

UNCLASSIFIED

AGRICULTURE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT GRANT II

PROGRAM ASSISTANCE APPROVAL DOCUMENT

(683-0257)

PROJECT PAPER

(683-0265)

VOLUME I

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
USAID/NIGER
1990

UNCLASSIFIED

A

AGRICULTURE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT GRANT II
(683-0257, 683-0265)
PROGRAM ASSISTANCE APPROVAL DOCUMENT

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C

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE MISSION DIRECTOR

FROM: PDO, ^{JK}Arna Kerst

SUBJECT: Authorization of the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II
(683-0257 and 683-0265)

I. Problem: Pursuant to the Africa Bureau Delegation of Authority received in 89 State 388808, your approval is requested to authorize the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II, under which USAID plans to grant a total of \$25 million from Development Fund for Africa funds to the Government of Niger (GON), of which \$5 million will be for the project component (683-0265). The planned obligation in FY 1990 is \$7 million, of which \$5 million will be under the Sector Grant (683-0257) and \$2 million will be under the project component (683-0265).

II. Discussion:

A. Program Description and Purpose

The Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (ASDG II) is essentially a resource transfer. It aims to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to manage and profit, in a sustainable way, from resources which they will control. The program will do this by assisting the GON to establish the legal and policy framework necessary for effective natural resource management, and to promote the development of institutions which can be positive agents of change in Niger. Resources will be transferred to the GON in four tranches of \$5 million each as policy conditions precedent are satisfied.

A companion project component is authorized and will be obligated as a separate Handbook 3 grant (ASDG II 683-0265) and will be directly managed by the Mission. A total of \$5 million will be provided over the life of that project component for technical assistance, studies, training, evaluation and audit.

B. Financial Summary

Funding for the first year of ASDG II will be \$5 million under 683-0257 for resource transfer and \$2 million under 683-0265 for project activities, for a total of \$7 million. An overall budget breakdown is presented below.

<u>Planned Obligation of Funds (\$000)</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>LOP</u>
1. Resource Transfer	<u>5,000</u>	<u>20,000</u>

d

2. Project Component		
- Technical Assistance	950	2,100
- Training	100	400
- Commodities	250	400
- Studies	600	1,100
- Evaluation	100	300
- Audit	-	200
- Other Support Costs	-	300
- Contingencies/Inflation	-	200
Sub-Total	<u>2,000</u>	<u>5,000</u>
Total	<u>7,000</u>	<u>25,000</u>

C. Conditions and Covenants

The Conditions Precedent to disbursements of the resource transfers and the Special Covenants to the grant agreement are set forth in Attachment A, the PAAD Face Sheet.

D. Section 121(d)

The Mission Director's certification under the terms of Section 121(d) of the FAA has been approved.

III. Justification to Congress:

The Congressional Notification waiting period expired on August 13, 1990, per State 268671.

IV. Recommendation:

A. That you sign the attached PAAD facesheet, thereby authorizing a DFA sector grant in the amount of \$5,000,000 for the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (683-0257) to be provided to the Government of Niger as non-project assistance and approving a sector grant of \$20,000,000 over Life of Program; and

B. That you sign the attached Project Authorization, thereby authorizing DFA funding of up to \$5,000,000 for a technical assistance grant project (683-0265) complementary to the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II.

Approved _____
Disapproved _____
Date _____



E

Drafted:PROG:LDouris Q 7/24/90

Clearances:

PDO:EKerst eu Date 8/16/90
CONT:PCallen PC Date 8/16/90
ADO:JMitchell JM Date 8/16/90
EXO:AVodraska AV Date 8/16/90
A/DDIR:JSlattery J Date 8/18/90
RLO:MFittipaldi MF Date 8/18/90

1909P

F

CLASSIFICATION:

AID 112D-1		1. PAAD NO. 683-T-606	
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT		2. COUNTRY Niger	
PAAD PROGRAM ASSISTANCE APPROVAL DOCUMENT		3. CATEGORY Dollar Disbursement Program Grant	
4. DATE		5. OYB CHANGE NO.	
6. TO: George T. Eaton, Director		6. OYB INCREASE	
7. FROM: Erna Kerst, Project Development Officer		TO BE TAKEN FROM:	
8. APPROVAL REQUESTED FOR COMMITMENT OF: \$ 5,000,000		10. APPROPRIATION - GSSA-90-31683-KG39 014-61-683-00-53-01	
11. TYPE FUNDING <input type="checkbox"/> LOAN <input type="checkbox"/> GRANT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMAL <input type="checkbox"/> FORMAL <input type="checkbox"/> NONE	12. LOCAL CURRENCY ARRANGEMENT <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMAL <input type="checkbox"/> FORMAL <input type="checkbox"/> NONE	13. ESTIMATED DELIVERY PERIOD 8/90 - 12/95	14. TRANSACTION ELIGIBILITY DATE Upon Authorization
15. COMMODITIES FINANCED			

16. PERMITTED SOURCE	17. ESTIMATED SOURCE
U.S. only:	U.S.:
Limited F.W.: \$5,000,000	Industrialized Countries:
Free World:	Local:
Cash:	Other: \$5,000,000

18. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

The Agriculture Sector Development Grant II is a sector grant with a discrete project component (683-0265). The purpose of the grant program is to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources they habitually use, and to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner.

Subject to the availability of funds and the mutual agreement of the Parties to the terms and conditions set forth herein, it is planned that Grants (dollar disbursements) will be made to the Government of Niger (GON) in tranches of \$5 million each for a total of \$20 million. Each of the dollar disbursements is tied to conditions precedent which demonstrate progress in implementation of the policy reform program.

19. CLEARANCES	DATE	20. ACTION	DATE
REG/PP PROG:LDouris	8/19/90	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROVED <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVED	
REG/GC CONT:PCallen	8/16/90		
ADO:JMitchell	8/16/90		
EXO:AVodraska	8/16/90		
A/DDIR:JSlattery	8/18/90		
RLA:MFittipaldi	draft		
		AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE: <i>George T. Eaton</i> Mission Director DATE: AUG 21 1990 AMEMBASSY NIAMEY U.S. AID OFFICE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL	

CLASSIFICATION:

I. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND COVENANTS

In addition to the standard conditions precedent (specimen signatures and designation of authorized representatives), the following conditions precedent and covenants will be included in the grant agreement for the program.

A. Conditions Precedent to Initial Disbursement

Prior to the disbursement of the first increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche I") the Grantee shall furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., all of the following:

1. The name, address and account number of the United States bank into which the dollars under this Grant will be deposited.
2. Evidence that Special Grantee Accounts (as hereinafter defined) have been established in a banking institution to be approved by both parties for the deposit of local currency in an amount equal to the amount of the U.S. Dollar disbursements (minus amounts for the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and the Local Currency Trust Fund Account, as these terms are hereinafter defined) for each dollar resource transfer increment.
3. Formal designation by the Government of Niger of the entity empowered to monitor policy reform measures under the program.
4. Evidence that (a) any and all amounts disallowed for payment by A.I.D., and thus owed to the U.S. Government, as a result of audit or investigative finding under any ongoing or prior A.I.D./Government of Niger agriculture project (e.g., ASDG I, 683-0246/0247; Agricultural Production Support, 683-0234) have been duly paid or settled in a manner acceptable to A.I.D. and (b) any and all ASDG I counterpart fund payments that have been agreed to jointly by the Ministry of Plan and A.I.D. have been released by the Treasury of the Government of Niger to the projects, NGOs or other implementing entities for which the funding was approved.
5. For the natural resource management ("NRM") component of the program, evidence that:
 - (a) A plan for harmonizing and coordinating the various programs concerned with natural resource policy and planning (including, but not limited to, PIGRN/PNLCD/TFAP/NCS/Rural Code/Forestry and Water Code revisions/National Wildlife Action Plan/Land Use Action Plan) has been elaborated and adopted by the Grantee for incorporation into an overall plan.
 - (b) The terms of reference for a national biological diversity assessment have been elaborated and adopted by the Grantee.

(c) The Land Tenure Center ("LTC")/Government of Niger and University of Michigan/Government of Niger studies on NRM tenure issues related to the Rural Code have started.

(d) The terms of reference for an in-depth joint study (A.I.D./Government of Niger) of both the needs for and options available in decentralization related to NRM have been elaborated and adopted.

(e) The terms of reference for an in-depth joint study (A.I.D./Government of Niger) on forestry agent field experience have been elaborated and adopted.

6. For the institutional component of the program, evidence that:

(a) The terms of reference for development of a computerized information system for better human and financial resource management in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock ("MAL") have been elaborated by the Grantee. Related data collection has begun.

(b) Pursuant to the development of personnel training and assignment policy for the MAL, the terms of reference for a study on the human potential of the MAL and on its personnel assignment policy have been elaborated and adopted by the Grantee.

(c) The planning of a workshop on management by objectives has been completed and the workshop has been scheduled. The purpose of the workshop is to elaborate a program budgeting system and guidelines for assuring the conformity of donor project and MAL program budgeting systems.

(d) With respect to non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"):

(1) A review of regulations governing the existence and operations of NGOs in Niger has been completed by a committee representing the Grantee, the NGO community in Niger and A.I.D. and an action plan for any revisions thereof has been drafted.

(2) The Ministry of Plan (the "MOP") has published the regulations and action plan cited above, and has led a vast information campaign on the above.

7. Evidence that (1) instructions have been given to the BCEAO to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from Tranche I to the Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made, and of the net remaining, fifty percent (50%) to the NGO Fund Account and fifty percent (50%) to the Special Grantee Account for support of Government of Niger operations relating to the Program and (2) agreement has been reached between the Parties as to the priorities assigned to the uses of such operational budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.

8. Evidence that the Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program.
9. Evidence of an agreement in writing with A.I.D. between the Parties on the specific terms of a plan for implementation of specific actions and policy changes proposed to be achieved (and the specific measures of performance to monitor the extent of their achievement) prior to the disbursement of the second increment of the U.S. Dollars under the Grant.

B. Conditions Precedent to Subsequent Disbursement

1. Prior to the disbursement of the second increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche II") the Grantee shall furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., evidence that the Grantee has carried out all of the following:

(a) For the NRM component of the Program:

(1) Demonstrated progress in the development of a national NRM policy and overall program.

(2) Demonstrated progress in achieving the objectives of the Rural Code project, including the incorporation of the principal recommendations from the LTC/Government of Niger and University of Michigan/Government of Niger studies into the Rural Code.

(3) Completed the study on decentralization of NRM specified the Conditions Precedent for Tranche I and adopted the principal recommendations of such study.

(4) Completed the study on forestry agent field experience specified in the Conditions Precedent for Tranche I and adopted the principal recommendations of such study.

(b) For the institutional component of the program:

(1) Developed and made a commitment to implement an action plan for the installation of systems for sectoral and regional information and coordination of development activities in the MAL.

(2) Established an information system on personnel, equipment and infrastructure in the MAL.

(3) Implemented the study specified in the Conditions Precedent for Tranche I on the human potential and personnel assignment policy of the MAL.

(4) Held the workshop on management by objectives specified in the Conditions Precedent for Tranche I.

(5) Held a Government of Niger-NGO Roundtable meeting with respect to NGOs and issued an action plan for the implementation of the recommendations made at such meeting.

(6) With respect to rural associations:

-- Completed a review of the status of policy reforms accomplished under the ASDG I program and, following a review of actions taken with respect to Tranche I, agreed with A.I.D. on the establishment of any new conditionality required to maintain progress achieved to date in development of economically viable cooperative movement and rural credit union systems.

-- Agreed to contribute the FCFA equivalent of one million United States Dollars (\$1,000,000) from disbursements under Tranche II to a bank guarantee fund (the "Guarantee Fund") for cooperatives operated under the Rural Organizations Development Project 683-0260 being implemented by Cooperative League of the United States of America.

-- Agreed that the Guarantee Fund can continue to function after the completion of the ASDG II program as long as management systems are in place and operating which meet normal banking standards.

- (c) Reached agreement with A.I.D. in writing as to (1) the percentage apportionment of Tranche II funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the Trust Fund Account) among (a) the NGO/Private Sector fund and (b) the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget and (2) the priorities assigned to the uses of such operating and investment budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.
- (d) Given instructions to the BCEAO (1) to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from the Tranche II resource transfer to the Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made, (2) to deposit the FCFA equivalent of one million United States Dollars (\$1,000,000) to the Guarantee Fund, and (3) to deposit agreed upon amounts to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and to the Special Grantee Accounts for the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs.
- (e) Submitted to A.I.D., in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D., financial and activity reports (as described in subsections (b) and (c), respectively, of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description) relating to Tranche I describing the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the Program, including, but not limited to, information on the governmental institutions supported by the local currency funds disbursed under Tranche I allocated to the operating budget to support the purposes and objectives of the Program.

- (f) The Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of any of the Conditions Precedent under the ASDG I program or in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under Tranche I of the present Grant.
 - (g) Reached agreement in writing with A.I.D. on the specific terms of a plan for implementation of specific actions and policy changes proposed to be achieved (and the specific measures of performance to monitor the extent of their achievement) prior to the disbursement of the third increment of the U.S. Dollars under the Grant.
2. Prior to the disbursement of the third increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche III") the Grantee shall furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., evidence that the Grantee has carried out all of the following:
- (a) For the NRM component of the program:
 - (1) Completed and adopted a national NRM policy strategy and program.
 - (2) Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation of the revised Rural Code.
 - (3) Demonstrated progress in the implementation of the Government of Niger's decentralization policy; specifically, implemented the previously adopted recommendations of the study on decentralization of NRM responsibilities as described in Section 4.1.F.4. of the Agreement.
 - (4) Implemented the previously adopted recommendations of the study on forester agent field experience as described in Section 4.1.F.5. of the Agreement.
 - (b) For the institutional component of the program:
 - (1) Established, as a part of the information system for better human and financial resource management in the MAL: (1) a system of job descriptions, and (2) a geographical information system.
 - (2) With respect to the development of the MAL personnel training and assignment policy: (1) determined criteria for the selection of (a) personnel to be trained and (b) the fields of training, (2) defined needs for technical assistance related to (1) above, (3) defined a strategy for monitoring personnel careers, and (4) adopted and implemented the recommendations from the study on the Ministry's personnel assignment policy described in Section 4.1.G.2. of this Agreement.

(3) With respect to the elaboration of a program budgeting system and guidelines for assuring the conformity of donor project and MAL program budgeting systems: (1) defined and adopted a management by objectives system, (2) made progress in the improvement of project design, programming coordination and management, (3) established a program budgeting system, (4) established a system for annual activity planning and budgeting, (5) elaborated guidelines on the conformity of the MAL program budgeting system and donor projects, and (6) held a workshop for explaining such guidelines.

(4) With respect to NGOs, made revisions and/or changes in regulatory texts as specified in the Conditions Précedent for Tranche I to provide specific permission for NGOs to operate in Niger and serve in community development roles in rural areas, with direct contacts with community organizations.

(5) With respect to rural associations: Completed a review of the status of policy reforms accomplished previously and, following a review of actions taken with respect to Tranche II, agreed with A.I.D. on the establishment of any new conditionality required to maintain progress achieved to date in development of economically viable cooperative movement and rural credit union systems.

(c) Reached agreement with A.I.D. in writing as to (1) the percentage apportionment of Tranche III funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the Local Currency Trust Fund Account) among (a) the NGO/Private Sector fund and (b) the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget and (2) the priorities assigned to the uses of such operating and investment budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.

(d) Given instructions to the BCEAO (1) to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from the Tranche III resource transfer to the Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made and (2) to deposit agreed upon amounts to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and to the Special Grantee Accounts for the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs.

(e) Submitted to A.I.D., in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D., financial and activity reports (as described in subsections (b) and (c), respectively, of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description) relating to Tranche II describing in summary form the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the Program including, but not limited to, information on the governmental institutions supported by the local currency funds disbursed under Tranche II allocated to the operating budget and a

description of the activities (including programs, projects, etc.) undertaken with such local currency funds allocated to the investment budget to support the purposes and objectives of the Program.

- (f) The Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program or in satisfaction of the conditions precedent under either Tranche I or Tranche II of the present Grant.
 - (g) Reached agreement with A.I.D. in writing on the specific terms of a plan for implementation of specific actions and policy changes proposed to be achieved (and the specific measures of performance to monitor the extent of their achievement) prior to the disbursement of the fourth increment of the U.S. Dollars under the Grant.
3. Prior to the disbursement of the fourth increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche IV") the Grantee shall furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., evidence that the Grantee has carried out all of the following:
- (a) For the NRM component of the Program:
 - (1) Demonstrated progress in the implementation of the national NRM policy and program.
 - (2) Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation and application of the revised Rural Code.
 - (3) Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation of the Government of Niger decentralization policy; specifically, demonstrated additional progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the study on NRM decentralization as described in Section 4.1.F.4. of the Agreement .
 - (4) Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation and application of adopted recommendations of the study on forestry agent field experience.
 - (b) For the institutional component of the program:
 - (1) Implemented a system of job descriptions as a part of the MAL's information system.
 - (2) With respect to the development of the MAL personnel training and assignment policy: (1) put in place a personnel career monitoring strategy, (2) implemented a training plan, and (3) put in place measures for ensuring relevancy of training to employment.

- (3) With respect to the elaboration of a program budgeting system and guidelines for assuring the conformity of donor project and MAL program budgeting systems, annual work plans derived from the program budgeting system are in use in two departments of the country.
- (4) With respect to NGOs, held a second NGO-Government of Niger Roundtable meeting and formulated an action plan for the implementation of the recommendations made at such meeting.
- (5) With respect to rural associations: A review of the status of policy reforms accomplished previously and, following a review of actions taken with respect to Tranche III, agreed with A.I.D. on the establishment of any new conditionality required to maintain progress achieved to date in development of economically viable cooperative movement and rural credit union systems.
- (c) Reached agreement with A.I.D. in writing as to (1) the percentage apportionment of Tranche IV funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the Local Currency Trust Fund Account) among (a) the NGO/Private Sector Fund and (b) the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget and (2) the priorities assigned to the uses of such operating and investment budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.
- (d) Given instructions to the BCEAO (1) to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from the Tranche IV resource transfer to the Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made and (2) to deposit agreed upon amounts to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and to the Special Grantee Accounts for the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs.
- (e) Submitted to A.I.D. in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D. financial and activity reports (as described in subsections (b) and (c), respectively, of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description) relating to Tranche III describing in summary form the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the Program including, but not limited to, information on the governmental institutions supported by the local currency funds disbursed under Tranche III allocated to the operating budget and a description of the activities (including programs, projects, etc.) undertaken with such local currency funds allocated to the investment budget to support the purposes and objectives of the Program.
- (f) The Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program or in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under Tranches I, II or III of the present Grant.

C. Special Covenants

In addition to the above policy reform conditionality, the following special covenants will be included in the grant agreement.

1. Continuance of Actions Taken by Grantee in Satisfaction of Conditions Precedent

The Grantee shall not in any way discontinue, reverse or otherwise impede any action it has taken in satisfaction of any condition precedent set forth in the Grant Agreement, except as may be mutually agreed to in writing by the Parties.

2. Special Local Currency Accounts

(a) The Grantee shall establish (1) a special account with the BCEAO Niamey (the "Special Dollar Account") and (2) two (2) special accounts (the "Special Grantee Accounts") with a banking institution to be approved by both Parties . To the extent allowed by the laws of the Government of Niger and applicable banking regulations and practices, the Special Dollar Account and each of the Special Grantee Accounts (collectively, the "Special Accounts") shall be interest-bearing accounts. Any interest accruing on any of the Special Accounts shall be used for the same purposes as the principal in such account.

(b) The Special Accounts shall be used solely for the purpose of transferring and holding funds supplied under this Agreement and any interest thereon. No other funds shall be commingled with the funds in the Special Accounts.

(c) Transfers of funds shall be effected promptly in accordance with the procedures set forth in Articles 6 and 7 of the Amplified Program Description.

3. Exchange Rate

The rate of foreign exchange applicable to this Agreement shall be the highest rate at which dollars may lawfully be sold under the FCFA regime on the day the United States Treasury transfers each dollar tranche to the U.S. bank account as described in Article 6.A.6. of the Amplified Program Description.

4. Uses of Special Account Funds

(a) Except for (1) 8% of the FCFA proceeds from each U.S. dollar disbursement made under the Grant, which BCEAO shall transfer directly to a Local Currency Trust Fund Account (the "Local Currency Trust Fund Account") to be administered by A.I.D. for program management and monitoring and for general mission support, and (2) that percentage of the FCFA proceeds from each U.S. dollar disbursement which the Parties will have agreed to have transferred directly by

BCEAO to the private bank account of the U.S. private for-profit or non-profit organization which manages and monitors NGO and private sector projects, the Grantee shall allocate the funds disbursed under the Grant to the Special Grantee Accounts in two ways:

(1) A percentage, as agreed to with A.I.D., to provide operational budget support to selected governmental agencies with key roles in fulfilling this Program's purposes and objectives.

(2) A percentage, as agreed to with A.I.D., to provide budget support to the Grantee's investment budget for programming contributing to the Program's purposes and objectives.

(b) As stated in the Conditions Precedent to Disbursement, prior to the transfer of each tranche of funds, agreement will be reached between the Parties as to the apportionment of the funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the Local Currency Trust Fund Account) among the three authorized uses (i.e., NGO and private sector projects, operational budget support and investment budget support), except that fifty percent (50%) of the Tranche I net proceeds shall be allocated to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and fifty percent (50%) to operational budget support as provided in Section 4.1.H. of the Agreement.

(c) Unless the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the implementing governmental agencies eligible for operational budget support through funds in the Special Grantee Accounts are:

- The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and

- The Ministry of Hydrology and Environment

(d) The Grantee covenants that, if any reductions are made to the Grantee contribution to operational budgets of the aforementioned governmental institutions identified as key to program success during the life of this program, those reductions will not exceed the average of reductions imposed government-wide.

(e) The Grantee covenants that funds in or derived from any of the Special Accounts shall not be used for support of military, paramilitary or police activities.

(f) The Grantee covenants that it shall promptly refund to the Special Grantee Accounts any local currency derived from such accounts, including interest, if any, which is found by audit, evaluation or by A.I.D. not to have been used for purposes agreed upon by the Parties.

5. Release of Funds from Special Grantee Account

The Grantee shall release funds promptly from the Special Grantee Accounts, in accordance with the ordinary and regularly applied disbursement procedures of the Ministry of Finance.

6. Reports, Records, Inspections, Audit

(a) The Grantee shall furnish to A.I.D. such reports and information relating to the Program and to this Agreement as A.I.D. may reasonably request, including, but not limited to, the documentation described in Section 6.6.B. of the Agreement and subsection (b) of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description.

(b) The Grantee shall maintain or cause to be maintained, in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices consistently applied, books and records relating to the Special Dollar Account and the Special Grantee Accounts. The Grantee shall permit A.I.D. or any of its authorized representatives to inspect such books and records at such times as A.I.D. may require. Such books and records shall be maintained for three years after the date of last disbursement of the Grant by A.I.D.

7. Meeting and Monitoring

At a minimum, representatives of the parties shall meet no less frequently than on an annual basis to report and review the progress of the Program. Prior to each such meeting, the Grantee shall transmit to A.I.D. the reports and records of financial and Program activities specified in subsections (b) and (c) of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description.

8. Policy Discussions

The Grantee agrees to hold policy discussions with A.I.D. whenever impediments to program success, such as restrictive policies or regulations, have been jointly identified by the Grantee and A.I.D. in future studies or implementation of the Program, with the goal of eliminating such impediments to Program success.

PROJECT AUTHORIZATION

Name of Country: Niger

Name of Project: Agriculture Sector Development
Grant II

Number of Project: 683-0265

1. Pursuant to Section 121 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby authorize the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II Project for the Republic of Niger ("Cooperating Country"), involving planned obligations of not to exceed Five Million U.S. Dollars (\$5,000,000) in grant funds from the Development Fund for Africa over a five-year period, subject to the availability of funds and in accordance with the A.I.D. OYB/allotment process, to help in financing the foreign exchange and local currency costs for the project. The planned life of project is through December 31, 1995.

2. The project ("Project") consists of technical assistance activities required to implement and support the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II program for Niger. It, therefore, contributes to the overall purpose of promoting policy and institutional reforms which will enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to manage and profit, in a sustainable manner, from resources which they will control.

3. The Project Agreement, which may be negotiated and executed by the officer to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with A.I.D. regulations and Delegations of Authority, shall be subject to the following essential terms and covenants and major conditions, together with such other terms and conditions as A.I.D. may deem appropriate.

Source and Origin of Commodities, Nationality of Services


1) Commodities financed by A.I.D. under the project shall have their source and their origin in the cooperating country or in countries included in A.I.D. geographic code 935, except as A.I.D. may otherwise agree in writing.

2) Except for ocean shipping, the suppliers of commodities or services financed by A.I.D. under the project shall have the cooperating country or countries included in A.I.D. geographic code 935 as their place of nationality, except as A.I.D. may otherwise agree in writing.

3) At least 50% of the gross tonnage of all A.I.D.-financed commodities shipped on ocean vessels must be shipped on U.S. Flag commercial vessels if such are available at fair and reasonable prices.

4) Air travel and transportation to and from the United States must be upon certified U.S. Flag carriers if such are available.

Date AUG 21 1990



Drafted:PROG:LDouris [Signature] 7/24/90

Clearances:

PDO:EKerst [Signature] Date 8/16
CONT:PCallen [Signature] Date 8/16
ADO:JMitchell [Signature] Date 8/16
EXO:AVodraska [Signature] Date 8/16
A/DDIR:JSlattery [Signature] Date 8/15/90
RLO:MFittipaldi [Signature]

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APPENDIX 3A, Attachment 1
Chapter 3, Handbook 3 (TM 3:43)

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT DATA SHEET

1. TRANSACTION CODE
 A = Add
 C = Change
 D = Delete
Amendment Number _____

DOCUMENT CODE
3

COUNTRY/ENTITY Niger

3. PROJECT NUMBER 683-0265

4. BUREAU/OFFICE USAID/Niger 06

5. PROJECT TITLE (maximum 40 characters) Agriculture Sector Development Grant III

6. PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION DATE (PACD) MM DD YY 1 2 3 1 9 5

7. ESTIMATED DATE OF OBLIGATION (Under "B." below, enter 1, 2, 3, or 4)
A. Initial FY 9 0 B. Quarter 4 C. Final FY 9 4

8. COSTS (\$000 OR EQUIVALENT \$1 =)

A. FUNDING SOURCE	FIRST FY 90			LIFE OF PROJECT		
	B. FX	C. L/C	D. Total	E. FX	F. L/C	G. Total
AID Appropriated Total						
(Grant)	(2,000)	()	(2,000)	(5,000)	()	(5,000)
(Loan)	()	()	()	()	()	()
Other U.S. 1.						
2.						
Host Country						
Other Donor(s)						
TOTALS	2,000		2,000	5,000		5,000

9. SCHEDULE OF AID FUNDING (\$000)

A. APPROPRIATION	B. PRIMARY PURPOSE CODE	C. PRIMARY TECH. CODE		D. OBLIGATIONS TO DATE		E. AMOUNT APPROVED THIS ACTION		F. LIFE OF PROJECT	
		1. Grant	2. Loan	1. Grant	2. Loan	1. Grant	2. Loan	1. Grant	2. Loan
(1) DFA	200	200			2,000			5,000	
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									
TOTALS									

10. SECONDARY TECHNICAL CODES (maximum 8 codes of 3 positions each)

11. SECONDARY PURPOSE CODE

12. SPECIAL CONCERNS CODES (maximum 7 codes of 4 positions each)
A. Code BR BF
B. Amount

13. PROJECT PURPOSE (maximum 480 characters)

To enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources they habitually use, and to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner.

14. SCHEDULED EVALUATIONS
Interim MM YY MM YY Final MM YY 0 6 9 3 | | | | Final 0 6 9 5

15. SOURCE/ORIGIN OF GOODS AND SERVICES
 000 941 Local Other (Specify) _____

16. AMENDMENTS/NATURE OF CHANGE PROPOSED (This is page 1 of a _____ page PP Amendment.)

17. APPROVED BY
Signature: *George P. Callen*
Title: Mission Director

18. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED IN AID/W, OR FOR AID/W DOCUMENTS, DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
AUG 21 1990
MM DD YY

Certification: P. Callen, Controller



ACRONYMS

A.I.D.	Agency for International Development
ASDG	Agriculture Sector Development Grant
BCEAO	Banque Central des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
BOM	Bureau d'Organisation et Méthodes
CA	Centrale D'Approvisionnement
CESAO	Centre d'Etudes Economique et Sociales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDR	Centre for Information and Documentation on Rural Development
CILSS	Comité Interetat de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse Sahelienne.
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the USA
CNCR	National Rural Code Committee
CRSP	Collaborative Research Support Program
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DFPP	Direction de la Faune, Pêches, et Pisciculture
DOA	Delegation of Authority
EIL	Experiment in International Living
EPSAT	Etude des Pluies à partir du Satellite
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
FCFA	CFA Francs (Monetary Units of Francophone West African Countries)
GAP	Groupement des Aides Privées
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GON	Government of Niger
GRAAP	Groupe de Recherche et d'Appui pour l'Autopromotion Paysanne
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPDR	Institut Polytechnique de Développement Rurale
IRED	Innovations et Reseaux pour le Développement
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
LTC	Land Tenure Center
MAL	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
MHE	Ministry of Hydrology and Environment
NEPRP	Niger Economic Policy Reform Program

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	Non-Projet Assistance
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OE	Operating Expenses
ONAHA	Office National des Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles
OPVN	Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger
PAAD	Program Assistance Approval Document
PAIPCE	Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives Privées et à la Création d'Emplois
PESAP	Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Program
PFPCG	Program for Training and Refresher Courses in Management
PIGRN	Programme Intégré de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles
PIL	Project Implementation Letter
PNLCD	Plan National de Lutte Contre la Désertification
PSR	Programme Significatif de Relance
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RCC	Rural Code Committee
ROD	Rural Organizations Development
SAF	Structural Adjustment Facility
TA	Technical Assistance
TFAP	Tropical Forestry Action Plan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WOCCU	World Organization of Cooperative Credit Unions
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature

Doc:0149i:nm

11

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Introduction

The Agriculture Sector Development Grant (ASDG II) is a \$25 million grant to the Government of Niger (GON) which will support GON efforts to increase productivity and incomes in rural Niger in a sustainable fashion. The program is financed under the Development Fund for Africa. The planned life of program is from August 1990 to December 1995. ASDG II is organized as a sector grant (683-0257) to be released in four tranches on satisfaction of policy reform conditions, and a project component (683-0265) for financing technical assistance, studies, training, and evaluation and audit requirements of the program. Use of the local currency proceeds of the sector grant tranches will contribute towards realization of program objectives.

ASDG II grows out of, and in initial years will coexist with, USAID's premier agricultural policy reform program, the Agriculture Sector Development Grant (683-0246/47), implemented from 1984 to 1992. The purpose of ASDG II is to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources they habitually use, and to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner. ASDG II aims at 1) establishing the legal and policy framework for natural resource management and 2) strengthening institutions which work directly with rural producers. The program approach is based on the concept that, in order for policy reform to lead to sustainable increases in rural production and income, rural citizens must have control over the land and resources which they traditionally exploit, must have access to technologies and resources from service providers which promote sustainable production, and must profit from their labors (through higher income, better standard of living).

The final selection of interventions has been made on the basis of GON priorities and interests, USAID experience in Niger and technical strengths (including access to experts and centrally funded programs), and USAID assessment of the management capacity of our two parties to undertake and monitor particular reforms and technical interventions. The design and negotiation of the program have been carried out during a period in which there has been renewed focusing of attention on natural resource management and tenure issues regionally (as demonstrated in the 1989 Segou conference and other fora) and, in Niger, some rethinking by the Government of Niger on the optimal role and organization of the State, and increasing official acceptance here of the potential value of nongovernmental organizations in promoting development. The dynamism of the situation has allowed thorough discussion of issues which were previously not open to donor intervention. It also means that maximum flexibility must be built into conditions for tranche release after the first year of the program. As the dialogue on the relationship of government to rural citizens and private sector continues to progress, conditions for release of the sector grant must evolve as well. For this reason, USAID and the GON are negotiating precise language for the conditions precedent of the initial tranche, and a statement of agreed goals and objectives

for the program as a whole, with a tentative listing of conditions precedent prepared for later years to serve as a framework for policy discussions. Conditions precedent for subsequent tranches will be further developed and negotiated as the program progresses.

The program design reflects A.I.D. rural development policy and non-project assistance guidelines as expressed in A.I.D. policy papers, the Bureau for Africa Action Plan for implementation of the Development Fund for Africa, and the Bureau Preliminary Guidance on Non-Project Assistance under the Development Fund for Africa. The program is fully consistent with the country development strategy for Niger.

B. Program Goal and Purpose

The ASDG II program will contribute to the goal of increasing agricultural production and individual incomes in rural Niger. The program's purpose is to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources they habitually use, and to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner.

ASDG II will assist the government in establishing the legal and policy framework necessary for effective natural resource management, and in promoting the development of institutions which can be positive agents of change in rural Niger. Establishment of a framework for NRM requires formulation and implementation of a national strategy and program for natural resource management, clarification of NRM tenure rights, progressive transfer of decision making on NRM from central government to local populations, and creation of a regulatory environment conducive to individual investment. Regulatory change can be through site-specific or use-specific exceptions to legal codes in force nationally or through changes in national legal codes related to resource tenure and use. The natural resources component of ASDG II will directly contribute to identifying ways to increase the efficiency and to broaden the impact of public investment, as well as stimulate private investment in natural resources management.

Institutional changes are needed as well. Revisions in the roles of government professional personnel, such as forestry agents, can serve to make their sanctioned roles ones of promotion of individual and community resource management endeavors. In a parallel and interrelated effort, the program will assist in strengthening institutions which work directly with rural producers. This will be effected by reducing governmental restrictions on operations of non-governmental organizations (including independent cooperatives and credit unions), by assisting the rural development ministries to improve their management of their human and financial resources, and through use of budget support, local currencies programmed in support of NGOs, and the project component of the program.

C. Program Components

The ASDG II program has two segments: a sector grant to the Government of Niger (683-0257) and a project component for technical assistance, studies, training, and for evaluation and audit requirements of the grant (683-0265).

Dollar disbursements to the Grantee are to be made in tranches on satisfaction of conditions precedent, which are specific policy and institutional reform measures and actions agreed to in advance by the two Parties. The dollar resource transfer will be a direct transfer to the Government of Niger, with an 8 percent trust fund deducted for management by USAID. The remaining funds will be jointly programmed in the following manner. Over the life of the program, no less than 30 percent (\$5.52 million) of the total net resource transfer will be programmed in support of NGO/PVO activities. These local currency funds will be transferred by the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) to the commercial bank account of a U.S. private sector entity recruited to manage a fund for programs of non-governmental organizations and private sector (including associations such as independent cooperatives). The remainder of the transfer will be granted to the Government of Niger for budget support, with funding attributed to operational budgets of selected entities and to the investment budget. The goal of the direct transfers to the GON (up to \$12.88 million over life of program) is to maintain a certain level of financial support to the governmental entities/programs charged with actions needed to achieve the program's purpose. The percentage of each tranche of the resource transfer to be used for the NGO fund and for budget support to GON operations and to its investment programs will be determined by USAID prior to disbursement of the dollar funds. Presentation of financial records demonstrating that the funds were so apportioned will serve as a condition to disbursement of the subsequent tranche.

The project component will finance technical assistance, studies, training, evaluation and audit. The release of funds for the project component will not be tied to satisfaction of policy conditionality.

The cost to A.I.D. of the program is summarized below:

<u>Component</u>	<u>\$000</u>
1. Conditional Resource Transfer (of which 8% reserved for USAID Trust Fund)	20,000
2. Project Component	
- Technical Assistance	2,100
- Training/seminars	400
- Commodities	400
- Studies	1,100
- Evaluation/Monitoring	300
- Audit	200
- Support costs	300
- Contingencies/Inflation	200
Subtotal	5,000
Total	25,000

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D. Program Implementation

The responsibility for implementation of the policy reform program will rest with the GON. The principal executing agency for the program will be the Ministry of Plan. Such ministries as Agriculture and Livestock and Hydrology and Environment will play important roles both for policy and institutional reform and in implementation of the project component.

E. Conditionality and Policy Reform

The policy reform program will promote and assist the GON to implement policy and administrative reforms related to tenure and resource use, and to the roles of specific public and private sector institutions which can serve as agents of change in promoting rural development.

Disbursement of dollar funds will be made in tranches, conditional on satisfaction of performance benchmarks which are detailed in Section VII of this PAAD. The reform program is fully consistent with the Government of Niger Structural Adjustment Program and Five Year Plan. Furthermore, the non-project assistance policy agenda is consistent with A.I.D. policies on economic reform and rural development, and builds on ongoing policy reform initiatives sponsored by the Agriculture Sector Development Grant I (683-0246).

The resource transfers will take place when conditions precedent to disbursement have been met according to defined performance criteria and targets. By the end of the program, the following policy actions (outputs) will have been accomplished:

1. Natural Resources Management

- Development of a coherent national policy and action plan for natural resources management.
- Integration of biological diversity concerns into national planning and programming.
- Movement from plethora of discrete NRM projects to coordinated national NRM programs.
- Substantially increased security of resource tenure guaranteed by GON.
- Decentralization and progressive transfer to local institutions of NRM rights and responsibilities for planning and implementation of NRM projects.

2. Institutional Development

- Establishment of a program budgeting system based on management by objectives in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
- Establishment of information systems for personnel and materials management and a ministry training strategy in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.

- Establishment of ministry guidelines for donor-funded projects to ensure conformity with the program objectives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
- Establishment of a system of annual workplan and evaluations for field staff, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
- Establishment of NGO rights and responsibilities in revised government regulations and pronouncements, such that NGOs have specific permission to operate in Niger as community development agents, in direct contact with beneficiary groups.

F. Program Impact

Key development impacts will include:

Socio-economic improvements for direct beneficiaries of program interventions (as a result of a combination of policy changes, local currency financing and project component activities):

- Sustainable increases in production and income.
- Community organization building.
- Reduced seasonal migration.
- Lessened workload of women.
- Increased attitude of self-confidence and self-reliance.
- Improvements in the biophysical conditions of beneficiary lands, indicating progress towards stabilization of the natural resource base.

Improvements in the efficiency of investment:

- Decreased cost of replication for establishment of sustainable, productive natural resource management systems on rural lands. Notional savings to the GON on the order of \$160 million can be predicted over a five year period after ASDG II reforms are in place.
- Gains in the number of hectares which can be targets for NRM improvements. With gains in efficiency as a result of ASDG II, the GON could finance NRM interventions on a land mass 80% larger than that without ASDG II (over a five year period).

NRM practices could be expected to be established on 147,000 hectares over the next five years with a GON investment budget of \$200 million without ASDG II. With ASDG II reforms in place, this same budget is expected to be sufficient to cover 266,000 hectares.

Assuming a maintenance of favorable policy environment, replication of NRM investments through individual (spontaneous) efforts, and stable level of public/private investment resources, coverage of 60% of agricultural land can be hypothesized at the end of twenty years. See Shaikh, Annex G, for impact scenarios leading to the above calculations.

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Program impact will be measured using sample surveys, interviews, evaluations, and through use of data provided by other sources (e.g., other donors). It is important to note that impact may not be visible within five years in many aspects of the program relating to natural resource management. This does not decrease the value of the program. The reality is that improvements in resource base, which lead to sustained income increases, can take from 5 to 20 years, depending on a number of ecological, demographic and economic variables. The fact is well established in the natural resource management literature (see ASDG I PAAD Amendment 3, Shaikh analysis in Annex G., etc.). Temporary income growth through externally financed interventions can be a shorter run result, but sustainability requires monitoring beyond the timeframe of the specific external intervention.

Given this fact, impact will also be monitored through process indicators (incremental steps leading to final impacts, above), which are defined as:

- An improved legal and policy framework to support NRM investments including clarification and substantially increased security of resource management rights and responsibilities.
- Increased efficiency of NRM investments through decentralization of the planning and implementation of NRM programs.
- Increased effectiveness of NRM investments, including less duplication of effort, through improved GON and donor coordination.
- Increased effectiveness of NRM investments through strengthened role of NGOs in NRM program identification and implementation.
- Increased efficiency of governmental operations, as seen through a higher rate of return to rural development investments due to more coherent investment programming and higher quality services provided to the rural population by Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock field staff.
- Expanded operations of NGOs and rural associations, with more local initiative in development projects supported by local NGOs, and growth in scale and number of cooperatives and credit union business activity in Niger.

G. Special Issues

1. Policy Concerns

The program is designed in full conformance with A.I.D. guidelines and regulations. Special attention to gender issues is mandated in all aspects of the program. The program reflects the Action Plan for the Development Fund for Africa, and conforms to A.I.D. worldwide guidance on natural resource management and biodiversity.

2. Contracting Opportunities

All contracting will follow guidelines of the Disadvantaged Enterprises Legislation (Gray Amendment). Any services contract with a value of \$500,000 or more must contain subcontracting

provisions for at least 10% of value, if the lead entity is not a Gray Amendment organization.

3. Donor Coordination

The program was designed in coordination with other major donors and international organizations, and such contacts will be maintained throughout implementation. See Section II.D. for descriptions of other donor interventions in the domain. Note that implementation of the policy reform conditions under ASDG II is not directly dependent on other donor actions or conditionality. However, close coordination with other major donors is essential to meeting key ASDG II objectives particularly in natural resources management.

4. PAAD Guidance Issues

The PAAD takes into consideration guidance in the ECPR approval cable (89 State 388808), as supplemented by 89 State 411279.

H. Summary Findings

From the review and analysis set forth in this document, USAID/Niger concludes that:

1. The proposed grant program is technically, economically and administratively sound;
2. The timing and funding of the program are appropriate;
3. Sufficient planning has been completed to implement, monitor and evaluate the program;
4. All statutory criteria have been met.

I. Authority

As Mission Director, USAID/Niger, you have been granted delegation of authority by the Assistant Administrator for Africa to approve this program (89 State 388808).

J. Recommendation

The USAID review committee recommends your approval of program assistance in the form of a grant of \$7,000,000 from the Development Fund for Africa in FY 1990. Subject to the availability of funds, the grant program will consist, over its life, of \$20,000,000 in financial support and \$5,000,000 for technical assistance, studies, training, evaluation and audit support to the program. Your approval is sought of the entire program.

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II. PROGRAM SETTING

A. Macroeconomic Environment

Traditional agriculture is the base of Niger's economy. An enclave mining sector (uranium) contributes to government revenues but it does not have extensive linkages with the rest of the economy. The small industrial sector is dominated by one public utility and handicraft industries. Manufacturing is a negligible component of the economy. The service sector, including trade and transportation but excluding government, is the second largest sector after agriculture.

Annual changes in the level of economic activity are explained more by rainfall patterns than by any other single factor. At the end of the decade of the 1980's, real gross domestic product (GDP) is equal to its beginning-of-the-decade level. The poor rainfall patterns in 1984, 1987 and 1989 led to declines in real GDP of seventeen, five and six percent respectively. GDP growth in non-drought years was not sufficiently strong to lift the economy above pre-drought levels. The high population growth rate, currently estimated at 3.2% per year, caused GDP per capita to decrease during the period.

Employment is concentrated in the rural sector. Ninety-one percent of the labor force earns all or a part of its income there, seven percent of the labor force is in the service sector (including government) and the remaining two percent is in industry. The annual growth rate of the labor force is in excess of two percent.

Per capita income is low (\$260) because of the large proportion of the labor force in agriculture and the low productivity of agricultural workers. Use of animal traction is not widespread. Fertilizer consumption per unit of land is lower in Niger than in the other Sahelian countries and is less than ten percent of the average for low-income Sub-Saharan Africa. At mid-decade the index of food production per capita was four percent below the base year (1979-81). The predominant crops are millet and sorghum, most of which production is for on-farm consumption.

The value of livestock production is nearly forty percent of total rural production in normal rainfall years. Livestock herders' practices can be described as traditional. Herders generally attempt to maximize herd size. Sales are made to meet cash needs for household consumption. Competition for land between herders and cultivators is increasing as population pressures push cultivators north and lack of pasture pushes herders south.

Both livestock and agricultural products are exported. Niger's major export market for rural products is Nigeria, which purchases substantial quantities of livestock and cowpeas. Onions are exported to Cote d'Ivoire and other coastal markets. The contribution of the rural sector to export receipts is dwarfed however by uranium export revenues. Three-fourths of all export receipts come from uranium.

The financial sector's structure and performance are what one would expect given Niger's economic structure. Three development banks

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(one undergoing liquidation), six commercial banks and three non-bank financial institutions comprise the financial sector; lending is dominated by the development banks. Three banks hold ninety-six percent of total private deposits. Outstanding credit is predominantly short and medium-term; less than one percent is long-term. Most banking activity is concentrated in the capital. Only two banks operate a system of branch offices. One bank has branch offices on both sides of the Niger-Nigeria border. The national development bank is undergoing rehabilitation during which time its banking operation are severely curtailed.

Government fiscal strategists have been preoccupied with several problems: a large external debt, weak domestic resource mobilization and poor resource management. The government sector is the country's major investor, yet government revenue can fund no more than five percent of the public investment budget. Donor funding pays for ninety-five percent of the public investment budget as well as a portion of the government operating budget. Indirect taxes (including foreign trade taxes) are the principal sources of public funds. The government revenue/GDP ratio is below ten percent. Fiscal and external imbalances are described in more detail below.

The structural transformation of Niger's economy will occur slowly under the best of circumstances. Educational levels are low. The primary school enrollment is twenty-eight percent. The adult literacy rate is ten percent. Productivity gains in agriculture through research have been difficult to find. The low-level of rural purchasing power constrains industrialization prospects. Urban demand for food is also constrained by low levels of income. Many urban households rely for their food consumption requirements on transfers from rural relatives of grain and other foodstuffs. Cash expenditures, and hence effective market demand, are quite low. Low incomes, small domestic markets and weak demand suggest the need for an outward looking development strategy.

2. Structural Adjustment

Uranium export receipts fueled strong economic growth in the late 1970's. The expansion of the Nigerian economy ended abruptly in 1981 with a drastic fall in the world demand for uranium, a lowering of the quality of ore being mined, and increases in production costs. Demand began to fall in 1979 after the accident at Three Mile Island. The world spot market price for uranium fell by an annual average of 24 percent between 1979 and 1982. The decline in the uranium price, together with the depreciation of the French Franc, led to a fall of more than 20 percent in the export price index while the import price index was rising. Consequently, Niger's terms of trade fell 25 percent between 1980 and 1982. In short, the anticipated revenue flows from uranium production, which served implicitly as collateral for Niger's external borrowing, collapsed. A reluctance to forsake the ambitious development plan led to its financing by resort to the drawdown of official reserves and foreign borrowing with increasingly short maturities and on commercial terms. Foreign assistance during this period leveled off. When the export situation did not improve at a rate compatible

with the need for debt servicing and external capital flows from private sources declined, a liquidity crisis was set in motion.

Going into 1983 the GON faced a situation in which the ratio of disbursed public and public-guaranteed debt to GDP was thirty-one percent; whereas three years earlier the ratio was below ten percent. The ensuing stabilization program was built around an "interim consolidation program." While the main objectives of the interim plan were the same as those of the five-year plan (1979-1983), it reflected the severe financial constraints of 1983. The elements of the austerity program included a freeze on wages in the public sector, reductions in other recurrent spending, and restrictions on external borrowing. However, the effort to restrain public spending had its strongest impact on capital expenditure. Planned public investment in 1983 was only thirty percent of its 1979 level. The external resources supporting the consolidation program included the IMF compensatory financing facility and stand-by arrangements, French exceptional budgetary assistance, and USAID sector assistance. Although these resource flows helped stabilize the economic situation, total outstanding debt continued to increase, reaching \$752 million by the end of 1985. The normal difficulties of stabilization were compounded by the drought of 1984/85 and closure of the border with Nigeria in May 1984. The GON and World Bank began a multi-year structural adjustment credit in FY 1986.

Niger had IMF stand-by arrangements in effect from August 1983 through December 1987, and a three-year, SDR 21 million Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) Arrangement with the IMF from December 1986. An Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of SDR 50 million entered in force in December 1989. This facility is supported by a Policy Framework Paper prepared by the government with assistance from the Fund and the World Bank. The program seeks to foster conditions of increased private sector activity by reducing the structural obstacles to economic growth. The scope of price controls will be narrowed, marketing will be liberalized, and the public enterprise sector will be reformed to improve its financial position and operations.

The Government of Niger routinely met the credit and external debt conditions of these programs between 1983 and 1989. The ESAF's success is predicated on strong growth of fiscal receipts. The program target for growth in fiscal receipts for fiscal year 1989 was sixteen percent. Although receipts had fallen short of program targets every year since 1984, the fiscal year 1989 outcome focused attention on the urgency of dealing firmly with the fiscal imbalance.

The World Bank and the Government of Niger developed a structural adjustment credit program in 1986. The program ran through 1987 and disbursements totaled \$60 million. The objective of the program was to increase the efficiency of resource use by addressing key structural problems of the economy through an economic reform program. Specifically, the program dealt with three structural problems: weak public resource management, inefficient parastatals and inappropriate agricultural policies. To meet the problem of public resource management, the GON was to restructure current expenditures towards materials and supplies and away from salaries,

raise rates of cost recovery and improve debt management. Secondly, public enterprises were to be reformed by revising economic incentive policies, improving their legal and institutional framework and carrying out selected privatization and divestiture efforts. Finally, the structural adjustment program called for agricultural policy changes found in USAID's Agriculture Sector Development Grant (ASDG): liberalization of cereals marketing, reduction of agricultural input subsidies, and improvement of the agricultural credit system.

Structural reform of parastatals received additional impetus from an \$80 million World Bank program (Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Program or PESAP) approved in mid-1987. This program extended the ongoing reform in six areas: public resource management, price liberalization and incentive policies, institutional reform of public enterprises, rehabilitation of selected enterprises, additional privatizations and liquidations, and completion of the settlement of parastatal cross debts. The program disbursements of the second and third tranches were significantly delayed by the slow pace of parastatal reforms.

As the structural adjustment process brought temporary order to the public finances, the Government of Niger was able to take a longer-term perspective on economic policy. In the fall of 1986 the government began to publicize an emerging long-term development strategy.

3. Development Strategy

Development planning had been dormant since the collapse of the 1979-1983 Five-Year Plan in the wake of the fiscal crisis in the early 1980's. The revival of development planning and a new policy of economic liberalization appeared together in the mid-80's in the form of several significant government documents. The first policy statement to address economic planning beyond the stabilization process was the Programme Significatif de Relance (PSR) (Economic Recovery Program). The PSR is an action plan which specifies the public policy changes that will be undertaken to revive the economy of Niger. Its foundation is a redefinition of the role of the State in economic affairs and an acknowledgment of the importance of the private sector in Niger's economic recovery. The State's role is to provide a fiscal and administrative framework which supports private sector development. In exchange for this offer of support to the private sector, the government expects a scrupulous adherence to its laws and regulations by the private sector, especially as regards taxation and customs administration. The thrust of the PSR is to increase the productivity of the existing capital stock through regulatory reform, in other words to get more output from existing resources through more efficient use of these resources, while the Five-Year Development Plan 1987-1991 and its accompanying Three-Year investment program emphasize increasing the stock of capital. Public pronouncements in the fall of 1986 characterized the PSR as a bridge from the period of stabilization to a period of sustained economic growth.

Between December 1986 and April 1987 the government worked on an elaboration of the PSR, in conjunction with several public institutions. This elaboration is known as the Programme d'Appui

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aux Initiatives Privees et a la Creation d'Emplois (PAIPCE) (Program to Support Private Sector Initiatives and Job Creation). PAIPCE deals with two public policy problems: burdensome and counter-productive regulations of the private sector and overemployment in the public sector. Specific actions to reduce disincentives to private sector activity are prescribed. Among the reforms to be carried out are revisions of the commercial and investment codes, revisions in labor laws, and reductions in the extent of oversight by the economic police. Institutional changes will strengthen the Chamber of Commerce and encourage the formation of other business interest groups capable of interacting with the government on public policy issues. This private sector emphasis is a major government policy shift.

The second major policy shift to be highlighted during the revival of development planning in Niamey is the decision to stress rural development as the engine of economic growth in Niger. The shift began in 1984 as budget allocations for public investment changed in favor of agriculture and rural development. This shift in sectoral emphasis has its most fully developed rationalization in the five-year development plan. Three documents make up the five-year plan: the Economic and Social Development Plan of Niger 1987-1991; the Financing Plan 1987-1991 and the three-year Investment Plan (1987-1989). The strategy of the development plan is export-oriented and rural based. The strategy represents a formal recognition that prospects in the world uranium market rule out any recovery in the mining sector. The productive sectors, other than agriculture, are too small to serve as a base for wide-spread economic growth. Only agriculture, the work place of ninety percent of the labor force, has the resource base from which sustained economic growth can emerge. At the same time, the resource base is threatened by natural (erratic rainfall patterns) and man-made (overgrazing and soil-depleting agricultural practices) calamities. The strategy gives considerable importance to the preservation of the resource base. The five-year development plan incorporates the private sector emphasis found in the PSR.

Reforms in economic regulations including but not limited to the Structural Adjustment Program undertaken to date can be classified in three areas: parastatal restructuring and divestiture, pricing and marketing policies, and regulation of business operations. The broad extent of these reforms can be appreciated by reviewing the types of changes being introduced or already in effect.

The parastatal structure in Niger comprises sixty-four firms. Progress in reforming public enterprises was presented above. Decisions taken to date affirm the government's resolve to reduce its participation in the production of goods and services.

Standard charters, a statement of parastatals' rights and responsibilities, have been approved for the parastatals to be retained. Nine of the thirteen major public enterprises have reduced their operating losses. Parastatal cross debts of 3.25 billion FCFA have been settled.

Pricing and marketing policies have changed to increase the scope and flexibility of the private sector. Many parastatals' trade

monopoly rights have been eliminated. The range of price and profit controls has been reduced.

Reforms already in place in the third area, regulation of business operations, include an extension of the period of validity of business operating licenses and a shortening in the legal process to be followed in registering a company. Work is continuing on a new investment code and new foreign trade regulations.

The private sector strategy continues to evolve. A Round Table on the private sector took place in June 1988 in Niamey. The government presented draft private sector policy papers for review and comment by donors, the Nigerien private sector and foreign investors. A three-day meeting involving the government and the Nigerien private sector (donors were invited as observers) took place in March. The purpose of the meeting was to let the government hear the private sector's reaction to a draft "private sector promotion policy" which had been prepared by the Ministry of Commerce. This meeting and other meetings between the President and high government officials on the one side and private sector business organizations on the other side show a recently acquired willingness on the part of the government to exchange views with the business community and incorporate their ideas into public policy.

The final policy paper describes three elements of the strategy for promotion of the private sector: progressive disengagement of the state, improvements in the regulatory and fiscal environment, and the creation of a sense of joint purpose between the government and the business community. What follows is a selection, in summary form, of initiatives and proposals from the private sector promotion policy paper.

Fiscal Measures:

- eliminate the minimum forfeiture tax (Impot Minimum Forfaitaire). This is a tax levied on businesses which keep accounting records. It is equal to one percent of annual turnover. It is payable regardless of the profit/loss position of the firm.
- lower the threshold for eligibility for investment code tax advantages, establish eligibility in terms of value of investment or number of jobs created, rather than value of investment alone.
- eliminate all export taxes, lower import duties on primary goods.
- reduce the business profits tax rate from fifty percent to forty percent.
- measures to offset the revenue losses associated with the above tax reduction include imposing the value-added tax on large-scale trading firms which do not keep accounting records, reducing the abuses of customs exonerations, further reducing parastatal losses and increasing levels of foreign aid.

Commercial and Pricing Policy:

- reduce the severity of business fines to conform to practices in neighboring countries.
- revise the commercial code.
- simplify foreign trade regulations.
- clarify the functions and authority of regulatory agencies in order to eliminate multiple investigations of the same allegation.

Finance and Banking:

- increase the threshold for loans requiring central bank preauthorization.
- simplify procedures and reduce delays in the preauthorization process.
- strengthen legal recourse against issuers of bad checks.

Trade with Nigeria:

- encourage joint ventures.
- reduce trade taxes.
- place a commercial attache in Kano, Nigeria.
- set up an ad hoc committee to examine Nigerian trade regulations, foreign exchange payment systems between Niger and Nigeria, and commercial exchange systems.

Private Sector Institution Building:

- strengthen the Chamber of Commerce and its affiliated Center for External Commerce.
- joint public/private sector market promotion.

The reaction of the business community to the new program, as expressed in the final communique of the meeting, was favorable. Representatives of modern sector firms seemed especially interested in the government's notion of equalizing the tax burden between firms that keep accounting records and those that do not (i.e., the informal sector).

Progress in this initiative since the 1988 Private Sector Rounds Table include the elimination of ago-pastoral export taxes, the placement of a commercial attache in Kano, extensive public, private and joint regional trade meetings with Nigeria, (all supported by the Niger Economic Policy Reform Program), reduction of the business profits tax rate, a two percent levy on the imports of traders exempted from the business profits tax, a draft investment Code,

draft foreign trade regulations and the creation of a taxpayers' ombudsman in the Ministry of Finance.

4. Trade and Fiscal Imbalances

The legacy of the uranium boom and bust experience is that Niger must deal with two important gaps or imbalances in the economy; the trade gap - the excess of imports over exports, and the fiscal gap - the excess of government expenditures over government receipts.

Look first at the trade gap. Row 1 of Table 1 shows the current account balance of Niger's balance of payments during the decade of the 1980's. Among the factors producing the current account deficit are declines in uranium receipts throughout the decade, high import levels early in the decade financed by capital flow (public and private debt), large episodic imports of cereals, and increases in the level of interest costs of Niger's foreign debt. The main contributory factor in holding down the level of the deficit is the increase in the level of official transfers during the decade, the recession in the modern sector of the economy, and the low implementation rate of the public investment budget.

Table 1
Niger's Current Account Deficit

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
	in billions of CFA francs									
Current Account	61.1	49.4	53.8	27.3	20.8	25.7	15.5	23.7	30.6	24.3
	as percentage of GDP									
Current Account	11.4	8.4	8.4	4.0	3.4	3.8	2.2	3.2	3.0	2.7
	in billions CFA francs excluding interest payment and official transfers									
Current Account	78.3	69.7	77.7	50.9	38.3	74.1	42.0	48.9	71.5	54.2
	as percentage of GDP									
Current Account	14.6	11.9	12.1	7.5	6.3	11.0	6.0	6.6	8.9	6.0

Note: As all figures are negative the minus signs are suppressed.

Row 2 of Table 1 shows the deficit figures of row 1 expressed as a percentage of GDP. Row 3 of Table 1 adjusts Row 1 to exclude interest payment on Niger's foreign debt and official transfers. The resulting figure more accurately represents the net difference in the flow of goods and services into and out of the Nigerien economy.

Cereal imports were high in 1985 and 1988, due to poor harvests in the preceding year. One can accept 45 billion CFA as an average late 1980s gap between the level of goods and services entering the economy and the level of goods and services leaving the economy. At the May 1990 exchange rate the gap is \$158 million per year. Overall balance in Niger's foreign sector is achieved by long-term capital inflows (concessional loans), IMF drawings and debt rescheduling in 1985-88. These sources are invaluable in dealing with the current situation, but they are not all feasible as long-term means of financing the imports Niger requires not only to keep the economy running but also to provide the capital goods and technology necessary for structural transformation and growth. Table 2 shows the composition of Niger's imports in 1986.

Table 2
Composition of imports, 1986

<u>Commodity Type</u>	<u>Value of Imports</u>	<u>Share of Total Imports</u>
Consumer goods	34,163	30
Industrial supplies and equipment	23,897	21
Food and Beverages	23,131	20
Petroleum products	13,622	12
Semi-processed goods	6,802	6
Mineral products	6,269	5
Animal/vegetable products	5,115	4
Agricultural supplies	1,536	1

Note: value of imports is in millions of FCFA

Three sources of financing exist to pay for these imports: uranium exports, "all other exports," and official transfers. Table 3 shows the contribution of each source during the 1980s.

Table 3.
Financing Niger's Imports, percent shares

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>
Uranium exports	60	54	54	68	66	61	70	66	64	51	42	36
All other exports	12	19	17	19	20	10	21	21	22	21	24	26
Transfers	28	27	29	13	14	29	9	13	14	27	34	38

Recall that the years of high cereal imports, financed by foreign aid, are 1985 and 1988. This table clearly shows Niger's dependence on uranium exports. Expert opinion is that no upward price trend exists in the world uranium market. Niger can reduce its dependence on uranium and foreign aid only be increasing the receipts of the third category, all other exports. These estimates reflect the

consensus of the three organizations involved in the preparation of Niger's Policy Framework Paper. Underlying these projections is the assumption that imports should increase at six percent annually. In order for "all other exports" to provide twenty-six percent of the financing of imports in 1991 (as projected in Table 3) the growth rate of the "all other" category must be eleven percent annually between 1986 and 1991.

Look now at the composition of Niger's "all other exports" for 1986 in Table 4:

Table 4
Composition of Non-Uranium Exports, 1986

<u>Commodity Type</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Share (%)</u>
Other mineral products	4,625	29
Food and Beverages	4,641	29
Consumer goods	2,804	18
Semi-processed goods	1,717	11
Animal/vegetable products	1,042	7
Industrial supplies and equipment	526	3
Petroleum products	451	3
Agricultural supplies	2	(.)
	-----	-----
	15,808	100

Note: Value figures in millions of FCFA.

An increase in exports between 1988 and 1991 of eleven percent per year would have to come from more output from the existing resource base or investments already underway to achieve the 1991 target. The time period is too short to conceive and implement new investments and begin producing new outputs. Non-uranium exports are predominantly other mineral products (salt, sulfur, lime and cement), food and beverage and consumer goods. These product areas are the ones from which short-term export growth must emanate.

A brief resume of Niger's trade imbalance is as follows. The country is dependent on a single export for more than three-fourths of its export revenue. Growth prospects for that product are dim. Exports of other products are too low to cover the remainder of the import bill; foreign aid pays for fifteen percent of imports. Import growth of six percent is called for in GON planning documents, while at the same time the financing share of foreign aid is to decline. Simultaneous achievement of these two goals necessitates an increase in non-uranium exports. The base for this required export growth is other mineral products, food and beverage products and consumer goods.

The second serious imbalance in the Nigerien economy is the fiscal gap; the excess of government expenditures over government receipts. A deficit in the overall government position is usual for developing countries in which foreign aid plays a role in the financing of public investment projects. The task of the fiscal decision-maker is to find a sustainable balance between domestic resources mobilization and recourse to foreign financing. During the latter half of the 1970s government revenue in Niger went from

twelve to fourteen percent of GDP, with up to twenty percent of the revenue derived from uranium receipts. The overall deficit at that time (defined as the excess of current expenditures plus government investment over total revenue from domestic sources) averaged 2.5 percent of GDP.

Encouraged by the rapid growth of receipts the GON programmed large increases in the investment budget, while the growth of current expenditures kept pace with GDP growth. Revenue growth slowed and then declined absolutely in 1982. Expenditure levels were adjusted, but by mid decade the overall deficit/GDP ratio exceeded eight percent and the government revenue/GDP ratio stood at ten percent.

Niger is in a situation in which substantial short-term improvements in these ratios will be difficult. Interest payments on foreign debt are over one-fifth of current expenditures. Spending on wages and salaries has increased six percent annually during the adjustment period, increasing from thirty-five percent in 1985 to forty percent in 1989. Spending on supplies and materials has not been maintained in most ministries. Subsidy and transfer payments have been reduced.

Table 5 shows the GON budget gaps for 1985-1989.

Table 5
Government Fiscal Position 1985-1988
(current prices in billion FCFA)

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
Total Revenue	69.9	74.0	75.7	67.7	69.4
Recurrent Expenditures w/o interest payments	70.1 (16,7)	75.0 (19,5)	76.1 (18,9)	79.9 (19,1)	83.8 (18.3)
Recurrent Surplus	-0.2	-1.0	-0.4	-12.2	-14.4
Investment	51.3	62.9	60.0	53.8	
Other Expend/Loans	7.4	-1.8	3.5	4.2	
Loan Amortization	18.7	18.6	16.2	18.4	N/A
Overall Deficit	77.6	80.7	80.1	88.6	
Financing	77.6	80.7	80.1	88.6	
Donor Financing	48.4	64.8	76.8	62.9	
Domestic Financing	14.2	1.9	-9.3	15.1	N/A
Debt Rescheduling	15.0	14.0	12.6	10.6	

Seventy-one percent of tax revenue comes from indirect taxes (48 percent from taxes on international trade and 23 percent from taxes on goods and services). The international trade tax base is expected to increase more slowly than GDP. Direct tax collections are hampered by the lack of accounting records among many of the firms, especially those engaged in trading activities and the economic recession affecting modern sector firms.

Government revenue as a percentage of GDP is ten percent, considerably below the average for low-income countries. The government's strategy for increasing its tax revenue is to improve collection rates on informal sector firms. At present a disproportionate share of the tax burden is borne by a small number

of modern sector firms. The private sector policy described above includes a proposal of lower profits tax rates coupled with a broader application of the tax. The tax structure and administration need to be modified to correspond better to the existing structure of the economy and the goals of Niger's development strategy.

The magnitude of Niger's fiscal imbalance, as shown in Table 5, is such that substantial foreign assistance will be required throughout the planning period even with improvements in domestic resource mobilization.

B. Sectoral Framework

1. Importance of the Agricultural Sector in Niger's Economy

The agricultural sector (which comprises crop production, livestock, forestry, fishing and wildlife) is the most important economic activity in Niger and the principal source of livelihood for the majority of the population. The livestock subsector of Niger's agricultural sector is the second major source of foreign exchange earnings after uranium. Cowpeas are the second main agricultural export, having replaced peanuts since the mid-1970s.

Little hard data is available on Niger's labor market. It is generally accepted, however, that the principal occupation of close to 90% of Niger's population is farming or herding. Farming is carried out in the southern part of the country while herding is the main activity for the 20% of the population living in the pastoral zones in the northern part of the country.

Niger's principal food crops are millet and sorghum, covering about seventy percent of the cultivated area each year. Other products include cowpeas, rice, onions, cotton, peppers, peanuts, skins and hides, live animals and firewood. Productive resources in the form of farmland are severely limited in Niger. Of a total of 126.7 million ha, only 12%, or around 15 million ha, is cultivable land. Of this, about 25% is farmed in any given year. Another 9 million ha are maintained in rotational fallow and pastures. Some 61,000 ha of land are identified as potentially irrigable, of which about 13,000 ha are under the management of the state irrigation agency, ONAHA. Dry season farming of bottomlands is more common than in the past and is encouraged by government policy and donor projects. The typical agricultural production unit is a small family-cultivated plot where rainfed crops are cultivated by traditional methods. The average area in crops per farm household is 4.5 ha. Almost all of Niger's productive agricultural land is located within 150 km of the Nigerian border.

Drought resistant crops such as millet and cowpeas are the only real alternatives for rainfed agriculture without water harvesting, and these crops are typically low yielding in the capital-poor farming conditions which prevail in Niger. Farmers in Niger nevertheless exhibit considerable ingenuity in adapting to their production environment. Sixty percent of cultivated land is intercropped. Cowpeas are an ideal part of such a system because of their compatibility with cereals like millet and sorghum in terms of cropping season and labor use. Cowpeas also present

distinct agronomic advantages by providing ground cover, a good source of biologically fixed nitrogen, and a good hay crop.

Outside of the southern zone, available soil resources are too poor and the rainfall too low or too irregular for successful cultivation. About 24 million ha of land located north of the official boundary for cultivable land are considered as useful pastoral lands. Forest lands are estimated to cover 9-14 million hectares. Overall, about 65% of Niger is located in the Saharan zone (characterized by less than 200 mm of rainfall at 90% probability).

2. Problems in the Agricultural Sector

Agriculture's problems begin with Niger's meager natural resource endowment. By far the most dominant variable explaining the performance of the agricultural sector is the low level and erratic frequency of rainfall in Niger. Rainfall levels in many areas of the country seem to be decreasing from long-term averages. Studies in the Tillabery Department indicate that the 350 mm isohyete moved south from 16 to 14 degrees latitude between 1968 and 1984. The northern limit of rainfed farming is considered to be the 350 mm isohyete. Today more than 36% of the population lives in areas receiving less than 350 mm of rain per year. Compounding the problem of low rainfall are poor soil conditions, very high rates of evapotranspiration, and other factors which make Niger, and similar parts of the Sahel, one of the world's harshest production environments.

The continuing high rate of population growth coupled with sluggish growth in agricultural productivity poses one of Niger's severest challenges. Since the 1940s the population growth rate has accelerated from 1% per year (1920-1940) to 2.7% per year (1960-1985) to the present rate of 3.2%. The present population of 7.2 million will double by 2013 if the current rate of population growth remains unaltered. Against this dynamic surge in population, the agricultural sector's growth has been anemic. During the past twenty years cereal production has averaged an annual growth rate of 1.6% while leguminous crops have managed an average annual growth rate of only 0.6%. Per capita production of millet, the basic element of the Nigerien diet, has slipped from 380 kg. in 1980/81 to 357 kg. in 1988/89, a year of record cereal harvest.

The gradually worsening climate and the relentless population growth have together contributed to the diminution of Niger's already poor productive potential. Nigerien agriculture has doubled the cultivated area over the past 25 years, with a spread of extensive cultivation toward the marginal lands of the north and a reduction of pastoral lands available in the intermediate areas. Fallow periods are down as land is forced into near-continuous use to meet the growing need for food. This in turn reduces yields, causing a new cycle of extension into more fragile and unproductive land. Cereal production increases and converse reductions in yields reflect the low productivity of the lands brought into cultivation in the 1980s. The internal disequilibrium in crop production systems in turn destabilizes the pastoral livestock production system through reduction of rangeland, localized

overgrazing, lack of access to rangelands and a reduction of crop residues as fodder in the agricultural zone.

Current technical and production practices are another problem for agriculture. Low input production practices combined with the poor condition of the natural resource base make for low productivity and consequent low standard of living in rural Niger. Technical breakthroughs in plant productivity gains require improving farming systems. Improvements center on reversing the decline in soil fertility and soil loss. Agronomic advances in intercropping, greater retention of soil moisture, control of soil erosion and integrated animal and crop production and agro-forestry hold the best promise for intensifying production and boosting yields.

The final problem which constrains rural transformation is the rudimentary and weak state of markets, firms and institutions in Niger. To be sure, marketing channels do exist. Cash crops move from producing to consuming areas. Manufactured goods are available in rural markets. What is in short supply is the technical knowledge and in some cases the resources to establish and operate the more complex structures and systems which introduce innovations into local markets. Only a small fraction of the agricultural sector marketed output is processed prior to reaching the retail market. Transporting and warehousing operations are generally simple operations perpetuating traditional practices.

Government agencies with critical rural development responsibilities are ill equipped to carry out their functions. The imbalances in the government's fiscal operations are evident at the arrondissement offices of the rural development ministries where there is no correlation between workload and the resources available from GON budget allocations. Complementary private organizations (NGO/PVO) are not as prevalent as in most other African countries. The weaknesses and potential of rural cooperatives are described in the Rural Organizations Development Project Paper (683-0260).

An increase in rural incomes from higher levels of agricultural exports is possible. The state of rural markets and institutions will determine the size of income increase and the magnitude of the income multiplier. At present, rural markets and institutions are not close to making their potential contribution.

3. Prospects for the Agricultural Sector

Recent experience offers a number of reasons why some degree of optimism is warranted in assessing the prospects of the rural economy in Niger. The first reason is the responsiveness of Nigerien farmers to market incentives and production parameters. Peanut production averaged 200,000 tons in 1960-65, while average cowpea production was 54,000 tons. By 1981-85 these production averages were 61,000 tons for peanuts and 223,000 tons for cowpeas. The decline in peanut production was caused by a combination of factors, such as disease, lack of seeds, unfavorable relative prices and a drier climate. The encouraging aspect of growth in cowpea production as a replacement cash crop was that it was one hundred percent a private sector initiative. The government was not involved. Farmers and traders saw a profitable

opportunity and took advantage of it. That experience will have to be repeated over and over as opportunities change in regional West African markets.

A second reason for optimism is the spread of dry-season farming (contre saison). Dry-season farming has been practiced for many years, albeit in a small number of places. After the 1984 drought the government encouraged farmers to exploit bottomlands using irrigation from subsurface water to grow food for local consumption. The response was a dramatic increase in dry-season production in 1985. Rains were good in 1985 so grain production was adequate. The following dry season farmers shifted production toward cash crops. Unfortunately, the marketing channels were not prepared to move the frequently perishable dry season production. Local gluts drove prices down and discouraged farmers reduced their dry-season farming activities to the extent that the prevalence of dry-season farming in an area is now considered an indicator of local drought. The lesson is that there is a productive resource in Niger which is not being exploited to its potential. Producers are waiting for the development of a market outlet. Dry season farming could diversify and increase incomes in rural Niger.

Another reason for optimism is the proximity of Nigeria with its enormous market potential. The future course of Nigeria's structural adjustment program is not clear. If per capita income does start to rise and if the naira stabilizes, Niger is well-placed to capture enough of a market share in agro-pastoral markets to fuel an export boom. Nigeria's history of abrupt, even irrational, changes in economic policy is well-known and heightens the uncertainty about market prospects. Nevertheless, the essential point remains: a one percent increase in per capita income in a nation of one hundred and six million is a lot of purchasing power.

Fourth, farmers are beginning to adopt natural resource management techniques, aimed at stabilizing the resource base and leading to sustainable agriculture. Natural resources management (NRM) has been defined by the GON/USAID Design Committee as follows: the quantitative and qualitative improvement or maintenance of the natural resource base for the purpose of assuring its perpetuity and increasing sustainable production from that base. In this context, natural resources are defined as the physical and biological systems associated with agricultural lands, forests and forest products, wildlife and their habitat, surface and subsurface water, and rangelands. Accordingly, natural resources management can be practiced by individual farmers through such activities as soil conservation and composting, or by groups of individuals or communities banding together to manage large tracts of forest or pasture. Whatever the specifics, the central concept is the same: conservation for increased production.

Natural resources management has become a cornerstone to both USAID and GON agricultural sector development strategies. More importantly, NRM has been taken up by a growing percentage of Niger's rural population. Inventories of NRM activities in Niger reveal that the number of farmers taking part in successful land improvement approaches has grown dramatically. North of Maradi, for example, where SIM and CARE projects have encouraged hundreds

of farmers to adopt agroforestry practices through the natural regeneration of trees in their fields, a spontaneous replication of these activities is reported to extend beyond the project area. The ASDG II design team saw large numbers of young Acacia Albida (gao) trees on fields along the road from Maradi to Zinder. The gao tree is widely respected and appreciated for its ability to both enhance crop production and provide a rich source of animal fodder. Nevertheless it has recently suffered a decline in population in the Sahel as older trees die off and new sprouts succumb to increasing pressure on the land (overcultivation, overgrazing, expanding human settlements, etc.). The fact that young trees are now being observed shows that individuals and communities are making a conscientious and determined effort to regenerate and conserve this valuable resource. With the support of CARE, farmers in the Maggia Valley continue to expand the area covered by windbreaks which have not only dramatically reduced soil loss due to wind and increased millet yields, but also have provided a new source of dry-season revenue from the sale of firewood and poles from tree pruning operations. On forested land, village-level natural forest management, pioneered on 5,000 hectares with the USAID funded pilot project at Guesselbodi, has now grown to the extent that 200,000 hectares are being brought under Guesselbodi-style management. Even in the pastoral zone, nomadic herders are now asking for assistance to regenerate and manage the forests and pastures that have been so hard hit by drought and overuse in the past.

Clearly, natural resources management has gone beyond the realm of a few isolated pilot projects. The combination of events may now be important enough to constitute a "trend." The question for USAID is therefore one of how it can make the most efficient use of very scarce public resources to support and broaden this trend. It is worth noting that the consensus on how best to do this is still forming, but that there is already a consensus that it will require radical departures from past public sector strategies. The natural resources component of ASDG II will directly contribute to identifying ways to increase the efficiency and to broaden the impact of public investment.

Finally, local associations are beginning to play a role as agents of change in the rural economy, after years of repression. The movement is just beginning, but shows promise. Nigerien NGOs, and Nigerien-staffed affiliates of international NGOs, are starting to become involved in grassroots development. Other forms of voluntary associations, such as cooperatives and private credit unions, also show signs of viability as private organizations, thanks to policy reform (under ASDG I and other programs). If the trend continues, these forms of nongovernmental organizations, in NGO form or cooperative mode, can make a significant difference in rural productivity and quality of life.

4. Niger's Rural Development Strategy

Agriculture, broadly conceived, is the basis of Niger's development strategy. Niger's Five Year Economic and Social Development Plan 1987-1991 acknowledges the demise of the uranium-financed industrialization strategy of the 1970s. The fiscal compression of the early 1980s also forced the Government of Niger to reassess the

extensive role of the state in national economic activity. The strategy in place since 1987 states that agriculture must be the engine of growth of the Nigerien economy and that the role of the state will be to establish a legal and administrative framework which will foster growth and development in the private sector.

Forty percent of the investment budget is allocated to rural development. Supporting investments in health, education and roads take the rural total over fifty percent. The emphasis in rural development projects has shifted from regional productivity projects (a type of rural integrated development project) to small-scale, locally designed rural operations (called micro-realizations in GON documents). This shift parallels new thinking within the GON on decentralization and the deconcentration of public administration. GON thinking has not yet produced the clear policy statements donors need to incorporate decentralization into their program designs. Incremental steps have been made in a few instances. For example, in January 1990 the Minister of Plan announced decentralization of approval authority for wholly-NGO financed micro-realisation projects. The substance of the government's decentralization intentions is gradually becoming clearer, but is still far from completely known.

Niger's willingness to liberalize its economic system is clear from the progress it has made under its structural adjustment program. The adjustment program for 1988/89 included divestiture or privatization of eleven companies, reduction in the number of products subject to preset profit margins from thirty-nine to twenty, abolishment of indicative prices for groundnuts and cowpeas, setting of producer prices for cotton and paddy rice according to world price trends and replacement of a system of compulsory domestic purchases by rice importers by a protective tariff system for rice.

C. USAID Policies and Programs

The second generation of policy reform programming under the Agriculture Sector Development Grant builds on the medium-term strategy of policy support and other actions necessary for structural adjustment. Such adjustment has been viewed as a condition for the longer-term strategy of increasing food production, leading to food self-reliance and increased rural incomes. As policy reforms have progressed USAID has adjusted its approach in accordance with the amplified agricultural strategy contained in the FY 1986 CDSS which calls for increased food production and diversification through community-based self-managed development. Such enhanced local level participation is embodied in the ASDG II approach. An equally important thrust deals with an underlying need to address Niger's serious environmental problems. This accords with the Africa Bureau's sector strategy guidance provided in the "Plan for Supporting Natural Resources Management in Sub-Saharan Africa" where Niger was ranked a Group I country having acute natural resources management needs.

Concerns addressed in the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) Action Plan are shared by Niger and are guiding ASDG II including the need to improve the efficiency of key public services, to provide a healthy environment for private sector-led growth, and to ensure

the conservation of the natural resources on which productivity depends. The articulation of policy interventions that will enhance the capacity of rural service organizations and which will improve natural resources management requires a number of incremental steps and a dynamic process of review and refinement. This is due to the early development stage of most local-level private service providers and to the complexity of relevant issues, e.g., land tenure, which are treated in ASDG II.

USAID and Peace Corps/Niger have collaborated on a range of programs in the agriculture and natural resource sectors/ There is currently active collaboration in a variety of areas including the African Farming Systems Initiative (AFSI), the national seed program (funded initially by the Agricultural Production Support project and now ASDG I local currency funds), natural forest management projects (funded initially by Forestry and Land Use Planning project and now through ASDG I), a biodiversity program in and around the national park, Parc W (funded by the AFR/TR NRMS project), and the Small Project Assistance project (SPA). USAID and Peace Corps will explore possibilities for future collaboration within the framework of ASDG II.

D. Previous Experience: ASDG I

The original ASDG I program included policy reforms in the areas of reduction of agricultural input subsidies, privatization of input supply with an emphasis on cooperative enterprise development, liberalization of cereals marketing and cross-border trade and the restructuring of Niger's agricultural credit system. Additional reforms in the areas of improved seed production, rural financial market development (credit unions) and natural resources management were added to ASDG I through PAAD amendments. The selection of the reform areas was based on a comprehensive agricultural sector assessment conducted to identify the key constraints to Niger's agricultural economy. The underlying theme of ASDG I has been improved productive resource allocation through reduced GON involvement in the agricultural economy. The ASDG I final evaluation (1989) indicated that the reforms included in the original program were well chosen, and that the Government of Niger's commitment to supporting the reforms was exemplary. A description of the most notable policy achievements under ASDG I follows.

Agricultural inputs: Subsidies on agricultural inputs reduced to the level agreed to under the Grant Agreement; input marketing monopoly held by GON parastatal (CA) removed and CA transferred to cooperative ownership; cooperative charter revised to allow increased financial and management autonomy and to reduce overall governmental control of cooperatives.

Cereals marketing: Monopoly of grain trade by grain marketing parastatal (OPVN) cancelled, its price stabilization mandate eliminated and its role reduced to managing emergency food reserves and foreign food aid; OPVN purchases for food reserve stock made using a tender and bid process; uniform national pricing for cereals abolished.

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Cross-border trade: Cross-border trade with Nigeria liberalized by rescinding export quotas on livestock, removing state monopoly on cowpea exports.

Rural financial markets: In-depth analysis of Niger's rural financial markets conducted emphasizing the dynamics of informal financial intermediation; following study recommendations, bankrupt and inefficient central agricultural credit facility closed and credit union development promoted as an alternative mechanism to improve financial intermediation in rural areas.

Seed production: GON policies for improved seed production reformulated; cost-cutting measures taken at GON seed production centers; pilot attempts introduced to privatize M1 and M2 generation production; increased emphasis placed on seed quality control; guidelines for seed certification developed.

Natural resource management: GON to extend usufruct rights to communities involved in forest and pasture management sites as well as to provide fiscal incentives for the rational exploitation of these sites.

The implementation history of ASDG I provides several important "lessons learned" which USAID/Niger will incorporate into the design and implementation of ASDG II. First, to assure sustainability of reforms, it is imperative that counterparts in policy-making capacities understand the potential benefits of proposed reforms, and that the majority of key GON staff at all levels eventually understand the logic behind the reforms and their importance to the economy of Niger. Efforts to educate GON decision makers will result in a stronger lobby within GON ranks in support of reforms undertaken. Second, the program must contain a mechanism for accurately measuring policy reform impact so that all decision makers can be better informed of results and trends of the overall program. Preliminary efforts at reform impact assessment were undertaken as part of ASDG I. Under ASDG II, more resources and intensive efforts will be devoted to this important area of concern.

A third major lesson is the need to back up certain reforms with project assistance. The most evident examples of this within USAID/Niger's agricultural portfolio are the Rural Organizations Development (ROD) Project and the Credit Union Development Project (under ASDG I). The ROD project is providing training in business skills and financial management to cooperatives throughout Niger, which will help them to increase their role in privatized input and product marketing. The pilot credit union activity is a direct result of recommendations from a comprehensive analysis of Niger's rural financial markets. USAID plans to continue the credit union activity as a discrete project starting in FY 1992 (1992-97).

ASDG I has demonstrated that policy reform is an evolutionary process. An example is the conditionality for reforming rural financial markets, which progressed from study to reform and pilot testing of an alternative institutional approach to credit. Similarly, an analysis of Niger's livestock marketing sector undertaken by ASDG delineated a set of actions needed to liberalize livestock export trade, which later became reform measures. During

ASDG implementation it was determined that the statutes governing the cooperative movement were inadequate. USAID-GON negotiation on this issue led to the GON's agreement to revise the cooperative law as a sub-conditionality.

A recent audit of the ASDG program by the Regional Inspector General (RIG/Dakar) found that the GON had met conditionality under the grant. However, the GON's management of its local currency resources (Counterpart Fund) was judged deficient. USAID has taken the audit findings into careful consideration in design of ASDG II.

E. Other Donor Assistance

The importance of donor activity in the Government of Niger's development program is evident from the fact that 94.25% of the funding available for investment activities in 1989 came from external sources. Even a larger percentage of investment funds in the rural development sector is derived from donor sources, 96.5%. Over the period 1990-1992 approximately 40% of the total investment budget, roughly \$320 million, will be devoted to "rural development" (including agriculture, livestock, forestry and micro-realizations).

These figures demonstrate that donor involvement in Niger's agriculture sector is substantial. In the subject matter defined as "natural resources," project funding is estimated to be \$50 million per year. This results in an enormous number of individual projects, each with its own design documents, approval procedures, funding sources, technical assistance, accounting systems, lifespan, equipment specifications, individually-negotiated counterpart and support systems, extension approaches and messages, implicit development strategies (if any) and specific objectives. A review of the computerized data base of proposed projects at the Ministry of Agriculture revealed, for one subsector in one arrondissement, a list of over 100 actual or planned projects.

Faced with this profusion of projects, most individual donors have very little information about what other donors are doing or planning to do. In the course of designing ASDG II substantial time and effort have been directed toward learning what donors are doing, what assumptions they operate on and what problems and promising solutions they have encountered. These contacts lead to the conclusion that the effort to improve natural resources management in Niger is entering a new and decisive phase. It is equally arguable that the current state of uncoordinated external inputs built on project timeframes and objectives does not constitute a strategy and impedes pursuing, to say nothing of meeting, strategic goals. (See Shaikh, Annex G.1.)

Several recent compilations have been prepared by USAID of NRM activities financed by various donors (Vezina, 1988; Millington, 1989). A synopsis of major projects is presented in Annex G. In addition, a comprehensive list of NRM programs is in the process of being prepared under the auspices of the CILSS/Club du Sahel in Niger and other countries as part of the post-Segou process. On the policy and strategy fronts, a series of initiatives are also either underway or under discussion. These include work on the Rural Code, creation of a Working Group to prepare the Integrated

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Program for Management of Natural Resources (PIGRN), finalization of the National Anti-Desertification Plan (PNLCD), preparation of a Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) for Niger, preparation of a National Conservation Strategy (NCS), etc. An important element of the NRM component of ASDG II will be to work with the GON and other donors in harmonizing and coordinating these various initiatives while at the same time working to strengthen donor coordination in the area of natural resources management.

