


Sahel Regional Program

**1996 Results Report
1999 Resource Request**

**Africa Bureau
Office of West Africa Affairs**



**Sahel Regional Program
March 1997**

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ACRONYMS

AGRHYMET	Regional Agroclimatology, Hydrology and Meteorology Institution
AFR/SD/PSGE and Environment	Africa Bureau/Sustainable Development/Productive Sector Growth
AFR/WA	Africa Bureau/West Africa
AFR/WA/RP	Africa Bureau/West Africa/Regional Programs
CFA	African Financial Community
CERPOD	Center for Studies and Research on Population and Development
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for the Control of Drought in the Sahel
CONACILSS	National Correspondents of CILSS
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAG	Donor Advisory Group
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
FERAP	Trade Facilitation and Policy Harmonization Project (CILSS)
FY	Fiscal Year
INC-D	International Convention to Combat Desertification
INSAH	The Sahel Institute
IPC	Implementing Policy Change Project
IR	Intermediate Result
LAP	Livestock Action Plan
MSU	Michigan State University
NRM	Natural Resources Management
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PADLOS	Assistance to Local Development in the Sahel Project (CILSS)
PRISAS	Food Security Analytical Capacity Building Regional Program (CILSS)
PRRD	Sustainable Restructuring and Relaunching Program of CILSS
REDSO/WCA Africa	Regional Economic Development Support Office/West and Central Africa
REDSO/WCA/WAAC	REDSO/WCA/West Africa Accounting Center
SO	Strategic Objective
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UDEAC	Central African States Customs Union
UNSO	U.N. Sudano-Sahel Office
USAID	U. S. Agency for International Development
USAIDs	Overseas Field Posts of USAID
USG	United States Government
WAEN	West Africa Enterprise Network

Preface

Perhaps more than many of the other operating units in USAID, the Sahel Regional Program is a true partnership among West African regional institutions and the bilateral and multilateral donors that support the institutions' programs. We share a single, common set of objectives, and parallel finance the activities that lead to the results reported herein. Most of the results are thus taken directly from the results reporting of the West African organizations themselves, and from the work of the Club du Sahel. In the spirit of partnership, we wish to acknowledge the work of our colleagues in West Africa, the U.S. experts who collaborate with those colleagues, and our donor partners, without whom the results reported here would not be possible.




Figure 2: Sahel Regional Program Objective Tree

SECTION I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

A. OVERVIEW

The goal of the Sahel Regional Program is: **Food security and ecological balance increased in Sahel West Africa.** Reporting on the program goal provides an overview of the progress of the Program in the long term, and of the challenges that remain.

General development

Although most of the broad measures of social and economic development rank the countries in the Sahel among the lowest in the world, these countries have made considerable progress over the past several years (Annex A, Table 1). In aggregate, the UNDP's Human Development Index calculated for the Sahel has increased by 70% since 1980 and it improved by 12% in 1993 alone. Niger is ranked the lowest in the world (174 of 174 countries ranked). Burkina Faso and Mali also ranked in the 170s. Thus, although there has been some general improvement, much remains to be done. A gender-specific measure of relative development, for example, shows that the Sahel stands at about one-third the level of the "high" human development countries, a gender-gap which is reflected in low female literacy rates. Sahel-wide, female literacy is about 22% compared to 35% for males; female literacy varies from lows of 6% (Niger) and 8% (Mali) to highs of 40% (Guinea Bissau) and 60% (Cape Verde). Seventy-one percent, or 38 million, of the 54 million people in the Sahel cannot read or write. Other gaps exist also. Incomes are highly skewed in favor of the urban population, yet well over 70% of the population is rural. The UN estimates that 60% of the population in the Sahel lives under conditions which contribute to severe poverty. Similarly, World Bank measures of poverty (according to income levels) indicate that 61% of the rural population in the Sahel lives in poverty (compared to 18% of the urban population). The region is further burdened by high population growth rates (close to 3% per year) stemming from high fertility rates of between 5 and 7 births per woman (rather than from migration), which increases the pressure on already scarce and very fragile resources -- over 30 million people (60%) in the Sahel live in areas with extremely high risk of adverse climatic events¹.

