STOCKTAKING OF REFORMS

SURVEY ANALYSIS

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Larry S. Beyna, Management Systems International

(for the Stocktaking Team, through USAID/PPC/CDIE/PME's Performance Measurement and Evaluation IQC, Delivery Order 1)

Note: This report could not have been written without the collaboration and painstaking design, administration, and analysis of the entire Stocktaking Study Team, including

Peggy Schultz (PPC/ROR),
Liz Baltimore (PPC/ROR),
Chanya Charles (PPC/CDIE/RRS),
John Haecker (PPC/CDIE/PME), and
Jerry Harrison-Burns (Management Systems International)

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I. INTRODUCTION

> *"USAID is going through cultural upheaval."*
> -- a survey respondent

The survey that is the subject of this report was part of a larger effort to take stock of program operations reengineering in USAID. Agency-wide reengineering officially began in October, 1995, but various reforms had been in place in some parts of the Agency on an experimental basis dating back to 1993. In response partly to Vice President Gore's National Performance Review and partly to a strongly felt need for change from within USAID, reengineering has encompassed a wide array of reforms in how the Agency does business, including the adoption of key Agency core values--i.e., customer focus, managing for results, staff empowerment and accountability, teamwork and participation, and valuing diversity--major changes in its development program operations--i.e., strategic planning, achieving results, and monitoring and evaluating performance--and new operational tools and systems--e.g., performance-based budgeting, management information systems, and reporting through the Results Review and Resource Request system.

> *"We are a long way from being able to judge the relative merits of reengineering, as we have not successfully implemented the principles. It is time to fully implement the principles and utilize the tools at hand to begin achieving RESULTS."*

In November, 1998, the Agency Administrator asked the Assistant Administrators in the Management and Program and Policy Coordination Bureaus to commission a review of USAID's status with respect to program operations reengineering. They were asked to "take stock" of the reforms to date and recommend actions for increasing the match between Agency practice and reengineering principles in the future. To accomplish this objective, the Assistant Administrators established a Stocktaking Team of about fifteen senior and mid-level managers from AID/W and charged it with taking stock, diagnosing problems, and recommending practical measures for improvement.

Assisted by a Stocktaking Study Team of six staff and contractors, the Stocktaking Team first established a conceptual framework of reengineering, loosely called a reengineering "results framework," and a set of performance indicators for assessing the status of reengineering reforms at this time and measuring progress over time in the future. The team's results framework is presented on the next page, and the performance indicators are presented in several tables in Section IV of this report. Using the results framework as a guide, the team then mounted a three-pronged effort to take stock of reengineering: (1) an extensive review of documents on the Agency's experience with reengineering during the past several years, (2) a series of focus groups and interviews with Agency staff and partners on selected topics, and (3) a survey of Agency staff's perceptions, opinions and recommendations regarding the practice of reengineering in AID/W and the field.



This report, which is the third of three stocktaking sub-reports, describes and reports the results of the survey. In Section II, which follows this introduction, we describe the approach taken to develop and administer the survey. In Section III, we briefly describe the 580 Agency staff who responded to the survey. Finally, in Section IV, we present both a “snapshot” of reengineering as seen through the eyes of our survey respondents and a detailed analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data collected through the survey. The two parts of Section IV are organized according to the four intermediate results presented above.

“Very good tool. Remember, in attitude surveying, one must always see to it that the respondents get the final results as quickly as possible.”

In the final question of the survey, we asked respondents for their comments regarding the stocktaking effort, in general, or this survey, in particular. We received more than 60 comments about the survey. A small number of respondents (14) felt that the survey was biased, too long, too confusing, or not expansive enough. More than half of the respondents who commented (36), however, expressed very positive reactions. Some appreciated the opportunity to express their views, others suggested that more such surveys of staff be conducted, and others felt the exercise was good for staff morale. Several respondents (13) urged that the survey, and the stocktaking effort as a whole, not end with data collection and analysis: the results should be shared with staff and, most importantly, they should lead to significant *action* on the part of the Agency's leadership.

“It is great to ask opinions; it is even greater to act on them.”

A Mosaic of Staff Perceptions and Opinions--Excerpts from the Stocktaking Survey

"USAID is a wonderful Agency with the best of purposes. Through it all, I firmly believe that. I feel sad (trite but true) to see us still in such a limbo trying to reestablish our identity and integrity when, post Cold War, we have so much we could accomplish."

"I have worked for 18 years in this Agency and have loved my job; but I and many others feel beaten down by Washington bureaucracy and overkill on layers of process, duplication in the office structure, SO teams, and program objective teams; much as we talk about managing for results, we don't yet."

"The problems...stem from perceived lack of commitment to reengineering at the top."

"It is interesting that we have to re-learn what we knew as children--that two heads are better than one. For years, we have worked and been rewarded as individuals, so it will take time to change our thinking."

"There is too much rhetoric in USAID about GPRA, proving results to Congress, etc. We should be encouraging our staff and partners to improve their programs overall, not just for Congress (which gives very mixed messages as to whether it's even interested in performance in foreign aid)."

"Do away with all the buzz words and acronyms."

"Never forget that organizations are either bureaucratic or virtual reality oriented, and the combinations between these two basic structures do not work well."

"Sometimes I think that people hide behind reengineering in order to cover up for their lack of a clear direction....We have become so process-oriented and bureaucratic that we have lost the meaning of what USAID was created to do."

"Fully implement reengineering, especially in Washington."

"Reengineering and our new results orientation have improved the Agency's operations, but at a cost--everyone is tired and fearful of more change. The Agency must work to foster stability and continuity."

"We have reengineered ourselves into a ditch: RIFed too many FSOs to pay for a non-functional computer system; forced reduced staff to feed redundant systems; disempowered and blamed the employees for the failures; and then claimed success in front of Congress. Perfect."

"The Agency has barely survived the Congress's attempt to abolish the Agency. Nevertheless, the operational changes undertaken are positive vis-a-vis core beliefs and may improve our chances of survival. Stay the course! Feedback must continue and enthusiasm must be sustained."

"I think that reengineering has been a disappointment. The agency (the emperor without clothes) has never really asked those most involved whether they feel we are better off. Rather than positive, reengineering is most often black holes of time and energy."

"Continue the reengineering process. Get our main stakeholder, Congress, on board..."

II. APPROACH

The stocktaking survey was constructed in December, 1997, and January, 1998, administered in February, 1998, and analyzed in April-May, 1998. The survey work was done by a six-member Stocktaking Study Team (the “we” in this report), which included three USAID staff in the Program and Policy Coordination Bureau-- Liz Baltimore (ROR), John Haecker (CDIE) and Peggy Schultz (ROR)--and three contractors--Larry Beyna, Chanya Charles, and Jerry Harrison-Burns. The team did not do it all alone, however. We received valuable guidance from the larger Stocktaking Team (whose members came from all over AID/W) and that team's sponsors, AA/M Terry Brown and AA/PPC Tom Fox. We also received very timely and invaluable technical support from Nancy Hutchins (M/IRM), crash analytical support from Jim Vermillion (PPC/DEM), and critical logistical support from the Agency's e-mail system administrators in the field and in AID/W, and expert editorial assistance from Stacy Stacks, Vicky Michener and Judy Light of MSI’s Performance Measurement Team. And, of course, we received an incredible response to the survey from USAID staff in AID/W and the field. We are grateful to all who contributed.

Survey Design

The survey design was based primarily on the four Intermediate Results (IRs) specified in the Stocktaking Team's “results framework” for the achievement of the reengineering reforms instituted in the Agency in 1995.[1] For each IR, the Stocktaking Team and Study Team identified several performance indicators that they believed would provide a basic “snapshot” of the status of the reforms outlined in the IRs, and the survey team was charged with collecting data against those indicators.[2]

> *“The survey seems to be programmatically biased. I would have asked more basic questions such as: Has reengineering resulted in any real changes or improvements in the way your mission operates?”*

We say “snapshot” and “status” here instead of “change” and “progress,” because this survey is the first of its kind with respect to reengineering, and, as such, provides the Agency only with *baseline* data, against which change and progress can be measured in future surveys. We do not know what people might have said on such a survey prior to the implementation of reengineering, and therefore cannot use this survey to assess *progress*. Indeed, some survey respondents--albeit a very small minority--stated in their written responses to some questions that things have gotten worse since reengineering! We did not ask survey respondents to assess whether things had changed between the time at which

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[1] The stocktaking team's results framework is provided in Section I of this report.

[2] All of the indicators and accompanying data are provided in four tables, one for each IR, in Section III of this report, under the sub-section entitled “Data Highlights.”

reengineering was implemented and the present. Given the strong emotions--both positive and negative--that many USAID staff have regarding reengineering, such an assessment would be difficult to interpret, and we would be wiser to focus only on the substance of reengineering in the here and now and advice for making improvements in the future.

On the basis of the four IRs in the reengineering results framework and consultations with the larger Stocktaking Team, we developed a 67-question survey, a copy of which is in Appendix 1. Forty-five of the questions were of the multiple-choice type, which lent themselves to quantitative analysis. The other 22 were open-ended questions, asking for specifics when “other” was chosen on multiple-choice questions, examples to illustrate responses to multiple-choice questions, comments about specific issues, and recommendations for improving the implementation of reengineering. The 67 questions can be broken down as follows:

Questions 1-6:

These six questions were designed to provide us with demographic information on the respondents: the type of sample in which people were responding (which will be discussed later), employment status (USDH, FSN, etc.), locale (field or AID/W), geographical region (for people responding from the field), time in USAID (under 2 years, 2-5 years, or over 5 years), and managerial status (non-manager, managing up to 10 people, 11-50, and over 50). All of these questions were multiple-choice questions, and were asked of all respondents.

Questions 7-17:

These 11 questions covered IR 1, “Empowered staff and teams accountable for results.” They covered respondents' perceptions of the extent to which individuals and teams are empowered, held accountable, given incentives to manage for results, and made significant decisions relating to their work. Eight questions were multiple-choice and 3 open-ended. The open-ended questions asked for comments regarding the factors hindering and facilitating progress on IR 1, and recommendations for improvement. All respondents were asked to answer all 8 questions.

Questions 18-33:

These 16 questions covered IR 4, “Responsive and flexible approaches for achieving.” They asked for respondents perceptions regarding the accessibility of approaches and information and the utility of specific Agency tools, tactics, processes and systems aimed at helping staff and teams achieve results (e.g., strategic planning, the NMS, procurement, and Agency culture). Thirteen of these questions were multiple-choice, and 3 open-ended. Again, the open-ended questions asked for hindering and facilitating factors and recommendations, but, in this case, for IR 4. And, again, all respondents were asked to answer all of these questions.

Question 34:

This question asked respondents to identify themselves as Operating Unit (OU) heads, OU deputy directors, heads of OU program offices/functions, strategic objective (SO) team leaders, SO team activity managers, SO team members, or none of the above. The purpose of the question was to divide our respondents into three groups for much of the remainder of the survey. The three OU sub-groups would go on to answer questions about IRs 2 and 3 from an OU perspective, and the three SO sub-groups would go on to answer questions about IRs 2 and 3 from an SO team perspective.

We used these OU and SO identifiers because we wanted only those respondents with direct experience in program operations to move on to Questions 35-65 of the survey, which ask about customer and partner involvement, development program decision-making on the basis of performance information, and the results framework. We separated people into OU and SO sub-groups because we wanted to see if there were differences in perception between staff who generally are not on SO teams but ought to know about SO team operations, namely, the OU respondent group, and staff who are serving directly on SO teams, namely, the SO respondent group.

The respondents who chose none of the six sub-group responses to this question were skipped over Questions 35-65 and on to Question 66.

Questions 35-43, 47-57, and 63-65:

These 23 questions focused on IR 2, “Addressing development needs through customers and partners.” Nine of them asked for OU respondents' perceptions of the use of customer and partner input into strategic planning and assessments of partners' financial contributions to USAID strategic objectives. Eleven questions asked for very similar perceptions and assessments of the SO team respondents, with the addition of a few questions about program activities. Finally, three questions asked both groups of respondents about the effectiveness of the results framework as a tool for program operations. There were 14 multiple-choice questions and 9 open-ended questions. The open-ended questions asked for examples to support multiple-choice questions and recommendations for reinforcing the principles underlying IR 2.

Questions 44-46 and 58-62:

These 8 questions were devoted to IR 3, “Results-oriented decision-making.” Three were addressed to OU respondents and 5 to SO team respondents. They focused on the extent to which program decisions (at the strategic level for both groups and at the activity level for SO team members) are based on performance information. Three questions were of the multiple-choice type and 4 open-ended, the latter dealing with examples and recommendations.

Question 66:

This open-ended question, which was asked of all survey respondents, solicited advice to the Agency Administrator with respect to what he should do to move Agency practice closer to principle in the areas covered by the survey.

Question 67: This final, open-ended question asked all respondents for additional comments on the stocktaking effort and the survey.

In order to promote wide participation in the survey and ease of analysis, we used Raosoft©, an e-mail survey software, which allowed respondents to receive and respond to the survey via e-mail and allowed us to analyze the data directly from the e-mail responses, thus avoiding the laborious task of separately transferring responses to a data base. With that facility, however, came some limitations. The two most important ones were as follows:

(1) Some sub-groups of respondents were inadvertently allowed to answer specific questions that we did not want them to answer. We wrote several "skips" into the survey, which were supposed to move respondents to certain survey questions on the basis of their answers to prior questions. The skips worked as they were supposed to, but respondents were allowed to move *back* through the survey, and some of those who did answered questions not intended for them. This limitation resulted, in some cases, of our receiving more answers to certain questions than we expected and receiving answers from unintended respondents. This did not happen very often, but it did serve to muddy the waters a bit.

(2) Respondents were allowed a limited amount of space in which to answer the open-ended questions on the survey. Some respondents wanted to write longer statements and were obviously frustrated in not being allowed to do so.

We pilot-tested our survey with several willing subjects in USAID/W. First we piloted all the questions with a paper and pencil exercise and then using the e-mail format. The most important adjustment made on the basis of these pilot tests was the elimination of several questions in order to decrease the amount of time needed to complete the survey (and increase the rate of participation). In some cases, questions were refined to increase understanding.

Survey Samples

The survey was administered to three samples: random, targeted, and open invitation. To construct the random sample, which was initially intended to serve as the source of our baseline data analysis, we selected every tenth name on the Agency's e-mail list of 8317 names as of January, 1998. A number of the addresses turned out to be lists or generic e-mail boxes. We eliminated those addresses and settled on 783 e-mail names and addresses. When we converted the list to an e-mail list specifically for the survey, about 35 names with unusable e-mail addresses were dropped from the sample. Later, when we sent the first notice of the survey to potential respondents, another 40 names were dropped because they were undeliverable and about 10 were found to be the names of institutional contractors, not USAID staff. We ended up with a reasonably random sample of 700 Agency staff.

We also constructed a “targeted” sample of 50 individuals in AID/W and the field whom we felt would be particularly knowledgeable informants on the basis of their prior experience with designing and implementing reengineering reforms. We included individuals who worked on the program operations business area analysis during reengineering's inception, worked in country experimental labs when reengineering was being tested, worked on developing the new Agency guidance, and so on. The sample included 10 mission directors, 1 deputy director, 3 deputy assistance administrators, 10 FSNs and 5 USPSCs. Fifteen of these staff were located in AID/W and 35 in the field.

The third sample, the open-invitation sample, included anyone not in one of the other samples who wanted to take the survey. All Agency staff were informed that the survey was available through e-mail, and were invited to take it if they desired.

Survey Administration and Response Rates

On February 11, 1998, both the random sample and the targeted sample were sent an initial notice that they had been selected and a request that they participate. They were then sent the survey via their own offices' e-mail systems. Finally, they were all sent follow-up reminders to participate. The actual dates on which potential respondents first received the survey varied because we worked through e-mail administrators at the various AID/W and field sites. All potential respondents were given at least three weeks in which to respond and the survey was closed on March 4, 1998.

Our numbers on response rates are not precise, partly because some respondents did not indicate the type of sample they were in (Question 1) and partly because some respondents apparently erred in identifying their sample type. We know this because, even though we included only 50 individuals in the “targeted” sample, we received responses from 66 individuals who chose that option in Question 1!

This much we know:

- **We received a total of 580 responses to the survey**. We suspect that we received a few duplicate responses, but only a few, and we did not have the time or resources to investigate. Either Raosoft itself or our lack of facility with the software made it difficult to do so.

- **Of those 580 responses, approximately 50 percent were from the random sample, 12 percent from the targeted sample, and 38 percent from the open invitation sample**.

These are estimates based on the numbers we received in 546 responses to Question 1. (We cannot determine sample types for the other 34 respondents.)