Donor activity in institutional reforms is far less widespread than it is in the agriculture and natural resource sector. Although many UNDP projects have institutional support components, the Canadians with the PAI (Institutional Support Project) under the auspices of CIDA are the only donor that has a systematic program of institutional support. The PAI comprises three elements: diagnostic studies, development of management systems, and training. Following assessments of several GON organizations, PAI has concentrated its institutional development efforts on three institutions: the Direction of Projects and Programming (DPP) of the Ministry of Plan, the Direction of Studies and Programming (DEP) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and the Bureau of Organization and Methods (BOM) attached to the Prime Minister's Office. At the Ministry of Plan actions are related to improving programming methods, project design and budgetary programming.

Support to the DEP of MAL focuses on training of personnel in the areas of project management, policy design and programming management techniques. Other areas concern support to sectorial studies, structural support and documentation (a center named CIDR: Centre for Information and Documentation on Rural Development, has been created). Support to the BOM is limited to technical assistance necessary to set up interventions that can improve administrative management. The PAI conducts training activities under the PFPCG (Program for Training and Refresher Courses in Management) in the areas of administrative management, secretarial skills, computer science, time management, management and organizational techniques, communication, work organization, etc.

CIDA is currently undertaking a review of its development program which will influence the direction of its activities for the coming five years. Reductions in the Canadian foreign aid budget and disappointing results from efforts addressing institutional reform suggest some re-orientation of CIDA's program. PAI activities in DEP are anticipated to end in October 1991. Support to the BOM is also being withdrawn.

UNDP has one project underway in Niger dealing with non-governmental organizations, a second project in the negotiating stage and a third in the proposal stage. The first is a regional project based in Lome which has as its principal goal the improvement of the working relationship between the GON and locally operating NGOs. Specific objectives include defining strategies for GON-NGO cooperation, developing communication between the two parties and financing workshops addressing NGO issues. To date, little has resulted from the project other than the financing of a four-day seminar bringing together GON and NGO representatives which explored ways to clarify and reinforce of role of NGOs in

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Niger's development. The GON and UNDP are negotiating a second project intended to strengthen the capacity of various types of organization, including NGOs, in community development. This project, which will be implemented largely through UN volunteers, has the aim of stimulating the development of local, grass-roots organization and the promotion of income-generating activities. The final project is proposed by the Experiment in International Living as a five-year effort to assist both the GON and non-governmental groups to create, train and strengthen indigenous Nigerien NGOs. This concept has not progressed beyond the proposal stage and its realization as a project is doubtful before 1992, if at all.

The World Bank has been conducting a pilot extension project in parts of Dosso and Tahoua Departments since 1988. The project, *Projet de Renforcement des Services d'Agriculture*, supports intensified training of agricultural extension agents and an increase in their numbers. Agents are receiving the training necessary to expand their ability to provide extension expertise in the subject areas of contre-saison production, soil and water conservation and livestock. The Bank is satisfied with the progress made under the pilot project and envisages its gradual expansion to eventually encompass a national extension program. An internal evaluation of the pilot effort is scheduled for the fall 1990 after which the timing and magnitude of an enlarged extension support program will be determined.

World Bank structural adjustment programs are described in section II.A.

III. Program Rationale

A. Major Problems

The major problem which ASDG II addresses is the absence of conditions which will allow individual rural citizens to manage and profit, in a sustainable fashion, from the resources they use. As described in earlier sections, Niger suffers from difficult climatic conditions and a degraded resource base, making the country one of the world's harshest agricultural production environments. The careful management of resources is a necessity in this situation. Insecurity of tenure, for ownership and use of resources, is a major impediment to individual investment in improvements in the land and in management techniques. In addition, access to technologies and material resources necessary for investments in better land management, such as improved cropping techniques, is limited. Government services at the rural level are too overextended to help more than a small minority of rural people (extension agents often are responsible for 30 villages), with little capacity for change because of inflexible government administration policies (e.g., refusal to allow agents to serve a smaller number of villages if technically more appropriate), poor planning and management of resources by the central administrations. Non-governmental organizations, including PVOs, have been restricted by the GON in the role they are allowed

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in rural development.^{1/} Until 1988, indigenous NGOs were absolutely banned. Cooperatives were until recently little more than an arm of the government, and not freely organized economic units. Through ASDG I policy conditionality and technical assistance by CLUSA, that is starting to change, but the process is slow.

Taking these problems into consideration, the ASDG II program emphasizes the legal and policy framework for NRM investment, and the capacity of rural service organizations, public and private, to facilitate increases in rural production and income. ASDG II's focus throughout design and implementation will be on individuals. The program will work to establish a set of strategies, policies and regulations which encourage individual investment in sustainable agriculture and rural development. The program will aim to strengthen institutions because they can improve rural standards of living through direct contact with rural people. The ASDG II program will achieve its objectives if stronger rural institutions contribute to growth and development in rural Niger.

1. Technical Constraints

Natural technical constraints to improved natural resources management include scarcity of water, poor soils, sparseness of vegetation and a harsh climate (particularly the level and variability of rainfall). Along with these qualitative constraints, the enormous variability and heterogeneity of the natural resources base also serve as constraints. Thus no single NRM technique is appropriate for the whole of the country; rather, recommended practices will be site-specific. In terms of the inherent physical limitations within which Nigerien production systems operate, these constraints are fairly obvious. Their role as impediments to increasing rural productivity above its current levels is less obvious. For example, several successful efforts in water harvesting have shown that even the limited rainfall which is available can be used with much greater efficiency. Examples within Niger include contour dikes in the Keita project and the Swissaid program in Ouri-Hamija, and demi-lunes in Ouri-Hamija and Guesselbodi; significant examples outside Niger include the World Vision project in Meneka (Mali) and the Oxfam programs in Yatenga Province of Burkina Faso. At the same time, failure to master water resource management has resulted in loss of productive lands as a result of water erosion. The past degradation of soils and vegetation is as important a constraint as are limitations in their productive potential.

^{1/} The nomenclature distinction between PVO and NGO is one made by A.I.D., but not generally understood by non-Americans. Throughout this document PVO is used to refer to U.S. non-governmental organizations which are registered with AID/W as eligible for direct AID grants, while NGO is used to refer to the universe of U.S., international and local groups with the same general developmental goals and organizational characteristics (which the GON often refers to as "ONG de developpement").

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Non-natural technical constraints center around problems of technology adoption exacerbated by geographic dispersion of the population over a large land area, poor communications and one of the lowest adult literacy rates in the world (about 10%). There is already a range of simple, low-cost and financially attractive technologies available through which agricultural productivity and income generation could be doubled if the technologies were widely adopted. Given the variability noted above, this necessarily implies the need for a menu of technology options, supported by a policy framework which systematically encourages adoption of those methods which can create localized opportunities for increased production and/or income generation.

2. Socio-economic Constraints

Socio-economic constraints to sustainable NRM include:

Ambiguous resource management rights and responsibilities, which are characterized by the progressive erosion of traditional authority and the gradual extension of administrative control without accompanying measures of governmental protection of resources, result in a situation in which resource tenure and use disputes abound and investment in natural resources declines.

Limited organizational capacity at the village level, particularly with respect to the skills needed for modern economic activity, makes mobilization of resources difficult. A paucity of rural credit, with diversion of what is thought to be a disproportionate supply of rural savings towards non-production activities, limits individual ability to undertake such investment.

The low value of agricultural and livestock output stands as an impediment to the application of numerous candidate technologies for improving productivity. There is evidence that access to urban and cross-border markets may provide income generation opportunities which could make land investments financially viable.

The lack of widespread adoption of improved techniques is the principal immediate obstacle to achieving greater impact. Inadequate and sometimes inappropriate extension capacity hampers technology diffusion and follow-on support. Forestry extension agents, through their para-military protection role, have often served as an obstacle to positive resource management. Both forestry and agriculture extension agents badly need more and better training in available techniques. Agricultural agents - who are frequently the only government representatives in a given area - are overburdened. Given their duties as surrogate administrators, local representatives, information sources and tour guides for outside visitors, they have been described by a number of observers as "not having the time for extension." Lacking job descriptions with prioritized tasks, with limited material means and sporadic funding, field agents have difficulty organizing their own time or workload. Lack of direction from central levels, and poor information flow at all levels, hamper efficiency.

Administrative authority is highly centralized and directive. While the implicit philosophy of previous decades (that the public sector would make development happen, with local populations as

beneficiaries rather than agents of change) has faded, the administrative and regulatory legacy of this world view has not. The issue is not just one of centralized vs. decentralized authority, but also one of defining the sources of public authority and its limits.

3. Policy Constraints

The multiplicity of sources of technical and financial assistance coming into rural areas does not now yield the productive impact desired because the assistance is not programmed in a coherent way. Coordination is poor in planning and implementation. This leads to duplication of effort and, more importantly, failure to learn from or capitalize on the lessons of other projects. The sum of individual project goals substitutes for a rural development strategy. "Project" resources dominate arrondissement and even department budgets. Goals of individual projects may be contradictory, while in other cases the problem is simply that they bear no coherent relationship to each other.

Lack of a coherent GON policy framework is an increasingly important constraint to progress. Public policy signals (pricing, taxation, tenure, etc.) now lack coherence. At the margin, both traditional and administrative authorities have so protected their right to "say no" that policy signals are often contradictory. The general recognition that changes in the policy environment are more urgent than technology issues means an increased emphasis (by many donors) on policy dialogue in such key issues as resource tenure, pricing policies and decentralization. It is much more important to coordinate policies than isolated technology projects.

4. Institutional Constraints

Rural development institutions are relatively poorly established in Niger for a variety of reasons. The country is very large, with a widely dispersed population. For political and equity reasons, the Nigerien government has long imposed a policy of equal treatment of all seven departments, meaning that areas with denser populations and more agricultural capacity may be relatively underserved in manpower. As noted previously, one of the lowest literacy rates in the world limits the capacity of the rural population to organize itself for change. The government does not now, and will not in the foreseeable future, have enough manpower and money to serve everyone adequately.

Government administrative regulations and procedures are antiquated, inflexible and confusing. Hiring, assignment and promotion practices are not directly related to the technical needs of the government services. Frequent movement of personnel, from one end of the country to another, limits the capacity of the individual agent to help rural clients in any one site. The technical ministries cannot perform personnel management in any coherent way, as they have no organized system for data collection or analysis on personnel recruitment, training or promotion, nor do they have an effective system for monitoring individual careers. To be able to argue convincingly for changes in personnel assignment policies, ministries need to know how many agents, with what skills and education are where, and to compare the personnel structure with the

particular needs of that area, and its potential for growth.

In a resource-poor situation, it is not surprising that the government administrations, especially at field level, have become dependent on project funding. Nor is it surprising that the central administration tends to accept any donor project proposed so as to have access to resources. Unfortunately, the result is lost opportunities and waste. The central government offices charged with donor coordination often do not even know all the projects that exist, and they certainly do not play a decision-making role in determining government priorities or directing investment.

The relationship between programs and budgets is little understood by most decision makers in the technical services, as no system exists for analyzing and displaying such relationships outside of the narrow boundaries of particular donor projects. This leads to a situation in which decision making is ad hoc and, again, dominated by donor whims. A major objective of ASDG II is to help the GON strengthen its ability to decide its own priorities and to shape programs which support those priorities in a coherent fashion. Technical assistance, studies and training will be offered to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, with the result to be a basic set of management systems which will allow decision making based on up to date, comprehensive information on available resources, both government and donor financed.

Until recently, the GON limited, if not actually forbade, the role of private organizations (NGOs, cooperatives, community associations of one sort or another) in rural development. Parastatals had a monopoly on trade of certain agricultural commodities (in principle, at least). Cooperatives, when allowed to trade, were required to buy and sell at predetermined governmentally set prices (which often eliminated any profit). Nigeriens were forbidden to form non-governmental organizations of the PVO model. Those foreign PVOs which established operations in Niger were required to vet every move through the Ministry of Plan in Niamey, and to work through local governments, never exclusively with communities.

The situation has changed, to the extent that top levels of government now agree that the administration cannot do everything, and that community development cannot be decided from Niamey. The problem is that correcting the situation will require major efforts. Better management of resources available to the government (both donor and internal) must start at the top, and requires a clear governmental strategy and plan for investments. Non-governmental organizations are still not sure of their rights. Government cadres are still distrustful of grassroots movements, at least partially because they have no experience in positive community development. Better mutual understanding will require education as well as regulatory change so that newly granted rights are not abused by either side.

B. Program Purpose

ASDG II contributes to USAID's long-term goal of increasing agricultural production and individual incomes in rural Niger. The purpose of the program is to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources they habitually use, and

to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner. ASDG II combines policy reform, local currency programming and project-type inputs aimed at 1) establishing the legal and policy framework for natural resource management and 2) strengthening institutions which work directly with rural producers. The underlying concept is that the following conditions must prevail for Niger to be able to capitalize on gains from agricultural policy reforms, already undertaken or planned, to lead to sustainable increases in production and income. Rural citizens must have control over the land and resources which they traditionally exploit. They must have access to technologies and resources from service providers (governmental and private) which promote sustainable production. And they must profit from their labors (in the form of better standard of living, higher income from marketing or related employment).

Key policy outputs from ASDG II will include:

- A national policy and action plan for natural resource management are in place and used in selection of investments by GON, in personnel training in related domains, and in review of regulations relating to NRM.
- An interministerial committee responsible for implementing the national policy and action plan is functioning, and improvements in procedures can be seen.
- More effective donor coordination, including regular meetings and periodically updated publications of donor activities in NRM, leading to less unintentional overlap between donor projects, coordinated activities, and eventually to verifiable gains in efficiency of the use of financial resources.
- Attention to biological diversity and environmental concerns is demonstrated through completion of a biodiversity assessment for Niger, completion of the National Conservation Strategy and its integration into the national NRM plan, and preparation of a technical handbook for environmental impact studies. Environmental factors are used by GON in policies and criteria for investment fund decisions.
- An increased number of NRM programs and land use plans exist for state and community lands, based on local participation and transfer of usufruct rights to local users and user groups. ASDG II anticipates increases in the following types of land and resource management systems:
 - Individual farming on deeded lands,
 - Community land use plans,
 - Water point attribution to and management by pastoralists,
 - Village level natural forest management,
 - Decentralized management of irrigated land,
 - Individual and communities adopting improved natural resource management practices.
- Secure and transparent ownership rights to natural resources on

private lands are assured through a set of regulations, procedures and legal precedents.

- Decision-making powers and implementation of NRM programs are transferred from the national to the local levels, where community involvement is mandated.

- System established and implemented which transfers responsibility and accountability to local populations for the management of forest resources (i.e., transfer of these responsibilities from foresters to local populations).

- MAL collects and analyzes information on personnel and material resources, and uses information as a tool for ministry management. By the end of the program this results in more efficient coordination and regional planning of development efforts by MAL and better regional distribution of human and material resources by MAL.

- MAL uses personnel career monitoring system, ministerial training and assignment policies to make decisions on personnel assignment and training consistent with rural development needs. By the end of the program, the trend to longer field assignment periods can be seen in arrondissements in which new personnel systems have been introduced. Over longer term (beyond life of grant), improvements will be seen in technical performance of field personnel (who will be assigned to positions for which they have requisite training).

- MAL uses program planning systems to improve planning and coordination of Grantee and donor resources, resulting in less duplication of efforts among donors and between GON and donor-funded activities.

- NGO rights and responsibilities are assured and clarified in revised regulations. NGOs are granted specific permission to operate in Niger in community development role. By the end of the program, increased level of activity (number, dollar value) by NGOs related to NRM is traceable.

- Independent cooperatives and credit unions continue to expand activities, under guaranteed autonomy from direct governmental interference.

Key development impacts will include:

- Sustainable increases in production and income. Better natural resource management practices established on land under user control are expected to result in sustainable increases in production and income for direct beneficiaries of NRM interventions.

- Community organization building. Many natural resource management practices are implemented on community property and involve development of collective organizations. Through these organizations, communities and individuals can take an active role in decision making, a necessary condition for rational exploitation of resources.

- Reduced seasonal migration. Many natural resource management

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practices create income generating activities in the non-farming seasons, reducing the need for the family breadwinner(s) to migrate during the dry season in search of gainful employment. This has an important impact on social stability in the families and communities of rural areas.

- Lessening of the workload for women. NRM interventions involving regeneration, conservation, and sustainable management of water and wood will reduce the time spent by women beneficiaries gathering wood and fetching water, two of the most time-consuming occupations for women in rural Niger.
- Increased attitude of self-confidence and self-reliance. One of the most important impacts at the level of the rural population is the increase in self-confidence that the ASDG II program is expected to engender. ASDG II policy reforms seek not only the transfer of rights and responsibilities for rural development to local populations, but also the reinforcement of local institutions active in the development process. As people become actively engaged in the management of natural resources under their control, they will realize that they are no longer helpless victims of nature and a distant government, but active participants in determining their own destiny and that of their children.
- Improvements in the biophysical condition of the land, indicating progress towards stabilization of the natural resource base. Given the extreme fragility of the Nigerien ecology, and uncontrollable factors such as drought and pestilence which so regularly intercede, care must be taken not to expect visible impacts too soon, or too dramatically. Previous analyses have indicated that visible changes in any one plot of land may take 5 years or more to appear, depending on a number of variables. Impacts are expected over time in soil quantity and moisture, vegetative cover, agro-silvicultural yields, plant and animal biodiversity.
- Decreased cost of replication for establishment of sustainable, productive natural resource management systems on rural lands. Notional savings to the GON on the order of \$160 million can be predicted over a five year period after ASDG II reforms are in place.
- Gains in the number of hectares which can be targets for NRM improvements. With gains in efficiency as a result of ASDG II, the GON could finance NRM interventions on a land mass 80% larger than that without ASDG II (over a five year period). Assuming a maintenance of favorable policy environment, replication of NRM investments through individual (spontaneous) efforts, and stable level of public/private investment resources, coverage of 60% of agricultural land can be hypothesized at the end of twenty years.
- Increased efficiency of governmental operations. This impact will start to be seen by program's end. Over time, impact should be: a higher rate of return to rural development investments due to more coherent investment programming; higher quality services provided to rural population by Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock field staff.
- Expanded operations of NGOs and rural associations. More local initiative in development projects supported by local NGOs, growth in scale and number of cooperatives and credit union business

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activity in Niger are anticipated changes.

Targets for changes in these indicators will be developed based on information available in year 1. See Section IV.F. for further description of planned outputs and anticipated impact.

C. Program Modality

USAID has chosen to pursue realization of the objectives of the program through a non-project assistance (NPA) programming mode. The selection of NPA over project assistance is based on the mission's experience in policy reform, which is that sectoral reform programs are best supported through the provision of resources in increments released on satisfaction of conditionality. Some project assistance is programmed to accompany the NPA, to allow provision of technical assistance, training and studies in support of the program. ASDG II thus combines sectoral assistance (dollar transfers) tied to policy reform, and a technical assistance, training and studies component focusing both on policy and institutional reform. Use of a combination of sectoral, non-project assistance and a "projectized" component has proven a successful approach to policy reform in Niger (ASDG I, Niger Health Sector Support, Niger Economic Policy Reform Program). USAID has found non-project assistance (NPA) particularly advantageous in dealing with problems which extend beyond a single ministry's mandate. Coordination of ASDG I, for example, involves some five ministries. While this makes the program more personnel intensive for GON and USAID management, it has paid off in reforms which required cooperation from many levels of government. It is an especially appropriate way to deal with natural resource management issues, which concern an array of institutions in Niger.

In USAID experience, policy reform programs also need carefully targeted project interventions to back up policy dialogue. Hence a project component to ASDG II. Additionally, ASDG II will be complemented by project activities in agricultural research (Niger Applied Agriculture Research and CRSPs), soils and watershed management research (TropSoils), cooperative development (Rural Organizations Development), credit union development (WOCCU activities under ASDG I and future discrete project), training (Sahel Human Resources Development and Human Resources Development Assistance), policy analysis (Agricultural Policy Analysis, Policy Reform and Poverty, and the planned Policy Analysis and Monitoring Project), as well as by the Niger Economic Policy Reform Program (NEPRP).

The uses of the local currency funds derived from the conditional resource transfers are designed to support the realization of programmatic objectives. ASDG II differs from the precursor program in the approach to local currency programming. Rather than having a jointly programmed local currency fund ("counterpart fund"), as in ASDG I, under the new program funds will be divided between a fund for non-governmental organizations and private sector, and budget support to the GON. At least 30% of the net resource transfer, converted in FCFA, will be managed by a U.S. private sector entity as a fund for non-governmental organizations and the Nigerien private sector (including independent cooperatives). The remaining funds will be contributed as budget support to the GON, a portion for attribution to operating budgets of agencies whose work is key

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to program success, and a portion for attribution to the GON investment budget, to support certain types of activities which contribute to realization of program objectives.

Providing grants for project activities by NGOs will contribute towards realization of the program's objectives to increase natural resource management efforts by individuals and to strengthen the ability of rural service organizations to assist individual farmers and herders. As described in later sections, NGOs are known for their predominant capacities in grassroots development, and for their particular interest and abilities in diffusing NRM. NGOs in Niger, particularly indigenous and quasi-local organizations (affiliates of international groups), do not have sufficient funds to undertake the level of activity needed to have optimal impact. Providing a separate fund exclusively for such organizations (including independent cooperatives) assures that NGOs will receive funding from first and subsequent tranches. Management of the fund by a qualified U.S. organization will allow coordination of technical assistance to small NGOs and the provision of local currency grants (funds in the project component will be programmed for T.A. to NGOs).

The NGO/private sector fund will essentially be managed as a project fund. That is, funds will be transferred directly from BCEAO to the interest-bearing account in a private bank controlled by the direct AID contractor. Financial management and accountability will follow standard project practices. Selection of this approach was based on a number of factors. First, and perhaps most importantly, smaller PVOs and non-American NGOs in Niger have expressed reluctance to apply for funds under the existing ASDG I counterpart fund which is jointly programmed by USAID and the GON, and managed through the GON Treasury. This reluctance results both from the dominance of the GON in fund management, with whom many NGOs have uneasy relationships, and historical problems in obtaining release of approved funds from Treasury. The contractor-managed fund will be more independent programmatically, and will not depend on Treasury.

The selection of the budget support approach to programming of the remaining local currencies was made after detailed review of the advantages and disadvantages of this programming mode. Originally, at PAIP stage, USAID had considered the possibility of applying a portion of the fund to budget support, while retaining a counterpart fund which could be used to program funds for investment purposes. Further review and reflection by USAID led to a decision to make all moneys made available to the GON itself direct budget support. The objective of the budget support is to provide the grantee with a level of funding which will assist it in carrying out the program's objectives.

In the initial tranche released, the entire portion controlled by the GON will be for attribution to the operating budgets of institutions which have a key role in achieving program objectives. Starting in the second or third tranche, a portion of the budget support will be attributed to investment accounts of the government. A time lapse for the latter is deemed necessary for the GON to define programming objectives for investment moneys (which is an element of conditionality under the grant).

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Use of a budget support approach to local currency programming is justified on several levels. As described in later sections, the combination of funding shortages and donor control over the majority of funds released to government agencies (funds being all tied to particular projects) results in a situation in which government agencies have little opportunity to develop management capacity or program planning. Basically, whatever activity receives specific donor project funding is what government services do. The budget support approach will allow the GON to program the funds in the way it prefers. The requirement will be that funds must be used to support the grant's objectives, and that a summary report illustrating how the funds were used must be received and accepted by USAID prior to the release of any subsequent tranche for this purpose. If the conditions are not met, the next tranche funds may be allocated to other uses (NGO fund or investment fund, if all conditions are met for those funds).

At the same time, a major element of ASDG II design is the effort to improve GON conceptualization, programming and coordination of available resources, both government and donor provided, in order to increase efficiency and reduce waste in investment programming. Achieving this objective will involve, in the first instance, policy dialogue, studies, some technical assistance and training. Once the GON has systems in place which prioritize investments, provide clear statements of policy (for example, in favor of interventions which use innovative tenure arrangements and maximize community role in management), then releasing funds for the government to program itself makes eminent sense.

The mission had originally started with the hypothesis that, in early years of the grant, joint programming of local currency funds for investment purposes would be appropriate. When the government eventually set up appropriate programming systems, this fund could be phased out in favor of direct budget support. The mission has since concluded that use of a counterpart fund, at this point, is not advisable. First, management problems with the ASDG I counterpart fund have been severe. The management system would need to be redesigned and tested before any such ASDG II fund could be approved. Beyond that, and more important in decision making, is that the context in which ASDG II is designed differs from that existing in 1984. As detailed in the program description (Section IV), the problem today is not a dearth of projects or funding gaps in existing projects (which would argue for a counterpart fund so that existing projects could be maintained and new projects could be designed and funded to fill in gaps). Rather, the underlying problem identified in project analyses, particularly in NRM, is the lack of consistency and coordination of project efforts. Therefore, USAID has determined that it is more appropriate to concentrate efforts on improving GON capacity to conceptualize, coordinate and manage a coherent portfolio of activities as national programs, than to finance discrete outreach activities through a counterpart fund arrangement.

The contribution to the investment budget will be released after agreement by the two parties on priorities to be followed in GON programming of the funds. The objective is to contribute to the development of coordinated national efforts in support of sustainable rural production. Agreement on precise criteria for

release of the funds will be an element of conditionality for each tranche, with criteria to be detailed in PILs. Release of further funds will be contingent on receipt and approval by USAID of a summary report describing use of the funds, and how their use contributed to realization of program goals. Failure to satisfy this condition will cause funds to be reallocated for future increments, as described in the operational budget support case, above.

IV. Description of the Program

A. NRM Component

1. Background

ASDG II occurs at a time of increased appreciation of the linkages between sustainable resource management and sustainable economic development in the Sahel. This appreciation is now reflected by renewed emphasis on natural resources and the environment in the portfolios of all major bilateral and multilateral donors in Niger, as well as in Government of Niger budgetary allocations. More importantly, there is increased farmer and herder receptivity, throughout the region, to approaches which will protect and enhance the visibly deteriorating resource base. This broadened "NRM agenda" brings natural resource management to the forefront of the larger issues of production, income opportunity and economic survival.

A concrete example of this widespread appreciation for natural resource management was a landmark conference held in Segou, Mali, in May 1989. The CILSS/Club du Sahel Segou Roundtable meetings on natural resources management in the Sahel set a long-term agenda which is directly relevant to Niger and to the goals of ASDG II. The Segou meetings were notable for the fact that they brought together representatives of the three principal partners in Sahelian natural resources development - rural populations, national governments and the international community - giving each an equal place at the table. The eight points of the Segou Declaration were:

- invest in the land
- promote the involvement of local communities
- increase efficiency through decentralization
- increase the security of land tenure
- increase local investment through local credit and mobilization of local savings
- enhance the participation of women
- promote the sharing of successful experiences
- master the population/resource equilibrium

As noted in a report on the Segou Roundtable:

The Segou Roundtable was a turning point in the crystallization of a "third generation" of resource management strategies in the region. It marks a shift in emphasis from technology issues; from isolated projects to generalized incentives systems; from specific "solutions" promoted by the public sector to a menu of options which capitalize on locally-available opportunities.

In short, the starting point for Segou was the premise that the locus of power and initiative must shift in order for resource management to be sustainable beyond the limited confines of externally-funded projects. (Shaikh, E/DI, 1989)

In terms of ASDG II, the results of Segou imply that the highest payoff role for public sector efforts is to build the conditions necessary for successful private initiative. Reviews of successful NRM efforts in the Sahel suggest that appropriate policies and generalized incentives systems may be the most urgent of these conditions. Of these, resource tenure, greater local autonomy and resource management rights, locally-available income generation opportunities and access to credit, markets and information stand out as being the most important. ASDG II will work directly on resource tenure and on the issues of local autonomy and resource management rights. Other elements of the USAID program including ASDG I, ROD and NEPRP have been working and will continue to work on income-generation opportunities and access to credit, markets and information.

The post-Segou process will also be integrated into plans for ASDG II. Under the auspices of the Club du Sahel and CILSS, the post-Segou process will attempt to establish a coordinated donor approach to natural resources projects in the Sahel, and to sustain and build the "trilogue" between donors, host governments and rural populations. For the donors, this means greater self-discipline and accountability in assuring that their natural resource portfolios are consistent with the Segou Orientations; for programs such as ASDG II, participation in the post-Segou effort will provide greater visibility, increased leverage, regional communication opportunities (between governments, between donors and between rural organizations and NGOs) and a structured regional framework within which to promote realistic NRM policy changes at the national level.

2. Strategy

Given the principal constraints to promotion of sustainable NRM practices (described in III.A.1.), ASDG II has adopted a strategy composed of five major elements, aimed at easing these constraints and creating a favorable environment for the widespread adoption of better NRM practices. These five elements are summarized as follows:

- Beginning an open national dialogue on natural resources management leading to the development of a coherent national policy and action plan for the management of natural resources.
- Providing substantially increased security of resource tenure.
- Reducing administrative strangleholds through the decentralization and progressive transfer to local institutions of NRM rights and responsibilities for planning and implementation of NRM projects.
- Improving extension capacity of the government forest service.
- Building long-term local capacity in NRM through the strengthening of rural organizations and NGOs.

Specific objectives have been established under each element and an implementation plan developed for attaining these objectives. Discussion of support to rural organizations/NGOs is included in Section IV.B., following.

3. Implementation

The implementation plan makes use of two sets of tools. One set of tools includes technical assistance, training, and studies that focus on policy reform and institutional development needed to accomplish the objectives. The second set of tools is sectoral assistance (dollar transfers) tied to and conditioned by the desired policy reform. The local currency derived from the dollar transfers will be used to support a variety of NRM programs, directly (in the case of NGOs) and indirectly (through support to GON budgets).

The following section consists of a discussion of objectives under each element, the interventions proposed to achieve objectives, and a calendar of proposed activities. Conditionality for release of funds and program impact are discussed in later sections of the PAAD. As noted previously, an important element of "rolling design" has been built into the PAAD so that the details of the program during its later years can be adjusted to fit the evolution of this and other major assistance programs as well as the pace of several key processes (elaboration and finalization of the Rural Code, implementation of the decentralization policy, etc.).

a. National NRM Strategy and Action Plan

As noted earlier, the lack of a coherent rural development strategy and subsequent duplication of efforts (or in some cases even contradictory policies and programs) is a major constraint to better NRM in Niger. Part of the reason for this situation is that the government and people of Niger do not "own" their own development program. With 95% of the investment budget in the agriculture, livestock and natural resources sectors coming from a multitude of external sources, it is easy to see why a unified strategy has been elusive. Donor funding is uncoordinated and represents a potpourri of changing agendas and strategies. The Niger government alone is unlikely to have the institutional resources or leverage to impose discipline on the process without a concerted effort on the part of the donors to ensure more effective coordination.

Furthermore, even if donor-driven programs were totally complementary and productive, the lack of national ownership of the development agenda would continue to limit success. As a case in point, much of the investigation and analysis of Niger's constraints and opportunities in NRM has been performed by outside experts and consultants. While their objectivity and expertise have been very useful, national policy makers have too often been left out of the analytical process. National policy makers need to be involved not just in approving development plans as presented by donors, but more importantly, they must take the lead in conducting the studies, making observations, and coming to the conclusions that will lead to a coherent development strategy.

Finally, in order for a national NRM strategy to be truly complete, it must fully integrate development and conservation concerns. All

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too often, production-oriented development strategists have pursued agendas that have run at cross-purposes to those that advocate a conservation-oriented approach. In The Greening of Africa, Paul Harrison makes the case for a more holistic approach:

A new style of thinking is needed. Production and conservation should no longer be separated. Specialists in crops, livestock and forestry production should 'think conservation' and look for ways of increasing production that also improve conservation. At the same time conservation experts should 'think production,' and concentrate on methods that improve output of food, fodder or fuel and conserve water for the least cost in cash, land or labour. (Harrison, 1987, p. 329)

(1) Objectives

In light of these concerns, the ASDG II program will pursue three major objectives as part of this strategy element:

1. Develop a comprehensive national policy, strategy, and plan of action for natural resources management.
2. Improve coordination and reduce duplication of NRM programs.
3. Integrate concerns for protection of biological diversity and environmental conservation with overall development planning.

(2) Interventions

ASDG II will support a variety of activities to accomplish these objectives. First and foremost is support for the development of a comprehensive NRM strategy and action plan. There are a number of activities, either underway or proposed, that can serve as mechanisms leading to the desired objective. Some of these activities include PIGRN (Integrated Program for NRM), PNLCD (National Plan for Combatting Desertification), TFAP (Tropical Forestry Action Plan) and the NCS (National Conservation Strategy). ASDG II will support and mandate harmonization of these activities so that the planning process results in a coherent national strategy. Particular attention will be devoted to NRM policy issues. A crucial element of this process will be that it is a participative planning activity, taking into consideration the input of the widest possibility of viewpoints, not only from all relevant public sectors, but also from NGOs, cooperatives, the private sector, and especially from women. Specific attention to gender issues is to be paid in each element of this process.

The problem of duplication and lack of coordination of NRM programs will be addressed in ASDG II at government and donor levels. In addition to the GON mechanisms described above, a donor committee on NRM will be proposed by USAID and supported by ASDG II through the project component. This committee, based on groundwork carried out by the Club du Sahel, will bring major donors together within Niger. The emphasis of the committee will be on the exchange of information, donors sharing with one another their current activities and future plans in the field of NRM. One of the main

products of this process will be a regularly updated publication of who is doing what in NRM in Niger.

Integrating conservation and biological diversity concerns into the national development plan will be promoted by enlisting the active support of the Direction of Wildlife and Fisheries of the Ministry of Hydrology and Environment (DFPP) as well as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) which have a joint office in Niamey. ASDG II project funds will be available to support the preparation of a National Conservation Strategy, including a preliminary biological diversity assessment in Niger. ASDG II project funds will also be available for the preparation of a technical handbook for environmental impact studies. Negotiations are underway with the GON to assure that these activities are fully integrated with those of the PIGRN committee and the Rural Code.

(3) Calendar of Key Activities (Key agents cited)

Year 1

- Harmonize the various programs concerned with natural resources planning: PIGRN/PNLCD/TFAP/NCS/Rural Code/Forestry & Water Code revisions/National Wildlife Action Plan/Land Use Action Plan. (coordination by Plan, PIGRN)
- Set up a donor coordination mechanism. (MAL, USAID)
- Complete a national biodiversity assessment. (PVO)
- Prepare the terms of reference for the national conservation strategy. (PVO)

Year 2

- Finalize proposed National NRM Strategy (NNRMS), integrating with it the National Conservation Strategy. (Plan, PIGRN)
- Review the draft NNRMS. (GON, USAID)

Year 3

- Adopt the NNRMS. GON/donor agreements on program funding. (GON, donor committee)
- Elaborate terms of reference for the preparation of a technical handbook for environmental impact studies. (NRMS II project buy-in)

Year 4

- Implement NNRMS.

Year 5

- Continue implementation of the NNRMS.
- Adopt the technical handbook on environmental impact studies.

b. Resource Tenure

As noted in a recent review by the Land Tenure Center, "The literature on land tenure in developing countries is replete with references to the relationship between land tenure and investment in

the land. The simplest relationship, most often noted, is that insecure tenure discourages investment because the farmer cannot be confident of the opportunity to reap the returns from investment." (Bruce & Fortmann, 1989)

Niger is a case in point as insecurity of tenure is widely viewed as a major block to voluntary efforts in natural resource management. Government has asserted stewardship rights over basic natural resources since the colonial era, under the legal concept of public and common use property rights. Authorities enforce these rights vigorously and often arbitrarily. For example, forest agents fine farmers for pruning trees without permission on land which is traditionally under the farmer's control. They also fine farmers if others prune those same trees. At the same time, the government sells woodcutting rights to individuals who can cut trees on sites the government defines as common land, without reference to traditional rights. The result is that most rural communities and the individuals within them have little incentive to invest in the land.

The Government of Niger recognizes that the hodge-podge of modern and customary tenure and use rights now in force is ineffective (as evidenced in the large number of land disputes requiring adjudication annually). The GON has already made some positive steps in ameliorating the situation. For instance, through USAID-supported efforts it has granted exceptions to legal restrictions on usufruct in a small number of managed national forests. It has started the process of revision through development of a comprehensive Rural Code, which is to treat issues of rights over land, water and associated natural resources. See Shaikh, Annex G, for a description of the Rural Code process.

It should be noted that the "Code" will not necessarily conform to what would be considered a legal code in the American judicial system. The term Rural Code is used to represent a concept, which is the objective to formulate a coherent system of laws, regulations, legal interpretations, judicial and administrative procedures which may, or may not, eventually be codified in a strict legal sense.

(1) Objectives

In terms of natural resource management, the desired outcome of the Rural Code process is that risks are reduced and incentives increased for communities and individuals to invest in natural resource management. ASDG II will support the Rural Code process to achieve two major objectives:

1. On public and community lands: to assure greater security of return on investments in the natural resource base by clarifying management and use rights on these lands and by progressively turning over these rights to local populations.
2. On private lands: to guarantee secure ownership rights of all natural resources on private lands.

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(2) Interventions

In support of the Rural Code process, ASDG II will sponsor studies related to land and resource tenure issues, making use of both local experts and outside consultancies from the Land Tenure Center. Specific attention to gender issues will be a must, and will be a requirement in any activity directly financed by ASDG II. Dialogue and public debate on tenure and usufruct issues, as well as publicity campaigns to disseminate information to the rural populace are called for under the grant. Use of operational budget support for this purpose will be proposed (the Rural Code secretariat being a subdivision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and hence eligible for budget attributions from operational budget support), and some project component funds will be available for this purpose. Furthermore, projects which take advantage of secure tenure rights to put common property under local management will be given priority when selecting proposals under the NGO/private sector fund and when defining criteria for support of the investment budget.

(3) Calendar of Key Activities

Year 1

- Complete studies and other work related to the preparation and adoption of a Rural Code. (MAL/Rural Code Committee, LTC, etc.)

Year 2

- Design and implement national publicity campaign on the principles and procedures for applying the new Code. (MAL/RCC, TA)

Years 3 - 5

- Grant newly secured tenure and usufruct rights to individuals and communities for the purpose of better management of the natural resource base. (GON through Rural Code)

c. Decentralization of Natural Resources Management

This strategy element is closely linked and complementary to the preceding one. Secure tenure rights provide a major incentive to local initiatives in NRM. Decentralization transfers the authority and responsibility in natural resource management to local institutions representing the rural populace.

One of the eight points of the Segou declaration addressed the issue of decentralization as follows: "Governments will encourage local communities to shoulder greater responsibility if those communities show that they can genuinely take their development in hand. But for this to happen, government departments will have to make local communities more aware of the issues involved, and will have to place these communities in charge of certain activities that are currently the responsibility of the public sector." (Shaikh, 1989, p. 14).

(1) Objectives

ASDG II will support the progressive decentralization of rights and responsibilities in natural resource management, including program planning and execution, by targeting three major objectives.

1. The effective and progressive transfer of rights and responsibilities for natural resources management to local populations.
2. The transfer of decision-making and executive powers for development programs to local institutions.
3. The institution of demand-driven programming for NRM projects.

(2) Interventions

The GON is already pursuing a policy of decentralization. ASDG II will support this process, especially in regards to NRM, primarily by sponsoring NRM training for traditional and administrative authorities at the territorial level. This will assure that, in the words of the Segou Declaration, local institutions will be able to "show that they can take their development in hand." Workshops and seminars will be targeted at public authorities at the territorial level (Prefets, Sous-Prefets, judges, etc.) as well as persons in traditional leadership roles. Technical services at the local level will also be given training in NRM project identification with special attention to "animation" (sensitization) methodology. Since women are often excluded from decision making at all levels, training must also include sensitization of traditional authorities and government officials as to the importance of including women in decisions on NRM, and training in culturally acceptable methods for involving women.

(3) Calendar of Key Activities

Year 1

- Design NRM workshop for local leaders. (TA)
- Establish terms of reference for a joint GON/USAID study on administrative reform necessary to ensure effective decentralization. (TA)

Year 2

- Conduct NRM workshops. (TA component)
- Conduct joint study, adopt recommendations. (TA component)
- Pursue application of decentralization policy.

Years 3 - 5

- Support demand driven NRM programs. (through NGO fund, investment budget)

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d. Forester Roles in Natural Resources Management

It has already been noted that many examples of successful NRM practices and techniques are to be found in Niger and across the Sahel. Inadequate or outmoded extension systems in Sahelian countries, however, hamper widespread dissemination of these successful practices. In Niger, as in many other Sahelian countries, the agricultural extension services have come under criticism for a number of reasons. The GON with World Bank assistance is implementing a pilot program to reinforce agricultural extension services. Plans are underway to expand this program. For this reason, USAID has chosen not to intervene in agricultural extension directly. Forest service field staff do not come under the World Bank-funded program. ASDG II will intervene to reinforce the extension capacity of forest service field staff by targeting one major objective.

(1) Objective

To reinforce progressively the "change agent"/extension role of forest service field staff, thereby improving the effectiveness and assuring success of participative forestry programs.

(2) Interventions

To achieve this objective, the first step will be to undertake a USAID/GON joint study of the current situation (using project funding) with a view to recommending changes to improve forestry extension services. Part of the study will include visit to and analysis of forestry projects in the region that have employed innovative extension approaches. One of the outcomes of the study will be the setting up of a pilot project where forestry agents will adopt alternatives to their traditional role of forestry police. The results of this pilot program, in addition to recommendations from the joint study, will be used as the basis for progressive modification of forester roles on a larger scale.

A key element of this and other studies to be undertaken as part of ASDG II is the joint nature of the study process. In this case, government forest service personnel are sensitive and not infrequently defensive about their current roles. Any modification perceived as imposed from the outside will be met with resistance. Hence, the importance of involving forest service as well as other GON personnel in the study from the outset, such that the observations, analyses, conclusions and recommendations come, to the maximum extent possible, from within the ranks.

(3) Calendar of Key Activities

Year 1

- Joint USAID/GON study of forester roles and extension models. (MHE, TA)

Year 2

- Set up and implement a pilot project to test alternative roles

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of forestry agents in forest management. (MHE, TA)

Years 3 - 4

- Monitor and evaluate test, modifying as necessary.

Year 5

- Final evaluation of test and progressive application of positive results on a national level. (MHE, TA)

B. Institutional Component

1. Background

Achievement of objectives of increased agricultural production and enhanced individual productivity and income is severely constrained by the paucity of effective rural service deliverers in Niger. In order to fulfill the purpose of ASDG II, efforts must be made to remove policy and institutional obstacles to service delivery related to sustainable natural resource management. USAID has chosen to concentrate efforts on reform of certain administrative policies and improvement of coordination and decision making in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, enhancement of the role of NGOs in rural development, and continued monitoring of the status of cooperatives and rural credit unions. At PAIP stage, inclusion of interventions directed at local government administrations (arrondissements, towns, etc.) was considered as an option. Given the announcement of potential World Bank activities in this domain, ASDG II will limit itself to a study of the capacity of local governments to collect and utilize fees/taxes for developmental purposes to be conducted in year 1. In the event that the study identifies problems which USAID and the GON agree should be addressed in the program, consideration will be given to amending the PAAD accordingly at a later time.

2. Strategy

ASDG II will use a combination of policy reform and institutional strengthening (through the project component) to address constraints to service delivery which are judged to be directly related to the program's objectives. The approach will vary depending on institution, as follows.

For the key rural development ministry, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (which is expected to be restructured as a rural development ministry including environmental services within the next year), the strategy to be followed by ASDG II is to concentrate in early years of the program on improving capacity in strategy development, and in planning and coordinating of resources, both donor and national. The reality is that, for the foreseeable future, the GON is heavily dependent on donor-provided resources for rural development. If the current budgetary crisis is an indication of future trends, this dependence will only become greater. Hence better coordination of resources at the central level is absolutely essential. ASDG II will apply a combination of conditions precedent

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to disbursement, technical assistance, studies and training in support of this strategy.

The effort to improve government coordination and management of the resources put at its disposal will be carried out under the NRM and institutional components of the program. Under the NRM component, GON-donor fora and information exchanges are planned, to put into place the national NRM strategy and program called for in policy conditionality. Under the institutional component, targeted (largely short-term) technical assistance will be provided to the planning units of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, to improve the structure needed for the central administration to play its assigned decision-making and coordination role.

For dealing with issues related to NGO role in rural development, the strategy to be followed under ASDG II is to combine policy reform and dialogue with a series of interventions (financed under the NGO/private sector fund described in Section IV.D.1.) intended to enhance the mutual understanding of NGOs, government and communities. As an outside actor, USAID has to guard against intervening directly to protect what we perceive to be NGO interests. Rather, USAID will need to play a liaison or broker role, primarily, supporting efforts which the NGOs define as being in their best interests (e.g., changes in regulations), providing opportunities for exchanges of information and for collaboration between government and private organizations. Use of the NGO local currency fund will be key to success in this area, as financial constraints, in particular for nascent local NGOs, are important barriers to their operations at the present time.

Note that independent cooperatives and credit unions are elements continued from the first stage ASDG (which overlaps with this program), and each benefits from direct project assistance (ROD, ASDG I and future discrete credit union project). Hence ASDG II's attention to these two important forms of rural association will, at least in early years, focus on monitoring implementation of past policy reforms. In the case that such monitoring leads to a decision that further policy reforms are needed, the PAAD and grant will be so amended.

3. Implementation

The following section consists of a discussion of objectives under each element, the interventions proposed to achieve objectives, and a calendar of proposed activities. Conditionality for release of funds and program impact are discussed in later sections of the PAAD. As noted previously, an important element of "rolling design" has been built into the PAAD so that the details of the program during its later years can be adjusted to fit the evolution of this and other major assistance programs as well as the pace of several key processes.

a. Rural Development Agencies

It is clear to any disinterested observer that the operations of the rural development ministries (now two, soon expected to revert to one Ministry of Rural Development) at field level are deficient in terms of efficiency and quality of service provided. Two reports

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attached in Annex G give ample descriptions of the disarray of the rural services. It is much less clear what improvements can be made to the situation using a combination of policy reform and technical assistance, within a five year time period. In preparation for ASDG II, USAID commissioned a series of studies of the operations of government services in rural areas to seek an answer to this question (see bibliography). The consensus of these studies was that field-level services of the rural development ministries suffer from such deep-rooted problems tied to the civil service system in force in this country, that attempts to deal with them as a universe (to effect structural improvements applicable nationwide) would require a huge effort and government-wide policy reforms.

One consultant suggestion was to give field staffs a large supply of gasoline each year so that they could visit the 30-odd villages which they are supposed to serve. It is undeniable that field staff offices receive insufficient fuel allocations to allow the theoretical number of field visits assigned to each professional employee ("cadre"). The problem is that simply providing more fuel does not assure better services. Another consultant recommended radical changes in the civil service system controlling operations of the rural development ministries, including changes in recruitment, training, assignment and promotion procedures. USAID has incorporated those recommendations which do not require reform of the civil service structure itself into the interventions proposed under ASDG II.

Cadres now serving at arrondissement level frequently complain that they do not have the technical qualifications needed to improve agricultural practices. However, review of the technical assistance needs of rural field staffs revealed that, with current FAO, World Bank and planned CIDA projects planned over a wide swath of the country, each aimed at improving various technical capacities of rural development field staffs, it is likely that direct USAID efforts added at that level would amount to more than the beneficiaries could absorb (although not more than would be needed in principle). The World Bank, as discussed in Section II.E., is embarking on a major program to reform the agricultural extension service in this country. This project needs time to prove its viability. In principle, extension cadres in the arrondissements hosting the Bank project will be fully devoted to this activity for the next several years.

What every consultant and every USAID review found was a plethora of projects in rural areas, which often exist unbeknownst to each other (and even to many cadres). These projects, which may each be excellent in quality, are poorly coordinated, do not exchange lessons learned, and do not follow any overall strategy or philosophy. This problem is especially noted in NRM projects, as mentioned in earlier sections. The problem stems from the central level, and it is there that it must be addressed. The reality of the Nigerien situation is that it is donor funding which fuels rural development, and without better management of that funding, scarce resources are wasted. The GON will not be able to improve field-level services until it reforms the haphazard pattern of project assistance, so that field staffs can be sure of what is

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required of them, and what resources they will have at their disposal at any time.

(1) Objectives

The programmed assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) will have the specific objectives of improved conceptualization, programming, coordination and management of the projects in the rural development investment budget and more effective use of MAL human and financial resources in the operating budget. Results to be gained are strengthened planning and management of programs, and human and financial resources, monitoring and evaluation in the MAL (offices of planning and administration/finance - DEP and DAAF).

The objectives in the PAIP regarding MAL field staff remain as ASDG II objectives. The field staff must play a larger role as agents of change in the rural economy. Analysis done since the PAIP has exposed the management weakness of MAL. Whereas in early stages of design, consideration had been given to directing budget support funds to arrondissement levels of ministerial operations, it has been concluded that such channeling of budget support is not appropriate. First, the GON should have responsibility for determining how such funds will be used by the eligible entities to support program objectives. Second, if USAID had chosen to make the entities eligible for operational budget support the field offices of ministries rather than the ministries in general, it would have appeared that USAID was rewarding poor performance, as the analysis has clearly shown that field office services are now a disparate, uncoordinated collection of activities. Three years of ASDG II will be spent putting in place management systems (program budgeting, a training strategy, information systems, and position descriptions). During the final two years the management systems will help in the development of annual work programs of the field staff. This approach will enable the ministry to begin to focus the resources of both the general budget and the donor-financed investment budget on the most important tasks confronting the field staff.

More specifically, the objectives to be pursued are:

1. Put in place information systems in the MAL which will be the basis for improved human and material resource management, and better understanding of the organization of development actions, particularly in NRM.
2. Develop personnel training and assignment policies in the MAL in order to promote a more systematic and equitable approach to training and assignment of individual cadres, with the goal of increasing efficiency and motivation of staff.
3. Set up a program budgeting system and guide for assuring conformity between the system and donor projects in the MAL so that the combination of resources available to the ministry will be better understood by decision makers and used more efficiently over time.

(2) Interventions

a. Information Systems Establishment

The main objective under this heading is the development of a sectoral information policy by creating 1) a management information system (personnel, equipment, infrastructure), 2) a project management information system, and 3) a geographical information system.

The inefficiency of information systems in the MAL, or even their total absence, does not permit sound decision-making related to personnel, equipment, infrastructure, project management and regional and local development actions. That impedes the development of knowledge in regard to resources available to the ministry, and hinders the articulation of coherent development strategy and planning of actions at the central, regional and local levels. The total absence of a job description system does not allow effective use of human resources and precludes meaningful personnel performance evaluation. The existing manually maintained personnel, financial, equipment and infrastructure management systems are so archaic that it is very difficult to produce reliable information on the stated items or to make informed decisions. The reporting and communication systems from the regional to central levels and vice versa are also very weak. Information and data related to development actions are almost always of questionable reliability because of the absence of a systematic way of analyzing and reporting information related to a project, a region or any particular activity.

Technical assistance and joint GON-USAID study teams will be used to determine the mechanisms appropriate to MAL for management information systems. The past USAID experience in designing, installing and monitoring similar information systems in the Ministry of Public Health (under the Rural Health Improvement Project and current Niger Health Sector Support Program) will serve as a model for this process.

b) Development of Personnel Training and Assignment Policy

Personnel management, which includes training policy and planning, job descriptions, career monitoring and policies on personnel assignment, are domains where meaningful changes must be introduced. The MAL's ignorance of the precise number and individual location of professional and non-professional employees, the present assignment procedure that gives little attention to skills requirements or employee needs, the lack of a sound training policy which relates training requests to ministerial needs, are all major constraints to management of human resources within the MAL. Smith's report (Annex G) has clearly defined the personnel management burden. The system as it functions now does not produce reliable information for decision-making related to personnel assignment, training, personnel career monitoring, or geographical personnel distribution. Job performance evaluation is not carried out in any comprehensive manner. Training and employment are not necessarily related, so that employees may be assigned to positions which do not meet their skills, and scholarships are awarded for training in domains not directly pertinent to ministry (or employee)

needs. The MAL's shallow knowledge of its human potential affects the efficiency of development actions undertaken by this ministry.

Specialized technical assistance, jointly conducted studies and reviews, and on-the-job training will be pursued in the first three years of the program, with the outputs to be a better understanding of resource needs, and the development of personnel strategies and policies, which can start to be tested for application by program end.

c) Elaboration of a Program Budgeting System and Guidelines for Conformity of Donor Projects and MAL Program Budgeting Systems

The main objectives of this subcomponent are to make investment and operating budgets more consistent ("harmonized" is the term in French) and to improve project conception, programming, coordination and management. These aims are related to coordination and strategy development efforts undertaken in support of NRM. Part of the problem is lack of easy access at ministerial level to information on the budget, and on project activities. The investment budget (controlled by the Ministry of Plan) and the operating budget of MAL are not coordinated. The adoption of a program budgeting system will allow the harmonization of the operating and investment budgets by displaying their relationships to decision makers. The lack of clear objectives and work plans is another problem within the MAL at all levels. The development of management by objectives techniques is a way to disseminate the idea of annual objectives in work plans and to facilitate the harmonization of investment and operating budgets, since resources will be linked to activities in a more visible way than in the past.

About 95% of Niger's investment funds come from various foreign donors. Each donor has its own funding policy. The MAL faces difficulties in coordinating foreign technical assistance. Improvements in information systems under the program will give MAL better knowledge of what donors are doing in any one geographic area or domain of intervention. While testing a program budgeting system, the MAL must elaborate guidelines that will permit conformity of donor projects with the program budgeting objectives. This will serve to facilitate achievement of the far-reaching goal of coordinating and integrating various interventions.

Implementation of this subcomponent will require technical assistance and in-service training of personnel over a three-year period.

(3) Calendar of Key Activities (key agents cited)

Information systems for better resource management, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

Year 1

- Collect data, develop computerized system and train MAL staff in computer use.

Year 2

- Design and install information system on personnel, equipment, infrastructure.
- Design and install geographic information systems.
- Develop action plan for establishment of systems for sectoral and regional information and coordination of development actions.
- Establish job descriptions for DEP (Direction of Studies and Programming) and for two arrondissements as a test.

Years 3-4

- Evaluate and refine the job description system.

Years 4-5

- Install the job description system.

Development of personnel training and assignment policy, MAL

Year 1

- Evaluate the human potential of MAL.

Year 2

- Determine training needs and technical assistance needs, and determine priority specialization categories for training.

Year 3

- Establish training plan and assignment policy for personnel.

Year 4

- Establish strategy for monitoring of personnel careers.

Years 4-5

- Put in place measures permitting better balance between training and employment.

Design of a program budgeting system and guide for conformity of donor projects with program budget objectives (MAL)

Year 1

- Seminar-workshop on management by objectives (MBO).

Year 2

- Design MBO system.
- Refine rules for project design, programming, coordination and management.

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Year 3

- Install annual program budgeting system for activities and budgeting.
- Prepare guidelines for conformity of the objectives of donor projects and the program budgeting system.
- Workshop-seminar on the extension of the guidelines, above.

Year 4

- Use annual work plan, derived from program budgeting system, in two departments.

b. Strengthening the Participation of NGOs and Other Rural Institutions in Natural Resource Management

The success at Guesselbodi, the outcome of the Segou roundtable, consultants reports and analyses all point to the same conclusion that popular participation in rural resources management is a key factor for sustainable development in the Sahel. If popular participation is to be enhanced, NGOs must play an increasingly significant role in the process. NGOs, by their nature, can play a particularly significant role in the following areas:

Village organization: NRM often requires popular management institutions, which are de facto non-governmental. Many development NGOs have village organization as one of their specialities (NGOs such as CLUSA, IRED, EIL, CESA0/GRAAP, etc.).

Technology dissemination: NGOs are often more effective than government agents at technology dissemination and extension because of their singleness of purpose.

Consciousness raising and village sensitization ("animation"): These important parts of the participatory development process are part of the NGO approach. NGOs are leaders in village sensitization techniques (e.g., CARE and GRAAP).

Feedback for policy dialogue: NGO project experience and ongoing relationships with local populations can provide a valuable source of information on which to base higher level policy decisions.

Providing rural credit: Highly successful and innovative credit programs such as those implemented by the NGO Six S in Burkina Faso have made a significant contribution not only to natural resources development but also to making communities responsible for the entire process of development. A pilot Six S project based on the Burkina Faso model is being implemented in Tera.

Compared to many neighboring countries, NGOs play a somewhat limited role in rural development in Niger. There are fewer NGOs and their involvement is less pervasive. Local associations, whether subsidiaries of international NGOs or nascent indigenous NGOs, are just beginning to be active, as the GON lessens restrictions to grassroots activity. Historically governmental-NGO relations have been somewhat strained, and restrictions placed on NGO contact with beneficiary groups. Until 1988, indigenous NGOs were banned

outright. Until 1989, all activities of foreign NGOs, no matter how small, had to receive written, advance approval of the Ministry of Plan in Niamey. Decision makers at high levels of the GON have recognized that overly restrictive approaches to development have not protected rural populations as intended, but tended to deprive them of assistance. ASDG II attempts to capitalize on, and advance further, openings toward NGO involvement on the part of the government. See Section VI.C. for further discussion of NGO status.

(1) Objectives

The objectives to be pursued as part of this strategy element are:

1. Create a regulatory and administrative environment conducive to NGO establishment and operations.
2. Expand access of NGOs to development resources, through flexible grant funding, partnerships between foreign and national organizations for rural development.
3. Improve performance of NGO projects, through enhanced monitoring and increased access to ideas and information.

(2) Interventions

The creation of an appropriate regulatory environment may include the amendment of regulations or publication of official pronouncements (e.g., arretes) specifically authorizing developmental NGOs. The basic legislation governing associations in Niger (Ordonnance No 84-06 of March 1, 1984) makes no mention of non-governmental organizations with development goals as a distinct form of association. Whereas some observers consider this lacuna in legislation to be a serious problem, particularly for indigenous NGOs, in neighboring countries such as Mali local NGOs flourish without specific legislative authorization. Rather, in Mali NGOs sign specific working agreements with the government which detail each party's rights and responsibilities, including rights for exoneration from import duties for materials to be used in projects. Some form of official and binding GON statement which authorizes the existence and operations of such entities is needed. However, USAID is not convinced that a change in basic legislation is necessary.

The selection of the most appropriate mode of regulation is the choice of the government. Whatever final choice is made should be the product of collaboration and consensus with NGOs now working in Niger. Formal dialogue on this subject began at a GON-NGO-donor seminar on "Emergence of National NGOs" held in May 1990. That conference proposed adding a paragraph to Ordonnance 84-06 stating non-governmental organization as a form of authorized association. The proposal is too vague to answer the problem in itself. A variety of approaches to the problem of written texts authorizing NGOs will be studied during Year 1 of the program, with approved reforms becoming CPs in later years of implementation.

The creation of an administrative environment conducive to NGOs requires better understanding, at all levels of society, of what NGOs are (and are not), what their rights and responsibilities are,

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and what they can contribute to Niger's development. ASDG II will call for public statements of support by the government for the NGO movement in Niger and dissemination of information on the government's regulations for NGOs. The program will promote efforts at sensitization of governmental field staff and community organizations as to the nature of NGOs. Dissemination of information on NGOs through national media and schools will be mandated in order to increase public awareness of opportunities for collaboration. The program will use the NGO fund and/or project component resources to finance visits by groups representing public and private sectors to NGO projects within Niger and to other African countries in which national NGOs are numerous and active such as Mali, Burkina Faso or Madagascar. Formal meetings between high government officials and NGOs on a biennial basis, in the form of roundtables, will be required in conditions precedent. CPs also include required implementation of recommendations approved by GON and NGO leadership in such fora.

Developing a more flexible funding mechanism: Present access to USAID funding is cumbersome for NGOs and only worthwhile if significant amounts of money are involved. NGOs are at their best doing smaller projects with often relatively small budgets. A two-tiered project approval process in the NGO/private sector fund component of local currency use (see IV.D.1) could alleviate this problem. Small projects (under \$100,000) will have a less demanding proposal review and approval process than larger projects.

Partnerships: Understanding the inherent differences in capacity (including fund raising) of indigenous and foreign NGOs will be especially important in determining governmental policies and programs which are appropriate for different forms of NGO. Support to national NGOs should not imply a requirement for any particular organization, NGO, donor or Nigerien public or private sector, to adopt or foster a local NGO. Forced partnerships run counter to the government's stated philosophy of freedom of association, and will rarely be effective. Rather, voluntary partnerships or sponsorships should be encouraged. There are a variety of ways in which such associations can be fostered. These could include financial support (local NGOs could receive some level of financial support from government-controlled resources, for setting up operations), temporary exemptions from certain taxes or duties for the national NGO (whose permanent exoneration rights would depend on proven performance as a non-profit organization), accelerated approval of micro-realisation projects proposed by such partnerships (review promised within a specified period of time). The program will fund studies and tests of various options, but will not enforce conditionality on these points, as NGOs need to take the leadership themselves on issues of interrelationships.

Improving NGO performance will be achieved through enhanced project monitoring and increased access to new ideas and technology.

Monitoring of projects: All NRM projects, NGO or otherwise, require accurate monitoring and timely evaluations in order to measure impact, correct errors, and plan for the future. NGOs are traditionally weak in this area and would benefit from training being provided in project monitoring and project monitoring being done by impartial outside agencies. ASDG II will explore the

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viability of establishing a participatory monitoring/evaluation process in which the NGO is partially involved in data gathering and monitoring, but outside expertise is used to assure standardization, verify data, prepare unbiased evaluations, etc.

Facilitating NGO access to ideas and information: In order to disseminate existing technologies, NGOs need access to ideas and information. This can happen in numerous ways including strengthening of NRM documentation in the Groupement des Aides Privees (GAP) documentation center, discussion groups, seminars, exchange visits, etc. Funding to facilitate this access will be available under the NGO fund of ASDG II.

(3) Calendar of Key Activities (key actors)

Year 1

- Review regulations governing NGOs. Draft action plan for modification. (Plan, in consultation with NGOs, USAID)
- Plan makes formal statement of NGO rights and responsibilities.
- Direct AID contract (funded from project component) signed with U.S. private sector organization to manage NGO local currency fund and provide T.A. to local NGOs. (USAID)

Year 2

- GON-NGO Roundtable and action plan for implementation of recommendations. (Plan)
- Direct AID contractor offers technical assistance to local NGOs. NGO local currency fund begins operation on release of first tranche.

Year 3

- Modify regulations, as agreed in Year 1. (Plan)
- Complete implementation of Roundtable 1 recommendations. (Plan, GAP)
- Study tours of model NRM activities held for NGOs/GON/private sector. (contractor)
- Project monitoring systems in place for each NGO project funded by program to date. (contractor, grantees)

Year 4

- GON-NGO Roundtable held, as Year 2. (Plan)
- Study tours of model NRM activities held for NGOs/GON/private sector.

Year 5

- Carry out joint GON/USAID/NGO evaluations of sample of NGO projects under grant.
- Implement Roundtable 2 recommendations, as above.

c. Rural Associations (independent cooperatives and credit unions)

Support for the development of an autonomous, economically viable cooperative movement is a major aspect of USAID's strategy and

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programs for Niger. The central focus of this support currently is through the Rural Organizations Development Project (ROD, 683-0260). ROD, implemented by the U.S. PVO National Cooperative Business Association (NCBA/CLUSA), is a five-year project (9/89-9/94) and second phase of direct USAID support to cooperative development in Niger. (CLUSA implemented a cooperative training component of the Agricultural Production Support Project from 1984-89.) USAID has also actively supported policy reform relating to the autonomy of the cooperative movement. As mentioned earlier, a major reform area under ASDG I has been revision of statutory provisions for cooperatives to remove them legally from direct governmental control. ASDG I-derived "counterpart funds" have also helped finance a bank guarantee fund as part of the CLUSA program.

The creation of economically viable cooperatives run by and for members can be of great value in building agricultural production and increasing rural incomes. Building the cooperative movement is part of the GON rural development strategy. The potential economic value of coops is generally accepted by GON decision makers. Cooperatives benefiting from CLUSA training have demonstrated significant gains in economic activity, well described in the final proposal for ROD. Several have been partners in successful NRM interventions as well (particularly natural forest management).

ASDG II will continue to monitor the status of the cooperative movement to assure that gains made in autonomy in the last five years are not lost. A review of that status at the end of each program year will determine if specific policy changes are required to correct any possible problems in legislation or regulation. If such changes are required they will be incorporated into CPs for the release of future ASDG II tranches.

ASDG II will also offer financial support to increase the bank guarantee fund provided under ASDG I by \$1 million (which is proposed to the GON as a single deposit in Tranche II, but could be incrementally funded over as many as three years and still function). As the economic activities of coops increase, and as CLUSA includes more cooperatives in its second phase project, the need for bank credit expands. The additional funds would be made available after agreement by the bank(s) involved to modify the guarantee program to one of portfolio guarantee rather than 100% guarantee of all individual loans. The GON will need to approve conversion of the fund into a continuing credit instrument, which will not be cancelled at the end of ASDG II, but continue to operate indefinitely in support of cooperative credit. This latter item will be a condition precedent under ASDG II (Tranche II).

Development of independent, self-financed rural credit unions is now being tested in Zinder department under USAID auspices. Direct support to credit unions is provided under a Cooperative Agreement with the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) as part of ASDG I. USAID plans to finance a second phase to this program as a discrete project starting in FY 1992.

The direct assistance to credit unions is the culmination of research and conditionality sponsored under ASDG I. The second phase ASDG program will continue to monitor the development of independent credit unions, and the legal status granted by the GON.

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Annual review will determine if specific additional measures are required to assure credit union independence. If so, these will be included as CPs for the release of subsequent ASDG II tranches.

d. Local government administrations

Consideration was given in initial design to including conditionality and/or assistance to local government administrations, in particular in secondary cities and market towns. Regional development theory asserts that such entities can in themselves be agents of change in the rural economy if they mobilize and use resources under their control to incite economic activity, for example agricultural marketing and urban-rural trade. A preliminary study financed by USAID in 1989 on market towns in Dosso and Maradi departments raised a number of questions about the capacity of local government administrations to promote economic growth. One major question revolves around mobilization of financial resources through tax and fee collection. The World Bank is planning studies on government finance during the next year. During year 1 of ASDG II, the program will sponsor a complementary study on the capacity of arrondissement administrations to collect and effectively manage taxes and fees to support economic development. The findings of this study will feed into implementation of the Bank project and may lead in ASDG II to a decision to program short-term technical assistance or to introduce conditions precedent relating to local government operations in later years of the program.

Use of studies during program implementation to determine conditionality and assistance requirements was a successful approach in the first phase of ASDG. The newly announced World Bank intervention makes this gradual approach especially warranted, as findings of the IBRD study can be used by ASDG II and vice versa, and duplication is avoided by this phasing of activities.

c. Conditionality

Specific conditionality is provided in Section VII. of this document.

D. Local Currency Programming

Each tranche of the net dollar transfer (minus 8 percent USAID trust fund) will be divided in up to three ways:

- 1) A portion to a fund for PVO and private sector projects, to be managed and monitored by a U.S. private sector organization, which might be a profit or non-profit organization (such as a PVO). Over the life of program this fund must receive at least 30% of net proceeds from the resource transfer.
- 2) A portion for operational budget support to selected agencies with key roles in fulfilling the program's objectives.
- 3) A portion for budget support to the GON investment budget, to support programming contributing to the objectives of the grant program. (In Tranche I this portion is zero.)

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As a subset of item 3), a contribution to the CLUSA bank guarantee fund will be proposed in the second tranche and used if/as necessary (as described in Section IV.B.3.c., above).

USAID and the GON will agree in the Grant Agreement to establish the percentage of each tranche to be apportioned to each of the three general categories. The percentage allocations between operating budget and investment budget support can be renegotiated as the program progresses, based on performance (if one or another does not operate as anticipated, and if C.P.s are not met). However, over the course of the program, no less than 30 percent of the total value of the net resource transfer (\$5.52 million) must be allocated to activities by PVOs/NGOs. The funding for the PVO/private sector program should be heavily weighted towards early years of the program, so as to provide a reasonable amount of money for programming. Partial funding of projects, with subsequent tranches needed to complete the project, is to be avoided as much as possible. As such, USAID will propose in the ProAg that 50% of the initial net transfer be allocated to the NGO fund.

Following is a description of objectives and operating procedures of each component of the cash transfer.

1. Fund for NGO and private sector field activities

Approximately \$5.5 million will be programmed in this fund over the course of the program. A U.S. private sector entity (PVO or firm) will manage the fund. A predetermined portion of each cash transfer will be transferred from BCEAO to a commercial bank account of the firm. The organization will be responsible for collecting project proposals and leading technical and management review of such proposals received from NGOs and private sector entities in Niger (including independent cooperatives). The U.S. organization will be responsible for financial management and for monitoring of the projects in implementation. It will factor its costs for management and monitoring into the budget proposal for each project. The U.S. organization may also apply for and receive local currency under this fund for activities, such as training for local NGOs, study tours for NGO, coop, GON and/or private sector representatives, support for improved coordination of PVO/NGO NRM activities, publicity campaigns for the program. A percentage of the fund will be earmarked for NRM activities in instructions issued to the fund manager and to NGOs. Attention to gender issues will be required in all proposals for outreach activities.

Oversight of the fund will be by a committee composed of USAID, GON (1-2 members), GAP (1-2 members), non-GAP member NGOs (1-2 members), and private sector (2 members). The committee will review proposals for new projects, reports on implementation of existing projects, and will participate in evaluations of selected projects. The Director of USAID and the Minister of Plan have final decision making authority (veto rights) in the case of dispute. Audits will be conducted of projects using private audit firms. A portion of the fund will be set aside for such purposes.

The intention is to a) move decision making on use of funds for NGOs and private sector entities outside of the GON to the extent possible in a host country-owned local currency fund situation, and

to b) put a private sector organization as first line manager of the funds.

The reason for a) is that NGOs say they object to having the GON control their funds. Some NGOs will not enter into a direct relationship with a governmental organization as a matter of policy. There have been few PVOs which have submitted proposals to the existing counterpart fund (mainly the big American organizations).

The reason for b) is that RIG/Dakar has found management of existing counterpart funds by the quasi-governmental organization ("Secretariat") to be flawed. Use of a local private sector organization has been judged not to be feasible at this time, as no institution exists which can guarantee a combination of acceptable financial management standards, programmatic oversight and access to technical assistance. Further, use of a U.S. private sector organization, be it PVO or for-profit firm, allows AID leverage not available over local or international organizations. This provides a measure of protection for USG interests.

Finally, separating this fund from any other local currency operation allows flexibility not now available. For example, it should be feasible to fund small support grants to NGOs (the existing "counterpart fund" rules are too inflexible to be worth financing small activities).

Management: It is proposed that the US PVO or firm receive a direct AID contract or cooperative agreement from the project component for its core management services in order to protect against potential funding shortfalls in CFA funds if there are delays in meeting CPs for any tranche. That is, USAID will sign a management contract which will guarantee costs for core staff, office rental, general operating expenses. It is difficult to predetermine how long it will take for CFA-denominated contracts or grants to be executed for actual activities by NGOs or private sector, hence the level of activity by the management organization in any particular year cannot be estimated in advance with accuracy. To allow the organization to operate and to expand or contract operations based on volume of programming, the U.S. organization will factor in costs for its oversight (financial, monitoring) into each proposal submitted to the local currency fund.

Local currency funds are to be released to the PVO or firm's commercial bank account in tranches rather than on approval of individual activities (as is now the procedure under ASDG I). The managing organization will then submit proposals for use of the funds on hand to the fund oversight committee. The managing organization will have ultimate responsibility for accounting and financial management for all activities (its own and other grants or contracts), as well as for monitoring of implementation. As stated above, the PVO or firm's management costs for such services would be factored into the budget for each CFA-funded activity.

Activities which can be financed under this fund include:

- Grants to PVOs (U.S.) and NGOs (international or local) for targeted NRM interventions (including training).

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- Small support grants to local NGOs (or consortia with international/U.S. organizations), alternatively grants/contracts for specific training aimed at strengthening local NGOs.
- Study/exchange tours for GON, NGO representatives farmers, coop agents, etc., to visit successful NRM interventions in Niger and other Sahelian countries.
- Documentation and publicity campaigns, including video production and dissemination, on successful NRM interventions.

Selection of the organization to manage this fund will be made following a market search. USAID will issue a nonbinding sources sought notice through the Commerce Business Daily to assess the level of interest in the U.S. private sector (including PVO) community. Use of a PVO would offer certain advantages, given USAID's objective of increasing PVO activity in Niger, and the presumed advantage that a PVO would have in understanding and responding to the needs of emergent NGOs. Any PVO interested would have to demonstrate interest in establishing a program in Niger over a long-term basis, and would have to have proven management capacity. Because it cannot be determined a priori that such an organization will respond, USAID will also entertain the possibility of contracting through a private sector firm or joint venture (firm/PVO).

2. Operational Budget support

A portion of the conditional resource transfer will be applied to budget support to GON services to provide a level of funding to those organizations in order to allow them to pursue the developmental objectives of the program as broadly defined. As described earlier, the operating budgets of government services are woefully small. Basically the ministries work on project budgets. There is little money which ministries manage by themselves. This creates not just a dependency on projects (a tendency to invent projects for every need) but makes development of internal management systems for core activities difficult. In a time of budget crisis, as now, O.E. allocations to development-related ministries such as Agriculture fall even further, as other government services (such as defense and police) are protected from cuts. Hence to achieve the objectives of ASDG II two choices of approach exist: either transfer funds to the GON for its own management to support general operations of institutions considered key to the program's success, or create a "counterpart fund" for joint management of the local currency, with "projects" created, financed and monitored which support operational costs. Given the history of ASDG I counterpart fund management, and the desire to build the GON's internal capacity to program and manage funds in the rural development ministries and affiliated institutions, a decision has been made to opt for general support.

For the purposes of the initial tranche, the ProAg will cite the following institutions as eligible to receive budget support:

- Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock,
- Ministry of Hydrology and Environment.

Each of these ministries has subdivisions, such as the Rural Code Committee and practical rural development training school (IPDR Kollo) which may receive portions of the attributed funds. As described below, this list may be amended by the two parties to incorporate other institutions, such as the University of Niamey.

The grantee may decide what portion of the resource transfer to attribute to any eligible entity. The budget support is not tied to particular activities in any explicit way. However, the use of the funds, as reported by the GON, must support the objectives of the program. And preference is given by USAID to the use of the funds to support efforts in natural resource management and institutional strengthening undertaken under policy and project components of the grant. For example, use of the funds for NRM planning and strategy making, rural code debates and publicity campaigns, testing of options for new administrative procedures in MAL are all uses of funds which would be considered by USAID to promote the objectives of the program. However, as budget support, USAID can neither direct the GON to use the funds for any particular activity, nor can it refuse to release further tranches if particular activities were not financed. USAID cannot require that the budget support be used to carry out activities which USAID may deem necessary to fulfill conditions precedent.

The stated intention of the budget support is to provide "a level of overall financial support to a program or institution" (as per 87 State 327494, the current guidance on programming local currency). Once deposited in the GON general budget, the funds will be commingled. USAID cannot require proof that the actual CFA derived from the dollar transfer arrived in x arrondissement or y government division. Rather, the program will be adding to the general funding attributed to selected parts of the government. The MOP will furnish a) proof that the money was transferred to the general budget of the Government, b) annual reports providing summary descriptions of activities of the beneficiary organizations with a summary of costs (which must, over life of program, be equivalent to the amount transferred for this purpose) to demonstrate that the funds were used for intended purposes. Receipt of reports which are acceptable to A.I.D. is a specific condition precedent to receipt of additional funds (release of subsequent tranche).

Given the probable budget cuts impending due to the current budgetary crisis, USAID cannot require proof of additionality in comparing program and prior year budgets of the institutions benefiting from the budget support. However, the GON will covenant that any cuts incurred by those institutions will not be more than the average losses incurred by other parts of the Government over the course of the program.

USAID and the Grantee may agree to change beneficiary entities as the program evolves. For example, operational budget support may be made available to the Ministry of Higher Education's University of Niamey. Note that, if it is determined that specific courses need to be offered by an educational institution in order to meet the program's objectives, use of budget support may not be the best way to assure that such courses are held. The option exists to use project component funds to support activities of the university or IPDR. This would imply a direct management burden for USAID, but

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would mean that training institutions would be assured of receiving the funding needed for offering courses at the time and in the amounts required. The options for funding of these institutions will be studied during program implementation, and appropriate program documents issued after decision on optimal approach.

3. Budget support to the Investment Budget

A strong underlying theme of ASDG II is the building of the GON's capacity to develop strategy, plan programs and manage its resources. Technical assistance and operational budget support are intended to assist this effort. Support to the investment budget without USAID selection of specific projects to finance is another part of ASDG II's capacity-building efforts. The purpose of the budget support to the investment budget is to support GON capacity to implement policies related to improved natural resource management, which policies will have been formally agreed to by both parties as part of the program. The GON will establish a reviewing process governing the selection of projects which it finances which reviewing process will be approved by USAID, and used as one basis for release of funds for investment budget purposes.

Note that in the past, under ASDG I, USAID and the GON have together reviewed project proposals for financing from local currency derived from ASDG. This approach was fully consistent with the objectives of ASDG I, and the budget crisis (elimination of GON contributions to existing donor projects) which prevailed when the program began. Phase II of the program will emphasize the development of national strategies and programs which will support realization of the program's purpose.

Once coherent national NRM strategy and programs have been developed, ASDG II will transfer a portion of the local currency derived from the resource transfer for attribution to the GON investment budget. Instead of financing particular projects which require joint review of all design details, ASDG II funding will be used to support government efforts which fit strategic guidelines agreed on by the two parties. The GON will be fully responsible for selection of which particular activities it chooses to fund. USAID participation will be at the level of strategic planning, not project selection and implementation.

The support to the investment budget will be programmed in the following manner. Each year, once suitable strategy and programs are established, the two parties (led by Plan and USAID) agree on the developmental objectives to be supported through use of the funds. These objectives should be defined through GON policies. Such a policy might be broad (promotion of soil conservation efforts through community action, reshaping of the role of forest agents) or narrow (government-community partnerships in certain kinds of natural forest management). The two parties would agree on policy priorities, and on the reviewing process to be used by the GON, but it would be up to the GON to decide to which projects/programs fitting the criteria to allocate funds. The ASDG local currency could be a partial contribution to a project, or finance the entire activity. This would be the grantee's decision.

The actual details of project design are left to the government, which will follow its internal procedures for design, approval and management of the detailed proposal. Indeed, the GON local currency funds which are provided to support of the investment budget are likely to be apportioned by the government as partial contribution to projects which may be designed by donor organizations. It is important to note that ASDG-derived local currency funds are transferred to the investment budget to contribute towards the realization of the objectives of the program, and not to particular projects. The key point in the process for USAID is the definition of goals, delineation of policies and setting of priorities. The ultimate success or failure of any particular project which might have received financing indirectly from ASDG II moneys is not a criterion for success of the ASDG program. USAID will have no authority and no responsibility for individual projects.

The GON will submit a summary annual report on the uses of the funds allocated to the investment budget, with a description of how the programs/projects support the purpose and goal of ASDG II. USAID will seek assurance that the projects are being implemented, and are contributing to the objectives of the program, but, as stated above, will not take responsibility for their success or failure.

There might need to be occasional revisions of this procedure in specific cases, for example if it is agreed that the CLUSA Bank Guarantee Fund needs to be increased in funding. In that case funds would be traced to the private bank, which would provide annual reports on use.

The Grantee will report on use of funds through a reporting system similar to that for the support to the operating expense budget (since funds would be commingled and untraceable, once deposited, in this scenario as in the previous). The reporting system is further detailed in Section V.B.

E. Project Component

The project component is designed to support implementation of the program. This component will be managed directly by USAID, in consultation with the GON.

1. Technical Assistance

A direct A.I.D. contract will be executed with a US PVO or private sector entity for management of the NGO/private sector local currency fund. See Section IV.D., above, for detailed description of this activity. This contract is not expected to take effect until 12-15 months after grant signing, given USAID experience in other projects. This is an acceptable time lapse, as release of the first tranche is not anticipated within the first year of the program. It is anticipated that an expatriate manager, a NRM technician (see below), and locally recruited accountant/bookkeeper, secretary and support staff (drivers, office guards, etc.) will make up the core team to be financed by the project component. The contract will be for four years.

Technical assistance will be provided to the DEP of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) for implementation of the

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institutional strengthening component. A long-term Senior Management/Administration Advisor will be provided for a three year period (beginning late 1991 or early 1992). In addition, short-term technical assistance will be provided in the areas of information system development and management, computer programming, and management training.

Technical assistance in natural resource management shall consist of a long-term NRM Advisor in the DEP of MAL (3 years), a NRM Program Specialist working with the US PVO or private sector entity implementing the NGO/private sector local currency fund component of ASDG II (3 years), and buy-ins for specialized short-term technical assistance to the ST/RD ACCESS II project (for Land Tenure Center support to the Rural Code) and to the AFR/TR NRMS II project. Based on a very positive recent experience in which two Malian specialists joined an American specialist to conduct a study of NGOs and NRM activities in Niger, technical assistance from within the region will be used when appropriate to complement assistance from the US.

The details of implementation roles and responsibilities among the various sources of technical assistance for the NRM component are provided in Table IV.1.

It is USAID's intention to issue a single technical assistance contract or cooperative agreement for all long-term technical assistance and PVO fund management, if feasible. The CBD sources sought process, to be carried out following ProAg signing, will allow USAID to make a final decision on the appropriateness of entering into one or two contracts (whether NGO fund management and provision of T.A. can be managed effectively by a single entity). Any technical assistance required during year 1 of the grant will be short-term in nature, and procured using IQC, buy-in or other similar arrangements.

Given the changing portfolio of centrally managed projects in A.I.D., as well as the evolving needs of the program, it is not possible to predetermine all potential buy-ins for provision of specialized short-term technical assistance under the program. Planned buy-ins include:

- Preparation of a technical handbook for environmental impact studies (through Natural Resource Management Support - NRMS II project).
- Buy-in to ST/RD project for services of Land Tenure Center (see studies, following)

2. Studies

The technical assistance contract for provision of long-term technical services will include funding for a portion of the studies planned under the project element. Other studies will be conducted using highly specialized agencies, such as the Land Tenure Center, and direct contracting (or buy-in to central projects) will be used for procurement of such services.

The following is a summary list of studies planned under the two components:

NRM component

- Development of national conservation strategy (by a PVO)
- Tenure and resource studies (MAL Rural Code section with Land Tenure Center, through buy-in to central project or direct contract)
- GON/USAID study of administrative reform necessary to ensure effective decentralization of NRM (with TA contractor on site)
- GON/USAID study of forester roles and extension models (with TA contractor)

Institutional component

- Study of fee collection capacity local governments.
- Study of NGO partnership options.
- Design and installation of information systems, MAL (TA contractor)
- Design and installation of personnel tracking systems, MAL (TA contractor)
- Design and installation of management by objectives system, program budgeting system, MAL (TA contractor)

For details on the NRM component see Table IV.1. All major studies to be undertaken as part of ASDG II are to be joint studies with active participation of Nigerien professionals from the GON and/or the private sector as appropriate. Management studies carried out at the DEP of MAL will use experience gained under the NHSS program to the maximum extent feasible.

3. Training

No long-term training is planned under this program. There will be a variety of short-term training opportunities, most organized as study tours, workshops and on-the-job training. These include:

- Study tours for NGOs/GON/private sector representatives. Note: it is planned to use the NGO local currency fund for this purpose to the extent feasible. Any tours in Year 1 will be financed under the project component.
- Workshop-seminars on management by objectives and implementation of use of the guidelines for conformance of donors projects and MAL program budgeting. Project directors, central-level directors, departmental directors and arrondissement chiefs of service to have attended.
- Workshops, seminars, short courses on NRM issues.
- Training at local institutions, including the university and IPDR Kollo, on subjects related to NRM. As stated previously, budget support or project funds may be used.

Approximately 25% of the funds allocated to training will be set aside for third country training opportunities which may arise during program implementation on subjects related to NRM and institutional development.

For details on the NRM component see Table IV.1. Training carried out in Niger will use local and regional expertise to the maximum extent possible.

