
RESULTS REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST (R4) FY 2001
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE
FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (REDSO/ESA)

**(Includes Programs for REDSO/ESA, Greater Horn of Africa
Initiative (GHAI), Somalia and Sudan**

May 1999



The attached results information is from the FY 2001 Results Review and Resource Request (R4) for East and Southern Africa (ESA) was assembled and analyzed jointly by REDSO/ESA. The R4 is a "pre-decisional" USAID document and does not reflect results stemming from formal USAID reviews. Additional information on the attached can be obtained from William R. Garland or Loise H. Mukira, Program Office, REDSO/ESA. Related document information can be obtained from:

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE
FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (REDSO/ESA)

June 4, 1999

Ms. Vivian Lowery Derryck
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Vivian:

I am pleased to submit for Africa Bureau consideration REDSO/ESA's FY 2001 Results Review and Resources Request (R4). In an extraordinary and difficult year, REDSO maintained critical services to client missions and increased and strengthened regional partnerships (e.g., IGAD, COMESA, ASARECA and CRHCS). These were accomplished despite dedicating attention to post-bombing activities and management.

I. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES / SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The increased anti-U.S. terrorist activities have reached Africa, and along with our responses, have forever altered the security landscape in the ESA region. REDSO and USAID/Kenya will make two physical moves, the first to a more secure interim office building (IOB) later this year, then to a permanent new office building (NOB) in 2002 or 2003. The good news is we have identified a fully acceptable IOB and are on a fast track to re-locate by September 30, 1999 onto the grounds of the Inter-national Center for Insect Physiology and Entomology or ICIPE. This first move will put all USAID staff in a fully safe and secure environment. Nairobi is still the pre-eminent hub for East Africa for reasons such as centrality, airline connections, support infrastructure, other donors, and the like. The temporary ICIPE site, followed by the move to the permanent Gigiri USG campus near the United Nations, will allow REDSO/ESA to continue to play its important service and development roles in the region.

II. ISSUES FOR USAID/W

1. Unusual Resource Requests: Because of increased security requirements and the fact that the State Department (Diplomatic Security) has overall responsibility for the Nairobi Mission's office and residential guard contract, REDSO/ESA may require up to an additional \$430,000 in FY 2000 if State/DS does not cover the considerable additional costs built into the present contract (a contract to which USAID was not a party). This is the subject of ongoing negotiations between USAID and State, however we are giving AFR advance warning that this could result in a major OE shortfall (for details see OE Workforce narrative and tables). Communications equipment (VSATs, wireless modems, etc.) required for REDSO's move to the interim office building should be covered under the existing security supplemental appropriation for Nairobi.

Regarding program funds in FY 1999, REDSO/ESA is requesting amounts equal to AFR/DP's program control levels for FY 99 and FY 00. However, because of staffing shortages -- especially in the all-critical procurement office, where no replacement candidates appear to be lined up in time for FY 99 obligations -- REDSO/ESA may be forced to request a rollover of \$1-2 million from FY 99 to FY 00. This will hinge on REDSO's grant and contract obligation "throughput" capacity. See detailed discussion in Part III Resource Request.

2. Setting Parameters: REDSO/ESA and AFR have worked together to establish parameters for our new strategy during this R4 reporting period in the light of likely resource allocation realities. We have re-looked at the number and types of strategic objectives and associated staffing and OE levels. These have also been placed through a management lens that looks at the appropriate blend of services to client missions vs. implementation of regional programs, including the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) and other Administration initiatives.

The recent parameters cable as well as the visit by AFR/EA's Philip-Michael Gary and DAA Keith Brown have brought clarity and closure to many issues. We are appreciative of the Bureau's efforts to better align our responsibilities with our staff resources. REDSO will move ahead with strategy development in the fall. The process will focus on the GHAI objectives of crisis prevention/mitigation/response, enhanced food security, and critical information for decision-makers, all within the context of African capacity building of partners, such as IGAD. Finally, we believe keeping a separate PHN SO and service capacity makes sense in the light of exceptional past performance, high regional need and high visibility with the Hill and PVO community. Submission timing is spring of 2000. In the interim, we ask that the Africa Bureau confirm, based on the model presented, resource levels pending completion of the refined strategy.

3. Key Personnel Shortages: REDSO/ESA -- like virtually every mission in the Africa region -- is experiencing critical gaps in key positions. Currently four of 21 USDH slots are unfilled. Our ability to deliver core services (e.g., procurement, legal, financial management, and Food-for-Peace) directly hinges upon the Agency's ability to provide replacements for upcoming USDH vacancies.

- **Contracting:** REDSO loses three of its four contracting officers this summer (including the most critical Supervisory CO), but no foreign service USDH replacement candidates have been identified or assigned. We are working with M/OP to replace at least one contracting officer with a GS crossover candidate.
- **Financial Management:** With the loss of the USAID/Kenya Controller slot, REDSO/ESA will be taking on significant additional work, doing with three USDH what five USDH carried out two years ago. The good news is FM has identified a definitive GS crossover candidate for REDSO's third financial management position, vacant for over a year, who will arrive in June 1999.
- **Legal:** Our already overworked Regional Legal Office -- a staff of two USDH -- will lose a seasoned RLA this summer, to be replaced with a new-hire on first overseas tour. TDY coverage has been arranged for the summer. During the DAA Brown and GC McAllister visits, we have recommended that an additional USDH RLA position would be in the best interests of the region in view of high service demand and legislative and legal complexity.
- **Food-for-Peace:** We will restore REDSO's third Food-for-Peace Officer position in light of the region's humanitarian assistance workload. This might involve a GS crossover as well.

In short, without timely filling of vacancies, REDSO will be constrained in delivering its core support services to the ESA region. We ask Africa Bureau management to continue to work with Agency senior managers, State Department, OMB, and Congress to resolve the broader USAID staffing crisis in key areas.

4. New Staff Requirements: REDSO/ESA understands the new staffing realities in the Agency. However, we cannot implement GHA activities without key staff resources. For example, over the past 18 months, REDSO has lost 4 USDH Project Development Officers without any replacements coming on board. Without the ability to design and implement regional activities, GHAI and other initiatives will suffer. Thus, we are asking approval for limited staffing, esp. in our Program-Projects Office. A staffing table with requested increased by category and funding source is attached to this memo.

5. Strategic Planning for Somalia, Sudan and Burundi: The ongoing and approved Integrated Strategic Plans (ISPs) for Somalia and Sudan run out this year. For Somalia, we will send in shortly a modest maintenance program for Africa review that will include a request an extension of the ISP for three years. For Sudan, we believe an extension of the current ISP is appropriate and ask Bureau guidance on how to proceed. In addition, Burundi seems to be gaining a higher profile on the USG and Agency screen. For this third non-presence country, we have already indicated to the Africa Bureau's Burundi assessment team REDSO's inability to take on any kind of field management and procurement tasks without additional staff.

REDSO/ESA Restructuring

Based on the parameters cable and consultations with AFR/EA, REDSO/ESA will re-structure itself to provide focused services and program implementation. Agreed upon Core Services to client missions are as follows:

- Financial Management
- Legal Services
- Procurement
- Food-for-Peace
- Environment (only USG requirements: Reg. 16 training, etc.)
- PHN services

All other technical services (e.g., PDO, economics, agriculture, and environment, DG/conflict) will be on an as-available basis pending completion of REDSO/ESA's own core food security, conflict, and regional information activities.

While the strategy process will better define and inform the choice of organization structure, we are looking at three principal groupings for synergies, management efficiencies and minimum unit size in the light of regional travel, the first two of which directly parallel GHAI strategic objectives. They are:

- **GHAI/Food Security**

Focus: IGAD capacity building, GHA food security, information and information systems for regional decision-makers (e.g., RIIS activity with IGAD and its member states).

Combines: GHAI Secretariat, Agriculture, Economic Growth, Environment, Global Information Infrastructure (GII) and Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP) Teams.

- **Conflict/Non-Presence Countries**

Focus: Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR), related DG issues and programs such as Sudan, residual Somalia monitoring and responses to crises that may arise in the GHA.

Combines: DG/Conflict, residual Burundi, Somalia, and Humanitarian and Transition Initiative Teams as well as Sudan.

Population/Health/Nutrition

Focus: Regional health care issues, HIV/AIDS, nutrition nexus with food security, and family planning.

Comprises: The current REDSO/ESA PHN team (11 members when fully staffed) will be the one hybrid unit that implements pieces of GHAI and regional PHN activities while continuing to provide a full range of services to client missions.

The key to making the above groupings effective will be a modest staff increase. Thus, we request an additional 10 positions, all program-funded, above our total REDSO/ESA currently approved Direct Workforce total of 108. Specifically, we are in dire need of a program-project development office with sufficient staff to provide the budget, reporting and design/implementation services required. With REDSO having lost 4 USDH Project Development Officers over the past 18 months, for example, we are asking approval to hire 1 US PSC PDO and 3 program-funded FSN Project Development Specialists.

With the small increase in staffing and continued dialogue on focusing REDSO/ESA's priorities in light of resources, we believe that client services, regional program results and African partner capacity will all be maintained and enhanced.

With best regards,

Donald R. Mackenzie
USAID Regional Director (REDSO/ESA)
Nairobi, Kenya

REDSO/ESA Revised Structure/Staffing

6/4/99

REDSO/ESA Operating Unit	OE-Funded			Program-Funded		OE	Program	Direct Workforce	Other *	Total Workforce	Allocation %
	USDH	USPSC	FSN	USPSC	FSN	Difference (+/-)					
Program Mgt.											14.1%
1 Director	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	4	
2 Program	2	1	6	1	4	2	4	14	-	14	
Core Services											49.2%
1 RLA	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	4	
2 RFMC	3	-	35	-	-	-2	-	38	-	38	
3 RCO	4	-	7	-	-	-	-	11	-	11	
4 FFP	3	-	2	-	-	-	-	5	-	5	
5 ENV	-	-	2	2	1	-	1	5	-	5	
Regional Prog.											36.7%
1 Food Security/Cross Sectoral											
> Coordination	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	3	
> Capacity Building	-	-	1	4	1	-	-	6	-	6	
> Food Security	2	-	2	3	4	-	1	11	2	13	
> Reg. IT	-	-	-	1	2	-	1	3	-	3	
2 Conflict/Non-Presence	1	-	2	5	3	-	3	11	1	12	
3 PHN	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	4	6	10	
Staffing Totals =	21	2	62	17	16	0	10	118	10	128	100%

Staffing Summary

REDSO/ESA Direct Workforce Base (FY 1998)	103
Transfer from USAID/Somalia (98 STATE 164967)	4
Addition for Sudan STAR Program (1 USPSC)	1
Total REDSO/ESA Approved Direct Workforce	<u>108</u>
Additional positions requested	10
Revised REDSO/ESA Direct Workforce	<u>118</u>

* Other: Fellows, TAACS, PASAs; these appear on other Agency unit ceilings

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ACRONYMS

AABA	-	All-Africa Business-Women Association
ADC	-	African Dialogue Center
ADP	-	Automated Data Processing
ADRA	-	Adventist Development Relief Association
AFR/EA	-	Africa Bureau's Office of East African Affairs
AFR/SD	-	Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development
AFRENA	-	Agroforestry Research Network for Africa
ARC	-	American Refugee Committee
ARH	-	Adolescent Reproductive Health
ARO	-	Africa Regional Office
ASARECA	-	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa
BHR	-	Bureau for Human Response
BHR/FFP	-	Bureau for Human Response/Food for Peace
CHWs	-	Community Health Workers
COMESA	-	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
COT	-	Cost of Transport
CPAF	-	Conflict Pilot Activities Fund
CPMR	-	Conflict, Prevention, Mitigation and Response
CQUIK	-	Conflict Quick Response Fund
CRHCS	-	Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat
CRS	-	Catholic Relief Services
DA	-	Development Assistance
DMC	-	Drought Monitoring Center
DROC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	-	East Africa Cooperation
EA-SSI	-	Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative
ECA	-	Economic Commission for Africa
ECHO	-	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECSACON	-	East, Central and Southern African College of Nurses
ECWD	-	Education Center for Women and Democracy
ESA	-	East and Southern Africa
ESABO	-	East and Southern Africa Business Organization
EU	-	European Union
EXP	-	Expendable
FAM	-	Food Aid Management
FBI	-	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEWS	-	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	-	Food for Work
FIDA	-	Federation of Women Lawyers
FSAU	-	Food Security Assessment Unit
FSN	-	Foreign Service National
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product

GHA	-	Greater Horn of Africa
GHAI	-	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
GOK	-	Government of Kenya
HASP	-	Horn of Africa Support Project
HIV	-	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HN	-	Health Networks
ICAAS	-	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
ICBT	-	Informal Cross-Border Trade
IDA	-	International Disaster Assistance
IDPs	-	Internally Displaced Persons
IEE	-	Impact Environment Evaluation
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IOB	-	Interim Office Building
IQC	-	Indefinite Quantity Contract
IR	-	Intermediate Result
IRC	-	International Rescue Committee
ISGM	-	Institutional Strengthening and Grant Making
ISP	-	Integrated Strategic Plan
KSA	-	Kenya Scouts Association
LAS	-	Local Administrative Structures
LRD	-	Linking Relief and Development
LSGA	-	Limited Scope Grant Agreement
LWOP	-	Leave without Pay
MAARDS	-	Modified Acquisition and Assistance Request Documents
MCH	-	Maternal Child Health
MCH/FP	-	Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning
MEO	-	Mission Environment Officer
MPP	-	Mission Program Plan
MSF	-	Medecins sans Frontieres
NARO	-	National Agricultural Research Organization (Uganda)
NARS	-	National Agricultural Research Service
NDA	-	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
NHA	-	National Health Accounts
NIDs	-	National Immunization Days
NRM	-	Natural Resources Management
NXP	-	Non Expendable
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
OE	-	Operating Expenses
OFDA	-	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OLS	-	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OYB	-	Operating Year Budget
PDO	-	Project Development Officer
PHCC	-	Primary Health Care Centers
PHCU	-	Primary Health Care Units

PHN	-	Population, Health, Nutrition
PIC	-	Project Implementation Committee
PVO	-	Private Volunteer Organization
RCQHC	-	Regional Center for Quality of Health Care
REA	-	Regional Environment Advisor
REDSO/ESA	-	Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa
RFMC	-	Regional Finance Management Center
RFSP	-	Rural Food Security Project
RLA	-	Regional Legal Advisor
RTAA	-	Regional Trade Analytical Agenda
SACB	-	Somalia Aid Coordinating Body
SCG	-	Search for Common Ground
SFO	-	Sudan Field Office
SMC	-	Sudan Medical Care
SPLA/M	-	Southern People's Liberation Army/Movement
SSDF	-	Somalia Salvation Democratic Front
SSIM	-	Southern Sudanese Independence Movement
STAR	-	Sudan Transitional Assistance Rehabilitation
STARS	-	Scheduling, Tracking, Analysis and Reporting System
STD	-	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TBA	-	Traditional Birth Attendant
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	-	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCU	-	United Nations Humanitarian Coordination Unit
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID/W/G	-	US Agency for International Development, Washington
USDH	-	United State Direct Hire
USG	-	United States Government
USPSC	-	United States Personal Service Contractor
WHO	-	World Health Organization
WIDSR	-	Women in Development Strategic Support
WILDAF	-	Women in Law and Development
WRI	-	World Resources Institute
WTO	-	World Trade Organization
WVRD	-	World Vision Relief and Development

PART I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

The Development Context: United States-African cooperation in East and Southern Africa had a banner year in 1998. President Clinton's trip to the continent set the positive and visionary tone for an expanded partnership. This was followed by two trips by Commerce Secretary Daley to the region to promote U.S.-African business linkages, trade and regionalism, supplemented by a number of high level visits and contacts from the Executive and Congressional branches. Finally, the first-ever U.S.-Africa Ministerial meeting in March 1999 reaffirmed the crucial role of regional cooperation to the overall development process and the importance of integrating African states into the global economy. The sessions advanced U.S.-African cooperation to prevent and resolve conflicts and to bolster human capacity through investments in health, trade, transportation and communications infrastructure, and agriculture.

These events and accompanying U.S. Government policy pronouncements **underscored the validity of REDSO/ESA's new programmatic focus, which emphasizes GHAI principles of African ownership, strengthened capacity of regional partners to prevent and mitigate conflict, enhanced food security, regional cooperation and increased utilization and sharing of critical information.** These emphases are fully consistent with the U.S. Embassy's Kenya Mission Program Plan (MPP) which focuses on the following goals:

- (a) **Regional Stability:** To promote peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, particularly in Sudan, Somalia, the Great Lakes and the Greater Horn of Africa;
- (b) **Humanitarian Assistance:** Prevent or minimize the human costs of conflict and natural disasters, with particular focus on Kenya, Somalia and southern Sudan;
- (c) **Open Markets:** Promote the Free flow of goods, services and capital to Kenya and the region through regional integration efforts, including agreement with the East African Cooperation (EAC) on tariff elimination and other measures designed to enhance regional trade, a close fit with REDSO's Regional Trade Activity;
- (d) **U.S. Exports:** Facilitate U.S. investment and promote U.S. exports to Kenya and the region through improvement of the investment climate for U.S. firms via processes such as the REDSO-financed Investor Roadmap;
- (e) **Economic Development:** Influence the Government of Kenya (GOK) to adopt economic and governance policies and practices which will increase Kenya's real GDP annual growth rate to eight percent or more. One area where REDSO plays a small, targeted role is through support to the Leland Initiative and regional information systems.
- (f) **Democracy:** Deepen democratic reforms in Kenya, and foster a genuine culture of democracy, based on a spirit of dialogue and compromise, and featuring respect for human rights. REDSO's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) conflict management and prevention activities are a natural fit in this regard.

Summary Progress in Implementing the Approved Strategic Plan

- REDSO/ESA signed three benchmark regional partnership agreements in democracy-governance/conflict, economic growth and health, the first two with the 21-member country Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) based in Lusaka, Zambia and the latter with the 14-member Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat (CRHCS) in Arusha, Tanzania.
- The two COMESA agreements put in place two conflict-response mechanisms as well as a new regional commercial court.
- Regional partner Internet interconnectivity and information sharing made major advances.
- Regional conflict prevention and food security were enhanced by a new \$10 million regional institutional strengthening and grant making facility for indigenous African NGOs/PVOs.
- Humanitarian crises in Somalia, Sudan and Kenya were avoided and suffering reduced through well-managed food-aid/disaster relief programs as well as timely data and analysis for key decision-makers.
- Critical services were delivered to USAID client missions on a timely basis with special emphasis on those with staffing shortages, such as Rwanda and Eritrea.

Significant Changes Leading to Reduced Objectives or Results

East Africa Bombings: The August 7, 1998 bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam have forever altered the security and operational landscape in the ESA region with the following impacts:

- Considerable management and staff attention must now be placed on security issues.
- REDSO will move twice over the next four years to interim and final facilities. The good news is that a secure temporary sight has been identified and the move-in time is shorter than any other option available. This will allow REDSO/ESA to better implement regional programs and provide services to client missions.
- Recovery activities for staff and their families appear to be on track after recent visits by the University of Oklahoma and the Department of State Regional psychiatrist.

Strategic Direction: The lack of an approved regional strategy that integrates the current REDSO and GHAI strategies, as well as finalization of the appropriate balance between service provision and regional programs has constrained and delayed REDSO/ESA's ability to focus its efforts and allocate resources. The recent parameters cable and the visit by AFR/EA Office Director and DAA East Africa are helping to reach clarity and closure on many issues.

Staffing: The Africa Bureau's response to REDSO's previous R4 made it clear that additional staffing in the numbers requested would be unlikely in the current resource-constrained environment. At the same time, we appreciate the Bureau's guidance to take some responsibilities off our plate. A second constraint is the inability to fill key slots where at present REDSO/ESA has only 17 of its 21 USDH slots filled while going down in staff from 27 USDH only eighteen months ago. This has impacted on our ability to provide project development and financial management services, the former having a major impact on our internal GHAI activity designs and implementation. And, on the horizon, is an even more serious gap where we will lose three out of four contracting personnel by the end of October 1999.

Most Significant Program Achievements

- Signature of a groundbreaking DG/Conflict agreement with COMESA provides the underpinning for two regional conflict quick-response funds.
- COMESA's Commercial Court of Justice, funded by USAID, began operations with its first tasks being assessment mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia to evaluate economic claims against each other.
- Signature of REDSO's first Economic Growth partnership with COMESA which was the capstone of a special regional session of the heads of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), EAC, and COMESA, All-Africa Businesswomen's Association (AABA) and East and Southern Africa Business Organization (ESABO) with Secretary of Commerce William Daley.
- REDSO and USAID/Uganda efforts and financing have set the basis for a coordinated regional response to the crippling water hyacinth problem threatening the economic viability of Lake Victoria while supporting better coordination and management of the lake itself.
- Putting in place a \$10 million Horn of Africa regional grantmaking facility that supports indigenous African regional efforts to reduce conflict and enhance food security.
- Developing REDSO's first partnership with the Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat (CRHCS) that will allow crosscutting health issues, such as quality of care, best practices and sustainable healthcare financing, to be transferred across the region.
- REDSO/ESA efforts have institutionalized regional climate prediction with two fora held in Mombasa, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda, respectively. With support from USAID's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), African and international climatologists and food security experts developed consensus forecasts and pro-active food security response plans for each Greater Horn country.

Regional Factors Influencing Progress

Conflict: The optimism expressed in last year's R4 on the "African Renaissance" and the encouraging trends toward regionalism were tempered in 1998 by the significant escalation of intra-regional conflict (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, southern Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo). These conflicts severely taxed the ability REDSO/ESA and its regional partners – especially IGAD – to design, implement or expand programs of integration and harmonization.

El Nino: The extraordinary El Nino rains continued until June of 1998, with negative impacts on agriculture production of staple commodities and transportation infrastructure.

Governance: The lack of economic governance is a key, if not the key, negative regional and individual country factor. For example, the EAC sponsored a Regional Road Network conference with donors in Arusha in May of 1998, that was opened by the three Presidents and looked at the building or rehabilitation of key north-south and east-west road corridors. Despite such attention, Kenya has yet to spend one shilling of its special emergency El Nino recovery road funds due to concerns over corruption and mismanagement.

Transparency: If corruption is up, so is transparency. The media are bringing more light on economic mismanagement and corruption, including naming the names of the transgressors.

Economic Growth: The individual economies of East and Southern Africa are generally not healthy which means that the impetus for regional economic integration may be countered by a return to protectionism as countries fight over declining, not expanding resources. The regional conflict noted above is an additional drag on growth as countries spend scarce foreign exchange on military hardware and support operations.

Overall Prospects

It is noteworthy, nevertheless, to underline that the wrenching conflicts in East and Central Africa did not stop African regional institutions from functioning and increasing cooperation levels. Two examples follow:

Despite their open hostilities, Eritrean and Ethiopian ministers attended the IGAD annual meeting in Djibouti, the conflict was put on the agenda, and IGAD issued a communiqué that urged constraint and cessation of hostilities.

Agricultural researchers from countries as politically diverse as DROC, Burundi, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Rwanda continue to work together in regional agricultural commodity research networks and attend the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA) technical meetings. Differences between nation states have hampered, but not severed technical cooperation and information links in the ESA region.

Regionalism has taken root in Africa. It is clearly in the U.S. Government's interest to encourage and fortify its growth. REDSO/ESA will continue to strengthen and nurture these roots. Though apparently a "down" year regionally in the face of expanded conflicts, the longer view is that critical conflict-mitigating mechanisms were put in place and important progress as noted above which support U.S.-Africa partnership. Our efforts by their very nature are long-term, but staying the course with African regional institutions will pay high dividends through more stability and democracy, less need for humanitarian assistance, and more economic opportunities for U.S. businesses.

PART II: RESULTS REVIEW BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

**Strategic Support Objective #1 (SSO #1):
Effective Technical and Program Support to ESA Missions**

Summary:

REDSO/ESA’s SSO #1 continues to achieve results in providing effective program and technical support services. Highly qualified and experienced program and technical staff are meeting the changing needs of ESA client missions. This proven support function continues to assist the direct beneficiaries, bilateral ESA client missions, to advance achievement of target results. A key to REDSO staff’s effectiveness is a powerful synergy, which combines their ever-current knowledge of problems in the region with solid and innovative solutions they bring to bear on them. This SSO continues to address the need to access scarce and critical short-term human resources.

Key Results:

Achieving SSO #1 requires the successful accomplishment of Intermediate Result (IR) 1.1: Improved Management of REDSO/ESA Services to ESA Missions.

Performance and Prospects:

Overall performance has exceeded expectations. REDSO overcame significant constraints (including the bombing) to achieve effective and timely response to client missions’ needs. During this past fiscal year, a major challenge was to fully integrate GHAI into the REDSO program (increasing from an OYB of \$10 M to \$30 M). This included necessary reorganization efforts to ensure successful implementation. REDSO staff dedicated almost exclusive attention early in the fiscal year to integrate the GHAI, postponing some services to ESA missions.

In REDSO’s third annual Customer Service Survey, ESA missions rated REDSO services higher than the previous two years. ESA missions scored REDSO’s contribution to their planning, implementation and monitoring/evaluation as follows.

REDSO/ESA CONTRIBUTION TO MISSION FUNCTIONS Scale of 1 to 5 (not significant to essential)		
FUNCTION	ACTIVITY	SCORE
Planning	Design, Strategy, Analysis	3.5
Achieving/Implementation	RLA, Procurement, Finance	3.6
Monitoring & Evaluation	Activity Evaluation, Program Monitoring Plan Development	3.4

Fully 98% of client missions found REDSO services to be very useful to their ability to achieve strategic objectives. On the same 1 to 5 satisfaction scale, client missions’ composite overall satisfaction with REDSO’s services was even higher than the above, 3.7 for on-site services and 3.8 for virtual services performed in Nairobi.

REDSO monitors client missions resource needs by asking “How could REDSO serve you better?” A representative sampling of responses follows:

- “The assistance has been **timely, technically superb, and extremely helpful** in moving our development efforts forward, and attaining results.”
- “Planning process this year was done electronically due to chaos after bombing...it worked reasonably well, but really we **should meet in person**, since this meeting can be a forum for a USAID/W info sharing, priority setting, and discussing regional issues salient to us all.”
- “REDSO staff have always been **a vital resource** to many East and Southern Africa missions – they are generally real pros who know both the sector in which they specialize as well as the USAID rules and regulations.”

Based on Customer Survey responses, SSO #1 will undertake the following new activities/services in the coming fiscal year:

- Host an ESA conference for field and AID/W participants to discuss Agency and AFR guidance as well as regional issues facing client missions;
- Plan regional workshops in health financing, quality assurance and R4 planning;
- Provide more training in Nairobi for client missions, with special focus on FSNs.

Intermediate Result (IR) 1.1: Improved Management of REDSO/ESA Services to ESA Missions. REDSO/ESA’s quantitative measure for management of services is “service days performed as a percentage of service days agreed-to.” For FY 98, the results were:

Number of service days agreed: ¹	3,769
Number of service days actually performed: ²	3,247
Overall FY Gross Performance Score	86% (performed v. agreed-to)
REDSO/ESA Target Score	80% (performed v. agreed-to)

The target expectation for this IR was exceeded by 6%, although the total number of service days actually performed was less than last year’s total of 4,270. Notabl in FY 98, 58% of the total service days performed supported the GHA bilateral Missions.

The Customer Survey also provided information on client mission alternatives to REDSO services. The struggle to manage mission programs continues as the Agency wrestles with declining staffing levels. Client missions provided responses on how they would hope to obtain services if not available from REDSO.

	FY 1997	FY 1998
Contract:	38%	46.2%
Global Bureau:	22%	20.7%
Africa Bureau:	19%	17%
Other:	14%	6.3%
Would not obtain:	8%	9.8%

¹ Does not include services canceled by client missions, REDSO staff dedicated to serving client Missions from Nairobi nor REDSO-oriented service days

² Does not include REDSO staff dedicated to serving client Missions from Nairobi or REDSO-oriented service days.

Significant drawbacks to replacing REDSO services with contracts include: (1) significant added OE and program costs for ESA missions; (2) time and effort needed to develop MAARDS and Statements of Work and to monitor performance; (3) lack of continuity on assistance to activities; and, (4) considerable delays due to the time needed to field technical advisors.

Services highlights from FY 98:

- REDSO staff provided important support to bilateral missions and partners to ensure that USAID-supported activities comply with federal environmental regulations. For example, in collaboration with AFR/SD/PSGE, REDSO staff completed the Agency-wide 1998 PL 480 Title II Environmental Documentation Manual and conducted three Africa-wide Title II environmental assessment courses for over 100 participants. The staff received the International Honor Award from the Foreign Agricultural Service in recognition of their work.
- Using their experience in conflict analyses from previous work in Uganda and Kenya, members of the Democracy, Governance/Conflict team assisted USAID/Tanzania in the design of the Tanzania Conflict Flashpoints study. This study will provide in-depth analyses of the most serious potential sources of conflict in Tanzania and recommend preventative and mitigation response options for the USG, other donors, NGOs, the Tanzanian government and civil society.
- The Regional Financial Management Center serves as the accounting station for 16 USAID operating units. During FY 98 it performed over 79,000 accounting transactions, processed over 5800 vouchers valued at \$37.3 million. In addition to providing these standard services, RFMC undertook a number of special activities on behalf of its client missions: systems installation and extensive staff training culminating in the certification of USAID/Ethiopia as an official USAID accounting station; establishing and training the staff in the USAID/Kinshasa accounting office; providing 28 days of training for non-client USAID/Zimbabwe Controller staff; and supplying extensive coverage and training for USAID/Rwanda during staff shortages. RFMC also modified its procedures to reduce the travel voucher processing time from approximately five working days to two and the processing time for overdue payments by 80%.