- **We estimate the response rate for the random sample at approximately 41 percent**. To calculate this estimate we added the 272 respondents who identified themselves as random sample members to 17 additional respondents (50 percent of the 34 unidentified respondents in the total set of responses received) and then divided by 700, the approximate total number of individuals who were included in the random sample. Even if we are off somewhat, a response rate in the range of 35-45 percent is, by most accounts, a very respectable one.

- **The response rate for the targeted sample was probably high but we cannot be sure.** Obviously, at least 16 of the 66 people who said that they were in the targeted group were incorrect (since we only asked 50), but how many of the others were also incorrect? We have checked informally with some of the 50 who were targeted, however, and we believe from their reports that we had a good response rate in this select group.

Data Analysis

We initially intended to use the random sample of respondents as our source of baseline data, and analysis, for the stocktaking survey. (The other samples--the targeted sample and the open invitation sample--were expected to yield additional data but not for baseline purposes.) However, when we compared the random sample to the entire sample (i.e., the combination of the random, targeted and open invitation samples), we found that they were quite similar in terms of their respective percentages of sub-groups of staff. This is demonstrated in Table II, on the next page, which presents a comparison of the breakouts of the demographic data on employment status, locale and region for the random and total samples. For example, in the random sample, 44 percent of the respondents were USDHs, 39 percent were FSNs, 9 percent were USPSCs and TCNs, and so on, whereas, in the total sample, 44% were USDHs, 35 percent were FSNs, 11 percent were USPSCs and TCNs, and so on. On the basis of these similar percentages, therefore, we decided to use the data from the *entire* sample, rather than just the random sample, for our analyses of both the quantitative and qualitative data from the survey and for the purposes of this report.

Regardless of the sample type--random, targeted or open invitation--those who wanted to respond to the survey did, and those who were more or less reluctant to do so were not excessively reminded or pressured to respond. Therefore, we do not have any good reason to believe that our total sample is any less representative of USAID staff as a whole than is the random sample. Nor, on the basis of some spot analyses, do we have any good reason to believe that the total sample gave more or less positive responses to survey questions than would a strictly administered random sample.

Table II: Comparison of the Random Sample with the Total Sample on Selected Characteristics									
Type of Sample	Employment Status						Locale		
	USDH	FSN	USPSC/ TCN	RASA/ PASA/ Fellow/ TAACS	Other	Total	Field	AID/W	Total
Random	120 (44%)	105 (39%)	25 (9%)	12 (4%)	8 (3%)	270 (100%)	181 (67%)	91 (33%)	272 (100%)
Total	270 (48%)	195 (35%	61 (11%)	19 (3%)	14 (3%)	559 (100%)	380 (66%)	192 (34%)	572 (100%)
	Region								
	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	Other	Total			
Random	47 (25%)	57 (30%)	23 (12%)	55 (29%)	5 (3%)	187 (100%)			
Total	109 (28%)	99 (26%)	67 (17%)	103 (27%)	10 (3%)	388 (100%)			

The stocktaking survey yielded a great deal of data--both quantitative and qualitative--regarding Agency staff's perceptions, self-reported behaviors, and opinions regarding how well reengineering is faring in 1998, why it is or is not faring well, and what needs to be done to ensure additional progress. Staff responded to 60 specific questions about reengineering. Among those 60, 39 questions involved multiple choice responses that lent themselves quite readily to quantitative analysis. In analyzing the data for those questions, we first looked at what the entire sample of respondents said; then we looked for differences in responses on the basis of several different ways of disaggregating the total sample:

- *locale* (field and AID/W),
- *employment status* (USDHs, FSNs and USPSCs/RASAs/PASAs/Fellows/TAACS),
- *time in the Agency* (less than 2 years, 2-5 years, and more than 5 years), and
- *managerial status* (not a manager, managing 1-10 employees, managing 11-50 employees, and managing over 50 employees).

The summary data from these analyses are presented in Appendix 2 of this report.

Our survey contained an additional 22 questions calling for written comments and examples. We asked for examples of instances in which reengineering principles were put into practice, staff's opinions about factors facilitating and hindering the implementation of specific principles and approaches, and their advice as to how to make reengineering work better. We did content analyses of these responses and counted the numbers of responses that fell into specific categories. The results of these analyses and many specific quotations from respondents are reported in Section IV. (The mini-analysis reports for these questions are not included in an appendix, however, because they add very little beyond what is reported in Section IV.)

III. SURVEY RESPONDENTS

We received a total of 580 returned e-mail responses to the survey. Based on responses to the survey's demographic questions (Questions 2-6 and 34), we have a fairly good, but not precise, picture of those who responded. Our picture is not precise because respondents could choose not to answer any number of the survey questions, and that happened with every one of the demographic questions. We suspect that some respondents simply did not trust our promise of anonymity and therefore chose not to give information that might be used to identify them. Much of what we know about the survey respondents is laid out in Table III below.

Table III: Characteristics of Survey Respondents

Question	Response Category, Number in Category, and Percentage of Total Answering that Question							Total
2. Employ- ment Status	USDH 270 48%	FSN 195 35%	USPSC/ TCN 61 11%	RASA/ PASA/ Fellow/ TAACS 19 3%	Other[1] 14 3%	[1]We did not ask respondents to specify their choice of “other,” but we suspect that at least some of these were institutional contractors.		559
3. Locale	Field 380 66%	AID/W 192 34%						572
4. Region (“Field” staff only)	AFR 109 28%	ANE 99 26%	ENI 67 17%	LAC 103 27%	Other[2] 10 3%	[2]We did not ask respondents to specify their choice of “other,” so we cannot determine where these field staff were located.		388[3]
5. Time in USAID	<2 yrs. 83 15%	2-5 yrs. 100 18%	>5 yrs. 381 68%					564
6. Manager- ial Status	Non- manager 379 68%	Manage <11 91 16%	Manage 11-50 62 11%	Manage >50 25 4%				557
34. Operating Unit/SO- Team Level	OU Head 48 9%	OU Dep. Director 15 3%	OU Prgrm. Office Head 31 6%	SO Team Leader 51 9%	SO Team Activity Manager 67 12%	SO Team Member 112 21%	None of the Above 31 6%	540

[3]Note: this number is higher than the 380 field staff in Q. 3. We are not sure how this happened, but we suspect that some non -staff individuals took the survey and answered Q. 4 but not Q. 3.

IV. SURVEY FINDINGS

This section of the report is divided into two sub-sections. In the first sub-section, we present a "snapshot" of findings from the entire survey, and in the second sub-section, we present "data highlights," which support the snapshot description and are derived from our analyses of the quantitative and qualitative data.

Both the snapshot and data highlights sub-sections are organized on the basis of the four intermediate results laid out in the stocktaking strategic objective framework, which was developed several months ago by the Stocktaking Team. At the end of the two sections, we present a snapshot and data analysis, respectively, of a very important part of the survey, namely, the question in which we ask respondents what they would advise USAID's Administrator to do so that Agency practice can move closer to achieving the principles embedded in the four intermediate results and discussed in the survey.

Snapshot of All Survey Findings

IR 1: Empowered staff and teams accountable for results

Underlying this IR is the principle, which was stated in the survey, that, in order for reengineering reforms to succeed, individuals and teams in the Agency must be empowered to make decisions according to achieve agreed-upon objectives. In the survey, we asked questions about four elements related to this principle: *empowerment* to make decisions, *accountability* for managing for results, *incentives* to manage for results, and *decision-making* about how to achieve results. By "empowerment," we meant generally that people have sufficient authority, resources, etc. to do their jobs effectively. By "accountability," we meant that people's performance is judged on the basis of how well they use their authority and resources to plan for achieving results, implement their activities, and monitor and evaluate their progress in a responsible, results-oriented manner. We defined "incentives" as any positive consequences people could expect to experience if they were to demonstrate that they were managing for results. Finally, "decision-making" included making and implementing significant decisions--i.e., those that had a real influence on the approaches or resources used--about how to achieve results.

> *"In my experience, there has been too much micro-management for empowerment...to work well. Empowerment can't work without a letting go of power by someone. It can't be all kept in the hands of the Mission Director or team leaders."*

The Big Picture. The survey data paint a general picture of Agency staff who feel that (1) they are empowered as individuals and teams "to some extent," and (2) they and their teams do, "to some extent," make significant decisions about how to achieve the results for which they are accountable. However, if we can assume that the four-point scale we used in all the survey items used for this IR yields comparable response strength (which may be arguable), the data also suggest a general picture in which (3) staff, as both individuals and members of teams, feel that their levels of empowerment and decision-making are not commensurate with the higher levels of accountability to which they are being held. Furthermore, the data show that (4) staff believe that their units and offices do not do much in the way of providing incentives to them, as individuals or as teams.

> *"In AID/W, we have a serious problem with actually delegating authority. There are too many levels, too many decision makers, and little accountability."*

Differences Among Groups. The picture shows some fairly consistent differences among sub-groups of staff. On all but one of the eight sub-indicators for this IR, staff in the field give higher average ratings than those of AID/W staff. In other words, field staff generally see both themselves and their teams as more empowered,

> *"The weakest principle is incentives, due to the (lack of) latitude in practical terms of offering any. The real incentive is being empowered to do good development work which has measurable results."*

more accountable, and as having more incentives for managing for results than do AID/W staff. As for making significant decisions on how to achieve results, field staff see themselves as doing this to a lesser extent as individuals than do AID/W staff, but see their teams as doing it to a greater extent.

"We have a common vision articulated and a clear set of values, and a well defined strategy. With this framework there is considerable latitude to determine how one achieves the results."

FSNs appear to see themselves as considerably less empowered, held accountable to a slightly lesser extent, and having made significant decisions to a considerably lesser extent than their USDH colleagues. They do, however, have a higher sense of being provided incentives for managing for results on an individual basis. With teams, the story is somewhat different. FSNs provide higher average ratings than did USDHs not only on team incentives, but also on team empowerment, team accountability, and, to a very slight degree, team decision-making. There does not appear to be a consistent pattern for USPSCs et al. relative to the other groups, but it can be said that USPSCs et al. do not provide the highest average rating on any of the indicators for IR 1.

The picture for field staff by region is not particularly clear. On all but one of the eight sub-indicators, the highest average ratings by field staff in geographical regions are given by either the staff from the ANE region or the staff from the LAC region. (Some of the differences are very slight). The one exception was ENI staff's providing the highest rating for individual incentives. An individual's amount of time in the Agency does not make much difference with respect to team empowerment, team accountability, and individual and team decision-making.

Presence/Absence of Management Commitment and Support from Two Survey Respondents:

"I had a supervisor who treated his staff as valuable resources. He also did not make us feel we were inferior to him. He was very open to suggestions, quick to explore other possibilities. He encouraged creativity. He was also a good teacher. He believed in sharing information with everyone."

"The DAA took personal charge of a team, managing all the details and making even the minor decisions herself. Even the counsel of the professional staffers on the team went

The Presence and Absence of Effective Teamwork from Two Survey Respondents:

"We had established a team with a very specific, clearly identified goal. We had different people on the team with the right balance of experience, knowledge and enthusiasm. Mission management had confidence in the judgment of team members, working as a group."

"(1) Lack of delegation to teams and team members; (2) lack of integration of team members into the team; (3) lack of properly defined roles in teams; (4) dual structures in missions and confusion as to where the members accountability lies."

Those differences that do show up seem to be where staff with relatively less time in the Agency report feeling less individually empowered and accountable, yet with more access to incentives, than those with more time in the Agency.

"I have noted no changes in incentives since reengineering was instituted. Incentives remain the same--either a strong EEP or a less strong EEP. What other incentives do you refer to?!"

Finally, non-managers provide lower average ratings for the IR 1 indicators than did managers. In general, non-managers feel less empowered as individuals and teams, less individually accountable, less provided with individual and team incentives, and report having made significant decisions as individuals and teams to a lesser extent than most of the sub-groups of managers. The only exception, and the difference is slight, is in the area of team accountability. The highest ratings on the sub-indicators where managers score higher than non-managers does not appear to be concentrated in any one of the managerial groups (i.e., managing 1-10 persons, 11-50, and over 50).

Factors Supporting and Constraining IR 1. The survey contains a number of strong messages as to what is helping and hindering the application of the key managing-for-results principles of empowerment, accountability, incentives and decision-making and what should be done to improve the situation. Highest on the list is commitment and support--and action, not just talk--for these principles on the part of Agency management, starting with the very top of the Agency, going through senior and middle managers, and extending down to the level of supervisors and team leaders. Other very important factors, which the Agency needs to work on, are the skills and understanding of teamwork, real empowerment of staff through such mechanisms and behaviors as delegations of authority and non-micro-managing by people up the line, and training and education in managing for results at *all* levels of responsibility, but especially at the program management level.

The Presence and Absence of Effective Empowerment from Two Survey Respondents:

"I empowered myself, was totally ready to be held accountable for the outcome and made a quick decision. Doing my job well is the incentive I have for taking such a risk."

"No authority to be creative was granted. I was told to do it one way or not at all."

IR 2: Addressing development needs through customers and partners

This IR is derived from two principles: *increased participation of (1) customers and (2) partners in planning, achieving, and monitoring and evaluating development programs*. Under IR 2, and for purposes of the survey, “customers” have been defined as individuals or organizations who receive USAID services or products, benefit from USAID programs, or are affected by USAID actions. The focus is on USAID's “ultimate customers,” not partners with whom USAID collaborates to serve its ultimate customers. “Partners” have been defined as organizations, or their representatives, with whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives and intermediate results.

> *“Customer orientation is an organizational culture thing, and has to grow in a nurturing environment.”*

The Big Picture. The survey data provide an overall snapshot of Agency staff and teams who have, to some extent, been using information from both their customers and partners to develop and modify their strategic plans. This is true of both staff at the Operating Unit (OU) level--i.e., directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers--and staff at the strategic objective (SO) team level--i.e., team leaders, members, and activity managers. It is worth noting here that the quantitative indicators for this IR revealed somewhat higher levels of performance than did similar types of indicators for IRs 1 and 4.

To a lesser extent (but closer to “some extent” than to “hardly at all”), SO team staff report that they have been planning and modifying their development *activities* on the basis of customer feedback. We are not sure why there is a difference between the extent to which customer input is being used by SO teams to develop and modify their strategic plans and the extent to which customer feedback is being used to plan and change activities. One explanation may lie in the survey questions, themselves. When we asked SO team staff about using customer and partner information to develop or adjust strategic plans, we asked them to rate the extent to which they had done so during the past year, whereas, when we asked about using customer feedback to plan or modify activities, we asked them to rate the extent to which they had done so during the past six months. We made that distinction because, in developing our indicators for this IR, we thought that it was reasonable to allow for one year's worth of experience with respect to strategic plans and six months' experience for activities because, as a general rule, strategic plans are reviewed and revised less often than are program activities.

> *“Reengineering has changed attitudes toward customers and partners. This is a transition period.”*

In addition, our snapshot shows that half of the Agency's staff directly involved in program operations are able, with at least a high degree of self-confidence, to estimate the level of their strategic partners' financial contributions to USAID's programs. This finding troubles us somewhat, especially because it is equally true of SO-team-level staff *and* OU-level staff, who might be thought to be in a better position of knowing more about partners' financial contributions. This part of our snapshot raises questions about how intimately program staff--at OU and team levels--know what their partners are doing in relation to USAID's development programs.

This picture of staff's perceptions and estimates about customers and partners should be viewed with a cautionary lens. Many of the comments we received in response to several open-ended questions in the survey suggest to us that many staff do not make as strict a distinction between "customers" and "partners" as we tried to make in our survey instructions. (One respondent went so far as to advise the Agency to redefine the term "customer" to mean U.S. taxpayers.) This is understandable in light of the confusion we find between these terms in other contexts--e.g., training sessions and strategy development workshops--and in light of the fact that in some aspects of the development process a particular individual or organization can be seen as a customer, while in others as a partner.

"Involving customers and partners takes time."

Differences Among Groups. As with IR 1, and IRs 3 and 4 that follow, our snapshot is not as simple as it looks at first glance. There are some notable differences among sub-groups of Agency staff. As with the other IRs, one of the most prominent differences is between staff in the field and staff in AID/W. Staff in the field report considerably more use of customer and partner input on all five of the indicators dealing with use. One might argue that staff in the field are generally more involved in programs that rely on customer and partner information and have more access to their customers and partners than staff in AID/W. While that may be a very important mitigating factor, it should be remembered that the findings for these indicators are based on data from only operating unit and SO team staff, all of whom, by definition, are working in programs that involve customers and partners. While it may be more difficult for AID/W staff to directly obtain information from customers and partners, that does not lessen the importance of getting and using such information under the principle that drives this IR.

"(When it comes to customers and partners), transparency, honesty, and trust are the most important things."