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PAAD TABLE IV.1 (Section IV.E) ASDG II NRM Elements/Implementation Responsibilities

	NRM	NRM	LIC	NR	ASDG	Others	NOTES
X=Primary responsibility	TA/DEP	T.A.	via	MS	II		
*=Secondary responsibility	MAG/EL	NGO	S&T	II	Prime		
Elements/Items							
I. National NRM Strategy/Program							
A. Strategy/program formulation & implementation.....							X
1. Strategy/program formulation.....							X
a. PIGRN, PNLCD etc.....							X
* private sector & NGO involvement.....							*
* full coverage of WID/NRM issues.....							*
* use of appropriate NRM models.....							*
(FRAP, Rapid III Pop-Agric-Environ(PAE) etc.)							
b. National Conservation Strategy (see below)							
c. Other strategy elements							
* Apres-Segou process.....				X			* (USAID)
* revision of other codes (Forestry, Water).....							X
2. Strategy/program implementation							
a. IC/GON investment budget.....							X
b. LC/NGOs.....							X
B. Improved donor coordination							
1. Information base.....							X
* Project data bank							
* Geographic information system							
* Who's who in NRM							
2. Coordination mechanisms.....							* (USAID)
a. Regional: Apres-segou trilogue.....					X		* (USAID)
b. Niger: Options/Selection of mechanism(s).....							* (USAID)
Niger: Implementation.....							X
3. Studies of donor coordination/duplication.....							* (USAID) PD&S
a. Baseline: Year 1							
b. Impact assessment: Year 4							
C. Integration of environmental/biodiversity considerations into national planning/programming.....							X (IUCN/WWF)
1. Biological diversity assessment.....							X (WWF)
* preparation of TORs							
* implementation of assessment							
2. National Conservation Strategy.....							* (IUCN)
* preparation of TORs							
* preparation of NCS							

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	NRM	NRM	LIC	NR	ASDG	Others	NOTES
X-Primary responsibility	TA/DEP	T.A.	via	MS	II		
*Secondary responsibility	MAG/EL	NGO	S&T	II	Prime		

- Elements/Items**
- 3. Environmental Impact Assessment Manual.....X
 - * preparation of TORs
 - * preparation of Manual
 - * training of GON staff in use of Manual
 - 4. Program implementation
 - a. IC/GON investment budget.....X
 - b. IC/NGOs.....X
 - D. Policy studies (as required).....*.....X.....*

DEP Reports
 - E. Impact monitoring.....X
 - 1. National policy/strategy/program development
 - 2. National policy/strategy/program implementation
 - 3. Role of women in NRM
 - 4. Donor coordination
 - 5. Environmental/biodiversity considerations
 - F. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....X

with USAID
 - G. Draft conditionality for tranches II, III and IV.....X

II. Resource Tenure/Rural Code

- A. Rural Code preparation.....X.....*
 - 1. LIC/GON studies.....X
 - * Input into Loi Cadre (Bloch et.al)
 - * NFM tenure/management
 - * Baban Rafi mgmt (elbow)
 - * other studies (Freudenberger)
 - 2. CRED/GON studies (ASDG I).....X (CRED)
 - * Litige de champs
 - * other studies
 - 3. Other work on Aes d'Investigation.....X
 - 4. other support
 - * IC/ASDG I.....X (USAID)
 - * TA/Operations & Financial mgmt.....X
- B. Rural Code communication & training.....*.....X.....*
 - 1. Support for communication (IC/GON Investment Budget)
 - 2. Support for training (IC/GON Investment Budget)
- C. Rural Code Implementation
 - 1. Support for field programs: (model sites: NRM, aménagement des terroirs etc.)
 - * IC/Investment Budget.....X
 - * IC/NGOs.....X

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	NRM	NRM	LTC	NR	ASDG	Others	NOTES
X=Primary responsibility	TA/DEP	T.A.	via	MS	II		
*=Secondary responsibility	MAG/EL	NGO	S&T	II	Prime		
<hr/>							
D. Impact monitoring.....*				X			DEP/CNCR Reports
1. Public & community lands:.....*				X			
* joint management of forest land							
* attribution of pastoral water points & surrounding pastures							
* attribution of contre saison water points							
2. Private land:.....*				X			
* enregistrement/immatriculation of land							
* clarity of resource tenure							
3. Case studies on the impact of changes in tenure on management of natural resources.....*				X			
E. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....*				X			
F. Draft conditionality for Tranches II, III & IV.....*				X			with USAID
III. NGOs & NRM							
A. Strengthening NGO role in NRM program implementation.....X							
B. NRM programs (LC/NGO):							
1. Field programs.....X							
2. Farmer to farmer NRM visits (see VI below).....*				X			
C. Impact monitoring.....X							
D. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....X							
E. Draft conditionality for Tranches II, III & IV.....X							with USAID
IV. Decentralization of NRM							
A. Decentralization of rights & responsibilities for the management & use of natural resources.							
1. USAID/GON decentralization study - current patterns/future directions...*				X			
* elaboration of TORs							
* implementation of study & presentation of findings (Seminar)							
* adoption of recommendations							
* implementation of recommendations							
2. Training in NRM for:.....*				X			
* Cadres de l'Administration Territoriale							
* Cadres de la Magistrature							
* Structures de base du MNSD							
* Chefs Traditionnels							
3. Case Studies on impacts of decentralization.....*				X			

	NRM	NRM	LTC	NR	ASDG	Others	NOTES
X-Primary responsibility	TA/DEP	T.A.	via	MS	II		
*Secondary responsibility	MAG/EL	NGO	SST	II	Prime		

- B. Decentralization of project/program identification & implementation.
- 1. Training for Technical Services in demand-driven NRM programming.....X
 - * GRAAP
 - * other training
 - 2. Support to implementation of decentralized NRM programs (LC/GON Investment budget).....X
- C. Impact Monitoring.....*
- 1. National/Department/Arrondissement budget allocation.X
 - 2. Other decentralization & Rural Code implementation indicators (see Section II)
 - 3. Case studies.....*.....*
- D. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....X
- E. Draft conditionality for Tranches II, III & IV.....X

with USAID

V. Forester Roles in NRM

- A. USAID/GON study on forester roles in NRM.....*
- * elaboration of TORs
 - * study tour (Asia & US)
 - * implementation of study & presentation of findings (Seminar)
 - * adoption/implementation of recommendations
- B. Pilot test w/out fining & repression (LC) operating budget or LC/NGO).....X
- * design of the test
 - * implementation of the test
 - * evaluation of the test
 - * LC reimbursement for fining revenues foregone
- C. Training of forestry agents in extension methods.....*
- D. Impact monitoring.....X
- E. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....X
- F. Draft conditionality for Tranches II, III & IV.....X

with USAID

IV. Farmer to Farmer NRM visits

- A. Fonctionnaire to farmer visits
- * PIGRN.....X
 - * otherX
- B. Farmer to farmer visits
- * GON sponsored.....*
 - * NGO sponsored.....X

	NRM	NRM	LTC	NR	ASDG	Others	NOTES
X=Primary responsibility	TA/DEP	T.A.	via	MS	II		
*Secondary responsibility	MAG/EL	NGO	S&T	II	Prime		
Elements/Items							
C. Sahel regional NRM visits.....				X			*
e.g. Burkina-Faso:							
Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs Villageois (PNGTV)							
Mossi Plateau water harvesting/soil conservation							
Association Six S							
CESAO/GRAAP							
D. Audiovisual Outputs.....				*	*		X
* videos of field visits for TV							
* preparation of radio programs							
E. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....				*	*		X
VII. Long Term NRM Impact Monitoring							
A. Biological indicators.....		*		X	*	*	(ICRISAT, INRAN, TROPSOILS)
B. Socio-economic indicators.....		*	*	X	*	*	(IFPRI, INRAN/DECOR)
C. Implementation support: overall responsibility.....		*	*	*	*	X	(USAID)
VIII. Related NRM Elements in Mission Portfolio							
A. ASDG I:.....						X	(USAID)
* field projects/model sites							
* studies (LC + CRED)							
* database development (BASDCNAG)							
* institutional support (CRED TA)							
B. ASDG II Institutional volet:.....		*	*				X
C. Other NRM elements.....						X	(USAID)
1. CARE Aménagement du Terroir study (PD&S)							
2. Mini Mini water retention/harvesting (Self-Help)							
3. USAID/Peace Corps AFSI Program							
4. INRAN/TROPSOILS Integrated Mgmt. of Agricultural Watersheds (NAAR)							
5. NAAR Research/Extension Liaison Unit (RELI)							
6. IFPRI Household Income Strategies & Agric. Policy Impacts Study (NEPRP)							
7. GIS system development (FEWS, MAG/EL(BEWS), USGS/AGRHYMET, TROPSOILS, CRED, INRAN/ICRISAT/ILCA)							
D. AID/W funded:.....				*	*	X	(USAID)
1. Peace Corps Conservation of Biological Diversity project (Parc W).....						X	
2. ICRISAT Regional Workshop on Acacia albida.....				*	*		(USFS)
3. CARE Natural Regeneration Study.....				*	*		(PVO/NGO NRMS)
4. NRMS/FAO Sahel Forestry Economics Workshop (annual).....				*	*		

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4. Commodities

Commodity procurement will be related directly to the needs of long-term technical assistance, and to the institutional strengthening activities in MAL. Commodity procurement will include:

- micro-computers and associated software for MAL (after an assessment of needs, since the ministry has a variety of computers already), computer equipment for T.A. office;
- vehicles for T.A. field trips (3);
- office furniture for T.A. office, household furniture for four expatriate technicians.

5. Evaluation

There will be two external evaluations scheduled during program life (see Section V.G.). Formal evaluations will be carried out using personnel not involved in the program implementation. USAID will use IQC or other appropriate contracting mechanism to recruit a team of outside experts (which might include an economist, a NRM specialist and a management specialist) to lead the studies. Full participation of GON personnel will be mandated, with personnel not directly involved in program implementation assigned to work with the outside team of specialists, and a joint GON/USAID review committee meeting to assess evaluation findings.

In addition, funds under the evaluation line item of the project budget may be used to supplement resources available to the mission from trust funds in order to carry out particular activities relating to monitoring requirements of the program. Whereas the trust fund can finance the local costs of such monitoring, the costs of expert consultants from outside of Niger, for example, might be best met from the evaluation fund of the project.

6. Audit

Audit plans are described in Section V.H.

F. Impact

1. Outputs

Key policy outputs from ASDG II will include:

- A national policy, strategy and action plan for natural resource management are in place, developed with the full participation of the population, NGOs, the private sector and government services, with special attention to the role of women in NRM. This framework for NRM is used in selection of investments by GON, in personnel training in related domains, in review of regulations relating to NRM.
- An interministerial committee responsible for implementing the national plan and programs is functioning, and improvements in procedures can be seen, as above.

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- More effective donor coordination, including regular meetings and periodically updated publications of donor activities in NRM, leads to less unintentional overlap between donor projects, coordinated activities such as pilot testing of promising technologies by various donors in different areas, eventually to verifiable gains in efficiency of the use of financial resources.
- Attention to biological diversity and environmental concerns is demonstrated through completion of a biodiversity assessment for Niger, completion of the National Conservation Strategy and its integration into the national NRM plan, and preparation of a technical handbook for environmental impact studies. Environmental factors are used by GON in policies and criteria for investment fund decisions.
- An increased number of NRM programs and land use plans exist for on state and community lands, based on local participation and transfer of usufruct rights to local users and user groups. ASDG II anticipates increases in the following types of land and resource management systems:
 - Individual farming on deeded lands,
 - Community land use plans,
 - Water point attribution to and management by pastoralists,
 - Village level natural forest management,
 - Decentralized management of irrigated land,
 - Individual and communities adopting improved natural resource management practices.
- Secure and transparent ownership rights to natural resources on private lands are assured through a set of regulations, procedures and legal precedents.
- Decision-making powers and implementation of NRM programs are transferred from the national to the local levels, where community involvement is mandated.
- System established and implemented which transfers responsibility and accountability to local populations for the management of forest resources (i.e., transfer of these responsibilities from foresters to local populations).
- MAL collects and analyzes information on personnel and material resources, and uses information as a tool for ministry management. By the end of the program this results in more efficient coordination and regional planning of development efforts by MAL and better regional distribution of human and material resources by MAL.
- MAL uses personnel career monitoring system, ministerial training and assignment policies to make decisions on personnel assignment and training consistent with rural development needs. By the end of the program, the trend to longer field assignment periods can be seen in arrondissements in which new personnel systems have been introduced. Over longer term (beyond life of grant), improvements will be seen in technical performance of field personnel (who will be assigned to positions for which they have requisite training).

- MAL uses program planning systems to improve planning and coordination of Grantee and donor resources, resulting in less duplication of efforts among donors and between GON and donor-funded activities.
- NGO rights and responsibilities are assured and clarified in revised regulations. NGOs are granted specific permission to operate in Niger in community development role. By the end of the program, increased level of activity (number, dollar value) by NGOs related to NRM is traceable.
- Independent cooperatives and credit unions continue to expand activities, under guaranteed autonomy from direct governmental interference.

2. Impact

The program will have impact at a variety of levels. Through the actions of ASDG II, and related project interventions, there are expected to be changes in socio-economic status of beneficiaries, improvements in biophysical parameters and gains in efficiency of public and private investment in rural development.

The most important intended effect is socio-economic benefits for the rural population. This is the impact that the program will have at the level of the resource user - the men and women who farm, fish, raise animals, and gather from woodlands. ASDG II is designed to establish the policy, legal, and institutional pre-conditions in which the rural population will be able to control, manage and profit from natural resources in a sustainable manner. The rural population is expected to realize a number of specific benefits from this program:

- Sustainable increases in production and income - Better natural resource management practices established on land under user control are expected to result in sustainable increases in production and income for beneficiaries. In the Maggia Valley, for example, an extensive system of windbreaks has not only benefited farmers with increases in crop yields and a reduction of the risk of crop failure, but also with the sale of timber and firewood generated from pruning operations. A combination of NGO intervention, secure tenure, and forest service willingness to allow community control of planted trees led to this result. Through ASDG II, this felicitous combination can become the model, not the exception. Monitoring of production and income change will be focused on a sample of sites benefiting from change as a result of program reforms, some of which will represent interventions financed under the NGO fund. Because of the complexity of measuring income, the sample must be small. Data from other sources (e.g., other donor projects) will be used to the extent feasible to supplement data gathered through ASDG-financed monitoring.

Rural populations benefiting directly from expanded operations of non-governmental organizations, independent cooperatives and credit unions will make gains in standard of living, and in some cases in income as a result of the program. Monitoring of change will be focused on a sample of activities financed by the NGO fund. Since this fund will not be operative until at least Year 2 of the

program, ASDG II monitoring will also track changes on sites selected for study under ASDG I (NRM component). The program will take advantage of the data and analysis of rural income collected under the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) field research (partially financed by USAID). This is the sole in-depth study of rural income and consumption in contemporary Niger. Targets for changes in production and income on individual sites must be site-specific, as the productive potential of specific sites can be expected to be widely varied. Monitoring under ROD and the future credit union project will track changes due to coops and credit unions.

- Community organization building - Many natural resource management practices such as natural forest management, pasture management, and village land use planning are implemented on common property. To this end, villages are obliged to organize their individual members and sometimes establish cooperative structures that include neighboring villages. These collective organizations, often based on traditional structures, break new ground in that they are legally recognized entities empowered to not only manage natural resources, but to pursue other economically or socially beneficial activities in the interest of their members. This was an achievement of ASDG I. The successor program will capitalize on this change in regulation and practice. Project activities under ROD will reinforce the policy and strategy-related efforts under ASDG II.

Community organization also benefits when NGOs are actively involved. The woodcutters cooperative at Guesselbodi, for example, has not only organized wood cutting and sales activities, but has recently undertaken cooperative purchases of agricultural inputs for members. This with the assistance of an NGO, CLUSA. ASDG II will foster the growth of NGO activities in Niger through a combination of policy reforms (establishment of NGO rights), technical assistance and local currency programming.

- Reduced seasonal migration - Many natural resource management practices create income generating activities in the off (non-farming) seasons. Pole plantations, fodder production, dry season irrigation, and wood cutting are all activities that can be performed during this period. This reduces the need for the family breadwinner(s) to migrate during the dry season in search of gainful employment. This has an important impact on social stability in the families and communities of rural areas. This impact will be expected to be seen in those communities where assurance of tenure and usufruct (e.g. wood cutting rights), are combined with access to new technologies and resources (through NGO interventions or coordinated GON/donor activities) over the course of several years. In areas in which seasonal migration is a cultural tradition, the rate of seasonal migration may be less amenable to change. In those cases, improved standard of living of family members staying behind would be the impact anticipated. Over the long term, the number of years in which a family member migrated or the duration of individual trips could be expected to decrease (factoring out extreme years of plenty or famine which would skew results). This change would be after program end, as stability of income must be established before lasting changes in migration patterns occur.

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- Lessening of the workload for women - Gathering wood and fetching water are two of the most time-consuming occupations for women in rural Niger. Deforestation, drought, and diminishing water tables combined with population increases have worsened this situation in recent years. The regeneration, conservation, and sustainable management of these scarce resources - water and wood - will reverse this trend. Near Maradi, farmers have embarked on an ambitious program of natural regeneration of trees in cultivated fields. The regenerated trees are carefully pruned each year to encourage tree growth and provide wood for household use. One of the first benefits cited by farmers is that the women of the village no longer have to walk long distances in search for cooking fuel. This innovation has been possible due to secure usufruct rights and cooperation from local forest service personnel. There are many examples which can be cited of cases in which the local forest agents ruled that pruning was forbidden. Clarification of usufruct rights and change in the demeanor of the forest service are among the objectives of the program.

In the valley of Mini-Mini newly settled Tuareg women had to walk 16 kms in the dry season in search of water. But an innovative pastoral land use plan, which included semi-sedentarization and the digging of wells for domestic and livestock use, solved their problem. Water is now available within 100 meters. The Tuareg community has also embarked on a program to construct a series of water retention structures to capture runoff and increase ground water recharge. This combination of natural resource management practices both greatly facilitates women's access to a source of clean water and secures the sustainability of that source. ASDG II-supported policy reforms and local currency-financed NGO programs are expected to result in similar reductions in the workload for women in other parts of rural Niger. Changes in workload of women will be traced in program monitoring, particularly through monitoring of a sample of NGO projects financed from the grant.

- Increased attitude of self-confidence and self-reliance - One of the most important impacts at the level of the rural population is the increase in self-confidence that the ASDG II program is expected to engender. Niger's rural population suffers from a sense of helplessness on two fronts. Faced with recent droughts that have decimated herds and severely decreased crop yields, many Nigeriens feel as if they are hostages of nature turned against them. Secondly, the dominant role that government has played at all levels of the development process has resulted in the stifling of development initiative at the community level. ASDG II policy reforms seek not only the transfer of rights and responsibilities for rural development to local populations, but also the reinforcement of local institutions active in the development process. As people become actively engaged in the management of natural resources under their control, they will realize that they are no longer helpless victims of nature and a distant government, but active participants in determining their own destiny and that of their children.

Items 1, 3 and 4 have been selected as key socio-economic indicators and will be monitored as indicated in the following table. Items 2 and 5 do not lend themselves to meaningful quantification and will, therefore, be the subject of case-study investigation and reporting.

Impacts will also include changes in biophysical conditions, indicating progress towards stabilization of the natural resource base. Given the extreme fragility of the Nigerien ecology, and uncontrollable factors such as drought and pestilence which so regularly intercede, care must be taken not to expect visible impacts too soon, or too dramatically. On land of direct beneficiaries of program-sponsored interventions, impacts are expected to be seen in the following biophysical parameters, over time: soil quantity and moisture, vegetative cover, agro-silvicultural yields. Biodiversity should be stabilized. Again, targets for changes will have to be defined on a site-specific basis, depending on the interventions applied, the productive potential of the site, and socio-economic factors (such as population density).

Program impact will be measured using sample surveys, evaluations, and through use of data provided by other sources (e.g., other donors). ASDG II will also be able to take advantage of biophysical data to be collected in a 10,000 km² area around Niamey as part of the World Climate Research Program under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization. The project is called HAPEX-Sahel (for Hydrology and Physics Experiment). The data, to be collected over the next two years, are to be used in experiments to help clarify the manner in which land surface processes influence conditions in the atmosphere. Results from HAPEX-Sahel are included as a primary source of biophysical baseline data in the ASDG II impact assessment plan relating to natural resources management. Sites including the ICRISAT Sahelian Center, the INRAN station at Kollo, several villages under study by IFPRI, the TropSoils watershed study site at Hamdallaye and Guesselbodi forest all fall within the HAPEX data collection zone.

Improvements in the efficiency of investment will include:

- Decreased cost of replication for establishment of sustainable, productive natural resource management systems on rural lands. Notional savings to the GON on the order of \$160 million can be predicted over a five year period after ASDG II reforms are in place.
- Gains in the number of hectares which can be targets for NRM improvements. With gains in efficiency as a result of ASDG II, the GON could finance NRM interventions on a land mass 80% larger than that without ASDG II (over a five year period). NRM practices could be expected to be established on 147,000 hectares over the next five years with a GON investment budget of \$200 million without ASDG II. With ASDG II reforms in place, this same budget would be sufficient to cover 266,000 hectares.

Assuming a maintenance of favorable policy environment, replication of NRM investments through individual (spontaneous) efforts, and stable level of public/private investment resources, coverage of 60% of agricultural land can be hypothesized at the end of twenty years. See Section VI.D. and Annex G, Shaikh, for impact scenarios and assumptions.

Monitoring changes in investment patterns is a relatively straightforward task. Seeing the impact of such investments in

sustainable production and incomes will require a long-term horizon. As noted earlier, sustainable improvements may not be visible within five years in many aspects of the program relating to natural resource management. This does not decrease the value of the program. The reality is that improvements in resource base, which lead to sustained income increases, can take 5 or more years, depending on a number of ecological, demographic and economic variables. Given this fact, impact will also be monitored through process indicators (incremental steps leading to final impacts, above), which are defined as:

- An improved legal and policy framework to support NRM investments including clarification and substantially increased security of resource management rights and responsibilities.
- Increased efficiency of NRM investments through decentralization of the planning and implementation of NRM programs.
- Increased effectiveness of NRM investments, including less duplication of effort, through improved GON and donor coordination.
- Increased effectiveness of NRM investments through strengthened role of NGOs in NRM program identification and implementation.

Impact on the efficiency of governmental operations will start to be seen by program's end. Given ASDG II's short duration (five years), and the necessarily phased nature of activities relating to governmental efficiency, USAID does not anticipate seeing more than process indicators of impact by PACD. Over time, impact should be:

- Higher rate of return to rural development investments due to more coherent investment programming.
- Higher quality services provided to rural population by Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock field staff.

Process indicators for NGOs and rural associations are:

- More local initiative in development projects supported by local NGOs.
- Growth in scale and number of cooperatives and credit union business activity in Niger.

Impact monitoring is based on objective tree analysis by Michael McGahuey. The objective tree for ASDG II is attached, following. The mechanism for monitoring these impacts is described in "A Framework for Monitoring ASDG II Policy Reforms Related to Natural Resource Management" by Patricia Kristjanson (May 1990), included in Annex G, and summarized in the following table, entitled ASDG NRM Impact Indicators.

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ASDG NRM IMPACT INDICATORS

I. PROCESS MONITORING	DATA SOURCE	FREQUENCY OF COLLECTION	RESPONSIBLE	FREQUENCY OF REPORTING	TARGETS (*)
1. National NRM policy development - Follow progress of PIGRN, PNLCD, etc. - Number of field trips, training - Regional or subregional plans developed	PIGRN	Yearly	DEP	Yearly	
2. Donor Coordination - Number of meetings - issuance of reports/inventories	Donor Files	6 months	ADO	Yearly	
3. National Conservation Strategy development - Number of studies - Final document & its integration into National NRM plan	WWF/IUCN	Yearly	ADO	Yearly	
4. Code Rural program - Number of studies, & their use - land registration - communication efforts - transitory measures, "arrêtés"	CNCR	6 months	DEP/PIGRN LTC	Yearly	
5. NGO policy reform - new NGOs created - Number of projects - budget amounts	GAP	Yearly	PDO/ADO	Yearly	
6. Decentralization of NRM programs - Number of training seminars - ratio of projects approved at local/national level	MOP PIGRN	Yearly	DEP	Yearly	
7. Forester role reform - Changes in job attributions - Changes in work plans of field staff	MHE/DE	Yearly	ADO	Yearly	

* Process monitoring does not lend itself to the establishment of quantitative targets. Qualitative evaluations of these activities will however, be made at the indicated yearly intervals.

II. INTERMEDIATE INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	GENDER SENSITIVE	FREQUENCY OF COLLECTION	RESPONSIBLE	FREQUENCY OF REPORTING	TARGETS
1. LAND MANAGEMENT						
- Number land registration & size	DDRAT	Y	Yearly	DEP	Yearly	(1)
- Number land use plans	PIGRN	Y	Yearly	DEP	Yearly	
- Number farmers using NRM practices	Field Sample	Y	2 1/2 yrs	NRMS II	2 1/2 years	
- (i.e. windbreaks, bunds, pole plantations, natural regeneration, etc)						
2. WATER POINTS MANAGEMENT						
- No. attributed/size of surrounding area	CNCR	Y	Yearly	DEP	Yearly	(1)
- people groups included/excluded	PIGRN	Y	" "		" "	
- Uses (pastoral, contre saison, multiple use)						
3. NATURAL WOODLAND MANAGEMENT						
- Number site & ha under management plans	MHE/DE	N	Yearly	ADO	Yearly	(1)
- Number people involved		Y	"		"	
- income from sales of wood and other forest products		N	"		"	
4. PASTURE MANAGEMENT						
- Number of GMP's	UNC	N				(1)
- Number of herder/farmer disputes	Legal system	N	Yearly	DEP	Yearly	
- Number of recognized proprietary rights	MAL	N				
- Number of pasture management plans						

1. Specific targets will be established following gathering of baseline data. In general, however, it is expected that an overall target of 266,000 hectares of new land will be put under sustainable production through the establishment of NRM systems promoted by ASDG II.

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
III. BIOPHYSICAL INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE (1)	GENDER SENSITIVE	FREQUENCY OF COLLECTION	RESPONSIBLE	FREQUENCY OF REPORTING	TARGETS
Changes in Soil Quality Changes in Soil Moisture Changes in Vegetation Cover Changes in Biodiversity Changes in Yields	HAPEX/TROPSOILS HAPEX HAPEX HAPEX/WWF HAPEX	N	Baseline, then yearly	NRMS II	End of Project	(2)
IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS						
Changes in Income Seasonal Migration Women's workload	IFPRI villages in HAPEX area Selected Proj.	Y Y Y	Baseline, then 5 years	NRMS II	End of project	(2)

1. The NRM Advisor at the MAL DEP team will be responsible for following project specific impact of selected NRM projects (using project reports, etc.) and reporting on this on an annual basis. The HAPEX program is explained in Annex F.
2. Impact monitoring of biophysical and socio-economic indicators will be done at a select number of yet to be chosen sites within the 100,000 km² HAPEX area and one or two other sites where ASDG II NGO support funds will finance specific projects. Quantitative targets will be determined after sites are chosen, baseline data are gathered, and project interventions are determined.


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OBJECTIVE TREE ANALYSIS OF NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ASDG II


Level IV
Socio-Economic
Benefits




Level III
Biophysical
Parameters



Level II
Local Level
NRM Strategies



Level I
National level
Policy/Institutional
Environment



02

V. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Overall Implementation Responsibilities

1. Government of Niger

The Ministry of Plan will be the official executing agency for the Government of Niger, and as such will be responsible for program coordination for the government. The ministry will collaborate with the various other ministries and agencies directly involved in the grant program following established procedures of the Government of Niger. The ministry will, in particular, ensure compilation and transmission to USAID of a) evidence attesting to satisfaction of the conditions precedent for each dollar resource transfer, and b) periodic reports on budgetary attributions which attest to compliance with agreed priorities for use of funds from the conditional resource transfer.

The Government of Niger may assign direct responsibility for preparation of the above reports to other units of the administration, as appropriate. The Prime Minister's Cabinet, or other such organization which serves at a level higher than ministries, may at any time assume all or part of the Ministry of Plan's designated functions, as decided by the government.

The Minister of Plan will nominate a Steering Committee for the program, which will meet with USAID representatives at least twice annually to discuss program progress and problems, in particular the status of policy reform efforts and satisfaction of program conditionality. The GON membership of the committee will be specified in Program Implementation Letters. The Minister of Plan and the Director of USAID will hold formal reviews of progress under the program on an annual basis. Details of the procedures for coordination to be followed by the two parties will be specified in the Grant Agreement.

Major implementing agencies for the Government of Niger are as follows:

a. Ministry of Plan

The MOP will play the major role of coordinator. It will be responsible for compilation and transmission to USAID of all official reports required under the program. It will also supervise implementation of certain of the reforms linked to NRM (see Section IV.A. for details) and for reforms relating to the status of nongovernmental organizations.

b. Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock

The MAL will have chief responsibility for aspects of the program dealing with development and implementation of changes in resource tenure systems. See Section IV.A. for details. The MAL will be the main focus of institution-building and institutional reform

efforts. See Section III.D. and the description of the project component for details.

The Secretariat for the Rural Code, which is a division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, will be the institution with primary responsibility for implementation of activities relating to tenure and use rights (the Rural Code as broadly defined). The secretariat will be directly involved in technical assistance/studies planned in support of the Rural Code (see project component description).

c. Ministry of Hydrology and Environment

The MHE will be responsible for leading efforts to develop a national NRM strategy and program, and for implementing changes in the role of the forest service. The ministry will play a key role in all aspects of the NRM component of the program.

2. USAID

The Agricultural Development Office will coordinate program implementation for USAID. The USAID Director will appoint a steering committee to provide technical support for policy monitoring and evaluation, as well as for management of the program support activities. The committee will comprise the Office Director, Agricultural Development Office, who will be chairman of the committee, the ASDG project officer in ADO, the mission economist, the agricultural economist, and representatives of the project development, program, training, management and controller's offices. The Mission Director will make determinations regarding the disbursement of funds with the assistance of the steering committee.

The Agricultural Development Office, with support from the USAID steering committee, will be responsible for monitoring of the policy reform program and preparing reports for USAID and A.I.D./Washington as required under this program; preparing and reviewing with the Government of Niger any changes or revisions in the grant agreement; and coordinating and carrying out any necessary reviews and evaluations to ensure that policy reforms are properly implemented.

USAID will have responsibility for contracting and financial management of the project component of the grant. This component consists of technical assistance, the management contract for the NGO/private sector fund, training and studies, as well as evaluation and audit. All procurement will be through direct A.I.D. contract, with use of IQCs and buy-ins to central projects as appropriate.

The USAID ASDG project officer will be assisted by a fulltime FN project specialist and one FN NRM specialist, as well as necessary support staff, financed from Trust Funds derived from this grant. S/he will be assisted by a U.S. PSC natural resource management specialist and a U.S. PSC rural organizations & private sector advisor. In addition, given the direct link between the ASDG program and the USAID projects supporting cooperative and credit union development (ROD already underway and NCRD starting in FY

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1992), the FN Assistant Project Officer working on ROD and NCRD will be financed from Trust Funds derived from ASDG II.

B. Reporting

1. Financial

The Government of Niger shall furnish to USAID an annual report on the deposition of dollar funds. In the case of this program, this report will include records of transactions from BCEAO indicating that the dollar funds have been converted to FCFA and the resultant FCFA funds transferred to U.S. Trust Fund, NGO/Private Sector and Special Grantee Accounts, as described in Section IV.D. The BCEAO will provide banking records indicating the various transfers, above. The NGO/Private Sector Fund manager will report receipt of its portion of any tranche. The Government will report on the transfer of the net proceeds provided as budget support into a special account or accounts in a banking institution acceptable to the two Parties. To the extent permissible by Nigerien law and banking procedures in force, this account shall be interest-bearing. The GON will further provide evidence that the funds to be attributed to operating and investment budgets were deposited in the general budget of the GON for attribution to those accounts, as specified in conditions precedent to disbursement.

The firm managing the NGO/private sector fund will provide full financial reporting on use of the funds to USAID and the GON.

The government will attest that the funds transferred to its use for budget support (operating and investment segments) were used to carry out the purposes of the ASDG II program. The Government will furnish USAID with an annual report indicating in summary form the level of financing accorded to various entities (which shall, for each tranche, equal no less than the equivalent of the value of proceeds provided to the GON), and describing, in summary form, activities undertaken (see section IV.D. for more detail).

The goal of the budget support portions of the cash transfer is to maintain a certain level of financial support to the government budget to allow the GON to fulfill the objectives of the grant, as defined. It is understood that the funds will be combined with other budgetary funds of the government and will not be specifically traceable.

2. Implementation of Policy Reforms

Each year, the Government of Niger will present a report to USAID stating the policy reforms or institutional changes enacted up to that time and other actions undertaken to satisfy conditions precedent, and will provide the official decrees or other documentation in an annex. The requirements of each succeeding annual report shall be agreed to in writing by the two parties as part of annual review of progress.

The annual report shall be used by Government of Niger and USAID senior management as a basis for analysis of the progress made or problems encountered in the policy reform program. Formal reviews of progress shall be held on at least an annual basis, and will

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provide the basis for determining subsequent disbursements of funds under this grant. They will also provide an opportunity to make necessary adjustments or to correct any errors made during the design or implementation of the program. Formal reviews required to determine if conditions precedent have been satisfied shall be co-chaired by the Government of Niger, as represented by the Minister of Plan, and the Director, USAID/Niger.

The USAID Mission Director will make the final determination as to whether necessary conditions precedent for each tranche of the dollar disbursement have been met. USAID will report to AID/Washington on compliance thereafter. It will also provide Washington with semi-annual reports on program progress, using data provided by the Government of Niger as well as information gained from its own monitoring of the program.

C. Monitoring

The monitoring plan for the program is based on 1) monitoring of design assumptions to assure that the design is valid (and to allow for mid-term corrections, if necessary), 2) monitoring of the policy reform program itself, with the intention of assessing its effectiveness and eventual impact, and 3) monitoring of program impact. Because the goal of the sector grant portion which is transferred to GON budgets is to provide support to the GON in achieving program purpose and not for particular project activities, the funds will be monitored until deposit in the GON general budget account. The portion of the grant which is transferred to the NGO/private sector fund will be monitored using normal AID procedures.

1. Monitoring of Design Assumptions

The key design assumptions are outlined in the Logical Framework (Annex A). USAID program management will use the results of field visits, surveys and studies carried out for this program and under other auspices to monitor the validity of the design assumptions. USAID semi-annual project implementation reviews will include this issue on the agenda. USAID will also use annual internal control assessments as a monitoring tool.

2. Monitoring of the Reform Program

Monitoring of the reform program will be accomplished through use of the reporting procedures and joint GON/USAID reviews described above. USAID will also use its own resources (staff and Trust Fund financing) to assure monitoring of GON compliance with the terms of the Agreement. The system is well established, given the years of experience with ASDG I.

USAID will monitor the performance of the entities responsible for carrying out the program. Long-term technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock is planned under the program. Funds also exist in the project component of the program which could be used to provide short-term technical assistance to assist the GON in improving the performance of those entities, if unforeseen

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problems arise which are amenable to resolution through technical advice.

3. Monitoring of Program Impact

See Sections IV.F. and VI.D. for discussions of the anticipated impact of the program. See Annex G., Kristjanson, for detailed discussion of approaches to monitoring of impact relating to natural resource management.

Monitoring of impact will be carried out during and beyond program life. Systems to be established under ASDG I, for the "NRM Amendment" (PAAD Amendment 3, 1989) will serve as a basis for monitoring of the impact of natural resource management interventions and related reforms. Monitoring of changes at beneficiary level (farmers, herders) will rely extensively on surveys conducted at sites which benefit from financing under the NGO/Private Sector fund. The process of impact monitoring as it relates to NRM should be a continuum from ASDG I to ASDG II. Therefore, the selection of sites for detailed assessment and monitoring under ASDG II will need to be made so as to build on data available through comparative study of sites selected for ASDG I. These decisions will need to be made during program life to be meaningful.

The impact on ultimate beneficiaries (farmers and herders) of institutional changes to be effected in rural development services will only be visible in a timeframe beyond program life. This is because the changes will take most of program life to institute, and because the primary effects will be gains in efficiency of actions, rather than an increase in the number or scale of those actions (the latter being assumed to be visible in a shorter time period, and also to be sustainable for a shorter period).

The first phase in program monitoring is to establish the baseline data to be used as a benchmark against which to measure progress. Determination of the data sets to be collected for baseline will be made during year 1, with the assistance of the Agricultural Policy Analysis II project (APAP II), the University of Michigan team assigned to the ASDG I program, and through assistance from NRM experts in Niger. The data sets must be able to serve for monitoring policy reforms in the short-term, and for monitoring impact during and beyond program life. See attached tables relating to impact monitoring actions (pp. 82-84).

The contractor groups responsible for impact monitoring of the NRM component are identified in Table IV.1. Detailed impact monitoring plans will be developed as part of the contractor work plan. In addition, USAID/Niger may finance and administer a series of small surveys and studies, financed from the USAID Trust Fund portion of the grant. Monitoring techniques will include, but not be limited to:

- interviews over time with key informants (e.g., beneficiaries of project interventions financed by the NGO/private sector fund, selected members of communities which have specifically benefited from changes in tenure rules);

- group interviews of farmers and herders in communities benefiting from NRM interventions and from tenure changes;
- sample surveys of selected sites benefiting from NRM interventions, to measure and track over time, improvements in physical measures of productivity (soil moisture, soil depth, etc.).
- site visits to arrondissements benefiting from institutional component interventions for review of governmental operations, interviews with beneficiaries to assess changes in efficiency of government services.

ASDG II monitoring will also benefit from studies and monitoring activities under ASDG I and NEPRP, and from technical assistance activities and studies under USAID projects, in particular from ROD and from WOCCU credit union development activities.

3. Monitoring of Local Currency Use

Monitoring of the funds provided to the NGO/private sector fund will be assured through review of financial reports received from the direct AID contractor managing the funds, and through nonfederal audit of the activities so financed. Funds have also been set aside for programmatic audit, if deemed necessary. The USAID project officer for ASDG will have direct responsibility for monitoring performance of the direct AID contractor, with assistance from the Office of the Controller in regards to financial management issues.

Monitoring of the funds provided to the GON for budget support will be followed to the point of deposit in general budget, since at that point they are commingled and not specifically traceable. As instructed in 87 State 327494 (and various other cables with identical wording): "If AID and the recipient government program the local currency for more general purposes, for example, an agreement that local currency will be used to meet development budget requirements of, say, the Ministry of Agriculture, the role of AID may be limited to ensuring that documentation exists demonstrating that the local currency indeed was transferred to the ministry's development account. The mission need not trace the funds to specific budgetary or end-use items since AID's development goal is a level of overall financial support to a program or an institution; indeed, once transferred from a special account to a program or an institution, the funds will generally have been combined with other budgetary funds and will not be traceable. However, the mission should generally be satisfied on the quality of overall program activities and the technical and administrative capabilities of the implementing entity or entities to carry out the program. Furthermore, periodic reports on budgetary allocations should be required over the period of the agreement to enable the mission to assess compliance with agreed priorities. Finally, the mission should assure itself post hoc that the government has accorded an appropriate emphasis to priority programs. This can be used as a basis for making judgments about future local currency allocation decisions."

Monitoring of performance of the government in carrying out the objectives of the grant will be mandated as a part of the annual

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review required for decision on release of increments of the conditional resource transfer. Government reports required under the grant will be supplemented by site visits and evaluations as a part of the program management conducted by USAID.

D. Implementation Schedule

1. Illustrative Implementation Schedule - Release of Funds

Grant Agreement Signed	8/90
Conditions Precedent to initial disbursement met (technical assistance funds)	11/90
Conditions Precedent to first dollar resource transfer met	6/91
Annual review of program progress	8/91
Conditions Precedent to second dollar resource transfer met	6/92
Annual review of program progress	8/92
Mid-term evaluation	6/93
Annual review of program progress	8/93
Conditions Precedent to third dollar resource transfer met	10/93
Annual review of program progress	8/94
Conditions Precedent to fourth dollar resource transfer met	8/94
Final evaluation	6/95
Annual review of program progress	8/95
End of Program	12/95

2. Illustrative Schedule of Major Program Activities

See Section IV. for a schedule of key events organized by topic.

Year 1

A. NRM Component

1. National NRM Strategy and Action Plan

- Harmonize the various programs concerned with natural resources planning: PIGRN/PNLCD/TFAP/NCS/Rural Code/Forestry & Water Code Revisions/National Wildlife Action Plan/Land Use Action Plan.
- Set up a donor coordination mechanism.
- Complete a national Biodiversity Assessment.

- Prepare the terms of reference for the National Conservation Strategy.

2. Resource Tenure

- Complete studies and other work related to the preparation and adoption of a Rural Code.

3. Decentralization of Natural Resources Management

- Design NRM workshop for local leaders.
- Establish terms of reference for a joint GON/USAID study on administrative reform necessary to ensure effective decentralization.

4. Forester Roles in Natural Resources Management

- Joint USAID/GON study of forester roles and extension models.

B. Institutional Component

1. Information Systems for Better Resource Management, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

- Collect data, develop computerized system and train MAL staff in computer use.

2. Development of Personnel Training and Assignment Policy, MAL

- Evaluate the human potential of MAL.

3. Design of a Program Budgeting System and Guide for Conformity of Donor Projects with Program Budget Objectives (MAL)

- Seminar-workshop on management by objectives (MBO).

4. Strengthening the Participation of NGOs and Other Rural Institutions in Natural Resource Management

- Review regulations governing NGOs. Draft action plan for modification.
- Plan makes formal statement of NGO rights and responsibilities.
- Direct AID contract signed with U.S. private sector organization to manage NGO local currency fund and provide T.A. to local NGOs.

Year 2

A. NRM Component

1. National NRM Strategy and Action Plan

- Finalize proposed National NRM Strategy (NNRMS), integrating with it the National Conservation Strategy.
- Review the draft NNRMS.

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2. Resource Tenure

- Design and implement national Publicity campaign on the principles and procedures for applying the new Code.

3. Decentralization of Natural Resources Management

- Conduct NRM workshops.
- Conduct joint study, adopt recommendations.
- Pursue application of decentralization policy.

4. Forester Roles in Natural Resources Management

- Set-up and implement a pilot project to test alternative roles of forestry agents in forest management.

B. Institutional Component

1. Information Systems for Better Resource Management, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

- Design and install information system on personnel, equipment, infrastructure.
- Design and install geographic information systems.
- Develop action plan for establishment of system for information and sectoral and regional coordination of development actions.
- Establish job descriptions for DEP (Direction of Studies and Programming) and for two arrondissements as a test.

2. Development of Personnel Training and Assignment Policy, MAL

- Determine training needs and technical assistance needs, and determine priority specialization categories for training.

3. Design of a Program Budgeting System and Guide for Conformity of Donor Projects with Program Budget Objectives (MAL)

- Design MBO system.
- Refine rules for project design, programming, coordination and management.

4. Strengthening the Participation of NGOs and Other Rural Institutions in Natural Resource Management

- GON-NGO Roundtable and action plan for implementation of recommendations.
- Direct AID contractor begins to offer technical assistance to local NGOs. NGO local currency fund begins operation after release of first tranche.

Year 3

A. NRM Component

1. National NRM Strategy and Action Plan

- Adopt the NNRMS. GON/donor agreements on program funding.
- Elaborate terms of reference for the preparation of a technical

handbook for environmental impact studies.

2. Resource Tenure

- Grant newly secured tenure and usufruct rights to individuals and communities for the purpose of better management of the natural resource base.

3. Decentralization of Natural Resources Management

- Support demand driven NRM programs.

4. Forester Roles in Natural Resources Management

- Monitor and evaluate pilot project, modifying as necessary.

B. Institutional Component

1. Information Systems for Better Resource Management, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

- Evaluate and refine the job description system.

2. Development of Personnel Training and Assignment Policy, MAL

- Establish training plan and assignment policy for personnel

3. Design of a Program Budgeting System and Guide for Conformity of Donor Projects with Program Budget Objectives (MAL)

- Put in place annual program budgeting system for activities and budgeting.
- Prepare guidelines for conformity of the objectives of donor projects and the program budgeting system.
- Workshop-seminar on the extension of the guidelines, above.

4. Strengthening the Participation of NGOs and Other Rural Institutions in Natural Resource Management

- Modify regulations, as agreed in Year 1.
- Complete implementation of Roundtable 1 recommendations.
- Hold study tours of model NRM activities for NGOs/GON/private sector
- Put in place project monitoring systems for each NGO project funded by program to date.

Year 4

A. NRM Component

1. National NRM Strategy and Action Plan

- Implement NNRMS.

2. Resource Tenure

- Grant newly secured tenure and usufruct rights to individuals

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and communities for the purpose of better management of the natural resource base.

3. Decentralization of Natural Resources Management

- Support demand driven NRM programs.

4. Forester Roles in Natural Resources Management

- Monitor and evaluate pilot project, modifying as necessary.

B. Institutional Component

1. Information Systems for Better Resource Management, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

- Evaluate and refine the job description system.
- Install the job description system.

2. Development of Personnel Training and Assignment Policy, MAL

- Establish strategy for monitoring of personnel careers.
- Put in place measures permitting better balance between training and employment.
- Install the system of job descriptions.

3. Design of a Program Budgeting System and Guide for Conformity of Donor Projects with Program Budget Objectives (MAL)

- Use annual work plan derived from program budgeting system in two departments.

4. Strengthening the Participation of NGOs and Other Rural Institutions in Natural Resource Management

- GON-NGO Roundtable held, as Year 2.
- Hold study tours of model NRM activities for NGOs/GON/private sector.

Year 5

A. NRM Component

1. National NRM Strategy and Action Plan

- Continue implementation of the NNRMS.
- Adopt the technical handbook on environmental impact studies.

2. Resource Tenure

- Continued progress in granting newly secured tenure and usufruct rights to individuals and communities for the purpose of better management of the natural resource base.

3. Decentralization of Natural Resources Management

- Support demand driven NRM programs.

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4. Forester Roles in Natural Resources Management

- Final evaluation of pilot project and progressive application of positive results on a national level.

B. Institutional Component

1. Information Systems for Better Resource Management, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

- Continue to install the system of job descriptions.

2. Development of Personnel Training and Assignment Policy, MAL

- Put in place measures permitting better balance between training and employment.

3. Design of a Program Budgeting System and Guide for Conformity of Donor Projects with Program Budget Objectives (MAL)

- Monitoring of systems in place.

4. Strengthening the Participation of NGOs and Other Rural Institutions in Natural Resource Management

- Joint GON/USAID/NGO evaluations held of sample of NGO projects under grant.
- Implementation of Roundtable 2 recommendations.

E. Financial Plan

1. Summary

ASDG II will be organized into two components: the first a dollar sector grant, the second a project component which will finance technical assistance, training, studies, evaluation and audit activities directly related to the policy reform program. Disbursement of the dollar resource portion of the sector grant is planned in four tranches. The dollar resource transfer is conditioned on satisfaction by the Government of Niger of specific terms stated in the Grant Agreement. USAID will retain 8% of the total dollar resource transfer in the form of a Trust Fund to be used to defray costs to A.I.D. related to program management and monitoring, and for general mission support.

It is proposed that dollar resources totalling \$20,000,000 be made available to the Government of Niger over the life of the program in the form of cash transfer, from which will be made a deduction of \$1,600,000 in Trust Funds. The total will be deposited by A.I.D. in a U.S. bank of the Grantee's choice, from which it will be transferred to the BCEAO Niamey for exchange into FCFA. The BCEAO will transfer 8% of the funds to A.I.D. for its trust fund, will transfer a predetermined percentage of the tranche to a commercial bank account for the NGO/private sector fund, and will transfer the net balance to the Special Grantee Account(s) of the GON, for eventual attribution to the a) operating and b) investment budgets of the government, as mutually agreed by the two Parties.

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The \$5,000,000 project component consists of technical assistance, studies and training directly related to the policy reform program, as well as evaluation and audit activities. Disbursement of funds for technical assistance will not be contingent on satisfaction of policy reform conditionality. Financial management of this component of the program will be the responsibility of USAID. The total budget request for the program will be \$25,000,000 over the life of program.

2. Proposed Budget

	\$000
Conditional Resource Transfer (of which 8% transferred to USAID Trust Fund)	20,000
Program Support Component	
-Technical assistance	2,100
-Short-term training/Seminars	400
-Commodities	400
-Studies	1,100
-Evaluation/Monitoring	300
-Audit	200
-Other Support Costs	300
-Contingencies/Inflation	200
Total	25,000

3. Illustrative Obligation Schedule (\$000)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>Total</u>
I. Dollar Transfer	5,000	5,000	4,000	5,000	1,000	20,000
II. Project Component	2,000	1,525	200	775	500	5,000
Total	7,000	6,525	4,200	5,775	1,500	25,000

4. Illustrative Disbursement Schedule (\$000)

	<u>Year 1</u>	<u>Year 2</u>	<u>Year 3</u>	<u>Year 4</u>	<u>Year 5</u>	<u>Total</u>
I. Dollar Transfer	0	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	20,000
(of which 8% for USAID Trust Fund)	0	400	400	400	400	1,600
Net Transfer to Govt.	0	4,600	4,600	4,600	4,600	18,400

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II. Project Component

A. Technical Assist.	100	500	600	500	400	2,100
B. Training/seminars	50	100	100	100	50	400
C. Commodities	150	50	50	100	50	400
D. Studies	200	200	300	200	200	1,100
E. Evaluation	0	100	50	50	100	500
F. Audit	0	50	50	50	50	200
G. Support costs	0	50	80	100	70	300
H. Contingencies	0	50	50	50	50	200
<u>Subtotal II.</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>1,100</u>	<u>1,280</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>970</u>	<u>5,000</u>
<u>Total Program Funding</u> (including Trust Funds)	<u>500</u>	<u>6,100</u>	<u>6,280</u>	<u>6,150</u>	<u>5,970</u>	<u>25,000</u>

5. Methods of Implementation and Financing

Method of Implementation	Method of Financing	Approximate Amount
1. Dollar Disbursement	Direct Payment	20,000
2. Project Component		
- Technical Assistance (AID direct contracts)	Direct Payment	2,100
- Training (AID direct)	Direct Payment/ Direct Reimbursement	400
- Commodities(AID direct)	Direct Payment	400
- Studies (AID direct)	Direct Payment	1,100
- Evaluation (AID direct)	Direct Payment	300
- Audit (AID direct)	Direct Payment	200
- Support costs(AID dir.)	Direct Payment	300
- Contingencies (N/A)	N/A)	200

6. Procedures for Sector Grant Resource Transfer

a. Procedures for Dollar Transfer

The procedures for the sector grant transfer are summarized as follows:

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(1) After the Grantee submits evidence that it has satisfied, and A.I.D. determines that the Grantee has satisfied, the conditions precedent for the initial disbursement of dollar transfer or, as the case may be, subsequent conditions precedent for subsequent disbursements, A.I.D. will notify the Grantee by Implementation Letter that the conditions precedent have been met.

(2) The Grantee must submit to A.I.D. a written request for a U.S. dollar disbursement under the Grant.

(3) Upon receipt of the Grantee's written request for a dollar disbursement under the Grant, A.I.D. will review such request and promptly notify A.I.D./Washington (PFM/FM/CMP/CGLC) that the conditions precedent have been satisfied and the Grantee has requested a U.S. dollar disbursement.

(4) Based upon documentation provided by A.I.D., PFM/FM/CMP/CGLC will request the U.S. Treasury to disburse U.S. dollars by electronic transfer to a special dollar account or sub-account in the name of the BCEAO at a U.S. bank of the Grantee's choice (the "BCEAO Account").

(5) The BCEAO will notify A.I.D. and the Grantee by written communication of receipt of the transfer within three days of such receipt.

(6) The U.S. Treasury's instructions to the BCEAO Account shall require immediate transfer of the dollar amount credit to a special dollar account at BCEAO/Niamey (the "Special Dollar Account") where the conversion from U.S. dollars to FCFA takes place. Any interest generated by the Special Dollar Account during the period between receipt of the dollar funds and disbursement of the FCFA by the BCEAO/Niamey is the property of the Government of Niger. Any such interest will be used for the same purposes as the principal.

(7) Pursuant to existing BCEAO rules and procedures followed by WAMU member countries, BCEAO/Niamey will pay into the special account of the Government of Niger (the "Special Grantee Account") at a mutually agreed-upon banking institution the FCFA equivalent of the amount of U.S. dollars transferred to the Special Dollar Account at the exchange rate specified in the Grant Agreement, minus the amounts transferred by BCEAO/Niamey to the Local Currency Trust Fund Account and to the NGO/Private Sector Fund as provided in the Amplified Program Description of the Grant Agreement. The Dollars deposited in the Special Dollar Account will automatically become part of the foreign exchange pool of WAMU.

b. Deposit and Disbursement Procedures for the Local Currency Component

(1) The Grantee will issue to BCEAO/Niamey written standing instructions, subject to variation only upon written authorization of both Grantee and A.I.D., requiring that each deposit to the Special Dollar Account be handled as follows:

(a) Immediately upon receipt of each deposit to the Special

Dollar Account, BCEAO/Niamey shall notify the Grantee and A.I.D. of such receipt.

(b) Within 5 (five) working days of receipt of each deposit, BCEAO/Niamey shall transfer a percentage of such deposit, as determined pursuant to the terms of the Grant Agreement, together with any interest thereon, to an account of the Grantee at a banking institution mutually acceptable to both Parties (the "Special Grantee Account").

(c) Within 5 (five) working days of receipt of each deposit, BCEAO/Niamey shall transfer a percentage of such deposit, as determined pursuant to the terms of the Grant Agreement, together with any interest thereon, to the special account of the U.S. private sector organization charged with managing the NGO/Private Sector Fund.

(d) Within 5 (five) working days of receipt of each deposit, BCEAO/Niamey shall transfer eight percent (8%) of such deposit to the United States Disbursing Officer, to be held in trust by A.I.D. for the Government of Niger for use in accordance with the Grant Agreement.

(2) The Special Grantee Account at the mutually agreed-upon banking institution shall be constituted separately from any other accounts of such banking institution and no other funds shall be commingled therewith. Funds deposited in the Special Grantee Account shall be used pursuant to the terms of the Grant Agreement. Such funds shall be considered as additional resources for the National Budget of the Government of Niger and shall not be a substitution for the Grantee's own budgetary resources.

(3) To the extent allowed by the laws of the Government of Niger and applicable banking regulations and practices, the Special Account shall be interest-bearing. Any interest accruing on the Special Account shall be used for the Program in the same manner as the principal.

(a) The Grantee will establish the Special Grantee Account for this Grant in a banking establishment mutually agreed by the two Parties. BCEAO/Niamey will deposit to the Special Grantee Account the FCFA equivalent of the dollar cash disbursements (minus funds to be disbursed to the Local Currency Trust Fund Account and the NGO/Private Sector Fund) as described hereinabove. The funds in the Special Grantee Account will then be transferred to the Treasury of the Grantee in the proportions to be attributed to operational or investment budgets as described in and determined pursuant to paragraph c. hereinbelow. All such funds transferred to the Treasury of the Grantee shall be considered resources for the operational and investment budgets of the Grantee, for use in support of the Program. Interest accruing on either the Special Grantee Account or the Grantee Bank Account shall be transferred to the Treasury of the Grantee for the Program in the same manner as the principal.

(b) As stated in the Grant Agreement, eight percent (8%) of the funds to be disbursed pursuant to each tranche under the Grant shall be deposited in the Local Currency Trust Fund Account to be

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administered by A.I.D. for program management and monitoring and for general mission support.

c. Procedures for Disbursements of Local Currency

(1) Operational budget support:

The Grantee shall attribute a portion of the proceeds from each sector grant tranche to the operational budgets of ministries and governmental agencies charged with implementing the ASDG II program. The specific portion of such proceeds to be attributed in this manner and the criteria for its use will be specified in Program Implementation Letters.

Unless the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the entities to receive such funding are as follows:

- Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
- Ministry of Hydrology and Environment.

(2) Investment budget support

The Grantee shall attribute a portion of the proceeds from the sector grant to the investment account of the Government of Niger, to be used to support fulfillment of the objectives of the grant. The specific portion of such proceeds and the criteria for its use will be specified in Program Implementation Letters.

(3) NGO/private sector fund.

The Grantee will instruct BCEAO/Niamey to transfer a portion of the proceeds from each sector grant tranche to the account of a U.S. private sector entity in a private banking institution for inclusion in the NGO/Private Sector Fund. The portion of the proceeds to be transferred to and the criteria for use of the NGO/Private Sector Fund will be specified in Program Implementation Letters. Oversight of the NGO/Private Sector Fund will be provided by a joint public-private committee, comprised of representatives from A.I.D., the Government of Niger, the Groupement des Aides Privees ("GAP"), NGOs which are not members of GAP, and the Nigerien private sector. The committee will review and approve proposals for funding under the NGO/Private Sector Fund, will review reports and may participate in evaluations of projects financed by the Fund. The Minister of Plan and the A.I.D. Mission Director have final decision-making authority over use of the funds in case of dispute.

The procedures will be further stipulated in detail in Project Implementation Letters prior to release of the first tranche.

F. Procurement Plan

All procurement under the project assistance component will be through direct A.I.D. contracting. A direct A.I.D. contract or cooperative agreement will be executed with a U.S. PVO or private sector entity for management of the NGO/private sector local currency fund. A direct A.I.D. contract will be executed for long-term technical assistance and USAID and the Regional

Contracting Officer are researching the feasibility of executing a single contract for both the NGO fund and T.A. management, in order to reduce mission management burden. Studies not programmed under the long-term T.A. contract will be arranged through mission buy-ins to centrally funded projects, or through IQC arrangements, to the extent possible. Short-term training will be arranged using standard USAID/Niger procedures and practices. Gray Amendment entities will be used whenever feasible and appropriate. For any contract with dollar value exceeding \$500,000, at least 10% subcontracting to disadvantaged enterprises is required.

All procurement is planned from Code 935 source and origin. The following procurement plan may be amended during program implementation.

Item	Estimated Value	% U.S.
Dollar resource transfer	\$20,000,000	N/A
Technical assistance	2,100,000	75
Training	400,000	30
- in-country workshops		
- training through local institutions		
- short-term training in U.S.		
Commodities	400,000	50
- computers		
- office equipment		
- vehicles		
- household furniture		
- office furniture		
Studies	1,100,000	50
Evaluation/Monitoring	300,000	80
Audit	200,000	80
Support costs	300,000	N/A
Contingencies/Inflation	200,000	N/A
Total	\$25,000,000	

Note that attempts will be made to increase participation of the Nigerien private sector in program activities (studies, short-term consultancies), thus reducing the percentage of U.S. procurement.

G. Evaluation Plan

The program will receive two external evaluations during its life. It is anticipated that in order to evaluate program impact properly, a further ex-post evaluation will need to be carried out after the PACD. Specific plans and funding for such an evaluation will be decided following the final evaluation. PD&S or other funds would

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be used for such a study.

The mid-term evaluation, scheduled for Year 3 of the program, will assess the progress to date, and gauge whether the program is on course and can achieve its purpose. The evaluation team will make recommendations for changes in any aspect of the program deemed appropriate, and will pay special attention to review of impact monitoring systems operated by the GON and USAID, to assure that they are adequate to needs.

The final evaluation, scheduled for Year 5, will provide lessons learned for USAID and the GON. The exact content of the final evaluation will vary depending on whether USAID and the GON will have decided to finance a third phase sectoral program or not. In the case that the two parties are at that point proceeding to design a follow-on grant, the evaluation will provide specific recommendations for such a program. In the case that the two parties will have determined not to proceed to such a next phase, the evaluation will concentrate on lessons learned which can be useful both within Niger and to AID worldwide.

It should be noted that the program will also include annual internal evaluations, structured around annual reviews of progress which trigger release of conditional resource transfers. The experience of existing sectoral programs is that these internal reviews are important elements of evaluation functions of the program. See also the Information Plan, Annex E.

H. Audit Plan

The Grant Agreement will include audit and redeposit provisions to protect A.I.D. The GON will assure that financial documentation, books and records covering the use of dollar funds are maintained in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices consistently applied, and are available for inspection by A.I.D. or any of its authorized representatives at all times as A.I.D. may reasonably require for a period of three years after the date of last disbursement by A.I.D. under the cash transfer.

The budget transfer portion of the cash transfer is intended to maintain a certain level of financial support to the government budget to assist the GON in fulfilling the program's objectives. It is understood that the local currency funds will be combined with other budgetary funds of the government and will not be specifically traceable.

Independent (non-federal) audits will be carried out to assess the management of the PVO/private sector fund and its activities.

During the course of the program, the joint GON-USAID steering committee, or USAID itself may choose to call for a "compliance audit" to review the Grantee's compliance with the terms of the policy reform conditions. Funds have been set aside for such a purpose. If no such audit review is needed, the funds will be used for contingency needs under the project component. In addition, USAID reserves the right to ask for audits or investigations by the Office of the Regional Inspector General of A.I.D. as in all other projects and programs of the Agency.

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VI. Feasibility Analyses

Please see annex G for detailed assessments of issues relating to natural resource management, institutions and social soundness.

A. Institutional and Social Analysis

1. Agencies Responsible for Implementing Institutional Reforms

a. General Comments on Government Rural Development Services

The previous historical and recent relationships in Niger between government officials, from both the technical services and the territorial administration, and the rural populations have not established traditions for collaboration in development. In general, the national leadership has focused on consolidating and maintaining power based on a collusion between the government and "traditional authorities." The exclusion of any association outside strict government surveillance is one facet of efforts to tightly control "regional," ethnic and other tensions. Indeed, indigenous Nigerien associations such as the Samaria and village cooperatives are really at best quasi-governmental creations, fitting neatly into a national, stratified hierarchy. The civil service, constituting the largest salaried and most educated group, has not escaped from strict supervision and direction based on criteria far removed from concern for successful technical performance. Unfortunately, previous experience suggests that the leadership has not had a vision allowing for some complementarity between their search for political stability and the requisites for successful rural extension and development.

There are positive, and increasing, examples of steps to solicit local participation in the identification, execution and evaluation of rural development. In both decree and deed, the government has bestowed greater rights to rural communities in the management of natural resources (for instance, in natural forest management and agroforestry). Members of the technical services now always preface remarks about any rural intervention with a description of the process of identifying and executing development based on community desires, and contributions (usually in labor or in kind). Contemporary government rhetoric certainly incorporates many terms evocative of the "new" relationship with rural populations, such as collaboration and responsabilisation. In addition, the number of non-governmental organizations have increased within the last two years, as has the scope of their activities. However, the local government services still wish to guard prerogatives to guide and monitor such organizations.

These changes remain fragile and should be accompanied by a significant effort to institutionalize precedents and apply the spirit of the philosophy of collaborative rural development. Extension officers often reiterate that the "new" approach to working with rural communities is only a few years old, and implies significant changes in mentalities and practices. The implication is that these changes are not yet universal, and neither clearly understood nor systematically applied. In practice and thought,

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many government officials obviously still have not gone beyond offering a simple verbal repetition of the current, official government policy to visitors. Some of the older officials remember the initiatives and subsequent reversals in approach to cooperative development in the 1960s under the Diiori regime as an inauspicious precedent, and thus express some cynicism - or at least scepticism - about the future of the "new" approach.

The agricultural service has the widest network of agents in rural areas, as well as the clearest mandate historically to provide services directly to beneficiary communities. This role is commonly referred to as "extension," but, in fact, encompasses a much broader range of tasks than extension as practiced in the United States. The environmental service also has a key potential role in introducing new technologies, but the paramilitary attributions and associations with repression in rural communities makes a transformation in roles particularly difficult. Changing the "mentalities" of officers and beneficiaries, with the accompanying revisions in training and the structure of the service, will be an arduous task. Livestock and hydraulics have virtually no tradition of outreach, which will require revisions in training and role definitions. USAID would therefore have most impact in the shortest period of time focusing initial efforts in agriculture.

b. The Agricultural Service

Although the agricultural service needs systemic transformations to offer more effective services, a variety of discrete changes can be made individually and at different times that would each have significant impact. In general, the service is not internally organized to fulfill a role as a catalyst for improvements of the conditions of production for rural communities. Although scarcity of human and material resources are a limiting factor for officers in the field, more fundamental structural problems in the service are the major factors negatively affecting performance. These dysfunctional characteristics permeate the system from initial selection and training of future agricultural officers, to posting, service and in-service training, evaluation, promotion and further training.

In effect, officers really deliver goods ("inputs") to rural communities, rather than services (that is, training and resources that can be creatively exploited by the beneficiaries). Farmers evaluate these inputs outside of a dialogue with the officer. They therefore accept or reject inputs based on a system of discrimination often alien to the government officials "closest" to local conditions.

The good intentions of many field staff in rural development are striking, in spite of the many factors which mitigate against motivation and action. The officers often simply do not have the necessary skills to offer meaningful services to farmers, who are professional agriculturalists with a thorough knowledge of their local environment, resources and opportunities. Other factors undermine or block individual efforts to effect positive changes.

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(1) Selection and Training

The criteria for selecting future agricultural (extension) officers are not based on personal background relevant to rural areas. Candidates have passed the examinations for the certificate attesting to the first level of high school education (the Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle - BEPC). Education previous to professional training is academic, and the criteria for success depend on the mastery of French and other subjects. Students of more urban backgrounds are more apt to succeed in the system, and even students of rural backgrounds become progressively more removed from their origins as they move to urban schools for four or more years as part of their education.

The candidate becomes a student at the national rural training school, Institut Pratique de Developpement Rural (IPDR), for a period of two years, before assignment to the field as a District Agricultural Officer. The level of education and practical skills after such a short period of technical training is necessarily modest. The young officer is introduced to a range of subjects pertinent to agriculture and trained in a few basic techniques and skills to offer to farmers. Future assignment and professional training after the first two years of IPDR are thus critical to the performance of extension officers in the field.

The modest academic background and level of professional training of new officers do not furnish a basis for a sophisticated or flexible approach to delivering advice to farmers. Thinking is still dominated by rather rigid "technical packages" constituted of a few components. Extension is still generally by the "demonstration" method of cultivating a field with new techniques in a few villages in each district. There are now some efforts at demonstrations also using control plots with local seed (and sometimes local techniques) and occasional on-farm trials with volunteers from the community. However, the general approach is not analytical, and does not train future officers to offer technical advice on a choice among various technologies based on specific contexts. The farmer is certainly not seen as a resource and veritable collaborator with the future officer. The training does not directly address the problems of educated attitudes towards the rural world.

(2) Posting and In-Service Training

New agricultural officers are not assigned according to relevant strengths in their personal backgrounds, including linguistic abilities. Indeed, officers are purposely assigned to alien regions, where they are unfamiliar with the local languages, culture, society and micro-environments (and thus the basic natural conditions affecting agriculture). A well-intentioned officer may soon learn basic communication skills but could hardly be genuinely effective in expressing the subtleties of distinctions in a range of agricultural domains (such as seed selection, soil quality and micro-environmental growing conditions) in less than one to two years. Even an officer assigned as a native speaker of local language in a district must (re)learn the language and culture of the rural community.

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The extreme mobility of officers within and between arrondissements discourages learning how to adapt knowledge to local conditions and linkages to community aspirations and capacities. Posting of officers looks like a game of musical chairs directed by the heads of the agricultural services at all of the administrative levels. Opportunities for in-service training are absolutely haphazard. There are no standards for the Chefs de Service in the arrondissements to guide the training of their staff. A new extension officer may, if quite lucky, fall under a Chef with an organized program for introducing, training and monitoring the district officer in the field. This is certainly the exception. Otherwise, the officer may receive sporadic visits and comments from the Chef, with occasional, structured meetings (such as the planning of the agricultural campaign for the arrondissement shortly before the rainy season).

The various forms of in-service training offered are not standardized, regular, or programmed into an officer's career. These opportunities are often financed as part of project activities, or by other programs of international donors. Neither the ministry nor the donors coordinate these programs in order to have a global impact on the agricultural service. The training can therefore have only limited effect on officer performance, and application of the training has short-term - or no - effect on officer performance due to a lack of logistical and policy support. In-service training also has absolutely no relation to an officer's career and promotions.

Officers therefore pick up new information as possible and basically following individual inclination, hope for an occasional opportunity for in-service training and bide their time for the next opportunity to leave for long-term training, and thus future promotion.

(3) Monitoring and Evaluation

District officers are expected to submit monthly reports on their activities to the arrondissement Chef, particularly during the "saison des cultures" (rainy season). The Chef uses the information gleaned from these and other sources to make his own periodic reports to the departmental authorities.

The field visits of Chefs are sporadic, and follow no standard programs (except, perhaps, within the new World Bank-financed program to intensify agricultural extension). The regularity of visits is at least partially conditioned by the availability of vehicles, and especially of fuel, for travel. However, it appears that other matters generally have higher priority for the Chefs, such as demands of the local territorial authorities for "technical" or political functions and of their Departmental superiors.

The content of monitoring and evaluation is really based on counts of inputs delivered, not on impact. Prominence is given to evidence such as: 1) the number of demonstration fields established and managed, 2) the quantity of improved seed delivered to farmers, 3) the number of villagers who have received (re)training as part of the plant protection program, 4) the volume of insecticides delivered, 5) the number of villages and villagers doing dry season gardening using delivered seed and additional materials (fencing,

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watering cans, etc.), and 6) the collection of statistical information on estimated crop yields within the district.

Assessing the impact of decades of agricultural extension in the rural areas on agricultural techniques and technologies is not a part of monitoring and evaluation. There is rarely mention of spontaneous adoption of innovation by farmers in target or other communities. Analysis certainly does not extend to the reasons why specific propositions are or are not adopted (and perpetuated) in particular cases. Indeed, monitoring in former target communities does not happen, and not simply because of the lack of time or means of transportation. These priorities are not institutionalized within the evaluation system.

There is therefore no structural incentive to extension officers to effect genuine rural change through the kind of patient dialogue and tedious work necessary to catalyze subsequent transformations of agricultural techniques and technologies. Such efforts are rather a testament to individual motivation and dynamism.

(4) Promotion and Career

The key questions about the linkages between fieldwork and the careers of agricultural officers can be summarized as: Is there any relationship between professional performance and promotion? Is there any relationship between impact in the field and (future) advancement? Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is very little.

Experience in the field, or in any capacity within the ministry, has no substantive impact on career advancement. Officers will move up in grade each year automatically, almost in spite of themselves, within the same civil service level. However, moving up in levels has no relation to experience and performance. Only long-term training can move a civil service employee between levels. In-service training and positive evaluations by immediate superiors in the field have no impact on advancement.

Long-term training is primarily based on university models of a combination of theory and research. There is no incentive, and certainly no obligation, to try to make the training directly relevant to former and future experiences in Nigerian agriculture. The social scientist conducting this review did note, however, a significantly different level of consciousness about the importance of practical training in the case of Chefs having studied in the United States.

There is no institutionalized system to relate professional performance in the field - and certainly not conscientiousness and motivation - to career advancement. Officers instead refer to connections (patron-client relations and "knowing someone" as friend or kin), favoritism for ethnic or other reasons, and other factors considered simply "getting by" (including trading favors, current or future transfers of resources, etc.). Blocking access to opportunities also becomes a weapon against enemies, potential competitors and outsiders. The general perception is that merit is at best a minor consideration in selecting candidates for training.

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b. The Other Technical Services

The other technical services start from a major disadvantage of limited or no experience in extension work. The hydrology and livestock services will have to undergo significant restructuring of training and assignment to incorporate contact and collaboration with rural populations as a priority.

The environmental service has acquired more experience in contacts with the population, but unfortunately many of these contacts are negative. The combination of counselor and policeman does not translate into a rural image of benign paternalism in the public interest. The typical reaction to the arrival of an environmental officer in a rural community is fear and avoidance. Changing rural reactions to the service is impossible without a fundamental, consistent mandate for the conduct of field staff. Assignment of staff to projects with extension components is not a solution, and actually creates longer term problems as rural communities watch officers alternating between "extension" and "repression" at the whim of their superiors.

c. The Rural Milieu

Any program to improve the rural economy will have to take into account the social structure of different communities. Distribution and access to resources is not egalitarian. The national government relies on local leadership and the elites for the administration and organization of the general population, and is thus hesitant to initiate transformations in these structures.

Recent examples of the creation of local association and viable cooperative organizations suggest that change is possible when catalyzed by external technical assistance and resources. Non-Governmental Organizations are particularly well placed to take such initiatives, as illustrated in the case of CLUSA, rural credit unions (WOCCU) and the NGO "Six 'S'". These programs taken together establish the necessary conditions for establishing genuine, independent associations: free association, management and decision-making by the membership, and access to and control of their own (financial) resources. The reaction of local leadership to such associations varies, though the CLUSA program has succeeded in working with a range of cooperative organizations. USAID will have to monitor the progress of such efforts, as conflicts for power and resources are inevitable. The collusion between the territorial administration and merchants in Tera is one case (see Section 5.3.2.). Other examples can easily be identified as, for example, the potential conflict between the CARE International-supported program of cooperative development in the Baban Rafi forest and the historical control of firewood production by the Emir in Maradi.

2. Institutions Selected to Implement NRM Reforms

a. Identification

Several government institutions have direct impact on natural resources management programs, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL), the Ministry of Hydrology and Environment (MHE), and the Ministry of Plan (MP). The national

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training institute for agriculture and natural resources (Institut Pratique de Developpement Rural, or IPDR) and the national university (Universite de Niamey) with departments for agronomy, natural sciences and social sciences also have significant effects on training human resources for the government technical services and conducting relevant research.

b. Technical Capacity

The ministries - and even administrative divisions within each ministry - suffer from a lack of coordination of policy and actions. Horizontal linkages are lacking. Projects with different donor support and technical assistance can work in relative isolation within the same division, with only informal linkages between individuals complementing the theoretical coordination of efforts by the senior government officials.

Frequent changes in the organization of the GON administration and technical services can handicap program continuity. For instance, the ministry hosting technical services for "the environment" has changed three times over the last few years. Government officers formerly covered natural resources management for fisheries, forestry, soils and wildlife within a single service as a special civil service professional category ("Eaux et Forets") until the early 1980s. The distinction outlined above is actually the result of a reorganization (in 1987) of the distinction originally drawn between forestry and wildlife (in the "Direction des Forets et Faunes") and fisheries (in the "Direction des Peches et de la Pisciculture"). In another recent change, officers from the two divisions belong to distinct hierarchies nationally, but fuse responsibilities at the level of the regional administration.

As noted in Section VI.A.1., above, frequent transfers of personnel compound the effects of periodic administrative reorganization. Staff are often moved between branches internal to technical divisions at the national headquarters, or between posts in the interior. Assignments are not always based on previous training or technical proficiency, which may reflect the low level of trained personnel. Forestry field officers assigned to extension work may be assigned to special sections (brigades) to sanction the same communities immediately before or after such work. This is in part because of unclear tenure laws and of confusion between officers' extension and policing roles. Relations between government personnel and the community therefore remain reserved, at the very least. Clearly, more continuity is required not only in terms of personnel but also in terms of how they apply laws, which in most cases is rather arbitrary.

GON project staff often benefit from some training, but also often never apply new skills to the sponsoring project. Few individuals returning from long-term training actually later serve in the same project, but rather fill other administrative positions, often really requiring completely unrelated skills, based on the additional seniority in the civil service furnished by new training and credentials.

The lack of properly trained manpower is particularly acute for the lower and middle level technical staff. The model for national

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training (at IPDR for example) remains based on technico-scientific information, often learned by rote, followed by infrequent in-service training. The objectives and techniques for extension work have little priority in current curriculum.

USAID/Niger support to natural resources management in the 1980's concentrated on building the institutional capacities of the GON environmental staff, particularly foresters (through the Forestry and Land Use Planning project FLUP). FLUP installed documentary, natural forest management ("model sites") and resource inventory sections to offer support to the entire forestry sector, as well as to other divisions of what was then the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment and other ministries (for instance, for the regional development services in the MP). The FLUP offered similar services on the regional administrative level (in the Departements) as a complement to the MP regional planning units ("Cellules de Planification Regionales").

3. Description of the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations

Encouragement of increased role of non-governmental organizations in rural development is an important element of ASDG II strategy. To understand why USAID deems donor intervention to be necessary to achieve program objectives in this regard, it is necessary to be familiar with the history of NGOs in Niger.

a. Background

Historically, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have played a lesser role in rural development in Niger than in most neighboring countries. There are several reasons for this. The roots of NGOs were developed during the colonial era in most African nations. In countries with active Christian missionary movements, churches often organized their community development work as a managerially distinct unit. Eventually many became registered as local NGOs (or affiliates of international NGOs associated with that religious sect). Islamic organizations tend not to follow this model. Niger, with a predominantly Islamic population, at independence had few indigenous organizations that could grow into what the GON calls "developmental NGOs" (a term approximating what the USG calls Private Voluntary Organizations). 1/

Second, GON political philosophy has been centrist and statist through much of the republic's history. This is not conducive to the growth of active community development movements. Many local observers point to the effective dismantling of village sensitization ("animation") organizations in 1968 as a major blow to the development of popular participation in decision making, a requirement for NGO effectiveness. Whether intentional or not, it is undisputable fact that community development through private association has not developed in Niger to any significant extent.

Under the regime of the late President Kountche (1974-87), Niger pursued a restrictive policy in relation to nongovernmental organizations. Indigenous NGOs simply were not allowed to exist legally. (Indeed, the first officially approved national NGO was not registered until 1988.) Any local NGO-type activity had to be under the sponsorship of an international organization. Foreign

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NGOs were allowed to establish operations in Niger, but the approval process was complex and could be long.

During the 70s and 80s, limitations were also placed on NGO liberty of action within Niger. All NGOs were, and are, required to work through the Government of Niger, with no possibility of complete autonomy of action. Until 1989, all NGO projects, no matter how small in size, had to be approved by the Ministry of Plan in Niamey. This could delay approval by months, and effectively limited the direct involvement of the beneficiary groups (who could never be sure their ideas would lead to a project). Small PVOs and NGOs were often forced to handle financial affairs through governmental offices, in effect becoming dependent on the GON administration.

The result was that many international NGOs chose to work in neighboring countries instead of Niger. A recent report from Mali indicates 184 NGOs (international and indigenous) are recognized by the GRM. The local NGO council (CCA/ONG) had 122 members in late 1989. The Government of Burkina Faso has registered 142 NGOs. Reports from USAID/Burkina estimate this to be less than half the NGOs operating in that country. A 1989 report from USAID/Senegal indicates more than 120 NGOs registered by the Government of Senegal. As a comparison, the GON recognizes 86 NGOs, of which some 50% are non-resident. The Malian NGO consortium, CCA/ONG, reports approximately 50% of its 122 members as Malian NGOs. Burkina has 54 national NGOs registered. Niger recognizes 6 "national" NGOs. The importance of numbers of entities as an indicator of impact of NGOs should not be overstated, especially as definitions of NGO may vary from country to country, and from year to year. However, given the size of the differences in each case, the numbers must be considered meaningful.

It should be noted that the major U.S. PVOs in operation in Niger in 1990 (CARE, Africare, Lutheran World Relief) all came here before or at the beginning of the Kountche regime in the mid-70s. The fourth pioneering U.S. PVO here, Church World Service, no longer maintains a resident office, having reduced its role to providing assistance to a Nigerien Protestant church (EERN). The mid-80s drought did not lead to major new U.S. PVO programs in Niger as it did in some Sahelian countries. A number of PVOs investigated procedures for working in Niger. A small number of U.S. PVOs eventually established programs here. But these programs were either very small or totally dependent on USAID project financing. Those PVOs with small programs have all since withdrawn.

1/ The nomenclature distinction between PVO and NGO is one made by A.I.D., but not generally understood by non-Americans. Throughout this document PVO is used to refer to U.S. non-governmental organizations which are registered with AID/W as eligible for direct AID grants, while NGO is used to refer to the universe of U.S., international and local groups with the same general developmental goals and organizational characteristics (which the GON often refers to as "ONG de developpement").

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b. Recent Changes

The Government of Niger has recognized the need to decentralize decision-making authority and to open up community development to private sector intervention. One form of private sector organization with developmental goals is the international or local NGO. Significant GON policy changes have been made in the last two years:

- Permission for national NGOs to operate legally (effective 1988). Six organizations have been registered to date.
- Approval for small projects (micro-realizations) to be approved at department or arrondissement level, without prior approval from Niamey (1989).
- Approval for NGO micro-realisation projects of any financial value, which require no contribution from the GON or donors, to be approved at field level by the prefet or sous-prefet (1990).

These changes represent a positive evolution of GON policy. The last is potentially the most significant, as it encourages NGOs to mobilize private resources to carry out small rural development programs without excessive red tape. The effect of this ministerial pronouncement has yet to be seen. The Government will have to monitor to assure that prefets and sous-prefets do not undermine the system by imposing new requirements for approval.

At the same time, the Ministry of Plan is making some moves to encourage new U.S. PVO interest in Niger. An innovative debt swap program sponsored by IFESH (International Foundation for Education & Self-Help), a relatively new PVO, has been signed by the GON. The IFESH program is to promote vocational, agricultural and literacy training. One or more PVOs may establish programs in Niger under the auspices of this program. Whether any new PVOs actually set up shop or not, the fact that the GON would agree to such a program, which may involve some financial concessions from the government, indicates a willingness at the highest levels to open up to broader NGO involvement in the rural economy.

The Ministry of Plan is also leading efforts to encourage the establishment of Nigerien NGOs. The stated justification is that national organizations will reduce the number of intermediaries between beneficiary and financier, thus increasing the percentage of any project's funding which reaches the ultimate beneficiary. The theory is plausible. Implementation will inevitably be slow. As noted earlier, there are many reasons for Nigerien reticence in forming fully voluntary community organizations. This reticence may take years to break down, and may not disappear completely. There are also practical problems. Those local NGOs which are not linked to a church or other such experienced fund-raising body (or not affiliated to a foreign NGO) may have difficulty keeping a steady enough income stream to permit paying staff. The efficacy of purely volunteer labor is limited in activities which require long-term investments of time. And, as long as the government is the employer of choice, the number of trained, experienced technicians available to form NGOs is likely to be limited. Malian NGO representatives have suggested that the flourishing of national NGOs in that country

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only began when the national government starting being unable to pay civil service salaries for months at a time and a sizable number of civil servants left government service, some to form NGOs (a move encouraged by the government). It is to be hoped that such forced layoffs do not have to occur in Niger. Whether individuals will voluntarily leave government service to form NGOs is still unclear in this country.

c. Prospects

There are still barriers to NGO participation in rural development. Problems exist from both sides. Cadres often perceive NGOs as uncooperative and unruly, even dangerous in their close links to communities and their reluctance to work through governmental structures. NGOs themselves present no universal vision of what their mission is (except in the broadest terms), what the relationship should be with the GON or with donor organizations, what are appropriate working styles or levels of technical expertise. Nor is there consensus on the subject of support to indigenous NGOs. Many international NGOs here have small resident staffs and could not, in the foreseeable future, help support fledgling Nigerien NGOs.

The very definition of "NGO" represents an issue in Niger. The term private voluntary organization (PVO), used in the United States, is not known elsewhere and tends to confuse Nigeriens with its use of the word voluntary (often misconstrued as volunteer). The term "developmental NGO" has recently begun to appear in official documents of the GON and the Groupement des Aides Privees (GAP), the local NGO council. According to the Ministry of Plan, national associations would be considered developmental NGOs only if they have the following characteristics:

- private, non-profit association;
- promoting projects or programs for rural or urban development;
- having passed a probationary period during which positive results will have been achieved (working alone, in collaboration or with the assistance of another NGO);
- having adequate logistical means to carry out projects;
- having a minimum of financial resources for implementing projects.

There is some confusion over the definition of non-profit, as evidenced in panel discussions in a recent GON-NGO-donor seminar. Some government officials interpret non-profit to mean that overhead cannot be applied to funding requests by national NGOs, although this is a common practice among international PVOs and NGOs (which reinvest any excess fees into the organization's work). The problem appears to lie in fears, which may be well-founded in some cases, that local NGOs will be formed just to siphon funds to the organizers. This is always a risk, particularly when organizations are new and public oversight is not established. The CCA/ONG requires a year of observation of performance before allowing new NGOs to become members of their organization. As CCA/ONG manages some donor funds (which GAP does not) this is a necessary control. The GON will need to install some oversight system for nascent national NGOs which receive government funds. This will be somewhat

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tricky, as too onerous a system will simply discourage individuals from forming such organizations.

The government will also need to recognize that local NGOs which are truly indigenous, and not subsidiaries of international organizations, will have limited capacity for independent fund raising, given the limits of disposable income of the vast majority of Nigerien citizens. A few may be able to obtain sponsorship of wealthy merchants, but this cannot be counted on (and those individuals tend to have well-established methods for making charitable contributions already). Hence material support to national NGOs will have to be included in donor and GON assistance.

Given the current situation, in which a handful of small organizations are recognized as Nigerien NGOs, and given the economic and political context in Niger, it is unlikely that within five or even ten years there will be a flourishing of indigenous NGOs in this country. But already six NGOs is far better than the zero of two years ago. And even small NGOs can make valuable contributions. To date, national NGOs which are not church-related tend to be either professional associations linked to environmental protection goals or technical groups for rural works (in particular well digging). The former could play a role in consciousness raising, particularly among the educated elite. The latter already can show some physical products of NGO-community collaboration.

The well digging organizations are interesting cases in point for local NGO models. Various NGOs have assisted in the establishment of two such NGOs, one in western Niger and one in Maradi department. Both organizations include former employees of foreign NGOs. These groups are seen by some outside observers as not true developmental NGOs, but more trade associations. Leaving aside definitional issues (which may not be crucial at this early point in their development), each organization is providing well-digging services to villagers through combining beneficiary contributions, GON and donor financing, in the same manner as international NGOs. The Brigade Hydraulique de Mayahi, established with NGO and UNICEF assistance, now employs 26 fulltime personnel and counted 62.3 million FCFA (about \$220,000) in receipts in 1988/89, according to a recent newspaper article (le Sahel, 3/30/90). The potential of such small organizations to make a difference in living conditions in rural areas should not be discounted.

Efforts to encourage the establishment of national NGOs should benefit international NGOs as well, as long as the government recognizes the worth of such foreign organizations (which are unmatched in their ability to mobilize private resources from foreign countries).

4. Groups Affected by the Program

The Nigerien population is predominantly rural (over 80% of the total population), and, in spite of a continual increase, the urban population will only reach 30% in the next two decades. The population therefore remains directly dependent on agricultural production for subsistence and general income. Given demographic pressure (a contemporary growth rate of 3.2%) on increasingly marginal farmland, and dependency on significant variations in

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annual and regional precipitation, improving management of fragile Sahelian natural resources is fundamental to the entire economy and society.

The program will directly affect a range of activities within the rural economy. Most rural Nigerien individuals and family groups maximize opportunities by engaging in a range of activities, while trying to minimize risks. For example, the members of a household will combine rainy- and dry-season farming, animal husbandry, food processing, petty commerce and the production of handicrafts in the course of the year. Income generated by labor migration is also significant in many regions, and even critical to communities in the marginal, rainfed farming areas on the northern border with the Sahara.

A program focusing on encouraging investment in natural resources will therefore globally benefit the rural population. Given the vast dimensions of the national territory and the necessarily long-term impacts of environmental changes, the program will only have an immediate effect on local communities in specific geographical areas. The implementation of the specific interventions will monitor potential differences between beneficiaries.

Nigerien societies have long been highly stratified, with significant differences even in rural areas between social groups and their access to resources. "Villages" are actually heterogeneous socio-political units, with limited capacities to mobilize as a common group. However, competition for land has only been intense for richer soils with ready perennial access to water (for example, in the Niger River Basin and Majjia Valley). As natural resources investments improve agricultural sustainability and productivity, special attention will be necessary to ensure equity in individual and group access to techniques. This will be particularly important given farmer tendencies to plant larger areas of marginal lands with decreasing average yields in order to maximize production. These farmlands are especially susceptible to environmental degradation.

There will be some differential impact of the program on (sub)groups based on combinations of identifying characteristics, including caste, class and ethnicity. For instance, a subgroup of the Fulani devoted to pastoralism, generally defined in Niger as Bororo or Woodaabe, follow patterns of annual transhumance with their animals. They pasture animals during their movements in some forest areas that would be temporarily closed to reconstitute vegetation.

Occupational specializations, sometimes associated with specific castes, are common within ethno-linguistic groups. For example, a specific Songhay subgroup (the Setye) descended from the original inhabitants of the right (Gourma) bank of the Niger River specialize in producing and working certain woods to make articles like mortars, pestles and canoes. North of Niamey in the Niger River basin, female descendents of former Tuareg captives, called Bella, cut and gather firewood in exchange for goods or for sale at local markets. Forest management programs will have to take such

specializations into account according to the geographical location of sites.

Occupational categories can also straddle ethno-linguistic categories. Fishermen along the Niger River are issue of both the Songhay-Zarma and Hausa groups (respectively referred to as Sorko or Sorkawa), but recognize common descent from the same putative ancestor as uniting their socio-political organization. The development of a Niger River fisheries management plan (with FAO, UNDP and USAID technical assistance) was based on addressing the profession through these common bonds.

The Program will particularly affect some professions or activities in specific localities. For instance, part of the program will focus on sustainable multi-use management of forest areas. In these areas, woodcutters could organize, as in the Guesselbodi example, for cutting and initial wholesale marketing rights based on developing a long-term management plan in collaboration with the forestry technical services. Pastoralists and/or agro-pastoralists would also negotiate grazing or forage rights with the communities managing the resource, with guidance from the technical staff. In spite of some short-term inconvenience for some groups, the long-term sustainability of production would ultimately benefit both the adjacent communities generally and specific user groups. For instance, pastoralists unable to settle and graze in protected areas during a certain period would later be able to obtain forage consistently without dramatically degrading the environment.

