Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)

Strategic Planning Framework 2003 - 2010

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1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Planning Framework

USAID formed the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) to consolidate USAID programs that help developing and transition countries prevent, or recover from, state failure. The focus on state failure provides a central organizing principle for the Bureau, and arises from U.S. foreign policy priorities and socio-political realities in many of the countries where DCHA works.

DCHA is one of the pillar bureaus established in the Agency's 2001-2002 reorganization, but, as evidenced by its distinct line offices and mandates, DCHA is a ***"Pillar-Plus Bureau."*** DCHA does disaster response, ***plus*** transition and longer-term development interventions. DCHA provides technical support to the field and other Bureaus, ***plus*** directly implements field programs in both presence and non-presence countries. Further differentiating it from other pillar bureaus, DCHA's engagement in the U.S. Government inter-agency process entails broad policy and operational collaboration with the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture, and the National Security Council.

Consistent with USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 201 guidance on Bureau Planning Frameworks, this Planning Framework is not a Bureau strategic plan. Rather, its primary purpose is internal to the Bureau, i.e., to establish general parameters for individual DCHA office strategic plans, to articulate high level goals that represent the Bureau's aspirations for global stability and operational coherence, and to provide a framework for DCHA offices to coordinate their activities in pursuing DCHA's joint Vision, Mission and Goals. In this regard, the Framework delineates line office roles within the recently established Bureau and provides examples of ongoing and future collaboration.

The secondary purpose of this Planning Framework is to communicate DCHA's priorities and responsibilities to other USAID Bureaus, USG agencies with whom we work, and to our partners worldwide. With regard to other USAID Bureaus, the Framework's focus on state failure as DCHA's central organizing principle, the description of DCHA office roles and responsibilities, and the discussion below on Coordination Within USAID are all intended to help communicate priorities and facilitate "hand off" and coordination of DCHA programs with Washington Bureaus and field missions.

In order for the Planning Framework to remain useful through 2010, it will evolve through the addition of operationally focused appendices. These appendices will complement and concretize the general guidance contained herein, and will

respond to specific needs identified by DCHA's leadership and offices. In 2003, for example, DCHA will append the following documents to this Framework:

- "Who's Who in DCHA," a functional staff directory that will greatly abet inter-office coordination and collaboration with other Bureaus and field missions
- new Bureau Directives on clearance procedures and other DCHA procedures
- the new Agency-level framework on fragile, failing and failed states
- new policy documents on Conflict and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- a list of "special opportunity countries" identified as DCHA priorities
- Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) guidance, if completed, and country selection criteria relevant to DCHA Operating Units

This Framework emanates from Bureau-wide consensus on DCHA's corporate Vision, Mission, and Goals, all of which help unify and guide DCHA programs and approaches. Individual DCHA office retreats produced inputs for the Vision and Mission statements, which an inter-office DCHA Strategy Working Group finalized with further DCHA vetting. The Vision and Mission statements express the Bureau's desired future and its reason for being: the what, why, how, for whom, and with whom DCHA works. The five DCHA Goals – developed by the Working Group and approved by the entire Bureau – set out the overarching objectives, both external and internal, to which the Bureau is committed. Annex 1 provides a graphic presentation of this Planning Framework.

As guided by the ADS, the goals laid out in this Planning Framework are not Strategic Objectives for use in obligating funds, notifying Congress, or reporting performance. However, DCHA management will monitor the Bureau's progress against this Planning Framework, with assistance from the Office of Program Planning and Management (DCHA/PPM). Progress reviews will occur regularly – at least annually -- at the discretion of the Assistant Administrator, and will involve Bureau-wide participation. In the interim, when monitoring the performance of their respective Strategic Objectives, each DCHA line Office will be required to record progress against the five DCHA Goals, understanding that individual office alignment with the first four goals will vary depending on office mandates, budgetary accounts, and technical skill sets. In contrast, all DCHA offices will be accountable for the fifth goal on intra-bureau coordination, and Office Directors will require their staff to provide specific evidence of coordination in program planning, implementation, and assessments and evaluation.

1.2 DCHA Vision

*Our **Vision** is that strong democratic institutions, less conflict, improved food security, and timely humanitarian relief will produce a free and more prosperous global community.*

1.3 DCHA Mission

DCHA's mission is to save lives, alleviate suffering, support democracy, and promote opportunities for people adversely affected by poverty, conflict, natural disasters, and a breakdown of good governance. DCHA rapidly responds in support of USAID's mission worldwide, particularly in fragile, failed and failing states.

To carry out our mission, we collaborate within the Agency, the U.S. Government and with external stakeholders. DCHA seeks to maximize its efforts through partnerships with organizations that share its vision and complement its resources. Our teams design and implement effective solutions to crisis situations that link our humanitarian efforts with longer-term development goals.

1.4 DCHA Goals

Goal 1: Longer-term development advanced through integrated, high-impact DCHA interventions, particularly in countries affected by crisis, conflict, and food insecurity.

Goal 2: Capable, responsive, and stable democratic systems and civil society strengthened, particularly in fragile, failing and failed states.

Goal 3: Host country capacity increased to save lives and reduce human suffering.

Goal 4: Technical leadership provided within USG and to partners in response to the needs of fragile, failed and failing states.

Goal 5: Coordination demonstrated within DCHA for more effective responses to crisis and development needs.

2. Background

2.1 New operating environment

A global operating environment that differs dramatically from that of its predecessor Bureau for Humanitarian Response necessitated DCHA's creation.

The challenges and trends we face require a DCHA Planning Framework that is both flexible and comprehensive. These challenges include: the tensions and opportunities associated with globalization; increased frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters; heightened diplomatic, military, and humanitarian demands on the United States as the world's only superpower; and the destabilizing potential of corruption, the increase in refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and HIV/AIDS.

Globalization has sent unprecedented flows of people, ideas, goods and services across borders, fostering growth and democracy, and resulting in increased trade and investment, including in developing countries. In the past 50 years, there have been tremendous gains in development indicators, such as literacy, income, health, and nutrition in many of the world's poorest countries. However, some countries, and many vulnerable groups within countries, particularly women and girls, IDPs, and marginalized people, have not benefited from these gains. And while political freedoms have expanded and thousands of civil society organizations have emerged as constituencies for democratic reform, the trend toward democracy is not universal, in some states is very weak and in others "back-sliding" is apparent. Violent conflict, corruption, poor leadership, and ill-conceived or poorly executed policies have combined to destroy or reduce development gains. These circumstances, particularly recurring violence and weak political and economic governance, can entrench poverty, nurture injustice, and fuel anger and alienation, while making populations more vulnerable to disasters.

Notwithstanding the increased number and impact of natural disasters in the late 20th Century, man-made disasters surpassed earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and other natural catastrophes as the more deadly crises in the 1980s and 1990s. Conflict played a central role in these man-made disasters, and in most cases the locus of conflict has been internal, rather than trans-border, often related to states' failure to forestall or mitigate conflict. Underlying this failure may be any combination of poor economic performance, inadequate economic reforms, inequality, endemic corruption, dysfunctional rule of law, ethnic and religious differences, and violence.

Nearly two-thirds of countries where USAID currently works have had civil conflict over the past five years. Civil war has produced an unprecedented number of people who have fled their homes in search of food and personal security. Rather than combatants, civilian populations and especially women and children have borne the brunt of these conflicts. Estimates of displacement in 47 countries suggest that at least 25 million people were internally displaced by the end of 2001; the number is expected to remain at high levels for some time to come.

