

USAID/Mali Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

**THIRD ANNUAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SURVEY
DATA ANALYSIS REPORT**

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Submitted By:

John Uniack Davis, Team Leader

In Collaboration With:

Stephan J. Goetz, MSI
Nicolas Sidibé, MSI
Thomas M. Zalla, MSI
Bakary Doumbia, Info-Stat

Management Systems International
600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024
USA

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APE	Association des Parents d'Elèves
AV	Association Villageoise
ASACO	Association de Santé Communautaire
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the United States of America
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CO	Community Organization
DG	Democratic Governance
DGSO	Democratic Governance Strategic Objective
GIE	Groupement d'Intérêt Economique
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mali
INGO	Intermediary Non-Governmental Organization
IR	Intermediate Result
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
ME&R	Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
R4	Results Review and Resource Request
SEG	Sustainable Economic Growth
SEGSO	Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective
SO	Strategic Objective
SpO2	Special Objective Two (The North)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WE	World Education

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1995, USAID/Mali has undergone a process of reengineering and the development of five strategic objectives and a new results-based framework. Pilot USAID/Mali programming in democratic governance began in the spring of 1997, and cooperative agreements including DG programming were signed in September 1997. MSI consultants assisted the USAID/Mali Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (DGSO) Team in the design, execution, and analysis of the first two DGSO performance measurement surveys, as well as this third annual survey. In these studies, enumerators interviewed leaders of USAID-partner community organizations (COs), federations, intermediary non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local officials in order to operationalize indicators of organizational performance and provide the DGSO team, USAID/Mali, its Partners, and USAID/Washington with data on the effectiveness of DGSO programming activities.

The present report is intended as a comprehensive description of the methodology employed and results obtained in this “DGSO Performance Measurement Survey II.” As such, it describes the process of operationalization and the methodology employed, provides results for the DGSO indicators, and presents analysis and recommendations.

The first section of the report provides background on civil society and democratization, as well as on USAID/Mali’s DGSO and the methods the DGSO Team have chosen to measure its performance. The second section of the report describes the process of preparing for data collection, including the roles of the various personnel in the study, the training of data collection enumerators and supervisors, and details on the pre-test of the survey instruments.

The third section provides details on the sampling and data collection methodologies employed. Specifically, six principal types of data were collected:

1. A survey census of 18 intermediary NGOs through which international NGO Partners (CLUSA, Save the Children-USA, and World Education) implement their programs.
2. A census of 18 federations that collaborate with USAID partners.
3. A survey sample of 181 community organizations which work with the 18 INGOs or CARE-Mali.
4. A control group of 73 COs that are not partners with USAID or its Partners. Of these, 43 constituted the so-called “spread effect” control group, in that they were located in communes where USAID partner COs also work. The remaining 30 non-target COs constitute the “true” control group, in that they are not located close enough to USAID partners to expect a spread effect.
5. Qualitative interviews with local officials in 45 arrondissements and communes where CO data were collected.

6. Qualitative interviews with officials at the Mission of Decentralization in order to gather information on the enabling environment with which partner COs are confronted.

The third section also describes the challenges encountered in compiling a complete sampling frame of the universe of DGSO-partner COs. Then, the sample design, control group innovation, and data collection supervision are explained. A disproportionate stratified sample was drawn in order to allow comparisons by international NGO Partner and CO gender type. The control group sampling methodology was a huge improvement over that employed in 1998 in at least two ways. First, for the first time we had lists of non-USAID partner COs for a representative array of circumscriptions in the four regions and were able to draw a systematic control group sample from over 30 communes. Second, we added the nuance of distinguishing between a “true” control group and a “spread effect” control group. The “true” control group was drawn from communes where USAID does not work, to compare organizations that are similar in every important characteristic to partners except for the fact that they do not receive support from USAID and do not evolve in close proximity to USAID partners. The “spread effect” group was drawn from communes where USAID *does* collaborate, and the only major difference they have from USAID partner COs is the fact that they receive no USAID funding or training.

Section four provides detailed information on the decision to conduct bivariate weighting of the results, followed by detailed analysis of those results. A summary of the findings by intermediate result is presented below.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (SO 3): “Community organizations in target communes are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision making and planning.”

Performance Indicators:

- 1. Percent of COs which have affected 2 or more development decisions.**

We estimate that 11 percent of all USAID-partner COs but no women’s COs have affected two or more development decisions in the past year (November 1998-November 1999).

- 2. Number of regional/national government decisions target intermediary NGOs and federations and their CO members and partners affected.**

As was reported last year, this is a difficult indicator on which to collect data. Because the unit of analysis in the present study is the organization, we reported on this as follows –

We estimate that 26 percent of all target COs have influenced decisions in collaboration with intermediary organizations such as NGOs and federations. However, only 6 percent of women’s COs report similar behavior.

3. Percent of target COs forming a good partnership with local government in delivering public services.

We estimate that only 5 percent of all target COs can demonstrate evidence of high levels of cooperation with the government in the provision of services, while a mere 2 percent of women's groups report this sort of cooperation.

4. Percent of target communes where USAID finances DG activities in which new COs have formed during the year.

In 72 percent of jurisdictions surveyed where USAID finances DG activities, new COs had formed during the twelve months preceding the survey.

5. Percent of target communes in which non-target COs adopt civic action practices.

Sixty-three percent of non-target COs in USAID target communes engaged in civic action practices in the 12 months preceding the survey.

6. Percent of COs expanding their development services and activities.

We estimate that 52 percent of target COs and 64 percent of women's COs expanded development services and activities in the twelve months preceding the survey.

IR 3.1: "Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond."

Performance Indicators:

1. Target COs govern themselves democratically.

First, we report on the individual items in the four-point democratic self-governance index:

- a. Forty-eight percent of mixed groups and 70 percent of women's groups report that they are voluntary in membership.
- b. Among all groups, 20 percent elect leaders for a fixed period of time ensuring alternation. This procedure is also followed by 27 percent of women's groups.
- c. Approximately the same percentage of mixed groups and women's groups offered evidence of the existence of organizational by-laws -- Fifty percent of mixed groups and 47 percent of women's groups.
- d. Six percent (10 of 181) of all groups studied this year were able to demonstrate proof of 60 percent rank-and-file attendance at their most recent general assembly. However, only one women's group out of 30 (3 percent) met this standard.

There is an encouraging, if relatively small, increase in the percentage of mixed and total target groups scoring at least three of four on the democratic self-governance index (from 4 to 9 percent and from 5 to 9 percent, respectively). Among women's groups, there is a drop from 21 to 11 percent. This is slightly unsettling but is almost certainly the consequence of a changes in the composition of the population and the small sample size of women's groups (n= 33 last year and 30 this year).

Here, some of the most striking evidence of a *spread effect* of USAID activity appears --53 percent of the true control COs scored zero on the democratic governance index while only 21-22 percent of the target and spread groups scored that poorly. Moreover, 12 percent of target groups met the standard (at least 3 out of 4), followed by 7 percent of spread groups, followed by only 3 percent of the true control group. While this result is not conclusive, it is the pattern one should expect if USAID partner COs are influencing the behavior of their neighbors.

2. Target COs have sound management practices.

First, we report on the individual items in the four-point sound management index:

- a. Among all groups, both mixed and women's, 53 percent presented evidence of a formal financial system.
- b. Target CO leaders were very articulate in describing their strategic planning. Among mixed groups, fully 79.00 percent (up from 75 percent last year) named at least two concrete objectives benefiting their communities. Among women's groups, 73 percent (up from 70 percent last year) met the same standard.
- c. Mixed groups were significantly more likely than women's groups to demonstrate at least fifty percent literacy among their officers. Specifically, 67 percent of the former and 45 percent of the latter met this standard.
- d. Seven percent of mixed groups and 33 percent of women's groups provided evidence of systematic dues collection.

According to weighted calculations, only two percent of all target groups score a perfect score of four on the sound management index. Among women's groups that probability rises to 12 percent. Fully 29 percent of all groups (the identical percentage for both mixed and women's groups), scored a solid score of at least three of four.

Because of interest on the DGSO Team, we continue to track two indicators that are no longer part of the sound management index:

- a. Ten percent of mixed groups and 7 percent of women's groups showed evidence of legal recognition at the national level. When local recognition is included, however, 43 percent of mixed groups and 30 percent of women's groups meet the standard of legal recognition.

b. Only 14 percent of all mixed COs showed evidence of performing gender analysis.

3. Percent of mixed-gender COs with women in leadership positions

Seventy-five percent of mixed COs had women in leadership positions.

4. COs pursuing civic action (public advocacy).

Fifty-seven percent of all target COs (59 percent of mixed COs and 38 percent of women’s COs) engaged in some form of civic action in the year preceding the survey.

5. Percent of COs pursuing issues with “systematic” (formerly “effective”) civic action.

This year, 37 percent of the total as well as of mixed groups met the standard of systematic civic action, but only 20 percent of the women’s group scored at least four points. Among the two combined segments of the control group, only 18 percent met the standard.

6. Financial sustainability – COs that mobilize resources from non-USAID, non-member sources.

We estimate that 37 percent of all target COs and 15 percent of women’s COs mobilized diverse resources from non-USAID sources.

IR 3.1.1: “Target intermediary NGOs and federations support community organizations’ democratic self-governance and civic action.”

Performance Indicator:

1. COs which report that they made organizational changes and/or used at least one of the new skills for which they were trained.

We estimate that 99 percent of all target COs receiving training in the past year and 96 percent of women’s COs have made use of the skills in which they were trained.

IR 3.1.1.1 (also called 3.1.2.1) “The capacity of target NGOs and federations is strengthened.”

Performance Indicators:

1. Target intermediary NGOs and federations govern themselves democratically.

One of 18 federations scored three out of three on the democratic self-governance index while 14 of 18 NGOs received a perfect score.

2. Target groups have sound management practices.

This year, 4 of 18 (23 percent) NGOs scored four of six on the sound management index. Four of 18 federations scored one point on the index. No federations scored higher than one out of six.

IR 3.1.2: “Target intermediary NGOs and federations effectively aggregate and represent community organization interests at the local level and beyond.”

Performance Indicators:

1. Number of target intermediary NGOs and federations for which 2 or more of their CO partners report that the organization in question effectively represents their interests.

Given the fact that the unit of analysis was the CO, as well as sampling stratification constraints, this indicator was operationalized slightly differently -- We estimate that 53 percent of target mixed COs and only 16 percent of women’s COs feel that a USAID-partner intermediary organization effectively represents their interests.

2. Number of federations formed to address specific concerns related to government decisions.

Again, given the fact that the unit of analysis was the CO, as well as sampling stratification constraints, this indicator was operationalized slightly differently -- only 18 of 254 COs(7 percent) reported knowledge of new federations.

3. Number of target federations whose membership is stable or increasing.

We only have two years of membership numbers for eight federations. Among those, however, seven of eight (88 percent) have stable or increasing membership.

4. Number of federations and intermediary NGOs engaged in sustained action on issues of mutual concern.

Nine of the 18 INGOs (50 percent) presented written evidence of sustained collaboration with other NGOs or federations. Two of the eighteen federations presented evidence of collaboration. Among all intermediary partners, 11 of 36 presented evidence of this sort of collaboration.

IR 3.1.2.2 “The civic action skills of target intermediary NGOs and federations are improved.”

Performance Indicator:

- 1. Percentage of trained intermediary NGOs and federations using civic action techniques in a given year.**

When presented with a series of eight different types of civic action, ranging from contacting public officials and organizing public meetings to using media outlets, 14 of 18 NGOs (78 percent) reported using at least four different civic action techniques. The remaining four NGOs used at least three civic action technique. Three of the eighteen federations (17 percent) engaged in no civic action at all, but 6 of 18 (33 percent) used 4 or more techniques.

IR 3.2 “Effective Decentralization occurs by 1999.”

Performance Indicators:

- 1. Percentage of communal boundaries decided.**

All communal boundaries were established under Law Number 96-059 of November 1996. Minor alterations may still occur, but less than ten percent of all communes have raised concerns.

- 2. Percentage of elections of mayors, communal boards and councils decided.**

For the first time, all 701 communal councils are in place.

- 3. Planned laws and regulations about communal councils, boards, and mayors’ authority and resources decided by 1999.**

“All texts and laws [concerning decentralization] have been voted upon.”

- 4. The portion of total human and financial resources generated and dispersed by communes.**

Substantial legal ground has been traveled in ensuring that communes have the necessary resources to run effective programs, but the exact total breakdown of resources is not yet known.

- 5. Frequency and number of public reporting on council and board meeting minutes and operations.**

The Mission of Decentralization reports that a system for public reporting is in place. Verification visits should be conducted to see whether or not this is in fact the case.

IR 3.3 “Enabling environment empowers target COs and intermediary NGOs and federations.”

Performance Indicators:

1. Progress toward legal recognition of cooperatives, village associations and federations adapted to decentralization.

A reform effort, initiated by the Ministry of Rural Development and the Environment, has been underway since 1995. The proposed law was rejected by the Council of Ministers in May 1998, supposedly in order to allow further input by ministries before it is sent to the National Assembly. By all reports the law is not yet in place.

2. Number of enabling environment issues around which two or more NGOs and federations work together to alleviate constraints.

Only 4 of 36 intermediary organizations, all NGOs, report collaborating on enabling environment issues. This leads us to believe that the number of issues around which intermediary organizations collaborate is quite low.

The next section of the report presents exploratory regression results on determinants of success on the most important DG indicators and on cross-sectoral synergies. The findings are as follows:

1. First, we looked at different types of COs and looked at their performance on the most important DG indicators. In terms of democratic governance performance, caisses perform the best, followed closely by ASACOs. Economic groups (AVs, groupements, etc.) are substantially worse, while APEs, both public and private, bring up the rear.
2. On the sound management index, 56 percent of ASACOs score three or above, compared with only 38 percent of caisses, their nearest competitor. Again, economic groups and APEs were generally weaker on this indicator.
3. Next, we looked at the determinants of democratic self-governance in a CO. Here, we see an encouraging positive relationship between USAID-financed DG training and improved self-governance. A similar result occurs with the synergy variable. The result only approaches statistical significance, but it provides cautious support for the hypothesis that COs receiving training from the DGSO Team and at least one other USAID source are more internally democratic than COs receiving support from one or the other but not both.
4. Then we looked at the determinants of sound management. The two strongest and most compelling results are the following. First, the more internally democratic an organization is, the better it tends to be managed. This is a particularly robust result and it holds up under a variety of model specifications. This makes sense, of course – internally democratic organizations are more likely to hold their leaders accountable, and this includes demanding transparent, sound

management practices. The second strong result is that organizations which generate their own independent revenue resources tend to be better managed.

5. Another set of regressions examined the factors more likely to result in an organization engaging in civic action behavior. There is only one result here that is strong – There is an extremely strong relationship between length of organizational existence and civic action behavior ($p = .000$). This suggests the intuitively appealing conclusion that older organizations have more capacity, confidence, or contacts and are more likely to engage in civic action. There is a faintly troubling aspect to this finding, however. As we showed earlier in this section, older organizations tend to be less democratic. This, combined with the finding here of an totally insignificant relationship between internal governance and civic action, suggests that the fact of engaging in civic action is not closely linked to other forms of democratic behavior.
6. Next, we looked at possible synergies between DG and other sectoral teams for a series of sectoral impact indicators. A quite interesting and appealing result is the following. Individually, both DGSO training and other SO team training is associated with increasing pupil teacher ratios (PTRs – in general, lower is better here). This is not alarming, as there could be many causes. What is exciting is that when they work together, PTR tends to drop, as indicated by the negative sign associated with the synergy variable. The results lead us to cautiously conclude that neither DG nor Youth Team support alone is enough to improve PTR, but their collaboration has positive synergistic effects on APE and school performance.
7. There were other interesting and significant relationships when looking at the determinants of economic vitality in AVs and other economic organizations, but none of the specifications of synergy were statistically significant. Regression analysis with community health associations (ASACOs) was inconclusive, as the ASACO sub-sample was extremely small ($n = 25$). Nonetheless, preliminary results suggest interesting avenues of further research regarding DG collaboration with other teams working with APEs and economic groups.

The final section of the report presents issues that must be addressed for the DGSO performance measurement system to continue to improve.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The results on various indicators suggest generally steady improvement on DGSO indicators, but this does not really tell us much because the three CO samples for the three years were each drawn from different sampling frames. The lists are now good enough that **USAID should use the exact same sampling frame for next year's survey as for this year's**. This will allow us to draw more solid conclusions regarding whether improvements are due primarily to USAID interventions or changes in the sampling universe. Nevertheless, **the DGSO Team should continue to update partner lists every six months, in order to have an accurate data base for the partner COs worked with each year**. Such lists also permit the option of at some point moving toward a cohort methodology in the annual survey.

2. The control group sampling methodology was a huge improvement over that employed in 1998 because, for the first time, we had lists of non-USAID partner COs for a representative array of circumscriptions in the four regions and were able to draw a systematic control group sample from over 30 communes. **This control group sampling frame should be regularly revised and updated.** Moreover, we added the nuance of distinguishing between a “true” control group and a “spread effect” control group. The results from the control group analysis often (but not always) show the exact relationship we would like to see. That is, USAID partners perform the best, followed by non-partners that work close enough to USAID to show a demonstration effect, followed by non-partners not evolving in close enough proximity to have good habits taught by USAID rub off on them. **In future rounds of data collection, USAID should consider again increasing the control group sample size (from the 73 contacted this year).**
3. Among the 1055 purported partners included in this year’s sampling frame, there may be as many as one hundred with whom PVOs are not engaged in any meaningful level of collaboration, as expressed by the COs themselves. In collaboration with the PVO partners, USAID should carefully examine existing CO lists to determine where meaningful collaboration is occurring and where it is not. They may also wish to reiterate to PVOs their preference for “quality over quantity” of collaboration (in terms of numbers of CO partners).
4. Similarly, not all of the organizations listed as partner “federations” by the PVOs were in fact true federations. About 9 organizations were identified which were in fact NGOs but did not play the intermediary role foreseen for them in the DGSO Strategic Framework. In past performance monitoring workshops, the DGSO Team has provided a concrete definition of what it means by “federation” (in particular, consisting of representatives of at least 3 member community organizations). Before the 2000 data collection begins, USAID should reiterate this and other definitions to ensure that partners are operating within a common conceptual framework.
5. In the spirit of employing local resources as well as building local capacity, this and past DGSO performance measurement efforts have used a local firm as well as local logistical support. This commitment should be reinforced in the future. Besides having a local firm responsible for data collection and preliminary analysis, Malians should be more involved at the conceptualization stage and throughout the data analysis stage as well. Past efforts fell short in this regard because of the lack of local partners with combined DG and statistical skills but this has changed over the course of three years of collaboration.
6. This year’s data collection was carefully supervised in the field by two MSI consultants as well as by Info-Stat’s own four supervisors. The confidence that USAID has shown in MSI and Info-Stat is much appreciated. Nevertheless, members of the DGSO Team may, time permitting, find it fruitful to accompany the enumerators in the field during the data collection process. Not only would it provide added supervision but it would also permit the Team additional first-hand information for their own continuing evaluation and programming efforts.

7. To make USAID performance measurement more accessible for local partners, all reports should be made available in French. Steps in that direction were made this year, by preparing the Performance Measurement Workshop Report directly in French. In the future, the equivalent to this Data Analysis Report could be prepared directly in French or at least made available in French translation. In this vein, we should also consider making brief summaries of data analysis results available in Bamanankan and Fulfuldé.
8. A recurring complaint on the part of intermediary NGOs this year was that they hesitated to take part in this year's INGO census because last year's results had not been shared with them. While we believe that such sharing should come from the PVOs once they have received reports from USAID, the translations mentioned above will permit greater accessibility of the information. Reiterating, USAID should provide all performance measurement reports to PVOs in a timely manner and the PVOs should share them with intermediary partners. The Bamanankan and Fulfuldé translations suggested above would permit information sharing even further down the hierarchy, further democratizing the process of collaboration.
9. **USAID may wish to consider commissioning additional, more involved analysis of the three years of DGSO performance monitoring data.** We now have three years worth of data, as well as more detailed, comprehensive information on community organizations than we have had in the past. The cost of this analysis would be relatively low, considering all of the field data collection costs have already been incurred. Absent the time constraints of the current study, and with a broader, more open research mandate, the data could provide additional rich insights for USAID/Mali programming. Moreover, these insights could benefit other SO teams as well as the DGSO Team. This analysis could include a detailed examination of partner-by-partner results. This should be done not to compare partners but, rather, recognizing the particularities of each PVO partner's program and in the spirit of offering PVO-specific programming insights.
10. The indicators used in the cross-sectoral questionnaires were developed in close collaboration with the program office, as well as the Sustainable Economic Growth and Youth SO Teams. Data collected, particularly on such indicators as pupil-teacher ratio and total production products, provide interesting insights concerning organizational performance. **The program office and other SO teams should carefully examine this year's results and suggest improvements and additions to indicators that can be measured in the annual survey.**
11. In the October 1998 Data Analysis Report, numerous recommendations were made concerning avenues for further exploration and programming implications. While they are not repeated here, **it would be worthwhile for the Team to review last year's programming recommendations** in order to "*dresser le bilan*" of what has been addressed and what has not and whether further interesting measures could be taken.
12. The DGSO Team has invested admirable energy over the past four-plus years to ensure the evolution of a rigorous, useful performance measurement system. They have also put considerable thought into integrating the quantitative data collection and analysis systems of

USAID and its partners while also adding a system of case study research on program successes and areas needing improvement. Once fully implemented, such a system would draw on the comparative advantages of USAID and the PVO partners in performance measurement. One of the thorniest remaining areas is that involving finding a useful role for PVO-collected data at the level of USAID. Since early 1998, USAID has had at least three performance measurement workshops with its partners. These constitute an important, participatory method of ensuring that the existing monitoring and evaluation system serves the purposes of all parties. However, more must be done in order to put into place complementary systems at the partners and USAID. Taking as a point of departure Leslie Fox's February 1998 memo and John Uniack Davis' April 1998 report on planning the next steps of DGSO performance measurement, **the DGSO Team should devise a system linking the data collection systems across the partners and into its own system.** This would be a fairly ambitious endeavor and cannot be done in conjunction with the annual survey – it should be carried out as a separate task in a single-minded manner.

