

**ROSCON**  
**Quarterly Report No. 7**  
**October-December 1994**  
**Final Report**

**Academy for Educational Development**  
**Cooperative Agreement No. CCN-0008-A-00-3045-00**



*Academy for Educational Development*

December 30, 1994

Mr. Allan Reed  
USAID/Moscow  
Novinsky Blvd.  
Moscow, Russia

Dear Allan:

Please find enclosed a copy of the Seventh, and Final Quarterly Report of the Russian Social Conversion Project (ROSCON).

If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 884-8747.

Sincerely,

Gregory R. Niblett  
Vice President  
Social Development Division

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Quarterly Report
2. Financial Report
- Appendix I. Communication Process for Social Change - Conference Program
- Appendix II. Focus Group Moderator's Certificates
- Appendix III. Commendation Letter from the Murmansk City Government
- Appendix IV. Background/Situation Analysis
- Appendix V. Report: Russian Judicial Reform - Attitudes of the Russian Public to the Re-Introduction of Jury Trial
- Appendix VI. Report on ROSCON Media Products and Focus Group Research Results

# 7th QUARTERLY/FINAL REPORT

## **Quarterly Report October-December 1994**

The final report of the ROSCON (Russian Social Conversion Project) project, as stimulated in the 1993 Cooperative Agreement with USAID, includes: a summary of activities for the period October-December 1994; an executive summary of accomplishments/short falls; a description of Cooperative Activities from inception; an as assessment of the significance of these activities; comments and recommendations; and a financial report.

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

During this quarter, ROSCON activities were focused on a ROSCON conference in Moscow, administrative issues related to the phase-out of the project, and on documentation of a review of the lessons learned.

### **PROJECT ACTIVITIES**

On November 2nd and 3rd, ROSCON sponsored a conference titled "**Communication Process for Social Change.**" The conference was aimed at reviewing the ROSCON experience both in disseminating economic messages through the media and in the application of qualitative research in testing media products. Numerous sociologists and communications professionals were among the 90 conference participants representing 25 different Russian cities.

The first day's session, titled "Using the Media to Convey Economic Messages in the Russian Environment," focused on a review of all ROSCON media pilots. Selected pilots were introduced by their producers who outlined the goals of the pilots and their intended target audiences. Next, sociologists who had conducted focus groups to determine audience reaction to each of the presented pilots presented their findings. The sessions stimulated significant dialogue among the media producers, sociologists and the audience. Day 1 of the conference concluded with a reception where Russian Sociologists who has successfully completed ROSCON focus group moderator training were presented with certificates of achievement (see Appendix II).

The second day of the conference was titled "The Social Marketing Process." Day 2 included a sample focus group exercise utilizing the Rule of Law Project short documentary. The film was shown as it was originally produced, this was followed by a mini focus group. The final produce film was then shown which had incorporated the results from actual focus groups conducted. This 'before and after' exercise dramatically demonstrated the assistance and value focus group review provides to media work.

Russian participants at the conference expressed their deep gratitude to ROSCON for the training provided in qualitative research as well as support in programming. Both media producers and sociologists indicated that they derived significant benefits from working together through the ROSCON experience.

ROSCON received a letter of commendation from the city government of Murmansk regarding the impact the project's work has had with the Liubava Women's club and its page supplement in the newspaper *Murmansky vestnik*. A copy of the letter and a translation appear in Appendix III.

Other program activities included the completion of the *Background and Situation Analysis*. Funds were also transmitted for the completion and printing of the Norma Ltd. series comic books on the ABCs of the Economy.

During this quarter, a ROSCON video was produced highlighting excerpts from ROSCON media productions produced during the project.

As part of project close-out activities, two copies of each ROSCON media product produced were provided to USAID Moscow in accordance with contract requirements. Concurrently, fifteen copies each of the ROSCON *Background and Situation Analysis* (provided as Appendix IV) and fifteen copies of the AED/ARD CHECCHI report *Russian Judicial Reform - Attitudes of the Russian Public to the Re-Introduction of Jury Trials* produced in support of the Russian Federation's State Judicial Administration (GPU) project on judicial reform and jury trial were provided to USAID/Moscow (provided as Appendix V). ROSCON furniture and equipment, with USAID concurrence, were transferred to CEMINTELL, the NGO that has been the ROSCON administrative and technical partner.

### **Other Programs**

Work continued under the ARD/CHECCHI Rule of Law collaborative effort during this period. Juror-training videos produced by ROSCON's George Vicas, were screened at a plenary session of a Rule of Law conference organized by the Presidential Law Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation (GPU) in Sochi in early October. This effort was highly successful with many of the participants, judges and court administrators, asking for copies of the program. Some 60 copies have been made available for distribution to Russian courts as well as to local television stations in Russia.

The first training program, a nineteen-minute short-form documentary was aired December 6th on Ostankino television (Channel One). The one-hour long-form documentary program *Judge for Yourself*, is to be aired before the end of 1994 as part of the program entitled *Chelovek i Zakon* (Man and the Law). Before the end of the year, approximately 295 VHS copies of each of the four programs will be shipped to GPU, Moscow.

### **Summary of Achievements/Shortcomings**

ROSCON was successful in providing methodological training in social marketing and developed experimental products that generated a better public understanding of economic issues. Audience response to these products provided a basis for understanding the level of economic knowledge of audience groups, their attitude toward reform, and the effectiveness of the media

as a vehicle for communicating economic messages. These efforts clearly will benefit future technical assistance programs involved in media, education and social marketing in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union.

ROSCON's major achievements include:

- Introduction of social marketing methodology;
- Training of Russian sociologists in qualitative research techniques leading to the development of a pool of trainers that have been used by other USAID projects;
- Development and dissemination of media products;
- Testing of media products.

The achievements are further elaborated in the section on the Cooperative Agreement below.

The shortcomings of the project can largely be attributed to a faulty project design from its inception. The project was overambitious, given its limited financial resources, and too broad in its conceptualization. ROSCON would have been more effective had it limited its focus on social marketing/qualitative research training, and the design and implementation of a narrowly targeted social marketing intervention focused on a specific audience such as, for example, young people. Geographic limitation to a specific area (city or region) would have enhanced project performance. While the Russian counterparts specifically sought a "social conversion" project, such "conversion" required the creation of a qualitative research base that was not yet in place in the country. ROSCON sought to do this. Yet, at the same time, by the project's design, ROSCON was to produce a wide range of media products aimed at free market information and education. These twin purposes, social marketing (or "conversion") on one hand, and the more traditional information, education, communication objectives on the other, were never fully reconciled during the course of the project.

### **Review of the Implementation of the ROSCON Cooperative Agreement Social Marketing and Qualitative Research Training**

The ROSCON was developed to introduce social marketing as a means of strengthening public understanding of economic reform in Russia.

#### **Project Overview**

The concept for ROSCON was proposed in early 1992 by a consortium of some 15 Russian organizations including research institutes, associations and university groups led by the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (CEMI). CEMI requested the assistance of the Academy for Educational Development (AED) to build long-term local capacity for social marketing in Russia as a methodology which will contribute to social conversion. Training,

research and communications activities would be conducted to develop public awareness of free market economic concepts. The project was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for two years beginning in March 1993.

Almost a year elapsed between the conceptualization of the project and its funding, as a result, the configuration of the Russian partnership changed. Only one organization remained of the original 15 -- a group of economists from CEMI who had started their own non-governmental research firm called CEMINTELL. While CEMINTELL provided able administrative and technical support to the project, ROSCON was to suffer from a lack of broader outreach and insight, that could have provided by the original configuration.

ROSCON was not intended to be a traditional social marketing program which begins with solid research into a target audience's knowledge, attitudes and practices, before designing a strategic intervention which will result in increased awareness and desired behavior change. Rather, ROSCON was intended to provide methodological training in social marketing as the concept itself was new in Russia. At the same time, ROSCON would develop specific communications products on an experimental basis to build greater public understanding of economic issues. Audience response to the products and focus group testing would provide a basis for understanding the level of economic knowledge of audience groups, their attitude toward reform, and the effectiveness of the media as a vehicles for communicating economic messages. Also gleaned would be insight into the kind of information that is most needed and a better understanding of which groups could be targeted for a social marketing intervention at a later stage.

ROSCON was implemented in three phases: development of media pilots; strengthening local research capacity; and, testing media products. These phases are described below:

### **Phase One: Development of Media Pilots**

First, pilot media programs were developed as an experimental process that would: 1) enable Russian producers to articulate reform messages in their own way; 2) identify what approaches work best to convey economic messages; and 3) provide material to test to gain better understanding of Russian attitudes toward reform and the media.

During this phase ROSCON developed over 70 media products which included:

- Three programs on entrepreneurship, ethics in business, and Russian entrepreneurial traditions, produced by the independent Russian company Business Wave and broadcast on Ostankino;
- Twelve radio programs for women interested in business produced by the Nadezhda Radio and broadcast NIS-wide;

- Seven programs on free market economic issues for young people ages 13-15 produced by the independent St. Petersburg company, Norma Ltd. for broadcast NIS-wide on Ostankino;
- A comic book, the "ABC's of the Economy" to accompany the Norma Ltd. series noted above for distribution to Russian schools;
- Ten programs on private sector farming issues produced by the independent company VICON for broadcast on Channel Three;
- Three programs explaining how banks, finance and insurance companies work produced by the St. Petersburg based independent company TOR as part of the St. Petersburg television series, New Petersburg;
- Sixteen broadcasts NIS-wide by Radio Yunost of the program series Radio Business Center;
- Twelve newspaper supplements on business issues for women in the Murmansk-based newspaper *Murmansky vestnik* titled Women's Club produced by the Liubava Woman's Club;
- One supplement on Russian entrepreneurs in the Hearst-Izvestia joint venture, the newspaper *We-Mbl*;
- Twelve programs on women and business produced by the independent company People's Academy for Bashkortostan television in Ufa.
- One program on surviving in today's economy produced for Ostankino by the independent television company, REN-TV.

Many of the ROSCON media products were exceptionally well received. For example, the Murmansk newspaper supplement led to the creation of a regional association for women in business and management on the Kola Peninsula. The ROSCON project was also commended by the Murmansk City government for its work. After the broadcast of the NORMA Ltd. television broadcasts on economic issues for young people, the Deputy Minister of Education of the Russian Federation requested that 500 cassettes of the series be distributed to Russian schools for the 1994 school year. With funds from the British government, copies of the programs were made and the cassettes were distributed.

Paul Solman, the business correspondent of the *McNeil/Lehrer NewsHour*, worked closely with ROSCON media producers in a special economics and the media workshop that the project held shortly after it was initiated. George Vicas, of the Academy for Educational Development, also applied his more than twenty years experience with network television in the United States and Europe in working with ROSCON media producers.

In addition, through collaboration with USAID's Rule of Law project, training videos and a long form documentary were produced on jury trials in Russia. The long form documentary was shown on Ostankino television. A video on the highlights of the ROSCON media products was also developed.

## **Phase Two: Strengthening Local Qualitative Research Capacity**

The second phase of the project overlapped with the first. This phase was aimed at strengthening local capacity to undertake qualitative research.

When ROSCON began operating in March 1993, qualitative research was virtually unknown in Russia. For a wide range of reasons, emphasis within sociology had always been placed on quantitative work. ROSCON provided training to sociologists at the Center for Sociological Research (CSR) at Moscow State University in both social marketing and focus group moderation. Through the network at Moscow State University, sociologists from 28 Russian cities have attended ROSCON qualitative research techniques workshops. Sociologists from CSR have already provided training to other USAID projects (both inside Russia and in other former Soviet Republics). In November, for example, the Center's Elena Pervysheva conducted a week-long training exercise in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on focus group moderation techniques and qualitative data analysis for 13 Kyrgyz physicians, health communicators and sociologists under USAID's BASICS project. The Kyrgyz trainees then conducted focus groups and in depth interviews in two regions of the country to study knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to immunization. Russian sociologists trained by ROSCON are also applying their new skills in work with Russian non-governmental organizations.

Russian sociologists trained by ROSCON and Russian research organizations used media products in focus groups to glean insight into the knowledge and attitudes about economic reform of selected audience groups. In the November 1994 ROSCON-sponsored conference in Moscow, the media producers and the sociologists both presented their work. Sociologists reviewed how audience groups perceived the media products. This information is useful in strengthening the quality of future programming intended for such audiences. Both the sociologists and the media producers found the ROSCON conference information and useful in their work. Collaboration between sociologists and media producers is a relatively new phenomenon to which many media groups were exposed for the first time through ROSCON.

## **Phase Three: Testing Media Products**

Focus group testing of ROSCON products was conducted to gain insight into how selected audiences respond to the products and view the economic issues presented. Among audience groups participating in focus groups conducted were:

- Students and young people in business in the three-part Business Wave series "The Spirit of Entrepreneurship," "Ethics in Business," and the "Traditions of Russian Entrepreneurship;"

- Agricultural workers and military officers planning and/or training to be farmers worker using four video segments from the VICON produced series on issues in private sector farming;
- Students and teachers on the Norma Ltd., series on the ABC's of the Economy;
- Women interested in business for the Radio Nadezhda series for women;
- Youth to gauge reaction to the Radio Yunost Radio Business Center;
- Potential jurors.

Focus groups were conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Kalmykia.

A detailed report on project focus group research findings is provided as Appendix VI to this report.

For much of its implementation phase, ROSCON was poised between the need to disseminate free market economic education to as broad an audience base as possible, and the need to develop a specific focused social marketing intervention that could produce the type of "social conversion" that its original mandate had evoked. Limited funding would not allow for a broad based program to reach as many audience groups as the original Russian partners had planned. Because of the lack of finite definition of its mandate, ROSCON had to focus by adapting to the operational environment and to realistically achieve its objectives: development of media pilots; strengthening local qualitative research capacity and testing media product.

It was originally envisioned that, had ROSCON funding been continued, the project would have applied the lessons learned from the first 18 months into the design of a specific social marketing intervention focused on youth.

### **Assessment and Significance**

ROSCON was highly praised by those Russian counterparts who had the opportunity to participate in project training workshops and conferences. ROSCON clearly showed the vital role that social marketing and qualitative research need to play, not only in strengthening economic reform, but in promoting democracy and rule of law. ROSCON training for Russian counterparts in social marketing and qualitative research will be vital also as public interest efforts begin to develop in areas such as health (AIDS, drug and alcohol abuse), environment and many others. Both U.S. and Russian organizations have continued to asked for ROSCON assistance in social marketing. ROSCON trained Russian sociologists are already training others and working both with other USAID projects and applying their new skills in the new private commercial sector. In this sense, as the first U.S. government effort to introduce social marketing to Russia, ROSCON has been highly effective.

The integration of sociological research and media production by ROSCON has also been relatively new for both sociologists and media producers in Russia. Both have expressed the desire for continued collaboration.

The fact that some ROSCON products have been integrated into the school curriculum throughout Russia speaks both to the acute need for educational materials that explain free market concepts in the country and for the value that the Russian government has placed on selected ROSCON products themselves. Focus group reports, presenting the knowledge and attitudes of Russian target audience groups toward economic issues and the media, provide valuable insight for future projects that will work with communications and education in the former Soviet Union.

Despite its handicap by an unwieldy and ill defined initial design, the project has made a significant contribution by laying the groundwork for social marketing and qualitative research in Russia.

### **Comments and Recommendations**

It is important for the initiative and the work done by ROSCON to be effectively used by other USAID projects. It is recommended that USAID projects, where applicable, utilize the skills and resources of the Center for Sociological Research at Moscow University. The ROSCON trained sociologists are effective trainers in social marketing, in in-depth interviews, and in focus group moderation. They can, for example, play an important role in strengthening non-governmental organizations' abilities to develop effective communications programs. ROSCON workshops have used already translated materials that serve as guides to explain qualitative research techniques. These can easily be adapted to other programs.

ROSCON opened the door to social marketing and qualitative research in Russia. It is important to build on these achievements as they are integral components of the process of building reform and democracy in Russia.

# FINANCIAL REPORT

**ROSCON QUARTERLY REPORT**  
**Academy for Educational Development**  
**Project Year Data**  
**Third Quarter (October-December 1994)**  
**Cooperative Agreement No. CCN-0009-A-00-3045-00**

Category	Budget	Expenditures:			1994-95	Estimated Encumbrance	Qtr.Total w/Accruals	Total Estimated Cumulative Expenditures *
		October	November	Estimated December	3rd Quarter Total			
Labor	\$488,800.00	\$17,948.74	\$21,527.59	\$22,901.00	\$62,437.33	\$0.00	\$62,437.33	\$501,362.51
Fringe	139,700.00	5,384.62	6,458.28	6,808.00	18,730.90	0.00	18,730.90	\$150,408.43
Consultants	27,600.00	0.00	0.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00	1,000.00	\$46,751.39
Travel	306,200.00	13,826.30	2,800.10	18,601.00	35,277.40	2,366.00	37,643.40	\$225,067.02
Other Direct	95,100.00	4,974.87	1,643.23	26,106.00	32,794.10	31,152.00	63,946.10	\$252,654.67
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>\$1,057,400.00</b>	<b>\$42,134.53</b>	<b>\$32,429.20</b>	<b>\$75,606.00</b>	<b>\$150,239.73</b>	<b>\$33,518.00</b>	<b>\$183,757.73</b>	<b>\$1,176,244.02</b>
Overhead	327,800.00	13,061.70	10,053.05	24,263.32	47,331.07	10,725.76	58,056.83	\$365,494.05
Subcontractors	457,700.00	6,903.70	3,516.70	6,005.00	16,515.40	11,250.00	27,765.40	\$328,022.85
G&A	18,300.00	276.15	140.67	2,380.00	660.62	450.00	1,110.62	\$11,532.57
Overseas Allowances	384,504.00	15,501.76	4,927.60	14,800.00	35,273.36	825.00	36,098.36	\$330,390.43
Equipment	31,500.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	\$33,031.70
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,277,204.00</b>	<b>\$77,877.84</b>	<b>\$51,067.22</b>	<b>\$121,005.12</b>	<b>\$250,020.18</b>	<b>\$56,768.76</b>	<b>\$306,788.94</b>	<b>\$2,244,715.62</b>

\* Does not include prior quarter encumbrances

17

Academy for Educational Development  
 USAID Cooperative Agreement No. CCN-0009-A-O-3045-00  
 Pipeline

ROSCON PIPELINE

COST ELEMENT	CONTRACT BUDGET	EXPENSES THRU 3H 05/31 94	ENCUMBERED THROUGH 05/31/94	DIFFERENCE	PROJECTED EXPENSES THROUGH 12/31/94	REVISED CONTRACT BUDGET	DIFFERENCE
SALARIES AND WAGES	488,800	366,104	2,612	119,984	125,391	494,207	(5,407)
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS	139,700	109,161	784	29,055	37,617	148,262	(8,562)
CONSULTANT FEES	27,600	44,722	1,060	(18,182)	0	45,782	(18,182)
TRAVEL/TRANSPORTATION	306,200	162,142	15,176	128,782	61,411	238,829	67,371
OTHER DIRECT COSTS	95,100	153,152	19,034	(76,986)	86,560	258,646	(163,546)
SUBTOTAL DIRECT COSTS	1,057,400	836,081	38,666	182,653	310,979	1,185,726	(128,326)
INDIRECT COSTS	327,800	258,552	12,373	56,475	99,513	370,838	(43,038)
SUBCONTRACTS	457,700	253,555	54,231	150,114	32,000	339,586	118,114
G & A OVERHEAD	18,300	8,546	2,169	7,585	1,280	11,995	6,305
ALLOWANCES	384,504	215,150	5,603	163,651	113,403	334,256	50,248
EQUIPMENT	31,500	23,103	9,500	(1,803)	1,500	34,803	(3,303)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,277,204</b>	<b>1,595,987</b>	<b>122,542</b>	<b>558,675</b>	<b>558,675</b>	<b>2,277,204</b>	<b>(0)</b>

13

# APPENDIX I

Communication Process for Social Change:  
Conference Program

# COMMUNICATION PROCESS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE A ROSCON - SPONSORED CONFERENCE

## DAY ONE: USING THE MEDIA TO CONVEY ECONOMIC MESSAGES IN THE RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENT

Wednesday, 2 November 1994

- 8:30 AM - Sign-In & Coffee
- 9:00 - Introduction and Welcome  
- *Jean de Malvinsky*, ROSCON  
- *Victor M. Konstantinov*, Cemintell
- 9:05 - ROSCON Overview and Purpose  
- *Ronald Childress*, ROSCON  
- *Raisa Scriabine*, ROSCON, Moderator
- 9:30 - Topic: Money, Taxes, Competition & Trade  
Producer: Norma, Ltd. (St. Petersburg)  
Presenter: *Margarita Fillopova*
- 9:55 - Responder: SAMI: *Tatiana Statsevich* Center for Sociological Research  
*Elena Pervysheva* Focus Group Results/Lessons Learned (20 minutes)
- 10:15 - Discussion on Results and Lessons Learned from Norma Production, Inc  
(30 minutes)
- 10:45 - Break
- 11:00 - Topic: Entrepreneurship  
Producer: Business Wave (Moscow)  
Presenter: *Andrei Kolomiets*
- 11:35 - Responder: Validata/Yankelovich: *Marina Volkenstein* Focus Group  
Results/Lessons Learned (15 minutes)
- 11:50 - Topic: Basic Business  
Producer: Radio Yunost (Moscow)  
Presenter: *Evegeny Pavlov*
- 12:25 - Responder: SAMI: *Vadim Lebedev*  
Focus Group Results/Lessons Learned (15 minutes)

- 12:40 - Discussion of Results and Lessons Learned from Business Wave and Radio Yunost Productions (20 minutes)
- 1:00 - Lunch
- 2:00 - Topic: Women in Business  
Producer: Peoples Academy (Ufa)  
Presenter: *Alla Troitskaya*
- 2:30 - Topic: Women in Business  
Producer: Liubava Women's Club (Murmansk)  
Presenter: *Liubov Shtileva*
- 3:00 - Topic: Women in Business  
Producer: Radio Nadezhda (Moscow)  
Presenter: *Irina Simenova*
- 3:35 - Responder: Center for Sociological Research, Moscow State University -  
*Elena Pervysheva and I.D. Gorshkova (15 minutes)*
- 3:50 - Discussion on Results and Lessons Learned from People's Academy,  
Nadezhda and Murmansk Productions (25 minutes)
- 4:15 - Break
- 4:30 - Topic: Business and Economic Issues in Agriculture  
Producer: Vicon (Moscow)  
Presenter: *Sergei Yurakov*
- 4:55 - Responder: Validata/Yankelovich: *Sergei Khaikin* Focus Group  
Results/Lessons Learned (15 minutes)
- 5:10 - Final Discussion on Results and Lessons Learned from Vicon and all other  
Productions (20 minutes)
- 5:30 - Closing Comments - *Ron Childress*, ROSCON Research Director
- 5:45 - Reception

Note: REN-TV, TOR, and TV Neva will not be included as presenters but will be invited to Attend.

**COMMUNICATION PROCESS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE  
A ROSCON - SPONSORED CONFERENCE**

**DAY TWO: THE SOCIAL MARKETING PROCESS**

**Thursday, 3 November 1994**

- 8:30 - Sign In & Coffee
- 9:00 - Welcome and Introductions - *Jean de Malvinsky (Moderator)*
- 9:10 - Instructional Jury Trial film
- 10:00 - Review of Social Marketing Theory - *Beverly Schwartz*
- 11:00 - Discussion
- 11:30 - Break
- 11:45 - Applying Social Marketing in Russia -  
The ROSCON Experience - *Ron Childress (ROSCON)*
- 12:30 - Discussion
- 13:00 - Lunch
- 14:00 - Russian Perspective on the ROSCON Experience  
- *Victor M. Konstantinov, Cemintell*  
- *Elena Peresheyeva, Center for Sociological Research, MSU*  
- *Sergei V. Tumanov, Center for Sociological Research, MSU*
- 14:30 - Discussion (Q & A)
- 14:50 - Closing Comments - *Jean de Malvinsky (ROSCON)*
- 15:00 - Adjourn

# APPENDIX II

Focus Group Moderator's Certificates

# СЕРТИФИКАТ

ВЫДАН

Г-же Бахтиной М.М.


В подтверждение успешного прохождения стажировки в качестве модератора и аналитика фокус-групп, проведенной РОСКОН и Центром социологических исследований МГУ.

РОСКОН  
ЦЭМИНТЕЛЛ




Academy for Educational Development

*Gregory R. Niblett*



МГУ

Центр социологических исследований



2 ноября 1994 г.

