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AFRICA WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

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MID-TERM EVALUATION

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development
AFWID	Africa Women in Development
ANEP	Analysis of Environmental Program
API	Assessment of Program Indicator
CDSS	Country Development Strategy Statement
CPSP	Country Program and Strategy Papers
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DPD	Development Planning Division
EOPS	End of Project Status
FED	Finance and Enterprise Development
FSN	Foreign Service National
NAWOU	National Association of Women's Organizations of Uganda
NIS	Newly Independent States
PD	Project Development
PID	Project Identification Document
PIR	Program Implementation Review
PPC	Program and Policy Coordination
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
ONI	Office of New Initiatives
R&D	Research and Development
TIP	Trade and Investment Project
WAPS	Women's Action Plans
WIBA	Women in Business Association
WID	Women In Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Africa Women in Development (AFWID) project was designed in 1989 to bring women-in-development concerns into the mainstream of programs and operations in the Africa region. The primary thrust of the project was to place an advisor in regional offices in East, West, and southern Africa and to coordinate and foster support for their work from within the Africa bureau as well as from the Women in Development (WID) office.

The project has demonstrated the value of making regional advisors available to give technical assistance to USAID missions in developing the gender dimensions of their programs and projects. It has also capitalized on new opportunities that have arisen in the context of AID's initiative in democracy and governance and it's "local participation" strategy for forging links between local women's groups and USAID mission programs.

But the project has suffered from critical flaws in both its design and implementation. Although the purpose of the project is to increase women's participation in development programs and projects, the project was not designed in response to a clear demand from missions for this kind of assistance. While missions had the opportunity to respond in 1989 to the draft Project Paper, many mission staff had turned over by 1991 when all of the AFWID project staff were on board. Hence, there has been a tension between the AFWID project staff's eagerness to assist missions and the missions' lack of awareness and, sometimes, lack of interest in calling on their assistance.

The project strategy, which focused resources on selected countries in each region, aggravated this tension because some "focus-country" missions resisted AFWID involvement, while some potentially interested missions were not encouraged to involve the advisors. Within focus countries, the advisors' mandate was very broad, including technical assistance in every aspect of mission strategy, program, and projects as well as in host country and private voluntary organization (PVO) activities, research, and systematic data collection, analysis, and dissemination.

The structure of the project was complicated, requiring each regional advisor to be coordinated by the resident advisor in Washington, D.C., supervised by the regional office in Africa, and accountable to the WID office because that office funded their salaries and expenses. The resident advisor in Washington, D.C., was hired by a local contractor, who was responsible for administering Washington-operations funds; the resident advisor reported directly to the AID project manager. Although not anticipated in the Project Paper, the 1991 reorganization of the Africa bureau forced a separation between the Africa bureau's project management, which came from the Office of New Initiatives (ONI), and its leadership and policy guidance, which came from the Development Planning (DP) division.

These design and structural flaws resulted in a breakdown of not only the executive (leadership) system, but also operations, financial management, and information management. Quality control has rested with the regional offices, and this has varied from one to the next. REDSO/ESA has given managerial and supervisory support to the regional advisor,

contributing much to the development of her professional skills. REDSO/WCA, with recent changes in staff, has not nurtured the regional advisor or figured out how to deal with the constraints of the focus-country strategy. The Botswana mission, which housed the southern regional advisor, was not entirely comfortable supervising the only regional staff person in its office.

In Washington, D.C., after the first project manager left ONI, managers were assigned to the project sporadically, depriving the project of an operational focus point and placing more AID administrative responsibilities on the resident advisor. There are two, completely separate financial systems, neither of which has made financial data available to the regional advisors or to others who might need them. A gender information system, which was to be a cornerstone of the project, was never developed, primarily because no one in missions or the bureau expressed interest. Nor were the 18 months of short-term technical assistance that the Project Paper envisioned ever made available to regional advisors or missions.

The project also suffered from disruptions within the WID office, the recent lack of political attention from the administration in Washington to women-in-development and gender concerns, and generally weak incentives for either bureau or mission staff to devote time to these concerns.

In sum, though the AFWID project has provided some benefits to missions and local women's groups with which they have programmatic ties, it has not proven to be an effective means of institutionalizing WID and gender concerns within the region. We do not find that either revisions to the project design or rearrangements in how it is implemented would dramatically improve the project's flow of outputs. We do find, however, that some of the functions introduced by the project--advisors in the regions and technical and policy/advocacy assistance within the Africa bureau--have been valuable and should be continued.

Based on our findings and conclusions, we have made the following recommendations.

1. That the Africa bureau support three regional advisors, one each in East, West, and southern Africa.

    - Each of these advisors would be based in a REDSO *if* the REDSO agrees to provide management, support, and professional supervision. If a REDSO declines, then missions in the region would be given the opportunity to host the regional advisor under the same condition. REDSOs would have periodic opportunities to keep or reclaim the advisor.

    - In southern Africa, where currently there is no REDSO, either the appointment of an advisor would be delayed until a REDSO opens in Pretoria, or, if agreeable to the candidate, temporarily housed in a mission until that time, or temporarily housed in REDSO/ESA.

2. That the regional advisors' scope of work include the following responsibilities:

   - Respond to requests from missions for program- and project-related activities;

   - Upon mission request, help link missions in a programmatic context to local women's groups;

   - Advocate and initiate WID services within the region, such as training and research, to which mission staff members are invited and which are funded by the region with resources earmarked for that purpose;

   - Maintain up-to-date information on WID technical assistance available to missions: internally, locally, regionally, and through the Africa bureau and the WID office (but not act as a gatekeeper); and

   - Upon mission request, coach and mentor mission, host government, or local organization staff in gender analysis and program and project design and evaluation.

3. That regional offices fill the regional advisor positions with African professional women who can help other foreign service national (FSN) staff forge links between mission programs and local organizations.

4. That each regional officer have a fund earmarked for regional WID activities, and that they be able to use these funds to obtain matching grants from the WID office for such activities.

5. That the regional advisors work within the following structure:

   - They are hired directly by the regional office, are accountable to a regional office staff supervisor, and receive direction and support through existing regional office channels; and

   - The Africa bureau funds the positions and provides support just as it does for other REDSO technical advisors.

6. That the Africa bureau provide for the following WID functions:

   - Senior-level policy guidance and advocacy to ensure continual vigilance at every level;

   - Staff support to that senior-level function; and

   - Technical and research support for bureau WID activities.

7. That the WID office offer technical support and services:

   - To the regional advisors just as it does to WID officers in missions, including contract services, opportunities for buy-ins, and matching grants; and

   - To the Africa bureau just as it does to the other regional bureaus.

8. That the Africa bureau assist in the professional development of regional advisors by:

   - Offering the regional advisors an opportunity annually to confer on professional matters and/or attend professional development training sessions or workshops; and

   - Detailing guidelines the advisors can use when they see opportunities for helping to implement the agency's research agenda on WID and gender concerns.

9. That the Africa bureau determine the best way to collect information on WID activities in missions for informing Congress.

   - The data collection process should encourage missions to report what they are actually doing, in words as well as or instead of numbers; and

   - The process should not be so standardized that it discourages diverse kinds of information nor so open-ended that it fails to provide guidelines.

In sum, we recommend that the Africa bureau use existing channels and projects in the bureau to provide technical assistance and training in WID and gender concerns to missions and to the bureau staff in Washington, D.C. The more resources delivered to missions through these channels and the more policy support from AID/Washington, the more likely WID and gender concerns are to become institutionalized.

INTRODUCTION

In December 1989, the Bureau for Africa of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) approved the three-year Africa Women in Development (AFWID) project to increase the participation and integration of women in the development process.

In April 1993, three years and four months after the AFWID project was approved, and one year and four months after it was fully staffed and operational, the Africa bureau contracted for a mid-term evaluation of the project. Although this evaluation was anticipated in the Project Paper, it had become critical by 1993 because the project had lost one of its three regional advisors and a number of complaints were coming from various corners about how it was being implemented.

To evaluate the project, we were asked to describe the outputs of the project in terms of the project design, constraints, and opportunities encountered in the operation and management of the project, the usefulness of its objectives and approach, and the efficacy of its structure. In particular, both the Africa bureau and the Office of Women in Development wanted recommendations on how to revise the project in order to improve it or how to replace it with other means of moving toward the project goal.

PURPOSES AND METHODS OF THE EVALUATION

Purposes

In this evaluation report, we assess the extent to which the project purpose and outputs have been accomplished and provide information to help the Africa bureau and the R&D/WID office decide which functions and resources they need to continue to institutionalize AID's women in development agenda in the Africa region.

We have used this report to share with the Africa bureau and the WID office what we learned through the AFWID project about the experience missions and regional offices have had in addressing gender issues. Because our main intent is to inform decision makers, we have limited the description of project activities. We have concentrated instead on examining the design, structure, environment, strategy, and systems of the project and the contribution of each of these components to the project's strengths and weaknesses.

Methods

On contract to AID, Creative Associates International formed a team to evaluate the AFWID project. The team was comprised of four women with combined professional expertise in evaluation, women in development, and organization development and management. In accordance with the scope of work and resources available to this evaluation effort, we carried out the mid-term evaluation during a five-week period between April 29 and June 14, 1993.