The DGSO Team has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to the scientific measurement of performance measurement indicators. In many ways, especially concerning the construction of a reliable, re-usable sampling frame as well as the building of bridges to performance measurement in other sectors, the Team has made great strides in devising a useful, durable system. Attention to the above recommendations will ensure that the DGSO performance monitoring system continues to serve the Team's reporting and programming needs.

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since 1994, USAID/Mali has undergone a comprehensive process of reengineering. This undertaking has involved the development of five strategic objectives and a new results-based framework. Early on in the reengineering process, several consulting teams assisted the Mission in the development of a performance monitoring and evaluation plan. In 1997 and 1998, consultants from MSI, Inc., in collaboration with Info-Stat, a Malian data collection and statistical analysis firm, assisted the USAID/Mali Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (DGSO) Team in the design, execution, and analysis of a baseline performance measurement survey as well as the follow-up to that survey. During the course of those surveys, Info-Stat data collectors interviewed leaders of USAID-partner community organizations (COs), intermediary organizations, and local officials. This permitted the measurement of indicators of organizational performance in order to provide the DG team, USAID/Mali, and USAID/Washington with data on the effectiveness of DG activities in Mali. Operationalizing the abstruse and nebulous concepts encountered in the analysis of democratic governance phenomena is not an easy affair. Each year, the consultants and the DGSO Team have had the opportunity to refine their skills and expertise in meeting this challenge. This year, new elements have rendered the study more complex than ever. This new complexity was engendered by an effort to make the study even more useful for USAID impact assessment.

This report is intended as a comprehensive description of the methodology employed and results obtained in this “DGSO Performance Measurement Survey III.” As such, it describes the process of operationalization and the sampling methodology employed, provides results for the DGSO indicators, and presents analysis and recommendations. The remainder of the report is organized as follows. First, background is provided on civil society and democratization issues and performance measurement of the DGSO. Following this background, details of the data collection preparation are described, after which sampling and quality control issues are discussed, along with the implications of this methodology on the representativeness of the sample and weighting method adopted. Then, the results and analysis of the surveys are provided. An added element of the analysis this year is a section employing regression analysis to look at synergies and impact assessment. The report concludes with recommendations on program implications of the analysis as well as future data collection and analysis needs.

A. Civil Society and Democratization

As we shall see below, USAID/Mali’s DGSO aims to increase the capacity of community organizations to be “effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning.” This civil society focus is the distinctive characteristic of the DGSO and merits a brief digression.

Civil society, as most often defined, refers to the public space between the household and the state. It consists of social networks based on affinity and cooperation, outside the realm of the state, and as such is considered to hold great potential for serving as a locus of free and independent social interaction in democratizing states. Indeed, civil society has also been viewed as holding great promise

as a counterweight to authoritarian states. More recently, state-society relations have been held to be more than a zero-sum game -- civil society can provide services and reinforce state capacity, to their mutual benefit. This is integral to the very concept of governance -- "the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm" (Hyden and Bratton, p. 7).

This evolution of cooperation and trust is often assumed to be a prerequisite for the long-term consolidation of democratic gains. Indeed, many believe that "The existence of an active civil society is crucial to the vitality of political democracy" (Hadenius and Ugglä, p. 1622). Civil society is a relational concept, both in terms of the horizontal ties between organizations and the vertical links that tie them to a national system.

The term civil society encompasses a vast array of types of organizations and has been used in a variety of different ways. In their conception, the DGSO Team excludes profit-making enterprises and organizations such as political parties, which aim to take over state power rather than simply influencing it. A critical characteristic for our purposes is that the organizations concerned have as a primary purpose the influencing of public policy.

The primary tasks of civil society in the context of democracy are: 1. To aggregate interests and provide a context in which groups vie for power with other groups as well as the state. In order for the multifarious organizations in civil society to perform this pluralist function they must exhibit autonomy; 2. "The growth and preservation of democracy depend ultimately on the support this form of government has in the hearts and minds of the people" (Hadenius and Ugglä, p. 1622). The people have to buy into the democratic rules of the game. Civil society is believed to hold great potential to serve this educational role in the consolidation of democratic gains. These two functions of civil society are certainly intertwined, though USAID/Mali is most explicitly concerned with buttressing the pluralist function.

In considering the role of civil society in political development, two approaches exist which often limit the usefulness of the concept. First, there is the temptation to include the entire voluntary sector under the rubric of civil society. Consequently, there are those who unrealistically and idealistically assume that all organizations will necessarily have a positive impact on political development. In fact, undisciplined and undemocratic organizations can have a destabilizing effect. Second, in contrast, there is a tendency to set the normative standard for what constitutes civil society so high that few organizations qualify and the term has little analytical utility. In short, if the definition includes everything or nothing it is equally weak in analytical power.

In working to strengthen Malian civil society, USAID charts a practical middle path -- it recognizes the potential of local organizations to make a contribution to political and socio-economic development while simultaneously realizing that they need capacity-building support to better realize that potential and to serve as a constructive force. In engaging in systematic performance measurement, USAID leaves nothing to chance. In striving to know the current performance of CO partners as well as their progress over time, we can ascertain their strengths and weaknesses, as well as what it will take to take advantage of and continue to improve upon these strengths.

B. USAID/Mali and its Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (DGSO)

In the five years that have passed since USAID/Mali embarked on its innovative reengineering process in December 1994, a conscious focus has developed on programming that yields concrete, measurable results. This particular focus necessitates a concern with systematic performance measurement that the Team has always embraced. Indeed, it should be noted that in commissioning the annual survey each year, the Team displays a laudable concern with the unblinking, rigorous measurement of results.

USAID/Mali aspires to the following program goal:

That “Mali [achieve] a level of sustainable economic, social, and political development that eliminates the need for concessional foreign assistance.”

The strategic plan is organized in such a manner as to strive for the realization of the program goal through the pursuit of five highly interrelated strategic objectives. The substantive foci of these objectives include sustainable economic growth, youth (health and education), information and communications, democratic governance, and a regional focus on the North of Mali which incorporates all of the aforementioned sectors. The Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (DGSO) Team aims at working toward the over-arching program goal by working for the day when:

“Community organizations in target communes are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision making and planning.”

This addition of an explicitly political facet of Mission programming has been made possible by the unexpected flow of events in Mali since 1991. Mali’s transition to a multi-party democracy makes observers more optimistic about the prospect of achieving sustainable (social, economic, and environmental) development than ever before. The promotion of democratic governance in which community organizations (COs) -- as the base unit of civil society -- participate as equal partners in sustainable national development efforts is viewed as a means to achieving the Mission program goal, as well as a desirable end in itself. The Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (DGSO) focuses on training and capacity building among the constituent organizations of civil society. Rather than focusing on state institutions and other more conventional targets of governance initiatives, USAID/Mali has, consistent with the explosion of organizational activity since March 1991 and the current vitality of the decentralization process, chosen for their work to be entirely civil society focused.

Implicit in the DGSO is a USAID contribution to promoting an enabling environment that facilitates this process of grassroots empowerment. A critical component of this strategy is support for meaningful decentralization through devolution of power and not simply deconcentration of the state apparatus. The fact that the long-awaited municipal council elections occurred this year gives cause for optimism, but there is “beaucoup de chemin à parcourir” before many of these newly empowered localities can stand on their own and USAID will continue to follow their evolution.

USAID/Mali's activities, however, are only indirectly concerned with the enabling environment and "rules of the game" and more directly involved with capacity building among a hierarchy of civil society organizations. They are engaging in projects aimed at promoting functional literacy, civic education, advocacy, management techniques, organizational skills, promoting local finance institutions, etc. These activities are intended to build the necessary expertise and organizational confidence that will permit civil society organizations to become meaningful partners in sustainable development. An integral part of results-oriented programming is a coherent performance measurement approach. The current study builds on those of the previous two years to work toward concrete measurement of the impact of DGSO programming.

Since September 1997, USAID/Mali has signed new, multi-sectoral, cooperative agreements with at least fourteen different international NGOs. Four of these cooperative agreements have a democratic governance programming component to them. These agreements are with the following Partners: CARE, The Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA), Save the Children-USA, and World Education (hereafter referred to as "the Partners"). These Partners, in turn, provide program support and training to at least nineteen different Malian intermediary NGOs (INGOs) and about the same number of federations. These INGOs -- "modern," formal organizations -- collaborate with community organizations (COs) at the village level. Most USAID support of the COs that are the centerpiece of the DGSO is thus channeled indirectly through international Partners and INGOs. The exception to this is CARE's program, which works directly with COs and does not act through intermediaries.

Each of the Partners has a unique approach to development. Consequently, the Partners work with a wide variety of different kinds of COs. Typical CO partners include Community Health Associations (ASACOs), Parent of Student Associations (APEs), cooperatives, Village Associations (AVs) and other producer organizations, women's groups, local credit unions, and civic groups, etc. This array of partner organizations makes for a rich array of programming possibilities but poses special challenges for making comparisons in the performance measurement process.

C. Performance Measurement of the DGSO

To respond to USAID/Washington's reporting requirements, as well as to guide program improvement, the USAID/Mali DGSO Team measures its performance. Because the DGSO is integrally related to civil society, organizational performance indicators constitute the most important part of the performance measurement project at hand. The six-year plan for DGSO monitoring and evaluation aims to measure changes in performance of these organizations over time. The current study constitutes the most ambitious part of the DGSO performance measurement program, including as it does a full census of about 40 DGSO-partner NGOs and federations and a survey of a sample of 181 DGSO-partner COs and 73 control group COs. Through hiring an independent firm to do a systematic study of this sort, USAID hopes to gain a broad overview of the effectiveness of DG programming.

At the same time, however, USAID recognizes that its international Partners -- CARE, CLUSA, Save the Children-USA, and World Education -- have their own monitoring and evaluation

(M&E) systems and have considerable expertise and experience in this regard. The Partners collect their own data on the DGSO quantifiable indicators and report these data to the Team. Where they have the most experience and have a comparative advantage in measurement, however, is in the sort of qualitative reporting that has long been included in the semester reports that USAID requires of them. USAID is working toward a performance measurement system which serves to ensure accountability while drawing on the respective parties' strengths and edifying efforts at program amelioration for both USAID/Mali and the DGSO Team and their Partners. In this spirit, the DGSO Team recently held its third Performance Measurement Workshop aimed at ensuring synergy and harmonization in data collection. (The first two workshops were held in February and September 1998). The parties discussed precise operationalization of the quantifiable indicators while also working toward a systematic qualitative data collection system. In this prospective approach, the four Partners would each create detailed case studies of one very-successful CO and one less-successful CO in matters of democratic governance and civic action (see the report in Annex 1). This qualitative reporting will help put interpretive meat on the bones of the broad overview provided by quantitative measurement that remains the focus of the DGSO Team's performance measurement. The recommended methodology for the partners' case studies was first discussed in September 1998 and it does not seem that much follow-up has occurred since then. Consequently, the team may wish to hold another, more detailed workshop to train the personnel who would be responsible for this data collection.

The performance measurement enterprise described in this report involves the operationalization of DGSO indicators that follow the logic of the strategic objective itself. The Mission has devoted a good deal of effort to developing a precise strategic objective, as well as the intermediate results necessary to achieve it. In brief, the strategy envisions management and civic action capacity-building for INGOs and federations in order to permit them to better aggregate the interests of and build the civic action capacities of their partner COs at the local level and beyond. INGOs and federations are viewed as critical intermediaries in the process of accomplishing the strategic objective, making "COs in target communes effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision making and planning."

The Mission has designated this as their third strategic objective among five. Strategic Objective Three has three principal intermediate results (IRs) on which it depends. IR 3.2 consists of *effective decentralization* occurring by the end of 1999. IR 3.3 envisions an *enabling environment* in Mali which empowers COs, INGOs, and federations. Results on these intermediate results are sought indirectly through questions in both surveys, as well as through qualitative interviews with local officials and the Mission of Decentralization.

IR 3.1, the principal focus of the CO and INGO/federation surveys, reads as follows:

"Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond."

IR 3.1 depends upon the successful achievement of IR 3.1.1 --

“Target intermediary NGOs and federations support community organizations’ democratic self-governance and civic action”

-- and IR 3.1.1.1 --

“The capacity of target NGOs and federations is strengthened.”

Equally important are IR 3.1.2 --

“Target intermediary NGOs and federations effectively aggregate and represent community organization interests at the local level and beyond”

-- as well as IR 3.1.2.2 --

“The civic action skills of target intermediary NGOs and federations are improved.”

The DGSO baseline data collection operationalizes indicators of performance related to the DGSO and the intermediate results (See Annex 2 for a diagram illustrating the DGSO Strategic Plan). The next section goes into more detail on sampling issues arising during baseline data collection.

2. PREPARATION FOR THE DATA COLLECTION

The present section describes practical steps taken in planning and undertaking DGSO Performance Measurement Survey III. While the activities undertaken were very similar to those of previous years

A. Personnel

In undertaking its third annual performance measurement survey, the DGSO Team followed one of the principal recommendations of last year's report. This recommendation concerned becoming more ambitious with the survey in measuring cross-sectoral impacts and synergies. Another recommendation that the team followed involved expanding and improving the control group methodology to be employed in the study. In order to put these recommendations into practice, MSI's team leader, John Uniack Davis, came to Mali for four days in late June to meet with potential collaborators as well as the DGSO Team. A major decision that was undertaken at this time was to try to involve our collaborators at Info-Stat in the compilation of a control group sample frame. This activity was started before Davis returned to Mali on September 24.

Upon Davis' return, several pressing tasks had to be immediately accomplished. The first of these was to rehire Nicolas Sidibé, who had played an important training and data collection supervision role for MSI in the 1998 study. The second was to develop terms of reference and hire Info-Stat to ensure continuity and vital expertise in the data collection. The third was to appraise the quality of existing target CO lists and begin the process of developing a sampling methodology. Finally, he had to revise the four primary questionnaires (CO, NGO, federation, local officials) and assist Dr. Tom Zalla in the development of new sectoral questionnaires for APEs, ASACOs, and economic groups.

Dr. Zalla was present from September 28 to October 12. His primary responsibility was in marshalling his decades of experience in survey design and monitoring and evaluation to conceptualize the sectoral questionnaires, an entirely new component of the study. Most of his time in country was spent in questionnaire design and pre-testing them in Bamako and nearby rural areas. He also gave advice regarding the sampling methodology and conducted a pre-training of Info-Stat's supervisors in the use of the new questionnaires.

Sidibé had extensive responsibilities throughout the study. These included assisting in the training of enumerators, developing an instruction manual for enumerators, supervising the Bambara translation of the CO questionnaire, and being present in the field both for oversight as well as to serve as a resource person for the data collection team.

Professor Stephan J. Goetz (agricultural economics, Pennsylvania State University) assisted Dr. Zalla from afar in the conceptualization of the data analysis plan. Then, he came to Mali from November 27 to December 6 to provide critical support in data analysis. In particular, he performed complex data recoding and programming functions and performed a variety of regression analysis techniques in order to look at issues of synergy and impact assessment.

MSI was fortunate to once again be able to count on the services of Info-Stat and its capable director, Bakary Doumbia, for field data collection and data entry and preliminary data analysis. Info-Stat put together an excellent, highly-trained data collection team consisting of four supervisors and twelve enumerators. All four supervisors and one of the enumerators had participated in at least one of the two previous surveys (and two had participated in both), adding necessary experience and continuity.

B. Training

Given the added complexity of this year's questionnaires, supervisors were trained for ten days and enumerators for nine days (as compared with six last year). The supervisors spent the day of October 12 being trained on the new questionnaires by Tom Zalla, in order to ensure a certain continuity after he boarded a plane that evening. The larger training began on October 14 and included seven days of classroom training, role playing, and self-evaluation and two days of pre-testing the CO questionnaires with CO leaders, first in the classroom and then in the field pre-test.

The first morning was devoted to an introduction of the DG Strategic Objective (DGSO). Davis gave an overview of USAID's re-engineering process and results orientation and explained where the DGSO fit into the Mission strategy. The performance measurement function of the data collection enterprise was explained as well. This provided important context, permitting the data collection team to understand the importance of their role in the process, as well as the point behind the study. Sidibé also provided an extended commentary on Malian decentralization and the role of civil society therein.

The afternoon of the first day was devoted to beginning to familiarize the enumerators with the master DG (CO) questionnaire in French. The entire second day was spent going over that questionnaire question by question in French. For each question, Davis would explain the concepts being measured and why a particular formulation was being used. He also explained how each question was coded and frequently employed role playing exercises to demonstrate how to code various response scenarios. The data collection team was very animated in the course of the discussion and offered numerous suggestions on how to render questions more precise or clear. Such suggestions often concerned the French translation of the questionnaire, but substantive issues of data collection strategy, as well as question formulation and order, were also raised.

All of the following (third) day was spent going over the master CO questionnaire question by question and getting the data collection team involved in translating from French into Bambara (Bamanankan). Care was taken to be faithful to the 1997-98 questionnaire translation, but it was considered important to involve the data collection team in questionnaire translation and to ensure that they felt they "owned" that translation. The trainers were careful to cultivate stimulus equivalence across enumerators. During this process, new definitional issues and clarifications were raised that had not come up in the previous session. The training was very useful in identifying needed improvements in the questionnaire -- a complete revision was undertaken after the training, before the pre-test, and further revisions were made after the pre-test.

The fourth and fifth days of the training were devoted to familiarizing the data collection team with the new sub-questionnaires, which posed a special challenge. In particular, they required the careful recording of data on amounts of training and external funding received, as well as their sources and types. Moreover, it involved asking for information on internal revenue and expenses of community organizations. This represented unusual content and thus unusual challenges for most of the enumerators.

The sixth training day was spent interviewing real community organization leaders in Info-Stat's training room. The enumerators broke into small groups and took turns interviewing the officers of a community health association and a school parents' association. The seventh day was spent going through the master questionnaire and each sub-questionnaire question by question, discussing points of difficulty and new translation issues. Where necessary, pairs of enumerators reenacted interview segments to get feedback from the rest of the group. This provided essential preparation for the eighth day, when the four teams went out and conducted three test interviews each with real COs within a 100 kilometer radius of Bamako. Sidibé, Doumbia, and Davis each accompanied a group, while the group with the most experienced supervisor was unaccompanied.

Half of the ninth day was spent once again de-briefing the previous day's interviews. Enumerator input was very valuable in permitting the MSI consultants to perform further revisions of the survey instruments. The most important revisions involved refining question sequence and enumerator instructions to ensure smooth interview flow and user-friendliness.

The second half of the ninth day was spent introducing the federation and local official questionnaires. The federation questionnaire involved the same concepts as the CO questionnaire, with the most important difference often being a higher standard of proof or performance being expected. The local official questionnaire was identical to the very brief version used last year as a triangulation device, and all of the supervisors were already familiar with it. Moreover, both of these questionnaires were to be administered in French and not local languages. Consequently, they were covered in considerably less time than the CO questionnaires.

Due to time constraints and the fact that the NGO interviews were scheduled after the CO, federation, and local official interviews, the NGO questionnaire training was postponed until after the enumerators returned from the field. At that time, just the four supervisors and two exceptional enumerators participated in a day-long training on the NGO questionnaire, which included all of the same questions as the federation questionnaire as well as a series of finance and training questions corresponding to those for the COs.

C. The Pre-Test

As described above, this year's study entailed major additions to the questionnaires employed in previous years. Indeed, three distinct new questionnaires were added, necessitating a considerable increase in the amount of time spent training enumerators. Needless to say, this also resulted in the need for considerable honing, fine-tuning, and pre-testing. The master DG questionnaire, after two completed surveys and numerous revisions over three years, did not require a pre-test, other than to

give enumerators the chance to polish their skills. The new sectoral questionnaires, on the other hand, required numerous drafts and ample pre-testing.