# APPENDIX III

Letter of Commendation from the Murmansk City Government

**АДМИНИСТРАЦИЯ  
ГОРОДА МУРМАНСКА**183005, г. Мурманск, пр. Ленина, 76  
тел. 555-77от 10.06.94. № 6/106

на № \_\_\_\_\_ от \_\_\_\_\_

Отзыв о работе

Публикуемые в газете "Мурманский вестник" статьи "Женского клуба", которые готовятся независимой организацией "Конгресс женщин Кольского полуострова", вызывают активный интерес особенно женской части населения. После публикаций ко мне, как к одному из руководителей города, часто обращаются с просьбами по связям с этой организацией, интересуются мнениями по той или иной проблеме, обсуждаемой "Женским клубом".

Инициативность организации поддерживается как инициативой отдельных личностей, так и популяризацией ее идей через средства массовой информации и о этой точке зрения публикации "Женского клуба" незаменимы для местного населения. Благодаря им, "Конгресс женщин Кольского полуострова" стал заметной организацией в общественной жизни города.

При оценке деятельности и решении вопроса о финансовой поддержке проекта выпуска "Женского клуба" прошу учесть мнение городской администрации.

Зам. главы администрации  
города Мурманска

аш/2

Л. ГУДИНА

From: Raisa Scriabine (RAISA)  
To: gregn  
Date: 16 September 1994 (Friday) 5:07 pm  
Subject: murmansk

We have received a letter (addressee not indicated) from the Administration of the City of Murmansk. I think we should discuss what our response on this should be. The text translation is provided below (some portions are illegible in the faxed version):

#### Assessment of Work

The publication in the newspaper Murmanski vestnik of "Women's Club" which are prepared by the independent organization, The Congress of Women of the Kola Peninsula, is of great interest to particularly to women. After the publication first appear, I, as an administrator of the city, have received numerous requests by people who seek advice from the Women's Club or who are particularly interested in the views and the opinions expressed by the Club.

An organization is supported by individuals as well as by the popularization of its ideas through mass media and in this regard the Women's Club has stimulated the growth of the women's movement. Thanks to the Women's Club, the Congress of Women of the Kola Peninsula became a well known organization in the life of the city.

I urge you to bear in mind the views of the City Administration of Murmansk in evaluating your decisions to continue funding the project of publishing the "Women's Club."

Deputy Administrator of the City of Murmansk  
L. Gudina

CC: scottms, andreau

# APPENDIX IV

Background/Situation Analysis  
Focus Group Report

PROJECT ROSCON  
SYNOPSIS OF FORMATIVE RESEARCH  
MAY, 1993, - OCTOBER, 1994  
(BACKGROUND AND SITUATION ANALYSES)



*Academy for Educational Development*

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The chief, distinguishing feature of Project ROSCON is the fact that it proceeds from a **Russian initiative**. The founding of ROSCON in 1992 as the "Russian Society for Social Conversion" was accomplished by sixteen (16) independent Russian organizations, each having on its own concluded that the process of economic transformation lacked a crucial ingredient - public understanding and support. The conversion of a command economy into a free market economy could not be accomplished solely through innovative policies or structural and institutional change implemented from above. The transformation required active cooperation from below.

In light of historical experience, the founders of ROSCON rejected the totalitarian model of "agit-prop" (agitation and propaganda). While committed to public education as a strategy, they realized that the process of change could not await maturation of a new generation. The transformation would require a relatively rapid mobilization of individuals and groups who would drive the process at all levels of the economy and across a vast geographic expanse. Thereafter, the transformation could only be sustained by the active engagement and participation of all Russia's adult citizens. In short, economic transformation would ultimately require major changes in economic behavior at all levels.

Intuitively, the founders of ROSCON were contemplating a program of social marketing. The techniques of commercial marketing had already been introduced into Russia, and an indigenous marketing capacity was under development.<sup>1</sup> The idea of social conversion or innovation as a "product" to be "promoted," however, was alien to Russia and to the founders of ROSCON.

Dr. Zurab A. Yakobashvili, a central ROSCON figure, was introduced to the concept of social marketing by the Academy for Educational Development (AED) in the late spring of 1992. By summer of that year, ROSCON and AED had jointly developed the project as an unsolicited proposal for funding by the United States Agency for International Development (AID). In March, 1993, Project ROSCON was approved and funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and in the first days of May, 1993, the AED/ROSCON field team arrived in Moscow.

## FORMATIVE RESEARCH

Formative research is the starting point for any social

---

<sup>1</sup> The actual effectiveness of these new marketing services is open to some doubt. Continuing, brisk sales of imported goods may not be the results of slick marketing campaigns but simply of pent-up consumer demand, requiring no artificial stimulus after decades of shortage.

marketing intervention. Typically, it consists of **background analysis** to capture information about the environment affecting the target audience(s) and **situation analysis** to identify existing knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of the target audience(s).

Private, non-governmental organizations pursuing their own objectives (e.g., fire prevention, eradicating drug abuse, preventing AIDS) are generally in a better position to design formative research than are organizations whose social marketing intervention supports government policies. The difficulties are compounded when the social marketing intervention is undertaken by American organizations in collaboration with foreign governments as hosts.

In the Russian Federation today, these difficulties in formative research are further compounded by frequent shifts in government policy, amorphous and occasionally secretive government programs, steady disintegration of the administrative apparatus, general confusion, and inaccuracy of available information. Nevertheless, Project ROSCON had a broad mandate to conduct formative research and to design social marketing intervention(s) that would support the Russian transition from a command economy to a free-market, free-enterprise system.

Part One of this document presents the Project ROSCON Background Analysis: its findings with respect to government policies and programs as well as other factors constituting the environment in which Russian citizens have been required to survive during the period from May, 1993, through September, 1994. Part Two of this document presents the Project ROSCON Situation Analysis: a report on the chief target audiences studied by ROSCON over the past seventeen months. Part Two also presents the rationale for selecting Youth as the most appropriate audience for long-term social marketing in the Russian Federation along with the caveat that immediate social marketing intervention(s) are required with decision-makers as the target group.

AED/ROSCON and its Russian partners (TSEMINTELL and others) have drawn upon varied sources of information. These include media monitoring, published and unpublished sociological and other research, travel, anecdotal data from a wide network of informal contacts and briefings with members of the Russian Federation Center for Information and Social Technology (TsIST) with which ROSCON is co-located in Moscow. Budget constraints have precluded extensive travel to regions for on-the-spot observation.

A final caveat should be added to this report. The conclusions set forth below should not be taken as direct or implied criticism of any individuals, groups or organizations presently engaged in the process of economic transformation in Russia. Some Russian readers of this report in draft form have

taken its findings as an indictment of Russian society. Such is not the intent of this report. On the contrary, the citizenry of the Russian Federation deserves nothing but admiration for its courage and tenacity in facing a challenge truly unprecedented in history. Thus, one might lament or even condemn the situation in which Russian citizens today find themselves, but one can only praise the tens of millions of Russians who struggle daily to improve their own lot and that of their fellow citizens. Especially to be noted in this regard are the hard-working Russian producers, sociologists and leaders of non-governmental organizations who have played a role in Project ROSCON.

## BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

### 1. Governmental Competition and Evolution.

Throughout the life span of Project ROSCON it has been difficult to speak of economic "policy" and "programs" in the Russian Federation. Instead, it is more accurate to describe **outcomes of competition** among power centers and networks. From May through September, 1993, the chief competitors were:

- the Executive Branch (Presidential Administration and Council of Ministers);
- the Supreme Soviet (Parliament);
- the Bureaucracy (federal, regional and local executive and "legislative" bodies).

From October, 1993, through January, 1994, in the absence of a functioning parliament, competition emerged between the Presidential Administration and the Council of Ministers, between and among component bureaucracies of each, and between and among levels of government in regions, oblasts and municipalities.

The final period of study begins in February, 1994, when the newly established parliament completed its organization. In this phase the competition seems to involve five elements:

- the Presidential Administration;
- the Council of Ministers;
- the Parliament (especially, the Duma);
- the Authorities (independent regional, oblast and municipal power centers);
- the Bureaucracies under each of the foregoing, who are responsible to implement policies and programs but whose actual performances frequently depart from formal announcements.

## 2. Method of Analysis.

Against this background, ROSCON has been required to examine government policies and programs in three discrete phases. First, the official promulgation of an initiative has been studied, whether in the form of a press release, press conference, formal address, announcement, or adoption of decrees, resolutions, regulations and statutes. From these materials, the outlines of the policy or program are gleaned.

The second phase has entailed monitoring the implementation and impact of policies and programs. With limited resources, ROSCON has been forced to rely upon investigative journalism, informed commentary and anecdotal materials (collected informally from various sources) as a balance to official reporting. Geography, obviously, has made it difficult to monitor closely developments outside of the Moscow region.

In the third and final phase, the foregoing data is interpreted in light of ROSCON's ultimate criterion: the creation of genuine opportunity for healthy participation in a market economy. More precisely, in this Background Analysis, government policies and programs are discussed in terms of their potential to:

- i. establish institutions and settings in which market forces become the primary determinant of economic **behavior**;
- ii. impart **knowledge** about the foregoing;
- iii. encourage **attitudes** of self-reliance and reduce dependency upon and surrender to perceived powers that be;
- iv. eradicate erroneous or negative **beliefs** about the market economy or about conditions in Russia.

In short, this Background Analysis is not intended to be a survey of the Russian economy nor an account of its transformation from May, 1993, through September, 1994. The subject matter of Project ROSCON is not economics or even economic behavior but rather it is "pre-economic" behavior in Russia, the environment in which it occurs and the knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs which direct it.

### 3. Background Analysis - Government Policies.

In May, 1993, when the AED/ROSCON field team was deployed, two governmental programs were well underway: (1) privatization of state property; and (2) dismantling of state price controls, generically termed market liberalization. The policy rationale for these programs was and continues to be: (1) private property provides a rational incentive for and regulator of economic behavior; and (2) market forces will be unleashed if individuals and organizations are prompted to make conscious calculations of cost and benefit in their economic decisions.

Since May, 1993, the Presidential Administration, Council of Ministers and the Bureaucracies at various times have articulated the following additional policy objectives:

- economic stabilization;
- controlling inflation (sometimes called, monetarism);
- eradication of organized crime.

Programmatic implementation of these five policy lines (privatization, market liberalization, stabilization, monetarism, and elimination of crime) varies from one economic sector to another. Detailed discussion of these sectors is set out below. Again, with each discussion, ROSCON evaluates the possibilities for social marketing - i.e., opportunities to adopt market behaviors, to impart market knowledge, to change attitudes and beliefs. Unfortunately, as recounted below, ROSCON has found little in the policies and programs studied over the past seventeen months which could support its objectives.

### Privatization.

As a theoretical proposition, the creation of private property should lead to a viable market economy. Ownership as an institution should awaken curiosity about market economics (if only to preserve, maybe enhance, the value of real and personal property). Actual experience of ownership should lead to rational economic behaviors and abandonment of erroneous beliefs, albeit through trial and error. Ownership should be empowerment, evoking attitudes of self-reliance, confidence and resistance to governmental abuse and arbitrary exercise of power.

Such arguments have been advanced in favor of privatization by government officials and respected academicians as, for example, Dr. Sergei Alekseev in his 1993 book, Sobstvennost'. In May, 1994, however, Alekseev published a repudiation of privatization as Russia has known it. He and others point out that privatization has simply been the appropriation of state property by individuals and groups (often members of the Soviet "nomenklatura") who lack the understanding or the incentive to generate income from such capital windfalls. Criminality has been widely reported in all sectors of privatization. According to anecdotal information obtained by ROSCON, even those who legitimately acquire property feel no sense of empowerment but instead a greater vulnerability to official and criminal pressure.

As a whole, the policy of privatization has not provided most Russians with genuine opportunity for healthy participation in a market economy. The range of behaviors fostered by privatization cannot be characterized as "economic," in the sense of being impelled by or responsive to classic market forces. Instead, most behaviors seem to flow from short-sighted greed and/or criminality. Knowledge of healthy market economics is not imparted by the privatization that has heretofore occurred. On the contrary, millions of ordinary citizens have been victimized by the process. Their feelings of dependency and helplessness have been reinforced along with the belief that economic benefits can never be earned by effort but only attained through influence or force. Privatization in the Russian Federation today seems amply to justify this belief.

### Market Liberalization.

By the time Project ROSCON was launched, hopes that liberalized prices would stimulate competition and foster the market economy were rarely voiced in the Russian press or in ROSCON's circle of contacts. Liberalization of prices, according to journalistic accounts and anecdotal information, instead enabled surviving monopolies of all sizes to continue setting and manipulating prices, in collusion with authorities, bureaucracies and criminal organizations.

To be sure, no single group can long control more than a discrete portion of a given market. This has enabled Russians in large cities to engage in comparison shopping (a marginal behavior in the deficit-driven Soviet economy). Sociological data indicates, however, that few Russians consider this a benefit when weighed against rising costs of living. Most citizens believe these rising costs are simply the work of criminals and monopolists.

For the average Russian, market liberalization has not created genuine opportunities for healthy participation in a market economy. In major metropolitan areas, Soviet-era deficits have been replaced by rising prices; the average urban consumer is still denied access to quality goods. Away from metropolitan areas, the consumer's struggle to survive is in many ways unchanged from Soviet times and in some ways is even more difficult. As prices are manipulated by monopolists, the average citizen has no opportunity to learn about market forces nor to respond to them. Helplessness is felt most acutely with the rise of prices for essential goods (such as food, discussed below). Nothing in "market liberalization" recommends itself as material for ROSCON social marketing efforts.

### Stabilization.

The policy of "stabilization" is left unclear by published versions. Major pronouncements by the President as well as the Prime Minister in March, 1994, called for the elimination of industrial debt. The "default crisis," as it is called, is a simple matter of "debtor enterprises" failing to pay their bills. The crisis is aggravated by dysfunctions in the banking system which delay transfers of funds and credits.

Presidential decrees in late 1993 attempted to force payment of debts by requiring firms to convert these obligations into short-term promissory notes. The program had little visible impact.

In fully developed market economies, such problems generally remain in the private sector and are resolved through court proceedings, including bankruptcy. In the Russian Federation, involuntary bankruptcy is often recommended as a solution. Yet there is no rush to institute fully such mechanism. Commentaries attribute this hesitation to fear of unemployment and resulting social unrest.

The matter of "stabilization" is further confused by governmental, journalistic and academic application of the term to Russia's "collapse of productivity." "Stabilization" in this sense would require a policy of financial support to moribund enterprises. It would directly contradict the positions of the President and Prime Minister described above. A policy of subsidizing such entities would also require additional revenues that can only be extracted from healthy or foreign sectors of the economy, already burdened by taxes or operating in violation of tax statutes.

In light of these ambiguities, the idea of "stabilization" seems inappropriate for ROSCON's social marketing activities.

### Monetarism.

Controlling inflation by reducing budgetary outlays is the general understanding of monetarism in Russia. This includes but is not limited to the subsidies just mentioned under "stabilization." Project ROSCON has witnessed significant digressions from a steady monetarist policy over the period since May, 1993.

In the summer of 1992, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation had granted massive "soft" loans to debtor enterprises, enabling them to pay their debts. Similar action was demanded by the Supreme Soviet in 1993, but was blocked by the executive branch.

Soon after the December 1993 elections and in direct contradiction of this firm policy, the President ordered soft loans to several distressed enterprises. No serious effort was made to reconcile this action with monetarist policy. Periodically throughout 1994 similar episodes have received press attention, even as the Economics Ministry set standards to limit and govern such credits to industry.

If consistently and uniformly applied, a monetarist policy could impart valuable lessons to Russia's industry and its citizens alike. It could teach the proper roles of government, the financial sector, and the borrowing public in a healthy market economy. Such a policy could teach all citizens alike not to expect government relief. It could dispel the still pervasive belief that economic benefits are not earned but are bestowed at the will of higher powers. Unfortunately, governmental commitment to a monetarist policy appears tenuous and has been easily dislodged by political considerations.

For the average Russian, debates over the policy of monetarism and the federal budget provide no personally relevant lessons about the market economy and provide no occasions for participation. Rigorous and consistent monetarism, resulting in widespread unemployment, can only heighten anxiety and feelings of helplessness. Citizens presently see, however, that monetarism is applied arbitrarily and in response to political pressures, a phenomenon which replicates the Soviet model wherein politics drove economics. When observed at the highest levels of government, such behaviors cannot impart to citizens a sense that economics (however understood) has any relevance to survival in Russia today. In short, monetarism offers ROSCON no viable prospects for social marketing.

### Eliminating Crime.

In January, 1994, a report was issued by the Presidential Center for Social-Economic Policy Analysis which recounted the penetration of business and government by criminal organizations. It boldly proposed establishment of an elite, paramilitary force to combat this problem. Although the project was never realized, the report itself was a major public event. Its findings of pervasive criminality and danger faced by the business community bolstered sociological data and anecdotal information collected by ROSCON on the widespread fear and vulnerability felt by Russian citizens.

Harsh decrees adopted by the Presidential Administration in June, 1994, were criticized by jurists and journalists as violative of human rights. They were also taken as a sign that the problem was beyond control. Such developments served to deepen the public sense that it was helpless and undefended by its government. They also neutralized in advance any ROSCON social marketing designed to encourage citizen activism to purge the economy of such distorting influences.

#### 4. Background Analysis - Government Programs.

In principle, the Soviet Union constituted a single, integrated economy; its dissolution severed innumerable lines of economic interaction between the constituent republics. Like so many strands of an unraveling fabric, major branches of the former Russian economy remain disconnected, three years later.

This phenomenon has been so widely reported and discussed that allusions to it become almost trite. For Project ROSCON, however, it poses the conceptual problem of describing a Russian "economy" as such. A more appropriate image would be that of a garden gone to seed: the furrows remain, where they had been methodically cut, but the growth is now random and uncontrolled, much of the original vegetation overgrown and choked by new (sometimes noxious) weeds.

To organize its research of government programs, ROSCON has elected to examine clusters of economic activity which the Russian government seems to consider "strategic" - i.e., essential to its survival. In a genuine free-market economy these clusters would be identified as "sectors," and for purposes of this background analysis the term will be employed. The chief sectors of interest are: fuels and energy production; transportation; agriculture, food processing and distribution; housing; and the military-industrial complex.

### Fuels and Energy.

In this sector, two primary objectives emerge from government statements and actions: (1) to continue, at any cost, to generate electricity needed to heat cities, operate waterworks, emergency services, urban transportation, and factories; and (2) to generate foreign exchange earnings through export sales. Stated bluntly, should "the lights go out," the social explosion so frequently predicted in commentaries will be inescapable.

In pursuit of these objectives, the Russian government has slowed privatization of the petroleum industry. It has provided stopgap subsidies to coal production, paying miners' salaries intermittently through the winter of 1993-1994 in response to strikes. It has continued to operate obsolete and dangerous nuclear power stations.

From the perspective of Project ROSCON, none of these actions by the Russian government provide examples of rational economic **behavior**. They impart no **knowledge** of healthy participation in a free market economy. While jobs are retained in the fuels and energy sector, workers develop no new **attitudes** of self-reliance. To the contrary (as reflected in strike slogans), feelings of helplessness and dependency are reinforced by daily experience. Workers in this sector are strengthened in their **belief** that economic benefits by nature are controlled by the powers that be and are bestowed according to plan or caprice. As a result, the average citizen remains a spectator to degradation of the environment and decay of urban infrastructure. The fuels and energy sector provides no material suitable for ROSCON social marketing.

## Transportation.

Transportation remains a critical and vulnerable sector of the Russian "economy." Its strategic importance cannot be overstated, of course, since survival of key urban centers depends upon timely delivery of fuels, food and other essentials. The largest "debtor" to the railroad system is the so-called "fuel-energy complex" (TEK).

As a first step toward introducing market forces, privatization of transportation in the Russia Federation has produced varied results. In aviation, it has resulted in the disintegration of the Aeroflot system, creating losses in efficiency and safety. It may not be an overstatement to suggest that expanding activity by foreign air lines in Russian air space (spurred by safety concerns of foreign travelers) could in the near term result in disappearance of investment, employment and business opportunities for Russians in their own domestic air transport industry.

With the exception of the railways and local, urban networks, surface transportation has also undergone massive privatization. Whether or not as a result of privatization (and business failures), the period since May, 1993, has seen significant contraction in inter-city shipping and transportation according to official statistics. While passenger travel has fallen only five percent (5%), water transportation of goods has shrunk by thirty-one (31%), road transportation by forty percent (40%), and rail transportation by eighteen percent (18%). Sixty percent (60%) of the cost of passenger rail travel is paid for by freight charges, still yielding a deficit in passenger revenues, according to the Ministry of Roads & Railways.

Local transportation systems remain the responsibility of government (not unlike western countries). Increasing levels of accidental injury and property damage may reflect actual degradation of infrastructure. (On the other hand, it may only reflect more open reporting.) Uncontrolled and incomprehensible increases in fares and tariffs have only increased the citizens' sense of dependency and helplessness.

There has emerged no clear governmental policy on the future of transportation. Hence it appears that present trends will continue, including the unfortunate tendency to "rob Peter to pay Paul" evident in the railroad industry. With the exception of isolated success by individual shipping firms, the transportation sector provides Russians with no example of market principles at work.

### Agriculture, Food Processing and Distribution.

A substantial fraction of the Russian federal budget is allocated to agriculture. The support is not in the form of price subsidies, as in the United States. Instead, funds go directly to purchase grain through "Roskhlebprodukt" or to supply soft loans to favored enterprises. In August, 1993, and again a year later, officials and observers agree that there is no coherent plan to introduce market forces into agriculture, food processing and distribution.

The general rationale for privatization leads some observers to expect that private ownership of land could be the first step toward creation of a healthy, competitive market economy in food production and distribution. A Presidential Decree of October 27, 1993, authorized purchase and sale of land. Yet the same decree prohibited farming of such land by hired labor, effectively limiting use of land to family farms. Furthermore, the distribution of land was delegated to local authorities, creating abundant opportunity for graft and corruption, as documented in press commentaries throughout the winter of 1993-1994.

On paper, de-collectivization of Russian agriculture has been accomplished. By the summer of 1994, ninety per cent (90%) of Russian collective farms had been converted from state enterprises into private joint stock companies. Yet the vast majority of these new enterprises differ in name only from their predecessors. Former chairmen of collective farms have simply become controlling stockholders of newly organized stock companies. Where collective farms have actually been dismantled into individual family farms, the land distribution has uniformly been the subject of bitter contention and unfairness.

Distribution of land through any existing or conceivable apparatus of the government in Russia tends to be unfair and corrupt. There are reports that allocations of land within the Moscow Oblast were limited artificially to two hectares because real-estate developers influenced governmental authorities to allocate land within 50 kilometers of the city for private home construction (i.e., the "kottedzhy" of the wealthy "New Russians"). In the United States, this would be a zoning issue and indeed a political fight. Individual Russian farmers, however, have no voice in government and believe themselves powerless to influence such decisions (especially if the "mafia" is involved). The de-collectivization and privatization of agriculture has come to be regarded as simply a new set of perquisites for the Bureaucracy ("Chinovnichestvo" see below).

The major burden of the 1993 harvest, like every harvest since the advent of collectivization, fell upon military "volunteers" or city dwellers drawn by promises of payments and discounts on produce sold in state stores. It is reported that these non-

agricultural "storm" workers never received the promised benefits. Similarly, regular farmers and agricultural workers who delivered the 1993 grain harvest to "Roskhlebprodukt" were not fully paid. The 1994 harvest has been slowed by lack of fuel and funds to maintain equipment. It is predicted that it will be another in a historic series of "struggles for the harvest" using again the combined forces of military and volunteers.

Wholesale purchase of grain remains basically a government monopoly. In the fall of 1993, eighty percent (80%) of the grain harvest was traded through the federal government. Localities looked to the government for supplies or compensation for grain expenditures. The Moscow City government, for example, petitioned and threatened to sue the federal authorities when they failed to pay the 1993 "grocery bill."

In late 1993, a Presidential decree called for drastic contraction of "Roskhlebprodukt," limiting its future operations to maintenance of a federal grain reserve for military and other "essential" governmental purposes. Further, the decree required "subjects" of the Russian Federation (regions, oblasts, republics and municipalities) to acquire their grain supplies independently. In part, this feature of the decree aimed to solve the problem of local claims on federal funds (as in Moscow, above). The ultimate impact of the decree, however, was to create competition between and among branches of government. Local authorities during 1993-1994 protected their supplies by enacting prohibitions on export of crops from their jurisdictions. The effect of these enactments has been to cause true commercial competition to be stillborn.

It is argued in some quarters that a governmental monopoly is preferable to a commercial monopoly because it is more humane. ("Roskhlebprodukt" has granted limited entry into its domain to some competitors, such as the OGO firm.) A purely private monopoly, runs the argument, would eradicate any and all competition.

