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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1994

BURUNDI

"OUR DEEPEST DESIRE, IS THAT ALL BURUNDIAN PEOPLE WOULD BE SAFE FROM ETHNIC CONFRONTATIONS FOREVER. WE WANT THAT IN EVERY FAMILY, VILLAGE, COMMUNE AND PROVINCE, SCHOOL AND BARRACK, THERE WILL BE NO MORE BLOODSHED CAUSED BY ETHNIC CONFRONTATIONS. THAT IS THE THEME SHARED BY ALL BURUNDIAN PEOPLE."

(Burundi President Melchior Ndadaye - Sept., 1993)

BUJUMBURA
March 1995.

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ACRONYMS

ACSI	African Child Survival Initiative
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APA	AIDS prevention Activity
BEST	Burundi Enterprise Support and Training Project
BHSS	Burundi Health Systems Support
BPP	Burundi Population Project
BPRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
BUHRD	Burundi Human Resources Development Project
CARITAS	Christian Caritative Organization
CCCD	Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Confédération des Syndicats du Burundi
DHA	Direct Humanitarian Assistance
ERP	Emergency Recovery Program
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
FFP	Food For Peace
GRB	Government of the Republic of Burundi
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPN	Health, Population, Nutrition
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association
IDS	International Development Strategy
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LPVO	Local PVO
MOH	Ministry of Health
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without borders)
NCBA	National Cooperative Business Association
NDI	National Democratic Institution
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OE	Operating Expenses
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PFP	Policy Framework Paper
PO	Project Outcome
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
REMODRA	Refonte et Modernisation du Droit des Affaires
RFP	Request for Proposal
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
SAF	Structural Adjustment Facility
SO	Strategic Objective
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
STTA	Short Term Technical Advisor
TAACS	Technical Advisor for AIDS and Child Survival
TCN	Third Country National
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commission for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSRG	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General
UPRONA	Union pour le Progrès National
USDAUS	Department of Agriculture
UTB	Union des Travailleurs du Burundi
WFP	World Food Program

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT (FY 1994)* USAID/BURUNDI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background: The Political Crisis.

Since 1966 when Burundi was declared a republic, it has been plagued by ethnic violence. For the past 30 years Burundi has been ruled by the military which is largely composed of the Tutsi minority ethnic group which has had a continued domination over the majority Hutu people. However, during the past half-decade, under the leadership of Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi), Burundi established a National Unity Charter, a democratic constitution and a multi-party political system. In June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu) became Burundi's first democratically-elected President and his FRODEBU Party won a large majority in the first democratic National Assembly. In October 1993, elements of the military attempted to take power by forceful means resulting in the killing of the President and other senior government officials. The results of this attempted coup have been catastrophic to the social, economic and political fabric of the nation. Six hundred and fifty thousand Burundians fled to neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaïre; another one hundred and fifty thousand people, mostly Tutsi, sought safety in schools, churches, and military camps inside Burundi; and between six and nine hundred thousand Hutu peasants hid in the hillsides and valleys throughout the country. The situation was aggravated by the death of Ndadaye's successor in April 1994, when the plane he and the president of Rwanda were aboard crashed mysteriously. In October, 1994 a coalition government was formed, called the Convention of Government, which provided a power sharing arrangement between the FRODEBU Party, UPRONA, and the dozen minority extremist parties. Since the beginning of 1995, however, this fragile coalition has been steadily eroded by extremist pressure. During the same period tension and violent incidents have increased.

Economic and Social Impact of the Political Crisis.

With 50% of the GDP coming from agricultural production and both private and small industrial enterprises making up for another 20%, the economy of Burundi is very sensitive to political and social changes, especially for the rural population where most of the activities are carried out. The growth of the GDP which rose from 3.5% in 1990 to 5.0% in 1991 dropped acutely to 2.7% in 1992, down to -5.7% in 1993 and to -9.0% by 1994 as a result of the instability.

Perennial problems were exacerbated by the October 1993 crisis, with women and children being the most vulnerable victims. While epidemics continued to spring up, health service

* This impact report will be limited to activities over the past 18 months; i.e., humanitarian assistance (HA) and promotion of dialogue and reconciliation. It must be emphasized that the activities related to democracy and governance (DG) are, at the moment, not aimed at institutional changes but rather to reconciliation and mitigation of the situation.

deteriorated with most health center staff fleeing or being killed and a large number of health units vandalized, looted or completely destroyed. The education sector suffered a similar blow. Over 300 teachers were killed while several thousand fled. Moreover, many schools were closed and transformed into camps to house the displaced. Thousands of women have been widowed, most of them with small children. The "affected" population (i.e., those in direct need of emergency assistance) has varied in size from 0.5 to 1.5 million. The immediate needs of the affected population were food, water, shelter, sanitation and protection from the spread of disease.

Through the first half of 1994 a trend emerged of humanitarian assistance replacing development aid, as bilateral cooperation was slowed down or suspended due to the prevailing insecurity, and non-governmental and international agencies provided services directly to the stricken population. The fragile political and security situation dictated the re-alignment of USAID's strategy to meet current demands. Essential human needs had to be provided and restoration of peace and stability had to precede economic development. USAID's developmental program had therefore to be limited to a primary focus on humanitarian relief, and reconciliation activities.

USAID Response.

USAID/Burundi has directed its efforts to mitigate and to minimize the effects of the crisis. In late November 1993, the mission submitted a revised strategic plan for Burundi which was accepted by AID/W. The objective to promote democracy and good governance (DG) was shifted from a target of opportunity to the primary mission strategic objective. Activities under the other strategic objectives of economic development and improved health and population planning were suspended except as they had relevance to immediate humanitarian relief needs. The immediate objective of the USAID sponsored DG activities was geared towards bringing opposing sides together and promoting non-violent solutions within a framework of respect for democratic institutions. At the same time, USAID programs sought to provide a support network for moderates who were increasingly coming under attack. USAID was the first major donor to provide on-the-ground programs for dialogue and reconciliation activities. In the area of humanitarian assistance (HA) the mission provided food, health, water and shelter for over 1,500,000 affected persons (displaced, dispersed and refugees). In total, contributions for humanitarian assistance in Burundi from US Government sources through the end 1994 amounted to \$79,615,705.

