

**R4**

# **USAID/CROATIA**

Results Review and  
Resource Request (R4)

**3 APRIL 2000**

***Please Note:***

The attached FY 2002 Results Review and Resource Request ("R4") was assembled and analyzed by the country or USAID operating unit identified on this cover page.

The R4 is a "pre-decisional" USAID document and does not reflect results stemming from formal USAID review(s) of this document.

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## Cover Memo

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**Zagreb, Croatia**

### Memorandum

**To:** Don Pressley, AA/E&E

**From:** Charles R. Aanenson, Mission Director

**Date:** March 6, 2000

**Subject:** Cover Memo for Croatia R(4), FY 2002

The USAID Mission in Croatia can claim success for the resounding victory by the opposition parties in both the parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2000. Of course the real victors are the Croatian people. However, USAID was the major stakeholder in providing technical assistance, educating citizens, and encouraging citizen participation through NGOs. Since the opening of the USAID Mission in Croatia, USAID has strengthened and trained grass-roots NGOs, political parties, labor unions and independent media. This five-year, targeted assistance developed a strong and deep foundation of democracy within the Croatian population. The increased assistance in 1999 for "Get out the Vote" achieved the democratic objective, illustrating that informed, participating voters can make a difference.

The Superior Honor Award presented to the entire US Mission by Secretary Albright in February states that, "For sustained, outstanding performance in helping to foster democratization in Croatia. The American Embassy in Zagreb is recognized for developing a proactive strategy to promote a democratic transition; for its effectiveness in fostering political cooperation among Croatia's diverse democratic political parties; and for encouraging the development of civil society by active engagement with non-governmental organizations in Croatia."

The opposition victory has now opened wide the door of reform. We shall assist the new government of Croatia (GOC) in anchoring and solidifying democracy, accelerating and invigorating economic and fiscal reform, and addressing the resolution of the returnee/refugee problem. USAID shall continue as the active and major player in these reform areas, catalyzing and leveraging other international donors. No serious issues are posed to senior management as part of this FY2002 Croatia R4 review process. There are two items for discussion we should note:

## **Items for Discussion**

1. USAID/Croatia is submitting a concept paper in advance of a new strategy to be written in the fall of this year. The new strategy proposes to eliminate SO 1.4, replacing it with a more focused, active and larger program within SO 1.2 and SO 1.3. In fact, the economic teams that have been in Croatia during January and February are applying their activities to SO 1.2 and 1.3 already.
2. USAID/Croatia, due to increased programmatic activity, is requesting a \$70,000 increase in its OE level in FY 2000 from \$1,100,000 to \$1,170,000. This request will be submitted separately to E&E/OM/FIS.

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## Glossary

ABA/CEELI	American Bar Association/Central and Eastern European Legal Initiative
ACILS	American Center for International Labor Solidarity
ADF	America Development Foundation
AED	Academy for Educational Development
AIT	Association for Independent Television
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
Delphi/STAR	Delphi/Strategies, Training and Advocacy for Reconciliation project
DOS	Dalmatia Solidarity Council
DP's	Displaced persons
EA	Environmental Assessment
EU-POP	European Union Reconstruction Programme for Return
FLAG	Firm Level Assistance Group
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GLAS '99	Literally "Voice '99"
GOC	Government of Croatia
GONG	Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections
GOTV	Get out the Vote
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HRT	Croatian Radio & Television
ICNL	International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
IEE	Initial Environmental Assessment
IFI	International Financial Institutions.
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	Intermediate Results
IRESX	International Research and Exchange Board
IRI	International Republican Institute
LGP	Local Government Program
MP	Member of Parliament
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non governmental organizations
NOA	Saving and Loan Cooperative "NOA"
ODPR	Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees
OI	Opportunity International
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PRM	Populations Refugees and Migration program
PTG	Proposed Transition Grant
RAP	Return Assistance Program
RFA	Request for Assistance
RS	Republika Srpska
SDF	Serb Democratic Forum
SEAF	Small Enterprise Assistance Funds
UATUC	Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USG	U.S. Government
WL	World Learning
WTO	World Trade Organization

## **R4 Part I: Overview/Factors Affecting Program Performance**

### **A. Overview**

The Government of Croatia (GOC) is an essential partner in bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. USAID's assistance to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina began in fiscal year 1993, and was initially focused on providing relief for victims of war. After signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (December 1995) and the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Sirmium (signed in Erdut in November 1995), the first USAID assistance strategy for Croatia period was prepared. Covering the planning period FY 1996 through FY 2000, the program focused on three strategic objectives: the return and reintegration of war-affected populations; a more competitive market-responsive private financial sector; and increased, better-informed citizen participation in political processes. The Mission's strategic objectives directly support the primary U.S. foreign policy goals for Croatia. These goals are articulated in the current Embassy Mission Performance Plan (MPP) as: (1) full implementation of the Dayton and Erdut agreements; (2) transition to a free-market economy; (3) increased domestic and regional stability, and (4) integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. USAID/Croatia's Strategic Objective (SO) 3.1 supports implementation of the peace agreements. SO 1.2 & 1.3 (new in 2000), will support the transition to a free-market economy. All SOs support increasing peace and stability, and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

USAID/Croatia's overall program performance has exceeded expectations. The Mission's achievements under the democracy strategic are the most strikingly apparent. President Franjo Tudjman, who led Croatia since independence from Yugoslavia, died in December 1999. In the parliamentary elections that followed in January 2000, pro-reform opposition parties gained a majority of seats. In February 2000, moderate Stipe Mesic, candidate of a four-party opposition coalition, was elected president. The Mesic government has committed to broad economic and political reform. These historic events cast a bright spotlight on USAID/Croatia's achievements in the democracy sector, but the drama of elections – the resounding victory for “democrats” – was preceded by years of quiet, steady effort. Since 1993, USAID has worked to lay the foundations for a more democratic Croatia, and these foundations set the stage for the groundswell of activism and public engagement evident in early 2000.

The Mission has played the leading role in developing and supporting civil society organizations that might otherwise have withered in the face of harsh government harassment. Citizen participation in electoral processes was expanded through direct technical assistance to NGOs, trade unions, and political parties. These efforts reached dramatic culmination in the coordinated pre-election efforts of 140 NGOs and trade unions. USAID-supported NGOs joined others in forming GONG (Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections) and GLAS '99 (literally Voice '99), two organizations that played preeminent roles during the elections. USAID-funded GONG successfully advocated for changes to the election law that made domestic election monitoring possible. GONG then recruited and trained 7,000 election monitors, who played a critical role in ensuring free and fair elections that brought a new government to power. For trade unions -- the largest single component of GONG -- participation in the monitoring effort was their first collective action with NGOs. Women's groups and environmental NGOs were a strong presence

within GONG. USAID-funded GLAS '99 organized a wide-scale "Get-Out-the-Vote" campaign. With additional assistance from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), GLAS '99 launched a massive outreach campaign that included TV and radio shows, commercials, provocative posters, brochures, and face-to-face citizen outreach. Voters turned out at the polls in record high numbers, an estimated 75% of those eligible, exceeding the turnout for the 1990 referendum on independence from Yugoslavia.

The outcome of elections also reflected USAID's five-year engagement with a broad spectrum of political parties. USAID support was central to formation of the opposition coalition that ousted the incumbent government. USAID helped political parties – initially divided, competitive, and distrustful of one another – to build alliances, enhance organizational effectiveness, and improve their ability to communicate persuasively with voters. Four national opinion polls, sponsored by USAID, enabled parties to re-order their priorities to better match voter concerns, in particular identifying and responding to the concerns of undecided swing voters. These polls also included "coalition-specific" questions that tested voter support for potential coalitions, guiding parties in forming political alliances that optimized public support. The impact of USAID's political party strengthening efforts was further evidenced by the greater professionalism of the campaign, in which parties used "new" tactics, such as direct voter contact and presentation of more regionally and gender balanced candidates' lists.

USAID also played a leading role in strengthening independent media and professional media associations, despite a hostile environment in which they were subject to unrelenting harassment by the government. Most critically, independent media were able to expand the flow of objective news and information during the election period. The Mission channeled SEED monies to OTI which, through its rapid disbursement mechanisms, was able to support a wide range of independent electronic media outlets in airing programs that addressed key political, social, and economic issues. Without these outlets, opposition parties would have lacked a crucial vehicle for communicating with the public. In June 1999, the USAID-supported Association for Independent Television (AIT) achieved a major breakthrough, successfully lobbying for changes to the Telecommunications Law that paved the way for developing a network of independent television stations that generates its own programming and now reaches more than 75% of the population. AIT organized and broadcast live debates featuring all candidates during both parliamentary and presidential elections.

Progress toward USAID/Croatia's other two strategic objectives was constrained by the erratic and partial cooperation of the previous government. A conspicuous lack of will to implement economic reforms and facilitate the return and reintegration of refugees led USAID/Croatia to amend its strategy in 1998, suspending assistance for financial sector reform and extending by several years the period in which its reintegration objective was to be achieved.

After several years of sustained growth, Croatia's economy contracted in 1999, and unemployment grew to over 25%. The budget deficit is in excess of 5% of GDP, internal debt is estimated to be approximately \$12 billion, and foreign debt has climbed to more than \$9 billion. Foreign direct investment, other than a few high-profile sales of some state-owned assets, continues to be weak and the business outlook is pessimistic. Since 1998, seven banks have gone into receivership. Some progress was achieved in bank supervision and rehabilitation,

capital markets and limited small-scale privatization. Croatia also reduced discriminatory excise taxes, enacted legislation to improve the trade regime, and made progress in negotiations to accede to the WTO. However, Croatia has made very little progress towards implementing second and third-tier economic reforms such as large-scale privatization, enterprise restructuring, banking sector reform, and improvement of the legal and regulatory framework affecting competition and private investment.

Subsequent to USAID's strategic decision in 1998 to suspend its economic growth strategic objective, the Mission continued to meet with opposition and ruling parties to discuss necessary reforms, promising renewal and expansion of economic assistance once the GOC extended its full commitment. This tactic was quite effective in creating a knowledgeable base of reformers within the GOC. Over the same period, the HDZ government's economy program became increasingly untransparent, causing citizens to become less trusting and tractable. USAID's very visible withdrawal from the economic sector increased this distrust.

Prior to the 2000 elections, USAID/Croatia renewed and expanded its economic reform activities. The newly elected GOC is vocal about its support for economic restructuring, and USAID is very optimistic regarding the direction it seems to be heading. In response to requests for assistance from the new government, USAID is developing an aggressive program to establish an enforceable policy, legal, and regulatory environment for market-oriented restructuring of the economy.

The return and reintegration of displaced persons in Croatia and throughout the former Yugoslavia is an essential element for successful implementation of the Dayton and Erdut agreements. It is also integral to long-term regional stability. More than 80,000 Croatian Serbs returned to Croatia in 1999, but several hundred thousand ethnic Croats, Croatian Serbs, and others, have been unable to return to their pre-war homes. A large percentage of the displaced cannot return because their homes and communities are in ruins or occupied. The stagnant economy in the war-affected areas presented another obstacle to return. Though the international community compelled the Tudjman government to pass new legislation governing return in late 1998, the provisions have not been implemented by the Croatian authorities to the degree the international community had hoped. Local officials who discouraged returnees found the central government supportive of discriminatory conduct.

USAID's Returnee Assistance Program (RAP) partnered with 15 municipalities to foster greater receptivity for returnees. In all 15, RAP-funded infrastructure projects have directly encouraged returns. However, the program has not progressed as quickly as expected because of the extensive time required to persuade local officials to remove obstacles to returnees. Having laid the groundwork for effective partnerships, RAP expects to move forward rapidly in 2000. USAID has established a national network of human rights and legal services NGOs. This network has instituted a system for monitoring trends affecting the human rights of returnees and provided legal assistance to more than 40,000 people, helping them resolve legal and administrative issues related to citizenship, property rights, professional licensing, business registration, and access to social benefits. The Mission's support for economic revitalization in war-affected regions is helping refugees develop alternative sources of income from micro,

small, and medium-scale enterprises, sustaining them through the transition from refugee to returnee.

Prospects for achieving the significant progress towards all of the Mission's strategic objectives have been greatly improved by the election of the Mesic government. In particular, USAID/Croatia is optimistic that conditions favorable to the full implementation of the Dayton and Erdut agreements will finally be established. There is now substantial hope for normalization of relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Mesic favors eradication of voting privileges for the Croatian diaspora, and if the GOC implements this policy, the political influence of Croats in Herzegovina will diminish. The boundaries between the two countries would become less porous, enabling each to become at last a distinct "country." The government's commitment to fair and equitable treatment for all its citizens – regardless of ethnicity – also suggests a shift away from the former government's policy of favoring ethnic Croats.

On February 9, 2000, the new government outlined an ambitious plan for economic growth and democratic reforms. It also committed to accelerating return and reconciliation of displaced persons and refugees. Explicitly citing membership in the EU and NATO as primary objectives of Croatian foreign policy, the plan also affirms the GOC's intent to fulfill Croatia's international commitments, support regional peace and stability, and democracy in Serbia Montenegro. Croatia is on the cusp of fulfilling the Stability Pact's vision that it serve as an "anchor" for peace and stability in the Balkans.

