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**PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MONITORING
USAID/HAITI**

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CHAPTER ONE
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
A Brief Summary of Salient Issues and Suggestions for their Resolution

The following is a summary of some of the more salient issues which arose during the TDY and suggestions for their resolution. These issues are discussed more fully in the subsequent text.

--Mission should develop managerial understanding of the program monitoring system with each division chief or sets of chiefs responsible for each strategic objective. This will lead to the assignment of responsibility within the mission for monitoring and reporting on each strategic objective, sub-objective and program output. The management contract of the mission to achieve the strategic objectives set out in the program will thus be appropriately shared and assigned.

--Although the mission makes a strong case for addressing a wide range of constraints in its program and has narrowed the range of program outputs during the course of the exercise, the large numbers of objectives to implement and monitor is considerable. The management burden this represents may require additional implementation and monitoring resources beyond current staffing levels. A careful re-examination of all program outputs in terms of their direct contribution to achievement of strategic objectives seems warranted to see if all outputs are necessary to achieve upper level objectives.

--The development of the USAID/Haiti program logframe has concentrated on USAID interventions, but a complete country strategy also calls for a careful examination of other donor and NGO activities as they may relate to the achievement of other necessary and sufficient elements of program achievement. These objectives and resources levels could be more completely analyzed in the CDSS to complete the picture.

--A more complete analysis of opportunities and strengths upon which the planned program draws would greatly strengthen the analytic basis for the program objectives. This would focus on current institutional and sector opportunities which drove the choice of program interventions.

--Each strategic objective and program output should articulate a complete set of critical assumptions in order to more accurately describe context and progress over time. An illustrative set was developed with the CDIE team but some need to be completed and revised in the final system.

--Since the program elements and ambitious scope reflect a large number of constraints which are being addressed, it may be useful to seek to prioritize or phase the interventions in order to test the likelihood of success especially for Strategic Objectives 1, 2 and 3. Program

outputs should be timed for the medium and long term as well to give some perspective on which activities are deemed most crucial for the immediate future in the planning period. The discussion in the CDSS appears to imply equal weight for all activities.

--The Mission might benefit from re-examination of the 1990 LAC Bureau CDSS guidance in order to show a closer linkage between mission and bureau objectives as currently articulated. The explanation of priority investments and focus would add to the strategy description and analysis.

CHAPTER TWO INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Scope of Work

This report's purpose is to help USAID/Haiti establish a Program Performance Monitoring System for its key programmatic interventions. When the system is operationalized, USAID/Haiti should be able to identify the information that will be needed on a regular basis to judge the impact of its various programs and progress towards the achievement of USAID's higher-level goal. This information can be used for the USAID's own management purposes and for reporting to AID/Washington and Congress.

B. The Team

The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) and Management Systems International (MSI) team was present in Haiti from August 18 through September 6, 1991. The team was comprised of: Ms. Christine Elias, social scientist/researcher affiliated with the Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, and evaluation consultant for MSI under the Women in Development Offices's GENESYS project; Dr. Thomas Marchione, Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, social scientist and research evaluation specialist with a focus on representing food assistance and food security in the Mission's program; Dr. Theresa Ware, Development Planning Office of the Latin American and Caribbean Bureau, social science and evaluation specialist with an emphasis on human resources and political development; Ms. Janet Tuthill, MSI vice president, management organization and information management specialist, and co-team leader/facilitator; and Dr. John Mason, CDIE/Labat-Anderson, Inc., senior social scientist and research evaluation specialist, and team leader.

C. Methodology

The CDIE/MSI team worked closely throughout the entire process with the Mission Director, Deputy Mission Director, and Program Officer and his staff. It enjoyed continuous access to, and support from, each of the technical offices.

Early on in the process, the CDIE/MSI team held a planning workshop in order to introduce Mission staff to the conceptual and logistical steps of the task. The workshop presented the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Bureau's Program Performance Assessment System, which represents that Bureau's approach to measuring results at the program or strategic level of impact. In that the Mission's Action Plan had recently been approved and its CDSS was being developed concurrent with momentous political changes in Haiti made the team's assistance to the Mission in refining its Strategic Objectives timely.

The team used as points of departure the USAID's basic program and project documents, historical records, current and planned portfolio, and recent evaluation experience. The objectives implicitly or explicitly reflected in these documents were scrutinized from three perspectives: their congruence with the articulated LAC Bureau objectives; their consistency with the values and judgements of the USAID staff; and their feasibility given projected resource levels and considerations of what is in the manageable interest of the Mission (see Section D. below for definitions).

The technique used with the Mission to refine their strategic objectives is the "Objective Tree" technique. That technique is used to help clarify the logic of linkages -- vertically and horizontally -- among and between higher-level strategic objectives and lower-level program outputs. These linkages are then arranged hierarchically and depicted graphically in a "tree."

Once the logic of the "Objective Tree" exercise was pinned down, the CDIE/MSI team worked with the technical offices in developing indicators for the Strategic Objectives and Program Outputs as well as, importantly, critical assumptions. Critical assumptions are those events or conditions which must be met in order for the objective or output to be achieved. These events or conditions are a function of the larger Haitian economy, society or polity and therefore not within the sphere of control by USAID.

Progress was made with the Mission in identifying Country Trend, Performance, and Program Indicators to measure progress on the Program Goal, Sub-Program Goal, Strategic Objectives and Program Outputs. Further work on these indicators and on the information systems associated with them will be necessary in the future.

D. Definitions

The initial analysis of the Mission's Strategic Objectives was done using the following framework of definitions:

Program: A program is the sum of the project, non-project, analytical studies, Title III food aid and policy dialogue actions undertaken by an A.I.D. field mission in pursuit of a given strategic objective.

Strategic Objectives: The three to five highest level objectives in USAID/Haiti's Program Logical Framework which the USAID accepts as within its manageable interest. These objectives should be stated in terms of results which are as close as possible to an actual developmental change. The results at this level should be attainable in five to seven years.

Performance Indicators: Criteria for determining or calibrating progress in the attainment of Strategic Objectives.

Performance Monitoring System: An institutionalized system for collecting and reporting program performance data on a periodic basis.

Program Activities: The inputs provided to produce Program Outputs which in turn contribute to achieving the Strategic Objective.

Program Outputs: The major accomplishments an A.I.D. field mission is willing to assume direct responsibility for in its efforts to achieve its Strategic Objectives. The results at this level should be obtainable in three to five years.

Sub-Targets: Accomplishments that contribute to achieving an Output.

Program Goal: The highest level objective in the USAID Program Logical Framework. It should be stated in terms of results which reflect developmental change. The results to be produced at this level may be very long term - i.e., ten to twenty or more years into the future.

Sub-Goal: An intervening level objective between the strategic objective and the goal in the USAID's Program Logical Framework. By definition, it is above the level of Mission manageable interest. Results at this level should be obtainable in less time than at the goal level.

Target of Opportunity: An objective or activity incidental to the A.I.D. field mission's basic program strategy but nevertheless included in its portfolio for historical, political, humanitarian, or public relations reasons.

Cross-Cutting Issue: An issue of programmatic or policy concern that permeates an A.I.D. field mission's portfolio and warrants unified planning and monitoring but which does not constitute a separate Strategic Objective.

Manageable Interest: Those elements of a USAID Program Logical Framework for which management accepts responsibility for achievement, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. The USAID will probably not control all the necessary and sufficient elements which produce the results for which it is taking responsibility. For those elements which it does not control, the USAID must monitor whether progress is being made so it can know if its objectives can and will be achieved.

Through iterations with individual USAID technical offices, the CDIE/MSI team proposed to Mission management revisions or re-articulations of Strategic Objectives, Program Activities, and Program Outputs which in the end reflected the USAID's own views of its program. The present report should be considered another iteration in the USAID process to finalize its strategy for the upcoming CDSS review and is therefore subject to further refinement.

CHAPTER THREE THE PROGRAM AND ITS PERFORMANCE MONITORING

A. USAID/HAITI Program Overview

The overall program of USAID/Haiti is represented in objective tree form in the following pages. That program is summarized below.

Mission Program Goal

The Haiti Mission's program goal is to "establish necessary conditions for the majority of Haitian men and women to improve the quality of their lives." That goal is based primarily on a decision by the Mission to support Haiti's transition to democratic government and assist in establishing the necessary conditions for private sector-led economic growth that will allow most Haitian people to improve their life quality.

