


**ACCORD SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
FOR THE PERIOD
01 APRIL TO 30 SEPTEMBER 99
SUBMITTED TO USAID**



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1. ***EXECUTIVE SUMMARY***

This semi-annual report comes at a time when we at ACCORD have completed our first phase in the consolidation process, which commenced in 1997. We are happy to report that the systems that were designed during most of 1998 have been implemented fully by all Divisions within ACCORD.

We have outlined the activities and lessons learnt for the different programmes and units at ACCORD. The report has been drafted in the form of two quarterly reports, one for the period March to June 1999 and the other for period July to September 1999. Kindly note that we have attempted to make the report readable by clearly identifying the period that is under review.

Some of the highlights of the activities involved in are listed for ease of reference:-

1. Trained both North and South Sudanese women (in Cairo and Nairobi) in conflict management in anticipation of them acting as facilitators of the Peace process in Sudan.
2. Hosted a Northern Ireland delegation of youth (Protestants and Catholics) and trained them together with a Southern African Youth delegation in Conflict Management. A video of this exchange was produced for circulation broadly with a hope of engaging the Northern Ireland citizenry in the peace and reconciliation process.
3. Trained approximately 428 senior staff in Conflict Management skills at KwaZulu Natal Provincial Department of Health. Early indications are that there has been a notable decrease in conflicts within the department. As a result of the success of this programme the KZN Department of Health has contributed approximately R1.5 million in 1999 for ongoing training of their staff and promised a further R3 million for the period 2000 - 2001. This programme has been exceptionally well received and indications are that it will be replicated in other parts of the Continent.
4. Trained 111 staff from Durban Metropolitan Department of Health and Electricity in team building and Conflict Management with special emphasis on race, culture and transformation.
5. Facilitated a meeting with all protagonists from the Democratic Republic of the Congo including senior representatives from Civil society as well as opposition groups.
6. Our Intervention programme trained approximately 2000 observers for the Nigerian elections.
7. The Research Unit provided early warning reports on a number of African Countries.
8. We published three issues of Conflict Trends, a range of Occasional Papers and Monographs that are available upon request.
9. Our peacekeeping programme is fast being seen as the leading think tank on Peacekeeping issues in Africa and the world. We facilitated all civilian aspects of operation Blue Crane, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping exercise, involving all

countries in the region.

10. The Peacekeeping programme conducted the first Conflict Management course for Peacekeepers in partnership with the Zimbabwe Staff College. This is the first such training that peacekeepers have undergone in Africa and possibly in the world.
11. The Peacekeeping Programme conducted the first civil military training course in Peacekeeping operations in Africa and potentially the first such course outside of UN type courses.
12. In late November, we will dispatch the inaugural issue of the African Journal on Conflict Resolution. This is the first such Journal in Africa.
13. Trained senior members of the OAU Central Organ in advanced conflict management skills. This proved to be very successful with the potential for follow-up activities planned for 2000.
14. The Executive Director served as commissioner to the South African Police Services Racism committee.

These are some of the highlights of our activities during this reporting period. More detailed discussions can be found in the following chapters.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING UNIT

01 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 1999

Over the past three months, the Training Unit has conducted twelve training sessions averaging one training per week. Although the majority of trainings were for the Public Sector Conflict Management Programme, this unit also conducted training for youth.

PUBLIC SECTOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME (PSCMP)

The Training Unit has continued its commitment to the PSCMP training for the Provincial Department of Health. This entailed the training of four groups in the following Courses: Basic Conflict Resolution, Advanced Mediation, and Facilitation. Furthermore, the Training Unit also conducted two trainings for the Durban Metro Department of Health.

Trainers for the Public Sector Programme were Karthi Govender (Deputy Director), Alison Lazarus (Training Manager), Pravina Makan-Lakha (PSCMP Manager), Oluwakemi Ogusanyo (Trainer for Public Sector), and Mernie Crane (Independent Consultant).

◆ COMMENTS FROM PARTICIPANTS:

There has been positive feedback from participants about ACCORD's training. They appreciate the method employed by the trainers who facilitate participatory involvement in the training. Participants have generally been happy with the conduct of the trainers, as they are approachable, open minded and patient. A common comment from those who have participated is that ACCORD's training gives ample opportunity to contextualize what is learnt in terms of their own work situation.

Participants have also raised some logistical issues aimed at improving the training:

- ACCORD must document its mediation involvement with the view to share lessons drawn with future participants who go out and train others.
- The Training Unit must devise means of rendering support for participants after training has ended.

Overall, participants express gratitude for a well structured and aptly presented training.

Composite of Public Sector Trainings:

DATE	CLIENTS	TYPE OF TRAINING	GENDER	COUNTRY	STATISTICS
7-9/04/99	DEPT.OF HEALTH METRO	BASIC	12F& 9M	SA	22
13-15/04/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH METRO	BASIC	12F & 12 M	SA	24
28-30/04/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH	BASIC		SA	22
11-13/04/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	BASIC	12 F & 9 M	SA	22
18-20/04/99	DEPT.OF HEALTH PROV	BASIC	9F & 13 M	SA	22
25-4/06/99	EIL	BASIC	11F & 12 M	SA	23
8-10/06/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	BASIC	9 F & 13M	SA	22
17-19/06/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	ADVANCE	11 F & 9 M	SA	20
22-24/06/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	ADVANCE	9 F & 13 M	SA	22
29-01/07/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	ADVANCED	12 F & 8 M	SA	20
28-30/06/99	DEPT. OF ELECTRICITY	BASIC	8 F & 10 M	SA	17
06-08/07/99	DEPT.OF HEALTH PROV	ADVANCE	8 F & 14 M	SA	22
14-15/07/99	DEPT. OF ELECTRICITY	BASIC	9 F & 13 M	SA	22
21-22/07/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	FACILITATION	9 F & 13 M	SA	22
21-23/07/99	DEPT. OF ELECTRICITY	BASIC	9 F & 12 M	SA	21
28-29/07/99	DEPT. OF HEALTH PROV	FACILITATION	12 F & 8 M	SA	20
			152 F & 168 M		343 TOTAL

YOUTH

ACCORD in association with Experiments in International Living (EIL) and the latter's associate, The National Union of Students – Ulster Students (NUS-US), organised a two phase cultural exchange and training programme for Youth with funds from Europe, a cash counterpart from EIL, and counterpart in kind from ACCORD. The aim was to share stories and country experiences under the theme “**Path from Conflict to Peace**”. The first phase, led by ACCORD, has taken place in Durban, South Africa in June 1999 while the second phase is set to take place in Northern Ireland in December 1999.

◆ PARTICIPANTS PROFILE

ACCORD invited its associate, Umtapo Centre, to nominate four delegates, from outside of KZN, who are involved in Peace Education in communities and in Youth work. The other five South African delegates included one Catholic nominated by the Catholic Youth Commission; one Protestant nominated by the Methodist Church; a member of Gogo Tales, a cultural and drama group working with youth in drama and education programmes; one member of the Unexplored Graduates Initiative (UGI); and a member of the Muslim Youth Movement.

The visiting delegation included student leadership (presidents and office bearers) from student unions in the Republic of Ireland (2 delegates) and Northern Ireland (8 delegates), one facilitator, the managing director of the Student Centre in Belfast and the director of the EIL – Ireland Office. There was also one of two expected student leaders from Swaziland.

The participants were all highly articulate, questioning in their stance and very involved in group and youth work.

◆ TRAINING

The programme was a varied one. It included training in basic conflict resolution, a focus on enhancing interpersonal relationships, interactive sessions with youth leadership of various political parties, shadowing of community leaders, visits to communities and museums to encourage co-operative learning, and an interfaith meditation to build religious tolerance.

Participants had the following to say about the training and interchange:

- “Learnt a lot about conflict resolution. Feel equipped to lead a share session. Learnt more about other cultures. Made new friends. Learnt more about myself”
- “Heard the theory. Got the exposure. Had a great craic! Let's go to Ireland”
- “Learnt more about unionist ideas. Learnt more about South Africans and Swazis. Learnt the basis of conflict resolution”
- “I have been uplifted - I now realise the responsibility and power I have as a young person and I must use it wisely”
- “Expectations have been fulfilled because we had enough time to know more about Northern Ireland and South Africa. The informal discussions out of the session were friendly and interesting. Some of the information was obtained in these discussions”
- “My main expectation was to be non-racial. My expectations were realised / achieved. My

challenge is now to live with them and keep them with me for the sake of others”

- “My expectations were achieved: tried many cocktails; chatted up and hugged many SA “chicks”; learnt some Irish which was brilliant fun and taught me it can be used socially and not as a weapon; learnt how racist I was which was shocking having seen the effects of apartheid in reality”.

INTERNS

The Training Unit had Asa Ekvall from Uppsala University in Sweden join ACCORD from 23rd June – 30th September. One of her main tasks was to translate training manuals into French. ACCORD also afforded her the opportunity to participate in the EIL youth training after which she produced a report on the exchange. As part of her internship, Asa visited the ACCORD Rural Office in Worcester on a one-month placement. While there, Asa assisted in tracking and documenting the training conducted by the rural office and also continued with her own research.

Asa has also written a paper entitled *Demobilisation and Re-integration of Ex-combatants into the Civil Society in Angola and Mozambique* for possible publication in Conflict Trends.

PUBLICATIONS

The Training Unit has produced the following articles for Conflict Trends:

Creating Capital for Conflict Resolution: The Principle of Emancipation by Alison Lazarus. This article was based on an interview with Professor Kwesi Prah, Director of the Centre for the Study of African Society (CASAS)

Youth Work: Challenges for Africa by Alison Lazarus, presented at a workshop organised by the School of Social and Community Sciences, Ulster University Jordanstown Belfast, Northern Ireland.

STAFF DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION

- From 11th –16th April Michael Langa attended a Conference on Youth Conflict Prevention in Africa held in Zambia.
- On 10th May Michael Langa attended a computer course at Westville University
- On 12th May Michael Langa attended an advanced course at Westville University.
- From 15th – 16th May Michael Langa attended a Mediation workshop that was designed for IEC Mediators on behalf of ACCORD.
- On 24th May Kemi Ogunyango and Michael Langa attended a workshop on Racism at Westville University.
- From 12th – 19th June Alison Lazarus delivered a keynote address at the first Annual Youth conference organised by the School of Social and Community Sciences Ulster University, Belfast, Northern Ireland.

CONCLUSION

The second quarter highlights that with the appropriate staff component and capacity, it is possible to conduct training every week. It also suggests that much of the training is taking place in South Africa. The Training Unit must now shift its work consistently into the rest of Africa

01 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1999

The 3rd quarter of 1999 involved training of students and staff in schools, as well as middle managers in Public Sector departments such as the KZN Provincial Department of Health and Durban Metro Department of Electricity. The Training Unit has managed to conduct 19 trainings in which 412 participants were trained. Out of the 19 trainings, one was for Sudanese women and 5 were for Youth in South Africa. The Training Unit was also involved, together with the Peacekeeping Programme, in training Company Commanders from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Conflict Management. In this quarter, Anitha Sunder, a new intern from the University of Oslo, joined the Training Unit.

PUBLIC SECTOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

◆ THE METRO DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICITY (DOE)

Customer services staff from DOE was involved in Conflict Management training. The main aim here was to communicate and achieve "team building" through teamwork. Extensive use was made of participative and interactive team oriented exercises which required participants to assume roles within their groups, and work towards meeting a common objective. Such activities served to increase cohesion, insight into work processes, inter-dependencies and the effectiveness of team relations. In addition, participants were able to explore the value of communication and establish a balance between attending to the task and attending to people. In the discussions that followed after each exercise, problems were identified and participants generated suggestions for improvement. This encouraged critical and active identification and reflection of functional customer service "team" processes.

◆ THE PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH)

Participants from the Provincial Department of Health were trained in Advanced Mediation, Facilitation and Collaborative Decision-Making. The training in Collaborative Decision-Making was of special interest to the participants who are engaged in health delivery within the context of limited resources. This course provided the participants with the opportunity to use the tools introduced to address real life challenges being posed in the Health Sector, such as how to use CDM to implement the District Health System, restructuring and rationalisation in health institutions and the implementation of Human Resource Development Policy. The video that was used to demonstrate the Negotiated Investment Strategy was found useful. Participants highlighted the need for the government to become more sensitive to its role as initiator, party in interest and equal stakeholder in Collaborative Decision Making processes.

ENGENDERING PEACE PROCESS

In support of the many existing peace activities by Sudanese women, the Royal Netherlands Embassy initiated "The Initiative to Facilitate the Participation of Sudanese Women in the Peace Process" hereafter known as The Initiative. All parties in the conflict have formed Women Working Committees. Through a mediator, each Working Committee will hold hearings in its constituency, to collect the grassroots' views on the conflict and on women's contributions to peacemaking.

In July ACCORD's Training Unit conducted the second training for the woman of Sudan.

Participants were trained for ten days in Basic Conflict Management, Facilitation and Collaborative Decision-Making. They later commented that the CDM training went beyond their expectation, inspired them to give the training to others, helped them analyse the weaknesses and difficulties in the Initiative and highlighted the need for understanding that conflict resolution requires the transformation of power and not just the transfer of power. The course also made it clear that in order for CDM to work it must be linked with and supported by external and formal legislative power.

MANAGING CONFLICT IN EDUCATION

A programme has been developed for schools. This course, which targets students, staff and governing bodies, aims to provide youth with tools that will aid the development of a positive attitude and skills for handling conflict creatively. It also assists in building the capacity of schools to manage their conflict.

The Training Unit has managed to conduct 6 trainings in this quarter. The learners enjoyed the methods used, which include role-plays, team building exercises and poster making.

The aim is to set up peer mediation forums in schools to enable youth to handle their conflicts. It is hoped that with both staff and students building their capacity in conflict resolution, efforts to re-establish a culture of learning based on mutual respect can re-emerge.


INTERNSHIP

Anitha Sunder has joined the training unit as an intern for eight months. She is from the University of Oslo in Norway. Her programme includes:

1. Assisting the Training Unit in compiling a list and database of African Women's Organisations regionally with the aim of identifying potential civil society partner organisations for ACCORD.
2. Tracking ACCORD's training for women, conducted from 1994 to 1998, for contribution towards a report on ACCORD's training efforts with women.
3. Submitting an article written from a gender perspective to Conflict Trends.
4. Submitting an article based on her personal study to Conflict Trends.
5. Being a full participant in the training in Basic Conflict Resolution.
6. Conducting administrative tasks for the Training Unit.

CONCLUSION

The 3rd quarter has been productive and sees the majority of our training commitment being complete. The Training Unit has continued to service all various programmes as the following pie chart indicates.



COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

01 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 1999

The second quarter of 1999 has been an important period of consolidation for the Communication & Information Unit, while some significant restructuring also took place. In Communications, a second, and substantially enhanced issue of *Conflict Trends* was released to a very positive reception from both African and international audiences; development of the new ACCORD branding identity has been ongoing. From an information systems perspective, a new mail-server has been installed and users ported to Lotus Notes software.

STRUCTURING THE UNIT

This will be the last joint Communications & Information report. As of June 1999, Ian Henderson-Wille, the Unit Manager, left fulltime employment at ACCORD and rejoined the staff as a consultant to manage information systems. As a result the Unit has now been split into a Communications Unit and an IT Unit. Angela Thomas is currently taking responsibility for Communications and reports directly to the Deputy Director for Operations.

◆ THE PERIOD IN REVIEW

The outstanding achievements of the preceding quarter have been the launch of the *Conflict Trends* magazine and the confirmation of the partnership agreement with IBM.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT

Further progress has been made towards IT systems implementation at ACCORD.

- ACCORD's proposal to IBM was concluded and delivered to the IBM Foundation, on the recommendation of IBM South Africa. The proposal motivates for IBM to support a full outsourcing arrangement with IBM's business partners assisting in the development of Lotus Notes-based information management and knowledge management systems. Initial indications via IBM's South African operations, are that the Foundation will support further hardware and software acquisitions for ACCORD and will, over a period of time, leverage its development and R&D experience to support the organisation's development of the necessary systems.
- ACCORD has now migrated onto an on-site Lotus Domino 4.6 Mail Server, and clients are running Lotus Notes. This has greatly enhanced messaging functionality and allowed us also to equip travelling users with remote access to the mail system.
- A Computer Based Training (CBT) station is now active. Use to this point has been moderate, but positive feedback has been received on the system.

WEBSITE

Substantial amounts of work have gone into redesigning and updating ACCORD's website. It has been migrated to a new server with scripting facilities to allow us to include interactive elements. Over the next six months we will be revising all content on the site.

COMMUNICATIONS

The major achievement of the Unit in this area was the completion of the second issue of *Conflict Trends*. This publication is now enhanced in both volume and content and has been very well received. Particularly noteworthy are the in-depth and thorough *Conflict Watch* and *Renaissance Barometer* sections, which have been attracting much positive feedback and offer pointers to the type of output that can be expected from the ACCNET system.

Editorial responsibility for the publication has now been handed over to the Research Unit, and a freelance editor contracted to perform language and grammar editing and image sourcing.

Ongoing production work of the Unit has included:

- Continuing development of the branding identity: production of new stationery and document covers.
- Design assistance to programme staff for printed documents and presentations.

THE WAY AHEAD

The key challenge facing the Communications Unit for the rest of 1999 is to develop the capacity and efficiency to handle a vastly increased demand on their resources. *Conflict Trends* is now under regular quarterly production, and the first edition of ACCORD's new journal has been received for production. Substantial work will also need to be put in to revise many of ACCORD's marketing publications that are out-of-date and no longer reflect ACCORD's new branding image.

From an IT perspectives we have come a long way towards implementing a basic, stable IT network at ACCORD. We are now on the threshold of beginning development towards substantial information management systems. Whether this will be on a large scale with IBM's corporate assistance, or on a smaller, internally managed scale is as yet unclear. A second challenge is to develop ACCORD's focus on the Internet as a primary marketing and information-sharing vehicle.

01 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER

This quarter has been a productive one for ACCORD's Information Technology Unit. Most of the fundamental problems and inadequacies in the information infrastructure have been dealt with and a solid foundation laid to proceed with the much-anticipated information systems development which will give rise to the full-blown ACCNET system.

The major disappointment of the period has been a lack of success in confirming IBM's response to the proposal submitted to them over six months ago. ACCORD's ambitious IT implementation vision hinges on IBM's support and it is thus a major priority to confirm exactly at what level that support will continue to be offered.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT

The primary focus of the last quarter has been on stabilising the network, thereby preparing the foundation for ACCORD's information systems growth in the year 2000. The lack of attention paid to this area had resulted in increasing numbers of problems emerging, but it has been satisfying to note that these have largely decreased:

- **Information Security**: ACCORD now has a reliable backup strategy in place. Automated overnight backups are augmented by off-site storage of weekly and monthly backups to ensure data security. Openness to destruction of the network by viruses remains a major concern, as the current anti-virus software is out-of-date and terminal-based, but repeated urgent application has been made to IBM to provide the network-based anti-virus software to protect the entire network and that should be implemented in the short term.
- **Communication**: Roll out of improved communication through the Notes/Domino system has continued. Staff equipped with computers at home, or exclusive-use laptops (including the Executive- and Deputy-Director) now have off-site access to the email systems. Staff who is travelling can now be equipped with a laptop linked to the main system. Cape-based staff are now also in the communication loop.
- **Notes Development**: functionality has been built into the Notes system to allow for on-line reservation and management of key organisational resources, including venues and equipment.
- **Contacts Databases**: a substantial amount of work has been invested by administrative staff in upgrading and updating the contact details on ACCORD's database. To better support this, the entire database interface has been redeveloped, and appropriate levels of security implemented to protect data.
- **Africa Peace Award**: Unlike in previous years, database management for the APA is to be handled completely in-house, and extra functionality has been built into the ACCORD database to handle this. Registration at the award ceremonies will be handled through this same system.

TRAINING & USER SUPPORT

Four training sessions in use of the Lotus Notes system were run during this period. Concerning the Microsoft Office packages which are the only applications which most staff members utilise, the training strategy has been focused on Commuter-Based Training (CBT) at a dedicated CBT terminal. Unfortunately use of the CBT terminal has been very low, despite the fact that those who have used the terminal have been satisfied with it. This must be dramatically improved in the future.

User help-desk support still demands a reasonably large amount of time, in the region of 8 hours per week. This is perhaps in line with the size and sophistication of our network and user-base.

ACCNET

ACCNET is primarily a partnership between ACCORD's Research and IT Units, the latter developing the infrastructure and the former the content and management of the project.

In late March a proposal was submitted to IBM for that infrastructure development to be effectively outsourced to an IBM business partner. The strategic planning and design of the systems would be assisted by an in-house representative, but all development and management of the actual IT systems was to be carried out by the outsourcing agent. Despite considerable pressure being placed on IBM, ACCORD has as yet no confirmation as to whether that proposal has been accepted.

However, covert indications are that IBM will supply ACCORD with the necessary hardware and software to run the system, and provide development support on an ad-hoc basis as the systems develop. With this in mind as a worst-case scenario, R&D time has been spent on preparing to build the systems in-house at ACCORD. As soon as R5 of Lotus Notes is implemented (see "Future Plans") that development will commence.

In the interim an ACCNET website will be operational by the end of November 1999. This site will be fully searchable, and will contain all of the current research, accessible through an image-based interactive format. However, it will not represent a full incarnation of the ACCNET concept in that it will be a static database as opposed to a live portal to the full information system, which comprises ACCNET.

WEBSITE

During this last quarter ACCORD's website has been extensively revised and rebuilt:

- Completely new and redesigned presentation to comply with ACCORD's new corporate branding image. Every page on the site redesigned to fit new image (currently 266 pages);
- Issues 2 and 3 of Conflict Trends added – for the first time the on-line version of Conflict Trends was published before the printed version;
- All occasional papers added to the website, and all ACCORD publications now consolidated in the publications section of the website;

- Interactive order forms added to the site for publication ordering and for people to update their change of address details directly through the website;
- Training section of the website was rebuilt – we are awaiting a spate of new information for the training site as per our discussions with the training team; this will further revitalise the training section of the website;
- New staff bio's added to the staff database.

The opportunity presents itself for ACCORD to make the Internet its primary marketing and communication tool. Certainly, as ACCNET comes on-line, major focus is going to be placed on ACCORD's web presence. The challenge here is to get staff to display a sense of ownership over the website and to utilise it through their programmes. It is unreasonable to expect that the webmaster will actively develop each programmatic section of the site without the support of the individual programme managers and staffers concerned.

FUTURE PLANS

The future focus of ACCORD's Information Systems Unit is highly contingent on the imminent outcome of the proposal to IBM. IBM's Corporate Social Responsibility Manager is currently in the US discussing this matter with the IBM Foundation.

We thus conceive of a "high road" and a "low road". The former will result should IBM fully support ACCORD's proposal. An outsourced IT service-provider will be contracted, and the focus of any internal IT services will be on design and strategy around scoping the IT systems with the service provider to guarantee that the most appropriate systems are implemented.

The "low road" scenario will result if IBM are unwilling to fund the outsourcing of ACCORD's IT services. ACCORD's planned IT systems, and particularly ACCNET, will then have to be developed in-house. Out sources suggest that at this juncture this scenario appears to be the most likely scenario. Taking this into consideration, the following will be the foci of the final quarter of 1999. The "Information Systems Strategic Review of 2000" document will outline the full plans for 2000.

- **ACCNET**: by the end of November a static ACCNET site will be in operation. This will appear to the end user as an interactive site with pseudo-GIS interface and it will be searchable; however, the ACCNET databases will not be live on the Internet at this juncture. Database scoping will occur during this period with the Research division and other key staff at ACCORD.
- **Website**: work will continue on upgrading and developing ACCORD's Internet site. The primary focus during this period, however, will be to make the site fully searchable.
- **Fax server**: it is planned, as a matter of urgency, to install a fax server on ACCORD's network. This is, however, conditional on IBM making the necessary hardware and applications available to ACCORD, as we do not have the budgets to purchase such systems at this point.
- **Notes/Domino R5**: it is planned to upgrade to Release 5 (R5) of Lotus Notes/Domino. R5 offers the additional functionality to develop ACCNET as a web-based system.
- **Anti-virus**: it is planned to upgrade to a network-based anti-virus system (Norton Anti-Virus Suite) which IBM have already verbally committed to supplying.

PUBLIC SECTOR UNIT

¹01 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 1999.

This report attempts to give a sense of what has been happening with respect to the various elements within the Public Sector Conflict Management Programme (PSCMP). It also highlights the mechanisms or systems put in place to ensure the smooth running of the process towards meeting all the objectives short; medium and long term.

USAID

The current grant is due to closeout on 31st August 1999. However, the Public Sector unit has applied for an extension until 31st January 2000. Approval of the extension will only kick in at the end of August 1999 once the current expiry date has passed.

Application of the exchange differential will automatically kick in once a disbursement report has submitted. The reporting requirements for the grant resulting from the extension will be a semi-annual report by 30th September 1999. Regarding the outstanding requirements of the Grant, the following are broad categories of outstanding objectives:

TRAINING

◆ METRO LEVEL

The training at the Department of Health has, in terms of the USAID objective been fully achieved and reported on at USAID at the beginning of June. The request for a follow up training at management level arising from this implementation remains outstanding, and may have to be explored as a full Programme with broader objectives and counterpart contributions from the North South Central local Councils Department of Health.

◆ PROVINCIAL LEVEL

Four groups have received training in the Basic and Advanced Conflict Resolution. The next two courses to be implemented are Facilitation and Participatory Decision-Making. Of the remaining 8 trainings, the next two will be facilitated by Mernie Crane, an independent consultant.

¹ This programme is funded by USAID / South Africa.

01 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER

OFFICES OF MEDIATION

An independent researcher, Jabu Sindane, has been commissioned to complete a research exercise on the Public Sector. The expected completion date is 7th July. A draft document will be reviewed and commented on for finalisation by 15th July. This will then be forwarded our partners in the US.

TRAVEL TO THE USA

Pravina Makan-Lakha will travel to the US in this quarter. This trip should give her a good orientation on the state - wide office of mediation based on the research and understanding of the Provinces and in particular the Provincial Department of Health.

In terms of meeting the grant objective on this, Public sector will, at the end of the grant period produce a "bluebook" for the design and implementation of the offices of mediation for SA and a document which will form the basis for models for the rest of the continent.

While the leadership of the second democratic elections in South Africa has received a Government that has succeeded in putting in place the structures of Good Governance, the challenge of building and strengthening the delivery mechanism remains indeed an enormous task. The public service has come a long way since the first democratic elections when government inherited a fundamentally flawed system of Government incapable of good governance. Through the first term of office, the first democratic Government has succeeded in its efforts to put in place good governance structures.

The challenge before the second democratic government today is to build the public service into capable machinery of delivery, delivery, and more delivery. Improving the delivery of public services to all the citizens of South Africa has to be the priority of this second democratic Government. The time for this is now.

The ACCORD Public Sector Conflict Management Programme (PSCMP) was conceived against this background and continues to operate within a vision of Good Governance both locally in South Africa and on the continent of Africa.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PSCMP PROGRAMME

The Public Sector Conflict Management Programme (**PSCMP**) has as its broad objectives: -

To transform the Public Service into a dynamic needs based and pro-active instrument capable of playing an integral and strategic part in entrenching good governance principles by increasing the capacity of the Public Service to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to provide institutional mechanisms to deal with recurring conflict.

The Process designed to achieve this is based on two main thrusts: Capacity Building/Training and developing institutions to deal with recurring conflict.

CAPACITY BUILDING/TRAINING

With regard to the capacity building/training thrust of the Grant comprehensive interventions at the Metropolitan Department of Health and Provincial Department of Health have taken place.

◆ PROVINCIAL LEVEL

At Provincial level 84 participants participated on the Programme. Owing to a large percentage of the participants of this Phase being drawn from deep rural areas such as Manguzi on the KZN/Mozambique border, Kranskop, Ixopo and Piet Retief the programme was adapted from a non-residential to a residential Programme. This capacity building/training objective took place between 11 May - 02 September 1999.

This activity was delivered through three distinct and intensive stages. The first stage related to consultations re: the composition of the Phase II intervention which resulted in a senior core of Provincial Regional Directors of Health and the Medical Superintendents, Matrons, and Hospital Secretaries of 26 Provincial institutions being selected. The selection process addressed the basis related to gender, race, rural/urban and age.

With the ACCORD training approach being adult learner sensitive and utilising the experiences and varied expertise that participants bring to the training's the second stage focussed on distributing the various participants with their diverse experiences into groups. Intensive planning and preparation ensured that participants were spread over the groups and that participants drawn from a single institution were able to go back to their respective areas of work with richer experiences and exchanges.

The third stage related to the actual training's these took place from the

11 May-2 September 1999. A team of multi-skilled trainers presented four courses re Basic Conflict Resolution, Advanced Conflict Resolution, Facilitation, and Participatory Decision-Making. A total of Seventy-nine (79) participants will receive certification for completion of all four training's while others will be certified with the next phase provided they have met all requirements and completed the outstanding courses.

◆ LESSONS LEARNT

The net effect of the capacity building /training objective of the USAID grant for the period 1997- 1999 were the completion of Phase I and II at a provincial level for the Department of Health with great success. The spread of the training within the Department of Health has been very extensive and diverse and this is evident from the geographical spread of the intervention across the province and the calibre of the participants that have been through the Programme. While Phase I targeted three levels at the Provincial Department of Health: the Human Resources, Organised Labour, and Personnel Departments, Phase II targeted the institutional level with twenty- seven (27) Provincial Institutions across eight regions been through the Programme.