The new sectoral questionnaires each went through at least two drafts during Zalla's time in country and at least two more revisions based on training and the pre-testing which occurred during training. Zalla, assisted by Sidibé and occasionally Davis, conducted over fifteen questionnaire pre-test interviews before training began. Then, the questionnaires were substantially revised during training before the enumerators conducted sixteen additional pre-test interviews, for a total of at least thirty-one.

The new questionnaires certainly constitute a new direction for DGSO performance monitoring, in that they are aimed at more precisely linking inputs (i.e., training and funding of COs) to outputs and outcomes (e.g., organizational performance). Just as the master DG questionnaire has been refined over the years, we are confident that this year's sectoral questionnaires will serve as a solid foundation to which we will add the bricks, mortar, paint and trim of a more refined cross-sectoral system in years to come.

3. SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION

The present report describes the results of a census of all INGOs and federations working with the international Partners of the DG team. It also describes the results of a survey of target and non-target COs. Because of the subjective and qualitative nature of much of the information sought in this study, we added a set of qualitative interviews with local officials to supplement, confirm and otherwise shed light on the quantitative data collected.

A. Data Types

As in previous years, data were collected from six sources:

1. A survey census of 18 intermediary NGOs through which international NGO Partners (CLUSA, Save the Children-USA, and World Education) implement their programs. This marked a drop from the 25 reported partners last year.
2. A census of 18 federations that collaborate with USAID partners. This was fewer than the 27 reported by the PVOs because some of the collaborating “federations” were in fact NGOs.
3. A survey sample of 181 community organizations which work with the 19 INGOs or CARE-Mali.
4. A control group of 73 COs that are not partners with USAID or its Partners. Of these, 43 constituted the so-called “spread effect” control group, in that they were located in communes where USAID partner COs also work. Consequently, through contact with neighboring COs, they could conceivably be influenced by USAID programs. The remaining 30 non-target COs constitute the “true” control group, in that they are not located close enough to USAID partners to expect a spread effect.
5. Qualitative interviews with local officials in 45 arrondissements and communes where CO data were collected.
6. Qualitative interviews with officials at the Mission of Decentralization in order to gather information on the enabling environment with which partner COs are confronted.

B. The Sampling Frame

In order to define a sampling frame, the list of every single member of a population, the population must first be defined. This task was more easily accomplished this year than in the past, since all of the Partners provided clear lists of the community organizations with which they were engaging in governance-related activities. Consequently, the universe from which the sample was drawn was defined as “all community organizations engaging in governance-related activities who were on lists provided by the Partners to the DGSO Team by 1 September 1999.”

The improving quality of lists provided gives cause for satisfaction. However, it poses the special problem that each year's performance measurement estimates are calculated on the basis of a different population, thus severely hindering comparability. Table 1, below, shows that only 58 percent of the organizations in this year's sampling frame were in last year's.

Table 1. Comparison of 1999 and 1998 Sampling Frames

Partner	1998 CO Universe	1999 CO Universe	1999 COs Carried Over From 1998 (% Of 1999 Total)
CARE	38	55	36 (65%)
CLUSA	132	173	19 (14%)
Save-USA	681	199	142 (71%)
World Education	451	628	414 (66%)
Total	1302	1055	611 (58%)

Put another way, fully 42 percent of the organizations eligible for inclusion this year were not last year because they did not appear on the lists! Also notable in the table is the fact that most (86 percent) of CLUSA's organizations are different from the ones they listed last year, as well as the fact that Save's numbers have decreased dramatically. Both of these phenomena are easily understood. CLUSA has a demand-driven philosophy that can result in a dramatic change in partners from year to year. For Save, the decrease was primarily but not exclusively related to a combination of the DGSO Team deciding to no longer count village health committees (CVSs) as COs.

A related problem seems to be a dis-juncture between numbers of organizations targeted by Partners' programs and the DGSO program. Specifically, three of the four DGSO partners (most dramatically World Education) showed a fairly substantial increase in the numbers of COs they were working with from 1998 to 1999. This comes in spite of the fact that USAID has long since surpassed the 750 partner COs that it promised to be held accountable for to Washington.

Even the least technically-astute reader can clearly see the difficulties this causes for tracking progress on key indicators. In light of this, one can only be surprised at the general consistency from year to year, as we shall see below.

One has difficulty seeing how we could have avoided this dilemma, as one of the biggest challenges in putting into action a performance measurement system for the DGSO Team's civil society partners was obtaining reliable lists, and they have improved leaps and bounds each year. While they may not be absolutely perfect this year, the standard is quite good. Previously, the list quality was not good enough to serve as a lasting master list. Happily, this year this has changed.

For this reason, the team should consider this year's sampling frame as a cohort – "All of USAID's DGSO CO partners as of 1 September 1999." In this vein, next year's evaluators may choose only to evaluate the progress of this cohort or they could choose to break it into sub-cohorts. This would be difficult, however, as relatively few of the organizations have 'length of USAID collaboration' information and for those that do it is of questionable accuracy. Alternatively, they could compare the 1999 cohort with that of the new CO partners that enter the universe after 1 September 1999. This seems more reasonable to expect to be able to do accurately. One should keep in mind, however, that any such comparison would increase the required sample size.

A slightly different problem in sampling frame definition is that different Partners may mean different things when they say that they are "collaborating with a CO to undertake governance-related activities." Hypothetically, in the extreme case, one partner may include all COs with which it has made contact and agreed on principles, while another may only include COs to which it has provided training. The DGSO Team asked the partners to provide lists of COs with which they were already engaged in DG activities but this seems to have been interpreted in rather broad fashion. This is generally not a problem, as the sorts of variables included this year (e.g., amount and type of training and external revenue received) permit us to sort out these issues in regression analysis.

Nevertheless, to conduct the study we were asked to do, we had to set a minimum threshold for what counted as partnership. We did this based on the COs' own reports. If we sampled a supposed USAID partner CO that reported receiving no training in the previous two years, no funding of USAID origin for the past year, and reported no USAID partner national or international NGOs as representing their interests, we reclassified them from the target group to the "spread effect" control group. In our original sample of 196 target COs, we found 15 who met these criteria. If one assumes that the rate of inclusion of these questionable partners is constant across PVOs, this suggests that only about 974 of the 1055 reported partner COs show any sign of collaboration ($15/196 = .0765 \times 1055 = 974.26$). More on this below.

C. Sample Design

The selection of a sampling methodology should be driven by the substantive objectives of the study, and the current survey has a broader scope than the 1997 and 1998 surveys. While the first two DGSO performance measurement surveys concentrated on governance performance indicators, the present study calls for an examination of the effect of DGSO collaboration upon CO service delivery in their economic, educational, or health-oriented activities.

Several variables are of particularly high interest to the DGSO Team, for reasons expressed below:

- ◆ *Gender* – This is the only stratification explicitly called for in the DG Strategic Framework/Results Plan. Because certain indicators require dis-aggregation of results for women's groups, such organizations must be well represented in the sample.

- ◆ *PVO Partner* – After Survey I, the DG Team expressed a strong desire to stratify by PVO partner in Survey II. Reporting results by PVO partner allows USAID and its partners to pool information in improving the program and it also permits USAID to independently verify results reported by partners.
- ◆ *Sector of Intervention* – Given the desire to explore the impact of DGSO support upon CO performance in their education, health, and SEG service delivery, sector is clearly an important consideration. A major change from last year is that comités villageois de santé (CVS) have been dropped from the sampling frame for reasons related to the nature of the groups as well as USAID programming priorities.
- ◆ *Region* – Given the wide variety of ecological zones and levels of affluence, geography is an important factor. In DGSO Survey I, region constituted a major stratification. In the interest of simplicity, it was replaced last year by PVO partner.
- ◆ *Length of Time Supported by USAID* – This is particularly relevant given the large number of relatively new partners and the fact that one cannot realistically expect a DG impact in periods under a year, if not longer. Out of the 1055 COs in this year’s sampling frame, we have identified 611 that were in last year’s universe, as shown in Table 1, above.

In the interest of continuity with last year’s methodology, we are retaining the stratifications by gender and PVO partner. A stratified sample by PVO will ensure adequate representation of the education and economic sectors. The sub-sample of health COs will be smaller, but a relatively high portion of their total number (N = 49), as CARE in particular works with a high proportion of these ASACOs.

This methodology should ensure adequate geographic representation, though Bamako and possibly Ségou will probably not attain the magic sub-sample threshold of 30. We do not see this as a problem, as the mix of organization types is so different in each region that it is difficult to compare them anyway.

MSI originally designed a combined target and control group sample of 309. Due to constraints on the resources available for the data collection contract, this was eventually scaled down to 254. We drew a two-staged stratified sample, first ensuring adequate numbers of women’s groups and then ensuring adequate numbers for each PVO. Due to the finite population correction factor (related to the proportion of the total population being sampled) and the desire to reduce sampling error, we drew a larger sample from the PVOs with more CO partners. Nevertheless, we sampled a smaller proportion of World Education’s partners than anyone else’s, given their large population. The sample that was ultimately drawn was distributed as shown in Table 2.

As described above, the total target sample was 181 as compared with 137 last year. The total control group sample was 73, as compared with 36 last year.

Table 2. The Sample, By Gender and International Partner

Partner	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
CARE	1	34	35
CLUSA	9	29	38
Save-USA	10	32	42
World Education	10	56	66
"Spread" Group	6	37	43
"True" Control Group	3	27	30
Total	39	215	254

Thirty of the universe of 88 USAID women's COs were sampled, while 151 of 967 in the partner mixed CO universe were sampled. The sample sizes are large enough to permit cautious generalizations about all women's groups and all mixed groups. Cautious generalizations can be made about all groups or mixed groups on a PVO by PVO basis, but the PVO women's group sample sizes are too small for reliable estimates.

Table 3. Distribution of Target CO Sample by Region and Partner

Region	CARE	CLUSA	Save-USA	World Ed	Total
Bamako	-	-	-	11	11
Koulikoro	-	18	-	52	70
Mopti	30	9	-	-	39
Ségou	5	6	-	3	14
Sikasso	-	5	42	-	47
Total	35	38	42	66	181

The general geographic distribution represents the areas where USAID intervenes very well. For example, USAID has far more partner COs in Koulikoro than any other region, and this is reflected in the sample. Nonetheless, Koulikoro is proportionately slightly under-represented, as it consists of primarily World Education partners, and Mopti is proportionately over-sampled, as it consists primarily of CARE partners. As predicted, Bamako and Ségou have relatively small sample sizes, but, again, this generally reflects the areas where USAID has fewer partners.

The sub-group totals will therefore allow a range of interesting, if tentative, comparisons. A common misconception is that one absolutely needs large samples in order to perform statistical comparisons. All things being equal, larger samples are better because they narrow the margin of error. Nevertheless, carefully-drawn *random* samples of 30 or more can be almost as useful as very large samples. One should note the relationship between sample size and statistical power. For the t-test used in comparisons between small samples, the table stops at a sample size of 120, and increasing

sample size beyond thirty has diminishing marginal returns. Our choice of sample size entailed reconciling statistical power with resource constraints. Given trade-offs between sampling error and data collection error, the consultants are confident that the present sampling methodology carefully balances these important considerations.

A few additional comments on sampling methodology are in order: Efficient sample size estimates assume a simple random sample without multiple stages or deliberate stratifications. Sampling variability increases when cluster sampling is used and decreases when stratification is used. Gains from stratification occur when the variability within a stratum is small (homogeneity) and the differences between strata are large. Our history of USAID data analysis shows consistent differences by Partner and by gender. We are therefore confident that we did everything possible under the circumstances to minimize sampling error. Nonetheless, the relatively small size of our sample makes it more difficult to discover statistically significant differences between groups, because fine-grained differences require larger samples to detect. Consequently, a relatively small sample allows us to trace general contours in the data while being unable to make definitive statements about finer nuances. However, some of the finer nuances can be sorted out in regression analysis, though that is somewhat constrained by small sample sizes as well.

D. Control Group

This year we employed a control group methodology that was considerably more ambitious than that attempted last year. Last year's methodology was limited by the lack of a complete sampling frame for non-target community organizations. This year, before the study began, Info-Stat was commissioned to construct complete lists of all of the community organizations analogous to the types USAID works with (APEs, ASACOs, community school comités de gestion, economically-oriented organizations, caisse-type groups, and women's groups) in a representative selection of communes in the four regions and Bamako. The zones for which the control group sampling frame was constructed were as follows:

- ◆ In Bamako District: Communes III and V
- ◆ In Koulikoro Region (all the communes in the following arrondissements):
 - Mourdiah Arrondissement (Nara Cercle, south of Wagadu)
 - Kangaba Arrondissement Central
 - Neguéla Arrondissement (Kati Cercle, north of Siby)
 - Massigui Arrondissement (Dioila Cercle)
- ◆ In Mopti Region (all the communes in the following arrondissements):
 - Mougna Arrondissement (southwest of Djenné)
 - Kani-Gogouna Arrondissement (Bandiagara Cercle, near Sangha)
- ◆ In Segou Region (all the communes in the following arrondissements):

Farako Arrondissement (Segou Cercle Central)
 Baraoueli Arrondissement Central

◆ In Sikasso Region (all the communes in the following arrondissements):

Finkolo Arrondissement (Sikasso Cercle, south of Danderesso)
 Keleya Arrondissement (Bougouni Cercle)
 Niena Arrondissement (Sikasso Cercle)

Once these lists were constructed, a reasoned sample was drawn ensuring that thirty control group COs would be drawn in communes where USAID works (“spread effect” group) and thirty would be drawn where USAID does not work (“true” control group). Care was taken to match organization types (e.g., education, etc.) with the types of organizations USAID partners work with in those zones.

As mentioned above, in initial questionnaire pre-tests, we discovered a serious problem that could affect USAID’s assessment of its impact. Several of the target COs contacted in the Bamako area were unaware of any partnership with USAID or one of its PVOs or intermediary NGOs. Consequently, the present study permits USAID to assess its true coverage in comparison with what its partners report. As reported earlier, COs giving absolutely no indication of collaboration with any USAID intermediary or international partners were reclassified into the spread effect control group, leaving us with a total of 43 spread effect COs and 30 true control COs for a total control group of 73.

To demonstrate the similarity of the control group to the target group sample, Table 4 displays their respective distributions by sector of operation.

Table 4. Comparison of Target COs and Control Group COs, by Sector

Sector	Target COs	Control Group COs	Total
Health	19 11%	6 8%	25 10%
Education	82 45%	31 42%	113 44%
Economic/Caisse	15 8%	9 12%	24 9%
Economic/non-Caisse	63 35%	27 37%	90 35%
Other	2 1%	0 0%	2 1%
Total	181 100%	73 100%	254 100%

Table 4 shows that all three of the major sectors in which DGSO partner COs work match up closely in terms of proportions of the target and non-target samples. All three sectors are within 6 percent in variation between the two groups.

Table 5 displays the distribution of control and target COs by geographic region.

Table 5. Comparison of Target COs and Control Group COs, by Region

Region	Target COs	Control Group COs	Total
Bamako	11 6%	5 7%	16 6%
Koulikoro	70 39%	22 30%	92 36%
Mopti	39 22%	11 15%	50 20%
Segou	14 8%	17 23%	31 12%
Sikasso	47 26%	18 25%	65 26%
Total	181 100%	73 100%	254 100%

The distributions in Table 5 are similar, though not as similar as by sector. This is the case for the following reasons. First, because the Koulikoro Region is saturated with World Education and CLUSA partner COs, we were unable to draw “true” control COs there. Consequently, we drew many control group COs in Ségou arrondissements bordering Koulikoro Region, and thus sharing similar characteristics. If one combines the Ségou and Koulikoro target groups and control COs, one finds they make up 47 and 53 percent, of their respective samples. Besides the refined distinctions and doubled sample size, another improvement in this year’s control group over last year’s is that it includes Bamako in a virtually identical proportion to that of the target sample.

One final note on the concept of a control group – The fundamental scientific principle behind the concept is to have a sample that is similar to the target group in every way except the key stimulus, the effect of which one wants to measure. In the present case, the key stimulus is “USAID support” (understood as funding, training, or other collaboration). The research question thus becomes “All else being equal, do organizations receiving support from USAID perform better than groups that receive no support from USAID?” We are not only examining the effect of aid, but *USAID* aid in particular, and we assume that, in general, organizations that receive development assistance of any kind differ in some fundamental way from those who do not. Consequently, the USAID target group’s peers, that is, those to which it will be compared to under the principle of *ceteris paribus* (all else equal), may (and perhaps must) include organizations receiving non-USAID development assistance. In other words, it in no way contaminates the control group if a CO in it has received non-USAID development assistance. The independent effects of different types of support can then be sorted out through regression analysis.

E. Data Collection Supervision

Sidibé and Davis accompanied Info-Stat personnel for much of the data collection in Mopti, Ségou, and Koulikoro Regions. Towards the end of the month of data collection, they then performed spot-checks to verify that the work was done (and reliability checks to verify that it was done well). In all, MSI attended or spot-checked 35 of the 254 CO interviews as well as about 15 of the federation, NGO, and local official interviews. This independent supervision was indispensable in alerting the consultants and Info-Stat's director to possible sources of confusion in the data collection. For example, in one case, the consultants identified a case in Nara cercle where the data collection team had interviewed the wrong CO from the one identified on their sample list, a CO that was not even part of the target universe. In this case, the interview was not wasted, as the CO was re-classified into the control group. Occasional mistakes are inevitable in any large data collection enterprise. In general, however, the supervision revealed that the Info-Stat enumerators were uniformly competent and conscientious in carrying out the data collection, even in the most remote zones, an observation consistent with our experience in previous years.

4. PROGRAM INDICATOR DATA

This section provides the tools for a detailed understanding of the data analysis, as well as a description of the actual results. First, the weighting techniques used as well as other statistical techniques employed are described. This description provides background for the benefit of future evaluators or the curious layperson. Casual readers can get a basic grasp of data implications without reading section A. In section B, data analysis and results following the logic of the DGSO results framework is presented. For ease of access, results for the indicators are presented in italics at the appropriate location in the text.

A. Weighting Digression

Continuing the logic of the earlier sampling discussions, the present discussion is intended to assist the DGSO Team in understanding how the weights in the present survey are calculated and why they are necessary. Because the logic is the same as was used last year, the text is virtually unchanged.

Sometimes disproportionate sampling is appropriate in order to ensure that sufficient numbers exist in each important sub-population in order to do statistical analysis. As long as the sub-populations are used for separate or comparative analysis, weighting is unnecessary. In such a case where certain sub-populations are over sampled and one wants to create a composite picture of the sample which is intended to accurately reflect the population, however, different elements must be weighted. Weighting permits the drawing of a relatively unbiased picture of the population and can be used for univariate (e.g., gender) or multivariate (e.g., gender and Partner) adjustments.

A probability sample is representative of a population if all elements have an equal chance of being selected for that sample. A proportionate stratified sample is a way of achieving a simplified approximation of a probability sample according to a characteristic deemed important.

In our case, we had a choice between doing a proportionate stratified sample and having too few cases in some strata (e.g., women's organizations, CARE partners) to do meaningful analysis or resolving the "too few cases" problem by doing a non-proportionate stratified sample. We chose the second approach, ensuring the possibility of making meaningful comparisons between Partners and types of organization, in spite of the fact that the proportions in our sample would be unrepresentative of the population as a whole.

This sample, in which different elements have different probabilities of selection, was made representative by effectively assigning each element a weight equal to the inverse of its probability of selection. This system allows the approximation of a representative probability sample. Some explanation is in order.

In a perfectly representative probability sample, every subgroup appears in exact proportion to its incidence in the population at large. Thus, every stratum is weighted equally in that its incidence in the sample equals its incidence in the population, so it has a weight of one (say, .25 percent of population/.25 percent of sample = 1.0). In a disproportionate sample, sub-groups must be weighted in

order to correct for over- or under-sampling. Weights are constructed very intuitively. For example, if a sub-group constitutes twenty percent of the population but only ten percent of the sample, its weight would be $.20/.10$, that is, two. Half as many of the sub-group were sampled as should have been, so the weighting system effectively doubles the stratum in order to correct for under sampling.

Because we wanted to ensure adequate representation in order to do analysis by gender, we intentionally engineered the stratified sample to over-include women's groups and under-include mixed groups. Similarly, CO partners of CARE, CLUSA, and Save the Children-USA are over-included while partners of World Education are under-included. Therefore, any analysis that is done in order to describe the whole population, as most of the indicators do, will be weighted.