Other Donor Programs: USAID staff regularly work with government and donor staff at the bilateral and regional level to ensure donor coordination and programming of scarce development resources.

Major Contractors and Grantees: In addition to a cadre of foreign service officers and personal services contractors, a variety of fellows and institutional contractors implement SSO #1. These in-house skills supplement local short-term contracts in specific fields. Contractors include Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte and Touche, Peat Marwick, and Ernst and Young.

Performance Data Table

**Strategic Support Objective #1 (SSO #1),
Intermediate Result 1.1**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SSO #1: Effective Program And Technical Support To All ESA Missions APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 1.1: Improved Management Of REDSO/ESA Services To ESA Missions.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Percent Of REDSO/ESA Planned Service Days And Tasks Achieved.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: TDY reports (STARS Data)</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of actual service days provided by REDSO/ESA staff as a percent of the total agreed with Missions in the ESA region.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: : In FY 98, REDSO/ESA provided services were: Number of service days agreed: 3,769 Number of service days actually performed: 3,247</p> <p>In FY 96, Agency financial constraints and instability affected REDSO/ESA's ability to plan and provide services and Missions' capacity to host REDSO/ESA staff. Furthermore, there was no "agreed" service days in FY 96 because of the absence of the annual scheduling conference.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	1995	70%	76%
	1996	70%	64%
	1997	70%	96%
	1998	80%	86%
	1999	80%	
	2000	80%	

**Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2):
Increased Utilization of Critical Information by
USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region**

Summary:

The purpose of this Strategic Objective (SO) is to support the Agency's strategic goals through increased availability and use of critical information of development issues having regional and global significance. Information sharing is fundamental for: regional cooperation and collaboration; formulating successful regional approaches; and, solutions and to ensure steady economic growth. REDSO/ESA's regional program and services uniquely facilitate the long-term development of regional capacity for improved information generation and accessibility, including on gender (see Annex B). REDSO/ESA is fostering greater collaboration among partners in the region and contributing to more effective problem-solving by decision-makers through the dissemination and replication of proven models, practices and development solutions. Beneficiaries include governments, institutions and regional organizations, with benefits ultimately accruing to persons throughout the region.

Key Results:

REDSO/ESA will achieve SO #2 through: 1) Improved Regional Information in Priority Development Areas; 2) Improved Models, Approaches and Technologies for Use in Priority Development Areas; 3) Enhanced Dissemination of Critical Regional Development Information; and, 4) Strengthened Human and Institutional Capacity to Generate, Analyze and Use Critical Regional Development Information.

Performance and Prospects:

REDSO/ESA is accomplishing key results through a successful portfolio of transnational activities in agriculture, population, health, nutrition, economic growth, environment and natural resources management. SO #2 activities support GHAI principles: all involve African partners who have participated in defining SO #2 activities and all utilize African technical experts who cooperate on regional issues. REDSO/ESA did not establish new performance targets for SO #2 in 1998 because SO teams were engaged in developing new results frameworks to better capture program performance. However, delays in REDSO/ESA's new strategy development required teams to revisit the original (frequently inadequate) indicators for this R4.

Intermediate Result 2.2: Improved Models and Approaches and Technologies for use in Priority Development Areas.

Agriculture: To increase basic food crop production, REDSO/ESA has supported a new network model for agricultural commodity research. The network model creates partnerships across national boundaries and among institutions. USAID's long-term investments in this model are yielding results: during this period, six new varieties were released to member countries. Moreover, bean varieties released in previous years are now generating benefits for small-scale farmers estimated at \$115 million/year. This is divided between export markets (approximately \$32 M), local markets and household consumption. Studies in Uganda and Rwanda showed that women farmers are the primary users of new varieties that provide additional protein for children and income for women.

In 1998, REDSO/ESA assisted the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA) to formulate and adopt a five-year, market-oriented research program. The program has aligned donor strategies and has leveraged significant additional funding. A recent European Union review of ASARECA resulted in a \$15 m commitment. The African Development Bank granted ASARECA \$270,000 for communications networks to link 2,300 scientists throughout the region.

Population, Health and Nutrition: REDSO/ESA-funded health networks expanded improvements to health care financing in the region, a critical activity given the economic constraints and severely limited health budgets faced by ESA countries. REDSO/PHN is assisting health policy-makers to improve allocation of scarce resources and to make strategic choices that ensure equitable and sustainable health sector development. Critical to this process is the National Health Accounts (NHA) model. The NHA model employs a set of common accounting standards and definitions, provides practical tools to estimate needs and to prepare national-level health resource and expenditure accounts. REDSO/ESA, collaborating with SIDA, World Bank, and Global Bureau partners, expanded the NHA Regional Network Initiative in 1998. USAID assisted ten country teams to use, adapt, and refine the NHA model, including computer tools and techniques to optimally manage health resource allocation and mobilization. Improved national health accounting through use of the NHA model is now being replicated in Mozambique, Kenya, Zambia, and Rwanda.

Intermediate Result 2.3: Enhanced Dissemination of Critical Regional Development Information.

Population, Health and Nutrition: Adolescents in the ESA region are at high-risk of early and complicated pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, sexual abuse and unsafe abortion. REDSO/PHN, through its Adolescent Reproductive Health (ARH) Network, produced and disseminated 1,000 copies of "Building Experience: Adolescent Reproductive Health in East and Southern Africa," showcasing ARH lessons learned and model practices in the region. The document is being extensively used and is in high demand throughout East and Southern Africa. Typical user feedback included the following statements: "*The report came at the right time, when KSA is just starting implementation of a four-year youth reproductive health project.*" Kenya Scouts Association. "*This particular document will be greatly useful in implementing our programme, 'Promoting Health Ideals for Enhanced Growth Among Students.'*" Young Christian Students' - - Uganda organization.

As a result of ARH Network, USAID/Kenya, with REDSO/PHN assistance, developed the first ARH strategy in the region, and ARH needs assessments were carried out in Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda to inform 1999 strategy development.

Economic Growth: REDSO's economic growth component has met or exceeded program targets for 1998. A singular success was the Regional Trade Analytical Activity (RTAA) which alone exceeded the total target for IR 2.3 (Economic Growth). The RTAA continues to develop and disseminate information needed by policy-makers to reduce major constraints to trade, investment, economic growth, and food security. In 1998, public and private sector transportation providers and users continued to engage in policy dialogue, analysis and

cooperation in the EAC sub-region. The increasing demand for RTAA information shows that policy-makers appreciate and are utilizing up-to-date information on trade and on trading patterns in other countries in order to make informed policy decisions.

REDSO/ESA also addressed a series of fiscal and institutional issues having implications for further trade liberalization. The result: common road engineering standards and axle-load limits continue to be harmonized and enforced. The creation of a Kenya "Roads Board Authority" is enabling private sector participation in the management of the national road system. Privatization of the railway communications and of port operations (e.g. storage facilities and handling equipment) will result in significant efficiencies and cost reductions. Expansion of the Advanced Cargo Information System continues to result in ever-greater timesaving at police checkpoints, tracking of cargo and transport vehicles, and cargo clearance through customs. REDSO is working on expanding these activities with EAC, IGAD and COMESA as well as in the Greater Horn and Southern Africa.

REDSO's expanded relationship with the East and Southern Africa Business Organization (ESABO) has linked it to the U.S. technology network, connecting ESA partners with U.S. firms through the transfer of technology and trade. Noteworthy information exchanges were achieved from REDSO's collaboration with other regional partners, including a series of on-going seminars to prepare ESA countries to respond to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.

Intermediate Result 2.5: Strengthened human and institutional capacities to generate, analyze, and use critical regional development information.

Population, Health and Nutrition: REDSO/PHN has developed and established the Regional Centre for Quality of Health Care (RCQHC) to which REDSO is "handing off" its Quality of Care Network activities in the ESA region. Based at Makerere University in Kampala, RCQHC is affiliated with the Faculty of Medicine and the Institute of Public Health. REDSO/PHN and RCQHC, have jointly developed a Master of Science Degree in Quality of Health Care, as well as a graduate program in Quality of Health Care being offered throughout Africa.

Other Donor Programs: REDSO/ESA's mix of successful activities under this SO are attracting support from the European Union, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the IMF, the East Africa Cooperation, several UN agencies, Sweden, Canada, IPPF, the International Development Research Center and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Principal Contractors, Grantees, or Agencies: All-Africa Businesswomen's Association, BASICS Project, Bureau of the Census, Center for African Family Studies, COMESA, CRHCS, ESABO, Family Health International, Family Planning Logistics Management Project, IGAD, Johns Hopkins University, Linkages Project, Pathfinder International, Project for Health Reform, TechnoServe, Quality Assurance Project, Rational Pharmaceutical Management Project and University of Rhode Island.

Performance Data Tables

**Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.1 (Population, Health and Nutrition)**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region – Population, Health and Nutrition APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 2.1: Improved Availability Of Regional Information In Priority Development Areas..</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Presence Of Appropriate Data Bases In Priority Development Areas.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of databases</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Quarterly reports from program implementing partners.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Databases include mailing lists, program inventories, assessments and situation analyses. For example: new data bases documenting better practices in six reproductive and child health focus areas were developed; contraceptive supply status and logistics systems were assessed in Mozambique and Uganda; the situation of postabortion care was assessed in Zambia and Kenya; summary reports with comparative analysis of National Health Accounts were produced in ten countries; a feasibility analysis for the fortification of weaning foods was conducted; an African consultant database was developed at CAFS; and mailing lists were expanded in each of the eight Health Networks focus areas.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: * In 1998 no planned figures were given because a new SO with new indicators was proposed that would better measure the results of the team’s efforts. To date these changes are still under review.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1994	0	0
	1995	0	4
	1996	6	8
	1997	4	25
	1998	*	27
	1999	29	
	2000	32	

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.2 (Population, Health and Nutrition)**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region – Population, Health and Nutrition APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 2.2: Improved Models And Technologies For Use In Priority Development Areas.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number Of Improved Or New Models And Technologies Shared And Adapted Across Borders</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: TDY's, participating Missions, reports.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Missions/Programs actively using models and technologies that have been shared and adapted across borders. For example: Mozambique adopted Kenya's logistics Forecast system; community-based health insurance schemes were adapted in three countries; a new model using social theater as an advocacy tool for postabortion care was adapted in Zimbabwe; a "Nutrition Profiles" tool was introduced in the region to evaluate the effects of nutrition intervention; advocacy tools were developed and incorporated in a CAFS advocacy training course; a resolution recommending a change in the model used for the vaginal discharge syndrome in the region was developed at the regional Standards and Guidelines workshop.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: * In 1998 no planned figures were given because a new SO with new indicators was proposed that would better measure the results of the team's efforts. To date these changes are still under review.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1994	0	0
	1995	0	4
	1996	4	6
	1997	12	25
	1998	*	29
	1999	31	
	2000	33	
	2001	36	

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.3 (Population, Health and Nutrition)**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region – Population, Health and Nutrition APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 2.3: Enhanced Dissemination Of Critical Regional Development Information.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number Of Users Receiving Critical Regional Development Information.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Mailings, TDY's, reports, e-mail.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of users receiving critical regional development information: at workshops, in meetings, on TDY's, through materials dissemination, etc. REDSO distributed 3,500 calendars showcasing quality of care interventions for reproductive and child health interventions; 20,000 condom promotion posters and dispensers were distributed; and 4000 compilation reports on integration were disseminated throughout the region. Network members received critical information at the following meetings: 120 participants at the Quality of Care Reproductive Health meeting, 80 at two Malaria meetings, 40 at the Quality of Care Facilitative Supervision meeting, 169 at the Integration meeting, and 29 at the Consultant's Skills meeting presented in collaboration with CAFS.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: * In 1998 no planned figures were given because a new SO with new indicators was proposed that would better measure the results of the team's efforts. To date these changes are still under review.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1994	0	0
	1995	0	355
	1996	400	1,200
	1997	2,00	21,010
	1998	*	35,500
	1999	36,000	
	2000	38,000	
	2001	40,000	

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.4 (Population, Health and Nutrition**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region – Population, Health and Nutrition APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Results 2.4: Increased Regional Collaboration Address Critical Regional Development Issues.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number Of Stakeholders Collaborating To Address Critical Regional Development Issues.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: TDY's, participating Missions, reports, meetings/workshop/study tour participants.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of Missions and other stakeholders who are collaborating in regional cross-boarder activities to address critical regional development issues. For example, 169 people from 17 countries collaborated at the Regional Integration Meeting in Kenya, 100 people from 9 countries came together at the Regional Standards and Guidelines meeting in Zimbabwe, 100 people in Zambia came together for a postabortion care dissemination meeting, 53 people from 28 institutions collaborated on nutrition and food security in Eritrea, 45 people from 8 countries collaborated to develop regional adolescent reproductive health activities, and 29 people from 7 countries participated in a consulting skills workshop.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: * In 1998 no planned figures were given because a new SO with new indicators was proposed that would better measure the results of the team's efforts. To date these changes are still under review.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	1994	12	14
	1995	17	21
	1996	35	56
	1997	65	213
	1998	*	1084
	1999	1400	
	2000	1500	
2001	1600		

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.5 (Population, Health and Nutrition)**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region – Population, Health and Nutrition APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>																													
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Results 2.5: Strengthened Human And Institutional Capacity To Generate, Analyze And Use Critical Regional Development Information.</p>																													
<p>INDICATOR: Number Of Institutions With Strengthened Human And Organizational Capacity To Generate, Analyze And Use Critical Regional Development Information.</p>																													
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: TDY's, participating Missions, reports.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of institutions with strengthened human and organizational capacity to generate, analyze and use critical regional development information. In addition to the capacity built at the Regional Centre at Makerere described in SO #2 narrative, formal partnerships were established with the Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat (14 member states) and the Centre for African Family Studies to manage and implement Health Networks activities, and assistance was provided to the East, Central and Southern Africa College of Nursing (ECSACON) to harmonize nursing curricula and establish core standards of practice in 14 ESA countries.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: * In 1998 no planned figures were given because a new SO with new indicators was proposed that would better measure the results of the team's efforts. To date these changes are still under review.</p>		<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>YEAR</th> <th>PLANNED</th> <th>ACTUAL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1994</td> <td align="center">1</td> <td align="center">1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1995</td> <td align="center">5</td> <td align="center">12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1996</td> <td align="center">18</td> <td align="center">23</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1997</td> <td align="center">30</td> <td align="center">42</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1998</td> <td align="center">*</td> <td align="center">46</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1999</td> <td align="center">50</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2000</td> <td align="center">52</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2001</td> <td align="center">55</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL	1994	1	1	1995	5	12	1996	18	23	1997	30	42	1998	*	46	1999	50		2000	52		2001	55	
YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL																											
1994	1	1																											
1995	5	12																											
1996	18	23																											
1997	30	42																											
1998	*	46																											
1999	50																												
2000	52																												
2001	55																												

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.3 (Economic Growth)**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region -- Economic Growth APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 2.3: Enhanced Dissemination Of Critical Regional Development Information -- Regional Trade Analytical Activity; Regional Investor Roadmap; WTO Activities; ESABO; and AABA.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number of persons and institutions receiving critical regional development information.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: : Number of persons and institutions receiving critical regional development information</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Quarterly reports and records from program implementers include: RTAA-Publications and workshop reports; Investor Roadmaps; WTO; ESABO; and AABA reports.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of persons/institutions attending workshops, meetings and receiving publications</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: The EG team's success in increasing the number of persons and institutions receiving critical regional development, was a result of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased demand for RTAA documentation and information after the program released a number of publications on the general reform and liberalization progress in the sub-region. 2. The ICBT and COT studies showed that trading between neighboring countries in the subregion was in need of a review and change of agriculture/ trading policies. As a result, there was increased dialogue amongst stakeholders. 3. The launch of the WTO series on capacity building and information dissemination workshops are also included in the numbers. 	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1993	-	0
	1994	50	80
	1995	100	225
	1996	350	577
	1997	650	1166
	1998	875	965
	1999	459	
	2000		

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2),
Intermediate Result 2.5 (Economic Growth)**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Increased Utilization Of Critical Information By USAID And Other Decision-Makers In The Region -- Economic Growth APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 2.5: Strengthened Human And Institutional Capacity To Generate, Analyze And Use Critical Regional Development Information.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number of REDSO/ESA assisted African stakeholders generating, analyzing and using critical regional development information.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of REDSO/ESA assisted African stakeholders</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Quarterly reports from program implementing partners:</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of African stakeholders generating, analyzing and/or using critical regional development information</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: The shortfall in the anticipated target occurred mainly due to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. RTAA's dissemination strategy being delayed partly due to the August 7, terrorist bomb. 2. Stakeholders' delays in formation of country implementation teams. 3. Some serious logistical/communication problems amongst partners that led to delays in policy dialogue and information sharing sessions 3. COMESA's implementation delays in computer training, WTO training sessions, and the impending completion of part of the RTAA program are reflected in the lower targets planned for FY 1999. 	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1994	100	75
	1995	225	250
	1996	372	427
	1997	400	469
	1998	900	761
	1999	501	
	2000		

**Strategic Objective #3:
Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the
Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI)**

Summary:

Last year's submission reported that REDSO/ESA had achieved this strategic objective. Subsequently, the Mission was advised to continue reporting against its current strategic framework. Thus, SO #3 reports on actual "implementation" of the GHAI, as opposed to establishing a strong basis for it. The intermediate results and indicators reported on for SO #3 this year are of necessity "interim" but draw heavily from the approved GHAI strategic framework. The direct beneficiaries of SO #3 are the institutions and organizations strengthened by USAID-funded programs; the ultimate customers are the people of the Greater Horn region who will benefit through activities that increase African capacity to improve food security, mitigate conflict and share developmentally strategic information. The principal intermediate results necessary to achieve this objective include: (1) regional information on food security and conflict accessible to African implementors and policy-makers; (2) African institutions strengthened in the areas of food security and conflict management; and (3) pilot activities in conflict mitigation tested to establish best practices.

Key Activities:

SO #3's key activities to date include institutional strengthening and program development for the African Dialogue Center (ADC) and IGAD, as well as, the newly launched Institutional Strengthening and Grantmaking Program (ISGM) for African NGOs, which is being managed by the U.S. PVO, PACT. In late FY 98, REDSO/ESA also formalized its partnership with the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) by signing two Agreements in the areas of conflict management and economic growth.

Performance and Prospects:

REDSO/ESA's self-assessment of this SO is that it is on-track. In FY 98, USAID launched the GHAI strategy and full management responsibility moved from USAID/W to REDSO/ESA. With the majority of FY 98 obligations taking place late in the fiscal year, SO #3's progress toward results is of necessity based on those activities which have prior year funding, primarily the Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP). In particular, HASP support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its member states resulted in SO #3's exceeding expectations for its regional information intermediate result.

Past Year Performance Relative to Plans

As SO #3 indicators have only been established over the reporting period. An assessment of positive and negative changes to these indicators is not possible. A clear indication of positive change, however, has been the rate at which GHAI-supported electronic connectivity has been established among GHA government ministries. This in turn has generated tremendous demand for increased connectivity and liberalized telecommunications policies among a multitude of potential users in the region. SO #3 also laid the groundwork for activities stemming from the three food security and nutrition "priority areas" identified by African stakeholders the previous year. The Maternal Nutrition Minimum Package (Minpak) has been adapted for East Africa to include three new components, renamed the Minpak+3. This package has been adopted by at

least five organizations. Lessons learned from a survey of nutrition and health indicators in a Tanzania refugee camp will be applied to the integration of refugees and displaced persons into host societies in northern Uganda.

While institutional strengthening remains a difficult result to measure, SO #3 believes that its commitment to strengthening IGAD is yielding returns, both in IGAD's internal operations and in its program development. Despite extraordinary challenges, IGAD remains a key player in the Sudan peace process, is aggressively moving ahead with donors in the design of its 17 projects and held its February 1999 Council of Ministers meeting in Djibouti as scheduled, in the midst of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. REDSO/ESA's response to IGAD's leadership has been uneven; staff losses and constraints, competing priorities, and USAID systems and procedures have contributed to this situation. The Mission is taking steps to resolve these issues, including strengthened internal accountability for commitments to IGAD within REDSO/ESA.

Even more difficult to measure, yet central to GHAI implementation, is its "operational framework," a set of guiding principles: African ownership, strategic coordination, linking relief and development, regional approaches and promoting stability. All GHAI-funded activities are expected to reflect the principles. FY 98 examples exemplifying their application follow.

African Ownership & Strategic Coordination

REDSO/ESA has played a lead role in the development of the multi-donor Project Implementation Committee (PIC), a coordination structure that allows 12 countries to work in partnership with IGAD on the regional development agenda set by IGAD member states. USAID serves as chair of the PIC which seeks to overcome operational obstacles faced by donors in financing regional initiatives, develop common reporting systems and agree on common norms of behavior for donors in working with IGAD.

Linking Relief and Development

Over 125 representatives from African NGOs, U.S. PVOs, the private sector, government and USAID missions were trained in principles of Linking Relief and Development (LRD) in 1998. The training was a joint effort of the GHAI/W Transitions Team and REDSO/ESA. Participants learned to use two analytical frameworks to identify programming options that better link relief and development interventions. Nine persons were trained as trainers to develop a cadre of LRD trainers based in the region. These trainers have since conducted workshops for the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), the Uganda Red Cross, and World Vision/Sudan.

Intermediate Results 3.1: Regional Information On Food Security And Conflict Accessible To African Implementors And Policy-Makers. SO #3 has made excellent progress toward achieving this result. (See Performance Data Table, IR 3.1) Linking liberalized telecommunications policies with provision of equipment and training, SO #3 is working through IGAD and ministries in non-IGAD countries to establish internet connectivity for key policy-makers in the GHA region. In 36 GHA government ministries, 110 users are actively using internet technology to communicate and share information on food security and conflict prevention among themselves and with international counterparts. Improved connectivity in the region has demonstrated to stakeholders the importance of regional telecommunications policy harmonization. Under its new partnership with COMESA and in conjunction with IGAD, SO #3

will also assist in the formulation of a regional telecommunications harmonization policy. A complementary activity is SO #3's support for IGAD's Project 5.1, a Regional Integrated Information System (RIIS). SO #3 is working with the Italian government and IGAD to develop this regional system that will be demand-driven and built on existing data sources within the IGAD region and the world.

Intermediate Results 3.2: African Organizations Strengthened In The Areas Of Food Security And Conflict Management.

In addition to the IGAD strengthening activities noted earlier, SO #3 is working with other donors and IGAD to develop a conflict early warning response system. The system will be based on an upcoming IGAD assessment of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) capacities in the region. In early FY 99, REDSO/ESA program and financial experts visited the African Dialogue Center to address implementation issues. The result was a greatly improved partnership, as well as, a successful networking meeting among CPMR organizations in the region. A REDSO/ESA team also visited COMESA early in FY 99 to ensure a smooth startup to FY 98-signed Agreements. With SO #3 support, COMESA will engage in telecommunications policy issues (see IR 3.1) as well as implement its Court of Justice, thereby strengthening its capacity for mediating and arbitrating disputes between member countries. The \$10 M ISGM contract was advertised, competed, and signed in FY 98. It supports African NGOs in the GHA that are undertaking innovative regional work in food security and CPMR. In collaboration with USAID/Uganda, SO #3 also addresses the Lake Victoria water hyacinth problem, which threatens food security for small-scale fisherfolk in East Africa. By working with the GoU's Water Hyacinth Unit, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute and other partners, USAID is assisting stakeholders to develop consensus on an integrated regional management plan for long-term sustainable control of water hyacinth. (See Performance Data Table, IR 3.2)

Intermediate Result 3.3: Pilot Activities In Conflict Mitigation Tested To Establish Best Practices.

REDSO/ESA contributed to IGAD's Peace Fund last year and IGAD has since utilized the Fund to reinvigorate the Sudan peace process. In Burundi, a grant to the PVO, Search for Common Ground (SCG), supports a radio studio that produces programs promoting peace which reach approximately five million Kirundi speakers in Burundi, Rwanda, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. These programs also link to SCG's technical assistance for political dialogue among national leaders and its development of a Women's Peace Center. In collaboration with COMESA and USAID bilateral missions, SO #3 is also launching two innovative conflict funds, one for quick response to existing or emerging conflicts and another for pilot activities to address longer-term conflicts. SO #3 has also facilitated the award of GHAI-funded grants to NGOs, managed by bilateral missions, which will undertake promising pilot approaches to CPMR.

Performance Data Table:

**Strategic Objective #3 (SO #3),
Intermediate Result 3.1**

OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective #3: Establish A Strong Basis For Implementation Of The Greater Horn Of Africa Initiative (GHAI)			
APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA			
RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 3.1: Regional Information On Food Security And Conflict Accessible To African Implementers And Policy-Makers			
INDICATOR: Number Of African Entities Connected To The Internet Through Liberalized Telecommunications Policies			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of African Entities (cumulative)</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: REDSO/ESA activity reports</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Self explanatory</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: Strategic Objective #3 supports liberalized telecommunications policy in a number of ways. As part of providing internet connectivity and training for 36 government ministries in the GHA region, SO #3 worked with each relevant government (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Rwanda) to ensure that the national telecommunications policy was sufficiently conducive to internet service provision.</p> <p>In addition, IGAD requested USAID funding for a U.S. NGO (MITRE) to conduct a well-received diagnostic study which on the telecommunications environment in Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. SO #3 also supports IGAD's Project 5.1 (Regional Integrated Information System) which began its comprehensive design phase in FY 98. Other technical expertise was provided to the Government of Kenya, through continued pressure and support for the liberalization and privatization of the telecommunications sector. This included Global Bureau assistance that led to a major rewrite of the new Kenya Telecommunications Bill passed last October. Through REDSO/ESA's new economic growth Agreement with COMESA, SO #3 supports telecommunications policy activities, including regional harmonization efforts, which are being undertaken with Global Bureau, Africa Bureau, M/IRM and the World Bank. A recent REDSO/ESA-IGAD joint assessment of connectivity efforts also revealed the need to include more ministries in the communication network. Thus SO #3, with IGAD and its member states, USAID/Tanzania and USAID/Rwanda, plans to assist with connectivity for additional ministries, and the African NGO sector, including universities, voluntary organizations and other NGOs.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1998	N/A	36
	1999	72	
	2000	102	
	2001	132	
	2002	162	

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #3 (SO #3),
Intermediate Result 3.2**

OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective #3: Establish A Strong Basis For Implementation Of The Greater Horn Of Africa Initiative			
APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA			
RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 3.2: African Organizations Strengthened In The Areas Of Food Security And Conflict Management			
INDICATOR: Number Of Strengthened African Organizations Working On Food Security And Conflict Management			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of African Organizations (cumulative)</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: REDSO/ESA activity reports</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Please note that this result and indicator correspond to the combined Intermediate Results (IRs) 3.2 and 3.3 of last year's SO3 submission.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: In FY 98, Strategic Objective #3's (SO #3) institutional strengthening efforts continued with IGAD and the African Dialogue Center (ADC) and in partnership with USAID/Uganda, with the Government of Uganda's Water Hyacinth Unit. In addition to the IGAD strengthening activities described in IR 3.1, REDSO/ESA also supported IGAD's plan to establish a regional conflict early warning and response system under their Project Profile 9.1 and continued providing technical assistance to Project 6.1 (Drought Tolerant Crop Production), 8.1 (Water Resources Management), and 8.2 (Community-Based Natural Resources Management).</p> <p>To address grant implementation issues, a REDSO/ESA team comprised of procurement, financial and program experts visited ADC headquarters in Arusha Tanzania. In conjunction with a Price-Waterhouse representative, the Team worked with ADC staff to help them better understand USAID's procedures and policies and also review the draft procedural manuals prepared by Price-Waterhouse after it conducted a pre-award survey. As a result of these efforts, ADC has nearly finalized their manuals, REDSO/ESA has granted them a no-cost extension, and ADC was able to hold a Consultative Networking Meeting for organizations involved in CPMR activities. The meeting brought together 40 scholars and NGO representatives from 28 countries and laid the groundwork for the establishment of a formal network among these entities.</p> <p>In FY 98, the \$10 M Institutional Strengthening and Grantmaking Program (ISGM) was advertised, competed and contracted, with PACT being the selected contractor. In FY 99 PACT will begin to strengthen regional African NGOs' capacity in areas such as administration and financial management, while supporting their initiatives to address the root causes of food security and conflict. The ISGM will also promote the collaboration of African governments, donors and non-governmental institutions within the GHA region. The ISGM estimates that up to 6 African institutions will be strengthened during the course of FY 99, with increasing numbers in successive years.</p> <p>In early FY 99, a REDSO/ESA team visited COMESA to discuss the new economic growth and conflict prevention Agreements and review USAID and COMESA policies and procedures. Planned activities with COMESA in FY 99 include modernizing COMESA's Court of Justice, as well as, the telecommunications harmonization activity described in IR 3.1.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	6	6
	1998	N/A	9
	1999	11	
	2000	18	
	2001	29	
	2002	42	

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Objective #3 (SO #3),
Intermediate Result 3.3**

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective #3: Establish A Strong Basis For Implementation Of The Greater Horn Of Africa (GHAI) APPROVED: 6/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 3.3: Pilot Activities In Conflict Mitigation Tested To Establish Best Practices</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number of Activities Implemented with Best Practices Identified</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of activities (cumulative)</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: REDSO/ESA activity reports</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Self explanatory.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: Results of two ministerial meetings and several shuttle diplomacy missions regarding Sudan and financed by IGAD's Peace Fund include: continued commitment by both parties to a common Declaration of Principles for the peace process; agreement on the rights of self-determination for Southern Sudan and the holding of a national referendum on this issue; and progress in reaching agreement on the definition of the boundaries of Southern Sudan.</p> <p>Search for Common Ground's grant activities in Burundi have led to development of two best practices. Studio Ijambo produces a variety of popular radio programs reaching approximately five million Kirundi speakers. A Women's Peace Center and training program initially involving women leaders provides a rare opportunity for women of Tutsi and Hutu heritage to work together to address Burundi's daunting social and political problems.</p> <p>REDSO/ESA also assisted USAID/Tanzania in designing a national study which analyzed key potential conflict flashpoints, and recommended priority responses to be considered by USG agencies, other donors and the government and civil society of Tanzania. USAID/Tanzania is using the study to evaluate and, where necessary, modify existing programs to enhance their conflict mitigation potential. Kenya plans to conduct a similar study, and other countries in the region may follow suit. REDSO/ESA is also providing financial and technical assistance for other CPMR activities managed by bilateral missions. In Kenya, a grant to the Education Center for Women and Democracy (ECWD) has supported seminars on peace for clergy and elders in Rift Valley communities affected by ethnic conflicts. Several seminar participants have since testified before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the clashes and participants of seminars are increasingly stepping forward to provide early warning reports of potential conflicts.</p> <p>In FY 99, REDSO/ESA will implement a Conflict Quick Response Fund (CQUIK) and a Conflict Pilot Activities Fund (CPAF). By FY 00, activities supported by these funds will be producing CPMR best practices for dissemination and replication.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1998	N/A	5
	1999	8	
	2000	11	
	2001	14	
	2002	17	

**Strategic Support Objective #4 (SSO #4):
More Effective responses to Humanitarian Assistance**

Summary:

REDSO/ESA provides crucial support for USAID's humanitarian and transition assistance programs throughout the East and Southern Africa (ESA) region. REDSO/ESA oversees the administration of nearly \$160 m in emergency food and non-food aid programs; manages development assistance programs in southern Sudan, Somalia, and Burundi; assists client missions in designing and/or managing food aid programs and works to strengthen the capacity of local and regional partners to use African resources to meet a greater share of the needs of vulnerable groups. The direct beneficiaries of this Strategic Support Objective (SSO) are the approximate 1.5 million Africans whose lives were saved or whose suffering was reduced through the timely and effective delivery of humanitarian and transition assistance.