The increase in these humanitarian emergencies (whether natural or man-made) and their tragic consequences for human, economic, and political development have compelled DCHA to view development and relief as more closely inter-related than the Bureau's predecessor programs and organizational structures implied. At the same time, the Bureau's focus on fragile, failing, and failed states provides both a conceptual and an operational framework for providing assistance to countries struggling with violent conflict, collapse of central political authority and public services, the breakdown of markets and economic activity, massive population dislocation, and food shortages leading to starvation, malnutrition, or death.

As noted in some of the many studies[1] that have helped inform this Planning Framework, other global phenomena not historically associated with democracy, conflict, and humanitarian relief also impinge on DCHA's operating environment. One of the foremost of these is HIV/AIDS. The pandemic threatens to be as devastating to the 21st Century as famine was for the 19th and 20th Centuries. More than solely a health crisis, HIV/AIDS is a worldwide development crisis whose destabilizing impact is now recognized: in May 2000, the National Security Council characterized the pandemic as a threat to U.S. national security. Approximately 42 million people are living with HIV/AIDS. The death toll exceeds 3 million per year, and the pandemic affects an estimated 200 million people overall, most in developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is most affected, where the disease has been a major contributor to large-scale food crises. HIV/AIDS is also spreading rapidly in Asia: India leads the world in the absolute number of infections. In addition to killing individuals in the most productive 15 to 45 years age band, HIV/AIDS erodes the capacity of households to attain food security, and at national levels, erodes government investments in human capital.

USAID established the Global Development Alliance (GDA) as its business model for the 21st century because we need to do business differently. DCHA recognizes that its Operating Units need to respond to a changing global environment, increase our effectiveness and impact in meeting objectives, leverage additional resources for development activities, and improve the quality of partnerships. DCHA Operating Units are encouraged to actively consider the feasibility and desirability of building alliances directly into strategic plans and planning selected Strategic Objectives or intermediate results in an alliance mode. In cases where this is appropriate, the key decisions concern how early

[1] *Foreign Aid and the National Interest*, USAID, 2003; *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental Experts*, National Intelligence Council, 2000; *Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian Humanitarian and Transition Programs*, U.S. Department of State and USAID, January, 2000; *National Security Strategy*, National Security Council, 2002; *Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, 2003; *United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, U.S. Department of State and USAID, April 10, 2003 DRAFT.

and in what ways to involve potential alliance partners in the analysis of the problem and the formulation of strategies to address it.

Within DCHA, reorganization changes have also contributed to a new operating environment. Some offices within the Bureau now share an important distinction from the predecessor (BHR) Bureau's chief areas of emergency focus. These offices have direct responsibility to provide technical support to field missions and other Washington Bureaus, in order to assist them in longer-term development activities, and in accordance with the Customer Service Standards for Field Support being developed jointly by the pillar bureaus. This long-term, mission-assistance lens will significantly bolster the Bureau's contribution to the Agency's short-, medium- and long-term development efforts. In fact, regardless of the timeframe in which DCHA programs occur, Operating Units will be expected to coordinate with cognizant geographic Bureaus, relevant Pillar Bureaus and field missions in planning and implementing DCHA programs.

2.2 U.S. foreign policy imperatives

In September 2002, a year after the worst terrorist event in U.S. history, the Administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS notes that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." Emphasizing that the aim of the NSS "is to help make the world not just safer but better," the Strategy elevates development as the third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy. Further, the NSS highlights three foreign policy priorities that relate directly to DCHA's work:

- Promoting democratic governance
- Mitigating conflict
- Providing humanitarian aid

DCHA will pursue these priorities in close alignment with the State Department, with which USAID is developing a common strategic framework. In addition to the NSS and the joint State-USAID strategy, DCHA's Planning Framework responds to other important mandates. These include: the Agency's emphasis on planning and implementing developmental relief, rather than operationally distinct development and emergency programs; the requirement that, as a Pillar Bureau, DCHA must be a service provider to field missions and USAID geographic Bureaus, and a technical counterpart and collaborator with the other Pillars; and, as elaborated below, the imperative that DCHA programs help prevent or address state failure in addition to supporting development and emergency relief in more stable

> "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."
> *National Security Strategy, 2002*

developing countries, such as those targeted for Millennium Challenge Account support.

2.3 Fragile, failing and failed states as DCHA's conceptual framework

The central, unifying themes of DCHA programs are to strengthen the forces of stability and broad-based development within societies, while saving lives and reducing human suffering in diverse country contexts, and particularly in fragile, failed, or failing states. Helping to prevent or recover from state failure provides a conceptual framework for activities across DCHA operating units and helps align the Bureau's work with the new joint State-USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009. As noted in the April 10, 2003 Draft of the joint Strategy, "Failed and failing states can provide fertile ground for terrorist organizations to thrive. In some regions, poverty, corruption, and oppression are symptoms of systemic problems such as despotism, weak institutions, and the effects of neglected social and political problems. The heightened threat of terrorism in weak states requires greater emphasis on moving states toward more effective, accountable, legitimate and democratic governance." Since this is a phenomenon that affects the entire Agency, DCHA is working with PPC to develop an Agency-wide strategy for working in fragile, failing and failed states. That strategy, when completed, will become an integral component of DCHA's strategic framework, and will help to emphasize the importance of addressing the needs of such states that is inherent in this planning framework.

DCHA uses the following definitions and taxonomy of state failure (which we recognize may be refined by the Agency strategy):

Fragile State: States that are at lower levels of development, and particularly states that exhibit weak or corrupt governance systems, are "fragile": they are more vulnerable to shocks, such as massive political change, poor harvests or economic performance, ethnic conflict, or natural disasters, than are more developed nations with sound democratic governance. In fragile states, democratic reforms and practices are tenuous or not fully consolidated.

Failing State: Countries in which the government is steadily losing the ability to perform basic functions of governance and is losing legitimacy are characterized as "failing." Present in failing states to varying degrees are conditions that may lead to civil and communal strife, or that may have resulted from such conflict; humanitarian crises, such as starvation and mass refugee movements; and increasing criminality and widespread corruption.

Failed State: DCHA recognizes the working definition of state failure, adapted from William Zartman's book, *Collapsed States* (1995) as follows: State failure is a slow process of decay ending in the total breakdown of good governance, law,

and order. The basic functions of the state are no longer performed. As the decision-making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative; laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. It cannot assure its territorial integrity nor provide security for its citizens. It has lost its legitimacy, and therefore, its right to command and conduct public affairs. As the government superstructure implodes, societal infrastructure breaks down as well. Power moves to the periphery, to clans or tribes, which then become the primary sources of identity.

2.4 Special Opportunity Countries

As an operating methodology for addressing these priorities, DCHA will focus resources where possible on a set of **"special opportunity"** countries. These countries meet the following criteria:

Special Opportunity Countries Criteria
*identifiable opportunity to achieve meaningful progress
*US foreign policy interests
*concern about renewed conflict or food insecurity

- There is an **identifiable opportunity to achieve meaningful progress** in areas such as conflict mitigation, food security, improved governance, or even advancing the war on terrorism, if we act quickly and decisively.
- These countries all have significant **US foreign policy interests**.
- There is concern about renewed **conflict or food insecurity** if we do not intervene more forcefully.

Our activities in each designated country will be integrated across the offices of the Bureau, coordinated directly by the AA or one of the DAAs. The interventions will also be closely coordinated with the Regional Bureau and field Mission, if one exists, and with the State Department, to ensure an integrated approach to the challenges in each country. We believe that the special focus on these countries will provide an excellent opportunity to operationalize the principles of closer coordination and integration between USAID and State envisioned in the joint State-USAID strategic framework.

There are currently 9 countries that have been designated as special opportunity countries, though the list may change as new opportunities arise (or disappear) that cannot always be anticipated: Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, and the Philippines.