The Mesic government is strongly motivated, but the challenges it faces are enormous. At this pivotal moment in Croatia's economic and political transition, it is essential that the USG intensify its assistance efforts. If crucial reforms are not successfully implemented, prolonged economic hardship could lead either to a resurgence of hardline, extremist sentiments or to a cynical disaffection that breeds corruption and despair. USAID's experience in the Europe and Eurasia region unfortunately provides too many examples of both cases. If Croatia reverses course, or fails to fulfill its potential, the ramifications could be disastrous for the region and for U.S. interests. Conversely, a successful Croatia would serve as a beacon in the troubled Balkans. Given the stakes, sustained engagement by the international community – with the leadership of the USG – is vital.

## **Factors Affecting Performance**

The resistance of the former GOC to reform significantly impeded progress in two of USAID/Croatia's strategic objectives. Though performance under the democracy SO exceeded expectations, the government's harassment of USAID staff and implementing partners caused some concerns that a forceful crackdown on democracy efforts would occur prior to the elections. A positive factor was the sustained, united efforts of the international community in applying pressure for reforms, which made possible some limited progress in both the economic sector and in the return and repatriation of displaced persons. European Union pressure was also helpful in facilitating passage of a new telecommunications law. A close, positive partnership with OTI assured rapid, targeted disbursement of SEED monies during the pre-election period and in

reaching communities experiencing reduced revenues during the NATO-Kosovo conflict. OTI contributed to two of the Mission's strategic objectives: "return and reintegration of war-affected populations" and "increased, better-informed citizen participation in political processes." It provided information and direct assistance to returnees and residents of war-torn areas, and was a key partner in supporting GONG's election monitoring, GLAS '99's Get-Out-the-Vote campaign, and independent media. Collaboration magnified the impact of both Mission and OTI activities. The attached Annex includes an OTI report covering its activities during the reporting period. Finally, performance in this reporting period capitalized on the investments USAID made during the preceding five years – in building capacity and developing partnerships with both implementing organizations and Croatian reformers.

Montenegro:

USAID/Croatia has willingly assisted "USAID/Montenegro" with logistics, setting up the USAID temporary offices in Dubrovnik, and with programmatic activities such as conducting the SME sector and privatization review and with programs which have cross border implications such as the financial and trade/investment sectors. USAID/Croatia is willing to continue to assist, as appropriate, in logistical and activities that impact both sides of the border.

## R4 Part II Results Review by SO

### Text for SO a

Country/Organization: USAID Croatia

Objective ID: 160-014-01

Objective Name: More competitive market-responsive private financial sector

Self Assessment: Not Meeting Expectations

Self Assessment Narrative: This S.O. has been suspended since April, 1998. However, with the recent change of government in Croatia, several economic sector assessments have been undertaken. Because of the new GOC's commitment and willingness to reform, the Mission will re-engage its bilateral economic technical assistance program. However, S.O. 1.4 will be discontinued and in its place will be S.O. 1.2 and S.O. 1.3 which will offer more activities for the GOC.

Primary Link to Strategic Agency Framework: 1.1 Private Markets  
(please select only one)

Secondary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(select as many as you require)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.1 Private Markets               | <input type="checkbox"/> 1.2 Agricultural Development/Food Security    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.3 Economic Opportunity for Poor            | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Rule of Law/Human Rights                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Credible Political Processes             | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.4 Accountable Gov't Institutions           | <input type="checkbox"/> 3.1 Access to Education/Girl's Education      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.2 Higher Education/Sustainable Development | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.1 Unintended Pregnancies Reduced            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.2 Infant/Child Health/Nutrition            | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.3 Child Birth Mortality Reduced             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.4 HIV/AIDS                                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.5 Infectious Diseases Reduced               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.1 Global Climate Change                    | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.2 Biological Diversity                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.3 Sustainable Urbanization/Pollution       | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.4 Environmentally Sound Energy              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.5 Natural Resource Management              | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.1 Impact of Crises Reduced                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6.2 Urgent Needs in Time of Crisis Met       | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.3 Security/Basic Institutions Reestablished |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.1 Responsive Assist Mechanisms Developed   | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.2 Program Effectiveness Improved            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.3 Commit Sustainable Development Assured   | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.4 Technical/Managerial Capacity Expand      |

Link to U.S. National Interests: National Security

Primary Link to MPP Goals: Regional Stability

Secondary Link to MPP Goals (optional): No Secondary Linkage

#### Summary of the SO:

USAID suspended assistance under this SO in 1998 because the previous HDZ led government in Croatia showed no willingness to engage in any meaningful economic reform. Despite having received some well targeted technical assistance, the HDZ government failed to implement most of the proposed reforms. The HDZ government's economic program became increasingly untransparent, with citizens becoming less trustful and pliant. USAID's very visible withdrawal increased this distrust.

As a result, the economy became a major political issue in Croatia, and the electorate withdrew its support for the HDZ government precisely because of their mismanagement of the economy and lack of transparency.

The newly elected reform minded government, confronted with fiscal hemorrhage and a deteriorating economy, is attempting to demonstrate that it is committed to fiscal austerity and economic reform. USAID Croatia is in the process of responding with immediate targeted support for the long overdue structural reforms. The new efforts will be starting from virtually ground zero and will require a significant quantity of new funds if USAID is to begin working effectively with the the GOC and the IFI s to reinstate sound management of the economy.

#### Key Results:

Since USAID suspended assistance in 1998, no assistance was provided during CY 1999. Past activities to support the achievement of this SO focused on two key intermediate results: (1) developing viable, transparent financial institutions, and (2) expanding capital markets. Prior to suspension of this assistance, USAID had trained and provided technical assistance to economists and bankers within the government. USAID's withdrawal from the sector left a dormant foundation of trained reformers waiting in the wings.

#### Performance and Prospects:

Overall performance toward the achievement of this SO has been below expectations. This assessment reflects the past inability of USAID's assistance to achieve any reasonable performance at the S.O. level under the former HDZ government.

The principal goals of USAID funded activities under this SO, prior to its suspension, were to develop an effective and enforceable legal and regulatory framework to support the development of transparent, reliable, and participatory financial markets. USAID funded activities were important complements to the World Bank and IMF programs in Croatia and will be even more so in the future.

#### Possible Adjustments to Plans:

In the fall of 1999, with the anticipation of a new government, USAID/Croatia began working with economists within the opposition parties on agendas for economic reform. Then the parliamentary and presidential elections early this year yielded an expected more progressive reform minded government. Consequently, USAID/Croatia proposes efforts to support the reform strategy of the new government which must be implemented quickly and efficiently if

this window of opportunity is to be maximized. Consequently, USAID Croatia is proposing to revise its strategic objectives in the economic growth sector. The new focus will change the SO framework by eliminating SO1.4 and replacing it with a larger and better focussed SO1.2 and SO1.3 which is planning new assistance that will parallel the GOC requests and will follow the Embassy's MPP priorities. The sector will focus on: (1) fiscal reform (budget, tax and pension), (2) commercial legal and regulatory reform (incl. bankruptcy and collateral law), (3) public asset management and divestiture (privatization), (4) strengthened bank supervision, (5) micro, small and medium business finance and development (including association development) (6) agricultural reform, and (7) regional trade and foreign direct investment. USAID is working very closely with the new government and the IFIs in an effort to leverage USAID resources and to establish conditionalities that will kick-start the reform process. Funding required for this economic reform process is \$16.6 million in FY 2000 and \$11.7 million in FY 2001.

#### Anticorruption:

USAID/Croatia realizes the window of opportunity we have with the new GOC to work with the parliament, the audit and investigative institutions attached to the parliamentary and other oversight bodies, with the NGO communities including the consumers' groups and advocacy oversight organizations particularly at the local levels in the area of anti-corruption. We will be focusing on removing the incentives for systemic corruption, realizing the importance of a well-organized civil society and equally strong political will from the new leadership. We will attempt to connect technical assistance programs to reform efforts, connecting those efforts to small business development and entrepreneurship. USAID/Croatia also fully realizes that this effort must be a multi-country regional approach. We will be full partners within the Stability Pact through several task forces focusing on these issues.

#### Other Donor Programs:

USAID is coordinating its economic sector assistance with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), EU, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the British Know How Fund. There is no PHARE program in Croatia and unfortunately, EU economic assistance is not anticipated prior to 2001.

#### Stability Pact

USAID/Croatia attempts to work closely with the Stability Pact Working Table on Economic Development, focusing on the issues of investment climate and reform, WTO accession, intra- and inter-regional trade barriers and customs reform, regional development and infrastructure sector program, including the energy sector. The Mission is looking forward to becoming an active player in the Stability Pact Environmental Task Force.

#### Major Contractors and Grantees:

Barents, Booz Allen, Department of Treasury

PLEASE NOTE: Charts are not attached because this SO was dormant in 1999 and no activity occurred.

## Text for SO b

Country/Organization: USAID Croatia

Objective ID: 160-021-01

Objective Name: Increased better informed citizens' participation in political processes

Self Assessment: Exceeding Expectations

Self Assessment Narrative: Under this strategic objective, USAID/Croatia has targeted support to NGOs, labor unions, independent media, political parties, and legal organizations. Collectively, these sectors of Croatian society played an instrumental role in advancing democracy during the past year. Three measures of success include the establishment of Croatia's first independent TV network, legislative reform allowing domestic election monitoring, and the triumph of the opposition parties during parliamentary and presidential elections. SO2 supported strategic sectors that influenced citizens' attitudes and encouraged political participation that culminated in historic changes.

Primary Link to Strategic Agency Framework: 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society  
(please select only one)

Secondary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(select as many as you require)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.1 Private Markets                           | <input type="checkbox"/> 1.2 Agricultural Development/Food Security    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.3 Economic Opportunity for Poor             | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Rule of Law/Human Rights       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Credible Political Processes   | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society          |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.4 Accountable Gov't Institutions | <input type="checkbox"/> 3.1 Access to Education/Girl's Education      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.2 Higher Education/Sustainable Development  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.1 Unintended Pregnancies Reduced            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.2 Infant/Child Health/Nutrition             | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.3 Child Birth Mortality Reduced             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.4 HIV/AIDS                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.5 Infectious Diseases Reduced               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.1 Global Climate Change                     | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.2 Biological Diversity                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.3 Sustainable Urbanization/Pollution        | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.4 Environmentally Sound Energy              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.5 Natural Resource Management               | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.1 Impact of Crises Reduced                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6.2 Urgent Needs in Time of Crisis Met        | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.3 Security/Basic Institutions Reestablished |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.1 Responsive Assist Mechanisms Developed    | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.2 Program Effectiveness Improved            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.3 Commit Sustainable Development Assured    | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.4 Technical/Managerial Capacity Expand      |

Link to U.S. National Interests: National Security

Primary Link to MPP Goals: Regional Stability

Secondary Link to MPP Goals (optional): Democracy and Human Rights

Summary of the SO:

The goal of this strategic objective to advance democratization in Croatia through a better-informed and politically engaged citizenry. However, actual performance exceeded this goal. More accurately, citizens were empowered to change their government to better represent their interests -- a core trait of democracy. During the past five years, USAID has worked to improve the capacity of civil society organizations and political parties to inform, educate, and engage the populace. Concurrently, citizens have become increasingly disenchanted with their political leadership, due in large part to economic hardship and anger at what many viewed as the government's gross mismanagement of the economy for the benefit of a few, politically well-connected elites.

The ultimate participants and customers of this objective are the people of Croatia. Reflecting the previous government's resistance to democratic reform, the strategic objective focuses on increasing informed citizen participation in political processes by strengthening civil society, supporting independent media, improving the responsiveness of political parties to their constituents, and providing targeted assistance to strengthen and enhance rule of law.

This objective supports the Agency strategic objective of strengthening democracy and good governance. USAID/Croatia's democracy objective promotes several Mission Performance Plan goals, including increasing domestic and regional stability and preparing Croatia for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Democratization enhances internal political stability, enabling Croatia to serve as a model for democratic reform in other countries of the former Yugoslavia, and eases accession to the human rights and civil liberties standards of Western Europe.

Key Results:

The key intermediate results under this Strategic Objective are: increased capacity of civil society organizations, more representative composition of national and local governments, and more diverse and independent sources of public information.

Performance and Prospects:

Progress toward this objective exceeded expectations. The political changes that took place in early 2000 are reflective of the enhanced effectiveness of the NGO sector. In the early months of 2000, the Croatian people resoundingly rejected the nine-year authoritarian rule of the HDZ. Independent media, civil society organizations, and political parties were able to improve outreach to the public, provide alternative sources of information, and effectively engage the citizenry in the electoral process despite continuing state control of major media outlets. Elections in January resulted in a parliament in which two-thirds of the new representatives were formerly opposition. The six-party opposition bloc that now controls parliament has distanced itself from nationalist policies, and promised to promote freer media, economic reforms, and respect for human rights. In February 2000, Croatians elected as president, Stipe Mesic, the candidate of a four-party opposition coalition. A long-standing moderate, Mesic has committed to preparing Croatia to enter the European Union and become a member of NATO. During his campaign, he promised to root out corruption and reform the judicial system. These dramatic

political changes affirm the efficacy of USAID's democratization efforts. Perhaps more important than the change of personalities in the government is the extent to which the Croatian people so completely rejected the rule of the HDZ.

Since 1994, USAID has identified and supported strategic sectors of Croatian society and politics that would catalyze reform. These included media, civil society, political parties, labor unions, and the legal/judicial sector. Collectively, these efforts catalyzed and anchored democratic changes in Croatia. At the inauguration of the new Croatian government, the U.S. Secretary of State directly credited USG activities with political parties and NGOs as instrumental to the changes in the Croatian government. Secretary Albright awarded the Superior Honor Award to the entire Mission for its democratization programs!

