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FINAL REPORT

Mid-Term Evaluation
of the
Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project, Phase II
(USAID/Zimbabwe Strategic Objective No. 1)

Contract #AEP-0085-I-00-6021-00

Communal Areas Management Programme
for Indigenous Resources, CAMPFIRE

Submitted to
USAID/Zimbabwe

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of a formal mid-term evaluation of USAID/Zimbabwe's bilateral Natural Resources Management Project (613-0241), Phase II (NRMP II) The project supports the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, CAMPFIRE, which is a distinctively Zimbabwean initiative designed to achieve community development and conservation objectives by transferring certain ownership rights over common property resources from central state authority to local communities The Programmeformally began with the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management's decision to devolve use rights over a mobile resource, wildlife, to Rural Districts Along with certain management responsibilities, decentralized governance gave local populations access to a ready stream of benefits in the form of the trophy fees associated with an established industry A few years later, in 1989, USAID began supporting CAMPFIRE through its regional Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP I) (690-0251 13) This geographically focused pilot phase was redesigned in 1994 as the bilateral NRMP II ($16 0 m), which included some continued funding through the USAID regional office ($4 5 m) The bilaterally-managed project, effectively underway since late 1995, is national in scope and adds support for CAMPFIRE's diversification into other indigenous resources After a recent extension, NRMP II is scheduled to continue through September 30, 2000

The evaluation scope of work calls for a comprehensive external review of CAMPFIRE and documentation of USAID support to it The Programme is complex, and its implementation involves a partnership of government agencies and non-governmental organizations who assist rural communities and community based organizations The evaluation team identified a number of priority issues

- Adequacy of the current level of devolution of authority over resources to the Rural Districts to achieve the tenure security and participation that CAMPFIRE assumes necessary for success,
- Potential for diversifying into additional resources and income streams and CAMPFIRE's capacity to undertake this initiative,
- Potential for NRMP II to enhance the long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE,
- Adjustments in project management structures, resources, and timetable needed to achieve maximum results

In addition, because the natural resource revenues the Programme channels to local populations are largely dependent on consumptive wildlife use, the Programmehas become the target of an aggressive anti-CAMPFIRE animal rights campaign The evaluation seeks to clarify some of the confusion resulting from this public controversy about CAMPFIRE and the USAID assistance provided through NRMP II

Findings and Conclusions

With its approximate 10-year history the lessons from CAMPFIRE are of real value to similar programs in the region and elsewhere In favorable habitats of Zimbabwe's agriculturally marginal communal lands, the Programme sports a stable track record of producing meaningful benefits for local residents In locations where wildlife is less abundant, the economic returns have been mixed and show less promise, at least in the short term

By conferring proprietorship of wildlife resources to the Rural District Councils (RDCs) through the mechanism of "Appropriate Authority," benefits accrue to the populations residing in proximity to favored habitat with its rich endowment of charismatic megafauna Most revenues still derive from the consumptive, sustainable use of this resource The maintenance of trophy quality and overall wildlife numbers suggest that wildlife populations are being sustainably exploited under present conditions Most observers consider the hunting quotas in CAMPFIRE areas to be conservative

CAMPFIRE's philosophy engenders a positive sense of empowerment, and its approach is well-entrenched among local populations as it is across government departments Non-wildlife resources, including some mineral resources, are coming under the CAMPFIRE umbrella, and thus, under its designation of the RDC as the responsible administrative unit, where Appropriate Authority resides That level is generally higher and removed from that of the producer communities CAMPFIRE functions best where the RDCs have devolved some authority, and the majority of revenues, to the producer level Where benefits are minimal or have been generalized to a wider population, the essential link to improved conservation breaks down

Devolution of resource management authority below the level of the Rural District remains problematic While policy and legislation enable some devolution and transfer of benefits to those groups actually bearing the burden of management responsibility, the RDCs have a mixed record in applying CAMPFIRE's principles Over time and on

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average they have respected the guidelines for revenue distribution Since the Programme began, RDCs have devolved 58% of revenue to the producer wards, retaining an average of 25% for management fees and 15% as a District levy Such statistics disguise significant variation across the RDCs, however, in how they apply the guidelines Communities utilize these revenues in a variety of ways, including for cash distributions and social infrastructure, and, to some extent, for economically viable micro-enterprise investments Much of this benefit distribution improves the quality of life of women and children in CAMPFIRE districts

Policy obstacles limit tenure security over resources and inhibit the capacity for devolution below the District level Policy changes are needed to facilitate the expansion of bottom-up planning capacity for improving natural resource management (NRM) Such empowerment would enable narrow pilot interventions to become more generalized across the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group's (CCG) capacity-building efforts in the producer community and RDC institutions The institutionalization of participatory quota-setting offers a model for other resources and practices

CAMPFIRE's early success was founded upon an already established international wildlife market, and its leaders were successful in helping local Zimbabwe communities link up to this revenue stream -- thereby benefitting not only their own socioeconomic development, but also leading to the sustainable management and successful conservation of this resource, particularly the African elephant For the past several years, CAMPFIRE has begun diversifying into other conservation-based economic activities USAID support has largely underwritten the investment in developing institutional capacity to expand the program Diversification into other natural resource uses, with the possible exception of the ecotourism market, does not enjoy similar ready-made markets Accordingly, successful models for these alternatives will take longer to develop, a major reason why continued long-term support for this effort is essential Long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE and its RDC and local staff depends on the economic growth of viable diversified natural resource enterprises, possibly including development of non-consumptive tourism or the inclusion of fish, forestry products, and minerals

NRMP II support has facilitated the rapid expansion of CAMPFIRE to the national level, but spreading CAMPFIRE Development Fund (CDF) institutional grants to some 20 Rural Districts dilutes benefits and the efforts of the implementing partners In some cases, the project appears to be creating unsustainable levels of staffing, especially for the CAMPFIRE Association (CA) and RDCs Projected infrastructure grants through the CDF have not yet materialized Absent an expanded revenue base, staff reductions will be necessary when project funds are no longer available

The Africa Resources Trust's (ART) advocacy and networking activities underscored a rapidly widening and fundamental rift between conservation NGOs and animal rights advocacy groups ART's own activities in espousing a Southern Africa sustainable use perspective remain a source of ongoing debate and direct confrontation with the animal rights movement After unsuccessully attempting to engage animal rights groups constructively with an eye toward possible collaboration, the elephant downlisting debate drew ART into a highly visible political struggle for international influence CAMPFIRE became a lightening rod for groups generally opposed to sustainable use initiatives, especially those involving trophy hunting and elephants Ultimately, ART spearheaded a government and NGO counter-response, using its own funding but building on the strengths ART had acquired through NRMP II financing

Two of USAID's critical assumptions about CAMPFIRE may increasingly become untenable, specifically, that "adequate ownership and use rights continue to exist for individuals and communities to manage resources sustainably and to benefit directly from that management," and "CAMPFIRE communities can manage population growth, particularly due to in-migration from less developed areas " In both cases, it is not clear that either of these conditions has actually ever existed in a **general** sense, and movement toward them continues, particularly for the second, to be problematic and may threaten program achievements and long-term sustainability The leadership of CAMPFIRE needs to become more focused and to concentrate on such key high-level challenges rather than day-to-day program implementation

Recommendations

Use the remaining project funds to continue CAMPFIRE efforts to diversify the sources of revenue from sustainable natural resource use Transform the CDF into a longer term financing mechanism, such as a sinking fund, that would extend NRMP II funds beyond the potential ending of USAID support in 2000 or 2002 This action would provide new, as well as ongoing, initiatives greater opportunity to prove their technical soundness and become

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sustainable

Simplify NRMP II administration by implementing a series of key project management changes In the short term, phase out the Project Execution Team (PET) and transform its subcommittees into CAMPFIRE Consultative Group (CCG) subcommittees, in part by refocusing CDF financial management and other NRMP II management responsibilities more tightly within the Institutional Contractor (IC) and USAID SO1 team For broader project issues, including impending NRMP II and Mission graduation, the core management team would work closely with the NRMP II Bilateral Review Committee In the longer term, the evaluation team recommends that a CDF/follow-on funding mechanism be used to provide an *enabling context* for the development of commercially viable NRM enterprises identified through the participatory planning process, especially at the village and ward levels

USAID should encourage CA to redefine its leadership role by focusing on policy dialogue and program advocacy, and on using its functions of program coordination to bring out the relative strengths of its implementing partners Key policy areas that affect resource tenure security, governance, and access to markets require a concerted policy initiative spearheaded by the CA Board and Secretariat The CA leadership should build on the PET subcommittee's efforts by working with the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ), political and private sector partners to improve the CAMPFIRE's policy environment The CA Board should bring in several outside members on an invited, fixed-term, basis representing, among other possibilities, natural resources institutions (both GOZ and NGO), the tourism and hotel sector, the financial sector, and, possibly, the mining sector The CA should encourage that CDF funding (along with other funding) be used to reinforce CA/CCG partner collaboration at all levels, but especially at the field level (RDCs, wards, villages and other groups with recognized authority)

Support new CCG partners and redefine interagency relationships and operating procedures USAID, together with the Bilateral Review Committee, should request that the CCG undergo a strategic reassessment of individual capacities and interrelationships among collaborators, leading to a new Plan of Operations similar to that realized in 1995 The aims would include providing greater synergy across sectoral expertise and more efficient geographic coverage through better use of the field presence of each implementing partner, redefining institutional objectives, reaffirming and accommodating new partners and strategies

Develop a CAMPFIRE approach to community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) In concert with District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) and other initiatives, define and generalize a flexible model of participatory land-use planning/CBNRM that infuses an empowering aspect into the existing provision for NRM by-laws Develop a set of "best practices" guidelines that can be adapted to differing contexts The CA should sanction this approach, which should include provision for the "graduation" of CAMPFIRE communities and an "exit strategy" for the CCG partners This would encourage a feeling of common purpose, shared ownership of principles, and a logical avenue toward common CAMPFIRE marketing efforts in areas such as ecotourism

Improve program monitoring and evaluation, including a major initiative to incorporate habitat monitoring into the overall monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system Strengthen World Wildlife Fund (WWF) support to CAMPFIRE by funding actions in wildlife habitat monitoring These should be linked to ongoing efforts among other partners, including the DNPWLM, Forestry Commission, Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and Agritex (which may also warrant some NRMP II funding)

Regional links to efforts such as tourism initiatives, information, and marketing outreach, and sharing CBNRM lessons should be strengthened Develop new initiatives to capitalize on the strategic alliance between the CA and ART USAID/RCSA activities should continue to support CAMPFIRE after bilateral funding has terminated

USAID/Zimbabwe should continue to support the CAMPFIRE movement, with some modification to NRMP II and additional funding through FY2002 Continue direct contract support of the IC and GOZ partners and continuing grant support at a reduced level to the CA Maintain initial direct support to NGOs Subsequently, phase down direct grants to CCG NGO partners, and, instead, encourage them to continue to access support through joint proposals with the CA Secretariat and membership for funding under the CDF or from other sources

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ART	Africa Resources Trust
ADMADE	Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (Zambia)
BSP	Biodiversity Support Program
BRC	Bilateral Review Committee
CA	CAMPFIRE Association
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources
CASS	Centre for Applied Social Sciences
CBCD	Conservation-Based Community Development
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CCG	CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group
CDF	CAMPFIRE Development Fund
CITES	Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (Flora and Fauna)
CSP	Customer Service Plan
CCU	CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit
CWA	Community Wildlife Areas
CLFP	Communal Lands Forests Produce
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DA	Development Associates
DNPWLM	Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
DEAP	District Environmental Action Plan
DSS	Decision Support System
E/NRM	Environment/Natural Resource Management
ESF	Environmental Screening Form
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FC	Forestry Commission
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HSUS	The Humane Society of the United States
HSI	Humane Society International
IDU	Institutional Development Unit
IC	Institutional Contractor
ISA	Initiative for Southern Africa
IUCN	World Conservation Union
IUCN/ROSA	IUCN Regional Office for Southern Africa
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAPS	Multispecies Animal Population
MLGNH	Ministry of Local Government and National Housing
MMET	Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism
MOF	Ministry of Finance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management

List of Acronyms, Con't

NRMP II	Natural Resource Management Project Phase II
NCS	National Conservation Strategy
NAP	National Action Plan
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
ODI	Overseas Development Institution
ODA	Overseas Development Agency
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PET	Project Execution Team
PAC	Problem Animal Control
PACD	Project Anticipated Completion Date
POMS	ZimTrust Process Oriented Monitoring System
PVA	Population Viability Analysis
RDC	Rural District Council
RCSA	Regional Center for Southern Africa
RF	Results Framework
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAFIRE	Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources
SARP	Southern Africa Regional Program
SASUG	IUCN Southern Africa Sustainable Use Group
SCI	Safari Club International
SECID	Southeastern Consortium for International Development
SOW	Scope of Work
SO	Strategic Objective
SOER	State of Environmental Resources
SP	Strategic Planning
SUPCAMP	WWF Support to CAMPFIRE Project
STTA	Short-term Technical Assistance
TIFF	The Investment Fund for Foundations
TMG	The Mitchell Group, Inc
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USFWS	US Fish and Wildlife Service
US$	United States Dollar
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature/World Wildlife Fund
ZimTrust	The Zimbabwe Trust
Z$	Zimbabwean Dollar
ZTA	Zimbabwe Tourist Authority

Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE Districts,1997



CAMPFIRE Wards in Guruve and Nyaminyami; 1989



I. OVERVIEW

When, upon arriving in Ghana to open his March 1998 tour of Africa, President Bill Clinton observed that "We must learn to live in harmony with other species," he implicitly acknowledged two central truths -- the global recognition of the importance of Africa's unique and vital wildlife resources and the fact that people and wildlife, both flora and fauna, cannot thrive in isolation of one another Africans had long coexisted fruitfully with wildlife until, first, colonization, and, then, modern development threatened and undermined traditional patterns of successful coexistence In the mid-1980s officials in Zimbabwe's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) teamed with social scientists from the University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) to create what came to be called the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, or CAMPFIRE In so doing, they acknowledged the inadequacy of the prevalent model of protection, with its singular focus on creating and policing an edifice of parks and other restrictive wildlife reserves Instead, CAMPFIRE encourages rural communities to rediscover their vital link with nature and to profit from its expression under contemporary sociopolitical and economic conditions

This evaluation addresses the second phase of USAID support for CAMPFIRE USAID/Zimbabwe's support through its Natural Resources Management Project, Phase I (NRMP I) was part of a larger regional project supporting several pilot efforts to test community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) approaches, the second phase (NRMP II) builds on this initial experience in four Rural Districts of rural Matabeleland and expands coverage to the national level The bilateral NRMP II (613-0241) is managed by USAID/Zimbabwe It began in September 1994, with a USAID contribution of US$20 5 million, of which US$16 0 million involves bilateral program funding The remaining US$4 5 million is passed through the USAID Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA) Zimbabwe governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO) partners contribute substantially in the form of salaries and organizational offices, investment of CAMPFIRE revenues, and materials Other donors have contributed more than US$7 million to CAMPFIRE

This report is organized to address a wide audience This chapter essentially serves as an expanded executive summary and is intended for many readers as a stand-alone document The main body of the evaluation goes into considerably greater detail, and the authors assume that many readers will be interested in only certain sections Chapter II introduces the evaluation and places CAMPFIRE in a broader context Chapter III covers the majority of current CAMPFIRE and NRMP II evaluation issues Chapter IV explores some of the development issues raised by CAMPFIRE in greater depth and assesses the Programme response vis-a-vis these issues Chapter V is principally concerned with USAID management decisions with respect to CAMPFIRE's sustainability and the measurement and monitoring of program performance Scenarios for future USAID support are contained therein Chapter VI highlights a few of the many lessons that can be drawn from the CAMPFIRE/NRMP II experience Finally, a considerable body of supporting material has been incorporated in a series of appendices

A What Is CAMPFIRE?

CAMPFIRE is concerned with all indigenous resources, natural and cultural In the case of the former, it provides an alternative to the loss and degradation of habitats by making wildlife a valuable resource In proposing to involve local populations as partners in conservation, CAMPFIRE bucked conventional wisdom and became, not a blueprint, but a model for CBNRM in the region as well as elsewhere in the world The Programme's historical roots, coupled with wildlife's income potential, gave the natural resource subsector a central role over the first decade of the Programme's implementation More attention is now being paid to expanding the Programme to include other indigenous resources

It is helpful to understand CAMPFIRE as both a philosophy and a program As a philosophy it weds the ideals of local empowerment to the rewards of sustainable use of the natural resource base It is founded on the premise that benefits must exceed the perceived costs of managing the resource and must be secure over time As a program, CAMPFIRE is indisputably a Zimbabwean creation, implemented by a coalition of local conservation and development partners based both inside and outside of government An association of its rural constituency, the CAMPFIRE Association of Rural Districts Councils (RDCs), occupies a lead role in this constellation As the challenges of translating philosophy into practice are confronted, the oft-heard phrase, "CAMPFIRE is a learning process," underscores the principles of adaptive management that underlie its history of implementation Over time CAMPFIRE is developing into a profound social movement By empowering communities to take responsibility for the ensemble of their "indigenous resources," CAMPFIRE encourages decentralization, local responsibility, and the evolution of democratic institutions

CAMPFIRE operates in communal areas of rural Zimbabwe that are mostly semi-arid lowlands with low agricultural potential With support from USAID and other donors, the Programme has expanded since 1987 from its initial focus of redirecting sport hunting revenues in two Rural Districts It now includes conservation-based initiatives involving diverse resources and 36 Rural Districts The coalition of CAMPFIRE implementors, or the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), has added new partners and activities that address the challenging array of institutional, economic, and technical hurdles linked with this expansion in scope and geographic breadth

B. Evaluation Issues -- The Natural Resources Management Project

The expansion of the Programme, proposed addition of new CCG members as NRMP II implementation partners, and impending Mission closeout require key management decisions about NRMP II The focus on broader issues such as the role of advocacy and lobbying, the Programme's association with sport hunting as a conservation tool, and its pioneering role in CBNRM suggest the timeliness of extracting key lessons of interest to a wider audience and of relevance to other operating units Documenting performance will help clarify the US Congressional debate regarding the relative merits and liabilities of continuing US support to CAMPFIRE The evaluation's specific objectives are to

(1) Assess NRMP II's responsiveness to the findings and recommendations of the last project evaluation,
(2) Document USAID-funded contributions to CAMPFIRE to date,
(3) Assess the performance of each of the implementing partners in fulfilling their respective roles and responsibilities under NRMP II,
(4) Document results and impacts to date,
(5) Address certain key policy, planning, management, and implementation issues, and
(6) Recommend revised implementation approaches and arrangements for improving NRMP II achievement and impact, and the prospects for the long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE as NRMP II progresses toward its final stages of implementation and closeout

The evaluation findings are made against a set of project assumptions included in the original project design These are listed in Box 1

C. Institutional Partners

The CCG is a relatively informal grouping of directors of the CAMPFIRE implementing organizations Considered to be somewhat "dysfunctional" from a management perspective, USAID promoted the creation of a project-specific inter-organizational structure, the **PET** The PET, which is chaired by the CA, holds quarterly implementation review meetings and annual planning workshops PET technical subcommittees, e g, policy, monitoring and evaluation, have become de facto CCG subcommittees One of PET's significant functions has involved review of proposals submitted to NRMP II's CDF The CDF has a budget line of US$6 million, of which US$1 6 million had been obligated at the time of the evaluation Over 20 CDF grants for equipment, CAMPFIRE staff, training, and operations have been released to the RDCs, funding that has enabled Zimbabwe to gear up for a much-expanded CAMPFIRE effort

Box 1 Key Project Assumptions

1 That wildlife resources are or will become adequate to sustain commercial exploitation

2 That wildlife utilization can compete economically and financially with other extensive forms of land use

3 That communities deriving wealth from wildlife resources will both wish to, and be able to, protect these resources

4 That communities will be willing to manage these resources, and can become capable of doing so, and will invest in the management of wildlife resources

5 That the international demand for wildlife products will support widespread development of this form of land use

6 With control over resources, farmers' behavior will lead to the improved conservation of the resource base

7 The member organizations involved with CAMPFIRE will continue to work cooperatively towards a common objective

8 Rural District Councils can be persuaded to pay out profits to ultimate resource managers in villages Villages and RDCs will use these revenues and grants to promote long term resource sustainability

9 Economically viable technologies and intervention strategies can be developed and adopted for the full range of ecosystems included in the program. (SARP 1994 9)

The **CA** has been a principal beneficiary of NRMP II assistance The CA was born of recognition by CCG members that a non-governmental representative organization was needed to promote the interests of the ensemble of CAMPFIRE communities and to take leadership in directing services to member communities The NRMP II contract provides a US$1 7 million grant (US$1 35 million obligated to February 1998) that funds more than 90% of the CA's budget CA's leadership role has been enhanced through chairing the PET and CDF committees Among other NRMP II initiatives was construction of the CA Executive Secretariat office building in Harare The CA receives organization and management training from the project's institutional contractor and was recently certified by USAID to manage its own grant funds

The project **IC** is housed in the CA building and assists the CA organizationally to coordinate implementation of CAMPFIRE This has involved working with the CA project officer and others to improve CDF grant requests The IC manages CDF funds and also administers some of the institutional grants to CCG partners The USAID contract with the IC totals US$3 45 million

The key GOZ partners are the Ministry of Mines, Environment, and Tourism (MMET), especially its **DNPWLM**, and the **Ministry of Local Government and National Housing** (MLGNH) Although the project is structured through a bilateral agreement, the CCG's NGO members felt that limited government involvement in areas such as policy, monitoring, and problem animal control imposed constraints on CAMPFIRE's agenda The DNPWLM has spent less than $100,000 of the US$1 5 million envisioned for the department in the project agreement As of February 1998, the MLGNH had yet to spend NRMP II project funds Recent policy statements and planning documents indicate readiness of the GOZ to assume a more active role in implementing the program **CASS** is an autonomous applied research institute attached to the national university system CASS was awarded a grant of US $1 05 million of which $ 4 m had been expended at the time of the evaluation CASS studies have provided valuable policy reviews and socioeconomic information, but their dissemination has been weak After a budgetary and staffing crisis in the university, CASS has proposed resuming a more active role in NRMP II

NRMP II has also supported several NGOs that are part of the CCG These include the Zimbabwe (now regional) offices of **WWF**, the **Zimbabwe Trust** (ZimTrust), ***ACTION Magazine***, and **ART** A grant agreement with WWF for US$1 6 million did not begin until late 1996 WWF provides monitoring and research services to the program, and some training Because of the late start, WWF had expended about $450,000 at the time of this evaluation WWF has done an excellent job of maintaining aerial surveys of CAMPFIRE areas and of monitoring revenues and economic indicators of performance ZimTrust has served as the primary capacity-building support organization at the field level for most of CAMPFIRE's history It continues to manage its own funds under a revised grant agreement dating from the project's first phase ACTION is, and ART was, a subcontractor under the ZimTrust grant (combined total of almost US$4 6 million) with which they share a Board of Directors The ZimTrust deserves credit for training and raising the awareness of many CAMPFIRE communities, but has also been criticized for not having a plan to graduate communities from this dependence on outside services ART played information, outreach, and advocacy roles for CAMPFIRE, especially in the international context, and worked closely with the CA as the latter

began assuming more of these functions ART's efforts were instrumental in improving market opportunities by building support for the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (Flora and Fauna) (CITES) partial lifting of restrictions on trade in ivory ART had exhausted its US$1 168 million in funding as of December 1997 and receives no further NRMP II support ACTION provides public school education and outreach materials in the form of environmental education curricula materials and a periodic publication, *ACTION Magazine* ACTION aims to make environmental education more relevant and to tie it to local, practical examples The evaluation team did not have the opportunity to carry out a field assessment of this component of the project, but it appeared to be accomplishing the objectives, despite reported organizational capacity constraints

The CCG has recently admitted new governmental and non-governmental members the **Department of Natural Resources** (DNR), **Forestry Commission** (FC), **and Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources** (SAFIRE) Each of these organizations has submitted requests for funding under NRMP II Their proposals support the CA's diversification initiative, which is also compatible with NRMP II's objectives The evaluation team supports expansion of the NRMP recipients to include these new organizations in the project, an expansion that strengthens the case for an overall extension of the project completion date

D General Results -- Responsiveness to Previous Evaluation Recommendations

Between the 1994 Mid-term Evaluation of the Zimbabwe component of the Regional NRMP (essentially a Phase I final evaluation) and the period when NRMP II got underway in earnest, CAMPFIRE was somewhat adrift and rife with uncertainty concerning its future growth and funding The USAID Mission, with the exception of one Personal Services Contractor (PSC), was neither focused on CAMPFIRE nor the natural resources sector in general The project, although it had shifted to a bilateral portfolio from a management standpoint, was not well-integrated with the Mission's strategy at the time During this period, USAID resorted to using interim "bridging" grants to maintain some continuity of NRMP activities Subsequently, the Mission redesigned its SO1 to coincide with CAMPFIRE

To its credit, the USAID management team convened a series of consultative workshops to analyze environmental and natural resource problem areas The resulting analysis helped to establish a new strategic focus for the USAID program and define an operating strategy for NRMP II that substantially addressed the concerns raised in the previous mid-term evaluation report (ULG 1994) Indeed, the workshop that set the second phase into full operation responded well to many of the previous evaluation's recommendations Likewise, Phase II design and implementation have responded to recommendations to scale up to a national-level program, expand the number and competencies of implementing partners, shift management from a regional to bilateral focus, give the project implementing committee (now the PET) real powers in coordinating, approving, and allocating work, and reinforcing the CA as the lead agency

The evaluation also stressed the need to further devolve CAMPFIRE activities below the Rural District level and to diversify the sources of natural resource revenues, taking these steps within a

demand-driven mode of operation, and to include technically and environmentally viable infrastructure in response to local needs The project structure acknowledges these concerns, and the implementation record under NRMP II is reviewed throughout this document

The ULG 1994 evaluation also called upon USAID to accomplish all these changes in a less "heavy-handed" manner This mandate may have been unrealistic USAID was, in effect, caught between the central government, who wanted more control, and an expanded group of independent-minded, mostly NGO, collaborators with only a limited history of working together Through NRMP II, USAID also faced the task of reinforcing a heterogeneous group of actors occupying the middle ground in a model of decentralization -- the RDCs and subdistrict institutions and their representatives for natural resources, the District, Ward, and Village committees concerned with resource management, the CA Board of Management, and the Executive Director of the CA With the project under heavy outside scrutiny and under threat of shutdown for much of its second phase, it is only now that USAID is in a position to back off and explore new implementation options This evaluation team's recommendations are tailored to assist the NRMP to wind down gradually and move in concert with other Mission programs toward orderly closeout, while contributing as far as possible to longer term CAMPFIRE sustainability

CAMPFIRE is currently active in 36 of Zimbabwe's 57 Rural Districts Its wildlife revenue base remains concentrated in 12-13 high potential districts, but geographic expansion, visible in the accompanying maps, continues The Programme has expanded out from its origins with the Guruve and Nyaminyami RDCs to include large expanses of the Mid and Lower Zambezi, Southeast Lowveld, Matabeleland, and Eastern Highland regions of the country Nevertheless, it continues to concentrate on areas where agricultural potential is limited and poverty widespread

Over the two phases of USAID involvement, the number of local communities participating in CAMPFIRE has increased to the present total of more than 185 wards This translates to more than 200,000 households and several million people As noted in this document, commercially exploitable wildlife populations are presently limited to about 13 districts

The CCG is now servicing districts both with and without Appropriate Authority status As a matter of practice, most RDCs are obtaining Appropriate Authority and are moving into full membership in the CA The shift to the national level has thus given impetus to CAMPFIRE to diversify to non-consumptive wildlife uses, to examine other resource policies governing land access, forest ownership, and use, and bring NRMP II into an investment strategy of heavy investment in institution-building of representative natural resource committees and district capacity to serve this constituency With expansion, efforts to diversify beyond the strict wildlife focus into forest and veld products, fisheries, and eco and cultural tourism are gaining momentum

Growth is not without consequences and risks spreading CAMPFIRE support under NRMP II, as explained in detail elsewhere in the report, produces high expectations for benefits from wildlife and other resources, dilutes the energies and capacities of the CCG actors, and puts sometimes excessive pressures on the Programme to engage new institutional partners and develop new revenue streams

Efforts to meet these challenges have tasked the project coordination structures to the limit The team's recommendations aim to ease these capacity constraints and enable capacity-building to be stretched over a longer timeframe

E. Major Recommendations

USAID/Zimbabwe should continue to support the CAMPFIRE movement, with some modification to NRMP II and with additional funding through FY2002

Continue direct contract support to the GOZ and IC partner and continuing grant support at a reduced level to the CA.

Maintain initial direct support to CCG NGOs Subsequently, phase down direct grants to CCG NGO partners, and, instead, encourage them to continue to access support through joint proposals with the CA Secretariat and membership for funding under the CDF or other sources

Modify the CDF to enhance CAMPFIRE sustainability and efforts to diversify the sources of revenue from sustainable natural resource use

Facilitate review and decisions regarding current proposals under active consideration,

Open up access to CDF monies by eliminating the distinction between capacity-building and infrastructure grants,

Revise CDF proposal criteria to encourage (1) actions at the sub-Rural District level and (2) economically viable natural resource enterprises through pre-investment feasibility studies and capital investments in the resource base,

Have USAID and the MLGNH begin to involve neutral peer reviewers in decision-making about the allocation of CDF monies,

Develop a decision strategy for extending the CDF beyond the current project completion date

Transform the CDF into a longer term financing mechanism, such as a sinking fund, that would extend NRMP II funds beyond the potential ending of USAID support in FY2000 or 2002 This would provide new, as well as ongoing, initiatives the necessary time to become technically sound and sustainable

Use the CDF/follow-on trust or endowment funding mechanism to facilitate and provide an enabling context especially at the village and ward levels for the development of commercially viable NRM enterprises, identified through the participatory planning process

Simplify NRMP II administration by phasing out PET and implementing a series of key project management changes

In the short term, eliminate PET and incorporate its subcommittees into the CCG

Refocus CDF financial management and other NRMP II management responsibilities more tightly within the IC and USAID SO1 team

Reduce the number and frequency of project planning and implementation meetings

For broader project issues including impending NRMP II and Mission graduation, the core management team would work closely with the NRMP II Bilateral Review Committee (BRC)

Include new partners and develop a revised Plan of Operations for the second half of the project

Shift the NRMP's project focus from expanding coverage to graduating communities

Emphasize "getting it right"' in promising areas or where promising initiatives show the most rapid progress,

Refine the criteria for what constitutes a successful CAMPFIRE community that can be considered graduated,

CCG implementing organizations should develop planning approaches that include a withdrawal phase, after which outside technical assistance would be intermittent and minimal

Develop a CAMPFIRE approach to CBNRM (and other indigenous resources) In concert with the District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) and other initiatives, define and generalize a flexible model of participatory land-use planning/CBNRM that is linked to a set of "best practices" guidelines that can be adapted to differing contexts The CA should sanction this approach and include provision for the "graduation of CAMPFIRE communities" and an "exit strategy" for CCG partners

F Getting There -- NRMP II Scenarios

Currently, NRMP II support for CAMPFIRE is scheduled to terminate in September 2000 The Mission has requested an extension through FY2002, which would extend the project completion date to September 2003 The team considered several broad options to guide Mission support to CAMPFIRE under each timeframe The team's reflections are summarized in the scenarios presented below The team favors the longer term phase-out of USAID support, which, it is argued in the body of the report, will

Enable a consolidation of progress in institutionalizing the CAMPFIRE principles,

Establish momentum behind the push for CAMPFIRE diversification into a wider range of resource use and revenue sources,

Help establish a favorable policy environment and other enabling conditions for long-term CAMPFIRE sustainability

The evaluation team recognizes there are other possibilities for pursuing the above objectives and encourages broad CCG and BRC debate of the options presented for SO 1 program modifications for the remaining CAMPFIRE support under NRMP II The team favors the FY2002-A scenario, as it contains the most progressive and responsive means of achieving results *and* closing down support

1. Graduation FY2000

Scenario FY2000-A Closeout with Modifications to the Existing Implementation Framework

Under this scenario, USAID would support existing grants under the IC through their current August 1999 termination dates, after which they would receive a one-year extension at reduced, perhaps 50-75%, funding levels They would be encouraged to complement NRMP II grant funds with matching funds and resources to complete their CCG commitments Support to new NRMP II partners and a renewed grant to ZimTrust would be structured similarly Support to government partners would be drawn directly from the USAID budget as per approved activity proposals USAID, in collaboration with the BRC, would transform/eliminate the PET This represents a step toward Mission graduation and recognizes CA's enhanced capacity Both the reduction in direct core support to grantees and the transformation of PET represent gradual and phased withdrawal of NRMP structures from within the CCG The level of the NGO match could be adjusted by institution if circumstances warranted USAID and the BRC would work through the IC to transform the CDF into an autonomous "sinking" grant fund that would gradually disperse funds through and beyond the PACD When the monies have expired, the funding mechanism will cease to exist The fund will support continued CAMPFIRE activities to the CA membership, CCG, and other actors whose proposals meet the revised CDF criteria Other USAID operating units could consider supportive, complementary intervention during and after the bilateral program's phaseout The CDF and possible presence of Peace Corps staff on the ground could leverage ongoing progress to enhance long-term sustainability

Scenario FY2000-B Closeout with No Major Modification to Existing Implementation Framework

Under this scenario, NRMP II would continue to fund existing CCG functions and operate under the same structures as are currently in place, ie, the PET and CDF New members would receive funding to enable diversification, habitat monitoring, further devolution and bottom-up planning, to be given additional impetus to achieve greatest immediate results At the PACD, USAID would pull out with minimal allowance for continuity and sustainability built into NRMP II The RCSA and other USAID operating units might play a greatly reduced role in CAMPFIRE's future, especially if a small grant fund from other sources and/or Peace Corps staff can support field-based initiatives

2 Graduation FY2002

Scenario FY2002-A Extension through FY2002 with Transition to CDF Funding

This scenario would essentially constitute an extension and expansion of Scenario FY 2000-A. The additional time would allow CAMPFIRE to consolidate the considerable investment made under NRMP II and achieve significantly greater results in several areas Under the extension, a provision similar to that in Scenario FY2000-A would be made for the PET, CDF, and new and existing CCG partners Direct grants under the IC would still wind down on the same time schedule, but the additional funds would allow a much greater period of CDF funding support The IC could be extended to oversee a two-year transition to the autonomous CDF in the post-Mission closeout period Between 2000-2002, the fund might contain a set-aside to enable smooth termination of certain core functions carried out by the CCG partners and give them time to develop alternative funding sources for some activities Additional time would also make implementation of CDF infrastructure grants a more realistic activity The additional effort would be expected to advance the diversification thrust greatly, especially of CAMPFIRE ecotourism ventures The additional time would allow USAID to assist CAMPFIRE in pursuing its policy initiative to insure producer communities are left with greater security in resource access and tenure As new partners are brought in, the extension would establish the basis for a more integrated approach to NRM Such a CAMPFIRE approach would employ participatory land-use planning and lead to "graduated" communities capable and motivated to manage their resources sustainably The extension would also allow USAID to strengthen program synergy with the Mission's special objective in economic growth and democracy As with the other scenarios, other USAID operating units could consider supportive, complementary intervention during and after the bilateral program's phaseout The CDF and possible presence of Peace Corps staff on the ground could leverage ongoing progress

Scenario FY 2002-B Extension Through FY2002 Under the Existing System of Sub-Grants

This scenario would essentially constitute an extension of Scenario FY2000-B Existing project structures would be maintained Additional funds would permit efforts to diversify CAMPFIRE NRM activities, and especially allow ecotourism and woodland management to be substantially furthered Policy changes and initiatives could be made a greater priority NRMP II could be used to enhance the GOZ/CAMPFIRE aim of comprehensive habitat monitoring to complement the widely praised wildlife monitoring functions The greatest number of incremental and specific recommendations made in this report could be implemented under this scenario The PET could be phased out prior to the PACD but less abruptly than under the FY2000 scenarios With careful planning, the impact of NRMP II closeout could be reduced

Scenario FY2002-C Extension with No Additional Funding

Essentially a second-choice scenario, it is preferable to the presently approved FY2000 closeout Activities and budgets could be wound down more slowly There would be no impetus to spend funds rapidly Rather, the challenge would be in using them even more parsimoniously than at present

Results would suffer, however Diversification to other CBNRM regimes that employ participatory methodologies and land-use plans, and that receive assistance from new CCG partners, would not be offered the same startup incentives, and post-project activities would be limited to options outside of NRMP II control in the post-graduation context Triage in activity selection would result in some activities being curtailed or dropped The RCSA, Peace Corps, and other US-funded activities could mitigate the abrupt withdrawal

G. Summary of Findings, Conclusions, and Additional Recommendations

1. Distribution of CAMPFIRE Revenues

Findings and Conclusions

For well-endowed Rural Districts, CAMPFIRE revenue is often significant From its inception, total US dollar revenue accruing to all Rural Districts rose from an initial $655,000 in 1989 to $1,253,405 in 1996 Since the USAID-funded NRMP II began in 1994, CAMPFIRE Rural Districts earned a total of US$ 4 8 million, slightly more than half of the US$8 5 million spent to date Overall, the Rural Districts have over time and on average respected the first revenue distribution guideline (50/35/15), rather than the more empowering 80/20 guideline, which encourages wards to budget for and administer resource management costs Since the Programme began, 58% of revenue has been devolved to producer wards, with the RDCs retaining an average of 25% for "management fees" and 15% as a District levy However, these average statistics disguise significant variation across the Rural Districts It is important to note that the management revenues are spent at the ward and village levels, so that the producer communities are receiving at least indirect benefits

NRMP II does not directly support trophy hunting The safari hunting industry, however, does generate substantial revenues in Zimbabwe, a portion of which the Programme captures efficiently NRMP II supports development efforts to help local communities capture and make better use of these revenues and of the resources that generate them Revenue distribution and use primary measures of how well the CAMPFIRE principles are being applied, and they will continue to grow in importance as new resources are developed They are used variously for compensation for animal damage to crops, social infrastructure, group enterprises such as grinding mills, and individual households in the form of cash dividends Since this goes to the heart of CAMPFIRE, the team spent considerable effort to assess the use of revenues

The few well-endowed Rural Districts -- Binga, Nyaminyami, and Guruve in the Zambezi valley -- provide the bulk of CAMPFIRE revenues This has given the Programme a false appearance of profitability and drawn undue attention to its potential as a means of providing rapid and substantial benefits to the majority of program participants However, the longer term potential for revenue from a wide range of resources may be higher than the skeptics suspect In addition, involvement with the CAMPFIRE provides non-financial benefits in the form of participation and empowerment

Recommendations

Have the CA issue guidelines calling on its member RDCs to be as open and transparent with their wildlife accounts as possible This would mean sending Ward Committees copies of contracts with safari operators as well as copies of all checks made out to the RDCs by operators under contract

Insure that communities fully understand and exercise their freedom to decide what to do with their wildlife revenue and in what form they prefer to receive it

Have the CA commission CASS to review existing data and complementary field studies for what constitutes sufficient benefit to maintain ward, village, and household and individual commitment to conservation behavior, essentially testing assumptions #3 (and #4) of the project regarding "willingness" to invest effort in conservation

2. Building Local Capacity

Findings and Conclusions

a Establishing the CAMPFIRE Association as the Lead Organization

The CA has successfully assumed the leadership role NRMP II, principally through the PET and the CDF, has contributed to rapid institutional evolution In assessing the CA's performance and making recommendations for improvement, the recency of CA's leadership capacity development has to be kept in mind Although nominally in the lead agency role since 1992, the CA has had only about 18 months to organize itself and install the necessary management infrastructure and processes to discharge its lead agency responsibilities fully The Institutional Contractor (IC) has been effective in assisting the CA in acquiring essential program administration capacity Although too early in CA's institutional evolution to posit final conclusions, it is clear from interviews with CCG members, other stakeholders, and documentary references that the CA is viewed as the lead CAMPFIRE agency The evaluation team's field data collection visits to the RDCs, wards, and villages further indicated that the local agencies look to the CA for leadership and assistance to help them do their jobs

b Providing Financial Support for Decentralization: The CAMPFIRE Development Fund

The CDF was established as a $US6 million grant fund The IC serves as the grants management unit, with specific responsibility to "execute and administer specific support grant agreements" Project documents are unclear about the long-term division of responsibility for CDF grant development, approval, and management, however, and variously allocate these responsibilities among the CA, PET, and IC A three-page grant and proposal guideline form was accepted by all parties and distributed to all the RDCs PET committee members agreed that two kinds of grants

were to be given capacity-building and infrastructure Capacity-building grants fund equipment, salaries, technical assistance, and training of new staff and community participants The infrastructure grants are meant to fund capital investments None have been made to date because most of the proposals have lacked the requisite social, economic, technical, and environmental feasibility analyses In addition, for both development and implementation reasons, the decision was made to allocate the two types of grants sequentially, beginning first with the institutional capacity-building As of February 1998, the CDF had made 20 grants to RDCs, obligating $Z24 2 million, or about $US1 6 million, from the CDF The RDCs have made total cash and in-kind contributions amounting to 22% of the grants Several infrastructure grant proposals have reached the advanced review stage

It appears that there has been over-standardization in the formulation of grants The similarity is the result of a belief that, to expand the CAMPFIRE concept nationwide to non-wildlife-producing Rural Districts, each new Rural District would need similar staff and organizational resources to coordinate NRM activities That approach has led to the similarity among grants The centralization of grant management responsibilities to the Rural District level tends to subvert the learning curve for self-organized village and ward communities Sophisticated ward committees such as can be found in Mahenye find that under the grant they move from one tutor to another, rather than being allowed to develop their own skills in project development, training, facilitation, and management in a learning-by-doing framework

The overall local revenue-generating capacity of the RDCs has not been adequately considered before approving grants that contain a salary line The short-term expansion of salaried village and ward-level resource monitors and promoters places heavy resource demands that have implications for the long-term sustainability and credibility of the Programme Districts that once relied on a sustainable combination of volunteer labor and a smaller number of salaried monitors paid out of CAMPFIRE revenue may find this more difficult to reestablish in the future if available resources were to shrink

The defacto choice of the RDCs as the sole organization eligible for a CDF grant hampers project development by limiting the number of organizations able to request funds for CAMPFIRE-like activities It reduces the incentive for village and ward communities to self-organize into cooperatives, user groups, and registered associations and eventually make themselves eligible for direct support

In the 30 months remaining until the end of FY2000, it is unlikely that the CDF can finance more than a handful of infrastructure projects Currently, there are not enough staff with engineering, economic, and environmental expertise in the CAMPFIRE administrative structure to analyze problems, examine alternatives, and develop worthy proposals in sufficient numbers to spend the remaining allotted funds In addition, most infrastructure projects will take even longer to implement, thereby going well beyond the PACD If the initial concept of funding US$3 million in CAMPFIRE infrastructure is to be retained, then a major infusion of assistance is needed from private sector business and technological consultants who can design projects that have the best possible chances for success The chance of viable activities being undertaken would be significantly enhanced in relation to the life of the project CAMPFIRE communities are increasingly ready to absorb the types of investments envisioned

c Empowering Local Communities

Among the CAMPFIRE CCG members, the ZimTrust has, since 1988, been involved the most directly in working with local communities at the village and ward levels This involvement, as well at the RDCs, in developing capacity for management and decision making for sustainable NRM, particularly wildlife management, for the purpose of helping people realize the maximum benefits from the resources of their lands The evaluation focused on ZimTrust's activities but recognizes there are other field activities, such as a DNPWLM fisheries initiative in Gokwe South

In many ways, it can be said that the ZimTrust effectively operationalized CAMPFIRE at the village, ward, and Rural District levels through its early capacity-building support. It took the early risks by pushing the new idea of decentralization, when this was just beginning to be thought about at local levels The ZimTrust has helped with conflict resolution, confidence-building, and awareness-building at all levels It has provided a great deal of the support needed to help local people see the direct links between wildlife and other indigenous resources and their needs CA management acknowledges readily that ZimTrust does very good work in the field It relies on ZimTrust to deliver much of CAMPFIRE's essential services to the RDCs, wards, and villages

The ZimTrust needs to develop, in collaboration with the CA and concerned RDCs, an exit plan for transferring the specific activities it is providing through NRMP II to the RDCs and communities in which it is currently working

Recommendations

Expand the range of organizations eligible for CDF grants beyond the RDCs to any registered private or public organization in Zimbabwe This includes NGOs, government departments, conservancies, user groups, associations, cooperatives, universities, and any other organization legally able to receive grant funds under Zimbabwe law Current CCG members are included on this list The only constraint to eligibility would be maintenance of minimal acceptable standards of financial accounting per USAID regulations and US law affecting the use of foreign aid funds In practice, this requirement would eliminate the vast majority of potential grantees However, organizations with below-regulation accounting practices (women s clubs, ward organizations, etc) Could certainly partner with a stronger support NGO that did meet the requirements The grant criteria should explicitly favor mentoring partnerships

Given the excellent support the ZimTrust has given to CAMPFIRE through NRMP I and II, and the regional placement of its personnel, USAID should not rebid the services for the time remaining Instead, it should amend the current project agreement The last chapter contains recommendations concerning the level of support required

Channel continued funding to the ZimTrust through the IC, as currently being done with the other CCG CAMPFIRE partners This in no way reflects negatively upon ZimTrust's capacity to manage and report on USAID funds, which has been excellent and timely The reasons have

more to do with creating the perception that USAID treats the CCG partners consistently and equitably Additionally, the move would streamline management in a manner consistent with the impending reductions in USAID staff associated with Mission closeout

3 Improving Natural Resource Management

Findings and Conclusions

Through WWF and to a lesser extent other CCG members, CAMPFIRE communities are called upon to be involved in a number of resource management activities, most having to do with wildlife Among other initiatives are wildlife fence establishment, quota-setting, and game monitoring

Problem animal reporting and control are important issues that have the potential to promote the goals of wildlife conservation or demoralize the people who are subject to wildlife-induced life or property loss Similarly, it can reinforce or undermine Appropriate Authority

Most observers consider the hunting quotas in CAMPFIRE areas to be conservative The maintenance of trophy quality and overall wildlife numbers suggest that wildlife populations are being sustainably exploited under present conditions An analysis by Dr Ian Douglas-Hamilton of the current aerial survey techniques and data, done in the run-up to the CITES convention in 1997, concluded that the system effectively provided data for the management of Zimbabwe's elephants and that Zimbabwe possessed "one of the best sets of elephant data in the world "

Although various stakeholders gather data on biological systems and the physical environment, monitoring of habitat change is not being systematically performed throughout the country, and an organized effort has not yet been realized throughout the CAMPFIRE areas Insufficient funds are currently devoted to this important aspect of CAMPFIRE

Recommendations

Support increased research into non-lethal means of managing problem animals such as using recorded sounds and improved delivery systems for irritant sprays (i e , capsicum)

Adopt a trophy record system that favors selection of older male animals, rather than prime males or females, an approach that has distinct advantages The adoption of qualitative rather than exclusively quantitative measures would favor this change, which the GOZ and NGO conservation agencies should encourage

Improve the management of lesser game In the short term, improve reporting and completion of the hunting forms and surveys Also, in keeping with adaptive management, use meetings or special working group sessions to determine field-based mechanisms for assessing populations and trends for lesser species Focus on commercial exploitation of and the creation of value for lesser species such as the impala Local/regional sport hunting, subsistence hunting and local

butcheries, live animal sales, and game viewing are possible mechanisms through which to accomplish this

Create a CCG working group on habitat monitoring Make an augmented effort to develop an effective strategy to monitor key environmental variables as they relate to wildlife habitat changes and conditions, land-use patterns, and baseline environmental variables To allow for funding constraints, this could be carried out in selected areas that are representative of conditions found throughout the CAMPFIRE areas, particularly those whose proximity to protected areas permits controlled experiments as described above

Re-examine current DNPWLM policy on live animal translocation It is an excellent conservation tool, particularly as some areas in Zimbabwe are overstocked and drought-prone, whereas other areas have depleted wildlife populations and good habitat

4 Improving NRMP II/SO1 and CAMPFIRE Coordination

Findings and Conclusions

Program coordination and improved communication are issues that need to be addressed at every level within CAMPFIRE The growing number of participating institutions only makes the need more urgent The section below addresses CAMPFIRE (CCG) institutional interrelationships Key unresolved issues include

Coordination of the CAMPFIRE movement

Coordination of the NRMP II support effort

Financial accountability throughout the movement

Coordination of CAMPFIRE with regional activities and donors

a. Coordination of the CAMPFIRE Movement

There clearly are differences of opinion among the CCG partners as to who should be doing what There is also disagreement as to what constitutes "coordination" and to what extent "control" has any place These differences appear partially to revolve around monetary control and the power it gives to build a constituency The differences are also due to the perceived effort of the CA to identify itself as CAMPFIRE within Zimbabwe This situation is a disincentive to potential future private sector and NGO partners joining the Programme, who believe they can apply CAMPFIRE or CBNRM principles outside the Programme without being micro-managed by the CA

The decision to structure NRMP II to reinforce the CA as the lead CAMPFIRE agency, and allocate substantial funds to build CA capacity, seems to have altered pre-NRMP II CCG interrelationships

and responsibilities It upset the relative positions of the actors within CAMPFIRE and reallocated project resources The relationship between the CA and ZimTrust is an obvious example The CA emerged from ZimTrust's shadow as the lead agency, with considerable project resources and a mandate to expand its capacity This expansion touched upon areas of responsibility (e g , training and technical assistance) formerly (and exclusively) in ZimTrust's portfolio On the other hand, the CA has complained about ZimTrust's direct project line to USAID

Instead of effective leadership and coordination of the CCG, the evaluation team saw several instances of intra-CCG squabbling over decision making prerogatives and access to project resources This may reflect, in part, historical disagreements among the CCG members The team also believes it reflects the absence of clearly delineated CCG roles and responsibilities and firm CA leadership in inspiring the needed sense of shared ownership in the CAMPFIRE implementation effort

Implementing partners have been successful in instilling a sense of ownership among participating RDCs -- to the extent that they consider themselves **to be** CAMPFIRE The work plans of these CCG members have been responsive to beneficiaries' demands for services -- although the demand is frequently larger than institutional capabilities can deliver

b. Coordination of the NRMP II Support Effort

The SARP NRMP II project document states that "no project specific steering committees or other special management structures will be established to guide project implementation, allowing project management to focus on strengthening CAMPFIRE institutions and structures for maximum relevance and sustainability of program interventions and accomplishments" (SARP, 1994 33) There is no mention within the project document of an entity similar to the PET The PET has, however, become just such a "steering committee " The reason is that, at the time the PET was set up, the CCG was not providing much overall guidance or direction, and the PET stepped in and effectively managed to pull things together That is, the PET took control of CAMPFIRE coordination by default, in order to move NRMP II activities forward and "get things done " The various subcommittees were formed (e g , policy and M&E) for much the same reason

The PET has helped strengthen the CA and has permitted the "expanded project team" to work better than ever before It has helped CCG partners focus and begin working together on common objectives, rather than proceeding individually In short, the PET has improved coordination. The PET has also been successful in launching NRMP II activities and has supported the CA in building up national level representation and activities The downside is that it has essentially replaced the CCG, which it has not similarly strengthened, nor has it improved the partnerships that could have resulted These outcomes were **not** intended

NGO partners are generally critical of the PET A major criticism is that USAID set up NRMP II has for its "administrative convenience," instead of in an optimal way for CAMPFIRE The NGOs cite the PET as an example while it may be useful for USAID, it does not promote project administration

efficiency, effectiveness, or sustainability USAID and the CA believe that NGO criticism stems from a generalized resistance to having their activities coordinated, reviewed, and subjected to external oversight

The PET has served its initial purposes and no longer responds to the realities of the CA and the general CAMPFIRE movement in Zimbabwe In particular, the PET has made it possible for USAID NRMP II project funds to be delivered to their target customers, the RDCs Although the PET did achieve greater coordination among CCG partner institutions, it may have done so at the cost of the evolving role of the CCG within the Programme Clearly, the CCG is weaker today than it was five years ago

In addition, the CA has begun to use the PET as a means of imposing greater control over its CCG partners Those not invited to a PET meeting are "out of the loop" on what is going on In effect, the PET is restricting input from Programme partners Moreover, there is a need for other donors and non-USAID-funded CCG partners to have a program-wide mechanism for addressing CAMPFIRE

The recently established Bilateral Review Committee attempt to situate the Programme and NRMP II in the larger national context Their input would be appropriate in helping to define post-PET project management structures

c. Financial Accountability

The IC has played a major role in building the CA's capacity, particularly in terms of financial management It has also increased the CA's capacity to manage its resources and account for them according to USAID requirements and regulations Price Waterhouse's pre-award assessment of the CA recommended that the IC continue this close assistance and oversight role with the CA

CA/CCG grantees continue to need limited assistance from the IC to execute their project administration responsibilities successfully The RDCs will continue to need technical services and training in this area

Strengthening the financial management capacity of the CA was well done and very useful to the CAMPFIRE Programme New CCG grantees could benefit from similar assistance if such services could be extended

d. Coordination of CAMPFIRE with Regional Activities and Donors

New CBNRM programs in neighboring countries have adopted CAMPFIRE's principles but not the elephant focus and history Regional sharing of common and different experiences and the drawing of lessons learned have become major aspects of the regional program Under the reorganized regional office, diversified CBNRM approaches have become a focus of activity

Collaboration between the regional program and the bilateral implementation effort has improved significantly in the several years since the last mid-term evaluation Synergy between similar CBNRM programs is developing across countries Shared objectives and agendas are strengthening individual programs Other programs, for example, have learned from CAMPFIRE's strengths -- its principles, its commitment to empowerment, and its strong adaptive management approach to wildlife and program coordination -- and from CAMPFIRE's weaknesses -- limited devolution and constraining policies that make change difficult and foster too great a focus on a single resource Progress has been limited by the staff and time the RCSA has been able to afford

Recommendations

USAID should concentrate its support of CA's Harare-based activities in two specific areas -- program advocacy and policy dialogue *Program advocacy* includes national and international initiatives aimed at informing individuals and groups about the CAMPFIRE movement and promoting a positive, constructive image The CA has carried out this activity well in the past Effective advocacy will require using the most current and appropriate communication technologies (e g , Internet, multi-media presentations) *Policy dialogue* requires proactively engaging policy makers in discussions of important policy issues of direct relevance to CAMPFIRE, with the intent of promoting the passage of sound legislation. It will also include dialogue on regulatory matters pertaining to the implementation of laws The CA will have to strengthen its policy advocacy skills and draw upon CCG resources, such as CASS and ART, to complement and help build this capacity

Since USAID is going to graduate Zimbabwe within the next five years (and perhaps end funding to NRMP II even sooner), it needs to begin *now* to relax its control of the project and avoid micro-management It will need to relocate de facto project control and authority to Zimbabweans, who eventually will have to assume complete program responsibility

The CA should request RCSA assistance in accessing the lessons of devolution and working with CBOs and local level producer communities This could involve workshops, exchange visits for the CA Board, RDC executives, and others, including community-based organizations (CBOs)

The RCSA should take the lead in defining an appropriate USAID role in supporting southern Africa regional states and NGO concerns in advocating national and regional positions on important policy and economic issues related to wildlife and other resource management and use at international fora/venues

5. Devolution of Authority

Findings and Conclusions

The essential "owners" of CAMPFIRE within Zimbabwe are the rural communities and their elected representatives at the RDC level Their natural resources and socioeconomic well-being are the

subject of CCG and NRMP II efforts to achieve sustainable management Both renewable and non-renewable natural resources have come to be the focus of community attention Since each Rural District possesses different resources, their strategies must be different RDC partners working to achieve CAMPFIRE objectives include government, NGOs, and other private sector groups, national and international CCG members are the central Programme partners, which through the leadership of the CA, with external donor funding, are able to provide capacity-building and support institutional strengthening in these Rural Districts

In the earlier years of CAMPFIRE within Zimbabwe, the NGOs played an important role, in partnership with the DNPWLM and a few special Rural District leaders, in putting together the conceptual and applied realizations of what has become CAMPFIRE During the past five years, the RDCs have risen to the challenge and have developed their own CAMPFIRE Association advocacy NGO agency to coordinate and articulate their needs before the GOZ, donors, NGOs and the private sector This evolution represents an important, deepening ownership of CAMPFIRE by its intended beneficiaries

The CAMPFIRE Programme, as a Zimbabwean initiative, should at some level be "owned" by all institutions adhering to CAMPFIRE principles That the RDCs wish to claim "ownership" of CAMPFIRE through their CA should be seen as a very positive development -- and permit supporting institutions to serve more in an advisory and technical support role to this growing CAMPFIRE constituency However, for the movement to really take root and expand, it would be a mistake to relegate CCG and business partners to simple external roles such service provider or commercial associate

Recommendations

The CA, as the lead agency within the Zimbabwe CCG network, should take the lead in terms of policy dialogue, national advocacy of CAMPFIRE principles through its RDC constituency, and championing the needs for continuing policy reform aimed at devolving sufficient authority over natural resources to local communities It should play a pivotal role in insuring program coordination, information flow, and program monitoring, but much of the work in these latter areas should be accomplished through facilitation and delegation of responsibility The CA should also take the lead in establishing standards in marketing CAMPFIRE-related products

Given the important challenges that Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE faces in coming years, both to maintain current wildlife resources and extend CAMPFIRE activities to other natural resources, it is time that CAMPFIRE collaborators, NGOs, the CA, with its RDCs, government agencies, begin to put past differences behind them and begin truly collaborating to reach their common goal of further devolution Between them, CAMPFIRE collaborators have an impressive range of skills and experience that can potentially lead the Programme well into the next century

6. Land Use and Diversification

Findings and Conclusions

Diversification of the sources of economic benefit from improving NRM depend on the inherent potential of both the resources and the political-ecological context Assessment generally underlies development projects espousing a NRM objective CAMPFIRE's capture of a ready stream of revenue renders it somewhat exceptional, and a single resource indicator -- trophy quality -- determined program organization and focus in the early years When some four years ago the Programme began diversifying, institutional momentum and the undeniable importance of wildlife have kept other resources in the background

In this section, the evaluation team assesses the progress and apparent potential of broadening the economic base upon which the CAMPFIRE principles are being tested In this respect, several issues may prove key to the future character and composition of the CAMPFIRE movement

Actual land-use potential, the institutional capacity to make such a determination, and the means of devising an appropriate land use strategy based on the assessment

Diversification of the benefit streams the economic potential of sustainable exploitation of the resource and the prospects for channeling revenues in a manner consistent with the movement's philosophy

The depth and breadth of CAMPFIRE management to accommodate new resources, markets, and modalities of production and distribution

The feasibility of using NRMP II funds to bring in new institutional partners to meet this expanding mandate

The issues are vital and underlie the rationale in recommending continued funding for NRMP II under the scenarios developed elsewhere in the document The evaluation has already signaled that under CAMPFIRE, WWF has made significant steps toward participatory land-use planning (cf Section II B)

Recommendations

Add new partners to respond to new technical and policy needs associated with diversifying and expanding coverage

Strengthen participatory land use planning activities and develop guidelines for bringing non-wildlife and ecotourism models to the point where they can be adapted and replicated

7 Advocacy and the International Context

Findings and Conclusions

As indicated in the SOW, in the run-up to the 1997 CITES Conference of Parties, "CAMPFIRE came under intense attack from a variety of animal welfare groups opposed to trophy-hunting of wildlife, particularly elephants, and the resumption of the trade in elephant ivory " The debate over this issue, which ultimately played out in the US Congress raised a number of matters of interest not only to NRMP II management but also, more generally, to the US foreign assistance program In this section the overall issue is divided into four related areas

Regional, international, and/or US-based advocacy for downlisting the African elephant and its appropriateness to CAMPFIRE and NRMP II

The role, performance, and results of ART's (and CA's) efforts in this area

The USAID Mission's response regarding the use of US funds for such activities

An advocacy role is appropriate and justified for governments, which participate in the international politics of wildlife conservation Government's devolution of Appropriate Authority to communities engages them directly and thus, in turn, their NGO partners In addition, CITES is as much NGO- as government-driven, further substantiating the appropriateness of Zimbabwean NGOs supporting CAMPFIRE in participating in the international dialogue surrounding the trade in wildlife products

The marketing and advocacy activities undertaken by ART and CA fall within the norms of what USAID has actively supported in other sectors, such as in many export promotion programs for non-traditional agricultural products or for certified tropical timber products CITES and other regulatory structures are legitimately the object of scrutiny as to whether they constitute non-tariff barriers to trade Without taking either a technical or moral stand on trophy-hunting of elephants, this conclusion reflects widely held US values grounded in fundamental beliefs about the importance of free trade, the democratic process, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the value of a vibrant civil society As documented in the body of the report, this is what USAID bought into with its support to the international activities financed by NRMP II

Recommendations

Allow the CA to continue utilizing ART's services and, where necessary, collaborating with ART to obtain necessary financial support to obtain those services

Have ART continue to help the CA explore the international market for non-consumptive wildlife use, including game-viewing and cultural and ecotourism A major or lead role in following regional activities would be appropriate in this regard It is important to CAMPFIRE to stay abreast of strategies and marketing techniques of potential use to the CA membership Related

networking and facilitation of cross-country visits and other strategic encounters would also play to ART's strengths

Work with CCG members, especially the CA, to use the Internet to link CAMPFIRE globally with affiliated interests in such subject areas as CBNRM, responsible ecotourism, and indigenous rights groups

Assist the CA in creating and maintaining an Internet-based discussion forum where substantive and controversial issues can be debated and constructive suggestions from all quarters incorporated into the CAMPFIRE process In this way, individuals and organizations, including animal welfare interests, could offer alternative perspectives on such questions as problem animal management, wildlife population dynamics, sustainable finance, resource tenure, wildlife habitat and monitoring, PRA, and other topics that could help guide CAMPFIRE's adaptive management model

8. Adaptive Management

Findings and Conclusions

Scientific findings and the needs of society may, for example, signal a need to adapt resource management to new information Adaptive management, a form of "learning by doing," means steadily adjusting management in the light of experience in order to rebuild healthy ecosystems Assessment and monitoring are integral to adaptive management, which requires field-based data from local resource users

Recommendations

Have CASS continue playing an active role in CAMPFIRE policy analysis and applied research Encourage it to develop its policy dialogue skills so its analysis may better contribute to policy decision making Specifically, CASS should (1) write policy briefs that summarize major findings and recommendations, (2) seek to expand the form in which studies are presented so that they are accessible by sub-national audiences, e g , they might work with *ACTION Magazine* to put some policy related studies in an animated strip format in the magazine and other educational materials, and (3) seize opportunities to make its work known through popular media, public speeches, and participation in CAMPFIRE meetings, workshops, and training

Although the results must feed into an adaptive management framework, establish a process that allows CASS, when tasked with a study, to determine its timing and precise content internally The CCG should help define the subject areas and scope of inquiry, such as tenure policy, ecotourism, and impact of natural resource policies

9 Sustainability of CAMPFIRE after NRMP II

Findings and Conclusions

The evaluation stresses the need to revise field level approaches in CAMPFIRE to incorporate greater bottom-up planning, with an aim toward sustainable NRM-based resource use, improved management capacity of enterprises, and social infrastructure in place Present NGO experience has not yet reached efficient systematic methods to achieve this combination of financial, social, economic/institutional, and ecological elements that in turn coalesce into local level "graduation " Notable exceptions are found, however, and refinement and replication of these successes are advocated over allocating project resources widely and too thinly These local "models" can serve as foci for extending field successes

To create a sustainable financing vehicle that will remain in place beyond the life of the project, capitalization of the remaining funds would be appropriate Capitalization would provide a sustainable financial mechanism that would continue to provide small-scale support for activities in the country consistent with NRMP II goals and the underlying principles of CAMPFIRE It would also slow the rate of spending to a level more in keeping with ongoing local absorptive capacity and would build on the first round of District-level capacity building grants A prolonged and steady access to even limited funds would more likely to allow for high-quality field results The DA could easily establish this mechanism during the closeout period, but after closeout it would not have in-country USAID management

Capitalization could involve either an endowment or a sinking fund and, in both cases, prudent management would require that the capital stay off-shore – that is, in the United States Annual transfers for grant-making would be made to a local organization charged with developing, approving, and monitoring the grants

Recommendations

Create a sustainable financing vehicle, to remain in place after the project Capitalize the remaining funds, and link this funding mechanism with other Agency operating unit and USG activities such as stationing Peace Crop volunteers in CAMPFIRE areas

H. Lessons Learned

The CAMPFIRE and NRMP II experiences are rich in development and management lessons, and many of these have been brought out elsewhere in the extensive literature This evaluation calls attention to a number under the following rubrics that stood out

- Planning for public scrutiny
- Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations
- The need for strong partnerships
- The importance of cultural values
- The inadequacy of protected area systems to protect biodiversity
- Balancing results and flexibility in programming

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Description of Activities Evaluated

This evaluation addresses the second phase of USAID support of CAMPFIRE USAID initiated that support in 1989 under the Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP) and has continued to support CAMPFIRE under the regional SARP Natural Resources Management Project (690-0251 13), now absorbed under the newer Initiative for Southern Africa (ISA), through the bilaterally-managed Natural Resources Management Project, Phase II (NRMP II) NRMP II (613-0241) began in September 1994 The USAID contribution was US$20 5 million, of which $16 million represents bilateral program funding USAID/Zimbabwe's support under NRMP I was a part of a larger regional project assisting several pilot efforts in four Districts of rural Matabeleland to test CBNRM approaches The second phase builds on this initial experience and expands coverage to the national level Having moved beyond the pilot phase, the project is now largely a bilateral effort and is managed as such

The goal of Phase II, as described by its logical framework (Appendix A), is to use natural resources to develop economically sustainable communities on lands marginally suitable for agriculture The purpose of the project is two-fold

(1) to develop community-based programs to increase income and sustain natural resources, and
(2) to improve local capabilities to protect the resource base

USAID and its implementation partners agreed to an implementation strategy as constituted in the CCG The resulting NRMP II -- Zimbabwe Plan of Operations (June 1995) served as the basis for a series of contracts, grants, and sub-grants that guide the specific activities evaluated in this document

NRMP II's design, contained in the SARP Project Amendment (USAID 1995) (and in Project Document 613-0241), embodies adaptive management principles that use annual planning updates and quarterly implementation workshops Notably, USAID/Zimbabwe and its CCG partners refocused the results orientation of the project so as to reflect the redesigned Mission Strategic Objective, SO1 The new Results Framework (RF) situates the program squarely within the Agency's Strategic Plan (SP), specifically contributing to the objectives of "sustainable natural resource management" and "biological diversity conserved "

Because of the Mission's scheduled graduation and closeout in 2003, the new SO1, "NRM strengthened for sustainable development of CAMPFIRE communities," was not expanded beyond the scope of the current NRMP II project While not ignoring household level measures, the current RF and indicators underscore the local (village/ward) community level focus of this innovative, conservation-based community development program

Table 1: USAID Flow of Funds in NRMP II as of February 1998, in nominal US$

Recipient	Per Project Document	Per Contract Agreement	Obligated to Contract	Spent to Date	Obligated not Spent	Remaining not Obligated	Remaining Total	Spending Started
CDF	6,000,000	6,000,000	1,674,451	636,630	1,037,821	4,325,549	5,363,370	11/96
DA/PW	2,675,000	3,453,613	3,453,613	1,814,977	1,638,636	0	1,638,636	11/95
DNPWLM	1,500,000	1,500,000	208,048	60,764	147,284	1,291,952	1,439,236	
MLGRUD	200,000	200,000	0	0	0	200,000	200,000	
CA	1,750,000	1,750,000	1,347,340	852,355	494,985	402,660	897,645	
Zimtrust	4,225,000	4,587,428	4,587,428	3,922,777	664,651	0	664,651	9/95
WWF	1,570,000	1,600,000	666,667	445,083	221,584	933,333	1,154,917	6/96
CASS	1,050,000	1,050,000	629,521	396,010	233,511	420,479	653,990	1/96
USAID	1,530,000	358,959	358,959	335,000	23,959	0	23,959	
Totals	20,500,000	20,500,000	12,926,027	8,463,596	4,462,431	7,573,973	12,036,404	

Notes

Zimtrust, DNP and MLG do not work on contracts as the other recipients do
Zimtrust works on grants USAID "commits" or obligates funds to the grantee
Zimbabwe government units work with "earmarked" USAID funds which are released on invoice
USAID line item for contract management acts partly as a contingent fund
Zimtrust expenditures are through Nov 30, 1997
Zimtrust expenditures include ART and Action

B. Evaluation Purpose, Methodology, and Scope of Work

CAMPFIRE is an important program It is among the first to test the notion that conferring specified proprietary rights and related economic benefits to local communities that share access to a given set of natural resources will engender responsible stewardship With appropriate support, the program design anticipates sustainable improvements in resource management and sustained benefits from a new stream of revenue With its 10-year history, the lessons learned from CAMPFIRE are of real value for similar programs in the region and elsewhere

CAMPFIRE exemplifies a new paradigm of conservation-based community development, founded on the premise that, by creating value in natural resources and giving communities a direct link to that value, these resources will provide sufficient incentives for the application of sustainable use regimes That is, when a community receives direct benefits in excess of the perceived costs of management, and its access to those benefits is secure over time, it will choose to manage its resource base sustainably This thesis attracts controversy where the principal natural resource is wildlife and the principal use is sport hunting of elephants and other fauna

Consistent with this thesis, in 1997 Zimbabwe successfully requested that its elephant population be moved from Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Flora and Fauna) (CITES) to Appendix II to permit limited sport hunting of elephants and ivory trade with Japan CAMPFIRE in turn became a focus of animal rights activists that led to a direct Congressional vote on continued USAID support and to a request by USAID for this evaluation of the program It is important to note at the outset of this report, as the evaluation team stresses, that neither CAMPFIRE nor NRMP II are ideal models, nor should they be expected to be

This evaluation is called for based on USAID's own criteria Following reengineering, USAID Strategic Objective (SO) teams are responsible for achieving results and using formal evaluations in a discretionary manner to help achieve them Operating Units, including the USAID Mission in Zimbabwe, support SO team evaluations when, among other situations

- performance monitoring indicates an unexpected (positive or negative) result on a critical measure,
- a key management decision must be made about directions in an activity, intermediate result, or SO, but there is inadequate information for making the decision,
- annual (or periodic) reviews in the operating unit or with the host country identify key questions to be resolved on which consensus must be developed,
- formal or informal feedback from participants, partners, customers, or other informed observers suggests that implementation is not going well or not meeting the needs of intended customers,
- there is a breakdown in a critical assumption or intermediate result supported by another donor

that challenges the validity of the strategy to achieve the SO, or

- an operating unit believes extracting key "lessons learned" or documenting experience is important for the benefit of other Operating Units or future programming in the same country (USAID 1997)

1. Purpose

In the case of this project, key management decisions are required because of the impending Mission closeout, the expansion of the project, and the proposed addition of new members to the CCG The focus on broader issues such as the role of advocacy and lobbying, the program's association with sport hunting as a conservation tool, and the program's pioneering role in CBNRM suggest the timeliness of extracting key lessons of interest to a wider audience and of relevance to other Operating Units Documenting performance will help clarify the Congressional debate regarding the relative merits and liabilities of continuing US support to CAMPFIRE

This evaluation takes a hard, objective look at the CAMPFIRE effort so as to answer some basic questions of interest to a diverse array of readers The specific objectives are to

1 Assess NRMP II responsiveness to the findings and recommendations of the last project evaluation,

2 Document USAID-funded contributions to CAMPFIRE to date,

3 Assess the performance of each implementing partner in fulfilling its respective roles and responsibilities under NRMP II,

4 Document results and impacts to date,

5 Address certain key policy, planning, management, and implementation issues, and

6 Recommend revised implementation approaches and arrangements for improving NRMP II achievement and impact, and the prospects for the long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE, as NRMP II progresses toward its final stages of implementation and closeout (The complete Scope of Work is included as Appendix B)

2. Methodology

The Mitchell Group, Inc (TMG) evaluation team used a four-phase methodology designed to insure quality and objectivity within a participatory and collaborative approach Phase One consisted of establishing definitions and developing the analytical framework and operational workplan Phase 2 involved data-gathering and identification of key issues, such as devolution, diversification, and sustainability To judge impact and to document performance, the team attempted to corroborate its

information base by using multiple data sources -- both primary and secondary, and qualitative and quantitative -- to corroborate its findings The team obtained most primary data through interviews, focus group discussions, and direct observation This work was carried out concurrently with an intensive review of substantive and process-related documents In the case of the CA, where existing multiple reviews were available, meta-analysis complemented the fieldwork to reach synthesis and conclusions

Following an internal consensus-building workshop and completion of a mid-course progress report, the team entered Phase 3, entailing analysis and report preparation Here subject matter specialists went beyond the shared information base to address specific evaluation questions more deeply The consensus-building effort continued as more detailed information was assembled The intent was to insure that the write-up represented a genuine team perspective and did not consist of a series of specialists' reports The Team Leader assembled, blended, and reconciled the individual contributions of team members to produce a unified draft report Phase 4, ownership and completion of the final report, began with a USAID and CCG stakeholder review, followed by consultations between the Team Leader accompanied by one other team member and the stakeholders with respect to core conclusions and recommendations

C. The Evaluation Team

The evaluation team consisted of six US-based professionals from a diverse range of professional disciplines and with extensive development experience and a local logistical support person No team member had any direct prior experience with the CAMPFIRE Programme As such, the team was able to conduct a truly objective examination of the project and its performance and impact to date The team members and their roles are as follows

- **Dr Frederick W Sowers**, Team Leader and environmental geographer, focused on general USAID issues, CAMPFIRE's regional dimension, lobbying, ART, and overall evaluation coordination and reporting

- **Dr. Thomas J. Cook**, Research Triangle Institute's (RTI) Principal Scientist in Social Science and International Development, addressed devolution, socio-political issues of CAMPFIRE, and the CA, and USAID strategic planning

- **Dr Robert Davis,** an economist specializing in natural resource management, was responsible for wildlife and land management issues and the economics of wildlife management and alternative NRM options

- **Dr Lynn Ellsworth,** who specializes in institutional and economic analysis of non-profit and public organizations, addressed CAMPFIRE sustainability issues and the CDF, CA, and IC and their interrelationships

- **Dr Richard Alan Swanson,** a social anthropologist, focused on the benefits gained from natural resources, diversification options, and devolution of authority to local producer communities Dr Swanson also contributed to the report preparation and stakeholder review processes

- **Dr Richard G. Ruggiero,** whose principal fields are wildlife ecology and management, looked at data quality for monitoring wildlife, including quota-setting, the ecological and technical merits of wildlife management over other options, and land-use planning and management schemes

D. Implementation Under NRMP II

1. USAID Funding Under NRMP II· Organizations, Amount, and Purpose

As noted, USAID has been providing financial support to CAMPFIRE since 1989 Initially it provided support through NRMP I under the Initiative for Southern Africa, formerly known as Southern Africa Regional Program NRMP II was launched in September 1994 with a USAID contribution of US$20 5 million, of which $16 million are bilateral funds

A diverse group of partner organizations, government and non-governmental, have also been assisting CAMPFIRE since the early years of the program They now provide their assistance under NRMP II and receive USAID funds for some or all of the support they give These organizations currently include

- CAMPFIRE Association,
- Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, Ministry of Mines, Environment, and Tourism,
- Ministry of Local Government and National Housing,
- The Zimbabwe Trust,
- Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe,
- World Wide Fund for Nature/World Wildlife Fund,
- Africa Resources Trust (to December 1997), and
- Action Magazine

Table 2 shows the total funding for NRMP II, how it has been allocated, and how it has been spent The September 1994 program document (SARP Natural Resources Management 690-0251 PP Amendment #1) showed an initial allocation that carried through with little modification to USAID's contract and grant agreements almost perfectly The notable exception was the IC, whose allocation in the contract was increased from US$2,675 m to US$3,454 m , with the increment coming from USAID's contract management line Spending by some partners has proceeded at a pace that will exhaust the amounts allocated by September 30, 1999 Other recipients, including the GOZ partners, WWF, and CDF, have thus far exhibited substantially slower rates of spending Subsequent sections of this document review the performance by all CAMPFIRE partners in NRMP II

Table 2 CAMPFIRE Programme Allocation of Revenue, 1989-1996 (ZW$)

Year		Disbursed to Communities (1)	Wildlife Management (2)	Council Levy (3)	Other (4)	Total (5)	%Annual Change
1989		$396,005	$173,180	$60,386	$25,579	$655,150	
1990		$509,994	$300,310	$129,854	$55,623	$995,781	52%
1991		$1,203,673	$823,441	$451,786	$213,544	$2,692,444	170%
1992		$3,074,278	$1,059,673	$589,914	$91,185	$4,815,050	79%
1993		$5,560,958	$2,331,210	$1,639,316	$210,050	$9,741,534	102%
1994		$7,794,511	$2,583,326	$1,219,653	$349,137	$11,946,627	23%
1995		$8,259,680	$3,086,311	$1,684,426	$228,688	$13,259,105	11%
1996		$8,388,566	$4,085,950	$3,031,985	$78,504	$15,585,005	18%
total		**$35,187,665**	**$14,443,401**	**$8,807,320**	**$1,252,310**	**$59,690,696**	

Table 3 CAMPFIRE Programme Allocation of Revenue, 1989-1996 (US$)

Year	Exchange Rate (6)	Disbursed to Communities (1)	Wildlife Management (2)	Council Levy (3)	Other (4)	Total (5)	%Annual Change
1989	*2 126*	$186,268	$81,458	$28,404	$12,032	$308,161	
1990	*2 472*	$206,308	$121,485	$52,530	$22,501	$402,824	31%
1991	*3 751*	$320,894	$219,526	$120,444	$56,930	$717,794	78%
1992	*5 112*	$601,385	$207,291	$115,398	$17,837	$941,911	31%
1993	*6 529*	$851,732	$357,055	$251,082	$32,172	$1,492,041	58%
1994	*8 2122*	$949,138	$314,572	$148,517	$42,514	$1,454,741	-2%
1995	*8 724*	$946,777	$353,772	$193,080	$26,214	$1,519,842	4%
1996	*10 07*	$833,025	$405,755	$301,091	$7,796	$1,547,667	2%
total		**$4,895,527**	**$2,060,913**	**$1,210,545**	**$217,996**	**$8,384,981**	

Table 4 CAMPFIRE Programme Percentage Allocation of Revenue By Year (1989-1996)

Year		Disbursed to Communities (1)	Wildlife Management (2)	Council Levy (3)	Other (4)	Total (5)
1989		60 44%	26 43%	9 22%	3 90%	100%
1990		51 22%	30 16%	13 04%	5 59%	100%
1991		44 71%	30 58%	16 78%	7 93%	100%
1992		63 85%	22 01%	12 25%	1 89%	100%
1993		57 09%	23 93%	16 83%	2 16%	100%
1994		65 24%	21 62%	10 21%	2 92%	100%
1995		62 29%	23 28%	12 70%	1 72%	100%
1996		53 82%	26 22%	19 45%	0 50%	100%
total		**58 95%**	**24 20%**	**14 75%**	**2 10%**	**100%**

1 Disbursed to communities - revenue allocated to sub-district CAMPFIRE institutions
2 Wildlife management - revenue allocated for wildlife and program management.
3 Council Levy - revenue allocated to district council general account
4 Other - revenue invested in capital development projects and RDC levy to CAMPFIRE Association
5 Not Allocated - revenue not allocated but retained by RDC for general account
6 Mean annual exchange rate based on RBZ end of month exchange rate

Table 5 CAMPFIRE Programme Income by Year, 1989-1996 (ZW$)

Year		Sport Hunting (1)	Tourism (2)	P A C Hides & Ivory (3)	Other (4)	Total	%Annual Change
1989		$694,773	$60	$11,256	$37,610	$743,699	
1990		$1,120,864	$7,082	$105,917	$141,639	$1,375,502	85%
1991		$2,393,713	$59,657	$78,242	$379,243	$2,910,855	112%
1992		$5,899,669	$96,878	$48,199	$174,913	$6,219,656	114%
1993		$9,101,816	$137,730	$97,858	$350,804	$9,688,208	56%
1994		$12,757,694	$328,360	$22,747	$380,811	$13,489,612	39%
1995		$12,883,712	$478,653	$101,939	$420,528	$13,884,832	3%
1996		$16,679,327	$234,381	$401,479	$366,842	$17,682,030	27%
total		**$61,531,568**	**$1,342,801**	**$867,637**	**$2,252,390**	**$65,994,397**	

Table 6 CAMPFIRE Programme Income by Year, 1989-1996 (US$)

Year		Sport Hunting (1)	Tourism (2)	P A C Hides & Ivory (3)	Other (4)	Total	%Annual Change
1989	*2 126*	$326,798	$28	$5,294	$17,690	$349,811	
1990	*2 472*	$453,424	$2,865	$42,847	$57,297	$556,433	59%
1991	*3 751*	$638,153	$15,904	$20,859	$101,105	$776,021	39%
1992	*5 112*	$1,154,082	$18,951	$9,429	$34,216	$1,216,678	57%
1993	*6 529*	$1,394,060	$21,095	$14,988	$53,730	$1,483,873	22%
1994	*8 2122*	$1,553,543	$39,985	$2,770	$46,373	$1,642,671	11%
1995	*8 724*	$1,476,812	$54,866	$11,685	$48,204	$1,591,567	-3%
1996	*10 07*	$1,656,338	$23,275	$39,869	$36,429	$1,755,912	10%
total		**$8,653,211**	**$176,970**	**$147,741**	**$395,044**	**$9,372,966**	

Table 7 CAMPFIRE Programme Percentage Income By Year of Activity 1989-1996

Year		Sport Hunting (1)	Tourism (2)	P A C Hides & Ivory (3)	Other (4)	Total
1989		93%	0%	2%	5%	100%
1990		81%	1%	8%	10%	100%
1991		82%	2%	3%	13%	100%
1992		95%	2%	1%	3%	100%
1993		94%	1%	1%	4%	100%
1994		95%	2%	0%	3%	100%
1995		93%	3%	1%	3%	100%
1996		94%	1%	2%	2%	100%
total		**93%**	**2%**	**1%**	**3%**	**100%**

1 Sport Hunting - income earned from lease and trophy fees paid by safari operators
2 Tourism - income earned from the lease of wildlife areas for non-consumptive tourism
3 PAC hides & ivory - income from the sale of animal products primarily from problem animal control
4 Other - income from the sale of live animals, collection of ostrich and crocodile eggs, etc
5 Mean annual exchange rates based on RBZ end of month exchange rates Note Rate April 1998 was 15 50 ZW$ = 1US$, which illustrates continuing inflation problem and value of incoming hard currency from wildlife revenue

The second phase got underway slowly The reason in part was difficulty in putting the IC mechanism in place As can be seen from Table 2, some partners started spending as late as July 1996, or more than 18 months into the project The first CDF grant was not made until November 1996, 26 months into the project As of February 1998, somewhat more than 40% of the total budget had been expended The purposes of each contract or grant by recipient are as follows

CAMPFIRE Association The CA was established in 1991 and registered with the Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare as a NGO In 1992 it was accorded lead agency status at the Hunyani Hills workshop Its purpose is to represent the interests of the RDCs and to promote and serve in the CAMPFIRE program By 1997, 36 of the 57 Councils had become Association members RDCs without Appropriate Authority status have associate membership in the CA, and it can extent honorary and ex-officio membership to any person or group invited to join by the General Assembly at the Annual General Meeting As the lead CCG agency for coordination of CAMPFIRE activities nationwide, the CA is expected to provide services to members and communities, lobby on behalf of member and program interests, disseminate program information, facilitate outside training for members, coordinate the activities of CCG members, assist in developing marketing strategies for program-generated products, and secure funds for program-related infrastructure development The CA has primary responsibility for mobilizing RDCs and CCG partners and resources to develop viable project proposals for funding under the CDF The CA had spent less than 50% of its total allocation by the end of February 1998

CAMPFIRE Development Fund The CDF is a funding mechanism for two types of grants "institutional" Community Capacity Building Grants and "infrastructural" Community Natural Resources Grants In addition to funding specific community-based NRM activities, the CDF is supposed to strengthen the leadership capacity of the CA, strengthen the capacities of the RDCs to define and implement CAMPFIRE activities, and improve coordination of CCG members implementing CDF-funded activities The CDF had utilized about 10% of its total allocation by the end of February 1998

Institutional Contract for CAMPFIRE Support. The IC serves as the financial and grants management unit for NRMP II and helps the CA and the CCG benefit from the programmatic funds made available through NRMP II Although originally conceived as a secretariat to the CA and CCG (through the PET), responsible for assisting in the day-to-day management of CAMPFIRE activities, the final agreement (CCG 1995) defined the IC's objectives more precisely

- execute, manage, and administer grants to the CA and its RDC members, *as well as those members of the CCG which require such assistance,* and

- build, through specific in-service training programs relating to the management of USAID funds, the general management and administrative capacities of the CA *and its RDC members,* as well as those CCG members which require such assistance "

The IC performs these functions for USAID-financed grants to participating CCG implementation partners -- CA, WWF, and CASS -- and participating local authorities The IC had spent over 50% of its total allocation by the end of February 1998

Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) Support Grants

Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management The DNPWLM began as the lead agency, but its role within CAMPFIRE has diminished considerably during Phase II, and, as noted, the CA is now the lead organization The DNPWLM is expected to continue providing technical inputs to the program The DNPWLM had consumed less than 5% of its total allocation for CAMPFIRE activities by the end of February 1998

Ministry of Local Government and National Housing The MLGNH approves project matters, including CDF grants It is a member of the NRMP's bilateral review committee The plan for the MLGNH's participation in the Programme is being finalized Originally, it was expected to advise and assist on CAMPFIRE policies and practices at the District level It had spent none of its allocation by the end of February 1998

CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) Support Grants

Zimbabwe Trust. ZimTrust assists communities and RDCs in developing and strengthening the skills and institutions needed to manage wildlife and other resources ZimTrust, including its sub-contractors, ART and Action (see below), had spent 86% of its total allocation by the end of November 1997

Africa Resources Trust. ART, under a subcontract with ZimTrust that ended in December 1997, provided an information service and center for the CCG and to lobby for and promote CAMPFIRE interests among regional and international regulatory organizations NRMP II called for ART to monitor and analyze international trade in wildlife, and it was expected to aid in marketing program-generated products, support training, maintain a library and database, collaborate with CA in establishing a CAMPFIRE information service, and lobby for the Programme at the higher levels of the national government

Action Also funded under the ZimTrust grant, Action Magazine concentrates on education and information within CAMPFIRE districts and to develop a CAMPFIRE curriculum, accompanied by associated educational materials and participatory teaching techniques

World Wide Fund for Nature. WWF has several functions under NRMP II monitor and research the economic and ecological aspects of CAMPFIRE's activities, conduct NRM training at the district, ward, and village levels, participate with communities in resource inventories and land-use planning, and publish and disseminate research WWF, which started later than other agencies, had spent less than 30% of its total allocation by the end of February 1998

Centre for Applied Social Sciences CASS's role is to study program policies and activities, conduct post-graduate training in the social and political aspects of NRM, monitor the social and economic impacts of the program, promote discussion and debate of program policies and principles, and disseminate information CASS had spent less than 35% of its total allocation by the end of February 1998

New Partners New partners in the CCG include MMET's Forestry Commission and Department of Natural Resources, as well as a local NGO, Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE) None of them had received NRMP II funds as of March 1998, but each has prepared funding proposals that are receiving favorable USAID review

US Agency for International Development (USAID) The Agency, through its SO team, provides day-to-day management and oversight of all activities sponsored by the project, including the IC and CDF It also ensures effective achievement of stated SO1 objectives Additionally, USAID manages all strategic studies, audits, and evaluations financed by the project, as well as those program activities that link with the greater ISA-regional NRMP effort

2. Other Donor Support

The Netherlands The other significant external donor to CAMPFIRE is the Netherlands Government Directorate General of International Cooperation The Netherlands Government supports CAMPFIRE through two mechanisms

- Institutional Support to the CAMPFIRE Association (to May 31, 1998), and
- Strategic Support through ZimTrust to CAMPFIRE (to January 31, 1999)

The Netherlands program focuses on field activities in the South East Lowveld and Mid-Zambezi region Support for the CA is targeted at (1) restructuring the association to facilitate broader representation, (2) revision of the constitution to permit membership by producer communities (the Dutch do not consider RDCs to be producer communities), (3) support for the establishment of sub-regional sections, (4) revision of the relationship of the CA to the CCG, (5) facilitation of a clearer job description for the executive director; (6) staff increases and training, and (7) facilitation of the preparation of a proposal for improved organizational/institutional relationships

The support to the ZimTrust furthers (1) assessment, planning, and implementation of village-level natural resource management and poverty alleviation activities, (2) a strengthening of the RDCs ability to carry out their Appropriate Authority responsibilities, (3) promotion of NGO and GOZ agency involvement in CAMPFIRE, and (4) promotion of international communication and exchange concerning CBNRM

A Dutch program evaluation was carried out concurrently with the NRMP II evaluation The evaluation concluded that the partnership between CA and the NGOs in the CCG was well-founded

and merited continued strengthening At the same time, it expressed concern over the recent emergence of tensions as the CA exerts its independence from its partner CCG institutions

CAMPFIRE is receiving modest support from other sources as well ART receives funding from the European Union for its Brussels office Norway supported the CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit in the DNPWLM and appears to be continuing its assistance to WWF's SUPCAMP project The Japanese also help support the CA. The US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and Safari Club International (SCI) contribute to implementing and improving the quota-setting program in CAMPFIRE areas

Other Support Other support is directed to the district level For example, some districts have SAFIRE advisors working in the forestry sector who assist with wildlife and natural resource management, including CAMPFIRE The District Environmental Action Plan process has targeted some eight pilot districts and introduces a participatory land-use planning approach to the RDCs by starting in the villages and wards Of note is the World Bank's RDC Capacity Building program, which assists RDCs to improve their capabilities in administration, financial management, and planning A district-level poverty alleviation program is just getting underway in 25 districts, many of which are coincident with CAMPFIRE The Bank's support for social works may reduce the incentives for CAMPFIRE communities to use their revenues for social infrastructure investments

A number of funding mechanisms are being considered or set up to support small environmental and natural resource activities at the local level, in much the same way that the CDF might be expected to operate in its infrastructural grants program A small grants program to improve woodland management is being administered by a coalition of environmental NGOs, including SAFIRE An Africa 2000 Global Environment Facility Small Projects Program is now in place, while a UNDP-sponsored National Anti-desertification Fund is under consideration These initiatives merit close monitoring by CAMPFIRE in view of the potential synergies and complementarities that may be achieved over time

3. The Greater CAMPFIRE Movement and NRMP II

Considerable confusion has developed both within Zimbabwe and among interested outside observers over the distinction between CAMPFIRE, the greater CAMPFIRE movement and the current USAID-funded NRMP II project The scope of work for this evaluation (section C 1 b) calls for the team to describe the fundamental distinction between the greater CAMPFIRE movement and NRMP II assistance to CAMPFIRE and to characterize the major implications of that distinction for ongoing CAMPFIRE and project implementation and achievements This section draws this distinction and lays the foundation for the many detailed implications that follow throughout the report

Within Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, outside the country, CAMPFIRE has come to represent a philosophical orientation toward the use of wildlife that combines sustainable development and sustainable management of natural resources Within Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE has become highly visible, as noted by Murphree, "CAMPFIRE was hailed as a leap forward in rural development and the CAMPFIRE Programme received the ultimate approbation when, in the lead-up to the 1990

General Elections, the manifesto of the ZANU-PF ruling party stated that CAMPFIRE had been a party innovation" (Murphree, 1997 14) Such political credibility underscores the growing importance and attractiveness of CAMPFIRE as a popular social phenomenon Typically, CAMPFIRE figures in two or three local newspaper articles each week. CAMPFIRE concepts continue to evolve in accordance with the socio-political realities of Zimbabwe Although CAMPFIRE's roots and greatest achievements are found within consumptive and sustainable management of wildlife resources, that is only one manifestation of a more general movement toward community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and empowerment through more localized control of all indigenous resources

Discussion of the CAMPFIRE movement must begin with a commonly agreed upon set of hypotheses and principles, as outlined in the following text box

Box 2 CAMPFIRE PRINCIPLES

As long as wildlife remains the exclusive property of the State, no one will invest in it as a resource, and therefore its long-term sustainability is in doubt This is particularly true of wildlife found within common or open access areas – like communal areas

The concept of the 'opens commons' must be replaced by effective control/custody of a geographically defined resource territory by the resident communities whose own well-being is most dependent on the long term sustainability of this resource The unit of proprietorship should be as close as possible to the unit of production, management, and benefit.