No doubt this intervention leaves a solid base within the Provincial Department of Health for the replication of the skills and a fertile environment for the design and implementation of a departmental mechanism to deal with recurring conflict. Further the intervention has generated positive feedback amongst the leadership of the Department and resulted in Prof. Green Thompson (Director General of Health in the Province) requesting that a three-year holistic Programme/intervention be designed for the Province. This task has been completed and a targeted 300 participants will participate in the exercise over the next three years. Sophisticated tracking mechanism will be put in place to measure actual successes and will assist in the continued adaptation of the model for replication nationally in South Africa and

onto the African continent.

The ongoing adaptation that one experiences on a Programme of this nature is indicative of the organic nature of such a Programme. The "lessons learnt" from this intervention to date, is that the Programme needs to be recipient orientated within a broader framework as opposed to be purely objective driven and this will inform all further interventions and has indeed contributed to the success of the Programme thus far.

◆ METROPOLITAN LEVEL

At Metropolitan level 112 participants were trained drawn from three broad levels, viz. top management, middle management and the transformation committee members. The intervention within the Metropolitan level was the culmination of an intensive and extensive consultative process between the PSCMP and Department of Health North/South Central local councils. The initial assessment of the Department revealed that the Department is severely plagued by real transformation issues, ranging from difficulties with the implementation of affirmative action policies; racism; to resistance to change which was confirmed and reiterated through the training process.

On completion of the training's it was evident that the experiences for all three levels proved diverse in a number of ways. The training's focussed on team building, highlighting the importance and the benefits of a team approach to dealing with challenges associated to change as faced by the Department. The training further dealt with conflict analysis and took participants through an experience of visioning, objective setting and dealing with barriers to change.

The training for the middle management and transformational committee focused on team building, identification of role-players, the placing of manager's roles within the system/Organisation, and the impact of the change process on these roles. Skills transference centred on understanding an analytical tool in conflict resolution and conflict resolution methods viz. negotiation and mediation. For the transformational committee participants, greater emphasises was placed on identification of role players and the two-way process of visioning and implementation as well as the benefits of ongoing feedback.

◆ LESSONS LEARNT

The transformational committee trainees posed a number of challenges for the trainers and were critical of the distribution of the participants over the six groups. In distributing participant's in-groups, ACCORD staffs takes great effort in ensuring diversity and an even spread in terms of race, gender, rural/urban and job responsibility. Although the Organisation is not prescriptive about this team members strongly articulate this position for the purposes of a broader and more extensive learning opportunity and experience. In our consultations with the Metro Department, the department felt strongly that the different levels be kept separate. ACCORD's views re: these were expressed however the wishes of the Department were upheld. The Process was shared with participants to take back as a lesson for future initiatives. Positive dialogue about this issue did take place.

A clear indication that came from all three levels of trainees is the need and desire to work together and this was shared with the leadership at the Metro Health Department with the aim of enhancing the transformational process that they were involved with.

OFFICES OF MEDIATION

The institutionalising of Conflict Resolution through the establishment of the offices of Mediation is the second thrust of the Programme. This process was planned to build itself on and follow on from the Capacity Building Process. With respect to this objective the preliminary activities have been completed simultaneously with the Capacity Building Process. These activities have included a research on the status of the Public Sector in South Africa.

The information obtained from the research initiative is intended to inform the design process of the offices of mediation in terms of location of these structures and in terms of the legislative environment it would operate in.

The PSCMP received additional services to its research activities through the ACCORD internship Programme. An USA intern Serena Parker took the original research on the status of the Public Sector in South Africa and summarised the initiative expanding on areas of particular bearing on the Programme.

These two pieces of research will be synthesised and will form part of the comprehensive document that will map the process/direction for the set up of the offices of mediation and which remains the objective to be achieved.

The Process to developing the source document on the office of mediation has been strengthened by our US experts/partners. A meeting in Pasadena, Los Angeles was convened and brought the US collaborative partners together to dialogue and strategize around the process of Institutionalising Conflict Resolution. Participants included Chris Carlson, Peter Adler, and Howard Bellman, who travelled at their own costs to the full day meeting. Administrative costs were absorbed by WJCF. Robert Jones and Wallace Warfield who were unable to attend and connected from time to time with the meeting through teleconferencing.

Team member contributions to the Process both financially and academically have been commended by ACCORD.

The meeting proved successful in discussing a number of issues related to institutionalising conflict resolution in the Public Service such as: discussing lessons from the US experiences; and the challenges that legal issues would place before the process. Cumulatively the meeting had the resources of a 100 years experience in the field.

♦ OUTCOME

The meeting provided a wealth of information on the challenges that faced us as an organisation in terms of this task. It was confirmed that no single model of implementation would be possible in SA. Furthermore that the KwaZulu Natal and Northern Cape initiatives would both follow different models and that these would be the provinces to begin with. It was agreed that a source document needed to be developed, which would be utilised for Model Development, Proposal Development, and serve as a catalyst for strategic planning around this initiative.

All team members have pledged their support to the Process and in this regard it was agreed that a joint Programme between the WJCF and ACCORD will be drafted and funding sought. It is clear that the WJCF and the individuals involved cannot absorb these costs any further.

With respect to the process of institutionalising conflict resolution we remain challenged to complete the comprehensive document that will map the process/direction for the institutionalising of conflict resolution and the design for the set up of the offices of mediation.

THE WAY FORWARD

Over the past six months the Programme has continued to operate at a vigorous pace in terms of meeting the outstanding objectives, as we prepare for the closeout of the USAID grant (31 January 2000). The lessons learnt from this USAID initiative are constantly being applied to the process of strategically aligning the PSCMP to continue its efforts both locally in South Africa and continent wide. The endorsement of the Programme by the KwaZulu Natal Provincial Department of Health and the Departments commitment, both in principle and financially to a continued intervention itself, is a testimony of the success of this Programme. The Programme remains committed to exploring collaboratively, with our Government in South Africa and Governments across the continent of Africa, models in Conflict resolution for the prevention and management of conflict within the Public Service with the view of ensuring sound mechanisms are in place to promote Good Governance. We remain challenged by our efforts to expand this Programme.

THE CLOSEOUT OF THE USAID GRANT

The closeout of the current grant is 31 January 1999 and the focus over the next four months will be to complete all outstanding objectives and meet the reporting requirements. At this stage all the training objectives both at a Provincial level and Metropolitan level in terms of this grant have been met.

MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT

On this objective we remain committed to delivering the planned comprehensive materials development at the end of the grant period. The brief for this activity has been completed and potential providers of the services are developing their proposals. Through the process of finding appropriate specialist to develop this objective it became very apparent to us in the Programme that materials development requires a team approach if the best results are desired. We envisage that all conceptual and writing up will be complete by the end of the grant period. Packaging the product as well as those activities that will be done by the artists will continue beyond the closeout of the grant.

CONCLUSION

The continuation of activities within the PSCMP beyond the USAID intervention continues to be high on the planning agenda of the Programme. The recent study tour of the US State - wide offices of mediation and the general orientation to the Dispute Resolution field in the US has presented diverse learning's that will inform the strategic positioning of this Programme over the next five years.

In the next year we envisage that within South Africa we would have taken the Programme to the Northern Cape and the successes of KwaZulu Natal and Northern Cape will be used to expand the Programme to other Provinces in South Africa. A programme beyond the South African borders is also envisaged and at this point various options present them to the Programme. However the strategic planning of the Organisation as a whole as well as the needs of other countries will inform its process.

Lobbying and Advocacy; Training; and Research will remain the three main thrusts of the PSCMP's holistic intervention.

PEACEKEEPING UNIT

01 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 1999

EXERCISE BLUE CRANE

Exercise Blue Crane was a SADC peacekeeping exercise that was hosted by South Africa during April 1999. This Brigade level peacekeeping exercise took place in the semi-desert Kalahari region at the South African Army Battle School from 9th to 30th April 1999. It was the first time in southern Africa and the first time in Africa that a peacekeeping exercise included a significant civilian role.

The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD, as part of the Norwegian funded Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project², was tasked to design, plan and co-ordinate all the civilian aspects of the Exercise.

The objective was to design the civilian participation in Exercise Blue Crane in such a way that both the civilian and military participants would:

- develop an understanding for each other's roles and mandates;
- develop an understanding for the need for joint problem solving and joint initiatives;
- develop an understanding for the need to exchange information and create liaison channels at all levels; and
- Develop an understanding of the need for holistic management of the overall mission.

Measured against these objectives, the exercise was a success. The participants that had the opportunity to interact, developed a greater understanding for each other's roles and mandates; the need to co-ordinate and exchange information; and the need for a joint and integrated mission management system.

The Peacekeeping Programme staff spent most of April on activities related to Exercise Blue Crane. These included three training activities and the co-ordination of civilian participants during the actual exercise.

² *The Peacekeeping Programme was established in late 1995 when ACCORD, ISS (Institute for Security Studies) and NUPI (The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs) initiated the Training for Peace in Southern Africa (TfP) Project with funding from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Project is aimed at enhancing the capacity for international conflict management and peacekeeping in the Southern African region. ACCORD is responsible for the Training Workshops as well as for some Policy Development and Research activities. ISS engages in training activities and the production of publications documenting local peacekeeping concepts, trends and techniques. NUPI is responsible for providing resource persons and advice on policy and project development as well as the general co-ordination of the project. The TfP Project is the largest African NGO Peacekeeping training and capacity building project, and is one of the largest NGO driven Peacekeeping training projects in the world. Learn more about the TfP partners from their respective web-sites: ACCORD: <http://www.accord.org.za>; ISS: <http://www.iss.co.za>; NUPI: <http://www.nupi.no>.*

◆ **PEACEKEEPING TRAINING WORKSHOP FOR BATTLE SCHOOL INSTRUCTORS**

A one-day Peacekeeping Training Workshop was hosted by ACCORD on 8th April for the instructors of the SA Army Battle School. The instructors formed the bulk of the Exercise Control organisation of Exercise Blue Crane. The SA Army Battle School is normally used for conventional warfare and the instructors had no previous exposure to peacekeeping. ACCORD was requested to give them an introductory briefing on peacekeeping so that they would better understand their role in the Exercise.

This Workshop was conducted by the Programme Manager with the help of a specialist Resource Person, LtCol Chris Serfontein of the SANDF. The participants were twenty-two (22) male officers ranging in rank from Major to LtCol. The Workshop Programme is attached as Annex C and the participant list as Annex B.

Various participants approached the Programme Manager and other Peacekeeping Programme staff through the Exercise to thank them for the Workshop and to indicate how the value of the Workshop became clear to them in the Exercise itself. The Workshop awakened an interest in several of the officers to further train in peacekeeping related disciplines and some indicated that they would like to specialise in peacekeeping.

◆ **LEADERSHIP TRAINING**

The Leadership Training took place from 12th to 14th April 1999 and involved all the military officers from all the participating SADC countries. The Programme Manager contributed to the Leadership Training with lectures on the Civilian Roles in Peacekeeping, Civil-Military Co-operation and the Role of the Media in Peacekeeping.

◆ **CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON SEMINAR**

The Civil-Military Liaison Seminar was held from 18th – 20th April at the SA Army Battle School. The CIMIC Seminar was intended to:

- Integrate the civil and military participants;
- Clarify the multidisciplinary nature and roles within the UN Mission to Naraland (UNMIN); and
- Brief the participants on the exercise scenario, structures and procedures.

The participants in the seminar included all civilian participants, representatives from the international military advisors group, selected senior military officers from the mission headquarters staff, representatives from the umpiring and exercise control organisations, legal officers and officers from the military health services. From time to time ad-hoc groups joined the seminar, e.g. a group of military observers to attend a lecture on the role of UN military observers. A list of all civilian participants in Exercise Blue Crane and the CIMIC Seminar is attached as Annex D.

In order to integrate the civil and military participants, presentations were given on the various multifunctional roles within UN peacekeeping missions and in Blue Crane, namely that of: the SRSG and his staff, UN agencies, the military, civilian police, military observers, human rights observers, the ICRC and NGOs. The CIMIC Seminar also served as an opportunity for the various participants to get to know each other better on an individual basis, prior to the start of the actual exercise. Time was also spent to familiarise the civilian

participants (the military participants had similar briefings earlier during their in-deployment-training phase) with the exercise scenario, UNMIN mission plan and exercise procedures and structures. The CIMIC Seminar Programme is attached as Annex E.

The CIMIC Seminar played a crucial role in integrating the civilian participants in the exercise. Although the Seminar also contributed to introducing and familiarising some of the military participants to the civilian participants and roles in the exercise, it was felt that the latter objective was not fully achieved as most of the crucial military players had other pressing responsibilities in the last few days before the exercise and thus did not have the time and opportunity to participate in the CIMIC Seminar. Similarly, the deployment and schedule of the CIVPOL group prevented them from being represented at the CIMIC Seminar. As a result it took longer than would otherwise have been necessary to integrate the CIVPOL and military elements into the Mission Co-ordination Centre (CMOC) and to achieve overall unity of effort.

EXERCISE BLUE CRANE

The actual Exercise took place from 22nd to 28th April 1999. The ACCORD staff met all the civilian participants at the Waterkloof Air Force Base in Pretoria and flew with them to the SA Army Battle School in Lohatla in the Northern Province for the Exercise. After the CIMIC Seminar, the civilian participants used the 21st to familiarise themselves with the exercise terrain and with the physical preparation of the Mission Co-ordination Centre and the Office of the SRSB.

The civilian component was designed to reflect a UN led peacekeeping mission with UN humanitarian and human rights actors. It also included parallel mission such as an OAU Observer Mission and a SADC Human Rights Observer Group. In addition, it included the ICRC and a number of NGOs. The media was included under the civilian component to perform the dual function of simulated press for exercise purposes and their normal real-time media responsibilities. These various civilian roles were simulated by diplomats from most SADC countries or were performed by real-time UN, OAU, ICRC and NGO personnel. The list of participants is attached as Annex D.

ACCORD also introduced and experimented with a new co-ordination mechanism, the Mission Co-ordination Centre (MCOC), in the exercise. The MCOC was created at Mission Headquarters level to act as a central clearinghouse for the various elements of the UN Mission and as a point of contact for all the non-UN actors in Naraland. It was modelled along the lines of a Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre (CMOC) but differed in that it was not intended to only co-ordinate between the military and other elements, but to co-ordinate among all the mission elements equally, under the auspices of the SRSB.

The MCOC was established as an operations room where all the various components of the mission were represented, i.e. the Office of the SRSB, the Force HQ, the CIVPOL HQ and the UNHCR. In addition, the MCOC served as the primary point of contact with the UNMIN for the various non-UN actors such as the OAUMIN, the SADC-HROG, AFRONET, other NGOs and the ICRC. All these players had direct radio communication with the MCOC and when personnel strength allowed, had at least one liaison officer placed at the MCOC.

Another unique aspect brought in by ACCORD was the use of actual members of the press to act as simulated press in the exercise. This was the first time real media were used as simulated press in a peacekeeping exercise of this nature. By using real media the other exercise participants were exposed to a much more realistic interaction with the media. At the same time, the participants from the press had the opportunity to learn more about

peacekeeping.

This was the first time that a peacekeeping exercise of this magnitude was organised in southern Africa, and the largest peacekeeping exercise ever organised in Africa. At the same time, it was the first time an attempt was made to incorporate the civilian role players as actual participants in an exercise, to the extent that it was done in Exercise Blue Crane. As such, Exercise Blue Crane was a resounding success and an important milestone, especially from a civil-military co-ordination point of view.

At the same time the exercise provided SADC with the opportunity to make mistakes in a safe, harmless and controlled environment. The time and resources SADC and the donor countries invested in Exercise Blue Crane would be wasted if we do not learn from these mistakes and take the time and effort to incorporate these lessons learned into our Standard Operating Procedures, into the planning processes for future exercises and into our training curricula. This is especially true in light of the recent ISDSC decision to consider the establishment of a SADC peacekeeping brigade.

From a civilian point of view, the primary lessons learned from Exercise Blue Crane were that we need to intensify the training of civilian role players, and that we need to develop more opportunities for joint civil-military training, prior to deployment in actual peacekeeping missions.

ADVANCED WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPING ADVANCED NEGOTIATION, FACILITATION AND MEDIATION SKILLS

The Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the Conflict Management Group (CMG) and ACCORD jointly hosted an Advanced Workshop on Developing Negotiation, Facilitation and Mediation Skills from 24th to 28th May at the Selbourne Sun hotel, south of Durban.

The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD, with the support of the Intervention Unit, was responsible for organising the Workshop. Apart from the considerable time invested in preparations for the Workshop, most of the month of May was devoted to the final preparations and the last week to the actual workshop itself.

The workshop offered participants a chance to reflect on their experiences in conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping and implementation of peace agreements. A variety of ambassadors, politicians, OAU Central Organ Members, and professionals from non-governmental organisations brought a wealth of first-hand experience to the table. The format was theory; tool and case presentations interspersed with discussion and brainstorming sessions. The workshop produced a variety of recommendations around conflict management and peacemaking issues. At the outset, participants highlighted the complex interplay between diverse internal and external causes of conflict and heavily emphasised the need for negotiators to collect as much data and background information as possible on each conflict under examination. The importance of early warning and early action, based on warning signs, was heavily emphasised.

Participants explored different potential models for partnership and collaboration between the OAU, sub-regional organisations, NGOs, and government. Suggestions of tasks for the OAU to undertake included keeping peace processes on track, co-ordinating initiatives, legitimising facilitators, mobilising resources, ensuring good faith commitments, putting in place monitoring, support and implementation mechanisms, and offering access to political and military intelligence. Throughout the week, delegates repeatedly highlighted the importance of co-ordinating OAU duties with those of SADC and the UN in order to work as

efficiently as possible and profit from each organisation's greatest resources and contacts. They emphasised networking, both horizontally and vertically, as well as improving the OAU's capacity to change and adapt to each new conflict situation.

Please note that the OAU Workshop was not a TFP Activity. The OAU, the Dutch Government and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) funded it

ADVOCACY AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

From 4th to 9th May 1999, the Programme Manager participated in a Danida Joint Review of the support for Regional Peacekeeping Training Co-operation in Southern Africa (SADC) through the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Zimbabwe

From 3rd to 14th May 1999, Mr. Kwezi Mngqibisa, Programme Officer: Peacekeeping, attended and participated in the first Civilian Staff Officers Course (CIVSOC) conducted by SWEDINT.

Cedric de Coning, the Programme Manager, represented ACCORD at the Official Opening of the new building housing the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe on 21st June 1999. Brigadier James Machakaire (rtd.) attended and represented ACCORD at the UN Mission Management Seminar organised to coincide with the official opening of the new building.

Mr. Kwezi Mngqibisa attended the 5th Annual Meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) in Halifax, Canada from 23rd to 25th June. ACCORD was elected the current Chairman of the Association (1999/2000) and confirmed as the host of the 6th Annual Meeting in the year 2000.

RESEARCH / PUBLICATION

The Peacekeeping Programme contributed the following articles over this period:

De Coning, Cedric The White Paper on SA Participation in Peace Missions – A Unique Beginning, Conflict Trends, Vol. 2, April 1999

Exercise Blue Crane – A Unifying Moment for SADC, Conflict Trends, Vol. 2, April 1999

Peacekeeping in the DRC – A New Role for the United Nations, Conflict Trends, Vol. 2, April 1999

◆ OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

The following Occasional Papers were finalised for publishing over this period:

OP 4/99 - Cedric de Coning Preparing for the Third Millennium: Towards a Policy Framework for the OAU Conflict Management Mechanism.

OP 5/99 - Rémi Landry The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in former Yugoslavia – Lessons Learned for OAU Civilian Missions.

STAFF

The Permanent Staff component – comprising of Mr. Cedric de Coning as Programme Manager and Mr. Kwezi Mngqibisa as Programme Officer – remained unchanged over the report period.

Brigadier James Mackakaire (rtd.) joined the Peacekeeping Programme as an intern until 15 July 1999.

Mr Makgalabone Phakoago continued with the Programme as an intern, specifically for the purposes of assisting with the OAU Workshop, until the end of May.

ANNEX A

BLUE CRANE TRAINING STATISTICS

TRAINING COURSE	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
Blue Crane Instructor Training Course	22
Civil Military Liaison Seminar (CIMIC Seminar)	32
TOTAL	54

PARTICIPANTS ACCORDING TO SENDING ORGANISATIONS



CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON SEMINAR

BREAKDOWN BY SENDING ORGANISATIONS

ORGANISATION	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
NGO'S	4
Foreign Ministry	11
Defence Force	26
University	2
Regional Organisations	2
Media	3
International Organisations	6

GENDER OF PARTICIPANTS
CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON SEMINAR

Males	23
Females	9
Total	32



ANNEX B

**SA ARMY BATTLE SCHOOL INSTRUCTORS
PEACEKEEPING WORKSHOP FOR EXERCISE BLUE CRANE**

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

S.A. ARMY BATTLE SCHOOL (8 APRIL 1999)

1. AO1 G.P. HILL
2. AO1 P.J. M. GOUWS
3. LT COL. D. J. HATTING
4. LT COL. C.J. DE WET
5. LT COL. W.J.S. VAN DER MERWE
6. LT COL. C. FUCHS
7. AO1 G. BARNARD
8. MAJ A.J. ANDRE
9. AO1 P.G. ANKER
10. MAJ W.P. STEENKAMP
11. MAJ D.T. PHILLIPS
12. MAJ W. ROSENTRAUCH
13. MAJ H. VAN JAARVELD
14. MAJ J. VELDMAN
15. LT COL. R. GRAY
16. MAJ A. NIEUWOUDT
17. JAM W.M. BOTHA
18. MAJ J.E. VAN ZYL
19. MAJ A. WIID
20. MAJ T.G. COETZER
21. MAJ J.M. KHUMALO
22. MAJ H. COETZER

ANNEX C

**SA ARMY BATTLE SCHOOL INSTRUCTORS
PEACEKEEPING WORKSHOP FOR EXERCISE BLUE CRANE
S.A. ARMY BATTLE SCHOOL - 8 APRIL 1999**

08:15 – 08:30	Welcome and Introduction
08:30 – 09:15	Peacekeeping Terms: Bridging the Terminology Trap
09:15 - 10:00	History and Development of Peace Operations
10:00 – 10:45	Brunch
10:45 – 11:30	The Strategic, Operational and Tactical Management of Peace Operations
11:30 – 12:15	Political and Civilian Roles in Modern Peace Operations
12:15 – 13:00	Peace Support Operations: The Role of the Military in Peace Operations
13:00 – 13:30	Coffee & Tea
13:30 – 14:00	CIVPOL: The Role of the Civilian Police in Peace Operations
14:00 – 14:30	UNMOS: UN Military Observers in Peace Operations
14:30 – 15:15	Civil-Military Relations: The Crucial Interface
15:15 – 15:30	Coffee & Tea
15:30 – 16:15	The Southern African Experience and Exercise Blue Hungwe

ANNEX D

**EXERCISE BLUE CRANE
CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS LIST
SA ARMY BATTLE SCHOOL – 18 TO 28 APRIL 1999**

SRSG & STAFF

- SRSG: H.E. Amb AA Panguene, (High Commissioner of Mozambique to South Africa)
- D\SRS: Mr Horst Brammer (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa)
- SRSG's Spokesperson: Mr Daniel Ngwepe (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa)
- MCOC Liaison Officer: Ms. Itumeleng Maake (DP's Office, South Africa)
- SRSG's Personal Assistant: Mr A Mangate (MFA, Mozambique)
- Civil Affairs Officer (Maritime): Mr. Hussein Solomon (ACCORD)

OAU OBSERVER MISSION (OAUMIN)

- Col. Amr Badran (OAU)
- Col. F Okonkwo (OAU)
- Mr Phakamile Gongo (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa)
- Mrs Anne N. Mutelo (Namibia High Commission, Pretoria)

SADC HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVER GROUP (SADC-HROG)

- Mr V.S. Chuckun, (Second Secretary, Mauritius High Commission, Pretoria)
- Mr N. Lindunda (Zambia High Commission, Pretoria)

UN AGENCIES

- Mr David Johnson, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Pretoria
- Mr Cosmas Chanda, SADC Liaison Officer, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Ms Amah Assiama, Protection Officer, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Mr Leonard Zulu, UNHCR, Zambia (Maritime, Durban)
- Ms Sharon Reddy, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Mr Raxon Tshobemea, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Mr Floyd Mngomezulu, UNHCR, Pretoria

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

- Patrick Flynn, Delegate to the Armed Forces, ICRC, Harare
- Michael Kleiner, Delegate, ICRC, Pretoria

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

- Mr Kennedy Mabasa, Cease-fire Campaign
- Mr Andrew Kazilimani, Afronet, Zambia
- Mr Anthony Mukweta, Afronet, Zambia
- Mr Sagaren Naidoo, South African Institute of International Affairs
- Ms Alexandra Schwarer, Rand Afrikaans University
- Ms Joelien Pretorius, University of Pretoria

MEDIA (SIMULATED PRESS)

- Ms Erika Gibson, Beeld
- Ms Jenine Coetzer, Channel Africa
- Mr Sarel van Zyl, SABC Radio
- Mr Hans Pienaar, The Star
- Pholane Motale, Sunday World

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS

- Mr. Bjorn Skjaerli (UNDPKO, New York)
- Maj. Stein Ellingsen (AFIC-N, Oslo)
- Maj. Bjorn Loken (UNDPKO/Norway)
- Col. Kurt Mosgaard (UNDPKO/Denmark)
- LtCol. Sam Siyaya (UNDPKO, New York)
- LtCol Jim Brubaker (UNDPKO/USA)

CIVILIAN EXERCISE CONTROLLERS

- Cedric de Coning (ACCORD)
- Kwezi Mngqibisa (ACCORD)
- Bereng Mtimkulu (Defence Secretariat, South Africa)
- James Machakaire (ACCORD)
- Ian Henderson-Wille (ACCORD) – Maritime, Durban

ANNEX E

EXERCISE BLUE CRANE
CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON SEMINAR
SA ARMY BATTLE SCHOOL – 18 TO 20 APRIL 1999

SUNDAY 18th APRIL 1999 (DAY ONE)

08:00 - 08:30	Opening and Official Welcome Maj Gen A Bestbier, Exercise Director Amb AA Panguene, SRSG Maj Gen Kitani, Force Commander
08:30 – 08:45	Structure and Purpose of the Seminar Cedric de Coning, Civilian Exercise Control
08:50 – 09:15	Exercise Blue Crane: Background, Planning, Objectives and Structure Brig GA Gen Haasbroek, Deputy Exercise Director Brig SB Moyo, Exercise Co-Director and Chief Umpire
09:20 – 10:00	Briefing on the Exercise Scenario: The Situation in Naraland Col L van Vuuren, Director Exercise Control
10:00 – 11:00	Brunch
11:00 – 12:00	The United Nations Mission in Naraland (UNMIN) Cedric de Coning – UNMIN Structure Maj Gen Kitani - Force Commander
12:05 – 12:30	Briefing on the SA Army Battle School and the Exercise Terrain Col A Grundlingh, Acting Commandant, Battle School
13:00 – 13:30	Coffee & Tea
13:30 - 14:30	History and Development of UN Peace Operations LtCol Sam Siyaya, UNDPKO Advisor
14:35 – 16:00	Briefing and Video on the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and Exercise Blue Hungwe Brig Gen EA Rugeje, Commandant, Zimbabwe Staff College
16:05 – 17:00	CIMIC: Civil-Military Co-operation Maj Stein Ellingsen, AFIC-N, Norway

MONDAY 19 APRIL 1999

08:00 – 08:05	Orientation
08:05 – 09:00	The Role of the SRSG and his Staff Cedric de Coning, Civilian Exercise Control
09:05 – 10:00	Peace Support Operations: The Role of the Military Bjorn Skjaerli, UNDPKO Adviser
10:00 – 11:00	Brunch
11:00 – 11:40	CIVPOL: The Role of the Civilian Police in Peace Operations Snr Sup Riaan van Staden, CIVPOL Exercise Control
11:45 – 12:15	AFRONET Andrew Kazilimani
12:20 – 13:00	The Role of Human Rights Monitors Cedric de Coning, Civilian Exercise Control
13:00 – 13:30	Coffee & Tea
13:30 – 14:15	United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) Kurt Mosgaard, UNDPKO Adviser - UNMOs
14:20 – 15:00	UNHCR: The Role of the High Commissioner for Refugees Cosmos Chanda, UNHCR
15:05 – 15:45	The Mission Co-ordination Centre (MCOC) Cedric de Coning, Civilian Exercise Control
16:15 – 17:00	The Role of the Media in Peace Operations Panel

TUESDAY 20 APRIL 1999 (DAY THREE)

08:00 – 08:05	Orientation
08:05 – 09:00	The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Col Patrick Flynn (Rtd.), ICRC Mr. Michael Kleiner, ICRC
09:05 – 09:30	The OAU Observer Mission to Naraland (OAUMIN) Col Amr Badran, OAU
09:35 – 10:00	Communication Structure and Procedures Col Ian Fordred, Chief Signal Officer
10:00 – 11:00	Brunch
11:00 – 11:40	Exercise Control Col L van Vuuren, Director Exercise Control
11:45 – 12:15	Umpiring Organisation Lt Gen P Lara, Director Exercise Umpiring Brig Gen SB Moyo, Exercise Co-Director and Chief Umpire
12:20 – 13:00	Closing Ceremony Maj Gen A Bestbier, Exercise Director Amb AA Panguene, SRSG Maj Gen Kitani, Force Commander
13:00 – 17:00	Tour of the Exercise Terrain

