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USAID/THE GAMBIA

FY 1997

BUDGET SUBMISSION

AND

ACTION PLAN

JUNE 1995

THE GAMBIA
BUREAU BUDGET SUBMISSION AND ACTION PLAN

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I. PROGRAM SUMMARY

A. STRATEGY OVERVIEW

- **Background**

On July 22, 1994 the thirty-year old democracy in The Gambia was toppled in a bloodless coup d'etat that lasted only a matter of hours. Within days the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) was established comprised of five young junior officers. Four military officers and twelve civilians were appointed to cabinet positions including four women. While the political changes subsequent to the coup were welcomed by many, most people felt that the duration of the military regime should be short. Thus, public pressure led to the shortening of the timetable for transition towards elections and civilian rule from four and one-half to two years from the date of the coup. The coup automatically triggered the sanctions of Section 508 of the annual appropriations act which prohibits assistance to a country whose democratically-elected government is overthrown in a coup d'etat or by decree. Pursuant to Section 617 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the mission ended all assistance within the eight month period provided in the statute for an "orderly termination and deobligated in excess of \$10.0 million.

Prior to the coup, the development assistance program of USAID/The Gambia had two strategic objectives: (1) increased private sector investment leading to greater formal sector employment and (2) sustained increases in agricultural production in areas under improved natural resource management practices. The program was carried out primarily through agencies of the Government of The Gambia (GOTG). The FY 1994 OYB was \$7.695 million from the DFA, \$2.2 million in P.L. 480 Title II resources and an OE budget of \$962,500. Since the coup staff has been reduced from 5 to 3 USDH, from 6 to 2 USPSCs and from 29 to 19 FSNs.

- **USAID Programmatic Decisions After the Coup**

On February 9, 1995 the USAID Administrator approved a decision to support the programs of NGOs which promote a return to democracy by citing the authority delegated to him by the President to consider whether it was in the national interest to exercise the provisions of Section 550 of the Appropriations Act. The Administrator approved the NGO program, "subject to the design of a compelling program that will make a difference or serve to show that further work is futile."

On February 26, 1995 USAID/The Gambia prepared and submitted a Concept Paper for a Democracy and Governance (D/G) program to support the return of an elected government by July 1996, the date announced in the AFPRC timetable for a return to elected rule. The concept paper was approved and forwarded by the desk on March

7. This document is now in the office of the Administrator for consideration. However, the USAID Representative and Director of AFR/WA met with the Administrator on February 26, 1995 and received verbal approval to proceed with identifying appropriate NGO programs which would support the objective of returning The Gambia to elected rule.

On April 7, a Congressional Notification was submitted to the relevant oversight committees and has cleared all committees.

- **Program Strategy**

Because of the decision to respond rapidly to the needs of this country in transition, the mission has no approved strategy document nor Action Plan I. Therefore an overall program objective tree for the return to democratic rule (see part I.D.) and indicators and benchmarks have been included in this submission (see part III.A.1.). Both are preliminary and subject to further refinement.

In summary, the goal of the USAID assistance program is the consolidation of a democratic regime in The Gambia through a strengthened civil society. The sub-goal is democratic and constitutional rule by July 1996. Thus in the short-term, FY 1995 and 1996, the mission strategic objective is to:

Promote the return of a democratically elected government and to mitigate the potential for regional instability.

The USAID/The Gambia Strategic Objective directly supports the Agency goal of promoting democracy by supporting the transition and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world. This objective will be supported in the short-term by establishing democratic institutions: a new constitution, a civic/voter education program and an independent electoral commission. Specifically the USAID program supports the Agency objective by encouraging meaningful participation of all Gambians in the electoral process as well as developing civil society through civic education programs and supporting the work of the newly emerging advocacy groups.

If the AFPRC further demonstrates its commitment and allows the transition to occur by mid-1996, USAID would develop a new strategic objective to address the underlying weaknesses of democratic institutions in The Gambia which led to the coup. Such a program would focus on the consolidation of the new democratic regime by strengthening intermediary organizations particularly those serving rural areas and/or supporting efforts to decentralize and devolve the power of central government.

Thus, the program sub-goal is expected to be achieved by the beginning of FY 1997. In approving the national interest decision memorandum, the Administrator specifically considered the possibility of demonstrating concrete results in a very limited timeframe. While longer term assistance will be needed to actually consolidate democracy in the Gambia, it is feasible to demonstrate program impact in a very short time.

- **Program Design**

In mid-February USAID received the services of the REDSO/WCA Democracy and Governance advisor who prepared a preliminary assessment document. In January 1995, the Chairman of the AFPRC requested assistance from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to conduct civic and voter education programs as well as to support other areas related to the transition. NDI visited The Gambia in April to assess the commitment to the transition and identify possible areas of support. USAID has received and is assessing a preliminary proposal from NDI. NDI will return to The Gambia to submit a report of their assessment findings to the Chairman of the AFPRC and to elaborate specific areas of collaboration with local NGO organizations, including most likely the teacher's association, a legal association, and possibly the Commission for Human Rights, the Women's Council and others.

The mission has prepared a draft project paper and has arranged a TDY from the Regional Legal Advisor in July. REDSO is currently providing design assistance and the document will be reviewed in REDSO the week of June 19. The Regional Contract Advisor has been advised of the need to quickly negotiate a grant once the program is approved and the final NDI proposal is received.

B. OVERALL PROGRESS IN RETURNING TO DEMOCRACY

As promised, in late 1994 the AFPRC announced its timetable for a return to democratic rule. However, the proposed transition period was four and one half years. The public and international community were stunned as elections have been held regularly in The Gambia and the process was well understood by the majority of the population. In an exceptional move, the AFPRC then appointed a National Consultative Committee (NCC) to revise the timetable for the transition through a consultative process with the public. As a result, in late January 1995, the NCC recommended a reduction in the timetable to two years from the date of the coup on July 22, 1994. Since the announcement of the NCC recommendations, the AFPRC has taken the following steps:

- publicly accepted the reduced timetable;


- appointed a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC);
- invited the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to assist them in voter and civic education;
- invited the UNDP to assist the electoral process and seek donor support for constitutional and elections law;
- appointed a Transition Committee and a secretariat to support the committee. The latter is charged with responsibility for drafting the terms of reference for national Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) and revising the sequence of certain activities in the timetable to eliminate inconsistencies;
- to date, have met the costs of the NCC and CRC without donor assistance;
- have budgeted \$3.0 million Dalasis (about \$.3 million) for the elections; and
- allowed the appointed committees and visiting assessment teams free movement and access to the general public to openly discuss the transition and return to democracy.

It is important to note, that no USAID resources to support the U.S. policy objective of a rapid return to democratic rule has been provided to date other than the presence of a USAID mission and the dialogue that the mission has fostered with the AFPRC, NGOs and other donors.

The mission believes the following two benchmarks, will serve in the short-run as the most important indicators of AFPRC commitment and further progress in implementing the timetable:

- Lifting of the ban on political activities and guaranteeing that among the provisions retained in the 1970 Constitution will be the freedom of speech, the right of assembly and a free press. Similarly, the parameters of Decree Number 31 -- which guarantee that the current regime will respect fundamental human rights -- need to be clarified.
- Establish an electoral commission, or other body, that is independent and selected in a manner that either balances party representation or is non-partisan.

Other important indicators of progress include:

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- 
- Completion of work by the CRC and a re-ordering and rescheduling of the Constituent Assembly and/or Referendum to allow the constitutional provisions to be put in place to ensure the timely establishment of the constituent boundaries and registration of voters.
 - Respect due process under the law.
 - Further commit financial and human resources to the transition activities.
 - Assure the existence of a level political playing field. If the AFPRC moves to create a political party, it must simultaneously lift the ban on the formation of other political parties before the scheduled date of April 1996.

The Department of State is also particularly concerned about the status of political detainees and will judge the performance of the AFPRC accordingly.


C. APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY

(INSERT TABLE 1 - one Page)

D. THE GAMBIA TRANSITION PROGRAM OBJECTIVE TREE

(INSERT Table 1 - one page)


**USAID/THE GAMBIA
D/G OBJECTIVE TREE**




**USAID/THE GAMBIA
D/G OBJECTIVE TREE**



Democratic Governance In 1996



**USAID/THE GAMBIA
D/G OBJECTIVE TREE**



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II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

A. S.O. 1: Promote the return of a democratically elected government and to mitigate the potential for regional stability

1. Relevance to Agency Objectives

The Mission objective is directly related to the overall Agency and foreign policy goals of promoting democracy. The Gambia was one of the oldest functioning democracies in Africa prior to the coup of July 1994. The human rights record was one of the best on the continent and the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression, assembly and association were not only guaranteed by the constitution but were respected with few violations most of which followed the unsuccessful coup of 1981. Elections were held every five years and competition for parliamentary seats was increasing. However, there were fundamental weaknesses. Among them were:

- almost total domination of the political scene by a single political party;
- growing corruption among the political elite;
- a weak civil society and fledgling intermediary organizations;
- irregularities in the voter registration process;
- a weak, although a relatively strong by African standards, judiciary, and
- lack of parliamentary oversight.