Mission Sub-Goals

The sub-goals underlying the program goal are two-fold, first to support the development of "more effective and enduring democratic institutions" and, second, support "economic growth [which] leads to equitable development." These sub-goals are viewed as interdependent and thus both are seen as critical in leading to achievement of the program goal.

Strategic Objectives

There are four Strategic Objectives (S.O.s) which underpin the sub-goals and program goal. Reflecting the political development focus of the Mission portfolio are two S.O.s, first of which is "strengthened governance and representation in key public service institutions" and second "strengthened private organizations participating in an emerging civil society." The third S.O., which represents the portfolio's economic development emphasis, is "broadened private sector-led economic growth." Aimed at serving both the political and economic sub-goals in the fourth S.O., "strengthened human resource base in support of economic growth and democracy." Rather than elaborate any of these S.O.'s here, that task is completed in each of the subsequent sections. The same is the case for the program output level as well as the "critical assumptions" developed for each program level depicted in the Objective Tree.

USAID/HAITI'S
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

MISSION
GOAL

Establish necessary
conditions for the majority
of Haitian men and women
to improve the quality
of their lives

MISSION'S
SUB-GOALS

More effective and
enduring democratic
institutions

Economic growth leads
to equitable development


STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES

Strengthened governance
and representation in
key public service
institutions

Strengthened private
organizations
participating in an
emerging civil society

Broadened private
sector-led economic
growth

Strengthened human
resource base in support
of economic growth and
democracy



B. Strategic Objective Number 1: Strengthened Governance and Representation in Key Public Service Institutions and

Strategic Objective Number 2: Strengthened Private Organizations Participating in an Emerging Civil Society

The U.S. Government's (USG) most critical policy objective in Haiti since the end of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 -- as the Mission's (early September 1991 draft) CDSS underscores -- is the country's successful transition to democracy. During the past several years, almost all USG assistance was provided not to the Government of Haiti but rather was channeled to the Haitian people through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). With democracy afoot in the country since mid-1990, the USAID strategy was redirected to support the new, freely-elected Government in its transition to democracy. At the same time the strategy of working with NGOs -- whose support of Haitians' basic needs is critical -- has been continued, though in such a way that such support for NGOs has also been incorporated into the USAID democratic initiative.

One critical assumption regarding the success of Haiti's emerging democracy -- stated in the (draft) CDSS -- is the "development of democratic values and institutions at all levels of society." While not addressing that assumption directly, the USAID strategy for democracy broadly supports the development of institutions which are at the same time responsive to the people's basic needs, efficient in their operation, and accountable and transparent to the public. The USAID democratic development program directly addresses matters of (a) governance, (b) rule of law, and (c) civil society.

1. Rationale

For purposes of the USAID 1992-1993 Action Plan three Strategic Objectives for the democracy goal were stated, as follows:

SO 7: Government institutions at all levels more effectively administered and accountable;

SO 8: Improved operation of an independent, efficient, impartial, and fair judicial system;
and

SO 9: Expanded and strengthened democratic institutions operating without government interference.

These three S.O.s reflect the three basic thrusts of the USAID program in support of democratic development stated earlier, respectively, governance, rule of law, and civil society.

Strategic Objectives 1 and 2

MISSION
SUB-GOAL

More effective and
enduring democratic
institutions

STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES

Strengthened governance
and representation in
key public service
institutions

Strengthened private
organizations
participating in an
emerging civil society

PROGRAM
OUTPUTS

Increased policy and
administrative reform

Improved effectiveness
of executive branch

Strengthened political
parties at national,
regional and local levels

Strengthened indigenous
PVO and NGO capability

Increased efficiency of
administrative systems
in both chambers of the
national assembly

Effective judicial
system reinforcing the
rule of law

Strengthened independent
and democratically
oriented trade unions

Strengthened independent
media(print and elec-
tronic) throughout the
country

Continuation of free,
fair and open elections

Strengthened local and
municipal government
throughout the country

Effectively functioning
interest groups
monitoring the judiciary

Broadened access to
public and private legal
representation

Effectively functioning
human rights organiza-
tions

Improved capability of
civic, professional and
community organizations
to increase citizen
participation



For purposes of assisting USAID in developing its program performance monitoring system, the CDIE/MSI team proposed a sub-goal for democracy which is general enough to encompass the three above thrusts, yet which captures the basic thrust of the USAID democratic initiative. That thrust is directed at support for democratic institutions which respond to the basic needs of the Haitian people. The proposed sub-goal which characterizes this thrust is articulated as: **more effective and enduring democratic institutions**. While USAID is not accountable for achievement at the sub-goal level, a few general indicators (what might be called 'pattern' or 'trend' indicators) of progress towards the sub-goal will still need to be reported on. Some trend indicators are suggested in tabular form in Section 3 below. Sample sub-goal indicators are as follows:

-- increased competition among individuals and groups for positions of governmental power and

-- more inclusive political and civic participation in the selection of leaders and policies -- higher degree of civil and political liberties

The above indicators together point to a certain sense of progress in the transition of Haiti to a democratic society. They are basically qualitative in character, though they might be susceptible to rough quantification. The important result or results to report at the sub-goal level for the democratic initiative, however, are not necessarily quantifiable nor are they probably best reported in the form of a number or series of numbers. Rather, indicators at that high (sub-goal) level of national political development are closer to the idea of a **trend toward** some desired Haitian form of democracy or a **pattern of** defined democratic norms towards which Haitian society is advancing.

The CDIE team proposed a re-articulation of the three Action Plan S.O.s reviewed earlier. That restatement in two S.O.s embodies the linkage upward to the proposed sub-goal statement as well as downward to underlying program outputs. At the same time the S.O.s express intended actions which are measurable and can be realistically reported on. The first of the proposed S.O.s -- strengthened governance and representation in key public service institutions -- comprises several basic dimensions of a democratic society. These are, namely, public or government institutions which promote basic freedoms and rights and which are accountable to the public for their actions -- such as free and open elections, an independent judiciary, balance of power among government branches. The second S.O. -- strengthened private organizations participating in an emerging civil society -- encompasses the non-public, nongovernmental entities of many different kinds in society which contribute to the growth of democracy, democratic values and civil society. These include such bodies as NGO/PVOs, trade unions, political parties, the press, human rights and innumerable other interest groups.

2. Indicators and Critical Assumptions

Indicators for the democracy initiative Strategic Objectives and program outputs are presented in tables on the following pages. These tables are organized vertically in terms of the level of impact at, first, sub-goal; second, strategic objective; and, third, program output. They are organized horizontally in terms of, first, indicators and, second, critical assumptions for each of the above three levels. The proposed indicators are preliminary in nature and are not exhaustive. Measuring progress of a society or nation towards a democratic form of development is not a cut-and-dried exercise. Since "democracy" or elements of democratic development are often associated with abstract, sometimes rather lofty concepts, it is that much more difficult to calibrate results in this domain. To the contrary, when the abstraction is dissected into several, small pieces for purposes of tracking progress, the result looks like a series of "outputs" which seem to lack in power what was suggested in the original concept. Nevertheless, it is possible to attach indicators to the two political development S.O.s and their respective program outputs developed by the Mission, though here if we have erred at all, it is on the side of finiteness or concreteness.

A critical assumption is an action or event which must be completed so that conditions are conducive to achievement of results specified by a USAID strategy or program. An example of a critical assumption at the societal level of political development -- over which USAID has neither control nor responsibility for achieving results -- concerns the conditions which need to exist in order that more effective and enduring democratic institutions may ultimately prevail. The necessary condition or conditions and the critical assumptions about them are that a stable political environment endures in Haiti and that the GOH remains receptive to USG assistance in the sensitive area of democratic development.

At the Strategic Objective level -- for which USAID **does** have responsibility for achieving results and measuring and reporting on those results -- there are several critical assumptions. For governance to be achieved in public institutions, for example, several pieces of enabling legislation, over which USAID has no direct control or responsibility, must first be passed by the National Assembly. Enabling legislation for a permanent electoral commission must be passed before governance can be achieved in electoral institutions; before the government can effectively be decentralized; and before the police and military can be separated from each other.

