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Mr. Peter Ellena, OPS

JUN 28 1973

Herman L. Myers, LA/DP/ES

Uruguay Public Safety Evaluation

Prior to leaving Montevideo on September 28, 1972, consistent with the Bureau's policy of leaving preliminary findings and recommendations with the Mission, I prepared a report for the Mission's use. A copy of the report is attached. The following supplementary findings and recommendations represent my contribution as a member of the evaluation team:

1. The Tupamaro threat has been virtually if not completely eliminated. There was unanimous agreement among the officials we encountered, both Uruguayan and U. S., that no organized threat remains. In the event of a sporadic vestige of this movement cropping up within the next several years, the military will have the responsibility for meeting and containing it. Indeed, the failure of the police to cope with the Tupamaro threat, admittedly due to the nature of the Uruguayan civil juridical and penal system, suggests that the military is the organization best suited to this responsibility.

2. Continued professionalism of the police force was based on preparation for riot control, presumably resulting from student and labor unrest, and the prevention of ordinary crime. It is likely that any future confrontations between the State and rioters will be met by the military organization rather than police activity. In view of the increasing involvement of the military in all phases of the Uruguayan society and economy, and the relatively scarce personnel and material resources available to the police, responsibility for the control of any major riots should be left to the military. It would appear reasonable, however, to expect that because of the training in riot control techniques that has been given to all police in their IPA and Police Academy training, the police should be able to cope with any minor disturbances which might occur.

3. My September 28 report recommended a revised PROP be prepared for submission to A.I.D./W by January 1973. I suggested that the Public Safety staff establish precise objectives, targets, indicators, and baseline data on what they expected to accomplish during the next two years through 1974. This would result in a determination of priorities which would permit the allocation of resources on a logical basis and would provide a basis for discussing with the Uruguayan police whether these were also the priorities held by them. To my knowledge, no such PROP has been submitted nor have priorities been established. On the basis of my observations as a member of the team, I recommend that the Public Safety Team in Uruguay be given

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30 days to prepare a new PROP. The attached matrix is illustrative of what could be done by the Public Safety staff during the next two years. The highest priority should be given to training in planning, organization and management, and procurement. The U. S. should terminate its assistance in the fields of communications and mobility as soon as possible. A maximum of six man-months should be expended in these latter two fields to complete present commitments. Our discussions with officials in these fields reveal that their major lack was their failure to procure replacement equipment and necessary spare parts. They do not appear to lack a technical understanding of the use of such equipment, but rather the budgetary resources for the purchase of such commodity items. This is clearly a Uruguayan responsibility and the quicker the U. S. acts decisively to limit activity in these fields, the more likely the GOU will take the necessary steps to accomplish those priority objectives. The scarcity of GOU budget resources for manpower and commodity elements suggests that the greatest help the police can be given within the next two years would be to improve their efficiency so as to maximize the effect of whatever resources are available to them. Thus, I would give planning, O&M, and procurement the highest priority. The Uruguayan police already have considerable technical capability in investigations. The Public Safety Team should spell out in great detail how it expects to assist in this field during the next 18 months. This detail should indicate what will be accomplished and how one can determine that investigations will be more effective and efficient at the end of that period.

4. The Team was told by the Uruguayan police that a new organization and responsibility for training was anticipated. The Montevideo police will have the responsibility of training the interior police. The Public Safety Team should spell out how it intends to work with the Montevideo police in assisting in such training. Practically every high level officer with whom the Team talked during the evaluation had received U.S. training. At present, the training objectives of the Public Safety Staff appear to be unstructured and it has not been possible to determine who and how many should be trained, because such training is not tied to specific functional objectives. The USAID Public Safety Team may actually be over-staffed in the field of training, since most of the Uruguayan police appear to have been trained already. Most, if not all the Montevideo middle and superior level personnel have already been trained at home or abroad. It is not clear why IPA training is being planned at present levels. It may very well be that most of the funds programmed for participant training could be eliminated and the budget limited to the costs of the Public Safety Staff, short term TDY in the priority fields, and up to \$10,000 in commodities.

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5. I have serious misgivings as to the need for more than two Public Safety officers during the next two years to accomplish the foregoing objectives. The burden of proof that more than two officers will be required over the next two years lies with the Public Safety Staff and will require extensive justification in the PROP which will be submitted. It would be desirable for such a submission to provide a month-by-month schedule of expected activity, by function, for each of the proposed advisors.

6. While I did not accompany the two Public Safety members of the Team to the border, I strongly recommend that the U. S. should not initiate activity to provide technical assistance to the Uruguayan police in the field of border patrol. The question of contraband is a complicated one and could reflect the questions of established markets, types of taxation, feasibility of adequate control (that is the cost versus the benefits likely to be obtained), and other factors, more in the realm of political and economic policy than in Public Safety. More important is the priority given to such activity by the Uruguayan Government and the Uruguayan police. If the Uruguayan police indicate this to be among the highest priority activities in the field of public safety, then the Public Safety Staff should consider whether it is more desirable to provide assistance in this area than in some other, such as investigations. In any case, if the objectives of the program cannot be accomplished in the next 18 months, no efforts should be initiated.