We convened in Washington, D.C., where we were briefed by the then project manager in AID/AFR/ONI and the AFWID resident advisor employed by the MayaTech Corporation. During the week in Washington, D.C., we interviewed AID officials currently or formerly associated with the project, examined project documents, and developed a framework for gathering data in Africa. We spent the following three weeks in Africa. Two team members travelled to Abidjan, Bamako, and Accra to study AFWID's presence in that region, and the other two travelled to Nairobi and Kampala to look at the project in East Africa and to Lilongwe, Windhoek, and Gabarone to see it in southern Africa. (The team leader made a second visit to Washington, D.C., rather than continuing to Gabarone, for additional interviews with AID officials.)

In each of these places, we conducted interviews with AFWID regional advisors, their supervisors, colleagues, clients--both within and outside missions--and reviewed documents.

In early June, we reconvened to discuss our findings, draw conclusions, and agree on recommendations. Immediately thereafter we prepared this report. The report was shared in draft with AID/Washington officials, who attended debriefings on July 19 and 20, 1993. Subsequently, we prepared and submitted the final draft report.

PROJECT HISTORY

The AFWID project was first envisioned in 1989 in AID/Washington by a senior staff person who had come from a mission director's post in Africa. Recognizing the inequities between the contributions women make to national economies and their development, and the inequitable balance between their rights and roles and those of men, he generated the idea of a project to help selected missions highlight gender issues and fully integrate host country women into their programs and projects as decision makers as well as beneficiaries. Ideally, AFWID would create "model" missions to which others could turn for guidance on how to improve their own. Such an effort would also respond more fully to both the Percy Amendment of 1973, which required that AID pay particular attention to women in its development projects, and the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) appropriations bill, which required that development objectives be achieved through the integration of women in the process.

In 1987, the Africa bureau had created a Women in Development (WID) Working Group, chaired by the director of the Project Development (PD) division and comprised of representatives of offices in the Africa and Research and Development (R&D) bureaus. The WID Working Group had no line authority and served only in an advisory capacity. It concurred with the need for additional resources to help missions prepare and implement Women's Action Plans (WAPs), to generate more and better data on gender issues, and to increase the participation of women in their programs and projects.

In the course of the AFWID project's development, some modifications were made that affected the direction of the project.

First, agency regulations, which prohibited a project from making USAID missions principal beneficiaries, required revisions in the project design to include services to host country

governments and organizations as beneficiaries (see Project Paper Annex B: Guidance in Preparing Scopes of Work).

Second, different views on whether the project should (1) raise awareness and sensitivity to gender and WID issues or (2) provide technical assistance to missions, host countries, and the bureau were never reconciled. As a result, the project included both kinds of outputs, but did not provide differentiated resources to cover these two distinct kinds of output.

The project was reviewed on September 14, 1989, and signed on December 12, 1989. Although the ECPR Issues Paper raised concerns about sufficient demand, selection of target countries, administrative structure, and AID/Washington's managerial capacity, no significant revisions were made to the project design.

The approved project was based on the following design elements.

DESIGN ELEMENTS OF THE AFWID PROJECT	
Goal	Increased and more equitable economic growth through greater participation and integration of women in the development process.
Purpose	To increase the participation of and benefits to African women in selected development programs and projects.
Outputs	• Improved empirical basis for developing increased understanding and awareness of the importance of women's roles in the African development process. • Development plans and strategies which more effectively integrate women's contributions into development programs. • Project and program designs which recognize and profit from increased and more appropriate female participation. • Project implementation which ensures greater and more productive involvement of women as both providers and beneficiaries of development assistance. In 1991 the project staff added a fifth output--to work with local women's groups.
Inputs	Four long-term advisors, three in regional offices and one in the Africa bureau; 18 person/months of short-term technical assistance; and funds to "address identified research gaps" and conduct two project evaluations. PPC/WID (now R&D/WID) provided funds for regional offices to hire advisors, and a Washington-based 8-a firm was contracted to direct project activities within the Africa bureau and coordinate the work of the regional advisors.

The project was to be managed by the director of PD, who was also the chairperson of the WID Working Group, or the chairperson's designee. The WID Working Group would advise the project manager. Of the total three-year project budget of $1.5 million, $625,000 was financed by the Africa bureau and $875,000 by the WID office. The WID office funds were

specifically designated to cover the cost of hiring three regional advisors, who would be hired by the regional offices.

The project strategy had several dimensions:

- The three regional advisors would work as a team coordinated by the resident advisor from Washington, D.C. They would share information, "cross-fertilizing" the programs and projects in their regions with empirical data from the other regions.

- Each regional advisor would work initially in target countries (later called focus countries), selected on the basis of the USAID mission's interest in WID concerns, its interest in participating in the project, the diversity of the country program, its category (I or II), and the sufficiency of baseline data for use in measuring progress.

- They would work in the four sectors in which WID activities were concentrated: education, private enterprise, natural resources, and agriculture.

- They would help missions identify, create links with, and strengthen local women's groups with potential programmatic ties to mission activities (this strategy was added following the advisor's first team meeting in December 1991).

This was the plan. But it was not until December 1991--two years after the project was approved--that all four advisors were on board and the project was fully operational. In the regions, the Botswana mission agreed to host the southern Africa regional advisor, who was on the job by May 1990. REDSO/ESA was lukewarm about AFWID for a long time, had a turnover of top management in 1990, and did not hire a regional advisor until September 1991, about the same time that REDSO/WCA, with no more apparent enthusiasm than its counterpart in East Africa, hired its advisor. In Washington, D.C., MayaTech (the firm selected to furnish the resident advisor), produced a candidate for the position in November/December of 1990, but in January of 1991, the Africa Bureau revised the terms of reference for the position. Thereafter, the recruiting process began again. The Bureau was kept informed of MayaTech's efforts, and new candidates were offered once the appropriate Bureau mechanisms were in place.

The delays were due in large part to reorganizations within AID/Washington that dissolved Policy and Program Coordination (PPC), which had housed the WID office, and AFR/PD, in which the project management was situated. The WID office was moved intact to R&D, and the AFWID project was assigned to the Development Planning (DP) division, where the office director became the chairperson of the WID Working Group. However, DP was not supposed to manage projects. Thus, the Working Group director designated a project manager in the ONI division. ONI was already absorbed in other initiatives with more political support than WID, and many of ONI's direct hire staff had moved to other bureaus.

Despite this organizational turbulence and lack of clear guidance from AID/Washington, the four AFWID advisors defined and undertook activities that would move the project toward its

purpose and outputs. This remained the status of the project for about 14 months, until February 1993, when the southern regional advisor resigned and the resident advisor's coordinating responsibilities were formally discontinued; the R&D/WID office became responsible for following up on progress reports from regional advisors.

FINDINGS

In this section we will summarize the outcomes of AFWID--what it has accomplished and what it has failed to accomplish. In the following section on analyses, we will probe what it was about the design, structure, strategy, environment, and systems of the project that influenced these outcomes.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Regional Advisors

The regional advisors have been most successful in working with USAID mission staff to strengthen the gender components of their programs and projects and in helping local women's groups strengthen their organizations and develop links to USAID programs. The resident advisors also succeeded in strengthening the gender components of project documents reviewed in AID/Washington.

Specifically, the regional advisors reported to us that they had accomplished the following.

- Contributions to Country Development Strategy Statements (CDSSs)/Country Program and Strategy Papers (CPSPs), and Action Plans:

  - Wrote scope of work for consultant to work on a WID portfolio analysis (Tanzania)
  - Conducted Assessment of Program Indicator (API) gender analysis (Tanzania)
  - Conducted a review of WID portfolio and proposed Women's Action Plan (Ghana, Botswana, and Malawi--the resident advisor also participated in the latter)
  - Reviewed and commented on the API (Ghana)
  - Assessed gender issues in the mission portfolio (Mali)

- Contributions to project designs:

  - Composed a team and assisted in scope of work for a gender study related to the basic education (SUPER) project in Uganda
  - Conducted gender analysis in agricultural marketing project (MARS/IDEA) (Uganda)
  - Conducted gender analysis of environmental program (ANEP) (Uganda)
  - Conducted gender analysis of Finance and Enterprise Development (FED) project (Tanzania)
  - Prepared to conduct social soundness and gender analysis of the AIDS project (Tanzania)
  - Participated in the draft Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for the Trade and Investment (TIP) project (Ghana)
  - Prepared scope of work for a sector study in the TIP program (Ghana)
  - Reviewed gender aspects of the APEX project (Mali)

- Reviewed FSRE project in order to recommend research and training needs (Mali)
- Submitted a work plan for assistance and field research on gender analysis in project designs for OHV, natural resources, and education sectors (Mali)
- Responded to a request from the African Development Bank for gender analysis training (Ivory Coast)
- Reviewed AWLAE proposal to mission (Ivory Coast)
- Participated in the design of the LIFE (natural resource management) and READ (adult education) project designs (Namibia)
- Reviewed the Natural Resource Management project paper supplement (Botswana)
- Performed gender analysis for the SABER project (South Africa)
- Reviewed the BOTSPA Project Identification Document (PID) (Botswana)
- Reviewed the BED education project paper (Botswana)

▸ Contributions to evaluations:

- Commented on the PRISM project's Monitoring Program Performance paper (Ghana)
- Assessing current draft of the Program Implementation Review (PIR) (Ghana)
- Observed semi-annual PIR process (Mali)
- Assisted the WID officer in determining impact indicators for the Women's Action Plan (Malawi)
- Participated in a mid-term project evaluation of an agriculture project by conducting a field study (Malawi)