These special opportunity countries also fit well within the priorities of the Agency and the State Department. Several of them, including Ethiopia, Sudan and Angola, are major focus countries within the Famine Fund. A Presidential Peace Initiative has been announced for Sudan, of course, with the USAID

Administrator assigned as the President's Special Representative. Most of the Special Opportunity Countries have experienced (or are experiencing) internal conflict, but have recently reached some kind of peace agreement or ceasefire that the US helped to broker, which must be capitalized upon immediately to ensure its success. The new Muslim World Outreach initiative focus will also be relevant in several of these countries, including Sudan and the Philippines, and we will look to incorporate the approaches being developed for that initiative within our activities. Many of these countries have opportunities for the private sector, so we will make every effort to enhance our resources and impact through the use of public-private alliances.

2.5 Linkages between Prior Experience and Approaches to New Challenges

Within USAID, DCHA is uniquely positioned to address the challenges of state failure, in addition to a broader portfolio of sustainable development and emergency relief activities. DCHA's line offices and technical staff are leaders within USAID, the U.S. Government, and the development community in developing high-impact programs and approaches to ensure democratic systems and norms, good governance, rule of law, food security, and robust organizations and institutions that meet citizens' needs and hold governments accountable. At the same time, DCHA's life-saving work in disasters and transition settings, and new approaches to conflict mitigation and management, express the very best of our country's humanitarian values and skills and have been acknowledged worldwide. Although these programs are classified as "development" or "relief," all of them impinge both on long-term development and emergency humanitarian assistance.

3. DCHA Goals

In developing this Planning Framework, DCHA office representatives on the Strategy Working Group avoided individual goals that would track to specific offices or apply to all DCHA offices equally. Rather, the Working Group, with the concurrence of Bureau leadership, focused on higher order goals to help the Bureau address linkages between development and humanitarian relief, in order to advance the concept and practice of *developmental relief*. The higher order goals are also intended to enable each office to pursue its own Operating Unit goals within an integrated framework that includes efforts to prevent, respond to, or recover from *state failure.* The goals included in this Planning Framework include both outward and inward looking goals for the Bureau.

3.1 Goal #1: Longer-term development advanced through integrated, high-impact DCHA interventions, particularly in countries affected by crisis, conflict, and food insecurity.

3.1.1 Rationale: Although emergency situations require an immediate response, in many cases the causes of the emergencies are rooted in longer-term development problems that are often linked to the absence of democracy and to governance failures. Crises, conflict and food insecurity result in a multitude of negative impacts, both short and longer term, and they have a number of causes. Agency policy on conducting conflict analyses during the development of Mission strategic plans, for example, illustrates the need to identify and address the underlying causes of conflict so that they do not inhibit or prevent successful development results. As a pillar Bureau uniquely focused on emergencies and transitions, and on assisting missions in their ongoing development programs, DCHA must ensure that its interventions are successful on a sustainable basis. Thus, in their own programs, in their collaboration with regional and pillar Bureaus, and in their support to missions, DCHA operating units must approach development and relief issues in an integrated manner, addressing the immediate needs of the affected populations, as well as the underlying causes of their problems, in order to help these populations attain sufficient levels of economic, social, and political stability to ensure long-term development.

3.1.2 How DCHA will achieve this goal.

All DCHA interventions should have a broad, longer-term development impact in mind during implementation and therefore should be coordinated with relevant DCHA and other USAID operating units with a mandate for longer-term development. DCHA's quick impact, disaster response activities, emergency food distributions, conflict mitigation interventions, capacity building programs at the civil society and institutional levels, efforts to address underlying causes of food insecurity and build local productive and distributive capacity, and support for good governance and rule of law must be implemented in a manner that either directly promotes longer-term development, helps to prevent state failure, assists in the transition from emergency response to development, or at least allows for a quick recovery from disaster in a way that enables a return to development. DCHA programs, coordinated and well-orchestrated, can be used to generate bottom-up support for change, peace and good governance. In their shared responsibility for achieving this goal, DCHA offices will be expected to coordinate or, where appropriate, jointly conduct program assessments and planning, to achieve appropriate sequencing and hand-off of interventions within the Bureau and where appropriate, with local USAID missions. DCHA offices will also be expected to coordinate concurrent program interventions in the same countries, in order to improve impact and ensure sustainability.

3.1.3 Illustrative Examples

In countries vulnerable to, or emerging from, civil conflict, DCHA will coordinate its interventions and assistance to the USAID mission. DCHA offices will pursue solutions to conflict and state failure using a variety of means: removing

immediate obstacles to peace; addressing medium-term conflict mitigation needs; and providing technical assistance to tackle underlying causes of the conflict that may jeopardize USAID's longer-term development goals.

In Burundi, for example, PVC/ASHA is extending OFDA's initial interventions targeting health services. Over a period of three years, the "hand-off" will further develop the capacity of Burundi's nongovernmental health sector. In addition to strengthening local NGO networks to improve information sharing and disseminate best practices, the follow-on activities seek to improve maternal and child health and nutrition.

In Sri Lanka, another example of integrated interventions, after an official cease-fire agreement ended 20 years of conflict end and after significant progress towards a political settlement had been made, OTI and CMM conducted a joint assessment mission. Each office produced its own report and program recommendations designed to help achieve DCHA's first goal, using different methods to address different challenges. OTI addressed immediate needs to maintain momentum for a lasting political settlement in coordination with the USAID mission, which will co-fund the second year of programming during the volatile post-conflict transition from war to peace. CMM focused on providing necessary technical assistance to the USAID mission on a range of issues that must be successfully addressed in the medium to long term in order to mitigate conflict.

3.2 Goal #2: Capable, responsive, and stable democratic systems and civil society strengthened, particularly in fragile, failing and failed states.

3.2.1 Rationale: Development experience has demonstrated that longer-term economic and social development is highly dependent on stability and good governance. Evidence also demonstrates that the origins of most man-made humanitarian crises are found in the political environments of weak, corrupt, or poorly governed states.

Good governance matters

Low levels of development and humanitarian crises alike are the dramatic symptoms and extreme consequences of governments that cannot perform the basic functions of a state. Armed conflict, lack of essential services, and food insecurity result from, and/or are exacerbated by, the erosion of government legitimacy, the loss of public consensus, and the breakdown of law and order. Just as DCHA provides emergency relief to save lives in such humanitarian crises, these actions must be complemented by interventions that address one of the root causes of crises: poor governance. The Bureau's focus on preventing, responding to, or recovering from state failure requires that all

DCHA programs pay special attention to governance issues – within civil society itself, and in political and government institutions at the local and national levels.

Enhancing good governance will also help link DCHA programs to other USAID and USG programs. As the Draft State-USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009 notes, "We will emphasize that all programs (i.e., health sector, education, and economic growth programs) promote democratic processes while growing a middle class capable of peacefully replacing authoritarian regimes at some point in the future. Providing for the economic and social basis for democratic rule – as through combating corruption, providing for basic material and health needs, and so forth – is the quieter but effective method of championing democratic reform."

3.2.2 How DCHA will achieve this goal. To the degree that states are fully democratic, they are more able to mitigate and prevent humanitarian crises. Democratic states, and partially democratic states, have social mechanisms that allow and even oblige them to mobilize the resources necessary to respond to citizens' critical needs before they reach the crisis stage. Responsive states do not have armed conflict and are typically able to minimize food insecurity. For these reasons, DCHA focuses a great deal of attention on helping countries create truly democratic systems and civil societies, including support for decentralization, strengthening local organizations and free media to help monitor and hold governments accountable, and efforts that target the legal and institutional framework for democracy. DCHA interventions focused on democracy and good governance under Goal 2 include: support to educational institutions that inculcate democratic values and practices in future leaders; programs focused on policy reform, political party training, and strengthening of national government institutions and leaders; programs that help nongovernmental organizations practice and model inclusive, accountable behavior; and advocacy training for civil society organizations. In addition, to promote improved governance in fragile democracies, DCHA can play an important role in helping create the incentives for countries to assume greater responsibility in disasters by helping them define appropriate roles for the public and private sectors to play in disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. In failed and failing states whose governments do not assume responsibility for safeguarding their own people, DCHA will work with other donors to determine the best approaches to assisting affected communities.