7. At the request of the Mission Director, I considered the question of the utilization of Alliance Funds for Public Safety technical assistance as compared with the utilization of such funds for other development objectives. I concluded that during that period when the Tupamaros were a seriously disruptive element, the allocation of close to 50% of the Mission's budget to the Public Safety project certainly could be justified. In FY 73, slightly more than 18% of the total Mission budget was programmed for Public Safety and the Public Safety group constitutes 27% of the Mission direct-hire staff. As I indicated in my preliminary report, Public Safety advisors are more likely to become targets of irrational attack, U. S. supplies used in riot control could trigger anti-U.S. feelings, and funds utilized for Public Safety prevent the financing of other projects in agriculture, education, and economic development, which are intended to strike at the cause of crime and threats to internal security, rather than merely coping with it.

8. I see no justification for continuing an unstructured, un-targeted program if the Public Safety Team cannot indicate what it hopes to accomplish. All of the recommended activities shown above should be subject to

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accomplishment by the end of Calendar 1974. In my preliminary report, I recommended that the Public Safety staff be reduced to a two-man team starting in July 1973. I leave to the USAID Public Safety Staff the justification for continuing the third Public Safety advisor through June 1974, the absolute maximum time a three-man team could be justified, and then only if the investigation objectives could be almost completed by that time. This would leave two advisors for the remaining 6-month period, June through December 1974.

9. The major reason for an evaluation at the end of the remaining two years of this program would be to determine whether the objectives have been met, and to obtain insights into the experience in Uruguay which could be helpful in the design of future programs in other countries. Evaluation is not a means of determining whether to justify an extension of a project. As in all other technical areas, there is always some need for further improvement in any police organization with which we are dealing. The question of the priority of Public Safety and alternative development fields of assistance cannot be determined by the technicians involved, either in the Mission or in Washington. This is a policy matter which appears to me to be best left to the Mission Director and Country Team when proposing its overall program in the CASP and program submissions. In the case of Uruguay, the expenditure of an additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety indefinitely, as compared with possible funding of agriculture, education, health, and other alternative fields will not be determined by an evaluation of whether the previous Public Safety Team had done a good job or not. If an evaluation is undertaken in the future, its terms of reference should be whether the established objectives in planning, O&M and procurement have been accomplished. Failure to accomplish these goals could be due to the low priority given to these fields by the Uruguayans or to other reasons outside the U. S. control. Adequate monitoring of the project by A.I.D./W and the USAID Director should reveal well in advance if these objectives are being met.

10. A draft paper on the history and operation of the Trust Fund was prepared by me and submitted on September 28, together with my major findings and recommendation. As I indicated in that draft, use of U.S. procurement channels tends to postpone the necessity for the Government of Uruguay to organize and become self-sufficient in procurement. From an economic standpoint, considering that dollars must be deposited to the account and considering that Argentina and Brazil are alternative sources of supply, there does not appear to be any advantage for the Government of Uruguay to use the Trust Fund. The only reason the Trust Fund was recommended for standby through June of 1974 was for use in emergencies. I frankly cannot imagine why the Uruguayans would use this Fund except to relieve themselves of the necessity of making their own contacts, agreements, and because shipment by pouch could circumvent their own customs formalities.

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I regret that our prior attempts to reach a common position on conclusions and recommendations has not resulted in an agreed report before my departure on June 29th, 1973. During the visit to Uruguay and subsequently I found it easy to work with you and to express my position. In the event that you are not in full or partial agreement with the foregoing, I take it for granted that the final printed report will fairly reflect my position on each of the issues which I have addressed in this memorandum. I have discussed these findings with Messrs Wren and Harrison and they are prepared to work with you.

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PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORKLife of Project: \_\_\_\_\_  
From FY \_\_\_\_\_ to FY \_\_\_\_\_  
Total U. S. Funding \_\_\_\_\_  
Date Prepared: \_\_\_\_\_

