [Might relate to Putin's statement that Russian NGOs know better than to bite the hand that feeds them?] Human Rights Watch, a HR protection organization financed by American George Soros and gatherer of material about genocide and ethnic cleansing on Bosnia and Kosovo, is a member of MHF. George Soros, himself, is a member of the MHF.

So, it is true what old human rights defender, A.O. Smirnov, wrote, "Who pays, names the music." (Human Rights, #2, 2001. [www.hro.org/ngo/research](http://www.hro.org/ngo/research))

This article discusses the aims and motives, by which American foundations finance Russian NGOs, including human rights organizations. The author provides brief information about a few very big American foundations—their history, philosophy, structure of the leadership, yearly budget, and tradition of giving grants to Russian human rights organizations.

### Who Needs Charitable Foundations?

American charitable foundations can be classified by different parameters. Classification by yearly budget, giving as they wish—a very large fund, such as the Ford Foundation (\$598 million in grants and donations); and a smaller fund, such as J.M. Kaplan Fund (\$6.9 million in grants).

We can separate foundations by the type of corporation that contributes the money to the fund: "production," such as the Ford Foundation, and financial investors, such as the Soros Foundation network. They can be separated by "liberal" foundations, such as Soros; and new "conservative" financiers, such as Scaife Foundation. There are foundations with broad portfolios, and there are narrow, specializing foundations that finance one sphere (defense of human rights or ecology).

I will introduce the history of American charitable foundations, private and governmental. Private foundations in the USA—are the majority, according to according to specialists, number more than 2,000. Governmental foundations, one can count on their hands, which reflects the American model for financing nonprofit sphere. In reality, at first, charitable

foundations were planned this way---to select, with government's help, unprofitable sphere (poor) ---homeless, arts, sciences, security, and ecology. The first foundations were founded in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford with a goal to solve social problems.

A famous researcher of charitable foundations, Joan Roelofs, named three reasons that American millionaires created foundations and put in their capital. (Joan Roelofs, "Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism", Suny Press, Albany, Feb. 2003.) The first reason---clean finances and reduce their profit in order to reduce their taxes. Second reason---to create a permanent mechanism for activity reflecting the public social-cultural atmosphere, and that gives them control over society. The third reason---to improve their image and public opinion, which is very important in a competitive economy.

With the strengthening of cooperation among state/government, business, and foundations, the American political-economic elite, it appeared necessary to this 'nomenklatura' to create permanent, active institutions. They (the institutions) were neutral structures, where it was possible for state/government (power), business, and the academic world to cooperate. These structures were noncommercial, private nongovernmental organizations, through which finance organizations started to play an important role in deciding a whole range of national problems.

The necessity for the state/government to establish foundations appears only when deciding global problems demand coordination of state politics and control from both of the main American political parties---democrats and republicans. This situation appeared after WW II in connection with the formation of the communist world headed by the Soviet Union.

In this article, we are speaking of only a specific few of these problems, resolution/decree before American establishment leading to a struggle between two superpowers---USA and USSR/Russia---as different civilization systems.

- In Russia, finance the opposition to socialism and nationalism (patriotic power) organizations, parties, and trends.
- Ideological publications, concepts of a free society by means of creating and financing a system of education, schools, liberal press and TB.
- Create a noncommercial sector, that is, nongovernmental organizations, step by step intercepting the state's culture, education, social, and charitable functions. As a result, the face/image of society's legal and legislative organs lost control to (under) this sector. The same will create conditions for transformation of civilization of Russian people, after that, they will lose their own identity and absolutely become a resource appendage of the 'golden million' (America).
- The formation of a civil society like the West on the foundation of cosmopolitan and liberal ideology of human rights.
- Create and finance schools, universities, which prepare jurists, workers for the social sector; reuse existing programs, and draw up new laws.

As we see, all these creative initiatives have nothing in common with the stereotype "subversive" elements of the CIA. But, even the CIA today is absolutely not what it was in the 1950 - 1960s. [Stereotype: USA uses specific methods to tear down the USSR.] Someone reports, in materials taken from transcripts (listening) of the USA 1976 Congress, about the activities of the CIA: working together with respected and prestigious foundations allowed the CIA to finance, practically with unlimited funds for programs, affecting youth groups, universities, media and other private institutes, including human rights organizations. Also, today the CIA considers foundations better for covert financing expenditures. As to underscore, in the same materials, of 700 grants, which were spent by the main American foundations on international projects, almost 50% of the total funds were received from the CIA.

### **The Most "Popular" American Foundations in Russia**

Exactly which Western and American foundations work to reform civilization in Russia? For the answer to this question, you need to recognize who finances the Russian "noncommercial" sector and for example, human rights organizations. To look again at all grants that were received by individual Russian human rights activists is impossible to imagine, because many organizations do not reveal their sponsor-donors or how much the grants were for.

We choose two human rights organizations (and the most famous) located in the capital city—Moscow Helsinki Group and Society "Memorial", and two provincial human rights organizations (but also famous)—Perm Human Rights Center and Ryazan Branch of Society "Memorial".

Here are ALL the foundations that finance the Moscow Helsinki Group:

- Liberty Road (government, Embassy of Switzerland in Russia).
- Department for International Development (government, Great Britain).
- European Commission (government, EU).
- Ford Foundation (private, USA).
- MacArthur Foundation (private, USA).
- MATRA (government, Embassy of Holland in Russia).
- National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (government, USA).
- Open Society Institute, (private, G. Soros, USA).
- UK Foreign Ministry, (government, Great Britain).
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (government, USA).

As you see from the list of 10 donors of the Moscow Helsinki Group, there is NOT one Russian organization, private or GOVERNMENT. But seven donors out of ten—are government organizations, moreover except for Switzerland, all are members of NATO... What will be the "human rights" politics of public organizations, FINANCED independent of the Russian State, but FINANCED dependent on representative countries of NATO – to think about this is not necessary.

Five American donors: three private organizations – Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and Open Society Institute, and two governmental [entities] –

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID.

Here are the main American "donors" of Moscow "Memorial" (a few personal givers, such as media [mogul] Edward Klein, I don't use as an example here, as it is such small money): Open Society Institute, Ford Foundation, Henry M. Jackson Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy, Bradley Foundation, and Guggenheim Foundation.

International foundations financing Perm "Memorial" – Ford Foundation, Open Society Institute, Eurasia Foundation (G. Soros), NED, Henry M. Jackson Foundation, International Research and Exchange Council (USA); and G. Kennan Institute (USA). Of the local (Russian) sponsors of the Perm Center, it makes sense to mention the city administration of Perm, the Perm Oblast, and also companies LUKoil-Perm and Motvilikhinskii Factory. And last, the sponsors from abroad of Ryazan Human Rights: Ford Foundation, NED, Institute for Democracy in East Europe USA, Open Society Institute, Eurasia Foundation, Freedom Path (representatives of Switzerland), and Government of Netherlands. "For a Civil Society" sponsors the Ryazan Memorial, which "feeds itself" on funds from Western sponsors, such as Ford Foundation and NED.