In theory, stratification is done because one thinks that there is reason to believe that the different strata have different characteristics. Therefore, disproportionate inclusion of strata can result in biased results. In last year's study, data analysis revealed frequent differences between women's and mixed groups and between Partners. The consultants therefore felt that the presentation of unweighted results would yield a biased and therefore unrepresentative portrait of target-CO performance. The decision was consequently made to weight by Partner and gender. This results in eight possible sub-groups, each with different probabilities of selection and therefore requiring different weights. The figures used in the calculation of the weights used in the data analysis are shown in Table 6, below. The far right-hand column displays the weights used to estimate the results that would emerge from a representative cross-section of DGSO Team partners.

Table 6. Calculation of Sampling Weights after Re-Classification, 1999

Category	Estimated Population N =	Original Sample - Reclassified COs = n	Proportion in Pop.	Proportion in Sample	% in pop % in samp
Care-mixed	$52 * 1.0 = 52$	$34 - 0 = 34$.054	.187	.289
Care-women	$3 * 1.0 = 3$	$1 - 0 = 1$.003	.006	.500
Clusa-mixed	$141 * .936 = 132$	$31 - 2 = 29$.139	.160	.869
Clusa- women	$32 * .90 = 29$	$10 - 1 = 9$.030	.050	.600
Save-mixed	$163 * .914 = 149$	$35 - 3 = 32$.155	.177	.876
Save-women	$36 * 1.0 = 36$	$10 - 0 = 10$.038	.055	.691
World-mixed	$611 * .875 = 535$	$64 - 8 = 56$.564	.309	1.825
World-women	$17 * .909 = 16$	$11 - 1 = 10$.016	.055	.291
TOTAL	3 = 952	3 = 181	3 = 1.00	3 = 1.00	-

Close examination of table 6 allows a couple of interesting observations. First, the fact that all but one of the weights in the far right-hand column are less than 1.0 tells us that all of the sub-groups were over-sampled except for World Education mixed groups, which were far under-sampled (Remember, a weight of exactly 1.0 would mean that the group appeared in the sample in the exact same proportion as in the universe). Save and CLUSA mixed groups, with weights closest to 1.0, were sampled in proportions closest to their incidence in the population.

Second, for the sake of brevity, the information on COs which were classified from the target group to the control group is included here. The target sample size was originally 196, until 15 “target” COs reporting no sort of collaboration with USAID partners were reclassified. Then the proportion of the “target” sample COs for each of the eight categories (by PVO and gender) is multiplied by population size for that category to give a revised estimate of the number for that category in the sampling frame who are really collaborators. Based on the aggregated estimates for each of the eight categories, we come up with an estimate that approximately 952 of the 1055 target COs are truly engaged in collaboration. [Note: This estimate is more precise than the estimate of 974 presented above for the following reason – Above, we just took the proportion of reclassified “target” COs in the whole sample to derive an estimate for the entire population. Here, we applied the proportion of reclassification for each one of the eight categories, calculated estimates for each category, and then aggregated them. The first estimate assumed a constant rate of overstatement of collaboration and applied the average across all categories. Clearly, this oversimplifies things, as CARE had no groups reporting no collaboration while 12.5 percent of the World Education mixed group sample reported no USAID-related collaboration. Consequently, the second approach is more precise.]

In order to demonstrate the process of weighting, we present the following example using last year’s data on the first strategic objective indicator. Table 7 presents the raw frequencies on amount of development decisions affected as reported by officers of the 137 target COs studied in 1998. The right-hand “total” column shows the total frequencies at various levels of affecting development decisions and their percentages in the sample. The two middle columns show the breakdown of responses among women’s groups and mixed groups as well as the percentage giving a given response *within that subgroup* (i.e., women or mixed). The bottom row shows the total frequency of women’s groups and mixed groups and gives column percentage totals.

Table 7. Percent of Target COs which Have Affected Local-Level Development, 1998 Decisions (Raw Frequencies)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No effort to contact authorities	21 63.64%	39 37.50%	60 43.80%
Contact, but no decisions affected	7 21.21%	23 22.12%	30 21.90%
One decision affected	3 9.09%	28 26.92%	31 22.63%
Two or more decisions affected	2 6.06%	14 13.46%	16 11.68%
Total	33 100.00%	104 100.00%	137 100.00%

In Table 8, we've estimated what the percentages in the table would be if we had done a proportionate sample by gender and Partner. It is presented in order to give the DG team an idea of the intuition behind weighting -- for good statistical reasons, some sub-groups (e.g., all women's groups, CARE-mixed groups) were over sampled and some (e.g., Save-mixed, World-mixed) were under sampled. Weighting corrects for giving a sub-group more or less importance than its incidence in the population warrants. When we weight sub-groups, we are operating under the premise that, for example, the percentages shown below are what we would expect to find had we drawn a proportionate sample.

Table 8. Percent of COs which Have Affected Local-Level Development Decisions, 1998 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total	Control
No effort to contact authorities	59.99%	35.87%	37.02%	50.00%
Contact, but no decisions affected	22.78%	19.17%	19.34%	19.44%
One decision affected	10.18%	25.19%	24.47%	22.22%
Two or more decisions affected	7.05%	19.77%	19.16%	8.33%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100%

B. Chi-Square Statistic

For many of the cross-tabulations presented in this study, a chi-square statistic and significance level is presented. The chi-square test is a test of statistical independence that allows us to demonstrate whether a non-random relationship exists between two variables. While it is not a measure of the strength of a relationship, it permits us to state the probability of a given relationship occurring by chance, or, conversely, our level of confidence in two variables being linked. Where the chi-square statistic does not show a relationship that is significant at the .05 level or better, it will not be reported, though the results by sub-group will still be reported.

A chi-square test is one of the most simple tests allowing us to make inferences about a population based on a sample. The significance level associated with this test gives us the probability of the particular configuration displayed by the sample arising if there is no relation between two variables in the underlying population. Therefore, the smaller the significance level, the more confident we are that the variables are linked. In statistical language, we are looking for evidence that tells us whether or not to reject the null hypothesis that, for example, women's groups and mixed groups engage in the same amount of civic action in the larger universe of COs.

C. DGSO ANNUAL SURVEY III RESULTS

In the present section we present tables summarizing data collected to measure USAID/Mali's DGSO performance indicators. As much as possible, we specify the clarifications that were given to the enumerators to ensure that terms are clearly defined. Most indicators were measured closely following the instructions given by USAID/Mali and previous consulting teams. Where this was not possible, an explanation and description of alternative measures taken are provided. The analysis follows the logic of the DGSO and intermediate results. Where it is perceived as useful for comparison purposes, results from previous years are also presented.

The reader should note that where frequencies do not add up to 181 for the target COs, 73 for the non-target CO control group (43 "spread" and 31 "true"), 38 for intermediary NGOs and federations, and 45 for local officials, the difference is the result of non-applicable categories or missing data.

The reader should note the following features aimed at making the data accessible:

Key data are presented in italics for the reader's convenience.

Results, intermediate results, and indicators are presented in bold type.

We rounded percentages to the nearest percentage point to facilitate comprehension. (Columns that do not sum to 100% result from rounding error)

The DGSO Performance Measurement Survey III results are as follows:

Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (SO 3): "Community organizations in target communes are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision making and planning."

Performance Indicators:

1. Percent of COs which have affected 2 or more development decisions.

Ever since beginning the performance measurement process, we have been honing the precision of this indicator. The word "affected" originally used in the indicator was deemed vague. Ever since last year, the questionnaire employed the language "convinced authorities to change a decision or resulted in something concrete" (this year's CO Question 36; see the questionnaires in Annex 1). This was a broader interpretation than was used in 1997, when it was defined as simply changing a decision. That definition raised the problem that areas where authorities are pro-active in seeking out the sentiment of the population would exhibit less organizational impact than was in fact occurring, which is why the interpretation was changed.

Table 9A provides the raw frequencies and percentages of CO-reported cases of influence on development decisions at the commune or arrondissement level, decisions made by development parastatals (such as the CMDT), and decisions made by deputies or other authorities.

Table 9A. Percent of Target COs Which Have Affected Development Decisions, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No effort to contact authorities	15 50%	64 43%	79 44%
Contact, but no decisions affected	11 37%	37 25%	48 27%
One decision affected	4 13%	30 20%	34 19%
Two or more decisions affected	0 0%	20 13%	20 11%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Chi2(3)= 6.2712 Pr.=0.099

Table 9B provides our best estimate as to what the population percentages are of women's and mixed groups having an impact upon development decisions. These percentages are calculated using the raw frequencies by Partner and gender and the weights by sub-group calculated in Table 8, above.

Note: The "women's groups" and "mixed groups" and "total" column in "weighted" tables provide data on the DGSO target CO sample. "Spread effect" and "true control" refer to the two categories in the non-target CO control group.

Table 9B. Percent of Target COs Which Have Affected Development Decisions, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No effort to contact authorities	62%	41%	43%
Contact, but no decisions affected	26%	27%	26%
One decision affected	11%	20%	19%
Two or more decisions affected	0%	13%	11%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that 11 percent of all USAID-partner COs but no women's COs have affected two or more development decisions in the past year (November 1998-November 1999).

Table 9C. Percent of Target COs Which Have Affected Development Decisions, Multi-Year Comparison (Weighted)

	1997	1998	1999

	Women	Mixed	Women	Mixed	Women	Mixed
“No contact” or Contact, but no decisions affected	82%	69%	83%	55%	89%	67%
One or more decisions affected	18%	31%	17%	45%	11%	33%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In the above simplified table, one can easily compare the behavior of women’s and mixed organizations over the past three years. Given the varying sampling frames and all the other possible distorting factors, it is remarkable how similar the results are. For both types of groups, well over half of the respondents report affecting no decisions and mixed groups consistently out-perform women’s groups with respect to this indicator.

2. Number of regional/national government decisions target intermediary NGOs and federations and their CO members and partners affected.

As was reported last year, this is a difficult indicator on which to collect data. We do not have data on aggregate decisions affected by USAID and its partners, but we can report on the percentage of target COs who report to have engaged in collaboration and affected decisions. These data are reported in Table 10A.

Table 10A. Percent of Target COs Reporting Collaboration and Decisions Affected, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
“No collaboration” or “collaboration but no decisions affected”	2893%	11174%	13977%
Decisions affected	27%	4026%	4223%
Total	30100%	151100%	181100%

Chi2(1)= 5.5191 Pr.= 0.019

In Table 10B, we present the same data as above weighted by USAID international NGO Partner and by gender, compared with results for the control group of non-target COs..

Table 10B. Percent of Target COs Reporting Collaboration and Decisions Affected, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total

“No collaboration” or “collaboration but no decisions affected”	94%	72%	74%
Decisions affected	6%	28%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that 26 percent of all target COs have influenced decisions in collaboration with intermediary organizations such as NGOs and federations. However, only 6 percent of women’s COs report similar behavior.

The next table compares changes in reported decisions affected in collaborative civic action over the past three years.

Table 10C. Percent Of Target COs Which Have Affected Any Development Decisions In Collaboration With Other Organizations, 1997-1999

	1997	1998	1999
No collaborative civic action, or contact, but no decisions affected	94%	89%	74%
At least one decision affected	6%	11%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%

In spite of the previously mentioned changes in the sampling frame, the steady increase on this indicator is striking. There is reason to believe that collaborative civic action among USAID target COs and intermediary organizations has increased since the beginning of the democratic governance program.

While the increase in collaborative behavior is encouraging, we have reason to believe that the number of regional and national decisions affected by NGOs, federations and their CO partners is quite low. As shown in Table 11, below, in 82 percent of the *localities* surveyed in this year’s study, local officials reported that such groups had not affected even a single decision taken in the previous twelve months (ARR Question 8).

Table 11. Number of Arrondissement or Commune-Level Decisions Influenced by NGOs, Federations, and COs, as Reported by Local Officials, 1998-1999

Decisions Affected	1998	1999
Two or More	3 9%	3 8%
One	7 21%	4 11%
Zero	24 71%	31 82%

Total	34 100%	38 100%
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The data presented in the above table point more than anything else to the fact that collaborative civic action behavior continues to occur, though it tends to be the exception rather than the rule.

3. Percent of target COs forming a good partnership with local government in delivering public services.

In 1997, this was defined as consisting of community organizations feeling they were receiving something in exchange for their tax contributions. Last year, the standard was raised, asking CO leaders whether they had engaged with collaboration with the State (broadly construed, including officials, State services, and parastatals) in which they received a service and in return made a contribution in cash (above and beyond tax contributions), in kind, or in personnel (e.g., labor). The results for this indicator (operationalized in CO Question 49-51) are displayed in Table 12, below.

Table 12A. Percent of Target COs Reporting a Partnership with the State, 1999(Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No partnerships	25 83%	89 59%	114 63%
Report partnership, but no concrete examples provided	4 13%	53 35%	57 31%
Partnership reported and example(s) provided	1 3%	9 6%	10 6%
Total	30 100.00%	151 100.00%	181 100.00%

Chi2(2)=6.44214 Pr.= .03991

Table 12B presents the same data weighted by international NGO partner and by gender type, along with comparisons with the control group of non-target COs.

Table 12B. Percent of COs Reporting a Partnership with the State, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No partnerships	82%	56%	58%
Report partnership, but no example provided	16%	39%	37%
Partnership reported and example provided	2%	5%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that only 5 percent of all target COs can demonstrate evidence of high levels of cooperation with the government in the provision of services, while a mere 2 percent of women's groups report this sort of cooperation.

Table 12C provides a detailed comparison of partnership data from last year and this year.

At first glance one would surmise that performance had greatly worsened from last year to the present. In fact, the mixed group and total target group numbers are very close when one combines reported partnership with confirmed partnership. For example, last year 49 percent of mixed group respondents reported some form of partnership, while this year 44 percent did the same.

Table 12C. Percent Of COs Reporting A Partnership With The State, 1998-99 (Weighted)

	1998			1999		
	Women	Mixed	Total	Women	Mixed	Total
No partnerships	69%	51%	52%	82%	56%	58%
Report partnership, but no example provided	22%	30%	30%	16%	39%	37%
Partnership reported and example provided	9%	19%	18%	2%	5%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In short, the current data are probably more reliable than that reported in the past. The indicator requires a fairly high degree of collaboration and places the restriction that this collaboration only be counted if it is with the state. It is very plausible that only 5 percent of USAID’s partners meet this series of restrictive criteria.

The following table examines the same indicator but compares USAID target groups with the two types of control groups.

Table 12D. Percent of COs Reporting a Partnership with the State, 1999

	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
No partnerships	114 63%	33 77%	22 73%	169 67%
Report partnership, but no example provided	57 31%	6 14%	8 27%	71 28%
Partnership reported and example provided	10 6%	4 9%	0 0%	14 6%
Total	181 100%	43 100%	30 100%	254 100%

Chi2(4)= 7.8431 Pr.= 0.097

As the Chi-squared statistic reveals, USAID is doing significantly better than the control group organizations – the spread effect group and the target organizations are comparable in true collaborative behavior with the state. However, in all cases of collaboration, the USAID groups come out ahead, 37 percent to 25 percent (18/73).

4. Percent of target communes where USAID finances DG activities in which new COs have formed during the year.

In 44 communes and arrondissements in which CO leaders were interviewed, Info-Stat supervisors also interviewed the chef d’arrondissement, commune mayor, or one of their assistants to

ask general questions about organizational activity in the areas under their jurisdiction. As shown in the Table 13, in 31 of 43 jurisdictions (72 percent) for which there were usable data, officials reported the creation of new COs. Responses of “don’t know” are included in the calculations because one expects that officials should be aware of active new organizations. Given the small sample sizes each year, the officials reporting of new COs seems quite consistent, varying from 58% to 72% over the three-year period. If the “don’t know” responses are removed from the table, the range is even smaller (1997, 83%; 1998, 73%; 1999, 82%).

Table 13. Target Communes and Arrondissements Sampled in Which Officials Report the Formation of New COs During the Previous Year, 1997-1999

	1997	1998	1999
Jurisdictions reporting new COs	15 68%	22 58%	31 72%
Jurisdictions reporting no new COs	3 14%	8 21%	8 19%
Officials “don’t know” whether new COs have formed	4 18%	8 21%	4 9%
Total	22 100%	38 100%	43 100%

In 72 percent of jurisdictions surveyed where USAID finances DG activities, new COs had formed during the twelve months preceding the survey.

In light of the small sample size and the resulting rough nature of the estimates, the most appropriate observation to make is that in all three years, significantly over half of the officials surveyed reported new COs being created in their communes or arrondissements.

Reiterating a recommendation made last year, it would be useful for the DGSO Team and its partners to identify the localities in which no new COs have been reported over the course of the three surveys. This would permit further study in order to identify program activities that can promote the growth of vibrant civil society organizations in those areas.

5. Percent of target communes in which non-target COs adopt civic action practices.

The formulation of this indicator makes it impossible to measure optimally without large samples of non-target COs in a representative selection of communes. Given the resource constraints of the present study, a more precise formulation is “percent of non-target COs in target communes adopting civic action practices.” The 73 non-target COs in the present study operate in 30 different communes. Forty-three of these COs come from 23 different USAID target communes. This is the very definition of the “spread effect” component of the control group – those operating in relatively close proximity to

USAID partner COs. Among these, 27 COs (63 percent) reported having engaged in civic action in the twelve months preceding the study.

It is illustrative to compare target and non-target civic action behavior. The following table presents percentages of target COs and non-target COs who have, in the previous twelve months, pursued civic action at the arrondissement, cercle, or parastatal (e.g., CMDT) level or have contacted their député (as operationalized in CO 32). The reader should note that these are simply reported instances of civic action -- we are not concerned here with the degree of *success* of the civic action in question.

Table 14. Percent of COs Pursuing Civic Action at the *Arrondissement, Cercle, or Parastatal Level, or Contacting Their Député, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)*

	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
Pursued action at all four levels	7 4%	1 2%	1 3%	9 4%
Pursued action at three levels	14 8%	4 9%	0 0%	18 7%
Pursued action at two levels	34 19%	11 26%	4 13%	49 19%
Pursued action at one level	46 25%	11 26%	6 20%	63 25%
No contact	80 44%	16 37%	19 63%	115 45%
Total	181 100%	43 100%	30 100%	254 100%

Sixty-three percent of non-target COs in USAID target communes engaged in civic action practices in the 12 months preceding the survey.

These in the “spread effect” control group demonstrated very similar behavior to the USAID target COs and performed much better than the “true” control group (from non-target communes), among which only 37 percent engaged in civic action. The Chi-square statistic could not be calculated due to low expected cell frequencies, but this is clearly a striking difference between the two types of control group.

6. Percent of COs expanding their development services and activities.

Table 15A shows the proportions of COs contacted which reported expanded services and activities over the previous twelve months (as operationalized by CO 52-55).

Table 15A. Percent of Target COs Reporting Expanded Development Services and Activities, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No new services or activities reported	13 43%	66 44%	79 44%
New services or activities reported, but none outside mandate	15 50%	77 51%	92 51%
New services outside mandate	2 7%	8 5%	10 6%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Chi2(2)= 0.0905 Pr.= 0.956

Most notable in the above table is the fact that results are virtually identical for both women's and mixed groups.

Table 15B, below, weights the raw frequencies by gender and international Partner to present a representative portrait of the data. Based on this, we estimate that in the entire population 52 percent of all USAID-partner COs expanded development services and activities in the previous year.

Table 15B. Percent of Target COs Reporting Expanded Development Services and Activities, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No new services or activities reported	36%	50%	48%
New services or activities reported, but none outside mandate	56%	45%	47%
New services outside mandate	8%	5%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that 52 percent of target COs and 64 percent of women's COs expanded development services and activities in the twelve months preceding the survey.

It is interesting to note that in the weighted results, the rates for women's and mixed groups are no longer identical. What this suggests is that some of the higher-performing mixed groups came from PVOs that were oversampled in the sampling methodology and their importance is diminished in the weighting process.

IR 3.1: “Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.”

Performance Indicators:

1. Target COs govern themselves democratically.

In order to measure the level of internal democracy in COs, previous consultants developed a four-point index according to commonly-accepted criteria. These criteria were as follows: First, is the CO voluntary in founding and membership or is it ascriptive? That is, do members automatically belong according to their membership in a social category such as gender or an age group? Second, is leadership elected and does alternation occur according to organizational by-laws? Third, are meetings held according to organizational by-laws? Finally, fourth, is attendance reasonably high at both board and general membership meetings (at least 75 percent board attendance, and at least 60 percent general membership attendance)?

In 1997, the Team had substantial difficulties in using this index, for a variety of reasons. Most notably, organizations were doubly penalized for not having by-laws, and organizations not keeping attendance records were penalized. Further, the standard for “voluntariness” included both the membership status of the organization at its inception as well as at the present time. This was judged to unduly penalize organizations for a history that was usually beyond their control, so this sub-indicator was simplified to only judge current membership status. Ultimately, because of the low number of COs being able to show any record at all of attendance, the CO democratic governance index was shortened to three indicators.