Since the coup, USAID has worked closely with the Country Team, especially the Department of State, in pursuing its policy objective of promoting a rapid return to democratic rule. It is within that context that the Administrator approved the decision to support NGO programs which promote a return to democracy in The Gambia. Other U.S. interests include crisis prevention and regional stability. The Gambia is surrounded by Senegal and is the only Anglophone country in the region other than Ghana not suffering from political and economic upheaval. The Gambia has re-established diplomatic links with Libya and, thus, Western donors must maintain a stabilizing influence and presence in The Gambia.

2. Progress to Date

Initial AFPRC pronouncements after the coup were isolationist. Donors were told they were dealing with a sovereign nation which would not accept the dictates of other countries. Critics charged that the AFPRC was not fulfilling its promise to lead a coup "with a difference." Rather, they were behaving like all military coup leaders by installing themselves in power indefinitely.

A number of internationally respected Gambians, local civilian leaders and donors quietly began to counsel the AFPRC to compromise and shorten the timetable. At the end of 1994 the AFPRC appointed a committee of civilian leaders charging them with the task of reviewing the four-and-one-half year timeframe, consulting with the public and international community and recommending an acceptable timetable. Hours before the submission of the National Consultative Committees (NCC) report to the Chairman a counter-coup attempt was staged but failed. Allegedly, the issue was disagreement within the AFPRC about whether the NCC report should be accepted. While the veracity of this explanation has been questioned, there is undoubtedly tension within the AFPRC on whether and when the country should be returned to civilian rule. Notwithstanding this tension, the AFPRC has taken the following steps toward a return to democracy.

- **HUMAN RIGHTS**.- In general respected the rule of law, avoiding the worst forms of human rights abuses and allowed the judicial system to continue to function. Most recently there has been an active public and press debate on whether a set of recent decrees purposely or unintentionally suspended the "bill of rights" contained in the 1970 constitution. Subsequent to a meeting between the Minister of Justice and the American Ambassador, the Ministry issued a press release stating the regime is committed to respecting human rights.

While a more specific listing of the guaranteed freedoms is necessary to allow political activity, this action indicates a desire to attempt to maintain The Gambia's international reputation of respecting human rights. In a subsequent meeting with the Solicitor General, the USAID Representative was informed that a decree fully reinstating the Bill of Rights was on the Chairman's desk for signature. It remains to be seen whether the decree will be signed, and more importantly whether the guarantee of the freedoms of speech and assembly will enable the political activity needed in preparation for elections.

- **TIMETABLE ACTIONS** - While there have been delays in implementing the actions set forth in the timetable, critical steps have been taken by the AFPRC:
 - Accepted a shortened timetable announcing the intention of holding presidential and parliamentary elections in June 1996;

- Appointed the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), provided them with office space and logistic support, and allowed them free movement and private and public consultation with citizens and the international community;
- Appointed a Secretariat to formulate the terms of reference for the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) and the drafting of new elections laws; and
- Asked donors to support specific aspects of the transition including NDI to assist in voter and civic education, the UN in the electoral process as well as submitting requests to the UNDP to obtain the services of a constitutional expert and an elections law advisor.
- Requested technical assistance teams financed by USAID and UNDP to design the civic education and elections activities have been allowed free movement, access to the general public to discuss views and issues concerning the transition.

- **POLITICAL PRISONERS**

Following the coup of July 22, the failed counter coup attempt of November 11 and the failed palace coup of January 23, a number of soldiers and police officers were arrested and detained. Periodically former ministers have been detained. The Minister of Justice argues that only the detainees following the July coup should be considered political prisoners and that all others who have been arrested were legally charged with treason or specific criminal offenses. A number of the July 22 detainees have been released and the ICRC as well as the U.S. Ambassador have been allowed periodic prison visits. The embassy estimates that about half of the 30 detained in July are still in prison. However, the Ministry of Justice and AFPRC have yet to provide a full accounting of the total number of arrests, the status of each prisoner, or allowed verification of this information by the ICRC or other independent international body. Recently one of the detainees accused with participating in the January 23 counter-coup died while in detention. Informed sources say that while death was the result of a pre-existing medical problem, the detained was allegedly so depressed he refused medication and the AFPRC.

- **COMMITMENT AND LIKELIHOOD OF A TRANSFER OF POWER**

The Chairman of the AFPRC has yet to make a strong public statement

concerning his commitment to a return to democracy. Instead, his public appearances harp on the corruption of the past as a justification for the coup. Nevertheless, members of the AFPRC and the military officers serving as district commissioners maintain publicly that the transfer of power will take place. There are a number of indicators which will be carefully monitored over the coming months to assess the likelihood of achieving the sub-goal of democratic and constitutional rule in 1996. These include:

- whether or not the AFPRC accepts the technical advice of NDI, UNDP and others to reorder and compress certain actions of the timetable which as currently sequenced cause confusion and implementation problems;
- whether or not the ban on political activities is lifted simultaneously for all potential candidates -- including the AFPRC -- so that future elections can be deemed free-and-fair;
- whether or not the civic and voter education and other NDI activities are allowed to be undertaken without interference or harassment; and
- whether or not the steps set forth in the timetable are actually undertaken.

● **ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND STABILITY**

In 1992 GNP per capita was estimated at \$370 with 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line and 40 percent below the food poverty line. Since the coup, the overall picture of the Gambian economy has become shrouded and gloomy. While agriculture's share of GDP was initially projected to grow at about 10 percent in 1994/95 even this sector declined slightly. All other sub-sectors including construction, transport and tourism will register significant declines by the end of the Gambian fiscal year (June 30, 1995). While GDP was projected to grow this fiscal year at about 4 percent in July 1994, performance estimates were revised to a negative 4 percent in February 1995 by the World Bank. Estimates prepared by the EU in May further revise the figure to an estimated negative 6.7 percent. The picture becomes more bleak when the estimated population growth rate of 4.1 percent is considered as well.

While the performance was affected by external shocks, the devaluation of the CFA and the closure of the Senegal border, both which have had a dramatic impact on GOTG revenues from tariffs on the re-export trade, additional factors have contributed significantly to the economic downturn. These include:

- the withdrawal of tourists following the attempted country coup in November and the travel advisory issued by the British Foreign Office. Tourists arrivals during the peak December to March period fell from over 45,000 in 1993/94

to about 8,000 in 1994/95. Over the entire year arrivals fell about two-thirds. While the British advisory was down-graded in March 1995 revision, this will not affect arrivals before the next peak season. Any other political event could quickly cancel the expected recovery in the sector.

- business confidence is extremely low. While the World Bank February Mission commended the GOTG for maintaining a prudent fiscal and monetary stance a number of confusing policy signals have contributed to the political uncertainty created by the military regime. These include: abrupt abrogation of an expatriate management contract for the public utilities; threats to reverse the privatization of the groundnut industry; and government interference in the private sector rice market.
- growing tension with Senegal, especially in the wake of the 1000 percent increase in ferry prices on the major Senegal-Gambia transit route.

Inflation has once again begun an upward creep reaching its highest level, 6 percent, since December 1993. However deposits in the banking system remain at satisfactory levels and are up about 3 percent from July 1994. This indicates a reduced demand for capital, and that capital flight has not yet set in. The Dalasi is still freely convertible. The exchange rate has also remained stable since the coup with the changes reflecting movements in international markets. The Central Bank is also continuing to service the external debt and to date no defaults have been reported.

Reserves at the Central Bank have also remained at satisfactory levels (US \$96 million) about five months of normal imports. However absent a mechanism to monitor and collect revenues from the better performing public enterprises, notably the ports authority and the telephone company, there is evidence that there have been off-shore transfers for off-budget expenditures which have not been accounted for in the consolidated budget.

Sales tax and tariff revenues have fallen by about 25 percent (D175 to 130 million) reflecting the decrease in imports and slowing of business activity. This revenue shortfall was partially offset by a 57 percent increase in income tax, caused by the greater efficiency in the newly computerized systems at the Central Revenue Department (financed by USAID) and the new era of "accountability." However in absolute terms the gains are small and are furthermore temporary as they reflect business activity of the 1993/1994 tax year. Overall revenues were down by 10 percent in the first nine months of the fiscal year forcing the Ministry of Finance to cut expenditures by 15 percent for non-salary expenditures in January. Because salaries were increased in the third quarter by 11 percent overall expenditures increased by 3 percent. Thus, the cut in non-salary costs did not produce the desired results in the budget.

The reductions will be absorbed by cuts in equipment and supplies such as medicines, books and transport for health and agricultural extension officers. According to preliminary IMF and IBRD reports of their June, 1995 mission the deficit is widening and is three times the deficit estimated for the fiscal year ending this month.

In summary, the economy is faltering and beginning to show signs of losing the hard-earned gains of the decade of policy reform and careful economic management. Since the overall policy framework remains in tact, a resurgence of business confidence could allow a fairly quick recovery. The likelihood of this occurring is however directly linked to the question of political stability and the prospects for the future. On the other hand, prolongation of this period of uncertainty could lead the business community to disinvest in the domestic economy and move its capital and assets off-shore. Further, the recovery will be strongly affected by the ability of the GOTG to resolve border problems with Senegal. Relations are currently strained and are not likely to improve until Senegal is convinced that the democratic transition is on track and that negotiations will not be derailed by capricious acts like the decision to increase ferry rates.

Donor resources for balance of payments support will not resume until the democratic transition. Even donor assistance for development activities, especially that of the major donors like the World Bank, E.U. and U.S. are on hold and the flow of resources is drying up. Only a rapid transition will allow these donors to resume planning activities and their development assistance. In sum, without a rapid transition, the economy will further decline and increase the likelihood of economic crisis and instability.

