**USAID / Bureau for Humanitarian Response**

# The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

**FY 2000**

# RESULTS REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST

***R4 Report***

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS


**Page**

Part I: Overview and Factors Affecting Performance . . . . . 1
- 1. Overview . . . . . 1
  - Complex Emergencies . . . . . 2
  - El Niño . . . . . 3
  - Mitigation and Planning . . . . . 3
  - Livelihoods . . . . . 4
  - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Disasters . . . . . 4
- 2. Factors Affecting Performance . . . . . 4

PART II: Progress Toward Objectives . . . . . 5
- A. PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW . . . . . 5
  - Methodology . . . . . 5
- B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS . . . . . 9
  - 1. Strategic Objective No. 1 . . . . . 10
    - a. Intermediate Result No. 1.1 . . . . . 10
    - b. Intermediate Result No. 1.2 . . . . . 10
    - c. Intermediate Result No. 1.3 . . . . . 11
    - d. Intermediate Result No. 1.4 . . . . . 13
  - 2. Strategic Objective No. 2 . . . . . 14
    - a. Intermediate Result No. 2.1 . . . . . 14
    - b. Intermediate Result No. 2.2: . . . . . 15
    - c. Intermediate Result No. 2.3 . . . . . 20
- C. Expected Progress Through FY 2000 and Management Actions . . . . . 21
- D. Performance Data Tables . . . . . 22

PART III: Management Contract . . . . . 33

PART IV: Resource Request . . . . . 34
- 1. Financial Plan . . . . . 36
- 2. Workforce and Operating Expenses . . . . . 37

ANNEXES:
- Annex 1: Summary of Declared Emergencies - FY 1997
- Annex 2: Host-Country Institutional Capacity Rating - 1990
- Annex 3: Institutional Capacity Scores of Implementing Partners, Host Countries and Local NGOs - FY 1997
- Annex 4: Desk Review Questionnaires used for Summarizing Data for FY 1997 Program Performance
- Annex 5: Human Interest Stories

## Part I: Overview and Factors Affecting Performance

### 1. Overview

In FY 1997, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) demonstrated continued flexibility in adapting and responding to the rapidly changing needs of disaster affected populations around the world. Since the 1980s, but more particularly since 1992, an upsurge in highly visible, large-scale complex emergencies such as those in the Horn of Africa and the former-Yugoslavia has compelled a dramatic shift in OFDA's funding patterns, as well as a more subtle evolution in its programming.

In the face of many expensive and protracted complex emergencies, the challenge of ensuring the greatest possible impact through the most effective use of resources continued to inform programmatic decisions. A key strategic adjustment that OFDA made in FY 1997 was to increase its focus on preparedness and mitigation activities. While OFDA has developed highly successful preparedness and mitigation activities in Latin America and the Caribbean and to a lesser extent in Asia and the South Pacific, there has been increasing interest and demand to expand this emphasis in Africa, particularly in the long-term complex emergency situations where OFDA focuses the majority of its resources. The recognition of a need for greater integration of this approach into OFDA's response programs has been a major impetus behind the decision to establish a new Africa Regional Office in Nairobi in 1998. One of many advantages of the new office will be its ability to more strategically coordinate OFDA's emergency response and preparedness activities from an integrated regional perspective.

OFDA has continued to develop its technical expertise in predicting natural and manmade crises and in contingency planning. For example, OFDA leads worldwide efforts to apply seasonal to inter-annual climate forecasting techniques to prepare for and perhaps mitigate the effects of hydro-meteorological disasters. With the

**Types of Disasters**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Complex Emergencies** | Humanitarian emergencies which are frequently caused or complicated by civil strife. Although complex emergencies can only be resolved by a political solution to the root causes of the crisis, humanitarian assistance is necessary in the interim to save lives and alleviate human suffering. |
| **Natural Disasters** | Humanitarian emergencies which are caused by hydro-meteorological and geophysical hazards such as floods, severe storms, storm surges and tsumanis, land slides, earthquakes, volcanoes, fires, drought and pest and disease outbreaks. |
| **Man-made Disasters** | Humanitarian emergencies caused by human error in design, implementation, operation and management. These emergencies include the collapse of bridges and other infrastructure and industrial and technological accidents. |

onset of a major El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) event in late FY 1997, OFDA was able to channel information and offer both mitigation and response assistance to reduce ENSO-related impacts in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Africa.

OFDA has also forged new and closer relationships with many organizations to help it better implement its programs. Within the US Government, OFDA has strengthened bonds with agencies including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the US Forest Service, the US Public Health Service, the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), and with other USAID operating units. OFDA has continued to invest in improving coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGO)s and international organizations that implement many of its relief programs. Along with multilateral donors such as the World Bank, OFDA is working to improve efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development activities. Facilitating the transition from relief to development and reducing the dependence of disaster victims on relief assistance remains an important focus of OFDA's work.

In FY 1997, OFDA responded to 48 officially declared disasters in 46 countries, at a cost of $140 million (see Annex 1). Of these 48 declared disasters, 27 were natural disasters, 13 were complex emergencies, and 8 were man-made emergencies. OFDA responded to the 27 natural disasters in 25 countries at a cost of $ 4.6 million. Of the 27 natural disasters, 13 were floods and the balance can be accounted for almost equally between droughts, epidemics, storms, and earthquakes. The 8 man-made disasters involved civil strife, accidents, fires and food distribution problems (e.g., North Korea) and cost about $1 million. The 13 long-term complex emergencies cost close to $134 million. By comparison, in FY 1996 OFDA responded to a total of 63 declared disasters, expending a total of $134.4 million. These consisted of four man-made disasters in 4 countries at a cost of $0.3 million, 45 natural disasters in 35 countries at a cost of $9.3 million and 16 complex emergencies at a cost of $124.8 million.

Finally, OFDA is increasingly using assessment, evaluation and performance monitoring data to inform management decisions and to better monitor emergency response and preparedness programs and implementation. To this end OFDA has invested considerable time and effort into developing its data collection, analysis and interpretation skills; staff training has also expanded to improve capabilities. Where necessary, OFDA has commissioned independent assessments, as it did in the former Yugoslavia where a study was conducted to determine the most critical emergency shelter needs before the onset of winter in 1997.

### Complex Emergencies

The demand for humanitarian relief in complex emergencies has declined slightly from its peak in 1992-93, but still remains nearly three times as high as it was in the early nineteen eighties. Overall, in FY 1997, 96% or close to $134 million of OFDA's disaster response funding was allocated for complex emergencies, up slightly from $125 million in FY 1996. By contrast, OFDA obligated only $4.6 million for natural disaster response. The high cost of

complex emergencies as compared to natural disasters is due to the multifaceted approach required and the need to provide for a wide range of critical emergency needs of disaster victims over extended periods of time. Often, due to deteriorated transport infrastructure and security problems, high-cost air transport of emergency commodities to isolated locations has been required.

In FY 1997, five countries accounted for about $ 91.9 million or 66 % of OFDA's total international disaster assistance (IDA) obligation -- four in Africa and one in Eastern Europe. In Africa, the largest recipient was Rwanda ($26.2 million), where there was mass repatriation of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the former Zaire), followed by Sudan ($22.2 million) where OFDA continued to fund emergency assistance to the internally displaced population. Next largest recipients were Angola ($12.8 million) and Burundi ($11 million) where civil strife continued throughout 1997. In Eastern Europe, the largest recipient was Bosnia-Herzegovina ($19.7 million) for continued humanitarian response to the complex emergency characterized by lack of security for minorities, lack of food, and a dearth of winterization and sanitation resources.

### El Niño

The last quarter of FY 1997 coincided with one of the most severe ENSO events on record, causing widespread anomalies in weather patterns which have already disrupted cropping patterns, livestock production, and other key sectors across the globe. El Niño's impacts were just beginning to be felt by the end of the fiscal year, and greater impacts have occurred in FY 1998.

Throughout FY 1997, OFDA built a network of relationships with USG Agencies (particularly NOAA), the World Bank, climate scientists and regional and national institutions to produce, disseminate and apply climate forecasts in key sectors (water, health, agriculture and shelter) to reduce the effects of disasters. With the onset of the 1997-8 event, these preparations enabled a vast array of international expertise and effort to be mobilized that created unprecedented levels of preparedness, and in some cases enabled preventive action as well.

### Mitigation and Planning

Although OFDA focuses on critical relief in disaster situations, its mandate also emphasizes prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and planning (PMPP). In FY 1997, OFDA continued its long-standing technical assistance training in PMPP to disaster-prone countries, primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia and the South Pacific. These efforts are showing concrete results. OFDA's technical assistance in disaster preparedness supports USAID's mandate for local empowerment. It has also been an effective tool for optimizing scarce disaster response resources available to OFDA, other donors, implementing partners and host governments.

### Livelihoods

In recent years, OFDA has devoted more attention to post-crisis initiatives for re-establishing the normal socioeconomic functioning of people affected by disaster. Programs are increasingly designed to foster capacity-building and promote disaster preparedness while taking environmental and gender impacts into consideration. For example, the provision of seeds and tools builds local capacity and helps farmers to regain their livelihoods. Infrastructure rehabilitation builds local capacity while generating income and creating livelihoods for returnees. Much of OFDA's considerable investment in the former-Yugoslavia during FY 1997 was of this nature in preparation for the expected phase-out of Bosnia relief assistance. In natural disaster-prone countries, the rehabilitation of damaged or destroyed buildings using improved building codes establishes conditions which mitigate future catastrophes while providing income to those who participate in rehabilitation activities.

### Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Disasters

In FY 1997, OFDA established a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Disasters (NBC) Team to study and promote mitigation and preparedness activities for such catastrophes. OFDA participated in a planning exercise named “Agile Lion” with the Departments of Defense, Energy and State, and with representatives from Lithuania. Participants worked together to develop humanitarian assistance response options through assessments and problem analysis of a hypothetical nuclear disaster. OFDA staff were players in the exercise, and also served in advisory and controller roles. In the end, OFDA strengthened guidelines, policies and agency relationships within the USG to promote disaster preparedness for response to NBC events overseas.

## 2. Factors Affecting Performance

The challenges of working in complex humanitarian emergencies continue to be formidable. OFDA's disaster response has often required coordination with other donors, UN agencies, numerous stakeholders within the USG and implementing partners. Despite the establishment of closer ties with USG entities and donors, in many instances the coordination process has been arduous and time consuming. In addition, lack of understanding regarding roles, responsibilities, and mandates for international disaster assistance within the USG continues to place huge demands on OFDA staff time to achieve even a semblance of coordination. For example, internal and external political and bureaucratic constraints to disaster responses like those for North Korea require patience, creativity and a flexible approach. The major factors which influence OFDA's programming continue to include the unpredictability and volatility of situations in the field, especially in complex emergencies, where flexible programmatic and strategic responses are required for each dynamic situation.

## PART II: Progress Toward Objectives

Throughout FY 1997, OFDA continued to meet its objectives of saving lives, reducing human suffering and mitigating the effects of disasters. The Office met critical needs for over 18 million victims of 48 officially declared emergency situations, and continued to promote adoption of mitigation measures in over 36 highly disaster-prone countries.

As stated in last year's R4, OFDA focused this year on establishing baselines for future monitoring and evaluation of its programs according to the Agency's commitment to "Manage for Results". Difficulties involved in monitoring emergency programs, due to working with mobile populations and in volatile situations have long been known. Nonetheless, through careful collaboration with implementing partners, other U.S. government agencies and within USAID, the office succeeded in collecting data and establishing the preliminary baselines contained in this report.

The primary goal of establishing reliable baseline data has been partially accomplished. While reporting on progress is slim this year, a great deal of investigation and analysis is behind the baseline data which appears in the Performance Data Tables. OFDA is in the process of revising its grant proposal and reporting guidelines and may incorporate the BHR menu of indicators, developed with input from implementing partners to help in reporting on the performance of OFDA-funded grant activities. The new reporting format and the menu of indicators will be tested over the coming months and may generate a richer set of performance data.

Once the reporting guidance and revised proposal guidelines are finalized this summer, they will be presented to NGOs at OFDA's biennial NGO conference scheduled for October 1998. As a result, next year will be the first year in which OFDA expects to provide preliminary reports on meeting targets and to update baseline data.

### A. PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW

Data collected this year has been used to set tentative baseline values and establish preliminary performance targets for future years, more than to report on progress in FY 1997. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that OFDA has met its objectives for FY 1997.

#### Methodology

For this pilot year of data collection, OFDA focused attention on the ten countries where most of its resources were concentrated: Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), Liberia, Burundi, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Angola and Afghanistan. These ten countries accounted for 136 grants of the total 167 grants, or 81 percent. They are, however, all related to complex emergencies, so no comparison is possible between complex emergencies and natural/man-made disasters.

Due to time constraints for this initial year, OFDA staff completed as much of the questionnaire as was possible from proposals, grant documents and reports, to facilitate data collection for this R4 report. In the future, partners will use OFDA's revised guidelines to provide performance data on their programs, from which OFDA will generate its performance information.

For this report, approximately 130 questionnaires were completed using data from grant proposals and documents. Questionnaires with missing information were sent to implementing partners in the field for validation and completion. Out of the 130 sent out, 64, or roughly half, were returned completed. In the analysis below, percentages for each question are based on programs for which complete data were obtained, excluding grants awarded in the last two months of the fiscal year.

In addition, questionnaires were completed by OFDA regional advisers for LAC and Asia to collect data for Strategic Objective No. 2 performance indicators. These questionnaires focused on accomplishments with regard to enhancing institutional capabilities of host-country entities and implementing partners to design, implement and manage prevention, mitigation, preparedness and planning activities to reduce vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters.

This collection of data is a product of a larger effort in OFDA to develop a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) apparatus. Throughout the last half of 1997, OFDA reviewed and revised its results framework and performance monitoring plan in cooperation with implementing partners. In coordination with BHR's Office of Food for Peace-Emergency Response, OFDA conducted a series of performance measurement and evaluation workshops in the U.S., Angola and Kenya in 1997. The primary aim was to educate NGOs on OFDA's and FFP-ER's performance indicators and to obtain feedback on issues relating to reporting on program impact as well as on inputs and outputs.

These workshops led to the creation of the Humanitarian Assistance Performance Monitoring Working Group, which includes representatives from BHR, STATE/PRM, PPC/CDIE, Food Aid Management and InterAction. The Working group continues to meet and build on progress made at the workshops to establish a list of common definitions of terms and to develop a menu of humanitarian assistance performance indicators. As a result of this ongoing work, the Office has made significant progress this year in five key areas:

- unifying and simplifying its internal M&E plan,
- validating its results framework and performance indicators,
- increasing communication with its implementing partners on M&E requirements,
- reducing the reporting burden on implementing partners by seeking to conform when possible, its data collection processes to those of other BHR offices, and
- ensuring uniform guidance on M&E and reporting consistent with OFDA's Grants Guidelines, Field Operations Guide, Operations Manual, workshop materials and other publications.

In the last R4 report, OFDA indicated that it would establish a preliminary baseline and targets on the basis of a case study of one or two complex emergencies. To this end, OFDA held a workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 1997, using Sudan as a case study. Results of the pilot data collection effort for Sudan is summarized in Box 1.

**Box 1: PERFORMANCE MONITORING IN SUDAN**

**Introduction**

Sudan has proven to be the longest and most costly of all prolonged complex emergencies. In FY 1997, it accounted for 34 of OFDA's 167 active grants. Overall, more than 4 million war-affected Sudanese remained vulnerable, 2.2 million in government controlled areas, and 1.8 million in the transitional zone and southern areas.

**Factors Influencing Performance**

Fighting between rebel and government forces, fighting among rebel forces, deteriorating security situations, and Government of Sudan (GOS) restrictions on humanitarian aid have hampered relief operations. For example, during FY 1997, the GOS imposed restrictions on humanitarian flights to southern Sudan, and a ban on the use of high-capacity C-130 aircraft prevented the timely delivery of humanitarian aid. The GOS also continued to carry out aerial bombardments of civilian targets, including NGO compounds in southern Sudan. NGO staff were frequently targeted in hijacking, abductions, and looting. Consequently, many NGOs suspended operations. In late 1996, ICRC suspended its program in Sudan after an ICRC aircraft and four expatriate staff, including one American, were detained for 38 days by forces aligned with the GOS. The suspension remained in place throughout FY 1997. Restrictions imposed by southern rebel forces further limited access to affected populations in some areas.

During FY 1997, fighting between rebel and government forces intensified as southern- and northern-based opposition movements united forces to capture many government-held areas. Hundreds were killed and thousands displaced as the allied forces seized several towns. Fighting among rebel forces also continued after six southern factions aligned themselves with the government.

**Critical Emergency Needs Met**

Of the total of 34 OFDA grants active during FY 1997, 31 grants were analyzed for this report. The cost of these 31 grants amounted to $19.5 million, or 88% of the $22.2 million total. OFDA funding was up 21% from FY 1996.

In FY 1997, OFDA-funded activities targeted humanitarian assistance to approximately 1.8 million war-affected victims in government-held areas and 2.6 million in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. While grant activities were implemented in a wide variety of sectors, the data indicate that activities were concentrated in emergency and public health activities. For example, 17 activities were related to the expanded program for immunization (EPI). Other activities included health clinics (14), potable water (12), agriculture/livestock (9), and maternal and child health (6). Despite difficult working conditions, 63% of the grants for which complete data was available (13 grants) met or exceeded their targets.

**Box 1 continued.**

**Targeting Vulnerable Groups**

OFDA's assistance was clearly aimed at helping the most vulnerable individuals. Four out of five grant proposals or 81% specified vulnerable groups by characteristics. Most mentioned internally displaced persons, children and women. In addition, 63% of the grants had instituted re-calibration of their emergency assistance after initiation of field activities. Almost three out of four (73%) grant proposals which identified special groups also adjusted service delivery in accordance with the assessed needs of these different groups.

**Delivery**

Delays were common. Of the 25 grant activities for which data were provided, 60% experienced delays in distribution of emergency commodities to targeted vulnerable groups. Most delays were due to difficult security situations and road conditions. Two grants had to suspend operations in one area and shift to a new location, due to security considerations.

OFDA rations and services are programmed based on internationally recognized standards, but, unforeseen increases in the size of vulnerable populations or field shortages did pose practical dilemmas in the field resulting in below-standard delivery. Such situations did occur, but performance monitoring data are insufficient to indicate their frequency.

**Linking Relief and Development**

OFDA funded-activities included rehabilitation initiatives in addition to humanitarian relief. Two out of three programs (67%) included measures to strengthen the capabilities of participating local NGOs or institutions, and over one-third (35%) incorporated resettlement or rehabilitation activities.

Food security initiatives, focusing on distribution of seeds and tools to build local capacity for food production, were an important component of OFDA's Sudan strategy for FY 1997. At the beginning of the year, it appeared that conditions in the south were becoming sufficiently calm to permit agricultural production.