Key Results:

In support of SSO #4, REDSO/ESA focuses on two intermediate results (IRs), 4.1, Improved Systems for Planning and Analysis of Crises in Place in the ESA Region and 4.2, Enhanced Target Population Capacity to Re-establish Their Livelihoods Following a Crisis.

Performance and Prospects:

While performance last year has met expectations overall, many significant constraints -- over which REDSO/ESA had no control -- continue to hamper the SSO #4 Team's ability to provide effective and timely humanitarian responses. These include: (1) serious security constraints that limit or prevent access to crisis areas; (2) deterioration of regional transport systems; and, (3) numerous political obstacles to resolving ongoing complex emergencies and political crises.

The severity of the 1998 humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan has underscored the critical importance of maintaining REDSO's proactive and flexible approach to address both immediate and longer-term issues. For the past several years, the USG has taken the lead in a two-track humanitarian strategy for Sudan supporting medium and longer term livelihood initiatives in addition to meeting urgent humanitarian needs. This approach allowed USAID to support a number of timely new interventions, saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of at-risk populations and averting an even greater human catastrophe.

Intermediate Result 4.1: Improved Systems for Planning and Analysis of Crises in Place in the ESA. This Intermediate Result (IR) addresses the importance of creating systems which provide timely and relevant information to help governments and donors address potential crises before they arise or to design suitable interventions to mitigate ongoing crises. An important indicator under IR 4.1 is the "number of climate outlook forums planned and coordinated by the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) in the GHA region per year."

The FEWS regional office in Nairobi has worked closely with African organizations, such as the Drought Monitoring Center (DMC) based in Nairobi, to strengthen their capacity to collect, analyze and disseminate various types of data relevant for early warning signs such as food

insecurity. FEWS staff worked with DMC to plan and implement the first-ever climate outlook forum in the region. This landmark forum, held in Nairobi in February 1998, brought together over 100 African climate scientists and food security experts from all 10 GHAI countries, plus prominent international climate scientists and disaster planning experts from the United States and Europe. A second climate outlook forum was held in September 1998, in Mombasa. This achieved the target of holding two climate outlook fora in FY 98.

These fora demonstrated that USAID-supported FEWS' work has successfully developed local capacity to produce and use climate forecasts, critical information that has permitted host country and donor government decision-makers to plan for and better address potential famine conditions. For example, the forecasts produced by DMC accurately predicted the excessive El Nino rains that inundated the region, as well as the drought conditions which scorched numerous areas in late 1998. FEWS will continue to work closely with the DMC to enhance their capacity for planning and implementing more climate outlook fora and for the dissemination of relevant information. The SSO #4 Team will also be looking for other local entities that can support this IR.

Intermediate Result 4.2: Enhanced Target Population Capacity to Re-establish Their Livelihoods Following a Crisis. This IR reflects REDSO/ESA's approach that humanitarian assistance programs should not create dependency or become an entitlement. Vulnerable groups themselves often have a number of coping mechanisms and capacities to meet at least some of their own needs, and REDSO seeks to exploit that opportunity.

One important indicator under IR 4.2 has been revised slightly from, "Increased USAID support for transitional activities in southern Sudan" to "Increased USAID support for re-establishing livelihoods in Southern Sudan." This revised indicator focuses more directly on the re-establishment of livelihoods rather than just transitional activities. The Sudan program is being used as an indicator under this IR because of its size and because the Sudan Field Office is managed by the SSO #4 Team. Of note during this period is the fact that REDSO's FY 98 target of \$5.5 m in support to re-establishing livelihoods in southern Sudan was surpassed by \$2.5 m. The target populations benefiting from these interventions are vulnerable groups who have the capacity to meet more of their own needs, but who had previously lacked incentives or the necessary inputs due to the continuing conflict.

Western Equatoria, a fertile southern Sudan area, is a prime example of the types of livelihood interventions REDSO has supported, increasing local agricultural production and promoting the marketing of surplus crops. By the end of FY 98, USAID-funded NGOs in this area, including CARE and World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD), have helped revive livelihoods for some 17,000 farmers and their families, or approximately 102,000 persons. NGOs provided a market for surplus crops through cash purchases and barter shops that exchanged basic items such as blankets, cloth, hand tools, soap and salt for farmers' surplus crops. This surplus production was then re-sold to relief organizations for distribution among refugees and displaced populations, and to the 1998 famine zone farther north. Since 1994, CARE and WVRD have injected \$670,000 in goods and cash into the local economy through grain purchases and barter programs. USAID's lead is now being followed by other donors.

As a result, an estimated 33,000 MT surplus is projected in Western Equatoria in FY 99. USAID's Sudan Field Office estimates that 15,000 MT of that surplus will be generated in the

two regions that were heavily assisted by CARE and WVRD in FY 97 and FY 98. Given overall projections of a southern Sudan food deficit of between 70,000 and 90,000 MT in 1999, the potential 1999 Western Equatoria cereal surplus is significant. Thus, through innovative agricultural interventions in southern Sudan, USAID has leveraged and multiplied the impact of humanitarian assistance, revived the livelihoods of thousands of households and helped generate surplus agricultural commodities which will be utilized to meet some of the upcoming large food deficits in southern Sudan.

Possible Adjustments to Plans: In FY 99, SSO #4 will be incorporated into REDSO/ESA's revised strategic plan. The strategy will take into account the establishment of BHR/OFDA's new Africa Regional Office (ARO) in Nairobi. This, in addition to an increased emphasis on providing core Food For Peace (FFP) services to client Missions and the management of non-presence country programs, such as Sudan, Somalia and Burundi. The strategy will continue to focus on the effective and timely delivery of humanitarian and transitional assistance. The strategy will also continue to support the main themes which guide the current SSO #4 operations, including: doing business differently; reducing vulnerabilities; enhancing food security and dependencies; enhancing greater self-reliance; being more proactive and less reactive; strengthening local capacities; and, improving targeting methodologies.

Other Donor Programs: USAID consults regularly with donors on a wide range of humanitarian and transitional issues because strategic coordination is critical for timely and effective responses. Other donors heavily involved in supporting humanitarian interventions include, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway and Italy. In many cases, where USAID has taken the lead on a proactive strategy, other donors have followed. For example, in Sudan where we provided funds to WFP, it procured surpluses in some of the more stable areas of southern Sudan, other donors followed suit. This practice creates incentives for farmers, reduces dependencies and strengthens local capacities.

Major Contractors and Grantees: REDSO/ESA directly manages grants to CARE, Catholic Relief Services, United Nations Children's Fund and United Nations Development Program. It also oversees grants made by BHR to World Vision International, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, American Refugee Committee, Lutheran World Federation, Save the Children Federation/UK, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)/Belgium, MSF/Holland, Norwegian People's Aid, Concern, GOAL, Medair, International Aid Sweden, and WFP.

Performance Data Table

**Strategic Support Objective #4 (SSO #4),
Intermediate Result 4.**

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Support Objective #4: Effective Delivery of USAID’s Humanitarian Assistance APPROVED: 5/97 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME Intermediate Result 4.1: Improved Systems For Planning And Analysis Of Crisis In Place In The ESA Region</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number Of Climate Outlook Forums Planned And Coordinated By FEWS In The GHA Region Per Year. (revised)</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Climate outlook forums</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: FEWS reports</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The indicator has been revised from “FEWS III regular reports providing critical info received on schedule” to the new one above. This revised indicator concentrates on climate outlook forums because this is an important new focus of the FEWS III project in the GHA region – strengthening of African organizations.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: The FEWS staff continue to do an excellent job at preparing regular reports which are widely disseminated and help decision makers to improve understanding of the basic causes and circumstances of famines; detect changes that create serious famine conditions; and, determine appropriate famine mitigation and prevention strategies. However, a relatively new but important focus of FEWS aims at capacity building of targeted African organizations.</p> <p>FEWS work has been very successful in the region in terms of building local capacities to produce and use climate forecasts. This critical information permitted host country and donor government decision makers to be plan for the likely scenarios and be better prepared to address potential famine conditions. The forecasts produced at these fora accurately predicted the excessive rains that hit the region during the El Nino, and the drought conditions which developed in part of the region in 1998/99. This process has also led to strategic collaboration, and each subsequent climate outlook forum has been funded by a different combination of agencies.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	1997	(B)	0
	1998	2	2
	1999	2	
	2000	2	
	2001	2	

**Performance Data Table: Strategic Support Objective #4 (SSO #4),
Intermediate Result 4.2**

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Support Objective 4: Effective Delivery Of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance APPROVED: 5/97 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: REDSO/ESA</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 4.2: Enhanced Target Population Capacity To Re-Establish Their Livelihoods Following A Crisis</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Increased USAID Support For Re-Establishing Livelihoods In Southern Sudan. (revised wording)</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: : (\$000,000)</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: : Review/analysis of grant documents</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Most of USAID funds support relief interventions in southern Sudan. However, this indicator tracks the amount of funds allocated to support the re-establishment of livelihoods (rehabilitation/recovery) activities in southern Sudan.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: The SSO #4 team has an ongoing dialogue with BHR/OFDA in order to recognize the importance of supporting livelihood (rehabilitation and recovery) activities within the limitations of their mandate as a means to reduce the overall need for humanitarian assistance and encouraging vulnerable groups to be more self-reliant. By livelihood activities we are referring to those activities which would not be characterized as relief, but rather those which help re-establish livelihoods of vulnerable groups. Such activities include barter shop programs, agricultural rehabilitation, provision of seeds/tools, income generating activities, veterinary programs, and road rehabilitation. We have revised our targets from FY 98-FY00 upwards as we have been successful in meeting the previous targets.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	1996	(B)	\$4.5
	1997	\$5.0	\$5.37
	1998	\$5.5	\$8.0
	1999	\$7.5 (revised)	
	2000	\$8.5 (revised)	

PART III: RESOURCE REQUEST

Even in this difficult year of dealing with the impact and immediate recovery needs of the August 7, 1998 bombing, REDSO/ESA maintained critical services to client missions and increased and strengthened regional partnerships (e.g., IGAD, COMESA, ASARECA and CRHCS). REDSO accomplished this despite dedicating significant time to post-bombing staff recovery, ongoing security and interim/new building issues and support to Kenya reconstruction activities. Moreover, REDSO was able to carry out strategy development work from October 1998 through March 1999, laying a firm basis for the coming year's efforts. REDSO will continue to face continued demands on resources for "non-program" activities. Key staff resources will be required for planning and executing two physical moves, one in September 1999 to an interim building, then in the next 3 years to a permanent building. Efforts will also continue to assist staff in post-trauma recovery.

By FY 2000, REDSO/ESA will be entering the fifth and final year of implementation of its approved Strategic Plan and the second year of its field responsibility for implementing the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) Strategic Plan. In order to best accommodate the integration of the Greater Horn of Africa strategy with the REDSO/ESA strategy, REDSO/ESA's strategy will be rewritten, a process begun in early FY 99. We anticipate submission to USAID/W in March 2000.

Meanwhile, REDSO/ESA will continue our work guided by the GHAI and REDSO strategies and by the March 1999 AFR/W strategy "parameters" cable. The need to provide a wide range of core services under SSO #1 will remain. Further, REDSO/ESA, under its SO #2, will continue to fund and implement a variety of regional activities that provide a regional "value-added" to bilateral programs and address development problems that are regional in nature and complement the GHAI. REDSO/ESA's mandate to manage and implement the GHAI is captured under SO #3 and is guided by the GHAI strategy pending the approval of the new REDSO/ESA strategy. Management of non-presence country programs (Sudan, Somalia and Burundi), including oversight of approximately \$176 million of humanitarian assistance will continue under the Sudan and Somalia Integrated Strategic Plans and REDSO/ESA's SO #4.

REDSO/ESA's program funding requests of \$22.624 million and \$25.45 million matches the AFR/DP program control figures for FY 1999 and 2000, respectively. Staffing shortages, particularly in the REDSO/ESA Procurement Office may mean REDSO will request a rollover of from \$1 - \$2 million of FY 99 funds to FY 00. We will be carefully monitoring contract and grant obligations in the coming months and will apprise AFR of any potential rollovers. Of the FY 00 \$25.45 million request, \$15.77 million is directly supportive of the GHAI program, of that, \$1.86 million is for activities in Sudan and \$9.68 million finances program funded core services for ESA bilateral missions and an ESA regional program that complements the GHAI. Per the FY 2000 Congressional Presentation, no DA funds are requested for Somalia.

REDSO/ESA's FY 01 program funding request of \$27.12 million, is 5.2% higher than FY 00. The main difference is \$1.2 million more for GHAI. Of the total request, \$16.95 million directly supports the GHAI program and \$1.72 million is for Sudan.

The detailed budget request for FYs 99, 00 and 01 are in the attached Program Request Tables.

REDSO is meeting or exceeding important target results under its current strategic plan, despite the disruption of the terrorist bombing and delays in revising its strategy

SSO #1: Effective Technical and Program Support to ESA Missions - Overall performance continues to exceed expectations. Under SSO #1, REDSO/ESA plans to continue providing technical and programmatic support to ESA Missions, thus maintaining its contribution to the Agency's goals. However, with increasing constraints on staff numbers, REDSO/ESA, in conjunction with AFR/W, will continue to identify the highest priorities against which to program resources. The AFR/W strategy "parameters" cable defines core services to client missions as contracting, legal advice, financial management and food for peace advisors who are primarily OE-funded. Clarification as to what other types of core services REDSO/ESA will be expected to provide (such as environmental/Reg. 16 services or other) is being sought from AFR/W and client missions. Until further clarification is received, REDSO/ESA has budgeted its SSO #1 request along historical lines. We will reprogram the apportionment in FY 00 and 01 among strategic objectives, possibly affording more funds toward direct implementation of the GHAI once the impact of the strategy "parameters" on program-funded services becomes more clear.

The financial resources required for SSO #1 in order to continue to make progress towards its target Results are: FY 1999 - \$3.32 million; FY 2000 - \$4.21 million; and FY 2001 - \$4.27 million.

SO #2: Increased Utilization of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region - - SO #2 exceeded its targets in FY 98. This SO is increasingly more supportive of the GHAI as REDSO/ESA continues its work in integrating the GHAI into its regional program portfolio. A highly successful set of value added activities will continue to be funded under SO #2: FY 1999 - \$5.35 million; FY 2000 - \$5.48 million; and FY 2001 - \$5.9 million.

Economic Growth and Agriculture: REDSO/ESA will support regional agricultural research networks and programs, primarily through ASARECA, to enhance African capacity in agricultural production and food security. USAID in conjunction with U.S business partnerships will support the Common Market for East and Southern Africa to harmonize trade policies and increase intra-regional and external trade.

Population and Health: REDSO/ESA will enhance networks and mechanisms to share cross-border "best practices" in HIV/AIDS prevention, health-care financing, maternal-child health, family planning and nutrition. REDSO/ESA will further strengthen regional African institutions through agreements with the Commonwealth Regional Health Community Secretariat and the Center for African Family Studies.

SO #3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) - - Because a strong basis has already been established, REDSO/ESA's request for program funding under SO #3 is for actual implementation of the GHA activities: FY 1999 - \$13.957 million; FY 2000 - \$15.77 million; and FY 2001 - \$16.95 million.

Information Technology: Cutting across sectors, REDSO/ESA's Global Information Infrastructure activities accelerate information technology use and information diffusion. To date, USAID has funded internet connectivity and training for 36 government ministries in the GHAI region giving decision-makers and policy-makers access to data on food security, health, agriculture and conflict prevention. REDSO/ESA will assist IGAD and COMESA to harmonize telecommunication policies in the region and will help Kenya with regulatory aspects of its telecom privatization.

Through the HASP/ISGM, USAID has launched a program for African NGOs in the GHA region. This activity, managed by the U.S. PVO PACT, will provide a demand-driven set of institutional strengthening and activity management grants to NGOs that are undertaking innovative regional work in food security and conflict prevention, mitigation and response. The first set of activities should be underway in the third quarter of FY 1999.

Democracy and Conflict: REDSO/ESA will support IGAD, COMESA and the African Dialogue Center to bring host government and civil society groups together to prevent, mitigate and/or resolve internal and cross-border conflicts. Key regional tools in this area are the Conflict Quick-Response Fund and the Conflict Pilot Activities Fund.

Environment and Natural Resources: REDSO/ESA will focus on critical transnational environmental problems through improved regional cooperation. For example, GHAI will support creation of a tripartite Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania policy on control of water hyacinths in Lake Victoria.

SSO #4: More Effective Responses to Humanitarian Assistance. *No DA funds are requested for SSO #4*

Humanitarian activities: In responding to crises in Sudan, Somalia and Burundi, REDSO/ESA will continue to address the root causes of food insecurity and will seek to decrease dependency on relief assistance by strengthening local and regional institutions to be responsive to the needs of vulnerable groups.

USAID's assistance to Somalia seeks to ensure that continuing instability does not spread to other countries in the Greater Horn of Africa. Although Somalia remains a failed state, USAID has made progress in recent years in developing local administrative structures which attempt to solve problems, ranging from infrastructure weaknesses to clan disputes. Wherever possible, indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are used to undertake the administrative strengthening. With the elimination in FY 2000 of DA funds in the Somalia portfolio, however, USAID efforts will focus exclusively on humanitarian assistance.

USAID has recently begun implementing the DA-funded Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR). The purpose of STAR is to increase participatory democracy and good governance practices in opposition-held areas of Sudan while reducing reliance on relief. STAR will contribute to reducing conflict and enhancing capacities for peace by strengthening the independent Sudanese civil society that has begun to arise in some of the more stable opposition-

controlled areas of southern and eastern Sudan. These actors are often strong on motivation, but weak on organizational skills. Through an umbrella grant to the U.S. private voluntary organization (PVO) Catholic Relief Services (CRS), private local organizations will receive small grants to enhance their capacity to solve local problems, work towards rehabilitation and hold civil authorities accountable.

Relationship of Program request to OE and Staffing Requirements:

As stated in the Cover Memo and workforce tables and as discussed with AFR/EA, REDSO considers the requested staffing numbers to be a minimal level to carry out GHAI activities, adequately deliver core services to client missions and to provide sufficient management oversight to non-presence country programs. The proposed staffing levels do not contemplate REDSO/ESA oversight or implementation of Great Lakes Justice Initiative activities, which would require additional program and support staff. Because REDSO's regional program OYB has jumped from \$5 million to \$25 million in the last two years, we consider the requested PDO positions to be especially critical to implement and report on planned activities. The requested additional Regional Legal Advisor and Food for Peace Officer positions are equally critical to supporting client mission programs, especially given the plethora of statutory and policy restrictions in numerous transition and non-presence countries. We realize in a resource-constrained environment that the Bureau must deal with the "zero sum" game in respect to the requested positions, however these levels (which are in reality REDSO/ESA 1994 levels, when REDSO was primarily delivering services, not implementing a large regional program) are truly minimal in relation to the task before us.

Pipeline Levels

All projected SO pipeline levels fall within forward funding guidelines. SO#3 represents the largest pipeline (approximately 18 months) however with the award of the PACT contract under the HASP project, expenditures should rapidly increase as institutional strengthening grants are awarded and program activities are implemented.

OE/Workforce Narrative

Workforce and Operating Expenses

Overview of FY 1999 OE Levels

REDSO/ESA's current OE level is \$5,2m. No ICASS amount was given in the levels to REDSO/ESA since the total amount for USAID ICASS OE charges (i.e., REDSO/ESA and USAID/Nairobi) was in the levels given to USAID/Nairobi. This level of \$5,2m will enable REDSO/ESA to successfully achieve REDSO/ESA program targets in FY 99. USAID/Kenya shares office operations and procurement costs (USAID/Kenya - 40%; REDSO/ESA - 60%). We expect a minimal exchange rate effect in FY 99.

FSN Salaries and Benefits

The Ambassador's policy is to maintain Mission FSN employee salaries within the range of the 75th (grades 7-12) to the 99th (grades 1-6) percentiles of the Nairobi labor market. This has resulted in an FSN salary budget increase in FY 99. The pay adjustment, effective November 8, 1998, approved a 5% increase for FSN grades 7-12 and a 12% increase for FSN grades 1-6. Since October 1, 1996, there have been five FSN salary increases. FSN salaries and benefits make up 30% of the total budget. This percentage is higher than normal due to a temporary 15% increase known as "Unique Conditions of Employment" given to FSNs as a result of the bombing. This increase is not directly linked to the US increase in post differential from 10% to 25%. This 15% expires October 9, 1999, and is not expected to be extended.

USDH and USPSC Costs

REDSO/ESA budgeted 10% of its FY 99 OE funds to cover USDH Personnel Benefits and USPSC salaries and benefits. This figure is higher this fiscal year due to the necessity of hiring USPSCs to fill in during long USDH vacancies at post. For example, as mentioned in last year's R4, one USDH position in the Regional Financial Management Center has been vacant since December 1997, with USPSCs filling in the gap. Another unusual cost this fiscal year was the allowance of a supplemental R&R due to the bombing in Nairobi last August. Two employees left early – one retired due to the bombing and the other went on LWOP. USAID reintroduced COLA benefits in Kenya in December 1998. On the positive side, there was an overall decrease in the education fees at the International School of Kenya.

Operational Travel and Training

Operational travel and training includes international and local site visits, conferences, retreats, and training. The emphasis again this fiscal year is on training the staff. The FY 99 budget contains the minimum amount adequate to monitor the REDSO/ESA Strategic Objectives, provide support to the client missions and maintain quality levels within the professional staff. This represents 9.6% of the total budget.

Office Rent, Security, Manpower, Utilities, Telephone, and Maintenance

USAID/Kenya and the Embassy share these costs and will be co-tenants with REDSO/ESA for nearly all FY 99. Therefore, office rent, building support costs, and the manpower contract costs will be less in FY 99 only, because the Embassy is due to move out shortly, before the end of the fiscal year. New Embassy-run warehouse and office security contracts are much higher in cost than previously. The Embassy is carrying additional office security costs. Inflation of 10% has been factored into utilities and maintenance. This is due in part to high generator fuel costs caused by frequent power failures and by the increase of electricity costs from Kenya Power and Lighting Company. The poor road network has caused motor vehicle maintenance costs to increase this fiscal year. This brings the total for this section to 8.7% of the total budget.

Residential Rent, Security, Utilities, Telephone, and Maintenance

Due to a significant increase in the State Department contracted security contract, there has been a four-fold increase in projected residential guard costs. Following USAID/Washington guidance, the R4 reflects only a 10% increase in the line item for residential security costs. Inflation of 10% has been factored into utilities and maintenance for the same reasons as the previous section. The total for residential costs is 15.9% of the total budget.

NXP, Supplies and Freight

Adequate NXP is budgeted for FY 99. However, this budget could be cut to pay for other mandatory costs such as residential security. Using a "cyclical, sinking-fund" method for a 15-year span, and an actual procurement list for FY 99, the REDSO/ESA share of the Office NXP and NXP freight budget has been set at \$165,000. Supplies (EXP) have also been budgeted at the minimum forecasted requirements, including residential supplies, office supplies, ADP supplies, and motor vehicle parts, coming to \$90,000. The total cost budgeted for NXP and EXP, including transportation costs, is \$255,000, or 4.9% of the total budget.

ICASS Costs

U.S. Embassy/Nairobi set the FY 99 OE -funded ICASS budget at US\$417,500. This amount is for both REDSO/ESA and USAID/Kenya. As mentioned above, the FY 99 OE and ICASS budget were greatly affected by the presence of the Embassy in the USAID complex building. The occupancy period is estimated to be twelve months, ending in August 1999. For FY 00 and FY 01, the ICASS costs are expected to return to approximately FY 98 levels plus inflation. REDSO/ESA pays 60% and USAID/Kenya 40% of this budget.

Overview of FY 2000 OE Levels

The request level for FY 00 is US\$5,759,800. This level will enable REDSO/ESA to successfully achieve REDSO/ESA program targets in FY 00. USAID/Kenya shares office operations and procurement costs (USAID/Kenya - 40%; REDSO/ESA - 60%). We expect a minimal exchange rate effect in FY 00.

FSN Salaries and Benefits

The Ambassador's policy is to keep the Mission FSN employees within the range of the 75th to the 99th percentiles of the Nairobi labor market. FSN salary increases are projected to be 12% for grades 1 to 6 and 7% for grades 7 to 12, along with the Within Grade increases of 5%. FSN salaries and benefits made up 24.0% of the total budget. The amounts are less than FY 99 because the 15% "Unique Conditions of Employment" has not been included in FY 00 and FY 01 budgets

USDH and USPSC Costs

REDSO/ESA budgets 9.1% of its FY 00 OE funds to cover USDH Personnel Benefits and USPSC salaries and benefits. This figure is lower this fiscal year due to the planned reduction in USPSC services.

Operational Travel and Training

Operational travel and training includes international and local site visits, conferences, retreats, and training. The FY 00 budget contains the minimum amount adequate to monitor the REDSO/ESA Strategic Objectives, provide support to the client missions, maintain quality levels within the professional staff. This represents 11.3% of the total budget.

Rent, Security, Utilities, and Maintenance

The prior warehouse lease will expire and the new lease will cause an increase. A significant rise in the cost of the Embassy-run security contract occurred, causing the overall office and residential security cost to increase. The cost of generator fuel and the level of generator fuel consumption are both expected to rise due to power infrastructure weaknesses. The total costs for this section represent 33.2% of the total budget.

NXP, Supplies and Freight

FY 00 includes an NXP and NXP freight budget of \$272,800 based on FY 00 procurement and sinking fund method estimates. These expenditures are in line with the R4 guidance to avoid shifting problems into the future. Therefore, it is mission policy to continue with the NXP procurement in an orderly, logical, and cyclical fashion. The combined NXP and EXP budget, including freight, is \$362,800, or 6.3 % of the total requested budget.

ICASS Costs

The ICASS costs are straight lined.

Target O.E. Level – FY 2000

The target level budget for FY 00 is straight lined from FY 99, or \$5.2 m. This level is adequate to meet all requirements with the exception of the security guard service. As mentioned

previously, the State Department has negotiated a contract for security services with an extraordinary increase in costs.

Overview of FY 2001 OE Levels

The request level for FY 01 is US\$5,878,300. This level will enable REDSO/ESA to successfully achieve REDSO/ESA program targets in FY 01. Office operations and procurement costs are shared with USAID/Kenya (USAID/Kenya - 40%; REDSO/ESA - 60%). We expect a minimal exchange rate effect in FY 00.

FSN Salaries and Benefits

The Ambassador's policy is to keep the Mission FSN employees within the range of the 75th to the 99th percentiles of the Nairobi labor market. FSN salary increases are projected to be 12% for grades 1 to 6 and 7% for grades 7 to 12, along with the Within Grade increases of 5%. FSN salaries and benefits made up 24.3% of the total budget.

USDH and USPSC Costs

REDSO/ESA budgets 9.0% of its FY 01 OE funds to cover USDH Personnel Benefits and USPSC salaries and benefits. This percentage figure is equivalent to FY 00.

Operational Travel and Training

Operational travel and training includes international and local site visits, conferences, retreats, and training. The FY 01 budget contains the minimum amount adequate to monitor the REDSO/ESA Strategic Objectives, provide support to the client missions, and to maintain quality levels within the professional staff. This represents 10.6% of the total budget.