Program Impact.

Although USAID/Burundi has operated its programs since 1977, much of its achievements were destroyed by the effects of the crisis. Recent democratic gains have been severely set back by killings and polarization, while previous economic gains have been nullified by the disruptions to labor in the agricultural and industrial sectors, destruction of property, and loss of confidence by entrepreneurs and investors.

The major impact of USAID's humanitarian activities can be seen in the absence of malnutrition and the low morbidity (3/10,000) and infant mortality (1/10,000) rates for the affected population, despite the destruction and devastation of the past 18 months. In the democracy/governance sphere impact is impossible to quantify. The fact that Burundi has

survived this difficult 18 month period and not degenerated into a "Rwanda like" situation has been credited by observers such as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (UNSRSG) to USAID's pivotal role in quickly putting in place mechanisms to promote dialogue and reconciliation.

The style of the DG program is consultative with a major focus on NGOs, civic bodies and democratic institutions. **The main thrust has been, and will continue to be, on reconciliation through dialogue** which will pave the way for a chance to empower individuals and institutions to advocate and support positive change. A major concern of our DG program for the immediate future is ensuring the establishment of an equitable, functioning justice system and dealing with the problem of impunity. While Burundi is on a transition course to peace and democratic civil rule, the USG will continue to give humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The aim of the HA program will continue to be saving of lives, reduction of human suffering and restoration of self-sufficiency. These will be achieved through timely delivery of disaster relief, establishment of short-term food production programs for self sufficiency recovery and rehabilitation, along with the operation of an emergency child survival assistance program. A major mission thrust will be rehabilitation of the rural economy through the development of local NGOs, associations and micro-enterprises.

I. SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USAID PROGRAM

POLITICAL FACTORS

Since 1966 when Burundi was declared a republic, it has been plagued by ethnic violence. For the past 30 years it has been ruled by the military to ensure continued domination of the majority Hutu people by the minority Tutsi. However, during the late 1980's and early 1990's, under the leadership of Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi), Burundi established a National Unity Charter, a democratic constitution and a multi-party political system. In June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu) became Burundi's first democratically-elected President and his FRODEBU Party won a large majority (67%) in the first democratic National Assembly. A remarkably smooth transition took place on July 10 with much seemingly genuine good-will and cooperation by all elements of society and Government, including the military. President Ndadaye went to great lengths to ensure harmony by naming many Tutsis to his Cabinet and other posts including that of Prime Minister — the first woman to that post in Burundi's history.

In October 1993, elements of the military attempted to take power by forceful means resulting in the killing of the President, several cabinet ministers and senior government officials. The results of this attempted coup have been catastrophic to the social, economic and political fabric of the nation. The military actions set off a cycle of violence throughout the country. The Hutu's initial reaction was the random killing of Tutsi. Some military elements then took reprisals against local Hutu populations. Six hundred and fifty thousand Burundians fled to neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaïre; another one hundred and fifty thousand people, mostly Tutsi, sought safety in schools, churches, and military camps inside Burundi; and between six and nine hundred thousand Hutu peasants hid in the hillsides and valleys throughout the country.

The donor and world community, including the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity condemned the coup and gave unequivocal support to the deposed democratically elected Government. Many donors including the United States, France and Belgium suspended their assistance programs. The military leadership soon disavowed any responsibility or connivance in the attempted coup and called on the remnants of the Ndadaye Government to return to lead the country. From the onset of the crisis, the multilateral and bilateral donors to Burundi have shown strong support for the civilian Government and have attempted to address Burundi's humanitarian needs.

The situation was further aggravated by the death of Ndadaye's interim successor in April 1994, when the plane he and the president of Rwanda were aboard crashed mysteriously. In October, 1994, after a period of increased tension, a coalition government was formed. The new arrangement, called the Convention of Government, provided a power sharing arrangement between the FRODEBU Party, UPRONA, and the dozen minority extremist parties. Since the beginning of 1995, however, this fragile coalition has been steadily eroded by extremist pressure. During the same period tension and violent incidents have increased. The constitutional reforms strengthening democracy and human rights have largely been eroded as extremists of both major ethnic groups hampered new power sharing arrangements.

ECONOMY

The agricultural sector, which accounts for about 50% of the country's GDP, has suffered losses, primarily in the areas of livestock, food crop production and forestry. The livestock population has been reduced by about 10%, while food production in 1994 is estimated to have declined by about 17%. For the first time, Burundi has to rely on large-scale food aid to meet its needs. Uncontrolled exploitation by refugees and displaced persons has recently exacerbated the destruction of woodland forests, estimated conservatively at 20,000 ha. The private sector, the main engine in Burundi's strategy for export-led economic growth, was severely affected by the crisis. In urban areas, the level of business confidence declined sharply and private investment came to a standstill due to security concerns. In rural areas, many entrepreneurs lost some or all of their stocks and equipment. Preliminary estimates assess the destruction of business property during the crisis at about US \$20 million (equivalent to 10% of the national budget). Small scale enterprises were hit particularly hard.

Prior to the political crisis, Burundi had one of Africa's better economic track records under the Structural Adjustment Program, started in 1986 and supported by three Structural Adjustment Credits from the Bank as well as Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangements with the IMF. From 1991 - 93 Burundi was demonstrating significant progress in private sector programs and reforms. The country successfully implemented monetary and foreign exchange policy reforms but encountered difficulties in limiting the role of the public sector and reducing the fiscal deficit. Following the outbreak of severe disturbances, real GDP declined by 16% and the cost of living increased by 28% (1994 data compared to 1992 levels). Over the same period, government revenue fell by 35% in real terms due to the decline in business activity and the collapse of external budgetary assistance. This brought about a fiscal crisis and the accumulation of government arrears. By mid-September 1994, arrears exceeded the equivalent of US \$20 million, including US \$6 million to external creditors. A number of enterprises that had not been paid by the government were unable to service their debts to commercial banks, which, in turn, had to borrow from the Central Bank.

SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The "affected" population (i.e., those in direct need of emergency assistance) has varied in size from .5 to 1.5 million, depending, at any time, on the political situation in Rwanda and Burundi. These include the internally displaced Burundians since the assassination of President Ndadaye in October, 1993 (those in camps, those dispersed in the hills and valleys who fear coming to the camps, and those who fled to Rwanda and then had to return), and Rwandan refugees dating back to the Habyarimana regime as well as newer refugees after the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in July 1994. The immediate needs of the affected population was food, water, shelter, sanitation and protection from the spread of disease. During the year after Ndadaye's assassination, food production declined by over 17% causing a food deficit of 650,000 metric tons (mt). Tens of thousands of homes and acres of productive land and forests were destroyed. Most of Burundi's 230 primary health care clinics were destroyed or made inoperable because of losses - including loss of personnel. Overcrowded camp conditions, particularly at the onset of the crisis, created a ripe environment for the spread of dysentery and other opportunistic diseases.

Through the first half of 1994 a trend emerged of humanitarian assistance replacing development aid, as bilateral cooperation was slowed down or suspended due to the prevailing insecurity, and non-governmental agencies provided services directly to the stricken population. Another trend emerged during the second half of the year, as some of the NGOs have completed their emergency program, and moved out of Burundi and on to the next emergency, leaving large gaps in the provision of humanitarian assistance which the government authorities are obviously unable to fill. Still another trend has emerged over the past several months, as NGOs and international organizations try to pre-position resources and systems to deal with potential future emergency needs.

Perennial problems have been exacerbated by the crisis, with women and children being the most vulnerable victims. The annual dysentery epidemic, which lasts from October through January was especially virulent in 1993/1994, with ten times the usual number of cases being registered. During that same period, malaria, which is endemic in the lowlands, has caused high levels of morbidity in the lowlands and high levels of mortality in the latter. Lack of shelter and clothing or blankets among the displaced aggravate the incidence of acute respiratory infections. High incidence of STDs have been registered in displaced camps, a likely precursor of higher incidence of HIV which was already dramatically high, especially in urban areas.

National health programs have suffered seriously. Health service staff have been killed or have fled from health centers and a large number of health units have been vandalized, looted or completely destroyed. A survey undertaken by UNICEF in May and June 1994 indicated that of the 270 health centers in Burundi, 13% were closed. Worse, of those remaining open, only about 30% had most of the essential drugs in stock. This was not due to a lack of drugs at the central level, but mainly to the serious gap in distribution, created by insecurity, inadequate transport and an acute fuel shortage. Lack of essential equipment, such as refrigerators, further complicated the picture. Another problem resulted from the fact that up to 15% of medical staff in Burundi is of Rwandan origin. After the victory of the RPF, most of these Rwandan Tutsi returned to Rwanda. As a result, some hospitals are being closed due to lack of doctors and nurses. Moreover, the continuous insecurity throughout the countryside has discouraged many parents, even those not directly affected by the violence, from taking their children to health centers. As a result, vaccination plummeted from around 80% in October 1993 to an estimated 20% in June 1994. Some ground has been recovered since then due to intensive actions taken by the Ministry of Health and strongly supported by UNICEF. Presently, about 50% of the children born after October 1993 have been immunized.

The education sector suffered a similar blow. Over 300 teachers were killed while a few thousands fled. Moreover, many schools were transformed into camps to house the displaced. Some are still being occupied. Though 80% of primary schools have reopened, their functioning is hindered by the lack of equipment. As with the health sector, the Rwandan brain-drain is also greatly affecting the school system. In some provinces, entire schools are being closed. Concerns of security further hamper school attendance, particularly for secondary schools, many of which have had incidents of ethnic violence. As a result of all these factors, the net enrollment rate dropped from 52% in 1993 to an estimated 40%. UNICEF funded the training of 1,300 new teachers, in an effort to limit the impact of the crisis on the educational system.

Until the events of October, 1993 Burundi was food self-sufficient. The situation has deteriorated since. Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread in Burundi. Endemic goiter resulting from iodine deficiency affects as many as 50 percent of primary school age girls. Iron deficiency is common among pregnant women (in the Imbo plains up to 80 percent of pregnant women showed signs of anaemia). As a result of the fighting, thousands of women have been widowed, most of them with small children at their charge. The medium term objective is to organize money-generating activities which will allow their total reintegration in society.

EMERGING CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

As a result of ethnic violence and political instability, Burundi has witnessed a serious erosion of international confidence in its future. The crisis in Burundi has had a negative impact on production and trade activities, public finances, external transaction accounts and the social sectors. By the end of 1993, the estimated downturn of Burundi's rate of economic growth was 5.7 percent. According to initial estimates, the economy may have reached an estimated negative growth rate of 9% percent in 1994 due to the slowdown in overall economic activity during the first five months of the year.

Foreign investment has dried up. Many in the expatriate business community are selling out and leaving. In 1994 output has declined markedly. The more than 1.5 million Burundians were displaced, combined with disruptions to the distribution systems caused a 17% decline in food production. Production decreased for almost the entire small industrial sector, which accounts for 14% of the GDP for 1994 and is estimated at 11% for 1995. With good rains and the return of most of the affected population (now less than .5 million), the food situation appears to be near normal for 1995. However, continued tension and insecurity will continue to depress economic development. The private sector is still facing depressed demand, a lack of new orders, and is unable to meet debt obligations to banks. Many firms are selling off assets to cover past losses. Many firms, as well as banks, face bankruptcy.

Burundi's foreign debt is over one billion dollars and debt servicing consumes one-half of its foreign-exchange earnings. The tax base is down approximately 18 percent from the pre-crisis period. Short-term growth prospects are limited by the heavy debt-service burden and concerns for personal security that continue to impede daily commercial activity. Political instability has prevented the government from negotiating a new IMF agreement, which is a condition for future multilateral financial assistance. In short, the political instability of the past 18 months has severely weakened the economy of Burundi.

The government intention to continue its policies of prudent economic management are being severely tested in an atmosphere of continual political and security crises. The GRB's objectives for 1995 are to reduce the inflation rate to 10% from 17% in 1994, and increase real GDP by 10% (to a level that would remain 8% below that of 1992). The government intends to restrict the budget deficit to a level that is compatible with the inflation target and the private sector's credit requirements. Moreover, net foreign exchange reserves would be kept at their end-1993 level, to provide a comfortable cushion against unforeseen shocks. Despite these sensible policies, the budgetary situation is expected to remain tight for the remainder of 1995 - particularly if all arrears are to be cleared - because of rehabilitation needs; especially in the social sectors. The World Bank estimated cost for reconstruction in

the amount of US \$ 87 million, broken down into 87% for housing, 4.5% for public infrastructure (building, bridges, roads, health centers, schools and water fountains) and 8.5% for private businesses (commerce and handcrafts).