**Conclusion**

Despite the deterioration of the security situation and the sporadic fighting between rebel forces and the GOS and among the rebel forces themselves, OFDA's assistance has reached over 3.0 million war-affected people thus saving many lives and reducing human suffering. In many areas where the security situation was stable, implementing partners have resettled the IDPs and re-established basic services.

## B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

This section describes OFDA's progress over the past year and establishes baseline values and targets where possible. It begins with a summary of performance and then highlights each strategic objective and intermediate result separately.[1] When considering these quantitative measures of performance, it is important to recognize the difficulty of performance measurement in emergency situations. For example, the story of Concern's Biaro Transit Center in Northeastern Zaire (Democratic republic of Congo) summarized in Box 2 describes several challenges for disaster victims and for those who seek to help them. It also exemplifies the rapidly shifting nature of emergencies which greatly influences assessment of emergency assistance impact.

**Box 2: Example of Rapidly Shifting Targeted Vulnerable Populations**

Concern established the transit center at Biaro to help weak and sick unaccompanied children get medical help before being transfer to Kisangani. Every evening, two to three thousand arrived in Biaro only to leave the next morning. People in the camp lived in fear that a gunman would appear from the jungle and kill them, as had happened a few weeks earlier in Kaseze. "Biaro is hell" said Aune O'Mahony a veteran of Concern emergency responses in Ethiopia and Somalia. "I have never seen anything like it." Previously the camp had an estimated population of about 40,000. Within a few weeks, it was estimated at just under 10,000. White body bags were laid out on both sides of the dirt road, waiting to be collected. People stepped over them as if they were there every day. Biaro smelled of death and decay.

Aliya was a 14-year-old boy who had been carried out of the forest on the back of a local villager. Severely malnourished and covered with scabies, he gulped down the porridge and water offered to him at the center and slowly began to tell his story. He had been orphaned for almost three years. He came from Kibuye Prefecture in Rwanda, where his mother was killed in 1994 during the genocide. Escaping with his father, he made his way to one of the refugee camps in Bukavu. Shortly after he arrived in Zaire, his father died. Was he killed? The boy didn't know, but from then on he had to fend for himself. When his camp was attacked in October of 1996, he was forced to flee, along with thousands of others, heading deeper and deeper into the jungles of Zaire. Finding something to eat was his greatest challenge. Since the refugee camps were attacked again in April, the boy had no choice but to stay in the jungle. He survived by scavenging -- eating roots, grass and insects. With no means to make fire, he was forced to eat everything raw -- snails, maggots and any other bug he could find. Finally, the boy became exhausted by telling his story, and rolled over on his side, holding his stomach.

Many people died in the forest around Kisangani, but many lives were also saved. More than 5,000 unaccompanied children like Aliya were rescued by Concern's program. Some were reunited with relatives in Rwanda while others were transferred to orphanage centers. Children who survived for months in the jungle will never forget their ordeal.

[1] The figures presented are based on a sub-sample of 44 questionnaires, selected on two conditions (1) that the implementing partner responded to the questionnaire, and (2) that the grant was issued at least 2.5 months before the end of the fiscal year.

### 1. Strategic Objective No. 1

Strategic Objective No. 1 requires that critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups are met. The associated indicator is the percent of disaster responses where an acceptable proportion of the target population's critical needs have been met. Critical needs are defined as emergency health, food, water, sanitation and shelter, since disaster victims may lose their lives or suffer greatly for lack of these essential resources.

The acceptable proportion of targeted vulnerable population reached may vary from situation to situation, and is typically lower under increasingly difficult and insecure conditions. For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that an individual's critical needs were met if he or she received the programmed humanitarian assistance. Implementing partners reported target populations and beneficiaries reached for each sector-specific activity, such as providing health services, shelter, or emergency food rations. Twenty-six grantees, who provided these detailed responses, listed a total of 105 sector-specific activities, and reporting meeting their targets for 78, or 74% of these (see Table 5.01).

#### a. Intermediate Result No. 1.1

In accordance with Strategic Objective No. 1's emphasis on meeting critical needs, Intermediate Result No.1.1 focuses OFDA's assistance on those within the affected population who are the most vulnerable. Implementing partners often identify children under five, pregnant and lactating women, internally displaced people, and returned refugees as the most vulnerable. Others include the elderly, those in institutions, and female or child-headed households. Review of grant proposals clearly indicates that implementing partners are targeting aid to the most vulnerable groups in crisis affected populations. Overall, seven out of ten programs (70%) targeted specific vulnerable groups (see Table 5.02).

#### b. Intermediate Result No. 1.2

Intermediate Result No. 1.2 measures timely delivery of emergency assistance that meets recognized standards. There are two indicators reflecting timeliness of delivery and the quality and standard of emergency commodities and services.

In complex emergencies, unforeseen delays are common, whether delays in arrival of support from abroad or delayed in-country access to those in need. Most are due to changes in local security conditions or local bureaucratic red tape. Several implementing partners have been forced to move their offices, and others have had to drop entire districts from their targeted activities.

OFDA has taken considerable measures including stockpiling, airlifting of emergency commodities, and the deployment of regional DART teams to ensure timeliness of the delivery of assistance. Most supplies except perishables are pre-positioned in accessible warehouses. In extreme cases, OFDA has funded air transport or air drops of emergency supplies to inaccessible areas.

In this sample, timeliness was measured by whether the implementing partners cited delays. The question was split out by sector-specific activity. Implementing partners averaged 4.3 activities each, and reported delays for 30% of these activities. Thus, seven out of ten, or 70% of activities were delivered on schedule (see Table 5.03). This appears to indicate reasonable performance, given the extremely difficult field conditions under which assistance is delivered.

There are accepted international standards for most emergency commodities -- water and food rations, plastic sheeting for shelter, construction of latrines, etc. In the questionnaire, each response had to be compared to these standards and rated as meeting or failing to meet them. However, many of these accepted international standards often far surpass resources normally available to African villagers. Due to inequities between target groups and surrounding citizens, local authorities have often argued for and in some cases enforced lower standards with respect to emergency food and water rations.

Deciding whether or not implementing partner's rations met international standards was extremely difficult. There was a great variety of programs without established standards like tools, seeds, and an assortment of non-food items. Easier to measure was whether or not implementing partners succeeded in delivering the rations levels that they had set for their programs. For those who responded to the question, the result was impressive -- 85% delivered at least as much as they had targeted (see Table 5.04). In OFDA's forthcoming revised grant guidelines, applicants will be asked to specifically state their standards of measurement and report against them.

### c. Intermediate Result No. 1.3

Intermediate Result No. 1.3, "capacities for livelihoods restored", relates to the re-establishment of livelihoods of targeted vulnerable groups. The questionnaire asked, "Does the program incorporate resettlement or rehabilitation activities to accelerate re-establishment of the target population's livelihood and self-sufficiency?" Of those responding, 65% said yes (see Table 5.05). A significant number of implementing partners' programs incorporate relief to development activities mostly in stable and secure areas. The example given in Box 3 from Sierra Leone demonstrates how an OFDA funded seeds and tools activity restored or established livelihoods and enhanced food security to returnees.

**Box 3: Restoring Livelihood To Avert Famine**

In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front started a revolution in the eastern provinces of Sierra Leone which devastated settlements and caused mass population displacements. In all, 1.2 million people were displaced internally and over 370,000 refugees fled to neighboring Liberia and Guinea. Mamie, a mother of two, lived in a village called Tihun. Tihun was the birth place of Maada Bio, who was second in charge to the president. "The rebels had come to Tihun several times, " said Mamie, " but when they returned in February 1995, it was a day of total destruction."

According to Mamie's story, the rebels arrived dressed as soldiers and announced that they were going to evacuate all those related to Bio for their safety. They told all Bio's relatives to gather in the "barrie" (open village assembly hall). Many people, including non-relatives, gathered, hoping to be rescued. When the hall was full, the rebels surrounded the place and opened fire with their AK47s, killing everyone.

Mamie was hiding under her bed with her five year-old son Maada and infant Matthew. But, the rebels came and pulled them all outside. Most were killed in front of their houses. "They would call to someone, 'come here! Get up!' and then they shot you." Mamie was spared death, but they beat and kicked her baby. The rebels took her clothes and told her and other villagers to run. "We ran into the bush, naked, left with nothing."

In 1997, with relatively improved security, some IDPs, including Mamie, were encouraged to return to their villages. In Tihun there were only ruins. The "barrie" still stands as cement columns, but no roof. The floor is littered with human bones bleached white by the sun, and swept into piles over two feet high. Skulls and ribs lay as grim testimony to the horror of civil war. "The bones are still here," said Village Chief Lebbei, "because we do not know what to do with them. We have no way of identifying the remains and it hurts us very much."

The returnees are struggling to slowly rebuild their homes and restore their livelihoods. They are surviving on a diet composed of almost exclusively of wild yam or cassava. However, these wild food sources will not last beyond the current season. Returnees didn't have seed stock for the coming growing season. Despite the insecurity of the situation, OFDA's implementing partner, World Vision Sierra Leone (WVSR), provided seeds and agricultural tools to promote farming efforts. Mamie says "with the seeds provided by WVSL we planted a rice field and a vegetable garden. With this help, the returnees may be able to pull it off until next year".

Throughout FY 1997, OFDA's implementing partners provided farm inputs for a total of 14, 973 farm families (89,838 beneficiaries). Each family received 25 kgs of improved rice seed, one machete, one hoe and 5 kgs of groundnut seed. In addition, 12,280 families were given cassava and potato planting materials. Also, 4, 944 farmers (supported by other donors) received assorted garden vegetable planting materials. A total of 18, 323 additional acres were cultivated as a direct result of the OFDA's FY 1997 seeds and tools support for IDPs in Sierra Leone.

### d. Intermediate Result No. 1.4

Intermediate Result No. 1.4 reflects OFDA's efforts to strengthen the institutional capacities of implementing partners and host government entities. The two prescribed indicators for this intermediate result are the number and percent of programs utilizing OFDA-approved emergency health protocols and the number of NGOs with health personnel trained in the OFDA-approved emergency health protocols. These indicators, however, are not yet appropriate since OFDA has carried out only a pilot training session to test the curriculum developed by InterAction. Implementing partners, therefore, can not be expected to report on these indicators until the curriculum has been adopted, students registered, trained and graduated with the appropriate training and credentials from the relevant training institutions and the information and skills applied to real emergency field conditions.

Instead, the questionnaire asked, *"Did the program contain any measures to strengthen the capabilities of participating local NGOs or institutions?"* Almost seven out of eight programs (85%) responded affirmatively (see Table 5.06). Most mentioned working with local NGOs or host-government agencies. It is clear that implementing partners are making major strides toward this intermediate result. The following example in Box 4 from Southern Sudan indicates that large numbers of people benefit from improved local NGO institutional capacity improvement programs.

**Box 4: Implementing Partners Improved Emergency Health Response Reduces Human Suffering and Saves Lives**

As the conflict in Southern Sudan enters its fourteenth year, fighting between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army , as well as various other factions, continues unabated. Population displacement, general deterioration of basic infrastructure, grim prospects for renewal of local economies, and outbreaks of killer disease continue to characterize this complex emergency. Despite concerted relief efforts by the international community, over four million war-affected civilians remain vulnerable to disease and death.

OFDA continues to work closely with several NGO partners in Southern Sudan. For example, in 1997, International Rescue Committee's Health Care and Water Sanitation Program trained 43 local community health workers as well as water/sanitation technicians to address the incident of waterborne diseases throughout the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions.

At the end of this project, primary and secondary health care services were available for 200,000 people, and a total of 49,000 war-affected people benefitted from potable water and sanitation activities. The locally trained mobile medical team provided public health care for an additional 144,080 war-affected people in areas where security is threatened from time to time.

### 2. Strategic Objective No. 2

Strategic objective No. 2 requires increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at greatest risk of natural and man-made disasters. Such efforts include disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and planning. In FY 1997, these activities constitute a small portion of OFDA's IDA budget, but have proved effective in enhancing local disaster response capacity and thus leveraging OFDA's resources available for natural and manmade disaster responses. Unlike relief efforts, these interventions take place before or immediately following disasters and have been concentrated mostly in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the South Pacific. There has also been significant PMP efforts in Africa, and the Office will establish a Regional Office in Africa to expand such programs in the near future. These programs are targeted at disaster-prone countries where there are opportunities, institutional capacity and infrastructure to implement and sustain PMP activities.

Because OFDA's activities frequently focus on complex emergencies, the Office is pursuing avenues and methods for bringing prevention, mitigation and preparedness activities to bear on these crises. They might include refocusing resources from relief to rehabilitation, applying mitigation expertise to emergency response strategies, expanding contingency planning, and focusing on risk management approaches.

Since 1990, OFDA has targeted 66 disaster-prone countries for PMP assistance, and has provided assistance to over 60% (40) of these countries (see Table 5.07). According to the scores given by OFDA regional advisors, ten of these 40 countries have now developed the capability to respond to disasters with less dependence on external donor assistance.

One of the most successful activities to enhance national capability to address rapid onset disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been systematic preparedness training of national and local government personnel and community groups. A significant number of assisted countries in the LAC region now have the institutional capacity to respond to most natural disasters without significant external emergency assistance except in extremely catastrophic situations.

#### a. Intermediate Result No. 2.1

Intermediate Result No. 2.1 reflects OFDA's support for implementing partners to strengthen their capacity to design and implement efficient and effective mitigation activities for natural disasters and complex emergencies. A half dozen PVOs and roughly the same number of international organizations have received OFDA grants for mitigation responses to disasters. Tangible results include UNDHA's Relief Web and World Food Program's (WFP's) Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping and emergency training which have changed the organization's views and procedures regarding the role and scope of food aid. Mitigation techniques have now become part of the way that WFP does business in countries and regions targeted under OFDA assistance.

In Latin America and the Caribbean region, institutional capacity of OFDA's international implementing partners is relatively high, indicated by the fact that they were able to design and implement effective PMP training and simulations. According to the institutional capacity scoring of the OFDA LAC Advisor, all six organizations scored 4.4 and above out of a total score of 5.0[2] and the average score was 4.7. In Asia the OFDA Regional Advisor evaluated only OFDA's main implementing partner, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC). ADPC, which manages an OFDA-funded training and technical assistance in urban disaster mitigation project in India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, scored 2.8 out of a total score of 5.0. OFDA has provided funds to enhance implementing partners capacity. As the case study in Box 5 shows, this has significantly improved the delivery emergency services to disaster victims.

**b. Intermediate Result No. 2.2:**

Intermediate Result No. 2.2 is strengthened host country capacities to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters. The indicator for this result is the percent of OFDA-targeted vulnerable countries developing, adopting and practicing national and local disaster mitigation and preparedness programs. This is measured by the Host Country Institutional Capacity (HCIC)score. A score of 3.0 or higher indicates the host country has a disaster response unit with trained staff and sufficient resources to design, develop and implement PMP-type activities.[3]

In FY 1990, the average composite HCIC score for the 66 OFDA-targeted at-risk countries was 3.1 out of a maximum of 5.0, with 67% (44 countries) scoring 3 or more (see Annex 2). In the LAC region a total of 22 at-risk countries were targeted. Of these, 17 countries had a score of 3 or more and the average HCIC score was 3.6. In the Middle East, Asia and the South Pacific a total of 25 at-risk countries were targeted for OFDA assistance. Of these 25 at-risk countries, 15 were given a HCIC score of 3.0 or more and the average was 3.1. In Africa, a total of 22 at-risk countries were identified and 12 were given an HCIC score of 3.0 or more and the average score was only 2.6.

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[2] An institutional capacity score of 5 indicates that the implementing partner has: (1) local presence, (2) trained staff with capability to transfer knowledge and technology to local partners and host-country counterparts, (3) technical capacity and resources to plan, design, implement and manage effective activities, (4) regularly conducts mock PMP exercise with targeted communities, and (5) track record in designing, implementing and managing effective PMP-type activities.

[3] An HCIC score of 5.0 indicates that the host country has disaster response units which (1) are effective; (2) have adequate financial resources to design, implement and manage PMP activities; (3) have the skills and capacity to design, implement and manage PMP activities, (4) regularly conduct mock PMP exercises with targeted communities; and (5) have prominent national status able to mobilize local resources and communities to develop and implement PMP activities.

In 1997, OFDA's assistance was concentrated in the LAC region, Asia and the South Pacific. The 22 targeted at-risk countries in the LAC region were given an average score of 3.9 (see Annex 3). Fifteen countries or 68 % of the targeted at risk countries had a score of 3.0 and higher. Of these, 12 or 80% had a score of 5.0. By contrast, in 1990, only five at-risk countries had a score of 5.0. See also Performance Data Table 5.09.

There is a direct link and a positive correlation between the reduction in OFDA disaster response expenditures and a host-country's capacity to respond to disaster; where OFDA has focused resources and training, the demand for external assistance has decreased. For example, in Colombia the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz/Armeno volcano/lahar disaster and the 1994 Cauca/Huila earthquake, landslide, and mudflow disaster were of equal magnitude. In 1985, Colombia was totally dependent on international emergency assistance. However, as a result of improved disaster response capability, in 1994, Colombia's response to the disaster was relatively self-sustained and required only minor, highly specialized USG relief assistance. In Africa, OFDA is just beginning to expand PMP activities and data is not available for this R4 period. As shown in Box 5, however, there have been efforts to implement PMP activities in several at-risk countries.

**Box 5: Improved Institutional Capacity to Deliver Effective Emergency Assistance**

With funding of $86,000 from OFDA, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), in Nigeria, formed a Disaster Response Unit to expand the provision of emergency planting materials of cassava and yam. OFDA funding was used for establishing a tissue culture and screen house nursery facility and hiring three additional staff to generate vegetative planting materials of cassava and yam, with the high standard of phytosanitation required for export.

As a priority during 1997, IITA's Disaster Response Unit made arrangements for the delivery of large quantities of cassava and yam planting materials to Liberia and Sierra Leone, to support rehabilitation and recovery. IITA has maintained contact with national agricultural research programs in both countries during recent periods of civil strife. Work in Liberia involves intensive training for Liberian technicians from both the Ministry of Agriculture and World Vision International, an NGO assisting with implementation. By supporting the provision of planting materials and training, OFDA is enhancing the capacity of IITA to help the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture and an international NGO to reduce the impact of disaster.

Under the OFDA-funded project "Community-based Promotion of Food Security Crops in Selected African Countries", IITA has moved beyond planning to action. OFDA's assistance has encouraged IITA to use existing developmental relationships with research and extension networks and non-governmental organizations to expedite delivery of cassava and yam planting materials to farmers in times of crisis.

OFDA funds helped IITA expedite the provision of recommended varieties of yams to Uganda. Government officials in Uganda, including the vice-president and the minister for agriculture, encouraged Ugandan farmers to invigorate yam production because bananas and cassava, two major sources of food and income, are seriously threatened by disease. IITA provided more than 3,000 plantlets of white yam genotypes to the main research station in Uganda where they are being used to produce mini-tubers for distribution to farmers. In addition, 143 farmers (104 women and 39 men) and extension officers in three areas received training in the rapid multiplication of yam planting materials. These efforts encourage the integration of yam production into sustainable farming systems, thus mitigating potential food shortages.