Rent, Security, Utilities, and Maintenance, NXP, Supplies and Freight

These costs represent 33.3% of the total budget. Increases are estimated due to higher costs in leases for the new office and warehouse as well as the increase in the security guard contract.

ICASS Costs

The ICASS costs are straight lined.

Target O.E. Level – FY 2001

The target level budget for FY 01 is straight lined from FY 99, or US\$5.2 M. This level is adequate to meet all requirements with the exception of the security guard service. As mentioned previously, the State Department has negotiated a contract for security services with an extraordinary increase in costs.

O.E. Funded Security Needs

Funding Needs for Security contract - (REDSO/ESA and USAID/Kenya)

The current USAID Office Complex is located in a relatively densely populated residential/commercial neighborhood. There is a 60-foot set back in the front, and zero set back on the sides of the building, including an apartment complex running the length of the building. It has become the location of not only USAID (Kenya and REDSO), but also the US Embassy Kenya, US Embassy Sudan, FAS, FBI, INS, etc. Literally overnight, we rose from a relatively low-profile office building to a very high profile diplomatic complex. When elements of the post depart for the Embassy interim office building, the Marine detachment will also. We will remain a high-profile building, despite the absence of many of these offices, but will not have the high level of protection afforded by the Marine detachment. AA/M and A/SEC informed us, with the encouragement of the Ambassador, that we must move to an interim office building as soon as possible while we wait for a new building on a joint USAID-Embassy compound. The budget below reflects the estimated costs for the two projects. Much of the funding for the IOB will come from the FY 99 supplemental. We have indicated the source of funding to the extent possible.

At the end of FY 1998, the Department of State, in Washington, DC, signed a renewal to the existing security contract for Nairobi. Both the U.S. Embassy and USAID in Nairobi have been compelled to participate in this contract. The new contract resulted in an unexpected four-fold increase in security costs, for the same level of service. Please note that the Office and Residential Security costs for FY 98 were approximately **\$40,000** and **\$156,400**, respectively. The expected costs for Office and Residential Security for FY 1999 and the two out-years in this R4 are as follows.

FY	Budgeted OE Office Security Costs	Budgeted OE Residential Security Costs
FY 1999	\$40,000	\$172,300
FY 2000 - Target	\$45,000	\$189,200
FY 2000 - Request	\$45,000	\$619,200
FY 2001 - Target	\$45,000	\$205,000
FY 2001 - Request	\$45,000	\$619,200

The total Office Security costs for FY 99 and the out-years are actually **\$145,000** per year. The Department of State Diplomatic Security has verbally promised funds to make up the annual **\$100,000** shortfall caused by the increase in Office Security costs resulting from this Washington based contract, for at least FY 99 and possibly later years.

For FY 00 and 01, the requested OE budget totals have been increased by the security cost increase, in order to maintain adequate Residential Security in FY 99 - FY 01, as well as other OE operations. To make up this much larger anticipated shortfall in Residential Security costs, funds may come from additional OE from USAID/W, or some other supplemental funding source.

The increases in the security costs are coincidental with the additional security concerns raised by the Nairobi Embassy bomb blast. However, it is anticipated that actual security services, in terms of person-hours and other resources, may also rise over the R4 period, to reflect worldwide increases in this activity. The cost of actual increases in the activity has not yet been measured, but additional funds sources would be needed to meet these costs, as they would for the additional costs mentioned above, from the rise in the contract price.

Funding Needs For The Purchase And Construction Of Facilities (REDSO/ESA and USAID/Kenya)

With the bombing of the Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998, the post was upgraded from a medium threat terrorist post to a high threat terrorist post. In addition, the post remained classified as a critical threat crime post. Kenya is surrounded by countries that are in a state of war or general turmoil and boundaries are loosely controlled making the area a prime location for recruitment and staging of terrorist incidents. It has also become a crossroads of trafficking in arms, drugs and illegal aliens. The area continues to receive threats and other reports of terrorist activity and within Kenya there are segments of the population who have an anti-US sentiment.

A separate table of OE needs for this activity has also been prepared and is attached.

The U.S. Embassy bomb blast in Nairobi in 1998 has triggered new activity in this area. In short, USAID is to move to an Interim Office Building (IOB), and then move again to a permanent Office Building when constructed.

During FY 99, we have acted to move USAID into an IOB. We plan the move in early FY 00. Listed below are anticipated costs for this move and for activity related to the construction of a permanent USAID office.

FY	Office Renovation/ Construction Costs		Real Estate Purchase/ Planning Costs	Total Facilities Costs
FY 1999	\$5,785,000		\$400,000	\$6,185,000
FY 2000	\$ 415,000	-	\$ 415,000	
FY 2001	\$ 319,000	-	\$ 319,000	
TOTALS	<u>\$6,519,000</u>		<u>\$400,000</u>	<u>\$6,919,000</u>

The Department of State and USAID/W have promised additional funds from various sources to pay the cost of this activity. The attached table shows the estimated costs by funding.

Cost of Construction, Relocation, Purchase and upgrades to facilities. (US\$000)				
FUND SOURCE/COST CATEGORY	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	Total
Security Supplemental				
Not Mission OE funds:	(US\$000)	(US\$000)	(US\$000)	(US\$000)
Lease cost -IOB	\$ 335	\$ --	\$ --	\$ 335
Renovation-New Building-IOB	\$ 5,230	\$ 50	\$ --	\$ 5,280
Renovation- Old Building	\$ --	\$ 35	\$ --	\$ 35
Structural survey-IOB	\$ 24	\$ --	\$ --	\$ 24
Misc.	\$ 15	\$ --	\$ --	\$ 15
move NXP to IOB	\$ --	\$ 55	\$ --	\$ 55
PSC IOB Manager.	\$ 175	\$ 135	\$ 185	\$ 495
Total – Security Supplemental	\$ 5,779	\$ 275	\$ 185	\$ 6,239
Building Purchase- 636c funds				
IOB/ Adjacent house purchase	\$ 400	\$ --	\$ --	\$ 400
Total – 636c Funds	\$ 400	\$ --	\$ --	\$ 400
Mission OE Funds (a)				
Lease- IOB	\$ --	\$ 134	\$ 134	\$ 268
Furniture-IOB	\$ 6	\$ 6	\$ --	\$ 12
Total – Mission OE Funds	\$ 6	\$ 140	\$ 134	\$ 280
GRAND TOTALS	\$6,185	\$415	\$319	\$6,919

Notes

(a) Mission O.E funds;

The amounts shown in this section totaling \$280,000 for FY 99-FY 01 are also shown in the main R4 OE table for these years. Conversely, the amounts shown above for the Security Supplemental funds and 636c Building purchase funds are not included elsewhere in the main R4 OE table.

CONTROLLER BUDGET NARRATIVE

FY 1999 ESTIMATE: \$1,715,600

REQUEST LEVEL FY 2000: US\$1,606,900, FY 2001: US\$1,725,200

The Regional Financial Management Center in REDSO/ESA has three USDHs and 37 FSNs to support the financial needs of the three strategic objectives through FY 99. Note that one USDH slot is currently empty and the services are being performed by a USPSC. The USAID/Nairobi Controller position is deleted near the end of FY 99 and REDSO/ESA will be providing oversight to the Controller Office that will remain under USAID/Kenya as a separate office.

Resource Code 11.8, FSN Salaries.

FSN salaries and benefits decrease from \$1,016,400 in FY 99 to the request level of \$899,300 in FY 00. The decrease is due to the expected discontinuance of the 15% "Uniform Conditions of Employment" introduced as a result of the bombing in Nairobi. No increase in USDH or FSN staff is anticipated at this time. This may change if the USAID/Nairobi Controller office is merged with the Regional Financial Management Center in REDSO/ESA.

Resource Code 11.8, USPSC Salaries

FY 99 includes \$80,000 to cover USPSC costs necessitated due to the long vacant USDH position in RFMC. It is anticipated that a USDH will be assigned during FY 99 so that FY 00 and FY 01 reflect no costs under this line item.

Resource Code 21 and 22, Post Assignment Travel and Freight

Post Assignment Travel and Freight have been included in FY 99 reflecting the anticipated assignment of a USDH to fill the vacant position in RFMC. No costs appear in FY 00 and FY 01 as REDSO/ESA is a 2-tour assignment and the other 2 USDHs will not have finished their tours during this period.

Resource Code 25.2, Office Security Guard and Residential Security Guard Services

Large increases in security guard services are shown in FY 00 and FY 01. The State Department recently negotiated an extraordinarily large increase in the security guard service contract. For FY 99, REDSO/ESA was advised to reflect a 10% increase over FY 98 actual costs. FY 00 and FY 01 request levels reflect the actual charges that are expected to be incurred by REDSO/ESA.

IV. TABLES

Program Funding (include G. Field Support Table)

FY 1999 Budget Request by Program/Country

Program/Country: REDSO/ESA/GHAI

(Enter either DA/CSD; ESF; NIS; or SEED)

08-Jun-99

10:07 AM

Approp Acct: DA/CSD
Scenario

S.O. #, Title		FY 1999 Request													Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY 99	
		Total	Micro-Enterprise	Agri-culture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Other Health	Environ	D/G			
SSO 1: Effective Program and Technical Support to All ESA Missions																	
Bilateral		2,820	0	215	1,052	0	0	0	550	0	0	0	0	573	430	2,622	4,412
Field Spt		500	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,680	300
		3,320	0	215	1,052	0	0	0	1,050	0	0	0	573	430	4,302	4,712	
SO 2: Increase Utilization of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region																	
Bilateral		2,270	0	1,350	670	0	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,535	2,530
Field Spt		3,077	0	0	0	0	0	325	1,450	500	250	102	450	0	0	2,415	1,577
		5,347	0	1,350	670	0	0	325	1,700	500	250	102	450	0	6,950	4,107	
SO 3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI																	
Bilateral		12,517	0	1,582	7,558	0	0	0	325	0	0	0	1,152	1,900	7,968	24,785	
Field Spt		1,440	0	0	290	0	0	0	675	0	0	0	375	100	2,560	940	
		13,957	0	1,582	7,848	0	0	0	1,000	0	0	0	1,527	2,000	10,528	25,725	
SO 4: Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance																	
Bilateral		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Field Spt		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 5:																	
Bilateral		0															
Field Spt		0															
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 6:																	
Bilateral		0															
Field Spt		0															
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 7:																	
Bilateral		0															
Field Spt		0															
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO 8:																	
Bilateral		0															
Field Spt		0															
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Bilateral		17,607	0	3,147	9,280	0	0	0	1,125	0	0	0	1,725	2,330	15,125	31,727	
Total Field Support		5,017	0	0	290	0	0	325	2,625	500	250	102	825	100	6,655	2,817	
TOTAL PROGRAM		22,624	0	3,147	9,570	0	0	325	3,750	500	250	102	2,550	2,430	21,780	34,544	

FY 99 Request Agency Goal Totals	
Econ Growth	12,717
Democracy	2,430
HCD	0
PHN	4,927
Environment	2,550
Program ICASS	136
GCC (from all Goals)	0

FY 99 Account Distribution (DA only)	
Dev. Assist Program	17,897
Dev. Assist ICASS	125
Dev. Assist Total:	18,022
CSD Program	4,592
CSD ICASS	10
CSD Total:	4,602

Prepare one set of tables for each appropriation Account
Tables for DA and CSD may be combined on one table.
For the DA/CSD Table, columns marked with (*) will be funded from the CSD Account

FY 2000 Budget Request by Program/Country

Program/Country: REDSO/ESA/GHAI

(Enter either DA/CSD; ESF; NIS; or SEED)

08-Jun-99

10:07 AM

Approp Acct: DA/CSD
Scenario

S.O. # , Title		FY 2000 Request														Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY 00
Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Micro-Enterprise	Agri-culture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Other Health	Environ	D/G				
SSO 1: Effective Program and Technical Support to All ESA Missions																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	3,285	0	385	1,110	0	0	0	750	0	0	0	580	460	2,675	5,022		
Field Spt	925	0	0	0	0	0	0	925	0	0	0	0	0	600	625		
	4,210	0	385	1,110	0	0	0	1,675	0	0	0	580	460	3,275	5,647		
SO 2: Increase Utilization of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	2,925	0	1,500	300	0	0	0	125	0	0	1,000	0	0	1,520	3,935		
Field Spt	2,550	0	0	0	0	0	600	800	500	200	200	250	0	2,277	1,850		
	5,475	0	1,500	300	0	0	600	925	500	200	1,200	250	0	3,797	5,785		
SO 3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	13,860	0	815	7,685	0	0	0	250	0	0	0	920	4,190	8,808	29,837		
Field Spt	1,905	0	600	205	0	0	0	750	0	0	0	250	100	1,440	1,405		
	15,765	0	1,415	7,890	0	0	0	1,000	0	0	0	1,170	4,290	10,248	31,242		
SO 4: Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Field Spt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 5:																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	0																
Field Spt	0																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 6:																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	0																
Field Spt	0																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 7:																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	0																
Field Spt	0																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 8:																Year of Final Oblig:	
Bilateral	0																
Field Spt	0																
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total Bilateral	20,070	0	2,700	9,095	0	0	0	1,125	0	0	1,000	1,500	4,650	13,003	38,794		
Total Field Support	5,380	0	600	205	0	0	600	2,475	500	200	200	500	100	4,317	3,880		
TOTAL PROGRAM	25,450	0	3,300	9,300	0	0	600	3,600	500	200	1,200	2,000	4,750	17,320	42,674		

FY 00 Request Agency Goal Totals	
Econ Growth	12,600
Democracy	4,750
HCD	0
PHN	6,100
Environment	2,000
Program ICASS	149
GCC (from all Goals)	0

FY 00 Account Distribution (DA only)	
Dev. Assist Program	19,812
Dev. Assist ICASS	138
Dev. Assist Total:	19,950
CSD Program	5,489
CSD ICASS	11
CSD Total:	5,500

Prepare one set of tables for each appropriation Account
Tables for DA and CSD may be combined on one table.
For the DA/CSD Table, columns marked with (*) will be funded from the CSD Account

FY 2001 Budget Request by Program/Country

Program/Country: REDSO/ESA/GHAI

(Enter either DA/CSD; ESF; NIS; or SEED)

08-Jun-99

10:07 AM

Approp Acct: DA/SCD
Scenario

S.O. # , Title		FY 20001 Request														Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY 01	Future Cost (POST-2001)
Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Micro-Enterprise	Agri-culture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Other Health	Environ	D/G					
SSO 1: Effective Program and Technical Support to All ESA Missions																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	3,320	0	400	1,150	0	0	0	700	0	0	0	590	480	3,076	5,266			
Field Spt	950	0	0	0	0	0	0	625	0	325	0	0	0	925	650			
	4,270	0	400	1,150	0	0	0	1,325	0	325	0	590	480	4,001	5,916	0		
SO 2: Increase Utilization of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	2,350	0	1,500	350	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	3,496	2,789			
Field Spt	3,550	0	0	0	0	0	800	1,550	500	500	200	0	0	2,850	2,550			
	5,900	0	1,500	350	0	0	800	2,050	500	500	200	0	0	6,346	5,339	0		
SO 3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	15,080	0	1,170	7,935	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	1,060	4,415	12,308	32,594			
Field Spt	1,870	0	500	215	0	0	0	700	0	0	0	350	105	1,905	1,370			
	16,950	0	1,670	8,150	0	0	0	1,200	0	0	0	1,410	4,520	14,213	33,964	0		
SO 4: Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	0																	
Field Spt	0																	
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 5:																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	0																	
Field Spt	0																	
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 6:																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	0																	
Field Spt	0																	
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 7:																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	0																	
Field Spt	0																	
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
SO 8:																Year of Final Oblig:		
Bilateral	0																	
Field Spt	0																	
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total Bilateral	20,750	0	3,070	9,435	0	0	0	1,700	0	0	0	1,650	4,895	18,880	40,649	0		
Total Field Support	6,370	0	500	215	0	0	800	2,875	500	825	200	350	105	5,680	4,570	0		
TOTAL PROGRAM	27,120	0	3,570	9,650	0	0	800	4,575	500	825	200	2,000	5,000	24,560	45,219	0		

FY 01 Request Agency Goal Totals	
Econ Growth	13,220
Democracy	5,000
HCD	0
PHN	6,900
Environment	2,000
Program ICASS	164
GCC (from all Goals)	0

FY 01 Account Distribution (DA only)	
Dev. Assist Program	20,869
Dev. Assist ICASS	151
Dev. Assist Total:	21,020
CSD Program	6,087
CSD ICASS	13
CSD Total:	6,100

Prepare one set of tables for each appropriation Account
Tables for DA and CSD may be combined on one table.
For the DA/CSD Table, columns marked with (*) will be funded from the CSD Account

GLOBAL FIELD SUPPORT

Objective Name	Field Support: Activity Title & Number	Priority *	Duration	Estimated Funding (\$000)					
				FY 1999		FY 2000		FY 2001	
				Obligated by:		Obligated by:		Obligated by:	
				REDSO/ESA	Global Bureau	REDSO/ESA	Global Bureau	REDSO/ESA	Global Bureau
S.S.O. 1: Effective Program & Technical Support to All ESA Missions	Adolescent Reproductive Health Advisor (Fellow) /PLN(936-3070)			0	150	0	225	0	225
S.S.O. 1: Effective Program & Technical Support to All ESA Missions	Child and Reproductive Health Advisor (Fellow)/PLN(936-3070)			0	250	0	300	0	300
S.S.O. 1: Effective Program & Technical Support to All ESA Missions	HIV/AIDS Advisor (TAACS) /(936-5970)			0	0	0	300	0	325
S.S.O. 1: Effective Program & Technical Support to All ESA Missions	Michigan Population Fellow/MPFP(936-3054)			0	100	0	100	0	100
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Center for Disease Control/CDC- (936-5994) - PASA			0	200	0	200	0	200
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Partners for Health Reform/PHR- Abt Associates (936-5974.13)			0	420	0	0	0	500
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Family Planning Logistic Mgmt/FPLM Carry Over(936-3038.02)			0	95	0	0	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Family Planning Logistic Mgmt/FPLM (936-3038.02)			0	150	0	0	0	350
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Rational Pharmaceutical Mgmt/RPM- MSH (936-5974.08)			0	100	0	400	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	AVSC (936-3068)			0	200	0	300	0	500
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Maternal & Neonatal Hlth/JHPIEGO (936-3092)			0	300	0	700	0	500
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Training in Reproductive Health III/ JHPIEGO (936-3069)			0	175	0	0	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Training in Reproductive Health III/ JHPIEGO (936-3069) Carry Over			0	200	0	0	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	AIDS Social Marketing(AIDSMARK) FHI (936-3090.02)			0	200	0	300	0	400
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	QualityAssurance II/Center for Human Services (936-5992.02)			0	75	0	0	0	200
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	HIV/AIDS/PATHFINDER/936-3062			0	130	0	0	0	100
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Contraceptive Technology Research/FHI (936-3079)			0	50	0	0	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Population Council Program (936-3050)			0	75	0	200	0	200
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Info. Edu.& Comm. Support Project (936-3052)			0	150	0	0	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Policy Project -Future Group Intern'l (936-3078)			0	50	0	0	0	100

S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	LINKAGES Academy for Educ. Devpt/936-3082.01			0	352	0	0	0	500
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Training Health/INTRAH (936-3072)			0	0	0	200	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Serengeti-Mara Ecos/Global Livestock CRSP (931-1328)			0	0	0	250	0	0
S.O.2: Increased Use of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision-Makers in the Region	Reg. Intergrated Coastal Zone Mgnt - URI/ (936-5518)			0	450	0	0	0	0
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	D/G Fellow D/G - (936-SS04)			0	100	0	100	0	105
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	Training in Reproductive Health III (JHPIEGO) - (936-3069)			0	300	0	0	0	300
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	Training in Reproductive Health III (JHPIEGO) - (936-3069) Carry Over			0	300				
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	AID Social Marketing(AIDSMARK)- FPI/Impact - (936-3090.02)			0	100	0	100	0	100
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	Micronutrient Op. Strategies & Technologies - (936-3094.01)/AED			0	150	0	350	0	0
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	QualityAssurance II - (936-5992.02)			0	100	0	0	0	0
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	AAAS Fellow - REDSO/ESA - (936-5861)			0	100	0	105	0	110
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	AAAS Fellow - GHAI/W - (936-5861)			0	90	0	100	0	105
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	INTSORMIL- (931-1254)			0	0	0	600	0	500
S.O.3: Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI	Env. Impact Assessment - EPIQ(936-5743)			0	375	0	250	0	350
Grand Total.....				0	5,487	0	5,080	0	6,070

OE Tables

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: REDSO/EA Org. No: 21623 OC		Overseas Mission Budgets														
		FY 1999 Estimate			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request			FY 2001 Target			FY 2001 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total												
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH	55.2		55.2	49.6		49.6	49.6		49.6	55		55	55		55
	Subtotal OC 11.1	55.2	0	55.2	49.6	0	49.6	49.6	0	49.6	55	0	55	55	0	55
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH			0			0			0			0			0
11.5	FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries	176.4		176.4	92.1		92.1	92.1		92.1	96.3		96.3	96.3		96.3
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	1240		1240	1081.6		1081.6	1081.6		1081.6	1113		1113	1113		1113
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	1416.4	0	1416.4	1173.7	0	1173.7	1173.7	0	1173.7	1209.3	0	1209.3	1209.3	0	1209.3
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances	293		293	395.3		395.3	395.3		395.3	389.7		389.7	389.7		389.7
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	23		23	23		23	25.3		25.3	23		23	27.8		27.8
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0
12.1	Quarters Allowances	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits	31.1		31.1	14.2		14.2	14.2		14.2	12.9		12.9	12.9		12.9
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	** Payments to FSN Voluntary Separation Fund - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits	13.3		13.3	12.2		12.2	12.2		12.2	13.3		13.3	13.3		13.3
12.1	US PSC Benefits			0			0	0		0			0			0
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	** Payments to the FSN Voluntary Separation Fund - FN PSC			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits	259		259	227		227	241.5		241.5	233.5		233.5	248		248
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	619.4	0	619.4	671.7	0	671.7	688.5	0	688.5	672.4	0	672.4	691.7	0	691.7
13.0	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	Severance Payments for FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13.0	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13.0	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
13.0	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21.0	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Training Travel	56		56	85		85	85		85	86		86	90		90
21.0	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Post Assignment Travel - to field	84		84	48		48	48		48	33		33	33		33
21.0	Assignment to Washington Travel	31.8		31.8			0			0			0			0

Operating Expenses

25.1	Engineering & Technical Services														
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line													
25.2	Office Security Guards	40		40	45		45	45		45	45	45		45	45
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services	172.3		172.3	189.2		189.2	619.2		619.2	205		205	619.2	619.2
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Representation Allowances	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1	2.1
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees	1.5		1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5	1.5
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Manpower Contracts	22		22	25		25	25		25	25		25	25	25
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0			0			0			0		0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services	65.5		65.5	80		80	85		85	80		80	85	85
25.2	Staff training contracts	65		65	80		80	120		120	80		80	120	120
25.2	ADP related contracts			0			0			0			0		0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	368.4	0	368.4	422.8	0	422.8	897.8	0	897.8	438.6	0	438.6	897.8	897.8
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government accounts	Do not enter data on this line													
25.3	ICASS	253.1		253.1	253.1		253.1	253.1		253.1	253.1		253.1	253.1	253.1
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0			0			0			0		0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	253.1	0	253.1	253.1	0	253.1	253.1	0	253.1	253.1	0	253.1	253.1	253.1
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line													
25.4	Office building Maintenance	10		10	20		20	45		45	20		20	25	25
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance	65		65	65		65	85		85	65		65	85	85
	Subtotal OC 25.4	75	0	75	85	0	85	130	0	130	85	0	85	110	110
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line													
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs			0			0			0			0		0
25.7	Storage Services			0			0			0			0		0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	10		10	10		10	25		25	10		10	25	25
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance	8.1		8.1	10.8		10.8	10.8		10.8	10.8		10.8	13	13
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	20		20	28.8		28.8	28.8		28.8	28.8		28.8	28.8	28.8
	Subtotal OC 25.7	38.1	0	38.1	49.6	0	49.6	64.6	0	64.6	49.6	0	49.6	66.8	66.8
25.8	Subsistence & spt. of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0			0		0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26.0	Supplies and materials	90		90	90		90	90		90	90		90	90	90
	Subtotal OC 26.0	90	0	90	90	0	90	90	0	90	90	0	90	90	90
31.0	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line													
31.0	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.	30		30	75		75	75		75	43.6		43.6	75	75
31.0	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.	45		45	45		45	45		45	45		45	45	45
31.0	Purchase of Vehicles	30		30	30		30	30		30	30		30	30	30

Operating Expenses

31.0	Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
31.0	ADP Hardware purchases	15	15	56.8	56.8	56.8	56.8	58.2	58.2	58.2	58.2	58.2	58.2			
31.0	ADP Software purchases	15	15	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16			
	Subtotal OC 31.0	135	0	135	222.8	0	222.8	222.8	0	222.8	192.8	0	192.8	224.2	0	224.2
32.0	Lands and structures	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32.0	Purchase of Land & Buildings (& bldg. construction)	0			0			0			0			0		
32.0	Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings	0			0			0			0			0		
32.0	Building Renovations/Alterations - Office	14.2		14.2			0			0			0			0
32.0	Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential	0			0			0			0			0		
	Subtotal OC 32.0	14.2	0	14.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42.0	Claims and indemnities	0			0			0			0			0		
	Subtotal OC 42.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL BUDGET		5200	0	5200	5200	0	5200	5759.8	0	5759.8	5200	0	5200	5878.3	0	5878.3

Additional Mandatory Information

Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases
Exchange Rate Used in Computations

<u>2976.2</u>	<u>2957.8</u>	<u>3402.2</u>	<u>3054.3</u>	<u>3483</u>
<u>60</u> _____				

** If data is shown on either of these lines, you MUST submit the form showing deposits to and withdrawals from the FSN Voluntary Separation Fund.
 On that form, OE funded deposits must equal:

0	0	0	0	0
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Controller Operations

Org. Title: REDSO/EA Org. No: 21623 OC		Overseas Mission Budgets														
		FY 1999 Estimate			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request			FY 2001 Target			FY 2001 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total												
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH	55.2		55.2	49.6		49.6	49.6		49.6	55		55	55		55
	Subtotal OC 11.1	55.2	0	55.2	49.6	0	49.6	49.6	0	49.6	55	0	55	55	0	55
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH			0			0			0			0			0
11.5	FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries	80		80	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	784.7		784.7	685.5		685.5	685.5		685.5	742.6		742.6	742.6		742.6
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	864.7	0	864.7	685.5	0	685.5	685.5	0	685.5	742.6	0	742.6	742.6	0	742.6
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances	44		44	45.8		45.8	45.8		45.8	45.8		45.8	45.8		45.8
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	4		4	4.4		4.4	4.4		4.4	4.8		4.8	4.8		4.8
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Quarters Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits	2.9		2.9	1.7		1.7	1.7		1.7	1.7		1.7	1.7		1.7
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	** Payments to FSN Voluntary Separation Fund - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits	13.3		13.3	12.2		12.2	12.2		12.2	13.3		13.3	13.3		13.3
12.1	US PSC Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	** Payments to the FSN Voluntary Separation Fund - FN PSC			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits	163.2		163.2	142.9		142.9	152		152	154.6		154.6	164.2		164.2
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	227.4	0	227.4	207	0	207	216.1	0	216.1	220.2	0	220.2	229.8	0	229.8
13.0	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	Severance Payments for FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13.0	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13.0	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13.0	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
13.0	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21.0	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Training Travel	25		25	35		35	35		35	35		35	40		40
21.0	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21.0	Post Assignment Travel - to field	12		12	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0
21.0	Assignment to Washington Travel			0			0			0			0			0

Controller Operations

21.0	Home Leave Travel	6.6	6.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	12	12	12	12					
21.0	R & R Travel	23.4	23.4	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2					
21.0	Education Travel		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Evacuation Travel	2.6	2.6	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9					
21.0	Retirement Travel	6.6	6.6		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line						
21.0	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5	17.5					
21.0	Site Visits - Mission Personnel	40	40	41.6	41.6	41.6	41.6	41.6	41.6	45.5	45.5					
21.0	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	8.4	8.4	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15					
21.0	Assessment Travel		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Impact Evaluation Travel		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Recruitment Travel		0		0		0		0		0					
21.0	Other Operational Travel	2	2	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4					
	Subtotal OC 21.0	144.1	0	144.1	135.2	0	135.2	135.2	0	135.2	144.6	0	144.6	153.5	0	153.5
22.0	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line						
22.0	Post assignment freight	31.8	31.8		0		0		0		0					
22.0	Home Leave Freight	10	10	27.6	27.6	27.6	27.6	42.6	42.6	42.6	42.6					
22.0	Retirement Freight	23.8	23.8		0		0		0		0					
22.0	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.	2	2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6					
22.0	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.	1.9	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6					
	Subtotal OC 22.0	69.5	0	69.5	32.6	0	32.6	32.6	0	32.6	47.8	0	47.8	47.8	0	47.8
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line						
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space	48.6	48.6	55.8	55.8	55.8	55.8	64.2	64.2	64.2	64.2					
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Warehouse Space	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1					
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2	57.2					
	Subtotal OC 23.2	108.2	0	108.2	115.7	0	115.7	115.7	0	115.7	124.5	0	124.5	124.5	0	124.5
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line						
23.3	Office Utilities	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3					
23.3	Residential Utilities	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6					
23.3	Telephone Costs	20	20	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30					
23.3	ADP Software Leases		0		0		0		0		0					
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease		0		0		0		0		0					
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing		0		0		0		0		0					
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)		0		0		0		0		0					
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs		0		0		0		0		0					
23.3	Courier Services	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3					
	Subtotal OC 23.3	38.8	0	38.8	48.8	0	48.8	48.9	0	48.9	48.8	0	48.8	48.9	0	48.9
24.0	Printing and Reproduction	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5					
	Subtotal OC 24.0	2.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line		Do not enter data on this line						
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations		0		0		0		0		0					
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services		0		0		0		0		0					