Special efforts are necessary to implicate women directly in natural resources management. Although women are key to many activities, such as firewood production, fruit tree care and cultivation, and forage collection, they remain outside the scope of most programs in Niger. The Keita project using women's labor to reconstitute a badly degraded environment is a notable exception, and CARE-sponsored efforts to associate tree nurseries with women's gardening in Tessaoua offers a modest beginning. Examples of forestry programs in neighboring countries focused on women (for example, in Cameroon and Mali) can serve as models for similar national efforts.

Rural women generally lack a direct voice in public affairs. They have more limited general rights than men with the same socio-economic status. For instance, women generally do not own cattle, lack property rights to land and have no long-term guarantees to investments in the land. Nevertheless, women generate significant income and invest capital in activities such as handicrafts, and raising small ruminants and poultry. Women are also central to petty commerce and the mobilization of rural savings (notably through informal credit associations).

The GON has shown some encouraging signs of better addressing the general status of Nigerien women. Educated women have a higher profile in government services. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Women's Status has been established. Contraception was legalized in 1988 as part of a general program to improve infant and maternal health, and to slow rapid population growth which is unsustainable given environmental constraints. Unfortunately, the national women's organization (the 'Association des Femmes du Niger') weakly

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reflects the needs and priorities of most rural women. The governing councils and active membership are drawn from the educated, advantaged and urban women.

5. Potential Social and Institutional Effects

The general thrust of the program should add impetus to USAID Mission support for GON policies supporting decentralization of services complemented by allocating increasing autonomy to rural populations and organizations. The USAID-financed ROD project, as well as other donor support including the World Bank in conjunction with Swiss financing (the Small Rural Organizations project) and FAO ("Microrealisations" Training project), aim at furnishing the GON and rural Nigeriens with the appropriate skills and necessary organization.

Investments in natural resources management will certainly imply the loss of some short-term benefits to individual users and some socio-professional groups. For instance, pastoralists will lose unlimited access to managed areas. General improvement of the environment and sustainability will compensate for such costs for most users.

These programs will therefore have to be preceded and complemented by discussions with different user groups in each locality in order to explore alternative forms of management based on various forms of organization. Given the complexity and significant variations in local ecology as well as economy and society (evident in documents such as Hagen, Brown and Sowers 1986, The Niamey Dept. Agro-ecological Zonage Study; Sidikou and Charlick 1985, a Study of Local Organizations in Niamey Dept; and Thomson 1981 Guesselbodi forest: Alternative Frameworks for Sustained Yield Management), outside specialists and local populations will have to collaborate to develop a joint approach to resource management. They will have to debate the short and long-term impacts of proposed measures to reach compromises respected with active local cooperation, in order to implement genuine enforcement. An extension and monitoring program would complement the specific management plans.

For instance, from 1984 to 1986 the Niger River Fisheries project nurtured a series of discussions with senior fishermen and general, open debates in fishing communities about the nature and future of the resource. The fishermen organized "socio-professional groups" ("Groupements Socio-Professionnels") on the local administrative level (the canton) covering the entire river to voice their specific interests and concerns. Local government authorities officially recognized the constitution of these groups through Proces Verbaux. Specialists simultaneously conducted extensive ecological and socio-economic research.

The specialists and fishermen debated propositions for resource management during 1986. They sought compromises to restore the resource with the smallest possible short-term negative impacts on fishermen, corresponding as far as possible with local conceptions of river ecology and fish biology. For example, immediate restrictions on all fishing gears would have slashed production by as much as two-thirds for the first several years. Many fishermen would have suffered drastic reductions in revenues. The specialists

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and fishermen developed a formula for more gradual introduction of modified restrictions to reduce and better distribute the effects of these measures. Fishermen authorities also identified zones following local traditions as appropriate for fish sanctuaries under their authority, thereby combining scientific conclusions from fish biology with indigenous knowledge.

The specialists working on the Guesselbodi experimental forest site used a comparable approach to arrive at a resource management plan. The communities surrounding the state forest participated in the development, and revision, of the management plan. Short-term, applied studies furnished necessary ecological and socio-economic information. Project staff have consulted the various user groups and individuals in the locality to fashion a sustainable, multi-use management program best balancing local priorities and interests. Lutheran World Relief is currently supporting the start of a similar, joint management effort at the Gorou-Bassounga state forest, based on agreement with the FLUP.

The short-term negative costs of some initiatives should not be overly dramatized. The rural Nigerien's strategy of combining a variety of activities while minimizing risk implies flexibility and adaptability in the face of frequent, radical changes in economic opportunities and in the environment. The aversion to longer-term investments in the environment partially originates with the lack of guarantees of the potential rural investor's rights. Reinforcement of precedents for local rights will best balance user costs and benefits.

6. Administrative and Legal Incentives

Unless rural populations have guaranteed rights to medium and long-term yields, research and experience indicate that they will not invest in improving the productive capacity, indeed even the sustainability, of local resources. There are encouraging signs that the GON is gradually recognizing the need to return specific rights and responsibilities to rural populations for natural resource management.

Work on development of a comprehensive Rural Code has been underway, at some level, for four years, and has recently included a number of meetings, draft proposals and reviews. See Shaikh, Annex G, for a description of this process. The exact nature of a future Rural Code, assuming one will eventually be promulgated, is still unclear. However, the process is important, as it serves notice of the government's intention to provide clarification and formalization of resource rights. While awaiting the development of a Code, the government has proceeded to make incremental changes. Several examples illustrate these rights de jure and de facto.

Law 74-7, Articles 21, 24 and 25, and Decree 74-226, Article 67, from the GON Forestry Code of 1974 permit the ministry charged with forestry services to establish agreements with individuals and groups to exploit the public domain (forets classees and forets protegees) in exchange for reforestation and land management. Several cases illustrate the recent application of the spirit of

these articles to establish joint management and exploitation of resources.

The Guesselbodi Forestry Cooperative ("Cooperative Forestiere de Guesselbodi") signed a contract with the Ministry of Hydrology and the Environment in 1987 to exploit a state forest (foret classée) for firewood. The basis for the agreement is a policy document ("Document de Politique pour la foret classée de Guesselbodi") and a cutting plan ("Plan de Coupe") developed by GON forestry services (the FLUP) in collaboration with representatives of the local communities. The contract recognizes the administrative and financial autonomy of the cooperative representing communities surrounding the forest. The GON furnishes technical services, monitors exploitation and receives royalties on production. Revisions and renewals of the agreement are part of the management program. For instance, the cooperative members and government officers have focused particular attention on pastoral uses for the forest (forage production and future pasture) given local demand, use patterns and economic viability.

Guesselbodi is not the unique example for such initiatives in Niger. The Garadoume Cooperative in the Majjia Valley has a similar agreement for harvesting wood from windbreaks. Village associations in the Dallol Maouri have started controlled cutting for timber of mature borassus palms (Borassus aethiopum, or ronier) in groves managed in consultation with the forestry service. Local administrative authorities in collaboration with forestry officers have granted contractual rights through local administrative decrees (Proces Verbaux) to exploit the products of baobab trees, including leaves for cooking, fruit and even live timber, planted and nurtured by individuals and family groups on the public domain in the Maradi Department.

Exploitation of private lands (owned by individuals or groups) is also explicitly recognized by Law 74-7, Articles 22 and 23, and Decree 74-226, Articles 63, 64, 65 and 66. Proprietors' have full rights to exploit the land, as long as any activities do not result in permanent environmental damage. However, forestry officers have sometimes applied protective measures on private property without reference to local motivation for investment and real rates of vegetative regeneration. As a result, rural communities have at times suffered from a loss of use rights to products of their own labor on their own land.

The results of such unilateral actions on the part of the forestry services are actually environmentally counterproductive. For instance, forestry extension officers found that the recipients of new seedlings in the Gaya region failed to protect young trees (Acacia spp.) planted in their fields from small ruminants. As the farmers feared touching the trees because of GON sanctions, but also did not wish the trees to encroach untrimmed on their cultivated areas, they kept the trees alive at shrub-size by "not stopping" browsing. They could neither be blamed for the use of trees as a common good for animals, nor be accused of negligence for permitting the trees to die. However, they lost the long-term advantages of associating mature trees with field crops for sustainable productivity.

The GON therefore must combine contracts for exploitation of public domains with reasonable control of the use of private lands. The UNSO/SIDA-supported project for Acacia albida extension in farmers' fields in the Dosso Department may offer valuable lessons for similar efforts.

Such examples serve as important de facto precedents to guarantee the security of investments by rural populations in the land. The President of Niger has stated on several occasions that local precedents (including litigation) will regulate rural land use and management. Application of this model of contracts between government authorities and rural associations has started at other sites scattered throughout the country (for instance, the Baba-N'Rafi, Fayra, Koure and Takeita forests). These precedents will later prove particularly significant as precursors and local cases to incorporate into the national Rural Code.

7. Role of Local Institutions

GON national policy has ostensibly supported increasing local participation and initiatives in rural production since the creation of the "National Development Society" in 1987. The government has nevertheless remained authoritarian and centralized. However, there are modest signs of real change since late 1987.

There have been virtually no autonomous local organizations in rural communities, or serving as the rural voice on the national level. The GON has incorporated local structures into a centralized, hierarchical organization through the territorial administration, and through "mass" associations (the Samarita for men, the "Association des Femmes du Niger" for women, village councils, etc.) incorporated into the National Development Society over the last few years.

The GON has embarked on an ambitious program of decentralization of regional planning and providing public services throughout the country. Of course, delegating greater authority to local government officials does not necessarily imply empowering local communities. Recent official recognition of rural organizations with (some) administrative and financial autonomy, as well as the creation of Nigerien private development firms and non-profit development organizations, furnish promising examples to emulate in the future.

USAID/Niger will have to follow carefully the future of some modest signs of devolution of authority to non-governmental organizations and local groups. Under the Rural Organizations Development project, there is a plan for the creation of a Nigerien private organization for cooperative training with CLUSA technical assistance over several years. Similarly, one of the first Nigerien private voluntary organizations plans to concentrate on environmental issues (the "Organisation Nigerienne des Volontaires pour la Preservation de l'Environnement"). The future of the various rural natural resources management groups cited above will also offer important evidence of genuine GON motivation to implement reforms.

For instance, the Guesselebodi Forestry Cooperative constitutes a legal entity with rights and obligations to the membership and the state. A committee drawn from the membership manages financial and administrative affairs. Local national administrative authorities deal with the Cooperative as an independent body. A team from the Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) has provided training and advice under the USAID-financed Agricultural Production Support and current Rural Operations Development projects.

The program will facilitate such developments by supporting expansion of natural resources management initiatives based on local and non-governmental organizations.

USAID/Niger will also have to monitor and, as necessary, try to influence other related GON legal and administrative reforms. For instance, through dialogues under the ASDG, USAID/Niger convinced the GON of the need to modify current legislation (a "Projet d'Ordonnance") governing rural organizations, especially cooperatives, to enable them to have increased commercial autonomy. This will have an important impact on natural resource-related user groups, as well as on the overall implementation of the ROD project.

8. Potential Contravention of Socio-Cultural Norms

As with other natural resources programs with a similar approach already initiated in Niger, program-supported activities will have to address the repercussions of long-standing disincentives for rural communities to invest in land now popularly perceived as the "public domain." Colonial and post-colonial law assigned management of these resources to officers of the technical services theoretically representing the interests of the entire nation. In fact, these services were incapable of properly managing the resources over such a vast territory, so maximal short-term exploitation of a proprietorless environment became universal. The GON has applied pertinent regulations, such as the protection of certain tree species, sporadically, unequally and often unfairly.

Concrete examples of (re)establishing local rights to exploit and manage the environment are dispersed throughout Niger. Developing viable local organizations requires time and initial investment. However, a range of precedents covering different kinds of users (individuals and groups), different kinds of activities (including woodcutting for fuelwood and timber, anti-erosive works such as dune fixation and micro-catchments, animal husbandry, fisheries and wildlife) already exist. There are therefore some institutionalized GON and local examples that can serve as models, as well as centers for the exchange of experiences.

The Nigerien populations have undergone dramatic ecological and social change during this century. The elimination of the insecurity characteristic of the immediate pre-colonial period, and of the famines and socio-political dislocations during and immediately after the French conquest, meant that large areas were sparsely populated. In other areas, particularly the zones immediately surrounding the old Hausa city-states and some settlements on the islands and river-banks of the Niger River, agriculture was intensive and sustainable.

Demographic pressure, land availability, and other factors under the colonial and independence administrations opened more marginal areas to extensive forms of cultivation. Periodic ecological crisis, particularly frequent shortfalls in precipitation, and impoverished soils have led to declining average yields over greater cultivated surfaces. Farmer strategies have not yet adjusted to intensively capitalizing on limited resources under stress. They rather pursue strategies capitalizing on a mix of diverse economic opportunities with low minimum investments.

The program therefore will encourage an evolution in rural mentalities similar to existing changes in northern Nigeria, or in more densely populated portions of Niger. Fallowing will become increasingly brief, or non-existent, as pressures for land increase. A realistic assessment of land most appropriate to agricultural, pastoral and agro-pastoral activities is also without doubt necessary. However, the GON will have to offer the incentives and opportunities to rural populations to encourage long-term investment in the land and in natural resources.

Programs to include women will require special attention given the limited access of rural women to the public arena and to sources of information. Women from privileged, often urban, socio-economic positions have dominated the national women's association. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local branches of this organization do not equitably express women's concerns, and are frequently immobilized by internal disputes arising from local politics, ethnicity, etc. Communication programs must properly identify the means and methods best adapted to addressing the range of women audiences. For instance, a recent evaluation of the Canadian-financed portion of the national crop protection program revealed that married women seldom benefited from televised extension in Hausa and Zarma. The rural community esteem their presence in the evenings in public places used for village televisions as disreputable. Under these circumstances, another strategy would have to be developed with, for example, a combination of radio transmissions (ownership is individualized, and thus information is more readily accessible within each household), small meetings for women by village or district, and/or visits to each compound.

B. Management Capacity of Key GON Agencies to Carry Out ASDG Program

The responsibilities of institutions charged with carrying out the ASDG program center on: ability to make and implement the reform program, ability to carry out the activities planned under the program, and capacity to account for funds provided under the program.

1. Technical Capacity of Key Agencies

The GON units which are key to program operations are as follows.

a. The Rural Development Ministries: Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock (MAL) and Ministry of Hydrology & Environment (MHE).

A detailed analysis of these two ministries was carried out as part

of ASDG II design (see Jonathan Smith, April 1990). Among the aspects analyzed were the legislative background and authorities within the ministries, organizational aspects and a detailed description of key operational systems including civil service hiring, hierarchical and functional relations within the ministries, training and scholarship procedures and operational budget procedures.

The overall picture provided by Smith was a sobering one. While it is difficult to summarize briefly the many disparate findings, the following excerpt from the Executive Summary provides an overall sense of Smith's analysis:

"The extreme mobility of the ministry personnel, and the lack of structural/organizational integrity of the ministries themselves because of constant organigram reorganization, is in interesting contrast to the seemingly ageless policies and procedures which reign over the ministries' operational systems with a consistency which belies the constant shifting of the structure and its personnel.

It is probably not an exaggeration to suggest that the permanence of the personnel policies and the operational procedures may be credited to the fact that the systems are so exceedingly rigid, so out-moded, and so very excruciatingly complex that the challenge to do anything with them is simply too forbidding.

This is truly unfortunate. It is the consultant's firm belief that the reorganizational efforts of the ministries should be spent more on the substance and less on the form, because if they are not, the ministries will become ever increasingly the bystanders in an arena where their employees are creating outside parallel systems because they cannot depend on the formal systems to serve their needs.

The consultant noted with great alarm employees' disdain for the inflexible, top-down systems in which they labor. The bureaucratic lethargy, the extreme concentration of power and decision-making at top levels, and the complexity of rules and regulations, have conspired to push the institution into operational bankruptcy where employees and managers alike have resorted to "managing" outside the existing systems rather than working within them. The creation of parallel systems is the employees' declaration that the formal operational systems do not work, work late, or work so imperfectly as to be invalid.

Similarly, however, it was encouraging to witness evidence of employee and managerial concern for the health of the institutions which they serve. There are enough people of talent, ability, and interest within the ministries that one could believe that, if the prevailing archaic policies are modernized and if the structure and the systems themselves are bolstered with solid, technical criteria, there are enough positive employee interests and talents about to ensure that

these modernized policies and reinforced systems be effectively implemented.

The consultant's recommendations which appear in this report are based on the above observations: that, yes, the systems and policies are decrepit and counterproductive but, like all structures, those can be remedied. And yes, there are also solid, talented professional and technical employees all throughout the ministry who are not productive only because of the lack of means and the inability of the institution to make intelligent and productive use of their abilities, and that human resource talent is willing and desirous of being intelligently utilized." (Exec. Summary)

Smith's analysis had a profound effect on ASDG II design. It was clear that earlier plans to fund directly rural development ministry operations at the regional and local levels had to be abandoned until concerted attention had been given to insuring that some fundamental changes has been put in place - particularly in the areas of personnel management and program planning. These findings were later confirmed by the social soundness analysis. As such, the focus of this element of ASDG II shifted to the DEP and DAAF of the Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock. The Ministry of Hydrology & Environment was not included for two reasons: a widespread feeling that the current institutional arrangements were not likely to last and that the foresters would likely find their way back to the Ministry of Agriculture before too long, and a desire to keep the program focused and manageable. To quote Smith again:

IF means were provided the MAL and MHE for improving operational capability, without first simultaneously: 1) achieving organizational stability within the ministries and 2) developing and implementing solid institutional and human resources systems that allow for a rationalized utilization of already meagre resources, then the inputs would probably have only temporary impact at best.

However, if the GON were to implement effective policies and activities that bring stability and effective personnel and institutional management and career systems to the MAL and MHE, then those substantive changes could provide a reasonable initial basis on which to commit certain inputs of material and equipment and could create, as well, a propitious institutional setting conducive to effective utilization of those inputs.

This, in a nutshell, is the design strategy adopted for work with the rural development ministries under the institutional component of ASDG II. USAID has worked with the Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock and with the Department of the Environment (currently located in the Ministry of Hydrology & Environment) on a variety of projects over the past fifteen years (i.e., NDD, NCR, APS, FLUP, NAAR and ASDG I). There is currently a wide range of other donors (multilateral, bilateral and PVO/NGOs) working with these ministries (see Annex G for a listing of natural resources management projects currently underway). Several of the reforms which form the basis of the institutional component of ASDG II should have a direct impact on improving resource management in the MAL. These include:

personnel policies that reduce transfers and keep people longer in one place (i.e. someone is clearly responsible), installation of a computerized inventory system for vehicles and major equipment, changes in personnel management practices including the setting of work objectives and the evaluation of performance, and changes in budgeting practices including the introduction of program budgeting.

A project component, with a budget of \$5 million for the five-year life of ASDG II, will provide key technical assistance to aid the GON in carrying out the elements of the program. Basically, for every \$10 in budget support over life of program, over \$3 will be spent on technical assistance, studies and training in support of program objectives. It is anticipated that no funds will be made available to the GON as budget support during year 1 of the program, during which time initial technical assistance for institutional strengthening will begin. Actual financial accountability will rest with the Ministry of Finance, not the rural development ministries. To this extent it is not possible to equate this program with a project, or with ASDG I, in which local currency funds were contributed to particular projects managed by the ministries.

b. Training Institutions: University of Niamey and the Institut Pratique du Developpement Rural (IPDR).

The University and IPDR will be involved during the course of the program in offering training related to NRM. A decision will be made a later time (following more extensive review of options and management systems of the two entities) on whether the institutions will be eligible for operational budget support, or whether it is preferable to contract with them under the project component.

University of Niamey

The University of Niamey falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Technology. The primary focus of ASDG II will be on the Faculty of Agronomy. This faculty, created in 1985, developed from the Ecole Superieure d'Agronomie (ESA), itself created in 1974. The faculty currently includes seven Departments staffed by some 14 permanent staff and several expatriate visiting professors. The faculty was recently selected as a center of excellence in francophone Africa for training in semi-arid agriculture and natural resources management. Limited operating budget support may also be made available over the course of the program for faculties which train students in the Faculty of Agronomy, such as the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Letters (including the social sciences).

USAID has provided minimal support to the University in the past (scholarships, etc.). The Fulbright program, administered by USIS, has placed and continues to place U.S. scholars at the University. The French are currently the only donor directly supporting the Faculty of Agronomy program. Indirect support is provided by several donors through provision of field practicums for students in various development projects.

IPDR

IPDR is a subdivision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. It is responsible for training of agricultural technicians, in other words, the field staffs responsible for agricultural service delivery (including animal and forestry-related services). The need for and importance of training to strengthen GON programs in agriculture and natural resources management was clearly shown in the ASDG II design report on field agent technical skills (J.C. Lemoine, May 1990). In addition to proposing support for Faculty of Agronomy programs, the report recommended strengthening the training departments in the rural development ministries. One of the elements of support to these ministries is to be the establishment of a computerized system in MAL to track the training received by various staff. An effort will also be made to widely advertise training slots within the MAL, to make selection for training based on competition and objective selection criteria, and to link training to future assignments, a linkage that is currently only haphazard at best.

USAID provided support to IPDR, Kollo under the Rural Sector Human Resources Development Project (1979-84). This project provided technical assistance, construction, commodities and several scholarships for IPDR staff. Other major donors, over time, have been France, the European Economic Community (FED), the Netherlands, IBRD, Belgium and Canada. Primary funding is provided by the FAO.

2. Capacity for policy analysis

The capacity for policy analysis is weak - or at least unorganized - among the disparate technical services addressing natural resources management issues. Although envisaged several years ago, the GON has created no interministerial body devoted to this area. Common policy positions have been limited to the results of sporadic, through important, meetings on specific topics, such as animal husbandry (1985), desertification (1984 and 1985), and wildlife (1986). However, the GON has not followed the announcement of political "commitments" (engagements and recommendations), based on the results of these meetings, by consistent actions.

The MP is responsible for coordinating technical services and donor activities for each sector. The ministry also produces a comprehensive program for Niger, the Five Year Plan, in collaboration with all GON ministries and technical services. The position of the MP is being reinforced with the national decentralization program, which assigns planning officers a key role in designing and coordinating development efforts at the regional and sub-regional levels in the territorial administration.

However, the MP does not have the technical expertise to establish informed policies without close cooperation with the relevant ministries. The technical services remain jealous of their autonomy and prerogatives, which are to some degree threatened by MP external control and authority. MP institutional capacities have not kept pace with rapid changes in the range and scope of new activities and responsibilities over the last few years. These limitations are reflected by the lack of elaboration and execution of more detailed

sectoral programs, within the broad framework established in the Five Year Plan.

The program places emphasis on improved analysis related to NRM, as described in Section IV. On a more macro level, the planned Policy Analysis and Monitoring Project (1990-96) will work to build up GON capacity for economic planning and analysis. Skills development in this project will include in-country training (short courses, seminars) to which analysts from rural development ministries will be invited. The reality of USAID programming for the present is that technical assistance and USAID staff resources are needed to supplement GON efforts. This approach will be followed under ASDG II.

3. Availability of Disaggregated Data

The design of each activity will have to include the collection of some simple baseline information in order to monitor the impacts of the program.

The Forestry and Land Use Planning Project (FLUP) generated some information specific to already-managed forest sites, as have other organizations managing similar sites (such as Lutheran World Relief in Gourou-Bassounga, and now CARE International in Baba-N'Rafi). Further support for these or other efforts will imply periodic collection of comparable data.

The Ministry of Plan has a department with a mandate to develop a centralized data base of socio-economic indicators for following projects. However, this service of the department is not at present operational.

The long-term technical assistance, special studies and any evaluations will furnish additional information for tracking the effects of the program on specific groups.

4. Training or Technical Assistance Needed to Enhance/Sustain Management and Analytical Capacity

A considerable variety of specialized technical assistance will be programmed in support of GON management and analytical capacity, both in domains specific to NRM and in more general institutional capacity areas. See Section IV. for descriptions of the technical assistance to be offered.

5. Grantee Capacity for Tracking and Accounting for Program Funds

The dollar resource transfers under the Grant become part of pooled funds in the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) and are not specifically tracked. Local currency funds derived from the resource transfers are owned by the Government of Niger, which is responsible for tracking and accounting for their use. Under the program FAA Section 121(d) standards are applied to the GON organization(s) responsible for local currency. All local currency placed at the disposition of the GON will be programmed as budget support. As such, it is the Ministry of Finance which has direct responsibility.

The GON financial management system is very centralized. All GON revenues are managed by the Ministry of Finance. MOF can delegate authority to Ministry of Plan to manage foreign assistance funds. For this program, all funds will be legally Government of Niger-owned currency, and as such any allocations to investment purposes will be managed by the Ministry of Finance using GON procedures for its own funds. The financial system used by the GON is as follows: budget line items approved in annual finance law for the fiscal year serve as authorizations to MOF to pay salaries, materiel, communications, maintenance and transport. Budgets are developed on the basis of firm personnel costs and past budget levels.

GON payment and accounting structure is as follows. Only the GON Treasury handles funds, and all payments are approved by the "Ordonnateur Delege" within the MOF, before being paid by Treasury. Based upon authorization made by fiscal year budget law, each ministry receives authorized level for personnel, transport, materiel. For procurement of goods and services, ministerial administrative departments create purchase orders which are approved by the minister (who is called credit administrator when wearing this hat) and sent to MOF. MOF compares purchase order with authorized quarterly spending levels to verify availability of funds in appropriate line item. If funds are available, MOF sends approved purchase order back to requesting ministry along with certification of credit title. Ministry sends purchase order to vendor who supplies goods/services along with his invoice. Purchasing ministry certifies receipt of billed goods/services and sends whole package (purchase order, certification of credit title, invoice, certification of delivery) through minister to MOF. MOF examines all documents against authorized line item amount and approves payment. GON financial controller in Treasury signs check/voucher which is sent to vendor.

GON Treasury handles disbursement for all ministerial recurrent costs under the above system. Ministry of Finance is the only ministry which would handle budget support funds for operating budget in 121(d) sense, and is the only operating ministry as far as handling of money goes, as line ministries have no access to cash, except in the case of petty cash funds in some ministries. These petty cash funds are ultimately accountable to MOF based on procedures outlined above.

Under GON budgeting system, once funds are transferred from a special account to a program or an institution, the funds are combined with other budgetary funds and are not traceable. This procedure is that stipulated as acceptable in the case of a program in which local currency is programmed for more general purposes, such as ASDG II. As stipulated in 87 State 327494, para 3.13(b), "If the Mission elects to program the local currency for more general purposes, such as meeting the development budget requirements of the Ministry of Agriculture, the role of the Mission may be limited to ensuring that documentation exists demonstrating that the local currency indeed was transferred to the ministry's development account. The Mission need not trace the funds to specific budgetary or end-use items since AID's development goal is a level of overall financial support to a program or institution; indeed, once transferred from a special account to a program or

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institution, the funds will generally have been combined with other budgetary funds and will not be traceable." Local currency funds derived from ASDG II, which are transferred to the GON (that is, minus trust fund and NGO fund allocations) will be traceable only at Ministry of Finance level, where books and records will be kept, with normal A.I.D. rights to review and audit.

To reiterate, as budget support, funds will be comingled and not specifically traceable after transfer from the special local currency accounts to the general funds (operating and investment) of the GON. The Ministry of Plan will be responsible for compiling summary reports on use of funds. Experience in other programs indicates that Plan is slow to carry out such duties, but that they are within its management capacity to perform. A 121(d) review and certification statement will be made as part of program authorization.

No funds under the project component (683-0265) will be released to the GON.

C. Financial and Sustainability Analysis

ASDG II has two distinct sustainability issues, one in the NRM component and one in the institutional component.

The first sustainability issue is whether sufficient funding will be available over a ten to twenty-year period to extend the successful prototype NRM interventions undertaken during the life of ASDG II. Section II. A. above describes the current fiscal situation of the GON. The GON makes a token contribution of five percent to the public investment budget. Multilateral loans and bilateral loans and grant finance the investment budget. Consequently, sustainability revolves around donors' perceptions of the GON commitment to development and the donors' aid strategies in Niger. Rural development received forty percent of the public investment budget in 1989, as it has every year since 1985. The rural development share was below twenty percent during the period 1979-1983. The portion of rural development investment classified as natural resources in the GON budget was eleven percent in 1989. (That is, eleven percent of the forty percent; or four percent of the total public investment budget.)

Section II.E. describes other donor assistance in natural resource management. Planned expenditures on natural resources (using a broader definition than the GON budget definition of desertification and forestry) in 1989 was on the order of \$50 million. Actual expenditures did not exceed \$15 million. This low execution rate is on a par with the other components of the investment budget. The institutional component of ASDG II will assist the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to increase its implementation rate. Government-wide hindrances, such as cumbersome public procurement regulations, are being reduced with the help of the World Bank. The fact that donors committed three times as much money for natural resources as was actually spent means the funding potential for prototype NRM projects is excellent. Part IV of the Shaikh technical report deals in more detail with the sustainability of project interventions.

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The second sustainability issue is whether sufficient funding will be available through the general budget to allow the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to maintain the management systems put in place by ASDG II and fund field staff activities at a level sufficient to spur rural development. Spending by rural development ministries on salaries and benefits rose from 1,699 million FCFA in 1984 to 1,922 million FCFA in 1988 or three percent per year. Since employment rose one percent annually, the wage bill per employee rose two percent over the period. Employment increased from 2,711 employees to 2,849 employees between 1984 and 1988. Spending on material fell from 611 million FCFA to 552 million FCFA, about four percent per year. The ratio of material spending to employment is a crude measure of the resources available to an employee to do the work of the ministries. (The calculations which follow count professional staff (cadre, and do not include non-tenured employees, such as drivers, cleaning crews, etc.). Spending per employee fell from 401,922 FCFA in 1984 to 307,930 FCFA in 1988. During this time, the inflation rate in Niger was around six percent. Real (inflation adjusted) spending per employee would have been constant between 1984 and 1988 if the 1988 ratio were 507,417 FCFA instead of 307,930 FCFA. Since there were 1794 cadres, a material spending level of 910,310,000 FCFA would have been necessary to keep spending per employee constant in real terms. The difference between 910 million FCFA and the 552 million FCFA allocated is 358 million FCFA.

This additional 358 million FCFA implies no improvement in the functioning of the ministries except to the extent that 272 new workers are in place. Additional resources are necessary to increase the productivity of the workforce. Allowing a four percent annual increase in real spending per cadre, 1988 material spending would be 1,055 million FCFA, a figure 503 million FCFA and ninety percent above the actual level. Clearly a continuation of these trends would mitigate the efforts of ASDG II to improve the performance of the field staff.

GON budget policy has undergone an intensive review as part of the 1990-1992 Policy Framework Paper (PFP) process. The World Bank and IMF have declined to accept a PFP unless it contains a set of policies able to restrain wage bill spending and increase the ratio of materials spending to the wage bill. The GON agreed to freeze the wage bill at 35 billion FCFA through 1993. Government-wide materials spending is to rise from 19 billion FCFA in 1989 to 25 billion FCFA in 1993, an annual growth rate of seven percent. Rural development ministries receive only three percent of total government materials spending, so their materials spending growth rate could easily exceed the government-wide average of seven percent. The projected increase in materials spending is made feasible by a projected eight percent revenue growth and an absolute decline in debt service costs from 18 billion FCFA in 1989 to 13.6 billion in 1993. Nothing in this analysis guarantees that the rural development ministries will receive budget allocations adequate to carry out their tasks. What it does show is that according to the projections in the PFP the GON will have at its disposal sufficient resources to fund these ministries.

D. Impact Analysis

1. Description

ASDG II is expected to have significant economic impact at three interrelated levels: 1) sustainable increases in income and production at the level of the resource user, 2) decreased costs for replication of successful natural resource management practices due to the establishment of a favorable policy and institutional environment, and 3) increased efficiency of sector assistance through the establishment of a coherent national NRM strategy, a mechanism for donor coordination and improved management of government rural development resources by the key GON agency, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.

a. Sustainable Increases in Income and Production

Paul Harrison, in The Greening of Africa, writes: "Rescuing land that appears totally lost to production might seem an impossible task. But low-cost, quick acting techniques are now being developed to do the job. They are, quite literally, rolling back the desert's advances... Reclamation lies within the grasp of the peasants and the herders of the semi-arid regions, and it can be made to pay."

The ASDG II design team confirmed that this observation holds true for Niger. There are significant examples, affecting thousands of rural producers, of technically viable, financially attractive and budgetarily sustainable natural resource management initiatives in Niger. Participating populations have improved their income, reduced risk and established the basis for future income growth and diversification.

The diversity of the viable approaches being tested is promising: Keita and Ouri Hamija directly enhance agricultural productivity; the natural regeneration efforts indirectly increase output while also providing wood and forest products and supplemental sources of income; private farmer woodlots generate cash income; Guesselbodi has created a commercially viable enterprise which serves urban markets and supports communal management of village lands. The approaches seen by the team are only a subset of the successful approaches underway in Niger.

However, the majority of rural populations have not yet benefited from those approaches which are already proven, at least partially because the majority of available funding resources are not being managed as successfully as in the field initiatives visited by the team. Even these best approaches, however, can provide sufficient options to affect a significant percentage of the rural population only if there is a coherent strategy and a coordinated effort to build on the successes and establish the policy and other preconditions for their spread.

b. Decreasing the Cost of Replication

Numerous studies have evaluated the costs of establishing sustainable, productive natural resource management systems on rural lands. These vary greatly, from around \$100 per hectare for the establishment of windbreaks to many thousands of dollars for

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intensive irrigated production systems. These costs reflect institutional overheads required to administer and execute the projects under which these systems were established. Without the policy reforms and institutional strengthening proposed by ASDG II, the cost of extension and replication of these systems will not change significantly, as widespread adoption will be dependent on government institutions and development projects to provide the lead. The policy and institutional environment created by ASDG II, however, is expected to dramatically decrease the cost of extension and replication of successful NRM practices. Security of tenure, decentralized decision making, the empowerment of community organizations and indigenous NGOs and other such reforms are expected to stimulate spontaneous adoption of many of the simpler NRM practices, and provide built-in incentives for the rural population to invest in more costly improvements. It is difficult to put a figure on the savings that can be expected at this level, but economies approaching 50% are not unreasonable.

According to Shaikh, NRM practices would be expected to be established on 147,000 hectares over the next 5 years with a GON investment budget of \$200 million without ASDG II. With ASDG II reforms in place, this same budget is expected to be sufficient to cover 266,000 hectares. This represents an economy of over \$160 million, a considerable return on the investment of \$25 million proposed for ASDG II. See impact scenarios, following, and Shaikh, Annex G.

c. Increased efficiency of sector assistance

A portion of the program resources will be devoted to creating a working mechanism for donor-government and donor-donor coordination. Past efforts have been unsuccessful for institutional reasons at both government and donor levels. Nevertheless, what is at stake is an agriculture and environment portfolio of \$160 million per year. A 3% improvement in the effectiveness of this portfolio is roughly equivalent to the entire ASDG II budget for both agriculture and natural resources.

2. Impact Scenarios

As little as five years ago, the economic analysis of a natural resources project was asked to focus on rates of return for specific interventions: cost-benefit, discount rates, valuation, sensitivity analysis. The debate is different than it was ten years ago. Niger will be, in some senses, at the cutting edge of the issues in natural resources economics in the Sahel. Issues of law, social process and economic policy have already been put squarely on the Sahelian natural resources agenda, both by the international community and from within the Sahel. Their resolution is likely to have as much influence on the resource base as the sum of individual NRM projects, especially in the ten year time-frame and beyond.

This section tests impact scenarios in order to explore the answer to one central question: "Can the effort to improve natural resources management in Niger be successful in macroeconomic terms?" We start out knowing that there will not be a "yes" or "no" answer. The objectives therefore are to learn (a) whether there is a possibility of having widespread impact, (b) under what

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circumstances this might occur, and (c) whether the attempt to do so appears to be a responsible use of scarce resources.

The analysis below uses a numerical thought process which has been kept as transparent as possible to avoid "black-box" results. Each of the three lines of strategy discussed above is addressed in the scenarios. However, since the scenarios do not just test the potential impact of ASDG II or even A.I.D efforts, they implicitly assume a broader range of interventions.

a. Framework and Assumptions

1) Target population and natural resources

There are 7.2 million people in Niger, of which 90% live in rural areas. About 80% of the rural population - 5.2 million people - engages primarily in agriculture. Total land under agricultural production is the order of 2.6 million hectares. While there is no equivalent figure for hectares of "terroir villageois" (more or less, meaning village lands), we can estimate that 3 to 4 hectares per person would have to be sustainably managed to make significant inroads into the demand for wood and other forest products.

Table VI.1. shows a 20-year population projection which assumes 3.2% growth for total population and an initial urban growth rate of 10% per year, which progressively slows to less than 7% per year by the end of the period. It shows resulting population levels for this scenario, and the associated numbers of hectares and common property resources to be managed. Note that the number of hectares farmed per household is thought to be subject to two competing influences: first, the tendency to diminish, as land becomes more scarce and intensification becomes more prevalent; second, the tendency to increase as more marginal land is brought under cultivation. On average, hectares farmed per household are assumed to rise at 2% per year. The intent of this exercise is not to provide the best available estimate of population, but to look at the orders of magnitude and their potential NRM implications. For a fuller set of projections see Niger Family Health and Demography Project, Project Paper, Volume II (Annexes), May 1988.

Table VI.1

Population and land use projections

	<u>Year</u>				
	0	5	10	15	20
Total Population	7,200	8,428	9,866	11,549	13,518
Urban Population	720	1,160	1,867	3,008	4,844
Rural Population	6,480	7,269	7,998	8,541	8,675
Agricultural Population	5,184	5,815	6,399	6,833	6,940
Hectares in Agriculture	2,592	3,210	3,900	4,598	5,156
Ha of Terroir Villageois	32,400	36,343	39,991	42,705	43,373

Above figures in thousands

2) Available financial resources

Niger has a budget of about \$160 million per year for agriculture, environment, livestock raising and related activities, mostly drawn from outside sources. Further resources for private sector development and extension and training could potentially have an impact on natural resources management as well. At present, roughly \$35 million per year goes directly to environment/natural resources. We note, however, that this percentage has more than doubled in recent years, and is likely to continue growing, although at a slower pace.

We therefore start with the assumption that, on a sustained basis, roughly \$40 million per year of the total agriculture/herding/environment budget goes towards activities which make agriculture more sustainable (including smallholder NRM investments in soil fertility improvement and soil and water retention, which are sufficiently in the mainstream of agriculture concerns to justify this slight incursion into the non-environment agricultural sector budgets).

To improve realism slightly, the analysis used to test the scenarios limits the money available for natural forest management, natural regeneration, windbreaks and other efforts which fall clearly outside traditional donor agricultural portfolios, to the amount of budget available for the "environment" line item. No growth in this budget is assumed in the base case.

3) Cost factors

To provide a point of reference, costs per hectare (including project technical assistance, planning and associated overheads) of various types of interventions have been estimated based on sketchy available data, supplemented by typical cost factors for other Sahelian interventions. The actual cost factors used in the scenarios are further refined by the addition of an "expected failure rate" - which often ranks as one of the higher costs in Sahelian resource management projects.

Even with the above minor nuance, the framework provides too simplistic a picture of longer term dynamics: a given approach may lead to less success (visible results) in the short-term, but may hold much more replication potential in the long run. In order to avoid a deterministic framework which links short-term success rates to specific patterns of long-term adoption, separate scenarios test long-term replication/adoption options. The very nature of these "spontaneous replication" options requires the assumption that costs per hectare will be much lower in the replication phases than in initial project phases. There is one caveat to this statement: some approaches, such as the Keita project for example, are not susceptible to spontaneous replication. The tables therefore show a replication cost factor of 100%, which amounts to saying that "replication" is limited to "duplication" of the initial project, at full cost. Nevertheless, it is probably a fair statement that public sector costs of even "spontaneous" replication are not zero. Depending on the approach being tested, different cost levels are

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projected for replication, as shown in the tables and described below.

4) Sensitivity analyses

The objective is to learn more about tradeoffs and potential, not to project the likely outcome. With this in mind, sensitivity analyses (i.e. testing the results under varying assumptions) has been used to identify a range of possible outcomes which merits consideration. The cost and replication assumptions are thought to be the most important internal variables to test in this way.

b. Scenario 1: Unfavorable Policy Environment

1) Preliminary results

A very simple base case was used, assuming \$40 million per year of expenditure on the seven major types of initiative observed during the field visits of the ASDG II team:

- Rock "diguettes" as in Keita
- Rock "diguettes" and "demilunes" as in Swissaid
- Natural regeneration (amalgam of SIM, CARE and UNSO) approaches
- Natural forest management as in Baba N'Rafi and Energie II (IBRD)
- Natural forest management which would correspond to the "non-commercial" terroir villageois case
- Pole plantations and other private on-farm investments

Estimates as to costs per hectare, likely failure rate, time to impact (from start of expenditures) and replication potential reflect order of magnitude guesses, but are not intended to pass judgment on any of the initiative types. They are shown in Table VI.2. In the same vein, the mix of initiatives projected is not a suggested strategy, but merely an attempt to see if a plausible mix of approaches can have a global impact.

The base case assumes little change in the policy environment - that is, it remains unfavorable.

To avoid overstating the relevance of this analysis to specific decision-making (i.e. technology choices, impact on soil fertility or agricultural production per dollar spent, etc.), results are expressed only in "hectares affected," broken out by agricultural land and common forest resources.

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Table VI.2

Resource management options and assumptions

Cost Assumptions (Per Hectare)				280 CFA = \$1			
		CFA	US\$	Replic Cost	Failure Rate	Final Cost	Impact Year
1	Rock Diguettes 1	252,000	900	100%	10%	1,000	3
2	Rock Diguettes 2	140,000	500	70%	30%	714	5
3	Nat regeneration	28,000	100	25%	30%	143	4
4	Windbreaks	28,000	100	30%	40%	167	7
5	Nat Forest Mgmt 1	70,000	250	35%	40%	417	5
6	Nat Forest Mgmt 2	112,000	400	70%	20%	500	5
7	Pole Plantations	112,000	400	20%	50%	800	4

The basic result of this case is that there are sufficient financial resources available at current cost factors, with no assumed "spontaneous replication" to affect nearly a third of the agricultural land in Niger over twenty years (Table VI.3).

Table VI.3

Results of Scenario 1
Unfavorable Policy Environment (No Replication)

	Pct of Budget	US \$ Per Yr	New Hectares Affected by Year (000)				
			0	5	10	15	20
1	15%	6,000	0	18	48	78	100
2	15%	6,000	0	8	50	92	135
3	15%	6,000	0	84	294	504	715
4	15%	6,000	0	0	144	324	500
5	15%	6,000	0	14	86	158	235
6	15%	6,000	0	12	72	132	190
7	10%	4,000	0	10	35	60	85
	100%	40,000	0	147	730	1,349	1,960

Summary of Results

Agricultural land

Hectares in use 5,156
Hectares affected 1,545
Percentage 30%

Terroir Villageois

Hectares in use 43,479
Hectares affected 422
Percentage 1%

All dollar and hectare figures in thousands

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The picture with respect to local forest resources is less promising: a very small percentage of land to be managed is affected, even though the absolute number (422,000 hectares over today's levels) is very high by current standards.

2) Uncertainties with respect to scenario 1

In addition to uncertainty surrounding the values of the variables used, the following uncertainties are particularly important:

- The potential increases in natural regeneration, windbreaks and pole production will decrease pressure on surrounding forests, reducing the number of hectares of natural forest to be managed in order to meet demand.
- In the long run, fuel substitution in urban areas can have the largest single impact on demand for forest products. Many observers expect non-wood fuels to become financially competitive (i.e. cheaper for the user) within the next few years. The Energie II project is actively pursuing fuel substitution options. A 50% substitution in urban areas would decrease demand on forest resources dramatically.
- The impact of land clearing on forest resource depletion has not been measured in these projections. That impact is obviously negative. To the extent that intensified land management approaches discussed in earlier sections can reduce the number of hectares brought into production, there is a double benefit.
- All of the measures examined are part of the process of building natural capital and intensification of land use. If successful at the levels shown in the base case, they can have an impact on the amount of land which is brought into agricultural production. Indeed, that is one of the principal objectives of a NRM strategy, given land constraints.

c. Scenario 2: Favorable Policy Environment

1) Assumptions and results

The basic difference in this scenario is to allow for improved replication of those options which lend themselves to it. The underlying hypothesis is that clearer management rights, resource tenure, favorable fiscal and price incentives and improved training and extension, use of mass media etc. - in short, the policy issues to be considered under ASDG II - can increase the adoption rate of improved resource management practices.

The specific assumptions are shown in Table VI.2. In all cases, replication is assumed to be some function of the on-going level of direct project support, to entail some (lower) public cost, and to take off only several years after the initial project results occur.

The replication of "terroir villageois" approaches is even more conjectural than the average, since there is no current management model from which to build replication hypotheses. A conservative assumption has therefore been used, as shown. Sensitivity analyses consider other options.

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In the favorable policy scenario, a majority of agricultural land and a "non-negligible" (over 1.5 million hectares) portion of village forests can be brought under more effective management (Table VI.4).

Table VI.4
Results of Scenario 2
Favorable Policy Environment (With Replication)

Replication	Pct of Budget	US \$ Per Yr	New Hectares Affected by Year (000)				
			0	5	10	15	20
1 Rock Diguettes 1	15%	6,000	0	18	48	78	108
2 Rock Diguettes 2	15%	6,000	0	12	72	132	192
3 Nat regeneration	5%	2,000	0	112	392	672	952
4 Windbreaks	15%	6,000	0	0	480	1,080	1,680
5 Nat Forest Mgmt 1	30%	12,000	0	82	494	905	1,317
6 Nat Forest Mgmt 2	15%	6,000	0	17	103	189	274
7 Pole Plantations	5%	2,000	0	25	88	150	213
	100%	40,000	0	266	1,676	3,206	4,735

Summary of Results

Agricultural land

Hectares in use 5,156
Hectares affected 3,145
Percentage 61%

Terroir Villageois

Hectares in use 43,479
Hectares affected 1,591
Percentage 4%

All dollar and hectare figures in thousands

d. Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analyses were run to test a broad range of options. These include, amongst others:

- Lower and higher annual expenditure limits
- Variations in the cost factors for each approach
- Reductions in failure rates over time
- Changes in replication cost assumptions
- A slower population growth rate

Table VI.5. Shows the results of the sensitivity analyses.

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Table VI.5

Impact of Sensitivity Analyses

Variable/Value	Base Assumption	Pct of Ag Land Affected	Pct of Terr Vill Affected
Variable/Value	Base Assumption	60.99%	3.66%
Population	3.00%		
Pop growth of 3% p.a.		64.83%	3.85%
Pop growth of 2.8% p.a.		69.03%	4.03%
Expenditure	40,000,000		
Budget of 45,000,000		68.61%	4.12%
Budget of 50,000,000		76.23%	4.57%
Cost Factors	Varies		
20% decrease		76.23%	4.57%
10% decrease		67.76%	4.07%
10% increase		55.44%	3.33%
20% increase		50.82%	3.05%
Failure Rates	Varies		
20% decrease		68.10%	4.09%
10% decrease		64.55%	3.88%
10% increase		57.43%	3.44%
20% increase		53.87%	3.22%
Replication Costs Factor	No change		
20% decrease		75.71%	4.57%
10% decrease		67.53%	4.07%
10% increase		55.63%	3.33%
20% increase		51.17%	3.05%

e. Comparison of Resources and Impacts

In broad orders of magnitude, the analysis clearly suggests that the battle to stabilize the Nigerien natural resources base is winnable. A significant portion of the population can be directly affected within twenty years, at currently available levels of funding. This is the potential. It will not be achieved if current practices regarding use of financial resources remain unchanged: an insufficient percentage of resources go to the field; funding approaches are often non-discriminatory with respect to the effectiveness of approaches being put forth; low strategic priorities absorb a disproportionate share of budgets; short-term visible results frequently dominate project agendas; there is considerable duplication of effort, particularly in the learning process; etc. In sum, nothing near the \$40 million per year available now goes to effective field efforts. This, along with creation of a favorable long term policy environment, must be a first priority.

In terms of macroeconomic dynamics, it will be impossible to create new economic opportunities for millions of people without creating new patterns of economic activity as well. Population pressure, new markets (urban, Nigerian), new infrastructure, and potentially, new technologies (such as the improved sorghum varieties developed at

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INRAN) can all enter the equation. The IFPRI studies of income diversification of households in four Niger villages provides evidence of patterns which are likely to spread and intensify over time, particularly in the more densely populated zones. The income from wood, forage, increased agricultural yields and by-products can all potentially affect the financial attractiveness of further investments in rural production. A second look at potential impacts therefore yields a more nuanced picture. As the bland numbers of this analysis start approaching 50% of the available agricultural land (which is achievable), new opportunities, both for individual producers and for public assistance, are likely to supercede current strategies, and to generate the more diverse set of outcomes which is associated with sustainable economic growth.

VII. CONDITIONS AND COVENANTS

The following are proposed conditions and covenants, as they appear in the draft Grant Agreement. Please note that conditions precedent for subsequent tranches (II-IV) are subject to modification during program implementation. The list of subsequent tranche C.P.s, therefore, should be considered indicative.

A. Conditions Precedent

In addition to the standard conditions precedent (specimen signatures and designation of authorized representatives), the following conditions precedent and covenants will be included in the grant agreement for the program.

1. Conditions Precedent to Initial Disbursement

Prior to the disbursement of the first increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche I"), or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which disbursement will be made, the Grantee shall, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., all of the following:

- A. A statement of the name of the person or persons holding or acting in the office of the Grantee specified in Section 9.2. of the Grant Agreement, and of any additional representatives, together with a specimen signature of each person specified in such statement.
- B. The name, address and account number of the United States bank into which the dollars under this Grant will be deposited.
- C. Evidence that Special Grantee Accounts (as hereinafter defined) have been established in a banking institution to be approved by both parties for the deposit of local currency in an amount equal to the amount of U.S. Dollar disbursement (minus amounts for the NGO/Private Sector Fund and the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund Account, as these terms are hereinafter defined) for each dollar resource transfer increment.

- D. Formal designation by the Government of Niger of the entity empowered to monitor policy reform measures under the program.
- E. Evidence that (1) any and all amounts disallowed for payment by A.I.D., and thus owed to the U.S. Government, as a result of audit or investigative finding under any ongoing or prior A.I.D./Government of Niger agriculture projects (e.g., ASDG I, 683-0246/0247; Agricultural Production Support, 683-0230) have been duly paid or settled in a manner acceptable to A.I.D. and (2) any and all ASDG I counterpart payments that have been agreed to jointly by the Ministry of Plan and A.I.D. have been released by the Treasury of the Government of Niger to the projects, NGOs or other implementing entities for which the funding was approved.
- F. For the natural resource management ("NRM") component of the program, evidence that:
1. A plan for harmonizing and coordinating the various programs concerned with natural resource policy and planning (including, but not limited to, PIGRN/PNLCD/TFAP/NCS/Rural Code/Forestry and Water Code revisions/National Wildlife Action Plan/Land Use Action Plan) has been elaborated and adopted by the Grantee for incorporation into an overall NRM plan.
 2. The terms of reference for a national biological diversity assessment have been elaborated and adopted by the Grantee.
 3. The Land Tenure Center (LTC)/Government of Niger and University of Michigan/Government of Niger studies on NRM tenure issues related to the Rural Code have started.
 4. The terms of reference for an in-depth joint study (USAID/Government of Niger) of both the needs for and options available in decentralization related to NRM have been elaborated and adopted.
 5. The terms of reference for an in-depth joint study (USAID/Government of Niger) on forester roles in NRM have been elaborated and adopted.
- G. For the institutional component of the program, evidence that:
1. The terms of reference for development of a computerized information system for better human and financial resource management in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) have been elaborated by the Grantee. Related data collection has begun.
 2. Pursuant to the development of personnel training and assignment policy for the MAL, the terms of reference for a study on the human potential of the MAL and on its personnel assignment policy have been elaborated and adopted by the Grantee.
 3. The planning of a workshop on management by objectives has been completed and the workshop has been scheduled. The
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purpose of the workshop is to elaborate a program budgeting system and guidelines for assuring the conformity of donor project and MAL program budgeting systems.

4. With respect to non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"):
 - a. A review of regulations governing the existence and operations of NGOs in Niger has been completed by a committee representing the Grantee, the NGO community in Niger and A.I.D. and an action plan for any revisions thereof, including to provide specific permission for NGOs to operate in Niger and to serve in community development roles in rural areas, with direct contact with community organizations, has been drafted.
 - b. The Ministry of Plan (the "MOP") has issued a formal statement of NGO rights and responsibilities.
- H. Evidence that (1) instructions have been given to the BCEAO to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from Tranche I to the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made, and of the net remaining, fifty percent (50%) to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and fifty percent (50%) to the Special Grantee Account for support of Government of Niger operations relating to the Program and (2) agreement has been reached between the Parties as to the priorities assigned to the uses of such operational budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.
- I. Evidence that the Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program.
- J. Evidence of an agreement in writing between the Parties on the specific terms of a plan for implementation of specific actions and policy changes proposed to be achieved (and the specific measures of performance to monitor the extent of their achievement) prior to the disbursement of the second increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant.
2. Conditions Precedent to Subsequent Disbursement
 - A. Prior to the disbursement of the second increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche II"), or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which disbursement will be made, the Grantee shall, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D. in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., evidence that the Grantee has carried out all of the following:
 1. For the NRM component of the Program:
 - a. Demonstrated progress in the development of a national NRM policy and overall program.
 - b. Demonstrated progress in achieving the objectives of the Rural Code project, including the adoption of the principal recommendations from the LTC/Government of

Niger and University of Michigan/Government of Niger studies and their incorporation into the Rural Code.

- c. Completed the study on decentralization of NRM specified in Section 4.1.F.4. of the Grant Agreement and adopted the principal recommendations of such study.
 - d. Completed the study on forester roles in NRM specified in Section 4.1.F.5. of the Grant Agreement and adopted the principal recommendations of such study.
2. For the institutional component of the program:
- a. Developed and made a commitment to implement an action plan for the installation of systems for sectoral and regional information and coordination of development activities in the MAL.
 - b. Established an information system on personnel, equipment and infrastructure in the MAL.
 - c. Implemented the study specified in Section 4.1.G.2 of the Grant Agreement on the human potential and personnel assignment policy of the MAL.
 - d. Held the workshop on management by objectives specified in Section 4.1.G.3. of the Grant Agreement.
 - e. Held a Government of Niger-NGO Roundtable meeting with respect to NGOs and issued an action plan for the implementation of the recommendations made at such meeting.
 - f. With respect to rural associations:
 - (1) Completed a review of the status of policy reforms accomplished under the ASDG I program and, following a review of actions taken with respect to Tranche I, agreed with A.I.D. on the establishment of any new conditionality required to maintain progress achieved to date in development of economically viable cooperative movement and rural credit union systems.
 - (2) Agreed to contribute the FCFA equivalent of one million United States Dollars (\$1,000,000) from Tranche II to a bank guarantee fund (the "Guarantee Fund") for cooperatives operated under the Rural Organizations Development Project 683-0260 being implemented by the Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA).
 - (3) Agreed that the Guarantee Fund can continue to function after the completion of the ASDG II program as long as management systems are in place and operating which meet normal banking standards.

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3. Reached agreement with A.I.D., in writing, as to (1) the percentage apportionment of Tranche II funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund Account) among (a) the NGO/Private Sector Fund and (b) the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget and (2) the priorities assigned to the uses of such operating and investment budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.
 4. Given instructions to the BCEAO:
 - a. to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from the Tranche II resource transfer to the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund Account,
 - b. to deposit the FCFA equivalent of One Million United States Dollars (\$1,000,000) to the Guarantee Fund, and
 - c. to deposit agreed upon amounts to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and to the Special Grantee Accounts for the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs.
 5. Submitted to A.I.D., in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D., financial and activity reports (as described in subsections (b) and (c), respectively, of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description) relating to Tranche I describing in summary form the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the Program, including, but not limited to, information on the governmental institutions supported by the local currency funds disbursed under Tranche I allocated to the operating budget to support the purposes and objectives of the Program.
 6. The Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program or in satisfaction of the conditions precedent under Tranche I of the present Grant.
 7. Evidence of an agreement in writing between the Parties on the specific terms of a plan for implementation of specific actions and policy changes proposed to be achieved (and the specific measures of performance to monitor the extent of their achievement) prior to the disbursement of the second increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant.
- B. Prior to the disbursement of the third increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche III"), or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which disbursement will be made, the Grantee shall, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., evidence that the Grantee has carried out all of the following:

1. For the NRM component of the program:
 - a. Completed and adopted the national NRM policy and program.
 - b. Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation and application of the revised Rural Code.
 - c. Demonstrated progress in the implementation of the Government of Niger's decentralization policy; specifically, implemented the previously adopted recommendations of the study on decentralization of NRM responsibilities as described in Section 4.1.F.4 of the Grant Agreement.
 - d. Implemented the previously adopted recommendations of the study on forester roles in NRM as described in Section 4.1.F.5 of the Grant Agreement.
2. For the institutional component of the program:
 - a. Established, as a part of the information system for better human and financial resource management in the MAL: (1) a system of job descriptions, and (2) a geographical information system.
 - b. With respect to the development of the MAL personnel training and assignment policy: (1) determined criteria for the selection of (a) personnel to be trained and (b) the fields of training, (2) defined needs for technical assistance related to (1) above, (3) defined a strategy for monitoring personnel careers, and (4) adopted and implemented the recommendations from the study on the Ministry's personnel assignment policy described in Section 4.1.G.2 of the Grant Agreement.
 - c. With respect to the elaboration of a program budgeting system and guidelines for assuring the conformity of donor project and MAL program budgeting systems: (1) defined and adopted a management by objectives system, (2) made progress in the improvement of project design, programming, coordination and management, (3) established a program budgeting system, (4) established a system for annual activity planning and budgeting, (5) elaborated guidelines on the conformity of the MAL program budgeting system and donor projects, and (6) held a workshop for explaining such guidelines.
 - d. With respect to NGOs, made revisions and/or changes in regulatory texts as specified in Section 4.1.G.4. of the Grant Agreement to provide specific permission for NGOs to operate in Niger and serve in community development roles in rural areas, with direct contacts with community organizations.

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- e. With respect to rural associations, completed a review of the status of policy reforms accomplished previously and, following a review of actions taken with respect to Tranche II, agreed with A.I.D. on the establishment of any new conditionality required to maintain progress achieved to date in development of economically viable cooperative movement and rural credit union systems.
3. Reached agreement with A.I.D. in writing as to (1) the percentage apportionment of Tranche III funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund) among (a) the NGO/Private Sector Fund and (b) the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs and (2) the priorities assigned to the uses of such operating and investment budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.
4. Given instructions to the BCEAO:
 - a. to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from the Tranche III resource transfer to the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made, and
 - b. to deposit agreed upon amounts to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and to the Special Grantee Accounts for the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs.
5. Submitted to A.I.D., in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D., financial and activity reports (as described in subsections (b) and (c), respectively, of Article 2.A.3. of the Amplified Program Description) relating to Tranche II describing in summary form the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the Program, including, but not limited to, information on the governmental institutions supported by the local currency funds disbursed under Tranche II allocated to the operating budget and a description of the activities (including programs, projects, etc.) undertaken with such local currency funds allocated to the investment budget to support the purposes and objectives of the Program.
6. Submitted to A.I.D., in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D., financial and activity reports related to Tranche II detailing the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the program and describing activities undertaken.
7. The Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program or in satisfaction of any of the conditions precedent under either Tranche I or Tranche II of the present Grant.

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8. Evidence of an agreement in writing between the Parties on the specific terms of a plan for implementation of specific actions and policy changes proposed to be achieved (and the specific measures of performance to monitor the extent of their achievement) prior to the disbursement of the second increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant.
- C. Prior to the disbursement of the fourth increment of U.S. Dollars under the Grant ("Tranche IV"), or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which disbursement will be made, the Grantee shall, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D., evidence that the Grantee has carried out the following:
1. For the NRM component of the Program:
 - a. Demonstrated progress in the implementation of the national NRM policy and program.
 - b. Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation and application of the revised Rural Code.
 - c. Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation of the Government of Niger decentralization policy; specifically, demonstrated progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the study on NRM decentralization as described in Section 4.1.F.4 of the Grant Agreement.
 - d. Demonstrated additional progress in the implementation and application of adopted recommendations of the study on forester roles in NRM.
 2. For the institutional component of the program:
 - a. Implemented a system of job descriptions as a part of the MAL's information system.
 - b. With respect to the development of the MAL personnel training and assignment policy: (1) put in place a personnel career monitoring strategy, (2) implemented a training plan, and (3) put in place measures for ensuring relevancy of training to employment.
 - c. With respect to the elaboration of a program budgeting system and guidelines for assuring the conformity of donor project and MAL program budgeting systems, annual work plans derived from the program budgeting system are in use in two departments of the country.
 - d. With respect to NGOs, held a second NGO-Government of Niger Roundtable meeting and formulated an action plan for the implementation of the recommendations made at such meeting.

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- e. With respect to rural associations: A review of the status of policy reforms accomplished previously and, following a review of actions taken with respect to Tranche III, agreed with A.I.D. on the establishment of any new conditionality required to maintain progress achieved to date in development of economically viable cooperative movement and rural credit union systems.
3. Reached agreement with A.I.D. in writing as to (1) the percentage apportionment of Tranche IV funds (less the eight percent (8%) of these funds which will be deposited in the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund) among (a) the NGO/Private Sector Fund and (b) the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs and (2) the priorities assigned to the uses of such operating and investment budget support in support of the purposes and objectives of the Program.
4. Given instructions to the BCEAO
 - a. to transfer eight percent (8%) of the proceeds from the Tranche IV resource transfer to the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund Account before any other transfers are made, and
 - b. to deposit agreed upon amounts to the NGO/Private Sector Fund Account and to the Special Grantee Accounts for the Government of Niger operating budget and investment budget support programs.
5. Submitted to A.I.D., in form and substance acceptable to A.I.D., financial and activity reports related to Tranche III detailing the level of financing accorded to each of the various elements of the program and describing activities undertaken.
6. The Grantee has not discontinued, reversed or otherwise impeded any action it has taken in satisfaction of the conditions precedent under the ASDG I program or in satisfaction of the conditions precedent under Tranches I, II or III of the present Grant.

B. Special Covenants

In addition to the above policy reform conditionality, the following special covenants will be included in the grant agreement.

1. Continuance of Actions Taken by Grantee in Satisfaction of Conditions Precedent

The Grantee shall not in any way discontinue, reverse or otherwise impede any action it has taken in satisfaction of any condition precedent set forth in the Grant Agreement, except as may be mutually agreed to in writing by the Parties.

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2. Special Local Currency Accounts

(a) The Grantee shall establish (1) a special account with the BCEAO Niamey (the "Special Dollar Account") and (2) one or more special accounts (the "Special Grantee Account") with a banking institution to be approved by both Parties . To the extent allowed by the laws of the Government of Niger and applicable banking regulations and practices, each of the Special Dollar Account and each of the Special Grantee Accounts (collectively, the "Special Accounts") shall be interest-bearing accounts.

(b) The Special Accounts shall be used solely for the purpose of transferring and holding funds supplied under this Agreement and any interest thereon. No other funds shall be commingled with the funds in the Special Accounts.

(c) Transfers of funds shall be effected promptly in accordance with the procedures set forth in Articles 6 and 7 of Annex I of the Grant Agreement.

3. Exchange Rate

The rate of foreign exchange applicable to this Agreement shall be the highest rate at which dollars may lawfully be sold under the CFA regime on the day the United States Treasury transfers each dollar tranche to the U.S. bank account of the BCEAO (the "BCEAO Account").

4. Uses of Special Account Funds

(a) Except for (1) 8% of the FCFA proceeds from each U.S. dollar disbursement made under the Grant, which BCEAO shall transfer directly to a Local Currency Trust Fund Account to be administered by A.I.D. for program activities to be identified by A.I.D. in Program Implementation Letters, and (2) that percentage of the FCFA proceeds from each U.S. dollar disbursement which the Parties will have agreed to have transferred directly by BCEAO to the private bank account of the U.S. private profit or non-profit organization which manages and monitors non-governmental ("NGO") and private sector projects, the Grantee shall allocate funds disbursed under the Grant to the Special Grantee Accounts in two ways:

(1) A percentage, as agreed to with A.I.D., to provide operational budget support to selected agencies with key roles in fulfilling this Program's objectives.

(2) A percentage, as agreed to with A.I.D., to provide budget support to the Grantee's investment budget, to support programming contributing to the objectives of this Program.

(b) As stated in the Conditions Precedent to Disbursement, prior to the transfer of each tranche of funds, agreement will be reached between the Parties as to the apportionment of the funds among the three authorized uses once the eight percent (8%) transfer to the U.S. Local Currency Trust Fund

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Account has been made (i.e., NGO and private sector projects, operational budget support and investment budget support).

(c) Unless the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the implementing governmental agencies eligible for operational budget support through Special Grantee Account funds are:

- The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
- The Ministry of Hydrology and Environment

(d) The Grantee covenants that, if any reductions are made to the Grantee contribution to operational budgets of the aforementioned governmental institutions identified as key to program success during the life of this program, that those reductions will not exceed the average of reductions imposed government-wide.

(e) The Grantee covenants that funds in or derived from any of the Special Accounts shall not be used for support of military, paramilitary or police activities.

(f) The Grantee covenants that it shall promptly refund to the Special Grantee Account(s) any local currency derived from the account, including interest, if any, which is found by audit, evaluation or A.I.D. not to have been used for purposes agreed upon by the Parties.

5. Release of Funds from Special Grantee Account

The Grantee shall release funds promptly from the Special Grantee Account(s) after the formulation of the national budget, in accordance with the ordinary and regularly applied disbursement procedures of the Ministry of Finance.

6. Reports, Records, Inspections, Audit

(a) The Grantee shall furnish to A.I.D. such reports and information relating to the Program and to this Agreement as A.I.D. may reasonably request.

(b) The Grantee shall maintain or cause to be maintained, in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices consistently applied, books and records relating to the Special Dollar Account and the Special Grantee Account(s). The Grantee shall permit A.I.D. or any of its authorized representatives to inspect such books and records at such times as A.I.D. may require. Such books and records shall be maintained for three years after the date of last disbursement of the Grant by A.I.D.

7. Meeting and Monitoring

At a minimum, representatives of the parties shall meet no less frequently than on an annual basis to report and review the progress of the Program. Prior to each such meeting, the Grantee shall transmit to A.I.D. the reports and records of

financial and program activities specified in Annex 1, Article II, A(3)(d) of the Agreement.

8. Policy Discussions

The Grantee agrees to hold policy discussions with A.I.D. whenever impediments to program success, such as restrictive policies or regulations, have been jointly identified by the Grantee and A.I.D. in future studies or implementation of the Program, with the goal of eliminating such impediments to Program success.

C. Negotiating Status

At the time of writing of this PAAD, the terms of the program have been negotiated at technical level, but the Grant Agreement has not been accepted formally by the GON. Therefore, there may be some disparities between this document and the final Grant. In every case, the Grant is the decisive document.

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Project:
From FY: 90 to FY: 96
Total U.S. Funding: \$25,000,000
Date Prepared: 7/90

Project Title & Number: Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (683-0257/0265)

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p><u>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</u> Increasing agricultural production and individual incomes in rural Niger</p>	<p><u>Measures of Goal Achievement:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased agropastoral production (crops, fodder, fuelwood, livestock) and farmer/herder incomes. Increased off-farm incomes in rural areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Surveys - GON crop reports - Independent evaluations and assessments 	<p><u>Assumptions for achieving goal targets:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GON commitment to increasing ag production and incomes remains high. - Better resource management can lead to widespread, measurable on-farm productivity gains. - Climate, rainfall & other natural environmental factors do not deteriorate drastically. - Outlets for ag products in regional mkts are not disrupted.
<p><u>Project Purpose:</u></p> <p>Enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources they habitually use, and to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner.</p>	<p><u>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased production & income, improved standard of living for beneficiaries of tenure exceptions & NRM interventions. - Reduced seasonal migrations among people benefiting from program interventions. - Reduced workload of direct women beneficiaries. - More locally conceived, managed small-scale investments funded by public investment budget. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sample surveys, interviews (beyond PACD) - Technical studies, site visits (over several yrs) - Sample surveys; interviews - Evaluations, GON reports 	<p><u>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security of tenure is a prerequisite for individual investment in the land. - NRM investments have sizable impacts. - Individuals will demand the output of rural organizations offering previously unavailable goods and services - Individuals will join community NRM and ag production initiatives. - Local currency derived from resource transfer is used to promote program objectives.

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! - Increased number of locally managed land and resource plans ! ! - Higher rate of return to rural development investments due to more coherent investment programming. ! ! - Higher quality services provided to rural population by Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock field staff. ! ! - More local initiative in development projects supported by local NGOs. ! ! - Growth in scale and number of cooperative and credit union business activity in Niger 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! - GON reports ! ! - GON reports ! - Evaluations ! ! - Interviews, surveys ! - Performance evaluations ! ! ! - Site visits ! - Interviews ! ! - GON, coop, credit union reports ! - Surveys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! ! - External factors do not prevent higher rate of return to rural development investments. ! ! - Better resource management can directly affect service quality in MAL. ! ! ! - Rural communities will be willing to collaborate with NGOs. ! ! ! - Economic potential of coops and credit unions is sufficient to allow continued growth. 	
NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<u>Outputs:</u>	<u>Magnitude of Outputs:</u>		<u>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A national NRM policy/ action plan and functioning interministerial committee for its implementation. - Active donor coordination in NRM results in reduced overlap of projects, increased efficiency of investment over time. - Biological diversity and environmental concerns integrated into the national NRM plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! - Publication of National Plan ! - Interministeriel committee operates as functional planning body. ! ! - Less inadvertent duplication of project activities in new donor investments. ! ! ! - Completion of biodiversity assessments, NCS, and EI manual. Incorporation of findings into NRM planning documents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! - Plan documents ! - Reports, decisions of intermin. committee. ! - Evaluations ! ! - Donor surveys ! ! - Donor evaluations (beyond PACD) ! ! ! - GON, WWF/IUCN reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ! - Donors will coordinate activities if given opportunity. ! - GON ministries will collaborate for achievement of NRM goals. ! ! - Public and non-govt. organizations willing to increase NRM efforts. ! ! - GON will use NRM plan in decision making on investments. ! ! - GON has, maintains, political will to invoke tenure changes which benefit peasants, protect disadvantaged.

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|---|--|--|--|
| - Tenure/use rights assured for beneficiary groups | ! - # Land attributions secured
! - # Waterpoints with secured rights.
! - (NRM) Land use plans developed. | ! - Rural Code committee reports.
! - Site visits, evaluations | ! - GON does not impose new restrictions on NGOs, private sector economic operations. |
| - Greater NGO participation in NRM. | ! - Increased # NGOs active in Niger and total financial resources they program. | ! - GAP reports. | ! - NGOs are interested in working in Niger. |
| - Expanded range of activities in the rural economy undertaken by indigenous NGOs and rural organizations. | ! - Increased # of legal indigenous NGOs, coops, and credit unions, increased programming by same. | ! - GAP reports.
! - Project monitoring
! - Site visits | ! - Nigeriens are interested in forming viable NGOs.
! - Pilot credit union program (ASDG I) will prove feasibility. |
| - Decentralization of decision making and implementing powers in NRM programs. | ! - # Local leaders trained in NRM.
! - Decrees supporting decentralization. | ! - Program reports
! - GON Reports
! - Evaluation | ! - GON will continue decentralization efforts. |
| - Transfer of forest resource management from foresters to local populations. | ! - # Foresters trained in animation techniques.
! - # Forests under local level management. | ! - Program reports
! - Site visits, interviews
! - GON Reports | ! - Local populations will take responsibility for forest management.
! - Changes in forester codes of conduct will be enforced by GON |
| - MAL collects, analyzes information on personnel and material resources, uses info as a tool for ministry management. | ! - Computerized information systems on personnel, equipment, infrastructure installed and in use.
! - MAL issues annual report on assets.
! - MAL specifically cites/analyzes information on resources in annual budget/activity plans. | ! - GON reports
! - Contractor reports
! - Site visits
! - GON reports
! - GON reports | ! - Procedural changes can be made in a ministry without govt. wide changes.
! - MAL personnel capacity is sufficient to undertake new procedures, systems without increased staff. |
| - MAL uses personnel career monitoring system, ministerial training and assignment policies to make decisions on personnel assignment and training consistent with rural development needs. | ! - Prioritization training needs of ministry accomplished, published.
! - Criteria for assignment, training decisions adopted, published.
! - Strategy for career monitoring adopted. | ! - GON reports
! - GON/contractor reports
! - GON reports | ! - GON budget crisis will not require austerity measures (e.g., reduction in force) which would make admin. improvements MAL infeasible in program period.
! - Any future government-wide admin. changes do not override reforms in MAL. |

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5C(2) - PROJECT CHECKLIST

Listed below are statutory criteria applicable to projects. This section is divided into two parts. Part A includes criteria applicable to all projects. Part B applies to projects funded from specific sources only: B(1) applies to all projects funded with Development Assistance; B(2) applies to projects funded with Development Assistance loans; and B(3) applies to projects funded from ESF.

Project 683-0265

CROSS REFERENCES: IS COUNTRY CHECKLIST UP TO DATE? HAS STANDARD ITEM CHECKLIST BEEN REVIEWED FOR THIS PROJECT? Yes Yes

A. GENERAL CRITERIA FOR PROJECT

- 1. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 523; FAA Sec. 634A. If money is to be obligated for an activity not previously justified to Congress, or for an amount in excess of amount previously justified to Congress, has Congress been properly notified? N/A
2. FAA Sec. 611(a). Prior to an obligation in excess of \$500,000, will there be: (a) engineering, financial or other plans necessary to carry out the assistance; and (b) a reasonably firm estimate of the cost to the U.S. of the assistance? Yes
3. FAA Sec. 611(a)(2). If legislative action is required within recipient country with respect to an obligation in excess of \$500,000, what is the basis for a reasonable expectation that such action will be completed in time to permit orderly accomplishment of the purpose of the assistance? N/A

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4. FAA Sec. 611(b); FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 501. If project is for water or water-related land resource construction, have benefits and costs been computed to the extent practicable in accordance with the principles, standards, and procedures established pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act (42 U.S.C. 1962, et seq.)? (See A.I.D. Handbook 3 for guidelines.) N/A
5. FAA Sec. 611(e). If project is capital assistance (e.g., construction) total U.S. assistance for it will exceed \$1 million, has Mission Director certified and Regional Assistant Administrator taken into consideration the country's capability to maintain and utilize the project effectively? N/A
6. FAA Sec. 209. Is project susceptible to execution as part of regional or multilateral project? If so, why is project not so executed? Information and conclusion whether assistance will encourage regional development programs. No
7. FAA Sec. 601(a). Information and conclusions on whether projects will encourage efforts of the country to: (a) increase the flow of international trade; (b) foster private initiative and competition; (c) encourage development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations; (d) discourage monopolistic practices; (e) improve technical efficiency of industry, agriculture and commerce; and (f) strengthen free labor unions. Project will foster private initiative to manage natural resources in a sustainable fashion; will help to promote non-governmental organizations independent coops and credit unions through technical assistance related to natural resource management (NRM). Institutional improvements at Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock will contribute to efficiency of agriculture.
8. FAA Sec. 601(b). Information and conclusions on how project will encourage U.S. private trade and investment abroad and encourage private U.S. participation in foreign assistance programs (including use of private trade channels and the services of U.S. private enterprise). U.S. private sector firms will be involved as technical assistance.

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9. FAA Secs. 612(b), 636(h). Describe steps taken to assure that, to the maximum extent possible, the country is contributing local currencies to meet the cost of contractual and other services, and foreign currencies owned by the U.S. are utilized in lieu of dollars. N/A
As RLDC in Sahel, no such requirement exists. Grantee will provide in-kind contributions of personnel, etc. No such currency owned by U.S.
10. FAA Sec. 612(d). Does the U.S. own excess foreign currency of the country and, if so, what arrangements have been made for its release? No
11. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 521. If assistance is for the production of any commodity for export, is the commodity likely to be in surplus on world markets at the time the resulting productive capacity becomes operative, and is such assistance likely to cause substantial injury to U.S. producers of the same, similar or competing commodity? N/A
12. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 547. Will the assistance (except for programs in Caribbean Basin Initiative countries under U.S. Tariff Schedule "Section 807," which allows reduced tariffs on articles assembled abroad from U.S.-made components) be used directly to procure feasibility studies, prefeasibility studies, or project profiles of potential investment in, or to assist the establishment of facilities specifically designed for, the manufacture for export to the United States or to third country markets in direct competition with U.S. exports, of textiles, apparel, footwear, handbags, flat goods (such as wallets or coin purses worn on the person), work gloves or leather wearing apparel? No
13. FAA Sec. 119(g)(4)-(6) & (10). Will the assistance: (a) support training and education efforts which improve the capacity of recipient countries to prevent loss of biological diversity; (b) be provided under a long-term agreement in which the recipient country agrees to protect ecosystems or other
a) yes
b) no, however project will contribute to such protection

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wildlife habitats; (c) support efforts to identify and survey ecosystems in recipient countries worthy of protection; or (d) by any direct or indirect means significantly degrade national parks or similar protected areas or introduce exotic plants or animals into such areas?

- c) yes. Biodiversity assessments
- d) no

14. FAA Sec. 121(d). If a Sahel project, has a determination been made that the host government has an adequate system for accounting for and controlling receipt and expenditure of project funds (either dollars or local currency generated therefrom)?

No funds will be released to Grantee from project.

15. FY 1990 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Agency for International Development." If assistance is to be made to a United States PVO (other than a cooperative development organization), does it obtain at least 20 percent of its total annual funding for international activities from sources other than the United States Government?

N/A assistance to Govt. of Niger. If PVO is used during implementation, requirement will be enforced as stated.

16. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 537. If assistance is being made available to a PVO, has that organization provided upon timely request any document, file, or record necessary to the auditing requirements of A.I.D., and is the PVO registered with A.I.D.?

N/A. see answer to 15, above

17. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 514. If funds are being obligated under an appropriation account to which they were not appropriated, has the President consulted with and provided a written justification to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and has such obligation been subject to regular notification procedures?

N/A

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18. State Authorization Sec. 139 (as interpreted by conference report). Has confirmation of the date of signing of the project agreement, including the amount involved, been cabled to State L/T and A.I.D. LEG within 60 days of the agreement's entry into force with respect to the United States, and has the full text of the agreement been pouched to those same offices? (See Handbook 3, Appendix 6G for agreements covered by this provision). N/A
19. Trade Act Sec. 5164 (as interpreted by conference report), amending Metric Conversion Act of 1975 Sec. 2. Does the project use the metric system of measurement in its procurements, grants, and other business-related activities, except to the extent that such use is impractical or is likely to cause significant inefficiencies or loss of markets to United States firms? Are bulk purchases usually to be made in metric, and are components, subassemblies, and semi-fabricated materials to be specified in metric units when economically available and technically adequate? Yes
20. FY 1990 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Women in Development." Will assistance be designed so that the percentage of women participants will be demonstrably increased? Yes
21. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 592(a). If assistance is furnished to a foreign government under arrangements which result in the generation of local currencies, has A.I.D. (a) required that local currencies be deposited in a separate account established by the recipient government, (b) entered into an agreement with that government providing the amount of local currencies to be generated and the terms and conditions under which the currencies so deposited may be utilized, and (c) established by agreement the responsibilities of A.I.D. and that government to monitor and account for deposits into and disbursements from the separate account? N/A for project

NSC
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Will such local currencies, or an equivalent amount of local currencies, be used only to carry out the purposes of the DA or ESF chapters of the FAA (depending on which chapter is the source of the assistance) or for the administrative requirements of the United States Government?

N/A

Has A.I.D. taken all appropriate steps to ensure that the equivalent of local currencies disbursed from the separate account are used for the agreed purposes?

N/A

If assistance is terminated to a country, will any unencumbered balances of funds remaining in a separate account be disposed of for purposes agreed to by the recipient government and the United States Government?

N/A

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B. FUNDING CRITERIA FOR PROJECT

1. Development Assistance Project Criteria

a. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 546 (as interpreted by conference report for original enactment). If assistance is for agricultural development activities (specifically, any testing or breeding feasibility study, variety improvement or introduction, consultancy, publication, conference, or training), are such activities: (1) specifically and principally designed to increase agricultural exports by the host country to a country other than the United States, where the export would lead to direct competition in that third country with exports of a similar commodity grown or produced in the United States, and can the activities reasonably be expected to cause substantial injury to U.S. exporters of a similar agricultural commodity; or (2) in support of research that is intended primarily to benefit U.S. producers?

1) no

2) no

Agricultural activities related to project are in support of natural resource management.

b. FAA Sec. 107. Is special emphasis placed on use of appropriate technology (defined as relatively smaller, cost-saving, labor-using technologies that are generally most appropriate for the small farms, small businesses, and small incomes of the poor)?

Yes, in studies and strategy related to NRM.

c. FAA Sec. 281(b). Describe extent to which the activity recognizes the particular needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the country; utilizes the country's intellectual resources to encourage institutional development; and supports civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.

Project is designed to support Nigerien efforts to provide sustainable rural production through individual efforts, and to individual and community benefit. Nigerien citizens will be actively involved in all aspects of the project.

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d. FAA Secs. 101(a). Does the activity give reasonable promise of contributing to the development of economic resources, or to the increase of productive capacities and self-sustaining economic growth?

Yes, in conjunction with program component 683-0257

e. FAA Secs. 102(b), 111, 113, 281(a). Describe extent to which activity will: (1) effectively involve the poor in development by extending access to economy at local level, increasing labor-intensive production and the use of appropriate technology, dispersing investment from cities to small towns and rural areas, and insuring wide participation of the poor in the benefits of development on a sustained basis, using appropriate U.S. institutions; (2) help develop cooperatives, especially by technical assistance, to assist rural and urban poor to help themselves toward a better life, and otherwise encourage democratic private and local governmental institutions; (3) support the self-help efforts of developing countries; (4) promote the participation of women in the national economies of developing countries and the improvement of women's status; and (5) utilize and encourage regional cooperation by developing countries.

Project will support technical assistance, studies, training related to NRM (which requires local participation and is aimed at rural inhabitants, great majority of whom are poor), provide T.A. to local non-governmental organizations which support community development and self-help. Attention will be paid to women's participation. Some project activities involve regional approach to NRM problems.

f. FAA Secs. 103, 103A, 104, 105, 106, 120-21; FY 1990 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Sub-Saharan Africa, DA." Does the project fit the criteria for the source of funds (functional account) being used?

Yes

g. FY 1990 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Sub-Saharan Africa, DA." Have local currencies generated by the sale of imports or foreign exchange by the government of a country in Sub-Saharan Africa from funds appropriated under Sub-Saharan Africa, DA been deposited in a special account established by that government, and are these local currencies available only for

N/A

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use, in accordance with an agreement with the United States, for development activities which are consistent with the policy directions of Section 102 of the FAA and for necessary administrative requirements of the U. S. Government?

h. FAA Sec. 107. Is emphasis placed on use of appropriate technology (relatively smaller, cost-saving, labor-using technologies that are generally most appropriate for the small farms, small businesses, and small incomes of the poor)?

Yes, through studies and training related to NRM.

i. FAA Secs. 110, 124(d). Will the recipient country provide at least 25 percent of the costs of the program, project, or activity with respect to which the assistance is to be furnished (or is the latter cost-sharing requirement being waived for a "relatively least developed" country)?

N/A. Niger is RLDC in Sahel. Provision does not apply.

j. FAA Sec. 128(b). If the activity attempts to increase the institutional capabilities of private organizations or the government of the country, or if it attempts to stimulate scientific and technological research, has it been designed and will it be monitored to ensure that the ultimate beneficiaries are the poor majority?

Yes, through evaluations during and after project.

k. FAA Sec. 281(b). Describe extent to which program recognizes the particular needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the country; utilizes the country's intellectual resources to encourage institutional development; and supports civil education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental processes essential to self-government.

see p. 17, B.1.c.

l. FY 1990 Appropriations Act, under heading "Population, DA," and Sec. 535. Are any of the funds to be used for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions?

No

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Are any of the funds to be used to pay for the performance of involuntary sterilization as a method of family planning or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any person to undergo sterilizations? No

Are any of the funds to be made available to any organization or program which, as determined by the President, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization? No

Will funds be made available only to voluntary family planning projects which offer, either directly or through referral to, or information about access to, a broad range of family planning methods and services? N/A

In awarding grants for natural family planning, will any applicant be discriminated against because of such applicant's religious or conscientious commitment to offer only natural family planning? N/A

Are any of the funds to be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in whole or in part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning? N/A

m. FAA Sec. 601(e). Will the project utilize competitive selection procedures for the awarding of contracts, except where applicable procurement rules allow otherwise? yes

n. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 579. What portion of the funds will be available only for activities of economically and socially disadvantaged enterprises, historically black colleges and universities, colleges and universities having a student body in which more than 40 percent of the students are Hispanic Americans, and Minimum 10% of any contract over \$500,000

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private and voluntary organizations which are controlled by individuals who are black Americans, Hispanic Americans, or Native Americans, or who are economically or socially disadvantaged (including women)?

o. FAA Sec. 118(c). Does the assistance comply with the environmental procedures set forth in A.I.D. Regulation 16? Does the assistance place a high priority on conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests? Specifically, does the assistance, to the fullest extent feasible: (1) stress the importance of conserving and sustainably managing forest resources; (2) support activities which offer employment and income alternatives to those who otherwise would cause destruction and loss of forests, and help countries identify and implement alternatives to colonizing forested areas; (3) support training programs, educational efforts, and the establishment or strengthening of institutions to improve forest management; (4) help end destructive slash-and-burn agriculture by supporting stable and productive farming practices; (5) help conserve forests which have not yet been degraded by helping to increase production on lands already cleared or degraded; (6) conserve forested watersheds and rehabilitate those which have been deforested; (7) support training, research, and other actions which lead to sustainable and more environmentally sound practices for timber harvesting, removal, and processing; (8) support research to expand knowledge of tropical forests and identify alternatives which will prevent forest destruction, loss, or degradation; (9) conserve biological diversity in forest areas by supporting efforts to identify, establish, and maintain a representative network of protected tropical forest ecosystems on a worldwide basis, by making the establishment of protected areas a

Yes. Note that Niger is semi-arid country in Sahel, of which 65% of land mass is in Saharan zone. Forested areas cover less than 10% of area, and are limited in density and diversity of plant life.

Project consists of T.A., studies, training. Activities in support of NKM include direct attention to protection of vegetation, including forests.