3.2.3 Illustrative Examples

In fragile states, DCHA's transition and longer-tem development interventions are aimed at strengthening civil society, good governance and decentralization by building the capacities of local institutions, NGOs and community-based organizations. These organizations are in an ideal position to stimulate demand

for improved government services and an end to corruption. For example, DG's anti-corruption efforts in Asia have included support for workshops and training on legal structures, credibility, funding, and membership expansion to strengthen local Transparency International chapters in India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

DG also provides field support and training to ensure free and fair elections, as in Nicaragua in 2001. DG supported and cooperated with USAID/Nicaragua on a national voter education effort that effectively apprised urban and rural residents of the importance of the election and that assured them of the secrecy and importance of their ballot.

3.3 Goal #3: Host country capacity increased to save lives and reduce human suffering.

3.3.1 Rationale: Development and humanitarian assistance are most effective when recipient countries participate in and take responsibility for their own development, and for the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters and humanitarian crises. The ultimate goal of all development activities is to reduce vulnerability while enabling recipients to become self-sufficient and no longer dependent upon external aid. This requires a favorable economic climate coupled with strong institutions, policies and political will to reduce the insecurity of all vulnerable groups, regardless of class or ethnicity; to identify, train, and support capable individuals at the national and local levels; and to help mobilize local communities and governing bodies to prevent, prepare for and, to the extent possible, mitigate the impacts of crises. DCHA's third goal addresses host countries' needs for capacity strengthening in these areas, and broadens the responsibility for capacity building across the Bureau.

3.3.2 How DCHA will achieve this goal

All DCHA offices have capacity strengthening interventions, either as a primary or secondary focus. This includes working at the governmental and institutional level to increase a country's capacity to serve its citizens, as well as at the local level to provide basic services. DCHA programs target government officials, the private sector and civil society organizations, since it is critical that all sectors participate more effectively in the development process and in preventing and mitigating disasters.

DCHA's capacity building programs strengthen capacities and coping mechanisms in times of crisis, to reduce vulnerability to future emergencies, and to increase local and national capacity to respond to emergencies. DCHA provides short-term technical assistance and training to strengthen the institutions that reinforce countries' democratic systems and practices, including programs to

enhance local capacity to manage and mitigate conflict, as well as longer-term programs that reinforce countries' democratic systems and practices. Capacity building programs also focus on enhancing community resiliency, strengthening human capabilities and increasing livelihood capacities in the communities most vulnerable to drought, famine, and political and economic crises. Finally, the Bureau will support the strengthening of local educational and health institutions so that they can develop indigenous capacity and leadership, as well as nondiscriminatory access to education and healthcare.

DCHA will develop a more consistent approach to documenting the strengthened capacity in host country organizations and institutions as a result of humanitarian and development activities. While there are relatively simple, standardized tools and approaches available these approaches are not widely used. DCHA will work towards use of a common approach to measuring organizational and institutional strengthening in DCHA programs to help consolidate this information for Bureau reporting.

3.3.3 Illustrative Examples

Understanding that capacity building is a USAID-wide mandate, the Bureau will increase the emphasis that each office places on capacity building, while encouraging and documenting innovative approaches. To the extent possible, DCHA offices will coordinate their capacity-building efforts, in order to achieve increased impact and sustainability. This will require joint planning to improve coordination and, in particular, improved planning of the hand-off from relief and transition to longer-term development interventions.

In Indonesia, another example of DCHA capacity-building, OTI and PVC/ASHA have made parallel investments. OTI funded a PVO's transition program in the Maluku Islands, while PVC/ASHA provided parallel funding to the same PVO to test a variety of tools and approaches to development programs in Indonesia and other conflict countries. Integrating these tools and approaches

> In Ethiopia, FFP, OFDA, the Africa Bureau and the USAID Mission have collaborated on an extensive assessment of the underlying causes of the famine, and to design and implement an integrated response. This joint approach is heavily focused on building assets and local capacity, both at the host government and the community levels, to provide early warning of impending famine conditions and to buffer shocks effectively, creating conditions for longer-term development. As this Framework is being written early in 2003, this approach is still in an experimental stage. If successful, it will be a model for collaboration among DCHA offices to build local capacity, reduce human suffering and save lives, while paving the way for self-reliance at the individual, household and community levels.

across the PVO's other transition and civil society programs, and sharing lessons learned within the Bureau and the PVO/NGO community, will help ensure a more strategic, coordinated approach to the hand-off from one DCHA office to another, as well as the hand-off to USAID mission funding.

3.4 Goal #4: Technical leadership provided within USG and to partners in response to the needs of fragile, failed and failing states.

3.4.1 Rationale: DCHA offices contain a cadre of experts in numerous technical fields related to the problems of state failure, including immediate disaster response, food security, the development of civil society organizations that serve as important constituencies for reform, community and free media development during periods of post-conflict transition, support for educational institutions charged with producing trustworthy leaders, and programs that strengthen rule of law and good governance. In addition to implementing programs, these DCHA experts also provide assistance and training to our partners within and outside the U.S. Government. Other donors and the international assistance community as a whole look to DCHA to provide technical – as well as financial – leadership and to catalyze broader support and progress in the technical fields in which the DCHA Bureau provides assistance. In coordination with State/PRM, DCHA has taken the lead on dealing with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and with PPC is developing an Agency-wide policy for working with IDPs.

3.4.2 How DCHA will achieve this goal

DCHA will provide direct technical assistance to USAID staff, partners and the practitioners in the conceptual, strategic, and operational aspects of democracy, conflict and humanitarian assistance. DCHA provides technical leadership in a variety of ways, ranging from participation in U.S. Government policy-making in Washington, to training programs aimed at building local capacity in relatively stable developing countries, as well as fragile, failed and failing states. Through publications, conferences, policy colloquia, and other opportunities, DCHA will share its experience and expertise, and help analyze and advance best practices. DCHA will also continue to provide support for innovative efforts that benefit fragile, failed and failing states. These range from the Famine Early Warning System to predict and prevent emerging drought and famine conditions, to support to Tufts University in support of one of the country's cutting edge masters degree programs in humanitarian assistance, to technical leadership in preventing or recovering from conflict.

Building upon our history of convening implementers, donors and counterparts to improve development praxis and partnerships, the Bureau will organize conferences and workshops on important issues, commission studies and

reports, and engage other donors in dialogue and debate to strengthen collaboration and complementarity. In particular, DCHA will seek to define and champion a new agenda among practitioners and donors that reflects our changed operating environment and the need to develop new programs in fragile, failing, and failed states. The Bureau will expect all DCHA offices to continue to pilot new approaches to respond to these phenomena, to document and disseminate lessons learned, and to maintain the level of program excellence required to demonstrate and sustain DCHA's leadership.