Despite superior performance, the process of democratization in Croatia is far from complete. The legacy of autocratic socialism will take greater time to eradicate, and continued democracy assistance over the next few years will be crucial to consolidating democratic gains and facilitating a full transition to democracy. The new government faces the formidable challenges of delivering on the promises made during the campaign and creating genuine reform. USAID will continue promoting advocacy by civil society organizations and greater involvement of citizens in political processes. Institutionalization of democratic practices will also require changes in the legal frameworks for media, civil society, and electoral processes. In addition, USAID will sustain its focus on strengthening the ability of independent media to challenge state media dominance and on enabling political parties to form effective coalitions (now in the legislative arena) and become more responsive to constituents. It is also anticipated that the new government will provide opportunities for USAID to accelerate reform in local governance and rule of law.

#### IR 2.1.1: Increased Capacity of Civil Society Organizations

The impact of USAID's work in building the capacity of civil society organizations (CSO) found dramatic embodiment in the dynamic, widespread citizen activism witnessed during the pre-election period. The increased capacity of CSOs – several years in the making – coincided with significant public disaffection with the former ruling party. CSOs played a pivotal role in transforming generalized disaffection into focused, effective political action.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the massive domestic monitoring effort organized by Citizens Organized to the Monitor Elections (GONG), to which USAID provided crucial technical assistance on coordination, strategic planning, outreach techniques, and “training of trainers.” GONG organized a lobbying campaign for changing the existing electoral law to allow domestic election monitoring. It then recruited, trained, and coordinated 7,000 volunteer citizens to monitor both parliamentary and presidential elections. This is a phenomenal achievement in a political culture still recovering from the disempowering effects of socialist and autocratic rule. Through its extensive network, GONG effectively engaged ordinary citizens across the country and convinced them that they could play an important role in ensuring free and fair elections. GONG used a “pyramid” scheme of recruitment – NGOs reaching out to citizens, who then reached out to other citizens, who then reached out to even more citizens – that resulted in a large monitoring “movement.”

A parallel effort was GLAS '99 ("glas" means both "vote" and "voice" in Croatian), a massive Get-Out-the-Vote campaign organized by a coalition of 140 NGOs and trade unions, that used every available form of media: print, TV, radio, posters, brochures, and, more unusually, face-to-face citizen "street" outreach. GLAS created an effective, provocative media campaign and was also an instrument for bringing together a huge number of activists. It was the first time that so many civil society organizations from different sectors – labor, human rights, environment, women's groups, youth groups, and social services – pooled resources (both political and material) for collective action. USAID assisted GLAS with technical assistance in analyzing the voting environment, coordination, strategy, training, and advice on creating an effective media campaign. Through the Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID provided direct assistance to purchase "air time" on TV, radio, and print media, as well as produce posters and brochures for face-to-face outreach.

As clearly evidenced in the work of GONG and GLAS, NGOs made significant progress in forging relationships with media that helped them improve their public image and draw attention to specific issues. In the run-up to elections, NGOs were instrumental to increasing public focus on political participation and keeping in the public dialogue important issues ranging from the role of women in Croatian society, environmental concerns, human rights, democratization, business and economic development, and ethnic reconciliation. Throughout the year, USAID-funded conferences, seminars, and brochures helped civil society organizations reach out to and engage citizens in political processes.

Extensive USAID-sponsored training to build organizational capacity and facilitate coalition-building directly contributed to a more empowered civil society sector. USAID expanded the local capacity for delivering technical assistance throughout the country through a six-month "training of trainers" program that created a cadre of skilled trainers and through two new USAID-sponsored NGO support centers. The Mission also provided direct technical assistance to NGOs, including assessments of key laws impacting the NGO sector. The Handbook of NGOs, a Croatian-language publication that provides guidance on strategic planning, advocacy, NGO management, fundraising, and budgeting was distributed to some 500 NGOs. Ten local governments partnered with ten NGOs, and received USAID funding for highly effective citizen service programs. The national Government Office for NGOs has paid graduates of USAID-sponsored training to give workshops on developing NGO-local government partnerships.

Labor unions, whose membership comprise two-thirds of the formal workforce, have been another important source of civic advocacy. USAID support for Croatian unions has successfully strengthened union management, efficiency, and financial sustainability. The Mission has provided technical assistance focused on improving capacity in collective bargaining, media communication, strategic planning, developing legislative agendas, monitoring labor practices, and membership recruitment. As a consequence, unions are more effective and visible, forming coalitions around economic, social, and political issues important to their members. The Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia (UATUC), the largest union confederation, published and disseminated to their members a "Black List," which detailed the HDZ's "anti-labor" policies and decisions. Unions were the largest component group in GLAS '99, the highly effective "Get-Out-the-Vote" campaign. GLAS '99 was the first time that unions had ever joined with a broad NGO coalition. Though labor unions in Croatia have

historically distanced themselves from political parties, the UATUC jointly signed with the Social Democratic party and the Social-Liberal party an "Agreement for a More Just Croatia," which set forth specific economic and social goals.

USAID will build on its successes in the civil society sector, focusing on further strengthening organizational capacity, improving financial management, and enhancing sustainability through diversified funding sources. The Mission will also work to improve the enabling environment for NGOs, in particular the legal framework that governs it and the broader support infrastructure for NGOs. For the civil society sector to reach its full potential as an agent of change, a number of impediments must be addressed. The existing Law on Associations makes it possible for the government to intervene arbitrarily in NGO operations: property can be seized, registrations can be revoked or denied, and special permission is required to engage in educational activities. Revisions in the tax code, to permit deduction of charitable donations and allow NGOs to engage in some for-profit activities, would help them diversify funding sources and enhance sustainability.

IR 2.1.2: Composition of national and local governments more accurately reflects voters' interests and preferences

The margin by which opposition parties won national parliamentary and presidential elections are strong evidence that progress towards this IR has been achieved at the national level. Performance during this reporting period, however, builds substantially on the Mission's work over the past several years to secure a more genuine multi-party system in Croatia. Throughout the calendar year, USAID continued providing training and technical assistance to the political leaders and activists at the national and local levels. Through NDI, USAID worked with seven major parties to professionalize operations, improve party infrastructures, strengthen strategic planning, develop platforms, and expand political bases through public outreach. IRI helped opposition parties compete more effectively in the national elections by identifying voter concerns through extensive national polling, improving message and platform development, and strengthening the opposition party coalitions. USAID support encouraged increased political activity by local party branches through volunteer recruitment and training; door-to-door, direct mail and telephone canvassing; database development and management; and fundraising. NDI provided critical support to the Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections (GONG) that helped guarantee the fairness of elections.

The impact of this thorough training was particularly evident in the performance of political parties during the recent round of elections. They implemented strategies that were more effective in reaching the populace. Political parties expended greater effort on direct voter contact, presented more balanced candidates' lists in terms of regional and gender representation, were more effective in representing local community concerns, and developed stronger, more persuasive party platforms. USAID-sponsored political polling helped political parties identify issues of greatest interest to voters, especially the crucial swing voters, enabling opposition parties to match their priorities with that of the electorate. As part of the polling, voters were asked which hypothetical coalitions they would consider voting for in elections. This information helped the opposition parties form political alliances that optimized public support.

Efforts to strengthen the legal framework for free and fair elections will continue over the next year. The election law passed in late October contains provisions widely viewed as obstacles to more competitive and representative multi-party. As an example, it maintains voting privileges for the Croatian diaspora in Bosnia-Herzegovina. USAID has been working with reformist party leaders to effect changes in the law. Future political training activities will shift focus to legislative processes, i.e., training on the role of the party caucus in the legislature, coalition maintenance, and the role of members of parliament (with particular reference to new parliamentarians), constituent relations, strengthening of the women's caucus, youth outreach and civil-military relations.

At the local government level, much remains to be done. The 1993 Law on Local Self Government, which regulates all forms of local governance in Croatia, allows for the direct participation of citizens in local government through their right to propose legislation and call referendums. In practice, there is no genuine devolution of power, whereby municipalities derive power from and are directly accountable to their constituents. Municipalities are heavily dependent on central government transfers which comprise 90% of municipal funds and which are allocated on an ad hoc, non-transparent basis. As a result, municipalities simply implement central government policies. USAID/Croatia has tendered an RFA for a new Local Government Project that will address key barriers to democratic local governance and strengthen citizen participation in local government.

#### I.R. 2.1.3: More diverse and independent sources of public information

USAID initiatives achieved major strides in the development of independent media. Its strategy of association development, business management training, journalism training, and targeted training to leading broadcast and print media outlets, has been successful in diversifying and professionalizing news reporting. The Croatian Journalist Association, practically moribund in 1994, has taken the lead in organizing training programs throughout Croatia, was a key player in developing the new radio and television networks, and has provided a home base for numerous non-governmental associations, media groups, and others connected with the media sector. USAID funded daily monitoring of HRT's (government TV) news coverage. Weekly reports were generated and used by the U.S. Embassy to point out bias to GOC officials during regular meetings. The reports were also shared with the EU, which applied steady pressure for media liberalization.

USAID support helped establish a new television network, the Association of Independent Television (AIT), which has eight member stations and a footprint that covers 75% of Croatia. USAID sponsored an analysis of the law governing telecommunications, identifying problematic areas. Based on this analysis, AIT successfully lobbied for a new Telecommunications Law, which was passed in June 1999. The law was a major victory, enabling independent stations to transmit for the first time on a nation-wide network. Though independents are still prohibited from broadcasting through traditional relay towers, it is now legal for them to broadcast on a brand new fiber optic network, the first of its kind in the region. Previously, independent TV stations literally had to drive or "bicycle" news from one city to another. Through the fiber optic network, independents can now share content almost instantaneously. AIT played a key role in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections by organizing and broadcasting live debates featuring all candidates, providing a critical alternative to state-controlled media. The network

shares programming, produces a national news show, and lobbies for the interests of its member stations. A similar USAID-sponsored network for radio will be developed by Summer 2000, drawing on members of the Association of Independent Radio, a USAID partner organization.

The Mission has used media in creative ways to enhance progress in other intermediate result areas. For example, USAID created joint seminars for journalists and lawyers focused on improving the public's understanding of legal processes through better reporting. The journalists learned more about the mechanics of the law, and the lawyers learned how to communicate more effectively with media. The end result was that citizens were better informed, because journalists were able to write more clearly about and explain legal issues to their readers. A similar seminar is currently being developed for journalists and police.

In Eastern Slavonia, a war-affected region that is predominantly home to ethnic Serbs, USAID provided grants to local community groups and students, who created a wide range of Serb-language radio shows, including call-in talk shows and Serb folk music programs. The broadcasts helped people feel more secure in their communities, because it drew people together and also indicated official acceptance of their presence (necessary to obtain radio licenses). Finally, by airing USAID-funded public service announcements for GONG and GLAS '99 on USAID-sponsored independent media, the Mission was able to promote several goals at once: citizen participation through election monitoring, voter outreach, and enhanced financial viability of independent media.

Despite these impressive achievements, the next two to three years will be critical to consolidating the gains of the past few years. Independent media need further assistance to mature into commercially viable, self-sustaining outlets. The Mission is concerned that without fundamental changes in the legal framework that governs media, sitting governments will be tempted to curtail the autonomy of the media when faced with criticism. USAID must support reform-minded legislators and media professionals. Support should also include training to improve journalism ethics, continued association development, enlargement of the independent fiber optic TV network, and further strengthening of print media and radio.

#### Possible Adjustments to Plans:

In 1998, through the ABA/CEELI, USAID initiated support to the Association of Croatian Judges, the Croatian Women Lawyers' Association, and the Croatian Bar Association with the purpose of enabling these bodies to become independent voices for judicial and legal reform. ABA/CEELI provided training, technical assistance, and sub-grants to these associations. The Association of Croatian Judges has been an active player in judicial reform, playing an instrumental role in securing substantial pay raises for the entire judiciary.

It is anticipated that legal and regulatory reform will be a major focus of future USAID activities. Judicial reform and independence will be crucial to further economic and democratic development in Croatia, but the challenges in this sector are prodigious. The judicial system is hampered by a severe lack of capacity, including a dearth of qualified staff, poor training, and inadequate equipment. Low salaries and poor working conditions make a judicial career

unattractive, and corruption is pervasive. The civil litigation process in Croatia is grossly inefficient, with a backlog of cases estimated at 900,000. Aside from lack of capacity, the previous government was unabashedly hostile toward the idea of an independent judiciary. Recent changes in the composition of the Constitutional Court, and the law that governs it, have strengthened the Court's role and independence, creating a possible opening for reform.

The Mission is in the process of identifying potential targets of opportunity created by the election of a new government. In addition to rule of law, areas currently under exploration include increased focus on local government and legislative strengthening. A concept paper will be submitted to USAID/Washington in the near future, as a prelude to strategy revision.

#### Anticorruption:

USAID/Croatia realizes the window of opportunity we have with the new GOC to work with the parliament, the audit and investigative institutions attached to the parliamentary and other oversight bodies, with the NGO communities including the consumers' groups and advocacy oversight organizations particularly at the local levels in the area of anti-corruption. We will be focusing on removing the incentives for systemic corruption, realizing the importance of a well-organized civil society and equally strong political will from the new leadership. We will attempt to connect technical assistance programs to reform efforts, connecting those efforts to small business development and entrepreneurship. USAID/Croatia also fully realizes that this effort must be a multi-country regional approach. We will be full partners within the Stability Pact through several task forces focusing on these issues.