Recently, a second attempt has been made to establish a grain commodities exchange. This may represent a ray of hope, as press commentaries predict a shrinking share in the grain market for the government. Fundamentally, however, the only consistent experience Russian farmers have had in the marketplace has been retail sale of produce raised on their individual plots ("uchastniki") which was institutionalized by the Soviets in 1935.

Retail distribution of food as a whole has been a theater of considerable privatization activity. In many localities, state owned chains of retail outlets have been completely or almost completely privatized. The fledgling commercial stores, however, have proven to be marginal enterprises. They lack cash flow to assure more than a few days' inventory. They are subject to arbitrary regulations (limitations on mark-ups for example) by

local authorities, and extortion by criminal elements.

The Russian Federal government in October, 1993, rescinded price controls on bread, causing immediate and painful price hikes by monopolist local suppliers. The price liberalization brought no relief to retail stores pressed for cash. For lack of cash, or access and transportation, small enterprises outside major metropolitan areas have no way to shop for sources of supply at a distance or discount. They have no hope of creating a diverse stock. Hence, privatized stores in many areas of the Russian Federation look much the same in 1994 as they did in the period of Brezhnev stagnation. In some cases, they are worse. In reports from late 1993, some localities in the Russian Far East found themselves without food outlets at all because state owned stores had been privatized, and the new enterprises had failed and closed.

On the whole, developments in agriculture, food processing and distribution provide no examples appropriate for adoption in ROSCON social marketing. It is possible, however, that in the future this sector could provide fruitful ground for study and development of free-market messages of a practical, encouraging nature.

## Housing.

Privatization of housing has occurred in two ways: municipal authorities have surrendered ownership of individual apartments to residents; Presidential decrees have permitted ownership and transfer of land. It was expected that both programs would foster individual ownership, while the latter program would stimulate commercial development of real estate and a market for residential property.

Privatization of municipal apartments has not created a commercial real estate market. Procedures for registering private ownership are not properly understood by large segments of the Russian citizenry, and little effort has been made to improve public understanding.

Uninformed citizens have fallen victim not only to corrupt officials but also to criminal gangs who have actually "purchased" apartments from elderly inhabitants, only to murder the victims after registering as new owners. Other social ills have been aggravated by the privatization of municipal apartments; social service agencies report that the incidence of homelessness among children has increased as parents sell apartments, then squander the proceeds in alcohol abuse.

Reports of murders and other abuses have discouraged many city dwellers from taking the first step into the marketplace - i.e., obtaining ownership of their own dwellings. The practice of "apartment swapping" already existed in the Soviet regime; it has become the surrogate for a market in urban housing.

Private ownership of land has indeed become the basis for a robust, but highly restricted market in single family dwellings. In the Moscow oblast alone, construction of suburban bungalows ("kottedzhy") for the "new rich" has invited many new entrepreneurs. Again, however, the appearance of healthy economic activity is deceiving. There exists no mechanism to secure construction loans (if such loans can be procured). Home-builders cannot be sure of any return for their work and investments. They are also confronted with rising costs and difficulties in acquiring materials, as well as harassment by officials and criminal gangs. Uncertainty for owners and developers is further heightened by the virtual absence of zoning laws, building codes, standard regulation of utilities and infrastructure.

In light of the foregoing, large scale construction of housing remains primarily the responsibility of federal and local governments. For example, throughout the period of ROSCON, the Moscow municipal government has continued construction programs in an effort to provide relief to thousands of citizens still dwelling in communal apartments. In addition, the municipal authorities have launched programs to demolish housing from the Khrushchev era

and have promised that future projects will be more aesthetically pleasing.

The housing sector remains an example of continued citizen dependency upon the government. Nascent elements of free enterprise are fraught with danger. They are for the most part concealed from the public and, when publicized, evoke little respect among the Russian citizenry. Citizens basically remain dependent upon the government for housing. Apartment swapping and similar practices are widespread but are not understood to be economic behavior in any sense. ROSCON has determined that this sector offers no inspiring material for social marketing intervention.

## The Military Industrial Complex.

For reasons of national security, much of the Russian Military-Industrial Complex (VPK) has been exempt from privatization. A Presidential decree in August, 1993, diluted legal restrictions imposed by the Supreme Soviet. By the Fall of 1993 the Russian Committee on Defense Industries had established working relationships with a number of private investment funds, authorized to purchase shares in selected defense plants on behalf of investors. Strategically important firms would remain completely under governmental control. A middle category of firms would be privatized but required to concentrate on state contracts. Others would be completely commercialized.

Since VPK (also called "Oboronka") historically accounted for the lion's share of the Soviet economy, the implications of a total collapse are grave. In the worst case, thousands of major plants would be closed, millions of workers would be displaced, and scores of cities deprived of their single industry, their economic and tax base. Perhaps with this prospect in view, most of Russia's major defense facilities have tried to remain structurally intact through the ROSCON period, considering size (and social risks of closure) to be leverage in the competition for state subsidization. Exceptions have included the Degtyarov Gun Factory in Vladimir and Sukhoi Design Bureau. By Spring of 1994, Degtyarov was a failing enterprise, its workers demanding to be paid in weapons for lack of salaries.

Actual VPK privatization has been limited to medium and small enterprises spun off from major production organizations, applying portions of military technology to supply narrow markets at home and abroad. There have been success stories among these conversions, but the significant fact remains that as a whole they represent a marginal phenomenon. Some experts note that for every single VPK worker absorbed into such new "conversion" industry, 500 or more other VPK workers are left unemployed. Moreover, even highly visible events such as the annual Defense Conversion Trade Fair in December, 1993, reflected meager progress and few commercially viable new enterprises. The public record, moreover, does not disclose how many of these success stories actually are based upon continuing government subsidization

At the level of the Russian Federation government, foreign arms sales represent sources of western hard currency. Recognizing the importance of this trade the President by decree established "Rosvooruzheniye" as the exclusive outlet for Russian arms production, a action which was to some extent diluted by subsequent exemptions granted to specific firms. Despite these measures Russian foreign arms sales have continued to fall for a variety of market reasons including strong US competition and customer concern that the Russian VPK and/or privatized manufacturers would be unable to supply replacement parts in the future.

The status of the armed forces as an institution is a concern for Project ROSCON as for all parties interested in the economic transformation of Russia. Dismantling of the armed forces themselves (as opposed to VPK) entails more than conversion from a "garrison" economy to that of a free market. Military forces levels must correspond to doctrine. Critics of the conversion process point out that a consistent new doctrine for the Russian Federation has yet to be pronounced. In the absence of a new strategic architecture, dismantling of the military becomes chaotic and socially disruptive insofar as hundreds of thousands of military personnel are affected.

Demobilization of officer personnel, for example, poses a very significant dilemma. Retaining officers on duty, obviously, prolongs expenses for salaries and support for dependents. Separation, however, requires immediate "up front" severance pay and costs of relocating families. It is, based upon this calculation, less expensive to retain an officer on duty than to discharge him. But figures do not represent the entire story. The government can make marginal savings by retaining officers and simply postponing salary payments until inflation erodes (reduces) cost. Families can be maintained in miserable conditions rather than relocated. Special programs of cross-training into agriculture and granting land to such officers are limited in scope and uneven in results.

Those remaining on active duty confront arbitrary and irrational budget cuts which impact the entire range of military operations from training through food and shelter. Recent reports from the Defense Ministry indicate that the armed forces have been unable to amass fuel supplies for the 1994-1995 winter. Reports abound of military personnel stealing and selling weaponry to feed their families.

On paper, the process of defense conversion - privatization and diversification of the VPK - should offer the richest variety of examples and materials for Project ROSCON. Success stories should demonstrate the empowering effective of private property, the stimulus of competition and monetary incentive, as well as the risks and rewards of free enterprise. Instead, unfortunately, the process has been amorphous, clouded in secrecy, distorted and warped by domestic and foreign political forces. Ultimately it has failed to establish any precedents for true private enterprise. The search for healthy examples in the defense sector should not be abandoned, but Project ROSCON's efforts in this direction have not borne fruit.

## 5. Background Analysis - Additional Considerations.

### Business Climate.

In a healthy free market economy, the "business climate" governs corporate and individual decisions to expand or contract operations. It is a combination of considerations: taxes and regulations, markets, availability and cost of labor and materials, interest rates and financing, evolving technology, quality of life (for plant start-up or re-location), and subjective "hunches." In the United States, moreover, one function of trade associations is to keep members informed about the "business climate" through trade journals and other communications.

These familiar features of the "business climate" are for the most part lacking in Russia. In their place, Russian and foreign entrepreneurs face an array of strange and daunting obstacles:

- unknowable and unfathomable "laws" and "regulations"
- absence of commercial law
- no genuine legal protection for ownership of real property and intangibles
- no reliable banking or credit system
- pervasive governmental corruption (including direct "loans" (grants) from the Central Bank to political cronies)
- no history or culture of "friendly competition"
- random and targeted violence
- arbitrary and oppressive taxation
- unreliable transportation and communications
- phoney stock exchanges and fly-by-night "investment funds"
- a largely unmotivated labor force.

All these problems were present at the initiation of Project ROSCON. Eighteen months later no significant improvement can be detected on any front. In some respects the "business climate" observed by ROSCON is worse than in May, 1993.

One interesting sidelight on the question of "business climate" is the emergence and popularity of "business schools" in such metropolitan areas as Moscow. Advertisements in newspapers and on the metro tout opportunities to learn western business skills. Limitations of personnel, time and funding have precluded close study of these organizations by Project ROSCON. Superficial contact with a few such institutions, especially those with significant American participation, reveals an unfortunate tendency simply to project American practices and standards upon the Russian environment. In fact, it appears that "the street" is the best source of practical information and realistic examples of business behavior in Russia today. To the extent that western "business schools" fail to recognize this fact, they impart lessons to their Russian students which ultimately must "unlearned" in the process

of survival.

Along with the emergence of these "academies," faculty members of formerly prestigious institutions for economic prognosis and planning have established consulting groups to serve privatized enterprises and new businesses. Project ROSCON's partner, TSEMINTELL, is one such entity. Had Project ROSCON continued and expanded its operations, attention and support for such "carriers of innovation" would have been greatly warranted.

Despite all the foregoing, individual success stories appear in the press. With its own pilot media products, Project ROSCON has contributed to this reportage. The audience feedback, as presented in a separate ROSCON document, has been highly critical sometimes harshly negative. Success stories are received with skepticism; they are intensely scrutinized for evidence of criminality, official corruption, or simple "connections." Not even successful entrepreneurs themselves are willing to believe that the "business climate" in Russia today is one in which economic rewards are the result of economic behaviors.

### The Bureaucracy (Chinovnichestvo)

The term "chinovnik" is roughly translated as "corrupt bureaucrat" and has already been used elsewhere in this report. The classic "chinovnik" is a notorious stereotype in Russian history and literature: a parasitical and narrow-minded functionary whose existence depends upon bribery and whose primary job is to report on his "wards" to superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy (collectively, the "Chinovnichestvo").

Throughout the period of ROSCON activity, the Russian and foreign press have been filled with lurid coverage of corruption and the phenomenon of the "Chinovnichestvo." Distilled and captured as a single line of argument, the "pessimistic" diagnosis would offer the following explanations for the continuing health and vigor of the Bureaucracy.

- The Russian Federation has become a banana republic. The authority and impact of the central government steadily dwindles as regions, localities and cities act spontaneously without regard to Moscow. Bureaucratic arbitrariness and caprice at all levels are now unfettered.

- The central government is insolvent, its resources steadily drained by expenditures exceeding revenue which nevertheless fail to discharge liabilities. Bureaucrats who hold the purse strings hold sway over all.

- If ever Russian economic and political transformation was a process of planned or programmatic "reform," it is now a spontaneous, virtually uncontrolled process of disintegration. In a setting of policy and programmatic chaos, bureaucrats account to no one for resources or for results.

- Privatization is the only element of transformation nominally under central control and consciously designed to foster independent, private economic activity. It is, unfortunately, perceived by the public as massive pillage and plunder, benefiting only a despised economic elite known as the "New Russians." In many ways, the "New Russians" owe their present status to the Bureaucracy, because manipulation of the privatization effort has been in great part the work of its implementing agencies.

- "Programs" to curb inflation and strengthen the ruble (both genuine reforms) are thwarted by the objective fact that subsidization of failing industries seems the only way to postpone massive unemployment and a social explosion. Allocation of resources follows patterns of influence within the Bureaucracy.

- Such infrastructure as exists to support small business or private farming operates at the will and caprice of its functionaries.

- No reliable mechanism exists to protect businessmen or farmers against criminal depredations. Self-protection involves payment to criminals or to law enforcement officials, and sometimes both.

- The taxation system stifles domestic savings, investment and enterprise. Regulations provide little or no guidelines for business operations but rather seem designed as traps for the unwary. The system is ameliorated case by case and only through personal influence with the Bureaucracy.

The foregoing theses may strike the reader as extreme. They do not in fact represent final conclusions of ROSCON by any means. Rather they recapitulate the "pessimistic" analysis of the Bureaucracy as an impediment to economic transformation, frequently encountered in Russian journalism. Whether exaggerated or not, the perception of the "Chinovnichestvo" as an almost insurmountable obstacle appears to be a very widespread view. It has surfaced in the course Project ROSCON audience research. It should be constantly kept in mind by all western efforts to support peaceful social change in Russia.

### Psychology of Dependence.

The question of dependency relates, of course, to the existing attitudes of target audiences and the Situation Analysis which follows. State paternalism, however, is also an objective and significant component of Russian history. As is well known, it pre-dates the Bolshevik revolution itself. The contours of paternalism in the post-1991 period are important elements of the setting within which Project ROSCON has had to work.

At least in its public pronouncements, the Russian Administration should be credited for its efforts to exhort citizens to abandon paternalistic expectations. In July, 1993, (relatively early in the course of Project ROSCON) Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was interviewed in Argumenty i Fakty and underscored the "psychological" difficulties of the economic transition. Citizens must learn, said he, to earn their livelihoods rather than expecting to survive through handouts or by stealing from their employers.

In the same interview, however, the Prime Minister himself expressed his anticipation that social conversion will succeed, if the interests of the individual worker and the company or collective could be brought into harmony. Of course, this romantic image of industrial relations in a free market economy would not be shared by American labor or management, a fact which suggests that vestigial and even reflexive paternalism may be a problem at all levels of the Russian economy and society. Indeed, it may be a phenomenon so pervasive as to challenge even the most sophisticated programs of social marketing.

Structurally, there are many features of Russian business practice which at present perpetuate paternalistic habits. Continued dependence of major industrial plants upon state "loans" is only the most obvious example. Likewise, many enterprises and collective farms, once privatized have retained most features of their Soviet predecessors, including a wide range of cost-free benefits to workers and families. The pattern was even brought to light in the course of one of ROSCON's media products - a television program depicting a successful farmer/horse breeder whose enterprise offered free housing and other important benefits to workers. An viewer noted that this merely perpetuated paternalism at the individual level.

A note of caution, however, is required at this point. To label these practices as "paternalistic" is to risk projecting western (especially American) definitions and biases upon the Russian environment. In fact, a significant component of Russian commentary and debate on economic transformation has been the question of the Russian "third way," the possibility of a mixed economic and social contract granting a place for traditions of paternalism even as the economy is basically permitted to

operate on market principles.

Such discussions are too intricate and theoretical for full representation within this Background Analysis, but their importance in the future of Russian social conversion cannot be overstated. The initial effort to "define the innovation" (see Situation Analysis, Part 3 below) reflects some early encounter with this aspect of the problem. Had Project ROSCON continued, it is certain that these profound questions would have played a key role in media message design.

## SITUATION ANALYSIS

### 1. Introduction.

Social marketing involves the traditional "Four P's" found in any species of marketing: Product, Price, Position and Promotion. The "product" is a new behavior having a "price" which a target audience is willing to pay, because benefits outweigh costs. The product must be "positioned" meaning that concrete opportunities must exist or be created whereby the new behavior can be adopted. With these elements in place, the product is then "promoted" through appropriate channels of communication and personal interaction.

As a social marketing project, ROSCON was unprecedented in its scope. By virtually any measure, ROSCON faced overwhelming challenges:

- the target population ("audience") was huge and diverse;
- the social innovation (the "product") was complex;
- as indicated by the foregoing Background Analysis, the "price" of new economic behavior for most Russians entailed personal risk, even physical danger;
- this same environment in many ways precluded "positioning" the product and vastly complicated its "promotion."

In the original ROSCON proposal, the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and its Russian colleagues adopted a "Goals Statement" aimed at defining the target audience. Eleven potential audiences were identified:

- School pupils through age 16;
- Students from age 16 through 25;
- Unskilled laborers;
- Entrepreneurs from age 16 through 25;
- Entrepreneurs from age 25 through 45;
- The industrial directorate;
- Social activists;
- Cultural elite;
- Military officers retired or involuntarily discharged;
- Military officers on active duty;
- Educators.

At project start-up, the original list of eleven potential audiences was deliberately retained, even though the "Goals Statement" had anticipated greater funding than was finally approved for ROSCON's first phase. Despite greatly limited resources, ROSCON believed that no potential audience could reasonably be validated or deleted without field information and, ultimately, a situation analysis.

During ROSCON's first year, four additional groups were added to the list of potential target audiences:

- Agricultural workers and individual farmers;
- Journalists;
- Women in business;
- Housewives.

Each of the target audiences has been carefully studied over a period of seventeen months. ROSCON remains convinced that its original inventory of target audiences was correctly drawn. In the course of this work, however, it became clear that time and funding constraints would require Project ROSCON to focus its social marketing campaign upon a target audience whose behavior could directly impact the Russian economic transformation.

With the termination of Project ROSCON, plans for extensive formative research (developed in the fourth and fifth quarters of the project) must now be abandoned. For this reason, the following Situation Analysis presents a summary of information collected on the original target audiences as it describes the process and results of ROSCON goal re-definition.

## 2. The Social Marketing Model.

In the classic model, a social marketing campaign begins with a defined goal. It may be the program of a non-governmental organization, as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) in the United States. It may be some policy or program of a host government.

Specific objectives are derived from the overall goal, as, for example, a local environmental campaign may establish concrete, measurable objectives - less litter on city sidewalks, more paper and bottles recycled. The target audience(s) may be implicitly defined by these objectives or may be determined and/or changed in the course of formative research.

Identification of the target audience(s) is followed by audience segmentation. Precise identification of the primary audience, and segments within it, logically drives formative research to discover knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors which intersect these major segments. In the process, some segments must be culled and resources targeted upon themes that link the remaining segments.

Formative research leads from the primary audience to secondary audiences which can influence its behavior. Messages directed to such "influentials" achieve a multiplier and reinforcement effect upon the primary audience. Finally, formative research recognizes the structural environment which can thwart or support and sustain new behaviors. Individuals and groups who create and control this environment become the tertiary audience in a given social marketing campaign.

Assuming, as above, a clear definition of the goal and objectives (the desired behavior(s) or "product"), formative research then moves to delineate the perceived value of a new behavior by interpreting data on costs (its "price") and benefits to the target audience. Correct calculation of price and perceived value are essential for effective "promotion," which is the development of messages and "media mix" to reach desired segments of primary, secondary and tertiary audiences.

In some settings, institutional and structural environments require change before a new behavior can be adopted (and even before the "product" can be "positioned"). These cases may require that initial "promotion" be aimed at the tertiary rather than primary audience. As explained below, such is in fact the case in Russia.

### 3. ROSCON Re-Definition - The Cognitive Phase.

After seventy-five years of Soviet rule, the expected goal of Project ROSCON should perhaps have been the wholesale replacement of the Marxist-Leninist ideology with free market economics. As a concrete social marketing campaign, however, Project ROSCON could serve such a broad goal only incidentally.

Virtually any free market or even democratic knowledge, attitude or behavior represented an innovation and departure from the Bolshevik tradition. The following observation from the 1950's Harvard Project on Soviet Society (published by Bauer, Inkeles and Kluckhohn as How the Soviet System Works, p. 55, 194) remains an operative reality, despite eight years of "reform," and it touches any ROSCON target audience:

Probably more than any other group of men in modern times, the Bolsheviks have stressed the pragmatic consequences of ideas ["Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist" doctrine]...Even those whose conscious point of view is that it is simply a useful tool with which to manipulate the Soviet masses and to subvert foreign populations are still affected by the "theology." They are prisoners of their own special vocabulary. It is a common place of psychology that the outlook of any group upon the world and experience is determined and reflected to an important extent by the cliches they continually use, by the habitual premises which they accept. No group which over many years preaches a doctrine, however much with tongue in cheek, has its thinking uncolored. If a person says something often enough and consistently enough, he will come to believe or half believe it himself - whatever his initial motives of expediency or cynical manipulation.

Recognizing early that its success would impact upon such "habitual premises," ROSCON set about to define minimally the salient features of any functioning free economy and polity. The results of this work are set forth in Appendix A, "Defining the Innovation." The conceptual framework for this Appendix is the third edition of Everett M. Rogers' classic text, Diffusion of Innovations.

With these definitions in mind, ROSCON: (i) monitored events and media commentary; (ii) collaborated with Russian media producers in pilot programming; (iii) tested audience comprehension of pilot programming; and (iv) surveyed existing public opinion research for clues to current knowledge, attitudes and behaviors of potential audiences. Much information was gathered. Yet these efforts brought ROSCON no closer to defining a specific goal and target audience as required by the social marketing model.

#### 4. ROSCON Re-Definition - The Behavioral Phase.

Adopting a more empirical approach, ROSCON concluded that its social marketing goal should be to foster attitudes and behaviors which had already manifested themselves in support of economic and political transformation. The first list (attitudes) contains viewpoints and beliefs frequently expressed by participants in the economic transformation, often as justification and rationalization for actions taken. The second list (behaviors) sets forth patterns of action which occur and are reinforced in the process of economic transformation.

##### Attitudes.

- Freedom increases productivity (corollary: not all free economic activity is mere "speculation" [Russian: "spekulyatsiya"])
- The old system was a dead-end [Russian: "tupik"]
  - There were few or no consumer goods
  - There was no reward for initiative
  - There were no choices, no opportunities
  - Human and natural resources were wasted
  - The environment was damaged
  - Life was dull
  - Spiritual hunger was unfulfilled
  - Russian culture was frozen
  - The State interfered in personal relationships
  - All were vulnerable to State persecution
  - Spontaneity, free self-expression were curbed
- In addition to more goods, choices, freedoms, rewards, opportunities, and excitement, the new system
  - Affords people control over their own lives
  - Provides access to the outside world
  - Provides access to reliable information
  - Allows individuals to "make a difference"
  - Arouses hope for a better future (for children)
  - May allow preservation of the environment.

##### Behaviors.

- Friendly competition, peaceful conflict resolution
- Focus on realistic goals, matching ends to means
- Regard for safety and human welfare in goal-setting
- Formation of genuine, legitimate businesses
- Formation of non-government organizations (NGOs)
- Spontaneous and free sharing of information
- The minority is respected by the winning majority
- All abide by rules and insist on their enforcement
- Gratification (e.g. "profit-taking") is voluntarily postponed
- By personal example and through policy, managers
  - listen to subordinates and accept feedback

- take initiatives and responsibility for outcomes
- encourage innovation, reward initiative

## 5. Survey of Target Audiences.

Having delineated the attitudes and behaviors to be researched in designing its social marketing intervention, ROSCON then made its first inventory of its target audiences, their knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. In drawing up this survey, it became clear that several target audiences needed to be consolidated. Moreover, the time had come to identify the primary target audience for concrete social marketing interventions.

### ROSCON's Primary Audience: Youth (Target Audiences One, Two, and Four).

In the course of collaboration with Russian sociologists, consultants, and colleagues, ROSCON discovered a wide consensus that the primary target audience for this project should be Youth, the population from middle school (age 13 years) through college and post-graduate school. Accordingly, ROSCON has combined three of its Target Audiences (TAs) for this Situation Analysis - TA One (Students up to 16 years of age), TA Two (Students from 16 years +) and TA Four (Entrepreneurs from 16 to 25 years).

The Russian Federation Ministry for Education presently is developing plans to impart general knowledge of the market economy through formal instruction. Western governments and organizations are fully engaged in this process. For example, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and its collaborators at Oldenburg University in Germany are actively developing textbooks and curricula. ROSCON itself has exchanged information and worked with the latter two organizations since December, 1993. Informal economic education is being provided by such organizations as Junior Achievement (60,000 members strong) throughout Russia and by Rotary Club through youth auxiliaries.

Members of this TA are acquiring rudimentary knowledge of the market economy (prices and inflation) through parents, siblings or peers. Moscow school children are often seen engaged in street peddling. They are "street wise" as to organized crime and official corruption. Unfortunately these formative experiences (unless corrected) will cast them as future carriers and multipliers of today's "bandit economy", known to Russians as the "wild bazaar" (dikii bazaar).