3. Assessment of S.O. Performance

To date no financial resources have been provided by USAID or any other donor to support the transition to civilian rule in The Gambia. The mission expects to execute a grant to NDI in July. The resources which have been provided consist of the dialogue the mission and country team have fostered with the GOTG and AFPRC as well as with Gambian leaders and the press. This dialogue has taken place through meetings, public speeches and wide distribution of materials on democracy and constitutional issues.

In view of the limited resources provided, the mission rates the overall performance under the Strategic Objective as "medium."

The criteria used in rating performance, once USAID financial resources are released, should be more rigorous and include a review of the **indicators** as set forth in Part III.A.1., "Strategic Objective Program Outcomes and Indicators." In addition the Department of State will review the following:

- Release or charge of the political detainees;
- The protection of press freedom including the right to carry out news gathering and reporting without threat or detention.

Finally, the donors privately acknowledge that not only is a reordering of certain activities in the timetable necessary, but that the feasibility of actual holding elections by June 1996 is problematic.

- June is probably one of the worst months to attempt to hold elections. This is beginning of the rainy and planting season. Logistic complications alone will be very difficult.
- There is a tremendous amount to be done in a very short time. However the AFPRC can greatly facilitate the whole process by moving certain activities to an earlier date (the constituent assembly, the constitutional referendum) and by undertaking certain actions in parallel with others (such as drafting of the electoral laws simultaneously with the activities of the constituent assembly).
- Speedy establishment of the independent electoral commission is a sine qua non for the timely accomplishment of a number of critical activities not the least of which is the civic and voter education program to be supported by NDI. To date there is little progress in establishing this commission; however, last week the Transition Task Force agreed to establish a provision commission by August 1995.

USAID and the Department of State plan a review of commitment and progress in early FY 1996. This will be an important juncture in determining whether the U.S. presence and assistance is indeed "making a difference" or whether future work would be futile.

If the AFPRC lives up to its commitment to hold elections in June 1996 and if the resources for the transition can be made available by both the GOTG and donor community, USAID will be able to demonstrate results in a fairly short period -- less than two years. The Mission believes strongly that The Gambia represents a test case. It can demonstrate that USAID assistance provided in a timely and targeted manner can "make a difference" and prove that the Administrator's Mission of crisis

prevention is indeed possible. The Gambia with its democratic tradition, offers a best chance laboratory for this experiment which holds both risk and promise.

4. Donor Coordination

The principal donors represented in The Gambia have met regularly and frequently since the coup. In a coordinated response, the EU, UK, Swiss and Japanese have suspended all balance of payments support. The EU Members, including the U.K. have terminated their assistance to the police and military. The UNDP, as the lead donor for The Gambia Round Table, is effectively coordinating the donors during transition program. The UNDP Resident Representative has served as a firm and steadfast interlocutor with the AFPRC. Currently, UNDP is designing its planned assistance for the electoral activities, USAID is the lead donor in civic and voter education. Both the EU and U.K. are prepared to provide supporting assistance; however, they are awaiting formal requests for assistance. Preliminary estimates for the costs of the entire transition program are in the neighborhood of \$10 million.

B. T.O.1 - Empowering Local NGOs

1. Relevance to Agency Objectives

This target of opportunity (T.O.) represents the efforts of the two USPVOs represented in The Gambia: Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Save The Children-USA (SCF). CRS is the oldest NGO in The Gambia and is a widely respected and well-managed organization. It has been recognized over the years by USAID as having sponsored some of the most innovative P.L. 480 Title II programs in Africa. CRS is involved in a variety of programs including:

- Strengthening of local community organizations, the Sesame Grower's Association (SGA), representing some 35,000 Gambian women throughout the country;
- Strengthening The Gambia Food and Nutrition Association (GAFNA), one of the most active local NGOs involved in nutrition program for children and pregnant and lactating mothers; and
- Supporting a partnership program with a variety of small and nascent NGOs to increase their ability to become active partners.

Both the SGAs and GAFNA are funded by P.L. 480 Title II resources with an appropriate total value of \$1.7 million in FY 1996. These resources are provided as Corn-Soy Blend (CSB) for direct feeding programs, (\$914,322) and vegetable oil for

monetization, (\$828,300).

While SCF did not receive any direct mission funding or a BHR matching grant in FY 1995, the Mission considers it to be another development partner. SCF works only in the North Bank, the poorer part of the country, and seeks to work through community age group organizations, primarily those involving women. Its efforts involve strategies to improve the welfare of the family in order to increase child survival. It is, therefore, involved in a number of activities including family planning, land reclamation, natural resource management and agricultural production. While no financial resources have been provided this year, Save is an active participant in Mission strategy and design efforts. SCF has been supported in the past by centrally-funded programs (a USAID-funded research grant to the Population Council, the Winrock On-Farm Productivity Enhancement Project) and gifts of USAID excess non-expendable property.

Both these USPVOs support the Administrator's New Partnership Initiative and are committed to empowering local NGO partners. Furthermore both USPVOs are directly involved in addressing issues of food security and crisis prevention. The food aid used to support the work of CRS is a critical incremental resource to the DFA being used to support the USAID strategic objective. Without this resource CRS will be forced to severely curtail its operations in The Gambia and possibly close its operations altogether.

2. Progress to Date

CRS/The Gambia has submitted a Development Program Proposal (DPP) on Food Security for FY 96 to BHR/FFP/DP Washington. Due to the political change and possible instability in The Gambia, USAID/The Gambia advised CRS/The Gambia to develop a one year DPP while leaving the door open for a future multi-year proposal. Most activities in the FY 96 DPP are a continuation of those already in progress.

This program also supports the Mission's Democracy and Governance program (D&G) by strengthening civil society and by empowering rural women country-wide in organizations which are organized around democratic principles.

SCF did not submit any proposal for USAID assistance in FY 1995 but has been in constant dialogue with mission on the part it can play in the new Democracy and Governance program (D&G). Although mainly working in agriculture and health in the north bank, SCF can make significant contributions in the civic education program through its Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) for their area of intervention in the country.

The Mission invited CRS and SCF to a retreat and solicited their inputs into the new D&G program design. Both PVOs have expressed their intention to continue to collaborate where possible and to share information and lessons learned.

3. Assessment of T.O. Performance

The criteria to be used by CRS/The Gambia to measure program impact and effectiveness -- although too numerous -- are realistic and measurable. These includes the amount of sesame purchased for export and pressed for oil, production of coarse grain cereals for home consumption and marketing, adoption of techniques in crop maintenance and functional literacy. The Mission has suggested that an independent evaluation of the CRS Title II program be conducted especially if CRS continues its presence here within a future multi-year DPP. An evaluation of the SGAs would provide valuable lessons for The Gambia and USAID in general.

III. PROGRAM AND BUDGET SCENARIOS

A. SCENARIO 1

1. Objective Tree and Narrative

The following table presents those program outcomes (P.O.) which have been selected from the objective tree included in Part I to which USAID will contribute. It also includes the indicators and performance targets which have been established.

USAID/The Gambia Strategic Objective: Promote the return of a democratically elected government and to mitigate the potential for regional instability.

Strategic Objective Program Outcomes	Objectively verifiable indicators	Baseline	Performance target		Means of verification and frequency of reporting	Important Assumptions
		1995	1996	1997		
1.0 Civic education campaign initiated and civic groups and democratic institutions participate.	1.1 Increased number of NGOs providing civic education.	Baseline and targets to be established.			USAID Reports NDI Reports	AFPRC approves civic education program
	1.2 Increase in number of democracy-related meetings, events and political public debates.					
2.0 Free, fair and multi-party elections conducted by June 1996.	2.1 Establishment of the National Independent Electoral Committee.	Discrete action.				
	2.2 Voter registration completed by April 1996					
	2.3 At least 2 parties participating in local and national elections.					
	2.4 At least 2 parties represented in new parliament.					
	2.5 Voter education program completed by April 1996.					
	2.6 Percentage of Gambian public reached by voter education program.	Discrete measurement.				
3.0 Constitution containing basic rights and democratic processes drafted through participatory and transparent process and promulgated as basis of fundamental law.	3.1 Constitution review committee established.	Discrete action.				
	3.2 New constitution drafted.					
	3.3 Constitution approved by national referendum.					
	3.4 Constitution promulgated.					

2. Summary of S.O. Funding

The Administrator approved an annual USAID contribution for the transition program of approximately \$3.0 million or \$1.5 million in FY 1995 and 1996. In addition, the Administrator will consider additional support for NGO programs to include traditional development activities, if concrete progress toward the return to democracy is demonstrated. Therefore, if the transition appears to be well on track by mid-FY 1996, USAID should consider at least maintaining the \$1.5 million program level in FY 1997 and possibly expanding it to reward performance. Table III shows a new SO being developed for FY 1997 (listed as S.O. 2) which builds upon the transition experience and seeks to consolidate the democratic transition. A new activity would be designed which would expand the partnership with the USPVOs already in The Gambia to support the development work in which they are engaged. Such an activity would enhance the capacity of indigenous NGOs, especially those working in rural areas, as well as addressing the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of local intermediary organizations.