3. Monitoring Status of the Assumptions

In tracking performance of the political development part of the program, it is essential that the critical assumptions be monitored periodically. This is especially so in the case of a program which must adjust to a dynamic socio-political process over which USAID has little if any direct influence. Monitoring critical assumptions should serve to provide signals -- stop, go, or caution -- of next steps. Details of a monitoring and evaluation (M & E) system which measures, tracks and reports on results of USAID/Haiti's political development program are handled as part of a subsequent technical assistance step. For general purposes, next steps in developing and implementing a performance M & E system are outlined in Chapter IV of this report.

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
<u>Sub-goal:</u> More effective and enduring democratic institutions	(Pattern or trend indicator) Progress towards: --meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and groups for positions of governmental power --inclusive political and civic participation in the selection of leaders and policies --a higher degree of protection of civil and political liberties	--Stable political environment endures --GOH receptive to continued USG assistance in area of democracy
<u>Strategic Objective # 1:</u> Strengthen governance and representation in key public service institutions	(Pattern or trend indicator) Progress towards: --Free & open elections --Independent judiciary --balance of power between 3 branches of Government	--Pass enabling legislation for: Permanent Electoral Commission; separation of the police & military; de-centralization of government
<u>Program Outputs:</u> <u>No. 1.1:</u> Increased policy and administrative reform	--'x' number of bills passed in 2 critical policy areas by 1994 --'x' number of administrative reforms in 2 critical areas by 1994	--GOH continues to practice transparency

LEVEL**INDICATOR****CRITICAL ASSUMPTION**

No. 1.2: Improved effectiveness of executive branch

[Note: Given political sensitivities in early phases of transition to democracy, careful selection of indicator must be made]

- 'x' # of new laws & regulations which improve financial management
- Increased # of CPAs in public sector financial management
- 'x' # of budget laws & regulations leading to reform in financial management
- Central accounting office provides leadership in setting up integrated financial management system
- High degree of political support for auditing & program evaluation
- 'x' increase in % of taxes collected by tax authorities
- Procurement & contracting laws, regulations, & procedures in place & applied
- increased attention to fiscal accountability

- Policy & research capability in place in Assembly
- Investigative staff in place
- Identification & availability of trainable support and professional staff

No. 1.3: Increased efficiency of administrative systems in both chambers of the National Assembly

- Budget bills reflect legislative input
- Increases in power of Assembly to approve or disapprove major executive decisions

- Policy & research capability in place in Assembly
- Identification & availability of trainable support & professional staff

LEVEL

INDICATOR

CRITICAL ASSUMPTION

Program Output

No. 1.4: Effective judicial system reinforcing the rule of law (provisional - depends on precise focus of Administration of Justice Program)

--Increased power of Assembly to enact laws for Haitian society
--Increased oversight by the Assembly of Government operations

--Judiciary budget fixed at a certain % of national budget as gauge of judicial independence
--Merit selection procedures for judicial appointment set and used as gauge of professionalization
--Court administrative procedure followed as gauge of judicial procedure
--Legal procedures implemented & used even handedly as gauge of judicial procedure
--More trained public prosecutors available across the country as gauge of access to judiciary
--Public confidence in the justice system increased as gauge of public accountability of the judiciary

--Adequate national budget available to meet judiciary's needs

--GOH willing to take steps to strengthen & professionalize the judiciary

--Some GOH entity in place to prepare uniform legal procedures
--Reconciliation of legal code & traditional practice

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
<u>No. 1.5:</u> Continuation of free, fair, & open elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Regular elections held at national & local levels (including parliamentary & presidential) --Increased proportion of public perceiving elections have been fair, open & free 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Effective, permanent electoral council legislated, in place and adhering to the Constitution in place --Electoral law revised & followed, enabling investigation & arbitration of charges of electoral fraud --Protection of right of free speech
<u>Program Output</u>		
<u>1.6:</u> Strengthened local & municipal government throughout the country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Responsiveness of local & municipal officials to citizens' concerns --Increased revenue amounts & sources available for local services & programs --Increased number & types of services provided locally & municipally --Increased % of public served by local & municipal government in provision of basic services --'x' # of infrastructure activities undertaken 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Decentralization legislation passed --Adequate local & national resources available & transferred to local government bodies --Enabling legislation to collect & retain local taxes
<u>Strategic Objective No. 2:</u>		
Strengthened private organizations participating in an emerging civil society	<p>(Pattern or trend indicator)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Degree of progress towards: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Freedom of speech & assembly respected

LEVEL

INDICATOR

CRITICAL ASSUMPTION

--a strong, coalescing pluralistic, civic society which tolerates opposing views
--democratic values practiced by non-governmental bodies

Program Output

No. 2.1: strengthened political parties at national, regional & local levels

--Increased level of party identification by activists
--Increased level of party identification by voting public
--Increased number of political party coalitions
--'x' # of parties maintain offices nationally, regionally, locally & with increased level of organizational identity
--'x' # of coalitions formed from small, individually-based political groups
--Continued multi-party representation in the Legislature & local bodies

--Political interests & issues coalesce at higher levels

--Toleration of loyal opposition

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
<u>No. 2.2:</u> Strengthened, sustainable indigenous NGO capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Increased linkages to international PVO/NGO & donor community --Increased number of income-producing activities --Strengthened organizational development, planning & finance systems --Increased level of PVO/NGO budgets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Enabling legislation on NGOs and independent sector passed --Availability of donor funding
<u>No. 2.3:</u> Strengthened independent and democratically oriented trade unions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Increased # of trade unions affiliated with democratic confederations --Increased # of dues paying union members --Increased # of collective bargaining agreements --Increased # of union-provided services provided to members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Political environment conducive to trade unions
<u>No. 2.4:</u> Strengthened independent media (print & electronic) throughout the country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Increased journalistic, editorial, & managerial capacity --Increased capacity for accurate, unbiased reporting --Increased capacity of media to do investigative reporting --Strengthened journalist associations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Political environment continues to be conducive to the media communicating open & freely & without censorship

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
<u>No. 2.5</u> : Effectively functioning interest-group monitoring of the judiciary	--Increased capacity by interest groups to monitor the judiciary	--Sufficient interest of civic groups to monitor the judiciary --Openness of judiciary to outside monitoring
<u>No. 2.6</u> : Broadened access to public and private legal representation	--Increased # of public defenders --Increased # of cases publicly defended	--GOH budget allocation for public defense
<u>No. 2.7</u> : Effectively functioning human rights organizations	--Decreased # of human rights abuses --Increased # of prosecutions of politically motivated crimes against individuals	--Ratification of international human rights charters --Respect in Haitian society for the rule of law continues
<u>No. 2.8</u> : Improved capability of civic, professional & community organizations to increase citizen participation	--Increased membership in civic, professional & community organizations --Increased financial resources available to civic, professional & community organizations --Improved organizational capability to promote civic participation	--Political environment conducive to citizen participation

C. Strategic Objective Number 3: Broadened private sector-led economic growth

The development of this objective draws on USAID/Haiti's initiatives in the development of investment and employment growth over the past ten years. The mission chose economic growth instead of only private sector development to emphasize its commitment to the contribution it anticipates its strategy will make to strengthening Haiti's economy. The choice of indicators for the Strategic Objectives: domestic investment, private sector investment and employment exemplify this commitment.

The two sub-objectives: promoting trade, investment and off-farm employment **and** the diversification of agriculture to meet new market opportunities show a decision to aggressively pursue a strategy that will provide growth and benefits in both urban and rural areas.

The ten key program outputs under these two sub-objectives target policy change needs, diversification of products and markets, availability of credit to men and women throughout the country who are trying to build businesses, and attention to increased production on better managed and maintained lands.