Secure tenure and decentralized management over natural resources through economic empowerment of local communities or producer communities to control of benefits and management are essential The unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable, within ecological and socio-political constraints

Creation of economic incentives are essential to make wildlife a competitive form of land use where this makes ecological and economic sense Economic benefits derived directly from the management control over (renewable) natural resources and commercialization by those most closely associated with this resource will lead to sustainable use and conservation Benefits must be sufficiently large to elicit the requisite sustainable management response

It is when local communities themselves experience the tangible economic benefits of local natural resources that they most appreciate their value to their own livelihoods, and who will accordingly make the efforts, sacrifices, initiatives needed to protect (manage) these for their own long term benefits

Compiled from various CAMPFIRE background documents

a Genesis of the CAMPFIRE Movement

CAMPFIRE began as an entirely Zimbabwean initiative, responding to a unique set of historical conditions It was originally conceived of by a Zimbabwean government agency, and not by a local NGO or an international aid program Murphree (1997) described some of the unique circumstances that led to its conception

- The existing tenure system is an out-growth of a colonial context in which long-established populations lost not only their traditional rights over land territories, but also rights to the land they were eventually "given" – called the "communal areas " These are outside the most viable arable areas found within the center to eastern borders of the country (cf Map 2)

- Communal lands remain, by law, unalienated State lands The State owns all the resources of these lands as well – including all commercially valuable species of flora and fauna Neither individuals nor groups can hold ownership over either lands or resources in these areas By 1975, 58% of the land was State-owned (41% communal areas and 17% other State such as national parks), while 42% was commercial and alienated (private freeholds)

The conceptual roots of what would later lead to CAMPFIRE, developed in the early 1960s in the wildlife sector At that time the DNPWLM realized that its policing tactics to protect wildlife and the damage being done by wildlife were alienating people and that the Department was fighting a losing battle both inside and outside the National Parks (which are located in the arid and semi-arid regions of Zimbabwe found along all the borders of the country) It also realized that wildlife *management* appeared, economically and ecologically, to be the best land use strategy for the National Parks and their environs The DNPWLM's response was to initiate practices that moved away from the traditional protectionist philosophy to one of conservation through sustainable use The policy recognized that people's primary concern is their own survival, not wildlife management or conservation, and that unless wildlife contributes to their survival, they will not attempt to manage it "the ability to earn direct economic benefit from wildlife would provide a more effective incentive for wildlife conservation " The government "will allow economic processes to determine the outcome of competition " In short, the principles of CAMPFIRE are based on economics

The culmination of this new thinking was the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act This Act permitted owners of alienated land (largely white residents) a form of proprietorship over the wildlife on their ranches and farms To do so, it established a transfer mechanism know as *Appropriate Authority*, which gave these owners legal rights to own, manage, and buy and sell animals as they wished The result was that wildlife populations dramatically increased, and the wildlife industry boomed in Zimbabwe These benefits did not extend to communal land populations, however, as they were excluded from the Act

The land redistribution that followed Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 decreased commercial areas to 37% (a trend that continues under strong political imperative and population pressures) In 1982, the government tried to extend some of the benefits of the 1975 Act to communal land residents by

allowing Rural Districts, composed of elected representatives of the constituent ward and village councils that comprise each District, to get Appropriate Authority ownership and control over the management of their wildlife The Government chose to retain the policy of vesting land rights in "communal lands," fearing that "individualization of common land holdings, extended to common pool resources, would result in fragmentation of management to levels where any possible benefits would be negated " Thus, initially CAMPFIRE was based on the concept that communal property constituted at the Rural Districts level was the appropriate entity for initiating a new approach to *wildlife* management

At first, the RDCs were not supportive They told the National Parks that "if [they] really want to help us, shoot the wildlife and we can get on with our farming " Given this assessment, and after observing the failure of a parastatal to launch the process that would lead to Appropriate Authority for RDCs, in 1987 the DNPWLM decided to take the lead in promoting its new program, CAMPFIRE Prior to 1987, there was no CCG or CAMPFIRE, much less a "CAMPFIRE movement " The DNPWLM's earliest perspectives for CAMPFIRE were that "resident communities (Natural Resource Cooperatives), through group cooperative ownership, would have territorial rights over defined tracts of land called Communal Resource Areas within the Communal lands " (Martin, 1984 164) In that year the DNPWLM asked three existing organizations, CASS, ZimTrust, and WWF if they would be willing to work cooperatively to push the Programme forward They agreed, thus beginning the first CAMPFIRE partnerships

b. CAMPFIRE Operations

As a program, CAMPFIRE operates through committee structures at the village, ward, and district levels In 1988, amendments to the District Council and Rural District Council Acts conferred the rights to the land and their resources to the RDCs – although these "rights" vary from district to district The RDCs, which are headed by elected political officials, are in turn made up of Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), which are made up of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) The Ministry of Local Government, which dictated these WADCOs and VIDCOs administrative structures, "often did not follow traditionally established boundaries of territory and membership" which has meant in practical terms that the formal structures at the local level have not provided may or may not be operational or easily accepted by the communities If delegated to them by the RDCs, potentially the WADCOs and VIDCOs could have legal rights to ownership or exploitation of land and resources However, the RDCs, because of wildlife's mobility, increasing financial needs and the government's inability to provide social and other services (such as clinics, schools, and road maintenance), have generally attempted to acquire and retain control many of the financial gains from district-level NRM activities In addition, politically chosen WADCO and VIDCO representatives are not fully accepted at the local level, conflicts with traditional authorities and management units are very real There is some reconsideration of village and local level governance that follows from a recently commissioned land tenure study and policy review which could lead to changes in the way CAMPFIRE is implemented, especially at the sub-district levels

CAMPFIRE follows the government's existing committee structures by establishing "CAMPFIRE" committees corresponding to each These CAMPFIRE wildlife or natural resource committees are supported by a CAMPFIRE coordinator, executive staff, and district-level technicians At the national level, CAMPFIRE communities have formed an association (the CA) and receive governmental and non-governmental organizational assistance through the CCG These organizations and the institutional dynamics between them are what constitutes the core of the Programme

The DNPWLM, CASS, and WWF proved successful partners in developing and applying the early CAMPFIRE principles The first test case was in the wildlife rich Nyaminyami District and Mahenye Ward in Chipinge District (see Map 2) In 1989, the Guruve and Nyaminyami Districts received Appropriate Authority and immediately began receiving 1988 hunting revenues The award of Appropriate Authority came with a recommendation that the RDCs keep 15% of the revenue as a tax levy and up to 35% to cover the costs of district wildlife management, such as the costs of quota-setting, wildlife monitoring, and problem animal control, and distribute not less than 50% to producer communities (through the wards) Failure to do so could lead to withdrawal of Appropriate Authority As the Programme became established, however, the Department changed its guidelines to suggest that Councils retain 20% of revenues and distribute 80% to the producer communities More recently, the GOZ has discouraged any "interference" in what the RDCs determine is an appropriate revenue-sharing formula

Conceptually, CAMPFIRE includes "all natural resources, but its focus has been wildlife management in communal areas, particularly those adjacent to National Parks, where people and animals compete for scarce resources " (Murphree 1995) One reason for the focus on wildlife is the dramatic success of the earliest activities in the late 1980s, when CAMPFIRE became associated with "wildlife revenue" for districts and producer communities, the image the larger public still has, even though other "indigenous resources" are now gaining attention This focus also emerged because wildlife promised to bring the quickest injection of financial benefit Within the wildlife sector, "game management is a form of agriculture " According to the Zimbabwean wildlife policy of 1989, "wildlife is a resource capable of complementing domestic livestock " As one proponent told the evaluation team, to be sustainable, "wildlife must ultimately pay for itself"

c USAID and the CAMPFIRE Programme

A major contributor to CAMPFIRE's success has been the substantial capacity-building support provided over the past 10 years USAID has played an important part in this effort Its first involvement in CAMPFIRE occurred through NRMP I from 1989 to 1994, working with three local institutional partners, the DNPWLM, CASS, and ZimTrust NRMP I provided capacity-building support to four Rural Districts in wildlife-rich areas in Matabeleland -- Binga, Tsholotsho, Bulilimamangwe, and Hwange This pilot effort enabled a broader application of CAMPFIRE principles first tested in Nyaminyami and Guruve Total funding for Phase I was US$7 6 million Based on the promising results achieved through this pilot effort, USAID greatly expanded its assistance under NRMP II, beginning in September 1994, adding $20 5 million, including $16 million in bilateral funds

As other Rural Districts became aware of what was happening in Nyaminyami and Guruve the number of CCG members increased dramatically, as can be seen from the following numbers

1988 - 2 RDCs with Appropriate Authority
1989 - 9 RDCs (beginning of NRMP I)
1991 - 12 RDCs
1995 - 26 RDCs (beginning of NRMP II)
1996 - 29 RDC
1998 - 36 RDCs

Three phenomena explain the dramatic growth in the number of participating RDCs (full and associate members of the CAMPFIRE Association)

(1) At first local communities had been suspicious of the National Parks and Rural Districts They were mainly interested in knowing when the Programme would be withdrawn because historically, the National Parks had not acted generously toward local populations (e g expropriation of tribal lands to establish parks, sanctions against traditional hunting) This skepticism was also a major reason why people wanted the initial dividends to be in the form of cash "in their pockets " This way the RDCs could not come back a few months later and say they had "made a mistake" and wanted the money back Soon, however, the local communities saw that they were actually **getting** significant amounts of money and that CAMPFIRE really meant the "devolution in the ownership of wildlife revenues from central government to RDCs " At that point they became eager to protect and manage the resource newly placed into their hands In short, there was latent popular support for RDC involvement

(2) A substantial wildlife industry **already existed** that created a demand for the CAMPFIRE "product " What was needed was to help communities participate in this revenue stream -- a radical new concept for Zimbabwe

(3) Enabling opportunities to build a program were facilitated by the entry foreign donors and the organizations they supported USAID provided very significant funding support through NRMP I and II, particularly for capacity-building and training (e g , for the Rural Districts and communities to organize for managing their natural resources, including wildlife) These funds also made obtaining new or updated infrastructure, vehicles, computers, supplies a possibility Funds have also been available for salaries of key personnel The support provided has included advice to RDCs on "getting the best deal" when working with the commercial sector, including on topics such as designing a tender and what to include in a contract This support linked the demand referred to above with an expanded capability to manage wildlife and other natural resources In NRMP II, this support has been critical in enabling even districts without significant wildlife resources to join the CA and begin to operationalize the Programme in their respective districts CAMPFIRE has always encouraged expansion of activities to natural resources other than the consumptive use of wildlife In short, the USAID-supported NRMP I and II have been mostly responsible for enabling the widespread capacity-building and

strengthening of local communities to manage their resources and benefits in a sustainable manner

d CAMPFIRE Ambiguities and NRMP II

CAMPFIRE is an extremely complex program, characterized by creative tensions that NRMP II has highlighted These have produced some unexpected, often unintended consequences and ambiguities Considered in the broader contexts of Zimbabwean society and international arena, the CAMPFIRE movement cannot be expected to have followed a smooth and predictable path Social movements, by their very nature, tend to represent organized, sustained, self-conscious challenges to existing authorities on behalf of constituencies whose goals are not effectively taken into account by these authorities CAMPFIRE is certainly no exception The key actors behind its rapid development and the organizations they represent have mobilized considerable activity behind the Programme and its guiding principles (The importance of these key figures is considered subsequently in section B 3 of this chapter) Support within Zimbabwe is now widespread and occurs in at least three forms ideological, material, and direct participation The resulting dynamism is, for the most part, positive and engaging to the movement's adherents The variety of levels and the unevenness of the CAMPFIRE's progression do call for explicitness and periodic adjustment At the time of this evaluation, a number of ambiguities struck the team as important and possibly requiring the attention of NRMP II's management These include 1) ownership of CAMPFIRE, 2) scope and nature of CAMPFIRE, 3) confusion over roles and responsibilities under CAMPFIRE, and finally, 4) the interrelations between CAMPFIRE movement organizations and those outside of or on its periphery

The ownership question relates to who actually is part of CAMPFIRE As a movement within Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE has become larger than its core program components In addition to the CAMPFIRE Programme itself, the CAMPFIRE movement includes elements of educational, political, and environmental groups outside the current CCG that believe in the CAMPFIRE principles but that are not directly associated with the Programme or the CA. The CCG members consider the sum total of all individuals and institutions, both within Zimbabwe and in other countries, that adopt CAMPFIRE principles and that are dedicated to promoting them through their own particular means and interests as being associated with a more general CBNRM movement that is linked to, but not directly a part of, CAMPFIRE There is also an international CAMPFIRE "community" that is directly linked to CAMPFIRE but is not actually a part of the Programme Yet through development actions NRMP II (USAID SO1) itself is just one project, albeit a major one, within the CAMPFIRE Programme

Another ambiguity surrounds the nature and scope of CAMPFIRE There is broad agreement that CAMPFIRE is more than just wildlife, yet wildlife revenues drive the program, Within Zimbabwe, different actors see the boundaries of CAMPFIRE in different ways The FC, for instance, thinks of CAMPFIRE in terms of geography -- the specific communities engaged in wildlife management The FC has and plans comparable social forestry activities within and outside of current CAMPFIRE areas They only considers an activity to be "CAMPFIRE" if the activities take place in existing CAMPFIRE wildlife-rich areas This point is important because the FC has proposed to take a role

of direct contribution to the program Other CCG members, in contrast, consider all CBNRM as an expression of CAMPFIRE principles The important distinction here is that the forestry people cannot disassociate CAMPFIRE as a concept from the idea of RDCs having control of the Programme and taking a major portion of the revenue gained by such activities When the CA lobbies on behalf of mining revenues and royalties for RDCs, it does so in the name of CAMPFIRE For some detractors, CAMPFIRE is no more than an organized effort to subsidize the sport hunting industry

A third source of ambiguity revolves around the roles of different parties For example, some CCG NGOs believe that when RDCs make decisions, they do not represent the CAMPFIRE communities The RDCs (including the CA that represents them), in contrast, believe that "we are the community" and "we are villagers ourselves" One CA Board Member commented, "I am an indigenous resource," and therefore how can anyone say that "local communities" are not sufficiently represented? (Issues of devolution of authority are discussed in more detail in section IV A.) The ambiguity extends to USAID Some CCG members and potential outside CCG partners look at the administrative complexity and what some see as excessive hands-on involvement by the USAID SO 1 team and conclude that USAID is dominating the CAMPFIRE Programme Because NRMP II has been providing the bulk of the financial assistance to what is called the CAMPFIRE Programme during the past few years, some may see the two as synonymous The Programmeis, however, distinct from the support USAID gives it through NRMP II Other factors similarly may blur the distinction For instance, initially the NRMP II PET was designed as a program component to enable USAID to deal directly through a single mechanism with all CCG grantees to program its funding It is now evolving into the CAMPFIRE body that evaluates and coordinates program activities with CA partner institutions However, according to one CCG member, there is a "need for any institution that subscribes to CAMPFIRE principles to consider itself, and be considered by others, as part of the CAMPFIRE program, notwithstanding the fact that it is not a NRMP II grantee"

Frequently there is pressure to accelerate sound implementation, and NRMP II attempts substantial resource transfers to the district level in relatively short periods of time At the field level, however, sometimes the perception is that the project agenda is to spend quickly, on occasion at the expense of quality, relevance, and sustainability This apparent ambiguity of purpose has been accentuated by the CA's effort, on the one hand, to determine priority districts and priority activities for each district and, on the other, its political motivation to disperse CDF grant funds equitably across its RDC constituency Wider coverage across the country's communal areas has helped to establish the CA as CAMPFIRE's lead agency However, the resulting levels and expectations with regard to staffing, training, meeting schedules, travel, and the like may be hard for the CCG partners and local participating institutions to sustain once such major aid departs (Such concerns are reflected in the USAID graduation scenarios discussed in Section V)

Ambiguity exists at the interface between CAMPFIRE and other local government structures that are not directly involved with the program Priorities and interests vary at the different levels -- national, district, ward, and village -- and all concerned parties -- the Government, RDCs, WADCOs, VIDCOs, traditional authorities, communities, and NGOs, including the CA --manage the interface

around strategies at these levels poorly For example, "The steady withdrawal of central government grants to RDCs has produced a growing need for Councils to generate their own income This gives Councils one set of development priorities " Traditional authorities want to increase their own power base, and they therefore have another set of priorities Communities and individuals are concerned with their own economic survival, creating yet another set of priorities "Rarely do these priorities and interests all coincide " (Zimbabwe Working Group 1996 9) For this reason, it appears difficult for the CA to claim it represents the villages and wards, as well as the interests of the RDCs, while at the same time claiming to be politically aligned with national policies The FC's concerns over the definition of the beneficiary community are relevant here as well It believes that some branches of the government administration consider their forest-sharing arrangements, in their words, as bordering on "subversive " (NRMP II institutional support grants cut across the ambiguities in these structures of governance, an issue that is addressed further in the section on the CDF [III B 1 b] and elsewhere)

That NRMP II support to CAMPFIRE has been successful is attributable to the skills of the USAID core team, institutional partners, and CCG members in steering a constructive course through this complexity (The ambiguities surrounding both programs and project coordinating structures are addressed in more detail in section III B 3)

III. NRMP II PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT

This section reviews the results achieved under NRMP II By extension, it inevitably reviews and makes judgements on CAMPFIRE overall, as only in this way can the USAID effort be seen in perspective This substantial chapter is subdivided into two major sections The first deals with general concerns including the CAMPFIRE's scope, the responsiveness of USAID to the previous evaluation, which called for USAID support to match the Programme's scope, and finally the allocation and programming of CAMPFIRE revenues The second part treats specific NRMP II and CAMPFIRE implementation issues Performance reviews of most of the implementing partners are integrated in this chapter because the workplans of each agency are so closely integrated with specific substantive areas of intervention The analysis identifies a number of outstanding development questions, which are covered in Chapter IV

A. General Concerns

1 USAID Responsiveness to the NRMP I Mid-Term Evaluation

Between the 1994 NRMP I Mid-Term Evaluation and the period when NRMP II got underway in earnest, the CAMPFIRE Programme was somewhat adrift and rife with uncertainty concerning its future growth and funding In general, the USAID Mission, with the exception of one PSC, was neither focused on CAMPFIRE nor on the natural resources sector Although from a management standpoint NRMP I had shifted to the bilateral portfolio, it was still not well integrated with the Mission's strategy at the time During this transitional period, USAID resorted to transitional "bridging" grants to maintain some continuity of NRMP and, hence, CCG activities

To its credit, the USAID management team convened a series of consultative workshops to examine environmental and natural resource problem areas The resulting analysis helped to establish a new strategic focus for the USAID natural resources program in Zimbabwe and define an operating strategy for NRMP II that substantially addressed the concerns raised in the mid-term evaluation report Indeed, the workshop that sent the second phase into full operation responded well to many of the evaluation recommendations Likewise, the Phase II design and implementation are responsive to the recommendations a scale-up to a national-level program, expansion in the number and competencies of implementing partners, shift in management from a regional to bilateral focus, assignment of real powers to coordinate, approve, and allocate work to the project implementing committee (now the PET), and reinforcement of the CA as lead agency

The ULG mid-term evaluation also stressed the need to devolve CAMPFIRE activities further below the Rural District level and to diversify the sources of natural resource revenues beyond wildlife It recommended taking these steps within a demand-driven mode of operation and including technically and environmentally viable infrastructure in response to local needs The project structure reflects these concerns, as the review of the implementation record under NRMP II throughout this document shows

The NRMP I evaluation also called upon USAID to accomplish these changes in a less "heavy-handed" manner This recommendation may have been unrealistic USAID was, in effect, caught between the central government, which wanted more control, and an expanded group of autonomous-minded and mostly NGO collaborators with only a limited history of working together With NRMP II, USAID also faced the task of reinforcing a heterogeneous group of actors -- the RDCs and subdistrict institutions and their representatives for natural resources, the WADCOs and VIDCOs, the Board, and the Executive Director of the CA -- that occupied the middle ground in a model of decentralization Finally, during much of its second phase the project was under heavy scrutiny and faced a threat of shutdown Only now is USAID in a position to back off and explore new implementation options The evaluation team's recommendations are tailored to assist NRMP II to wind down gradually and to move in concert with other Mission programs toward orderly closeout and longer term sustainability

2 Current Scope of CAMPFIRE

Despite its expansion to a national-level focus, CAMPFIRE continues to concentrate on the communal areas in Zimbabwe's Natural Regions IV and V, where the agricultural potential is limited and poverty is widespread CAMPFIRE is currently active in 36 of Zimbabwe's 57 Rural Districts Its wildlife revenue base remains concentrated, as noted, in 12-13 Rural Districts with high potential, although its geographic expansion, as can be seen in the accompanying maps, continues The Programme has expanded from its origins in Guruve and Nyaminyami Rural Districts to include large expanses of the Mid and Lower Zambezi, Southeast Lowveld, Matabeleland, and Eastern Highland regions Over the two phases of USAID's involvement, the number of local communities participating in CAMPFIRE has increased to a total of more than 185 wards This translates into more than 200,000 households and several million people

As stressed in this document, commercially exploitable wildlife populations exist in only about 13 Rural Districts Thus, as the Programmehas expanded, the working definition of its targeted geographic coverage has changed to reflect the efforts to diversify beyond wildlife into forest and veld products, fisheries, and general ecotourism

> *Under NRMP II, all collaborative project partners shall service the membership of the CAMPFIRE Association having Appropriate Authority status, with special emphasis on areas with commercial viability* (CCG-USAID 1995 6)

With diversification, the CAMPFIRE implementors are now servicing districts both with and without Appropriate Authority status, although, as a matter of practice, most Rural Districts are obtaining Appropriate Authority and moving into full membership in the CA. The shift to the national level has thus given impetus to CAMPFIRE to diversify to non-consumptive wildlife uses, to examine other resource policies governing land access, forest ownership and use, and to move NRMP II to a strategy of heavy investment in institution-building of representative natural resource committees and of RDC capacity to serve this constituency The decision to go national does not necessarily imply, however, that all communal areas should be included A more successful avenue to building up to

national coverage might have been to find successful, replicable characteristics of ongoing or new interventions These could then be developed as several CAMPFIRE "models," to be used in a search for areas with similar characteristics in which the one or another model might be replicated

Expanding the geographic focus is not without consequences and risks Spreading CAMPFIRE support under NRMP II, as explained in detail elsewhere in the report, produces high expectations for benefits from wildlife and other resources, dilutes the energies and capacities of the CCG actors, and puts pressure on the Programme to engage new institutional partners and develop new revenue streams Efforts to meet these challenges have stretched the project coordination structures and sometimes seem to be burying the program's underlying rationale in a plethora of process and planning activities The team's recommendations aim to ease these capacity constraints by extending capacity-building activities over a longer timeframe

3 Current General Financial Situation and Trends

Although NRMP II does not directly support trophy hunting in Zimbabwe, it supports development efforts that help local communities capture and make better use of the substantial revenues the safari hunting industry generates, and the Programme itself also captures a portion of these resources Revenue distribution and use are primary measures of how well the CAMPFIRE principles are being applied, and they will continue to grow in importance as new resources are developed The revenue is used variously for compensation for animal damage to crops, for social infrastructure, for group enterprises such as grinding mills, and for individual households in the form of cash dividends Since the generation and distribution of this income goes to the heart of CAMPFIRE, the team spent considerable effort to assess the use of the revenues generated by sustainable resource activities

Evaluation Issue Campfire Revenue and Its Distribution to Wards and Councils *"Describe CAMPFIRE's current general financial situation and trends, including the Programme's primary sources of income Describe CAMPFIRE's general revenue distribution system, including proportional allocations to the various participants Discuss the appropriateness of CAMPFIRE's current revenue distribution system, with emphasis on the proportional amounts of Programme revenues accruing to revenues accruing to each participant How are they commonly used? Discuss any alternatives for optimizing the use of these funds in the achievement of CAMPFIRE's community development objectives "*

Findings

As WWF and CA data show (see Tables 3-10), some 93% of CAMPFIRE revenue is derived from contracts the RDCs sign with safari operators These safari operators pay the RDCs a fee to bring in clients to shoot a game animal on District lands, usually in areas bordering the National Parks The DNPWLM determines or agrees to the quotas for the number of animals that may be hunted According to CAMPFIRE principles, part of this revenue is distributed to residents in the ward where the animal was shot, and in principle, the residents of these "producer wards" are free to use this money in any way they choose Most have a ward committee to manage the quota-setting and

administration of revenues

In the Rural Districts well-endowed with wildlife resources, CAMPFIRE revenue is often significant Since CAMPFIRE began, the total revenue accruing to all Districts rose from an initial $655,000 in 1989 to $1,253,405 in 1996 Over the eight years for which data are available, the CAMPFIRE Districts have earned a cumulative total of US$8 1 million Three Districts -- Binga, Nyaminyami, and Guruve (all in the Zambezi valley) -- have each generated totals of over US$1 million in the period since 1989, and their earnings dominate the CAMPFIRE revenue reports Since the beginning of NRMP II in 1994, the CAMPFIRE Rural Districts have earned a total of US$4 8 million, slightly more than half of the US$8 5 million of NRMP II funds expended to date

Distribution of revenues to producer communities is a key principle of CAMPFIRE, without it, there is no compelling reason to manage natural resources sustainably The economic stake in their wildlife resources is what leads villagers to set aside land they might otherwise use for agriculture, whether suitable or not, and to take other measures to protect wildlife Typical measures include reporting local and professional poachers, ceasing poaching to procure family "meat," and cutting back on requests to the Parks Department to kill "problem" animals that raid corn fields in remote areas Instead, local communities will segregate their cattle from the wildlife to improve the "hunting experience "

There are three categories of revenue use One is the District tax or levy, which goes to the general budget of the Rural District and whose use is independent of CAMPFIRE's specific needs Often it is calculated on a sum that already includes a 2% levy paid to the CA Second is program management, which may be the 35% mentioned above, however, these funds may come from the revenue the RDCs transfer to the wards, which then administer them The third category is discretionary funds for community and/or household use

Revenue is dependent on the state of the hunting safari market Light management assistance is provided by CCG members, who advise the RDCs about the market, contracting trends, best practices in quota-setting, and management of the wildlife resource for quality so that the price of hunting safaris in the Rural Districts rises At present, many of the Rural Districts deriving safari revenue do not attract premium prices because the presence of dogs and cattle, fields planted ill-advisedly in areas reserved for hunting, and degraded landscapes detract from the quality of the hunting experience In Chipinge District, for example, Mahenye ward operators complain that the game is depleted by drought, trophy quality animals are scarce, and/or human settlements reduce the quality of the hunt

The number of Rural Districts that have significant wildlife resources or border National Parks and National Safari Areas is not great, as mentioned After nine years of implementation, just 9 of the 36 current Rural Districts that are CA members appear to have the potential to earn over US$50,000 a year from this activity This amount is certainly enough to pay for a skeleton staff of resource monitors and, perhaps, a CAMPFIRE coordinator, should such staff be needed However, the potential to expand this part of the Programme is limited

Photo safaris can be significant in at least 13 of the wildlife-rich Rural Districts A case in point is the nature reserve near Bumi Hills, where Sun Hotel has exclusive rights to viewing and where elephant, antelope, buffalo, and zebra come within a stone's throw of the hillside resort looking down on Lake Kariba Other destinations in southern Africa and Zimbabwe's own National Park system pose fierce competition However, the private game ranches and the nature preserves themselves possess their own unique charms and attractions Others benefit from proximity to the competition

The richest CAMPFIRE Rural Districts have an uneven track record of distributing benefits to producer communities In 1996, Nyaminyami District Council, Zimbabwe's top earner ($443,095 in CAMPFIRE revenue in 1996) distributed only 18% of that total to producer communities in 1996 In fact, in only two of the eight years for which data are available did this District distribute more than 50% of the revenue The track record of second-place Guruve District Council -- it earned $299,415 in 1996 (see Table 8) -- is better it has distributed over 70% of its revenues in the past few years

Box 3 CAMPFIRE Revenue

Efforts to extend CAMPFIRE revenue to other natural resources, although an "early" concept, has only recently resurfaced as a significant issue However, most RDCs are still operating using the historic definition and so restrict themselves to "wildlife " Scope for widening this definition will be determined politically, as is currently being discussed in relationship to minerals, such as gold, diamonds, black granite, coal, nickel, chromite, asbestos, and emeralds Mberengwe District only gets 0004% of the tax earned for its minerals - not to speak of anything for the wards in which these are found (Owen and Maponga, 1996)

On average, the Rural Districts have followed the first revenue distribution rule (50/35/15), rather than the more empowering 80/20 guideline that allows wards to budget for and administer resource management costs Since the Programme began, 58% of revenue has devolved to the producer wards, with the Councils retaining an average of 25% for management fees and 15% as a District levy At the same time, these average statistics disguise significant variations across the Rural Districts Again, it is important to note that management revenues are also spent at the ward and village levels, so that the actual producer communities do receive at least indirect benefits

As Table 11 shows, *average* household benefits rose to Z$92 (US$9 20) in 1996 This increase is, however, far from the norm and really reflects the expansion of the hunting niche in the top four wildlife districts The median benefit was only $Z45 (about $US9), an amount not much different from what it was in 1989 However, because the payment was in hard currency, it has been inflation-proof Generally, this amount compares to an equivalent of about a 1-2 month supply of maize per household Many participating households fall well below even these averages Material benefits on a per household basis are lower, a pattern that fits the tendency to implement shared investment strategies On a more positive note, the number of households, villages, and wards receiving any benefits continues to increase

This practice of the RDCs' legally retaining more than the recommended share of the revenue would not be so serious if the benefits per household in the producer wards were already exceptionally high Unfortunately, most of the data indicate that, while individual household benefits fluctuate greatly,

the value of the benefit per household is frequently marginal, and only in the wealthiest wildlife Rural Districts is the benefit enough to make a significant difference Along with the recognition that wildlife is fundamentally a communal resource, this is an important reason that local communities, when given the choice, actually voted to aggregate their funds so that they could collectively undertake programs they considered important to all of them -- such as a rural health clinic, water pumps, cattle dip pens, or a primary school building The Rural Districts have often chipped in a portion of their share of the dividends to make these projects possible

As the wildlife niche is filled, the figures in those districts will continue the plateauing trend of the past several years Increases will instead come from quality management of the wildlife resource and foreign exchange gains, rather than from greater numbers of animals shot Where CAMPFIRE succeeds, as it does in those districts, a participating household can earn as much as Z$5,506 (US$550) in benefits distributed to them by the ward committees However, this does not actually occur, as the concerned districts question whether individual distributions of such large amounts of cash revenue will yield optimal developmental results

Key factors shifting individual households away from direct cash benefits from wildlife resource are

- RDC distribution of less than the recommended 50-80% of revenues by the RDCs to the ward communities

- How communities receive and use their wildlife dividends varies greatly, even when they are given complete freedom to decide how to dispose of it There is no obvious generalizable pattern or trend The literature study and observations by the evaluation team indicate that most ward committees allocate a portion of the revenue to basic, standardized community projects such as grinding mills, the local school or clinic, cattle dip pens, or a borehole fund, and frequently allocate another portion for cash distribution to households This allocation of large portions of ward-distributed revenue to social infrastructure projects means that less funds are available to distribute as cash to individual households If a majority of the residents in an area freely choose those projects, nothing need be said about this practice However, the evaluation team was also led to understand that some steering takes place Numerous policy statements by MLGNH and Council officials expressing resistance to the idea of cash benefits for producer communities and favoring collective infrastructure projects support that finding (Bond, 1996) While the long-term benefits of providing schools and clinics unquestionably have merit, the short-term benefits are also very important to people at the economic margin, who are also the most likely to hunt "illegally" for subsistence needs

- Migrants moving into CAMPFIRE Rural Districts are allocated land, even in areas set aside for wildlife, and they are able to claim their share of revenues after a few years of residence Research shows that there has been a 10% a year increase in population in the Zambezi valley from in-migration This influx has caused habitat fragmentation and has deeply eroded the substantial gains made by the most significant CAMPFIRE wards, such as in Guruve, Binga, and Nyaminyami (WWF, 1997 Land Use Study)

A final point is that a few RDCs have organized insurance funds to compensate farmers for the crop damage caused by wildlife These attempts have foundered, however, primarily because of the difficulty of assessing crop damage in a timely manner and because of false or inflated claims of damage and requests for compensation by farmers Still, these attempts to address the risk that farmers are facing in these wards are important, and continued support should be encouraged

Conclusions

Unless communities in the Zambezi valley realize significant economic benefit from their wildlife resources, they may lose the incentive to retain habitats and manage wildlife resources in a sustainable manner -- and Zimbabwe will lose its most productive wildlife habitats for communal area residents More information is needed to determine what people would judge as adequate to maintain their commitment and protect the habitat from human encroachment

The well-endowed Rural Districts -- particularly Binga, Nyaminyami, and Guruve in the Zambezi valley -- that provide the bulk of CAMPFIRE revenues have given the Programme a false sense of profitability and drawn undue attention to its potential to provide rapid and substantial benefits to the majority of program participants Great care must be exercised in tailoring the Programme to correspond to the revenue potential of a given area

The Zambezi valley land-use study and other information about land allocation in CAMPFIRE districts indicate that they face erosion of the wildlife management gains achieved early in CAMPFIRE's history There is a great need for problem-solving and participatory analysis of these situations to increase the quality of the wildlife resource and value of their safari operations In lower revenue potential areas, a longer term perspective and strategy are needed A more integrated approach to natural resource management, one that initially focuses on woodland management while gradually building up wildlife populations, should be considered The potential and significance of all natural resources to household well-being should not be underestimated, but neither should the differences in requisite approaches that CAMPFIRE might avail itself of

It is not evident, where communities have invested the revenue derived from wildlife activities in collective revenue-generating activities (such as small shops offering basic staples, beer halls, and grinding mills) that these activities are any more profitable than the private sector enterprises they occasionally displaced Nor is it clear that these collective enterprises are generally well-managed and economically viable over a multi-year period However, in most of these cases the motive is not profit, but rather the provision of an important service at a lower cost or more convenient location that benefits the poorest of the community

Table 8: CAMPFIRE Revenue and % Distributed to Wards Below the Council (in US$)

District	1989 Income	%	1990 Income	%	1991 Income	%	1992 Income	%	1993 Income	%	1994 Income	%	1995 Income	%	1996 Income	%	TOTAL
Beitbridge	na	na	38,836	89	37,902	58	44,014	69	39,210	46	67,043	50	65,566	50	58,461	0	351,032
Binga	na	na	76,587	0	63,278	22	254,927	62	176,951	71	189,342	60	212,831	60	211,586	59	1,188,502
Bulilimamangwe	na	na	37,682	0	33,324	68	38,146	50	29,867	50	37,263	36	46,622	50	57,062	44	279,966
Chipinga (Gaza)	na	na	11,237	100	19,728	82	39,124	80	24,200	82	21,998	81	16,557	79	27,704	50	160,548
Chiredzi (Gaza)	na	na	na	na	77,846	0	64,490	17	84,850	28	129,729	63	141,022	78	131,011	78	628,948
Gokwe	na	na	na	na	114,429	53	97,738	41	81,801	47	na	na	na	na	na	na	212,167
Gokwe North	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	96,188	55	112,604	52	127,956	39	336,748
Gokwe South	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	7,385	87	3210	0	0	0	10,595
Guruve	198,770	46 9	209,356	38	138,154	30	140,074	51	294,631	55	314,950	78	305,956	73	299,415	0	1,702,536
Hurungwe	na	na	na	na	45,664	0	6,861	65	133,729	48	127,614	65	130,395	57	9,930	50	454,193
Hwange	na	na	21,036	?	?	?	?	?	25,581	33	63,805	51	112,495	55	72,549	50	274,430
Mudzi	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	3,410	?	?	?	4,418	8	7,828
Muzarabani	828	0	4,762	0	4,862	0	2,009	?	7,658	100	29,756	68	75,288	33	39,471	0	163,806
Nyaminymani	**150,213**	**62**	**155,462**	**26**	**152,769**	**35**	**162,612**	**59**	**390,537**	**44**	**458,128**	**44**	**279,838**	**44**	**443,095**	**18**	**2,042,441**
Rushinga	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	4,418	0	4,418
Tsholotsho	na	na	77,974	36	86,628	40	140,845	40	179,841	46	96,062	50	89,509	56	130,866	60	801,725
UMP	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	4,418	0	4,418
Total	**349,811**		**632,932**		**774,584**		**990,840**		**1,471,856**		**1,642,673**		**1,591,893**		**1,622,360**		**9,076,949**
Total During NRMP II											**1,642,673**		**1,591,893**		**1,622,360**		**4,856,926**
MIN	828	0	4,762	0	4,862	0	2,009	17	7,658	28	3,410	36	3,210	0	0	0	4,418
MAX	198,770	62	209,356	100	152,769	82	254,927	80	390,537	100	458,128	87	305,956	79	433,095	78	2,042,441
AVERAGE	116,604	36	70,326	36	70,417	35	90,076	53	122,655	54	117,334	60	122,453	53	101,398	29	507,312

Source WWF Programme Office-Harare
See text for discussion of weakness in the data
* as of March 21, 1998, not enough Ddistrict Councils had submitted to CAMPFIRE Association enough accurate 1997 income and benefit distribution dta to presente any resutls for that year
na = not applicable as Council had not yet joined the CAMPFIRE Programme
? = data point uncertain or unavailable
Gokwe District divided into Gokwe South and North in 1994

TABLE 8A NUMBER OF WARDS RECEIVING CAMPFIRE REVENUE, AVERAGE BENEFIT PER PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLD

Year	Number of Wards	Average Ward Dividend	Households in Ward	Total Amount Devolved to Wards	Average benefit per household in Zim $	Median Benefit per Household in Zim $	Which Buys X kilos of grade d maize	Average Benefit per household in $US	Minimum HH Benefit in Zim $	Maximum Household Benefit in Zim $
1989	16	24,688	8280	395,005	48	41	n a	23	5 07	498
1990	31	19,655	22503	609,292	27	19	n a	11	1 39	651
1991	56	22,386	54542	1,298,363	24	22	n a	6	69	744
1992	75	41,296	72775	3,097,214	43	30	6	9	1 85	2,303
1993	100	54,246	97257	5,424,584	56	37	9	9	37	3,832
1994	102	68,859	92912	7,023,667	76	32	15	9	1 91	5,327
1995	115	71,845	101995	8,262,218	81	40	32	9	93	4,388
1996	103	79,774	89475	8,216,717	92	45	43	9	1 96	5,506

Source WWF Programme Office-Harare and grain Marketing Board, Zimbabwe

Notes Maize price is marketing board's selling price of unmilled grade D maize, an amount thought capable of providing enough staple grain for a small family for 4-6 weeks Population data is not updated over time to reflect substantial in-migration and splitting of households, hence average benefit may be somewhat overestimated The fall in households in 1996 is due to some Districts still to report n a = not available

Recommendations

The CA should commission CASS to review existing data and complementary field studies of what constitutes a sufficient benefit to encourage people to maintain their commitment to conservation (essentially this review would test assumption #3 of the project relating to a "willingness" to invest in conservation)

The CA, backed by the DNPWLM, should make increased CAMPFIRE revenue-sharing with producer communities a priority policy issue with member RDCs and with the government and publicly acknowledge those RDCs that adhere to desirable revenue distribution standards This policy change may be reinforced by the imminent World Bank funding for 26 Rural Districts to support the kind of activities such dividends currently fund (health clinics, improved roads, primary schools, etc)

RDCs should strengthen their commitments to facilitating procedures wherein user communities decide what to do with their wildlife revenue and in what form they receive it

The CA should issue guidelines stating that its member councils should be as open and transparent with their wildlife accounts as possible As part of that process, it will need to send the ward committees copies of contracts with safari operators and of all checks made out to the Council by operators under contract

MLGNH program participation should be supported by assisting it in carrying out the annual audits required by law The audits and public accounting should be posted in public places for general transparency

CCG members interested in habitat preservation should concentrate their human resources, funds, and project activities in those districts where the possibilities for generating significant wildlife revenue are greatest

Collective revenue-generating activities established with dividend funds should be compared with similar private sector operations to understand what the actual benefits are and whether they are likely to be sustainable

B Current CAMPFIRE and NRMP II Evaluation Issues

1 Building Local Capacity to Achieve Community Development Results

An important focus of NRMP II has been to develop the different types of knowledge and skills, with accompanying administrative and institutional structures, by rural communities and their local governments require to manage their natural resources effectively and sustainably Included in this capacity-building has been "the development and transfer of the range of individual and institutional NRM skills needed to enable communities to manage their resources wisely, as well as an appropriate

incentive framework " (SO1 Document 1997) The discussion in this section focuses on key NRMP II initiatives to provide that support, with attention to their social and economic impacts The discussion is organized into the following topics

- The CA as the lead organization,
- Financial support for decentralization and the CDF,
- Issues relating to infrastructure development,
- Empowerment of local communities and the ZimTrust,
- Reaching communities through public education and Action, and
- The social and economic impact of NRMP II and CAMPFIRE activities

Evaluation Issue Establishing the CAMPFIRE Association as the Lead Organization. *"To what extent has NRMP II assisted the Association in assuming its leadership roles/responsibilities " "To what extent have collaborating agencies, as well as the GOZ, accepted the Associations's leadership " "To what extent is the Association's Secretariat responsive to the aims/objectives expressed by the Associations's Board of Management " "To what extent has the Association been successful in defining and fulfilling/meeting its roles/responsibilities to its increasing number of members ?" "Discuss the role and impact of the institutional contractor in these areas " (A 8)*

As noted, the CA serves as the lead agency in the implementation of the CAMPFIRE program It exercises this responsibility through a program of advocacy, coordination, and information dissemination, both local and international The CA has a Secretariat, much of whose agenda entails serving the interests and coordinating the activities of the other implementing partners, known collectively as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group The CA is also responsible for chairing and coordinating the activities of the PET (See Section B III for a more detailed discussion of the CA's performance and related recommendations, and for an assessment of the PET)

Box 4 CAMPFIRE Association Mission Statement

"We provide services to member RDCs to enable them to engage in sustainable natural resources management and development so they can improve life in rural areas through participatory rural development."

Source CAMPFIRE Association, Strategic Plan, NRMP II, 1996-1999, p 1

The CA constitution calls for a Board of Management, comprised of 14 members elected by the general membership The Board makes policy, issues policy guidelines, approves annual budgets and workplans, and oversees staff employment It enjoys direct linkages with government The CA Executive Director is charged with implementing Board policy

The CAMPFIRE Secretariat is headed by an Executive Director, who is supported by a Deputy Director for Finance and Administration and a Deputy Director for Projects The Executive Director supervises the Harare office staff of 14, who include the two Deputy Directors, a Training and Institutions Development Officer, Monitoring Evaluation and Gender Officer, Projects Development Officer, Information and Public Relations Officer, and Finance and Administration Officer

The CA has established five regional bodies to promote CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe

From 1991 to 1995, the primary source of support for the CA was the ZimTrust, using funds obtained from a variety of donors, particularly the Overseas Development Fund In 1996, ZimTrust funding of the CA ended NRMP II provided continued funding, beginning with a pre-award "bridge" grant of Z$4,081,056 for the period January 1996 to November 1996 USAID then provided a long-term grant of Z$13,523,810 for the period November 1996 to August 1999 In addition, the CA received approximately Z$3,131,457 from other donors in the period 1995 to 1998 The Netherlands -- Z$2,695,000, Global Guardians Trust (Japan) -- Z$174,192, WISDOM -- Z$110,765, and the British Council -- Z$150,000 (Price Waterhouse, 1997 5)

As of March 1998, each Council member pays a "joining fee" of Z$3,000 and thereafter an annual fee of Z$1,500 In addition, RDC members pay the CA a levy not to exceed 2 5% of the gross revenues realized from CAMPFIRE activities in their Districts The actual Z$ amount the CA receives varies and can drop or rise sharply in response to local conditions (e g , drought)

Findings

The need for a representative lead agency for CAMPFIRE was recognized from the beginning, with the idea for the CA arising in 1989 At the meetings leading up to the CITES convention in 1989, there was great concern within Zimbabwe about a proposal to place elephants on Appendix 1, a step that would prohibit trade in ivory District representatives came to Harare to meet and prepare a statement to be read opposing the ban at the CITES meeting At that time the RDCs decided they should continue as a group to lobby for their interests at the national and international levels By 1992, the CA was recognized as the only group that could claim to represent a wide membership base of rural people from communal areas

It is clear from interviews with CCG members, other stakeholders, and documentary references that the CA is now viewed as the lead CAMPFIRE agency This is true even for the RDCs, wards, and villages Local agencies visited by the evaluation team indicated that they look to the CA for leadership and assistance to help them do their jobs ZimTrust, like other early CCG members, has also been very supportive of the creation of the CA It felt the NGOs were being placed in an impossible role as combination technical advisors and "gatekeepers" between the funding agencies such as USAID and the RDC clients They were having to decide on priorities CAMPFIRE needed a support organization of constituent members to lobby within the government, and the CA has begun to fill this need

It is too early in the CA's institutional evolution to make final conclusions regarding its performance as lead agency It has only had approximately 18 months to organize itself and install the necessary management infrastructure and processes to discharge its responsibilities fully In its effort to acquire the essential capacity to administer the program, the CA has received effective assistance from the IC

Although the MLGNH recognizes the CA as the lead CAMPFIRE agency, it is critical of the current focus, organization, and implementation of the Programme, which it believes subverts the original intent CA revenues, they argue, go largely to support CAMPFIRE Secretariat, the CCG, and NGOs The MLGNH would like to see a greater percentage of funds going directly to the RDCs

The MLGNH envisions a different CAMPFIRE model that it views as preferable and more sustainable Under its model, the RDCs would comprise the CA. They would appoint an executive committee (e g , five RDCs serving for a set term) An executive director with 3-5 person staff would serve the executive committee The GOZ and donors would provide assistance to the CA, as appropriate

Conclusions

The evaluation team concluded that the CA has been effective in promoting CAMPFIRE A key CA objective, as listed in its constitution, is "to promote the fundamental principle enshrined in the CAMPFIRE concept of proprietorship of natural resources by producer communities " CA staff are effective in articulating the CAMPFIRE philosophy to diverse audiences both in Harare and in the field and have gained international exposure Clearly, the CA can perform the program advocacy role and enhance it further with the help of specialized agencies such as ART

With respect to the MLGNH criticism, the CA is using its funding as the GOZ and CA agreed to, and the CA itself recognizes the need for the kind of material and technical capacity-building support its CCG partners are providing its RDC constituents

2. Providing Financial Support for Decentralization

Evaluation Issue The CAMPFIRE Development Fund (CDF) *"The CAMPFIRE Development Fund was designed as a project-specific mechanism to redress leadership, coordination, and customer satisfaction lamentation How has it performed in addressing these concerns? What can be done to improve its performance? What should its ultimate status be? Should it be project specific and allowed to dissolve at the end of NRMP II or is a longer term approach warranted? What might that approach be? Options that are possible include a simple grant fund, a matching grant fund, a special revolving loan fund, a trust fund, an endowment, etc " (SOW, section C3a)*

Findings

The CDF was established as a grant fund with $US6 million The grants management unit is the IC, with specific responsibility to "execute and administer specific support grant agreements " The IC is charged with collaborating with other CCG members in identifying proposals, developing grants, allocating funds, and monitoring grants The IC is also tasked to "assist PET to determine whether or not proposals submitted by the RDCs meet technical requirements for funding as agreed upon by the CCG and USAID " NRMP II provided for the CA to hire its own Project Development Officer (PDO) to help the RDCs access the CDF

NRMP II documents themselves are, however, unclear about the long-term division of responsibility for CDF grant development, approval, and management and variously allocate these responsibilities among the CA, PET, and IC Field interviews and PET minutes suggest, that at least initially, there was some informal discussion about the CA eventually undertaking an increasing share of CDF management responsibilities (see SARP ULG Midterm Evaluation, PET Minutes, and Plan of Operations, June 1995) The PET committee members agreed that the CDF would make grants for two types of projects institutional capacity-building and infrastructure To reiterate, capacity-building grants can be used for equipment, salaries, technical assistance, and training of new staff and community participants The infrastructure grants are to support capital investments No such grant has yet been made because most proposals for infrastructure have not contained the needed social, economic, technical, and environmental feasibility analyses In addition, for both development and implementation reasons, a decision was made to allocate the two types of grants sequentially, beginning first with institutional capacity-building

The grant award process is as follows The RDCs submit proposals to the CA for initial project development The CA PDO presents them to the PET project subcommittee for review and commentary The PDO (and during his tenure, the CDF Advisor) then visits the RDC and/or ward to discuss possible modifications before the project proposal is sent to the full PET committee The PET committee members may send a proposal back for further development If the PET approves the proposal, the IC screens it once more and then prepares the grant document for approval by USAID and the GOZ The proposal review chain can be summarized as follows CA project officer → PET subcommittee→ PET committee → IC → USAID + GOZ

Grants are made conditional on pre-award financial and accounting surveys, whose purpose is to attempt to certify that grantees, thus far limited to RDCs, have adequate financial accounting and control and commodity management practices in place to permit receipt of foreign aid funds The practices of many RDCs have had to be brought up to the minimum standards before USAID grants were possible Moreover, no RDC had sufficient controls in place to permit use of the cash advance system for grant payments The IC has set up a reimbursement system that requires the RDCs to manage their available funds (from other sources) in such a way as to benefit from the activities intended by the CDF One RDC has been successful in this regard to the point that it now qualifies for the cash advance method of grant disbursement The IC expects the financial management standards of other RDCs to improve similarly so as to meet the requirements for advance payments

Even before the CDF was set up, many staff members of the CCG organizations encouraged the RDCs to submit proposals As a result, when they began operations, the IC and PET had to sift through over 200 requests for funding Few of these were fully developed proposals or directly relevant to the project's conservation and NRM objectives Most PET members felt that the quality of the proposals was very low Many were for inappropriate projects that rarely embodied CAMPFIRE principles Considerable guidance, rewriting, reworking, visits to prospective grantees to discuss and review proposals, and negotiation of proposals by IC staff members, consultants, and CCG members in Harare were necessary to get fundable projects from the RDCs Staff attempt to incorporate commentary by the PET full committee and subcommittees, the IC, and USAID in the final grant awards Eventually the CA, IC, USAID, and CCG agreed to a three-page grant and proposal guideline form that was distributed to all RDCs Despite these problems, the CA has been urging fast award of the grants, mostly by requesting that the IC conduct pre-award surveys and by hiring staff and a consultant to assist the RDCs in developing their proposals

Even with this considerable effort, few actual or proposed projects contain participatory approaches to diversified CBNRM at the village and ward levels Instead, the PET and USAID judged that an initial round of direct institutional support to the RDCs was called for One byproduct of this entire process is a relative homogeneity in grant design Each grant thus far has contained similar elements There are line items for capital equipment, such as trucks, computers, radios, office equipment, camping equipment, motorcycles, and mountain bikes, followed by a line item for new RDC staff positions The grants also pay for technical assistance and training, often supplied by third-party trainers such as the ZimTrust, ACTION, or WWF Line items for "soft" expenditures such as training and minor equipment (flip-charts, radios, camping equipment, look and learn visits, etc) constitute only a small percentage of the overall grant and rarely exceed $US25,000 per grant over a one-year period Grantees typically hire RDC CAMPFIRE Coordinators and equip them with a vehicle, radio, and computer Most also hire additional ward promoters, game scouts, and resource monitors and equip them with camping equipment, mountain bikes, and radios RDC staff manage and control the funded activities

As of February 1998, the CDF had made 20 grants to the RDCs, obligating $Z24 2 million, or about $US1 6 million The first grant went to Hurungwe in October 1996, followed by Mazoe and Gokwe North The most recent grant, approved in February 1998, was to the Kusile District Of the first seven grants made, only the Hurungwe RDC had significant CAMPFIRE wildlife income Not until May 1997 did the biggest CAMPFIRE revenue-producing District, Nyaminyami, receive a grant The PET project subcommittee staff felt that the high wildlife revenue-producing Rural Districts did not need a grant as much as the RDCs with little or no existing Programme revenue did The RDCs themselves have made total cash and in-kind contributions to the grant activities amounting to 22% of the grants

The 20 grants issued to date have been used to purchase 19 trucks, 20 computers and printers, 26 two-way radio sets, 6 motorcycles/motorbikes, at least 76 mountain bikes/standard bicycles, 5 fax machines, 2 cameras, 12 sets of camping equipment, and at least 15 sets of assorted office furniture The grants have also been used to pay for some technical assistance and at least 121 salaried resource

monitors, game scouts, and ward promoters and 32 Rural District staff (coordinators and clerk/typists) All grants include a provision that the RDC will pick up the recurrent staff costs at the end of the grant If not retained by the RDC, the CA hopes these new workers will have increased their skill levels during the project and will find employment more easily after the grant ends

Review of the grant budgets shows that of all the CDF grants, an average of 30% of grant funds have been used for expenditures that *directly* filter down to the village and ward levels (see Table 11) As noted, many of the Rural District-level support services provide indirect benefits to local producer communities

Grant performance over the short period of implementation to date has been mixed While the RDCs are grateful for the additional resources the grants bring, many CCG members think the grants have been awarded too slowly and have not always been consistent with CAMPFIRE principles The grants, as noted, resemble each other in terms of what is requested When new staff are funded, this homogeneity can be a problem For example, there is little guidance on what CAMPFIRE managers should to do to promote CAMPFIRE when the Rural District has few wildlife resources Most grants have been based on the RDC District Plans developed by the RDCs with the ZimTrust or, in some cases, the assistance of other CCG members It is not clear that the training activities and even equipment requests in the proposals are based on a systematic needs analysis

For grants that call for development of NRM by-laws, no methodology is spelled out for how ward and village by-laws are to be developed, and it is not clear that newly hired staff under the grant have the conceptual and analytical skills to facilitate such development The approved proposals are rarely clear about how the RDCs are to recruit candidates for managerial posts and who decides who gets the ward-level jobs of monitors or scouts The RDC discusses the job descriptions, which the IC approves, followed by competitive procedures for hiring Last, most grants make ward-level workers report to RDC staff rather than to ward committees This practice means that existing ward committees do not have responsibility for hiring, monitoring and evaluating, and firing or retaining ward-level workers

There is an assumption among some CCG players, and especially the CA itself, that essentially all ideas and projects coming from CA-member RDCs will and should be funded The goal of project development favors "getting the thing funded" rather than to teasing out the best ideas from the villages and wards Project development procedures pre-screen out only non-CAMPFIRE compatible activities Although village consultation is a general practice, the methodology for grant or proposal development does not yet involve the proactive use of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) or other field-based methods The staff involved in project development lack experience or skill in negotiating a set of alternative CBNRM project concepts with a producer community, with a view to developing the best environmentally and economically sound ideas Instead, weak ideas get carried forward for project development, when better judgement on the ground would have screened them out earlier in the review process In proactive proposal development, complex pre-screening happens *before* proposals get to a review committee

Table 9 Distribution of CDF Grant Benefits (in $Z at 1$US = $Z 15)

District	Total Grant	% of Grant in District Capital Equip	% in District Wages	% District Training	Sum Directly Benefiting Ward	% Benefiting Ward	New Ward Jobs	New Council Jobs	Job Titles At Council Level
Mazowe	673 000	63%	17%	11%	25 000	4%	0	2	Campfire manager and clerk/typist
Chipenge	826 980	57%	23%	12%	72 210	9%	0	2	Co ordinator and clerk typist
Gokwe North	774 777	65%	9%	10%	122 006	16%	0	1	Project Bookkeeper
Hurungwe	917 860	65%	8%	9%	167 000	18%	0	1	Assistant Campfire Coordinator
Nkayi	874 020	49%	16%	11%	190 500	22%	10	2	Assistant Campfire Manager clerk/typist
Bulilimamangwe	1 293 200	40%	12%	21%	354 600	27%	2	2	training officer and accounts clerk
Chimanimani	1 381 000	35%	14%	23%	379 840	28%	4	2	Campfire manager and clerk/bookkeeper
Nyanga	1 340 040	40%	8%	24%	378 040	28%	5	1	Campfire manager
UMP	1 104 920	28%	22%	14%	333 220	30%	4	2	campfire coordinator and clerk/typist
Binga	1 698 700	42%	9%	20%	551 000	32%	0	2	Campfire Training officer and clerk/typist
Gwanda	1 592 650	42%	9%	15%	527 300	33%	5	2	Campfire manager and clerk/typist
Beitbridge	1 483 280	29%	13%	25%	494 880	33%	12	3	Training Officer clerk/typist Campfire Promoter + maintenance paid for by USAID
Kusile	1 493 300	42%	7%	17%	498 300	33%	6	1	Campfire Coordinator
Mudzi	1 187 910	34%	14%	11%	407 810	34%	15	2	Campfire Coordinator and clerk/typist + maintenance paid for by USAID
Muzarabani	1 348 428	28%	6%	8%	477 000	35%	10	2	Campfire Training officer and accounts clerk
Nyaminyami	913 600	46%	0%	28%	325 000	36%	11	0	
Chiredzi	1 218 850	26%	12%	25%	444 600	36%	9	1	coordinator
Tsolotsho	1 014 700	30%	16%	15%	391 000	39%	0	2	Training Officer and typist
Guruve	1 695 000	19%	9%	9%	800 900	47%	10	2	training officer and accounts clerk
Rushinga	1 403 505	31%	12%	9%	684 150	49%	18	2	Institutions Development Officer clerk/typist + maintenance paid for by USAID
TOTAL	**24 235 720**				**7,624 556**	**31%**	**121**	**32**	
AVERAGE	**1 211 786**	**41%**	**12%**	**16%**	**381 228**	**30%**			

Source CDF grant files

Note A typical grant creates a new Campfire Unit at a District Council (if the Council does not have an active Campfire program) or it may expand the existing Campfire staff at the Council level This staff is then equipped with a vehicle a computer printer fax flip chart and sometimes office equipment In many cases additional ward promoters game scouts or resource monitors are hired and equipped with camping equipment and mountain bikes The whole group are then equipped with several two way radio sets All staff are supervised by the District Council Campfire manager who in turn is hired by and reports to the District Council Executive Officer

At the current rate of expenditure, there is a high probability that substantial funds -- a conservative estimate is $US1 6 million -- will remain unspent, even with the one-year extension to the project If the money continues to be spent at a rapid pace, it is possible that the Fund can be whittled down, but the shift from capacity-building to infrastructural grants will likely slow the rate of spending to a point where more than US$3 million might remain in the CDF by the project completion date of September 2000

Conclusions

The structure of the current set of capacity-building grants clearly benefits the recipient RDCs (see Table 11) There is considerable evidence that the strategy of providing economic incentives to encourage institutional change is working in some Rural Districts where a commitment to and quality of CAMPFIRE, wildlife, and other natural resource programs is clearly established and growing

There is some unnecessary ambiguity about the CA's role in the CDF process The CA is involved in proposal development, approval, grant management and implementation, and monitoring and evaluation These multiple roles place the CA in a position of potential conflict of interest and subject to being perceived as "self-dealing" (a term used where the same organizations is involved in developing proposals and conducting feasibility studies, and approving the grants) vis-a-vis the CDF In addition, this situation puts pressure on the CA to advocate for faster grant approvals, even where the projects are not ready or the RDCs do not yet have the financial capacity to manage the grants Although not formally in the position of making funding decisions, the co-mingling of the functions of the CA and the IC potentially could delegitimize the organization Ensuring that CDF management is clearly distinct from CA operations can only serve to strengthen the CA as an autonomous organization, whose role is to assist its membership develop viable, sound proposals that meet CAMPFIRE criteria These attributes will serve the membership in finding funds irrespective of their source

As with the CA, charging the PET with "recommending proposals for funding" creates for its members conflicting roles and potential conflicts of interest The same agencies who may get funds out of technical assistance and training line items ideally should not be participating in the funding decision Similarly, the same agencies asked to organize feasibility studies that accurately point out project deficiencies should not be forced to be the naysayers on the PET The issue of self-dealing extends to the technical CCG staff as well, who are in the uncomfortable and undesirable position of needing to veto or approve proposals on the grounds of the technical soundness of those proposals it forwards to USAID/GOZ for approval Some input from involved parties may be necessary and desirable, but formal involvement of neutral persons could reduce the overlap in roles

Grant documents do not reveal the extent to which the project activity and its structure, modalities, and composition reflect widespread village and ward-level input in the planning and design of activities Few projects follow all the criteria described in the document, "Approval Criteria and Procedures for Review of Projects to Be Assisted Under CAMPFIRE Development Fund "
The hiring of a CDF advisor and CA PDO has improved the rate of proposal development The

guidelines for proposal writing distributed to the CCG and District Council members appear to be realistic, helpful, and well-prepared The CDF Advisor is preparing a project development manual

The strategy of rapid disbursement of CDF funds poses risks to all members of the CCG involved in developing the grants, and could partly undermine the project and associate of the CAMPFIRE movement with unsustainable capital equipment and salaries, inequitable distribution of foreign resources, and top-down planning by urban elites and civil servants on the District Councils The delays in awarding grant funds were acceptable, and even desirable They amounted to the inevitable "start-up" considerations normal with any grant funding and revealed laudable fiscal caution and prudence on the part of the IC Experience has shown that community-level grants take time to develop, are often small, and involve minimal capital equipment The sense of haste appears in part to have been caused by the late start-up of the CDF and the decision to favor the local government level with the initial set of grants

Several other areas of the grant process merit attention

- The number of steps in grant development and approval is quite cumbersome to fund managers but they as well as recipients, appear to be necessary for a proper accounting of USAID funds While the cost reimbursement method of grant payments can result in significant delays, the RDCs have managed to proceed with grant spending

- The *de facto* limitation on eligibility for CDF grants to the RDCs hampers project development by reducing the incentive for village and ward communities to self-organize into cooperatives, user groups, and registered associations and eventually make themselves eligible for direct support Village and ward communities may well wish to develop a project with their RDC, but they might also choose to develop a project activity in partnership with any number of NGOs, associations, or other registered organizations, whether or not they are a member of the CCG The centralization of grant management responsibilities in the RDCs also subverts the learning curve for self-organized village and ward communities Sophisticated ward committees such as can be found in Mahenye find that under the grant they move from one "tutor" to another, rather than being able to develop their own skills in project development, training, facilitation, and management in a learning-by-doing framework

- It appears that the approach to grant formulation has been over-standardized The intent was to expand the CAMPFIRE concept nationwide to non-wildlife-producing Rural Districts The common need of each new District for staff to coordinate the NRM activities led to a similarity across the grants

- There is weak or no evidence that producer villages and wards have an adequate understanding of the impact of the projects in terms of recurrent cost obligations and annual subsidies on the use of existing program revenues

- The overall local revenue-generating capacity of the RDCs has not been adequately considered

before approving grants that contain salary line items (see the various PET and PET subcommittee minutes) The assumption and promise that the RDCs will sustain these new staff members with other funds has no economic basis In Rural Districts that do not have much chance of generating a wildlife-based income stream, alternative natural resource income streams are not specified The short-term expansion of salaried village and ward-level resource monitors and promoters could jeopardize the long-term sustainability and credibility of the program Districts that once relied on a sustainable combination of volunteer labor and a smaller number of salaried monitors paid out of CAMPFIRE revenue may find this approach to be more difficult in the future

- Grants to the RDCs have not been made conditional on their having a track record of applying the desirable revenue-sharing levels recommended by CAMPFIRE, as articulated in CA policy Opportunities to encourage some of the wealthier CAMPFIRE RDCs to apply the rule are thereby lost

Recommendations

The CDF should be maintained as a separate fund under IC management until the end of FY2000 (September 2000) Consistent with the FY2000-A and FY2002-A scenario (2000-2002), the CDF should be progressively transferred to a distinct and separate grant management unit within an existing Zimbabwean organization (The last section of this evaluation and Appendix G outline recommendations for how the sinking fund the team recommends for the future of the CDF might operate The team did not see locating the fund elsewhere in the southern Africa region as a desirable option for CAMPFIRE because of the importance of sustaining Zimbabwean ownership of the Programme However, keep currency held with an international offshore financial institution, protecting the capital by permitting the funds to be held in hard currency The IC can continue to *advise* a CAMPFIRE (CCG)-level committee as it begins to interact with the sinking fund or trust organization managing the CDF The IC can also continue to administer existing and pipeline institutional and infrastructural grants as per the current modus operandi

During the transition and phaseout period of USAID/Zimbabwe's assistance, make every effort to manage the remaining funds in the CDF as if a sinking fund were already in place Develop simpler procedures for grant allocation, pre-award certification, and grant approval, and make greater use of quick-release mechanisms for small grants These procedures might require setting up a grants management unit inside the IC and operating with a modest, fixed, annual grant budget For example, a fixed amount of about US$500,000 could be allocated to the annual CDF grant budget, of which 15% could be used to finance the overhead costs of a three-person grant management unit (project officer, finance and database officer, and administrative assistant) The overhead funds would also cover local travel costs for this staff and the costs of routine meetings of a rotating panel of voluntary jury members who would review proposals

The CDF should be used to continue funding RDC capacity-building over the short to medium term CDF funds should be sufficient, beyond what has already been spent, to finance two new

projects under consideration, and at least five capacity-building projects for new RDCs, for a total of about $850,000 between now and the end of FY1999

The CDF should be opened up to a wider range of potential grantees, specifically, to any registered private or public organization in Zimbabwe These include NGOs, RDCs, government departments, conservancies, user groups, associations, cooperatives, universities, and any other organization legally able to receive grant funds under Zimbabwe law, as well as current CCG members The only constraint on eligibility would be maintenance of minimal acceptable standards of financial accounting as per USAID regulations and US law affecting the use of foreign aid funds Although in practice this requirement would eliminate the vast majority of potential grantees, organizations that did not meet the standard (such as women s clubs and ward organizations) would certainly be free to partner with a stronger, support NGO that did meet the requirement Such mentoring partnerships should be explicitly favored in a revised grant criterion Criteria would change to reflect the post-Mission closeout arrangement, if adopted

The ambiguity created by the overlapping roles some organizations play in grant preparation, approval, management, and execution should be rectified as soon as possible, in part by involving neutral reviewers and in part by establishing an explicit set of approval procedures These changes will be increasingly important as the fund is opened to a wider pool of potential recipients

Following FY2002 (September 2002), a neutral review committee, to be comprised of a selected, voluntary panel of representatives of the CCG and other parties interested in and involved with Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE movement in general (such as retired faculty, former members of the Board of Management, etc), should be set up to handle the proposal approval process To keep the post-NRMP II CDF vibrant, the CA should consider delegating chairmanship of this "CAMPFIRE Fund Committee" annually among the CCG movement partners A long-term local administrator could be employed, using Fund revenue, to manage the links between the CAMPFIRE Fund Committee and the organization administering the fund The funding agency can monitor the administrator A two-stage proposal process on a competitive basis, as described in Appendix G, should be considered

Once the fund is put on a competitive basis, USAID and the GOZ should revisit the necessity of pre-approving grants to non-RDC CDF grantees It is common practice for donor agencies to send annual reports to the Government that include a list of the grants made, with a brief synopsis of their purpose and activities USAID might again try, with the Government, to get agreement to operate on this less stringent basis

Evaluation Issue Infrastructure Development. *"To what extent has NRMP II and CAMPFIRE implemented policies and procedures to properly review the technical feasibility of proposed infrastructure development activities and what if anything should be done to further promote the sound design and implementation of infrastructure development activities?" (SOW, sec A 9)*

Findings

The CDF has US$3 million identified for physical infrastructure investments, but, as noted, no physical infrastructure proposals have been approved PET committee members have been slow to approve infrastructure requests, in part because of legitimate doubts about the appropriateness of using grant funds to subsidize commercial activities absent a serious business analysis The members also have valid concerns about the technical, social, environmental, and economic feasibility of requests for electric fencing, irrigation projects, and tourist chalets This point is clear in the case of some tourism projects WWF-funded studies of three ecotourism campsites/chalet projects on communal lands concluded that they were unlikely to be profitable except under limited conditions Two community-based ecotourism proposals that are nearly ready for final consideration by the PET The proposals are, however, not convincing as to profitability or management strategies, although these aspects are being critically reviewed by CCG agencies There was some private sector (small-scale) development of bed and breakfast-type accommodations on communal lands in various parts of Zimbabwe, but those initiatives were private and did not require assistance This information suggests that the enthusiasm for ecotourism projects on the part of the RDCs, CA, and other CCG members may require closer examination At present, there is no overall CA level strategy for CAMPFIRE ecotourism development and marketing

Box 5 The Rwenge Electric Fence Proposal

The evaluation team visited the Hurungwe Rural District Council, with which it discussed the Rwenge elephant electric fence for wards 13 and 15 requested under the USAID CDF infrastructure program The fence is something the concerned local communities urgently want Delays in funding led to"'awareness meetings," facilitated by the Hurungwe CAMPFIRE coordinator and Zimbabwe Trust The meetings led to a request that the CASS carry out a social impact study of the project The study was done, but unfortunately was not carried out in the affected areas and was therefore rejected by the Hurungwe Rural District Council The delay in implementing this project is cause for concern, as some illegal settlers may start setting up residence in the areas reserved for wildlife management In addition, the rate at which people are being killed and injured by wildlife is rising During the period between April and May 1997 alone, an elephant killed three people in the same day, and a buffalo injured a young girl and a man in the same area The local safari operator dealt with these problem animals The project still has not been funded Steps need to be taken to bring this process to an

Another example of a problem proposal is one for veld fire management that is ready for consideration by the PET Its economic justification is not convincing, nor does it reflect appropriate and current concepts on veld fire management Ward and District representatives, as well as technical representatives of other lower level groups, have participated in assessing the proposal Examination of a wildlife fencing proposal showed a flawed definition of the problem, and the area to be fenced has no future as a wildlife area One USAID-funded infrastructure project input that has been completed is a 10-office complex built in Harare to house the CA Secretariat and provide a permanent base for coordinating CAMPFIRE activities (Box 5 provides a case study of the consequences of delays caused by weak proposals)

To support proposal development, USAID held a training session in 1995 on the seemingly user-friendly Environmental Screening Form it developed to accompany a user-friendly environmental screening form (ESF) that accompanies proposals to their final approval It held a training session in 1995 on the ESF, with follow-up sessions in Southeast Lowveld and the Eastern Highlands The form was also introduced at a broader proposal development workshop held in November 1996 for CCG members and RDC staff These various initiatives have, however, had no noticeable effect on RDC proposal development and did little to improve capacity to produce substantive proposals Those developing proposals use private sector consultants and contractors through the practice of requesting tenders for a specific concept, such as an elephant fence, and then using the submission to develop the specifications and costs of the proposal

When investments are made in physical infrastructure using CAMPFIRE wildlife or other revenues, the projects typically involve schools, grinding mills, water developments for wildlife, and wildlife fencing Schools and grinding mills represent low technological risk, certainty of markets, and only moderate risk of management failures Water points and wildlife fencing pose moderate to high levels of technological risk and higher risk of management failures because of a lack of attention to operations and maintenance

Conclusions

The concerns expressed about the economic, environmental, technical, and long-term sustainability of most of the infrastructure-type project ideas are legitimate The feasibility studies should not be sped up and their quality jeopardized by a need to accelerate expenditures With no mechanism for producing sound proposals expeditiously, the CDF runs the risk of being a fund that distributes benefits to districts and communities on the basis of non-technical factors If the initial plan to fund US$3 million in CAMPFIRE infrastructure is to be retained, increased technical support for the development of infrastructure grant proposals will be essential

In the time remaining until the end of FY2000, it is unlikely that the CDF can finance more than a few infrastructure projects There is not enough available engineering, economic, and environmental expertise in the CAMPFIRE administrative structure to analyze problems, examine alternatives, and develop worthy proposals Under current procedures, outside consulting services cannot be procured without a lengthy process of preparing terms of reference and going out for competitive tenders Without a project extension, little time would be left for implementation, monitoring, and oversight In addition, most infrastructure projects would take years to implement, thereby going well beyond the NRMP II's project life With an NRMP II extension until September 2002 and with outside consultants, there would be ample time to prepare perhaps 10 to 20 infrastructure projects in time to secure for funding under the CDF

In developing proposals and before selecting a proposed project, more attention needs to be paid to a correct definition of the problem and a more complete examination of a range of alternative solutions Fire management projects, for example, are risky because the technology is demanding and the effectiveness of fire control (as opposed to the management of risk) is not easy to demonstrate

Community-based ecotourism investments have high potential returns but are also high risk because of market uncertainty and management failure In addition, the tourism proposals under consideration for infrastructure grants are more suited to credit activities and reveal unacceptable weakness in basic business planning and financial feasibility analysis Moreover, business enterprises should only be funded through a grant mechanism where a credit alternative can be implemented Seemingly more appropriate would be business-related grants for feasibility studies, rural zoning studies that might, for example, make a tourism venture involving the viewing of game viable, or business-related training or other work that would improve the context for natural resource enterprises The proposed grants for fencing should be subjected to rigorous social, economic, technological, and sustainability analyses prior to funding, so as to avoid the abandonment and/or lack of maintenance observed at some locations or the construction of functional but counterproductive and inappropriate interventions

Recommendation

Solicit a major infusion of assistance in the development of infrastructure grant proposals from private sector businesses and technological consultants, who can design projects that have the best possible chance of success Increased support for technical assistance for sound infrastructural projects could be provided by using NRMP II to fund further staff and some related support at a competent technical organization such as WWF Its expertise could help the RDCs and communities develop worthy proposals, although the process could be lengthy because it should involve community participation Communities must pay for these services with assistance or other funds (including those accessed through the CDF under the recommended provision for grant development funds)

Allowance could be made for project development grants to the RDCs, but with the proviso that these projects would be developed with consultations from the village level upwards

Evaluation Issue Empowering Local Communities* by *Raising Village and Ward Capacity -- the ZimTrust

Despite some of the concerns noted about the CDF activities, the CDF monies have made the RDCs more active partners in the effort to bring CF to the wards and villages In most cases this has meant that RDCs have looked to existing CCG members for support Among the CAMPFIRE CCG members, the ZimTrust has, since 1988, been working the most directly with local communities at the village and ward levels The purpose of this involvement, as well as with the RDCs, is to develop a capacity for management and decision-making for sustainable NRM, particularly wildlife management, with the intent of helping people realize maximum benefits from the resources on their lands

Findings

The ZimTrust was established as a charity in the United Kingdom soon after Zimbabwe's independence and was registered in Zimbabwe as a Welfare Organization The ZimTrust has been receiving USAID support since December 1989 and depends on USAID for 75% of its funding Current funding runs only through September 1998, and its future in CAMPFIRE is "uncertain," according to ZimTrust management

ZimTrust's objectives are the "relief of poverty and the improvement in the quality of life" of the poor in Zimbabwe Its policy is to support "the development of representative community-based institutions of an economic nature " The focus has been on the communal areas and on support for institutional development at the village and ward levels, especially to help facilitate organizational and management capacity and a capacity to manage financial resources and run projects

Box 6 USAID Funding to the ZimTrust under NRMP I and II (US$)

1989-1992		2,706,000
1st Amend	(- 1993)	768,800
2nd Amend	(- 1994)	50,000
3rd Amend	(- 1995)	325,000
4th Amend	(- 1995)	3,390,412
5th Amend	(- 1997)	1,197,016

ZimTrust initially began its CAMPFIRE involvement by providing services to the Guruve and Nyaminyami Districts and later to four districts in Matabeleland as a pilot project Currently, ZimTrust is obligated under NRMP II to provide services to all RDCs and other support agencies It seeks to benefit rural communities through institutional development, training, and advisory services to enable them to use their natural resources in a sustainable manner and to manage the income derived from such use The range of services include assisting in training for the wildlife monitors, development of infrastructure (e g , electric fences and watering points), training and technical assistance for area managers in the districts, necessary vehicles, radios, office equipment, etc , the involvement of women in wildlife production and management, conservation education and training for schools and communities, and development of wildlife and development curriculum and material for secondary schools

In terms of field operations, the ZimTrust facilitated establishment of the CAMPFIRE committees under the CA umbrella, those members are democratically elected at the village, ward, and district levels It has provided for USAID-funded infrastructure for the RDCs to work in, as well as for training for all committees on the organization and management of the Programme-- tendering, marketing their safari area, setting quotas, and the functional skills needed to manage a business It has helped the communities invest their money in social and income-generating projects

In many ways, it can be said that it was ZimTrust that effectively operationalized CAMPFIRE at the village, ward, and district levels through its early capacity-building support. It took the early risk of pushing the new idea of decentralization at a time when the local levels were just beginning to think about it ZimTrust has been involved with conflict resolution and confidence- and awareness-building

at all levels within the CAMPFIRE Districts in which it intervenes It has provided a great deal of the support needed to help local people see the direct links between wildlife and their needs

ZimTrust's work "on the ground" with the RDCs is generally well-received Based on the team's field interviews with people trained by the ZimTrust, it appears the training was useful and appropriate Evaluation team interviews with ZimTrust field managers confirmed that they were conversant about CAMPFIRE and the program's objectives CA management readily acknowledges that ZimTrust does very good work in the field, and it relies on the ZimTrust to deliver much of CAMPFIRE's essential services to the RDCs, wards, and villages

ZimTrust is promoting a number of changes in CAMPFIRE One is to push NRM and control below the RDC level It believes that the CAMPFIRE philosophy can be fully realized only as control of these resources takes root in the wards, especially the villages, where people have the most direct stake in sustainable wildlife management Villagers have to experience the CAMPFIRE dividends directly for the philosophy to be realized It believes CDF money should be spread out over a longer period of time It would like to see greater attention paid to building stronger *regional* CAMPFIRE constituencies It believes that if the regions were able to employ their own people and were capable of coordinating their own programs, submitting proposals, bringing in the people they need for their own particular problems (and cutting out the current bureaucracy), the Programme would begin to move more rapidly

To measure and monitor capacity, institutional development, and sustainability, the ZimTrust developed a Process Oriented Monitoring System (POMS) instrument and process, which it is applying in a number of CAMPFIRE wards It has also been responsible for putting into place, with much effort, a village to ward to district-level system that communities can apply in determining how they would like to use CDF funds, leading to the development of ideas and culminating in proposals being sent to the CA and IC for evaluation and funding

Conclusions

ZimTrust has an excellent on-the-ground field presence and provides needed services very effectively The CA and other CCG members see it as effective in providing services in the field For its part, ZimTrust is critical of some other CCG members, which sometimes impedes effective collaboration In addition, by virtue of making its own direct grants and sub-contracts, ZimTrust operates differently from other CCG grantees This distinction gives the appearance of a hierarchy in the importance of CCG partners that is unnecessary and inappropriate to the collegial nature of the CCG