Economic Growth

Broad-based economic growth is the ultimate measure of food security, especially when the sectoral and geographic distribution of that growth contributes to poverty reduction. Prospects for economic growth in the region improved dramatically when the CFA countries decided in early January of 1994 to devalue the currency by 50%. While the devaluation alone could not solve the growth problem or assure **food security**, it was an important precondition. Prior to the devaluation, per capita economic growth rates were near zero (and after accounting for inflation, negative) in the nine countries (Annex A, Table 1). The initial impact of the devaluation was a significant increase in inflation, which means that real incomes were certainly reduced as the economies began to make the

¹ Data from the World Resources Institute. This includes populations living in hyper-arid, arid, and semi-arid areas. It excludes a fourth category (dry sub-humid) which is also considered to include high climate risk populations.

necessary adjustments to a more rational economic environment. Available data indicate that region-wide per capita GNP fell by almost 8% in 1994. Indications from the most recent data available are that the region has begun to recover, with a positive (1.6%) growth in per capita GNP in 1995. The improved competitive situation, more rational allocation of resources to local vs. imported foods, and a greater incentive to invest in regional trade is expected to have pushed per capita economic growth to a sustainable level of about 2.0% per year by the end of 1996. At this rate of growth these nations could begin to make advances toward **poverty reduction** and see a significant improvement in food security. Prospects are good for improved incomes and greater civic participation in the Sahelian countries and development is expected to accelerate over the next five to seven years. We expect substantial immediate gains in purchasing power in the rural areas and longer term improvement in life spans and education levels.

People-level impacts. One of the characteristics of an efficient marketing system is that changes in retail prices (domestic or international) are transmitted to producers rather than being absorbed by the government or by the marketing system. There is ample evidence that this has been the case for livestock, as well as for most other agricultural commodities produced in the Sahel. In Mali, for example, a comparison of pre- and post-devaluation farm and central market prices reveals that farm prices increased 1.2% for each 1% increase in central market prices -- by the end of 1995 farm prices increased by about 64% relative to the post-devaluation level. Evidence is that the devaluation was and remains a substantial benefit to the rural populations in the Sahel in that it shifted the traditional urban bias of the economies in favor of the rural population. Live cattle imports to the Cote d'Ivoire from the Sahel more than doubled between 1993 and 1995, while meat imports in 1995 (largely from Europe) were one-fifth of the 1993 level. Per capita consumption of meat in the Cote d'Ivoire appears to have increased (rather than decreased) for the first time since 1986². The livestock-based incomes of rural Sahelians probably did not increase in 1995 relative to 1993 by the (over) 200% implied by the price and volume changes mentioned above, but there is no doubt that cash incomes (and wealth because of increased value of existing stock) of rural families have improved. Gross margins on cereal crops also increased substantially. In Mali, for example, gross margins on millet and sorghum increased by 60-70% and by 300% for corn. These changes may not translate into actual income increases, because, except for some trade with Senegal and Niger, much of this production is for home consumption, but they do show that the devaluation produced the kind of incentives it was intended to generate.

There were losers. The devaluation was intended to reduce real wages and shift consumption from imported to domestic (or regional) commodities and to encourage exports. This happened, but it also means that real urban incomes declined. The impact of this decline was especially evident in some urban vegetable markets. For example, reduced urban incomes, lower domestic demand and higher air freight and input costs are probably the reason that green bean producers in Mali and Burkina

Source is "Impact de la Devaluation sur la Filiere Batail/Viande en Cote d'Ivoire" by Berte, K. and Zongo, D. , Novembre 1996. Prepared under the CILSS/INSAH/PRISAS devaluation monitoring activity.

Faso did not benefit from the devaluation as much as others. On the other hand, onion producers in Senegal, Niger, and Chad experienced both higher farm prices and greater export volumes.