Mindful of its medium term development objectives, the government invited the IMF and IDA in September 1994 to assist them in designing a macro-economic framework for 1994 and 1995. The government's broad strategy was outlined subsequently by the Minister of Finance during a donor's meeting in Paris on September 28, 1994. The main objectives are to restore internal security in order to halt the deterioration of the economic situation and establish a sound basis for an upturn in economic activity. In February 1995, another IMF mission visited Burundi to prepare the ground for a possible ESAF program. The policies envisaged to resume the economic reform process has been outlined by the authorities in a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) covering the period 1995 through 1997, to be agreed with the Bretton Woods institutions around mid 1995. Again, however, it must be emphasized that much of the GRB's good intentions are falling by the way-side because of continual political/security crises.

Profound and extremely complicated issues remain at the core of Burundi's problems. These include questions of land tenure, which have been complicated by claims of previous occupants sporadically forced off their land over the past 35 years; the need to punish the "putschists" of October 1993, the tinders of violence that occurred afterwards, as well as crimes committed in previous incidents of ethnic violence; recognition of the rights of the poor majority, as well as minorities; and a critical need for a fair, impartial, functioning system of justice. The judicial system will require particular attention. Polarization in the society, ineffective uses of the system and shortages of well trained lawyers and magistrates as well as an antiquated record-keeping system result in delays and errors in processing cases.

MAJOR USAID MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Following the events of April 1994 and the insecurity that ensued, the USG responded by suspending the development programs and ordering an evacuation of most of the American staff leaving only the necessary core. In October, 1994 dependents and non-essential personnel were allowed to return to Bujumbura. In March, 1995 dependents were again evacuated. As can be seen in the chart below, the numbers of direct hire personnel, as well as contractors was reduced by more than half of the previous totals.

Staff

	Total	American DH	PSC	FSN	CONTRACTORS
FY 1992	66	8	2	46	10
FY 1993	76	10	3	53	10
FY 1994	74	5	3	64	2

Budget (OE)

	Approved	Trust Fund	Total
FY 1992	895,000	520,000	1,415,000
FY 1993	1,315,000	1,211,600	2,526,600
FY 1994	985,000	485,000	1,470,000

Burundi's political crisis has created several significant problems for the USAID Mission which will probably worsen in the next fiscal year:

1. Foremost is the decline of staff productivity caused by insecurity. While only one USAID local employee (a night guard) has lost his life due to the political violence, all local employees have lost family members during the bloodbath that took place in October/November, 1993. Many local employees have also lost their homes during the various "ethnic cleansing" operations in Bujumbura. Often employees will not appear for several days because of security concerns. Often employees are pre-occupied with security related concerns;
2. Direct hire staff, which was reduced from 10 to 5, is severely stretched with consequent vulnerability concerns. Both DG and HA are labor/management intensive programs. The re-establishment of development activities in health, and micro-enterprise/rural development will further stretch scarce management and control resources. Not unexpectedly, it has been difficult to find replacements for direct hires as well as contractors.
3. At this writing it appears that the Mission will not receive \$750,000 in trust funds from the GRB for FY95/96. This is because it is unlikely that the GRB will meet the conditions precedent for the BEPP Program. This funding loss will have to be supplemented by dollar appropriations if significant cuts in operations and personnel are to be prevented.

CHANGES MADE IN THE MISSION STRATEGY

The fragile political and security situation dictated that the USAID/Burundi strategy be re-aligned to meet the current reality. Restoration of peace and stability had to precede economic development. USAID's developmental program had therefore to be limited to a primary focus on humanitarian relief, and democracy/governance activities.

In December, 1992 USAID/Burundi's approved CPSP focused on two strategic objectives: 1) Increase in the modern contraceptive prevalence rate; and 2) Increase value of private agricultural related production for domestic and export markets. Improved democratic governance was identified as a target of opportunity.

The attempted coup led to USAID/W's immediate suspension of the USAID/Burundi

program (State 321988) pending a determination by State Department as to whether the Provisions of Section 508 of the FY 1994 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act (FAA) and identical prior year provisions were triggered. The cable directed USAID/Burundi "not to make any obligation, expenditure or disbursement of any funds for assistance to Burundi, or give approvals which could lead to such actions by third parties without prior consultation with AID/W". This directive coupled with the immediate effects of the attempted coup created a heightened sense of urgency for the Mission to assist in the emergency humanitarian relief efforts. A Mission Emergency Relief Committee was formed and Mission staff was mobilized to assess the extent of the destruction and develop appropriate mechanisms to provide the needed assistance. Mission staff has spent a great deal of time planning the emergency relief, and assessing and monitoring the situation with Government officials, other donors, church leaders, relief agencies and other NGOs/PVOs. With the Declaration of Disaster by the U.S. Embassy, OFDA made available to USAID/Burundi US\$25,000 for immediate assistance. REDSO/ESA Regional Food for Peace, and Regional Disaster Relief Coordinator have assisted the Mission in assessing the humanitarian needs and have cabled recommendations to USAID/W for immediate and follow-up action.


II. REVISED STRATEGIC GOAL, SUB-GOALS, OBJECTIVES, PROGRAM OUTPUTS AND INDICATORS

Due to the events of October 1993 and its aftermath USAID/Burundi, in late November 1993, submitted a revised strategic plan for Burundi which was accepted by AID/W. The objective to promote democracy and good governance was shifted from a target of opportunity to one of the two primary mission strategic objectives. Activities under the other strategic objectives of economic development and improved health and population planning were suspended except as they had relevance to immediate humanitarian relief needs. The immediate objective of the USAID sponsored DG activities was geared towards bringing opposing sides together and promote non-violent solutions within a framework of respect for democratic institutions. At the same time, USAID programs sought to provide a support network for moderates who were increasingly coming under attack.