Beyond these generalizations, extensive formative research on this combined target audience would require segmentation by age, gender, geography, economic status and career track.

i. Age. Pupils now entering middle school sometimes display greater understanding of economic principles and sophistication in their use than do older students. At least in urban school systems there has been a pronounced difference in

intra-generational experience due to the rapid pace of social change.

Younger students have little recollection of the Brezhnev era or even the Andropov years. Their older siblings and friends experienced the vacillations of Gorbachev's "Perestroika" at a crucial age when, unfortunately, teachers and parents were equally unable to comprehend or explain the unfolding changes.

The liberalization of prices in 1992 forced virtually every Russian household to adapt. Again, students between the ages of 13 and 15 years have watched and listened from the "sidelines" as their families coped with this upheaval. Older students (especially those now living on meager college stipends) have been thrown unprepared into the struggle for economic survival, acquiring economic acumen by trial and error.

ii. Gender. Historically Russian and Soviet society can be broadly characterized as male dominated. Perhaps as a result of this history, it appears from empirical and anecdotal information that women in Russia are adapting more successfully to economic transformation than are men. In some sectors of the defense industry, highly educated women have become unemployed in large numbers. They have proven more resilient and willing to start businesses or accept lower paying jobs than male peers undergoing the same misfortune. To the extent that these individuals, as parents, provide role models for their children, it is possible that gender may influence attitudes and behaviors even in younger populations.

iii. Geography. Pupils and students in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major metropolitan centers have experienced a vastly different economic transformation from those living in smaller cities or towns. Standing apart from all urban populations are young people living in rural and village settings. By the same token, less differentiation by age groups might be anticipated in rural and village environments owing to a slower pace of change, earlier termination of formal education, and greater commonality of general life experience.

Economic transformation has varied in its course and character across the regions of the Russian Federation. Resonant differences between and among young populations in the regions may be anticipated, but specific data is presently lacking to predict the nature of these differences.

iv. Economic Status. Children of "New Russians" are inclined to accept their privileged status and have few doubts or questions about so-called reforms. Children of former party apparatchiki, depending upon ages and education prior to 1992, may be suffering serious inner conflicts. Children of middle and lower income families most likely share their parents' despair and anomie.

v. Career Track. Despite official pronouncements, Soviet society was highly stratified. Careers were frequently determined by the results of examinations taken in high school which "qualified" students for higher education, technical training (at various levels) or simple trades. Exceptions were few (though not infrequent for children of influential parents); career changes were extremely rare.

Presently, among older students there are significant differences in attitudes and behaviors, as some students continue career paths chosen for them under the old regime, others have changed (or sought to change) programs, and still others have abandoned their studies altogether. The old system of culling examinations continues (at least in Moscow) but its role may diminish as private "business colleges" are established, with their own admissions criteria. Younger students and pupils may face career choices unimaginable to older siblings only a few years ago.

vi. Summary. Russian citizens between the ages of 13 and 25 years are adapting to the economic transformation in a range of behaviors. Some are sophisticated participants in legitimate business and finance. Others are engaged in less sophisticated street commerce (extending, unfortunately, to pornography, prostitution and violent crime). Still others reject the transformation and attack its proponents, as in rural areas where individual farmers are vandalized and driven off by local collective farmers.

Had ROSCON gone forward to complete its formative research, it would have concretely explored the specific settings in which free market knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors are found among youth and the variances between youthful audience segments as determined by age, gender, geography, economic status and career track.

### Secondary Audiences.

Turning to the question of secondary audiences - those most likely to influence Russian youth - ROSCON made some interesting discoveries. Initially it was assumed that parents and teachers would constitute such secondary audiences. ROSCON's own qualitative research, however, revealed a need for caution. A complaint heard from male laborers with middle to lower education was the fact that they were unable to intelligently discuss economic transformation with their middle school children. Even educated parents admitted occasional embarrassment when asked economic questions by their youngsters. Educators (originally ROSCON's Target Audience Eleven) themselves now profess despair as they observe young people abandoning their educations to enter into the commercial arena, more often than not at the lower end - i.e., street vending.

In the current environment, the influence of Russian parents is diminished as their children seek information outside the home. Among these alternative sources of information may be those adults (honest entrepreneurs, academicians, members of the cultural elite) who have actively supported transformation.

At the opposite extreme, there are adults who cogently argue against transformation (even through demagogy), and some who effectively block or reverse it from positions of power. Project ROSCON could neither "convert" these individuals nor neutralize their negative influence; nor could Project ROSCON forestall political upheaval and economic retrenchment. In fact, the adolescent character of fascist, proto-fascist and nationalist solutions to economic and social problems of Russia greatly enhances the appeal of these groups for younger segments of this target audience.

Had ROSCON been able to efficiently promote pro-transformation attitudes and behaviors, it might thereby have equipped Russian youth to "survive" a temporary revival of authoritarian government and the command economy. Thereafter, when they become decision-makers themselves, today's youth might resume and even accelerate the transformation process.

Tertiary Audiences: Decision-Makers  
(Target Audiences Six, Seven, Eight, Eleven, and Fourteen).

At present, Russian youth can have little impact upon economic institutions and abuses nor can youth bring about their elimination (i.e., true reform). Witnessing these abuses, or learning of them from influential adults, Russian youth becomes susceptible to the arguments of those opposing transformation.

In view of these harsh objective realities, and their potential impact on its social marketing efforts, ROSCON determined

that a full scale social marketing campaign would be clearly required to support pro-transformation attitudes and behaviors among present decision-makers. In the classic social marketing model, these decision makers would constitute the "tertiary audience" for youth as the primary target group.

Within the tertiary audience of Russian decision-makers, there are clear audience segments. The original ROSCON design identified four target audiences: the industrial directorate; social activists; the cultural elite; and educators. In the course of its background and situation analyses, ROSCON came to consolidate these groups into a single tertiary audience segmented five ways, as follows: Elected officials; the Authorities (other officials); Leaders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs); Industrial directors; and Labor leaders.

i. Elected officials at the national level receive the lion's share of domestic and international media coverage. Despite this coverage, it is by no means clear that their publicized pronouncements (attitudes) and actions (behaviors) are truly supportive of transformation. (See Background Analysis above.)

Likewise, the actual impact of "behaviors" at the national level is subject to question. There is evidence that in some key regions federal legislation, decrees, regulations, and instructions have been ignored and local initiatives implemented in their place. Local elected officials who take such bold initiatives would have been the focus of ROSCON formative research to identify specific attitudes and behaviors. From this data, quantitative research would have been designed to test similar attitudes and behavioral predispositions throughout Russia.

ii. The Authorities (appointed and career officials) at regional and local levels frequently "hold the levers" which permit or block the transformation process. Unfortunately, it appears that many members of this audience segment have chosen the path of the "chinovnik," thereby eliminating themselves as a potential tertiary audience for ROSCON social marketing.

iii. The leadership of emerging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) offered the most promising target audience among decision-makers. Examples abound. The city of Perm' was a major center of defense production. In the course of economic conversion, many highly educated and experienced women have lost their jobs. Local women established a club and a training institute to help their colleagues adapt. As in most such industrial centers, Perm' had a local employment office. Generally these offices are relics of the Soviet "employment service" which recruited and assigned workers, but provided no assistance to the unemployed. The director of the Perm' employment office, on his own initiative, made his resources available to this women's NGO. This support has basically enabled the organization to survive and serve its members. Explaining his

actions, the director simply said: "If not I, then who?" Such examples, of course, provide an inspiring counterpoint to the overall image of the Authorities as obstructionist "chinovniki."

iv. Under the Soviet regime, the role of factory director closely resembled that of a feudal manor lord. A Soviet factory director was responsible not simply for production levels but the global welfare of his employees. Factory directors controlled and allocated housing, medical services, cafeterias and food stores, education and child care, recreation and vacation opportunities and virtually every other aspect of individual life.

The process of privatization has meant dismantling of such empires or, in some cases, attempts to convert the entire apparatus into a market-driven enterprise. Reactions of factory directors vary widely. At one extreme, privatization represents deliverance from unmanageable and burdensome responsibilities; at the other extreme, privatization represents a threat both to personal power status as well as self-esteem (i.e., inability to "tend the flock"). There have been media reports of factory towns in which the cafeterias and food stores were severed from the factory directorate and privatized. Subsequently, the private firms failed, leaving the towns with no food delivery system.

Cases in which privatization and dismantling of enterprises have been successfully driven by the former directorate would have been a key focus of ROSCON's extended formative research.

v. The labor movement within the Russian Federation is today divided between newly organized trade unions (established along Western patterns and with Western assistance) and the Soviet based "profsoyuz" or professional unions which have so far escaped the transformation process. The leadership of the new union movement already display attitudes and behaviors consistent with ROSCON objectives, although significant gaps in information and understanding are reported even among its most "progressive" leaders.

The impact of independent labor leaders would no doubt be multiplied if they knew of pro-transformation attitudes and behavioral predispositions among potential allies within the "profsoyuz" apparatus. As an organization not affiliated with either side in the labor movement, ROSCON would have been able to collect this information through its formative research. This research will have to be accomplished by other, successor efforts to ROSCON.

vi. Among decision-makers favorably disposed to economic transformation, there are differences in emphasis. Factory directors seem to be more interested in the greater productivity of a free market system, whereas labor leaders anticipate more control over their own lives through collective bargaining. NGO leaders

may be attracted by the greater opportunities to "make a difference" or preserve the environment, whereas far-sighted local officials may simply be acting in hope of a better future. Such differences in emphasis would have been the subject of careful research with the objective of identifying the underlying commonalities between and among the five segments which constitute the tertiary audience of decision-makers.

Target Audience (TA) Three - Unskilled Labor.

This TA would have represented the most difficult audience for Project ROSCON. In some respects, it may have been unreachable. Data indicates that among unskilled laborers, knowledge of the market economy is very limited. Members of this TA buy and sell on the street. They know the price of sausage, metro tickets, and Snickers. They lack the most basic understandings of free enterprise and view all persons of wealth as expropriators of the toiling masses. This audience may be assumed suspicious and hostile toward economic transformation. They were hostile to the Soviet regime but possessed sufficient survival skills not to openly voice resentments and opposition to the bolshevik ruling class. As in the past, the toiling masses in Russia wait for the government to guide, direct and feed them.

Within this TA, it is assumed that all economic benefits flow and should flow from the State. All political power is arbitrary and uncontrollable. According to anecdotal and sociological data, members of this TA are loyal to enterprise directors who are decisive, stern, and aggressive in protecting their enterprises and providing for their personnel.

Even Russian organizers of independent trade unions have difficulty grasping the American model of "friendly opposition" (occasionally disrupted by strikes) between and among American labor organizations and management. There is a prevailing, naive notion that, after privatization, a spontaneous solidarity will emerge between worker-owners, worker-managers, and workers-on-line. The rough-and-tumble middle ground between the myths of idyllic industrial peace and mortal combat is yet unclear even to sophisticated labor organizers. Frustrations emerging from failed ventures of this sort may be expected to produce a backlash against market economics as a whole.

Anticipated formative research directed to this audience would have examined its understanding of the connection between work and rewards, the place of money in a free economy, the operations of a labor market and the role which effective labor unions can play.

Target Audience (TA) Five - Entrepreneurs (age 25 to 45)

This TA could be the essential force for Russian economic conversion. Actual knowledge of a healthy free market system ranges from extensive to rudimentary. Many members of this TA acquired start-up capital, credit and access to material, facilities and other support through connections with Soviet and Communist party apparatus. Others have benefitted by the privatization process described above in the Background Analysis. These individuals are often connected with organized crime and will oppose messages calling for eradication of such criminality in a healthy market system. They are more likely than younger entrepreneurs to focus on short-term rewards and be inclined toward cynicism and opportunism.

Detailed formative research directed toward this audience would have focussed upon its original motives for engaging in market behaviors. To the extent possible, information about the actual origins of their business would have been sought. Already, some sociological data has been successfully collected by asking such entrepreneurs to speak of "business people" in the third person rather than recount their own, personal experiences. The ultimate question for ROSCON would have been the openness of this TA to messages which suggest the utility and long-range advantage to be gained through honest and far-sighted business planning as opposed to quick profits through unfair practices.

### Target Audiences (TAs) Nine and Ten - Military Officers

Political analyses and journalistic commentaries have focussed upon discontent within the Russian armed forces over the period of Project ROSCON. Concern peaked in October, 1993, immediately following the storming of the White House and again in December, following the election results which showed strong support within the ranks for nationalist candidates. The final withdrawal of Russian forces from Berlin has recently provided another occasion to reflect upon confusion and despair within the ranks. Dissatisfactions flow from lack of housing, perceived lack of strategic rationale in deployment and re-deployment of forces, and involuntary discharges of career personnel.

The key question of interest to ROSCON is the degree to which Russian servicemen understand that, all things being equal, a prospering free market economy can serve their own interests just as well as those of the "new rich." This is, of course, the argument over "guns and butter" which has divided the competing ideologies of the twentieth century - communism, fascism and constitutional democracy.

In May, 1994, Colonel General Valerii Mironov, Deputy Defense Minister, published an article in which he called for better indoctrination, including stronger emphasis on democratic values and a strong economy. Neither his article nor available sociological data cast light, however, upon the fundamental question of the nexus between a strong, free economy and a stable, reliably funded military establishment.

ROSCON's direct access to the military has been limited to focus group research of military officers already identified for demobilization. Their attitudes were relevant to ROSCON pilot programming and are reported in a separate document. More global issues of free market economics and peacetime civil-military relations were not within the scope of that research.

Target Audience (TA) Twelve - Agricultural Workers.

This TA is divided between individual farmers (khutory) and former collective farmers. As noted in the Background Analysis, de-collectivization has typically entailed little more than a change in name for the former collective and state farms.

A number of foreign advisory programs have facilitated acquisition of marketing "know how" in a number of agricultural regions throughout Russia. By and large, individual farmers are learning some principles of market economics: raw materials and labor have costs; private farming must be capable of meeting those costs up front or by credit; business planning means not only recouping costs but paying taxes and amassing a reserve for contingencies. Even for those farmers who grasp the principles, institutions (like rural banks) to support them have yet to be firmly established.

Meanwhile, among collective farm workers, expectations still rest upon the government which remains the only reliable (albeit insolvent) customer for agricultural output. Hostility to private ownership of land remains high. In part, this hostility stems from traditional belief that land must remain indivisible, a national treasure. The suspicion abides too that officials charged with implementing the program simply have created new wealth for themselves.

Notwithstanding long experience retailing products of individual plots, there is a lingering distaste for retail sales. Another belief impeding market development is the view that the economy works best with strict specialization and compartmentalization. Farmers should not attempt to be retail salesmen. A farmer who engages in sales is considered no longer a farmer nor "worthy of the name."

### Target Audience (TA) Thirteen - Journalists

In its pilot program phase, ROSCON developed close working relationships with a number of Russian broadcast organizations and a network of looser contact with others. Much information was gathered through these interactions, separately reported in a document entitled "ROSCON Media Lessons Learned."

Among broadcast and print journalists, knowledge of the market system varies widely. Even among producers who have closely collaborated with ROSCON, certain misconceptions of the market economy persist. Printed journalism and commentary monitored by ROSCON likewise presents a broad spectrum of understanding and misunderstanding. In the absence of accurate and reliable information, however, it is difficult to dispel beliefs such as the conviction shared by journalists and readers alike that the bulk of Russia's economic dislocations and dysfunctions result from deliberate manipulation and wrongdoing by criminal elements and chinovniki.

Critics of contemporary Russian journalism frequently complain about its condescending tone. Russian journalists are accused of having little interest in or regard for reader/viewer attitudes or beliefs. Some of ROSCON's own pilot programs have, despite consultations, manifested a tendentious and sometimes belligerent tone. The confrontational approach leads sometimes to heightening of social tensions and deepening of divisions.

The role of the Soviet press was to instruct and correct public opinion. Against this background, it is not surprising that residual elements of the Soviet pecking order and of the special status of the press in Marxist-Leninist theory combine to perpetuate former attitudes of condescension and disinterest in the audience.

By contrast, commercial journalism in the West keeps a constant eye on advertisers and ratings. Exposure to audience research, for those producers collaborating with ROSCON has proven a broadening experience and, it is to be hoped, one which will enhance their effectiveness in social marketing projects in the future.

Among the issues which ROSCON would have covered in its formative research would have been the origins of tendentious reporting in Russia today, the obstacles to objectivity, and possible techniques (perhaps, humor) to bridge social divisions and eliminate pathological stereotypes inherited from the Soviet regime.

### Target Audience (TA) Fifteen - Housewives

Under the Soviet regime, and increasingly at present, Russian society tends toward matriarchy. There is evidence that the male population has become paralyzed by the trauma of social conversion. Accordingly, Russian housewives may constitute a singularly powerful TA in their ability to influence behaviors and attitudes of future generations.

Unremitting daily exposure to the "wild bazaar" has provided primitive exposure to market forces. Casual encounters with urban housewives and conversations overhead in the subway, on the street and in lines at state stores might give a Westerner the false impression that these homemakers understand the market economy. They know how to shop and compare prices; they do not know why the prices may differ. More rigorous sociological inquiries reveal attitudes of disgust, anger, resentment (a sense that "they" are responsible) and resignation bred from years of standing in line for deficit goods.

Russian homemakers are learning how to budget household expenses, but the exercise is only partial to date. Many expenses common to Western household budgets are not yet "expenses" for the average Russian family.

Complete formative research would illuminate this TA's understanding of how it is that goods and services come to the retail market. Research is also needed into the understanding of the role of competition in yielding better quality, lower prices and greater variety.

## 6. Product Design.

The lists of pro-transformation attitudes and behaviors presented above (4.a. and 4.b.) and survey of audiences represented merely the first distillation of data accumulated by ROSCON during the past seventeen months of activity. The concluding formative research would have sought to validate and refine these lists and to quantify their distribution throughout the primary, secondary and tertiary audiences. Only thereafter could the "product" or series of messages be designed.

### Price.

With particular reference to the tertiary audience of decision-makers, it would have been critical to determine the "costs" which have been paid for choices made to affirm pro-transformation attitudes through pro-transformation behaviors. It is already clear that these "costs" range from spiritual and psychological trauma to physical endangerment.

### Position.

As originally conceived, ROSCON was a social marketing project with a potentially limitless scope. The foregoing situation analysis should indicate that a true social marketing intervention in support of Russian transformation would have to be focussed upon specific target audiences in an effort to foster specific pro-transformation attitudes and behaviors. Only in this way could a generic "product" be developed for Russian youth (the primary audience) and its segments. Unfortunately, as indicated by the Background Analysis, the "product" cannot be "positioned" today because too many obstacles obstruct the way for adoption of specific pro-transformation behaviors.

With regard to its tertiary audience, however, ROSCON could have found a "position" for its product by carefully selecting one or two localities in which the attitudes of decision-makers indicated receptivity to pro-transformation messages and the economic and political structures would allow decision-makers to immediately react to the messages by implementing transformation (i.e., adopting desired behaviors).

### Promotion.

ROSCON pilot programming produced many valuable lessons, which will be captured in a separate report. It is clear that Russian youth and Russian audiences in general view broadcast media with suspicion bred from seventy five years of "agit-prop." Didactic materials are rejected as boring and as reminiscent of stultifying Soviet "enlightenment" programs. A fresh and entertaining format will be required for any generic message promoting transformation among Russian youth.

Decision-makers would be less easily reached through broadcast media. On the other hand, printed materials appear to receive continued attention from all varieties of decision makers; printed materials also enjoy greater credibility. The busy schedules of enterprise directors and officials typically preclude them from watching television or listening to radio on any routine basis. In any event, local and regional broadcast media must be given priority for such specific target audiences. Sociological data already indicates that independent local stations are more often relied upon for information by Russian viewers in all social groups.

There is also data available to indicate that decision-makers are influenced by peers. NGO conferences, workshops and seminars are common occurrences and provide fertile soil for diffusion of specific "know how" and sharing of experience supporting pro-transformation activities. Such workshop techniques would have to be fully employed at every opportunity in the course of any social marketing intervention.

## 7. SUMMARY

After seventeen months of field experience, ROSCON has found that the original goal and design of the Project, while noble and far-sighted, was in fact too broad for effective implementation as a social marketing campaign. Social marketing in Russia today must focus upon a primary audience capable of sustaining the transformation process even in the face of potential political and economic retrenchment. This audience is Russian youth.

Given the limited ability of Russian youth to influence the actual course of transformation today, social marketing interventions are needed which will in fact target the tertiary audience - decision makers. Given also the vast geographic expanse of the Russian Federation, any initial social marketing intervention should be confined to one or two localities in which specific changes in behavior can be measured and can directly impact the transformation process.

"DEFINING THE INNOVATION" (July, 1993)  
(Appendix A)

I. Defining the Innovation. The goal of Project ROSCON is the adoption of the following "technology cluster" of attitudes and practices (Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, pp. 14, 226-227).

- A. Acceptance of the concept that materials, goods, services, labor, expertise and opportunities all are "commodities." [Marxism-Leninism rejected this idea.]
- B. Acceptance of "money" as the final determinant of value for all commodities. [Marxism-Leninism condemned money as an alienation of man from his labor. Soviet practice ignored money as the measure of things or medium of exchange.]
- C. Use of money to acquire commodities. [Soviet practice was to use barter and/or influence to exchange commodities. Street vending and other retail activities demonstrate latent popular understanding. Other business practices, however, suggest strong residual influence of Soviet practice--eg., preference for personal contact rather than competitive bidding in procurement.]
- D. Acceptance of ownership as responsibility. [Marxism-Leninism and Soviet practice provide no precedent for this innovation.]
- E. Acceptance of uncertainty and risk. [Soviet practice had established the government as guarantor of social and economic security, in part based upon Leninist theory (socialism and dictatorship of proletariat) and in part based upon practical requirements of a totalitarian political system.]
- F. Reduced reliance upon governmental participation in the economy. [Abandonment of state ownership is only the beginning of economic reform. Russians must delineate for themselves the ultimate role for government; options range from American "conservative" view of government as hindrance to economic vigor to Scandinavian models of welfare state.]
- G. Rational organization of economic activity to manage risk. [In eliminating economic uncertainty and risk, Soviet practice precluded development of private institutions for management of same.]
- H. Acceptance of and rational pursuit of opportunity. [Soviet totalitarian state monopolized all opportunity; creation

of private opportunity was unlawful, involving misappropriation of state property. At present, difficulties with the voucher program illustrate the inability of populace to understand, accept and pursue opportunity.]

- I. Acceptance of profit as a legitimate product of economic activity. [Marxism-Leninism condemned "surplus value" as exploitation. Soviet state ownership of all property precluded generation of private profit and reinforced negative stereotype of profiteer.]
- J. Acceptance of and insistence upon contractual obligations. [Marxism-Leninism and Soviet practice precluded private business dealings, hence private contractual obligations.]
- K. Acceptance of and compliance with tax obligations. [In absence of genuine income producing economic activity, Soviet tax system was a fiction.]
- L. Adoption of business ethics (eg. Rotary Club "Four Way Test") as pragmatic, yielding long-term relative advantage over short-term profits through unfair practices. [Marxism-Leninism and Soviet practice provide no precedent for this innovation.]
- M. Rejection of and resistance to organized crime. [Marxism-Leninism and Soviet practice provide no precedent for this innovation.]

## II. Attributes of the Innovation.

- A. Relative Advantage. Speaking candidly, few (if any) of the attitudes or practices constituting this innovation cluster promise much financial or social advantage in the near term.
- B. Compatibility. Pilot programs which stress historical roots of free enterprise and free market in Russia may validate the theme of "continuity" as an indicator of compatibility. An alternative approach to consider: asking target audiences to define a "natural economy" in their own words. "Market Economy" and "Capitalism" may be inappropriate labels to instill sense of compatibility. (Rogers calls this "naming" the innovation.)
- C. Complexity. A money-based economy is far simpler in its operation than the convoluted system of non-market economic activity which existed under Soviet socialism. The ROSCON innovation is a "cluster" of attitudes and

practices, but the market paradigm can still claim simplicity as its greatest strength.

D. Triability. There is substantial danger, given structural problems listed below (see item V), that many Russians will suffer bad experiences in testing this innovation and will, based upon that experience, reject it.

E. Observability. The results of free market activity to date are obviously mixed. No citizen of Moscow can overlook the availability of goods and services which never existed before. At the same time, this abundance is accompanied by inflation, crime, disruptions, and rampant violation of important values and norms. ROSCON's task is to interpret this mixed record.