The POMS system ZimTrust uses is methodologically and practically questionable It is a very cumbersome instrument, requiring considerable in-field judgement (permitting unacceptable inter-coder error) and the application of non-transparent response scaling procedures That said, it represents the major tool and effort to monitor and to determine institutional development within CAMPFIRE

Recommendations

ZimTrust should develop, in collaboration with the CA and concerned RDCs, an exit plan for the specific activities it is currently working on with the RDCs through NRMP II It should develop new activities in conjunction with other donor funds or partnerships, or even through community support in accessing future CDF funding

The project agreement should be amended to extend the timeframe of ZimTrust's involvement in NRMP II Given its excellent support to CAMPFIRE in both Phases I and II of the NRMP, and the regional placement of its personnel, the ZimTrust is uniquely positioned to achieve field-level results

Continued funding for the ZimTrust should be channeled through the IC, as is currently done with the other CCG CAMPFIRE partners This recommendation in no way reflects negatively on ZimTrust's capacity to manage and report on USAID funds, something it has done in an excellent manner and in full compliance with the intent and requirements of the contract The reasons have more to do with creating a perception that USAID is treating the CCG partners equitably in its funding and with improving relationships within the CCG and between USAID and all its grantees This step will also enable all CCG partners to move toward a USAID graduation and closeout plan under the same parameters

Evaluation Issue Reaching Communities through Public Education -- ACTION

Findings

ACTION Magazine, an affiliate of ART, was established in Harare in 1987 (see Box) It began participating in CAMPFIRE in the first phase of the NRMP project and has expanded its activities to include information, communication, and training and environmental education linked to CBNRM It has had experience operating similar activities in the wider Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region Under NRMP II, ACTION has been operating as a subcontractor to the ZimTrust under a grant It sees its role as performing outreach within the CAMPFIRE Districts

Box 7 ACTION's Overall Aim

Increased awareness of environmental education with a focus on CBNRM

ACTION's 1997-98 workplan responds to the needs of CAMPFIRE communities as perceived both directly and indirectly through the input of youth, teachers, extension agents, and the professional RDC staff, as well as other agencies supporting CAMPFIRE The plan sets forth five outputs

(1) Effective project management and increased implementation capacity,

(2) Educational materials relating to the environment and health, to be provided to all CAMPFIRE district schools,

(3) Appropriate and relevant secondary curricula and educational materials that link with and reinforce CBNRM within CAMPFIRE districts,

(4) Improved teaching and learning about the environment within the CAMPFIRE districts' schools and colleges, and

(5) Links among schools and their communities with reference to CBNRM

A number of sources viewed ACTION's performance as effective and supportive of the CAMPFIRE Programme The recent NRMP II planning workshop noted that Action " can now provide adequate services to 12 RDCs that have CDF funding in place " (NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop Report, August 1997) Interviews with members of the CCG elicited favorable assessments of ACTION's work for CAMPFIRE Teachers and school staff were active and involved in the program's field activities In a region where materials for rural classrooms are extremely limited, ACTION has become a greatly sought-after medium for communicating environmental and health issues relevant to rural communities It has been estimated that 25% of Zimbabwe's rural children in grades six and seven gain hands-on experience with *ACTION Magazine* Seventy percent of Zimbabwe's rural teachers were reported as having access to *ACTION Magazine* in sufficient numbers to make its use viable in their schools (Russel & Murrey, 1993 1,2)

The evaluation team visited ACTION's offices in Harare, talked with the director and staff, observed various aspects of the operation, examined its project review reports (e g , ACTION, Quarterly Narrative Report, December 1997-February 1998), and reviewed its published materials The team verified that *ACTION Magazine* "also assists CCG members and other program participants in developing program communication methods and materials (publications, newsletters, flipcharts, posters, handbooks, and public relations materials) At the RDC level, ACTION trains District officers and community representatives in environmental education and related topics " (CAMPFIRE Customer Service Plan, 1997 8)

At the same time, ACTION suffers from serious capacity constraints, most likely linked to the extensive scope of its outreach, which includes the SADC countries of Namibia, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana, as well as Zimbabwe

Conclusions

The ACTION organization is very clear about its objectives, strengths, and limitations and has a viable plan for achieving its mission of CAMPFIRE support It shows evidence of being well-managed and realistic in its outreach ACTION has the capacity to produce very user-friendly materials on policy dialogue for target audiences, it has a good sense of what will be easily understood and digested, and its materials are professionally prepared and disseminated

Action staff appear to have a solid understanding of the CAMPFIRE principles and how to communicate them to diverse audiences ACTION can provide materials for Programme advocacy

All of ACTION's core funding comes from the ZimTrust under the NRMP II project Management is aware of the danger of dependence on one donor and is actively pursuing other sources of funding

The evaluation team concluded that ACTION is doing a good job and is a very valuable resource for CAMPFIRE It sees ACTION as an excellent CAMPFIRE resource for communicating policy changes to rural school children across the country

Recommendation

Continue ACTION's role in CAMPFIRE, with particular reference to supporting the CCG (with materials) and Ministry of Education involvement in policy dialogue and program advocacy

Evaluation Issue Social and Economic Impact of NRMP II and CAMPFIRE Activities. *"To what extent is NRMP-II (and CAMPFIRE, in general) continuing to provide meaningful benefits to participating communities? What if anything, should be done to augment NRMP-II and CAMPFIRE* ***benefits to and impacts on producer communities?"*** *(Emphasis added) (SOW, A1)*

Findings

CAMPFIRE has championed the concept of directing trophy hunting fees to local populations Safari operators are well-organized private sector groups, some of whom have excellent connections all over the world In 1995 these operations generated over US$1,600,000 in revenue from leases with the RDCs for access to communal lands Of that, initially the RDCs devolved between 50% and 80% to local communities at the ward and village levels Other districts have become interested in this approach, as have adjacent countries facing similar wildlife/human competition for limited resources These successes are directly attributable to the CAMPFIRE movement

CAMPFIRE continues to generate meaningful benefits for participating communities receiving wildlife dividends, despite some problems associated with the RDCs' practices in wildlife-rich Districts devolving dividends to producer communities Some US$1,090,362 were generated during FY1996 alone, of which about half found its way, in one form or another, to communities below the Rural District level The ripple effects of this much money, turned over and over, on these local rural economies are impossible to quantify, but must be dramatic Thus, CAMPFIRE is already an important motor for economic development

Nevertheless, the team found, as have others, that while non-consumptive resource utilization such as ecotourism and photo-safaris have produced significant revenue increases over the past few years within CAMPFIRE districts, little is channeled *directly* to local producer communities In some cases, the RDCs have kept the funds for their own use, noting, however, that they generally apply them for the "common good," since "not all district wards can benefit from their 'own' wildlife resources" In other cases, the private sector captures essentially all revenues As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the CA has made commercial gain from game viewing and cultural tourism a priority for the Programme, and communities are pressing for change The ZIMSUN hotel

agreement with the Mahenye community offers a measure of optimism for the broader CAMPFIRE effort

In the case of the extensive, privately owned commercial farms and game ranches found within many districts, neither the RDCs nor the producer communities benefit from any kind of levy on the wildlife utilization taking place Private wildlife conservancies present a more mixed picture, with potential for outgrowing (e g , ostriches in SAVE) and ecotourism spinoffs (e g , Malilangwe in SAVE) At the same time, these private properties are important sources of employment, although estimates of the amount of employment were not available

Initially, as noted, member households in the producer communities wanted to get their dividends in cash However, once the total dividend due a ward was divided into equal shares, in many modestly endowed wards it became clear the individual household might get no more than Z$10-116 -- less than US$1-$9 This prompted the households to decide that it would be better to combine their common funds for larger activities Many useful community projects that otherwise would have gone without financing have been funded in this way Moreover, although US$9 may not soundlike much, in the poorer communal areas cash is only a small part of the rural economy Such sums are sufficient to cover critical grain shortfalls or purchase necessary supplies or pay for the services of grinding mills Moreover, WWF studies show that the habitat that supplies CAMPFIRE revenues also leads to significant non-CAMPFIRE benefits as well Finally, recent World Bank data quantify the limited role played by cash in communal areas, placing average per capita income between US$21-$34

The process of determining what to use the revenues for is dynamic The RDCs ask local communities for a list of activities on which they wish to spend their (ward) dividends In some Districts, the RDCs "accept" all proposals for the use of producer community dividends, in others, they play a stronger role in influencing ward proposals, suggesting alternatives such as social projects This system has led to a healthy and growing debate on the use of such funds (see the case of the Gwanda District presented in Appendix F)

As far as how the dividends are actually used, according to CA records on current fiscal year USAID NRMP II grant funding, 12 RDCs *already* pay the full cost of the minimum number of CAMPFIRE staff (a CAMPFIRE coordinator, game scouts, and game guards) and operation costs -- and should be considered "graduated" (see Table 2) District wildlife revenues range from a low of Z$110,000 (US$7,300) in Mudzi to a high of Z$4,462,000 (about US$300,000) in Nyaminyami One Rural District with over Z$1,319,000 in wildlife revenues used USAID NRMP II money to pay for its CAMPFIRE coordinator, game scouts, and expenses

Local communities are using the benefits from CAMPFIRE natural resource dividends for a wide range of activities Heading the list are social infrastructure development projects, examples being roofing materials for a teacher's cottage, a typewriter for a school, paint for schools, school furniture (tables and chairs), rehabilitation of a dam, construction of primary schools, with homes for teachers, construction of health clinics, rehabilitation of irrigation, construction of a ward-level administrative building, cattle dip pens, poultry production, and sewing clubs

The team observed that village-level purchases of grinding mills have also been popular They permit local people to grind their corn into flour without the heavy labor of pounding it Such mills can be seen as a way to redistribute the benefits of the wildlife revenue to the poor, who are the most in need not only of such a labor-saving device, but also of a mill that runs at below normal costs The team noted such a communal village mill, paid for out of wildlife revenue, in Beitbridge There the dividends only covered the cost of the fuel and the salary of the miller The overhead costs for the building and replacement parts were not included in the price of sales, suggesting a role for micro-enterprise advisory services

Conclusions

Rural communities in the CAMPFIRE Districts are receiving significant benefits from the return of wildlife dividends and from the capacity-building they have received through training, awareness raising, and other field-level institutional development One of the most important impacts of CAMPFIRE and NRMP II support has been the building of local concepts about local governance, ownership, and management of the local communities' natural resources These successes will have long-term implications for the country as the ideas continue to work their way through society

Records suggest that annual CAMPFIRE revenue of Z$500,000 or more should be adequate for RDCs to fund the CAMPFIRE staff costs out of their wildlife revenue share (currently as much as 50%)

Recommendations

Capacity-building should continue to be supported at the district, ward, and village levels, with priority given to the latter The focus should be on wards and Districts that have identified "new" NRM ventures whose development needs support That is, NRMP II CDF funds need to be targeted toward helping local communities "with a good idea" for a new NRM venture obtain financial support to develop the ideas into a project proposal that can be submitted to a local bank or other institution for funding The priority for such ventures should be the wards in CAMPFIRE Districts that currently are not benefiting from significant wildlife dividends

Where significant CAMPFIRE dividends are being received at the ward level, NRMP II support should be targeted toward looking closely at the issues involved in assuring the long-term availability of this resource The CA and others should focus every effort on providing the means to protect these resources, including the authority to limit in-migration

Future funding for capacity-building with the RDCs should not cover the salaries of CAMPFIRE staff if the RDCs can be expected to cover them themselves

3 Building a Capability for Improved Natural Resource Management

Evaluation Issue Protection and Management of Wildlife Populations and Habitat. *Quota-setting as an essential component of sustainable consumptive utilization of wildlife*

Findings

In CAMPFIRE areas, quota-setting is a participatory effort conducted at annual workshops and involve various stakeholders, such as representatives of communities in wildlife-producing areas, safari operators, and the DNPWLM The DNPWLM, WWF, and ZimTrust assist the efforts of participants with instructional workshops and meetings, employing user-friendly manuals and visual aids Information from stakeholder groups, aerial surveys, ground counts (where they exist), and previous quotas and hunt return forms (including the monitoring of trophy sizes) are brought together through a "triangulation process " The data are used to propose quotas for hunted species in each District WWF's Resource Management Support to CAMPFIRE Project (SUPCAMP) and ZimTrust/WWF/SCI also support the program for quota-setting, providing essential training and facilitation These efforts are critical to the quota-setting in CAMPFIRE areas

In some areas, the setting of quotas generates considerable debate Some stakeholders at the ward and District levels feel the quotas should be higher than what other stakeholders recommend In the end, the DNPWLM reviews, comments on, and approves the proposed quotas for application in each District A continuing trend toward devolution of quota-setting tot the ward level is, however, apparent

With respect to the actual hunting itself, DNPWLM regulations require that professional hunters complete 11 different forms The hunters claim that there is redundancy and irrelevant information on the forms that leads them to believe that the forms are an unnecessary bureaucratic exercise Because the hunters doubt the relevance of the forms, they attempt to avoid filling them out, which promotes non-compliance and the potential for corruption

The law does not require completion and submission of the CA/RDC hunt record designed by the WWF Voluntary compliance is increasing but has not yet reached 100% As a result, it is likely important data are missed, and other abuses are able to enter the system Some observers within the DNPWLM state that the hunting quotas are not exceeded and that the quotas for elephant and buffalo are filled in most areas of the country However, this information is not always reflected in the hunt report forms The fill rates for the quotas for lions and leopards are estimated at 75% (Appendix L)

The DNPWLM is taking remedial steps to address the deficiencies in the hunt reporting system Statutory Instrument 26 of 1998 contains a revised version of the problematic NP-9 form that now must be completed This change will permit the capture of important data that may previously have been lost because of non-compliance with the voluntary CA/District hunt return form Still more progress is needed, however, particularly in terms of streamlining the reporting requirements, which may be somewhat improved by the development of (1) the new forms, (2) a revision of Statutory

Instrument 26-98, and (3) a new quota-setting guide The quota-setting guide, which is currently being prepared, is intended to provide wildlife managers with information on techniques, harvesting strategies, and the potential dangers of poor quota management

An important issue that needs attention is the potential for induced genetic drift because of excessive selective hunting and poaching, as this practice may affect the value and genetic integrity of the hunted species Excessive selective off-take of members of a breeding population of animals containing a particular trait may have adverse effects on the frequency of the appearance of that trait in future generations With safari hunting, the trait is usually trophy size (e g , horn length or tusk weight) Although genetics, food quality, availability, and the age of the animal influence trophy size, monitoring trophy size is a good indicator of the appropriateness of the quotas and hunting offtake (in terms of maintaining trophy size) However, monitoring trophy size does not necessarily indicate the effects of selective hunting on the genetic composition of the exploited species

Trophies are measured and recorded using the Rowland-Ward system in most places, but the SCI system is gaining acceptance and may become the dominant one The manner in which trophies are measured has relevance to the selection pressure on trophy animals Using the example of the African buffalo, if the trophy measurement uses only the length of horns from tip to tip, then killing bulls in the prime of life would be favored Because wear at the tips of the horn is greater than horn growth in older bulls, their trophies lose tip to tip distance and become less desirable as they age If, however, the size and/or weight of the horn bosses are included in the trophy record, which continue to increase in older bulls, trophies from these older bulls become more valuable to hunters This would promote trophy hunting of older bulls, which are thought to be less important in the breeding process, rather than prime bulls, which account for the majority of mating in breeding herds In the case of the common eland, females may have longer (but thinner) horns than males A measure that counts horn length, but not thickness at the base, which is usually larger for males, actually favors shooting females to obtain maximum trophy size, which would also decrease the number of mating animals in a herd

Conclusions

Although it is desirable to devolve most of the responsibility for quota-setting to the districts and wards containing wildlife, other stakeholders still have important roles to play WWF has a great deal of expertise that is essential to the scientific setting of quotas, and the DNPWLM has the ability to view larger issues such as movements of game animals locally, between districts, and internationally

If the present quota-setting system is properly executed, it appears it is adequate for most species, even while constantly undergoing adjustment and refinement Improvements in ground and aerial counts and environmental monitoring will enhance the informational base used to produce quotas and carry out other management efforts An updated and accessible database from the DNPWLM's NP-9 form should provide better information

Hunting offtake is relatively conservative for the most part, but may be reaching a plateau in some places The quotas and levels of hunting need continuous re-examination as part of an adaptive management system

Recommendations

Continue promoting better compliance by professional safari operators in accurately completing both the mandatory and voluntary hunt return forms The percentage of elephant and buffalo reported is relatively high (see Table 15 in Appendix L) A simple study should be conducted to profile which professional hunters fill out the forms and which do not A better understanding of the trends relating to completion of the form would help improve compliance and interpretation of the WWF database WWF should create an additional page in the database manual to explain the variables used

Adopt a trophy record system that favors the selection of older male animals, rather than prime males or females Use of qualitative rather than exclusively quantitative measures would favor this change, which the GOZ and NGO conservation agencies should encourage

Continue with the present methodology of quota-setting This must be done within a better-defined policy atmosphere regarding problem animal control (PAC) and its inclusion in approved hunting quotas (see PAC comments)

Evaluation Issue SUPCAMP *The need for participatory resource surveys, land use plans, resource management options, and monitoring techniques that can be accomplished at district, ward, and village levels in a manner consistent with CAMPFIRE principles and field activities*

Findings

Although land-use planning and local resource management are closely linked, CAMPFIRE has addressed this important NRM planning combination to only a limited extent WWF's SUPCAMP, with funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), is providing essential services in support of CAMPFIRE that are beginning to address this issue SUPCAMP works with selected rural communities in the Zambezi valley to develop, implement, and test, in a participatory manner, resource surveys, land-use plans, resource management options, and monitoring techniques that can be adopted and sustained at the ward and village levels Project implementation began in September 1993, and the final project report was due March 31, 1998 ZimTrust, RDCs, and The DNPWLM have undertaken other small initiatives Some of the new partners (DNR, FC, and SAFIRE) are bringing needed skills to the CCG in this area (This issue and the potential contribution of these new CCG members are discussed further in Section IV B)

The evaluation team attended a SUPCAMP workshop, interviewed participants, and reviewed documentation Recent technical reports discuss project outputs and comment on progress in three selected districts (Gokwe North, Guruve and Nyaminyami) For example

- SUPCAMP has completed wildlife-related land-use planning exercises in all three districts Although in general communities view land-use planning negatively, villagers in all three project areas, which face serious land-use pressures, have found that planning can help minimize conflicts

- In the North Gokwe and Negande areas, SUPCAMP has identified some management options, including safari hunting, problem animal management, and game fence management In Mazoe, safari hunting, fence management, fire management, and water management systems are in place Non-consumptive tourism, project planning and development, and financial planning, and budgeting are being developed in all three areas

- All three areas have at least three monitoring systems in place problem animal reporting, fence monitoring, and hunt return analyses, and financial monitoring is under way in all three areas Analyses of animal numbers, abundance, trophy quality, hunt effort, and poaching are monitored and evaluated for use in the annual quota-setting

- Five training manuals on various aspects of wildlife management have been produced, distributed, and tested, with funds from the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and SCI Subjects include problem animal reporting, electric fence projects, marketing of safari hunting, safari hunting, and quota-setting

- SUPCAMP staff have contributed to the development of M&E methodologies for CAMPFIRE and by extension for NRMP II Monitoring of sport hunting will be a component of these procedures, as will the SUPCAMP financial/economic monitoring and the NRMP II-funded Multi-Species Project (MAPS) aerial surveys

Conclusions

The SUPCAMP project is well-designed and documented Its structure and execution, which are based on participatory activities, are constantly undergoing re-examination and modification, based on experience and observation, in keeping with adaptive management principles SUPCAMP activities have focused on three CAMPFIRE areas that are fairly representative of other ones with considerable wildlife resource potential The techniques being perfected in these well-studied areas may then be applied to other areas as they express a need and support becomes available

Recommendations

WWF should promote the SUPCAMP approach within CAMPFIRE but not at the expense of perfecting it in the pilot areas Because it is a demand-driven service, continue to inform the districts and wards of the range and utility of SUPCAMP activities Doing so may allow other CAMPFIRE areas to benefit from the project, which may be expanded appropriately as funding and institutional capacity permit

USAID and the CA, through the CDF, should assure continued funding of this critical component, as the funds from CAMPFIRE revenues may not be adequate to support it Use NRMP II funding to complement, not replace, other donor funding Consider whether the regional RCSA might contribute to this area (see Section III B 3 g)

Evaluation Issue Problem Animal Reporting and Control

Although zebra, buffalo, and other ungulates can be involved, most of the problem animals are elephants that raid fields in the wet season when the crops are nearing maturity Some stakeholders at the ward/village levels complain that baboons cause considerable damage and that professional hunters and their clients do little to help because baboons are not of interest as a game species Buffalo are believed to be carriers of foot and mouth disease, and considerable measures (fencing and culling) have been taken to separate them from livestock WWF has developed a consultant study of this problem

Findings

Policy Issues PAC is an important issue to CAMPFIRE because of its impact on villagers' attitudes toward wildlife conservation and its direct effects on animal populations It poses a challenge to CAMPFIRE stakeholders and is a complex subject that is constantly being debated at various levels Theoretically, no PAC should be necessary within 5 km of the boundaries of the National Parks because the law forbids settlement in this zone However, some areas around the parks have settlements up to the park boundaries, and these areas are highly prone to disturbance by animals

There is considerable variation in how problem animals are treated from place to place and over time In some areas, responses by the DNPWLM to problem animal reports have been less than adequate In other areas, the wildlife monitors employed by the RDCs, in concert with agents from the wildlife department, deal effectively with them Some RDCs have instituted effective systems to compensate residents of wards containing wildlife for losses to their crops and/or livestock It is thought that this policy promotes positive attitudes toward living with wildlife in communal areas Other districts prefer not to offer compensation for losses to avoid potential abuse of the system

Some Department officials have stated that the Rural Districts are responsible for preventing animal problems from getting to the point where the animals must be killed, but this goal is not always adequately accomplished These officials also stress that the DNPWLM will authorize the killing of problem animals only when they exceed the district's annual quota, but any animal below the agreed upon quota can be shot either as a trophy animal by a hunter or as a PAC, a matter the Rural Districts have the power to decide

Some DNPWLM officials express concern that a potential for abuse exists whereby aspiring professional hunters attempt to shoot animals under the guise of the PAC to meet their licensing requirement of having participated in five hunts of dangerous game Some officials support a ban on shooting trophy animals as PAC to avoid potential abuse

WWF strategy suggests that a PAC agent should be hired at times of the year when problems are likely and that the wet season PAC should be marketed as part of the district's quota It is emphasized that a reduction of the PAC quota may increase community revenue, and if an agreement with a safari operator can be reached, the PAC agent can transfer the revenue from the marketed PAC hunt directly to the VIDEO that suffered the crop or stock losses

The DNPWLM ended the prior PAC quota because of abuses Current department policy requires that problem animal complaints be directed to the DNPWLM Provincial Warden, who may choose to allow District officials to handle a certain situation and/or may dispatch an agent to observe the process

Administrative Issues Reporting of problem animals by some wildlife-containing districts to Harare is adequate, but in others, the levels of reporting are less than desirable WWF has developed a problem animal report form (PAR F1), a reaction request form (PAC F2), and a PAC report form (PAC F3) to capture information and communicate need SUPCAMP teaches problem animal reporting and has developed a handbook to assist people in dealing with problem animals

Implementation Issues Often the standard means of frightening offending animals (e g , noise, lights, fire, or shooting over the backs of crop-raiding animals) eventually prove insufficient to prevent a recurrence Research to develop non-lethal ways (e g , use of irritant spray and acoustic systems) to deter elephants is underway in Zimbabwe, and preliminary results are promising

In North Gokwe in the late 1980s, approximately 44 problem animals per year were reported shot After inception of WWF's efforts to improve problem animal reporting and offer other management possibilities, in 1992 the total decreased to 3 animals shot for control, and in 1993 2 animals Many observers view this tendency as evidence of the potential to minimize problem animal conflict if available strategies are adopted (However, it should also be noted that animal populations in general decreased at that time because of a serious drought)

Conclusions

Problem animal reporting and control are important issues that can either promote the goals of wildlife conservation or demoralize people who are subject to wildlife-induced life or property loss Similarly, it can reinforce or undermine Appropriate Authority

The extent and nature of the problem are often the result of increasing human settlement and subsistence agriculture, particularly in places where elephants traditionally move during wet season migrations or during times of environmental stress Improved land-use planning and effective district or ward by-laws may be effective tools in minimizing such conflict

Progress is being made in dealing with problem animals in most areas This is particularly important in light of the inherent increase in human-wildlife conflict as human populations grow and wildlife habitats diminish WWF's efforts to promote enhanced problem animal reporting and awareness of

alternatives to shooting are effective in many areas and have the potential to help in others Workshops, information manuals, and discussions of problems encountered by the various wildlife wards are employed to exchange information and provide feedback for an adaptive management strategy of dealing with problem animals and human-wildlife conflict

Recommendations

Support more research into non-lethal means of PAC, such as using recorded sounds and improved delivery systems for irritant sprays This is a logical area in which animal welfare groups can make a constructive contribution to the people-wildlife issues in Zimbabwe

The CA and DNPWLM should jointly sponsor a workshop that encourages local involvement in PAC Formal meetings of the various stakeholders should be held to discuss and resolve the problem of unclear or inconsistent policy regarding PAC

The DNPWLM should institute a legal requirement that problem animal reports be completed and give the responsible parties in each Appropriate Authority compliance training The DNPWLM can spot check conditions surrounding the shooting of problem animals, particularly elephants and lions, and particularly in areas where abuses are suspected

Conduct more research into settlement planning on communal lands that have problem animal conflicts Although difficult to accomplish in a practical sense, land-use planning and properly designed and maintained wildlife fences can provide effective long-term solutions to PAC

Have the CCG examine the SUPCAMP results for possible application in other areas habitat monitoring, monitoring of lesser game, and resource conflict resolution These are key areas for all CAMPFIRE communities WWF should systematically engage in training in these areas, coordinating the effort with new partners who bring overlapping expertise

Evaluation Issue Electric Wildlife Fence Projects (Ecological and Practical Considerations)

Findings

In some CAMPFIRE areas, human-wildlife conflicts are serious threats to crops, livestock, and positive attitudes among villagers regarding wildlife The trend toward increasing human settlement in some areas brings with it increased risk of problem animal incidents Research by WWF and others indicates that fences, if properly studied, designed, and maintained, can be an effective management option for reducing human-wildlife conflicts This is important to a program such as CAMPFIRE, which relies on the good will of villagers living in close contact with wildlife

Many villagers and district officials interviewed in the field feel that electric fences are the best solution to PAC However, they often complain about delays in getting approval for proposals for fences under current CAMPFIRE procedures The CA appears to be a vocal advocate for building

fences in affected districts Some areas have effective electric fence projects, such as that carried out by the Mastiche Ward Wildlife Committee (with NRMP I funding) Fence menders are employed under CAMPFIRE to inspect and repair electric fences The WWF's project training manuals and workshops provide CAMPFIRE stakeholders with valuable information about the financial, practical, and ecological considerations of fences

The downside to fencing is that large-scale fencing is expensive, occasions the most environmental change, and is least likely to be maintained without subsidy Elephants often learn how to avoid or knock down fences, rendering them ineffective, and electric fences are not effective against some nuisance animals that are small and able to burrow under them (e g , porcupines, spotted hyenas, and warthogs) Other animals are able to go over the fences (e g , baboons and vervet monkeys) Some fences are poorly designed, patrolled, and maintained Electric fences are ineffective unless the necessary degree of care is taken to keep them intact and operational This work is often arduous and requires an a priori understanding by the communities as well as a realistic commitment of manpower and funds to accomplish

Because of difficulties in the proposal writing process and, in some cases, insufficient study of design considerations, no new fences have been built under NRMP II

Conclusions

Electric wildlife fences are expensive in comparison to the damage elephants do to crops Moreover, although the technology is simple, the fences require rigorous study and design, and elements of the fencing systems are vulnerable to theft and damage Inadequately designed fences may have negative effects on elephant migrations, which are necessary to the well-being of herds, particularly in times of nutritional and water stress If a fence cuts across wildlife migration routes, its location may cause long-term management problems It is not always clear that communities have the ability and willingness to maintain electric fences once in place The evaluation team observed a number of broken down or poorly maintained fences Finally, electric fences and PAC treat the symptoms of problem conditions and not the root causes, such as habitat loss and fragmentation, competition for space, inadequate land-use planning and settlement policy, and climatic stress

Recommendation

The key ingredients of successful design and implementation of electric fences as a management practice need to be studied Caution should continue to be exercised in authorizing new fence projects and in promoting fences as a panacea for human-wildlife conflicts Avoid building unrealistic expectations on the part of villagers that will ultimately prove negative to the CAMPFIRE Programme

Evaluation Issue Ecological Monitoring of Wildlife and Habitat -- Aerial Surveys of Wildlife Populations

Findings

Aerial surveys are essential to wildlife management in the National Parks, parks estates, and CAMPFIRE areas In the case of elephants, the surveys provide data on the numbers, distribution, and movements of elephants and are essential to quota-setting and other wildlife management considerations The surveys are also somewhat useful for buffalo, although the clumped distribution of this species often leads to extremely wide confidence intervals Their application to smaller species, such as impala, is very limited using current statistical analysis methods

At the same time, aerial surveys are time-consuming (accounting for up to an estimated half of the principal WWF pilot's time on an annual basis), dangerous (a crew was lost in 1994), and physically punishing (long hours of flight and cabin temperatures sometimes reaching 52° C) They were once the responsibility of the DNPWLM, but its ability to provide aircraft and pilots has diminished considerably because of damaged/lost equipment and staffing constraints (as noted in the DNPWLM reports) The WWF team has assumed much of the responsibility of late, particularly in the CAMPFIRE areas, but the effort is still collaborative, involving personnel from both WWF and The DNPWLM The surveys are a burden for WWF, however, and its staff argue that, under present circumstances, the "only sustainable option is to encourage NGOs, The DNPWLM, and RDCs to subcontract this service to the private sector "

Conclusions

The evaluation team concurs with an analysis by Dr Ian Douglas-Hamilton of the current aerial survey techniques and data, done in the run-up to the CITES convention in 1997 He concluded that the system was an effective means of providing data for management of Zimbabwe's elephants, stating that Zimbabwe possesses "one of the best sets of elephant data in the world " Currently, however, the DNPWLM does not have the capacity to conduct extensive aerial surveys Resumption of this responsibility would allow it to fulfill its mandate on a national level A study to determine the feasibility of establishing an Aerial Survey Specialist Unit within the DNPWLM may be desirable

Some of the new statistical methods for treating aerial survey data (i e , Unsworth et al , 1994) might be appropriate for Zimbabwe They involve using an index to correct for the differential visibility of certain species in various habitats and cover types Any modification of the statistical analysis or survey techniques must, however, be made in such a way that the newly-acquired data and analyses are comparable to the existing aerial survey database Similarly, other new technologies, such as GPS-referenced digital aerial videography, might be appropriate and would provide a greater range of options for dealing effectively with the growing need for expanded and more precise coverage, particularly for smaller species (e g , greater kudu and impala)

Recommendations

The status of the Cessna 206 purchased under NRMP I should be pursued to secure a replacement aircraft as soon as possible The condition of the two Cessna 336 aircraft the United States gave the DNPWLM should be evaluated and their potential for remote sensing of environmental and habitat conditions and use for the CAMPFIRE aerial surveys assessed In the short term, USAID should continue supporting WWF efforts to meet CAMPFIRE's aerial survey needs

The applicability of the recently developed statistical methods and technologies for use in aerial surveys in Zimbabwe should be assessed

Evaluation Issue Wildlife Habitat Evaluation and Monitoring

Findings

The loss and fragmentation of wildlife habitat are the most serious threat to conservation in Zimbabwe The ecosystems around the protected areas are becoming fragmented because of a number of factors, including population growth, poverty, unequal representation, inadequate planning strategies, and compromised market systems (Metcalfe 1995) Unfortunately, once an area has been associated with some form of human-specified use, it becomes increasingly difficult to allocate the land to more restrictive patterns of use, such as those dictated by wildlife management (Guyer and Richards 1996) The underlying causes of human-wildlife conflicts are habitat loss and fragmentation, increasing human populations in rural areas, competition for space and natural resources between humans and wildlife, poor or no land-use planning and settlement policy, and climatic stress These problems are likely to continue throughout the country unless steps are taken to deal with them

Metcalfe (1995) made some general recommendations for CAMPFIRE regarding the importance of considering physical realities (forage, variation in stocking rates, competition with livestock, and the fragmentation of ecosystems) in designing management systems However, as is the case with the community-based conservation programs in Zambia, no organization is conducting extensive analyses of the ecological impacts of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe (Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1995) Although various stakeholders gather data on biological systems and the physical environment, no one is systematically monitoring habitat changes across the whole country or even across the CAMPFIRE areas The money to do so for CAMPFIRE is, however, available

The DNPWLM has shelved its previous plans to do this monitoring WWF is currently planning to help CAMPFIRE examine the options to meet this need The parties have agreed to the terms of reference for an expert consultancy and are waiting to carry them out Coordination with the FC and The DNR, each of which is involved in environmental monitoring, had not taken place at the time of this evaluation.

WWF has produced an excellent database from the hunt return forms Although reporting percentages could be higher, and this database and the aerial survey reports have some inconsistencies, abundant information is available that can help address a number of important management-related issues, including the monitoring of trophy size, fulfillment of the hunting quotas for various species by district or nationally, handling of problem animals, and financial return from hunting The tables in Appendix L of this report illustrate a few of the useful outputs that can be derived from statistical analysis of this database The hunt report database is currently in dBase format but can easily be translated (using systems such as DBMS Copy) to other common spreadsheet formats (e g , MS Excel or SAS) to permit a far more detailed analysis than the hunt program currently provides

Institutions outside Zimbabwe are working on the design of environmental monitoring systems For example, several university programs and conservation organizations (e g , Conservation International) are currently developing low-cost systems using high-resolution aerial photography and satellite imagery for wildlife conservation applications The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will shortly initiate the first-ever scientific assessment of the environment in southern Africa Working with universities and other partners in the region, NASA will employ satellite and ground-based surveillance to study land-use changes

Conclusions

Without ecosystem-level monitoring and evaluations that test the assumptions and hypotheses of CAMPFIRE's community-based conservation initiatives, it will become increasingly difficult to draw conclusions that are consistent with the program's adaptive management model Several measures can be taken to address the loss and fragmentation of wildlife habitat One is to develop a systematic monitoring program that can quantify and qualify changes in environmental conditions Better land-use planning, greater devolution of authority to local levels, and improvement of macroeconomic conditions are needed to help address the problem Well-written district and ward by-laws may also be effective tools A few already exist, but more emphasis and refinement would help move instruments away from the restrictive, control-oriented "model by-laws" the RDCs often use The CCG may be able to collaborate with some of the institutions outside Zimbabwe that are involved with environmental monitoring to meet CAMPFIRE's objectives

Much of the necessary data-gathering can occur at the local level using trained monitors Remote sensing information such as satellite imagery, aerial photography, and digital videography would also be useful Data layers such as soil and hydrological maps, vegetation composition, and climatological data would be extremely helpful if incorporated effectively in a spatially-based monitoring system

Recommendations

A CCG working group on habitat monitoring should be created

An augmented effort should be made to develop an effective strategy for monitoring key environmental variables as they relate to wildlife habitat changes and conditions, land-use patterns, and baseline environmental variables To allow for funding constraints, the monitoring could be carried out in selected areas representative of common conditions throughout the CAMPFIRE areas, particularly those whose proximity to protected areas permits controlled experiments as described above

Execution of the proposed technical consultancy should be accelerated This and the follow-up design and implementation phases of a monitoring program are critical steps in the process The relevant subcommittee must agree on the important variables to be monitored, which ones will be the responsibility of the stakeholders, and how the data are to be stored, analyzed, and interpreted Follow-up on previous work, in particular, needs assessments, community aspects of monitoring, and the cost-effectiveness of various methods, should be carried out

The support for WWF's Geographic Information System (GIS) should be continued/expanded Priority should be given to the storage of existing environmental data in an efficient GIS This effort needs to be coordinated with other GIS activities in Zimbabwe of relevance to CBNRM USAID may want to involve Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) in this effort

Improvements in the environmental impact studies of settlement patterns and proposed projects such as boreholes, dams, and fences should be emphasized Studies on human-wildlife conflict (e g , Hoare and Mackie 1993) should be supported and expanded

In light of the constraints of funds and personnel, strategic collaboration should be sought with appropriate outside organizations to further the environmental monitoring work required for CAMPFIRE

Evaluation Issue DNPWLM and WWF Performance within NRMP II

Findings

The DNPWLM is the statutory authority responsible for wildlife in Zimbabwe The major force behind the creation and definition of CAMPFIRE, the Department has been a principal player throughout the Programme's history The DNPWLM currently employs approximately 2,400 staff throughout Zimbabwe The CCG was originally formed under the coordination of the DNPWLM

The Department is charged with a number of activities that are essential to the functioning of the CAMPFIRE Programme These include review and approval of hunting quotas, participation in aerial and ground surveys of animal populations, training of CAMPFIRE wildlife monitors, poaching control, PAC, participation in quota-setting, applied research, fish culture projects, and participation in various meetings and technical training workshops

Through its CAMPFIRE Coordination Unit (CCU), the Department is charged with providing guidance on all wildlife matters, monitoring and implementation of the Programme and financial flows, assisting the RDCs in setting quotas and enforcement, program-related ecological and economic research, representation of CAMPFIRE in the international arena, coordination of DNPWLM park planning and management activities with participating neighboring communities, and assistance on some aerial surveys

Since 1992, DNPWLM has been less actively involved in CAMPFIRE implementation "The slowing down of the Department's pace within the programme has been partly due to extensive change in

- management (probably priorities and variations in opinions and beliefs)
- structure
- staff turnover
- ministerial composition
- CAMPFIRE activities are demanding It "is thus a programme which requires a team specifically for the programme with a full support in decision making, technically, availability of equipment, etc "

(National Parks and Wildlife NRMP II Annual Review/Progress Report, August 1996-February 1997, as revised February 1998)

CCG members are encouraging more active DNPWLM involvement Its latest workplan relating to NRMP II details six outputs, as summarized below

Output 1 Legislative and administrative framework facilitated The Department assigns policy reviews to people at high levels who are not involved in program implementation, do not have field experience, and do not respond in timely fashion The CCU believes it should be delegated responsibility for policy reviews

Output 2 Training provided to RDCs and The DNPWLM A full-time training officer is needed to coordinate training for the RDCs The CCU's ability to address the training issue is hampered by the provision that USAID funds can be used only for its own operations

Output 3 Fisheries management capacity developed Funding problems delayed start-up, and the lack of a second vehicle has caused transport difficulties Nevertheless, according to the CCU, the DNPWLM identifies potential dams monthly, has stocked 5 fishponds and visited 20, and has contacted 13 communities about the project It is leveraging other donor support

Output 4 Wildlife habitat monitoring This activity is partially completed but suffers from a shortage of skilled staff and the lack of a second plane and trained pilot for the habitat monitoring Still, some aerial surveys have been conducted Among the CCU's suggestions are replacing the survey airplane, providing a wildlife survey team for some areas, and setting up a vegetation monitoring unit immediately

Output 5 Restocking of wildlife in depleted areas Staff shortages, the high prices for wildlife, a ban on live animal translocation, and the change in department status to a fund have slowed restocking

Output 6 Project management This has been achieved through meetings at various forums The CCU's lack of recognition and insufficient staff, equipment, and transport are obstacles to implementing the workplan The CCU commented that little action is being taken on the obstacles to its participation in the Programme

***Conclusions** (see also the prior sections on aerial surveys, quota-setting, and PAC)*

CAMPFIRE is an interdependent entity whose success is determined by the degree to which all players fulfill their obligations It is essential that the DNPWLM have a role in the Programme Even though USAID has made funds available, the Department has been unable to take advantage of those resources to move forward with its CCU The impact of the Department's diminished role affects other stakeholders, particularly WWF, and the general program Most of the constraints appear to be of internal origin

A redefinition of the Department's role, in light of present constraints and future capabilities and needs, would help in planning for the future It needs to address the CCU, which is having difficulty operating without a defined mandate and decision making powers Improvement in the level of communication between upper management in the DNPWLM and WWF, which must collaborate with the Department (e g , for the aerial surveys and quota-setting), is also essential to assuring efficient CAMPFIRE operations

Recommendations

Translocation and live animal sales activities should be re-initiated Current DNPWLM policy on live animal translocation must be re-examined Absent a general policy, specific proposals should be put on a fast track review on a case-by-case basis

Strengthen DNPWLM field activities and encourage broader re-engagement of the DNPWLM in the CAMPFIRE Programme Ways should be sought to reinvigorate the involvement of the DNPWLM in the CAMPFIRE Programme, and to provide far more decision making within the Department To build on and systematize the current pilot fisheries activity, a master plan for CAMPFIRE involvement with artisanal fisheries should be developed and implemented PAC, quota-setting, and other DNPWLM CAMPFIRE-related administration should be further decentralized Finally, a study of how the DNPWLM could facilitate devolution of Appropriate Authority or aspects of it below the RDC level should be conducted

Evaluation Issue World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)

Findings

As a founding member of the CCG, the Zimbabwe Office of WWF is responsible for providing a wide range of ecological and economic services to CAMPFIRE under WWF (MAPS) This project has produced a considerable number of documents relevant to CAMPFIRE and other environmental and conservation issues The workplan was linked to two other WWF projects the completed Study of Agro-Pastoral Systems in the Zambezi valley and the SUPCAMP project, which is ongoing

The NRM-WWF MAPS project, funded by USAID, performs essential technical services for the CAMPFIRE Programme A description of the project and work plans were developed at CAMPFIRE CCG workshops in 1992, March 1993, and June 1995 The workplan was revised in November 1997, and quarterly progress reports have been submitted, most recently for the period of December 1997 to February 1998 The immediate objective of the MAPS project is "Improved technical knowledge available at all levels, including policy levels, to manage, use, and benefit wildlife and other natural resources in wards with the CAMPFIRE areas " Based on this objective, five outputs have been identified, which are summarized below along with a brief review of progress

(1) Monitoring, including aerial surveys of large mammals in CAMPFIRE areas and monitoring of performance and relevant management and marketing data Annual large mammal surveys were conducted as planned, analyzed, and reported in collaboration with personnel from the DNPWLM, and the results disseminated for use in quota-setting Recording protocols were established, databases (financial, hunt return, NP9, POMS, and GIS spatial components) were designed, and various analyses on hunting quotas and trophy quality were made

(2) Technical assistance to the RDCs for the implementation of CAMPFIRE development projects The RDCs were apprised of the services available from WWF, a consultant pool was assembled, and some ecotourism studies, wildlife management planning, and environmental reviews were undertaken

(3) Resource surveys and feasibility studies as requested by RDCs Consultants and WWF staff were deployed or planned for a tourism potential survey, RDC resource survey, and ecotourism study, and a feasibility study was completed for small-scale ostrich farming

(4) Research and decision support systems (DSS) at the Rural District level The WWF GIS database was extended and consolidated into a single meta-database Progress was made on components of the NRM DSS simulation models, labor analyses, and derivations of patterns of settlement from aerial photographs

(5) WWF project management and implementation capacity Appropriate accounting and procurement systems were established, and WWF participated in the Annual Review of the NRMP II

Conclusion

WWF provides essential services to CAMPFIRE Its work on publications, skills transfer, participatory data-gathering projects, and devolution of responsibility are key ingredients of CAMPFIRE The WWF training component, some portions of which were curtailed because of a funding shortfall resulting from the effects of inflation on the Zimbabwe dollar, has been an efficient means of transferring the necessary skills The commitment and professional vision of WWF staff have been integral components in the success of CAMPFIRE, and the need for the leadership and technical competence of this organization is likely to remain high and even to increase as the Programme develops and expands

Recommendation

Given WWF's demonstrated effectiveness in establishing and achieving its CAMPFIRE goals, its activities should receive continued support, and the WWF training component should be reinforced

Evaluation Issue Impact of CAMPFIRE on Wildlife and Habitat, Key Assumption Number One – Wildlife Resources Are or Will Become Adequate to Sustain Commercial Exploitation

Findings

A valid and urgent question in the CAMPFIRE context is whether the wildlife resource is adequate to provide sufficient commercial returns to assure the engagement and long-term support of local communities The evidence from various sources indicates that in many CAMPFIRE areas with long-standing CAMPFIRE activities, particularly those in the Zambezi valley, the wildlife resources are sufficient for sustained commercial exploitation The evidence is less clear or unavailable in other places where CAMPFIRE activities are incipient and in places where wildlife populations and their habitat are inferior

Most observers consider the hunting quotas in CAMPFIRE areas to be conservative The maintenance of wildlife of trophy quality and the overall numbers of wildlife suggest that their populations are being sustainably exploited under present conditions However, mortality factors attributable to catastrophic occurrences are important considerations in estimating sustainable harvest levels Natural die-offs (as experienced in some areas in Zimbabwe during the early 1980s) are common among wildlife populations, with as much as 65% of a population being affected (Barrett and Arcese 1995) This factor must be included when developing adaptive management models

There are adequate secondary indicators of exploitation (e g , those that reflect current commercial practices) in the form of data on trophy quality, wildlife numbers, distribution, and subjective observations from stakeholders in the field These indicators appear to be sufficient to permit continued wildlife exploitation and other management actions, particularly if applied in an adaptive management framework

Conclusions

Wildlife management is a complex process containing biological, ecological, economic, and social elements Integration of these factors into a comprehensive, scientifically sound, and sustainable system of research is desirable if the conditions within which species exist are to be understood and conclusions about the sustainability of commercial exploitation of wildlife made with an acceptable level of certainty

Comparative analyses of game and cattle ranching impacts have shown that environmental stability increases when ranch land is dedicated to wildlife (e g , Berwick and Faeth 1995) Monitoring these ecological impacts is essential, as even low levels of degradation have been shown to have deleterious effects on population dynamics (Doak 1995)

Even though consumptive use is considered ecologically sound, it is still necessary to attend to concerns regarding the impact of harvesting not only on target species, but also in terms of possible associated effects a cropping scheme might have on ecosystems (Kremen et al ,1994) Game-cropping schemes can have considerable potential for positive ecological impacts based on the increased amount of habitat being maintained for wildland systems, and also have the potential to support the conservation of endangered species (Hill 1994)

***Recommendations** (see also the section on wildlife habitat evaluation and monitoring)*

In the short term, the level of reporting and completion of the hunting forms and surveys must be improved In keeping with adaptive management, meetings or special working group sessions should be held to determine field-based mechanisms for assessing populations and trends for lesser species

In the longer term, one approach to answering the questions posed by assumption #1 is the Population Viability Analysis (PVA) PVA is a computer modeling technique that can identify those parameters having the largest influence on reproduction and population dynamics (Possingham et al 1993) Although individual models differ in their assumptions, they are primarily based on Leslie matrices and age/stage structured population information, and have the advantage of being able to incorporate the potential effects of catastrophic change (environmental and disease), genetic erosion, and population structure (e g , meta-populations) (Mills et al 1996)

Emphasis should be placed on commercial exploitation of and creation of value for lesser species such as impala Local/regional sport hunting, subsistence hunting and local butcheries, live animal sales, and game viewing are possible mechanisms through which to accomplish this

4. Improving Coordination

Improved Programme coordination and improved communication are issues that need to be addressed at every level The growing number of participating institutions makes the need more urgent The following section reviews CAMPFIRE (CCG) institutional interrelationships If institutions, and the people who make up these institutions, are to collaborate, they must share certain common goals and some ownership of the results and achievements This section also reviews the impact of key CAMPFIRE individuals within their institutional settings The role of USAID, the most important donor and source of financial support to the various institutions promoting CAMPFIRE within Zimbabwe, is evaluated in terms of its impact on program coordination, local ownership, and the long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE's impressive achievements The topics discussed below include

- CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group,
- CAMPFIRE Association,
- Project Execution Team,
- USAID SO1 Core Team,
- Institutional Contractor, and
- Regional communication, cooperation, and coordination.

Key unresolved issues include (1) coordination of the CAMPFIRE movement, (2) coordination of the NRMP II support effort, (3) financial accountability throughout the movement, and (4) coordination of CAMPFIRE with regional activities and donors

Evaluation Issue CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) Past and Future Role. *"The CCG, originally the driving force in defining the goals, tenets, and policy direction of the CAMPFIRE Programme appears to have lost much of its impetus Explain the primary reasons for this development What are the potential consequences of this 'loss'? Have alternatives emerged which can replace the Programme policy advisory body? What should be the role of the CCG in ongoing Programme operations? What, if anything, should be done to promote the long-term renewal of the CCG?" (SOW B-2-c) "How effective have implementing partners been in instilling a sense of* ***Programme ownership*** *among participating RDCs? improved responsiveness and accountability to RDC and community customers?" (SOW C-3-b) "To what extent does USAID's relationship with its NGO partners cause problems in ownership, defining the roles/responsibilities of the various implementing agents and in determining future directions for CAMPFIRE? What, if anything, should be done to improve relationships among all Project partners (expanded team members) in the future?" (SOW A-6)*

Findings

The CCG is a Zimbabwean creation comprised of the organizations active in defining, applying, and promoting the CAMPFIRE principles Over time, new organization have joined the group Currently, the active members (the early members appear in bold) and their key functions include

CAMPFIRE Association	Program coordination, policy, communication
Dept of National Parks & Wildlife Management	Policies for wildlife management
Ministry of Local Government & National Housing	Policies for local governance
Zimbabwe Trust	Training, capacity-building, institution-building
ACTION Magazine (a sub-unit of ZimTrust)	Environmental education
Centre for Applied Social Sciences	Applied field, sociological research, some policy
World Wide Fund for Nature	Biological monitoring, training in quota-setting
Africa Resources Trust	International advocacy, public relations,
Department of Natural Resources	Policy coordination, land-use planning
Forestry Commission	Woodland management, participatory approaches
Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources	PRA, woodland management

A foremost issue affecting the CCG, as noted, is the differences of opinion among the partners as to who should be doing what, as well as disagreement as to what constitutes coordination vs control and to what extent "control" has any place These disagreements appear partially to revolve around access to monetary control and the power it gives to build a constituency They are also the result of the perception that the CA identifies itself as CAMPFIRE within Zimbabwe This situation acts as a disincentive to potential private sector and NGO partners involved in the greater CAMPFIRE movement, as they believe they can apply CAMPFIRE or CBNRM principles without being "led" by the CA.

Some of the tension can be traced to the decision to use NRMP II to reinforce the CA as the lead CAMPFIRE agency, and to allocate substantial funds to build its capacity This move seems to have altered the pre-NRMP II CCG interrelationships and responsibilities and upset the relative positions of the actors within CAMPFIRE The relationship between the CA and ZimTrust is an obvious example The CA emerged from ZimTrust's shadow as the lead agency, with considerable project resources and a mandate to expand its capacity in areas of responsibility (e g , training and technical assistance) formerly (and exclusively) within ZimTrust's portfolio On the other hand, the CA has complained about ZimTrust's direct project line to USAID

For its part, ZimTrust feels that USAID/Z wants to move away from the wildlife emphasis in CAMPFIRE because of the political fallout It sees wildlife as Zimbabwe's niche, its comparative advantage, which all must push to use in the most sustainable manner ZimTrust is also critical of the direction of NRMP II, feeling that the project has developed a management and institutional infrastructure and project delivery process that are both unnecessary and unsustainable ZimTrust is also concerned about the roles that other CCG members play in CAMPFIRE, especially the passive involvement of the DNPWLM and MLGNH It sees the CA as seeking to subsume certain functions, such as technical assistance and training, formerly within its portfolio, and views the PET process solely as a USAID project delivery mechanism that lacks justification in terms of promoting or sustaining CBNRM in Zimbabwe

Instead of effective leadership and coordination by the CCG, the evaluation team saw several instances of intra-CCG squabbling over decisionmaking prerogatives and access to project resources This conflict may reflect, in part, historical disagreements among the CCG members, but the team believes it also reflects the absence of clearly delineated CCG roles and responsibilities and firm CA leadership in bringing about the needed sense of shared ownership of CAMPFIRE implementation

The implementing partners have been successful in instilling a sense of ownership among the participating RDCs -- to the extent that they consider themselves to be CAMPFIRE The workplans of these CCG members have been responsible to the beneficiaries' demands for services, although the demand is frequently larger than the institutional capabilities to deliver

The CA has created, with its partners, a Customer Service Plan (CSP) intended to address customer satisfaction with the services provided The plan is still only in rough form and has not yet been fully implemented In addition, information is not shared adequately among partners

Conclusions

The evaluation team came to three main conclusions about the CCG (1) Its partners are not working in a truly collaborative manner Intra-CAMPFIRE rivalries produce tensions that are difficult to channel constructively However, with the increasing influence of the CA, program coordination under NRMP II's broader support has been much better thana it was under NRMP I (2) The strength of the CAMPFIRE movement in Zimbabwe will ultimately depend on the ability of current CCG members to draw in new member institutions with greater ranges of expertise and sector diversity It must not be seen as an "exclusive club," where wildlife interests are the only "game" in town (3) The CAMPFIRE Programme, as a Zimbabwean initiative, should continue to be "owned" by institutions promoting and articulating CAMPFIRE principles Shared philosophy and produce are the basis of the CF movement and form a network of institutions The CA, as the central institutional CAMPFIRE partner within the Zimbabwe CCG network needs to use this lead role in the Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE movement to spearhead Programme coordination, national advocacy of CAMPFIRE principles through its RDC constituency, and championing of the needs for policy reform

Recommendations

The CCG should sponsor an annual gathering of its members to discuss CAMPFIRE management Such a meeting should follow the CA's Annual General Meeting and should focus on tailoring services to meet guidance given by the Board of Management This meeting would eventually replace the NRMP II annual workplan reviews

The CCG should be a voluntary organization and not have specific implementation ambitions It should not, for instance, seek funds in its own name to achieve some project Rather, its purpose should be to

(1) Analyze problems and exchange views on the strengths and weaknesses of how CAMPFIRE principles are applied in the field, and recommend to its members non-binding strategic shifts in activities, missions, and purposes,

(2) Use the combined networks of each CCG member to support each other's work and troubleshoot problems in the field as they emerge, and promote CAMPFIRE principles nationally among other organizations interested in CAMPFIRE ideas

As the organization that most represents the local constituent base of CAMPFIRE Rural Districts, the CA should continue to chair future CCG meetings The members with the greatest proven experience and competence in a subject area should, however, be delegated by the CA to chair the CCG subcommittees in those areas (e g , policy and M&E) The rationale for sub-committee chairmanship would change over time and therefore should be reviewed as part of the annual CCG meeting agenda

NRMP II, Support organizations in the CCG, and District-level personnel (CAMPFIRE coordinators) need to spend more time linking local communities with other Zimbabwean private and informal sector institutions interested in sustainable NRM ventures within CAMPFIRE Districts NRMP II CDF funds should be used to support design and write-up of promising ventures that can provide economic returns to village- and ward-level communities or groupings Those ventures can then be submitted for bank loan funding

The significant support given to capacity-building should be continued However, the institutions providing the support should have an exit-policy plan for the specific support being given Institutionalization of specific capacity development within the RDCs, as well as at lower levels, should be a priority as a potential incentive for the RDCs and CA to seek continued support from these institutions in other domains

To promote improved responsibility and accountability among CCG partners, the RDCs, and community customers, there should be more joint proposals from individual CCG members and RDCs The evaluation team proposes a new approach to CDF grants to encourage such joint partnerships

To improve relationships among all NRMP II partners, the PET as it currently operates should be eliminated and a new Plan of Operations created and sanctioned by the BRC To this end, the team suggests a facilitated workshop for the CA Board, regional representatives, CCG members, other government partners, USAID, and the IC

Evaluation Issue CAMPFIRE Association Performance. *To what extent is the Association's Secretariat responsive to the aims/objectives expressed by the Association's Board of Management? To what extent has the Association been successful in defining and fulfilling/meeting its roles and responsibilities to its increasing number of members? To what extent is the CA likely to be sustainable as USAID assistance decreases over time? What should be the ultimate role of the CA?*

Within the remaining implementation time-frame, what, if anything, should be done to promote the CA's long-term sustainability? (SOW A8)

Findings

Advocacy, Information, Communication. As an RDC organization, the CA's core business is advocacy of RDC interests in CAMPFIRE Although CA rhetoric argues that it represents local communities, its interest may not always coincide with the interests of subdistrict groups and organizations, and it has made insufficient actual movement in their direction in this field activities It should be possible for full membership in the CA to be extended to ward-level economic interest groups to become full members and advocates of CAMPFIRE and their own particular interests within their districts

Policy. The CA has articulated clear policy positions but is not addressing the policy issues affecting the CAMPFIRE movement aggressively enough, including the development of positions on legislation and policy changes that could help to move CBNRM interests forward Policy dialogue is an example of an important program goal that, ,for the most part, the CA has not achieved Only recently has the PET subcommittee met to discuss a policy agenda and task committee members with follow-up responsibilities No concrete action has been taken on certain items, such as extending Appropriate Authority beyond wildlife, even though these issues have been on the CA agenda for several years

Monitoring and Evaluation There is some concern, based on experience, whether the CA can achieve its M&E objectives Hurungwe, one of the earliest RDCs to embark on CAMPFIRE (in 1992), experienced a delay in the start-up of grant-related activities (until January 1997) that risked quashing its initial enthusiasm The CA organized M&E courses " was not well grasped because it has fewer practice examples and more theoretical examples " These statements, albeit limited in scope and depth, when joined with RDC comments about problems with communication and coordination, raise the general issue of the CA's capacity to implement and sustain its current agenda of activities successfully

Management Capacity Recent evaluations note that, with the close assistance of the IC, the CA has recently developed the management capacity to use resources efficiently and ensure accountability The CA leadership also brings a solid base of experience and commitment The Board has made it very clear that it has delegated executive operational authority to the Secretariat and that it will review progress with the Secretariat on a quarterly basis The CA's Secretariat appears to be responsible to its Board, although perhaps not sufficiently so There is a risk of the CA becoming just another "Harare NGO " The Secretariat is heavily involved in a number of key issues, including follow-up to the CITES convention issues, and preparation of input into discussions on new legislation concerning the devolution of mineral rights to districts To date the Board expresses satisfaction with progress

Senior staff in the MLGNH have a varying understanding of the intermediary role played by the CAMPFIRE Executive Director They have expressed concern that " [he] is more aligned with the CCG than with the Association (i e , the RDCs) and does not represent the interests of the RDCs Rather, he represents the interests of the CCG members " Others who work more closely with the CCG have developed a genuine appreciation for Executive Director's success in achieving in the difficult task of balancing the interests of all parties -- the CA Board and constituency, the NGOs in and outside the CCG, senior staff, and technical departments (especially the DNPWLM) of the MMET, the MLGNH itself, and the various donors and outside parties Moreover, they "sympathize with his ideas" and point out that in representing the communities, he has sometimes taken strong stands in his efforts to coordinate NGO interventions Differences in position with NGOs notwithstanding, the MLGNH encourages the Executive Director not to push his partners too hard, arguing that to be successful, "he must make himself popular "

The CA, through the RDCs, WADCOs, and VIDCOs, has permitted the increased politicization of CAMPFIRE down to the lowest levels Some RDCs are open to experimentation and delegation of some authority for some innovative NRM ideas The current management structure favors the status quo in institutional arrangements The team's field work underscored the vastness of Zimbabwe's geography and the difficulty of attempting to be an effective on-the-ground presence while based in Harare Comments from the field highlighted the fact that the CA is seen as effective at the national level, but less so at the district, ward, and village levels

The point about overextension reflects the evaluation team's observation that the CA is trying to do too many tasks in too many areas, and as a result not doing some important tasks effectively

The CA is over 90% dependent on USAID funding, which funding is scheduled to end in the year 2000 Additional Netherlands funding is likely, but not guaranteed at the time of this evaluation Other future donor support is likewise not a sure thing In sum, the CA has only approximately 2-2 5% of its post-2000 funding either secured or in negotiation as of March 1998 The Association has begun to explore other sources of support

CAMPFIRE Coordination The CA has taken over as the lead institution in CAMPFIRE With PET and IC support, it has permitted money to be channeled to the field, although the process has been very slow and bureaucratic While the CA Secretariat has developed a capacity to handle USAID money for its own support grant, it has not developed the financial management capacity needed to play a central role in assisting its members in meeting the financial management and reporting requirements of, for example, the CDF or GOZ

The CA does not have a particularly strong presence of program support staff "on-the-ground," although this is understandable given the institution's relative youth and limited personnel It is

represented on the ground principally by the District Councilors and CAMPFIRE coordinators, many of whom have only recently been hired with CDF support Data on this issue were hard to find since the team found no in-depth evaluations of CA implementation activities in the field There are some limited observations on this issue in the four CASS draft mid-term evaluations of CDF grants (Nemarundwe, 1998, Mid-Term Evaluation of the Mazowe Rural District Council CAMPFIRE Project, Mid-Term Evaluation of the USAID-Funded CAMPFIRE Programme in Chipinge, Mid-Term Evaluation of the Hurungwe Rural District Council) These draft reports depict the Association as playing somewhat of a remote and, at best, limited role in coordinating CCG activities in the RDCs

Box 10. CAMPFIRE Association Issues

Strengths

- Lead agency recognition
- National and international visibility
- Effective program advocacy
- Staff skills and experience
- Recently acquired management capacity

Limitations

- Inadequate communication with RDCs and other CAMPFIRE partners
- Ineffective program coordination
- Inability to establish an on-the-ground presence for implementation
- Overextension in activities inappropriate for its skills and capacity

Conclusions

The CA has strengths and limitations that should be recognized and that should guide recommendations Its long-term strategy underscores the institution's rapid evolution, but, because it does not adequately build on its strengths, it does not appear sustainable It is still too early to tell if this institution will be able to take the difficult steps needed to reorganize and refocus as USAID assistance decreases

The CA is still stuck at the RDC level It has performed well at increasing RDC membership and involvement but has not been as successful as it would like in fulfilling its roles and responsibilities to its increasing numbers of members at the ward and village levels This suggests broader institutional constraints to becoming more inclusive Fore example despite Dutch efforts to assist the CA in opening its membership beyond RDC, its constitution remains one for the "CAMPFIRE Association of Rural District Councils "

Through the PET, through significant training and the IC's technical assistance, and through the CA's role in reviewing and promoting the CDF program, NRMP II has assisted the Association in assuming its current leadership role and responsibilities The GOZ and CCG agencies totally accept CA's leadership of the CAMPFIRE Programme However, they would like the relationship to be more collegial and less adversarial

As the lead agency, the CA Secretariat is sometimes seen as the exclusive torchbearer of CAMPFIRE principles, but the development and expression of program principles is properly shared among all partners including CCG members, the Board, communities, and supportive government agencies Figure 1 shows a proposed model for CA's future It depicts CA as the lead agency, working

collaboratively with its CAMPFIRE movement partners The CA still *represents* CAMPFIRE, but it focuses and concentrates on program advocacy and policy dialogue It can draw upon the skills and capacity of its partners on an "as needed" consultant basis For example, since effective policy dialogue requires sound policy analysis, the CA might commission a policy analysis from CASS that would set the agenda for and inform the dialogue with ministry management and staff

The proposed model envisions the CAMPFIRE partners as a voluntary association of movement leaders This association will organize itself as the individuals' interests and initiatives dictate As donor support declines, its membership will determine its purpose and activities and decide how the association will support itself Presumably the association will harbor an internal reservoir of appropriate skills that can be tapped by tendering to meet CAMPFIRE needs The principle implication of these changes from the status quo is a greater fluidity in membership and in all likelihood a leaner and more flexible and cost-conscious CA.

The proposed model includes Resource User Groups (e g , ecotourism associations, forestry products associations, associations of fish farmers, and other economic interest groups) that would play an important role in commercial enterprise development in CAMPFIRE areas

The CA is in a very precarious position regarding its financial future and needs to be weaned gradually from dependence on USAID funding

Recommendations

USAID should fund only those CA activities that show promise of sustained good performance It should support CA's Harare-based activities in two specific areas program advocacy and policy dialogue *Program advocacy* includes national and international initiatives aimed at informing individuals and groups about the CAMPFIRE movement and promoting a positive, constructive image of the movement The CA has carried out this activity well in the past Effective advocacy will require using the most current and appropriate communication technologies (e g , Internet and multi-media presentations) *Policy dialogue* requires proactively engaging policymakers in discussions of important policy issues of direct relevance to CAMPFIRE, with the intent of promoting the passage of sound legislation It should also include dialogue on regulatory matters pertaining to the implementation of existing laws The CA should strengthen its policy advocacy skills, which it has the resources, such as CASS and ART, to draw upon

The CA should become increasingly responsive in representing the policy needs and directions of its most rural constituents at the village and ward levels, as it is beginning to do now at national and international levels CAMPFIRE's success in identifying itself with the most local levels (village and ward) will define its ultimate role within the country

To promote CA's long-term sustainability, the Association should be placed on a financial support phaseout plan The plan should enable the CA to refocus its activities and gradually diversify its base of financial support A number of options should be considered (see the last chapter of this

report) One option might continue CA funding at its current level (100% of salaries) through the end of FY1999, followed by a 50% reduction for FY2000 Because of the key lead role the CA plays, the team believes USAID support should continue at this reduced level through FY2002 if possible (see Table 14)

The CA should consider strongly advocating with its members to distribute a maximum of the wildlife revenues to the producer communities and should publish an annual report that discusses the nature and level of RDC revenue distributions and factors affecting them. Such a report would also serve as a means of documenting new diversified sources of CAMPFIRE revenue

Evaluation Issue The Project Execution Team (PET) *"Under NRMP II, the Project Execution Team (PET) is the key Project implementation coordination and decision making body How effectively has the PET functioned in Project planning, implementation, coordination, and communications? What, if anything, should be done to improve PET performance in the future? What is the relationship between PET and the CCG? What should this relationship be? What, if anything, should be done to promote coordinated PET-CCG operations in the future?"(SOW C-3-b) "How effective have the PET sub-committees (e g monitoring/evaluation, training, information/ communication, etc) been in planning and coordinating inter-agency activities? What, if anything, should be done to improve PET sub-committee operations and effectiveness in the future?" (SOW C-3-b)*

Findings

The concept of the PET emerged at a plan of operations workshop in 1994 involving various CAMPFIRE partners and USAID USAID agreed with the CCG on the need to maintain a high level of Zimbabwean ownership for the Programme, and also saw value in establishing a mechanism to coordinate and deliver funds through the CA more effectively to what was defined as the CA's *primary customer base* -- the RDCs The intention was to give the RDCs some control over the nature and timing of the services to be delivered to them through CCG partners It is not clear why these functions were not initiated as part of the then-CCG functions One reason may have been that the members of the CCG were perceived as not being best positioned to develop the felt need for increased indigenous representation If there was to be support for the CA to assume the role of lead agency within CAMPFIRE, then it might have seemed appropriate that the CA "control" PET from the beginning USAID has had a strong voice in the PET

The SARP NRMP II project document states that "no project specific steering committees or other special management structures will be established to guide project implementation, allowing project management to focus on strengthening CAMPFIRE institutions and structures for maximum relevance and sustainability of program interventions and accomplishments " (SARP,1994 33) There is no mention within the project document of an entity similar to PET

In practice, PET has become just such a "steering committee " At the time, the CCG was not providing much overall guidance or direction to the program By default, PET took control of the

Programme's coordination and PET effectively managed to pull things together so as to move NRMP II activities forward, to "get things done " For the same reason it formed the various subcommittees (e g , policy and M&E) From an implementation perspective, PET accomplished many things it enabled the "expanded project team" to work better than ever before, helping the CCG partners to focus and begin working together toward common objectives, rather than individually, it was successful in launching NRMP II activities, and it supported the CA in building up national-level representation and activities, helped strengthen it, played an important role in helping the CA establish itself firmly as the CAMPFIRE lead agency PET has also been successful in pressuring WWF and CASS to be more responsive to RDC support requests and PET-perceived needs (such as support requests, non-lease tourism studies, and CASS evaluations of RDC projects)

The IC's project documents refer to PET as the CCG/PET, an entity that was "to have duties of convening meetings, coordinating CCG support for CAMPFIRE, and enhancing communications between implementing partners " (DA Quarterly Report #8, 1998) In reality, PET ended up replacing the CCG, although that was *not* the intent It functioned as the CA/PET, with even larger ambitions PET did not strengthen the CCG or improve its partnerships The activities that came to be included under PET were initially intended to be guided by the CCG However, the pre-NRMP II CCG did not function as a CAMPFIRE coordinating group, as intended Even to this day it has remained a loose affiliation of Programme partners, without any real institutional cohesion or voice, which is perhaps has one of its greatest shortcomings Each NGO has had its own agenda and timetable Their programs have been driven not by customers, but by institutional goals In short, leadership did not come from the CCG itself, although most of its members had a voice on the PET

The CA and the IC share adjacent offices This arrangement has certainly facilitated the IC's providing support to the CA, but it may have contributed to the CA's inclination to become the manager of the NRMP II CCG partner grants and the CDF The CA's chairmanship of the PET reinforced this tendency

The NGO partners are generally critical of PET One major criticism is that USAID structured the NRMP II for its "administrative convenience," instead of in a way that is optimal for CAMPFIRE They cite the PET mechanism as an example of this bureaucratic mechanism -- while it may be useful for USAID/Z, it does not promote efficiency, effectiveness, or sustainability in project administration USAID and the CA believe that the NGO resistance stems, instead, from a generalized resistance to having their activities coordinated, reviewed, and subject to external oversight

Conclusions

PET has served its initial purposes It has succeeded in the important function of making it possible for USAID NRMP II program funds to be delivered to the target customers, the RDCs It has provided training and capacity-building for NRM, particularly of wildlife, among scores of wards throughout Zimbabwe, an important achievement It has permitted greater coordination, communication, and support for the CA's lead agency role, as well as more efficient administration of USAID funds

That said, PET no longer responds to the realities of the CA and the general CAMPFIRE movement within Zimbabwe Although it achieved greater coordination of CCG partner institutions, it may have done so at the cost of the evolving role of the CCG within the CAMPFIRE Programme Clearly, the CCG is weaker today than it was five years ago It is also true the CCG was not providing a great deal of overall leadership and coordination five years ago

The CA has begun to use the PET as a means of exercising greater control over its CCG partners Those not invited to a PET meeting are "out of the loop" on what is going on Given the importance of the CDF funds and their management within PET -- and the eventual delivery of services to CAMPFIRE Rural Districts and wards -- this situation effectively limits the input from general CAMPFIRE partners There is a need for other donors and non-USAID-funded CCG partners to have a program-wide mechanism for addressing CAMPFIRE

Recommendations

Since USAID is going to graduate Zimbabwe within the next five years (and perhaps end funding for the NRMP II even sooner), it needs to begin relaxing its control of the project *now* and to avoid micro-management Doing so will defacto relocate project control and authority with Zimbabweans, who eventually will have to assume complete program responsibility Some of PET's current functions should be returned to USAID direct management or delegated to the IC so as to remove the CA from direct program implementation, grants management, and training Insteadit should rely more on its CCG member partners within the shared CAMPFIRE movement

USAID's current PET activities should be replaced during the "winding down" phase of program funding (1998-2002) USAID should not plan for more than one NRMP II planning meeting a year with its project implementers *at the CCG level* At that time, it should review the contracted SOW objectives and results and propose, accept, or reject modifications USAID's core team should not be involved in the current weekly and monthly PET review of implementation activities, a practice that led some CCG members to see USAID as micro-managing The evaluation team recommends that, during this period, the CA Board's chairman begin to serve as chairman of the CCG For the rest of the year, implementers should not be required to participate in further NRMP II organizational meetings Twice yearly meetings may be held to *communicate* results, field findings, issues, resolutions, and lessons learned, and not for programmatic changes The latter should be done in small break-out subcommittees, not large plenary sessions

PET subcommittees, such as policy and M&E, should be transformed into CCG subcommittees

Evaluation Issue USAID SO1 Team Flexibility and Adaptive Design. *"To what extent has USAID adopted managerial changes which make it more flexible in its dealings with its local NGO partners?" (SOW A-6) "To what extent has this design approach (i e , flexible design approach) allowed implementers to adjust their plans/budgets to meet changing circumstances? To what extent has it allowed implementers to learn from their experiences and incorporate their lessons learned within future work plans?" (C 2 b)*

Findings

USAID's core management team is intensively involved and informed on all aspects of the Programme through its NRMP II funding and PET involvement The USAID core team exerts considerable influence over the NRMP II program direction, partner discussions, and internal reviews It has been an important advocate of the Programme in Zimbabwe, including to outside critics of the program, and can claim credit for some of NRMP II's successes over recent years All parties appreciate the fact that USAID/Z has been instrumental in securing, increasing, and protecting the funding for NRMP II USAID/Z staff fought hard and successfully for the project during a time of heavy scrutiny and criticism USAID's commitment to the project is sincere and acknowledged

USAID NRMP II has helped to strengthen the subregional governing units that are closer to the interests of local populations and communities, and has supported decentralization within Zimbabwe Under NRMP II SO1, USAID has defined "benefiting communities" within CAMPFIRE as "either villages, wards, or RDCs receiving USAID support, either directly or through its agents " (SO1 Document, April 1997 15) However, the RDCs are the lowest level of civil government within Zimbabwe They receive this kind of support because they have been called "the only game in town" and because they have the Appropriate Authority for wildlife program development within their boundaries Overtly supporting village- or ward-level communities without "passing through" the RDC, whether done by a local NGO or even a government institution, is seen as unnecessarily creating "parallel structures " (Appendix L for USAID Zimbabwe SO1 Results Indicators)

In the ULG mid-term evaluation, USAID/Z was urged to adopt a more flexible management approach, one that minimized micro-management and burdensome controls USAID/Z sought to do so under NRMP II by adopting adaptive management principles that emphasize efficiency and effectiveness over a stifling adherence to bureaucratic protocol These principles were intended to provide guidance when requested and implementer latitude when appropriate Tools such as annual planning, quarterly reviews, and planning workshops have been employed

Most of the NGOs in CAMPFIRE are experienced in adaptive management principles Examination of their work plans revealed familiarity with strategic planning concepts and practice They gave evidence of being experienced in setting out objectives and planning the necessary outputs to reach them USAID appears to have encouraged this practice Most of the CAMPFIRE partners have the capacity to plan strategically and adjust to fluid circumstances Implementers appear to be capable of adjusting their plans/budgets to some degree as circumstances dictate The use of the annual work plan as a tool to revisit their strategy (e g , objectives and outputs) facilitates changes (with the necessary approvals) USAID appears to have encouraged this behavior

Conclusions

One of USAID/Z's greatest achievements has been the sustained support and interest the mission has given this important conservation project for the past 10 years It has been a key reason for the significant achievements of NRMP II and CAMPFIRE overall, and is testimony to the importance

of long-term, sustained support to achieving results However, it must be pointed out that the real success has been in the area of sustained wildlife conservation and management, a domain that had a ready, built-in world market Initiatives in other, non-wildlife domains, without such evident markets but nevertheless with great potential, are only just beginning The success of sustainable CBNRM in these other areas will also depend on continued, long-term support, if not by USAID, then by other donors

Because the USAID core team does not have field implementation responsibilities, it must be careful not to overstep its coaching and support to the program The partner institutions themselves are ultimately accountable for the results for which they have been contracted

Although the flexible implementation approach practiced through reengineering permits easier mid-course corrections at the program management and oversight level (in Harare and in the PET), it can cause confusion among program implementers in the field Changes in direction or focus always take considerable time and energy to implement at the field level When changes occur too frequently, field programs can become cynical and resentful of "wasted" efforts, undertaken to meet a donor's needs An example is the SO1"M&E indicators," which have gone through a range of modifications and data collection efforts The effort made to develop, modify, and collect data to respond to these indicators has in some cases increased the information-collecting burdens of the project

Recommendations

Greater latitude and accountability should be given to NRMP II grantees to make decisions and mistakes, and to learn from them As recommended by reengineering proponents, USAID should expect its grantees to set clear and realizable performance objectives and outputs, and then give them the time, as needed, to accomplish them without further discussion and evaluation

USAID/Z should practice "results management" with those partners possessing the requisite management capacity It should place the implementation responsibility squarely on these NGO partners and then hold them accountable for results and avoid micro-managing USAID/Z should adopt more of a results-focused project management style namely, provide maximum discretion to the CAMPFIRE partners to implement the project, and confine USAID/Z staff time to verifying the results and holding the project implementers accountable for specific results The results achieved should determine the resources received This approach requires initially setting clear, mutually accepted project objectives

In future assistance agreements, USAID should require matching funds from each NGO partner up to 50% of the operating budget recommended in this evaluation, so as to move local ownership of the CAMPFIRE movement back where it belongs and to further sustainability of the program This approach will reduce the current overdependency of the CCG and the Programme in general on a single donor

A mechanism should be developed that spreads the remaining NRMP II funds out over a greater period of time that extends well beyond the anticipated end in August 2000 This change is particularly necessary because many RDCs are just initiating alternative (to wildlife) NRM activities The remaining funding should focus less on infrastructure and more on continued capacity-building and training at the ward and village levels The remaining funding and training should focus on support for the development of viable income-generating, CAMPFIRE-linked, bankable micro-enterprise proposals

Evaluation Issue The Institutional Contractor. *"Discuss the role and impact of the project Institutional Contractor in regard to USAID's implementing more flexible managerial changes in its dealings with its local NGO partners " (SOW A6)*

Findings

The IC for NRMP II, Development Associates/Price Waterhouse, signed its contract with USAID at the end of September 1995 The IC has worked closely with the CA to develop and expand its capacity to assume the leadership role entrusted to it under NRMP II By August 1996, the CA had developed an organizational structure and staffing, and submitted a draft long-term grant proposal to USAID The grant was approved in October 1996 (Garcia 1997 14)

The IC has taken on the role of managing certain aspects of the NRMP II project on behalf of USAID Its activities include participation on the PET, semi-annual assessments of the CA in its role as lead agency for CAMPFIRE, administration and management of grants to the CA and its RDC members, as well as to CASS and WWF, financial oversight for selected NRMP II grantees, and "in-service training programs relating to the management of USAID funds, the general management and administrative capabilities of the CA and its RDC members to insure program sustainability beyond the life of the project " (DA Quarterly Report, 1998) The IC has been asked to transfer its oversight and management role with the CDF to the CA The grant funds to be administered amount to US$10 4 million, out of the $13 85 million USAID contract signed in September 1995

The delay in the IC's arrival, combined with other factors treated elsewhere in this report, has resulted in slower spending rates by grantees and RDCs than expected CDF grant funds have been available to CAMPFIRE districts for two major purposes, as noted institution-building/infrastructure, and RDC capacity-building Delays have been experienced in reviewing and awarding capacity-building projects, but a total of 20 grants have been awarded to date, the last in February 1998 With respect to the RDC infrastructure grants, 26 pre-award surveys have been completed, but progress has been slow in awarding the actual grants The delays have been attributed to a slow learning process for the CCG and the RDCs around proposal development and review Moreover, in general there have been problems with the infrastructure proposals, which have not contained the information (e g , on financial viability, economic soundness, and management) required to make informed approval decisions

The IC's pre-award surveys of the RDC proposals have indicated that the reimbursement method of grant payment is necessary While this system has created some legitimate difficulties for grantees, its basis appears sound

The IC's financial staff are in an excellent position to support the RDCs in their review and identification of the audit-related problems associated with CAMPFIRE accounts The MLGNH provides free audit services, which could assist the RDCs in meeting their annual audit report requirements The RDCs are still getting financial systems in place that will allow them to better meet the requirement to submit to annual audits required by law MLGNH has thus limited resources to carry out costly audits and has programmed available audit funds accordingly The IC's efforts have already helped bookkeeping for CDF grants in the context of RDC budgets The IC might be able to help RDCs to meet regular audit requirements, so as to further transparency in financial accounting

Conclusions

The IC has performed its tasks well and carried out its responsibilities with professionalism and fairness Its record-keeping has been excellent, and its contributions at meetings relating to PET activities have been thoughtful and useful to the execution of NRMP II

The IC has played a major role in building the CA's capacity, particularly in terms of financial management It has been effective in increasing the CA's capacity to manage its resources and account for them according to USAID requirements and regulations Price Waterhouse's pre-award assessment of the CA recommended that the IC continue this close assistance and oversight role with the CA CA/CCG grantees continue to need limited assistance from the IC to execute their project administration responsibilities successfully The RDCs will continue to need technical services and training in this area

It was an early NRMP II strategic mistake to integrate the CA so closely in the decision process for allocating CDF funds It is not useful for the CA to be strengthened as a grant-maker, nor would it have been appropriate given the inherent conflict of interest This responsibility is also very time-consuming and program-intensive and could only distract the CA from its self-defined principal objectives It would also place the CA in charge of judging the merits of awarding grants to its own constituents, an neutral but knowledgeable third party would promote higher standards of competition for limited funds

The professionalism behind the pre-award RDC surveys is unquestionable However, the standard used may be higher than necessary

The strengthening of the financial management capacity of the CA was done well and has been very useful to the CAMPFIRE Programme New CCG grantees could benefit from similar assistance if such services could be extended, in a light-handed way, to them

Recommendations

The IC should play a key operational role in overseeing the transfer of the CDF to a post-NRMP II institution

- Current efforts to give the CA a role in the CDF grant-making should be discontinued CDF funds are best managed and granted by an independent entity, as discussed above

- The IC should set up a semi-autonomous, professional grant-making unit (described earlier) This unit would then be transferred to an independent intermediary organization When setting this unit up, the IC will have to assess its current staff configurations and capacity in light of its expressed role in the CDF and make adjustments as needed

- The current senior management team of the IC should play a facilitating and oversight role in setting up this CDF unit, serving as proxy "trustees" of the sinking fund while allowing the grant management team to serve as the "intermediary grant-maker," as described earlier

- The IC staff should analyze their pre-award survey method and the rules for determining who can get partial advances, although the idea of strengthening and testing RDC financial management capacity through the reimbursements method seems to be working, even if slowly Only one RDC, Tsholotsho, has qualified for small grant advances because of its proven ability to manage funds and provide receipts for reimbursement Other RDCs can qualify for advances once they show similar financial management skills The goal of such analysis should be to make it somewhat easier to qualify for a partial advance on a grant, especially for grantees that do not have sophisticated accounting systems The principles of financial control can be adapted to extremely simple book-keeping systems to allow for greater use of the partial advance system of paying out grants, all without risking misappropriation of grant funds Many non-USAID donors elsewhere have found ways to simplify the pre-award survey process, and IC staff should be encouraged to think through the problem and actively propose simplifications With this in mind, it may be worthwhile for IC financial staff to look into the system used by the embassy's "self-help" grant program for ideas or into the rules developed by USAID-PACT in Madagascar

The IC should coordinate with USAID to eliminate, transform, and phase out PET functions and organizational structures

- USAID should continue IC assistance to the CA as necessary and in a timely manner, until the CA demonstrates a full capacity to carry out all of the necessary administrative tasks (e g , financial reporting, progress reporting, and coordination) incumbent on the CAMPFIRE lead agency

- The RDCs should be encouraged to take better advantage of MLGNH's free audit services, as well as the IC's capacity to provide some support for identifying ways to improve financial

management and reporting The IC should actively meet with and share information with WWF staff charged with data collection and analysis of CAMPFIRE revenue

- The IC should provide financial management advisory services to a wider variety of new CCG partners that may become recipients of USAID funds in the next few years The method suggested here is to use the power of information to strengthen and motivate, rather than exerting direct control This might be done by issuing bi-annual "report cards" for the main CCG grantees, using a checklist to score and rank the presence and quality of internal procedures and managerial systems

The IC should assist CCG grantees to shift to new grant criteria involving matching fund requirements In light of the expanded tasks proposed for the IC in this evaluation report, the IC should review its capacity and the likely demand for its services over the next few years, in terms of the scenarios presented at the beginning of the report

The IC should complete execution of the current CDF grant pipeline and continue to exercise oversight over grants allocated under the current criteria Between now and the end of FY1999, CDF funds should be sufficient, beyond what has already been spent, to finance two new projects under consideration (including the Veld project), and at least five capacity-building projects with new RDCs -- for a total of about $850,000 The team does not recommend financing expensive game fences out of this fund (a 100 km fence can cost up to several hundred thousand dollars) Based on the CDF level proposed for the years following FY2000, and if placed in a sinking fund to extend for about 10 years, the CDF funds expended would not exceed $425,000 per year and would go for many small grants to a wide range of new, and old, CCG partners (Table 13)

Evaluation Issue Regional Communication, Cooperation, and Coordination

CAMPFIRE and the Southern Africa region *"Has regional cooperation/coordination improved under NRMP II? Zimbabwe's component of NRMP I was expected to benefit from its linkages to the broader SARP initiative, yet the first evaluation reported little tangible progress toward reaching regional consensus and program synergy If so, to what extent has the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE benefitted from and/or contributed to improvements in regional-level cooperation/coordination? What, if anything, should be done to improve the NRMP II's contribution to regional level cooperation/ coordination? What, if anything, should be done to improve the Regional NRMP's contribution to the achievement of NRMP II specific objectives?"* (SOW A-3)

Findings

A Congressional directive that USAID support elephant conservation initially led to USAID's regional initiative in CBNRM That directive coincided with the 1988 Sustainable Wildlife Utilization workshop held in Gaborone, Botswana The outgrowth in terms of USAID field activity took shape under the SARP-NRMP, which tested sustainable use as a means of conserving elephants and other wildlife in three pilot countries -- Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe -- and gave Malawi, which has

the lead role for SADC in NRM, a coordinating role With regards to Zimbabwe and CAMPFIRE, the important point is that a defined conservation approach *already* existed, to which USAID lent support, consistent with its testing of its CBNRM precepts In Phase I of the Zimbabwe NRMP, nearly the entire US$7 6 million authorization was expended, at a time when the context and conditions framing elephant conservation efforts were undergoing rather dramatic changes at the international level

When elephants were given CITES Appendix 1 status and Zimbabwe began lobbying (unsuccessfully in 1992) for a reversal, the regional concern with elephant conservation under the project was no longer the central issue (the ban was considered by Congress as addressing the need to do something to promote elephant conservation) The amended SARP project paper showed a distinct shift toward national concerns (and more direct bilateral program management) and away from pilot interventions toward more general institutionalization of CBNRM Although wildlife utilization and the capture of revenue remain central, the conceptual shift, in both Zimbabwe and the other country programs, was clearly toward multiple resources and diversification of revenues

New CBNRM programs in neighboring countries adopted CAMPFIRE principles but not necessarily its initial elephant focus, and certainly not its historic particularities, such as the Appropriate Authority mechanism Regional sharing of common and differing experiences and the drawing of lessons have become a major aspect of the regional program Under the reorganized regional office, diversified CBNRM approaches became a focus in and of themselves

The USAID RCSA has given new impetus to regional and transnational NRM, and regional linkages and consensus are beginning to emerge The program synergy that was lacking in the previous mid-term evaluation is now visible and growing The 1995 regional NRMP conference in Kasane, Botswana marked a turning point, substantiating the fact that a shared Southern Africa perspective on CBNRM was emerging (Rihoy, ed 1995) In the past few years, the RCSA has refined its mission and launched an important regional support project, NETCAB NETCAB, which began in late 1995, helps reinforce capacity-building among NRM activities by strengthening networking It also supports start-up of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Southern African Sustainable Use Initiative, CITES TRAFFIC compliance monitoring (although Zimbabwe was judged not to need outside assistance in this area), NGO networks, and various regional-level workshops, for example, in ecotourism As does the regional component of the NRMP, NETCAB also supports cross-country visits by persons at all levels -- decisionmakers, technical staff, NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs)/individual producers These appear to have been highly successful

Zimbabwean NGOs provide the technical assistance team that implements the regional NRMP The RCSA-financed consortium of WWF, the IUCN, and ART has assisted the USAID/Z Mission in carrying out strategic planning, and it has contributed to CAMPFIRE by supporting regional activities such as the successful seminar tour by various CBNRM participants to the United States and Canada, and the realization of a theatrical production on the theme of community-based conservation

CAMPFIRE has had a regional impact in many other ways Key individuals coming out of the CAMPFIRE movement have taken on important roles in regional organizations One early CAMPFIRE pioneer now directs a conservation-based community development project in Zambia One student of Professor Murphree plays an important role in Mozambique's Tshuma Tshata, a local initiative in community-based NRM It is opening the way for policies and legislation that are being developed in that country The Agency's Biodiversity Support Project/BIOME was able to use ART and the IUCN Sustainable Use Specialist Group (headed by important CAMPFIRE founding figures) to carry out international visits

Conclusions

Collaboration between the regional program and national activities such as CAMPFIRE have improved significantly in the several years since the last mid-term evaluation Synergy between similar CBNRM programs is developing across countries Shared objectives and agendas are strengthening individual programs Other programs, for example, have learned from CAMPFIRE's strengths -- its principles, commitment to empowerment, and strong adaptive management approach to wildlife and program coordination -- and from its weaknesses -- the limited degree of devolution, the constraining policies that make change difficult, and the rigidity imposed by the very strong focus on a single resource With regard to the USAID role, progress has been limited by available staff and management time the RCSA has been able to afford

Through involvement in neighboring programs, trained and experienced CAMPFIRE practitioners have shortened other countries' learning curves in designing and implementing their programs The lengthy experience with CAMPFIRE provides the foundation that is permitting CCG members (e g , WWF and ART) to shift to regional roles Zimbabwe's presence at regional NRM fora can sometimes be overpowering to smaller and less mature programs in neighboring countries

Observing the more rapid progress in other countries' programs in recent years has driven home the point that CAMPFIRE is relatively blocked or frozen, some have even argued that it is emerging from a period of backsliding This team concluded that this exposure has made CAMPFIRE more open to constructive criticism and change

Recommendations

NRMP II NGOs in the CCG should continue to expand their regional roles and ties but not at the expense of CAMPFIRE and CBNRM in Zimbabwe

The CA should request RCSA assistance in accessing the lessons of devolution and working with CBOs and local-level producer communities This assistance could involve workshops and exchange visits for the CA Board, District Council executives, and others, including CBOs themselves

The team recommends expanding the continuing ongoing relationship between the RCSA and CAMPFIRE, even prior to NRMP II completing its phaseout plan

The RCSA should explore with the NRMP II IC what role the RCSA could play as the CDF is transferred to an independent grant-making entity At a minimum, the RCSA will be able to bring in wider regional and international experience with sustainable conservation finance, and possibly can assist the independent body with technical support in preparing and reviewing post-NRMP II CDF grant proposals

The RCSA should assist lead figures in the CAMPFIRE producer communities and at higher levels of the CAMPFIRE movement to play technical assistance roles in neighboring programs

The RCSA should take the lead in defining an appropriate USAID role in supporting southern Africa regional states and NGO concerns in advocating national and regional positions on important policy and economic issues related to wildlife and other resource management and use

IV. DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT

A. Devolution and Issues of Appropriate Authority

Evaluation Issue Ownership of CAMPFIRE at the National, Rural District Council, and Lower Levels. *"How effective have implementing partners been in instilling a sense of Programme ownership among participating RDCs? To what extent are the implementing partners' work plans responsive to beneficiaries' demands for services? To what extent has an effective Customer Service Plan been put in place to monitor RD clients' level of satisfaction with the services being provided to them by each of the implementing partners? What, if anything, should be done to promote improved responsiveness and accountability to RD and community customers?" (SOW C-3-b) "To what extent does USAID's relationship with its NGO partners cause problems in ownership, defining the roles/responsibilities of the various implementing agents and in determining future directions for CAMPFIRE? What, if anything, should be done to improve relationships among all Project partners (expanded team members) in the future?" (SOW A-6)*

Findings

The essential "owners" of the CAMPFIRE movement within Zimbabwe are the rural communities and their elected representatives at the RDC level Sustainable management of their natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, and their socioeconomic well-being are the focus of efforts by the CCG and NRMP II/SO1

Although a fundamental principle of CAMPFIRE is cooperation and partnership in the pursuit of sustainable management of natural and other indigenous resources, there appears to be more competition than partnership among some CCG institutional partners One source of this tension is, as noted, differing access to and control of donor money, and the power and support it provides to building a constituency Moreover, it is not always clear what the focus of the CA, a very young organization, will be, and whether it will rely on government, private, and NGO partner institutions to provide technical support and training

Conclusions

All institutions adhering to CAMPFIRE principles should have a stake in the ownership of the Programme The competition and uncertainty over the position of the CA are deterring some private sector organizations and NGOs from joining or fully supporting the CCG partnership Some think they can apply the CAMPFIRE principles on their own and do not have to be "led" by the CA.