During FY 1997, in Asia, where OFDA's assistance was concentrated in India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, the scoring provided by the OFDA Regional Advisor, suggests a preliminary average HCIC score of 2.7, excluding India. OFDA's successful PMP activities in Latin America and the Caribbean have been extended to the South Pacific region, where many small islands are often victim to violent storms and volcanic eruptions. However, host country capacity data is not yet available.

It has long been recognized in the South Pacific region that natural disasters pose a major threat to sustainable development. Over the past decades cyclones, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis, prolonged droughts, and landslides have resulted in deaths, injuries, suffering and loss of economic assets in the majority of the South West Pacific countries. Cyclones Ofa and Val in Samoa, Cyclone Kina in Fiji, and the volcanic eruption of Rabaul in 1994 produced record losses and resulted in major setbacks, both short and long-term, in social and economic development. Limited economic diversification, small land masses dispersed over the world's

largest ocean, population growth and development, and global climate change make Pacific Island nations particularly susceptible to the devastating effects of natural disasters. As shown in Box 6, OFDA has implemented several programs to strengthen host country capacity and to reduce these countries' vulnerability to natural disasters.

**Box 6: Replication of Successful PMP Activities in the South Pacific**

Since 1994, in collaboration with UNOCHOA's South Pacific Disaster Reduction Programme, OFDA has supported a regional Disaster Management Training Program (DMTP). The Training Program, modeled along successful LAC activities, is designed to:

1. Improve the disaster management capacity and Performance of Pacific Island countries,
2 expand the base of support for disaster management within Pacific Island Countries,
3. assist countries organize, conduct and maintain their own training for disaster management and,
4. develop and adapt training materials that are relevant to the South Pacific.

The components of the Program include standardized curriculum development, course development and adaptation, regional level training courses, support for in-country training, and promotion of regionalization for disaster management. Thirteen countries -- Fiji, Tonga, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Niue, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu -- have participated in the Program.

The Program has successfully tested and adapted existing OFDA courses to the South Pacific, including the OFDA Training for Instructors (TFI) Course and Shelter Management. In turn, the Introduction to Disaster Management Course, (IDM), which was developed for the South Pacific region has been transferred to LAC, and is now translated into Spanish and French. As a result of being trained in these courses, the Pacific Islands are now adopting a wide range of approaches to enhance their preparedness through in-country training.

Fiji, Cooks Islands and Tuvalu have organized country training groups that have adapted OFDA courses and conducted national level activities. Training working groups are comprised of government and non-government agencies and include the key groups designated with preparedness and response responsibilities, i.e. national disaster offices, police, defense, health, education, agriculture, local government, public works, Red Cross and other NGOs.

IDM Courses have led to the formation of village disaster committees and disaster preparedness plans for several of the Cooks Islands. Instructors trained in a locally organized TFI Course in Tuvalu have translated the IDM, and are conducting courses in the outer islands to develop local level preparedness plans, and to mobilize community level support and involvement. Kiribati has used the IDM course to structure the process for forming a committee to develop its national disaster management plan.

A small working group in Vanuatu, under the direction of the national disaster office, is taking steps to adapt and translate the IDM Course and integrate it into the standard training programs of the Government Training Center and the Police Training College. Similarly, Fiji is seeking to make the IDM course a regular offering of the Fiji National Training Council (FNTC). Fiji and Cook Islands are undertaking pilot activities in their main islands to improve community level evacuation planning and to upgrade local evacuation centers, using OFDA's Shelter Management Course as the training tool. Samoa is considering a similar effort.

Since 1995, the Training Program has trained up to 150 individuals in six regional level courses, and has developed a core group of instructors who have trained more than 200 persons in national level courses.

### c. Intermediate Result No. 2.3

Intermediate Result No. 2.3 aims at enhancing the strategic use of resources to link relief to development. The performance indicator is the percent of disaster response strategic plans implemented at sub-national, national and regional levels with a Strategic Plan Quality Score (SPQS) of 3 or more.[4]

While not a direct measure of the link between relief and development, this indicator emphasizes the importance of planning in effecting such transitions. OFDA has increasingly taken a proactive approach to promoting this kind of strategic planning. Under USAID's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, OFDA has participated actively in the Integrated Strategic Plans (ISP) for both Sudan and Somalia.

While the ENSO event began in the spring-summer of 1997, OFDA's strategy in relation to ENSO and its impact was not fully underway until FY 1998. Nonetheless, in November 1997, OFDA created an ENSO Team to coordinate OFDA's response to this ENSO event, focusing on enhancing the preparedness, mitigation and prevention capacities of targeted at-risk countries in order to reduce vulnerability to the event. Several El Niño-related disasters have already been declared in FY 1998 including Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Kenya and Peru. OFDA has responded through numerous airlifts of relief supplies and grants which target the most critical needs of disaster affected populations.

OFDA's strategy also involves the dissemination of climate forecasting information to policy-makers both within the USG and in countries that are vulnerable to ENSO-related impacts. As part of this strategy, OFDA initiated the use of new information management tools and concepts in preparing its response to the potential effects of the ENSO event. Within the terms of the OFDA-InterAction Cooperative Agreement, the Multi-Agency, Distributed, Geo-referenced Information Collection (MADGIC) data collection format is being tested to collect, compile and distribute information on the activities and capabilities of NGOs that are positioned to respond to a possible ENSO-related drought in southern Africa. The results of this effort could be quite useful to host governments and the relief community to plan for and respond to potential impacts of El Niño in the region, thus effectively linking development to relief (see Box 7).

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[4] An SPQS score of 5.0 indicates that the country strategic plan: (1) identifies the size of the targeted vulnerable population, (2) categorizes that population by distinctive vulnerability characteristics, (3) assesses the capacities and the traditional coping mechanisms of each group, (4) identifies each group's critical needs, (5) links capacities and traditional coping mechanisms to the critical need, (6) periodically assesses and recalibrates the number of targeted vulnerable populations and their critical needs during implementation, and (7) is integrated with USAID's , other donor's, and the host country's programs

**Box 7. OFDA's PMP Response to the ENSO Event**

El Niño is a warming of the central and eastern Pacific Ocean that typically occurs several times per decade. With its atmospheric counterpart, the Southern Oscillation, this coupled system (ENSO) affects temperatures and rainfall worldwide. Typical effects include suppressed hurricane activity in the Caribbean; below normal rainfall in southeast Asia, parts of South America, Central America, and southern Africa; and above normal rainfall in the Greater Horn of Africa and parts of South America.

Since 1993 OFDA has worked extensively with a wide range of international partners to use an emerging ability to forecast regional climate using ENSO and other climate system indicators. In mid-1997, climatologists announced that the 1997-98 ENSO event was expected to be one of the strongest on record. OFDA moved into an operational mode to collaborate in particular with other USAID Offices and Bureaus (including BHR/FFP and regional Bureaus) and other USG agencies, particularly NOAA, to sensitize countries to potential ENSO impacts and promote mitigative measures.

Throughout FY 1997 OFDA, NOAA, the World Bank and regional and national-level counterparts engaged in extensive planning on ways to produce, disseminate and apply regional climate forecasts to reduce negative impacts and promote benefits in critical sectors. For example, these partners issued a white paper entitled "Getting Ahead of the Curve: Reducing Climate-Related Vulnerability in Southern Africa in July, 1997. Plans were made for convening a September, 1997 Southern Africa consensus climate outlook forum. Small pilot applications projects were developed and funded by OFDA to test how to best use forecast information.

These activities complemented ongoing OFDA activities in the region, such as promoting drought tolerant crops. In August, 1997 prior to the climate outlook forum, OFDA staff provided extensive briefings throughout southern Africa on ENSO climate effects and the need to monitor the climate outlook carefully due to increased 1997/98 drought risks posed by ENSO. OFDA provided funding to the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Food Security Technical Assistance Unit to coordinate drought preparedness efforts. USAID Mission Directors evaluated these efforts as having contributed to unprecedented levels of preparedness in southern Africa, and to a high degree of African ownership of the process; SADC in particular demonstrated unprecedented maturity and capacity, and the private sector proved itself as a viable alternative to food assistance.

Furthermore, throughout FY97 and FY98 the procedures developed through the partnership of agencies described above for developing consensus climate outlook guidance products were subsequently replicated in nearly a dozen subsequent outlook fora worldwide. These products and the procedures for producing them were the backbone of the international effort to provide advance information on ENSO impacts worldwide. Thus the planning effort that OFDA engaged in for southern Africa was leveraged into worldwide impacts throughout the following year.

## C. Expected Progress Through FY 2000 and Management Actions

OFDA expects to show continued and significant progress toward achieving the results stated in its results framework. Over the next several months, OFDA will establish a performance database and refine, update and issue its Guidelines for New Grant Proposals and Grant Revisions. Thus, as OFDA and its implementing partners refine their performance monitoring and evaluation approaches, the Office will be in a better position to report on the performance of its programs. With the development and implementation of a performance monitoring database OFDA will be able to more effectively extract program performance and impact data from implementing partners' reports.

Furthermore, advanced planning on the El Niño phenomenon and other cyclical or expected natural disasters is expected to reduce vulnerability, suffering and hardship in affected regions, thus enhancing the performance of OFDA-funded programs in those regions. OFDA is now in the process of replicating successful PMP activities and lessons learned from LAC, South Pacific and Asia in selected countries in Africa. This, together with the establishment of a Regional Africa Office, and the expansion of LAC, Asia and the South Pacific Regional Offices, is expected to reduce vulnerability from natural and manmade disasters particularly in Southern and Eastern Africa, the South Pacific, and LAC at-risk countries. Advanced planning, replication of successful activities and closer coordination with operating units within the Agency, implementing partners and other donors will significantly enhance OFDA's performance.

## D. Performance Data Tables

The following set of Performance Data Tables summarizes the preliminary baseline data developed for this R4 cycle. These baselines will be further refined as better data becomes available.

The implementation of OFDA's new Grant Proposal and Reporting Guidelines which may incorporate the BHR menu of humanitarian assistance performance indicators should help generate a richer set of performance data. In addition, with the institutionalization of reporting on host-country and implementing partners institutional capacity to design, implement and manage PMP activities through the regional advisors, reporting on SO2 indicators will be improved. The revised baseline data will be reflected in the FY 2001 R4 report.

## Table 5.01: Strategic Objective 1: Indicator No.1

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Objective No.1: | Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations. | | | |
| Approved: In review | Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: | % of disaster responses where an acceptable proportion of the targeted vulnerable population's critical needs have been met. Analyzed separately for (a) complex emergencies and (b) natural and man-made disasters.<br>(For FY 1997, data are only available for complex emergencies.) | | | |
| Measure:<br><br>Unit of Measurement: | % of OFDA grant activities which meet their targets<br>OFDA grant sector activities | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Sources:<br>FY 1997 Desk Review Questionnaire, Implementing Partners' quarterly and EOP reports. | | 1997 | Baseline year | 74%* |
| | | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>The indicator relates to the proportion of OFDA sector activities which met their targets for FY 1997. The denominator is the total number of OFDA sector activities listed by responding grantees (health services, water, sanitation, shelter, and emergency food distribution, etc.) and the numerator is the number of these activities that met their FY 1997 targets. | | 1999 | | |
| | | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>Critical Assumptions: (1) Insecurity does not affect access to vulnerable populations or compromise effectiveness of the assistance effort; (2) Coordination mechanisms among the various actors will improve; (3) The institutional and logistical capacity of cooperating institutions will improve.<br>Discussion: Measuring specific sector activities avoids the potential double counting that could occur when two grantees provide services to the same target population. Future measures could attempt to reflect beneficiaries receiving services for all four critical needs -- health, water, shelter, and food. More complete data collection could permit separate analysis for each declared disaster. | | 20001 | | |
| | | 20002 | | |

* Twenty-six grantees responded to Performance Review Questionnaire Item D.05, listing a total of 105 sector-specific activities (an average of 4 each) (see Annex 4). They reported meeting or exceeding targets for 78 or 74% of these.

## Table 5.02: Intermediate Result 1.1: Indicator No.1

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No. 1.1: | Improved targeting of emergency assistance to the most vulnerable groups. | | | |
| Approved: In review | Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: | % of disaster responses based on a periodic process of needs assessment and re-calibration of targeting. Analyzed separately for (a) complex emergencies and (b) natural and man-made disasters. (For FY 1997, data are only available for complex emergencies.) | | | |
| Measure:<br><br>Unit of Measurement: | % of OFDA grants with a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting<br>OFDA grants | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Sources:<br>Desk review questionnaire and implementing Partners' quarterly and EOP reports. | | 1997 | Baseline year | 70%* |
| | | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>The indicator relates to the appropriateness of targeting criteria. "Re-calibration" is defined as adjusting the beneficiary groups and/or emergency assistance to match assessed needs. The denominator is number of OFDA grants providing results data and the numerator is the number of these that have a periodic process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting. | | 1999 | | |
| | | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>FY 1997 data measured whether the grantee has undertaken ANY re-evaluation since inauguration of fieldwork. The measure should indicate the basis for reassessment data -- survey, rapid assessment, external data, etc., and the frequency of re-evaluation. Needs assessment guidelines must include measures of degrees of vulnerability, including gender and ethnic issues, and capacities of disaster victims to cope with and survive the disaster. | | 2001 | | |
| | | 2002 | | |

* Twenty-three of 33 grantees responding to Performance Review Questionnaire Item C.05 "Was emergency assistance reassessed/re-evaluated since initiation of field activities?

## Table 5.03: Intermediate Result 1.2: Indicator No.1

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No.1.2: | Emergency assistance, meeting recognized standards, delivered within acceptable time frame. | | | |
| Approved: In review | Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: | % of disaster response programs accomplished within acceptable time-frames. Analyzed separately for (a) complex emergencies and (b) natural and man-made disasters. Only data for complex emergencies are available for FY 1997. | | | |
| Measure:<br><br>Unit of Measurement: | % of grant sector activities completed within their established time frames<br>grant sector activities | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Sources:<br>Desk review questionnaires, implementing partners' proposals, quarterly and EOP reports. | | 1997 | Baseline year | 70%* |
| | | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>This indicator reflects the completion of disaster responses within their established time frames. Implementing partner proposals list sector-specific interventions and specify time-frames for each. The denominator is the number of sector-specific activities listed by all grants providing results data. The numerator is the number of these activities accomplished within their established time frame. | | 1999 | | |
| | | 2000 | | |
| Comment:<br>It is important to analyze the reasons for delays and identify those that could be reduced by implementing partners or by OFDA, and those that are due to uncontrollable circumstances. | | 2001 | | |

* 31 of the 105 sector activities cited by the 26 grantees responding to Performance Review Questionnaire Item D.01 were cited as experiencing delays in Item D.04. "For which activities were there delays in commodity or service delivery to beneficiaries. The question wording needs improving. Currently, we assume no delays for the sixty activities not mentioned.

## Table 5.04: Intermediate Result 1.2: Indicator No.2

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No.1.2: Emergency assistance, meeting recognized standards, delivered within acceptable time frame. | | | |
| Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 2: % of disaster response programs that have delivered emergency assistance packages which meet recognized standards. Analyzed separately for (a) complex emergencies and (b) natural and man-made disasters. Only data for complex emergencies are available for FY 1997. | | | |
| Measure: % of OFDA funded grant activities that delivered the targeted quantity of rations / services<br>Unit of Measurement: Grant activities | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Sources:<br>Performance Review Questionnaire, implementing partners' proposals, quarterly and EOP reports | 1997 | Baseline year | 85%* |
| | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>This indicator deals with the adequacy of the emergency assistance provided to targeted disaster victims. It is concerned with delivering relief to the level where the targeted vulnerable populations will not easily slide back into disaster situations. The assistance should provide the minimal basis for livelihood. "Recognized standards" are agreed to during the proposal review stage. The denominator is the number of sector-specific activities specified by grantees and the numerator is these that deliver their targeted rations / services. | 1999 | | |
| | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>OFDA funds emergency assistance in accordance with internationally accepted standards. | 2001 | | |
| | 2002 | | |

* Data for both targeted and delivered rations/services (Performance Review Questionnaire Item C.04) were only obtained for twenty sector-specific activities. Of these, 17 (85%) either met or exceeded targets. Because of the low response rate, these data should be treated cautiously.

## Table 5.05: Intermediate Result 1.3: Indicator No.1

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No. 1.3: Capacities for livelihoods restored. | | | |
| Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: % of disaster response programs which include the implementation of appropriate relief to development components. | | | |
| Measure: % of OFDA funded grant activities including relief to development programs<br>Unit of Measurement: OFDA grants | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Sources:<br>Performance Review Questionnaire, implementing partner proposals, quarterly and EOP reports | 1997 | Baseline year | 65%* |
| | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>This indicator recognizes that short-term rehabilitation is the first post-crisis assistance intended to move the target population toward sustainable development. Short-term rehabilitation should enable targeted vulnerable groups to enhance their productivity and income opportunities. Appropriateness of the need for rehabilitation activity is determined by the situation and defined by OFDA during review of implementing partners' proposals. The denominator is the total number of OFDA grants, and the numerator is the number of these that include relief to development components. | 1999 | | |
| | 2000 | | |
| Comments: | 2001 | | |
| | 2002 | | |

* Seventeen of 25 grantees responding answered yes to Performance Review Questionnaire Item B.05 "Did the program incorporate resettlement or rehabilitation activities to accelerate re-establishment of the targeted population's livelihood and self-sufficiency?"

## Table 5.06: Intermediate Result 1.4: Indicator No.1

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No. 1.4: | Disaster response capabilities of NGOs and host government entities strengthened. | | | |
| Approved: In review | Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: | Number and percent of disaster responses including measures to strengthen the capabilities of participating local NGOs or institutions. | | | |
| Measure:<br><br><br>Unit of Measurement: | Number and percent of OFDA grants including measures to strengthen capabilities of participating local NGOs or institutions<br>OFDA grants | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Sources:<br>Performance Review Questionnaire; implementing partners' proposals, quarterly and EOP reports. | | 1997 | Baseline year | 85%* |
| | | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>This indicator relates to interventions designed to strengthen the capabilities of local NGOs and institutions to provide humanitarian assistance. The denominator is the total number of OFDA grants, and the numerator is the number of these including measures to strengthen local NGOs or institutions. | | 1999 | | |
| | | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>The Strategic Plan indicators which related to OFDA-approved emergency health protocols were dropped. Training on the OFDA-funded emergency health protocols has not yet began. | | 2001 | | |
| | | 2002 | | |

* Twenty-three of 27 grantees responding said yes to Performance Review Questionnaire Item B.06 “Did the program contain any measures to strengthen the capabilities of participating local NGOs or institutions?”