#### Other Donor Programs:

The USG plays a lead role in coordinating international democracy assistance in Croatia, frequently convening donor coordination meetings and working to develop consensus on specific issues. Through its support to key sectors of Croatian society -- NGOs, media, labor, legal organizations, and political parties -- USAID has helped to set the reform agenda. It has been able to leverage substantial support from other donors, in particular because organizations that receive technical assistance and capacity-building support from USAID often receive direct project assistance from other donors, including the European Union, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, and other bilaterals. International NGOs and foundations, such as the Open Society Institute, the Mott and Westminster Foundations, as well as the German foundations (Friederich Neumann, Friedrich Ebert, and Heinrich Bell Stiftungs) have also been active in supporting civil society, labor unions, pre-election outreach, and independent media.

#### Stability Pact

Realizing that none of the democratic challenges facing Croatia occur exclusively within its borders, USAID/Croatia is working closely with the Stability Pact, including with the Task Force on Gender, headed by the OSCE; the Task Force on Good Governance, including Anti-Corruption, headed by the Council of Europe; and the Task Force on Media, headed by Great Britain. In addition, USAID/Croatia works closely with USAID/Washington on cooperation with the democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro, enabling Croatian implementing partners to assist these neighboring countries.

Major Contractors and Grantees:

The International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), the Academy for Educational Development (AED), the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, and the American Bar Association/Central and Eastern European Legal Initiative (ABA/CEELI).

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased better informed citizen participation in political processes			
Objective ID: 160-021-01			
Approved: 05/05/1996		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: Increased better informed citizen participation in political processes			
Indicator: Freedom House combined average rating			
Unit of Measure: Scale 1 to 7 (1= Free, 7 = Not Free)	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Freedom House, The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1996-1997, 1997-1998 and Nations in Transit, 1998	1996 (B)	NA	4.0 (PF)
	1997	3.0 (PF)	4.0 (PF)
	1998	3.5 (PF)	4.0 (PF)
Indicator/Description: Laws, regulations, political pressures/controls and repressive actions.	1999	3.0 (PF)	4.0 (PF)
	2000	2.5 (Free)	NA
	2001	2.5 (Free)	NA
Comments: This indicator captures accurately the repressive policies and actions of the HDZ government over the past year, but does not capture democratic progress made in the non-governmental sphere, especially by citizens and civil society. Progress in this sphere led to a new government, creating a substantially different policy environment and a leadership that is motivated to create reform.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased better informed citizen participation in political processes			
Objective ID: 160-021-01			
Approved: 05/05/1998		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: Increased capacity of Civil Society Organizations (CSO includes NGOs and Trade Unions)			
Indicator: Overall strength/development of the NGO sector			
Unit of Measure: The Sustainability Index is a composite score based on qualitative analysis of the entire NGO sector in five areas: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy skills, public image of NGOs and overall civil liberties. Scale 1 - 7 (1 = Free, 7 = Not Free)	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996 (B)	NA	4.5
	1997	4.0	4.6
	1998	3.8	4.4
	1999	3.5	5.0
	2000	2.5	NA
	2001	2.0	NA
Source: USAID, 1997 and 1998 NGO Sustainability Index			
Indicator/Description: A score of 1 corresponds to strong progress towards sustainable NGO development. 7 is the lowest rating, corresponding to erosion or no change since the end of the former socialist era.			
Comments: The composite score may have been higher, had the Index been able to incorporate progress evident during the last few months of the year.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased better informed citizen participation in political processes			
Objective ID: 160-021-01			
Approved: 05/05/1996		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: More diverse and independent sources of public information			
Indicator: Freedom House Press Freedom rating			
Unit of Measure: Freedom House Scale of Press Freedom	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Freedom House Report	1996 (B)	NA	58 (PF)
Indicator/Description: Scores from 1-30, correspond to Free (F); from 31-60, Partly Free (PF); and from 61-75, Not Free (NF)	1997	45 (PF)	63 (NF)
	1998	57 (PF)	63 (NF)
	1999	50 (PF)	63 (NF)
	2000	45 (PF)	NA
	2001	40 (PF)	NA
<p>Comments: Aside from the Freedom House rating, we present additional data which indicates some progress. National broadcast media remained under the complete control of the ruling party, but its repressiveness has led to the creation of an increasing number of local radio and TV stations and media associations which are not under the government's control:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of independent TV stations: (1996-3; 1997-4; 1998-5; 1999-8)</li> <li>2. Number of independent radio stations: (1997-7; 1998-9; 1999-12)</li> <li>3. Number of independent print news publications: (1997-7; 1998-9; 1999-10)</li> <li>4. Number of media associations: (1996-1; 1997-1; 1998-4; 1999-4)</li> </ol> <p>In addition, the creation of a new, independent fiber optic network capable of airing its own program content poses a significant challenge to state TV monopoly.</p>			

## Text for SO c

Country/Organization: USAID Croatia

Objective ID: 160-031-01

Objective Name: Reintegration of war-affected populations

Self Assessment: On Track

Self Assessment Narrative: On balance, the program is on track and progressing well. Improved structure and approach to the Return Assistance program in 2000 and 2001 will correct current weaknesses.

Primary Link to Strategic Agency Framework: 2.4 Accountable Gov't Institutions  
(please select only one)

Secondary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(select as many as you require)

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.1 Private Markets                | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.2 Ag Development/Food Security              |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.3 Economic Opportunity for Poor  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Rule of Law/Human Rights                  |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Credible Political Processes   | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society                     |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.4 Accountable Gov't Institutions | <input type="checkbox"/> 3.1 Access to Ed/Girl's Education                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.2 Higher Ed/Sustainable Development         | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.1 Unintended Pregnancies Reduced                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.2 Infant/Child Health/Nutrition             | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.3 Child Birth Mortality Reduced                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.4 HIV/AIDS                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.5 Infectious Diseases Reduced                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.1 Global Climate Change                     | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.2 Biological Diversity                                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.3 Sustainable Urbanization/Pollution        | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.4 Environmentally Sound Energy                         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.5 Natural Resource Management               | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.1 Impact of Crises Reduced                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6.2 Urgent Needs in Time of Crisis Met        | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6.3 Security/Basic Institutions Reestablished |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.1 Responsive Assist Mechanisms Developed    | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.2 Program Effectiveness Improved                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.3 Commit Sustainable Development Assured    | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.4 Technical/Managerial Capacity Expand                 |

Link to U.S. National Interests: National Security

Primary Link to MPP Goals: Regional Stability

Secondary Link to MPP Goals (optional): No Secondary Linkage

Summary of the SO:

The goal of this SO is to facilitate the return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees in Croatia and the region. Of the almost 1.8 million displaced persons (DPs) and refugees in the

region, more than 300,000 are either in or from Croatia and are directly affected by the Government of Croatia's policies on return and reconstruction. The specific purpose of this SO is to catalyze the return to their homes of as many as possible of the 280,000 Croatian citizen DPs and refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), and Republika Srpska (RS) and the 91,000 internally displaced people within Croatia by the end of CY 2001.

#### Key Results:

Key results needed to achieve this SO are: (1) the creation of political and physical conditions and policies at both the national and local levels conducive to the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes of origin; (2) strengthened human rights monitoring capacity and improved access to legal services for war-affected populations; and (3) growth of micro, small and medium scale enterprises (including agriculture) to provide jobs and incomes to support returning and remaining populations.

#### Performance and Prospects:

Overall performance toward achievement of this SO is meeting expectations. The results achieved through USAID/Croatia's cooperative agreement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), our Return Assistance Program (RAP) implementing partner, fell short of what was feasible. Nevertheless, the program continued to make positive progress facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin within Croatia. RAP is being significantly restructured for the 2000 – 2001 period, and the Mission is confident that results from that program will improve significantly. At the SO level, there has been reasonable performance toward catalyzing returns in general and good performance at the intermediate results level, particularly toward the establishment of a non-discriminatory framework to support multi-ethnic returns.

Official GOC figures place the total number of returnees during 1999 at about 37,000 people, although only 12,000 of those were ethnic Serb Croatians from outside the country. The others were largely ethnic Croats returning to the Danube Region. That figure for ethnic Serb returnees was less than had been expected by the international community for a combination of factors. These included less than helpful GoC attitudes, poor infrastructure and general economic conditions in return areas, and the instability brought about by the Kosovo crisis just as the return “season” was getting underway.

The newly installed government in Zagreb gives every indication that it will actively support the return of all of its war-displaced citizens, and in general pursue policies conducive to the return of all Croatians, regardless of ethnicity, to their homes of origin. In a related development, the new government is demonstrating willingness to tackle the thorny issue of economic reform. Reflecting this about-face in Zagreb's attitude towards returnees and the more favorable prospects for an improved economic outlook, the international community anticipates that the pace of returns from without Croatia will increase significantly in 2000-2001.

Returns, however, are only the first step. Croatia and the international community must work together to ensure that those returns are sustainable. That will require continued engagement of the international community, including the USG. The country team's analysis is that we need to stay fully engaged on return and reconciliation issues in Croatia for two more years (2000 and

2001) to bring to completion the process of enabling all war-affected populations to return to communities of origin in Croatia. We expect the summers of 2000 and 2001 to be the last two seasons for catalyzing large-scale returns. Over the next 12 to 24 months, the Mission will also need to focus more attention on resolving cross-border return issues among Croatia, the FRY, BiH, including the RS. The development of cross-border return axes by the international community holds promise for increasing the number of returnees between Croatia and the above three entities.

Unfortunately, a barrier we must address, concerning reintegration is the hesitancy of returnees to return to areas that have been mined during the war. USAID/Croatia works closely with the Embassy, the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), and others in the international community to support demining funded through the International Trust Fund (ITF) in Slovenia. To date, the USG, through the Embassy, has provided \$1,000,000 in matching funds to Croatia drawn from its \$28 million contribution for demining to the ITF. USAID/Croatia coordinates with CROMAC to ensure that RAP partnership municipalities and other selected areas receive demining assistance, and that the return of refugees and displaced persons to RAP municipalities is not obstructed by mine fields. USAID/Croatia also assists private sector fund raising and awareness for demining projects in Croatia, led by Ms. Lynn Montgomery, wife of US Ambassador.

USAID projects and activities under this SO provide affected populations access to information and legal services needed to navigate the labyrinthian return process. They also support development of small and medium scale private enterprises to provide incomes for returnees. They assist selected municipal governments that demonstrate reasonable and credible commitment to nondiscriminatory support for returns. These projects are important tools for encouraging returns, verifying GOC compliance with its paper commitments, and for identifying priority areas for improved performance.

During 1999 USAID funded a one-year Local Government Program (LGP) of direct technical assistance to war affected municipalities to develop their administrative capacity and improve public services, as a means of encouraging the return of refugees and DPs. Eleven war-affected municipalities benefited directly from the program. More than 30 additional municipalities benefitted through dissemination of successful models, methods, and processes produced by the program. This program is being phased out in 2000.

In 1999 Ecolinks, a regional environmental program promoting market-based solutions to environmental problems, was introduced to war-affected Croatia, especially municipalities participating in the RAP and LGP programs. During the two 1999 grant cycles, Croatian municipalities were awarded four grants, a strong showing because the grant topics were not well-suited to local conditions. For 2000, Ecolinks is adjusting to include those more relevant to Croatia's war-affected areas. We anticipate several more Ecolinks grants in 2000.

In the area of human rights monitoring and protection, USAID-funded assistance has directly supported the development of a legal services and assistance network consisting of 23 local offices representing eight NGOs. These NGO-operated community action/legal aid offices assisted 40,000 clients deal with legal matters related to return, such as status and personal

documents, repossession of property, pensions, convalidation, health insurance and reconstruction. This is a 25% increase over 1998 figures. At the end of 1999, 50% of the cases were pending, 28% of the cases were solved in favor of the client and 12% negatively. The remaining cases for both years include those where clients ceased contact or the matter was referred to an attorney for court appeals. Although direct USAID assistance to this program is being phased out in 2000, the network of NGOs it has created will be able to continue work through their own fundraising efforts, thanks to the preparation and training that they have received to date. To date, partner NGOs secured over \$500,000 in matching funds to support human rights monitoring, community development and voter awareness campaigns operated from the legal aid offices.

USAID technical support for private enterprise and agricultural development has, to date, been limited to war-affected areas and is specifically targeted to assist the greatest possible number of persons to either return to their home of origin or to remain in their homes in war-affected regions. In 1999, the Firm Level Assistance Group (FLAG) provided direct technical assistance and training support to over 620 private businesses and farmers. However, support services were provided that benefitted 11, 807 association and cooperative members. Firms receiving FLAG support, including family farms attempting to establish themselves on an economically viable basis (since most were previously secondary sources of income), reported an average 6% annual increase in employment (compared to a national annual decline of 12.9%) and a 17% increase in sales revenue. This is below the levels FLAG reported in previous years and is largely attributable to the significant deterioration of the Croatian economy (all four quarters were in recession) and the inability of most businesses to secure payment for the goods and services they delivered. FLAG also helped to establish over 285 new business linkages (significant contractual, investment, trade or market linkages) in Croatia, the region and abroad for firms in the war affected regions of Croatia.

By the end of 1999, the USAID funded NOA Credit Cooperative micro-loan project, implemented through Opportunity International, had cumulatively approved more than 1200 loans and disbursed more than 1000 loans valued at \$5.5 million to small-scale entrepreneurs and farmers. These micro-loan recipients have been able to sustain more than 1500 jobs while creating nearly 1000 new jobs.