That the RDCs wish to claim "ownership" of CAMPFIRE through their CA is a very positive development, and should permit supporting institutions to play more of an advisory and technical support role to the growing CAMPFIRE constituency However, it would be a mistake to downgrade CCG members to a status of simple providers Their vested interests go well beyond that

Collectively, the CAMPFIRE partners have an impressive range of skills and experience that can lead the Programme well into the next century The CA's challenge, to successfully fill the coordination role to which it aspires, is precisely to enhance the CCG members of shared commitment and ownership of the Programme, which is larger than any single organization

Recommendations

The CA, as the lead agency within the Zimbabwe CCG network, should, through its RDC constituency, exercise its leadership vigorously by advocating nationally for CAMPFIRE principles and continuing policy reforms aimed at the devolution of sufficient authority over natural and other indigenous resources to local communities

CAMPFIRE collaborators, NGOs, the CA and its RDCs, and government agencies must put past differences behind them and begin truly collaborating to reach their common goal of further devolution

Evaluation Issue Devolution of Appropriate Authority and Bottom-up Planning
"To what extent has the NRMP II/CAMPFIRE taken steps to further devolve authority over indigenous natural resources below the district level? To what extent have RDCs adopted a more bottom-up approach to identifying, planning and implementing Project/Programme activities? What has been done to promote increased devolution/control of CAMPFIRE financial benefits to producer communities? What if anything should be done to promote a more bottom-up approach?" (SOW, A7) "CAMPFIRE theory proposes that authority for NRM should be devolved to the 'most appropriate authority ' Is the current level of devolution of authority appropriate for the resources being managed under CAMPFIRE? Does the current focus on Rural District Councils (RDCs) as 'Appropriate Authorities' limit the achievements of CAMPFIRE's community development objectives? Does it limit CAMPFIRE's movement into community-based management of other, non-wildlife, and indigenous resources? Review, assess, and discuss realistic alternatives to CAMPFIRE's current devolutionary approach towards CBRNM, using examples, where appropriate, from other similar programs " (SOW, 4-B)

In the Mid-Zambezi, during the early CAMPFIRE movement (1989), personnel carried a slogan on their shirts that read, "Putting the last first " That slogan derives from the concepts for devolution of authority developed by Robert Chambers, who said

> With secure tenure and rights to land, livestock and trees, farm families tend to take the long view and invest in sustainable agriculture Without it, they take the short view and environmental degradation often follows (Cited in Derman, "The Unsettling of the Zambezi Valley," September 1990 3)

Findings

National Level (CCG Programme Partners, GOZ, and Others) CAMPFIRE has been a powerful force in stimulating rural peoples and their elected representatives in the RDCs, along with their CCG partners, to take the development of their own areas into their own hands and to apply the CAMPFIRE concepts They have supplied enduring ideas and detailed case studies Their work merits continued experimentation, testing, refinement, and elaboration The CAMPFIRE literature provides some of the few valid analyses that indicate how sustainable development might yet take place

The CA, the RDCs' most vocal NRM advocacy group, clearly promotes the concept that the RDCs are to be elected "from the bottom up," and the RDCs are becoming increasingly autonomous in the management of their own affairs The RDCs know, however, that they have limited capacity for NRM and rural community development activities, and that, to achieve their goals for their Districts, they need various kinds of technical and material support They have been proponents, often in the face of objections by the GOZ (which strongly favors using all bilateral funding for government agency support), of the need for partnerships with NGOs and private sector groups An important achievement of NRMP II has been to support the CA in its important front-line assistance to Zimbabwean institutions active in bringing private sector and NGO expertise to bear on the expressed needs of the Rural Districts and their local populations CAMPFIRE advocates in Zimbabwe continue to push for policy changes that will help rural households, village communities, and wards organize themselves so that they can better manage their natural resources

The Rural District Councils Act was a major step by the GOZ in decentralizing central authority to the 57 Rural Districts of the country It was a move to delegate power to local people No longer could a Minister in Harare make unilateral decisions affecting a particular Rural District without its consultation and support

Official policy statements and sentiments concerning devolution have shifted over time Bond's policy log (Bond 1998a, reproduced in Appendix N) suggests what some might consider a negative trend of (recentralization) in the 1995-1997 period However, recent ministerial statements and expressions of interest in CAMPFIRE by the FC and The DNR suggest that this negative sentiment is shifting toward a more positive view of sustainable use through devolution The MLGNH has likewise endorsed decentralization " decentralization is necessary and desirable based on the clear understanding that it promotes and strengthens democracy and civic responsibility and citizens participate in their governance and democracy " (J L Nkomo, Minister, MLGNH, 1998) The Minister of the MMET has gone so far as to say that a current legislative review

> will include considering further devolution of Appropriate Authority below the RD level, to the villages and wards We envision a situation where communities eventually have the legislative backup when they decide to go into business transactions and to negotiate deals on their own without needing an overlord in the form of an RD which should ideally concentrate on being a regulatory body (February 26, 1998 speech, Harare, Zimbabwe)

The GOZ continues strongly to support exploring further means of devolving management of natural resources to rural communities For example, in a February 26, 1998 speech, the Minister of MMET, CDE Simon Khaya Moyo, declared that CAMPFIRE was an "unqualified success" and that "the Government is proud to be associated with it " He stated further that the Government will continue "easing legislation governing access by rural communities to all natural resources" so that they "can realize maximum benefits from the resources they live with " CAMPFIRE, he said, "is an integral part of a nationwide decentralization program through which communities will assume greater control over their own development " The Government of Zimbabwe "will be more proactive and will investigate ways of shedding some of its costly responsibilities to capable, well organized communities like those involved in CAMPFIRE " Within this show of support, the MMET and MLGNH, the key ministries with operational responsibility for translating this commitment into action, are, however, proposing different approaches and timetables

Promotion of bottom-up planning is facing some serious constraints are making its implementation much harder These constraints, which are not being addressed under NRMP II, are

- The varying effectiveness of participatory methodologies, even when used by experienced practitioners
- The need for further experimentation with the methodologies before they can be disseminated widely
- The differences across Rural Districts in terms of resources, potential, and needs, which necessitate developing and using different strategies

Rural District Councils A variety of legislation reinforces the RDCs' central role within the framework of a decentralized allocation of natural resources and the benefits deriving from their use To date, formal devolution of authority under CAMPFIRE applies only to wildlife The issue of providing equivalent status to other natural and indigenous resources remains unclear and unresolved, although in general both policy and practice support their use The CA Board noted that the RDCs can, without the FC's authorization, enter into concession-type agreements with private operators to exploit timber resources within their borders Current practice, however, is to get FC sanction of RDC-operator concessions The evaluation team noted at least one case in which the Hurungwe RDC needed FC authorization for its recent timber concession agreement

The GOZ has passed some acts recently that strengthen decentralization and are a first step toward the level of devolution implied in the earlier discussion of CAMPFIRE principles (Section II D) There is inconsistency, however, across the acts (e g , the Forestry and the Rural District Acts) The Communal Land Act, for example, enables by-laws but confuses land allocation Traditional chiefs and kraal heads did not welcome the Rural District and the Chiefs and Headman's Acts because they thought the legislation would disempower them by removing their basis for power and local authority The Regional Town and Country Planning Act requires local authorities to consult with area residents on all land-use plans in rural areas, whereas the Forestry Act apparently does not permit local

communities to take charge of and economically manage their local forest/woodland resources The Natural Resources Act can take land away for the State if it judges it to be "degraded" and in need of "rehabilitation" Decisions to take land away are not necessarily made in a participatory manner The Rural Land Act addresses the loss of habitat to resettlement schemes, the State over RDCs and below (e g , Masoka) and can also expropriate lands, especially unsettled habitat

The RDCs appreciate CAMPFIRE because it has provided a mechanism for them to gain new sources of (wildlife) revenue delegated from the State They also appreciate donor funds such as those provided through NRMP II that allow the purchase of vehicles and computers and provide some temporary salary support to help set up CAMPFIRE offices in the Rural Districts, particularly those without significant wildlife dividends

CAMPFIRE principles serve as "guidelines" that are applied based on the different needs of the different Rural Districts Their meaning and significance appear to vary depending on whether the organization is a CCG NGO partner or the CA and RDCs NGOs have quite different objectives than those of the CA and its member RDCs, which are directly responsible for the well-being of the communities they represent In response to questions from the evaluation team about CAMPFIRE principles, RDC representatives asked, "whose principles are we talking about?" As noted, each Rural District has its own particular set of resources and needs, so that there may be several different sets of them and no standard, generalizable one Nyaminyami, for example, may not be giving the recommended percentage of wildlife dividends back to its local communities, as some other Rural Districts may be doing, but its circumstances are different Wildlife-generated revenue is far and away the most important source of funds for the District's multitude social and administrative needs, such as schools or health facilities Its local communities -- wards or producer communities, among them -- want these services, and the GOZ does not have money to give them The RDC believes that it is using the funds to benefit local communities, even though they are not receiving the dividends directly Other Rural Districts, in contrast, may also be able to generate revenue from commercial farms, businesses, mining activities, etc

Many CAMPFIRE Districts will have access to an additional source of revenue for local infrastructure development through the World Bank's new "Community Poverty Alleviation Project " It should provide the Rural Districts an opportunity to follow CAMPFIRE recommendations concerning the distribution of dividends to communities at the ward and lower levels more closely The project will make available US$43 million in *grants* over five years for local infrastructure activities in 26 districts, Nyaminyami included, beginning May or June 1998

The current focus on RDCs may limit the achievement of some CAMPFIRE community development objectives, such as diversification into community-based management of other native indigenous resources The RDCs may be more interested in promoting "high value" resource development options and pay less attention to supporting the efforts of smaller groupings of communities in the District who are coming together around resources with much less exciting economic potential from the RDCs' perspective This RDC preoccupation is understandable, given their pressing need for funds to support general community needs

The RDCs that have received Appropriate Authority to manage wildlife resources within their Districts are to follow a management plan that designates quota limits on various wildlife for cropping and game hunting These Districts have been working directly with private sector commercial hunting interests to market their hunts, and with tourist game-viewing groups or hotel chains such as Sun Hotels, that want concession rights within their territories The USAID project helps the RDCs "get the best deal" from these commercial operators by providing training and capacity-building to local communities It has no direct relationship with the strictly commercial operations themselves

To manage their wildlife, well-endowed Rural Districts must crop certain animal populations Nyaminyami, for instance, uses District game guards to crop about 1,500 impala each year District trucks pick them up and deliver them to the various wards, where the carcasses are sold at a subsidized price (Z$5/kg) The sales are necessary, says the RDC, to pay for the cost of ammunition, fuel for the trucks, time of the game guards, etc It is difficult to consider these cropped animals as "belonging" to the producer communities, however, when they have to purchase them Traditional hunting with registration might be cheaper Some communities might even be able to increase the value-added by permitting professional bow-hunting under their local control

Colonial policy relegated the mass of rural poor to state-controlled and owned "communal lands," which are located in semi-arid and generally low productivity regions where open access is the norm Current programs continue to be designed and implemented around community-shared access systems Although government policy is to resettle people from the communal lands on to more productive ones, land reform has been slow, and the resources to carry it out are limited In practice, the resettlement programs and informal settlements are pushing onto marginal communal lands

The RDCs have not *as a group* demonstrated a bottom-up approach to identifying, planning, and implementing CAMPFIRE activities or CDF grants under the NRMP II, albeit with some clear examples to the contrary (see Appendix E-Gwanda field trip) The RDC approach is better described as top-down, with consideration of local points of view The reasons for this approach are many

- No one has given the Harare-based staff and consultants developing CDF projects (the IC and CA) instructions, incentives, time, or methodologies for bottom-up planning in CDF project development Skill levels for bottom-up planning vary tremendously across the RDC and field-based CAMPFIRE staff

- The incentive to do bottom-up planning varies constantly as the willingness of cash-strapped RDCs to share revenue with the wards fluctuates from Council to Council and year to year depending on local economic conditions

- The financial benefits that the natural resource base is producing do not always create an incentive for the RDC to apply bottom-up planning, even though the intent of that planning is to improve the productivity of the resource The implication is that specific natural resources may only hold financial incentives for local producer communities, which need tailored support to launch them

- Bottom-up *participatory* planning is hard to do, takes a long time, and does not always work The Rural District Council Act, as revised in 1996, supports this process The Land Tenure Commission has submitted new recommendations to the GOZ that show the GOZ is seriously considering returning to the concept of the traditional village, with its own circumscribed territory, led by a chief, who would be advised by a popularly elected council of village people Under this scenario, the VIDCO and WADCO committees would cease to exist, and the territorial or spatial building blocks for the planning effort would change dramatically

- In some cases, it is not clear that the RDCs have a significant interest in applying the CAMPFIRE principles because they are already able to exploit the resources without revenue-sharing rules In other cases, when the CAMPFIRE revenue becomes very large, the RDCs are tempted to use the funds for other District-level social development projects Nyaminyami is a case in point in 1996, revenue-sharing accounted for only 27% of wildlife revenue, and in 1997 only 18% The average across the Rural Districts in 1996 was 52%, with a range of from 0% to 78% Nevertheless, it may be argued that most RDCs *do* represent their constituents and do seek the best for the greatest number of people -- a political reality

The existence of CAMPFIRE coordinators, game scouts, and game guards at the Rural District and ward levels paid for by local, decentralized government units out of their own wildlife receipts is an important achievement in the devolution of authority It brings accountability for the conservation and management of the resources to the local levels most interested in their sustainability for their own long-term socioeconomic benefit

Below the RDC Level (Ward and Producer Communities) Formal devolution of authority below the level of the RDCs in communal areas has not yet occurred The fact that most RDCs are treating only "wildlife sport hunting income" as "CAMPFIRE income," with other wildlife (ecotourism and photo-safaris) and natural resource income (from forestry, minerals) accruing only to the Districts, underscores the need for clearer and more forceful policies favoring the downward transfer of resource rights

There are examples, however, of de facto devolution Interviews with CAMPFIRE stakeholders at the ward and village levels revealed that, in some Rural Districts, democratically elected ward- and village-level committees *do* control CAMPFIRE wildlife revenues and decide how to use the money for the good of the community Some local interviewees firmly rejected the notion that they would do whatever the RDCs told them to do with their CAMPFIRE dividends Some Districts, for instance, have permitted the formation of "dam committees" around small dams and bodies of water so as to manage their fish resources However, the options available to local communities have not been well-developed NRMP II could support applied research and technical capacity-building on this important topic

When the evaluation team interviewed people in the wards and villages, the latter expressed a clear sense of "their land and resources " They asserted clearly that they would be able to manage these resources themselves if given the right This potent concept may receive impetus under the proposed

new natural resources legislation This legislation will reportedly affirm the concept of village territories which would be defined and turned over to local management and first-level resource conflict adjudication

On the other hand, it is clear the RDCs and CAMPFIRE Ward committees believe that the local communities need, in the words of one CAMPFIRE Board member, to be "controlled so they won't just do whatever they want with their resources " At one extreme, a paternalistic concern was expressed to the team that distribution of cash dividends to local people will lead them to waste it

Greater attention could be paid to the other channels already permitted by law that the CA is not yet pursuing effectively Other NGOs and USAID have advocated cooperative structures, user groups, economic interest groups, and other groupings *not* tied to RDC authority As yet, they have not, as yet, been able effectively to translate these options into practice There is concern that the MLGNH might see the effort as "subversive" to the local government structures that should be providing such services There is also a perception that the other channels might create a dependence on "outside" NGOs rather than on local leaders and RDC members

As Appropriate Authority is currently structured, the unit of proprietorship is not small enough and continues to be a major challenge in Zimbabwe's evolving CAMPFIRE Programme Current government discussions offer hope for further devolution of authority to the ward and even to lower levels However, different natural resources may require different approaches to devolution

Legal authority over natural resources below the district level is vested in a number of ministries and commissions and is addressed in several laws, ministerial regulations, and policy documents (examples being the FC and the Forest Act) The DNPWLM was the first governmental body to experiment with devolution of authority, in this case with respect to wildlife resources Since then, many of Zimbabwe's public entities have expressed an interest in following that innovative lead

In practice, the following concepts have been the focus of attention

- Supporting producer communities using a constellation of natural resources
- Vesting producer communities with a wide bundle of access, use, and management rights over the resources
- Sharing the natural resource revenue between the RDC and producer community in question

The hypothesis that drives these ideas is that vesting the producing communities with rights will provide a much-needed incentive for them to engage in sustainable management The policy framework supporting such incentives is, however, unfinished In part the reason is the CA's inability to push the policy agenda in this critical area forcibly Recently the PET subcommittee for policy has shown renewed energy in pursuing this agenda

The CCG organizations and their staff have successfully kept devolution on the local agenda and in use as a significant concept by continuing their experimentation and workshops in the wards and villages of producer communities The most common action has been to conduct "awareness workshops" to inform producer communities about what rights they have over their natural resources and how they might benefit from their sustainable use Certain follow-up workshops are designed to empower these communities to act on this knowledge, especially when the resource has a high market value, the case with wildlife

It appears that tension is growing between the RDCs and villages as people gain experience in applying CBNRM ideas and demand greater accountability of their local officials At the extreme, the team was informed of an instance where the records on wildlife or other natural resource off-take which are not kept at ward levels, and where the RDCs directly hired and supervised ward-level game scouts, pressures for unrecorded hunts are taking place at the RDC level and that "two sets of books" are or were being maintained on what specific wards should expect to receive This extreme example underscores the growing pressure and need for further decentralization where it the scale of operations is localized At the same time, NGOs have been working at the ward levels through the NRMP II to build their capacity to keep accurate records and account for funds (see Appendix K on one Hurungwe Ward)

Devolution of Benefits As previously discussed, there is scattered anecdotal evidence that the villages and wards are being "steered" on how to use their CAMPFIRE revenues for collective income-generating projects and social services This "steering" is *not* necessarily bad *if* the schools and clinics built are provided with the necessary paid government personnel In a similar vein, it appears there is a tendency for observers, supporters, and facilitators to pass judgement on the value or usefulness of what the village and ward committees decide to do with their money once they get it For their part, the RDCs want to be kept informed on a timely basis of what the wards and villages intend to do with the revenues, since, as the legal authority in the district (and below), they are accountable for all local governance activity, including the utilization of local revenues from whatever sources For the same reason, they have a responsibility and right to know about the outside organizations working within their borders

Giving local communities the option of receiving cash dividends, however small, is a strategic masterpiece, as people are then willing to combine their funds for larger activities of social benefit to a wider section of the ward population This outcome is very satisfactory to the RDCs, as it assists them in providing the social services the central government is not providing This practice also offers a strong impetus to producers to participate in the Programme and convinces villagers that the RDC is not "holding out on them "

The RDCs and villages often use the revenues and grants they receive to promote long-term resource stability However, the wards and villages are not necessarily using their CAMPFIRE dividends for specific wildlife management projects Instead, some have spent their revenues for schools, teachers' cottages, grinding mills, clinics, and household dividends Three wards are using their funds to maintain game fencing, and one ward is considering using the funds for dam maintenance Other

NRM-related uses for the funds include water points for wildlife, dam maintenance, and reclamation of an irrigation scheme It is difficult to argue with these expenditures, as long as a majority believe they are the best ways to improve the welfare of households individually and collectively In time, as the more urgent social needs of local communities are met, and if they believe their tenure over the resource is secure, more wards and villages will invest at least in the maintenance of resource management facilities

In most Rural Districts, the producer communities need a very high percentage of the revenues for them to have an incentive to conserve and manage the wildlife resource There is fragmented evidence that the RDCs are returning less to producer communities with each passing year As discussed in Section III A 3, the RDCs have a mixed track record on devolving CAMPFIRE revenues The producer communities receive 50% of the revenues allocated to them under CAMPFIRE However, the amounts are sometimes too small and too variable to elicit the needed sustainable management response from producer communities

Indeed, some local communities are favoring cropland over wildlife and are engaging in uncontrolled subsistence hunting of lesser game species There are a number of reasons for this response

- The RDCs have many demands for revenues, and natural resource-based income is a tempting source of general funds

- The RDCs are also very slow to return the benefits to local communities

- Many of the current, leading CAMPFIRE wildlife Districts are not consistent in reporting their wildlife-related income, partly because some apply a narrow definition of that income Many Rural Districts bordering on the National Parks (e g , Nyaminyami) receive, or until recently received, 50% of the trophy fees from the National Parks for hunting that takes place in the "Safari Areas," which, while not actually part of district territory, nevertheless have wards adjacent to the parks Because the Rural Districts do not consider this revenue as deriving from CAMPFIRE, they do not report it and instead use it for general revenue needs If this revenue were considered as CAMPFIRE, it would be included in what is potentially shared as dividends with local communities

- NRMP II funding is not made contingent on RDC accountability for the use of CAMPFIRE revenue

- A final point is that most GOZ Acts devolve considerable authority to the RDCs and little to the wards

There has been some limited experimentation with "producer community" management (or "community-based cooperative management") of wildlife and other renewable natural resources Examples are the Mopane worm management in Bulilima-mangwe, grazing schemes, proposed communal wildlife trusts, and collective management of some fisheries

Conclusions

Some local producer communities feel no security of tenure over wildlife-related benefits in terms of amounts, timeliness of receipt, stability over the years, and integrity of the RDCs that are responsible for issuing the dividends As a consequence, the incentive to manage their wildlife resources sustainably may be insufficient This situation is a major threat to CAMPFIRE in general It may also require that the RDCs become the "district game department" to protect the source of the revenues

Within Zimbabwe, the model for decentralization is "co-management" (State and rural partners), and not full decentralization and devolution of authority to rural communities to manage the resources themselves This model limits CAMPFIRE's applicability to other countries in Africa and elsewhere, where devolution of authority for some natural resource subsectors has progressed further (see text box 8)

To date, progress toward "producer community" management (or "community-based cooperative management") over wildlife and other renewable natural resources remains limited to a few experiments Murphree states that "the core of the matter is strong property rights for *collective communal units*, not only over wildlife and other natural resources, but over the land itself" The RDCs continue to retain tenurial rights over the entire unit of their communal lands While they are sharing a portion of the revenue benefits with the wards with wildlife resources, the amounts, timeliness, and consistency of the payments vary, affording little security to local communities This is CAMPFIRE's greatest recognized weakness and greatest threat to its conceptual roots

Different resources require different levels of devolution of authority Whereas it may be appropriate for wildlife, which move around, to be managed at a district level, the same is not necessarily true for other natural resources (e g , timber, fish in ponds, and forest products)

A return to the concept of "natural resource cooperatives" might be considered, under the authority of the RDCs or with local autonomy

Greater effort to look at alternative approaches to providing support at the ward and village levels is needed Despite the existence of counterexamples, too much credence has been given to the idea that Appropriate Authority prevents any other kind of village/ward-level community action program

There probably is enough latitude at the Rural District levels to permit small-scale support for household- and village-level initiatives (associations, pre-cooperatives and cooperatives, and economic interest groups) aimed at exploiting natural resources other than wildlife, if the resources are available in economically interesting quantities Organizing across ward and district boundaries, as is already being tried in certain larger private sector-oriented initiatives, may be necessary to achieve the volume and scale needed for economic viability The economic aspects of such initiatives will need to respect the need for tenure security, and the beneficiary communities should be the producer communities

Two of NRMP II's critical assumptions are problematic (1) that "adequate ownership and use rights continue to exist for individuals and communities to manage resources sustainably and to benefit directly from that management", and (2) "CAMPFIRE communities can manage population growth, particularly due to in-migration from less developed areas " It is not clear that either of these conditions has ever existed in a *general* sense, and movement toward these conditions is too slow and is hampered by contradictory policy This situation can threaten program achievements and long-term sustainability

Box 8.

In Niger, the State, through the Forestry Service, has delegated (subject to management plans) what is legally mandated appropriate authority to *specific villages* to manage a geographically delineated territory The policy is one village-one territory-one market The village has exclusive rights to market all firewood within the boundaries, subject to a mutually agreed upon management plan The village itself sets the price of the wood, and all merchants must purchase wood from these village markets The village market manager gives the wood merchant a government-authorized permit to transport wood (location, quantity, and cost indicated) The village market manager also collects, above the cost of the wood, a government levy of US$0 20/*stere* (one cubic meter of wood) This policy has effectively stopped the "rape of the woodlands" by wood merchants and forestry officials, brings very significant revenue directly into poor communities, and generates far more income for the State coffers than the previous system of "open woodland commons," which permitted abuse and corruption The communities are now lobbying for officially recognized sanction powers to administer and keep fines levied Zimbabwe could learn from this model that for some resources, their payoff to placing confidence in village level structures and authorities

Stressing the autonomy of wards to make decisions about CAMPFIRE revenues is a key success factor in the Programme The RDCs should continue to make clear on an ongoing basis that the wards and local communities can receive the dividend payments during any particular year and should be flexible in allowing for community-led choices The CAMPFIRE principles will be quickly violated if the dividend dispersal system does not allow local communities to choose their own projects freely each year

CAMPFIRE supporters should limit their interventions to facilitating access to the benefits of the resource and insuring that spending and allocation decisions fairly involve all groups considered as producers of the resource

The acclaimed and widely visible success (in terms of income generation) of the legislation authorizing Appropriate Authority for wildlife resources has perhaps blinded many to the potential that exists in other areas The RDCs, the CA, and too many others have jumped on the wildlife sport-hunting bandwagon, a fairly easy winner, and paid insufficient attention to other sectors In this regard, it is important to identify and support local Zimbabwean private and informal sector initiatives underway in many different areas (the following section explores questions related to diversification of income and indigenous resources)

Recommendations

The RDCs that crop animals might consider giving a share of the "quota" for cropping to the wards adjacent to these wildlife areas, allowing them to remove the permitted number of animals when and how they wish This practice would devolve an important resource into their hands so that they will begin to think of these animals as theirs, much as they do their own cattle The communities would finance the removal of these animals themselves The RDC could monitor the Programme through the game scouts, who would be involved in the process

CAMPFIRE support personnel in the CCG and districts (CAMPFIRE coordinators) need to spend more time linking up with other Zimbabwean private and informal sector natural resource utilization schemes CDF funds could be used to help support promising and sustainable ventures that would provide economic returns to village- and ward-level communities or groups

CAMPFIRE must get away from the idea that the RDCs must control all income-generating NRM economic ventures, from which they retain about one half of the benefits for themselves In the case of many small-scale economic ventures, *all* income should accrue to the village- or ward-level associations or cooperatives, with only a small levy being passed on to the RDCs Examples of this approach are found in many other parts of Africa

CAMPFIRE should expand technical and organizational support to local user groups such as the "dam committees" organized to exploit fisheries The devolution models practiced in other African countries might be consulted (see the text box below)

CCG members must harmonize their efforts, particularly in light of the important challenges facing Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE in the coming years in terms of maintaining current wildlife resources and extending CAMPFIRE activities to other natural resources

Box 9.

The Fisheries Department in Niger has permitted villages surrounding small, permanent bodies of water to stake exclusive claim to the management and control of the fish in their waters Several villages that traditionally have exploited the fish organize into a "fishing cooperative," which has a set of internal rules to manage the fishing on this body of water To fish, each fisherman must agree to follow these rules and must, besides paying the State fishing tax, pay a local tax to the cooperative Both taxes are controlled by "fishing monitors" who are paid for out of the cooperative's revenue All fish taken from the waters must be weighed, differentiated by species, and counted at the cooperative's fish market, where fish merchants come to purchase fish. The cooperative levies a tax per kilogram of fish, with different rates for different kinds of fish. The cooperative itself has stopped the custom of fishing year-round in favor of two fishing seasons of about 60 days duration The cooperative may close the fishing season early if total fish weights (aggregate and for a few key species such as Nile perch) drop below predetermined limits Income generation has been very substantial for the local communities that monitor the fishing themselves (size of fish, net mesh, etc) and issue fines for the cooperative treasury The State gains revenue from the increasing number of fish permits and the transportation levies paid by the fish merchants This system started being used in Niger before all the legislation was completed , and actually helped define it. Similar activities could take place within Zimbabwe through a delegation of authority (not Appropriate Authority) to the dam committees, which should be organized into similar structures with the authority they need to manage these resources properly

The PRA skill levels of CCG members and district-level technical staff need to be increased and could represent a valuable shift in the NRMP II, with one caveat PRA is easily oversold In practice, the success of PRA depends on the communication skills, analytical judgement, quick thinking, and creativity of its facilitators and trainers Experience has shown that this condition is a limiting factor on wider use of PRA

The NRMP II should continue to support the capacity-building activities already underway at the ward level, and expand them into wards with income-generating resources and currently not receiving assistance This support will permit them to do better accounting, financial reporting and monitoring, and annual program budget planning

To promote a more bottom-up approach to planning by the RDCs and other players, the CCG and CA will need to become more active in policy analysis and dialogue concerning devolution Success with enabling legislation to support further devolution would go far to providing the incentive needed for bottom-up planning

All CCG members would profit from greater and more in-depth experimentation with methodologies for participatory land-use planning, resource inventories, conservation projects, and identification of village- and ward-based CBNRM activities Most would also benefit from stronger skills for analyzing the market subsectors for natural resources

Incentives need to be given to the RDCs and other players to promote CAMPFIRE principles and bottom-up planning These incentives include

- Rewards, perhaps in the form of selective grant support, for those who apply generous revenue-sharing rules and experiment with bottom-up planning,

- Positive publicity for those RDCs that do revenue-sharing and bottom-up planning,

- Application of negative sanctions for those that fail to do bottom-up planning and are stingy in their revenue-sharing, and

- A clear, up-front statement by the CDF that the degree of resource-sharing and bottom-up planning will be important criteria in judging proposals and requests for financial support

The CA and all relevant CCG members must pay much greater attention to policy issues Zimbabwe is entering a period of change, and activity in this area could produce significant, long-term results The CA should take on policy debate as its major role on behalf of its rural constituents The CA should encourage CASS to provide analytical support in this area

Evaluation Issue Performance of the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing in CAMPFIRE

Although it has not yet had an active day-to-day implementation role, the MLGNH is a key partner within CAMPFIRE because of its oversight responsibility for decentralization and local governance, including the RDCs Moreover, it is one of NRMP II's GOZ partners in the bilateral agreement and a member of the Bilateral Review Committee Under NRMP II, the Ministry sets policy, approves CDF grants, and is concerned with RDC, WADCO, and VIDCO accountability for the use of project funds, and with how local peoples are organized and how development initiatives impact them

Findings

One of the MLGNH's responsibilities is the GOZ portfolio for governance at the local levels Its official, legal charge is to *establish and maintain the institutions for local governance in Zimbabwe* Its authority centers on fostering and assuring effective relationships among the various levels of governance, consistent with GOZ law -- provincial, Rural District, ward (WADCO), and village/community (VIDCO) As the exclusive legal authority for local government in Zimbabwe, the MLGNH conducts the initial reviews of applications from the RDCs for Appropriate Authority It then forwards the applications it approves to the MMET, the ministry with authority over all wildlife issues It in turn reviews, approves, and returns the applications to the MLGNH, which then notifies the RDC of the decision Thus far, approval has been 99+% certain

MLGNH's role within CAMPFIRE is to establish and regulate the institutions of local governance The Ministry insists that CAMPFIRE structures be integrated with official government structures In the past they have expressed concern about the creation of "parallel structures" that they believed CAMPFIRE, especially through ZimTrust's field activities, was establishing

Concerning NRMP II, the MLGNH goes to great lengths to distinguish two phases, one that occurred prior to a 1996 agreement, PIL 67, which addressed most of the concerns of the MLGNH and MMET, established new principles for project implementation, and affirmed a new basis for cooperation with USAID, a second, "much happier period" that followed the signing of PIL 67 The MLGNH attributed the implementation problems CAMPFIRE experienced in 1996 principally to the failure of the other implementing agencies to recognize the authority and responsibilities of the key government ministries responsible for the institutions of local governance (the MLGNH) and wildlife (the MMET) The parties held several meetings that resulted in PIL 67 The meetings also helped build trust and strengthened relations between the Government, USAID, and the CCG Whereas in the past the MLGNH had found USAID "the most difficult donor to work with," more recently collaboration has been positive The Ministry now claims that USAID, successfully working through it as part of a larger group, has even "helped the government speed up the process of decentralization " While "there is still room for improvement," any significant perceived weaknesses in CAMPFIRE are seen as having preceded the 1996 consultative meetings

The MLGNH is a member of the key new implementation structure, the NRMP II BRC, which also includes USAID, the MOF, and the MMET The BRC has primary responsibility for management oversight of project implementation, including resource allocation, evaluation, and national-level coordination of project activities with other relevant development initiatives As the lead GOZ agency, the MMET serves as the BRC Secretariat

The MLGNH is also a member of the CCG, although it usually does not play an active role in the everyday implementation of NRMP II According to the MLGNH, the 1996 problems had called its project participation into question The Ministry remained involved because of the importance of the needs of the people on communal lands and the "possibility" that the project could be repositioned on a proper course The MLGNH has been attending the CCG meetings regularly since the 1996 agreement, although it was not represented at any of the meetings the evaluation team participated in While its role is limited to oversight, approval of project activities, including CDF grants, and, to some extent, policy formulation, senior Ministry officials assured the evaluation team that they "will do everything they can to make sure the CAMPFIRE project is a success "

As the MLGNH no longer feels bypassed, it and USAID have finalized discussions on the Ministry's workplan and budget The MLGNH will soon access funds under NRMP II One area of proposed MLGNH activity under NRMP II is monitoring and evaluation of individual RDC performance under CAMPFIRE It will also help strengthen RDC financial management capacity through a program of annual audits

The Ministry has a vision of success that is somewhat different from that of most organizations involved in CAMPFIRE, and it is critical of the current direction and implementation of the CAMPFIRE Programme The original (and in the MLGNH's opinion, proper) intent of the Programme was to allocate resources and revenues directly to the RDCs, to be used, it claims, at that level and below to provide needed services and facilities for their populations The MLGNH is concerned that donor assistance largely goes to support the CA, CCG, and NGOs It believes the

assistance should instead be going directly to the RDCs, which identify needed services and contract for them

The Ministry concurs with the RDCs that CAMPFIRE natural resource revenues should be deposited with the RDCs and that they, with input /approval from the producer communities in the RDCs, should determine how to use them One rationale it gives is that the proceeds from wildlife now depend on where the animal was killed, which is not necessarily in the community that made the management sacrifices in terms of cohabitation with the game while it was living For example, Ministry decisionmakers note, "an elephant which wrecks havoc in Ward 3 and travels through other wards and finally gets killed in Ward 9, 50 km away, benefits only Ward 9, and not the other wards that suffered along the way It is our hope that the Campfire Association will make wide consultations on the issue " The MLGNH claims that natural resource revenues do not now get deposited with the RDCs and that they get only a small percentage for administrative purposes The issue of whether the utilization of proceeds from CAMPFIRE activities should be handled by the producer communities or the RDCs still needs debating

The MLGNH also stated that the allocation of CAMPFIRE resources is overweighted toward CCG support to NGOs (80%), whose "capacity to carry out all the tasks required is doubtful," according to the Ministry It thinks that all CCG members are aware that they are to work through the local governance institutions established under GOZ policy and law, and that they are not to use CAMPFIRE funds to set up parallel institutions of governance It argues that CCG members should support ongoing capacity-building programs that reinforce existing institutions It supports an approach of learning by doing because it builds sustainable systems in the RDCs The Ministry's stance on devolution is conservative but it is nevertheless, "cautiously delegating power to lower tiers of government and assessing their financial and managerial capacity to handle the added responsibilities "

The Rural District Councils Act (1988, Previson 29 13) permits sub-district local authorities to take action in most areas where government is active and to administer programs, including NRM With initial approval from its RDC, the local committee can form joint committees and undertake projects to benefit their specific areas For example, a group of villages could agree to develop some common land for their own benefit (e g , a tourist park) Under the Communal Land Act (1982, Provision 20 04), any land intended for commercial use must first be "alienated" from the communal lands, and then the Ministry must give its approval Further, the intended land use has to pass an environmental assessment and other standard qualifications Given this framework, the MLGNH maintains that sub-district organization and enterprise development are possible within extant GOZ local governance institutions and regulations, and that "parallel institutions" are unnecessary and "counter-productive "

Conclusions

With the exception of CDF grant proposals, the MLGNH has been minimally involved in CAMPFIRE It should be more involved, since it is the legal authority for local governance in Zimbabwe and will have to approve the devolution of Appropriate Authority below the RDC level

MLGNH officials appear to have a mixed understanding of CAMPFIRE's approach of working through the CCG structures to build local NRM institutions It needs to develop a better understanding of the possibilities that partnership with NGOs offers

Recommendations

Since the MLGNH is a key agency in the bilateral arrangement and is a member of the BRC, USAID should expedite the release of funds to the MLGNH and strengthen dialogue in the context of policy concerns and NRMP II phaseout The MLGNH should increase its active involvement in CAMPFIRE

The CCG should be proactive in approaching the MLGNH as a policy dialogue partner

The policy issues that fall within the MLGNH's authority should be identified and a dialogue initiated on them In particular, the means for resource management below the RDC level needs exploration

The CCG should explore the areas in which the MLGNH could actively contribute to CAMPFIRE, including a possible expansion of responsibility in the allocation of CDF funds USAID should engage the MLGNH in a dialogue on key issues relating to CAMPFIRE sustainability

CDF management (USAID, IC, and the MLGNH) should develop a plan for utilizing proposed MLGNH audit results in coordinating field activities and in defining the financial management criterion for "graduating" CAMPFIRE communities The MLGNH should coordinate with the IC to benefit from financial involvement with the RDCs Helping to move RDCs from cost reimbursement to an advance system under the CDF would be a good first step

B. Land-Use Strategy and Diversification of Benefit Streams

Diversification of the sources of economic benefits through improved NRM depends on the potential inherent in the resources and on the political-ecological context (which includes pressures to maintain other land uses such as grazing or resettlement, an administrative propensity to concentrate settlement, resource access regimes i e a foreign mining company representative scoffed at the suggestion that his company might pay revenues or royalties to local communities to offset environmental costs) Resource assessments generally underlie development projects with a NRM objective CAMPFIRE is somewhat exceptional because early on it captured a ready stream of revenue, and a single resource indicator -- trophy quality -- determined the Programme's organization and focus in the early years When, in 1994, the Programme began branching out into other resources, institutional momentum and the undeniable importance of wildlife continued to hold other resources somewhat in the background However, the CA has outlined diversification as a major strategic thrust, and more attention is now being paid to other indigenous resources

This section assesses the progress and apparent potential for broadening the economic base upon which the CAMPFIRE principles are being tested In this respect, several issues may prove key to the future character and composition of the CAMPFIRE movement

- Actual land-use potential, the institutional capacity to make that determination, and the means of devising an appropriate land-use strategy based on the assessment

- Diversification of the benefit streams the economic potential for sustainable exploitation of resources and the prospects for channeling revenues in a manner consistent with the movement's philosophy

- The depth and breadth of CAMPFIRE management's capacity to accommodate new resources, markets, and modalities of production and distribution

- The feasibility of using NRMP II funds to bring in new institutional partners to meet the expanded mandate

These issues are vital and underlie the rationale for recommending continued funding for NRMP II under the scenarios presented in Section V of this document The evaluation has already signaled that under CAMPFIRE, WWF has made significant steps toward implementing a pilot participatory land-use planning methodology (see Section III B 2)

Evaluation Issue Appropriate Land Use. *"What is the most environmentally, economically and culturally appropriate land use strategy among CAMPFIRE's RDC members?"* (SOW B 1 c) *"To what extent have certain key assumptions in the design of NRMP II remained valid? To what extent have certain external risks affected Project implementation and achievements? What are the real prospects for expanding CAMPFIRE beyond its current focus on the consumptive utilization of wildlife (especially the large mammals) within the NRMP II's existing time frame?" (SOW questions C 2 a and C 2 c)*

Findings

A varied set of forces drive land-use strategies in CAMPFIRE communities, including the relative income derived from wildlife and agriculture, the influence of traditional authorities, RDCs, and the central government, the balance of ethnic and cultural factors, politics, population, the programs of external donors and NGOs, the demands of safari operators, other private sector interests, and rangeland management paradigms Households, villages, and larger groupings employ a diverse set of strategies to help manage risk, and these are shaped by their natural resource endowment

In CAMPFIRE areas, the variability of the resource endowment is critical Severe drought, for example, is always a risk in the communal areas, where annual rainfall averages less than 650 mm Rainfall is "very erratic," and below 450 mm it is "unreliable " (Child 1995) Between 1989/1990 and 1996/1997 there were six consecutive years of below average rainfall in Zimbabwe, with 1990/1991

recording the lowest level, 50% below average Only the last two years of rainfall have been above average The 1991/1992 drought was relatively more devastating to agricultural income than it was to income from the more drought-adapted wildlife, and during that season wildlife became a larger percentage of household income in CAMPFIRE wards than it had been before or has been since

Economically viable technologies and intervention strategies can be developed and adopted for the full range of ecosystems included in the Programme There is ample evidence that economically viable intervention strategies exist for Natural Regions IV and V because they are being used on private game ranches, most of which are profitable Some of the same strategies could be used on communal lands, although with less certainty because of the communal tenure of land and wildlife
It seems to be a valid rule that if wildlife income exceeds agricultural income at the household level or is a valued component of a household's strategy for reducing risk, then wildlife will be a preferred land use on a large part of the lands at the disposal of the community

Wildlife areas are also woodlands with other resources However, with the exception of a few areas with commercial timber potential, there is less clarity about the viability of strategies aimed at the management of veld and forest resources on communal lands

Key Project Assumptions

- *Wildlife utilization can compete economically and financially with other extensive forms of land use* Zimbabwe is divided into five natural regions that fall along a continuum so far as the economics of livestock and wildlife are concerned Regions I and II are suitable for intensive crop and livestock production Only more intensive types of wildlife farming could compete in those areas In Natural Regions III, IV, and V, where most of the communal lands and CAMPFIRE initiatives are found, extensive wildlife ranching produces a greater economic return than does livestock This research conclusion applies to both commercial farms and communal lands that have abundant wildlife However, commercial farmers have been using wildlife for commercial profit, whereas communal farmers have a tradition of co-existing with or without a privatized sense of ownership and control over the resource For CAMPFIRE wildlife revenues, this fact may help explain why communities often choose collective investment in social infrastructure over cash dividends for individual households

- *Communities deriving wealth from wildlife resources will both wish, and be able, to protect these resources, but only under favorable conditions* The most favorable conditions include receipt of benefits from wildlife sufficient to offset the costs of living with the wildlife, a secure claim to a continuous flow of benefits, and enough control over access to the wildlife that it can be protected

  - From a land use perspective, the income and other benefits to individual households from wildlife has to compare favorably with the damage the wildlife causes, plus any income forgone by not grazing livestock in the wildlife areas Other factors that may need to be taken into account are the objections of the people being moved out of a wildlife area, the

termination of people's access to thatch or other veld products, and even restrictions placed on dogs

- Another condition is met if the producer community has agreed to protect its commercially valuable wildlife and can enforce its decision when the wildlife is on communal territory, while someone else enforces controlled access to the wildlife when it is elsewhere (the problem of a fugitive resource)

- *Communities not only will be willing to manage these resources but also can become capable of doing so, and will invest in this management* It is simply rational entrepreneurial behavior for a person or group to manage the resources that support their livelihood and to want to improve their management capabilities, if there is a good chance that doing so will pay dividends that exceed the costs The members of CAMPFIRE communities demonstrate this behavior in the management of their individual farming activities Management of communal resources, such as wildlife, however, requires the community to act as one body There are examples of communities, such as Kanyurira, that maintain a wildlife fence because wildlife is a large income earner, just as there are examples of communities that let their fences fall into disrepair, perhaps because they have little meaningful function

- *With control over resources, farmers' behavior will lead to the improved conservation of the resource base* Control of resources over time is upon occasion called secure resource tenure or property rights Many of Zimbabwe's commercial farmers have demonstrated that with secure tenure in the form of usufruct of the wildlife on their private properties, they make wise use of that resource base, protecting it, encouraging it to grow, and making profitable, sustainable, commercial use of it Communal areas offer farmers few secure rights to resources Wildlife can be the exception where Appropriate Authority and revenue distribution to producer communities operate effectively

Some observers argue that wildlife is an inappropriate use of the land because it competes with food security (ENDA, cited in Bond, 1993, and see also Cumming, 1994) This view is based on a faulty concept of food security Food security is not the same thing as food self-sufficiency, which implies that people are producing all their own food Food security implies that people can purchase or barter for what they do not produce themselves and are making the best use of all their resources in a market economy

Where communities prefer wildlife use on a portion of the lands at their disposal, their choice may not only be economically rational, but it may also be consistent with their cultural values based on their long history of hunting and coexistence with wildlife

Field Observations Some of the conflicts between villagers and resettlement programs are severe In some cases, traditional authorities have parceled land out for uses that conflict with communal and/or RDC preferences for wildlife management In other cases, the RDCs prefer wildlife uses for lands in contravention of the preferences of local communities, which perceive the Councils

to be the prime beneficiaries of the income from wildlife In still other cases, the central government has directed agricultural settlement of lands that could produce higher returns if used for wildlife In one case external donors directed agricultural uses on wildlife lands There was also a case of a safari operator who attempted to increase the land available for wildlife by redirecting a fence he was building for the community, but the community defeated his effort

The evaluation team found that the NGOs have provided useful assistance to local communities in setting aside land for wildlife enterprises

The risk of regional political unrest is abating with the cessation of the fighting in Mozambique Team members visited one CAMPFIRE village near the border with Mozambique and found that it is benefitting from the peace in that the guerrillas are no longer killing their wildlife and people

Conclusions

It has been shown that wildlife is economically superior to livestock as a land use in Natural Regions IV and V, where the communal lands are mostly located Wildlife can be economically the best resource to use in many parts of Natural Regions IV and V, including on communal lands In a market economy, making the best economic use of resources contributes to food security Because wildlife is based on intact ecosystems characterized by natural vegetation, usually it is environmentally the most benign use of these lands

Assuming secure resource tenure, several factors are vital to successful wildlife utilization under CAMPFIRE

- Producer communities must receive a major share of the revenues from the wildlife or other resources being commercially exploited under CAMPFIRE
- When a producer community is effectively protecting the resource from open access, in this case wildlife, which is a fugitive resource, it must receive adequate protection as elsewhere
- Communities that have incentives to manage their wildlife must receive the technical support and training required to do so in an effective and economically sound manner

The paradigms for the management of rangelands are moving away from a strict red meat focus with the realization that the regions are not equilibrium systems and the dominant rangeland strategy of single or dual species under fenced conditions is no longer viable

People can be expected to seek the optimal economic strategy for use of their resources, subject to the constraints imposed by the resource tenure arrangements they are under

Wildlife-based income can be a form of drought insurance in CAMPFIRE communities because it tends to remain more constant than agricultural production during a drought This contributes to food security even if wildlife itself makes little direct addition to the diet

Land-use strategies in the CAMPFIRE areas must be based upon sound technical and economic analysis, local self-determination under secure tenure arrangements, and minimal but supportive government involvement

Recommendations

Through its policy subcommittee, the CCG should consider the applicability to CAMPFIRE of the recommendations of the recent Commission on Land Tenure and the new legislation that purports to give clear titles to communal lands and first-line authority for resolving conflicts to village communities

Based on a systematic review of the policy and legislative changes now underway, the CCG should establish an operational plan that would enable CAMPFIRE communities to hold appropriate authority over wildlife and other CAMPFIRE resources Related actions would include communities forming legal associations or cooperatives and revision of the resource laws Accelerated development of the more exceptional land use mechanisms (cross-District management agreements, local wildlife zones, etc) Should be accompanied by careful monitoring These 'test' cases are the type of field activities that the USAID SO team might want to monitor directly

USAID should devote NRMP II funds to policy change and implementation related to access to and tenure of land and resources In particular, more work should be done on the economics of NRM on communal lands, taking into account the variety of resources and ecosystems, the insecurity of tenure at present, and the potential for more secure tenure based on indigenous knowledge and use of resources

Greater understanding of the importance of wildlife income and potential uses of wildlife products as drought insurance in the CAMPFIRE areas that have adequate wildlife resources needs to be developed and disseminated

Evaluation Issue NRMP II and Trophy Hunting *"To what extent is the NRMP II supporting or promoting trophy hunting, particularly but not exclusively, of elephants, in Zimbabwe (directly or indirectly)?"* (SOW C 4 a)

Findings

NRMP II is neutral with regard to trophy hunting it accepts the right of CAMPFIRE communities to determine for themselves the most economic uses of their wildlife CAMPFIRE gives people a meaningful stake in their wildlife, and it does not encourage or discourage this use of wildlife Trophy hunting is conducted through established channels that require and receive no direct NRMP II support

With or without NRMP II, CAMPFIRE communities would be developing the legal off-take of wildlife on their communal lands USAID funds are used to ensure that this off-take is conducted in a sustainable manner (i e , through such means as quota-setting, resource monitoring, and hiring of game scouts) NRMP II has discouraged and reduced illegal off-take (i e , poaching) of wildlife on communal lands in the CAMPFIRE areas, in part because it has enabled the employment of resource monitors who track legal and illegal hunting in their wards

Conclusions

There is no need for USAID to take steps to disassociate the NRMP II from CAMPFIRE because communities in the Programme choose to receive income from their wildlife through sport hunting With or without NRMP II, CAMPFIRE communities will develop the legal off-take of wildlife on their communal lands NRMP II at least offers some assurance that this resource is managed in a sustainable manner

Recommendations

USAID should maintain open communication and information exchange with the USFWS in an effort to support CITES compliance

The CCG should examine options for giving more focus to revenue generation based on sport hunting of "lesser species" such as impala

Evaluation Issue Diversification of Benefit Streams and CAMPFIRE Management Capacity

Alternative Income Sources *New income is linked to the development of alternative natural resources which may be found within RDCs "The NRMP II economic analysis projected significant increases in CAMPFIRE revenues from non-consumptive resource utilization schemes, particularly wildlife based eco-tourism To what extent have these projected increases materialized? What are the real prospects for expanding CAMPFIRE beyond its current focus on the consumptive utilization of wildlife (i e especially large mammals) within the NRMP II's existing timeframe? What strategic, financial, or other modifications to the existing Project would be required to achieve this Programme diversification objective? What, if any, additional financial or other support would be required in this interest, and how might it be put to the most effective use?" (SOW C-2-c) "CAMPFIRE currently focuses on a limited set of indigenous natural resources (mainly renewable wildlife resources) Does the Programme have breadth/depth to include the management of other natural resources and/or indigenous cultural resources, such as traditional folklore, arts/crafts, cultural practices, special archeological or cultural sites, etc , under its umbrella?"* (SOW 4-B-1-b)

Findings

The strength of CAMPFIRE to date has been its success in allowing producer communities access to part of a market-led revenue stream created by the hunting industry (Table 10) This industry is

driven by impressive international demand Most alternatives for diversification will not be as financially rewarding as wildlife, and as such the RDCs will probably be less interested in promoting them

Marketable non-wildlife resources on communal lands include forage timber, sand, granite, slate, and woodland products such as wild fruits, bark, scenic sites, certain herbs, palm and grass thatch, Mopane worms, crafts, and butterflies Many of these products are already subject to lively, informal sector entrepreneurial activity, little of which is regulated and almost none of which is taxed by the RDCs (timber being the obvious exception, subject to FC oversight) The extent to which these products are abundant is also highly variable Some, such as timber, are not abundant at all WWF socioeconomic studies indicate that communal land resources provide for about one-third of a household's subsistence needs (WWF 1997)

Different natural resources provide different benefit streams The greater the profitability, the greater will be the interest of the RDCs in exerting control for their own financial objectives/needs Wildlife concessions have been profitable, and the RDCs have a vested interest in satisfying the rural populations who are capable ultimately of undermining this resource The greater the share of benefits the RDCs provide to their local communities, the greater are the chances the resource will continue to be important into the future Many alternatives that are not of major importance to the RDCs will nevertheless be important at the ward and village levels

Minerals (black granite, sand, slate, and alluvial gold) are not renewable natural resources, but they can be used slowly over time or mined quickly for immediate profit The RDCs will find that the wards are important constituents in determining the long-term use of such resources

Some indigenous resources are very site-specific, such as scenic views, caves, ancient cave art, bat guano in caves, cultural tourism, and rivers or streams, ponds and dams These resources are located at the level of a village or group of villages, or even at the ward level -- and should not be seen as major sources of RDC income Exploitation of these kinds of resources will, however, help small communities develop micro-enterprises Sustainable marketing structures grouped at the ward or district levels through cooperative structures can serve such enterprises

Table 10 1996 Campfire Generated Income (Wildlife)

District	Chron/Rank Month/Year	Income Z$ 1996	Income Rank	AID Z$ to 2/98	AID $ Rank	AID Z$ Spent	% Spend W/V Level	Date of Grant	Percent Rank of Incomes Sample	Rank	Percent
Beitbridge	2	588700	9	1483280	5	391597	0	7/97	4461969	1	100 00%
Binga	2	2130674	3	1698700	1	0	59	2/98	3015112	2	94 74%
Bulilima Mangwe	2	574615	10	1293200	10	0	44	2/98	2130674	3	89 47%
Cham /Shamva	8	18000	19	0	21				1319277	4	84 21%
Chimanimani				1381000	7	0		2/98			
Chipinge	3	278979	12	826980	18	498802	50	11/96	1317820	5	78 95%
Chiredzi	3	1319277	4	1218850	11	340020	78	7/97	1244726	6	73 68%
Gokwe North	3	950509	7	774777	19	460867	39	11/96	950509	7	68 42%
Gokwe South	3	52000	16	0	21		na		730568	8	63 16%
Guruve	1	3015112	2	1695500	2	499319	0	10/97	588700	9	57 89%
Gwanda	5	100000	14	1592650	3	0		2/98	574615	10	52 63%
Hurungwe	9	1244726	6	917860	15	583638	50	11/96	397476	11	47 37%
Hwange	2	730568	8	0	21		50		278979	12	42 11%
Kusile				1493300	4	0		2/98			
Matabo	4	60000	15	0	21				110400	13	36 84%
Mazowi				673000	20	389284		11/96			
Mudzi	11	110400	13	1187910	12	605464	8	6/97	100000	14	31 58%
Muzarabani	2	397476	11	1348428	8	505608	0	10/97	60000	15	26 32%
Nkayi				874020	17	429059		11/96			
Nyaminyami	1 8/94	4461969	1	913600	16	470077	18	5/97	52000	16	21 05%
Nyanga	10	6000	20	1340040	9	0			44488	17	10 53%
Rushinga	12	44488	17	1403505	6	697347	0	6/97	44488	17	10 53%
Tsholotsho	2	1317820	5	1014710	14	449466	60	6/97	18000	19	5 26%
UMP Zvaitaida	9	44488	17	1104920	13	551881	0	6/97	6000	20	0 00%
Totals		17445801		24236230		6872429			17	0 00%	

Table 11 Diversification in Economic Benefits Through Exploitation of Natural Resources (Actual and Potential) Among Campfire Association Producer Communities

Number and Date**	District	Total # Of Wards	# Wards Receiving Dividends	1996 Campfire Income***	% '96 Income Returned Communities	Approp. Authority?	Eco-Tourism	Live Animal Sales	Misc Options	Misc Options	USAID Support?
1, 1989	Guruve	28	11	$3,015	0	Y	Y	Y	Forest Products	Masawu fruit Bamboo Beekeeping	Y
2, 1989	Nyaminyami *	16	10	$4,462	18	Y	Y		E D Paper Making	Grinding Mills Impala leather articles	Y
3 1991	Beitbridge	18	6	$589	0	Y			Grinding Mills Irrigation	Ilala Palms Mining Sand Stone Carving	Y
4, 1991	Binga	27	20	$2,131	59	Y			E D Paper Making Impal leather	Grinding Mills	Y
5 1991	Bulilima Mangwe	33	7	$575	44	Y	Y		Mopane Worms Amarula	Silk Worms Conservancy Camp Dam	Y
6 1991	(Gaza) Chimanimani	28	0	$1 319	na	Y			Fisheries reptiles amphibians	Ilala Palms Babobab rugs butterflies forestry	Y
7, 1991	Chipinge (Gazaland)	33	2	$279	50	Y	Y		Amphibians reptiles butterflies	Ilala forestry Baobab rugs Ostrich T Village	Y
8 1991	Chiredzi	32	9		78	Y			Grinding Mills Vetiver	E D Paper Making	Y
9 1991	Gokwe North	25	4	$951	39	Y	Y				Y
10, 1991	Gokwe South *	28	6	$0	na	Y			Fisheries Forest Products		Y
11, 1991	Hurungwe *	40	9	$1,245	50	Y	Y		Grinding Mills Croc Eggs	Bat Guano Forest Products Beekeeping	Y
12 1991	Hwange *	27	14	$731	50	Y	Y		Croc Eggs Rafting	Hides Hot Air Balloons	Y
13 1991	Muzarabani	17	10	$397	0	Y	Y	Y	Forest Products	Masawu Fruit Bamboo	Y
14 1991	Tsholotsho	20	8	$1,317	60	Y	Y		Forest Products Ostrich	Mopane Worms Beekeeping	Y
15, 1993	Bubi	12	1	$0		Y					Y
16, 1993	Chaminuka/Shamua	26	2	$0		Y					Y
17, 1993	Gwanda *	20	6	$100	na	Y	Y		Croc. Eggs Cave Art. Alluv Gold	Game Fishing, Amarula,Cattle Ranching	Y
18, 1993	Marondera	24	0	$0		Y					
19, 1993	Mazowe/Ghlweshi	29	5	$0		Y					Y
20, 1993	Mudzi	18	2	$110	8	Y	Y		Ostrich		Y
21, 1993	Mwenezi	31	0	$0		Y					
22, 1993	Nkayi	23	6	$0		Y					Y
23, 1993	Nyanga	37	1	$0		Y	Y		Forest Products	Beekeeping	Y
24, 1993	Rushinga	17	0	$44	0	Y	Y		Ostrich, Slate	Masawu Fruit	
25, 1993	UMP Zvaitaida	15	2	$44	0	Y	Y		Forest Products	Beekeeping	Y
26, 1994	Kusile/Lupane	24	11	$0		Y					
27, 1996	Buhera	30	0	$0		N					
28, 1996	Chikomba		0	$0		N					
29, 1996	Goromonzi	26	0	$0		N					
30, 1996	Matobo	26	4	$0		Y					Y
31, 1996	Mutoko	29	0	$0		N				Black Granite	
32, 1996	Pfura/ Mt Darwin	29	0	$0		N					
33, 1996	Wedza		0	$0		N					
34, 1997	Manyame		0	$0		N					
35, 1997	Umguza	16	0	$0		Y					
36, 1997	Umzingwane	14	0	$0		N					

* = Field Visits by Evaluation Team

** = Date when District Joined Campfire Movement

*** = Sport hunting Tourism PAC hides/ivory Other in millions of Z$ (Z$16/1$US)

The following observations address the ongoing diversification efforts

- Table 11 presents a compilation of information garnered from team field visits, discussions, and a review of the literature on the range of "alternative" and natural resource "diversification" options It makes a number of interesting points The wildlife-rich Rural Districts were the first to join CAMPFIRE, since sport hunting was CAMPFIRE's initial focus The order in which the RDCs have received Appropriate Authority correlates with the order of importance this resource held for the concerned RDCs, and by extension the selected wards having wildlife within their borders Most of the actual or potential diversification efforts fall within these same wildlife-rich districts Those Rural Districts with little or no wildlife dividends seem to have received less attention for micro-enterprises revolving around sustainable use of renewable natural resources

Most of these resource options remain a "gleam in the eye" of local people The reason is that either the State is unlikely to move quickly to liberalize policies that would make a resource accessible or taxable by local governing units (as in the case of minerals), or exploitation of the resources requires a level of management beyond local means Examples are

(1) *Forest resources* The Rural Districts vary greatly in terms of the flora/fauna they have available, which are usually grouped on the basis of annual rainfall, elevation, and soil quality Commercially valuable stands of timber on communal lands are widely dispersed but not rare Particularly valuable trees that are harvested for their timber in many Districts include mopane, pod mahogany, and the "wooden banana" tree In many Districts where these trees are abundant, the RDCs sell them via concession by the RDCs, in cooperation with the FC The FC sets the terms and conditions of timber exploitation and monitors what is done The concessionaire pays an agreed upon fee per meter of wood taken In Hurungwe, the RDC recently gave a timber concessionaire a permit to cut all three of the above species *anywhere* within the District, as long as the diameter is greater than 30 cms There is no quota Cutting is to begin all along the river below the Ward Tourist Campsite As with wildlife revenue, each ward in which trees are cut receives 85% of the concession receipts The evaluation team met the loggers, who were setting up several sawmills in the District They referred to the cutting as "salvage cutting " Both the ward and the FC have assigned people to stay with the woodcutters at all times to monitor the off-take

There has been considerable documentation of "revenue-seeking" RDCs granting concessions to remove trees wherever they are found -- farmer's fields, villages, woodlands surrounding villages -- over the strong objections of, and even near violent confrontations with, concerned local communities "While tenurial relationships are complex in communal areas, there is a sense that the traditional situation in which any community member had rights to trees, even in other people's fields, is now being supplanted by a form of customary law where rights are held by a farmer who is perceived as the 'owner '" (Clark Bird, et al , "Was Mrs Mutendi Only Joking Access to Timber in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas," *IIED* 1995 5) In the referenced case study, Mrs Mutendi was demanding, from the RDC, the

money realized from the sale of the timber removed from "her" trees in her fields This is an indication of what may be occurring across the country, as local communities become more assertive over what they perceive as their legitimate rights over natural resource exploitation

(2) *Mopane* Where there are extensive numbers of mopane trees, communities have the option of harvesting Mopane worms Where there are extensive semi-arid and more humid woodlands, bee-keeping is always a good option Woodlands include grasses that can be harvested for roofing, as well as traditional medical plants They may also include commercial quantities of amarula and msawu fruit, the latter being largely exploited by the informal sector Hundreds of tons of both are exported fresh each year from the country As with amarula, the wild masawu fruit provides a sought-after liquor and is found throughout the Zambezi valley

(3) It is evident that local communities are not yet benefiting as much as they might from wildlife other than through the dividends from sport hunting Live animal sales are not yet producing significant income and perhaps are beyond the management ability of most producer communities, although two have been selling roan and sable antelope Local producer communities have not conducted any meat cropping, although they do culling For example, Nyaminyami District has an annual quota of 1,500 impala to be culled from their large herds on communal lands

Some Rural Districts have ecotourism/photo-safari concessions with hotel safari lodges, using the wildlife reserves located along their borders The team visited Chilo, Hwange, Bumi Hills, and others and noted the substantial and developing potential at these sites CAMPFIRE is beginning to get more involved in such conventional game-viewing tourism enterprises International trends in tourism are favoring Zimbabwe and the wildlife/recreational experiences CAMPFIRE offers There is much less experience with cultural tourism in Zimbabwe or with CAMPFIRE development of archeological, historical, or botanical sites The tourism based in CAMPFIRE areas in the southern low veld is not yet breaking even, but the first distributions from CAMPFIRE lease agreements with major hotel operators are underway While Zimbabwean tourism, based primarily on wildlife and the attraction of Victoria Falls, is generally doing well, that based in CAMPFIRE areas has yet to demonstrate viability in all regions In particular, cultural, archeological, historical, and botanical tourism are virtually untried concepts in these areas

Bumi Hills/Nyaminyami Case Study

Sun Hotel's Safari Lodge in Bumi Hills has had a long-term (30-year) series of photo-safari leases with Nyaminyami District through the Ministry of Local Government. Each lease is good for 9 9 years and must be renewed at that time The lease gives Sun Hotel exclusive visitor rights to the nature reserve Every year the Lodge gives a lease "rent" of about Z$70,000 (US$4,375) to the RDC On top of this, another Z$ 250,000 (US$15,625) plus or minus -- depending on the actual number of guests -- is given by the Safari Lodge to the RDC, with the intent that the funds go to the Mola Ward, which is adjacent to the 50 sq km concession and is very rich in wildlife and elephant. The Safari Lodge manager also claimed that they have provided funds on occasion to pay the salaries of the adjacent ward game scouts The RDC has specifically informed the Safari Lodge that the Lodge

cannot deal directly with the Mola Ward or give funds directly to them, as the distribution is the business of the RDC In a meeting with the RDC, at which Mola Ward representatives were present, the general manager of the Safari Lodge asked them directly why they continued to snare animals as they do -- given the financial assistance the Lodge had been giving them over the past 15 years They were not being good neighbors The ward members asked, "What money?" They had never received or even known that the Lodge had been giving this money to the RDC all these years on their behalf There is no transparency in the financial accounts within the District for members of the various wards Sun Hotels claims to fear making an issue of this, given the RDC's authority over the lease, which is up for renewal in a year The final observation was that Safari Lodge is reconsidering the sum of about Z$250,000 they have been giving of their own free will for the adjacent ward and may stop this practice as they see no positive results

The Safari Lodge desires a good relationship and partnership with people in the adjacent ward because they experience poaching/snaring problems They want to tell their customers that the local people receive part of their lodging expenses ($5/person/day) to help conserve this wonderful wildlife The guests have often given special gifts to the villages in Mola Ward, particularly helping to build school blocks and equipping them, and also putting fencing around the schools Legitimate sport hunters' guides from the adjacent ward will sometimes lure animals (leopards and lions) across into their territory (there is no fence or buffer area) The concession, which has been in effect for more than 15 years (several renewals), has repeatedly asked for a 5 km buffer zone between the Wildlife Nature Reserve and the hunting area -- without success For this reason, Bumi Hills Lodge has put radio-collars on many animals and tracks them The matriarch elephant of the concession has one and is tracked carefully to keep her from crossing over and probably being shot. When collared animals become immobile, a patrol goes out to check for snares A review of the 1995/1996 audit of income from Nyaminyami shows Z$102,664 for a "bednight levy," probably the annual lease receipts No income line item shows anything close to the amounts the Safari Lodge reported giving, unless it is subsumed under sundry income" of Z$289 546 -- money intended by Safari Lodge for the population of Mola Ward. However, the RDC does *not* consider these funds to be "CAMPFIRE Revenue," a portion of which should be given to the ward directly bordering the small wildlife area the Lodge depends upon

Nyaminyami District is one of the two original Districts in CAMPFIRE -- having received Appropriate Authority in 1988 Its Z$4,461,969 (US$278,873) from wildlife sport hunting placed it at the top of the CAMPFIRE revenue list in 1996 (that figure does not include ecotourism-type income, which the RDC does not count as "CAMPFIRE revenue") Ideally, the RDC should transfer 80% of these funds to producer communities to reinforce the conservation ethic and provide economic benefits to the communities that are most touched by the presence of this wildlife (damage to crops and danger to life and limb) One year Nyaminyami District gave back only 18% of the wildlife revenue to its communities and put Z$1,131,371 into its "surplus account," to be carried over to the next year's budget, a sum that could have been given to people in the producer communities as direct benefits It is obvious that in a district more than 100 km across (width/length), small benefits received in one corner will not have much impact on wildlife/human interaction problems in another This dilution of benefits is sobering to the CAMPFIRE movement and does not bode well for the future if other RDCs follow their lead in reducing the benefits to producer communities

Bumi Hills Safari Lodge noted that people in the District have no idea of the kind of revenue non-consumptive photographic safaris bring them Not only do they produce revenue for the District and ward through the lease levies and funds given for ward distribution, but the Lodge employs 150 people from the community in permanent positions and pays for social security and other benefits Safari hunters, in contrast, generally employ less than 10 people, and then for only a limited time and with no benefits

Conclusions

There are valid options for diversification and new economic benefits for rural producer communities using other natural resources, although few will be as profitable as wildlife in the areas where it is abundant (Table 11) Mining and timber are the exceptions These are often profitable activities, with strong connections to world and regional markets If the CA and CCG members can get the mining and timber industries in Zimbabwe to apply the revenue-sharing concept of CAMPFIRE, they will have accomplished much.