ANNEX F

**ADVANCED WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPING
NEGOTIATION, FACILITATION AND MEDIATION SKILLS**

DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA 24 –28 MAY 1999

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Adjei, E. N. | Foreign Ministry, Ghana |
| 2. Agama, M. Dr. | Ministry of Defence, Ghana |
| 3. Akapelwa, Simataa | Ambassador, Zambia |
| 4. Allen, Hayden | Research Assistant to the Executive Director, ACCORD |
| 5. Amkongo, Eddie | Ambassador, Namibia |
| 6. Badr, Marawan | Ambassador, Egypt |
| 7. Beha, Abdelkrim | Political Counsellor, Embassy of Algeria |
| 8. Bwakira, Melchior | Ambassador, Burundi |
| 9. Diakite, Mohamed | Special Assistant to the ES, ECOWAS |
| 10. Gounden, Vasu | Executive Director, ACCORD |
| 11. Govender, Karthi | Deputy Director, ACCORD |
| 12. Ibok, Sam | Director a.i., Political Department, OAU |
| 13. Jaona, M. | Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Madagascar |
| 14. Kafumba, Helen | Foreign Ministry, Tanzania |
| 15. Ki-Doulaye, Corentin | Conflict Management Centre, OAU |
| 16. Kileo, Charles S. | Ambassador, Tanzania |
| 17. Maake, Itumeleng | Office of the Deputy President, South Africa |
| 18. Mamabolo, Kingsley | Ambassador, South Africa |
| 19. Mpungwe, Ami. | High Commissioner to South Africa, Tanzania |
| 20. Mungoma, Lucy | Foreign Ministry, Zambia |
| 21. Murithi, Tim. Dr. | Special Fellow, UNITAR, Geneva |
| 22. Ndondo, Neville, Dr. | Ambassador, Zimbabwe |
| 23. Ngoga, Pascal, Dr. | Ambassador, Rwanda |
| 24. Ntombela, Simon | Office of the Deputy President, South Africa |
| 25. Odendaal, Andries | Project Co-ordinator: Africa, CCR, Cape Town |

- | | |
|------------------------|--|
| 26. Ognimba, Emile | Conflict Management Centre, OAU |
| 27. Quainoo, A | Genera, 1 st Field Commander ECOMOG |
| 28. Rahantabololo, Ida | Director, Foreign Ministry, Madagascar |
| 29. Solomon, Hussein | Research Manager, ACCORD |
| 30. Tapsoba, Michel | Secretary on Mediation, GERDDES |
| 31. Tesha, John Dr. | UNDP Capacity-building Project, OAU |
| 32. Toga, Dawit, Dr. | Inter Africa Group, Addis Ababa |
| 33. Wachira, George | Executive Director, NPI, Kenya |
| 34. Wesseh, Conmany | Executive Director, CEDE, Monrovia |
| 35. Yazid, Norredine | D/Director: Central & West Africa, Algeria |

ORGANISING COMMITTEE

- | | |
|---------------------------|--|
| 36. Beyene, Solomon | Conflict Management Centre, OAU |
| 37. Stanford, Joseph S. | Chairman: Board of Directors, CMG |
| 38. McClintock, Liz | Reg. Director: Middle East and Africa, CMG |
| 39. Newman, Lori | Project Assistant, CMG |
| 40. Abdulai, Napoleon | Intervention Manager, ACCORD |
| 41. De Coning, Cedric | Peacekeeping Manager, ACCORD |
| 42. Phakoago, Mokgalabone | Project Intern, ACCORD |
| 43. Machakaire, James | Project Intern, ACCORD |

INTERPRETATION & TECHNICAL SUPPORT

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 44. Ellerbeck, Michelle | Sworn Translator/Interpreter |
| 45. Hervé, Jean Armanet | Sworn Translator/Interpreter |
| 46. Fenn, Beatrice | Sworn Translator/Interpreter |
| 47. Eksteen, Joey | Technician, Conference Communications |
| 48. Mtonga, Felista | English Secretary |
| 49. Kenfe, Azeb | French Secretary |
| 50. Tenkessa, Tessema | Documentalist |

ANNEX G

**ADVANCED WORKSHOP ON
DEVELOPING NEGOTIATION,
FACILITATION, AND
MEDIATION SKILLS**

DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA

24-28 MAY 1999

PROGRAMME

23 MAY 1999 - Sunday

19:00 – 20:30

Official Opening Reception

24 MAY 1999 - MONDAY

CHAIR: DR. JOHN TESHA, OAU

8:30 - 9:00

Official Opening

Mr Sam Ibok, Director a.i., Dept. of Political Affairs, OAU

9:00 - 10:00

Introduction And Objectives Of Workshop

OAU/CMG/ACCORD Organising Committee

• **Tea Break**

Tea Break Tea Break Tea Break

10:30 - 11:30

Conflict Analysis

Mr Hussein Solomon, ACCORD

11:30 - 12:30

Tool Presentation: Relationship Mapping

Mr Joe Stanford & Ms Liz McClintock, CMG

• **Lunch**

Lunch Break Lunch Break

CHAIR: H.E. MARAWAN BADR, AMBASSADOR OF EGYPT

Facilitator:

Cedric de Coning, ACCORD

13:30 – 15:00

Case Study – Democratic Republic of the Congo

Presenters:

Mr Vasu Gounden, ACCORD

Amb. Corentin Ki-Doulaye, OAU

Respondents:

H.E. Dr. Pascal Ngoga, Ambassador of Rwanda

H.E. Dr. Neville Nondo, Ambassador of Zimbabwe

• **Tea Break**

Tea Break Tea Break Tea Break

15:30 – 17:00

Case Study – Democratic Republic of the Congo (continued)

25 MAY 1999 – Tuesday

Chair: H.E. Melchior Bwakira, Ambassador of Burundi

Facilitator: Joe Stanford, CMG

8:30 - 8:45 **Review of Previous Day**

8:45 - 10:00 **Peace Making – Stage One: Preparing the Ground**

Napoleon Abdulai, ACCORD

• **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea break** **Tea Break**

10:30 - 12:30 **Case Study: Sierra Leone**

Presenter: Dr. John Tesha, CMC, OAU

Respondents: Dr. M. Agama, Ministry of Defence, Ghana

Gen. A. Quainoo, ECOMOG

• **Lunch** **Lunch Break** **Lunch Break**

Chair: H.E. C.S. Kileo, Ambassador of Tanzania

Facilitator: Napoleon Abdulai, ACCORD

13:30 – 14:30 **Tool Presentation: Seven-Element Analysis**

Joe Stanford & Liz McClintock, CMG

14:30 – 15:30 **Case Study: Burundi**

Presenter: Mr Emile Ognimba, CMC, OAU

Respondents: H.E. Melchior Bwakira, Ambassador of Burundi

Mr. Andries Odendaal, CCR

• **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea Break**

15:45 – 17:00 **Case Study: Burundi (continued)**

26 MAY 1999 - WednesdayChair: H.E. Leandre Bassole, Ambassador of Burkina Faso**Facilitator:** *Liz McClintock, CMG*8:30 - 8:45 **Review of Previous Day**8:45 – 10:00 **Peace-Making Stage Two: Negotiating a Cease-fire***Napoleon Abdulai, ACCORD*• **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea Break**10:30 - 12:30 **Case Study: Ethiopia/Eritrea****Presenter:** *Mr Sam Ibok, OAU***Respondents:** H.E. Eddie Amkongo, Ambassador of Namibia
Dr. Dawit Toga, Inter Africa Group, Addis Ababa• **Lunch Break** **Lunch Break** **Lunch Break**Chair: H.E. Eddie Amkongo, Ambassador of Namibia**Facilitator:** *Cedric de Coning, ACCORD*13:30 – 14:30 **Tool Presentation: Facilitated Joint Brainstorming***Joe Stanford & Liz McClintock, CMG*14:30 - 15:30 **Case Study: Uganda – Nairobi Agreement '85****Presenter:** *Mr. Napoleon Abdulai, ACCORD***Respondents:** H.E. Marawan Badr, Ambassador of Egypt
H.E. Leandre Bassole, Ambassador of Burkina Faso• **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea Break**15:45 - 17:00 **Case Study - Uganda (continued)**

27 MAY 1999 - Thursday

CHAIR: H.E. JERE MAMABOLO, AMBASSADOR OF SOUTH AFRICA

Facilitator: *Joe Stanford, CMG*

8:30 - 8:45 **Review of Previous Day**

8:45 - 10:00 **Peace Making Stage Three: Peace Agreements**

Napoleon Abdulai, ACCORD

• **Tea Break** **Tea Break** **Tea break** **Tea Break**

10:30 – 12:30 **Case Study: Angola – Lusaka Protocol**

Presenter: *Dr John Tesha, OAU*

Respondents: *H.E. Simataa Akapelwa, Ambassador of Zambia*

Mr. Stanley Kunjeku, SADC Organ, Zimbabwe

• **Lunch Break** **Lunch Break** **Lunch Break** **Lunch Break**

Chair: H.E. Dr. Neville Nondo, Ambassador of Zimbabwe

Facilitator: *Napoleon Abdulai, ACCORD*

13:30 – 14:30 **Tool Presentation: Currently Perceived Choice**

Joe Stanford & Liz McClintock, CMG

14:30 - 15:45 **Case Study: Rwand**

Presenter: *Amb. Ami R. Mpungwe, Tanzanian High Commissioner to SA*

Respondents: *H.E. Dr. Pascal Ngoga, Ambassador of Rwanda*

H.E. C.S. Kileo, Ambassador of Tanzania

15:45 – 18:00 **Tour of Durban**

18:00 – 20:00 **Cocktail Reception hosted by ACCORD**

28 MAY 1999 – Friday

CHAIR: H.E. SIMATA AKAPELWA, AMBASSADOR OF ZAMBIA

Facilitator: Liz McClintock, CMG

8:30 – 9:00

Review of Previous Day

9:00 – 10:00

Enhancing the OAU's Negotiation Capacity

Introduction by Mr Sam Ibok, OAU

• **Tea Break**

Tea Break

Tea Break

Tea Break

10:30 – 11:00

Evaluation and Closing

12:30 – 14:00

Closing Luncheon

01 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1999

EXERCISE BLUE CRANE LESSONS LEARNED SEMINAR, SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE, 9TH JULY

ACCORD and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) organised a Lessons Learned Seminar for Exercise Blue Crane on 8 & 9 July 1999. The 8th focussed exclusively on the military aspects of the Exercise and was arranged by the SANDF. The 9th was coined the Civil-Military Relations component of the Lessons Learned Seminar and was arranged by ACCORD. In addition to the military personnel representing the various SADC countries, ACCORD invited a representative group of the civilian participants in Exercise Blue Crane, a CIVPOL representative, a representative from the International Advisor Group and Dr. Leonard Kapungu, the Head of the Lessons Learned Unit at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The aim of the seminar was to facilitate a discussions on the lessons learned during Exercise Blue Crane, and to make recommendations on the basis of these lessons learned on how future exercises, and even peace missions, could be better planned and executed.

The Seminar was well attended and a great success. The Peacekeeping Programme is in the process of editing and compiling the various reports into a comprehensive Lessons Learned Report. The proposed Report will contain sections on the civilian-, military-, and police participation as well as the presentations by the UNDPKO and the International Advisors Group. The proposed title of the publication is "SADC Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: Lessons from Exercise Blue Crane". The contents of the book will be as follows:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Foreword: Brig. Gen. Andre Bestbier
- Editorial: Cedric de Coning
- Exercise Blue Crane
- Summary of Military Debrief: Brig. Gen. Andre Bestbier
- Civilian Police in Exercise Blue Crane: Mark Malan
- Civilian participation in Exercise Blue Crane: Cedric de Coning
- Lessons Learned from the Perspective on the International Advisors Group: Lt.Col. Bengt Carlsson
- Lessons Learned Perspective from the United Nations: Dr. Leonard Kapungu

**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR PEACEKEEPERS, SADC REGIONAL
PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE – 8TH SEPTEMBER 1999**

One of the insights gained during Exercise Blue Crane was that whilst military and civilian personnel rely heavily on conflict management skills in peace missions, very little time is devoted to skills development in these fields during normal career training. The Peacekeeping Programme discussed this issue with the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare and proposed to develop a Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers to address the shortcoming. The proposal was accepted and the first Course was presented during the United Nations Peacekeeping Course for Company Commanders presented at the RPTC in Harare in September 1999.

The Course was developed as a jointly by the Training Unit (Kemi Ogunsanya) and the Peacekeeping Programme (James Machakaire). The Course was developed using ACCORD's Basic Conflict Management Course and adapting it to the peacekeeping environment. Extensive use was made of role plays and simulations relevant to the peacekeeping environment in Africa.

The Course was presented on 8 September 1999 by Mr. Cedric de Coning of the Peacekeeping Programme and Ms. Kemi Ogunsanya of the Training Unit, and was a great success. The SADC RPTC has asked ACCORD to develop a two-day course for the UN Staff Officer's Course in November 1999 and has indicated that they see this as an integral part of all their future courses.

ADVOCACY

- The Programme Manager was invited to respond to a talk given on Peacekeeping in Kosovo at a meeting organised by the Peace in the City Campaign in Durban on 19 August 1999. He responded with a short presentation entitled an African perspective on Peacekeeping and the International Response to the Crisis in Kosovo.
- The Programme Manager attended a United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Lessons Learned Seminar on the Implementation of the Principles and Guidelines on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Geneva on 15 to 17 September.
- The Programme Manager gave a lecture at the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism in Johannesburg on 13 August 1999 on the Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Operations.
- James Machakaire, Programme Intern, attended the Certificate in Defence Management from 23rd August to the 24th of September at the WITS P&DM.
- The Programme Manager made a presentation on The Role of Civilians in Peacekeeping and CIMIC during Exercise Pegasus at the SA Army College in Pretoria on the 20th of September
- The Programme Manager made a presentation on Managing the Media and Information during Exercise Pegasus at the SA Army College in Pretoria on the 23rd of September
- The Programme Manager gave a lecture on Conflict in Africa to students from the Institute of International Training at ACCORD on the 21st of September.

- The Programme Manager participated in Exercise Pegasus as the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN at the SA Army College in Pretoria from the 29 of September to the 1st of October.
- The Programme Manager gave a number of lectures on Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping as part of the Peace Studies Course for the University of Durban-Westville Political Science Honours Degree Course.
- The programme established publication exchange agreements with the International Peacekeeping Journal, University of Roma Tre in Italy and the Africa Institute of South Africa in Pretoria.

STAFF

The Permanent Staff component – comprising of Mr. Cedric de Coning as Programme Manager and Mr. Kwezi Mngqibisa as Programme Officer – remained unchanged over the report period.

Brig James Machakaire (rtd.), who joined the Peacekeeping Programme as an intern, remained with the Programme throughout the reporting period.

ANNEXURE A

LESSONS LEARNED SEMINAR

EXERCISE BLUE CRANE LESSONS LEARNED SEMINAR**CIVIL-MILITARY CO-ORDINATION 9 JULY 1999**

08:00 – 08:30	Welcome & Introduction
08:30 – 09:00	Lessons Learned from the Perspective of the International Military Advisors Group
09:00 – 10:00	CIVPOL
10:00 – 10:30	Coffee & Tea
10:30 – 11:00	Lessons Learned from the Perspective of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
11:00 – 11:30	Preparation and Planning
11:30 – 12:00	In-Mission Training and the CIMIC Seminar
12:00 – 12:30	The Role of the SRSG and his Office
12:30 – 13:30	Lunch
13:30 – 14:00	The Humanitarian Dimension
14:00 – 14:30	The Human Rights Dimension
14:30 – 15:00	The OAU Observer Mission & the SADC Human Rights Observer Group
15:00 – 15:30	The International Committee of the Red Cross
15:30 – 16:00	Coffee & Tea
16:00 – 16:30	The Role of the Media/Sim-Press
16:30 – 17:00	The MCOC (Mission Co-ordination Centre)
17:00 – 17:30	Summary & Closing

LIST OF CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS @ THE BLUE CRANE LESSONS LEARNED SEMINAR

Andrew Kazilimani	Afronet
Sudir Chuckun	Mauritius High Commission
Mr N. Lindunda	Zambia High Commission
Ms Joelien Pretorius	South Africa – University of Pretoria
Mr Horst Brammer	South Africa – Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr Bereng Mthimkulu	South Africa – Department of Defence
Mr Daniel Ngwepe	South Africa – Department of Foreign Affairs
Ms Betsie Smith	South Africa – Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr David Johnson	UN – High Commission for Human Rights
Mr Cosmos Chanda	UN – High commissioner for Refugees
Mrs Anne Mutelo	Namibia High Commission
Mr Michael Kleiner	ICRC
Col. Flynn (rtd)	ICRC

Military Component

Brig.Gen. Haasbroek	South Africa
Lt.Col. Andreas	South Africa
Lt.Col. A Botha	South Africa
Capt. Opperman	South Africa
Capt. W.S. Afunde	Namibia
Capt. J.J. Jatileni	Namibia
Col. R. Van Heerden	South Africa
Lt.Col. D.J. Bredenhann	South Africa
Lt.Col. G.H. Barrie	South Africa
Lt.Col. G.W. Lutgaan	South Africa
Cdr. L Goveia	South Africa
Col L. Van Vuuren	South Africa

Col. J.V. Hatting	South Africa
Capt. S. Gina	South Africa
Lt.Col. M.K. Mlenzana	South Africa
Col. P.J. Oelofse	South Africa
Col. J.L.F van der Colf	South Africa
Col. I.R. Fordred	South Africa
Maj. M.S. Nqhilifa	
Capt. T.G. Dlamini	Swaziland
Maj. S.S. Dlamini	Swaziland
Lt.Col. C.S. Nhlengethwa	Swaziland
Maj. C.V. Dlamini	Swaziland
Lt. Col Bengt Carlsson	Sweden
Col. E.P. Mntwale	Zambia
Lt.Col J.C. Mwansa	Zambia
Maj. B.M. Kaunda	Zambia
Maj. F.K. Thoola	Lesotho
Maj. M. Maboloka	Lesotho
Lt.Col J.M. Liebenberg	South Africa
Lt.Col. H.J. Blom	South Africa
Col. A.D Boshoff	South Africa
Col A.J. Botha	South Africa
Lt.Col B.M. Flourie	South Africa
S.Supt. R. Van Staden	South Africa
Mr j.B Dorfling	South Africa
Mr F. Scholts	South Africa
Col. J. Meiring	South Africa
Capt. S.O. Kgosi	Botswana
Col. E.S. Lekgaba	Botswana
Capt. K. Baruti	Botswana

Lt.Col. I. Macajo	Angola
Maj. R.T Lisbon	Angola
Col. A.L. Pombo	South Africa
Lt.Col. A Wushe	Zimbabwe
Brig.Gen. E.A. Rugeje	Zimbabwe
WG Cdr P.M. Govere	Zimbabwe
Brig. Gen. V.L. Sindane	South Africa
Brig.Gen. C.K. Gimonge	
Lt.Col. S.M. Brento	
Lt.Col G. Bloem	South Africa
Maj. B. Van Zyl	South Africa
Mr D Gerber	South Africa
Maj. Bakker	South Africa
Mr J.B. Dorfling	South Africa
Ms. F. Baliso	South Africa
Ms S. Tshinka	South Africa

ANNEXURE B

**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR PEACEKEEPERS – 8TH
SEPTEMBER**

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
1	8 Sept	0800-0815	RPTC Cedric	General Introduction. What is the focus of this course?	Auditorium	
2		0815-0900	Kemi	What is Conflict? Circle of Conflict	Auditorium	
3		0900-0930		Syndicate Exercise Exercise Back to the Bush	Syndicate Rooms	Annex A
4		0930-1000	Kemi	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
		1000-1015		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
5		1015-1045	Cedric	Communicating Skills Empathetic Listening Dealing with Threats and Anger (your own anger and that of others). Skills in dealing with Confrontation	Auditorium	
6		1045-1130		Syndicate Exercise The Quelimane Rape Dispute	Syndicate Rooms	Annex B
7		1130-1200	Cedric	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
8		1200-1230	Kemi	Continuum of Conflict resolution Mechanisms What is Negotiation Conditions for Negotiation Styles of Negotiation Stages of Negotiation	Auditorium	
9		1230-1300	Cedric & Kemi	Group Exercise The DRC Cease Fire Agreement	Auditorium	Annex C

		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
10		1400-1445	Kemi	Interest based Negotiation Six principles of Negotiation Pre-& In-Negotiation Preparing to Negotiate	Auditorium	
11		1445-1530		Exercise The Naraland Convoy Exercise	Syndicate Rooms	Annex D
12		1530-1545		Tea	Foyer	
13		1545-1600	Kemi	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
14		1600-1630	Cedric	Evaluation & Closing	Auditorium	Annex E

- Number trained 28
- Males 28
- Females 0

Sending organisations – Defence

Regional Breakdown

- Southern Africa 24
- East Africa 1
- West Africa 2
- Nordic 1

PARTICIPANTS NAMES

1. Major Abdulai Mahama
2. Koulibaly Soualifou
3. Thomas Nkouhomi
4. Major Jari Piira
5. Captain Vincent Luther
6. Major Xolani Gilbert Mabanga
7. Major D.P. Hobson
8. LtCol Vicotr Simunja
9. Major N. Hango
10. Major Wilson S.M. Mvula
11. Major Richard Binky Tamocha
12. Lt.Col. Petros S., Manyemba
13. Major Tebo L. Nthobotsang
14. Captain Lugano Kabeta Mwaipopo
15. Captain Chiro Jared Okombo
16. Major Boniface Masalu Kahema
17. Major Japhet Wankogere Maginga
18. Michael Thabo Lefa
19. Major Andrew Kabaira
20. Wilson Gambiza
21. Austine Matiwaza
22. Daniel Mapfumo Gede
23. Major Rantham Moyo
24. George Christopher Mapeza
25. Anastácio Zaguru Barassa
26. Major Vivios Matakala
27. Bernard M Kamushila
28. Major Wilson Ngenge

RESEARCH UNIT

³01 APRIL 1999 – 30 JUNE 1999

PRESENTATIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES

During this period, the Research Manager participated in the following conference:

Third African Governance Forum: Good Governance and Conflict Management for Durable Peace and Sustainable Development hosted by the United Nations Development Programme, 28th – 30th June 1999 in Bamako, Mali.

In addition, the Research Manager made the following presentations:

31st May 1999, “*Constitutionalism in Southern Africa*”. Paper presented to the workshop *The African Renaissance: Promoting Constitutional Democracy in Southern Africa* hosted by the Department of Constitutional Development in Pretoria.

24th May 1999, “*Analysing Conflicts*”. Paper presented to the *Advanced Workshop on Developing Negotiation, Facilitation and Mediation Skills* hosted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); Conflict Management Group (CMG); and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Durban.

18th May 1999, “*Africa: Problems and Prospects*”. Paper presented to the workshop *Africa: Prospects and Problems* hosted by ACCORD and the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria.

16th April 1999, “*Resolving Africa’s Conflicts*”. Paper presented to the *International Consensus Forum on Health and Human Security in Conflict and Transitional Settings* hosted by the World Health Organisation (WHO); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Tulane University.

RESEARCH INTERNSHIPS

In terms of ACCORD’s commitment to African capacity building, another intern joined the Research Unit. She is Kamar Yousuf, a Somali national. Having arrived in May at the Research Unit, she was immediately tasked to follow the unfolding peace process in Sierra Leone. This she has done as well as having an Internal Staff Seminar where her findings were presented to ACCORD staff. Thereafter her paper was reworked and will be used in the July edition of Conflict Trends.

³ Articles attached at the end of the report

EARLY WARNING

ACCORD's Early Warning Database was perpetually updated with new reports from the field on conflicts and potential conflicts being filed by country, region and chronologically by Mr. Senzo Ngubane, Research Assistant in the Unit. In addition, early warning and situation reports were produced for Angola, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone during this period.

AFRICA DIALOGUE LECTURES

During this period, the following Africa Dialogue Lectures occurred:

- 29th April 1999, "**Egypt's Foreign Policy and the Call for an African Renaissance**", addressed by the Egyptian Ambassador to South Africa, Ambassador Moushira Khattab.
- 13th May 1999, "**Political Developments in South Africa and Elections '99**", addressed by Mr. Khehla Shubane of the Centre for Policy Studies and Mr. Theo Bekker of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.

The Research Manager is currently editing some of these lectures in a monograph that should be going to press at the end of July.

WORKSHOPS

In its efforts to contribute towards the celebrations leading to Africa Day, ACCORD together with the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa held a one-day workshop entitled *Africa: Prospects and Problems*. The workshop was a resounding success with 112 people attending the proceedings. Several ambassadors, generals and other senior civil servants were delegates. A copy of the programme is attached for your information. As a result of the success of the workshop, ACCORD and the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa have decided to make this an annual event.

PUBLICATIONS

During this period, one of the Research Unit's main areas of activity was the commissioning, contributing, and editing of the July edition of **Conflict Trends**. That has been finalised and the design and layout is now being done. After this, it will go to press. However, outside of Conflict Trends, members of the Research Unit also contributed to other publications. Senzo Ngubane's "Niger's Walk to Democracy," has been published in *African Security Review*, Vol. 8(3), while, Hussein Solomon's "Challenges Facing Nigeria in the Era of Obasanjo," has been published in *SAIIA Update* No. 1/99.

OTHER

Hussein Solomon served as a Political Affairs Officer between 21st – 24th April 1999 during Operation Blue Crane, a Southern Africa-wide peacekeeping training exercise.

01 JULY 1999 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1999

RESEARCH INTERNSHIPS

During this period, Kamar Yousuf finalised her internship at ACCORD. During this period Kamar produced a paper entitled Reconstructing Somalia: Time for a Somali Initiative. Kamar also presented this research to all ACCORD staff in an Internal Staff Seminar. At the request of the Deputy Director: Operations, Kamar also drafted an internship policy for ACCORD. Kamar also participated in a workshop on gender equality in Durban.

Serena Parker also served a brief three-week stint in the Research Unit where she was tasked and successfully completed a paper entitled The State of the Public Service in South Africa.

PRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCES/WORKSHOPS/SYMPOSIA

Mr. Senzo Ngubane attended a **Civil Society workshop for Peace and Unity** in Malawi on 27th – 28th August, hosted by the National Consultative Group.

On 9 September 1999, Mr. Hussein Solomon presented a paper entitled Endless Night: Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Angola to the 49th Pugwash Conference: Confronting the Challenges of the 21st Century. Hosted by the South African Chapter of Pugwash. Rustenburg.

EARLY WARNING

During the period, ACCORD's Early Warning Database was continually updated and situation reports were produced on the following countries: Somalia, Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, Mozambique, Lesotho and Namibia.

AFRICA DIALOGUE LECTURES

The following two Africa Dialogue Lectures took place over this period:

On the 17th August, Professor Manthia Diawara presented a lecture entitled Globalisation and Modern African Societies.

On the 21st September, Mr. Tito Mboweni presented a lecture entitled The Role of the Reserve Bank in SADC Regional Economic Integration.

PUBLICATIONS

During this period Conflict Trends Issue No. 3 appeared. Considerable progress has also been made with Issue No. 4, which has currently been sent for language editing.

In addition, Africa Dialogue Monograph Series No. 1 has been finalised and has just been returned from the language editor.

The first issue of the African Journal for Conflict Resolution has also been finalised and will be going to press.

Finally, Hussein Solomon has published the following two articles:

- “Controlling Light Weapons in Southern Africa,” in Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare (eds.) Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence. Carnegies Corporation and Rowman and Littlefield. New York. 1999.
- “Critical Reflections of South African Foreign Policy,” in Vladimir Shubin (ed.) Yuzhnaya Afrika: Ocherki sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo I politicheskogo razvitiya (South Africa: Essays on Socio-economic and Political Developments). Vostochnaya Literatura (Oriental Literature Publishers). Moscow. 1999.

SUPPORT FOR OTHER UNITS/PROGRAMMES AT ACCORD

- The Research Unit has supported the Office of the Executive Director by constantly providing him with a chronology of events in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and interpretation and analysis of these.
- The Unit also provided data on youth in Africa to the Training Unit.
- The Unit assisted the Peacekeeping Programme in the solicitation and choice of articles for the Peacekeeping Occasional Paper Series.
- The Unit also provided information and analysis on the Public Service in South Africa to the Public Sector Programme

LECTURES/TRAINING/WORKSHOPS

- Mr. Senzo Ngubane together with the Programme Manager: Peacekeeping conducted a training workshop on Conducting Research Through the Internet to Political Science Honours students at the University of Durban-Westville.
- Mr. Hussein Solomon together with Mr. Senzo Ngubane conducted a one-day workshop on Research Methodology for staff of the Unexplored Graduate Initiative.
- Mr. Hussein Solomon together with Mr. Ngubane and the Programme Manager: Peacekeeping lectured a module on Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution to the University of Durban-Westville’s Political Science Honours students.
- Mr. Hussein Solomon also presented a series of lectures to staff and students in the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria on the role of the OAU and sub-regional organisations such as SADC in conflict resolution.
- Mr. Hussein Solomon is also an External Examiner for the Conflict Resolution Honours Course at the University of the North (Qwa-Qwa campus).

ANNEXURE ONE

ANALYSING CONFLICTS¹

By
Hussein Solomon²

1. Introduction

Future historians will certainly view the twentieth century as one of the bloodiest centuries as humanity struggles against its more primordial instincts. Beginning on the bloody plains of Armenia to the trench warfare of World War I, the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Daschau, the killing fields of East Timor, Cambodia and Sudan and now Angola and Yugoslavia, the twentieth century has witnessed mans' inhumanity to man reach new levels of depravity. Altogether 160 million people lost their lives as a result of war, genocide and state killings³. In 1996 alone, Rupesinghe and Anderlini⁴ note that 19 major internal conflicts were being fought world-wide, with a further 42 lower-intensity and 74 lethal violent political conflicts.