Ecological balance

Ecological balance, as measured by changes in per capita "availability" of forest and woodlands, declined by 3.8% per year in the 1980's -- population growth rates of 2.8% and a reduction in forest and woodland area of 1.0% per year (Annex B, Table 1).

The International Convention to Combat Desertification (INC-D), which began an early implementation phase in 1995, will contribute to **ecological balance** by helping protect existing forest and woodlands and by improving incentives for implementing better natural resource management practices. The Convention explicitly recognizes that the root cause of advanced desertification is more than just climate or biophysical, it is also rooted in social and economic practices and incentives. Bilateral programs to improve agro-forestry practices and land use policy in Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, and Niger and regional efforts to improve environmental education, and to assure better coordination and information-sharing will contribute to reduced pressure on the ecosystem. Combined, these programs should help reverse the negative trend in resource balances, and should increase availability by 1% per year by the year 2000. Since these data change very slowly, objective measures of progress will only be available every 5-10 years.

Sub-Goal 1: Regional cooperation allows market development

The Sahelian states, and West Africa in general, have come to realize that active economic cooperation is essential for economic growth in the region, with the Sahelian states especially dependent on trade with the coastal states. This awareness is reflected in the many regional institutions in West Africa (CILSS and ECOWAS included). Until the devaluation of the CFA, a combination of surplus dumping (European red meat), the overvalued exchange rate, and formal and informal barriers to trade acted to discourage trade between the Sahel and the coastal states. The overvalued exchange rate also

Table 1. Recorded Export Trade Between West African States (% of total exports)

Exports to:	Exports from:		
	Sahel	Non-Sahel Coastal States	West Africa*
Sahel 1987-92	3.8%	2.8%	3.0%
Average 1993	3.2%	3.0%	3.0%
1994	4.3%	3.2%	3.3%
1995	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%

encouraged substitution of imports for locally available commodities, rather than encouraging growth and income generating exports. The situation changed dramatically when the CFA was devalued because it and associated political commitments helped to open domestic, regional and international markets to local products.

The value of recorded export trade between Sahelian and other West African states is used as an indicator of progress for this sub-goal (Table 1). Between 1987 and 1992 this trade amounted to 11.3% of the total export trade of the Sahelian states. Over the same period, recorded export trade from the other West African states to the Sahelian states amounted to only 2.8% of their total exports. (Table 1)

Recent data on the direction of trade in the region suggests that the distribution of Sahelian trade has been shifting toward the coastal states, with between 12% and 14% of the total from the Sahelian countries going to all of West Africa and 8.5%-10% going to the coastal states. Recorded trade between Sahelian and non-Sahelian-Coastal countries increased 20% in 1995 (a grouping which includes countries with CFA and non-CFA currencies). Total reported exports from Sahelian countries increased by 44% in dollar value in 1995.³ This is a significant increase but it masks some astounding country-specific changes. For example, in 1994 exports of cattle from Burkina Faso increased 70% and small ruminant exports (which have a higher probability of benefitting women) increased 36%. Cattle exports from Burkina Faso declined by about 15% in 1995, but they were still 45% ahead of exports in 1993. Similarly, exports of cattle from Mali increased over 300% in 1994, and smaller animal exports increased 65%. The major market for these exports was the Cote d'Ivoire, but some animals were also sent to other regional markets, such as Ghana and Togo. It is not reasonable to expect these rates of increase to continue, because the increased trade represents a considerable rate of herd culling which, coincidentally, has a positive environmental impact via reduced pressure on fragile pasture lands. As with Burkina Faso, this reduction in exports was reflected in cattle exports from Mali in 1995, which were about 42% lower in volume than in 1994 -- however, exports in 1995 were still 144% higher than they were in 1993⁴. We expect trade in faster-growing small ruminants to continue to expand, but probably at a somewhat slower rate.

Latest available data. These are current dollar amounts, so the stated increases include both price and volume changes. World prices for commodities such as cotton increased substantially in 1995, which together with the devaluation meant domestic fob price increases were stimulated by both a change in the exchange rate and a change in world market prices. Unit export values for African countries increased by about 10% between quarter 4, 1994 and quarter 2, 1995, so a substantial part of the increase in export value was related to increased volumes and a domestic price change induced by the devaluation. Data sources are: 1995/96 editions of Direction of Trade Statistics, and International Financial Statistics, both published by the International Monetary Fund.