## Table 5.07: Strategic Objective 2: Indicator No.1

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Objective No.2: | Increased adoption of mitigation measures in countries at greatest risk of natural and man-made disasters. | | | |
| Approved: In review | Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: | Number and % of OFDA-targeted at-risk countries with one or more PMP programs. | | | |
| Unit of Measurement: | No. & % of OFDA-targeted at-risk countries with one or more PMP-type activities | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Source:<br>Implementing Partner proposals, quarterly and EOP reports; OFDA records | | 1997 | Baseline year<br>LAC =<br>Asia =<br>S. Pacific= | <br><br>22<br>5<br>13 |
| | | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>"Targeted at-risk countries" are those countries which are most vulnerable to the most frequently occurring natural disasters (initially selected as countries that had experienced 10 or more natural or man-made disasters from 1964 to 1990), as well as those suffering from prolonged civil strife. "PMP programs" include activities that seek to stimulate new and innovative approaches to reducing the impacts of disaster on potential victims and economic assets in highly disaster-prone localities and regions in the targeted countries. The denominator is the number of OFDA-targeted at-risk countries and the numerator is the number of OFDA-targeted at-risk countries with one or more PMP-type activities. | | 1999 | | |
| | | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>In 1990, 22 countries in Africa, 25 countries in the Middle East, Asia and the South Pacific, and 22 countries in LAC were identified as at-risk countries and targeted for PMP assistance (see Annex 2). | | 2001 | | |
| | | 2002 | | |

## Table 5.08: Intermediate Result 2.1: Indicator No.1

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No. 2.1: | Enhanced institutional capacity of international NGOs and international organizations to reduce the impact of disaster. | | | |
| Approved: In review | Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: | Change in the institutional capacity of international NGOs and IOs to develop and implement PMP programs. | | | |
| Unit of Measurement: | % change in institutional capacity composite scores of implementing partners to develop and implement effective PMP-type activities | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Source:<br>Implementing Partners' proposals, quarterly and EOP reports; OFDA reports | | 1997 | Baseline year<br>LAC =<br>Asia = | <br>4.7<br>2.8 |
| | | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>Institutional Capacity Composite Scores (ICCS) of implementing partners are tracked annually. They range from one to five, where an "institutional capacity score of 5" indicates that the implementing partner (1) has a local presence, (2) has trained staff with capability to transfer knowledge and technology to local partners and counterparts, (3) has technical capacity and resources to plan, design, implement and manage effective PMP activities, (4) regularly conducts mock PMP exercises with targeted communities, and (5) has a track record in designing and implementing effective PMP-type activities. The measure is percent change in ICCS. The denominator is the sum of FY 1996 ICCS scores for concerned implementing partners, and the numerator is the difference between FY 1997 scores and FY 1996 scores for the same implementing partners. | | 1999 | | |
| | | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>Data was not available to rate the institutional capacity of implementing partners to design, implement and manage PMP-type activities in Asia and the South Pacific, and Africa. | | 2001 | | |
| | | 2002 | | |

## Table 5.09: Intermediate Result 2.2: Indicator No.1

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No.2.2: Strengthened host country capacity to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters. | | | |
| Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: % of OFDA-targeted vulnerable countries developing, adopting and practicing national and local disaster mitigation and preparedness programs. | | | |
| Unit of Measurement: % change in host country institutional capacity scores (HCIC) | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Source:<br>Implementing Partner proposals, quarterly and EOP reports; OFDA-records. | 1997 | Baseline year<br>LAC =<br>Asia = | <br>3.9<br>2.7 |
| | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>This indicator relates to the institutional capacity of host-country entities to implement and manage PMP-type activities. Host country institutional capacity (HCIC) is scored 1 to 5. An HCIC score of 5.0 indicates that the country has disaster response units which (1) are effective; (2) have adequate financial resources to design, implement and manage PMP activities; (3) have the skills and capacity to design, implement and manage PMP activities; (4) regularly conduct mock PMP exercises with targeted communities; and (5) have prominent national status able to mobilize local resources and communities to develop and implement PMP activities. The denominator is the number of targeted at-risk countries and the numerator is the number of targeted at-risk countries with an HCIC score of 3 or more. | 1999 | | |
| | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>Sufficient data was not available for Asia, South Pacific and Africa. In 1990, the host-country institutional capacity scores were 2.5, 3.1, and 3.5 for Africa, Asia and the South Pacific, and LAC, respectively. | 2001 | | |
| | 2002 | | |

## Table 5.10: Intermediate Result 2.3: Indicator No.1

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate Result No. 2.3: Improved use of resources to link relief and development. | | | |
| Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance | | | |
| Performance Indicator 1: % of OFDA disaster responses based on strategic plans with SPQS scores of three or more -- by sub-national, national and regional levels. | | | |
| Unit of Measurement: % of disaster responses | Year | Planned | Actual |
| Data Source:<br>OFDA records | 1997 | Baseline year | |
| | 1998 | | |
| Indicator Definition:<br>This indicator relates to the quality of disaster responses, indicated by the quality of the strategic plans on which they are based. The denominator is the number of OFDA disaster responses and the numerator is the number of disaster responses where PMP activities are implemented on the basis of strategic plans with an SPQS scores of 3 or more. Responses at the sub-national, national and regional levels are analyzed separately. An SPQS score of 5.0 indicates that the country strategic plan (1) identifies the size of the target vulnerable population; (2) categorizes that population by distinctive vulnerability characteristics; (3) assesses the capacities and the traditional coping mechanisms of each group; (4) identifies each group's critical needs; (5) links capacities and traditional coping mechanisms to the critical needs; (6) periodically assesses and recalibrates the number of targeted vulnerable populations and their critical needs during implementations; and (7) is integrated with USAID's, other donors' and the host country's programs. | 1999 | | |
| | 2000 | | |
| Comments:<br>No information was available for this indicator. The indicator is a candidate for replacement with indicators that measure the # of OFDA-funded cooperative agreements that have incorporated mitigative and rehabilitative activities. | 20001 | | |
| | 20002 | | |

## PART III: Management Contract

OFDA's Strategic Plan was approved in November 1996. Achievement of the strategic objectives and intermediate results outlined in that document forms the basis of the management contract for OFDA. After a year and half experience with the strategic framework, OFDA is contemplating some adjustments to its results framework and indicators. While the framework has served adequately so far, it could be more finely tuned to better capture what OFDA does. This year is a pilot, and the Office will not make major changes until all issues regarding the framework emerge and are thoroughly discussed.

As an example, both indicators for IR 1.4, which relate to emergency health protocols, should be dropped. Instead, direct measures of improved institutional capacities of implementing partners, host-country entities and BHR to design, implement and manage effective emergency response programs should be identified and used. This is the strongest example of an adjustment that needs to be made, but the Office would like to identify other constructive changes and make them en masse.

An abiding challenge to OFDA results reporting is the volatile nature of most complex emergencies, especially those which involve mobile populations and where baselines are often nonexistent. The situation in Biaro cited on page 9 where a camp population dropped by 30,000 people in two weeks is not uncommon in OFDA’s work. In such cases, it is not always possible to collect good data on changes in nutritional status, immunization rates and the like. OFDA is working with its implementing partners on this issue and others like it, and expect that these discussions will inform further adjustments to OFDA’s results framework.

## PART IV: Resource Request

The financial and human resources required by OFDA to achieve its strategic objectives are described in this section. As outlined earlier, the shifting magnitude and unpredictability of disasters poses significant challenges to program planning and response. Complex emergencies usually cause greater and longer lasting damage than do natural disasters, and they consume more emergency assistance resources. While OFDA's mandate includes relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, the relief budget remains the priority when resources are reduced. In the past, disaster funding requirements have occasionally exceeded appropriations, forcing OFDA to exercise its authority under Section 492(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) to utilize other USAID funding sources to meet high priority emergency relief needs. This is the rare exception, however, and OFDA is constantly looking for ways to optimize the use of scarce resources.

In the upcoming year, OFDA plans to extend its operations in the following areas: first, it plans to expand SO2 activities to compliment and augment local disaster response capabilities. Building on OFDA's success in developing PMP capacity in LAC, OFDA is planning to apply these lessons in Africa. A new Africa regional office will soon be established in Nairobi, Kenya, and will greatly expand and enhance OFDA's ability to respond to disasters and implement PMP strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Strengthening host country and regional capacities to prevent, mitigate and prepare for disasters ultimately places fewer requirements on OFDA. In the short-term, however, building that capacity will require additional resources.

OFDA is increasingly investing in programs designed to use PMP approaches in complex emergencies to increase institutional and local response capacity and preparedness for emergencies before they occur. This, too, requires additional resources. OFDA estimates that 3 expatriate and 3 local staff will be recruited to staff the Africa Regional Office. OFDA also expects to expand PMP-type training and technical assistance in Asia and the South Pacific, and to consolidate gains made in LAC.

Second, OFDA has resumed responsibility for ENI disaster response in 1997. While no major response was required in FY 1997, developing OFDA capacity is underway. This region is at great risk for natural disasters and complex emergencies. Recent intensification of the conflict in Kosovo has already required close monitoring by OFDA and could require significant resources in the future.

Third, pursuant to Presidential Decision Document (PDD)-39, it is OFDA's responsibility to support and advise US Missions, and provide humanitarian relief and emergency management assistance to local authorities in the case of a nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) incident. Additional funds were not provided for this purpose, however, and NBC incidents could potentially strain IDA funds programmed for other disasters. In order to provide adequate training and operational preparedness for humanitarian response to NBC incidents, the estimated start-up cost is $6 million.

Fourth, although considerable progress has been made toward improving emergency response in general, much more needs to be done. Areas for improvement include the emergency response capabilities of implementing partners, including enhancement of their targeting and needs assessment capacities, performance monitoring and evaluation systems, grant proposal preparation, results reporting and overall activity impact in a consistent and timely manner. To facilitate these efforts, OFDA is in the process of revising its grant procedures and guidelines and will streamline the grant proposal review process. The Office will continue to work closely with its partners to improve overall monitoring and evaluation. It is hoped that these efforts will ultimately enable OFDA to manage its resources more strategically and meet the needs of disaster victims in a more timely and clearly targeted manner.

### 1. Financial Plan

In order to carry out its mandate and achieve its strategic objectives, OFDA is requesting a total of $165 million in IDA funds for FY 2000. This level of funding is the minimum necessary to respond to complex, natural and man-made disasters and to implement PMP activities in targeted regions to mitigate against natural and man-made disasters. As shown below, this resource request is consistent with OFDA's obligating levels in recent years.

OFDA's FINANCIAL RESOURCE REQUEST
($ Millions)

| Funding Sources | Actual FY 1995 | Actual FY1996 | Actual FY 1997 | Actual FY1998 | Planned FY 1999 | Planned FY 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA- New Obligating Authority (NOA)* | $150.80 | $155.90 | $165.00 | $160.00 | $160.00 | $165.00 |
| Suppl. ** | $15.20 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Borrowed | $19.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Transfers | $7.70 | $14.50 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| Carryover*** | $15.50 | $19.20 | $36.70 | $27.00 | $15.00 | $15.00 |
| Total Resources | $208.20 | $189.60 | $201.70 | $187.00 | $175.00 | $180.00 |
| Obligations | $192.20 | $156.60 | $174.60 | $172.00 | $160.00 | $165.00 |

* The total NOA-IDA account which is shared between OFDA and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is: FY 95 = $170 million, FY 96 = $181 million, FY 97 = $190 million, FY 98 = $190 million, FY 99 = $205 million.

** Unobligated balance from the FY 1994 Rwanda Supplemental.

*** Includes recoveries and the de-obligations of closed and expired grants and other financial transactions.

The data presented in the table represents OFDA's resources only. The IDA account also supports OTI. The OTI resource request is entirely separate from this document and is not included in the table above. The IDA account is appropriated as no-year funds. This authority allows OFDA the flexibility to carry-over unobligated funds between fiscal years

and these resources are available until expended. The high carry-over balances for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998 result from the closure of two longstanding and costly DART operations, Bosnia and northern Iraq.

Because of the usual delays in receiving the NOA at the beginning of the fiscal year, the availability of carry-over funds is imperative for OFDA. OFDA's response to the Rwanda crisis in FY 1997, for example, was financed almost exclusively from carry-over funds, as the disaster occurred early in the fiscal year when NOA was not available.

In order to assure that OFDA is able to coordinate with other USG agencies and respond to the unique requirements of an overseas NBC event, additional funds are required for 2000. The PDD-39 states that agencies will bear the cost of their participation.

### 2. Workforce and Operating Expenses

Throughout this document it has been noted that OFDA faces many diverse tasks. The ability to perform these tasks and carry out OFDA's mandate requires adequate staffing levels. A careful review of the current OFDA workforce reveals that several of the tasks previously outlined require additional staff. For instance, responding to NBCs is expected to require 2 additional direct hire positions. OFDA is continuously upgrading the skills and expertise of its staff to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, but NBC emergencies will require greater depth of expertise than additional training of current staff can yield.

In order to meet disaster victims' critical needs during emergencies, OFDA plans to alter the composition of its field operations to respond more quickly in times of disaster, and enhance the quality of DART teams and the work of regional advisors by recruiting and hiring more experienced personnel. It also will increase the number of Regional Offices and Advisors. With the establishment of the Africa Regional Office, OFDA will be required to recruit and fill an additional 6 staff positions, to be filled under Personal Service Contracts.

As shown in the table below, in FY 1998, OFDA is operating with a staff level of 81, of which 25 are direct hires, 27 US PSCs, 16 RSSAs/PASAs/Fellows and 13 regional advisors and EDRCs, who are also PSCs. For FY 2000, OFDA is requesting a staff level of 90 and an operating expense budget of $357,250. El Niño-related early warning data indicate that in the coming years many countries will experience unusual weather patterns which may result in widespread damage like that brought about by the current ENSO. The staffing level shown in the table below does not reflect additional human resources that may be required for managing El Niño-related hydro-meteorological disasters and the expanded responsibility in ENI.

| BHR/OFDA WORKFORCE REQUIREMENT, FY 1997-2000 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Actual** | | **Requested** | |
| **STAFF LEVELS** | FY 1997 | FY 1998 | FY 1999 | FY 2000 |
| USDHs | 26 | 24 | 26 | 26 |
| U.S. PSCs - Washington Based | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| RSSA/PASAs/Fellows | 15 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Regional Advisors/EDRCs - Field Based PSCs | 20 | 13 | 19 | 19 |
| | | | | |
| **Total Staff** | **88** | **80** | **88** | **88** |

| BHR/OFDA OPERATING EXPENSE and TRAVEL BUDGET, FY 1997-2000 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **OPERATING EXPENSE** (OE) | FY 1997 | FY 1998 | FY 1999 | FY 2000 |
| Travel | $297,500 | $280,000 | $290,000 | $310,000 |
| PSC OE Funded* | $35,000 | $40,000 | $45,000 | $47,250 |
| | | | | |
| **Total OE** | **$332,500** | **$320,000** | **$335,000** | **$357,250** |

* This position is funded jointly funded by OFDA and PPE.

# ANNEX 1

## ANNEX 1: SUMMARY OF DECLARED EMERGENCIES -- FY 1997

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 below summarize declared emergencies and OFDA's disaster response for FY 1997. There was a total of 48 declared disasters for which OFDA assistance was sought, representing an estimated total of 40 million affected persons. OFDA responded in every case, providing a total of $140 million in humanitarian assistance, used to assist about 18-19 million people.

Of the 48 declared disasters, there were 13 complex emergencies, 27 natural disasters, and 8 man-made disasters. Floods were the most common natural disaster at a total of 13, followed by 4 droughts, 4 cyclones/storms, 3 earthquakes, and 3 epidemics. Man-made disasters included three complex situations - Uganda, Albania and N. Korea, 2 cases of displaced persons, 2 fires, and one accident.

Table 1.1: Comparison of FY 1997 Complex Emergencies, Natural Disasters and Man-Made Disasters

| Disaster | No. | Affected (Thou) | % | Assisted (Thou) | % of Aff. | Funding (Thou.) | % | $/person assisted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Complex Emergency** | 13 | 23,100 | 57 | 15,410 | 67 | 134,386 | 96 | $8.72 |
| **Natural Disaster** | 27 | 14,162 | 35 | 3,031 | 21 | 4,591 | 3 | $1.51 |
| **Man-made Disaster** | 8 | 3,002 | 8 | 318 | 11 | 1,046 | 1 | $3.29 |
| **TOTAL** | 48 | 40,264 | 100 | 18,758 | 47 | 140,023 | 100 | $7.46 |

Table 1.1 shows that 96% of OFDA's funding is devoted to complex emergencies, even though this category only accounts for 57% of the total affected population.