3.4.3 Illustrative examples

DCHA offices will continue to provide leadership and promote collaboration within USAID and the broader international assistance community in a variety of ways. For example, CMM has already participated in and/or facilitated conflict assessments in over 17 countries. These assessments will continue, and are designed to: help missions identify and prioritize causes (or potential causes) of conflict; integrate conflict considerations into existing programs and strategies; and recommend new areas of intervention as necessary. In addition, DCHA will continue to act as a catalyst among practitioners and donors, through leadership in such fora as the USAID-USPVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict sponsored by PVC/ASHA and jointly run by all DCHA offices, and the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network. CPR brings together bilateral donors and international organizations engaged in conflict management. Through its extensive website, email lists, and semi-annual meetings, CPR provides a forum for the exchange of cutting-edge practices and opportunities for close donor coordination. OTI helped establish CPR in the 199s and CMM joined the network in 2002. DCHA will work through the CPR to provide technical leadership in responding to new operating environments and help ensure cross-fertilization and coordination between operational and analytic research agendas.

FFP's leadership and collaborative activities provide other examples of ways in which DCHA will pursue this goal. FFP plays an active role in U.S. and global deliberations on food security issues through the Food Policy Assistance Group and its participation in the World Food Program Executive Board meetings and other UN fora on food security. Moreover, the new FFP 2003-2008 Strategic Plan calls for enhancing FFP's global leadership, by committing the Office to framing a new food security agenda and increasing strategic collaboration with PVOs and the private sector through the Global Development Alliance.

OFDA provides leadership internationally and domestically through a variety of avenues. OFDA's regional advisors based in Africa, Latin America, and Asia maintain close relationships with national and regional authorities. They are ready to deploy on a moment's notice to provide leadership in disaster assessment, risk management, and coordination. OFDA is home to specialists in

public health, nutrition, meteorology, geohazards, gender, disability, internal displacement, shelter, and food security who provide a range of support services to USAID, other U.S. Government agencies, and outside partners involved in humanitarian assistance. OFDA conveys the latest innovations and best practices in humanitarian assistance through outreach activities, training courses, publications, and other professional activities. Office experts also serve on peer review groups to establish international guidelines and standards for relief provision, including the Sphere project. OFDA is a leader in humanitarian evaluation, designing and implementing its own evaluations while also supporting the dissemination of lessons learned by others through its support of projects such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Participation (ALNAP). OFDA fosters the next generation of humanitarian professionals by funding academic and research programs at the Tufts University Feinstein International Famine Center. OFDA has a leadership role in supporting multilateral disaster efforts through its participation and in-kind support to United Nations response mechanisms including UNDAC Teams (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination) and INSARAG (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group). OFDA has the lead response responsibility within the U.S. Government for natural, manmade, and terrorist events requiring the international deployment of urban search and rescue technical expertise.

PVC/ASHA has also contributed to conflict prevention and management by supporting educational institutions that encourage rigorous intellectual discourse, and by creating interaction and information exchanges among people from different countries, cultures, and ethnic groups. By promoting understanding, respect, and tolerance for others' cultures, values, and ideas, these DCHA-supported institutions help ensure the creation of democratic and open societies, while advancing broad-based economic and social development.

3.5 Goal #5: Coordination demonstrated within DCHA for more effective responses to crisis and development needs.

3.5.1 Rationale: Critical to the success of the broad range of activities being implemented by the DCHA offices will be continual and improved inter-office coordination. This is especially important, given the Bureau's diverse funding accounts and the fact that the line offices carry out a wide variety of activities through different implementing mechanisms. Improved intra-DCHA coordination will help to reduce overlap and duplication of effort, make our interventions more effective, and help achieve integrated responses in the field for better impact. Clear differentiation of the roles and responsibilities of DCHA's offices will contribute significantly to increased coordination, so that skills and competitive advantages are leveraged in the context of inter-office collaboration and integration. While this Goal focuses on coordination within DCHA, the Bureau

will also work to improve coordination with the rest of the Agency as described in section 5 below.

3.5.2 How DCHA will achieve this goal

Each DCHA office has its own programs and activities. However, broad coordination in terms of policies, program planning and design, country portfolios, and other critical issues is essential for greater effectiveness. Coordination mechanisms can and will vary depending on the situation, and there can be no single method or mechanism that is appropriate in every case.

DCHA will achieve this goal by promoting coordination at four levels:

- Policy level
- Program level
- Services level
- Administrative level

Within the Front Office, one Deputy Assistant Administrator (DAA) will be responsible for overseeing and advancing inter-office coordination focused on these four levels. In addition, the Assistant Administrator will delegate additional, targeted responsibilities to the DAAs for oversight of individual offices, countries, and sectors. The Front Office will monitor coordination and collaboration across the Bureau and will identify and reward outstanding coordination performance by DCHA operating units and individual staff.

At the *policy level,* DCHA will enhance coordination largely through senior staff decision-making fora, led by the Front Office. At present, all office chiefs meet regularly to share information, discuss and establish policy guidelines and ensure broad coordination and agreement on bureau objectives. DCHA management will determine which new policies are needed at the bureau level and what follow up actions are necessary. Development of policy and associated actions will be delegated to appropriate staff.

At the *program level,* coordination will be achieved through ongoing efforts to advance coordination at the country/field level, and through efforts to improve coordination around key issues. DCHA Offices will share criteria for engagement and disengagement; appoint liaison officers to engage with sister offices and attend one another's staff meetings as appropriate, and debrief one another on activities of mutual interest. Further, DCHA will achieve improved country level coordination through joint planning and program design, country watch lists for priority, "special opportunity countries," joint TDYs, and coordinated assessments and evaluations. In reviewing their respective offices' performance with regard to this goal, Directors will request evidence of collaborative planning, as well as joint trip reports, assessments and other inter-office products. In addition,

certain issues, such as IDPs, warrant close coordination around a common operational challenge. Finally, there will be on-going coordination on issues and challenges that involve two or more DCHA offices, in some cases involving collaborative development of pilot projects.

At the *services level,* the Bureau will increase coordination and reduce costs by sharing a variety of services across offices. These include information management and technology services and procurement services. Sharing services will make DCHA offices better aware of the programmatic activities and resource demands of sister offices, opening the door to greater intra-bureau collaboration. A Shared Services Working Group will assess the potential for sharing services, examine relevant costs -- both human and dollar costs -- and legal issues, and oversee transition to greater collaboration.

At the *administrative level* coordination of processes across DCHA offices is achieved through a single administrative services organization (PPM/AMS) within the Bureau.

In pursuing increased intra-Bureau coordination at each of the levels described above, DCHA will uphold the following principles.

- ***Make a concerted effort to work collaboratively instead of individually.*** This applies equally to offices/teams and to individuals. Without a clear commitment from all staff to work in a collaborative fashion, no amount of policy guidance, structural change or communication will yield better coordination in DCHA. This principle means that individual offices will actively pursue ways to coordinate with other DCHA offices. It also means that individuals within an office working on a specific country or issue will actively seek out opportunities to work with their counterparts in other offices. The Bureau will develop and maintain an up-to-date functional staff roster ("Who's Who in DCHA") to help staff identify and collaborate with their technical and functional counterparts in other line offices.

- ***Increase communication at all levels in the Bureau.*** Because better communication is the foundation for improved coordination, DCHA will seek to improve communication at every opportunity. Immediate opportunities for improving communication include the following tasks:
  - ✓ Establish and keep current a Bureau website with links to up-to-date sites for each office
  - ✓ Initiate periodic front office communication to all bureau staff summarizing the discussion and decisions emanating from senior staff meetings
  - ✓ Establish a mechanism to share information across the bureau regarding planned assessments, TDYs, etc.

- ***Establish new structures only if there is a compelling need to do so.*** Achieving better coordination will not always necessitate the creation of new bureau-wide structures. However, should the situation require it, as with Sudan and Afghanistan at the country level and the Strategy Working Group at the issue level, formal working groups may be established to coordinate activities. It is the responsibility of senior staff to determine if/when a formal cross-bureau working group should be established and/or dismantled. DCHA/PPM will play a key role facilitating these senior staff decisions by raising the need for new working groups and maintaining a roster of all DCHA working groups.