▸ General work with mission staff:

- Conducted informal sessions on gender analysis and development with mission technical and program staff (Ghana)
- Facilitated discussions on information sources for gender analysis (Ghana)
- Facilitated discussions in the mission on gender analysis and development strategies (Mali)
- Promoted staff participation in the regional Gender Dimension Workshop (March 1993) (Ghana and Mali)
- Developed and maintained a network of WID persons for information exchange (Ivory Coast)
- Reviewed USAID's bilateral concept paper (Ivory Coast)

▸ Initiatives with local women's groups:

- Helped National Association of Women's Organizations of Uganda (NAWOU) organize as an NGO
- Helped NAWOU and the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers receive grants from USAID (Uganda)
- Helped arrange for GENESYS to evaluate FEMNET, a local women's group (Kenya)
- Helping mission fund a local group to study violence against women (Kenya)

- Initiated and monitored a series of activities, including a study tour, designed to strengthen local women's organizations (Burundi)
- Facilitated contact between women's NGOs, U.S.-based training firm, Winrock, and mission staff (Mali)
- Identified local institutions to participate in WID training of trainers (Ghana)
- Assisted the Women in Business Association (WIBA) in identifying members to attend a workshop on women as entrepreneurs (Botswana)
- Assisted WLSA develop a proposal for funding and to get mission support to hold a workshop on maintenance laws and action plans (Botswana)
- Assisted in coordinating activities of WLSA, WILDAF, and WFH (Botswana)
- Helped WFH obtain small grants for staff salaries (Botswana)
- Provided support to the Federation of Women Lawyers (Lesotho)
- Met with the women's unit in the government (Namibia)
- Responded to a request for funding from CIFAO (Ivory Coast)

Resident Advisor

The resident advisor accomplished tasks in three areas.

- Coordination and support of the work of the regional advisors, including two field visits (April-May 1992 and October-December 1992):

  - Sent documents and other information related to their work
  - Reviewed gender aspects of the SPARC project (Mali)
  - Participated in REDSO/WCA workshop on the gender dimensions of program effectiveness (Banjul)
  - Presented a paper on "gender integration" at the REDSO/ESA scheduling conference in 1992

- Contributions to Washington-based reviews and projects:

  - Called meetings of the WID Working Group to report on AFWID and initiate a dialogue on integrating gender in policy guidance and mission reporting systems and on ideas for a bureau WID strategy
  - Presented gender issues at the Agricultural Development Officer Conference
  - Contributed to review of the Uganda CPSP
  - Participated in the Africa Bureau review of the APIs, FY91 and FY92, and produced a report for each year
  - Reviewed gender dimensions of an Africa bureau project paper (PARTS)
  - Consulted in the development of the Women in the Market initiative of ONI
  - Advised on the scope of work for democracy assessments
  - Prepared responses to congressional inquiries on WID as they occur or talking points on WID for selected conferences and events
  - Briefed visiting professionals on AID's WID activities in Africa
  - Served on technical review committees for WID-related unsolicited proposals and facilitated the decision to fund two major projects

- Made recommendations on gender inclusion to AFR/ARTS strategic frameworks on technology transfer, NRMS, and agribusiness development
- Designed the scope of work for three linkage studies in collaboration with PRISM to examine gender in natural resources, policy reform, and trade and investment

▸ Collection and dissemination of documents:

- Established a small documentation center on WID in Africa that includes a cataloguing system
- Sent information to missions on request (average two a month)
- Sent information on request to people outside the agency (average three or four a month)

In addition to these responsibilities, the resident advisor stepped in to do some of the field work in southern Africa when the regional advisor there left her position. The work she did in southern Africa includes the following:

- Conducted a WID portfolio review in Madagascar

- Drafted the social soundness analysis for the SAAR project paper (Botswana) and a family planning project (Zambia)

- Met with a South African women's delegation to foster AID support for women's agenda in constitutional reform

- Advised on the privatization strategy project paper (Zambia)

- Canvassed local women's groups to make recommendations to the Democracy and Governance project (Zambia)

- Acted as a resource person at the Southern Africa WID Officer training

- Participated in training on gender analysis and participatory rural appraisal in natural resources management in Zimbabwe

- Facilitated technical assistance to Malawi for a project evaluation

FAILURES

The regional advisors and resident advisor were unable to accomplish other tasks specified in the Project Paper. Based on a lack of evidence that these activities occurred and on the regional advisors' and REDSO and mission staffs' observations, we have found that AFWID was unable to make progress on the following:

- Improve databases on gender and WID concerns;

- Create and maintain a monitoring and evaluation system on gender-related aspects of programs and projects in Africa (although the resident advisor initiated some discussions on this matter);

- Integrate women's concerns into project and strategy documents of host government and PVOs (although the regional advisor in West Africa accompanied mission staff to observe women's activities in a PVO cofinancing project in Mali);

- Increase political support within the Africa bureau of WID and gender concerns;

- Assist in addressing gender concerns in project implementation; and

- Work as a team to share ideas and experiences related to gender issues in order to improve programs and projects.

Each of the AFWID advisors has performed competently in the context of opportunities and constraints that she faced. Each has worked with mission staff, local women's groups, and occasionally, but not significantly, with host country government agencies and PVOs affiliated with missions. What lies behind the incomplete outcomes summarized here is not due to incompetence on the part of AFWID staff, but rather a series of external and internal constraints.

In the next section, we analyze the project design and implementation in order to draw conclusions about what has worked well and what went wrong in this attempt to institutionalize the WID agenda in the Africa region.

ANALYSIS

PROJECT DESIGN ELEMENTS

While the project goal seems unassailable, the project purpose and prescribed outputs were flawed.

Goal

The project goal is "increased and more equitable economic growth through greater participation and integration of women in the development process." The goal is far-reaching and closely tied to AID's broad mandate to encourage a more equitable treatment of women in development. Because of this, and because the project was not accountable for demonstrating measurable progress at the goal level, the goal itself was immune to controversy.

Purpose

The project purpose is "to increase the participation of and benefits to African women in selected development programs and projects." Inherent in the project purpose itself are two of the major flaws of the project and the source of many problems. First, although USAID mission programs and projects are integral to the purpose, the project was not designed in response to a clear demand from missions. Missions were asked to *respond* to the draft project paper, and many did so favorably. But it was not the missions that initiated the demand for the project.

The purpose assumes that missions (and the host governments and PVOs with which they work) agree with the project goal and acknowledge the problem it is addressing. In reality, regardless of written AID mandates and policies, these organizations differ dramatically in the extent to which they embrace that goal, and their commitment to it varies considerably over time, depending on the policy environment and managerial environment of the organization. Thus, to some missions, the project purpose is consistent with their own strategies, while to others it feels like an unwelcome imposition.

Second, the purpose encompasses a broad strategy for moving toward the goal, requiring project staff to work in all stages of program and project development; in government, PVO, and USAID organizations; and, eventually, in an unspecified number of countries. The end-of-project status (EOPS) and the project outputs do not provide specific guidelines or prioritize activities.

End-of-Project Status

The end-of-project status is "participation of women in projects and programs assisted by the project is 10 percent greater than in comparable projects (either past or present) in the region."

It is not likely that the end-of-project status will be measurable within the remaining life of the project. We have not attempted to count how many more women are participating in projects affected by AFWID, either directly or indirectly, than in "comparable" projects not affected by AFWID. First, this is a spurious measure of success, since, according to the problem statement that guides the project goal, the importance of women as project participants is in the nature of their roles, functions, and/or benefits, not only in their numbers, either absolute or proportional. Second, AFWID staff members usually worked in the early design stages of strategies and projects or in the formative stages of women's groups, and, although the general consensus is that their work has a strong impact when it comes at an early stage, at this time it is still too early to count how many women will ultimately participate in the project.

Outputs

We will look at each output and the indicators related to it in order to analyze what the project has accomplished according to what was anticipated by the design. We will also comment on the usefulness of the prescribed outputs.

Output #1: *Improved empirical basis for developing increased understanding and awareness of the importance of women's roles in the African development process.*

The database developed in Output #1 has two distinct purposes:

- To "provide a more realistic basis on which to develop and implement programs and projects" (Project Paper, p. 15); and

- To "convince host country and sometimes AID officials of the importance of women's roles" (pp. 14-15).

The *indicators* derived from this output are:

- *Improved databases on women's roles in six to nine countries maintained by host governments, private organizations, or AID.* For a number of reasons we will discuss in subsequent sections, not one database was developed. The main deterrent to its inception is a total lack of interest within missions.

- *Gender assessments conducted in at least three countries.* "Gender assessments" is a vague term that probably encompasses a number of activities undertaken by AFWID staff, including their analyses of CPSPs, mission program and project designs, and evaluations.

- *Nine to twelve program or project evaluations conducted.* We counted five evaluation activities (see previous section on Findings), but only one of these (ASAP in Malawi) represented significant participation in a full-scale evaluation. AFWID advisors would have to be invited to participate in evaluations, but often they were not. Evaluations often entail contractual obligations that they be

conducted by outsiders, in which case AFWID advisors might not be able to participate.

- *Monitoring and information system established for gender activities in AID activities in Africa.* This indicator implies that the project will develop a full-scale activity monitoring system; it fails to discuss the relationship between such a system and AID's other activity-monitoring and data-collection systems, such as the API and PIR.