SEAF Croatia has made equity investments in small businesses totaling \$1.8 million that have resulted in an 80% average annual increase in revenues and an aggregate increase in employment of over 100%. SEAF has also provided extensive in-house and specialized technical assistance to their investees. The average increase in employment for the companies working in the war-affected areas was 115%. Two of their investments are also suppliers of essential inputs for 78 other businesses in Eastern Slavonia.

#### Possible Adjustments to Plans:

While the actual pace of returns remained slower than anticipated in 1999, the newly elected GOC has identified return and reintegration as one of its priorities. In anticipation of additional cooperation with the GOC in this area, USAID/Croatia is expanding its SO3.1 staff by one USPSC and two FSNs. This is necessary in order to support the GOC's anticipated new policies.

To adequately assist the new GOC, USAID/Croatia requests an extension of the original time frame for achievement of this SO from 12/99 to 12/02 to allow sufficient time for large-scale returns to occur but more importantly, time for the new GOC to establish and implement new policies. While it is expected that the national government will be cooperative, municipality administrations may remain ambivalent in their commitment, even resistant, to multi-ethnic return and reconciliation. It is necessary for USAID to continue to have the ability to engage not only the national government but also the municipalities in policy dialogue well into 2001. By remaining engaged in the return process, USAID/Croatia acts as a "watchdog" to ensure that the GOC lives up to the Erdut and Dayton agreements. Even with the new GOC, a premature disengagement by USAID/Croatia could cause a reversal of progress made to date. The central government is tackling a number of major social, economic, and political reforms at once and needs the support of the United States and the international community to maintain pressure on resistant municipal governments.

Increasing economic opportunities -- both employment and enterprise -- will be crucial to support and sustain the return process. Understandably, displaced persons are reluctant to return when they have no means of supporting themselves in their communities of origin. FLAG and RAP are currently working on cross-border programs designed to attract returnees to RAP partner municipalities.

USAID Croatia will need a minimum of \$6.0 million in FY 00 funding for this SO to extend the existing activities of RAP, FLAG and NOA from their current completion dates in 1999 to December 2000. SEAF was fully funded in 1999 and therefore no funding is sought for FY2000. No further funding is sought for ADF or the Urban Institute programs.

#### Other Donor Programs:

The European Union (and its separate member states), the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the UNHCR, as well as the State's PRM program, are the key other donor partners for achieving this strategic objective. OSCE and UNHCR are working on monitoring, data collection and, in the latter's case, logistical and administrative support for returnees. The EU recently established EU-POP (a European Return Assistance Program modeled on USAID's RAP). USAID's RAP and EU-POP are working in a coordinated effort to address the needs of the return process at the municipal level. However, the USAID-supervised RAP takes the lead on policy and implementation issues by ensuring that partner municipalities live up to the letter and spirit of their agreements in regard to return and reconciliation.

#### Stability Pact

USAID/Croatia will work closely with the Stability Pact Task Force on Refugee Returns headed by UNHCR, the Task Force on Human Rights and National Minorities headed by Slovenia, and the Pact's Table on Security. Cross-cutting regional issues will need to be integrated, such as the serious problem of mines and de-mining programs, citizenship regulations and processes, trauma and reconciliation training. Within Croatia, the donors are very well integrated, however, regionally USAID needs to ensure collaboration in design and implementation.

The coordination among the former Yugoslavia countries is absolutely essential for success of this objective. Working with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, and the leadership within the churches, the Republika Srpska, the Government of BiH may ensure the critical dissemination of accurate information, and even ascertain reintegration.

Major Contractors and Grantees:

Opportunity International, University of Delaware, America's Development Foundation, Small Enterprise Assistance Funds, International Organization for Migration, Urban Institute

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Reintegration of war-affected populations			
Objective ID: 160-031-01			
Approved: 03/01/1997		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: Reintegration of war-affected populations			
Indicator: Number of displaced person and refugee returns			
Unit of Measure: Displaced persons (DPs) and refugees	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: UNHCR, GoC Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR), OSCE	1998	100,000	80,632
	1999	150,000	113,384
Indicator/Description: Numbers who have actually returned to their home of origin.	2000	100,000	
	2001	80,000	
Comments: The above figures figures for "actual" returns represent only those who have been officially assisted by UNHCR and GoC. For 1999 the unofficial actual total returns, including unassisted, or "spontaneous," returns is in fact much larger than the figure we have used.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Reintegration of war-affected populations			
Objective ID: 160-031-01			
Approved: 03/01/1997		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: I.R.3.1.1.1 Enterprise growth and expansion			
Indicator: Number of firms, including farms, assisted			
Unit of Measure: Private firms, including agricultural cooperatives, associations and farmers, in war-affected regions	Year	Planned	Actual
	1998	1,500	3,700*
	1999	4,500	12,817
	2000	5,000	-
Source: University of Delaware (FLAG), Opportunity International (OI/NOA), and the Small Enterprise Assistance Fund (SEAF-Croatia)			
Indicator/Description: Assistance provided directly in the form of credit, equity investment, technical assistance or training.			
<p>Comments: Figures are aggregates of all of the various types of assistance provided in order to indicate the breadth of assistance provided.</p> <p>* Approximately 90% are farmers or agriculture related businesses .</p>			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Reintegration of war-affected populations			
Objective ID: 160-031-01			
Approved: 03/01/1997		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: I.R.3.1.1.2 Enterprise growth and expansion			
Indicator: Employment growth in assisted firms			
Unit of Measure: Jobs created through the creation, growth or expansion of assisted firms.	Year	Planned	Actual
	1998	1,000	963
	1999	2,000	2817
	2000	3,000	-
Source: University of Delaware (FLAG), Opportunity International (OI/NOA), and the Small Enterprise Assistance Fund (SEAF-Croatia)			
Indicator/Description: Jobs created after, or as a result of, assistance provided directly in the form of credit, equity investment, technical assistance and/or training.			
Comments: Figures are aggregates of all of all of the jobs created that are due to the various types of assistance provided.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Reintegration of war-affected populations			
Objective ID: 160-031-01			
Approved: 03/01/1997		Country/Organization: USAID Croatia	
Result Name: I.R. 3.1.3 Municipalities encourage affected populations to return to and remain in communities of origin			
Indicator: Number of returns to IOM-supported municipalities			
Unit of Measure: Displaced persons (DPs) and refugees	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR, GoC ODP, OSCE	1998	14,350	8,335
	1999	20,000	10,000
Indicator/Description: Numbers who have actually returned to their homes of origin in the municipalities in the Return Assistance Program.	2000	30,000	8,000
	2001	30,000	
Comments: IOM figures have been relied upon for 1998 and 1999 as it was their responsibility as part of the Return Assistance Program (RAP) to track and verify return related data gathered for each municipality they support.			

## R4 Part III: Resource Request

### A. Program Resource Levels

Total approved SEED funding for Croatia in FY 00 is \$20.0 million (which includes \$4.9 from FY99 Supplemental CarryOver). The planning/control levels provided by the E&E Bureau for FY 2001 and FY 2002 are \$30.0 million for both years.

USAID/Croatia is requesting a \$35.725 million increase in its FY 2000 resource level to \$55.725 million including three levels of priority and concurs in the proposed \$30.0 million level for FY 2001 and FY2002. The table below summarizes the overall allocations of program resources for both the control/planning figures and the USAID/Croatia request level. As indicated in the table, additional funds requested will be used to fast-track the reactivated financial and economic restructuring activities in SOs 1.2 and 1.3, to solidify democratic change in SO 2.1 and to reinforce projects and activities under SO 3.1.

Croatia is in a unique and critical moment in its transition to a market-oriented economy and democratic governance. The rationale for additional FY00 funding is that the election of a reform-minded government has created what the Mission estimates to be a 9-12 month window of opportunity to accelerate economic and political reform. Mission's ability to respond quickly will be instrumental to jump-starting economic growth, solidifying and anchoring democratic principles and practices, and quickening the pace of displaced persons' return to their communities of origin. USAID can only move quickly and efficiently to assist the GOC if it has the necessary resources. The Mission's analysis of the political and economic situation concludes that significant program-level progress and policy-level developments can be anticipated over the next 12-24 months, providing international donors come to Croatia's aid. The voters made the correct choice, now donors need to follow. The USG should not miss this opportunity to further advance its goals, both for Croatia and the Balkans.

In the area of democratization, USAID programs can take much of the credit for the opposition's dominance in recent elections. In her recent visit to Croatia, Secretary of State Albright praised the U.S. Mission's democratization activities (largely USAID's) and its "proactive strategy to promote a democratic transition; for its effectiveness in fostering political cooperation among Croatia's diverse political parties, and for encouraging the development of civil society. " However, USAID cannot rest on its laurels until Croatia's democratic transition is closer to completion. The installation of new, democratically-oriented leaders have given a major boost to the prospects for full transition, but USAID must now assist the new GOC follow through with its mandate. USAID/Croatia needs to consolidate and anchor the progress made towards strengthening key civil society institutions as well as the foundation for a more open democratic society.

In the area of return and reintegration, progress achieved over the past year towards establishing a framework to support multi-ethnic returns in Croatia and the actual return of about 37,000 (official GOC figures) to Croatia in 1999 are strong indications that the US strategic approach to this issue is succeeding and should be sustained until the process is complete. The country team's analysis is that, providing the new GOC follows through on its promises to assist returnees and refugees, the summer of 2000 will be a major return season in Croatia. The sustained engagement of the US and the international community are needed to ensure success.

USAID support for financial sector reform and economic restructuring was curtailed throughout 1999 due to continued lack of political commitment by key GOC counterparts to implement genuine economic reform. The decision to continue suspension of this Strategic Objective was based on USAID's assessment that further capacity building within key financial regulatory bodies would be of no avail until authorities demonstrated a willingness to utilize that capacity. Consequently, there are no results to show for this reporting period. However, due to the major change in the political environment, USAID/Croatia has re-instituted the program, changing its focus and creating two Strategic Objectives, instead of one.

The Program Office requests a USPSC to focus on public relations, cable reporting and website updates as well as one FSN to work with the SO Teams in monitoring and data collection.

**FY 2000-2002 Funding for USAID/Zagreb by SO at Current Planning levels**

<b>Strategic Objective</b>	<b>FY 00*</b>	<b>FY 00*</b> (Req.Supp)	<b>FY 01</b>	<b>FY 02</b>
FY 2000 Budget Support	0	15,000	0	0
SO 1.2: Increased development and fiscal policies and fiscal management practices	3,225	8,230	6,350	6,350
SO 1.3: Accelerated development and growth of private enterprises including energy and environmental activities	2,950	2,200	5,350	5,350
SO 2.1: Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political process	4,100	5,000	7,975	7,975
SO 3.1: Return and Reintegration of war-affected populations	6,000	3,800	6,050	6,050
SO 4.2: Cross-Cutting	3,725	1,495	4,275	4,275
SEED Operating Year Budget	20,000	35,725	30,000	30,000

\*Includes new Supplemental Carryover (\$4.9 million) to be spent in FY00.

## Accessing Global Bureau Services Through Field Support and Buy-Ins

Objective Name	Field Support and Buy-Ins: Activity Title & Number	Priority *	Duration	Estimated Funding (\$000)			
				FY 2001		FY 2002	
				Obligated by:		Obligated by:	
Operating Unit	Global Bureau	Operating Unit	Global Bureau				
SO 1.2	180-0014 SEGIR - GBTI (Booz Allen)	High	3years	750,000		planning	
SO 1.2	180-0014 SEGIR - GBTI (Barents)	High	3 years	750,000			
**Note: both of the above activities were funded originally in FY2000. The sector is still assessing needs for the longer term.							
<b>GRAND TOTAL.....</b>							

\* For Priorities use high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, low

## **Program, Workforce and OE**

(in a separate folder named Country02R2b\_data; enter data and print separately)

## FY 2000 Budget Request by Program/Country

Fiscal Year: 2000      Program/Country: CROATIA  
 Approp: SEED  
 Scenario:

S.O. # , Title		FY 2000 Request												Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY2000
	Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Agriculture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Health Promotion (**)	Environ	D/G		
SO 1.2: Increased Soundness of Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Management Practices															
	Bilateral	3,225,000		3,225,000				0						3,225,000	1,000,000
	Field Spt														
		3,225,000	0	3,225,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,225,000	1,000,000
SO 1.3: Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises, including Energy and Environmental Activities															
	Bilateral	2,950,000	500,000	2,100,000								350,000		2,950,000	800,000
	Field Spt														
		2,950,000	500,000	2,100,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	350,000	0	2,950,000	800,000
SO 2.1: Increased Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision Making															
	Bilateral	4,100,000											4,100,000	5,100,000	4,300,000
	Field Spt	0													
		4,100,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,100,000	5,100,000	4,300,000
SO 3.1: Reintegration of War-Affected Populations															
	Bilateral	6,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000									4,000,000	8,150,000	4,500,000
	Field Spt	0													
		6,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,000,000	8,150,000	4,500,000
SO 4.2: Cross-Cutting															
	Bilateral	3,725,000				1,275,000							2,450,000	3,725,000	400,000
	Field Spt	0													
		3,725,000	0	0	0	1,275,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,450,000	3,725,000	400,000
SO 6:															
	Bilateral	0													
	Field Spt	0													
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 7:															
	Bilateral	0													
	Field Spt	0													
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 8:															
	Bilateral	0													
	Field Spt	0													
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Bilateral		20,000,000	1,500,000	6,325,000	0	1,275,000	0	0	0	0	0	350,000	10,550,000	23,150,000	11,000,000
Total Field Support		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>		<b>20,000,000</b>	<b>1,500,000</b>	<b>6,325,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,275,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>350,000</b>	<b>10,550,000</b>	<b>23,150,000</b>	<b>11,000,000</b>

FY 2000 Request Agency Goal Totals	
Econ Growth	7,825,000
Democracy	10,550,000
HCD	1,275,000
PHN	0
Environment	350,000
Program ICASS	0
GCC (from all Goals)	0

FY 2000 Account Distribution (DA only)	
Dev. Assist Program	20,000,000
Dev. Assist ICASS	
Dev. Assist Total:	20,000,000
CSD Program	0
CSD ICASS	
CSD Total:	0

Prepare one set of tables for each Fiscal Year (FY2000, FY2001, FY2002)

Prepare one set of tables for each appropriation Account  
 Tables for DA and CSD may be combined on one table.