Thus, the "leaders" in financing Russian human rights organizations are private "charitable" funds, such as, the Ford Foundation and Open Society Institute, and the government organization National Endowment for Democracy (NED). We will begin a detailed analysis of these organizations.

### Corporate Foundations

The Ford Foundation is, I suppose, the wealthiest charitable organization in the USA. It was founded 30 years ago by automobile magnet, Henry Ford. Only after WWII, it lost its connection with the Fords, as leaders of the board of directors. This foundation became one of the first foundations to enter into the 'Cold War' (take part in). Its president, 1952-1954, was Richard Bissel, who after his leaving the Foundation became the assistant to director of the CIA, Allen Dallesa. Succeeding him was John McCloy, who had been president of the World Bank, undersecretary of defense (USA), and a representative of the Chase Manhattan Bank. It was McCloy who established the department for coordinating operations with the CIA in the Ford Foundation.

After notorious "exposures" during the 1960s and 1970s, the Foundation's work became more careful and versatile. It appeared that members of the board of directors were no longer ex-CIA, and its special department stopped working. Since 1996, the head of the Ford Foundation has been Susan Berresford. She is a member of the Council for Foreign Relations, and also a member of the 'international section' of a council called the Trilateral Commission, where all progressive political, economic, and financial world leaders are. (By the way, from Russia, S. A. Karaganov and R. A. Yavlinski are on this commission.)

On the Ford Foundation's board of directors are sixteen individuals who are presidents of America's largest corporations, such as, Xerox Corp., Alcoa Inc., Coca-Cola Co., and Rock Creek Group, which is a part of the famous Carlyle Group. There are also leaders and presidents from the largest American universities and famous jurists.

If we speak "concretely" about the Ford Foundation's participation in the 'life' of the soviet people, let us say a word about the contributions of the Ford Foundation. We read: "In 1950, the Ford Foundation began to support projects oriented toward the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries. Between the years of 1950-1988, around \$60 million was allocated to analyze the key problems in the relationship between the east and the west, to support freedom of speech, cultural pluralism, and to maintain human rights. In 1989, the board of directors made a decision about rights (! - O.P.)---to support progressive organizations in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary (and later, in Czechoslovakia), in order to move democratization and economic reforms in these states more quickly. 1989-1994, about \$30 million was directed toward these goals." ([www.fordfound.org/](http://www.fordfound.org/))

In 2001, the Ford Foundation financed (according to my count) 21 Russian human rights organizations for a total of about \$5 million. The international, historic human rights society "Memorial" was granted the largest amount, \$2 million to purchase a building for their headquarters in the center of Moscow. Also, Memorial received \$1.5 million for its research activity. The rest of the human rights organizations received less money:

- Moscow Helsinki Group - \$70,000.
- Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (schools, seminars) - \$100,000.
- Perm Civil Center - \$140,000.
- International League for Human Rights - \$100,000.
- Center for Human Rights "Memorial" (the same organization as previously mentioned, but for different activity) \$400,000.
- Nongovernmental Committee for Human Rights (Krasnoyarsk) \$30,000.
- Independent Council of Juridical Expertise - \$116,000.

In 2002, the total amount of money given by the Ford Foundation for grants was a little less (\$590 to 850 million), however in Russia, 17 human rights organizations, including "Memorial" and MHG, received grants from this Foundation.

The MacArthur Foundation is quite actively working on the Russian soil. In January of 2003, this foundation "announced six grants, for a total of \$1.5 million for development and strengthening of human rights regional networks in 13 Russian cities ([www.macfdn.org](http://www.macfdn.org)). For example, one of the grants (\$140,000) went to finance the Perm NGO Center to support Democratic Youth Initiatives that gives juridical assistance to young people who "refuse for

moral reasons to register for service in the army." It is not difficult to understand that many "moral reasons" for not serving in the army can arise, especially if it is well known that American philanthropic organizations with yearly funds of \$175 million, will petition (advocate) for them.

### Financial-Investment Company Foundations

Russian human rights activists found big support in Western economic and political structures, which have an interest in establishing conditions in Russia favorable for carrying out their finance and monetary operations, absent government control. In the first instance—it is international Jewish financial capital, traditionally liberal and cosmopolitan<sup>1</sup>, that for many years has financed human rights organizations, such as, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Helsinki Federation, and the International League of Human Rights. International capital, more exactly, Jewish speculative capital, which is cosmopolitan by nature; and more than the others, is interested in economic and political globalization and establishing super-governments and super-national international institutes, limiting sovereign national governments and permitting owners of finance corporations to move their capital around the world, including Russia, without difficulty and with profit.

In order to give the reader an idea "which" money and the appropriate size of the "operation for establishing conditions," the author discusses it further. Valuations are based on material drawn from the American press and information taken from the Internet. Of the 450 wealthiest people in the world, private capital over \$1 billion, about 20% of these people received their exorbitant capital from the financial investment sphere. Their "legendary" private capital exceeds \$200 billion. Finance capital, managed by billionaire bankers, amounts to \$10 trillion.

In particular, we must note the "Open Society Institute" of American billionaire, George Soros, who frequently presents the image of "benefactor" and "philanthropist". He founded another global (in Europe and the ex-republics of the former Soviet Union) "insect web" (network) of organizations that has a definite goal to establish social and political structures for the future

"open society" dream of George Soros. In Yugoslavia, these structures—so called human rights "civic groups"—were the center of the formation and consolidation of anti-government parties and structures. They played a deciding role in organizing a coup to bring down the government of S. Milosevic, the liquidation of the remaining social government and the political integration of Serbia in a so called "western community."

A goal of activity of the Soros Foundation in Russia was recently "publicly announced" by the dismissal of Alexander Goldfarb (according to the words of George Soros, "for connection with B.A Berozovsky"). Goldfarb was the director of the Soros Foundation in Russia. A biologist, he emigrated from the USSR at the end of the 1970s: "I worked with George almost 10 years, and spent \$130 million of his money on charitable projects, which were to assist reform in Russia, to make easier the transformation from a communist dictatorship to a liberal democracy, to make a closed society open..." (The end of a fine epoch. [www.grani.ru/](http://www.grani.ru/)). What I am saying is that the goal of a millionaire's philanthropy—is not to support Russian science or education, as was advertised by his liberal propagandist, but transformation of CIVILIZATION in Russia: to create a western "liberal democracy" and a market economy with no governmental control("open society").

An educated person, who understands the decisive role of information, science, and technology in modern world, George Soros directs his finances and power to those institutes which form the future elite cosmopolitan "open society." Of the \$56 million that Soros put into Russia in 2000, \$18 million was spent to establish and support the control of information

<sup>1</sup> During the Soviet era, *cosmopolitan* took on an anti-Semitic connotation, which remains today. Cosmopolitan refers to those who do not have a national allegiance. I verified this connotation with several knowledgeable Russians.

networks; \$9.5 million---to develop a "correct" system of education; \$5 million---to support "liberal" newspapers and TV; \$4.5 million to develop "culture"; and so forth.

In 1990, George Soros wrote and published a book entitled "Opening the Soviet System". In this book, Soros explains in detail his philosophical principles and strategy for establishing free structures in "closed" (that is, not western) countries. That is, no government control and a societal structure that allows transnational financial corporations to carry out their monetary operations.