## Table 1.2: OFDA'S FY 1997 DISASTER RESPONSE

| | COUNTRY | DISASTER | AFFECTED*b | ASSISTED*d | | NEEDS MET | FUNDING*b | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **OFDA TOTAL*a** | | **40,263,883** | **18,758,153** | | **Relief and Rehabilitation** | **140,023,667** | **100%** |
| | **A. Complex Emergencies** | | 23,100,000 | 15,410,000 | | | 134,386,352 | 96% |
| 1 | Rwanda | Complex E. | 1,500,000 | 1,000,000 | | food, water health, sanitation, shelter, clothes | 26,150,280 | 19% |
| 2 | Sudan | Complex E. | 4,000,000 | 4,000,000 | | food, water, health, sanitation, shelter, clothes | 22,201,953 | 16% |
| 3 | Bosnia-Herzegovina*c | Complex E. | 2,000,000 | 1,400,000 | | security, food, sanitation, winterization, infrastructure | 19,681,308 | 14% |
| 4 | Croatia*c | Complex E. | | | | (included in Bosnia-Herzegovina) | | |
| 5 | Serbia-Montenegro*c | Complex E. | | | | | | |
| 6 | Angola | Complex E. | 3,300,000 | 3,000,000 | | health, vaccines, food, coordination, airlift | 12,747,085 | 9% |
| 7 | Burundi | Complex E. | 2,500,000 | 2,500,000 | | food, health, sanitation, water, rehab, agric., coordination. | 11,023,353 | 8% |
| 8 | Dem Rep Congo | Complex E. | 1,400,000 | 1,000,000 | | feeding, health, water, children, agric., coordination. | 10,707,267 | 8% |
| 9 | Liberia | Complex E. | 2,000,000 | 1,000,000 | | health, repatriation, nutrition, agric., logistics | 8,643,348 | 6% |
| 10 | N. Iraq | Complex E. | 650,000 | 330,000 | | water, sanitation, health training, evacuation | 8,355,678 | 6% |
| 11 | Somalia | Complex E. | 1,250,000 | 750,000 | | drought relief, health care, water & sanitation | 6,055,599 | 4% |
| 12 | Sierra Leone | Complex E. | 1,500,000 | 200,000 | | health, nutrition, medicine, water and sanitation | 5,862,276 | 4% |
| 13 | Afghanistan | Complex E. | 3,000,000 | 230,000 | | health, shelter, winterization, clothes, agriculture/livestock | 2,958,205 | 2% |

| | COUNTRY | DISASTER | AFFECTED*b | ASSISTED*d | | NEEDS MET | FUNDING*b | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **B. Natural Disasters** | | **14,162,067** | **3,030,612** | | | **4,590,897** | **3%** |
| 14 | Kenya | Drought | 1,600,000 | 1,000,000 | | repaired boreholes, vaccinated camels, coordination. | 1,857,942 | 1% |
| 15 | Chad | Drought | 624,000 | 77,000 | | food dist./therapeutic feeding for women & children | 357,000 | 0% |
| 16 | Bolivia | Floods | 80,000 | 26,000 | | emergency food rations | 280,000 | 0% |
| 17 | Peru | Earthquake | 81,900 | 56,000 | | tents, blankets, non-food items, plastic sheeting | 276,920 | 0% |
| 18 | Poland | Floods | 162,500 | 80,000 | | water, vaccines, tents, blankets, hygiene, food | 232,901 | 0% |
| 19 | Honduras | Floods | 37,500 | 30,000 | | food, shelter, water | 191,512 | 0% |
| 20 | Czech Republic | Floods | 50,000 | 50,000 | | food, non-food, water, sanitation, health, vaccines | 184,213 | 0% |
| 21 | Bangladesh | Cyclone | 1,100,000 | 70,000 | | non-food survival packets & replenish stockpiles | 154,600 | 0% |
| 22 | Laos | Floods | 420,000 | 100,000 | | irrigation pumps, food for work | 128,033 | 0% |
| 23 | Iran | Earthquake | 60,000 | 20,000 | | food, clothing, hygiene items & tents | 100,000 | 0% |
| 24 | Ethiopia | Drought | 4,600,000 | 15,000 | | food distribution, etc. | 48,776 | 0% |
| 25 | Cambodia | Floods | 1,300,000 | 600,000 | | shelter, clothing, food, flood relief, FFW, rehab. | 47,000 | 0% |
| 26 | Burma | Floods | 103,655 | 5,000 | | food and non-food needs for one month | 25,000 | 0% |
| 27 | Chad | Epidemic | 8,500 | 8,500 | | cholera treatment, medicines, logistical support | 357,000 | 0% |
| 28 | Ecuador | Floods | 11,907 | 11,907 | | water pumps, hoses, megaphones | 25,000 | 0% |
| 29 | The Gambia | Epidemic | 25,000 | 25,000 | | meningitis vaccines, medical equip., treatment | 25,000 | 0% |
| 30 | India | Cyclone | 1,605,000 | 15,000 | | food, non-food supplies, rehabilitation | 25,000 | 0% |
| 31 | Iran | Earthquake | 76,000 | 55,000 | | food, non-food, clothing, water, shelter, hygiene, medicine, rehab | 25,000 | 0% |
| 32 | Madagascar | Cyclone | 570,000 | 570,000 | | road repair, water | 25,000 | 0% |

| | COUNTRY | DISASTER | AFFECTED*b | ASSISTED*d | | NEEDS MET | FUNDING*b | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | Malawi | Floods | 400,000 | 15,000 | | food, shelter, blankets, med. supplies, agriculture, bridge reconstruction. | 25,000 | 0% |
| 34 | Malaysia | Floods | 10,000 | 10,000 | | shelter, health, rehabilitation | 25,000 | 0% |
| 35 | Mauritania | Drought | 200,000 | 15,000 | | food distribution, therapeutic feeding for children | 25,000 | 0% |
| 36 | Mongolia | Floods | 100 | 100 | | shelter, agricultural, animals | 50,000 | 0% |
| 37 | Mozambique | Floods | 300,000 | 152,600 | | food, medicine, seeds, clothing | 25,000 | 0% |
| 38 | Paraguay | Storm | 5,000 | 2,500 | | shelter, roofing, sheets, blankets, livelihood, assessment | 25,000 | 0% |
| 39 | Tajikistan | Epidemic | 6,005 | 6,005 | | bed linens, mattresses, blankets & pillows for health facilities | 25,000 | 0% |
| 40 | Vietnam | Floods | 725,000 | 15,000 | | emergency assistance to most severely affected families | 25,000 | 0% |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | **C. Man-made Disasters** | | **3,001,816** | **317,541** | | | **1,046,418** | **1%** |
| 41 | Uganda | Civil Strife | 400,000 | 223,000 | | health, sanitation., shelter, food, water, resettle., agric. | 905,109 | 1% |
| 42 | Albania | Emergency | 30,000 | 3,000 | | bed linens for hospitals & health centers | 25,000 | 0% |
| 43 | Central African Rep. | Displ Pers. | 55,000 | 55,000 | | drugs, medical equipment, 200 latrines | 25,000 | 0% |
| 44 | Haiti | Accident | 500 | 225 | | funeral expenses | 25,000 | 0% |
| 45 | Colombia | Displ Pers. | 16,000 | 16,000 | | health, water, sanitation -- esp. women & children | 23,392 | 0% |
| 46 | N. Korea | Food/Health | 2,500,000 | 20,000 | | food, health, two epidemiologist | 20,217 | 0% |
| 47 | Guinea-Bissau | Fire | 211 | 211 | | shelter: materials to repair houses, livestock | 15,200 | 0% |
| 48 | Belize | Fire | 105 | 105 | | household goods & furniture | 7,500 | 0% |

*a In addition, OFDA continued funding for four disasters declared in FY 1996. The amounts carried over totaled $130, 579. They were: Ecuador earthquake $67,000; China floods $46,940; Costa Rica floods $15,120; and Palau accident $15,519.

*b Funding and number affected were obtained from the OFDA Annual Progress Report.

*c Former Yugoslavia -- included in Bosnia-Herzegovina .

| | |
|---|---|
| *d | In general, estimates for number assisted were based on OFDA's Annual Progress Report. For the numerous small disasters where OFDA provided $25,000 without elaborate needs assessment, the number assisted is estimated at 15,000 unless better data are available. Estimates based on data other than the Annual Progress Report are footnoted below. |
| | #01 Rwanda: Programs focused on assisting the 1,000,000 Rwandan refugees to return home (Sources APR & Merlin). |
| | #02 Sudan: Programs targeted all 4 million affected -- 1.8 million in government controlled areas (Source UNDHA) and 2.2 million in southern Sudan (Source WFP). |
| | #03-5 Former Yugoslavia: Programs focused on the 1.4 million Bosnian refugees and IDPs. |
| | #06 Angola: Programs focused on the 1.2 million IDPs and 1.8 million war affected in Angola more than the 300,000 refugees abroad. |
| | #08 DROC: UNICEF's drug distribution program for Haute Zaire estimated a target population of 1,000,000. |
| | #09 Liberia: Estimate based on 1,000,000 IDPs. |
| | #10 N. Iraq: Estimates based on FY 1996 estimates, with the assumption that the population of Kurds in N. Iraq did not change substantially. |
| | #11 Somalia: Estimate based on annual report statement that there were 600,000 returnees and 250,000 IDPs. OFDA had 9 active grants. |
| | #12 Sierra Leone: Based on WFP estimate that 200,000 were in need of food assistance. OFDA had 10 active grants in FY 1997. |
| | #14 Kenya: Estimate based on OFDA funding a relief coordinator for the USAID/Nairobi drought coordination unit. |
| | #18 Poland: Estimated at half of those who were forced to evacuate their homes. |
| | #22 Laos: Estimated that OFDA water pumps and food-for-work programs assisted roughly one-fourth of those affected. |
| | #23 Iran: Estimated that OFDA funds provided to IFRC assisted about one-third of the 60,000 homeless. |
| | #24 Ethiopia: Estimated that OFDA's contribution of $48,776 would assist roughly 10,000. |
| | #25 Cambodia: Estimated from annual report statement that 200 villages were covered with food-for-work projects. |
| | #26 Burma: Estimated from annual report statement that $25,000 was to provide a one month supply of food and non-food items. |
| | #31 Iran: Estimated based on 60,000 homeless cited in OFDA annual report. |
| | #36 Mongolia: Estimate based on annual report statement that 20 families lost their homes and livestock. |
| | #42 Albania: OFDA's contribution of $25,000 was used to buy bed linens for hospitals. Estimate 3,000 people assisted. |
| | #43 Central African Republic: OFDA funds provided drugs and 200 latrines. Estimate assumes all 55,000 IDPs were assisted. |
| | #44 Haiti: OFDA annual report states that OFDA funds were used to pay funeral expenses. |
| | #45 Colombia: OFDA funds purchased water tanks and purifiers, and sanitation assistance. Estimate assumes all IDPs were assisted. |
| | #46 N. Korea: N. Korea refused most direct OFDA assistance. OFDA's contribution of $20,217 was used for measles vaccination. However, OFDA provided funds through UNICEF for supplemental feeding and contributed $2 million to the World Food Program's appeal. |

# ANNEX 2

## Annex 2: Institutional Capacity Score of Targeted At-Risk Countries - 1990

| OFDA-Targeted At-Risk Countries | Host-Country Institutional Capacity (HCIC) Scores - 1990 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Score |
| **1. Africa** | | | | | | |
| Algeria | | | | x | | 4 |
| Botswana | | | | x | | 4 |
| Burkina Faso | | x | | | | 2 |
| Chad | x | | | | | 1 |
| Ethiopia | x | | | | | 1 |
| Kenya | | | | x | | 4 |
| Madagascar | | | x | | | 3 |
| Mali | x | | | | | 1 |
| Mauritania | x | | | | | 1 |
| Morocco | | | | x | | 4 |
| Mozambique | x | | | | | 1 |
| Nigeria | | | | x | | 4 |
| Niger | | x | | | | 2 |
| Senegal | | | x | | | 3 |
| Somalia | | x | | | | 2 |
| South Africa | | | | x | | 4 |
| Sudan | x | | | | | 1 |
| Tanzania | | | x | | | 3 |
| The Gambia | | | x | | | 3 |
| Tunisia | | | | x | | 4 |
| Uganda | | x | | | | 2 |
| Zaire | | | x | | | 3 |
| **Africa Average Score** | | | | | | **2.6** |
| | | | | | | |
| **2. Middle East, Asia and the South Pacific** | | | | | | |
| Afghanistan | x | | | | | 1 |
| Australia | | | | | x | 5 |
| Bangladesh | | x | | | | 2 |
| Burma | | x | | | | 2 |
| China | | | x | | | 3 |
| Fiji | | | x | | | 3 |
| Hong Kong | | | | | x | 5 |
| India | | | | | x | 5 |
| Indonesia | | | x | | | 3 |
| Iran | | | x | | | 3 |
| Japan | | | | | x | 5 |
| Laos | | x | | | | 2 |
| Lebanon | x | | | | | 1 |
| Malaysia | | | | x | | 4 |
| Nepal | | x | | | | 2 |
| Pakistan | | | x | | | 3 |
| Papua New Guinea | | x | | | | 2 |

| OFDA-Targeted At-Risk Countries | Host-Country Institutional Capacity (HCIC) Scores - 1990 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Score |
| Philippines | | | x | | | 3 |
| Sri Lanka | | | x | | | 3 |
| Taiwan | | | | | x | 5 |
| Thailand | | | | x | | 4 |
| The Republic of Korea | | | | | x | 5 |
| Vanuatu | | x | | | | 2 |
| Vietnam | | x | | | | 2 |
| Yemen | | x | | | | 2 |
| **Middle East, Asia & S. Pacific Average Score** | | | | | | **3.1** |
| | | | | | | |
| **3. Latin America & the Caribbean** | | | | | | |
| Argentina | | | | | x | 5 |
| Belize | | | x | | | 3 |
| Bolivia | | | x | | | 3 |
| Brazil | | | | | x | 5 |
| Chile | | | | | x | 5 |
| Colombia | | | | x | | 4 |
| Costa Rica | | | | | x | 5 |
| Cuba | | | | x | | 4 |
| Dominican Republic | | | x | | | 3 |
| Eastern Caribbean | | | x | | | 3 |
| Ecuador | | | x | | | 3 |
| El Salvador | | | x | | | 3 |
| Guatemala | | | x | | | 3 |
| Haiti | x | | | | | 1 |
| Honduras | | | x | | | 3 |
| Jamaica | | | | x | | 4 |
| Mexico | | | | x | | 4 |
| Nicaragua | | x | | | | 2 |
| Panama | | | | x | | 4 |
| Paraguay | | | | | x | 5 |
| Peru | | | x | | | 3 |
| Venezuela | | | | | x | 5 |
| **LAC Average Score** | | | | | | **3.6** |

* The copping capacity of Host Countries was rated taking into account the following factors:

a. Political will and resource availability of the country
b. Strength of the private sector to cop with disasters
c. Competencies of the cadre of disaster response professionals in the country
d. The presence or absence of national, regional or local disaster plans which are exercised periodically

**SOURCE:** Heyman B. N. , Davis C. and Krumpe, P. F. 1991, *Assessment of worldwide disaster vulnerability*. Disaster Management 4:1, pp. 3 -14

# ANNEX 3

## Annex 3: Institutional Capacity Scoring (NGOs/IOs) - FY 1997

| Country | Organization | Type | Activity | Capacity Score | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Local Presence | Trained Staff | Technical & Financial Capacity | Disaster Management Plans | Track Record | OFDA-trained Personnel in Key Position | Total Score | Normalized Score |
| LAC | PAHO | IO | Hospital Vulnerability Reduction | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 5.0 |
| LAC | POM | NGO | Emergency Preparedness Programs for Schools | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 4.4 |
| El Salvador | ARC | NGO | Training In Disaster Preparedness | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 5.0 |
| Caribbean | OAS | IO | Disaster Mitigation | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 5.0 |
| LAC | Metro Dade Fire Dept. | County Gov. Org | Disaster & Emergency Response Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 4.4 |
| LAC | USGS | USG | Volcano Disaster Assistance | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 4.4 |
| **Average Score** | | | | | | | | | | | **4.7** |

| Country | Organization | Disaster Activity | Capacity Scoring | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Has Disaster Response Unit | Unit Has Core Staff & Budget | Unit has Trained Staff & Resources | Unit Conducts Mock Practice | Unit has Prominent National Status | Unit has OFDA-trained Staff in Key Position | Total Score | Normalized Score |
| Argentina | Civil Defense | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2.5 |
| Belize | NDC/BRC | Disaster Management Training | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 |
| Bolivia | NCD/MOH/BRC | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 4.2 |
| Brazil | NCD/ | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Chile | NEOMOI/MOH/NFS | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Colombia | NOAED/NCD/ MOH/CRC | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Costa Rica | NEC/CRRC/ NSVO/MOE/ MOE/MOH | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Dominican Republic | NCD/DRC/MOPW/NFS/DCDM | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 4.2 |
| Eastern Caribbean | NDCO/MOH/ CDERA/RSS | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 4.2 |
| Ecuador | NCD/MOH/NFS/ERC | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2.5 |
| El Salvador | NEO/ESRC/NFS/MOH | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Guatemala | NCD/MOH | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1.7 |
| Haiti | NEO | Disaster Management Training | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 |
| Honduras | NCO/MOH/NFS/NFS | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Jamaica | OEP/MOH | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Mexico | NCDP/MRC/ CGMS | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Nicaragua | NCD/NRC/NFS/MOH /NFS | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1.7 |
| Panama | NSC/NFS/MOH/PRC | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2.5 |
| Paraguay | NEC/MOH/ DIBEN/NFS/PRC | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Peru | NCD/MOH/ISS/NFS/P RC | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Uruguay | NEC/URC/ NJCAF | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| Venezuela | NCD/CDSAT/ FSFD | Disaster Management Training | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5.0 |
| **Average Score** | | | | | | | | | | **3.9** |

| Country | Organization | Type | Activity | Institutional Capacity Score | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Dependent on International Partner | Has Trained Staff To Conduct Vulnerability Mapping | Has Trained Staff To Implement PMP Activity | Has Capacity to Mobilize Local Communities & Resources | Has Attained National Reputation and Stature | Total Score |
| Costa Rica | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Guatemala | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Honduras | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| El Salvador | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Nicaragua | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Ecuador | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Peru | Companeros de las America | Local NGO | Emergency Preparedness Program for School | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| **Average Score** | | | | | | | | | **4.3** |

| Institutional Capacity Scoring (Local NGOs) - FY 1997 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **Org.** | **Int'l IP** | **Activity** | **Capacity Scores** | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | **Dependence On Int'l Partner for Resources & TA** | **Dependence on International Partner to Implement PMP Activities** | **Participation in Designing, Implementing and Managing DPMP Activities** | **Staff Training in Risk Mapping & Vulnerability Assessment** | **Staff Trained to Design, Implement & Manage DPMP Activities** | **Conducting DPMP Mock Exercises with local Communities** | **Ability to Mobilize Local Communities and Resources** | **Sufficiency of Resources including Host Government Allocation** | **National Reputation & Stature** | **Total Score** | **Normalized Score** |
| India | Baroda Citizens' Council/Times Research Foundation | Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) | | | | | | | | | | | | NA |
| Indonesia | Institute of Technology, Center for Earthquake Engineering Studies, Bandung | ADPC | Training on Urban Disaster Mitigation | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.5 |
| Nepal | NSET | ADPC | Technical Assistance for School and Urban Earthquake Vulnerability Assessment | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 3.1 |
| Philippines | Philippines' Business for Social Progress (PBSP | ADPC | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2.8 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sri Lanka | Center for Housing Planning and Building (CHPB) | ADPC | Urban Disaster Mitigation Skills | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2.5 |
| **Average Score** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2.7 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| Institutional Capacity Scoring (International NGOs) - FY 1997 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **Organization** | **Type** | **Activity** | **Capacity Scores** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | **Local Presence** | **Ability to Transfer PMP Knowledge & Technology** | **Trained Staff** | **Technical Soundness & Effectiveness of DPMP Activities** | **Appropriateness of IP's Experience** | **Sufficiency of Funding** | **Degree to which IP Leveraged OFDA Funding** | **Extent of Training Provided to Host Country Counterparts** | **Effectiveness of Counter-part Training** | **Degree of Acceptance of IP by Host Country** | **Total Score** | **Normalized Score** |
| India | Asia Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) | NGO | Asia Urban Disaster Mitigation Project (AUDMP) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 2.0 |
| Indonesia | ADPC | NGO | Asia Urban Disaster Mitigation Project (AUDMP) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.5 |
| Nepal | ADPC | NGO | Asia Urban Disaster Mitigation Project (AUDMP) | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 4.0 |
| Philippines | ADPC | NGO | Asia Urban Disaster Mitigation Project (AUDMP) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 2.5 |
| Sri Lanka | ADPC | NGO | Asia Urban Disaster Mitigation Project (AUDMP) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 3.0 |
| | **Average Score** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | **2.8** |

# ANNEX 4

## OFDA R4 PERFORMANCE REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

**Desk Review:** Grant:_____ Date: _____ By:_____
☐ Proposal ☐ Grant ☐ Reports dated: _____ _____ _____ _____
Date questionnaire sent to implementing partner: _____ Returned: _____

**Introduction**

Based on the OFDA workshop in Nairobi in December, 1997, we have revised our reporting questionnaire as follows. This is still a draft, and will be finalized later this year. We will appreciate any comments you would like to make on this format.