For the DA/CSD Table, columns marked with (\*) will be funded from the CSD Account. (\*\*) Health Promotion is normally funded from the CSD Account, although amounts for Victims of War/Victims of Torture are funded from the DA/DFA Account

## FY 2001 Budget Request by Program/Country

Fiscal Year: 2001      Program/Country: CROATIA  
 Approp: SEED  
 Scenario:

S.O. # , Title		FY 2001 Request												Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY2001		
	Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Agri-culture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Health Promotion (**)	Environ	D/G				
SO 1.2: Increased Soundness of Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Management Practices																	
	Bilateral	6,350,000		6,350,000				0							6,350,000	1,500,000	
	Field Spt															0	
		6,350,000	0	6,350,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,350,000	1,500,000	
SO 1.3: Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises, including Energy and Environmental Activities																	
	Bilateral	5,350,000	1,000,000	3,850,000								500,000			5,350,000	1,500,000	
	Field Spt															0	
		5,350,000	1,000,000	3,850,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500,000	0	0	5,350,000	1,500,000	
SO 2.1: Increased Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision Making																	
	Bilateral	7,975,000												7,975,000	6,800,000	4,000,000	
	Field Spt															0	
		7,975,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,975,000	6,800,000	4,000,000	
SO 3.1: Reintegration of War-Affected Populations																	
	Bilateral	6,050,000	1,500,000	2,850,000										1,700,000	5,000,000	2,500,000	
	Field Spt															0	
		6,050,000	1,500,000	2,850,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,700,000	5,000,000	2,500,000	
SO 4.2: Cross-Cutting																	
	Bilateral	4,275,000													2,775,000	4,275,000	500,000
	Field Spt															0	
		4,275,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,775,000	4,275,000	500,000	
SO 6:																	
	Bilateral	0														0	0
	Field Spt															0	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
SO 7:																	
	Bilateral	0														0	0
	Field Spt															0	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
SO 8:																	
	Bilateral	0														0	0
	Field Spt															0	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total Bilateral		30,000,000	2,500,000	13,050,000	0	1,500,000	0	0	0	0	0	500,000	12,450,000	27,775,000	10,000,000		
Total Field Support		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>		<b>30,000,000</b>	<b>2,500,000</b>	<b>13,050,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>500,000</b>	<b>12,450,000</b>	<b>27,775,000</b>	<b>10,000,000</b>		

FY 2001 Request Agency Goal Totals	
Econ Growth	15,550,000
Democracy	12,450,000
HCD	1,500,000
PHN	0
Environment	500,000
Program ICASS	0
GCC (from all Goals)	0

FY 2001 Account Distribution (DA only)	
Dev. Assist Program	30,000,000
Dev. Assist ICASS	
Dev. Assist Total:	30,000,000
CSD Program	0
CSD ICASS	
CSD Total:	0

Prepare one set of tables for each Fiscal Year (FY2000, FY2001, FY2002)  
 Prepare one set of tables for each appropriation Account  
 Tables for DA and CSD may be combined on one table.  
 For the DA/CSD Table, columns marked with (\*) will be funded from the CSD Account. (\*\*) Health Promotion is normally funded from the CSD Account, although amounts for Victims of War/Victims of Torture are funded from the DA/DFA Account

## FY 2002 Budget Request by Program/Country

Fiscal Year: 2002      Program/Country: CROATIA  
 Approp: SEED  
 Scenario:

S.O. # , Title		FY 2002 Request												Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY2002	
		Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Agriculture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Health Promotion (**)	Environ			D/G
SO 1.2: Increased Soundness of Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Management Practices																
	Bilateral	6,350,000			6,350,000				0						6,350,000	2,000,000
	Field Spt															0
		6,350,000	0	6,350,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,350,000	2,000,000	
SO 1.3: Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises, including Energy and Environmental Activities																
	Bilateral	5,350,000	1,000,000	3,850,000								500,000		5,350,000	1,750,000	
	Field Spt															
		5,350,000	1,000,000	3,850,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500,000	0	5,350,000	1,750,000	
SO 2.1: Increased Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision Making																
	Bilateral	7,975,000											7,975,000	8,500,000	3,500,000	
	Field Spt	0														
		7,975,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,975,000	8,500,000	3,500,000	
SO 3.1: Reintegration of War-Affected Populations																
	Bilateral	6,050,000	1,500,000	2,850,000									1,700,000	7,000,000	3,000,000	
	Field Spt	0														
		6,050,000	1,500,000	2,850,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,700,000	7,000,000	3,000,000	
SO 4.2: Cross-Cutting																
	Bilateral	4,275,000											2,775,000	4,275,000	500,000	
	Field Spt	0														
		4,275,000	0	0	0	1,500,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,775,000	4,275,000	500,000	
SO 6:																
	Bilateral	0														
	Field Spt	0														
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 7:																
	Bilateral	0														
	Field Spt	0														
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 8:																
	Bilateral	0														
	Field Spt	0														
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Bilateral		30,000,000	2,500,000	13,050,000	0	1,500,000	0	0	0	0	0	500,000	12,450,000	31,475,000	10,750,000	
Total Field Support		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>		<b>30,000,000</b>	<b>2,500,000</b>	<b>13,050,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>500,000</b>	<b>12,450,000</b>	<b>31,475,000</b>	<b>10,750,000</b>	

FY 2002 Request Agency Goal Totals	
Econ Growth	15,550,000
Democracy	12,450,000
HCD	1,500,000
PHN	0
Environment	500,000
Program ICASS	0
GCC (from all Goals)	0

FY 2002 Account Distribution (DA only)	
Dev. Assist Program	30,000,000
Dev. Assist ICASS	0
Dev. Assist Total:	30,000,000
CSD Program	0
CSD ICASS	0
CSD Total:	0

Prepare one set of tables for each Fiscal Year (FY2000, FY2001, FY2002)  
 Prepare one set of tables for each appropriation Account  
 Tables for DA and CSD may be combined on one table.  
 For the DA/CSD Table, columns marked with (\*) will be funded from the CSD Account. (\*\*) Health Promotion is normally funded from the CSD Account, although amounts for Victims of War/Victims of Torture are funded from the DA/DFR Account

Workforce Tables

Org_ USAID/CROATIA									Total	Org.	Fin.	Admin.	Con-	All	Total	Total	
End of year On-Board		SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2	SO/SpO	Mgmt.	Mgmt.	Mgmt.	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff
FY 2000 Estimate																	
<b>OE Funded: 1/</b>																	
U.S. Direct Hire			1						1	2						2	3
Other U.S. Citizens									0			1				1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire									0							0	0
Other FSN/TCN									0	2	2	4				8	8
Subtotal		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	5	0	0	0	11	12
<b>Program Funded 1/</b>																	
U.S. Citizens			2	1	2				5	1						1	6
FSNs/TCNs			4	2	4				10	1						1	11
Subtotal		6	3	6	0	0	0	0	15	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	17
Total Direct Workforce		6	4	6	0	0	0	0	16	6	2	5	0	0	0	13	29
TAACS									0							0	0
Fellows									0							0	0
IDIs									0							0	0
Subtotal		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL WORKFORCE</b>		6	4	6	0	0	0	0	16	6	2	5	0	0	0	13	29

1/ Excludes TAACS, Fellows, and IDIs

Workforce Tables

Org_ USAID/CROATIA									Total	Org.	Fin.	Admin.	Con-	All	Total	Total	
End of year On-Board		SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2	SO/SpO	Mgmt.	Mgmt	Mgmt	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff
FY 2001 Target																	
<b>OE Funded: 1/</b>																	
U.S. Direct Hire			1						1	2						2	3
Other U.S. Citizens									0			1				1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire									0							0	0
Other FSN/TCN									0	2	2	5				9	9
Subtotal		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	6	0	0	0	12	13
<b>Program Funded 1/</b>																	
U.S. Citizens		1	1	2					4	1						1	5
FSNs/TCNs		2	2	4					8	1						1	9
Subtotal		3	3	6	0	0	0	0	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	14
Total Direct Workforce		3	4	6	0	0	0	0	13	6	2	6	0	0	0	14	27
TAACS									0							0	0
Fellows									0							0	0
IDIs									0							0	0
Subtotal		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL WORKFORCE</b>		3	4	6	0	0	0	0	13	6	2	6	0	0	0	14	27

1/ Excludes TAACS, Fellows, and IDIs

Workforce Tables

Org_ USAID/CROATIA								Total SO/SpO Staff	Org. Mgmt.	Fin. Mgmt	Admin. Mgmt	Con- tract	Legal	All Other	Total Mgmt.	Total Staff
End of year On-Board	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2									
FY 2002 Target	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2									
<b>OE Funded: 1/</b>																
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	2						2	3
Other U.S. Citizens								0			1				1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire								0							0	0
Other FSN/TCN								0	2	2	5				9	9
Subtotal	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	6	0	0	0	12	13
<b>Program Funded 1/</b>																
U.S. Citizens		1	1	2				4	1						1	5
FSNs/TCNs		2	2	4				8	1						1	9
Subtotal		3	3	6	0	0	0	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	14
Total Direct Workforce		3	4	6	0	0	0	13	6	2	6	0	0	0	14	27
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0
IDIs								0							0	0
Subtotal		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL WORKFORCE</b>		3	4	6	0	0	0	13	6	2	6	0	0	0	14	27

1/ Excludes TAACS, Fellows, and IDIs

USDH Staffing Requirements by Backstop, FY 2000 - FY 2003

Mission: CROATIA

Functional Backstop (BS)	Number of USDH Employees in Backstop in:			
	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
Senior Management				
<b>SMG - 01</b>	1	1	1	1
Program Management				
<b>Program Mgt - 02</b>	1	1	1	1
<b>Proj Dvpm Officer-94</b>	1	1	1	1
Support Management				
<b>EXO - 03</b>				
<b>Controller - 04</b>				
<b>Legal - 85</b>				
<b>Commodity Mgt. - 92</b>				
<b>Contract Mgt. - 93</b>				
<b>Secretary - 05 &amp; 07</b>				
Sector Management				
<b>Agriculture - 10 &amp; 14</b>				
<b>Economics - 11</b>				
<b>Democracy - 12</b>				
<b>Food for Peace - 15</b>				
<b>Private Enterprise - 21</b>				
<b>Engineering - 25</b>				
<b>Environment - 40 &amp; 75</b>				
<b>Health/Pop. - 50</b>				
<b>Education - 60</b>				
<b>General Dvpm. - 12*</b>				
<b>RUDO, UE-funded - 40</b>				
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

\*GDO - 12: for the rare case where an officer manages activities in several technical areas, none of which predominate, e.g., the officer manages Democracy, Health, and Environment activities that are about equal. An officer who manages primarily Health activities with some Democracy and Environment activities would be a Health Officer, BS 50.

remaining **IDIs**: list under the Functional Backstop for the work they do.

Please e-mail this worksheet in Excel to: Maribeth.Zankowski@HR.PPIM@aidw as well as include it with your R4 submission.