The Administrator approved the allocation of 2 USDH staff. In addition, the Bureau has provided FTE controls of 3 USPSCs and 5 FSNDHs. The mission does not plan to utilize its FSNDH allocation as all direct hire staff have been either eliminated or converted to PSC status. This staffing level will require approximately \$490,000 in FY 1996 and \$430,000 in FY 1997 in operating expenses, representing a reduction of more than 50 percent from pre-coup levels.

(INSERT TABLE III - eight pages)

3. Projected Impact

USAID will focus its efforts on strengthening civil society in The Gambia through civic and voter education in FY 1995 AND 1996. This decision is based on both practical and programmatic reasons. Because USAID can only support the programs of non-governmental organizations, its resources can most easily support civic education activities of various local indigenous organizations. Also, the proposal submitted by NDI involves a wide range of civic education activities. A variety of local NGOs have already come forward with proposals for such activities, including The Gambia Teachers Union, the Gambia Women's Finance Association and the local chapter of the International Society for Human Rights. From a programmatic standpoint USAID resources are most likely to have a lasting impact if local advocacy groups and NGOs demonstrate an understanding of, and begin promulgating knowledge of, democratic principles. Even if the AFPRC fails to implement actions important for achieving the sub-goal of democratic and constitutional rule by 1996, the mission strongly believes that the public debate which has occurred in recent months and which will be further encouraged once the USAID-support program is activated in the coming month, cannot now be stifled. Arguably, Gambians have become more aware of their democracy upon losing it than they were in the 30 years of what was called democratic rule. The constitutional debate, the question of the length of military rule, the issues surrounding public accountability and parliamentary oversight, the right of political activity and the associated freedoms are all issues which are now the subject of a healthy public interest and discussion. **Thus, even if the transition does not occur in the short-run, the forces which have now been set in motion should lead The Gambia to become a full participant in the democratic movement in Africa.**

USAID will also assist, as resources allow, in both the electoral and constitutional components of the overall multi-donor D&G program being coordinated by the UNDP. Other donors have been requested to provide technical assistance for the drafting of the new constitution and electoral laws. However, NDI as the lead U.S. PVO implementing the civic education component of the overall program, has requested flexibility to provide services and support to these program components. Thus, while USAID will not be the lead donor for electoral processes and constitutional components, it will play a key role as NDI has demonstrated its competence in other countries. Such flexibility will enable USAID resources to be used in ways that can make a difference between getting something done or not done if resources or expertise are lacking. UNDP and NDI have collaborated in other countries and both organizations have expressed their willingness to establish such a relationship in The Gambia.

If this program succeeds, USAID will have been a key player in restoring democracy in The Gambia and in preventing the protracted installation of military regimes that have occurred in other countries.

4. Changes in Content of S.O.

This section is not applicable. The S.O. utilizing DFA resources was established in FY 1995.

5. New Partnership Initiative

The USAID program in FY 1995, 1996 and 1997 will work exclusively through PVOs, NGOs and community organizations. It is, therefore, in its entirety a program implemented in partnership with non-governmental organizations. A USAID program that works directly with the Government will only become possible if the transition takes place. Thus USAID will resume formal dialogue concerning assistance with the GOTG only after the transition. This means the development of a new long-term strategy might begin to involve government directly in FY 1997; however, USAID would expect to continue its partnership with the non-governmental sector and rely on it as the mechanism of providing development assistance certainly through FY 1997 and perhaps beyond.

Africa Table 2: New Partnership Initiative (NPI) Inventory of Current NPI Activities

(\$000,000's)

	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 96</u>	<u>FY 97</u>
1. <u>Democratic Local Governance</u>			
SO #1: Promote the Establishment of Viable Democratic Institutions			
Scenario 1	1.5	1.5	n/a
Percent Share	(100)	(100)	
Scenario 2	1.5	1.5	n/a
Percent Share	(100)	(100)	
Scenario 3	1.5	1.0	n/a
Percent Share	(100)	(100)	
Implementing Agent:	National Democratic Institute (NGO)		
Sub-implementing Partners:	TBD, but examples include - Gambia Teachers Union (GTU), National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), Bar Association, Human Rights Center, etc.		
New SO #2: Consolidating Democratic Institutions			
Scenario 1	n/a	n/a	1.5
Percent Share			(100)
Scenario 2	n/a	n/a	1.0
Percent Share			(100)
Scenario 3	n/a	n/a	1.0
Percent Share			(100)
Implementing Agent:	TBD		
Sub-Implementing Partners:	Local intermediary organizations TBD		
2. <u>Small Business Partnership</u>			
3. <u>NGO Empowerment</u>			

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TO #1: Strengthening Local NGO Organizations

Scenario 1

Percent Share

Scenario 2

Percent Share

Scenario 3

Percent Share

Implementing Agent: Catholic Relief Services (USPVO); Save the Children USA (USPVO)

Sub-implementing Partners: Sesame Growers Associations (CBO), Gambia Food and Nutrition

Association-GAFNA (Local NGO), various other local NGOs supported by CRS; Kafos
and Kabilos ***

*These scenarios reflect the availability of P.L.480 Title II Resources

Scenario 1: FY95 one year extension of MYOP approved; new MYOP approved in FY96

Scenario 2: FY95 one year extension of MYOP approved; no new MYOP in FY96

Scenario 3: FY95 extension not approved; no new MYOP considered

**No direct bilateral funding or central funded at this time; however, SCF is an important partner whose continued presence in The Gambia is linked to USAID's decision regarding the future of the mission.

***CBO = Community Based Organization

B. SCENARIO 2

Under this scenario, FY 1996 funding would remain at \$1.5 million; however FY 1997 funding would be reduced from \$1.5 to \$1.0 million. This reduction in resources would affect the scope of the new S.O. to consolidate the democratic transition. While the mission would remain engaged in the D&G program, it would face hard choices in deciding whether it would be more effective to concentrate on building NGO capacity through the programs of USPVOs or whether it would concentrate on building the capacity of local intermediary organization without direct support to the USPVOs. This decision will be in part be linked to the availability of P.L. 480 resources, currently the only USAID resource provided to CRS.

The consolidation of democracy in The Gambia will be tied largely to whether the Gambian people:

- have a sense of hope that their lives will improve in the reasonably near future;
- have confidence in the legitimacy of the post-1996 government;
- have participated in establishing the new fundamental law -- the constitution -- and understand the rights and responsibilities guaranteed to citizens;
- are able to participate in local institutions and decisions about their welfare; and
- are represented through stronger intermediary organizations.

The impact of reduced funding availability in FY 1997 is an issue which cannot be addressed at this time. The design of the follow on program to support the new post transition S.O. 2 would have to address the issues set out above in light of funding availability.

C. SCENARIO 3

Under this scenario, FY 1996 and FY 1997 funding would be reduced from \$1.5 to \$1.0 million annually. The impact of the reduction in FY 1996 funds would have the effect of reducing total USAID support for the transition from \$3.0 TO \$2.5 million. The impact of the \$.5 million reduction in FY 1997 has been discussed in part III.B. above and basically affects the question of consolidating the democratic transition.

Assuming the total costs of the transition program is indeed the estimated \$10 million,

a reduction of \$.5 million in FY 1996 represents about 5 percent of total resource requirements. Under this scenario, the mission would have to carefully consider the components of the NDI program and possibly eliminate USAID support for certain "Program Outcomes." The mission would give highest priority to civic/voter education activities. However, because this program is responding to a democratic crisis and working in a multi-donor context, USAID could only decide whether it would eliminate an entire program outcome (P.O.) or reduce some of the activities in all P.O.s once the funding level was actually reduced. The decision would also depend on NDI's estimates of resource requirements for particular activities and a review of actual expenditures in about November 1995.

Because of this uncertainty no revision of the P.O. and indicators table in part IIIA.1. has been submitted.

A revised Table III(Revised) would show some changes in the distribution of AC/SI coding reflecting the reduced emphasis on program areas other than civic education. However since the mission has only one S.O. and one project no revision of Table III had been submitted since such an analysis would be meaningless and reflect only a reduction in funding. Because of the fluid nature of this rapid response program, changes in the program outcomes cannot be forecast at this time.

Staffing requirements would not change as the mission has already reduced to the minimal level needed to continue operations and manage the program. The 2 USDH staff retained are critical to the process of dialogue and liaison with NGO partners. Thus, the reduction in program level would have the effect of increasing the ratio OE to program resources. In other words, USAID's overhead costs remain fixed under all scenarios.

D. SUPPORT SERVICES

For the remainder of FY 1995 and during FY 1996 the mission will not require any project support from either the G or AFR bureaus. However, it is highly reliant on the Democracy and Governance Center and AFR/SD for technical backstopping. The Mission views staff of both these offices as key members of its S.O. Core team because it relies on their technical expertise for guidance and support.

Beginning in FY 1997, with the formulation of the new S.O. to address the issue of consolidating the democratic transition, the mission would expect to use the services either of GREENCOM or the new INTERCOM project and request the services of a long-term communications specialist. If the INTERCOM project is operational by this date, we prefer this mechanism as it would not be necessary to focus only on environmental and natural resource messages thereby giving the mission greater flexibility to work on broader civic education, decentralization and participatory

messages.

If the mission budget is reduced to \$1.0 million in FY 1997 (Scenario Three), the mission would probably have inadequate resources to support a long-term advisor. Therefore, we would plan only a modest "buy-in"/OYB transfer to support periodic short-term advisory services.