Even some lesser resources may have high potential niches Zimbabwe's commercial honey exports reach US$10 million a year It is easy to imagine a "CAMPFIRE" brand organic honey being marketed internationally

The Councils and CA may be overly optimistic about the potential for ecotourism as a CAMPFIRE revenue-producing sector There are places where ecotourism ventures are possible and might attract trekkers and backpackers, but the investment will need to be based on careful niche market development and strategic involvement with the private sector

Currently, CAMPFIRE does not tap into the Zimbabwe tourism sector in any coordinated manner, and CA management is just beginning to think strategically about the sector The CA Board has no members from the hotel association, the Zimbabwe Tourist Authority, or related organizations The CA and RDCs are beginning to develop some capacity to negotiate lease arrangements for effective communal, private sector partnerships involving tourism

Management Capacity CAMPFIRE and NRMP II possess the breadth and depth of experience and competence needed to expand programs into other natural resource and/or indigenous cultural resources To do so, however, they must focus on a few target districts and/or wards within districts where there is real potential for success and then to engage the professional expertise (private sector, NGOs, and government) required to put an active program into place When solutions are refined and successful economic/commercial chains established, and other RDCs learn from the experience gained, they will in turn replicate the models The target districts/wards should be located in areas where wildlife is not already a major option

In most instances it appears the RDCs would be better off leasing their scenic areas to industry entrepreneurs and improve their negotiating skills to produce deals that are favorable to the producer communities in those scenic areas Similarly, NGOs that think they have a good prospect and cooperation in a producer community should try to facilitate the creation of enterprises However, grant funds should not be used to subsidize the *operations* of such enterprises A possible role for the RDCs and CCG members is to help monitor and improve the existing tourist leases of major hotel companies on district land, and through publicity encourage these companies to make good on promises to producer communities

Not enough care has been taken in evaluating the capacity of the Rural Districts to finance their

minimum CAMPFIRE staff (coordinator, game guards, and/or monitors) out of their own revenue This works against sustainability

Considerable uncertainty surrounds the economic viability of resource management strategies on communal lands in the CAMPFIRE areas, both because of the insecurity of tenure of the resources and uncertain knowledge about the production functions for most of the resources that might be more intensively managed In many areas, the economic value of most of these other resources is not great, and the gains from improved management depend on restricting open access Where significant economic value is to be found in alternative resources, the communal area residents are already exploiting that value Any as-yet-untapped potential is likely to be less lucrative than safari hunting Nevertheless, it may still offer some increase in prosperity for communal area residents That possibility, however, poses a contradiction Better management of these resources for collective interests is possible and necessary, but their economic value is more local From the point of view of the RDCs, there is no significant incentive either to take action or to share the eventual revenues with producer communities The required management activities are more likely to be of the social forestry and land-use conservation planning type, rather than of market-led activities such as safari hunting, hotel operation, commercial logging, or mineral extraction

Natural resources such as forests and minerals that do not move around are easier for an RDC to control for its own ends/needs and to use for general district operating costs Since local populations can destroy trees, forests resemble wildlife in the kind of approach needed to sustain them Local communities should receive a very significant portion of the benefits from forest resources, both exotic and indigenous Where natural forests exist, some micro-enterprises based on resource use, such as woodworking, traditional medicines, Mopane worms, beekeeping, and other forest products, become natural options for support to move from subsistence to sustainable commercialization Household/extended family-managed and controlled wood lots for personal and commercial exploitation might be encouraged over communal wood lots where there is no owner, but this approach is difficult to implement within existing land policies

Recommendations

Diversification efforts should focus on those Rural Districts (or wards of Districts) where wildlife is *not* abundant These areas should be the target of the long-term close-out efforts of USAID in the coming years Such assistance holds out the promise, if centered around a short menu of potentially economically sustainable alternative natural resource activities, of building enough RDC capacity to sustain a small staff of CAMPFIRE support personnel for the District

Under CA leadership, the CCG needs to take a more creative and proactive stance toward the development of tourism activities that benefit CAMPFIRE communities "CAMPFIRE Tourism" needs to be fostered as a powerful marketing and revenue-generating tool

- The CA should establish strong ties with the Zimbabwe Tourist Authority (ZETA), domestic and international tourism hotel and tour operator associations, and private hotels and hotel

associations As discussed elsewhere in this report, the CA Board could invite tourism industry professionals to serve on the Board The CA should lobby the industry to hire CAMPFIRE community residents and to buy locally, when possible

- The CA should work with the ART to monitor and form strategic alliances with other tourism associations in the region, such as the Southern Africa Tourist Organization ART might also help CAMPFIRE establishments get listings in travel guides such as the *Lonely Planet Guide*, which already features some CAMPFIRE sites

- USAID/RCA should assist the CA and ART in strengthening their regional contacts and alliances regarding ecotourism information, studies, lessons, and institutions

- The CA should move, without delay, to copyright and register CAMPFIRE to create a CAMPFIRE "brand" name that members can use to establish standards, and market and raise funds

- The CA should establish a visitors information center in Harare to assist adventure and ecotourists, as well as business and professional visitors CAMPFIRE documentation, curios, and crafts produced by CA members throughout the country could be sold at this location, making it self-financing

- CASS (or ART) should carry out sociocultural and economic impact studies of those sites where tourism is being developed and assist the CCG to adapt its ecotourism strategy This effort should begin immediately by extending Bond's 1997 work through a study of existing tourist facilities located in CAMPFIRE communal areas and covering the extent and impact of local employment, local purchasing, and lease terms

- WWF should continue its involvement in ecotourism development and marketing

- The CCG should make sure the RDC and ward-level"customers" have usable guidelines for reporting and developing ecotourism

Micro-enterprise and alternative NRM development activities should be targeted for Rural Districts that are not yet financially able to cover the basic minimum support needed for local CAMPFIRE implementation (CAMPFIRE coordinator, game scouts, and logistic expenses, and possibly game guards where more revenue is available) Twenty-four of the 36 CAMPFIRE RDCs fall within this category (Table 2) Within the other 12 better-off Districts, there are still many wards without CAMPFIRE revenue The efforts in such Districts should concentrate on those wards, rather than on the ones with significant CAMPFIRE wildlife revenue

Significant, increased attention must be given to assuring sustainability of the wildlife resource where it is most abundant and where CAMPFIRE wildlife revenue is still very sizable Sustainability of this resource in the *wards* must be given greater priority over the efforts under

the NRMP II and the general Programme to diversify into other areas Table 2 clearly shows the tendency to work for other options in areas where wildlife revenue is already significant However, issues such as habitat loss and increased population pressures are key problems in these areas, and the legislation/authority needed at the ward/community levels to control these problems *must* be identified and given due attention Otherwise this real benefit will be lost while time is spent exploring other options that offer no assurance of significant financial return These other options should be left to the ward communities themselves to develop, following the model they have already learned with wildlife

The CA should look again at what it considers to be "graduated" Rural Districts A minimum and perhaps sustainable financial criterion for graduation could be any District that can pay for its CAMPFIRE coordinator and game scouts and maintain a minimum operating budget Sufficient funds to accomplish this should be found within 20% of the District's CAMPFIRE revenue -- with the balance thus available to concerned wards The RDCs should be encouraged to give the wards the money to employ game scouts (out of the 20%) and let this responsibility be handled entirely at the ward level Table 2 shows that most of the first CAMPFIRE Districts have already met this graduation threshold In fact, many of them already pay for these positions out of their own dividend revenues

Community-led projects using ward dividends should be considered to a larger extent for income-generating activities involving sub-groupings of the community These could be oriented toward some kind of internal loan program (or such a revolving fund) that would enable individuals or local enterprise groups to find funding to initiate micro-enterprise activities Ward-level capacity-building should include helping communities explore these options Income-generating activities at the communal ward-level may ultimately fail, as no one would actually "own" the enterprise and "open access" would not be adequately maintained

Evaluation Issue New Institutional Partners to Meet CAMPFIRE's Diversification Initiative *The CAMPFIRE Association long-term plan has identified five strategic thrusts, of which one is* ***"the diversification of CAMPFIRE Principles to other resources in addition to wildlife"*** *CAMPFIRE diversifying into new resources requires new partners and modalities To what extent do woodland management, habitat monitoring, policy, tenure and economic considerations require attention to support diversification?*

Findings

The CA is actively engaged in a strategy of diversification of resource management strategies to enhance benefits accruing to its membership This initiative is young and still has not gone much beyond the stage of planning efforts, feasibility studies, and a few pilot programs at the field level These ground-breaking actions appear to have given CAMPFIRE an undeniable start on the actual capture of revenue streams Already non-consumptive wildlife revenues are developing momentum, with tourism leases, direct ventures, and business ventures such as crocodile/egg farming as sources of revenue The diversification thrust is customer-oriented, with the CA attempting to channel

resource revenues, e g , timber and minerals, to the local level

> *CA will seek to expand "CAMPFIRE" principles to other resources this will require the existence of legal instruments that will permit members of the CA and their respective communities to utilize various other natural resources* (CA 1998)

The CA strategy involves a push to get policies in place such as Appropriate Authority mechanisms for other resources, to promote NRM diversification of activities, and to enhance cooperation and collaboration with selected partners This latter point is the subject of the following remarks, which address the CA's recent incorporation of new partners into the CCG

Forestry Commission The FC is a parastatal with statutory responsibility for the forests of Zimbabwe Of Zimbabwe's 39 million ha of land, 25 8 million ha are forests (using the FAO definition of 10% crown cover) Of the total forest area, about 8 million ha are on communal lands Another 8 million ha are demarcated as "indigenous forests," which are found mostly in Matabele North Province in the Rural Districts of Lupane, Tsholotsho, Binga, Bubi, and Gokwe

The FC's Social Forestry Division has submitted a workplan to the PET that asks for Z$3,010,000 for the period April 1998 to September 1999 It plans to enhance the economic contribution of woodland resources by training community personnel and developing community woodland action plans and natural resource by-laws The forestry plan would include policy studies/research to create enabling legislation for community participation in the management of woodland products (including apiculture)

The Division of Forestry Extension, likewise under the FC, provides forestry services on communal lands The services include woodland management, but most efforts to date have involved either agroforestry or been woodlot-related Woodland management has been initiated on state forest lands (e g , Mafungabusi Forest) There are 8 provincial forest extension managers and 55 forest extension officers in the Rural Districts The FC states that it is "thin on the ground" and that, if it had the resources, it would increase personnel in the Districts The FC does not have the funds to hire staff, as donors typically fund operations and not personnel The FC gave conflicting signals with regard to its intention of joining the CCG

The team visited one of the Mafungabusi Forest committees The committee members appreciated their forest access to firewood, mushrooms, Mopane worms, and some thatch, but felt the arrangements granting them the "forest-sharing" rights were part of an ongoing process that would lead to a larger share of the resources and greater long-term assurance of their access

The Rural District Council (RDC) Act of 1988, the Communal Land Act of 1982, and the Communal Lands Forest Produce (CLFP) Act of 1928 cover the use of forests on communal lands Through the RDC Act, the RDCs may formulate by-laws to protect and manage the trees on communal lands The Communal Lands Act overrides the power of chiefs to control the land and provides for land-use planning Only a few RDCs have used these Acts to manage forest resources or legitimize local-level

resource management initiatives The CLFP Act is commonly used to prevent large-scale commercial operators from poaching in communal land forests It permits the RDCs to license commercial concessionaires to cut down trees, with the revenue going to the RDCs The Act permits only "own use" of forest products by local people and proscribes the movement of forest produce from communal lands The Act is not used to prevent local traffic in raw material for carvings and other products from the forests, nor is this traffic of much concern to the officers who enforce the Act The extension foresters have little opportunity to influence local uses of the forest, but the RDCs are encouraged to use them to plan commercial cuts for a fee Management believes the RDCs should be plowing the proceeds back into village infrastructure, as CAMPFIRE does with the revenue from wildlife However, FC management does not believe there is much commercial potential in communal land forests

The demarcated indigenous forests of Matabele North are used for wildlife tourism, including hunting The FC has its own Safari Company and also leases competitively to other safari operators FC management estimates that the wildlife in these forests produces ten times the revenue that would derive from commercial harvest of the trees in the same forests The CAMPFIRE principle is of interest to the FC in these forests because neighboring villages are inclined to settle in them FC management reasons that if they share the revenues from the forests with the squatters, the squatters can be persuaded to move back to the communal lands and stay there "To the extent USAID would support them in efforts to coexist with communal peoples," they have submitted a proposal to work on forest management in communal areas However, they only consider these efforts to be CAMPFIRE to the extent they take place in CAMPFIRE wards There are two reasons the FC limits what it calls CAMPFIRE The first is the use of a geographic distinction for programming purposes CAMPFIRE activities take place in CAMPFIRE (i e , wildlife-rich) villages and wards In non-CAMPFIRE areas, the FC prefers to maintain an administrative distinction that has financial and donor-related implications Second, the FC is engaged in experimentation with different models of "forest sharing" with local communities, and the areas covered are defined by watersheds, cultural groupings, and other factors that do not necessarily correspond with CAMPFIRE and RDC sub-district structures In one case where safari revenues from state forest lands were to be shared with the local population, the villages rejected becoming part of CAMPFIRE They perceived its revenue-sharing formula to be less in line with their interests than a direct arrangement with the FC would be

One of the problems in NRM is the various uncoordinated laws that bear on natural resources They have been described as a bad jigsaw puzzle in which some pieces are missing and others do not fit Presently an effort is underway to develop omnibus natural resources legislation Each of the natural resource agencies has provided input The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is assisting with the effort The Cabinet has already approved a package, which is expected to be through Parliament by June or August 1998 Reportedly it recognizes indigenous knowledge, changes the rights over communal lands from usufruct to commercial, and recognizes property rights on communal land

Department of Natural Resources Until recently, the DNR had been involved with CAMPFIRE only through its attendance at meetings and workshops Now, "however, with the

introduction of diversification policy in CAMPFIRE, the need has arisen for DNR to be involved as utilization of all other resources which DNR specializes is envisaged " (DNR 1998)

The DNR operates under a Natural Resources Board and various Conservation Committees It has the principal responsibility for implementing the Natural Resources Act and is involved in efforts to harmonize various legislation related to the environment and the management of natural resources Prior to independence, there were Tribal Trust Land Conservation Committees and Tribal Land Authority in Communal Areas Both of these tribal land entities were neglected The DNR now wants to use its resources along with CAMPFIRE to accomplish natural resource conservation goals on communal lands

The DNR is the responsible authority for insuring the completion of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and compliance for development activities This role is likely to become more important with the passage of new legislation under the pending Environmental Management Act The requisite EIAs under this legislation will move the DNR into a prominent role in NRM issues involving significant development actions, as will be the case with CAMPFIRE infrastructure projects

The DNR will bring experience with CBNRM into the CCG It has been involved in efforts to operationalize the National Conservation Strategy through the District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) Programme Like CAMPFIRE, the DEAP is based on principles of community participation and empowerment in NRM The experiences of DEAP to date, although limited, are relevant to the land-use planning concerns discussed above The DNR also implements activities under two Agenda 21 efforts, the National Action Programme (anti-desertification) and the Biodiversity Program

The DNR's Integrated Resources Information System, a GIS-based environmental information database with monitoring functions, is relevant to CAMPFIRE's needs to improve its habitat monitoring capacity and to USAID's intentions to develop an integrated environmental monitoring indicator for its SO1 (see V C)

To assist with its diversification initiative, the CA formally invited the DNR's participation, and USAID has agreed in principle to support its involvement The workplan the DNR submitted to the CCG has five goals

(1) Establish and build the capacity of a CAMPFIRE Unit in the DNR

(2) Advise on Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA)

(3) Enhance the capacities of local communities and local groups in NRM It says it is devolving responsibility and staff to the Rural District level

(4) Assist in carrying out Natural Resource Inventories, and facilitate sharing of information between the DEAP, the National Action Plan (NAP), CAMPFIRE, and a GIS database on the State of Environmental Resources (SOER)

(5) Assist in creating an enabling environment for CBNRM in Zimbabwe

Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources SAFIRE is a "Zimbabwean development agency dedicated to the development of rural self-sufficiency through the improved management of natural resources " Its major focus has been to "build on the achievements of CAMPFIRE, and to promote economic development in communal areas based on sustainable and productive use of natural resources It has woodlands and trees as its primary focus "

SAFIRE has been a member of CAMPFIRE since 1994, but to date has not received USAID funding for any of its activities A project proposal before USAID at this time will make it one of the newest CCG members to have such support

SAFIRE staff conclude that one reason for the threats to the sustainability of Zimbabwe's communal area woodlands, and the resulting lack of focus on this area, has been a widespread misunderstanding and lack of knowledge concerning the actual economic value of these woodlands to local communities Without these woodlands, rural households would not be able to sustain themselves adequately The rights regime pertaining to woodland resources does not acknowledge the potential economic contribution to woodland resources the rights would convey (Zimbabwe Working Group, 1996)

SAFIRE proposes to provide substantial training and some pilot development of NRM approaches that rely heavily on "participatory reflection and action"[1] as a means of insuring that local communities identify with and own CAMPFIRE initiatives from the outset The training component targets RDC executive and District-level officers from the AGRITEX, CA, DNR, ZimTrust, MLGNH, and other institutions

Conclusions

The above remarks suggest that diversification away from safari hunting of wildlife can succeed as a major source of income in some places Success, however, depends on strong links to the private sector In other areas, diversification will likely mean social forestry-type activities and the micro-enterprises that go along with it The CCG recently gained the social forestry and NRM background to undertake the different management specializations necessary for bringing forest and woodland resources more fully under the CAMPFIRE umbrella Their prior and ongoing experience will reduce the 1-3 years of basic training, learning, and low-level experimentation that might otherwise be expected Given the two years left of the NRMP II project, efforts to launch this diversification thrust need to be tailored and implemented to meet the eventual post-project circumstances

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[1] SAFIRE uses this adaptation of the acronym PRA (usually signifying Participatory Rural Appraisal) to describe its specific approach

The entry of the FC, the DNR, and SAFIRE into the CCG is a positive step toward bringing integrated natural resource planning, social forestry, and participatory land-use planning skills into the CAMPFIRE movement As diversification of CAMPFIRE proceeds, it is important that each institution concentrate on high pay-off model sites that would highlight best practices and lessons for replicability The addition of SAFIRE to CAMPFIRE brings new and important insights and experience to the issue of diversification. From a rather narrow focus on wildlife, new initiatives will take place involving other natural resources

Recommendations

The environmental information systems and GIS efforts in the country need to be strengthened and harmonized Although going beyond a narrow interpretation of CAMPFIRE, NRMP II support for such action is critical to the diversification effort The DNR, under the Natural Resources Board's aegis, is the best situated to coordinate this action and assist the CA and CCG partners (especially WWF, FC, and DNPWLM) in developing synergy with a broader national effort Data-sharing protocols, formatting standards, shared boundary files, and other areas need attention

While diversification is important, NRMP II priorities must continue to include consolidation of the economic and NRM gains made in those Rural Districts that have significant wildlife resources and low population density

Support to SAFIRE during the remaining time of NRMP II is highly desirable SAFIRE field technicians should make it a priority within their NRMP II CAMPFIRE activities to help local communities develop proposals for economic ventures involving sustainable woodlands exploitation, to be submitted to banks or other local institutions for funding

C Advocacy and the International Context

As indicated in the SOW, in the run-up to the 1997 CITES Conference of Parties, "CAMPFIRE came under intense attack from a variety of animal welfare groups opposed to trophy hunting of wildlife, particularly elephants, and the resumption of the trade in elephant ivory " The debate over this issue, which ultimately played out in the US Congress, raised a number of matters of interest not only to NRMP II management but, more generally, to the US foreign assistance program This section looks at the overall issue from three perspectives

(1) Regional, international, and/or US-based advocacy for the down-listing of the African elephant and its appropriateness to CAMPFIRE and NRMP II,

(2) The role and results of ART's (and CA's) efforts in this area, and

(3) The USAID/Z Mission's response to the use of US funds for such activities

Included under the second point above is an evaluation of ART's overall role and performance As noted, ART's activities are broader than simple "lobbying"[2], nonetheless, much of its activity is channeled into the advocacy roles it plays NRMP II programming decisions were made on this basis

Evaluation Issue The Need for International Advocacy *"Certain key project assumptions (SARP/NRMP II Document, p 9) refer to the internal economic, political, legal and technological situation in Zimbabwe Certain other assumptions depend upon the international economic and political forces One such assumption is that* ***the demand for wildlife products will support widespread development of wildlife as a form of land use*** " (SOW C 2 a)

Findings

According to *The Economist*, world tourism accounts for nearly 11% of gross global product and for more than one in ten jobs around the world Moreover, it is growing at nearly 6% a year Tourism in Zimbabwe has been growing at an annual rate of 10% a year since 1980, with European and North American visitation growing at 13% and 12% a year, respectively European and North American visitors still comprise only 18% of total tourist visitation to Zimbabwe The majority of the remainder are domestic or arrive from neighboring states The market is by no means saturated

The strength of Zimbabwe's tourism industry depends on stability and growth in the world economy and on Zimbabwe's ability to promote its comparative advantages Involving both consumptive and non-consumptive uses, tourism also depends on the existence of a viable, intact wildlife habitat Zimbabwe's ability to continue to expand its tourism at nearly twice the world rate depends, in some measure as well, upon the success of CAMPFIRE and other resource management programs in maintaining attractive opportunities for tourists to use and enjoy wildlife, cultural, and other resources

In turn, establishing and maintaining wildlife habitat as a land use in Zimbabwe depend upon the demand for tourism

Zimbabwe's revenue from sport hunting by foreign tourists has been growing by 18% a year since 1986 Although it accounted for about 90% of the income to the Programme between 1989 and 1995, there are signs that trophy prices are flattening out in real terms Elephant hunting provides slightly over 60% of CAMPFIRE wildlife revenues Notwithstanding the few examples discussed previously in this report, the local hunting markets for lesser species are virtually undeveloped

Down-listing the African elephant from Appendix I to Appendix II of CITES has assured the continuation of the sport hunting of elephants CITES restrictions on the sale of ivory and other

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[2] The term lobbying, as used here relates to host country regional, and international advocacy activities It does not include formal US government lobbying as prohibited under Office of Management and Budget Circular 122A (as revised) Therefore, the evaluation report is not making a judgement as to the legality of NRMP II activities undertaken in support of regional and international advocacy Rather the intent is to describe these activities and judge their merits in terms of project and development objectives When reference is made to efforts to lobby the US Congress, for example the report points out that these were clearly not funded by USAID under NRMP II.

elephant products are, however, reducing Zimbabwe's and CAMPFIRE's ability to generate additional revenues

The US Endangered Species Act lists elephants as threatened That status could have negative consequences for the economic value of elephants in Zimbabwe, as it enables the US Government, through the USFWS, to restrict trophy-related imports if it judges the resource to be exploited in an unsustainable manner Were the United States to find negatively on the sustainability of Zimbabwean wildlife use, the US trophy hunting market, currently representing about half of Zimbabwe's total, could shut down immediately

Conclusions

Demand for Zimbabwe's wildlife as a tourist resource seems assured, although the rate of growth in consumptive use may taper off as non-consumptive forms of wildlife tourism expand

Diversification into non-consumptive wildlife tourism offers CAMPFIRE communities economic possibilities As with other uses, geographic location and resource endowments are critical determining factors CA producer communities have already demonstrated some potential and nascent capacity for undertaking cultural and ecotourism activities They have also begun to negotiate revenue-sharing arrangements with game-viewing safari lodge operators These are seen as a logical expansion of ongoing CAMPFIRE activities

The international politics of wildlife are a definite threat to Zimbabwe's ability to market products in which it has a definite comparative advantage

The GOZ's primary role is to assure that people have the incentives to protect the resources that are the basis for international tourism, that the industry is healthy and free to promote its products, and that the barriers to international trade are not increased unnecessarily

Recommendations

The government must continue resisting the erection of barriers to legal and controlled trade in elephant and other wildlife products However, it must also devote adequate resources to assuring responsible stewardship of both the public and private wildlife estate and effective safeguards for controlling the ivory trade

This task should be complemented by government efforts to promote sustainable use of its wildlife products, both consumptive and non-consumptive, by allowing market forces to determine the balance and by encouraging an industry that can market wildlife tourism worldwide

CAMPFIRE, with CCG support, should encourage government efforts and policies that reinforce the desire of producer communities to raise more of their revenue through improved market conditions Increasing the local gain from tourism will further enhance conservation objectives

USAID should concentrate the remaining NRMP II support for international promotion and advocacy on strengthening the ties between the tourist sector and the CA.

Evaluation Issue CAMPFIRE, NRMP II, and International Advocacy *"To what extent, if any, have NRMP II funds been used for lobbying, regionally, internationally and/or in the U S for the Down listing of the African elephant and the resumption of the ivory trade under CITES, the U S Endangered Species Act or for other positions with respect to U S legislation or international treaties or conventions Considering the existing focus of CAMPFIRE activities, is "international lobbying" or advocacy for the promotion and development of natural resource product markets appropriate or justified? Is it appropriate to use U S assistance funds for such activities, have U S assistance funds been used for similar activities in other sectors?" (SOW C 4 b)*

Findings

About 92% of CAMPFIRE revenue comes from sport hunting It is the revenue that CAMPFIRE communities have obtained from safari leases and through their commitments to conservation and improved NRM International marketing of sport hunting is an appropriate and justifiable activity for safari operators, professional hunters, and other business interests They pursue this regulated activity and its marketing individually or collectively, domestically and internationally There is no obvious justification for NRMP II to engage *directly* in international market development or promotion of this controversial aspect of CAMPFIRE, and it is important to reemphasize that the funds do not come from NRMP II or from any other source of development assistance At the same time, it may be justifiable to use USAID funds and CCG members to observe and monitor these activities Even at the local level, CAMPFIRE does little more than assist communities with its negotiating strategies and various aspects of wildlife and habitat management (as discussed in section III B 2)

Protection of existing markets from the politics of international wildlife conservation is another matter The strongly differing views held by various decisionmakers require countries like Zimbabwe to participate in the political dialogue on CITES and other endangered species policies As an important participant in Zimbabwe's wildlife markets, CAMPFIRE communities and their supporters have a real stake in decisions such as the elephant down-listing debate, resumption of the ivory trade, and regulatory actions affecting meat, hides, and other animal products

CAMPFIRE communities are aware of the stakes and are pushing their NGO partners -- principally through the CA, with support from ART -- to represent their interests in pressing for changes that improve the economic conditions for their products *wherever and whenever appropriate* Even in the controversial case of elephants, where coexistence with humans requires sacrifices, producer communities want to assure their right to make commercial use of their resources One community with modest wildlife resources informed its elected CA Board member, as he left his community to attend the CITES COP meeting, " if you don't succeed in getting us the down-listing, you'd better plan on emigrating " CAMPFIRE producer communities would suffer major losses in income if international wildlife politics prohibit their commercial use of wildlife

CAMPFIRE participants are supported by other donors in addition to the United States

Conclusions

An advocacy role is appropriate and justified for governments, which participate in the international politics of wildlife conservation Government's devolution of Appropriate Authority to communities engages them directly and, thus, in turn, their NGO partners In addition, CITES is as much NGO-driven as government-driven, further substantiating the appropriateness of Zimbabwean NGOs supporting CAMPFIRE to participate in the international dialogue surrounding the trade in wildlife products

The development of international markets for other, less controversial natural resource products on communal lands may justify collective marketing or advocacy efforts by CAMPFIRE and its CCG partners

If US assistance funds are given to support a commercial enterprise and the operators of the enterprise determine, jointly or separately, that it is in their economic interest to engage in international economic or political operations to maintain or widen their markets, it is not inappropriate for them to use US assistance funds, along with the other funds at their disposal, for such activities What the NRMP II actually carried out in this regard was consistent with the project design

The marketing and advocacy activities ART and the CA have undertaken fall within the norms of what USAID has actively supported in other sectors, such as in many export promotion programs for non-traditional agricultural products or for certified tropical timber products CITES and other regulatory structures are legitimately the object of scrutiny as to whether they constitute non-tariff barriers to trade Without taking either a technical or moral stand on trophy hunting of elephants, this conclusion reflects widely held US values grounded in fundamental beliefs about the importance of free trade, the democratic process, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the value of a vibrant civil society As documented in the following sections, this philosophy is what underlies USAID's support for the international activities financed by NRMP II

Recommendations

CAMPFIRE interests should participate fully, principally through the CA and ART, in the international politics of wildlife conservation to protect Zimbabwe's freedom to enjoy its comparative advantage in all forms of wildlife-based tourism

USAID should not object to any legal use of NRMP II funds that is consistent with the project design and the precedents of change established through workplans, grant amendments, and the like This could include activities that have an international political or economic dimension to them where their purpose is maintaining or widening markets

USAID should continue to recognize the validity of the policy connection, spelled out in the project paper, between CAMPFIRE's international use of funds to protect markets and the economic success of NRMP II

The GOZ and CCG should continue to use their own and a variety of funding sources to finance their involvement in these legitimate activities

Evaluation Issue The Role and Results of ART's Involvement in NRMP II *"What has been the role of ART under NRMP II? What if any are the potential impacts on CAMPFIRE producer communities from its advocacy activities?"*

ART owes its existence to ZimTrust, with which it continues to share a Board of Directors It was formed as a Zimbabwean welfare organization but was also legally constituted in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Republic of South Africa It emerged in part as a response to the negative publicity that the southern African wildlife programs were receiving in the period following the 1989 ivory ban and debate on the elephant issue at the 1992 CITES meetings Rather than responding itself as a humanitarian development organization with a single country focus, ZimTrust encouraged the creation of ART ZimTrust felt that the response to what were perceived as threats to the region's sustainable use programs would more appropriately come from a regional body with specific aims

"Africa Resources Trust is a private voluntary organization dedicated to the alleviation of poverty in Africa through the sustainable use of wild species by rural communities With headquarters in Zimbabwe, ART is a southern organization which aims to counter the traditional North-South flow of information ART believes that informing the public and policy makers in the North is essential to successful sustainable development in the South " (ART 1997)

ART, which included *ACTION Magazine* at the outset, developed its capacities in four areas, which were utilized by and strengthened through NRMP II (1) information outreach, (2) networking, (3) education, and (4) policy research and analysis

When the NRMP II was being formulated in 1993-1994, USAID, to its credit, acknowledged that an advocacy role was critical to project success ART was included in the CCG following its invitation to participate in a workshop on information and communication held in 1993 The June 1995 Plan of Operations defines ART's purpose in the CCG and NRMP II as taking action to create and maintain a "supportive international market environment for CAMPFIRE " This purpose, which depends on market conditions, conforms to the second of the nine key project assumptions, "that wildlife utilization can compete economically and financially with other extensive forms of land use " The NRMP II recognizes policy and regulatory factors *outside* of Zimbabwe as being critical to the wildlife-based elements of the program Accordingly, its design provided that

> During Phase II, ART will lobby for, and promote, CAMPFIRE interests among regional and international policy and regulatory organizations and interests- e g the Convention on

International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) It will also monitor international markets in wildlife products and conduct trade policy and regulatory analyzes in support of its international lobbying efforts In addition, ART will facilitate international networking among similarly interested parties in Africa and throughout the world, to identify and develop market opportunities for program-generated products Locally, ART will collaborate with the CA in the establishment and operation of the CAMPFIRE information service, and lobby on the program's behalf at the higher levels of Zimbabwe's government (SARP 1994 40)

To support this role in the NRMP II, ART, which is funded through ZimTrust in what is described as a "holding company" relationship, was included as a contractor under the ZimTrust grant As per the 1995 Plan of Operations, ART's technical outputs included

- Monitoring, analyzing, and influencing important factors affecting markets, including selected national and international policy, regulatory organizations, and instruments,
- Developing regional and international support networks for CAMPFIRE,
- Monitoring and informing African nations,
- Assisting the CCG with the operation of an international CAMPFIRE information service,
- Informing and influencing key decisionmakers, media, NGOs, and academic communities in Africa, Europe, and the United States, and
- Challenging and countering arguments against sustainable use as practiced in conservation-based community development

To assess ART's performance, the evaluation team conducted interviews with staff at its Washington office, discussed ART's role and CAMPFIRE with key staff within the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), met and discussed the issues under debate with conservation NGOs (WWF, AWF, and IUCN), reviewed extensive letter files from others, interviewed staff, and reviewed USAID/LPA documentation, correspondence, and the related record of Congressional debate The team also reviewed EU documents related to sustainable use, CITES, and CAMPFIRE Finally, ART's Harare offices were visited, and key staff shared their experiences and work products with the team

Findings

ART utilized US$1 168 million of NRMP II funds through December 31, 1997 to implement the work objectives as outlined above ART successfully accomplished the mission the CCG and NRMP II defined for it and continues to carry out most of the same functions following the termination of USAID funding on December 31, 1997 In concert with the CA, ART has served as a public information arm of CAMPFIRE, reaching an international audience It is presently replicating the information center for the CA and transferring direct management of the Internet website to the CA.

Advocacy, Monitoring and Policy Analysis ART established offices in Harare, Brussels, London, Washington, D C , and Johannesburg, all of which were active and functioning as of March 1998, three months after USAID/Z support to ART ended The home office in Harare is staffed by 10 full-time staff and a variable number of volunteers The offices are well-maintained and show clear evidence that the program areas described above are still being actively pursued A new office director was recently assigned to ART's Washington office

ART's activities underscore a rapidly widening and fundamental rift between conservation NGOs and animal rights advocacy groups ART's own activities in advocating a southern Africa sustainable use perspective are a source of ongoing debate and direct confrontation with the animal rights movement Initially, ART attempted to engage animal rights groups in constructive dialogue and possible collaboration The fact that Zimbabwe hosted the last CITES meetings and that elephant down-listing was a major focus at the meetings drew ART into a highly visible political struggle for international influence The Programme became a lightening rod for groups generally opposed to sustainable use initiatives, especially those associated with trophy hunting and elephants The HSUS spearheaded a campaign to stop USAID support for CAMPFIRE, and ART's Washington office took on the role of coordinating a counter-response Such an undertaking built on the strengths ART had acquired through NRMP II financing

When the House and Senate Committees in the US Congress took up the issue of CAMPFIRE funding, ART was not using USAID project funds to support the lobbying efforts of its Washington office USAID had already stopped funding to the Washington office, and ART had already begun using other funding sources for its Washington activities This point is important because some of the activities undertaken could be construed as going beyond the provision of information and as involving an attempt to influence member votes ART's response to the HSUS was remarkably effective (see Appendix J) It galvanized support and generated an explicit, supportive position on sustainable use from a range of more than 40 mainstream conservation NGOs ART/W served as an information source and strategic ally to the embassies of the southern African states in Washington, helping them address their concerns to the Congressional offices most concerned with the debate ART worked with the media, providing the arguments that supported sustainable use as an effective conservation tool and CAMPFIRE as an effective means of creating conservation incentives through local participation

Information, Outreach, and the Media ART established an information center that focused on international concerns of relevance to the CA and its member communities It developed and initiated an Internet website that provides abundant information on the CAMPFIRE Programme, with the primary focus on the conservation and rural development aspects Its orientation is one of providing public information, rather than technical networking

ART monitored the print and broadcast media for content and supplied information to journalists and producers The effectiveness of this work is evident, particularly in conveying an understanding of the complexities of sustainable use arguments in the written press An ART-commissioned assessment of its European media campaign concurs "ART/CA's media outreach activities are successful in

increasing media coverage help stimulate further media discussion of CBNRM issues Positive portrayal of sustainable use of wildlife has increased " (LeBreton 1997)

Among its achievements, ART assisted the British Broadcasting Corporation produce a documentary on CAMPFIRE that the evaluation team found to be very professional in terms of its accurate and direct portrayal of CAMPFIRE's true situation

Networking ART created databases of US, Zimbabwean, and other international persons and organizations with a supportive interest in CAMPFIRE, and tries to supply information through these networks on a regular basis It has given the larger CBNRM database to the CA

Education ART conducted seminar/study tours in the region, as well as in the United States, Canada, and Europe (the latter was not US-funded) and hosted visits to CAMPFIRE communities by various groups ART has produced a very powerful series of posters on elephant conservation that trace each of the key steps in the CAMPFIRE Programme

Conclusions

ART's performance demonstrates the soundness of the original project design and indicates the need for continuing its services ART's close collaboration with the CA membership helped decisionmakers understand the stakes in the 1997 CITES down-listing decision and was critical in obtaining support Its close collaboration with SADC embassies and conservation NGOs in Washington and elsewhere was instrumental in creating a supportive coalition in favor of CAMPFIRE While this effort grew out of its informational role, which was supported initially under NRMP II, the actual effort and lobbying took place well after USAID funding for ART's Washington office had ceased

It may be difficult, given ART's strong stands and confrontational style, for it to attempt again to engage organizations with legitimate animal welfare concerns in constructive collaboration with the CCG, despite the scope for dialogue in such areas as PAC and animal population dynamics

Recommendations

The CA should continue to utilize ART's services and, where necessary, collaborate with it to obtain the financial support needed for those services

ART should continue to help the CA explore the international market for non-consumptive wildlife use, including game-viewing and cultural and ecotourism A major or lead role in following regional activities would be appropriate in this regard It is important that CAMPFIRE stay abreast of strategies and marketing techniques of potential use to the CA's membership Related networking and facilitation of cross-country visits and other strategic encounters would also play to ART's strengths

ART should work with CCG members, especially the CA, to use the Internet to link CAMPFIRE globally with affiliated interests in such subject areas as CBNRM, responsible ecotourism, indigenous rights groups, and other topics ART should assist the CA in creating and maintaining an Internet-based discussion forum where substantive and controversial issues can be debated and constructive suggestions from all quarters incorporated in the CAMPFIRE process In this way, individuals and organizations, including animal welfare interests, could offer alternative perspectives on such questions as problem animal management, wildlife population dynamics, sustainable finance, resource tenure, wildlife habitat and monitoring, PRA, and other topics that could help guide CAMPFIRE's adaptive management model

Evaluation Issue USAID/Zimbabwe Response to CAMPFIRE International Advocacy *"What steps have the Mission and its partners taken to address expressed concerns regarding use of U S funds for such activities, are these measures justified and appropriate in this instance? What if any additional measures might be taken to ensure that these concerns are handled in an appropriate manner?" (SOW C 4 b)*

Findings

Both Houses of the US Congress debated CAMPFIRE in committee The Senate Committee emphasized "its support for programs that protect endangered species and promote sustainable development CAMPFIRE has done its best to satisfy these two goals The committee urges AID [sic] in the strongest possible manner to continue to insure the program's compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)" The Senate Conference Agreement "prohibits funds from being made available for any activity in contravention to [CITES]"

The evaluation team reviewed the extensive debate in the House of Representatives (Congressional Record - House, September 3, 1997) and found a diversity of opinion, but weighted in favor of very strong support to the CAMPFIRE and the principles it represents In defeating the Fox-Miller amendment (HR 2159), the full US House of Representatives voted 267 to 159 for continued funding for CAMPFIRE through the NRMP II

Despite this public scrutiny, the US Congress requested additional information regarding the Programme, much of which can be gleaned from this programmatic evaluation Specifically, the Senate Committee chaired by Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) wanted documentation of the specific activities funded under CAMPFIRE

The evaluation team found no evidence that NRMP II funds directly financed trophy hunting of elephants or other endangered species as defined by CITES Actions such as the construction of wildlife fences, the establishment of water points, and the improvement of quota-setting procedures recognize a sport hunting industry, but their intent is to promote improved resource conservation and human well-being and, in the case of some fences, safety The team found no evidence that NRMP II funds had been used to lobby US government officials and that the actions undertaken by ART and CA in the United States were of an information and advocacy nature ART did begin lobbying the US

Congress during the CITES and CAMPFIRE debates, but a review of these activities by the Counsel General found that they had not been funded by USAID The evaluation team made no attempt to investigate this matter further

The evaluation team found that NRMP II had supported ART's information and advocacy campaign, which attempted to influence international agreements such as CITES and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) The evaluation team believes that, from the Zimbabwean perspective, these are valid and possibly essential dimensions of CAMPFIRE, at least in those Rural Districts where sport hunting makes important economic contributions As a sovereign state, Zimbabwe remains committed to promoting sustainable use, resumption of legal trade in ivory, and modifications to international conventions and treaties

The evaluation team also found that, given the confusion of the debate over lobbying and the uncertainty with respect to US commitment to this aspect of the CAMPFIRE Programme, USAID has stopped providing support to ART USAID's concern is over the appropriateness of its project-funded activities, and not the appropriateness of such activities to Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Programme The evaluation team found that USAID/Z had implemented these changes primarily through a modification of its agreement with ZimTrust (Modification No 05, Grant No 690-0251-4-00-9001-00), with which ART had subcontracted This modification contained special provisions that

- Confirmed that funding for the Washington office would not resume (effective November 1996),
- Stopped funding for all foreign offices of the ZimTrust as of June 1997,
- Stopped funding for communication "with convention delegates, governments, and other official participants, or communication with the general public or segments of the general public, as part of a lobbying campaign to directly influence any official decision to down list elephants under CITES or to amend the Articles of CITES or other international convention, and communications with government officials, or communications with the general public or segments of the general public, as part of a lobbying campaign to directly influence the introduction, enactment, or modification of the legislation of any country "
- Fully phased out the subcontractor, ART, not later than December 31, 1997

These steps were taken following scrutiny of ART's activities and considering the controversial nature of its positions with respect to those of the animal rights constituency in the United States, some members of the US Congress, and others

The IUCN-led initiative to broaden the debate on sustainable use at the CBD is far more compatible with CAMPFIRE than is most of the current CITES agenda, in that it is already oriented toward sustainable use

Conclusions

Suspending support to ART has been a necessary political step to protect the funding of the project The team found this measure to be prudent under the circumstances, but one that is at odds with its more fundamental conclusions concerning the appropriateness of international advocacy activities in USAID-funded programs In a global society and global marketplace, international advocacy is a legitimate activity and essential to meeting the sustainable development objectives outlined in USAID's current strategy (USAID 1997)

It is in the interest of CAMPFIRE to follow the efforts of IUCN's Southern Africa Sustainable Use Group to promote the integration of CITES into the broader CBD Proponents of this initiative argue that the CBD and its Agenda 21 can appropriately absorb the CITES functions, noting the bulk of CITES work on Appendix III species is already centered on sustainable use, not the strict protectionist measures under Appendix I

Recommendations

USAID should continue to take all legal steps necessary to protect the funding of NRMP II

The CCG should hold a policy forum to discuss the overlap between CBD and CITES and the possible value of a strategy of international involvement in the issue

D. Adaptive Management

Adaptive management might be described as a type of NRM that implies making decisions as part of an ongoing process It assumes that monitoring the results of actions will provide a flow of information that may indicate the need to change a course of action Changes in the parameters in which a program operates may also dictate the need for revision.

Scientific findings and the needs of society, for example, may signal a need to adapt resource management to new information Thus, adaptive management, a form of "learning by doing," means steadily adjusting management in the light of experience in order to rebuild healthy ecosystems Assessment and monitoring are integral to adaptive management

Monitoring is repeated measurement to detect change over time, it provides feedback on the impacts of land management and can guide future improvements The use of target organisms as indicators is increasingly accepted by managers Adaptive management helps resource managers evaluate their own performance It provides a way for the knowledge of managers to be applied in concert with that of scientists It also helps the public see how successful management can be

In communal areas, concerns relating to the human environment are central and require at least the adaptive monitoring that is called for as regards habitat and fauna The task is by definition spatially bound In some places, Adaptive Management Areas have been adopted These are landscape units

designated to encourage the development and testing of technical and social approaches to achieving desired ecological, economic, and other social objectives Each area is meant to pilot adaptive management, thus promoting learning about how to manage in a changing environment

Management strategies based on untested scientific assumptions can create problems when agencies and the public demand action based on a poor understanding of cause and effect (Arcese and Sinclair 1997) The application of management actions that have not yet been subjected to rigorous assessment may lead to the adoption of faulty strategies In the absence of controlled experimental conditions, which is often the case under actual field situations, the success or failure of a particular strategy may not even be attributable to the actions themselves because of the number of confounding variables that contribute to the observed outcome In an approach that is gaining increased acceptance, wildlife management is treated as an adaptive learning process (Walters 1986) One approach to adaptive management combines the monitoring of interventions with paired ecological variables in adjacent control areas (Arcese and Sinclair 1997) The occurrence near some CAMPFIRE areas of protected areas containing similar habitat and wildlife communities offers the opportunity to design experiments that can use the protected or minimally managed areas as controls for areas receiving CAMPFIRE interventions This design squarely depends on adequate monitoring of "ecological baselines," and it has the potential to provide sound information to the adaptive wildlife management approach Without suitable controls, there is no reliable basis for judging the success of interventions with regard to wildlife communities and ecosystems (Arcese and Sinclair 1997)

Evaluation Issue Performance of the University of Zimbabwe's Center for Applied Social Sciences

Findings

CASS has been involved in the CAMPFIRE movement since 1989 Former Director Murphree was a key contributor to the fundamental thinking behind what later became CAMPFIRE CASS continues to be a member of the CCG

CASS stated its mission in 1994 "To serve as a multi-disciplinary applied social sciences department, providing high level graduate and policy relevant teaching and research "

CASS core staff positions include one professorship, four lectureships, and one research fellowship It also has five research fellowships funded by the NRMP II

CASS's NRMP II budget is Z$10,316,240 (through August 1999) CASS had spent Z$3,892,986 (38%) through January 1998 The trend in underspending its budget appears to be reversing, recent CASS involvement has seen an acceleration in spending rates The spending rate is likely to increase because CASS has initiated an effort to contract out a larger portion of the work specified under its CCG obligation Informal budget projections at a recent PET quarterly review meeting suggest that all grant funds will be exhausted at term

CASS has suffered the loss of two key staff, has three vacant lectureships, and an unfilled research position It is having a difficult time filling these positions and it is understaffed and unable to meet its NRMP II obligations fully and credibly Staff feel that the university has not been supportive in filling these positions While these are risks to continuity in CAMPFIRE participation, the Center is continuing to push to fill two lectureships, one professorship, and two research fellowships to resolve this problem It will try to make employment more attractive by facilitating additional salary and fees by soliciting consultancies through the administratively more autonomous CASS Trust

CASS is undergoing a period of self-analysis, trying to determine what its mission and focus should be Some staff prefer a more traditional academic department role, with the emphasis on teaching and scholarly, publishable research and policy analysis, and strongly oppose the "social technicians" epithet that goes with an *applied* research focus They feel that CASS should do analytic work The current director is actively attempting to create an administrative middle ground that would allow CASS to fulfill both its analytic role and its obligation to provide "advisory services" to CAMPFIRE As mentioned, CASS would contract out and oversee the advisory work (socioeconomic feasibility studies for CDF grants, CDF evaluations, various surveys, and, more recently, the CAMPFIRE customer service plan) CASS management believes that too much staff time gets lost in such routine work, but feels its expertise would make management oversight, quality control, and administration appropriate CASS researchers would then be free to provide leadership in pursuing research themes that would be of value to CAMPFIRE's adaptive management mode of implementation Key staff would be able to manage long-term ongoing studies in areas of critical importance to CAMPFIRE (woodland management, resource tenure security, and related policy, for example) The principal researcher would have prime responsibility for directing these research programs and would take advantage of timely opportunities of substance and staff availability CASS would also continue to undertake short-term analyses on substantive issues and policy

CASS has been doing research on CAMPFIRE for 10 years and has published 4 doctoral theses (one later turned into a book) and 2 masters theses It has published an impressive list of policy analysis papers and the Technical Papers Series, as well as a limited number of refereed journal articles

CASS' NRMP II activities fall into five areas policy research, CAMPFIRE-related research (e g , land use management), survey training for districts (a suspended activity), advisory services (on demand, with a very limited capacity), and NRMP II project management

CASS has not made its findings widely accessible It has been criticized for failing to write and distribute its reports to catch the attention of policy-makers and for its failure to be at fora for key policy-makers CASS does not follow up to verify if fellows' research papers have an impact, fellows are interested in publishing articles to advance their academic careers Other CCG members are among the critics CASS appears to be launching a new initiative that responds to these criticisms Working with other CCG members, some CASS studies were shortened and widely distributed and even made available on the Internet The team briefly reviewed what might be called a dissemination plan This step is important because the opinions expressed by the CA representatives question the relevance of CASS's work, citing it as abstract and not useful

Conclusions

CASS has been responsible for supporting NRMP II and CAMPFIRE with a tremendous amount of applied field research It has documented this work and given it wide distribution among partner institutions It deserves much credit for the success of CAMPFIRE within Zimbabwe

CASS has a track record of doing serious and useful policy analysis in support of CAMPFIRE

CASS needs to bolster its staff if it is once again to play an effective role in CAMPFIRE

Institutionally, CASS is passing through a period of low morale, but would like to enter more into policy areas of study, and to do less in the applied, field-oriented advising it has been asked to do in the past (a reflection of current personnel skills and interests)

CASS, as a university-based program, continues to be an important (potential) partner to the program, and ways to support personnel should be found

Recommendations

CASS should continue to play an active role in CAMPFIRE in the areas of policy analysis and applied research It should be encouraged to develop its policy dialogue skills so its analysis may better contribute to policy decision-making Specifically, CASS should (1) write policy briefs that summarize major findings and recommendations, (2) seek to expand the form in which studies are presented so that they are accessible to sub-national audiences, e g , it might work with Action magazine to put some policy-related studies in an animated strip format in the magazine and other educational materials, and (3) seize opportunities to make its work known through popular media, public speeches, and participation in CAMPFIRE meetings, workshops, and training

CASS must be tasked with a studies mandate that allows it to determine timing and the precise content of studies internally The CCG should help define the subject areas and scope of inquiry, such as tenure policy, eco-tourism, impact of natural resource policies, or other areas determined

USAID, through the IC grant or through the CDF, should strengthen CASS's efforts by

- Providing block grants to principal investigators in the key subject areas identified in this report (policy harmonization and local resource governance, woodland policy management and tenure, and the nature of community commitment to CAMPFIRE), and

- Revising CASS agreement

V LOOKING AHEAD. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CAMPFIRE SUSTAINABILITY

A. Graduation Scenarios

Current CAMPFIRE NRMP II support is scheduled to end in September 2000 The Mission has requested an extension through FY2002, which would move the project completion date to September 2003 The evaluation team considered several broad options to guide Mission support for CAMPFIRE under each timeframe The team's reflections are summarized in the scenarios presented below

The evaluation team favors the longer term phaseout of USAID support, as proposed in the FY2002-A scenario As is argued in the body of the report, it contains the most progressive and responsive means of achieving results *and* closing down support More specifically, it will

- Enable a consolidation of progress in institutionalizing the CAMPFIRE principles,
- Establish momentum for the push for CAMPFIRE diversification into a wider range of resource use and revenue sources, and
- Help establish a favorable policy environment and other enabling conditions for long-term program sustainability

The team recognizes that there are other ways to pursue the above objectives, and the range of options encourages broad CCG and BRC debate over program modifications for the remaining CAMPFIRE support under NRMP II

1. Scenarios Assuming Graduation in FY2000

Scenario FY 2000-A Closeout with Modifications to the Existing Implementation Framework

Under this scenario, USAID would support existing grants under the IC through their current August 1999 termination dates, after which they would receive a one-year extension at 50% funding levels They would be encouraged to complement NRMP II grant funds with other funding to complete their CCG commitments Support for new NRMP II partners and a renewed grant to the ZimTrust would be structured similarly Support for government partners would be drawn directly from the USAID budget as per approved activity proposals USAID, in collaboration with the BRC, would eliminate the PET This action is a step toward Mission graduation and recognizes the CA's enhanced capacity Both the reduction in direct core support to grantees and the elimination of the PET represent a gradual and phased withdrawal of NRMP structures from within the CCG The level of the NGO match could be adjusted by institution if circumstances warranted USAID and the BRC would work through the IC to transform the CDF into an autonomous "sinking" grant fund that would gradually disperse funds through and beyond the PACD When the monies have expired, the funding mechanism would cease to exist The fund would support continued CAMPFIRE activities by the CA

membership, the CCG, and other actors whose proposals meet the revised CDF criteria Other USAID operating units could consider supportive, complementary intervention during and after the bilateral program's phaseout The CDF and possible presence of Peace Corps staff on the ground could leverage ongoing progress to enhance long-term sustainability

Scenario FY2000-B Closeout with No Major Modification to the Existing Implementation Framework

Under this scenario, NRMP II would continue to fund existing CCG members and functions and operate under the same structures as are currently in place, i e , the PET and CDF New members would receive funding to enable diversification, habitat monitoring, further devolution, and bottom-up planning, which would be given additional impetus to achieve the greatest immediate results At the PACD, USAID would pull out with minimal allowance for continuity and sustainability built into the NRMP II The RCSA and other USAID operating units might play a greatly reduced role in CAMPFIRE's future, especially if a small grant fund(s) from other sources and/or Peace Corps staff can support field-based initiatives

2. Scenarios Assuming Graduation in FY2002

Scenario FY2002-A Extension Through FY2002 with Transition to CDF Funding

This scenario would essentially constitute an extension and expansion of Scenario FY2000-A The additional time would allow CAMPFIRE to consolidate the considerable investment made under the NRMP II and achieve significantly greater results in several areas Under the extension, similar provision would be made for the PET, CDF, and new and existing CCG partners as were made under Scenario FY2000-A Direct grants under the IC would wind down on the same time schedule, but the additional funds would allow a much greater period of CDF funding support The IC could be extended to oversee a two-year transition to the autonomous CDF in the post-Mission closeout period Between 2000-2002, the fund might contain a set-aside to enable smooth termination of certain core functions carried out by the CCG partners and afford them time to develop alternative funding sources for some activities The additional time would also make implementation of CDF infrastructure grants a more realistic activity It would allow USAID to assist CAMPFIRE in pursuing its policy initiative to ensure producer communities are left with greater security in resource access and tenure The additional effort would be expected to advance the diversification thrust significantly, especially of CAMPFIRE ecotourism ventures As new partners are brought in, the extension would establish the basis for a more integrated approach to NRM Such a "CAMPFIRE approach" would use participatory land-use planning and lead to "graduated" communities capable of and motivated to manage their resources sustainably The extension would allow USAID to strengthen program synergy with the Mission's special objective in economic growth and democracy As with the other scenarios, other USAID operating units could consider supportive, complementary intervention during and after the bilateral program's phaseout The CDF and possible presence of Peace Corps staff on the ground could leverage ongoing progress

Scenario FY2002-B Extension Through FY2002 Under the Existing System of Sub-grants

This scenario is essentially an extension of Scenario FY2000-B Existing project structures would be maintained Additional funds would permit efforts to diversify CAMPFIRE NRM activities, especially into ecotourism and woodland management Policy change and policy initiatives could be made a greater priority The NRMP II could be used to enhance the GOZ/CAMPFIRE aim of comprehensive habitat monitoring to complement the widely praised wildlife monitoring functions The greatest number of the incremental recommendations made in this report could be implemented under this scenario The PET could be phased out prior to the PACD but less abruptly than under the FY2000 scenarios With careful planning, the impact of the NRMP II closeout could be reduced

Scenario FY2002-C Extension with No Additional Funding

This scenario is a second-choice one but is still preferable to the presently approved FY2000 closeout Activities and budgets could be wound down more slowly There would be no impetus to spend funds rapidly Rather, the challenge would be to use them even more parsimoniously than at present Results would suffer, however Diversification to other CBNRM regimes that employ participatory methodologies, land-use plans, and the same start-up incentives and post-project activities with new CCG partners would be limited to options outside the control of NRMP II in the post-graduation context Activities would be triaged, and some activities would be curtailed or dropped

B. Sustainability of CAMPFIRE

1. Extending and Improving the CAMPFIRE Development Fund

Given the start-up delays with the NRMP II and additional distractions brought on by the international CITES debate, progress on NRMP II-funded activities has understandably been slower than expected Design flaws, which could be easily remedied, in the CDF compounded this slowness The CCG group, which has spent years -- with USAID encouragement -- building capacity to implement sustainable use principles, merits continued support

Bringing in three new CCG members and extending the project by a year will also draw down funds The exact amount remains to be seen However, the absorptive capacity of SAFIRE, the DNR, and the FC is limited In addition, it is unlikely that "pushing" funds through the CDF at an excessive rate will result in institution-building or successful in CBNRM activities in the field

For these reasons, this section concentrates on exploring the option of capitalizing the remaining available program funds Capitalization would have the advantage of slowing the rate of spending to one that could be matched with local absorptive capacity High quality field results even without large supportive project structures would continue to be possible

The purpose of capitalization would be to establish a sustainable financing mechanism that continues to provide small-scale support for activities that are consistent with NRMP II goals and the

underlying principles of CAMPFIRE The IC could easily establish this mechanism during the closeout period

Capitalization could involve either an endowment or a sinking fund In either case, prudent management would require that the capital stay off-shore in the United States Management of the grant fund would be in Zimbabwe That is, only fiduciary custodianship of the capital would be entrusted to an offshore account Transfers for grant-making would be made annually to a local organization charged with participating in the development, approval, and monitoring of the grants

The choice of a sinking fund or straight endowment concept depends on the amount of capital available Because of management costs, it rarely makes sense to create an endowment for a developing country unless the available capital is greater than about US$7 million.[3] When the amount is less that $7 million, the best alternative is a sinking fund A sinking fund works somewhat like an endowment the funds are invested in the US, usually in some professionally advised fund that combines stocks, Treasury bills, and cash If the trust that holds the money is registered as a 501c 3 charitable organization in the United States, competitive and prudent management is available from such services as The Investment Fund for Foundations (TIFF) or Vanguard Institutional Advisory Services WWF-US has had fair experience and success serving as a trustee for beneficiaries outside the United States, often with USAID funding as the original source of the capital

The difference between an endowment and a sinking fund is that, with a sinking fund, the capital is not accumulated and does not grow over time Rather, a fixed sum is transferred each year to a grant-maker who is charged with making grants consistent with the purposes of the fund as specified by the original donor, in this case, USAID (A suggested approach to establishing and managing a longer term fund mechanism is included in Appendix G) Finally, it is worth noting that, were substantial funds available in excess of $US7 million, and the endowment mechanism favored, the level of annual grant-making would be much lower at first (see the accompanying table) than with a sinking fund However, the level would grow over time and provide a longer lasting USAID legacy in Zimbabwe

Recommendations

The team recommends that USAID establish an extended funding mechanism Several planning steps would be necessary

Work with existing CCG members to make expenditures under the current framework,

Enter into a dialogue with Washington-based USAID legal counsel on possible trust and endowment scenarios, and

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A common rule of thumb puts that figure at US$10 million, but that is for a US context. When the intent is to create a steady source of small-grant funds in a developing country, US$7 million will generate the sums required

Contract for an in-depth review of the capitalization concept to investigate the possibility in depth, explore the wording of a trust agreement, and review potential partners and options for a local grant-making intermediary that would work in-country after USAID departure until the grant funds were spent

C. Strategic Plan Review -- USAID Results Framework

Evaluation Issue SO1 Performance Monitoring Plan *"To what extent these SO-level indicators and targets are appropriate, i e , can they be appropriately measured and monitored for SO 1 performance purposes ?" "Are they realistic for the specified time frames and resource levels?" "What changes might the team recommend in these indicators and targets for improved measurement and monitoring of SO achievement and sustainability?" (4 D e)*

Findings

In June 1995, USAID/Z developed a Plan of Operations for Phase II that included objectively verifiable, quantifiable indicators, including targets and timeframes, to measure project outputs Under Phase II of the project, each of the implementing partners (e g , the ZimTrust, WWF, CASS, ACTION, ART, PET, and The DNPWLM) is responsible for one of the eight planned outputs that will be measured to determine the achievement of project purposes (Audit, 1995)

The 1995 audit reported that USAID/Z needs better indicators for measuring results (Audit, 1995), and the Mission progressively worked on its indicator set IUCN-ROSA facilitated the SO redesign effort, leading to the current set of indicators and performance monitoring and measurement tables and data collection plan "Virtual SO team members" in USAID/W/AFR /SD/PSGE also provided assistance The Mission relies on CCG partners, which generate a more extensive information base for their own and the Programme's M&E needs The SO1 indicators attempt to isolate critical measures that meet the needs of the USAID Mission and overall Agency requirements for strategic performance monitoring and measurement Over the course of the project, changes at all levels (shift from a food security to NRM objective, reengineering and redesign of NRMP II as SO1, shift from household to community focus, etc) have affected what should or even could be measured by the CCG (i e , addition of new partners and enhanced capacity of existing partners, etc) The existing framework reflects this evolving context and the capacities of the CCG partners systems

USAID and its implementing partners spent a great deal of time and effort discussing, developing, and then implementing the current Performance Monitoring Plan for SO1 The reasoning and causal linkages established between "performance-based, process indicators," which are "to measure results rather than outputs" at various levels, is theoretically sound It is, nonetheless, removed from on-the-ground complexity and "real-life" ability to measure CAMPFIRE, a complex program, is process-orientated, and the indicators developed may be difficult to measure objectively An example is the ambiguity as to what constitutes a community In the R4, a "CAMPFIRE community" is defined to include people at the village, ward, *and district* levels CAMPFIRE implementation and principles are, however, based on benefits to "producer communities" -- households at the village level

The current SO1 Results Indicators are displayed in Appendix L, along with planned and actual results The table also offers the rapid, overview assessment of the indicators made by the responsible evaluation team members Six of the indicators from the USAID March 1998 R4 submission draw information from USAID pre-NRMP 1989 baseline information That baseline refers to two districts (Guruve and Nyaminyami), comprising 15 wards USAID/Z and WWF data for that year differed substantially, but the differences were corrected in the most recent R4 submission prepared during the evaluation team's fieldwork

USAID outsourcing of the NRMP II for M&E information to multiple CCG partners is not working well in terms of producing a coordinated, focused activity The issue is not that the framework for meetings and coordination -- the PET M&E subcommittee -- is not working The subcommittee does seem to be progressing, although the team's observations in three field visits (regional implementation meetings) indicate that the ground-level generation of information is felt to be complex, not always harmonious, excessive, and incompletely understood, internalized, and coordinated Rather, the NRMP II needs to add a set of analytical concerns to the already substantial monitoring efforts underway, even though the CA has whole-heartedly endorsed USAID's customer service plan and borrowed the concept and tools for its own purposes More importantly, some participants recognize that much of the progress of CAMPFIRE eludes the formal M&E system and may be accessible only by less quantitative, and at times more subjective, measures

The POMS instrument to measure results (IR 2 0) has been tested in a few Rural Districts, the reliability and validity of this very long and complex instrument remain unknown Three of the 10 indicators in the table are "proposed" and have not been approved for actual use One of the remaining seven indicators will be discontinued after 1998 Thus, six indicators are actually producing usable results at this time

Despite the concerns expressed above, the evaluation team recognizes that CAMPFIRE is fortunate in having an extremely rich base of data from the early years of the Programme to draw upon -- particularly as concerns wildlife monitoring and dividends earned and distributed among local communities This rich data base, developed within CAMPFIRE through the efforts of its various implementing partners, serves many purposes The Programme in Zimbabwe has generated one of the most impressive sets of relevant and high quality literature found in any program of its kind in the world, much of it with direct support from NRMP II (e g , CASS, WWF, and ART/ACTION bibliographies)

Many sources have benefitted the CAMPFIRE very substantially, but they are not being measured at all An example is the employment benefits to rural communities from wildlife tourism industries located nearby or in their midst Even measuring the economic benefits of natural resource diversification efforts (e g , Mopane worms, elephant dung paper, and leather crafts) is extremely difficult and time-consuming, and it is even more arduous to centralize the information at a national level in a meaningful and timely manner so that it can be included in a quarterly, or even annual, S01-reporting exercise

Attention to spatial aspects in CAMPFIRE's M&E system is limited Monitoring of habitat loss, particularly in the wildlife-rich Rural Districts and wards, is very weak This gap is particularly surprising given the financial resources at the disposal of CAMPFIRE over the past eight years Without an objective basis for characterizing, describing, and quantifying the increasing fragmentation of habitat and the growth of scattered population centers within former wildlife habitats, it is difficult to interpret and respond to this important demographic challenge to CAMPFIRE Simply monitoring population growth, without knowing where people are settling, does not address the problem adequately

Conclusions

Performance monitoring and evaluation have been weak components of the NRMP I and II, for reasons that are usually beyond the means of project personnel to improve significantly No one wants the cost of monitoring to exceed the costs of the activity being monitored It already takes a great deal of project personnel's time, and it should not be increased Simplification would be preferable

Performance monitoring and evaluation in NRMP II could have been better coordinated with the CA as the lead agency There has been inadequate focus on the verification of results in attempting to implement CAMPFIRE principles Since the SO1 was redesigned, there is a closer association between what is proposed for measurement and what is being carried out on the ground

NRMP II performance "process" monitoring may not have exploited the rich database resources to the extent possible, preferring simply to create a new set of indicators, many of which would appear difficult to acquire or interpret

A fresh look at existing data might be considered For example, the benefits of CAMPFIRE dividends in real terms, when compared with inflation, might be pointed out more clearly While the value in Zimbabwe dollars of a cow or kilogram of corn to rural farmers has declined over the years, the value of the hard currency they get from wildlife management, as well as other NRM options (exported honey and tourism), has remained constant, if not increased The Zimbabwean dollar has lost 50% of its value since the beginning of the NRMP II, but the hard currency values of natural resource products have remained the same or risen

The case for rural communities *without* wildlife dividend benefits is not clearly shown One way to catch diversification in revenue generation (SO1E), a key goal for the NRMP II, particularly in these closing years of USAID support to the Programme, would be to take total non-sport hunting income as a percentage of total CAMPFIRE NRM revenue (that figure could include income-producing activities flowing from the initial wildlife revenue, as in case of the revenue from grinding mills or leather crafts) (see Tables 6 and 7) Yet, obtaining and aggregating the data needed for this proposed indicator will be extremely difficult CAMPFIRE benefits to rural communities are very substantial, and their impact is not captured through the indicators presented

Policy changes are an important intermediate result and seem to escape the current framework The use of NRM by-law infractions is a particularly disturbing proxy Most by-laws the team examined were local adaptations of prescriptive, restrictive, top-down, and agriculturally-biased model by-laws that do not reflect the participatory resource use governance and self-regulation that seem indicated by CAMPFIRE's principles

During the remaining years of NRMP II, improvements in habitat monitoring need to be made Baseline information for *at least* the wildlife-rich Rural Districts and wards would be an important database to leave to future CAMPFIRE initiatives within Zimbabwe Case study data exist that would provide a longitudinal ground check for a general system that encompassed all CAMPFIRE areas

Recommendations

Given the remaining timeframe of NRMP II, and the proposed phased closedown, no significant additional time should be expended on further modifying or changing the current monitoring system Better interpretation and use of existing data and ongoing data acquisition should meet the needs of the project

USAID/Z, with assistance from its IC, should assume direct responsibility for insuring the coordination of the data-gathering efforts that deal directly with completion of USAID's SO1 Performance Monitoring Plan. The point is not for USAID and the IC to gather these data directly, although periodic field verification of aggregate data will assist in guiding CAMPFIRE support, in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the data acquired, and in gathering first-hand anecdotal material with which to complement the performance monitoring tables It is currently clear which institutions are responsible for gathering the requisite data needed to report on each indicator, and this arrangement should continue

The M&E subcommittee should establish indicators for the resources into which CAMPFIRE is diversifying Tourism statistics might be an important indicator to follow, as a significant number of the tourists who visit Zimbabwe visit one or more of its game parks Concrete examples from two or three specific photo-safari sites (e g , Sun Hotel at Bumi Hills) of the numbers of tourists coming might be included with the aggregate figures All such visits add revenue that benefits the rural communities living directly with wildlife and can be seen as a proxy to show whether the benefits are increasing or decreasing over time Moreover, this step would allow USAID to monitor at least one of the project's critical assumptions

USAID/Z should obtain some comparative data from either the pre-NRMP period (i e , baseline) or Rural Districts not participating or just entering into NRMP II as a basis for assessing results

The ZimTrust should continue to implement POMS While it may be a complex and still largely untested tool for measuring impact, it is being used and should continue to provide the best information it can in the time remaining to this project Perhaps it can be adapted as a criterion for defining "graduated CAMPFIRE assumptions "

The formal indicator reporting needs to be supplemented with case study material This approach is already being applied but can be taken a step further by reinterpretation and "ground truthing" of the in-depth studies by CASS and other CCG members This information could contribute to the "adaptive management model" that CAMPFIRE employs

The source and data quality analysis that accompanies SO indicator measurement should be improved USAID/Z should also improve the justification for each of its project result indicators

There need to be several sets of spatial habitat monitoring data Efforts should be initiated to improve the monitoring of habitat loss, beginning with the most important wildlife Rural Districts A baseline for key aggregate land-use classes (e g , bush cover, new agricultural land, old agricultural land, human settlements, roads, and bodies of water) could be established for approximately the last 10 years, using Landsat images for the 1970s, for example A second set could be established for the period 1988-1991, when CAMPFIRE began Finally, a third period, the most recent coverage possible -- 1997/1998 -- should be completed Annual, low-cost, videographic monitoring could be initiated in high-risk but valuable areas, and the data superimposed on the earlier geographically referenced maps Finally, these spatial data could be integrated with information concerning safari zones of operation and correlated with wildlife quotas and revenues being generated It seems the WWF is currently the best positioned to support such an effort The additional cost of this effort would certainly be justified, given the current total absence of such information for Zimbabwe's most significant natural resource its wildlife Such information is also critical to establishing meaningful NRM plans for the concerned wards and Rural Districts Given sufficient time and funding, these efforts should be extended to other Rural Districts where forests (without wildlife) are the resources, as they are critically important to the future economic options of the local population Had such spatial monitoring resources been available for at least CAMPFIRE's wildlife-rich Rural Districts, NRMP II could have objectively measured reduced habitat loss as an indicator of the success of the Programme and of CAMPFIRE's overall philosophy

Table 12 Model 1 Capitalization of Fund in Endowment Mechanism/Trust Fund

Assumes Off Shore investment of capital in U S financial markets
stock/bond mix generating 7% long run average total return (conservative) and
requirement to deduct 1% management costs and 3% inflation reinvestment

Basic Capital	US $	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	Yr 6	Yr 7	Yr8	Yr 9	Yr 10
Total Initial Endowment	7 000 000	7,415 100	7,696 132	7 987 816	8 290 554	8,604 766	8 930 887	9 269 367	9,620 676	9,985 300	10 363 743
Less 1% Management Fee	70 000	74 151	76 961	79 878	82 906	86 048	89 309	92 694	96,207	99 853	103 637
Less 3% for Grant making	6 930 000	7 192 647	7 465 248	7 748 181	8 041 837	8,346,623	8 662 960	8 991 286	9 332 056	9 685 741	10 052,830
Available for Grants after 15% grant-makers overhead		189 085	196 251	203 689	211 409	219,422	227 738	236 369	245 327	254 625	264 275

Table 13 Model 2 Eleven Year Sinking Fund

Same assumptions as above but aim for $500 000 fixed payout every year

Basic Capital	Zim $	Xchange	US $	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Yr 4	Yr 5	Yr 6	Yr 7	Yr8	Yr 9	Yr 10	Yr 11
Unspent CDF	25 000 000	15	1 666 667											
Unspent Project Funds			2,500 000											
Additional Donor Contributions					REINVESTMENTS									
Total			4 166 667	4,383,433	4 075 932	3 743 899	3 385 502	2 998 778	2 581 622	2 131 775	1 646 817	1 124 153	561 001	45 621
1% Management Fee			70 000	74,151	76 961	79 878	82 906	86 048	89 309	92 694	96 207	99 853	103 637	0
Less Grant Budget			4 096 667	3,809,282	3 498 971	3 164 021	2 802 596	2 412 731	1 992 313	1 539 081	1 050 610	524 300	42 637	545 621
Available for Grants after 15% grant makers overhead				425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000	425 000
Fund Disappears after 11 years														

Management fee is the cost of an investment firm plus marginal cost of trustees meeting and bank transfers

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Table 14a Future Scenario 2002-A (original)

Recipient	Remaining Total	Amount Projected to FY 2000 @ 100%	Annual Rate	March 1 - Sept 30, 1998	75% for FY 1999	50% for FY 2000	Total Budget	Balance to New Partners or CDF	Amount Needed to September 2002	Balance After FY 2002
CDF	5,363,370		425,000	400,000	425,000	425,000	1,250,000	4,113,370	850,000	4,166,667
DA/PW	1,638,636	2,035,446	814,178	407,089	814,178	814,178	2,035,445	-396,809	1628356	0
DNPWLM	1,439,236		100,000	50,000	75,000	50,000	175,000	1,264,236		0
MLGRUD	200,000		100,000	50,000	75,000	50,000	175,000	25,000		0
CA	897,645	993,750	397,500	198,750	298,125	198,750	695,625	202,020	596250	0
Zimtrust	664,651		600,000	300,000	450,000	300,000	1,050,000	-385,349	0	0
WWF	1,154,917	1,058,333	523,000	261,500	392,250	261,500	915,250	239,667	0	0
CASS	653,990	662,500	265,000	132,500	198,750	132,500	463,750	190,240	0	0
SAFIRE	0		200,000	100,000	150,000	100,000	350,000	-350,000	0	0
Forestry C	0		200,000	100,000	150,000	100,000	350,000	-350,000		0
DNR	0		100,000	75,000	75,000	50,000	200,000	-200,000		0
USAID	23,959	250,000	250,000	125,000	250,000	250,000	625,000	-601,041	850,000	0
Totals	12 036,404	5000029	3974678	1,987,339	3353303	2731928	8,072,570	3,751,334	3924606	0
									4,502,439	

DA, USAID, and the CDF are not subject to % reductions
CDF will begin FY2002 with about $5,016,667 (plus any amount unspent in previous years)
It is important that USAID keep money allocated per year in US dollar currency until when needed, otherwise 20%+ inflation will change all projections and diminish significantly program impact

NRMP Graduation Scenario

CDF	5,016,667
DA/PW	1,628,356
CA	596250
USAID	850,000
Totals	8,091,273
Left	3,751,334
Need	4,339,939

Table 14 FY 2000-A Graduation Scenario

Recipient	Remaining Total	Amount Projected to FY 2000 @ 100%	Annual Rate	March 1 - Sept 30, 1998	100% for FY 1999	50% for FY 2000	Total Budget	Balance to New Partners or CDF
CDF	5 363 370		425,000	400 000	425,000	425 000	1,250,000	4,113,370
DA/PW	1 638 636	2,035,446	814,178	407,089	814,178	814,178	2,035,445	-396,809
DNPWLM	1,439 236		100,000	50,000	100,000	50,000	200,000	1,239,236
MLGRUD	200 000		100 000	50 000	100,000	50 000	200,000	0
CA	897 645	993,750	397,500	198,750	397,000	198,750	794,500	103,145
Zimtrust	664,651		600,000	300,000	600,000	300,000	1,200 000	-535,349
WWF	1,154,917	1,058,333	523,000	261,500	523,000	261,500	1,046,000	108,917
CASS	653,990	662,500	265,000	132,500	265,000	132,500	530,000	123,990
SAFIRE	0		200,000	100,000	150,000	100,000	350,000	-350,000
Forestry C	0		200,000	100,000	150,000	100,000	350,000	-350,000
DNR	0		100 000	75,000	75 000	50,000	200,000	-200,000
USAID	23 959	250,000	250,000	125,000	250 000	250,000	625,000	-601,041
Totals	12 036 404	5000029	3974678	1,987,339	3849178	2731928	8,568,445	3,255,459

DA, USAID and the CDF are not subject to % reductions

CDF will begin FY2001 with about $3 255 459 (plus any amount unspent in previous years)

It is important that USAID allocate monies annually in US$ currency as required

otherwise 20%+ inflation will change all projections and diminish significantly program impact

FY2000 Graduation Scenario	
Current funds	12 036 404
Required to 9/30/2000	8 568 445
CDF Fund	3 255,459

Table 14b. Future Scenario 2002-A (modified)

Recipient	Remaining Total	Amount Projected to FY 2000 @ 100%	Annual Rate	March 1 - Sept 30 1998	75% for FY 1999	50% for FY 2000	Total Budget	Balance to New Partners or CDF	Amount Needed to September 2002	Balance After FY 2002
CDF	5,363 370		425,000	400,000	425,000	425,000	1,250,000	4,113,370	850,000	4,166,667
DA/PW	1,638,636	2,035,446	814,178	407,089	814,178	814,178	2,035,445	-396,809	1628356	0
DNPWLM	1 439,236		100,000	50,000	75,000	50,000	175,000	1,264,236		0
MLGRUD	200,000		100,000	50,000	75,000	50,000	175,000	25,000		0
CA	897,645	993,750	397,500	198,750	298,125	198,750	695,625	202,020	596250	0
Zimtrust	664,651		600,000	300,000	450,000	300,000	1,050,000	-385,349	0	0
WWF	1 154 917	1,058,333	523,000	261,500	392,250	261,500	915,250	239,667	0	0
CASS	653,990	662,500	265,000	132,500	198,750	132,500	463,750	190,240	0	0
SAFIRE	0		200,000	100,000	150,000	100,000	350,000	-350,000	0	0
Forestry C	0		200,000	100,000	150,000	100,000	350,000	-350,000		0
DNR	0		100,000	75,000	75,000	50,000	200,000	-200,000		0
USAID	23,959	250,000	250,000	125,000	250,000	250,000	625,000	-601,041	850,000	0
Totals	12,036,404	5000029	3974678	1,987,339	3353303	2731928	8,072,570	3,751,334	3924606	0
									4,502,439	

DA, USAID, and the CDF are not subject to % reductions
CDF will begin FY2002 with about $5,016,667 (plus any amount unspent in previous years)
It is important that USAID keep money allocated per year in US dollar currency until when needed, otherwise 20%+ inflation will change all projections and diminish significantly program impact

NRMP Graduation Scenario

CDF	5,016,667
DA/PW	1,628,356
CA	596250
USAID	850,000
Total	8,091,273
Left	3,751,334
Need	4,339,939

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VI. NRMP II LESSONS LEARNED

A. Planning for Public Scrutiny

More than ever it is becoming important to screen and design development projects against a filter of potential debilitating controversy Modern communications technology, including the Internet, mean that activist participation can be very focused and rapidly mobilized Foreign assistance activities that operate in remote, as well as culturally and politically distinct, circumstances are particularly susceptible to US interest group pressures CAMPFIRE's controversial acceptance of sport hunting of elephants as a means of furthering conservation-based community development proved to be a lightening rod for controversy The impetus might just as easily come, however, from support for divisive health or population issues and practices, for out-of-favor crop or forestry activities, for financing for ever-unpopular massive infrastructure projects, or for decisions to operate in disputable geographic locations "Hot" issues backed by a concerted campaign can have the immediate impact of halting (for better or worse) longstanding and ongoing development efforts This civil society oversight can be healthy, but it should be considered at the planning stage This is particularly important with overseas development activities, because domestic standards and international program standards of acceptability are not necessarily the same Oftentimes the opposition is not domestic, not well-organized, and/or not popular with decisionmakers CAMPFIRE has been able to survive, but the effort to ensure its survival may provide lessons for what may become a more characteristic level of public involvement in specific development assistance activities

B The Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations

CAMPFIRE's experience reaffirms the validity and utility of involving NGOs as important actors in the development process In the early 1980s, it was considered a major breakthrough to have NGO participation at an international meeting on NRM in the Sahel The so-called "Bamako process" was launched under the umbrella of an intergovernmental advisory commission and has become something of a benchmark for NGO involvement toward institutionalizing local participation in NRM programs The 1991 Rio "Earth Summit" was a landmark for establishing and formalizing an NGO place at international fora. CAMPFIRE, mainly through the CA and ART at the international level, and through all the CCG NGOs at the operational level, confirms the value and need for NGOs to carry forth mandates from a specific program level The Programme further underscores the point that NGO legitimacy is not a given, but is based on specific comparative strengths in serving and responding to local people and their community-based organizations

C. The Need for Strong Partnerships

One of CAMPFIRE's most impressive accomplishments is to demonstrate the value of strong partnerships The extent and depth of local commitment and ownership of the Programme enable it to see beyond and overcome the many hurdles and institutional limitations that have thus far presented themselves CAMPFIRE is a microcosm embodying the complex dynamics of ecology, politics, and race, of central control and decentralized autonomy, of state structures, NGOs, and

community-based organizations, and of local interests and international pressures Despite broad commitment and field-based success stories, CAMPFIRE is not yet a mature program The process of forming and constantly modifying partnership arrangements between government and NGOs, urban and rural institutions, communities and resource-based enterprises, and local and international groups has thus far given the Programme a strength and vitality that are instructive for similar programs anywhere

D The Importance of Cultural Values

The real heroes of CAMPFIRE are the indigenous peoples who have realigned their relationship to the wildlife and other resources that surround them Giving these resources an economic value and establishing sufficient tenure and market security to generate income are the easy parts of the Programme Sustaining their commitment, involvement, and profound change in the way populations relate to the environment is the greater challenge, and it is based on communities rediscovering wildlife as an asset to be protected and shared Tenure and governance of natural resources, especially intermittent fugitive resources such as wildlife, will inevitably rely on institutions that are able to harness and be harnessed by local cultural traditions and values CAMPFIRE works to create enabling conditions, but it is Zimbabwe's rural communities that have made CAMPFIRE work

E The Inadequacy of Protected Area Systems to Protect Biodiversity

Although it is much neater bureaucratically to assign the global role of conservation of biodiversity to a segregated and comparatively easily controlled system of protected areas, truly viable conservation must consider the entire range of habitats that occur across the landscape Given the preponderance of human settlement, sustainable use approaches show real promise as a long-term conservation tools National parks occupy about 7% of the country, yet intact relatively natural landscapes take up more than one-third of the national territory is managed for wildlife and other resources

Trade restrictions are not always the best or most appropriate tools for conservation Furthermore, they represent an imposition of CITES parties' methods over alternative options that may be favored by range states themselves At least from an internal national standpoint, CITES restrictions had been largely inappropriate to conservation problems in Zimbabwe Even the anti-CAMPFIRE interests advocate *limiting* or *reducing* elephant populations through birth control programs In a context where current elephant populations may exceed carrying capacities by a factor of two, habitat loss and interconnection are much more important challenges Sustainable use approaches are providing the essential mechanism to address these challenges, and this is why conservancies, CAMPFIRE areas, and private game ranches are finding their way into Zimbabwe's mosaic of land uses

F. Balancing Results and Flexibility in Programming

Since conservation is an ongoing effort, it is not surprising that the technical division of USAID's Africa Bureau once used the somewhat tongue-in-cheek title of a CBNRM programming document,

"Where are we going and how will we know when we get there?" The lesson from CAMPFIRE is that application of adaptive management redefines the question as, "Where are we going, and how will we know when we are off track?"

A clear vision of where a program is heading is vital if the implementation approach permits substantial and frequent modifications The force of vision projected in CAMPFIRE's strong and clearly stated principles has served as a backdrop and yardstick for the Programme's application of adaptive management practices Protecting nature is not like constructing a building, and thus, as CAMPFIRE's experience shows, does not require a detailed blueprint CAMPFIRE's conservation objectives are permanent, and meeting them is an ongoing effort What is remarkable and instructive about the Programme are the importance and constancy of the underlying CAMPFIRE principles as guideposts in making constant programmatic adjustments

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FIELD VISITS BY DISTRICT

Gowkwe District (South)
Charles Danda, Campfire Coordinator, Gokwe South Rural District Council

Njekele Dam
P Fusi, VIDCO Chairperson
Ncube- ZANU PF District Chairperson
T Guruberu, Councilor

Havano Dam
S Matshiya, Councilor
Karowa, Campfire Chairperson
Njelele, Chief

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Mafumgautsi Forest Project
Ward Councilor and Forest Sharing Committee Chair

Gwenungu Dam
T Gumbesu, Councilor
Chisina, Chief

Sebakwe Dam/Jahana Zebras
J Dhlohlo, Councilor
J Jahana, Chief
C Bhophe, Campfire Chairperson

Beitbridge District
A Maboyi, CEO
S Modeme, Campfire Coordinator
Mr Muleya, Campfire Unit Coordinator
Campfire Information Officer
D J Maphala, Zimtrust Officer
Jameson Malunguza, Campfire Resource Monitor
Mr Manyelenga, Resource Manager
Mr Ndou, Maramani Wildlife Monitor

Chiredzi District
E Chauke, Campfire Coordinator
Derek A de la Harpe, Malilangwe Conservation Trust
Jameson Malunguza, Campfire Resource Monitor

Chipinge District
Charles Inggs, RDC CEO

Mahenye Ward Committee

Bulilama-Mangwe District
Christopher Ndhlovu RDC CEO
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Sithembile J Naube, Acting RDC CEO
Phineas Maphosp, HREE Chairman
Phemolo Maplosa, ZimTrust Area manager
Ian Lloyd, Resource Planner, GRDC

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T Dube, Zimtrust Regional Manager

STATEMENT OF WORK

Mid-Term Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project, Phase II (USAID/Zimbabwe Strategic Objective No. 1)

I. Title

Mid-Term Evaluation Report Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project, Phase II-USAID/Zimbabwe Strategic Objective No 1

II. Purpose Statement

Short-term technical assistance services by a multi-disciplinary team of experts are required to conduct a Mid-Term Evaluation of the Natural Resources Management Project, Phase II (NRMP II)[1], more recently redesigned as USAID/Zimbabwe's Strategic Objective No 1 (SO 1) The evaluation should begin in January 1998 and end no later than March 31, 1998

Specific evaluation objectives include (1) assess NRMP II responsiveness to the findings and recommendations of the last Project evaluation, (2) document USAID-funded contributions to CAMPFIRE to date, i e , what has USAID "bought" with its support, (3) assess the performance of each of the implementing partners in fulfilling their respective roles and responsibilities under NRMP II, (4) document results and impacts achieved to date from this assistance, (5) address certain key policy, planning, management and implementation issues, and (6) recommend revised implementation approaches and arrangements for improving NRMP II achievement and impact, and the prospects for the long-term sustainability of CAMPFIRE as NRMP II progresses toward its final stages of implementation and closeout. The product of these services will be a Mid-Term Evaluation Report for NRMP II/SO1.

III. Background Information

USAID has, since 1989, been providing financial support to CAMPFIRE under the Southern Africa Regional Program's (SARP), now the Initiative for Southern Africa (ISA) Natural Resources Management Project (690-0251 13), commonly referred to as NRMP I USAID/Zimbabwe's involvement in NRMP I was originally conceived as a pilot effort focusing on four districts in Matabeleland NRMP II (613-0241) was initiated in September 1994 with a USAID contribution of US$ 20 5 million (including $16 million in bilateral

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1 The terms NRMP II or Project are used herein to distinguish USAID-funded support to CAMPFIRE from the greater CAMPFIRE Programme or movement (which also receives assistance from several other donors as well) In section IV D ("Future Strategic Planning Issues/Questions") this terminology changes with USAID's future assistance to CAMPFIRE referred to as Strategic Objective No 1 (SO 1) in agreement with the recently approved re-design of this program in accordance with USAID's reengineered operating systems and procedures

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funds) NRMP II seeks to build upon NRMP I and expands the coverage of USAID assistance to CAMPFIRE nationwide

USAID's assistance to CAMPFIRE was last evaluated in 1994 by ULG Consultants Ltd [See Midterm Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project (Project Number 690-0251 13), January 1994] The major findings and recommendations from this evaluation are presented in summarized form in section IV A of this Statement of Work, together with a set of pertinent follow-up questions The evaluation results were used as the basis for the design of NRMP II, as decribed in USAID's Phase II design document entitled Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management 613-0251 Project Paper (September 1994). Through a series of planning workshops and other partner consultations, these design recommendations were subsequently translated into agreed upon implementation workplans for each of the participating partner organizations The final results of these consultations are reflected in the NRMP II - Zimbabwe Plan of Operations document of June 1995, which served as the basis for the NRMP II-funded contracts and grants with these organizations denoting their specific implementation roles and responsibilities under the Project Following adaptive management principles, NRMP II has adopted a flexible, design involving annual planning, followed by quarterly review/planning workshops Therefore, two subsequent annual updates of these partner workplans have also been prepared, reviewed and approved for each of the first two years of NRMP II implementation

The above-mentioned documents, together with each partner organization's periodic performance monitoring reports and technical reports and other Project-financed documentation, constitute the bulk of the written evaluation reference materials Supplementary information (e g , letters, notes, correspondence, etc) is also available from relevant participating partner organizations. In addition to the above written materials, the team will also obtain information through site visits and interviews with various stakeholders involved in one or more aspects of NRMP II management and implementation

A diverse group of Government and non-governmental partner organizations provide assistance to CAMPFIRE under the Project These organizations, currently constituted as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), include the CAMPFIRE Association (CA), the GoZ's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) and the Ministry of Local Government and Public Housing (MLG&PH), Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST), University of Zimbabwe's Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Africa Resources Trust (ART), and Action Magazine (ACTION) Most of these organizations have been assisting CAMPFIRE implementation since the early years of the program, with or without USAID support

IV. Evaluation Scope of Work

The evaluation team will review the above key reference documents and other salient information, conduct interviews and site visits, and will perform any other tasks that are required to collect sufficient information to complete a comprehensive Mid-Term Evaluation

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of NRMP II's design, implementation progress and success in achieving its stated sustainable conservation-based community development objectives In addition to in-country evaluation activities, selected team members will also be required to visit Washington, D C and Gaborone, Botswana in order gather information from knowledgeable sources regarding NRMP II's regional and international operations and impact While extensive interviews will be required of a variety of different stakeholders, the team will be expected to rely, to the maximum extent possible, on existing written and oral information on NRMP II and CAMPFIRE Therefore, it is not anticipated that any major formal surveys or other primary data collection activities will be required to complete this work The results of this work will be presented in an evaluation report for consideration and use by concerned U S G , GoZ, Non-Governmental (NGO) and community stakeholders The final methodological details of this Scope of Work (e g , including team composition, timing, staffing and levels of effort of individual team members, and specific assessment techniques) will be determined by the selected firm through a limited competitive selection process for this work.

The more specific questions and issues to be addressed are described in the following sections of this Scope of Work (SOW) These questions and issues are organized around the following major evaluation topics (a) follow-up questions from the major findings and recommendations from the last Project evaluation (b) current salient questions and issues regarding both the greater CAMPFIRE Programme and NRMP II assistance to that Programme, (c) certain management issues and questions arising from the controversy surrounding ongoing U S G assistance to this Programme, and (d) recommendations regarding future strategic directions for ongoing NRMP II support to CAMPFIRE in preparation for the planned SO and Mission graduation and closeout.

In completing this SOW, the contractor shall address the following specific questions and issues and perform the following tasks

A. 1994 NRM Project (Phase I) Evaluation Questions/Issues

The following are the major findings and recommendations, together with pertinent follow-up questions/issues, from the last evaluation conducted on NRMP I by ULG Consultants Ltd in January 1994

1 Finding/Conclusion The Project is providing meaningful benefits to communal residents in the Project area

Recommendation No specific recommendation

Follow-Up Questions/Issues· To what extent is NRMP II (and CAMPFIRE, in general) continuing to provide meaningful benefits to participating communities? What, if anything, should to be done to augment NRMP II (and CAMPFIRE) benefits to and impacts on producer communities?

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2 Finding/Conclusion Because NRMP I (as a subset of CAMPFIRE) operated in a discrete geographical area, it was sometimes isolated from the larger CAMPFIRE Programme or movement

Recommendation The NRMP II should adopt a national focus

Follow-Up Questions/Issues To what extent has the NRMP II adopted a national focus? What have been the major results of this change in the geographic scope of NRMP II operations? What are the implications of this change on greater CAMPFIRE operations? What, if anything, should be done to improve CAMPFIRE-NRMP II coordination?

3 Finding/Conclusion The (Zimbabwe) NRMP II's attachment to the broader Regional NRMP[2] (including Botswana, Zambia, Namibia and Malawi) has yielded little tangible progress toward achieving regional-level consensus about important wildlife management/conservation issues

Recommendation The NRMP's regional focus should be either discontinued or revised

Follow-Up Questions/Issues Has regional cooperation/coordination improved under NRMP II? Why/why not? If so, to what extent has the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE benefitted from and/or contributed to improvements in regional-level cooperation/coordination? What, if anything, should be done to improve the NRMP II's contribution to regional-level cooperation/coordination? What, if anything, should be done to improve the Regional NRMP's contribution to the achievement of NRMP II specific objectives?

4 Finding/Conclusion Project-funded infrastructure (e g , fences, water points, dams, etc) has not been subjected to rigorous technical assessments (e g , environmental financial, socio-economic, etc), thus exposing the Project to unknown quantities of risk

Recommendation Infrastructure development activities should undergo environmental assessments, engineering reviews and economic analyses to ensure their sustainability and reduce their risk of failure

Follow-Up Questions/Issues To what extent has NRMP II and

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2 Although currently managed by USAID's Regional Center for Southern Africa in Gaborone Botswana, originally, the Regional NRMP (as distinguished from its respective "bilateral" country-specific component activities in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia) was designed and managed by regional elements of USAID/Zimbabwe in Harare until early 1995 Hence throughout Phase I of the Zimbabwe NRMP and the design and initial implementation of Phase II USAID/Zimbabwe had the dual responsibilities of managing both its specific bilateral NRMP component activity, as well as the greater Regional NRMP

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CAMPFIRE implemented policies and procedures to properly review the technical feasibility of proposed infrastructure development activities? What, if anything, should be done to further promote the sound design and implementation of infrastructure development activities?

5 Finding/Conclusion In general, the success of the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE, owes a lot to the commitment, talent and tenacity of certain key project implementors and participants

Recommendation No specific recommendation

Follow-Up Questions/Issues To what extent are the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE still driven by key personalities (vs a more organizationally-driven implementation approach)? To what extent does the commitment, talent and tenacity of certain actors continue to impact positively or negatively on the direction and evolution of the Project and Programme?

6 Finding/Conclusion Some implementation problems have been attributed to what is perceived as USAID's inflexible, heavy-handed approach to activity planning, implementation and management

Recommendation The Project's implementation committee needs overhauling, and USAID's role in implementation approval/decision-making needs to be reconsidered USAID needs to be more sympathetic to the needs and requirements of small, local NGOs

Follow-Up Questions/Issues To what extent has USAID adopted managerial changes which make it more flexible in its dealings with its local NGO partners? Discuss the role and impact of the project Institutional Contractor in this regard To what extent does USAID's relationship with its NGO partners cause problems in ownership, defining the roles/responsibilities of the various implementing agents and in determining future directions for CAMPFIRE? What, if anything, should be done to improve relationships among all Project partners (expanded team members) in the future?

7 Finding/Conclusion The focus on Rural District Councils (RDCs) gives the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE a top-down planning/implementation orientation, i.e , activities are not usually initiated as a response to problems identified by individuals, or groups of individuals, at village-level As a consequence, some communities mistrust the Project and Programme Moreover, because NRMP II/CAMPFIRE activities are identified, planned and implemented at the district-level, and financial decisions are made at that level, benefits are perceived as being controlled by district-level officials This has served, in some areas, to undermine community-level commitment to CAMPFIRE.

Recommendation Control over NRMP II/CAMPFIRE

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planning/implementation needs to be devolved from District Councils to participating producer communities The Project and Programme need to respond to the demands of individuals, and groups of individuals, at village-level The control over CAMPFIRE financial benefits needs to be devolved to participating communities

Follow-Up Questions/Issues To what extent has the NRMP II/CAMPFIRE taken steps to further devolve authority over indigenous natural resources below the district level? To what extent have RDCs adopted a more bottom-up approach to identifying, planning and implementing Project/Programme activities? What has been done to promote increased devolution/control of CAMPFIRE financial benefits to producer communities? What, if anything, should be done to promote a more bottom-up approach to Project and Programme planning and implementation?

8 Finding/Conclusion The CAMPFIRE Association, composed of Rural District Councils having Appropriate Authority status, has been identified as the Programme's lead agency The Association, however, has certain limitations which will need to be redressed for it to assume its leadership role in the Programme

Recommendation The CAMPFIRE Association should be given assistance to improve its standing and capabilities within the CAMPFIRE movement

Follow-Up Questions/Issues To what extent has the NRMP II assisted the Association in assuming its leadership roles/responsibilities? To what extent have collaborating implementation agencies, as well as the GOZ, accepted the Association's leadership? To what extent is the Association's Secretariat responsive to the aims/objectives expressed by the Association's Board of Management? To what extent has the Association been successful in defining and fulfilling/meeting its roles/responsibilities to its increasing number of members? Discuss the role and impact of the Institutional Contractor in these areas

To what extent is the Association likely to be sustainable as USAID assistance decreases over time? What should the ultimate role of the CA be? Within the remaining implementation timeframe, what, if anything, should be done to promote the Association's long-term sustainability?