Because of the importance of the business legal and regulatory climate in the achievement of the objective of the strategy as well as the sensitivity of the economy to forces outside of Haiti, the mission has chosen a set of critical assumptions to monitor for each objective and program output which will help to explain progress over time. Some of the decisions and choices which went into strategy definition are seen in the assumption statements and give a clearer view of the constraints and opportunities implied in the program.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3


MISSION
SUB-GOAL

Economic growth leads
to equitable development

STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE

Broadened private
sector-led economic
growth

PROGRAM
OUTPUTS



LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
Strategic Objective Three: Broadened private sector-led economic growth	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gross domestic investment increases from 10% of GDP in 1991 to 16% in 1993 and 20% in 1996. 2. Private sector investment increases 14% by 1993 and 25% by 1996. 3. Formal private sector employment increases by 15,000 in 1993 and 40,000 jobs by 1996. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Legislative environment provides private sector growth incentives. 2. Market conditions and labor relations are conducive to private sector growth. 3. Jobs lost through privatization of parastatals can be offset through increase private sector growth.
Sub-objective: Promote trade investment and off-farm employment.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Value-added of manufactured exports increased by 10% in 1993 and 20% in 1996. 2. Value-added of non-traditional agricultural exports increases 20% by 1993 and 30% by 1996. 3. Off-farm employment creates 10,000 jobs in provinces and urban area by 1996. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Business regulatory environment becomes conducive to additional investment. 2. Haitian products find and expand international market niches. 3. Assisted businesses expand and create new jobs to respond to increased demand for goods.
Sub-objective: Agriculture diversifies to meet new market opportunities.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Exports of agricultural products increase as share of GDP. 2. Value-added for agriculture sector increases by x% by 1993 and y% by 1996. 3. Number of new competitive products increases each year. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prices on internationally traded commodities remain stable. 2. Haitian farmers and agri-businesses have access to credit and other inputs necessary to meet increasing demand. 3. Market information is used effectively by producers.

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
Program Outputs:		
1. Trade, licensing, import policies and regulations modified to stimulate economic growth.	Indicators to be determined as specific policy and regulatory issues are analyzed and negotiated.	1. Changes in policies and regulations are needed to promote certain economic growth opportunities.
2. Increase in value-added industry for competitive Haitian products.	2.1 Nos. of products developed per year. 2.2 Value-added in businesses assisted by USAID.	2.1 Pricing and market information available and widely used. 2.2 Market conditions are conducive to diversification of production and processing.
3. New jobs created in provinces.	3.1 Nos. of men and women employed in business sectors assisted by USAID programs increases each year. 3.2 Employment growth outside of Port au Prince for key businesses as proportion of national employment figures.	3.1. Expanded businesses are able to retain and increase their market share over time. 3.2. Skills levels necessary for newly created jobs can be found or provided by employers and private sector institutions.

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
4. Credit available to men and women in small business and microenterprise particularly in provincial areas.	4.1 Nos. of women and men receiving and paying back credit in enterprises program seeks to assist. 4.2. Nos. and size of loans made in provinces versus capital.	4.1. Conditions of loan and choice of borrowers assure good repayment rates in target groups. 4.2. Loan funds are responsibly managed to avoid decapitalization. 4.3. National interest rates make lending to small businesses cost effective and sustainable.
5. Small business men and women use credit to expand production.	5.1 Value-added in businesses receiving loans 5.2. New jobs created in businesses receiving loans 5.3 Credit used for approved purpose and repaid.	5.1 Credit is a principal constraining factor in increases in production. 5.2 Market information is available to allow businesses to respond to production opportunities.

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
6. Provincial business and microenterprise activity increases.	<p>6.1 Nos. of new businesses operating in provincial areas at end of planning period.</p> <p>6.2 Value-added from businesses in provinces as share of national private sector accounts.</p> <p>6.3 Nos. of jobs created in provinces in small and microenterprise business sectors.</p>	<p>6.1 Information and business services provide needed impetus for business growth in provinces.</p> <p>6.2 Credit for business launch or expansion is available in provinces.</p>
7. Efficiency of state-owned enterprises increases.	<p>7.1. Ratio of operating costs to revenue generated by selected state owned enterprises improves over planning period.</p> <p>7.2 More efficient state-owned enterprises are sold to private investors.</p>	<p>7.1. GOH interest in improving efficiency of state-owned enterprises is strong.</p> <p>7.2. Unemployment created by streamlining public enterprises does not deter efficiency promotion measures.</p>

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
8. Small farmers respond to expanded range of domestic and export markets and increase production.	8.1 Value-added in farming sector increases each year over planning period. 8.2. Value of products traded in domestic and export markets increases over planning period.	8.1. Domestic and international market prices provide incentives for diversification of products marketed. 8.2. Market information is available in production areas to allow farmers to respond to precise export niches which are seasonal. 8.3. Regulatory climate is conducive to market diversification.
9. Production increases on locally managed and maintained irrigation systems.	9.1. Nos. of tons of irrigated crops increases. 9.2. Cost of irrigation systems is recovered by farmers operating them.	9.1. Other constraints to production increases are held to a minimum: soil fertility, availability of credit for inputs, availability of improved varieties. 9.2. Prices for crops grown on irrigated lands offer sufficient incentive to promote expanded production. 9.3. Costs of maintaining irrigation systems are acceptable to farmers.

LEVEL	INDICATOR	CRITICAL ASSUMPTION
10. Farmers practicing improved soil/water management increase production of higher value crops for domestic/export markets.	10.1 Nos. of tons of crops produced in areas with improved resource management. 10.2 Value of crops produced in these areas is higher than for areas without improved methods.	10.1. Prices for crops provide incentive to increase production. 10.2 Areas with improved practices have higher production ratios per hectare than those without. 10.3 Inputs needed to increase production are available.

D. Strategic Objective Number 4: Strengthened Human Resource Base In Support of Economic Growth and Democracy

1. Rationale

The vast majority of Haitians live in extreme poverty without access to basic social services. The infant mortality rate is at least ten percent, total fertility rates are at 6.5%, and the national literacy rate is under 20%. The USAID/Haiti strategy to help improve this situation is two-fold. First, Strategic Objective Four flows directly from the Mission's program goal -- to establish the conditions necessary for the majority of Haitian people to improve the quality of their lives -- by contributing to the basic health and education needs of Haitian people. Program outputs in this area focus on the following:

- Health service delivery, specifically maternal and child health care, family planning, AIDS and drug abuse prevention, access to potable water and sanitation;
- Improved quality of primary school education;
- Food security, including a primary school feeding program, nutritional supplements for pre-school children at MCH centers, and emergency food relief as required.

The program strategy reflects Mission thinking that providing for the physical well-being and basic education needs of Haitians are valid ends in themselves from a humanitarian point of view. Equally important in terms of the Mission's overall program strategy are the links between this and the other Strategic Objectives. As stated in the CDSS,

"...the provision of basic services to alleviate the worst manifestations of poverty is vital to an environment of political and economic stability and, therefore, democracy and economic development in Haiti...To succeed in its development objectives, Haiti needs healthy, productive citizens."

In this light, the second strategic dimension of SO4 is a focus on enhancing the capacity of individuals to participate in and contribute to personal and national development. Beyond providing basic health, nutrition, and education services, SO4 targets two program outputs in support of the Mission's other objectives:

- Technical and leadership training for professionals who will manage private and public service delivery in Haiti;
- Policy reform measures to decentralize service delivery and increase local participation in decisions affecting these services.

Strategic Objective 4

Strengthened human resource base in support of economic growth and democracy

Improved health and nutrition status of Haitian families

Enhanced capacity of individuals to participate and contribute to personal and national development through formal education

More effective and efficient Haitian health service delivery and primary education institutions at the local level

Promote short and medium term food security

Increased use of family planning methods

Improved health and nutrition status of infants and young children

Girls and boys attain acceptable skills levels in primary schools and complete education through grade 4

Increased local participation in decisions affecting family health and education

Safety net provided for socially marginalized groups

Improved nutritional status of school age children

Improved health status of women of child-bearing age

Women and men trained to required professional levels managing private and public sector service delivery

Increased access in depressed rural and urban areas to health services

Families provided emergency food relief as required

Positive attitudes concerning drug abuse avoidance more widespread

Control the spread of HIV infection

Improved efficiency of primary education institutions

Temporary employment for unemployed and underemployed increases in target areas

Increased access to potable water and sanitation for rural families in targeted areas

Policy reform measures instituted (TBD)

Improved access to food for primary school-age children

Improved access to food for pre-school children

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

MAJOR PROGRAM OUTPUTS

PROGRAM OUTPUTS

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2. Strategic Objective Indicators and Program Output Indicators

Included in the program matrix (see following pages) are a number of indicators which, all things being equal, would measure progress towards the related strategic objectives and program outputs. Consideration still needs to be given to several factors before finalizing the choice of indicators.