At the higher program level of \$1.5 million the mission would also request BHR support for considering expansion of grant support to WINROCK International through the Farm Productivity Enhancement Project (OFPEP) and even consider using some bilateral resources to support such an effort. Prior to the coup OFPEP provided advisory services to SCF and was a key resource for agricultural and natural resources technical input to their efforts.

Finally, if program levels were increased above \$1.5 million the Mission would give high priority to utilizing the services of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center and/or other contractors to be selected to implement the next phase of the ACCESS project as tenure issues are critical to the whole question of devolving power and responsibility in rural communities.

AFR Table 3: Global and Regional Bureau Support

	FY	Office/Center	Service	Est. Budget
Scenario 1	95	D&G & AFR/SD	-substantive backstopping -virtual team members	none
	96	D&G & AFR/SD	"	
	97	D&G & AFR/SD	"	
	97	D&G & AFR/SD	-design assistance	\$75,000
	97	HDC	-GREENCOM or INTERCOM	\$.5 million
Scenario 2	95	D&G & AFR/SD	-backstopping & team member	none
	96	D&G & AFR/SD	"	
	97	D&G & AFR/SD	"	
Scenario 3	95	D&G & AFR/SD	-backstopping & team member	none
	96	D&G & AFR/SD	-backstopping & team member	
	97	D&G & AFR/SD	-backstopping & team member	

E. MORTGAGE AND PIPELINE ISSUES

There are no mortgage or pipeline issues. The Mission deobligated more than \$10.0 million from terminated activities. The remaining pipeline of \$4.0 million is needed to allow 15 participants to complete their training programs and for close-out of four institutional contracts. The contractors have up to one year to submit their termination proposals.

The mission now has a single strategic objective and a single activity with a planned authorization of \$3.0 million. About half of this amount will be obligated in FY 1995 and the balance in FY 1996, for the objective of supporting a democratic transition. If this objective is achieved by the end of FY 1996, the mission will design a new program activity to support the consolidation of the transition and elevate the target of opportunity (strengthening local NGOs) and incorporate it in the new strategic objective. The design of this activity will consider the likely availability of future resources including DFA and P.L. 480 Title II; however, the mission is considering an activity with an estimated life-of-program cost of \$6.0 to \$10.0 million. If the current strategic objective is not achieved in FY 1996, or is not likely to be achieved shortly thereafter, the mission will close and there will be no resource requirements other than those to cover close-out costs in FY 1997.

Africa Bureau Table 4: Mortgage Information and Pipeline

(\$000,000's)						
Strategic Objective	Option 1		Option 2		Option 3	
	Last FY	Post 97	Last FY	Post 97	Last FY	Post 97
SO 1: Establish Democratic Institutions	FY 96	-0-	FY96	-0-	FY96	-0-
New SO 1: Consolidate Democracy	FY01	8.5	FY01	8.5	FY01	5.0
TO 1: Strengthen Local NGOs **						

*Assumes new start designed to consider funding availability; life-of-project funding between \$6 to \$10 million.

**P.L. 480 Title II Resources

F. MICROENTERPRISES

The mission supports indirectly a microenterprise activity through CRS. The Sesame Growers Associations (SGAs) sponsored by CRS are involved in numerous activities identified at the local level by the individual associations. CRS estimates that in FY 1995 it provided training for micro-credit schemes valued at approximately \$10,000. They plan to continue responding to such requests and thus this small level of training will continue through FY 1996 and 1997. Therefore the mission has included in the Agency Table X, Microenterprises, an estimate of \$10,000 per year for each year covered in this budget submission. This estimate remains constant under all funding scenarios.

One of the major activities sponsored by CRS is the promotion of sesame production, marketing, exporting and processing. While most of the sesame promotion activities do not involve credit schemes, the activity itself is the promotion of a microenterprise at the community level. In FY 1994/1995 CRS provided about \$80,000 for these activities. In the coming years this activity is expected to significantly expand to about \$200,000 per year. The support for these activities is not included in Table X.

The source of funding for these activities is the monetization proceeds from the sale of P.L. 480 vegetable oil.

(Insert Table X - 2 pages)

IV. OPERATING EXPENSE AND WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS

A. FY 1995 OVERVIEW

USAID The Gambia is a mission in transition. As a result of the military coup which occurred in the last quarter of FY 94, all U.S. Government assistance was curtailed and all project assistance was terminated by March 22, 1995. On February 9, 1995 the USAID Administrator signed a national interest consideration in support of programs of NGOs designed to promote a return to democracy.

The FY 1995 O.E. budget estimates reflect the transition between winding down a traditional development assistance program to designing a rapid response program to encourage the return of democracy in The Gambia. Staffing in all personnel categories has been significantly reduced across the board during FY 1995. By the fourth quarter of FY 1995, the mission will be down to 3 USDH and one USPSC funded under O.E. resources. The mission has reduced its FSNDH to two positions. During the fourth quarter of FY 1995 these two positions will be eliminated and the incumbents will be transferred to FSNPSC positions in line with new job descriptions to support the transition program. Staff reductions represent a 55% decrease in USDH and PSC presence and a 35% reduction in overall FSN staffing.

Salary and housing related cost savings associated with the personnel reductions were offset by the adoption in FY 1995 of a post FSN involuntary severance and separation package and the termination and repatriation costs of a TCNDH deputy controller. In addition due to security concerns, the Embassy has requested that USAID begin the necessary planning to relocate its offices to an area on the mainland in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. The USAID office, which is a U.S. Government owned building is located in downtown Banjul on a small island connected to the mainland by a single bridge. This single entrance/exit point to Banjul proper has been determined to be a choke point in the Post's Emergency Action Evacuation Plan. USAID is currently complying with the Embassy's request and considering options for relocation if warranted and determined to be necessary by USAID and State Washington. In the event of relocation, estimated first year costs are judged to be in the \$45,000 range and subsequent years expenses are estimated at \$25,000 annually. Due to the preliminary nature of the investigations into the plan for relocation and the need to obtain USAID and State Washington approvals, the Mission has not budgeted for relocation costs under the current O.E. budget scenarios.

USAID The Gambia's allocation of Embassy provided FAAS charges approached the \$400,000 level including costs for project funded contractors during FY 1995. The Mission provided the appropriate six month written notification to the Embassy and State Washington of USAID's substantial reduction in required FAAS services beginning in FY 1996 resulting from USAID's reduced personnel contingent. The primary FAAS support function which the Embassy provides to USAID comprises GSO

operations pertaining to USAID housing, warehousing and storage services. In addition to USAID, there are two other serviced agencies at post, Peace Corps and NASA. Peace Corps is self-supporting in the GSO arena and NASA has no personnel at post. The Embassy allocates their only USDH GSO position to the DAS charges. In addition, the Embassy has not reduced their GSO support staffing to correlate with the reduced level of services required by the supported agencies. The State Department has informed the Embassy that it will not consider the reapportionment of the single USDH GSO position to State Core. Therefore USAID will continue to absorb an extremely high percentage of the Embassy's operating costs. The Embassy has not as of yet provided FAAS cost factors for FY 1996, but USAID estimates that our share under the current scenario will remain in the \$350,000 range and all budget estimates have been reflected as such for all years.

B. FY 1996 AND 1997 OVERVIEW

In accordance with the USAID Administrator's national interest decision, a review of the progress made by the military regime and the impact of the USG program supporting a return to a democratically elected government will be evaluated in early FY 1996. Depending upon the outcome of this evaluation, the USAID program could either be expanded into additional developmental areas, maintained at current levels, curtailed or the USAID mission closed.

The FY 1996 and 1997 O.E. budgets are based exclusively on a straight line assumption of the continuance of a rapid response program with no change in dollar program levels. All staffing basically remains static for both years. The only exception is that the USDH Controller position is eliminated and the financial management oversight functions are assumed by REDSO/WAAC. The Controller is expected to depart in December 1995 and as such USDH FTE levels total 2.25 positions for FY 1996 and is reduced to 2 positions thereafter.

The mission has budgeted funds during FY 1996 to complete the conversion to the Agency prescribed NMS computer systems at the reduced personnel levels. Approximately half of the system upgrades are budgeted for acquisition in both FYs 1995 and 1996. The mission's newest vehicles are two 1991 model Toyota Land

Cruisers, one of which was funded by O.E. Trust Funds. The mission has obtained GOTG authorization to retain this vehicle as long as there remains a USAID program in The Gambia. Under minimal reduced operational scenarios, a single replacement vehicle is required in both FYs 1996 and 1997. In addition during FY 1997, the Mission has budgeted minimal amounts for the replacement of household appliances. Additionally, the mission is aware that there exists some possibility that out-of-cycle USDH personnel changes may occur during FY 1996. The probability is that the rotations would occur with personnel being assigned from and to USAID Washington.

If these out-of-cycle assignments are undertaken by USAID Washington, then the mission would require additional budgetary support during FY 1996. Additional FY 1996 funding requirements could range from \$40,000 to \$100,000. Due to the uncertainty of these USAID Washington actions, no amounts have been established in the current budget proposals.

C. OUTYEAR REQUIREMENTS: FY 1998 TO FY 2000

Due to the FY 1996 mission program evaluation discussed above and the uncertainty of the future of the USAID program and presence in The Gambia, all cost estimates for FY 1998 to FY 2000 have been replicated at the FY 1997 levels with increases budgeted for inflation only and anticipated levels of FSN payroll and benefit package raises.