- ***Use and update this Planning Framework as a living document that responds to evolving needs and opportunities for coordination.*** As described above, future Appendices to this Planning Framework will help support and guide improved inter-office coordination over the Framework period. These Appendices are expected to pertain to each of the four levels noted above, e.g., through the expected addition of lists of "special opportunity countries" that will change over time based on foreign policy priorities and windows of opportunity for DCHA, new policies on IDPs and on conflict, new communications resources and procedures that will enhance joint planning and programs where appropriate, protocols for sharing services, and new Directives and other appendices on administration and management.

4. DCHA Structure and Operations



4.1 Overview of the role of the DCHA Operating Units

The DCHA Bureau has seven operating units, in addition to the Front Office and the Office of Program, Planning and Management (PPM). They cover a wide range of activities, from emergency disaster response to longer-term development activities. DCHA implements activities in all USAID regions and in

many non-presence countries. DCHA offices work with diverse partners outside the Agency, including the State Department, other USG Departments, the UN system and international, host governments, and local NGOs.

Several DCHA offices directly implement activities overseas. This is especially true of disaster and humanitarian assistance programs, and programs in non-presence countries. Nevertheless, wherever possible, these activities will be coordinated with the field Mission, or where none exists, with the relevant regional bureau offices.

DCHA offices support field Missions in a variety of ways. Bureau offices and staff serve as a source of technical expertise in democracy and governance, disaster assistance, food aid and food security, capacity building and conflict management. While they provide this technical assistance largely from Washington, the offices are frequently called to assist Missions in a more hands-on manner. In addition, various offices have developed financial implementing mechanisms that allow Missions more rapid response capability in answering the call for assistance in their host countries. Finally, several DCHA offices rely on training workshops and distance learning to work more closely with mission staff on augmenting technical skills.

4.2 Roles and Responsibilities.

The division of labor within DCHA is as follows: OFDA and FFP provide humanitarian relief to save lives, while also addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition to prevent or reduce future emergency needs; in the intermediate term, OTI focuses on restoring minimal democratic governance and economic functioning after state failure or near state failure in particularly weak states; DG strives to help countries create the fundamental elements of democratic governance, free elections, civil society development and rule of law through its longer term initiatives; and CMM works to mitigate the potential consequences of violent conflict in vulnerable countries. PVC/ASHA builds robust civil societies by strengthening the capacity of indigenous NGOs, cooperatives, networks, and intermediate support organizations that comprise the NGO sector in select countries, and supports educational institutions to improve academic standards and develop a cadre of democratic leaders who can more effectively prevent or deal with state failure. Office descriptions providing more detail on program focus, organization, and implementation mechanism and partners are provided in Annex 2.

The division of labor among the DCHA operating units allows for a certain amount of overlap, since the countries where we work do not progress through neat, well-defined stages, and usually require the expertise of more than one operating unit. For this reason, it is not uncommon for several DCHA offices to

be working in a given country at the same time. To maximize impact and facilitate hand-offs as DCHA operating units move in and out of a country, DCHA offices will closely phase and coordinate their interventions and consult with one another regularly.

Conflict is a development issue; it is also is a recurring aspect of state failure.

Dealing with conflict requires particularly close coordination, since it is a recurring aspect of state failure. Conflict is a development issue, with both short- and longer-term causes and impacts. Thus, many DCHA offices will necessarily be involved, and will divide and target interventions according to the comparative advantage of each office, the individual skills and abilities of their respective staffs. In this regard, improved coordination will be imperative, along with flexibility to draw on available resources. Living within the Bureau's overall financial and personnel constraints will sometimes result in a more flexible division of responsibilities among DCHA offices, while still adhering to budgetary accounts and statutory requirements.

OFDA and FFP address the emergency humanitarian needs generated by conflict and displacement. Building upon these interventions, the three offices most directly involved in conflict-related activities – CMM, OTI and DG – will coordinate their activities on a regular basis through a working group, bringing in other offices as needed.

A logical division of responsibilities exists among these offices along both substantive and bureaucratic lines with regard to conflict:

- OTI directly manages its own programs, focusing on immediate conflict, attempting to mitigate its impact, and moving beyond the conflict to hand-off to a USAID mission for sustainable development programs. OTI is more directly political and less concerned with conflict as a development problem.

- CMM supports the programs of USAID missions and geographic bureaus, though it may directly manage programs in select non-presence situations. Conflict is a growing technical field in its own right, and CMM will provide technical leadership for the Agency in this field, helping to view development programs through a “conflict lens,” by attempting to identify causes of conflict, and by mitigating and managing its impact.

- DG supports the programs of USAID Missions and geographic bureaus, and provides technical leadership for the Agency in the broad field of democracy and governance. Democratic governance is essential to long-term sustainable development, as reflected in the Millennium Challenge Account. DG may become involved in failed or failing states as they establish

institutions, and may even be involved in conflict settings, but viewing conflict through a "democracy and governance lens."

It is important to note that FFP development programs and PVC/ASHA also have a role to play with regard to conflict and state failure. For example, Title II food aid development programs help address root causes of food insecurity that can lead to conflict, while PVC/ASHA programs help strengthen civil society organizations press for improved national and local governance or more equitable distribution of resources and public goods.

5. Coordination Within USAID

5.1 Overview

As noted above, DCHA is a "Pillar Bureau Plus" whose programs range from discrete, finite interventions, to those requiring hand-off to other DCHA offices and field missions, to field support programs. Because of its broad portfolio, and recognizing the importance of good governance to all USAID development sectors, DCHA faces particular challenges – and opportunities – regarding coordination with the rest of the Agency. In fact, DCHA's predecessor Bureaus were sometimes perceived as being separate within USAID, or as failing to collaborate with regional Bureaus and missions that would either "inherit" follow-on programs or be the location of ongoing programs funded by the Bureau. Given this history and the clear service mandate of all the Pillar Bureaus, DCHA will develop and support a Bureau-wide culture of coordination to leverage DCHA's competitive advantages in collaborating with colleague Bureaus and missions.

5.2 Coordinating Mechanisms

As with inter-office coordination within the Bureau, DCHA coordination efforts within USAID will employ different mechanisms depending on the issues and players at hand. And as with intra-DCHA efforts, successful intra-USAID coordination will require a commitment to improved communication and information sharing (particularly on best practices and lessons learned). Coordination and communication efforts with the rest of the Agency will occur simultaneously throughout DCHA, with different actors performing the following functions:

- DCHA Front Office, which plays a leadership role in articulating Bureau priorities

- PPM, which helps facilitate and support intra-Agency communication
- Line Offices, which coordinate with the rest of the Agency at the operational level

For example, the Front Office will identify and update a DCHA list of "special opportunity countries" to focus and guide coordination efforts within the Bureau, USAID, and externally. Each DCHA Deputy Assistant Administrator will be responsible for managing the Bureau's response to – and intra-Agency coordination of – a subset of these priority countries. Specifically, the DAAs will communicate with the cognizant Regional Bureaus and USAID missions (if they exist in the given countries), lead joint TDYs and assessment teams to these countries, and convene country working groups involving Regional Bureau and mission representatives, as well as DCHA staff. Through these efforts, DCHA intends to adopt a more collaborative, better informed, and more strategic approach to special opportunity countries, to help the Agency maximize resources and avoid redundancies, and ensure that potential hand-off, collaboration, or field support processes are well coordinated from the initial planning stages.