Information from this questionnaire will be used in OFDA's FY 1997 R4 (Results Review and Resources Request) as part of OFDA's overall monitoring and evaluation effort. For the purposes of this pilot effort, the R4 team has completed as many questions as possible through information gleaned from files on the indicated grant. Questions which were not answerable through this means are highlighted, and we would greatly appreciate your filling in the missing information. Please return the form to Juanita Rilling, BHR/OFDA/PMPP by no later than April 2, 1998. Fax 202-955-8498, or e-mail jrilling@usaid.gov.

**Source:**

**A. IDENTIFICATION** P=Proposal

G=Grant

A.01 Implementing Partner: _____ A.02 Country: _____ R=Report

A.03 Proposal: Title: _____ [P]
_____ Date: _____ Amount:_____
Proposed Dates: Start: _____ End: _____

A.04 Persons Involved: [P]
HQ:_____
Tel: _____ Fax: _____ E-mail: _____
FIELD: _____
Tel: _____ Fax: _____ E-mail: _____

A.05 OFDA Grant Agreement: [G]
No. _____ Date: _____ Amount:_____
Grant award: Begins: _____ Ends: _____

| Amendments: | Dated | From | To | Amount | New Focus? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | ☐ Yes ☐ No |
| 2. | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | ☐ Yes ☐ No |

A.06 Disaster type: ☐ Natural ☐ Man-Made ☐ Complex Emergency [P]
Specify: _____

## B. ACTIVITIES

B.01 Purpose/Objectives of program. [G,P]

_____
_____
_____
_____

B.02 Sectors of activity (*Check all that apply*): [G,P]

☐ Health clinics ☐ Immunization ☐ MCH ☐ Epidemic control ☐ Public health
☐ Emergency feeding ☐ Water ☐ Sanitation ☐ Shelter ☐ Resettlement ☐ Security
☐ Agriculture ☐ Livestock ☐ Other:_____

B.03 Please list program activities. [G,P]

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____

B.04 What targets (if any) were set for each activity for FY 1997? ☐ None [P]

_____
_____
_____
_____

B.05 Did the program incorporate resettlement or rehabilitation activities to accelerate re-establishment of the target population's livelihood and self-sufficiency? [P]

☐ Yes: What? _____
☐ No: Why not? _____

B.06 Did the program contain any measures to strengthen the capabilities of participating local NGOs or institutions? [P]

☐ Yes: What? _____
☐ No: Why not? _____

## C. TARGETING

C.01 Geographic area of activity: _____ [P]

Estimated affected population in area of activity: _____

Total size of targeted population(s) in this program _____

C.02 Were special groups targeted by characteristics? ☐ No ☐ Yes: If Yes: [P]
Which groups? (*Estimate number of people in each target group*.)
☐ IDPs: _____ ☐ Refugees: _____ ☐ Resettled: _____
☐ Women: Pregnant/Lactating: _____ ☐ Other women: _____
☐ Children under five: . . . . . _____ ☐ Other: _____
_____

C.03 Did the program identify special needs for different groups? ☐ Yes ☐ No [P]
IF YES: What special needs were identified? _____
_____

C.04 What were the commodity ration levels and service delivery standards? (e.g. liters of water per person per day.) [P,R]

| | Targeted | Delivered |
|---|---|---|
| 1. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 2. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 3. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 4. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 5. _____ | _____ | _____ |

C.05 Was emergency assistance reassessed/re-evaluated since initiation of field activities? [R]
☐ No ☐ Yes: IF YES:
a. Describe changes in the target population and why they were changed.
_____
_____

b. What was the size of the new target population? Number: _____

c. Describe how commodity rations or services were adjusted.
_____
_____

## D. ACHIEVEMENTS

D.01 For each activity, how many beneficiaries were reached? [R]

| Activity | Beneficiaries |
|---|---|
| 1. _____ | _____ |
| 2. _____ | _____ |
| 3. _____ | _____ |
| 4. _____ | _____ |
| 5. _____ | _____ |
| 6. _____ | _____ |
| 7. _____ | _____ |

D.02 For which activities were targets met? [R]

_____

_____

D.03 Were activities adjusted for those targets that were not met? ☐ Yes ☐ No [R]

IF YES: How? _____

_____

D.04 For which activities were there delays in commodity or service delivery to beneficiaries? [R]

_____

_____

IF ANY: a. What caused these delays? _____

_____

b. How frequent were the delays? _____

_____

c. How were these delays addressed?_____

_____

D.05 In general, did the program achieve its targets for FY 1997? [R]

☐ Exceeded targets ☐ Met targets ☐ A little short ☐ Far short ☐ No targets set

Why? _____

D.06 If possible, please attach at least one "success story". Success stories are written like brief newspaper articles illustrating outstanding program successes. *(Coders please photocopy from the files; implementing partners, please photocopy or draft.)* [R]

D.07 Is there any information recorded above that you would like to change?

☐ Yes ☐ No

IF YES: Specify: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

D.08 If you would like to comment on the overall performance of your program, please use the following space.

_____
_____
_____
_____

D.09 Any comments on this new reporting questionnaire will be appreciated.

_____
_____
_____
_____

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH.**

==========

*Form: desk 3/4/98* ofda\desk.doc

# USAID/BHR
# Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

## Local NGOs' Institutional Capacity Assessment

Reporting Period FY 97 Ending September 30, 1997

| |
|---|
| **Country:** |
| **Name of Local NGO:** |
| **Name of Partnering International Implementing Partner:** |
| **Name of Capacity Strengthening Areas:** |
| **Description/Components of Capacity Strengthening Activities:** |
| **Purpose/Objective of Activities:** |
| **Describe progress being made to meet objective:** |

## INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY EVALUATION

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1. | To what degree did the local NGO dependent on its international partner for program resources and technical expertise? | Not at all (2) | Partially (1) | Fully (0) |
| | | | | |
| A2. | To what extent did the local NGO dependent on its international partner to implement disaster preparedness, mitigation and prevention (DPMP) activities? | | | |
| A3. | To what degree did the local NGO participate in the design, implementation and management of DPMP activities? | Fully (2) | Partially (1) | Not at all (0) |
| | | | | |
| B1. | To what extent was the staff of the local NGO trained in risk mapping and vulnerability assessment? | | | |
| B2. | To what extent was the staff of the local NGO trained in designing, implementing and managing DPMP activities? | | | |
| B3. | To what extent did the local NGO conduct DPMP mock exercises with targeted communities? | | | |
| C1. | To what extent was the local NGO able to mobilize local communities and resources to implement DPMP activities? | Fully (2) | Partially (1) | Not at all (0) |
| | | | | |
| C2. | To what extent were local resources, including resources allocated by the host government, sufficient to fund DPMP activities managed by the local NGO? | | | |
| C3. | To what extent has the local NGO attained national reputation & stature in designing, implementing and managing DPMP activities? | | | |

# USAID/BHR
# Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

## Implementing Partners' Institutional Capacity Assessment

Reporting Period FY 97 Ending September 30, 1997

| |
|---|
| **Country:** |
| **Implementing Partner:** |
| **Name of PMP Activity:** |
| **Description/Components of PMP Activity:** |
| **Purpose/Objective of PMP Activity:** |
| **Describe progress being made to meet Objective:** |

## INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY EVALUATION

| | | Fully (2) | Partially (1) | Not at all (0) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1. | To what degree was the Implementing Partner locally represented? | | | |
| A2. | To what extent was the Implementing Partner able to transfer PMP knowledge and technology to local partners and counterparts? | | | |
| B1. | To what extent was the staff of the Implementing Partner trained in designing, implementing and managing DPMP activities? | | | |
| B2. | To what extent were DPMP activities designed and implemented by the Implementing Partner technically sound and effective? | | | |
| B3. | How appropriate was the experience of the Implementing Partner in designing, implementing and managing effective and efficient DPMP activities? | | | |
| C1. | To what extent were the funding levels of DPMP activities implemented by the Implementing Partner sufficient to meet the objectives of the program? | | | |
| C2. | To what extent was the Implementing Partner able to implement DPMP activities using funds other than OFDA sources? | | | |
| D1. | To what extent did the Implementing Partner train host-country counterparts? | | | |
| D2. | How effective was the training of host-country counterparts in the implementation of DPMP activities? | | | |
| D3. | What was the degree of acceptance of the Implementing Partner's activities by the host country? | | | |

# USAID/BHR
# Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

## Quality of Disaster Response Strategic Plans

Reporting Period FY 97 Ending September 30, 1997

| |
|---|
| **Country:** |
| **Name of PMP Program Strategic Plan:** |
| **Description/Components of PMP Program Strategic Plan:** |
| **Purpose/Objectives of PMP Program Strategic Plan:** |
| **How is progress toward meeting Objectives tracked?** |

| | | Yes (1) | No (0) | Insufficient Information (0) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1. | Does the strategic plan identify the crisis and the affected population? | | | |
| A2. | Does the strategic plan break down the affected population into distinctive vulnerability categories (i.e., age, gender, women of reproductive age 15-49 years old, ethnic, religious and political groups, etc)? | | | |
| A3. | Does the strategic plan assess and identify the emergency needs of the affected population? | | | |
| A4. | Does the strategic plan assess and identify the capacities and coping mechanisms of the affected population? | | | |
| A5. | Do rehabilitation components identified in the strategic plan build on the capacity and coping mechanisms of the affected population? | | | |
| A6. | Does the strategic plan identify commodity rations and service standards by vulnerability groupings? | | | |
| A7. | Does the strategic plan outline a program for reassessing the numbers and emergency needs of the affected population after program implementation? | | | |
| A8. | Was the implementation of the strategic plan timely in meeting the needs of the affected population? | | | |

# ANNEX 5

## FY 1997 OFDA SUCCESS STORIES

**1) Biaro**
**Source:** SCF/UK Goma proposal # DRC-0308

Biaro in northeastern Zaire was a site where about 40,000 Rwandan refugees had camped. As other Rwandan refugee camps were attacked by Zairian soldiers in the area of Kisingani, the Biaro site had also served as a transit center for more refugees either to flee deeper into the Zairian forests or to catch a UNHCR repatriation truck and later to board a train when Kabila gave a 60 day ultimatum for refugees to return back to Rwanda.

"Biaro is hell" said Aune O'Mahony, a veteran of many of Concern's Emergency responses, including Ethiopia and Somalia. "In all my years working overseas I have never seen anything like it. Two weeks ago the camp had an estimated population of 40,000 people. Yesterday it was estimated at just under 10,000. As we drove through the camp, white body bags were laid out on both sides of the dirt road waiting to be collected. People were stepping over them as if they were there every day. Biaro smelled of death and decay. The people who are in the camp live in fear that gunmen will appear from the jungle, as they did a few weeks ago in Kaseze, and kill them."

Every evening for a few weeks, two to three thousand refugees arrived in Bario only to leave the next morning. Concern had set up a transit center in Bario to help weak and sick unaccompanied children get medical help before being put on trucks for transfer to Kisangani. As trucks would pull out of the camp, mothers would throw their children on the trucks, claiming that they were orphans.

In the first four weeks, under an OFDA grant, Concern was able to transit 4,000 unaccompanied children through its Kisangani center. Many of these children had survived months in the forest without their parents or other guardians.

Concern staff recorded the stories of many children, including a 14 year old boy who had been carried out of the forest on the back of a local villager from Biaro. Severely malnourished and covered with scabies, he gulped down the porridge and water that had been prepared for him at the collection point and slowly began to tell his story.

The boy had been orphaned for nearly three years. He came from Kibuye Prefecture in Rwanda where his mother was killed in 1994 during the genocide. Escaping with his father, he made he is way to one of the refugee camps in Bukavu. Shortly after he arrived in Zaire, his father died. Was he killed? The boy didn't know, but from then on he had to fend for himself. When the camp he lived in was attacked in October of 1996 he was forced, along with thousands of others, to flee, heading deeper and deeper into the jungles of Zaire.

Finding something to eat in the jungle was his greatest challenge. Since the refugee camps were attacked again in April the boy had no choice but to stay in the jungle. He survived by scavenging in the forest, and survived on roots, grass and insects. With no means to make fire

he was forced to eat everything raw, including snails, maggots and any other bug he could find. As the boy was telling his story, he rolled over onto his side and held his stomach; he was exhausted from the effort.

Many people died in the forest around Kisangani, Zaire but many lives were also saved. More than 5,000 unaccompanied children like the 14 year old boy were rescued by Concern's program, and some were reunited with their relatives in Rwanda. The ones who had lost their parents and had no relatives were delivered to orphanages.

**2) James Duku**
**Source:** The American Refugee Committee for Sudan grant #0281.

James Duku is a man who sees "the big picture". As a commissioner for Kajo Keji county, he is responsible for the welfare of nearly 115,000 men, women and children. Of these, 40,000 are internally displaced people residing in three camps along the Uganda border. He recognizes the strain their presence places on the surrounding environment. People needed wood for building houses and cooking meals, so what was once a heavily forested area was beginning to look like a savannah. Something had to be done to halt the devastation.

James Duku had heard about an improved cooking stove which was accepted and standardized by all international humanitarian agencies operating in the area as a proven efficient technology at the refugee camps of Goma, Zaire. At his request, and with funds from OFDA, ARC brought the improved cooking stove technology to Kajo Keji county. Materials used to make the stoves were readily available and free - clay, sand and a little water. These materials needed only to be transported to each camp. Cooking on the traditional three stone cooking fire was difficult under the best of circumstances, and one needed to travel two to three hours every day to collect enough firewood for one day. Using the new standardized cooking stove, the heat produced with a small amount of firewood would cook a day's meal.

Starting with a small group of women in Kerwa camp for the displaced, Theodore Tehenah, the trainer, was able to sell the new cooking stove almost immediately. He continued to work with this core group of women to promote the new stove in the internally displaced camps. By the end of first month, nearly 600 women had learned how to build and maintain improved clay cooking stoves. By the end of December 1997, there were 23,412 new cooking stoves in use in 9,300 homes. The firewood consumption in homes at the camp where the new stove was used had decreased by two thirds. In addition, the health facilities reported a decreased incidence in cooking fire related injuries and illness, particularly burns, eye irritation and respiratory problems.

**3) Mamie**
**Source:** World Vision Sierra Leone grant # 0108 attached to quarterly and Final Report Ending November 22,1997.

In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) initiated war in the eastern provinces of Sierra Leone. The conflict devastated settlements in the area and caused mass population displacement resulting in the creation of 1.2 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and over 370,000 refugees who fled to neighboring Liberia and Guinea.

Mamie, a mother of two who lived in a village called Tihun recalled some of the horrors. "The rebels had come to Tihun several times in the past" said Mamie, " but when they came in February 1995 it was different. It was a shock . That day was a day of total destruction." The day opened with RUF rebels, dressed as soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army, entering the village and announcing that the rebels were coming. Tihun village is the birth place of Maada Bio who at that time was second to the president in the military Government of Sierra Leone. The disguised rebels said they had a plan to evacuate all those related to Bio as they feared the rebels would target them. As Chief Lebbie, Chief of the area, describes, " The rebels told all those in Bios's family to collect in the court barrie ( a traditional building with open sides in the village square). They said they would be taken from there to safety. Many people went, including people not related to Bio, because they also wanted to be rescued. When the barrie was full, with many, many people, the rebels surrounded the place and opened fire with their AKs (automatic rifles). They continued shooting and shooting, and killed every person in the barrie".

Mamie was hiding under her bed with two of her sons, five year old Maada and her infant son Matthew when the rebels were shooting people in the barrie. "Then the rebels came and got us. They put us all outside right there in front of the houses. They would call to someone, 'come here! Get up!' and then they would shoot". Mamie was spared death, but they beat up her baby Matthew. "He was in my arms and they started to beat him. Their beatings forced him out of my arms and they kicked him". The rebels then took Mamie's clothes and told her and other villagers to run. "They told us to go anywhere we want. So we went to the bush. We were naked. We had nothing. They took it all from us".

In 1997 after security in the area had improved, some of the IDPs were encouraged by humanitarian agencies to return to their villages. Villagers from Tihun returned to a town in ruins. The court barrie still stood, but its roof was destroyed and the building was a rectangle of cement columns. The floor was littered with human bones. Bleached white by the sun and swept into piles over two feet high, skulls and ribs lay as horrifying testimony to the "civil war".

"The bones are still here," said Chief Lebbei, "because we do not know what to do with them. We have no way of identifying any of the remains and it hurts us very much." The people who had returned to Tihun were trying to rebuild their homes and restore their livelihoods. They were surviving on a diet composed almost exclusively of wild yam or cassava. However, the wild food sources would not last beyond the current season and the returnees didn't have seed stock to plant for the next growing season.

Despite a very uncertain security situation, OFDA through implementing partner World Vision Sierra Leone (WVSR) promoted farming efforts through provision of seeds and

agricultural tools. FY 1997 saw concerted efforts of organizations like WVSL to resettle IDPs in to their homes by providing necessary farm inputs and support to enable farm families to rebuild their shattered livelihoods. Support was provided for 14,973 farm families (89,838 beneficiaries calculated at an average family size of six) by distributing 25 kgs of improved rice variety seeds, one machete, one hoe and 5 kgs packet of groundnut seed to each family in all affected areas. In addition, 12,280 families were given cassava and potato planting materials. In addition to OFDA agricultural inputs, 4,944 beneficiary farmers (supported by other donors) received assorted garden vegetable planting materials like okra, pepper, brinja, tomato, eggplant and cucumber seeds in 10 g packets. A total of 18,323.4 additional acres were cultivated as a direct result of the FY 1997 OFDA funded seeds and tools support for IDPs in Sierra Leone.

Almost two years after they were forced to flee to the bush, the people of Tihan have returned to what remains of their village and their homes. They are slowly rebuilding their community. As for Mamie, she is also back to Tihan with her two sons, living among the unburied bones. She says with rice planted in the fields through seeds provided by WVSL and with her vegetable garden thriving, she might be able to survive independently next year.

**4) Southern Sudan Health Care/Water and Sanitation Program**
**Source:** Final Report of IRC Sudan

As the conflict enters its fourteenth year, fighting between the government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) as well as factional fighting among splinter groups in southern Sudan continues unabated, displacing thousands of civilians and often defying efforts to provide assistance to affected people. Population displacement, general deterioration of basic infrastructure, grim prospects for the renewal of local economies and outbreaks of killer diseases continue to characterize the chronic complex emergency situation in the region. Despite concerted efforts by the international community to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations through the delivery of emergency relief supplies, over four million war affected southern Sudanese remain vulnerable to diseases and death.

Despite the complexity and scope of the situation there, OFDA continues to work with its implementing NGO partners in southern Sudan. One very successful program implemented in 1997 was the health care and water/sanitation project maintained by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The objective of this project was to build Sudanese capacity in providing community-based primary and secondary health care services by training local community health workers throughout the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions. In addition, the program supported training of local water and sanitation technicians to address the problem of waterborne diseases. A total of 43 Sudanese are serving their respective communities now, after having been trained. At the end of the project, primary and secondary health care services were available for 200,000 people. A total of 49,000 war affected people benefitted from the potable water and sanitation activities. The locally trained mobile medical team provides primary health care for an additional 144,080 war affected people in areas where security risks are especially high.