D. PROGRAM REDUCTION AND MATERIAL WEAKNESS INVESTMENTS

The bureau levels provided to the mission project a worse case scenario of a rapid response program reduction from \$1.5 to \$1.0 million in FY 1997. The staffing reductions undertaken by the mission during FY 1995 and to be completed during the first quarter of FY 1996 are the very minimum levels required to support a return to democracy rapid response strategic objective program. A \$500,000 reduction in program funds would not provide any bases for changes or reductions in the mission's FTE or O.E. levels to support the program objectives. Any attempt to further reduce staffing or administrative associated dollar costs would significantly erode the mission's oversight ability and create an unmanageable program environment resulting in serious material weaknesses.

E. OE TABLES

(INSERT BUDGET TABLES - seven pages)

5

V. OTHER

A. TITLE II NON-EMERGENCY FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS

AFR Table 5: P.L. 480 Title II - PVO/NGO Partners*

Organization	FY95	FY96	FY97
CRS (USPVO)	\$ 1,606*	\$ 1,742*	\$ 1,895*
GAFNA (Local NGO)	\$ 1,353	\$ 1,355	\$ 1,469
SGAs (Local NGO)	\$ 253	\$ 387	\$ 426

*Totals do not include insurance and freight

B. IMPACT OF "LOST" RESOURCES

While P.L. 480 is not covered by the statute which required termination of assistance because of a coup, the Administrator considered and approved as a policy matter the continuation of the Title II program implemented by CRS. The mission considers the presence of CRS as a critical element of a crisis prevention strategy. If the transition does not occur and the economy continues to deteriorate, the capacity to respond to a humanitarian crisis is dependent of the presence of at least one USPVOs. In addition, the separatist movement in the Cassamance is becoming increasingly unstable and small numbers of refugees have begun to trickle into The Gambia. CRS is currently in the last year of its DPP and the Mission encouraged CRS to submit a one-year extension, an FY 1995 request, which will carry their program operations through FY 1996. Depending on USAID policy and program decisions over the next year, the mission will consider and recommend whether a multi-year proposal should be submitted in FY 1996.

Like all donors CRS and the single other USPVO represented in The Gambia, Save the Children (US-SCF), is facing funding problems. Their continued presence in The Gambia is linked directly to USAID's decisions regarding a program in The Gambia. While SCF received no USAID mission or central funds this year, the mission has collaborated closely with them over the years and considers it a key partner along with CRS. Both USPVOs are working to increase the capacity of local NGOs and should become funding partners once the democratic transition occurs and USAID modifies its Strategic Objective in FY 1997 to consolidate the democratic gains.

If the transition does not occur and USAID closes its programs, it will become even more important to consider the impact on a rapid response capability if both USPVOs decide to close their Gambia programs.

C. OTHER ISSUES

Part of the Mission's current strategy to prevent crisis in The Gambia includes supporting a Child Survival grant to UNICEF for its Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) which was first established in 1979. Since that time infant mortality rates have declined to 89/1000 livebirths. EPI coverage for fully immunized children has increased from 55 percent in 1984 to over 70 percent in 1993. However the gains of the highly successful program in The Gambia are now being eroded as Government has cut its recurrent budget by 15 percent and other donors resources for EPI have dried up. G/HNP is considering a \$.5 million grant to UNICEF in FY 1995 to support the program over the next years. The mission strongly supports such a grant and considers it an important activity not only for The Gambia but for Senegal and the sub-region as any epidemic here will certainly spread to Senegal.

V. OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET NARRATIVE

A. FY 1995 OVERVIEW

USAID The Gambia is a mission in transition. As a result of the military coup which occurred in the last quarter of FY 94, all U.S. Government assistance was curtailed and all project assistance was terminated by March 22, 1995. On February 9, 1995 the USAID Administrator signed a national interest consideration in support of programs of NGOs designed to promote a return to democracy.

The FY 1995 O.E. budget estimates reflect the transition between winding down a traditional development assistance program to designing a rapid response program to encourage the return of democracy in The Gambia. Staffing in all personnel categories has been significantly reduced across the board during FY 1995. By the fourth quarter of FY 1995, the mission will be down to 3 USDH and one USPSC funded under O.E. resources. The mission has reduced its FSN DH to two positions. During the fourth quarter of FY 1995 these two positions will be eliminated and the incumbents will be transferred to FSNPSC positions in line with new job descriptions to support the transition program. Staff reductions represent a 55 % decrease in USDH and PSC presence and a 35 % reduction in overall FSN staffing.

Salary and housing related cost savings associated with the personnel reductions were offset by the adoption in FY 1995 of a post FSN involuntary severance and separation package and the termination and repatriation costs of a TCNDH deputy controller. In addition due to security concerns, the Embassy has requested that USAID begin the necessary planning to relocate its offices to an area on the mainland in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. The USAID office, which is a U.S. Government owned building is located in downtown Banjul on a small island connected to the mainland by a single bridge. This single entrance/exit point to Banjul proper has been determined to be a choke point in the Post's Emergency Action Evacuation Plan. USAID is currently complying with the Embassy's request and considering options for relocation if warranted and determined to be necessary by USAID and State Washington. In the event of relocation, estimated first year costs are judged to be in the \$ 45,000 range and subsequent years expenses are estimated at \$ 25,000 annually. Due to the preliminary nature of the investigations into the plan for relocation and the need to obtain USAID and State Washington approvals, the Mission has not budgeted for relocation costs under the current O.E. budget scenarios.

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B. FY 1996 AND 1997 OVERVIEW

The time table prescribe by the military junta for scheduling of democratic elections and installation of a democratic government occurs late in FY 1996. In accordance with the USAID Administrator's national interest decision, a review of the progress made by the military regime and the impact of the USG program supporting a return to a democratically elected government will be evaluated by USAID in early FY 1996. Depending upon the outcome of this evaluation, the USAID program could either be expanded into additional developmental program areas, maintained at current levels, or curtailed and the USAID mission closed.

The FY 1996 and 1997 O.E. budgets are based exclusively on a straight line assumption of the continuance of a rapid response program with no change in dollar program levels. All staffing basically remains static for both years. The only exception is that the USDH Controller position is eliminated and the financial management oversight functions are assumed by REDSO/WAAC. The Controller is expected to depart in December 1995 and as such USDH FTE levels total 2.25 positions for FY 1996 and is reduced to 2 positions thereafter.

The mission has budgeted funds during FY 1996 to complete the conversion to the Agency prescribed NMS computer systems at the reduced personnel levels. Approximately half of the system upgrades are budgeted for acquisition in both FYs 1995 and 1996. The mission's newest vehicles are two 1991 model Toyota Land Cruisers, one of which was funded by O.E. Trust Funds. The mission has obtained GOTG authorization to retain this vehicle as long as

there remains a USAID program in The Gambia. Under minimal reduced operational scenarios, a single replacement vehicle is required in both FYs 1996 and 1997. In addition during FY 1997, the Mission has budgeted minimal amounts for the replacement of household appliances.

Additionally, the mission is aware that there exists some possibility that out-of-cycle USDH personnel changes may occur during FY 96. The probability is that the rotations would occur with personnel being assigned from and to USAID Washington. If these out-of-cycle assignments are undertaken by USAID Washington, then the mission would require additional budgetary support during FY 96. Additional FY 1996 funding requirements could range from \$ 40,000 to \$ 100,000. Due to the uncertainty of these USAID Washington actions, no amounts have been established in the current budget proposals.

C. OUTYEAR OVERVIEW FY 1998 TO FY 2000

Due to the FY 1996 mission program evaluation discussed above and the uncertainty of the future of the USAID program and presence in The Gambia, all cost estimates for FY 1998 to FY 2000 have been replicated at the FY 1997 levels with increases budgeted for inflation only and anticipated levels of FSN payroll and benefit package raises.

D. PROGRAM REDUCTION AND MATERIAL WEAKNESS INVESTMENTS

The bureau levels provided to the mission project a worse case scenario of a rapid response program reduction from \$ 1.5 to \$ 1.0 million in FY 1997. The staffing reductions undertaken by the mission during FY 1995 and to be completed during the first quarter of FY 1996 are the very minimum levels required to support a return to democracy rapid response strategic objective program. A \$ 500,000 reduction in program funds would not provide any bases for changes or reductions in the mission's FTE or O.E. levels to support the program objectives. Any attempt to further reduce staffing or administrative associated dollar costs would significantly erode the mission's oversight ability and create an unmanageable program environment resulting in serious material weaknesses.

V. OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET NARRATIVE

A. FY 1995 OVERVIEW

USAID The Gambia is a mission in transition. As a result of the military coup which occurred in the last quarter of FY 94, all U.S. Government assistance was curtailed and all project assistance was terminated by March 22, 1995. On February 9, 1995 the USAID Administrator signed a national interest consideration in support of programs of NGOs designed to promote a return to democracy.

The FY 1995 O.E. budget estimates reflect the transition between winding down a traditional development assistance program to designing a rapid response program to encourage the return of democracy in The Gambia. Staffing in all personnel categories has been significantly reduced across the board during FY 1995. By the fourth quarter of FY 1995, the mission will be down to 3 USDH and one USPSC funded under O.E. resources. The mission has reduced its FSNDH to two positions. During the fourth quarter of FY 1995 these two positions will be eliminated and the incumbents will be transferred to FSNPSC positions in line with new job descriptions to support the transition program. Staff reductions represent a 55 % decrease in USDH and PSC presence and a 35 % reduction in overall FSN staffing.