At the SO-team level, FSNs and USPSCs et al. consistently report higher use of customer and partner information than their USDH colleagues. This is not true at the OU level, but the finding is based on a very small sample of FSNs or USPSCs et al. who are in OU positions of director, deputy director, or chief program officer.

While the differences among staffs in the four geographical regions were slight on several indicators, the LAC region's staff consistently reported the highest levels of use of customer and partner information, at both the OU strategy level and SO-team level. LAC OU-level staff provided one of the highest ratings in the entire survey with respect to their use of partners' input to adjust their OUs' strategic plans; LAC SO-team level staff reported relatively high use of customer input into adjusting SO strategies.

The most notable differences among staff with differing amounts of time in the Agency was that, at the SO-team level, the perception of use of customer and partner information appears to be inversely related to years of experience in USAID. In other words, staff with the least time in the Agency report more use by their teams, and it lessens with increased time in the Agency.

"Missions and operating unit managers need to be freed up somewhat from constant...reporting requests from USAID/W...to afford them time to think...(and to) visit with customers to get feedback."

Finally, at the OU level, managers of more than 50 persons are saying that their OUs use both customer and partner information more than other staff are reporting. Middle managers (of 1-10 persons and 11-50 persons) report less use, and non-managers even less. This part of the picture seems reasonable, as one might expect that the more senior the manager, the more of a sense that OUs are acting on their customers' and partners' input. At the SO-team level, no senior managers report use (which stands to reason, as there are few, if any, senior managers on SO teams), and the picture is mixed with respect to the other sub-groups.

"Involve customers and partners throughout the process of development assistance, from strategy...to evaluation and closeout."

Information Sources. Our picture of staff's interactions with customers and partners shows that the most information sources from both groups are regular meetings and site visits. Additional relatively more common sources of customer information are focus groups and planning workshops; and other relatively more common sources of partner information are telephone and e-mail and, again, planning workshops. It is worth mentioning here that membership on an SO team is almost twice as likely among partners as among customers; surveys are used twice as often with customers as with partners. Staff cite a variety of unusual sources of customer and partner input, including, for example, the media, proposals from partners, town meetings, and unsystematic informal discussions in person and on the phone. This suggests that staff are hearing more from their customers and partners (and presumably listening to them more) than might be reported in R4s and other reports.

"Our customers now are largely field Missions. We've amended projects to accommodate a Mission request. In the present environment, with the intense concern over management units, any extra procurement action is frowned on. But it's the right thing to do."

Respondents' examples of use of customer and partner input provide a great deal of texture to our survey snapshot. Input is used in deciding to direct program attention to a particular new area; to change whole strategies or intermediate results within strategies; to drop, add or change activities; to design results packages, and so on.

How to Increase the Achievement of IR 2. If the Agency wants to increase the match between principles and practice in the area of using customer and partner information in program operations, there are a number of things that should be done, according to our survey respondents: (1) the Agency should provide more clarity, guidance, and flexibility regarding working relationships with customers and partners, most notably in the area of procurement restrictions with respect to conflict of interest for partners; (2) there should be more attention on using creative and tried-and-true approaches simply to increase dialogue; (3) the Agency's leadership and mid-managers should reinforce working with customers and partners through support and example; and (4), which is related to the last one, management should provide more resources, especially time and travel money, to staff who want to interact more with customers and partners but who are constrained by forces beyond their control.

How to Increase Customer and Partner Involvement? A Few Views:

"Insist on participatory approaches to monitoring and evaluation."

"Mission leadership must require it."

"Clarify conflict of interest for partner collaboration."

"More time and funds for travel outside the office."

"Program office must build it into design."

IR 3: Results-Oriented Decision-Making

Underlying this IR is the principle of increased focus on results in planning, achieving, and monitoring and evaluating development programs. Especially important is the *increased use of results data by SO teams in making decisions about program strategy and activities*. This was the focus of the eight survey questions asked of respondents, three questions for individuals who identified themselves as Operating Unit directors, deputy directors, or chief program officers (whom we will refer to as OU-level program managers); and five questions for other individuals, who identified themselves as SO team leaders, members, or activity managers (SO team program managers). Another focus of this part of the survey--and a central element in planning, achieving and monitoring and evaluating performance--was *the results framework,* which was the subject of three questions asked of both groups.

"(Underlying) this (question) is an assumption that SO teams make decisions that are not based on performance, which I believe is false. Performance is now 50% of the SO's ranking. It is very important and constantly considered."

The Big Picture: Making Decisions on the Basis of Performance Information. The survey data paint a picture of strategic objective teams making decisions regarding their program strategies and allocations of resources on the basis of performance information, but the picture offered by OU-level program managers is a considerably bolder one than that offered by SO team program managers. Almost two-thirds of the OU group say that SO teams used performance information to make results framework or resource decisions at least two times during the year preceding the survey, but slightly less than half of the SO team group could say the same. The difference appears to be one of perception rather than actual behavior, because both groups were asked about SO team use of performance information, and, presumably most of the respondents in both groups were thinking of the same SO teams in their answers to the survey. It does appear, from the specific examples of information use provided in these survey responses, that some of the OU group were thinking of their own decisions as well as team decisions, so it may stand to reason that their responses would be stronger than those of their SO team colleagues.

"We noticed that our indicator on national institutions was not doing well and decided, for the present, to dedicate fewer resources to this area (while recognizing major other donor support in this area, so as not to jeopardize the development hypothesis."

Another interesting aspect of this picture is that fully 23 percent of the OU group and 28 percent of the SO team group respond that they "don't know"--which we interpret as not being able to estimate--the number of instances in which SO teams made strategic decisions based on performance information. This may be understandable in light of the many factors that go into such decision-making, such as the availability of resources, political considerations, earmarks, etc. However, it also suggests that results-oriented decision-making may not be a particularly prominent factor in their minds and observations.

"Bean counting (i.e., we counted the number of organizations that networked around shared problems) was turned into impact tracking (i.e., we now count the number of viable partnerships around shared problems)."

Incidentally, the snapshot of SO team use of performance information in making key strategic decisions would be considerably sharper had we set a lower standard with our indicator. If we include all respondents who reported at least *one* instance, instead of two, in which SO teams made such decisions on the basis of performance information, the percentages for OU-level program managers and SO team-level managers increase somewhat and become more consistent. In this scenario, the percentages change to 71 percent for the OU group and 70 percent for the SO team group.

"There is pressure not to make changes in the results frameworks or indicators, given the efforts to which the mission teams went to get USAID/W approval during the R4 process--even when results/facts suggest a change."

Consistent with SO team program managers' observations about using performance information to make decisions about results frameworks and resource allocations, our snapshot reveals that half of them report that their teams used performance information to confirm or adjust their program activities two or more times during the past six months. (Please note that we did not ask OU-level program managers about this. Note also that the timeframe we gave was *six months*, as opposed to one year for strategy-level decisions, because it could be expected that teams would make more and more frequent decisions at the activity level.) Again, if we would reduce the standard to one or more times in the past six months, the percentage would rise to 68 percent, or two-thirds of our SO team-level respondents.

Differences Among Groups. As with most other aspects of the survey, our snapshot shows that there are some rather dramatic differences in perception of decision making when we look at staff locale. More than twice as many program management staff in the field (at both the OU and SO team levels) as staff in AID/W report two or more instances of the use of performance information in strategic decisions, and one and one-half as many field staff as AID/W staff report the same in activity-level decision making.

There are no notable differences among types of employees (USDHs, FSNs, and USPSCs), and staff with differing amounts of time in the Agency. The differences among regions are rather mixed, except that considerably fewer staff in the LAC region report using performance information to make either strategic or activity-level decisions than did their colleagues in the other regions. Finally, the percentages of staff reporting information-based decision making generally increases as we move from non-management staff to those with higher and higher management responsibility.

Examples of Decision Making. Agency staff provide a great deal of paint for our picture of results-oriented decision making, offering examples of how and when decisions are made, the kinds of performance information being used, and situation-specific decisions. Specific settings for decision making include meetings with partners, R4 review sessions, team meetings, and annual field program reviews. Performance information includes survey data, monitoring data from partners, informal assessments, data on key performance indicators, performance audits, consultations with customers, project data, pilot project findings, and so on. Decisions include terminating non-performing activities, revising the focus or intermediate results in results frameworks, canceling grants, shifting resources from less productive activities and strategies to more promising ones, redesigning or dropping results packages, redefining targets, putting more performance pressure on USAID-funded partners, and many more.

Three Examples of Activity Level Decision Making

"Based on our field findings, we decided to include some men in microenterprise programs, as most programs currently involve women, and an imbalance seems to be appearing."

"Quality data from a nutritional surveillance project was used to reduce the number of sentinel points surveyed. By reducing the number of sentinel points, the activity is much more likely to be sustainable when our development support funds are no longer available."

"We decided that we are willing to cut off a grant to the ___ if we do not see specified progress in the next six months."

How to Increase the Achievement of IR 3. How do staff think the Agency can increase the extent to which SO teams increase their use of performance information in program and activity-level decision making? Survey respondents offer many ideas, two of the most prominent involving developing better monitoring and evaluation systems and practices and putting more flexibility into Agency systems that either support or depend upon results-oriented decision making. In effect, both sets of advice involve developing and using simpler, more objective tools, which provide for more flexibility in the process and more surety in the measurement of performance by SO teams and in the use of results data beyond the SO-team level. Additional recommendations center around getting more partner and customer input into obtaining and using performance information, developing better and more

"We CONTINUALLY adjust activities on the basis of performance information. The sources of this information most likely are the often subjective judgments of colleagues and counterparts in the field or else second-hand data sources. We don't have resources for objective evaluations or surveys."

"The reward for performance has to be real. The perception remains that there is little that ties rewards or punishments to performance."

"Spend less time figuring out what to report to Washington and more on what information is needed to make decisions."

flexible indicators, and providing more training, incentives, resources, and leadership for results-oriented decision-making.

The Results Framework as an Effective Tool for Helping SO Teams Accomplish Development Results. Our snapshot shows that, among all the people closely involved in program management (both OU-level and SO team-level staff), there is general agreement that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results. Also, our analysis shows that the level of agreement is consistent between the two groups.

"Teams need to be given the time to implement things before being held accountable for the results. Forcing a look every year when the results are proposed for a 5-8-year period creates additional bureaucratic work and suggests that teams are not really empowered."

As for sub-group differences, field staff are much more positive about the results framework than are AID/W staff, FSNs are considerably more positive than their USDH and USPSC et al. counterparts, ENI staff are much less positive than their colleagues in all the other regions, staff with less than two years of experience in the Agency are much more positive than those with more experience, and senior managers are considerably more positive than other managers and non-managers.

Three Views of the Results Framework

"The results framework forces us to articulate our assumptions and try to understand the relationship between our goals and what we do to reach those goals. It helps us avoid overlapping and counter-productive activities and predict where our biggest obstacles occur."

"There is no evidence to suggest that the results framework corresponds to the actual needs of the developing country. Rather, the rigidity of the framework probably causes the writers to eliminate, underestimate, or overestimate their goals simply to fit them into the framework."

"Results frameworks are so new they haven't stood the test of time. Time will prove the level of their effectiveness."

Staff agreeing that the results framework is an effective tool cite a variety of reasons for their opinion. The results framework is seen as useful (compared several times to the project-level logical framework) in mapping out where a program and an SO team is going, communicating program strategy and expectations with partners and customers, guiding the design and implementation of program activities, and serving as a framework for assessing program performance. Although the data show more agreement than disagreement about the effectiveness of the results framework, the tool has many critics. Their concerns include its being too complex for staff and partners to understand; its being, on the other hand, too simple to capture the dynamics and complexity of development strategies; too time consuming for the value that it adds to development planning; and too measurement oriented, at the expense of sound strategy and implementation.

How to Improve the Results Framework? Make it more simple and flexible, say many survey respondents. Strip it of jargon and let people improvise in how they define and organize the results they are trying to achieve. Other respondents think that staff and partners need more training in how to use the results framework, and they need more good examples of well conceived frameworks. Finally, many argued for more participation--by staff, partners and customers--in the development and use of the results framework.

IR 4: Responsive and flexible approaches for achieving

Underlying this IR are two principles, which were stated in the survey. The first is that, in order for reengineering reforms to succeed, *program operations approaches must be responsive and flexible, and Agency approaches must enable timely and effective achievement of results*. By "approaches," we meant generally the tools, tactics, processes, and systems used in program operations (planning, achieving, and monitoring/evaluating performance). The second principle is that *each manager and work team is concerned with, and has access to, all the information needed for achieving results*.

Three Views of Responsible/ Flexible Approaches

"There are no responsive and flexible tools. We have taken away from agency personnel the tools they were familiar with and knowledgeable about, and exchanged them for something similar yet different, so you spend too much time trying to learn new tricks."

"We've always had tools that could be made to work well. Restructuring around results has made them less unwieldy and available, perhaps, to more USAID staff."

"We have been able to cut the amount of time for developing and beginning a new activity to six months--a significant improvement over the past, when it would take 18 months."

The Big Picture: Some Agency Approaches Are Working Better than Others. The survey data provide a snapshot of Agency staff who are not very satisfied with the Agency's general provision of flexible and responsive approaches, but feel that certain approaches are more helpful to them in achieving results. By far, staff give the highest marks--in fact, the highest rating on the entire survey, halfway between contributing "to some extent" and "to a great extent" to their ability to achieve results--to Automation-Communication (i.e., e-mail, internet, web). Far below Automation-Communication, but still relatively highly regarded, are Organizational Arrangements (i.e., offices, operating units, teams), Strategic Planning (including customer planning, results frameworks, etc.), Agency Human Resources (number of staff, skills, etc.), and Performance Measurement (monitoring, evaluation, reporting). These approaches have ratings that are just under contributing "to some extent."

"I think you should completely junk the 'automated' systems and start all over again, this time listening to the employees."

The Agency approaches receiving the heaviest criticism from survey respondents are Automation-MIS (the NMS), Agency Culture, and Procurement (A&A, performance-based contracts, contracts, grants, etc.). It is worth noting that Automation-MIS have the lowest rating among all similar ratings on the entire survey, just under the level of contributing "hardly at all" to staff's ability to achieve results. Procurement and Agency Culture fall close to the halfway mark between contributing "hardly at all" and contributing "to some extent."

Three other Agency approaches included in the survey are rated under the level of contributing to "some extent": Program Implementation Organizing Approach (results packages, projects, activities), Resource Allocation, and Agency Directives and Guidance.

Access to Information. Assessments of the second principle--the extent to which staff have access to the information they need--are relatively positive. This element in being able to achieve results received the second most positive average response from all Agency staff among the 13 survey questions dealing with Agency approaches. Although the comments later in the survey suggest that much could be done for making information more accessible (i.e., handier, more readable, and more usable), especially policies, directives and guidance, it appears that the information can be obtained if staff need it.

"A member proposed a way to reduce the time to process a grant from seven months to three. His idea was discussed by the team, and accepted. The 'front office,' through delegation of authority, allowed the team to carry out the task. A new implementation letter was signed in a week."

Differences Among Groups. As with IR 1, there are some fairly consistent differences among sub-groups of survey respondents. Field staff give higher ratings than did AID/W staff on all but one of the 13 quantitative survey items for this IR. The only exception is the rating for Automation-MIS, in which the field's average rating was slightly below that of AID/W. Reasons for the higher field ratings are a matter of speculation, but one possibility is that the staff in the field may have more hands-on experience with the approaches for achieving. In addition, some of the respondents' specific comments and examples indicate that certain types of staff and offices--e.g., procurement staffs--are responding more flexibly and in a more customer-oriented way to the staff in charge of implementing programs and activities than happens in AID/W.

"In designing a new activity, a team of FS-01 officers--including contracts, legal, technical, program and PDO--worked together using old process and new principles. The result was lauded for being fast, innovative and reengineered. It took historical knowledge and open minds."

FSNs, as a group, seem considerably more positive about the Agency approaches and information than their USDH and USPSC et al. colleagues. FSNs provide higher ratings than do USDHs on *every one* of the 13 scorable items for IR 4, and higher ratings than USPSCs et al. on all but one. Given the field-AID/W differences, it stands to reason that FSNs (all of whom are field staff) would be generally more positive about Agency approaches for achieving results than all USDHs (many of whom are in AID/W), but it is worth noting that they seem generally more positive than their USPSC et al. colleagues (most of whom are in the field). The sharpest contrasts between FSNs and their USDH and USPSC et al. colleagues are in their more positive responses with respect to automation-MIS (NMS), strategic planning, Agency directives and guidance, and Agency culture.

"Our operating unit is under-staffed, under-equipped, under-funded, and not fully empowered to implement this approach."

