
Final Program Performance Report

Providing Winterized Shelter in Unfinished
Houses in Pristina, Uresevac, Mitrovica and
Djakovica, Kosovo

GRANT NO. AOT-G-00-00-00173-00

OBJECTIVE 3 ONLY

OCTOBER 10, 2001

List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development & Relief Agency
AOR	Area of Responsibility
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMG	International Management Group
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MHC	Municipal Housing Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NIMA	U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
TCS	Temporary Community Shelters program
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo



I. Executive Summary

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Program Title:

Providing Winterized Shelter in Unfinished houses in Pristina, Urosevac, Mitrovica and Djakovica, Kosovo.

Country / Region:

Yugoslavia / Kosovo.

Disaster:

Returnee and IDP caseload resulting from war.

Period of Activity (Objective 3 only):

8 September 1999 to 17 April 2001

Budget Summary (Objective 3 only):

Dollar Amount Requested from OFDA	\$2,049,590.00
Dollar Amount Requested from Other Sources	\$ -
Dollar Amount of In-kind contribution	\$
Total Dollar Amount of Project	\$2,049,590.00

Budget Summary (All Objective):

Dollar Amount Requested from OFDA	\$3,363,977.00
Dollar Amount Requested from Other Sources	\$ -
Dollar Amount of In-kind contribution	\$
Total Dollar Amount of Project	\$3,363,977.00

Justification:

Civil war and violence in Kosovo culminating in air strikes by NATO forces resulted in the internal displacement and exile of an estimated 1.5 million people¹. The large returnee caseload requires emergency assistance in all sectors, including Shelter, in order to rehabilitate and normalize their lives.

Objective 3:

Provide winterized housing solutions for up to 1,280 returnee and IDP families in Pristina, Djakovica, Mitrovica and Urosevac, utilizing [760] unfinished urban housing stock. (Sept. 8, 1999 – Apr. 17, 2001)

¹ UNHCR News: Kosovo concept paper on displaced persons (12 May 1999).



II. Program Overview

A. Goals and Objectives

Goal

To contribute to the post-war rehabilitation and normalization of life in the Province of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Objective

Provide winterised housing solutions for up to 1,280 returnee and IDP families in Pristina, Djakovica, Mitrovica and Urosevac, utilizing [760] unfinished urban housing stock.

B. Profile of Target Population

Vulnerable Kosovar returnees and IDPs at risk due to the loss of their home.

The target for this project was to be the wider urban areas of Pristina, Djakovica, Mitrovica and Urosevac. With the large influx of returnees and IDPs, the limited existing housing stock had already become stretched. This was manifest in data from ADRA's Community Services projects being implemented in all four areas, which reported that, at the time of the project proposal was written, more than 90% of the cases received at reception and referral centres were shelter related. There were high numbers of IDPs reported (UNHCR Kosova RVA, 26 July 1999) with 37% of villages reporting the presence of IDPs. There were also large numbers of IDPs reported in the urban and wider urban areas, according to the RVA. It was also anticipated that large numbers of Albanians would be migrating from predominately Serb areas to the urban and wider urban areas of Albanian Kosovo. Thus the target beneficiaries of the project were the vulnerable Kosovar returnees and IDPs at risk due to the loss of their home. This was prioritised due to the impending difficult winter conditions.

C. Geographic Locations

The program was undertaken in the principal urban Municipalities of Pristina, Djakovica, Mitrovica and Urosevac in the Province of Kosovo, Yugoslavia. Initially the field of operation was set to be with a 5 km radius of the city centre but as time progressed, this was permitted to extend to 15 km of the city centres. Modification 3 provided for the provision of materials and assistance to beneficiaries over the whole municipality of Mitrovica.

III. Program Performance

A. Actual Accomplishments

This Final Report covers only Objective 3 (Winter Shelter) for Grant No. AOT-G-00-99-00173-00. The Final Report for Objectives 1 and 2 (Water and Sanitation) activities was completed and submitted in May 2000.

Objective 3. ADRA provided 892 winterised urban shelters to 1505 families, a 117% and 118% completion of the targets, respectively. As detailed below, the targets were established and subsequently expanded in Modifications 1, 2 and 3 of the original agreement with OFDA.

Modification 1. Modification 1 set the original target of 260 houses. The project completion date was then extended by 6 weeks to coincide with the completion of a second program being conducted under the same grant. With the additional time, the target was exceeded with 284 houses being completed prior to the completion of the project period. No additional funds had been required with some funds remaining. This

gave rise to the opportunity to extend the duration of the program and provide a monitoring period for those dwellings previously completed. The outcome was that a total of 405 houses were completed accommodating 844 families.