Available data While numerous data sources exist on the health, nutrition, and education status of the Haitian population, the scope and quality of these vary immensely. Furthermore, some of the available data are in raw form and require aggregation and analysis before useable information can be generated from them. The indicators included in the matrix are indicative suggestions. USAID/Haiti needs to choose those indicators which most closely measure what they are trying to do, given the data sources which are currently available or can be generated, and the staff time which would be required to put the data in useable form.

If, after assessing the data sources, it is determined that a suggested indicator is inappropriate (i.e. it requires a disproportionate amount of resources to collect the data), other measures of progress will need to be defined.

Specific program targets. Indicators more accurately measure progress towards objectives and program outputs when they specify current baseline levels and projected targets. Once the Mission determines which indicators will be tracked and data sources used, the indicators included in the program matrix should be modified as required to reflect the baseline status and targets.

3. Critical Assumptions

Public sector services for primary health care and primary school education are extremely limited at best. For this reason, USAID/Haiti channels virtually all of its resources in support of these services through private/non-governmental organizations. GOH is reassessing its policy towards these organizations and a curtailment of their current operating freedom could have an adverse impact on USAID programs. At the Strategic Objective level, therefore, the critical assumption is that any changes in GOH policy towards NGOs will not be excessively restrictive.

At the program output level, critical assumptions for SO4 remain to be defined. Given that the health delivery and primary school education programs have been operational for some time, the USAID/Haiti staff is in a good position to specify critical assumptions. Included should be:

- factors in the program environment which have affected implementation in the past and which should be monitored and
- anticipated factors which might have an impact on new program interventions.

LEVEL

INDICATORS

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Strategic Objective 4:

Strengthened human resource base
[***in support of economic growth and
democracy].

- Increase in available calories per capita in the Haitian diet
 - Decreased % of household income spent on food for target groups
 - Increased capacity of Haitian families to obtain basic needs (e.g. ratio of average wage to the average cost for subsistence needs).
- TBD

LEVEL

INDICATORS

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Strategic Sub-Objective 4A: Improved health and nutrition status of Haitian families.

- Decrease in total fertility rates from 6.5 in 1991 to *** in 1996. TBD
- ** ***??? Second degree malnutrition (weight for height) of primary school children decreases by 10% in 1993 and 15% in 1996
- Second degree malnutrition in children under five reduced from 19% to 14% in 1993 and 10% in 1996.
- ***??? Third degree malnutrition in children under five reduced from 3% to 2% in 1993 and less than 1% in 1996.
- Infant mortality rate reduced from 101 per 1000 live births to 96 per 1000 in 1993 and 87 per 1000 in 1996.

LEVELINDICATORSCRITICAL ASSUMPTIONSProgram Outputs

1.	Increased use of family planning methods.	--	Increase in contraceptive prevalence rate from 13.9 in 1991 to 18 in 1993 and 25 in 1996.	TBD
		--	Increased number and proportion of male and female continuing users of family planning methods	
		--	Increase in national rate of couple years of protection	
2.	Improved health and nutrition status of infants and young children.	--	Percentage of children aged 12-24 months completely immunized increases from 45% in 1991 to 55% in 1993 and 70% in 1996.	TBD
		--	Increased numbers and proportion of children 0-6 years receiving vitamin A supplementation (two caplets/year) nationally.	
		--	Increased number and proportion of women nationally who are exclusively breastfeeding their infants for the first four months.	

LEVELINDICATORSCRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

	--	Decreased incidence of diarrhea in children under five nationally.	
	--	Number and proportion of young children in target areas being treated with ORT during diarrhea episodes.	
	--	Nos. and proportion of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) nationally who receive two doses of tetanus toxoid increases from 22% to 30% by 1993 and 50% by 1996.	
3.	Improved nutritional status of school age children.	** Height/weight ratio improves for children with school feeding (compared to those without school feeding).	Food intake away from school not deteriorating
4.	Improved health status of women of child-bearing age.	-- Decreased maternal mortality rate from *** to *** by ***.	TBD
5.	***??? Positive attitudes concerning drug abuse avoidance more widespread	-- Increased access by at-risk groups to drug prevention messages from *** to *** by ***.	TBD

<u>LEVEL</u>	<u>INDICATORS</u>	<u>CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS</u>
7. Control the spread of HIV infection.	-- Increased number and proportion of sexually active adults using condoms nationally.	
8. Increased access to potable water and sanitation for rural families in targeted areas.	-- Increased numbers of families with potable water source in target areas.	TBD
<u>Strategic Sub-Objective 4B</u> : Enhanced capacity of individuals to participate and contribute to personal and national development through formal education	TBD	Families perceive primary school education as valuable economic investment
<u>Program Outputs</u>		
1. Girls and boys attain acceptable skills levels in primary schools and complete education through Grade 4 (Premier Cycle).	-- Improved performance by girls and boys on competency test (following Premier Cycle) in target schools, compared to control schools -- Higher percentage of girls and boys completing Premier Cycle (Grade 4). -- Decreased rates of school abandonment and repetition for	Student passes to Deuxieme Cycle are based on test scores, not social promotions

LEVEL

INDICATORS

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

	girls and boys in Premier Cycle in target primary schools.		
	-- Increased retention rates of school age children in target schools		
	** Improved daily attendance rates at schools with meal program.		
2. Women and men trained to required professional levels managing private [***?? and public] sector service delivery.	-- Improved performance and leadership by technicians and administrators in key sectors.	TBD	
<u>Strategic Sub-Objective 4C</u> : More effective and efficient Haitian health service delivery and primary education institutions at the local level.	-- Percent of MOH doctors stationed in rural areas increases		GOH policy related to NGOs not excessively restrictive
<u>Program Outputs</u>			
1. Increased local participation in decisions affecting family health and education.	TBD		TBD
2. Increased access in depressed rural and urban areas to health services.	-- People served by MOH, PVOs and MOH/PVO partnership facilities increases		TBD

<u>LEVEL</u>	<u>INDICATORS</u>	<u>CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS</u>
3.	Improved efficiency of primary education institutions [***??? in the private sector].	TBD
4.	Policy reform measures instituted (to be determined through design of Title III and Health Sector NPA)	TBD
	-- MOH budget for personnel reduced from 90% of total to 79% by 1993, and 60% by 1996	
	-- Completion of MOH restructuring plan by end of FY92	
<u>Strategic Sub-Objective 4D: Promote short- and medium-term food security.</u>	-- Increase in available calories per capita in the Haitian diet	TBD
	-- Decreased % of household income spent on food for target groups	
<u>Program Outputs</u>		
1.	Safety-net provided for socially marginalized groups.	TBD
	** Number of orphans, elderly, and the mentally ill receiving food aid supplements in resource poor institutions increases or is maintained	

LEVEL

INDICATORS

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

- | | | | |
|----|--|----|---|
| 2. | Families provided emergency food relief as required | ** | Health problems resulting from short-term food deficiencies decrease. |
| | | ** | Social protests regarding food shortages decrease. |
| | | ** | Family displacement due to food shortages decreases. |
| 3. | Temporary employment for unemployed and underemployed increases in target areas. | ** | Person-days of food-for-work participation (including those employed through the municipal development program and well as FFW in other areas) increases. |
| 4. | Improved access to food of primary school-age children. | ** | Number of primary school children getting one standard-size school meal per day increases from *** to ***. |
| 5. | Improved access to food of pre-school children. | ** | Number of pre-school children recuperated from malnutrition at MCH centers increases. |

CHAPTER FOUR

MONITORING PERFORMANCE OF CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAM ELEMENTS

A. Targeting Women in the USAID/Haiti Program

1. Current Status

At the project level, USAID/Haiti has taken significant steps to consider potential impacts on women and to involve women as full participants and beneficiaries in project activities. Illustrative examples from various program areas are highlighted in the a brief "USAID/Haiti WID Workplan, 1989-1991" (the only formal document currently available).

USAID/Haiti country goals, strategic objectives, and program outputs outlined in the program matrices have been developed to specify desired impacts on women. However, this was done in the absence of a detailed Mission-wide, cross-sector, gender-disaggregated program strategy. The program outputs represent "targets of opportunity" for gender impacts within current project activities and do not yet articulate outputs for which new projects, and/or revisions to on-going projects, might contribute. In short, the gender-specific program outputs are, for the most part, project-driven rather than program or goal-driven.