Studies will include biodiversity assessments.

Conservation strategy statements will be part of project outputs.

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condition of support for activities involving forest clearance or degradation, and by helping to identify tropical forest ecosystems and species in need of protection and establish and maintain appropriate protected areas; (10) seek to increase the awareness of U.S. Government agencies and other donors of the immediate and long-term value of tropical forests; and (11) utilize the resources and abilities of all relevant U.S. government agencies?

p. FAA Sec. 118(c)(13). If the assistance will support a program or project significantly affecting tropical forests (including projects involving the planting of exotic plant species), will the program or project: (1) be based upon careful analysis of the alternatives available to achieve the best sustainable use of the land, and (2) take full account of the environmental impacts of the proposed activities on biological diversity?

N/A

g. FAA Sec. 118(c)(14). Will assistance be used for: (1) the procurement or use of logging equipment, unless an environmental assessment indicates that all timber harvesting operations involved will be conducted in an environmentally sound manner and that the proposed activity will produce positive economic benefits and sustainable forest management systems; or (2) actions which will significantly degrade national parks or similar protected areas which contain tropical forests, or introduce exotic plants or animals into such areas?

No

No

r. FAA Sec. 118(c)(15). Will assistance be used for: (1) activities which would result in the conversion of forest lands to the rearing of livestock; (2) the construction, upgrading, or maintenance of roads (including temporary haul roads for logging or other extractive industries) which pass through relatively undergraded forest lands; (3) the

N/A

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colonization of forest lands; or (4) the construction of dams or other water control structures which flood relatively undergraded forest lands, unless with respect to each such activity an environmental assessment indicates that the activity will contribute significantly and directly to improving the livelihood of the rural poor and will be conducted in an environmentally sound manner which supports sustainable development?

s. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 534(a). If assistance relates to tropical forests, will project assist countries in developing a systematic analysis of the appropriate use of their total tropical forest resources, with the goal of developing a national program for sustainable forestry?

N/A. See o, above.

t. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 534(b). If assistance relates to energy, will such assistance focus on improved energy efficiency, increased use of renewable energy resources, and national energy plans (such as least-cost energy plans) which include investment in end-use efficiency and renewable energy resources?

N/A

Describe and give conclusions as to how such assistance will: (1) increase the energy expertise of A.I.D. staff, (2) help to develop analyses of energy-sector actions to minimize emissions of greenhouse gases at least cost, (3) develop energy-sector plans that employ end-use analysis and other techniques to identify cost-effective actions to minimize reliance on fossil fuels, (4) help to analyze fully environmental impacts (including impact on global warming), (5) improve efficiency in production, transmission, distribution, and use of energy, (6) assist in exploiting nonconventional renewable energy resources, including wind, solar, small-hydro, geo-thermal, and advanced

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biomass systems, (7) expand efforts to meet the energy needs of the rural poor, (8) encourage host countries to sponsor meetings with United States energy efficiency experts to discuss the use of least-cost planning techniques, (9) help to develop a cadre of United States experts capable of providing technical assistance to developing countries on energy issues, and (10) strengthen cooperation on energy issues with the Department of Energy, EPA, World Bank, and Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.

u. FY 1990 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Sub-Saharan Africa, DA" (as interpreted by conference report upon original enactment). If assistance will come from the Sub-Saharan Africa DA account, is it: (1) to be used to help the poor majority in Sub-Saharan Africa through a process of long-term development and economic growth that is equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and self-reliant; (2) being provided in accordance with the policies contained in section 102 of the FAA; (3) being provided, when consistent with the objectives of such assistance, through African, United States and other PVOs that have demonstrated effectiveness in the promotion of local grassroots activities on behalf of long-term development in Sub-Saharan Africa; (4) being used to help overcome shorter-term constraints to long-term development, to promote reform of sectoral economic policies, to support the critical sector priorities of agricultural production and natural resources, health, voluntary family planning services, education, and income generating opportunities, to bring about appropriate sectoral restructuring of the Sub-Saharan African economies, to support reform in public administration and finances and to establish a favorable environment for individual enterprise and self-sustaining development, and to take

Yes. Project is technical assistance, studies, short-term training in support of sectoral reform related to NRM and strengthening of service institutions as agents of change in rural development. Objectives include increase in sustainable ag production through individual and community stewardship of resources.

Project will supply T.A. in support of institutional reform in Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock. Project is explicitly tied to NRM.


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into account, in assisted policy reforms, the need to protect vulnerable groups; (5) being used to increase agricultural production in ways that protect and restore the natural resource base, especially food production, to maintain and improve basic transportation and communication networks, to maintain and restore the renewable natural resource base in ways that increase agricultural production, to improve health conditions with special emphasis on meeting the health needs of mothers and children, including the establishment of self-sustaining primary health care systems that give priority to preventive care, to provide increased access to voluntary family planning services, to improve basic literacy and mathematics especially to those outside the formal educational system and to improve primary education, and to develop income-generating opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed in urban and rural areas?

v. International Development Act Sec. 711, FAA Sec. 463. If project will finance a debt-for-nature exchange, describe how the exchange will support protection of: (1) the world's oceans and atmosphere, (2) animal and plant species, and (3) parks and reserves; or describe how the exchange will promote: (4) natural resource management, (5) local conservation programs, (6) conservation training programs, (7) public commitment to conservation, (8) land and ecosystem management, and (9) regenerative approaches in farming, forestry, fishing, and watershed management.

N/A

w. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 515. If deob/reob authority is sought to be exercised in the provision of DA assistance, are the funds being obligated for the same general purpose, and for countries within the same region as originally obligated, and have the House and Senate Appropriations Committees been properly notified?

N/A

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2. Development Assistance Project Criteria
(Loans Only)

ALL N/A

a. FAA Sec. 122(b). Information and conclusion on capacity of the country to repay the loan at a reasonable rate of interest.

b. FAA Sec. 620(d). If assistance is for any productive enterprise which will compete with U.S. enterprises, is there an agreement by the recipient country to prevent export to the U.S. of more than 20 percent of the enterprise's annual production during the life of the loan, or has the requirement to enter into such an agreement been waived by the President because of a national security interest?

c. FAA Sec. 122(b). Does the activity give reasonable promise of assisting long-range plans and programs designed to develop economic resources and increase productive capacities?

3. Economic Support Fund Project Criteria

ALL N/A

a. FAA Sec. 531(a). Will this assistance promote economic and political stability? To the maximum extent feasible, is this assistance consistent with the policy directions, purposes, and programs of Part I of the FAA?

b. FAA Sec. 531(e). Will this assistance be used for military or paramilitary purposes?

c. FAA Sec. 609. If commodities are to be granted so that sale proceeds will accrue to the recipient country, have Special Account (counterpart) arrangements been made?

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3(A)2 - NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE CHECKLIST

The criteria listed in Part A are applicable generally to FAA funds, and should be used irrespective of the program's funding source. In Part B a distinction is made between the criteria applicable to Economic Support Fund assistance and the criteria applicable to Development Assistance. Selection of the criteria will depend on the funding source for the program.

CROSS REFERENCES:	IS COUNTRY CHECKLIST UP TO DATE? HAS STANDARD ITEM CHECKLIST BEEN REVIEWED?	Yes Yes
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A. GENERAL CRITERIA FOR NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE

1. FY 1990 Appropriations Act Sec. 523: FAA Sec. 634A. Describe how authorization and appropriations committees of Senate and House have been or will be notified concerning the project. CN
2. FAA Sec. 611(a)(2). If further legislative action is required within recipient country, what is basis for reasonable expectation that such action will be completed in time to permit orderly accomplishment of purpose of the assistance? N/A
3. FAA Sec. 209. Is assistance more efficiently and effectively provided through regional or multilateral organizations? If so, why is assistance not so provided? Information and conclusions on whether assistance will encourage developing countries to cooperate in regional development programs. No

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4. FAA Sec. 601(a). Information and conclusions on whether assistance will encourage efforts of the country to: (a) increase the flow of international trade; (b) foster private initiative and competition; (c) encourage development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations; (d) discourage monopolistic practices; (e) improve technical efficiency of industry, agriculture, and commerce; and (f) strengthen free labor unions. Private initiative in NRM is stressed. Reforms include specifically approving establishment of non-governmental organizations, monitoring of prior reforms (under ASDG I) relating to cooperative movement autonomy, and credit union operations.
5. FAA Sec. 601(b). Information and conclusions on how assistance will encourage U.S. private trade and investment abroad and encourage private U.S. participation in foreign assistance programs (including use of private trade channels and the services of U.S. private enterprise). Through project component (683-0265)
6. FAA Sec. 121(d). If assistance is being furnished under the Sahel Development Program, has a determination been made that the host government has an adequate system for accounting for and controlling receipt and expenditure of A.I.D. funds? Yes

B. FUNDING CRITERIA FOR NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE

1. Nonproject Criteria for Economic Support Fund
- a. FAA Sec. 531(a). Will this assistance promote economic and political stability? To the maximum extent feasible, is this assistance consistent with the policy directions, purposes, and programs of Part I of the FAA? N/A. Not ESF.
- b. FAA Sec. 531(e). Will assistance under this chapter be used for military or paramilitary activities?

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c. FAA Sec. 531(d). Will ESF funds made available for commodity import programs or other program assistance be used to generate local currencies? If so, will at least 50 percent of such local currencies be available to support activities consistent with the objectives of FAA sections 103 through 106?

Not ESF

d. FAA Sec. 609. If commodities are to be granted so that sale proceeds will accrue to the recipient country, have Special Account (counterpart) arrangements been made?

"

e. FY 1990 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Economic Support Fund," and Sec. 592. If assistance is in the form of a cash transfer: (a) Are all such cash payments to be maintained by the country in a separate account and not to be commingled with any other funds? (b) Will all local currencies that may be generated with funds provided as a cash transfer to such a country also be deposited in a special account, and has A.I.D. entered into an agreement with that government setting forth the amount of the local currencies to be generated, the terms and conditions under which they are to be used, and the responsibilities of A.I.D. and that government to monitor and account for deposits and disbursements? (c) Will all such local currencies also be used in accordance with FAA Section 609, which requires such local currencies to be made available to the U.S. government as the U.S. determines necessary for the requirements of the U.S. Government, and which requires the remainder to be used for programs agreed to by the U.S. Government to carry out the purposes for which new funds authorized by the FAA would themselves be available? (d) Has Congress received prior notification providing in detail how the funds will be used, including the U.S. interests that will be served by the assistance, and, as appropriate, the economic policy reforms that will be promoted by the cash transfer assistance?

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2. Nonproject Criteria for Development Assistance

a. FAA Secs. 102(a), 111, 113, 281(a).

Extent to which activity will: (1) effectively involve the poor in development, by expanding access to economy at local level, increasing labor-intensive production and the use of appropriate technology, spreading investment out from cities to small towns and rural areas, and insuring wide participation of the poor in the benefits of development on a sustained basis, using the appropriate U.S. institutions; (2) help develop cooperatives, especially by technical assistance, to assist rural and urban poor to help themselves toward better life, and otherwise encourage democratic private and local governmental institutions; (3) support the self-help efforts of developing countries; (4) promote the participation of women in the national economies of developing countries and the improvement of women's status; and (5) utilize and encourage regional cooperation by developing countries?

Program supports policy reform and local currency NGO/private sector fund finances interventions aimed at promoting sustainable ag production through individual initiative in NRM. Ultimate beneficiaries are rural inhabitants, great majority of whom are poor. Policy interventions and funding support to local NGOs are planned. Status of coops will be monitored. Role of women will receive special attention in program monitoring.

b. FAA Secs. 103, 103A, 104, 105, 106, 120-21. Is assistance being made available (include only applicable paragraph which corresponds to source of funds used; if more than one fund source is used for assistance, include relevant paragraph for each fund source):

(1) [103] for agriculture, rural development or nutrition; if so (a) extent to which activity is specifically designed to increase productivity and income of rural poor; [103A] if for agricultural research, account shall be taken of the needs of small farmers, and extensive use of field testing to adapt basic research to local conditions shall be made; (b) extent to which assistance is used in coordination with efforts carried out

N/A

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under Sec. 104 to help improve nutrition of the people of developing countries through encouragement of increased production of crops with greater nutritional value; improvement of planning, research, and education with respect to nutrition, particularly with reference to improvement and expanded use of indigenously produced foodstuffs; and the undertaking of pilot or demonstration programs explicitly addressing the problem of malnutrition of poor and vulnerable people; and (c) extent to which activity increases national food security by improving food policies and management and by strengthening national food reserves, with particular concern for the needs of the poor, through measures encouraging domestic production, building national food reserves, expanding available storage facilities, reducing post harvest food losses, and improving food distribution.

(2) [104] for population planning under Sec. 104(b) or health under Sec. 104(c); if so, extent to which activity emphasizes low-cost, integrated delivery systems for health, nutrition and family planning for the poorest people, with particular attention to the needs of mothers and young children, using paramedical and auxiliary medical personnel, clinics and health posts, commercial distribution systems, and other modes of community outreach.

N/A

(3) [105] for education, public administration, or human resources development; if so, (a) extent to which activity strengthens nonformal education, makes formal education more relevant, especially for rural families and urban poor, and strengthens management capability of institutions enabling the poor to participate in development; and (b) extent to which assistance provides advanced education

N/A

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and training of people of developing countries in such disciplines as are required for planning and implementation of public and private development activities.

(4) [106] for energy, private voluntary organizations, and selected development problems; if so, extent activity is:

N/A

(i)(a) concerned with data collection and analysis, the training of skilled personnel, research on and development of suitable energy sources, and pilot projects to test new methods of energy production; and (b) facilitative of research on and development and use of small-scale, decentralized, renewable energy sources for rural areas, emphasizing development of energy resources which are environmentally acceptable and require minimum capital investment;

(ii) concerned with technical cooperation and development, especially with U.S. private and voluntary, or regional and international development, organizations;

(iii) research into, and evaluation of, economic development processes and techniques;

(iv) reconstruction after natural or manmade disaster and programs of disaster preparedness;

(v) for special development problems, and to enable proper utilization of infrastructure and related projects funded with earlier U.S. assistance;

(vi) for urban development, especially small, labor-intensive enterprises, marketing systems for small producers, and financial or other institutions to help urban poor participate in economic and social development.

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(5) [120-21] for the Sahelian region; if so, (a) extent to which there is international coordination in planning and implementation; participation and support by African countries and organizations in determining development priorities; and a long-term, multidonor development plan which calls for equitable burden-sharing with other donors; (b) has a determination been made that the host government has an adequate system for accounting for and controlling receipt and expenditure of projects funds (dollars or local currency generated therefrom)?

a) coordination in NRM is through CILSS and local donor coordination; priorities are set by Govt of Niger; donor coordination is part of project activities

b) yes, local currency

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ACTION: AID INFO: AMB DCM /3

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PP RUEHNM
DE RUEHC #8808 3400205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 060204Z DEC 89

DEC 6 Recd

LOO: 366 184
06 DEC 89 0257
UN: 108488
CHRG: AID
DIST: AID

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 2213
INFO: RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY APIDJAN 1311
BT
UNCLAS STATE 388808

ACTION: ADO
INFO: DIR

DD
P/ECON/PTO
CHRON 12/04

DIR DATE: 12/12/89

AIDAC APIDJAN FOR: REDSO/WCA

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: ECPR REVIEW OF NIGER AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT GRANT II (ASDG) PAIP (683-0257/0265)

1. THE ECPR FOR THE NIGER ASDG II PAIP, CHAIRED BY
DAA/AFR SAIBRS, WAS HELD ON NOVEMBER 21, 1989 AND
INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DESK, GC, DP, PD, AND
TR/ANR. MISSION REPRESENTATIVE, FRANK MARTIN, WAS VERY
HELPFUL IN EXPLAINING THE PROGRAM'S RATIONALE AND
RELATED DESIGN FEATURES, AND IN RESPONDING TO ECPR
CONCERNS. THE PAIP WAS APPROVED AND THE MISSION MAY
PROCEED WITH PAAD DEVELOPMENT, APPROVAL, AND
AUTHORIZATION PURSUANT TO THE GUIDANCE OUTLINED BELOW.
SEPTEL WILL FOLLOW WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR MISSION
CONSIDERATION IN DEVELOPING THE PAAD. A SECOND SEPTEL
WILL ADDRESS IEE REQUIREMENTS. FYI THIS IS THE FIRST
NPA PROGRAM FOR WHICH FIELD HAS BEEN DELEGATED
AUTHORIZATION AUTHORITY. END FYI.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE CONCERNS IDENTIFIED BY THE ECPR
WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE PAAD:

A. PROGRAM'S ORDER OF MAGNITUDE: THE LOGICAL

FRAMEWORK IS WELL DONE BUT REQUIRES DEFINITION OF ORDER
OF MAGNITUDE, TIME FRAME, AND EXPECTED IMPACT. MEANS OF
VERIFICATION OF IMPACT SHOULD ALSO BE AMPLIFIED. FOR
EXAMPLE, WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE COUNTRY'S RURAL
FARMERS/HERDERS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAM; WHAT
ARE THE PROJECTED INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR
INCOMES/STANDARDS OF LIVING; HOW MUCH LAND WILL BE
MANAGED IN AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND AND SUSTAINABLE
MANNER; IN BRIEF, WHAT IS THE EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE
PROGRAM ON THE TARGETED POPULATION GROUPS? THE MEANS OF
VERIFYING PROGRAM IMPACT SHOULD ALSO BE AMPLIFIED.
FINALLY, A DETAILED MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLAN
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO ADEQUATELY TRACK THE PROGRAM'S
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS AND IMPACT.

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B. LOCAL CURRENCY COUNTERPART FUND MANAGEMENT:
COUNTERPART FUND MANAGEMENT WAS IDENTIFIED AS A
SERIOUS CONCERN. PAAD SHOULD PROVIDE EXPANDED

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DESCRIPTION OF HOW FUND IS TO BE MANAGED WITHOUT IMPOSING ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT BURDENS ON USAID MISSION.

— C. ESTABLISHING CONDITIONALITY FOR PROGRAM

DISBURSEMENT: MISSION REPRESENTATIVE ADVISED THAT DISBURSEMENTS WOULD BE EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A ROLLING PLAN SIMILAR TO THAT USED BY THE WORLD BANK WHEREBY CONDITIONALITY FOR FIRST TRANCHE DISBURSEMENT IS SPECIFIED AT THE OUTSET IN THE GRANT AGREEMENT ALONG WITH CLEARLY QUANTIFIED END OF PROGRAM TARGETS, ETC. HOWEVER THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE REMAINING THREE TRANCHES WOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN DETAIL ON A YEARLY BASIS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PROGRAM PROGRESS TO DATE, END OF PROGRAM TARGETS, AND OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROGRAM. THE AUTHORIZATION VENUE FOR SUCH AMENDMENTS WOULD BE THE MISSION DIRECTOR, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE REGIONAL LEGAL ADVISOR, UNLESS SUCH AMENDMENTS INVOLVED SUBSTANTIVE MODIFICATIONS IN THE PROGRAM IN WHICH CASE AA/APR AUTHORIZATION WOULD BE SOUGHT.

3. FOLLOWING PAAD DEVELOPMENT BUT PRIOR TO AUTHORIZATION, PLEASE FORWARD AN INFORMATIONAL CABLE TO A.I.D./W INDICATING SALIENT FEATURES OF THE PROGRAM INCLUDING SPECIFIC CONDITIONALITY, PROGRAM TARGETS AND BENCHMARKS, AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS. BAKER

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REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER
CONSEIL SUPERIEUR D'ORIENTATION
NATIONALE
MINISTERE DU PLAN
SECRETARIAT D'ETAT AU PLAN

Niamey, le

ANNEX D

08 AOUT 1990

683-0257

N° 0338/MP/SEP/DAEP

LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT

Monsieur le Directeur de l'USAID

ACTION: ADD
INFO: DIR: DD
PDC
PROG
CHRON

Objet : Programme subvention au développement du secteur agricole - Seconde phase (SDSA_{II}).

DUE DATE: 8-16-90

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USAID/NIGER

Monsieur le Directeur,

La recherche de solutions aux multiples problèmes du secteur rural a conduit notre pays à réfléchir sur des politiques de réformes appropriées. C'est ainsi que le programme SDSA_I a été mis en place à partir de 1985 avec pour objectif principal l'appui institutionnel au secteur agricole. Ce programme tire à sa fin avec des résultats assez encourageants.

Pour une bonne consolidation des acquis des réformes initiées par la SDSA_I, une seconde phase s'avère nécessaire, d'où la mise en place d'un programme SDSA_{II} dont les travaux préparatoires sont en cours d'achèvement.

Dans ce cadre, j'ai l'honneur de vous demander d'introduire officiellement auprès des autorités compétentes de votre institution une requête de financement du projet visé en objet.

Il convient de rappeler que l'instruction de ce dossier a été menée par un Comité conjoint composé des cadres de vos services, ceux des différents ministères impliqués et cela sous la coordination de la Direction de l'analyse économique et de la prévision.

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
.2.

L'objectif de ce programme est de rehausser la capacité des populations rurales à gérer et tirer profit de manière soutenable des ressources dont elles disposent à travers essentiellement deux (2) volets à savoir :

- le volet "gestion des ressources naturelles" et
- le volet "appui institutionnel".

En renouvelant nos sincères sentiments quant à la contribution de l'USAID à ces programmes, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Directeur, l'expression de ma très haute considération.


DOURAMANE MOUSSA



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12/28/89 13:26

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AID/AFR/TR/ANR

L. E. G. Rm2895 NS 002/002

INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXAMINATION

ANNEX E

COUNTRY: Republic of Niger

PROJECT TITLE: Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (683-0257/63)

FUNDING: Proposed Funding (LOF) - \$25,000,000 (DFA)

PERIOD OF PROJECT: FY 1990 - FY 1995

Activity Description: The program is intended to assist the Government of Niger in its program to reduce the constraints to agricultural production and rural income growth. The program consists of 1) phased dollar disbursements as policy reforms are implemented and 2) the technical assistance and in-service training necessary for monitoring the policy implementation, conducting studies and strengthening the CON capacity for program monitoring.

Environmental Action Recommended: Categorical Exclusion in accordance with 215.2 (c)(2)(VI).

IEE Prepared by: Erna Kulev, Project Development Officer, USAID/Niger

Reviewed by: George Taylor, Mission Environmental Officer, USAID/Niger

Determination: George T. Eaton, Mission Director, USAID/Niger

Approved:

George T. Eaton

Date:

NOV 1 1989

Bureau Environmental Officer's Recommendation:

Approved:

B. Boyd AFR/TA
Bureau Environmental Officer, AFR/TA

Disapproved:

Date:

JEC 15 1989

Clearance: GC/AFR: PJohnson

P. Johnson
2/16/89

ANNEX F

Information Plan

Users of the Information - Major users of the information generated by the monitoring and evaluation activities of the program are the Joint GON-USAID program review committee, the studies and policy divisions of the Ministries of the Plan, Agriculture and Livestock, Hydrology and Environment, special commissions or committees related to issues of natural resource management and resource tenure, and USAID/Niger. A.I.D./Washington will be a secondary user of the information.

Principal Objectives

The ASDG II program will contribute to the goal of increasing agricultural production and individual incomes in rural Niger. The program's purpose is to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to gain control over resources which they habitually use, and to manage and profit from them in a sustainable manner.

ASDG II calls for a set of policy reforms and initiatives by the Government of Niger to assist in establishing the legal and policy framework necessary for effective natural resource management and in promoting the development of institutions which can be positive agents of change in rural Niger. Policy reform and project assistance under ASDG II concentrate on formulation and implementation of a national NRM strategy and program, gradual transfer of decision making on NRM from central government to local populations, creation of a regulatory environment conducive to individual investment. In institutional issues the program stresses revisions of codes of conduct for forestry agents, reducing governmental restrictions on operations of nongovernmental organizations, and assisting rural development ministries to enhance their internal resource management.

Priority information needs

The policy reform program is designed with dollar disbursement in four tranches on satisfaction of conditions precedent. The tranches are scheduled at approximately one year intervals from year 2. There are, then, annual decision points requiring review and analysis of program performance. This review will be based on evidence provided by the Grantee as to satisfaction of conditions, and on results of program monitoring by USAID and the GON.

Program performance will also be reviewed on a less formal basis in semi-annual program reviews with the GON at technical level, and in USAID semi-annual PIR reviews.

Management questions requiring review at key decision points include:

- Are inputs being delivered on time, and are they appropriate in content?
- Have the inputs contributed to realization of outputs (reforms)?
- Has the GON met conditions for disbursement?

- Have reforms made had the intended initial effects?
- Were design assumptions correct?
- Does the program need modification in design?

Formal evaluations of the program's impact will take place at mid-term, in its last year and after it has ended. USAID will begin preparations for the ex-post evaluation during the program's life. Program monitoring activities (including small scale surveys and studies) will give indications of program purpose achievement.

ASDG II monitoring will also benefit from studies and monitoring activities under ASDG I and NEPRP, and from technical assistance activities and studies under USAID projects.

Monitoring Plan/Management Information System

The monitoring plan for the program is based on 1) monitoring of design assumptions to assure that the design is valid (and to allow for mid-term corrections, if necessary), and 2) monitoring of the policy reform program itself, with the intention of assessing its effectiveness and eventual impact. This involves both monitoring of compliance, and preliminary assessment of the achievement of program purpose. Because the goal of the budget support portion of the cash transfer is to provide general support to the national budget, and as such funds will be mingled, and because there is no local currency fund associated with this element of the grant, USAID will not actively monitor the specific uses of the local currency allocated to support of GON operating and investment budgets. The NGO/private sector fund will be monitored using standard practices, as it is managed by a U.S. private sector entity.

Monitoring of design assumptions

The key design assumptions have been described in section IV.E of the PAAD. Purpose level assumptions are, to summarize:

- Security of tenure is a prerequisite for individual investment in the land.
- NRM investments will have sizable impacts.
- Individuals will demand the output of rural organizations offering previously unavailable goods and services.
- Individuals will join community NRM and ag production initiatives.
- Local currency derived from resource transfer is used to promote program objectives.
- External factors do not prevent higher rate of return to rural development investments.
- Better resource management can directly affect service quality in MAL.
- Rural communities will be willing to collaborate with NGOs.
- Economic potential of coops and credit unions is sufficient to allow continued growth.

USAID program management will use the results of field visits, surveys and studies carried out for this program and under other auspices to monitor the validity of the design assumptions. USAID semi-annual project implementation reviews will include this issue on the agenda. USAID will also use annual internal control assessments as a monitoring tool.

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Monitoring of Compliance

The Minister of Plan will nominate a steering committee for the program, which will meet with USAID representatives at least twice annually to discuss program progress and problems, in particular the status of policy reform efforts and satisfaction of program conditionality. In addition, the GON will prepare an annual report on program progress and satisfaction of conditions precedent which will be addressed to USAID/Niger. The annual report shall be used by Government of Niger and USAID senior management as a basis for analysis of the progress made or problems encountered in the policy reform program. Formal reviews of progress shall be held on at least an annual basis, and will provide the basis for determining subsequent disbursements of funds under this grant. They will also provide an opportunity to make necessary adjustments or to correct any errors made during the design or implementation of the program. Formal reviews required to determine if conditions precedent have been satisfied shall be co-chaired by the Minister of Plan and the Director of USAID/Niger.

USAID will monitor the performance of the entities responsible for carrying out the program. Long-term technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock is planned under the program. Funds also exist in the project component of the program which could be used to provide short-term technical assistance to assist the GON in improving the performance of those entities, if unforeseen problems arise which are amenable to resolution through technical advice.

Program monitoring will be accomplished through use of the reporting procedures and joint Government USAID reviews described above. In addition USAID/Niger will finance and administer a series of small surveys and studies, financed from the USAID Trust Fund portion of the grant. The surveys and studies will serve both to monitor effective compliance with the terms of the grant, and to begin assessment of its impact (see next section).

Monitoring of project purpose achievement

The first phase in program monitoring is to establish the baseline data to be used as a benchmark against which to measure progress. Determination of the data sets to be collected for baseline will be made during year 1, with the assistance of the Agricultural Policy Analysis II project (APAP II), the University of Michigan team assigned to the ASDG I program, and through assistance from NRM experts in Niger. The data sets must be able to serve for monitoring policy reforms in the short-term, and for monitoring impact during and beyond program life. See Section IV.F. for tables relating to impact monitoring actions.

Monitoring of the reform program will be accomplished through use of the reporting procedures and joint GON/USAID reviews described above. The contractor groups responsible for impact monitoring of the NRM component are identified in Table IV.1. Detailed impact monitoring plans will be developed as part of the contractor work plan. In addition, USAID/Niger may finance and administer a series of small surveys and studies, financed from the USAID Trust Fund portion of the grant. Monitoring techniques will include, but not be limited to:

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- interviews over time with key informants (e.g., beneficiaries of project interventions financed by the NGO/private sector fund, selected members of communities which have specifically benefited from changes in tenure rules);
- group interviews of farmers and herders in communities benefiting from NRM interventions and from tenure changes;
- sample surveys of selected sites benefiting from NRM interventions, to measure and track over time, improvements in physical measures of productivity (soil moisture, soil depth, etc.).
- site visits to arrondissements benefiting from institutional component interventions for review of governmental operations, interviews with beneficiaries to assess changes in efficiency of government services.

Please see Section VI.F. (Impact) for a detailed description of approaches to monitoring of impact. See also Kristjanson, Annex G.

ASDG II monitoring will also benefit from studies and monitoring activities under ASDG I and NEPRP, and from technical assistance activities and studies under USAID projects, in particular from ROD and from WOCCU credit union development activities.

Host Country Participation

Agencies of the Government of Niger will be actively involved in program monitoring and evaluation. The University of Niamey is a potential source of skilled analysts. The ministries involved in implementation of the grant program all have units which are responsible for studies and programming, another source of trained personnel.

Budget

The information (evaluation) component of the project is budgeted at \$300,000. An additional \$200,000 is programmed for audit. In addition, funds will be made available from the USAID Trust Fund for ASDG II monitoring purposes, making the total allocation to "information" approximately 3 percent of the grant.

The Government of Niger will contribute professional personnel to work on studies, surveys and evaluations. The Government will also provide a portion of the data which will be used in monitoring, and will support operational costs involved in collecting and assembling those data.

Estimated evaluation requirements

Mid-term and final evaluations will be scheduled. An ex-post evaluation is also planned but not financed under this program.

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The HAPEX Program

The information component of ASDG II will be able to take advantage of biophysical data and analysis conducted under the HAPEX program in Niger. The HAPEX program is a research effort that is being mounted in an 100 km by 100 km area around Niamey (the "square degree" between longitudes 2-3 degrees East and latitudes 13-14 degrees North) over the next two years as part of the World Climate Research Program (WCRP). The experiments which make up HAPEX-Sahel (Hydrology and Physics Experiment) are designed to collect data which will help clarify the manner in which land surface processes influence conditions in the atmosphere. This work is being coordinated through the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and is intended to help develop more accurate global climate models.

The "square degree" chosen for HAPEX is already being used by ORSTOM scientists in an EPSAT (Etude des Pluies a partir du Satellite) project aimed at developing improved estimates of precipitation by combining raingauge, satellite and radar observations. Currently some 60 raingauges are in operation in this area and another 20 are scheduled for installation. Other related work currently underway includes the Sahelian Energy Balance Experiment (SEBEX) being carried out by the Institute of Hydrology (UK) and ICRISAT.

Some eleven Working Groups have been established for HAPEX covering the following areas:

- * meteorology
- * hydrology
- * soil moisture
- * ecology & vegetation
- * ground based fluxes
- * airborne fluxes
- * remote sensing
- * modelling up to canopy
- * mesoscale modelling
- * climatology
- * data base methodology

The Niger site is the only site in either Africa or Asia programmed for detailed investigation by the scientists working on global climate models between now and 1995. As such, a large number of expatriate and a significant number of Nigerien researchers will be involved in HAPEX-Sahel. In addition to the U.S., countries involved include France, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Australia and Denmark. U.S. research organizations range from Universities through USDA to NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

Key Nigerien organizations include the University of Niamey, INRAN and the national meteorology service. In addition, regional and international organizations based in Niamey will be involved (e.g. ICRISAT, AGRHYMET, Centre Regional de Formation et d'Application en Hydrology et Agrometeorologie).


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Results from HAPEX-Sahel are included as a primary source of biophysical baseline data in the ASDG II impact assessment plan for the natural resources management component. Sites including the ICRISAT Sahelian Center, the INRAN station at Kollo, several villages under study by IFPRI, the TROPISOILS IMAW Watershed at Hamdallaye and the Guesselbodi forest all fall within the "square degree".

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HAPEX-SAHÉL

Réseau routier - Le site du projet



10 km

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Fig 2

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AGRICULTURE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT GRANT II

PROGRAM ASSISTANCE APPROVAL DOCUMENT

(683-0257)

PROJECT PAPER

(683-0265)

VOLUME II
TECHNICAL ANNEXES

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
USAID/NIGER
1990

UNCLASSIFIED

AN ANALYSIS OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGER

Prepared for USAID/Niger ASDG II Project Design
Niamey, April 1990

Dr. Joy E. Hecht

International Resources Group
1400 I Street, N.W. suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
tel: 202/289-0100

Executive Summary

This report examines local institutions involved with rural development in Niger, as part of the project design process for USAID/Niger's Agricultural Sector Development Grant, phase II. The report is concerned with who those organizations are, what they do, how responsibilities are divided among them, how lines of authority are drawn between them and the central authorities in Niamey, and how they interact with each other both officially and unofficially. The report is based primarily on interviews with public officials in national, departmental, and arrondissement services, carried out during a six week mission to Niger in March and April of 1990.

Several themes run through the work. First is the straightforward question of what the arrondissement technical services do, how they balance donor funded activities against those of the national government, and what problems constrain their ability to function effectively. The second theme concerns the balance of authority between the national ministries which direct the work of their technical agents and the sous-prefet who has final authority over the arrondissement. The third issue is whether development really "comes from the base", as it should according to the prevailing ideology in Niger. The answers to all three of these questions will determine how ASDG II can most effectively support the local technical services.

The report addresses the functions and problems of seven local institutions; the sous-prefectures, the technical services in five fields (agriculture, animal resources, environment, hydraulics, and rural engineering), the arrondissement planning services, the regional and sub-regional development councils, the local arms of the political party, the department and arrondissement technical committees, and the cooperatives. The first four of these turned out to play important roles, and the last three did not. The report also considers three mechanisms for proposing and financing development activities at the local level; the Fonds Regionaux de Developpement, the micro-realizations, and the fiches d'operation.

The report draws several major conclusions. First, the authority structure within the arrondissement is made up of two overlapping systems, that of the technical ministries and that of the sous-prefecture. The centralized ministries have positive authority over development activities because they define technical strategies and control the local personnel. The sous-prefet can hinder their work through exercise of his political and administrative duties, but has neither the power nor the authority to take a proactive role in defining and implementing development strategy.

Second, despite good faith efforts on the part of government and donors, development does not come from the base. Development from the base would require a change in power relations at the village level to allow villagers to freely express their views without fear of reprisals from traditional chiefs or local government officials. The creation of the village development councils, while part of Niger's policy of participatory democracy, has in fact done nothing to make this change. Similarly, the power relations within the government do not encourage technical agents freely to express their views or honestly to assess conditions in their areas, for fear of reprisals from their superiors. These problems are largely beyond the scope of a donor project, because they involve changing fundamental aspects of the structure of Nigerien society.

It is, therefore, more useful to focus on the narrower problems of the technical services, particularly those which could be addressed without complementary changes in official or traditional power structures. Technical service agents identified a number of fundamental constraints on their activities. The most immediate problem is the lack of transportation for service heads and field agents. In addition, the technical staffs are often too few and sometimes too unskilled to carry out their tasks effectively. Excessive and uncontrollable staff mobility limits their ability to implement a coherent program of activities. Perhaps most fundamental, the villagers' fear of the government and assumption that development is the government's responsibility makes it hard to elicit local participation in the work of the services.

Outside observers identify additional problems in the work of the technical services. Although development is supposed to come from the base, in fact technical strategies are defined uniformly for the whole country by the central ministries, even when this is inappropriate to the ecological conditions of some regions. Technical agents cannot object to these policies, and cannot object when their resources are inadequate to carry them out, because to do so would be regarded as a criticism of someone in power and therefore could entail a personal risk to the agent. Donor projects (and possibly government activities as well) are also plagued with kickbacks which inflate the total cost and distort allocations of time or other resources across activities.

Most of these problems could not be solved without major changes in the structure of local government and the allocation of responsibility for rural development. Some strategies for change are imaginable, but go far beyond the scope of donor activity because they are highly political. For other problems, such as that of the mentality of the villagers and the field agents, it is hard to even imagine strategies which would be

effective in changing the situation. For this reason the recommendations focus narrowly on the those issues which are or could be governed by rules rather than personal relations, and which can be addressed without major overhaul in the organizational structure of the arrondissements.

The report makes two major recommendations. First, it recommends that ASDG II provide operating budget support to the technical services to address transportation and possibly other problems. USAID should decide the total amount of subsidy to be provided. A technical expert should then be brought in to design the exact nature of the subsidy, and to develop a rational formula for allocating the resources to the arrondissements.

Second, the report recommends consideration of two types of civil service reform. One is to replace the current system of assignment of professional staff without their accord or that of the services which will receive them with a system in which vacancies are posted, qualified candidates may apply, and the services select from among them. This should help depersonalize the civil service system and reduce mobility among the technical agents. The other reform would introduce on-the-job experience as a factor in civil service promotions along with formal education. This would enable the technical services to benefit more from the experience of long-term staff.

The report also recommends studies to investigate areas of potential interest which have emerged in the course of this investigation. One is the possibility for encouraging private sector activity in the agricultural services area. A second is the investigation of mechanisms for using arrondissement funds as leverage to encourage private sector investment in environmental protection. A third is to determine the areas in which agricultural policies can usefully be defined at the national level and the areas in which they should be set by the regional or local governments.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The object of this mission has been to investigate the functions, organization, and authority structures of local level institutions involved with rural development, in order to improve the provision of technical services at the arrondissement level. (1) Strategies for reinforcing the technical services must be designed in the context of three general issues; their direct functions and responsibilities, the institutional framework in which they work, and the philosophy of rural development which they are supposed to implement.

The first of these issues can be addressed by looking directly at what the services do and identifying the direct constraints on their actions.

To address the second issue, the institutional framework, it must always be borne in mind that local "governments" in the Nigerien context are not governments in the U.S. sense. Rather, they are the regional and local representations of the national administration. Each professional staff member in the regional (department) or local (arrondissement) administration works for a national ministry, and has simply been assigned to one of its field offices rather than to the office in Niamey. He or she is a national civil servant, not an employee of the arrondissement.

Consequently, the balance of authority, responsibility, and power among the different ministries at the local level is a crucial--but somewhat confused--aspect of any understanding of how local government operates. (2) The discussion of the different institutions, therefore, will highlight information which can provide insights into how these relationships work in practice. The understanding developed on this question will feed into the assessment of how to design policies to improve the effectiveness of the technical services

The third concern, development philosophy, requires consideration of the issue of "development from the base." The

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1. The terms of reference for this mission are attached in Appendix A.
 2. For simplicity, I have continued to use the word "government" to refer to the local representatives of national ministries assembled in the prefectures and sous-prefectures, even though this is not really the correct term.

prevailing ideology in Niger since the mid-1980s has been that development activities should be bottom-up rather than top-down. The rationale is that the target population ("the base") is best qualified to define its own problems, so villagers should be encouraged and solicited to express their needs so that the multi-tiered government hierarchy can respond to them. This philosophy has justified the creation first of a five-level (village, canton, arrondissement, department, national) system of development councils responsible for initiating projects, and more recently of a five-tiered structure to manage the single political party, the Mouvement National de la Societe de Developpement (MNSD). It has also justified the transfer of certain funds and project authority to lower levels of government, and the implementation of a project development process based on the interaction between villagers and arrondissement technical staff.

It is essential to assess the extent to which the initiative for technical service activities actually comes, or potentially could come, from the villages, in order to determine how to strengthen those services. If the relatively modest interventions proposed by AID could make the difference between top-down and bottom-up development--and if AID believes that bottom-up approaches are preferable--then it will be worth while to invest in ways to strengthen development from the base. If, on the other hand, AID believes either that top-down approaches may be more effective at this time in Niger, or that the changes required for bottom-up development to work are beyond the scope of ASDG II, then its interventions will take a different form. Another theme in this analysis will therefore be to assess whether development from the base is a reality in Niger, or whether it is at present only a hope on the part of the government. (3)

In thinking about all three of these issues, and indeed in addressing most of the questions posed by the terms of reference for this project, it is important to bear in mind that direct questions do not get direct answers. Any arrondissement civil servant would say that of course all development has to come from the base now, because that is government policy. With further questioning he might agree that this has been hard to implement

3. It is also possible that the government does not believe in bottom-up development at all, and is merely espousing it for political reasons, either to please the population or to please the donor community. In straightforward political terms this must be considered a viable hypothesis, since true development from the base would necessarily empower village populations in ways which would threaten the government's position. Fortunately, answering this question does not appear necessary for the purposes of this report.

because of the educational level of the villagers. However he is not likely to even make the connection to other, apparently unrelated, government policies which call into question whether development from the base could be a reality, such as the existence of nationally-set technical strategies for agricultural extension. Similarly, it is useless directly to ask how authority is allocated within the arrondissement. In a complex situation like this one, the actual flow of authority and responsibility is observed by seeing how many different decisions are made, and who actually has the final say when different services disagree; the lines of authority traced in official documents do not tell the story.

This means that the conclusions drawn in a report like this one are necessarily somewhat subjective. This is unavoidable. I have done my best to present the data from which I draw my conclusions, so that the reader can assess whether they are reasonable, and perhaps arrive at different results. I consider this approach preferable to presenting my conclusions as if they were objective statements of fact, when in fact I do not believe them to be.

This report is in four chapters, of which this introduction is the first. The second and third chapters present basic data on the existing context for rural development activity. Our objective is to understand the mechanisms through which rural development activities happen, who is involved, and what their roles are. Within this context we can see what role the field offices currently play, and thus what might be useful strategies for strengthening them.

This involves considering two different aspects of the existing context. In chapter 2, we look at the institutions operating at the local level. Because our focus is local rather than regional, we have concentrated primarily on the arrondissements rather than the departments. Department-level administration is discussed in the first section of chapter 2, which directly addresses the prefectures and sous-prefectures. Thereafter it is considered only insofar as it impacts on the execution of arrondissement activities.

Chapter 3 looks at the mechanisms through which rural development activities occur, particularly the funding vehicles controlled by local actors. By looking at how these mechanisms operate, we should be able to get some insights into how resources are controlled and what criteria influence their allocation. This will help us to understand how local government authority structures really operate, and how it may be possible for AID to intervene effectively.

Chapter 4 draws some conclusions about the operations of local government, particularly in relation to the questions posed

above. These conclusions provide the basis for recommending interventions which could be undertaken in ASDG II. These are described in the second part of the fourth chapter.

Chapter 2:

Institutions for Rural Development at the Local Level

This chapter considers the attributions, activities, and roles of seven institutions operating at the local level; the prefectures and sous-prefectures, the technical ministries, the Ministry of Plan, the development councils, the MNSD, the COTEAR and COTEDP, and the cooperatives. The first four play a major role in local development activities. The last three turn out to be relatively unimportant.

A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY - PREFECTURES AND SOUS-PREFECTURES

Local governments in Niger are umbrella organizations which house the regional and local field offices of the national ministries. Their purpose is to coordinate and implement national policy at the local level. They are not expected to take an independent role in formulating or implementing local development strategies.

A.1 Staffing

The departmental and arrondissement staff (with a few exceptions noted below) are civil servants. They are hired by the national ministries, and assigned to the field offices by the national level, according to staffing plans designed nationally. The organizational structure and individual positions in the departmental and arrondissement offices are determined by the respective ministries, and authorized via arretes issued by the president. Thus at the local level there is no authority either to define the posts to be filled, or to choose the people to fill them. Job descriptions are promulgated by national decree, not in response to the needs of a community, and by and large civil servants are chosen by Niamey for posting to one community or another, without any input from that community.

At both the department and the arrondissement level, there are two classes of public service posts. Most posts are regular civil service positions, filled with employees designated by their ministries. At each level, however, a few positions are "postes de commandement" - what would be considered political appointments (or "plum jobs") in the American system. The cadres de commandement are nominated by their ministries, but must be approved directly by the president, who can also replace them at will. As political appointees they generally have a larger role in party political concerns than do purely technical staff. They

also have more authority - all else being equal the preferences of a cadre de commande will be honored over those of a regular civil servant.

The staff of the prefectures and sous-prefectures include the following: (N.B.: Unless otherwise specified, all of these posts are regular civil service positions, not postes de commandement.)

Prefecture:

Prefet - is a political appointee under the tutelle of (i.e. working for) the Ministry of the Interior. He is also the president of the Conseil Regional de Developpement (CRD, see section D below) and of the Section, the department level arm of the MNSD (see section E below). As the head of the prefecture and the nominee of the president, the prefet holds final authority over all actions of the department.

Secretary-general (SG) - is a political appointee under the tutelle of the Ministry of the Interior. He is responsible for all administrative matters within the prefecture.

Deputy Secretary-general (Secetaire-general adjoint, or SGA) - is a political appointee under the tutelle of the Minister of Plan. He is also the Directeur Departemental du Plan, which gives him responsibility for all development activities within the department.

Conseiller Economique - is an advisor to the prefet, under the tutelle of the Minister of the Interior.

Payeur - is a political appointee under the tutelle of the Ministry of Finance. He is the controller on all departmental expenses, to ensure that the prefet and the technical services have not authorized expenditures not permitted within their budgets. He has no role in project funding or in managing salaries of civil servants.

Administrative Secretary - is the head of the Section, the departmental level arm of the MNSD.

Chef de Personnel - This position is newly created by the Ministere de la Fonction Publique; since as yet the chefs de personnel have no budgets, their function is not yet clear. They serve as the conduit for personnel information and decisions between the technical services and the prefecture, but they have no authority over those decisions.

Departmental Directors - The department government includes a directorate, with corresponding director, for each of the technical services represented in the local administrations. The

SGA, in his role as Departmental Director of Planning (DDP), fills this role for the Ministry of Plan. Other directors relevant to this analysis are those of agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock), rural engineering (genie rural, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock), animal resources (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock), hydraulics (Ministry of Hydraulics and Environment), and environment (Ministry of Hydraulics and Environment). Only the Departmental DDP is a political appointee; the others are regular civil servants.

Arrondissement:

Sous-Prefet - is a political appointee under tutelle of the Ministry of the Interior. Like the prefet, he serves as the final authority in decisions to be made at the arrondissement level.

Deputy (Adjoint) Sous-Prefet - is also a political appointee under tutelle of the Ministry of the Interior. His is the only post whose functions are not specified by decree; therefore his role is up to the sous-prefet whom he serves.

Secretary of the Arrondissement - is the administrative director of the arrondissement, and is responsible for budgetary and financial matters. He is a civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior.

Chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Plan (SAP) - is the arrondissement-level director of planning activities, under tutelle of the Minister of Plan. He coordinates all development activities for arrondissement and is the secretary of the Conseil Sous-Regional de Developpement (CSRD).

Comptable d'Etat - is the representative of the Minister of Finance. He is the controller of the arrondissement budget and of the national budgets of the technical services, and has a major role in arrondissement tax collection.

Arrondissement Service Heads - The arrondissement government includes services, with corresponding heads, for each of the technical areas represented in the local administrative structure. The SAP is the head of the Planning Service. Similar services exist for agriculture, animal resources, environment, and in some cases rural engineering and hydraulics. All of the service heads are regular civil servants.

A.2 Implications of Local Government Staffing for the Authority Structure

The staffing system of the local administrations creates a

precarious balance of authority between the arrondissement, in the person of the sous-prefet, and the technical ministries. In the context of ASDG II, the key question is whether the technical services follow the dictates of the sous-prefet or the ministries for which they work. The answer to this question is not obvious.

On the one hand, the sous-prefet is clearly agreed to be--at least theoretically--the final authority at the arrondissement level. The arrondissement structure is designed to duplicate the structure of the national government in Niamey, in which the president clearly has supreme authority. As the designee of the president, the sous-prefet therefore has the same role within the arrondissement.

On administrative and political matters, everyone seems agreed that the sous-prefet has this authority, and can direct the activities of the rest of the staff. All administrative affairs concerning the technical staff must be presented to the sous-prefet for a decision, when then goes up to Niamey in his name. All arrondissement correspondence goes out over his name, and he receives and reviews all incoming correspondence before funnelling it to the appropriate technical or administrative staff. Technical staff will advise him as to what they consider a reasonable course of action, but if he does not follow it they have no choice but to accept his dictates.

On the other hand, in many respects the sous-prefet's control is very limited. He does not have the authority to select his own staff within the arrondissement, even those concerned with administrative matters, since all civil service positions are filled by the ministries under whose tutelle they fall. Thus if he wanted to build a team to put in place his vision of how the arrondissement should be run, he cannot do so.

Moreover, even though the sous-prefet is supposed to have authority over the technical services as the president has authority over the national ministries, in practice technical staff allegiance is to their ministries, and not to the arrondissement. Straight out of school they are programmed for service in a ministry, not an arrondissement or department. It is that ministry which will determine where they are assigned, whether they rise in the civil service, whether they will be sent for training which could allow them to change grade or at least to earn per diem, and so on. It is the hierarchy of that ministry with whom they must be on good terms to avoid being sent to undesirable posts, to ensure that their way will be smoothed in the civil service. These forces have a much more powerful hold on local technical staff than the official authority of the sous-prefet over the technical services in his arrondissement.

In technical matters, the sous-prefet's position is also limited. Officially the central ministries are supposed to

determine technical strategies which their field offices implement. The field staff have limited authority to make technical decisions on implementation questions. Most technical staff questioned agreed that they could do so without interference from the sous-prefet. They also agreed that if they needed technical guidance they would seek it from the departmental director and possibly in Niamey, not from the sous-prefet.

If he does not have the authority to provide constructive input into technical activities, however, the sous-prefet does apparently have the power to block them. There is at times a fine line to draw between technical, administrative, and political issues, and the sous-prefet's authority over the last two can influence the technical staff's ability to address the first. For example, the sous-prefet has the authority to requisition the use of technical service vehicles for whatever purpose he deems necessary, whenever he wants, and the technical services have no choice but to surrender them up. (4) While we had no reason to think that this privilege was abused--it was apparently used to accommodate visiting dignitaries, meetings of the CSRD, and the like--it certainly could block the work of the technical services.

The technical services also agreed that the sous-prefet could override their decisions on political grounds, and they would have no recourse. The technical staff took for granted that the sous-prefet could change their allocations of seeds or fertilizer to the villages to reflect his objectives rather than theirs. In one (apparently extreme) case the technical services recommended a site for an earthworks project, and were overruled by the sous-prefet who wanted it to be visible from the road so that passers-by would see the works of the arrondissement. The sous-prefet's site was not technically viable, but his preferences prevailed. The construction never served the purpose for which it was intended because it was in an inappropriate site.

Only one technical staff member suggested a positive role played by the sous-prefet's political authority. An agriculture service agent, he said that his ability to carry out his responsibilities depended on having the cooperation of village and cantonal traditional chiefs. Only the sous-prefet's political authority could keep them in line and ensure that they would cooperate with his technical projects.

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4. Interestingly, although he can take cars and chauffeurs, it would be unthinkable for the sous-prefet not to provide his own gas - a good indicator of the relative scarcity of different resources and who controls which ones. See the discussion of the transportation problems of the technical services in section B.6 below.

The position of the Service d'Arrondissement du Plan in this balance is different from that of the other technical services (if Plan can even be considered a technical service). Because of its political role, even at the arrondissement level where the head is not a political appointee, it tends to be lined up with the sous-prefet against the technical services. As coordinator of development activities, the SAP clearly has power over the other services; one SAP head almost gleefully told us that although of course the services were all equals, in fact if they didn't agree he would get his way because the "Plan always does". In fact, the SAP might actually be the only group whose power is not directly countered by anyone else's, to the extent that they serve as the funnel through which technical development proposals reach the political decision-makers. This will be discussed further below, in section C on the Ministry of Plan.

In conclusion, the role of the sous-prefet in the technical activities of the arrondissement seems to be either neutral or negative. While his political position can occasionally be an asset, by and large the technical staff seem to regard him as a potential block to be avoided insofar as possible. The sous-prefet is not working against the technical staff; however his political and administrative responsibilities may sometimes conflict with their technical ones. He cannot turn his role into a more proactive one of leading the technical activities or development projects, because he has not authority over budget allocations, staffing, or the technical strategies to be implemented.

A.3 Local Public Finance

Since access to and control over resources are a major source of authority and power in any organization, a basic understanding of local public finance in Niger will help us understand how the local governments operate. The department and arrondissement levels of administration are in quite different positions financially. At both levels the vast majority of the staff and operating costs are provided for in the budgets of their respective ministries. However the arrondissements also have independent financial authority, with their own budgets, the right to levy taxes, and increasingly the responsibility for financing public services or development activities which are not covered by the national budget. These budgets are the only financial vehicle under direct control of the local authorities.

Prefecture Finance:

The departmental level of administration receives revenues

from a number of sources. By far the most important is the annual budgets of the ministries which have departmental field offices. These cover the salaries and benefits of all the staff, and provide operating budgets in all cases except the Ministry of Interior. These operating budgets generally have four categories; office expenses, gasoline, car maintenance, and technical materials. Each departmental directorate has its own budget, which is totally independent of the other technical directorates, even when they fall under the same ministry. These budgets are prepared and the funds allocated in Niamey, based on the previous year's budget, with little or no input from the field with respect to their needs.

Only the prefecture itself--the prefet and those working directly for him who are not under the tutelle of another ministry--does not have its own operating expenses paid through the national budget. In order to make up this lack, an annual charge is assessed to the arrondissement budgets to contribute to the operating costs of the prefecture. The administrative secretary, apparently receives his operating funds from the MNSD dues, although this is not yet clear since the system is quite new.

Arrondissement Finance: (5)

The arrondissements have two major sources of revenue. As at the departmental level, their staff are almost all supported by the national budgets of their respective ministries. (Auxiliary support staff are the only exception. They may be important in number, but are low in cost.) The arrondissement staff do not negotiate or manage salaries at all; they are determined, allocated, and paid at the national level in Niamey.

Also as at the departmental level, each technical service has an operating budget which covers office expenses, technical

5. The discussion which follows refers to all "collectivites locales" in Niger. This category includes arrondissements, communes, and communes rurales. Communes are urban areas which are administratively carved out of the arrondissements and given local autonomy analogous to that of an arrondissement. The logic for their creation is that the problems they face differ substantively from those of an arrondissement, so they should be able to deal with them separately. However they have the same taxing and budgeting authority. Throughout this section I refer only to arrondissements; however in fact what I am saying (including the data on local revenues) applies to the two groups together.

materials, gasoline, and car maintenance. (6) These budgets are completely separate from one service to another; although there is some informal sharing and vehicles and gasoline, there is no formal system for pooling resources across services with different levels of support. Allocation decisions are made in Niamey by the relevant ministries and technical directorates, with no apparent input from the field concerning their needs. The logic for the allocations to each arrondissement is unclear, to say the least; the financial manager for the (former) Ministry of Animal Resources cited the lack of a rational formula for allocating gasoline in particular across arrondissements as a major problem in their budgeting process. This will be discussed further in section B on the technical services and in Chapter 4 on policy recommendations.

The technical service operating funds are made available quarterly through treasury credits delegated to the service's account in the local office of the Ministry of Finance. The head of the service can order expenses on these funds; in French accounting terminology he is the ordonnateur. The comptable d'Etat must ensure that the proposed expenditures are within the rubrics authorized in the budget; he is the controller in French accounting terminology.

The other major element in local finance is the arrondissement's own budget. Both revenues and expenditures are divided into two parts, an operating budget (title 1, or the "general budget") and an investment budget (title 2). Both parts of the budget must be balanced every year. The arrondissements visited had total budgets (titles 1 and 2) in the range of CFA 100 million to CFA 135 million for 1990 (about \$335,000 to \$500,000).

The arrondissement revenue sources vary in importance from place to place, depending on whether the arrondissement is rural or urban. Common to all arrondissements is the tax d'arrondissement, a CFA 700 head tax imposed on everyone between the ages of 14 and 60 who is not in school. In urban areas this is joined to another head tax called the tax des voiries, which can be up to CFA 800 per capita. These two taxes together accounted for an average of 30% of arrondissement revenues in 1990 (Ministere de l'Interieur 1990, p. 3).

Other direct and indirect taxes accounted for another 50% of

6. Some newly-created technical services at the arrondissement level, e.g. genie rural, did not yet have operating budgets, because their ministry had been able to put through the creation of the new posts before it was able to create the new budget item to fund their activities. This was expected to be corrected shortly.

arrondissement revenues in 1990, according to the same Ministry of the Interior study (p. 3). These include a tax on built property, licensing fees charged to merchants and those holding market stalls, taxes on taxis, mopeds and bicycles, liquor taxes paid by bars, sales taxes on animals, slaughterhouse taxes, and so on. The tax on built property (Contribution fonciere sur proprietes baties, Section 1 Chapter 1 Article 3 of the arrondissement revenues) is particularly sensitive because the revenues are divided between the arrondissements and the treasury. The Ministry of Finance collects the tax and deposits it in the treasury. A percentage of each arrondissement's revenues is then returned to the local level for its use. However the proportion returned can be changed each year by the Ministry of Finance without input from the arrondissements, which angers them considerably. This tax is very important in urban areas where there is a lot of built property; for example, it accounted for over 70% of Niamey's revenue in 1990 according to the Ministry of the Interior study (p. 3). In rural arrondissements, this tax is less important, but market taxes can account for a significant proportion of the revenue which must be collected and managed at the local level.

Service charges account for an average of 8% of the arrondissement budgets. These include in particular livestock sales taxes, which are important in pastoral areas and which involve a major effort in tax collection. They also include a charge levied on bus station receipts. This charge is important enough to create an incentive for arrondissements which don't already have them to build new bus stations. (7) A small proportion of the arrondissement revenues (3%) is provided by rent on arrondissement equipment and direct subsidies by the national government, according to the Ministry of the Interior (p. 4).

Arrondissement revenues are expected to cover the operating costs of the sous-prefecture, infrastructure maintenance for the arrondissement, public services, social and cultural activities, contributions to other organizations and funds, and investments in development activities in the arrondissement. The operating budgets (title 1), which cover everything except investments, accounted for about 75% of arrondissement expenditures in 1990 (Ministry of the Interior 1990, p. 7).

The contributions to other organizations, like the tax on built property, attracts the ire of local officials because it makes very obvious the tug-of-war over resources going on between

7. This in turn implies that the charges levied are higher than those needed to recover the costs incurred, or that subsidies in construction costs are not taken into account in analyzing the returns from building the station.

the arrondissements and other arms or levels of the government. The major contributions required of the arrondissements are as follows:

- A fixed 10% of the taxe d'arrondissement (therefore an average of 3% of the budget) must go to the Fonds Regional de Developpement, a regionally administered fund available for grants to small development projects (discussed at length below and in chapter 3).
- A fixed 2% of total arrondissement revenues must go for operating costs of the prefecture, to make up for its lack of an operating budget.
- A fixed 5% of the taxe d'arrondissement (1.5% of the total revenues on average) must go support the hierarchy of institutions of the MNSD.
- A fixed 1% of total revenues must go to support departmental agricultural fairs.
- Variable contributions must be made to fund the activities of other local organizations (the Association des Femmes Nigeriennes, the Association Islamique, the Association des Parents d'Elevés, and so on)

In addition to these standard contributions, the department, in the form of the Conseil Regional de Developpement (CRD), has the authority to impose special charges on the arrondissement budgets or on the population to support activities like the traditional games, cultural events, and so on. The arrondissement does not have the right to refuse these charges, and there is apparently no legal limit on the CRD's authority to impose them. Because they are so obvious, and because the arrondissement is powerless to resist them, both the standard and the exceptional charges quickly become a bone of contention in discussions of the arrondissement's financial strength or ability to take on new responsibilities. Possibly their importance is greater than warranted in view of the amount of money involved. (8)

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8. There is a discrepancy between the contributions required of the arrondissements by law, and the share of these contributions in the arrondissement budgets in 1990 according to the Ministry of the Interior report. The report calculated that these transfers absorbed 5.53% of arrondissement resources in 1990. The fixed percentages merely of contributions to the Fonds Regionaux de Developpement, the operating costs of the prefectures, and the MNSD, account for 6.5% of the total receipts, if his calculation of the taxe d'arrondissement as 30% of total revenues is accurate.

Development of the arrondissement budgets follows a series of steps which seem to be more or less standard. First, the arrondissement secretary estimates the total revenues which will be available in the following year. Initially these estimates are based on revenues in previous years. However, the estimate may be revised upwards to accommodate political pressure to spend as much as possible. This leads to inflated revenue estimates, which are justified by good intentions to improve tax collection in the upcoming year, but which in fact may be unrealistic.

Next (perhaps simultaneously), the technical services are asked to estimate their investment needs for the upcoming year. Proposals for arrondissement investment in development activities are developed using a standard form called the fiche d'operation. Many of the activities funded through the fiches d'operation are required by the national government, so in fact the arrondissement cannot choose where to place its resources. A number of the activities funded through the fiches d'operation would also not be considered investments in any typical definition of the term; however this probably does not matter for our purposes.⁽⁹⁾ The investment proposals made through the fiches d'operation do not include an evaluation of the recurrent costs which will later be imposed on the operating budget, apparently because arrondissement staff simply are not used to evaluating investments in terms of their ongoing maintenance costs.

The fiches d'operation prepared by the technical services are submitted to the CSRD for review, modification, and selection of those it wishes to finance. The approved fiches, as modified according to CSRD dictates, are then passed onto the CRD, which also can review, modify, and indicate its choice. Thus the department-level CRD has the authority to tell the arrondissement how to invest its own resources, without any recourse by the arrondissement if it does not agree. While this oversight authority is sometimes criticized by the arrondissement staff, it is basically accepted with resignation.

Once the fiches d'operation have been selected by the CRD, the arrondissement secretary prepares the rest of the budget. The amount to be spent on the fiches d'operations is deducted from the general budget on a line for contributions to investments. Next, obligatory expenditures such as loan payments, salaries of auxiliary staff, and contributions to other organizations are deducted from the remaining revenues. Finally, the rest of the money is allocated among operating costs of the sous-prefecture, infrastructure maintenance, sports and cultural

9. For example, the annual campaign of animal vaccinations is funded through the fiches d'operations.

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events, public health, and so on. This budget is submitted first to the CSRD and then to the CRD for review and modification, as were the fiches d'operation. Either of these bodies can change it or increase the level of expenditures without the accord of the arrondissement staff.

The authority of the CSRD and CRD to increase arrondissement expenditures makes keeping the budgets balanced something of a problem. According to several arrondissement secretaries, there is no statutory obligation for the CSRD or the CRD to ensure that their changes in planned expenditures are feasible, and the arrondissement secretary does not have the authority to tell them that they are not. The result seems to be that in the face of increases in expenditures the secretaries increase their revenue predictions so the whole package will be balanced. During the year if it turns out that the predictions were too high, the budget can be modified, again with approval of both the CSRD and the CRD. During the year the CRD can also impose new charges on the arrondissements, requiring additional modification of the budget. For example, in 1989 the CRD of Maradi instructed each arrondissement to contribute .5% of its budget for maintenance of the sports facilities in Maradi. In response, the arrondissement of Madarounfa reduced its financing for new school construction so the budget would remain balanced (Proces Verbal du CSRD de Madarounfa, 5 January 1990).

Tax recovery in the arrondissements is unimpressive. The taxe d'arrondissement is apparently the only tax for which a role is defined, and for which it is therefore possible to estimate recovery. The role is prepared by the arrondissement secretary, and the village chiefs are responsible for bringing in the taxes for their people. Based on anecdotal evidence (the arrondissements we visited, comments from Mr. Hamza in the Ministry of the Interior), tax recovery ranges from 40-70%. Efforts to improve this rate take the form of appeals to the village chiefs, via the CSRD meetings, to improve their tax collection efforts. Available data on recovery of other taxes show similar or lower rates. However, these are calculated by taking the ratio of revenues to predictions. Since there is no defined tax base for these taxes, and predictions are inflated to accommodate desired expenditures, these recovery rates are not reliable. Efforts to improve tax recovery do not seem to be significant, in part because the arrondissements do not have the authority to modify the taxes in order to make them easier to administer.

Arrondissements may borrow money from the Caisse des Prêts aux Collectivités Territoriales to fund investments in economic, social, or administrative infrastructure. The terms of the loans vary depending on the type of investment, length of repayment period, and the financial position of the collectivity. Interest rates are on the order of 10%, which some officials suggest is

too high given the low revenue-generating capacity of the arrondissements. Many arrondissements apparently are near or at their borrowing limits. In practice, arrondissement borrowing is almost always for administrative or social infrastructure, and almost never for economic infrastructure, development projects, or other directly productive activities.

Fonds Regional de Developpement:

As part of its emphasis on development from the base and decentralization, the government created in the mid-1980s the Fonds Regionaux de Developpement (FRDs) to finance small-scale development projects at the local level. The FRDs are managed at the department level, with grants awarded by CRDs. The money in the FRD comes from the arrondissements (10% of the taxe d'arrondissement, as mentioned above) and directly from the national investment budget.⁽¹⁰⁾ A portion of the national funding has been reserved each year for dry-season gardening projects, as part of the national policy to encourage food self-sufficiency.

FRD money is used to finance small investment projects referred to as "micro-realizations" (MRLs). MRLs are also designed to encourage development from the base. Project proposals are supposed to be initiated at the village level, and then developed more fully by the technical services working with the villagers. If they are not funded by foreign donors, they are then submitted to the CSRD for approval and proposed to the CRD to seek funding from the FRD.⁽¹¹⁾

The total amount of funding available from the FRDs is modest. Based on the departments we visited, it seems to be between CFA 100 million and CFA 150 million per year per department (\$330,000 to \$500,000), including both the arrondissement and the national contributions. The national contributions account for over half of the total funding.

B. MINISTERIAL TECHNICAL SERVICES

This section considers the activities of the local level agents of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and the Ministry of Hydraulics and Environment. Within these ministries, five services are of importance; agriculture, animal resources,

10. In some departments the national government contribution was referred to as the Fond d'Investissement, and was differentiated from the FRD. The distinction appears to be semantic, however.

11. This process is discussed more fully in Chapter 3.

environment, rural engineering, and hydraulics. The discussion of each of these services focuses on how it is organized, what its "classical" functions are, and the role of donor-funded projects in its routine activities. One question running through this section is whether the technical staff are unable to work on their own activities because their time is taken up by donor project activities. Following the information about the individual services is a discussion of the problems they face. Since these problems are similar across services, it is more useful to address them as a whole rather than individually.

B.1 Agriculture

The Arrondissement Agriculture Services are structured in three divisions:

- The agricultural production division handles agricultural extension, training, and other services intended to increase or improve the quality of agricultural outputs.
- The crop protection division handles all pest control activities.
- The statistics division does data collection both for routine monitoring of the agricultural season and for special surveys.

The service as a whole has a head and a deputy. In principle each division also has a head; however due to staff shortages the deputy often is also the head of a division. In addition to these staff, who are based in the arrondissement seat, the agriculture services have one agent in each agricultural district. Arrondissements are typically divided into 5-7 districts, which makes for a total professional staff of 10-12 in the service.

The attributions of the agricultural services--or actually of their heads--are officially defined by a presidential arrete promulgated in 1988. This document lists a range of activities including planning for the agricultural season, supplying technical and methodological advice upon request, preparing master plans for rural areas, providing technical assistance to projects, monitoring and evaluation both of projects and of the agricultural season, animating the rural population, and so on. These attributions are developed by the national ministry, without input from the field services as to what is necessary or possible to accomplish.

The actual routine activities of the agriculture services include some but by no means all of these tasks:

- The district-level agents distribute inputs like pesticides,

fungicides and fertilizers, and train village people to apply them. The extent of the crop protection activity is limited by the supply of technical inputs available to the service.

- The agents provide fertilizers, improved seeds, and other agricultural input to the villages.
- The agents offer training in production techniques, sometimes in structured courses and sometimes in informal contexts.
- They plant trial fields to test new seed varieties and show the villagers that they can work. The ideas for these tests come from INRAN, which furnishes the seeds and fertilizer to carry them out.
- They provide data to monitor the agricultural season, including information on crop conditions, rainfall, and so on.

With one agent per agricultural district, and typically between 50 and 150 villages per district, it is clearly difficult to provide these services throughout the arrondissement. The efforts of the agents are further limited because they typically get around on foot, by taxi, or on horses or camels, unless a donor project has provided them with more efficient transportation. In the face of these limitations some arrondissements have chosen to concentrate on a few villages in each district, rather than spreading themselves so thin that they have no impact anywhere. This can be difficult to justify politically, however.

The routine activities of the agricultural services seem to originate from several sources. Historically, agricultural extension in francophone Africa has offered villagers a set of technical themes which were recommended for their land. Recently the appropriateness of both the overall strategy and the particular themes has come into question in Niger, but the model still survives.⁽¹²⁾ Some standard activities also seem to be the result of specific donor projects, e.g. to distribute chemical fertilizer or improved seeds to the villagers. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture develops national agricultural strategies with limited input from the field. The ministry's strategies apply to the whole country, and must be followed whether or not they are appropriate to local conditions. Similarly, the government can establish agricultural strategy as a political policy, as in the decision after the 1984 drought to encourage dry season farming throughout the country.

Since the mid-1980s the agricultural services have had added

12. See Sowers, 1987 for a full discussion of this historical background.

to their responsibilities the identification and preparation of proposals for micro-realizations, and their execution if they are funded. In this aspect of their work they can more easily respond more easily to the needs of their own area than they national strategies allow.

Donor projects take up between 50 and 90% of the time of the agricultural agents, according to rough estimates by the service heads. The agents were adamant that it would be unacceptable to take time away from regular activities for the projects. In fact, despite the large share of their time devoted to projects, they may indeed not be slighting their standard activities. Two factors come into play here. First, many projects fund routine agricultural service activities like training or MRL development and execution, so they do not significantly distort the activities of the field staffs. In this case, the only influence of the project may be to determine which villages the agents visit, not what they do when they get there. Second, the field staffs usually do not have the complementary resources (particularly cars and gasoline) necessary to carry out their routine activities. If the projects provide the resources needed to get out into the field then they can work--whether it is on their activities or those designed by the project. Otherwise they may well sit idle in their office or village for lack of transportation to get to the work site.

B.2 ENVIRONMENT

The Arrondissement Environment Services have three divisions; Fauna, Fisheries and Fish Culture, Forest Management and Reforestation, and the Forest Brigades. Most of their staff are based in the arrondissement seats. They can include a service head and his deputy, a head of each of the three divisions, and a few assistants to help with forest management and the forest brigades; between 5 and 10 people per arrondissement.

Traditionally the environment services have been the forest police force. They issue permits to cut wood, and patrol the countryside issuing violations to people found cutting green wood, cutting without a permit, poaching, or setting forest fires (deliberately or accidentally). They are also charged with informing the population about the importance of protecting the environment, preserving trees, and so on. The forest brigades are uniformed, and despite some efforts to change their image the services are still viewed as a military operation.

Recently several other kinds of activities have become important in the environment services, largely with donor funding. Many arrondissements have developed nurseries in which they raise tree seedlings. These are sold to donor projects which have a reforestation or wind-break component, and are given

away to the local governments and to villagers. The appropriateness of the environment services going into the nursery business is worth questioning. On the one hand, why should projects buy seedlings from the government rather than from private nurseries, if this is a viable economic activity? On the other, why should the government be giving away seedlings to villagers rather than selling them?

The nurseries operations are related to the reforestation activity which is being undertaken under what is referred to as the Engagement de Maradi. At a meeting held in Maradi in 1984 the arrondissements were asked to undertake the reforestation of a certain number of hectares each year; ten for the arrondissement, five for each administrative post (an outpost of the arrondissement), and two for each canton. The environment services provide the seedlings and carry out this activity, which is funded through the fiches d'operation.

The Engagement de Maradi is another example of a national level policy which has been applied uniformly across the country as a political strategy, without regard for whether it is well designed to solve the problems it addresses. As the head of the environment service in Dakoro pointed out, although deforestation is a problem in Niger, it will not be solved by the arrondissements trying to single-handedly plant enough trees to cover the Sahel. In Dakoro the service decided that planting hectares of trees was a misuse of resources. Instead, they have begun using their Engagement de Maradi fiche d'operation funds to work on fixing mobile sand dunes and planting windbreaks around fields. Next year they plan to expand on their innovations. Instead of simply funding their activities directly, they want to use the arrondissement money as leverage to encourage villagers to invest in dune fixing and windbreaks in their own areas. This was virtually the only case we encountered of a service deciding that the national strategy was inappropriate to its area, and simply deciding to do something else instead.

Unlike the agriculture services, the donor-funded activities in the environment area seem to differ substantially from the services' traditional activities. This is in part because their primary role has been policing, which donors clearly are not interested in, and because they services have not yet begun to define their own agenda for dealing with environmental problems in any other way. The services seem to feel that they should be moving away from the military role. The donor activities offer the direction and resources needed to do something else, so there is no apparent conflict involved in devoting their time to

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those activities. (13) Micro-realizations do not play an important role in the environment services; the services are sometimes incorporated into integrated projects, but they do not develop proposals on their own.

The desired role of the environment services does not seem to be very well defined. There is some recognition among many of the services that environmental issues should be addressed jointly with agriculture and livestock, because all three are closely intertwined. The current organizational structure does not make this easy. However, the problem is more fundamental than whether the three services are in separate ministries or have separate budgets. Although some of the links between the domains are clear to everyone involved (the service heads in Boboye got into what was obviously a regular argument about the issues while we were talking to them), on an intellectual level no one seems to know how to actually integrate them. Integrated projects typically call on agents from two or three of the services, but they are simply working on separate arms of a single project, rather than on something which is really integrated. (14)

B.3 ANIMAL RESOURCES

The Arrondissement Animal Resource Services are organized in three divisions; animal health, animal production, and studies and planning. They typically have a core staff of five or six in the arrondissement seat running a clinic and managing their operations, and about the same number of people stationed in the villages manning veterinary posts and inspecting markets and slaughterhouses.

The classical activities of the livestock services are clearly defined and apparently account for almost all of their activities. In the health area, they run a clinic in the arrondissement seat and smaller veterinary stations in the bush to which herders can bring their animals if they are sick. The agents submit declarations whenever they encounter contagious diseases, to help in controlling them. The agents in the villages regularly inspect the meat coming out of approved

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13. The services realize, of course, that the donors disapprove of the police role. When speaking to an AID mission, therefore, they may be criticizing that activity only to please their listeners, not because they believe what they are saying.
 14. This is an issue that could be addressed in the studies carried out for the national resources management part of ASDG II.

slaughterhouses to confirm that it is acceptable.

The health activities also include an annual vaccination campaign carried out from December through February. The vaccination campaign is required by national policy. It is paid for partly with national funds, and partly through the fiches d'operation of the arrondissements. There is talk of it being transferred entirely to arrondissement responsibility, although so far there has not been any corresponding rumors to suggest how the arrondissements are supposed to be able to afford it. The services typically do not have the resources to carry out the campaign properly (vaccines, refrigerated trucks to carry them, ice to keep them cold, gasoline, etc.). However, they are required by law to do the campaign, and they cannot publicly show that the lack of resources makes the task impossible.

This dilemma is absolutely typical of the technical services. The government will hold them accountable for carrying out an activity even if it has not given them the resources necessary to do so. Rather than say exactly what can be done, and show that the available resources are insufficient to do more, the services must somehow make it look as if they have been able to accomplish the whole task. Otherwise the head of the service--since the attributions of the service actually are to the chief, not to the group--will be seen as incompetent, and could lose out professionally because of his failure to accomplish the tasks for which he is responsible.

The animal production activities of the livestock service include animal fattening projects, encouraging the production for consumption or sale of dairy products, animal husbandry, and the introduction of new techniques such as reducing the size of their herds in order to improve their quality. They offer some products for sale to the herders, including salt licks and anti-parasite medicines. (Apparently these are also sold effectively by private merchants.) The animal production staff also gather data on the prices at which animals are sold in the markets, although how these data are used is not clear.

Project funding in the livestock area has largely been for the standard activities, with the exception of small projects in areas such as bee-keeping. Some micro-realizations have been funded for animal fattening activities, especially before Tabaski, but these have not been an important part of the livestock services' activities. In most places there seem to be very few projects directly targeted at the livestock sector; if the sector is funded, it is as an offshoot of a large integrated donor project like Keita or the land use management projects in Boboye (Dallol Bosso Nord and Sud). The relative lack of projects leaves the livestock services hard pressed for resources, especially the amounts of gas needed to carry out the vaccination campaigns and survey the herds in wide pastoral

areas.

B.4 HYDRAULICS

Hydraulics is not represented at the arrondissement level. At the department level, they are involved with monitoring water sources and hydraulic infrastructure projects in the context of donor projects which have funds to invest in this area. Because they are almost totally dependent on donor investments, there is no distinction between their classical activities and their donor-funded ones.

The activities of the hydraulics departments include:

- Managing water resources - maintaining data on where the water sources are, their quality, the quantity of water available, and so on. Unfortunately, since they do not have the transportation resources to go out and locate traditional wells, they only know about modern ones constructed by the government or by projects. Their data base is therefore rather incomplete.
- Monitoring the construction of garden wells, dams, deep wells, drinking water wells, and other water projects.
- Maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure.
- Training on water infrastructure maintenance.

The departments do not actually do the construction on the infrastructure projects; this is typically contracted out to OFEDES or to foreign firms when donor funding is involved. They are not involved with micro-realizations, which in this area are handled by the rural engineering services.

B.5 RURAL ENGINEERING

The rural engineering services have just been introduced at the arrondissement level in the past year or two. Each service has at most two staff members, a chief and his deputy, so there is no organizational structure within the services. Moreover, while the administration has created the services and given them staff and in some cases a car, it has not yet given them operating budgets. Thus they have no offices, no office supplies, no gas, and so on.

Under these rather limiting circumstances, the services can only work when funding is available from donor or national government projects. They are brought in to provide services in several areas:

- Studies for the construction of buildings, vaccination corrals, and other infrastructure
- Engineering for earthworks projects; treating wadi beds, building wells for gardening, livestock, or drinking water
- Soil rehabilitation to improve water retention
- Construction of irrigation systems

The services do not actually do the construction themselves. Rather, they do studies which to determine what is needed, do working drawings, estimate construction costs, prepare RFPs for contractors, evaluate the responses, and oversee the implementation. Construction work itself may be done by a variety of actors. In Tahoua the CRD has equipment--bulldozers, trucks, loaders, etc.--recuperated from various projects which they make available for genie rural activities from time to time. In some areas ONAHA does some of the physical construction work. In Maradi the services rent equipment from Travaux Publique and hire people to run it. In some places they simply contract with private construction companies when they are available to do the job.

B.6 GENERAL THEMES

Many of the problems or issues which must be raised concerning the technical services are common to all of them. This section first considers the problems identified by the technical agents themselves. It then addresses a number of questions posed by an outside observers, which help clarify how AID could most effectively reinforce the services.

Problems identified by the technical agents:

Transportation: Without a doubt, the most pressing constraint on the technical services in their estimation (and probably in mine as well) is transportation. Most of the services have one or two vehicles based in the arrondissement seat, and few or none in the bush where the agents are stationed. Their gas allotments are between CFA 100,000 and CFA 150,000 per quarter, enough to buy between 435 and 660 liters of gas (CFA 230/liter if they don't buy black market gas near the Nigerian border, which everyone who can does). Assuming their cars average 5 km/liter,⁽¹⁵⁾ this allows them to travel between 2200 and 3500 kilometers per

(15. This figure is at the high end of the estimates by the AID chauffeurs of the mileage they get driving AID vehicles on sand and dirt roads. Government cars are probably worse. Thus our cost estimates may be low.

quarter - a few trips around the arrondissement, depending on how big it is. Given the tasks they are supposed to fulfill and the number of agents they have in the bush, this clearly can come nowhere near meeting the demand.

The budgets for car repairs are equally derisory, running between CFA 50,000 and CFA 100,000 per quarter for each service. This is enough to allow minor repairs, but not enough to do anything major. The cars are run until they need major repairs; then they are retired to the parking lot of the service, where they stay indefinitely.

The lack of vehicles for agents in the bush is also obviously an issue. In the arrondissement seat mobility is constrained more by gasoline and repairs than by the total number of vehicles, especially since the services seem to be able to borrow cars from each other if they have the gas to run them. In the bush, however, the agents are often limited to the villages they can reach on foot, since they have no other way to get around. Either they do nothing, or they spend half their time travelling; they would clearly be more effective if they could get to their work sites more quickly. Some donor projects have provided motorcycles to field agents, but these are limited to a few arrondissements.

In addition to the total supply of cars and operating budgets for them, many of the services complain that the formulas for allocating these resources among the arrondissements are unfair. (Since allocations are made within a ministry, they did not complain about the allocations across services - they compare themselves with the same service in the next arrondissement, not with a different service next door.) The financial officer for animal resources in Niamey(16) corroborated this; he indicated that there was no rational basis for how the allocations were made. No matter how it is cut, the current pie is far too small to meet the need; however developing a rational allocation formula (and publicizing it to ensure it will be used) might make the services less resentful of what the people in the next arrondissement had received.

Staff/Skills: Several related complaints were heard about the staffing of the technical services; that the quantity was too small and they are badly overloaded, and that the quality was too low and they need training which they do not receive.

The first complaint is clearly valid; six or seven agricultural extension agents (even fewer in other services) clearly will not be able to meet the needs of an arrondissement of 200,000 to 300,000 peasant farmers, unless they attempt to do

16. Mr. Keita, Ministere de l'Agriculture et l'Elevage

almost nothing. On the other hand, in the current situation the complementary resources needed to enable the existing staff to work are not available. Increasing the number of staff without first providing transportation and operating budgets to those already in the field would be a waste of resources.

Whether the services are overloaded is somewhat open to question. This view was expressed by some service heads who seem to take on all the work of their arrondissement rather than delegating tasks to their staff. To some extent this could be because the system, by assigning responsibility for tasks to the department head rather than to the department, makes it hard for people to delegate authority. It may also be because the lower level staff are not qualified to take on additional responsibilities. The service heads also typically handle a lot of administrative work, and spend a great deal of time talking to visiting missions (like ours), which significantly cuts into the time left for their technical responsibilities.

This view was also expressed by some of the donors working with the technical services on their projects. Many factors are at work here. Once they have access to transportation, the technical staffs clearly have a lot to do. Therefore in areas with many donor projects--i.e. where transportation is available--the time of the technical services may be a significant constraint. This is logical, and is consistent with what we said above about the need to make complementary resources available before providing more staff.

In addition, however, the services apparently allocate their time to the projects which interest them the most--i.e. those which pay the highest per diems. The government pays the lowest per diems, but there is clearly an obligation to do government work nevertheless (if government gas is available). Among the donors, however, there is significant variation in per diems, which means that those who attempt to keep their per diems in line with those offered by the government tend to lose out on technical staff time. They then find that the staff are too busy to go out and visit their project sites, because they are taken up with those paying more for their services.(17) Thus their complaint that the staff are overloaded may not be entirely accurate.

The second complaint, that the technical agents are underskilled and need training which they don't receive, is somewhat less clear. Some of the ministries have introduced a policy of placing higher level civil servants in the field offices as part of their decentralization effort, with the result

17. The donors have attempted to coordinate on per diem rates, but could not manage to do it.

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that in many places the service head is at grade A1, the highest level possible. This is particularly true in agriculture and animal resources. Most people seem to feel this is a good strategy, that the higher level people are an asset because they are better able to conceptualize the broad needs of their services, and they have the abstract thinking needed to design projects like the micro-realizations.

The down side of this approach is that the services are increasingly run by young people just out of school, with a lot of training and very little field experience. (18) They enter the civil service as the supervisor of a staff of field agents who are much older and more experienced, and who know what is going on at the local level in their areas. It is very much a function of the individuals involved whether the new leaders learn from their staff, or think they are already equipped to tell them what to do. Most of the people we spoke to felt that the advantages of having these highly trained service heads outweighed these disadvantages. (19) This suggests that pursuing this policy elsewhere may be worthwhile, either by bringing in more highly trained people, or by making more long-term advanced training available to those already in the service.

Many people felt that the skills of the lower-level civil servants needed improving, either with long-term training which would enable them to improve their grade, or with short courses and on-the-job training. While this may well be the case, it is also important to bear in mind that long-term training means a chance to go to school at full salary and improve one's civil service grade (and salary) at the end. Short-term training means earning per diems plus salary while in the course. Irrespective of whether they actually need the training, no one will turn down the financial opportunities it represents. We cannot therefore conclude that if everyone tells a visiting consultant from a donor agency that they need training, that they all really do.

It is clear, though, that to the extent that long- or short-term training is available, the word does not get down to the arrondissement level. Although announcements are supposed to be sent out to the field requesting candidates for training courses,

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18. This is consistent with another complaint sometimes heard, that the training they receive is too theoretical, and does not teach them how to deal with situations they encounter in the field.
19. Some did suggest, though, that it would work better if they had to get more field experience before heading the department, and if the civil service system allowed people to be promoted on the basis of experience instead of only on the basis of formal education.

no one we asked in the arrondissements had ever seen one before it was too late to respond, and most people had never seen one at all. People who had received training usually received it because they knew someone in Niamey who had alerted them to its being available. Thus although it is not clear that everyone needs training, it is clear that what is available is not fairly allocated to those who need it most.

Mobility: Almost everyone complained about the excessive mobility of the technical staffs, particularly the service heads, as a factor which makes it almost impossible to maintain a consistent program of activities over time. Although in the institutional analysis part of this mission I could not amass statistical data to determine how long people actually stay in their posts, (20) anecdotal evidence does suggest they are moved frequently and abruptly. The Nigerien personnel system, in which individuals are assigned to and removed from posts by their ministries without their accord or that of their supervisors, is certainly largely to blame for this. Even if people do not want to move, they are reluctant to fight against reassignment, because they risk antagonizing people in their ministry. In an environment where "everything is based on personal relations", as we often heard, this is a significant risk. A new law apparently says that people who are members of the sous-section in their arrondissement cannot be transferred out; however this is not being enforced. (21)

Specialization of Field Agents: A number of technical service agents identified as a fundamental problem the fact that while at the department and arrondissement levels the staff are specialized in particular areas, the agents in the field are the least trained but are expected to carry out tasks in many different domains. As a result, they are spread too thin, they do not have time to become expert in anything, and they are always being pushed in different directions by the specialists above them who are competing for their time.