Modification 2. Modification 2 expanded the objective to include a target of an additional 100 rooms. 84 rooms were completed, accommodating an additional 67 families.

Modification 3. Modification 3 provided for an additional 400 houses for 400 families. At the conclusion of the materials distribution period, 403 houses had been selected and provided with materials. A total of 228 family projects had been completed with 209 of the families residing in the shelter provided. A further 258 families had projects under construction with the average progress towards completion being 63%. It was presumed that the majority of these would be completed within a 2 to 3 week period following the reporting period. The final result being that a total of 594 families were provided with shelter material to provide accommodation in the houses selected.

Final Objective. Combining all of the above, ADRA provided 892 winterised urban shelters to 1505 families, a 117% and 118% completion of the targets, respectively. The project achieved its objectives in each area of the project, completing more than the specified number of houses and the target number of families.

The numbers of houses completed in each region along with the numbers of beneficiary families are shown in the following table.

Total by Objective

Objective	Target	Achieved	%
Total Houses	760	892	117
Total Beneficiary Families	1280	1505	118

Totals by Modification and Urban Area

	Prishtina	Ferazaj	Gjakova	Mitrovica	TOTAL	%
Initial Objective as per Modification 1						
Total Houses	94	7	141	163	405	155 %
Target	60	30	80	90	260	
Total families	179	14	391	260	844	108 %
Target	180	90	240	270	780	
Beneficiaries	880	64	1759	1558	4261	
Target	1080	540	1440	1620	4680	
Modification 2						
Total Rooms				84	84	84 %
Target				100	100	
Families				67	67	67%
Target				100	100	
Beneficiaries				316	316	
Modification 3						
Total houses				403	403	101%
Target				400	400	
Total Families				400	400	148%
Target				594	594	
Beneficiaries				3014	3014	
Objective Total						
Total Houses	94	7	141	650	892	117%
Target	60	30	80	590	760	
Total Families	179	14	391	921	1505	118%
Target	180	90	240	770	1280	
Total Beneficiaries	880	64	1759	4888	7591	
Average beneficiaries per family	4.9	4.5	4.5	5.7	5.05	



B. Project Successes

ADRA successfully achieved and surpassed its targets. The project achieved 118% of the project target number of prepared rooms and families. ADRA also exceeded the house objective, winterizing 892 houses, a 117% completion of the target of 260.

The achievement of project targets resulted from several activity successes. At the start of the program, tripartite contract periods with the owners were set to conclude on the May 1, 2000. This was extended such that each owner committed the house initially for a period of 6 months and this was extended to provide for 12 months contracts to overcome those contracts concluding at the onset of winter 2000

Many of the beneficiaries in the programs were eligible for inclusion into reconstruction programs that commenced midway through 2000. Many had already left the project accommodation and had been repatriated back to their own properties. Due to the variations in the formation of the Municipal Housing committees, the project had no significant influence with the selection committees in each municipality although representations were made where it was known that a beneficiary might have been eligible and beneficiaries were amongst the priority groups.

Differences between the shelter assistance provided by the Temporary Community Shelters programs and this program also arose. It was strongly argued that the TCS programs created a level of long term dependency by the beneficiaries in that every aspect of daily living was being catered for. This program demanded a large level of self-dependency of the beneficiaries and consequently, the majority of them used the accommodation provided as a staging point from which to commence reconstruction of their own dwellings. This allowed a number of rooms to be reused thereby accommodating more than one family.

C. Factors affecting the Program Performance

As with any program of this magnitude and duration, a number of problems arose which had material but little detrimental effect on the overall performance. These problems ranged from some inaccuracies in the early assumptions, the early lack of a supply infrastructure, shifting social conditions and community demands and unexpected lengthy demands on the services provided by the program.

Factors associated with initial program assumptions.

Final reporting of houses, families and beneficiaries was based on early assumptions that included the following.

1. The average house could accommodate a host family plus 2 additional families.
2. The average family comprised 6 people.
3. The beneficiary households identified by ADRA's community services program are willing to do the winterising work in conjunction with the owner and ADRA's technical supervisor by providing free labour.
4. It is culturally acceptable for Kosovar families to temporarily reside in structures completed to a minimum standard to ensure winter shelter.
5. It is possible to procure sufficient building materials (doors, windows, timber, plastic sheeting, terracotta bricks, etc) in the local market to provide winterised shelter in 260 unfinished houses
6. It is possible to identify 260 unfinished houses and their owners and negotiate adequate arrangements for use of the structures by returnee/IDP families as temporary houses (up to 9 months).
7. Security in the target areas remains at a level that does not jeopardize target families or project personnel
8. Other implicit presumptions were also prove an obstacle in the program. These included:
9. Those beneficiaries will not require management after they had been placed in Unfinished Houses.
10. Water, Sanitation and electricity will not be provided beyond what can be covered in the Sundries item line.