III. Identifying Adopter Categories. ROSCON's original "Goal Statement" should be re-examined in light of Rogers' categories and a systematic justification for each target segment should be developed accordingly.

- A. Innovators (present entrepreneurs)
- B. Early Adopters
- C. Potential Early Majority
- D. Potential Late Majority
- E. Likely Laggards (Primary nominees: peasants, apparatchiki, factory/kolkhoz directors)

IV. Identifying and Evaluating Change Agents. Following groups should be evaluated as opinion leaders employing Rogers' criteria ("homophily-heterophily," accessibility, innovativeness).

- A. National Executive Branch (President, Premier, Ministries)
- B. National Legislature (Parliamentary Reform Factions)
- C. National Organizations (Parties, Associations, Interest Groups)
- D. Local Governments (Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, Cities)
- E. Factory and Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz Directorates
- F. Middle level managers and apparatchiki
- G. Entrepreneurs
- H. Journalists (esp., mass media "entrepreneurs")
- I. Mafiosi

V. Structural and Systemic Problems. The following is a preliminary list of problems which ROSCON cannot resolve yet which will significant impact upon the diffusion process.

- A. Oppressive taxation.
- B. General lawlessness.
- C. Instability/conflict of laws, ordinances, and regulations.
- D. Inadequate legal remedies for breach of contract, unfair trade practices, business torts, and the like.

- E. Absence of government protection against organized crime.
- F. Inflation.
- G. Pre-Soviet tradition of collectivism.
- H. Inadequate urban socialization of population (residual peasant mentality).

# APPENDIX V

Russian Judicial Reform -- Attitudes of the Russian Public  
to the Re-Introduction of Jury Trials

RUSSIAN JUDICIAL REFORM  
ATTITUDES OF THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC  
TO  
THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF JURY TRIAL



*Academy for Educational Development*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Academy for Educational Development (AED), under contract with the ARD/Checchi Rule of Law Consortium, has produced a series of television video programs on the re-introduction of jury trial into Russia. The programs had the following objectives:

- to inform general audiences about the institution of jury trial;
- to gain general audience approval and support for re-introduction of jury trials into Russia;
- to inform and assist potential and actual jurors in the performance of their duties.

To enhance the effectiveness of these programs, AED conducted audience pre-testing through the research component of its Russian Social Conversion (ROSCON) project. Two Hundred Fifty Six (256) Russian adults in Moscow and other localities viewed the programs in focus groups.

This report presents overall findings from this research, together with an explanation of the program production, the audience research design, and specific feedback on each video and from each focus group session.

## OVERALL FINDINGS

Study of Russian audience reactions to a series of video productions on the topic of jury trials has brought to light a complex set of attitudes and beliefs, often self-contradictory, which provide considerable insight into the possibilities for democratization in the Russian Federation today.

Audiences in all regions tested had some prior knowledge of trial by jury. The main sources of information were nineteenth century Russian literature and/or foreign films.

All audiences approved of the concept of trial by jury in contrast to the existing, Soviet-style tribunal of one judge and two "People's Representatives" (Narodnyi Zasedatel' hereafter, "NZ"). When asked which forum they would choose for themselves, audience members without exception selected jury trial.

### I. Belief in the Basic Fairness of Average Citizens.

Among audiences studied, there is a universal conviction that juries of "disinterested" citizens will decide cases "humanely," "objectively," "democratically," and "justly." Speaking positively, the belief is that juries which represent the community will bring more objectivity and common sense into judicial proceedings. Speaking negatively, it is a sense that a larger number of jurors will better resist manipulation and pressure from the judge and prosecution.

### II. Fear of Non-Professional Jurors.

Russian audiences believe in the basic fairness of their fellow citizens, but they have serious reservations about the **competence** of average people to handle the complexities of judicial proceedings. In fact many viewers with middle education turn this criticism upon themselves, expressing complete lack of confidence in their own ability to serve as jurors without further education. The role of juror is perceived as an office, one which requires legal training and specialization.

Russian audiences are concerned about manipulation of jurors' emotions by the prosecution and defense. Turning the criticism upon themselves, Russian viewers (especially women) profess inability to imagine themselves as jurors: "I am too emotional," "I could not stand the psychological stress," "I am too easily swayed."

### III. Quest for Historical Truth.

Viewers like video sequences depicting the historical origins of jury trial in Russia and want to learn more about the past. They seem to desire a sense of continuity and connection with the

pre-revolutionary era.

By the same token, however, audiences reject anti-Soviet commentaries. None of the viewers approve of the existing trial system, nor do they express a desire to restore the Soviet order. Yet viewers react negatively to overt anti-Soviet images. The feeling typically expresses itself as follows: we know all about the "bad old days," and we are tired of hearing it; we want truthful information about history without artificial coloring.

On a specific note, the viewers reacted quite negatively to comments in one program deprecating the "NZ's" as individuals with little or no personal character who were generally chosen for jury duty because they were useless in their places of employment. This language was personally offensive to those who had actually served in this capacity and was objectionable to all viewers as unfair and unbalanced. As a result of this feedback, the material was deleted from the final video program.

#### IV. Quest for Objectivity.

The disinclination to re-live the recent past or dwell on Soviet wrongs is related to an overall desire for objective and balanced programming. The Soviet practice of "public relations" had two branches. Each was assigned a technical definition and specific task:

- "propaganda" was aimed at Communist Party members and could be best understood as "indoctrination" in a Western context;
- "agitation" was designed for and targeted at the broad masses, the concept being analogous to the Western idea of "promotion" or "propaganda" as Americans casually understand the term. (It should be noted, however, that the audiences in this study often use the words interchangeably themselves.)

Viewers almost unanimously considered the programs to be "agitation," often saying so in a completely neutral tone of voice and in a matter-of-fact way. They did not appear offended by "agitation" as such, but more disappointed not to have heard both the "pro" and "con" of jury trial.

#### V. Pessimism on Reforms in Russia.

Sample audiences support the idea of jury trial in general and overwhelmingly would choose jury trial for themselves if put to the choice. Yet they have profound doubts that jury trial is feasible in Russia today. They perceive Russian society as too divided economically, socially, and ethnically for jurors to set aside prejudices and decide cases on evidence alone. In small urban areas and even in ethnically homogeneous regions, they question the

feasibility of jury trial because personal acquaintance, kinship, clan and other loyalties will override any instructions from the bench to decide a case upon evidence alone. A fair number of audience members said they feared the Russian public was too unsophisticated to make jury trials work.

In short, while audiences would welcome jury trial as a species of reform, they are fundamentally pessimistic about its realization.

85

## GENERAL COMMENT ON MEDIA PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA

Since January, 1994, AED/ROSCON has conducted approximately thirty focus groups to test pilot broadcast products on economic conversion and the market economy. With only one exception (a group of ten-year-olds), the audiences have been critical (often harshly critical) of the programs. Russian viewers display a keen analytical bent and a penetrating eye for details. A didactic tone (even a pleasant voice in the narration) reminds them of obligatory Soviet "kino" and "telejournals," and frequently evokes distaste for the program and sometimes the message. Unexplained facts or errors are invariably given a sinister interpretation.

ROSCON has not developed a systematic explanation for the jaundiced eye which Russian audiences cast upon the "blue screen." A typical comment from Russian social scientists is that seventy-five years of misinformation and deception has eroded trust among Russians for any mass media products.

Whatever its causes, this distrust of broadcast media seems an ever present factor among Russian audiences. Accordingly, focus groups can be expected to criticize and ridicule programs as a matter of course. While many comments must be (and are) taken seriously, the real value of focus group discussions consists of substantive comments and ideas on the underlying themes of the shows.

## PROGRAM PRODUCTION

The programs were developed by AED in collaboration with the State Judicial Administration of the Russian Federation, and specifically the judicial reform branch directed by Dr. Sergei A. Pashin. The video footage was shot in a Moscow courthouse in May, 1994. Materials included: an actual jury trial (three defendants accused of murder); simulated jury "deliberations" using actors; and interviews with judges, lawyers, other legal experts, jurors, defendants, and citizens. Audience pre-testing was accomplished by the research unit of Project ROSCON in July and September using "fine cuts" of the programs.

The initial production was a "package" consisting of three video programs, each approximately twenty minutes long:

- (1) the first segment was an overview of trial by jury and its re-introduction into Russia for television broadcast to a general audience;
- (2) the second segment was an instructional video to be shown to members of a jury pool (potential jurors) when they report on summons to the court house;
- (3) the third segment was also a training video for viewing immediately prior to a trial by those actually selected as jurors.

The fourth production was a single documentary program one hour in length. It presented many of the same themes and materials as the twenty minute general audience program, but in greater detail and including interviews with trial participants and commentary by legal experts.

Primarily the programs were designed as informational vehicles - i.e., to enhance **knowledge**. The second and third videos were specifically designed for training of jurors (enabling them to better understand and perform their duties). To a limited extent, therefore, they were intended to affect behavior. The first and fourth programs primarily imparted information, but it is hoped that they might also encourage positive attitudes and beliefs toward the institution of jury trial.

The first and fourth general audience programs opened with Moscow street interviews in which everyday people were asked: "what do you know about jury trials?" On the whole, the respondents were favorably disposed. One old gentlemen categorically rejected the modern idea of jury trials, although he muttered that he knew of their existence before the revolution and accepted that. A middle aged women expressed serious doubts about allowing everyday people to decide cases without special education. With these exceptions, however, most passers-by considered the jury trial to be more objective and better for Russia than the Soviet system of one professional judge and two lay persons (the NZ's).

The first video continued by explaining qualification, disqualification, and selection of jurors from voter lists. Then the program provided historical perspective on the 19th century introduction of jury trial together with an account of how the Soviet system was established. The camera returned to the courtroom capturing the actual selection and seating of a jury while the narrator explained the process and the mechanics of jury duty (including compensation and reimbursement of costs). The narration briefly explained that jurors should listen carefully to the evidence and could ask questions (through the court). Then several actual jurors were asked how it felt to have served. In the last shot, a juror said he was grateful for the opportunity.

In the fourth program, the street interviews were followed by introductory remarks from Dr. Pashin and scenes comparing jury trial with the three member Soviet tribunal. Expert commentaries on the Soviet system followed, interspersed with historical materials as in the first program. The scene then shifted back to the courtroom where the stages of an actual murder trial were presented: jury selection and oath-taking; reading of charges; testimony of witnesses; roles of the judge, jurors and parties; judge's instructions; verdict of the jury and sentencing by the judge.

The second and third programs were designed for specific instruction of jurors as they await selection and/or actual service on a real jury. The videos explained the roles of the parties in a trial, the nature of evidence, the reasons for which jurors were sometimes excused during legal arguments, the do's and don'ts of juror duty (don't discuss the case with strangers), and in one episode the video simulated a bad verdict being reached because the foreman pressured his fellow jurors (all actors). The emphasis was placed upon the importance of procedural due process in practical application and upon the need for jurors to suspend judgment until all legally obtained and proper evidence had been received. This latter point was driven home with an illustrative experiment conducted by a GPU psychologist to demonstrate the power of suggestion and self-reinforced stereotypes.

## AUDIENCE RESEARCH DESIGN

**1. First Series:** In testing the first series of three videos, the objective was to capture audience comprehension and response within the Moscow area ("mega-city"), within a small but urban setting (Sestroretsk) away from Moscow, and in a non-Russian setting (Kalmyk Republic). Sestroretsk is a town of 30,000 inhabitants located approximately thirty (30) kilometers northwest of St. Petersburg. In the Kalmyk Republic, focus groups were conducted in the capitol city, Elista, which has a population of approximately 100,000, fifty percent (50%) Kalmyk and forty-six (46%) percent Russian.

a. Audience Predisposition: Audiences were deliberately screened to consist solely of persons favorably disposed or neutral to the idea of jury trials. The research was intended purely to measure the transfer of information. If the research goal had been to test persuasiveness of the videos in changing attitudes, then the reactions of persons hostile to the jury trial concept would have been important. Inclusion of such persons in the initial research, however, posed the risk of ideological conflict and disruption of the discussions. As it turned out, even among the audiences selected, preconceptions and misconceptions about jury trials sometimes overshadowed the discussion of the videos themselves.

b. Audience Make-Up:

i. General Audience Program: In Moscow, four (4) groups viewed this program - eighteen to thirty year old viewers with general middle education, eighteen to thirty year old viewers with technical middle education, viewers above thirty years of age with general middle education, and viewers above thirty years of age with technical middle education. In Sestroretsk and in Elista, two groups each viewed the video, both having higher education - eighteen to thirty year old viewers and viewers above thirty years of age.

ii. Jury Training Programs. In Moscow, four (4) groups viewed the jury training programs in sequence. The selection criteria were the same as for the general audience film: age and education (general versus technical middle education). In Sestroretsk, two groups (eighteen to thirty and above thirty years of age) viewed the videos, both being mixed groups with general and technical middle educations. In Kalmykia, two groups (eighteen to thirty and above thirty years of age) viewed the videos, both having higher education.

c. Methodology: The general audience program was viewed and evaluated using standard focus-group methodology, the expectation being that a group dynamic and free discussion would bring to light both strengths and weaknesses of the video as an information

vehicle. The jury training segments were viewed in sequence in order to measure initial comprehension and enhanced comprehension, if any, after the second program. Questionnaires were completed immediately after each viewing to gauge immediate recall, and a general discussion (not a focus group) followed to capture key impressions from individuals. (English versions of the questionnaires appear as Attachments "A" and "B" to this report.)

## **2. Documentary (One Hour) Program.**

The one hour documentary video was viewed in four different metropolitan areas: Moscow, Pskov, Volgograd and Kemerovo. In each locality, four focus groups met, the selection criteria being identical: age and education. Thus, in the designated cities there was one group each of persons below the age of thirty and persons above the age of thirty with higher education, and one group each of persons below the age of thirty and above the age of thirty with middle and lower educations.

In this audience study, the focus group format was modified slightly to provide some indication of attitude change following the video. Before viewing the program, participants responded in writing to a simple question: on the whole, what is your attitude toward jury trial? The questionnaire invited them to add any words of explanation as desired. The questionnaires were not mentioned again by the moderator but were collected and used to compare opinions before and after the video.

## AUDIENCE RESEARCH RESULTS - FIRST GENERAL AUDIENCE VIDEO

### 1. Moscow.

#### a. Moscow One.

Young people (eighteen to thirty years) with non-technical middle education all characterized the video as "agitation." Resulting reactions and conclusions were somewhat sharply divided. Some audience members disliked the program because it was agitation; others felt that they had learned something new. Dr. Pashin's lengthy discourse was rejected by most viewers; a typical comment - "I can't remember what he said."

The juror interviews drew interesting and varied reactions. Some viewers were pleased with the sincerity of the interviews. Others considered the jurors naive: "These people sincerely believe that they played a role in this major decision; it doesn't seem to me that they did." Another viewer found the juror comments "laughable."

A number of comments seemed less a product of viewing the video than a reflection of residual resentment and alienation from all governmental institutions, especially those responsible for "justice." Some viewers seriously doubted that re-introduction of jury trial would inaugurate an age of "conscience." The idea of compulsory jury service was objectionable to some, perhaps as a vestige of the old regime. A few audience members said they would be motivated to serve as jurors, primarily to acquit or "help out" the accused. Such comments may reflect a latent suspicion that government exists to victimize the populace, a cynicism that might surface in any discussion of "reforms" today in Russia.

All viewers expressed a desire for more information. Some were dissatisfied that the program did not show an actual jury trial. Others remained confused about the juror selection process and wanted more information.

Above all, this first group of Moscow youth objected to "one-sidedness" of the video's presentation, its failure to show possible disadvantages to jury trial, such as juror bias or emotionalism. "The time for condemning the Soviet era is passed. Why this again?"

Implications for democratization: neutral members of this audience started with doubts about the competence and professionalism of jurors. The video did not assuage their doubts.

#### b. Moscow Two.

All but one viewer expressed dissatisfaction with the program, primarily because of its length and boring moments. They compared it to the "telejournals" of Soviet agit-prop which depicted heroic feats of "steel-forging" and the like. Dr. Pashin's monologue was rejected as too long and unfocussed.

This audience also expressed dissatisfaction with "one-sidedness." The program was too categorical in its message that jury trial was "the only alternative to the bad Soviet court." It

should have avoided value judgements.

Viewers did not understand the juror selection process. Most preferred not to be jurors and were made uneasy by the idea of sanctions for failure to serve.

Viewers wanted more detail on the actual conduct of a jury trial. The division of labor between professional and non-professional functions remained unclear both in the Soviet tribunal and jury trials. Audience members doubted the objectivity of jurors. For example, in today's poverty, average jurors could hardly be expected to show fairness toward "businessmen." One of the jurors said in his interview that he reported for jury duty with a degree of curiosity. This choice of words offended several audience members as frivolous or voyeurist.

At the same time, the video received good marks for its informational content.

#### c. Moscow Three.

This group of citizens over age thirty with middle, general education required no prompting to enumerate the advantages of jury trial over the Soviet tribunal: "people from different social strata, more opinions," "people with knowledge of life," "more just." Said one viewer: "it is harder to put pressure on jurors than upon two NZ's." These positive views were strengthened by the video.

The video itself was considered informative, but oppressively long and dull. This audience liked both the street interviews and interviews with jurors: "they were varied, not rigged," "the jurors came across as humans," "well said." The historical section was also appreciated. Audience members all felt they had learned new things.

The viewers were uncertain about the division of labor between judge and jury: "who makes the final decision?" The audience felt a need for more detailed information: how do jurors vote? what if they are evenly divided?

With only two exceptions, members of this audience felt that they personally should not attempt to serve as jurors: "one has to have very high moral qualities, such as I lack," "the psychological pressure would be too great," "I am sentimental, I'll sympathize with the wrong side." One viewer had been a victim of crime and found the courtroom atmosphere unbearable.

#### d. Moscow Four.

Viewers over the age of thirty with middle, technical education also spoke spontaneously in favor of jury trial: "twelve people will decide more objectively;" in the Soviet court "the judge pressures the NZ's;" the Soviet court "was a joke." One viewer believed that jurors were popularly elected officials.

More than the preceding audiences, this group received the video quite favorably, feeling they were given a great deal of new information. The audience shared the positive views expressed in

the street interviews. The interviews with jurors evoked sympathetic responses, albeit the subjects "spoke awkwardly."

Viewers were disappointed that the film did not show more of an actual trial. They felt that they had not been shown the essential function of a jury. Other questions were left unanswered: how are jurors protected? how does the court avoid subjectivity? what is the interaction of judge and jury?

This audience felt that the historical materials were too brief and sketchy. They wanted to know more about the social make-up of pre-revolutionary juries and the extent of their use.

Most members of this audience could not imagine themselves as jurors: "I am a sinner," "I am not suited, I don't consider myself perfected," "Jury service is a huge responsibility...I couldn't cope." One of the viewers who was favorably disposed to jury service added that it would be important to "help the accused."

## 2. Sestroretsk.

### a. Sestroretsk One.

This audience of young adult viewers (up to age thirty) with higher education was favorably disposed to the idea of jury trials prior to viewing the program. Most knew about jury trials from literature and foreign films including a Canadian television program recently aired in St. Petersburg. Jury trials will "make political trials impossible" and will be "more democratic."

This audience reacted very negatively to the video itself, complaining that it was superficial, amateurish and designed for school children. Viewers did not like the interviews with jurors, especially one juror who stuttered. The juror's oath reminded one viewer of the oath taken by Soviet Young Pioneers. When asked if they had any positive comments on the film, the audience was silent. (Interestingly enough, however, all focus group members watched the film attentively. Even after conclusion of the focus group session, participants lingered to continue the discussion.)

They remained confused about a number of specific matters: how were preliminary juror lists drawn? what were the chief criteria for selection? where do jurors come from? are verdicts reached unanimously or by majority vote?

After viewing the film (and the juror interviews), one audience member said she would prefer to be judged by professionals rather than the individuals shown. Others agreed, saying that jurors should be professionals with a legal education. Other audience members disagreed, pointing out that jurors would be guided by professionals during the trial and needed only to be conscientious.

The question of what is desirable in jurors evoked comments which may show residual preference for specialization and social stratification: "jurors should be at least 35, preferably men," "women are too emotional," "educated people are more objective," but "let lathe operators judge lathe operators."

To improve the program, viewers suggested more footage of an

actual trial, specific information about trials in czarist Russia and trials in the United States (in order not to repeat American mistakes).

Among this audience, only male viewers could envision themselves as jurors. Women's responses included: "hearing about crimes would be very difficult for me;" "I would try to get out of it...that's not for me;" "I don't know enough about life to judge somebody;" "I don't have the moral preparation." On the positive side, one male viewer said: "What right do I have to judge? But, then, if everybody refuses, then there will be no jury trial...."

#### b. Sestroretsk Two

Viewers over the age of thirty years with higher education were skeptical about jury trials: "the judge will decide everything;" judges should decide everything, otherwise "jurors will be ruled by emotions; jury trial will become "lynching court." For one viewer, jury trial represented abdication by judges of their professional responsibility. Viewers questioned the idea of jury trial in Russia because "here any good beginning gets carried to absurdity" and because Russians are too passive, too inclined to shirk responsibility for a system to succeed which requires citizen engagement.

The audience sharply criticized the video, noting its "enthusiasm" but decrying its lack of "persuasiveness." They were sharply critical of the juror interviews: "they were enthusiastic about being chosen as jurors...these are people who want publicity." One viewer wanted to ask, "why do you want to be a juror? Do you feel you have the right to judge?" (Such apparent resentment towards the juror-interviewees was not detected in any other focus group.)

This audience had many of the same questions as the younger Sestroretsk viewers as well as some questions of their own: how should jurors balance emotion and law? what is the relationship between the jury verdict and the ultimate sentence? why is there an even number of jurors? They wanted more details about actual conduct of a trial and jury deliberations: "what criteria govern them?" "what do the accused expect from jurors?" This audience also wanted more details about pre-revolutionary jury trials and a more detailed comparison of jury trial with other tribunals; to omit such comparison is "not very ethical, it is just advertising."

Not one of the viewers felt capable of performing jury duty: "I couldn't bear such responsibility;" "I could not judge another;" "I frequently cannot understand myself, yet there I would judge another."

### 3. Elista, Kalmykia.

#### a. Elista One.

This audience of viewers over thirty years of age with higher

education had some prior awareness of jury trials through literature, television and recent news of jury trials in the city of Saratov. Even prior to viewing the program, this audience was favorably disposed to the idea of jury. They expressed reservations, however, about the introduction of jury trial into a setting such as Kalmykia, where historical and traditional clan and familial ties might jeopardize impartiality in the absence of countervailing mechanisms.

The audience considered the program informative, but remained unclear on a number of issues. Several viewers were concerned about the formulation of juror lists. One viewer thought that jury training, not juror service, took ten days: "that's all - ten days?" (This comment may reflect a more fundamental confusion - i.e., belief that jurors are public officials who are selected, undergo special training, and serve for an appointed term, as the former NZ's.)

In contrast to Russian audiences of Moscow and Sestroretsk, the Elista audience favorably received Dr. Pashin's remarks. They expressed some disappointment with the juror's interviews which seemed too emotional.

Members of this audience were deeply concerned about the adequacy of juror preparation: "a professional preparation is mandatory, after all someone's fate is at stake;" "without a legal education, is it possible to be objective?" For lack of such preparation, many viewers felt they could not serve as jurors. Others felt the responsibility was too great.

b. Elista Two.

Kalmyk viewers under the age of thirty with higher education reacted to the video for the most part in the same way as the older audience. The viewers were dissatisfied that they were not shown an actual trial. Likewise they were left uncertain as to the precise decisions made by jurors. One viewer conceived jurors as public officers, like the NZ's: "what's the term of office?"

This younger audience considered the film boring in places and complained that they were not shown more details of the trial. The procedures seemed too simple and smooth, even unreal or staged: "with ease they were chosen, with ease they sat [in session], with ease made their decision, and left. In fact it is hardly that way." The juror interviews were not reassuring: "many go out of curiosity;" "there was not the feeling that these people were prepared, that they were capable of deciding someone's fate;" "they all expressed their subjective opinions."

All but one member of the audience declined the idea of being a juror: "it's a great responsibility, I probably could not do it;" "you'd have to see who is being judged" [see comment above on familial and clan loyalties].

In short, young Kalmyk viewers reacted less favorably to the program itself than the older audience, but on the whole shared the same views on jury trial as such and the strengths and weaknesses of the video production.

Conclusion: As a result of the foregoing focus groups, the general audience video tape was significantly revised. Dr. Pashin's commentary was deleted entirely (at his own suggestion). The selection process was described in greater detail, starting with the formulation of juror lists from voting lists. The importance of random selection was emphasized. The closing interview with the jurors was edited to delete language that had offended viewers and to evoke a more sympathetic reaction.