In 1997, even after dropping one criterion from the index and defining a democratic CO as one meeting all three of the retained criteria, not a single one of the 168 COs surveyed exhibited systematic democratic self governance as defined in the DGSO program indicators. Moreover, only 3 percent even satisfied two criteria.

In 1998, because of concerns about doubly penalizing organizations for not having by-laws, as well as the fear of having overly complicated individual criteria (which tends to result in a higher rate of missing data), the “democratic self-governance index” was simplified as follows: COs were awarded one point each for meeting the following standards: 1. being voluntary in membership; 2. Practicing leadership alternation with fixed terms; 3. Possessing written by-laws; 4. Being able to demonstrate at least 60% attendance of rank-and-file members at their last general assembly. As the reader can see, this revised index measures all of the same phenomena as in the first study such as nature of membership, nature of leadership, level of participation, and possession of formal rules. At the same time, it also has the advantage of being greatly simplified.

Below, we present raw scores on each of the sub-indicators and then present the aggregate table in both raw and weighted form.

This year's results on the first democratic self-governance indicator are shown in Table 16. Interestingly, in this year's sample, 52 percent of the organizations surveyed described themselves as voluntary in membership (as measured by CO Question 11), as compared to 58 percent last year.

Table 16. Democratic Self-Governance Criterion 1, 1999: Percent of Target Cos Reporting that They are Currently Voluntary in Membership (Raw Frequencies)

Membership Type	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Ascriptive	9 30%	78 52%	87 48%
Voluntary	21 70%	73 48%	94 52%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Chi2(1)=4.70188 Pr.=.03013

This year, 48 percent of mixed groups and 70 percent of women's groups report that they are voluntary in membership.

The reader will note the strongly-significant difference between women's groups and mixed groups in membership type, as reflected by the Chi-square statistic. However, we would caution that this is a result of the particular type of women's groups in our sample (e.g., a disproportionately high number of women's credit unions), and not necessarily anything characteristic of women's groups in general.

The data for the second democratic governance criterion, leadership selection (as operationalized by CO 22) are displayed in Table 17, below.

Table 17. Democratic Self-Governance Criterion 2, 1999: Percent of Target Cos in Which Leadership Is Elected for a Specific Time Period Allowing Alternation (Raw Frequencies)

Method of Leadership Selection	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Leadership elected for a specific time period	8 27%	29 19%	37 20%
Leadership elected for open period	1 3%	7 5%	8 4%
Consensus of members	20 69%	90 60%	110 61%
Selection by village notables or previous board members	0 0%	25 17%	25 14%
Total	29 100.00%	151 100.00%	180 100.00%

Chi2(4) = 6.0588 Pr=.195

Among all groups, 20 percent elect leaders for a fixed period of time ensuring alternation. This procedure is also followed by 27 percent of women’s groups.

This result is identical to what was found in the 1998 sample. The implicit normative preference behind this indicator is for organizations to formally elect their leaders. Nevertheless, observers would be well-advised to view Western-style democracy as a continuum ranging from elected leadership for a fixed period, through leadership elected for an open period, to consensus, and concluding with selection by village notables. Many self-professed Malian democrats would argue that consensus is the appropriate means of democratic selection at the village level and any type of formal election would be de-stabilizing. Viewed in this manner, 86 percent of the organizations surveyed engage in some form of democratic leadership selection, a statistic that is quite encouraging. This figure is inflated by the large number of groups (61 percent) asserting that they choose their leaders by consensus of all the members. It would be worthwhile to contact some of the organizations in this category to examine in greater depth the leadership selection process. In particular, how inclusive are these groups when they engage in leadership selection or decision making by consensus? For example, do women and youth have their fair say in the process?

The next table presents the data for democratic self-governance criterion 3 -- the percentage of COs claiming to have formal organizational by-laws and those able to offer proof to that effect.

Table 18. Democratic Self-Governance Criterion 3, 1999: Percent of Target COs Demonstrating Proof of Formal By-Laws (Raw Frequencies)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Do not have by-laws	5 17%	34 23%	39 22%
Report by-laws but offered no confirmation	11 37%	42 28%	53 29%
Report and provide confirmation of by-laws	14 47%	75 50%	89 49%
Total	30 100.00%	151 100.00%	181 100.00%

Chi2(2)= 1.1131 P=.573

Approximately the same percentage of mixed groups and women’s groups offered evidence of the existence of organizational by-laws -- Fifty percent of mixed groups and 47 percent of women’s groups.

This is a significant improvement over last year, when only 31 percent of groups were able to show proof of by-laws. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that last year’s study was conducted during the rainy season and respondent’s were consequently busier and perhaps less willing to track down elusive documents. Nonetheless, this year’s result is encouraging.

The reader can see that 53 of the 142 COs (37 percent) claiming to possess formal by-laws were unable to present them for inspection. The reason for establishing “proof of by-laws” as a stand-alone index item was to avoid double-penalizing organizations not possessing by-laws. Nonetheless, if we eliminated all standards of proof, we would be lowering the bar too low and it would be difficult to seriously compare this year’s data with that of previous years. Consequently, for the purposes of the democratic self-governance index, only COs showing written proof of by-laws will receive this point. If at some point the Team feels that the standard was too rigorous, the index can be recalculated including all those claiming formal by-laws, regardless of whether or not they offered proof.

The fourth democratic self-governance criterion concerns rank-and-file attendance at the most recent general assembly. The primary purpose of this sub-indicator is to measure broad-based organizational participation. Unfortunately, the lack of organizational record keeping on matters of attendance has the effect of preventing 87 percent of the DGSO Team’s partners CO from meeting the standard. Consequently, their lack of formalized record keeping prevents USAID from measuring participation, which is what it is really trying to get at, and it is unreasonable to assume that all of these 171 organizations not receiving credit for this index item are non-participatory.

This underscores one more time the need for the DGSO Team to encourage its Partners to promote more systematic record keeping among COs, both as a means of monitoring other phenomena, as well as a desirable end in itself. One should note that the percentage of organizations with sufficient records of membership and attendance to permit the calculation of this indicator rose from 6 percent last year to 13 percent this year. While the indicator is still problematic, the trend is encouraging.

Nonetheless, it is useful to note that 43 percent (10 of 23) of the few organizations that were able to produce attendance records showed attendance in excess of the desired 60 percent. While the lack of records of 87% of the sample makes one wary of generalizing, this provides at least anecdotal evidence of rank-and-file participation in some organizations.

Table 19 Democratic Self-Governance Criterion 4, 1999: Percent of Target COs Demonstrating at least 60% rank-and-file General Assembly Attendance (Raw Frequencies)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
60% or Greater General Assembly Attendance	1 3%	9 6%	10 6%
30-59% General Assembly Attendance	0 0%	8 5%	8 4%
0-29% General Assembly Attendance	2 7%	3 2%	5 3%
No Attendance Records	27 90%	131 87%	158 87%
Total	30 100.00%	151 100.00%	181 100.00%

Chi2(3)= 3.9165 Pr.=0.271

Six percent (10 of 181) of all groups studied this year were able to demonstrate proof of 60 percent rank-and-file attendance at their most recent general assembly. However, only one women's group out of 30 (3 percent) met this standard.

The overall trend is nevertheless an improvement over last year, when only five of the 137 groups in the target sample (4 percent) were able to demonstrate proof of 60 percent rank-and-file membership attendance at their most recent general assembly.

Tables 20A and 20B display the 1998 and 1999 raw data for target CO scores on the democratic self-governance scale, with all of the sub-indicators included.

Table 20A. Percent of Target COs Practicing Democratic Self-Governance, 1998

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + written by-laws + *assemblée général* attendance; one point for each index item; a score of 4 = "very democratic;" 0 = "not democratic"]
(Raw Frequencies)

Democracy Score	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Four	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
Three	7 21%	9 9%	16 12%
Two	5 15%	19 18%	24 18%
One	18 55%	43 41%	61 45%
Zero	3 9%	33 32%	36 26%
Total	33 100%	104 100%	137 100%

Because of low expected cell frequencies, a valid Chi-square statistic cannot be generated. Once the top two categories are combined, however, a significance level of .273 is generated, meaning that there is a 27 percent chance that the differences between the two groups (women and mixed) occurred by chance and not because of anything systematic. This means that we cannot reasonably say that the relatively small differences between women's and mixed groups are the result of anything other than sampling error.

Table 20B. Percent of Target COs Practicing Democratic Self-Governance, 1999

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + written by-laws + *assemblée général* attendance; one point for each index item; a score of 4 = “very democratic;” 0 = “not democratic”]
(Raw Frequencies)

Democracy Score	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Four	1 3%	0 0%	1 1%
Three	4 13%	16 11%	20 11%
Two	10 33%	35 23%	45 25%
One	8 27%	68 45%	76 42%
Zero	7 23%	32 21%	39 22%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Tables 20C and 20D present the democratic self-governance scores weighted by Partner and gender and compared to the control group.

Table 20C. Percent of COs Practicing Democratic Self-Governance, 1998

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + written by-laws + *assemblée général* attendance; one point for each index item; a score of 4 = “very democratic;” 0 = “not democratic”]
(Weighted)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total	Control
Four	0%	0%	0%	3%
Three	21%	4%	5%	6%
Two	15%	15%	15%	8%
One	55%	43%	44%	44%
Zero	9%	37%	36%	39%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 20D. Percent of COs Practicing Democratic Self-Governance, 1999

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + written by-laws + *assemblée général* attendance; one point for each index item; a score of 4 = “very democratic;” 0 = “not democratic”]
(Weighted)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Four	4%	0%	0.4%
Three	7%	9%	9%
Two	27%	24%	24%
One	32%	50%	47%
Zero	29%	18%	19%
Total	100%	100%	100%

There is an encouraging, if relatively small, increase in the percentage of mixed and total target groups scoring at least three on the democratic self-governance index (from 4 to 9 percent and from 5 to 9 percent, respectively). Among women’s groups, there is a drop from 21 to 11 percent. This is slightly unsettling but is almost certainly the consequence of a changes in the composition of the population and the small sample size of women’s groups (n= 33 last year and 30 this year).

If one combines the top three categories, those who scored from 2 to 4 on the index, women’s groups increased slightly, from 36 to 38 percent, while mixed groups and the total target group jumped from 19 to 33 percent and 20 to 33 percent, respectively.

Figure 1 compares the democratic self-governance index results with those of previous years. In this and other figures displaying index results, scores of zero are classified as weakest one as weak, two as promising, and three or four as strong.

Table 20E compares the 1999 target group results on the democratic self-governance index with those of the spread effect and “true” control groups.

Figure 1
Democratic Governance Index, 1997-99
USAID Target Group Performance





Table 20E. Percent of COs Practicing Democratic Self-Governance, 1999

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + written by-laws + *assemblée général* attendance; one point for each index item; a score of 4 = “very democratic;” 0 = “not democratic”]
 (Raw Frequencies)

	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
Four	1 1%	0 0%	0 0%	1 .4%
Three	20 11%	3 7%	1 3%	24 9%
Two	45 25%	8 19%	3 10%	56 22%
One	76 42%	23 53%	10 33%	109 43%
Zero	39 22%	9 21%	16 53%	64 25%
Total	181 100%	43 100%	30 100%	254 100%

This cross-tabulation yields a Chi-square significance level of .014, confirming our visual judgment that there is clearly a dramatic difference between the three groups. Most strikingly, 53 percent of the true control COs scored zero on the democratic governance index while only 21-22 percent of the target and spread groups scored that poorly. Moreover, 12 percent of target groups met the standard (at least 3 out of 4), followed by 7 percent of spread groups, followed by only 3 percent of the true control group. While this result is not conclusive, it is the pattern one should expect if USAID partner COs are influencing the behavior of their neighbors. This pattern is displayed nicely in Figure 2.



Next we examine the performance of COs on the sound management index.

2. Target COs have sound management practices.

Both target and control group COs do slightly better when evaluated for the quality of their management practices.

The sound management criteria employed over the past two years to evaluate the performance of community organizations include:

1. Evidence of formal financial systems;
2. Evidence of strategic planning;
3. board literacy exceeding fifty percent; and
4. Systematic collection of dues.

This is a slight change from 1997, when both a five- and a four-point index were calculated. The five-point index was biased in favor of women’s organizations, because they automatically received credit for the gender analysis component of the strategic planning sub-indicator. Both indices included legal recognition as a sub-indicator. Upon further examination, the DGSO Team decided that this criterion in itself was not a direct indicator of sound management, though it remains an important organizational characteristic to track. It was therefore dropped from the index, and is now reported separately. Similarly, the gender analysis component of strategic planning was dropped, though it also is tracked separately. Finally, because by-laws are already a component of the democratic self-governance index, the collection of dues was separated from “as required in by-laws” and was changed to “systematic collection of dues.” The new standard simply requires that organizations be able to demonstrate a formal system of dues collection.

The first sound management criterion requires COs to present evidence of systematic, formal, financial systems. Results for this item are presented in Table 21.

Table 21. Sound Management Criterion 1, 1999: Percent of Target COs Presenting Evidence of Formal Financial Systems (Raw Frequencies)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Reported and provided evidence of formal financial system	16 53%	80 53%	96 53%
Reported formal financial system, but no evidence provided	8 27%	45 30%	53 29%
Do not have formal financial system	6 20%	26 17%	32 18%
Total	30 100.00%	151 100.00%	181 100.00%

Chi2[2] = .1941 P = .908

Among all groups, both mixed and women’s, 53 percent presented evidence of a formal financial system.

For this indicator, we have seen the sort of gradual progression that one would like to see. In 1997, 36 percent of all groups showed evidence of formal systems, followed by 47 percent last year and 53 percent this year.

The COs in this study are often very informal organizations with very few literate members who are capable of adequate record keeping. There are indicators in the study, such as those having to do with by-laws and formal financial systems, which measure the level of formalization of an organization. In other indicators which do not directly intend to measure that phenomenon, we must be careful not to doubly penalize an organization. For example, in Mali’s rich oral culture, it is perfectly conceivable that organizations with no literate members engage in careful, systematic strategic planning processes. We recognize that careful thought can take place even if it is not written down. Consequently, we evaluated

the next criterion “evidence of strategic planning” as follows. CO leaders were asked whether they had set objectives for the five years to come and, if so, to name them. If they named at least two objectives for their CO or the larger community, they were judged as having met the standard. In general, CO leaders were very articulate in demonstrating evidence of strategic planning. These results are shown in Table 22.

Table 22. Sound Management Criterion 2, 1999: Percent of Target COs Showing Evidence of Strategic Planning (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
At least two concrete objectives benefiting community	22 73%	119 79%	141 78%
Claim to have organizational objectives, but mention zero or one concrete objective	3 10%	15 10%	18 10%
Do not have organizational objectives	5 17%	17 11%	22 12%
Total	30 100.00%	151 100.00%	181 100.00%

Chi2=[2] =.6987 Pr. =.705

Target CO leaders were very articulate in describing their strategic planning. Among mixed groups, fully 79.00 percent (up from 75 percent last year) named at least two concrete objectives benefiting their communities. Among women's groups, 73 percent (up from 70 percent last year) met the same standard.

The third sound management criterion concerns literacy rates on CO boards. Lacking concrete evidence of individual literacy levels, we asked respondents how many of their officers had completed four years of formal schooling (French or French-Arabic) *or* could read *and* write in a national language. Consultants then calculated literacy rates based on officer numbers provided by the organizations.

Table 23. Sound Management Criterion 3, 1999: Literacy Rates on Target CO Boards (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
75-100% Board literacy	6 21%	52 34%	58 32%
50-74.99% Board literacy	7 24%	49 32%	56 31%
25-49.99% Board literacy	7 24%	38 25%	45 25%
0-24.99% Board literacy	9 31%	12 8%	21 12%

Total	29 100%	151 100%	180 100%
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Chi [3] = 13.0924 Pr. = .004

Mixed groups were significantly more likely than women's groups to demonstrate at least fifty percent literacy among their officers. Specifically, 67 percent of the former and 45 percent of the latter met this standard.

In the fourth sound management criterion, CO leaders were asked whether their members pay regular dues and, if so, to show a formal, written record keeping system for that purpose. Results are shown in Table 24.

Table 24. Sound Management Criterion 4, 1999: Percent of Target COs Systematically Collecting Dues (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Confirmation provided of systematic dues collection	10 33%	11 7%	21 12%
Report that dues are collected systematically	3 10%	27 18%	30 17%
Do not have periodic dues collection	17 57%	113 75%	130 72%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Chi2(2)=16.7248 Pr.= .000

Seven percent of mixed groups and 33 percent of women's groups provided evidence of systematic dues collection.

This is comparable to but a slight improvement over last year, when only 5 percent of all mixed groups but 27 percent of women's COs provided such evidence. As was the case last year, the relatively high percentage of women's groups meeting this criterion seems to be linked more to the types of women's groups in the sample than to the nature of women's groups in general. More precisely, a disproportionate number of the women's groups that USAID's partners work with are credit unions, which generally require inscription fees as well as regular dues.

The DGSO Team should note that fully 72 percent of all target groups do not even collect periodic dues. (This is comparable to the 79 percent measured last year). Consequently, most of the COs under study had no chance of being given credit for satisfying this sound management criterion. The Team should examine their programmatic goals as they concern sound management. Specifically, do they consider the failure to collect dues as suggestive of a poorly-managed organization? If not, other indicators of sound management should be examined as possible replacements.

Based on the above four criteria, an additive four-item sound management index has been calculated to paint a composite picture of management practices. Raw frequencies for last year's and this year's indices are presented in the two tables which follow.

Table 25A. Percent of Target COs Practicing Sound Management Techniques, 1998

[Index: financial systems + strategic planning + functional literacy + systematic dues collection; one point for each item; a score of 4 = "sound management;" 0="unsound management"]
(Raw Frequencies)

Sound Management Score	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Four	4 13%	1 1%	5 4%
Three	7 22%	20 20%	27 20%
Two	10 31%	45 44%	55 41%
One	10 31%	31 30%	41 31%
Zero	1 3%	5 5%	6 4%
Total	32 100%	102 100%	134 100%

Table 25B. Percent of Target COs Practicing Sound Management Techniques, 1999

[Index: financial systems + strategic planning + functional literacy + systematic dues collection; a score of 4 = "sound management;" 0="unsound management"]
(Raw Frequencies)

Sound Management Score	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Four	3 10%	5 3%	8 4%
Three	8 27%	47 31%	55 30%
Two	9 30%	59 39%	68 38%
One	7 23%	32 21%	39 22%
Zero	3 10%	8 5%	11 6%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Neither year's sound management data generates a valid Chi-square statistic because cell expected frequencies are too low. Even if recoding is done to create fewer, larger categories, the Chi-square statistics are insignificant, meaning that the difference between mixed and women's groups are not enough to surmise that they are systematically different.

The next table presents weighted percentages for the sound management index.

Table 25C. Percent of COs Practicing Sound Management Techniques, 1998

[Index: financial systems + strategic planning + functional literacy + systematic dues collection; one point for each item; a score of 4 = "sound management;" 0="very unsound management"]
(Weighted)

Sound Management Score	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total	Control
Four	12%	0.1%	1%	3%
Three	22%	18%	18%	14%
Two	29%	47%	46%	36%
One	33%	28%	29%	36%
Zero	4%	7%	7%	11%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 25D. Percent of COs Practicing Sound Management Techniques, 1999


[Index: financial systems + strategic planning + functional literacy + systematic dues collection; one point for each item; a score of 4 = "sound management;" 0="very unsound management"]
(Weighted)

Sound Management Score	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Four	6%	2%	3%
Three	23%	27%	26%
Two	31%	39%	38%
One	28%	25%	25%
Zero	12%	7%	8%
Total	100%	100%	100%

According to weighted calculations, only two percent of all target groups score a perfect score of four on the sound management index. Among women's groups that probability rises to 12 percent. Fully 29 percent of all groups (the identical percentage for both mixed and women's groups), scored a solid score of at least three of four.

This is a considerable improvement over last year's estimate of 19 percent scoring that highly (mixed, 18 percent; women's groups, 34 percent). The slight reversal of the women's groups' percentage is not cause for concern, as such fluctuations are within the margin of error for such a small sample. In other words, one cannot say that the women's groups' performance is significantly different from last year's, while the mixed groups' and overall scores are certainly significant improvements over 1998.

Figure 3 portrays tendencies in the sound management data of the last three years.



If one examines closely the highest-frequency categories, an encouraging trend is depicted in the above figure. In 1997, the modal categories, (that is, those with the highest frequencies) were “weak,” followed by “weakest.” Last year, the modal categories were “promising,” followed by “weak.” This year, the modal categories are “promising,” followed by “strong.” In other words, each year, the biggest part of the distribution shifts to the right, just the way we want it to.

Table 25E compares the 1999 target COs with the spread effect and true control groups.