9 Finding/Conclusion Despite CAMPFIRE's mandate to manage a broad range of indigenous resources (natural and cultural), the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management views CAMPFIRE as a wildlife management activity

Recommendation As CAMPFIRE expands into non-wildlife resource management areas, the Department's role (as the GOZ's representative in Programme decision-making) will need to be reviewed.

Follow-Up Questions/Issues In recent years, the Department of National

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Parks and Wildlife Management, originally a founding and leading member of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), and a strong CAMPFIRE proponent, appears to have become less involved with the Programme To what extent has DNPWLM's participation in CAMPFIRE changed over time? What are the consequences of this change for CAMPFIRE and the NRMP II?

How has this change affected CAMPFIRE's relationship with, and perception by, central Government? To what extent have other GOZ departments/actors become involved in Programme and Project decision-making? To what extent has CAMPFIRE been institutionalized within the GOZ's development policy framework? What has the NRMP II done to strengthen relations and improve communications with concerned central Government agencies and decision-makers? What, if anything, needs to be done to promote continued/improved communications/relations with concerned central GoZ authorities and decision-makers? What, if anything, should be done to promote continued/improved central GoZ involvement in Programme and Project implementation, both generally and as it diversifies into other resource areas?

B Current CAMPFIRE Questions/Issues

1 Development Hypotheses

a CAMPFIRE theory proposes that authority for NRM should be devolved to the "most appropriate level of authority". Is the current **level of devolution of authority** appropriate for the resources being managed under CAMPFIRE? Does the current focus on Rural District Councils (RDCs) as "Appropriate Authorities" limit the achievement of CAMPFIRE's community development objectives? Does it limit CAMPFIRE's movement into community-based management of other, non-wildlife, indigenous resources? Review, assess and discuss realistic alternatives to CAMPFIRE's current devolutionary approach towards CBNRM, using examples, where appropriate, from other similar programs

b CAMPFIRE currently focuses on a limited set of indigenous natural resources (mainly renewable wildlife resources) Does the Programme have breadth/depth to include the management of other natural resources and/or **indigenous cultural resources**, such as traditional folklore, arts/crafts, cultural practices, special archeological or cultural sites, etc , under its umbrella?

c What is the most environmentally, economically and culturally **appropriate land-use strategy(s)** among CAMPFIRE's RDC members? Discuss the primary factors supporting this conclusion

2 CAMPFIRE Implementation. The contractor shall

a Define **the current scope of the CAMPFIRE Programme** or movement (i e , numbers of participating districts, wards, people, geographic extent of operations, technical area(s) of

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operations, etc), and

b Describe **CAMPFIRE's current general financial situation and trends**, including the Programme's primary sources of income Describe CAMPFIRE's general revenue distribution system, including average proportional allocations to participating Safari Operators, districts, producer wards and communities, and other private, commercial or communal interests Discuss the appropriateness of CAMPFIRE's current revenue distribution system, with emphasis on the respective proportional amounts of Programme revenues accruing to each system participant Describe how these revenues are commonly used Discuss any alternatives for optimizing the use of these funds in the achievement of CAMPFIRE's community development objectives

c The **CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group** or CCG (originally the driving force in defining the goals, tenets and policy direction of the Programme) appears to have lost much of its impetus The contractor shall explain the primary reasons for this development What are the potential consequences of this "loss"? Have alternative fora emerged which can replace this Programme policy advisory body? What should be the role of the CCG in ongoing Programme operations? What, if anything, should be done to promote the long-term renewal of the CCG?

3 Other Donor Support The contractor shall

a Describe the current and planned amounts and sources of **donor support to CAMPFIRE** Is this level and mix of resources appropriate for this type of grassroots development program?

b Discuss current donor coordination in support of CAMPFIRE What, if anything, should be done to improve coordination of donor assistance to CAMPFIRE?

C. Current Natural Resources Management Project (Phase II) Questions/Issues

1 General· The contractor shall

a Describe specifically how, and for what purposes, USAID funds are being spent under the **NRMP II** (i e , which organizations have received funds, the amount of funds received, and for what activities and purposes).

b Discuss **the fundamental distinctions between the greater CAMPFIRE movement** (see section IV B above) **and NRMP II assistance to CAMPFIRE** What are the major implications of these distinctions for ongoing Programme and Project implementation and achievement?

2 Design Issues

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a The NRMP II design included nine **key assumptions** (see p 9 of the Project Paper supplement of September 1994) which needed to remain valid for the NRMP II to successfully achieve its stated objectives To what extent have these assumptions remained valid? The design also noted several **external risks**, beyond the manageable interest of the Project, such as the evolution of international conventions on elephant and ivory trade, severe drought regional political or economic unrest, and international trends in tourism, which could significantly affect the achievement of its objectives To what extent have these (or other) external factors affected Project (and Programme) implementation and achievements? Discuss recommendations for dealing with these factors in the future?

b As noted above, following adaptive management principles, the NRMP II has adopted a flexible **design approach** involving annual planning, followed by quarterly review/planning workshops To what extent has this design approach allowed implementors to adjust their plans/budgets to meet changing circumstances? To what extent has this approach allowed implementors to learn from their experiences, and incorporate the lessons learned within future work plans? To what extent have planning/review requirements detracted from management efficiency and/or on-the-ground implementation activities? What, if anything, should be done to improve future implementation planning?

c The NRMP II's Economic Analysis projected significant increases in CAMPFIRE revenues from non-consumptive resource utilization schemes, particularly wildlife-based eco-tourism To what extent have these projected increases materialized? What are the real **prospects for expanding CAMPFIRE beyond its current focus on the consumptive utilization of wildlife** (i e , especially large mammals) **within the NRMP II's existing timeframe**? What strategic, financial or other modifications to the existing Project would be required to achieve this Programme diversification objective? What, if any, additional financial or other support would be required in this interest, and how might it be put to the most effective use? [See also Future Strategic Planning in Section IV D below]

3 NRMP II Implementation Issues

a **The CAMPFIRE Development Fund**

Instituted in mid-1995, the CAMPFIRE Development Fund (CDF) is a core Project element. The CDF provides financial assistance, in the form of grants, to support the development of district and sub-district level CAMPFIRE institutions and natural resources management infrastructure

Due to a variety of factors, CDF implementation has lagged behind initial plans, jeopardizing the achievement of maximum Project and Programme results and impacts What, if any, actions should be taken to provide for more rapid disbursement of CDF grants to support community capacity-building and infrastructure activities in the future, without sacrificing quality and impact?

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To what extent has the NRMP II facilitated (through the CDF) environmentally sound development planning processes? To what extent have participating RDCs incorporated technical feasibility assessments as a routine element of their development planning? Are the size and scope of existing and proposed CDF capacity-building and infrastructure development grants appropriate? What, if anything, should be done to promote sound sub-activity planning and implementation in the future?

The CDF was designed as a Project-specific mechanism to redress leadership, coordination and customer satisfaction issues identified in NRMP I implementation How has it performed in addressing these implementation concerns? What, if anything, should be done to improve CDF performance?

Now that the CDF is fully operational under NRMP II, what should be the ultimate status of the CDF? Should the CDF be continued in its present form throughout the remaining life of the Project? Should the CDF remain Project-specific and, therefore, be allowed to dissolve following completion of NRMP II, or should mechanisms be put in place to promote longer term CDF operations in support of the ongoing achievement of Programme objectives? If some longer term approach towards CDF operations is deemed appropriate and worthwhile, what possible mechanism(s) and associated institutional arrangements should be considered for accomplishing this objective (e g , simple grant fund, matching grant fund, special revolving loan fund, standard commercial loan fund, some type of trust fund or endowment, other)?

b The Project Execution Team (PET)

Under NRMP II, the Project Execution Team (PET) is the key Project implementation coordination and decision-making body How effectively has the PET functioned in Project planning, implementation, coordination and communications? How effective has the leadership of the CAMPFIRE Association been in this regard? Discuss the role and impact of the Institutional Contractor in these areas What, if anything, should be done to improve PET performance in the future?

How effective have the PET sub-committees (e g , monitoring/evaluation, training, information/communication, etc) been in planning and coordinating inter-agency activities? What, if anything, should be done to improve PET sub-committee operations and effectiveness in the future?

Discuss the relationship between the PET and the CCG [See section IV B 2 above] What should this relationship be? What, if anything, should be done to promote coordinated PET-CCG operations in the future?

How effective and efficient has each of the implementing partners been in executing their respective agreed-upon Project/Program roles, responsibilities and activities, e.g , training, institution building, research, feasibility studies, infrastructure, information dissemination,

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advocacy, etc ? What has been the impact to date of this collective work? How do these results compare with the Project's design targets and objectives? What, if anything, should be done to improve individual partners' implementation performance in the future? What, if anything, should be done to improve NRMP II's progress in achieving its stated results and objectives?

How effective have implementing partners been in instilling a sense of Programme ownership among participating RDCs? To what extent are the implementing partners' work plans responsive to beneficiaries' demands for services? To what extent has an effective Customer Service Plan been put in place to monitor RDC clients' level of satisfaction with the services being provided to them by each of the various implementing partners? What, if anything, should be done to promote improved responsiveness and accountability to RDC and community customers?

How effective have implementing partners been in communicating the results of their research/investigations to participating RDCs? What, if anything, should be done to improve the partners' communications with their RDC clients in the future?

4 NRMP II Management Issues

During the run-up to this year's 10th Conference of the Parties (COP 10) to the Convention on International Trade in Flora and Fauna (CITES) in Harare, the NRMP II and CAMPFIRE came under intense attack from a variety of animal welfare groups opposed to trophy hunting of wildlife, particularly elephants, and the resumption of the trade in elephant ivory This opposition has resulted in extended debate in the U S Congress regarding the relative merits and liabilities of continuing U S Government support to CAMPFIRE

The contractor shall address the following questions and issues emanating from this debate

a To what extent, if any, is the NRMP II supporting or promoting **trophy hunting**, particularly, but not exclusively, of elephants, in Zimbabwe (directly or indirectly)? To what extent, if any, has the Project facilitated, fostered or encouraged, the growth and development of legal wildlife offtake (i e , commercial sport hunting, subsistence hunting, cropping) on communal lands? To what extent, if any, has the Project discouraged, reduced or stopped the illegal offtake (i e , poaching) of wildlife on communal lands? What has been the impact of Project activities on the status of wildlife in participating communal areas? Is wildlife management the most environmentally, economically and culturally appropriate land-use among CAMPFIRE's RDC constituents?

b To what extent have NRMP II funds been used for **"lobbying"**[3], regionally,

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3 The term "lobbying" as used here relates to host country regional and international advocacy activities It does not/not include formal U S G lobbying as prohibited under Office of Management and Budget Circular 122A (as revised) Therefore the team is not being asked to make any judgement regarding the legality of the various activities

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internationally and/or in the U S , for the downlisting of the African elephant and the resumption of the ivory trade under CITES, the U S Endangered Species Act or for other positions with respect to U S legislation or international treaties or conventions? Considering the existing focus of CAMPFIRE activities, is "international lobbying" or advocacy for the promotion and development of natural resource product markets appropriate and justified? Is it appropriate to use U S assistance funds for such activities? Have U S assistance funds been used for similar activities in other sectors? What has been the role and results of Africa Resources Trust and/or the CAMPFIRE Association in these endeavors? What, if any, are the potential impacts on CAMPFIRE producer communities from these activities? What steps have the Mission and its partners taken to address expressed concerns regarding the use of U S funds for such activities? Are these measures justified and appropriate in this instance? What, if any, additional measures might be taken to ensure that these concerns are handled in an appropriate manner?

c During the course of the current debate surrounding CAMPFIRE, USAID's support for CAMPFIRE under the NRMP II, and the Program's relationship to CITES and other international treaties and conventions, several important **Agency policy issues** have arisen These issues include (1) the Agency's position on sustainable use vs other more "protectionist" or conservation-oriented environmental management philosophies or strategies (particularly, but not exclusively as related to sport hunting, in general, and big game hunting, in particular, per the first Management Issue above), (2) use of USAID funds to support the role of Agency NGO partners in developing and promoting regional and international markets for wildlife and other products of community-based natural resources management programs (as per the second Management Issue above), and (3) use of USAID funds to support the role of Agency NGO partners in regional and international networking, information dissemination and advocacy activities (as distinguished from the inappropriate "lobbying" activities disscussed above) While much of the current debate surrounding these issues has remained largely Zimbabwe-specific to date, Agency policy on these subjects ultimately has worldwide program implications, some of which extend well beyond the environmental sector (e g , USAID funding to support partner NGOs in advocating for a particular position at recognized relevant regional and international fora (even if that position might not agree with current Agency or U S G policy on the subject in question)

Current Agency Strategy includes "Environment managed for long-term sustainability" as its "environmental" Goal (No 4) Included among the five Objectives contributing to the achievement of this Goal are "Biological diversity conserved" (4 1) and "Sustainable natural resource management" (4 5), as the two Agency objectives of most relevance to USAID/Zimbabwe's NRMP II/SO 1 Among the various "Agency Program Approaches" for achieving these objectives are "Promoting sustainable use of biological resources", and "managing forests , water resources (and) coastal zones sustainably" Yet, beyond this

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completed under the NRMP II to date but rather to simply describe their understanding of the extent to which Project funds have been used to support regional and international advocacy activities by implementing partners (e.g , notably Africa Resources Trust and the CAMPFIRE Association), and to describe the types of activities undertaken.

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existing strategic framework, there has been little guidance on preferred strategic approaches for pursuing these worthwhile objectives

Similarly, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 122A (as revised) provides detailed guidance on restrictions against the use of U S G funds for lobbying U S officials and legislators on domestic U S legislation However, there is little or no clear guidance on the use of such funds for regional and international advocacy activities (i e , addressing regional or international topics outside of the U.S with non-American officials and counterparts), such as that under consideration here for CITES and other international treaties or conventions

In view of the above, and based upon the team's above findings in each of these three critical policy areas, including importantly the results of its USAID/W consultations, the contractor shall articulate current USAID policy on these important strategic topics In the team's opinion, is USAID's approach to these policy areas appropriate for the current international environmental management context? Is this approach appropriate for the current international developmental context? Has this approach been sufficiently well defined, articulated and communicated to properly guide specific country program achievement? What, if any, recommendations might the team have regarding Agency policy in these areas? What, if any recommendations might the team have regarding the application of this policy in this instance?

D. Future Strategic Planning Questions/Issues

a As described in section IV C. 2 above, the NRMP II's adaptive management approach towards implementation calls for a rolling approach towards Project design This rolling design approach specifically includes provision for the periodic review of implementation, with adjustments in design and/or resource allocations depending upon the performance of the various implementing partners and design components In this interest, the contractor shall review NRMP II implementation performance to date and provide recommendations for any modifications, including any associated reallocations of existing Project resources, which may be required to improve future performance and otherwise enhance the achievement and sustainability of its results within the remaining two years of implementation under the existing FY 2000 graduation scenario

b In accordance with USAID's reengineered operating principles and procedures, the Mission has recently completed a new draft **Results Framework (RF)** for Strategic Objective No 1 (SO 1) which delineates USAID's strategy for ongoing assistance to CAMPFIRE through the end of FY 2000 (i e , the current SO 1 graduation date) The contractor shall carefully review this document, both internally and with concerned USAID and partner representatives, to determine its appropriateness for the successful achievement of SO 1's stated objectives More specifically, the contractor shall assess the appropriateness of all of the draft RF components (i e , rationale, development hypothesis, results framework, results packages, and performance monitoring and customer service plans)? What modifications, if

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any would the team recommend in any of these strategic components?

c State cable 116224 (dated 6/20/97) relates the results of USAID/W's review of this proposed SO 1 strategy The cable indicates the possibility of additional time and funds for SO achievement, primarily in the interest of diversifying program resource use activities beyond the current heavy focus on wildlife, in general, and large mammals (elephants), in particular The contractor shall assess the relative feasibility of this proposal, and how it would most effectively accomplished What amount of **additional program resources** would be required to accomplish these diversification objectives within the specified additional two years of SO 1 implementation (i e FY 2002 SO 1 graduation scenario)? How would these additional resources be most effectively allocated and used to accomplish these objectives within this revised SO 1 planning period?

d What should be the bilateral **Mission's role** (vs other Agency operating units, such as Africa Bureau and the Regional Center for Southern Africa, and/or donors) in any ongoing assistance for Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE? Are there certain areas of **comparative advantage** for U S (vs other donor) assistance in this regard? What suggestions might the team have for the most strategic application of any additional U S assistance to this program, considering USAID/Zimbabwe's planned graduation and closeout in FY 2003?

e Under the existing FY 2000 graduation scenario, the strategy proposes the following measures of SO achievement and **sustainability** (i) an effective CAMPFIRE Association, (ii) ten percent (%) of member communities, or approx 20 communities "graduated" with well-functioning, financially sustainable and environmentally sound NRM programs making regular and substantial contributions towards meeting their communal residents' development needs and expectations, and (iii) an additional 50% of member communities in various stages of planning and implementing such NRM programs Under the expanded and extended FY 2002 graduation scenario, another set of performance measures has been proposed as follows (i) a sustainable CAMPFIRE Assocation, (ii) up to 30% of "graduate" member communities (50-60 communities) as defined above, and (iii) an additional 50% of member communities in various stages of planning and implementing such NRM programs, including pilot sub-district level CBNRM regimes The contractor shall determine to what extent these SO-level indicators and targets are appropriate, i e , can they be appropriately measured and monitored for SO 1 performance purposes? Are they realistic for the specified timeframes and resource levels? What changes might the team recommend in these indicators and targets for improved measurement and monitoring of SO achievement and sustainability? And, if achieved, what would be the implications for greater CAMPFIRE sustainability under each of these two scenarios? What could be done to improve the prospects for CAMPFIRE sustainability following the cessation of USAID assistance?

V. Work Products

The contractor evaluation team shall schedule and conduct entry and mid-term briefings during the evaluation with concerned USAID, GoZ and CCG staff The team will produce

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draft and final reports which will include detailed findings, recommendations, lessons learned and other salient results of the analysis specified in the above SOW The draft report will be submitted to the COTR, USAID/Zimbabwe and concerned GoZ agencies (i.e , MMET, MoF, MLG&PH) and CCG organizations no later than March 1, 1998 for review, discussion and comment prior to finalization The team will hold individual or joint debriefing session(s) with concerned USAID, GoZ and CCG personnel approximately two weeks following draft report submittal to discuss the report's findings and recommendations and facilitate the review and comment process

The contractor shall submit the final evaluation report no later than March 31, 1998 Thirty-five (35) bound copies of the final report should be submitted to the COTR, USAID/Zimbabwe, who will assume responsibility for subsequent transmittal to other concerned agencies, together with an electronic copy of the final report in WordPerfect format for subsequent printing, dissemination and use The Contents of the Final Evaluation Report are included as Annex 1 to this Statement of Work

VI. Team Composition and Qualifications

The evaluation will require a multi-disciplinary team of experts over the three month period January-March 1998 Final team composition, and the timing and level of effort of individual team members, will be determined by the selected firm through a limited competitive selection process for this work

Suggested key team disciplines include environmental/natural resources (E/NRM) policy and strategic planning, community-level capacity building and institutional/organizational development, social anthropology, resource economics, and wildlife management and ecology Additional possible areas of desirable expertise include general natural resource management (in such areas as fisheries ecology, forestry and silvicultural operations, etc), eco-tourism development, natural resources marketing, business mangement, sustainable E/NRM financing mechanisms, program and project planning, management, implementation and monitoring and evaluation

Due to the great prominence of this program and importance of this evaluation, to the maximum extent possible, all team members shall be experienced senior-level professionals within their respective areas of expertise The team members shall possess an advanced degree and a minimum of ten years of work experience within their respective areas of expertise, at least half of which should have focussed on LDC situations Demonstrated experience in Africa is mandatory for all team positions, prior southern Africa experience, in general, and Zimbabwe experience, in particular, is highly desirable At least several team members shall possess demonstrated experience in planning, managing and implementing national, regional and/or international community-level development initiatives in LDC contexts Prior USAID experience in these areas, as well as evaluating USAID programs and projects is highly desirable, familiarity with USAID's new reengineering principles and procedures is also highly desirable All team members shall also possess well-developed

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written and oral communications skills, including a good working knowledge of standard computer word processing and spreadsheet applications Finally, for maximum credibility, no team member(s) shall have had direct prior employment relationship with the NRMP, or with any of CAMPFIRE's implementing partner agencies

VII. Team Reporting Relationships and Responsibilities

The contractor will receive technical direction from the USAID/Zimbabwe Mission Director or her designee (i e , the SO1 Team Leader)

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The Evaluation Team

Dr Frederick W Sowers, Team Leader, is an environmental geographer with 20 years experience in natural resource management programs in Africa, Latin America, and Asia Dr Sowers previously served in the USAID's Office of Evaluation as technical coordinator for a multi-year assessment of the performance and impact of the Agency's environment and natural resource management programs Dr Sowers has led and participated in numerous natural resource and biodiversity conservation project evaluations, including of Zambia's ADMADE program, conducted in 1995 He is currently involved in private conservation and ecotourism in Mexico and Honduras In the evaluation, Dr Sowers focused on general USAID issues, CAMPFIRE's regional dimension, lobbying, ART, and overall evaluation coordination and reporting

Dr Thomas J Cook, Research Triangle Institute's (RTI) Principal Scientist in Social Science and International Development, has more than 20 years' experience in performance monitoring and program evaluation, strategic planning and management, social science research, and program evaluation methodology training He leads RTI's international work in the program evaluation and performance measurement sectors His international experience includes work for the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Asian Development Bank, USAID, J Paul Getty Trust Conservation Institute, and the Eurasia Foundation He has managed the design of a monitoring and evaluation system for the Environmental Division, USAID/Cairo, and led an evaluation for the UNDP Democracy and Governance Program in Moldova On this evaluation, Dr Cook addressed devolution, socio-political issues of CAMPFIRE, and the CA and USAID strategic planning

Dr Robert Davis, who has degrees in economics, agriculture, agronomy, and public administration, is an economist who specializes in natural resource management, with an emphasis on wildlife and rangelands, water resources, and fisheries Currently working as Senior Associate at the University of Colorado's Institute of Behavioral Science, Dr Davis previously served as Assistant Director for Economics in the US Department of Interior's Office of Policy Analysis Dr Davis has international experience in wildlife, national parks, biological diversity issues, and water resources He has authored major studies of water resource economics and policy, including a book on the Okavango Water Resource Development Project in Botswana, written for Resources for the Future He was stationed in Kenya as Ford Foundation economic advisor to the Kenya Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, and subsequently as Visiting Senior Research Fellow at Kenyatta University's Institute for Development Studies, from 1976 to 1980 On this evaluation, his areas of focus were wildlife and land management issues and the economics of wildlife management and alternative NRM options

Dr Lynn Ellsworth is an independent consultant specializing in institutional and economic analysis of non-project and public organizations She brings expertise in such areas as design and evaluation of grant programs, development of sustainability plans for organizations, and methodologies for organizational change She has four years of consulting experience with non-profits in the US, Eastern Europe, Madagascar, and East Africa, and six years experience as a donor and grant-maker in West Africa with the International Development Research Centre On this evaluation she focused on CAMPFIRE sustainability issues and on the CDF, CA, and IC and their interrelationships

The Evaluation Team, Cont

Dr Richard Alan Swanson has spent most of his professional career since 1973 outside the US, working closely with various donor agencies, host governments, academic institutions, international institutes, and rural communities in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, frequently as Chief of Party Recently, he assisted in the creation and institutional development of Madagascar's first National Parks Service, a not-for-profit NGO He has expertise in program impact monitoring and evaluation, agricultural anthropology, rural development, village/farm level socio-economic studies, and rapid rural reconnaissance surveys on such diverse topics as analysis of human pressures and their causes on protected areas of natural resources Dr Swanson also brings expertise in geographic information systems (GIS) and natural resource management On this evaluation, Dr Swanson's focus was on the benefits gained natural resources, the NRMP II program inputs made by the different constituents of the CAMPFIRE program, diversification options, and devolution of authority to local producer communities Dr Swanson also contributed to the report preparation and stakeholder review processes

Dr Richard G Ruggiero, a wildlife specialist, whose primary fields are wildlife ecology and management, has worked in the United States, Kenya, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, and Burundi Primary areas of interest include the design and management of protected areas, instruction in wildlife biology, conservation biology, and related issues at the university and graduate level, training in field research and management techniques, and in-service training for wildlife professionals His research has covered a range of topics, including large mammal and avian ecology, wildlife and forest management issues, and the use of wildlife resources by indigenous peoples On this evaluation, Dr Ruggiero looked at data quality for monitoring wildlife, including quota-setting, the ecological and technical merits of wildlife management over other options, and land-use planning and management schemes

APPENDIX D

ITINERARY AND FIELD PROTOCOLS

Current Campfire Questions

Issue Devolution of Authority (B 1 a)
1 The Rural District Councils are the current "Appropriate Authorities"

Is this the most appropriate level of devolution?
Does this level limit the achievement of C community development objectives?
Does this limit C's ability to move into other NRM management, non-wildlife indigenous resources?
What are realistic alternatives to CAMPFIRE current devolutionary approach to CBNRM (examples from other programs)(concessions, associations)

2 What is the authority of specific wards?
3 Describe how RDC actually work (exec Committee, district council, wards, villages)

Village (campfire sub-committee – village development committee VIDCO)
Ward (campfire sub-committee – ward development committee (WADCO)
District (campfire sub-committee – District Dev Committee
District Council
Campfire Association (made up of elected wards) (is there an exec Committee and who are they)

Which districts have permitted or encouraged creation of ward or village level concessions (as opposed to district controlling everything)

What do they think their decision making prerogatives are concern NR (at each level)?
What areas do they think they should have increased authority concerning NRM?
What do you see as primary barriers to having greater decision making for NRM?
Over last 10 years, what have been the greatest changes for NRM in their area?
What are most immediate changes which need to occur to get their decision making authority to point it should be over next 4 years? (personnel, institutional, policy, etc)

DIVERSIFICATION
4 Wildlife resources currently main income generator of CAMPFIRE districts What do they think about diversification into other areas (forestry, cultural resources, traditional folklore, arts/crafts, bee-keeping, Mopane worms, etc. (cf Table on Diversification) Do you think you could do more in diversifying?
What do you see as main areas for potential diversification? How do you learn about new opportunities?
How could program funds be focused on this issue most effectively (in these areas)?
What are major barriers for diversification? How to overcome these?
Would there be greater potential for local management control (village level) being ceded by Rural District Councils, and what are implications for this (Maybe conditionally for all future USAID funds to be used for this kind of management (with 90% for village 10% for RDC support)? Long term concession agreements with Monitoring

5 Will districts where wildlife is already important have much interest in moving in this direction? Will they be open to granting concessions to local villages or wards for managing non-wildlife resources? How would this work with current government regs?

LAND USE
6 What is most environmentally, economically, and culturally appropriate LAND USE strategy among CAMPFIRE RDC members? (Wildlife No one – even in non-wildlife areas?)
Do you think wildlife management is most appropriate use of land?
Who are the key decision makers about land use (agriculture, herding, wildlife, tree farms,), and how are land use decisions make (a few elite, community debate, individually, etc.
Do you think there is sufficient community involvement in land use debates?

In last few years, have there been decisions concerning land use in district which you think was unfair to community? Why?

7 Do RDC's really represent the interests of their constituents (wards villages) or simply of a governing board of influential people at the district level, for their own ends?

8 How top down is decision making at this level?

9 **How many wards are found within various districts? And How many villages within these Wards? How many of these are essentially wildlife rich ones which are providing significant income to the district (or have this potential)? How are these resources shared?**

10 **How do villages with wildlife areas really view the benefits of schools, (ie social projects) as opposed to household level income benefits and their support to the inconveniences of wildlife presence (field damage, etc)**

1 0 Benefits Analysis at District Level

Intended Benefits	Perceived Benefits by Recipients	Observed Benefits Evidence of Benefits	Benefits Gap Analysis
Direct Management of NRM	Do you think the DC has control of the NR of your district? How do you exercise this control? Voice in Decision Making	How much money did the DC receive from NRM? How do they exercise legal authority?	
Sustainable NRM Practices adopted or applied by Campfire communities	Are receiving funds?	Graduate DL Schools wells	
Bio-physical Monitoring System in Place	Establishment of Quotas Status of NR Base	Setting of Animal Quotas in Approp Manner	
Improved Surveillance			
Improved NRM Technical & Entrepreneurial skills Community Satisfaction with Campfire Services Information Flow/Reports/Docs Received and Read Equitable Financial Management Access to Market Information	What do they perceive to be benefits? Worthwhile? Do they feel are receiving fare share of proceeds? Do you have info On best way to sell NR products	Existence of a DataBase	

Benefits Analysis at Ward Level

Intended Benefits	Perceived Benefits by Recipients	Observed Benefits Evidence of Benefits	Benefits Gap Analysis
Direct Management of NRM	Do you think the DC has control of the NR of your district? How do you exercise this control?	How much money did the DC receive from NRM? How do they exercise legal authority?	
Sustainable NRM Practices adopted or applied by Campfire communities		# of Wards with established NRM Practices?	
Bio-physical Monitoring System in Place			
Improved Surveillance			
Improved NRM Technical skills Community Satisfaction with Campfire Services Information Flow/Reports/Docs Received and Read Equitable Financial Management			

Benefits Analysis at Village Level

Intended Benefits	Perceived Benefits by Recipients	Observed Benefits Evidence of Benefits	Benefits Gap Analysis
Direct Management of NRM	Do you think the DC has control of the NR of your district? How do you exercise this control?	How much money did the DC receive from NRM? How do they exercise legal authority?	
Sustainable NRM Practices adopted or applied by Campfire communities		# of Villages in Wards with established NRM programs?	
Bio-physical Monitoring System in Place			
Improved Surveillance			
Improved NRM Technical skills Community Satisfaction with Campfire Services Information Flow/Reports/Docs Received and Read Equitable Financial Management			

Benefits Analysis at Household Level

Intended Benefits	Perceived Benefits by Recipients	Observed Benefits Evidence of Benefits	Benefits Gap Analysis
Direct Management of NRM	Do you think the DC has control of the NR of your district? How do you exercise this control?	How much money did the DC receive from NRM? How do they exercise legal authority?	
Sustainable NRM Practices adopted or applied by Campfire communities		# of Households in Villages with NRM programs	
Bio-physical Monitoring System in Place	Any idea of #s of Wildlife species?	Elephant or other animal funds	
Improved Surveillance			
Improved NRM Technical skills Community Satisfaction with Campfire Services Information Flow/Reports/Docs Received and Read Equitable Financial Management			

APPENDIX E

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK TABLE

PROJECT NO 690-0251

ORIGINAL AUTHORIZATION· 20 AUG 89
CURRENT PACD: 31 AUGUST 1997
PROPOSED PACD· 31 AUGUST 1999

CRC. 09 SEPTEMBER 1994

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROJECT

ZIMBABWE · AMENDMFNT NO 2

NARRATIVE	ACHIEVEMENT & MEASURES	VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
GOAL. The development of economically sustainable communities on lands marginally suitable for agriculture	– Community food security – Incomes above subsistence, and in rising trend – Wildlife resource base and revenues increasing	– Nutrition surveys – Income surveys – DNPWLM reports	– Food is available and affordable – Incomes growth exceeds inflation – National disasters do not eliminate wildlife resources in target areas
PURPOSE To expand community-based natural resource management and utilization throughout marginal lands nationwide, and to halt declines within the wildlife resource base, especially in Regions IV and V	– NRM programs underway in 23 districts, with more looking to join – Revenue distributions made to all participating communities – Stable wildlife populations in targeted areas	– DNPWLM and NGO reports, USAID site inspections – Indications of interest from non-participating communities – RDC reports – DNPWLM reports	– Continuing market for wildlife and veld products – Communities are willing and able to learn and practise wildlife management – Continued granting of Appropriate Authority status – National will to protect endangered species

NARRATIVE	ACHIEVEMENT & MEASURES	VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
OUTPUTS.			
1 Community-level resource management capacity institutionalized	Communities making own decisions By-laws covering revenue uses Land-use plans	Site inspections ZT reports RDC reports	Community consensus maintained
2 Strengthened CA	Communities represented by CA in fundraising and government and international relations	Contractor reports	CA accepted by communities as legitimate representative
3 Knowledge of NRM increased	Mass circulation publications	ART reports and videos	Popular receptivity to the concept of sustainable utilization
4 Education and outreach expanded	Specialized technical publications	ACTION, CASS, WWF reports and videos	ACTION, CASS & WWF continue to produce high quality materials
5 Policy analyses complete	Studies sufficient to support continuation or change in Strategic Objective No 1	AID decision re continuation or change	CPSP can be modified
6 Networking and communications systems in place	Periodic meetings of CCG and its committees CCG members' collaboration in field activities and publications	CA reports CCG member reports	Inter-organizational conflict does not undermine the networking process
INPUTS	Amounts		
Two Community Funds	$ 6,000,000	- USAID Controller records	- Grantee in compliance with Agreement
Technical Assistance	6,000,000	- Contractor reports	- Funds available
Training	2,255,000	- Audits	
Commodities	2,175,000		
Operations/Overhead	3,790,000		
Audit	80,000		
Evaluation	200,000		
	$ 20,500,000		

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Gwanda Rural District Council

Evaluation Team Field Trip

Information obtained from discussions with field staff and documentation are provided as representative of information obtained which helped lead team to conclusions and recommendations drawn Mr Ian Lloyd was particularly helpful in providing this information

Doddleburn Ranch

Year	Income Source	Amount
1995	Hunting Safari Inhlaba Safari	$209,250
1996	Hunting Safari Tehabezi Safari	$26,484 (received the quota very late, hence a small return)
1997	Hunting Safare Tshabezi Safari Crocodile Egg Collection Mr Evans	$183,400 (this will rise as there is a small amount outstanding) $630
1998*	Hunting Safaris Ilanga	$10,000 + US$ 17,152 50

Thull Shashe Concession Area

Year	Income Sources	Amount
1995	Hunting Safaris Gariya Safaris	$10,650
1996	Hunting Safaris Gariya Safaris	$15,610
1997	Hunting Safaris Ilanga Safaris	$71,433
1998	Hunting Safaris Ilanga Safaris	$10,000 + US$ 8,250

- Expected income Money is in Zim dollars unless stated

Dividends are distributed as follows
50% to communities, distributed through the six wards concerned (of 20 within the district
34% retained by Council to cover management costs (i e game scout wages, diesel for the irrigation machines, uniforms, ammunitions, etc)
14% retained by Council to cover administration costs (i e stationary, staff time for liaison with Safari operators, Parks, CA, Zimtrust, etc)
2% Campfire Association levy

It should be noted that the concession fees are retained by the Council

Dividends (the 50%) returned to the 6 wards concerned, to date, are presented below

Ward	'95 Revenue Distributed in 1996	'96 Revenue Distributed in 1997	'97 Revenue Distributed in 1998	Total	Expected '98 Income to be Distributed '99
14	25,406 25	2,998 12	21,753 75	50,158 12	US$ 2,144 06
15	26,006 25	3,448 12	24,253 75	53,708 12	US$ 2,594 06
17	25,406 25	2,998 12	21,753 75	50,158 12	US$ 2,144 06
18	25,406 25	2,998 12	21,753 75	50,158 12	US$ 2,144 06
19	300		8,333 25	8,633 25	US$ 1,000
20	2,295	6,305	24,888 25	33,483 25	US$ 3,125
Total	104,820	18,747 48	122,731 50	246,298 98	12,701 24 (Z$ 203,220)

This table shows something very important Zimbabwe experiences inflation of around 30% Because safari operations are calculated in US$, this income is inflation proof, therefore assuring local communities significant and fairly safe revenue generation – something they can not get from any other form of local revenue generation which does NOT keep up with inflation

Community use of Campfire Funds.
Fully 50% of funds received by the District Council from wildlife safari concessions within the district are given back to local communities It is entirely the communities which decide how they wish to spend this money To date, money has been spent on school furniture, roofing materials for a school, rehabilitation on a dam

Other Natural Resources in the Gwanda District

Many minerals are found within the district, with a large cement factory and numerous gold mines Gwanda has a large area of Commercial Farms which are predominantly large cattle ranches, although there are numerous farmers which manage their properties for game and game hunting

Numerous Rock Paintings (some in caves) and other historic sites exist of interest to a potential tourist viewing The district has approximately 150 small to medium dams (in varying states of repair) some of which are used for irrigation and most of which contain fish which supplement the local diet It is noted that some of the commercial farmers raise funds by charging fishermen for the right to fish

A fairly healthy population of natural wildlife exists through the district Though few elephant and buffalo, there are many soft plains game (antelope)

Natural Resources with potential for use under the CAMPFIRE programme

Crocodiles are used both for the collection of eggs and in rearing of crocodiles (for meat and hides) A project proposal is currently being developed as part of the Campfire programme for the establishment of a small hatchery

Mapane tree caterpillars "Macimbi" are already harvested in Gwanda, although at present this is fairly small scale and not done commercially Some Campfire committees are already regulating and charging for the collection of such caterpillars

Fish from the numerous dams Some dam committees are already regulating and charging for fishing The potential of fish farming in some of the larger dams is currently being investigated There is potential for ecotourism in regard to fishing

Amarula fruit are already harvested in Gwanda, although at present it is fairly small scale and not done commercially There is potential for commercial production

Ecotourism, in terms of game viewing, fishing, viewing of rock paintings, etc has a huge potential as the district is currently very under utilized in this area.

It is important to note that the Campfire programme is very young in Gwanda This RDC only received appropriate authority in 1994, with the program actually starting in 1995 Many potential projects have not been fully explored, and the current program is still heavily focused on community training

APPENDIX G

CDF REVISION AND EXTENSION BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Background for Support and Extension of the CDF

This appendix relates to the recommendation made by the evaluation team to extend the functional life of the CAMPFIRE Development Fund initiated under NRMP II by transforming it into a locally managed fund which would be distributed according to revised criteria over a longer period of time The appendix describes a process or requesting proposals, offers draft text for a proposal solicitation brochure, suggests a review procedure, and considers some operational observations based on the team's fieldwork

A. Two Stage Proposal Process and Call for CBNRM Project Ideas

First draft a brochure or ***Call for CBNRM Project Ideas*** that explains the competition, eligibility requirements and judging criteria This document should be widely published (newspapers, radio interviews with project officers, faxes and mailings to NGOs working in CBNRM) The document invites organizations to submit CBNRM project ideas that are consistent with CAMPFIRE principles Applicants would send in their project ideas and a neutral jury (composed of qualified experts from both within and outside the CCG/CA) would rank and choose winners Winners would be invited to submit full proposals They might then be given small grants or consulting assignments to fully develop their concepts into full-scale proposals Of course, organizations who submit the winning project ideas would still be subject to a pre-award survey to determine if they would be eligible for a grant and, if so, under what terms of payment

Initially, USAID and MLGNH would step back from the CDF approval process by taking only an oversight role This rotating jury would be charged with ranking and commenting on grants and scoring them according to fixed criteria Their ranks, scores, comments, and recommendations for funding would then be forwarded to the IC for official approval The chain of approval should stop there The IC would retain the right to countermand the independent panel's recommendations and rankings In practice, this right should be exercised only rarely and, when exercised, the reasoning should be well documented

In this transition scenario a clearer and simpler decision rule needs to be established to decide when cash advances are permissible This needs to be documented and explained to potential grantees

The current list of criteria should be reformulated in brochure form so as to be easier to read and to make it clear that CBNRM micro-credit projects at the village and ward level are welcomed by CDF as would participatory land-use planning and income-generating activities In the brochure for the CDF, distinction should be made between "eligibility requirements" and "review criteria"

In general, grants should not be made for salaries, infrastructure, or capital equipment valued at more than $US 10,000, total Neither should grants ordinarily cover organizational overheads or indirect costs of support NGOs of more than about ten percent

In addition to existing criteria, proposals should be reviewed for

a) the extent to which CAMPFIRE principles are evident in the design and

structure of the grant and in the work of the requesting organization -- including commitment to revenue-sharing concepts

b) Visible evidence of widespread village and ward support for the design and structure of the project

c) Evidence of the use of participatory methods for project development and participatory plans for project implementation (copies of PRA results would for example serve as evidence)

Funding decisions (yes/no/yes with limited conditionalities) by the neutral jury should be made at regular intervals, perhaps quarterly or semi-annually Any number of specialized competitions might be organized according to USAID and CCG group interest Examples are research grants, micro-credit grants, conservation and CBRNM activities, cultural and ecotourism development, etc

CALL FOR IDEAS

THE CAMPFIRE COMPETITION FOR IDEAS IN COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

USAID has established a grants fund for community-based natural resource projects, programmes, and research activities A total of $Z 25,000,000 per year is available

Grants will be given in three categories

One time small projects of limited duration,
Programmes of activities that cover one or more villages, wards, or Districts and that take place over a 12-24 month time-frame,
Applied, action-oriented, and policy research

Grants will be awarded in each category in a two-stage competition In the first stage, eligible organizations are invited to submit a 3-5 page document explaining their project idea, programme idea, or research activity along with a one page cost estimate These ***IDEAS FOR FUNDING*** *will be judged by neutral reviewers Winners will then be invited to submit a fully developed programme or project document Winners at this first stage will receive a small* ***planning grant*** *to enable them to fully develop their idea The* ***planning grant*** *can cover feasibility studies, economic analysis, participatory rural appraisals, and planning workshops Winners of the planning grant can then submit their fully developed ideas to a second-stage review during which they can be awarded full or partial fund grant for a maximum of two-years of activity*

WHO IS ELIGIBLE?

The idea must come from a registered Zimbabwean charitable, educational, scientific, or religious organization or an international NGO operating in Zimbabwe A copy of the organization's constitution, by-laws, and registration number must accompany the initial idea, as well as a list of board members a list of staff members

Publicly-funded organizations in good financial standing with the government are also eligible If the request comes from a District Council, the council should be prepared to document its CAMPFIRE policies and how it actually shares natural resource revenue with producer villages and wards, as prescribed by the CAMPFIRE philosophy

WHAT KIND OF PROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES CAN BE FUNDED?

The idea must concern community-based management of natural resources (wildlife, trees, soil, grass, fish, water, wild-fruit, scenic landscapes, etc) in the widest sense of the term Social welfare projects are not eligible

The ideas should in some way reflect the basic CAMPFIRE principles

The idea must have the support of residents in the area where the project is to occur and the nature of this support should be explained and documented when submitting the initial idea

Micro-credit and savings projects linked to community based resource management are also eligible

WHAT CANNOT BE FUNDED?

Grants cannot be used to pay for salaries, cars, buildings, international travel, or capital investments and equipment greater in value than $US 5,000 per year

Grants that are purely charitable in nature will not be funded

Projects and programmes that do not have meaningful co-contributions from the affected community will not be funded

HOW TO APPLY?

Written project ideas of 3-5 pages plus a one page cost estimate should be submitted by X date Each submission must be accompanied by a letter of support from the head of the organization submitting the request along with a copy of the organization's constitution, by-laws, list of Board members, list of staff members, and registration number (where relevant) Send idea packages to X or to your local CAMPFIRE Coordinator in your District Council who will forward them to the IC or its replacement who is managing the competition

WHO WILL JUDGE THE COMPETITION?

Development Associates, on behalf of USAID, is organizing the competitions and will pre-screen idea packages based on eligibility criteria as listed above

A locally-based international, volunteer panel of jurors will select the winning proposals The panel will be composed of seven senior professionals with experience in community-based natural resource management and knowledgeable about the CAMPFIRE philosophy Jurors will change each year and will be selected from the donor, research, university, government, private sector, NGO, and CBO community Jurors from organizations submitting ideas for the competition will not be allowed to comment on or discuss proposal ideas originating from their organization and will be asked to leave the room while that idea is being reviewed

Jurors rankings and comments on the submitted ideas will be written down and the IC will provide summaries of these comments to the organizations submitting proposal ideas when announcing the results of the competition Winning organizations should be prepared to have their organization and a synopsis of their idea listed in the national papers

WHAT CRITERIA WILL THE JURORS USE TO RANK IDEAS?

In the first stage, winners will be judged on

Pertinence of the idea to community-based natural resource management and the CAMPFIRE philosophy (maximum 10 points)

Likelihood and overall promise of success (maximum 10 points)

Clarity of purpose(s) (maximum 10 points)

Evidence of community support for the idea and for the organization(s) submitting the idea (maximum 10 points)

Evidence of clear thinking about how the activity will be sustainable in the long-run when the grant money runs out (maximum 10 points)

Originality of the idea (maximum 10 points)

Degree to which the idea reflects collaboration and a spirit of partnership among two or more organizations working together on the idea (maximum 10 points)

Geographical specificity of the zone of activity (maximum 10 points)

In the second stage, winners will be reviewed on realism of the budget and workplan they submit, ability to manage the grant money, and capacity to carry out the fully developed idea

FOR MORE INFORMATION OR TO ASK QUESTIONS

Call DA, or see your CAMPFIRE Coordinator who has information available

C. Potential Modalities of Operation

To set this up for the longer term, USAID should reallocate remaining available project funds to a *trust instrument* in the US (an unexplored option would be to do so in the UK where trust law is equally developed) The trust instrument would have a small US board of trustees -- 2 to 3 people serving pro bono with only cost reimbursement The trustees would be charged with oversight of the financial investment and assuring annual transfer of the grant budget to the selected Zimbabwean local organization Annual transfer is usually made in the trust contract contingent upon receipt of an unqualified international quality audit and the local partner=s use of internationally acceptable accounting practices

It may be possible for someone from USAID-Washington to serve as one of the official trustees This is desirable, for in such situations USAID is required to report annually on the use of the

funds for five to ten years after the creation of the trust instrument Typical trust clauses would make the trust revocable over a certain time period so that if USAID decided abuse of the trust was a problem, they could revoke the instrument Also if desired, a Zimbabwean of international reputation with US residency could be invited to serve as a voluntary trustee In any case, the capital would be invested in a mix of stocks, bonds and treasury bills, according to professional advice The management fee should not exceed 1% of capital per year Prudent investment of the capital typically yields 7% a year over the long-run, although slightly more aggressive investments can yield more At the beginning of each fiscal year, the trustees would draw out a fixed sum and transfer it to a Zimbabwean grant-making organization that agrees to open a A CAMPFIRE funding window This organization would account for its use with fund-accounting software (such as the one sold by Sunsystems which is rapidly becoming a world standard for this kind of need)

A viable option worth exploring is to set up a local charitable organization that is allowed, under local law, to receive an annual gift from abroad and undertake grant-making activities Another possibility is to identify an existing local or international organization Examples might be the Beit Trust, the Oak Foundation, or some other local non-profit Even a US organization operating in Harare such as the Kellogg Foundation might agree to open a sub-account for the fund and house one or two staff members dedicated to the fund It would be important that the intermediary be based in Zimbabwe in order to simplify grant monitoring A regional-based intermediary outside Harare would not be useful

Identifying such an intermediary might take some time and careful thought Existing organizations, be they international organizations operating in the country, large support NGOs, or small-scale donors, are all wary of USAID Their wariness arises from concern that USAID would impose unreasonable reporting requirements (more than annual and more detailed than required under GAAP) Some might also be concerned over possible loss of organizational identify were they to serve as a pass-through for USAID funds This is not to say that a local organization might not be found who is willing to be a grant-making intermediary, but USAID would need to approach them gently and diplomatically It would be important to provide them with assurance of the appropriate scale of USAID=s intentions They might also need assurance that USAID does not intend to micro-manage grant-making and that only a funding window is under consideration, not wholesale transformation of an existing organization=s character

Assume that US$ 4 16 million is left available and put into a sinking fund, from which a fixed amount is transferred to Zimbabwe Let that amount be US$ 500,000 a year (an appropriate amount for modest annual grant-making with the present low-value of the Zimbabwe dollar) Under present projections of capital availability (see attached spreadsheet), a sinking fund at that level of capital would close down after 11 years of operation If the local intermediary organization used 15% of the funds for their own auditing costs and for the costs of employing a ACAMPFIRE Grant-maker and those of a financial monitoring assistant, about US$ 425,000 a year would be available for CAMPFIRE-related grants At present, the soft costs of a typical grant (training, meetings, minor equipment, etc) rarely amount to more than US$15,000 a year, so it is possible to make some 20 grants a year on a competitive basis Larger, multi-year grants

might also be encouraged under this scenario If investment returns are exceptional, the annual grant budget might also be increased If minor capital and small infrastructure increased the size of grants, a smaller number of grants could be made

The transactions cost of developing grants should be reduced and fairness enhanced by avoiding the program officer mode of grant-making common to US foundations Rather the fund should adopt the grant competition model using rotating panels of jurors to select among proposals Competition is by far the best practice in grant-making

Regardless of the intermediary chosen (new or existing), the selected organization would be required to produce annual audited financial statements to the US-based trustees of the trust instrument and take minimum precautions to assure that all grants would be for scientific, educational or charitable purposes

D Observations Pertaining to CDF Operation

- The purpose of allocating grant funds on a competitive basis is to establish the true absorptive capacity of the many and varied organization's seeking to work with CAMPFIRE villages and wards It also ensures that this absorptive capacity is not exceeded The competitive approach relieves IC of the responsibility of proposal development and allows many other actors to contribute their ideas and time to proposal development

- All proposal ideas over US$ 5,000 should be submitted by eligible organizations at least one month before the bi-annual meeting of the jury However, the jury should give sufficient commentary on rejected proposals so that applicants are free to improve their proposal ideas and resubmit in the next competition

- IC's grant officer might also facilitate quarterly "proposal writing and development" workshops in different regions over a two-three day period Interested participants can be invited to work on their project ideas and complete proposals during the workshop CA or CCG staff might participate in the training to complement the proposal writing skills with technical knowledge and support. These would be low-key, voluntary workshops that do not pay for the transport, accommodations and per diem of participants

- Twenty-five percent of the CDF might also be allocated for small "proposal development grants" using a quick-release mechanism (perhaps in the form of consulting contracts with two people at IC signing off to indicate approval) Such grants should not exceed $5000 each and might often be directly managed by IC as it would a consulting contract Their purpose would be to allow eligible groups to hold workshops, hire facilitators, collect data relevant to the preparation of a project, conduct baseline and planning PRAs, and contract specialists for feasibility studies IC would not actually carry out the work, each recipient would use those resources it judged most appropriate and would most likely team with a CCG partner (including the CA itself)

- IC accounting staff should make an informed request to USAID about reduction of the depth and level of pre-award survey requirements for small grants below $20,000 This request should include suggestions for how to simplify the accounting and reporting burden on grantees for these small grants, while still maintaining acceptable levels of accountability

- Approved grants should be made under a partial advance system, in which a percentage of approved grant funds are passed to the grantee after signature of the grant contract The rest can be given on a schedule left to the discretion of the grant officer Staff of the grant management unit would need to make a number of visits to grantees a pre-grant visit, a mid-grant monitoring visit, and a grant-completion visit

- Projects would be submitted directly to IC under this scenario The role of IC would be to build and train an internal, autonomous grant management team that would be transferred to an independent, third-party, local organization at the end of NRMP II and funded under the sinking fund concept

- An alternative that would allow ample time for good projects to gestate would be to start planning now to reserve the unobligated funds in NRMP II as of September 30, 1999 as a CAMPFIRE Development Trust In principle, the trust would be set up to be liquidated over a period of, say, 10 years The funds would be used to support the process of project development at the community/village/ward level and to provide the communities with modest amounts of equity finance to give them a real stake in their CAMPFIRE development projects, not only as decision makers but also as investors The balance of project finance could come from joint venture partners and/or lines of credit The only restrictions on the projects would be that they would be for development of communal areas "indigenous resources " There would be costs of community facilitation which could be borne by the trust One possibility would be for communities to know at the outset that a what their share of the trust would be over a set period of time so that they would not be playing with unreal money and would begin to realize the opportunity costs of their choices Competition would be directed within a set aside and not against other areas or against time

- The key financial (as opposed to economic, technical, environmental and C/F principles criteria) criteria for approval of a project would be (1) that the community, after a sufficiently thorough review process, were willing to invest their equity in the project and, if this were insufficient, (2) that a joint venture partner and/or a lending institution would be willing to invest or lend to the project There would be no prohibition against other donors increasing the community's equity in the project

- Use restructuring of the CDF infrastructural support as part of the rationale for extending the project beyond its current PACD

2

In Hurungwe, dividends are split 50% for ward level producer communities at the village level, 35% for ward level wildlife management control, and 15% for District overhead needs Local community members in the six district CAMPFIRE wards agreed to use their CAMPFIRE 50% dividends for a CAMPFIRE Tractor Program, to purchase equipment to use in small dam construction and erosion controlling contour riding in major maize fields In 1996, two tractors, one reversible plough, and two dam scoops were purchased In 1997, two more tractors, reversible ploughs, dam scoops, and one tow grader were purchased The tractors have also been sent around to all the CAMPFIRE wards to support whatever communities felt

Gwanda District reports that " Six wards in Gwanda have earned a total which is 50% of the CAMPFIRE proceeds from sport hunting" A District report shows ward allocations of Z$ 104,858 for 1996, Z$18,742 for 1997, and Z$ 123,356 for 1998 (of which only Z$ 81,938 had actually been spent) Dividend payments are usually made in February following the year the income is earned So 50% of the 1998 figure here represents the allocation from sport hunting in 1997 The 6 wards deposit their allocated dividend funds into their own bank account until they can decide as a group how they want to spend the money This took a full year for decisions to be made, after much internal disagreement The RDC did not get in the middle of these discussions Gwanda revenues are nowhere near enough for sustainably employing the CAMPFIRE coordinator and 6 game scouts currently being paid for by USAID (Z$ 208,000), though this district has put in Z$162,900[1]

1

In Hurungwe, dividends are split 50% for ward level producer communities at the village level, 35% for ward level wildlife management control, and 15% for District overhead needs Local community members in the six district CAMPFIRE wards agreed to use their CAMPFIRE 50% dividends for a CAMPFIRE Tractor Program, to purchase equipment to use in small dam construction and erosion controlling contour riding in major maize fields In 1996, two tractors, one reversible plough, and two dam scoops were purchased In 1997, two more tractors, reversible ploughs, dam scoops, and one tow grader were purchased The tractors have also been sent around to all the CAMPFIRE wards to support whatever communities felt needed to be done In Nyamakate ward, contour construction, and repairing of the Huyo farm to market road was completed, in Chundu, the Mayamaba road was repaired and hauling of bricks, river and pit sand for the Karuru health clinic done, in Kazangarare ward, two farm to market dirt roads were repaired, and stones were transported for the Dete dip tank, and in Chidamyoyo and Rengwe wards, a road to Badze school and Point 4 roads were repaired Other projects underway or completed include construction of Chipfuko primary school and Nyamakata secondary school, construction of a waiting mother's shelter at Chundu clinic and four blair toilets, a classroom block at Kabidza and Mahwua primary construction of dip tanks in Rengwe and Kazangarare wards, with construction of a weir dam in Rengwe ward in progress All these, and other projects were of general benefit to the ward populations and would have been left un-done without this CAMPFIRE revenue They have provided important employment possibilities for many local residents as well, money which will further stimulate the local economy

APPENDIX H

CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION META-ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis·
Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources

Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994	Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996	Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997	NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997	Garcia Evaluation September 1997	Field Observations	Comments from Interviews, Other Sources
1 Policy Related to CA-NRM issues formulated, implemente d and monitored			Scheduled meetings held, minutes produced but need more timely distribution, CITES position paper prepared RDC feedback that CA policy guidance inadequate or non-existent due to poor communication or mis-interpretation		In general, CA is progressing well in accomplishing its tasks and activities contained in its annual work plan, improvement in meeting agenda and minutes distribution, but of poor quality Some improvement in policy guidance, but RDC still concerned about lack of CA/CCG communication on policy matters	RDC's want more action on policy matters, such as extending appropriate authority status to other resources, such as forestry, minerals, etc	CA lacks a clear policy agenda and a plan to implement it Policy viewed as "vacuum" in the project PET policy sub-committee held first meeting in early March 1998, and developed agenda of "issues" but action on them just getting underway

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Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
2 Project Management, implementation, coordination, and monitoring established, including logistical support for the decentralization of the CAMPFIRE Association		Funds properly accounted for and USAID procurement procedures followed (with considerable DA assistance to CA) At present, CA does not by itself have the financial management capacity to manage the magnitude of funds under this project	"CA progress under this output has been excellent" Improvement needed in quarterly review reports, financial reporting accuracy, and RDC travel reimbursement	CCG member services are poorly coordinated at the RDC and producer community level, CCG members tend to have a paternalistic view/attitude of RDCs,RDCs do not feel they own the project because CCG agency officers go to districts with their own ideas, and sometimes local authorities and the communities are not consulted	Progress in this area has been very good CA staffing completed, positive review of CA grant management, progress reports still late, financial management control and reporting system is working satisfactorily RDCs are still not informed on a timely basis	CA lacks the capacity to provide on-the-ground services to RDCs	CA does not represent the interests of the RDC, it represents of the NGOs in the CCG (Min Local Gov't) RDC very critical of CA re poor communication

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Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
3 A Effective CA Advocacy locally and inter-nationally			Publications behind schedule, behind on public relations strategy development, behind on visitor strategy development		Publications still lag behind schedule, Publications relations strategy still behind schedule, visitor strategy still behind schedule		
3 B Effective information developmen t and disseminati on	RDCs feel they're not receiving adequate CITES information, yet they could play more active role			Some RDCs are not even aware of agencies such as ART, research outputs from CASS and WWF do not filter down to RDCs	RDCs feel they are not receiving adequate information on NRMP activities, they feel they should have more a active role in CA activities Little progress in establishing routine communication system of communication with the Board of Management and the Association membership	CAMPFIRE dispersal across Zimbabwe's vast geography, and the time involved in traveling to remote communal areas, makes essential direct CA communication with RDCs and communities very difficult and problematic	

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Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
4 CA staff trained in financial, procurement and project management			Draft training needs assessment completed, training underway, formal on the job training (OJT) program development behind schedule		Staff development not fully institutionalized, CA Formal OJT program still not developed, informal OJT is continuing, training in management and leadership techniques needs improving, has not been instituted fully		

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Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis: Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
5 Assist RDCs to develop capacity to market and promote CB natural resource utilization projects			WWF, CASS tasked by PET to conduct eco-tourism study, CA, Zimtrust and ART exploring marketing strategies Some indigenous resources identified	RDCs and the communities they represent are not included in important activities, such as attending international symposia and meetings	WWF, CASS tasked by PET to conduct eco-tourism study, CA, Zimtrust and ART exploring marketing strategies, Some indigenous resources identified, however, no real progress achieved - not much accomplished		

Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis: Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
6 RDC proposals screened by PET, projects approved, and assistance provided by the IC and CCG agencies			Planned progress achieved, Accelerate timely screening of RDC projects and feedback to RDCs on process		The system for screening and review of RDC projects is working well, need to accelerate timely screening of RDC projects and feedback to RDCs on process, CA staffing is inadequate to complete pre-award surveys and monitoring visits		

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Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
7 Increased revenues from its constituent base and more diversified donor base to ensure CA financial sustainabilit y			Price Waterhouse to prepare preliminary strategy, no structured plan for development of alternative sources of revenue, no annual business plan developed		CA management is beginning the process to develop and implement innovative strategies that will ensure its financial future, however, it lacks a viable plan for increasing membership, a structured plan for development of alternative sources of revenue or an annual business plan developed, the Association cannot depend solely on dues from its membership and an occasional external donor for financial support		CA lacks a firm strategy or plan for building future financial sustainability Discussions with CA management reveal disparate ideas lacking a coherent action plan No direct evidence, other than the Price Waterhouse study, of action in this area

Campfire Association Work Plan Performance Analysis: Meta-Analysis of Documents and Other Data Sources							
Work Plan Project Outputs (1-8)	**ULG Midterm Evaluation January 1994**	**Price Waterhouse, Pre-Award Assessment June 1996**	**Garcia, Huchu Evaluation February 1997**	**NRMP II Annual Planning Workshop August 1997**	**Garcia Evaluation September 1997**	**Field Observations**	**Comments from Interviews, Other Sources**
8 Engage in research, monitoring and evaluation activities pertinent to RDC and CCG activities			M&E workshop for RDCs conducted	RDCs should be involved in the evaluation of CCG services to RDCs and the producer communities	Little progress in PET or RDC identification of research projects, M&E workshop for RDCs conducted, CA/CCG/RDC workshop to develop M&E, sub-committee formed to follow-up	Four evaluations of CDF projects are of variable quality with very little data or analysis Essentially "thin" discussions of impressions	Poor coordination of M&E within CAMPFIRE, multiple data collection activities with little coordination to avoid duplication and ensure data quality

APPENDIX I

EXAMPLES OF CAMPFIRE M&E FORMS

1. POMS Bi-Annual Survey Sheets
2 CA Customer Service Plan
3. PAC Reporting Forms
4. CA Hunt Return Form
5. Revised DNPWLM Hunt Forms

POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

NAME OF WCC	WCC ID	DISTRICT	DISTRICT ID	AGE OF WCC

NO OF CONTACTS IN MONITORING PERIOD		MONITORING PERIOD		AREA MANAGER

A. PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONING OF WARD CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

A 1

Constitution & bylaws in place	----3-------2-------1-------0--------	Constitution & bylaws not in place

A 2

Committee meetings held according to bylaw requirements	----3-------2-------1-------0--------	Committee meetings not held & bylaws non-existent

A 3

General meetings held regularly	----3-------2-------1-------0---------	General meetings not held

A 4

Meetings held according to proper agenda & minuting procedures	----3-------2-------1-------0---------	Agenda & minuting procedure not followed

A 5

Financial management & reporting procedures followed	-----3-------2-------1--------0--------	Financial & reporting procedures not followed

A 6

Budgeting procedures followed	-----3-------2-------1--------0-------	Budgeting procedures not followed

A 7 NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF WARD COMMITTEE FUNCTIONING

B QUALITY OF WARD CAMPFIRE LEADERSHIP

B 1

Recognition & acceptance of leaders by community members	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Leaders not accepted by community members

B 2

Creativity of WCC management	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Lack of creative WCC management

B 3

WCC able to communicate with supporting officials , agencies & community in general	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	WCC unable to communicate with supporting officials, agencies & community in general

B 4

WCC willing to learn	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	WCC unwilling to learn

B 5

WCC has capacity to resolve local level conflicts, listen to community & accept differing views	------3-------2-------1-------0---------	WCC not able to resolve local level conflicts, listen to community & accept differing views

B 6

WCC committed to Campfire & can promote awareness	------3-------2-------1-------0---------	WCC not committed to Campfire & cannot promote awareness

B 7 NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF QUALITY OF WARD CAMPFIRE LEADERSHIP

C PRODUCER COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

C 1

CAMPFIRE awareness & support within the community	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Lack of CAMPFIRE awareness & support in community

C 2

Accountability of WCC to community Community demand WCC accountability	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Lack of accountability of WCC to community Community cannot demand WCC accountability

C 3

Much community involvement in the decision making process	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Much community involvement in the decision making process

C 4 NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF PRODUCER COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

D ROLE OF CAMPFIRE INSTITUTIONS & LINKAGE WITH SUPPORTING AGENCIES & DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURES

D 1

Active support of traditional leaders & extension workers in Campfire activities	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Lack of active support of traditional leaders & extension workers in Campfire activities

D 2

Needs of women & children addressed by WCC management	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Needs of women & children not addressed by WCC management

D 3

WCC encouraged to consider full range of resources	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	WCC not encouraged to consider full range of resources

D 4

WCC accountable to the community	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	WCC not accountable to the community

D 5

WCC supported by WADCO/RDC in developing revenue utilisation proposals	------3-------2-------1--------0---------	WCC not supported by WADCO/ RDC in developing revenue utilisation proposals

D 6

Good collaboration between WCC & extension agencies, safari operators NGOs CCG members	------3-------2-------1--------0--------	Poor collaboration between WCC & extension agencies, safari operators, NGOs, CCG members

D 7 NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF ROLE OF CAMPFIRE INSTITUTIONS & LINKAGE WITH SUPPORTING AGENCIES & DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURES

E DEVELOPING & IMPLEMENTING NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (NRM) PLANS & PROJECTS, & INVOLVING CAMPFIRE WORKERS

E 1

Good community involvement in developing NRM plans	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	Poor community involvement in developing NRM plans

E 2

WWC able to source technical assistance when necessary	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	WWC unable to source technical assistance when necessary

E 3

WCC able to monitor community resource off-take	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	WCC unable to monitor community resource off-take

E 4

PAC strategy developed & implemented	-----3-------2-------1-------0----------	PAC strategy not developed nor implemented

E 5

Community decides revenue distribution Direct & indirect benefits accrue to community	------3-------2-------1-------0---------	Community does not decides revenue distribution Benefit stream distorted

E 6

Community prioritises, chooses, implements, supervises & maintains own projects	------3-------2-------1-------0--------	Community does not prioritise, choose, implement, supervise or maintain own projects

E 7

Community Campfire Worker role & supervision clear with community & RDC	------3-------2-------1-------0--------	Community Campfire Worker role & supervision not clear with community & RDC

E 8

CCW trained for role	------3-------2-------1-------0---------	CCW not trained for role

E 9 NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF NRM PLANS & PROJECTS & ROLE OF CCW WORKERS

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POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

NAME OF WCC	WCC ID	DISTRICT	DISTRICT ID	AGE OF WCC	AREA MANAGER	NO OF CONTACTS IN MONITORING PERIOD	MONITORING PERIOD

CATEGORY A:. PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONING OF WARD CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

Indicator A1 WCC / VCC Constitution

1	*Committee constitution not developed*
2	*Committee constitution in existence but, not documented (orally agreed on)*
3	*Draft committee constitution developed*
4	*final draft produced but not yet adopted by general community*
5	*Committee constitution in place, adopted by general community and documented*

Indicator A2 Ward/Village Campfire Committee Meetings

1	*No meetings held*
2	*Meetings held because of external pressures (i e from RDC s/ws), orally agreed meeting schedule capitalise on other meetings*
3	*Meetings held according to draft constitution to address burning issues or through individual committee member initiatives*
4	*Meetings held but partially follow constitution*
5	*Meetings held according to constitutional requirements*

Indicator A3 General Community Meetings

1	*No general community meetings called by WCC although community asked for general meetings*
2	*General community meetings held and called by WCC in response to external insistence*
3	*General community meetings held and called by WCC without a constitution or its draft*
4	*General community meetings held in partial conformity to constitutional requirements*
5	*General meetings held and called by WCC according to constitutional requirements*

Indicator A4 Agenda for Committee Meetings

1	*No agenda is set for Committee meetings*
2	*Agenda set informally by some committee members and not circulated*
3	*Agenda set in the meeting*
4	*Agenda set, circulated in advance but not adhered to*
5	*Agenda set in consultation with members, circulated in advance and is adhered to*

Comments

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POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

Indicator A5 Agenda for General Community Meetings

1	*No agenda is set for general community meetings*
2	*Agenda set informally by some committee members and not circulated*
3	*Agenda set in the general meeting*
4	*Agenda set, advertised in advance but not adhered to*
5	*Agenda set advertised in advance and adhered to*

Indicator A6 Committee Meeting Minutes[1]

1	*No Committee meeting minutes taken or recorded*
2	*Committee meeting minutes not well recorded and W/C/VC rely on memory*
3	*Committee meeting minutes recorded but not referred to*
4	*Committee meeting minutes well recorded well kept and but follow up on issues is weak*
5	*Committee meeting minutes well recorded well kept and issues followed up*

Indicator A7 Financial Recording

1	*No financial records (cash book, receipt book, payment vouchers, invoices & any relevant records of expenditure and income transactions) kept*
2	*Income and expenditure transactions are haphazardly recorded*
3	*WCC keeps all source documents (Receipts Payment vouchers, Invoices) but do not maintain a Cash book*
4	*WCC is able to keep and maintain Cash book and other source documents*
5	*Cash book & Asset register maintained and able to produce a simple Income and expenditure statement*

Indicator A8 Financial Reporting

1	*WCC does not inform wider community on all financial matters*
2	*WCC presents a fragmented financial report in response to external Influence*
3	*WCC presents financial reports that have missing information (incomplete)*
4	*WCC presents delayed but comprehensive financial reports*
5	*General communities are informed of all financial matters in every general meeting as per constitutional requirements (income and expenditure statement)*

Comments

[1] Well recorded minutes are those which capture all resolutions and follow up action

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POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

CATEGORY B QUALITY OF WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

Indicator B1 Implementation of Community Projects

1	No Community projects (income generating/social infrastructure) identified
2	Community projects identified but not implemented
3	Community projects implemented as a result of external influence
4	Community projects implemented through initiatives of a few committee members
5	All planned community projects implemented and well managed

Indicator B2 Decision Making Process[2]

1	WCC/VCC makes all the decisions (dictates)
2	WCC/VCC makes all decisions as a result of non participation of communities in the process
3	WCC/VCC makes all decisions because of low community participation
4	Community entrusts WCC/VCC to make decisions
5	Consensus on major decisions made at general community meetings

Indicator B3: WCC ability to Secure Technical Services

1	WCC/VCC has not identified and sourced any technical assistance
2	WCC/VCC has identified available technical assistance but have not yet secured them
3	WCC/VCC has been able to secure technical assistance from local agencies they are currently working with
4	WCC/VCC has been able to secure external technical assistance (e.g. RDC, CCG etc.)
5	WCC/VCC has identified and secured government and NGO services (e.g. training)

Indicator B2 Decision Making Process[3]

1	WCC/VCC makes all the decisions (dictates)
2	WCC/VCC makes all decisions as a result of non participation of communities in the process
3	WCC/VCC makes all decisions because of low community participation
4	Community entrusts WCC/VCC to make decisions
5	Consensus on major decisions made at general community meetings

Comments

[2] Minutes can be used for verification

[3] Minutes can be used for verification

POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

CATEGORY C - COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Indicator C1 Attendance and Contributions at Meetings

1	*Communities do not attend general community meetings (WCC only attends)*
2	*Communities only attend when there is outside influence*
3	*Communities only attend when there are issues of interest*
4	*Communities attend but do not make meaningful contributions*
5	*Communities voluntarily attend meetings and contribute meaningfully to discussions*

Indicator C2 Participation of Traditional Leaders

1	*Traditional leaders do not attend meetings and Campfire related activities*
2	*Traditional leaders attend Campfire related activities in response to external insistence (of WCCs, NGOs, Govt e/ws or general community members)*
3	*Traditional leaders accept the Campfire Programme but take part as ordinary community members*
4	*Traditional leaders act as advisors to the Campfire Programme*
5	*Traditional leaders support the Campfire programme attend meetings, contribute advises on traditional issues and raise awareness in Campfire related activities*

Indicator C3 Project Identification and implementation

1	*Community do not realise the importance of projects & do not participate in project identification & prioritisation*
2	*Community not involved in project identification (Process done by WC/VCC or Councillor*
3	*Community involved in project identification due to external pressures*
4	*Community identifies and prioritises but do not participate in implementation*
5	*Community identifies, prioritises and participates in the implementation of community projects*

Indicator C4 Women Participation (Gender Sensitivity)

1	*No women in WC/VCC*
2	*Women represented in WC due to external pressure (e.g. Donor requirements)*
3	*Women represented in WC but restricted to few decision making areas*
4	*Women represented in WC but do not have decision making capacity ????*
5	*Women equitably represented in decision making bodies (WCC)*

Comments

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POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

CATEGORY D - NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Indicator D1 Inventory of available Natural Resources

1	*No inventory of natural resources undertaken*
2	*Oral inventory is in place and the community is aware of the value of resources*
3	*Communities identified available resources but have not documented the available natural resources*
4	*Communities have identified and documented few major natural resources*
5	*Inventory of all potential natural resources for utilisation undertaken and documented*

Indicator D2 Zoning / Simple Landuse Plans

1	*Awareness on LUP non existent*
2	*Awareness on LUP exists*
3	*Community appreciates and accepts the concept of LUP*
4	*Community has produced simple LUP and is prepared to implement it*
5	*Community has produced simple LUP, and has implemented it*

Indicator D3 Natural Resources Management by-laws

1	*No natural resources management by laws developed*
2	*Natural resources management by laws in the process of being discussed with communities but draft not yet documented*
3	*Draft natural resources management by laws in place but not yet adopted by Council*
4	*Draft natural resources management by laws in place and adopted by RDC*
5	*Natural resources management by laws approved and gazetted by local government and being implemented by RDC and community*

Indicator D4 Natural Resource Utilisation (resource off-take)[4]

1	*No Resource monitoring system in place*
2	*Resource Monitoring system at developmental stage*
3	*Resource monitoring system in place but not functional*
4	*Resource monitoring system functional but results not used*
5	*Resource monitoring system functional and results informs decision making*

Comments

[4] Respondents may be asked to explain types of resources monitored

POMS BI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHEETS FOR WARD/VILLAGE CAMPFIRE COMMITTEES

Indicator D5 PAC Reporting System (Where applicable)

1	*No mechanism of PAC reporting in place*
2	*PAC reporting system at development stage (not documented)*
3	*PAC reporting system developed but not functional*
4	*PAC reporting system functional but does not inform PAC reaction strategy*
5	*PAC reporting system functional and informs PAC reaction strategy*

Indicator D6 Community Investment in Natural Resources management

1	*No investments by communities in the natural resource base (e g Water provision, fire control gully reclamation, etc)*
2	*Communities rely on external support*
3	*Communities prepared to contribute e g in form of labour*
4	*Communities are investing in form of labour and have plans to invest capital in the natural resource base*
5	*Communities injecting capital investments into Natural Resources Management*

Comments

Overall Comments

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GOKWE DISTRICT PAR FI NO .

PROBLEM ANIMAL REPORT Ward

Date of complaint Name of PAR

Date of incident Complainant

Locality (village) Grid Ref (6 figures)

Nature of Problem (tick where appropriate)

- ☐ Crop Damage
- ☐ Livestock maimed or killed
- ☐ Damage to property, e.g. grain bins
- ☐ Threat to human life
- ☐ Other (Specify)

Wildlife responsible (tick)	Numbers involved	Sex
☐ Elephant	☐	☐
☐ Buffalo	☐	☐
☐ Lion	☐	☐
☐ Baboons	☐	☐
☐ Other (Specify)	☐	☐

Type of crop damaged (tick)	How good was the crop before damage occurred (tick)			Stage of Crop (tick S for Seedling, I for intermediate or M for Mature)		
	Good	Medium	Poor	S	I	M
☐ Maize	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
☐ Millet	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
☐ Sorghum	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
☐ Cotton	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
☐ Vegetables	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
☐ Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Dimensions (paces) of total field where damage occurred

Length (paces)

Width (paces)

Dimensions (paces) of actual damaged portion of field

Length (paces)

Width (paces)

Other relevant details (e.g. movement or behaviour of problem animal, number of livestock killed, type of property damaged, numbers of previous reports in area etc.)

Copy to council Yes / No Date copy sent

How was the copy sent?

255

PROBLEM ANIMAL REACTION REQUEST PAC F1*

Date of request

From Cheziya Gokwe District Council

To National Parks Gokwe, National Parks, Chirisa/Safari Operator (delete inapplicable)

Request for the above mentioned to investigate a Problem Animal Incident

at Ward/Video Grid Reference

The Problem Animal is reported to be
(state which animal is causing the problem and nature of problem)

This request does not necessarily require an animal to be destroyed
Please return the PAC F1 with this request after reaction to the incident

Stamp

Signature

(Tick where appropriate)

- [ ] The Problem Animal Report was made on the enclosed report
- [ ] The Problem Animal Report was made by telephone from
- [ ] The request for Problem Animal Reaction was made by this form
- [ ] The request for Problem Animal Reaction was made by telephone by
(Name of officer making the request)

PAC F1 and PAC F2 can be combined back to back

PROBLEM ANIMAL CONTROL REPORT

PAC F2

Copy of PAR report received date

Name of authorised control officer

Position held

Specify animal(s) against which action was taken

Animal(s) harassed YES/NO

Animal(s) destroyed YES/NO If YES, how many?

Total no in herd (if applicable)

Locstat (6 figure grid reference if possible)

Sex(es) of animals destroyed

Was animal killed instantly? YES/NO

Was animal harassed destroyed at damage site? YES/NO

Method of harassment (Brief details)

Was the PAC call out justified? YES/NO

Distance travelled by vehicle (km) Distance travelled on foot

No of days and nights spent out

No of rounds of ammunition expended Rifle Calibre

Assistance received (Brief details if applicable)

Hide recovered YES/NO

To which base? No of hides recovered

Has hide been properly cleaned, slated and stored? YES/NO

How were the tusks disposed of? CLIENT/COUNCIL

Serial no of issue voucher if delivered to Council

Combined weight of tusks (kg)

Any other remarks

Signed Date

PAC F1 and PAC F2 can be combined back to back

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[redacted]

HUNTING AREA: Safari Area — NAME OF OPERATOR: Hunters

NAME OF CLIENT: Mr W F Klinkshien — PERIOD OF HUNT: 29 5 96 → 01/6/96

ADDRESS OF CLIENT: Mannheimer Coer Way — RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL: Gwanda

BEST AVAILABLE COPY 475

Species	WARD/VICCO	Grid Ref	Date Shot	Killed/Wounded	Location Shot	Sex M/F	CO	RDC
Elephant male								
Elephant female								
Bull		TT1984	31/5	K	415	M		
[illegible]								
Tsessebe								
[illegible]								
[illegible]								
[illegible]

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15 The Fourth Schedule to the principal regulations is repealed and the following is substituted—

FOURTH SCHEDULE (*Section 60*)

PERMIT No

BOOK No

ZIMBABWE HUNT RETURN FORM (NP/CITES FORM 9)
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT/RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE

Operator THR number

Address Phone Fax

Professional hunter Licence

Client's surname Forenames

Passport number Country of issue

Address Phone Fax

Guests

(Continued on Page 7)

(Continued from Page 6)

N.B. – SHOW ALL US DOLLARS in WHOLE FIGURES AND EXCLUDE e.g. US$100

	US$
Total daily rate	
Total guest rate	
Less commission	
Total trophy fee	
Other fees	
GRAND TOTAL	
	/S

AGENT DETAILS

Name

Address

Percentage commission charged

Exchange control ref

where commission exceeds [illegible]

State currency and total amount paid by the client to the Professional Hunter or the company by whom he is employed

(country) (currency)

Date	A/C NUMBER	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	FORMS No	BANK STAMP & SIGNATURE

Balance unpaid if any
copy of this return if funds remain unpaid)

Note A *separate and full* written explanation must accompany each

(Continued on Page 8)

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(continued from Page 7)

HUNTER

CONCESSION	START DATE	STOP DATE	DAYS

Name and address of processing agent or Taxidermist

Name and address of shipping agent

SPECIES	SEX	LOCATION					Date	Killed Wounded	TROPHY SIZE Sex Left Side Right Side Total Inches and Fractions of Inches Standard	TROPHY FEES US$
		District	Concession/Farm	Ward	Village	Grid Ref				

COMMENTS

I

to the best of my knowledge true and correct

I hereby certify the information given in the returns

IMMIGRATION CONTROL AUTHORIZATION REFERENCE (SEE FEES FORM II)

Signature of Licensee/Agent Date

Signature of Professional Hunter Date

*for elephant give left and right measurements

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16 the Fifth Schedule to the principal regulations is amended in the heading by the deletion of AMPHIBIA AND REPTILES and the substitution of WILDLIFE AND FISH

17 The Sixth Schedule to the principal regulations is amended by the repeal of the form titled Trophy Dealer's Register and Return of Trophies (Other than Manufactured Trophies and Fish) Acquired or Manufactured and the Substitution of the following

TROPHY DEALER'S REGISTER AND RETURN OF TROPHIES (OTHER THAN MANUFACTURED TROPHIES AND FISH) ACQUIRED OR MANUFACTURED

FORM A

Dealer's name
Address (Premises)
Licence number
Licence that authorises acquisition of trophies and the month
Date

Registration Number

Part I

Description	Quantity	Name and address of supplier	Supplier's authority	Date acquired or manufactured	Whether manufactured or not (Yes/No)	Description of article	Number of articles manufactured	Remarks

Signature date

Remarks

PART B
(To be completed by trophy dealer who is a taxidermist)
PRE PROCESSING RETURN

NP9 No _____ to which the animals listed below refer

Name of Taxidermist

Address

Name of client

Country of destination of trophies

Species	How to be processed

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TAXIDERMIST POST PROCESSING RETURN FORM NP ANNEX

NP9 No _____ to which the animals listed below refer

Name of Taxidermist

Address

Name of client

Country of destination of trophies

Shipping costs (where applicable) US$

Total cost of taxidermy work to client US$

Name and address of shipping agent

IVORY TROPHY DEALERS AND OTHER PERSONS REGISTER OF MANUFACTURED IVORY TROPHIES ACQUIRED FROM A DEALER FOR RESALE

Page

Name

Address of premises

Licence number

Register number

I certify that this is a true record of transactions conducted by me during the calendar month of 19

Date

Signed

ITEMS PURCHASED					ITEMS SOLD				
Description of manufactured article	Weight	Quantity	Date acquired	Name address and licence/permit number of dealer who supplied the manufactured articles	Description of items	Stock on 1st of the month		Lots sold		Stocks on hand at end of the month
						Quantity	Weight	Quantity	Weight	
					Bangles					
					Necklaces					
					Earrings					
					Small items					
Total					Total					

DECLARATION OF STOCK BY IVORY MANUFACTURER

Licence No

Name
Address
Month

WEIGHT OF IVORY IN STOCK AT BEGINNING OF THE MONTH

	Weight of raw ivory purchased	Description of items	Quantity of items on hand at beginning of month	Weight of items on hand at beginning of month	Quantity of items produced	Quantity sold	Weight of items sold	Quantity of items on hand the last day
		Bangles						
		Necklaces						
		Carvings						
		Small items						
		Cut off						
		Dust						
	Totals							

WEIGHT OF IVORY IN STOCK AT THE END OF THE MONTH

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18 The principal regulations are amended by the insertion of the following Schedules—

FOURTEENTH SCHEDULE (*Section 59 (4a)*)

AUTHORITY TO HUNT

Name of operator — HOP No
Name of professional hunter — Licence No
Name of client
Country of origin
Number of non hunting clients — Daily rate charged
Name of property(ies)* on which hunting will take place
District
Duration of hunt
Type of hunt (specify animal to be hunted)
Daily rate charged US$

If a package hunt supply the list of the animals to be hunted and the total price and the balance of animals remaining on the quota

*It is the onus of the hunter to ensure that the landowner has an approved quota for the offtake

This is the actual number of hunting days

Declaration —

I undertake not to cause or permit the hunting of animals in excess of those indicated on this authority on this hunt

(*for or on behalf of* appropriate authority)

Animals to be hunted		Balance on Quota	Animals to be hunted		Balance on Quota

Authority granted — Signature of Officer/Game Scout

for *Director (NPWLM)* — *E C Vo*

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TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1) The holder of this authority and any person who is specified as hunter shall comply with the requirements of the Parks and Wild Life Act and any regulations made thereunder.

2) Where any dangerous animal as defined in the Act is wounded or believed to have been wounded a written report shall be made by the holder in person to the nearest permanent office of the Department or Police. The holder shall compile a written report in which he shall set out the full circumstances of the wounding. Such report shall indicate an accurate map reference, the date and time of wounding and direction of flight of the wounded animal. The follow up action taken or intended to be taken by the holder must be stated. The report shall be made, handed over to National Parks or Z.R. Police within 24 hours of the wounding of the animal.

3) Where the sex of any animal has been specified on this authority, the opposite sex of the same species shall not be hunted instead.

4) No problem animal control shall be undertaken by a client.

5) The holder of an authority is required to enter the details of any animal killed or wounded on Form NP9.

6) The holder of this authority shall produce it on demand.

7) The holder shall keep this record for a three year period.

8) This authority is not valid if not stamped by an authorized person. The authority is only valid for hunting in the inscribed area. Separate forms are to be submitted for each hunting area.

9) The Director may attach such additional terms and conditions to this authority as are deemed necessary and any such attachment shall then form part of this authority.

10) This authority is issued in terms of section 59 of the Parks and Wild Life Act (*Chapter 20:14*) and section 59 of the Parks and Wild Life (General) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 362 of 1990.

FIRTEENTH SCHEDULE (*Section 60(4)*)

PART I

SPORT HUNTING REGISTRATION FORM

1. This form is to be submitted by the 28th of February each year or before hunting commences whichever is the sooner.

2. This applies to all animals listed in the year end hunting return intended for sport hunting by foreign clients whether for bait or trophies and will be appearing on the CITES/NP9 form at the conclusion of a hunt.