These factors proved to be incorrect as a general rule in urban living although they may have approximated the conditions across the more regional areas of Kosovo.

a. *Factors associated with house sizes assumptions.*

The project found that the average number of rooms to be obtained from the houses selected was 2.10 across the 4 centres with variations in each centre.

The program initially aimed for a minimum level of habitable space at 4m² per person. An early assumption being that the average room could accommodate an average family of 6 persons in an area of 24m². It was found during the course of the project that the average room sizes were in fact in the order of 16m², and a single room could accommodate a family of 4 persons. The average number of beneficiaries per family across the whole project was found to be 4.9 persons. This often required that a single family be allocated 2 rooms to meet the minimum levels of habitation set by the Sphere project.

In addition, during the final stages of the project, minimum habitation levels within the province had been set by UNMIK at 6m² per person.

In areas such as Mitrovica, a greater number of houses included in the program provided access to 1 or 2 rooms only. In Gjakova however, larger houses were often available, at times providing accommodation for up to 14 families.

b. *Factors associated with Average family sizes assumptions.*

As indicated earlier in this report, the total number of beneficiaries was initially determined on the basis of an average of 6 members per family. This was not in fact the case. The recorded average number of members per family in the program was 4.96 and in the majority of centres it being 4.6. Many families were initially recorded as the total members from the one family group such that 1, 2 3 or even 4 families may have been accommodated under the one family name of the senior member.

Also a family unit was redefined during the course of the project to be a nuclear family comprising 2 parents and their children if any. Where a single grandparent resided with the family, this was still counted as one family. In the early stages of the project, a large family may have comprised one or two family units but has been counted as one family.

In the later modification to the project, more than one family co-occupied the house selected and increased the total number of nuclear families.

c. *Factors associated with the assumption of capacity of beneficiary families to do shelter work.*

This was an initial problem in getting the project started. The beneficiaries targeted were predominantly those with female heads of family or the elderly. These people by definition had little skill or physical capacity to perform the works required in the program without the intervention of project staff. Initial program local staffing was directed towards professional engineers. As the program progressed, these were also used to construct the shelters with specialist plumbers and electricians being engaged.

d. *Factors associated with acceptability of temporary shelter to Kosovar families.*

It was found initially that many families chose to remain in tents on their own land without water and sanitation and social support services due to the need to remain with livestock, the fear of property title disputes and the fear that they would not be included in reconstruction programs. This created some early difficulties in bringing rural families into urban shelter programs. This was the largest source of early returnees.

e. *Factors associated with the availability of materials*

At the commencement of the project, many of the basic materials required for the project were not available due to the infrastructures being destroyed as a consequence of the conflict. The program was obliged to import many materials from surrounding countries yet at the same time many significant effort to support the local industries. One supplier supported during the program had established a manufacturing facility of



doors and windows in a tent. Although they had a limited capacity, they could produce products acceptable at the time.

Later in the program, the owners were reluctant to release their houses where only basic quality materials had been used. This resulted in a shift towards higher quality of material for the program. Fortunately the number of local suppliers had increased and finding alternate manufacturers in the same pricing structure was no longer a problem.

Another early problem, particularly in the supply of imported materials, was the lengthy blockage at the Macedonian border. Many importers were stalled at the border unless they paid a substantial fee to the Macedonian police controlling their movement. It is generally accepted that this was not an official fee.

Transport within Kosovo was generally not a problem except for a period when heavy snow had blocked the primary routes between Prishtina and Gjakova for some weeks.

Problems also existed in the competition between NGO's in their quest to complete individual programs at the expense of others. Little effort amongst the humanitarian community existed to consolidate the movement of materials into and around the country. In another program, under OFDA coordination, considerable success was to be had in bringing in timber and other materials via the rail line that had been recently renovated.

f. Factors associated with availability of houses.