In this, Africa contributed more than its fair share. Of the 48 genocides and 'politicides' registered throughout the world between 1945 and 1995, 20 took place in Africa. Put differently between 1945 and 1995, an estimated 8 million people were killed in Africa as a direct result of war⁵.

These horrendous statistics reveal the challenge we all face, to effectively analysing violent conflicts or potential violent conflicts with a view to transforming them along more non-violent trajectories. To borrow a phrase from Kumar Rupesinghe, the goal of such conflict analysis is not conflict termination but conflict transformation. The reason for this is that conflict is an integral part of human relations and cannot be entirely eliminated. Indeed, under certain circumstances conflict can be a positive force. The purpose of such conflict analysis, then, is to aid in the ending of the violent expression of conflict and to have it re-channelled through such institutions as the holding of regular elections or the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of steps towards effective conflict analysis. Invariably, during the course of the presentation I will be sharing with you some aspects of the methodology ACCORD's Early Warning System employs in its analysis of conflicts and potential conflicts. We will begin

¹ Paper presented to the Workshop on Advanced Negotiation, Mediation and Facilitation Skills. Organised by the OAU, ACCORD and CMG. 24 May 1999.

² Hussein Solomon is Research Manager at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

³ Newsweek International, 7 December 1998.

⁴ K. Rupesinghe and S.N. Anderlini (1998). Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution. London. Pluto Press, p. 2.

⁵ L. Reyhler (1997). "Conflicts in Africa – the issues of control and prevention", in Report of the Commission on African Regions in Crisis, Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of Crises and Crisis Prevention Measures. Brussels. European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security, p. 17.

this paper however with an overview of conflicts in Africa.

2. An A – Z of Conflicts in Africa

In Algeria, the fighting between government forces and the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) have spread to areas such as Mascara, Khemis Melinia in the Ain Defla district as well as Chlef and Ain Soltan, claiming new victims in its wake.

In Angola from Andulo to Bailundo, from Lunda Norte to Lunda do Sul, war is exacting a terrible price on the Angolan people. The regional dimensions of the conflict has seen its spill-over effects in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – it now threatens Zambia. It is this regional dimension of the conflict, which I believe constitutes the gravest challenge to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

In Burundi, massacres being perpetrated against innocent civilians continue unabated in areas such as Nyomaboko in the commune of Kanyosho as well as Mutambo and Kabezi communes in Bujumbura Rural Province in western Burundi. As in Angola, the situation in Burundi threatens to have serious regional dimensions. On 11 October 1998, the Burundian News Agency (ABP) alleged that 'terrorist' groups allied to the National Council of Democracy (CNDD) and those allied to the Party for the Liberation of Hutu People (Palipehutu) are given refuge and are armed by Tanzania. Should Major Buyoya's government believe this to be true, would it respond militarily to Tanzania, either directly or indirectly?

In Chad, former President Goukouni Oueddi, who is currently in exile in Algiers, has appealed for general mobilisation against President Idriss Deby's regime. Meanwhile, the conflict in the Tibetsi Massif, in northern Chad is intensifying.

The situation in Congo-Brazzaville is deteriorating in the regions of Pool, Bouenza, Lekoumou and Du Niari. The fighting is between President Denis Sassou-Nguesso's government security forces, 'cocoyes' militiamen loyal to ousted President Pascal Lissouba and 'ninja' militiamen loyal to former premier Bernard Kolelas.

Meanwhile the on-going conflict in the DRC continues to sap the energies of several African States. What is clear about the DRC is that as time goes by, the situation becomes increasingly more complex and difficult to resolve. Two examples illustrate the point. First, both the allies and rebels are becoming more fractious which makes it difficult for third party mediation to try to resolve the situation. Second, there are reports that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are installing their own populations in the Itombwe high plateau in areas surrounding Mwenga in the Uvira region in the eastern DRC. If this report is true, it results in this area falling under the *de facto* control of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and further complicates conflict resolution intervention efforts.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has escalated rapidly along the Badme/Shiharo, Zalaambessa, Mereb-Selit, Dadme and Tsorona fronts.

The situation in Guinea is tense following the arrest of the leader of the opposition Guinean Peoples' Rally, Alpha Conde.

Ethnic strife has reared its ugly head again in Kenya where fierce fighting in Ngomongo Estate, Kariobango have broken out between the Bagisu and Luo tribes.

Meanwhile peace in Lesotho looks set to unravel should the government persist in actions that are perceived as a 'witch-hunt'. This has witnessed the arrest of 30 mutineers of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) who have been taken to undisclosed places for interrogation; threats emanating from the government against those civil servants who took part in rallies; as well as the fact that the Lesotho police have issued warrants of arrest for two of the country's opposition youth leaders – Africa Molungoa and John Maseribane.

The situation in Liberia is tense following the government indicting 32 people on charges of treason. The 32, including opposition leader Roosevelt Johnson are accused of plotting to overthrow the government.

Political tensions in Malawi is escalating following a decision by the ruling United Democratic Party (UDP), which is facing serious challenges from opposition parties, to increase for the May elections, constituencies in southern Malawi where it enjoys more support. Opposition parties have called the move legal rigging of the election since the move will make it a foregone conclusion that the UDP will have a majority in parliament as well as being assured of another term.

Despite Nigeria's relatively successful programme regarding the transition to civilian rule, poor civil-military relations is the only fault-line in the troubled West African country as the conflict between Ijaw and Itsekeri youth in Nigeria's Delta State underlines.

The assassination of President Mainassare recently in Niger, suggests that the problem of poor civil-military relations is not simply a Nigerian phenomenon, but an African one.

In Sierra Leone, the bitter fruit of the politics of vengeance was sown on 19th October 1998 when 24 military officers were publicly executed in connection with the coup that ousted the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Two days later Revolutionary United Front (RUF) commander Sam Bockarie said he would revenge the execution of these 24 soldiers by trying to oust Kabbah again. Fighting between ECOMOG and the RUF rebels immediately intensified. There are currently moves towards peace in the country, but I believe it to be too

early to make a pronouncement on the likelihood of success regarding such peace initiatives.

Somalia's feuding faction leaders continue their reign of terror in that country as fighting once again broke out in Kismaayo, southern Somalia between the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in November-December 1998.

Africa's long-running civil war in Sudan between the Khartoum government of General Bashir and John Garang's Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) continues. Currently the conflict has produced two million dead and 10 million displaced.

And what of South Africa? Crime seems to be one of the biggest problems confronting the new South Africa. Consider the following statistics in this regard:

- There are currently 481 organised crime syndicates in the country
- In 1996, the estimated costs of all crime was a minimum of R31 billion, equivalent to 18% of the national budget and an amount completely unsustainable in a developing economy
- According to Interpol, South Africa has an average of 53.4 murders per 100,000 people; the international average is 5.5
- It also has the highest number of reported rapes (99.7 per 100,000)

In this regard, I would like to argue that one of the greatest dangers facing South Africa as we move towards the second democratic elections is that the politics of reconciliation pursued by President Mandela might be overturned by the politics of incapacity.

Since the end of November 1998 the political situation inside Swaziland has deteriorated. On 20th November 1998, Swazi security forces were out in force following a bomb explosion that destroyed the office of the Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Khoza. Three weeks before this, a blast destroyed a bridge at Matsapha, east of the capital, hours after the king had passed by.

Uganda continues to be plagued by various rebel movements – the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) operating in Gulu and Kitgum in northern Uganda; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in the Ruwenzori mountains in southwestern Uganda and the West Nile Bank Front (WBNF) which has been most recently active in Aringa County, Arua District in northwestern Uganda. This is, in addition, to the fact that Kampala has committed troops to the DRC. By November 1998, it was estimated that Kampala had spent Ush 55,000,000,000 (US \$40 million) on its then three-month old intervention in the DRC.

In Zambia, there is the emergence of a secessionist movement under the leadership of Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, president of the opposition

Agenda for Zambia (AZ) which has been advocating for a free and independent Barotseland.

Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe economic decline which has witnessed the Zimbabwe dollar losing 64,3% of its value has resulted in 23% of children under the age of three being chronically malnourished while 45% of all households fall below the national food poverty line. This has resulted in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) demanding a 20% wage hike. Having their demands not met has resulted in strike activity and state repression. The million-dollar-a-day military intervention in the DRC has not helped the Zimbabwe economy either. Popular anger has also been fuelled by perceptions of corruption and mismanagement on the part of the government. Faced with a rising tide of protest the government has grown more authoritarian as the arrest and torture of journalists Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto indicate as well as Mugabe's attack on the judiciary.

This brief overview of conflicts and potential conflicts on the African continent once more stresses the need for effective conflict analysis.

3. A Caveat

Our discussion of conflict analysis needs to be preceded with a caveat. There is a tendency to reduce complex social and political analysis into CNN 'sound-bites' – into easily consumable stereotypical phrases. Two such examples illustrate the point.

First, amongst academics and policy-makers there is a growing tendency to view inter-state conflicts as being replaced by intra-state conflicts. On closer inspection, however one finds that such a dichotomy is false; that historically there has been a strong interaction between these two forms of conflict and that this interaction continues today. Surveying the current state of Africa it is clear that several rebel movements – be they Jonas Savimbi's UNITA or Joseph Kony's LRA - would cease to exist in the absence of external support.

Second, there is a tendency in certain circles in Washington and in certain other Western capitals to equate 'Islamic fundamentalism' with terrorism. Problems arise when African governments internalise these positions, resulting in disastrous consequences. This sort of 'pseudo-analysis' does not deepen our understanding of why 'Islamic fundamentalist' Sudan would support the 'Christian fundamentalist' Lord's Resistance Army to toppled the secular government of Uganda's Yoweri Museveni. Equating 'Islamic fundamentalism' with terrorism results in problematising over one billion of the world's Muslims and could in the long-term result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Commenting on this Rupesinghe and Anderlini⁶ notes that 'Islamic fundamentalism':

"... is a popular reaction to western cultural domination and the West's

⁶ Rupesinghe and Anderlini, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-11.

support of often corrupt regimes. It is also a reaction to the increasing disparity between the rich and the poor in these areas. The clerics, who always maintained strong power bases among the poverty-stricken, have emerged as political figures calling for a return to basic Koranic traditions and a rejection of any form of secularism. In Bosnia, the emergence of extremist Islamic groups is, in part, a consequence of the Muslim population's anger at what they perceived as western indifference to their plight. For the Chechens, on the other hand, the promotion of Islam as part of a new national identity is a means of distancing themselves from their former Russian rulers ... Care must be taken, however, not to oversimplify the issues through injudicious stereotyping.... In reality stereotyping, fuelled by ignorance and the blanket use of terminology such as 'Islamic fundamentalism' not only obscures complex social and political issues ... but potentially exacerbates them in relation to the world at large. The Islamic world is made up of a patchwork of nations, cultures, languages and histories. The danger is that by focusing on Islam itself, rather than on its politicisation by governments [and groups] this perceived threat could become a self-fulfilling prophecy".

Many other cases can be used to illustrate the point, but I believe that the point: that oversimplistic analysis and injudicious stereotyping needs to be avoided in any conflict analysis has been made.

3. Analysing conflicts

A concomitant of the above point is the fact that we need to accept that the emergence of violent conflict is often the result of complex processes with often deep historical roots. Following Barry Buzan's⁷ typology, ACCORD's Early Warning System views conflict as the result of five sources of insecurity: politics, economics, military, environmental and socio-cultural variables.

Often in our analysis we are prone to emphasise the political and military dimensions of a conflict at the expense of other variables which are often more deep-seated and drive violent conflicts. According to Stanley Samarasinghe⁸ a functional correlation exists between poverty and conflict. Consider in this regard the following statistics:

- In the past 15 years about 15 of the 20 poorest countries have experienced violent conflict
- About half of the world's low income countries are either engaged in conflict or are in the process of transition from conflict
- Almost every low income country shares at least a border with a country in conflict if not embroiled in ones own conflict

⁷ B. Buzan (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. New York. Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

⁸ S.W. Samarasinghe (nd). Conflict Management Throughout the Crisis Life Cycle. Mimeo, p. 2.

- In the 1990s about 70 million of the world's poor have been displaced from their homes as a result of conflict. In Africa, alone, about one-third of the countries have produced refugees

Supporting this view and relating poverty to the occurrence of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Rupesinghe and Anderlini⁹ notes that:

"...in Rwanda, one of the world's poorest countries, a rapidly increasing population coupled with decreasing agricultural productivity, few opportunities and uneven government support for rural areas, exacerbated social tensions. This combined with a drop in tea and coffee prices in the late 1980s and structural adjustment policies in 1990, led to even harsher living conditions and eroded the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the people. These factors in themselves did not create sufficient conditions for the outbreak of civil war or the genocide of 1994. Within the wider context, however, they were instrumental in the build-up of tensions and grievance in a country with a history of social and ethnic divisions and recurrent communal violence".

According to Stanley Samarasinghe¹⁰ any violent conflict has five basic phases. These are:

- Pre-conflict phase;
- Conflict emergence phase;
- Conflict and Crisis phase which is characterised by chaos and complex emergencies;
- Conflict Settlement phase; and a
- Post-conflict phase

A question that might be asked at this point is what factors need to be taken into account when demarcating a particular conflict into phases or plotting the crisis life cycle on a graph. In this Rupesinghe and Anderlini¹¹ argue that the following factors affect the gradation of conflicts:

Table 1: Factors Affecting the Gradation of Conflict

⁹ Rupesinghe and Anderlini, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁰ Samarasinghe, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

¹¹ Rupesinghe and Anderlini, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

- The intensity of grievances
- Parties' awareness of differences and separate identities
- Parties' perception and attitude towards each other
- Level of political mobilisation and organisation behind parties
- Extent of polarisation
- Amount of hostile behaviour
- Extent that parties use or threaten the use of arms
- Number of issues in dispute
- Number of parties supportive of each side
- Intensity of emotion and level of psychological investment in parties positions and views of the world
- Amount of direct interaction and communication the parties have with one another
- Cohesion between leaders of respective parties and their constituencies

To this categorisation, I would like to add:

- The ability of existing institutions **in the society** to effectively redress the grievances of the parties and effectively resolve the conflict.

For the purposes of our discussion on conflict analysis, I will focus on the first two phases listed above.

The pre-conflict phase, according to Samarasinghe¹², "... represents conditions that are normal to the society concerned. At this stage disputes between groups do not result in violence. If the country has democratic institutions such as a freely elected legislature with minority representation and a free media, protest will be channelled peacefully through such institutional channels. In the conflict-emergence phase disputes become more evident and protesting groups become more vocal and militant. Protest can take many forms including boycotts, strikes, and mass demonstrations. The degree of violence that such protest entails would depend on the specific conditions that prevail in the country. If the country has a democratic tradition less violence can be anticipated. If the political conditions are more authoritarian a higher level of violence can be anticipated". What is important to note that what distinguishes this phase from the conflict and crisis phase is that violence in this phase, should it occur, is sporadic and random rather than organised and regular.

¹² Samarasinghe, *op.cit.*, p. 1

It is at this second phase also when an effective Early Warning System should start monitoring the situation. Early warning, in my view, is concerned with forecasting the potential for violent conflict and framing an appropriate response that seeks not only to resolve the current conflict but also to create conditions that would result in sustainable peace. For too long, in my view, has preventive diplomacy focused in on short-term cessation of hostilities between parties and the international community is often surprised when hostilities flare up again. The various attempts at peace in Angola is possibly the archetypal example of this on the African continent. Addressing the root causes of a conflict, is necessarily a longer-term project but its contribution towards sustainable peace is more enduring than any short-term initiative.

There are five basic steps towards the construction of an Early Warning System. These are:

- Develop an appropriate monitoring framework consisting of a model with variables and indicators
- Risk assessment using historical and contemporary data
- Monitoring and analysis of variables and indicators
- Recommendations for preventive responses
- Integration of recommendations to the response system¹³

For an Early Warning System to be effective, it needs to be practicable. Despite eluding to the fact that Buzan's five sources of insecurity seen in a historical context are essential in understanding the origins and nature of violent conflicts, this is too broad to measure in an Early Warning System. Thus this needs to be subdivided and criteria to be measured needs to be established. Once again Rupesinghe and Anderlini¹⁴ provides us with some of the indicators which can be practically measured. This is captured in Table 2.

Table 2: Possible Indicators for Early Warning

<i>Political and Leadership Issues</i>	<i>Criteria to be Measured</i>
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¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴ Rupesinghe and Anderlini, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

Regime capacity	Duration, democracy/autocracy, revenue as share of gross domestic product
Characteristics of the elite	Ethnic and religious base, revolutionary leadership, exclusionary ideology
Political and economic cleavages	Extent and degree of group discrimination, group separation, income inequality
Conflictual political cultures	Revolution or ethnic war/ genocide/ politicide, low level conflict in past 15 years
International influence	Military intervention, shifts in interstate conflict/ cooperation instability/ conflict in neighbouring countries
<i>Economic and Environmental Issues</i>	Level of pollution, impact on indigenous livelihood
<i>Demographic and Societal Issues</i>	

Population pressure	Density, total change in five years, youth bulge, cropland and labour force in agriculture
Ethnolinguistic diversity	Diversity, history of suppression
Militarisation of society	Military expenditure, five-year change in arms import, military vs medical personnel
Economic strength	Level and change in per capita income and consumption
Quality of life	Access to safe drinking water, food supplies, infant mortality
Constraints on resource base	Water depletion, soil degradation, famine
Government's economic management	Change in revenue and public sector debt, level of inflation, capital outflows, government reserves
Economic openness and trade	Import + export/GDP, direct foreign investment
International economic aid	Existence of IMF stand-by loan, other external aid

Whilst such a list is not exhaustive, it does provide us with some idea of the kind of criteria which needs to be measured in a given conflict situation. It is important to recognise that the criteria used will determine the kind of interpretation or analysis that results from the process. This, in turn, would determine the kind of conflict resolution tools one will employ in a given situation be it informal consultation, civilian fact-finding missions, arms embargoes and other punitive sanctions, or military confidence-building measures.

Early warning, it should be noted is a tool for action, the aims of which are two-fold. The more immediate goal is the immediate cessation of hostilities between the parties. This results in additional information that needs to be found for a comprehensive early warning report:

- What are the political and other objectives of the parties concerned? Is there any interface between their agendas? If such an interface exists, could a third party use this as a starting point to defuse the conflict?
- Who or which third parties would be acceptable to all parties as neutral mediators?
- Is there an effective strategic peace constituency? If so, how can they become involved in the peace process?

- Finally, what incentives and punitive measures can be brought to bear upon recalcitrant parties on the part of the international community?

The long-term goal of, of course, is to promote the condition of a sustainable peace and such an early warning report would need to contain recommendations of a structural and non-structural nature towards that goal.

According to Luc Reychler¹⁵ such structural measures relate to reconstruction and include:

- Political democratisation,
- Economic reconstruction,
- Reconstruction of the judicial system,
- Education and training,
- Health and housing; and
- Arms control

On the other hand non-structural measures relating to reconciliation which aims to change the political and moral climate include:

- Healing the past,
- Commitment towards the future,
- Reconciling values; and
- Developing a belief in 'us'/plural loyalties

4. Conclusion

As we gather, around to listen and participate in the rest of the proceedings of this workshop, the challenge is to attempt to constrain those forces that are wreaking such havoc on our beloved continent. Effective conflict analysis is one small step towards the vision articulated by South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki of an African Renaissance. Though the challenges we face are monumental, it is also true that small steps such as those articulated above are essential for the choice is as stark as it is brutal. An Africa doomed to experience death, destitution and despair or an Africa living up to its full potential of peace and prosperity whose people are filled with happiness and the hope of a better tomorrow.

¹⁵ Reychler, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

ANNEXURE TWO

SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

By Kamar Yousuf

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BACKGROUND

The civil war began in Sierra Leone in 1991 when insurgent forces, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), launched attacks against the government of President Joseph Momoh. The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a charismatic former army corporal, who was supported by the Liberian leader, Charles Taylor's forces, and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. The reason President Taylor was supporting the RUF was that President Momoh allowed ECOMOG troops to use Sierra Leone as a rear base for its operations in Liberia during that country's seven-year civil war.

The RUF at first seemed a puppet movement, an offshoot of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), but it soon took a life of its own, and attracted disillusioned young men from the impoverished countryside. The RUF exploited the frustration felt by groups of uneducated and unemployed youth, with no prospects for advancement. Resentful of the way in which a Freetown elite has enriched itself at their expense, these disillusioned bands of young men already possessed anti-government sentiment and provided a fertile recruiting ground for the RUF. The rebel movement's numbers have also been increased by the addition of disparate groups that see violence as a means of solving local disputes.

Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has endured a succession of corrupt military regimes and rebellions in struggles over economic and political power. Flawed economic and political models have led to dismal growth per capita income, falling rates of food production, mismanagement of natural resources, disregard of human rights, and ongoing civil war. However, the latest round of violence is unique in the scale and grotesque nature of the attacks on civilians. Much of rural Sierra Leone is inaccessible

due to the ongoing war, creating difficulties for relief agencies that distribute urgently-needed food supplies to reach starving rural population.

Unfortunately, Sierra Leone has been largely ignored by much of the international community, with the exception of those attempting to exploit its rich diamond and mineral deposits. This mix of exploitation and indifference, coupled with a history of weak respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions, has repeatedly permitted military leaders to hold power and divert revenue from the mines for their own benefit. In attempts during recent years to gain political and economic control, both government and rebel groups have sought to tip the balance of power by employing private security firms or mercenaries, often in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions.

Main Players

The major actors in this conflict include the government forces: Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA); the Kamajor, a pro-democracy civilian militia group loyal to the current President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah; and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The rebels that are fighting the government consist of the RUF commanded by Sam Bockarie, and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), renegade Sierra Leonean soldiers, led by Johnny Paul Koroma. The RUF leader, Sankoh has been in jail since March 1997 and has been sentenced to death for treason. He has appealed against the sentence, and has recently participated in the current peace agreement.

On 25 May 1997, the democratically-elected government of President Kabbah was overthrown by disgruntled military junta under the command of Major Koroma. This

forced the President to flee to exile in Guinea. President Kabbah came to power in 1996 in the first multiparty election in Sierra Leone for many years.

This military junta called itself Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and joined forces with the RUF to form a regime characterized by serious human rights violations and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. In February 1998, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping troops, forced the AFRC/RUF out of power and reinstated President Kabbah. Since the reinstatement of the legitimate government, the rebel alliance has been waging war against ECOMOG and the government. With no recognizable political platform, the rebels are committing widespread and outrageous atrocities against innocent population in an attempt to regain power. As the violence in Sierra Leone continues, grave human rights abuses continue to take place.

Moreover, AFRC/RUF are targeting unarmed civilians, especially women and children, torturing and mutilating them often by amputating their limbs. For instance, women have been actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. Children have been targets of killings, and violence and are forcibly recruited as soldiers. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, innumerable Sierra Leoneans suffer from psychological trauma due to intentionally cruel methods of inflicting harm against these individuals and their communities.

These atrocities committed against civilians are the latest cycle of violence in the armed conflict that has devastated Sierra Leone for eight years. The fighting has caused the displacement of more than a million Sierra Leoneans. Most have become internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands have fled the country as refugees, predominantly to neighboring Guinea and Liberia.

President Kabbah returned to office to face the task of restoring order to a demoralized population and a disorganized and severely damaged economy. In addition, the Sierra Leonean army is neither strong nor effective, and is fragmented. Before the conflict started, RSLA was around 3,000, and was dramatically increased to 13,000 soldiers, in response to RUF's constant attacks. Army recruitment was largely random, with the admission of criminals and unemployed street youth to bolster numbers. They were given minimal training before being armed and sent up to the front. Due to public spending cuts, the army was often not paid leading them to loot from civilians, and some even joined the rebels.

Foreign Involvement

Sierra Leone is another place in Africa where diamond smuggling web is thriving. The illicit operators are taking advantage of the ongoing political instability. The most conspicuous aspects of these operations are the presence of foreign mercenaries that are available to defend mineral resources, and to help the rebels and the government as well. To cite an example, South African Executive Outcomes (EO) are the biggest mercenaries defending diamond-mining companies in Sierra Leone, at the same time helping the ECOMOG forces. They were experts in regional destabilization during the apartheid era, and have turned their skills to defending mining corporations in Africa.

It has been reported that major mining corporations, such as De Beers and British-owned Branch Energy, mainly finance the Executive Outcomes. These South African mercenaries maintain security in the diamond district, keeping both the RUF at bay and the RSLA under control. Using attack helicopters and sophisticated radio equipment, EO has launched attacks on RUF-held areas. They also undertake some training of the

RSLA. EO has a history of supporting despotic rulers and taking care of Africa's dirty wars. For example, they were working in Angola with diamond firms and the Angolan government selling military force for commercial returns.

The international community, including the United States, and Britain, has charged that Taylor's forces continue to support the RUF, although he has denied this allegation. Recently, ECOMOG said it had confirmed that Liberia and Burkina Faso were providing arms and support for the rebels, including through Ukrainian mercenaries.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Sierra Leone is one of the world's five poorest countries. The majority of the population are subsistence farmers. Ironically, Sierra Leone possesses an abundance of natural resources, including gold, diamonds, bauxite, titanium dioxide, and is a producer of coffee, rice and cocoa. However, the enormous wealth generated from these exports has served to enrich government officials, international mining companies and businessmen, many of whom are Lebanese. The granting of mining licenses and Customs and Excise duties have provided the main source of revenue for the government, but smuggling is rife and it is estimated that US\$200 million of diamonds each year are illegally exported. In addition, the revenue that is collected has often not found its way into the country's treasury. Officials have used their positions to accumulate personal wealth and in doing so, they have sold out their authority. Basically, the international community described Sierra Leone's governments as a kleptocracy, a government of thieves, in which looting the country's assets became the state's very "raison d'être". Sierra Leoneans are aware that they have been denied access to the wealth of their

country that is so apparent. Most affected is the large pool of youth that are disillusioned and distanced from government.

On top of this, Sierra Leone belongs to a group of countries classified by the World Bank and the IMF as "Highly Indebted Poorest Countries" (HIPC). Years of economic mismanagement have resulted in a plethora of severe socio-economic problems. Fewer than 40% of Sierra Leoneans have access to health services and there is poor provision of other social services. Also, education and health sectors have suffered, and economic situation has worsened because of this ongoing civil war.

Furthermore, legitimate mining activities were closed following attacks and looting. Most importantly, in January 1995, the Australian and American owned company, Sierra Rutile, and Australian owned bauxite exporting company, Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company, shut down operations. Sierra Rutile is the world's largest producer of titanium dioxide. These companies were previously major employers in the region and provided the government with about half of its export earnings. Both companies are considering resuming operations in Sierra Leone, but not before a destroyed infrastructure can be rebuilt and there is a return to some degree of stability.

Meanwhile, some diamond mining has continued and smuggling has increased, facilitated by networks of army officers, and rebels and the closing of certain border checkpoints. Recently, there has been a resumption of diamond mining in the Koidu area under the protection of Executive Outcomes. Branch Energy has been given a special mining concession in the Koidu district. Providing the security and monopolizing the diamond business may mean that this company has a very strong hold on any future government.

The production of rice, cocoa and coffee, important staples of the economy has been seriously disrupted by the conflict. Terrorised farmers have fled their lands and food distribution has been virtually halted due to the insecurity of the road network. Export earnings have collapsed and the country, traditionally a rice exporter, now imports foodstuff.

In sum, the government is virtually bankrupt and dependent on World Bank and IMF loans. It appears that most of the revenue goes to servicing the war.

LONG-TERM PROSPECT FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

The crisis in Sierra Leone is not only about who controls the diamond mines, but also due to many years of bad governance and economic mismanagement. It seems that Sierra Leoneans have never experienced responsible governments. The wealth of the country has not resulted in economic growth. Inequity between the few in a position to exploit the resources and the majority who go without is extreme. There is widespread resentment and a loss of faith in government and politicians. Most affected is the large pool of youth who are distant from government and traditional authority. The war, then, is the result of the acute political and economic crisis, and sustained violence has exaggerated the crisis and created a humanitarian emergency.

The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) did not bring a rapid end to the war and corruption, as promised in 1992, and the coup revealed that weak governance continues. Also, critics say President Kabbah is not a strong leader but more of a civil servant. Before coming to power, he worked for the UNDP for 20 years. Critics claim that he lacks astute political leadership. The challenge for his government now is to reverse these trends, and bring stability and economic growth to his collapsed country.

Economically, Sierra Leone has the potential to be self-sufficient and with its rich mineral deposits it is reasonable to assume that there would be healthy foreign investment in the country. I believe that long-term sustainable peace can be feasible in Sierra Leone when the government and the international community commit to playing the following roles:

Role of the Government

A major challenge to Kabbah's government is to promote respect for the rule of law and the establishment of institutions of justice in the midst of the present chaos and brutal civil war in the country. In my opinion, while demanding accountability for crimes committed by all sides, the government must assure due judicial process for the rebels accused of gross violation of human rights. These trials will constitute the first major test of the justice system under Kabbah. The government has made repeated gestures in favor of human rights, such as its pledge to provide amnesty for child soldiers and to demobilize all child soldiers; it must now follow through on these commitments. Likewise, the government must immediately ensure disarmament, demobilization, and integration programs. Particular attention should be paid to (a) humane treatment of captured and surrendered combatants; (b) psychological and social preparation of the reintegration of combatants into communities; and (c) training in human rights and humanitarian law for those combatants wishing to enlist in the Sierra Leonean army. Demobilized combatants suspected of having committed war crimes or human rights violations should be monitored by the government in compliance with international standards, and investigated and prosecuted where appropriate.