Controller Operations

25.1	Engineering & Technical Services			0		0		0		0		0		0
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line												
25.2	Office Security Guards	5.8		5.8	5.9		5.9	5.9		5.9	5.9		5.9	5.9
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services	24.5		24.5	27		27	88.5		88.5	29.6		29.6	88.5
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Representation Allowances			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees	0.5		0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Manpower Contracts	4.6		4.6	5.2		5.2	5.2		5.2	5.2		5.2	5.2
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services	20		20	21.6		21.6	21.6		21.6	21.6		21.6	21.6
25.2	Staff training contracts	21.6		21.6	25		25	40		40	25		25	40
25.2	ADP related contracts			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	77	0	77	85.2	0	85.2	161.7	0	161.7	87.8	0	87.8	161.7
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government accounts	Do not enter data on this line												
25.3	ICASS	31		31	31		31	31		31	31		31	31
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	31	0	31	31	0	31	31	0	31	31	0	31	31
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line												
25.4	Office building Maintenance	1.3		1.3	2.6		2.6	5.9		5.9	2.6		2.6	3.3
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance	11.2		11.2	11.7		11.7	15.3		15.3	11.7		11.7	15.3
	Subtotal OC 25.4	12.5	0	12.5	14.3	0	14.3	21.2	0	21.2	14.3	0	14.3	18.6
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line												
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.7	Storage Services			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	2.5		2.5	2.5		2.5	6.3		6.3	2.5		2.5	6.3
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance	1		1	2		2	2		2	2		2	2
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	4.2		4.2	3.8		3.8	3.8		3.8	3.8		3.8	3.8
	Subtotal OC 25.7	7.7	0	7.7	8.3	0	8.3	12.1	0	12.1	8.3	0	8.3	12.1
25.8	Subsistence & spt. of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26.0	Supplies and materials	32		32	32		32	32		32	32		32	32
	Subtotal OC 26.0	32	0	32	32	0	32	32	0	32	32	0	32	32
31.0	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line												
31.0	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.	4.6		4.6	11.5		11.5	11.5		11.5	6.7		6.7	11.5
31.0	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.	15.5		15.5	13.8		13.8	13.8		13.8	13.8		13.8	13.8
31.0	Purchase of Vehicles	5		5	5		5	5		5	5		5	5

Workforce Tables

Workforce Tables

Org 21623									Total	Org.	Fin.	Admin.	Con-	All	Total	Total	
End of year On-Board									SO/SpO	Mgmt.	Mgmt	Mgmt	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff
FY 1999 Estimate	SSO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2	SO/SpO	Mgmt.	Mgmt	Mgmt	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff	
OE Funded: 1/																	
U.S. Direct Hire		3	1	4				8	4	3	0	4	2		13	21	
Other U.S. Citizens								0	1						1	1	
FSN/TCN Direct Hire								0		1					1	1	
Other FSN/TCN		5	3	3				11	5	34	0	7	2		48	59	
Subtotal	0	8	4	7	0	0	0	19	10	38	0	11	4	0	63	82	
Program Funded 1/																	
U.S. Citizens	9		4	3				16							0	16	
FSNs/TCNs	4		5					9	1						1	10	
Subtotal	13	0	9	3	0	0	0	25	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	26	
Total Direct Workforce	13	8	13	10	0	0	0	44	11	38	0	11	4	0	64	108	
TAACS	1							1							0	1	
Fellows	4		3					7							0	7	
IDIs/PASA	0		2					2							0	2	
Subtotal	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	
TOTAL WORKFORCE	18	8	18	10	0	0	0	54	11	38	0	11	4	0	64	118	

1/ Excludes TAACS, Fellows, and IDIs

Workforce Tables

Org 21623								Total	Org.	Fin.	Admin.	Con-	All		Total	Total	
End of year On-Board	SSO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2	SO/SpO	Mgmt.	Mgmt	Mgmt	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff	
FY 2000 Target																	
OE Funded: 1/																	
U.S. Direct Hire		3	1	4				8	4	3	0	4	2		13	21	
Other U.S. Citizens								0	1						1	1	
FSN/TCN Direct Hire								0		1					1	1	
Other FSN/TCN		5	3	3				11	5	34	0	7	2		48	59	
Subtotal	0	8	4	7	0	0	0	19	10	38	0	11	4	0	63	82	
Program Funded 1/																	
U.S. Citizens	9		4	3				16							0	16	
FSNs/TCNs	4		5					9	1						1	10	
Subtotal	13	0	9	3	0	0	0	25	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	26	
Total Direct Workforce	13	8	13	10	0	0	0	44	11	38	0	11	4	0	64	108	
TAACS	1							1							0	1	
Fellows	4		3					7							0	7	
IDIs			2					2							0	2	
Subtotal	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	
TOTAL WORKFORCE	18	8	18	10	0	0	0	54	11	38	0	11	4	0	64	118	

FY 2000 Request																	
OE Funded: 1/																	
U.S. Direct Hire		3	1	4				8	4	3	0	4	2		13	21	
Other U.S. Citizens								0	1						1	1	
FSN/TCN Direct Hire								0		1					1	1	
Other FSN/TCN		5	3	3				11	7	34	0	7	2		50	61	
Subtotal	0	8	4	7	0	0	0	19	12	38	0	11	4	0	65	84	
Program Funded 1/																	
U.S. Citizens	9		4	3				16	1						1	17	
FSNs/TCNs	4	3	6					13	4						4	17	
Subtotal	13	3	10	3	0	0	0	29	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	34	
Total Direct Workforce	13	11	14	10	0	0	0	48	17	38	0	11	4	0	70	118	
TAACS	1							1							0	1	
Fellows	4		3					7							0	7	
IDIs			2					2							0	2	
Subtotal	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	
TOTAL WORKFORCE	18	11	19	10	0	0	0	58	17	38	0	11	4	0	70	128	

1/ Excludes TAACS, Fellows, and IDIs

Workforce Tables

Org_ 21623									Total						Total	Total
End of year On-Board								SO/SpO	Org.	Fin.	Admin.	Con-	All	Total	Total	
FY 2001 Target	SSO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2	Staff	Mgmt.	Mgmt	Mgmt	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff
OE Funded: 1/																
U.S. Direct Hire		3	1	4				8	4	3		4	2		13	21
Other U.S. Citizens								0	1						1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire								0		1					1	1
Other FSN/TCN		5	3	3				11	5	34	0	7	2		48	59
Subtotal	0	8	4	7	0	0	0	19	10	38	0	11	4	0	63	82
Program Funded 1/																
U.S. Citizens	9		4	3				16							0	16
FSNs/TCNs	4		5					9	1						1	10
Subtotal	13	0	9	3	0	0	0	25	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	26
Total Direct Workforce	13	8	13	10	0	0	0	44	11	38	0	11	4	0	64	108
TAACS	1							1							0	1
Fellows	4		3					7							0	7
IDIs			2					2							0	2
Subtotal	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
TOTAL WORKFORCE	18	8	18	10	0	0	0	54	11	38	0	11	4	0	64	118

FY 2001 Request									Total						Total	Total
End of year On-Board								SO/SpO	Org.	Fin.	Admin.	Con-	All	Total	Total	
FY 2001 Request	SSO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SO 5	SpO1	SpO2	Staff	Mgmt.	Mgmt	Mgmt	tract	Legal	Other	Mgmt.	Staff
OE Funded: 1/																
U.S. Direct Hire		3	1	4				8	4	3		4	2		13	21
Other U.S. Citizens								0	1						1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire								0		1					1	1
Other FSN/TCN	0	5	3	3				11	7	34	0	7	2		50	61
Subtotal	0	8	4	7	0	0	0	19	12	38	0	11	4	0	65	84
Program Funded 1/																
U.S. Citizens	9		4	3				16	1						1	17
FSNs/TCNs	4	3	6					13	4						4	17
Subtotal	13	3	10	3	0	0	0	29	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	34
Total Direct Workforce	13	11	14	10	0	0	0	48	17	38	0	11	4	0	70	118
TAACS	1							1							0	1
Fellows	4		3					7							0	7
IDIs			2					2							0	2
Subtotal	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
TOTAL WORKFORCE	18	11	19	10	0	0	0	58	17	38	0	11	4	0	70	128

1/ Excludes TAACS, Fellows, and IDIs

USDH Staffing Table

MISSION :

REDSO/ESA

USDH STAFFING REQUIREMENTS BY SKILL CODE

BACKSTOP (BS)	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 1999	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2000	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2001	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2002
01 SMG	2	2	2	2
02 Program Officer	1	1	1	1
03 EXO				
04 Controller	3	3	3	3
05/06/07 Secretary				
10 Agriculture	1	1	1	1
11 Economics	1	1	1	1
12 GDO				
12 Democracy				
14 Rural Development				
15 Food for Peace	3	3	3	3
21 Private Enterprise				
25 Engineering				
40 Environment				
50 Health/Pop.	1	1	1	1
60 Education				
75 Physical Sciences				
85 Legal	2	2	2	2
92 Commodity Mgt				
93 Contract Mgt	4	4	4	4
94 PDO	3	3	3	3
95 IDI				
Other*				
TOTAL	21	21	21	21

Please e-mail this worksheet
in either Lotus or Excel to:
Maribeth Zankowski
@hr.ppim@aidw
as well as include it with
your R4 submission.

*please list occupations covered by other if there are any

ANNEX A

USAID/REDSO/ESA Environmental Review Status, Plans and Schedule¹

ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES	FY 98 and previous	FY 99	Comments
SO #2 Increased Utilization of Critical Information by USAID and Other Decision Makers in the Region			
GHA Food Security and Conflict Management: 623-1001	28ghai1. Cat Ex covers only FY 98 funds. Covers both SO2 & SO3 activities.	Future activities deferred. Amend Cat Ex or prepare several topic- or new SO-specific ones.	EG/Private Sector, DG/Conflict, Ag & Food Security, PHN, E/NRM, Humanitarian/ Transition Initiatives and Cross-Cutting activities covered.
LSGA Commonwealth Reg Cmnty Health Secretariat: 698-0483.23	28rdsoe3. Cat Ex.	No action needed until FY 00 funding, unless new SO structure.	Activities beyond current funding deferred. Incorporate in any consolidated Cat Ex/IEE.
Center for Arican Family Studies	1993 Cat Ex.	No action needed.	Incorporate in any consolidated Cat Ex/IEE.
Partnership for EG in ESA: 623-1001, 698-0546 & 698-0570	28rdsoe2. Cat Ex covers only FY 98 funds.	Future activities deferred. Amend or new SO-specific Cat Ex/IEE.	Incorporate in any consolidated Cat Ex/IEE.
SO #3 Establish a Strong Basis for Implementation of the GHAI			
GHA Food Security and Conflict Management: 623-1001	28ghai1. iee does not cover PARTS funding of ASARECA and IARCs grants.	IEE draft for env screening/review of sub-grants. Process initiated.	IEE for IARCs and ASARECA needs completion and BEO approval. No sub-grants yet awarded.
African Dialogue Center: 623-0005	27ghai1. Cat Ex covered FY 97 only.	No additional funding; no action.	No cost extension in 98; no change in activities.
Horn of Africa Support Project: (HASP): 623-0006	27ghai2. Neg Det/Conditions for env. screening/review of NGO grants & implementing IGAD profiles. Cat Ex profile design.	Monitor env. screening/review process. Status reports to BEO.	Amend IEE if IGAD project profile activities do not lend themselves to umbrella screening/review.
SO #4 Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance			
Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR): 623-0008	28rdsoe1. Neg Det/Conditions for umbrella env. screening/review of grantmaking. Cat Ex for other activities.	Monitor env. screening & review process. Status reports to BEO. Amend IEE for new activity.	New activity for administration of justice, likely Categorical Exclusion.
Somalia			
Economic Planning Project: 649-0142	27som1. 94 Cat Ex continued through 9/98.	Memo to files re continued Cat Ex	Extended through FY 2000.
Administrative Management: 649-0144	27som2. Neg Det/Conditions to document EU env assmn't of roads. Cat Ex ADRA admin mgt.	Office to monitor EU's continued intent to do env. assmn't.	EU funding not yet available. No roads yet implemented.

Note: Activities in compliance. Deferrals will be resolved in FY 99 as information becomes available. Number of new IEEs/Cat Ex depends on SO structure.

¹SSO1 Effective Program and Technical Support to All ESA Missions excluded from table as it has not needed 22 CFR 216 documentation.

ANNEX B

REDSO/ESA

Cross-Cutting Themes: Gender The Eastern African Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women

Introduction

Regional institutions are increasingly taking on the challenge of ameliorating the continuing economic, social and militaristic crises plaguing Africa. Most of these institutions are at a nascent stage of growth and will need technical and financial support before they can effectively carry out their mandate. REDSO/ESA assistance in the east and southern Africa region is designed to establish an environment that will nurture the seeds for making peace and enabling development. Integral to these efforts is the realization that gender plays a pertinent and critical role in areas as diverse as macroeconomics, international trade, humanitarian affairs, and health and poverty eradication. REDSO/ESA considers gender to be one of the five priority crosscutting themes critical to its development successes in the region.

Increasing regional demands for the implementation of the Beijing Declaration provides evidence that issues of gender equity, equality and empowerment are now seen as a means to poverty reduction, promotion of human rights, and making democratization more effective. This approach addresses the needs of both men and women. In providing support to the Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EA-SSI), REDSO seeks to assist in defining issues and strengthening knowledge on gender equality. The assistance provided will facilitate efficient tracking and documentation of the integration of gender perspectives within the eastern Africa region, and create the basis for advocacy on issues pledged by governments in the Beijing Platform for Action.

The Development Challenge

The key challenge has been to translate commitments made at international meetings to the development of an action agenda. In the East Africa region, national gender policies are being defined within the framework of the Beijing commitments and the Africa Platform for Action. REDSO/ESA is striving to ensure that regional women's organizations seeking to address the implementation of these priority-setting documents have the means to do so. This regional approach focuses on the development of institutional and resource capacity to address the non-availability of quality information needed to support women in their efforts to address gender issues in the region. The support provided to the **Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EA-SSI)** is an excellent example of how USAID is effectively promoting regionalism and African ownership.

The Eastern African Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI)

The best demonstration of African women's leadership following the Beijing meetings in 1996, has been the establishment of sub-regional women's initiatives. The Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women emerged from the Kampala Forum, held in Uganda. The EA-SSI, headquartered in Kampala, is a sub-regional network of NGOs and government departments with national focal points in 8 Greater Horn of Africa countries. In 1997, REDSO/ESA became the sole donor/partner to the EA-SSI. The objective of REDSO/ESA's support was to assist the EA-SSI establish the capacity to develop systems and structures for monitoring the implementation of the regional commitments to the Africa Platform for Action and the Beijing Declaration.

Specifically, REDSO/ESA is supporting the EA-SSI to collect information on the changing status of women at the sub-regional, national and local levels. The EA-SSI is using the country data developed for the 1995 Beijing Conference as baseline information. While there are many gaps in the available information, it is now clear that there is a lot of information that has been generated and never analyzed nor is it being utilized for informing the development process.

Over the past year and a half, REDSO/ESA's support to EA-SSI has focussed on achieving the following three objectives:

- (1) Assisting the EA-SSI to develop its institutional capacity for service delivery;
- (2) Supporting the development of the regional database that is composed of country specific reports. This data identifies the social and economic status of women by geographical region within each country. The data serves as the basis for advocating on critical issues affecting women in the region; and ,
- (3) Developing a monitoring and evaluation tool to track changes in the status of women in the region. This monitoring tool is intended to map and assess women's advancement through the implementation of the African and Global Platforms for Action and the Beijing Declaration.

Key Results

Specific results achieved by the EA-SSI:

- (1) The compilation of the database has been completed and is now providing information on the progress and constraints member countries and women's organizations have in the implementation of the African and Beijing Platforms for Action. This information is currently being disseminated to member countries, women's organizations, governments and donors. The information is being provided through the EA-SSI newsletter, "The East Africa Initiatives".

- (2) The monitoring and evaluation tool for the implementation of the Africa and Beijing Platforms for Action now forms an integral part of the information management system for the EA-SSI. This tool was presented, and formed the basis for discussions on monitoring the implementation of the National Action Plans, at the ECA Sub-Regional Follow-up Meeting on the Implementation of the Dakar (African) and Beijing Platforms of Action in Eastern and Southern Africa, held in Mahe, Seychelles in February 1999.
- (3) The EA-SSI has also launched several special initiatives associated with:
- (a) The East African Treaty: The re-emergence of the East Africa Cooperation (EAC)- to enhance economic development in the east Africa region- has special significance for women in the promotion of equity in economic and political cooperation. The draft treaty lacks a human rights dimension and is silent on issues of poverty and illiteracy, both, major constraints to women participating in and receiving recognition for their contributions to economic and social development in the east Africa region. The EA-SSI, in collaboration with the Federation of Women Lawyers, (FIDA-Kenya), the Women in Law and Development, (WILDAF), and Akina Mama wa Afrika, reviewed and recommended input into the draft treaty. This has resulted in the creation of a gender unit at the EAC Secretariat to address gender issues within the EAC.
 - (b) Women and Land: Women's marginalization in the region is linked to their level of poverty. This is related to women's limited access to and ownership of land and control over the factors of production. EA-SSI has launched a regional study focusing on women's independent rights over land and ownership and avenues for enhancing their rights. The recommendations of the study will focus on increasing opportunities for women to own land.
 - (c) The Gender Budget Initiative: In an attempt to analyze country/national budgets with a focus on gender concerns, the EA-SSI is drawing attention to issues of resource allocation as they relate to the Beijing Platform of Action. Recognizing that as a regional organization it does not have the capacity to implement the gender budget initiative, EA-SSI has taken on the role of documenting and sharing information with partners. This process involves developing effective strategies for information exchange and sensitization of women groups and others involved in the budget process.

Performance and Prospects

In the relatively short period of time that EA-SSI has been operational the problems of data overload and the need for consistently relevant and timely data have emerged. It is slowly becoming evident that not all gender issues are measurable and data is not always available for many issues that can be measured. There is far more data available with donors, partners, women's organizations and governments than had been initially anticipated. It is critical that EA-SSI have the capacity to determine which issues should be addressed and establish priorities for analysis that will inform policies.

Gender statistics will need to go beyond the sex-disaggregation of indicators and establish a system to analyze the data produced. Finally, there is an increasing need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for the promotion, monitoring and advocacy of regional policies that advance the status of women.

Conclusion

In supporting the EA-SSI activity, REDSO/ESA is now complemented by the UNDP, UNIFEM, the Africa Development Bank, the ECA and the Netherlands Government. While there is a general acknowledgment that increased attention needs to be paid to supporting the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies at both the regional and national levels, developmental policies and approaches at sectoral levels remain badly disconnected on gender equity issues. This gives rise to challenges of coordination, even within USAID, on issues affecting gender. Support to the EA-SSI is thus merely one approach that REDSO is using to support the integration of gender into development processes. There is still a continuing need to emphasize the systematic use of gender analysis in the design and preparation of strategic plans, programs and activities, so as to ensure that a gender perspective is apparent. To advance this, REDSO envisages an extension to the current two-year grant to enable EA-SSI undertake an interim evaluation of its program, allow for stabilization of on-going activities, and develop the necessary mechanisms to strengthen the promotion, monitoring and advocacy of regional policies that advance the position of women. By creating linkages with the EA-SSI, it will now be possible for REDSO to measure its work against the priorities established by African women in the region.

Annex C

**SOMALIA R4-LIKE DOCUMENT
R4 2001**

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PART I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Somalia has been without a central government since dictator Mohamed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991. Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the killing, dislocation and starvation of thousands of Somalis.

Eight years later, Somalia now ranks at the absolute bottom of UNDP's Human Development Index: the average life expectancy is between 41 and 43 years of age; the adult literacy rate is barely 15%; and over 25% of children will never reach five years of age. Unfortunately, there was no miraculous turnaround in 1998; El Nino floods, a Saudi livestock ban, rat and insect infestations, pitched battles in Bay and Bakool regions, and later in the year, drought conditions, have all ensured Somalia's undisputed status as the most luckless country on earth.

Against this backdrop, it is all too easy to dismiss Somalia as hopeless, undeserving of anything more than basic humanitarian aid. In reality, though, while Somalia is certainly the epitome of a complex emergency, refusing to recognize the positive development results being achieved would be a disservice to REDSO/Somalia's and the international community's efforts to mitigate and improve the situation in a number of areas.

USAID has played a large role in preventing Somalia conditions from worsening -- there is no widespread starvation, no large outflow of refugees as we saw only a few years ago -- and we are indeed helping to strengthen certain sectors in targeted areas. In addition to the traditional "humanitarian" response being undertaken in Somalia, such as free food distributions, and emergency health and water interventions, USAID has also, through our implementing partners, helped rehabilitate numerous irrigation canals, river dikes, and farm-to-market roads. As a result, farmers have tended to stay on their land, planting more, and in time should realize larger and better quality harvests.

In the absence of a central government and in order to help Somalis rebuild the country from the bottom up, USAID has helped build the capacity of local authorities and civil society through technical support to regional/district administrations and indigenous NGOs. The formation in 1998 of Puntland state, an autonomous tri-regional authority in the Northeast, as well as its northwestern neighbor, Somaliland, augurs well for the future of those regions and the potential for development programs there.

The continuing Saudi Arabian ban on livestock from the Horn, due to the suspected presence of Rift Valley Fever during the floods, has severely affected Somalia's economy. Livestock exports from Somaliland are the largest foreign exchange earner in the country. While Somaliland is reeling from the ban, it is at the same time being challenged to diversify its economy -- a potentially positive step to take.

One of the major contributions that USAID has made to international efforts in Somalia is the establishment and leadership of a unique voluntary donor coalition known as the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The SACB is comprised of over 150

organizations, including donors, UN agencies, and international NGOs. The SACB has established sectoral committees to address specific issues, such as health and food security, in order to ensure efficient, low-cost programs for meeting the basic human needs of Somalis in the absence of central civil governance.

In July 1998, USAID/Somalia was incorporated into REDSO/ESA. The Somalia office, however, continues to function as a discrete unit, with its own Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) and strategic objectives separate from REDSO. In this sense, it functions much as a “Mission-in-waiting”; should the decision be made to reinstate a higher level of USG presence, REDSO/Somalia would be able to step in immediately.

USG assistance to Somalia seeks to ensure that continuing instability in parts of Somalia does not spread to other countries in the Horn. The paramount goal of U.S. policy in Somalia is to encourage the return of Somalia to the international community as a legitimate and reliable member. Supporting successful models of local administration and governance – in Somaliland and Puntland, for example – is one obvious way to accomplish this goal.

PART II: RESULTS REVIEW BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Strategic Objective #1 (SO #1): Improved Foundation For Agricultural Production In Target Areas

Summary:

The purpose of this SO is to improve the foundation for agricultural production in southern and central Somalia to a point where farmers remain on their land, those previously displaced return, and planting is substantially increased. This objective contributes directly to, and is necessary to achieve, a subgoal of “Increased Food Crop Production in Target Areas”. REDSO/Somalia and its partners believe that an actual increase in production is too ambitious to be achieved given the current timeframe, limited donor resources, and the continually changing weather and security conditions in Somalia.

The main assumption underlying SO #1 is that an improved foundation for agricultural production will in time contribute to increased food crop production and ultimately to improved household food security.

Principal beneficiaries and ultimate customers are the farmers of southern and central Somalia who are some of the most vulnerable and least food-secure populations in the country. They are at the mercy of unpredictable weather patterns and civil insecurity. Their clans generally offer them little or no protection. A large proportion of those displaced within the country, as well as refugees in Kenya, are farmers from southern Somalia.

Key Results:

Principal results necessary to achieve the SO are: increased availability of agricultural inputs and services such as seeds and tools; extension training; improved agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation canals and river embankments; and increased agricultural investment by the farmers themselves.

Performance and Prospects:

The SO #1 achievements have exceeded performance expectations. All SO and Intermediate Results indicators were met or exceeded, despite the adverse weather conditions prevailing in the farming areas of southern Somalia at the beginning of 1998. The effects of the El Nino-related flooding were still being felt in many areas where flooding had caused great damage to the crops in the fields, as well as the food in storage. Though recovery has been relatively quick, a widespread rat infestation destroyed many of the seeds planted after the floods receded.

The SO indicator target is *15,000 hectares planted with food crops in target areas*. In spite of the chaotic conditions in early 1998, this target was exceeded. Improved agricultural infrastructure, farmer training, and availability of seeds has helped farmers expand their planted area in selected locations to 76,092 hectares, compared to the 15,000

hectares planned (Table 1). Much of this is due to the impressive work of CARE through its Rural Food Security Project (RFSP) which was a pilot project in 1998. The achievement in improved infrastructure as detailed in IR 1.2 and the synergies between CARE's two USAID programs have dramatically increased the capacity of the NGOs and their ability to implement activities.

Intermediate Result 1.1: Increased Availability of Agricultural Inputs and Services for Farmers in Target Areas. The objective of Intermediate Result (IR) 1.1 is to increase farmers' utilization of improved agricultural techniques, such as more environmentally-sound pest management and better cropping practices. Over 4,000 selected farmers were trained as agricultural extension workers (Table 2), and they, in turn, trained numerous others in their communities. At the SO level, many more farm families are now actually practicing these new techniques. In addition, seeds and tools were provided to 15,686 families whose supplies were washed away by the devastating El Nino floods at the beginning of the year.

Intermediate Result 1.2: Improved Agricultural Infrastructure in Target Areas. This IR captures the Food for Work (FFW) activities which rehabilitate canals, river embankments, farm-to-market feeder roads and other infrastructure, needed by farmers for increased production and marketing. These results are achieved mainly using PL 480 Title II food commodities.

USAID more than doubled the kilometers of canal rehabilitation over what had been originally planned for the year (Table 3). This accomplishment resulted in a dramatic increase in the hectares under irrigation (3,919 hectares in 1997 to 53,516 hectares in 1998) and is expected to bring about positive changes in food security for thousands of households in the target areas. These accomplishments will help keep farmers on their land, thereby reducing the number of displaced people in Somalia.

Intermediate Result 1.3: Increased Investment by Farmers in Agriculture in Target Areas. The indicator for this IR is "number of agricultural loans taken by farm families in target areas". The crippling floods, which wiped out many farmers' savings, resulted in 6,358 cumulative agricultural loans disbursed against 2,920-planned (Table 4). Even more important, the repayment rate has been 97%. Community contributions to projects are also worth noting: an estimated 5% of the value of each project is donated by the community in the form of cash, labor, warehouse space, and other assets.

Possible Adjustment to Plans:

BHR/FFP continues to support CARE's Rural Food Security Project, and the project will be expanding in 1999. CARE will be working with more NGOs, including World Vision (the largest food for work implementer in Somalia) and ADRA; and expand their geographic coverage in southern and central Somalia. Results under SO 1 are expected to increase in 1999, subject to the availability of DA funds for the CARE Umbrella Grant, which contributes substantially to results under IRs 1.1 and 1.3.

Other Donor Programs:

While USAID is the major donor in this sector, WFP continues to be active in southern Somalia with a number of FFW projects to rehabilitate infrastructure. The EU has funded some international NGOs as well. In the absence of a central government in Somalia, all activities are coordinated under the umbrella of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and, in particular, its Food Security Sectoral Committee, chaired by USAID.

Major Contractors and Grantees:

The SO's primary partner is CARE, through both its Rural Food Security Project and Umbrella Grant. The SO also includes grants with World Vision and other international and local NGOs.

Strategic Objective #1 (SO #1)
Improved Foundation for Agricultural Production in Target Areas

Tables**TABLE 1**

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia			
RESULT NAME: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
INDICATOR 1: Hectares planted with food crops in target areas during the annual main growing season (<i>gu</i>)			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: CARE and World Vision will collect, analyze, and aggregate data on project assisted target areas from their implementing partners. -- Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) will collect comparable data at the district level for all of the agricultural regions, for comparison with data for the project assisted areas within those regions.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Food crops include cereals (sorghum and maize). Target areas are defined as the project sites where USAID-funded activities are taking place. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: Target was far surpassed due to CARE's and World Vision's activities in 1998. Improved agricultural infrastructure, farmer training, and availability of seeds has helped farmers progressively expand their hectareage.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	96(B)		12,600
	97	13,500	58,822
	98	15,000	76,092
	99	17,000	

**Table 2 Strategic Objective # 1 (SO # 1)
Intermediate Result 1.1**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #1: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 1.1: Increased Availability of Agricultural Inputs and Services for Farmers in Target Areas.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR 3: Number of contact farmers trained in target areas</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Implementing partners of USAID</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Target areas are defined as the project sites where USAID funded activities are taking place. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.</p> <p>This is an annual figure.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: CARE was able to reach a larger number of farmers than planned, through 7 local NGOs implementing agricultural extension activities.</p> <p>World Vision also met its targets. Farmer training field-days have helped to explain and reinforce any relatively new extension concepts. In addition, the program is currently compiling a farmer training manual for future use.</p> <p>Note that this indicator is a proxy measure of the availability of services.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	96(B)		3,843
	97	3,744	3,830
	98	3,500	4,087
	99	3,500	

**TABLE 3: Strategic Objective # 1 (SO #1)
Intermediate Result 1.2**

OBJECTIVE: SO #1: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia			
RESULT NAME Intermediate Result 1.2: Improved Agricultural Infrastructure in Target Areas:			
INDICATOR 2: Length of irrigation canals constructed or rehabilitated in target areas			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of Kilometers	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: Implementing partners of USAID	96(B)		132
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Both primary and secondary canals are included. Target areas are defined as the project sites where USAID-funded activities are taking place. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia. This is a cumulative number.	97	257	200
	98	377	780
	99	497	
COMMENTS: CARE's Rural Food Security Project (RFSP) began activities in May 1998. The exceeding of the planned target was due to an additional nine local NGOs in the RFSP undertaking canal rehabilitation whose activities had not been considered when setting the target for 1998.			