It was an initial assumption that 10% of the housing stock in Kosovo was Unfinished Housing and within the parameters of the project. Problems arose in that at the early stages of the program, a large number of unfinished houses could be seen to be available in the urban areas, yet the owners could not be located or contacted, either being refugees themselves or residents in other countries. This was particularly evident in the larger city of Prishtina where unlike in Mitrovica and Gjakova that had existing neighbourhood networks, caused a slow start in this centre. This situation eased significantly although was still evident towards the end of the program when many owners had been repatriated back to Kosovo. Some contracts were arranged through third persons with the owners residing in countries as far away as Germany and America.

g. Factors associated with Security.

Security with opposing forces was not a problem through out the duration of the project but was isolated to issues with some beneficiaries of the program. Many Kosovar Albanians resorted to a posture of violence in order to secure some tangible benefits. Although there was more than one incident, only one incident of a death threat to a worker in the program required the intervention of police services. That matter still proceeds at the conclusion of this program. Mitrovica was often the centre of possible security problems with demonstrations and conflicts between opposing groups of Albanian and Serbians. This generally had little effect on the work except for the restriction of movement. The balance of works was conducted under the daily security regime of Kosovo.

h. Factors associated with contract management.

It was generally assumed that the tripartite contracts would be maintained without the intervention of the project coordinators beyond the term of the project. This was an error that may have seen substantial problems arising between owners and beneficiaries and then between different beneficiary families residing in the one house. The project coordinator and the area coordinators spent substantial time resolving issues between these groups. The program extensions allowed for the continued monitoring of these problems and difficulties.

i. Factors associated with materials allocations.

The early materials allocation to the program had been fairly rigid and did not include the provision of electrical power reticulation and water-sanitation facilities. Without these, many beneficiary families early in the program were reluctant to move into the buildings. An early request and agreement with the donor for these materials relieved this situation. A minimum number of water-sanitation kits were provided requiring



the balance to be procured from the existing budget. Targeting larger houses and providing a communal bathroom and basic common electrical reticulation achieved economies of scale. Additional to the allocation of these materials was the requirement to engage suitably qualified personal to install within regional guidelines. The program staff was reorganised to provide for this personal.

Factors associated with shifting community standards.

Another significant factor that affected the program was the shift in community standards and attitudes towards living to an adapted lifestyle. At the commencement of this project, a large number of the beneficiaries had been living under what was considered to be less than ideal conditions. What was not realized very well was that they had to a large extent, over a period of time, adapted their lives to that condition and in reality, looked to incurring a substantial change before altering their accommodation. This program aimed to raise their conditions to a minimum level but stopped short of full reconstruction, which the majority sought.

Connected to this was the dramatic shift in community support to the refugee position towards a more self-interested approach. Whereas at the conclusion of the war in 1999, the majority of people in the community was prepared to and did assist those in a more unfortunate situation, a year and a half afterwards, the community has a greater propensity to get as much for them from the system as is possible.

At the conclusion of the program, the need for the provision of shelter had also shifted. At the commencement, many families had become fragmented and without support networks as a result of the conflict. Throughout the program these networks had been reinstated and satisfactory alternatives could be achieved. In a few, although insignificant instances, beneficiaries were found to be exploiting the shelter services.

Many humanitarian programs operating in Kosovo have significantly contributed towards a "handout mentality" in the Kosovar community that was a factor that ADRA actively sought to prevent. Based on what was perceived to be occurring throughout the community, beneficiaries were demanding their "rights" to the access of materials as distinct from their need. As the various programs wind down, it becomes evident that individuals may not be eligible for future assistance and so the fabrication of living conditions and financial circumstances has become more prevalent. A number of beneficiaries selected in the program, had at the time of their selection, given all of the appearance of being in great need yet in a number of instances and well after the event, it became clear that they had perhaps not given a truthful account of their circumstance. This possibly accounted for up to 5% of the overall number of beneficiaries families selected during the final stages in the program.

The final activities of the program were devoted towards the provision of shelter for those refugees who normally resided on the north side of Mitrovica yet for political reasons, could neither be included in reconstruction programs nor could they return to their homes to commence reconstruction. Many are from the "intellectual group" within the community and most are without meaningful employment, living on handouts from humanitarian organisations or emoluments from extended families. ADRA fears that this group of refugees will become long-term dependants on shelter assistance.

Factors associated with other agencies.

Early in the program, UNHCR created shelter coordination meeting in most centres. These operated at varying levels of success. In most centres, the selection of beneficiaries was the responsibility of the NGO with the assistance from UNHCR. The UNHCR office in Ferazaj imposed restrictions on the organised movement of refugees from villages where the predominant damage had occurred. Not with standing, many refugees moved to urban centres largely because of the support systems in place there. The program did not succeed in Ferazaj because of this restriction and resources were moved to the other centres.