The style of the DG program is consultative with a major focus on NGOs, civic bodies and democratic institutions. The main thrust has been, and will continue to be, on reconciliation through dialogue which will pave the way for a chance to engage efforts on empowering the institutions to be able to advocate and support positive change. The Burundi Democracy and Governance Program/Project was recently amended to finance programs implemented by the National Democratic Institute that would increase dialogue and consensus among diverse groups; strengthen civic groups, local associations and human rights organizations and strengthen the functioning of democratic institutions. In FY94, the D/G project was further amended to include short term activities implemented by U.N. Agencies to encourage human rights, e.g. the UNHCHR \$3.5 million proposal to send human rights monitors to northern Burundi, tolerance for ethnic and political differences that would encourage peace and reconciliation, e.g., the UNICEF \$4.0 million proposal to revise the curriculum in all public schools to reflect ethnic tolerance, and to improve the legal environment and support judicial reform.

While the need exists, the USG will continue to give humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The aim of the HA program will continue to be saving of lives, reduction of human suffering and restoration of self-sufficiency. These will be achieved through timely delivery of disaster relief, establishment of short-term food production programs for self sufficiency and the operation of an emergency child survival assistance program. The HPN Program in Burundi consists primarily of the Burundi Health Systems Support Project (BHSS, 695-0128), which was designed to consolidate other activities which were terminating, including the provision of a TAACS advisor, the Burundi Population Project (BPP) implemented by Pathfinder, and the AIDS Prevention Activity (APA) project implemented by Population Services International. In response to the crisis, USAID is utilizing BHSS resources to provide immediate health needs in collaboration with other donors. The APA was beginning to gain momentum in the sale of condoms and provision of information on AIDS. Given the significance of AIDS in Burundi, this project is continuing on a smaller scale with one instead of two advisors. The APA will benefit from the procurement of contraceptives through the Central Contraceptive Procurement activity, initiated with a \$500,000 OYB transfer in FY93. The Burundi Economic Support and Training project will re-focus its activities to promote the rehabilitation of rural commerce and small scale enterprise, as well as promote the rural micro-enterprise.

Fig 1: REVISED OBJECTIVE TREE FOR USAID/BURUNDI (NOV. 1993)



The indicators for each of these components have been slightly revised to make a more realistic set with readily available (or easily collectable) data. The following table displays the current set of indicators:

Objective	Indicators
GOAL Improved quality of life for all Burundi's people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Per capita GDP ● Average life expectancy ● Infant mortality rate ● Child mortality rate ● Average education level ● Literacy level
SUB-GOAL 1 Save lives, reduce suffering and restore self-sufficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # deaths caused by crisis ● # crisis refugees resettled ● Food production deficit/surplus ● Nutritional status of children below 5
SO 1 Provide short-term humanitarian assistance and aid post crisis transition to normalcy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● National disaster plan in place ● All USAID relief food transported and distributed on a timely manner ● Malnutrition, morbidity and infant mortality rate for affected populations at normal levels
PO 1.1 Timely delivery of disaster relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● % of needs food met ● % of crisis refugees sheltered ● % of concentration camps with regular water and sanitation ● % displaced with access to reliable medical services ● % of camps with schooling services
PO 1.2 Establish basic food self-sufficiency through short-term agricultural programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # of people fed by gender ● Volume of seeds provided ● Quantity of tools provided ● Volume of fertilizers provided
PO 1.3 Provide emergency child survival assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Immunization coverage ● Prevalence of diarrheal diseases ● Acute nutritional status of children ● Low birth weight prevalence
PO 1.4 Provide emergency health services (BHSS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # persons per medical doctor ● # persons per trained nurse ● % essential drug types available ● % reached with health education services
PO 1.5 Rehabilitation /Recovery Micro-enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # Rural enterprise that restarted ● % of commercial activity (compared to 1992)
SUB-GOAL 2 Enhance Democracy and Governance	<p>Evidence of increased/strengthened :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Democratic institutions ● Peaceful conflict resolution ● Human rights ● Local involvement in government ● Transparency and responsiveness of elected officials
SO 2 Promote dialogue and reconciliation within a framework of democratic institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # of political parties ● # media outlets ● Amount of meaningful competition in election

<p><u>PO 2.1</u> Support development of civic groups, local associations and human rights organizations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # civic groups ● # local associations ● # labor unions ● # business organizations
<p><u>PO 2.2</u> Strengthen the functioning of democratic institutions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● # parliamentary interest groups ● # multi-ethnic political parties ● # political parties with definite platforms
<p><u>PO 2.3</u> Improve legal environment and support judicial reforms</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reform of legal codes relating to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● commerce ● land tenure ● women rights ● # public law firms ● # courts in Bujumbura & outside ● # cases by criminal, traffic & civil ● Case turnover rate
<p><u>PO 2.4</u> Increase dialogue among diverse groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Evidence of multi-ethnic dialogue increasing in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● study and discussion groups ● media campaigns ● parliamentary debates ● local integrated committees
<p><u>PO 2.5</u> Provide training for political leadership</p>	<p>Evidence of improved political leadership</p>
<p><u>PO 2.6</u> Strengthen network and support for political moderates</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regularity of fora (workshops, seminars, meetings, exchange visits, etc) ● Evidence of team work ● Mass education activities ● # political moderates associations

III. PROGRESS TOWARDS OVERALL PROGRAM GOAL AND SUB-GOALS

THE GOAL OF THE USAID/BURUNDI MISSION IS IMPROVED QUALITY OF LIFE FOR ALL BURUNDI'S PEOPLE.

Burundi has a current GDP per capita of \$170. The subsistence agriculture sector which employs the majority of the population and the country was estimated to be 96% food self-sufficient before the outbreak of the crisis. However, with an estimated annual population growth rate of 2.8% and the second highest population density in Africa (after Rwanda), Burundi faces an uncertain future. Total production in the agricultural sector which accounts for up to 50% of the GDP has been decreasing over the recent years mainly due to population pressure, soil degradation and political instability. The crisis has also adversely affected the growth in the private and small industry sectors that together contribute 20% of the GDP. The combined effect is a drop in the GDP growth rate which rose from 3.5% in 1990 to 5.0% in 1991 then dropped to 2.7%, -5.7% and -9.0% in 1992, 1993 and 1994 respectively.