Whether this is actually a problem depends on the model of how the field agents are supposed to operate. If they are to follow a cookbook approach to implementing strategies designed by the specialists, this probably is not a major problem as long as the cookbook is straightforward. However, with the new emphasis on the field agents as the frontline in helping the villagers identify their needs and articulate project proposals, they will have to be able to respond more creatively, which will require greater training.

20. Hopefully Jonathan Smith's report will provide this information.

21. According to the sous-prefet in Dakoro.

Unfortunately, having more specialized field agents in the face of the staffing limitations on the government is not a realistic option. With only six or seven generalist agents per arrondissement, it would be impossible for them to specialize, and then each cover an even larger geographic area. The only alternative left is to offer them short-term training which might improve their skills marginally in a number of areas, but would not really equip them to operate at a much higher level in any of them. Moreover, even if they were very skilled in a number of areas, they would still be pressured by all of the arrondissement and department specialized staff to work on everything at once. A solution to this problem may not be in the offing, therefore.

The Mentalities Problem: Perhaps the most difficult problem raised both by the technical agents themselves and by outside analysts is that fundamentally the effectiveness of the field agents is a function of the mentalities of the people involved - both their own and the villagers'. The current ideology of development from the base depends on the people at the base to be willing to take initiative for working on their own problems, at least to the point of identifying them and working with the technical staff to arrive at solutions. It also depends on those technical staffs to listen to the villagers' needs rather than to approach them with a pocketful of solutions to distribute - or impose.

With too few exceptions, neither villagers nor technical staffs are ready to work in this way. The villagers see the government both as the institution responsible for dealing with their problems, and as a body to be feared and obeyed, rather than negotiated with. The technical staffs want to use their authority--both technical and political--to tell the villagers what to do, instead of encouraging them to determine and ask for what they want or need.

Many people both within and outside the technical services have focused on changing these mentalities as the essential precursor to effective rural development activity in a context of bottom-up development. Unfortunately, no one really knows how to do it. Probably a few people will change by working closely with and being trained by the people who have already assimilated the new attitudes. This will be a slow, time-consuming process of discussion, experience, and training. Finding a way to accomplish this on the scale necessary if it really is a prerequisite to "development from the base" seems to be an impossible task.

Questions raised by outside observers:

National Technical Strategies: Notwithstanding the lip service paid to development from the base, the strategic planning for the

activities of the technical services comes entirely from Niamey in the form of directives to be applied throughout the country. In some services there is input to this process from the field offices via meetings at the departments and in Niamey at which the arrondissement plans of activity are discussed and revised. However, the link between the field services' inputs and the strategies ultimately adopted is tenuous.

This approach is entirely appropriate for agricultural development strategies which require national perspective and action in order to be effective. However, the ecological diversity of the country means that some kinds of technical strategy must be developed in response to local conditions to be effective. The fear of regionalization as a political strategy is leading the ministries involved with rural development to choose approaches which may be technically inappropriate, simply in order to treat the whole country in the same way. Moreover, this approach denies the technical services the option of actual listening to the villagers in order to determine what approaches they should take; listen as they may, they are still required to do what Niamey says. For both of these reasons, it would be preferable to encourage the arrondissements to formulate their own technical strategies, to the extent that it is effective to do so based on local agricultural conditions.

This issue is not a problem where donor projects are concerned. While the government may prefer projects that accord with its priorities, it will not turn down any funding offered. While this may make it hard for the government to direct development activity, it means that projects are not constrained, as the technical staffs are, to use their resources on specific activities. However, it may be useful for the services to have more flexibility in the use of government resources--the national budgets and the fiches d'operation--as well as of donor funds.

Role of Department Level Technical Services: The function of the department level technical services, while perhaps obvious to the Nigeriens, is not totally clear to an outside observer. They seem to play several roles:

- They are channels for information, regulations, and communications flowing between the arrondissements and the central ministries.
- Some technical services are responsible for resource allocations (particularly gasoline) to the arrondissements. This immediately puts them in a position of significant power, since they control the tightest resource in the system. Presumably the logic for assigning this to the departments is that they understand local needs better than Niamey does.

people in power change, this means never offending anyone lest that person be in a position to harm you at some point. While this characterization may be extreme, even in a mild form this attitude can quickly stifle any individual initiative to improve the operations of the technical services.

Regularizing some aspects of the Nigerian civil service could help address this kind of problem. The more there are clear, publicly-stated rules regulating promotions, assignments, access to training, and so on, the harder it is for these to be used as rewards or punishments. If positions were assigned based on expressed preference, it would further eliminate the fear some agents have of being transferred to Bilma (or, less drastically, away from the paved road) if they offend someone in power. Such personalization of the operations of the civil service would be a strong first step in helping the technical agents operate as professionals.

Integration of Technical Service Activities: The technical services are working in areas which are clearly closely related. Should their efforts be more closely integrated than they are? What would such integration look like, and is it necessary?

None of the technical agents interviewed cited this as a particular problem. When directly asked about it, some said the services worked together as well as needed, while others indicated that they couldn't initiate cooperative efforts which they implied) might be desirable. However, desirable forms of integration could go far beyond the relatively limited cooperative ventures envisioned by the technical services. It is therefore worth asking whether increased integration is desirable and feasible, even if they have not pinpointed this as a problem.

At present the technical services are almost entirely independent. Their budgets are separate, their strategic planning is separate, they report to different ministries. They only seem to collaborate in a few areas: in integrated rural development projects designed, funded, and implemented by foreign donors; in elaboration of MRL proposals under the leadership of the SAP; and in occasional efforts to pool their travels in the bush.

Integration of the technical services might take various forms. At one extreme is what we could call "full integration," a scenario in which the services would merge into one multi-disciplinary group working jointly to identify rural development strategies which take into account the interrelationships among the agricultural and environmental problems of the region. This kind of intellectual approach might be easier to implement if the services were administratively integrated, rather than independent groups competing for resources. Such integration

They provide technical guidance on questions which the arrondissements cannot answer.

They provide technical guidance to the prefecture upon request.

They filter information (activity reports, plans of activities, reviews of the agricultural season) flowing from the field services to Niamey. In this role they usually receive reports from all the arrondissements, and synthesize them into a single department report to the minister. This puts them in a position to color how information is presented to the minister, so it reflects well on the department (or its directors). This filtering probably gives Niamey a rosier picture of life at the field than is actually the case.

They simplify the management task for Niamey, since the central ministries can deal with eight departments (seven plus the capital) rather than 35 arrondissements and a variety of communes.

They simplify certain administrative and technical functions at the field services, which can deal with a small bureaucracy at home instead of a large one far away.

In balance, the existence of an intermediate level of government seems to simplify a variety of management tasks, at a financial cost (including the deductions from arrondissement budgets) and at the cost in the clarity of communications between the central ministries and the field.

Cost of Telling the Truth: The technical staff learn quickly to present a positive view of how things are going in their services in their arrondissements. In the Nigerien context, saying that things are going badly implies that someone is to blame - either themselves or someone else. At the highest levels, saying that all development activities are not working somehow implies that the government is not capable of solving the problems of the country. This is totally clear in the case of the animal resources services whose staff cannot explain that the vaccination campaign could not be completed due to lack of resources. But it is even true when the cause is the weather: an environment service chief explained that he had to report good pasture conditions even when in fact there was no growth because it had not rained.

To the individual, the costs of honest evaluation of the agricultural season outweigh the benefits of speaking the truth in an environment where professional advancement depends on personal relations, not on civil service rules. This means that throughout the system there is a strong incentive to do what will please the people in power happy, rather than to struggle to really make a technical service work well. Given how frequently the

It would be essential if what were desired was for a group of people to take joint responsibility for charting out an effective development strategy for their area, under a single source of leadership such as the sous-prefet. Then it would be of primary importance that the people involved design their interventions to manage their resources jointly, to ensure that they were fully complementing each other and preparing a package which would maximally benefit the targeted populations.

Full integration might be the best way to build an approach to development which emphasizes collective action and recognizes intellectual relationships among rural development problems. However, this is clearly not what is intended by the Nigerian government, as evidenced by the entire structure of local organizations, their financing, management, staffing, and so on. Large scale integration in this new approach to development would require massive changes in the organization of local government, which may not be desirable, and certainly are not feasible.

A more modest approach involves developing integrated projects like Keita (on a large scale) or those in Boboye or Chamiza (on a more limited scale). These target a single area and bring in the skills of many different technical agents to try to address all of the development issues of that area at once. The logic for this approach is that the complementarity between different interventions will make the whole larger than the sum of its parts, making this more effective than addressing a single problem in many different places. Whether this actually works out in practice is an open question. This kind of integration is more an exercise in managing and timing the different interventions than it is one of really building fundamental changes in working practices, so it is much easier to implement than the first approach.

On the other hand, managing integrated projects has proven to be more difficult than managing simpler single-purpose ones, and integrated rural development has often failed because the projects became so unmanageable. The government's current emphasis on micro-realizations suggests that it is more interested in small, single-purpose activities which can be managed easily by the field services and the villagers.

In the existing context, improving limited cooperation of the type we already observe may therefore be more appropriate than integration. Strengthening this cooperation in arrondissements where it is weak, to maximize sharing of the few resources which will be used jointly--for example, arrondissement money on the basis of cooperation, and transportation resources--would certainly be desirable, although it will not significantly change the operations or effectiveness of the field services. While this is a very modest ambition, broader integration would require a scale change in local practices which is beyond the scope of ASDG II

intervention.

Kickbacks: One of the problems cited by almost all of the outsiders to the government with whom we spoke was that the technical agents receive kickbacks on purchases made with donor funds. This usually works through the purchasing process. The agent responsible for identifying a vendor and signing off on the purchase (the ordonnateur) goes to a vendor whom he knows, and arranges to get a receipt for more than the purchase price. The vendor receives his payment at the ordinary price (or more in return for his compliance) and the technical agent pockets the difference. Sometimes the benefit to the technical agent is less direct--favors rendered return for the purchase--but it usually seems to be there in one form or another. Since the foreign donors controlling the purchases often don't know Nigerian prices, they may not even realize they are being overcharged. The amounts involved are not necessarily small; one ONG representative reported receiving receipts for goods at ten times the price of the same item on the street in Niamey.

These kickbacks have two undesirable effects. First, obviously, they enormously inflate the cost of the projects, which is undesirable anywhere, but especially in a country where resources are as tight as they are in Niger. Second, they distort the behavior of the technical agents. Since profits are to be made on projects with purchases but not on those which only involve advice, the agents are only willing to work on the former. In the MRL development process or other proposal preparation, they will always argue for activities that involve purchases. (C2) One ONG said that the agents were eager to work with them as long as their project was making investments. As soon as the investment phase ended and ongoing monitoring was needed, the agents' interest faded and they stopped visiting the site. Another ONG reported interested participation in its project from the service involved as long as it managed some of the funds, but hostility and non-cooperation as soon as the funds were routed directly to the villages for whom they were intended.

Unfortunately, no one had any suggestions for how to deal with this problem. One ONG simply said "don't let the government get its hands on any of the money," but agreed that this was not a viable option. "Policing" was a highly imperfect second best. If it were possible to change mentalities as discussed above, the kickbacks would probably be eliminated as well, this is also difficult.

12. It is not clear whether the kickbacks apply on government funded activities as well. In any case purchasing on government projects (e.g. operating budgets, fiches d'op ration) is very limited.

Once a proposal is developed the SAP, with assistance or input from the sous-prefet, is charged with seeking donor financing for it. None of the technical services interviewed played any role in the search for financing. They did not know how the SAP went about this task; they simply turned the proposal over to the Plan and eventually got back a "yes/no/still pending" response. This role therefore places the head of the SAP in a position of some power (if not authority); he is the link to the resource supply, and the people who need those resources do not even know how the system works to access them directly.

However, the technical service heads did not seem to see the SAP as controlling access to project funds, nor did they think of seeking funding themselves if their projects were on hold with the SAP. Rather, they seemed to think of this fund-raising functions as a technical activity which they were glad not to have to deal with themselves. It is surprising that the SAP's fund-raising function is not seen as a source of power, in an environment where the benefits to be derived from access to resources is so clear, and rules concerning their use relatively ineffective. On the other hand, the technical agents did have an undefined sense that the SAP was both powerful and political, without stipulating what that meant in practice.

MRLs which are not funded by foreign donors are presented to the CSRD, which then requests the CRD to fund them from the Fond Regional de Developpement. Although the head of the SAP is also the secretary of the CSRD, it is not clear that this gives him any additional influence. In his role as secretary he solicits items for the agenda, but does not have the authority to actually write it. CSRD meetings and decisions are commonly agreed to be dominated by political concerns, but based on the minutes, these are quite typical of any (ostensibly) representative body trying to please its constituents. To the extent that one voice is heard over the others it is that of the sous-prefet, not the head of the SAP.

Once a project is funded, the SAP is generally responsible for monitoring and coordinating its execution. In practice, this means (according to staff at one donor project) collecting regular activity plans from the technical services, approving their budgets and proposed expenditures, signing checks for the project expenses jointly with the sous-prefet (if the donor has placed the money in arrondissement hands), and being the point of contact with the funder. The technical service remains the ordonnateur for the funds; the SAP only signs the checks. The SAP has little role on the technical content of the project; its role is more administrative and financial. The evaluation portion of their responsibilities does not involve serious assessment of whether the project is accomplishing its objectives. Instead, it involves monitoring project activities

to ensure that the proposal is being followed.

Everyone involved with this process--donors, technical services, and SAP staff themselves--indicated that the laboration and execution of MRLs is a huge task, and that the SAP staff are overloaded. The SAP staff are relatively unskilled, in light of the recent emphasis on sending high-level civil servants out to the field. Most of the service heads are grade B in the civil service, and many of the people who work for them are grade C or D former rural animation staff with only two years of training.

With these staff, it is not surprising that many of the SAP heads are also the head of the monitoring and evaluation division, and handle most or all of the MRL proposal development themselves without delegating anything to their subordinates. This means that they are indeed overloaded, while the rest of their services have little to do. Their time becomes a stumbling block on getting MRL proposals through, and donors who are willing to fund projects find themselves trying to call on the technical staff to coordinate proposal development rather than on the SAPs. The SAP chiefs' time is further constrained because as the representative of a powerful ministry and the coordinator of local development activities they are in demand for many special activities, particularly hosting visiting missions and participating in a wide range of seminars and training. These responsibilities pull them away from their technical tasks, leading to further delays in developing the project documents.

Two solutions to this problem could be envisioned: to enlarge or improve the skills of the SAP staff, or to transfer some project design responsibilities to the technical services. Given the power the SAPs already have, which is not clearly justified by skills they provide or the authority they command with their skills, strengthening or increasing their staff may not be the best approach. On the other hand, many of the technical staff probably do not want more proposal development responsibility, especially for the non-technical aspects, nor do they want to become fund-raisers. They seem to see a need for a SAP in a coordinating and fund-raising role as a service to the technical agents, but not a SAP which uses that role to become a power broker.

At the department level this problem might be addressed by separating the technical functions of the Departmental Director of Planning from the political role of the Deputy Secretary General, something which was proposed by one of the technical agents we interviewed. At the arrondissement level, it is less clear how to retain the technical services of proposal development and fund-raising, but keep the SAP from being able to indirectly determine which projects are funded, how, or who has access to resources. Possibly some of the SAP's power derives

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THE MINISTRY OF PLAN

The Ministry of Plan field offices are responsible for coordinating and monitoring all development activities at the local level. This gives them both a technical role and a political one, making them a powerful actor in the arrondissements.

The Services d'Arrondissement de Plan are structured in three divisions:

The Community Development Division, built out of the old local animation services, is responsible for training and building awareness ("sensibilisation") among the villagers. They go into the villages as part of the teams formulating micro-irrigation proposals, rather than preceding them with the consciousness-raising or community organization which could lead the villagers to express a need for such a team. According to one community development staffer, they prefer to get involved only when a project is already being defined, because they feel that otherwise their presence will create expectations about projects to be developed when the resources may not exist.

The community development staff also train the local elected officials. Their courses are basically a political socialization into prevailing political ideologies and the workings of the development councils and the MNSD. These staff members played an important role in the political activity of 1989, including the village-level committees of the MNSD, and carrying out the elections.

The Statistics Division handles routine data collection and analysis, particularly of the population data from the état civil.

The Monitoring and Evaluation Division coordinates MRL proposal development and monitors and evaluates projects in execution. This is the major responsibility of the SAPs in the arrondissements visited. Their authority over development activity in the arrondissement seems to involve several concrete tasks. They coordinate the other technical services in the preparation of project proposals. This involves creating a technical team (of which they are always a member) which negotiates with the village involved in order to define the project. The technical services prepare the parts of the proposal which cover their areas of expertise, and turn it over to the SAP to complete the financial analysis and put it in a presentable form. SAP staff usually indicated that they play a major role in developing the proposals; technical staff imply that the SAP role in actually developing the proposal is minimal.

from the political position of the Plan at the department level, so that there would be a trickle-down effect if the functions of DDP and SGA were separated. Another possible strategy could be to explicitly delegate MRL activities to a division chief who cannot be the service head, so that the technical work can keep moving while the service head is called away to entertain missions and attend seminars. This would, of course, require that someone else in the service have the training required to develop the proposals, which brings us back to enlarging the service. However if it meant that there would be a pure technician with the time to work on MRLs, this might be a reasonable course to follow.

D. DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS

The five-tiered hierarchy of development councils(23) is an important part of the government's strategy of development from the base. At each level the council includes representation from the lower level in the hierarchy (from "the population" at the village level), and from the other nationally created institutions; the youth movement (samariya), the cooperatives, the Association of Nigerienne Women, the Islamic Association, and other socio-professional associations.

The development councils are charged with developing, implementing, and overseeing development activities within their areas of jurisdiction. At the higher levels (department and national) their role is naturally more overview and less implementation.

Discussions with the prefecture and sous-prefecture staff and reading the minutes of the CRD and CSRD meetings allow us to develop a reasonable idea of the kinds of issues considered by these bodies. The CRDs review the arrondissements' fiches d'operation and budgets, providing comments and requiring revisions before they are ultimately approved. They discuss the proposals for funding from the FRD, and choose among them. During the course of the year they hear reports on the progress of the activities they are funding, and on such topics as the progress of students in the department's schools, repayment of cooperative loans, and the progress of the agricultural season (including prayers for rain). They discuss the management of special events, such as traditional games, fairs, and youth festivals, and often call on the arrondissements to contribute

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- 27. National: Conseil National de Developpement
 - Departmental: Conseil Regional de Developpement
 - Arrondissement: Conseil Sous-Regional de Developpement
 - Cantonal: Conseil Local de Developpement
 - Village: Conseil Villageois de Developpement

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extra resources to support these activities. They also discuss and plan the organization of political activities such as the creation of the village committees of the MNSD and the national elections held in fall 1989.

The CRD has various kinds of authority over the department and the arrondissements in it. They can take three kinds of actions as the result of their deliberations; recommendations, resolutions, and appeals ("appels"). Recommendations are made to higher levels in the administration, or to the CND. They express the wishes of the CRD but do not have any authority. Resolutions concern department-level activities which will be executed by the CRD members. Appeals are calls to lower levels of government or lower development councils to carry out actions. They have the force of law; the jurisdictions to whom they are addressed are required to carry them out without having any say. It is through these appels that the CRDs can change the fiches d'operations or the arrondissement budgets, require the arrondissements to contribute to special events, or impose head taxes on the population. The arrondissement representation on the CRD is considered sufficient check to keep the CRD from requiring anything which is really excessive. However since they represent only a small proportion of the CRD membership, the arrondissement delegates may not have sufficient power to protect themselves from the CRD.

CSRD meetings are similar to those of the CRD. They discuss the fiches d'operation, the MRL proposals, and the budget, as well as modifications to the budget during its execution. They hear reports and make recommendations on subjects such as tax recovery, the progress of the agricultural season or the dry-season gardening, how projects are advancing, community activities, and so on. The sous-prefet usually calls upon the cantonal and village chiefs to redouble their efforts on tax recovery, contribute to the upcoming sports events, or support the political efforts and training being undertaken by the MNSD. The CSRD seems to serve not only as a decision-making forum, but as a means of communicating with people in the field, since their representatives are at least all in one place for the meeting and can take information or instructions back to their constituents.

The Conseil Villageois de Developpement (CVD) is intended to be the basic forum for initiating development activities "at the base". The CVDs are supposed to meet regularly, discuss problems, projects, and so on. They are also supposed to be the dispute resolution center for the village.

However, according to project representatives working and living at the village level, the CVDs actually do not function as intended. The president of the CVD is the traditional village chief, and was nominated by the Minister of the Interior when the system was created. Although there may have been local elections

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for the CVD, there was a single slate of candidates chosen by the government or the chief, and the villagers' yes-no votes were certainly not secret. The notion that the CVD in any way represents the choice of the villagers is, therefore, a polite fiction.

The chief has always been the source of power and authority in the villages, and creation of the CVD has not given the rest of the residents any more voice than they had before. Moreover, the villagers are typically afraid of the chief, because he has the power to make problems for them with the administration (or not resolve problems that they might get into on their own). Since they never know when they might need his help, they can't afford to risk antagonizing him. Similarly, the villagers are afraid of the government, so they will not disagree with its representatives—the technical services—even if their projects proposed bear no relation to their needs.

This implies that a system of "development from the base" through which the villagers can express their own needs even if they counter those of the chief or government authorities is not really in place. The creation of the CVDs has not changed the village power structure, so it will not change the internal dynamics of the village. The problem of "the mentality of the villagers" is certainly related to this power structure. As long as they believe they are at the mercy of the local authority figures (as, indeed, they still are) they will not take initiative in asserting their own development needs as against those identified by others.

E. MNSD

The local level organs of the MNSD are a relatively new creation, and no one was clear on their function including the people responsible for setting them up and running them. (24) At the departmental level, the Maradi administrative secretary said that the section were basically interested in mobilizing and training the villagers. They want to encourage them to think about projects such as school construction, wells, health, and so on. It was not clear, however, whether the section intends to actually carry out projects themselves, or whether they have the more limited goal of encouraging people to ask for them. It was clear, though, that they had not yet done anything in this area.

24. The information in this section is sketchy. Since I did not expect the party to be directly relevant, I did not talk to enough people to get a systematic picture of what the MNSD is doing. Nevertheless, it is useful if only because it confirms that further investigation is not needed for ASDG II.

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The Maradi administrative secretary was also unable to explain the differences in functions of the section and the CRD, in view of the fact that the same people are on both. It would appear that the section is intended to be a political group and the CRD a more objective development council. However since the members are the same, this simply permits the party to use the slightly greater legitimacy of the CRD directly to authorize its political objectives or activities. It may also enable the party structure to use development council control over resources as a way to reward or punish villages for their role in party activities.

The party hierarchy is financed in part through membership dues. In Maradi they had already sold 78,000 memberships at CFA 500/year, out of a department population of 1,300,000. The arrondissements are also required to contribute from their budgets to support the structures of the MNSD, as discussed above in section A. The administrative secretaries are civil servants, however, so their salaries do not come out of this money.

The technical services, particularly the Service d'Arrondissement du Plan, have played a significant role in putting the MNSD structure in place at the village level. In spring/summer of 1989 the arrondissements were called upon by the MNSD to put in place Comites de Base in all of their villages. These committees were to include various local representatives, and were to meet at least monthly in order to inform the population about party activities and policies. (25) Since there are on the order of 500-1000 villages in each arrondissement, creating these committees--even merely getting a list of names on paper--had to be a major task. It fell to the lot of the arrondissement level planning staff. One deputy to the head of the SAP estimated that their service spent a month full-time on this activity last summer.

The technical services are expected to play a role in the training program of the MNSD. They will be integrated into teams to go into the villages presumably to train party members about development issues. How much time this will involve is not yet clear. Aside from requiring this kind of participation (and having the authority to commandeer their vehicles--without gasoline), the MNSD structures do not have an input into the technical work of the services at the arrondissement level.

F. COIEDEP/COIEAR

25. According to project agents based in the villages, they do not meet.

The COTEDEP and COTEAR are (or were) committees composed of the technical service representatives at the departmental and arrondissement levels, respectively. Although they seem to have played an important role in the past, at present they are marginal.

Exactly how they function varies from place to place. In a one arrondissement visited the COTEAR meets as a group each Friday during the rainy season to review the progress of the agricultural season in order to prepare a required monitoring report. In many places they do not meet as a group, and their former role in evaluating project proposals is simply assumed by the former members. In these cases the role of the SAP or DDP as the coordinator of development activity has eliminated the need for a technical committee ~~per se~~, since the Plan representatives ensure that there is adequate technical input into the proposal development process. In some places these committees meet before each CRD or CSR meeting in order to discuss the agenda and make sure the technical questions will be clear, so as to avoid confusion in the council meeting itself.

To the extent that these committees (particular the COTEDEP, since the COTEAR never had any official attributions) used to have any decision-making authority, it has apparently been taken over by the development councils. The COTEDEP used to prepare project proposals for submission to the national ministries in seeking funding for investment projects. This function has been changed by the creation of the FRDs and the MRL funding process. To the extent that the same individuals still fill this role, they are likely to be working on MRLs, their input will be coordinated by the Ministry of Plan, and their (advisory) decision-making authority has been assumed by the development councils.

G. COOPERATIVES

The cooperatives seem to be very minor actors in the development area. They are considered to be the appropriate executing agents for projects concerned with grain commercialization, village boutiques, and other village economic activities. Their activities are coordinated and overseen by the USRC and URC, and they have little apparently connection to the work of the technical services.

The routine activities of the USRC directors include:

- Training cooperative members or management committees in management practices. This is often in coordination with literacy people. Both of the USRC directors interviewed said they didn't have time to do all the training necessary.

- Providing information to cooperatives about how the government works, insofar as it affects them.
- Monitoring what the cooperatives are doing
- Selling materials and supplies to cooperatives.
- In the past, lending money to the cooperatives. Repayment of these loans has been so bad (close to 0%, according to many of the CSRD minutes) that they have been discontinued. The USRC had no hold over the cooperatives to require them to repay the loans, so they were apparently treated simply as a grant.

It is not at all clear from discussions with the USRC directors where the financial interest is in creating cooperatives. In the activities in which they are engaged-- purchasing grain after the harvest in order to resell it to the peasants during the dry season, running village stores--the particular advantage of cooperative ventures over private enterprise was never clear. This is particularly true since cooperatives working through the USRC purchasing or commercialization channels had to pay a share of their profits to support the UC hierarchy instead of turning them back to their members in the form of dividends or discounted prices.

Chapter 3

Mechanisms for Funding Local Development Activities

Locally managed and funded projects represent a very small part of the national investment budget. In 1990, donor funding is expected to cover 93% of the budget. Less than 1.5% of the overall budget goes to locally managed micro-realizations including both government and donor contributions. More than 92% of national investments will be in centralized projects managed by the Ministry of Plan. (26)

However, although financially unimportant, the allocation of that 1.5% to investment projects can help us understand how local governments work, and what their potential is for taking a more active role in steering and managing economic development. This chapter therefore takes another look at the three major elements of the local development efforts; the Fonds Regionaux de Developpement, the micro-realizations, and the fiches d'operation.

A. FONDS REGIONAUX DE DEVELOPPEMENT

The Fonds Regionaux de Developpement constitute the major effort on the part of the government to decentralize some (albeit limited) control over investment resources, in order to allow local and regional authorities some autonomy in choosing their own development activities. The FRDs accounted for about CFA 800 million in investment funds in 1989, and may be expected to account for CFA 950 million in 1990. (27)

26. Based on data from Ministere du Plan, 1989, pages 4, 25-26, 33, 36, and 39.

27. The 1990 investment budget (Ministere de Plan 1989, p. 25) showed a CFA 300 million contribution (\$1 million) to the FRDs in 1989, and projected a CFA 450 million contribution in 1990. This apparently does not include the restricted funds for dry-season gardening, unless the departments interviewed received unusually high allocations. 1989 data from the departments interviewed showed the arrondissement contributions to average about CFA 50 million/year, for a total of CFA 400 million. I assume the arrondissement contribution will not rise in 1990 even if the national one does. Guessing that an additional CFA 100 million might be spent on dry-season gardening I come up with CFA 800 million for 1989 and CFA 950 million for 1990.

The allocation of these funds to development projects is the responsibility of the CRD. In all the departments we visited there were more completed proposals than could be funded. In most places it was not possible to determine the total value of the proposals presented to the CRD; in the one which had a list of all the projects under consideration, their value came to about twice the funds available.

Only one department, Maradi, tried to establish explicit criteria for choosing projects for funding. In both Dosso and Tahoua the SGAs and economic advisors were rather vague on the subject of overall criteria for choosing. In Tahoua the economic advisor said that they had established a formula for allocating the funds to the different services, and when they found out how much money would be available they simply divided it up following this formula. However this explanation seemed suspect, since MRL proposals are frequently multi-disciplinary and not associated with a single service. In Dosso there was no claim to have established any criteria; the department officials simply recited the usual litany of development problems and claimed that they were all of highest priority in allocating funds.

The Maradi CRD, on the other hand, established a technical commission to visit the proposed project sites and rank them in order of priority, so that those ranked highest could receive FRD funding. When the commission returned with its report, however, the CRD members were unwilling to follow its recommendations. The deputies from the arrondissements, in particular, were each insistent that something had to be funded in his arrondissement even if it was not a high priority. The CRD did follow the commission's recommendations in the choice of rural roads for upgrading, selecting them in order of priority. However the CRD reserved a portion of the money for politically determined choices, to ensure that every arrondissement received some share. Although we don't know how much of the money was allocated by priority and how much in response to political pressures, it would be hard to argue this is very different from budget allocations in more democratic or more developed countries.

The only information we have on which projects were funded are simple lists by title, with few-word explanations of the target populations. Based on this limited information, it would appear that in two of the departments, Tahoua and Maradi, the funds were used for reasonable development activities; well-digging, roads, earthworks, and so on. In Dosso, however, almost half the money went to investments that did not appear essential; construction of an elaborate traffic circle in front of the prefecture, improvements to the villa of one of the prefecture staff, construction of a road to another villa, and so on. This is disappointing; it forces us to ask what proportion of the money must go to urgent development projects for us to conclude

that the fund is an effective tool.

The FRD is a mechanism that could allow the departments to take some initiative in evolving their own development strategy and putting it into effect. Its effectiveness for this purpose is limited, however, by several factors. The total amounts of money involved are very small; nationwide FRD funding amounts to just over a third as much as the *fiches d'operation* (28), and the FRD accounts for less than a third of the amount spent on micro-realizations. Therefore the CRD is only controlling a modest portion of the available resources through this mechanism, which is not enough to use it to implement a new development strategy.

Administrative problems also limit the effectiveness of the FRD. The government contributions for dry season gardening came too late in the year to be used on that purpose. In some departments FRD money is used to cover the costs of CRD meetings, since the FRD is seen as being the cause of those meetings. Moreover there are apparently no controls on how funds are spent to prevent their use for flowerbeds and curbing rather than wells and schools.

On the other hand, these problems could be addressed if the government wanted to the FRD to be more effective. This would take several changes. First, the funding levels would have to be high enough to have a greater impact on conditions in the department. Second, a mechanism would have to be set out for regulating the general kinds of activities that were funded. Third--most important, and least likely--departmental officials would have to be charged with formulating a clear regional development strategy to be implemented in part through the use of these funds. In the absence of such a strategy the fund would simply continue to be a random bone tossed out to meet the needs of the department, and it could not be expected to have any particular impact. However, formulating such strategies is not, and does not seem likely to become, a responsibility of local governments. Thus although the FRD does have the potential to be an important development tool, it would require significant complementary changes in how responsibilities for development is assigned within the government.

B. THE MICRO-REALISATIONS

Micro-realizations are a second key element in the government's bottom-up development strategy. They may be

28. According to the Ministry of Interior (1990, p. 8) the total transfer from operating to investment budgets was CFA 2443 million on the 1990 budgets as compared with our CFA 950 million estimate for the FRD.

distinguished from other development projects in several key ways:

- They are smaller in scale and lower in cost.
- They are initiated, developed, funded, and executed at the local level, usually without any involvement by the national government. (29)
- They are supposed to be initiated at the instigation of "the base"; i.e. in response to village requests for project assistance.
- Foreign funding for MRLs can be negotiated directly between the arrondissement or department and the donor. Until this year the amount of donor contributions per project was limited to CFA 30 million at the arrondissement level and CFA 50 million at the department level. This limit has recently been removed, so now the local governments can directly negotiate projects of any size.
- They do not require counterpart funding in the national budget to cover staff time or other government contributions. Working on MRLs is considered part of routine technical staff responsibilities.

The United Nations (FAO) put in place a major project to support the MRL program, called FORPROSA. The project wrote a manual for MRL proposal development, (30) and ran training courses in all the departments to teach arrondissement service heads how to follow their procedure. Their training was very effective at least to the extent that everywhere we went the arrondissement staff gave exactly the same description of how MRL proposals were to be elaborated. The process is roughly as follows:

- At the village level someone suggests an idea or expresses a need, which is conveyed to the sous-prefet. This idea or need could be quite vague, since typically the villagers know enough to see that they have a problem, but not to suggest meaningful solutions.
- The COTEAR, or some other committee of technical agents designated by the SAP, goes out to the village to assess what the real problem is through a so-called "diagnostique du milieu."

29. An important exception to this is when a donor funds a large project to provide resources for MRLs. In that case the overall project is first negotiated in Niamey before the funds are made available at the department level.

30. Ministere du Plan, 1988

They talk to the villagers, seeking information that is broader than the problems which generated the initial request.

- Based on this visit (or visits), the technical staff prepare a study for a project they will propose to the village.

- The committee presents its proposal to the village. It is discussed and modified in response to the villagers' comments.

- Once the village and the committee agree on the overall outlines of the project, the technical staff develop a more detailed proposal.

- The technical staff and the villagers negotiate the allocation of responsibility for implementing the project. The technical staff must make sure that the villagers understand what their responsibilities will be, whether financial or in labor, and that they are prepared to assume them.

- The committee submits the project to CSRD for its approval.

- The technical agents sign a contract with the village ensuring each group's role in executing the project.

- Funding is sought for the project.

Evidence is mixed as to whether, by training 300-500 technical agents in a new proposal development process, FORPROSA has really been able to "make development come up from the base." The FORPROSA director, not surprisingly, feels that it has been quite effective and that now this is the process used. They have not done any follow-up evaluation of the effectiveness of their training, but they are convinced that it has worked. In particular, they are convinced that they have been able to get the agents to realize that what is important is the philosophy of responding to village needs and treating the villagers as equals, not following the individual steps of the procedure to the letter.

Donor project staff offer a less rosy picture of the effectiveness of this methodology and training. Although there is some agreement that technical staff approaches have changed, the full FORPROSA method is not being implemented. One problem with the method which was often mentioned was that a few visits to the village by a technical committee are insufficient to really ascertain what the villagers most need. Since the technical staff cannot spend enough time in the villages to get better information, the project documents are not really developed "with the people". So while the villages do some have input they do not have what is envisioned by the FORPROSA method.

The evidence of donor project agents living in the villages

corroborates this. In their own work they said it took as long as eight months before the villagers with whom they were living accepted them enough to indicate what they really need, especially when it countered the preferences of the chief. In the short time that the technical committees spend with the villagers it is impossible for the necessary trust to develop. Consequently, the committees only hear the preferences of the chief or a reflection of their own suggestions. The villagers themselves do not negotiate the details of the project with the committee, because they never get past viewing it as an authority structure imposed by the government.

It has also been hard to ascertain the extent to which villagers really raise the problems that lead to the proposal development process. One donor project manager laughed in response to a question about needs being expressed by villagers and said that only once had the organization ever seen to a request from a village, in several years of working on MRLs. Some arrondissement officials said that the villagers would address project requests to from the technical agents, and that they even sent letters to the sous-prefet with their requests; however we could not verify this.

When the villagers actually do contribute to elaboration of a project which meets their needs, they get cynical and discouraged if it is not funded, as often happens. It is hard to keep them believing that it is worth taking initiative to push for their own needs being met under these circumstances. Easing this problem would require both more MRL funding and a faster and more flexible allocation process. To keep the villagers' confidence in the system, it might be better if each arrondissement or even each technical service had its own fund, so that they could respond more quickly to villagers' interests. Then they would not encourage the villagers to develop a project if in fact funds were not available. Asking the beneficiaries of a funding program to prepare a detailed proposal before they know whether they will be funded is reasonable when they understand how the system works and can evaluate the anticipated return on the time invested. When a major objective is to convince the beneficiaries to trust the system, however, this may not be the best strategy to follow.

The MRLs can probably be an effective way to encourage bottom-up development planning if they are properly implemented. Even if they reflect the orientation of the technical services or the chiefs more than the villagers themselves, this is probably closer to the village needs than the schemes which might be hatched in Niamey. Moreover, to the extent that the technical agents can think in terms of small-scale projects that they can get implemented themselves, this should encourage them to take more initiative in identifying and acting on the needs of the population.

The MRLs are still a small operation, however. Even at their current fairly low level of funding, the SAP staff supposed to coordinate their development are swamped, and the technical staff do not have the time to really listen to village needs. Should the MRLs assume a large share of the national investment budget, they would probably become a management nightmare for the arrondissements. Doubling or tripling funding to MRLs--which would still give them a small share of the investment budget--would require at least a corresponding increase in staff and administrative effort, and the development of an MRL bureaucracy which could become as bad as the ones through which large donor projects are formulated. If this is a good model, it is not obvious how to enlarge it so its benefits can be more widespread without losing those benefits in bureaucracy.

C. THE FICHES D'OPERATION

The fiches d'operation are the single largest source of development funding at the local level, representing some CFA 2,443 million in the 1990 budgets (Ministry of the Interior 1990, p 8). However, there is much less creativity and innovation in the use of this money than there is in the case of the MRLs. To some extent this is because the fiches d'operation must be used by the arrondissements to fund routine activities to which they are committed every year, such as the vaccination campaign and the Engagement de Maradi. This limits the arrondissements' ability to use this money in order to implement their own view of their development needs.

The choice of which fiches to fund when the requests exceed what the CSRD is willing to spend is not made according to clear rules. Obviously, the activities required by the national government must be funded, although the level of funding could vary. Beyond that, the CSRDs apparently tend to continue to fund what they funded the previous year, at the same level, as if longevity constituted an argument for continuing an activity in particular. Most arrondissement secretaries implied that there was no money available to fund new activities. If there is, however, the prevailing impression is that the sous-prefet has the say in what is funded, according to whatever criteria he prefers.

The ideology of development from the base does not seem to enter into the preparation of the fiches d'operations or the allocation of funds. Direction in the use of funds comes from national strategies or from simply continuing the expenditures of the previous year, rather than from listening to the needs of the villagers. The departments can also dictate fiche d'operation expenditures to the arrondissements. Between the two influences,

it would be hard to use the fiches as a mechanisms for introducing a new, innovative approach to development projects.

On the other hand, the comments of the Dakoro environment service chief about how he planned to use the Engagement de Maradi funding for other more productive activities, and as leverage to encourage villagers to make complementary investments, suggests that it is possible for the fiches to be a basis for new development approaches. If the arrondissements had more freedom to decide how to use their funds, this too could be a way to implement new approach to development, or at least to adapt old approaches to the needs of the local population.

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Chapter 4

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

A. CONCLUSIONS

Developing an effective strategy for reinforcing the arrondissement technical services depends on understanding three aspects of their work. In the first chapter we identified three key questions. First, what are the services trying to accomplish, and what their most important problems in doing so? Second, how does the institutional environment in which they work influence their effectiveness? Third, what is the development philosophy underlying their work, and are they actually accomplishing the fundamental objectives expressed by that philosophy? In answering these questions, we will be able to identify support strategies which could help them accomplish their goals, and to assess which of these strategies is most likely to be effective.

A.1 Technical Service Responsibilities

On an immediate level, the technical services are responsible for carrying out a set of concrete tasks to support rural development and operations. They are hindered in their ability to perform these tasks by a serious lack of resources, a personnel system which makes it hard to maintain coherence or continuity in their work, and in some cases insufficient or inadequately trained staff. Some of these constraints might be addressed by ASDG II, and mechanisms for doing so are discussed in section B on policy recommendations.

A.2 Institutional Relations in the Arrondissement

On the second question, the analysis of institutional relations within the arrondissements shows a complex pattern formed by the overlap of two different authority structures, that of the national ministries directing a hierarchy of regional and local staff, and that of the sous-prefet trying to direct the activities of his arrondissement. The existing system gives most of the authority to the ministries, since they set technical strategy and hold the primary loyalty of the staff who work for them. The sous-prefet has enough power to block the technical services through his own efforts to accomplish administrative or political objectives. However he lacks the authority to provide positive leadership to the technical staffs in order to establish a development strategy for the arrondissement.

Some of the people we interviewed argued that this organizational structure is ineffective in responding to local needs because of the predominance of the national ministries. In this line of thinking, local development in Niger would be more effective if the arrondissements could serve as actual agents of development, with an overriding technical authority focused on the integrated needs of the arrondissement rather than the national needs of a single sector. The local government would then evolve its own strategies in response to the area's needs, and would manage its own resources (and staff) in order to implement its strategies.

This approach might allow the technical services and the arrondissement as a whole to be more effective in meeting the needs of their target populations. However, it would require a massive overhaul of both local and national government structure and finance. For example, it could involve changing the civil service system so that personnel are employed by an arrondissement or department rather than a national ministry. The local governments would have the authority to choose their own staff. They would also have much more responsibility for charting their own development strategies, and the public finance system would have to be modified to enable them to fund their own activities. Irrespective of its desirability, this kind of change clearly goes far beyond the scope of ASDG II.

Many of the individual issues which we have identified in this report are related to this broad problem, however. For example, the concerns about technical strategies being developed centrally and handed down to the local level is part of the broader question of who is responsible for local development. It would be possible for ASDG II to recommend, say, that strategies developed centrally be advisory, and that the services have the authority to chart their own course more fully. Similarly, there is a clear opportunity to strengthen local development by contributing to the FRD and improving how such funds are used. However, the impact of such activities would be minimal if not accompanied by significant changes in the system as a whole. These complementary changes are such a complex and political task that ASDG II probably could not get anywhere on them.

Moreover, many salient aspects of the existing authority structure are not the outcome of distinct policies or rules regulating arrondissement interactions. Rather, they are the result of political pressures, traditional power structures, and other subtle forces which it is hard for outsiders to even observe, much less know how to change. These factors determine how, in practice, power and authority are divided among the different actors at the local level in the context of their overlapping attributions on paper. While AID might be able to change explicit rules, it will be much less effective in trying

to influence an authority structure in which rules are only of secondary importance. For all of these reasons, it is inadvisable for AID to think about policy recommendations designed to marginally change the authority structure within the arrondissement.

A.3 Development from the Base

On the third question, we have seen a variety of apparently sincere efforts to implement a bottom-up approach to development. The extension of the development council and party hierarchies down to the village level, the transfer of development resources to local levels through the Fonds Regionaux de Developpement, and the introduction of the FORPROSA process for developing micro-realizations, are all significant steps in this direction.

However, as we have also seen, much more would be required for development initiatives to really be rooted at the village level. Notwithstanding the creation of new village-level development councils and the emphasis on local action, the power structure in the country still does not allow people to criticize those above them. From the villagers dealing with their chiefs, to the technical agents dealing with the departmental directors, and probably straight up through the highest central levels of authority, everyone seems to be afraid to tell their boss what needs to be done. The frequent remark that "everything is based on personal relations" is true. At all levels the personal risk incurred by displeasing some individual who might have the power to help or hurt far outweighs the professional obligation to try to ensure that tasks are well done. It is a change not only in this attitude, but in the reality which generates it, which would be needed for development to really come from the base.

To the extent that this development philosophy requires a change in power structures at the village level, supporting it goes beyond the scope of what is possible under ASDG II. As in the case of the arrondissement authority relations, village power structures are based on traditional systems, and not on rules. This makes it virtually impossible for an outside donor with relatively little understanding of the country or influence within the system to have any impact.

On the other hand, within the administration this attitude might be susceptible to AID influence, to the extent that it is a function of rules or procedures rather than traditional power relations. In particular, changes in some personnel policies might reduce the personal element in staffing policy, and so reduce the risk to the individual of speaking out. This will therefore be considered in the recommendations which follow.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASDG II INTERVENTION

In light of the problems discussed above, the recommendations for ASDG II intervention focus on issues which are--or could be--based more on rules than on personal relations, and on reforms which need not be complemented by massive overhaul of the local administration in order to be effective. We have identified two areas for direct intervention in the activities of the technical services; support for transportation and operating costs, and civil service reforms. These two areas were identified for intervention because they are the two where the needs are the most clear, and where it might be possible to meet them with relatively simple injections of funds and/or changes in explicit operating procedures.

A number of other possible interventions were not included essentially because the needs and their solutions are not clear enough to allow AID to confidently propose policy or administrative reforms that will work. For example, AID could recommend changes in the training of technical agents in order to try to change their attitudes towards the villagers. However without getting involved in the training programs themselves, there is no way to be sure that this would really be effective. Such training is only one of many factors determining how the agents and the villagers interact: the impact of AID's intervention could be lost if it were not made in the context of a much broader effort to encourage bottom-up development. Similarly, AID could look for ways to reduce the power which the SAPs hold over the technical services, and try to give the planning staff a stronger technical role. While this may be desirable, it is unlikely to be effective because the SAPs position is part of the much broader power and authority relations both in the arrondissements and in the national government. There is no clean way in which AID can intervene, without getting embroiled in political battles which go far beyond the scope of ASDG II.

The two areas of intervention which I recommend, therefore, are the ones in which the objectives and means to accomplish them seem the clearest and the simplest. Of the two areas proposed, the former, operating budget support, is simpler and much more likely to be implemented. However, the civil service reforms seem so desirable that it is worth proposing them even if there is little chance that the government will listen.

In the course of this study several other strategies which are less directly related to local institutions, but which seem potentially useful, have also been identified. These have been tagged as areas for additional investigation under ASDG II, and for further development if it proves warranted. These are discussed in section B.3 below.

B.1 Transportation and Operating Budget Support

The resource constraints on technical service operations offer a good opportunity for ASDG II to have an immediate impact on the effectiveness of their activities. Although meeting their operating costs will not resolve all of their problems by any means, it is a necessary precondition to any improvement in the services.

A program of operating budget support should have two components. The first, obviously, is the funds with which the budgets are supplemented. The second should be an investigation of how these funds are allocated to the arrondissements within each ministry affected, and the development of objective allocation functions which take into account the needs of each area.

Funds Transfer:

Supplementary resources could be made to any or all of the four services operating at the arrondissement level (agriculture, livestock, environment, and rural engineering). They could go only to transportation, identified as the most pressing need in most cases, or could be for general support to be allocated as each local service considered the most urgent. (31)

These choices will probably be made based on a trade-off between the amount of resources available and the extent of coverage desired. The ideal, clearly, would be to provide support to all four services. They are all involved with ASDG II objectives, and the arguments for supporting one over another are not obvious. They all very much need the resources.

The amounts of money involved depend, of course, on the level of support provided. Some rough calculations, set out in the table on the next page, indicate that in order to triple the number of trips made by each of the four technical services in all 25 arrondissements an annual subsidy of about \$500,000 would be required. Tripling the number of trips may still leave the services without enough gas for their routine activities. Support is also needed for vehicle car maintenance; the same level of supplement would cost AID about \$200,000 per year.

How the subsidy should be used, and thus the precise mechanism through which it is provided, is open to question. Probably the best strategy from the services' perspective would be to provide unrestricted support for their operating budgets,

31. Such subsidies would have to be accompanied by measures to ensure that the government did not take the opportunity to reduce its own contribution by the same amount.

Table 4-1: GASOLINE SUBSIDY ESTIMATES

	CFA	Dollars
Average quarterly gas allocation/service	125,000	\$431
Cost per liter (regular gas)	230	
Liters purchased per quarter	543	
Kilometers per liter	5	
Total Kilometrage	2717	
Annual gas allocation per service	500,000	\$1,724
Subsidy to triple kilometrage	1,000,000	\$3,448
Subsidy for 4 services/arrond.	4,000,000	\$13,793
Subsidy for all 35 arrondissements	140,000,000	\$482,759
TOTAL ANNUAL SUBSIDY TO TRIPLE KILOMETRAGE FOR FOUR SERVICES IN ALL ARRONDISSEMENTS:		\$482,759

which they could use for gas, car maintenance, office supplies, or technical materials. The funds would be funnelled through the treasury and controlled by the comptable d'etat, who would ensure that they were not used for anything not included in those four categories (as he does for government funds). This would allow the services to reallocate among the categories according to their own priorities. The livestock services in particular may wish to reallocate some of their resources to technical materials (medicines) which are less important for other services. Possibly AID might want to restrict reallocations out of the car repair category, however, lest the services deplete that item to fund more urgent needs, and then have no resources left when their vehicles break down in December.

The argument against unrestricted operating budget support is that if AID is unwilling to meet all of the services' operating needs (which is certainly the case), the impact of its resources may be diluted too much if they are not targeted at a single item. The estimates above are only for gas and repairs, and do not consider the needs for technical materials and office supplies. At this level of support, therefore, the impact might be greater if its use were limited to transportation.

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Another transportation problem of some importance is that the agents in the field have no vehicles. Although it would not fall under operating budget support, AID should consider providing them with motorcycles, since this expenditure would greatly increase their effectiveness. If we assume an average of ten agents per arrondissement without transport (five in agriculture, five in animal resources), thirty-five arrondissements, and a cost of \$3,000 for a modest all-terrain motorcycle, (32) this would cost \$1,050,000 plus administrative costs. It could be a very valuable investment.

Allocation of Resources Across Arrondissements:

The formulas for allocating operating budgets across arrondissements have been described by a number of people as arbitrary or unfair. If AID chooses to support operating costs through ASDG II, therefore, we would recommend that they also address the development of rational allocation formulas.

Several questions would have to be considered in thinking about such formulas. At present total budgets for gas and other resources are available at the ministerial level. In some ministries these are parcelled out directly to the arrondissements; in others they are divided up among the departments which they decide how much to give each arrondissement. One question would therefore be where the allocation decision should be made, or whether this should be up to each ministry (or direction within the ministry) to decide for itself. The formulas developed will differ according to this choice.

The second question will be the structure of the allocation formula and its independent variables. Probably the number of vehicles needed by the service should be decided first, based on the number of staff, the number of different sites to be visited, and the size of the arrondissement. The number of cars available should then become one of the independent variables in the formula for allocating gas and repair funds. Should the presence of donor projects providing transportation be an independent variable which reduces the amount the government allocates? Presumably not; those donors probably don't want their contributions to substitute for government efforts any more than AID wants its subsidies to be used in that way. The formulas will differ for the different services, since their needs will differ. They will also differ depending on whether they are used to allocate from national to arrondissement level, from national to departmental level, or from departmental to arrondissement

32. John Mitchell's estimate for Yamaha GT-125 bikes purchased in bulk in the USA.

level.

Once a formula and an allocation mechanism has been developed and agreed on--which will be both a technical and a political process--it must be made public. The only way to ensure that such a formula is used is to make sure everyone knows exactly how the calculations are done. In that way the services will be able to determine for themselves what they are entitled to, at least relative to their neighbors, and they will be able to ensure that they are receiving their fair share. A very direct approach, like printing the formulas on the form on which the services are informed of their awards will help keep the system open and honest.

Management Changes:

Various resource management changes might also be considered in determining how to support operating cost needs of the technical services. In particular, vehicle use and repair might be more efficiently handled if there were more formal cooperation among the services within a single arrondissement. In the current system, where each service receives separate budget allocations, the only cooperation comes in the form of taking joint trips when possible, and lending cars (without gas) to services which do not have their own. It is worth considering whether a car pool, or a car maintenance pool, could increase the total trips available to the arrondissement as a whole. Putting all the cars in a pool might be difficult, because whoever managed the pool would suddenly have control over everyone's ability to work. Putting maintenance funds in a pool, especially if they were also increased by enough that not every service would necessarily need all their money every year, might be easier. The car maintenance pool would become like a traditional mutual help group; everyone would contribute, and one service would use the pool for major repairs each year.

Implementation Plan:

In order to put the operating budget subsidies into place, I would recommend that AID decide on the total amount of subsidy to be provided each year, and then bring in a technical expert to work out how it should be put in place. This would include deciding how far to restrict use of the funds, whether to target all four services or only a subset of them, and whether to target all arrondissements or only a subset of them. It would also include investigating how these resources are managed at the local level, and whether a changes in management practices could lead to more efficient use. These decisions would have to be made through discussions with the services involved, and through an independent assessment of which approaches best meet ASDG II objectives. The expert would then work on the specifications of the allocation formula; someone with some operations research or

modelling experience might therefore be desirable. S/he would work out the details of how the subsidies were to be implemented, and how to ensure that the allocation formula would actually be followed.

I estimate that this would require at least two months of consultant time at the start of ASDG II.

B.2 CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS (33)

Personnel Assignments:

Several different problems might be addressed by changes in the civil service rules applying to assignment of technical service staff. These include the following:

- Excess mobility of public servants makes it difficult to maintain continuity in service activities.
- Lack of individual choice as to where people work means they are frequently uprooted and sent to new assignments without their consent.
- Lack of arrondissement input into the choice of its employees makes it difficult to manage their operations.

These three problems could be solved by a personnel system in which vacant posts were advertised, and qualified people who were interested could present their candidacy. The service with a post to fill would review the candidates and select the one whom they felt best met their needs. No one would be required to accept a post s/he didn't want, and no service would be assigned someone without having had a chance to review the candidates.

This would mean completely eliminating the current system of assignments made at the national level without the knowledge or consent of either candidates or employers. If the system could be made to work according to clearly stated rules, jobs were publicly posted in time for people to respond, and candidates were selected by the services for whom they were to work, it should significantly help to depersonalize the civil service. With personnel assignments based on known rules, civil servants

33. This discussion focuses on the needs for civil service reform as they appear from my analysis of local institutions. I assume that it will be complemented, and the details filled in, in Jonathan Smith's more detailed analysis of how personnel procedures work. That analysis should provide the discussion of specific practices and rules needed to determine exactly what changes will resolve the problems.

would longer have to be as concerned about displeasing people in positions of authority, and they should be freer to carry out their duties objectively.

Eliminating the arbitrary transfers of civil servants without their or their employers' accord would also help maintain continuity in the programs being implemented by each service. It should also decrease overall mobility, since positions would become vacant only because someone was promoted or left the service, and not because the ministry decided to shift the staff around to free up slots for specific reassignments.

This would be a radical change from the existing system. Its implementation would raise many questions which the current system does not pose. For example, at present the government can ensure that all positions are filled simply by designating people to fill them. The most desirable posts--those on paved roads, near the Nigerian border, with a lot of project funding--presumably go to those with the connections to get them, and the others go to those with no one to ensure them a better assignment. Under the proposed system, it could be hard to fill the undesirable posts. To ensure that undesirable arrondissements had a fair shot at the better qualified candidates, the government might have to offer post bonuses as an incentive to go to remote areas.

It might also be necessary to consider what happens to employees whom no one wants. In a system where a civil service salary was not guaranteed, they would simply be out of work. If they are guaranteed a post somewhere, however they could cause problems if no one was to be forced to take an employee they didn't want. A related question is whether in addition to giving the services hiring authority they would have to give them firing authority as well. This is possible--albeit difficult--in civil service systems where employment is not guaranteed. It would be considerably more complicated if everyone were guaranteed a post somewhere.

Promotions Based on Experience:

The Nigerian civil service determines the grade level of each employee on the basis of his or her training alone, without taking into account work experience. This has a variety of undesirable consequences. The new policy of putting more highly trained people in as service heads means that young people straight out of school with no field experience are put in charge of people much older and much more experienced. The lack of emphasis placed on experience in determining job assignments, promotions, or grades, is discouraging to those who have not had access to formal education. Since the system has no way to reward those without higher education, they have little incentive to perform well on the job.

Several modifications in the personnel system could address these problems. One option would be to change the rules for grade changes so that they could be given based on either years of schooling or on of experience plus performance evaluations. This would make it possible for experienced field workers to move up to positions of greater authority as service heads. However, if the service heads are really thought to need the additional schooling in order to handle the new tasks being delegated to the local level, this would not be an appropriate strategy.

A less radical and possibly more appropriate shift would be to change the rules for returning to school so that people with strong field experience would more easily be able to get the education which would allow them to move up. This would not necessarily change the general value assigned to experience, but it would allow the system to take advantage of knowledge gained in the field, and would improve the incentives of field workers.

If AID could not change government policy, it could simply establish its own program to identify skilled field workers and provide the schooling they need in order to move up in the Nigerian civil service. However, while this would benefit those individuals and would allow those with whom they work to learn more from their experience, it would not resolve any of the systemic problems, and therefore it is not recommended.

Implementation of Civil Service Reforms:

The changes proposed in this section go far beyond the scope of a modest program to subsidize the agricultural sector. There may be no reason whatsoever to think that the government would be willing to negotiate reforms of its entire civil service simply in order to receive the funds which ASDG II will provide. However, the existing policies cause enough problems at the local level that it is worth investigating whether they can be modified, perhaps on a trial basis for the two affected ministries only.

B.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

Private Sector Activity:

The interviews with the field services identified several activities which either they or the donors are undertaking which might be appropriate areas for private sector activity. These include the development of nurseries to meet the demand for seedlings for a number of purposes including projects, the Engagement de Maradi, and village planting activities. The environment services seem to be trying to make these nurseries

into a source of revenue, although with only partial success. Similarly some of the livestock services are selling salt licks, anti-parasite medicines, and other inputs to livestock production. A third example is the ranch in Fako (Dakoro arrondissement), whose revenues from livestock and dairy products apparently far exceed its operating expenses (excluding salaries, however).

The question arises, therefore, of whether these activities offer a viable opportunity for private entrepreneurship. If they are viable, such activities would both generate income for the entrepreneurs, and would provide income-generating inputs to local agricultural activities. ASDG II may want to undertake a study of these and other opportunities to assess whether they are viable, what the legal, institutional, or financial constraints may be on their implementation, and whether AID can usefully play a role in encouraging them.

Such a study might involve two to three months of work for an agricultural economist.

Using Available Funding as Leverage to Encourage Village Investments:

One service head mentioned that he was planning to use the technique of operation to induce villagers to invest their own resources in environmental protection. He did not say how he intended to do this. However, the fact that the idea came from a local technical service and not from an outsider suggests that it is worth investigating further. ASDG II funds could be used for a study to identify tactics by which these resources could be made to go farther by using them as incentives to local investment. If this proves to be viable, additional funding might go into encouraging the field services to adopt these new tactics.

Agricultural Development Strategies:

This report has discussed at some length the issue of rural development strategies being developed centrally and handed down to the services for implementation. It is not obvious how this should be changed in theory, nor it is clear how changes in this approach could be put into practice. ASDG II resources could be used to fund a study of agricultural policy development, to assess which issues or strategies should be set centrally and which would better be handled by regional or local levels of government. This would require the skills of someone who knows how to analyze both the technical and the political dimensions of agricultural strategy issues.

A related issue which should be considered in this study concerns the use of information from the local level in policy-making. The services report monthly, quarterly, and annually on their activities, but the information they provide apparently is not used in setting national strategies. The investigation of policy-making should therefore look at what information the national ministries actually need, and whether existing reporting requirements should be modified (or reduced) to make the information more usable.

This research could lead to several kinds of proposals. One might be for ASDG II to get further involved in policy analysis, particularly in encouraging the use of information in setting strategies for the future. Another could be to provide the organizational support and training which would be needed for the services to take a more active role in developing their own technical strategies. The initial study might require about three months of consulting time for one person, possibly some of it in the US doing general background work on agricultural policy. Alternately, the study could be shared by two people, one working the levels at which policy is set and the other looking at the use of information in policy formulation.

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ATTACHMENT I

Scope of Work, Institutional Analyst, Public Administration Specialist

I. Objective

The objective of this procurement is to obtain the services of two specialists (institutional analyst, public administration specialist) to assist USAID/Niger in the design of the Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (683-0257). The services of the institutional analyst are required for 6 work weeks in Niger, the public administration specialist for 8 work weeks in Niger. The consultants are needed on or about February 1, 1990. Six day workweek with no premium pay is authorized.

II. BackgroundA. Program Summary

The Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (ASDG II) is planned as a \$25 million, five year sectoral assistance program contributing to USAID's long-term developmental objectives of increasing agricultural production and individual incomes in rural Niger. The purpose of the program is to enhance the ability of individual rural inhabitants to manage and profit from resources under their control in a sustainable manner. ASDG II combines policy reform, local currency programming and project-type inputs aimed at 1) establishing the legal framework for natural resource management and 2) strengthening institutions which work directly with rural producers. The underlying concept is that the following conditions must prevail for Niger to be able to capitalize on gains from agricultural policy reforms, already undertaken or planned, to lead to sustainable increases in production and income. Rural citizens must have control over the land and resources which they traditionally exploit. They must have access to technologies and resources from service providers (governmental and private) which promote sustainable production. And they must profit from their labors (in the form of better standard of living, higher income from marketing or related employment).

The ASDG II program grows out of and furthers the efforts which the Government of Niger (GON) and USAID have made since 1984, under ASDG I, Niger Economic Policy Reform Program (NEPRP) and related interventions. There have been many improvements in Nigerian government policy and regional economic relationships in the last five years. Independent analyses by USAID and others have concluded that the economic policy framework in the agricultural sector is appropriate. Having put in place the policies that get prices right, the obvious question is what is the next step?

Even a cursory analysis of Niger would spotlight the centrality of preserving the natural resource base as a necessary condition to income growth in the rural economy. There was never any doubt that ASDG II would deal with natural resource issues. What was not clear initially but has become so as a result of the analytical work that has been done is the centrality of rural institutions in introducing the mechanisms of income growth into the rural economy. The weakness or absence of these institutions diminishes the impact of sectoral policy reforms. Thus the Mission's answer to the question "What

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do you do after you get prices right?" is that you must deal with nitty-gritty institutional issues, none of which by itself has the policy reform panache of exchange rate devaluation or marketing board elimination, but which, taken collectively, transform the economic rights acquired by policy reform into real opportunities for improvements in individual standards of living in the rural economy.

B. Proposed Approach to ASDG II

The focus of ASDG II is on establishing conditions which will allow individual rural citizens to manage and profit from the resources they control in a sustainable fashion. To do so, the program emphasizes the local framework for NRM investment, and the capacity of rural service organizations, public and private, to facilitate increases in rural production and income. ASDG II's focus throughout design and implementation will be on individuals. The program will try to strengthen institutions because they can improve rural standards of living through direct contact with rural people. ASDG II will achieve its objective if stronger rural institutions contribute to growth and development in rural Niger.

III. Statement of Work

A. Summary

The analysts will assist USAID/Niger and the Government of Niger (GON) to define the scope and components of the ASDG II. The analysts will work with USAID and the GON personnel who will elaborate plans for each element of the grant: policy reform, technical assistance, training, studies, local currency programming. The analysts will have prime responsibility for undertaking institutional analyses in support of the design.

The analysts may be called on to assist USAID in policy dialogue with the GON during the design process on issues relating to rural development institutions, public and private. The analysts will each review and comment on the feasibility of USAID and GON proposals for the program concept and elements relating to his or her field of expertise. The analysts will identify limitations and assess the feasibility of implementing the chosen reforms, and suggest benchmarks for reforms to be implemented within the framework of the grant as appropriate.

The analysts will be responsible for all aspects of analysis dealing with rural development ministries and will assist other members of the PAAD team in preparing related analyses (social analyses, impact assessment, etc.) in accordance with the AID/Washington (Bureau for Africa) current guidance on technical analysis for sectoral assistance programs.

B. Specific Analyses

(1) Public Administration Expert

One consultant is requested to analyze the technical operations of the ministries dealing with agriculture and livestock (MA/L), water resources and environment (MI/E) and other agencies as appropriate, focusing on the way in which resources are allocated and on the relations between national ministry

personnel (in Niamey) and cadres at the department and arrondissement levels. This person will work primarily (but not exclusively) at the central ministry level.

This consultancy requires a person with knowledge of public budgeting procedures, program management, personnel systems, and the operation of rural development ministries.

The kinds of information needed for ASDG II design include but are not limited to:

- description of budgeting, program management, personnel systems, and financial controls in the two rural development ministries.
- description of field staff responsibilities as identified in Niamey, as well as a priority ranking of these responsibilities.
- description of field staff responsibilities and behavior as observed at arrondissement level.
- sources and uses of, and accountability for, resources at the local level (financial and human).

Specific questions to be answered:

- can field agents obtain adequate funds from ministry sources to support their operations? If not, what is the process by which resources and workloads are reconciled?
- how do the ministries allocate budget resources? what is the central/field split? In the field, how are funds allocated over the various ministry responsibilities?

In addition, it is expected that the consultant will identify reasons for any problems of performance of the local service deliverers by analyzing such questions as:

- are personnel management policies and practices conducive to carrying out the ministries' field responsibilities?

The consultant will provide a report with recommendations on ways to improve the efficiency of the rural development ministries' field staffs (administrative reform, training, budget resources, etc.). The technical assistance requirements, resource costs and anticipated impact of the reforms will be described.

(2) Institutional and Organizational Expert

A second consultant will work primarily at the level of the arrondissement and provide information on horizontal relations among the field staff of the rural development ministries and the local government officials (sous-prefet).

The consultant for this aspect of the program should be knowledgeable in the areas of local administration, horizontal integration of vertical organizations, and rural development.

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The objective of this consultancy is to obtain information on the workings of the various cadres at the local level in order to understand the constraints on their activities, their incentives, and their relations to higher levels of authority (department and national). The consultancy will explain the functioning of the rural development ministries in the larger context of department and arrondissement administrative structures.

The kinds of information required include, but are not limited to:

- description of arrondissement staff: composition, function, authority-responsibility vis-a-vis Department and Niamey.
- role of the sous-prefet vis-a-vis MAL/MIE field staffs.
- role of the department and arrondissement-level interministerial committees (COTEDEP, COTEAR) in rural development.
- assess feasibility of USAID support limited to MAL/MIE at the arrondissement level.
- recommendations for improving MAL/MIE effectiveness as components of COTEAR and COTEDEP.

Some questions to answer include the following:

- how are responsibilities and tasks distributed among the various levels of field staff?
- how is departmental and arrondissement level authority over field staff operations exercised? are there conflicting responsibilities between Ministries and local administration?

The consultant will provide a report with recommendations as to specific reforms/interventions to be included in ASDG II.

(3) Joint duties: Analyze program feasibility and impact

The consultants will be required to prepare an institutional capability assessment for the PAAD. This analysis will include:

- Description of institutions which will implement the reforms (anticipated to be MAL, MIE and the Ministry of Plan).
- Assessment of institutions' capacity to carry out particular tasks required by the grant program, including:
 - Policy reform
 - Policy analysis, reporting, monitoring
 - Identification and management of activities and local currency funds.

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The analysts will also contribute to impact assessment sections of the PAAD, taking responsibility for assessment of the impact of institutional reforms on beneficiaries and on the agricultural sector.

The analysts will also identify any alternative low cost approaches to achievement of program objectives for institutional reform (answering the question, is this the best approach?).

The analysts will be assisted by other members of the design team in completing these assessments, and will be able to refer to a variety of existing assessments of the institutions in question.

C. Reports

The analysts shall each prepare a report, elements of which can be incorporated into the PAAD body or used as an annex. The reports shall be based on analyses detailed above, and shall also include commentary on the following, as appropriate:

Technical assistance, studies and training

- Recommendations for technical assistance (skills mix, duration, beneficiary agencies, suggested scopes of work);
- Recommendations for studies (suggested terms of reference, timing, personnel and budget requirements);
- Recommendations for in-country and other training (seminars, colloquia, study tours, etc.).

Recommendations for reform measures related to rural development

- Detailed definition of the policy goals;
- How achievement of goals will be measured (baseline data for measurement of goals must be set forth).

Recommendations for program operations

- Recommendations on administrative procedures to be followed in managing the grant.
- An illustrative list of activities USAID/Niger can support with local currency that will result in better performance in implementing the reforms related to rural development institutions.

IV. Qualifications

A. Public Administration Expert

The contractor should have an advanced degree in a field such as political science, government, business, public administration. The individual must have at least 5 years of professional experience in the analysis of public administrative operations, including budgeting and program management.

Including at least two years in the Third World. Familiarity with civil service systems of ex-French colonies, is required, with Sahel experience preferred. French at the FSI 3/3 level is a minimum requirement and fluency must be attested to by the contracting firm.

D. Institutional Analyst

The contractor should have an advanced degree in a field such as public administration, political science, government, planning, economics, anthropology with specialization in institutional analysis or organizational behavior. Familiarity with agricultural development agencies is required. He/she must have at least 5 years of professional experience in the analysis of institutional development issues as pertains to the Third World. Familiarity with civil service systems of ex-French colonies is required, with Sahel experience preferred.

French at FSI 3/3 is a minimum requirement and fluency must be attested to by the contracting firm.

V. Schedule

The period of service in Niger is to start on February 1, 1990. The Institutional specialist is required for 6 work weeks and the public administration specialist for 8 work weeks.

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List of Individuals Interviewed

Dosso Prefecture:

Mr. Housseini Mahamane Rabiou, Secretary-General
Mr. Aboubacar Ma'azou, Assistant to the Deputy Secretary-General
Mr. Adamou Guisso, Directeur Adjoint, Direction Departementale de
la Production Agricole
Conseiller Economique

Tahoua Prefecture:

Mr. Mazawage, Conseiller Economique
Mr. Marah Mamadou, Secretaire-General
Mr. Sanoussi Djigo, Chef du Service des Micro-Realisations
Mr. Idrissa Samna, Secretaire General Adjoint
Mr. Naroua Djibo, Directeur Departemental de l'Agriculture
Mr. Assoumane Maizoumbou, Chef, Service Departemental de Faune,
Peche et Pisciculture
Mr. Awal Issa, Chef, Service de la Production Animale
Mr. Lawal Habou, Directeur Departemental Adjoint de l'Hydraulique

Maradi Prefecture:

Mr. Djibril Mamadou N'Baye, Adjoint au Chef de Service du Genie
Rural
Mr. Abba Malam Kafougou, Secretary-General
Mr. Djika, Payeur, Paierie de Maradi
Mr. Yahya Yandaka, Secretaire Administratif
Dr. Seyni Aboubacar, Directeur Departemental des Ressources
Animales
Mr. Amadou Boukatr, Conseiller Economique
Mr. Mounkaila Harouna, Chef de Personnel
Mr. Nomaso Mamane, Chef, Service de la Statistique, DDA
Mr. Harouna Issa, Directeur, Union Regionale des Cooperatives

Tahoua Arrondissement:

Mr. Aboubacar Albade, Sous-Prefet
Mr. Amani Salhatou, Adjoint au Sous-Prefet
Mr. Adamou Roro, Secretaire de l'Arrondissement
Mr. Abdulwahab Salifou, Adjoint au Chef, Service d'Arrondissement
du Plan
Mr. Chaibou Yacouba, Responsable de la Division Statistique, SAP
Mr. Mounkaila Soumeila, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement des
Ressources Animales

Keita_Arrondissement:

Mr. Idi Daouda, Sous-Prefet
Mr. Issaka Boubacar, Directeur National du Projet Keita
Mr. Renato Carucci, Conseiller Technique Principal du Projet Keita
Mr. Hachimou Sidibe, Directeur Technique du Projet Keita and Chef d'Arrondissement Agricole
Mr. Houssein Sarkinrafi, Chef, Division Suivi et Evaluation, Service d'Arrondissement du Plan
Mr. Sina Soumaila, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement des Ressources Animales

Birni_N'Konni_Arrondissement:

Mr. Ari, Adjoint au Sous-Prefet
Mr. Maino Zanguina, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Plan
Mr. Souleymane Mahamoudou, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Agriculture
Mr. Moutari Abdou, Directeur, Union Sous-Regionale des Cooperatives
Mr. Sanda Ataraka, Chef, Service de la Genie Rurale
Mr. Al Ousseini Nahantchi, Division Faune, Peche et Pisciculture, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Environnement

Birni_N'Gaoure_Arrondissement:

Mr. Hamidou El-Koudize, Secretaire de l'Arrondissement
Mr. Moustapha Ayouba, Adjoint au chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Plan
Mr. Ibrahim Souley, Adjoint au chef, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Agriculture
Mr. Harouna Mamoudou, Adjoint au chef, Service d'Arrondissement des Ressources Animales
Mr. Abdourahmane Anamadou, Directeur, USRC
Chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Genie Rural
Service d'Arrondissement de l'Environnement
Mr. Ide Bana, Directeur du Projet d'Aménagement de Terroirs, Dallol Bosso Sud
Mr. Emile N'DEJURU, Directeur de projet Dallol Bosso Nord
Mr. Perre, Responsable de l'Organisation Paysanne

Dakoro_Arrondissement:

Mr. Abdoulahi Mohamed, Sous-Prefet
Mr. Ekane Chimier, Secretaire d'Arrondissement
Mr. Issa Talba, Adjoint au Chef, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Agriculture

Mr. Issaka Assoumane, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Genie Rural
Mr. Marichatou Amadou, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Environnement
Dr. Boube Magagi Ibrahim, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement des Ressources Animales
Mr. Abdou Boukau, Adjoint au Chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Plan
Mr. Abdou Nagaissa, Comptable d'Etat
Dr. Aboubakar Djibrillou, Chef du Centre de Multiplication du Betail de Fako
Mr. Alhousseini Hassane, CLUSA Agent, Kornaka

Madarounfa Arrondissement:

Mr. Abdoulaye Sabo, Adjoint au Sous-Prefet
Mr. Mahamadou Issaka, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement des Ressources Animales
Mr. Issaka Djillou, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Agriculture
Mr. Djibril Tinni, Chef, Service d'Arrondissement du Plan
Mr. Ide Tagou, Secretaire d'Arrondissement
Mr. Moussa Dan-Moussa, Chef de Personnel
Mr. Abouhamid Aboubacar, Adjoint au Chef, Service d'Arrondissement de l'Environnement
Mr. Maibouge Tanko, CLUSA Agent, Baban Rafi
Mr. Abdoukarim Soumailo, CLUSA Agent, Maigamji

Ministry of Interior:

Mr. Ali Amani, Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Juridiques
Mr. Mamane Sani Brema, Directeur de l'Administration Territoriale
Mr. Hamza Maliki, Chef, Bureau des Finances

Ministry of Agriculture:

Dr. Ma'azou, Secretary-General
Mr. Zongoma Abdourahmane, Directeur du Personnel et de la Formation
Mr. Keita, Affaires Financieres, Ressources Animales
Mr. Frederick Sowers, Cellule PIGRN (CRED, University of Michigan)
Mr. Hassan Amadou, Cellule PIGRN

Ministry of Administrative Reform:

Mr. Mamane Boukari, Minister
Mr. Issoufou Mainassara, Secretary-General

Ministry of Finance:

Mr. Gati Seybou, Director of the Budget

Ministry of Plan:

Mr. Abdoulaye Harouna, Directeur de l'Analyse Economique et de la Prevision

Projects:

Ms. Marily Knieremen, Director, Lutheran World Relief
Mr. Jon Naugle, Lutheran World Relief
Ms. Lisa Matt, Director, CLUSA Project
Mr. Johannes Krupp, GTZ Community Development Project, Tahoua
Mr. Lawali, Directeur, FORPROSA
Mr. Ibrahim Boukary Abdou, Directeur, PPODR (Programme de Petites Operations de Developpement Rural)
Mr. Perron, Conseiller Technique, PPODR
Mr. Dieter Robert, GTZ

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SOCIAL SOUNDNESS ANALYSIS
FOR
THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT GRANT II

JUNE 1990
DOC:1327b

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1. Executive Summary

2. Introduction

The USAID Mission in Niger is currently designing and negotiating the second phase of the Agriculture Sector Development Grant (ASDG II). The program aims at affecting the policy conditions for improving sustainable rural development. The program therefore focuses on the Niger government services specialized in rural development, particularly agriculture and natural resources.

The following "Social Soundness Analysis" attempts to identify some of the the constraints and opportunities for rural development. The fieldwork and analysis examine the performance of officers from the technical services in the field, in case studies of two Arrondissements. The general context for rural development is examined, as well as the current perspectives of local leadership and members of rural communities (see Terms of Reference in Appendix 2).

The conclusions offers a general review of the systemic weaknesses of the technical services in the field, particularly agricultural. The USAID-financed program could contribute significantly to key improvements in these services.

3. Methodology

The social scientist conducted research using a "quick and dirty" approach to fieldwork (for information on such techniques, see Cernea 1987:Chapter 2). In this case, the methodology aimed at developing informed impressions of constraints and opportunities affecting rural Nigerien communities, based on rapid appraisals in the field of topics pertinent to the project design for the USAID Agriculture Sector Development Grant II (see Appendix 2: Terms of Reference).

Fieldwork focused on open-ended interviewing of members of the government technical services, the regional members of the territorial administration, "traditional" (local) authorities, and members of the rural communities. An interview guide furnished the structure and content for discussions, though other, related topics were readily added (see Appendix 1). Some quantitative information was also available through the Chefs de Service for each branch of a technical service (such as the number and categories of personnel and the volume of logistical support) and the Plan office (information on regional demography and administrative units). There is also an abundant literature on Nigerien rural development (see bibliography).

Fieldwork concentrated on two Arrondissements in western Niger - Say and Téra - as offering the range of problems confronting efforts at rural development. The regions are representative of Nigerien ecological and human diversity. The ecology of the two, contiguous Arrondissements ranges from heavier rainfall and vegetation in Say, including a virtual micro-environment in the national park ("Parc W"), to the sparse rainfall and dunes of the northern border of Téra. Average annual precipitation ranges from 800 to 260 millimeters running over approximately 600 kilometers from north to south (Hagen, Brown and Sowers 1986:29). Human diversity is reflected in the

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ethnolinguistic composition of the region, including Fulani, Gourmantché, Songhay-Zarma and Tuareg populations, as well as in the economy, including both irrigated and rainfed agriculture as well as pastoralism. The Arrondissements benefit from a variety of "classic" and "project" forms of technical assistance to rural development. Fieldwork covered two weeks in April and May 1990, with a slightly longer period devoted to Téra.

Interviews in each Arrondissement included officers from technical services intervening in rural development (in this case, agriculture, environment, Génie Rural, hydrology, livestock and Plan), members of the territorial administration (such as the Sous-Préfet or the Chef de Poste Administratif), expatriate technical assistance, representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations, "traditional" authorities (such as the chefs de canton, the village chiefs, and their counselors), and members of the rural communities (the final beneficiaries of rural development efforts).

The social scientist also accompanied one of the the institutional analysts for the ASDG II design, Dr. Joy Hecht, and the USAID/Niger (PDO) Program Development Specialist, Mr. Aboubacar Souleymane, during one week of fieldwork in the Tahoua Department, in the Arrondissements of Birni N'Konni, Keita and Tahoua. There were also visits to the governmental services at the departmental level in Dosso and in one of the Arrondissements, Boboye. Although contacts with the local populations were quite limited, the interviews with members of the technical services furnished useful comparative information.

Experience accumulated in Niger since 1984, especially long-term association with members of the environmental services as a "socio-economist" on a fisheries project and in other capacities, also serve as a background for the general research.

4. General, introductory observations

4.1. Historical relationships of government authority and services to rural populations

Relations between rural populations and both the colonial and independence national governments have been authoritarian. These populations have had no voice in local, regional and national government. The central government has offered technical services for rural development based on national priorities with little reference to local aspiration, preferences or reactions. The model of government has been extremely centralized, especially since independence, with limited power and authority outside of the capital. The members of the technical services have had a minor, and certainly not a final, voice in crucial policy decisions since the start of the military government in 1974. "Traditional" authority has in effect been incorporated into the government administration. Local associations do not exist outside of government control, due to tacit national policy emanating from the highest levels of decision-making.

The French colonial administration concentrated on establishing a coherent territorial organization with basic infrastructure, personnel and materials. Although the first colonial military expeditions crossed the (future) country at the turn of the century, the territory was not completely subjugated until

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the 1920s and early 1930s (see Fuglestad 1983; Kimba 1981; Rothiot 1989). The colonial administration furnished some services for Nigerien populations - such as public health facilities - and looked to rural development efforts - such as agricultural extension for peanut production and livestock vaccination - as means of raising local income to support the colonial government. The leadership of rural communities were also obliged to furnish labor for public works projects (corvées) - such as road and building construction - designed and supervised by the colonial civil service. The imposition of a head tax also furnished an "incentive" to rural populations to raise cash income through sale of rural production (crops and livestock), wage labor for the colonial administration, and labor migration to the coast. Relations between colonial administrators with their African assistants and the general Nigerien population were authoritarian and coercive.

The independence government did not fundamentally alter the relationship between the national administration and the rural milieu. The central government remained in firm control of local authorities and rural associations. Highest priority was still assigned to activities generating income for the state, such as cash cropping for export and extractive industries (mining of uranium). Although urbanization in Niger has not been as dramatic as in other West African countries, the urban centers have benefited from investments in infrastructure and services delivery disproportional to relative population (currently only about 20%). Systems for raising revenues from rural populations, including the head tax, remained in force.

The alienation of the national administration, including the technical services, from the rural populations remained apparent after independence. The agricultural services still concentrated on export crops, or offered "technical packages" to improve general agricultural production based on models poorly adapted to local conditions. For example, the evident failure by the early 1980s of the ambitious departmental rural development projects is symptomatic of the results of this approach. Officers of the environmental service (Eaux et Forêts) guarded forests and other natural resources against the rural populations. "Extension" was a term scarcely applicable to these activities, which the officers themselves did not see as part of their role. Representatives of technical services did not consult, and did not really "collaborate," with local communities. Community "participation" in development was based on obligation or "incentive" through payment in cash or kind (such as "food for work").

4.2. The relationship between "national" and "traditional" authorities

Previous to the French conquest, Niger hosted a diverse spectrum of forms of political organization. The size and complexity of these organizations varied significantly. In some regions, such as the Zarmaganda currently in the Ouallam Arrondissement, every village was autonomous with an leadership. Villagers were closely related by descent and marriage. Community members could easily choose to establish a new settlement - and thus an autonomous village - motivated by internal conflicts, the search for fertile new lands, or other reasons. In other cases, as many as a few dozen villages would be under an overarching leadership, as in the legacy of miniature states in the Téra region (Dargol, Kokoro) left by the fragmentation of the Songhay empire

after the Moroccan conquest in the late 16th Century. Finally, some of the Hausa kingdoms (emirates) and Tuareg confederations (ettebel) governed large territories including many communities. The Hausa city-states had elaborate, royal courts and territorial administrations with specific posts for a variety of tasks (tax collection, city management, dispute resolution, etc.).

The French military and administration subjugated and subsequently radically transformed indigeous forms of social and political organization. The colonial civil servants wanted to create a uniform, hierarchical system of territorial administration. Niger was incorporated into regional administration for French West Africa governed out of Dakar, with headquarters for Niger originally in Zinder and later moved to Niamey. The colony was divided into regional and sub-regional units (Départements and Arrondissements), which has remained the case since independence (though the number and size of these units has changed). The colonial administration then decided to incorporate the "traditional" leadership into the system at the sub-Arrondissement and local levels.

Nigerien communities lost their autonomy, of course, but the colonial government also significantly changed these organizations to mould them into the overarching administration. As necessary, the administration changed the size of units, the leadership, the powers of local authorities, and the rights and duties of community members. In general, there was a basic distinction made in the restructuring of "sedentary" and "pastoral" groups. Sedentary, and thus almost exclusively agricultural, populations were attached to a "village" (village) with a "village chief" (chef de village). Large agglomerations could have several neighborhoods (quartiers), each with a separate, autonomous chief with the same attributions as a village chief. Villages were then grouped into a larger administrative unit - the canton - with a chief (chef de canton) with authority over all of the village chiefs and their subjects in his jurisdiction. The territory, population and number of villages in a canton could vary greatly. Pastoral populations - essentially the Fulani and the Tuareg groups - were divided into tribus, which were then grouped into a groupement (pastorale). Membership to these units had no territorial association, as befits "nomadic" pastoral peoples, though the chief of the overarching administrative unit (the chef de groupement) often had a couple of permanent, seasonal residences. The lowest level of the territorial administration - the Arrondissement - would often include several cantons and groupements. There are, however, four examples of "traditional" authorities with spheres of influence greater than the level of a canton which have in effect become regional counterparts to the departmental territorial administrations: the Emirates of Maradi and Zinder, the Sultan of Agadez, and the Zarmakoye of Dosso.

Changes in local political organization were often dramatic. For instance, the individual villages and smaller political groupings were agglomerated into cantons, on occasion regardless of pre-existing ties or conflicts. The large Tuareg confederations troublesome to the French military were broken into smaller units, and a more malleable leadership appointed. The structure of the leadership of the Hausa city-states remained, though the royal courts were stripped of much power. In some cases, local groups or individuals benefited handsomely from French patronage for services rendered. The Zarmakoye family in Dosso became powerful in the course of the colonization and subsequent pacification of western Niger through localized military campaigns and political advice to the new French administrators (Fuglestad 1983; Rothiot 1989).

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These historical relations between the "national" and "traditional" authorities have important implications for local legitimacy, (real) authority and collaboration with community members. The independence government has followed the previous model of frequent, important intervention in local affairs. The national administration (the Ministère de l'Intérieur through the territorial administration and the Gendarmerie Nationale) make the final on the nomination of new chiefs, and government decrees regulate and change their powers, jurisdictions and responsibilities. Such interference has led to bitter disputes within communities and with the national government, including very recent examples in several regions of Niger.

Local perceptions of the legitimacy and importance of the "traditional" authorities thus vary enormously. In many cases, the local leadership has been viewed as an auxiliary of the colonial and national governments imposed without a local constituency. These leaders are viewed as tax collectors, policemen and minions of the state. As a contrast, the Emir of Maradi has maintained significant authority and general legitimacy in his region.

These factors have significant implications for development efforts involving local "consensus," "collaboration" and "participation" (see the section below of the National Development Society). The combination of extensive social stratification and differentiation since the pre-colonial period with the deligitimization of traditional authority does not create conditions favorable to spontaneous local participation in rural development. Precedents for such cooperation, such as rotational labor groups in agriculture, have been destroyed or corrupted when incorporated into the centrally imposed organizations. Development efforts are instead viewed as coercive and alien.

4.3. "Mass participation" in Nigerien politics and rural development

The ebb and flow of government rhetoric about "Mass participation" in public life in general and rural development in particular has long been a dominant theme in Nigerien politics. In effect, the ritual invocation of the desires and particularities of the Nigerien masses have simply served as a symbolic. The rural population has had neither a voice nor a means of genuine, independent expression of opinion in the range of mass organizations established by the state.