Name of land owner: _____

Address of landowner: _____

Size of property in HECTARES: _____

Name of lessee (where appropriate): _____

Address of lessee: _____

Name of operator to whom hunting rights have been sold: _____

TRH No. of operator who will be hunting the quota: _____

Species	Quota	Species	Quota

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PART II

YEARLAND HUNTING RETURN

Name of landowner

Address of landowner

Size of property in HECTARES

Name of lessee (where appropriate)

Address of lessee

Name of operator(s) to whom hunting rights have been sold

TRH No of operator(s) who hunted the quota

Species	Sport hunting harvest	Management offtake	Species	Sport hunting harvest	Management offtake

1 Under sport hunting column enter all animals which have been sport hunted by foreign nationals including bait animals

2 Under management offtake list all animals that have been taken for other reasons including hunting by local Citizens "

Supplement to the Zimbabwean Government Gazette dated the 13th February 1998
Printed by the Government Printer Harare

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BENEFICIARY CONTACT MONITORING

WARD DATA COLLECTION FORM

YEAR DATA IS COLLECTED

MONTH DATA IS COLLECTED

DISTRICT WARD IS IN

WARD NAME/NUMBER

NAME OF WARD CAMPFIRE CHAIRPERSON

NAME OF WARD CAMPFIRE SECRETARY

A

1 Estimated Ward population

2 No of Households presently in ward

3 Number of Ward CAMPFIRE General meetings held in 1997

4 No of Ward CAMPFIRE Committee Meetings held in 1997

5 Household representation at Ward CAMPFIRE General Meetings in 1997 Complete according to number of meetings held

Date Ward CAMPFIRE General Meeting was held	Total households attended	Number of Households represented by female members	Number of Households represented by male members

6 Present CAMPFIRE Ward Committee Composition

Total Number	Number Male	Number Female	

WCC Meetings held in 1997

Date WCC meeting was held	No Woman Committee Members Present	No Male Committee Members Present

B

B1 Ward CAMPFIRE Revenues (Distributed 1998 but generated 1997)

CAMPFIRE Revenue Source	Amount in Z$
Safari Hunting	
Lodges	
Photographic Safaris	
Timber	
Crafts	
Macimbi	
Grinding Mill	

B2 Total Amount Generated

B3 Uses of Generated 1997 CAMPFIRE Revenue

ACTIVITY	AMOUNT USED/COMMITTED

B4 Ward Projects/activities implemented wholly or partially from CAMPFIRE revenue since CAMPFIRE Started in area

ACTIVITY / PROJECT	YEAR STARTED	IMPLEMENTATION STAGE 1= Just Starting 2=In Progress 3=Completed	NUMBER OF UNITS	TYPE OF COMMUNITY FUNDING 1=WHOLE 2=PARTIAL	COMMUNITY FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION	OTHER FORMS OF COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION	VALUE OF OUTSIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE	SOURCE OF OUTSIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (DONORS)
A EDUCATIONAL								
Pre-schools								
Teachers Houses								
classroom blocks								
Toilet blocks								
Cash disbursements								
B WATER								
Boreholes								
Weirs								
Dams								
Wells								
C ROADS AND TRANSPORT								
Roads								
Footbridges								
Bridges								

D HEALTH								
Clinic Blocks								
Mothers Shelters								
Staff Houses								
Toilets								
E COMMERCIAL								
Grinding Mills								
Tuckshops								
Warehouses								
Lodges								
Crafts Centres								
E SOCIAL								
Football clubs								
F OTHER								

B5 DONOR FUNDED CAMPFIRE PROJECTS WITHIN WARD

ACTIVITY / PROJECT	YEAR STARTED	IMPLEMENTATION STAGE	NUMBER OF UNITS	VALUE IN OF DONOR ASSISTANCE IN Z$	SOURCE OF ASSISTANCE (DONOR)

C

C1 COMMUNITY NATURAL RESOURCE POLICING

ACTIVITY	NUMBER CAUGHT	NUMBER EDUCATED	NUMBER RECEIVED WARNING	NUMBER FINED	NUMBER
TREE CUTTING					
RIVER BANK CULTIVATION					
STARTING VELDT FIRES					
NO CONSERVATION WORKS ON ARABLE					
FISH POACHING					
GOLD PANNING					

C2 Wildlife Poaching in 1997

Wild Animal	No Of snares found	No Of carcasses found	No Of people caught
Elephants			
Buffaloes			
Kudus			
Zebras			
Crocodiles			
Impalas/bucks/hares			
Lions			
Leopards			
baboons			

C2 HUMAN ANIMAL CONFLICTS AND CONTROL

Incidences of Human-Animal conflicts and control means used in 1997

TYPE OF ANIMAL	ESTIMATED TOTAL NUMBER INVOLVED	PROBLEM CAUSED	CONTROL MEANS
1 ELEPHANTS			
2 CROCODILES			
3 BUFFALOES			
4 LIONS			
5 LEOPARDS			
6 BABOONS			

D

D1 TYPES OF TRAINING RECEIVED IN 1997 BY WARD MEMBERS UNDER CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME

TRAINING ACTIVITY	WHO ATTENDED	NUMBER ATTENDED	FACILITATING ORGANISATION	WHO FINANCED COURSE	COMMENTS
Constitution Development	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
By law Formulation	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
Project management Courses	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				

Monitoring and Evaluation	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
Quota setting	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
wildlife Ground Counting	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
Problem Animal Control	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				

Land Use Planning	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
Bookkeeping and Record keeping	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
Financial Management	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
Meeting Procedures and Conflict resolution	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				

	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				
	WCC members				
	Resource monitors and game scouts				
	Traditional Leaders				

E.

E1 Do you receive minutes from Village CAMPFIRE Meetings 1=Yes 2=No

E2 Do you have a Ward Bank account 1=Yes 2=No

E3 Where do you get assistance for your Ward development Activities?

APPENDIX J

PUBLIC CONTROVERSY AND THE MEDIA

1. Example of Local Press Coverage of Elephants and CAMPFIRE, March 1998
2. Animal Rights Position and Campaign, HSUS Exhibits
3. What the Experts Say
4. ART Response to HSUS
5. Exibits of the Range of Media Coverage

Appendix J

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The Herald

Incorporating the Nation

ESTABLISHED 1891
Registered at the GPO as a newspaper

HARARE, TUESDAY MARCH 24 1998

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(including sales tax)

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mazda

GET THE FEELIN

Wild animals wreak havoc

'UMBO PROBLEM These villagers in Gokwe sift through one of the flattened maize fields recently salvaging the little that was left after elephants destroyed hectares of maize and cotton in the area

Elephants destroy 50 000h fields, lions kill livestock

Herald Reporter

TWO elephant herds have destroyed 50 000 hectares of cotton and maize in the Nenyunga and Siamchembu chieftainships of Gokwe North, while lions are killing livestock

The elephants have left villagers in Zhomba Kamakuli Nenyunga and Siamchembu areas with nothing to harvest as all their maize and cotton crops were destroyed

Now there are fears that communal farmers in these areas along the Sengwa River may need drought relief food this year if nothing is done to control the elephants

A lone bull also gored and trampled a 60 year old woman Mrs Conese Chikono of Mutemarunga village in Madzivaz

Wednesday morning as she was harvesting crops in her field and Mr Mavious Shanaura who was herding cattle in Nenyunga area was injured by the elephants last week

The elephants which are roaming the area in two groups of 15 and 20 are now giving Nenyunga and Siamchembu communal farmers sleepless nights as they invade fields and destroy all crops they come across

It is understood that the elephants move from the game corridor running between Chirisa Safari Area and Chizarira National Park to the nearby villages of Nenyunga, Siamchembu Madzivazvido Kahobo and Chireya 5

The councillor for Nenyunga ward Clr Heck Mkandla said the animals roam the fields in broad daylight causing

people from ou activities

Although Gokwe Rural District Co had a problem a control contract w safari operator to c the animals he h been able to succe control them

Clr Mkandla sai contract obliges the operator to react to wild animals He ac the operator of try scare off the animal rubber bullets

He said the peo Nenyunga were poo ing to the perenni mal problem oth they have the capa adequately feed selves Council s use Campfire pro on people whose have been destroy the wild animals

Zhomba farme Johnson Pondo zanywa whose 5 h

© To Page 1

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Elephants wreak havoc

● From Page 1

ton field was destroyed only last week, said I will not be able to pay back my credits with Cottco because of the extensive destruction to my field Most people here have failed to send their children to school over the years The safari operator has breached his contract so council should look for other alternatives to protect us Lions are also a problem here'

Gokwe North Rural District Council chief executive Mr Allan Chinho said in an interview last week that the problem animal control team had failed to contain the rogue elephants

Mr Chinho said the elephants were now used to shotgun sounds and they retaliate by charging instead of being scared off

There was also a problem of late supply of ammunition to the safari operator or council assigned game guards

The safari operator comes second in reaction He has full facilities to carry out PAC but he is dealing with two districts Gokwe South and North This could be the major problem to his ability to react'

However Mr Chinho said council was looking at the problem seriously because "we might end up having a greater number of people needing drought relief food in the area We have asked the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management to assist in containing the situation In view of the fields that have been destroyed so far, the animal problem is so acute' said Mr Chinho

He said there was need to contain the animal problem if the villagers were to harvest the remaining crops in the fields

Wild animal menace needs immediate solution

THE destruction of 50 000 hectares of maize and cotton in Gokwe North, the crops of around 10 000 families, by two fairly small herds of elephants shows up dramatically the immense social cost of wildlife conservation borne by some of the poorest people in this country

Much of the population in a fairly wide swathe of countryside would have been able to support themselves this year Now they are going to have to ask for drought relief, not a pleasant prospect for hardworking families prepared to toil on their own land

A few years ago this destruction could have been extremely limited Within a day or two of the invasion of the elephants, the marauding creatures would have been shot dead or driven back into the wildlife areas The few families directly affected could easily have been compensated from the sale of ivory and the meat would have given most in the community a decent meal.

These days international pressure makes the logical response to an elephant invasion some sort of crime There are many in the North, and we saw this dramatically at the Cites conference in Harare last year, who literally weep when an elephant dies while shrugging off the genocide in Rwanda.

Such people certainly would not worry about 10 000 families reduced to beggary so long as 35 elephant could continue to wander free, destroying crops Or rather, such people do not worry about 10 000 poor African families, it would be different if those who suffered lived in the suburbs of London or New York

It is time to stop the nonsense People are more important than elephants But that does not mean elephants should be exterminated as the wolves of Britain were wiped out or dangerous animals in other parts of the North brought close to extinction

Instead elephants should be considered an important source of income and a useful renewable resource in areas such as Gokwe North It was noteworthy in our report yesterday that the people of the area had some positive thoughts on how Campfire funds could be used, as well as on the need for better control of problem animals

Indeed, the whole approach of the farmers up near Chirisa Safari Area is considerably more sophisticated than that of the jet-setting do-gooders who dominate the international "conservation" lobby

The whole Campfire concept was tailor-made for marginal areas like Gokwe North where the only real way anyone can make a decent living is to have multiple sources of income Crops, livestock, wildlife, safari operations and tourism all have to be tapped

In good years, when all come right, incomes will be good But even in bad years — when drought, floods or animal diseases strike — people can be assured that something will bring in survival income Under those circumstances people will tolerate elephants a lot more happily although they might well prefer to sell hunting licences to those who promise to deal with problem animals first.

Yet it is this integrated approach that is so condemned by the do-gooders They see the world in blocks People live in fancy cities surrounded by very gentrified countryside in rich countries Animals live in big national parks in poor countries where they can be visited

The North has, by and large, destroyed its more dangerous natural resources If the so-called conservationists want the same to happen in Africa they are going the right way about it. If large dangerous animals destroy livelihoods rather than enhance them, then they will go Villagers are quite capable of co-operating with poachers if no one else will help

Yet much of Africa is desperately trying to truly conserve elephant and other dangerous wildlife Experts throughout the continent have seized Zimbabwe's Campfire concept as a serious solution to twin problems how to enhance standards of living and how to conserve wildlife for future generations With careful programmes not only are both possible, but either is only possible with the other

Zimbabwe needs to unilaterally implement such policies if no one else will agree And in the meantime someone in authority should authorise immediately the hunting or removal of those Gokwe North problem elephants

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CAMPFIRE:

A Close Look at the Costs and Consequences

APRIL 1997

The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) was founded in 1954 to promote the humane treatment of animals and foster respect and compassion for and understanding of all creatures Today its message of care and protection embraces not only the animal kingdom but also the earth and its environment To achieve its goals The HSUS works through educational legislative and investigative means The HSUS maintains nine regional offices in the United States its worldwide outreach is supported by its global humane family of organizations **Humane Society International (HSI)** is The HSUS in its work abroad

THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES / HUMANE SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL

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CAMPFIRE: A Close Look at the Costs and Consequences

The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) is the largest animal protection organization in the United States with more than 4 1 million members and constituents nationwide

Although we recognize that bilateral and multilateral development assistance agencies can play a constructive role in international development assistance The HSUS is strongly opposed to programs that in the interest of pursuing development encourage consumptive use of wildlife for international markets Specifically we strongly oppose the use of American tax dollars to support programs that promote or enable international trade in or trophy hunting of endangered or threatened species

Over-exploitation of wild plant and animal species for international commercial trade is becoming an increasingly important factor contributing to the loss of global biodiversity Each year thousands of species of plants and animals and their products are traded internationally in a marketplace worth billions of dollars Many plants and animals in trade are taken from wild populations Two familiar examples are the rhinoceros and African elephant. Over the last two decades alone 90% of the worlds rhinos and half of Africas elephants have been killed to satisfy demand for rhino horn and ivory For some species including parrots orchids, cacti lizards, fishes and other species, unsustainable trade constitutes the chief threat to their survival

The HSUS has learned that the U S Agency for International Development (USAID) funds a number of programs all in southern Africa that encourage and enable consumptive use of wildlife for international markets One such program is the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe which is funded through USAIDs Natural Resources Management Program The program received over $7 million dollars from USAID between 1989 and 1996 and USAID plans to provide another $20 million between now and August 1999 Through extensive research made more difficult by USAIDs poor response to our request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act The HSUS has learned the following facts about the CAMPFIRE program which are elaborated on in detail in attached Appendices

- CAMPFIRE is based primarily on trophy hunting of African elephants, a species considered threatened with extinction under the U S Endangered Species Act (see Appendix I) A 1995 USAID audit of CAMPFIRE acknowledged that one of the purposes of the program is the "establishment of viable wildlife management schemes to encourage income generation from safaris and hunting " USAID has also acknowledged that they used tax dollars to provide assistance to two Zimbabwe government officials to attend an

annual meeting of Safari Club International where they represented the Zimbabwe trophy hunting industry Eighty-four percent of Americans oppose elephant trophy hunting and the same number oppose taxpayer dollars being used to promote or enable elephant trophy hunting These were the results of a December 1996 nationwide poll conducted by Penn & Schoen Associates Inc Yet through USAID taxpayer funds are being used to promote and enable elephant trophy hunting

- CAMPFIRE advocates the resumption of the international ivory trade (see Appendix II) The ivory trade caused the continental African elephant population to plummet by more than 50% between 1979 and 1989 In 1989 the ivory trade was banned by the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora The U S has opposed the resumption of the ivory trade since 1989 Yet through USAID taxpayer funds are being used by CAMPFIRE implementing agencies to lobby for resumption of the ivory trade in opposition to U S policy

- CAMPFIRE has lobbied to weaken the U S Endangered Species Act to make it easier for endangered and threatened species to be imported to the U S for commercial and other purposes (see Appendix III) CAMPFIRE implementing agencies have misused taxpayer dollars to facilitate this lobbying

- CAMPFIRE is environmentally unsound (see Appendix IV) The methodology used to monitor wildlife populations is questionable and there is a lack of quantitative assessment of the potential impacts on wildlife resulting from the project More mature male elephants are being killed on CAMPFIRE lands than can be sustained by the population

- CAMPFIRE implementing agencies, notably the Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management as well as the Campfire Districts are plagued by corruption and mismanagement (see Appendix V)

- CAMPFIRE funds have been poorly managed by USAID/Zimbabwe which according to a USAID auditor did not always ensure that project commodities were properly accounted for and used as intended (see Appendix VI) As a result commodities valued at about $470,000 were not used effectively

- CAMPFIRE provides more financial benefits to the implementing agencies than it does rural villagers (see Appendix VII)

- CAMPFIRE is not socio-economically sound and has not successfully involved local people in wildlife management (see Appendix VIII) CAMPFIRE is driven from the top-down by the Zimbabwe government and the implementing agencies not from the villagers themselves A consulting firm hired by USAID to provide a mid-term evaluation of the program said that such an approach is subject to collapse once donor funding is withdrawn

- CAMPFIRE is a waste of taxpayer dollars Since 1989 USAID has invested approximately $7 million dollars in trying to make CAMPFIRE work For every taxpayer dollar USAID has spent on CAMPFIRE CAMPFIRE itself has earned only 52 cents of which only five cents reached village households (Appendix IX) With no hope for self-sufficiency and with villagers receiving comparatively little financial benefit from the program CAMPFIRE is a waste of taxpayer dollars

- One CAMPFIRE implementing agency Africa Resources Trust, has been granted approximately $600 000 per year in American taxpayer dollars by USAID to open offices in several important capital cities around the world including in Washington DC,

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to influence national and international policies (including apparently to weaken the U S Endangered Species Act and to lobby CITES Parties for resumption of the international ivory trade) to produce lobbying documents to challenge environmental protection organizations and causes and to promote trophy hunting of threatened species in Zimbabwe (see Appendix X) USAID should not use taxpayer dollars to fund anti-environmental lobbying activities

In summary The HSUS strongly recommends that bilateral and multilateral development assistance agencies take steps to ensure that funds are not used to promote or enable consumptive use of wildlife for international markets specifically for trophy hunting of or wildlife trade in endangered or threatened species

In addition The HSUS believes that the CAMPFIRE program cannot be reformed to address the concerns we have raised in this report CAMPFIRE is not environmentally socially economically or ethically sound It is a program that subsidizes trophy hunting promotes the ivory trade and uses taxpayer dollars to lobby for changes in U S laws and regulations Therefore HSUS recommends that USAID funding for the CAMPFIRE program be immediately terminated The HSUS certainly has no objection to helping impoverished people in Zimbabwe or elsewhere However such activities must not promote or enable consumptive use of endangered and threatened wildlife for international markets or provide development assistance dollars to anti-environmental organizations who promote such wildlife use and trade

Across Africa people have embraced less destructive means of living with and profiting from wildlife through well-planned community based ecotourism or community development programs that are based on development and enhancement of cottage industries that are unrelated to wildlife (see Appendix XI) These are the types of projects development assistance agencies should be funding They are economically and biologically sustainable and will help both people and wildlife in the long-term



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HELP END THIS OUTRAGE!

Innocent elephants slaughtered for fun — & YOU'RE PAYING FOR IT!



GENTLE, BELOVED African elephant is a threatened species.

It's cruelty beyond belief . PAID FOR BY YOU!

Heartless bureaucrats are forking over millions of your tax dollars to organizations that promote the brutal and bloody trophy hunting of African elephants, a beloved and threatened species

Incredibly, the U S Agency for International Development (USAID) is handing this fortune to pro-hunting groups that are also lobbying to overturn the international ban on the sale of ivory — which would lead to wholesale slaughter of gentle beasts

It s an atrocity' fumed newly elected U S Sen Wayne Allard (R Colo) the only veterinarian in the Senate

It s outrageous that taxes paid Americans who almost universally adore the elephant should be used by bureaucrats on such a program

It s callous and brutal

Fortunately you can assist Senator Allard in his quest to stop funding for this vicious purpose — by filling out and mailing The ENQUIRER coupon at right

So far USAID has given about $10 million to African organizations and governments to reward fat cat hunters with their lands for hunter safaris

A whopping $20 million more of U S taxpayer money will be handed to them over the next four years

The hunt for an elephant is usually long and sickening says Dr Telecky a zoologist and official with the Humane Society of the U.S

During one recent hunt, a skilled sportsman shot a bow arrow into an elephant's belly The animal shrieked in pain and loped off into the bush

Instead of putting the animal out of its misery — a fundamental rule of hunting — the "sportsman" returned to his luxurious camp for refreshments

Later the hunter found the bloodied beast nursing its wounds He quickly fired another arrow into its chest.

As the dying animal shrieked in terror three more arrows ripped into its flesh

The majestic creature toppled to the ground Another rich hunter had satisfied his blood lust and got a trophy to show his friends It cost him roughly $60 000

The pro hunting African organizations receiving Uncle Sam s dollars say the hunts provide funds for local villagers But Dr Telecky says very little of the money reaches those who need it Instead, it goes to support the organizations bureaucracies and to their lobbying and promotion efforts

If the U S government really wants to help poor Africans, observed Dr Telecky "it could just donate the money directly to the villages "

— WILLIAM BARNHILL



ONCE STATELY beast is now just a trophy on a wall

U S Senator Wayne Allard is asking you to join the fight against this "atrocity"

Here's what you can do

Here s how you can help stop the slaughter of these innocent creatures

Says Sen Allard "When Congress reconvenes in January I plan to fight for an end to this program

And he needs your completed coupon to demonstrate the public is behind him

"Please join me in the fight by filling out the coupon below " said Allard 'Demand that Congress put an end to the taxpayer subsidized slaughter of elephants "

Complete then clip and mail this coupon to Save the Elephants c/o National Enquirer Lantana Fla 33464

To the U S Congress

I am appalled that millions in tax dollars are being spent by the U S Agency for International Development to promote the cruel trophy hunting of innocent African elephants I want Congress to act swiftly to stop funding this senseless slaughter

ENQUIRER READER POWER

Name _____

Address _____

City State Zip _____

Phone _____

Comments _____

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The National Enquirer Dec 96

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HUMANE SOCIETY
THE UNITED STATES
0 L Street, NW
ington, DC 20037

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

ur tax dollars are aying for this lephant to become meone's trophy!

Lauren Mackay
0 16th St NW Ste 502
ashington, DC 20036-2219

Anti Elephant Trophy Hunting Petition Enclos for Ms. Mackay

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THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION TO SAVE THE ELEPHANTS

to

The President of the United States Bill Clinton, and
The Vice President of the United States Albert Gore



WHEREAS, as a registered voter and taxpaying citizen of the United States of America I find it patently offensive and legislatively inexcusable that my tax dollars are being used to support programs that promote trophy hunting of African elephants, and the international ivory trade, and

WHEREAS, said African elephants are already listed as "threatened" under the U S Endangered Species Act, and

WHEREAS, continued support for these programs is leading to increased pressure to remove or relax the international ban on ivory trade, leading to even greater slaughter of elephants, and

WHEREAS, both of you distinguished leaders have expressed a concern for the environment and the protection of endangered and threatened species,

THEREFORE, I am supporting the work of The Humane Society of the United States in demanding an immediate cessation of U S Government funding, through U S AID, of any program which encourages elephant trophy hunting in Africa.

Respectfully signed this _____ Day of _____, 1997 by

s/ _____ s/ _____

2100 L STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20037

Please DO NOT separate Fold at the red arrows ◀ ▶ and return entire form in pre-paid envelope provided

The United States can't lead the world in conservation efforts and encourage the killing of elephants. Help stop this hypocrisy!

Ms Lauren Mackay
1400 16th St NW Ste 502
Washington, DC 20036-2219

Using your tax dollars to promote elephant killing is an outrage! We must stop it. NOW!

Dear Ms Mackay,

Consider the magnificence of this great animal, the sheer majesty of his very presence

Then imagine a hunter, stalking by vehicle, then crouching in the underbrush, coldly taking aim, and firing his high-powered rifle once, maybe several times

The mighty beast screams in anguish, then staggers, bleeding from his wounds, and falls to the ground with a tremendous crash

The hunter and his helpers approach and, after celebrating their "success" and taking pictures, start to hack away at this once-great animal, sawing his ivory tusks off, or his majestic head, to serve as a trophy

Sickening, isn't it?

But there is more Imagine that this horrible scene is taking place .

. and you are paying the bill

Ms. Mackay, as difficult as it may be to believe, this is not a scene in some 1950's movie. It's real Painfully, frighteningly real .. and your tax dollars make it possible!

I'm telling you this not to make you sick, but to make you

HSUS
2100 L STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20037

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angry And to ask you to join with me, and The Humane Society of the United States right now, in helping to end this abomination once and for all!

We must stop it! And there is not a minute to spare Let me explain

The U S. Agency for International Development (U S AID) has already paid as much as $7 MILLION to organizations that promote "trophy hunting" of African elephants and the international ivory trade --

-- despite African elephants being listed as "threatened" under the U S Endangered Species Act --

-- despite the fact that more than 8 out of 10 Americans are opposed to elephant trophy hunting --

-- despite the fact that 8 out of 10 Americans also oppose U S foreign assistance being used for the purpose, and --

-- despite the fact this program supports the re-opening of the international ivory trade which cut Africa's elephant population by HALF from 1979 to 1989!

Plus, not satisfied with the current level of slaughter supported by U S taxpayer funds, U S AID wants to spend $20 million more on this wasteful program over the next four years!

Why?! Why would an agency of the U S. government even consider such a program?!

Well, their explanation is that it is a way to provide much needed income to some impoverished villages in Africa

In the kindest terms possible, my friend, that is a myth A total, absolute myth

Your tax dollars help fund a program called CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources) but little of the money goes to help villages

Instead, your money subsidizes the trophy killing of elephants and other wildlife, with only a small amount of money going to help the villages in need

In truth, the people who benefit most from this legalized slaughter of elephants are those who organize the killing

safaris and a handful of officials who skim off the rest of the money!

Even if the "idealistic" goals of this program were legitimate and attainable, it would still be inexcusable

Why not simply take the same $20 million, use it to develop programs that don't involve the killing of animals, and distribute it directly among the villages where it is most desperately needed for food, water, and medical care?

Instead, it is spent on a misguided program that could lead to the ultimate extinction of one of the most cherished species of animals on this planet!

Putting an end to this travesty is one of our highest priorities at The Humane Society of the United States

And I'm appealing to you, today, as one of our most important and loyal HSUS members, to help us do just that

There are several things I'm asking you to do

In this mailing, you'll find a Petition addressed to President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore

It reminds each of these two Administration leaders of their professed commitment to protect animals and the environment

I'm asking you to sign that Petition and and return it to me today, so we can demonstrate without the slightest doubt, how strongly the American people feel about this issue We intend to deliver your Petition to President Clinton, soon, along with those received from other HSUS supporters.

I firmly believe that our Petition to the President and Vice President makes it clear the continuation -- much less expansion!! -- of this program will not be tolerated!

So no matter what else you may do after reading this letter, PLEASE return your signed Petition

(By adding your Petition to those from other caring HSUS friends, and delivering them all at once, we can achieve far greater impact than if delivered separately)

The urgency could not be more apparent. The more we are delayed in ending this horrible and destructive program, the

more scenes like the one I described earlier will take place

We cannot stand by and let this senseless slaughter of these wonderful animals continue!

So please return your signed Petition today

In addition, however, I hope desperately that you will be able to find it in your heart and in your means to enclose with your signed Petition the most generous contribution you can possibly spare

Whether it's $15, $25, $50 or any other amount, you know it will be put to good use by reaching as many people as possible with the urgent message that we must stop the U S government-funded promotion of the senseless slaughter of African elephants and help protect ALL animals from cruelty and abuse

It is only the help of caring friends like you that makes our every effort possible Ms Mackay, please help again Thank you

Sincerely,

Paul G Irwin
President

P S Please sign and return the Petition, even if you can't send a contribution I also hope you'll use the special stamps I've enclosed to tell others about our life-saving campaign Please remember that your gift of $15, $25, or $50, will make a difference Thanks!

P P S The taxpayer funded CAMPFIRE program is using these government funds to entice hunters to shoot African elephants for trophies Others are lobbying hard for a return to ivory trading There's literally not a minute to spare Please return the Petition today
Thanks again

HSUS

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WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY ABOUT CAMPFIRE ITS SISTER PROGRAMS, AND USAID FUNDING

everything I know about the CAMPFIRE programme tells me that it is world class Its strategy for the sustainable harvesting of elephant populations for the benefit of both the elephants and local people has my full support and that of my colleagues in conservation biology even the most casual analysis tells one that, in the case of the elephants, the CAMPFIRE programme is on the right side and the HSUS is on the wrong side' Paul Ehrlich Stanford University

By allowing people to derive a direct economic benefit through the sustainable utilization of their own resources, the dependence on foreign aid is broken CAMPFIRE has helped establish that environmental protection and wildlife conservation can help to improve, and are indeed essential to improving, the quality of human life Therefore in the interest of wildlife, the environment, and people, we urge you not only to maintain your support for CAMPFIRE, but to help expand programs like it in the future" Barbara Bramble, National Wildlife Federation

' The only way to save wildlife and wildlands, especially in poverty ridden areas, is to provide human beings with incentives to save nature Most conservationists have come to accept this Those who oppose it have yet to come up with an alternative that works We sincerely hope that as CAMPFIRE matures, certain changes will occur But to cut the AID funding to CAMPFIRE, will only engender more human poverty and suffering as well as enormous losses of African wildlife and habitat' Mike Wright, African Wildlife Foundation

By working with people on communal lands to take marginal agricultural and grazing lands and turn them to economically productive use CAMPFIRE attempts to provide people at the local level a better livelihood Furthermore, by providing land for wildlife outside of reserves and national parks CAMPFIRE and its sister programs in other countries produce a real conservation benefit John Robinson, Wildlife Conservation Society

' I applaud USAID s support of community based natural resource management programs in Africa, as these programs are vital to conservation of biodiversity I strongly encourage you to continue to fund these important conservation initiatives Dr George Rabb, Chicago Zoological Society

' Community-based management of natural resources is proving to be effective in both substantially improving the quality of the lives of the people and in providing strong incentives for the rural people to conserve the resources I applaud USAID's investment in rural community management of renewable natural resources in Africa and strongly endorse continuation of your funding for these important initiatives' David McDowell, IUCN - The World Conservation Union

"Through the NRM program, USAID has become a world leader in supporting innovative efforts to understand the complex relationship between conservation and development. Conservationists recognize that without incentives for humans to conserve wildlife and their habitats, animals and the environment will lose In the interests of wildlife and the people of southern africa, the regional NRM Program deserves continued support" James Leape, World Wildlife Fund

' CAMPFIRE is an organization that proves that humans and wildlife can coexist and flourish CAMPFIRE not only reflects the basic tenets of the United States' wildlife policies, but exemplifies the highest goals and successes possible through America's involvement in foreign developments CAMPFIRE deserves our continued national support, admiration and respect" Robert Easterbrook, Safari Club International

A response by the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) to the Humane Society of the United States pamphlet 'CAMPFIRE A Close Look at the Costs and Consequences'

A close look at the facts and fiction behind the HSUS 'Anti-CAMPFIRE Campaign'

For more information about the CCG and what is *really* happening in CAMPFIRE, contact The CAMPFIRE Association, Mukuvisi Woodlands, PO Box 661, Harare Tel 747152, 747436, Fax 795150

The HSUS pamphlet entitled 'CAMPFIRE A Close Look at the Costs and Consequences' represents the latest effort in its long-running campaign to undermine and discredit Zimbabwe's conservation policies. The accusations levelled against CAMPFIRE are unfounded and reflect a deep-seated ethical divide between the 'animal rights' philosophy of the HSUS and contemporary practices in conservation and rural development. The conclusions that HSUS draws about CAMPFIRE are at odds with the expert opinions of WWF, IUCN, USAID and IIED, who along with over 40 other renowned international institutions and academics, have indicated that they believe CAMPFIRE to be in the forefront of global conservation initiatives.

Of serious concern is that HSUS presents information that is frequently wrong, incomplete and misleading. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this is a deliberate attempt at distortion to validate their philosophy with scant regard for the truth, human welfare or conservation. This is borne out by the nature of the 'extensive research' which it claims to have undertaken. This involved HSUS funding a single covert 'evaluation mission' to Zimbabwe. **Of the two-member research team, it is understood that one withdrew on the grounds that the 'evaluation' appeared to be a disruptive and unethical attempt to undermine a successful conservation and development programme.**

The following is a brief presentation of the facts relating to each of the HSUS's false claims.

HSUS CLAIMS: CAMPFIRE is environmentally unsound, its ecological monitoring questionable and elephant use unsustainable.

The documented evidence flatly contradicts this! For example, the 1996 CITES panel of experts report reviewed what it referred to as 'one of the best elephant data sets in Africa' and concluded that 'the elephant population is large, increasing and viable and no serious risks have been identified'. As evidence for the unsustainable off-take of bull elephants, **HSUS quotes a WWF report, the author of which has responded stating 'whilst the information contained is factually correct, it has been used out of context and is consequently totally misleading'.** Other reputable institutions, such as IIED, whose reports are quoted by HSUS to substantiate its allegations have stated that their research is also being used by HSUS in a misleading manner.

HSUS CLAIMS: CAMPFIRE is based primarily on trophy hunting of the threatened elephant.

CAMPFIRE is 'based upon devolution of control of natural resources to local communities'. If HSUS means that the majority of funds are generated by the elephant, this is correct. But it is wrong to say that the elephant is 'threatened' with extinction in Zimbabwe. An independent EU-funded survey, Elesmap, in 1996 estimated that Zimbabwe has some 66,000 elephants, with an effective growth rate (ie after natural mortality and offtakes) of 2.1% per annum over the last 15 years. **Far from threatening the survival of the elephant, CAMPFIRE has contributed significantly to its conservation. Since the introduction of CAMPFIRE in communal lands, the number of elephants shot has decreased from approximately 300 per year, primarily for crop raiding, to 150 per year for all reasons.**

HSUS CLAIMS: CAMPFIRE is not socio-economically sound and is not socially acceptable.

CAMPFIRE is based upon the devolution of control of, and benefits from, natural resources to local communities. The programme can only work on the basis of its acceptability by communities. Since 1989, over half the countries districts have voluntarily joined the CAMPFIRE Association and well over a thousand democratically elected village CAMPFIRE committees have been established. This is not to deny that there is no conflict or change. Managing commonly owned resources necessitates deciding cost and benefit flows which requires painstaking consensus building and conflict resolution. HSUS base their analysis of the programs social suitability on the observation that at any one point in time there are vigorous disputes. The CCG would argue that this is one of the indicators of a strong and successful democratisation process. **Ultimately the best 'proof' of whether or not CAMPFIRE is participatory is to ask the people. Many of their representatives are at this CITES COP and we would urge HSUS to take the opportunity to ask them about CAMPFIRE's social acceptability.**

HSUS CLAIMS: CAMPFIRE is a waste of US taxpayers' dollars.

This conclusion is reached on the basis that the revenue generated from the resource base by CAMPFIRE is equal to approximately 50% of the total USAID grant. This grant is used to deliver services that are in effect an investment in institutional capacity building and skills development at the local level and will be phased out over time. Because USAID subsidises training and infrastructure at this early stage, communities are able to benefit directly from revenues. **The most recent data on CAMPFIRE, as analysed and verified by WWF Zimbabwe, indicates that no less than 56% of revenues generated by CAMPFIRE are being returned directly to local communities, contrary to the 11% claimed by HSUS.**

HSUS CLAIMS: CAMPFIRE provides greater benefit to the implementing agencies than to villagers.

USAID funds are used to enhance capacity with the

aim of establishing a sustainable community based programme The NGOs involved provide cost-effective capacity building services to CAMPFIRE communities to enable them to manage their wildlife sustainably To suggest donor funds should go directly to local people is naive in the extreme Simply giving people a handout perpetuates the vicious cycle of dependence **CAMPFIRE enables people to break away from this dependency through the establishment of sustainable production systems which enable them to generate their own revenue and determine their own futures**

HSUS CLAIMS One CAMPFIRE implementing agency Africa Resources Trust (ART) uses USAID funds to undertake anti-environmental activities in the US
Whilst ART does have an office in the US this is not funded by USAID nor do the activities undertaken there or elsewhere by ART resemble those claimed by HSUS The accusation that ART is part of the wise-use anti-environment movement comes as no surprise given that HSUS characterises WWF and IUCN as being part of a new generation of big game hunters and traffickers in wildlife' **HSUS is attacking ART for working in partnership with the leading global environmental agencies and for advocating the principles of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)'**

HSUS CLAIMS CAMPFIRE is riddled with corruption
This very serious accusation is made with only the flimsiest of evidence' comprising a few newspaper articles HSUS is aware that in most of these cases, subsequent reports and findings have led to these accusations being dropped For example investigations by both USAID and the government of allegations that CAMPFIRE funds were misused in Nyaminyami have shown these to be false **HSUS has been invited by the government to present any evidence of corruption so that this can be fully investigated, but it has failed to respond**

HSUS CLAIMS CAMPFIRE has misused USAID funds to undertake illegal lobbying of the US Congress to weaken the US Endangered Species Act
This allegation led to a comprehensive review of the activities of the CAMPFIRE implementors by the USAID office of the General Counsel **The review concluded that 'the allegations did not disclose any existence of a violation of the lobbying restrictions'** Despite having been informed of this finding, HSUS continues to make this spurious claim

HSUS CLAIMS CAMPFIRE advocates the resumption of the ivory trade in opposition to US policy
Several members of the CCG believe that it is important for the international community to examine the possibilities for the reintroduction of a well-regulated trade in elephant products **This is a position strongly supported by a range of conservation and development arguments, not least of which is that CAMPFIRE communities own elephant products which represent a large and moribund asset to some of the poorest communities in the world** The implication that CAMPFIRE has used USAID funds to undertake lobbying to reopen the ivory trade is wrong

The CCG believes that HSUS has every right to maintain its animal rights philosophy even if this is at odds with mainstream conservation and development approaches endorsed by the CBD (also subject to numerous attacks by HSUS) However it should not have the right to impose its protectionist philosophy through unethical methods involving a smoke screen of false claims and accusations and the misrepresentation or omission of documented information

Briefing on 'anti-CAMPFIRE' campaign in the USA

Background
Over the last 8 years the Humane Society of the US (HSUS), in conjunction with other animal rights organisations, have been involved in a campaign to discredit the concept of sustainable use of natural resources as endorsed by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) This has arisen from a deep-seated ethical divide between the 'animal rights' philosophy and contemporary practices in conservation and development One notable aspect of this campaign has been an attempt to discredit the conservation and development policies of Zimbabwe (see Appendix 1, 'A Brief History of the HSUS Campaign Against the Concept of Sustainable Use and Zimbabwe's Conservation Policies', for details) More specifically, over the last year this has focused on attempts to disrupt and discredit CAMPFIRE

HSUS have three objectives

- prevent the down listing of the elephant at CITES
- disrupt USAID funding of CAMPFIRE and similar CBNRM programmes
- discredit the concept of sustainable use and CBNRM

Having been unsuccessful in achieving their first objective they are now concentrating on securing the others

HSUS strategy and activities
The activities of HSUS have been focused in the USA, where they have targeted the media, the US Congress and Administration, conservation and development NGOs and potential donors **Whilst the campaign is ostensibly targeted at CAMPFIRE, it has implications for all AID funded NRM programmes in Africa, affecting approximately US$70 million of development assistance to the region** The campaign is characterized by the presentation of information that is frequently wrong, misleading and incomplete, as clearly illustrated in the CCG pamphlet 'A close look at the facts and fiction behind the HSUS 'anti-CAMPFIRE campaign' (see appendix 2)

HSUS are notorious for choosing one key campaigning issue every two years which they put the full force of their large and well funded ($36 million annually) organisation behind This is also their primary fundraiser CAMPFIRE has become this issue and a conservative estimate indicates that they have spent approx $ 6-8 million on their campaign to date They will of course be confident of recouping these costs through their fundraising campaign to 'save the elephant', (see appendix 3) **The general consensus amongst many in the US is that this is perhaps the largest 'animal rights conservation' campaign that has been witnessed to date**

HSUS initially made 10 detailed accusations against CAMPFIRE, these can be summarised as follows

1 CAMPFIRE subsidizes trophy hunting and promotes the resumption of the ivory trade using US taxpayer funds which threatens the extermination of the elephant

2 CAMPFIRE and ART used tax payer funds to illegally lobby the US Congress on the ESA and CITES for resumption of the international commercial ivory trade

3 98% of USAID funds do not reach CAMPFIRE communities

4 CAMPFIRE is not socially, ecologically or economically sustainable

Media - Instigated by HSUS, 17 'anti-CAMPFIRE' editorials have been produced in politically strategic state newspapers (see appendix 4) and national TV and radio ads have been run (see appendix 5) These demand the end of tax payers dollars subsidising the slaughter of the elephant through CAMPFIRE Whilst local papers have run negative articles, the larger dailies, which undertake appropriate research, have all reported positively on CAMPFIRE, with favorable articles appearing in approximately 20 national publications Several tabloid 'investigative TV' programmes (eg Hard Copy) have initiated research on CAMPFIRE/ART but have dropped the issue once determining the facts

Congress - HSUS have initiated a huge campaign targeted at Congressional representatives This has involved the mailing of dozens of negative CAMPFIRE publications to all 500 + Congressional offices, briefings with hundreds of Congressional officers, identification of Congressional 'champions', etc By mobilising their 5 million members, and the millions of members of other animal rights organisations, they have instigated what has been characterized as 'the largest Congressional letter writing campaign ever witnessed on a foreign issue' (hundreds of thousands of protest letters)

US administration - Letters have been sent to the Secretary of Interior, the President's Environmental Advisor and the Administrator of USAID, leveling accusations at CAMPFIRE and also accusing CAMPFIRE implementors of 'working feverishly to undermine and destabilise management and policies of South Africa's National Parks Systems' (see appendix 6) They are in the process of gathering signatures for a protest petition to the President

Potential donors - Efforts have also been made to disrupt other potential and ongoing donors to CBNRM initiatives in the SADC region, eg The GEF

Amongst a host of specific activities undertaken by HSUS - too numerous to detail here - has been an 'undercover investigation' of CAMPFIRE officials This included comprehensive background checks, surveillance and investigation of Zimtrust Trustees and many staff members of the various implementing agencies

ART strategies and activities
Over the last 9 months the ART Washington office has devoted approximately 90% of staff time and expenditure to assisting the southern African Embassies in addressing the HSUS campaign An essential element has been the development of a core group of supporters who have been prepared to actively assist in combating the accusations leveled against CAMPFIRE This has involved the following

- the endorsement of approximately 50 leading conservation and development NGOs and leading academics
- development of key contacts within the media and distribution of regular press releases
- identification and coordination of inputs of a group of renowned academics
- development of a support base within the African American community
- coordination of activities of a core group of NGOs, notably WWF, AWF, WCS and IUCN, who have actively supported CAMPFIRE
- Congressional liaison activities to organise Congressional supporters
- briefings and liaison with key US administration personnel
- securing active support and coordinating inputs of a variety of 'grass-roots' activist US NGOs/agencies to counter HSUS letter writing campaign, eg Fishermans Coalition, International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies

Having developed a comprehensive support base and appropriate informational materials, ART

and the southern African Embassies have been able to coordinate the appropriate response from the appropriate quarter to much of the HSUS campaign, effectively counteracting what they have done

The majority of efforts have been focused on the Congressional campaign to prevent the passage of amendments which would have eliminated the use of USAID funding In this regard the impact of the HSUS campaign cannot be overstated When it is considered that in US Congressional terms CAMPFIRE is an 'obscure' African development programme, with no budgetary significance and little political significance, it is extraordinary that we are now faced with a situation where **CAMPFIRE is known to every US Representative and will be debated at length on the floor of the House and Senate**

The HSUS Congressional campaign has been effectively addressed through

- the organisation of a core group of members of Congress to support CAMPFIRE, enabling,
  - the establishment of an 'early warning system',
  - access to other Congressional offices, and
  - ensuring a cohesive and standard message be advocated

- the development of action plans to counter HSUS's activities on Capitol Hill, including,
  - development of and distribution of informational materials
  - 'Dear colleague' letters (see appendix 7, A-D)
  - Preparation of briefings and floor statements for Members

- coordination with NGOs, academics and embassies to deliver message
- briefings for and coordination of media to 'sensitize' congress
- development and distribution of legal arguments against the amendments

The advise and assistance of the southern African Embassy lawyers, Bracewell and Patterson, has been essential in the successful Congressional campaign Bracewell and Patterson are currently involved in a dialogue with HSUS with regards to potential legal action that various southern African organisations may take against them

ART informational activities have also forced HSUS to dramatically alter their initial claims against CAMPFIRE, with their current accusations being confined to

- CAMPFIRE supports trophy hunting and ivory trade using tax payers money
- US foreign aid should not be used to support consumptive use programmes

Current status and long term impact
Strong bi-partisan support has been secured for CAMPFIRE and it is highly unlikely that the Fox/Miller appropriations amendment to disrupt funding that will be offered in early September will be successful (see appendix 8)

The long term impact of the HSUS campaign may well prove to be of great benefit to Southern Africas CBNRM initiatives, particularly CAMPFIRE, for a variety of reasons, including the following

- the campaign has resulted in high level of awareness and understanding of CBNRM in the US that we could not have hoped to achieve 'unaided'
- a core group of Congressmen has emerged that are prepared to actively promote US

policies that will support CBNRM initiatives through trade promotion and diplomatic channels in addition to AID funding

- strong working relationships have been established with a variety of significant decision makers and influencers, ranging from NGOs to the media
- for the first time the US conservation community have publicly endorsed 'consumptive sustainable use' leading to increased public awareness of the distinction between 'animal rights' and conservation
- The dishonest nature of the HSUS campaign has served to discredit them amongst many with whom they have worked in the past

The general consensus amongst in the US is that the HSUS campaign would have been successful in reversing recent US policy shifts towards support for sustainable use conservation policies and away from preservationist approaches if it had not been for the response coordinated by the southern African Embassies and ART In the short term this would have resulted in a loss of USAID funding to Southern Africa The long term implications would have been even more dramatic, eg The closure of markets for wildlife products

Liz Rihoy
ART Washington

August 29 1997

Capital Notebook

Hunting the Elephant in AID's Budget

By Guy Gugliotta
Washington Post Staff Writer

Elephants are pretty neat They're really big They pick up stuff with their noses They do fantastic tricks in the circus Disney made a movie about one Republicans love them

Elephants are not as neat, however, when they're running wild in the neighborhood and break dancing in your cornfield They've never heard of the macarena and scarecrows don't work

Elephants, said the Agency for International Development's Tony Prior "take up a lot of ecological space"

Prior is AID's natural resources policy adviser for Africa and among other things oversees a $28 million investment in a project to help Zimbabwe improve the lot of rural people's living in elephant country

Several years ago the project ran afoul of the Humane Society of the United States which makes the point– not denied by AID— that what rural people living in elephant country like best is to issue licenses so rich foreigners can come into the neighborhood and shoot elephants

This is worth anywhere from $20 000 to $50 000 a pop, which can buy a lot of economic development in a drought ridden southern African nation and if it happens often enough, the cornfield problem is solved

Unfortunately notes the Humane Society, the African elephant is a "threatened" species under the U S Endangered Species Act and therefore not to be hunted AID's program "is at odds with fundamental American values," said Teresa Telecky director of the Humane Society's wildlife trade programs "We don't give money for something we don't do here"

The Humane Society has never liked this project but has become more upset recently because AID is expanding it AID spent $7 million in three Zimbabwean districts between 1989 and 1996 and now proposes to spend the rest (more than $20 million) in 23 districts between 1997 and 1999

"The first part was a pilot for the very driest districts" Prior said The next phase is to mainstream" He carefully notes, however, that "this" is not just shooting elephants. "This is a resource management project, not a wildlife project"

Maybe so but maybe not

At this point AID and the Humane Society pretty much agree on mechanics—but not on outcomes AID thinks it is demonstrating to Zimbabweans that a properly managed environment is a renewable and lucrative resource The Humane Society thinks AID is simply giving Zimbabweans an excuse to kill elephants.

AID dedicated $28 million to the project in 1989, the year when 130 nations overwhelmingly approved a ban on international trade in ivory Hunting and poaching had halved Africa's elephant population to 600,000 during the previous decade

AID contributes its money to the Zimbabwe government's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) which puts local people in charge of managing their own natural resources

According to Prior CAMPFIRE's goal is to get people to see wildlife and the environment as income sources from ecotourism photo safaris and yes trophy hunting We want to make maintaining the wildlife population a matter of self-interest," Prior said

An AID blurb brags that poaching in Zimbabwe has gone into "dramatic decline" since AID started contributing to CAMPFIRE and that the country's elephant population has risen from 50 000 to 65 000

The Humane Society suggests however that the ivory ban is what's helping the population—no ivory market no poaching One of the things that has the society going bonkers is that Zimbabwe has joined a minority of African nations calling for a lifting of the ban

The AID blurb also acknowledges that 90 percent of CAMPFIRE revenue in 1995 came from hunting licenses which the Humane Society additionally points out, doesn't say much for photo safaris and camping

And the Humane Society also quotes unflattering passages from an independent study of CAMPFIRE contracted by AID in 1995 District councils have ignored program directives failed to invest revenue in village projects and taught people nothing about wildlife management the study said

"The result has been ignorance or hostility to the CAMPFIRE program," the study added and "mistrust of councils increasing intolerance of wildlife and a continued lack of communal environmental controls"

Prior does not apologize Environmental projects take time to mature, he said and AID is trying to put in place the conditions for long-term change "Elephant hunting is not the problem not with the threat of "30 000 elephants dying from drought"

JP 2/12/97

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1997

Environmentalists vs. Wildlife

By KARL HESS JR

Southern Africa is facing an environmental crisis On June 9 the source of that crisis arrives in Harare Zimbabwe, with the opening of the 10th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (known as Cites) There the fate of elephants will be debated and the lot of millions of poor farmers will be held in the balance

Two issues are at stake The first is the ivory ban currently enforced by Cites Zimbabwe Namibia and Botswana, with the support of nine neighboring states will ask for a limited resumption of the ivory trade The second is trophy hunting of elephants Animal rights groups will push for an end to all hunting counting on sympathies for Bambi to carry the day

But there is something much larger at stake a bold conservation initiative under way to win over rural villagers to elephant conservation Begun in Zimbabwe in 1985 as the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (Campfire) it has—under the generic label of community based conservation—spread to Botswana Malawi Namibia Zambia South Africa and Mozambique Its idea is to give rural villagers an economic stake in putting up with wildlife and its costs—like crop loss and loss of human life and limb It does so by giving small communities the right to market predetermined levels of elephant and other big game to safari companies and keep the revenues And it works $12,000 per elephant is a lot of money for a village where household income is $300 a year

In Zimbabwe, for example, poaching is down and the number of elephants killed annually to protect crops and human lives has fallen from 300 to fewer than 30, allowing annual trophy kills to rise to more than 100 from 50 At the same time, elephant numbers have soared to 66,000 from 46,000 since 1980, making Zimbabwe one of the world s prime elephant producers Much the same has happened in other nations with programs like Campfire

Cites threatens Campfire in two ways First, its ivory ban punishes the good managers of elephants—the Campfire nations—for the failure of other countries in Africa and Asia to adequately protect their elephants At this moment, 33 tons of ivory sit in warehouses in Zimbabwe alone Gradual sale of that ivory could more than double Campfire revenues, yielding even stronger incentives for villagers to protect both elephants and elephant habitat Indeed a recent study sponsored by the World Wildlife Fund, the U S Fish and Wildlife Service, the World Conservation Union the Species Survival Commission and Traffic, a group that tracks illegal sale of animal parts, concludes that the ivory ban has had at best a minimal effect on elephant poaching Even with a total ivory ban global elephant numbers will fall as humans usurp more and more elephant habitat—a trend Campfire could help stem

This is where the Cites membership—135 countries including those of Southern Africa and Europe as well as the U S —actually threaten to hasten the extinction of



elephants and to keep rural villagers in poverty If animal rights groups—led by the U S -based Humane Society—are successful in their bid to outlaw trophy hunting of elephants (either through Cites or through the U S Endangered Species Act), Campfire will be snuffed out Fully 90% of village Campfire revenues come from trophy hunting, and 65% of those come from elephants Moreover, most African trophy hunters come from the U S Take them and the income they provide away and Campfire dies—and with it the economic incentives needed to persuade poor farmers to share their meager landholdings with elephants

The U.S should stand up for Southern Africa and support limited resumption of the ivory trade Vice President Al Gore should stand up for the millions of Africans who benefit from Campfire-type programs Environmentalists should stand up for the promise that Campfire holds for elephants But they won't Those who do stand up for Campfire—the Congressional Black Caucus, conservation biologists and a handful of libertarian-minded think tanks—will remain voices in the wilderness

A month ago on this page, Julian Simon tendered a bet "to any prominent doomsayer that just about any trend pertaining to material human welfare [anywhere in the world] will improve rather than get worse ' I am neither prominent nor a doomsayer but I am convinced that material human welfare—not to mention elephant welfare—will worsen in rural Southern Africa as a result of U S and European wildlife policies

It is not in the interest of politicians in either the U S or Europe to save elephants especially when doing so risks the backlash of voters who see African wildlife only on TV The problem is a widening cultural divide Elephants are marvels to us, to Africa s struggling poor they are marauding pests Elephants are cheap to us, costing only the price of the Discovery Channel, they are dear to the African farmer who must pay for land set-asides for wildlife parks and for lost crops, and who face loss of life Witness also the rise of wildlife protectionism in developed nations and its equation of human and animal rights In a subcontinent where human rights are barely respected demands that wildlife be given even greater rights smacks of racism and imperialism

I am prepared to take up Mr Simon's bet, but not because I think his argument is wrong The world-wide environment is improving, and it will continue to improve so long as people are free to control where they live and to benefit from the market process But those conditions do not hold in Southern Africa So I leave to Mr Simon the terms of the bet, a bet I will work to lose, and one that I will gladly pay off

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Mr Hess is a senior associate of the Thoreau Institute in Portland, Ore

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Save Elephants - Buy Ivory

Michael De Alessi
August 1997

This message has been muffled for quite sometime, but it was trumpeted loud and clear at the close of the 10th meeting of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in Harare

The decisive moment came on June 19 when proposals by Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe for a limited resumption of the ivory trade passed with the required two-thirds majority, despite strong opposition from the U S and some European delegations With the tally of the last vote, many Africans in the auditorium broke into song, while dejected animal rights advocates tried to come to terms with a rare CITES defeat

They had better get used to it This vote is just the beginning of a sea change in the way that the developed world manages its resources

For the first time in recent CITES memory, countries like the U S and the United Kingdom and their shrill, preservationist allies did not carry the day These countries were influential in the 1989 CITES decision to ban the ivory trade They claimed that devaluing elephants was the way to save them and promised to make up lost revenues with donor aid But over the last eight years, many countries, particularly developing nations, have come to understand the insidious nature of these protectionist approaches to conservation

Delegates from some these countries expressed their concerns on the floor of the meeting that these measures were simply attempts to turn their countries into "natural history museums" for wealthy environmentalists and that foreign aid only served to keep them "poor and mendicant "

The greatest threats to elephants is habitat loss Making them less valuable may discourage some poaching, but by encouraging habitat destruction, this devaluation has surely harmed elephant populations Countries like Zimbabwe with its CAMPFIRE program are realizing that the greatest incentive to protect habitat comes from allowing local people to benefit from the wildlife that surrounds them In this case, devaluing elephants only means less effort will be put into providing space for them

The resulting vote on a limited trade in ivory is indicative of a dramatic shift taking place on the international conservation scene The consensus on wildlife conservation is shifting, and developing countries are finally beginning to work together to push for sustainable utilization of wildlife resources to both benefit and empower impoverished communities and nations

Of course, CITES still has a long way to go Norway proposed trade in its minke whale stocks, Cuba in hawksbill sea turtles, and Japan in both minke and gray whale populations Each failed, in spite of evidence that none of these species are endangered The Norwegian and Cuban proposals came close -- majority support,

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but not the required two-thirds But for these species, the political machinations of countries like the U S and the U K were more successful

U S animosity toward Cuba is well known, and the whale proposals were likely scuttled by the advice of the International whaling Commission (IWC), which is today almost wholly divorced from conservation The IWC routinely ignores its own rigorous scientific assessments Member countries like the U K , Australia, and New Zealand have publicly stated that they oppose whaling under any circumstances Few of the developing nations that are beginning to transform CITES belong to the IWC, and so the IWC remains dominated by such animal rights views

The increasingly marginalized and out-of-touch views of the United States were evident in its comments on the South African white rhino proposal, which failed to win the necessary approval by only two votes South Africa sought merely to open a dialogue with some Asian countries on the topic of a potential trade in rhino horn Rhino horn is popular in some countries, most notably China, as a medicinal remedy for fevers and other ailments

CITES has always had little or no effect on traditional and medicinal demand, and as expected, rhino horn is as popular as ever in many Asian countries In fact, the CITES ban has only served to increase the price of rhino horn, and therefore, the reward for poaching Nevertheless, the U S opposed South Africa because "the effort to reduce the demand for rhino horn may be undermined by this proposal "

This position underscores exactly what is *wrong* with CITES -- the assumption that trade and conservation are diametrically opposed, unless proven otherwise In fact, the opposite should be the guideline for CITES, and the southern white rhino is case in point Whittled down to a population of nearly 20 by the turn of the century, the South African white rhino population now numbers over 7,500

In a recent study for the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, South African economist Michael□t Sas Rolfes points out that the Natal Parks Board, which has been largely responsible for this remarkable recovery, demonstrates the efficacy of commercial use and management The revenues generated from the sale of hunting concessions and live animals create a considerable incentive to conserve and propagate the rhino

Unfortunately, this is one of the few examples of good government game management, and it is only because the Parks Board is relatively autonomous, so it behaves more like a private owner The fundamental importance of secure tenure to wildlife conservation is, sadly, all but lost on the great majority of CITES participants, who all too often fail to understand the relationship between ownership and conservation

Private conservators saved the South African bontebuck, the American bison, and countless other species that were wiped out on public lands, but dearly protected on private ones And just as one might expect, the healthiest elephant populations tend to be in those countries that are turning to more and more local control over wildlife The stronger these tenure systems are, the more wildlife, endangered or not, will benefit from trade and be fiercely protected

After last month□s CITES decision, all eyes will be on Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, not only to see how they handle this trade, but to see how well they reward these local communities for their on-the-ground conservation work If and when they do, and the world takes note, *that* will be the really dramatic turning point in international conservation For until the CITES bias against trade is reconciled with the positive effects of private ownership on trade and conservation, it will continue to

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hamper conservation

Michael De Alessi is a research associate at CEI and attended the CITES meeting in Zimbabwe

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NEWS FROM THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY
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For release July 22 1997
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Libertarians demand: Congress should kill program that subsidizes the slaughter of African elephants

WASHINGTON, DC - Hundreds of majestic African elephants are being killed every year by trophy hunters -- and U S tax dollars are helping to pay for the slaughter

"This is an outrage that must be stopped," said Steve Dasbach, national chairman of the Libertarian Party "Congress has already spent millions to promote this wildlife butchery and if we don't stop the politicians, they're going to spend $21 million more "

The U S House could decide as early as Tuesday whether to continue funding CAMPFIRE -- a foreign aid program that funnels money to Zimbabwe to promote big game hunting

The CAMPFIRE program (Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources) subsidizes the hunting of elephants -- as well as leopards, lions, baboons, hippos, and zebras

"Your tax dollars are being turned into the bullets that are killing these magnificent animals," said Dasbach "That's why the Libertarian Party has joined with the Humane Society of the United States to oppose the program -- and demand that CAMPFIRE be doused We need to stop the politicians before they kill again "

Congress already has funneled $7 million into this program through the U S Agency for International Development, and the agency is now requesting $21 million more -- despite the fact that elephants are considered an endangered species, and 29 African nations have outlawed elephant hunting

The CAMPFIRE program uses American taxpayers' money to pay for advertising to lure wealthy European "trophy" hunters to Zimbabwe, where they spend up to $30,000 for a license to kill a bull elephant

"Critics of foreign aid, take note Politicians are using your tax money to persuade wealthy Europeans to go on an elephant-hunting safari in Africa," Dasbach said "How can they justify that? How can a single American benefit from this?"

In fact, a vast majority of Americans -- 84% -- oppose trophy hunting because they believe it's cruel to the animal, according to a nationwide poll taken last December by Penn & Sheehan

"And it's cruel to American taxpayers as well, because they're forced to fund the killing of these animals with their tax dollars," said Dasbach

CAMPFIRE also spends hundreds of thousands of American dollars every year lobbying to overturn the international ban on ivory sales, and to remove African elephants from the list of endangered species

"Consider the irony," said Dasbach "American environmentalists are getting their tax dollars taken by politicians, who then spend it to encourage the slaughter of an endangered species "

The Libertarian Party's opposition to the CAMPFIRE program doesn't mean that Libertarians are opposed to hunting, said Dasbach

"We are 100% in support of people's right to hunt It's a popular sport, and is frequently necessary to thin the herd and prevent animal starvation," he said "Individuals have every right to hunt on their property, here or abroad But they also have a right not to be forced to subsidize someone else's hunting "

Perhaps the most amazing thing about the taxpayer-financed elephant massacre, Dasbach said, is that the CAMPFIRE program has been supported by so-called environmentalists like Bill Clinton

"When will the environmental alarmists who wag their fingers about spotted owls and tree frogs show some concern about the slaughter of elephants that they are aiding and abetting in Africa?" he asked

"The CAMPFIRE program presents a perfect opportunity for the president and Congress to do a little trophy hunting of their own Hunt down and kill this deplorable program -- and stop using U S taxpayers' money to subsidize the slaughter of African elephants "

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Animal rights activists peddling 'junk science'

December 18, 1997
by Absalom Shigwedha

Windhoek - Wildlife organisations have dismissed claims that the poaching of elephants has increased in the wake of the decision by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites) to allow limited trade in ivory

Both the Wildlife and Environment Society (WES) of South Africa and Zimbabwe's Africa Resources Trust (ZART) say they have been closely monitoring the effects of the Cites decision, and that there has been no measurable increase in elephant poaching so far

At its 10th conference in Harare in June, Cites decided to downlist the African elephant to its appendix two, which allows for limited trade in ivory

Dr Bruce Davidson, who is a board member of WES, said his organisation was extremely surprised to see reports in the media to the effect that poaching levels had escalated since the Cites decision in June

"With our partners we have been investigating every (poaching) claim of which we have been made aware, many of which are at best only anecdotal, and it appears that poaching levels may prove to be lower than they were before Cites," Dr Davidson said

According to Davidson, the biggest threat to the elephant at the moment was animal activist groups and their "irresponsible reporting"

"By falsely proclaiming world-wide that there is a renewed ivory trade and that there was once more an incentive to poach elephants, they are making it much more likely that elephant will indeed come under pressure from Africa's rural poor," he argued

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Davidson said the campaign by animal rights organisations was selfishly calculated to achieve the aim of placing the elephant population of Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe back on Appendix I of Cites, while conveniently ignores the facts

Cites's decision to downlist the African elephant to Appendix II was a prelude to the resumption of controlled ivory trade which, once certain conditions of control are met, and provided that there is no escalation in elephant poaching, could resume on a limited scale by mid-1999

Cites's Appendix I lists a group of endangered species which cannot be killed for commercial gain The African elephant was placed on on Appendix I in 1989, after it was discovered that elephants across the continent were fast disappearing as a result of poaching

Meanwhile ZART General-Secretary Rob Monro said allegations that poaching was increasing in Africa was a campaign "based on junk science" He said the only real measure of the effects of the Cites' decision to consider a return to a legal, well regulated ivory trade was the work of Traffic, the

official monitor for Cites "And they can find no evidence of an upswing in poaching," he said

Recently, International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) alleged that there was an elephant "massacre" taking place in Kenya, with a total of 29 elephants poached during September alone The Kenyan Wildlife Service has officially denied the claims

The London-based Environmental Investigation Agency was also singled out as one of the animal protection groups telling the world that poaching was on the increase place in Africa

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June 20, 1997

U.N. wildlife panel eases ban on ivory sales

By PAUL ALEXANDER Associated Press Writer

HARARE, Zimbabwe -- A U N wildlife panel eased the worldwide ban on ivory Thursday, allowing three African countries to sell 59 tons of stockpiled elephant tusks to Japan Supporters burst into a chorus of "God Bless Africa "

Backers saw the decision as a victory for self-determination and a reward for the conservation efforts of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe since the ban took effect 7 1/2 years ago

"This is a triumph for sanity, objectivity and for recognizing developing countries' ability to take their own decisions on natural resource management," said Dick Pitman of the Zambezi Society of Zimbabwe "It's a major, major achievement "

Ivory trade supporters cheered and sang when the results were announced, animal rights activists sat in glum silence They said any relaxation would spark resumed elephant slaughters by poachers

"It sends a strong signals to poachers across Africa that it's a good time to start killing elephants again," said Isabel McCrea of Greenpeace

The first of three secret ballots on proposals by the three countries cleared the 138-nation U N Convention on Trade in Endangered Species on a 74-21 vote, with 24 abstentions

The other two passed by almost identical margins - well over the two-thirds majority required to downgrade the protection afforded the elephants under international law

The proposals had been rejected Tuesday, but a committee was then set up to amend them to ensure illegal ivory is not mixed in with legal shipments

The ivory sale can go ahead in 18 months, if promised controls are deemed in place by then Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe wanted to sell combined ivory stocks of more than 150 tons to Japan but agreed to the smaller amount

Western countries have strongly opposed lifting restrictions on ivory but some developing countries say they have more elephants than their land can support

Don Barry, head of the U S delegation, said he voted against the proposals but would cooperate with the three countries to ensure trade is properly managed

"For the sake of the African elephant, we can't afford to fail," he said

Ginette Hemley, head of the World Wildlife Fund delegation, said the issue might not have gone this far if Western countries had come up with promised

contributions for elephant conservation

"We are extremely disappointed and fearful for the future of the elephant throughout Africa," said Wayne Pacelle of the Humane Society of the United States

The ivory decision came a day after delegates imposed restrictions on trade in sturgeon and caviar but rejected easing controls on rhinoceros horn South Africa, which initiated the rhino proposal, saw it defeated a second time Thursday

The body also rejected, for the third straight meeting, a proposal by the United States and Bolivia to increase protection for big-leaf mahogany trees

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Groups Assail U.S. Funding of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Program

Animal rights organization in the United States have launched an aggressive campaign against US funding of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program

CAMPFIRE (an acronym for "Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources") is a rural development program that shifts authority for wildlife management to local districts and communities, especially those near parks and on marginal agricultural lands The program, first implemented in 1989 in remote regions of northern Zimbabwe, provides villagers with opportunities to generate revenue through various wildlife-related industries About 90% of the revenues generated by CAMPFIRE districts in 1995 were derived from leasing sport hunting concessions to commercial safari operators, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID)

The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) is leading the anti-CAMPFIRE effort It will soon release a new document entitled, "Ten Reasons Why U S Funding for CAMPFIRE Should Stop "

"CAMPFIRE is far from the social and conservation panacea it is proclaimed to be by those involved in the project Indeed, it is a failure in many important areas and a waste of American taxpayer dollars," declares a draft of the HSUS document

Between 1989 and 1994, USAID contributed $7 6 million to the CAMPFIRE program USAID will contribute an additional $20 5 million through 1999

"How can CAMPFIRE ever be economically sustainable when it is so heavily subsidized?" asks Teresa Telecky, Director of HSUS's Wildlife Trade Program

In its forthcoming document, the Humane Society alleges that some of the organizations that implement CAMPFIRE may be using USAID money to lobby against the existing ivory trade ban

Tony Pryor, a natural resource policy advisor in the Africa Bureau at USAID, denies that any USAID money is being used for that purpose He told *African Wildlife Update* in late September that "U S policy is clear in that regard USAID funds cannot be used for lobbying We might not always agree with the lobbying entity of a funded organization But the entity must keep an airtight seal between the lobbying part and other activities Keep in mind that CAMPFIRE officials are free to talk about sustainable use and their point of view--that's not lobbying "

In Zimbabwe, the Director of Africa Resources Trust, Jon Hutton, called the HSUS campaign against CAMPFIRE "entirely predictable from an organization that places the value of an animal above that of our impoverished rural people The Humane Society's new attack, like their previous ones, is full of errors and inaccuracies to such a degree that one has to assume their intention is to mislead Let's not forget the Humane Society is interested neither in conservation nor people "

According to USAID documents, interest in the CAMPFIRE program is growing in Zimbabwe, with the number of participating households increasing from 9,000 in 1989 to about 103,000 in 1996 Non-hunting tourism to CAMPFIRE Districts is also on the rise, according to USAID, which cites as evidence the development of the Sanyati Bridge Camp in Hurungwe District and "additional development at Mavhuradhona Wilderness Area ,

where the introduction of a variety of wildlife species enhanced the popularity and success of the area's horseback photo safari operation "

HSUS officials are not impressed "Communities would have benefited much more if USAID had given the money directly to them rather than to a group of Zimbabwean non-governmental organizations who implement the program," said HSUS's Telecky

USAID's Pryor says HSUS is missing the point

"It's an issue of institutional development and empowerment It's not simply an issue of, 'Why don't we just take the money and divvy it out to people ' That's not sustainable We're trying to put in place better institutions so they can make sensible and qualified decisions at both the community and national levels," Pryor said

The growing debate on U S funding of CAMPFIRE comes as Zimbabwe begins the process of seeking permission to sell 33 tons of its stockpiled ivory According to press reports, Zimbabwe submitted a "draft proposal" for the ivory sale to the CITES Secretariat in mid-August The proposal is likely to be debated at the next CITES meeting, which will be held in Zimbabwe in June 1997

Zimbabwe says it needs the income from ivory sales to fund wildlife conservation in the country and, according to one report, "to compensate people in poor rural communities who are sometimes attacked by elephants and whose crops are regularly damaged by the huge beasts "

Officials from Zimbabwe's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management have said the stockpiled ivory they want to sell is from culled or rogue elephants and not from poached elephants

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Rumours Of Poaching Increasing Denied In Harare

December 15, 1997

HARARE Zimbabwe (PANA) - Conservation authorities in Southern Africa have vehemently denied that six months after being allowed limited sale of elephant tusks, the largest land-based mammal was being threatened by poachers

Conservationists in Southern Africa Sunday refuted claims that there has been an increase in poaching in the region since the decision by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered species (CITES) to downlist the African elephant in June

The Zimbabwe Trust and the Wildlife Environment Society of South Africa said in separate statements there had not been any measurable increase in elephant poaching so far while in some areas it had gone down

At the June conference of parties to CITES, the African elephant was downlisted from appendix I, where trade is banned to appendix II where controlled trade is allowed

Conditions were set under which Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe could resume controlled but strictly limited trade in ivory by 1999 provided there was no increase in poaching activities

Many animal rights groups, which heavily fought the downlisting, have published materials claiming that there was an increase in poaching activities in the past six months

In Sunday's denial, Zimbabwe Trust secretary general Rob Monro claimed that TRAFFIC, the official monitor for decisions made by CITES, had not found any evidence of the purported increase in poaching

"As far as we can see in some places, the rate of poaching actually fell over the past six months If poaching is going to escalate now, we will be inclined to blame those who claim now

that it is on the increase," Monro said

The UK-based International Fund for Animal Welfare reported recently that a total of 29 elephants had been poached in Kenya, one of the countries initially opposed to the downlisting of elephants

But the Kenya Wildlife Society has refuted this, saying poaching had actually gone down compared to the previous four years

Statistics showed that in 1992, 97 elephants were killed either for meat or ivory, 124 in 1993, 97 in 1994, 47 in 1995, 76 in 1996, and so far this year 53

Wildlife and Environment Society board member Bruce Davidson said the allegations of increased poaching were surprising as it appeared that poaching levels may even be lower since the CITES decision was made

"By falsely proclaiming worldwide that there is renewed ivory trade and that there in an incentive to poach elephants, they are making it much more likely that elephants will indeed come under pressure from Africa's rural poor," Davidson said

The European Union has already voted to follow the CITES decision by incorporating the regulations set on trade in elephant products in the European law

It will therefore be possible for commercial shipments of elephant hides and personal tourist items of leather and ivory to be made from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to enter Europe beginning the end of the year

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US News and World Report - Nov 25, 1996

WORLD REPORT

Killing with kindness

Preserving wildlife has been a moral and practical disaster for the developing world The paradoxical solution. Use it or lose it

Traditional recipe for creating a picture-book African wilderness Massacre the natives introduce smallpox to kill off some more let tsetse fly spread and wipe out the cattle declare what s left a park shoot any poachers An image of teeming wildlands in far off tropic climes has long seized the imagin itions of affluent nature lovers in affluent lands with the ascendancy of global biodiversity as issue No 1 on the environmental agenda safeguarding that image has become a major focus of fund-raising campaigns and legal initiatives

But it is an image wash in ironies not least that a land teeming with wildlife untrammeled by man is a modern colonial invention — in anachronism created by brutal force and alien to anything nature had known for thousands of years The famous game parks of Kenya for one arose on the centuries-old homelands of the cattle herding Masai after they were weakened by disease and driven out by colonial law

As a policy preservation is a deeply flawed anachronism at that In parks and reserves around the world scrupulously

RANS LAYING AND PICTURES

Megafauna *Darlings of the West, elephants are enemy No 1 to Africans*

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gether or modified to allow limited ivory exports from countries with large herds

The highly charged issue will dominate the agenda next June when the 133 member nations of CITES meet for their biennial conference The meeting will be held coincidentally in Zimbabwe one of Africa s strongest advocates for resumed ivory trading With about 70 000 elephants—more than twice the carrying capacity in a country the size of California—and with 45 tons of ivory locked in a government warehouse, Zimbabwe badly wants to find a market for its trove of white gold

Estimates of stockpiled ivory across the continent range from 500 to 600 tons, perhaps more For nations mired in poverty that represents a vast untapped source of revenue that could underwrite rural development habitat acquisition and wildlife protection It also could be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats Thus one idea being floated by the World Wildlife Fund is a debt-for-ivory swap in which Western governments would write off a portion of a nation s indebtedness in return for destruction of its stockpiled tusks

Western animal-protection groups are preparing to mount massive opposition to renewed ivory trading The Humane Society of the United States which has launched a $2 5 million elephant contraception experiment in South Africa s Kruger National Park says that culling and hunting are unnecessary Believes the society s John Grandy 'Birth control is a humane alternative for African nations who make money from devastating their wildlife, a way for them to embrace compassion "

Ecoimperialism This sentiment infuriates Africans eager to use their wildlife like any other natural resource, be it timber, copper or diamonds "Why should our people beg and starve while we are sitting on a stack of ivory worth tens of millions of dollars?" asks Graham Child, an internationally known wildlife scientist in Zimbabwe Says Botswanan President Masire "It is environmental imperialism Let us manage our own resources without interference from the West "

The same ecoimperialism charge is leveled against the United States by Botswana, Zimbabwe Malawi and Namibia in a related controversy Together with the 35,000-member Safari Club International, the world's largest big-game-hunting organization, the four southern African nations have petitioned the United States to amend its Endangered Species Act The law forbids American hunters to bring home trophies of animals the ESA deems threatened or endangered—even though CITES allows limited hunting of some of these species in specific countries

Big-game hunters typically spend between $20 000 and $60 000 for a safari Denying them trophy import permits they argue is a restraint of trade that costs African nations millions of dollars a year In South Africa s Pilanesburg National Park not long ago for example, three very rare black rhinoceros bulls, past breeding age were approaching the end SCI members offered up to $250 000 each to shoot them and bring home the trophies The law, not common sense, prevailed and the rhinos ended up as hyena food Likewise hundreds of cheetahs are killed each year across southern Africa as livestock pests SCI lobbyist and former Montana congressman Ron Marlenee says the U S species protection act actually hampers efforts to provide incentives to rural Africans to halt poaching, to stop converting prime wildlife habitat to livestock pasture and to quit killing the sleek cats that prey on their animals "If cheetahs killed as pests were instead worth $5,000 apiece to local people, they'd feed their cattle and hogs to them " Marlenee argues

Some prominent conservationists like elephant researcher Cynthia Moss argue that Africa s big game should be protected for its intrinsic worth Others insist that wildlife must pay its way if it is to survive outside zoos and safari parks

The protectionist mentality is irrelevant today believes Hector Magome manager of planning and development for the South Africa Parks Board Wildlife must be used to reduce poverty, otherwise we will lose the parks The government he notes is under tremendous pressure from land-poor South Africans to carve up New Jersey-size Kruger National Park for farms and homesteads Wildlife officials in southern Africa calculate that managing wildlife on marginal lands can produce twice as much revenue as cattle ranching

Programs like Zimbabwe s CAMPFIRE which began in earnest about eight years ago are a promising start CAMPFIRE generates $2 5 million a year 90 percent of that from sport hunting The money is shared by about 600 000 people living on communal lands

CAMPFIRE is dependent on a 10-year $27 million U S Agency for International Development grant for administration, training and infrastructure that began in 1990 Though emulated in other countries the program has recently been tainted by charges of poor management and corruption in some areas of Zimbabwe Sustainable-use proponents consider it a model for community development despite the blemishes Opponents say CAMPFIRE is nothing more than U S tax dollars subsidizing wealthy trophy hunters

For Phineas Uketi and his fellow villagers such controversy is an abstraction They point out that last year the 681 households in Mahenya each received a cash payout of 240 Zimbabwean dollars That's about $25 a significant sum in a subsistence economy in which $100 to $150 is the average annual household income Revenues from the program which began in Mahenya in 1992, also have purchased the village two grinding mills and a water line and have built a small school

CAMPFIRE has brought the villagers of Mahenya full circle Davison Msimbini says his people once hated nearby Gonarezhou Park because they were forced off the land 30 years ago to create the preserve and were forbidden to hunt the animals that had sustained them for centuries "Now we use the skills and knowledge of our elders to conserve wildlife as they once did,' he says "Once again, animals are part of our livelihood " ■

GERALD HOLMES FORD SCIENTIFIC FILMS

Rampage *A baobab tree destroyed by elephants*

BY MICHAEL SATCHELL IN KENYA ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA

APPENDIX K

DISTRIBUTION OF CAMPFIRE REVENUES IN RDCS VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM

Distribution of Wildlife Funds, Examples from Wards Visited by Evaluation Team

There is a great deal a variation on how dividends are distributed within RDCs In some cases these are distributed to wards, in some cases to villages within wards where animals were killed We did not see a case where dividends were distributed directly to households This is now rare, with most people preferring to aggregate their funds at a village or ward level to make possible projects of community interest

Tayanda Ward Wildlife Project (one of Nyaminyami Wards) (Mala Ward #4)

This wildlife rich district has been plowing its dividends into income generating activities (grinding mills), whose income is expected to reach about 17% of that provided by the wildlife dividends received next year The ward hopes that their elephant dung paper project, and community store, will further increase this percentage Expenditures of ward funds are expected to benefit a broad range of community members (Note Remember that most dollar figures refer to Zimbabwe Dollars, exchange rate in 1998 was about U$ 1 00 - $15 Zimbabwe)

Income	Actual 97-98	Projected 98-99
Marembera Grinding Mill	$24,780	$36,000
Moyuhi Grinding Mill	$14,690	$24,000
New Grinding Mill		$24,000
Sub-Total	$39,470	$84,000
Ward Dividends (50%)	$353,136	$500,169
Problem Animal Cont Meat	0	$20,000
Loan (from RDC)	0	$50,000
Ward Tuckshop (groceries)	0	$210,000
Elephant Dung Paper Sales	0	$205,000
Total		$1,153,169 (US$ 76,877)
Expenditures (Planned)		
Pre-Schools	0	NA
Youth Projects	0	
Women's Clubs	0	
Pre-School Tutors	0	
Pre-School Toilets	0	
Drought Relief	0	
Loan Funds	0	
Paper Making Project (Elephant Dung)		
Fencing around Area	0	$15,000
Wages/Salaries		$10,000

Staff

Bookkeeping	7,200	14,400
Six Game Scouts	21,600	43,200
Grinding Mill Workers	14,400	43,200

1996 Wildlife Fees

Elephant	$3000
Buffalo (M)	$450
Kudu	$180
Bushbuck	$135
Buffalo (F)	$225
Duiker	$33
Waterbuck	$300
Impala $30	
Zebra	$240
Sable	$540
Grysbok	$30
Baboon	$6

Ny Amabishi Ward Wildlife Project (one of the Nyaminyami Wards

The evaluation team met with members of the CAMPFIRE ward committee In this district, 11 of 12 wards are in participating in CAMPFIRE Note that in example below, no funds are distributed to households Last year's expenditures were similar to those projected for the coming year A very large meeting of village representatives at the ward level decided upon these categories for expenses for the coming year

Budget for 1998 - 1999

Income

Balance Forward (in bank)	$1,342 72	
Expected Ward Dividends	$105,000	(representing their 50% of take)
Grinding Mill Rental Fee	$10,800	
Total	$117,142 72	(US$ 7,899 47) (US$1 = 15Z$)

Ward Expenses Budgeted

Millers Wages	4,800
Book-keepers Wages	7,000
Grinding Mill Repair and Maintenance	7,000
DIP Tank	16,000
Gunguhive Primary School	15,000
Ward Annual General Meeting	2,000
Resource Monitor Wages	9,600

Traveling & Subsistence Allowances	8,000
Sitting Allowances (Meetings)	4,680
Stationary	1,500
Game Scout Allowances	6,000
Zunde Ramambo (Festival)	1,500
Independence Celebrations	2,100
Pre-School Mothers	1,800
Youth Projects	8,000
Casual Wages	3,000
Game Scout Uniforms	6,000
Ward Wildlife committee Office	5,000
Office Equipment	6,400
Total	$115,780
Balance	$1,362 72

Nyaminyami Rural District Nebire Ward #7

This Ward has a total of 190 households, with some 1,038 people

A review of their game scout books at the ward level showed that careful attention is given to keeping track of the location and number of animals killed by sport hunters within their ward - the basis upon which their semi-annual paid dividends are paid by the RDC We learned that

Between June 10 - December 1997, animals shot were

Buffalo	6
Impala 7	
Leopards	4
Kudu	2
Bush Buck	2
Baboon	2
Knipspringer	1

Between Jan 1, and June 1997

Buffalo	5
Elephant	1
Baboon	1
Zebra	1
Impala 2	

Besides this, this ward received 34 culled impala, and 1 buffalo (for which a minimal price (US$ 0 33) was paid per kilogram) The RDC culls the animals and delivers them by truck to the ward

where a specially prepared metal grilled area has been set up within each ward where animals are hung and cut up, weighed, and sold to local people When dividends are distributed by the RDCs, each ward will verify the 50% payment received against their own records, such as those above

Beitbridge Rural District Council

Distribution of Wildlife Funds, 1995 Per Village/Ward (from the 1994 Hunting Year)

Though dividends are distributed by ward levels, in actual fact, within the Beitbridge RDC, it is the villages themselves which receive the payments From their 1995 records, we were able to learn how revenue were distributed It became evident that record keeping (archiving) is frequently a problem at the district level, as we were not able to obtain information for the 1995, 1996, or 1997 years, though dividends had been distributed for these years It is interesting to note that communities count off-take of everything, for which a price is fixed, including baboons, monkeys, birds! It is important to note that this RDC did not deduct any overhead fees when revenue was very small, but gave 100% of dividends back to the communities!