Table 25E. Percent of COs Practicing Sound Management Techniques, 1999

[Index: financial systems + strategic planning + functional literacy + systematic dues collection; one point for each item; a score of 4 = “sound management;” 0=“very unsound management”]
(Raw Frequencies)

Sound Management Score	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
Four	8 4%	0 0%	0 0%	8 3%
Three	55 30%	8 19%	9 30%	72 28%
Two	68 38%	17 40%	8 27%	93 37%
One	39 22%	16 37%	8 27%	63 25%
Zero	11 6%	2 5%	5 17%	18 7%
Total	181 100%	43 100%	30 100%	254 100%

Chi2(8)= 13.9063 Pr.= 0.084


In comparing the unweighted percentages for the target groups and the two types of control groups, 34 percent of USAID’s partners scored in the top two tiers of the sound management index, while only 23 percent (17/73) of the control group COs did so.

Figure 4 compares the performance of the three groups over the past twelve months.

The results displayed in this graph are slightly more ambiguous than in Figures 1 through 4 but are still quite interesting. First, note that the group with the highest percentage of weak organizations is the true control group. Second, the group with the highest percentage of strong organizations is the USAID target group. Moreover, the USAID distribution has its highest point in the upper half of the distribution. The spread effect group has its highest point in the middle of the distribution, and the true control group is fairly evenly distributed among the top three categories, though its modal category is “strong.” The fact that the USAID target organizations are strongest is encouraging but there is no clear pattern suggesting a spread effect.

Two indicators were included in the sound management index in 1997 but were removed the past two years because they were considered to be only tenuously linked to sound management. Nevertheless, they were both considered important and the DGSO Team wishes to continue following them. These indicators are those concerning legal recognition and gender analysis.

Figure 4
Sound Management Index, 1999:
Target vs. Control Group Performance



Because of confusion in the past as to what constituted legal recognition, this sequence of questions (CO 25-26) included first a filter to determine whether or not the CO claimed to be legally recognized, followed by a second question asking to see an official document demonstrating recognition. Enumerators were then instructed to note whether it constituted “local” recognition (circle- or arrondissement-level) or national recognition. The results are shown in Table 26A.

Table 26A. Percent of Target COs Reporting and Presenting Proof of Legal Recognition, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Proof of recognition by national administration	4 13%	9 6%	13 7%
Proof of recognition by local administration	8 27%	47 31%	55 30%
Reported legal recognition, but no document shown	8 27%	42 28%	50 28%
No legal recognition reported	10 33%	53 35%	63 35%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Chi2 (3) = 2.0924 Pr= 0.553

The following table adjusts the above frequencies, weighting them to correspond to the distribution of COs by PVO and gender type in the larger USAID-partner universe.

Table 26B. Percent of Target COs Reporting and Presenting Proof of Legal Recognition, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Proof of recognition by national administration	7%	10%	10%
Proof of recognition by local administration	23%	33%	32%
Reported legal recognition, but no document shown	29%	22%	23%
No legal recognition reported	41%	35%	36%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Ten percent of mixed groups and 7 percent of women's groups showed evidence of legal recognition at the national level. When local recognition is included, however, 43 percent of mixed groups and 30 percent of women's groups meet the standard of legal recognition.

This is a case where the results for the mixed and women's categories change considerably once weighting is introduced. These changes are more likely to occur for a variable where results differ by PVO. In such a case, the percentages for response categories where PVOs that make up either a very large or small part of the population from which the sample was drawn (i.e., World Education or CARE, respectively) tend to change.

The next table compares levels of legal recognition among the target groups and the two types of control groups.

Table 26C. Percent of Target COs Reporting and Presenting Proof of Legal Recognition, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
Proof of recognition by national administration	13 7%	2 5%	0 0%	15 6%
Proof of recognition by local administration	55 30%	14 32%	5 17%	74 29%
Reported legal recognition, but no document shown	50 28%	17 40%	9 30%	76 30%
No legal recognition reported	63 35%	10 23%	16 53%	89 35%
Total	181 100%	43 100%	30 100%	254 100%

Chi2 (3) = 10.4765 Pr.= 0.106

Very interestingly, when broken down into the two best categories and the two less normatively desirable categories, the target group and spread effect numbers are identical – 37 percent on the high end and 63 percent on the low end. Their results differ considerably from those of the control group, however (17 percent high and 83 percent low). There is clearly a significant difference between these two groups and the fact that this did not simply occur by chance is confirmed with a simple test – one can run a second chi-square independence test grouping target and spread groups together and comparing them with the true control group. Once this is done, we find a probability of only .07 that the results could have occurred by chance. In other words, true control COs differ systematically from the other groups in that they are less likely to demonstrate any kind of legal recognition.

CO Question 31 was designed to determine whether or not mixed CO leaders had given serious thought to the impact of their organization upon women. In order to avoid leading respondents by asking directly about their impact upon women, we asked them to describe their CO's impact on their community. Enumerators were then instructed to note whether or not respondents spoke directly of their impact on women. Based on this methodology,

Only 14 percent of all mixed COs showed evidence of performing gender analysis.

This result is startling, as last year's results are categorically different, with 50 percent being recorded as showing evidence of gender analysis. There are at least four plausible explanations for this discrepancy: 1. Question formulation – This is a very difficult concept to measure without excessively guiding the respondent. The validity of the question used to measure the underlying concept could be at issue; 2. Reliability issues – Given the nature of the question formulation and enumerator instructions, it is not certain that the same respondent would respond the same way every time the question was asked; 3. Enumerator effects – It is conceivable that this year's enumerators were trained to be more demanding in their standards of proof this year than last year's were; 4. Changes in the sampling frame – Forty-two percent of the CO names furnished by the PVOs to construct the sampling frame were different this year from last. Such a change could engender notable differences in the make-up of the population and thus the sample.

In fact, this difference could easily be a combination of minor effects from all factors, with the large resulting difference that we see above. The reader should keep in mind that the measurement of many governance concepts is a challenging endeavor in any context and is aggravated in Mali by the lack of formal records and organizational archives, resulting in the need to try creative but sometimes unsuccessful measurement techniques.

We are confident that this year's measurement of the indicator was done carefully and systematically. Moreover, in light of the oft-described challenges facing women in rural Mali, it is not surprising that officers of mixed organizations only directly raised issues of explicit interest to women in 14 percent of the interviews.

3. Percent of mixed-gender COs with women in leadership positions

Seventy-five percent of mixed COs had women in leadership positions.

As a rough measure of representativeness, mixed gender COs are asked how many women they have in leadership positions (CO 5). The result of 75 percent is a marked increase over last year's result (62.50 percent). Nonetheless, this increase should be viewed cautiously, as last year's observation marked a drop from 1997's point estimate that 82 percent of mixed groups had at least one woman on their leadership board. Given the dramatic fluctuations in the PVOs' CO partner lists from year to year one should not be surprised to see the composition vary -- We cannot be certain whether year-to-year changes are attributable to the success (or lack thereof) of USAID and its partners' programs or to the changes in make-up of the population from which the sample is drawn. Because this year's lists were the best yet provided, it would be prudent for USAID to draw the sample for next year's annual survey using this year's sampling frame. There for the first time it would be possible to observe changes in the behavior of the population with as few compromising factors as possible.

Last year's survey report included the recommendation that USAID and its Partners conduct more detailed qualitative studies in order to begin to get a sense as to the degree to which women really participate on the boards of mixed COs as well as whether these women exercise real influence or are simply token board members for the outsiders' benefit. This year's results are instructive in that regard. Among the 151 mixed organizations reporting female board members, women constitute less than a quarter of the board in 75 percent of the cases, and women constitute less than half of the board in 97 percent of the cases. In other words, women are almost always a minority and usually a small minority on CO boards of officers.

An interesting result is the following -- The target groups and spread effect groups reported women board members with almost identical frequency (approximately 75 percent). The true control group COs, on the other hand, reported female board members only 41 percent of the time. This result is particularly compelling because this is a case where donor influence could change CO behavior relatively quickly -- Leaders of non-target COs in close proximity to USAID-funded organizations would be quick to be exposed to the preferences of the donor. Consequently, they may be tempted to change the composition of their board in order to be more attractive to potential funding sources. While it is likely that the most rapid behavior change occurs for this sort of instrumental reason than deep convictions, the trend is encouraging.

4. COs pursuing civic action (public advocacy).

Table 27 presents a comparison of civic action behavior among USAID partner COs over the past three years. Respondents were asked whether they had contacted arrondissement, cercle, development parastatals or their member of the national assembly concerning a development problem in the previous 12 months.

Table 27. COs Pursuing Civic Action of any kind (weighted)

	1997		1998		1999	
	Women's	Mixed	Women's	Mixed	Women's	Mixed
Pursued any civic action	31%	46%	40%	64%	38%	59%
No civic action	69%	54%	60%	36%	62%	41%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

(Note: The 1997 survey did not ask about contact with one's national assembly representative)

Fifty-seven percent of all target COs (59 percent of mixed COs and 38 percent of women's COs) engaged in some form of civic action in the year preceding the survey.

While this indicator dropped slightly for both women's groups and mixed groups, this result is extremely close to the 1998 findings. Given the variety of factors influencing the data that we have already discussed, this should be considered roughly a statistical tie.

5. Percent of COs pursuing issues with "systematic" (formerly "effective") civic action.

This indicator, one of the four that are reported to Washington, is problematic, as this detail of information about procedural behavior is better gathered through a qualitative study (e.g., case studies) than through survey questions. Nevertheless, we have tried to operationalize it as well as we can given methodological constraints. Respondents were asked to identify and describe the most complex problem over which their CO had interacted with authorities during the preceding twelve months. Enumerators were instructed to observe during the course of the respondent's description and note whether respondents mentioned analysis of the problem at hand, proposal of a solution, formulation of an action plan, collaboration with other organizations, and participation of rank and file members.

When asked to identify and describe an instance of working in collaboration with the authorities to resolve a problem, only 102 of the 181 target organizations surveyed this year were able to present such an example. The enumerators' evaluations of the degree to which responses reflected a systematic approach to civic action are displayed in Table 28A.

Table 28A. Percent of Target COs Pursuing Issues with Systematic Civic Action, 1999

[Index: Problem analyzed + position developed + action plan formulated + other entities contacted + rank-and-file members participating; one point for each index item; a score of 5 = “systematic civic action;” 0=“unsystematic civic action”]
(Raw Frequencies)

Systematic Civic Action Score	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Five	0 0%	6 7%	6 6%
Four	3 20%	22 25%	25 25%
Three	6 40%	33 38%	39 38%
Two	6 40%	20 23%	26 25%
One	0 0%	4 5%	4 4%
Zero	0 0%	2 2%	2 2%
Total	15 100%	87 100%	102 100%

The next table presents the same target group data, weighted by partner and gender. The third presents a comparison of unweighted results for the target, spread, and true control COs.

Table 28B. Percent of COs Pursuing Issues with Systematic Civic Action, 1999.

[Five-Point Index: a score of 5 = “systematic civic action;” 0=“unsystematic civic action”]
(Raw Frequencies)

Systematic Civic Action Score	Women’s Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
Five	0%	11%	11%
Four	20%	26%	26%
Three	35%	36%	36%
Two	45%	18%	20%
One	0%	6%	5%
Zero	0%	2%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table 28C. Percent of COs Pursuing Issues with Systematic Civic Action, 1999

[Five-Point Index: a score of 5 = “systematic civic action;” 0=“unsystematic civic action”]
(Raw Frequencies)

Systematic Civic Action Score	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
Five	6 6%	0 0%	0 0%	6 4%
Four	25 25%	4 15%	3 27%	32 23%
Three	39 38%	10 37%	3 27%	52 37%
Two	26 25%	7 26%	3 27%	36 26%
One	4 4%	4 15%	2 18%	10 7%
Zero	2 2%	2 7%	0 0%	4 3%
Total	102 100%	27 100%	11 100%	140 100%

Chi2(10)= 11.6903 Pr.= 0.306

This year’s data present a very different picture from those of last year. Last year, 51 percent of all target COs were judged as scoring at least four of five possible points and thus demonstrating proof of systematic civic action. This percentage was uniform across both mixed and women’s groups. Forty-five percent of the organizations in the control group met this standard.

This year, 37 percent of the total as well as of mixed groups met the standard, but only 20 percent of the women’s group scored at least four points. Among the two combined segments of the control group, only 18 percent met the standard.

As mentioned above, numerous issues can affect the quality and reliability of the data one gathers. For example, questions may not be formulated in a valid manner. In other words, we may not be measuring what we think we are measuring. There is also the possibility of enumerator effects – a lack of inter-coder reliability because of different degrees of conscientiousness or the quality of the training they received. There is also, particularly in the case of the current study, the nagging question of how much variation in sampling frames affects the results received. Though we can not authoritatively answer the question of what went wrong in the measurement of this indicator, we do have hints that point us in the right direction. The fact that the results for the control group COs plummeted as much as those for the target COs leads us to believe that variation in the sampling frame is not responsible for the drop, as that would not cause the control COs to vary. We can confidently rule out that the quality of civic action undertaken deteriorated throughout Malian civil society. That is what such a uniform and dramatic change in both the target and control group could suggest, but we have no contextual information that even remotely corroborates this hypothesis. Consequently, we are left believing that the

change results from some combination of flawed question formulation (and, more generally, operationalization of this particular concept) and enumerator effects.

The field of quantitative evaluation of performance in democratic governance programming is quite new. Many of the concepts to be operationalized are quite abstract and difficult to measure using any methodological approach, particularly using concise survey questions. Consequently, much of this measurement should be considered experimental, with all of the uncertainty that the term implies. Given that this is one of the Team’s most important indicators, they should explore alternative means of measuring it, including, notably, more in-depth, qualitative, case study approaches. This was one of the indicators that the team felt the PVO Partners could usefully track in their monitoring and evaluation systems. Such assistance from the Partners would be most welcome.

6. Financial sustainability -- COs that mobilize resources from non-USAID, non-member sources.

In order to evaluate financial sustainability, we attempted to gather data on organizational effectiveness in diversifying revenue sources. To operationalize this, we asked CO leaders about non-USAID external and internal revenue sources. This question used a higher standard of proof than in the past, as this year we asked detailed questions on revenue sources and types. Organizations were judged more sustainable if they demonstrated diverse, non-USAID revenue sources. In this vein, an organization received credit for meeting the standard of this indicator if they were able to demonstrate at least one non-USAID external revenue source and one internal revenue source. The responses are summarized in the two tables below.

Table 29A. Percent of Target COs Citing Diverse, non-USAID Revenue Sources, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No other sources confirmed	26 87%	101 67%	127 70%
Other sources confirmed	4 13%	50 33%	54 30%
Total	30 100.00%	151 100.00%	181 100.00%

Chi2(1)= 4,6773 Pr.= 0.031

Interestingly, mixed groups are significantly more likely to demonstrate diverse resources than women’s groups.

**Table 29B. Percent of COs Citing Diverse, non-USAID Revenue Sources, 1999
(Weighted)**

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No other sources confirmed	85%	61%	63%
Other sources confirmed	15%	39%	37%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that 37 percent of all target COs and 15 percent of women's COs mobilized diverse resources from non-USAID sources.

Given the stricter standard, fewer COs met it than last year. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that over a third of all target COs meet the higher standard.

IR 3.1.1: "Target intermediary NGOs and federations support community organizations' democratic self-governance and civic action."

Performance Indicator:

- 1. COs which report that they made organizational changes and/or used at least one of the new skills for which they were trained.**

Organizational leaders who reported that their members had received trainings of any sort in the previous twelve months were asked to describe the utility of these trainings to their organizations (CO 56-58). Enumerators recorded the frequency with which respondents mentioned organizational changes made or other ways in which they had used skills gained from trainings. Included in these calculations are only those COs reporting that they received training in the previous year. The reader should note that USAID target COs were far more likely to receive training than were organizations in the control group (167 of 181 target COs, 92 percent; 44 of 73 non-target, 60 percent). The raw frequencies for those reporting making good use of training received are shown in Table 30A.

**Table 30A. Percent of Target COs Reporting That They Made Organizational Changes or Used the New Skills for Which They Were Trained, 1999
(Raw Frequencies)**

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No evidence of change	1 3%	3 2%	4 2%
Training skills used	28 97%	132 98%	160 98%
Total	29 100%	135 100%	164 100%

Table 30B displays the weighted percentages for this indicator.

Table 30B. Percent of COs Reporting That They Made Organizational Changes or Used the New Skills for Which They Were Trained, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No evidence of change	4%	1%	1%
Training skills used	96%	99%	99%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that 99 percent of all target COs receiving training in the past year and 96 percent of women's COs have made use of the skills in which they were trained.

These percentages are even higher than the 92 percent and 88 percent, respectively, for all and for women's COs that were reported last year, and the uniform 91 percent reported in 1997.

The results for women's and mixed groups for this indicator are very similar, the same trend as was remarked the past two years. Women's and mixed COs appear to use new knowledge gained from training in approximately the same proportions.

One very important caveat, however -- Because these data are based on reports by the organizations themselves, and there are clear incentives to create a favorable impression in order to attract future assistance, they may be biased upward.

Table 30C compares the behavior of target and control group COs for this indicator.

Table 30C. Percent of Target vs. Control COs Reporting That They Made Organizational Changes or Used the New Skills for Which They Were Trained, 1999

	Target Groups	Spread Effect	True Control	Total
No evidence of change	4 2%	3 12%	0 0%	7 3%
Training skills used	160 98%	23 88%	18 100%	201 97%
Total	164 100%	26 100%	18 100%	208 100%

Interestingly, a lower percentage of "spread effect" control group COs received training, and those COs receiving training were slightly less likely than target groups to report making use of the skills learned. We note that the all of the small sub-sample of true control group COs reported using skills, but we attribute this to the small sample size (n = 18).

IR 3.1.1.1 (also called 3.1.2.1) “The capacity of target NGOs and federations is strengthened.”

Performance Indicators:

1. Target intermediary NGOs and federations govern themselves democratically.

This was originally designed as a four-item index. Because of the same problems associated with the CO attendance measure, especially with respect to the federations in the sample, we dropped attendance from this index after the first survey. The three criteria for NGO/federation democratic governance are therefore voluntary adhesion, leadership alternation by regular elections, and holding regular meetings in accordance with organizational by-laws.

Seventy-two percent of the NGOs and federations surveyed considered themselves to be voluntary associations. There is a marked difference by type of intermediary organization, however. Of the 18 NGOs, all considered themselves to be voluntary, while only 8 of the 18 (44 percent) federations considered themselves to be voluntary. Presumably, because federation members automatically belong by virtue of their membership in constituent organizations, they classified their organizations as non-voluntary. Needless to say, this does not mean that they are ascriptive either, so the Team may wish to consider whether or not this particular criterion is appropriate for federations.

Of the 36 intermediary organizations, 16 selected their officers in an election for a fixed term in accordance with their by-laws, while 20 did not. Again, the different intermediary organizations differed greatly in their distributions. 78 percent of the NGOs (14 of 18) met the democratic alternation criterion, while only 11 percent (2 of 18) of the federations did.

A similar pattern occurred in the criterion requiring that intermediary organizations hold meetings in accordance with the manner stipulated in their by-laws. 15 of 18 NGOs (83 percent) met this criterion while only 7 of 18 federations did (39 percent), for a combined rate of 61 percent (22 of 36).

Table 31A shows the composite scores of all intermediary organizations on the three-item democracy index.

Table 31A. Percent of Partner Intermediary NGOs and Federations Governing Themselves Democratically

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + meetings/by-laws; one point for each scale item; a score of 3 = “democratic;” 0 = “undemocratic”]

Democracy Score	1998	1999
Three	13 33%	15 42%
Two	6 15%	4 11%
One	12 30%	11 31%
Zero	9 23%	6 17%
Total	40 100%	36 100%

In spite of the fact that this year’s combined NGO and federation sample had a higher proportion of federations, which are generally weaker, the aggregate numbers are slightly better than last year. Slightly fewer scored zero than last year and a higher proportion scored a perfect score of three points. Nuances are more easily seen by disaggregating the totals, as is done in Table 31B.

Table 31B. Percent of Partner Intermediary NGOs and Federations Governing Themselves Democratically

[Index: voluntariness + leadership alternation + meetings/by-laws; one point for each scale item; a score of 3 = “very democratic;” 0 = “very undemocratic”]

Democracy Score	NGOs		Federations	
	1998	1999	1998	1999
Three	13 52%	14 78%	0 0%	1 6%
Two	4 16%	1 6%	2 13%	3 17%
One	8 32%	3 17%	4 27%	8 44%
Zero	0 0%	0 0%	9 60%	6 33%
Total	25 100%	18 100%	15 100%	18 100%

Clearly, in terms of self-governance, intermediary NGOs and federations have very little in common --

One of 18 federations scored three out of three on the democratic self-governance index while 14 of 18 NGOs received a perfect score.

The team may therefore wish to either dis-aggregate NGOs and federations in the indicators or find a different arrangement for doing their performance measurement. In terms of role, federations have much in common with NGOs as intermediaries between the local and national level in the development and interest-aggregation process. In terms of personnel and procedures, however, they often have more in common with the community organizations that constitute them. Nevertheless, on the democratic governance criteria, the federations did considerably better than last year.