  This indicator was modified informally at the first team planning meeting to reflect the view that such a system would not be useful unless it was integrated into existing monitoring systems. This system was not established--a failure that is discussed in the subsequent section on systems.

Output #2: *Development plans and strategies which more effectively integrate women's contributions into development programs.*

The *indicators* related to this output are:

- *Three host government and five PVO development plans or strategy documents which include plans for detailed analysis of the obstacles to women's participation in the development process and strategies to overcome them.* AFWID advisors rarely worked with host governments or PVOs. This indicator was modified informally at the first team planning meeting to "assist three missions to incorporate gender in policy discussions with host governments." In other words, advisors' clients no longer included host governments and local PVOs, thus changing the balance that had been struck in the project paper between mission and host government clientele (see above section on Project History).

  Six to nine AID action plans or CDSSs which include more detailed and gender disaggregated analysis, plans, and targets for women's participation. Advisors did participate in the development and review of CPSPs (which replaced CDSSs) and other program-related activities. This indicator was modified informally at the team planning meeting to "conduct three CPSPs or program reviews." We counted five such instances (see the Findings section).

Output #3: *Project and program designs which recognize and profit from increased and more appropriate female participation.*

The *indicators* for this output are:

- *Twenty project designs in project-target countries.*

- *Ten project designs in other AID-assisted countries in Africa.* Here it is clear that the project is to reach beyond the target (or focus) countries.

These indicators were modified informally at the team planning meeting to "conduct or affect 18 project and program designs in specific countries, utilizing existing data." Thus, the distinction between focus countries and other countries was blurred.

This is the output in which AFWID advisors worked most successfully because this is what USAID missions invited them to do. We count about 20 activities related to USAID project design (see the Findings section).

Output #4: *Project implementation which ensures greater and more productive involvement of women as both providers and beneficiaries of development assistance.*

The *indicators* are:

- *Forty projects assisted in project-target countries.*
- *Twenty projects assisted in other AID-assisted countries in Africa.*

Here again, the extension to host country and PVO projects is not explicit, but the extension to countries beyond target/focus countries is. The indicators were modified informally to "assist 30 projects in specific countries" and "monitor application of existing data for integration of gender in implementation of six projects," another effort to restrict the advisors' work to focus countries.

AFWID advisors did little work in project implementation. Our discussions with them and with mission staff reveal that once projects are in the implementation stage, the contractor is likely to turn to its own staff and subcontractors, to whom it has some obligation to employ, for short-term assistance.

Output #5: *Strengthening African women's capacity to express their needs in order for them to participate more fully in the development process.*

The *indicator* is:

- *Assist three organizational initiatives to support women's access to information and training in the political, economic, and legal arena or to educate women in how to affect policy.*

This output (added by the AFWID staff at their December 1991 planning meeting, recorded in the July 1992 First Progress Report, appears to amplify Output #2; it permits regional advisors to work directly with local women's groups. The extent to which this is an appropriate project output became an issue early on in the project and is still an unresolved issue. We discuss this more in the subsequent section on strategy.

Each of the AFWID advisors worked successfully with local women's groups, especially those in East and southern Africa. We counted a dozen activities of this kind (see the Findings section).

Additional Activities Described in the Project Paper

In the discussion of project outputs, the Project Paper suggests a number of AFWID staff activities that will result in these outputs. But not all the activities are linked explicitly to indicators. The activities described (Project Paper, pp. 15-20) include:

- "Short-term training in settings which are both formal (workshops) and informal (on-the-job) during implementation";
- "The development of networks of contacts with prominent individuals and organizations with particular interests and expertise in women's issues";
- "Visits to current or proposed project sites and interviews with project personnel, collection and analysis of background data, preparation of design studies (or assistance in preparing SOWs for such studies, assistance in preparing planning documents and project proposals, review of project and program planning and implementation documents, and attendance at review meetings with counterpart and AID personnel"; and
- "[Provision of] information, particularly to local groups, on women's issues and on potential sources of financial and technical assistance."

As a group, the AFWID advisors engaged to a limited extent in each of these activities. They were most active in providing information to local women's groups about sources of financial and technical assistance. While they did not conduct training sessions themselves, they did arrange for training. This happened in southern and West Africa, where the AFWID advisors assisted in--but were not responsible for--setting up regional workshops on gender issues. In East Africa, the advisor helped the mission set up and contract for a study tour of women of Burundi through Tanzania and Kenya. Each of the advisors visited project sites, but only the southern regional advisor conducted an extensive study to assist in preparing an evaluation document.

RESULTS

In sum, viewing the project solely in terms of the Logical Framework, we find that the project staff is expected to:

- Carry out a wide range of activities that include advocacy, training (workshops and on-the-job), network development, establishing and maintaining a systematic base of empirical data from analyses and research, and providing information to local women's groups, as well as technical assistance to mission staff;

- Work from the beginning to the end of the program and project cycle--"from the earliest strategy planning stage through implementation to review and evaluation" (Project Paper, p. 15);

- Conduct these activities not only with USAID missions but also with governments and indigenous PVOs; and

- Extend these activities to countries beyond the initial focus countries sometime within the life of the project.

Beyond the guidance of the project goal that activities should fall within the bounds of increasing the participation and integration of women in the development process, the project design does not make it clear how the AFWID staff is to prioritize activities.

This broad framework gives the project staff extreme latitude in choosing specific activities, but not much guidance. We will discuss in the following section on strategy, how the project intended to provide guidance to AFWID staff and how this guidance caused problems.

PROJECT STRATEGY (APPROACH)

To produce the outputs, the project strategy required that the advisors:

- Serve as consultants to selected missions, advising them on strategies, designs, implementation, and evaluations;

- Conduct research and collect and analyze data;

- Work as a team to share information;

- Work exclusively in focus countries until these were operating as successful models of missions that integrate women into programs and projects;

- Work in the four sectors in which the WID program concentrates; and

- Strengthen local women's groups and their links to USAID programs.

To what extent did this strategy work and for what reasons?

The Consultant Role

Operating out of her regional base, each regional advisor was to serve as a consultant to selected mission staff and to the host governments, PVOs, and local women's groups with whom missions worked or intended to work. In this role, she would influence the design and implementation of programs and projects.

The advisors played this role successfully, some better than others. The effectiveness of all three advisors increases when they have a relationship with a program, project, or group that continues over time and they are brought in more than once. They also have more influence when they are brought in early in an activity rather than asked simply to read and review a fairly complete document.

The advisor in southern Africa worked well with the resident advisor in AID/Washington, from whom she sought and received strong support. The advisor in REDSO/ESA benefitted from strong supervision and support in how to work effectively as a consultant and how to work in the AID institutional environment. The advisor in REDSO/ESA has also benefitted from the organization of that mission, in which she is an equal member of the Analysis Division, working in a collegial relationship with the other analysts. The advisor in REDSO/WCA, in contrast, is not part of a working group, and the advisor in southern Africa was on her own as the only regional staff person in a bilateral mission.

The advisors' responsibilities go beyond those of many consultants in their need to play an advocacy and educative role in keeping gender issues alive, both in the consciousness of people involved in programs and in the documents they produce. They are more effective in this role when they have a sustained presence in the mission, getting to know staff and suggesting upcoming activities in which they can be helpful. They not only have to provide technical assistance, but also have to continually market their services.

USAID missions use the AFWID advisors as one of a number of available sources of technical expertise in gender matters. The missions also have the option of using local consultants and consultants provided by AID contractors, especially those whose services are obtained by buy-ins and matching grants from the WID office. This arrangement seems to work well. AFWID advisors are often preferred because their services come at no cost to the missions, although in southern and West Africa some mission staff members complained that the lack of flexibility in the REDSO scheduling conference mechanism limits the missions' ability to use the AFWID advisor when she is most needed. This is not a problem in East Africa.

Some missions do not know enough about what WID-related services are available. The regional advisors are in a good position to facilitate missions' access to services, as long as the advisors are kept informed. Although there is some temptation to empower a regional advisor to act as a clearinghouse or "demand clarifier" for WID expertise, this might unduly constrain missions in their choice of assistance and cause them to resent the advisors' authority.

All in all, by Spring 1993, the regional advisors had, to varying degrees, made notable progress in developing and marketing their services to missions. As they continue to prove their worth, demand for their services grows; for example, the advisor in East Africa is on the verge of seeing too much demand, and, at the time she resigned, the advisor in southern Africa had built an active clientele in several countries. The advisor in West Africa also saw an increased demand for assistance after the last REDSO scheduling conference.

Research and Data Analysis

The role of research, data collection and analysis, and information dissemination gets much attention in the Project Paper, but remains unclear and impractical. One rationale given in the Project Paper for the research and data collection function is that USAID missions, host governments, and related development organizations need more empirical data to identify the ways in which increased participation of women will promote economic growth and development (see pages 9, 11, 12, and 14-15 of the Project Paper for examples of this rationale). But we found no evidence that anyone has looking for empirical data to convince them of the importance of women's participation in development.

Nor is there as much interest as seems to have been anticipated in collecting data for some general purpose. We found no research agenda or guidance that AFWID or other WID advisors could use to initiate research in WID and gender concerns or to respond to opportunities for such research. If there is such guidance, it needs to be better advertised. The advisors can--and do--collect data for use in designing or evaluating a specific project. The southern regional advisor did some extensive field research, and all three have often engaged in less formalized data collection activities in their role of technical assistants.