**TABLE 4 Strategic Objective #1
Intermediate Result 1.3**

<p>OBJECTIVE: SO #1: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME Intermediate Result 1.3: Increased investments by farmers in agriculture in target areas</p>			
<p>INDICATOR 2: Number of Agricultural Loans Taken by Farm Families in Target Areas</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Implementing partners of USAID</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This indicator tracks the number of agricultural loans disbursed in USAID-funded project sites. Loans included are those specifically taken for agricultural activities. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.</p> <p>This is a cumulative number.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: Note that this indicator is a proxy measure of actual investment by farm families in agriculture. However, since the loans are specifically taken for agricultural activities, it is a very close proxy.</p> <p>The El Nino floods of late 1997/early 1998 literally washed away thousands of farmers' assets. The target was exceeded in 1998 in recognition that significantly more customers would be in need of such credit. It should be noted that, despite the dire circumstances, the average repayment rate for these loans was an impressive 97%.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	96(B)		420
	97	1,920	2,740
	98	2,920	6,358
	99	3,920	

**Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2):
Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups**

Summary:

This SO captures USAID's key humanitarian interventions in Somalia. Its objective is to meet the critical needs of vulnerable people. The ongoing complex emergency means that food, health, water and emergency problems remain chronic. The emergency which began in 1998, was caused by a combination of drought, continuing insecurity, increasing numbers of internally displaced people, and deteriorating water and health conditions.

During the first part of 1998, international agencies worked together to address critical health, water and sanitation problems – many of which were caused by the El Nino floods. A subsequent drought in mid/late 1998 affected the whole country, with the central and southern parts of Somalia being particularly affected. Rain-fed crops failed in many areas and pastures did not regenerate sufficiently, resulting in a substantial increase in malnutrition rates and a large movement of internally displaced people.

By October 1998, the international community, including USAID, had begun responding to the drought related food crisis in southern and central Somalia. Primary beneficiaries include roughly one million of the four million inhabitants of central and southern Somalia. The most vulnerable include 30,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at risk due to hunger and insecurity. Approximately a third of them are at very high risk and are subject to severe food shortages, malnutrition, and outbreaks of communicable diseases.

Key Results:

Principal results necessary to achieve this SO are: improved food delivery systems for emergency food commodities with minimal losses; critical needs met for vulnerable groups; improved identification and targeting of vulnerable groups; and improved capacity of local networks to meet critical social services.

Performance and Prospects:

Overall performance in achieving SO #2 was very good this year. Most SO and Intermediate Results (IR) indicators met or exceeded performance expectations. The few indicators that achieved lower than expected results are explained by the unanticipated flooding, drought and security problems in Somalia.

The SO level indicators are: a) the percent of target children under 12 months old that have been fully vaccinated; and b) the number of vulnerable people who received food aid within an agreed upon time.

The year started with the flood emergency and ended with the drought. The food crises, combined with cholera and measles outbreaks, left only four to five months in the middle

of the year when regular program planning and implementation was possible. During that time, USAID supported Somalia's first National Immunization Days (NIDs) in Central and Southern Somalia. Despite the fact that flooding resulted in some impassable roads, making routine immunization activities in the field difficult, the SO indicator target was exceeded. The results continue to be very good: 58% of children (compared to the planned 40%) under 12 months old were fully vaccinated in targeted catchment areas (Table 5), and 58% of children under five received vitamin A treatment. This year, an impressive 100% of targeted pregnant women visited or were visited by a health professional during their pregnancy, compared to the targeted 68%.

During the flood emergency and again during the first weeks of the food crises, notably among the IDPs and most vulnerable villages, emphasis was put on ensuring that children had access to nutritious food regardless of their current nutritional status. UNICEF's new approach in supplementary feeding aims to prevent children in acute crises from losing weight and becoming more vulnerable to communicable diseases. A total of 320,113 vulnerable people received timely delivery of food aid (Table 6).

An inter-agency response was coordinated by the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) in an attempt to pre-empt a full-blown famine. USAID's responses were made in consultative cooperation with the SACB and its sectoral coordination groups. The SACB is a unique donor/NGO/IO institution which takes the lead in mobilizing resources and developing strategy across sectors. USAID has played a key role in developing and strengthening the SACB, and this role has allowed the USG to leverage resources from various sources in a highly effective way.

Intermediate Result 2.1: Improved Delivery Systems For Emergency Food Commodities. This IR is critical to accomplishing the objective of critical needs met for targeted vulnerable groups. The indicator for this IR is "percent of transportation food losses." In the past, transportation food losses in Somalia have been extremely high, primarily due to theft and hijacking of food convoys.

Since reallocating food resources and their delivery from WFP to CARE, food losses have decreased dramatically -- from 27% in 1996 to 3.4% in 1997 to 0.7% in 1998 (Table 7). CARE's delivery system is based on a system that gives the community ownership of the food, through its own indigenous NGOs. Thefts and banditry on CARE/community food is much less than that of other food aid providers, as the community is less tempted to steal from itself. In addition, CARE's cost of delivery is less than half of what WFP's costs are per metric ton.

Intermediate Result 2.2: Improved Identification Of Vulnerable Groups. The objective of IR 2.2 is to improve crisis mitigation through early identification and response to critically vulnerable groups. Although the IR 2.2 indicators were established recently, reflecting new initiatives in the identification of vulnerable groups, the results for 1998, exceeded expectations. The indicators include the percent of major food economy zones mapped according to vulnerability and the number of implementing partner local staff members that have been trained in vulnerability assessments.

An important component of improving the identification of vulnerable groups has been the food economy studies conducted by the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU). These studies comprise an in-depth field assessment and review of the food economy conditions in the region. A total of five food economy studies have been completed by the FSAU since last year, and another six studies were initiated in 1998, and are ongoing. During this past year, the FSAU and UNDOS completed the mapping of the major food economy zones according to vulnerability.

CARE, ADRA, IMC and World Vision have made a major effort to train local staff in vulnerability assessments during this year. The target was 55 staff trained. The reality is a total of 104 implementing partner local staff trained. This facilitated the identification of target vulnerable groups and as a result, interventions targeted the most vulnerable populations. For example, CARE and World Vision staff used the new training in targeting most vulnerable populations for their food for work and emergency food programs in Southern Somalia.

Intermediate Result 2.3: Improved Capacity To Meet Critical Social Services To Targeted Vulnerable Groups. This IR captures the critical health and sanitation activities that are being implemented by partner agencies such as: essential drug kit deliveries, rehabilitation and chlorinating of wells, and certification of health workers.

The IR indicator is “percent of target health centers receiving at least 90% of the requested essential drug kits on time.” While the planned target of 96% was not achieved, 93% of target health centers received at least 90% of the requested essential drug kits (Table 8), up from 71% in 1998.

In addition, 675 health workers were certified, helping improve the communities’ ability to meet their health needs. USAID also funded the construction and rehabilitation of 51 potable water sources, resulting in 256,700 vulnerable people now having access to potable water in targeted areas as a result of USAID interventions.

Possible Adjustment to Plans:

While OFDA funding has been reduced in 1999, results toward this SO are still likely to be achieved. It is anticipated that activities under SO #2 will remain critical in addressing basic humanitarian needs in Somalia. Although results under this objective could increase, some activities will largely be dependent upon increased funding from BHR/OFDA if there is a reduction in DA funding.

Other Donor Programs:

Although USAID continues to be a major donor in meeting the critical needs of vulnerable people in Somalia, other active donors include UNICEF, WHO, EU and British DFID.

Major Contractors and Grantees:

Primary partners implementing SO #2 include UNICEF, Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), IMC, World Vision, ADRA, CISP, ACF France and CARE.

TABLE 5 Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2)
Indicator a) Critical Needs Met for Target Vulnerable Group

OBJECTIVE: SO #2: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia			
RESULT NAME: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
INDICATOR: a) Percent of Children Under 12 Months Old That Have Been Fully Vaccinated			
UNIT OF MEASURE:	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
Number of children under 12 months fully vaccinated [Total targeted catchment area x 4%]	96(B)		30
SOURCE: UNICEF, SCS, CISP, IMC, World Vision, Mercy International	97	45	41.5
	98	55	58
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Fully vaccinated means that a child has been vaccinated for all of the following: a. Tuberculosis (BCG) b. Measles c. Polio (O) d. Diphtheria Pertussis tetanus (DPT)	99	65	
COMMENTS: A higher level of immunizations was achieved this year due to the national immunization days (NIDs) that UNICEF coordinated throughout Somalia in 1998.			

**TABLE 6: Strategic Objective #2 (SO #2)
Indicator b)**

<p>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups</p>			
<p>INDICATOR 5a: Number of Vulnerable Persons That Received Food Aid Within an Agreed Upon time</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Distribution Plan and CARE & UNICEF distribution records and monitoring reports</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Food Aid includes food for work, supplemental feedings and free food distributions.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: Note that the number of people receiving food aid would be higher if the figures included the World Vision food for work projects funded by OFDA. The food for the project was scheduled to be distributed during 1998, however WFP's food shipment to World Vision was late in arriving and therefore, was only distributed in 1999.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	96(B)		328,513
	97	300,000	802,759
	98	300,000	312,990
	99	300,000	

**TABLE 7: Strategic Objective # 2
Intermediate Result 2.1**

OBJECTIVE 2: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia			
RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 2.1: Improved Delivery Systems for Emergency Food Commodities			
INDICATOR 1: Percent of transportation food losses			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent as measured by: Total amount of food arriving at the port cities in Kenya and Tanzania Total amount of food received by the ultimate beneficiaries. SOURCE: CARE records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The transportation losses are measured from the time the food arrives at the ports in Kenya or Tanzania until they are delivered to the ultimate beneficiaries in Somalia. This includes shipment, storage, transit, and distribution losses. This is an annual figure. COMMENTS: There were minimal food losses (less than 1%) in the CARE food distributions during 1998.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	96(B)		27.06% *
	97		3.4%
	98		0.7%
	99		

* The 1996 losses were mainly due to a fire at the WFP warehouse in Mogadishu, a large WFP port loss, and theft in Mogadishu.

**TABLE 8: Strategic Objective # 2
Intermediate Result 2.3**

<p>OBJECTIVE:SO #2: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME Intermediate Result 2.3: Improved Capacity to Meet Critical Social Services to Targeted Vulnerable Groups</p>			
<p>INDICATOR 1: Percent of Target Health Centers That Received at Least 90% of The Requested Essential Drug Kits on time.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent as measured by: Number of essential kits delivered to the health centers Number of kits actually requested by the health centers</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: UNICEF, CISP, IMC, World Vision, Mercy International, SCS, CARE</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Health centers include MCH centers, OPDs, HPs and TBAs. Requested is the amount actually requested from the partner NGOs, not the amount originally estimated during the planning period. On time means the kits were delivered within X days of the agreed upon delivery date.</p> <p>This is an annual figure.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: It should be noted that the high target was very nearly met, and is a huge jump from 1997's results due to increased ability to meet critical needs in a timely manner.</p>	<p>YEAR</p>	<p>PLANNED</p>	<p>ACTUAL</p>
	96(B)		86.5
	97	92.5	71
	98	96	93
	99	97	

**Special Objective #1 (SPO #1):
Increased Community Capacity To Meet Its Own Needs**

Summary:

The purpose of the Special Objective, (SPO) is to strengthen local Somali capacity to manage donor assistance and establish decentralized planning and program analysis capabilities. Two major channels to achieve these results have been undertaken: 1) Assisting established local administrative structures to acquire essential technical and functional knowledge to better govern their communities. (This includes assistance to put bookkeeping systems in place, collect taxes, and distribute revenues equitably within the communities); and 2) Empowering civil society by increasing the financial, administrative, and programming capacity of indigenous NGOs.

Currently, each area of Somalia is developing its own rules and regulations, including laws and legal codes. For example, the self-declared “independent” Somaliland maintains a civilian legal system, enforcing the pre-war Somalia Civil Code. Somaliland has pioneered inter-clan reconciliation with relative success. Nevertheless, the Hargeisa Administration is concerned that the peace and security prevailing in the region is threatened by a shortfall in revenue due to the Saudi ban on imports of livestock because of the suspected presence of Rift Valley Fever.

Probably the most significant event of 1998 was the formation of Puntland state (Bari, Nugal and Mudug regions) in the Northeast, under the leadership of the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Like Somaliland, Puntland has relatively high community support, but unlike its “independent” neighbor, Puntland considers itself within the context of the state of Somalia, however with significant (and presently de facto “total”) autonomy in the political, economic and social spheres.

The SPO’s ultimate beneficiaries, direct or indirect, are the Somalis in the target regions. Somalia in general will also benefit from technical analysis and studies carried out under this SPO, which are relevant to the formation of a sustainable national development policy and establishment of peace and security in these areas.

Key Results:

Principal results necessary to achieve this SPO are: more operational local administrative structures; increased ability of local NGOs to provide community services; increased availability of decision-making information; and a strengthened private enterprise sector.

Performance and Prospects:

Our performance toward the Special Objective over the last year has been on track. USAID assistance to local administrative structures in Somalia, through UNDP/UN Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), has increased their capacity to improve the services they provide to their respective communities. Results have been fairly

rudimentary to date, befitting a pilot Special Objective, but show promise that we are on the right path. SPO indicator data shows that 45% of revenues collected in target Local Administrative Structures (LASs) were expended on basic services, up from 38% in 1997 (Table 9). Assistance to civil society through the CARE Umbrella Grant has consistently delivered solid results throughout the country, both in work done on the ground (provision of credit, agricultural extension, etc.) as well as building the capacity of local NGOs.

One of the main success stories in 1998 was the formation of Puntland in the Northeast. USAID, through technical support provided by ADRA, helped the three governments develop and form a tri-regional Roads Administration, which was the precursor to the larger supra-regional body. While not claiming total credit for Puntland, USAID did play a role in bringing the regions together in a spirit of formalized cooperation. However, it must be acknowledged that a general difficulty faced in working with many other nascent structures, especially in southern Somalia, has been that their overall credibility is often weak to begin with, as their support is often not based on ability, but on clan affiliation. The progress to date has not been the same throughout the country.

Intermediate Result 1.1: Local Administrative Structures Operationalized. Regional and district councils, or any other local administration that is assisted, will be trained and will have acquired the minimum institutional capacity necessary to provide a secure socio-economic environment. With the establishment of Puntland, and continued work by UNDOS, more Local Administrative Structures are developing annual work plans (4 regional bodies in 1998 compared to 1 in 1997) and putting systems for collecting taxes in place (4 in 1998 compared to 2 in 1997).

Intermediate Result 1.2: Increased Ability Of NGOs To Provide Community Services. The importance of the NGO sector in rebuilding Somalia from the ground up cannot be understated. A strong and competent cadre of NGOs in Somalia is absolutely essential to Somalia's future. CARE has worked hard to establish this corps of NGOs, which have progressively increased their capacity, both to manage themselves administratively and financially, as well as to implement needed projects in the field. The capacity ratings of over 20 local NGOs have increased dramatically -- over 85% are now certified as competent compared to 66% in 1997 (Table 10), and CARE expects the remaining ones to reach this level by the end of 1999.

The capacity building for the southern NGOs allowed them to combat the serious flood situation in late 1997/early 1998, often more effectively than international organizations who were not physically operational on the ground. It should also be noted that due to the demonstrated competence and ability of these local NGOs, a number of them are now working with CARE's Rural Food Security Project to achieve the results shown in SO #1.

Intermediate Result 1.3: Increased Availability Of Information Necessary For Informed Decision-Making. In the Somalia context, it is abundantly clear that community consensus is essential for local government units to operate successfully. In

order for the community to be more supportive, information must be made available to individual citizens. The initial thought was that the LASs could become more transparent by publishing their decisions, so that individual community members could have a greater understanding of the process and underlying rationale for the decisions made. However, since the adult literacy rate in Somalia is barely 15%, the team is looking for alternative ways to capture the effectiveness of the LASs. Community involvement becomes increasingly important as LASs begin to collect revenues from its citizens and provide services to the community at large. Consensus can also be built by sharing information about the success of other LAS in the country.

Intermediate Result 1.4: Private Enterprise/Entrepreneurs Strengthened. By providing micro-credit loans to farmers and small businesspeople, USAID expects community investment to increase, and private enterprise will be strengthened. CARE disbursed over 50% more total loans than the previous year (3,715 in 1998 compared to 2,320 in 1997) (Table 11), including maintaining high repayment rates -- 97% in the agricultural sector, and a respectable 70% in other sectors (Table 12). This was no mean feat, considering that the first part of 1998 was a life-and-death struggle for many people in the face of the El Nino floods.

Possible Adjustment to Plans:

This objective is totally dependent on adequate DA funding (unlike the other two objectives, to which BHR/FFP and OFDA funds also contribute). The current decrease and proposed zeroing out of funding in FY 2000 will either result in elimination of the SPO or where possible, it could be merged with other SO activities.

Other Donor Programs:

UNDP and the EU are the main donors in conflict mitigation/capacity building activities, especially in the northern part of the country. All activities are coordinated under the umbrella of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), in particular its Local Administrative Structures sectoral committee.

Major Contractors and Grantees:

CARE (under the Somalia Partnership Program cooperative agreement, sometimes referred to as the CARE Umbrella Grant) is the lead organization working with local NGOs in Somalia, both to increase their financial and administrative capacity, as well as their ability to implement projects effectively. UNDOS and ADRA also work with local administrations to this end.

**TABLE 9: Special Objective #1 (SPO #1)
Indicator 3**

<p>OBJECTIVE SPO #1 : Increased Community Capacity to Meet its Own Needs. APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia.</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 1.2: Increased community capacity to meet its own needs.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: 3: Percent of revenues collected in target local Administrative Structures (LASs) that are expended on basic services.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: % as measured by: Sum of the % increase in revenues spent on basic services. Number of LAS with Bookkeeping systems in place.</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: UNDOS, Expert Assessment; LAS records</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Basic services include: security, education, health, sanitation and water.</p> <hr/> <p>Target Local Administrative Structures, for this indicator only, include those Regional Administrative Structures with a bookkeeping system in place (as identified in the previous indicator)</p> <p>This is an annual figure.</p> <p>COMMENTS:</p> <hr/> <p>For all of the indicators measuring Local Administrative Structures (LASs), USAID is referring to the following seven Regional Administrative Structures: Hiran, Middle Shabelle, Somaliland, Puntland, and Galgaduud.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	96(B)		N/A %
	97	45%	38%
	98	50%	45%
	99	55%	

**TABLE 10: Special Objective #1 (SPO #1)
Intermediate Result 1.2**

OBJECTIVE 1: Increased Community Capacity to Meet its Own Needs.			
APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia			
RESULT NAME: Intermediate Result 1.2: Increased Ability of NGOs to Provide Community Services.			
INDICATOR 2: Percent of NGOs, completing capacity training rated as competent			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent as measured by:</p> <hr/> <p>Number of NGOs with a overall CARE capacity rating greater or equal to 3.5 Number of NGOs completing training</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: CARE capacity survey</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The Care Index measures NGO capacity in four areas: Government, Finance, Management & Technical.</p> <p>An NGO would have to receive an overall average rating of 3.5, on a scale of 1 to 5 in order to receive a rating of competent.</p> <p>This is a cumulative figure over time.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: CARE expects to attain 100% competency of its local NGOs by the end of 1999.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	96 (B)		TBD*
	97	70%	66%
	98	85%	85.6%
	99	85%	

**TABLE 12: Special Objective #1 (SPO #1)
Intermediate Result 1.4**

OBJECTIVE SPO #1: Increased Community Capacity to Meet its Own Needs. APPROVED: 10/15/1996 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Somalia			
RESULT NAME Intermediate Result 1.4: Private Enterprise/Entrepreneurs Strengthened			
INDICATOR 2: Loan Repayment Rate*			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: % as measured by: Number of loans classified as being repaid as a proportion of total Number of loans</p> <p>NB: This indicator represents the fiscal year and is not cumulative. In addition to the rate, a narrative will also be provided addressing loans written off during the period.</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: CARE, Umbrella Grant records</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Repayment includes loans being repaid that are no more than 6 months in arrears and loans fully repaid during the USAID fiscal year.</p> <p>For the purpose of clarity (see NB above) this indicator will be desegregated in two categories: Agriculture and Other Loans Repayment Rates</p> <p><u>This is an annual figure.</u></p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: Despite the El Nino floods, and the subsequent disbursement of more loans than planned, the repayment rate was phenomenal in the agricultural sector, and nonetheless quite respectable in other sectors.</p> <p>*To the extent that agriculture loans are included in this indicator they are also reflected in SO1.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	96(B)	80%	99% Agriculture
	96(B)	83%	84% Other Loans
	97	80% Agriculture	93%
	97	80% Other Loans	70%
	98	80% Agriculture	97%
	98	80% Other Loans	70%
	99	80% Agriculture	
	99	80% Other Loans	

Annex D.

**SUDAN R4-LIKE DOCUMENT
R4 2001**

**SUDAN INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN
A PROGRESS REPORT**

June 1999

**Prepared by USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response, in cooperation with REDSO/ESA
and the Africa Bureau**

*must act urgently, coherently and
Sudan's suffering. Humanitarian assistance is vital - but not enough. The UN
disposal to bring Africa's longest running war, finally, to a close."*

A paper by Save the Children Fund, CARE International and Oxfam GB

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Sudan Integrated Strategic Plan A Progress Report

PART ONE: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

I. INTRODUCTION

In January 1997, USAID staff, in concert with the U.S. Department of State, its implementing partners and other stakeholders in the Horn of Africa region, drafted an Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for Sudan. This strategy supports U.S. foreign policy objectives and combines USAID International Disaster Assistance funds (IDA), P.L. 480 Title II food aid and dollar resources, and Development Assistance (DA) funds in a single strategic framework. The strategy's goal is to help promote a "less vulnerable, more self-reliant population better prepared for a transition to peace in Sudan."

This report reviews progress to date since the plan was crafted two years ago. Inputs were provided by the U.S. State Department; the National Security Council; USAID's Sudan Field Office; the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Food for Peace (BHR/FFP) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA); the Africa Bureau; and USAID's Research and Reference Services. It was coordinated by BHR's Program Planning and Evaluation office.

The overall tenet of this review is that USAID humanitarian assistance programs in Sudan have achieved significant impact in the last two years. It clearly shows that lives have been saved and suffering reduced because of USAID interventions. However, this impact is clearly time- and place-limited. The "fundamentals" in Sudan—civil war complicated by natural disasters—have not changed. And so, despite humanitarian successes, widespread civilian suffering continues.

The mood among relief experts working in Sudan is reflected in the quote following the title page of this report. Some eleven years into Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)¹, relief agencies are calling for renewed political efforts to address the underlying, root causes of war and reminding the UN Security Council and its member states that humanitarian assistance, "is vital – but not enough."

This progress report shows both the successes and limitations of humanitarian aid in Sudan. It also discusses an innovative new USAID program designed to support local peace initiatives and capacity building in opposition held areas of Sudan. It begins with an overview and factors affecting USAID performance and follows with a discussion of strategy adjustments to date, a portfolio overview and progress against objectives. Finally, USAID management issues are discussed.

¹ OLS is a framework that provides authorized access to war-affected civilians in Sudan. It is a UN-managed consortium of more than 40 UN and international NGOs that provides emergency relief for war affected citizens of Sudan. Formed in 1989, as a result of the 1988 famine, its relief activities are coordinated by UNICEF and logistics operations by the UN World Food Program.

II. BACKGROUND

While not approved formally until May 1997, the ISP has essentially been implemented for two full years. It is valid through the end of 1999.

BHR took the lead in drafting the Sudan ISP with the primary aim of forging with implementing partners a unifying vision of how USAID and other stakeholders and partners could work effectively in the longstanding Sudan emergency context. The ISP has created a common vision among USAID and its partners and has been used primarily by BHR in its dialogue with PVOs about what kinds of proposals it will consider funding.

The ISP process brought home to USAID partners the idea that USAID was willing to consider innovative activities that not only provided relief but also promoted self-sufficiency and reduced relief costs. It also clarified in which areas USAID would not work, (e.g. education and some kinds of health interventions.)

The ISP framework is as follows:

Goal: A less vulnerable, more self-reliant population better prepared for a transition to peace.

Strategic Objective (SO) One: Emergency food needs of targeted groups are met in a manner which increases local capacities for food self reliance

SO Two: Enhanced basic primary health care (BPHC) for targeted war affected groups

SO Three: Target groups pursue viable reintegration options

SO Four: Improved support to reduce conflict and strengthen capacities for peace

The full ISP framework, including key “intermediate” results and related program interventions, is shown in Annex 1.²

III. OVERVIEW – WAR AND POLITICS

A. State of the War

Sudan has been torn by civil war for 32 of the 43 years since its independence. At the time of this writing, Sudan is entering its sixteenth consecutive year of war; and USAID is moving into its eleventh year of humanitarian assistance to Sudan.

² While the “Strategic Objective” and “Intermediate Result” terminology is used in this report, the ISP uses the terms “Objectives” and “Key Results.” This was done at the request of non-USAID staff engaged in the planning process who were not familiar with USAID terminology.

Currently, warfare is ongoing between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and southern and northern opposition movements working under the umbrella name of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Since 1996, the NDA has included the Southern People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)³ as well as northern opposition movements, making the war transcend a north/south conflict. In addition, there is south-south fighting between the SPLA and the Southern Sudanese Independence Movement (SSIM). The SSIM is counted among five southern groups that formally aligned themselves with the government in 1997. There also has been inter-tribal fighting among government-supported factions within the Nuer ethnic group; and inter-tribal fighting among groups which nominally support the SPLA. Independent warlords move freely from alliance with the GOS to alliance with the SPLA.

While most of the fighting occurs in the south, it continues in the eastern and northeastern parts of Sudan as well. (Thus, the territory involved is the same as when the ISP was written in early 1997.) The SPLA achieved important victories in 1997, taking a number of key garrison towns and establishing control over much of Western Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal. While they made no decisive gains in 1998, the SPLA held on to gains made in 1997. The SSIM controls most of Upper Nile. In northern Sudan, along the Eritrean border, NDA forces also made important gains in 1997, capturing a number of key towns.

GOS losses in 1997 and the SPLA attack on Wau, Bahr el Ghazal in January 1998, led to GOS flight bans from February to April 1998. These prohibited organizations conducting humanitarian relief operations under OLS from obtaining access to critical areas. A powerful combination of war, successive years of drought, lack of humanitarian aid and periodic raiding by tribal militias, forced large-scale displacement. Ultimately, famine conditions prevailed in Spring/Summer 1998.

Relief agencies stepped up assistance efforts in April 1998 when flight bans were lifted and the extent of the famine was revealed. The negotiation of a cease fire in Bahr el Ghazal in mid-July 1998, coupled with a scaled up logistics operation, allowed for a dramatic expansion in the relief effort in the summer months. The cease fire, which has been extended two times, remains in place through April 15, 1999.

B. Affected Populations

Numbers Killed: Research recently conducted by the U.S. Committee for Refugees suggests that in the last 5 years some 600,000 people have died due to war-related causes and the policies of successive Sudanese governments. A staggering 1.9 million southern Sudanese and Nuba Mountains people have perished since 1983. It is believed that one of every five southern Sudanese has died because of the civil war.⁴

Numbers of IDPs and refugees: As when the ISP was written, some 4.5 million Sudanese, primarily southerners, remain displaced by the war, giving Sudan the largest internally displaced

³ Southern leadership has long declared a distinction between the SPLA and the SPLM. Both always have been under the joint command of Col./Dr. John Garang. Civilian leadership is appointed by the SPLA.

⁴ U.S. Committee for Refugees *News*, December 10, 1998.

person (IDP) population in the world today. About 2.2 million have made their way to Khartoum, living in city slums or forcibly moved by the government to remote camp settings. In Kordofan province, the government had also forcibly moved an estimated 172,000 Nubans into 72 Peace Villages by mid 1998. As when the ISP was written, the government severely restricts humanitarian access to areas of the Nuba Mountains outside of its control.

The number of Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries has declined from about 433,700 in 1996 to some 353,000 in 1997 and 382,000 in 1998. UNHCR does not believe conditions are right for a formal repatriation package.

Numbers at risk: In 1997 and 1998, WFP targeted around 2.5 million people for emergency food aid. While this population requires some aid each year, most required full food rations in 1998. Due to famine conditions, estimates of civilians at risk of death from starvation in Bahr el Ghazal province in 1998 rose from 350,000 in February to 700,000 in April to 1.2 million in May. While conditions have improved, more than 2 million people in the Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile regions of the south and Kassala in the north will require food aid in 1999. Non food needs (e.g., health care) remain vast.

C. Status of U.S.–GOS Relations

As when the ISP was written, U.S. foreign policy continues to be shaped by concern about the Khartoum regime's support for terrorism and regional insurgencies, its human rights violations, and its prosecution of the war in the south. In 1993, the U.S. placed Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and, in February 1996, the U.S. government suspended its permanent diplomatic presence in Sudan for security reasons, establishing a liaison office in Nairobi.