2. Towards Establishing a Gender-Disaggregated Strategy for USAID/Haiti

A three-step process is recommended to help the Mission incorporate gender concerns into its development strategy:

1. Develop a detailed gender-disaggregated program strategy which is goal-driven;
2. Design a monitoring system to track progress towards strategic implementation; and
3. Integrate gender-related program development activities into the scopes of work of current USAID/Haiti staff.

Two activities would be required to develop the strategy. These are:

1. USAID/Haiti portfolio review: Each project, both current and forthcoming, would be assessed to identify: (a) explicit gender-related objectives; (b) on-going activities involving women and their impacts; (c) project data sources and potential for disaggregating by gender. For new projects, suggested activities targeting women would also be defined. The project-specific information would then be compiled into a series of recommended actions for integrating gender concerns into the Mission's program strategy.

An important element of the portfolio review would be a compilation of the current knowledge base related to gender issues in Haiti: literature review of existing studies; GOH

priorities; other donor and NGO activities; etc. The information on women's current status in Haiti would, of course, be important input to the USAID/Haiti strategy.

2. Workshop for USAID/Haiti staff on gender issues: The Mission needs to be brought up to date on current thinking and strategies for addressing gender concerns around the world. The PPC/WID GENESYS Project would be one source to plan and conduct such a workshop. The GENESYS project has a fairly extensive library and access to numerous outside information sources. A package of services most suitable to USAID/Haiti could be created, including, perhaps, a gender specialist to assist with the portfolio review, help begin a library on gender issues, and plan a workshop for the USAID/Haiti staff on methods for developing and tracking a gender-disaggregated program strategy. Representatives from other public and private sector organizations might also be invited to participate in the workshop to facilitate future collaboration on program monitoring.

B. Tracking Progress Towards Strategic Implementation

Once the strategy is clearly articulated, a mechanism will be needed through which the Mission can track progress towards strategic implementation. Specifically, this would entail an information management system which would:

1. Monitor current project-level impacts on women and men and modify project implementation accordingly, i.e. to enhance positive impacts and mitigate against negative impacts;
2. Ensure that desired program-level impacts on women are being addressed through specific project-level activities;
3. Guide new project designs to incorporate the Mission's WID strategy;
4. Ensure coordination between projects so as to avoid activities working at cross-purposes; and
5. Feed new information (i.e changes within the Haitian context, experience of other organizations working with women, etc.) into the USAID/Haiti program.

In developing the information management system, careful consideration would be given to balancing data collection costs (financial and staff time) against the benefits to obtaining the data.

Some of the above activities might best be conducted simultaneously or at least overlap. For example, the workshop might be most useful if conducted during the process of developing the information management system.

C. Integrating Gender-related Activities into USAID/Haiti Staff Responsibilities

Developing an operational program to target women will require some focused staff time. At least one person's job description should be modified to include explicit responsibility for initiating this effort and monitoring progress. As has been the experience in other USAID Missions, naming a WID Officer is merely the first step in the process; addressing gender concerns must be an explicit objective of the entire Mission. In addition, the Mission WID committee should be revived in support of the WID Officer.

In addition to a WID Officer, the Mission might consider employing locally a Coordinator to handle the details of the gender-related program. The Coordinator's responsibilities might include, for example, workshop logistics, monitoring gender-related programs of other donors and local organizations, and facilitating information exchange within the Mission.

As a starting point towards developing a comprehensive strategy to address gender issues, the USAID/Haiti staff is encouraged to consult the following document (available from Rosalie Fanale): Falvey, M. Christine, "Improving Statistics and Indicators on Women in Guatemala", June 1990. Women in Development Program in Technical Assistance, MUCIA/WID. The document goes far beyond the Guatemala context. It includes an extensive bibliography, suggested indicators for monitoring gender issues in a variety of sectors, and a scope of work which has elements potentially relevant to USAID/Haiti's needs.

D. Monitoring Performance of Food Assistance in the USAID/Haiti Program

1. Targeting Food Assistance in USAID/Haiti Program

Approximately 3% of Haiti's food needs are provided by U.S. food aid managed by USAID/Haiti. In FY/91 the Mission managed 65 thousand metric tons of U.S. food commodities valued at \$30 million -- approximately one-third of the value of the whole Mission portfolio. Assistance was provided through a \$10 million P.L. 480 Title II program, which involved direct distribution by PVOs to over 450 thousand beneficiaries in primary schools (76%), MCH centers (12%), food for work programs (3%) and other feeding programs (9%). Assistance was also provided through a \$21 million P.L. 480 Title III grant food aid program, which was used for policy dialogue with the GOH and local currency funding of program and projects. The Mission plans to maintain these programs and slightly expand food assistance over the next few years, maintaining its importance in the Mission budget.

Consequently, it is important that the Mission program performance assessment system (PPAS) capture, as far as possible, the performance of the food assistance program -- a goal that can only be achieved if the Mission program and the P.L. 480 programs are integrated in the overall Mission strategy. This first attempt to integrate a food aid program into a CDSS and Program Performance Assessment System (PPAS) seeks to satisfy both the Mission's reporting and planning requirements and A.I.D.'s central planning and Congressional reporting requirements of the new P.L. 480 program.

This exercise was done in a way that minimized influence on the structure of the Mission program. Recommendations for a more comprehensive integration of P.L. 480 food security purposes into the current CDSS and PPAS are presented in Annex 1.

The following two sections outline the points of articulation between the food aid program and the Mission's overall program and monitoring system. Food aid program outputs and indicators are identified and, in most cases, links to the overall Mission program were found. In some instances, food aid outputs and indicators were directly incorporated into the Mission program and PPAS. In other instances, the food aid output and indicator served as an indicator for Mission outputs or objectives that are also being accomplished with dollar resources. In the latter cases, Mission progress indicators will complement the indicators specific to the food aid program. In other words, progress in the food aid program can be measured through Mission indicators as well as indicators specific to the food aid program.

2. Title II Program Outputs, Indicators and Links to the PPAS

1. Output: Improved student performance in resource-poor primary schools with feeding programs.

Indic.: Daily attendance rates at schools with meal programs increases and repetition rates decrease.

Link: SO4B.1 (Indicator of Educational Enhancement)

2. Output: Improved access to food by primary school age children.

Indic.: Number of primary school children getting standard size school meal per day increases from (?) to (?).

Link: SO4D.4 (Output and Indicator of Improved Food Security)

3. Output: Improved nutritional status of school age children.

Indic.: The weight for height ratio improves for children with school feeding (compared to those without school feeding).

Link: SO4A3.1 (Output and Indicator of Improved Family Health and Nutrition)

4. Output: Improved access to food by pre-school children.

Indic.: Number of pre-school children recuperated from malnutrition at MCH centers increases.

Link: SO4D.4 (Output and Indicator of Improved Food Security. NB: This output should also be judged by pre-school nutritional status indicators of SO4A)

5. Output: Temporary employment for unemployed and underemployed increases in target areas in FFW programs.

Indic.: Person-days of short-term work employment per month increases in rural areas and secondary cities provided food for work.

Link: Unknown

6. **Output: Improved institutional and physical infrastructure in government municipalities and other communities.**
 Indic.1: The number of municipal authorities completing planned projects with food for work increases.
 Indic.2: Miles of road new or improved.
 Indic.3: Miles of irrigation new or improved.
 Indic.4: Other local physical infrastructure improved.
 Indic.5: Temporary jobs created per month increases.
 Link: SO1.6 (Indicators of Public Service Improvement)
7. **Output: Safety-net provided for socially marginalized groups**
 Indic.: Number of orphans, elderly, and the mentally ill receiving food aid supplements in resource poor institutions increases or is better targeted.
 Link: SO4D.1 (Output and Indicator of Improved Food Security)
8. **Output: Expanded and improved Haitian PVO/NGO food aid program planning and management capacity.**
 Indic.: Complete reorganization of central storage and transport of all Title II commodities. (Other indicators to be developed.)
 Link: SO2.2 (Indicator of Strengthened Private Organizations)
9. **Output: Families provided emergency food relief as required.**
 Indic.: To be determined. (Possible are absence of social disruption during food shortages, absence of family dislocations, or increased health problems)
 Link: SO4D.2 (Output and Indicator of Improved Food Security)
3. **Title III Outputs, Indicators and Links to the PPAS**

The overall goal of the Title III program (now under consideration by the Mission) is to assist the GOH to achieve enhanced food security for the Haitian people. Food security is defined according to the P.L. 480 legislation and FVA guidance as, "access to sufficient food of all people at all times for a healthy and productive life." The goal is to be achieved through three purposes and two instrumentalities denoted by the symbols in parenthesis:

policy and administrative reforms (--)

local currency funding (..)