Data were also to be collected for Africa-wide use in program and project designs. But, in design efforts, mission staff generally use data sources specific to the country. They rely on World Bank and United Nations publications for comparative data on a regional level. They view the regional advisors as advisors, not researchers, and the advisors are not well situated to initiate research activities.

In Washington, D.C., the resident advisor facilitated three studies to help demonstrate the linkages between gender integration and positive program and project impacts. In our visits to missions, however, we did not hear about these studies, and the data collection component of the strategy never got off the ground.

Teamwork and Cross-Fertilization

For at least two reasons, the AFWID advisors did not develop a team relationship. One reason is the project structure, which we discuss in the following section. The other is that they have no incentive to work together. The Project Paper intended that they would cooperate to "increase the cross-fertilization of ideas and experience on women's issues in Africa." But they see their primary job as serving USAID missions and organizations related to those missions. To do this job, they have no need to maintain formal communication with their counterparts in other regions. Cross-fertilization would require them to package their

own ideas and experiences in a manner useful to their counterparts, which they have not found the time to do.

MayaTech was responsible for organizing two team meetings in Washington, D.C., which it used to conduct team-building activities based on its conviction that the success of the project depended on good teamwork among the four advisors. The first meeting was held in December 1991, just after the resident advisor was on board and the project completely staffed.

Although the written report on the first meeting was positive, the regional advisors now look back on it as confusing. Although the meeting provided the advisors with much information on the background of the project and resources they could use, they do not think it helped develop the team. The advisors could not achieve consensus on fundamental issues of roles, relationships, and procedures. There were clashes of will and unresolved conflicts. This is not surprising, since they came from different cultures, with different expectations, and no meaningful incentives to collaborate. They owe their success and allegiance to their individual environments, not to the artificial construct of the project. The team meeting did not deal adequately with the cross-cultural issues, and group processes were not managed effectively.

A second meeting in September 1992 was again unsuccessful in bringing the advisors to a common understanding of how and why they should work together. None of the regional advisors reported positively about the meeting or remembered having learned anything of use in her job. Only one regional advisor reported that conflicts were resolved more skillfully by the facilitator in the second meeting.

The advisor in southern Africa and the resident advisor in AID/Washington worked well together as a team. The other two advisors, however, did not work closely with this team. Hence, the project staff remained fractured.

Focus Countries

The focus country strategy has not worked. The ECPR Issues Paper noted the uncertainty about demand for AFWID services in the suggested target countries, but the requirement for a definitive assessment of demand was waived. In spite of some early indications of missions' interest in AFWID advisors, more often mission staff were initially indifferent or even hostile to inviting advisors to help them. The knowledge of and attitude toward WID and gender concerns varies considerably from staff person to staff person, and the overall interest of the mission waxes and wanes depending largely on the attitudes of senior staff members, the skill and interest of the WID officer and/or WID coordinator (when there is one), and the mission's perception of how the regional advisor can complement the mission staff.

Some of the missions suggested in the Project Paper as focus countries, which may have expressed interest in 1989 in AFWID participation, were no longer interested in 1991 when regional advisors appeared on the job. Two of the three regional advisors could not get an invitation from their designated focus countries (Tanzania and Malawi) for many months. It

was only staff turnover that eventually produced invitations (which then led to a sustained relationship in both cases).

The focus country strategy became an important issue at the first team planning meeting, and the outputs of the Project Paper were informally modified to allow advisors to work in countries other than the focus countries (see section on Project Design). Two advisors made themselves available to other missions and, over time, began to develop productive relationships with three or four others.

A year and a half after the first team planning meeting, however, the focus country strategy was still a concern of the advisors in East and West Africa. In East Africa, the advisor believes that Tanzania, her focus country, should be given priority. In West Africa, the advisor has been hampered by REDSO/WCA's understanding that she is not allowed to serve any missions but those in the two focus countries. Thus, she has had to turn down invitations from other missions and, in one case, struggles to sustain a relationship in a mission in which the WID coordinator and some staff members feel she is superfluous.

Finally, the focus country strategy was misguided in its attempt to develop model WID programs. Mission leadership defines the emphasis of programs, and as leadership and personnel are transitory, programs that are models at one time are likely to change. We saw some missions with excellent WID programs, such as in Malawi, where recently they have updated the WID portfolio review (formerly the Women's Action Plan), and gender concerns are structurally integrated in project designs and implementation plans. We saw other missions moving toward a strong WID program and still others moving away from one. But in each case it is senior management, with the help of the WID officer, who built the program; the AFWID advisor's role has been secondary and limited to responding to mission requests. The strength of a WID program results more from the support it receives from senior management in the mission than from central projects.

Concentration Sectors

The project design limits the activities of the advisors to the four sectors: education, private enterprise, natural resources, and agriculture. This strategy works to the extent that the expertise of the advisors falls within these sectors and helps the advisors develop links with other technical advisors in the REDSOs. But it does not allow the advisors either to work in other sectors in which they have expertise or to develop expertise in sectors they do not know as well. At least one advisor is tentative about working in a sector that she does not know well, although sector-specific guides developed by the WID office are available to help advisors develop expertise in an increasing number of sectors.

Local Women's Groups

This is the strategy component that, in view of AID's initiatives in democracy and governance and its "local participation" strategy, has had a serendipitous effect on AFWID and the missions it serves. In their efforts to develop democratic institutions, USAID missions recognize the need to forge links with groups and organizations that have an actual or

potential role to play in a functioning democracy. In recent years, women's groups have proliferated; some will not last long, but others will become important political institutions.

Particularly in East and southern Africa, missions are beginning to call on the AFWID advisor to help them identify viable women's groups and to strengthen and help those groups develop links to USAID programs. In the East and West Africa regions, where the advisors are African women, they have demonstrated their ability to serve as critical interlocutors between the USAID missions and the local groups and host government agencies.

This important resource deserves better recognition than it now receives. The advisors need guidance from missions and their supervisors on determining which women's groups have potential programmatic linkages to missions and which should receive priority attention. By virtue of their consultant role and detachment from day-to-day mission activities, these African advisors have the credibility and objectivity to help other Africans--within the mission as well as outside of it--express their valuable insights in terms useful for program and project development.

Results

The project strategy has not been implemented entirely as intended. Some aspects of it have been successful--the advisors' role as consultants to missions and their work with local women's groups--but others have not--data collection and research, teamwork, focus countries, and concentration sectors. The viable strategy that has emerged, then, is to have regional advisors consult with missions in response to requests for help on the WID and gender dimensions of their programs and projects. In addition to providing help directly in design and evaluation matters, the advisors have discovered they can play a valuable role in helping missions develop programmatic links with local women's groups. This role could be further exploited, but advisors and missions will need some careful guidance in determining which local groups to strengthen, at what point in their development, for what precise purpose, and by what means. This kind of activity, as it grows, may also require more managerial oversight from missions and perhaps new ways to ensure that productive relationships between the women's groups and mission programs are maintained.

PROJECT STRUCTURE

Together with the flaw in the project purpose--that it did not respond to mission demand--probably the most egregious defect in the project design is its structure. First, it is unduly complicated. Each advisor is supposed to report to at least three people as well as respond to their clients, mission staff members. Second, it assumes that four people, living and working thousands of miles apart, in different organizational and cultural environments and without any functional need to collaborate, will regularly communicate and be responsive to a common set of systems and orders. Third, it has complicated funding channels and various contracting mechanisms, which were apparently designed to "end run" established channels but only served to aggravate the offices being avoided, and which have reverted in some

respects to normal business procedures. Added to this is that the larger structure of both the Africa bureau division (PD) and the WID office (PPC/WID) were dismantled shortly after the project began, so the channels of authority and reporting became circuitous to the point of collapse.

Lines of Authority

The Project Paper does not include an organization chart. Some advisors provided us with their versions of such a chart, and the complexity of lines running between boxes instantly signaled problems. Each of the regional advisors was "coordinated" by the resident advisor, who, in turn, was hired by a contractor (MayaTech) that had no line authority over or responsibility for the regional advisors. Each was also supervised by someone in the regional office--REDSO/ESA, REDSO/WCA, or, in Southern Africa, the Botswana mission. And each was supposed to report regularly to the WID office by way of the resident advisor. Thus, each advisor reported through three different channels while she struggled to build her credibility and prove her value directly to many different staff members of two or more USAID missions. To say the least, these women were torn in different directions.

In addition, the regional advisors were asked to fulfill three functions, each of which requires a somewhat different support organization. The missions expected them to be consultants, providing technical expertise to missions; the regional offices required them to be salespeople, advocating gender concerns and marketing their own services; and the project coordinator in Washington, D.C., wanted them to contribute to the project information about what they had accomplished and what approaches had worked so that this information could be made available to various audiences.

Restructuring

At the same time these conflicting demands were put upon them, the advisors suffered from an absence of political, technical, and managerial support from Washington, D.C. Some of this resulted from the restructuring of the Africa bureau. The WID Working Group, intended to provide policy guidance, was severed from the managerial arm of the project when the latter was placed in ONI. As WID was hardly a new initiative (it has been around since 1973), AFWID had to compete for attention in ONI with some politically "hot" initiatives--private enterprise and democracy and governance. Moreover, the whole Africa bureau, and ONI in particular, had been partially gutted after 1989 as a result of emerging attention to Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States (NIS). ONI was left short-handed, unable to offer any incentives to its staff to manage an already troubled WID project.