As with IR 1, the differences among staff in the geographical regions are somewhat mixed. There are almost no region-specific differences on the Agency's provision of approaches as a whole and staff's access to the information they need. On the 11 specific approaches, however, the general picture is one of staff in the ENI region being relatively less positive than those in the other regions, and of staff in ANE being more positive with respect to more approaches than their counterparts. ENI staff give very low marks for procurement, program implementation organizing approach, performance measurement, and Agency human resources relative to their colleagues in the other regions. ANE staff give higher marks to automation-MIS (NMS), Agency directives and guidance, resource allocation, Agency culture and Agency human resources than do staff in the other regions. Staff in the LAC and AFR regions see strategic planning as being particularly more helpful than do staff in ENI and ANE.

"AID/W needs to move to a collective responsibility for requirements placed on the field and has to think of missions as clients. There has always been a large disconnect between FM, OP, HR, G and regional bureaus on any number of issues. Keeping guidance simple and in one place would help."

There is one quite consistent difference among the sub-groups of Agency staff with varying amounts of time in the Agency. On all but one of the 13 survey items for IR 4, staff who have been in the Agency for less than two years give higher average ratings than their colleagues with more years. Staff with under two years' experience in USAID feel that the Agency generally provides useful approaches and they have access to the information they need for achieving results to a greater extent than do their colleagues. As for specifics, they give the highest ratings to all approaches except strategic planning. They are markedly more positive with respect to automation-MIS (NMS) and somewhat more positive with respect to organizational arrangements, Agency culture, resource allocation, program implementation organizing approach, and Agency directives and guidance. In one area, strategic planning, the staff with two to five years' experience in USAID are most positive.

"This is a cultural thing; if the managers of resources and senior managers believe in flexibility it will happen. I've been blessed to be in an environment for my whole time in USAID when that was the case."

The snapshot for non-managers and managers is a real collage of higher ratings for one or another sub-group. Some noteworthy differences include: senior managers (of more than 50 persons) are considerably more positive about the utility of Agency culture in achieving results, somewhat more positive about Agency human resources, and considerably less positive about the program implementation organizing approach and automation-communication (e-mail, etc.) than all their colleagues; non-managers are considerably more positive than all managers with respect to automation-MIS (NMS), somewhat more positive with respect to Agency directives and guidance, and a bit less positive with respect to access to information; managers of 11-50 persons are considerably more positive about strategic planning and resource allocation; and managers of 11-50 persons are relatively less positive about Agency approaches in general, and somewhat more positive about procurement.

Factors Supporting and Constraining IR 4. As with IR 1, staff had a lot to say about the factors facilitating and hindering the responsiveness and flexibility of Agency approaches in terms of helping them achieve results. According to our survey respondents, things work well when (1) there is effective communication and information sharing (particularly through communications technology and on teams), (2) staff are given the license to be innovative and creative and flex the rules a bit, (3) people are really collaborating on teams, (4) staff receive support from management (both their supervisors and top managers), and (5) the guidance is available, clear, and consistent. When Agency approaches are *not* particularly helpful in achieving results, common culprits include (1) problem processes and tools (especially the procurement process and the NMS), (2) confusion over guidance and rules, and (3) human resistance, such as responsibility-avoidance, risk-avoidance, lack of trust and courage, and so on. Also mentioned, but by fewer respondents are lack of management support (especially authoritarian management at various levels) and lack of communication and information sharing, both of which mirror positive factors.

"In other departments, it was clear (1) what the priorities and strategies were from senior management, (2) they were set by those who knew enough so that they were not inconsistent with the situation on the ground I had to manage, and (3) when I needed senior decisions, I got them."

"There remain in the Agency some individuals who follow orders well, do not think for themselves, and are paralyzed by choices and responsibility. When they are part of the decision or action stream, they can be a roadblock."

If the Agency wants to increase the utility of flexible and responsive approaches, first and foremost, it should, according to our survey respondents, concentrate on getting management on board. There is a strong perception that managers, from senior officials on down the line to managers who are in team leadership positions, must start "walking the walk" of reengineering. The Agency should also focus on clarifying guidance and the many terms that have entered the reengineering lexicon, get more training to all staff (management training for the managers, technical and administrative training for staff, and joint training of managers and staff in appropriate areas), providing more opportunities for information sharing (particularly on what works well and what does not), and fixing and making reengineering-friendly certain processes (especially the procurement system, in the field and in AID/W, and the budget system).

"So much was left open to individual missions to figure out for themselves...that we have spent an inordinate amount of time creating the wheel. Standard Operating Procedures have been replaced with confusion, and potentially serious gaps."

> *"We need a culture of results management that starts from Washington, goes to the Front Office, down to teams, and is reflected in employees' work objectives. Reengineering has let 1000 flowers bloom. Some are roses, some are weeds. It's time to cut away the weeds and replicate roses."*

Advice to the Administrator. Our snapshot ends with a rich body of observations and suggestions from almost 400 Agency staff. While their many thoughtful comments and recommendations cannot adequately be captured here, several of their messages stand out above the rest.

> *"Walk the talk. Don't let Washington or Mission Directors override the principles in practice."*

First, and above all else, USAID staff are asking the Administrator to take charge of making Agency practice consonant with the principles of reengineering, first, by "walking the talk" himself--in everything he does and says--and, second, by demanding that his senior managers--the assistant administrators, deputy assistant administrators, mission directors and office directors--do the same. And he should hold them accountable for practicing the principles themselves and for holding their managers responsible, and down the line.

> *"Reengineering in many offices is only lip service, with centralization of authority more the rule at all levels than decentralization. [can't type more than 6 lines here - much more to say - no place to say it?]"*
> -- a (frustrated) survey respondent

Second, the Administrator should ensure that more authority is delegated from AID/W to the field, from senior managers to mid-managers, from office directors to teams, from U.S. direct hires to foreign service nationals and personal service contractors, and, in many cases, from authoritarian team leaders to team members. He should make empowerment a two-way street--managers empowering staff and staff empowering themselves.

> *"The Administrator needs more feedback from the working level, so that he can encourage senior and mid-level management to recognize and allow more initiative in seeking new approaches to longstanding tasks and problems."*

Third, the Administrator should get out there and talk with staff much more than he does already. He should observe reengineering first hand--in the offices of AID/W and out in the field. He should walk the halls as well as the talk.

> *"Training, training, training."*

Fourth, the Administrator should ensure that staff get the training they need in order to put the principles into practice effectively. This means training not only for the new entry staff and line staff working in teams, but also for their supervisors, and their supervisors, all the way up the line. Training in management, the technical program operations skills--planning, achieving and monitoring and evaluation-- teamwork, and participatory processes are just a few of the areas he should concentrate on.

"Take an honest look at the incentive structure and how it ACTUALLY works--who is getting rewarded and for what?...Reward GOOD management and professional practices and FIELD RESULTS."

Fifth, the Administrator should revise the Agency's incentives systems, to ensure that they are consonant with the principles of reengineering. Continuing to reward old behavior or ignoring the failure or refusal to apply the principles is demoralizing. A key place to start here is with the processes and procedures of the Agency's personnel system.

Agency staff make many, many more recommendations--some of them very specific--for reform of various agency systems and processes (e.g., procurement, budget, NMS, R4, strategic planning, and so on), for dealing with the world outside USAID (e.g., reductions in earmarks, getting the authority to budget by strategic objective, and so on), and for changing people's attitudes and behavior (more trust, more accountability, more teamwork, and so on).

"[Do] nothing more. Just leave us be."

"Encourage and reward people for implementing the principles."

Data Highlights

Indicators for IR 1: Empowered Staff and Teams Accountable for Results

The data for the quantitative indicators for IR 1 are presented in Table IVa below. We used four major indicators (empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making), with two sub-indicators for each (one for individuals and one for teams), to measure progress on this IR.

These data come from Questions 7-14 of the survey. While the data are based on the responses of all respondents to the survey, please note that the number of respondents varies with each question. In general, fewer people responded to the questions about teams, primarily because there were quite a few people who did not have experience on teams.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Table IVa: IR 1 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS
(Scale of Responses: 0.00: Not at all; 1.00: Hardly at all; 2.00: To some extent; 3.00: To a great extent)</th></tr>
<tr><td>Indicator 1.1.a: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of perceptions of INDIVIDUAL EMPOWERMENT to make decisions to achieve agreed-upon objectives.
(Survey Q. 7)</td><td>1.90
(n = 510)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Sub-group differences:
o A slightly higher average rating of individual empowerment among staff in the field (1.96) than in AID/W (1.81)
o Among USDHs (2.04), a considerably higher rating than among FSNs (1.69) and a somewhat higher rating than among USPSCs et al. (1.86)
o No notable differences among staffs in the four regions
o Increasingly higher ratings as time in the Agency increases (1.72 for less than 2 years, 1.80 for 2-5 years, and 1.97 for over 5 years)
o Increasingly higher ratings as number of people managed increases (1.70 for non-managers, 2.19 for managers of 1-10 persons, 2.38 for managers of 11-50 persons, and 2.42 for managers of over 50 persons)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Indicator 1.1.b: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of perceptions of TEAM EMPOWERMENT to make decisions to achieve agreed-upon objectives.
(Survey Q. 8)</td><td>2.06
(n = 432)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Sub-group differences:
o A considerably higher average rating of team empowerment among staff in the field (2.18) than in AID/W (1.78)
o A slightly higher average rating among FSNs (2.11) than among USDHs (2.00) and USPSCs et al. (2.09)
o A slightly lower rating in ENI (2.08) than in the other regions (2.18-2.20)
o No notable difference with regard to time at USAID
o A considerably higher rating among staff managing 11-50 persons (2.35) than among non-managers (2.01) and those managing 1-10 persons (2.06) and over 50 persons (2.06)</td></tr>
</table>

Indicator 1.2.a: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of perceptions of INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY for managing for results. (Survey Q. 9)	**2.25 (n = 512)**
Sub-group differences: o A slightly stronger perception of being held individually accountable among field staff (2.28) than AID/W staff (2.22) o A slightly stronger perception among USDHs (2.34) than among FSNs (2.20) and USPSCs et al. (2.12) o A slightly stronger perception in ANE and LAC regions (2.36 and 2.33) than in AFR and ENI (2.18 and 2.26) o A considerably stronger perception among those in the Agency for 2 to 5 years (2.29) and more than 5 years (2.29) than among those in the Agency for less than 2 years (2.08) o A substantially stronger perception among all managers (2.51 for managers of 1-10 persons, 2.55 for managers of 11-50, and 2.36 for managers of over 50) than for non-managers (2.13)	
Indicator 1.2.b: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of perceptions of TEAM ACCOUNTABILITY for managing for results. (Survey Q. 10)	**2.19 (n = 428)**
Sub-group differences: o A considerably stronger perception of teams' being held accountable among field staff (2.28) than among AID/W staff (1.97) o A stronger perception among FSNs (2.34) than among USDHs (2.07) and USPSCs et al. (2.17) o A considerably stronger perception in the LAC region (2.51) and a considerably weaker perception in ENI (1.94) than in AFR (2.29) and ANE (2.24) o No notable difference with regard to time at USAID o A slightly stronger perception among non-managers (2.21) than among all managers (2.07-2.14)	
Indicator 1.3.a: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of degree to which the offices in which they work provided INCENTIVES TO INDIVIDUALS for managing for results in the last six months. (Survey Q. 11)	**1.20 (n = 504)**
Sub-group differences: o A considerably stronger perception of individual incentives among field staff (1.33) than among AID/W staff (0.94) o A considerably stronger perception among FSNs (1.42) than among USDHs (1.10) and USPSCs et al. (1.16) o The strongest perception of incentives in the ENI region (1.47) and the lowest in AFR (1.19), with ANE (1.41) and LAC (1.30) in the middle o A much stronger perception among staff with less than 2 years' experience in the Agency (1.55) than among staff with 2-5 years' experience (1.05) and with over 5 years' experience (1.16) o A considerably stronger perception among managers of over 50 persons (1.52) and managers of 11-50 persons (1.32) than among managers of 1-10 persons (1.13) and non-managers (1.16)	
Indicator 1.3.b: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of degree to which the offices in which they work provided INCENTIVES TO TEAMS for managing for results in the last six months. (Survey Q. 12)	**1.28 (n = 424)**
Sub-group differences: o A stronger perception of incentives for teams among field staff (1.41) than among AID/W staff (1.28) o A considerably stronger percepton among FSNs (1.52) than among USDHs (1.09) and USPSCs et al. (1.21) o Stronger perceptions among LAC staff (1.52) and ANE staff (1.41) than among AFR staff (1.28) and ENI staff (1.27) o A considerably stronger perception among staff with under 2 years in the Agency (1.59) than among other staff (1.15-1.20) o Considerably stronger perceptions among managers of 11-50 (1.40) and over 50 (1.39) than among non-managers (1.23) and managers of 1-10 persons (1.16)	

Indicator 1.3.a: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of degree to which the offices in which they work provided INCENTIVES TO INDIVIDUALS for managing for results in the last six months. (Survey Q. 11)	**1.20 (n = 504)**
Sub-group differences: o A considerably stronger perception of individual incentives among field staff (1.33) than among AID/W staff (0.94) o A considerably stronger perception among FSNs (1.42) than among USDHs (1.10) and USPSCs et al. (1.16) o The strongest perception of incentives in the ENI region (1.47) and the lowest in AFR (1.19), with ANE (1.41) and LAC (1.30) in the middle o A much stronger perception among staff with less than 2 years' experience in the Agency (1.55) than among staff with 2-5 years' experience (1.05) and with over 5 years' experience (1.16) o A considerably stronger perception among managers of over 50 persons (1.52) and managers of 11-50 persons (1.32) than among managers of 1-10 persons (1.13) and non-managers (1.16)	
Indicator 1.3.b: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of degree to which the offices in which they work provided INCENTIVES TO TEAMS for managing for results in the last six months. (Survey Q. 12)	**1.28 (n = 424)**
Sub-group differences: o A stronger perception of incentives for teams among field staff (1.41) than among AID/W staff (1.28) o A considerably stronger perception among FSNs (1.52) than among USDHs (1.09) and USPSCs et al. (1.21) o Stronger perceptions among LAC staff (1.52) and ANE staff (1.41) than among AFR staff (1.28) and ENI staff (1.27) o A considerably stronger perception among staff with under 2 years in the Agency (1.59) than among other staff (1.15-1.20) o Considerably stronger perceptions among managers of 11-50 (1.40) and over 50 (1.39) than among non-managers (1.23) and managers of 1-10 persons (1.16)	
Indicator 1.4.a: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of self-reported extent to which INDIVIDUALS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED DECISIONS within the last six months to influence approaches or resources used. (Survey Q. 13)	**1.97 (n = 493)**
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher rating of decision-making among AID/W staff (1.89) than among field staff (1.70) o Higher ratings among USDHs (2.11) and USPSCs (2.03) than among FSNs (1.79) o No notable difference with regard to region o A slightly higher rating among staff in the Agency for over 5 years (1.96) than among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (1.89) and 2-5 years (1.75) o Considerably higher ratings among all three groups of managers (2.27-2.31) than non-managers (1.84)	
Indicator 1.4.b: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of self-reported extent to which TEAMS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED DECISIONS within the last six months to influence approaches or resources used. (Survey Q. 14)	**1.92 (n = 420)**
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating of team decision-making among field staff (2.02) than among AID/W staff (1.68) o No notable difference with regard to employment status o A relatively high rating in the LAC region (2.19) and a relatively low rating in ENI (1.80), with ANE and AFR in the middle (2.00 for both) o No notable difference with regard to time in USAID o An increasingly higher rating as management responsibility increases from non-managers (1.86) to managers of over 50 persons (2.19)	

Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Achievement of IR 1. In the survey, we asked respondents to identify factors that were responsible for instances in which the principles of empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making worked well (Q. 15) and did not work well (Q. 16). There were 409 responses to Q. 15 and 397 to Q. 16. Our content analysis of the responses to both questions revealed three key factors for making it possible for the principles to work well and the absence of the same three factors for making it difficult for the principles to work well. It stands to reason that many of the people who cited a positive factor in Q. 15 would also cite the reverse of that factor in Q. 16. Notwithstanding that fact, the following three factors stood out among all the rest:

- ***Management commitment and support (or lack of it) --*** 93 respondents offered this as a positive factor, and 101 respondents offered its absence as a negative factor. We received such comments as the following when the principles worked well: "a supportive and trusting manager," "leadership," and "when senior managers held the team accountable for results without trying to micromanage the process." On the negative side, 101 respondents offered such comments as the following for when the principles did not work well: "when people who talk the talk do not walk the walk," "lack of leadership/guidance at the mission director level," and "management not really interested."

- ***Effective Teamwork (or lack of it) --*** 50 respondents to Q. 15 made such comments as "team members working toward the same goal" or "the right balance of knowledge, skill and experience" when describing good teamwork as a positive influence on making the principles work well. When the principles did not work, lack of or ineffective teamwork was cited as a reason by 57 respondents. They said such things as "controlling team leaders," "the good of the individual was placed above the good of the team," and "when there is not a sharing of information and communication among SO team members."