1. **Purpose: Improve the availability of food at the national level (or increase national food self-reliance.**
 Indic.: Increased calories per capita in the Haitian national diet.
 Link: SO4 and SO4D (Indicators of Strengthened Human Resources and Promotion of Food Security)

- 1a Output:-- reviews of food import licensing, tariff reduction, land titling, and public lands.**
 Indic: Completion by end of FY 93.
 Link: SO3.1 (Indicators of Modification of Regulations to Stimulate Economic Growth.)
- 1b Output:-- decentralize authority and budgetary control of the Ministry of Agriculture.**
 Indic.: Preparation of requisite legal and administrative authorizations by end of FY93.
 Link: SO1.1 (Indicator for Policy and Administrative Reform)
- 1c Output:-- improve management of the Minoterie flour mill**
 Indic.: Implementation of RIG audit recommendations (?)
 Link: SO3.7 (Increase in Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises, Indicator)
- 1d Output:.. rehabilitate small-scale irrigation systems**
 Indic.: Acres of land in target areas served by up-graded systems increases by (?)
 Link: SO1.6 (Indicator of Strengthened Local Government)
- 1e Output:-- Reform procedures for local collection and reinvestment of water user fees.**
 Indic.: Procedures established by end FY 92.
 Link: SO1.6 (Indicator of Strengthened Local Government)
- 1f Output:.. Improved secondary roads**
 Indic.: Miles of roads improved increase by (?)
 Link: Unknown
- 1g Output:.. Improve small farmer marketable crop production**
 Indic.: Value-added in small farming sector increases each year in life of Title III (?)
 Link: SO3.8 (Indicator for Small Farmer Market Expansion)
- 2. Purpose: Improve access to food by men and women in the most food deficit segments of the population.**
- Indic.: Percent of household income spent of food decreases for target groups (Alternatively real prices of key food items in diet of the poor relative to real income decreases)
 Link: SO4 and SO4D (Indicators of Strengthen Human Resource Base and Promotion of Food Security)
- 2a Output:-- establish a NGO-GOH partnership framework for social service delivery**
 Indic.: Adoption of a legal framework by (?)
 Link: SO2.2 (Indicator of Strengthen Indigenous NGOs)
- 2b Output:.. increased public sector labor-intensive employment generation.**
 Indic.: Person days of employment increases from ? to ? in target areas.
 Link: Unknown

2c Output:.. increase management support of Title II for extending access to food
Indic.: (See indicators and links for Title II)

2d Output:-- Private Sector Reform (to be defined)

3. Purpose: Improved health and nutritional status

Indic.: Second degree malnutrition in children under five reduced from 19% to 14% in 1993 and 10% in 1996

Indic.: Infant mortality rate reduced from 101 per 1000 live births to 96 per 100 in 1993 and 87 per 100 in 1996

Link.: SO4A (Improved Health and Nutrition of Haitian Families)

3a Output:-- decentralization of the Ministry of Health

Indic.: Completion of plan by end FY 92 and administrative authorizations by the end of FY 93.

Link.: SO4C.4 (Strengthened Local Health and Educational Institutions)

3b Output:.. Sustainable health care and family planning projects.

Indic.: (Specific to projects and sectors to be identified)

Link.: SO4A (Improved Health and Nutrition of Haitian Families)

3c Output:.. Management support for Title II feeding programs to improve nutritional impact.

Indic.: (Specific to Title II outputs in previous section)

Link.: SO4D (Promotion of Food Security)

3d Output:.. Extend access to potable water.

Indic.: Number of families having access to potable water increases in target groups from ? to ?

Link.: SO1.6 (Indicator of Strengthened Local Government)

CHAPTER FIVE NEXT STEPS IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING USAID/HAITI PERFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM

This chapter suggests next steps for USAID/Haiti in developing and implementing a Performance Monitoring System.

The USAID should review the present report and make revisions, as it sees fit, to the Program Goal, Strategic Objectives, Program Outputs, and critical assumptions. The USAID should similarly review and revise the suggested indicators for the strategic objectives and program outputs and provide values where these are alluded to.

After the USAID completes these steps, the following steps are suggested:

- To the extent possible, establish measures to be achieved annually for each indicator of each Strategic Objective.
- Select a limited number of indicators for each program output.
- Establish baseline levels for each indicator. Data should be disaggregated by gender.
- Identify data sources. In some cases, individual USAID projects will generate the necessary data; in other cases, national data (e.g., foreign exchange earnings) may suffice. But for some indicators, obtaining data will require additional work. If the data collection effort is resource-expensive, consideration should be given to alternative indicators.
- Assign responsibility for data collection on each indicator in the system and identify data sources.
- Discuss data needs with implementing organization to determine if data exist or if indicators should be adjusted.
- Prepare reporting formats and procedures. The collection, analysis and organization of the data needed for internal management and external reporting can be identified and reporting formats, including sample tables, can be designed in advance to facilitate data presentation for ongoing management review and preparation of reports for AID/W.

The USAID has various options available for carrying out the above tasks. CDIE helped with the present report and may be able to provide further assistance. Or the USAID could consider employing a contractor to carry out the activities with, of course, the active participation of the USAID itself.

ANNEX I

The Food Security Concept

**ANNEX I:
FOOD SECURITY STRATEGY FOR USAID/HAITI:
Concept, Rationale, and Recommendation**

by Tom Marchione, FVA/PPM

The Food Security Concept

A food security strategy is not a food aid strategy. Food aid can play a short- to medium-term role in a food security strategy, but a successful food security strategy eliminates the need for food aid.

National food security is not national food self-sufficiency. National food self-sufficiency implies a fully inward-oriented approach to development, where the country produces sufficient food within its borders to satisfy the food needs of all its people.

National food security is not national food self-reliance, although food self-reliance is a part of food security. Food self-reliance is a country's ability to feed itself through its own production and through commercial imports of the food it cannot or does not want to produce domestically, i.e., the national level availability of needed food. In this form, food self-reliance has become a tenet of A.I.D.'s agricultural development strategy.

Food security, unlike either food self-sufficiency or food self-reliance, embraces the macro-economic concept of national food self-reliance and adds to it the micro concept of family access to food, i.e., the ability of the families to demand food in the market, grow food for their own use, or access food through targeted feeding.

Finally, the ultimate test of food security is well-nourished individuals.

The newly authorized 1990 Farm Bill amends P.L. 480 elevating the enhancement of food security to its principal purpose. The law defines food security to mean "access to sufficient food by all people at all times for healthy and productive lives." However, the determination of country eligibility and allocation for grant food aid (Title III), the law uses indicators of food security that compare the relative food-insecurity of countries. These comparisons were derived from an index composed of food self reliance -- or national food availability -- measured by domestic production and foreign exchange reserves (as a proxy for import capacity), and a composite indicator of household access to food measured through a combination of the best available proxies for household income, national income distribution, and food prices for which cross-national data sets were available.

Rationale for a Food Security Strategy for USAID Haiti

The Seriousness of the Problem:

Almost by any measure, Haiti is the poorest and most food insecure country in the Western Hemisphere. The Agency food security index ranks Haiti 11th most food insecure out of 79 countries which have been ranked. Bangladesh and nine Sub-Saharan countries are more food insecure. In comparison, the only other LAC country among the most food insecure 32 countries is Bolivia which ranks 24th most food insecure. These observations were further confirmed by the April 1991 food security review done by LACTECH for LAC/DR.

Estimates of the degree of food self-reliance, based on studies by the World Bank and others, show that commercial food imports, food aid, and domestic production fall 20% short of the nutritionally determined needs of the population (1800 KCal per capita per day consumed compared to 2300 KCal per capita needed).

