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95869 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

DATE: December 17, 1985
REPLY TO: Jay P. Johnson, Mission Director
ATTN OF: 
SUBJECT: Final Disaster Summary Report -
FY-85 Cameroon Drought Emergency Food Assistance -
TA 631-xxxx-000-5606
TO: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Attached is the final disaster summary report for USAID/Cameroon's Drought
Emergency Food Assistance Program (FY 85) as required under AID Handbook 9,
Chapter 9D 1a(4) following the format provided in Handbook 8, Appendix F(5).

Attachments: a/s

cc: FVA/FFP/POD, Room 441, SA-8, AID/W
RFFPO/PADS, REDSO/WCA, Abidjan
FODAG, Rome

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FINAL DISASTER SUMMARY REPORT

1. STATISTICS AND DESCRIPTION

- A. Country: Republic of Cameroon
- B. Time of Disaster: Drought during CY 84 rainy season with subsequent food shortages until harvest in CY 85.
- C. Location: Far North Province
- D. Population: Estimated 1,355,351
- E. Number of people affected: 230,423
- F. Extent of food losses: The GRC estimated that 45% of acreage under cultivation was lost resulting in a food production deficit of 69,362 M.T. The Ministry of Agriculture provided the following losses per cereal:

Millet and sorghum: Out of 8,388 hectares under cultivation, 60% or 5,061 hectares were destroyed.

Corn: Out of 16,128 hectares, 38% or 6,150 hectares lost.

Rice: Out of 1,150 hectares, 33% or 383 hectares lost.

G. Narrative Description:

The Far North Province of the Republic of Cameroon, located 10° to 13° north of the equator, has a climatology approximating the sahelian zone. During the 1984 planting season rainfall was from 20% to 40 % below the 40 year average throughout the region. The rains were also poorly distributed; they started early, ceased abruptly and never recommenced fully.

These drought conditions affected not only food crop yields (see 1.F. above) but also seriously depressed farmers' cash availability by reducing the production of cotton, the region's major cash crop. The Muskwari harvest, which is sorghum produced on residual moisture and is normally harvested during January-February, was reduced by 58%. In addition, the drought affected the availability of animal forage which caused losses in livestock, another cash source for the population of Northern Cameroon. The situation was aggravated by the arrival of an estimated 16,000 Chadian refugees, fleeing the effects of drought and civil strife in their country. This refugee flow increased the demand on already seriously depressed cereal production. The price of the limited amount of cereals on the open market skyrocketed, increasing 217% by January, acc. to the GRC, and the average Cameroonian farmer of the Far-North had little or no money to purchase his food on the open market.

The Government of the Republic of Cameroon (GRC) assessed the situation early, estimating food consumption requirements for the area to be 332,067 tons and production at 262,705 tons, leaving a deficit of 69,362 tons. The GRC issued the first request for food assistance to WFP on October 27, 1984 for 6,750 tons of cereals. A total of 150,000 drought victims would thereby receive a daily emergency ration of 450 grams of cereals for 100 days.

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The request for emergency food aid assistance to USAID was issued on January 24, 1985 in the amount of 8,620 tons for 183,363 people at a daily ration of 470 grams for 100 days. As the program got underway in July, the Government found that the number of people requiring assistance had increased to 230,423 and therefore had to decrease rations accordingly.

2. RELIEF OPERATIONS - IN-COUNTRY

A. The Context:

The Republic of Cameroon was experiencing great internal stresses due to the demands placed upon its infrastructure to support the relief effort in neighboring Chad, which was massive (244,314 MT of food aid acc. to WFP Weekly Report 41). With the closures of Nigerian ports and borders, the major portion of this food aid had to pass through Cameroon, adding a great logistics burden to the port of Douala, the railroad, the off-take point at Ngaoundere and the road and trucking system from there to Chad. The U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon requested the Presidency of Cameroon to contribute to the international relief operations in Chad by ensuring that (1) the port of Douala work day and night to offload relief commodities, (2) that two trains per day be reserved solely for transporting food aid to Ngaoundere, (3) that the freight forwarder in Ngaoundere work a double shift and (4) that a fleet of 260 trucks be made available for off-take at Ngaoundere. The GRC extended its maximum support, including a preferential rail transport rate for commodities destined for Chad, to ensure the success of this relief effort. President Reagan addressed a letter to President Paul Biya thanking him for Cameroon's cooperation.