In order to end the cycles of violence in Sierra Leone, perpetrators of human rights violations must be held accountable for their actions. AFRC/RUF members suspected of having committed human rights abuses and former AFRC/RUF collaborators, as well as some members of the armed force who have also committed similar crimes against civilian, must be given fair trials and punished according to national and international law. Furthermore, the government should consider incorporating international judges into its judicial system, in particular for cases regarding war crimes.

To succeed in promoting sustainable peace and economic development, the government must demonstrate the following strategy:

1. Good governance:

- a sustainable peace agreement,
- the re-establishment of functioning government institutions,
- a strong civil - military plan, including demobilization and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and the re-training of police and soldiers,
- upholding the rule of law, observing human rights and strengthening the judiciary,
- rehabilitating education and health sectors, and provision of these services to reach all areas of the country,
- establishing strong political leadership, and legitimizing opposition political parties.

2. Economic revival:

- fiscal accountability,
- building capacity for transparency in decision-making,

- encouraging the return of foreign investment and ensuring that this is regulated in a manner consistent with Sierra Leone's financial and economic requirements,
- employment creation, specifically provisions must be made for unemployed youth and soldiers demobilized from the Sierra Leone army and the RUF,

3. Nation Building:

- establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
- creating trauma counselling and psychological treatment for mutilated civilians,
- promoting dialogue among different groups—religious leaders, scholars and business people—based on mutual trust and recognition of rights and responsibilities of all Sierra Leoneans.

Roles of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS

The United Nations

The international community has a crucial role to play in order to promote human rights, the rule of law, and stability in Sierra Leone. The United Nations agencies are well placed to implement programs and policies to meet these ends in this country. The United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) should closely monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian law and assure that ECOMOG's mandate to train the new Sierra Leonean army results in an ethnically and geographically balanced force, and includes adequate training in the laws of war. UNOMSIL should reinforce and integrate human rights into its existing mandate, primarily through further

support for its human rights office. This office should be given the resources necessary at UN headquarters as well as in the field to monitor and report publicly on the human rights situation throughout the country.

Additionally, the office must have the capacity to provide technical assistance and training to the Sierra Leonean government and local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Also, UNOMSIL must carefully monitor the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program for combatants, developed by the World Bank and the Sierra Leonean government. UNOMSIL should ensure that ECOMOG, responsible for the implementation of the DDR program, treats captured or surrendered combatants, especially the large number of child soldiers, in a humane fashion, and works closely with other agencies to facilitate the reintegration of children and other former combatants into civilian communities.

In order to put an end to the cycles of violence and atrocities against civilians, the UN will have to focus on the root causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. With the democratically elected Kabbah government reinstalled, the UN should provide the resources to train the civilian police. Also, the UN should support the government's efforts to establish institutions of justice and the rule of law, as well as to promote a vibrant civil society with full respect for human rights.

The UN can most effectively assist by encouraging democratic and accountable systems of governance and can take a lead role in strengthening civil society. Further, the UN can facilitate bringing together different players who can both push for and lend assistance to the Kabbah government to make it function effectively and responsibly.

The Organization of African Unity

Apart from condemning the coup and the subsequent violence in Sierra Leone, the OAU has not played an active role in this conflict. Actually, in its entire history, the OAU has not succeeded in mediating an end to a single conflict in Africa. This is largely due to the fact that the OAU lacks the capacity to undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Also, the OAU lacks an adequate financial base and infrastructure to assemble a peacekeeping force; most of its member countries are in desperate economic conditions, and it lacks expertise and resources needed for peacemaking and peace-building.

For the OAU to be effective in resolving Africa's problems, member states should empower the organization's role in order to make it a mechanism for conflict prevention, resolution and management. Likewise, African states should pay their arrears and membership dues on time.

To sum up, the OAU needs to be restructured and reformed. Its role should be as a coordinating body and it should transfer responsibility to the sub-region bodies, such as ECOWAS and SADC.

The Economic Community of West African States

The ECOWAS should assure that human rights concerns are integrated into ECOMOG's mandate, as well as into its own initiatives to promote peace and stability in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG troops should stop obstructing humanitarian aid and take measures to minimize the impact of their military initiatives on civilian populations and structures. Moreover, ECOMOG should work closely with UNOMSIL, UNHCR, and

humanitarian agencies to assure that accurate and neutral information regarding security is provided to the public, especially to refugees, displaced populations, and aid workers.

Role of Multilateral Institutions

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have to promote steps that will encourage the international community to support the long-term reconstruction and development of Sierra Leone. In the past, under its post-conflict reconstruction funding activities, the World Bank has provided money for social safety net projects for conflict-affected populations of its member countries. Therefore, the Bank should formulate a framework supporting Sierra Leone's post-conflict reconstruction through social and economic sustainable development, and enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society. It can also support mobilization and integration of ex-combatants, mine clearing activities, and rehabilitation of infrastructure.

Moreover, the World Bank and the IMF need to bring together donors to address the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. Post-conflict reconstruction should include (a) jump-starting the economy through investment in key reproductive sectors; (b) creating conditions for resumption of trade, savings, domestic and foreign investment; and (c) promoting macroeconomic stabilization, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and restorations of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.

Role of ACCORD

As the most reputable conflict resolution organization on the continent, ACCORD can play an important role in a variety of peacemaking scenarios in Sierra Leone. ACCORD can enter in Sierra Leone under Track II Diplomacy to gather information

through meetings with the major players in order to know what is happening on the ground. To make this work, ACCORD needs to cultivate good working relationship with Kabbah's government. This will help ACCORD to facilitate dialogue among local, international, governmental and non-governmental bodies.

In addition, ACCORD's Intervention Unit could work with the UN to monitor demobilization of ex-combatants. The Training Unit could also help in facilitating conflict resolution training workshops, and in creating neutral forum at which contestants can safely meet to open informal lines of communication, share their experience of personal anguish during this conflict, and discuss approaches to reducing the tensions. The training should incorporate issues of healing and reconciliation, and mechanisms for institutionalizing long-term conflict prevention and management.

The Peacekeeping Program could train the civilian police and the Sierra Leonean military to build their capacity in promoting peace. I believe that rehabilitating and training of the civilian police is critical to the security of the country. They will be responsible for patrolling streets for surveillance of criminal activities, and restoring law and order.

The Public Sector Program could help in instilling conflict management techniques in the restructured public sector. In my opinion, this type of training can assist Sierra Leoneans in developing or improving communication, negotiation, and problem-solving skills that will be useful as they search for ways to resolve their conflicts.

In sum, ACCORD can also play a role in empowering Sierra Leone's civil society. It can facilitate in bringing together religious leaders, women's groups, and intellectuals to develop understanding and strategies for collaboration in the context of complex emergencies or post-conflict reconstruction.

CONCLUSION

Sierra Leone is a state where there has been little of the ethnic conflicts that have characterised other African crises. The majority of the population shares a common language, Krio, and the country's borders contain its ethnic groups intact. Ethnic divisions between the two dominant language groups - the Temne of the north and the Mende of the south, are not a causative factor in this violence.

In addition, the current violence in Sierra Leone has not been confined to conflict between two organised factions. The RSLA high command seems to have lost control of its soldiers necessitating the intervention of foreign forces. Poorly supervised rogue elements, particularly from within the army, and cross-border bandits have used force to steal diamonds, locally-produced food stocks and attack food convoys. Stories of complicity of rebels and government troops abounded and there were several cases of soldiers serving the government by day and rebels at night. This gave birth to "sobels", an acronym for disloyal soldiers.

It is difficult to say how this conflict will be resolved, but it seems clear that the goals of the two sides have become submerged by the extent of the violence and the breakdown of clear structures on the two sides. The government must promptly bring an end to the conflict in order to maintain the support of the people that elected it into power. The Sierra Leonean people want transparent and accountable government, and civil institutions to end this war and to build a sustainable peace. The victims of the violence would like to see both the rebels and members of army who committed atrocities prosecuted and held accountable for their actions.

It is also clear that the Executive Outcomes are part of a political-commercial network that rules in the place of the government. Therefore, they are capitalizing on this political instability for their existence and power, and conflict resolution and negotiation are not in EO's interest. There is a sense that if peace is not achieved and Kabbah's government collapses, a scenario in which private mining corporations govern certain areas with their own army providing employment, foreign exchange and policing could fill the vacuum. Hence, peace negotiations should include the removal of all mercenaries and the ending of future firm-mercenary deals, from which the political elite profited greatly.

The other impediment to any lasting peace is the RUF's control of diamond areas which will make disarming and demobilizing them very difficult. The RUF sees itself as a people's movement and feels that Sierra Leone is being robbed of its mineral resources. They grow in size by capturing young people from the attacked villages and towns. The RUF refuses to support the democratic process because they don't believe they will obtain a fair hearing or much support. In order to end this war, the government has to offer amnesty to all the young recruits of the RUF, because they are what is still holding the movement together.

To conclude, the government agreed in principle to release Sankoh, who is in Lome, Togo, attending the peace talks between RUF and the government. However, it seems to me that Sankoh is not in full control of the rebels on the ground. Even though the government and the RUF rebels signed cease-fire agreement, RUF violated the cease-fire and attacked the ECOMOG forces just few hours after the agreement entered into effect on Monday, May 24, 1999. Unless these rebels totally lay down their weapons, long-lasting peace in Sierra Leone is so bleak.

ANNEXURE THREE

Africa Watch

Niger's walk to democracy?

Senzo Ngubane

Research Assistant, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

INTRODUCTION

The reign of the late President of Niger, General Ibrahim Bare Mainassara was always under threat. Ever since he assumed power on 27 January 1996, possibilities of a coup remained a reality. The events over the last few months thus bear testimony to the fact that his rule was to be short-lived.

Mainassara was not considered as a legitimate head of state because he assumed office through a military coup that toppled former President Ousmane. The latter was democratically elected during the country's first multiparty elections in 1993. President Ousmane steadfastly undermined the fundamental principles of democracy during his reign. Notwithstanding the activities of the Ousmane government, the 1996 coup shattered all hopes for a stable country, since Mainassara has further transgressed proper forms of popular participation.

It has become a trend that the military justifies its use of force on the grounds that it is saving the country from a corrupt civilian leadership. General Mainassara employed similar tactics when he assumed power during a political crisis in Niger. Due to the pressure exerted by foreign countries

over the staged coup, Mainassara was forced to outline a transitional programme which culminated in a general election.¹

Thus, six months after he overthrew the democratic government, General Mainassara organised an election in July 1996, in which he also campaigned for the presidency.² He emerged victorious amidst reports that the process was chaotic. He had disbanded the Electoral Commission and appointed his own which, not surprisingly, declared the election to have been 'free and fair'.

The same election was viewed as a mockery of democracy when Mainassara placed most of the opposition leadership under house arrest. Even though he had hoped that he would transform himself into a civilian leader through the election, his failure to address issues affecting the general population made him an unpopular figure.³

In February 1999, local elections were held and voting was again disrupted, with vandalism and theft of election material reported at most polling stations.⁴ Under these confusing conditions, the opposition coalition, consisting of the Front for Restoration and Defence of Democracy (FRDD) and the Alliance for Democratic and

It has become a trend that the military justifies its use of force on the grounds that it is saving the country from a corrupt civilian leadership

Social Forces (AFDS), announced an election victory. The result of the polls showed that the opposition had obtained 596 seats against 468 for parties supporting Mainassara.⁵ To the coalition's dissatisfaction, however, the Supreme Court annulled the election and ordered a new one. On the eve of Mainassara's assassination, the opposition parties had already called for his resignation from office.⁶

During Mainassara's reign, the state security apparatus was employed to suppress opposition parties, although there were reported cases of some sections in the army showing support to the opposition.

Niger is clearly a country that has never enjoyed a stable democratic system of government, but has rather experienced the progressive disintegration of good governance. The background provided above shows that the death of General Mainassara occurred when there was a political stalemate in the country between the regime and the opposition parties.

FROM ONE JUNTA TO ANOTHER

In the space of less than three years, history repeated itself when Niger experienced another *coup*. The only interpretation that could be offered, is that the democratic value system has scarcely had any opportunity to entrench itself in a country where the polity itself is fragile.

At the time when the Nigeriens were still pondering the assassination of Mainassara, described by the military spokesman as an "*unfortunate accident*",⁷ the military announced that it is taking over the control of the government and the country. A new military junta, under the leadership of Daouda Malan Wanke, took over the reins.

Wanke, like the man he replaced, is a career soldier who has spent most of his life in the military where he held several senior positions.⁸ Furthermore, Wanke was the head of the élite presidential guard and therefore responsible for

Mainassara's security. Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, who was the Prime Minister under Mainassara's regime, was re-appointed to the same position by Wanke.

Immediately after his appointment, Wanke announced a series of institutional changes in the country. He dissolved the National Assembly and opted for a transitional National Reconciliation Council (NRC) to be in charge of Niger for the next nine months.

There should be cause for concern about the National Reconciliation Council (NRC) given that it is an all-military Council. This affords the military an opportunity to dictate the pace of this crucial period. The dissolution of the Assembly is also a strategic move in the sense that it was mostly constituted of pro-Mainassara members. Wanke also suspended the Supreme Court, as well as the 12 May 1996 Constitution.

The proposed transitional programme announced by Wanke is to commence with a constitutional referendum in September 1999, with a general election following in December. A civilian government will subsequently assume office on the last day of 1999.⁹

The new military ruler opened up the political arena when he lifted the suspension of political parties imposed after the assassination of Mainassara. The eleven opposition parties welcomed the announcement that the National Reconciliation Council (NRC) is only a temporary measure and called on their supporters to accept the proposed nine-month transitional programme. This move needs to be appreciated by opposition leaders, since the gravity of the situation demands that decision-makers in the country collaborate in order to ensure that peace prevails during this time.

Even the Convergence for the Republic (CPR), a coalition of about ten political parties and former allies of the President, have expressed their support for the new regime's intentions to facilitate the route to democracy in the country.

True to its word, the NRC announced the transitional government of national unity. Out of nineteen ministries that were created, thirteen were occupied by the main opposition parties, the FRDD and the AFDS, and two by military staff.¹⁰

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The April *coup* has a variety of implications for Niger. One scenario is that the assassination of Mainassara, although bad on its own, offers Niger another opportunity to implement democratic changes, especially when bearing in mind that Mainassara halted all forms of democratic activity. This depends of course on the participation of the opposition in ensuring that the process reaches its ultimate goal.

The second scenario is that Wanke, the new ruler, with the army behind him, would want to cling to power and not honour his promises. This is, however, an unlikely scenario when one considers the external environment both at regional and international levels and its effects on Niger.

The country's powerful southern neighbour, Nigeria, has recently been witness to a democratically elected President assuming power. The military leader mostly responsible for this achievement in Nigeria is General Abubakar who currently epitomises Africa's new versions of the 'strong man'. With these changes right next door, Niger's new regime would be inclined to follow suit. General Obasanjo of Nigeria has already voiced his opinion about the current situation in Niger and has urged General Wanke to persist with his transitional programme.

Pressure is also mounting with other

countries in the region, such as Chad, Mali and Sudan, expressing similar opinions. Interestingly, the new military leader was denied an opportunity to attend the summit of the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (COMESSA) of which Niger is a member.¹¹

Maintaining such pressure might be one of the ways that will ensure that peace and democracy prevail in Niger. At a regional level, forces against the current military leadership therefore hold sway. That the new military leader is aware of this was reflected in his decision to meet with representatives of other countries in Niger, including the ambassadors of the United States and France.¹²

The transitional programme, as outlined by the military leadership is not a window-dressing exercise. That is, there is a realisation from within the army that the pendulum has shifted and that it is no longer feasible for a military regime to hold the reins of power. Wider consultations with opposition parties and other influential groups, for instance trade unions, thus originate from this realisation.¹³

In the light of the changes that are likely to occur as a result of the *coup* and the transitional arrangements, there are two issues that the regime has to deal with that would have an impact on the ultimate outcome of the process. Firstly, there is the issue of the former Tuareg and Toubou ethnic groups who had already entered into agreements with Mainassara.¹⁴ The leadership of the Tamoust Liberation Front (FLT) stated that the fragile peace agreements signed with the former government could be affected by the change of guard; more at stake is the delay of the implementation

The assassination of Mainassara, although bad on its own, may offer Niger another opportunity to implement democratic changes

phase.¹⁵ There are about fifteen rebel groups in Niger that concluded peace deals with the former government. Although some of the stipulations of these agreements have been implemented, the decentralisation and development of Tuareg regions are still to come into effect.¹⁶

The regime has maintained its commitment to bring about national reconciliation and extra measures would therefore be necessary to ensure that the Tuareg rebels are not left out of these processes, as this could let the country drift into civil strife. France is of significance in this regard as it is the largest contributor to initiatives aimed at reintegrating former rebels into national life.¹⁷ The challenge for the regime is to ensure that France does not withdraw its aid to Niger as a result of the coup.

The second issue concerns Niger's economic recovery. Since Niger is regarded as one of the world's poorest countries, the regime would have to meet the challenge of rebuilding a weak economy.¹⁸ To achieve this, it will need the necessary support from its neighbours and the international community. This support is most likely to be extended if the regime does not backtrack from the process of change that it has embarked upon.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion reflects one of the important points about transitions to democracy: it is a fragile process marked by difficulties. Hope is therefore mingled with fear about the likely outcome of democratisation in Niger. Fundamentally, the process rests on the next step that the regime takes. What is clear from the population's point of view is that their acceptance of the current scenario is solely dependent upon General Wanke's regime adhering to its promises of taking the country to a democratic dispensation.

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ANNEXURE FOUR

NIGERIA IN THE ERA OF OBASANJO

By

Hussein Solomon¹

On the 27th February 1999, Nigerians went to the polls for the last time in a tortuous process to re-establish civilian rule by voting for the man who was rules this conflict-ridden country until 2003 – the date of the next elections. Two days later the results of the elections were announced by Justice Akpata: Olusegun Obasanjo of the People's Democratic Party polled a total number of 18,738,154 votes against 11,110,287 votes of his opponent, Chief Oluyemisi Falae of the All People's Party. According to Justice Akpata, Obasanjo's votes constituted 62.78 percent of the total votes cast whilst Chief Falae's votes represented 37.22 percent of the votes. Since the sudden demise of former military ruler, General Sani Abacha there has been much optimism, if not euphoria, in the press and amongst policy-makers that Nigeria is well on its way to civilian rule, and hence, political stability. This recent electoral victory of former military ruler, now President-elect, General Olusegun Obasanjo has further fuelled the fires of optimism and hope.

Such an analysis, however, is not unproblematic. In the first instance, such an analysis assumes a monocausal, static view of Nigeria which belies the complexity and mutlifaceted nature of the problem confronting the Nigerian colossus as we approach the dawn of a new millennium. Second, and a

¹ Hussein Solomon is Research Manager at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and Research Associate of the Centre for Defence Studies (CDS), University of Zimbabwe. The views reflected in the paper are his own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of either ACCORD or CDS.

concomitant of the first, despite the fact that the situation has dramatically improved in Nigeria since the death of General Abacha, the truth is that the situation is still far from healthy and several questions remain unanswered. Answers to these questions have to be sought and sought quickly during Obasanjo's presidential term if Nigeria is not to slide once more over the precipice.

First, even if the military formally relinquishes their power to President Obasanjo on the 29th May 1999 as planned, the military retains the capability to stage a coup. In this vein, we must view the Nigerian military's refusal to decentralise its command structure with concern. Allied to this is a culture of coups and counter-coups. In this the institutional memory of the Nigerian military needs to be overcome with re-education. This however, necessarily takes time, and the question of the military's intrusion into the political sphere is an immediate one.

There are, in addition, two further reasons to be wary of the power of the military. The first relates to the economic muscle the Nigerian military can flex within broader Nigerian society. According to a recent article in the Mail and Guardian, *"The leadership of the Nigerian military, both retired and serving, is the richest group of people in the country. They own banks, shipping companies and farm lands"*². The economic might of the military and former military officers is a force any civilian government needs to reckon with in the

² Chris McGreal, *Old faces come out for poll*, Mail and Guardian, 26 February - 4 March 1999, p. 14.

post-conflict reconstruction period immediately following the hand-over of power.

A second reason to be wary of the power of the military relates to the influence these men in uniform exercise within President-elect Obasanjo's People's Democratic Party (PDP). It is a known fact that much of the PDP's electoral success relates to the financial support it receives from the very rich retired military officers inside the party. It is also a known fact that former military dictator, General Ibrahim Babangida, has also done his utmost to secure Obasanjo the presidency of Nigeria. In a recent press interview, Babangida was quoted as saying that he would support "...a candidate that fits my definition of a president for this country". He then went on to add that Olusegun Obasanjo was "one of them"³.

Second, should the military manage to stay within proper civilian control, two other questions needs to be answered. Firstly, with the demise of its influence in the domestic arena would the military be prone to some alternative foreign adventure? Here the territorial dispute between Nigeria and the Cameroon regarding the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Second, would the demise of its domestic influence, would this also result in a reduction of Nigeria's peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone and other parts of the West African region? An affirmative answer to either or both these questions holds serious implications for the future of West African security.

³ *Nigeria: Troubled Empire*, Reuters, 15 January 1999, http://www.briefing.reuters.com/cgi-bin/ttext.exe?session_id=Aben0146686%7ctext_ref=%.

Thirdly, Nigeria is a country characterised by stark differences regarding religion, language, culture, ethnicity and region. The renewed fighting between Ijaw and Itsekeri youth in the mid-west Nigerian state of Delta, underlines the sad truism that poor civil-military relations is not the only fault line in this troubled country.

Fourthly, Nigeria is the most populous country in the West African region and there is every indication that it would remain so into the next century.

Consider the following: currently Nigeria's population is 108 million. By the year 2023, this is estimated to reach a staggering 178 million! Population growth, in itself, is not a source of instability. However, combined with poor economic performance and skewed economic distribution, this could hold severe implications amongst the frustrated unemployed and other socially marginalised groups and this in turn, could lead to political instability. In this regard, it is instructive to note that the new militant leadership of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) has called on the government to keep its word and raise the workers' wages. Negotiations between the NLC, chaired by Adams Oshiomhole, and the military regime of General Abubaker collapsed after the government reneged on its promise to increase wages by more than 300 percent. Following the sudden and dramatic increase of pump petrol from its pre-Christmas price of 11 naira to 20 naira⁴ per litre in February; the stage is set for further confrontation between government labour in the form of strike activity in the Obasanjo era. This, in turn, could cost the country billions of dollars in lost productivity. Another example, this time involving unemployed,

⁴ One US dollar equals to 85 dollars.

alienated youth also illustrated the point. In February 1999 unemployed youth demanding work at a Shell Oil in southern Nigeria clashed with soldiers protecting the premises of the conglomerate. The result was between 15 and 19 people dead.

Meanwhile the Niger Delta provides an interesting case where ethnic identity and economic grievances coalesce to produce both political and economic instability. On 11 December 1998, 5000 youth from 500 communities, 40 clans and 25 organisations in the Ijaw nation met in the town of Kaiama and adopted an eleven-point resolution, "*...resolving that all land and natural resources, including mineral resources within the Ijaw territory, belong to Ijaw communities. The resolutions now known as the 'Kaiama Declaration' not only gave an ultimatum to oil workers to vacate Ijaw land or be ready to face the consequences, it made a vow to free Ijaws from enslavement from [central] government*"⁵.

Following the adoption of the Kaiama Declaration, a peaceful procession of placard-carrying women marched towards Creek Haven where the State Government's offices were located. They were prevented from reaching their destination by a platoon of armed soldiers who opened fire on the crowd. Tragically, seven of the women were reportedly killed. This prompted armed Ijaw youths, known as the Niger-Delta Volunteer Force, to attack the soldiers the following morning. In the ensuing gun-battles twenty people were believed to have been killed. The subsequent escalation of the violence also resulted in

⁵ Africa News Service, 12 January 1999.

a steep decline in oil production. This case reveals the fragility of social relations and its political ramifications within the context of resource-based conflicts in contemporary Nigeria.

Finally, crime and corruption in this West African behemoth is rampant with its attendant spin-offs: poor or ineffective governance and the concomitant flight of foreign capital that worsens the plight of the destitute. According to a recent survey by Transparency International, Nigeria is the second most corrupt country in the developing world. To compound matters further, there is growing evidence of 'rogue' elements within the security forces engaging in criminal acts. One such case occurred in Enungo state when seven serving soldiers were hired as mercenaries by some political aspirants to steal ballot boxes at the local government elections.

To sum up then, the challenges facing President-elect Obasanjo are vast:

- To forge a nation from various fractious peoples
- To limit the power of the military whilst at the same time maintaining it as a source of stability in West Africa
- To increase economic performance whilst at the same time understanding the need for more equitable distribution of the country's wealth
- To put an end to spiralling levels of crime and corruption through effective good governance

Though the challenges are large and may, at times seem ominous, they are by no means insurmountable. Much can be accomplished through a

combination of the requisite political will and international support. Already international support has emerged. Western governments and leaders have prepared a US\$ 1,5 billion for the civilian government due to take office in May. What is now required from President-elect Obasanjo is the requisite political will combined with effective implementation policies.

ANNEXURE FIVE

**RECONSTRUCTING SOMALIA: TIME FOR
A SOMALI INITIATIVE**

By Kamar Yousuf

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INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Somalia is not simply the result of clan rivalries, as some western academics and journalists portray, but it is about power struggles within the remnants of the former military regime. The state collapse in 1991 was a manifestation of many years of mal-governance, mismanagement of authority and public resources by the political and military élite in the country. The so-called warlords are fighting to gain legitimacy in order to protect their parochial interests through the shaping of the current and future power structure in Somalia. These warlords have run out of ideas, lost sense of political direction and are captive to a problem of their own creation for which they have neither the ability nor the will to extricate, not only the country but also themselves. Their political agendas and platforms are indistinguishable from the late dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre's policy of "divide and rule". The chronic power addiction they suffer is compounded by their concern for being held accountable for the crimes they have committed against the Somali people.

In order to survive, these warlords fragmented the Somali society into clans thereby institutionalising clan conflict. Central to their agenda are issues of land and power and, as a result of the civil war, the two have become inseparable. Before this conflict, political power was concentrated in the capital, Mogadishu. Whoever controlled the capital held court over the political affairs of the whole country. However, the civil war changed the situation and perpetuated total localisation of Somali politics creating in the process a disintegration of the country into mini-states. Each locality contains elements who are unyielding to the calls of instituting a new national government with a decentralised political structure.

The Somalia of the 1990s is a legacy of Siyad Barre's despotic rule. The warlords that plague the country are part of the regime's remnants of officers and political appointees. As a result, their leadership is based on political patronage, embezzlement of public money and extortion. It is clear that these elements are benefiting from Somalia's communal tensions and lawlessness. They are obstructing any forum for inclusive peace talks as they have much to lose from the peaceful re-establishment of a national government. Somalia cannot be expected to come out of this critical situation unless a broad based participatory system of debate and governance is allowed to evolve.

CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

The chronic crisis in Somalia has been caused by years of colonial misrule, the establishment of arbitrary boundaries, and a repressive military regime. During the colonial period in the late 19th century, Somalia was divided into five jurisdictions: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti). Britain also handed over the Ogaden region to Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Kenya. The British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland were joined together in the Republic of Somalia on 1 July, 1960, leaving the other three (the Ogaden, NFD, and Djibouti) under foreign rule. Colonialism destroyed the social fabric that had previously maintained order and its legacy of division had profound effects on Somali foreign policy at independence, leading it into territorial disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya.

In its first eight years the Somali State, although plagued by difficulties in integrating the dual legacy of British and Italian administrations, remained a model of democratic governance in Africa. Governments were regularly voted into and out of

office. However, the last civilian government that assumed power after the March 1969 election became hopelessly corrupt and incompetent. Taking advantage of the widespread public bitterness and discontent with this government, the military, with the support of Russia, staged a coup d'etat on 21 October 1969, and established a military regime under Major General Siyad Barre. Barre became one of the most vicious and brutal dictators Africa ever had.

To divert attention from the failing economy, public dissent and his regime's unpopularity, Siyad Barre invaded the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia in 1977 to liberate the Somali inhabitants. His strategy proved to be disastrous as his main ally, the Soviet Union, pursuing an opportunistic Cold War strategy shifted their allegiance to the Ethiopians, and provided them with weapons and military personnel. With the help of thousands of Cuban and South Yemeni troops operating sophisticated Russian weapons, the Ethiopians defeated the Somali army and recaptured the Ogaden. The regime lost credibility following the defeat and from then on, Somali politics became vividly repressive and militarised.

The root causes of the current political fragmentation in Somalia stems from the oppressive and clan-based autocracy of Barre's regime that promoted rivalries among clans and created clanistic institutions for his own ends, to oppress his political opponents. His nepotism involved appointing family members who were not qualified for the positions. For example, he made his eldest son the defense minister, his brother the foreign affairs minister, and put his relatives in every ministry where money was to be made. On top of this, economic mismanagement, widespread poverty, high inflation rates, and high unemployment also contributed to Somalia's problems. The dictator and his phalanxes of kleptocrats accumulated wealth largely provided by foreign aid agencies, creating the marginalisation and exclusion of large

sections of the population, and the inevitable deterioration of the economy. For instance, the Ministry of Planning traditionally used to handle issues pertaining to the collaboration with the donor community. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdirahman Jama Barre, took the Department of Cooperation and Planning to his ministry for good reasons. In the 1980s, economic aid represented around US\$400 million per year, one quarter being provided by USA and after 1985 Italy became the first bilateral donor to Somalia.