George Soros' final goal is the establishment of a "coalition of open societies, which takes the functions from the UN and transforms the General Assembly into a real legislative power that supports international rights" (taken George Soros' speech given at a round table of the Council of International Relations of the US Congress, December 10, 1998).

### Government Foundations

Among Russian human rights activists, the most popular "governmental" foundation is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). It was founded in 1983 by President Ronald Reagan and the US Congress, and had a yearly budget of \$30 million. The mission NED formulated was such: "to promote the formation and development of democracy and freedom in the world" ([www.ned.org](http://www.ned.org)).

NED's board of directors is made up of 26 members, among which are congressmen, businessmen, and ex-politicians. For example, here are only a few names:

Vin Weber, chairman of the board of directors, an ex-congressman and now the vice president of the Clark and Weinstock bank; Wesley Clark, general, ex-commanding officer of the NATO army, who led the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia; Ralf Gerson, millionaire, president of the Guardian International Corporation; Frank Carlucci, ex-defense minister and now the chairman of an investment company the Carlyle Group; Morton Abramowitz, ex-advisor to president R. Reagan and now the chairman of the International Crisis Center (ICC); and Lee H. Hamilton, ex-senator and now a member of the President's Council on National Security.

For many years, Julie Finley has been working as a member of NED's board of directors. She is the founder of the USA Committee for NATO, and president of the "Project on Transitional Democracies". This "project" implementation, under NED's "roof," presents these goals "acceleration of the process of reform in ex-socialist countries and shortening the time of integration of these countries into the European Union and NATO." In the frame of this project, NED financed the Yugoslavian anti-government youth organization, "Otpor" (in 2001, NED gave "Otpor" \$220,000) and regularly sent members of the group off to seminars, schools and other "organizational" events. I remind you that the group "Otpor" took the most active part in preparing and making the coup in Serbia on October 5, 2000, leading to the removal of the president of Yugoslavia, S. Milosevic.

The aim of financing Russian "grant-eaters" (a term defined by Rostov human rights activist, E. V. Finkov ([www.rpqi.narod.ru](http://www.rpqi.narod.ru)) is expressed by NED's leaders clearly enough: "to help recipients of grants to fight authoritarian tendencies and for freedom and openness." In 2000, in accordance with this leading directive, NED gave 38 grants for a total of \$1.3 million to Russian nongovernmental organizations. Of this, a little less than one-half, \$600,000, was given to support 16 human rights organizations and human rights publications. For example, NED gave \$40,700 to the blatantly anti-Russian and pro-American weekly publication "Express-Chronicle" (A.P. Podrabinek). "Glasnost Defense Fund" (S.E. Grigoryants) was given \$40,700, for the publication of some books about questions of freedom of the press in Russia. At the same time, NED gave only \$65,000 to help Chechen refugees in Ingushetia and Russian migrants in central Russia, who were "squeezed out" of the ex-republic of the Soviet Union.

In 2002, NED allocated about \$1.4 million in grants for 22 Russian human right organizations. Among these was \$36.5 million for the Center of Development and Human Rights. Money was given to make an assessment of the law on conscription into the armed forces, from the point of view of human rights, and an assessment to development recommendations for effective "answers" to that law. So, we see, American congressmen are very concerned with the problems connected with universal military conscription in Russia.

### Conclusion

No one should be surprised that Russian human rights activists regard themselves as members of a worldwide (more correctly western) human rights movement, because they are included in a network that has been primarily woven by American organizations. Russian human rights activists follow the human rights politics, sharing the same politics and views, of their western "brothers" who finance them.

The dependence of the human rights movement on financing from western foundations and institutes makes it surrender its principles on human rights entirely to the political goals of western powers, particularly the USA. Russian human rights activists understand this very well. This subject has already been written about by our human rights activist, A.O. Smirnov (Kosterin): "... The west invests in our democracy for its own purposes. For the USA, this is a long-term, but profitable investment---to remove the "evil empire from the world map and to civilize Russia in a manner similar to the west, in measure, to weaken Russia for a placid life, for American business and politics [www.hro.org/ngo/research/](http://www.hro.org/ngo/research/)).

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Subject: Brown Bag - Democracy Fellow Caryn Wilde

Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 09:09:37 -0400

World Learning for International Development's Democracy Fellows Program will host a Brown Bag discussion on Thursday, August 26 from 12:00 - 1:30pm, in our office at 1015 15th Street, NW, Suite 750. Our guest speaker will be Caryn M. Wilde, our Democracy Fellow for the past three years in Moscow, Russia.

Caryn was a co-organizer and the author of the Russia narrative for the 2003 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia (June 2004). She will bring to light additional aspects about the seven dimensions that were analyzed: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. Caryn will challenge the audience to consider the myriad of facts and conjecture surrounding the emerging Russian third sector, and to decide for themselves whether or not public space for civil society organizations is contracting in Russia.

If you have any questions, please contact Ellen Garrett at (202) 408-5420, ext. 141.

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## Activity Report

**Event:** Corporate Social Responsibility Conference  
Moscow, Russia. April 1-2, 2004

**Participants:** Russia's Major Corporations, Leading Nonprofit Associations, and Government Officials.

**Sponsors:** Interros, SUAL Holding, PBN, British American Tobacco, and the Russian Managers Association, KPMG, AIG Russia Insurance Company, Novo Nordisk, Kraft Foods, and Norilsk Nickel.

**Date:** May 20, 2004

**Observation:** Caryn M. Wilde, Democracy & Governance Fellow

### The Reactivation of Former Soviet Enterprises is Restructuring Russian Society.

As USAID/Russia considers a 5-Year Strategy, it should factor the 'social affects of privatization' into the democratization equation.

1. How is business development changing (civil) society?
  2. Is businesses obligatory social responsibility affecting the development of a third sector?
  3. How much social burden is business anonymously shouldering, and can civil society organizations improve their situation by helping to reduce that burden?
- Businessman, "Forestry is a business, not a charity; however, we have to attend to the social needs."
  - Jan Dauman, chairman of the Russian Partnership, "If you want a market economy, it comes with responsibilities, especially in Russia. You can't just fire thousands of people, or you'll destroy the society. Social improvement has usually come before the legislation. People's actions usually push changes to the law."<sup>2</sup>
  - "I don't want to go to prison like Khodorkovsky. West has laws on lobbying, but Russia does not! What is business to do? The responsibility is born by government!"

It was my observation that business is trying to find ways to show, the public and world, this contribution. They want credit and appreciation. They also want government to systematize social services, as much of their financial assistance is getting pilfered or wasted.

#### Soviet Enterprise Legacy

Based on discussions, the following is a list of social responsibilities that corporations are often mandated to assume if they purchase an enterprise:

1. Former employees. Frequently, massive numbers of people, whether qualified or not, must be kept on the corporation's payroll.
2. Unreliable workforce. Lack of appropriate work ethics necessary in a competitive environment, rampant alcoholism, and unhealthy employees and families.
3. Workforce and product safety, and to a lesser extent protection of the environment.