Most importantly, the concerns about the nature of juror duty were addressed. The overwhelming majority of viewers either previously believed or perceived from the program that jurors decided legal issues and made sweeping moral judgements. To allay these anxieties, new segments of narrative text were written and inserted into the program with scenes from an actual trial. The narration explained the different roles of judge and juror, the former deciding issues of law and the latter deciding issues of fact - a distinction familiar in the West. In this way, it is hoped that viewers will better understand that the role of the jurors is simply to make everyday judgements of factual questions and to use their everyday common sense in believing or disbelieving testimony.

## AUDIENCE RESEARCH RESULTS - JURY TRAINING VIDEOS

As described earlier in this report, the audience research for the jury training videos was primarily designed to establish levels of comprehension. The second video is to be viewed by potential jurors upon reporting for jury duty but prior to selection; the third video is to be viewed by jurors who have been selected, prior to commencement of the trial.

The videos cover a variety of topics, as outlined earlier. Several themes, however, were considered crucial to the effective performance of their duties by jurors. To test comprehension of these concepts, questions were devised to measure levels of understanding after each video viewing. Results of the questionnaires are presented in tabular form as Attachment "C" to this report. The key topics and corresponding questions were as follows:

1. jury selection should produce an unbiased panel, representative of the community (I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-10 I-11);
2. jurors must understand their role in a trial (I-9, I-15, I-16, I-22, II-5, II-9, II-10, II-11, II-13, II-16)
3. jurors must understand the parties to a trial and the burden of proof (I-8, I-12, I-13, II-3, II-6, II-7, II-15);
4. jurors must understand the nature of evidence (I-14, II-2, II-4, II-8)
5. the integrity of jury deliberations must be assured (I-1, I-18, I-19, I-20, II-14).

### 1. Juror Selection.

Selection of jurors from voting lists provides a large pool of potential fact-finders in the trial process. The film states clearly that jurors will be excluded because of incapacity or prior conviction. Other factors are not mentioned. Question Three (I-3) is designed to test audience recall of this important point. Well over fifty percent (50%) in every audience group (Moscow, Sestroretsk and Elista) recognized most of the correct criteria for jury selection and disregarded inappropriate selection criteria.

Jury duty as a universal civic obligation is an important cornerstone not only of the judicial process but also of democracy itself. In this respect, at least half of each audience group recognized the duty of individual citizens to report for jury duty and the existence of sanctions for failure to discharge this civic obligation. The best scores were reported for the Elista audience groups. (Questions I-4 and I-5)

Random selection is another aspect of the jury trial system which enhances broad representation of the community. Question Eleven (I-11) draws attention to this factor. At least half of all the viewers remembered it.

The process of juror selection must assure the exclusion of persons with prior knowledge of a case or possible bias (as, for

example, a juror who knows a party to the matter). Questions Six (I-6) and Seven (I-7) directly addressed these concerns. The data indicates that over one-half and in some groups all the viewers remembered this information. Finally, Question Ten (I-10) re-introduced the concept of random selection and equal access of the parties to the selection process. In every audience (except Moscow Three) at least half the respondents answered the question correctly

## 2. Role of the Juror.

One very important objective of the jury training videos was to impart an understanding of the juror's role in a criminal trial and the functions which jurors could expect to perform. Question I-9 lists all the participants in a Russian criminal trial, each of which has the right to question witnesses. In response to this initial questionnaire, on the average, half of the respondents realized that all groups listed (including jurors themselves) could question witnesses. On the same questionnaire (I-16) viewers did understand that they had the right to seek information from the judge through the courtroom assistants. On the second questionnaire (II-13), in answer to a similar question, practically all viewers understood their right and duty to seek clarification of matters on which they might be confused.

In both videos, the jury verdict is explained as the final decision of factual questions at the conclusion of which the jury reaches the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. In both questionnaires, viewers were reminded of this function. (I-22, II-16) On the first questionnaire, virtually all participants correctly distinguished between the verdict and the final sentence. On the second questionnaire, the issue was more subtly stated, couched in terms of the authority of appeals courts to overturn judicial rulings only or to include jury verdicts also. More than half the respondents answered correctly.

To aid jurors in understanding that legal questions are the exclusive domain of the judge (and the attorneys) both questionnaires contained questions on the practice of dismissing the jury from the courtroom for legal arguments (I-15, II-5). All audience groups received high scores on at least one of the questionnaires, several groups on both.

Finally, to confirm jurors' understanding of the Russian verdict format (i.e., lists of specific questions) and to assure them that the judge would provide general instructions, three questions were included in the second questionnaire. (II-9, II-10, II-11) In all audience groups (except for Sestroretsk Two), at least fifty percent of the respondents correctly and completely answered the questions.

## 3. Roles of Parties/Burden of Proof.

A fundamental rule to be remembered at all times by jurors is the maxim: "he who asserts must prove." In criminal proceedings,

this rule is especially important. Jurors must understand that the prosecution must carry the burden of proof, establishing every fact underlying the criminal charge. The defendant has no duty to assert or prove any facts. The defendant may remain silent or rest his case solely upon reasonable doubts arising from the prosecution's case.

On the first questionnaire (I-8) the viewers were given a list of five possible "parties" to a trial, of which only two (prosecution and defendant) were properly listed. In every group except one, a large number of extraneous responses appeared, which indicated the audiences were not fully clear on the identity of true "parties" as litigants.

Question Twelve (I-12) asked the viewers if the defendant was required to testify and answer questions. Unfortunately, the audience groups failed to correctly respond. This result is puzzling, because Question Thirteen (I-13) followed immediately and asked the viewers about the defendant's right to remain silent. Overwhelmingly the audiences gave correct answers.

In the second questionnaire (following the second film) similar questions were posed. Viewers were asked about the nature of evidence required in a trial (II-3), the duty of the prosecution to "prove" guilt (II-6) and to prove "every fact" of the charge (II-7). Question Fifteen (II-15) also touched upon the criteria for acquittals - i.e., failure of the prosecution's evidence.

The results were widely varied. In every audience group, half the viewers did understand that "every fact" must be proven (II-7). In answering Questions Three (II-3) and Six (II-6), the number of extraneous answers indicated that viewers were unclear that the only burden of proof was upon the prosecution; some erroneously imagined jurors had a burden of proof rather than the duty to weigh and judge evidence. With regard to question II-15 incomplete answers suggested that viewers did not fully understand all circumstances under which the prosecution's proof could fail.

Burden of proof as a concept often confounds the understanding of first-time jurors even in countries with long-standing judicial traditions. These survey results indicate that the role of the parties and the burden of proof are concepts which require some further explanation from the bench in the course of actual trials to strengthen juror understanding.

#### 4. The nature of evidence.

It is vital that all jurors understand the nature of courtroom evidence. Rules of evidence and evidentiary decisions by the judge provide a "filter," whereby the verdict will rest solely upon judicially sanctioned proofs. The viewers were asked (I-14) if the charging document constituted evidence and if "any information" relevant to a case was admissible (II-2). Well over half the respondents understood that neither could be evidence. The viewers were asked about the criteria whereby a judge excluded evidence (II-4), and again at least two-thirds of the audiences understood that "illegally obtained" materials could not be admitted into a

trial.

Finally, the viewers were presented with a list items from which they were requested to choose those admissible in evidence (II-8). Here the results were mixed. The audiences correctly excluded newspaper and media reports and illegally obtained items as well as the arguments of lawyers. They correctly allowed physical evidence and conclusions of experts. But many jurors were uncertain about the status of the investigative file, the charging document, arguments of the parties and even testimony of witnesses.

Again, as with burden of proof, the concept of evidence is frequently a source of confusion for Western viewers and jurors. The results of this audience research should be seen as encouraging but also indicative of the need for presiding judges to assure that evidentiary rulings, as necessary, are simple and clearly understood by the jurors.

#### 5. The integrity of jury deliberations.

An inescapable requirement of any jury trial is the integrity of jury deliberations. These deliberations must take place in isolation and in secrecy, free from any outside interference or pressure. Jurors must be completely free to speak openly and without fear that their comments will later be revealed to the parties or to the public.

Several questions were directed to this important component of the jury trial. Question One (I-1) contained a suggestion that the courtroom assistants should advise jurors or be present during deliberations. Well over half the viewers in all groups understood that this was not so.

Questions Eighteen (I-18), Nineteen (I-19), and Twenty (I-20) presented the matter once again in terms of persons with whom jurors should communicate or share information about deliberations. In response to these questions, all the audience groups displayed correct understanding. Finally, Question Fourteen (II-14) on the second questionnaire asked viewers about the proper basis for a verdict. Over half the viewers correctly responded that the decision must rest upon the personal conviction of each juror, indicating that the individual must be free from any undue influence during deliberations and in reaching the ultimate verdict.

#### 6. Audience Comments.

On the whole, general audience discussion which followed viewing of both films yielded virtually identical comments. The Sestroretsk audiences, however, questioned the feasibility of jury trial in a small town: "I must know half the people in Sestroretsk, and I don't want to decide their fates." Another viewer objected to the practice of excusing jurors from the courtroom at any time, feeling this deprived them of information. Yet another viewer felt that jurors should be tested and selected on a merit system.

## AUDIENCE RESEARCH RESULTS - DOCUMENTARY VIDEO

### 1. Moscow.

#### a. Moscow One.

This audience of persons under the age of thirty with higher education was favorably disposed to jury trial, albeit with reservations. As in prior focus groups, members were concerned about juror "subjectivity." On the other hand, jury trials offered other viewpoints than "professional lawyers" in concrete cases. One viewer believed the introduction of jury trial would not be feasible in Russian conditions today.

Viewers were touched by portions of the video, felt they had learned new things and acquired a new interest in the topic. On the other hand, the program's "one-sidedness" was objectionable: "if the video is to convince, it should be objective;" "It provokes a little bit of resistance. As if jury trial has no negative aspects!" "I didn't like it when they praised the pre-revolutionary era and cursed the revolution."

Some viewers were offended by the appearance of the jurors in the video: "it would be better to entrust one's fate to a professional rather than to a Philistine;" "we shouldn't see sport shirts and gum-chewers...jurors should dress to evoke respect from the person they are judging;" "the courtroom looked like a school...like people picked up off the street."

In particular, a brief scene showing jurors having lunch caused indignation: "it was bad that, after the hearing, they were at lunch, as if they came for that. That should be removed from the video."

Viewers who started the session favorably disposed toward jury trial were strengthened in their opinions. One previously undecided viewer said, "Now I am more inclined to a positive attitude." The program did, however, cause one viewer to become pessimistic: "I was positively disposed before. But the film showed that this will be practically impossible. We have so many [criminal] cases, bandits! Twelve people for every trial - a difficult task. I was somewhat discouraged."

#### b. Moscow Two.

This audience of persons over thirty years of age with higher education began with a favorable attitude toward jury trial, its "objectivity," the ability of jurors to resist pressure, and its reflection of public opinion.

At the same time, viewers were guarded in their assessment of jury trial in Russia today, citing social instability, lack of professional training and legal knowledge of jurors which might lead to "subjective" verdicts: "We are slaves in many ways, but to be judges, reach verdicts, you need to be free. Who can say when we will be free, to change our mentality?"

One viewer felt "material [financial] independence" was

important for jurors and was definitely lacking in Russia today. Others disagreed. Some viewers were indignant that murderers were accorded a jury trial: "for killing there should be killing." Another viewer felt ethnic prejudice would distort jury trials: "these were Russian fellows, but if they had been Chechens? That's it! They would get the death penalty right away."

Dim prospects for jury trial as such cast a cloud over the video for many viewers. The program was praised as informative but "unrealistic," "a dream." The video was criticized as tendentious and agitational: "Very persistent, exhorting a [vote] FOR! There just isn't anything better [than jury trial]! So we have bad courts, but what prevents improving them? That's not clear." One viewer was very much offended by harsh characterizations of "NZ's" in one of the interviews. The comment of another expert that the judicial system should return to the hands of the people (narod) provoked ridicule: "gag reflex," "in what year was this said?"

The "cafeteria" scene also upset this audience. All agreed the scene should be deleted, although discreet mention could be made of the fact that, for convenience, jurors are provided lunch. Some viewers felt it depicted the jurors as "dependent" (i.e., being fed by the court).

For some audience members, the program attempted to cover too much: the need for jury trial and for reform in the "SIZO" system (investigative detention facilities). The program had too many "talking heads," and provided insufficient information on how jurors actually perform their duties. Some viewers said they probably would not have watched the entire broadcast because it was "a bit long," "drawn out," "tedious."

A variety of specific questions remained unanswered for this audience: who are these jurors? what's their status? are unemployed people chosen? What if the jury is evenly divided?

In the end, the audience did find that the video had strengthened their latent support for jury trials. The single participant who, at the outset, had been negative toward jury trial changed her mind: "It may in fact be true that in a gathering of twelve people objective truth is born....This film did move me to a positive attitude."

Most of these viewers felt they could and would accept jury service as a civic duty. Those who declined were all women: "I am a religious person: judge not, lest ye be judged." One of these viewers felt that she herself was too "emotional" to impose a sentence. Continuing on this line, she added that other jurors would probably be too "soft" as well: "I am afraid that with jurors there will be more acquittals. Those scum - excuse me - will get off easy."

### c. Moscow Three.

Viewers under the age of thirty years with middle education started with generally favorable views of the jury trial: it protects human rights and honest people; it is fair; it is more difficult to corrupt twelve jurors than two. The only reservation

was a concern that lawyers and parties might play on the emotions of "simple people."

The viewers found the program informative but tedious. To them, it was a species of "advertisement," yet no one used the term "agitation." About half the audience members said they would freely watch the entire program; among those were the viewers who had initially negative views of jury trial.

These viewers expressed the same criticisms as previous groups: the connection between jury trial and the SIZO was unclear; there were too many expert commentaries; more details of actual trial procedure were needed; the program was too slanted; critics of jury trial should be heard. The program strengthened the convictions of those favorably disposed toward jury trial, although one supporter came to have some doubts: "I saw minuses." Those negatively inclined did not change their opinions.

#### d. Moscow Four.

This audience of persons over age thirty with middle education was sharply divided in its initial perceptions of jury trial. Several viewers believed that jury trial would assure objectivity and "independence from every structure." Others opposed the very idea of individual citizens sitting in judgment of other individuals.

This audience was hostile to the video. They considered the video to be "one-sided" and boring, reminiscent of old Soviet "movie journals." The audience also felt that the film was too ambitious, touching on too many themes. None of the respondents said that they would watch the entire program voluntarily.

Unlike prior focus groups, this audience's reactions were strong, as for example: "The jurors were a motley crew. It should be stricter." Viewers noted: the moment when the judge interrupted the prosecutor; the predominance of women in the new jury trial structure; the horrific conditions in which persons are held under the SIZO regime; the poor impressions created by the prosecutor and attorneys. A number of viewers disliked the phrase "return the judicial process to the people [narod]." It brought to mind Soviet propagandistic language.

Attitudes toward jury trial were basically not changed by the program, supporters of jury trial expressed "disappointment" with the program. One viewer said that the film "strengthened" her support for jury trial, but those viewers who at the start were undecided came out against jury trial after the program.

In contrast to other audience groups, these viewers generally displayed no serious reservations about jury service: "I'd go especially if they gave preparatory instructions," "I could set aside my own opinion," "I think it is essential to accept this responsibility; if not we, then who?"

## 2. Kemerovo.

### a. Kemerovo One.

This audience of persons under the age of thirty years with higher education was favorably disposed to jury trial. They believed in the greater independence and objectivity of a larger number. Moreover, they saw jury trial as truly adversarial: "from such conflict the truth is born." On the negative side, viewers were concerned that experienced lawyers could trick simple people and that jury trials might lead to unduly soft sentences.

After viewing the program, additional viewpoints were expressed. In favor of jury trial, viewers noted the random selection process and likelihood that non-professional jurors would be free from legalistic "stereotypes and cliches." On the other hand, quick re-introduction of jury trial was felt a mistake, especially if the reformers expected to transplant nineteenth century institutions into contemporary unstable Russian soil.

The audience considered the video informative, mainly for those who know nothing in advance about jury trials. The format (especially protracted interviews) was considered boring.

Audience members were struck by a lack of skill and preparedness on the part of the prosecutor and attorneys: "complete helplessness," "they are practically unprepared to conduct such judicial proceedings, really, they're helpless."

Viewers said they had learned a considerable amount from the video: "I especially remember that they showed actual juror selection, that it is done randomly, by random draw."

On the negative side, the audience was struck by the tendentious, propagandistic and "politicized" character of the video. They felt that the idea of jury trial did not benefit from the admixture of politics (anti-Soviet and pro-Yeltsin narrative comments). They noted the absence of commentators opposed to jury trial. Argumentation should have been subliminal, "and not so heaped up."

The audience strongly rejected one expert's comment about "returning legal proceedings to the hands of the people [narod]." As in prior focus groups, this term evoked unpleasant political memories and sounded empty. Some viewers were led by the phrase to question again the competence of ordinary people to handle judicial cases: "popular court could become lynching court... popular court should be limited, contained in some kind of framework."

The term "narod" provoked a very strong reaction from one viewer who talked at great length about the use of the word to brand unpopular individuals and groups as "enemies" of the people. For this viewer, positive aspects of jury trial were "drowned out" by invocation of the word "narod."

Only one viewer could visualize himself as a juror. There was little enthusiasm among viewers for juror service. Typically they felt themselves unprepared, insufficiently objective or too emotional, or were constrained by religious convictions against judging others.

b. Kemerovo Two.

This audience consisted of persons over thirty years of age

with higher education. Prior to viewing the video, they generally approved the idea of jury trial.

One member of the audience had served as a "NZ" for twelve years and strongly rejected the program: "A disgusting film!" Despite his outburst, however, the rest of the group found the program informative but excessively politicized and propagandistic. One viewer disliked the juxtaposition of Lenin and Alexander II without some clear evidence that Lenin himself had eliminated jury trial. Opposing points of view should have been included.

Some details bothered viewers, such as the oath-taking and the comportment of the prosecutor: "He was very disrespectful toward the jurors. He later said that he had had to change his language, but he was quite unsuccessful in doing so." Viewers felt that two distinct projects were undertaken and confused: objectively explaining jury trials and persuading audiences to accept jury trial. The video should undertake one or the other but not both at the same time.

With this audience, as previous groups, the statement by one expert that the judicial process would "return to the people (narod)" provoked strong negative reactions and discussion. The audience members approve of popular involvement in the business of justice, but the phrase "return to the people" was offensive and demagogic.

c. Kemerovo Three.

This audience consisted of persons under the age of thirty years with middle education. With one exception who was unsure, all participants had a positive attitude toward jury trial prior to viewing the program. One audience member commented upon negative attitudes in the public at large as a reflection of general "distrust and negative outlook in society toward the institution of law as a means of punishment."

The video was well received by this audience: "a good film," "very informative, very logical," "I liked it, the theme is very topical." The video strengthened these positive views and brought the undecided viewer to share them. Audience members disapproved the existing Soviet tribunal.

One viewer felt that the program did not show capture the adversarial nature of jury trial: "I mostly watched the trial. Somehow the [the TV show] Santa Barbara came to mind. On it there is always somebody on trial and always a jury trial...On Santa Barbara there is the adversarial system, but [the film] did not show it to us." Another viewer was impressed by the "dispassionate" conduct of the trial: "I liked it...that the judge explained some points of law to them."

Some felt that the judge received too much coverage whereas the prosecutor and defense attorneys were put to the side. Another viewer disliked the prosecutor's arrogance, while another was offended by Savitsky's harsh criticism of "NZ's."

Language about "returning the courts to the people (narod)" did not provoke negative reactions in this group. On the contrary,

viewers approved jury trial as a vehicle of democratization. Members of this audience, however, saw limits to the utility of jury trial. Small claims should be handled by individual judges, as well as divorces: "Why would you need twelve jurors to divide up the forks and spoons?" The viewers also felt that horrendous crimes should be judged by jurors: terrorism or cases like Chikatilo [ed: notorious serial killer and mutilator].

Personally, most of the audience expressed willingness to serve as jurors. Those who felt they would decline were uneasy about the psychological stress and uncertain about their own objectivity.

d. Kemerovo Four.

These viewers were above the age of thirty years with middle education. The sociologists conducting this focus group described the session as not particularly successful. The selection process yielded an appropriate mix of men and women but the personalities of the group members were such that a full discussion by all participants did not develop. Instead, three male members of the group tended to dominate and several older women proved hesitant to participate. Nevertheless impressionistic data was obtained.

Initial attitudes toward jury trial were positive. The primary impact of the video was to alarm and upset the viewers. There were strong reactions of dismay to the description of the SIZO regime. The problem of rising crime surfaced in the course of the discussion.

Viewers felt the actual details of the jury trial needed more coverage. They viewed the program attentively. No one felt it was boring or tedious, nor did this audience feel the video was propagandistic or tendentious.

As a result of the viewing, two audience members became convinced of the merits of jury trial; they were particularly affected by the receipt of new information. Another viewer, however, came to have doubts based primarily upon his concern that jurors would lack the professionalism and competence to deal with difficult cases. From his comments it appeared that he believed the jury pronounced sentence rather than merely determining guilt or innocence. No one among the other viewers corrected this impression, although some participants did later indicate an understanding that jurors did not require legal educations.

3. Pskov.

a. Pskov One.

These viewers were less than thirty years of age with middle education. Initial attitudes toward jury trial were positive, the institution being seen as "just," "humane," and one which "exists in all capitalist countries and plays a large role in resolving a great many legislative problems of government."

The program was considered informative, "not bad" but somewhat long, even though all members of the audience watched attentively without distraction. One viewer was initially suspicious of jury trial from a general hostility toward Soviet institutions, but his attitude became positive while watching the video. Another commented that this type of video was part of the all important re-education of Russian society.

The audience felt that the program was too "one sided" and propagandistic in the sense that disadvantages of jury trial were never mentioned. The first portion of the program was particularly susceptible to this criticism.

The materials on the SIZO system seemed irrelevant to the theme of jury trial, although one audience member had been employed in the system and testified to its horrors. On the whole the audience considered the SIZO theme to be a thinly veiled device, designed to arouse emotions. In fact, however, the institution of jury trial would not eliminate the abuses of the detention facilities.

One viewer objected to the portion in which jurors were provided "a tasty lunch." This suggested they were somehow compromised: "they feed them, pay them; I don't think that is good." The comment struck a responsive chord within the group. Another member felt that jury duty should be performed for free.

The audience was disappointed not to have seen an entire trial in greater detail rather than excerpts with commentary. They wanted to know more about the juror deliberations and factors that motivated the specific verdict. Some audience members were confused about the roles of the parties and the judge, the details of juror selection, the reason for the varying sentences among the three accused.

Several audience members categorically rejected the idea of serving as jurors themselves: "I feel sorry for everybody, even the guilty who are in such jails," "deciding the fate of another is hard," "I don't have enough experience to decision," "maybe if I were 35-36 years old...." Others felt they could serve as jurors, one viewer would do so, "in order that the innocent were not condemned, in order to cast a ray of truth's light."

As to the institution of jury trial itself, there was general concern that juror selection should eliminate "casual" people and those who were merely "curious." The group entered into a discussion of Pskov itself and its suitability for jury trial, which was deemed rather low at present. In a small city, there will be "pressures" on the jury, including "the mafiosi." Diverging slightly from this attitude was one viewer who felt that local authorities in Pskov were on the whole good, but that juror selection should be spread through different districts and parts of town. Ultimately, introduction of jury trial in Pskov should be postponed until "life becomes stable" and "people are different."

b. Pskov Two.

This audience consisted of viewers over the age of thirty

years with higher education. Jury trial was perceived as not only "just" and "civilized," but also an important supplement to the strict letter of the law: "statute law cannot foresee all real-life situations," "many, various situations in real life are possible which it is difficult to 'fit into' the framework of law." One viewer felt that jury trial would assure a more "qualified" (competent) determination of guilt and innocence.

The audience watched the video most attentively. The viewers generally considered the program to be propagandistic, although for several this fact was not taken in a negative way: "We already know about the former courts, and this [program] gave more information about the new one, so the propagandistic character would not be noteworthy." The program evoked heightened interest in the issue of re-introducing jury trials, and it provided much clearer understanding of the institution: prior to viewing the film, one viewer thought that "jury trial was just the same as trial by the People's Court only with a larger number."

While one viewer lamented the "one-sidedness," another disagreed saying that the informative value outweighed any propagandistic tendencies. Differing views emerged on the propriety of historical comparisons, but there were strong feelings among some viewers that portions of the program attacking the Revolution were "unnecessary" - "we're up to our ears." These viewers were also upset by harsh criticisms of NZ's: "the ones I knew were people of justice, they had the right to judge others, to decide someone's fate," "I was surprised when they said that we chose meek people, not the right types. My jury of NZ's were honest people." Still, one viewer who had served in that capacity commented that it was "tough, unpleasant - you felt your worthlessness."