The general mobilization of the population by the "modern" and "traditional" leadership has been continuous since the period immediately preceding independence. The political parties founded in the 1950s reflected some of the regional and ethnic diversity of the new nation, with a leadership issue of the regional colonial system of education (for instance, the Ecole Normale in Senegal that trained the future politicians and heads of state of several countries including Niger). However, within a few years of independence the head of state suppressed the other parties, partially as a response to claims of "insecurity" due to opposition from a political party with a strong base in eastern Niger (the "SAWABA" party, with a particularly large following in Zinder). Some civil disturbances and the perceived threat of an embryonic rebellion or civil war sealed the fate of political expression outside of the single "legal" party (see Fuglestad 1983). These problems of

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"insecurity" originating in basic regional, ethnic and other inequities within the society have become structural characteristics of the government and thus have remained a recurrent theme - under slightly differing glosses - since independence.

In order to increase agricultural production, the leadership decided to organize the rural population into "cooperative" groups. In order to popularize the movement and stimulate rural development, the government initiated a communication and extension service called animation. The members of the technical services worked in conjunction with specialists (animateurs) in conducting public meetings and fostering enthusiastic collaboration with the priorities of the national development program. However, the resulting rural associations were not expressions of local, spontaneous congregations of individuals with common interests and goals. Indeed, the crises in the management of the national umbrella organization for the "cooperative movement" (the Union Nigerienne de Credit et de Cooperation - UNCC), coupled with growing unease of the leadership with the potential for rural unrest, led to a stifling of the movement in the late 1960s.

After the change in regime with the military coup of 1974, the new leadership fabricated a basis for mass legitimacy by creating association loosely based on inspiration from a regional model - the Samaria. The term is derived from "youth" in Hausa (samari). The concept is based on the traditional mobilization of the members of junior age-sets in some Hausa regions to execute public works for the village community. The village chief delegated a member of the community to direct the works (the serkin samaria) (Decalo 1979). The government initially used the Samaria for public works such as school construction, and then extended the organization into a national - and all inclusive - network organizing social and cultural affairs as well as communal labor for public works ordained by local authorities.

The other "mass" organizations have also been created, organized and directed with the (in) direct intervention of the successive governments. For instance, the national women's association (the Association des Femmes du Niger) and the national Islamic association (Association Islamique du Niger) act as quasi-governmental organizations within their spheres of influence. Only the organized labor movement (the Union des Syndicats de Travailleurs du Niger - USTN) has occasionally contested government initiatives, which is certainly why the military regime quickly banned the ancestor to the current organization (the Union des Travailleurs du Niger - UNTN) after taking power.

The military regime temporarily relaxed the political atmosphere of the former government by allowing the return of major political opponents...on condition of no dissent with the new leadership. Subsequent concern with "insecurity" narrowed the scope of expression outside of official rhetoric within a couple of years. A military council (the "Conseil Militaire supreme") then led a "transitional" government, for 15 years.

The second head of state eventually started the "National Development Society" (Societe Nationale de Developpement - SND) as his own umbrella organization for expressing the specificities of Nigerien society. The national leadership - through the official press - heralded the organization as the authentic representative of the views of all Nigeriens. The SND theoretically offers an organization parallel to the government for transmitting the desires of the general population to the national leadership.

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The SND has developed into a structure incorporating all kinds of associations from the community ("Village") and professional ("Groupement socio-professionnel") to the national levels. The SND was to furnish the basis for a new society, with a new constitution and thus a "Second Republic." However, the head of the military council did not survive to see the dawn of the new age, as he died in November 1987.

The SND is portrayed, and is in fact, a pyramid with a "supreme council" (the Conseil Supérieur d'Orientation Nationale) and the President at the top. There is also a National Assembly and, in effect, a single party system (the "Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement") with a governing executive committee (the "Bureau Exécutif National"). The entire structure has been legitimized through a series of strictly controlled elections for charts of candidates and the new constitution. The government offered no alternative to the candidates carefully selected by the local, regional and national authorities. Although communication is theoretically free and reciprocal between the top and the bottom of the society, the "New" Government is still in practice patriarchal, at best.

There have been modest signs that the government will allow a greater range of autonomy and organizations in rural areas. There has been much official discussion of the merits of "decentralization" and small-scale projects ("micro-realizations") in the latter half of the decade. Application of these concepts compliments a "new" approach to rural populations, based on dialogue and cooperation ("consultation, concertation et participation" or "consultation, acting in concert and participation"). In theory, the technical services and the territorial administration would combine at the local level to be more responsive to general population, and thus stimulate rural development.

The government services have also started reattributing some authority and responsibility to local populations. Rural cooperatives and village associations now have rights in certain cases to the general usufruct in forest areas (Arrêté No 048/MAG/EL/CNCR of 16 May 1990), participate in natural forest management programs and have greater rights to trees as part of agroforestry efforts. These changes are dramatic when compared to previous applications of law to these areas as public domains, and thus under the exclusive control of forestry officers as representatives of the state.

The government is also taking a more encouraging attitude towards the foundation and operation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). After a reduction in the number of NGOs operating in Niger in the course of the 1980s, in spite of the severe drought of 1984, the number has started to increase again over the last two years. The Ministry of Plan is responsible for NGOs, and recently sponsored a conference on the nature and needs of such organizations. Although government initiative to hold such a forum can be seen as positive, the modest number of NGOs in Niger as compared to other West African states, and the pervasive reticence of officials about any activity outside of their control, call for cautious optimism. The government has certainly not agreed - at least not yet - that NGOs can work with the general Nigerien population without careful monitoring and even direction (the current limits to such activities are illustrated by an example in Section 5.3.2.).

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The continuity in leadership between the "transitional" military regime and the Second Republic has meant stability, but also perpetuation of the same problems which have plagued the governments since independence. The lack of a new vision, and of a redistribution of power and privilege with a wider range of expression accepted by the state, does not augur well. If "insecurity" becomes a major focus of the leadership, "rural development" based on local initiative, association and participation could be confounded once again with potential threats to stability. The leadership has not had an encouraging record of being able to distinguish the conditions requisite for maintaining authority from those for stimulating rural development (see, for instance, Charlick 1989).

5. The Téra Example

5.1. Administrative Organization

The Téra Arrondissement is part of the Tillabéry Department, covering 20,220 km² with a total population of 302,249 inhabitants distributed between 198 villages, 82 tribus (pastorales) and the Commune of Téra (figures here and below based on information from the regional plan office in Téra, from the 1988 Census and the Arrondissement administrative census). The Arrondissement is situated to the west (on the right bank) of the Niger River, northwest of Niamey. Burkina Faso and Mali border the Arrondissement to the west and north respectively (see map).

The Arrondissement has two Poste Administratifs, with headquarters at Bankilaré and Gothèye. The town of Téra, with six districts and two neighboring villages, also constitutes a commune directed by a Maire, with a population of 13,256 inhabitants. There are five Cantons: Dargol, Diagourou, Gorouol, Kokoro and Téra; and three Groupements (Pastorales): Gaoubé Peulh, Tuareg Dunfrafrakh and Tuareg Tingragadesh. The populations and administrative sub-units of these groups are as follows:

The Cantons (unless noted otherwise, the canton names are also the names of the villages serving as the chief's residence and administrative headquarters):

- Dargol - 122,463 inhabitants in 68 villages
- Diagourou - 28,993 inhabitants in 38 villages
- Gorouol - 22,713 inhabitants in 27 villages
(canton seat in the village of Yatakala)
- Kokoro - 46,535 inhabitants in 40 villages
- Téra - 33,966 inhabitants in 25 villages

The Groupements:

- Gaoubé Peulh - 3,911 members in 6 tribus
(Lamiido's residence in Pélé Kolé)

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Tuareg Dunfrafrakh - 5,747 members in 5 tribus
(Tambari's residence in Teguey)

Tuareg Tingragadesh - 38,291 members in 71 tribus
(Tambari's residence in Bankilaré)

NB: The headquarters of the two Tuareg Groupements are in the Gorouol Canton;
the headquarters of the Peulh Groupement in the Téra Canton

5.2. The technical services

There are officers from Agriculture (including Genie Rurale), Environment, Literacy, Livestock and Plan in the Arrondissement. There are several projects in the region affecting the services in differing degrees: 1) a UNICEF-financed project for village development and dry-season gardening (ostensibly to improve community health); 2) a German-financed agro-sylvo-pastoral project (project Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral - PASP); 3) an IFAD-financed small-scale irrigation project; and 4) a Netherlands-financed with SNV technical assistance project for reforestation (Project Reboisement). The major services can be broken down as follows:

5.2.1. Agriculture

Personnel: in Tera - a Chef de Service, his assistant (Adjoint au Chef), a secretary, two laborers (main oeuvres), and two drivers (one PASP employed). A German "Technical assistant" is posted to Tera for the PASP.

5 District Officers - posted in Bankilaré, Dargol, Gothèye, Méhanna and Téra. Two posts correspond to canton territories: Bankilaré (Gorouol) and Méhanna (Kokoro).

The Dargol Canton was divided into two sections due to size - Dargol and Gothèye.

Finally, Téra covers the Diagourou and Téra Cantons (see Map).

5 Aide Encadreurs hired as part of project activities and assigned to a site responsible for activities in one or more villages.

They are assigned by project as follows:

- 2 Aide Encadreurs for the UNICEF Project in Taka and Zaney
- 2 Aide Encadreurs for the PASP Project in Tchibari and Téra Barrage
- 1 Aide Encadreur for the IFAD Project in Gothèye.

The district officers are responsible for the following number of villages:

Bankilaré	27	Méhanna	40
Dargol	40	Téra	65 + 6 districts in Téra town
Gothèye	28		

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The size of these districts vary from 6,250 km² for Bankilaré to 2,000 km² for Gothéye.

The Aide Encadreurs cover much smaller areas. For instance, the Aide Encadreurs for the UNICEF Project are basically responsible for their own villages only. The Aide Encadreur in Taka has also done some work in neighboring Bouppon and Diagourou, while the one in Tchibari works in effect in one village, that has been split administratively into two adjacent villages. The Aide Encadreur at Téra Barrage works with members of several communities not resident at the site, but rather exploiting gardens on the edge of the reservoir.

The extreme mobility of staff was striking in the case of the agricultural service. On my first visit, the Chef de Service was transferring his region to the new Chef. The "old" Chef had been at the post... for two months, and was being transferred to Diffa as the director of an agricultural project. On my following visit a few weeks later, the new Chef was absent and had not yet visited his agricultural districts. He had been preoccupied by Departmental and national meetings... He had been previously working with Ms. Christine Okali in extension/research liaison, after returning from studies in Algeria. He has no field experience or background.

During the second visit in late April, the Chef's assistant therefore offered his overview of the region. However, he had only been effectively at post for....two months (though he had been posted in February). He stated that he had not yet had the opportunity to really tour the region. Being from and having previously served in the east, he does not have a command of the local languages.

The "old" Chef had also redistributed four of the five district officers before the arrival of his successor. Although these officers have generally been in the region at least one year, their accumulated knowledge of each zone has been lost to the new Chef, as they have just arrived in unfamiliar territory in the same region. With the exception of the Téra district, the entire Service appears to be almost starting from zero!

The officers were not selected or assigned according to linguistic ability. The majority of the district officers are Hausa-speaking, in region with only a few Hausa scattered among the merchants and a few professional categories (such as butchers). None of the officers have a grasp of two important minority languages in the region - Fulani and Tamacheq - spoken by at least a quarter of the total regional population.

Discussions with the district officer in Téra illustrate some of the strong and weak points of the agricultural service in the field. He has been in Téra as district officer for almost two years (since September 1988) and does speak Zarma-Songhay.

This officer has been working in at least 13 communities over the last two years in a variety of domains, including soil conservation techniques, millet-cowpea cropping associations, individual and community tree nurseries ("mini-pepinière"), "demonstrations" of cropping techniques and improved crop varieties, and dry season gardening. The communities are predominantly Songhay, with the exception of the Fulani community of Pétél Kolé.

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Our discussions about the introduction of "new" cropping techniques was particularly interesting. The district officer started by proudly speaking of their extension work in cowpea-millet cropping association as a technique new to the area. After a little questioning, he agreed that the technique was traditional, and indeed common, in the region. He first spoke of "some" farmer abandoning the technique, but then indicated that the agricultural service offered a technical package that improved yields. The package includes improved varieties of millet and cowpeas, changes in the spacing and distribution of plants, and the addition of fertilizers.

However, not all farmers adopt these or other techniques offered by the service. In the above example, farmers may adopt all of the package, a few of the components, or none at all. He indicated that "some farmers accept and understand our advice, others do not." When asked for further explanation, he stated: "Les paysans sont ignorants, ils sont là posés." He also noted that the Fulani farmers in Pétél Kolé were "en retard en cette zone," since "ils ignorent les bases de l'agriculture." In contrast to these generalizations, the farmers interviewed offered some specific explanations for accepting, and for not accepting, the advice of the district officer (see below).

The Aides Encadreurs are recruited locally for project-specific activities. Their quality and impact appear to vary significantly. For instance, the Aide Encadreur in Taka in from the village and has a basic, primary school education. He is a young man, but his father's support as a local authority gives him some standing in the community beyond his age and accompanying status. The father is functionally literate in Zarma, and the village council actively supports the UNICEF-financed program including a village tree nursery, seeds and other materials for dry season gardening, and functional literacy.

The Aide Encadreur in Tchibari was recruited by the PASP. He is from Téra town and attended secondary school for a couple of years. He originally worked for eight months in a Tuareg (Bouzou) community north of Téra during the dry season in 1988/89. However, the project withdrew from the community when all of the young men left on labor migration for the entire dry season, leaving insufficient labor for local agriculture. After a rainy season in Téra, he was assigned to Tchibari. In spite of his urban background and academic (that is, not practical or technical) training, the PASP has offered him no in-service training. He functions, in effect, as an administrator and accountant for the project in the village. He cannot be categorized as an "extension worker," by his own declarations.

5.2.3. Environment

Personnel: Professional staff - a Chef de Service and an Agent Technique in Téra, an Agent Technique in Méhanna, and an Agent Technique in Yéléwani (note that all of the Agents Techniques are assigned to the Dutch-financed project).

(Expatriate) Technical Assistance - SNV has furnished Dutch expertise for the "Projet Reboisement": a Forester, a Sociologist and a Regional Planner.

Support staff in Téra - a Secretary, a Driver, and Gardes and other auxiliary personnel for tree nurseries, etc.

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The Dutch-financed "Projet Reboisement" has also an interpreter for extension work.

Other support staff - the Chef de Service did not offer complete information on other auxiliaries posted in the Arrondissement, though indicating postings at the Poste Administratifs and some border stations. The level of local staffing can be deduced by referring to the figures for the Say Environmental Service below.

Equipment: several Toyota Land Cruiser Station Wagons and Sedans for the Dutch-financed project based in Téra.
Toyota Land Cruisers for the field staff in Méhanna and Yéléwani from Dutch financing
an older Land Rover furnished by the Ministry
materials for professional activities, plastics sacks and seeds for the tree nurseries, fencing, digging tools, etc.

The Chef de Service is simultaneously responsible for all "classical" forestry activities in the region and director of the "Projet Reboisement." His staff are also active in assisting the PASP and UNICEF projects in establishing and maintaining "mini-nurseries" (mini-pepinières) in rural communities. The Chef and his Adjointe are both from eastern Niger, and therefore neither (previously) familiar with the region nor fluent in the local languages.

The Chef discussed in some detail the goals and activities of "Projet Reboisement." When asked about other activities of the environmental service, he mentioned the mini-nurseries and suggested that we speak to the members of the local agricultural service for further details. In his terse comments about "classical" service activities, he immediately cited the police forestière to indicate that the volume of this kind of work "tend à baisser."

The "Projet Reboisement" offers an interesting example of the evolution of environmental service policies and activities, as well as exposing a few persistent, typical structural weaknesses in design and execution. The project has concentrated on a region running 100 kilometers along the right (west) bank of the Niger River between Méhanna and Yéléwani. The project has eventually included approximately 50 villages within 70 kilometers of the river. The project started in 1983, and has just entered a third phase.

The first phase devoted efforts to dune fixation in the villages immediately west of the river. The approach was quite directive, encouraged by material benefits offered to rural participants in return for effort. The results were dramatic, physical changes to the nearby landscape, but without consideration of long-term sustainability. A SNV forester based in Méhanna managed the program in the field. However, education (sensibilisation and animation) and extension work were not key components of the program.

The second phase, from November 1986 to October 1989, changed the focus to local participation, after a reassessment of the results of the initial phase. The project shifted from a heavy focus on the technical aspects of dune fixation to a search for methods to motivate the population to protect and transform the general environment. A baseline sociological study was commissioned at the end of this phase.

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The third phase will focus on developing a global land management program in the target area based on local participation. The approach is therefore an application of aménagement de territoire, specifically at the village level (terroir villageois). The expertise of the technical assistance corresponds to the three sections (volets) of the third phase of the project: 1) the forester for "technical interventions" (exécution technique), including dune fixation, (re)forestation and improved stoves for household cuisine; 2) the regional planner for the global design of the land management program; and 3) the sociologist for extension (glossed as "complementary activities" - actions complémentaires).

The sociologist, the Adjointe au Chef de Service and the interpreter constitute a team to assist community organization and carry out extension work. Based on the results of the previous phases and of the baseline sociological study, the team has adopted an approach referred to within the project as "actions (and) investigations" (actions enquêtes). This simply seems to indicate a establishing a meaningful relationship between implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Team work in the field is based on group discussions with communities managing village lands. The team will try to establish a program of project activities relying on local organization and inspired by a dialogue about community aspirations.

Some of the problems of the project appear "classic," given common, contemporary thinking about "development" in the Sahel. The project staff - both national and expatriate - has only recently assigned genuine importance to identifying beneficiary motivations (and capacities?) to cooperate in various activities. Efforts like dune fixation have had impressive short-term impacts, but now maintenance problems previously unaddressed are starting to cancel the initial results of these activities. The local populations view the earthworks, grasses, shrubs and trees (the réalisations) as project property, and certainly not their responsibility, or concern. The project can no longer furnish the level of necessary inputs to maintain certain aspects of the infrastructure - such as metal fencing (grillage) - originally created by the project. The local human and material resources were not identified to make these interventions sustainable without continuing outside assistance.

There are some other, basic weaknesses that affect the project. Although project activities are localized along the Niger River, the project headquarters with senior Nigerien staff and the three technical assistants are in Tera (80 kilometers from Mehanna on an earth road). This "political" decision - given Tera is also the Arrondissement headquarters - certainly adds transport costs, but most important compromises project impact and effectiveness in the field. However, two of the Agents Techniques assigned to the project reside in the major communities at the extreme ends of the region (Mehanna and Yelewani), and the sociologist will (probably) move his residence to the former community within the near future.

There are other dysfunctional aspects of the posting and rotation of project staff. The two senior Nigerien staff on the project, the Chef and his Adjointe, are not fluent in the local language(s). The Adjointe was in midst of her marriage to the officer in charge of statistics at the Tera SAP during my last visit, which implies future limitations on her ability to travel as a key member of the extension team. She will certainly not move to Mehanna, as is the case for the Dutch sociologist. SNV is currently in the process of

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changing all three of the technical assistants within the space of a few months, so there will not be an opportunity for a gradual, staggered transition of the expatriate assistance, which will have an important effect on continuity in project activities and approach.

5.2.4. Livestock

Personnel: Total staff for the Arrondissement - the Chef de Service (Ingenieur Technique), the Adjoint au Chef de Service (Adjudant Technique), 2 other Adjudants Techniques, 7 Agents Techniques, 5 veterinary nurses (Surveillants Infirmiers), a "skins and hides monitor" (Moniteur des Cuirs et Peaux), an administrative officer (Chef de Bureau Administratif), a driver, a guard, 3 laborers (main oeuvres), and a secretary
in Tera (for the Arrondissement) - the Chef, his Adjoint, an Adjudant Technique, auxiliary staff
in Tera (for the Commune) - an Adjudant Technique, an Agent Technique and a veterinary nurse
in Bankilare (Poste Administratif) - 2 Agents Techniques and a laborer
in Gotheye (Poste Administratif) - an Adjudant Technique, a guard and a laborer
at each of four local stations (Cellule d'Intervention de Base, including Dargol and Mehanna) - an Agent Technique and a veterinary nurse

Equipment: A Land Rover in Tera for the Arrondissement
Materials for the annual vaccination campaign

The Chef described his staff in the Arrondissement as offering the "classic" livestock services: animal vaccination, the distribution - generally free of charge - of medicines for livestock, examination of animals to be sold for slaughter at principal daily and weekly markets, control of slaughtering conditions, and imposing taxes on animals for sale at markets. Neither the Chef nor his staff in Tera or in the field described their work as including "extension" in pastoral communities. They did indicate that they offered advice on animal health, but did not speak of recommendations about improved pastoral practices, such as reduced herd size (as mentioned by the Adjoint au Chef of the Livestock service in Boboye).

The staff in the field cover the major, weekly livestock markets in their area. Aside from the towns and villages cited above, the following markets were mentioned as particularly important in the region: Bandio, Bangare, Dangial, Dölbél, Mehanna, Petel Kole, Toure and Yelewani. An Agent Technique or a veterinary nurse are almost certainly present at each of these markets every week. Based on observation and interviews, they limit their activities to checking animal health before slaughter and levying taxes. The staff has no means of personal transportation, so they go to markets on foot or by public transport.

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The major annual activity is clearly the vaccination campaign. The service mobilizes support from other services and organizes financial and material resources to move the staff about the Arrondissement in teams over a couple of months. Although complaining of logistical difficulties, the description of the campaign suggested an optimal use of modest resources.

The service offers some assistance to the PASP, and in return has periodic access to project vehicles. The Chef did not mention any significant technical expertise offered by his service to the project.

5.2.5. Plan

Personnel: a Chef de Service, his Adjoint, a "statistician," a student from I.P.D.R./Kolo, assigned to Tera for a few months as practical experience, covering "studies and monitoring" and a secretary

Equipment: a Toyota Land Cruiser (inherited from the Second National Census)
office equipment

The Chef has been in Tera approximately six months, after finishing four years at I.P.D.R. and a posting in Ouallam. His Adjoint has been in the region for several years, and is responsible for the "community development" (developpement communautaire) activities of the SAP.

As elsewhere, the Plan staff are few and only posted to the headquarters of their respective Arrondissement. The staff in Tera is not sufficient to even cover SAP responsibilities divided between several (theoretical) divisions within each regional office: statistics, programming, studies, monitoring, community development, etc. Staff have to cover a range of fields, as was typical in other Arrondissements. Both the Chef and his Adjoint are fluent in Songhay.

The Chef indicated that they had few resources to work in the field or office. He emphasized the key role of the SAP as an umbrella organization for "coordinating" all of the development efforts by the technical services in the Arrondissement. Indeed, he seemed to be very sensitive to any activities outside of the scope of his direct influence (for example, see Section 5.3.2. below). Given the de facto collaboration evident between the technical services already, the advantages offered by any SAP contributions were unclear. The SAP staff rely on the technical services to go into the field, and the community development officer apparently serves primarily as a interpreter for members of the technical services without the requisite language skills. This officer also serves as a guide and interpreter for visiting national or expatriate expertise identifying or evaluating projects (for instance, during this study).

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5.3. The Local Populations

5.3.1. Farmer Interviews

The consultant visited several villages in the Arrondissement, including Bouppon, Dargol, Diagourou, Taka, Tchibari, Téra, and Tilim. All of these villages have been either primary or secondary sites for various rural development projects. For instance, Bouppon, Diagourou and Taka have been included within the UNICEF small-scale, integrated rural development project. Tchibari is a site for the PASP. The community in Tchibari has joined the "Six 'S'" association based in Téra (see Section 5.3.2.). All of the villages have also periodically benefited from a variety of rural development services, including improved seeds, reforestation, dry season gardening materials and insecticides, with the equipment for plant treatment.

The community members in each village could provide a complete list of the local activities of each technical service. They also looked at these activities in a historical perspective, citing the beginning and end of various interventions.

The communities were invariably positive about the services offered by government officers, at the beginning of the interview. The comments offered by the beneficiaries were revealing, always emphasizing lists of material inputs such as improved seeds (cowpea and millet), donkey carts, village pumps for drinking water, insecticides, fungicides, seedlings, animal vaccinations, seeds for dry season gardening, and fencing. Opinions on the relative value of these inputs, and of the accompanying technical services, were not spontaneously forthcoming.

When pressed a little on their points of view about the merits of the various inputs and technical advice, responses became more nuanced. The farmers had specific opinions in each case, evaluating the general and situational conditions that affected the intervention. The analyses were quite realistic, and really quite balanced in the overall view of the impact of the technical services. They certainly characterize the results as a very mixed bag.

A few examples illustrate the range of reactions to the inputs offered by the rural development services. For instance, the agricultural service is promoting mixed cropping of cowpea and millet. The farmers at first echoed the initial position of the extension officers about the advantages of such an association in their fields, as though the technique was absolutely new. In fact, they stated immediately afterwards that the technique was already quite common, indeed universal, in the region. The agricultural service was offering advice and inputs to improve existing techniques, including improved cowpea and millet seed, and changes in spacing of plants. They agreed that the cowpea seed is an improvement. The changes in spacing are an improvement in some cases, under some conditions (which is a subject of on-farm trials by the beneficiaries). The millet seed is not adapted to their needs and to the region, producing insufficient grain on the local soils as well as inherently having a stalk too short for local use as construction materials. The farmers pick and choose the components of the "technical package" that fits their individual needs. (A recent document published by the national agricultural research institution, lists 26 permutations of cowpea-millet association according to a variety of factors. The farmers already make such decisions in

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practice in their fields....with little benefit from the sophisticated, and potentially useful, results of national expertise.) In another case, agriculture sold imported cocks and hens ("de race") to breed with local stock. The cocks all died, unable to adapt to local environmental conditions. The popularization of improved peanut seed has also failed, due to a combination of disease and generally unfavorable climatic conditions over the last decade. A major village water pump is periodically broken for months due to lack of parts for maintenance. Although such examples were common, farmers also lauded other inputs, such as the delivery of insecticides, seeds for dry season gardening and tree seedlings.

The communities do not characterize their relationships to the representatives of the technical services as collaborative, certainly not as participative. The government officers deliver the inputs, and the farmers then evaluate their relative merit independently. Dialogue is infrequent. As summarized by the members of one community, "the technical services bring what they want to the villages" ("les services techniques apportent ce qu'ils veulent aux villages").

5.3.2. Local associations and the activities of a "Non-Governmental Organization"

The difficulties of attempting to establish local associations with some degree of autonomy from the local administration and technical services may be illustrated by the example of the activities of a NGO in Tera. The information is based on interviews with government officers and some members of a local board of a "Six 'S'" association in Téra. "Six 'S'" ("Se servir de la Saison Sèche en Savane et au Sahel") is an organization important in Burkina Faso, with headquarters and a training office in Ouahigouya. The organization is active in Mali, Senegal, Togo.... Financial support is provided for the organization from Switzerland. The approach is innovative, at least for Niger, in that funds are put directly into the hands of local associations without any reference to government services. The members of the associations decide on the activities and use of the funds. The headquarters staff monitor the returns on investments and on credit to members from each association based on their periodic reports, and then proposes gradually augmenting capital based on performance. Funds are attributed by agreement between "Six 'S'" headquarters and the Swiss donors. The initial "seed" money for an association grouping from 6 to 10 villages (or districts) is 4,000,000 Francs CFA.

Boukary Younoussi, Director of IRED ("Innovations et Réseaux pour le Développement") in Niger, has served as the liaison with "Six 'S'" headquarters. The first two "Six 'S'" associations are in the Tillabéry Department, in the Téra and Tillabéry Arrondissements. During my first trip to Téra, the consultant asked the local representative of Plan (the "Chef de Service" for the SAP) about "Six 'S'" activities in his region. He replied sharply that they were very displeased with the association, which did not furnish information on their activities and did not communicate with the technical services.

During the second visit to Téra, with the "Chef" absent, the consultant noted to his surprise that the local "Six 'S'" office was at most 100 meters from the Plan office, and directly across from the agricultural services.

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Agricultural officers indicated during interviews that they were accustomed to offering their services to the association on request, for instance for "cultures de contre saison."

The next interview was of an officer of the "Six 'S'" association, as well as a local representative of the "Association des Puisatiers de la République du Niger (A.P.R.N.)," that works in collaboration with the association. They offered a list of woes with some members of the local administration, and were straightforward in admitting that they had not always consulted with the Plan on decisions about their activities. However, imagine the consultant's surprise when the assistant head of the Plan office walked into the office, greeted us all, and in the course of further discussions indicated that he had participated in a training course with the local association members in Ouahigouya! He indicated that he had on numerous occasions reported on "Six 'S'" activities to his "Chef," who had in addition refused to participate in association meetings on invitation.

The association board also reported on the difference in their relations with the Mayor of Téra and the Sous-Préfet of the Arrondissement. The Sous-Préfet supports their activities as a positive local initiative. The Mayor is absolutely against their activities. Why? In one example, the members spoke of their grain marketing at lower prices to members, after purchase in Niamey and local stocking. The Mayor had summoned them to try to force them to bring their prices in line with the Téra merchants'..... When they recently invited him to an association meeting, he refused and told them stop all activities as their association is "dangerous" ("dangereuse")!

The other "Six 'S'" association in a canton adjacent to Tillabéry town has encountered similar reticence from Plan representatives. In spite of an invitation from the association board, no member of the Departmental Plan office has moved a few kilometers to visit and evaluate their activities, after a wait of more than one year. Nevertheless, the annual evaluation report of activities in the Tillabéry Department for 1989/90 complains of the lack of association and communication with government officials (note that the Peace Corps Volunteers stationed in villages in the Say Arrondissement within the AFSI program came in for similar criticism).

These kinds of blockages with local officials, perhaps particularly with some members of the technical services, will continue to offer a persistent source of conflict over NGO or other direct assistance to rural populations. Independent, local-level association is still not accepted generally in practice by many members of the technical services or of the territorial administration.

6. Comparative examples from the Say Arrondissement, with illustrations from other regions and previous experience

6.1. Say

6.1.1. Say Arrondissement administration

The Arrondissement of Say is part of the Tillabéry Department. The Arrondissement is to the west (on the right bank) of the Niger River, west and

southwest of Niamey and borders Burkina Faso to the west and Benin to the south.

The Arrondissement has a Poste Administratif, with headquarters in Torodi. There are four cantons: Gueladio, Say, Tamou and Torodi.

6.1.2. The technical services

All of the technical services for rural development encountered elsewhere at the Arrondissement level are also in Say: Agriculture (including Génie Rurale), Environment, Literacy, Livestock and Plan. A couple of these services are broken down as follows:

6.1.2.1. Agriculture

Personnel: in Say - a Chef de Service (trained at the University of Mississippi in seed multiplication) and his assistant. The Say staff also includes a driver and a laborer main oeuvre. The Arrondissement officer for Génie Rurale is also posted to Say.

: in Torodi - a "manager" (conducteur) with a laborer (main oeuvre) for the poste phytosanitaire at the Poste Administratif headquarters. The staff essentially assures better distribution of materials and pesticides, as the district agricultural officer for Torodi handles extension work.

: 5 District agricultural officers in Gueladio, Makalondi, Say, Tamou and Torodi. These divisions correspond to divisions, with the exception of Torodi (with posts at Makalondi and Torodi) due to the size of the canton.

Equipment: a Toyota Land Cruiser for the Chef de Service a motorcycle for each District officer (for a total of 5 motorcycles), supplied by the World Bank PRSA program. Each District officers has an allowance of 45 liters of fuel per month for professional activities. materials for professional activities, such as improved seeds for trials and distribution, seeds for dry-season gardening and pesticides furnished by the Ministry for the Arrondissement.

The district officers are responsible for the following number of villages:

Gueladio	22	Tamou	55
Makalondi	28	Torodi	67
Say	45		

TOTAL - 217 villages (95 villages are in the Torodi canton)

There are significant differences in the number of villages and areas covered by the district officers.

The Chef de Service described the agricultural staff as basically responsible for extension work in both the dry and rainy seasons, and for "statistical" work to estimate annual agricultural production in the region.

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The Chef primarily complained of the lack in number of agricultural officers for the region. His goal would be an officer for every 1000 farmers, or every 6 villages (or a staff increase of 31 officers.....or 600%!). His figures were explicitly modeled on his understanding of the World Bank-financed intensive extension programs in pilot regions such as Madaoua.

Other discussions and observations are perhaps more revelatory about the quality of services offered by agricultural staff. The Chef noted that agricultural innovations, such as improved seeds, were difficult to introduce into the region. He stated: "Les gens sont méfiants à l'innovation." He suggested that farmers in the region were "satisfied with their (current) activities," and were less susceptible to recommendations since they "suffer less" than farmers living in areas more heavily affected by drought. His analysis did not extend beyond this level.

In the course of our discussions, and in discussion with other agricultural officers, the language skills of the staff quickly became an important issue. The region has an important Fulani and Gourmantché population. Indeed, the Fulani aristocracy dominates the canton governments. However, only one district chief has limited skills in Fulani; the other staff have no skills in these languages. The Chef keeps the Fulani-speaker in the Gueladio canton, as the population is 95% Fulani. The officer in Gourmantché-dominated Makalondi speaks but a few words of the language, but is at least the most "familiar" with "local customs" after a previous posting to Tamou within the Arrondissement. The Chef also noted that the Fulani and the Gourmantché are the most resistant to change... Incidentally, the Chef speaks no Zarma, and therefore cannot speak to any farmers in his Arrondissement.

The Chef also indicated that there were generally problems with the plant protection program, which now had trained over 1000 farmers as brigadiers in the Arrondissement. He was impressed by farmers' capacity to manipulate, maintain and repair the "sophisticated" equipment supplied by the program.

The level of fieldwork with "support" from a project can be compared to the Téra example, where outside support is more limited. The district officer in Torodi had demonstration trials in....4 villages last rainy season (he already had the motorcycle). He plans to extend demonstration trials to a total of....7 villages this rainy season (the list above shows that he covers 67 villages in his district). The village most distant from Torodi town (his residence) among future range of demonstration sites is 27 kilometers. He noted in the course of our discussions that local farmers were reticent to pay for improvements offered by the agricultural service, particularly improved seeds and fertilizer, without offering any speculations about farmer motivations for such preferences.

The officer responsible for rural works (Génie Rurale) has been in the Arrondissement for one year. Since finishing three years of training at I.P.D.R., he has also had short-term training in drafting, topography and rural African architecture. He has a four-wheel drive vehicle for fieldwork, and has recently received some surveying instruments basic to developing plans for rural construction and environmental work, such as earthworks. He has no support staff assigned separately to Génie Rurale and therefore relies on the good graces of agriculture and other technical services as necessary.

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His schedule seems to be driven by project finances and the requests of other services. Activities have focused on small-scale irrigation for dry season gardening (IFAD and CIDA financing). Although he spoke of offering services based on community requests, there was no connection between services actually delivered and requests later cited. He also noted that the populations would only work on his projects for payments in money or kind. When asked about his major problems, he noted the lack of a driver for Génie Rurale and the need for a separate office for his service (he already has his own office within the agricultural service compound).

6.1.2.2. Environment

Personnel: in Say - a Chef de Service, his assistant (Adjointe), other officers (gardes), 5 laborers (main oeuvres) in Torodi - an Agent Technique and 4 officers (gardes) 8 other officers (gardes) in three other sites - Bolsi (2), Tamoul (3) and Turudi (3)

Equipment: a Land Rover for the Chef and his staff materials for professional activities, such as plastic pots for tree seedlings, wire fencing, seeds and watering cans

The officers (gardes) are posted adjacent to the border, on major roads and next to the national park ('Parc W') in order to monitor the forests, the Niger River fisheries and entrance into the park region.

The Chef feels that the environmental service must redefine its role as primarily extension, rather than "repression" (the common term used within the service for policing activities). He feels strongly that officers have to make a major change in their attitudes (mentalités) in order to listen to the rural population, take their ideas into account and remain in constant contact with beneficiaries. Although he spoke of the logistical constraints that affect performance, his emphasis rested on agent motivation, training and "will" (volonté).

He offered five principal reasons for poor performance by rural development officers: 1) "natural laziness" (naturellement faineants), 2) the fear of starting activities that cannot be sustained; 3) demoralization due to negative or indifferent reactions to their efforts from the rural communities; 4) fear of failure; and 5) weaknesses in training. His proposed remedies to these problems that focus on changing the training, working methodology and attitudes of officers. For instance, he suggested that most problems stem from the incapacity of officers to transmit their knowledge to rural populations.....and to admit the limits of their knowledge and capacities. "Extension" does not succeed due to unconvincing demonstrations and the impatient, brusque introduction of techniques. Activities are often started without soliciting the opinion of the beneficiaries. He even suggested that as attitudes change, the officers should see themselves and progressively become "conseillers techniques de la masse."

The Chef's somewhat atypical perspective on the role of the environmental service is partially inspired by continuing close contacts with members of his native riverine communities. He has been able to remain active - at least in his Arrondissement - in fisheries management, which has a personal connection

to his background in the Tillabéry region. He has also worked on projects financed by FAO and other donors that nurtured another perspective on the role of the service.

Torodi section

The role of the forestry service at the natural forest management site at Fayra near Torodi is part of an effort to change the nature of relations between environmental officers and local populations. The site is part of the "Project Forestier" originally financed by IDA, FAC and the CCCE. The project is currently entering a second phase financed by the two latter donors.

The scope of the project has moved beyond only natural forest management to include regional land-use planning (aménagement de territoire) and local land management (gestion de terroir [villageois]). The objectives are implicitly quite ambitious, extending to rural integrated development based on community participation, with particular emphasis on sustainable natural resource management.

The intriguing aspect is the change in the role of the environmental officers. At least as expressed by the officers posted at Torodi, the technical service and the community start a dialogue about the future management and exploitation of village territory. A process of negotiations about priorities for local development fixes the program in each case. The project aspires to furnish a wide range of inputs and advice. For instance, activities in the communities have included digging wells for drinking water and dry season gardening, furnishing fencing and seeds for dry season gardening, building soil recuperation works such as "half moons" and stone banking, and planting trees. "Common" spaces between villages critical for managing important natural features, such as the trees and soils in part of a watershed, are jointly managed by the communities with the officers' advice. There is also, of course, the managed exploitation of the Fayra forest for fuelwood production.

The officers generally have several years experience at the site, and speak one of the predominant languages in the region - Zarma. The project provides in-service and longer term training to officers in areas such as extension techniques and land-use management. An important weakness is the lack of any qualified staff to work with the new Fayra woodcutters' cooperative. The forester assigned to this task has no training or background in the subject, and as the newest officer at Torodi (since one year) has the least familiarity with the project philosophy. During interviews, his remarks were the closest to reflecting "classic" forester attitudes towards rural communities.

The project is ambitious, but has the merit of addressing the problems of changing the classic role of the environmental service. The aspirations of the "aménagement" also call upon close linkages between Arrondissement services in agriculture.

6.2. Birni N'Konni

6.2.1. The Chef de Service of agriculture

The Chef de Service for the agricultural service in the Birni N'Konni Arrondissement offered some revelatory comments about the problems facing agricultural officers in extension work. The Chef has a university degree in agricultural extension and education from Ohio State University. He highlighted a range of issues including: 1) the lack of consideration of experience in the assignment and promotion of field staff; 2) the difficulties of changing the role, both actions and attitudes, of agricultural officers from directors to counselors (and equals) of farmers; 3) the problems of native speakers (re)discovering the vocabulary and systems of thought of their "own" milieu in rural areas.

His description of some aspects of his own career illustrated some of these and other problems. As an agricultural officer, he had only served once in an area dominated by his maternal tongue (Hausa) in over a decade of public service, before leaving studies in the States. He was initially assigned to the Songhay-speaking region of Téra as a young officer, where he learned the language over a few years. He was then reassigned to a Kanuri-speaking area in the Diffa Department, where he found learning the local language personally impossible. In any event, the service has never since capitalized on his earlier apprenticeship in Zarma-Songhay, as he has since been assigned to Maradi, Ohio and Birni N'Konni.

He stressed that even as a native Hausa speaker assigned to the Maradi Productivity Project, he had to learn the vocabulary, expressions, metaphors and ways of thinking of rural Hausa. Young agricultural extension officers, often of "urban" background, due to family origins and/or prolonged residence in urbanized areas for secondary and professional/university education, must learn the rural - and sometimes also dialectical - versions of their native language. The Chef was quite open about his initial ignorance and period of apprenticeship. His experience is the real norm.

He emphasized that he had expended considerable effort in encouraging and training the agricultural officers under his direction in an different approach towards farmers. The officers viewed an approach based on dialogue with farmers about their needs, priorities and interests as alien. They did not see, at least initially, the professional or career advantages. The Chef now keeps new officers with him in Birni for a few months to introduce them to his approach, and officers and farmers periodically for training and discussions (note that the number of officers under his direction has doubled from 6 (about 30 villages each) to 12 due to the World Bank-financed program).

He stated: "Il faut commencer par change la mentalité des fonctionnaires. Les paysans vont ensuite changer leurs points de vue."

7. The Technical Services: performance and motivation

7.1. Agents' coverage of their regions, with and without support

The comparison of a couple of case histories, combined with accumulated impressions from anecdotal evidence, suggest that the lack of logistical support for rural development affects agent performance without really being a

basic determinant of the level of effort of working with potential beneficiaries. Agents mobilize limited resources gleaned from diverse sources to furnish services and execute their work plans. The agents with no transportation - such as some of the agricultural and livestock officers - manage to work in nearby villages and local markets. Officers with access to more resources through projects or the regional administrative centers organize among themselves and with the field agents to maximize the use of these scarce resources. The agents from different services almost universally do collaborate to share resources to work in the field, as part of a network of many informal, reciprocal obligations (the "Système 'D'" described by Jonathan Smith).

There was no clear correspondance between increased resources and increased efficiency or impact in service delivery. For instance, the district agricultural officer in Torodi worked on demonstrations in 4 villages during the 1989/90 season, while his counterpart in Téra worked in 8 villages. However, the Torodi officer had his own motorcycle, while the Téra officer relied on transport periodically available from the Arrondissement services or through projects. In addition, the Téra officer actually worked in a wider radius outside of his home base. The Torodi officer could also have profited from resources available through the Poste Administratif or local projects, such as integrated, rural development approach characteristic of the 'Projet Forestier.' Who was more efficient? Who had more impact (at least in quantitative terms)?

There are many other factors - both individual and institutional - which appear more important in affecting real impact, including agent motivation, communication skills, level of technical proficiency, attitudes towards rural communities and technologies, and functional relationships between rural development services and rural realities.

7.2. Agents' attitudes towards rural communities

7.2.1. Communication

An absolutely fundamental problem is the de facto government policy of systematically assigning rural development officers to "foreign" regions of Niger. The officers have to somehow function as extension workers in areas where they have no, or at best an imperfect, knowledge of the local language. The result? Extension without communication or, in other words, efforts at extension severely handicapped from the very outset, notwithstanding the complexity and difficulties inherent in the tasks. This lack of linguistic and accompanying cultural skills affects the majority of agents ostensibly working directly with rural beneficiaries to effect change. The extreme mobility of government officers exacerbates this basic flaw in national policy towards rural extension.

Meeting government officers working ad hoc through a locally available translator, such as the chauffeur or a member of the local community with some knowledge of French or a common language, became banal in the course of the fieldwork. Even well-motivated officers with important technical skills can only work around these problems. For instance, the Chef in Say returned from the States with university training in seed multiplication.....and was posted

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in an area where he speaks none of the three local language.... He cannot directly grasp the range of local problems, express his own knowledge, or verify the quality of the information transmitted by his staff or translators.

Even officers assigned as native speakers to rural areas need a period of apprenticeship to learn local vocabulary and concepts. Motivation to gain such skill is also contingent on attitudes to the knowledge and competence of rural populations.

Agents in rural extension recurrently requested training programs in communication and community "diagnosis" (diagnostique). The latter request often comes out of the current government emphasis on regional land planning (aménagement de territoire) as a part of localized management with local participation (gestion de terroir). Small-scale projects (microréalisations) and local initiatives for projects fit into this general framework.

Officer concern with communication problems appears genuine, and not simply inspired by government directive. Training programs offered by regional institutions, like GRAAP in the Boboye Arrondissement sponsored by CECI, elicit interest and curiosity. These training programs are not set into an institutional framework of preliminary and in-service training, as well as monitoring and evaluation of officer performance.

7.3. Agents' attitudes towards their own expertise

Field officers combine a modest level of technical training with their (severely) limited communication skills. The district agricultural officers universally have had two years of training at I.P.D.R./Kollo, after completing the first cycle in secondary school. Two years of training in agriculture can at best offer some fundamental, certainly rudimentary, analytical and practical skills. Unless the student is from an agricultural background, and if so has not become estranged from this background, the students will have no skills immediately relevant to agriculture from previous academic training. The curriculum over two years can offer a general introduction to a variety of topics important to rural development.

Increasing these skills will depend heavily on the monitoring and training offered by the Chef managing the officers in a given Arrondissement, and the periodic availability of in-service training. There seem to be no institutional mechanisms to encourage Chefs to train officers in the field. Individual initiative is the sole inspiration, and so young officers can haphazardly encounter the range from Chef as mentor and instructor (the case in Birni N'Konni) to Chef as simply administrator and sporadic evaluator. In-service training programs depend on factors external to the needs of the officers and the Arrondissement, particularly through projects or general donor programs. Agents also have a generally passive attitude towards acquiring knowledge, so personal initiative to study or perfect technical skills is rare.

The field officers therefore arrive at post with a few basic notions about agriculture and a limited set of propositions to "improve" local conditions. Discussions indicate clearly that, in general, officers do not view their role as problem-solving in specific circumstances based on a range of technical alternatives. Officer comments about rural populations reflect their

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inflexibility in applying "technical" solutions to problems, and the lack of analysis needed to identify the genuine reasons motivating the adoption or rejections of these solutions.

Officers use a cluster of related terms to describe the reactions of rural communities to proposed innovations, such as "distrust" (méfiance), "ignorance" (ignorance) and "lack of will" (motivation), (manque de volonté). They also recognize that there are often problems due to poor communication, lack of mutual understanding and disappointment in rural areas with broken promises to deliver services. However, they do not dissect individual cases to determine the specific origins of obstacles to find particular solutions. For instance, farmers in a particular village will accept the installation of a "demonstration plot," and a supply of improved seeds, pesticides and fertilizer. The farmers will usually apply a few of the proposed inputs, experiment with the others (if unfamiliar), and watch - rather than imitate - the trials. The farmers have clear, specific reasons for not accepting some suggestions, such as the inadaptability of certain millet varieties to local conditions, the "burning" of crops with fertilizer during years with low rainfall, and the lack of markets (last year) for certain dry-season crops. They also have clear, specific reasons for accepting certain innovations, such as improved yields with certain cowpea varieties or reduced losses due to pesticide application. Agricultural officer response to these differences depends on analysis, flexibility, dialogue.

7.4. The relationship between agent performance and evaluation

There is a system for evaluating field officer performance based on periodic reporting and periodic visits by immediate superiors. However, the system does not really evaluate the impact of officer activities on rural development. The reports and visits actually verify the number of concrete activities executed following service directives (glossed as réalisations). The fascination with the quantification, including inputs delivered, demonstration sites successfully managed, and numbers of peasants "trained," does not fit into a general evaluation of the accumulated impact of such activities in a given region. Adoption and imitation of techniques is not measured, hardly mentioned. Propositions for technical services therefore remain directive and uninformed by realities in the field.

Some officers suggested that there is a need within their own services to take suggestions and observations from the field into account. They perceive their activities and goals as directed from above, without a realistic appraisal of the difficulties and specificities of field conditions. The notion of "decentralization" was periodically lauded, assuming that the application of the notion really included a closer match between local programs and realities.

7.5. The role of the Service d'Arrondissement du Plan (SAP)

Representatives of the technical services generally discounted the value of the SAP. Indeed, some suggested that the institution was becoming a nuisance by trying to "coordinate" (and therefore somehow direct or manage)

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the representatives of the other ministries in the Arrondissement. They were generally negative about the substantive input of Plan officials into particular proposals for rural development activities/projects.

The SAP has a potentially useful role in preparing and finding financing for projects. However, lack of staff and training makes the SAP appear overburdened and incapable of accelerating the process for initiating local projects. Indeed, the SAP appears to slow project development in some regions.

The Plan appears to be simultaneously developing a central technical and political role at the Arrondissement and Department levels. The Chef of the SAP has become the third figure in the Arrondissement hierarchy, after the Sous-Préfet and his Adjoint, and thus above the other Chefs de Service. The SAP has become the "coordinator" and "guide" for expatriate visitors and representatives of financing organizations or NGOs. The SAP at the same time has assumed the role of organizing and executing local training for members of the Development Society, including the political officers for local or regional bodies such as the comités de base. The community development (développement communautaire) officers thus serve both for local development and political mobilization. The Chef in Boboye (Birni N'Gaouré), for instance, was quite emphatic about the key political role of Plan in the new political scene as part of the Second Republic.

The community development officers, generally issue of the old animation service, speak the local languages in contrast to most members of the other technical services working in extension. They can therefore serve both as intermediaries for members of the other technical services with the local communities.....as well as insure the political indoctrination of the same communities.....

7.6. Specific problems for extension work in some services: environment, hydraulics and livestock

These three services share the problem of having limited traditions and little training in extension work. Historical relationships to rural populations and the nature and structure of service delivery differ.

7.6.1. Environment

The personnel of the two "environmental services" ('Direction de l'Environnement' and 'Direction de la Faune, de la Pêche, de la Pisciculture et de l'Apiculture') are part of a common tradition as "Eaux et Forêts." The environmental service has been a para-military organization, including military grades, uniforms and training. Staff can, and often do, carry arms. The organization has in general fulfilled a role of protecting the environment....against the rural populations. Environmental staff go on patrols to identify infractions of the law (as interpreted in practice), and then to sanction illegal actions by fine or arrest. Rural populations have placed these agents in the same category as the police or the military.

Development efforts by the environmental service have been inspired by the same authoritarian style. For instance, staff direct hired laborers or villagers in tree planting as part of the "national campaign against

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desertification".....with local participation reduced to exhorting rural communities to plant more trees. Rural communities plant trees during these programs for food and money, or view the program as a form of obligatory labor directed by the State. Wildlife and fisheries have also been managed as protection of resources against the Nigerien population.

Notions of joint - or at least of collaborative - management of natural resources is a new, revolutionary philosophy for the service. The institutional framework from training through service discouraged staff seeing their role as cooperating with and counseling of rural communities. Agents that went against these traditions were rare, and sometime stigmatized professionally.

The service has been undergoing a number of changes that are leading to a gradual, but continuous, shift from the former role. The program for natural forest management, including a combination of local participation and technical input by service staff sanctioned by government decree, is a radical departure. The wildlife and fisheries programs are also moving towards collaborative management of common resources. Agroforestry and other programs are following the same example.

Most staff are trained at Kollo and, as in the case of agriculture, the majority for only the first two years. The curriculum is broad in order to cover all aspects of "Eaux et Forêts," from forestry to fisheries. Greater specialization comes in the later years of Kollo training, for staff who are able to pass the entry exams. In any event, field staff are in effect responsible for all of these domains in their particular region. The Chef can assign staff to particular areas according to his preference. Environmental officers are more specialized when assigned to a particular project (for instance, the "Projet Aquaculture"), a game park or a national forest.

The agent as extension officer is therefore new, and the modest training at Kollo has not yet been reinforced significantly by in-service training or practical examples in the field. Most senior environmental officers are simply not accustomed - if motivated - to genuine discussions with rural communities.

7.6.2. Hydraulics

The hydraulics service is the most marginal for rural communities, as "field staff" are posted no lower than the Departmental level. According to such staff, the service really provides support to the organizations that actually put in the wells or water points especially OFEDES ('Office des Eaux du Sous-Sol'). The staff establish an inventory of water points in their jurisdiction, and conduct studies to determine the hydrological characteristics of proposed sites. They also test water quality. There is no extension component to their work, though some spoke of sanitation training around some sites during our discussions. Génie Rurale actually furnishes a wider range of services for building and maintaining rural infrastructure, such as water points, and extension is an integral part of staff efforts in collaboration with the other technical services.

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7.6.3. Livestock

Livestock staff furnish services to animals, not people. People own the animals, of course, but interventions are not primarily aimed at training in livestock management, techniques of animal husbandry, etc. The service has tried to prevent disease in animals and control epidemics. Staff offer medicines for animals free or for sale. Their activities at markets are limited to controlling animals for disease, checking animals sold for immediate slaughter and imposing marketing taxes. Veterinarians have traditionally directed the service, as in other French-speaking West African countries.

Interest in pastoral management and pastoralist labor and social organization has been minimal. The staff certainly offer services of great interest to proprietors of livestock, but there is little intentional impact on management. Interest in changing the range of staff expertise is expressed in programs such as fattening small livestock for sale, but extension training, techniques and experience remain embryonic.

Members of rural communities have a rather blasé attitude towards the technical services. Representatives of government services are a fixed part of the landscape, but are generally inaccessible and perceived as unreliable. Farmers interviewed greet promises of "technical assistance" with scepticism, based on experiences with sporadic, lightening visits to villages by a confusing succession of agents offering proposals for various project ideas.....without any predictable result. "Assistance" is basically viewed as physical inputs, which may or may not prove useful to the beneficiaries. They evaluate the inputs independent of genuine dialogue with the government officers, and then make their own decisions about the value and use of these items.

8. The local population: impact and opinions

8.1. Local views of the technical services and of government officers

Rural communities view the presence of government staff as a given, which they try to use as possible to best advantage. As they experience the relationship as authoritarian, the current rhetoric about collaboration with the general Nigerien population rings hollow. Contact with rural development officers is infrequent and superficial. The overwhelming impression is that they still do not see the officers as attentive to their points of view and desires. Distrust is pervasive, due to the breaking of promises made to the communities to deliver particular services (at least according to the perception of future beneficiaries after visits of members of the technical services) and the repressive history of some services.

The community members certainly recognize and appreciate the value of some services. Health services, the provision of village water supply and animal vaccination are just a couple of prominent examples of highly esteemed activities. Each community has a list of development priorities, and the limited response or availability of the services for most requests is a source of disappointment.

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8.2. Technical "inputs" versus technical "advice": an evaluation

Discussions with members of rural communities indicate that they generally view government agents as primarily offering various physical inputs of varying quality given local conditions. Farmers accept these inputs hesitantly, fearing future demands by the technical services for reimbursement in cash or in kind for innovations in agricultural techniques that are unfamiliar, unsolicited and often undesired. The classic example was in the course of the Niamey Productivity Project, when young farmers were trained in regional centers ("Centres de Perfectionnement Technique," or C.P.T.s) in a technical package inadapted to conditions in the Department. Farmers returned to their communities with inputs for the "technical package".....which were never subsequently applied. In spite of ample information about the failure to adopt the "package" in the course of a decade of project activities, the general approach to conceiving, popularizing and evaluating services was never fundamentally changed (Painter, et. al. 1985).

The technical services, stimulated by the declarations of the former head of state, initiated the approach of micro-réalisations (small-scale, local interventions) as a solution to the failures of the Departmental level productivity projects during the early 1980s. The supposition was that such projects would be better adapted to local environmental and human conditions. However, the ostensible change in policy did not initiate a corresponding change in the structure and content of activities in the agricultural service. Officers were expected to simply revise their methods of work to fit a smaller scale of interventions, still based on the delivery of "improved techniques" with accompanying inputs.

The focus on small-scale, local level interventions in rural development has not been complimented by a comprehensive review of the structure of the agricultural service. The implications of focusing on local level development initiated from the bottom up ("de la base") have not yet stimulated fundamental change in the curriculum for future agricultural officers at I.P.D.R., nor in the global approach of the Ministry towards development.

The extension officers in the field, particularly at the district level, are obviously struggling with the implications of these policies. They do not have a tradition of really seeing themselves as advisors to farmers. During interviews, they frequently recognized their lack of skills in techniques basic to implementing the new approach, such as group dynamics and "diagnosis" (diagnostique) of community problems. Unfortunately, their own identification of needs easily falls back into opinions based on paternalistic attitudes to local knowledge, and models of modern technological expertise divorced from existing systems of rural production.

8.3. Indigenous perspectives on the role of agriculture in the rural economy

Although the Nigerien population is overwhelmingly rural, and government and donor documents portray agriculture as the major activity of the population, farmers rely on strategies which include agriculture along with other key activities. Rural households actually combine a variety of seasonal and periodic activities which have become vital to survival. Seasonal and long-term migration of young men as labor has become a central feature of the rural economy of much of Niger. Communities rely on cash remittances to buy

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grain for subsistence in most years. Along with agricultural production for subsistence and sale, other common household activities within the village include animal husbandry, a range of handicrafts, and food processing for sale. Indeed, evidence suggests that production of food for household subsistence is no longer a major, or sufficient, activity. The household relies on the combination of the other activities for survival (see, for instance, Painter 1985).

Efforts at agricultural development must therefore take into account the relative importance of subsistence production to rural communities. Farmer strategies do not emphasize investment to increase production, but rather minimize risk - including investments - as part of a strategy to maximize returns in a general environment unfavorable to reliable production. Farmers reject "improvements" which are costly, and sometimes even counterproductive under some circumstances (such as the use of fertilizers during a drought).

9. Equity and rural development programs

Both Niger government and international donor agencies are interested in seeing a wide distribution of resources from rural development programs, though certainly based on rather different motivations and objectives. Donor agencies ostensibly focus on sustainable development for the rural population, with particular concern for equity and reducing (extreme) poverty. The Niger government concentrates on the delicate questions of balancing the competing regional, ethnic and other demands for limited resources to maintain social and political equilibrium. These goals are not necessarily in conflict, though the latter is more biased towards privileged groups or individuals that actually have more political weight with the government, such as the urban populations, the educated and the clients of prominent figures.

9.1. Social stratification and rural elites

Most Nigerien societies have historically been highly stratified. The legacy of the old Sahelian empires and city states subdivided communities into a complex of groups of ascribed status, generally including nobles, freemen (Agriculturalists), certain categories of craftsmen or members of trades (such as blacksmiths and butchers/leatherworkers), and slaves. Differentiation within these groups varied, and some of the societies had finer, more elaborate distinctions within categories. All of the major ethno-linguistic groups in Niger - the Hausa, Kanuri, Songhay-Zarma and Tuareg - inherited such traditions.

The colonial and independence periods both reinforced and rearranged pre-existing stratification. Certain "traditional" leaders and the nobility continue to exercise considerable authority within their territories. Although the abolition of slavery stimulated major social changes, the society has remained differentiated and ascribed membership to a particular group still plays a central role in social status, occupational choice and marriage. Nevertheless, traditional values have come into conflict with social change as individuals of lower status - such as former slaves - have become government officials or merchants.

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Rural communities have not escaped from change. Some freed slaves have been able to change their economic - though not necessarily their social - status by taking advantage of opportunities for generating income from labor migration. They have also claimed land for household cultivation, though the distribution and quality of such land varies according to region.

Stratification, with the inevitable inequality of distribution of and access to resources, is thus a feature of the rural Nigerien landscape. The government has institutionalized these structures by making the "traditional" authorities as the widest extension of the territorial administration. Under these circumstances, the national leadership will be reluctant to foster new structures that would pose a potential threat to actual stability.

The general population is not destitute, however, most of the rural population still has access to land and other means of gaining cash or kind resources. The tremendous mobility of the Sahelian population, at least the young male population, has also significantly increased their opportunities. Community members are therefore not disenfranchised, and certainly can express opinion, and exert influence, within the forums internal to the community. In the extreme, Nigeriens have been able to vote with their feet since the colonization early in this century.

9.2. Women

Women have not figured prominently in programs aimed at rural development. Activities have generally focused on areas commonly associated with women only, such as child care, sewing and cooking (popularizing improved wood stoves). The general prejudices of both Nigeriens and expatriates have severely limited the scope and impact of any efforts. The lack of insight or imagination, relevant policies and objectives, and appropriate human resources have meant ineffective programs, perpetuating the marginalization of "women in development."

Women are scarce as staff in the rural development technical services, though their recruitment has increased. The government has created a Ministry for Social Affairs and Women's Promotion within the last two years, directed by a woman, which is searching for goals and activities. Unfortunately, the artificial compartmentalization of "women's development" from addressing the global organization of rural production makes effective intervention quite difficult (or impossible?).

The search for women-specific activities, combined with misinformed or preconceived notions about women's actual occupations, inspire significant errors. For instance, donor agencies in Niger are currently fascinated with the vistas for women in "fattening sheep" (embouche ovine). Research in at least the Maradi region indicates that women have no interest in or reason to engage in such an activity for commercial purposes. Instead, they raise and multiply small ruminants for sale as a significant means of savings and future income (Djibo 1990). Donor insistence on a misconceived intervention coupled with misplaced enthusiasm from the relevant technical services, could lead in this case to inevitable disappointment and yet another "failure" for women in development in Niger.

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The inclusion of women in ASDG II supported activities will require putting them into the proper perspective as an integral part of the global rural economy. Improvements in rural production and environmental sustainability will therefore have both direct and indirect impacts on women, even if the activities are not all specifically focused on this group.

10. Conclusions and Recommendations

10.1. General remarks

The previous historical and recent relationships in Niger between government officials, from both the technical services and the territorial administration, and the rural populations have not established traditions for collaboration in development. In general, the national leadership has focused on consolidating and maintaining power based on a collusion between the government and "traditional authorities." The exclusion of any association outside strict government surveillance is one facet of efforts to tightly control "regional," ethnic and other tensions. Indeed, indigenous Nigerien associations such as the Samaria and village cooperatives are really at best quasi-governmental creations, fitting neatly into a national, stratified hierarchy. The civil service, constituting the largest salaried and most educated group, has not escaped from strict supervision and direction based on criteria far removed from concern for successful technical performance. Unfortunately, previous experience suggests that the leadership has not had a vision allowing for some complementarity between their search for political stability and the requisites for successful rural extension and development.

There are positive, and increasing, examples of steps to solicit local participation in the identification, execution and evaluation of rural development. In both decree and deed, the government has bestowed greater rights to rural communities in the management of natural resources (for instance, in natural forest management and agroforestry). Members of the technical services now always preface remarks about any rural intervention with a description of the process of identifying and executing development based on community desires, and contributions (usually in labor or in kind). Contemporary government rhetoric certainly incorporates many terms evocative of the "new" relationship with rural populations, such as collaboration and responsabilisation. In addition, the number of non-governmental organizations have increased within the last two years, as has the scope of their activities. However, the local government services still wish to guard prerogatives to guide and monitor such organizations.

These changes remain fragile and should be accompanied by a significant effort to institutionalize precedents and apply the spirit of the philosophy of collaborative rural development. Extension officers often reiterated that the "new" approach to working with rural communities is only a few years old, and implies significant changes in mentalities and practices. The implication is that these changes are not yet universal, neither clearly understood nor systematically applied. In practice and thought, many government officials still have obviously not gone beyond offering a simple verbal repetition of the current, official government policy to visitors. Some of the older officials remember the initiatives and subsequent reversals in approach to cooperative development in the 1960s under the Diouri regime as an inauspicious precedent, and thus express some cynicism - or at least scepticism - about the future of the "new" approach.

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The agricultural service has the widest network of agents in rural areas, as well as the clearest mandate historically to carry out "extension work." The environmental service also has an key potential role in extension, but the paramilitary attributions and associations with repression in rural communities makes a transformation in roles particularly difficult. Changing the "mentalities" of officers and beneficiaries, with the accompanying revisions in training and the structure of the service, will be an arduous task. Livestock and hydraulics have virtually no tradition in extension, which will require revisions in training and attributions. USAID would therefore have most impact in the shortest period of time focusing initial efforts in agriculture.

10.2. The agricultural service

Although the agricultural service needs systemic transformations to offer more effective extension services, a variety of discrete changes can be made individually and at different times that would each have significant impacts. In general, the service is not internally organized to fulfill a role as a catalyst of improvements of the conditions of production for rural communities. Although scarcity of human and material resources are a limiting factor for officers in the field, more fundamental structural problems in the service are the fundamental factors negatively affecting performance. These dysfunctional characteristics permeate the system from initial selection and training of future agricultural officers, to posting, service and in-service training, to evaluation, promotion and further training.

In effect, officers really deliver goods ("inputs") to rural communities, rather than services (that is training and resources that can be creatively exploited by the beneficiaries). Farmers evaluate these inputs outside of a dialogue with the extension officer. They therefore accept or reject inputs based on a system of discrimination often alien to the government officials "closest" to local conditions.

The consultant has been frequently struck by the good intentions of many field staff in rural development in spite of the many factors which mitigate against motivation and action. The officers often simply do not have the necessary skills to offer meaningful services to farmers, who are professional agriculturalists with a thorough knowledge of their local environment, resources and opportunities. Other factors undermine or block individual efforts to affect positive changes.

10.2.1. Selection and Training

The criteria for selecting future agricultural (extension) officers are not based on personal background relevant to rural areas. Candidates have passed the examinations for the certificate attesting to the first level of high school education (the Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle - BEPC). Education previous to professional training is academic, and the criteria for success depend on the mastery of French and other subjects. Students of more urban backgrounds are more apt to succeed in the system, and even students of rural backgrounds become progressively more removed from their origins as they move to urban schools for four or more years as part of their education.

The candidate becomes a student at IPDR for a period of two years, before assignment to the field as a District Agricultural Officer. The level of education and practical skills after such a short period of technical training is necessarily modest. The young officer is introduced to a range of subjects pertinent to agriculture and trained in a few basic techniques and skills to offer to farmers. Future assignment and professional training after the first two years of IPDR are thus critical to the performance of extension officers in the field.

The modest academic background and level of professional training of new officers do not furnish a basis for a sophisticated or flexible approach to delivering advice to farmers. Thinking is still dominated by rather rigid "technical packages" constituted of a few components. Extension is still generally by the "demonstration" method of cultivating a field with new techniques in a few villages in each district. There are now some efforts at demonstrations also using control plots with local seed (and techniques?) and occasional on-farm trials with volunteers from the community. However, the general approach is not analytical, and does not train future officers to offer technical advice as a choice between various components based on specific contexts. The farmer is certainly not seen as a resource and veritable collaborator with the future officer. The training does not directly address the problems of educated attitudes towards the rural world.

10.2.2. Posting and In-Service Training

New agricultural officers are not assigned according to relevant strengths in their personal backgrounds, including linguistic abilities. Indeed, officers are purposely assigned to alien regions, where they are unfamiliar with the local languages, culture, society and micro-environments (and thus the basic natural conditions affecting agriculture). A well intentioned officer may soon learn basic communication skills but could hardly be genuinely effective in expressing the subtleties of distinctions in a range of agricultural domains (such as seed selection, soil quality and micro-environmental growing conditions) in less than one to two years. Even an officer assigned as a native speaker of local language in a district must (re) learn the language and culture of the rural community (see the example from the Chef de Service of Birni N'Konni).

The extreme mobility of officers within and between Arrondissements discourages learning how to adapt knowledge to local conditions and linkages to community aspirations and capacities. Posting of officers looks like a game of musical chairs directed by the heads of the agricultural services at all of the administrative levels. Opportunities for in-service training are absolutely haphazard. There are no standards for the Chefs de Service in the Arrondissements to guide the training of their staff. A new extension officer may, if quite lucky, fall under a Chef with an organized program for introducing, training and monitoring the district officer in the field. This is certainly the exception. Otherwise, the officer may receive sporadic visits and comments from the Chef, with occasional, structured meetings (such as the planning of the agricultural campaign for the Arrondissement shortly before the rainy season).

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The various forms of in-service training offered are not standardized, regular, or programmed into an officer's career. These opportunities are often financed as part of project activities, or by other programs of international donors. Neither the Ministry nor the donors coordinate these programs in order to have a global impact on the agricultural service. The training can therefore have only limited effect on officer performance, and application of the training has short-term - or no - effect on officer performance due to a lack of logistical and policy support. In-service training also has absolutely no relation to an officer's career and promotions. At worst, in these programs the beneficiaries can cynically view the opportunities as a source of supplemental income and, in some cases, travel and tourism.

Officers therefore pick up new information as possible and basically following individual inclination, hope for an occasional opportunity for in-service training and bide their time for the next opportunity to leave for long-term training, and thus future promotion.

10.2.3. Monitoring and Evaluation

District officers are expected to submit monthly reports on their activities to the Arrondissement Chef, particularly during the "saison des cultures" (rainy season). The Chef uses the information gleaned from these and other sources to make his own periodic reports to the Departmental authorities.

The field visits of Chefs are sporadic, and follow no standard programs (except, perhaps, within the new World Bank-financed program to intensify agricultural extension). The regularity of visits is at least partially conditioned by the availability of vehicles, and especially of fuel, for travel. However, the consultant had the strong impression that other matters generally have higher priority for the Chefs, such as demands of the local territorial authorities for "technical" or political functions and of their Departmental superiors. During field trips, Chefs de Service were frequently absent for these motives.

The content of monitoring and evaluation is really based on counts of inputs delivered, not on impact. Prominence is given to evidence such as: 1) the number of demonstration fields established and managed, 2) the quantity of improved seed delivered to farmers, 3) the number of villagers who have received (re) training as part of the plant protection program, 4) the volume of insecticides delivered, 5) the number of villages and villagers doing dry season gardening using delivered seed and additional materials (fencing, watering cans, etc.), and 6) the collection of statistical information on estimated crop yields within the district.

The impact of decades of agricultural extension in the rural areas on agricultural techniques and technologies is not a part of monitoring and evaluation. There is rarely mention of spontaneous adoption of innovation by farmers in target or other communities. Analysis certainly does not extend to the reasons why specific propositions are or are not adopted (and perpetuated) in particular cases. Indeed, monitoring in former target communities does not happen, and not simply because of the lack of time or means of transportation. These priorities are not institutionalized within the evaluation system.

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There is therefore little structural incentive to extension officers to effect genuine rural change through the kind of patient dialogue and tedious work necessary to catalyze subsequent transformations of agricultural techniques and technologies. Such efforts are rather a testament to individual motivation and dynamism.

10.2.4. Promotion and Career

The key questions about the linkages between fieldwork and the careers of agricultural officers can be summarized as: Is there any relationship between professional performance and promotion? Is there any relationship between impact in the field and (future) advancement? Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is...very little.

Experience in the field, or in any capacity within the Ministry, has no substantive impact on career advancement. Officers will move up in grade each year automatically, almost in spite of themselves, within the same civil service level. However, moving up in levels has no relation to experience and performance. Only long-term training can move a civil service employee between levels. In-service training and positive evaluations by immediate superiors in the field have no impact on advancement.

Long-term training is primarily based on university models of a combination of theory and research. There is no incentive and certainly no obligation to try to make the training directly relevant to former and future experiences in Nigerian agriculture. The consultant did note, however, a significantly different level of consciousness about the importance of practical training in the case of Chefs having studied in the United States.

There is no institutionalized system to relate professional performance in the field - and certainly not conscientiousness and motivation - to career advancement. Officers instead refer to connections (patron-client relations and "knowing someone" as friend or kin), favoritism for ethnic or other reasons, and other factors glossed simply as "débrouillardisme" (including trading favors, current or future transfers of resources, etc.). Blocking access to opportunities also becomes a weapon against enemies, potential competitors and outsiders. The general impression left in interviews, and the consultant's personal experience with members of the environmental service, suggest that merit is at best a minor consideration in selecting candidates for training.

10.3. The other technical services

The other technical services start from a major disadvantage of limited or no experience in extension work. The hydraulics and livestock services will have to undergo significant restructuring of training and assignment to incorporate contact and collaboration with rural populations as a priority.

The environmental service has acquired more experience in contacts with the populations, but unfortunately many of these contacts are negative. The combination of counselor and policeman does not translate into a rural image of benign paternalism in the public interest. The typical reaction to the arrival of an environmental officer in a rural community is fear and

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avoidance. For example, the consultant stopped in a fishing community on a previous occasion accompanied by two environmental officers (in uniform). At first glance the village appeared deserted, with the exception of a couple of women and children. The women told us that all of the men were absent. We camped about a 100 meters away, and as the sun gradually set in the late afternoon a few men came to inquire about the motives of our visit. In the interim, any fishing gear in sight had disappeared. Finally, in the course of the evening some of the senior fishermen and adult men came in a delegation to talk at ease, once they had understood our friendly intentions.....they had been hiding in their compounds for hours! Changing rural reactions to the service is impossible without a fundamental, consistent mandate for the conduct of field staff. Assignment of staff to projects with extension components is not a solution, and actually creates longer term problems as rural communities watch officers alternating between "extension" and "repression" at the whim of their superiors.

10.4. The rural milieu

Any program to improve the rural economy will have to take into account the social structure of different communities. Distribution and access to resources is not egalitarian. The national government relies on local leadership and the elites for the administration and organization of the general population, and is thus hesitant to initiate transformations in these structures.

Recent examples of the creation of local association and viable cooperative organizations suggest that change is possible catalyzed by external technical assistance and resources. Non-Governmental Organizations are particularly well placed to take such initiatives, as illustrated in the case of CLUSA, rural credit unions (WOCCU) and "Six 'S'". These programs taken together establish the necessary conditions for establishing genuine, independent associations: free association, management and decision-making by the membership, and access to and control of their own (financial) resources. The reaction of local leadership to such associations varies, though the CLUSA program has succeeded in working with a range of cooperative organizations. USAID will have to monitor the progress of such efforts, as conflicts for power and resources are inevitable. The collusion between the territorial administration and merchants in Tera is one case (see Section 5.3.2.). Other examples can easily be identified as, for example, the potential conflict between the CARE International supported program of cooperative development in the Baban Rafi forest and the historical control of firewood production by the Emir in Maradi.

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APPROACH TO PROBLEM
SOCIAL SOUNDNESS ANALYSIS: ASDG II DESIGN

The social anthropologist proposes the following approach to his Scope of Work (see attached). The approach takes into account two conditions: 1) the previous completion of one week of fieldwork in the Dosso and Tahoua Departments from 11 to 16 March 1990, in the company of Mr. Souleymane Aboubacar from the Project Design Office at USAID/Niger and the consultant for institutional and organizational analysis, Dr. Joy Hecht, as well as a one day visit to Dosso with the above and the consultant for public administration, Mr. Johnathan Smith, on 9 March 1990; and 2) the availability of approximately two weeks (14 days) to complete further fieldwork.

Based on earlier proposals discussed with USAID staff, fieldwork will concentrate on the Téra Arrondissement in the Tillabéry Department. The region was selected as including many of the ecological and human conditions encountered elsewhere within Niger, though situated north of the most productive agricultural areas. Nevertheless, the mix of agricultural and pastoral systems of production is characteristic of much of the country. The Arrondissement includes most forms of administrative organization found within these units in Niger: the chef-lieu of the Arrondissement (in this case, the city of Téra) with the seat for the territorial administration and the heads of the various government services, a city government (the Mairie of Téra), two administrative sub-units of the local territorial administration (the Postes-Administratifs of Bankilaré and Gothèye), at least five cantons (Bankilaré, Dargol, Gothèye, Mehanna and Téra), and approximately 280 villages.

The consultant has already established initial contacts with the territorial administrative authorities and heads of the technical services for rural development (agriculture, environment, livestock and planning) during a trip to Téra on 29 March 1990. The heads of the technical services detailed their available human and material resources, and their localization. Based on these patterns, the research would tentatively cover a sample of government officers and their beneficiaries (members of the rural communities) in order to develop a qualitative picture of perceptions and impacts of services key to rural development.

The spatial distribution of personnel from the agriculture, environment and livestock services varies a little within the Arrondissement, but most are jointly located in the seats of the major administrative sub-units (the Poste-Administratifs and the cantons).

The consultant proposes conducting open-ended interviews with three major groups: government officers (primarily outside of Téra), local cantonal and village authorities, and members of the rural population. The interviews would be individual in the case of government officers and local authorities, and with several small groups from each community in the case of the beneficiaries in order to identify the range of perspectives within each group. Preliminary discussions with the head of the Planning Office for the Téra Arrondissement, Mr. Djibo Zakou, indicate that he could put his assistant at my disposition during the fieldwork. His assistant is responsible for "community development" ("développement communautaire") within their office and has worked in the Arrondissement for approximately two and one half years. He is thoroughly familiar with the local technical services staff, the authorities in the rural communities, and the members of these communities.

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The sample could include three to five cantonal seats, and one to two other villages under the authority of these seats. Interviews would cover the relevant government officers posted within each canton. There would also be interviews of authorities and members of some of the pastoral groups within the Arrondissement (groupement and tribu authorities, as well as pastoralists).

Some comparative fieldwork in the Say Arrondissement would be interesting, given the contrast in human and ecological conditions which correspond roughly to those prevailing in the southern band of Niger. However, constraints on time will probably make such fieldwork impractical.

The tentative list of fieldsites in the Téra Arrondissement therefore includes:

- Bankilaré (Poste-Administratif and chef-lieu de canton, with a large pastoral population)
- Dolbel (village in the Bankilaré canton with an old, important Catholic Mission for the locality)
 - Dargol (chef-lieu de canton, home for one of the important regional Songhay chiefdoms before the pre-colonial period, post for the only CLUSA cooperative assistant in the Arrondissement)
 - Méhanna (chef-lieu de canton, important market town bordering the Niger River)
 - Téra (administrative headquarters for the Arrondissement, Mairie, chef-lieu de canton, important historical center for the Fulani and Songhay populations, one of the pilot sites for the innovative NGO program - "Six 'S'")
 - Kokoro (attached to the Téra canton (?), a major Songhay village)

And if time permits:

Gothèye (Poste-Administratif and chef-lieu de canton)

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FIELDWORK QUESTIONS
ASDG II DESIGN - SOCIAL SOUNDNESS ANALYSIS

1. Services offered by rural development staff in the field
 - a. What services do they offer?
 - b. What is their level of expertise (training and practical experience)?
 - c. How do local communities perceive their skills?
 - 1) Are they familiar with local conditions?
 - 2) Do they offer specific services of real use (such as plant protection)?
 - 3) What do they perceive as their real contribution - capital input or technical advice?
 - d. Can we evaluate the constraints due to lack of "means" (materials and operating expenses) versus "motivation"?

2. Community desires
 - a. What kind of services would the rural communities like to receive?
 - capital input and materials?
 - technical advice/assistance?
 - credit?
 - b. How do they view the impact/importance of the technical services?
 - concrete impact
 - relations with the agents
 - frequency of contacts

3. The technical service staff
 - a. Training
 - b. Personal background - region and family
 - c. Assignment - posting and length of assignment
 - d. Description of duties - calendar and activities
 - e. Resources at their disposal - infrastructure and operations
 - f. Support: from the Arrondissement, Département and National levels
 - g. Authority: their Technical Ministry versus the territorial administration?
 - h. Evaluation and advancement:
 - Who evaluates them, and on what basis?
(To what degree are they evaluated for field performance?
How important do they perceive non-professional criteria for their evaluation and advancement? For assignments and training?)
 - How do they perceive the relation between their impact on rural communities and their own professional development/advancement?
 - What incentives do they have to perform effectively in the field?
 - f. Contacts with the rural communities: which communities, with what frequency, with whom?
 - How do they describe/characterize their contacts?
[Refer to local activity reports, etc., for information]
 - g. What do they view as major constraints to their efforts? How can these constraints be addressed?
 - what can be done with or without project support?

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A FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING ASDG II POLICY REFORMS
RELATED TO NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

May 1990

Prepared for USAID/Niamey

Prepared by

Patricia Kristjanson

Conducted under contract with Abt Associates Inc.
and the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II

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Monitoring NRM Policy Reforms in ASDG II

I. Introduction

The five main objectives of ASDG II are to develop the following: a coordinated national natural resource management (NRM) strategy, more secure and transparent property rights, a more open climate for NGO's (encouraging more NGO's and increased involvement of existing NGO's in NRM interventions), decentralized decisionmaking regarding NRM and an increased role by local populations, and a shift in the role of forest agent from policeman to extension agent. These are expected to ultimately lead to the increased adoption of better NRM practices such as water harvesting, natural forest management, windbreaks, natural regeneration, private pole production, small-scale contre-saison enterprises, watershed management, along with other income diversification and intensification schemes that use improved NRM techniques. These practices are expected to result in increases in: soil quantity and quality, soil moisture, vegetative cover, yields, water quality, and biodiversity. The final impact will be sustainable increases in productivity and income levels realized by the rural population. This sequence of events is shown in Figure 1.

II. Impact Indicators

The central problem in impact assessment is to establish a link between specific actions and specific measurable outcomes. Establishing this link is difficult in the case of policy reforms because the final impact of interest (e.g. increased incomes) may be the result of a complex series of intermediate causes and effects. The effect of a particular policy change may also take many years to show up as a measurable change in the variable of interest.

Monitoring the effects of policy reform can take place at each of the six levels shown in Figure 1. At the first level, monitoring the actual process of policy change as laws and regulations are changed or new laws are formulated will be important as Niger revises and defines its new Rural Code. Indicators can be identified that will give USAID some idea of the advancement of the process - I have called these process indicators. At the second, third, and fourth level, short to medium-run (1 to 5 years) impacts of policy changes can be monitored with the identification of intermediate impact indicators. For example, the number of hectares of natural forest under management plans can be monitored. While this does not give us a measure of the impact of managed forests on rural incomes, it provides information as to the success of policy changes aimed at increasing the area of natural forest that is being managed locally. At the fifth level, biophysical indicators measuring the direct impacts of NRM practices on the physical environment can be measured. Examples are measures of soil fertility or water quality. At the sixth level, we wish to measure the impact of policy reform on rural income levels, distribution, and sustainability. Sustainability is of particular importance in evaluating the impact of reforms in NRM policies, and is also the most difficult to assess in a short time. It may not be possible to assess given a program life of five years. However, setting up a monitoring framework and establishing baseline information will facilitate monitoring over the long run as well as over the life of the program.

Monitoring the impact of policy reforms related to NRM is more difficult

than monitoring the impact of specific policy reforms such as the removal of a subsidy, since it involves reforms in property and management rights and responsibilities, i.e. changes in "the rules of the game". In the long run, changes in property rights are expected to lead to increased security of tenure and thus increased investment in the land. This will lead to increased productivity, and more income-generating opportunities. Since there are so many other factors influencing incomes (e.g. prices, rainfall), and the effects of NRM reforms will take many years to be fully realized, measuring income levels will not be the best indicator of the impact of the NRM program over the short to medium term. In the short and medium-run, indicators that are related to the more immediate goals of policy reform will be easier and more appropriate to monitor. For example, an immediate goal of USAID's NRM strategy is to increase the number of locally-managed forests, and this is something that can be easily monitored.

Since the policy changes themselves are in the process of being determined, and will come out of the new Rural Code, closely following the process of defining the Rural Code and how it is implemented will also be an important monitoring exercise. The process of drafting legislation and administrative regulations will be a lengthy process, and will be occurring over the first few years of ASDG II.

III. Monitoring the Formulation of a Rural Code (Process Monitoring)

Timing. A draft from the Technical Committee is now being revised after workshops in Guidiguir in February and in Rome in April, to be presented to the Minister of Agriculture within the next few months. It will then be presented to the leadership of the National Development Society (probably this summer), and subject to open public debate before going to the National Assembly (early in 1991).

Importance. Two underlying processes will take place as the Rural Code is implemented: clarification and formalization of resource rights. During this process, judgements will be made as to who has what rights, as well as which authority shall prevail and what rules shall govern new and unanticipated issues which may arise (Shaikh, 1990).

Monitoring this process will allow USAID to stay involved and continue to influence the process so that the objectives of ASDG II, outlined in Figure 1, can be realized.

Issues that need to be followed and possible process indicators to monitor include the following:

- o the number and content of studies that are being undertaken during the process of drafting the legislation and administrative regulations used to implement the Code. These studies may contain some useful information to be incorporated into the NRM monitoring database. The extent to which the results of studies being used in the drafting of new legislation (or the revision of old regulations), and the quality of the information used in these studies (e.g. how representative is it) are also qualitative indicators that can be monitored.

o process of registering land: decisions are being made about how to amend and/or rewrite existing statutes as to how land is registered - e.g. which is the least costly method, including specific methods to determine boundaries of property. There is a debate concerning under what conditions legal title should take the form of "enregistrement" or "immatriculation"¹. The process will start in the irrigated perimeters and densely populated agricultural areas, and depending on the cost and speed of the process, will then be extended to other dryland farms. Indicators of the advancement of the land registration process will include decisions made on the registration of each category of land use: irrigated agricultural fields, rainfed fields, etc. In the short term, any "measures transitoires" that are adopted should be monitored as well.

o the "transparence" of the entire Rural Code process is an issue. An indicator for monitoring this is the number of methods used to expose the new laws to the public (e.g. radio, televised debate of the National Assembly).

o revisions to the Forestry Code and Water Code which are within the Rural Code will also have to be monitored.

o drafting of textes d'application that support and legitimize the Guesselbodi Arrete and allow for the declassification of classified forests and management turned over to local populations.

o in the longer-run, the issue of enforcement of new laws and regulations will need to be monitored.

IV. Intermediate Impact Indicators

By monitoring short to medium-run impacts of policy reform concerning NRM, USAID will be able to follow the degree to which each of the five objectives (see Figure 1) of ASDG II is being met. For example, monitoring the number of hectares covered by management plans will give an indication of the success of USAID's goal of increased decentralization and local control over natural resources.

The process of drafting legislation and administrative regulations will proceed according to issues surrounding each type of natural resource - land, water, forests, and pastures. Without going into detail on all the issues involved for each resource, some suggestions are made as to possible variables to monitor with respect to each. Some of these variables also involve getting information from the Rural Code definition process.

1. Land

- o number of cases the Rural Code considers which attribute land to individuals or groups

¹ "Enregistrement" involves a simple registration based on declaration of property rights substantiated by local authority, and local consensus on the size and location of the property. "Immatriculation" involves a cadastral survey and legally recording the property, i.e. converting it to a modern property right.

- o what is the average size of landholding (i.e. where private ownership exists)
- o who is taking ownership (issue: increasing concentration of ownership)
- o area under land use planning (aménagement du territoire)
- o number of farmers using improved NRM techniques

Baseline information needed:

- o number of farmers currently using improved NRM techniques
- o current area under aménagement du territoire
- o number of land disputes

Since obtaining detailed country-wide information may be difficult for variables such as the number of farmers currently using improved NRM techniques, a sample of NRM projects could be chosen (which have this information available) and the results extrapolated to get an estimate of national impact. Alternatively, a specific area could be chosen and a survey undertaken. Population data can be used to determine the number of people affected if the specific area covered by an intervention is known.

2. Water Points

- o number of water points for which individual/group ownership is recognized in pastoral areas and for dry-season agriculture
- o who is being allowed access/excluded?
- o number of people affected by changes in property rights concerning water points.

Baseline information needed:

- o number of common public water points near pastoral/dry-season enterprise areas
- o size of area being affected
- o number of individuals involved

Information regarding the number of common and private water points may become available during the process of drafting the legislation and administrative regulations used to implement the Rural Code. One of the issues is what will happen to the land when "ownership" rights are granted. For example, water point degradation may be able to be monitored if baseline information exists in the form of aerial photographs.