1	Chikwarakwara Village	Z$	Z$
	1 waterbuck	x 6000	= 6000
	3 (M) buffalo	x 9000	=22700 (1 PAC X 4700)
	1 genet	x 500	=500
	4 baboon	x 200	=800
	1 kudu	X 5000	=5000
	1 lion	X 9000	=9000 (as PAC)
	1 bushbuck	x 4000	=4000
	1 impala	x 1200	=1200
	1 civet	x 500	=500
	2 hyaena	x 4000	=8000
	2 vervet monkey	x 100	=200
	1 lilac breasted roller	x 100	=100
	Total		76,000 (US $8,711)
2	Chipise Village		
	1 kudu	x 5000	=5000
	4 buffalo (M)	x 9000	=31,700 (1 PAC x 4700)
	1 klipspringer (M)	x 3000	=3000
	4 baboon	x 200	=800
	Total		40,500 (US$ 4,642)

3	Village # 19			
	1 bushbuck (M)	x 4000		=4000
	1 impala (M)	X 1200	=1200	
	1 wild cat (M)	x 500	=500	
	Total		5,700 (US$653)	
	Total Chipise Ward I		122,200 (US$ 14,007)	

Dite 2

1	Dite Village			
	2 impala	x 1200		=2400
	1 steenbok	x 1200		=1200
	Total		3,600	

Mtetengwe Ward 6

1	Mtetengwe/Malala/Makakavhule			
	1 elephant (M)	x 72000	=72000	
	4 eland (M)	x 6000		=24000
	4 impala (M)	x 1200		=4800
	2 duiker (M)	x 1200		=2400
	1 wild cat	x 500	=500	
	1 baboon	x 200	=200	
	Total		103,900 (US$ 11,910)	

Maramini Ward 8

1	Village #16			
	1 steenbok	x 1200		=1200
	2 crocodile (M)	x 9000		=9000
	Total			19200
2	Maramai Village			
	1 impala (M)	x 1200		=1200
	1 duiker (M)	x 1200		=1200
	1 leopard (M)	x 7200		=7200 (as PAC)
	1 hyaena (M)	x 4000		=4000
	1 jackal	x 500	=500	
	Total			14,100

3	Shashe Village			
	1 elephant (M)	x 72000	=72000	
	1 impala (M)	x 1200		=1200
	1 mongoose (M)	x 100	=100	
	2 jackal (M)	x 500	=1000	
	Total			74,300
4	Jalukanga Village			
	1 duiker	x 1200		=1200
	2 springhare (M)	x 100	=200	
	Total			1400
	Maramani Ward Total		109000 (US$ 12,494)	

Machchuta Ward 9

1	Bili Village			
	1 duiker	x 1200		=1200
	1 monkey	x 100	=100	
	Total			1300
2	Swerikı Village			
	1 hornbill	x 100	=100	
	2 impala	x 1200		=2400
	3 zebra	x 6000		=18000 (1 wounded)
	1 steenbok	x 1200		=1200
	1 baboon	x 200	=200	
	1 kudu	x 5000		=5000
	2 lilac breasted roller	x 100	=200	
	Total			27,100
	Machchuta Ward Total		29,600 (US$ 3,394)	

Dendele Ward 10

1	Shobi Village			
	1 zebra	x 6000		=6000
	1 jackal (M)	x 500	=500	
	Total			6,500

SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION OF 1995 CAMPFIRE REVENUE

Ward	Gross	50% to Ward	15% Levy	35% Dev Levy
Chipise Ward 1	122,200	61,100	18,330	42,770
Dite	3,600	3,600	-	-
Mtetengwe Ward 6	103,900	51,950	15,585	36,365
Maramani Ward 8	109,000	54,500	16,350	38,150
Machuchuta Ward 9	29,600	14,800	4,440	10,360
Shobi	6,500	6,500	-	-

1995 Safari Hunting Revenue	446,800 (US$ 51,215)
Less Elephants not harvested	72,000
Total For 1995 Distribution	374,800 (US$ 42,962)

Net Distributions of Wildlife Funds Per Ward (1990 - 1994)

	< 1990	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Chipise	30,000	44,000	19,202	28,960	20,992	61,100
Dite II	0	0	20,000	29,500	0	3,600
Mtetengwe	0	0	15,000	23,600	38,400	51,950
Masera	5,000	0	0	9,100	0	6,500
Machuchuta	0	0	0	13,800	27,520	14,800
Maramani	5,000	1,000	27,127	53,000	30,848	54,500
SubTotal	40,000	45,000	81,329	157,960	117,760	192,450
RDC	6,000	5,235	18,671	67,040	138,240	183,350

APPENDIX L

ANNOTATED USAID SO1 RESULTS INDICATORS

Appendix L

Table _____

USAID/Z SO 1 Results Indicators

NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
SO 1 A	Number of Campfire communities with established NRM programs	Campfire Assoc (CA), Zimbabwe Trust (ZT)	1994			☛No baseline data
			1995			☛No specific criteria presented in R4 explaining how the indicator is actually measured As it is defined, it is a *process*, not a purpose or results - level of measurement It presumably is scored as CAMPFIRE "graduates", whatever that means
			1996			
			1997	2	2	
			1998	5		
			1999	15		☛Definition of "community" changed to "wards", whereas earlier strategy statements defines communities as "districts, wards or villages"
			2000	25		

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NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
SO I B	Value of total Campfire benefits per household	CA , WWI	1994	150	93	☛ 1989 /$ 89 (data source not identified) ☛ This indicator presumes that all households benefit equally from the CAMPFIRE dividends, which may not be true for some uses of the dividends - such as a CAMPFIRE meeting hall or a store selling farm implements ☛ Assumes equivalent accounting of benefits across communities ☛ Indicator is not a measure of SO1 as it is defined, i e , "NRM strengthened "It is at higher purpose level ☛ This indicator will not be reported after 1998
			1995			
			1996	146	87	
			1997	175		
			1998			
			1999			
			2000			

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NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
SO1 B(a)	Value of total CAMPFIRE benefits	CA, WWF	1994			☛ This is a proposed indicator
			1995		Z$ 14 082,032 US$ 1 614 912	☛ This is not a measure of SO1 as it is defined It is at higher purpose level ☛ Assumes comparable accounting of 'benefits' across all communities
			1996		Z 17,445,801 US 1,732 453	☛ 1989 Z$ 43,699 (data source not identified)
			1997			☛ Original indicator assumed 1USD = Z$ 10 07 Exchange rate in March 1998 was 1USD - Z$ 15 4
			1998			
			1999			
			2000	US$ 2,400 000		
SO 1 B(b)	Number of households in Campfire communities	CA, WWF	1994			☛ This is a proposed indicator ☛ 1989 9000 (data source not identified) ☛ Total number of CAMPFIRE communities may include some that are not generating CAMPFIRE revenues

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NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
			1995	n/a	103 000	
			1996	n/a	105 000	
			1997	n/a	200,000	
			1998	210 000		
			1999			
			2000	250 000		
SO 1 C	Value of local-level Campfire benefits per household (Z$)	CA, WWI	1994			☛$US 1 - Z$ 15 4
			1995	112	72	☛1989 Z$ 44 (data source not identified)
			1996	135	84	☛Is not a measure of SO1 as it is defined It is at a higher purpose level
			1997	150	TBD	
			1998	175	TBD	☛Measure assumes that households are equally affected by the revenues May not be if revenues go for community projects that some households do not participate in (schools)
			1999			
			2000	TBD		

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NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
SO 1 D	Status of Natural Resource Base in Campfire Areas	WWF, Dept Of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM), Dept Of Natural Resources and Forestry Commission	1994			☛1989 "Rapid Habitat Loss and Decreasing Wildlife Numbers" (Measurement methodology not identified) ☛Present indicators are inadequate to determine national trends in the status of the natural resource base There are ground counts in some locations and aerial surveys in most places for Elephants There some isolated studies but no nation wide data base
			1995			
			1996			
			1997		Moderate habitat loss and stable wildlife numbers	
			1998			
			1999			
			2000	Negligible habitat loss and stable wildlife numbers		
SO 1 F (Proposed)	Diversification of Campfire revenue base (%)	CA, WWF	1994		5 5	☛This is a proposed indicator ☛1989 6 6 % (data source not identified) ☛This is not a measure of SO1 as it is defined It is at a higher purpose level
			1995		7 1	
			1996		8 8	
			1997	9 5		
			1998			

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NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
			1999			
			2000	15		
IR 1 0	Sustainable NRM practices adopted # of reported NRM by-law infractions committed by Campfire communities with NRM by-laws	Rural District Councils	1994			☛Indicator depends on local enforcement practices regarding NRM by law infractions ☛Not all CAMPFIRE communities have by bylaws in force ☛This indicator is closer to the SO1 level as it is defined, than to the IR level ☛It is a process measure
			1995			
			1996			
			1997			
			1998		TBD	
			1999			
			2000	TBD		
IR 2 0	Sound community decision making processes adopted # of institutionally developed Campfire communities / # of Campfire communities Expressed as % (see comments)	ZI (POMS)	1994			☛POMS system in development, a very complex instrument ☛POMS as a *project implementation* scaling methodology is problematic at best - it is unexplained and untested in a rigorous manner (e g , POMS uses ordinal scaled values and divides them ratio values) justifying its use as a results measure in the R I
			1995			
			1996			
			1997	3	3	
			1998	7	TBD	
			1999			
			2000	3 5		

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NRM II Results Name	Results Indicator	Data Sources	Year	Planned	Actual	Comments
IR 3 0	Rural land pressure reduced (Persons per sq Mile)	Central Statistics Office , Rural District Councils	1994			☛ CAMPFIRE cannot be posited as a cause of population density Indicator is limited to being a descriptor of the CAMPFIRE community Does not fit the strategy at either the IR or SO level It is (possibly) a mediating factor
			1995			
			1996			
			1997			
			1998			
			1999			
			2000	TBD		

Source March 1998 USAID R4 Draft

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APPENDIX M

DETAILED PRESENTATION OF CAMPFIRE HUNT DATABASE

Table 1 Summary of quotas, # reported hunted, US$ Fee paid to RDC, mean trophy value and standard deviations, and % of hunted animals reported for selected species hunted in Zimbabwe 1994-1996 based on hunter reports supplied to WWF and incorporated into their HUNT Database

NATIONAL SUMMARY															
			1994					1995					1996		
SPECIES - SEX	*QUOTA*	*# REPORTED*	*US$ FEE*	*TROPHY MEAN*	*TROPHY SD*	*QUOTA*	*# REPORTED*	*US$ FEE*	*TROPHY MEAN*	*TROPHY SD*	*QUOTA*	*# REPORTED*	*US$ FEE*	*TROPHY MEAN*	*TROPHY SD*
ELEPHANT MALE	142	76	382,345	1=30 3	23	156	102	430,354	1=26 19	21	159	71	1,140,660	1=22 76	21 6
ELEPHANT FEMALE	146	9	n=89	2=1 11	4 2	185	25	n=148	2=1 65	5	88	28	n=102	2=1 48	4 75
% REPORTED		**29.5%**					**37 2%**					**40 1%**			
BUFFALO MALE	409	200	158,852	18 74	23	407	337	301,834	26 29	26	418	205	226,843	33 09	13 7
BUFFALO FEMALE	137	47	n=248			139	71	n=412			126	52	n=264		
% REPORTED		**45 2%**					**74 7%**					**47 2%**			
LION MALE	63	14	19,350	2 71	5 6	57	16	24,510	6 79	7	51	8	22,750	6 02	7 13
LION FEMALE	32	3	n=17			35	2	n=19			22	3	n=13		
% REPORTED		**17 9%**					**19 6%**					**15 1%**			
LEOPARD MALE	120	29	61,450	1 78	3 9	130	37	99,023	3 93	6	134	33	105,606	5 94	4 02
LEOPARD FEMALE	0	6	n=46			0	20	n=67			8	7	n=45		
% REPORTED		**29 2%**					**43 8%**					**28 2%**			

Table 2 Summary of elephant hunting by district including population estimates, quotas, # reported hunted in the WWF hunt database, US $ Fee paid to RDC, and Zimbabwe $ Fee received by RDC

ELEPHANTS BY DISTRICT															
	1994					1995					1996				
DISTRICT *	POP'N ESTIMATE	QUOTA **	# REPORTED TAKEN	U S $ FEE	Z$ RDC REVENUE	POP'N ESTIMATE	QUOTA	# REPORTED TAKEN	U S $ FEE	Z$ RDC REVENUE	POP'N ESTIMATE	QUOTA	# REPORTED TAKEN	U S $ FEE	Z$ RDC REVENUE
BB	ø	3M	6M	16,000 n=2	ø	ø	5M	2M	16,000 n=2	ø	ø	3M	5M	41,500 n=5	19,415 n=4
BM	ø	1F, 4M	3M	37,000 n=4	308,050 n=4	400 [c]	1F, 4M	1F, 4M	9,500 n=2	257,000 n=2	ø	3F, 6M	3M	29,065† n=3	294,760 n=3
BN	572 [a]	27F, 17M	0	ø	ø	730 [a]	29F, 17M	1F, 15M	50,000 n=7	ø	519 [b]	17F, 17M	7F, 17M	137,000 n=20	ø
CP	ø	4M	0	ø	ø	ø	4M	1M	ø	ø	ø	4M	0	ø	ø
CR	5,241 [c] (1993)	17M	0	1,200 n=1	12,000 n=1	4,143 [e]	18M	13M	N/A	12,000 n=6	3,844 [d]	23M	8M	41,884 n=9	144,000 n=4
GN	668 [a]	4F, 7M	5F, 6M	4,500 n=4	N/A	591 [a]	17F, 9M	7F, 8M	20,200 n=5	ø	224 [b]	5F, 2M	2F, 2M	1,200 n=2	ø
GV	2,495 [c] (1993)	56F, 18M	4F, 20M	20,300 n=4	50,662 n=4	2,107 [c]	72F, 18M	9F, 12M	16,200 n=5	30,678 n=5	2,792 [b]	22F, 18M	12F, 14M	46,000 n=19	45,126 n=13
HU	799 [a]	12M	13M	ø	ø	1,031 [a]	13M	12M	ø	ø	682 [b]	13M	0	ø	ø
HW	36,027 [c]	3F, 8M	7M	28,000 n=4	193,050 n=4	27,189 [c]	3F, 12M	1F, 11M	ø	370,000 n=6	33,143 [d]	6F, 10M	5M	24,496† n=4	377,456 n=4
MB	ø	3M	4M	ø	68,000 n=2	ø	2M	4M	31,754 n=2	222,640 n=2	ø	2M	1M	ø	ø
MD	ø	2M	0	ø	ø	ø	2M	1M	4,125 n=2	45,000 n=2	ø	2M	2M	9,750 n=2	110,598 n=2
NM	2,324 [a] (1993)	1F, 23M	9M	18,800 n=4	ø	3,465 [a]	6F, 23M	6F, 19M	32,500 n=7	190,635 n=5	ø	10F, 23M	6F, 14M	74,500 n=14	273,702 n=14
TS	689 [c]	16M	8M	48,600 n=10	519,977 n=10	2,859 [c]	21M	0	ø	ø	0	21M	0	ø	ø

Data Sources a = Taylor and Mackie (1997), b = Mackie (1997), c = Price Waterhouse (1996), d = DNPWLM (1996a), DNPWLM (1996b)

District Codes BB = Beit Bridge, BM = Bulilima-Mangwe, BN = Binga, CP = Chipinge, CR = Chiredzi, GN = Gokwe North, GV = Guruve, HU = Hurungwe, HW = Hwange, MB = Muzarabani, MD = Mudzi, NM = Nyaminyami, TS = Tsholotsho

Ø = data not available, † = data re-calculated to US $ from WWF HUNT database which appeared to indicate Z$

NB: when 1994 population estimates were unavailable, 1993 values were used and noted. Estimates for CR include Gonarezhou aerial survey results, GV include data from Dande aerial surveys; HW includes estimates for Hwange NP and Matetsi SA

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APPENDIX N

POLICY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CAMPFIRE

1 Policy Logs from WWF Policy Monitoring (Bond 1998)
2 Appropriate Authority - Parks and Wild Life Act
3. Parks and Wild Life Act SI 26-2/1998
4. Excerpts from Natural Resources Act,
Communal Land Act, Forest Act, RDC Act
5. Example of RDC Natural Resources By-Laws

Appendix [redacted] Policy Logs

Wildlife Policy Log

Policy / Legislation	Date	Sponsor	Description and Potential Impact	Positive or Negative	Source
Parks and Wildlife Act	1975 (amended 1982, 1990)	Government	RDC become the appropriate authority for wildlife on their land	Positive	The Act
Amendment to Parks and Wildlife Act which allows district councils to be designated the appropriate authority for wildlife in the communal lands	1982	Government	Enabled district councils to be designated the appropriate authority for wildlife in the communal areas	Positive	Amendment to the Act
General Notice 369 of 1988	1988	Muzarabani District Council	Mavuradonha Wilderness Area proclaimed First protected area to be created in the communal lands without central government intervention	Positive	General Notice 369 of 1988 in Cunliffe (1992)
Guruve and Nyaminyami District Councils receive letters of Appropriate Authority from Minister of Environment and Tourism	1989	Minister of Environment and Tourism	Nyaminyami and Guruve become the first districts to control wildlife resources Start of the CAMPFIRE Programme	Positive	Petersen 1992
Protection of Wild life (Indemnity) Act	1989	Government	This protects persons against criminal liability in respect of acts done in good faith to suppress unlawful hunting of wildlife	Positive	The Act
DNPWLM issues CAMPFIRE Guidelines for the use and allocation of wildlife revenue by district councils	1991	DNPWLM	Guidelines recommended that at least 50% of gross wildlife income be devolved to producer communities, up to 35% be used for wildlife management and up to 15% for programme administration	Positive	Petersen

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Policy / Legislation	Date	Sponsor	Description and Potential Impact	Positive or Negative	Source
Twelve District Councils receive Appropriate Authority	1991	Government	Twelve districts empowered to manage their wildlife resources	Positive	Statutory instruments 12 and 63 of 1991
DNPWLM issue revised CAMPFIRE Guidelines	1992	DNPWLM	The guidelines increase the allocation of wildlife revenue to producer communities to at least 80%, with 15% being retained by RDC for management and the remaining 5% as a levy	Positive	Child (1996)
CAMPFIRE Association becomes lead agency and CCG agree to devolve Appropriate Authority to ward level	Sept 1992	CAMPFIRE Association	CAMPFIRE programme lead and represented by a producer association Recognition that further devolution of appropriate authority necessary to provide necessary enabling environment	Positive	Hunyani Hills Workshop Report (1992)
Mr W Chiwewe informs Gokwe North RDC that wildlife revenues are to be used throughout the district	June 1994	Mr W Chiwewe Permanent Secretary MLGRUD	This statement implies the non-acceptance of the MLGRUD of the CAMPFIRE Principles which are based on the producer community principle	Negative	Gokwe North RDC Special full Council meeting on 13/6/94
Twelve more rural district councils receive appropriate authority Total = 24	1994	Government	Further twelve districts empowered to manage their wildlife resources Total number of districts with Appropriate Authority for wildlife 24	Positive	SI 40/94
Contract for the funding of the Natural Resources Management Project signed	October 1994	USAID and GoZ	The agreement amends the 1990 amendment to the 1989 agreement This agreement provides fund (CDF) for development of essential wildlife infrastructure by RDC's	Positive	Project Grant Agreement Amendment Number 2
CAMPFIRE Association adopts an 18 point resolution	1995	CAMPFIRE Association	The resolutions aim at diversifying from wildlife to other natural resources and the establishment of a fund for the environment	Positive	CA Annual General Meeting 1995

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DNPWLM indicates to Chipinge and Guruve RDCs that they will be required to lease Malipati and Dande SA at commercial rates	October 1996	DNPWLM	Malipati and Dande Safari Areas were created out of communal land for benefit of communal land residents Policy decision indicative of a recentralisation of control by DNPWLM	Negative	Pers comm Guruve RDC
MET and MLGRUD issue joint statement indicating that RDC's should be considered the primary beneficiaries of the CAMPFIRE Programme	November 1996	MET and MLGRUD	Further rejection of the producer community principle and the efforts of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group to decentralise appropriate authority to ward level	Negative	IUCN (1997)
MET and MLGRUD issue joint statement that RDCs "will not be forced into any one model of benefit distribution"	November 1996	MET and MLGRUD	Further rejection of the producer community principle and the efforts of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group to decentralise appropriate authority to ward level Potentially allows RDCs to retain significant proportion of wildlife revenue	Negative	IUCN (1997)
DNPWLM becomes a Statutory Fund	February 1997	DNPWLM	Potentially reduces DNPWLM involvement in wildlife management activities outside the protected areas	Negative	DNP&WLM
DNP&WLM requires RDCs to report all problem animals to provincial wardens first before dealing with them	1997	DNPWLM	Effective re centralisation of problem animal control, weakens the enabling conditions created by the decentralisation of appropriate authority	Negative	CAMPFIRE Association
DNP&WLM Public Notice requiring ISCF to submit intended offtake quotas for private land	October 1997	DNPWLM	This notice weakens the enabling conditions created by the decentralisation of appropriate authority	Negative	Sunday Mail 27 October 1997
MET indicates that other resources like forests and minerals will be included in the CAMPFIRE programme	1997	Ministry of Environment and Tourism	Indication that there is to be decentralisation of management of resources other than wildlife	Positive	MET
CAMPFIRE Association press statement indicates that the Association will not dictate to communities on the use of wildlife revenue	October 1997	CAMPFIRE Association	Indicative of the autonomy that the CAMPFIRE Association feels should be given to local communities	Positive	Herald 30 October 1997

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CAMPFIRE Association Board reaffirms that Appropriate Authority should be devolved to producer wards	December 1997	CAMPFIRE Association	Supports the 1992 CCG recognition that further devolution of appropriate authority necessary to provide necessary enabling environment	Positive	CAMPFIRE Association Strategic Plan 1997 - 2002

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Forest Policy Log

Policy / Legislation	Date	Sponsor	Description and Potential Impact	Positive or Negative	Source
Native Reserves Forest Produce Act	1928	Government	The Act sought to regulate the use of forest products in the communal areas rather than commercial areas, and was applied on the basis of land tenure	Negative	
Natural Resources Act (Chapter 20 13)	1941	Government	The Act gives the Natural resources Board powers to enforce measures on land users or occupiers, most of which are technical recommendation based on shaky empirical foundations	Negative	Bradley and McNamara, 1993
Forest Act (Chapter 19 05)	1949	Government	For the establishment of a commission for administration control and management of State forests	Positive	The Act
Forestry Commission established	1954	Government	The Commission was established for the management of demarcated forests		
Communal Land Forest Produce Act	1988	Government	The act regulates exploitation of and protects forest produce within communal land This was as well enacted on the basis of land tenure, thus having the same effect as the Native Reserves Forest Produce Act (1928) It also makes much current forest product management in communal areas illegal	Negative	Bradley and McNamara, 1993
Memorandum by Minister of Environment and Tourism	1990	Minister of Environment and Tourism	The memorandum sought Cabinet endorsement of Zimbabwe's National Forest Policy	Positive	
Forest Act (Chapter 19 05) amended	1996	Government	The Act allows for more innovative resource sharing opportunities to be developed on forest land	Positive	Bradley and McNamara

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Land Policy Log

Policy / Legislation	Date	Sponsor	Description and Potential Impact	Positive or Negative	Source
Land Apportionment Act	1930	Government	Racial separation of land into Black and White areas	Negative	The Act
Native Land Husbandry Act	1951	Government	Change of traditional tenure to Western style, and enforcement of destocking and soil conservation Developed negative attitude towards conservation because of enforcement	Negative	The Act
Native Land Husbandry Act Scrapped	1961	Government	The Act was scrapped after resistance	Positive	
Tribal Trust land Act	1965	Government	Traditional tenure restored, tribal land authorities created operating under District Commissioners	Positive	The Act
Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 137)	1979	Government	This Act resulted in the establishment of the Agricultural Land Settlement Board, and empowers the Minister to acquire land for settlement schemes	Positive	The Act
Communal Land Act	1982	Government	Changed Tribal Trust Lands into Communal Areas, changing authority from traditional leaders to District Councils This is tantamount to central control	Negative	Land Tenure Commission Report
Statement of Policy and Directive by Prime Minister	1984	Prime Minister Mugabe (then)	Creation of VIDCOs and WARDCOs through which District Councils execute their functions Although this seemed like devolving authority to lower levels, it was a consolidation of the Land Tenure Act which took away the powers of traditional leaders	Negative	Land Tenure Commission Report
Land use and conservation by laws	1985	Government	The by laws empowered district councils to make plans that specify the maximum number of livestock grazing an area, and measures to be taken for the conservation of wildlife in any grazing area Land use plans are made without consultation with the local people, which is tantamount to centralised decison making	Negative	SI 166/1985

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Land Acquisition Act	1985	Government	The Act gave government the first right to purchase large scale farms for resettlement	Positive	Land Tenure Commission Report
Rural District Councils Act	1988	Government	Authorized the formation of a unified system of local government	Positive	The Act
Government announces land reform policy (after the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution)	1990	Government	The reform had the following key policy issues *land designation for resettlement *land price *land taxation and farm size control *monitoring of land use productivity *land ownership control *state sector development	Positive	
Land Acquisition Act	1992	Government	the Act empowers the president and other authorities to acquire land and other immovable property compulsorily	Negative	The Act
The President appoints Land Tenure Commission	1993	President Mugabe	The Commission was appointed to inquire the appropriate land tenure systems	Positive	Land tenure commission Report
Land Tenure Commission Report	1994	Land Tenure Commission	Commission recommends proposed legislative and administrative reforms on land tenure, with focus towards encouraging local level autonomy and security in the communal areas	Positive	Land tenure commission Report
Policy / Legislation	**Date**	**Sponsor**	**Description and Potential Impact**	**Positive or Negative**	**Source**

3cv

Department of Lands established within the Ministry of Agriculture	1997	Ministry of Agriculture	?	Positive	Ministry of Agriculture
President Mugabe announces that government will not compensate Large Scale Commercial farmers for land designated for resettlement	1997	President Mugabe	?	Negative	Press News

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less in either case the amount of any compensation which may have been paid to the owner by or on behalf of the person convicted

(3) Sections 348 and 349 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [*Chapter 9 07*] shall apply *mutatis mutandis* in relation to the amount specified in an order made in terms of subsection (1) as if such amount were a fine referred to in those sections and any amount so recovered shall be paid to the owner of the animal concerned

Provided that the owner shall give security *de restituendo* in case the judgment of the court which made the order is reversed on appeal or review

(4) Where an order is made in terms of subsection (1) upon two or more persons the liability therefor shall be joint and several unless the court in its order apportions the amount which each such person shall be required to pay

106 Forfeiture and cancellation of authority in terms of this Act

(1) Where any person is convicted of—

(*a*) a contravention of paragraph (*b*) of subsection (1) of section *fifteen* paragraph (*a*) of subsection (1) of section *twenty four* or subsection (1) of section *thirty six* or

(*b*) an offence in terms of this Act involving hunting or fishing and such hunting or fishing took place at night

the court—

(i) shall unless good cause to the contrary is shown order that any weapon explosive fishing net or dazzling light and

(ii) may order that any tent vehicle aircraft or boat used for the purpose of or in connection with the commission of the offence shall be forfeited to the State

(2) Where any person is convicted of an offence in terms of this Act involving hunting or fishing and the offence is not an offence mentioned in paragraph (*a*) or (*b*) of subsection (1) the court may order that any weapon explosive fishing net tent vehicle aircraft or boat used for the purpose of or in connection with the commission of the offence shall be forfeited to the State

(3) Where any person is convicted of an offence in terms of this Act the court may order that any animal other than a specially protected animal or the meat or trophy of any such animal or any fish in respect of which the offence was committed shall be forfeited to the appropriate authority for the land on which or the appropriate authority for the waters in which as the case may be the offence was committed

(4) Anything ordered to be forfeited to the State in terms of subsection (1) (2) or (3) shall be deemed to be a State trophy

(5) The conviction of a person who has any authority in terms of this Act of an offence in terms of this Act shall if he is sentenced therefor to pay a fine of two hundred dollars or more or to imprisonment for a period of three months or more and whether or not such imprisonment is suspended or is in alternative to a fine have the effect of cancelling any such authority with effect from the date of such conviction unless in a particular case the Minister otherwise directs

PART XVI

INSPECTORS OFFICERS EMPLOYEES AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES

107 Director of National Parks and Wild Life Management

(1) There shall be a Director of National Parks and Wild Life Management whose office shall be a public office and form part of the Public Service and who shall have the powers and perform the duties conferred upon him by this Act

(2) The Minister may delegate to the Director such of the powers conferred upon him in terms of this Act as he thinks fit

(3) All powers conferred upon the Director in terms of this Act or delegated to him by the Minister shall be exercised subject to the directions of the Minister

(4) The Director may with the consent of the Minister delegate to officers inspectors and employees such of the powers and duties conferred upon or delegated to him in terms of this Act as he thinks fit

(5) All powers and duties delegated to an officer inspector or employee by the Director shall be exercised subject to the directions of the Director

108 Appointment of appropriate authority

(1) The Minister may by notice in a statutory instrument appoint a rural district council to be the appropriate authority for such area of Communal Land as may be specified in such notice and may in like manner amend or revoke such notice

(2) Where by virtue of a notice made in terms of subsection (1) the appropriate authority for any area of Communal Land is changed any permit issued by the previous appropriate authority which was of force and effect immediately before the date of commencement of the notice shall remain in force and effect and be subject to amendment or cancellation as if it had been issued by the new appropriate authority

109 Officers, inspectors and employees

(1) The Minister may designate the persons or classes of persons employed in the Public Service who shall be officers inspectors or employees for the purpose of exercising the powers and performing the duties conferred and imposed upon officers inspectors and employees in terms of this Act

Provided that the Minister shall not designate persons employed in any Ministry the administration of which has not been assigned to him without the consent of the Minister to whom the administration of that Ministry has been assigned

(2) An officer inspector or employee shall be furnished with a certificate signed by or on behalf of the Minister which shall state that the holder has been designated as an officer inspector or employee for the purposes of this Act

(3) An officer inspector or employee exercising any power or performing any duty conferred or imposed upon him in terms of this Act or about to do so shall on demand by any person concerned produce the certificate issued to him in terms of subsection (2)

(4) The Minister may delegate to officers inspectors and employees such of the powers conferred upon him in terms of this Act as he thinks fit

(5) All powers and duties conferred upon officers inspectors and employees in terms of this Act or delegated to

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Parks and Wild Life (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1998 (No 2)

IT is hereby notified that the Minister Mines, Environment and Tourism in terms of section 129 of the Parks and Wild Life Act [*Chapter 20 14*], has made the following regulations —

1 These regulations may be cited as the Parks and Wild Life (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1998 (No 2)

2 Section 52 of the Parks and Wild Life (General) Regulations 1990 published in Statutory Instrument 362 of 1990 (hereinafter called the principal regulations ') is amended—

(a) by the repeal of the definition of breeder' and the substitution of the following—

" breeder means any person who keeps or produces wild life or fish for the purpose of selling any wild life or fish or any trophy therefrom '

(b) in the definition of dust" by the insertion after 'such ivory" of "which weighs less than thirty grams"

(c) in the definition of ' trophy dealer' by the repeal of paragraph (a) and the substitution of—

(a) process carves embellishes or stuffs and mounts a trophy so that it has a life like appearances or otherwise manufactures any trophy for sale or reward, or",

(d) by the insertion of the following definition—

'taxidermist' means a person who processes prepares stuffs and mounts a trophy so that it has a life like appearance '

3 The principal regulations are amended by the insertion after section 58 of the following section—

58A Every person who, for reward or otherwise intends to conduct any other person who is not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe on a photographic or viewing safari in a Parks and Wild Life Estate shall, before the commencement of the proposed safari send to the Director a written notice in duplicate setting out the following information—

(a) full names and address of the person who is to conduct the safari, and

(b) the type of safari to be conducted and

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(c) the number of persons to be taken on the safari and

(d) the park in which the safari is to be conducted and

(e) the type of vessel or vehicle to be used on the safari and

(f) the currency in which any amount payable is to be paid

(2) On receipt of a notice sent to him in terms of subsection (1) and the appropriate fee the Director shall in writing authorize the photographic or viewing safari concerned unless he is satisfied on reasonable grounds that—

(a) any information contained in the notice is untrue or

(b) a contravention of any law is likely to take place if the safari takes place or

(c) the area in the Parks and Wild Life Estate in respect of which the application is made is unsuitable for the conduct of the safari

(3) The Director may attach such reasonable conditions as he thinks fit to any authority given by him in terms of subsection (2), and any such conditions shall be endorsed in writing on the authority concerned

(4) No person shall for reward or otherwise conduct any other person who is not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe on a photographic or viewing safari in a Parks and Wild Life Estate unless—

(a) at the commencement of the safari he is in possession of the written authority given by the Director in terms of subsection (2) in respect of the safari concerned and

(b) he complies with any conditions which the Director may have attached to the written authority, and

(c) holds in addition to holding a professional hunter's licence a learner professional hunter's licence or a professional guide's licence a tour operator's licence or is a director employee or agent of a holder of a tour operator's licence issued in terms of the Tourism Act [*Chapter 14 20*], and

(d) in the case where an open vehicle is used it is solidly constructed up to the shoulder level of seated passengers and is fitted with protective bars and

(e) the vehicle to be used on the safari is the subject of an operator's licence issued in terms of the Road Motor Transportation Act [*Chapter 13 10*],

(5) Subsection 4 shall not apply in relation to an officer honorary officer or employee while he is carrying out his duties as such

(6) Subsection 4 shall come into operation two months after the date of commencement of the Parks and Wild Life (General) (Amendment) Regulations, 1998 (No 2)

Provided that if during that two month period any person referred to in subsection (1) applies for a tour operator's licence under the Tourism Act [*Chapter 14 20*] he shall be deemed for the purpose of this section to be the holder of such a licence until his application is granted or refused "

4 Section 59 of the principal regulations is amended—

(a) in subsection (1) by the insertion after paragraph (f) of the following paragraphs—

'(g) the full names and address of the hunter who is to conduct the safari and his licence number and

(h) the duration of the hunt and the types of animals to be hunted '

(b) by the insertion of the following subsection—

(4b) No person shall permit any person who is not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe to hunt on any land for which he is the appropriate authority any animals other than those entered on the authority to hunt set out in the Fourteenth Schedule

5 Section 60 of the principal regulations is amended—

(a) in subsection (1) in paragraph (b) by the insertion after form or 'and a copy of the authority to hunt ,

(b) by the insertion after subsection (3) of the following subsection—

"(4) Any person who is the appropriate authority for any land, who hunts or causes or permits any person to hunt on his land shall submit annually—

(a) a sport hunting registration form as specified in Part I of the Fifteenth Schedule and

(b) a hunting return form specified in Part II of the Fifteenth Schedule

6 Section 61 of the principal regulations is amended by the deletion of ' reptiles or amphibia" and the substitution of wild life or fish

7 Section 63 of the principal regulations is amended in the proviso by the deletion of 'reptiles and amphibia ' and the substitution of wild life or fish

8 Section 64 of the principal regulations is amended by the repeal of subsections (1) and (2) and the substitution of—

"(1) A breeder of wild life or fish shall keep a register in which he shall cause to be recorded by species—

(a) the number of eggs acquired the place from which they were acquired and the number of eggs successfully hatched and

(b) the number of live wild life or fish acquired and the place from which they were acquired, and

(c) the number of wild life or fish disposed of, by age size or class, and the method of disposal

9 Section 65 of the principal regulations is amended by the deletion of reptiles or amphibia ' and the substitution of wild life or fish

10 Section 66 of the principal regulations is amended by the insertion after paragraph (e) of the following paragraph—

(f) no person shall carry on the business of taxidermy processing or otherwise manufacturing a trophy unless he is authorized to do so by a trophy dealer s licence, issued in terms of section 67 "

11 Section 67 of the principal regulations is amended in subsection (2) in paragraph (b) in subparagraph (ii) by the insertion after 'trophy dealer" of "a taxidermist "

12 Section 77 of the principal regulations is amended by the insertion after subsection (4) of the following subsections—

(5) For the purpose of verifying any records or registers kept in terms of this section, the Minister may at any time when he considers it necessary to do so by notice in the *Gazette* require any person within a period of not more than thirty days from the date of publication of the notice to produce to an officer any raw ivory or horn in his possession and the certificate of ownership for re registration

(6) In the event of a re-registration in terms of subsection (5) the officer shall issue a new certificate of ownership in respect of such ivory or horn and any certificate of ownership issued prior to the re-registration exercise in respect of any raw ivory or horn shall after the period of re-registration be void."

13 Section 81 of the principal regulations is amended by the repeal of subsection (1) and the subsection of—

"(1) Upon the sale or transfer of any registered raw ivory, the person disposing of it and the person receiving it shall present themselves before an officer who shall immediately endorse upon the certificate of ownership the name and address of the person to whom the sale or transfer has been effected and shall sign and stamp such endorsement '

14 Section 97 of the principal regulations is amended by the repeal of subsection (2) and the subsection of—

"(2) The Director may, in terms of subsection (1), fix—

(a) different appropriate fees to be paid by persons resident in Zimbabwe and persons not so resident

(b) different levels of appropriate fees

(c) different appropriate fees for breeding different species of wild life or fish '

circulating in its area and shall give verbal or written notice of the time and place of such meeting to every such holder of land whose address is known to such committee

(5) The notice referred to in subsection (4) shall set out the proposed amount of the unit of the tax to be imposed

(6) At any meeting convened in terms of subsection (4) those members of the conservation committee who are holders of land referred to in that subsection shall be entitled to vote on any resolution at such meeting

(7) Every such tax shall be imposed, assessed and graduated in accordance with the Schedule, and shall become due and payable upon a date fixed by the conservation committee

(8) If any tax imposed under this section remains unpaid after three months from the date fixed by the conservation committee for the payment thereof, interest upon such tax may, in the discretion of the conservation committee be charged and recovered by such committee at the rate fixed in terms of section *forty-one*, reckoned from the date upon which such period of three months expires, with a minimum charge of one month's interest.

44 Position upon division of intensive conservation area

(1) Whenever an intensive conservation area is divided into two or more intensive conservation areas in consequence of the exercise by the Minister of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph (*f*) of subsection (2) of section *thirty-five* or whenever any portion of an intensive conservation area is severed and declared to be a separate intensive conservation area or is joined to another intensive conservation area in consequence of the exercise by the Minister of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph (*e*) of subsection (2) the assets and liabilities of the conservation committee appointed for the intensive conservation area which is divided or from which the portion is severed as the case may be shall be apportioned among the conservation committees concerned in such manner and in such proportions as may be mutually agreed upon by such committees or failing such agreement, as may be determined by the Board

(2) Whenever two or more intensive conservation areas are joined in consequence of the exercise by the Minister of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph (*d*) of subsection (2) of section *thirty-five*, the conservation committees appointed for such areas shall be deemed to be dissolved and all the assets and liabilities of such committees shall be transferred to and vest in the committee appointed in their place

(3) Whenever the declaration of an area as an intensive conservation area is cancelled in consequence of the exercise by the Minister of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph (*g*) of subsection (2) of section *thirty-five*, the conservation committee appointed for such area shall be dissolved and all moneys or other assets or property or things whatsoever and all books, accounts or other documents belonging to such committee shall be vested in such person as may be appointed for that purpose by the Minister (hereinafter called the liquidator) and the liquidator shall liquidate all valid claims against the committee out of the moneys or other assets of the committee

(4) If the moneys or other assets referred to in subsection (3) prove to be—

(*a*) less than the amount required to liquidate all valid claims which may be brought against the committee, the liquidator may in order to make good the deficiency, levy a rate assessed in such manner as may be approved by the Board upon all holders of land within the committee's area, and such rate shall become due on such date as may be determined by the liquidator and may be recovered by him by proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction

(*b*) in excess of the amount required to liquidate all valid claims which may be brought against the committee the liquidator shall dispose of such surplus in such manner as the Board may direct.

PART VI

CONSERVATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN COMMUNAL LAND

45 Provisions for Communal Land

The provisions of this Part shall apply to Communal Land

46 Protection of despoiled or deteriorated areas

(1) Where in any Communal Land any land has become despoiled or is deteriorating through over-grazing or other misuse the Board may with the approval of the Minister responsible for the administration of the Communal Land Act [*Chapter 20 04*] direct that the whole or part of such land be reserved against human occupation or cultivation, the depasturing of stock or the cutting down or destruction of trees and other vegetation

(2) No reservation shall take place in terms of subsection (1) unless and until the Minister responsible for the administration of the Communal Land Act [*Chapter 20 04*] is satisfied that suitable provision has been made elsewhere for the inhabitants who would be affected by the reservation and such reservation shall be withdrawn when, in the opinion of the Board, its objects have been sufficiently accomplished

(3) Land reserved in terms of this section shall be clearly demarcated and may, with a view to more effective regeneration be fenced on the recommendation of the Board and the cost of such fencing shall be paid from moneys appropriated for the purpose by Act of Parliament.

(4) Any person committing an act in conflict with a reservation made in terms of subsection (1) or interfering with any demarcation or fencing carried out in terms of subsection (3) shall be guilty of an offence

47 Destocking and limitation of stock

(1) Whenever the President is satisfied, on the report of the Board or of the Minister responsible for local government, that the natural resources in any Communal Land are being injured or are deteriorating through over-stocking by domestic animals, he may authorize the reduction of the number of such animals and prescribe the maximum number and class of such animals as may be depastured on a fixed unit of land

(2) The Minister responsible for local government, before submitting any report to the President in terms of subsection (1), shall first submit such report to the Board for its report thereon

(3) Destocking and limitation of stock in terms of this section shall be carried out in accordance with regulations

48 Setting aside areas for protection of natural resources

(1) The President may, on the recommendation of the Board and with the approval of the Minister responsible for the administration of the Communal Land Act [*Chapter 20 04*] set aside areas in any Communal Land for the

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conservation or improvement of natural resources or for the protection of irrigation works or sources of water supplies

(2) No area shall be set aside in terms of subsection (1) unless and until the Minister responsible for the administration of the Communal Land Act [*Chapter 20 04*] is satisfied that suitable provision has been made elsewhere for the inhabitants who would be affected by the setting aside of such area.

49 Obligation to maintain conservation works

Where soil conservation works have been carried out for the common benefit of the inhabitants living in Communal Land, any such inhabitant enjoying the facilities furnished thereby who fails to maintain such portions of the works as afford direct protection to the land set aside for his use in a manner reasonably sufficient to ensure such protection shall be guilty of an offence

50 Powers of Minister in respect of Communal Land preserved

Nothing in this Act contained shall derogate from the powers in respect of natural resources conferred by the Communal Land Forest Produce Act [*Chapter 19 04*] on the Minister to whom the administration of that Act has been assigned or the Secretary of the Ministry for which the Minister is responsible, or by the Rural District Councils Act [*Chapter 29 13*] on rural district councils The advice and co-operation of the Board shall be available to the person or council exercising such powers

PART VII

CONSTRUCTION OF WORKS IN COMMUNAL LAND FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

51 Interpretation in Part VII

In this Part—

"expenditure' means the expenditure incurred by the Minister in respect of the wages and feeding of persons employed in the construction of works but does not include the amount of any such expenditure which the Board certifies as being payable by any person in terms of any order made under section *twenty-seven*,

"works' means any works constructed or to be constructed in any Communal Land in terms of this Part.

52 Minister may construct works in Communal Land

(1) The Minister may on the recommendation of the Board, construct in Communal Land any works which he may deem necessary or desirable for the conservation of the natural resources, including the control of water tables and the disposal of irrigation drainage water of land outside such Communal Land or within such Communal Land

(2) The cost of the construction of such works shall, in the first instance, be paid from moneys appropriated for the purpose by Act of Parliament.

(3) Section *twenty-seven* shall apply *mutatis mutandis*, in respect of the apportionment and recovery of the cost of such works

Provided that no order for the payment of costs shall be made under that section against an inhabitant.

53 Imposition of levy on inhabitants

(1) For the purpose of recovering the expenditure on any works, such Minister as the President may by notice in a statutory instrument, designate, may, after consultation with the local authority from time to time impose a levy on such of the inhabitants as in his opinion, may benefit from the construction of the works

(2) The Minister may for good cause shown remit the whole or any part of the levy imposed upon any inhabitants

(3) The proceeds of the levy shall be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund

54 Recovery of levy

The amount of any levy imposed on any inhabitant shall be a debt due to the State and shall be recoverable by action in any court of competent jurisdiction

55 Penalty for non-payment of levy

(1) Any inhabitant who fails to pay the amount of any levy imposed on him upon the demand of a local authority or any person authorized by the local authority to demand such amount shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding twenty dollars or, in default of payment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days

(2) In addition to any penalty which it may inflict, the court convicting such inhabitant may, upon application by the prosecutor, give summary judgment for the amount of any levy due and unpaid by such inhabitant, and such judgment shall have the same force and effect and be executed in the same manner as if it had been given in a civil action duly instituted before a competent court.

56 Evidence

In any civil or criminal proceedings under this Act, a certificate alleging—

(*a*) the amount of the levy due and payable by the defendant or the accused, as the case may be, and

(*b*) that the defendant or accused failed to pay such levy on demand by a person named in the certificate

shall, if issued by the local authority, be admissible in evidence in any court on production by any person and shall suffice as proof of any facts falling within the scope of paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) unless sufficiently rebutted by other evidence or unless it is proved that it was not duly issued by the local authority

PART VIII

GENERAL

57 Conservation councils

(1) The President may, by proclamation in a statutory instrument, for the area defined in such proclamation appoint a council, to be called a conservation council and the council shall be representative of the special interests of the said area.

(2) A conservation council shall confer with and advise the Board in regard to the conservation and improvement of natural resources within the area for which it is appointed

58 Appointment of inspectors and conservation or other officers

(1) For the purposes of this Act—

(*a*) the Minister may appoint such inspectors and other officers as he may consider necessary, and

(*b*) the Minister responsible for agriculture may appoint such conservation officers as he may consider necessary

(2) An inspector appointed in terms of subsection (1) shall either on his own initiative or at the request of the Board, report to the Board on such matters as appear relevant to the objects and purposes of this Act and shall

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CHAPTER 20 04

COMMUNAL LAND ACT

Act 20/1982 8/1985 21/1985 5/1988 15/1989 (s 3) 3/1992

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

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PRELIMINARY

Section

1 Short title
2 Interpretation

PART II

COMMUNAL LAND

3 Extent of Communal Land
4 Vesting of Communal Land
5 Description of Communal Land
6 Additions to and subtractions from Communal Land

PART III

OCCUPATION AND USE OF COMMUNAL LAND

7 Restriction on right to occupy or use Communal Land
8 Occupation and use of Communal Land for agricultural or residential purposes
9 Permits to occupy and use Communal Land
10 Setting aside of Communal Land for certain purposes
11 Servitudes relating to water rights over Communal Land

PART IV

GENERAL

12 Compensation
13 By-laws of rural district councils
14 Model by-laws
15 Regulations
16 Penalties and orders of ejectment
17 Savings

AN ACT *to provide for the classification of land in Zimbabwe as Communal Land and for the alteration of such classification to alter and regulate the occupation and use of Communal Land and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing.*

[Date of commencement: 1st February, 1982.]

PART I

PRELIMINARY

1 Short title

This Act may be cited as the Communal Land Act [Chapter 20 04].

2 Interpretation

In this Act—

"**Communal Land**" means land referred to as Communal Land in section *three*;

"**inhabitant**", in relation to any Communal Land or part thereof, means a person who is entitled, in terms of this Act, to reside in that Communal Land or part thereof;

"**Minister**" means the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development or any other Minister to whom the President may, from time to time, assign the administration of this Act;

"**use**", in relation to Communal Land, includes the erection of any building or enclosure, ploughing, hoeing, the cutting of vegetation, the depasturing of animals or the taking of sand, stone or other materials therefrom.

PART II

COMMUNAL LAND

3 Extent of Communal Land

Communal Land shall consist of land which immediately before the 1st February, 1982, was Tribal Trust Land in terms of the Tribal Trust Land Act, 1979 (No. 6 of 1979), subject to any additions thereto or subtractions therefrom made in terms of section six.

4 Vesting of Communal Land

Communal Land shall be vested in the President, who shall permit it to be occupied and used in accordance with this Act.

5 Description of Communal Land

(1) The Minister shall, by statutory instrument, publish a description of the area of Communal Land.

(2) The Minister may, from time to time, by statutory instrument, amend any instrument published in terms of subsection (1), or any replacement of such instrument, in order—

(*a*) more clearly to describe the area of Communal Land; or

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(b) to change the name or other designation of any Communal Land or

(c) to correct any error in the description of any Communal Land

(3) If the instrument referred to in subsection (1) has been amended in terms of subsection (2) or in terms of subsection (2) of section six, the Minister may, by statutory instrument, repeal and replace such instrument with a further instrument describing the area of Communal Land as at the date of such replacement and may thereafter, from time to time, likewise repeal and replace any instrument published in terms of this subsection.

(4) No statutory instrument published in terms of this section shall have the effect of transferring any land to or from Communal Land.

6 Additions to and subtractions from Communal Land

(1) Subject to this Act, the Forest Act [*Chapter 19:05*] and the Parks and Wild Life Act [*Chapter 20:14*], the President may, by statutory instrument—

(a) declare that any State Land shall form part of Communal Land;

(b) after consultation with any rural district council established for the area concerned, declare that any land within Communal Land shall cease to form part of Communal land.

(2) Whenever the President has published a declaration in terms of subsection (1), the Minister shall, by statutory instrument, amend the instrument published in terms of subsection (1) or (2) of section five, as the case may be, to reflect such declaration.

(3) Whenever any land ceases to form part of Communal Land in terms of a declaration published in terms of subsection (1), such land shall thereupon become State land until it is granted, sold or otherwise disposed of in terms of this Act or any other law.

PART III

OCCUPATION AND USE OF COMMUNAL LAND

7 Restriction on right to occupy or use Communal Land

Subject to sections *six* and *eleven*, no person shall occupy or use any portion of Communal Land—

(a) except in the exercise of any previously acquired right subsisting on the 1st February, 1982; or

(b) except in accordance with the terms and conditions of any right, consent or permit granted or issued, as the case may be, in terms of this Act or any other enactment; or

(c) unless he or she is a spouse, dependent, relative, guest or employee of a person who occupies or uses Communal Land in terms of paragraph (a) or (b).

8 Occupation and use of Communal Land for agricultural or residential purposes

(1) Subject to this Act and the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act [*Chapter 29:12*] and any order issued in terms thereof, a person may occupy and use Communal Land for agricultural or residential purposes with the consent of the rural district council established for the area concerned.

(2) Subject to subsection (3) and the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act [*Chapter 29:12*] and any order issued in terms thereof, when granting consent in terms of subsection (1), a rural district council shall—

(a) where appropriate, have regard to customary law relating to the allocation, occupation and use of land in the area concerned; and

(b) grant consent only to persons who, according to the customary law of the community that has traditionally and continuously occupied and used land in the area concerned, are regarded as forming part of such community, or who, according to such customary law, may be permitted to occupy and use such land:

Provided that, if no community has traditionally and continuously occupied and used land in the area concerned, the district council shall grant consent only to such class of persons as the Minister, by notice in writing to the district council, may specify.

(3) Officers and employees of a rural district council may, with the consent of the council, occupy and use Communal Land within the council area for the purposes of their employment, notwithstanding that they could not, by virtue of paragraph (b) of subsection (2), be permitted to occupy and use such land.

(4) Any person who is aggrieved by a refusal by a rural district council to grant consent in terms of subsection (1) may appeal to the President within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed by regulation.

(5) In any appeal in terms of subsection (4), the President may confirm, vary, set aside or reverse the refusal appealed against or make such other order in the matter as he thinks just.

(6) Where a rural district council is established for any area of Communal Land or any area of Communal Land is incorporated within the area of a rural district council, any person lawfully occupying or using land in such area for agricultural or residential purposes on the date of such establishment or incorporation, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have obtained the consent of such rural district council for the purposes of subsection (1).

9 Permits to occupy and use Communal Land

(1) A rural district council may, with the approval of the Minister, issue a permit authorizing any person or class of persons to occupy and use, subject to the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act [*Chapter 29:12*] and any order issued in terms thereof, any portion of Communal Land within the area of such rural district council, where such occupation or use is for any of the following purposes—

(a) administrative purposes of the State or a local or like authority;

(b) religious or educational purposes in the interests of inhabitants of the area concerned;

(c) hospitals, clinics or other such establishments for the benefit of inhabitants of the area concerned;

(d) hotels, shops or other business premises;

(e) any other purpose whatsoever which, in the opinion of the rural district council, is in the interests of inhabitants of the area concerned.

(2) A rural district council may, with the approval of the Minister—

(a) impose such conditions upon the issue of a permit in terms of subsection (1) as may be specified in the permit; and

(b) at any time, by notice in writing to the person to whom the permit was issued, cancel or vary a permit issued in terms of subsection (1) or any of the conditions subject to which it was issued.

(3) Any person who is aggrieved by—

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(a) a refusal by a rural district council to issue a permit in terms of subsection (1) or to vary any permit or any condition thereof in terms of subsection (2) or

(b) the cancellation or variation of a permit or any condition thereof in terms of subsection (2)

may appeal to the Minister within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed by regulation.

(4) In any appeal in terms of subsection (3) the Minister may confirm, vary, set aside or reverse the refusal, cancellation or variation appealed against or make such other order in the matter as he thinks just.

10 Setting aside of Communal Land for certain purposes

(1) Subject to this section, the Minister shall set aside land contained within Communal Land for the establishment of—

(a) a township, village, business centre or industrial area, where such land is—

(i) designated for any such purpose in terms of a rural development plan approved by him and the Minister responsible for lands after consultation with the Director of Physical Planning and any rural district council established for the area concerned; or

(ii) the subject of a layout approved in terms of section 43 of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act [*Chapter 29:12*]

or

(b) an irrigation scheme, where such land is designated for such purpose in terms of a rural development plan approved by him and the Minister responsible for lands after consultation with the Natural Resources Board established in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20:13*] and any rural district council established for the area concerned.

(2) Subject to this section, after consultation with any rural district council established for the area concerned, the Minister may set aside any land contained within Communal Land, other than land referred to in subsection (1), for any purpose whatsoever, including a purpose referred to in subsection (1), which he considers is in the interests of inhabitants of the area concerned or in the public interest or which he considers will promote the development of Communal Land generally or of the area concerned.

(3) Before any land is set aside in terms of subsection (1) or (2), the Minister shall publish a statutory instrument—

(a) describing the land concerned; and

(b) specifying the purpose for which the land concerned is to be set aside; and

(c) specifying the date with effect from which the land concerned will be set aside; and

(d) ordering all persons, or such class of persons as the Minister may specify in the notice, who are occupying or using the land concerned otherwise than by virtue of a right held in terms of the Mines and Minerals Act [*Chapter 21:05*], to depart permanently with all their property from the land concerned within such reasonable period as the Minister shall specify in the notice

and the Minister shall ensure that such steps are taken as appear to him sufficient to disseminate the terms of the notice within the area of the land concerned.

(4) Where any land is set aside in terms of subsection (1) or (2), the Minister may in regulations made in terms of section *fifteen* provide for—

(a) charges and deposits to be made for any services, amenities or facilities provided by the State within or for any such land, whether or not any such service is used or not;

(b) supplementary charges in respect of immovable property within any such land, to cover the expenses incurred by the State in the maintenance and administration of such land;

(c) delegating to any rural district council within whose area the land is situated responsibility for collecting any rents, charges, deposits or supplementary charges on behalf of the State;

(d) generally, the terms and conditions subject to which any person may lease, occupy or use any such land.

(5) Regulations providing for charges, deposits or supplementary charges in terms of subsection (4)—

(a) may provide that the charges and supplementary charges shall be included in rents or charged separately; and

(b) may divide the persons who are liable to pay the charges, deposits or supplementary charges into classes and fix different amounts for different classes; and

(c) may vary any charges and deposits according to the use to which the premises concerned are put; and

(d) shall base every such supplementary charge upon a unit of land and additionally or alternatively a unit of residential or business accommodation, as the case may be, determined by the Minister and may vary such supplementary charge according to any or all of the following—

(i) the type of tenure under which the property is held;

(ii) the value of the property, whether based upon the value of the land or the improvements or both;

(iii) the area of the property, being either that of the land or of the improvements;

(iv) the use to which the property is put.

(6) Any land set aside in terms of subsection (1) or (2) shall remain part of Communal Land unless the President in terms of subsection (1) of section *[illegible]* declares that it shall cease to form part of Communal Land.

11 Servitudes relating to water rights over Communal Land

Where any person has applied to the Administrative Court in terms of the Water Act [*Chapter 20:24*] for—

(a) a servitude of storage as defined in section 87 of that Act, and the exercise of such servitude would cause the inundation of any area of Communal Land, the Administrative Court may grant such servitude and, if necessary, any servitude of abutment, purification or passage as defined in section 78 of that Act; or

(b) a servitude of passage as defined in section 78 of that Act for the passage of water over any area of Communal Land, the Administrative Court may grant such servitude

if the Minister, after consultation with any rural district council established for the area concerned, has consented to the grant of such servitude or servitudes, as the case may be, and any conditions fixed by him in giving his consent are made binding on the person to whom the servitude has been or the servitudes have been, as the case may be, granted.

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(*e*) abolishing any demarcated forest

(3) No land shall be declared to be demarcated forest unless it is—

(*a*) State land or

(*b*) trust land and the trustees thereof have consented thereto

(4) Any notice made in terms of paragraph (*a*) (*b*) or (*c*) of subsection (2) shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after it has been published and if a resolution is passed within the next twenty-eight days on which Parliament has sat next after the notice is laid before it requesting the President to rescind or vary the notice it shall forthwith be rescinded or varied, as the case may be, by further statutory instrument but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder

(5) No notice may be made in terms of paragraph (*d*) or (*e*) of subsection (2) unless the proposal to make such notice has been approved by Parliament

36 Minister may amend Third Schedule

(1) The Minister may by notice in a statutory instrument, amend the Third Schedule in order to—

(*a*) more clearly describe such land, or

(*b*) correct any error in the description of or statement of extent of such land

(2) The Minister may by statutory instrument, amend Part III of the Third Schedule in order to add any land which is acquired by the Commission or delete any land which is no longer owned by the Commission

(3) No notice made in terms of this section shall have the effect of transferring any land to or from the Forest Estate

37 Owner of private land may apply for protection of forest

(1) The owner of any private land who has placed or intends to place such land or any portion of such land under a system of forest management approved by the Commission may make application to the Minister for a declaration that such land or such portion of such land shall be protected under this Act.

(2) Upon receipt of an application in terms of subsection (1) the Minister shall require the Commission—

(*a*) to submit a report on the area to which the application relates and to cause a sketch plan to be produced together with a written description, approved by the Surveyor-General of the boundaries of such area

(*b*) to cause a certified copy of such report, together with a copy of the plan attached thereto, to be deposited in the office of the local authority for the area and of the mining commissioner in whose district the area is situate Such report and plan shall be available at such office during office hours for inspection by members of the public, free of charge,

(*c*) to cause—

(i) in the case of an indigenous forest, three months' notice, or

(ii) in the case of a plantation, whether already established at the date of the application or to be established thereafter, one month s notice

of the intention to declare such area to be protected under this Act to be published on three consecutive occasions in the *Gazette* and in a newspaper circulating in the district in which the area is situate and to call upon any person who has any objection to the proposed declaration to lodge his objection in writing with the Minister within three months or one month as the case may be of the last publication of the notice in terms of this paragraph

(3) The Minister after consideration of the application and objections if any may if he is satisfied that the public interest will not be prejudiced thereby, by statutory instrument, declare that the area of private land described in such notice shall be protected under this Act.

(4) The Minister may at any time revoke any declaration issued in terms of this section if he is satisfied that the private land to which it relates is no longer under a system of forest management approved by the Commission or if the owner so requests

38 Reservation of trees or forest produce

The Minister may in respect of any State forest, by statutory instrument, declare any species of tree or any forest produce to be specially reserved and may in like manner revoke or amend any such declaration

39 Protection of forest or trees from cutting

(1) Whenever, in respect of any land not being a State forest, the President deems it expedient in the public interest that any tree or the whole or any part of a forest or plantation shall be protected, the President may, by proclamation, declare such tree or such forest, part of a forest or plantation to be protected

(2) The owner of any forest, plantation or tree in respect of which the President has exercised his power under subsection (1) shall be entitled to compensation for any loss resulting therefrom in such sum as may be mutually agreed upon or failing agreement, as may be determined by arbitration

40 Expropriation of land for forest and certain other purposes

Whenever in the opinion of the President, any area of land is required for the production of forest produce either by the conservation and management of forest produce existing on such land or by means of plantations the President may expropriate such land on payment to the owner of the land of such sum as may be mutually agreed upon or, failing agreement, as may be fixed by arbitration

Provided that the power of expropriation conferred by this section may only be exercised if the Natural Resources Board recommends the expropriation

41 Certain acts prohibited

Unless authorized in terms of subsection (3) or (4) of section *forty-four* no person shall—

(*a*) cut, fell, injure or destroy any forest produce in, or remove any forest produce from any demarcated forest or protected private forest or

(*b*) fell remove or injure any tree or forest produce which is reserved in terms of section *thirty-eight* or

(*c*) cut, injure or destroy any tree protected or any tree in any forest or plantation or part of any forest or plantation protected in terms of section *thirty-nine* except with the written consent of the Minister and subject to such conditions as he may determine

42 Acts excepted from section 41

Nothing in section *forty-one* shall be deemed to prohibit—

(*a*) the owner of a protected private forest from exercising full rights of ownership in regard to such protected private forest,

(*b*) any act done with the permission or under the direction of the Commission,

(*c*) any act done in accordance with regulations

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(7) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the law relating to the Public Service no officer in the Public Service shall be seconded to the Commission except for an indefinite period

(8) The First Schedule shall apply to any employee of the Commission who is not on secondment from the Public Service

28 Pension contributions to be deducted

Any contributions for pension purposes which are payable to the Consolidated Revenue Fund in terms of this Act by an employee of the Commission, whether on secondment from the Public Service or otherwise shall be deducted from the emoluments of the employee concerned and forwarded by the Commission to the State

29 Commission to contribute to Consolidated Revenue Fund

There shall be paid monthly out of the funds of the Commission to the Consolidated Revenue Fund such amount as may be determined by the Minister responsible for finance after consultation with the Commission in respect of the contributions for pension purposes paid to the Consolidated Revenue Fund by employees of the Commission

30 Disability benefits

(1) Any enactment providing for the payment of compensation in respect of the injury or death of officers or employees of the Public Service shall apply *mutatis mutandis* in relation to contributors as though they were officers or employees of the Public Service

(2) The Minister responsible for finance may recover from the Commission any compensation paid to a contributor or his dependants in terms of subsection (1)

(3) A contributor shall not be regarded as a workman for the purposes of the National Social Security Authority Act [*Chapter 17 04*]

(4) In this section—

contributor' means an employee of the Commission who is paying contributions to the Consolidated Revenue Fund in terms of this Act, whether he is on secondment from the Public Service or otherwise

31 Suspension, reduction or forfeiture of pension or gratuity

If any employee or former employee of the Commission who becomes entitled to a pension or gratuity or is in receipt of a pension under this Act—

(*a*) is found by a board appointed by the President for the purpose to have made improper use of or to have disclosed in an improper manner any information which he may have obtained in the course of his employment, or

(*b*) is found by a competent court to have been guilty of misappropriation of property of the Commission which would, if it had been discovered before he became entitled to a pension or gratuity, have rendered him liable to discharge or dismissal or

(*c*) is found to have made a false statement for the purpose of obtaining a pension or gratuity or commutation of pension, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, or

(*d*) refuses to comply with a reasonable request made by the Commission to afford all assistance and information in his power relating to any appointment formerly held or class of duty formerly carried out by him or

(*e*) solicits or, without the consent of the Commission, accepts directly or indirectly, any gift of a pecuniary value after retirement in connection with his service,

the President may order that any right to any pension or gratuity to which that person has become entitled or the pension of which he is in receipt shall be suspended, reduced or forfeited

32 Deduction from pension, gratuity, refund of contributions or other benefit

(1) The Minister responsible for finance may authorize the deduction from any pension, gratuity, refund of contributions commutation of pension or other benefit payable under this Act to an employee of the Commission who has been discharged or dismissed for misconduct of an amount equal to any direct loss which the Commission has sustained by reason of the conduct of the employee on account of which the employee was discharged or dismissed from the service of the Commission

(2) The Minister may authorize the deduction from any pension gratuity, refund of contributions or other benefit to which a person or his estate is entitled under this Act of a liquidated amount which that person is liable to pay to the Commission

(3) To facilitate the recovery of an amount due under this section the Minister may order the commutation in accordance with any enactment relating to the commutation of pensions payable to members of the Public Service of all or part of the pensions payable to the member notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act

PART III

FOREST ESTATE AND FOREST LAND

33 Forest Estate

(1) The Forest Estate shall consist of—

(*a*) forest land

(*b*) demarcated forest on Rhodes Estates

(*c*) land owned by the Commission specified in Part III of the Third Schedule

(2) The Forest Estate shall be used for the purposes specified in this Act.

34 Forest land

(1) Forest land shall consist of State land which is declared to be a demarcated forest.

(2) The total extent of forest land shall not be reduced by more than one *per centum* of the total extent of forest land on the appointed day

PART IV

DEMARCATED FORESTS NATURE RESERVES PRIVATE PROTECTED FORESTS RESERVED AND PROTECTED TREES

35 Demarcated forest

(1) Each of the areas described in Parts I and II of the Third Schedule is hereby declared to be a demarcated forest which shall be known by the name specified in the Third Schedule

(2) Subject to this Act, the President may, on the recommendation of the Commission, by notice in a statutory instrument, amend the Third Schedule for the purpose of—

(*a*) declaring a new demarcated forest and specifying the name thereof,

(*b*) changing the name of any demarcated forest,

(*c*) adding any area to a demarcated forest,

(*d*) subtracting any area from a demarcated forest,

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(*e*) the district head of each Ministry and department of a Ministry within the district that the Minister may designate by notice in writing to the district administrator and

(*f*) such further persons representing other organizations and interests as the Minister on the recommendation of the district administrator may permit

(2) If there is no officer who is the senior officer or district head of any force, department or Ministry referred to in paragraph (*d*) or (*e*) of subsection (1) or if there is doubt as to which officer is the senior officer or district head as the case may be the Commander of the force or the head of the department or the Secretary of the Ministry as the case may be shall at the request of the district administrator concerned designate an officer in his force department or Ministry to be the senior officer or district head of the force department or Ministry in the district concerned

(3) The persons appointed as members of a rural district development committee in terms of paragraph (*f*) of subsection (1) shall hold office at the pleasure of the Minister

(4) The district administrator shall preside at all meetings of a rural district development committee at which he is present and in his absence the members present shall elect a district head of a Ministry or department referred to in paragraph (*e*) of subsection (1) to preside at the meeting

(5) The functions of a rural district development committee shall be—

(*a*) to consider ward development plans submitted to it in terms of section *fifty nine* and

(*b*) to make recommendations to the council as to matters to be included in the annual development and other long-term plans for the district within which the council area is situated and

(*c*) to prepare the annual district development plan for approval by the council and assist in the preparation of other long-term plans for the council area and

(*d*) when instructed to do so by the council to investigate the implementation of the annual development and other long term plans for the council area and

(*e*) to exercise such other functions in relation to the annual development and other long term plans for the district as may be assigned to it from time to time by the council

(6) A district development plan referred to in paragraph (*c*) of subsection (5) shall be prepared and presented to the council before the 31st May in every year

(7) Subject to subsection (9) the district administrator shall fix the times and places of all meetings of a rural district development committee and subsection (11) shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the convening of such meetings

(8) A majority of the members referred to in subsection (1) shall form a quorum at any meeting of a rural district development committee

(9) The chairman of the council may at any time direct that a joint meeting be held between the council and its rural district development committee for the purpose of considering and approving the district development plan referred to in paragraph (*c*) of subsection (5)

(10) A joint meeting referred to in subsection (9) shall be held at such place and time as the council chairman may direct, and he shall be the chairman of any such joint meeting

(11) At least twenty-one days before a joint meeting referred to in subsection (9), the chief executive officer of the council shall send a notice stating the date time and place of the joint meeting and the business to be transacted thereat to each member of the council and the rural district development committee and shall display the notice at the places at which and in the manner in which notices of the council are normally displayed or in such other place and manner as may be prescribed in regulations

(12) At any joint meeting referred to in subsection (9) every councillor and member of the rural district development committee who is present shall be entitled to one vote on every question before the meeting

Provided that only councillors may vote on the final approval of an annual district development plan referred to in paragraph (*c*) of subsection (5)

61 Natural resources conservation committee and subcommittees

(1) Upon the recommendation of the Minister responsible for the administration of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] the Minister may by statutory instrument declare that, with effect from a specified date—

(*a*) a council area or any part thereof shall be an intensive conservation area for the purposes of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] and

(*b*) the council shall be the natural resources conservation committee for such intensive conservation area

(2) Upon a council becoming a natural resources conservation committee in terms of subsection (1)—

(*a*) sections 34 to 37 of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] shall not apply to the council

(*b*) any existing intensive conservation area wholly included within the council area shall be deemed to have been dissolved in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] and the conservation committee for such former intensive conservation area shall subject to subsection (5) be deemed to have been appointed in terms of subsection (3) as a natural resources conservation subcommittee of the council for the area of such former intensive conservation area

(*c*) where a portion of an existing intensive conservation area falls within the council area, that portion shall be deemed to have been severed from that intensive conservation area in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] and joined to the intensive conservation area formed by the council area

(3) For the better carrying out of its functions as a natural resources conservation committee a council may with the approval of the Natural Resources Board established in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*], and shall if directed to do so by the Minister—

(*a*) appoint one or more natural resources conservation subcommittees to exercise functions relating to natural resources within one or more wards of the council area and

(*b*) delegate to any such natural resources conservation subcommittee all or any of its functions as a natural resources conservation committee in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*]

(4) A natural resources conservation subcommittee appointed in terms of subsection (3) shall consist of—

(*a*) a chairman who shall be the councillor for the ward or one of the councillors for the wards as the case may be, for which the committee is established and

(*b*) such other persons as are appointed or elected in terms of regulations made by the Minister with the consent of the Minister responsible for the

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administration of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*]

(5) Within a year after a declaration in terms of subsection (1) or within such longer period as the Minister may permit, the council shall ensure that the boundaries of the area for which a natural resources conservation subcommittee is deemed to have been appointed in terms of paragraph (*b*) of subsection (2) are altered so that they coincide with the boundaries of one or more wards of the council area

(6) The assets and liabilities of the conservation committee for any intensive conservation area of which a portion is included within the intensive conservation area of a council shall be apportioned between the committee and the council in such manner and in such proportion as may be mutually agreed upon by the committee and the council or failing such agreement, as may be determined by the Natural Resources Board established in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*]

(7) The assets and the proceeds from the sale realization or other disposal of the assets which a council has acquired in terms of subsection (6) shall be applied only to the purposes in respect of which powers have been conferred upon a conservation committee in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] or to such purposes as may be prescribed

(8) The Minister may by a statutory instrument—

(*a*) upon the recommendation of the Minister responsible for the administration of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] declare that, with effect from a specified date any part of a council area which is an intensive conservation area shall cease to be part of the intensive conservation area and

(*b*) make any consequential amendments he considers necessary to any notice previously made in a statutory instrument in terms of subsection (1) in respect of the intensive conservation area concerned

(9) Where the Minister has made a declaration in terms of subsection (8), he may after consultation with the Minister responsible for the administration of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] and the council concerned give directions as to any matter or thing arising from such declaration including the apportionment of assets liabilities between the council and any conservation committee formed or to be formed in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] for the whole or part of the area which is excluded from the intensive conservation area in terms of that declaration

(10) Whenever a council meets as a natural resources conservation committee such meeting may be attended by a member of the Natural Resources Board established in terms of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 20 13*] or by any person authorized by the Natural Resources Board for that purpose

62 Other committees of council

(1) Subject to this Act, a council may appoint such committees whether of a general special or local nature as it may think fit, and may delegate to any such committee subject to such terms and conditions as the council may think fit, any power that may be exercised by the council

Provided that—

(i) the council shall appoint a committee whenever directed to do so by the Minister and shall delegate to the committee such functions as the Minister may direct,

(ii) the council shall not delegate to any committee—

(*a*) power to impose levies rates special rates rents or charges to borrow money to expropriate property or to make by-laws or

(*b*) unless the Minister has authorized such delegation any power specified in paragraph 1 of the First Schedule

(2) Subject to this Part, a council may continue alter or discontinue a committee appointed in terms of subsection (1)

Provided that a council shall not alter or discontinue a committee referred to in proviso (i) to subsection (1) without the consent of the Minister

(3) Every committee referred to in subsection (1) shall consist of—

(*a*) two or more councillors appointed to the committee by the council

(*b*) such persons other than councillors who are enrolled on any voters roll for a ward of the council area as the council may in consultation with the committee co-opt to be members of the committee

Provided that the number of co-opted members shall not exceed the number of councillors

(4) A person co opted to be a member of a committee in terms of paragraph (*b*) of subsection (3)—

(*a*) shall hold office for such period and subject to such conditions as the council may fix and

(*b*) shall not be eligible for appointment as the chairman of the committee and

(*c*) shall be subject to section *forty eight* which shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to such member

63 General provisions applicable to all committees

(1) In this section—

committee includes a natural resources conservation sub-committee

(2) The chairman of the council shall be an *ex officio* member of every committee appointed or established by a council under this Act, but unless he has been specifically appointed or elected to a committee he shall not be entitled to vote or be elected as chairman of the committee

(3) All powers vested in a committee in terms of this Act may be exercised at any duly convened meeting thereof at which no fewer than one-half of the whole number of members and, in any case no fewer than two members are present

Provided that the presence of the chairman of the council solely in his capacity as an *ex officio* member of the committee shall be disregarded for the purposes of this subsection

(4) Subject to sections *fifty-nine sixty* and *sixty-one* every committee—

(*a*) shall elect a chairman and

(*b*) may elect a vice-chairman,

from among its members who are councillors

(5) If at any meeting of a committee—

(*a*) the chairman of the committee is absent, the vice chairman shall act as chairman

(*b*) both the chairman and vice-chairman of the committee are absent or the chairman is absent and no vice-chairman has been elected the committee shall elect one of its members who is a councillor or, if there is no such councillor present, one of its other members to act as chairman at that meeting

(6) Any question before a meeting of a committee shall be determined by resolution passed by a majority of the

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(8) A council shall advise every tenderer in writing whether or not his tender has been accepted

80 Income-generating projects

(1) With the written approval of the Minister and subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose a council may engage in any commercial industrial agricultural or other activity for the purpose of raising revenue for the council

(2) The Minister, after consultation with the council concerned, may revoke any approval given in terms of subsection (1) or amend any term or condition of such approval and, where he has done so may give the council such directions as he considers necessary in regard to the disposal of any assets or undertakings acquired or used by the council in carrying on the activity concerned

(3) A council shall comply with any directions given by the Minister in terms of subsection (2)

81 Establishment of co-operatives

(1) Subject to any other enactment, with the written approval of the Minister and subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose, a council may—

(a) establish and foster co-operatives to carry on any commercial industrial, agricultural or other activity, and

(b) advance moneys and give other assistance to any co-operative

(2) The Minister after consultation with the council concerned may give a council such directions as he considers necessary in regard to the carrying on of any activity by a co-operative referred to in subsection (1) or as to the winding up of any such co-operative

(3) A council shall comply with any directions given by the Minister in terms of subsection (2)

82 Co-operation with local authorities and persons

(1) Subject to this section, a council may by agreement co-operate with the State or with any council local authority or other person for the better or more economic carrying out either by any of the contracting parties or by the use of joint facilities of any matter which the council may by law perform and in which the contracting parties are mutually interested

(2) The terms and conditions of any agreement referred to in subsection (2) shall be embodied in a deed of agreement to be entered into and subscribed to by the contracting parties and shall, *inter alia*, as far as may be necessary or expedient, provide for—

(*a*) the date upon which the agreement shall come into force, the period for which it shall endure and the terms and conditions on which—

(i) any of the parties thereto may withdraw therefrom, and

(ii) the State or another local authority or other person may become a party thereto, and

(iii) the agreement may, during its currency, be terminated,

and

(*b*) the money, material, land, buildings or other property or things to be provided by each of the contracting parties, and the payment, if any, to be made therefor, and

(*c*) the charges, if any, to be borne by, and the revenue or profit, if any, payable to each of the contracting parties, and

(*d*) the apportionment between the contracting parties of the revenues profits assets losses and liabilities arising out of the operation of the agreement and

(*e*) the raising of loans subject to the approval of the Minister either jointly or separately by the contracting parties and the determination of their liability under and generally the terms and conditions of any such loan and

(*f*) the management, control and execution of any matter forming the subject of the agreement and

(g) the rights powers privileges and duties of each contracting party and

(*h*) the amount of and the manner of fixing and collecting the charges if any to be paid in regard to any matter forming the subject of the agreement and

(*i*) the making of regulations subject to any law, including this Act, conferring the power thereof, in regard to any matter forming the subject of the agreement, and

(*j*) the delegation by the contracting parties of any matter forming the subject of the agreement to one of their number or to a joint committee appointed by them

(3) Where the Minister considers that the co-operation of any council with the State or with any other council, local authority or person for any purpose which they may by law perform would be of public or local advantage, he may make an order for the drawing up of an agreement for the purposes specified therein and any such agreement shall subject to subsection (4) be framed in accordance with subsection (2)

(4) Where any council local authority or person objects to the exercise of the Minister s powers under subsection (3) the Minister shall appoint investigators in terms of section *one hundred and fifty-four* to hold an investigation into the objections and to report to him thereon and provisions of that section shall apply accordingly

(5) On receiving the report in terms of subsection (4) the Minister may make such order as he thinks fit

(6) If the Minister has ordered a council in terms of subsection (5) to draw up an agreement such as is referred to in subsection (2) or (3) and the council fails or refuses to do so within such period as the Minister may direct, the Minister may enter into such an agreement on behalf of the council, and such agreement shall be binding on the council and the other party or parties thereto if it had been entered into by the council

(7) If the agreement concerned so provides, a joint committee referred to in paragraph (*j*) of subsection (2) shall be a body corporate capable of suing and being sued in its own name and having such powers as may be conferred upon it by the agreement concerned

83 Joint committees by agreement

(1) Subject to this section any council may, on such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the parties concerned, combine with any other council or local authority for any purpose which the parties may by law perform and in which they are jointly interested, including without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the purpose of conducting and managing their business and the employment of their officers and employees

(2) Any agreement in terms of subsection (1) may, *inter alia*, provide for any or all of the following—

(*a*) the appointment of a joint committee of the councils and local authorities concerned consisting of such number of councillors or members as is specified in

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Example of RDC NRM By-Laws

Statutory Instrument 67 of 1996

[ACT 8/88

Bulilimamangwe Rural District Council (Communal and Resettlement Land) (Land Use and Conservation) By-laws 1996

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

Section

1 Title
2 Application
3 Interpretation
4 Preparation and adoption of a plan
5 Amendment of a plan
6 Contents of a plan
7 Sieghs
8 Protection of natural resources
9 Fencing and conservation works
10 Evidence
11 Offences and penalties

IT is hereby notified that the Minister of Local Government Rural and Urban Development has in terms of subsection (4) of section 90 of the Rural District Councils Act 1988 approved the following by-laws made by the Bulilimamangwe Rural District Council —

Title

1 These by-laws may be cited as the Bulilimamangwe Rural District Council (Communal and Resettlement Land) (Land Use and Conservation) By-laws 1996

Application

2 These by-laws shall apply to communal and resettlement land within the Bulilimamangwe Rural District Council area

Interpretation

3 In these by-laws—

"conservation works" means works undertaken by a conservation committee in terms of section 152 of the Natural Resources Act [*Chapter 150*]

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"council" means the Bulilimamangwe Rural District Council

"council area ' means the area for which the council has been established

"livestock' means cattle donkeys, sheep and goats

"owner ' means—

(a) in the case of livestock the person who normally has custody or control thereof

(b) in the case of cultivated land any person who has the right to the produce of the land including the spouse of such person and children over the age of eighteen years

"plan" means a diagram or illustration depicting or describing any area of land within communal or resettlement land areas set aside for exclusive use by inhabitants for residential grazing and cultivation purposes

provincial administrator' means the provincial administrator for the province within which the communal and resettlement land concerned falls

"provincial agritex officer ' means the provincial agritex officer in the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for the province in which the communal or resettlement land falls or any person in his office designated by him in writing to perform his functions

"provincial planning officer" means the provincial agritex officer in the Department of Physical Planning of the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development responsible for the province in which the communal or resettlement land falls or any person in his office designated by him in writing to perform his functions

"provincial warden means the provincial warden of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management who is responsible for the province in which the communal or resettlement land falls or any person in his office designated by him in writing to perform his functions

'regional officer' means the regional officer in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism responsible for the region in which the communal or resettlement land falls or any person in his office designated by him in writing to to perform his functions

Preparation and adoption of a plan

4 (1) The council may prepare a plan for—

(a) all communal or resettlement land within the council area or

(b) any ward or combination of wards in communal or resettlement land within the council area or

(c) any part of a ward or wards in communal and resettlement land within the council area

(2) If requested to do so by the village development committee or a headman the council shall prepare a plan for the area for which the village development committee or headman concerned is responsible

(3) Where a council intends to prepare a plan in terms of subsection (1) it shall cause the inhabitants of the area for which the plan is intended to be notified in such manner as it considers appropriate of its intention to prepare a plan and shall—

(a) make available for inspection by any of the inhabitants a draft proposal of the area plan and

(b) call upon any inhabitant who has any objection to the proposed plan to lodge his objection with the council within thirty days of the date of notification of the proposal

(4) In preparing any plan the council shall—

(a) seek the advice of—

(i) the provincial planning officer and

(ii) the provincial agritex officer and

(iii) the regional officer and

(iv) the provincial warden

and

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(b) take into account any objections received in terms of subsection (3)

(5) If in preparing any plan, the council does not act in accordance with the advice given by any of the officers referred to in subsection (4) it shall advise the provincial administrator in writing, of this fact and the reasons therefor

(6) Once a plan has been prepared and approved by the council by resolution a copy thereof shall be forwarded to the provincial administrator together with the substance of any—

(a) objections lodged in terms of subsection (3)

(b) advice tendered in terms of subsection (4)

(7) The provincial administrator may within thirty days of the date a plan is forwarded to him in terms of subsection (6)—

(a) inform the council in writing of his approval of the plan, or

(b) inform the council in writing of his approval of the plan subject to any amendments he may propose

(8) Where the provincial administrator makes proposals for the amendment of a plan the council may—

(a) proceed in terms of subsections (3) and (4) of this section or

(b) if it is not satisfied with the decision of the provincial administrator appeal to the Minister, within thirty days of the notification of the decision The Minister shall make a decision on the matter after calling for representations from all the parties concerned including if necessary the inhabitants of the area for which the plan is intended The decision of the Minister on the matter shall be final

(9) In describing areas in a plan an area may be described by reference of the summits of hills streams rivers roads fences buildings communal boundaries prominent rocks or trees or any other thing which is readily identifiable by, or is well known to the inhabitants of the area

(10) A copy of an adopted and approved plan shall be available for inspection free of charge during normal working hours at the council offices and such other places as the council considers to be convenient and one copy shall be sent to each village development committee affected by the plan.

Amendment of plan

5. The provisions of subsections (3) to (8) of section 4 shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to any proposals to amend a plan.

Contents of a plan

6. (1) In respect of any area set aside in the plan for grazing the council may in the plan, specify—

(a) the maximum number of livestock which may be grazed in any grazing area;

(b) which owner or owners may graze livestock in a grazing area;

(c) the maximum number of livestock or the maximum number of different types of livestock which each owner may graze in a grazing area;

(d) the grazing within which inhabitants are to cease other activities within a grazing area;

(e) the period within which any inhabitant is to reduce the number of livestock to the level he is permitted to graze in any grazing area in terms of paragraph (c);

(f) the period within which any inhabitant is to cease grazing livestock within any area where such inhabitant is not permitted to graze livestock in terms of paragraph (d);

(g) measures appropriate for the conservation and proper use of any wildlife in the grazing area;

(h) the division of grazing land into paddocking for seasonal and rotational grazing;

(i) the sustainable utilization of thatch grass in the grazing area, and

(j) the marking of arable land by fencing.

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(2) In respect of any area set aside in a plan for cultivation the council may in the plan specify—

(a) which inhabitants may cultivate in any cultivation area

(b) the means or implements which may be used to cultivate in any cultivation area

(c) the type of crops which may be grown and their rotation

(d) the responsibility for removing noxious weeds

(e) contour ridging schemes and other land protection and conservation measures

(f) areas set aside as wood lots and

(g) the date on which cultivation shall cease until certain land protection and conservation measures have been implemented

Sleighs

7 No person shall own, possess—use or have in his custody or control a sleigh

Protection of natural resources and vegetation

8 (1) The council may make orders controlling all or any of the following matters—

(a) the cutting of trees

(b) the harvesting of mopani worms

(c) the collection of firewood

(d) the cutting of timber,

(e) the harvesting of thatch grass

(f) the picking of indigenous plants

(g) the hunting and removal of wildlife and

(h) the removal of ostrich eggs

within the communal or resettlement areas

(2) An order made in terms of subsection (1) may be addressed to a particular person orally or in writing or may be of general application throughout the communal or resettlement areas within the council area

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(3) An order which is intended to be general application throughout the communal or resettlement areas shall—

(a) be recorded in a book kept for that purpose and

(b) specify the date upon which it is to come into operation and

(c) specify and describe the area affected and

(d) be read out at a public meeting of the council called for that purpose and

(e) be signed dated and certified by the person who read it in terms of paragraph (c) as having been read out in terms of that paragraph

(4) For the purposes of paragraph (c) of subsection (3), the provisions of subsection (9) of section 4 shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the description of the area referred to in that paragraph.

(5) An order—

(a) addressed to an individual shall come into operation immediately

(b) having general effect shall come into operation one week after the order is read out in terms of paragraph (d) of subsection (3)

(6) The book in which orders are recorded in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (3) shall be available for inspection at the council offices by any inhabitant of the affected area during normal working hours

(7) An order made in terms of this section may be amended or revoked by the council

Fencing and conservation works

9 Any person who—

(a) damages destroys or removes any fence within a communal or resettlement area or on the boundary of a communal or resettlement area or

(b) damages or destroys any conservation works in any area to which these regulations apply

shall be guilty of an offence.

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Evidence

10 (1) If any livestock is found grazing in an area other than a grazing area the owner shall be presumed to have allowed the stock to so graze

Provided that it shall be a sufficient defence if the owner proves that he took all reasonable precautions to ensure that the stock do not graze outside the grazing area

(2) The holder of a dipping card upon which is recorded the number of cattle which he dips shall be deemed to have the custody or control of the number of cattle recorded upon his dipping card until the contrary is proved

(3) No plan or part thereof shall be deemed to be invalid because it is not possible to determine the exact situation on the ground of the boundary of any grazing or cultivation area

Provided that no person shall be convicted of an offence in terms of paragraphs (a) (b) (c) or (f) of subsection (1) of section 11 unless it can be shown that the land in respect of which the charge arose falls clearly within or outside the area concerned

(4) The book in which orders are recorded in terms of subsection (3) of section 8 shall be admissible in court and shall constitute *prima facie* evidence of—

(a) any order recorded therein and

(b) the due observance of subsections (3) and (5) of section 8 in respect of any such order

Offences and penalties

11 (1) Any person whether an inhabitant or otherwise who within the area covered by a plan—

(a) grazes his livestock in any area other than a grazing area, or

(b) grazes his livestock in a grazing area when he is not permitted by the plan to do so, or

(c) exceeds the number of livestock he is permitted to graze or grazes livestock of the type prohibited by the plan or

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(d) fails to destock at the rate and within the period stipulated in the plan or

(e) fails to remove his livestock within the stipulated period in the plan or

(f) cultivates in an area other than a cultivation area or

(g) fails to carry out any land protection measures which have been assigned to him in a plan or

(h) contravenes any term condition or control measure in a plan or

(i) removes collects cuts harvests or hunts natural resources or vegetation within the council area without the authority of the council shall be guilty of an offence

(2) Any person who contravenes any provision of these by-laws or any order made in terms of section 8 shall be guilty of an offence

(3) Any person who is convicted of three or more offences under subsection (1) may have his rights under the plan revoked by the Council

(4) Any person who is guilty of an offence in terms of these by-laws shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months or both of such fine and such imprisonment

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