<sup>2</sup> Hernando DeSoto, The Mystery of Capital, "... confirming Justice Holmes's opinion... that the law must be compatible with how people actually arrange their lives."

4. The community's social service infrastructure: hospitals, clinics, rehabilitation facilities (vacations), sport facilities and recreation centers, and schools.
5. The community's physical infrastructure: pensions for retired workers, salaries of municipal workers; the systems for transportation and roads, communal services, such as water, sewer, electricity, heating; adequate housing; the food supply and basic consumer goods; and financing and training for support businesses.
6. Presidential administration directives (and other levels of local government) to make charitable contributions, such as, massive renovations in St. Petersburg prior to its 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary or the recovery and return of the Faberge collection to Russia.

#### **Societal Complications Resulting from the Soviet Legacy**

1. CSOs' expect Russian businesses will be their main source of funding, that is, after Western donors.
2. CSOs do not demonstrate their ability to relieve some of the enterprises' social burden; instead, they also make financial claims on businesses revenue.
3. Government has taken a 'managing' attitude toward legislation relating to the emerging third sector.
4. Government and business have divided up social needs, with little or no thought of CSOs or the citizen in the policymaking process.
5. Absence of a mentality that acknowledges the value of social capital.
6. Russia's overall infrastructure is seriously deteriorated. Much of it cannot be repaired, but will have to be rebuilt at great expense.

#### **USAID/Russia's 5-Year Strategy**

Democratic transition will remain a major focus. Civil society development will take center stage. The Mission will be increasing support to civil society organizations. Such an emphasis will encourage citizen participation in democratic governance. The Mission will define the sub-sector broadly to encompass those NGOs, not only in democracy and governance area, but also in environment, health, economic and social policy, and other arenas of citizen concern (Pre-Strategy Consultative Exercise, DC).

1. To increase citizens' participation and activism;
2. To strengthen civil society and advocacy institutions; and
3. To help improve cooperation between civil society, government, and business for public benefit. (DRAFT: USAID/Russia Strategic Vision for Democracy)

Across the portfolio, programs will help to develop culture of personal rights and responsibilities, ethics and action – whether in promoting volunteerism, charitable giving, public accountability or civic activism.

#### **Western Statistics**

The proportional breakdown of monetary and nonmonetary support for nonprofit organizations:

1. Commercial Income (49%) - fees, charges, memberships, earnings on endowments, and other.
2. Public Sector Support (40%) – grants, contracts, third party payments (e.g. social security and health programs).
3. Philanthropy (11%) – individuals, corporations, and foundations.
4. Volunteers – man-hours calculated in monetary equivalent.
5. Worship activities of religious congregations.

Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (22 countries), 1999. The Nonprofit Almanac & Desk Reference, Independent Sector and Urban Institute, 2002, corroborate the percentile breakdown for the USA.

#### **Commentary**

Are businesses actually making more social contribution than is evident from the very public efforts of Russia's new foundations? If so, are many of them 'tapped out'? If local resource mobilization is a key factor in sustaining the nascent third sector, it is important to understand where support for the sector is generally derived. Russia appears to have a unique set of circumstances that will affect Russian CSOs' mobilizing resources. These circumstances could influence USAID/Russia's future programming. The following notes provide further insight into how corporate leaders understand and experience CSR.

### **Session One: Defining Corporate Social Responsibility Today in Russia Today**

Fedor Prokopov, Russian Union of Industrialists & Entrepreneurs, Chief of Social Department.

Re: the relationship between the authorities and business. The attitude toward CSR is varied, as is the attitude toward individual charity and corporate philanthropy. The authorities have to 'milk' business because they are short of funds. It is considered the social coercion of business. Businessmen say, "I don't like letters from the administration telling me what I have to give to, but I don't want to quarrel, so I pay." Because the authorities do not have the funds to meet social needs, business has to pay—and that is in addition to paying their taxes. Business is asking for achievable goals regarding social needs, wants the government to manage the money well, and would like to be appreciated for their contributions.

Today, business has multiple moral responsibilities—the old social responsibility (CCCP), and the new social responsibility (civil society). Business seeks social partnership and solidarity. "We can wait for CSOs to mature, or government to develop an infrastructure, or we can participate now. We have time to set CSR standards, while the government has not!"

Dmitri Zelenin, President of the Russian Managers' Association and Governor of Tver. There is increasing interest in CSR. Russian laws guarantee social benefits, and the budget is inadequate to meet the needs; therefore, CSR sometimes replaces budget activity. Unfortunately, there are few rules and guidelines. Socially active companies prefer the Public-Private Partnership Model. UNDP, RF, Managers' Association, and leading businesses are working together to measure social investment, the policy and practice of CSR, and how to stimulate CSR.

Mikhail Dmitriev, Ministry of Economic Development & Trade, 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy.

**Social Policy:** new mechanisms to provide for social needs involve charity. The government is going to business for financing the social strata that needs help. The plan is to create state and non-state commercial organizations, each with different powers and benefits. As a co-founder, the government will retain influence on the joint development of social programs. Fighting poverty is now an important political issue.

Khamzat Khazbulatov, McDonalds, President – Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

CSR is becoming a norm in society because it is being demanded. The Association of Managers conducted a survey and consumers ranked their expectations of corporations in the following order of importance: Product, Quality, Employment, and Charity. Khazbulatov is adamant that business must define the scope of CSR. Protection of workers and the environment are a normal course of work, but business forgets to include them in their contribution. "We either continue to wait for a definition of the rules, or band together to show people what business is already doing. Our contributions are 2% of GDP, but who knows about it?" Individual progress has been good; however, social opinion toward business has not improved with contribution.

He agreed that government blamed business for social issues, and is passing-the-buck. The government needs to redistribute social obligations and target more precisely. Passing-the-buck happens when one group fails to provide. Today, the fear is that the informal agreement to be socially responsible may become mandatory. There are arguments

between government and business about who is responsible, and who is not moving society forward.

## **Session Two: Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Policy**

Ann McDonagh Bengtsson, SUAL Holding, Senior VP, Human Resources and Social Policy. SUAL is taking an integrated approach to CSR. The Russian government is developing a system, and right now no one knows whether it will be hands-off (USA) or fully designed (Scandinavian) approach. SUAL is in many one-company towns where it generates all the wealth. Often, there is not a huge margin between expenses and profit. SUAL's focuses on the well-being of its employees and the community by adding, to the expense line of the budget, health, sports, culture, charity, and collective agreements. They know that the company greatly impacts the life of their employees (60,000) and the communities (250,000).

Vasili Kiselov, SUAL Holding, VP, Interaction with Federal, Local Authorities, and Natural Monopolies.

CSR is not a reply or attack from authorities. SUAL has a strategy for social stability. КСП + СП = КСП---корпоративная социальная политика/corporate social partnership with government. Government and business should develop a reform strategy together.

Vladimir Aksyonov, British American Tobacco (BAT), Director for Corporate Relations. BAT started a CSR program two years ago. We have a responsibility to our employees; to contribute to the economies of the countries by paying taxes and contributing to the growth of the civil society; need to respect human rights and freedoms; it is essential to take care of environment. BAT products are controversial, must be open about risk of product. Smoking is an informal choice for adults. They spent a lot to create awareness that children should smoke.