Life expectancy is currently at 51 years up from 48.5 in 1990. Malaria is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality within the country and is showing a steady increase among all ages within the population. Diarrheal disease is the leading cause of mortality among children zero to four years of age. Morbidity and mortality due to immunizable childhood diseases has significantly decreased during the past seven years, partly due to the impact of a successful Expanded Program of Immunization. The overall child mortality rate increased from 175/1000 in 1991 to a peak of 192/1000 in 1992 and then stabilized at 183 and 182/1000 in 1993 and 1994. HIV/AIDS has become a major threat to the improvement of health standards in Burundi. Among sexually active 15-44 year old, the rate of HIV infection is 15.2 percent in Bujumbura, 14.7 percent in the semi-urban provincial areas, and 0.7 percent in rural areas. The age and gender distribution is similar to other African countries. Women are infected at younger ages and at higher levels than men.

The literacy rate is very low, 70 percent of the adult population (15+) has no education while half of all adult men and two-thirds of adult women cannot read printed Kirundi, the national language. Although the gross enrollment rate had climbed to 76 percent of the primary school age population by 1991, overcrowding and lack of qualified teachers has caused a deterioration of the quality of primary education; with the result that literacy is not necessarily achieved through a primary-school education. Furthermore, because the secondary education system is severely restricted, less than ten percent of 6th-year students go on to secondary school and only a fraction of these eventually receive college diplomas.

The larger problem is the consequent lack of employment skills among the burgeoning youth population. Technical and vocational schools - with a few exceptions - are generally inadequate in transferring practical skills, and the university system tends to produce graduates whose training is not relevant to the needs of the labor market. For example, in 1992, less than 15% percent of university students were in the agronomy department - this in a country where over 90 percent of effective employment is agriculturally based. The table below shows the trends in some of the socio-economic indicators. The secondary school and university system is characterized by an inequitable distribution of resources along ethnic lines.

Sub-Goal 2: Enhance Democracy and Governance

Following the decision to concentrate on reconciliation, the USAID/Burundi's DG strategy made the following contributions:

- Made Grants to NDI, UN Special Representative, and UNHCHR in order to undertake activities which encourage dialogue between opposing groups and exposure of Burundians to democratic procedures (seminars, works-shops, sport events, youth camps, study tours...).
- Trained parliamentarians in order to understand their roles in enhancing democracy
- Made Grants to organizations involved in Humanitarian Assistance for Refugees and Displaced People (ADRA, C.R.S., WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF...).
- Trained journalists to encourage the role of free press in democracy
- Supported Local NGO/PVO organizations to increase mass participation in the democratic process
- Funded UN agencies on programs to integrate reconciliation in the education system

The following table outlines the achievements as given by the impact indicators

IV. PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

SO 1: *Provide short-term humanitarian assistance and aid post crisis transition to normalcy.*

Food aid

The US government has contributed to \$ 63,937,100 in food aid to Burundi since the present crisis started in October 1993. Food for Peace (FFP) has supplied 61,130 MT of food in FY94 and FY95 to date. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) supplied 27,000 MT in FY93 and FY94. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided funding for local purchase of food. The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) received a small grant at the onset of the crisis since they were immediately operational on the ground.

Health and other Non-food assistance

The US government has contributed \$3 million to help with immediate medical care in the aftermath of the crisis. OFDA has made grants to Médecins Sans Frontières/Belgium (MSF/B) to provide emergency medical and surgical assistance in seriously affected provinces. OFDA gave \$1,200,000 to UNICEF/WHO to purchase a one-year supply of essential drugs. USAID/Burundi through its Burundi Health System Support Project (BHSS) made a grant to Médecins Sans Frontières/France (MSF/F) to provide a therapeutic and supplemental feeding program in Kirundo province. OFDA has provided blankets to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), plastic sheets to various NGOs, soap and cooking pots to Catholic Relief Service (CRS) for distribution to the displaced and dispersed. Also USAID/Burundi through its Burundi Enterprise Support Project (BEST) has supplied seed for planting.

Logistical support

Besides providing practical support to affected populations, the US government has also been assisting with the logistical implementation of various relief programs. Providing food is one thing, ensuring that it reaches its intended recipients is another. OFDA together with the Department of Defense have been active in providing appropriate logistical support to the relief effort in Burundi. This has included a dysentery prevention support program operated by the US Center for Disease Control (CDC), support for WFP's operations and a grant to help CRS strengthen CARITAS' disaster response capability through a food distribution program. State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) also made substantial grants to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and WFP for operational support towards helping Burundian refugees in neighboring countries. The US government has provided funding for airlifts of vital humanitarian supplies where conventional surface transportation would not have been quick enough to respond to the immediate crisis.

In total, contributions for humanitarian assistance in Burundi from US government sources through the end 1994 amount to \$ 79,615,705. Table 3.2 shows the impact of all the assistance as measured by the indicators.

Table 5 Progress towards SO 1

Objective/ Program Output	Indicator	Progress/ Impact
SO 1: Provide short-term humanitarian assistance and aid post crisis transition to normalcy	National disaster plan in place	After the declaration of disaster, a Mission Disaster Relief Committee was set up and humanitarian assistance became the first priority of all mission personnel. REDSO/ESA Regional Food for Peace and Regional Disaster Relief Coordinator assisted the mission in assessing humanitarian needs.
	All USAID Relief food transported and distributed in a timely manner	To ensure that food reaches its intended recipients, the US Government has provided funding for airlifts of food from Angola and Nairobi to Bujumbura and has paid for one month helicopter use in Burundi. Logistical support was granted to relief organizations, WFP, CRS, IFRC and UNHCR.
	Malnutrition, morbidity and infant mortality rate for affected population	Morbidity: 3/10,000 Infant mortality: 1/10,000
PO 1.1: Timely delivery of disaster relief	% food needs met	The US Government has provided 77,630 MT of food aid in FY93 and FY94 representing 44% of all food distributed over the period.
	% crisis refugees given shelter	About 15% of the affected population was given shelter with the 300 rolls plastic sheeting and 20,000 blankets distributed.
	% camps with regular water supply and sanitation	OFDA made a \$1,601,560 grant to MSF/B for emergency medical, water sanitation and shelter.
	% displaced people with access to reliable medical supplies	OFDA made a \$1,601,560 grant to MSF/B for emergency medical, water sanitation and shelter and a \$1,200,000 to UNICEF for essential drugs for one year.
	% refugee camps with schooling services	No schooling facilities were provided in displaced camps.
PO 1.2: Establish basic food self sufficiency through short term agricultural programs and food aid supplements	# people fed by gender	Approx. 500,000 benefited from food aid. Women represent 53.6% in camps. About 58% of households have women as heads. The total registered unaccompanied children are 14,305 of whom 51.7% are girls. In camps, 34.7% of women are widows.
	Volume of seeds provided	Beans (251MT), Maize (278MT) Potatoes (22MT)
	Quantity of tools provided	Hoes (9671 units) Cook pots
	Volume of fertilizers provided	No fertilizer was provided.
PO 1.3	-immunization coverage -prevalence of diarrheal diseases -acute malnutritional status -low birth rate prevalence	60% (80% before the crisis) No data available, but high prevalence 10-12% 15%