Like many other groups, this audience was curious about jury deliberations and wanted to see more details of the actual trial. Unlike other audiences, however, this group formed a strong opinion about the defendants actually shown: "it was clear that they were guilty," and, said another, "maybe jury trial is not needed in such cases." [Editorial note: in fact, the film showed only excerpts from various portions of the trial and by no means provided enough evidence upon which to form even a premonition of guilt or innocence.]

The roles of the judge and jury became an issue of vigorous discussion. One viewer felt the judge: "should be more prominent and not simply organize the trial." Audience members felt that judicial proceedings should be highly professional and on this point there was concern about emotionalism among jurors. Along this line, at least viewer expressed doubts that "dressmakers and people out from behind the plow" could really function in a judicial proceeding.

c. Pskov Three.

These viewers were young people up to the age of thirty with

higher education. On the whole, the audience was favorably predisposed to jury trial, anticipating that a larger number of jurors would be more difficult to bribe and that they would be more independent and objective. A fair number of viewers came to the program with no strong opinion or prior knowledge, and several were dubious that jury trial would work in Russia or represented a prudent expenditure of public funds.

The audience watched the program attentively, smirking occasionally at the performance of the prosecutor. Scenes depicting the SIZO regime were disturbing but also raised questions about the relationship of jury trial to the problem of detention facilities.

Viewers felt that the program was informative: "now I feel that I can talk about this problem." On the other hand, it was also somewhat tedious. Few would watch it to the end on everyday television. They were disappointed that the proceeding was so dry and lifeless, and they disliked the "anemic" presentations of the attorneys.

The video's "one-sidedness" offended some viewers: "the agitation was quite visible - specialists are celebrating their own innovation. A comparison was needed - what kind of rights did the NZ's have and what have the jurors?" Generally the audience was not impressed by the series of experts who praised trial by jury without proving its worth.

The comments of one expert (Dr. Savitsky, who was harshly critical of the NZ's) greatly provoked one viewer: "the grey-haired lawyer talks about how bad it was. And where was he himself? How come he did not fight against it? And now - everything is going to be better?" The remainder of the group disagreed strongly with this reaction, considering it to be overly categorical.

As in prior audience groups, these viewers were jolted by the cafeteria scene: "I was very surprised, when they invited [the jurors] to lunch. In the midst of murder - and suddenly it's lunchtime." This reaction was widely shared in the discussion.

After viewing the program, the audience members discussed jury trial as such from a wide range of viewpoints. A vigorous exchange followed the misgivings of one viewer about non-professional jurors: "a case of any kind should be handled by a professional. The facts can be regarded in this or that light." None of the rest of the group agreed, and they particularly rejected his view (implicitly approving the SIZO regime) that "a thief should feel like he is sitting in jail."

Objections to the cost of jury trial provoked another lively discussion. Among the strong views supporting jury trial were the following: "to save one life it is worth changing everything," "this is the most democratic court, nothing is to be feared. After all, much gets spent and no one knows for what," "judicial reforms are important and cost should not be an obstacle."

One viewer would readily serve as a juror because it is a patriotic duty. Others had profound doubts, feeling they lacked life experience and professionalism. Others feared making a mistake: "practically speaking this is power over people. To

decide their fate, sending them into inhuman conditions, nothing good will come from that."

d. Pskov Four.

The members of this audience were over thirty years of age with middle education. Prior to viewing the program, they approved the idea of jury trial because numbers assured some independence.

Immediately after viewing the program, one audience member spoke out strongly: "This is just like in Gorbachev's time - come on, support what we propose - life will be good. And what now? Maybe it will be better, but what if the mafia gets to the court? I don't believe this video, it's propoganda." After some discussion, this same viewer became less adamant, maintaining his position, however, that conditions were not yet right for jury trial.

Some details remained unclear to the audience: initial selection of jurors, their compensation, their status (are they unemployed? off the streets?), and the way in which the jurors reached their verdict in the specific case shown. The audience wanted more detailed comparisons between trial by NZ's and trial by jury.

Actual jury duty service was not as daunting a prospect to this group as to others. Still, audience members expressed doubts about themselves: "we are so accustomed to subordination all our lives - say something "against," and they take you out - so that morally we cannot move over to the new [system]." Fear for personal safety and that of loved ones was a reason for avoiding service; several participants expressed fear that mafia elements could "infiltrate" juries.

Looking back to pre-revolutionary jury trials, viewers questioned the idea of a parallel to the present: "actually jurors in Russia were always educated people," "jury trials were not the voice of the people, remember who it was that served."

General reflections about jury trial brought to light underlying political and social tensions: "a hero of the Soviet Union (Rutskoy) sits in prison, everything is upside down, so who needs jury trials in this situation." Another viewer, commenting on the idea of returning the courts "to the people" said: "here every change is in the name of the workers, regardless of the fact that it is the workers whom it hits." Others felt that re-introduction of jury trial should await social stabilization and material improvement in the country.

4. Volgograd.

At the election of the sociologists retained by AED/ROSCON, the Volgograd results were consolidated in a single report. Except for variations noted below, the focus group sessions in Volgograd revealed no startling differences between the target audiences.

Responses to the initial questionnaire were basically positive with respect to the idea of trial by jury. The outlooks of non-

professionals in judicial proceedings were considered "important from the moral viewpoint." Jury trial could soften harsh results that might flow from the strict letter of the law. Jury trial represents popular control of the courts. It is hard to bribe an entire jury. The West has had good results. It is more objective, dispassionate, humane.

There were audience members, however, who were skeptical. One viewer wrote that jury trial could protect society from the "corporate idiotism" of the legal profession, but at the same time the idea of non-professionals deciding cases is itself somewhat at odds with common sense.

On the whole, the older viewers received the video well, finding it "informative" and "accessible." They recommended that it be shown to all audiences. Well-educated young viewers objected to its "tendentious" and "agitational" quality: "The film was done according to all the Soviet canons - it was bad before, now everything is good." The phrase "returning the courts to the people" evoked rather strong reactions from highly educated viewers: "people's court is lynching court," "there should never be mob court," "we should not hand over power to short-order cooks, competent people should operate the courts."

The juxtaposition of jury trials and the SIZO regime confused some viewers; they thought the program should focus on one or the other. Many were disturbed by the SIZO revelations and commentary, while younger viewers resented its use as an "emotional device." They also noted that, among the street interviews, the only interviewee seriously opposed to jury trial turned out to be a disheveled, shabbily dressed old man ("the dirty old geezer"). This complaint about the "one-sidedness" was also expressed as a desire to hear about defects in the jury trial system.

Many viewers felt they learned new things from the program, as for example the distinct roles of judge and jury. Also, the audiences understood more the functions of the parties and attorneys for prosecution and defense. One viewer commented: "Lawyers are opposed to jury trial because these courts take away their right to act as they please, capriciously."

The poor performance of the prosecuting attorney irritated viewers with higher education. Also, older viewers were much offended by the commentary attacking the NZ's; from personal experience, several viewers knew his statements were "outright lies" and "defamation."

Overwhelmingly the Volgograd audiences preferred not to serve as jurors themselves. Several viewers were concerned about danger to themselves and family members. Others felt they could not morally judge another person, while still others cited personal emotional make-up as disqualifying in their view.

Among those who felt no reservations about jury service, the explanations reflected genuine understanding of citizen obligations in a democracy: "if not I, then who," "I have experience in life, upbringing; I think that I can make an objective decision," "I would think about innocent people who are accused who want an opportunity to realize justice. Although, my nerves, my

health...."

Some fine points of jury trial remained unclear (juror selection, protection for jurors), but audiences in general felt they understood jury trial and their positive attitudes had been strengthened: "My opinion was not settled, but now I am more positively than negatively inclined. I tried to put myself in the place of the accused - I would hope to be judged by jurors, that honest, "unbought" people would objectively evaluate me." Asked their choice of forum, all participants would select a jury trial for themselves.

## CONCLUSION

The re-introduction of jury trial in the Russian Federation is in itself a profound process of democratization. It requires an understanding of the distinction between questions of fact and of law as the basis for the differing functions of juror and judge. As it becomes clear that jury verdicts are based on a series of concrete, factual determinations and that the chief ingredients are everyday experience, common sense, reason and fairness, it is possible that Russian citizens may acquire a feeling of "ownership" with respect to judicial institutions. The belief that justice is too complicated for average citizens and is the domain only of professionals can be replaced by a confidence in and among the populace itself through this single judicial reform. The results of audience research supporting the jury trial video series clearly indicates the need for broad dissemination of information on this topic. It also clearly illuminates the obstacles in the path of this important reform.

Attachment A  
Questionnaire One

Select and mark the correct answers according to your view.

1. Which of the following are to be done by courtroom assistants responsible for work with the jurors?
  - a. Verify documentation of candidate jurors.
  - b. Assure proper conditions for work of the jurors.
  - c. Communicate with the judge on behalf of jurors.
  - d. Consult with jurors during deliberations.
  - e. Be present during jury deliberations.
  
2. At what age may a citizen of the Russian Federation be summoned to jury duty?
  
3. Identify the criteria which are important for jury selection:
  - a. Gender
  - b. Nationality
  - c. Mental competence and physical capacity
  - d. Criminal convictions (absence or existence of)
  - e. Knowledge of the Russian language
  - f. Religious affiliation.
  
4. If there is a legitimate reason, a citizen
  - a. Is automatically excused from jury duty
  - b. Must inform the court of the reason and be excused from jury duty by the court.
  
5. Administrative sanctions apply in what cases?
  - a. A potential juror did not appear in court.
  - b. A potential juror sent someone else in his place.
  
6. Should a potential juror have advance knowledge about a given case?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No.
  
7. Should a potential juror inform the judge if a [preliminary screening] questions concerns:
  - a. Himself personally
  - b. His relatives and acquaintances
  
8. Which of the following come under the definition of "parties" to a judicial proceeding?
  - a. Prosecutor
  - b. Defense attorney
  - c. Defendant
  - d. Victim
  - e. Jurors

9. Who has the right to question witnesses and experts?
  - a. Prosecutor
  - b. Defense attorney
  - c. Defendant
  - d. Victim
  - e. Jurors
  
10. Can the parties exclude persons any person from the jury without giving a reason?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  
11. How is the actual jury formed in the final stage?
  - a. Decision by the judge
  - b. By lots (chance)
  - c. Decision by the parties
  
12. Must the accused testify and answer questions?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  
13. Silence of the accused, in your opinion, is:
  - a. Evidence of his guilt
  - b. His right.
  
14. Is the charging paper [indictment] evidence of the guilt of the accused?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No.
  
15. Is the judge allowed to request the jurors to leave the courtroom?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No.
  
16. If it is necessary to obtain information, the juror may turn to:
  - a. The judge
  - b. Any participant in the proceeding
  - c. To the courtroom assistants responsible for work of the jury.
  
17. In reaching a verdict, the jurors answer:
  - a. Questions propounded by the judge
  - b. Questions propounded by the prosecutor
  - c. Questions propounded in the course of jury deliberations.
  
18. With whom may jurors meet and discuss the matter at hand during recesses in the proceeding?
  - a. With the prosecutor
  - b. With the defense attorney
  - c. With the judge

- d. With experts
  - e. With no one.
19. Who can be present during jury deliberations?
- a. Only the judge
  - b. Only the courtroom assistants responsible for work of the jury
  - c. No one.
20. Who can be informed of the course of jury deliberations?
- a. Only the judge
  - b. Only people having no relation to the case or the court
  - c. No one
21. How are results reached in jury deliberations?
- a. Secret ballot on each question from the list
  - b. As a result of discussion of each question.
22. The verdict of the jury is:
- a. The final sentence
  - b. The basis for the final sentence

Attachment B  
Questionnaire Two

Choose and mark the correct answers.

1. What kinds of cases are considered by jury trial?
  - a. All kinds
  - b. Cases of most dangerous crimes.
  
2. During a trial proceeding the following may be taken into consideration:
  - a. Any information regarding the case.
  - b. Only evidence presented in court.
  
3. What items of evidence must be presented in court?
  - a. Evidence implicating the accused
  - b. Evidence advantageous to him.
  
4. In what event may the judge exclude evidence presented by the prosecution?
  - a. If it is objected to by the defense attorney.
  - b. If the judge finds the evidence to be unlawful.
  
5. In what event may the judge request the jury to leave the courtroom?
  - a. In order to discuss legal questions with the parties.
  - b. In the event of a disagreement between the prosecution and defense with regard to contested evidence.
  
6. Who must prove the guilt of the defendant?
  - a. The judge.
  - b. The prosecutor.
  - c. The jurors.
  
7. The prosecution is required to prove:
  - a. Every fact of the accusation.
  - b. The majority of facts of the accusation.
  - c. The most important facts.
  
8. What can serve as proof of the guilt of the defendant?
  - a. The arguments of counsel
  - b. Newspaper and television reporting
  - c. Testimony of the victim
  - d. Evidence and materials obtained by illegal means
  - e. Physical evidence
  - f. Conclusions of experts
  - g. Testimony of the accused
  - h. Testimony of witnesses
  - i. The investigation file
  - j. The charging paper [indictment]
  - k. The closing statement of the defendant.

9. Does the judge make a statement of instruction to the jurors before their deliberations on the list of questions?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
10. How many questions may be on the list of questions?
  - a. Only one
  - b. Several
  - c. Either one or several
11. What do questions on the list concern?
  - a. Proof of the events of the crime.
  - b. Proof of the fact that it was committed by the defendant
  - c. The guilt of the defendant.
  - d. The penalty.
12. What is the role of the jury foreman? He:
  - a. Propounds the questions for the deliberations.
  - b. He looks after the course of the deliberations
  - c. He makes the final decision
  - d. He announces the verdict
13. If a juror did not understand one of the judge's questions on the list, then he:
  - a. May elect not to take part in the discussion
  - b. Must request clarification
14. In answering the questions on the list, the jurors must rely upon:
  - a. Their own perception of the evidence
  - b. The viewpoint of the prosecution
  - c. The viewpoint of the defense
  - d. The opinion of the majority of jurors on the given case.
15. In what case should there be a judgment of acquittal?
  - a. If the proof of the accusation is insufficient
  - b. If the proof of the accusation is unconvincing
  - c. If the jury announces a verdict of acquittal
  - d. If the verdict of acquittal is not unanimous.
16. The appeals court may change:
  - a. The judge's decision
  - b. The jury decision
  - c. Both

Attachment C  
Compiled Responses to Questionnaires

Abbreviations:

- M1 - Moscow Group One (Over 30 years, Middle Technical Education - MT)
- M2 - Moscow Group Two (Over 30 years, Middle General Education - MG)
- M3 - Moscow Group Three (Under 30 years, Middle General Education - MG)
- M4 - Moscow Group Four (Under 30 years, Middle Technical Education - MT)
- S1 - Sestroretsk Group One (Under 30 years, Middle Education - M)
- S2 - Sestroretsk Group Two (Over 30 years, Middle Education - M)
- K1 - Kalmykia Group One (Over 30 years, Higher Education - H)
- K2 - Kalmykia Group Two (Under 30 years, Higher Education H)
- I-1, I-3, I-6.... Items from First Questionnaire
- II-4, II-7, II-8.... Items from Second Questionnaire

True/False questions and questions with but a single correct answer are presented with the number of correct answers first, followed by the number of incorrect responses separated by a back slash (/).

Multiple choice questions are presented with the number of correct responses first, followed by the number of possible correct responses, based upon the size of the group, in parentheses (), followed by incorrect or extraneous responses separated by a back slash (/).

Ques	M1 MT 30+	M2 MG 30+	M3 MG -30	M4 MT -30	S1 M -30	S2 M 30+	K1 H 30+	K2 H -30
I-1	16(24)/2	15(24)5	20(24)/4	20(24)/6	19(30)/3	25(30)/3	22(24)/2	23(24)/3
I-2	6/2	5/3	8	6/2	8/2	7/3	8	8
I-3	18(24)/5	17(24)/1	20(24)/5	20(24)/4	19(30)/2	25(30)/3	18(24)/1	16(24)/1
I-4	5(8)/3	6(8)/1	6/2	5/3	6(10)/4	7(10)/5	8(8)	8(8)/1
I-5	12(16)	9(16)	11(16)	14(16)	17(20)	13(20)	16(16)	16(16)
I-6	5/3	5/3	7/1	6/2	7/3	6/4	6/2	5/3
I-7	12(16)	14(16)	15(16)	15(16)	17(20)	18(20)	16(16)	16(16)

I-8	8(16)/11	7(16)/6	11(16)/12	10(16)/12	11(20)/11	15(20)/13	8(16)/9	12(16)/12
I-9	16(40)	22(40)	21(40)	24(40)	20(50)	34(50)	19(40)	22(40)
I-10	4/4	5/2	3/5	6/2	6/4	7/3	5/3	7/1
I-11	5(8)/3	5(8)/3	5(8)/3	6(8)/1	6(10)/4	7(10)/3	4(8)/4	7(8)/3
I-12	1/7	4/4	3/5	5/3	7/3	3/6	4/4	6/2
I-13	8	7/1	8	8	9/1	8/1	8	8
I-14	8	5/2	8	8	9/1	8/1	7/1	6/2
I-15	5/3	7/1	7/1	7/1	10	8/2	7/1	7/1
I-16	6(8)/2	7(8)/2	7(8)/3	8(8)/3	6(10)/4	6(10)/3	6(8)/4	8(8)/4
I-17	1(8)/6	7(8)/3	5(8)6	8(8)/3	6(10)/4	6(10)/6	5(8)/5	3(8)/6
I-18	7(8)/1	7(8)/1	7(8)/1	8(8)	10(10)	10(10)/1	8(8)	8(8)
I-19	7(8)	7(8)	8(8)/3	8(8)	9(10)/1	9(10)/1	8(8)	8(8)
I-20	7(8)/1	6(8)/2	6(8)/2	8(8)	10(10)	9(10)/1	8(8)	7(8)/1
I-21	1/7	5/2	5/4	4/4	5/5	4/6	2/6	4/4
I-22	7/1	7/1	6/2	6/2	6/4	8/2	7/1	7/1
II-1	8	7/1	7/3	6/2	8/2	4/6	7/1	8
II-2	5/3	4/3	7/1	5/3	9/1	7/3	5/3	5/3
II-3	5(8)/6	7(8)/4	8(8)/7	7(8)/6	10(10)/7	10(10)/9	8(8)/8	8(8)/8
II-4	8(8)/1	8(8)	8(8)	8(8)	10(10)	10(10)	8(8)	8(8)
II-5	7(8)/1	7(8)/2	7(8)/3	7(8)/3	7(10)/4	3(10)/5	7(8)/4	8(8)/3
II-6	8(8)/5	4(8)/6	5(8)/5	5(8)/3	4(10)/7	6(10)/6	6(8)/6	5(8)/3
II-7	6(8)/1	7(8)/1	5(8)/1	7(8)/1	8(10)/2	9(10)/3	7(8)/2	7(8)/1
II-8	35(48)/2	29(48)1	31(48)7	34(48)6	31(60)/1	43(60)/7	28(48)/4	26(48)/4

II-9	5/3	3/5	5/3	5/3	7/3	3/7	5/3	6/2
II-10	6(8)/2	4(8)/4	5(8)/3	4(8)/4	8(10)/2	4(10)/6	6(8)/4	5(8)/5
II-11	18(24)2	15(24)/1	23(24)/4	16(24)	17(30)/1	25(30)/4	22(24)	18(24)/1
II-12	12(16)/6	12(16)/5	12(16)/6	12(16)/4	16(20)/2	18(20)/5	14(16)/7	14(16)/4
II-13	8(8)	8(8)	8(8)	8(8)/1	9(10)/1	9(10)/1	8(8)	8(8)
II-14	6(8)/5	7(8)/1	7(8)/3	8(8)/1	8(10)/2	9(10)/5	7(8)/5	7(8)/2
II-15	11(24)/1	13(24)	15(24)/1	12(24)/1	10(30)/3	19(30)	15(24)/1	11(24)/1
II-16	5(8)/2	3(8)/3	3(8)/5	3(8)/5	6(10)/4	7(10)/5	6(8)/4	5(8)/3

# APPENDIX VI

Report on ROSCON Media Products and Focus Group Research Results

## REPORT ON *ROSCON MEDIA PRODUCTS AND FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH RESULTS*

### 1. Pilot Media Programs

Ten sub-grants were provided directly to Russian media organizations in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Murmansk, and Ufa, for the development of television, radio, and print pilots. Programs were targeted to youth, women, entrepreneurs and farmers.

Seventy products were produced presenting basic facts and concepts about the free market and how it works. The pilots articulated the role of market institutions such as banks, investment firms, and insurance companies. They addressed issues such as how to obtain credit and develop a business plan. One series for youth consisted of a dialogue between a father and son which explained concepts such as money, taxes, inflation, international trade, and competition. The pilot series targeted to farmers focused on: traditions of land ownership; case studies in private farming, and the marketing of agricultural products.

As the pilot media phase was experimental a variety of formats were used, such as: documentaries, infomercials, discussion programs with live call-ins to stimulate audience interaction, competitions, newspaper supplements; and comic books.

Grants were given to both professional and fledgling production companies. Grant recipients included: Business Wave, Nadezhda Radio, Radio Yunost, Liubava Women's Club (Murmansk), Norma Ltd. (St. Petersburg), TOR (St. Petersburg), VICON (Moscow), REN-TV (Moscow), *We-Mbl* (Hearst/Izvestia Joint Venture), and People's Academy (Ufa). Among grantees were both governmental media organizations and independent companies. Programs were broadcast on Ostankino (Channel One); Channel Three; St. Petersburg Television; Tolpar Television (Ufa); Nadezhda Radio and Radio Yunost. Pilots were initiated in Murmansk, St. Petersburg and Moscow.

A training workshop was led by Paul Solman of *MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour* for Russian producers to explore different techniques to creatively present economic information on television.

In addition, four programs were produced by ROSCON for USAID's Rule of Law Judicial media project, including: a documentary film for television on the jury trial in Russia, training films on jury trials for potential jurors, jurors selected to hear a trial, and a popular short television film on the introduction of the jury trial.

A number of ROSCON programs were used in training programs in Russia by Florida State University and in Ukraine for training women in educational television techniques.

## 2. Strengthened Research Capacity

ROSCON conducted a series of training workshops to strengthen qualitative research capacity for Russian sociologists. A core group of Russian sociologists from Moscow State University's Center for Sociological Research (CSR) participated in qualitative research workshops in November 1993. Concurrently, focus group moderators from 12 cities were trained. Follow-up training took place in mid-March 1994 when more than 25 additional sociologists from 10 cities participated in qualitative research workshops. Workshops were also conducted on social marketing methodology. A number of ROSCON trained sociologists were able to apply their skills to other programs and have worked for the Salvation Army, BBDO Worldwide and Gallup.

## 3. Tested Broadcast Product

Focus groups were conducted to test pilot television and radio programs in order to gather insight into audience responses to various approaches and context.

The focus groups have provided a wide range of insight into current attitudes toward: economic reform, entrepreneurship and business, morals and ethics in business, the role and opportunity for women in the emerging economy, and in the development of future media based educational programming. A summary of the "lessons learned" of the ROSCON project is provided below.

### Lessons Learned

The ROSCON experience demonstrated that community involvement in small-scale media projects can have significant regional impact. Funding, for example, was provided to Liubava, a small women's club in the city of Murmansk, to produce a newspaper supplement in the local paper, *Murmansky vestnik*, on issues of interest to women in business. In preparing materials for the supplement, the club expanded its network which, in turn, led to the creation of a regional women's business association. Women whose stories were profiled in the *Murmansky vestnik* went on to appear on radio and television and demand for their businesses grew significantly. Men in Murmansk decided to fund their own supplement in the same paper pointing out that economic success was not for women only. The project was commended by the Murmansk city government.

Multi-media programs can be particularly effective. A series funded by ROSCON on basic economic messages for young people ages 13-15 appeared on Channel One television. The Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation requested that the series be presented in video cassette form to over 500 schools in Russia for the 1994 academic year. Donors in Great Britain covered the costs of the production of the cassettes. A companion comic book was produced for distribution to schools to further reinforce the messages of the original television pilot series.

ROSCON found a general fatigue with Soviet style programming. Soviet style -- in the use of language, the stiff posture of the host, the presentation of didactic messages -- affects people in a negative way. Many assume that it's just propaganda again and programs lose their credibility. Entertaining and interactive programming, such as soap operas and game shows, are among the most popular broadcast vehicles.