Liaison existed between many agencies during the course of the program and cooperation on a smaller scale could be achieved, particularly towards the end of the project. Project managers and field office managers regularly attended coordination meeting in all centres. It was apparent at the early stages that many agencies were being frustrated by the same problems and were reluctant to give ground.



Many additional services outside of primary shelter were being coordinated by other agencies. Project staff at each office was constantly in contact with these agencies to assist those beneficiaries who for one reason or another, required help. This may have been in the capacity of food allocations, firewood or clothing. Various other programs coordinated by ADRA in this regard were heavily drawn upon.

Factors associated with funding

For the majority of the program, little problem was encountered with funding difficulties save that there was little concept of the financial handling difficulties associated with the program implementation. Without adequate banking facilities and poor security in the province, it became necessary to rely upon the services available in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the early stages of the project, this required frequent trips to Skopje from Prishtina to return with operating funds. This created several lengthy delays due to the border being either closed or blocked for periods from several hours to several days. The program funding should have incorporated the provision for funds handling security either individually or in association with other organisations working in the province.

The modifications of the program were initiated as a funded extension. Difficulties arose in the implementation of these stages. This caused a slight delay in recreating operational effectiveness within the short time allocated to this part of the project. These are generally attributed to the late start of the program that came about from a delayed approval process. In this instance, although a limited pre-grant authorization was given as from the 18 November 2000, final signing of the contracts and the release of funds did not take place until 17 January 2001. This incurred a cash flow constraint on the procurement of materials and the payment of salaries at an early stage of the project. Effectively, this left ADRA with the ability to procure materials only during the last 6 to 8 weeks of a sixteen-week modified period.

Connected to this was the dramatic shift in community support to the refugee position towards a more self-interested approach. Whereas at the conclusion of the war in 1999, the majority of people in the community was prepared to and did assist those in a more unfortunate situation, a year and a half afterwards, the community has a greater propensity to get as much for them from the system as is possible.

Although it was argued that social vulnerability was to be the criteria for selection, many cases that sought assistance lived in similar circumstance prior to the war and often had sustained no damages or loss during the war. ADRA took the objective of the program to favor those whose conditions had been altered because of the war and had little recourse to providing suitable alternatives. A beneficiary whose had a long history of poor housing and domestic economics was in reality, in a far better shelter position than a great number who appeared to be more affluent but had no recourse or prospect to rehabilitate their own house due to its proximity within the Serbian areas in the north of Mitrovica and had as a consequence of the war, lost their houses and all of their possessions.

The extreme winter conditions for which the program was established, fortunately failed to materialize even though it had a psychological effect on the program output. In many of the villages involved in this municipality, snow was on the ground for less than a week throughout the whole winter period. In some regions though, particularly in the mountains this was generally longer. Still, the winter has been very mild and not produced the same urgency as had been noticed in the preceding year.

II. Resources Use/ Expenditure

A. Summary and Explanation of Expenditure

The initial allocation and distribution of funds for the material inputs to houses was determined according the a convenient conversion of US dollars to German Deutch marks that allowed an average budget of approximately 1000 GDM per family. Material schedules for each project were manually compiled that used this average.

This amount was generated on the basis of specified materials being provided, effectively a kit, to each beneficiary family. This generally proved ineffective, as each situation was different. Following discussions



with the field office, it evolved that a more flexible approach be allowed that produced habitable housing. From this point on, a greater dependency on maintaining a set budget per family was required.

Initially, this average figure was not being reached and extra capacity was apparently initially available. As time progressed and as mentioned earlier, in order to contract houses towards the end of the project for periods of 12 months, a higher input per family was required. The final averages being used were in the order of 1300 GDM per family.

As the project progressed and services were reinstated to the province, the ability to have materials delivered to site at no cost increased, allowing substantial savings in transport hire and maintenance costs. These amounts allowed for early review of the budgets providing for changes to operation costs that were submitted and approved with each extension. Savings in the line items for tools could also be reallocated either to local staff salaries and field operational costs.

There were slight cost overruns in materials expenditure and the project finished slightly over budget. The project fund details are included with this report.

The final analysis of expenditure suggests that the value of assistance including operational costs provided per family was US\$ 1361.00 per family and US\$ 270.00 per beneficiary. The initial objective provided for US\$ 1500.00 per family and US\$ 250.00 per beneficiary. This slight discrepancy exists due to the assumptions of families being 6 people rather than an actual 5.05 people as found.