Salary and housing related cost savings associated with the personnel reductions were offset by the adoption in FY 1995 of a post FSN involuntary severance and separation package and the termination and repatriation costs of a TCNDH deputy controller. In addition due to security concerns, the Embassy has requested that USAID begin the necessary planning to relocate its offices to an area on the mainland in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. The USAID office, which is a U.S. Government owned building is located in downtown Banjul on a small island connected to the mainland by a single bridge. This single entrance/exit point to Banjul proper has been determined to be a choke point in the Post's Emergency Action Evacuation Plan. USAID is currently complying with the Embassy's request and considering options for relocation if warranted and determined to be necessary by USAID and State Washington. In the event of relocation, estimated first year costs are judged to be in the \$ 45,000 range and subsequent years expenses are estimated at \$ 25,000 annually. Due to the preliminary nature of the investigations into the plan for relocation and the need to obtain USAID and State Washington approvals, the Mission has not budgeted for relocation costs under the current O.E. budget scenarios.

USAID The Gambia's allocation of Embassy provided FAAS charges approached the \$ 400,000 level including costs for project funded contractors during FY 95. The Mission provided the appropriate six month written notification to the Embassy and State Washington of USAID's substantial reduction in required FAAS services beginning in FY 96 resulting from USAID's reduced personnel contingent. The primary FAAS support function which the Embassy provides to USAID comprises GSO operations pertaining to USAID housing, warehousing and storage services. In addition to USAID, there are two other serviced agencies at post, Peace Corps and NASA. Peace Corps is self-supporting in the GSO arena and NASA has no personnel at post. The Embassy allocates their only USDH GSO position to the DAS charges. In addition, the Embassy has not reduced their GSO support staffing to correlate with the reduced level of services required by the supported agencies. The State Department has informed the Embassy that it will not consider the reapportionment of the single USDH GSO position to State Core. Therefore USAID will continue to absorb an extremely high percentage of the Embassy's operating costs. The Embassy has not as of yet provided FAAS cost factors for FY 96, but USAID estimates that our share under the current scenario will remain in the \$ 350,000 range and all budget estimates have been reflected as such for all years.

B. FY 1996 AND 1997 OVERVIEW

The time table prescribe by the military junta for scheduling of democratic elections and installation of a democratic government occurs late in FY 1996. In accordance with the USAID Administrator's national interest decision, a review of the progress made by the military regime and the impact of the USG program supporting a return to a democratically elected government will be evaluated by USAID in early FY 1996. Depending upon the outcome of this evaluation, the USAID program could either be expanded into additional developmental program areas, maintained at current levels, or curtailed and the USAID mission closed.

The FY 1996 and 1997 O.E. budgets are based exclusively on a straight line assumption of the continuance of a rapid response program with no change in dollar program levels. All staffing basically remains static for both years. The only exception is that the USDH Controller position is eliminated and the financial management oversight functions are assumed by REDSO/WAAC. The Controller is expected to depart in December 1995 and as such USDH FTE levels total 2.25 positions for FY 1996 and is reduced to 2 positions thereafter.

The mission has budgeted funds during FY 1996 to complete the conversion to the Agency prescribed NMS computer systems at the reduced personnel levels. Approximately half of the system upgrades are budgeted for acquisition in both FYs 1995 and 1996. The mission's newest vehicles are two 1991 model Toyota Land Cruisers, one of which was funded by O.E. Trust Funds. The mission has obtained GOTG authorization to retain this vehicle as long as

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there remains a USAID program in The Gambia. Under minimal reduced operational scenarios, a single replacement vehicle is required in both FYs 1996 and 1997. In addition during FY 1997, the Mission has budgeted minimal amounts for the replacement of household appliances.

Additionally, the mission is aware that there exists some possibility that out-of-cycle USDH personnel changes may occur during FY 96. The probability is that the rotations would occur with personnel being assigned from and to USAID Washington. If these out-of-cycle assignments are undertaken by USAID Washington, then the mission would require additional budgetary support during FY 96. Additional FY 1996 funding requirements could range from \$ 40,000 to \$ 100,000. Due to the uncertainty of these USAID Washington actions, no amounts have been established in the current budget proposals.

C. OUTYEAR OVERVIEW FY 1998 TO FY 2000

Due to the FY 1996 mission program evaluation discussed above and the uncertainty of the future of the USAID program and presence in The Gambia, all cost estimates for FY 1998 to FY 2000 have been replicated at the FY 1997 levels with increases budgeted for inflation only and anticipated levels of FSN payroll and benefit package raises.

D. PROGRAM REDUCTION AND MATERIAL WEAKNESS INVESTMENTS

The bureau levels provided to the mission project a worse case scenario of a rapid response program reduction from \$ 1.5 to \$ 1.0 million in FY 1997. The staffing reductions undertaken by the mission during FY 1995 and to be completed during the first quarter of FY 1996 are the very minimum levels required to support a return to democracy rapid response strategic objective program. A \$ 500,000 reduction in program funds would not provide any bases for changes or reductions in the mission's FTE or O.E. levels to support the program objectives. Any attempt to further reduce staffing or administrative associated dollar costs would significantly erode the mission's oversight ability and create an unmanageable program environment resulting in serious material weaknesses.

TABLE VIII (a1) - Operating Expense Request
 BPC: 21635
 Mission: THE GAMBIA

EXPENSE CATEGORY	FC	FY 1995 Estimate				FY 1996 Request				FY 1997 Request				FY 1998 Estimate			FY 1999 Estimate			FY 2000 Estimate		
		OE	TF	TOTAL	Units	OE	TF	TOTAL	Units	OE	TF	TOTAL	Units	OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL
U.S. DIRECT HIRE:																						
Other Salary	U105	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0				0.0												
Education Allowances	U106	58.1	0.0	58.1	5.0	27.0		27.0	3.0	30.0		30.0	3.0									
Cost of Living Allow.	U108	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Other Benefits	U110	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Post Assign Travel	U111	1.8	0.0	1.8	1.0	28.0		28.0	2.0	14.0		14.0	1.0									
Post Assign Freight	U112	1.7	0.0	1.7	1.0	60.0		60.0	2.0	30.0		30.0	1.0									
Home Leave Travel	U113	18.9	0.0	18.9	4.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	5.0		5.0	2.5									
Home Leave Freight	U114	6.5	0.0	6.5	4.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	2.0		2.0	2.5									
Education Travel	U115	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0									
R & R Travel	U116	13.5	0.0	13.5	5.0	14.0		14.0	5.0	12.0		12.0	4.0									
Other Travel	U117	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0									
Subtotal	U100	100.5	0.0	100.5		129.0	0.0	129.0		93.0	0.0	93.0		98.0	98.0	103.0	0.0	103.0	108.0	0.0	108.0	
F.N. DIRECT HIRE:																						
F.N. Basic Pay	U201	67.3	0.0	67.3	3.5	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0									
Overtime/Holiday Pay	U202	2.0	0.0	2.0	3.5	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0									
Other Code 11 - FN	U203	48.5	0.0	48.5		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Other Code 12 - FN	U204	12.3	0.0	12.3		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Benefits - Former FN	U205	3.2	0.0	3.2		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Accrued Separation Liability	U206	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Subtotal	U200	133.3	0.0	133.3		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0			0.0		0.0				0.0	
CONTRACT PERSONNEL:																						
U.S. PSC - S&B	U302	72.0	0.0	72.0	1.0	80.0		80.0	1.0	85.0		85.0	1.0									
Other U.S. PSC Costs	U303	50.1	0.0	50.1		60.0		60.0		66.0		66.0										
FN PSC - S&B	U304	111.9	40.0	151.9	23.0	147.0		147.0	18.0	182.0		182.0	18.0									
Other FN PSC Costs	U305	9.4	0.0	9.4		15.0		15.0		17.0		17.0										
Manpower Contracts	U306	1.9	0.0	1.9	0.2	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Accrued Separation Liability	U307	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Subtotal	U300	245.3	40.0	285.3		302.0	0.0	302.0		330.0	0.0	330.0		363.0	363.0	399.0		399.0	438.0		438.0	
HOUSING:																						
Residential Rent	U401	61.2	0.0	61.2	5.0	28.0		28.0	2.3	25.0		25.0	2.0									
Residential Utilities	U402	48.2	0.0	48.2		38.0		38.0		38.0		38.0										
Maint/Repairs	U403	9.7	0.0	9.7		8.1		8.1		7.5		7.5										
Living Quarters Allow	U404	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0									
Security Guards	U407	44.8	0.0	44.8	18.0	30.4		30.4	10.0	28.8		28.8	8.0									
Official Res. Exp.	U408	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Representation Allow.	U409	0.4	0.0	0.4		0.4		0.4		0.4		0.4										
Subtotal	U400	164.3	0.0	164.3		105.8	0.0	105.8		97.4	0.0	97.4		105.0	105.0	113.0		113.0	121.0		121.0	
OFFICE OPERATIONS:																						
Office Rent	U501	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Office Utilities	U502	9.0	0.0	9.0		13.0		13.0		14.5		14.5										
Building Maint/Repair	U503	5.6	0.0	5.6		7.0		7.0		7.7		7.7										
Equip. Maint/Repair	U508	23.1	0.0	23.1		14.7		14.7		16.2		16.2										
Communications	U509	26.4	0.0	26.4		25.2		25.2		27.8		27.8										
Security Guards	U510	20.8	0.0	20.8	7.0	23.0		23.0	7.0	24.2		24.2	7.0									
Printing	U511	0.5	0.0	0.5		0.5		0.5		0.5		0.5										
Site Visits - Mission	U513	10.6	0.0	10.6	4.0	10.0		10.0	4.0	11.0		11.0	4.0									
Site Visits - AID/W	U514	18.1	0.0	18.1	3.0	20.0		20.0	3.0	22.0		22.0	3.0									
Information Meetings	U515	4.8	0.0	4.8	1.0	5.0		5.0	1.0	5.5		5.5	1.0									
Training Travel	U516	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Conference Travel	U517	6.0	0.0	6.0	2.0	8.0		8.0	2.0	8.8		8.8	2.0									
Other Operational Tvl	U518	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Supplies	U519	27.5	0.0	27.5		30.0		30.0		33.0		33.0										
FAAS	U520	350.0	0.0	350.0		350.0		350.0		350.0		350.0										
Consultant Contracts	U521	6.1	0.0	6.1	0.3	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0										
Mgmt/Prof Svcs Cont	U522	9.2	0.0	9.2	1.0	10.0		10.0	1.0	11.0		11.0	1.0									
Spec. Studies/Analyses	U523	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
ADP H/W Lease/Maint	U525	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
ADP S/W Lease/Maint	U526	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Trans/Freight - U500	U598	0.8	0.0	0.8		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0										
Other Contract Svcs	U599	4.8	0.0	4.8		4.0		4.0		4.4		4.4										
Subtotal	U500	523.4	0.0	523.4		520.4	0.0	520.4		536.6	0.0	536.6		214.0	214.0	242.0		242.0	271.0		271.0	
NXP PROCUREMENT:																						