PPM will help facilitate DCHA's coordination efforts with the rest of the Agency by convening bimonthly meetings with each Geographic and Pillar Bureau (a process initiated during the vetting of this Framework). Co-chaired by DAAs from DCHA and the colleague Bureau, these meetings will include representatives from each DCHA office and the colleague Bureau's Program Office. The bi-monthly meetings are not intended to replace ongoing technical meetings between DCHA staff and the Bureaus. Rather, they will provide a venue to discuss technical issues and cross-cutting priorities, such as attention to women, IDPs and other vulnerable groups, at a more strategic level or to resolve issues arising from ongoing operational discussions. Because one of the primary goals of improved DCHA coordination with the rest of the Agency is to enhance field support, the inter-bureau meetings will also help identify and clarify field support needs and determine preliminary approaches for meeting these needs.

DCHA offices are expected to manage technical coordination at the operational level, including through the provision of field support to missions. Offices will participate in Sector Councils, help integrate their respective country backstopping procedures with the Geographic Bureaus, invite representatives of cognizant Geographic and Pillar Bureaus to participate in DCHA program design and assessments, and include other Bureaus' representatives as technical reviewers of competitive applications and proposals as appropriate. In addition, offices will circulate their draft strategy Concept Papers and Strategic Plans to the Bureaus for comment and will participate in the review of Country Strategic Plans and portfolio reviews with PPM.

Acronyms

AA	Assistant Administrator
ADS	Automated Directives System
AFR	Bureau for Africa
ANE	Bureau for Asia and the Near East
BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response
CMM	Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
CPR	Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network
DA	Development Assistance Account
DAA	Deputy Assistant Administrator
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
DG	Office of Democracy and Governance
E&E	Bureau for Europe and Eurasia
ESF	Economic Support Fund Account
FFP	Office of Food For Peace
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IDA	International Disaster Assistance Account
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IQC	Indefinite Quantity Contract
LAC	Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PDM	Program Development and Management
PPC	Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
PPO	Program Planning and Outreach
PPM	Office of Program Planning and Management
PVC/ASHA	Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation/American Schools and Hospitals Abroad
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SEED	Support for Eastern European Democracy Account
TAG	Technical Assistance Group
TDY	Temporary Duty overseas
TI	Transition Initiative Account
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USPVO	United States Private Voluntary Organization

Annex 1

DCHA VISION

Our vision is that strong democratic institutions, less conflict, improved food security, and timely humanitarian relief will produce a free and more prosperous global community.

DCHA MISSION

DCHA's mission is to save lives, alleviate suffering, support democracy, and promote opportunities for people adversely affected by poverty, conflict, natural disasters, and a breakdown of good governance. DCHA rapidly responds in support of USAID's mission worldwide, particularly in fragile, failed and failing states.

To carry out our mission, we collaborate within the Agency, the U.S. Government and with external stakeholders. DCHA seeks to maximize its efforts through partnerships with organizations that share its vision and complement its resources. Our teams design and implement effective solutions to crisis situations that link our humanitarian efforts with longer-term development goals.

GOAL 1

Longer-term development advanced through integrated, high-impact DCHA interventions, particularly in countries affected by crisis, conflict, and food insecurity.

GOAL 2

Capable, responsive, and stable democratic systems and civil society strengthened, particularly in fragile, failing and failed states.

GOAL 3

Host country capacity increased to save lives and reduce human suffering.

GOAL 4

Technical leadership provided within USG and to partners in response to the needs of fragile, failed and failing states

GOAL 5

Coordination demonstrated within DCHA for more effective responses to crisis and development needs.

Annex 2: DCHA Offices

DCHA's Front Office and Operating Units focus on the following activities:

Front Office

DCHA's Front Office is composed of an Assistant Administrator, three Deputy Assistant Administrators, one special assistant, two secretaries and an Executive Secretariat manager.

The Assistant Administrator's chief responsibilities are to: manage information and serve as the primary conduit of information to the Administrator; manage the Deputy Assistant Administrators; act as a representative and spokesperson for the Bureau at meetings, fora, and Congressional hearings; help set policy for DCHA; serve as the primary contact for humanitarian assistance at cabinet level departments and agencies; represent and maintain DCHA's portfolio of roles and responsibilities within USAID; and act as the Bureau's envoy to field missions for DCHA related programs in development and humanitarian assistance.

Deputy Assistant Administrators oversee the offices within the Bureau, manage day to day operations and report back to the AA, handle special projects for the AA and Administrator, manage personnel issues, represent the offices in various meetings and fora, provide leadership to the office directors on issues, and provide expertise to the AA regarding their offices of responsibility. In addition, each DAA serves as Bureau coordinator for a group of "special opportunity countries."

Office of Democracy and Governance (DG):

Program Focus: The DG Office promotes the transition to, and consolidation of, democratic regimes throughout the world. DG programs are designed to achieve the Agency's four democracy-related objectives: 1) strengthened rule of law and human rights, 2) more genuine and competitive political processes, 3) increased development of a politically active civil society, and 4) more transparent and accountable government institutions.

Types of Activities: The DG Office assists USAID missions by providing technical support in several areas: 1) Technical advice, including direct consultation with DG Office staff and reference to the office's learning via technical publications and occasional papers, distance learning modules, and the web. 2) Direct field support, where, on a requested basis, DG Office staff travel to the field to assist personnel in conducting DG assessments, evaluate specific mission DG activities, participate in the design of sub-sector strategies, design scopes of work, etc. 3)

Technical training, including annual introductory and advanced level training workshops designed to meet the needs of junior and senior DG officers.

Organization: The Office is currently organized in divisions that correspond with the Agency's four DG objectives and sub-sectors. In addition to DG staff within the bureau in USAID/Washington, Democracy officers implement DG programs in many USAID missions worldwide.

Budget Accounts and Implementation Mechanisms: The Office carries out its diverse activities using both Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts. Because the Agency's primary means of implementing DG programs remains USAID Missions, DG provides technical support to Missions where appropriate, and Mission-friendly implementing mechanisms specifically targeted to DG programs. Implementation mechanisms include a portfolio of already procured agreements for missions to use in more quickly purchasing a wide range of services from program design to program implementation. In well-defined circumstances, these mechanisms may also be used to work in non-presence countries. Overall, DG support of Missions is provided through an inter-linked approach that involves technical leadership, field support, and direct program management.

Implementing Partners: DG implementers include U.S. and local nongovernmental organizations and institutions of higher education, for-profit contractors, and host country government ministries.

Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI):

Program Focus: (OTI) helps local partners advance peaceful, democratic change in conflict-prone countries that are priorities for U.S. foreign policy. Seizing windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key transition needs, particularly citizen security and democratic political processes.

Types of Activities: In volatile operating environments where the re-establishment of public safety, government legitimacy and public confidence are critical to sustaining peace, OTI supports independent media to promote balanced information, grassroots efforts to mitigate conflict, and quick-impact community projects that build participatory decision-making processes.

Organization: OTI is organized functionally and has four regional teams that correspond to the Agency's regional bureaus (AFR, ANE, E&E, LAC) and a program development team. In addition to its headquarters presence in Washington, OTI maintains offices in the countries in which it operates, some of which are offices co-located at USAID missions.

Budget Accounts and Implementation Mechanisms: OTI uses Transition Initiative (TI) funds, which provide maximum flexibility and timely response to the needs of conflict prone countries. TI funds are frequently augmented by other accounts (DA, IDA, ESF, SEED, etc) when available. OTI implements programs worldwide in countries where USAID has Missions, as well as in non-presence countries. OTI provides support primarily to local organizations and institutions. In order to maintain maximum flexibility, OTI uses diverse instruments, including cooperative agreements, contracts, and grants under contracts to provide local organizations with cash and in-kind support.