In the last three years, the U.S. stance towards the GOS has toughened considerably. The U.S. supported the 1996 United Nations Security Council resolution that imposed diplomatic sanctions on Sudan. In 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive bilateral trade and economic sanctions and offered Temporary Protected Status to Sudanese nationals in the U.S. In addition, Secretary of State Albright met with SPLM/A leader John Garang and the NDA leaders. The U.S. has provided non lethal aid to the frontline states of Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia to help them thwart GOS destabilization campaigns.

On August 20, 1998 the U.S. conducted an airstrike against Sudan's el-Shifa facility, a direct response to the GOS's connection with the bin Laden terrorist organization and the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. Sudan proceeded to withdraw most of its diplomats from Washington and inform the U.S. that its diplomats would not be welcome in Khartoum. The U.S. continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Sudan, however, and U.S. officials have met with Sudanese officials on a number of occasions since the el-Shifa strike to discuss the whole range of bilateral issues.

The USAID representative based in Khartoum was withdrawn to Nairobi at the time of the el-Shifa bombing, making monitoring of continuing USAID-funded relief efforts for displaced southerners in the North difficult.

D. Status of Peace Talks

The obstacles to a just and lasting peace remain formidable. Begun in 1993, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks yielded (in 1994) an important Declaration of Principles. Provisions include the right of self-determination, with national unity remaining a high priority, and the separation of religion and state. Progress has been slow since that time. Most recently, in May 1998, the government agreed to a referendum in the south but talks broke down in August on this and questions related to a secular Sudan.

The U.S. believes that the IGAD process offers the best hope of keeping parties focused on the core issues related to religion and the status of the south. It has provided financial and diplomatic support to the IGAD effort and will continue to take steps to make that process as effective as possible. In particular, it is interested in the development of technical committees around each of the principles and more regular meetings of the involved parties.

Current tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have distracted the frontline states from their roles in the IGAD peace process. It may ultimately lead to a realignment of allegiances or, at a minimum, decreased support for the SPLA/M and NDA from its eastern neighbors.

PART TWO: FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

I. FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

The emergence of famine in the Bahr el Ghazal region of southern Sudan is probably the defining event of this reporting period. While the famine masks some of the positive events taking place in the south (discussed below), it demonstrates the precarious position of the Sudanese people and the limits of humanitarian response during war.

Sudan has experienced three famines in the past decade, in 1988, 1994 and 1998. Research conducted by USAID's Research & Reference Services reveals that several patterns emerge from the history of humanitarian relief to Sudan over the past decade, including the current relief effort:

1. In each instance of famine and severe humanitarian crises in southern Sudan, civil strife has been the primary contributing factor.
2. In each case restrictions on access to those in need of aid have fueled the deterioration of already grim food security situations.
3. In each case the warring parties did not comply with their 1989 agreement to provide safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance⁵.

Drawing from the recent crisis, we can point more specifically to actions that impede achievement of the ISP's goal and strategic objectives:

⁵ Anne O'Toole Salinas, USAID/CDIE/R&RS, "*The Famine in Sudan: Why is this happening again? Lessons Learned*," September 1998.

A. Failure to Sustain Progress Towards Peace: While the ISP was written to address needs in a war setting, lack of progress on the peace front during the ISP period clearly has affected long term prospects for a “less vulnerable, more self-reliant population.” Gains made towards this goal in the reporting period are localized and sometimes short lived, depending on the location in question and cycle of the war.

B. General Insecurity: Between August 1997 and June 1998, over 200 relief personnel were evacuated from 37 locations in Sudan and indiscriminate bombing by the government in civilian areas were reported on 31 separate occasions. In some cases, bombings killed civilians and destroyed USAID-supported facilities – including hospitals.

C. The Maneuvers of Kerubino: In late 1997, Kerubino Bol, who had been allied with the GOS since 1995 decided to redefect to the SPLA and attempt to capture Wau and two other towns in Bahr el Ghazal. In a Trojan Horse maneuver in late December 1997, several thousand SPLA troops pretended to surrender to Kerubino in Wau. In January 1998, Kerubino and these troops attempted, unsuccessfully, to capture Wau, Gogrial and Aweil from GOS forces. Some 100,000 people were displaced as a result. They would be the most vulnerable group during the famine period that followed.

D. GOS Control of Relief Flights: Under the terms of OLS, the government must approve every relief flight into southern Sudan. It often bans flights to certain cities. Following SPLA victories in 1997 and Kerubino’s defection in 1998, the GOS imposed a flight ban to Bahr el Ghazal on February 4. It allowed limited access in March and finally lifted the ban on April 7, 1998. The ban prevented relief groups operating under the OLS umbrella from accessing the province to assess needs and deliver relief. Donors were also unable to verify the severity of the crisis. When the ban was partially lifted in four locations, large scale population movements towards those locations resulted. People congregated at food locations that were not adequately equipped to deal with such large numbers and many died as a result.

E. Poor Infrastructure: Lack of roads meant there was no reliable alternative access route when the government imposed the flight ban.

F. OLS Weaknesses: USAID supports and relies heavily on Operation Lifeline Sudan to deliver aid. OLS management suffers, however, from tensions between its Nairobi and Khartoum-based staffs, each viewing the other as representing the point of view of their Sudanese interlocutors. OLS management failed to respond aggressively enough to GOS flight restrictions and to field-based reports of emerging needs. They also did a poor job of mobilizing additional donor resources for the famine response and using the flight ban period to prepare for the anticipated surge in relief efforts when the ban was lifted.

G. Failure to Achieve a United Donor Front: Differing diplomatic and humanitarian perspectives on Sudan among the U.S. and other donors have had a significant impact on USAID supported relief programs. These differences have prohibited, for example, a strong and unified donor stance on government flight bans.

The U.S. bombing of the el-Shifa factory derailed USAID and DFID (the British aid agency) efforts this summer to undertake a leadership role with other donors in seeking revisions to the terms of the OLS humanitarian aid framework now used in Sudan. USAID is renewing donor coordination efforts now.

H. Logistics Challenges: USAID-funded programs were hindered by a variety of operational problems including lack of planes, lack of fuel, lack of seeds, poor seed quality and a shortage of personnel. These problems related primarily to poor planning and insufficient resources available to our partners to cover all requirements.

II. STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS TO DATE

USAID, led by BHR, prepared an Action Plan in response to the 1998 famine. This detailed implementation plan focused on the immediate crisis in the south and predominantly supports the first strategic objective of the ISP. While for a shorter time period, it revalidates the strategic approach of the ISP. It does, however, have a slightly different emphasis.

1. It states more forcefully that the ultimate success or failure of the USAID strategy (ISP) rests on the international community's efforts to: a) make long term national peace in Sudan a priority, and b) reduce the strategic manipulation of relief aid by all sides. The plan rests on the "core assumption that the approach outlined...fits within the context of a broad USG political strategy to pursue aggressively a resolution to the long running civil war."
2. It provides for high level USAID leadership to pursue a coordinated approach with other donors to seek a change in the terms upon which humanitarian assistance is provided, especially policy issues around the functioning of Operation Lifeline Sudan.

Operationally, the plan states in more detail the actions needed to address famine conditions, and ultimately, improve impact of the ISP. It is available from BHR/OFDA.

PART THREE: PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

I. 1997/1998 STATISTICS

USAID funding for Sudan

Office	FY97 (in thousands)	FY98 (in thousands)
FFP (Title II)	\$ 27,700	\$ 65,800
OFDA (IDA)	21,800	36,600
<i>OFDA/FFP Total</i>	<i>49,500</i>	<i>102,400</i>
AFR (DA)	0	3,000
USAID Total	\$49,500	\$105,400

Due to famine conditions USAID humanitarian relief funding jumped 52% in FY98 to approximately \$102.4 million, the largest relief outlay for Sudan since 1991. FFP and OFDA expenditures jumped 58% and 40%, respectively. The increases were handled without any increases in staff and, in some cases, reductions in staff.

In addition, for the first time since 1988, USAID obligated Development Assistance (DA) for Sudan. These funds support capacity building efforts in opposition held areas, (see further description under Section V), and reflect this Administration's strong interest in laying the groundwork for a successful transition from war to peace in Sudan.

USAID has spent over \$840 million in Sudan over the last decade. See Annex 2.

II. GRANTS SUMMARY

In keeping with the ISP's focus on integration of resources, almost all FFP-funded food grants in FY97 and FY98 had OFDA-funded components⁶. With the exception of one competitively awarded OFDA-funded umbrella project in Khartoum, all grant proposals were unsolicited and approved on a rolling basis in response to need and USAID priorities as outlined in the ISP and Action Plan.

More than 27 different organizations received grants from OFDA and FFP. A complete list of FFP and OFDA grant projects for FY97 and FY98, including grantee names, dollar amounts, type of program and populations and regions served are provided in Annex 3. They are listed by Strategic Objective.

III. TOTAL POPULATIONS SERVED

It is difficult to ascertain total populations reached directly by USAID activities since many grants provide different services for the same populations. While many OFDA grants are providing services for targeted groups of some 100,000–300,000 people at a time, OFDA's broad support for UNICEF/OLS and WFP airlift operations, and other logistics support, are designed to

⁶ Exceptions primarily related to FFP contributions to WFP appeals.

support relief efforts for the entire population in need.

FFP grants to individual NGOs serve target populations ranging from 75,000 – 150,000. Its contributions to WFP are merged with other donors to serve the needs of about 2.5 million people. USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, with its contribution of 416(b) wheat, have provided 55% of the total cash requirement, or 62% of the food requirement, to WFP's emergency operations appeal for Sudan.⁷

Overall, the U.S. is the largest donor to the Sudan relief effort. USAID-supported WFP relief operations alone reached between 1 million and 1.8 million people per month during the period August–December 1998.

IV. NON-OLS SUPPORT

In light of OLS' reliance on GOS approval to access certain areas and the severe impact of flight bans on the delivery of relief, USAID has adopted a strategy of increased support to the handful of organizations that operate outside of OLS, (i.e., do not adhere to the need for government authorization to operate in Sudan.) These organizations include Norwegian's People's Aid (NPA), Concern, GOAL, Medecins sans Frontieres/Switzerland, Medecins sans Frontieres/France and Lutheran World Relief (LWR).⁸

The chart below reveals resources moved through non-OLS organizations in FY97 and FY98.

Support for Non OLS Organizations

Office	FY97 (000)	FY98 (000)
OFDA	\$ 1,535	\$ 3,677
FFP	3,418	6,084
Total	\$ 4,953	\$ 9,761

These numbers are important baselines given USAID's commitment, as stated in both the ISP and the Action Plan, to more vigorously support efforts of non-OLS groups as a way to reduce the relief program's vulnerability to flight bans.

V. GENERAL SUPPORT FOR OLS (UNICEF, WFP, UNDHA)

USAID's program relies heavily on the OLS structure and its funding for UN operations reflects this. Some 26.7% of OFDA's Sudan budget in FY97 (\$5.85 million) and 17.9% (\$6.57 million) in FY98 supported UN/OLS operations. FFP food grants to WFP also included cash support to cover indirect costs. Funding supported a range of functions and activities including staffing, light aircraft operations for monitoring, assessment methodology, coordination of sectoral activities and some program work, such as the UNICEF health and livestock activities, WFP food deliveries, and OLS dissemination of information related to humanitarian principles. These grants support multiple ISP objectives.

⁷ WFP EMOP 5826.01.

⁸ LWR is funded in FY99, not in FY98 or FY97.

PART FOUR: PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVES

While USAID staff continue to use the ISP as a statement of vision for its approach to the Sudan emergency, it was never intended as a document from which a traditional “results report” would flow. No indicators, baselines or targets were set to report on progress towards achieving the objectives or key (intermediate) results. (See Annex 4 for a cable summary of the ISP inter-agency review.) Thus, this progress report relies on anecdotal, qualitative and quantitative information provided primarily by our implementing partners.

Only a handful of key grants could be fully reviewed in the time available and so the impact of the USAID program is not covered comprehensively in this report.

I. LIVELIHOODS

SO1: Emergency Food Needs Are Met in Manner Which Increases Capacities for Food Self-reliance.

IR1: Increased Availability of Locally-Produced Food Resources;

IR3: Food Resources Move More Easily through Marketing Networks.

The impact of activities supporting SO1, IR1 and IR3, are considered together under the rubric of “livelihoods.” Agricultural production, road repair and livestock were selected for review since all were highlighted as top priorities in the current BHR Action Plan.

Agricultural Production

Key Results

- **Helped generate surplus food production in Western Equatoria**
- **Revived livelihoods for some 102,000 people, (17,000 families)**
- **Facilitated use of locally grown food in the relief effort**
- **Assisted over 230,000 beneficiaries through rehabilitation projects**

Since 1993, USAID has been supporting rehabilitation activities in agriculture, roads, health, water supply and sanitation, with the overall goal of reducing immediate suffering, building capacities, reducing vulnerabilities, and reducing the high cost of emergency response. (Restated in the 1996 ISP goal as “A less vulnerable, more self reliant population better prepared for a transition from war to peace.”) The activities seek to replace expatriate staff with local personnel, air transport with road transport, and imported food with locally grown food surplus.⁹

⁹ A 1995 evaluation of this strategy found that there was evidence of both increasing local capacity and reducing relief costs, and called for its continuation under the current constraints of war. This serves as the basis for USAID’s ongoing commitment to the livelihoods approach, which is also widely embraced by relief agencies operating in Sudan.

Part of the strategy is to both increase local agricultural production and promote the marketing of surplus crops. Western Equatoria, a fertile area in firm SPLA/M control, has been a focal point for this approach, although other areas also benefit from USAID supported seeds and tools distributions. With USAID funding, NGOs in Western Equatoria, including CARE and Worldvision, have helped revive livelihoods for some 17,000 farmers and their families. They did so by providing a market for surplus crops through cash purchases and “barter” shops that exchange basic items such as blankets, cloth, hand tools, soap and salt for farmers’ surplus crops. The surplus production is sold to relief organizations for distribution among refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable groups. Since 1994, CARE and Worldvision together have injected \$670,000 worth of goods and cash into the local economy through grain purchases and barter programs.¹⁰

There will be an estimated 33,000 MT surplus in Western Equatoria in FY99. USAID’s Sudan Field Office estimates that some 15,000 MT of that surplus is generated in the two regions that were heavily assisted by CARE and Worldvision in FY97 and FY98.

Given overall projections of a southern Sudan food deficit of 80,000 MT in 1998, and between 70,000 and 90,00 MT in 1999, the estimated 1999 Western Equatoria cereal surplus is potentially significant.¹¹ The challenge, however, is to collect and move surplus crops into deficit areas. The Sudan Field Office estimates that some 1,000-1,200 MT/year of surplus production was purchased in Western Equatoria for use in the relief market annually over the last few years, a strategy designed to simultaneously support livelihoods for local farmers while saving on relief costs. An estimated 4,000 MT will be purchased in 1999 – a significant increase.

The case study below explains the approach further.

Case Study – CARE/Tambura Western Equatoria Economic Recovery Program¹²

CARE’s Tambura program seeks to build capacity and restore household livelihood security through integrating a variety of different activities, including: road repair (to improve market access,) agricultural extension services (to boost production,) and barter shops (to absorb surplus production and provide needed goods without “handouts”).

As a result of the CARE/Tambura program, the Tambura County community has developed an agricultural capacity capable of generating a very significant surplus of crop production. The CARE agricultural activity reached about 10,000 farmers between 1994 and 1998. The program saw three consecutive years of increased agricultural surplus production and in 1996/7, the majority of surplus crops produced were of seed quality, showing obvious gains in agricultural practices leading to improved quality of production. A total of 1,468 MT of surplus grains were bartered with farmers and then sold by CARE to as many as seven different NGOs for some \$352,490 between 1994 and 1998.

The Tambura County Barter Association was formed and will function using revolving funds generated over the past years from sale of crops. CARE will act as an advisor, focusing on institutional strengthening to complete the hand over of barter-related activities to the Tambura County Barter Association. (The community association has taken on a purely commercial shape; subsidies were removed from imported commodities and prices restructured accordingly.) Agricultural extension activities have been ceded to the SPLA/M relief arm, the SRRA, intimately involved since the beginning of the project.

Another important project supporting the livelihoods approach is the CRS Umbrella grant, which has been funded since 1994. Its purpose is to support local rehabilitation initiatives in both Eastern and Western Equatoria in the areas of food security/agriculture, income generation and

¹⁰ Cash/dollar infusion estimates provided by USAID’s Sudan Field Office.

¹¹ FEWS project, “Southern Sudan, Monthly Report,” December, 1998. Report indicates that the SPLM’s relief arm, SRRA, provided the ‘98 figure & ‘99 deficit figure of 90,000 MT; FAO’s projection for FY99 is 70,000 MT.

¹² Care South Sudan, “End of Grant Report (AOT-1006-G-00-50067-00); Feb ‘94-Feb. 98,” December 1998.

organizations. Each sub project must also include a component to increase the capacity of the organization presenting and implementing the proposal. Beneficiaries include both resident and

To date, under this grant, CRS has:

- supported 47 rehabilitation projects developed and implemented by Sudanese; (16 new projects approved in 1997-1998). This is 100% of the project target. assisted more than 380,000 beneficiaries; (including over 230,000 in 1997-1998 period).
-
- assistance

Among the findings of a recent CRS-funded impact evaluation were the clear positive changes in with serious health implications (such as prostitution) and the revival of many lost livelihoods, primarily trade and oilseed cultivation/processing.

Two CRS sub grants are described in Annex 4.

A. Road Repair

Key Results

- **Travel time cut almost in half between Yambio and Tambura; facilitate recovery of Yei and Yambio markets; (commercial traffic is moving)**
- **Access to market and health services restored for Tambura County (pop:140,000)**
- **Saved estimated \$2 million in air transport costs through movement of 8,000 MT (largest quantity ever) of relief supplies by road in 1998 to Bahr el Ghazal**
- **Projected savings in FY99 is \$9.25 million, with some 36,000 MT of food aid expected to be moved on roads improved through USAID-funded activities**

USAID's Action Plan and the ISP emphasize the importance of road repair to improve market access, reduce the costs of relief efforts by reducing the need for airdrops, and reduce GOS control over relief operations. Both OFDA and FFP grants support road improvement efforts.

The Sudan Field Office estimates that approximately 8,000 MT of food aid was moved by road into Bahr el Ghazal in 1998, primarily by WFP. This is the largest quantity ever moved by road into this region under OLS and results from both improved security due to SPLA victories in the area in 1997 and road improvements funded by USAID. Given savings of about \$250 for each

¹³ CRS Sudan Office, "Umbrella Grant Proposal, 1998-1999," June 1998.

ton of commodity moved into Bahr el Ghazal by road compared to air, this is a cost savings of \$2 million in 1998 alone.

For 1999, WFP and NGOs plan to move some 37,000 MT on roads improved by USAID-funded activities into Bahr el Ghazal that would otherwise have to be airdropped. Thus, the roads could generate a future savings of at least \$9.25 million.

Some program highlights are provided below.

Road Repair Case Studies

IAS/MEDIC¹⁴: As a result of IAS/MEDIC work, the road route from the Uganda border to Yei (Eastern Equatoria) to Maridi (Western Equatoria) is now all-weather, allowing 40 MT trucks to reach the town of Maridi. This road access is significant because it allows the delivery of supplies and personnel to most relief and development projects in Western Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal. It was a key piece of the transport road that allowed for the trucking of 8,000 MT of relief food in 1998.

The larger goal is to obtain an all weather surface from the Uganda border to Rumbek, in the Lakes region, or southern Bahr el Ghazal, by October 1999. MEDIC uses equipment provided by the SPLM, most of which was originally donated by USAID to Sudan in the 1980s. It has established, in cooperation with local authorities, locally based road maintenance units to ensure ongoing maintenance.

CARE/Tambura: The road component of this project has rebuilt and consistently maintained over 300 kilometers of primary roads, including repairs to over 30 bridges and small culverts. Travel time from Yambio to Tambura decreased from 8 hours to 4.5 hours by jeep. An additional 225 kilometers of secondary roads were cleared of forest growth. The roads program target population was all 140,000 people of Tambura County, providing them with critical links to markets, schools, health care facilities and rivers. The roads allow for the free movement of trucks to pick up grain for barter/sale and have facilitated recovery of Yei and Yambio markets.

C. Livestock

Key Results

- **About 1 million cattle vaccinated/year against rinderpest**
- **Rinderpest outbreaks decline from 14 in 1994 to 1 in 1997**
- **Livestock services considered better than pre-war levels**

USAID's livelihoods approach has also focused on livestock, a sector critical to the pastoral societies of southern Sudan. BHR/OFDA supported livestock activities in FY97 through direct support for the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), German Agro-Action,¹⁵ UNICEF/OLS and Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine, which provides technical services to UNICEF livestock programs. In FY98, OFDA boosted livestock support by adding NPA/Sudan Medical Care and Veterinaires Sans Frontieres (VSF)/Germany and Belgium to its list of grantees.

The livestock sector is well coordinated in southern Sudan under the UNICEF/OLS umbrella. Its emphasis is on the eradication of the deadly rinderpest disease, which can wipe out entire herds if left unchecked, and provision of other animal health services through a community-based approach. These programs, which work in tandem with a regional project of the Organization of African Unity, (known as the OAU/IBAR PARC-VAC project), have important regional

¹⁴ MEDIC, "A project proposal: MEDIC/IAS Road Maintenance and Repair Project; Kaya to Rumbek, South Sudan," July 1998.

¹⁵ This grant closed out upon GAA's receipt of funding from other donors.

vaccination programs are also being used to improve human health services. Implementors, for health programs to children and women in cattle camps.

Cost recovery approaches are being used, limiting dependency on aid assistance. Livestock revenue is used to pay community animal health workers and the remainder is put into a community fund used for a variety of purposes, including human health services and schools.

Support for UNICEF and the NGOs has had tremendous impact. Over 1 million livestock are Rinderpest outbreaks have dropped from 14 in 1994 to 1 in 1998. Current treatment for disease is considered by ex-government livestock personnel to be a

animal health has been an entry point for contacting community leaders and young men responsible for conflicts between neighboring tribes. Promise of access to the heat stable vaccine¹⁶ has been Toposa and Turkana on

Excerpts from a recent assessment of the program are provided below.

Case Study: UNICEF/OLS, OAU PARC-VAC, Tufts University School of Medicine

A community-based approach to the eradication and control of rinderpest using the heat-stable in the UNICEF/OLS (southern sector) Livestock Program in 1993. In the following 12 months, the use of Community-based Animal Health Workers (rinderpest.

Since 1993, vaccination coverage has been maintained at about 1 million cattle per year and reported decreased from 14 outbreaks in 1994 to 1 outbreak in 1997. More than 7.5 million doses of heat stable rinderpest vaccine were CAHWs. Considering the complex emergency context of southern Sudan and the importance of rinderpest in a rinderpest by UNICEF/OLS can be viewed as a major achievement.

A network including 563 reaches approximately 70% of southern Sudan. UNICEF data shows that 30.5% of the estimated cattle population of southern Sudan received treatment from the trypanosomiasis, parasites and ticks. livestock personnel to be a dramatic improvement to the pre-war situation.

The OFDA evaluation notes that the PARC-VAC and UNICEF/OLS approach is uniquely effective in achieving community NGOs and implementing partners. The guiding principle behind the approach is commitment to community-led involvement in animal health service delivery and transparent relationships with pastoral communities. This long term impact leads to opening for discussion on issues such as conflict, water, natural resource management or human health.

: USAID has committed in its action plan to expand support for agriculturally based livelihood programs, livestock activities and road repair.

induce farmers to plant for surplus production and encouragement of relief agencies to purchase

¹⁶ The OAU program is also supported by USAID, including OFDA funds, through a Global Bureau mechanism.

locally grown food. Dramatic expansion in the use of food surpluses in Western Equatoria for relief efforts will be constrained by a variety of factors including insecurity, additional road repair requirements, information dissemination to farmers about surplus purchases, storage requirements and the availability of donor funds to purchase the food. With regard to road repair, expansion of trucking from northern Uganda, the use of private transporters to move food into Bahr el Ghazal and road rehabilitation requirements in Uganda and Kenya are all challenges to be addressed.

II. 1998 FAMINE RESPONSE

SO 1, IR 2: Food Aid Helps Fill Local Resource Gaps

SO 2, IR 1: Urgent Needs Caused by an Acute Emergency Met on a Timely Basis


This progress report looks at the impact of famine response in southern Sudan during the period July – December 1998. Bulk food aid (SO1, IR2) and health programs that provided supplementary and therapeutic feeding (SO2, IR1) are considered together.

Key Results:

- **1-1.8 million people/month in southern Sudan received food aid between July and December 1998**
- **Mortality rates improved dramatically in key locations**
- **Nutritional trends improved dramatically in key locations**

A. Impact of Relief Operations

The immediate term impact of the relief effort was outstanding once the Sudanese government lifted flight bans into Bahr el Ghazal in May 1998.




WFP southern sector food distributions rose dramatically after July 1998.¹⁷ WFP reached 1 million to 1.8 million people per month in southern Sudan during this period. Bulk food distributions were complemented by supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs. In July, NGOs in Bahr el Ghazal supported 14,000 children in 19 supplemental feeding centers. By the end of August, programs were reaching over 46,000 children in 50 supplementary and 21 therapeutic feeding centers. Many adults and adolescents also were in these programs, underlining the extreme

nature of the crisis.¹⁸ USAID funded aircraft, food aid and nutrition programs made a critical difference, facilitating sharp increases in commodities moved for food and nutrition programs.

WFP food delivery increases and other relief interventions were accompanied by dramatic improvements in crude mortality rates in Bahr el Ghazal.

Figure 3: Mortality in MSF sites in Bahr-el-Ghazal
Source: MSF



While Figure 2 only monitors MSF/B sites (some of the worst-affected areas of the province), it is indicative of the larger impact of the heavily USAID-supported relief operations. Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) reported in November 1998 that all available data suggested a fall in malnutrition and mortality rates by October.

For instance:

- in the severely affected town of Wau, UNICEF reported 9.6% malnutrition in December, compared to 43.4% in August.

¹⁷ The WFP graph shows food deliveries from OLS southern sector only. Parts of Bahr el Ghazal were also served from the northern sector.

¹⁸ An estimated 1.2 million were at risk of starvation in Bahr el Ghazal by May 1998.

In Ajiep, the famine's epicenter:

- The overall crude mortality rate was 0.94 deaths/10,000 persons/day in December (2.38/10,000/day for under fives), compared to more than 69 hunger-related deaths/10,000/day in mid July.¹⁹
- Global malnutrition rates are now estimated at 20%, compared to 48% reported in early October.
- NGOs reported 362 patients in Therapeutic Feeding Centers and 2,537 in Supplemental Feeding Programs in December in Ajiep—a considerable drop from a total caseload of 48,162 beneficiaries in late September.

In addition to the WFP food program, there were other important factors leading to dramatic improvements in the health of the population. These included the onset of the harvest, a decrease in fighting, and an increased availability in wild foods as a result of the rainy season.

With improved nutritional trends throughout most of Bahr el Ghazal, phase down of many supplementary and therapeutic feeding centers began around October. Conditions in some locations where large numbers of internally displaced persons have gathered, however, still represent an ongoing crisis.

One by-product of the emergency is improved collaboration among NGOs working in the health sector. In the aftermath of the 1998 crisis, OLS agencies are working to standardize water and sanitation conditions around health facilities. Selection and discharge criteria have been standardized and NGOs are now utilizing standard nutrition surveys and assessment methodology in emergency programs. In addition, NGOs are beginning to decentralize services as urgent health needs diminish, as a way of drawing people back to their home areas. USAID actively encourages this kind of sectoral coordination.

B. Ongoing Concerns

1. Uneven Distribution: While WFP has been consistently at or near its overall food targets for southern Sudan since July 1998, this achievement masks significant inconsistencies across regions. It must be noted that heavy fighting both among Nuer groups as well as Nuer-Dinka conflicts have all but cut off access to the Upper Nile region at various time, preventing both an accurate assessment of needs and delivery of relief. In October and November, WFP only delivered .1% of food targeted to this region. Further, there remain places where there is no OLS access, including parts of the Nuba Mountains and the Beja area of northeastern Sudan. In addition, there have been pipeline gaps for certain commodities.

2. Seeds and Tools: OFDA and FFP support many seeds and tools programs in an effort to restore assets and promote food self reliance. Some grants also addressed issues of seed quality and multiplication. Despite these efforts, there were numerous problems in this sector.

¹⁹ Experts state that anything higher than 2 deaths/10,00 people/day is an emergency out of control.

FEWS reports:

“A shortage of seeds and tools were given [by SRRA and FAO] as a major reason for a large reduction in the area planted in 1998. The poor 1997 harvest resulted in large needs for free distributions in 1998. However, despite a major investment by NGOs and UNICEF to distribute seeds, the impact was limited. The quantities taken in were insufficient to meet the needs and the coverage was limited. In some cases, the seeds were distributed late and quality and suitability of the selected varieties was an issue.”²⁰

While inadequate planning was one reason for the poor performance, other factors also contributed. The flight bans seriously disrupted timely delivery of seed. Poor weather negatively affected both seed deliveries and planting. In addition, displaced populations could not benefit from seed distributions because they did not have access to their fields to plant.

3. Distribution and Diversion Issues: Diversion of food for military purposes has been a problem and key concern of USAID, which has been in the forefront of donors seeking better accountability for relief resources. It is known that the SPLM currently taxes private transporters of relief goods. In addition, recent OLS task force findings indicate that relief food diversion happens at the community level as a result of a socially-accepted and traditional practice of “tayeen”, a contribution of relief food by the community to a “government”, which includes the army.