The historical trend of food available in Haiti has been 1800 Kcal per person per day, and there is no prospect that domestic food production will fill this gap. Even with liberal estimates of contraband, the food deficit over the 1988-94 period has been estimated by these sources to be 250 to 336 thousand metric tons per year. US food aid already provides 60,000 tons (approximately half of all the food aid for Haiti). However, no combination of donors can or would find it desirable, to fill this gap with additional food assistance.

A similar picture emerges from the perspective of the families' access to food. A 1987 national food consumption survey by the University of Iowa showed that the Haitian rural household spends over 60% of its income on food. Coupled with high rates of unemployment, underemployment and declining real incomes (under \$150 per years for most of the rural population), and high and unstable food prices, the majority of the population is clearly food insecure, especially in the rural Northeast, and other depressed urban and rural areas. In fact the 1987 household income and expenditure study found that 50% of the populations had less than 75% of their recommended daily calorie intake.

The high and persistent rate of child nutritional deficiency, is fully consistent with this picture. The recent CDC nutritional point prevalence survey finds moderate and severe underweight in 23% of the under five population -- a rate statistically indistinguishable from the rate found in 1978. I estimated that this serious level of malnutrition affected over 300,000 Haitian children under five years of age in 1990. Infant mortality rates and under five mortality rates have declined in recent years largely due to improvements in immunization coverage not nutritional status. Alarming high death rates of infants in the first month of life attests to the poor nutrition of mothers in pregnancy. The rising fertility rate in recent years might also be explained by -- as much as it explains -- the threat to child survival, as families strive to insure survival of some of their children into adulthood. (Though speculative, no other data seems to explain the increase, according to CDIE's just completed Haiti Child Survival Assessment.)

Policy Development with GOH

The present GOH campaigned on a food self-sufficiency strategy that it is clearly not feasible to implement. However, it would be reasonable to promote a short- to medium-term food security strategy. Such would combine short-term uses of Title II to guarantee access to food for the most vulnerable with a medium-term strategy that stresses strategic uses of current food aid levels to foster food self-reliance and food access through commercial imports and targeted food price reductions, equitable income growth, and domestic food production. Visibly and sustainably increasing food security would have stabilizing effects that will foster the democratic transition. As democracy is a necessary precondition for long-term food security, so short-term food security helps to prevent popular discontent that could destabilize the political process. On the economic front, measures challenging traditional occupation incomes and food prices that appear to increase food insecurity can trigger damaging vocal protest. Although not entirely parallel to Africa, the impact of structural adjustment has caused real and perceived increases in food insecurity that led to negative popular reactions and reversals of economic policy reforms.

Current Mission Activity

In fact, most of the components of a food security strategy exist in the Mission's program, and a reformulation would not represent a major departure but would help to focus and integrate parts of the Mission's strategic plan. Over 30% of mission resources come through legislation where food security is the principal goal. Title III guidance encourages the food security theme while at the same time calling for full integration into the Mission's program. Many Mission activities already planned and funded with DA resources imply increased availability of food, increased access to food, and responds to the nutritional and health problems characteristic of Haiti's food insecure population.

Furthermore, the Mission is intent on relieving constraints on commercial imports of basic foods, lowering and stabilizing food prices, increasing incomes through a vigorous private informal and formal sector, and increasing the productivity of domestic farm production and small farm incomes, while maintaining an effective safety net. It would not be a major task to make a food security strategic objective a constructive part of the Mission's overall strategy.

Food Security as part of the Mission's Program

Long-term versus Short-term

In the broad sense, food security is now a part of the overall goal of the Mission in that it can be thought of as one of the necessary conditions by which the majority of the Haitian people will improve the quality of their lives. Indeed, in the long-term, the effects of a successful Mission program will solve the Haitian food insecurity problem. However, in the Haitian case, the long-term is most uncertain, so an explicit and focused short- to medium- food security strategy seems most appropriate right now.

The Present Position of the Food Security Objective

The 1993-1997 CDSS proposes to incorporate short-term food security as a sub-objective under the fourth strategic objective -- "to promote human resource protection and development" -- along with health and nutritional protection, and educational sub-objectives. In fact, conceived this way, the food security theme proved a most convenient way to represent the targeted feeding activities of the Title II program, and relate them to the overall Mission Program. However, food security as it is defined above, must be advanced through a broader set of activities -- more consistent with the range of program activities in the Title III proposal. The proposed policy reform and local currency outputs of the Title III program articulate with the democracy objectives in at least four places, the economic objectives in eight places, and the human resource objective in four places. In addition, the Title III program provides strategic inputs to the Title II program to assist in short-term food security provided by that program. That is not to say that food security should be confined to food aid programs, quite the contrary.

A Food Security Strategic Objective

A more logical placement of a food security objective would be in a position between the economic and human resource strategic objectives, either as a strategic objective itself or a cross-cutting program strategy.

Although the Mission's program was not consciously devised to directly address food security, one could reorganize the present program elements that directly address food access of families, and the availability of food nationally so food security would appear central rather than peripheral to the Mission's program.

Short-term food security provided by the food aid program should be associated with medium term outputs that increase food access through market mechanism. For example, increased small and micro-enterprise business credit, private sector employment, and more profitable farms should lead to improved incomes. More food, decreased regulatory environment for food imports, and competitive Title III sales should translate into food price stabilization and decline. Together, lower prices and equitable income increases will increase household access to food. Furthermore, the Title II program and the local currency temporary employment program provide a food access safety net when temporary economic dislocations are caused by economic growth.

A missing program output in the Mission's program is increased availability of food, nationally. However, the Mission already has activities that could be focused on this output; the combination of improved foreign exchange reserves and decreased import restraints coupled with increased production of domestically consumed foods are among the activities that could lead to increased availability of food for dietary needs.

Next Steps

At this writing, I am not prepared to propose a full-scale and detailed revision of the CDSS to highlight a national food security strategy. But I recommend the following steps be taken:

1. **Incorporate the food security concept in current CDSS language where appropriate.** As suggested in this presentation, food security could be discussed in relation to strategic objectives other than the fourth strategy on human resource protection.
2. **Create a food security monitoring system.** The Mission could, in conjunction with the Title III program, invest in a reliable monitoring system to detect changes in food availability in Haiti and the access of Haitian families to the food they need through the market mechanism or targeted food programming. At present, the data bases for such a system are moribund, but could be upgraded and revised without overwhelming expenditures. Three improvements in data quality are needed, (1) production monitoring perhaps through the revival of the area frame sampling method or food gap analyses, (2) food price monitoring, and (3) household income monitoring. Assistance is available for these tasks from the S&T nutritional monitoring project, the new food aid IQC, and perhaps the Africa FEWS project.
3. **Conduct a full food security analysis with expert assistance.** Much of the best analysis and design work on food security is being done in Africa. Some of the top expertise can be found in the Food Security Unit in the Africa Department of the World Bank. The Agency also has a first rate food security project with Michigan State Department of Agricultural Economics, jointly funded by S&T/RD and Africa Bureau. FVA would also like to be of assistance in the analysis as well as the planning.

September 5, 1991

TO: David Cohen, DIR
FROM: Tom Marchione, FVA/PPM
SUBJECT: Food Aid and Food Security

I have now provided assistance to the GDO and the PDI office as well as HPN in integrating food aid into the Mission's program. It was difficult, but certainly not impossible.

It is now much clearer where the food aid programs articulate with the Mission's program. In some instances, monitoring food aid program outputs will be indicative of the Mission's performance, and in other instances, monitoring Mission outputs and objectives assists in the monitoring of both Title II and Title III program outputs. These points should be clearer in the presentation the team will make at the end of the day, and will be discussed in detail in the team's report. As requested our integration strategy led to only slight modification of the Mission's program.

I have also managed to be of help to the PDI on the design of the Title III proposal monitoring and evaluation. And my office would open to any additional requests for help in any aspect of the design.

Following on our discussion last week, I am also attaching some ideas and suggestion regarding a food security strategy for the Haiti Mission.

If possible, I would like your reaction to it before I leave. My thought is that this would form an Annex to the team's report. However, I do not want the issues raised to consume the team's scheduled briefing time today.

As mentioned in the paper, I am offering more assistance from our my bureau. I have checked this out with my office and found them eager to help.

It was very valuable to me to get to know the Mission and the Haitian food security and food aid situation over the past three weeks. I trust that FVA has and will continue to be of assistance to USAID/Haiti.