- ***Staff and teams were empowered and held accountable (or not) --*** 45 respondents said that the principles guiding managing for results worked well when staff and teams were really empowered and really held accountable, while 38 respondents cited the absence of these conditions in cases where the principles did not work well. Positive comments included "allowing team members full responsibility to make decisions and move forward" and "having sufficient training to do my job, resources to research the best approach, and minimum bureaucracy to implement." Among the negative comments: "teams have been formed but the same management level makes all the major decisions" and "there are no clear guidelines of the extent of empowerment."

Other factors making it possible for the principles relating to empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making to work well, were cited by a substantial number of respondents: *trust* (35), *a good decision-making process* (31), *clear goals and direction* (30), and *delegations of authority* (29). Other factors cited as making implementation of the principles *difficult* were *centralized decision-making and poor decision making process* (25), *lack of delegations of authority* (20), and *lack of resources* (19).

What Needs to Be Done to Increase Achievement of IR 1, i.e. The Extent to Which Staff and Teams Feel Empowered and Accountable for Results? In Question 17, we asked survey respondents, who needs to do what to improve the situation so that their working experience reflects the principles relating to empowerment, accountability, incentives and decision-making. We received recommendations from 410 respondents. The most common comments fell into five categories, four of which, not surprisingly, mirror major factors identified in Questions 15 and 16. The one that does not is training and education. These five types of recommendations, and a few illustrative comments for each, are as follows:

- ***Management support and commitment*** **(128 responses) --** “Directors and deputy directors need to emphasize these principles to their supervisory staff and follow up to make sure their staff are applying them.” “Management needs to stop protecting managers...who only understand how to use disincentives and threats..., do not trust their staff, and who [say] ‘damn the process...hit the target--MY target.'”

- ***Teamwork*** **(51 responses) --** “The Agency needs to understand how teams function.” “Team leaders need to be more coach-oriented, delegating, sharing information....” “Team leaders must accept that implementation responsibility is still with project and activity managers. Not every decision is a collective decision of the team. Teams are for strategy development, planning, monitoring, not day-to-day implementation.”

- ***Training and education*** **(39 responses) --** “More sensitization of senior managers.” “Training in program management with the new principles should be offered to all technical staff.” “We have totally inadequate management training...[but] even with training there is hardly anyone to DO THE WORK.”

- ***Empower people*** **(34 responses) --** “Empower FSNs, especially at the middle level.” “Match authority with accountability.” “The DAA needs to empower the professional staff to achieve the goals and then step back and let them do it--giving high ranking to high achievers and low ranking to low achievers.”

- ***Delegation of Authority*** **(19 responses) --** “The delegation from Washington to the field has to be real; the Mission Director has to delegate authority and responsibility to the teams.” “We need to be trusted to make important decisions ourselves.”

Additional comments of advice fell into the categories of rewarding and recognizing people (19); increasing incentives (14); EVERYONE applying the principles (12); clearly defining direction, objectives and results (10); trusting people (8); and increasing communication (8).

Indicators for IR 2: Addressing Development Needs Through Customers and Partners

The data for the quantitative indicators for IR 2 are presented in Table IVb below. To measure progress on this IR, we used seven major indicators, which are divided into two subsets on the basis of the type of survey respondent. The first three indicators tap the perceptions of *Operating Unit directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers* (whom we refer to as “OU-level program managers”) with respect to OU involvement with customers and partners. With the first two indicators, we measured the extent to which OU-level program managers reported that their units' strategic plans were developed on the basis of needs expressed by customers (2.1) and on the basis of input from partners (2.2). In conjunction with those indicators, we also asked how their operating units obtained information from their customers and partners. With the third indicator, we measured the OU-level group's ability to estimate, with a certain degree of confidence, the percentage of the financial resources that their OUs' partners were contributing toward achieving their OUs' strategic plans (2.3). This indicator is a proxy measure of the extent to which informed partnership is really occurring.

The remaining four indicators tap the perceptions of *strategic objective team leaders, members, and activity managers* (whom we refer to as "SO-team-level program managers") with respect to team involvement with customers and partners. Indicators 2.4, 2.6, and 2.7 are similar to 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, except that they involve strategic plan development and modification and partners' resource contributions at the SO level, instead of at the entire OU strategy level. Indicator 2.5, which is unique to this set of respondents, deals with the extent to which program activities have been planned or changed on the basis of customer feedback.

The data for Indicators 2.1-2.7 come from Questions 35, 38, 41/42, 47, 48, 52 and 55/56 of the survey, respectively. Questions 42 and 56 asked respondents to assess their level of confidence in their estimates of partner financial contributions. Subsequently, only those respondents expressing a high degree of confidence were counted on questions 41 and 55.

Please note that the number of respondents varies with each question. The differences in response rates are due primarily to the fact that Questions 35, 38, and 41/42 were asked of OU respondents only, and Questions 47, 48, 52 and 55/56 were asked of SO team respondents only.

Table IVb: IR 2 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS	
Indicator 2.1: Operating Unit directors', deputy directors, and chief program officers' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of perceptions of the extent to which their Operating Units' STRATEGIC PLAN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED BASED ON NEEDS EXPRESSED BY CUSTOMERS (Scale of Responses: 0.00: Not at all; 1.00: Hardly at all; 2.00: To some extent; 3.00: To a great extent) (Survey Q. 35)	**2.16 (n = 118)**
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating among field staff (2.27) than AID/W staff (1.93) o A much higher rating among USDHs and FSNs (2.18 and 2.17) than among USPSCs et al. (1.67) o A slightly higher rating among LAC staff (2.35) than among those in other three regions (2.20-2.27) o Among staff with 2-5 years' experience in the Agency (2.30), a somewhat higher rating than among those with over 5 years (2.15) and a considerably higher rating than among those with less than 2 years (2.00) o Considerably higher ratings among managers of over 50 persons (2.32) and of 11-50 persons (2.25) than among non-managers and managers of 1-10 persons (both 2.00)	
Indicator 2.2: Operating Unit directors', deputy directors, and chief program officers' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of perceptions of the extent to which their Operating Units' STRATEGIC PLAN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED BASED ON INPUT FROM PARTNERS (Scale of Responses: 0.00: Not at all; 1.00: Hardly at all; 2.00: To some extent; 3.00: To a great extent) (Survey Q. 38)	**2.31 (n = 85)**
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating among field staff (2.42) than AID/W staff (2.07) o Among USDHs (2.36), a considerably higher rating than among FSNs (2.00) and a much higher rating than among USPSCs et al. (1.50) o Among LAC (2.81) region staff, a considerably higher rating than among staff in ENI (2.50), ANE (2.29), and AFR (2.07) o A considerably higher rating among staff with over 5 years (2.34) than among those with 2-5 years (2.00) (There was only one respondent with less than 2 years.) o Among managers of over 50 persons (2.58), a considerably higher rating than among other managers (2.26-2.29) and a much higher rating than among non-managers (2.00)	
Indicator 2.3: The percentage of Operating Unit directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers who were able to estimate, at a self-reported level of confidence of "very" or "extremely" confident, the PERCENTAGE OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES directed toward achieving their Operating Units' strategic plans (either budgeted or actually expended) that was being CONTRIBUTED BY THEIR OPERATING UNITS' PARTNERS. (Survey Q. 41)	**47% (n = 73)**
The particular e-mail survey software used (Raosoft) did not allow computation of sub-group differences for this indicator. These computations required cross-tabulations of three items, which could not have been done without creating a new data base and using a standard analytical program.	

Sources of Information from Customers and Partners. In Questions 36-37 and 39-40, we asked OU-level program managers how their Operating Units obtained information from customers and partners, respectively. In Questions 50-51 and 53-54, we asked essentially the same questions of SO-Team-level program managers, except in relation to their teams obtaining information. In each pair of questions, we first provided a list of possible sources of information and asked respondents to check off as many as applied. We then asked if they could cite other sources that were not on the list.

Table IVc presents the data from those survey questions. The data indicate that two of the most common sources of information from both customers and partners, as cited by both OU-level and SO-Team-level program managers, are regular meetings and site visits.

Table IVc: SOURCES OF INFORMATION FROM CUSTOMERS AND PARTNERS

	Sources of CUSTOMER Information				Sources of PARTNER Information			
	OU-Level Program Managers		SO-Team-Level Program Managers		OU-Level Program Managers		SO-Team-Level Program Managers	
Types of Sources	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited
Customer/partner is an SO Team member	19		33		34		62	
Survey	46		61		30		29	
Focus Group	47	*	43		37		44	
Rapid Appraisal	21		34		12		21	
Regular Meetings	50	*	108	*	71	*	138	*
Telephone/e-mail	34		68		49		86	*
Planning Workshops	45		69	*	57	*	82	
Site Visits	60	*	110	*	52	*	97	*
Other	14		21		9		16	
Total	336		547		351		575	

Among “other” sources of information from CUSTOMERS that our respondents cited were such things as: local NGOs that serve or represent customers, informal meetings with selected customers, informal communications, field mission sources (for AID/W program managers), reports from contractors, proposals received, monitoring and evaluations, FSN input, the media, fellow donors who track customers, special studies, sector assessments that included consultations, formal requests via letters, interviews, conferences, and literature reviews.

“Other” sources of information from PARTNERS included: proposals, periodic meetings, town meetings, reports, correspondence, roundtable discussions, informal communication, joint partner meetings, steering committees, retreats with partners, extended team meetings, sector assessments, discussions with government officials, semi-annual reports, interviews, and special studies.

Examples of Activity Planning or Modification on the Basis of Customer Feedback. Please recall that in Question 48 of the survey (for Indicator 2.5), we asked SO-team-level respondents to tell us the extent to which their teams had planned or changed their development program activities on the basis of customer feedback in the past six months. The average rating on that question was 1.70, between "hardly at all" (1.00) and "to some extent" (2.00). In Question 49, we then asked for examples from those who responded above the "not at all" level. A small number of the nearly 100 examples we received appeared to refer more to "partners" than to customers, e.g., collaborating host country government agencies, NGOs, contractors, etc. The terms "customer" and "partner" are quite relative terms, and both can actually apply to the same entity depending on the process or transaction in question, but in this small number of cases it was clear that respondents were not using the terms as defined under reengineering.

Many of the examples cited referred to the *means* of obtaining customer feedback or the situations in which customer feedback are used, rather than examples of planning or changing program activities on the basis of that feedback. Respondents cited such things as those mentioned in the sub-section immediately above: customer surveys, meetings involving customers, focus group sessions, site visits, and so on.

Many respondents did cite examples of program activity planning or modification on the basis of customer feedback, however. Here are a few of the ones they offered:

- "In the last three months, at the request of the local business community, USAID has engaged in a review of labor law and an analysis of the value-added tax. These were not even blips on our screen six months ago."

- "We finalized the design process for one of the results packages--this resulted from a lot of dialoguing with our customers."

- "Activities have been focused on two towns, referred to as high potential zones, following customer recommendations."

- "We developed a new results package for adolescent reproductive health based on direct input from customers and stakeholders. This is a new activity for us."

- "We are abandoning some services/products and procedures not desired or appreciated by our customers, sometimes to the chagrin of our partners, who were using our resources to accomplish activities they deemed important."

- "We reviewed the results framework with 65 of our potential customers and changed aspects of the RF in response to input."

- “The design of a RP [results package] for one IR [intermediate result] involved monthly meetings with customer representatives. Activities under another IR are being changed as a result of a customer survey.”

The following examples do not relate to program activity planning and modification, but they do indicate that people are also thinking of their colleagues and contractors as customers, too.

- “The members of my team have been in cross training to learn one another's duties, so that when someone is absent, everybody else can perform his/her duties.”

- “Our customers expressed concern about the way our Controller's Office was operating. The matter was addressed and we have no more complaints.”

What Needs to Be Done to Increase Achievement of IR 2, i.e. to Better use Customers and Partners to Address Development Needs? In Questions 43 and 57, we asked OU-level and SO-Team-level program managers to tell us what they considered the most important things that need to be done to improve the situation so that Agency practice fulfills the principles regarding customers and partners. The 331 suggestions we received from all the respondents answering Questions 43 and 57 revealed several types of comments with high frequencies. The top 5 types of advice were as follows:

- ***Provide more clarity in guidance and definitions and more flexibility in application, especially with respect to procurement and partners*** (44 responses) -- Respondents cited such needs as “more flexible procurement rules” and “more clarity on conflict of interest” to allow partner collaboration, “fewer procedural requirements forced on the field,” and redefinition of the term “customer” (for example, to include grassroots organizations, or to refer to U.S. taxpayers).

- ***Increase the dialogue with customers and partners, especially through creative ways of communicating*** (34 responses) -- The comments here were very general, such as “take the time to continuously consult and involve,” or “meet with partners and customers more often.”

- ***Increase management's and leaders' support of the core values*** (27 responses) -- A few comments: “Top managers need to be sure that there is adequate travel money so that managers can get out there and work with people;” “management must demonstrate how it is addressing the needs of *its* partners and customers;” “strong senior management leadership.”

- ***Provide adequate resources, especially OE resources for travel*** (25 responses) -- Respondents' comments centered around two themes as expressed by these two examples: “increased staff in the field” and “more OE for travel.”

- ***Allow more time for staff to consult with customers and partners*** (23 responses) -- Respondents want “more time outside the office for field trips,” “greater time in the planning process,” and so on.

Other advice comments centered around more regular consultation with customers and partners (12), more promotion of transparency and trust (11), more active listening to customers and partners (10), involvement of customers and partners in every phase of the program operations cycle (10), more acquisition of feedback (9) and more empowerment of teams and operating units to respond to customers and partners (9).

Indicators for IR 3: Results Oriented Decision Making

The data for the quantitative indicators for IR 3 are presented in Table IVd below. We used three major indicators to measure progress on this IR. Two of them dealt with the use of performance information: (3.1) the percentage of Operating Unit (OU) respondents (directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers) and strategic objective (SO) team respondents (leaders, members, and activity managers) reporting that SO teams used performance information to confirm or make adjustments in their results frameworks or allocations of resources two or more times during the past year, and (3.2) the percentage of SO team respondents reporting that their teams or activity managers used performance information to make a decision confirming or adjusting program activities two or more times during the past year. Indicator 3.1 was disaggregated into OU respondents and SO respondents. The third major indicator (3.3) was the extent to which both OU and SO respondents agreed (or disagreed) that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results.

These data come from Questions 44, 58, 60 and 63 of the survey. Please note that the number of respondents varies with each question. The differences in response rates are due primarily to the fact that Question 44 was asked of OU respondents only, Questions 58 and 60 were asked of SO team respondents only, and Question 63 was asked of both OU and SO team respondents.

Table IVd: IR 3 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS	
Indicator 3.1.a: Percentage of Operating Unit directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers who reported that there were two or more times during the past year in which a strategic objective team decided to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information. (Survey Q. 44)	**64%** (n = 69)
Sub-group differences: o A much higher percentage among field staff (77%) than AID/W staff (33%) o A considerably higher rating among USPSCs et al. (100%) than among USDHs (66%) (There were no FSN OU directors et al., and there were only 3 USPSCs et al. in this respondent group.) o Among AFR and ANE staff (both 83%), a somewhat higher percentage than among ENI staff (73%) and LAC staff (69%) o A somewhat higher rating among staff with more than 5 years' experience in the Agency than among those with 2-5 years (50%) (There were no staff with less than 2 years in this respondent group) o Considerably higher percentages among managers of over 50 persons (78%) and non-managers (71%) than among both groups of middle managers (53-56%) (The non-managers are presumably all program officers.)	
Indicator 3.1.b: Percentage of strategic objective team leaders, members and activity managers who reported that there were two or more times during the past year in which their teams decided to confirm or adjust their results frameworks or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information. (Survey Q. 58)	**47%** (n = 147)
Sub-group differences: o A much higher percentage among field staff (53%) than among AID/W staff (21%) o A slightly higher percentage among FSNs (53%) than among USDHs (44%) and USPSCs et al. (46%) o Somewhat higher percentages in the AFR, ENI, and ANE regions (56-58%) than in the LAC region (42%) o A slightly higher percentage among staff in the Agency for less than 2 years (56%) than among the other two groups of staff (45-47%) o Consistently increasing percentages from non-managers (44%) to managers of 1-10 (50%) to managers of 11-50 (60%) (There were no managers of more than 50 persons in this respondent group.)	
Indicator 3.2: Percentage of strategic objective team leaders, members and activity managers who reported that there were two or more times during the past six months in which their teams decided to confirm or adjust their program activities on the basis of performance information. (Survey Q. 60)	**50%** (n = 145)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher percentage among field staff (54%) than among AID/W staff (35%) o No differences among USDHs, FSNs, and USPSCs et al. (50-51%) o In the ANE region (64%) a slightly higher percentage than in the ENI and AFR regions (59% and 56%), and a much higher percentage than in LAC (34%) o Somewhat higher percentages among staff in the Agency for 2-5 years (57%) and under 2 years (56%) than among staff in the Agency for over 5 years (46%) o A considerably higher percentage among managers of 11-50 persons (78%) than among non-managers (47%) and managers of 1-10 persons (50%) (There were no managers of over 50 persons in this respondent group.)	