**5) South Pacific Nations' Preparedness Efforts**
**Source:** Joanne Burke (OFDA)

Pacific Island countries clearly recognize that natural disasters pose a major threat to sustainable development. Cyclones, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis, prolonged droughts and landslides have resulted in deaths, injuries and suffering in the majority of South West Pacific countries. Cyclones Ofa and Val in Samoa, Cyclone Kina in Fiji, and the volcanic eruption of Rabaul in 1994 produced record losses and resulted in major short and long-term setbacks in social and economic development.

Limited economic diversification, small land masses dispersed over the world's largest ocean, population growth and development, and global climate change make Pacific Island nations particularly vulnerable to disaster devastation and losses.

Since 1994, OFDA has supported a regional Disaster Management Training Program (DMTP), which has been implemented in collaboration with UNOCHOA's South Pacific Disaster Reduction Programme. The Training Program, modeled along OFDA's successful methodology and Program in LAC, is designed to:

1. Improve the disaster management capacity and performance of Pacific Island countries.
2. Expand the base of support for disaster management within Pacific Island Countries.
3. Help countries organize, conduct and maintain their own training for disaster management.
4. Develop and adapt training materials that are relevant to the South Pacific.

Components of the Program include: standardized curriculum development, course development and adaptation, regional level training courses, support for in-country training and promotion of regionalization for disaster management. Thirteen countries -- Fiji, Tonga, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Niue, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu -- have participated in the Program.

The Program has successfully tested and adapted existing OFDA courses to the South Pacific, including the OFDA Training for Instructors (TFI) Course and Shelter Management. In turn, The Introduction to Disaster Management Course, (IDM), which was developed specifically for the South Pacific has been transferred to LAC and is now translated into Spanish and French. As a result of this training, the Pacific Islands are now adopting a wide range of approaches to enhance their preparedness through in-country training.

Fiji, Cooks Islands and Tuvalu have organized country training groups that have adapted OFDA courses and conducted national level activities. Training groups are comprised of government and non-government agencies and include key groups responsible for preparedness and response activities, i.e. national disaster offices, police, defense, health, education, agriculture, local government, public works, Red Cross and other NGOs.

IDM Courses have led to the formation of village disaster committees and disaster preparedness plans for several of the Cooks Islands. Instructors trained in a locally organized

TFI Course in Tuvalu have translated the IDM, and are conducting courses in the outer islands to develop local level preparedness plans and to mobilize community level support and involvement. Kiribati has used the IDM course to structure the process for forming a committee to develop its national disaster management plan.

Under the direction of the national disaster office, a small working group in Vanuatu is taking steps to adapt, translate and integrate the IDM Course into standard training programs of the Government Training Center and the Police Training College. In a similar effort, Fiji seeks to make the IDM course a regular offering of the Fiji National Training Council (FNTC). Efforts in these areas will result in regular offerings of disaster management training to a very wide audience. Fiji and Cook Islands are undertaking pilot activities in their main islands to improve community level evacuation planning and to upgrade local evacuation centers using OFDA's Shelter Management Course as the training tool. Samoa is considering a similar program.

Of particular note is the diversity of approaches that countries have undertaken to apply training received from OFDA to address their specific priorities in disaster management. Additionally, the Program has demonstrated to countries ways that they can successfully capitalize on internal resources and increase their self-reliance for disaster preparedness. This is especially important in the Southwest Pacific, given the scattered island configuration of many of the countries.

For national level courses, OFDA provides limited funding and technical assistance. Instructor exchange has proven to be an especially valuable tool for increasing regional and sub-regional linkages. The bulk of resources for the training including instructors, facilities, equipment and materials, and support is provided by the countries. Policy level support has also been a contributing factor to the success of the program at the country level.

Since 1995, the Training Program has trained up to 150 individuals in six regional level courses, and has developed a core group of instructors who have trained more than 200 persons in national level courses. Trends in the direction of local training leading to enhanced preparedness are expected to continue beyond 1998, when OFDA's direct support for and management of the program is phased over to Emergency Management Australia (EMA). It is expected that EMA will continue to support these important efforts.

**6) Drought in Kenya**
**Source:** Greg Gottlieb USAID Nairobi

The prolonged 1996-97 drought in northern Kenya had affected the pastoralist tribe of Gabbra. Traditional boreholes which serve as a last resort for water sources for human and animal consumption were on the verge of collapse due to overuse. Herdsmen prefer to stay near pasture and use local water sources. As a result, it was estimated that hundreds of people and thousands of cattle died due to water shortages. As the pastoralist means of livelihood depends on the survival of the herd, the existence of the herd through the drought period was essential for the survival of the population.

OFDA intervened in two ways. First, through implementing partner WaterAid (a small British NGO operating in the area) resources were made available to repair and maintain 6 important boreholes in the drought affected area. Second, cattle that survived the drought remained weak and sick due to insufficient pasture. It was understood that if the rains came back, the weak animals would die from pneumonia, so drugs were purchased and supplied to the community through another implementing partner (ITDG). Prior to the rains, the animals were healthier due to the drug interventions, and when the rains finally came in April of 1997 not nearly as many animals died in the areas that received drugs compared to the areas that did not receive them.

**7) Tambura County**
**Source:** Care South Sudan, Grant AOT-1066-G-00-5067-00.

CARE was awarded this USAID grant in 1994 to support economic recovery in Tambura County, which had been adversely affected by the ongoing civil war in Sudan. This report is for the time period of July 1, 1996 through December 31, 1996 and provides information on project progress and budget expenditures.

During this reporting period, the population of Tambura County had increased food and seed production to a level which indicated that household food security had been achieved and economic self-sufficiency was within reach. These accomplishments were achieved despite a surprise bombing by the Government of Sudan in Tambura on September 26th which resulted in most of the local population fleeing into the bush. Although the bombing raid did not claim any direct casualties, the fear inflicted by the event remains an open wound on the local population. For several weeks following the bombing, a majority of local residents did not venture into town and even today the social disruption caused by the bombing has not rescinded. The main market has been relocated to an area under the cover of dense mango trees and the civil authorities have relocated their offices to the local hospital.

The surprise attack significantly delayed the start of the 1996-97 CARE barter season as it came in the middle of the harvest period, and additionally coincided with negotiations between CARE and the Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (JRRC0 on barter and surplus grain prices. However, despite this late start, the 1996-97 barter season has surpassed previous production marks in every category. The third phase goal of moving from subsistence food production to surplus seed production has been accomplished with dramatic success as illustrated below:

| Crop | 12/95 Intake (MT) | 12/96 Intake (MT) | Increase (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Groundnuts | 76.28 | 85.66 | 12% |
| Maize Seed | 4.20 | 76.20 | 1,700% |
| Maize Food | 16.11 | 27.35 | 70% |
| Sorghum Seed | 1.50 | 36.35 | 2,323% |
| Sorghum Food | 0.20 | 4.65 | 2,225% |

It should be noted that over eighty percent of the crop intake for the 1996-97 barter seasons has been through privately owned farming cooperatives.

**8) Assisting Victims of War**
**Source:** CRS/Congo

Catholic Relief Services, an American aid agency operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, recently brought to a successful close a USAID-supported project to assist war victims in the eastern part of the country. Working in collaboration with a local counterpart agency, SEIPI, CRS met or surpassed all proposed project objectives.

Included among the over 6,500 beneficiaries of this project was single mother, Jenerose Zawabi, and her three young children. Zawabi and her children are finally home after nearly a year of living with host families or in transit centers in eastern Congo's North Kivu province. We often hear the harrowing tales of people who flee war-torn countries and become "refugees'' in foreign lands, but the stories of families like Zawabi's who are internally displaced often go unheard.

With funding from USAID/OFDA and food provided by the United Nation's World Food Programme, Catholic Relief Services and local partner, SEIPI, carried out a five-month program to assist families like Jenerose Zawabi's to return home and begin rebuilding their lives.

In the former Zaire which has roughly the same surface area as western Europe, distances traveled by some displaced families and individuals are staggering. Some people who were assisted by CRS during the course of this project had traveled by foot and river boat thousands of miles, across the entire country from the Rwandan border to the city of Kinshasa. Zawabi and her children's flight took them from her home of Bukavu in South Kivu province nearly 500 km north.

CRS's program aimed to reinforce a network of five SEIPI registration and transit centers throughout the North Kivu province to register and provide basic assistance to displaced people in their place of refuge and then to assist registered displaced in resettlement through the provision of transport to their home areas and distribution of a 'return kit' of food and non-food household items upon their return. While the project targeted those displaced in North Kivu, families ultimately assisted came from all over the country.

Massive internal displacements of people are nothing new to the eastern Kivu region of the newly-named Democratic Republic of Congo. For several years the Kivus have been afflicted with chronic internal displacement due to inter-ethnic conflict and low-grade fighting between national and foreign militia. During 1996 two major events conspired to uproot people from their homes.

Zawabi fled her home in September, 1996 as President Kabila's AFDL rebel uprising engulfed the east of the country. She joined tens of thousands of Zairians in South and North Kivu provinces who were displaced from their homes.

Several months earlier in North Kivu province, the infamous Operation Mbata (meaning 'to strike' in Swahili) pitted the military of former president Mobutu Sese Seko against Mai Mai rebels who had seized control of many key villages there. Thousands of North Kivu residents fled their homes, losing houses, property, and loved ones as the Zairian military exacted revenge on villages 'sympathizing' with the Mai Mai occupiers, burning and looting thousands of homes.

Twenty-year old Muhindo Mbukeri and his three younger sisters were among those who took flight north to escape the violence of Operation Mbata. Their parents were not so lucky, and now young Muhindo looks after himself and his three orphan sisters. Just as they might have been ready to return south to their home area of Nyanzale, the AFDL civil war swept through North Kivu, displacing many more families and discouraging those already displaced like Muhindo and his siblings from returning home.

By early 1997, a degree of calm had returned to the Kivus and many displaced families were ready to return home. Some were able to secure the means to make the journey home themselves. Others, like Zabawi and Muhindo were unable to do so without some extra assistance.

At this time, SEIPI, a local aid group operating out of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, began to set up make-shift registration and transit centers in North Kivu province to assist the remaining displaced families. CRS's Goma office conducted its own assessments of the displaced problem and began working with SEIPI to develop a large-scale project to address the unmet needs of all vulnerable displaced in North Kivu province who had been victims of these recent conflicts.

Initial assessment missions and attempts by SEIPI and CRS to estimate the number of remaining displaced in the region put the figure between 3,000-4,000. Once registration began, the estimates rose. By increasing delivery capacity of assistance to these families and reducing costs, SEIPI and CRS were ultimately able to assist over 5,400 registered displaced with a complete package of assistance including registration, transit center services, transport home, provision of resettlement kits of food, agricultural tools, cooking equipment, blankets, and other basic household items.

Many more displaced were assisted with partial services at the centers, having been assisted with transport by other aid agencies or by the new Congolese government. By the end of the project however, CRS/SEIPI had assisted over 6,500 displaced. Families such as Zabawi's and Muhindo's are now able to begin the work of rebuilding their lives.

In addition to fulfilling and surpassing the stated objectives of the project, the CRS program also succeeded in strengthening SEIPI's logistical and management capacities in ways that have endured beyond the scope of this project. Building on the experience of this project, SEIPI is continuing to assist newly identified IDP groups in eastern Congo.

**9) IITA Disaster Response Unit**
**Source:** Beth Stanford, OFDA

With funding of $86,000 from OFDA, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) formed a Disaster Response Unit to expand its capacity to provide emergency planting materials of cassava and yam. The expansion included establishing a tissue culture and screen house nursery facility and hiring three additional staff to generate vegetative planting materials of cassava and yam, with the high standard of phyto-sanitation required for export. Existing facilities provide materials on a regular basis to existing national programs in Africa, but are inadequate to meet new or emergency demands. The new facility enhances IITA's capacity to prepare and maintain planting materials for rapid deployment to countries that have emergency needs.

Cassava and yam are drought tolerant crops that bring African households a lot of flexibility in the annual cycle of food availability. Especially during the weeks preceding the wet season, cassava with its long in-ground storability and yam tubers, with their long shelf life, help ensure food availability in homes and markets. In addition, the processing of cassava and yam provides income, especially for women who are the primary processors and marketers. Increasing the availability of cassava and yam to farmers helps mitigate food shortages. A number of countries that are facing food security challenges have requested planting materials, including Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Tanzania.

As a priority during 1997, IITA's Disaster Response Unit made arrangements for the delivery of large quantities of cassava and yam planting materials to Liberia and Sierra Leone, to support rehabilitation and recovery. IITA has maintained contact with national agricultural research programs in both countries during recent periods of civil strife. Work in Liberia involves intensive training for Liberian technicians from both the Ministry of Agriculture and World Vision International, an NGO assisting with implementation. By supporting the provision of planting materials and training, OFDA is enhancing the capacity of IITA to help the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture and an international NGO to reduce the impact of disaster.

**10) IITA Strategic Action Plan**
**Source:** Beth Stanford, OFDA

Through OFDA funding, the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) expedited the development of a Strategic Action Plan for Root and Tuber Crops in eastern and southern Africa. The plan proposes interventions to mitigate the adverse effects of the El Niño Southern Oscillation on vulnerable areas and to increase the relative importance of root and tuber crops in farming and food systems. Target crops are cassava, sweet potato and yam.

Farmers are increasingly interested in cassava and sweetpotato because they grow even in marginal conditions. Yams are also hardy and are well adapted to areas where moderate to high rainfall makes the production of grain crops problematic. Although Africa accounts for over 90 percent of the world's production of yams, yams have received very little agricultural research attention.

In developing the Strategic Action Plan, IITA collaborated with key organizations involved in research, training and international cooperation for root and tuber crops. The plan uses available technologies and the expertise located in national agricultural research systems, regional networks and international institutions. It proposes to deploy improved varieties of germplasm, use rapid methods of multiplication for vegetative propagation to deliver healthy planting materials, and disseminate appropriate post-harvest technologies. Included are a range of activities that provide options and flexibility to facilitate decision making at the local planning level.

The plan draws on the experience of Malawi where the droughts of the early 1990s caused extensive losses of the maize crop. A joint OFDA - USAID/Malawi project focused on accelerating production of planting materials for root crops led farmers to make major adjustments in their cropping systems. Now, maize intercropped with cassava is more common than previously, and consumers have modified their food preferences. About 20 percent of cassava and sweetpotato production is marketed, providing cash for other household needs.

The plan provides a framework for similar changes throughout eastern and southern Africa. It clarifies the partnership of national agricultural research and extension systems, NGOs, PVOs, and international agricultural research centers in expanding the availability of root and tuber planting materials. The partnership strengthens the ability of individual countries to reduce their vulnerability to natural disasters in the short term and to promote the diversification of farming and food systems in the long term.

**(Integration of The last two stories)**

In Africa, OFDA works closely with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to mitigate potential disasters. During FY 1997, IITA expedited development of a Strategic Action Plan for Root and Tuber Crops in Eastern and Southern Africa. The plan proposes interventions to mitigate the adverse effects of the El Niño Southern Oscillation on vulnerable areas and to increase the relative importance of root and tuber crops in farming and food systems. Target crops are cassava, sweet potato and yam, which grow even in marginal conditions. The plan was developed in collaboration with key organizations involved in research, training and international cooperation for root and tuber crops. Thus, it uses available technologies and expertise for rapid deployment and multiplication of improved germplasm, while including options and flexibility to facilitate local decision making.

Based on lessons learned during the droughts of the early 1990s in Malawi, the plan focuses on accelerating production of root crop planting materials and encouraging farmers to adjust

their cropping systems by intercropping maize with root crops. In Malawi, intercropping maize with cassava is now more common, and consumers have modified their food preferences. About 20 percent of cassava and sweet potato production is marketed, providing cash for other household needs.

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Under the OFDA-funded project “Community-based Promotion of Food Security Crops in Selected African Countries”, IITA has moved beyond planning to action. OFDA's assistance has encouraged IITA to use existing developmental relationships with research and extension networks and non-governmental organizations to expedite delivery of cassava and yam planting materials to farmers in times of crisis. Thus, assistance in times of emergency becomes not a one-shot provision of assistance, but part of a long-term development and mitigation program.

For example, during 1997, OFDA funds helped IITA expedite the provision of recommended varieties of yams to Uganda. Government officials in Uganda, including the vice-president and the minister for agriculture, encouraged Ugandan farmers to invigorate yam production because bananas and cassava, two major sources of food and income, are seriously threatened by disease. IITA provided more than 3,000 plantlets of white yam genotypes to the main research station in Uganda where they are being used to produce minitubers for distribution to farmers. In addition, 143 farmers (104 women and 39 men) and extension officers in three areas received training in the rapid multiplication of yam planting materials. These efforts encourage the integration of yam production into sustainable farming systems, thus mitigating potential food shortages.

**11) IITA Community-Based Promotion**
**Source:** Beth Stanford, OFDA

OFDA helps organizations involved in development to link that work with relief. For example, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) has a development mandate, but that mandate is being enhanced by IITA’s involvement in disaster assistance under the OFDA-funded project ’Community-based Promotion of Food Security Crops’ in Selected African Countries.

IITA has worked with cassava and yam for over 30 years and has developed elite broad-based materials with many of the required resistances and other characteristics that farmers, processors and consumers prefer. In these efforts, IITA works closely with national agricultural research and extension systems and gives focused attention to end-user

requirements. OFDA's assistance has encouraged IITA to use its existing relationships with research networks and non-governmental organizations to expedite delivery of planting materials to farmers. Thus, assistance in times of emergency is not a one-shot provision of assistance, but part of a long-term development program.

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**12) Angola Health**
**Source:** Kimberly Smith, USAID Angola
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In 1997 the overall health status of Angolans remained poor. According to UNICEF, Angola's average infant and maternal mortality rates of 195/1,000 and 1,500/100,000 respectively rank among the highest in the world. The Ministry of Health continues to experience severe service delivery problems, due to low salaries, late or non-payment of salaries, lack of essential drugs, low operating budgets and a dearth of trained personnel. Although some increase in government spending on health is anticipated, the increase is not expected to be dramatic, nor is it expected to have much short term impact. Despite this environment, USAID/BHR/OFDA-supported health interventions saved numerous lives through the careful and sustained treatment of more than 17,820 malnourished children, by vaccinating 724,858 children and women of childbearing age against tetanus and the major preventable childhood diseases, and by providing preventative and curative health care services to an estimated 160,000 people in remote areas which lack government support.