B. GRC Relief Effort:

In addition to assisting the relief effort for Chad, the GRC had to undertake its own emergency measures. The provincial Service of Studies and Statistics in co-ordination with the provincial Drought Committee undertook the initial assessment of the extent of the drought damage. In February 1985 the GRC purchased, with its own funds, 3,000 MT of food aid to be transported to and distributed in the drought affected areas. At the same time the GRC approached WFP and the EEC for food aid assistance, contributed to the cost of the WFP commodities purchased locally and defrayed the transportation costs to the recipient areas. For the USAID commodities, the GRC provided onward transportation from the point of entry Maroua, the capital of the Far North Province, to the other two main distribution points, Mora and Kousseri. From these three points, the GRC arranged and paid for transportation to 12 secondary and the tertiary distribution points where the villagers picked up their rations.

The relief effort was designed to be of short duration and cover the crucial three-month period before the harvest at the end of October. Since this period is also the rainy season, the relief effort encountered the problem of impassable roads and subsequent strains on storage facilities. The Minister of Agriculture, the Governor of the Far North and Messrs. Dang and Tori of the

Management Committee for Food Aid spared no expenditure of effort to overcome any problems encountered. In August the Minister of Agriculture undertook a tour of the drought-affected areas to express the President's personal concern in the relief efforts. When necessary, he took immediate action to improve the transportation of the relief commodities, authorizing the purchase of additional trucks to facilitate food movements.

Other GRC relief efforts involved provision of water to the drought-struck areas via water vans and by construction of water points. Tree and forage planting were emphasized during the subsequent planting cycle. The GRC also undertook a small seed distribution program, which unfortunately encountered problems with seed transferrability from one agricultural zone to another and therefore did not receive the broader application initially envisaged.

C. GRC Organization and Management:

The Minister of Agriculture and the Governor of the Far North Province of Cameroon supervised the coordination and implementation of the relief effort. The Provincial Committees for Emergency Food Aid Distributions and the Management Committee for the WFP Project were entrusted with the implementation. The Minister and Governor ensured that the required amount of transport was available as of Maroua and that adequate storage existed in all areas. The local prefects and sub-prefects reported to the Governor on the distribution. Mr. Dang, the Executive Secretary of the Management Committee and Mr. Tori, Technical Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture and Co-ordinator of Emergency Food Aid Programs in the Far North Province, compiled this information for the GRC's final report, which was submitted to USAID/Cameroon on December 30, 1985.

D. GRC Contribution:

The GRC ensured that the USAID relief commodities receive a preferential rate for the railway portion of the transport. This rate saved the U.S. government CFA 49,236,675, which at the December 3, 1985, exchange rate of CFA 386 = US\$1.00 is equivalent to \$127,556.

The GRC has placed the value of its contribution to the USAID program, which consisted largely of onward transportation from Maroua to the outlying areas including handling, at \$454,909 using the same exchange rate as above. This figure does not include the reduction on the railway.

The GRC itself purchased a total of 6000MT of rice, 640MT of corn for emergency food aid distributions and 80MT for distribution as seeds. The GRC also subsidized the WFP purchase of 6000MT at CFA35,000/MT and defrayed transportation costs estimated at CFA22,000/MT. In August, the GRC budgetted an expenditure of about \$3.3M (at exchange rate above) for the operation of its relief effort and USAID/Cameroon estimates that its expenditures were on the same magnitude.