OPERATING EXPENSES

Org. Title: Croatia _____ Org. No: _____ OC		Overseas Mission Budgets								
		FY 2000 Estimate			FY 2001 Target			FY 2002 Target		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0		0	
	Subtotal OC 11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0		0	
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH			0			0		0	
11.5	FNDH			0			0		0	
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries	65		65	130		130	132	132	
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	199		199	315		315	320	320	
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0		0	
	Subtotal OC 11.8	264	0	264	445	0	445	452	452	
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances	38		38	50		50	50	50	
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	12		12	14		14	14	14	
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances	5		5			0		0	
12.1	Quarters Allowances			0			0		0	
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits			0			0		0	
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	** Payments to FSN Voluntary Separation Fund - FNDH			0			0		0	
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits			0			0		0	
12.1	US PSC Benefits	3		3	5		5	5	5	
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	** Payments to the FSN Voluntary Separation Fund - FN PSC			0			0		0	
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits			0			0		0	
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0		0	
	Subtotal OC 12.1	58	0	58	69	0	69	69	69	

OPERATING EXPENSES

Org. Title: Croatia Org. No: OC		Overseas Mission Budgets								
		FY 2000 Estimate			FY 2001 Target			FY 2002 Target		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
13.0	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	Severance Payments for FNDH			0			0			0
13.0	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0			0			0
13.0	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0			0			0
13.0	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21.0	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Training Travel	15		15	12		12	10		10
21.0	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Post Assignment Travel - to field	8		8	4		4			0
21.0	Assignment to Washington Travel	8		8	0		0	3		3
21.0	Home Leave Travel			0	5		5	5		5
21.0	R & R Travel	5		5	3		3	3		3
21.0	Education Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Evacuation Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Retirement Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel	20		20	20		20	15		15
21.0	Site Visits - Mission Personnel	12		12	20		20	18		18
21.0	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	14		14	15		15	14		14
21.0	Assessment Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Impact Evaluation Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)			0			0			0
21.0	Recruitment Travel			0			0			0
21.0	Other Operational Travel	8		8	10		10	14		14
	Subtotal OC 21.0	90	0	90	89	0	89	82	0	82
22.0	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
22.0	Post assignment freight	150		150	30		30	30		30
22.0	Home Leave Freight			0	5		5	5		5
22.0	Retirement Freight			0			0			0
22.0	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.	2		2	3		3	5		5

OPERATING EXPENSES

Org. Title: Croatia _____ Org. No: _____ OC		Overseas Mission Budgets								
		FY 2000 Estimate			FY 2001 Target			FY 2002 Target		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
22.0	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.	2		2	2		2		2	
	Subtotal OC 22.0	154	0	154	40	0	40	42	0	42
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space	70		70	72		72	72		72
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Warehouse Space	25		25	25		25	25		25
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences	162		162	202		202	202		202
	Subtotal OC 23.2	257	0	257	299	0	299	299	0	299
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.3	Office Utilities	13		13	15		15	15		15
23.3	Residential Utilities	19		19	19		19	20		20
23.3	Telephone Costs	40		40	42		42	42		42
23.3	ADP Software Leases			0			0			0
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease			0			0			0
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing			0			0			0
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)	1		1	1		1	1		1
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs	1		1	1		1	1		1
23.3	Courier Services	4		4	4		4	4		4
	Subtotal OC 23.3	78	0	78	82	0	82	83	0	83
24.0	Printing and Reproduction			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 24.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations			0			0			0
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services			0			0			0
25.1	Engineering & Technical Services			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.2	Office Security Guards			0			0			0
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services			0			0			0
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0			0			0
25.2	Representation Allowances	2		2	2		2	2		2
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0			0			0

OPERATING EXPENSES

Org. Title: Croatia _____ Org. No: _____ OC		Overseas Mission Budgets								
		FY 2000 Estimate			FY 2001 Target			FY 2002 Target		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0			0			0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees	3		3	3		3		3	3
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0			0			0
25.2	Manpower Contracts			0			0			0
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0			0			0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0			0			0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0			0			0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services	20		20	20		20		20	20
25.2	Staff training contracts			0			0			0
25.2	ADP related contracts			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	25	0	25	25	0	25	25	0	25
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government accounts	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.3	ICASS	145		145	145		145	145		145
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	145	0	145	145	0	145	145	0	145
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.4	Office building Maintenance	3		3	4		4	4		4
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance	4		4	4		4	4		4
	Subtotal OC 25.4	7	0	7	8	0	8	8	0	8
25.6	Medical Care			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs			0			0			0
25.7	Storage Services			0			0			0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	3		3	4		4	5		5
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance	5		5	6		6	7		7
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	5		5	5		5	5		5
	Subtotal OC 25.7	13	0	13	15	0	15	17	0	17
25.8	Subsistence & spt. of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING EXPENSES

Org. Title: Croatia _____ Org. No: _____ OC	Overseas Mission Budgets									
	FY 2000 Estimate			FY 2001 Target			FY 2002 Target			
	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	
26.0	Supplies and materials	8		8	8		8		8	
	Subtotal OC 26.0	8	0	8	8	0	8	8	0	8
31.0	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
31.0	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.	28		28	10		10	10		10
31.0	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.	13		13	10		10	10		10
31.0	Purchase of Vehicles			0	40		40	35		35
31.0	Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment	5		5	0		0	0		0
31.0	ADP Hardware purchases	10		10	10		10	10		10
31.0	ADP Software purchases	5		5	5		5	5		5
	Subtotal OC 31.0	61	0	61	75	0	75	70	0	70
32.0	Lands and structures	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32.0	Purchase of Land & Buildings (& bldg. construction)			0			0			0
32.0	Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings			0			0			0
32.0	Building Renovations/Alterations - Office	10		10			0			0
32.0	Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 32.0	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
42.0	Claims and indemnities			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 42.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL BUDGET		1170	0	1170	1300	0	1300	1300	0	1300

**Additional Mandatory Information**

**Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases** \_\_\_\_\_

**Exchange Rate Used in Computations** \_\_\_\_\_

\*\* If data is shown on either of these lines, you MUST submit the form showing deposits to and withdrawals from the FSN Voluntary Separation Fund.  
On that form, OE funded deposits must equal: 0 0 0

# Supplemental Information Annexes

## *Environmental Impact*

Information Annex Topic: Environmental Impact

### **1. New or amended Initial Environmental Assessments (IEE) or Environmental Assessment (ea) Documents for new projects and activities.**

USAID/Croatia anticipates no new or amended initial environmental assessments (iee) or environmental assessment (ea) documents needed in the coming year for new projects or new activities. However, IIEs will be reviewed by the Bureau Environmental Officer and the Mission Environmental Officer during the BEO's visit in March 2000.

### **2. Compliance of existing activities USAID and**

All USAID/Croatia Strategic Objectives and related activities are in compliance with previously approved IEE, or EAs with the possible exception of the Return Assistance Project (project number 180-0034) under SO 3.1 Reintegration of war-affected populations. USAID/Croatia SO 3.1 Team plans to re-engage with the E&E Bureau environmental officer to ensure that this program is in full compliance with agency environmental impact regulations.

## **Updated Framework Annex**

Information Annex Topic: Updated Results Framework

USAID/Croatia

### **Results Frameworks for Strategic Objectives (SOs) and Intermediate Results (IRS)**

USAID/Croatia is requesting Washington approval to delete SO 1.4 and to replace it with two SOs, SO1.2 Increased soundness of fiscal policies and fiscal management practices and SO 1.3 Accelerated development and growth of private enterprises, including energy and environment. Immediate Results for these two new SOs have not been completed because the economic sector teams are still assessing the needs. A new USAID/Croatia strategy to be written in the fall 2000 will have a complete framework for both SO 1.2 and SO 1.3. The Results Framework for 1999 is listed below:

#### **I. SO 1.4 More competitive, market responsive private financial sector (SUSPENDED in 1998 & Discontinued in 1999)**

IR 1.4.1: Viable, transparent financial sector institutions developed.

IR 1.4.1.1 Legal Framework improved.

IR 1.4.1.2 Largest banks rehabilitated.

IR 1.4.1.3 Bank supervision functioning.

IR 1.4.2 Capital markets expanded.

IR 1.4.2.1 Legal/Regulatory frame work for capital markets developed and improved.

IR 1.4.2.2 Institutional capacity strengthened.

#### **II. SO2.1:Increased, better informed citizen participation in political processes.**

IR 2.1.1: Increased capacity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

IR 2.1.1.1 Improved advocacy by CSOs.

IR 2.1.1.2 Improved public perception of CSOs.

IR 2.1.1.3 Improved legal environment for CSOs.

IR 2.1.1.4 Improved financial management & diverse funding sources of CSOs.

IR 2.1.1.5 Improved organizational capacity of CSOs.

IR 2.1.2: Composition of national and local governments more accurately reflect voters? interests and preferences.

IR 2.1.2.1: Coalition building and cooperation among political parties increases.

IR 2.1.2.2: Political party platforms increasingly reflect public interests.

IR 2.1.2.3: Legal/regulatory framework encourages free and fair elections.

IR 2.1.3: More diverse and independent sources of public information.

IR 2.1.3.1 Sustainable independent media increases.

- IR 2.1.3.2 Improved access of media to the public and the public to independent media.
- IR 2.1.3.3 Increased professionalism within media.

### **III. SO 3.1: Reintegration of War Affected Populations**

IR 3.1.1: Affected populations become economically productive members of society.

- IR 3.1.1.1 Private enterprise growth and expansion.
- IR 3.1.1.2 Reintegration of regional economies.
- IR 3.1.1.3 Cooperatives and business associations developed.
- IR 3.1.1.4 Legal/regulatory and policy constraints to private economic development. identified and solutions proposed by cooperatives and associations.

IR 3.1.2: Civil and Human Rights Protected.

- IR 3.1.2.1 Human rights monitoring capacity strengthened.
- IR 3.1.2.1 Legal Service available to war-affected populations.

IR 3.1.3: Municipalities encourage returns.

- IR 3.1.3.1 Conditions conducive to return established at local level.
  - IR 3.1.3.2 Regional coordination encourages 3-way returns.
-

## **Success Stories**

### **Information annex topic: Success stories**

1. **The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 2000:** Democracy was successful. A Superior Honor Award presented to the entire US Mission by Secretary Albright in February states that, “For sustained, outstanding performance in helping to foster democratization in Croatia. The American Embassy in Zagreb is recognized for developing a proactive strategy to promote a democratic transition; for its effectiveness in fostering political cooperation among Croatia’s diverse democratic political parties; and for encouraging the development of civil society by active engagement with non-governmental organizations in Croatia.”
2. **SO 2.1-Media:** USAID in cooperation with its implementer, IREX, has successfully created a fiber optic network of independent television stations capable of reaching approximately 75% of the Croatian population. This network takes advantage of changes in the Croatian Telecommunications Law that were initiated by the Croatian Association of Independent Television created as a lobby for the interests of commercial television. The network provided crucial independent information during the parliamentary and presidential elections that overthrew the ruling party of Franjo Tudjman and is the only network of its kind in Europe.
3. **SO 3.1–Reintegration/Reconciliation:** ADF supported NGOs provided legal assistance to individuals regardless of ethnicity. A few examples include Dalmation Solidarity Council (DOS) which assisted a six-member organized returnee family obtain all necessary documentation (citizenship, birth certificates and ID cards) in one day! DOS also assisted a Bosnian Croat refugee obtain health insurance for an urgent surgical procedure. Most refugees do not have health insurance for specialized care. Serbian Democratic Forum helped a client realize the right to financial, medical and reconstruction benefits guaranteed to families of slain soldiers. In this case, the client was a Serb whose son was killed in 1991 as a member of the Croatian police. The client had been trying since 1991 to realize these rights until he contacted SDF in 1999.
4. **SO 2.1-Unions:** Croatian trade unions played an important role in bringing the issues of working people to the top of the political agenda. Through a face to face effort across the country, union stewards encouraged members and their families to vote, and to let the candidates know that jobs, payment of wages, work safety, and other workplace issues would determine for whom they would vote. The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Croatia added an effective media campaign of radio, newspaper, billboard, poster, and direct mail announcements to urge union members to vote. The record turnout of union members indicates they heard the message.
5. **SO 2.1-Political Parties:** USAID through its implementers ,IRI and NDI, worked closely with the major opposition political parties to challenge the rule of the authoritarian HDZ party. This effort included work with the leadership of the six major opposition parties and their development into an opposition bloc. At the same time, political party development approached the grass roots of party building. The effort was successful as the opposition bloc was able to unseat the ruling party and control a majority of the seats

in parliament and eventually go on to take the presidency. In both the parliamentary and presidential elections, the parties performed beyond expectations for one of the most historic and monumental events in the history of Croatia and the region. It is likely that the impact of these events in Croatia will have an impact on regional democratization efforts.

6. **SO 2.1-WID:** Since 1993 USAID/Croatia has provided extensive support especially to women NGOs (through Delphi/STAR Project, WL/Transit, Democracy Commission, and AED). Consequently, women NGOs have become the strongest and most progressive of the NGOs in Croatia. Even in 1995 women activists have started the first get out the vote campaign *51% Campaign*, through which they wanted to raise public awareness about low representation of women in politics and encourage women to vote for the parties which are concerned about women's issues. Consequently, women NGOs have become very strong in organizational development, conflict resolution, ethnic reconciliation, training, and advocacy. They have been especially successful in training women from political parties on women issues, organizing various workshops on women issues, providing valuable data on women's status in Croatia and lobbying women MPs. In addition, USAID also provided significant support to women from political parties (through NDI) and labor unions (through ACILS). This support to women in NGOs, political parties and labor unions resulted in strong coalition and partnership among women from different sectors. This is clearly illustrated with the results of the last January 2000 Parliamentary elections where women won more than 20% of seats in the Parliament. Before the elections, their representation was only 7.8%. Examples of women trained through USAID programs are the new Deputy Prime Minister, Zeljka Antunovic (US training "Women in Politics"), and 16 MPs (Dijana Cizmadzija, Sanja Kapetanovic, Sonja Borovcak, Dubravka Horvat, Dorica Nikolic, Milanka Opacic, Zrinjka Glovacki-Bernardi, Ingrid Anticevic, Ljubica Lalic, Vesna Podlipec, Mirjana Didovic, Djurdja Adlesic, Vesna Pusic, Mirjana Feric-Vac, Gordana Sobol, Snjezana Biga-Friganovic). Moreover, one Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and one Assistant Minister for European Integration have also participated in USAID training programs.
7. **SO 3.1-Reintegration/Reconciliation:** In less than two months, together with officials of the central and local governments, the USAID/RAP reconstructed a water system iproviding water to a newly constructed community of 120 houses for displaced persons in Kistanje. This activity was a political success as well as a success for returnees. The agreement between USAID and the Ministry of Reconstruction included the return of 20 Serb houses to their original owners while the temporary occupants where given 20 newly build houses. Kistanje is a mainly Croat municipality with a large number of Kosovo Croats who were also recently moved to live there, this was quite an achievement.
8. **SO 2.1-NGOs:** A group of 17 NGO trainers who have completed six months NGO ToT training, have become active providing training for local government and NGO activists. They were hired by the Government Office for NGOs to provide training on Local Government - NGO Partnership and Cooperation. Those trainers have established 2 new

NGO training organizations and one training department, which have started to offer training and assistance to a broad range of NGOs all around Croatia.