Olga Golodets, Norilsk Nickel, Deputy General Director.

Norilsk Nickel is expanding the boundaries of business excellence. She maintained that a corporation's main responsibility is to take care of employees by providing stable employment. A socially responsible corporation must:

1. Pay taxes and adhere to the labor codes.
2. Create economically viable jobs. Responsibilities include pensions, responsibly terminating employment, and hiring young graduates who haven't got enough experience to qualify for jobs.
3. Assume unconditional social responsibility. A company must take the whole community into consideration when it takes over an enterprise.

Golodets said that business sets standards for the community, so it must provide good pay and benefits, paid vacations to restore health, and to assume a long-term policy.

## **Session Three: CSR as an Effective Tool to Increase Shareholder Value and Reputation.**

Alexei Germanovich, Severstal, Deputy General Director.

Severstal is a conglomerate of heterogeneous firms – Severstal Group.

- Severstal developed their social standards of support to the community---health, sports, and rehabilitation. If they don't subsidize community needs, the town would disappear.
- Society and the media don't believe that Severstal has social standards. Social investment is a policy that is on going. It is a line item in the budget.
- There is an absence of any legislative or tax benefits, and an absence of an environment to develop NGOs, which could serve as agents between business, government, and the recipient.

- Attitude of authorities toward Severstal: behave as if they are extortionist rather than partners.
- Western businesses expressed surprise at what Russian businesses routinely finance: sports clubs, coaches, and busses. They must make social investment or quality of life will decline.

When Severstal buys a plant; it comes with an existing set of issues and costs. All of it is calculated, and shared with the investors. Investors are told that Russia is a country where business can't walk away from the communities' dependent programs. In one city, Severstal inherited the tram line. We turned it over to the municipal government (not without serious negotiation, as the city liked the possibility that Severstal would subsidize the city's transportation system), but we can't always do that. Severstal hopes to turn to NGOs. If Severstal gets out of 'city infrastructural support', the dollars will have to go toward higher tax payments.

Sergei Smirnov, Novo Nordisk, VP and Head of Representative Office in Russia. This pharmaceutical firm extends the lifespan of diabetics. Until recently, a Russian diabetic's lifespan was no more than 3 years. This company considers their CSR:

- To make vital healthcare products available.
- To make sure product is used correctly.
- To contribute to the diabetic network.
- To make social contributions.

Victor Semyonov, Council of Trade Unions-Chairman, and Representative of State Duma. Russian businesses need a 'nudge' to engage in CSR. Russia does not give incentives to businesses for CSR. In early 90s, Russia went over-board on tax incentives. Due to abuse/corruption, all incentives were taken away. Kudrin said that the situation is getting better, but wait another 12-18 months, and government will revisit the issue of tax incentives.

#### **Session B: Corporate Restructuring: How to Restructure Responsibility?**

"Two for One Sale: Buy a state owned enterprise and get a town." The fundamental question being asked everywhere, "Whose responsibility is it?"

Jan Dauman, The Russia Partnership, Chairman.

Outlined the business and social situation, the goals are to reclaim defunct Russian enterprises, re-employ people, and invigorate towns.

Vasili Kiselev, SUAL.

Karelia factory - SUAL is not working in a competitive environment; they strive to keep any single supplier from becoming dominant. The problem with thwarting monopolies is the issues that go along with a location 5,000 km to the north of Yekaterinburg. A new company will have trouble coming in because there is no housing or related infrastructure.

Restructuring and shedding inefficient jobs are not a simple process. SUAL must engage in dialogue with local authorities about these issues. It is difficult balancing efficiency and maintaining employment. An example of what one Karelia director did to solve financial difficulties: He laid-off 4,000 people, and raised the salary of those still working by five times. He told mayor that the 4,000 people were the city's problem. SUAL doesn't like to work that way, and believes that the business that does is doomed to failure.

What SUAL has to do in an area with no competitive environment and no possibility for investment, no banks, no infrastructure, and no business skills, they start from scratch designing programs of social and economic development—creating infrastructure.

Vyacheslav Bytchekov – Forests and Pulp.

The problems forestry businesses face, include: An absence of internal competition. Employees lack of business skills, such as accounting expertise. Historically the industry used prison inmates, Komsomol, and Gulag inmates. Their current employees are prisoners

and the ancestors of former prisoners. Forestry is not a charity, but a business; however, we have to attend to the social needs. We power the labor union; build roads where there are none; create business incubators to support SME growth. As the major business in the area, we must get involved with SME in order that employees have access to other vital. The elderly and youth have special needs. Guaranteeing social benefits and salaries costs big money! The social responsibility of the enterprise/corporation meant restructuring the community in order to improve quality of life. The biggest problem was restructuring management. Each leader was a tsar. For example, the town had a huge swimming pool, which was built by the director of the firm during soviet times. Today, it is a huge financial drain. We gave each employee \$200 for a membership at the pool. The managers of the pool didn't like this new system of subsidization. Our factories have to include expenses for basic and social needs of the people and the infrastructure of the community.

He referred to issues of changing the soviet mentality. Employees don't always like the new leaders, but "we respect them." He said that 50% of his employees are former convicts.

TNK BP brought up the valuable contribution that the NGO sector makes.

Jan NGO sector nascent, and absent in too many places to be reliable. [He attempted to dismiss this line of discussion.]

SUAL Novosibirsk is the center of the Siberian Initiatives Network. They are effective organizations, and we work with them.

Jan It depends on the issue. The partnership, between business and NGOs, has to be relevant to the issue. Sometimes, NGOs are important, and sometimes they are not relevant. If they [business] need them, they [business] will create them. [I don't know where he gets this information. It is not my experience that business has created NGO. It has established a few foundations.]

#### **Session Four: The Interaction of NGOs, Corporations, and Government in Solving CSR Issues.**

##### **Session A: The Role of Independent Directors of the Board.**

Alexander Filatov, Independent Director's Association, Executive Director.  
Issues of restructuring involve governors, managers, and a lot of time spent without pay. The difference today is that business is not only about 'doing business', but also about social participation. Companies have to train their future board members

Communication companies are feeling better off than oil companies. Directors, invited by shareholders, soon find irregularities. Each paid about \$1,000/mo, a small amount. Directors might have to deal with employees or criminals. There is lots of crime, more so than the newspapers cover. Companies are lagging behind in productivity, even behind old soviet companies. Companies created social programs—especially the energy companies. Millions of dollars were sent to St. Petersburg for the 300th anniversary restoration. Corporations argued against this, but were forced to donate anyway.

SUAL: Profits are sent from regional to main office. Resources are always found in the head office. We don't know what the State owned enterprises are doing about social responsibility. Are they saddled with same problems in the community? Does the State enterprise subsidize social needs in a State-company-town, or does the State enterprise have to cover these expenses out of their budget?

Energy companies spend laughable a amount on Charity. Government tasks an enterprise with building a hockey stadium; board asks if there is a hockey team---answer is, "next create and maintain a hockey team."

**Yukos Representative:**

Comparison of Yukos and Lukoil companies: Yukos conducted an information campaign to show investors that it ran by Western standards. No corruption and transparency. Charity you give and forget. Social investment, you must track and report.