PO 2.1	Support development of civic groups, local associations and human rights organizations	Local NGOs have the ability to have impact at the personal level where participation and attitudinal changes occur. If these are well developed, they become agents of change as well as providers of checks and balances.	Government in power gives ears to representatives of NGOs
PO 2.2	Strengthen the functioning of democratic institutions	The judiciary, legislature and other democratic institutions must be able to deliver services to the people for the achievement of participation and popular representation.	Ability and freedom of the institutions to effect change
PO 2.3	Improve legal environment and support judicial reforms	Favorable legal environment and a strong independent judiciary are important conditions for people's participation. People will not participate openly until there is sufficient/efficient protection.	Independence of judiciary
PO 2.4	Increase dialogue among diverse groups	Dialogue is a critical factor for democracy. Until tolerance and reconciliation is achieved (which can only be done through dialogue), democracy and governance will remain constrained.	Willingness of all parties to accommodate other people's ideas

Table 1 Trends in the major economic and social indicators of the goal

Indicator		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
GDP growth rate		3.5	5.0	2.7	-5.7	-9.0
Average life expectancy (years)*	Men	45	46	50	50	no data
	Women	48	50	52	52	no data
Infant mortality rate/1000		107	107	106	116	116
Child mortality rate/1000*		180	175	192	183	182
Literacy level (%)	Men	60	50	50	48	48
	Women	40	40	40	38	38

* Source changes from year to year

Sub-goal No. 1: Save lives, reduce suffering and restore self-sufficiency

With the declaration of disaster by the American Embassy almost immediately after the attempted coup of October 21, 1993, USAID/Burundi began its disaster relief efforts. Throughout the periods of crises, mission staff undertook assessment trips and reported on developments. The initial \$25,000 made available to Burundi after the declaration of disaster was split between the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) to purchase food and non-food items for immediate distribution to the displaced and dispersed populations. A Mission Disaster Relief Committee was set up and a U.S. Direct Hire employee was designated Humanitarian Relief Officer. Humanitarian assistance became the first priority of all mission personnel. Concurrently, OFDA arranged to airfreight 25,000 blankets to Burundi for distribution by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). OFDA funding was also used to support grants to Doctors Without Borders/Belgium (MSF/B) to provide emergency medical and surgical assistance; World Food Program/Burundi (WFP/B) for field personnel and administrative support; and the United Nations (UN/DHA) for the use of a helicopter to ensure timely distribution of relief supplies to vulnerable populations. USAID also approved a grant of \$454,000 to MSF/France for medicines and other emergency needs. Teams from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) were brought to Burundi to respond to outbreaks of dysentery and potential cholera epidemics. Table 2.3 below outlines the achievements under each of the impact indicators.

Table 2 Progress on process and impact indicators for sub-goal 1

Indicator	Progress/ Impact
# deaths caused by crisis	Estimated to be 150,000 (an average of figures given by various assessors)
% of crisis refugees believed to be resettled	69% of the initial 700,0000 refugees have been resettled
Food production deficit/surplus	17% deficit
Nutritional status among the displaced	Nutritional status surveys show an ever improving nutritional situation with malnutrition rates among the displaced populations down to level registered in Burundi before the civil crisis

Linkages between different objective levels

The next chapter will give a report on the progress toward achieving the manageable interests of the mission (strategic objectives). Before doing so, an analysis of the logical relationships between the various levels of objectives (goal, sub-goals, strategic objectives and program outputs) is given in the table 4 below.

Table 4 Linkages between the goal, sub-goals, strategic objectives and program outcomes

Objective Level	Objective Statement	Linkage	Major Assumptions
GOAL	Improved quality of life for all Burundi's people	It is a USG's foreign aid goal to assist Burundi government improve the quality of life for the people in the country.	NA
SUB-GOAL 1	Save lives, reduce suffering and restore self-sufficiency	In the Middle of the kind of crisis that Burundi is in, developmental efforts will not achieve meaningful people level impact in the absence of emergency assistance for food, water and health.	Government and civic support, infrastructure and security for continued humanitarian assistance
SUB-GOAL 2	Enhance democracy and governance	Current emphasis is on reconciliation through dialogue and mediation that will pave way for more rigorous activities towards people's participation in democratic governance	The actors and stock holders are willing to adopt policies that establish democracy and governance
SO 1	Provide Short-term humanitarian assistance and aid post crisis transition to normalcy	The provision of humanitarian assistance saves life and reduces suffering and prepares ground for self sufficiency restoration programs	Donors willing and ready to provide timely disaster relief
PO 1.1	Timely delivery of disaster relief	Timeliness in the delivery of disaster relief is necessary for sustenance of life and reduction of suffering	Security and infrastructure in place
PO 1.2	Establish basic food self-sufficiency through short-term agriculture and food programs	To help in the normalization of the crisis, it is mandatory that food security is enhanced. This can only be achieved if people resume their own food production such that aid food becomes only supplemental	Security improved, farmers will return to their farms
PO 1.3	Provide emergency child survival	Children are the most vulnerable portion of the affected population and decreasing child mortality saves lives	Efficient delivery system
PO 1.4	Provide emergency health services	Emergency health services save lives and reduce suffering	Efficient delivery system
PO 1.5	Rehabilitation/recover micro-enterprises	Self-sufficiency and normalcy will be achieved through recovery programs at grassroots level	Security up-country and availability of funds
SO 2	Promote dialogue, reconciliation and stability within a framework of democratic institutions	Develop peaceful channels through which citizens can dialogue and negotiate a compromise with other citizens who express conflicting interests is essential to resolve the crisis and prepare ground for good governance	Willingness of all parties to accommodate other people's ideas and efficient mediation