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Vehicles	U601	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	35.0	35.0	1.0	35.0	35.0	1.0									
Residential Furniture	U602	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0										
Residential Equipment	U603	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		10.0	10.0										
Office Furniture	U604	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0										
Office Equipment	U605	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0										
Other Equipment	U606	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0										
ADP H/W Purchases	U607	38.2	0.0	38.2		38.0	38.0		7.5	7.5										
ADP S/W Purchases	U608	7.5	0.0	7.5		7.5	7.5		1.5	1.5										
Trans/Freight - U600	U698	3.0	0.0	3.0		5.0	5.0		1.0	1.0										
Subtotal	U600	48.7	0.0	48.7		85.5	0.0	85.5	55.0	0.0	55.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0		
Real Property Purchase/Cons	U900			0.0									0.0		0.0			0.0		
TOTAL OE COSTS		1,216.6	40.0	1,256.6		840.8	0.0	840.8	782.0	0.0	782.0	437.0	0.0	437.0	478.0	0.0	478.0	520.0	0.0	520.0
Less Dollar Funded FAAS		350.0		350.0		350.0		350.0	350.0		350.0									
Less Real Property Savings																				
TOTAL OE REQUEST	U000	866.6	40.0	906.6		490.8	0.0	490.8	432.0	0.0	432.0	437.0	0.0	437.0	478.0	0.0	478.0	520.0	0.0	520.0
Alternative Budget																				
If Bur. Program Cut 25%	U000					490.8		490.8	432.0		432.0	437.0		437.0	478.0		478.0	520.0		520.0
SPECIAL INFORMATION:																				
Local Currency Usage - %			29 %				45 %		52 %			55 %		55 %			55 %		55 %	
Exchange Rate used in Calculations			8.5				8.5		8.5			8.5		8.5			8.5		8.5	
Trust Fund End-of-Year Balance			0.0				0.0		0.0			0.0		0.0			0.0		0.0	
USDH FTE			3.75				2.25		2.0			2.0		2.0			2.0		2.0	

NAMING CONVENTION: OE21635.wk4

TABLE VIII (b) - Workforce Request
 BPC: 21635
 MISSION/BUREAU/OFFICE: THE GAMBIA

Category	FY 1995 ESTIMATE				FY 1996 REQUEST				FY 1997 REQUEST			
	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL
U.S. Direct Hire (USDH)	3.8			3.8	2.3			2.3	2.0			2.0
F.N. Direct Hire (FNDH)	4.0			4.0	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0
U.S. PSC	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0
F.N. PSC	12.0	12.0	1.0	25.0	18.0		1.0	19.0	18.0		1.0	19.0
Total FTE	20.8	12.0	3.0	35.8	21.3	0.0	3.0	24.3	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0

NOTE: Report USDH in FTEs.
 Report PSCs as end-of-year on-board.

Category	FY 1998 ESTIMATE				FY 1999 ESTIMATE				FY 2000 ESTIMATE			
	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL
U.S. Direct Hire (USDH)	2.0			2.0	2.0			2.0	2.0			2.0
F.N. Direct Hire (FNDH)	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0
U.S. PSC	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0
F.N. PSC	18.0		1.0	19.0	18.0		1.0	19.0	18.0		1.0	19.0
Total FTE	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0

NOTE: Report USDH in FTEs.
 Report PSCs as end-of-year on-board.

NAMING CONVENTION: WF21635.WK4

BUDGET AT BUREAU
 PROGRAM CUT OF 25%

Category	FY 1995 ESTIMATE				FY 1996 REQUEST				FY 1997 REQUEST			
	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL
U.S. Direct Hire (USDH)	3.8			3.8	2.3			2.3	2.0			2.0
F.N. Direct Hire (FNDH)	4.0			4.0	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0
U.S. PSC	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0

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F.N. PSC	12.0	12.0	1.0	25.0	18.0	1.0	19.0	18.0	1.0	19.0		
Total FTE	20.8	12.0	3.0	35.8	21.3	0.0	3.0	24.3	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0

NOTE: Report USDH in FTEs.
Report PSCs as end-of-year on-board.

Category	FY 1998 ESTIMATE				FY 1999 ESTIMATE				FY 2000 ESTIMATE			
	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL
U.S. Direct Hire (USDH)	2.0			2.0	2.0			2.0	2.0			2.0
F.N. Direct Hire (FNDH)	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0	0.0			0.0
U.S. PSC	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0	1.0		2.0	3.0
F.N. PSC	18.0		1.0	19.0	18.0		1.0	19.0	18.0		1.0	19.0
Total FTE	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0	21.0	0.0	3.0	24.0

NOTE: Report USDH in FTEs.
Report PSCs as end-of-year on-board.

NAMING CONVENTION: WF21635.WK4

TABLE VIII (c) - Consulting Services
BPC: 21635
MISSION/BUREAU/OFFICE: THE GAMBIA

EXPENSE CATEGORY	FY 1995 ESTIMATE				FY 1996 REQUEST				FY 1997 REQUEST			
	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL	OE	TF	PG	TOTAL
Management and Professional Support Services	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0
Studies, Analysis and Evaluations	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0
Engineering & Technical Services	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0
Total Consulting Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

NAMING CONVENTION: CS21635.WK3

TABLE VIII (d) - FN Voluntary Separation
BPC: 21635
MISSION: THE GAMBIA

Category	FY 1995 ESTIMATE			FY 1996 REQUEST			FY 1997 REQUEST		
	OE	PG	TOTAL	OE	PG	TOTAL	OE	PG	TOTAL
F.N. Direct Hire (FNDH)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F.N. PSC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Obligations	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Estimated Withdrawals			0.0			0.0			0.0

NAMING CONVENTION: FSN21635.WK4

TABLE VIII (e) - Cost of Controller Operations

BPC:
Mission:

EXPENSE CATEGORY	FUNC CODE	FY 1995 ESTIMATE			FY 1996 REQUEST			FY 1997 REQUEST			FY 1998 REQUEST			FY 1999 REQUEST			FY 2000 REQUEST		
		OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL	OE	TF	TOTAL
U.S. DIRECT HIRE	U100	26.4		26.4	4.2		4.2	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0
F.N. DIRECT HIRE	U200	109.3		109.3	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0
CONTRACT PERSONNEL	U300	21.0		21.0	32.9		32.9	36.2		36.2	39.8		39.8	43.8		43.8	48.2		48.2
HOUSING	U400	38.8		38.8	9.7		9.7	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0
OFFICE OPERATIONS	U500	76.7		76.7	61.1		61.1	59.1		59.1	59.9		59.9	60.7		60.7	61.5		61.5
NXP PROCUREMENT	U600	8.6		8.6	9.9		9.9	3.3		3.3	1.9		1.9	2.0		2.0	2.1		2.1
TOTAL OE COSTS		280.8	0.0	280.8	117.8	0.0	117.8	98.6	0.0	98.6	101.6	0.0	101.6	106.5	0.0	106.5	111.8	0.0	111.8
Less "OE" FAAS		58.6			46.8			43.7			43.7			43.7			43.7		
TOTAL OE REQUEST	U000	222.2	0.0	222.2	71.0	0.0	71.0	54.9	0.0	54.9	57.9	0.0	57.9	62.8	0.0	62.8	68.1	0.0	68.1
SPECIAL INFORMATION:																			
Local Currency Usage - %				41 %			66 %			93 %			93 %			93 %			93 %
Exchange Rate used in Calculations				95			95			95			95			95			95
Trust Fund End-of-Year Balance				0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0
USDH FTE				0.25			0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0

NAMING CONVENTION: CO2XXXX.WK4