NGOs are a potential to rollup sleeves and work. [There followed a discussion about the value of public relations.]

**Session C: A Socially Responsible Employer: Investing in People.**

Sergei Litovchenko, The Russian Manager's Association, Executive Director.

When Russian businesses have western partners, the situation is more thoughtful of society. Russian businesses are less careful or attentive, and often rush into charity. Charity should not replace the more profound CSR. The State is ineffective because it is bogged down with soviet legacy. There is an absence of civil society. He believes there is an intellectual crisis surrounding CSR, which will not be solved today. It should be a 'tri-partite' issue. Many people are indifferent about CSR, "It's all about management of business." and most think it (CSR) means something personnel."

**Maryanne Yerkes**  
**Democracy Fellows Final Report**  
**July 2005**

***Professional Goals***

The goal of my fellowship was to assist USAID's Democracy and Governance Office's Civil Society Division in analyzing and developing better strategies for assessing the value and impact of civil society initiatives in transitional societies. More specifically, my goal was to focus on civic education and youth. In the area of civic education, my goal was to assess different pedagogies and curricula at the elementary, secondary and university levels, both in secular and religious school systems. I also hoped to bring more attention to the specific challenges facing youth in conflict and explore different programming options for reaching this cohort.

***General Description of Fellowship to Date***

To date I have focused the majority of my time and attention on civic education, following the latest developments in the area and attempting to incorporate this research and the lessons learned into USAID's civic education strategy. As noted in the following pages, I have attended numerous meetings and conferences on the topic and have been able to bring back knowledge and expertise to the Agency. One example is informing the Civil Society Division's thinking on comprehensive approaches to civic education by bringing in additional methods such as working through school governance.

In addition to working on civic education I have also contributed to USAID's thinking on youth and how to engage youth more effectively in its work. I have devoted considerable attention to youth in conflict.

Finally, it is important to note that I have become increasingly involved in the agency's work on fragile states. Since the beginning of the fellowship I have been a member of the Democracy and Governance Office's fragile states working group and have taken the initiative on a number of the working group's projects. I have also become involved in intra and interagency work in this area, attending training courses focused on improving USG responses in fragile states and crisis environments and helping to develop the Agency's strategy in this area.

More than likely, I will become increasingly engaged in such initiatives during the second year of the fellowship. One project I intend to work on is exploring the relationship between civil society and state fragility. The majority of the current scholarship on fragile and failed states ignores the role of civil society. While this is understandable since the focus is on the state, such a state centric lens inevitably weakens the analysis.

## *Fellowship Objectives*

**Objective 1: Provide research and technical support to USAID's headquarters and field offices in order to strengthen politically active civil societies in developing and transitional states.**

### *Methods and Approaches Followed to Fulfill Objective*

My first objective for the fellowship was to provide research and technical support to USAID's headquarters and field offices in order to strengthen politically active civil societies in developing and transitional states. Initially, I suggested four ways in which I would achieve this objective. They were as follows:

- a) Conduct research and attend significant conferences and meetings on civil society building and civic education in order to stay up-to-date on the latest scholarship and developments in these areas.
- b) Develop strategies to incorporate the above research into USAID's programs, thereby bridging the gap between research and practice in the field of democratic development.
- c) Devise new strategies to disseminate best practices in civic education and civil society building to USAID field and headquarter offices.
- d) Cultivate relationships with the top scholars and practitioners in the field and involve them, where appropriate, in USAID's programming and strategizing.

To date, I have used all but the third method in order to achieve the objective. I have informally suggested ways in which information could be better disseminated to the field, including establishing a general website on civic education that would connect interested individuals and organizations worldwide; however, I have not pushed this strategy and nothing has been done yet. In the following paragraphs I will provide detailed information on each approach that I did use, providing examples of its success.

**Approach 1: Conduct research and attend significant conferences and meetings on civil society building and civic education in order to stay up-to-date on the latest scholarship and developments in these areas.**

### *Civic Education*

As proposed in my program description, I have attended several significant meetings on civil society and civic education, updating my knowledge in the area and bringing this knowledge back to the office. The first meeting I attended was a national civic education conference in Reno, Nevada. During the conference I attended a number of sessions that informed my thinking on civic education and that exposed me to different approaches to civic education. In addition, I had the opportunity to meet international practitioners and experts in the field and have stayed in touch with these people since then. One of the people provided me with a number of contacts in Europe who have proven very useful. It

was through this person that I was also invited to attend a large civic education gathering in Budapest, Hungary in the fall of 2005.

In December 2004, I had the opportunity to participate in another major civic education conference that took place in Malaysia. The conference gave me the opportunity to observe a number of civic education approaches being used in countries around the world, and in the Asia Near East region in particular. After this meeting, a colleague of mine and I recommended that the Civil Society Division revisit its civic education strategy to see if it is comprehensive enough. While the Agency has been supporting several impressive programs, we felt that the programs were isolated and needed to be buttressed by other approaches. Conversations revolved around the need to intensify our work and look at opportunities to combine approaches. We realized that it was time to stop and take stock of where we were and how we could increase the impact of USAID's programs in this area.

Another contribution I've made to the Civil Society Division's civic education work is connected to a trip I made to Georgia in January 2005. A colleague of mine and I fulfilled the USAID Mission's request to assess how the Mission's achievements in the area of civic education could be incorporated into the country's educational reform process. We examined one of the Mission's major civic education programs, implemented by IFES, and advised an extension of the program operating at the time and made recommendations of ways in which the program could be sustained and replicated throughout the country by linking it to larger educational reforms.

One of the major results of this trip was that it helped to inform the Civil Society Division's thinking on how we could develop a more comprehensive approach to civic education. I began to see school governance as providing an excellent opportunity for citizens to learn about democratic processes, such as elections and relationships between governmental officials and citizens. The program focused on developing civic-minded student councils, parent-teacher associations, and school boards of trustees. Through this trip I understood the school, at least when there are school governance processes in place, as a microcosm of larger democratic processes. No one in the USAID/DG office had focused on this before and our primary civic education implementers were not working from this angle. My colleague and I suggested to the IFES Georgia office to consider doing a pilot program with one of our major implementers, the Center for Civic Education (CCE). At our urging, the two organizations came together to combine their civic education approaches and are currently in the middle of the pilot process. Since then, the two organizations have increased their collaboration with CCE inviting someone from IFES Georgia to attend a major civic education conference they had in the Middle East.

While I was very impressed with the democratic school governance concept, I realized that creating democratic bodies was not enough. The Student Councils were very impressive due to the intense training they had received in democratic processes, conflict resolution, diversity, etc. I also realized that this approach was important because it was

voluntary. Students chose to be involved. It was also a way to bridge schools and local communities.

In addition to contributing to the writing of a statement of work for civic education in Georgia, I began to explore how the DG office could incorporate the school government approach into its larger civic education strategy. I organized a meeting between USAID staff and IFES's civic education experts to explore how IFES's experiences in Central Asia may be meaningful to us. I have also consistently encouraged a more comprehensive approach to civic education, including methods that more fully engage local communities.