Indicator 3.3: Average rating, on a scale of -3 to +3, of extent to which mission director, deputy mission directors, chief program officers, SO team leaders, SO team members, and SO team activity managers agreed that the RESULTS FRAMEWORK is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results. (Scale of Responses: -3 = strongly disagree; -1 = disagree; +1 = agree; and +3 = strongly agree) (Survey Q. 63)	**1.17** (n = 271)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat more positive rating among field staff (1.31, a little over "agree") than among AID/W staff (0.67, a little under "agree") o A somewhat more positive rating among FSNs (1.44) than among USDHs (1.07) and USPSCs et al. (0.96) o Somewhat more positive ratings in the ANE, AFR, and LAC regions (1.46, 1.37 and 1.38) than in ENI (0.76) o A somewhat more positive rating among staff in the Agency for under 2 years (1.67) than among other staff (1.10-1.12) o A somewhat more positive rating among managers of over 50 persons (1.56) than among non-managers and mid-managers (1.11-1.21)	

Examples of the Use of Performance Information. In conjunction with Questions 44, 58, and 60 (for Indicators 3.1.a, 3.1.b, and 3.2), we asked respondents to cite examples of instances of making decisions on the basis of performance information (Questions 45, 59 and 61). These questions were used as both a check to see if people reporting decisions could actually cite examples--and they could cite many--and as a source of interesting examples to enrich our quantitative data.

In response to Questions 45 and 59, 42 OU respondents (directors, deputy directors and chief program officers) and 84 SO team respondents (leaders, members and activity managers), respectively, cited a variety of examples of use of performance information by an SO team to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources. Some of the examples reflect decisions on the part of the "front office," but most often those actions appear to have included the concurrence or recommendation of SO teams. It is also worth noting that many of the decisions about results frameworks that were cited involved decisions about activities and projects or about indicators, not necessarily decisions about key results or causal relationships in the results framework. A few of the many interesting examples cited are as follows:

- "SO 4 was changed to give it a more specific focus on water, as opposed to the broader area of natural resources."

- "Lack of progress on electoral administration led to a change in the framework and change in contractors. The mission recognized that, while electoral administration is not perfect, further improvements could only be realized through greater civil society involvement."

- "We were getting more hard results in EG, so when the budget crunch came, we opted for more EG rather than try to 'save' DG, which was extremely important but much harder to produce hard results."

- “In HIV/AIDS, our SO team was getting poor results in a ‘peer education activity.' Analysis showed that greater promise could be attained through another, more intense, behavior change methodology--voluntary counseling and testing. The former program is being shut down and we are moving in the new direction.”

- “Several activities/projects were terminated because of inability to clearly influence performance indicators or achieve stated objectives.”

- “Our IR [Intermediate Result] team got more resources based on performance factors.”

- “A sector assessment and performance monitoring information helped us shift two intermediate results to lower levels of the results framework because we learned they were more means than results.”

In response to Question 61, 62 SO team respondents cited examples of their teams making decisions to confirm or adjust program activities on the basis of performance information. Just about all of these examples were activity-level examples, but many of them were very similar to examples presented in Question 59. Several respondents (not counted in the 62) simply noted that their example for this question was the same as for Question 59. This suggests that some USAID staff do not make much, if any, distinction between results frameworks and activities when thinking about decisions based on performance information.

Examples cited include “changed the end date of a condition precedent,” “did not renew an agreement,” “terminated an activity,” “deferred certain activities,” “scaled back assistance due to partner's lack of clear objectives,” and “used lessons learned from pilot projects to refocus activities.”

The Results Framework.   As indicated in Table IVd, OU and SO Team respondents, on average, “agreed” that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results. (The average was 1.17 (on a scale of -3 to +3, with 1.00 reflecting “agreement” and 3.00 reflecting “strong agreement.”) Of those who expressed an opinion, 87 percent expressed agreement or strong agreement, while 13 percent expressed disagreement or strong disagreement.

We also asked (in Question 64) respondents to give their reasons for agreement or disagreement regarding the effectiveness of the results framework. The 251 comments we received reflect a common view of the results framework as not only a strategic planning and management tool, but also, with its accompanying performance indicators, as a tool for measuring results and monitoring activities.

The following comments are illustrative of the range and depth of positive and negative feelings about the results framework:

- “The results framework keeps us all fiercely on track.”

- "It shows the relationship among the results and the way for evaluating them through specific indicators."

- "It might be a tool, but it is not as effective as it is supposed to be. The language used confuses everyone--partners, counterparts, customers."

- "It is very good at helping teams/mission focus and articulate what the common objective(s) is. However, there is no one right way to write the objectives. We spend countless hours reworking the frameworks and indicators to make them near perfect...which isn't possible."

- "One can see or understand at a glance what a strategic objective is supposed to do and who are the members. If well designed, it is self-explanatory."

- "The time and effort (and general disinterest) in working on such a framework mean that no one wants to change it again--it isn't a tool, but a corset."

- "The results framework is all but ignored in this Bureau."

- "It guides implementation. It facilitates result monitoring. It guides selection of activities. It guides processes."

- "The world is not as simple as direct cause and effect--the model is too narrow."

- "Results frameworks seem to force activities into areas that are measurable--with the emphasis on the measurement, not the activity."

We also asked respondents to tell us what needs to be done to make the results framework a more effective tool. The 212 responses fell into a wide variety of categories. The three most common pieces of advice centered around training, more simplicity and flexibility, and more participation in developing results frameworks:

- ***Make it more simple and flexible*** -- 32 respondents want the tool to be easier to use. Most of the responses here were very general, such as "keep it simple." A few more specific comments: "allow greater flexibility to adjust the results framework annually as experience dictates," and "allow flexibility in format and content of frameworks, adapted to specific needs of teams."

- ***More training and education*** -- 22 respondents suggest that training is the key to a more effective results framework. A few comments: "we used to have mandatory training on the old log-frame--we need the same on the new RF;" "give examples and patient explanation, walk people through live cases...to support staff's understanding;" and "TRAINING!--disseminate examples of good ones (I haven't seen any that I like yet)."

- ***More participation*** -- 16 respondents think that there should be more involvement of partners and customers in the development and use of results frameworks. One respondent put it quite aptly: “We need to educate everyone from the janitor to the Mission Director to all NGOs, PVOs, Host Government, ‘this is why we're here, and this is how we prove/disprove that the strategic framework is on target.”

Other types of advice given include developing ***more understanding*** of the results framework and related concepts (13), making it ***more precise*** (11), providing ***more resources*** to develop and use it effectively (9), inserting ***more realism*** into developing results and objectives (9), and disseminating ***more guidance and best practices*** about the results framework (7).

What Needs to Be Done to Increase Achievement of IR 3, i.e., to Increase the Extent to Which SO Teams Base Their Decisions on Performance Information?   We asked this question of survey respondents (in Questions 46 and 62), and we received 240 comments. The two areas with the largest numbers of responses were the needs for 1. better monitoring and evaluation systems and practices and 2. more flexibility with USAID's systems (e.g., budget, program and activity management).

- ***Better monitoring and evaluation systems and practices*** -- 34 respondents suggest that the Agency and its staff need such things as “simpler monitoring tools,” “better, more objective systems for collecting performance information,” “a good system of measuring progress,” and “strict monitoring based on a well conceptualized plan.”

- ***More flexibility in Agency systems*** -- 27 respondents cited such things as “more flexible resource allocation,” “[more of a connection between] budgetary allocations and performance,” “flexible assistance vehicles, like umbrella contracts under SOAGs,” and “multi-year budgets [that could] permit greater flexibility.”

Other recommendations included ***more communication and customer/partner input*** (14), ***better and more flexible indicators*** (13), more ***reviews and analyses*** of performance information (12), ***more resources*** (especially to collect data and get staff out into the field) (11), better data (11), ***training and technical assistance*** in managing for results (10), ***incentives*** (10), and ***leadership and guidance*** (10). Fifteen respondents felt that they already do a good job of using performance information or that they are on the right track and need a little more time.

Indicators for IR 4: Responsive and Flexible Approaches for Achieving

The data for the quantitative indicators for IR 4 are presented in Table IVe below. We used three major indicators to measure progress on this IR: the Agency's provision of approaches for achieving results, the responsiveness and flexibility of specific approaches in program operations for achieving results, and access to the information needed for achieving results. The second indicator, the one dealing with specific approaches, is divided into 11 sub-indicators, each dealing with a specific approach (i.e., a tool, tactic, process or system) provided by the Agency.

These data come from Questions 18-30 of the survey. While the data are based on the responses of all respondents to the survey, please note that the number of respondents varies with each question. The differences in response rates are due primarily to the numbers of respondents who had actual experience with approaches and information relating to managing to achieve results and could therefore answer the survey questions.

Table IVe: IR 4 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS (Scale of Responses: 0.00: Not at all; 1.00: Hardly at all; 2.00: To some extent; 3.00: To a great extent)	
Indicator 4.1: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of the extent to which the Agency has provided them with the APPROACHES they need to effectively achieve results. (Survey Q. 18)	**1.76** (n = 484)
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating among field staff (1.85) than AID/W staff (1.57) o A considerably higher rating among FSNs (1.90) than among USDHs (1.65) and USPSCs et al. (1.75) o No notable difference with regard to region o A somewhat higher rating among staff with less than 2 years' experience in the Agency (1.86) than among others (1.72-1.74) o Among managers of over 50 persons (1.83), a slightly higher rating than among managers of 11-50 (1.78) and non-managers (1.76), and somewhat higher rating than among managers of 1-10 persons (1.67)	
Indicator 4.2.a: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which STRATEGIC PLANNING (incl. customer planning, results frameworks, etc.) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 19)	**1.90** (n = 441)
Sub-group differences: o A much higher rating among field staff (2.07) than among AID/W staff (1.56) o A higher rating among FSNs (2.08) than among USDHs (1.77) and USPSCs et al. (1.98) o Considerably higher ratings in the LAC region (2.22) and AFR (2.18) than in ANE (1.97) and ENI (1.72) o A slightly higher rating among staff in the Agency for 2-5 years (2.01) than other staff (1.86-1.94) o A low rating among managers of over 50 persons (1.77) relative to those of other managers (1.93-2.05) and non-managers (1.86)	
Indicator 4.2.b: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which PROCUREMENT (A&A, performance-based contracts, contracts, grants, etc.) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 20)	**1.63** (n = 416)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher rating among field staff (1.68) than among AID/W staff (1.53) o A considerably higher rating among FSNs (1.78) than among USDHs (1.58) and USPSCs et al. (1.48) o The highest rating in the LAC region (1.84), and the lowest in ENI (1.40), with ANE (1.77) and AFR (1.63) in the middle o A slightly higher rating among staff in the Agency for 2-5 years (1.71) and under 2 years (1.72) than among staff in the Agency for over 5 years (1.60) o Higher ratings among non-managers (1.66) and managers of 1-10 persons (1.68) than among managers of more persons (1.50-1.53)	

Indicator 4.2.c: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (offices, operating units, teams) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 21)	**1.96** (n = 493)
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating among field staff (2.06) than among AID/W staff (1.75) o A somewhat higher rating among FSNs (2.08) and USPSCs et al. (2.06) than among USDHs (1.85) o Higher ratings in the AFR region (2.19) and ENI (2.10) than in LAC (1.99) and ANE (1.94) o A somewhat higher rating among staff in the Agency for under 2 years (2.13) than among other staff (1.92-1.95) o No notable difference with regard to management status	
Indicator 4.2.d: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which AUTOMATION-COMMUNICATION (internet, e-mail, web) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 22)	**2.45** (n = 512)
Sub-group differences: o No notable difference with regard to locale o No notable difference with regard to employment status o No notable difference with regard to region o Considerably higher ratings among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (2.55) and more than 5 years (2.48) than among staff with 2-5 years (2.33) o A substantially lower rating among managers of over 50 persons (2.18) than among all other managers and non-managers (2.45-2.55)	
Indicator 4.2.e: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which AUTOMATION-MIS (NMS) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 23)	**0.93** (n = 425)
Sub-group differences: o A slightly higher rating among AID/W staff (1.00) than among field staff (0.90) o A considerably higher rating among FSNs (1.16) than among USDHs (0.82) and USPSCs et al. (0.76) o A somewhat higher rating in the ANE region (1.07) than in the other three regions (0.77-0.85) o A much higher rating among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (1.49) than among other staff (0.86-0.90) o The highest rating among non-managers (1.03) and the lowest among managers of over 50 persons (0.64), with managers of 1-10 (0.74) and managers of 11-50 (0.84) in the middle	

Indicator	Rating
Indicator 4.2.f: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZING APPROACH (results packages, projects, activities) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 24)	**1.80** (n = 414)
Sub-group differences: o A substantially higher rating among field staff (1.93) than among AID/W staff (1.53) o A considerably higher rating among USPSCs et al. (1.93) and FSNs (1.92) than among USDHs (1.68) o In the ANE and LAC regions (2.03 and 2.01), a somewhat higher rating than in AFR (1.91) and a considerably higher rating than in ENI (1.71) o Sizable decreases in rating as time in the Agency increases--from 2.06 for under 2 years, to 1.86 for 2-5 years, and 1.74 for over 5 years o A somewhat lower rating among managers of over 50 persons (1.64) than among all other managers and non-managers (1.81-1.84)	
Indicator 4.2.g: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which AGENCY DIRECTIVES AND GUIDANCE contribute to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 25)	**1.75** (n = 487)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher rating among field staff (1.82) than among AID/W staff (1.61) o A considerably higher rating among FSNs (1.95) than among USDHs (1.64) and USPSCs et al. (1.62) o In the ANE region (1.96), a somewhat higher rating than in AFR (1.79) and LAC (1.78) and a considerably higher rating than in ENI (1.62) o A somewhat higher rating among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (1.89) than among other staff (1.71-1.72) o The highest rating among non-managers (1.79) and the lowest among managers of over 50 persons (1.50), with managers of 1-10 (1.65) and managers of 11-50 (1.70) in the middle	
Indicator 4.2.h: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT (monitoring, evaluation, reporting) contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 26)	**1.89** (n = 454)
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating among field staff (1.99) than among AID/W staff (1.68) o Among FSNs (1.98), a slightly higher rating than among USPSCs et al. (1.90) and a somewhat higher rating than among USDHs (1.79) o In the ANE and LAC regions (2.09 and 2.05), a slightly higher rating than in AFR (1.97) and a substantially higher rating than in ENI (1.65) o A slightly higher rating among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (2.02) than among other staff (1.83-1.90) o A somewhat lower rating among managers of over 50 persons (1.76) than among all other staff (1.86-1.91)	
Indicator 4.2.i: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which RESOURCE ALLOCATION contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 27)	**1.79** (n = 433)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher rating among field staff (1.85) than among AID/W staff (1.66) o Among FSNs (1.91), a slightly higher rating than among USPSCs et al. (1.78) and a somewhat higher rating than among USDHs (1.69) o A somewhat higher rating in ANE (1.97) than in the other three regions (1.74-180) o A considerably higher rating among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (2.08) than among other staff (1.71-1.85) o The highest rating among managers of 11-50 persons (1.91) and the lowest among managers of over 50 persons (1.50) with non-managers (1.79) and managers of 1-10 persons (1.76) in the middle	

Indicator 4.2.j: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which AGENCY CULTURE contributes to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 28)	1.63 (n = 457)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher rating among field staff (1.69) than among AID/W staff (1.51) o A considerably higher rating among FSNs (1.83) than among USDHs (1.53) and USPSCs et al. (1.49) o In the ANE region (1.77), a slightly higher rating than in ENI (1.69) and LAC (1.64) and a somewhat higher rating than in AFR (1.57) o A somewhat higher rating among staff with less than 2 years in the Agency (1.77) than among other staff (1.59 and 1.59) o The highest rating among managers of over 50 persons (1.73) and the lowest among managers of 11-50 (1.52), with non-managers (1.65) and managers of 1-10 persons (1.59) in the middle	
Indicator 4.2.k: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which HUMAN RESOURCES (number of staff, skills, etc.) contribute to their ability to achieve results. (Survey Q. 29)	**1.91** (n = 479)
Sub-group differences: o A somewhat higher rating among field staff (1.98) than among AID/W staff (1.77) o Among FSNs (2.05), a slightly higher rating than among USPSCs et al. (1.94) and a somewhat higher rating than among USDHs (1.82) o A somewhat higher rating in the ANE region (2.05) than in ENI (1.81), with LAC and AFR in the middle (1.99 and 1.95) o Among staff in the Agency for less than 2 years (2.05), a slightly higher rating than among staff with 2-5 years (1.96) and a somewhat higher rating than among staff with over 5 years (1.86) o A slightly higher rating among managers of over 50 persons (2.05) than among all other staff (1.88-1.95)	
Indicator 4.3: Respondents' average ratings on a 4-point scale (0-3) of extent to which they have access to the information they need for achieving results. (Survey Q. 30)	**2.12** (n = 496)
Sub-group differences: o A considerably higher rating among field staff (2.21) than among AID/W staff (1.96) o A somewhat higher rating among FSNs (2.21) than among USDHs (2.09) and USPSCs et al. (2.05) o No Notable difference with regard to region o Among staff in the Agency for less than 2 years (2.23), a slightly higher rating than among staff with over 5 years (2.13) and a somewhat higher rating than among staff with 2-5 years (2.05) o Slightly higher ratings among all managers (2.15-2.19) than among non-managers (2.10)	

Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Achievement of IR 4. In Questions 31 and 32 of the survey, we asked respondents to identify factors that were responsible for instances in which the principles of responsive and flexible approaches worked well and did not work well, respectively. There were 294 responses to Question 31 and 270 to Question 32.