These funds were earmarked mainly for some agricultural projects and the Garowe-Bosaaso road. The funds spent on this road, approximately US\$250 million, were absurd and wasteful as the road stretches 450 kilometres across barren desert, crossed only by nomads on foot. To execute these projects, a joint committee was formed. The leader on the Somali side was not even a civil servant but a confidant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Wolfgang Achnert, an Italian author of "*The Italian Connection: How Rome Helped Ruin Somalia*", revealed that a majority of Italian cooperative projects were carried out without considering their effects on the local population. Achnert pointed out that the Italian construction and engineering companies who were awarded lucrative contracts for these projects provided kickbacks to the political class in Rome and Somali politicians. Italian officials who were involved in these corrupt projects and some leading politicians have been put in front of a court in Italy.

Furthermore, the last years of the 1980s witnessed the total collapse of the banking system. Loans were provided for political or familial reasons and never reimbursed. Companies and individuals became very reluctant to put their cash into the banks simply because they could not get it back. The situation at the Central Bank

where a daughter of Siyad Barre was the Director General was no better as the regulations set up by the IMF were distorted.

As Barre's regime became increasingly corrupt and unpopular, it resorted to force to crush all opposition. Torture, mass execution, and pillage were the regime's signatures. So paranoid was this military regime that it imprisoned thousands of Somalis over the years and declared war on its own people. In May 1988, it dropped bombs on northern part of Somalia, particularly Hargeisa and Burao, after the civilians demonstrated against Barre's despotic rule. The human rights violations included summary executions, rape, torture, imprisonment, or detainment without charges or trial, and the theft of private property. During the course of the 1988 civil war in northern Somalia, 50,000 people were killed and another 500,000 were forced to flee to Ethiopia. Government forces also laid over a million unmarked landmines in the North. In addition, many politicians, businessmen, religious leaders, and young students simply vanished or were executed. For example, on 16 July 1989, in the early hours of Eid-El-Adha, a Muslim holy day, government forces arrested six prominent imams after the Eid prayers in Mogadishu's major Mosque. Whole sections of the crowd of worshippers were gunned down. Innocent civilians who opposed the arrest of the religious leaders were rounded up by the hundreds, and many were murdered and buried on the Jazira beach, near Mogadishu. Over 1,000 civilians died that holy day.

After the collapse of the military regime in 1991, intense competition for power among different rebel groups led to a full-fledged civil war. The country, in the process of removing Barre, had already been devastated and normal government functions largely ceased. The factions that succeeded in driving Barre from power

were waging a fierce battle to determine who should be president, totally unconcerned about the plight of their people.

There was more ammunition in Somalia than food as this war has been sustained by the huge arsenal built up during the long years of Barre's dictatorship. If Barre was able to accumulate arms on such a vast scale, it was because of the Cold War. During the Cold War, first the Soviet Union and then the United States provided large quantities of assistance to Somalia, principally in the form of military aid and state-of-the-art weapons of mass destruction. Both superpowers provided such patronage in an effort to check the other's ambition in the Horn of Africa, and in exchange for access to air and naval facilities.

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR

The problem of how international actors could relate to a geo-political entity that had no functioning national government, and therefore no status in a world of nation-states, became increasingly important as international intervention grew, particularly since the United Nations, the World Bank, etc, are all state-centric. The failure of the Somali State brought with it total institutional collapse. Security structures and systems of civic service delivery disappeared, together with the legal and normative standards that previously regulated social interactions at all levels. Before the war, the political, economic and moral order of Somalia was bounded by the rules of Islam and the traditional law "Xeer". The Xeer was an unwritten Somali-wide social contract that governed communal and individual codes of conduct. The economic basis of early Somali society had a correlate of political institutions and practice: kinship—a combination of blood-ties and customary law. The Xeer and the teachings of Islam transcended the potential divisiveness of kinship, and provided

codes of moral and ethical behaviour. Various communities now apply combination of traditional system of justice, Shari'a law and common law in maintaining local peace and stability. The presence of traditional law and Islamic ethics and laws of conduct offers one piece of a foundation upon which the new Somalia can be built.

Moreover, the effects of the civil war were not only limited to the obvious signs of physical destruction of public and private properties, but also the unprecedented human suffering and displacement of Somalis within the country and as refugees in other countries. Equally devastating have been the pervasive fear and mistrust, and the negative attitudes towards public authority created by years of dictatorial misrule in which State authority became synonymous with private ends and group interests.

The on-going civil war has pushed the country further down the economic ladder and exacerbated the plight of Somali civilians, especially women and children. Eight years of widespread violence and general insecurity have devastated infrastructure and agriculture, especially in the southern part of the country, where the conflict has been the most severe. The Baidoa area, the agricultural and breadbasket district of Somalia, has been shattered by the war and the ensuing widespread displacement of people from their homes. Unregulated past exploitation and land grabbing by some faction leaders in the area have displaced thousands of farmers from land they had farmed for generations.

A major stumbling block to peace is the proliferation and trade of arms and ammunition. In the absence of authority and governance, Somalia has become a military playground for both users and traders of weapons. In addition, the country's descent into anarchy affected many young boys who have no choice but to be recruited by either of the warring factions. These child soldiers contribute to the

protracted nature of this war as they are brought into the armed forces at a young age and taught only to kill, thereby contributing to the problem of violence becoming systematic within the society.

External Players

Outside attempts to resolve this conflict have regularly proven ineffective and even counterproductive. For instance, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) ignored all the other stakeholders and chose to deal with warlords who did not represent the majority of the Somali people. Its mission failed because it was too engrossed in its own extravagant plans to construct a state around Somalia's burgeoning warlord classes.

Now, with the departure of UN peacekeeping mission, there is a growing influence of Ethiopia as a power broker in the peace talks. However, it has become apparent that Ethiopia's intervention has become the lightning rod for those groups that oppose and refuse participation in peace talks, and have found sympathy for their views from Eritrea. Just as the UN intervention failed to impose a political settlement, Ethiopia's role may likely backfire. Recently, Ethiopia and Eritrea, who are also involved in a border conflict, appear to be waging a proxy war in Somalia. For example, Eritrea has been sending heavy weapons to Hussein Aideed's faction while Ethiopia has been supporting the opposing factions, such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) of Baidoa region, by sending tanks, artilleries as well as military personnel.

If the past is any guide to the future, any foreign intervention driven by determination that the warlords negotiate the peaceful settlement of the Somali conflict is doomed to failure because the majority of the Somali people do not respect

or believe in the ability of the warlords to run the country. Although the international community can help with the resolution of this conflict, it should be recognised that Somali citizens themselves bear the ultimate responsibility for resolving their problems. I believe that a long-term solution to this crisis can come only from the civil society, namely, scholars, business people, women's groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Nurturing these groups, rather than dealing with the warlords, will enable the international community to advance the cause of sustainable peace, democracy and economic development in Somalia. The introduction of a forum where public issues are discussed openly, transparently and critically will represent a break from the kind of centralised and authoritarian leadership which characterised the former military regime and the warring factions that superseded it.

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

Although the Somali conflict may seem unresolvable, most observers find the character of the Somali culture to be forgiving and compromising. The Somali conflict has no historical precedent; therefore, the process of healing may not be protracted. Although clan politics has emerged as part of this conflict in recent years, the very structure of the Somali society, with its close attachment to kinship, linked in turn to the larger Somali nation, could again serve as a foundation for social order, as it has been in the past. Therefore, lasting solutions to this crisis should only be Somali driven.

Furthermore, Somalis face a daunting task of transforming the instrument and culture of war into agents of reconciliation, reconstruction and sustainable development. Such a task must start with creating basic security, building trust, and

new political order as the basis for effective social policy formulation and programmes. In order to do this, Somalis need to address the root causes of this war, particularly its linkages with economic mismanagement, poverty, political instability, and brain drain. Indeed, brain drain is one of the key problems facing the country as thousands of qualified people fled to the Middle East, Europe and North America. The exodus of many professionals, such as professors, lawyers, doctors, veterinarians, engineers, economists, teachers, technicians, and nurses, from Somalia due to a dwindling means of existence, devastation of macro political institutions, harassment and political intimidation by Barre's regime, has had a great impact on the country's social and economic development.

There is a growing movement among Somalis within and outside the country to put an end to this conflict and they are willing to play vital roles in bringing a lasting peace. The question is how to bring these groups together and who would pay the resources to make this happen? The international community, perhaps the European Union, as well as the Nordic countries who showed interest in assisting Somalia, could sponsor this diplomatic task. This type of intervention could facilitate dialogue to promote political reconciliation among the Somali intelligentsia to enable them to rise above their internal divisions.

One of the purposes of this dialogue should be to identify and encourage leadership potential. To help achieve such objectives, eminent persons like Nelson Mandela could act as mediators. Such positive diplomacy could indeed create a climate for mending relations, building trust and consensus that underpin post-war rebuilding. If a group representing the most vital elements of the Somali society could be assembled, it could begin the debate relating to the specific form and reconstruction of a new Somali State.

Likewise, it is necessary that the Somali professionals return from their places of emigration to rebuild their country. In this way the brain drain will be reversed as the returnees begin to contribute toward the reconstruction of the new Somali State. The challenge is how to encourage the return of all these people in order to restore the state's technocrat capacity. Perhaps International organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) could facilitate the repatriation of these professionals. In the past, the World Bank has helped war-torn countries, particularly Cambodia and Uganda, to repatriate their intelligentsia from abroad to make contributions to their countries' post-conflict rebuilding.

The starting point for the re-building of Somalia should be social development, economic rebuilding, and rehabilitation of judicial, police and political institutions. There is a great need to (i) rehabilitate the state apparatus, the security system and public services such as education and health; (ii) restore physical infrastructure and productive assets; (iii) reintegrate demobilised combatants and returnees; and (iv) clear landmines. Post-conflict reconstruction could start with complete disarmament of all factions in order to promote security and stability in the country. Further, an independent human rights group should be established to monitor, collect and investigate reports of violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

The second and most difficult task is the rehabilitation of moral fabric of the society, especially that of the youth, and helping communities to heal and reconcile. Young people have a vital role in the re-building of Somalia. Their ideas and energy offer creative new ways to explore non-violent alternatives to conflict. At the moment, many young people feel powerless in the face of this crisis. The rebuilding

of the country should include programmes that empower and support the youth who are either interested or already involved in peace and reconciliation work.

The Role of Women

The persistent economic and social decline of Somalia no doubt has effected every Somali regardless of gender. However, it is evident that women and girls as mothers, wives and caretakers have been bearing the brunt of the country's economic collapse. Women population in Somalia is estimated at half of the eight million population. They are caring for the elderly and those with disabilities. Sadly, girls as young as fifteen years have been reported to be heading families. It is estimated that an average woman in Somalia works for more than 17 hours a day. Some of these women are involved in hawking businesses including selling of foodstuff and clothing. However, their businesses are highly vulnerable as young militiamen loot them.

In this conflict, men are usually either fighting or searching for work in conflict-free areas. Even when men are available to the household, gender ideologies put a disproportionate burden of work on women. Women are left behind with the responsibility for providing for their immediate and extended families. This burden is compounded by the destruction of traditional support systems and livelihoods due to the civil war. Lack of basic services such as health, education and infrastructure further undermined the ability of women to provide for their dependants in these situations.

In the chaos of this conflict, Somali women have assumed roles from which they had previously been excluded, such as becoming peacemakers, heads of households, and community leaders. The intense social dislocation experienced in the

country by this conflict has produced major shifts in the structure of the Somali society. These shifts have allowed women to move to the forefront. Somali women are actively pursuing peace, reaching across clan divides to defuse tensions and rebuild communities torn apart by this conflict.

Moreover, women NGOs are undertaking responsibilities, such as supporting health and nutrition programmes and getting schools going again. In the rural areas, some nomadic women took over men's traditional role and began frequenting the markets to sell livestock and milk and to buy other essential consumer items while the war was still raging. The main cause of this change in roles was the prevailing security: women apparently had an advantage over men because they possessed a dual clan identity due to extensive intermarriage. Somali women are often married into a clan other than their own, so they are in a unique position to help resolve conflicts between clans.

With all the hardship they went through, Somali women are still insecure and seldom receive the attention or the resources they deserve. They are aware of how war and preparations for war diverted resources from women's advancement and undermined their rights. One questions if the future political system will recognise and protect their rights and interests that women have gained during this conflict? And will Somali women be enabled to influence and to participate in the political process? As the country settles down to better and more strengthened governance will women move into decision-making mechanisms in Somalia? For that, more attention needs to be given to (a) more assertive education for girls at all levels and development of career opportunity for women, (b) better vocational training in skills, professions and management, and (c) continuous awareness building, mobilisation

and political education. The national institutions and the overall political leadership of the country need to face this urgent task and to afford it the deserved priority.

Provision should be made for special support to be given to women organisations and businesswomen so that they can assume prominent roles and continue their constructive influence in rebuilding civil society. It is important, therefore, that women's voices and approaches be incorporated in the framework of conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

The Role of the Civil Society

After the collapse of the central government, strong civil societies have emerged. Different service delivery agents have appeared in each region with the most advanced ones being in the private sector. Several companies with institutionalised management structures operate in telecommunications, airline transport, and currency dealing. The ownership of such companies is not exclusive to any region's residents but involves also other Somalis across clan and regional boundaries, in addition to expatriate shareholders. Another feature of such companies is that they may have other branches in different regions of Somalia and some of them have offices and representatives in foreign countries, like the United Arab Emirates.

Private service delivery agents also include small-scale family enterprises, self-employed professional teams, and individuals with special trades and skills. Privately owned and managed hotels are the most widespread service, while professional groups are engaged in livestock export, veterinary services, design and execution of construction works, private health clinical services and other similar fields of activity.

In spite of the lack of institutional support, e.g. banking and financial institutions, business in most regions of Somalia, relatively speaking, is flourishing. Developments in the private sector are mainly due to the efforts of aspiring entrepreneurs but the activities of the merchant class are not wholly driven by self-interest. The business community and NGOs have been instrumental in restoring the prevailing peace and stability in the North. In times of need, business people form their own committees and act as fund-raisers for the general well-being of the Somali communities.

Most of the service delivery is performed by civil society structures led by local NGOs and community groups that include women's organisations. Despite the limited impact of such groups on the overall political and economic spheres, they nevertheless play an important role in the service delivery system. Professional sectors, women's groups and representatives of the business community are trying hard to acquire independent roles and to take initiatives that support the rebuilding process.

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

The majority of the Somali people feel that Somalia is completely marginalised and abandoned by the international community after the UN-US peacekeeping mission fiasco. For the most part, it has been the civilians who have suffered the greatest. Since 1969 they have lived under a dictatorship, the termination of which in 1991 embroiled the country into a brutal civil war that caused extreme violence, grave humanitarian crisis and chaos. International efforts have thus far failed to restore peace and stability. The fragile stability that has been achieved in

some regions seems to have come as a result of local initiatives with little or no assistance from the international community.

During this conflict, the government and all public institutions have virtually disappeared over the past eight years. In its place a large shadow economy (informal sector), parallel markets and/or criminal activities were flourishing. An example is the alliance among traders, illegal fishing fleets, toxic waste dumping foreign companies, arms dealers and the warlords. These groups have a common, vested interest in perpetuating an environment of scarcity and maintaining the war machinery. They might even be tempted to revive hostilities because they stand to lose from peace. The post-conflict reconstruction should include the establishment and regulation of the markets and financial institutions, a framework for international investment, and access to international assistance.

The social services such as public health, primary education for school age children, access to safe water, food security, and expansion of basic services to the rural areas need to be rehabilitated. Over the last few years, local institutions like NGOs and private groups have been running most of the social services in many different regions of the country. These services include schools that are presently functioning with assistance from various voluntary organisations. The major impediment to advancement of education in the country is lack of resources. Since there is no national government in Somalia, these schools have functioned from contributions by students' families and voluntary organisations.

Like other services, the health sector is in poor shape. UNDP surveys in 1997/8 estimated that at least 90% of health care facilities have been seriously damaged and looted during the war. The external supply of essential drugs for the hospitals is scanty and irregular. Where health care is provided, it continues to be

financed almost entirely by external sources, though cost-recovery programmes are being implemented in some locations to render health care facilities and hospitals at least partially sustainable. For example, in Mogadishu, Kaysenay hospital in north of the city is managed by the Somali Red Crescent Society and funded by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). In addition, there has been a massive migration of trained health care personnel both to other countries, and within Somalia, to the more secure areas. Training of health care personnel remains a serious problem. The collapse of the educational system has prevented the training of doctors, nurses and other health care workers. Aid agencies have provided training for nurses, midwives, and community health workers. They are the backbone of primary and preventive care, but cannot substitute for nurses and physicians beyond basic care.

Rebuilding the social and political community must proceed concurrently with the task of repairing the shattered infrastructure. Restoring people's confidence in state institutions is perhaps one of the critical first steps in post-conflict reconstruction. The acceptance of the rule of law and the establishment of political order are key steps in this process. It is necessary to redefine the role of the state, local authorities, civil institutions, grassroots organisations and the private sector.

In addition, there is an ever-growing problem of uncleared landmines in many places in Somalia. Mine explosion incidents are now occurring on daily basis in most of the main roads linking the country. Barre's military forces planted most of the landmines in the North, and militiamen from different warring factions planted more landmines in the South. These landmines pose one of the greatest security problems and a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions causing human suffering and inaccessibility to vast amounts of arable territory. Today, the victims of these

landmines are not just soldiers or militiamen but rather innocent civilians: women, children and nomads herding their cattle to scarce pastures and water. According to statistics released by the UN, more than half a million landmines are believed to be buried in Somalia. It was also reported that an average of two people die in mine explosion every week. A limited de-mining programme implemented by local Somali entities has worked well until the security situation prevented follow-up to clearance activities in the field.

Re-building the Judicial System and the National Police

The judicial system and the national police need to be reformed and re-established to implement the rule of law. The restoration of law and order to underpin public safety is one of the concerns of the Somali people. It is vital to ensure basic security and to build a framework for social and economic development if there is to be any future accountability for the massive human rights violations that have happened in the country. There must be a strong and independent judiciary that allows attorneys to carry out their legal responsibilities in an environment that is free of intimidation. It is essential that the judicial system receive international assistance by training Somali judges and other legal personnel.

It is also necessary that the UN High Commission for Human Rights to mobilise international support for investigation and possible trial of Somalia's war criminals. The international community should combat any proposals for immunity to be used by war criminals as a condition for peace. The perpetrators of atrocities and other violations of international humanitarian law should be made accountable for their actions.

The Role of the United Nations (UN)

The UN has a vital role to play in bringing peace to Somalia. It should participate in the disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation of combatants. Given the fact that a demobilisation programme requires a certain degree of momentum to make it successful, financial support and other requisite resources should be assured in advance of the exercise. A carefully planned selection process should be put in place during the selection and retraining of a broadly representative national army.

While the essential prerequisite for a successful disarmament and demobilisation is genuine commitment by the international community to support the programme, parties to the peace agreement should equally be committed to see the process through.

The agreement to disarm and demobilise must be universal and the process needs supervision by a neutral body that is acceptable to all parties. Combatants should be encouraged to take part in the demobilisation scheme through the use of incentives. These incentives include a basic survival package designed to meet the short and medium term needs. However, any kind of package of this nature must be balanced so that it does not destabilise communities by creating resentment among the civilian population. Ideally, paths to concrete longer-term opportunities for employment, vocational training and formal education should be integral to the demobilisation scheme. The administration and management of funds provided for the programme should be transparent, accountable and guaranteeing fair and equal treatment of all demobilised combatants.

The Role of the Multilateral Institutions

Since the international financial institutions are often the main creditors to countries at war as well as to post-conflict economies, their support for direct foreign investment would be crucial to Somalia's recovery. To this end, support may be needed for macroeconomic stabilisation, rebuilding of viable financial institutions, appropriate legal framework and for the reconstruction of requisite transportation and communication infrastructure. The World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) need to bring together donors to support the post-conflict reconstruction that should address (a) revival of agricultural, fisheries and livestock economies, (b) water, sanitation and solid waste rehabilitation, (c) resettling of refugees, demobilised combatants and displaced persons, and (d) emergency de-mining programmes.

To be meaningful and acceptable, the reconstruction process must be guided by an accurate reading of prevailing realities without becoming a prisoner of current circumstances. Solutions can neither be superimposed nor imported.

CONCLUSION

The Somali crisis presented the international community with profound challenges to address state collapse. A sustainable solution that would make a return to the conditions of the humanitarian emergency less likely require addressing the underlying political and social conditions. Narrowly based operations designed to manage the humanitarian aspects alone all failed because they did not address the socio-psychological problems of the country. Even though current literatures focus on the current breakdown of the Somali society into mutually suspicious and hostile clan fragments, a closer analysis of the situation will show that the civil war in

Somalia has a far more complex political and economic legacies. Reconciliation and conflict resolution need to begin with building confidence and trust among all the contending factions. The peace process may commence with the acknowledgement of each faction's mistakes, negotiation and accommodation. To this end, the international community could help by bringing together Somalia's intelligentsia to start a peace process that includes all the stakeholders.

To succeed in promoting sustainable peace and economic development, and to reach the "largest common denominator", the peace process needs to be comprehensive, transparent, and inclusive. This means that all social, economic and political aspects of the conflict should be addressed in an open forum.

The disintegration of Somalia into mini-states is not a solution to the current crisis. The majority of Somalis favor a decentralised and democratically-elected government representing all the Somali communities. Since the fall of the last regime, the Somali people are still groping for a new political order acceptable to all the different parties. The country that Somalis want to rebuild may never be the same as the one of the past. It is a widely accepted assumption that the days of centralised governance with all powers concentrated in Mogadishu, are gone for ever. Decentralisation and the devolution of power and authority appear to invite widespread support. Political plurality and power-sharing arrangements that are supported by a popular constitution that respects the interests of all diverse groups is what every Somali is hoping for.

In the final analysis, lasting peace also hinges on the presence of institutions that are conducive to and supportive of economic and social development on a participatory and equitable basis. Somalia needs a government that will allow each region a great measure of local self-governance that reflects Somalia's societal base.

Grassroots industry should be allowed to flourish in a manner which does not deprive the people of privately self-directed growth. The civil society has independently begun a number of relief and rehabilitation associations that provide income opportunities to the displaced and destitute, reach children, deliver health care and promote community development. The international community could provide significant support and nurture the capacity and the skills of the civil society to promote reconciliation and healing among belligerent groups. To do this, the following points need to be taken into consideration:

- The UN should promote women's empowerment and gender equality to ensure the participation of women in all levels of political and economic development in Somalia. Somali women are in control of the fabric of the society; therefore, their voices and needs should be heard. It is advisable for leaders to avoid using religious excuses to exclude women from public and business spheres/activities/issues.
- Somalis already have experience of separate Shari'a and non-Shari'a courts, with different methods of combining and ordering the various forms of law. Some similar formulation could be applied to the new Somali State. Judicial system, courts of law, prisons, and local and national police could be financed locally, possibly with donor support.
- Development institutions and donor governments can provide technical and financial support as well as programmes that strengthen the civil society. The World Bank has to forge a partnership with the UN and other donor agencies to establish a framework that will influence good governance and capacity building in local administrations.

- The UN can most effectively assist by encouraging a democratic and accountable system of governance to evolve by strengthening the political institutions. In addition, it could assist the judiciary system bring perpetrators of human rights violations to book.

Finally, the reconstruction of legitimate authority has to happen on Somali time and in Somali ways. The international community should not lose patience and should empower the civil society as they try to rebuild their communities and country from the ground up. I am optimistic that peace will one day be achieved in Somalia, and it is possible that a modern nation-state can evolve out of such an atmosphere.

ANNEXURE SIX

РОССИЙСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК
Институт Африки

ЮЖНАЯ АФРИКА

*Очерки
социально-
экономического
и политического
развития*



МОСКВА
Издательская фирма
«ВОСТОЧНАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА» РАН
1999

132

Хуссейн Соломон

**Некоторые соображения
о внешней политике Южной Африки:
лидерство среднеразвитой страны
или совместное руководство?**

Южная Африка занимает двойственное положение на международной арене. Это самая развитая страна Африканского континента. Ее валовой национальный продукт (ВНП) составляет 84% совокупного ВВП стран—участниц региональной организации Сообщество развития Юга Африки (САДК). Как же рассматривать ЮАР в контексте отношений Север—Юг, считать ее «северной страной Южного континента» или лидером Юга Африки? Некоторые представители мировой общественности полагают, что ЮАР является естественным лидером Африки. Так, глава миссии наблюдателей ООН в ЮАР в 1994 г. А. Кинг полагает: «Южная Африка вскоре станет катализатором быстрого развития не только южноафриканского региона, но и континента в целом»¹.

Этот взгляд разделяет ряд южноафриканских ученых. В недавней статье «Глобальный диалог, права человека и внешняя политика: пусть руководит ЮАР!» В. Сеймур отмечал: «Мир ожидает большего от демократической Южной Африки. После длительной борьбы за права человека нашу новую демократию рассматривают как естественного лидера развивающихся стран, тем более что преданность демократии и правам человека президента Н. Манделы не вызывает сомнений»². Нередко эту руководящую роль облекают в терминологию, связанную с лидирующей ролью среднеразвитой державы, что рассматривается как противопоставление внешней политике, зафиксированной на национальных эгоистических интересах. Однако среднеразвитые страны вряд ли осуществляют свою внешнюю политику более альтруистическими методами, чем прочие государства, верные

реализму в духе Е. Х. Кара или политике с позиции силы Г. Моргантау.

В этой статье попытаемся рассмотреть проблемы, связанные с лидерством среднеразвитых государств, выявить наличие у ЮАР возможности или политической воли для осуществления этой роли. Если Претория изберет курс на лидирующую роль, ЮАР будет трудно сбалансировать сопутствующие международные обязанности и ответственность с многочисленными и значительными потребностями внутренней политики «Радужной страны» (так называют ЮАР с 1994 г., поскольку в стране проживают люди всех оттенков кожи).

В современном мире, для которого все более характерен рост взаимозависимости, у каждой страны имеются и общие проблемы: угроза государственной безопасности, глобальное потепление климата, массовые миграции, контрабанда наркотиков, распространение вооружений обычного типа и т. д. Все более растет необходимость в сотрудничестве. Однако до этого далеко, поскольку международные институты в массе своей отживают свой век или не пользуются доверием. Кроме того, невелико число правительств, способных эффективно решать проблемы, связанные со взаимозависимостью и многосторонним сотрудничеством. Так, Б. Уорд пишет: «Сверхдержавы слишком велики, слишком сосредоточены на своих собственных обязанностях. Огромная масса новых государств слишком бедна и слаба, слишком нестабильна. Среднеразвитые страны занимают предпочтительное положение „на шкале влияния“»³. Поддерживая эту точку зрения, Р. Кокс заметил, что среднеразвитые страны по своим материальным возможностям располагаются посередине — и в военном, и в экономическом отношении. Они пытаются подталкивать международные организации к совместным действиям⁴. В этом же ключе высказывались А. Купер, Р. Хиггот и К. Носсаль: руководящая роль держав среднего масштаба тесно увязывается с «недостатками структурного лидерства на международной арене» после окончания «холодной войны». По мере того как великие державы обращаются к своим внутренним проблемам, открываются большие перспективы для средних держав, т. е. стран с достаточными материальными возможностями. Они могут претендовать на некоторые формы лидерства⁵, что рассматривается с пониманием. Полагают, что «интересы среднеразвитых стран больше совпадают с глобальными интересами, чем интересы малых стран или великих держав»⁶. Отсюда делается вывод, что, преследуя свои национальные интересы, страны среднего уровня развития будут способство-

вать и общей выгоде, утверждению более стабильного мирового порядка.

Различные авторы отмечают, что средние страны имеют различные концепции своей национальной роли, которые представляются собой «взгляды ведущих политиков по основным вопросам (решения, правила, традиции), соответствующим действиям и функциям, которые следует осуществлять государству в разнообразных географических и прочих обстоятельствах», включая роль регионального или субрегионального лидера, миротворца или посредника. В условиях «холодной войны» роль последнего проходила по линии Восток—Запад. С окончанием bipolarности мира роль миротворца все более перемещается на линию Север—Юг. Средним странам отводится важная роль менеджера (имеется в виду разработка норм, договоров и конвенций).

Обычно среднеразвитые страны активны в том, что ряд авторов характеризует как вопросы второго порядка в международной политике. Великие державы обычно берут в свои руки решение вопросов первого порядка. А Купер, Р Хиггот и К. Носсаль отмечают, что средние страны не чужаются вопросов первого порядка (например, территориальная целостность скандинавских стран). Эти страны озабочены факторами, вытекающими из проблем второго порядка, угрожающими традиционно высокому уровню жизни в этих странах. Например, их беспокоит, что «австралийской экономике нанесла урон война субсидий между США и ЕЭС», что «качеству окружающей среды в Канаде угрожает загрязнение воздуха в США».

По мере ослабления военного противостояния в связи с окончанием «холодной войны» вопросы первостепенной важности в международных делах, касающиеся территориальной целостности и суверенитета, все более отодвигаются на второй план проблемами, обычно относимыми к «низкой политике». Это проявляется в размахе теоретических дискуссий о новом понимании безопасности, когда делается акцент на невоенных проблемах безопасности, таких, как международная торговля, ухудшение экологической обстановки, рост населения. Обострение проблем безопасности, когда вопросы «низкой политики» превращаются в первостепенные, может привести к дальнейшей маргинализации среднеразвитых стран, поскольку великие державы берут на себя и эти вопросы.

Среди ученых и политиков продолжается дискуссия относительно критериев, необходимых для признания за государствами среднего масштаба роли лидеров. Они выразили согласие относительно того, что эти страны в целом находятся в среднем ин-

тервале властных возможностей, но не уверены в том, по каким критериям оценивать эти властные возможности.