In March 2005 I made another trip that proved very useful to the Civil Society's civic education team. I first went to a conference in Belfast, Northern Ireland on civic education in divided societies. This was a perfect opportunity to merge my background, peace and conflict resolution, with the current work on civic education. This conference strengthened my view that USAID needed to look more critically at how we were doing our work in fragile states and other difficult environments. While this self-reflection process had already begun in the Agency, the Belfast conference, which was organized by the Center for Civic Education and the Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland peace organization Cooperation Ireland, provided an opportunity to focus on civic education in these difficult environments.

Following this conference, I began to think more seriously about how USAID could adapt its civic education approaches in these environments. When the Civil Society Division Chief suggested organizing a workshop on civic education for USAID's annual education conference I suggested focusing on civic education approaches used in complex and challenging environments. I arranged to bring three experts/practitioners in this area to be on a panel addressing the topic.

In addition to attending the conference in Belfast, I also took the time to explore what was happening in the civic education field in Europe. I visited organizations, donors, and intergovernmental bodies in England, Belgium, and France. During this trip I developed a number of contacts that are proving important to the DG office as it reexamines its civic education strategy. One concrete example is that one of the panelists we are bringing to speak at USAID's Education Conference is a peace education specialist who has served as a consultant to UNHCR and UNESCO. Another example is a connection I made with counterparts in UNESCO. During the Education Conference Civil Society Division staff will meet with one of the primary players in the field of education in UNESCO to discuss opportunities for collaboration. I have written a draft report on this trip that provides extensive information on civic education initiatives in Europe. The Civil Society Division will continue to follow up with contacts I made during this trip.

## *Civil Society Building Research*

### Impact of Civil Society

In the more general area of civil society building, I have also conducted research to further develop USAID's thinking in this area. One early project I worked on was exploring quantitative research that has been conducted to assess the impact of civil society on democratic processes. Unfortunately, I found that the research in this area is very limited and not satisfying. In any case, I wrote a brief memo outlining what is available. I have included this as Annex 1.

### Youth

One area that I have spent a great deal of time researching is that of youth. This is not just in relation to civic education, but spanning out to youth who are not necessarily in the formal education system. For the 2005 Democracy and Governance conference a colleague and I organized the first workshops on youth. The first workshop was an overview of how working with youth may help DG officers achieve their objectives. It also provided information on best practices for working with youth. The workshop was participatory, drawing heavily from the experiences of DG officers in the field. While the workshop was participatory, an enormous amount of research formed its backbone. My colleague and I compiled a great deal of information on youth programs and initiatives in USAID as well as innovative youth programs outside of the agency. This is a living document that we will update. We may also suggest developing a USAID website on youth.

In designing this workshop we brought in USAID staff from other officer and bureaus to ensure that our approach was cross-sectoral. One of the main points we wanted to make was that working with youth demands cross-sectoral and innovative approaches. We were successful in bringing together a diverse group of people to work on this and are currently exploring how to move forward and encourage the Agency to seriously consider how it is engaging youth. One suggestion has been to develop an assessment tool focused on youth and democracy and governance.

The second workshop focused on youth in conflict. We worked with the office of Conflict Management and Mitigation on this workshop. CMM took the lead; however, we were very involved in the process. Information on both youth workshops can be found in Annexes 2 and 3.

### Fragile States

Another area where I have focused a great deal of my time on is fragile states. I have been actively engaged in the DG office's Fragile States Working Group and have participated in numerous interagency meetings on the topic, which I will outline in another section. One of my goals is to examine the role of civil society in state fragility; however, I haven't yet had the time to work on this. While in Europe I met with civil society experts in DFID who are working on this topic and we discussed working on a

joint project on civil society. Unfortunately, however, I haven't had time to follow up on this.

**Approach 2: Develop strategies to incorporate the above research into USAID's programs, thereby bridging the gap between research and practice in the field of democratic development.**

#### Civic Education

As noted in previous pages, the research (both desk and field) I've conducted on civic education is certainly being incorporated into USAID's larger strategic approach to civic education. I am currently organizing a strategy session in August that will bring together a number of organizations working on civic education to help our office explore how we would like to move forward in this area. Two topics linked to my research and initiatives are examining school governance as a civic education approach as well as examining the linkages between peace education and civic education. The draft programs for both workshops in August are attached as Annexes 4 and 5.

#### Youth

I also noted earlier the work I have done on youth. The youth workshops at the DG conference were hopefully the first steps towards the DG office examining how it engages youth. I will continue working on this topic and will join agency-wide working groups that are trying to encourage USAID to adopt a strategy on youth. I will also look into the possibility of developing a youth assessment tool.

#### Civic Education in Difficult Environments

I've also mentioned earlier my efforts to encourage the Civil Society Division to examine the role of civic education in difficult environments. One example is examining the potential overlap between peace and civic education. This is an area I would to continue to examine.

**Approach 3: Cultivate relationships with the top scholars and practitioners in the field and involve them, where appropriate, in USAID's programming and strategizing.**

In the previous pages I mentioned numerous times the contacts I've made during my fellowship and how they have contributed to the Civil Society Division's work.

#### *Degree to which the objective has been achieved*

Overall, I would conclude that I have been successful in helping to develop the Civil Society Division's thinking and work in this area. I would have to say, however, that I do not believe that my efforts are already having an impact in the field, with the exception of the Georgian example. More time is needed to develop the trainings and

assessment tools mentioned above and to inform the thinking of the DG officers. The key is in further developing the training modules, designing assessments, and coming up with new strategies for disseminating best practices in the field (the third approach mentioned in my initial fellowship program description that I haven't yet used.)

**Objective 2: Support the DG office in advancing the effectiveness of civic education programs overseas through contributions to strategy, program design, field support, training, and monitoring and evaluation.**

***Methods and Approaches Followed to Fulfill Objective***

In order to achieve the second objective I initially noted that I would use the following approaches:

- a) Identify best practices and cutting edge approaches in advocating for civic education for use in grant programs and assistance in to Missions
- b) Keep abreast of trends in civic education programs and disseminate best practices from USAID and other donors' programs
- c) Assist in the development of specific program indicators and evaluation criteria for civic education programs, and participate in the evaluation of these programs.
- d) Assist DCHA/DG and USAID missions in designing and implementing strategies and scopes of work for civic education programs.
- e) Advise on cross sector linkages to promote Democracy and Governance linkages across sub-sectors.
- f) Organize civic education training workshops for USAID headquarters and field offices with top researchers and practitioners in the field.
- g) Provide technical assistance in civic education at the elementary, secondary and university level, both among secular and religious educational systems.
- h) Assess different pedagogies and curricula in civic education, test their application through pilot projects and develop dissemination strategies for replication and expansion.