Implementing Partners: OTI implementers include U.S. and local NGOs, UN agencies, and U.S. for-profit contractors.

Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM):

Program Focus: The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation was established in late FY2002 to serve as a resource for Missions, regional and pillar bureaus, and other USG agencies focused on conflict and potential conflict settings. CMM activities are designed to complement the Agency's overall objectives by helping to lessen the negative impact of violent conflict on development and humanitarian assistance.

Types of Activities: CMM will focus on technical assistance, including strategy, program and activity design, training and information dissemination, research and analysis, and donor coordination. In collaboration with the regional bureaus, it may also implement conflict-related activities in non-presence countries. In partnership with PPC and other bureaus, CMM will also review and, as necessary, refine the Agency's overall policies and guidelines for managing and mitigating conflict.

Organization: CMM has a total of 10 authorized staff positions. As a small office, CMM does not expect to create formal office divisions, although it will focus on the specific areas of: economics and conflict; environment/natural resources and conflict; political and social institutions and conflict; and crosscutting conflict issues, including strategies and assessments.

Budget Accounts and Implementation Mechanisms: CMM is funded by the Development Assistance account.

Implementing Partners: CMM will utilize U.S. and field-based conflict management and research organizations, primarily through IQC mechanisms, to provide field support in its focus areas.

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA):

Program Focus and Activities: OFDA delivers emergency assistance that meets recognized standards, to populations in disaster-affected countries. OFDA assistance can include emergency health and nutrition, water, sanitation, shelter, emergency or therapeutic food, agricultural and livestock assistance, search and rescue, information management, and strategic and operational coordination. Whenever possible, OFDA humanitarian assistance is delivered in a manner that facilitates a rapid transition from an emergency phase toward sustained economic and social development. Parallel to its disaster response efforts, OFDA's preparedness activities help save lives and alleviate suffering even before disasters occur.

Organization: OFDA has three divisions: The Disaster Response and Mitigation Division includes teams focusing on specific geographic regions, technical assistance and planning. The Operations Division deals with logistics; operations center management; military liaison; chemical, biological, and nuclear response; overseas administration; and interagency coordination. The Program Support Division includes teams specializing in budget and finance; information technology and communications; personnel, procurement, and administrative services; information support; and training. OFDA maintains field offices in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and deploys staff to respond to emergencies as necessary.

Budget Accounts and Implementation Mechanisms: OFDA uses International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds, which enable the Office to respond quickly and save lives. The Office programs these funds through grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. OFDA also delivers stockpiled relief commodities directly to areas impacted by disasters.

Implementing Partners: OFDA implementers include U.S. and foreign NGOs, United Nations agencies, and international organizations. OFDA also has a number of arrangements with various federal civilian agencies, emergency service providers (including search and rescue teams), and the U.S. military to provide technical expertise and support.

Office of Food for Peace (FFP):

Program Focus: FFP works to reduce hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity in vulnerable populations, especially in fragile, failing or failed states. FFP responds to the immediate food needs of vulnerable people, while addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition through Title II emergency and development programs. FFP is developing a dynamic new 2003-2008 Strategic Plan that will more closely integrate emergency and development

programs into a more coherent and comprehensive program with a single Strategic Objective: "Food insecurity in vulnerable populations reduced."

Types of Activities: In both emergency and development programs, FFP targets resources to the most vulnerable areas and groups, and enhances the capacities of the vulnerable – individuals, households, and communities – to predict and buffer successive shocks while protecting and maintaining critical assets. Activities include direct food aid, food for work, feeding programs directed to mothers, infants, and children, and use of food aid resources to improve agricultural productivity.

Organization: The Food for Peace Office is organized into emergency and development program divisions. In addition, FFP Officers serve in many USAID missions worldwide, as well as in emergencies.

Budget Accounts and Implementation Mechanisms: FFP uses Title II food aid to implement programs in the following ways: using food in direct distribution programs; and mobilizing additional non-food resources to complement food aid to compensate for reduced monetization levels, as demanded by the Office of Management and Budget, by integrating FFP resources with Mission and other local resources. FFP also uses DA funds to support Title II programs to provide technical and institutional support to USAID missions and cooperating sponsors.

Implementing Partners: FFP works with U.S. PVOs and multilateral organizations, such as the World Food Program.

Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation/American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (PVC/ASHA):

Program Focus: PVC is the focal point for the Agency's relationship with private voluntary organizations (PVOs). PVC provides grants to U.S. PVOs to strengthen the strategic, managerial, financial, advocacy, and service-delivery capacity of local non-governmental organizations, the NGO sector, and cooperatives in developing countries, particularly fragile, failing, and failed states. The office also promotes policy formulation on issues of concern to the NGO community and facilitates the exchange of information within the Agency and among U.S., international, and local NGOs. ASHA supports overseas schools, libraries and hospital centers to demonstrate the best in American educational and medical technologies and practices. These institutions, founded and supported by U.S. citizens, are study and demonstration sites of U.S. education and medical achievements that also help prepare future leaders.

Types of Activities: PVC grants provide support for capacity-building initiatives to improve the performance of indigenous NGOs, cooperatives, and associations of

these organizations in order to strengthen the NGO sector and foster the growth of a vibrant civil society in select countries. PVC also supports the formation and strengthening of NGO networks; linkages between NGOs and public and private sector institutions; and initiatives to improve programming in post-conflict environments. Other PVC activities include research and outreach to identify best principles and practices related to NGO strengthening. ASHA awards annual competitive grants, primarily for improvement or construction of infrastructure and for equipment. ASHA grants are used to increase the recipient institutions' effectiveness to demonstrate state-of-the-art technologies and approaches, and to inculcate democratic ideals and practices.

Organization: PVC-ASHA has three divisions: Program Development and Management (PDM), which administers PVC grants; Policy Planning and Outreach (PPO), which serves as PVC's information, analytic, and policy center; and a third division which manages ASHA grants. The office also serves as the secretariat for the Agency's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.

Budget Accounts and Implementation Mechanisms: PVC-ASHA programs DA funds through grants and cooperative agreements, and maintains contracts for program support and the management of PVO registration.

Implementing Partners: PVC-ASHA's implementing partners are U.S. PVOs that, in turn, support indigenous NGOs and educational institutions, libraries, and medical centers.

Office of Program, Policy and Management (PPM):

Program Focus: The Office of Program, Policy and Management is not an operational unit. PPM's primary responsibility is to provide advice, guidance, and operational support to DCHA on effective and efficient use of program, OE and workforce resources, performance management, policy compliance, program planning, administration and evaluation.

Types of Activities: PPM reviews internal operations to propose improvement, represents the Bureau program and budget to the Agency and Congress and serves as primary liaison with the OIG and GAO. PPM provides oversight for the Bureau's audit follow-up and management control programs and other financial and accountability programs, and ensures that audit recommendations receive management decisions and final action in a timely manner. PPM's management section provides administrative and management services for the entire bureau, and the budget section coordinates overall bureau budgeting and financial reporting. PPM provides technical support to line offices through participation on competitive review committees and evaluation teams, and in strategy development. PPM also assists DCHA management with coordination functions, in order to establish consistent procedures and systems. Finally, PPM provides

support to the Front Office, via technical expertise on Bureau issues, research, information support (briefing papers, talking points, etc.), and representation in selected fora.

Organization: PPM is organized into three teams, which focus on the following issues from an overall bureau perspective: a) administrative and management matters, b) budget and reporting issues and c) program analysis and coordination.

Budget Account: PPM is not an operating unit and does not manage any of its own programs, per se. Nevertheless, PPM has a small budget for assessments, evaluations and travel, utilizing DA funding.