9. **SO 2.1-NGOs:** Through the NGO activity, the first textbook *Handbook on NGO Development* has been published in Croatian. This Handbook is covers important information regarding NGO management, strategic planing, fundraising, strategic planing, proposal writing, budgeting, how to run meetings, and other areas connected with broader NGO environment, i.e., civil society and advocacy.

***E&E R4 Detailed Budget Information***

CROATIA: E&E R4 Detailed Budget Information

			Contractor/ Grantee			FY 2000 Total	FY2000 Potential Supplemental	Potential FY2000 Total	FY2001 SO Total	FY2002 SO Total	FY2000-2002 Total
<b>FY 2000 Budget Support</b>											
180-0034	Reintegration/Stability Pact	TBD					\$13,000,000	\$13,000,000			
180-0034	Demining/Stability Pact	TBD					\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000			
<b>FY 2000 Budget Support TOTALS</b>							\$15,000,000	\$15,000,000			
<b>SO. 1.2 Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Management</b>											
180-0027	Economic Restructuring Advisors/Dep Prime Minister	TBD					\$750,000	\$750,000	\$475,000	\$475,000	\$950,000
180-0014	Fiscal Advisor/Min of Finance	Dept. of Treasury	\$475,000	\$950,000	\$1,425,000			\$475,000	\$475,000	\$1,425,000	
180-0014	Fiscal Reform: Budget	TBD	\$1,000,000	\$3,000,000	\$4,000,000			\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$5,000,000	
180-0027	Fiscal Reform: Tax & Pension	TBD	\$750,000	\$1,250,000	\$2,000,000			\$750,000	\$750,000	\$2,250,000	
180-0014	Banking/Financial Sector	SEGIR/GBTI	\$500,000	\$500,000	\$1,000,000			\$1,750,000	\$1,750,000	\$4,000,000	
180-0014	Single Treasury/Ministry of Finance	SEGIR/GBTI		\$280,000	\$280,000					\$0	
180-0014	Asset Management/Privatization	TBD	\$500,000	\$1,500,000	\$2,000,000			\$900,000	\$900,000	\$2,300,000	
<b>SO 1.2 TOTALS</b>			\$3,225,000	\$8,230,000	\$11,455,000			\$6,350,000	\$6,350,000	\$15,925,000	
<b>SO 1.3 Growth of Private Enterprises incl. Energy and Environment</b>											
180-0026	Commercial Law Reform/Competition Policy	TBD	\$800,000	\$1,200,000	\$2,000,000			\$1,750,000	\$1,750,000	\$4,300,000	
180-0024	Agricultural Reform	TBD	\$500,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,500,000			\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$2,500,000	
180-0023	Foreign Investment Advisory Service (transfer)	FIAS	\$100,000		\$100,000			\$0		\$100,000	
180-xxxx	Trade and Investment (Cro.Inv.Prom.Agen)(transfer)				\$0			\$750,000	\$750,000	\$1,500,000	
180-xxxx	Customs Reform & Trade Facilitation (SECI)(transfer)	US Customs	\$600,000		\$600,000			\$600,000	\$600,000	\$1,800,000	
180-0030	Regional Energy Program	TBD	\$500,000		\$500,000			\$750,000	\$750,000	\$2,000,000	
180-0039	Environmental Activities	TBD	\$350,000		\$350,000			\$500,000	\$500,000	\$1,350,000	
180-xxxx	Commerce WTO Accession(transfer)	Dept. of Commerce	\$100,000		\$100,000					\$100,000	
<b>SO 1.3 TOTALS</b>			\$2,950,000	\$2,200,000	\$5,150,000			\$5,350,000	\$5,350,000	\$13,650,000	

		<b>Contractor/ Grantee</b>	<b>FY 2000 Total</b>	<b>FY2000 Potential Supplemental</b>	<b>Potential FY2000 Total</b>	<b>FY2001 SO Total</b>	<b>FY2002 SO Total</b>	<b>FY2000-2002 Total</b>
<b>SO 2.1 Increased Citizen's Participation</b>								
180-0021	Political Party Strengthening	NDI & IRI	\$500,000	\$500,000	\$1,000,000	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$2,000,000
180-0021	Labor Unions Reform/Strengthening	ACILS	\$500,000		\$500,000	\$600,000	\$600,000	\$1,700,000
180-0032	Regional Women's Program	TBD	\$200,000		\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$600,000
180-0022	Media and Regional Program	IREX	\$1,500,000	\$1,000,000	\$2,500,000	\$1,425,000	\$1,425,000	\$4,350,000
180-0032	NGO/Civil Society	AED			\$0	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$1,500,000
180-0020	Rule of Law/Anti-corruption	TBD	\$400,000	\$1,500,000	\$1,900,000	\$1,200,000	\$1,200,000	\$2,800,000
180-0020	Judicial Training	ABA/CEELI			\$0	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$600,000
180-0034	Local Government	TBD	\$1,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$3,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$5,000,000
180-0034	Municipal Borrowing/Financing Capacities	TBD				\$750,000	\$750,000	\$1,500,000
<b>SO 2.1 TOTALS</b>			<b>\$4,100,000</b>	<b>\$5,000,000</b>	<b>\$9,100,000</b>	<b>\$7,975,000</b>	<b>\$7,975,000</b>	<b>\$20,050,000</b>
<b>SO 3.1 Social Sector Reform/Reintegr/Revitalization</b>								
180-0034	Reintegration of War-Affected Pop	TBD	\$4,000,000		\$4,000,000	\$1,700,000	\$1,700,000	\$7,400,000
180-0032	NGOs/Reducing Ethnic Tensions	TBD			\$0	\$350,000	\$350,000	\$700,000
180-0023	MSME Development/MicroLending	Opp. International U. of Delaward	\$1,000,000	\$3,800,000	\$4,800,000	\$1,500,000	\$1,500,000	\$4,000,000
180-0023	AG Coops/Associations		\$1,000,000		\$1,000,000	\$1,500,000	\$1,500,000	\$4,000,000
180-0023	Equity Finance	SEAF			\$0	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$2,000,000
<b>SO 3.1 TOTALS</b>			<b>\$6,000,000</b>	<b>\$3,800,000</b>	<b>\$9,800,000</b>	<b>\$6,050,000</b>	<b>\$6,050,000</b>	<b>\$18,100,000</b>
<b>SO 4.2 Cross Cutting Programs</b>								
180-0349	AEPS		\$1,500,000	\$295,000	\$1,795,000	\$1,825,000	\$1,825,000	\$5,150,000
180-0045	Participant Training	World Learning	\$1,275,000	\$500,000	\$1,775,000	\$1,500,000	\$1,500,000	\$4,275,000
180-xxxx	Public Diplomacy Prog.(Rbrown/etc Grants)(transfer)		\$950,000	\$700,000	\$1,650,000	\$950,000	\$950,000	\$2,850,000
<b>SO 4.2 TOTALS</b>			<b>\$3,725,000</b>	<b>\$1,495,000</b>	<b>\$5,220,000</b>	<b>\$4,275,000</b>	<b>\$4,275,000</b>	<b>\$12,275,000</b>
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>\$20,000,000</b>	<b>\$35,725,000</b>	<b>\$55,725,000</b>	<b>\$30,000,000</b>	<b>\$30,000,000</b>	<b>\$80,000,000</b>

## ***Supplemental Annex***

### **USAID/OTI/CROATIA**

#### **Country Profile**

**Context:** In 1990, Croatia declared its intent to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, igniting fear among Croat Serbs that they would become minorities in a hostile break-away republic. After receiving recognition as an autonomous state from the European Union and the United States, Croatia argued that much of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which had a significant Croat population) should be part of a larger Croat state. Serbia responded by attempting to militarily annex Serb regions of Croatia – the opening salvo of a Balkans conflict characterized by horrific campaigns of ethnic cleansing. The complex ethnic linkages among the republics of the Former Yugoslavia — especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) — requires a regional approach to peace-building.

**U.S. Foreign Policy Interests:** As one of the more powerful former Yugoslav republics, Croatia is vitally important to durable peace in the Balkans. The U.S. has a strong interest in eliciting Croatia's cooperation in implementing the Dayton Agreement, and in supporting democratic reform that enhances prospects for long-term regional stability.

**OTI Role:** OTI started its Croatia program in July 1997, recognizing that progressive change in Bosnia-Herzegovina was partly contingent on the intentions of its powerful neighbors. OTI efforts to influence attitudes, perceptions, and expectations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Croatia were viewed as elements of a single regional peace-building and democratization program.

**Focus/Program Design:** The Croatia program shifted to allocate the majority of time and resources to the parliamentary elections seen as a pivotal event in promoting stability and democratic change in Croatia. At the same time support continued for independent media, promotion of reintegration and reconciliation. In addition the program adjusted to fund activities in response to the effects of the NATO campaign on Croatia.

**Relationship of OTI program to USAID Mission strategy:** OTI in Croatia has a very strong relationship with the USAID Mission. OTI activities support two Mission SOs: SO1: Return/reintegration of war-affected populations. SO2: Democratization (Independent media and civil society development). OTI was also deeply involved in the USG election strategy, OTI was seen as the main mechanism for USG support to citizen participation in the parliamentary elections through a get out the vote campaign and election monitoring by domestic NGO. OTI assisted the mission in development of a response to the effects of the NATO campaign. The Mission used was selected to program all of the \$1.0 million in frontline state (Talbot) funds in addition to \$200,000 of the Kosovo supplemental.

## **PROCESS INDICATORS**

**Speed:** Estimated time between identification of a project and signing of a grant varies greatly from 24 hours to 45 days. OTI rapid response was instrumental in the mission's decision to use OTI to program over 1.8 million in SEED funds. In the support to the pre-election activities OTI's rapid response made it the only donor, besides SOROS a private foundation, able to effectively work in the dynamic situation where the date of the election was not declared until one month before the date.

**Targeting:** Civil society groups, independent media, inter-ethnic communities. The target groups have not changed, but the specific type of actions has changes to reflect the focus on pre-election activity. For example, within the media sector, OTI has increased its focus on funding media through paid advertising as well as support of informative programming. In the case of civil society and interethnic communities, the geographic locations have shifted to focus efforts where the potential for impact was greater.

**Resource Leveraging:** The pre-election actions supported by OTI would not have been possible without significant support from other donors. While OTI and SEED were the largest donors for both the domestic monitoring (\$260,000) and the GOTV campaign (\$750,000), more than 2 million was leveraged from other donors. Nearly all of those funds were allocated based upon information provided by OTI or a direct appeal from OTI to support a pre-election campaign activity.

### **Advancing Change:**

Total Political Transition Grants as of September 30, 1999: 172

Media Development PTGs:	64	Total Est. Value:	\$ 1,062,767
<u>Civic Org. Development PTGs:</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>Total Est. Value:</u>	<u>\$ 1,164,393</u>
Total Value Of Grants to Date:	172		\$ 2,227,160

Total Political Transition Grants as of January 30, 2000: 236

Media Development PTGs:	80	Total Est. Value:	\$ 1,516,731
<u>Civic Org. Development PTGs:</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>Total Est. Value:</u>	<u>\$ 2,097,671</u>
Total Value Of Grants to Date:	236		\$ 3,614,402

### Impact:

- An OTI-supported get out the vote campaign resulted in the highest voter turnout since the 1991 vote for independence. Estimates of voter turnout range from 73-

78% reversing a trend of declining voter participation and contradicting pre-election predictions of a 60-65% turnout.

- GONG, the OTI-supported non-governmental organization fielded over 5000 trained election monitors for each of three elections. The total number of volunteers recruited, over 9000, was unprecedented in Croatia. GONG's professionalism and presence has led the government to request GONG become a permanent part of the electoral process in Croatia.
- The OTI supported media campaign (for get out the vote and election monitoring) was cited as the most professional and effective of all the pre-election campaigns. Members of several political parties requested the continuation of the campaign for the presidential election due to its impact. (OTI declined due to the prohibition on partisan activities and a lack of funds)

## **BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

The success of OTI in Croatia was based upon the tireless dedication of the local staff, the full integration of OTI into the USG strategy and USAID Mission, developing a clear channel of communication to share information and keep the key players informed, and having a relatively narrow focus to our program.

## ***PARTNERSHIPS***

**Within the USG:** OTI Croatia is intimately linked to the Mission, with much of our programming complementing Mission activities. OTI assisted the Mission to program the \$1,000,000 of the frontline state money allocated to Croatia to mitigate the impact of the NATO campaign. This success led to the transfer of \$500,000 in Displaced Children and Orphans Funds to OTI for programming in support of SO1 and \$200,000 in Kosovo supplemental funds. Close collaboration with the Mission, combined with OTI's ability to program and disburse funds quickly, is making this a possibility.

**Other partnerships:** OTI's local personnel are the envy of the USAID Mission and other donors. Their relationships with local authorities, independent media, and members of civil society is what makes this program so effective. Virtually all of the funds leveraged from donors was based upon OTI staff's knowledge of the grant recipients and our ability to oversee the funded actions. The staff's knowledge of the media was instrumental in selecting and managing the professional team that created the media campaign.

## ***FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY***

**Planned Adjustments for program in near term and rationale for changes.** N/A program is closing.

**Exit Strategy and Timeframe:** OTI will phase-out around March 2000, allowing for wrap up of activities, post election analysis, smooth transition for local staff.

Discussions are underway with the USAID mission, Mott Foundation and the British Know-How Fund to provide long-term support to civil society through legal reform, development of NGO coalitions, and technical training.