The resident advisor in the Africa bureau has probably suffered the most from the restructuring and ONI's lack of interest in the project. She had been hired to work as a researcher, but she is situated in ONI, an office of program advocates and project developers. Conflicting expectations of the resident advisor (to be an advocate, technical assistant, coordinator, administrator, and researcher) have left no one satisfied.

Inter-bureau Relationships

The relationship in AFWID between the Africa bureau, including the REDSOs, and the R&D/WID office was troubled by the complicated lines of authority and communication. Since AFWID provides a resident advisor within the Africa bureau, the WID office does not place one of its own staff (GENESYS contractors) in the bureau as well. This deprives the WID office of a direct link within the Africa bureau that it has in other regional bureaus. Their only formal connection to AFWID was a seat on the bureau's WID Working Group and their contribution of funds to the REDSOs. The WID office staff has no allegiance to AFWID or its staff. WID sees itself as supporting missions directly, and has no reason to welcome the interference of AFWID with its links to WID officers in the field. Misunderstandings and different interpretations of events by WID staff and regional offices made some R&D/WID staff regret their lack of control over the regional advisors, whom they support financially.

In addition, during much of the project, the WID office had problems of its own. People we interviewed who were familiar with the situation in the WID office, said that the staff was not working well with the office director--a political appointee who left abruptly, leaving them without a permanent director. Thus, the leadership of WID did not work with the Africa Bureau to clarify levels communication between WID and the AFWID staff.

Resource Management

Africa bureau funds stayed within ONI and have been controlled by MayaTech. In addition to the four long-term advisors, resources planned for AFWID included 18-months of short-term technical assistance. We learned that funds for short-term assistance were never made available by ONI to the project. MayaTech funded some technical assistance from its contract: an "Assessment of Gender Reporting in the Africa Bureau's FY92 API documents" (January 1993). It also funded a consultant who gave short-term technical assistance to Malawi in place of the southern regional advisor, who had just resigned. But ONI never made funds available to the regional advisors for short-term assistance.

Environment

Several features of the environment in which AFWID takes place have impinged upon its development. First of all, since the project has multiple venues of activity, it has multiple environments: the USAID missions in which advisors work, the regional offices where they are housed, the organizational environment in Washington, D.C., and the policy environments of AID.

The regional advisor's effectiveness in each mission is influenced by the extent to which various mission staff members support WID concerns and gender analysis and the extent to which they know how to use the particular insights and skills of African professional women. It is also directed by the host government's policies on women's rights and their role in development. Sometimes a mission staff that would otherwise have an aggressive WID agenda must hold back in order to work comfortably with the host government. Moreover, within each mission, the attitude toward WID concerns is affected by the past experience and

present outlook of every staff person. Perceptions of WID matters vary widely among AID officials. Some Africa bureau staff claim they have hardly been informed or sensitized to gender issues; others are committed to the WID agenda.

While attitudes toward WID vary, attitudes toward initiatives from Washington, D.C., are less diverse. Some mission staff members view some central projects with skepticism. Some are more skilled than others in assessing each initiative for its own value to the mission. As a Washington, D.C.-based project, AFWID has had to struggle uphill, and each advisor has had to demonstrate her usefulness to people in the missions.

Because commitment to WID activities and gender issues ebbs and flows as mission staff turns over, it would be risky to place full-time WID advisors directly in missions. An advisor may be stranded in a mission with no interest in her services. Advisors placed in regional offices have the advantage of directing their services to those who request their services.

Just as important as the mission environment is the policy and organizational environment of the regional office itself. We have already discussed how these differ, and from observations of these differences, we conclude that a supportive regional office is critical to the effectiveness of the AFWID advisor. The African women need guidance and supervision in how to follow AID procedures and to get along in that hybrid American environment. Investment in their professional development, however, is worthwhile, because they have much to offer in linking mission programs to local organizations.

Finally, the policy environment in Washington, D.C., strongly affects how amenable mission programs are to WID concerns. The Percy amendment ensures that efforts to integrate women into development will hold some incentive for mission personnel to pay attention to WID concerns and gender issues, but at present, this incentive cannot compete with Washington, D.C.'s enthusiasm for other initiatives--private enterprise and democracy and governance, to name two. Pressure to address gender issues in development comes from outside AID, and it changes with transitions in the administration and the legislature. Any structures and programs intended to institutionalize WID--AFWID being an illustrative case--must be designed to withstand ill winds and be sustainable in unfavorable political climates. AFWID has had to survive with what the advisors perceive as virtual inattention from the WID office, because the latter has suffered recently from political neglect beyond AID.

Results

As a result of the complex structure of the project and the number of environments in which it has been implemented, we have found opposing views on many important issues concerning the project. We heard many inconsistent accounts and interpretations of events, and we discovered misunderstandings, anger, resentment, and hurt feelings among project staff and others who had dealt with the project. These perceptions and feelings diverted energy of those involved with the project away from substantive matters to structural and systemic problems.

PROJECT SYSTEMS

In light of the project's complex structure and sporadic management within ONI, it is not surprising that the systems that should have supported the projects did not function well. We will define these systems as:

- The executive (leadership) system;
- The operations system;
- The financial management system; and
- The information management system.

The Executive System

An executive system provides policy guidance, quality control of services, and professional development of the staff. But a systematic treatment of these functions was almost impossible in a project in which the chair of the policy advisory body (the WID Working Group) was in a different office from both the operations management (ONI), and the staff (the four advisors). Each advisor was accountable to different organizations (the regional offices and the Africa bureau).

Quality control (systematic measures to ensure that advisors are producing outputs) and professional development are critical to the effectiveness of the regional advisors' work. While REDSO/ESA imposed some quality control on the AFWID advisor's work and took responsibility for her professional development, the other advisors appear to have worked independently. They have been frustrated by a lack of feedback and experienced no mentoring, on-the-job training, or structured training opportunities.

The regional offices have received no policy guidance from the WID Working Group and have been left to determine on their own the priorities for the AFWID advisors. Except for REDSO/ESA, none of them made such determinations, again leaving the advisor on her own. Senior-level support for WID activities also varies among the regions, and the strength of this support has affected each regional advisor's comfort with what is expected from her and assurance that her work is valued.

MayaTech attempted to provide leadership in the team-building sessions and by reaffirming the resident advisor's coordinating role, which was prescribed in the Project Paper. As we discussed in the preceding section on project structure, the de facto lines of authority were in conflict with the attempt to create an executive system directed by the resident advisor.

MayaTech urged the regional advisors to submit quarterly work plans and quarterly reports, but the advisors in the East and West resisted. They were not comfortable with this approach to planning and communicating, and they do not want to establish any lines of accountability to the resident advisor in addition to those within REDSO. In the absence of regular reports from regional advisors, no one in Washington, D.C.--MayaTech or ONI--had a means of knowing how well the advisors were doing in producing outputs, what kind of help they needed, or how the project might be modified to help them fulfill its purpose. Thus, AFWID

has had no formal leadership, no quality control, and little systematic means of professional development.

The Operations System

An operations system provides direct supervision, technical support, and administrative and clerical support. In the project design, these functions were divided among the project management (which fell into ONI with the reorganization of the Africa bureau), MayaTech, and the regional offices. ONI assigned the project to a series of managers, and sometimes no one was in the management position. The managers did not necessarily have professional experience with or personal interest in WID or gender issues, were stretched thin over a number of projects (most of which provided more incentives for their attention than AFWID), and used a hands-off management style. Consequently, supervision and administrative and clerical support fell to the regional offices.

This vacuum of leadership and operational support in Washington, D.C., has affected each advisor differently. The resident advisor in Washington, D.C., has been left to work independently, with support only from the consulting firm that hired her. She had been hired to do research, yet some expected her to be an advocate and "sell" WID to bureau staff and affiliated organizations. She needed to stay close to activities within the bureau, yet she was assigned to an office in Rosslyn, far from the center of the activities she was supposed to monitor. Worst of all, she was told to coordinate her colleagues in the regions without any organizational authority or functional necessity.

The regional advisors hired by REDSOs have had to depend on those offices for support. This worked well in REDSO/ESA, which saw an opportunity to enhance its analysis staff with a full time WID expert. REDSO/ESA took over supervisory responsibility, and, in the absence of signals from Washington, D.C., policy guidance and managerial support. The AFWID advisor has gained collegial support and credibility from her colleagues in the division, and support and opportunities for on-the-job training that came from top management as well as her direct supervisor. In this situation, the AFWID project has flourished.

In REDSO/WCA, it has been less satisfying. The structure of that office does not provide an easy fit of the AFWID advisor in the organization. While other technical advisors are organized according to their technical expertise, the AFWID advisor is "free floating," not part of a team or group of colleagues. Because REDSO/WCA has understood that the project limits her work to focus countries, her portfolio appears strikingly different from those of others, who can respond to any mission in the region. In addition, her immediate supervisor has only recently arrived and still lacks a clear understanding of how best to work with AFWID. Senior management in REDSO/WCA has not provided leadership or administrative support to the AFWID advisor.