This \$3.3M total GRC contribution does include the cost of administering the distribution of the U.S. donated commodities, but

again does not reflect the reduction on the railway tariff for all the food aid shipments to Chad, which also received preferential rates.

E. Other Donor Contributions:

As indicated above, WFP donated 6,000 MT to the emergency food aid program and the EEC 3500 MT, with the GRC subsidizing the WFP purchase price and transport costs. WFP also contributed 624 MT of imported rice for 6000 Chadian refugees resettled at Poli in North Cameroon.

3. RELIEF OPERATIONS - U.S. GOVERNMENT

A. USG Relief Assistance:

On January 24, 1984, USAID/Cameroon received a request for emergency assistance from the GRC. This request was for 8,620 MT of food aid, consisting of

7,335 MT of cereals
550 MT of vegetable oil
<u>735 MT of pulses</u>
8,620 MT

The aid was requested to provide 183,363 beneficiaries with a daily ration of

400 gms cereals
30 gms oil
40 gms beans

for a period of 100 days preceding the harvest at the end of October.

On April 10, USAID/Cameroon agreed to provide the food aid requested and on May 7, 1985, forwarded the Transfer Authorization (631-xxxx-000-5605) to the Minister of Agriculture. Acting for the GRC, the Minister of Agriculture signed his acceptance of the conditions in the Transfer Authority on June 14, 1985. With his signature on the same document, the Director of USAID/Cameroon on behalf of the USG agreed to provide the following:

7,355 MT of rice with an estimated value of	\$	2,280,000
735 MT of beans	"	349,200
<u>550 MT of vegetable oil</u>	"	<u>535,700</u>
8,640 MT Total		3,164,900

The Transfer Authority provided an additional \$1,252,800 to cover ocean freight and inland transport costs to Maroua, the official point of entry and capital of the Far North Province. (Please refer to Appendix A for an overview of actual costs and deliveries.)

B. Food Operation Logistics:

In early June the food aid was dispatched from the U.S. on two ships. The YS Risan picked up 550 MT of soybean oil at Savannah, Ga., and 7,446 MT of rice at Lake Charles, Louisiana. The Greek ship Epos picked up 730 MT of black-eyed beans in Beaumont, Texas, for delivery in Douala.

The RFFPO and the ARCO contracted SOAEM to transport these commodities to Maroua, where the GRC signed for their receipt. The ships were unloaded in Douala mid-July, except for the Risan which unexplainably left Douala after discharging the oil but only half its rice shipment. The second half of the rice was eventually transshipped in Abidjan onto the TIVAT, which returned to Douala with its cargo. By mid-August all U.S. food aid had been expedited by SOAEM to Maroua. The ocean losses averaged 3.8% and the inland transportation losses amounted to an average of 2.6% for the three commodities.

By September 16, 1985, the GRC had taken receipt of all the food at the point of entry and the two other primary distribution centers, Maroua, Mora and Kousseri respectively. The GRC assumed the responsibility for storing and transporting the food to the 12 secondary and 154 tertiary distribution points, where the villagers received their rations.

C. Distribution:

Local government officials identified the most needy in four administrative areas of the Far North Province. A sample taken by the Mission indicates that 99% of the recipients were farmers. Eighty percent of USAID commodities were distributed in the northern most tip of Cameroon, the administrative area known as Logone-Chari, which most approximates Chad in climate and has had a significant influx of Chadian refugees. Please refer to Appendices B and C for details of population figures and allocations per distribution points, as compiled by USAID/Cameroon's food monitors.

The one-time distribution of USAID/Cameroon-donated food aid was supervised by the prefect or sub-prefect of a given location. He was assisted by a committee of local political and administrative personnel. As often as possible, one of USAID's three monitors attended the distribution.

The daily ration requested by the GRC (see 3A above), after additions to the beneficiary rolls and transportation losses, had to be readjusted to approximately 300gms of cereals, 23gms of oil and 29gms of cowpeas.