2. Target groups have sound management practices.

To evaluate management practices among INGOs, previous consultants devised a complex index with six criteria each of which had several sub-criteria. These criteria are applied equally to both national NGOs and federations. As we shall see, the organizational capacity of federations has more in common with COs and should certainly be looked at separately from NGOs and should probably be evaluated according to less rigorous criteria.

The first of these criteria was “good financial management,” which consisted of the publication of an annual report, the execution of an annual external audit, and the carrying out of corrective measures recommended by the audit. 5 of 18 NGOs met all three of the sub-criteria, while not a single federation was able to satisfy all of them.

The second criterion was “good strategic planning practices,” including evidence of gender analysis, a vision statement or concrete goals and objectives, a written or clearly explained strategic plan, and evidence of the implementation of this plan. 17 NGOs (94 percent) measured up, while, 3 of 18 (17 percent) federations met the standard. This was a marked improvement over last year, when no federations met the strategic planning criterion.

The third sound management criterion was “good training and facilitation practices.” The criteria are: 1. Formally-trained trainers on staff; 2. Training curricula with clear learning objectives; and 3. COs participate in defining the curricula. Ten NGOs and no federations received credit for satisfying this criterion.

Fourth, NGOs were evaluated for “good personnel practices,” including the existence of an organizational chart, job descriptions for core staff, and at least one woman employed in a professional position. Fifteen of 18 NGOs and but 1 of the 18 federations were able to meet all three sub-criteria.

“Ethical standards respected,” the fifth criterion, is very difficult to measure. The indicators adopted by the DG team included the existence of a code of conduct, staff trained to respect the code of conduct, and evidence that the code of conduct had been implemented, as evidenced by the organization’s annual audit. Two of 18 NGOs satisfied this criterion and no federations did. This was nevertheless an improvement over last year, when none of the 40 total federations and NGOs met this criterion.

The sixth and final good management criterion was “good conflict resolution skills,” as judged by evidence of at least one staff member trained in conflict resolution skills and evidence that these skills had been used during the previous year. Only two NGOs were scored as meeting this criterion, while no federations did.

Table 32. Percent of Intermediary NGOs with Sound Management Practices

[Index: financial management + strategic planning + training + personnel practices + ethical standards + conflict resolution; one point for each scale item; a score of 4-6 = “sound management;” < 4 = “unsound management”]

Management Score	NGOs		Federations		Total	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
Six	0 0%	1 6%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 3%
Five	0 0%	1 6%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 3%
Four	7 28%	2 11%	0 0%	0 0%	7 18%	2 6%
Three	5 20%	6 33%	0 0%	0 0%	5 13%	6 17%
Two	6 24%	6 33%	0 0%	0 0%	6 15%	6 17%
One	4 16%	2 11%	1 7%	4 22%	5 13%	6 8%
Zero	3 12%	0 0%	14 93%	14 78%	17 43%	14 39%
Total	25 100%	18 100%	15 100%	18 100%	40 100%	36 100%

This year, 4 of 18 (23 percent) NGOs scored four of six on the sound management index. Four of 18 federations scored one point on the index. No federations scored higher than one out of six.

Even at these low levels, the federations improved over last year. At the high end, the NGOs stayed at about the same level as last year, though at the low end there was a solid improvement – Last year, 28 percent scored zero or one point while this year only 11 percent were in that range.

IR 3.1.2: “Target intermediary NGOs and federations effectively aggregate and represent community organization interests at the local level and beyond.”

Performance Indicators:

- 1. Number of target intermediary NGOs and federations for which 2 or more of their CO partners report that the organization in question effectively represents their interests.**

As was stated last year, this indicator was impossible to measure exactly as it was written because it would have required stratifying by NGO, which would have enlarged the sample as well as survey costs astronomically. Nevertheless, we believe that we have measured the indicator as well as possible under the given constraints by asking each CO respondent to describe the nature of the representation they receive from their NGO partners to the national administration. Enumerators were then instructed to code the response to reflect whether or not the CO response reflected effective representation by the partner NGO.

Table 33A. Percent of Target COs Reporting that Collaborating NGOs and Federations Effectively Represent Their Interests, 1999 (Raw Frequencies)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No NGOs or federations represent interests	17 57%	49 32%	66 36%
Partner NGO does not effectively represent interests	8 27%	25 17%	33 18%
Partner NGO effectively represents interests	5 17%	77 51%	82 45%
Total	30 100%	151 100%	181 100%

Chi2(2) = 11.9378 Pr = 0.003

The weighted results for this indicator are presented in Table 33B.

Table 33B. Percent of Target COs Reporting that Collaborating NGOs and Federations Effectively Represent Their Interests, 1999 (Weighted)

	Women's Groups	Mixed Groups	Total
No NGOs or federations represent interests	54%	31%	33%
Partner NGO does not effectively represent interests	31%	16%	17%
Partner NGO effectively represents interests	16%	53%	50%
Total	100%	100%	100%

We estimate that 53 percent of target mixed COs and only 16 percent of women's COs feel that a USAID-partner intermediary organization effectively represents their interests.

This result is highly statistically significant ($p = .003$) and should be cause for great concern – women's target groups are far less likely (by a factor of three!) to report that they are well represented by a USAID-partner NGO or federation. This is a profound enough difference to warrant a separate study to find out the reason for this dissatisfaction on the part of women's groups.

2. Number of federations formed to address specific concerns related to government decisions.

This indicator cannot be definitively measured in the present survey. However, we did ask CO leaders if they knew of the formation of new federations for this purpose. In response, only 18 of 254 (7 percent) reported knowledge of new federations. While this is not a definitive answer, it makes one question the degree to which horizontal links across civil society are being constructed.

3. Number of target federations whose membership is stable or increasing.

This year, for the first time, we have data allowing us to trace membership trends among federations. This information is presented in Table 34.

Table 34. Membership Trends for Partner Federations

Federation Name	1998	1999	Trend
APE Federation Centrale, Dioila	21	-	-
APE Federation Centrale, Djenne	7	6	Decrease
APE Federation Centrale, Kolondieba	-	5	-
APE Federation Primaire, Djenne	5	7	Increase
APE Federation Primaire, Kolondieba	-	6	-
APE Federation Primaire, Konio	3	5	Increase
APE Federation Primaire, Koula (Koulikoro)	-	Missing	-
APE Federation Primaire, Kouakourou (Djenne)	2	2	Same
APE Federation Primaire, Madina Sacko	7	10	Increase
APE Federation Primaire, Mena (Sikasso)	4	-	-
APE Federation Primaire, Mougna	3	5	Increase
APE Federation Primaire, Nougua (Koulikoro)	5	-	-
APE Federation Primaire, Nyamina	-	26	-
APE Federation Primaire, Sofara (Mopti)	4	4	Same
APE Federation Primaire, Taga	2	Missing	-
Agence Evangelique de Devmt du Mali	-	Don't Know	-
Coordination Des Femmes, Kolondieba	4	-	-
Faso Jigi, Kolondieba	42	Missing	-
Felascom, Kolondieba	14	14	Same
Jigiya, Kolondieba	-	5	-
Sennasigi, Kolondieba	-	35	-

We only have two years of membership numbers for eight federations. Among those, seven of eight (88 percent) have stable or increasing membership.**4. Number of federations and intermediary NGOs engaged in sustained action on issues of mutual concern.**

Nine of the 18 INGOs (50 percent) presented written evidence of sustained collaboration with other NGOs or federations. Two of the eighteen federations presented evidence of collaboration. Among all intermediary partners, 11 of 36 presented evidence of this sort of collaboration.

IR 3.1.2.2 “The civic action skills of target intermediary NGOs and federations are improved.”

Performance Indicator:

1. Percentage of trained intermediary NGOs and federations using civic action techniques in a given year.

When presented with a series of eight different types of civic action, ranging from contacting public officials and organizing public meetings to using media outlets, 14 of 18 NGOs (78 percent) reported using at least four different civic action techniques. The remaining four NGOs used at least three civic action technique. Three of the eighteen federations (17 percent) engaged in no civic action at all, but 6 of 18 (33 percent) used 4 or more techniques.

IR 3.2 “Effective Decentralization occurs by 1999.”

In addition to the surveys, USAID asked the consultants to collect information on the progress of Mali’s ambitious decentralization process and other aspects of the enabling environment of democratic governance. The results of interviews conducted by the Malian data collection firm, Info-Stat, follow.

This is a summary of Info-Stat’s report findings, which are presented in Annex 4.

Performance Indicators:

1. Percentage of communal boundaries decided.

All communal divisions were established under Law Number 96-059 of November 1996. Under 10 percent of the communes have asked for modifications of the existing communes, and these modifications are being studied.

Law number 96-059 of the Republic of Mali establishes 682 new communes across the eight regions of Mali. Adding in the nineteen urban communes of the District of Bamako, Mali has 701 communes. Law Number 93-08 permits modifications in which municipalities belong to which communes.

It should be noted that “division” is a more appropriate term than “boundary,” as communes are decided by what villages are included and not by geographical boundaries.

2. Percentage of elections of mayors, communal boards and councils decided.

All communal councils were put in place in this year’s municipal elections.

3. Planned laws and regulations about communal councils, boards, and mayors' authority and resources decided by 1999.

Malian Law #93-08 put these regulations in place but they can be modified if necessary.

4. The portion of total human and financial resources generated and dispersed by communes.

Substantial legal ground has been traveled in ensuring that communes have the necessary human and financial resources to run effective programs. The Mission of Decentralization is currently doing a study in Ségou and Sikasso to evaluate the economic potential of communes.

Decrees 95-210 (of 30 May 1995), 96-084 (of 20 March 1996), and 96-119 (of 11 April 1996) dictate how human resources will be deconcentrated under the new decentralized system. Law 96-051 established the resources available to communes.

Eighty percent of the TDRL is to remain in the commune where it was generated, and 98 percent of any other locally generated taxes will remain at the local level.

5. Frequency and number of public reporting on council and board meeting minutes and operations.

The Mission of Decentralization reports that a system for public reporting is in place.

Interviews in existing communes in Bamako have revealed that officials are aware of the desire for transparency in the operations of communal administration, though systematic data on public reporting does not exist. The exact modality for reporting is left up to the local officials. Verification visits should be conducted to get an idea of the range of these modalities.

IR 3.3 “Enabling environment empowers target COs and intermediary NGOs and federations.”

Performance Indicators:

1. Progress toward legal recognition of cooperatives, village associations and federations adapted to decentralization.

A reform effort, initiated by the Ministry of Rural Development and the Environment, has been underway since 1995. The proposed law was rejected by the Council of Ministers in May 1998, supposedly in order to allow further input by ministries before it is sent to the National Assembly. It has still apparently not been passed.

For background information, see Jesse C. Ribot's report entitled “Political-Economic Analysis of Cooperatives Reform in Mali: ‘The State is the Best Hen,’ : Report to USAID/Mali DGSO Team, 30 September 1998.

2. Number of enabling environment issues around which two or more NGOs and federations work together to alleviate constraints.

The nature of the data prevented effective cross-referencing of NGOs, federations, and individual enabling environment issues on which they collaborated. Nevertheless, to get a sense of the pervasiveness of such collaboration, we asked the respondents at each of the 36 intermediary organizations (18 NGOs and 18 federations) to cite cases where there was sustained collaboration on issues involving the legal status of COs, cooperatives, or federations. Table 33 presents comparative results for 1998 and 1999.

Table 35. USAID-Partner INGOs and Federations Reporting Collaboration on Enabling Environment Issues

	NGOs		Federations		Total	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
Reporting collaboration	5 20%	4 22%	0 0%	0 0%	5 13%	4 11%
Not reporting collaboration	20 80%	14 78%	15 100%	18 100%	35 87%	32 89%
Total	25 100%	18 100%	15 100%	18 100%	40 100%	36 100%

As shown above, the level of collaboration among intermediary organizations around enabling environment issues remains at the same low level as last year. Indeed, especially in light of the small sample size, the results are virtually identical.

D. Exploratory Analysis of Cross-Sectoral Effects

As described above, one major change in this year’s survey was the addition of analysis of the cross-sectoral impacts of DG assistance. This could manifest itself in a number of ways. First, organizations receiving assistance from multiple USAID teams could perform better on certain governance indicators. For example, a cooperative that receives both administrative training as well as agricultural marketing training from USAID sources may receive the sort of procedural reinforcement that makes it a sounder manager of member resources.

A second domain in which positive synergies could arise is in increased effectiveness in the organization’s area of substantive focus. For example, It would be reasonable to expect that an APE receiving both DG and non-DG training would be more effective in advocating for higher girls’ education rates. Similarly, an AV with sound management practices gained through DG training may feel increased confidence in managing larger economic transactions.

The richness of this data also permits serious study of the determinants of various DG phenomena as well as non-DG sectoral effectiveness and impact. The present section is meant primarily

to be illustrative of the possibilities present in the data. While interesting results will be presented here, the DGSO Team is encouraged to pursue further data analysis that present constraints do not permit.

A first remark that should be made is that surprisingly few organizations reported receiving training in both DG and non-DG subject matter. Table 36 shows the breakdown of target COs in this regard.

Table 36. Comparison of Training Synergy and Non-Synergy COs, by Sector

Sector	No Training Synergy	Training Synergy	Total
Health	13 10%	6 13%	19 11%
Education	62 46%	20 42%	82 45%
Economic/Caisse	10 8%	5 10%	15 8%
Economic/non-Caisse	47 35%	16 33%	63 35%
Other	1 1%	1 2%	2 1%
Total	133 100%	48 100%	181 100%

Chi2(4)= 1.4044 Pr.= 0.843

The above table shows the distribution of COs by sector and by whether or not they received both DG and non-DG training from USAID sources. If they received training in both DG and non-DG subject matter, we describe them as a “training synergy” CO. Interestingly, as a casual perusal will reveal and as is confirmed by the Chi-square statistic, there is virtually no difference between the distribution by sector of the two groups. In other words, no one type of CO (APE, ASACO, etc.) is more likely than any other to be the beneficiary of such synergy.

A major challenge in collecting this data at the CO level was identifying and then tracing support received, both in terms of revenue and training. From the ground up, it was virtually impossible to trace financing directly to a particular USAID SO team. For training, this was resolved by very fine distinctions between DG subject matter and non-DG subject matter. Thus, training in DG subject matter received from a USAID national or international partner was attributed to the DGSO Team and USAID-source training in non-DG subject matter was attributed to a USAID/other category. The revenue data do not permit these sorts of distinctions. Consequently, at the present time we can measure synergies between teams in training but not anything as finely-grained concerning revenue.

One possible solution to this problem is the following – The DGSO Team says that the only support its partners provide to COs is in the form of training. If this is true, then all revenue support from USAID sources could reasonably be assumed to come from non-DGSO sources. From there a variable could be constructed to compare organizations which received DG training as well as USAID non-DG training and/or revenue.

Table 37, for illustrative purposes, shows the democratic governance performance of different types of CO.

Table 37. Democratic Governance Performance by Sector

Score	ASACOs	APEs	AVs/Groupements	Caisses	Total
Four	0 0%	0 0%	1 1%	0 0%	1 .4%
Three	5 20%	3 3%	8 9%	6 25%	22 9%
Two	6 24%	22 19%	18 20%	10 42%	56 22%
One	10 40%	61 53%	32 36%	6 25%	109 43%
Zero	4 16%	27 24%	30 34%	2 8%	63 25%
Total	25 100%	113 100%	89 100%	24 100%	251 100%

The results are interesting. In terms of democratic governance performance, caisses perform the best, followed closely by ASACOs, with 25 percent and 20 percent, respectively, receiving a score of three or better. In fact, however, if one looks at the middle and bottom of the distribution, caisses are even better, as they only have 33 percent scoring zero or one, compared with 56 percent of the ASACOs.

Economic groups (AVs, groupements, etc.) are substantially worse, with only 10 percent scoring at the high end and 70 percent scoring at the low end. APEs, both public and private, bring up the rear, with a mere 3 percent scoring three points or higher and 77 percent scoring only one or zero out of four.

While all types of groups have plenty of room for improvement, there is a clear ranking of which types of organizations are generally worse off in democratic governance practices.

Table 38 provides the same sectoral breakdown for the sound management index.

Table 38. Sound Management Performance by Sector

Score	ASACOs	APEs	AVs/Groupements	Caisses	Total
Four	2 8%	0 0%	2 2%	3 13%	7 3%
Three	12 48%	31 27%	23 26%	6 25%	72 29%
Two	9 36%	40 35%	36 40%	7 29%	92 37%
One	2 8%	33 29%	23 26%	5 21%	63 25%
Zero	0 0%	9 8%	6 7%	3 13%	18 7%
Total	25 100%	113 100%	90 100%	24 100%	252 100%

Here the ASACOs are far and away the best. CO sound management performance is more solid than democratic governance performance across the board, but here, 56 percent of ASACOs score three or above, compared with only 38 percent of caisses, their nearest competitor. Interestingly, while on the high end caisses out-perform economic groups and APEs, they also have as high a proportion as these others at the bottom of the spectrum. What this means is that there is more variation among caisses than other groups – while a high proportion of the best groups are caisses, some of the least well-managed COs are caisses as well. Consequently, while one can generalize and say that most ASACOs are well-managed, one cannot make such a generalization about caisses.

It is instructive to view some regression results on the determinants of democratic governance and sound management. The next table presents results of an ordered logistical regression (because the dependent variable is ordinal) on the determinants of democratic governance (demgov). Variables hypothesized to have an effect on democratic governance include USAID DG training (dgaid), USAID non-DG training (ndgaid), training support from DG and at least one other USAID SO team (synergy), external revenue received from USAID (revaid), external funding from other sources (revoth), autonomous internal revenue (revint), DG training from non-USAID sources (dgoth), non-DG training from non-USAID sources (ndgoth), length of organizational existence (orgexist), gender of the organization (genre), literacy rate of board members (litrte), and length of collaboration with USAID (collabyr).

Table 39. The Determinants of Democratic Self-Governance (Ordered Logit Results)

Iteration 0:	Log Likelihood	--278.04306	
Iteration 1:	Log Likelihood	--268.93218	
Iteration 2:	Log Likelihood	--267.53599	
Iteration 3:	Log Likelihood	--267.51004	
Iteration 4:	Log Likelihood	--267.50995	
Ordered Logit Estimates			Number of obs = 223

Log Likelihood = -267.50995					chi2(12)	= 21.07
					Prob > chi2	= 0.0494
					Pseudo R2	= 0.0379

demgov	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	

dgaid	.0019018	.0012346	1.540	0.123	-.000518	.0043216
ndgaid	-.0004316	.0004958	-0.871	0.384	-.0014033	.00054
synergy	.0000156	9.56e-06	1.629	0.103	-3.17e-06	.0000343
revaid	-1.64e-07	6.18e-07	-0.266	0.790	-1.38e-06	1.05e-06
revoth	-1.88e-08	6.16e-08	-0.306	0.760	-1.40e-07	1.02e-07
revint	6.21e-08	5.54e-08	1.122	0.262	-4.64e-08	1.71e-07
dgoth	-.0006535	.0035365	-0.185	0.853	-.0075849	.0062779
ndgoth	.0000131	.0003328	0.039	0.969	-.0006393	.0006654
orgexist	-.0381476	.0152668	-2.499	0.012	-.06807	-.0082252
genre	-.5676583	.5253868	-1.080	0.280	-1.597398	.4620809
litrates	.8678707	.4710242	1.843	0.065	-.0553197	1.791061
collabyr	.0002052	.000362	0.567	0.571	-.0005044	.0009147

_cut1	-.8141715	.3252074	(Ancillary parameters)			
_cut2	1.273986	.332755				
_cut3	2.889077	.4037339				
_cut4	5.905428	1.068521				

These regression results are preliminary and illustrative but display findings that survived a variety of model specifications. First, we see an encouraging positive relationship between USAID-financed DG training and improved self-governance. This result is not particularly strong, as there is a 12 percent chance that it could have occurred by chance and not represent something systematic, but especially given the relatively small sample size, it is encouraging. It is a particularly reassuring result when one considers that the effect of DG training received from non-USAID sources was absolutely insignificant.

A similar result occurs with the synergy variable. The result only approaches statistical significance ($p = .103$), but the results provide cautious support for the hypothesis that COs receiving training from the DGSO Team and at least one other USAID source are more internally democratic than COs receiving support from one or the other but not both. The evidence also suggests that this effect is more pronounced as the combined training days increase.

Another interesting result is the following -- There is a very strong negative relationship between length of organizational existence and internal democracy ($p = .018$). In other words, the older an organization is, the less democratic it is. Given the fact that democratic rule in Mali is a relatively recent phenomenon, combined with anecdotal evidence that, for example, older APEs are more infused with authoritarian principles, this finding is compelling.