Survey responses yielded 5 commonly cited factors that facilitate the application of the principles of responsive and flexible approaches:

- ***Effective communication and information sharing*** -- 58 respondents referred to such factors as “being informed...on time,” having “the required information...via the use of phones and personal contacts,” “internet access to development information,” and “e-mail and other modern communication services.” Such things as excellent communication skills on the part of team leaders, good inter-office and inter-bureau communication (which is generally not the case), and good communication among team members, including virtual team members, were also mentioned.

- ***Permission to be flexible, innovative and creative*** -- 55 respondents cited such things as "staff willing to interpret rules flexibly to get the job done," "management attitudes support[ive] of innovation," "waivers of competition in procurement," "a creative and great GC," "flexible contracting mechanisms," and being "able to use a variety of approaches."

- ***Teamwork and collaboration*** -- 38 respondents mentioned things like the following: "when the work team and the supervisor are in sync with the goals of the office," teamwork in which "those who 'controlled' the process would understand the purpose of the work and could modify accordingly," "when the mission and USAID/W office team leaders are on the same wave length," "when there were great teams in formation and great team players."

- ***Support from management and leadership*** -- 38 respondents cited this factor. Here are a few of the comments offered: "local management has developed a culture of innovation;" "when we are empowered by our supervisors;" "support from the director and team leader;" and "supportive management [and] support groups (GC, OP, FM) providing solutions not barriers."

- ***Guidance*** -- 35 respondents mentioned such things as "the availability of easy-to-understand instructions/guidance and resources," "when Agency rules were well understood and easily accessible [but] the ADS is neither," and "management set parameters for operating effectively."

Smaller, but substantial, numbers of respondents mentioned ***training and knowledgeable staff*** (19), ***sufficient (or insufficient) time*** (19), and ***personal accountability and trust*** (15), ***empowerment*** (9), and ***good office equipment*** (8). The time factor was cited as working either of two ways. In one sense, approaches can be flexible and responsive when there are "realistic time lines and resources to allow for consultation and participation." A contrasting view is that the principles worked when "the pressure to achieve results quickly was very strong and traditional systems could be shortened and pragmatic approaches thought through and partially applied."

Survey respondents identified 3 major factors hindering the application of the principle of flexible and responsive approaches to achieving results:

- ***Specific bureaucratic processes*** -- 44 respondents cited unreengineered Agency processes and systems, especially the procurement process and the NMS. A few typical comments: "Procurement processes remain opaque, complicated, time-consuming and unresponsive;" "the premature introduction of NMS caused a chaotic situation in which critical and time-sensitive decisions were hampered by uncertainties about the process;" and "Washington's R4 review and consultation are not as flexible as advertised and a lot of trouble."

- ***Confusion over guidance, rules, etc.*** -- 43 respondents cited this factor. Some of the comments were general-- e.g., "unclear and conflicting guidance," "lengthy guidance arriving late," and "lack of guidance"--and some were specific--e.g., "we could have benefited from better guidance and models of best practices in development of Results Packages," and "R4 and non-presence guidance does not reflect BHR needs."

- ***Human factors*** -- 38 respondents cited a number of different human failings, including avoidance of responsibility, risk-avoidance, lack of trust, lack of courage, and so on.

Sizable numbers of respondents also identified ***inflexible processes and people*** (31), ***authoritarian management and lack of management support*** (20), and ***lack of communication and information sharing*** (19) as impediments to making Agency approaches flexible and responsive. Other factors cited by small numbers of respondents include lack of access to tools, lack of knowledge and training, poor teamwork, lack of financial and staff resources, and the NMS.

What Needs to Be Done to Increase Achievement of IR 4, i.e. To Create More Responsive and Flexible Approaches for Achieving? In Question 33, we asked survey respondents who needs to do what to improve the situation so that their working experience reflects the principles of flexible and responsive Agency approaches. The most common comments from the 303 respondents who answered the question, fell into five categories. It is worth noting here that two of the most common recommended changes, i.e., more management support and commitment and more training--were among the top recommendations for the principle of empowered staff and teams accountable for results under IR 1.

- ***Management support and commitment*** -- 84 respondents suggest that a primary key to flexible and responsive tools, systems, processes, etc. is the behavior of USAID's managers. A few typical comments: "Management should empower team members;" "management must make the team approach work or stop trying and go back to the old system;" "top level management needs to give more than lip service--managers need to be trained in managing work and people."

- ***Clarity on guidance and definition of terms*** -- 34 respondents believe that what is needed are such things as "a good, cogent definition of teamwork and empowerment, emphasizing that management still has decision-making power," "clear, simpler guidance and procedures," "simple, clear guidance on contracting rules and regulations," "simplified procedures and processes," "accelerated updating of the ADS," "consistent policy from IRM/W on information systems management," and "clear...operational norms."

- ***Training*** -- 33 respondents mentioned the need for training and education of staff, from top management down. One respondent wrote, "integrated training, where senior management is not separated out and kept in a cocoon, but is rather trained with middle management and staff." Another argued that "both AID/W and the field missions should arrange for training for actual actors (program implementers), and it should not be limited to only a few office chiefs." Another suggested that "reengineering training received poor reception because it was handled differently across the Agency, by staff who were not necessarily strong in necessary skills."

- ***Better communication and information sharing*** -- 22 respondents cited such needs as "periodic meetings/sessions between teams...to share programmatic information, successes, constraints, etc.;" "more open forums at which respective individuals exchange necessary information to achieve success;" "broader knowledge of technical and administrative functions;" "training in the new approaches;" and "better training for FSN staff in procurement processes."

- ***Fix the processes, especially procurement and budget*** -- 22 respondents called for process improvements. "Procurement processes need to be made less cumbersome and enable development assistance to be delivered rather than hamstrung," wrote one. Another suggested that the Agency "start all over in streamlining procurement and personnel assignments." Another asked for "greater flexibility in the timing of decisions regarding the reallocation of OYBs depending upon performance, greater flexibility in the whole budget process, and more monies up front at the beginning of the fiscal year."

Other recommendations centered around a change in the way ***AID/W*** does business and in its relationships with the field (17), the ***"human factor,"*** e.g., the need to have personal responsibility (13), ***more flexibility and risk-taking*** (12), ***incentives and rewards*** that reflect the core values (12), ***holding people accountable*** (11), ***honesty about the political aspects*** of USAID's work (9), ***more resources*** (9), and several others.

Advice to the Administrator. In Question 66 of the survey, we asked respondents to tell us the one thing they would advise USAID's Administrator to do so that Agency practice could move closer to achieving the principles discussed in the survey. Recall that the principles are as follows:

- individuals and teams who are empowered to make decisions to achieve agreed-upon objectives

- individuals and teams held accountable for managing for results

- increased participation of customers and partners in planning, achieving, and monitoring and evaluating development programs

- increased focus on results in planning, achieving and monitoring and evaluating development programs and increased use of results data in making decisions about program strategy and activities.

- responsive and flexible program operations approaches, which enable timely and effective achievement of results and

- each manager and work team concerned with, and having access to, all the information needed for achieving results.

We received 397 responses to this question. The responses, which for the most part were intensely thoughtful and heartfelt, offered a variety of types of advice for the Administrator, but the most common comments fell into five categories, which can be defined as follows:

- ***Provide leadership and ensure senior management commitment to principles and reforms*** -- 46 respondents want the Agency Administrator and senior managers (AAs, DAAs, et al.) to “walk the talk,” “set the example and live the experiment.” They also want the Administrator to “hold senior Agency managers responsible for ensuring that the core values [are] exercised routinely;” “get those who can't lead out of the way so [that] those who can, can;” and “cause his immediate circle to adopt the principles and values of reengineering and then reward and punish behavior in light of the guiding principles;” and “tell his staff [to] listen to their staffs, even when they do not agree with the advice--they could be articulating what many others think, but lack the courage to say.”

- ***Delegate more authority and empower staff and teams more*** -- 37 respondents would like to see more devolution of decision making and less micro-management. “Direct bureaus to direct office directors to get out of the way and let teams be empowered,” wrote one. Another said, “To the extent possible, truly devolve decision-making authority to the lowest level--including FSNs.” Another called for delegating “greater procurement and grant-making authority to the field.”

- ***Communicate and dialogue more with Agency staff at all levels*** -- 33 respondents want the Administrator personally to “take the time to listen to employees,” “have ‘lunch-bunch' sessions with randomly picked staff,” “ask questions of the field,” “travel more often to the field,” “use frequent questionnaires from all staff of all levels,” “participate periodically in bureau staff meetings with employees,” and “get more feedback from people actually working in teams.”

- ***Provide more training and education*** -- 28 respondents called for training at all levels, including the senior staff level. Recommended training topics included teamwork, participatory approaches, program operations and systems, and management skills. A few suggestions: “Instruct PPC and M to figure out what's worked, implement a major initiative to disseminate these lessons and train us on best practices;” and “spend more resources to train USAID staff around the world on the aspects of reengineering.” One person wrote, “Train, train, and train...this means stop spending money on computers and remember that people are what makes up this or any organization--not machines and their languages.”

- ***Revise the incentives system*** -- 24 respondents want the Administrator to “encourage and reward people for implementing the principles” and “reward creativity and taking risks.” A few suggested approaches: “have nominations be submitted by units that feel that they are successfully achieving the principles;” “tie budget allocation to performance [and] reward the performers--through increasing budgets...and promotions.”

Several recommendations from relatively fewer respondents each fell into a group that might be described as AID/W-related. They included making the ***human resources system*** congruent with reengineering (13), ***reengineering AID/W*** (13), fixing the ***NMS*** (12) and ***procurement*** (11), ***limiting the Agency's program priorities and focus*** (11), making the ***budget more flexible***--primarily by reducing earmarks (9), and provide ***clearer guidance*** (9). General recommendations from small numbers of staff included more teamwork and teams, more trust of staff, more focus on results, more accountability, better planning, more use of information technology, better participatory processes, more recognition of the constraints to reengineering, more public relations for Agency programs, and less reporting.

It is impossible in this brief report to do justice to the many thoughtful observations and interesting suggestions in the answers to Question 66. One of our recommendations to the Stocktaking Team is that the entire set of unedited, unidentifiable comments be transmitted to the Agency Administrator.

Appendix 1

USAID STOCKTAKING SURVEY

The Administrator has asked the Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination and the Bureau for Management to do an assessment or "stocktaking" of reengineering efforts in the Agency's program operations system. This survey will provide decision-makers with an important understanding of progress under reengineering and the state of the program operations system in the Agency. In addition to this survey, an AID/W working group is also pursing specific actions to resolve problems and to further implement reforms. This effort will be coordinated with and complement other recent efforts by the Acquisitions & Assistance and Workforce Planning Task Forces and the REFORM Initiative.

Responses to this survey will be kept strictly confidential. Although some background information is asked, individuals cannot be identified by their responses and the software does not record your e-mail address. Only the aggregated results of the survey will be shared around the Agency.

The survey will take approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. We are particularly interested in your responses to the open-ended questions in the survey and your suggestions for actions that could be taken in the short and longer term to address issues of concern. Your responses will be submitted electronically when you save the survey at the end. We very much appreciate the time you are taking out of your schedule to complete this survey. Analysis of survey results will be made available via e-mail and the Web by late March. To provide feedback or for further information, contact the "Stocktaking Team": John Haecker, Chanya Charles, Peggy Schultz and Liz Baltimore at stocktaking@usaid.gov (within USAID system: "stocktaking@irt@aidw").

For purposes of analyzing the data from this survey, we need to know a few things about you. For each of the following questions, please choose the response that applies to you:

Q1 - I am responding to this survey because:
[] I received an email stating that I am part of a random sample group.
[] I received an email stating that I am part of a targeted group.
[] I did not receive a special email, but read a general notice.

Q2 - I currently work with USAID as a (choose one):
[] U.S. Direct Hire
[] Foreign Service National (either Direct Hire or PSC))
[] U.S. Personal Services Contractor (PSC) or Third Country National (TCN)
[] RASA, PASA, Fellow or Technical Advisor for AIDS & Child Survival (TAACS)
[] Institutional Contractor
[] Other

Q3 - I currently work in (choose one):
[] a USAID field office (bi-lateral mission, regional mission, etc.)
[] USAID/Washington

Q4 - I currently work in (choose one):
[] Africa region (AFR)
[] Asia and Near East region (ANE)
[] Europe and Newly Independent States region (ENI)
[] Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) [] Other

Q5 - I have worked for USAID (choose one):
[] less than two years
[] two to five years
[] more than five years

Q6 - Do you currently serve in an official managerial position in USAID (i.e., as a division director, office director, etc.)? Please choose one:
[] I do not hold a managerial position in USAID.
[] I manage/direct a USAID office or unit that has up to 10 staff
[] I manage/direct a USAID office or unit that has between 11 and 50 staff
[] I manage/direct a USAID office or unit that has more than 51 staff

Below we describe some of the principles that guide how the entire Agency operates. Please answer the questions based on your experience with respect to each.

Empowered staff and teams accountable for results

Principle: INDIVIDUALS AND TEAMS ARE EMPOWERED (I.E., HAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY, RESOURCES, ETC.) TO MAKE DECISIONS TO ACHIEVE AGREED UPON OBJECTIVES.

Q7 - To what extent are you, as an INDIVIDUAL, empowered to make decisions to achieve agreed upon objectives? (Please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q8 - If you are a team member, to what extent is your TEAM empowered to make decisions to achieve agreed upon objectives? (Please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Principle: INDIVIDUALS AND TEAMS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR MANAGING FOR RESULTS (i.e., their performance is judged on the basis of how well they use their authority and resources to plan for achieving results, implement their activities, and monitor and evaluate their progress in a responsible, results-oriented manner).

Q9- To what extent are you, as an INDIVIDUAL, held accountable for managing for results in the work that you do? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q10- If you are a team member, to what extent is your TEAM held accountable for managing for results in the work that it does? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q11 - During the past six months, to what extent has the unit or office in which you work provided specific incentives for you, as an INDIVIDUAL, to manage for results in the work that you do? We define incentives here to mean any positive consequences that you could expect to experience if you were to demonstrate that you were managing for results. (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q12 - If you are a team member, during the past six months, to what extent has the unit or office in which you work provided specific incentives for your TEAM to manage for results in the work that it does? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q13 - During the past six months, to what extent have you actually made and implemented significant decisions about how you, as an INDIVIDUAL, are to achieve results for which you are accountable? By significant decisions, we mean decisions that had a real influence on the approaches or resources you used. (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q14 - If you are a team member, during the past six months, to what extent has your TEAM actually made and implemented significant decisions about how your team is to achieve results for which it is accountable? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q15 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles relating to empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making worked well. What were the factors that made this possible?

Q16 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles relating to empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making did not work well. What factors were responsible for this?

Q17 - Who needs to do what to improve the situation so that your working experience reflects these principles?

Responsive and flexible approaches for achieving

Principle: PROGRAM OPERATIONS APPROACHES ARE RESPONSIVE AND FLEXIBLE. AGENCY APPROACHES ENABLE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF RESULTS. As the term is used here, "approaches" refer generally to the tools, tactics, processes, and systems used in program operations.