Table 3

Progress of process and impact indicators for sub-goal 2

Indicators	Progress/ Impact
Democratic Institutions	Parliament: No parliament before 1993. Parliamentary elections held in 1993. 65 members (67%) from FRODEBU party, 16 (32%) from UPRONA. None from the other parties
	Judiciary: Partiality is believed to be rampant in the judiciary and people have lost trust. To date, culprits of the attempted coup and mass assassinations, although believed to be known, have not been brought to justice.
	Executive: Democratically elected president assassinated in Oct '93, New president appointed Jan '94, death of second president in April '94, power sharing convention of government negotiated in Sep '94, another president nominated October '94 and cabinet named.
	Oppo. parties: Multipartism allowed April 4, 1992. From a single political party in 1990 to 7 in 1992 and 13 in 1994.
Peaceful conflict resolution	<p>The presence of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the nomination of the Special Representative of the OAU Secretary General and military observers from OAU. Establishment of UNESCO Maison pour la Paix for peace education and the UN Center for Human Rights and UNICEF activities on peace and reconciliation in schools.</p> <p>Negotiation and signature of the 'Convention of Government' in 9/94.</p>
Human Rights	<p>Existence of various associations. Decree on Associations dated 4/92. Human Rights Leagues ITEKA established in 1989 and SONERA established in 1990. UN Center for Human Rights in Burundi, May 1994. Both Leagues ITEKA and SONERA began participating in democratic and human rights. League ITEKA has benefitted from USAID funding for training activities for magistrates and police .</p>
Local involvement in government.	<p>National Unity Charter debated and approved by 89% of voters in a national referendum in February 1991. Constitution approved by Referendum in March 1992 by more than 90% of voters. Elections both Presidential and Legislative in June 1993: more than 90% of the voting population participated. Convention of Government signed on September 10, 1993 between the winning party, FRODEBU, and the opposition parties.</p> <p>USAID funded NDI Programs (National Democratic Institute) before and after the elections. Their broad objective is to consolidate democracy in Burundi through a comprehensive education and training program to strengthen the National Assembly and to help non-governmental organizations adapt to a new role in the post-election environment and expanding public understanding of democracy through civic education.</p>

PO 1.4	# Persons per medical doctor # persons per trained nurse % essential drugs available %reached with health education	17,210 4,800 USAID provided funds to replace drugs used during the crisis low
PO 1.5	- Rural enterprises that restarted -% of commercial activity (as compared to 1992)	Due to lasting insecurity, very few enterprises restarted 88%

SO 2: Promote dialogue, reconciliation and stability within a framework of democratic institutions

Table 6 Progress towards SO 2

Indicator	Progress/Impact
# media outlets	Decree/Law dated February 4, 1992, establishing free press including the electronic media. Creation of Burundi Journalists' Association (ABJ) in 1990 and the Association for Press Freedom (APPLE) in 1992. Only one newspaper in 1990, two in 1992, 13 in 1993 and 15 in 1994. Still only one Radio/TV - State-owned.
	With the advent of multi-party democracy, and the 1992 Decree on the Press, opposition groups and nascent parties are issuing publications. Political Parties have coverage on both radio and TV. Once a week political parties have access to talk for 15 minutes on Radio, and press interview to publicize their party's platform.
Meaningful competition in election	National Unity Charter was approved in a referendum held on February 5, 1991 by 89.21 % of the voters. The press reported that local participation reached 96.22 %.
	The Constitution approved on March 9, 1992 by 90% of the voters.
	Presidential Election took place on June 1, 1993 with 3 political parties fielding candidates. 90% of voting population participated.
	Legislative Election took place on June 29, 1993 with 2 parties in competition. Attempt coup of October 1993. Set-back democratic government and a power sharing convention of September 1994 supplanted constitutional government
PO 2.1: Support development of civic groups, local associations and human rights organizations.	
Number of civic groups, local associations participating in the strive for democracy and human rights	In 1989: 53 NGOs operating in Burundi As of May 1994, UNICEF list indicates 60 LPVOs/NGOs. These includes the forum of 7 Women Associations (CAF), and other small ones. APB association of 12 Human Rights groups in Burundi compared to 2 previously existent.
	On Labor unions before 1990 it was UTB alone (Union des Travailleurs du Burundi). CSB (Centrale Syndicale du Burundi) established following the decree on NGOs/PVO dated April 18, 1992. As of January 1995 there were 8 labor unions (education, commerce, handcrafts, transportation, employers, etc.)
PO 2.2: Strengthen the functioning of democratic institutions.	
# and agenda for Parliamentary interest groups.	Parliamentary committees with members from both parties have been established that investigate and act on specific national problems and issues of interest to the nation at large. However, Parliament remains weak and ineffective.
PO 2.3: improved legal environment and supportive judicial reforms	
Evidence of the improvement of the legal environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Commerce Code partially revised under the on-going REMODRA Project in 9/93. - Authorization to conduct studies on Land tenure given Feb. 15, 1993 - Rights of Women: Revision of the Family Code in 1991. - Labor Code revised and published on 7/17/93. - Criminal justice system remains inoperative - Impunity remains a critical issue

PO 2.4 : Increase dialogue among diverse ethnic groups.	
# dialogue enhancement groups	Youth programs, Study tour to observe south african elections, Conference on the Role of Military, Workshop for Women for Peace Association and conference on democratic governance organized between 1993 and 1994 to support reconciliation.
PO 2.5 : Facilitate training for political leadership	
Training for political leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Parliamentarian and political tendencies went on study tours to U.S., South Africa and other countries. - In country training workshop for political leaders in mediation and conflict resolution
PO 2.6 : Strengthen network and support for political moderates	
Strengthen network for political moderates	Fora for a dialogue on political issues