3. Forestry

A. Natural forest management

- o number of hectares covered by management plans
- o targets of projects
- o number of hectares covered by management plans successfully implemented
- o number of people potentially affected by management plans
- o income of cooperatives from firewood sales

B. Private farm forestry

- o number of private initiatives such as pole plantations
- o development of government extension programs to encourage private NRM initiatives

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- o whether marketing studies for private initiatives are being carried out

C. Role of forest agents

- o number of forest agents undergoing extension training
- o number of fines
- o number of agents carrying out a comprehensively planned extension program

Baseline Information Needed:

- o current number of managed forests
- o current area under management plans
- o current number of people affected by management plans
- o current number of private initiatives

The number of hectares of natural forest covered by management plans can be taken out of the plans themselves. The population affected can be obtained from census data once the villages within the areas are defined. The number of private initiatives such as private pole plantations may have to be estimated through a sampling of projects. Determining the number of hectares affected by successful management plans will involve some judgement of what constitutes a success. One way of obtaining this information would be through project evaluations.

Monitoring the role of forest agents may also involve some qualitative information, since a reduction in the number of fines does not necessarily imply that forest agents are acting more like extension agents than policemen, which is one of the goals of ASDG II. The extent to which these agents are following comprehensive extension work plans may be a better indicator of the success in changing the role of forest agents.

4. Livestock

- o formation of GMP's - size and area covered by each
- o disputes involving pastoralists
- o management plans regulating pastoralists

Issues arising with respect to pastoralists and their access or ownership rights to pastures and wells are very complex and will probably be addressed in Niger over many years. One of the unintended side-effects of encouraging policy reform in the NRM area may be the proliferation of areas such as managed forests which regulate access to pastoralists. Thus it will be important to monitor the policy process with particular attention to the issues concerning pastoralists (who in general also have less of a collective "voice" in the policymaking process). Since the density of livestock is higher in agricultural zones than in purely pastoral zones, how some of the conflicts between farmers and herders are resolved will be important to monitor. As with land, the concentration of ownership is another issue which will have to be addressed in the process of formulating the Rural Code.

Because of the tendency towards sedentarization by the traditionally nomadic herdsmen, the formation of GMPs, or groupements mutualistes pastorales, has been proposed which would essentially assign specific

geographic areas to each group. The proprietorship of water points is also an important issue for pastoralists (the monitoring of this was discussed under water points).

Targets

Determining specific targets is difficult when the starting point is still unknown. Putting the emphasis on a qualitative assessment of quantitative information may be preferable. For example, the goal in policy reforms affecting NRM is not a target of the highest possible number of hectares being encompassed under management plans. In fact, given the huge increase in NRM interventions in recent years (e.g. the number of hectares of forest under NRM plans increased from 5,000 to around 200,000 hectares from 1986 to 1989), and the number of donors involved, an important goal of ASDG II is increased coordination between donors and a more coherent national (and donor) NRM strategy. More important than the number of hectares targetted is monitoring whether realistic management plans are being developed and implemented.

Timing

Effective monitoring of the impact of ASDG II will require good baseline data from the start of the program. It is recommended that an interim assessment be undertaken 2-2.5 years after the beginning of ASDG II, with a final assessment in year 5 at the completion of the program. Much of the baseline information is available from various sources such as the Ministry of Agriculture, USAID, and PVO's. It is recommended that someone be designated to put together a database for monitoring policy reforms affecting NRM within the next few months. This could be done using a simple spreadsheet format.

Monitoring Rural Incomes

The ultimate goal of ASDG II is to achieve sustainable increases in rural incomes in Niger. Up to this point, methods of monitoring intermediate impacts of policy reforms have been discussed. Measuring and monitoring the final impact on incomes will require good baseline information on rural incomes.

The IFPRI/INRAN rural income survey currently underway will constitute the best baseline income information available for Niger. It is an extremely detailed, labor-intensive study that is difficult and expensive to carry out. From this study, it will be possible to determine feasible income proxies and methods of monitoring income over time. Because it will provide such valuable baseline information, every effort should be made to invest in follow-up surveys (possibly of a smaller cross section of the original households) that will monitor income changes over time.

Biophysical Monitoring

There is currently some monitoring of the impact of specific NRM interventions on productivity at the project level, and any new NRM projects initiated under ASDG II will include an impact monitoring plan. This includes

farm-level monitoring of the effects of diquettes or other NRM techniques on soil fertility, for example. An effort should be made to incorporate any existing biophysical measures of the success of NRM interventions into the monitoring database.

A more extensive study of land use and the degree of resource degradation using new technologies such as satellite imagery (as well as extensive fieldwork) will be undertaken in 1992 by a large multinational donor effort. It will cover an area in Niger of approximately 10,000 square kilometers. This area includes at least three villages currently part of the IFPRI/INRAN income survey that contains extensive socio-economic data. The database that will be provided with the two studies will thus be extremely valuable to USAID.

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PVO-NGO/NRMS PROJECT

ANNEX G.6

PVO-NGO/NRMS
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*Private Voluntary Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations
in Natural Resources Management*

PVOs, NGOs, and Natural Resources Management in Niger

A PVO-NGO/NRMS Evaluation

Consultants: Issa Sidibe, Permanent Secretary, CCA/ONG/Mali
Jean de Dieu Dakouo, Project Coordinator, PVO-
NGO/NRMS/Mali
Michael Brown, Project Director, PVO-NGO/NRMS

April 27, 1990

Presented to: The ADO & PDO/USAID/NIGER

The PVO-NGO/NRMS Project is managed by a consortium including:

**The Experiment in International Living
CARE/USA
The World Wildlife Fund/USA**

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I. Introduction

A team of three consultants associated with the PVO-NGO/NRMS Project -- Issa Sidibe, Permanent Secretary of the CCA/ONG in Mali (the Country Lead Agency for the PVO-NGO/NRMS project in Mali), Jean de Dieu Dakouo, PVO-NGO/NRMS/Mali Country Coordinator, and Michael Brown, PVO-NGO/NRMS Project Director representing the Management Consortium consisting of The Experiment in International Living, CARE/USA, and The World Wildlife Fund/USA -- visited Niger at the invitation of the USAID/Niger mission between April 14 - April 28, 1990.

The terms of reference of the consultancy were: (1) to identify the policy context within which PVOs and NGOs work in Niger (2) to identify constraints and opportunities for NGOs working in natural resource management (NRM) activities in Niger (3) to identify opportunities and constraints for promoting the emergence of Nigerien NGOs working in NRM (4) to contextualize all of the above points within the context of the SDSA I and II components of the ASDG I and II programs.

From the consultants' viewpoint, part of the rationale for having the PVO-NGO/NRMS project conduct the consultancy is that the project's mandate in Mali, Cameroon, Uganda and Madagascar -- its four target countries -- is to promote NGOs technical and institutional capacities to conduct work in NRM in each respective country. Secondly, the mission was entirely financed through PVO-NGO/NRMS funding as part of the Cooperative Agreement between EIL and USAID/Washington, and specifically out of the Special Projects Component of the project. Thus no special contracting procedures were necessary from USAID/Niger's or USAID/Washington's standpoint to get the team operative on the ground. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the considerable experience which CCA/ONG has in clearhousing information among the Malian NGO community, and in effectively coordinating a broad spectrum of NGO activities for a significant NGO cross-section in Mali at the NGO, donor, and to some extent Malian government level, has not gone unnoticed in neighboring Sahelian countries.

One justification for having expatriate consultants with little to no prior in-country experience examine a situation such as that described in the terms of reference cited above is that a relatively fresh perspective may hopefully be elicited. Though no such thing as a purely "objective" analysis of NGOs working in Niger could be expected of the team (despite its relative lack of prior "Niger specific baggage"), nevertheless each consultant on the team inevitably brought a range of biases based on prior and on-going experiences. It was the team's hope nevertheless that through its members' range of experience with NGOs and NRM in other country contexts, the set of observations and recommendations presented in this report will help to catalyze

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discussion between all involved parties in Niger. For this reason, we propose that if USAID/Niger feels it appropriate, that this document be made available to all prospective participants of the May 7-10 NGO/GON/Donor meeting in Dosso.

II. Methodology Employed

The consultancy team worked as much as possible together as a group in interviewing NGO, Nigerien Government (GON), and USAID personnel. Open-ended interviews were conducted with the following:

1. The Groupement d'Aides Privees (GAP) Bureau Executif consisting of:

Yves Pelletier, AFVP, President
 Marily Knierman, Lutheran world Relief
 Genevieve Spaak, EIRENE
 Guillaume Ayinde, Permanence GAP
 Vincent Sibout, BALD

2. IRED: Magaji Abdou
3. CARE: Joe Kessler, Jim Sumberg, Marshall Burke
4. The World Wildlife Fund: John Newby
5. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN): Susan Kenney
6. African Development Foundation: N'gade Amadou
7. CLUSA: Lisa Matt
8. Direction du Developpement Regional et de L'Amenagement du Territoire (DDRAT): Zouma Salifou, Mathieu Gracias
9. USAID/Niger: George Taylor, Erna Kerst, Tom Price, Souleymane Aboubacar, Bourahima Hamadou, Barry Rands

We unfortunately did not succeed in reaching any one of the recently formed Nigerien NGOs, despite repeated efforts.

In conducting discussions with the majority of organizations and staff mentioned above, the raison d'etre for the mission was presented up-front to everyone, along with a description of the project context from which the consulting group was coming from. This was done to clarify that unlike many consultancies, the team was not emanating from a consulting firm but was rather from the NGO world, and that the team members have to varying degrees gained, and are continually gaining, a certain experience in NGO work in NRM in a diversity of country contexts.

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The remainder of the document is organized into two sections: (1) Observations (2) Recommendations. In general, we have attempted to link recommendations to observations where appropriate in the approximate order as presented. Given the intertwined nature of many of the observations -- i.e. many of the observations are either immediate derivatives or logical follow-ons one to the other, we have attempted to present observations (and hence recommendations) in as logical an order as possible. The most general or overarching points are first mentioned, with more particular or specific points following further down.

The present document was composed together by the team, and reflects the consensus of all the team members. A French translation has also been prepared by the team for non-English speakers who gain access to the document.

Finally, the methodology used to satisfy the terms of reference was left largely up to the discretion of the consults.

III. Observations

1. In general, there is an atmosphere of cautious optimism on the part of NGOs, GON officials, and USAID personnel that the context in which NGOs work in NRM in Niger is improving for the better. The change in negotiation parameters for NGOs implementing projects of 100 Million CFA or less indicates the GON's desire to both lighten the bureaucratic process while simultaneously encouraging its own decentralization process. Specifically, each "protocole de mise en execution" between an NGO and the GON is now signable at the Departement level instead of obligatorily in Niamey (with protocol negotiation theoretically possible at the arrondissement level for projects of 30 Million CFA or less). Furthermore at another level, the stated desire of the GON to amend existing legislative texts to more appropriately consider NGO specificities (versus those of any other type of "association"), is another indicator of the GON's desire for facilitating change in the context in which NGOs work.

As for USAID, given that it is prepared to obligate as much as \$2 Million for NGO activities in NRM under SDSA I, with an unspecified amount for NRM activities under SDSA II or other ASDG II components, the importance that USAID/Niger is attaching to NGOs' potential role in NRM is clearly signalled.

2. The GON is attaching extreme significance to the amendment of existing texts as a means for facilitating NGO work in NRM in Niger, particularly in stimulating Nigerien NGOs to become actively involved in NRM and other sectors. NGOs, particularly those involved in GAP, signal the need for the government to clearly pronounce itself in public fora and the media on just how

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and why the environment for NGOs working in NRM or otherwise, particularly Nigerien NGOs, has changed for the better.

3. The NGO community has a rather unclear picture of what USAID would like to promote in its NGO NRM program, SDSA I, SDSA II or otherwise. GAP members believe(d) that USAID wants to support American PVOs and Nigerien NGOs exclusively.

On another level, most NGOs (US PVOs included) perceive the proposal submission and reporting procedures to be less than conducive (particularly regarding smaller projects) for eliciting NGO participation in USAID-funded NRM activities.

4. Much of the interest on the part of northern NGOs and GON in supporting the emergence of Nigerien NGOs appears to be functional. For the GON, the perception is that some donors increasingly wish to intervene directly as close to the ground as possible. Instead of working through expatriate NGOs which then work through intermediary Nigerien structures, these donors increasingly wish to short-cut the expatriate layer, thereby presumably increasing the proportion of obligated project funds reaching intended beneficiaries -- i.e. local populations.

Northern NGOs meanwhile perceive the lack of existing viable intermediary organizations (or structures) in Niger, between themselves and the beneficiary populations they are working with, as representing a serious constraint to long-term sustainability of processes and outputs, particularly in regard to NRM. This perception holds as true for small NGOs with limited NRM portfolios, up to higher profile NGOs with important NRM portfolios.

5. The GON is extremely sensitive as to the raison d'être of NGOs working in NRM or otherwise in Niger, and feels that "development NGOs" should be non-profit organizations. The sense of non-profit however is not totally clear, and may imply that Nigerien NGOs should not have the right to generate any revenues through overhead for instance, even if this overhead could be used to extend programming opportunities or fortify institutional capacity to undertake more work in NRM or other sectors.

6. From GAP's point of view, it is desirable for there to be a multiplicity of NGO projects and consortia operating in Niger; i.e., the burden of responsibility should not fall on any single body or forum to speak for or represent the NGO community in more than a loose, virtual ad hoc way.

7. The experience of Solidarite Canada Sahel (SCS) in attempting to insert itself into GAP to promote NGO strengthening activities in Niger did not work out well. GAP as a result is clearly not interested in assuming responsibility for projects which presuppose or require GAP to assume a major organizing

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role.

8. GAP members and some non-GAP NGOs expressed interest in participating in a program or project which could bring information and technical resources together to improve both the technical and institutional capacity of NGOs working in NRM. The opinion seems to be shared, to varying degrees given the technical capacity of the NGO concerned, that both increased information and increased technical resources available to assist in implementing NRM activities would be of great value to NGOs if appropriately packaged.

9. Certain NGOs expressed reservation about the suitability for donors and the GON to target Nigerien NGO development as a priority per se in the short-term. Some thought that "looser", less formalized structures which evolve naturally around commonly held beliefs or objectives of a particular community is of crucial importance at this point in the evolution of Nigerien society. Others suggested that emphasis should not be placed on emergent Nigerien NGOs since the existing human resource capacity and the "on-the-ground level of consciousness" as to the raison d'être of NGOs is still very limited. Focussing on Nigerien NGOs in a major way as structural entry points for NRM interventions could therefore be slightly premature.

10. If the state assumes a high profile in NGO formation as it implies it may, given the potential role for DDRAT which the document "L'urgence des ONGs Nigeriennes" outlines,, it is not clear whether emerging NGOs will be given the necessary breathing room they need to establish their identity. If DDRAT tries to maintain too close a rein on the evolution of NGO activities from the outset, Nigerien NGOs may come to resemble government instigated Nigerien Associations.

11. Nigerien associations appear to be unlikely structures from which NGOs could be formed, since most were state-inspired creations, and never necessarily reflected the needs of la base. Cooperatives originate from similar sources and have a disappointing track record in general. The potential to create Nigerien NGOs from other existing traditional structures based on ethnic, religious, or other traditional community groupings or poles of identity is not at all clear.

12. Much emphasis is being placed on the potential role for informed citizens" to group together and form NGOs. The assumption is that through a sensibilization/mobilization campaign, many people will be prepared to associate under different NGO banners for the betterment of Niger.

13. The GON feels it is its inalienable right to "orient" NGO work in Niger, in particular regard to where NGOs work, and to some extent in what particular sectors. In terms of the approach

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taken, the GON wishes to promote NRM interventions which utilize the CILSS'-inspired amenagement des terroirs methodology. This ambitious and in some manners complicated approach is still in a very early stage of development.

14. Everyone has great hopes for the seminar in Dosso bringing NGOs, Donors, and GON to discuss NGO activities in Niger. It must be noted however, that there invariably will not be sufficient representation of Nigerien NGOs at the seminar, since there are anywhere from 3 to 9 Nigerien NGOs, depending on how one wishes to define a Nigerien NGO.

15. If NGO-initiated NRM interventions are to become sustainable, many NGOs feel that much greater emphasis needs to be placed by NGOs on ascertaining the constraints, needs, and aspirations of local populations vis a vis how NRM is to be integrated into their socioeconomic systems than is currently the case. This is another way of saying that local populations must participate in NRM activities at all points in the project or program cycle. The feeling often expressed in fact is that Nigerien populations and structures operating in Niger at all levels -- farmer, association, NGO and government -- need to express themselves honestly and directly in regard to how this local level participation is to be structured and factored into NRM activities so that viable, potentially sustainable processes and outputs can be realized.

IV. Recommendations

1. In order to further improve the already improving context within which NGOs operate in NRM in Niger, clarification of the GON and various donor positions vis a vis NGOs is required. The Dosso workshop clearly represents an excellent opportunity for each side to express its concerns and aspirations, NGOs obviously included.

Both NGO and donor representatives should request clarification from the GON as to just how flexible it is prepared to be in providing a conducive context for international and national NGOs to operate. "Flexibility" here refers to the GON's level of tolerance of NGOs' (both northern and Nigerien) desire and capacity to evolve according to their defined needs and objectives for how they can best provide services to beneficiaries in NRM or other sectors. Such flexibility is fundamentally linked to the level or degree of confidence in NGO abilities and programming decisions which the GON maintains. NGOs will have a major role in conveying to GON just why it should in fact become increasingly flexible in its dealings with NGOs.

Conversely, the degree of anticipated GON participation in NGO activities from GON, NGO, and various donor viewpoints requires clarification. A fresh set of guidelines which defines each

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partner's reasonable expectations as to its own participation in terms of quality and quantity in NRM and other sectoral activities, along with definition of the limits of other respective partner's participation, is very important at this time.

2. The role of northern NGOs in support of Nigerian NGOs should focus more on support of the latter once groups of committed Nigeriens have taken the bulk of the initiative to organize themselves through their own willpower. This is opposed to emphasizing programmatic attempts to establish Nigerian NGOs in the image of particular northern NGOs.

The support provided to Nigerian NGOs, once formed, should focus on a progressive strengthening of Nigerian capacities to identify viable NRM projects, design such projects, and effectively implement and monitor such projects.

3. The nature of northern NGO support for Nigerian NGOs should at the outset focus on institutional strengthening. This includes highlighting organisational strengthening and specifically, personnel management for technical and administrative tasks. Financial management should receive attention from the outset, but should be packaged in such a way to be applicable to existing NGO capacities.

4. Donor programming for NGO activities in NRM should prioritize the establishment of processes and mechanisms which will respond to the capacities and requirements of local populations to sustain NRM activities and outputs over the long-term -- 10 to 20 years. Donor programming of "micro-realisation" activities which will not promote sustainable NRM capacity at the NGO and local levels should be avoided if at all possible.

For example, as an extreme but still not unimaginable case, an agroforestry activity is proposed by an NGO which purportedly will increase both crop and tree production through use of a particular technological package for associating legumes and trees. Instead of being proposed as a test activity the project ambitiously will target hundreds of farmers over dozens of hectares.

On paper the proposal sounds technically sound enough from the point of view of soils and climate. The proposal fails however to consider the raison d'être of targeted farmers' existing agricultural systems and specific practices regarding potential crop and tree associations. Therefore the sociocultural soundness of the intervention is dubious from the outset and with it, any potential sustainability is at best assumed.

At worst, because of the scale and methodology of the intervention, the "micro-realisation" risks being a major setback

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for what in a different implementation context could ultimately prove to be a promising technological package. At this point in time, unless there is empirical reason to believe that grass-root level structures will sustainably implement a proposed activity, there is no justification ipso facto for the work to proceed. Here a distinction must be made between "microrealisation" activities which are presumably sound from all standpoints and which therefore presuppose that the technologies to be extended are worthy of being diffused, versus project activities which in fact are really adaptive tests and are thus experimental in nature. Both deserving "microrealisation" activities and promising experimental activities should be supported in NRM programming.

5. It is not likely to be sufficient for the GON to rely on modification of juridical texts vis a vis NGOs' legal status in Niger to convince those same NGOs that the sociopolitical context for work is now favorable. Verbal declarations and clarification through dialogue at meetings such as Dosso are critical accompaniments to any textual changes, and clearly action promoting confidence to backup rhetorical statements is now of paramount importance.

"Action" could be first and foremost for the GON to assure that the texts which are modified and put into theoretical effect are emphatically enforced in both word and deed.

6. To promote a better comprehension of the goals and objectives of SDSA II, it would be laudable for the Coordination Committee of SDSA II to embrace a number international and national NGOs within the committee to identify how SDSA II earmarked funds for NGOs in NRM can best be utilized.

7. The manner in which Nigerian NGO formation is being rationalized/proposed by the GON and northern NGOs reflects on the presumed potential usefulness of local NGOs for the GON and northern NGO community's purposes. Nigerian NGOs are perceived as means towards ends for both of the latter -- i.e. for the GON, potential proliferation of Nigerian NGOs may help donors rationalize increased in-country project funding; for northern NGOs, the former may represent potential partners able to ultimately assume on-going northern NGO activities which presumably will promote sustainability.

An accent is being placed by all parties on the functionality and usefulness of NGOs to satisfy GON and international NGO objectives. There is however no consensus between the GON and NGOs as to the actual efficiency of NGO interventions in NRM, or for that matter the criteria needed for evaluating the effectiveness of NGO interventions. It therefore is desirable, without judging the philosophical grounding of this reasoning, that a levelling of perception and understanding be sought

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regarding the usefulness of NGOs and their activities on the ground.

To achieve this "levelling of perception and understanding", it is recommended that a group of NGOs take the lead, with participation from GON and donors, in preparing a workshop subsequent to Dosso. The workshop objective will be to develop an instrument and methodology which will be implemented to identify what NGO activities in NRM are effective and why.

There is justification for striving to reach some sort of consensus among the key partners regarding the effectiveness of NGO operations from both an institutional and technical perspective. Without this, the climate of mutual confidence necessary to facilitate sustainable NRM activities involving both NGOs and local populations in Niger will remain elusive.

8. The issue of NGOs and revenue generation requires some clarification. The same type of levelling of perception regarding NGO capacity as noted in the preceding point is necessary in regard to revenue generation activities.

There is considerable variation among U.S. PVOs and international NGOs regarding revenues generated through overhead charges. Overhead rates and methods of application differ markedly, largely as a function of NGOs' fundraising capacity.

The justification for NGOs' charging overhead rates needs to be forthrightly dealt with by the GON in concertation with the NGO community and donors. This should definitely be an agenda item at Dosso, for the long-term viability of Nigerien NGOs will be impacted by decisions taken on overhead levies.

It is our opinion that the ability for Nigerien NGOs to generate revenues to use for institutional strengthening and extended programming is of fundamental importance for the future viability of these NGOs. This capacity is directly correlated to their eventual ability to reduce dependency on external grant sources.

9. In many African countries now, the necessity for an NGO coordinating body has become a preoccupation of many local and international NGOs. Such is not now the case in Niger. While at some point such a coordinating body may prove to be desirable, it must evolve naturally out of a common perceived need of the NGO community. Therefore, for the time being, emphasis should be placed on creating the necessary environment for such an ultimate evolution to occur.

10. There appears to be no systematic means via any existing structures in Niger for NGOs to receive support in enhancing their technical and institutional capacities to implement NRM

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projects. It is recommended that SDSA II and/or other USAID funding sources for NGO NRM activities, focus on promoting structures which will enhance the possibility for exchange at all institutional and technical levels, both in-country and abroad.

It could be profitable for instance for mechanisms to be established which will permit both NGO and GON (and even less formal organizations') representatives to travel to other countries on exchange and training visits. Mechanisms should also be established for tapping into NRM expertise in other countries, for application in Niger.

11. It is recommended that a rapid appraisal study be undertaken to determine whether informal structures such as producer associations (not necessarily based on ethnic groupings), may be potential models for NGO formation. At the same time, a sampling of cooperatives and associations should also be investigated for potential applicability.

The feasibility of this particular recommendation could be discussed at Dosso.

12. Given that a substrata of distrust regarding all associations of any kind will likely exist for most Nigeriens for some time, and given peoples' existing perceptions of the role and function of associations, much work will need to be done to (a) guarantee Nigerien citizens that freedom to associate for peoples' own perceived needs will be granted by the GON and (b) people therefore will have a major stake and role to play at the grass roots' level in deed, and not only in rhetoric.

13. In agreeing that the GON, has the right if not the obligation to closely monitor NGO activities, it is recommended that clarification be made regarding the sense of what is meant by "monitoring". Bringing transparency to NGO activities, and proscribing abuses by NGOs of legislative concessions made by the GON in juridical modifications are all valid GON preoccupations that NGOs must (and often seem grudgingly) to be aware of.

14. Any conclusions or Action Plans decided at Dosso vis a vis the emergence of Nigerien NGOs will need to acknowledge the extremely weak representation and bargaining position of Nigerien NGOs at Dosso. Given that this meeting portends to be a path breaking event, this gap is most inopportune.

15. It is very important that the GON, donors, and NGOs surpass the stage of rhetoric in proclaiming that local people participate in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of NRM activities. To operationalize the concept of participation, it is recommended that all future NRM planning or working groups focussing on policy issues include local resource

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user representation. Developing models of partnership at the operational level should be a primary objective of all forthcoming NRM activities. This emphasis should take precedence in the short-term over significant donor earmarking of resources to promote the emergence of Nigerien NGOs. The point being that it is essential for organizations already on the ground in Niger -- donor, NGO, GON, and local resource user groups included -- to learn how to collaborate effectively with one another before injecting a major new category of actors onto the stage.

16. USAID/Niger should develop an effective "marketing strategy" for its approach to support NGOs in NRM once its NGO NRM strategy is fully clarified.

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Listing of projects related to Natural Resources Management
June 1990

- The listing includes:
- Ongoing projects
 - Projects in negotiation
 - Standby projects.

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ACRONYMS - ABBREVIATIONS -NOTES

ADF	African Development Fundation
AFVP	Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès
AMA	Agence Musulmane d'Afrique
AID	Agency for International Development
BALD	Bureau d'Animation et de liaison pour le Développement
BOAD	Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement
CCCE	Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique
CECI	Centre Canadien d'Etudes et de Coopération Internationale
CFCF	Comité Français Contre la Faim
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CFLI	Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives
COSPE	Coopération pour le Développement des Pays du Tiers-Monde (Italy)
COSV	Comité de Coordination des Organisations pour le Service Volontaire (Italy)
CWS	Church World Service
EERN	Eglise Evangélique de la République du Niger
EIRENE	Service Chretien International Pour la Paix International Christlicher Friedensdienst
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (France)
FAI	Fonds d'Aide Italien
FED	Fonds Européen de Développement
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusamme Narbeit
IDA	International Development Agency
IPAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ISAID	Institute for Study and Applied Integrated Development
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JOCV	Japan Overseas Cooperation VolunTERS
KFW	Kredelanstalt Für Wiederanfbau
LWR	Lutherran World Relief
MBM	Mission Baptiste Méridionale
OPEC	Organization of Petrollum Exporting Countries
NAHA	Office National des Aménagement Hydro-Agricoles
PODR	Projet de Petites Opérations de Développement Rural
SM	Sudan Interior Mission
STABEX	Association Néerlandaise d'Assistance au Développement Fonds de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation
UICN	Union Internationale pour la Conservation de la Nature
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

* Projects marked with an asterix (*) are those that are reported by the 1988 UNDP Report as future country assistance Projects.

- When the cost was given in dollars, calculations have been made on the basis of 1\$ = 300FCFA.

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>Compo Descr</u> (Whenever possible)	<u>Cost</u> <u>1000 FCFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Funding Agency/ Country</u>	<u>Duration (Year)</u>	<u>Starting Year/ observations</u>
1.	Goussierou, Dia & Garoua Plego Project	Integrated Development	Development of pond and intensification of cultures.	54,721.2	Diffa	Africare	5	1983
2.	Badge Koara Project	Agriculture Water	Increasing market gardening production.	38,111.4	Dosso	Africare	3	1987
3.	Sakadama Valley development	Agriculture	Food self-sufficiency, windbreaks, pond development, inputs, wells.	255,135	Dosso	Africare	2	1987
4.	Animal Resource exploitation at Farak	Livestock	Increasing sheep production especially regarding Tuareg women Wells Reforestation Literacy.	179,442	Tanout	Africare	1	1987
5.	Support to CSRD Maradi	Integrated development	-Identification-design and <u>micro-realizations</u> program management -Monitoring European Development Fund Program in dry season cultures -Inputs diffusion -Environmental protection -Cooperatives.	51,204.13	Madarounfa	AFVP	Each year since 1986	1986
6.	Support to CSRD Maradi	Agriculture	-Identification-design and <u>micro-realizations</u> program management -Monitoring European Development Fund Program in dry season cultures -Inputs diffusion -Sheep fattening -Sites protection -Cooperatives -wells.	47,261.884	Aguié	AFVP	Each year since 1986	1986

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7.	Hydraulic Brigades associations	Water	-Institution building -Wells -Management committee -Reforestation -Dune fixation -Village Woods -Water hygiene -Village tree nurseries	181,900	Mayahd	AFVP	5	1985
8.	Gardening wells	Integrated Development Water	Support to gardeners to consolidate hydraulic infrastructures.	245,000	Tchirozerine	AFVP	3	1985
9.	Azel Valley Development	Integrated Development Water	-Environment management and protection -Reinforcing hydraulic structures -Sensitizing and training peasants to new techniques -Peasant organizations -Product conservation	29,500	Azel & Tchirozerine	AFVP	2 (renewable)	1987
10.	Integrated Rural development	Integrated development	-"Terroirs villageois" studies -Management of pastoral zones -CES and Management of water points and shallows -Women's participation in the fight against desertification	22,600	Zinder	AFVP	2	1988
11.	Support to CSRD	Integrated	-Designing new development project -Participating in CSRD <u>micro-réalisation</u> program implementation and management -Environmental protection -Hydraulics -Inputs diffusion	118,894.559	Tillabery	AFVP	Each year since 1986	1986
12.	Support to CSRD	Agriculture Water	-Identification, design and management of CSRD <u>micro-réalisation</u> program -Wells -Input diffusion -Cooperatives -Site protection	84,577.079	Tessaoua	AFVP	Each year since 1986	1986

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13. Support to CSRD	Agriculture	-Site protection -Increasing revenue -Improving farmer's techniques -Training -Wells -Inputs diffusion	87,017.673	N'guigni	AFVP	4	1986
14. Support to CSRD	Agriculture	-Inputs -Training in new techniques -Hydraulic infrastructures -Sites protection -Literacy and village libraries	80,247	Mirriah	AFVP	4	1886
15. Support to CSRD	Agriculture	-campaign monitoring -Site protection -Dune fixation -Inputs diffusion -Training -Forestry nursery -Literacy -Hydraulic infrastructures	94,930	Matameye	AFVP	2 (renewable)	1986
16. Support to CSRD	Agriculture Water	-Agricultural extension -Environmental protection -Peasant organization -Hydraulic infrastructures	80,634	Mainé Soroa	AFVP	4	1986
17. Sessalé development project	Water	-Gardening wells -Dry season cultures -Site protection -Training -Literacy -Peasant organization	6,797.428	Tillabery	AFVP	Each year since 1985	1985
18. Support to CSRD	Agriculture	-Identification, design and management of <u>micro-réalisation</u> program -Forestry -Peasant organizations -Literacy -Cooperatives	12,518.28	Arlit	AFVP	1 (renewable)	1986

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19. Support to CSRD	Integrated development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Design of new programs -Participating in the implementation and management of <u>micro-réalisation</u> program -Securing economic viability of dry season culture sites -Farmers' organization -Wells 	78,967.816	Filingué	AFVP	1 (renewable)	1986
20. Support to CSRD	Integrated development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Identification, design and management of <u>micro-réalizations</u> -Monitoring European Development Fund dry season culture program -Sensitization -Input diffusion -Site protection -Agricultural extension -Sheep fattening -Training 	61,255.079	Gridanroumji	AFVP	1 (renewable)	1986
21. Tondikandia Demana Development Project	Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Promoting of ecologic and socio-economic equilibrium by restoring and improving soil fertility in pastoral zones and stopping deforestation -Sensitization and training 	85,000	Filingué	AFVP	4	1986
22. Improved wood stoves	Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Socio-economic surveys -Use and consumption of woods -Sensitization -Training -Demonstration 	16,801	Dosso/Tahoua	AFVP	3	1986
23. Artisans and Improved Wood stoves	Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Production monitoring -Wood stoves commercialization in Niamey -Applied research -Training -Survey 	16,500	Niamey	AFVP	3	1985

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24. Improved Wood stoves	Environment	-Fight against deforestation in the zone -wood consumption as domestic energy -Training and sensitization -Wood stoves diffusion -Inquiries on woods	203,806	Tchadaoua/ Aguilé	AFVP	4	1985
25. Improved wood stoves	Environment	-Participating in the national dynamics on improved wood stoves -Network commercialization and artisans -Extension -Wood consumption study -Sensitization	18,619.5	Zinder	AFVP	5	1985
26. Air/Mounts Bag-zane cooperative	Agriculture Water	-Improve economic conditions -Developing hydraulic infrastructures -Cooperative training -Reforestation -Commercialization	16,408	Tchirozerine	AFVP	2	1988
27. Ouirhamiza Project	Integrated Development	-Land regeneration by dams -reforestation -Gardening wells -Demi-lunes	-	Tchintabaraden	BALD	4	1974
28. Delegated Fund for micro-réalisation	Integrated Development	-Supporting various micro projects aiming at improving the conditions of the population exposed to drought -Training	-	National	BALD	undetermined	1985
29. Integrated rural animation in the SIRBA Zone	Integrated Development	-Food self-sufficiency -Training -Preservation and restoration of the ecological setting	87,615	Say	BALD	3	1986

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30. Improved wood stoves	Environment	-Information, sensitization and animation on desertification and means to fight it -Training	4,415.172	Agadez	BALD	1 (renewable)	1987
31. Reforestation in Tillabery arrondissement	Environment	-Greenbelt -Village woods -Training and animation of foresters, extension, agents, counselors and cooperators	25,292.55	Tillabery	BALD	3	1988
32. Peasant training in arboriculture	Agriculture	-Extending the promotion of fruit trees within the department -Developing small and medium scale fruit enterprises -Farmer training in arboriculture	11,279	Gidan Ider Konni	CARE International	-	-
33. School Tree nurseries	Training and animation	-Educating children in regards to environmental problems -Education in seeding and sowing practices	40,313.984	Dakoro	CARE International	3	1986
34. Galmi watershed Development Project	Environment	-Reduce the problem of dams sanding up -Tree plantation	32,577.624	Galmi/Konni	CARE International	3	1987
35. Tillabery Agro-forestry Project	Environment Agriculture	Food self sufficiency by restoring agricultural land -Reforestation	436,925	Tillabery	CARE International	3	1985
36. Kongougorou Hedge project	Environment	-Environment & private gardens protection -Peasant sensitization -Seedbed	1,820	Niamey	Caritas	undetermined	-
37. Kouza Tadjil project	Integrated Development	-Emergency actions -Health and nutrition education -Literacy -Gardening -Fight against desertification	1,600	Niamey	Caritas	undetermined	-

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38. Gardening Development	Agriculture	-Increasing production in the villages by improving working conditions -Gardening wells -Cooperatives -Handicrafts	2,500	Attri/Tchintabaraben	Caritas	1	1988
39. C.E.S. Project	Integrated Development, Environment	-Increasing cereal yields -Rehabilitating the environment -Improving effectiveness of population and socio-administrative structures.	50,000	Tillabery	Caritas	3	1987
40. North Dallol-Bosso Terroirs Development Phase II	Agriculture Health/Training/animation	-Securing a better protection and regeneration of the ecosystem by self-training and self development of the population in regards to the improvement of living conditions	-	Boboye	CECI	2	1987
41. Development of fertile basin	Agriculture	-Wells -Dune fixation -Enclosure -sensitization/training of peasant -arboriculture promotion -Extension technique	66,732.919	Mainésoroa	CFCF	1	1987
42. Improved Wood stoves	Environment	-Fight against desertification -Wood stoves extension -Sensitization.	9,000	Aguilé	CFCF	2	1988
43. Integrated Rural development Project	Integrated Development	-Contributing to rural development in the Goulbi N'Kaba Valley by a technical and financial support to the "société de développement" structures and to technical services. -Gardening production, village cooperative actions, reforestation, training and commercialization	321,161.895	Tessoua	COSPE	2	1987

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44. Integrated Development Project for women's promotion	Integrated Development/Women's promotion	-Improving the conditions by the development of economic activity -Promoting dry season culture -Sheep fattening -Livestock reconstitution -Village stores -Village water systems -Improved wood stoves -Training in health, nutrition, horticulture and reforestation	141,991.477	Say	OOSV	2	1986
45. Dry season culture development Project	Agriculture	-Fighting against rural exodus -Creating infrastructure that will allow the population to be occupied during dry season -Furnishing water for people and irrigation.	17,925.344	Ouallam	EERN	undetermined	1986
46. Gardening consolidation program	Agriculture	Development and consolidation of gardening by increasing agricultural production and community involvement. Support to cooperatives/ literacy/women's involvement Agricultural extension Irrigation system improvement Reforestation	245,000	Tchirozérine	EIRENE	4	1984
47. Gaïdam Tchoukou Hydro-agricultural Project	Agriculture production.	Increasing agricultural Irrigation/ Water damming/ Kouadougou bank protection	31,000	Diïffa	EIRENE	2	1986
48. Support program to village actions	Integrated development	-Helping the village people to develop themselves -Supporting village structures -Technical and material assistance -Literacy -Wells -Livestock reconstitution -Support to dry season gardens -Irrigation techniques	45,000	Filingué	ISAID	6	1985

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49. Green cover project	Integrated development	-Test and demonstrate techniques that lead to the production of increasing food production and fighting against desertification in order to arrive at a new ecological equilibrium.	-	Filingué	ISAD	undetermined	1988
50. Support to Nadara gardeners	Agriculture Training Animation Livestock	-Increasing gardening protection -Sheep fattening as source of revenue -Irrigation -Site protection -Cooperative training -Literacy -Animation	20,004.626	Illéla	L.W.R.	2	1988
51. Tillabery-Bayé Bolongou Integrated Development Project phase II	Integrated Development	-Increasing food and fruit production -Redynamizing cooperative structures -Reinforcing gardening techniques -Self - training -Site protection -Transformation techniques, extension and food products conservation -Literacy -Village libraries -Cooperative self-management	9,870.706	Tillabery	L.W.R.	2	1988
52. Yakaouda Basin development project	Integrated development	-Increasing water access -Intensifying and diversifying gardening and fruit cultures -Site protection -Cooperative actions -Literacy -Training in gardening products conservation	14,174.475	Magaria	L.W.R.	1	1988

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53. Gardening Cultures in the valley of Guidan Dan Bakl	Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increasing living standards and reduce exodus by improving agricultural techniques -Irrigation -Equipment and material -Seeds -Fruit trees -Fertilizer -Cooperation/health sensitization -Stopping desert development and protecting site. 	97,137.495	Madaoun	L.W.R.	5	1984
54. Gardening Project in Goulbi N'Kaba	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Reinforcing and promoting an agriculture of dry season cultures. -Developing and intensifying irrigated cultures -Developing the marketing of gardening products in urban areas -Site protection -Cooperative actions -Health and literacy. 	15,935.943	Agué	L.W.R.	2	1985
55. Kabeye Integrated Development Project	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increase food production -Site protection -Cooperative action -Literacy -Animal protection -Training in health -Improved wood stoves -Training in conservation and transformation techniques. 	23,318.521	Tillabery	LWR	2	1987
56. Dadinkoa Development Project	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Developing gardening and improving arboriculture methods -Improve health conditions -Fight against desertification -Cooperative promotion -Education and training 	21,152.506	Matameye	LWR	18 months	1987
57. DAZGA development Project	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Improve agricultural methods and health conditions -Site protection and fight against desertification -Cooperative promotion -Health actions and literacy 	20,241.464	Matameye	LWR	18 months	1987

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58. Bond Development Project	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Improvement and rationalization of food production by training the population to be able to assure the sustainability of development actions -Site protection -Consumption extension -Training and extension of conservation and transformation techniques -Training of women in improved wood stoves techniques -Training in health -Increase of animal production -Literacy 	42,099.201	Tillabery	IWR	3	1987
59. Zoubattan Valley integrated development proj.	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increasing agricultural production -Increase the effectiveness of rural organizations -Site protection -Experience exchange 	3,577.818	Birni N'Konni	IWR	9 months	1988
60. Gouré Development Project	Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increasing food production -fight against desertification -Rural organization promotion -Training of farmers 	89,057.361	Gouré	SIM (Sudan Interior Mission)	3	1987
61. EBRN/SIM Integrated Development Project	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Help the village people to better understand the effect of their activities on the environment and assist them to develop their methods. -Reduce negative effects and improve living conditions of the peasants -Tree plantation in cultivated land and firewood production -Tree protection -Aviculture -Demonstration of dry season cultural methods. -Improved woodstoves techniques 	112,000	Maradi	SIM	3	1985

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62. Bagaré Project	Integrated Development	-Pond development -Wells construction -Health actions -Training and literacy -Fishing.	28,461.939	Tchintabaraden	Swissaid	2	1986
63. Radijata Project	Environment	-Environment defense -Valley protection -Land regeneration and semi-lunes -Reforestation -gardening development -village firewood -Dams and kori protection -Village wells	15,000	Tchintabaraden	Swissaid	1 year renewable	1988
64. Tamszalek Valleys Integrated development and rural production	Integrated Development	-	449,099	Tchirozerine	Switzerland	3	In Negotiation
65. Mandet Kori Treatment	Environment	-	6,000	Tchirozerine	-	1	standby
66. Biological Protection of Teloua Banks Phase II.	Environment	-	8,000	Tchirozerine	West Germany	1	1988
67. Belgium Micro-realizations, Program	Integrated	-	1,024	Dosso	Belgium	4	1988
68. Pond Protection	Environment	-	18,532	Boboye	PRODR	1	In negotiation
69. North Dallal Bosso Terroirs development program	Integrated	-	255,048	Boboye	CIDA	3	1987
70. Lido village Protection	Environment	-	16,258	Dogondoutchi	CFLI	2	In negotiation

71. Bey-Bey Village Protection	Environment	-	16,258	Dogondoutchi	CFLI	2	In negotiation
72. Matankari City Protection	Environment	-	2,544	Dogondoutchi	-	-	Standby
73. Tabkin Sao Pond Protection	Environment	-	50,266	Dogondoutchi	-	-	Standby
74. Bouza pond Protection	Environment	-	15,724	Dogondoutchi	-	-	Standby
75. Zéla Integrated Project	Integrated	-	26,704	Dogondoutchi	PPODR	5	1989
76. Kargui Bango koris Protection	Environment	-	9,462	Dosso	PPODR	-	In negotiation
77. Village realization Program	Integrated	-	123,697	Dosso	Africare	2	In negotiation
78. Nakinfada village wood project	Environment	-	18,952	Dosso	-	3	Standby
79. Garankadé Koris Protection	Environment	-	18,014	Dosso	-	2	standby
80. River basin Protection	Environment	-	16,000	Dosso	-	2	standby
81. Bengouhi Integrated Project	Integrated	-	19,633	Gaya	-	2	Standby
82. Defense and soil restoration	Environment	-	69,479	Loga	-	2	Standby
83. Nutrition support in Loga arrondissement	Integrated	-	100,000	Loga	IDA	5	1989
84. South Koris Banks stabilization	Environment	-	131,140	Dosso	-	1	Standby
85. Tree plantation	Environment	-	47,627	Dosso	-	3	Standby

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86. Improved wood-stoves phase II	Environment	-	5,000	Aguié	CFCF	2	1988
87. Local service Integrated program	Integrated	-	1,300,000	Aguié	UNICEF	4	1988
88. Gazona Integrated Project	Integrated	-	23,000	Aguié	CIDA	3	1987
89. CARE Agro-forestry Project	Integrated	-	31,107	Aguié	CARE	3	1987
90. Improved wood-stoves	Environment	-	4,653	Dakoro	CWS	2	In negotiation
91. UNICEF Integrated project	Integrated	-	35,240	Dakoro	UNICEF/Fin-Land	4	In negotiation
92. Cultivation Land Protection	Agriculture	-	76,946	Dakoro	-	3	standby
93. Gadabedji wildlife reserve Project	Environment	-	373,100	Dakoro	SNV	3	1989
94. CARE Agro-forestry Project	Integrated	-	54,375	Guidanroumji	CARE	3	1987
95. Dunes fixation in Mayahi arrondissement	Environment	-	9,348	Mayahi	-	4	Standby
96. Assisted Natural regeneration	Environment	-	4,045	Mayahi	-	3	standby
97 Dunes stabilisation	Environment	-	60,181	Mayahi	-	4	Standby
98 Livestock development and support to dry season culture in Goulbi N'Kaba Villages	Integrated	-	26,978	Mayahi	MEM	4	1990

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99	Integrated rural development and Yatama valley environment Protection	Integrated	-	498,586	Tessaoua	COSPE/Italy	2	In negotiation
100	CARE agro-forestry Project	Integrated	-	56,600	Tessaoua	CARE	3	1988
101	Greenbelt around Tessaoua City	Environment	-	12,000	Tessaoua	CFLI	1	In negotiation
102	Agro-forestry project	Integrated	-	2,600	Filingué	ISAID/Solidarité Canada Sahel	6 months	1989
103	Support program to village actions	Integrated	-	-	Filingué	ISAID/Solidarité Canada Sahel	2	1989
104	Dunes fixation	Environment	-	43,041	Ouallam	Fonds Koweïtien	3	In negotiation
105	Fight against desertification	Environment	-	255,993	Ouallam	Fonds Koweïtien	5	In negotiation
106	Defense and restoration of degraded livestock areas	Environment	-	20,242	Ouallam	Fonds Koweïtien	4	In negotiation
107	Anti-erosive development at Tientchergou	Environment	-	11,201	Say	Fonds Koweïtien	4	In negotiation
108	Anti-erosive Agricultural land development	Environment	-	52,383	Say	-	-	Standby
109	Fight against agricultural land degradation in Tamou canton	Environment	-	255,582	Say	-	-	Standby
110	Dunes fixation of Kokorou	Environment	-	222,297	Téra	SOS-Sahel	4	In negotiation
111	Integrated project for child nutrition	Integrated	-	302,234	Téra	UNICEF Niger/AFVP	4	1986

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112 Anzourou Integrated project - phase II	Integrated	-	36,179	Tillabery	-	4	1987
113 Dunes fixation in Namaro canton	Environment	-	78,930	Kollo	-	3	In negotiation
114 River banks Protection	Environment	-	37,817	Kollo	AMA	2	In negotiation
115 Dantiadou reforestation Project	Environment	-	105,600	Kollo	CARE	2	In negotiation
116 North Ader Development program	Integrated	-	88,500	Tchintabaraden & Tahoua arrondissement	Swissaid	1	1988
117 Cultivation land protection of Moulela in Ader-Doutchi	Environment	-	39,044	Birni N'Koni	-	1	Standby
118 Galmi village protection against running water	Environment	-	15,726	Birni N'Koni	-	1	Standby
119 Zoubattan Valley integrated development project Phase II	Integrated	-	11,603	Birni N'Koni	LWR	1	1989
120 Improved woodstoves	Environment	-	130	Bouza	USAID	1	1989
121 Micro-réalisations test	Integrated	-	30,000	Bouza	Switzerland	1	1989
122 Azérori Kori project	Environment	-	27,000	Madaoua	CIDA	1	1987
123 Dan Atiknou agro-pastoral project	Integrated	-	3,000	Tchintabaraden	SNV	1	In negotiation
124 Kiggari agro-pastoral farm	Integrated	-	14,000	Tchintabaraden	ADF	1	In negotiation
125 Idouk agro-pastoral improvement project	Integrated	-	3,000	Tchintabaraden	SNV	1	In negotiation

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126	Environment improvement and integrated development	Environment		289,998	Tahoua commune	SNW/Holland	4	1989
127	Fight against bush fire	Environment		5,000	Gouré	SNW	4	In negotiation
128	Joint nutrition support Project	Integrated	-		Gouré	WHO/UNICEF	5	1985
129	Gouré rehabilitation	Integrated	Rural life improvement through production-increase livestock reconstitution and fight against desertification.	-	704,839	Gouré	Africare	3 years
130	Bandé Integrated Project	Integrated	-	584,71	Magaria	Africare	3	1989
131	Domestic Energy	Environment	-	15,000	Magaria	-	2	1989
132	CES/IRS Program	Environment	-	200,000	Mirriah	STABEX	4	1988
133	West Mirriah agro-forestry project	Integrated	-	411,130	Mirriah	SOS Sahel	3	1989
134	Hydro-agricultural and forestry development of Moa	Integrated	-	60,000	Mirriah	Belgium SOS Sahel	3	1988
135	North Mirriah rural Development	Integrated	-	300,145	Mirriah	FAI	4	1987
136	Protection of 57 dry season culture sites	Environment	-	120,000	Tanout	-	3	Standby
137	Projection of 500 villages	Environment	-	180,000	Tanout	-	2	Standby
138	East Damergou Project	Integrated	-	170,000	Tanout	Roger Rloce Fundation	5	1988
139	UNICEF Integrated Project	Integrated	-	375,201	Tanout	UNICEF	6	1985

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140	Improved wood stoves	Environment	-	21,500	Zinder	World Bank	3	In negotiation
141	Reforestation of Middick village	Environment	-	8,053	Zinder	-	2	standby
142	Protection-reinforcement of Middick pond capacity	Environment	-	17,456	Zinder	-	1	standby
143	Kagua Pond Integrated development project	Integrated	-	37,084	Zinder	-	2	standby
144	Natural resources development	Environment	-	774,514	Tchintabaraden	-	-	DAEP/Plan 1989-1992 Programming
145	Peri-Urban green-belt Phase II	Environment	-	502,698	Tahoua	-	-	"
146	Nlamey green belt extension Phase II	Environment	-	480,800	Nlamey	-	-	"
147	Support to the fight against desertification	Environment	-	1,957,000	-	-	-	"
148	Maggia watershed antierosive fight	Environment	-	1,957,000	-	-	-	"
149	Fight against desertification sectoral Program	Environment	-	1,009,000	-	-	-	"
150	Green cover program Dunes fixation	Environment	-	245,000	-	-	-	"
151	Extension ERZA fight against desertification	Environment	-	137,250	-	-	-	DAEP/Plan 1989-1992 Programming
152	Extension mobilization running water	Environment	-	522,000	Agadez/Tahoua	-	-	"
153	Agricultural development program and fight against desertification	Environment	-	1,159,556	Diffa	-	-	"

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154	Mayahi Terrcoirs development	Environment Integrated	-	1,267,690	Mayahi	-	-	-	"
155	Zinder CRS/IRS program	Environment	-	1,374,450	Zinder	-	-	-	"
156	Forestry project, Phase II	Environment	-	4,506,380	-	-	-	-	"
157	Forests and soil planning and use	Environment	-	565,310	-	-	-	-	"
158	Dallol Maury Phase II	Environment	-	113,000	-	-	-	-	"
159	Natural Gum-trees development	Environment	-	419,554	-	-	-	-	"
160	Agadez department Reforestation	Environment	-	355,650	-	-	-	-	"
161	Damagaran Takaya Development project	Integrated	-	630,230	-	-	-	-	"
162	Multi-goals reforestation development project	Environment	-	178,000	-	-	-	-	"
163	Nlamey natural forests development	Environment	-	392,728	-	-	-	-	"
164	Tadres Cyngetic zones development	Environment	-	100,000	-	-	-	-	"
165	Semi-arid land natural forests development	Environment	-	2,092,932	-	-	-	-	"
166	Abr-Ténéré natural resources conservation and management	Environment	-	240,580	Agadez	-	-	-	"
167	Dakoro-Gadabedgi Development Projet	Environment	-	361,398	Maradi Dakoro	-	-	-	"
168	Termi Wildlife conservation	Environment	-	152,000	Agadez	-	-	-	"

169	W Park Development project	Environment	-	5,000	Tillabery/say	-	-	-	"
170	Niger cynegetic resources development	Environment	-	670,000	-	-	-	-	"
171	Ayorou region wildlife protection	Environment	-	15,000	Tillabery Ayorou	-	-	-	"
172	Diffa rural development support project	Agriculture Livestock	-	2,088,622	Diffa	-	-	-	"
173	Diffa rural Development support project Phase II	Agriculture Livestock	-	3,587,241	Diffa	-	-	-	"
174	Tahoua rural development project Phase II	Agriculture Livestock	-	1,316,564	Tahoua	-	-	-	"
175	Zinder department Integrated rural development project	Integrated	-	2,096,437	Zinder	-	-	-	"
176	Illéla - Konni Project	Agriculture Livestock	-	5,000,000	Illéla/Konni	-	-	-	"
177	Air Valleys development project	Agriculture Livestock	-	1,208,450	Agadez	-	-	-	"
178	Oasis creation and renovation (Irhazer Boukoulou)	Agriculture Livestock	-	12,507,600	Agadez Tillabery	-	-	-	"
179	Village development Pilot program	Agriculture Livestock	-	283,071	-	-	-	-	"
180	Dosso Agricultural support project	Agriculture Livestock	-	2,205,685	Dosso	-	-	-	"
181	Bilma integrated development project Phase II	Integrated	-	738,224	Agadez/Bilma	-	-	-	"
182	Plant Protection	Agriculture	-	7,172,387	-	-	-	-	"

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183	Rural organizations development	Agriculture Livestock		1,482,000	-	-	-	-	"
184	IFAD/Niger special national program	Agriculture Livestock		3,882,149	-	IFAD	-	-	"
185	Mainé Soroa Pilot Palm project	Agriculture Livestock		343,847	Diffa/Mainé Soroa	-	-	-	"
186	North Diffa zone rehabilitation	Agriculture Environment	-	6,206,690	Diffa	-	-	-	"
187	North Tillabery Terroirs development project	Integrated	-	240,000	Tillabery	-	-	-	"
188	N'Guigui integrated development project	Integrated	-	803,737	Diffa/N'guigui	-	-	-	"
189	Filingué Terroirs development	Integrated	-	1,240	Filingué	-	-	-	"
190	Damergou II rehabilitation	Integrated	-	6,200	Zinder/Tanout	-	-	-	"
191	Ouallam arrondissement rehabilitation	Integrated	-	2,500	Ouallam	-	-	-	"
192	Cassava Banana plantation project	Agriculture	-	3,922,031	-	-	-	-	"
193	Dakoro arrondissement rehabilitation	Integrated	-	6,305,432	Dakoro	-	-	-	"
194	Maradi Fishing Project	Fishing	-Increase fish production by modern pisciculture to improve local nutrition and to increase revenue. -Technical support to the Departmental service of fishing and pisciculture by training 5 counselors (Bouaké Fishing school, Ivory Coast)	63,839.06	Madarounfa	Africare	3	1985	

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Re-training 75 fishermen at Madarounfa fishing center -Equipment credit -Cooperative constitution -offices and residence construction 						
195	Aquaculture Development	Fishing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Extension of aquaculture techniques in traditional setting -Improvement of fishing techniques management and commercialization -Training 	10,920.650	Tillabery	AFVP	4	1986
196	School APP (Practical Productive Activities)	Agriculture Livestock/ Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -create pedagogical tools with APP as support. -Initiate pupil to agricultural production. -Initiate pupil to environment protection. -Initiate pupil to maintenance and raising small ruminants and poultry. -Assure school cooperatives autonomy. 	60,000	Magaria	AFVP	4	1988
197	School APP	Animation/ Training Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -To transform the Nigerien child into an actor and an extension agent in the fight against the drought, the desertification and make him a human being capable of exploiting rationally his environmental resources. -Participate in APP development at school in order to facilitate a better educational integration within the milieu and environmental realities. -Prepare the youth to act in ways compatible with environment data. -Bring pedagogical and technical support to Primary School Inspectors and to Teachers to develop practical productive activities, to define priority topics, to define pedagogical supports, to elaborate pedagogical and technical sheets. -Stimulate village participation in the school life. 	60,000	Say	AFVP	4	1988

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198 Support to CSRD	Livestock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Development of agriculture in Madarounfa. -Increase honey demand -Organize commercialization -Increase and improve honey production -Cooperatives -Improve techniques. 	4,903.300	Madarounfa	AFVP	1	1987
199 Makalondi Apiculture	Livestock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increase the revenues of the apicultors in Makalondi region in 2 years. -Increase honey demand by means of advertisement, new markets. -Improve and increase honey production by extending performing production techniques and sensitizing the apicultors to natural regeneration of bees species. -Improve management system -Create a cooperative store. 	13,800	Makalondi	AFVP	2	1988
200 Improved wood stoves Departmental Coordination	Technology Artisanat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Participate in the national dynamics on improved wood stoves in regards to environmental protection and management -creating an artisan network -creating a commercialization network in 3 M (Magaria, Matameye, Mirria) -Extending the technique of constructing stove with local material. -Sensitization on use of wood stoves -Educative action on deforestation -creation of woodstoves unit in each arrondissement. -Monitor the works of arrondissement unit -Data collection. 	30,000	Zinder	AFVP	4	1987
201 Hydraulic infrastructure monitoring	Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Create a structure for the maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure. -Creation of management committees for water points -sensitization, animation in regards to environment improvement around water points. 	33,000	Tessaoua	AFVP	3	1985

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202 Community Initiative Fund	Integrated development	To encourage self promotion measures and to favor realizations that are results of collective initiatives.	16,000	National	BALD	Undetermined	1984
203 Emergency Fund	Aid	Support various micro-projects that aim at reaching food self sufficiency and improving living conditions by creating employment, gardens, by buying materials, by transporting food, by financing small scale activities and training.	47,500	National	BALD	Undertermined	1984
203 Village Wells construction in Maradi Department	Water	Satisfy rural population needs of water and improve their living conditions. Rural populations should participate in the construction of the wells	453,360.3	Maradi	EERN	4	1987
204 Bargouga Pond development project	Agriculture	-Contribute to food self-sufficiency -Create definite infrastructures (Wells) -Supply of seeds and fruit trees.	5,313	Ouallam	Mission Baptiste meridionale (MBM)	3	1988
205 Mondolo-Garbay Dry season Gardening project	Agriculture	Help the population of the site to reach self-sufficiency by having gardening wells, seeds and production materials.	4,311.120	Ouallam	MBM	2	1986
206 Maradi Farm School	Training Animation	Teach students improved methods of agriculture by use of cattle, fertilizer and improved seeds. Training in gardening and seedbed preparation. Activities include seedbeds, livestock, fruit trees, etc.		Maradi	SIM	Undetermined	1949
207 Tahoua city Dry Season culture project	Agriculture Water	-Contribution to Tahoua valley development -Wells construction and rehabilitation -Cooperative stores -Cooperative training -Inputs and compost.	14,287.900	Tahoua	Swissaid	1	1988

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208	ESAK Project	Water Environment	Multisectorial development actions that put emphasis on environment defense, antierosive fight, reforestation, village hydraulic with high popular participation and an important women's supporting program.	35,000	Tahoua	Swissaid	1	1987
209	Inadougou Project	Integrated Development	Multisectorial development action with emphasis on environment defense, anti-erosive fight, reforestation, village hydraulics, animation with high popular participation and an important women's supporting program.	36,017.458	Tahoua	Swissaid	3	1985
210	Maradi Agro-forestry project	Agriculture Environment	Environmental protection against wind and water erosion in order to increase agricultural production by planting wind breaks.	196,022.376	Aguilé/Tessaoua/ Guidanroumji	CARE International	Undetermined	1986
211	Tahoua Agro-forestry project	Agriculture Environment	Fight against soil degradation by protecting agricultural lands against erosion in order for the populations of Bouza, Konni, Madaoua, Illéla to reach food self-sufficiency.	262,671.447	Bouza, Madaoua, Konni, Illéla	CARE International	4	1984
212	Niger River Rice cultivation development program	Agriculture	-Streambank protection -Tree planting -Cooperatave training	-	-	European Development Fund (FED)	-	-
213	Small irrigation Project in the lower Tarka valley	Agriculture	Irrigation	-	Madaoua	FED	-	-
214	Wetlands management in Zinder	Agriculture	-Inventory and classification of ponds - Ponds development schemes	-	Zinder	FED	-	-
215	Mainé Soroa Project	Hydraulic Environment	-Small scale village hydraulics for winter gardening -Local land use planning -Dune fixation	-	Mainé Soroa	FED	-	-

216 Pastureland Mapping and estimation of Gross Biomass by Remote sensing phase II	Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Installation of a network of radiometric measures and dry matter to serve as reference for satellite recordings. -Acquisition of NOAA and spot images for the area concerned (Tahoua) -Image processing and ground processing -publishing of maps and reports -training 	-	Tahoua	France	-	-
217 Water resource Information and management support	Water/ Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Provide GON services a decision taking tool with regard to water resources in rural areas. <p><u>Measures are:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - permanent updating of water resources data - setting up a computer programming process - definition of capital investment programs based on priority criteria - organization of water infrastructure maintenance 	-	-	France	-	-
218 Forestry Project	Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Desertification control by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - observation, restoration and improved management of natural vegetative resource - reduction of the destructive effect on the environment by fuel wood gathering. <p><u>Actions planned are:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - protection and management of natural formations - Tree planting in fields - promoting, producing and planting multi-purpose trees - planting of wind breaks and small scale soil irrigation and restoration works - construction and dissemination of improved wood stoves. 	-	Filingué	France/ World Bank	-	-
219 Zinder Rural Integrated Development project	Integrated Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increasing agro-sylvo-pastoral production to strengthen community structures and to preserve natural resources with a program of activities in 25 villages on a regional scale. 	1,183,673.4	Zinder	France/ COCE	4	1986

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220 Soil Behavior project	Environment	-Experiments of anti-erosive measures -Training and retraining of senior staff Nigerien		Zurich (Zurich Federal polytechnic school (EPFL))	Switzerland
221 Dallol Maouri Palmyra Management project, Ph III	Management Environment	Transfer of responsibilities of harvesting, protecting and artificial regeneration to the different village councils		Gaya	Switzerland
222 Nature conservation and development in the Air Mountains and Ténéré	Environment	-Large scale restoration and conservation effort (watershed management, woodless construction studies of the natural and the human environment) - Popular participation in the management of a newly designated National Nature Reserve.		Agadez (Air/Ténéré)	Switzerland
223 Water Resources Inventory	NRM	-Water resources inventory and atlas of Niger -Institutional support to various organizations (OPEDES, Ministry of hydraulics and Environment, University of Niamey)	3,000,000		
224 Small Rural Development operations	Integrated	-Small natural resource management activities in six arrondissements		Tillabery/ Tahoua	Switzerland World Bank
225 Management of areas Surrounding Wells Tchintabaraden	Environment	Following wells development and tree planting, the objectives of the project are to integrate the immediate needs of sedentary and nomadic populations in the village level natural resource management plan with the long term needs to restore and protect the presently degraded environment surrounding the deep wells in the arrondissement.		Tchintabaraden (Tahoua)	Switzerland

226	Keita Valley integrated Rural development project	Integrated	Project objectives are to reduce food deficiency, arrest erosion and the destruction of soils, and to strengthen the rural farming institutions. Conditions for success is the voluntary and full participation of the population to undertake and protect the works and plantations. Techniques include DRS and CES and actions are soils protection, plantation, agricultural extension, improved livestock breeding, formation of cooperatives, credit, training, social infrastructures and the promotion of women in development.	12,968,101	Keita	Italy	7	1983
227	Mirriah Project	Integrated	micro-projects and integrated actions.	473,106.6	Mirriah	Italy	-	-
228	Damergou Valley Project Phase I	Integrated	-	3,300,000	Tanout	Italy	3	1986
229	Liptako Gourma Integrated Rural Development Project	Integrated	Long term agro-sylvo-pastoral project in the arrondissements of Teca, Tillabery, Ouallam, Filingué.	-	Tillabery	GIZ (West Germany)	15	1986
230	Tahoua Arrondissement Rural development	Integrated	Rural development, diguettes and dams as part of a water conservation program	-	Tahoua	GIZ	14	1980
231	Biological streambank protection of the Téloua Valley in the AIR	Environment	-	87,600	Tchirozerine	GIZ	3	1987
232	Trail maintenance teams in the AIR	Environment	Plantation and gardening	-	Agadès	GIZ	-	-
233	Improved Wood stoves	Environment Energy	Extension work, blacksmith training	-	Dosso, Tahoua Tillabery	GIZ	-	-
234	Crop Protection	Environment	Locust and pest control assistance to the Direction de la Protection des Végétaux (DPV)	-	National	GIZ	-	-

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235	"The management and Protection of natural Forests in the Niamey region" study	Environment	study of two out of 10 selected sites.	-	Niamey region	KFW	-	-
236	Reforestation in Téra Arrondissement	Forestry	The project involves dune fixation, live fencing, tree planting and water conservation	-	Téra	SNV	Phase III was scheduled to begin in January 1989	-
237	Niamey Greenbelt	Environment	At the request of GON and through UNSO, a SNV technical assistant is designing the Greenbelt forest management system based on the Guessebodi model site project	15,000	Niamey	SNV/UNSO	-	-
238	Forestry Project	Forestry	Soil management and water conservation.	-	Torodi/ Niamey	IDA/FAC/ COCE	-	-
239	Irrigation Perimeters in Say and Sadia-Aval	Forestry	Tree planting	-	Say	Belgium	-	-
240	Institutional Assistance to IPDR	Training	-Technical assistance, financing of small-scale rural operations in and around Kollo which are performed by students themselves, such as reforestation, soil reclamation. -Technical assistance to construct new educational facilities.	-	Kollo	Belgium	-	-
241	Protection des Végétaux phase IV	Environment	This project involves training locust and other pest control agents (extension agents and farmers) and the provision of training in natural resources management to the Direction de la Protection des Végétaux agents.	3,030,000	Niamey	CIDA	10	1982
242	Support to desertification control	Environment	-Soil conservation and rehabilitation -Training of farmers from 100 villages in natural resource management through village level resource planning, forestry, agro-forestry, soil and water conservation techniques	-	Dosso	CIDA	5	1989 (Phase I)

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243 Village Rehabilitation Master Plan Ouallam Arrondissement	Integrated rural development			Ouallam	Jica & Jocv		
244 Oua-Koussa Hydro-Agricultural Development project	Integrated	Major emphasis on rice production		Gaya	Jica & Jocv		
245 Planning, implementation and management of underground water resources	Water	The project will help in defining policies and reinforcing decentralized institutional capacity which will permit a national autonomous management of water resources as well as making capital investments economically feasible.	810,000	National	UNDP Netherlands Switzerland France		
246 Multi-Purpose Forest Management and agro-forestry Development	Agro-forestry	-This project covers 306 villages or 353,590 people in Kollo and Ouallam arrondissements and 253 villages or 369,110 people in Aguié and Madarounfa arrondissements. Project elements include soil conservation, dune fixation, koris correction or realignment, windbreaks, fallow restoration, regeneration of acacia albida (gao), management of classified and protected forests, creation of 200 schools and village nurseries.	694,500	Kollo/Ouallam Aguié/Madarounfa	UNDP	4	1987
247 Rural development and anti-desertification in Diffa	Integrated	The project aims to implement integrated agro-sylvo-pastoral programs particularly production of tree species and cereals. These programs will also improve crops and restore soil fertility within the scope of the anti-desertification campaign.		Diffa	UNDP		
248 Locust control office	Institutional	The project involves the setting up of a rational efficient locust control apparatus in order to ensure food security and economic performance of rural areas. The project is part of a collective action by several donors	27,150	National	UNDP		

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in addition to UNDP: Nigeria, Canada, FAO, FED, France, West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, USAID.

249	Extension of the Niamey Greenbelt	Environment	The project aims at studying the opportunities to mobilize co-funding for the implementation of the "Ancreges Verts strategy" and to support its coordination, as well as the elaboration of other complementary strategies.	90,000	Niamey	UNDP	-	-
250	Small irrigation project	Irrigation	The project provides support to the IFAD program for small irrigation and soils conservation.	225,000	-	UNDP	-	-
251	Use of Agro-meteorological and hydrological data for the development of agricultural production in Niger, Phase III	Agro-meteorology	The project ensures agro-meteorological data distribution allowing for better crop planning and better management of seed stock by farmers. This is the national component of the regional Agrhymet project.	312,150	National	UNDP	-	-
252	Semi-Arid lands and Natural Forest Management	Environment	The goal of the project is soil conservation through several actions such as the management of semi arid lands namely the natural forest management in Madarounfa forest, dune fixations and Koris realignment.	2,362,500	-	UNDP	-	-
253	Agricultural Extension support services	Institutional	The project provides central support and activities in the departments of Tillabery, Dosso and Maradi in an effort to make extension services more efficient.	-	National	World Bank	15	-
254	Energy Project	Energy	Objectives are to assist Niger in improving its performances in the energy sector by: - promoting conservation of firewood, the substitution of energy sources and the improvement of management of natural forest cover. - promoting the development of renew-	3,450,000	National	World Bank	8	-

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- able energy sources.
- promoting electric energy conservation and provision of electricity at less cost.
- improving oil exploration management
- NRM specific components include:
- elaboration of a control and taxation system of firewood.
- management of forest areas around urban areas in relation with the firewood production capacity. Preparation of firewood supply management phases, creation of rural market and firewood production zones.
- encourage a) local production and marketing of improved wood stoves; b) local production, importation and distribution of improved kerosene, gas and liquified petroleum.
- preparation and execution of a pilot project on renewable energy sources.

255	Small rural operations Integrated (SRO)		The project aims to improve the GON's institutional means to prepare, execute and evaluation SROs, as well as supplying efficient extension services afterwards. 27 model sites will be tested for natural resources management. Individual projects are to be conceived and managed by villagers in the areas of:	-	Tillabery Dosso, Tahoua	World Bank	5	1989
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Soil and water conservation - Bottomlands and ponds development - Small irrigated perimeters - village nurseries - Other activities to be identified by GON. 					
256	Water planning	Water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning, development and management of underground water in rural setting. - Personnel, equipment, training. 	812,700	All departments	UNDP	3	1988
257	Water supply	water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic actions as well as actions that will improve people sanitary conditions are to be undertaken - Personnel and equipment. 	719,400	Zinder	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNDP - UNICEF - USA for Africa 	5	1988

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258	Enair	Training	Training at Enair (Niger) and at ENSIP (Ivory coast) of Ingeneers, Technicians in water techniques and supply.	621,300	Agadez	UNDP	5	1988
259	Hydro-Niger, Phase II	Hydrology	This regional project based at Niamey aims at setting an hydrological forecasting system concerning the Niger River basin.	495,000	Niamey	UNDP	2	1988
260	Village water points	Water	- Drilling, development and consolidation of pastoral wells. - Professional services, equipment manpower, other cost (operating).	3,510,000	Zinder Maradi Diffa	CIDA	7	1985
261	Village hydraulics	Water	Technical assistance, equipment, drillings	1,574,213	Zinder Diffa	Danmark Krüger	4	1988
262	Urban hydraulics	Water	Technical assistance, equipment.	2,023,988	Zinder Diffa	Danmark Krüger	4	1988
263	Water Resources phase III	Water	Sahel water resources management, technical assistance, training, supplies.	2,700,000	-	USAID	6	1987
264	Hydraulic convention	Water	National system of hydraulic equipment management and maintenance. Other activities include drilling to satisfy water needs of the rural population, studies, equipment, training, spare parts, etc.	127,551	Tillaberi Maradi	FAC	2	1988
265	Village hydraulic and drilling	Water	Realization of 400 drillings, 10 pumping stations, training of technicians and animation.	8,100,000	Tahoua Dosso	Italy	3	1987
266	Village hydraulic	Water	Materials and technical assistance.	3,019,897.8	Dosso	Netherlands	3	1988
267	Hydraulic Program	Water	Technical assistance, reinforcement of national capacities by institutional support, training, support to OPEDES, wells and drills.	8,397,976.8	Maradi	Switzerland	13	1979

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268	Water and soil conservation	Water	Technical assistance, applied research in CES/DRS, operational studies related to natural resource preservation and to agro-sylvo-pastoral exploiting capacities.	461,379,300	Tahoua Agadez	Switzerland	4	1987
269	Tessaoua Hydraulic Brigade	Water	Satisfy the needs of the population as regard to water by creating an autonomous hydraulic brigade.	1,172,472.3	Tessaoua	GTZ	2	1988
270	Wells maintenance and management	Water	The project aims at creating and training a structure that can be operational for all activities related to hydraulic.	90,397.200	Gouré Mirriah	AFVP	3	1988
271	Pastoral well rehabilitation	Water	The project aims to improve water points along caravane road in the North of the arrondissement.	25,998.300	N'guigmi	AFVP	2	1988
272	West Air water catchment	Water	-	46,899	Agadez	BALD	3	1987
273	Water and soil conservation (CES)	Water	Increasing cereal yielding by rehabilitating the environment and by improving socio-administrative structures.	50,977.2	Niamey	CARITAS	2	1988
274	Village wells project phase III	Water	-	391,375.5	Dosso	EERN	4	1987
275	Micro-realizations	Integrated	The project aims at favorizing the development of project initiated by the village community.	750,000	National	CIDA	7	1983
276	Micro-realizations Transitory phase	Integrated	As a transitory phase the project encourages actions initiated at the village level.	480,000	National	CIDA	4	1988
277	Agricultural development project Phase II	Agriculture	Support to departmental services as regard to agricultural development and small projects. Technical assistance is included.	2,730,000	Diffa	CIDA	7	1988

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278	Micro-realizations Fourth program	Agriculture Environment	Dry season culture, reforestation, technical assistance, equipment, etc..	1,349,325.6	Zinder/Diffa	Denmark	4	1988
279	Micro-realizations	Integrated	Multi-sectorial actions	1,286,100	Tillabery Tahoua/Agadez	Germany/ GTZ	3	1988
280	North Niamey Agro- sylvo-pastoral project	Integrated	-	1,554,000	Tillabery Fillingué	Germany/ GTZ	4	1986
281	Agro-Sylvo pastoral Project	Integrated	-	31,034.4	Tillabery Ouallam	West Germany	2	1988
282	Small scale develop- ment actions	Integrated	Various actions are involved: training, agriculture, vitamin deficiency, plant protection, anti-locust fight, etc.	40,344.9	-	Switzerland	-	1988
283	Micro-realizations	Integrated	This project supports micro-realiza- tions actions through planning, self development promotion and action research.	331,034.4	National	Switzerland	3	1988
284	Natural Resources Management	Environment	The project aims to improve the population socio-economic conditions by means of CES/DRS and agro-sylvo pastoral equilibrium.	351,724.2	Tchinta- baraden	Switzerland	3	1988
285	ICRISAT	Research	This is a contribution of Switzer- land to the sahelian center of ICRISAT	806,896.5	Niamey/Say	Switzerland	7	1983
286	Cofida Small Operation	Institu- tional	The project aims to improve the institutional means to prepare, evaluate and execute various concrete rural small operations with the population.	2,586,207	Niamey	Switzerland IDA	7	1988
287	Technical Assistance to ONWA	Assistance	Personnel	82,251.6	Niamey	FED	4	1986

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288 N'guigui rural development	Agriculture	The project intends to increase both agricultural production and monetary revenues of the farmers. Other elements include technical assistance, equipment, training	356,625.9	N'guigui	UNDP	5	1986
289 Rural development	Agriculture	-	1,536,000	Tahoua	West Germany	3	1988
290 Productivity project	Agriculture	-	112,068.9	Tahoua	West Germany	5	1985
291 Palm grove development	Arboriculture	Dallol Maouri development, equipment, training and technical assistance.	1,086,207	Gaya	Switzerland	11	1980
292 Malama Project	Agriculture	-	71,367.9	Zinder	GWS	4	1986
293 Convention 229/CD/28/ NCR laboratory	Livestock	The project aims to support the central livestock laboratory and the agrostology program. Other elements include survey, resources evaluation in the South Tamesna pastoral zone, training, equipment, documentations and personnel.	102,040.8	Niamey/Zinder Tahoua	FAC/France	2	1988
294 Apiculture	Livestock	-	63,793.2	Gaya	West Germany	6	1985
295 Milk product promotion	Livestock	Increase the revenues of women producers of traditional cheese	81,685.8	Tahoua/Tchin-tabaraden	AFVP/Canada	3	1988
296 Semi-Intensive Gomba Fishing Project	Fishing	The project intends to stock 8 ponds with 8 species of fish. Other actions include cooperative creation and pond protection.	10,257	Matameye	AFVP/FED	2	1988
297 Wildlife protection	Environment	-	-	-	Peace Corps WWF/UIQN	5	1988
298 Forestry Project	Forestry	Natural forest development, rural center and greenbelt protection. Mini-nurseries, sensitization	127,551	Guesselbodi Tondikandia Torodi	France	2	1988

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299	Plant Protection	Environment	-	2,201,663.4	CILSS Regional Project	Netherlands	8	1982
300	Plant Protection	Environment	-	4,217,100	National	West Germany	14	1977
301	Forest and soil Planning and use and environment	Environment	Technical assistance and equipment.	233,620.8	Tahoua Niamey Diffa	West Germany	6	1985
302	Wildlife Protection	Environment	Equipment/technical assistance.	31,034.4	Iferouane	West Germany	4	1986
303	Gonou-Bassounga Forest management	forestry	The project intends to allow the exploitation of various forestry products by the population.	225,113.7	Gaya	DWR	6	1988
304	CEAO village hydraulics Phase II	Hydraulics	500 water points both for agriculture and livestock have been programmed.	2,697,841.8	-	BOAD/COCE	3	1988
305	Drills and water Points in the Liptako region	Hydraulics	-	2,993,700	Liptako	-	4	1987
306	Irrigated perimeters	Hydraulics	Hydro-agricultural development by means of drillings and gardening wells.	1,320,000	Dosso	BOAD	4	1987
307	Village hydraulics	Hydraulics	Realization of 271 wells and 186 drills in the departments of Tahoua and Maradi.	2,190,000	Tahoua/ Maradi	BOAD	5	1987
308	Rural development credit	integrated	The objective of the project is the preparation, evaluation, and implementation of small rural development operations. Other actions include extension, pond development.	2,790,000	-	World Bank switzerland	7	1988
309	Agricultural Sector Development Grant I	Rural development	The purpose of the Grant is to support policy formulation in the area of agricultural production. Objectives are a) to promote agricultural production by reducing political	15,874,500	National	USAID	8	1984

constraints that impede agricultural sector development, b) to maintain current investment activities and to increase the sector absorption capacity, c) to contribute to the goals of structural adjustment by minimizing the negative impacts of austerity and structural adjustment measures on agricultural/rural development program.

310 Niger Economic policy Reform Program	Institutional Policy	The program aims to promote institutional and policy reforms that favorize agro-pastoral export.	4,500,000	National	USAID	4	1988
311 Agricultural Applied Research Project	Research	The project intends to reinforce INRAN's institutional capacity to undertake applied research related to irrigated and non irrigated culture in close linkages with extension services. The project is mostly oriented towards cereal selection, agronomics, water resources utilization, soil fertilities and small scale irrigation.	6,000,000	National	USAID	4	1988
312 Rural organization development	Rural organization	The aim of the project is to support the development of self managed and participative rural cooperatives that are engaged in revenue generating activities.	2,700,000	National	USAID	5	1989
313 Sahel Water Resources Management - Phase III	Water	This is a third phase development process of a regional program that aims at collecting, treating and analyzing meteorological data that will be transmitted to agricultural planning specialists, early warning agencies and to funding agencies.	2,700,000	National/ Regional	USAID	5	1987
314 Human Resources development Assistance	Human Resources	This training program will contribute to respond to training needs in Niger. It is composed of a short term training in Niger and technical and university short and long term training program in the USA and West African Francophone countries for students and Nigeriens professionals.	256,200	National	USAID	7	1988

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315 Africa Emergency Locust and Grass Hopper assistance	Environment	The project aims at controlling locust and limiting their impact. Activities concerned are observation of locust movement and training related to studies and fight against locust.	7,971,000	Regional	USAID	3	1987
			(Regional Africa) 342,300 (Niger)	National			
316 Peace Corps african Food Systems Initiative	Rural deve- lopment	The purpose of the assistance is to encourage and support self-assistance activities undertaken by rural communities. While the assistance is financed by USAID, the Peace Corps is the executive agency.	180,000	Say/Ouallam	USAID	6	1987
317 FED Micro-realization Program	Rural Development	-	950,263.5	National	FED	5	1976
318 Cooperatives Develop- ment	Cooperative	Irrigated perimeters and cooperatives self-management development.	999,150.3	Niger River	FED	5	1985
319 Irrigation Credit	Irrigation	The purpose of the project is to rehabilitate irrigated perimeters to increase food and agricultural revenues and to promote management.	2,790,000	-	World Bank OCCE/KFW	4	1986
320 ONWA Rehabilitation	Irrigation	-	4,336,734.6	Nlamey	OCCE	5	1986
321 Modern rice culture development	Agriculture	-	2,767,289.7	Tillabery	FED	8	1982
322 Modern rice culture development	Agriculture	-	3,925,233.6	Dairbery	FED	5	1985
323 Modern rice culture development	Agriculture	-	121,325.4	Tillakaina	FED	5	1985
324 Small Irrigation Program	Irrigation	-	8,715,558	Benza/Madaoua Zinder/Maradi	FED	5	1987
325 Bambou Milk hydro- agricultural develop- ment	Integrated	-	420,000	Kollo	OPEC	4	1986

326	Aquaculture Phase II	Livestock	-	255,102	-	OCCE	4	1986
327	Hydraulic works	Hydraulics	The purpose of the project is to improve living conditions by organizing a safe and efficient wells and drills maintenance system. Other elements include personnel, training, sensitization	369,000	Zinder	UNDP	2	1989*
328	Mayahi village Hydraulic Phase II	Hydraulics	Equipment, personnel, training.	117,600	Mayahi	UNICEF	2	1990*
329	Underground water exploitation	Hydraulics	Equipment, personnel, training.	1,267,500	Maradi	UNICEF	3	1990*
330	Hydraulic Technical Assistance	Assistance	One assistant within the Ministry of hydrology to monitor the hydraulic sector.	116,054.1	Niamey	Italy	2	1989*
331	Pumping stations maintenance	Hydraulic	The purpose is to monitor the water pumping system.	696,324.9	Tahoua/Zinder	Italy	2	1989*
332	Rural development	Rural development	This project aims to assist Niger to set up a rural development policy. It comprises experts, consultation, training.	1,080,000	Niamey	UNDP	2	1989*
333	Agricultural machinery Phase II	Research	Applied research, extension in farmer's setting and support to the development of a national policy of agricultural machinery.	450,000	Konni/Niamey	UNDP	3	1990*
334	Bilma Integrated development Phase II	Integrated	Experts, consultation, training, personnel and equipment.	1,200,000	Bilma	UNDP/FENU	3	1990*
335	Kollo United Institutes	Training	The aim of this fusion is to adapt and develop the capacities of the new institute to perform middle cadre training activities. Other components include equipment and technical assistance.	628,650	Kollo	UNDP	3	1989*
336	Terrois development	Integrated	Integrated development of farmer's setting, technical assistance, training and equipment.	638,400	Tillabery	UNDP	3	1989*

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337	Ner 2734/1 Rural development	Integrated	Fight against desertification, training, rural infrastructures and food security at the village level.	5,907,821.7	National	World Food program	3	1990*
338	Ner 3579 Rural development	Assistance	Assistance to Keita integrated project.	1,296,105	Keita	World Food Program.	2	1989*
339	Support to village communities	Assistance	The purpose of the project is to support economic activities initiated by the rural population.	1,230,000	Dosso	CANADA	6	1991*
340	Integrated program for local services	Integrated	This a multi-sectorial rural development project. Components are equipment, material, and logistic support.	1,050,000	Aguié	UNICEF	3	1989*
341	Micro-realiation Phase II	Integrated	The purpose of the project is to favorize the implementation of projects initiated by local communities.	1,020,000	National	CANADA/CIDA	5	1992*
342	Fight against desertification	Environment	The aim of the project is to support the implementation of programs of population sensitization as regard to the problem of desertification.	1,230,000	National	CANADA CIDA	4	1992*
343	Rural development Project Evaluation	Rural development	Scientific evaluation of protection and restoration action of the agro-ecological potential.	696,324.9	Keita/Damergou	Italy	2	1989*
344	Keita Rural development project support	Assistance	The aim is to support FAO activities: dams, dry season cultures, etc.	1,578,336.6	Keita	Italy	3	1989*
345	Gabou-Boufela	Irrigation Technology	Technology transfer and realization	8,123,791.2	-	Italy	2	1989*
346	Bas in development	Integrated	The purpose of the project is to exploit ponds in order to increase dry season agricultural production and to increase participant revenues. Other elements include wells, agricultural tools, seeds, training, literacy and fertilizers.	47,772.6	Magarla	Africare	3	1989*

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347	Irbaher development Project	Food security	The propose is to increase significantly the food security of the population.	20,390.7	Tchirozerine	AFVP	3	1989*
348	Faming livestock	Livestock	Support to intensive milk and meat production at the family or village level. Components include training, equipment, consultation and technical assistance.	477,000	Niamey/ Tillabery/ Dosso/Koml/ Maradi	UNDP	4	1989*
349	Milk technology	Livestock	Improvement of milk technology in traditional setting. Other elements are equipment, training, consultation and technical assistance.	243,900	Ibeceten Fako/Toukourous	UNDP	3	1990*
350	North Bakoro stock breeders rehabilitation	Livestock	Wells, distribution of animals and construction of literacy center.	58,113.9	Dakoro	USA	1	1989*
351	Fishing development	Fishing	Fishing and fish consumption promotion, training and equipment.	189,000	Tillabery/ Tahoua/ Dosso/Diffa	UNICEF	3	1989*
352	Dakoro "Terroirs" Development	Integrated	Actions include technical assistance, consultation and training.	821,100	Dakoro	UNDP	3	1990*
353	Protection against sandbank	Environment	The purpose is to elaborate a stabilization and reforestation program. Other elements include extension techniques to fight erosion. planning capacities development, training, technical assistance, equipment.	889,800	Gouré/Mainé-soroa/Diffa N'Guignl	UNDP	3	1989*
354	Development Plan/ Greenbelt	Environment	Support to the setting up of Niamey Greenbelt development Plan. Components include technical assistance and consultation.	300,000	Niamey	UNDP/ Norway	3	1989*
355	Agro-forestry development	Agro-Forestry	This is a pilote agro-forestry project, phase II - Actions concern village "Terroirs" intregated development, training, consultation, technical assistance.	1,050,000	Boboye/Loga Dosso	UNDP/ Sweden	3	1990*
356	Plant Protection Phase V	Institutional	Support to the Direction of Plant Protection, professional services, training, support to operating budget.	3,480,000	National	CIDA	6	1990*

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