Q18 - To what extent has the Agency provided you with the approaches you need to effectively achieve results? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

For areas listed below, to what extent do each, in their present state, contribute to your ability to achieve results? (please choose one for each area)

Q19 - Strategic Planning (including customer planning, results frameworks, etc.)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q20 - Procurement (A&A, performance-based contracts, contracts, grants, etc.)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q21 - Organizational arrangements (offices, operating units, teams)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q22 -Automation-communication (internet, e-mail, web)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q23 - Automation-MIS (NMS)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q24 - Program implementation organizing approach (Results Packages, Projects, Activities)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q25 - Agency directives and guidance
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q26 - Performance measurement (monitoring, evaluation, reporting)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q27 - Resource allocation
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q28 - Agency culture
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q29 - Agency human resources (#of staff, skills, etc.)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Principle: EACH MANAGER AND WORK TEAM IS CONCERNED WITH, AND HAS ACCESS TO, ALL THE INFORMATION THEY NEED FOR ACHIEVING RESULTS.

Q30 - To what extent do you have access to the information you need for achieving results? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q31 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles of responsive and flexible approaches (tools, tactics, processes, systems, and information) worked well. What were the factors that made this possible?

Q32 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles of responsive and flexible approaches (tools, tactics, processes, systems, and information) did NOT work well. What factors were responsible for this?

Q33 - Who needs to do what to improve the situation so that your working experience reflects these principles?

For the purpose of the following question, an "operating unit" is defined as a USAID field mission or USAID/W office or higher-level organizational unit that expends program funds to achieve a strategic objective, strategic support objective, or special objective, and that has a clearly defined set of responsibilities focused on the development and execution of a strategic plan.

Q34 - Please read down the following list in order, and choose the FIRST item that applies to you:
[] HEAD of an OPERATING UNIT that expends program funds
[] DEPUTY DIRECTOR of an Oper. Unit that expends prog. funds
[] Head of an Operating Unit's PROGRAM office/function
[] TEAM LEADER of a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM responsible for achieving development program results
[] ACTIVITY MANAGER of a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM responsible for achieving development program results
[] MEMBER of a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM responsible for achieving development program results
[] None of the above

Addressing development needs through customers and partners

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF CUSTOMERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Customers are defined as individuals or organizations who receive USAID services or products, benefit from USAID programs, or are affected by USAID actions. We mean USAID's ultimate customers here, not partners with whom USAID collaborates to serve the ultimate customers. We will also ask specific questions about partners.)

Consider for a moment your operating unit's current strategic plan. (A strategic plan includes the operating unit's strategic objectives and a description of how it plans to use resources to accomplish them. Typically, a strategic plan includes results frameworks and narrative discussions for each of the strategic objectives it contains.)

Q35 - To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your operating unit's strategic plan been developed or modified based on needs expressed by customers?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q36 - How did your operating unit obtain the information from customers? Please check all that apply.
[] customer is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group
[] rapid appraisal [] regular meetings [] telephone/email
[] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q37 - If other, please specify.

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF PARTNERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Partners are defined as organizations, or their representatives, with whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives and intermediate results.)

Q38 - To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your operating unit's strategic plan been developed or modified based on input from partners?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q39 - How did your operating unit obtain the information from partners? Please check all that apply.
[] partner is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group
[] rapid appraisal [] regular meetings [] telephone/email
[] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q40 - If other, please specify

Q 41 - USAID partners often include some who contribute financial resources toward the achievement of the USAID strategic plan (e.g., other donors, host country governments, and non-governmental organizations). To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percentage of the financial resources directed toward achieving your operating unit's strategic plan (either budgeted or actually expended) is being contributed by your operating unit's partners?
[] Don't know [] 0-25 percent [] 26-50 percent [] 51-75 percent
[] 76-100 percent

Q42 - How confident are you that your estimate is an accurate one? Please choose one:
[] Not at all confident [] Just a little confident
[] Somewhat confident [] Very confident [] Extremely confident

Q43 - What are the most important things that need to be done to improve the situation so that Agency practice meets up to the principles regarding customers and partners?

Results-Oriented Decision-Making

Principle: INCREASED FOCUS ON RESULTS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. INCREASED USE OF RESULTS DATA IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT PROGRAM STRATEGY AND ACTIVITIES.

Q44 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past year in which a strategic objective team in your operating unit made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information?
[] Don't Know [] None [] One [] Two [] More than two

Q45 - Please cite an example of this.

Q46 - What needs to be done to increase the extent to which strategic objective teams base their decisions on performance information?

Addressing development needs through customers and partners

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF CUSTOMERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Customers are defined as individuals or organizations who receive USAID services or products, benefit from USAID programs, or are affected by USAID actions. We mean USAID's ultimate customers here, not partners with whom USAID collaborates to serve the ultimate customers. We will also ask specific questions about partners.)

Q47 - Consider for a moment your team's current SO strategy (An SO strategy includes the team's strategic objective(s), results framework, and a description of how it plans to use resources to achieve results.)

To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your team's SO strategy been developed or modified based on needs expressed by customers.
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q48 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past six months in which your team planned or changed its development program ACTIVITIES based on customer feedback?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q49 - Please cite an example of this.

Q50 - If your strategy or activities have changed based on customer input, how did your team obtain the information from customers? Please check all that apply.
[] customer is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group [] rapid appraisal
[] regular meetings [] telephone/email [] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q51 - If other, please specify

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF PARTNERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Partners are defined as organizations, or their representatives, with whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives and intermediate results.)

Q52 - To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your team's SO strategy been developed or modified based on input from partners (including partners who may be on your team)?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q53 - How did your team obtain the information from partners? Please check all that apply.
[] partner is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group [] rapid appraisal [] regular meetings
[] telephone/email [] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q54 - If other, please specify

Q55 - USAID partners often include some who contribute financial resources toward the achievement of the team's strategic objective (e.g., other donors, host country governments, and non-governmental organizations). To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percentage of the financial resources directed toward achieving your team's strategic objective (either budgeted or actually expended) is being contributed by your team's partners?
[] Don't know [] 0-25 percent [] 26-50 percent [] 51-75 percent [] 76-100 percent

Q56 - How confident are you that your estimate is an accurate one? Please choose one:
[] Not at all confident [] Just a little confident
[] Somewhat confident [] Very confident [] Extremely confident

Q57 - What are the most important things that need to be done to improve the situation so that Agency practice meets up to the principles regarding customers and partners?

Results-Oriented Decision-Making

Principle: INCREASED FOCUS ON RESULTS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. INCREASED USE OF RESULTS DATA IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT PROGRAM STRATEGY AND ACTIVITIES.

Q58 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past year in which your strategic objective team made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information?
[] Don't Know [] None [] One [] Two [] More than two

Q59 - Please cite an example of this.

Q60 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past six months in which your strategic objective team or activity managers made a decision to confirm or adjust program ACTIVITIES on the basis of performance information?
[] Don't Know [] None [] One [] Two [] More than two

Q61 - Please cite an example of this.

Q62 - What needs to be done to increase the extent to which strategic objective teams base their decisions on performance information?

Think about results frameworks for a moment. We define a results framework as a description, often a graphic one, of a program strategy, which shows the strategic objective and the intermediate results needed to achieve it, and the cause-effect relationships (or hypotheses) that link results to one another.

Q63 - To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The results framework is an effective tool for helping strategic objective teams accomplish development results.
[] Don't know [] Strongly disagree [] Disagree [] Agree [] Strongly Agree

Q64 -Please state, as precisely and briefly as you can, the reasons for your response in the previous question.

Q65 -What needs to be done to make the results framework a more effective tool for helping strategic objective teams accomplish development results?

Comments

Q66 - What one thing would you advise the USAID Administrator to do so that Agency practice can move closer to achieving the principles discussed in this survey?

Q67 - If you have any other comments you would like to share with respect to the stocktaking effort or this survey, please write them here:

Thank you for helping us with this survey. Please press the Save button to submit your answers and you will automatically exit from the survey.

Appendix 2

Quantitative Data

COMPARATIVE "SCORES" BY 580 SURVEY RESPONDENTS[3]

Question	Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)															
	All	Locale		Employment Status[2]			Region				Time in USAID[3]			Managerial Status			
		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 1: Empowered Staff and Teams Accountable for Results																	
7. Extent to which individuals are empowered	1.90	1.96	1.81	2.04	1.69	1.86	1.95	1.94	1.98	1.99	1.72	1.80	1.97	1.70	2.19	2.38	2.42
8. Extent to which teams are empowered	2.06	2.18	1.78	2.00	2.11	2.09	2.18	2.20	2.08	2.20	2.08	2.05	2.04	2.01	2.06	2.35	2.06
9. Extent to which individuals are held accountable	2.25	2.28	2.22	2.34	2.20	2.12	2.18	2.36	2.26	2.33	2.08	2.29	2.29	2.13	2.51	2.55	2.36
10. Extent to which teams are held accountable	2.19	2.28	1.97	2.07	2.34	2.17	2.29	2.24	1.94	2.51	2.25	2.19	2.15	2.21	2.14	2.12	2.07
11. Extent to which individuals were provided incentives	1.20	1.33	0.94	1.10	1.42	1.16	1.19	1.30	1.47	1.41	1.55	1.05	1.16	1.16	1.13	1.32	1.52
12. Extent to which teams were provided incentives	1.28	1.41	1.28	1.09	1.52	1.21	1.28	1.41	1.27	1.52	1.59	1.15	1.20	1.23	1.16	1.40	1.39
13. Extent to which individuals made & implemented decisions	1.97	1.70	1.89	2.11	1.79	2.03	2.02	2.11	1.95	2.06	1.89	1.75	1.96	1.84	2.31	2.27	2.30
14. Extent to which teams made & implemented decisions	1.92	2.02	1.68	1.92	1.94	1.87	2.00	2.00	1.80	2.19	1.90	1.85	1.94	1.86	1.97	2.04	2.19

1 Unless otherwise noted, the scores were calculated as follows:
[(# of "Not at all" responses x 0) + (# of "Hardly at all" responses x 1) + (# of "To Some extent" responses x 2) + (# of "To a great extent" responses x 3)] divided by [(# of total responses) - (# of "Don't know/Not applicable" responses)]

Among all the average scores calculated for all respondents on all 4-point scale questions (i.e., the average scores for Qs. 7-14, 18-30, 35, 47, 48, 38, 52, and 41, in the first column of the table), the mean average rating was 1.88. This figure allows a point for comparing the relative strength of average ratings for each of the 4-point scale items. For example, the average rating for the extent to which individuals feel empowered (Q. 7, 1.90) is very close to the how people responded, on average, to all the questions; the average rating for extent to which individuals received incentives (Q. 12, 1.20) is a relatively low average rating; and the average rating for automation-communi-cation (Q. 22, 2.45) is a relatively high average rating.

2 Fourteen respondents designated their employment status as "other." Because of the small number, and our inability to determine their precise status, we have dropped them from the analysis of questions by employment status.

3 Ten field respondents designated their region as "other." Because of the small number, and our inability to determine the precise nature of their location in the field, we have dropped them from the analysis of questions by region.

Question	Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)																
	All	Locale		Employment Status[2]			Region				Time in USAID[3]			Managerial Status			
		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 2: Addressing Development Needs Through Customers and Partners																	
35. Extent to which OU's Strategic Plan was developed or modified based on customers' input (according to OU respondents: Directors, Dep. Directors, and Chief Program Officers)	2.16	2.27	1.93	2.18	2.17	1.67	2.27	2.20	2.25	2.35	2.00	2.30	2.15	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.32
38. Extent to which OU's Strategic Plan was adjusted based on partners' input (according to OU respondents)	2.31	2.42	2.07	2.36	2.00	1.50	2.07	2.29	2.50	2.81	3.00[4]	2.00	2.34	2.00	2.29	2.26	2.58
41. Percentage of OU respondents who estimated the percentage of financial resources in their OU's strategic plan contributed by partners with a self-estimated level of confidence in their estimates at "very" or "extremely" confident	47%	The survey software did not allow computation of this indicator by sub-groups.															
47. Extent to which team's SO Strategy was adjusted based on customers' input (according to SO Team respondents: Team Leaders, Team Members, Team Activity Managers)	2.11	2.18	1.84	1.97	2.29	1.93	2.26	2.06	2.00	2.36	2.41	2.15	2.03	2.09	2.18	2.27	---[5]
48. Extent to which team's activities were planned/ changed based on customer feedback (according to SO Team respondents)	1.70	1.79	1.31	1.51	1.81	1.74	1.76	1.77	1.82	1.82	2.13	1.83	1.56	1.65	1.79	2.08	---
52. Extent to which team's SO Strategy was adjusted based on partners' input (according to SO Team respondents)	2.17	2.21	1.97	1.97	2.26	2.28	2.24	2.16	2.18	2.26	2.46	2.37	2.02	2.13	2.33	2.00	---
55. Percentage of SO Team respondents who estimated the percentage of financial resources in their team's strategic plan contributed by partners with a self estimated level of confidence in their estimates at "very" or "extremely" confident.	47%	The survey software did not allow computation of this indicator by sub-groups.															

4 Only one respondent answered this question.

5 Dash (-) means no survey respondents answered the question.

Question	Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)																
	All	Locale		Employment Status[2]			Region				Time in USAID[3]			Managerial Status			
		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 3: Results-Oriented Decision Making																	
44. Percentage of OU-level respondents reporting that an SO team made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information two or more times during the past year	64%	77%	33%	66%	---	100%	83%	83%	73%	69%	---	50%	65%	71%	53%	56%	78%
58. Percentage of SO Team respondents reporting that their team made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information *two or more times* during the past year	47%	53%	21%	44%	53%	46%	58%	56%	57%	42%	56%	47%	45%	44%	50%	60%	---
60. Percentage of SO Team respondents reporting that their team or activity manager made a decision to confirm or adjust program activities on the basis of performance information *two or more times* during the past six months	50%	54%	35%	50%	51%	51%	56%	64%	59%	34%	56%	57%	46%	47%	50%	78%	---
63. Extent to which OU-level and SO team respondents agree that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results *(Note: This score is on a scale of -3, -1, +1, +3, ranging from strongly disagree, to disagree , to agree, to strongly agree.)*	1.17	1.31	0.67	1.07	1.44	0.96	1.37	1.46	0.76	1.38	1.67	1.12	1.10	1.14	1.21	1.11	1.56

Question	Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)																
	All	Locale		Employment Status[2]			Region				Time in USAID[3]			Managerial Status			
		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 4: Responsive and Flexible Approaches for Achieving																	
18. Extent to which Agency provided approaches	1.76	1.85	1.57	1.65	1.90	1.75	1.85	1.89	1.81	1.78	1.86	1.72	1.74	1.76	1.67	1.78	1.83
Approaches:																	
19. Strategic Planning	1.90	2.07	1.56	1.77	2.08	1.98	2.18	1.97	1.72	2.22	1.94	2.01	1.86	1.86	1.93	2.05	1.77
20. Procurement	1.63	1.68	1.53	1.58	1.78	1.48	1.63	1.77	1.40	1.84	1.72	1.71	1.60	1.66	1.68	1.53	1.50
21. Organizational Arrangements	1.96	2.06	1.75	1.85	2.08	2.06	2.19	1.94	2.10	1.99	2.13	1.95	1.92	1.94	1.92	2.08	2.00
22. Automation-Communication	2.45	2.46	2.43	2.45	2.48	2.46	2.48	2.48	2.46	2.45	2.55	2.33	2.48	2.45	2.53	2.55	2.18
23. Automation-MIS	0.93	0.90	1.00	0.82	1.16	0.76	0.77	1.07	0.79	0.85	1.49	0.90	0.86	1.03	0.74	0.84	0.64
24. Program Implementation Organizing Approach	1.80	1.93	1.53	1.68	1.92	1.93	1.91	2.03	1.71	2.01	2.06	1.86	1.74	1.81	1.81	1.84	1.64
25. Agency Directives and Guidance	1.75	1.82	1.61	1.64	1.95	1.62	1.79	1.96	1.62	1.78	1.89	1.71	1.72	1.79	1.65	1.70	1.50
26. Performance Measurement	1.89	1.99	1.68	1.79	1.98	1.90	1.97	2.09	1.65	2.05	2.02	1.90	1.83	1.86	1.90	1.91	1.76
27. Resource Allocation	1.79	1.85	1.66	1.69	1.91	1.78	1.74	1.97	1.78	1.80	2.08	1.85	1.71	1.79	1.76	1.91	1.50
28. Agency Culture	1.63	1.69	1.51	1.53	1.83	1.49	1.57	1.77	1.69	1.64	1.77	1.59	1.59	1.65	1.59	1.52	1.73
29. Agency Human Resources	1.91	1.98	1.77	1.82	2.05	1.94	1.95	2.05	1.81	1.99	2.05	1.96	1.86	1.88	1.95	1.93	2.05
30. Extent to which staff has access to information	2.12	2.21	1.96	2.09	2.21	2.05	2.25	2.22	2.20	2.17	2.23	2.05	2.13	2.10	2.15	2.19	2.18