The task force also found that a key reason that food does not reach its intended beneficiaries relates to distribution systems. Displaced populations, often the most needy, do not have a voice in the community-based committees which relief providers rely upon to distribute food. In addition, communities, it was found, define need or vulnerability differently than western aid agencies. As a result, as much as 40% of relief rations provided to some targeted populations was found to be shared, or redistributed, although this varied greatly from location to location. The rest was consumed or traded.²¹

Implementation of OLS task force report recommendations will be critical to better address distribution and diversion problems. A Steering Committee has been established to follow up on report actions. Donors, (the Netherlands, with an alternate from USAID or the EU,) will participate with observer status.

C. Assessment of Prospects for the Future: While relief agencies agree that the back of the famine has been broken for now, a resurgence of hunger is expected in FY99. This is primarily due to a failure to address the root causes of conflict (and anticipated displacement of additional populations,) coupled with successive years of drought, followed in 1998 by some of the worst flooding seen in decades. With assets depleted, affected populations have few coping

²⁰ FEWS Project, “*Southern Sudan, Monthly Report*,” December 1998.

²¹ “*WFP Operations in Southern Sector, OLS Situation Report*, December 15, 1998.” During the reporting period, OFDA funded an important anthropological study describing why targeted groups perceive vulnerability within their own communities differently than western aid agencies.

mechanisms available and therefore remain extremely vulnerable for the foreseeable future. Only a break in the fighting sufficient to allow some restoration of assets will yield better longer term prospects for most vulnerable groups, especially the displaced.

With regard to emergency response, an increased emphasis on road repairs and support for non OLS agencies could help mitigate the impact of any GOS flight bans this year, especially if the 37,000 MT of food aid noted earlier in this report is actually moved by road. A UN and NGO plan to move more and better seed in a timely manner could also make a difference if fully implemented. USAID also expects to keep distribution and diversion issues in the forefront. The addition of a new PSC food aid monitor will help in this regard.

III. BASIC PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (BPHC)

SO2: Enhanced Basic Primary Health Care for War Affected Groups

IR2: Expanded coverage of BPHC services

IR3: Improved quality of BPHC services

IR4: Enhanced local capacity to support BPHC services

A. Narrative Analysis - Overview

In FY 1997, OFDA provided over \$7 million—35% of International Disaster Assistance expenditures used in Sudan—to support health and nutrition programs. The following year, this number increased 59% to \$16.5 million—45% of total expenditures.²² A discussion of trends in the OFDA health grants is provided in Annex 6.

The ISP supports a Basic Primary Health Care approach which seeks to treat the major causes of morbidity and provide vaccines through Primary Health Care Centers (PHCCs) and smaller Primary Health Care Units (PHCUs). Training of Sudanese to staff these locations is a key ingredient of the strategy.

Preliminary findings of a recent health assessment indicates that perhaps 60% of southern Sudan has health care coverage through PHCCs or PHCUs, but that coverage is very highly variable. Western Equatoria, for example, has close to 100% coverage while Western Upper Nile has perhaps 15% coverage, declining considerably in 1998 due to insecurity in that area. Vaccination coverage is similarly low. UNICEF estimates that 30% of children have been vaccinated, with no good records of completion of a series of shots against certain diseases. Coverage levels are highly variable across southern Sudan. While these notional numbers are dismal, access to western style medicine would be zero in the absence of the relief effort.²³

Health needs increased dramatically in Sudan during FY97 and FY98, primarily due to ongoing insecurity and displacement. Mortality rates remained high in southern Sudan, with people dying from easily-treatable diseases such as malaria, respiratory infections, and diarrhea. In

²² This is a low estimate since grants with multiple objectives and general support to UNICEF and WFP were excluded.

²³ Estimates in this paragraph were provided by Centers for Disease Control officer Leslie Boss, a recent participant in the health assessment.

Bahr el Ghazal, malnutrition rates reached extraordinary levels during the famine of 1998. Segments of populations in other areas, particularly Upper Nile/Jonglei Region, also suffered but poor access due to inter-factional fighting and floods limited both assessment of needs as well as response. Throughout the south, heavy rains and poor roads, along with insecurity, disrupted health activities, (especially immunization programs), and compromised program monitoring. Outbreaks of cholera, measles, TB and sleeping sickness were also reported during the period and disrupted ongoing programs. On a more positive note, a local response offset a potential health crisis due to a large influx of returning refugees from Uganda in 1997.

B. Expanded Coverage, Improved Quality and Enhanced Local Capacity to Support Basic Primary Health Care Services.

Key Results

- **Better trained Sudanese health care workers**
- **Primary Health Care Centers and Units established and supported**
- **Major disease outbreaks prevented or quickly addressed**
- **Vaccination coverage provided for targeted groups**

- The famine hindered progress towards achieving IRs 2, 3, and 4, in large part because it diverted the attention of relief agencies from these objectives. It forced many health NGOs to forgo crucial activities, including conducting assessments and collection of disaggregated health-related data, a necessary component of IR2. They shifted from basic primary health care approaches to emergency assistance feeding programs. On a more positive note, however, extensive training of local staff has helped dampen the effects of expatriate withdrawals. Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) trained through OFDA-funded activities, for example, continue their maternal and child health work in Upper Nile regardless of expatriate evacuations.

Despite insecurity in some areas, some USAID-funded programs did further expand coverage during the 1997-98 period. In addition, the quality of services for many Sudanese improved through provision of supplies, expatriate oversight and training. Finally, local capacity was enhanced through training individual workers, village health committees and local administration officials.

The program supported some extremely creative and unusual programs for a relief context. Activities included, for example:

- The involvement of veterinary care workers in human health programs (see livestock, p.15)
- Extensive use of mobile clinics to expand reach
- Training programs to enhance both service delivery and health education
- The pairing of international and local NGOs to build local capacity
- The hiring and training of Sudanese refugees from camps in Kenya for health care positions in Sudan

Efforts to transfer program management functions to a local civil authority
The case studies below illustrate some of these points.

Case Study: International Rescue Committee (IRC)/Upper Nile

OFDA has supported IRC health activities in southern Sudan since 1989. IRC locations have varied over the years, but the program has been consistent in content and incorporates key aspects of the ISP's objectives: training of local staff, delivery of services through fixed facilities and, in remote/insecure areas, through mobile facilities.

According to an IRC 1997 external evaluation, "IRC's health training programs ...are the most cost effective contribution that can be made to the 'chronic disaster' situation of Southern Sudan."

IRC's training activities result in better services for up to 300,000 people. The current grant provides training and other support to over 500 health and water workers as well as village health committees, provides drugs and supplies to support activities of 21 Primary Health Care Units (PHCUs) and 4 smaller Primary Health Care Centers (PHCCs). It also supports new well construction.

Program impact includes:

- Virtual elimination of maternal and neonatal deaths and new cases of neonatal tetanus—both previously common – in areas served by 23 Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs)
- Elimination of six common, immunizable diseases in the Ganyiel area (population: 240-300,000) due to training and EPI services
- Immunization against six common diseases and training and support for 20 Community Health Workers (CHWs), 35 EPI team members, 92 TBAs, and 24 water/sanitation team members in remote locations (achieved through establishment of mobile teams)

A key program innovation is IRC's ability to expand health coverage to insecure areas where expatriate personnel cannot travel. It transports local health workers from insecure areas to a fixed training site to provide training. Once back home, these health workers are supported by mobile teams. Another innovation is the inclusion of Sudanese from refugee camps in Kenya, who return to Sudan to train and then work on this program.

Case Study: American Refugee Committee (ARC)/Eastern Equatoria

Since 1994, OFDA has supported ARC's health program in Eastern Equatoria. It is a good example of a project transitioning from an original focus on urgent needs of internally displaced to a basic primary health care approach for all war affected populations (IDPs, returnees, and local residents) in Kajo Keji, Eastern Equatoria. The program goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality for 115,000 war-affected people.

As part of this program's evolution, ARC is providing technical, material and logistical support for a new county health department, which remains in the formative stage under the county civil authority. ARC's program management responsibilities will be shifted to this department. This transfer of responsibility from an NGO to the civil authority is an important transition in the delivery of health services. It is listed as a high priority in the ISP and as an activity that can potentially be supported by USAID's DA-funded Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program.

Current grant results include: measles outbreak quickly and effectively addressed with only 6 cases and 1 mortality; 3 Public Health Care Centers established in Kajo Keji; 11 smaller Public Health Care Units established, served by mobile outreach from PHCCs; and 32 TBAs trained and provided technical support.

Case Study: Sudan Medical Care (SMC)/Kapoeta

OFDA support for this local NGO program started in FY94. The program is funded through NPA, which provides its own funding and project oversight, advising SMC on its own institutional development and on technical aspects of the project.

This basic primary health care program expanded both in terms of services and geographically in FY98. It now includes basic primary health care, EPI, Community Health Worker (CHW) training and support for Village Health Committees across all of Kapoeta County, E. Equatoria. SMC's program aims to improve the health status of approximately 207,000 people (mostly Toposa). The Toposa are a semi-nomadic group and an under-served population with typically poor access to health services.

The project supports two PHCCs and 14 smaller PHCUs; trains and provides refresher training for three EPI teams; trains and supports 25 CHWs, trains 25 MCHWs/TBAs, and establishes and trains 10 Village Health Committees. Key Results include no major disease outbreaks in the three areas where SMC has been operating since 1995.²⁴ SMC sees options for its programs to address conflict issues, (See SO4.)

C. Assessment of Prospects for the Future: The prospects for a measurably improved health system for war affected Sudanese is not likely until there is peace. Lack of sustainability, largely due to insecurity, and continued urgent needs also reduces the likelihood of the phase out of many OFDA programs. Challenges include:

²⁴ An outbreak of cholera occurred in New Cush, Natinga and Narus early in September but was quickly eliminated.

- Communities remain unable to co-finance and build their own health structures; NGOs have been unable to establish fee for service mechanisms so far although this has been approved by the SPLM on a pilot basis.
- Community mobilization and transfer of program responsibilities to local administrations remain a real challenge.
- Better targeting of women is needed both in terms of services, training and program design. (Fortunately, NGOs, including ARC and IRC, are aware of this and have begun to emphasize reproductive health in training and outreach.)
- The chronic lack of skilled labor force in Sudan has, and continues to, significantly affect the effectiveness of health programs in Sudan.

A multi donor evaluation of the health sector, conducted by the Centers for Disease Control, the World Health Organization (WHO) and a private consultant, has just been completed. The final report will be available in March. Preliminary findings revalidate the need to strengthen existing basic primary health care structures. The review will note the disruptions to ongoing activities caused by vertical programs (e.g., polio eradication campaigns) and the need for much-improved information and coordination in the sector, as well as improved pipelines for EPI programs. Extremely important is an improved monitoring and a regularized health surveillance system, which is non-existent despite 11 years of health care provision under OLS. The health sector evaluation will influence future OFDA funding in the health sector.

IV. REINTEGRATION

SO3: Target Groups Pursue Viable Reintegration Options

IR1: Viable Reintegration Options Identified

IR2: Reintegration Efforts are Supported for Selected Groups

A. Narrative Analysis

Key Results

- **Resettlement plans developed by USAID partners in north and south**
- **Pilot reintegration efforts underway**

The ISP supports the reintegration of war affected populations into productive life based on the targeted population's voluntary choice when presented with various, viable options. Target populations are identified as displaced war affected populations in Khartoum camps and squatter areas, garrison towns, and Equatoria camps, as well as refugees returning spontaneously or under an organized repatriation plan, or even demobilized soldiers. The ISP defines "reintegration" as the return of target populations to their home, their resettlement in other areas or their reintegration into their current "host" communities.

Refugee and IDP trends: The number of IDPs in Sudan has remained constant since the ISP was written, hovering at about 4.5 million. This masks the fact that some small numbers have either returned to home areas or resettled in new places, while others have been newly displaced.

The number of Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries declined overall during the period 1995-1997. Statistics are as follows:

	1995	1996	1997	1998
# Sudanese refugees ²⁵	448,100	433,700	353,000	381,951

Large scale returns in 1997 are primarily due to an estimated 50,000-80,000 Sudanese refugees repatriating voluntarily from Uganda. Most returns followed the SPLA capture of key towns in the south but insecurity in northern Uganda was also a factor.

B. Viable Reintegration Options Identified

USAID has supported a number of organizational efforts to both identify reintegration options and then implement programs to support them. Data on target populations and potential locations for resettlement (IR3.1.1) have been gathered by various USAID-supported groups including ADRA, CARE, and CRS. In addition, USAID has funded staff to support UN efforts to collect and analyze information and develop a comprehensive database on IDPs living in GOS-held areas, including accurate population figures and socioeconomic profiles. Support is provided through the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UNHCU) in Khartoum.

Some examples are provided below.

Case Studies: Resettlement planning

ADRA's emergency program for IDPs in the north includes efforts to identify potential locations in Kordofan and south Kordofan to which IDPs could move. Extensive visits to potential resettlement sites have led to the development of a relocation manual and some 120 families are now targeted for resettlement in south Kordofan in 1999. ADRA has established a Transition Unit which is hosting workshops, documenting and analyzing the relocation experiences of IDPs. One analysis related to a Sudan Council of Churches sponsored relocation of 500 persons from Khartoum camps to locations in Upper Nile in June 1998. While this resettlement effort was not successful, (most returned to Khartoum), ADRA's analysis helped to identify program weaknesses.

For the first time ever, the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit in Khartoum fielded six IDP coordinators in late 1997. In the first six months each of the coordinators provided analysis of displacement in different regions and defined frameworks for providing long term solutions for displacement in their designated areas. They brought IDPs into decision making processes and discussions on long term planning. In addition, the USAID-supported UNHCU IDP program engaged for the first time in a constructive dialogue with the Ministry of Engineering on the impact of urban planning measures on the Khartoum displaced. UNDP funds were secured for a survey of IDPs and migrant populations in Khartoum state.

CRS has prepared a coordinated resettlement plan of IDP's in Eastern Equatoria that considers resettlement requirements if Torit and Juba were to fall to the SPLM/A. Including extensive assessment interviews in a number of locations with potential beneficiaries, church representatives, the relief arm of the SPLA and local chiefs, the plan considers the numbers of IDPs and refugees returning to the region, their travel routes and resettlement requirements.

C. Reintegration Efforts are Supported for Selected Groups

Three major reintegration efforts were supported by USAID during this reporting period. Since these grants support multi-faceted programs for a variety of different groups and needs, dollar figures solely for resettlement were not readily available. The grants are:

²⁵ Located in six neighboring countries. U.S. Committee for Refugee statistics, as of end of calendar years.

- A CARE program for 36,160 households in Bor County, Eastern Equatoria. This program seeks to raise surplus agricultural production and strengthen the ability of communities to absorb the Dinka who are returning to the more stable south and central Bor areas after years of displacement due to Dinka-Nuer fighting. It is one of a number of USAID grants providing food security and health services in Bor County (Jonglei region) in an effort to attract displaced persons to their original areas.²⁶ Large scale return of IDPs from Equatoria camps to Bor County in the next year will depend mainly on security. If SPLA takes any of the remaining garrison towns (Torit, Kapoeta, Juba, Bor), more people will probably return to Bor.
- A CRS program in Eastern Equatoria promoting self reliance in food production for 15,840 households in displaced camps and 2,680 households of Acholi IDP/returnees from Uganda, while also planning to facilitate the return of displaced populations to Bor.
- An NPA program to support resettlement needs of 50,000 moving from Uganda to Kajo Keji and Yei Counties, Eastern Equatoria.

These programs generally ensure that health and food resources are available in selected reintegration areas. They promote self-sufficiency through agricultural endeavors or other pilot activities. Relief food is supplied to support the population during the cultivation periods until second season crops are harvested.

Reintegration Case Studies

NPA/Equatoria: *During the first six months of 1998, NPA noted that 13,500 persons returned to Yei County from the Kajo Keji displaced camps. The delivery of relief food and agricultural inputs, coupled with training in basic sustainable agricultural techniques, acted as a "pull factor" for not only the targeted displaced beneficiaries, but also the refugees in Uganda and vulnerable groups from Juba County. Food-for-work is utilized to conduct road repair to facilitate access to distribution points and storage areas.*

CARE/Bor County: *In 1997, CARE distributed 75MT of seed and 36,000 tools to 13,000 households. Eighty six percent of participating households increased their farm sizes due to the availability of tools. In northern Bor County (Jonglei), a survey of the villages in the focal zones showed that the land cultivated increased by at least 50%, mostly due to resettlement but also due to the expansion of individual farms. This was due to the increased availability of labor. In 1997, timely rains during the crucial flowering phase of the sorghum helped produce the best crop in the last five years in the areas not stricken by localized drought.*

D. Assessment of prospects for the future: A number of factors have negatively affected these reintegration programs. These include a) far greater services in refugee camps—especially in the areas of health and education—than these programs offer in home areas; b) continued insecurity in some locations, especially for the CARE program operating around Bor, c) flooding and d) drought. A further complicating factor is that OLS activities inside Sudan and UNHCR programs for refugees in neighboring countries are not well-coordinated. USAID expects that IDP and returnee reintegration efforts will remain relatively small scale for the life of the ISP.

²⁶ Bor was the sight of great devastation in 1991/92 when the main southern ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer) united against the north split. Most of the IDPs in camps in Equatoria and many refugees in Kenya are from Bor County.

V CONFLICT REDUCTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING

SO4: Improved Support to Reduce Conflict and Strengthen Capacities for Peace

IR 1: Local Capacities for Peace Strengthened through Selected Programs

IR 2: Relationships and Linkages that Help Reduce Conflict Among Warring Parties Promoted

Given the state of the war over the past 24 months, it difficult to say that significant achievements have been accomplished under SO 4. However, some small steps have been taken. Both AFR- and BHR-funded activities contribute to this objective. In addition, diplomatic efforts to promote peace also contribute here.

Key Results:

- **STAR program grants awarded**
- **Through UNICEF, reached over 8,000 people at all levels of southern Sudanese society with an awareness-raising campaign to promote humanitarian principles (since 1995)**
- **U.S. –supported IGAD peace process yielded a technical committee on humanitarian aid which signed two agreements to improve security for relief workers and support cross-battleline delivery of relief supplies**

A. Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR)

1. Background: USAID initiated the Development Assistance (DA) funded STAR program in FY98. While there are no results to report yet, this section describes the activity. It is an important new addition to the USAID portfolio and will be the cornerstone of USAID work towards this objective.

The STAR program originated from a June 1997 Administration decision that USAID should support democracy and governance building activities in opposition-held areas of Sudan. The program seeks to reduce conflict and strengthen capacities for peace through support for independent Sudanese civil society. Elements of this civil society include private local organizations, mainly associated with the international relief effort. The SPLM has itself made public commitments to promote a more open civil society with greater respect for human rights and a more transparent and accountable civil administration. To date, however, it has not moved much beyond the rhetoric stage, and its military agenda continues to generally take precedence. The STAR program provides an opportunity for the SPLM and other opposition movements to begin implementing this commitment. STAR objectives and expected results are outlined in Annex 7.

2. Program Status: Total planned funding for STAR is \$7 million over 3 years, of which \$3 million was obligated in FY98 with GHAI (Development Assistance) funds. The STAR program will comprise the following:

Cooperative Agreement with Catholic Relief Services (CRS), signed in September 1998. This umbrella grant program will build the capacity of "grassroots" Sudanese civil society

organizations. CRS will provide sub-grants to these organizations—mostly NGOs but also church organizations and cooperatives—and perhaps technical assistance and training. These groups often work with the opposition movements' civil administration and wings. The humanitarian wings themselves may be eligible for these sub-grants if they are active in organizing communities for self-help activities.

The first subgrant under the CRS program will be disbursed in late January or early February 1999 to support the Nuer-Dinka Peace Process being facilitated by an indigenous NGO, the New Sudan Council of Churches. It will bring together elders, church leaders and civilians from both the Nuer and Dinka areas to work at reducing conflict and moving towards a more peaceful environment.

Grant to UNICEF, signed in September 1998. This will support the Capacity Building/Humanitarian Principles program of OLS to provide training to county administrators and their staffs in public administration and finance, as well as governance, transparency, accountability, and human rights. This UNICEF program has been operating for several years, and USAID has provided limited funds through OFDA.

UNICEF is finalizing plans to begin civil administration training during the 2nd quarter of FY99.

A Leadership Training component. USAID will provide training to the leaders of the National Democratic Alliance in governance, transparency, accountability, and human rights, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of the recent trend towards improved governance. An important element in addressing Sudan's long-term problems is the ability of the opposition's leadership to resolve internal differences, understand and undertake democratic governance, and plan for the future. REDSO/ESA's Sudan Field Office (SFO) is preparing the terms of reference for this NDA leadership training program, and will be working with G/DG to identify suitable NGOs to undertake its implementation. Obligation is planned for April 1999.

In addition to the programs outlined above, REDSO is contemplating a fourth component to comprise special activities in support of peace and reconciliation efforts, rule of law and judicial independence, and in-kind organizational support.

Care will be taken to ensure that sub grants made to local NGOs under the Cooperative Agreement with CRS do no harm in terms of multiple ethnic conflicts and jealousies, and do not undermine the civil authorities which, while currently unelected, may offer the best hope for civilian government. In addition, no activities funded will presuppose any outcome of the conflict or favor any of Sudan's many ethnic groups and religious affiliations.

B. BHR Activities

Like the STAR program, BHR programs also contribute toward both IR1 and IR2 of SO4. They are described briefly below. It is difficult at this point to determine impact as conflict reduction and peace building results are sub-sets, or by products, of BHR relief related grants and are not often reported on directly in grant documents; and most of the programs are nascent.
humanitarian

1. “Do No Harm”: BHR and REDSO/ESA collaborated to provide training in FY97 and FY98 to USAID implementing partners in the use of analytical frameworks developed by Mary Anderson. These help design relief (and development) programs that consciously seek to avoid exacerbating conflict and that identify and build on desires for peace. USAID is not currently monitoring or documenting in any formal way the extent to which partners have embraced these concepts – i.e., how their project designs succeed in either “avoiding harm” or building on local desires for peace. But there is evidence through grant proposals that these approaches are being used. CRS, for example, provided a full “Capacity and Vulnerability” analysis in its last umbrella grant proposal to OFDA. Worldvision has gone a step further, offering up its Sudan program as a test case in Anderson’s project to formally apply her frameworks. (CRS is formally testing the approach in Liberia.)

2. Support for OLS Ground Rules and Humanitarian Principles: OFDA has provided funding for this activity, which began in 1995 and is aimed at promoting in southern Sudan humanitarian principles, the protection of humanitarian assistance, respect for basic human rights and the protection of civilians from the conflict.

Since that time, the SPLA/M relief arm (SRRA) together with UNICEF, have:

- Reached over 8,000 people at all levels of society through a joint dissemination and awareness-raising campaign to promote humanitarian principles
- Held over 30 Ground Rules workshops in Sudan, attended by more than 15,000 members of the general public, local counterparts, civil administrators, military leaders, and members of churches, women’s and other groups
- Held an additional ten workshops in Kenya, attended by more than 250 representatives from UN agencies, NGOs, counterpart organizations and donors

In part because of the humanitarian principles work done by UNICEF and the SPLM-OLS Ground Rules agreement, the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the openness regarding humanitarian issues has been significantly improved in parts of southern Sudan. The value of this was shown when local SPLM authorities requested more OLS humanitarian principles workshops in late 1998, to deal with the increase in misunderstandings between relief workers and local authorities due to the unprecedented levels of assistance going into the SPLM areas of south Sudan.

However, progress towards another of the program’s aims – to encourage the creation of a more representative and democratic civil society within Sudanese humanitarian organizations – has been slower, in part because of competing and conflicting agendas within the SPLM.

3. “By products” of OFDA Relief Grants - A number of grantees are interested in experimenting with ways in which their health related activities can bring together groups that are normally in conflict.

- The local NGO, Sudan Medical Care, has pointed out that its health services in mostly Toposa areas of Kapoeta are attracting people from other tribes that are usually in conflict with the Toposa. They believe this contact is positive and could be built upon for greater conflict resolution effect.
- ADRA is conducting a combined health and livestock program in western Kapoeta county, that has the potential to bring together the Boya, Didinga and other neighboring tribes. While violent cattle rustling causes these tribes to live in fear of each other, those providing community veterinary services are highly regarded in the area. ADRA reports in its proposal that the veterinary assistant will seek to bring together conflicting parties for dialogue.

This part of BHR's portfolio is underdeveloped and poorly documented. The STAR program offers opportunities to create greater synergies between relief activities and conflict mitigation.

C. Diplomatic Contributions

U.S. support for the IGAD peace process is one clear way that the U.S. pursues this objective and is a critical piece in the overall U.S. Sudan strategy.

One potentially important achievement under IGAD is the formation in August 1998 of an IGAD technical committee on humanitarian aid. The committee includes representatives from OLS, the GOS, the SPLM/A and Kenya. In November 1998, the group issued a communique and signed two agreements related to improvement of security for relief workers and cross-battleline delivery of relief supplies.

Negotiations for humanitarian corridors across frontlines is specifically cited as one way to promote IR2 (linkages that help reduce conflict) The impact of these agreements have not yet been felt on the ground but bear both continued support and monitoring from the U.S.

D. Assessment of Prospects for the Future: The new DA-funded component of this SO is critical to improving USAID progress in this area. With regard to broader peace efforts, conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea will likely negatively affect the IGAD peace talks. Alternative approaches to promoting peace in the region may need to be considered.

PART FIVE: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES

I. REVISIONS TO THE ISP

BHR, AFR and REDSO/ESA do not believe that any changes to the ISP are necessary at this time. The Action Plan discussed in Part II, Section II both fine tunes and revalidates the strategy laid out in the ISP. The new STAR program also has clearly articulated objectives and indicators and fits neatly into the current ISP framework. If conditions in Sudan remain more or less “status quo,” BHR, AFR and REDSO/ESA may recommend that the ISP be extended beyond its December 1999 expiration, through the year 2000. Progress on the peace talks and reform of the OLS system will be important factors to consider.

II. NEAR TERM PERFORMANCE MONITORING OPTIONS

BHR, AFR and REDSO/ESA staff expect to conduct a Portfolio Review of the Sudan program around the end of CY1999. This review would be modeled along a 1996 portfolio review, which considered such issues as the SPLM’s efforts to create a blueprint for relief and rehabilitation efforts over a five year period; ways to improve health care for populations in insecure areas; and ways to improve targeting of food aid.

In addition to making operational recommendations, the next portfolio review should also suggest:

- Whether or not to extend the ISP through 2000 and/or whether revisions need to be made;
- Whether a formal evaluation of the humanitarian assistance portion of the portfolio is warranted.²⁷ (It may be too early to look at the STAR program.). Given the current lack of a formal monitoring system for Sudan, an evaluation seems appropriate, especially to consider the impact of some of the longer term objectives relating to training and livelihoods strategies. In addition, the evaluators might make recommendations regarding the kinds of information available for regular program monitoring.

The Portfolio Review will also serve to bring many of the new AID/W and field staff working on the program together with veteran staff for a unified look at the program.

III. FUTURE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MONITORING

While BHR, AFR and the Sudan Field Office do not believe that now is the time to amend the ISP, we do see the need for an improved monitoring system. The Sudan Field Office is preparing suggestions on how best to report on the Sudan program. This will be shared with AID/W in the near future.

²⁷ A 1995 evaluation of the southern Sudan program, along with the 1996 Portfolio Review, served as an important foundation for the development of the ISP.

BHR and the Sudan Field Office have been emphasizing the need to improve efforts by our PVO partners to submit progress reports in a timely fashion and with information that clearly expresses progress against originally stated project objectives. The revised OFDA and FFP proposal guidelines, with their emphasis on timely and substantive reporting (and OFDA's potential adoption of a database system to improve office level results) should facilitate progress in this area. OFDA's new guidelines offer PVOs a list of potential project-level indicators to choose from, but grantees can also create their own.

There is a very mixed view among Sudan programmers and "watchers" about the value of creating a whole range of indicators to measure progress against the ISP. The value of such a system both for measuring impact and shaping budget decisions needs to be weighed against the time and effort required both to develop and implement it.

IV. FUTURE REPORTS

This progress report is designed to meet the Sudan reporting requirements for this R4 season.

Future reporting for Sudan should be done jointly by the REDSO/ESA Sudan Field Office and OFDA's new Africa Regional Office, in consultation with BHR/Washington offices. An alternative might be a bi-annual report on Sudan, with a Somalia program review submitted on the alternate year. These two countries both have ISPs that will be co-managed by AFR/ESA and BHR. Even with bi-annual submissions, a short progress report on the STAR program would be needed annually to consider future budget levels.

V. STAFFING ISSUES

The Sudan program benefits in 1999 from the arrival of a PSC to cover the STAR program, and a new Food for Peace PSC and FSN food monitor to assist with food aid monitoring. With these additions, there will be three full time field-based PSCs working on the program and two USDH based in REDSO/ESA working part time on the program. The program will be sufficiently staffed at that time.

VI. FUNDING ISSUES

There are two important funding issues that bear mentioning:

- Hurricane Mitch has seriously affected funding availability for OFDA programs. If humanitarian requirements spike up again in Sudan in FY99 and other priorities worldwide need to be simultaneously addressed, OFDA may have difficulty meeting all requirements.
- It is unclear at this point which Agency funding sources will be used to support the STAR program in the future. AFR and BHR will need to consider options based upon availability of funds and Agency priorities for their use.