**13) Angola TBA Training**
**Source:** Kimberly Smith, USAID Angola

During the height of the war in 1993 1994, nearly 1,000 people were dying each day from malnutrition and other causes related to the war. Populations were cut off from any means of providing for themselves, and relief organizations, the majority of which we funded by USAID, responded by delivering food aid and establishing emergency feeding programs for malnourished children and other vulnerable groups. Over the past few years, however, such emergency needs have diminished and the number of malnourished children who require therapeutic and supplemental feeding decreased in 1997 so that two of the nine USAID/BHR/OFDA-supported therapeutic and supplemental feeding centers were either

closed or absorbed by provincial hospital pediatric wards. Notwithstanding progress in many parts of the country, there continued to be a need for emergency feeding centers to address cases of severe and moderate malnutrition of children, mostly due to medical complications and poor feeding practices. In addition, in some areas the nutritional status of the local population decreased due to the arrival of new internally displaced persons [IDPs], many who fled their agricultural fields when their villages were attacked and arrived in areas where food stocks were not sufficient to support them. Over the coming year, it is expected that remaining pockets of malnutrition will decrease, unless a rise in insecurity causes the displacement of additional people and the agricultural season is not as productive as anticipated. In general, as USAID/BHR/OFDA continues to support the training of Ministry of Health staff to increase their capacity to train others in nutrition, and immunization coverage improves as a result of programs funded by USAID/BHR/OFDA and other donors, the prevalence of malnutrition exacerbated by vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles should decrease.

**14) Increased Access to Primary Health Care**
**Source:** Kimberly Smith, UDAID Angola

Social services in Angola have taken a long time to recover from over 30 years of war and neglect by the government. Even the most basic health services are absent in most areas of the country, which takes a heavy toll on women and children, many of whom die from vaccine-preventable diseases and complications in childbirth. USAID/BHR/OFDA supported mother-child-health programs have resulted in a decrease in infant and maternal mortality rates to 42/1,000 and 262/100,000 respectively where they serve, compared to the national averages of 195/1, 000 and 1,500/100,000. More than 325 traditional birth attendants [TBAs] were trained in 1997 who subsequently assisted 11,531 deliveries. Close to 12,640 women received prenatal consultations either by trained TBAs or at USAID/BHR/OFDA-supported health posts. More than 48,550 women received training through 159 seminars conducted by NGOs on health and nutrition. USAID/BHR/OFDA also funded the provision of basic curative and preventative services at nine health posts, providing consultations to an estimated 160, 000 people. In order to increase immunization coverage against tetanus and the major preventable childhood diseases, USAID/BHR/OFDA supported the vaccination of 724,858 children and women of childbearing age. In addition, 195 cold chain technicians, vaccinators or community activists were trained and eight new fixed vaccination posts were established. USAID/BHR/OFDA also provided funding to UNICEF for vaccines and vaccination materials for the work of NGOs in extended programs of immunization [EPI]. It is impossible to determine how many lives were saved and how much human suffering was relieved as a result of these emergency interventions. However, many more women and children continue to be at risk and in need of support. USAID/BHR/OFDA plans to continue to support programs to target the needs of women and children in FY 98, and will continue to press the GRA to channel more appropriate levels of resources into the social services.

**15) Bosnia Water**
**Source:** Newspaper story from the Sarajevo Canton March 18, 1998, pg. 13. Sent in with questionnaire BOS 0377 from UMCOR.

## They Will Finally Have Water!

The citizens are digging the trench. They have never had “town”water.

The action of supplying water for Velesici started on March 7, 1998 with professional help of municipality Novo Sarajevo, the mayor and secretary for regional planning. Financial resource of 26.000 DEM for realization of the Project was provided by the municipality, 250.000 DEM for material was provide by the UMCOR and 280.000 DEM was provide by the Canton Government for work performers, companies “Thermoteling” and “Vodovod”. The digging of the trench, for placing the water pipes, was helped by citizens, which participation was valued on 190.000 DEM.

“We do not have water. We are completely cut, although we are close to the town center. We have never had town water and this project is a big pleasure for us, said Nusret Sadrovic, the citizen, who we found on the field during the excavation work. The same opinion is shared by Ibrahim Emrovic, who did not stop to work during the conversation with us: “Our pleasure is big and it is going to be a lot easier with water in the house.”

Total Project cost is 750.000,00 DEM and total length of the new water pipe line is 2500 m. Completion of the project is expected in May if there are no unforeseen problems.

“So far the work is going very well. The citizens were ready to help and they manage to dig 350 m. of trench for 2 days. Yesterday we started to install the pipes -- said Dzemo Eminovic, president of the initiative council for building of water supply system.

**16) Water in SWIMA, DROC**
**Source:** ACF/US Questionnaire #DRC 0301.

Swima, a village located 45 minutes south of Uvira, had its water distribution system destroyed during the war. A spring was identified 2 miles from the village. In order to reestablish a functional water system, the spring had to be developed and protected. The water had then to be channeled from the spring to a pressure tank and “reservoir”, and a distribution system had to be built, including 4 km of pipes and tapstands. For such a system to be sustainable, all pipes must be underground, therefore, trenches had to be dug. SNHR, a local implementing partner, formed a water committee of five persons in Swima. Discussions within the village took place to organize the work to be done. The water committee was able to mobilize over 1,000 people to dig the trenches. Before the work began, though, a celebration took place at the site of the spring, to insure good work. All the workers brought food and drink, and the celebration went on for hours. The day after the party, the trenching work began. The work was completed in two weeks, instead of the one and a half months foreseen.

After some more weeks of work (pipe laying, tank and reservoir construction and tapstands installation), 16,000 people had minimum access to safe and clean water. This demonstrates

that the combination of a community's capacity to cooperate, technical assistance and a minimum of supplies can achieve crucial improvements in the standard of living.

**17) Survey Finds Seed Distribution Almost the Only Source of Income**
**Source:** MI/USA, Bosnia Agriculture Intervention

After the project was completed and the crops harvested, MI-USA conducted a field survey using a structured sample of 301 interviews with beneficiary families. To summarize the results, in spite of a late start, 85% felt the distribution was done in time for optimum production, 98% were satisfied with quality of the seeds and 87% were satisfied with the quality of the tools. As one specific example of the reports derived from the project manager's follow up interview in the municipality of Breza, out of a population of 16,000 (10,000 adults) only about 200 were employed (average wage about US$100 per month) and about 3% were pensioners on less than marginal assistance. The balance of the families had no income at all. Ten percent were displaced persons. The only local sources of jobs, a coal mine and clothes factory were destroyed during the war and have not been restored. The municipal executive reported that MI-USA was the only supplier of seeds to the village in Spring 1997. Seed productivity was as expected and there were no complaints about any aspect of the project. We were asked to expand the distribution to a greater number of beneficiaries the following year. MI-USA concluded that this was a very successful project, delivering agricultural inputs to those who were affected by the war and needed help.

**18) Efficient Method of Reuniting Rwandan Children with Their Families**
**Source:** Desk review of RWA0253

Children were grouped in order of commune of origin and taken from the transit centers in these groups with a team of tracers on the day of food distribution in the commune. At the commune office, families were able to see the children and were told by megaphone that separated children waited there. There was a 90-95% success rate through this kind of tracing. If a child was not reunified, he was brought back to the transit center. CONCERN had a rule that no child can go out on immediate tracing visits more than three times. If this process fails a third time, the child automatically becomes a candidate for active case by case tracing.

**19) Club for Teenagers in Tuzla**
**Source:** ACF/F - Thomas Gonnet, Desk Officer, Bosnia

Emir, Elmir, Adnan, Edvin and Mensur, aged between 12 and 15, live in Tuzla, an industrial city in the heart of Bosnia. They all live in the part of the city named Stari Grad. All of them were born in Tuzla with the exception of Edvin, who originally comes from Brcko in the North of Bosnia and had to flee from the fighting. He is now a refugee. His father was killed during the war. The fathers of Elmir and Mensur were also killed.

The five friends attend a club called TELEX every day. This club provides facilities for learning English and computers, playing football, basketball and table tennis, painting and

drawing. Action Contre la Faim helped support this club throughout last year by providing sandwiches on a daily basis for the children. Edvin's father was killed and his mother is unemployed, so his family is in a very difficult situation. A daily meal provided by the club was therefore greatly appreciated.

Action Contre la Faim donated a kiosk with a mini-kitchen to make and sell sandwiches to raise money for the club. The kiosk was painted by a member of the club and the members are all involved in the activity. The money raised is used to finance the activities and continue provision of food for the children.

**20) The Ufamandu Children: The Difficulties of Trying to Rescue Unaccompanied Rwandan Children from Zaire**
**Source:** John L. Beaven, SCF/UK

In the north Kivu Province of eastern Zaire, SCF has taken on the responsibility of identification and repatriation of unaccompanied Rwandan children left behind from the exodus of refugees back to Rwanda in late 1996. In rural areas outside of Goma, the regional capital, a network of SCF employed social workers (agents) based in local parishes, supervise several village-based extension workers (animateurs). These people seek out and locate Rwandan children who were scattered in the forests and often taken into care by Zairean families in local villages, and then arrange their transport onward to Goma for repatriation to Rwanda.

Twizerimana Aloys is an agent from Matanda Parish, 30 km west of Goma and Lake Kivu, and is based in Ngungu village. He works in an insecure region, not yet under firm control of the Alliance forces who are at war with the Zairean Government, and is still threatened by gangs of Interahamwe, the militia responsible for most of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

In mid January, he visited an outlying village called Ufamandu in the far west of the parish. Here he found 21 Rwandan children who had been separated from their families when their refugee camps had been attacked in the region of Walikale. The children had been mixed up with other refugees who fled through the forests and arrived at Ufumandu. There they had been accommodated by local Zaireans and a local Red Cross health worker. Two of these children, 12-yr old girls, were extremely malnourished and weak, another 13-year old boy had a bullet wound in his arm, and they were all too ill to travel. Twizerimana gathered up the 18 others and they walked for half a day back to his village of Ngungu, on the track to Karuba, the beginning of the nearest traversable road to Goma. By the time they arrived in Ngungu, however, most of the children were too tired and weak to continue. He left 15 there, in the care of the local health centre, and continued with two stronger children and one extremely weak child he was afraid would die if left in Ngungu. They walked and carried the sick child for eight hours through forest paths to Kalungu, where they immediately met up with a team of UNHCR workers visiting to register and transport refugees. The UNHCR workers radioed to the SCF office in Goma who sent a vehicle to meet them and bring them back. On arrival in Goma, the children were placed in a transit centre where they were registered, given necessary medical treatment, and accommodated overnight before being

repatriated the next day to Rwanda. They are then taken by SCF or the Red Cross to another transit centre inside Rwanda where they wait while their families are traced.

Twizerimana told SCF about his efforts and the remaining sick children he was forced to leave behind in Ufamandu, and was issued some medicines and dressing to deliver to the Red Cross health worker so the children could be treated. He returned by local truck as far as Karuba, only to receive the news that the village of Ngungu had been attacked by the Interahamwe on a cattle stealing raid and everyone had fled, including the children he had left there. Two of them had arrived in Karuba amongst the villagers fleeing Ngungu, and he immediately brought them to Goma together with another Rwandan child he had identified in Karuba.

After delivering the children to the Transit Centre, he made another attempt to return to Ngungu by truck as far as Karuba and then walking, but on arrival home he found no sign of the remaining children, and it was too dangerous to continue on to Ufamandu. While searching surrounding areas, he heard a story that there were many more children arriving in Lubuu, a village to the north of Ufamandu and about a three hour walk from Ngungu. Twizerimana found many children had indeed arrived in Lubuu, and were mostly in the care of benevolent Zairean families. These families immediately offered the children to be taken for repatriation, but just before he was ready to depart with them, news arrived of the bombing of Bukavu by Zairean government planes. In these remote areas, lack of good information about outside events leads to rumor and exaggeration. In this instance, villagers were under the impression that there were repeated bombing raids on Goma and Bukavu, and fearing for the safety of the children, they refused to release them.

Twizerimana spent a few days in the village talking to the families until he felt it safe to try once again to get to Ufamandu. Arriving there he found that the boy had died of his wounds, but the two girls were a little stronger. With the assistance of an animateur, he returned with them to Lubuu, sometimes carrying the girls through the rougher terrain. In Lubuu, he collected another small child, hired some women to help, and then carried them all the way back to Karuba, through the forest on foot paths. By now, the Alliance had sent out military patrols to hunt down the Interhamwe and along the way they had to dodge several battles. When he arrived in Karuba, he was able to then get a bush taxi to Goma with the three children, who are now receiving medical attention in the transit centre.

Of the original 231 children form Ufamandu, only seven have been successfully rescued so far. Twizerimana will now go back to Ngungu to continue to search for the missing 13 children, who he thinks will still be alive as none of them were among the dead found in the village after the Interahamwe attack. They may well have trekked towards villages in the neighboring parish of Bobandana, where they will perhaps come within reach of SCF workers there.

**21) Creative Use of Established Distribution Project**
**Source:** Doctors of the World, Kosovo

In July, 1997, OFDA elected to continue its support of a food and hygiene parcel program for Tuberculosis (TB) patients in Kosovo, but with a new approach. Instead of a "free" distribution of parcels to TB patients, the receipt of parcels was tied directly to TB therapy compliance. TB patients were assisted by receiving supplemental food and hygiene supplies, while the link to treatment assisted in increasing the cure rate. This project brought in a large number of new patients and kept the majority of current patients on therapy, with an increased compliance rate of nearly 34%. This has been a very successful approach in tracking TB patients and in encouraging them to continue treatment.

Through information gathered on a database developed by Doctors of the World (DOW), DOW was able to design a comprehensive TB control program. DOW has drawn together a coalition of eleven partner organizations to develop and implement a region-wide TB control program for all of Kosovo, tied directly to the Government's National and Regional TB control plan. After completion of this five-year program, the government will be able to monitor and maintain TB control activities for the region in an effective, realistic, and sustainable way. DOW is very pleased that OFDA is a partner in this coalition working toward sustainable control of the worst public health problem in Kosovo.

During the implementation of a spring, 1997 parcel distribution, Serbian police units attacked several villages in the Drenica region of Kosovo, displacing at least 25,000 people who left their homes and villages with nothing more than the clothes they were wearing, grabbing their children and hurrying out of town. The situation with the IDPs could have been much worse if not for OFDA's activities in the region prior to this tragedy.

Due to OFDA support of DOW's parcel distribution program, DOW was able to respond immediately to the situation, releasing nearly 4,500 food and 4,000 hygiene parcels to the affected population. This amounted to nearly 45 metric tons of food within the first month of the disaster. DOW's vehicles were loaded with food parcels and delivered them to the IDPs within the first week of the disturbance. Because of DOW's close working relationship with the Government and Mother Theresa Society, DOW was allowed to reach villages that no other agencies could reach. In one example, DOW's vehicles reached the village of Tushille with 1,500 kilos of food and found, hiding in a school, 60 women and children who had eaten nothing for the previous 10 days but bread. There were many instances like this during the first weeks but fortunately, DOW had a warehouse of food supplied by OFDA. Although not the original intention of the parcels project, the supplies were available for this displaced population.

OFDA and DOW's presence in the region allowed for an almost immediate delivery of the necessary commodities, assisting a population already weak from hunger and increasingly susceptible to disease through lack of adequate nutrition. In this case, OFDA helped avert a potential humanitarian disaster instead of reacting to one. Now, with continued assistance from OFDA, the four NGO's that receive funding from OFDA are working in close cooperation to continue delivering supplies to the displaced people, monitor the ongoing situation, and prepare contingency plans in case it worsens.

Through this one parcel project alone, OFDA and DOW have given nutritional assistance to the economically disadvantaged population of TB patients and their families in Kosovo and have helped avert a potential disaster with 25,000 displaced people from the Drenica region. Through the success of a parcel program directly tied to therapy compliance (for measurable impact) OFDA and DOW have laid the necessary foundation for a long-term and sustainable solution to the region's TB problem.

**22) International Medical Corps Bosnia Immunization Program**
**Source:** IMC, Bosnia

Since 1993, the International Medical Corps (IMC) has provided comprehensive medical training and emergency relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) . IMC's programs have expanded the capacity of the Bosnian medical community and have supplied essential emergency services. Among IMC'S most successful programs has been its expanded program of immunization (EPI), which it operated in areas controlled by both the Federation government and Republica Srpska (RS). In February, 1998, IMC transferred authority for its immunization program, which has been supported by a grant from OFDA ,to the respective Federation and RS health authorities. The transition represented a significant accomplishment. When the immunization program began in 1993, Bosnia was still at war, the health systems on both sides of the front lines were severely compromised, and morbidity and mortality due to immunizable diseases soared. Five years later, warring factions have ceased overt violence and both the federation and RS health systems' ability to vaccinate children has been restored. Most important, morbidity and mortality have been reduced dramatically: an IMC survey in RS at the program's conclusion revealed a 24.1% increase in vaccination coverage. Through IMC's efforts, more than 500,000 doses of vaccine have been administered to children and their mothers. During the course of the program standardized procedures and protocols for the country's immunization program were established; local immunization teams were trained in World Health Organization -recommended methodology; and a computerized surveillance system was initiated to track communicable disease.

At the programs's conclusion, IMC transferred the five EPI Support Centers it established to the respective Ministries of Health, as planned. As IMC withdrew from the immunization activities, it left Bosnia with a sustainable indigenous capacity to maintain immunization coverage rates at levels which exceed those recommended by WHO. IMC's immunization program also:

1) prevented widespread outbreaks of polio. During 1996 and 1997 polio outbreaks which left more than 150 children permanently disabled occurred in southern Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), Albania, and Greece. In contrast, in Bosnia during the same period not one case of polio was reported, a direct result of strict adherence to IMC-supported vaccination policy, comprehensive cold chain supervision, and regularly scheduled National Vaccination Days.

2) prevented widespread outbreaks of measles. Prior to 1996, Bosnian children did not receive proper vaccinations for measles, an immuno-preventable disease than can cause

serious illness and death. As a result of this program, measles vaccination procedures were refined so that by 1997 more than 85% of children in Bosnia had been vaccinated.

3) diminished the likelihood of widespread outbreaks of tuberculosis. Bosnia's tuberculosis prevalence rate is among the highest in Europe. One control measure for the disease is immunization of infants with BCG vaccine, an essential component of IMC's program. The program supported the administration of BCG and included campaign planning and execution, skills upgrades in vaccine application, and logistic assistance with vaccine distribution. The program also emphasized community health education in tuberculosis transmission and treatment, all of which reduced morbidity and mortality due to tuberculosis, particularly among infants.

4) Conducted surveys that identified the low quality of the immunization program in place. While statistics produced by Bosnian health authorities often showed high vaccination coverage rates, IMC conducted independent surveys to precisely identify the status of immunizations in the country. The surveys showed that though coverage rates were high, the quality indicators of immunization were quite poor, problems with the country's cold chain were likely, and vaccines given were not effective. In response, IMC conducted continuous skills transfer sessions and numerous field visits, and improved the quality indicators to satisfactory levels. When Bosnian health authorities presented coverage reports at the conclusion of IMC's program, the reports reflected the true immunization status of the population.