Project Title &amp; Number: \_\_\_\_\_

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</p> <p>Support Climate of Confidence in Uruguayan Economy</p>	<p>Measures of Goal Achievement:</p> <p>Increased revenues from</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Tourism</li> <li>b. Investment</li> </ol> <p>(Targets not required)</p>		<p>Assumptions for achieving goal targets:</p>
<p>Project Purpose:</p> <p>Develop Uruguayan police capability and efficiency in selected fields during transition to non-military situation.</p>	<p>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.</p> <p>Police effectiveness in:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Communications</u> 73/74               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Responding time reduced by _____ %.</li> <li>b. Decoding time (scrambling) increased by _____ %.</li> <li>c. Time for response to interior emergency no more than _____ for selected locations.</li> <li>d. _____ % of country covered.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>(con't)</p>		<p>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</p>
<p>Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Communications</u></li> </ol>	<p>Magnitude of Outputs:</p> <p>Specify:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Complete grid between Montevideo and interior</li> <li>b. All mobile units and patrols in communication</li> <li>c. Material _____ % standardized</li> <li>d. Other records</li> <li>e. Manuals of operation</li> <li>f. Trained personnel in place.</li> </ol> <p>(con't)</p>		<p>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</p>
<p>Inputs:</p>	<p>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity)</p>		<p>Assumptions for providing inputs:</p>

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Title & Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved:  
End of project status. (Con't)

2. Mobility

- a. Equipment being replaced every \_\_\_\_\_ years
- b. Spare parts in inventory
- c. \_\_\_\_\_ % equipment standardized
- d. % operational
- e. Responding time.

3. Investigations

- a. No. and % cases cleared  
(arrests, convictions, follow-up)
- b. Coordinated capability of different Ministries,  
intra-police departments, and with interior.

4. Organization and Management

- a. Studies completed of personnel utilization, mobile  
unit costs and replacement, records management,  
budget and accounting systems.
- b. % of recommendations followed up.
- c. No. of unsolicited requests.
- d. Other indicators.

5. Procurement

- a. Time of procurement reduced \_\_\_\_\_ %
- b. Cost of items reduced \_\_\_\_\_ %
- c. \_\_\_\_\_ of items standardized.

Outputs: (Con't)

2. Mobility

Magnitude of Outputs:

- a. \_\_\_\_\_ % of force mobile
- b. Ratio of force to population covered \_\_\_\_\_
- c. \_\_\_\_\_ % in normal use daily
- d. Degree of coordination:  
mobile - mobile  
mobile - foot

Project Title & Number: \_\_\_\_\_

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS
Outputs: (Con't)	Magnitude of Outputs: (con't)
2. <u>Mobility</u>	e. Other records f. Manual of operation g. Trained personnel in place
3. <u>Investigations</u>	a. Records in place and management b. Trained personnel in place c. Manual of operation d. Systematic and regular meetings of different agencies.
4. <u>Organization and Management</u>	a. Trained personnel in place (specify) b. Office recognized and given space, budget, leadership, etc. c. Coordination with statistics, budget, accounting, personnel, etc.
5. <u>Procurement</u>	a. Reorganized central office b. Trained personnel in place c. Manual of operation d. Study of relative advantage of source of commodities.
6. Nationwide Integrated Training Program fully operational	

September 28, 1972

URUGUAY PUBLIC SAFETY EVALUATION

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - OF TEAM MEMBER HERMAN L. MYERS

1. Previous Public Safety Program efforts have been beneficial and effective, especially in training and materiel procurement.
  - a. A very high proportion of police staff (leaders) are IPA graduates or otherwise have U.S. Training.
  - b. A major impact on Uruguayan Police of Public Safety assistance has been on the morale of the corps during trying times.
  - c. Selected Uruguayan officials should be made aware of the extent of P.S. assistance.
  - d. Use of P.S. personnel for U.S. security and intelligence was helpful but is now marginal and should be discontinued.
2. The current level of three Public Safety Advisors is considered proper if augmented by specialized short term (TDY) assistance.
  - a. As a proportion of total USAID staff or USAID budget, Public Safety is the largest office. Any future decision to add a permanent advisor in such fields as communication, mobile equipment, border patrol, or similar fields should occur only if one of the present staff can be shifted to another post.
  - b. As shown by a preliminary matrix, the fields most likely to benefit from concentration by the P.S. advisors are: (1) completion of communication and mobile unit organizations. We do not foresee the possibility of grant assistance for commodities, except for training or exceptional surplus items; (2) develop the investigations staff in line with the renewed attention the police are expected to give

to crime and civil disorders; (3) initiate and develop a capability of the police in the fields of planning, O and M, and procurement to assure the maximum efficient use of the scarce resources available to it.

- c. It is recommended that up to \$30,000 be shifted from the participant training budget to short term T.A. for specialized advisors in the foregoing fields, leaving to the P.S. team the administration, training, and follow through necessary to the success of the program. In general, short-term TDY of 2 months at the beginning and later on is preferred over a longer period.
- d. The team does not believe it possible to compare directly the cost and benefits from Public Safety assistance as compared with other more development-oriented assistance. The attack on established order and institutions stems from ideological, assisted by international ties and events; economic; and personal behavioral causes. Any success in countering the threat to established government and to personal liberties which has and will result from the Public Safety Program would appear to have been more important during the recent period than the longer term efforts of the USAID in agriculture, tourism, and other economic fields. It appears that the major threat has now been contained and that the next few years should see a return to more normal functions of the police, keeping in mind that tourism and foreign and domestic investment depend on the confidence of adequate law and order. On the negative side, public safety advisors are more likely to become targets of irrational attack; U.S. supplies used against the populace in riot control tend to fuel anti-U.S. feelings, and insofar as increases in economic resources result from other assistance, in the long run

this tends to diminish crime and internal insecurity.