Other relationships are not statistically significant, but the direction of two warrant mention. First, when controlling for other confounding factors we see a negative relationship between gender and democratic governance, suggesting that women’s organizations tend to be less internally democratic. Second, there is a positive relationship between board literacy and internal governance.

Table 40 presents regression results for determinants of sound management among COs.

Table 40. The Determinants of Sound Management (Ordered Logit Results)

Iteration 0: Log Likelihood = -301.63253						
Iteration 1: Log Likelihood = -288.12887						
Iteration 2: Log Likelihood = -287.63726						
Iteration 3: Log Likelihood = -287.63428						
Iteration 4: Log Likelihood = -287.63428						
Ordered Logit Estimates				Number of obs = 225		
				chi2(12) = 28.00		
				Prob > chi2 = 0.0055		
Log Likelihood = -287.63428				Pseudo R2 = 0.0464		

soundmgt	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	

demgov	.3741978	.143417	2.609	0.009	.0931056	.65529
dgaid	.0015347	.0013076	1.174	0.241	-.0010282	.0040976
ndgaid	.0000707	.0006733	0.105	0.916	-.0012489	.0013902
synergy	.00001	.0000121	0.833	0.405	-.0000136	.0000337
revaid	1.55e-07	5.52e-07	0.280	0.779	-9.28e-07	1.24e-06
revoth	9.34e-08	6.75e-08	1.383	0.167	-3.89e-08	2.26e-07
revint	1.90e-07	6.53e-08	2.914	0.004	6.23e-08	3.18e-07
dgoth	.0023257	.0032437	0.717	0.473	-.0040317	.0086832
ndgoth	.0000262	.0002859	0.092	0.927	-.0005341	.0005866
orgexist	.0137744	.0146883	0.938	0.348	-.0150141	.0425629
genre	-.5577594	.4693599	-1.188	0.235	-1.477688	.3621691
collabyr	.0002139	.0003332	0.642	0.521	-.0004392	.0008671

_cut1	-2.002705	.3505199	(Ancillary parameters)			
_cut2	-.0384009	.2784777				
_cut3	1.614609	.2987338				
_cut4	4.930086	.5768156				

Here again, interesting results appear. The two strongest and most compelling results are the following. First, the more internally democratic an organization is, the better it tends to be managed. This is a particularly robust result ($p = .009$) and it holds up under a variety of model specifications. This makes sense, of course – internally democratic organizations are more likely to hold their leaders accountable, and this includes demanding transparent, sound management practices.

The second strong result ($p = .004$) is that organizations which generate their own independent revenue resources tend to be better managed. Here, of course, the causality can run in two directions – more soundly managed organizations are more likely to seek financial autonomy while, at the same time,

organizations that begin to manage larger sums of money may be driven to seek the management capacity that the circumstance requires. A simultaneous equations model, beyond the scope of the present work, would be needed to sort out this causal direction, but the correlation is revealing in itself.

No other results are statistically significant, but the directions of most remain intuitively appealing and encouraging. For example, there is a positive relationship between DGSO support and sound management, and it is much closer to significance than DG support from non-USAID sources. Women's groups are negatively associated with sound management. This is instructive, as it provides support for an assertion we made last year and again this year – once one controls for the particularity of the caisses which make up a large share of the women's sample, women's groups are not any better managed than anyone else and may in fact have worse management practices.

Here, there is no relationship of any kind between synergy between USAID SO teams and better management performance. Nevertheless, its sign is positive, so it is in an encouraging direction.

Table 41 looks at the same explanatory variables for a civic action dependent variable. This dependent variable is ordinal, aggregating the number of different levels at which an organization engaged in civic action.

Table 41. The Determinants of Civic Action Behavior (Ordered Logit Results)

Iteration 0: Log Likelihood =-304.57858						
Iteration 1: Log Likelihood =-293.04942						
Iteration 2: Log Likelihood =-292.60494						
Iteration 3: Log Likelihood =-292.60418						
Iteration 4: Log Likelihood =-292.60418						
Ordered Logit Estimates						
Log Likelihood = -292.60418						
Number of obs = 225						
chi2(13) = 23.95						
Prob > chi2 = 0.0316						
Pseudo R2 = 0.0393						

civicact	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	

soundmgt	.150918	.1400081	1.078	0.281	-.123493	.4253289
demgov	.0794738	.1450945	0.548	0.584	-.2049063	.3638538
dgaid	-.0002696	.0011972	-0.225	0.822	-.0026161	.0020769
ndgaid	-.0000932	.0004512	-0.207	0.836	-.0009776	.0007912
synergy	7.88e-06	8.88e-06	0.887	0.375	-9.54e-06	.0000253
revaid	5.79e-07	5.25e-07	1.103	0.270	-4.49e-07	1.61e-06
revoth	-4.19e-08	6.43e-08	-0.652	0.514	-1.68e-07	8.40e-08
revint	-3.09e-08	5.64e-08	-0.549	0.583	-1.41e-07	7.96e-08
dgoth	.0003175	.0031721	0.100	0.920	-.0058997	.0065347
ndgoth	-.000376	.0003337	-1.127	0.260	-.0010302	.0002781
orgexist	.0535699	.0148638	3.604	0.000	.0244373	.0827024
genre	-.7240293	.4988088	-1.452	0.147	-1.701677	.253618
collabyr	-.0006021	.0003485	-1.728	0.084	-.0012851	.0000808

_cut1	.535565	.3512038	(Ancillary parameters)			
_cut2	1.588774	.3651717				
_cut3	2.951097	.4134245				
_cut4	4.213248	.5081147				

Here again, the sign of synergy is positive but not statistically significant. Indeed, there is only one result here that is strong – There is an extremely strong relationship between length of organizational existence and civic action behavior ($p = .000$). This suggests the intuitively appealing conclusion that older organizations have more capacity, confidence, or contacts and are more likely to engage in civic action. There is a faintly troubling aspect to this finding, however. As we showed above, older organizations tend to be less democratic. This, combined with the finding here of an totally insignificant relationship between internal governance and civic action, suggests that the fact of engaging in civic action is not closely linked to other forms of democratic behavior.

This is interesting and instructive. One possible conclusion to be drawn is that the very act of contacting a mayor or a député may not automatically have the accountability overtones we would like to think. It could be suggestive that those who were tied into the neo-patrimonial networks of the old one-party regime (e.g., APE bureau members) continue to engage in claim-making behavior that is not automatically tied to the best interests of their organizations' members or stakeholders.

In this there is a both a lesson and a challenge to USAID and its partners. As the DGSO Team begins a new stage of funding advocacy training and programming, they must ensure that not only the amount of civic action, but also the quality and representativeness of it increase.

Now we will examine the determinants of two forms of impact indicators, one for the education sector and one for the economic sector (the ASACO sub-sample size, 25, with even fewer usable observations, was too small to generate reliable results). The next table presents ordinary least square (continuous dependent variable) results for the determinants of pupil-teacher ratio (PTR). A lower pupil-teacher ratio is assumed to be an indicator of more attention to individual pupil needs and consequently is generally associated with better educational quality. Negative arithmetic signs therefore indicate desired influences – they cause PTR to drop.

Table 42. The Determinants of Pupil-Teacher Ratio (Ordinary Least Squares Results)

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 91		
Model	36346.1181	13	2795.85524	F(13, 77)	=	5.49
Residual	39212.283	77	509.250428	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	75558.4011	90	839.53779	R-squared	=	0.4810
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3934
				Root MSE	=	22.567

ptr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
soundmgt	.2673566	3.029778	0.088	0.930	-5.765701	6.300414
demgov	-.8268763	3.779083	-0.219	0.827	-8.351991	6.698238
dgaid	.0797776	.0284556	2.804	0.006	.0231152	.13644
ndgaid	.0219118	.01352	1.621	0.109	-.00501	.0488336
synergy	-.000538	.000324	-1.661	0.101	-.0011831	.0001071
revaid	7.25e-06	7.19e-06	1.008	0.317	-7.07e-06	.0000216
revoth	-2.10e-08	1.09e-06	-0.019	0.985	-2.19e-06	2.14e-06
revint	8.33e-06	5.37e-06	1.552	0.125	-2.36e-06	.000019
dgoth	-.06663	.1231713	-0.541	0.590	-.3118953	.1786354
ndgoth	-.0085066	.0084586	-1.006	0.318	-.0253497	.0083366
orgexist	-.025159	.3006708	-0.084	0.934	-.623871	.573553
apedum	36.17602	7.589724	4.766	0.000	21.06295	51.28909
collabyr	.0112479	.0141036	0.798	0.428	-.016836	.0393317
_cons	32.87311	6.523225	5.039	0.000	19.88371	45.86251

As sample size drops, it is harder and harder to find statistically significant results. In light of this, the above results are quite encouraging. A quite interesting and appealing result is the following. Individually, both DGSO training and other SO team training is associated with increasing pupil teacher ratios. This is not alarming, as there could be many causes. For example, perhaps both the DG Team and the Youth Team seek to help the neediest schools, which would tend to be the ones with the fewest teachers and thus the highest PTRs.

What is exciting is that when they work together, PTR tends to drop, as indicated by the negative sign associated with the synergy variable. Though this variable is only borderline significant ($p = .109$), this is most likely an artifact of the small sample size ($n = 91$). The results lead us to cautiously conclude that neither DG nor Youth Team support alone is enough to improve PTR, but their collaboration has positive synergistic effects on APE and school performance.

One indicator of the performance of economically-oriented groups is the size of the transactions they engage in. As economic importance of total contracts (particularly for the commercialization of crops, etc.) increases, it demonstrates trust in the capacity of the organization on the part of the outside world (e.g., merchants) as well as its own members. Table 43 presents results of a regression exploring the determinants of such contracts.

Table 43. The Determinants of Economic Vitality (Ordinary Least Square Results)

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 82		
Model	3.8434e+15	12	3.2029e+14	F(12, 69)	=	1.54
Residual	1.4341e+16	69	2.0784e+14	Prob > F	=	0.1308
				R-squared	=	0.2114
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0742
Total	1.8184e+16	81	2.2450e+14	Root MSE	=	.4e+07
Contract	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
soundmgt	931208.7	1792003	0.520	0.605	-2643739	4506157
demgov	32576.76	1887585	0.017	0.986	-3733053	3798206
dgaid	-22308.77	16268.17	-1.371	0.175	-54762.87	10145.33
ndgaid	-4580.419	7220.223	-0.634	0.528	-18984.37	9823.53
synergy	16.3434	90.26261	0.181	0.857	-163.7256	196.4124
revaid	22.43371	26.41594	0.849	0.399	-30.26466	75.13207
revoth	.6793752	2.199269	0.309	0.758	-3.708045	5.066796
revint	1.637541	.9572475	1.711	0.092	-.2721153	3.547198
dgoth	-10288.28	34278.84	-0.300	0.765	-78672.68	58096.13
ndgoth	1449.609	3212.03	0.451	0.653	-4958.215	7857.432
orgexist	647294.5	285606.5	2.266	0.027	77525.15	1217064
collabyr	-6070.609	3648.584	-1.664	0.101	-13349.33	1208.117
_cons	-1373058	4459755	-0.308	0.759	-1.03e+07	7523909

There is only one strong relationship here – it is the intuitively appealing but unsurprising finding that older organizations tend to be more economically important. There is an almost significant relationship between autonomous internal revenue and economic vitality ($p = .092$). Needless to say, these two variables could be highly correlated, as many organizations receive commissions on transactions, and these would be counted in internal revenue. Nevertheless, they could also be separate phenomena with a common cause. For example, organizations that have the initiative to generate their own revenue are also aggressive in serving as mediator in transactions which benefit their members.

Surprisingly, no relationship between sound management and this economic variable shows up. DGSO training and non-DG USAID training are shown to be insignificant but have a negative sign. This may suggest that USAID tends to seek out smaller economic actors for its support. The synergy variable comes out as absolutely insignificant in this regression equation.

Combined with the above analysis of the DG indicators, this regression analysis gives a more nuanced sense of the state of the DGSO program. In particular, it gives suggestions on the determinants of sound management and democratic self-governance that permit informed reflection about programming directions. The evidence on synergies between SO teams is mixed but gives reason for cautious optimism. The current analysis should be viewed as instructive but still exploratory, as the primary purpose of this study is to report progress on the DGSO indicators. The new cross-sectoral indicators provide a rich source of supplemental data that provide great opportunities for current analysis as well as a base for further performance measurement advances in the years to come.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Once again, the DGSO Team of USAID/Mali has funded an ambitious study on the performance of its partner civil society organizations. One should not forget that, in the world of donor-financed development, it takes considerable courage as well as commitment to real results to commission an external performance review. This year's study was particularly innovative in that it added three sector-specific questionnaires aimed at examining synergies between other SO teams and the DG Team. These new questionnaires were also intended to explore links between performance on DG indicators and performance in the fields of education, economic growth, and health. The present report presents data on all of the indicators tracked in the previous two DGSO performance measurement surveys. It also presents exploratory results on the phenomena just described. The present section comments on the entirety of the data collection and analysis enterprise, while offering concrete recommendations permitting the continued evolution of DGSO performance measurement. These comments and associated recommendations follow.

1. This year, consultants had by far the best, most comprehensive and accurate lists thus far of USAID partner COs. This permitted a very careful, systematic sampling methodology, stratified by PVO Partner and gender type. The results on various indicators suggest generally steady improvement on DGSO indicators, but this does not really tell us much because the three CO samples for the three years were each drawn from different sampling frames. The lists are now good enough that **USAID should use the exact same sampling frame for next year's survey as for this year's**. This will allow us to draw more solid conclusions regarding whether improvements are due primarily to USAID interventions or changes in the sampling universe. Nevertheless, **the DGSO Team should continue to update partner lists every six months, in order to have an accurate data base for the partner COs worked with each year**. Such lists also permit the option of at some point moving toward a cohort methodology in the annual survey.

2. The control group sampling methodology was a huge improvement over that employed in 1998 for at least two reasons. First, for the first time we had lists of non-USAID partner COs for a representative array of circumscriptions in the four regions and were able to draw a systematic control group sample from over 30 communes. **This control group sampling frame should be regularly revised and updated.** Second, we added the nuance of distinguishing between a “true” control group and a “spread effect” control group. The “true” control group was drawn from communes where USAID does not work, to compare organizations that are similar in every important characteristic to partners except for the fact that they do not receive support from USAID and do not evolve in close proximity to USAID partners. The “spread effect” group was drawn from communes where USAID *does* collaborate, and the only major difference they have from USAID partner COs is the fact that they receive no USAID funding or training. The results from the control group analysis often (but not always) shows the exact relationship we would like to see. That is, USAID partners perform the best, followed by non-partners that work close enough to USAID to show an “effet d’imitation,” followed by non-partners not evolving in close enough proximity to have good habits taught by USAID rub off on them. **In future rounds of data collection, USAID should consider again increasing the control group sample size (from the 73 contacted this year).** This year, a control group sample size of 100 was originally planned but was ultimately scaled back because of resource constraints.
3. This year, 15 of the COs contacted in the original target sample of 196 did not cite any instance of USAID funded training over the past two years or USAID funding over the past year. Moreover, when asked if any intermediary NGO or federation represented their interests they did not cite the names of USAID-affiliated organizations. Consequently, these organizations were reclassified into the “spread effect” control group, as we felt that for the definition of “partner” to mean anything there had to be a minimum threshold of collaboration required for inclusion in the target group. The implication of this is that among the 1055 purported partners included in this year’s sampling frame, there may be as many as one hundred with whom PVOs are not engaged in any meaningful level of collaboration. **In collaboration with the PVO partners, USAID should carefully examine existing CO lists to determine where meaningful collaboration is occurring and where it is not. They may also wish to reiterate to PVOs their preference for “quality over quantity” of collaboration** (in terms of numbers of CO partners).
4. Similarly, not all of the organizations listed as partner “federations” by the PVOs were in fact true federations. About 9 organizations were identified which were in fact NGOs but did not play the intermediary role foreseen for them in the DGSO Strategic Framework. In past performance monitoring workshops, the DGSO Team has provided a concrete definition of what it means by “federation” (in particular, consisting of representatives of at least 3 member community organizations). **Before the 2000 data collection begins, USAID should reiterate this and other definitions to ensure that partners are operating within a common conceptual framework.**

5. In the spirit of employing local resources as well as building local capacity, this and past DGSO performance measurement efforts have used a local firm as well as local logistical support. This commitment should be reinforced in the future. **Besides having a local firm responsible for data collection and preliminary analysis, Malians should be more involved at the conceptualization stage and throughout the data analysis stage as well.** Past efforts fell short in this regard because of the lack of local partners with combined DG and statistical skills but this has changed over the course of three years of collaboration.
6. This year's data collection was carefully supervised in the field by two MSI consultants as well as by Info-Stat's own four supervisors. The confidence that USAID has shown in MSI and Info-Stat is much appreciated. Nevertheless, **members of the DGSO Team may, time permitting, find it fruitful to accompany the enumerators in the field during the data collection process.** Not only would it provide added supervision but it would also permit the Team additional first-hand information for their own continuing evaluation and programming efforts.
7. **To make USAID performance measurement more accessible for local partners, all reports should be made available in French.** Steps in that direction were made this year, by preparing the Performance Measurement Workshop Report directly in French. In the future, the equivalent to this Data Analysis Report could be prepared directly in French or at least made available in French translation. **In this vein, we should also consider making brief summaries of data analysis results available in Bamanankan and Fulfuldé.**
8. A frequently-heard complaint on the part of intermediary NGOs this year was that they hesitated to take part in the INGO census because last year's results had not been shared with them. While we believe that such sharing should come from the PVOs once they have received reports from USAID, the translations mentioned above will permit greater accessibility of the information. Reiterating, **USAID should provide all performance measurement reports to PVOs in a timely manner and the PVOs should share them with intermediary partners.** The Bamanankan and Fulfuldé translations suggested above would permit information sharing even further down the hierarchy, further democratizing the process of collaboration.
9. The data sets assembled this year are much richer and more complex than those commissioned in 1997 and 1998 by the DGSO Team. The new cross-sectoral synergy analysis gives guarded support for the hypothesis that in some cases, other SO teams can be more effective when their support is combined with DGSO support. While the primary objective of the present report was to provide estimates on the DG indicators that have been measured for the past three years, the exploratory analysis of synergies proved very promising. **USAID should consider commissioning additional, more involved analysis of the three years of DGSO performance monitoring data.** We now have three years worth of data, as well as more detailed, comprehensive information on community organizations than we have had in the past. The cost of this analysis would be relatively low, considering all of the field data collection costs have already been incurred. Absent the time constraints of the current study, and with a broader, more open research mandate, the data could provide additional rich insights for

USAID/Mali programming. Moreover, these insights could benefit other SO teams as well as the DGSO Team. This analysis could include a detailed examination of partner-by-partner results. This should be done not to compare partners but, rather, recognizing the particularities of each PVO partner's program and in the spirit of offering PVO-specific programming insights.

10. The indicators used in the cross-sectoral questionnaires were developed in close collaboration with the program office, as well as the Sustainable Economic Growth and Youth SO Teams. Data collected, particularly on such indicators as pupil-teacher ratio and total production products, provide interesting insights concerning organizational performance. **The program office and other SO teams should carefully examine this year's results and suggest improvements and additions to indicators that can be measured in the annual survey.**
11. In the October 1998 Data Analysis Report, numerous recommendations were made concerning avenues for further exploration and programming implications. While they are not repeated here, **it would be worthwhile for the Team to review last year's programming recommendations** in order to "*dresser le bilan*" of what has been addressed and what has not and whether further interesting measures could be taken.
12. Finally, a more general suggestion – The DGSO Team has invested admirable energy over the past four-plus years to ensure the evolution of a rigorous, useful performance measurement system. They have also put considerable thought into integrating the quantitative data collection and analysis systems of USAID and its partners while also adding a system of case study research on program successes and areas needing improvement. Once fully implemented, such a system would draw on the comparative advantages of USAID and the PVO partners in performance measurement. One of the thorniest remaining areas is that involving finding a useful role for PVO-collected data at the level of USAID. Since early 1998, USAID has had at least three performance measurement workshops with its partners. These constitute an important, participatory method of ensuring that the existing monitoring and evaluation system serves the purposes of all parties. However, more must be done in order to put into place complementary systems at the partners and USAID. Taking as a point of departure Leslie Fox's February 1998 memo and John Uniack Davis' April 1998 report on planning the next steps of DGSO performance measurement, **the DGSO Team should devise a system linking the data collection systems across the partners and into its own system.** This would be a fairly ambitious endeavor and cannot be done in conjunction with the annual survey – it should be carried out as a separate task in a single-minded manner.

The DGSO Team has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to the scientific measurement of performance measurement indicators. In many ways, especially concerning the construction of a reliable, re-usable sampling frame as well as the building of bridges to performance measurement in other sectors, the Team has made great strides in devising a useful, durable system. Attention to the above recommendations will ensure that the DGSO performance monitoring system continues to serve the Team's reporting and programming needs.

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