On October 31, 1985, the Mission's food monitors reported completion of the distribution of USAID/Cameroon's emergency food assistance. Thus the program achieved the target date as originally requested by the GRC.

D. Mission Management:

USAID/Cameroon detailed a staff of 3 FSN's who spent a total of 197 man-days in the field during the distribution period from July to October, with part of November as a follow-up period. Their vehicle support was provided by the Mission's North Cameroon Liaison Office.

Two of the monitors, Messrs. Aparara and Tanifum, received training in distribution and end-use checking techniques from USAID personnel in Chad familiar with the procedures. Mr. James Munang was hired for a three-month period to assist in the end-use checking. Under his contract which was funded by FVA/FFP, Mr. Munang also prepared a program evaluation and future needs assessment, which will be forwarded to FVA/FFP under separate cover.

These monitors fulfilled an essential role in the smooth unfolding of the distribution plans. They alerted concerned officials of transportation bottlenecks and potential storage shortages and kept the Mission abreast of development in the field. Their field trip reports contain the periodic up-dates of distribution data which constitutes the Mission's internal monitoring of the distribution process. They also worked closely with the concerned GRC officials on the reporting requirements as outlined in the Transfer Authority and Handbook 9.

The former acting Mission Director managed this program personally through the Transfer Authority process until his departure in late June. Thereupon, the acting Deputy Director and Program Officer briefly put his energy to this effort and resolved some of the early logistics issues. In mid-August, the program responsibility was transferred to the Agriculture and Rural Development Division, which assigned part-time PSC, Michaela Lang, to the day-to-day operation of the program within the Mission.

4. BENEFITS AND RESULTS

The headline on the June 15, 1985, French edition of the national newspaper "Cameroon Tribune says it most clearly, "USAID GIVES OUR COUNTRY AN ASSISTANCE WORTH MORE THAN TWO BILLION FCFA." The English edition of the same paper published on June 19 gives all the relevant details of the program outlined above, including the cost of inland transportation on to Maroua and quotes, "...the Minister of Agriculture lauded Cameroon - U.S. co-operation and expressed gratitude for U.S. concern for drought victims in Cameroon. ...the positive U.S. response was very human and timely."

The same English edition quoted Mr. Herbert Miller, former acting Mission Director, as saying that the agreement just signed was "not only a humanitarian gesture between our two peoples, but also a symbol of the high esteem and respect in which the United States holds the Republic of Cameroon."

The French edition states that the Director "of USAID also praised the spirit of co-operation manifested by Cameroon. Because

'although extremely preoccupied by its own drought-related problems, the Government of the Republic of Cameroon joined forces with those of the international community and has undertaken successful and laudable efforts to greatly accelerate the emergency food aid deliveries to the people of Chad through the port of Douala.'

In addition, the national English service of Radio Cameroon carried the program "Our Changing Rural World" which detailed the emergency food aid being provided by the U.S. Government to the people of Cameroon and was aired a minimum of four times during the month of August.

These two articles in the "Cameroon Tribune" detail the major thrust of this program: (1) to help the GRC ameliorate the effect of a drought in the Far North Province of Cameroon and (2) thank the GRC for extending its cooperation to the massive relief effort in Chad.

That the food aid was sorely needed is indicated by the growing beneficiary rolls, which increased from an initial assessment of 150,000 to 230,000. While the rations were thus somewhat reduced, Mission assessment indicates that the food aid did fill a vital gap in meeting cereal requirement for the Far North Province of Cameroon.

The GRC officials involved in this program have expressed their deeply-felt gratitude to USAID for its timely intervention. Mr. David Dang, the Executive Secretary of the Management Committee, in his meeting with USAID Director Jay Johnson said, "The American aid was the most important part in the food aid program. You facilitated the inland transportation which is so crucial to relief efforts." Mr. Tori Limangana, Technical Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, went on to express the "profound gratitude of the population" and to say, "The U.S. donation was the best appreciated because with the rice, bean and oil it was considered a complete meal."