Некоторые сторонники лидерства средних стран используют ВВП в качестве общего показателя национальной мощи. Б. Вуд приводит довод, что «ВВП автоматически определяет совокупную экономическую мощь, богатство и численность населения, а также в значительной мере военный потенциал...»⁸. Используя ВВП как критерий «стран среднего уровня», ученый составил список из 31 страны, в котором фигурируют Италия, Канада, Финляндия и Румыния.

Этот список вызывает ряд вопросов. Почему такая страна, как Румыния, оказывается примерно в той же группе, что и Канада? Следовательно, существуют широкие расхождения в оценке мощи этих государств и их способности эффективно влиять на другие страны. Признавая наличие расхождений по вопросам влияния и могущества, Холбраад решил ввести дополнительное деление средних держав на высший и низший подкласс⁹. Однако и это проблематично. Как заметили Дж. Эванс и Ю. Ньюхэм, ряд государств не вписываются в такую классификацию¹⁰.

Отдельные ученые подвергли сомнению этот список по нормативным соображениям. Они возражают против предоставления статуса «средняя страна» государствам, не соблюдающим права человека, так как этот статус вроде бы дает право на моральное лидерство. На этом основании Купер, Хиггот и Носсаль предлагают ввести новые обязательные, «поведенческие» критерии. Это увязывается с вопросом, является ли данное государство «благонадежным гражданином мира»¹¹. Подобные критерии, однако, базируются на принятых в обществе ценностях и специфичны для определенных культур.

Как таковые, «поведенческие» критерии в отношении среднеразвитых стран вызывают сомнения. Указывается, что различного уровня лидерство таких стран требует различных критериев. Прежде всего имеется в виду два вида лидерства: субрегиональное или региональное (рассматривается в пространственных терминах) и функциональное (в отдельных специфических областях). Региональное лидерство предполагает определенные военные и экономические возможности, а функциональное требует наличия современных технологий и экспертных знаний в определенной области (например, нераспространение ядерного оружия или ухудшение экологической обстановки).

Даже эти вроде бы объективные критерии для определения лидерства средних стран не окончательны. При избрании представителя Южной Африки на пост председателя САДК престиж

президента Н Манделы сыграл не меньшую роль, чем военная и экономическая мощь ЮАР. Существуют и другие переменные, влияющие на лидирующую роль, которые не учтены в литературе по этому вопросу. В частности, вызывает сомнение полезность концепции среднеразвитой страны.

Не все аналитики доброжелательно относятся к среднеразвитым странам и доказывают, что, несмотря на лозунги и пропагандистские заявления, собственно национальные эгоистические интересы и требования реализма в политике значительно влияют на внешнюю политику таких стран. Они лояльны коллективным интересам на уровне риторики, но в их политике всегда преобладают национальные интересы. Бывший канадский премьер-министр П Трюдо главным приоритетом объявил глобальное экономическое развитие, тем не менее канадское правительство быстро отзывалось на нужды и интересы местной промышленности. Оно придерживалось политики протекционизма и ввело квоты на импорт одежды и обуви из стран с низкими издержками производства. Таким же образом действовала и Австралия.

Чрезмерная озабоченность среднеразвитых стран проблемами порядка и стабильности в международных отношениях нередко приводит к тому, что они поддерживают гегемонистский статус-кво.

Ряд аналитиков отметили, что средние страны на Западе не слишком заинтересованы в укреплении равноправных «эгалитарных» организаций, где малые страны могут добиться слишком большого влияния (например, сопротивление части среднеразвитых стран Западу призывам стран «третьего мира» создать «новый международный порядок»). В глубоком исследовании Д.Блэка говорится: «Ряд малых западных стран... сильно заинтересованы в поддержке норм и институтов послевоенного „либерального экономического порядка“, Бреттон-вудского соглашения и ГАТТ. Эти страны и их господствующие классы проявляют значительный интерес к сохранению сравнительно открытой, либеральной и стабильной мировой экономики, что способствует развитию международных отношений и „поведенческих“ традиций путем активной поддержки и участия в основных институтах этой экономики. Когда стабильности международного хозяйства стала угрожать неудовлетворенность Юга и его требования введения нового международного экономического порядка, некоторые из этих стран (Нидерланды, Норвегия и Швеция) были особенно активны в поисках реформистского ответа Югу, который позволил бы международной экономике отреагировать на его требования, в то же время сохраняя существенное —

преимуществом и жизнестойкостью»¹². Все это доказывает, что западные страны вовсе не отражают коллективных интересов человечества, а стремятся поддержать интересы Севера за счет Юга.

В том же ключе другие комментаторы рассматривали страны среднего уровня развития как главным образом искателей определенного статуса. В основном эти страны не дотягивают, не могут претендовать на место среди великих держав, но не хотят и попасть в один разряд с «прочей серостью», добиваются альтернативной роли с целью захвата руководства. Так, С.Тувай и У.Зартман пишут: «Оказывается, посредничество среднеразвитых государств на деле вызвано желанием укрепить свое влияние... Мелкие и среднего размера страны стремятся поднять свой международный престиж, принимая на себя роль посредника-миротворца. У них немного способов улучшить свое положение в мире. Более того, посредничество часто избавляет их от необходимости принять чью-то сторону в конфликтной ситуации».

Нежелание со стороны среднеразвитых стран занять определенную позицию в споре теснейшим образом связано с их пониманием своей роли как посредника-миротворца, за что их часто обвиняют в беспринципности, желании «пересидеть на заборе». США также обвиняют эти государства в уклонении от международных обязательств.

Д.Блэк заметил, что лидерство стран среднего уровня развития зачастую основывается на высказанном или молчаливом предположении о наличии морального превосходства. Однако критическое исследование их внешней политики противоречит ожиданиям высокоморальной позиции. Короче говоря, лидерство среднеразвитых стран — это весьма неочевидное теоретическое построение. Ведется достаточно острый спор относительно природы среднеразвитых стран, их позитивной или негативной роли в системе международных отношений. Учитывая эту двойственность и влияние теории на политику, неудивительно, что Р.Кокс высказывает пессимистический взгляд на практическую полезность средних стран: «В течение всего периода времени после второй мировой войны тезис о средних державах оставался скорее идеей, потенциальной возможностью, чем реализованной и эффективной стратегией мировой политики»¹³.

Несмотря на двойственную природу лидерства среднеразвитых стран в теории и практике, известно, что некоторые ученые призывали Преторию сыграть подобную роль. В этой связи возникает вопрос: соответствует ли ЮАР этой роли согласно перечисленным выше критериям?

По объему ВВП Южная Африка могла бы претендовать на роль среднеразвитой державы. Однако суммарные цифры скрывают неравенство богатых и бедных жителей страны. По мнению Э.Сэрлиф из ПРООН, «Южная Африка — это две нации в одном государстве. меньшинство населения с доходом более 3000 долл. и все остальные с доходом 300 долл. в год, как в большинстве африканских стран».

В этом контексте некоторые специалисты предположили, что ЮАР не следует стремиться к роли лидера региона, поскольку она требует определенной ответственности и влечет за собой ряд обязательств. Э.Сэрлиф далее писала: «Южноафриканские ресурсы не следует использовать вне страны до тех пор, пока не наступит улучшения доли граждан ЮАР, которые столько лет были лишены необходимого».

Столь же проблематично применение «поведенческих» критериев, а также определение ЮАР как «благонадежного гражданина мира». С одной стороны, можно привести массу примеров, свидетельствующих о подобной роли Претории. В июле 1994 г. президент Н.Мандела провел встречу с главами Анголы, Мозамбика и Заира, стремясь действовать в роли посредника между Анголой и Заиром в вопросе о поддержке движения УНИТА. Позднее состоялось еще одно совещание, приведшее к возобновлению деятельности Совместной комиссии по безопасности между двумя странами.

С другой стороны, дружба ЮАР с Кубой и Ливией рассматривается, особенно США, как несоответствие их требованиям, что усугубилось предложением Претории продать технологию производства вооружений такой малой стране, как Сирия. Подобные «поведенческие» критерии при решении вопроса о лидерстве среднеразвитой страны чрезвычайно сомнительны, поскольку возникает вопрос о самой шкале ценностей при определении, что есть хорошее или плохое государство. В конце концов поддержка США таких диктаторов, как Сомоса, Батиста, Мобуту, хорошо известна.

В отношении ЮАР ВВП и «поведенческие» критерии для определения лидерства среднеразвитой державы представляются как минимум неокончательными. Следует заметить, что Претория демонстрирует достаточные материальные возможности и технологические знания, чтобы действовать в качестве державы среднего уровня развития как на субрегиональном, так и на функциональном уровне. Это проявилось во время конституционного кризиса в Лесото в октябре 1994 г. и в ходе переговоров о нераспространении ядерного оружия в 1995 г.

Вопрос о наличии у ЮАР политической воли к принятию на себя роли регионального и функционального лидера решить не просто. И об этом свидетельствуют противоречивые заявления руководства страны.

С одной стороны, власти ЮАР, похоже, уклоняются от роли лидера на страдающем от кризисов континенте. В речи на сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в июле 1994 г. министр иностранных дел ЮАР А.Нзо сказал. «Мы ставим превыше всего ответственность правительства национального единства перед народом Южной Африки. Наша главная цель — борьба за создание лучшей жизни для всего нашего народа... Южная Африка располагает чрезвычайно ограниченными ресурсами для выполнения каких-либо задач, выходящих за рамки Программы реконструкции и развития»¹⁴.

Эту мысль углубил сотрудник МИД П.Дитрихсен: «Южная Африка является военной державой среднего уровня с ограниченными ресурсами для использования на международной арене, например для осуществления операций по поддержанию мира. Хотя по мировым стандартам иностранный долг ЮАР невелик, затраты на собственно развитие страны таковы, что ЮАР может стать донором и оказывать помощь развитию других стран»¹⁵. В то же время, судя по выступлению заместителя министра иностранных дел А.Пахада, на долю ЮАР якобы выпала роль лидера.

Очевидно, что для успешного и последовательного развития южноафриканской внешней политики такую двойственность во взглядах крупных политиков необходимо изжить. Кроме того, мнения соседей Южной Африки по вопросу о ее лидерстве также весьма неоднозначны.

Например, в конце 1995 г. Н.Мандела начал было кампанию против Нигерии в связи с казнью некоторых активистов демократического движения. Руководство Нигерии отмолчалось. Африка была смущена и дистанцировалась от позиции Претории на уровне как САДК, так и ОАЕ. К апрелю 1996 г. посол ЮАР возвратился в Нигерию. Руководство МИД ЮАР поддержало резолюцию ООН, которая собиралась назначить международную комиссию по правам человека для наблюдением за ситуацией в Нигерии. Очевидно, урок заключается в том, что мир не обязательно поддержит ЮАР. Известны и другие случаи перемены позиции по внешнеполитическим вопросам, например проблема «двух Китаев» и неудачные попытки Претории выступить в роли посредника в делах Анголы, Замбии, Алжира.

С другой стороны, все эти «незадачи» уравниваются ведущей ролью ЮАР в разрешении кризиса на востоке Заира, а также просьбами Намибии, Мозамбика и Танзании о спасении морских ресурсов этих стран от разграбления средствами ВМС ЮАР, равно как и тем, что представителя Южной Африки избрали председателем САДК и, возможно, поставят во главе Движения неприсоединения.

Уровень экономического развития страны, высокие профессиональные качества руководителей и сравнительно мощная военная машина ЮАР — все это оборачивается на пользу континента. В то же время наблюдатели отмечают опасения, связанные с Южной Африкой и ее лидерством. Эти страхи проистекают из того, что для внешней политики Претории характерна более преемственность, чем переменчивость, что дипломатия принуждения, практиковавшаяся Преторией в период дестабилизации в 80-е годы, в 90-е годы сменилась активной дипломатией, пропагандирующей идею лидерства среднеразвитой страны. В целом это рассматривается как доброжелательное руководство Претории. Но сопутствующим является ощущение, что соседям ЮАР отводится весьма пассивная роль — во взаимоотношениях превалирует патернализм, а не партнерство.

Учитывая двойственность и нечеткость понятия «лидерство среднеразвитой страны», проявляющиеся и в академических построениях, и на практике, а также поскольку соседние страны испытывают реальные опасения, очень важно подчинить внешнеполитическое лидерство тому, что можно охарактеризовать, как «совместное (коллективное) руководство». В последнем термине акцент ставится на поиске консенсуса всеми участниками. МИД ЮАР уже избрал подобный стиль руководства и добился успеха, проводя активные действия в рамках ОАЕ, чтобы положить конец конфликтам в Либерии, Сьерра-Леоне, Бурунди. Вспомним также конституционный конфликт в Лесото (октябрь 1994 г.), в разрешении которого участвовала Южная Африка вместе с Зимбабве и Ботсваной.

Безусловно, «совместное руководство» имеет свои сложности. Например, поиски консенсуса могут замедлить попытки действовать по мере развития кризиса. Следует также принимать в расчет и боязнь южноафриканского господства в регионе. Нельзя бросаться обвинениями в адрес руководства, но нельзя и их игнорировать. Тем более что исторический опыт показывает, когда такие страхи остаются незамеченными, вся региональная программа рассыпается.

Принцип «коллективного руководства» имеет глубокие корни в истории Африканского национального конгресса: «...Построение нового регионального порядка станет коллективным деянием всех свободных народов Юга Африки и не может быть навязано извне или односторонними действиями какой-либо „региональной державы“... В связи с этим демократическая Южная Африка должна решительно отказаться от любых гегемонистских амбиций в регионе. Ей следует сопротивляться любому давлению с целью вынудить ее стать „региональной державой“ за счет остального субконтинента. Южная Африка станет создавать новые формы экономического взаимодействия стран Юга Африки на основе принципов взаимной выгоды и взаимозависимости»¹⁶

«Совместное руководство» предполагает также учет собственного опыта. Один из высших чиновников МИД ЮАР Й. Маркс утверждает: «... Самым большим вкладом, который может внести ЮАР в дело развития Африки, станет демонстрация того, что эффективная и некоррупцированная администрация, постоянное совершенствование существующей инфраструктуры и построение демократической системы являются существенными предпосылками развития. Если ЮАР сумеет оказать Африке подобную услугу, она выступит в такой руководящей роли, которой сможет гордиться вся Африка в целом»¹⁷

Об авторе *Соломон Хуссейн* — старший исследователь Института проблем безопасности (ЮАР).

Примечания

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ACCORD Rural Office

01 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 1999

The main focus of the ACCORD Rural office is to offer training in conflict resolution to members of rural communities and political organisations, facilitation to community organisations, as well as intervention in conflict situations. This report seeks to outline its activities within these three areas, during the period April to June 1999.

The Rural Office has been serving rural communities of the Western Cape since its inception. Before the 1994 democratic elections, the Western Cape was one of four provinces in South Africa, stretching from Namaqualand in the west to what was then referred to as the Eastern Cape in the east. After 1994, South Africa was demarcated into nine provinces, which resulted in a much smaller Western Cape Province. As a consequence, this office now serves not only the Western Cape Province, but also the Northern Cape and Eastern Cape Province.

TRAINING

♦ EX – COMBATANTS ASSOCIATION

In 1998, the Rural Office expanded its area of operation to the Northern Province when it engaged in a partnership with the Ex – Combatants Association (ECA). This is a national NGO that runs capacity – building training projects with ex – combatants in society.

During the month of May, two training sessions were held with members of ECA in the Northern Province. A Basic Course in Conflict Resolution was held at the Moffat Mission Station in Ganyesa, from 6th – 8th May 1999. 32 participants, of whom 17 were female and 15 male attended the workshop. An Advanced Course in Conflict Resolution was held from 11th – 13th May 1999, in the Huhudie Municipality Boardroom in Vryburg. Eight participants who completed the Basic Course in 1998 attended the Advance course.

♦ OVERBERG ABET (GENADENDAL CLUSTER MINI CONGRESS)

In June, the Overberg ABET, an adult literacy organisation, requested the Rural Office to present a module in conflict management at their annual conference. The conference was held from 11th – 12th June 1999, and was attended by 31 participants, of whom 10 were male, and 21 female. Professor Jannie Malan, (Senior Researcher) from the Cape Town office, and Ferdie Fourie, (Rural Office Manager), facilitated this workshop.

♦ **WORCESTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE SRC STRUCTURES**

The Worcester Community College was established in January 1999, when two colleges in Worcester, Söhnge College and Worcester College, amalgamated to form one institution of learning. Worcester College was known as a historically white institution of learning, while Söhnge College was a historically black teacher training college.

As a result of the amalgamation process, two SRC structures from both institutions, and both elected in 1998, now had to face an amalgamation process as well. This process was marked by cultural tension, as neither structure was eager to work with members from other cultural backgrounds.

ACCORD was requested by the Board of Worcester Community College to assist the two SRC structures in finding a constructive way of dealing with the transformation process.

A date for the workshop has been finalised for 22nd– 24th July 1999. A report of this workshop will be reflected in the third quarterly report.

FACILITATION

♦ **UNOBUNTU MULTI – PURPOSE CENTRE**

ACCORD was asked by the above – mentioned Centre to facilitate their Annual General Meeting (AGM). The AGM was concluded successfully with the election of the new executive committee of the centre.

Date: : 23rd June 1999
Venue : Centre Auditorium Hall, Zwelethemba
Facilitators : Ferdie Fourie and Celeste Fortuin

♦ **OTHER ACTIVITIES**

In June, Karthi Govender and Aubrey McCutcheon visited the Rural Office. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the future of the rural office, as well as to establish fundraising procedures for the rural office. It was decided that staff of the rural office should play an active role in acquiring funds for this programme. This includes doing donor research, designing projects for this office, as well as compiling fundraising proposals.

Apart from the assessment process that is being conducted within ACCORD as a whole, it has also become necessary for this office to do an assessment of the work it has been doing in the rural areas for the past six and a half years. Such an assessment will aid strategic planning for the future of the rural programme of ACCORD. A report of the stages of this assessment process will be outlined later in the year.

JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1999**TRAINING**◆ **WORCESTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE SRC STRUCTURE**

Date	:	22 - 24 July 1999]
Venue	:	Du Toit Kloof Resort
Trainers	:	Ferdie Fourie, Jannie Malan, and Celeste Fortuin
Participants	:	10 Male 3 Female

The Worcester Community College was established in January 1999, when two colleges in Worcester, Söhng College and Worcester College, amalgamated to form one institution of learning. Worcester College is known as a historically white institution of learning, while Söhng College is a historically black teacher's training college.

The amalgamation process brought about that two SRC structures from both institutions and both elected in 1998, now had to face an amalgamation process as well. This process was marked by cultural tension, as neither structure was eager to work with members from other cultural backgrounds.

ACCORD was requested by the Board of Worcester Community College to assist the two SRC structures in finding a constructive way of dealing with the transformation process.

The workshop took place from 22 - 24 July 1999. The workshop was held at Du Toits Kloof Resort, 20 km outside Worcester. It was decided that a residential workshop would strategically assist the two structures to get to know each other better. It was also thought that removing them from the site of the conflict to a neutral venue would assist the problem-solving process.

Some SRC members were reluctant to attend the residential workshop. This was due to the poor relationship that existed between the two groups. A few preferred driving to the venue every day, instead of sleeping over at the resort, while others preferred not to attend the workshop at all. Finally thirteen out of the twenty members attended the workshop. Those who did attend the workshop expressed their disappointment at those who did not. They felt that those who failed to attend were not serious about the transformation process at the College, and building a better relationship with one another.

The workshop proved to be a huge success. It was facilitated by Ferdie, Celeste and Jannie. The workshop not only focussed on the Basic Module, but items regarding Cultural Diversity, Leadership Styles and The Role of an SRC member, were also added to the program

Emphasis was placed on team-building and improving communication between the two groups. The group felt that this workshop and the way it was facilitated, provided them with much - needed opportunity to really get to know one another better. Honest discussions about racism, prejudice and cultural diversity also assisted the groups to express their hopes and fears regarding a Multi - cultural institution of learning.

The group as a whole expressed their need for project planning skills in order to implement projects that would assist in bringing together students from various backgrounds at the College.

♦ **CMR / HAPPY VALLEY COMMUNITY**

Date : **13 - 15 August / 20 - 22 August / 27 - 29 August 1999**
Venue : **Happy Valley Community Centre**
Trainers : **Ferdie Fourie, William Nutt, Jannie Louw, and Celeste Foutuin**
Participants : **Female 2 Male 10**

ACCORD was asked by the "Christelike Maatskaplike Raad" (CMR) to present a series of three workshops to the community of Happy Valley in Blackheath, Cape Town Residents of Happy Valley previously lived in informal settlements before they were moved to this new housing scheme.

Most of the participants were illiterate or semi-literate and we had to make use of codes and role-plays to demonstrate the key concepts of conflict resolution. Participants spoke either Afrikaans or Xhosa, but did not have a working knowledge of English. Therefore we had to make use of a translator throughout the workshop to accommodate all participants.

Three training modules were completed with the group from Happy Valley, which includes the Basic, Advanced and Facilitation course. The participants enthusiastically joined in the exercises and discussions during the workshop. At the end of the three workshops, the group expressed their need to take the training that they have received further. This can only be realized if funds are acquired for this group, since most of them are either unemployed or temporary employed.

Two ACCORD panellists, Janine Louw and William Nutt helped with the facilitation of these three workshops. ACCORD panellists are expected to complete a practicum in which they have to assist with the facilitation of workshops before they can be certified as ACCORD trainers.

CMR covered the costs of the ACCORD staff's transport and accommodation during the three weeks. It is possible that the Happy Valley community can be used as a pilot group for community mediation panels in the Western Cape. We would like to do more research on this topic to see whether community mediation panels can be implemented in these communities or not.

♦ **SADEP - UCT**

Date : 20 - 23 September 1999
 Venue : UCT Middle Campus
 Trainers : Ferdie Fourie, Celeste Foutuin, Janine Low
 Participants : Female 7 Male 3

As part of an ongoing partnership between ACCORD and SADEP, students at SADEP were trained in Basic Conflict Resolution Skills during the third week of September. After completion of the Basic Course, students are expected to complete an assignment relating to the course contents. These assignments will be submitted by the third week of October.

USAID representative, Ajit Joshi, also attended the workshop on the third day. The purpose of his visit was to observe training conducted by staff from the Rural Program. Janine Louw, one of the ACCORD panellists, assisted with the facilitation of this workshop.

FACILITATION

The Rural Office had no facilitation sessions during the period in question.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

♦ **ACCORD ASSESSMENT / VISIT OF CHRIS LANDSBERG**

Chris Landsberg visited ACCORD in July. Chris was appointed as an Independent Consultant by USAID to conduct an assessment of ACCORD as a whole. He visited the rural program to conduct interviews with the staff and clients in order to get an idea of the impact of its work in the rural areas.

Activities in the Executive Director's Office:

APRIL:

◆ **INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION:**

Vasu was invited by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to attend and present at their "The Electoral Ethos: Consolidating South African Democracy" Conference that was held in Pretoria from 21-23 April. He was also the discussant to the Session on "The Meaning of Free and Fair", which took place on Thursday the 22nd.

The Independent Electoral Commission covered Vasu's travel expenses.

◆ **MEETING AT USAID, PRETORIA:**

Vasu met with the new Head of Mission, Mr. William Stacy Rhodes to give a briefing and introduction to ACCORD and its recent activities.

Vasu's travel was funded by ACCORD.

◆ **INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING OF ORGANISATION:**

Consultations and discussions were held with various staff members, MANCO, and an independent consulting company, FSA Contact, to assist the Executive Director in the initial planing and development of a structure for the re-organisation of ACCORD. This process is on going and has not as yet been completed.

MAY:

◆ **CONFERENCES IN BELFAST AND THE HAGUE**

From 2nd to 16th May, Vasu travelled first to Belfast (Ireland) and then onto The Hague (Netherlands).

He was invited by the Coexistence Initiative, a strategic initiative of the State of the World Forum, to attend and present at their Conference held in Belfast on "The Challenge of Reconciliation: Diversity and Community in a Global Age". The Conference also served as the launch of the Coexistence Initiative. Besides making a panel presentation on "Sharing Experiences of Coexistence and Community Building", Vasu was also asked to participate in the three Coexistence Initiative core meetings that took place.

From Belfast, Vasu then travelled to The Hague to attend "The Hague Appeal for Peace"

Conference. He was invited by the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation to make a presentation within their "commission" held at the Conference. Vasu presented on "Coalition and Constituency Building: Networking and Communication in crisis / conflict zones Experiences in Southern Africa".

Vasu was also asked to make a presentation for the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) within their "commission" on "Making Conflict Early Warning Effective". He presented the conclusions of the preceding presentations as well as "From Early Warning to War Prevention - Developing Integrated Strategies for Action".

Vasu's travel and related expenses were funded in part by the Coexistence Initiative (State of the World Forum) and the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation.

◆ **ACCORD / OAU WORKSHOP:**

ACCORD, in collaboration with the Conflict Management Group (CMG), jointly hosted an Advanced Conflict Resolution Workshop for the Ambassadors of the OAU's Central Organ from 24th – 28th May along the KwaZulu Natal South Coast. As part of the Workshop Agenda, Vasu presented a case study on the DRC.

◆ **AFRICA PEACE AWARD (APA):**

A preparatory meeting (part of a series of ongoing meetings) was held with ACCORD, ENGEN (core sponsor) and Anita Soni and Associates (ASA) to discuss budgetary and planning issues related to the event. There were also ongoing telephonic discussions.

JUNE:

◆ **SECOND SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS:**

In early June Vasu was appointed by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to their panel of mediators for the KwaZulu Natal region during the election period.

He was also invited by President Mandela to attend the Presidential Inauguration of the President elect, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, which was held in Pretoria on June 16th.

His travel and related expenses were funded by ACCORD.

◆ **INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO RACISM IN SAPS:**

This Committee met on 7th June to discuss the finalisation of their Report and to formulate their conclusions and recommendations. A draft copy of the Report was then sent to Minister Mufamadi, the Secretariat for Safety and Security and the Police Management Forum.

◆ **MEETING WITH THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR:**

The Norwegian Ambassador, H.E. Mr. Per Grimstad invited Vasu, to attend a briefing on South African-Norway co-operation.

Vasu's travel was funded by ACCORD.

◆ **ACCORD PEACE CENTRE:**

Discussions have been held with Ruben Reddy Architects to formulate a draft proposal for an Architectural Competition and Project Management for the Peace Centre. It is hoped that the short-list of designs received will be shown at the next Africa Peace Award.

◆ **DISCUSSIONS WITH MTN:**

There have been ongoing discussions to look at formulating a partnership between MTN and ACCORD. This is in line with ACCORD's strategic partnerships with the Private Sector, which to date include IBM and ENGEN.

01 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1999:**JULY:**♦ **INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO RACISM IN SAPS:**

Professor Paulus Zulu (Chairperson), Vasu Gounden and Hayden Allen flew to Pretoria on the 08th to make a presentation of the Committee's findings to the Police Management Forum. This resulted out of a request made by National Commissioner Fivaz when the Committee made its initial presentation to the Secretariat for Safety and Security in February.

Taking into account the feedback received, the Committee will finalise its Report and make a submission to the Minister of Safety and Security.

Vasu's travel was funded by the South African Police Services.

♦ **MEETING WITH THE SWISS AMBASSADOR:**

While in Pretoria for the above SAPS presentation, Vasu took the opportunity to meet with His Excellency Mr. Mayor, the Swiss Ambassador to South Africa at the Swiss Embassy. Arising out of this meeting are plans for joint collaboration between ACCORD and the South African Department of Constitutional Affairs funded by the Swiss Government.

♦ **MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS:**

Following on from this, Vasu then met with Deputy Director-General Sizane (from the South African Department of Constitutional Affairs) at ACCORD on the 20th to discuss the project in more detail. ACCORD will now put together a proposal.

♦ **MEETING WITH VISITING US SENATORS:**

On Sunday the 11th Vasu was invited by the US Consul General to a lunch to meet with Donald Payne and Tom Campbell, two US Senators who were conducting a Study Tour of a select number of Africa countries. ACCORD was one of the civil society organisations that they requested to meet with.

♦ **MEETING WITH ENGEN OIL CORPORATION EXECUTIVES, CAPE TOWN,**♦ **15 JULY:**

The Executive Director, along with ACCORD Chair Professor Gerwel, made a formal presentation to the ENGEN MANCO members in Cape Town to strengthen relations between the two organisations (ENGEN is the core sponsor of the APA) as well as introduce the ENGEN MANCO members to Professor Gerwel.

Vasu's travel and related expenses were funded by ACCORD.

◆ **FEWER:**

Vasu has been appointed as the interim Chair of the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) for a three month period (July – September), pending the appointment of a permanent Chair.

◆ **EUROPEAN PLATFORM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND TRANSFORMATION:**

ACCORD was approached by the Platform to provide three papers as part of a Survey project that they have undertaken and which will be published in a monograph. For that purpose, the Research Manager wrote two of the papers, the one being an overview of the Southern African region and the other a survey on KwaZulu Natal. The Executive Director on the other hand, wrote a paper, which giving an overview of South Africa in the post 1994 period and measures undertaken by the Government to prevent/reduce conflict in the country.

◆ **A MEDIA BRIEFINGS:**

On the 23rd presentation were made to ACCORD by a select number of Media companies that had been short-listed to oversee and manage the media coverage leading up to and around the APA.

◆ **UNDP MEETING:**

Vasu travelled to Switzerland the week of the 26th to attend a UNDP brainstorming workshop to discuss the conceptual and operational frameworks and methodological approaches for the design of long-term development training and common vision among decision-makers, within countries affected by violent conflicts in Africa.

While in Switzerland Vasu had meetings with the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and the World Economic Forum.