Russian audiences prefer programs that: make abstract concepts relevant to everyday life, tell stories about real people and real issues, present everyday role models with whom the audience can identify, offer practical tips and information about how to survive and thrive in the current economic situation.

ROSCON found that information about Russia's own pre-revolutionary traditions of entrepreneurship was of marginal interest. People feel that the past has few lessons to offer in today's environment. The concern is largely focused on the present -- how to make sense of it - - and how to improve one's standard of living. Audiences do not like to see criticism -- direct or veiled -- of the previous regime. Even young viewers (ages 13 to 15) point out that there "were good things about the Soviet Union."

Focus group participants were interested in Western models -- in comparing their life and institutions to the United States and other countries.

ROSCON found that Russian audiences prefer foreign to domestic programming. Russian radio stations, for example, are considered to be less credible than foreign ones. Students prefer to listen to EuroPaplus which carries European news and music rather than the Russian stations like Mayak or Radio Yunost.

## **ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEDIA**

Seventy years of controlled media has left its mark on public attitudes. The media were largely tools of the Party and the State. Facts were presented and sometimes fabricated to promote political objectives. The Russian people saw the media for what it was and adapted accordingly. The media were the prime source of news and information. But the media were not credible with the people. ROSCON focus groups show that attitudes have not changed appreciably toward the media -- be it governmental or independent, Russians expect to be disinformed by the media. But, they expect to see through the disinformation. In focus groups, participant often ask -- who is behind this show -- who paid for it? Someone must be behind it.

In a series of short case studies of individual farmers, for example, focus group participants questioned whether the individuals featured were who they said they were. They thought that the farmers were really mafia-connected because where else would they get the money to start an enterprise. Just because television tells you who someone is, who it does not mean that it is true.

There is no question, Russians look at television differently than Americans. Seventy years of propaganda has led to a sharpening of cognitive ability. The minutest details are noticed, like the type of clothes that a person wears, the dishes on the table during an interview. Picking up on details is instinctive as they are clues that will help the viewer sort out fact from fiction. Focus group participants, for example, examined the license plate on a car that inadvertently went by in the background while an interview was being conducted. This was not considered accidental and participants discussed the number on the plate and speculated as to whether it belonged to a collective farm boss or a racketeer. Small things are also symbols. A red scarf worn by a boy in one program led to an association with the Pioneers, a former communist party youth organization. Even though the boy discussed inflation and money, because he was wearing a Pioneer-like scarf, he was thought to represent a new cadre of "indoctrinated youth" -- "business youth." Nothing during the propaganda era was spontaneous, therefore it is still accepted that nothing is left to chance.

In the Russian context, there is a fine line between education and advocacy. Journalists are not trained to do educational programming. And when they try, they often infuse content with political messages. It is also generally assumed that educational programming will carry a bias or advocate a specific position. In a pilot series where a father and son discuss the types of taxes in Russia, Russian producers had the father argue against a land tax. While these sections were eventually removed, the distinction between education and advocacy was never clear to the Russian counterparts.

## TARGET AUDIENCES

### Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs stimulate economic growth as producers, manufacturers and role models. As owners of their own enterprises, entrepreneurs are stakeholders in the reform process.

Three 15-minute programs were produced for entrepreneurs by Business Wave (Delovaya Volna), an independent producer company, and broadcast on Ostankino Television (Channel One).

The programs focused on what motivates the entrepreneur, the need for honesty and integrity in business, and on the history of Russian entrepreneurship before the Revolution of 1917. Interviews were featured with entrepreneurs, psychologists and religious leaders.

#### Messages:

- Entrepreneurs are people who contribute to the wealth of nations through their productivity.
- Honesty and integrity are integral to sound business development.

- Entrepreneurs not only gain prosperity for themselves but engage in activities that benefit others.
- Russian entrepreneurship has a history going back to the 17th century.

### **Focus Group Results**

Focus groups were conducted in Moscow with youth and small business owners to gauge how well viewers understood the concepts presented in the broadcasts.

The two audience groups viewed entrepreneurial activity differently. Students had a negative image of entrepreneurs because, for them, entrepreneurs and businessmen are: linked to organized crime, acquire capital in a dishonest way, are motivated by self interest and "easy money," do not benefit the nation by their work.

Students are not interested in moral and ethical issues related to business. They assume that business practices presuppose a degree of corruption and dishonesty, given the difficult conditions under which many businessmen must operate.

Students perceive business as motivated by self-interest. Corruption is permissible if it helps a business develop. Similarly, where honesty and integrity help stimulate business growth, they are appropriate. Students did note, however, that it is important to be honest to your partners and to produce quality products for your clients. Success is the ultimate goal -- whatever ends you need to achieve it are permissible.

Small/medium business owners, by contrast, hold entrepreneurs in high esteem. While individuals who make large amounts of money are respected, there are mixed feelings as to whether the acquisition of large profits is a positive goal. Large entrepreneurs may be admired but are distrusted as they may have acquired their start up capital in dubious ways. Entrepreneurial activity is not for everyone as it involves risk and independent initiative. Small/medium business owners blame the former regime for destroying the spirit of initiative in the people and accuse the present government of promoting policy disincentives for business growth. This group notes that the motivating force for entrepreneurs is satisfaction in personal achievement rather than desire for profit.

Both students and the small/medium business owners had a limited understanding of how financial institutions work. The stock market, for example, is seen as a place to make a "quick buck."

## Women

### **Radio Nadezhda (Moscow)**

Radio Nadezhda began broadcasting a 12-part series of weekly 15-minute live programs titled *Women and Business Pluses and Minuses* on November 19th. Each program featured interviews with psychologists, practical advice from women entrepreneurs, and an historical sequence on Russian entrepreneurship. Ten programs included a call-in segment.

### **Messages**

- Be informed before you start a business. Know the laws and understand your trade.
- Starting your own business provides personal freedom.
- Think through the pluses and minuses before starting out. Business is a commitment.
- You have to balance business activity with family and other obligations.
- To start a business you need to take risk, make decisions, accept responsibility and adapt to changing circumstances.
- Women can make a positive contribution to the economy.

### **Focus Group Results**

A focus group with women interested in business was conducted in Moscow. The female participants lauded the concept of a broadcast on business issues for women. The program, however, raised questions about the role of women in the changing environment.

Participants noted that women are as capable as men in taking on challenging work in such nontraditional areas as finance and investment. Participants were largely concerned about the impact of entrepreneurial activities on their ability to fulfill their roles as wives and mothers. Some were concerned about becoming more successful than their husband; and of managing the dual burden of business and family.

The opportunity to share in a dialogue with other women through the media was welcome. Women's media business programs are valuable, and they should provide more practical advice and more live interaction with successful women.

Participants were also interested in gaining more knowledge about the experiences of women entrepreneurs in other countries and to see how they resolve those problems that are common to women engaged in managing both business and family responsibilities.

## **Liubava Women's Club (Murmansk)**

The Liubava Women's Club in Murmansk received ROSCON support to develop a one page monthly supplement for the regional newspaper *Murmansky vestnik* (circulation 36,000). The supplement included: feature stories about women entrepreneurs and how they overcome the obstacles they face, news of interest for women in business, legal rights for women employees, and articles of general interest including how women entrepreneurs deal with organized crime.

### **Messages**

- Learn everything you can about your business before starting out.
- Evaluate your capacity for success. Education and experience are what you need to succeed.
- Stand up for your rights. Challenge unjust treatment in the work place.
- It's okay to make mistakes as long as you learn from them.
- Your activity can benefit others.
- Business isn't easy -- it takes careful planning investment and hard work.
- Do not squander profits. Reinvest them into your business.

While no focus groups were conducted, reader response was highly positive. The supplement led to the creation of a regional women's business association and stimulated local business growth. The project was commended by the city government.

## **Peoples Academy (Ufa)**

The People's Academy, a small-women owned firm in Ufa, Bashkortostan, produced a series of twelve 15-minute programs for local television (Tolpar). The program is seen by approximately 4 million viewers. Half of the local population is Bashkir and Tatar. The program featured studio discussion with experts in areas such as business plan development, obtaining credit and financing, law and banking. Interviews with local women entrepreneurs were included.

### **Messages**

- Entrepreneurs are people who take risk, and bear responsibility. Entrepreneurs must work within the appropriate framework of the law;
- Women can make an enormous contribution to the development of small business;

- Preparation is important before beginning a business. Advanced planning and experience in your chosen field are instrumental to success;
- A market economy creates opportunities for investment.

The program series was not focus group tested during the project.

## Youth

Two ROSCON pilot programs aimed at youth were produced by Norma Ltd. and Radio Yunost. Normal Ltd. of St. Petersburg produced 7 five-minute discussions between a father and son which were aired on Channel One (Ostankino). The programs covered issues such as: What is money? Can we live without money? What is inflation? How does the Treasury work? What kind of taxes are there? Why do we need foreign trade? Why do we need competition? A companion comic book was produced.

### Messages:

The series explained the origins of money, the causes of inflation and the types of taxes existing in Russia. Among the messages conveyed were:

- Money is the foundation of the economy.
- It is important to pay taxes to enable the state to protect its citizens.
- Russia should open to the world market gradually permitting imports while not threatening domestic production.
- Foreign trade increases the availability of consumer products.
- Competition stimulates quality output at reduced cost.

## Focus Groups

Focus groups were conducted in St. Petersburg in March 1994 to test the content of the Norma Ltd. series. Separate groups were conducted for students (13 to 15 years of age) and teachers. Films were used which addressed the following issues: money, inflation, taxes, and international competition.

The students showed maturity in their understanding of the basic concepts presented in the programs. While students were optimistic, teachers tended to see the situation in the country as difficult and were concerned about the future. Students understood the difference between business and speculation. Students tended to see the higher echelons of their government as corrupt and noted that Russia lags behind Western European countries in foreign trade. They

indicate that the Soviet period was one of stagnation that made people lazy. The students generally liked the programs noting their originality. Both students and teachers indicated that the programs help orient viewers to the new market economy.

Students watched the programs with interest with no distracting conversations. Teachers, by contrast, were mistrustful of the programs and often spontaneously exchanged opinion. Teachers paid more attention to ideological nuances. The father, for example, was thought to be a former military man because he had a "typical" shirt. The political implication of the son wearing a red tie was discussed.

Teachers tended to underestimate the level of understanding the students demonstrated of economic issues. While students were able to aptly discuss the concepts involved, teachers noted that more simple explanation is needed to make the issues understandable. They also felt that television alone is not an effective means of education -- that a teacher must be present to personally explain the concepts being covered. This attitude is reflective of the fact that television has rarely been used in Russia for education purposes. The concept itself is new and skeptically viewed by educators. Teachers also indicated that economics must be taught systematically -- step by step. Teachers also felt that specific principles have to be taught in context. They did not see an informational television spot as having educational value apart from its integration into a formal educational effort. Teachers, for example, noted that:

The movie may be used in the way to make the teacher's job more convenient. On one hand, the movie may be used as an illustration, on the other hand, it may be used to prove a point of view. By itself this movie is not necessary.

This is the teacher's skills when he/she will use the movie. The teacher can show it in parts, to set up discussions about the movie, to illustrate his/her information.

In this movie there are no explanatory subtitles, there are no explanatory or comparative diagrams to the presented terms. In other words, the movie cannot be considered as educational. It can be considered only as an illustrative movie. This movie needs a teacher. Prior to the movie and after it he/she will explain certain terms, certain graphs, tables, diagrams. All these things are needed for the lesson.

Teachers separated education and entertainment, noting that educational value is lost if a program is entertaining.

Teachers criticized the programs for not providing actual answers for questions such as, "what is money?" They also were critical of a slogan "money is freedom minted in metal," which they found to be political.

Students felt that the films helped them understand concepts such as value added tax and annuities. "I find these movies very useful," "I have learned the basics," were common remarks.

Cassettes of the programs were distributed to 500 Russian schools following the broadcast. A companion comic book was later issued.

The ROSCON-funded Radio Business Center began airing on Radio Yunost throughout the former Soviet Union on February 9, 1994. The 30-minute programs were broadcast twice a week offering practical advice, business news, education commentary and competitions. Profiles were featured from the history of economic thought portraying concepts such as mercantilism and physiocracy.

### **Focus Group**

On May 18, 1994, a focus group with young people (ages 18-25) was conducted in St. Petersburg to gauge attitudes and impressions of young people interested in business toward the Radio Yunost.

In general, participants found the broadcasts to be uninformative. They noted that information about business should be gleaned from books not radio.

Because Radio Yunost had been affiliated with the Komsomol (Communist Party Youth Organization), some participants automatically assumed that material was tainted. Former Party media organs (despite their wide listener/viewership) are not always effective choices to convey educational messages. EuropaPlus and Baltika Radio, for example, are most often listened to by focus group participants. Foreign media channels are more popular and more authoritative to Russians than local media channels.

The participants felt that the most popular formats for reaching youth through radio would be informative and entertaining interviews and discussions. The use of "clever and well-known people" would add to the credibility of a broadcast for this target group. Despite the generally negative views shared by participants, they nevertheless felt that the business center broadcast had potential and could be improved. It would be more effective, for example, not to use academicians and professors in the broadcasts but people from everyday life. Question and answer formats -- about everyday life economic situations would do well. Practical advice toward everyday problems and humor would enhance the quality of the broadcast. Concepts and information cannot be abstract but has to be grounded in everyday reality.

### **Farmers**

Seven weekly 15-minute programs titled Land and Freedom were developed for Channel 3 (TV Moscow). The series produced by the independent production company VICON began airing on October 19. The programs were targeted to people considering farming as a profession and to decision makers to highlight the problems faced by individual farmers.

### **Messages:**

- Russians have a special bond with the Earth that can help private farming succeed.
- Before the 1917 Revolution and despite the fact that private farming was only introduced in the early 20th century, Russia's 2 million private farmers turned the country into the "world's granary."
- Even though private farming is difficult in Russia, individual farmers can succeed.
- Enlisting support of rural communities is important to succeed as a private farmer. Farmers may have to provide facilities such as storage and processing services to local communities to become accepted.
- A more favorable psychological climate for private farming is needed.
- Finding creative ways to market farm produce can help offset losses from multiple taxation. Income from sales can be re-invested in production.
- Farmer cooperatives can help individual farmers solve problems.
- Agricultural development in Russia needs not only to allow people to farm as they wish but to give them the freedom to do so.

### **Focus Groups**

Focus groups were conducted with military reserve officers in Moscow and with collective and private farmers in Voronezh to gauge their attitudes to the messages presented.

In February 1993, 10 military reserve officers in Moscow reviewed three VICON programs. It was clear that military officers generally have very little information about opportunities that may be available for them in the farming sector. The officers felt that practical advice is needed on how to overcome the problems that private farmers face. Many officers are concerned about their own security as the military is downsized in Russia, yet few choose agriculture as a sector for their primary employment. They cited a number of constraining factors: lack of personal or family experience in agriculture, lack of necessary skills and qualifications, and lack of specialized expertise and practical information on how to do farming. Some indicated their lack of motivation for farming stems from the negative experience that relatives have had in this sector. Participants also indicated that, after age 20, it is difficult to start over in a new profession, particularly one that involves displacement such as moving to a rural area. Participants indicated that government guarantees and subsidies would be needed to encourage people to migrate to the villages and become farmers.

Most participants did not believe the VICON programs to be true. "It is illusion, a make-believe story," was a common view of the programs that focused on the stories of

agricultural entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, participants responded positively to the charismatic personality the private farmers portray. The difficulties they face elicited viewer sympathy. Participants did not find television a credible source of information and thought there was political motivation behind the programming. The focus group participants also noted that it was not possible for an individual to build a large scale private farming enterprise himself without the assistance of "certain government structures and possible collaboration with shady commercial groups." Questions were raised about the source of start up capital that the entrepreneurial farmers had obtained. Questions were raised about how they got credit for construction and purchase of equipment.

Additional focus groups were conducted in the Voronezh area testing the impact of the ROSCON funded agricultural series Land and Freedom on more rural audiences.

On April 8th and 9th, focus groups were conducted with farmers and former military personnel (private farmers) in the village of Korshevo, Borovsky Raion, Voronezh Oblast. Participating collective farmers were from the Lenin collective farm, now a limited partnership. The first two focus groups included farmers from the collective farm. The second two groups included former military personnel who had taken up farming as a vocation. Programs viewed by participants included the profile of a successful horse-breeder, case studies of farming entrepreneurs and a program on purchasing agricultural equipment.

The general consensus was that the programs were well targeted and that there was interest in continuing to see programs of this type on television. For former military personnel, the problems highlighted in the Land and Freedom series struck a particularly responsive chord as they can personally relate to the difficulties that face entrepreneurs involved in farming. The collective farmers, on the other hand, found the programs useful because they tended to profile the types of people with whom they have to deal as managers or bosses.

Collective farmers appear to be drawn to the past -- to the old non-threatening and stable order. They exhibit a hostility to wealth. The *kolkhoz* (collective farm) is idolized. Collective farmers, while singularly uninformed about the political process, tend to support leaders that remind them of the Communist past such as Zuganov, Rutskoi or Zhirinovskiy.

Collective farmer focus group participants are generally resigned to the economic situation in which they find themselves. They are not inclined to try to change or improve their circumstances. They fear responsibility and are willing to settle for very little. Dependence on the state is not only acceptable it is preferable. "I consider that it is like our father -- the State."

While most collective farmers find little satisfaction in their work, they note the collective creates a social environment in which they feel comfortable and content. Collective farmers acknowledge that both labor and local management on collective farms is largely ineffective. They tend to regard private farmers as cunning and clever (these concepts carry a negative connotation). They feel that private farmers tend to see themselves as superior to collective farmers. They see private farmers as exploiters of labor ("do you think I would bend my back for them. This is not farming, this is exploitation." "If he hires me, he exploits my labor.").

Collective farmers clearly have a problem working for an individual rather than a social unit. Collective farmers also see private farmers as "ideological saboteurs" -- individuals who threaten the established order by breaking up the collectives.

Collective farmers unilaterally note that what they like best about their work is "getting paid." They also tend to have not only a passive but pessimistic attitude toward the world around them. They idolize the past and see the future as becoming worse. "I think it will become worse. From day to day - worse, worse, worse."

The private farmers who were participants in the focus groups were largely from the army. Their values and attitudes differ markedly from those of collective farms who have spent their lives in rural areas. The private farmers tend to be better educated and share a sense of motivation and commitment to the alternative career choice they made -- farming.

As a result, their comments in the focus groups differ significantly from those of the collective farmers. The private farmers cite as their main priorities: achievement, independence, responsibility, results, the readiness to overcome difficulties and risk.

Private farmers note that what they like best about their jobs is "freedom," "independence," "the feeling of being a master and having property." One respondent said, "The harder the aim is, the more satisfaction when it is achieved."

Reasons cited for why private farmers took up agriculture include: thirst for land, fatigue with urban life, a longing to pass knowledge and property to their children. They are more prone than collective farmers to open up and communicate and work with other people. The private farmers acknowledge that often their knowledge base for agriculture is insufficient. They are more actively informed about the political situation in the country. The political sympathies of this group tend to be toward the reformist side (Russia's Choice, Yavlinsky, etc.).

Among the key problems faced by private farmers who were former military personnel are: psychological adaptation to the rural environment, the resolution of local conflicts with (collective farms and local authorities who incite the surrounding population against private farmers), acquiring initial capital and credits, storing, processing and selling produce, taxation, and crime, racketeering and extortion on the part of local authorities.

For collective farmers, by contrast, the key issue was psychological -- how to assess the moral character of a private farmer (a potential boss) and the private farmer's honesty toward employees.

Despite the fact that collective farmers have a generally negative attitude toward private farmers, the stories of the private farming entrepreneurs elicited much sympathy from the collective farmers. The presentation of concepts or messages through personal stories is, therefore, an effective means of reaching this audience.

The three programs featuring stories of entrepreneurs can all be considered to be successful. The focus group participants paid attention to the program, related to the

protagonists and recalled details well. The participants were less enthusiastic about the film that dealt with purchasing agricultural equipment.

The guarded attitude that collective farmers have toward private farmers can impact on the overall success of the farming movement in Russia. Appropriate programming on television could help overcome negative attitudes existing among collective farmers toward private farmers and to draw to farming those collective farmers who have an inclination to try to out on their own.

Recommendations for developing future agricultural programming in Russia include:

1. For Collective farmers who would be employed by private farmers:

- Show the "human face" of the private farmer including showing that the private farmer can engage in charitable or other socially beneficial work than can benefit the local population.
- De-emphasize programs that show problems in private farming. If problems are shown, offer solutions so as not to discourage people from private farming.
- Show private farmers as responsible people who care about the land they farm and who deal with their employees in an honest manner. Proper treatment of employees by a private farmer is a serious source of concern among collective farmers.
- Show diverse types of farming systems such as, for example, cooperatives.
- Show that private farmers usually have to invest their earned income back into the farm rather than to spend it on themselves.

2. For collective farmers who would consider becoming private farmers:

- Build programs around stories highlighting collective farmers who have become private farmers. Peer identification is important as collective farmers may harbor hostility toward individuals who have come from a more privileged environment.
- Focus not only on achievements but on the "formation" of the farmers, highlighting the developmental phases of how they made the transition from collective to private farming.
- Emphasize the details of the start up; there a common sentiment that it is much more difficult to start today than it was several years ago. Overcoming the initial fear is, therefore, very important.

136

3. For the private farmers already in business:
  - Address problems related to the processing and sale of agricultural products.
  - Highlight ways to make cooperation between farmers more efficient (cooperatives).
  - Discuss issues of land ownership and renting; and
  - address farmer concerns about security issues, racketeering and the extortion by local authorities providing advise on how farmers can work out ways of defending themselves.
4. For the private farmers just starting out:
  - Show how to work with the local population.
  - Explore how families from urban areas can best psychologically adapt to a rural environment.
  - Provide practical advise on how to get start up capital (credits).
  - Give practical tips of where and how to go for information.

### **Potential Jurors**

ROSCON provided support to the USAID-funded ARD/CHECCHI Rule of Law project to develop a series of video programs in collaboration with the Presidential Law Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation (GPU).

Three training films were produced on jury trials. The first, intended for television, is a short introduction to jury trials (which existed in Russia since the 1860s when they were introduced by Alexander II but were abolished when the Bolsheviks came to power). The second program addresses itself to potential jurors and will be shown prior to the beginning of the jury selection process. Program three has been developed for jurors who have been selected to sit on the jury. Programs two and three deal with the specifics of jury trials, with the duties and the responsibilities of jurors. Their aim is to inform and explain in detail to new jurors what a jury trial is, who its participants are, what the jury's role is, and what jurors can expect in the course of the trial. The second and third programs are to be used in courthouses throughout Russia. The fourth program is an hour-long documentary for airing on Russian national television. Focusing on an actual jury trial, it deals with the history of jury trials in Russia from Alexander II through the Soviet period to the present. Calling on a number of distinguished jurists, it deals with trials and sentencing during the Soviet period; with "judicial mistakes," miscarriages of justice; with the conditions in so-called holding jails, where

defendants are often held for long periods during the investigation of their case. The program makes the case for the widest possible use of jury trials throughout Russia.

## **Focus Groups**

Two focus groups were conducted in Kalmykia to determine the level, knowledge and attitude toward jury trials. One group included participants over 30 years of age. The second consisted of individuals 20-30 years of age. All participants reacted favorably to the concept of jury trials and conveyed information was generally understood. Participants even recalled a jury trial that had taken place in Saratov earlier in the year. Participants indicated that the jury trial is an important step to establishing rule of law and a foundation for a democratic society. The younger group tended to be more critical about the concepts conveyed. Participants would have preferred to see more opinions of a wider diversity of people expressed about the efficacy of jury trials. Younger viewers wanted to see more concrete examples and elaboration of the experience of jury trials in Western countries. They also wanted to hear the opinion of young people and noted that the whole jury selection process appears to be contrived.

Older audience groups demonstrate more tolerance to "monologues" by officials in large part because they have been exposed to them longer than younger viewers. Key questions raised touched on the moral and ethical responsibility borne by jurors in deciding on a verdict.

All expressed concern about how jury trials would be conducted in areas where there are predominantly minority populations -- such as in Kalmykia where clan relationships and other strong traditional ties exist and can affect juror objectivity.

Two-thirds of the younger participants did not want to serve as jurors, considering the job to be difficult and very responsible. More than half of the participants indicated that jurors should have some legal training. The participants considered the films to be highly effective as an information source on jury trials and indicated that the films should be distributed as broadly as possible.

Older participants had mixed feelings about the jury trial. Half noted that the jury system is an important component of a democratic system. Half indicated that verdicts are really reached based on feelings, but that the system was a good one nevertheless because a group of people, rather than an individual, holds responsibility for the verdict.