Approaches 'a', 'b', 'd' and 'f' have already been discussed in the first part of this report. I briefly mentioned approach 'e' in discussing the work that I have done related to youth. For both of the workshops on youth that I organized, one of the main goals was stressing the importance of cross-sectoral work. Concerning approach 'g', I have responded to various requests from USAID missions concerning civic education, but only provided direct in-country technical assistance on civic education during my trip to Georgia. As

mentioned earlier, I have been engaged in efforts to assess different pedagogies and curricula in civic education (approach 'h'), and have encouraged pilot projects, such as the case of Georgia. However, as also noted earlier in the report, I haven't yet developed dissemination strategies for replication and expansion. The only approach that I haven't used is approach 'c', concerning the development of specific program indicators and evaluation criteria for civic education programs. In addition to not having time to work on this, it is also important to note that it is very difficult to assess civic education. Through my research I encountered several major evaluations that have been conducted and I'm still following developments in that area. However, the impact of civic education will only be seen in the long term. Despite this reality, it would be worthwhile to examine what could be developed in this area, even if it is not perfect.

I am very interested in approach 'e' and I am still exploring ways in which we can work across sectors, not only in civic education but also in other DG areas.

### ***Degree to which the objective has been achieved***

The second objective is more targeted than the first, and, in my opinion, is much easier to achieve. I certainly feel that I have made progress in all aspects of this objective, with the exception of the monitoring and evaluation component. However, much work is still to be done. The civic education workshops in August will definitely move the process forward.

### ***Experiences and outcomes unanticipated in the fellowship program description but relevant to the fellowship***

Throughout this fellowship I have had numerous unanticipated experiences, which is not uncommon for people working within USAID. Everything is constantly changing and USAID direct hire and non-direct hire employees have numerous demands placed on them. In addition, there is a myriad of initiatives in which one can get involved. In the following paragraphs I briefly describe some of the additional work in which I have been engaged, all of which has helped me better understand the Agency and the numerous challenges currently facing it.

#### **1) Trainings**

While my original fellowship description included planning civic education trainings for USAID staff, I have also become involved in other trainings. For example, I was on the DG planning committee for the 2005 Democracy and Governance conference. In addition to assisting with the overall conference, I was responsible for organizing two training workshops on youth. I have also been engaged in organizing more general trainings on civil society issues for DG officers. In October 2004 I assisted with a training on capacity building for civil society organizations and I am currently working

on a training on civil society actors for an upcoming fundamentals training for new DG officers.

## 2) Fragile states

Another area in which I have been involved that was not included in my fellowship description is fragile states. As mentioned earlier, right after joining the DG office I became engaged in the office's fragile states working group. Since then I've been actively involved in the working group and have attended a number of meetings and trainings on fragile states and crisis environments on behalf of the working group. One of my more recent activities was helping to develop a document on the working group and conceptualizing the future division of labor between the working group and the newly created Fragile States Unit.

## 3) Intra and interagency collaboration

As noted earlier in this report, I have also become increasingly engaged in intra and interagency collaboration. I attended two trainings on USAID as well as the larger USG response in crisis environments and have followed up with attempts to improve working relationships between offices within USAID and between USG agencies. One concrete example of intra-agency collaboration is the work that I've done on youth. I was also involved in developing an Agency-wide proposal on improving USAID's response in crisis environments. This effort involved individuals from the various offices and bureaus meeting on a regular basis to identify current gaps in the Agency's response in these difficult environments and determine ways in which the response can be improved. The proposal was submitted to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization operations as part of the Global Skills Network.

## 4) DG Photography Contest

On a lighter note, I also initiated and organized the first ever democracy and governance photography contest which encouraged DG officers and FSNs to explore creative methods for publicizing their work. This was also an opportunity to enliven the annual DG conference and eventually improve the aesthetics of the DG office itself (the photos will be permanently exhibited in the DG office in Washington). People were extremely pleased with the photography contest and were interested in making it an annual event. It served as an opportunity for the DC based DG office to collect images that could be used in future publications. The office has acknowledged that it needs to do a better job of promoting its work and photographic images play a powerful role in this effort.

## *Major Outcomes and Impact*

### Civic Education

The Civil Society Division is seriously rethinking its overall strategy for civic education. In particular, it is examining how to intensify its effort and develop a more comprehensive approach to civic education, exploring ways to encourage collaboration between different organizations involved in this field. Based on my work and involvement, the division is also taking a serious look at the types of civic education approaches that might be useful in complex environments and fragile states. As mentioned earlier, I am organizing two workshops in August that will explore these issues. One is bringing together panelists to talk about their work in difficult environments (e.g., civic education practitioners from Bosnia and Georgia, as well as a peace education expert engaged in programs in post-conflict communities in sub-Saharan Africa.) The second workshop is an all day strategic planning workshop that will bring together a group of civic education experts, implementers, and funders of civic education initiatives to examine how the different actors can collaborate in the future.

### Youth

My work with youth is also beginning to have an impact on the DG office. As mentioned earlier, the youth workshops that my colleague and I organized for the annual DG conference were the first youth workshops ever organized by the DG office. This is a major step forward. Since then the DG office has received requests from USAID Missions to conduct youth assessments. The Civil Society Division is currently taking the time to evaluate how it will move forward in this direction; however, it is clear that youth have now been placed on the larger agenda. A direct follow-up from the conference are two working meetings that my colleague and I are organizing for DG staff and other USAID staff with youth leaders/advisors from six countries. In addition, my colleagues and I will continue to be involved in an agency-wide youth working group and explore how the agency come move forward in this area.

### *My assessment of my performance as a professional within the field of democratization*

My experience as a Democracy Fellow certainly helped me to grow both personally and professionally. While I already had experience in democracy and governance work, I developed a much better understanding of how USAID works and what some of the internal and bureaucratic constraints are to this work. I also had the opportunity to think more strategically, which I appreciate.

Overall, I feel very confident about my competency in this area and have realized some of the unique contributions I can make to the field. More specifically, I can contribute

creativity, which I view as essential, as well as an understanding of how to work with youth and my experience in peace and conflict resolution.

### ***Competencies I anticipate developing in my future work***

I am very keen on becoming more skilled and competent in the other DG sectors and exploring ways to avoid stove-piping in our work. I am also very interested in developing additional competencies in designing and conducting assessments and honing my skills in evaluation and monitoring.

### ***Contribution of Fellowship to the Needs of the Sponsor Organization***

I certainly feel that the fellowship has benefited the Democracy and Governance Office. The office has so many demands placed on it, that the presence of the fellows is definitely useful. The fact that I was able to work on research projects and use program funds to travel also proved helpful. What I would like to do is use the research I've conducted and expertise I've acquired to write several guideline papers on civic education, youth, and civil society and fragile states. I still have the intention of doing this.

### ***Proposed Revisions to Program Description***

If I were to revise the program description I would focus it more on fragile states and addressing the unique challenges of conflict areas. At the mid point of my fellowship another person joined the division to work on civic education and youth. While we worked quite well together, it would be helpful to more clearly outline the division of labor. As my background is in peace and conflict resolution, it seems natural that I would focus on youth in conflict.

I would also like to have more time to work on general fragile states issues and to become more involved in interagency initiatives. I found this part of my work to be very interesting and useful for the office. Another idea I have is to research intra-agency issues, such as the hand-over of programs from the Office of Transition Initiatives to the Democracy and Governance Office. I feel strongly that we need a smoother process for transitioning between 'emergency' and 'long-term development' work. It would be interesting to conduct an analysis of this and explore ways in which the hand-over could be improved.