Draft:ARD:MJLang:bt

Wang No. 0091A p. 21-31

Clearances:DIR:JPJohnson

D/DIR:MJordan

PRM:BKosheleff

ARD:WFLitwiller

PRM:KApara draft

ARD:ATanifum draft

ARD:JMunang draft

Info: HNP

SUMMARY -- U.S. ASSISTANCE
PL 480 TITLE II COMMODITIES

	Rice	Beans	Vegoil	Total
<u>Approved Shipment (Metric Tons)</u>	7,446	730	550	8,726
<u>Program values (US\$)</u>				
- Commodity costs	1,969,764	428,178	507,924	2,905,866
- Ocean freight costs	432,931	33,000	49,600	515,531
- Inland delivery costs	- -	- -	- -	1,138,267
- Total USG Assistance	- -	- -	- -	4,559,664
<u>Commodity Deliveries (MT) *</u>				
- Shipments	7,446	730	550	8,726
- Ocean freight/Port Losses(-)	(285)	(29)	(14)	(328)
- Inland transit losses (-)	(184)	(35)	(6)	(225)
- Received inland point of entry	6,977	666	530	8,173
<u>GRC Distributions:</u>				
Diamare	1,013	142	98	1,254
Mayo Sava	207	30	37	274
Mayo Tsanaga	12	6	10	136
Logone-Chari	<u>5,360</u>	<u>486</u>	<u>380</u>	<u>6,496</u>
Totals	6,971	665	524	8,160
Losses	(6)	(1)	(6)	(13)

* Calculated in net tons and rounded off.

Appendix B

ALLOCATIONS BY DISTRIBUTION POINTS (in MT)

	<u>Population</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Veg. Oil</u>	<u>Cowpea</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>DIAMARE</u>					
Bogo (normal) ⁽¹⁾	6,798		14.250	21.690	35.940
Bogo (Extension)	20,000	600.022	41.923	63.813	705.758
Maroua (")	12,798	390.822	28.925	40.960	460.707
Meri	740	22.226	1.551	2.404	26.181
Pété (normal)	5,260	-	11.025	13.971	24.996
<u>MAYO SAVA</u>					
Mora (normal)	3,240	-	7.155	5.790	12.945
Tokombéré (")	2,514	-	5.552	4.492	10.044
Kalofata (Ext.)	6,886	206.580	15.206	12.305	234.091
Kalofata (Normal)	4,824	-	10.653	8.520	19.173
<u>MAYO TSANAGA</u>					
Koza (Extension)	4,000	120.000	9.579	5.942	135.521
<u>LOGONE & CHARI</u>					
Waza	7,241	267.669	17.292	21.500	306.461
Makari	47,633	1,636.747	110.470	142.109	1,889.326
Goulfei	37,737	1,124.886	75.920	97.920	1,298.413
Logone Birni	28,670	985.145	66.490	85.481	1,137.116
Kousseri	12,000	417.000	32.188	35.800	484.988
Fotokol	8,714	299.410	20.209	25.981	345.600
Hile Alifa	26,368	906.050	61.150	78.617	1,045.817

	230,423 (²)	6,976.557	529.538	665.843	8,171.938

(1) "Normal" indicates that the people received rice from the WFP/GRC Program.

(2) Extension includes 2,636 and 44,424 people from further assessments.

Appendix C

Percentages of Allocation per Division

Division or "Département"	% of Total	% Rice Allocation	% Cowpea Allocation	% Oil Allocation	% Total Allocation
LOGONE et CHARI	70.9	80.8	73.0	72.7	79.7
DIAMARE	19.8	14.5	21.4	18.4	15.3
MAYO SAVA	7.6	3.0	4.7	7.3	3.4
MAYO TSANAGA	1.7	1.7	0.9	1.8	1.6