In southern Africa, in the absence of a regional office, regional staff members work out of bilateral missions; the AFWID advisor, until she left the project in February 1993, worked in Botswana. As she was the only regional person in that mission, the staff sometimes found it awkward to approve or disapprove her schedule, which responded to requests from other

missions. There were also misunderstandings about her use of office space, faxes, and telephones. Given the nature of her regional responsibilities, the mission staff, which was focused on a bilateral program, was not oriented toward giving her professional supervision and guidance, and, perhaps worst of all, she lacked the collegial support of other regional consultants.

The project design called for the R&D/WID office to provide some technical support to regional advisors. But the advisors did not seek or get such support. Two of them appear to have misunderstood R&D/WID's function, and during most of the life of AFWID, the R&D/WID staff position designated to support the project has either been vacant or filled by someone who was "acting" and had other responsibilities.

The Financial Management System

The project design called for two separate financial systems: the management of Africa bureau funds was delegated by contract to MayaTech, and the management of R&D/WID funds was delegated to the regional offices. It was not in our scope of work to look at either ONI's or MayaTech's financial management of the project, and we have no information on how either organization managed or accounted for these funds.

R&D/WID has not been able to track the funds it supplied to the project, because the funds have been commingled with the funds of each regional office. No one we interviewed mentioned problems at either REDSO. Though the AFWID advisors do not seem to have much knowledge of or control over the funds provided to the project, and faced extreme logistical difficulties by not having access to dollar credit accounts, they have experienced no budgetary constraints in their work. We learned that the Botswana mission had some serious financial control problems in the early days of AFWID, and the AFWID advisor could not track her own expenditures within the mission accounting system.

The R&D/WID office, however, stated that as the end of the fiscal year approaches, it does not get from the regional offices what should be routine financial statements, making it difficult for them to project how much they should allocate to the project in the coming year.

The Information Management System

We discussed in the project strategy section the total lack of demand in missions for more general-purpose empirical data on gender and women and the lack of activity in this function. Likewise, no one in a USAID mission has pressed AFWID advisors for an additional monitoring and information system on gender that would serve missions. Consequently, it makes little sense to the regional advisors to initiate such a system. The AID/Washington resident advisor was prepared to establish and maintain a database, but she could not do much without an influx of information from the regional advisors or the missions.

In addition to an information management system that serves missions, a separate issue arose from the need for a system to serve AID/Washington. The Project Paper calls for AFWID to help meet AID's ongoing need for data that can be used to persuade Congress that women are being given adequate attention. During the three years since the paper was written, the Africa

bureau has instituted the API document, which some expect will help meet this need. But because most data on gender are collected at the project level, they are not adequately reflected in the API.

The system-level problem in this case is how best to revise the API data collection system or to devise an additional system that reveals disaggregated data on men and women. Although solving this problem is not entirely a function of AFWID, the regional and resident advisors, working with appropriate mission and bureau staff members, should be able to contribute to the development of a useful means of systematically providing information on what missions are doing to increase the participation and integration of women in their programs and projects.

Confusing the use of data on gender for congressional reporting purposes with its use in project design and implementation harms everyone concerned with such data. Experts in WID concerns and gender issues do disservice to mission staff when, in their role of consultants, the advisors cannot go beyond a general instruction to "collect gender-disaggregated data." Program and project designers, implementors, and evaluators who ask for gender expertise need to work side by side with someone who can guide them in asking appropriate questions about how a project will involve and affect women differently than men, or boys differently than girls. It is this role, not that of gender-disaggregated data systems manager, that regional advisors play best.

Results

The ultimate effect of the breakdown in AFWID's systems is that the regional advisors operate like REDSO staff members. The advisors' relationship to AFWID has, if anything, a negative effect on their positions in regional offices. The lack of transparency in both financial systems have caused some problems. The information management system envisioned in the Project Paper was an odious task to at least two of the regional advisors and not responsive to demand from missions. Hence, it never happened.

CONCLUSIONS

In this section we will summarize our findings and draw from them conclusions about the value of the AFWID project and the best way to institutionalize WID concerns within the Africa bureau.

THE VALUE OF AFWID

Assistance to Mission Staff

AFWID has provided valuable assistance to individual mission staff members. Missions are not monolithic--knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes vary widely among staff members. And they are not stable--staff turnover is continuous. Under these conditions, staff members who think WID is important have taken all the help they can get in looking at gender issues and addressing WID concerns. Some of those who are indifferent have been willing to take no-cost help, such as AFWID has offered, and have benefitted from good guidance. Those who believe development is gender-blind have gained nothing from AFWID.

Assistance to REDSO/ESA

The project also added value to the REDSO/ESA group of analysts, among whom some were already serving as consultants in WID and gender matters, but who welcomed the first full-time WID expert. Part of this added value was in the professional growth of the AFWID advisor, which resulted from the office's support and supervision of her work.

Support for Local Women's Groups

AFWID used opportunities to capitalize on several circumstances to promote women in development. First, the regional advisors and some of the WID officers with whom they worked in the missions recognized a growing sense of efficacy among local women's groups and an increase in the number of those groups. The advisors helped these groups organize and attract resources with the expectation that the groups can soon forge stronger programmatic links with the missions. Next, by providing support to women's groups, AFWID began the long process of strengthening their involvement in democratic institutions, thus supporting AID's new initiative in democracy and governance. Finally, the advisors in each region took tentative steps toward facilitating the participation of local Africans, both within and outside the mission, in developing mission programs and projects.

CONSTRAINTS ON AFWID'S EFFECTIVENESS

In balance, AFWID has not yet fully achieved its objective or produced the outputs that were expected. This is not the result of incompetent staff but of severe constraints beyond their control.

Unresponsive Purpose

By limiting their work to focus countries and certain sectors, the project design constrained the advisors' ability to respond to needs in other countries and sectors. When the project became operational, there was little demand from focus countries for the services of AFWID advisors. They have had to continually create a demand for their services as mission personnel changes over time.

Misguided Strategy

The broad project purpose was not further defined by EOPS or outputs that could help the project staff set priorities or follow a workable strategy. While in some respects this lack of definition gave them flexibility, it also failed to help them distinguish between activities that could be effective. The strategy called for the advisors to provide technical assistance in a consulting role to a wide range of mission and local people. It did not give guidance in terms of program or process development priorities. It attempted to narrow this scope by stipulating that advisors would limit their work, initially, to selected focus countries. But in most cases the focus countries did not request services from the advisors, leaving them in the dilemma of ignoring this aspect of the strategy or working where they were not entirely welcome.

The strategy also assigned multiple functions to each advisor: technical expert, marketer of services, researcher, and data system contributor. The advisors were not equipped to do all these tasks, and attempts to have them work as a team, doing tasks they were not inclined to do, failed. In particular, the guidance in data collection and research efforts was particularly weak, and little was done in these areas.

Unworkable Structure

The project organization, at first glance, looked unworkable, and proved to be so. Each advisor was supposed to report to three people in addition to serving mission clientele. Altogether, the staff of four was in some ways accountable to seven different offices (AFR/DP, AFR/ONI, R&D/WID, REDSO/ESA, REDSO/WCA, USAID/Botswana, MayaTech Corporation), the interests, needs, and demands of which were not the same and sometimes conflicted.

Insufficient Management Resources

Direct hire personnel in ONI has been stretched thin, resulting in the neglect of AFWID. The project had a manager during its first year of operation, but since then, it has had only short-term, intermittent management. No one has overseen the contract with MayaTech, and the resident advisor, who was hired to focus on technical assistance and research activities, has had to work extensively on managerial and administrative tasks.

Inadequate Support Systems

One consequence of poor management has been inadequate support systems: executive, operations, finance, and information. After the 1991 reorganization of the Africa bureau, the executive system was truncated, leaving no viable link between the WID Working Group and the ONI project manager. Two separate financial management systems have disappeared from view. R&D/WID funds have been absorbed by the regional offices. The information management system never got off the ground, but no one seems to have suffered from its absence.

Unfavorable Environment

AFWID has been operating not only without much leadership and management support, but also in the thin air of political support from outside the agency. This environment is shared by other WID activities, and we will discuss it in the more general terms of institutionalizing WID.

INSTITUTIONALIZING WID IN THE AFRICA REGION

Constraints

AFWID was designed as a means of institutionalizing WID concerns in the Africa region. Why has that been so difficult? Part of the explanation lies in the analyses of the project itself, but part of it goes beyond this particular project. We take this opportunity to share what we learned from mission staff members about the more general constraints on WID efforts.

First, different people have different views of what "WID" is. Those who have not given it much thought seem to associate it with either the strident extremes of feminism or the innocuous activities of ladies' sewing circles. In either case, they stay clear of it. Others, who are more enlightened, link WID with equity issues and female human rights, which is only one component of the WID agenda. Those who have been recently indoctrinated view WID concerns as a function of economic development, which is precisely in line with the goal of AFWID, but still leaves room for differing interpretations of how WID should be institutionalized.

Second, gender issues are difficult to conceptualize in the aggregate. WID is not a science, a sector, or a discipline. Although its concerns are "cross-cutting," and gender experts use common analytical tools, their application differs in each sector--agriculture, education, private enterprise, and so on. An analysis of data on gender must raise questions and issues unique to each sector. Thus, it is difficult to impose standard procedures or requirements across sectors or to recognize common trends in the larger picture of an economy's development.

Third, AID offers few incentives for its staff to make an effort to master WID concerns and gender issues. The Percy Amendment mandate comes from outside of the agency, and does not often find an effective advocate or enforcer on a senior level within the agency.