- e. Insofar as drug and narcotics identification and control become more important in the day-to-day activities of the Uruguayan police, it is expected that the P.S. advisor will continue to give maximum encouragement to such efforts. The Uruguayan border is vulnerable and the control at airports does not seem to be tight. The beginning of concern by and corresponding initial training of the Uruguayan police has occurred and more can be expected. Until such time as evidence exists that Uruguay is an important location and after the problem has been studied by the Inter-Departmental Committee, the USAID, and other pertinent AID offices to determine whether to provide operational or institution building support, no further assistance is recommended. Insofar as training and development in investigation and border patrol permits, narcotics control can be included.
- f. A systematic and conscious effort should be made by the P.S. staff to analyze in dept the present status of each of the principal objectives recommended by the evaluation, the result of which will be a series of indicators and baseline data. Once these are established, agreement should be reached with the Uruguayan police counterparts on targets to be reached by June 30, 1973 and 1974. A revised PROP should be submitted to AID/W with these data by January 15, 1973.
- g. As targets and objectives become definite, non-related intelligence and reporting activities should be reduced to a minimum, if not

completely discontinued. In this connection, non-related requests from the police, Embassy, and AID/W may have to be discouraged. Reporting should be reviewed at each level to assure that new responsibilities are not being hampered.

- h. Present staffing calls for the presence of two senior advisors through FY 1974 and one advisor for only one year. USAID/Director should review progress by June 1973 in achieving the project targets. For the last year of this proposed program, the Chief P.S. advisor, augmented by TDY as necessary, will oversee objectives in investigation and border patrol. IPA Training is expected to be made available to Police after FY 1974.

3. Coordination of Police and Military

- a. It is likely that military will continue to assist police in meeting internal security threat.
- b. Team sees great advantages to Police in view of extremely scarce materiel likely to be available and possibility that over time a cooperative specialization will free up police for normal activities.

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TRUST FUND

A Trust Fund Agreement was signed on July 12, 1966 and amended on December 30, 1968 to "assist and furnish services to the GOU for the procurement of certain police commodities." Commodities included guns and ammunition, spare parts for communication, auto, training, traffic and field equipment; and for administrative costs. The rate of exchange was that in effect between AID and the GOU on the day of deposit. The objective of the Fund was to temporarily provide a means of dollar conversion to speed up procurement of commodity needs.

The Fund was continued, year by year until 1972, at which time it was put on a stand-by basis. The USAID Director points out that the introduction of multiple exchange rates, under which the U.S. receives the highest rate, makes use of the Fund less attractive to the GOU. The Government appears to be shifting much of its procurement to Argentina, a LAFTA country in which local currency is acceptable.

Amounts deposited and commodities procured are shown in attachment \_\_\_\_\_.

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

The lack of coordination and organization for central procurement within the Police Department and the Ministry of Interior, coupled with the advantage of doubling the value of peso availabilities to the Departments from receipt of the official rate of exchange of 3.70=\$1.00 (compare with 7.00=\$1.00), provided an incentive to use of the Fund. Use of the Fund permitted the police to escape the inflation in prices which reached 100% in some years.

Commodities, especially mobile units and communication equipment, were procured and delivered within months of order. The benefits to police effectiveness during the period 1967-1972 cannot be overstated. Despite these benefits, the Team does not recommend its use in other countries nor its unlimited extension.

1. The conversion of local currency to dollars is an internal problem for the GOU. Priorities for use of dollars should be set by the GOU (Central Bank).
2. As a precedent, other Ministries can pressure the USAID for a similar service.
3. Use of U.S. financial benefits and procurement services and channels postpones the capability of the GOU and the particular Ministry to organize and become self sufficient in procurement.
4. Future availability of dollars to the Ministry are likely to be less rather than more as the economy requires that foreign exchange be used rigorously. Standardizing as much as possible, given the

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technical or physical availability, in commodities available from LAFTA countries should be encouraged, providing these are no more costly than in the U.S.

5. Purchasing and keeping accounts for eighteen separate Departments places an unnecessary burden on the USAID.

The Team recommends that the Fund be kept on a stand-by basis through FY 1974, for use in emergencies only and for purchase of commodities to be paid for by deposits of dollars by the GOU. During the intervening period, the Ministry should be encouraged and assisted to organize a central purchasing office capable of coordinating its requirements with the Ministry of Finance, the military, and the Uruguayan Embassy in Washington.