Vasu's travel and related expenses are funded by UNDP and partially by ACCORD.

AUGUST:

◆ **AFRICA PEACE AWARD:**

Preparations for APA were ongoing.

◆ **SENIOR MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA:**

Vasu was invited to participate in the above workshop funded by USAID, which ran from 06-20 August. The workshop brought together senior management from select organisations (civil society and the private sector) in the SADC region. There will be a follow-up workshop in November/December and at Harvard University in the USA in June/July.

USAID/SA funded Vasu's travel, and related expenses.

◆ **INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE CONFERENCE:**

Vasu attended the IGD's Conference on Nigeria that was held in Gauteng on the 27th of August.

Vasu's travel was funded by IGD.

SEPTEMBER:

◆ **AFRICA PEACE AWARD:**

Preparations for APA were ongoing.

◆ **CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP:**

A joint project has been established, funded by the Swiss Government, to look at Constitutionalism on the Continent. In order to formulate the programme for the three-year project, members of an Expert Advisory Group were identified, who will come together at a meeting in October to plan the above.

◆ **UNIVERSITY OF DURBAN-WESTVILLE (UDW):**

On the 23rd Vasu was invited by UDW to be one of the main speakers at the Special Ceremony hosted to present former President Nelson Mandela an honorary degree in Law.

◆ **DRC PRESENTATION TO SENIOR POLICY MAKERS FROM ANC EXECUTIVE:**

On the 27th Vasu/ACCORD was invited to present a briefing on the situation in the DRC and to explore possible solutions to resolving the dispute in this important central African country.

Vasu's travel was funded by ACCORD.

◆ **INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY:**

On the 28th of September the Independent Committee was invited by the new South African Minister for Safety and Security, Mr Steve Tshwete, to make a formal presentation of the Committee's Report to the Minister's Committee. This will be followed up by a meeting to discuss the Minister's Committee's implementation of the Report's recommendations.

SAPS funded Vasu's travel.

ANNEXURE ONE

**REPORT ON THE ACCORD DRC MEETING HELD AT THE ESPADA CONFERENCE
AND TRAINING CENTRE, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA,
09 – 11 MARCH 1999:**

BACKGROUND:

The ACCORD initiative was part of a process started by the National Council of Development NGOs of the Congo (CNONGD) to facilitate discussion and debate on the prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). CNONGD held the first of these meetings in September 1998 in the DRC involving mainly NGOs.

Synergies Africa in Geneva convened a second meeting in November 1998, to which Congolese academics living in the Diaspora were invited to contribute their views on the conflict in the DRC. The third meeting in the process was convened in Antwerp by CNONGD and a fourth meeting was convened by the Canadian International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal in late January 1999.

ACCORD staff participated in all these meetings except the initial meeting that took place in the DRC under the auspices of CNONGD. Discussions were held with our partners (who convened the other meetings) about the convening of a smaller meeting in South Africa, to which all the political formations of the DRC and a select group of civil society leaders should be invited.

Further discussions were held at the Montreal meeting with Archbishop Monsengwo, the Catholic Archbishop of Kisangani and Mr. Hamuli Kabarhuza of CNONGD. It was decided at this meeting that Mr. Kabarhuza would secure the participation of the DRC civil society representatives. Archbishop Monsengwo, who was in contact with President Kabila and several other political leaders, would secure their participation. ACCORD undertook to approach the rebel movement known as the Rassemblement des Patriotes Congolais (RCD).

Archbishop Monsengwo visited South Africa to prepare for the meeting and ACCORD arranged for him to meet with and to brief President Nelson Mandela on our proposed initiative.

The objectives of the meeting were identified as follows:

- 1). To provide a forum to facilitate communication among political and civil society actors within the DRC;
- 2). To provide a forum within which perceptions could be cleared and views and concerns shared;
- 3). To identify common and differing perspectives on the current crisis in the DRC;
- 4). To identify common and differing views on prospects for peace in the DRC.

SELECTION OF DELEGATES:

Twenty-nine participants were invited with the aim of getting a broad group of individuals who represented diverse interest groups, so that they could share with each other their respective perspectives. It was decided that five interest groups should be invited namely, the Government, civil society, the internal democratic opposition groups, the RCD and individual politicians and political formations who were associated with the regime of former President Mobutu.

The decision to invite the "former Mobutists" was later met with some opposition from the Government and was cited as the reason for their non-participation in the meeting. At the time it was decided to include the "former Mobutists" so as to make the process inclusive and, more importantly, we knew that they had the resources and necessary support to destabilize any peace agreement to which they have not been a party. It is also evident from current peace initiatives that they are still actively involved.

Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (UDPS), who had indicated his willingness to participate all along, pulled out on the last day. He also cited the presence of the "former Mobutists" as the reason for his non-participation. In particular he was aggrieved by the presence of Mr. Kengo wa Dondo, former Prime Minister under President Mobutu whom he held responsible for scuttling the democratic process that led to him (Tshisekedi) becoming Prime Minister.

The possibility of this happening was brought to the attention of Archbishop Monsengwo during the preparations for the meeting, but he felt that an inclusive process was necessary and Mr. Kengo wa Dondo should nevertheless be invited. In this context an attempt was made to balance the number of participants from all the groups. (See Annexure 1 for delegates list).

THE MEETING PREPARATIONS AND PROCESS:

A secluded venue was chosen due to the sensitivity of the meeting and the role players involved and in order to give the delegates the freedom to engage in open discussion without the fear of reprisal. The location of the venue was also withheld from the Press to avoid the presence of journalists and any media coverage. We had given the delegates an undertaking that the meeting would be closed.

We did however invite representatives of the Embassies of the SADC countries in South Africa to an informal dinner with the delegates, so that they could be briefed on the reasons for the meeting and on what we hoped to achieve. It was stressed at this meeting that the meeting was convened to give Congolese stakeholders an opportunity to dialogue with each other and that there were no expectations beyond this. In addition, a brief Press Statement was released by ACCORD a day before the meeting began, indicating that such a meeting was taking place, but without disclosing the names of the participants (see Annexure 2). The meeting also received wide coverage internationally (see Annexure 3).

Careful consideration was given to the structure of the meeting. Delegates were seated alphabetically so as to divide formations and allow for more individual inputs. ACCORD staff facilitated the meeting and strict ground rules were set and followed by the

participants. This created equity in the participation of everybody. The agenda for the meeting was left as unstructured as possible, to allow the delegates free discussion on issues that they felt needed discussion.

In the spirit of second track diplomacy, we gave the participants an undertaking that the discussions would be closed and confidential. We provided professional facilitation of the discussions and ACCORD staff refrained from any active participation on the substantive content thereof. In order to allow individuals to express themselves freely, simultaneous translation was provided for the delegates.

ACCORD believes that second track diplomacy initiatives, having no official status, gives the participants the opportunity to explore each other's perceptions without having to make any commitment. It helps to narrow differences and prepare the ground for official talks.

The focus for the first day was to give delegates the opportunity to give their perspectives of the problem/crisis, while on the second day discussion was directed towards prospects for peace.

The discussions were very frank and open. Participants gave their perspectives and voiced their concerns very strongly within a carefully facilitated process that ensured such differences were recognised but did not deteriorate into acrimonious debate.

The delegates reached consensus on the following:

- 1). There is an urgent need for a cease-fire. The cease-fire needs to include the Government of President Kabila and his allies on the one side and the RCD and its allies on the other side.
- 2). For there to be peace in the DRC, mechanisms must be found to disarm the Interahamwe, the Ex-Far and other armed groups that are destabilizing the DRC.
- 3). The reaffirmation and respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congo as well as national unity.
- 4). A holistic political settlement of the crisis as an alternative to war.
- 5). The organization of a roundtable of all the political and social forces of the country without exclusion, to explore ways and means to recreate a national consensus on a constitutional order during the transitional period and to determine the modalities for its practical implementation. The roundtable should determine the length of the transition during which free, fair and democratic elections shall be organized.
- 6). Every effort should be made to ensure that all foreign troops leave the country as soon as possible.

All the delegates regretted the absence of the Government representatives and indicated that without the Government no dialogue on a cease-fire can be achieved.

At the end of the discussions, the participants agreed that ACCORD should convene a Press Conference to avoid speculation of what may have transpired at the discussions. We invited members of the press to a Press Conference held at the meeting venue on the evening of 11 March. A Press Statement was drafted and agreed to by all the participants and presented by ACCORD to the press (Annexure 4).

The Press Statement was immediately sent to President Kabila via his official representative in South Africa and a copy was sent directly to his offices in Kinshasa. Copies of the Press Statement was also sent to the Secretary-General's of the OAU and UN and to the Ambassadors in South Africa of countries who had a direct involvement in the DRC. (Annexure 5).

POST- MEETING DEVELOPMENTS:

On Friday, 12 March, we learnt that President Kabila had issued warrants of arrest for the individuals who attended the meeting and that they would be arrested on arrival back in Kinshasa. This affected four delegates who traveled from Kinshasa, three of whom were members of civil society and the fourth a representative of a political formation (two of the civil society members were from the media). After extensive discussion amongst themselves and their families they all decided to return home despite the threat of arrest.

The two media persons spent Friday and Saturday ensuring that their arrest and detention received as much media coverage as possible, especially within the DRC. A fifth person, the Executive Director of CNONGD, who had first traveled to Cameroon on business after the Pretoria meeting, also undertook to return home and face arrest. They were all arrested on arrival, held for a few days during which they were questioned and thereafter released.

CONCLUSION:

The meeting was positively received by all the delegates. They were glad to have been given the opportunity to dialogue freely and frankly without the pressure of having to reach an agreement or to commit themselves or their organizations to any position. In many ways most delegates saw this as an opportunity to test the views of others and to present their own views and clarify issues.

It was encouraging to see the civil society representatives being very critical of the political groupings and the politicians taking responsibility for their past wrongdoings. The RCD was also criticized in a very emotional contribution from one of the civil society delegates and it was pleasing to see the leader of the RCD delegation, Mr. Alexis Thambwe, accepting some of the criticism and clarifying other perceptions of his movement.

It was evident that most delegates were meeting for the first time. The social events that we organized (an informal dinner and a bush barbecue) gave the delegates the opportunity to interact on a more personal level and to get to know each other. We found that these events helped people to deal with difficult issues that were raised in the meeting.

We, as ACCORD, were surprised at the level of consensus that existed among the delegates, which is reflected in the Press Statement. This is not to say that there was not strong disagreement on certain issues. We found that people find it easier to understand each other when there is not the pressure of formal talks. In addition, although we did not involve ourselves in the substantive content of the discussions, as facilitators we served to ask some of the awkward questions, so as to avoid a direct clash of comments between the delegates.

Apart from achieving the objectives of facilitating communication and identifying common and differing perspectives, the meeting also built relationships among key stakeholders who will have to interact with each other in formal discussions in a future consultative conference on the DRC. We believe that this meeting, together with the other civil society initiatives, would have set the basis for constructive dialogue based on these understandings and relationships.

FOLLOW UP:

ACCORD, in consultations with Mr. Hamuli Kabarhuza, who is heading the civil society peace platform in the DRC, have decided to concentrate our efforts on building and consolidating the role of civil society in current peace talks and later constitutional talks. To this end, we will be planning the convening of a SADC civil society meeting to build a SADC platform to lobby SADC governments for the involvement of Congolese civil society formations in future talks.



ACCORD

AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

Private Bag X018, Umhlanga Rocks, 4320, South Africa
Telephone: +27-31-502 3908 Fax: +27-31-502 4160
Email: info@accord.org.za Internet: http://www.accord.org.za

PRESS RELEASE

A meeting of Congolese political parties and civil society leaders gets underway tomorrow. The closed meeting, which is being held at an undisclosed venue outside Pretoria, is the initiative of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). This initiative is part of a series of meetings that accord has been involved in together with its partners, synergies Africa (Geneva) and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada). Four meetings have been held in Kinshasa, Geneva, Antwerp and Montreal.

The Pretoria meeting will involve some thirty participants from both political parties and civil society. Four civil society representatives from Kinshasa and four civil society representatives from eastern DRC have already arrived in the country. Ten representatives from political parties have also arrived and a rebel delegation headed by the RCD's shadow foreign minister is expected this evening. President Kabila has also been invited to send a delegation.

The talks are expected to last for two days. The talks are not expected to reach any specific outcome and so participants are not under pressure to meet the expectations of an agreement. The purpose of the talks is to get the participants to share their concerns about the situation in the DRC and about each other's political interests.

Issued by Mr. Vasu Gounden, Executive Director
09/03/1999

Executive Director: Vasu Gounden Trustees: S.M.E. Bengu (Minister of Education, South Africa) - G.J. Gerwel (Director General, Office of the State President, South Africa) - Mdm Graça Machel (President FDC, Moçambique) - W.L. Nkuhlu (Chairman, Economic Equity Investment Promotions (Pty) Ltd South Africa) - J. Reddy (Former Chairperson, Commission on Higher Education, South Africa)

A Project associated with the universities of Durban-Westville, Fort Hare, The North, Transkei and Western Cape, South Africa

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ANNEXURE TWO

Conférence sur la Sécurité Régionale dans la Région des Grands Lacs
Le 09-11 mars 1999, Pretoria, Afrique du Sud

Liste des Participants

PARTICIPANTS	
1. Atundu Liongo	Comité des Bons Offices et de Facilitation du Consensus National en RDC
2. Bagenda Balagizi, Patient	Comité Anti Bwaki (CAB)
3. Banguli, Marco	Union pour la République "Opposition non armée"
4. Bisimwa Ganywa, Etienne	Union des Congolais pour la Paix (UCP) Forces du Futur
5. Endundo, José	Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (FEC)
6. Hamuli Kabaruzza, Baudouin	Conseil National des ONG (CONONGO)
7. Ipakala, André	Fondation Ipakala
8. Kabamba Mbwebwe	Front Patriotique (FP) "Forces Démocratiques Internes"
9. Kalala Shambuyi	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)
10. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Gérard	Rassemblement des Patriotes Congolais (FCN)
11. Kengo wa Donco, Léon	Union des Démocrates Indépendants
12. Kirhero, Arsène	Innovations et Réseau pour le Développement IREN / Grands Lacs
13. Kyalangilwa, Joseph	Coordination de la Société Civile Sud Kivu
14. Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya (Monseigneur)	Eglise Catholique
15. Lukiana - Mufwankolo, Marie-Ange	Union Nationale des Femmes (UNAF)
16. Mishiki, Willy	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)
17. M'Peti, Albert	- Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien (PDSC) - Comité du Suivi de Montréal - Collectif des Forces Démocratiques
18. Muheto, Léon	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)
19. Mukaniwa, Jeanine	Promotion et appui aux initiatives des Femmes (PAIF)

20. Mutinga, Modeste	Média pour la Paix
21. Mutombo-Bakafwa Nsenda	Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)
22. Ndjovu Okundji, Emery	Forces Novatrices pour l'Union et la Solidarité (FONUS)
23. N'landu Kavidî, Wivine	Union des Fédéralistes Républicains Indépendants (UFERI)
24. N'Singa Udjuu, Joseph	Union Pour La République
25. Pay Pay, Pierre	Indépendent
26. Thambwe Mwamba, Alexis	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)
27. Zamundu, Alphonse	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)

PARTENAIRES D'ACCORD

28. Akakpo-Vidah, Akouété	Centre International pour les Droits de la personne et du Développement Démocratique - Canada
29. Kianza, Nola	Forum de Suivi - Montréal

PERSONNEL ACCORD

30. Allen, Hayden	Assistant de Recherche auprès de Vasu Gounden
31. Gounden, Vasu	Director Exécutif
32. Sachane, Jerome	Directeur - Adjoint

INTERPRETES

33. Fenn, Béatrice	Interprète Freelance
34. Jaques, François	Professeur, Université de Rhodes

HAYDEN

From: leonard suransky [leosur@hotmail.com]
Sent: 13 March 1999 08:56 AM
To: Hussein@accord.org.za; hallen@accord.org.za
Subject: Congo NGO conference

Hi guys, Love to hear how the art. gleaned fr internet this am went????
Remember I'm doing research on SADC and Congo war and am all ears.
Thanks in advance for yr. respnse. LEn

=====
NGO-convened forum calls for ceasefire

Representatives of 17 Congolese civil society and political organisations yesterday ended a two-day meeting in Pretoria, South Africa, calling for a ceasefire and disarming of foreign groups, news agencies said. The meeting, which included rebel representatives and former ministers under late president Mobutu Sese Seko, also called for the organisation of a round-table to help "recreate a national consensus", AFP reported. The meeting was convened by the South African NGO ACCORD. The DRC government was not represented. Last week, DRC Information Minister Didier Mumengi had said the government had not been informed in advance of the conference and that it would constitute serious interference in the DRC's affairs.

Leonard & Caroline Suransky //Leonard Suransky,IRD & PADS
Callenburghplantsoen 1, Institute of Social Studies,
2253 TP Voorschoten, Bcx 29776, 2502 LT The Hague,

THE NETHERLANDS.

Home: +31-71-572-4068 Work: +31-70-426-0489
Fax : +31-70-426-0799

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BBC Africa

3/12/99 SOUTH AFRICA: REBELS, OPPOSITION GROUPS AND FORMER OFFICIALS HOLD TALKS NEAR PRETORIA.

Source: 'Business Day' web site, Johannesburg, in English 10 Mar 99

Text of report by South African newspaper 'Business Day' web site on 10th March

Opposition leaders from Democratic Republic of Congo are meeting near Pretoria in an effort to narrow their differences ahead of an inclusive political settlement.

Participants include senior representatives of the rebel groups fighting President Laurent Kabila's forces, former ministers and a former reserve bank governor under Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and emissaries of internal opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who has been banned from travelling.

Also present is the Archbishop of Kisangani, Monsignor Monsengwa, who met President Nelson Mandela last week and is emerging as an increasingly important mediator in Congolese peace efforts.

Plans adopted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo call for an inclusive political settlement once the fighting has stopped.

The organizer of the Pretoria meeting, Vasu Gounden, said yesterday the talks were aimed at defining a common basis so that they were ready to participate in the internal Congolese process once a cease-fire was in place. The aim was to narrow the gap between the parties, as it was unlikely that the Pretoria meeting would achieve consensus on all issues.

Further meetings were planned for Paris and Geneva. Gounden said Mobutu's former Prime Minister Leon Kengo wa Dondo, Foreign Minister Gerard Kamanda, and former reserve bank governor Pierre Pay-Pay were among the participants in South Africa. Alexis Thambwe was representing rebel leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba.


Gounden is the director of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord), a nongovernmental organization involved conflict resolution on the continent. The South African government had cooperated with Accord by granting visas to the participants, but had otherwise "respected our independence in convening this meeting".

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Congo Leaders Prepare For Peace

March 10, 1999

By Stephen Laufer

Johannesburg - Opposition leaders from Democratic Republic of Congo are meeting near Pretoria in an effort to narrow their differences ahead of an inclusive political settlement.

Participants include senior representatives of the rebel groups fighting President Laurent Kabila's forces, former ministers and a former reserve bank governor under Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and emissaries of internal opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who has been banned from travelling.

Also present is the Archbishop of Kisangani, Monsignor Monsengwa, who met President Nelson Mandela last week and is emerging as an increasingly important mediator in Congolese peace efforts. Plans adopted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo call for an inclusive political settlement once the fighting has stopped.

The organiser of the Pretoria meeting, Vasu Gounden, said yesterday the talks were aimed at defining a common basis so that they were ready to participate in the internal Congolese process once a cease-fire was in place. The aim was to narrow the gap between the parties, as it was unlikely that the Pretoria meeting would achieve consensus on all issues.

Further meetings were planned for Paris and Geneva. Gounden said Mobutu's former prime minister, Leon Kengo wa Dondo, foreign minister Gerard Kamanda, and former reserve bank governor Pierre Pay-Pay were among the participants in SA.

Alexis Thambwe was representing rebel leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. Gounden is the director of the African centre for the constructive resolution of disputes (Accord), a nongovernmental organisation involved conflict resolution on the continent.

The SA government had co-operated with Accord by granting visas to the participants, but had otherwise "respected our independence in convening this meeting".

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


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DRC rebels, Mobutu-era ministers, in "national consensus" call

PRETORIA, March 11 (AFP) - Rebels fighting Democratic Republic of Congo President Laurent Kabila and former members of the Mobutu regime called Thursday for talks to achieve a "national consensus" in war-battered ex-Zaire.

About a dozen disparate DRC parties ended two days of unofficial talks in Pretoria with a joint call for the "organisation of a round table of all the political and social forces of the country without exclusion to explore ways and means to recreate a national consensus."

Kabila's government snubbed the meeting, which was attended by a delegation of the main rebel group trying to topple him, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD).

The bid to find common ground for a resolution to the eight-month war was held behind closed doors in the South African capital under the auspices of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), a South African non-governmental organisation.

The gathering received no official recognition by the South African government.

"There is an urgent need for a cease-fire. The cease-fire needs to include the government of President Kabila and his allies on the one side and the RCD and its allies on the other side," according to a joint statement released by the participating parties.

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Rebels, Mobutu-era ministers, in "national consensus" call

<http://www.yahoo.com.sg/headlines/1203...d/921181020-90311193757.newsworld.html>

The rebel delegation was led by Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, the RDC party's foreign affairs spokesman.

It included about a dozen former ministers in the Mobutu regime, among them several times prime minister Leon Kengo wa Dondo, former foreign minister Gerard Kamanda, and former central bank governor Pierre Pay-Pay.

"Mechanisms must be found to disarm the (armed Rwandan Hutu group) Interahamwe, the ex-FAR (ousted Rwandan army soldiers) and other armed groups that are destabilising the DRC," the joint document said.

They participants also agreed on the need for the "respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congo".

"Every effort should be made to ensure that all foreign troops leave the country as soon as possible," according to a text adopted by the gathering.

ACCORD official, Gounden Vasu, said that the participants had shown an "acceptance of collective responsibility for what happened during the Mobutu era".

He said the participants had also shown themselves to be "open to the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission" in the DRC, along the lines of that put in place in South Africa in a bid to close the chapter on the apartheid era.

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Rebels Want 'Round Table'

March 12, 1999

By Stephen Laufer

Johannesburg - Opposition parties from the Democratic Republic of Congo meeting outside Pretoria have called for a "round table" to determine a new constitution and establish how long the transition to democracy will take.=

The delegates, including representatives of the rebels fighting to overthrow the government of President Laurent Kabila as well as unarmed political groups, said the round table should include all political and social forces in the Congo.

The round table - a concept which gained popularity during eastern Europe's transition to democracy in the early 1990s - would determine the practical implementation of the new Congolese constitutional order. Participants said there was an urgent need for a cease-fire as a precondition for the round table to function effectively.

Every effort should be made to ensure that all foreign troops left the country as soon as possible, they said. An essential element of any lasting peace in the Congo had to, they maintained, be the disarming of the Interahamwe Hutu militia, the Rwandan Ex-Far and other armed groups currently destabilising the country.

Vasu Gounden of the Accord nongovernmental organisation which

organised the Pretoria meeting said that while the opposition groups had disagreed on many issues they were satisfied with "frank and open discussion on many crucial issues". He said the various groups were in agreement that face-to-face talks between Kabila and the rebels were an essential precondition to a cease-fire.


Face-to-face talks between all opposition groups and Kabila on the transition to democracy should follow. Kabila has consistently refused to meet the rebels.

Among those at the meeting were the Archbishop of Kisangani, Laurent Monsengwo, rebel foreign minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, and a number of former ministers and high-ranking officials in the government of former Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Gounden said the organisers of the meeting regretted that Kabila had not sent a representative to the talks.

Gounden said several former Mobutuist ministers had said they accepted collective and individual responsibility for what had happened under the former dictator's rule. They were open to the creation of a Congolese truth and reconciliation commission as part of the establishment of an inclusive democratic system and were prepared to appear before it.

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A C C O R D

**AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES**

**ACCORD Private Bag X018 Umhlanga Rocks, Durban 4320, South Africa
Telephone: (27-31) 502 3908 or 502 3926 Fax: (27-31) 502 4160**

PRESS STATEMENT

Representatives of the Unarmed political groups, civil society and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo met for two days at the Espada Ranch, outside of Pretoria from 10 March 1999 until 11 March 1999, for informal talks on the crisis in the DRC.

The discussions were aimed at providing a forum for dialogue on peace among Congolese. The hosts of the talks, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), say they are satisfied that frank and open discussions took place on many crucial issues. The parties disagreed on many issues. However, the talks gave all the participants who hold divergent views on the issues an opportunity to clear perceptions and answer questions on their respective positions.

There was consensus among the delegates on the following:

1. There is an urgent need for a cease-fire. The cease-fire needs to include the Government of President Kabila and his allies on the one side and the RCD and its allies on the other side.
2. For there to be peace in the DRC, mechanisms must be found to disarm the Interahamwe, the Ex-Far and other armed groups that are destabilising the DRC.
3. The reaffirmation and respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congo as well as national unity.
4. A holistic political settlement of the crisis as an alternative to war.
5. The organisation of a roundtable of all the political and social forces of the country without exclusion, to explore ways and means to recreate a national consensus on a constitutional order during the transitional period and to determine the modalities for its practical implementation. The roundtable should determine the length of the transition during which free, fair and democratic elections shall be organised.
6. Every effort should be made to ensure that all foreign troops leave the country as soon as possible.

All the delegates regretted the absence of the Government representatives without whom no dialogue or cease-fire can be achieved.

ACCORD undertook to share these views with President Laurent Desire Kabila. ACCORD also undertook to convey these concerns to the Governments of SADC and the surrounding region as well as the OAU and the UN.

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ACCORD

AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

ACCORD Private Bag X018 Umhlanga Rocks, Durban 4320, South Africa
Telephone: (27-31) 502 3908 or 502 3926 Fax: (27-31) 502 4160

07 April 1999

H.E. Dr. Salim. A. Salim
Secretary General
Organisation of African Unity
Ethiopia

Fax: 09251 1 513036

Your Excellency

Greetings from ACCORD!

We recently hosted informal discussions among representatives from Congolese political parties and civil society. This initiative was part of a series of civil-society organised meetings around the DRC, that were convened by ourselves and our partners. The first of these meetings was hosted by the National Council of Development NGOs of the Congo (CNONGD) in September 1998. The second meeting took place in November 1998 in Geneva under the auspices of Synergies Africa. The third meeting was hosted by the CNONGD in Antwerp in January 1999 and the fourth meeting was hosted by the Canadian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal in late January 1999.

The objective of these meetings was to facilitate dialogue among Congolese political parties and civil society with a view towards developing increasing consensus that could lead to a negotiated solution to the current crisis. These efforts were intended to compliment official governmental initiatives.

The Pretoria meeting was planned to build on the positive developments attained at the several other initiatives. Participants for the Pretoria meeting were invited with the aim of getting a broad group of individuals who represented diverse interest groups so that they could share with each other their respective perspectives. In addition, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was invited to send delegates to participate in the discussions. Unfortunately, and for reasons we fully appreciate, they declined to do so. A full list of participants is attached for your information.


In the spirit of second track diplomacy, we gave the participants an undertaking that the discussions would be closed and confidential. We provided professional facilitation of the discussions and refrained from any active participation in the substantive content of the discussions. We believe that second track diplomacy initiatives, having no official status, gives the participants the opportunity to explore each other's perceptions without having to make any commitment. It helps to narrow differences and prepare the ground for official talks.

The Pretoria discussions were very frank and open. Participants gave their perspectives and voiced their concerns very strongly within a carefully facilitated process that ensured such differences were recognised but did not deteriorate into acrimonious debate.

At the end of the discussions, the participants agreed that ACCORD should convene a press conference to avoid speculation of what may have transpired at the discussions. A press statement was drafted and agreed to by all the participants and presented by ACCORD to the Press (a copy of the press statement is attached for your information). We request that you please convey the sentiments contained in the press statement to your Government. Owing to the confidential nature of the discussions and our undertaking to the participants, we have decided not to compile any report of the meeting.

We welcome the recent announcement by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to convene a national debate on the future of the country. We were encouraged by the level of consensus that existed among the participants of the Pretoria gathering and we are therefore confident that a national debate will yield positive results. We will continue to pursue an agenda for peace in the DRC, at the request of and in partnership with our civil society partners, as part of our ongoing efforts to find African solutions to African challenges.

Sincerely



VASU GOUNDEN
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Incl. Press Statement
List of Participants

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

**ACCORD
M069 USAID INTERIM GRANT
for the period 30 September 1997 to 30 September 1999**

LINE ITEM	BUDGET	12/31/97	03/31/98	06/30/98	09/30/1998	12/31/98	03/31/99	6/30/99	9/30/99	TOTAL	BALANCE
Compensation	2,520,979.00	94,977.57	112,149.19	147,940.69	146,833.88	141,389.56	126,244.01	129,937.31	125,103.83	1,024,576.05	1,496,402.95
Direct Costs	761,210.00	9,472.56	36,924.72	50,481.44	59,739.95	162,845.86	180,293.00	29,263.00	12,236.13	541,256.66	219,953.34
Indirect Costs	647,925.00	11,939.17	1,303.26	19,030.65	16,900.78	207,706.46	12,503.77	23,034.19	11,039.08	303,457.36	344,467.64
Non Expendable Equip.	92,609.00	17,295.52	4,708.05	5,537.85	231.32	-	-	14,435.15	3,128.46	45,336.34	47,272.66
Audit and Evaluation	52,277.00	-	-	293.67	13.63	2,618.28	-	415.50	6,411.81	9,752.90	42,524.10
TOTAL in US\$	4,075,000.00	133,684.82	155,085.22	223,284.30	223,719.55	514,560.17	319,040.78	197,085.15	157,919.32	1,924,379.30	2,150,620.70

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