Moreover, contributions to the WID agenda are not highly visible among matters that count toward career advancement. Thus, an AID staff person will reasonably put WID matters on the back burner when they interfere with the many demands that do affect career advancement.

Solutions

An important step toward bringing WID concerns into the mainstream of AID programs is to acknowledge these constraints and deal with them. Until WID is institutionalized, its strengths will be located in people, not procedures. This implies strategies that are opportunistic, taking advantage of favorable conditions to implant gender concerns.

Advocacy of WID concerns needs to be ongoing, as people come and go, taking on new positions and responsibilities. Continued education should eventually lead to a critical mass of people who are comfortable addressing WID issues in every mission and bureau office and in the host government agencies and local organizations with which missions work.

WID expertise is more effectively applied in the early stages of program, project, and other activity development rather than at document review meetings, at which time it is too late to do much other than hand waving. WID technical assistants should be invited to work side by side with others in the design, implementation, or evaluation efforts, not asked to add a paragraph or phrase to a document.

In thinking through an activity intended to institutionalize WID (such as the AFWID project), consider whether it can be sustained during times when political support, within and outside the agency, is feeble, and do not impose requirements related to WID activities on staff members without incentives to meet them.

Finally, the focus of all WID activities must be the USAID missions and their work with host governments, local organizations, and contractors. This dictum does not discount the value of advocacy, training, and research activities initiated outside of missions, as long as they are conceived with careful consideration of their impact on the work of missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on these conclusions, we recommend that the Africa bureau phase out the AFWID project but *not discontinue* its support of WID activities, particularly regional advisors. The effort of managing and coordinating such a small project staff over such a wide geographical area has detracted from, not enhanced, the service that regional advisors offer to missions. We recommend instead that it use different, primarily existing mechanisms to institute some of the functions encompassed by the project. Specifically, we recommend the following:

1. That the Africa bureau support three regional advisors, one each in East, West, and southern Africa.

    - Each of these advisors would be based in a REDSO *if* the REDSO agrees to provide management, support, and professional supervision. If a REDSO declines, then missions in the region would be given the opportunity to host the regional advisor under the same condition. REDSOs would have periodic opportunities to keep or reclaim the advisor.

    - In southern Africa, where currently there is no REDSO, either the appointment of an advisor would be delayed until a REDSO opens in Pretoria, or, if agreeable to the candidate, temporarily housed in a mission until that time, or temporarily housed in REDSO/ESA.

2. That the regional advisors' scope of work include the following responsibilities:

    - Respond to requests from missions for program- and project-related activities;

    - Upon mission request, help link the mission in a programmatic context to local women's groups;

    - Advocate and initiate WID services within the region, such as training and research, to which mission staff members are invited and which the region funds with resources earmarked for that purpose;

    - Maintain up-to-date information on WID technical assistance available to missions: internally, locally, regionally, and through the Africa bureau and the WID office (but not act as a gatekeeper); and

    - Upon mission request, coach and mentor mission, host government, or local organization staff in gender analysis and program and project design and evaluation.

3. That regional offices fill the regional advisor positions with African professional women who can help other FSN staff forge links between mission programs and local organizations.

4. That each regional officer have a fund earmarked for regional WID activities, and that they be able to use these funds to obtain matching grants from the WID office for such activities.

5. That the regional advisors work within the following structure:

   - They are hired directly by the regional office, are accountable to a regional office staff supervisor, and receive direction and support through existing regional office channels; and

   - The Africa bureau funds the positions and provides support just as it does for other REDSO technical advisors.

6. That the Africa bureau provide for the following WID functions:

   - Senior-level policy guidance and advocacy to ensure continual vigilance at every level;

   - Staff support to that senior-level function; and

   - Technical and research support for bureau WID activities.

7. That the WID office offer technical support and services:

   - To the regional advisors just as it does to WID officers in missions, including contract services, opportunities for buy-ins, and matching grants; and

   - To the Africa bureau just as it does to the other regional bureaus.

8. That the Africa bureau assist in the professional development of regional advisors by:

   - Offering the regional advisors an opportunity annually to confer on professional matters and/or attend professional development training sessions or workshops; and

   - Detailing guidelines the advisors can use when they see opportunities for helping to implement the agency's research agenda on WID and gender concerns.

9. That the Africa bureau determine the best way to collect information on WID activities in missions for informing Congress.

   - The data collection process should encourage missions to report what they are actually doing, in words as well as or instead of numbers; and

- The process should not be so standardized that it discourages diverse kinds of information nor so open-ended that it fails to provide guidelines.

In sum, we recommend that the Africa bureau use existing channels and projects in the bureau to provide technical assistance and training in WID and gender concerns to missions and to the bureau staff in Washington, D.C. The more resources delivered to missions through these channels and the more policy support from AID/Washington, the more likely are WID and gender concerns to become institutionalized.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

AID/Bureau for Africa (AFR)
Don Muncy, ONI/PMO
Mary Picard, AFWID Resident Advisor
Robert Shoemaker, ONI/PMO
Pamela Mandel, AFR/SA
John Breslar, former WID office, USAID/Mali
Michael Caughlin, ONI
Timothy Bork, Acting AA
Marge Bonner, DP
John McEnaney, (formerly) ONI/PMO
Cameron Bonner, ARTS
Joan Atherton, DP
Sherri Grossman, DP

AID/R&D/Women in Development (WID)
Martin Hewitt, Deputy Director
Tim Seims
Deborah Schumann
Rosalee Norem
Sylvie Morel-Seytoux

Contractors in Washington, D.C.
Jean-Marie Mayas, President, MayaTech Corporation
Pietronella van den Oever, GENESYS Project Director, The Futures Group
May Rihani, Vice President, Creative Associates International

REDSO/ESA (Nairobi, Kenya)
Fred Fischer, Director
Bruce Odell, Deputy Director
Emmy Simmons, Analysis Division Director
Wanjiku Muhato, AFWID Regional Advisor
Joel Barken, Political Analyst
Steven Freundlich, Program Officer
Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst

USAID/Kenya
Elizabeth Martella, WID Officer
Nimo Ali, WID Coordinator

Contractor in Nairobi
Kathleen Webb, Regional Director, Breldan Consultants, Ltd.

USAID/Uganda
Shirley Erves Kore, Program Evaluation and Gender Officer

Patrick Fine, Education Officer
Cheryl Anderson, Program Officer
Elizabeth Marum, Health/AIDS Officer

National Association of Women's Organizations of Uganda (NAWOU)
Florence Nekyon, President
Nora Matoku, Legal Affairs
Maria Fischer, Advisor

USAID/Malawi
Carol Peasley, Director
Stephanie Funk, Program and WID Officer
JoAnn Hale, Supervisory ADO

Women's Program, Ministry of Agriculture
Catherine Chitwaren, Principal Agriculture Extension Officer

Contractor (on TDY in Malawi)
Ed Comstock, GENESYS Project

USAID/Namibia
Carol Culler, (formerly) AFWID Southern Regional Advisor
Barbara Belding, (formerly) WID Officer, USAID Botswana

USAID/Botswana
Howard Handler, Director
Hector Nava, WID Officer
Rochelle Rainey
Scott Stewart
Raymond Baum
Khalalelo Chepete
Robert McColaugh

Women and Law in Southern Africa
Daniso Mokgwathi

REDSO/WCA (Abidjan, Ivory Coast)
Esther Addo, Deputy Human Resources Development Officer
Medjomo Coulibaly, EHRD Technical Advisor
Katherine Jones-Patron, Assistant Director, HHR
Rene LeMarchand, Democracy and Governance Advisor
William Rideout, HRD Officer
Fatou Rigoulot, AFWID Regional Advisor
David Robinson, Director, PMO
Idrissa Samba, Environmental Officer

USAID/Mali
David Atteberry, PDO

Dennis Bilodeau, ADO/Project Officer
Kadiatou Cisse, PDO/Assistant
Richard Cook, APEX, Project Coordinator
Abdoulaye Dagamaissa, ADO/NRM
Augustin Dembele, Project Agronomist
Maimouna Dienapo, WID Coordinator
Mamadou Fofana, GDO/PVO
Ousmane Guindo, APEX, Technical Coordinator
Carol Hart, Project Officer, Community Health and Population
Doumbia Hawa Dolo, APEX, Bamako District Coordinator
Cheryl Jennings, PRM
Korotoumou Konfe, HRDA
Fanta Macalou, GDO/PVO, Health
Wayne McDonald, ADO/NRM
Djenebou Mariko, HRDA, Training Assistant
Robin Poulton, PVO Coordinator
Chahine Rassekh, BEEP Program Manager
Brehima Sangare, APEX, Kayes District Coordinator
Diaguely Sylla, APEX, Segou Region Coordinator
George Thompson, GDO
Sekou Togola, APEX, Koulikoro District Coordinator
Doral Watts, APEX
Freda White-Henry, HRDA

USAID/Ghana
William A. Akiwumi, Program Specialist (Ag/Econ)
Stafford Baker, Program Officer
Carol Bujeau, Program Manager, Monitoring and Evaluation
Joanna Laryea, Assistant Population Officer
Sandy E. Olesky-Ojikuto, Deputy Program Manager, Primary Education Program
Denise A. Rollins, Program Development Officer
Robert Wuertz, Program Economist