Data are from INSAH/PRISAS devaluation monitoring reports, November, 1996.

Changes in trade in other commodities, such as cereals, fruits, and vegetables is a little more difficult to quantify because so much of this trade is through traditional trading channels and is unrecorded. However, there is clear evidence that price changes have favored producers, which should provide incentive for more production and trade. This is discussed in more detail later, when results for Strategic Objective I are presented.

The effect of the devaluation was to stimulate considerable import substitution from both domestic and regional sources, especially of rice, vegetables and meat. Estimates are that trade between West African states could double if formal and informal barriers are removed. The Sahelian states, especially the rural sector where most of the poor are located, will be the largest gainers.

Table 2. Comparative Measures of Freedom in Sahelian Countries

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Burkina Faso	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Cape Verde	F	F	F	F	F	F
Chad	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Gambia	F	F	NF	NF	NF-	NF
Guinea Bissau	PF	PF	PF	PF+	PF	PF

Sub-goal 2: Democracy and governance improved

This sub-goal is measured by the Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes produced by Freedom House. They measure rights of association, expression, participation and freedom of movement. Countries are classified according to "not free", "partially free", and "free", depending on individual classification of civil liberties and political rights (Table 2). Analysis has shown that political and civil freedom are positively correlated with economic growth.

The 1995 coup in The Gambia and the 1996 coup in Niger shifted the two countries into the "not free" status. The Gambia and Niger are expected to post low growth rates over the next several years. Burkina Faso, on the other hand has instituted some significant reforms, so it was shifted from "not free" in 1991 to "partially free" in 1992 and has remained in that category. There have been some very positive moves in Guinea Bissau and Mali (the latter has shifted into the "free" category). These change are reflected in improved prospects of economic growth. As of the end of 1996, the other Sahelian countries maintained past rankings, but there were some additional improvements in civil liberty in Mali and Senegal.

Sub-goal 3: National policy decisions increasingly reflect intra-regional realities

Attainment of this sub-goal is measured by the existence of harmonized National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs), a complete absence of unanticipated food crises, and the existence of regionally attuned national population policies. Each of these indicators is generated at the national level, often as a result of bilateral actions and activities, so overall attainment is a reflection of donor coordination, regional cooperation, and assistance from regional institutions to national governments.

NEAPs. The INC-D is the major event which impacts on complementarity of NEAPs in the region. While implementation of the terms of the Convention has just begun, with early actions yet to be determined, it is expected that associated planning, dialogue and environmental monitoring will make a major contribution to improved resource management in the region. At the present, most of the Sahelian states have either completed or are well advanced in developing NEAPs. As of the end of FY 96, Niger had just begun organizing to develop a NEAP and Senegal was in the initial development phase (See Annex B Table 1.

National Population Policies. In 1992, none of the Sahelian states had pro-family planning population policies. Eight of nine now have promulgated population policies, with Guinea Bissau's awaiting ratification. All of the policies have chapters on migration, as well as addressing natural increase. There are two challenges to be addressed in the coming years. The first is to re-examine policies and programs in light of the recommendations of the U.N. conferences in Cairo, Copenhagen and Beijing; specifically, the introduction of a broader range of reproductive health concerns and thorough gender integration. The second challenge is to move from policy formulation to program implementation. Three states now have population program action plans. One Sahelian state - Senegal - is actually reporting a decline in urban fertility rates. Over the next two to three years, it is anticipated that the remaining Sahelian states will develop action plans for population and related health programs. The third regional conference on population and development in West Africa -- a major opportunity to increase regional harmonization through information exchange and the realization of economies of scale is scheduled to be held in Burkina Faso in 1997.

Food crises avoided. One of the great achievements of the Club du Sahel/CILSS system has been the avoidance of famine in the Sahel. Rainfall variation is probably the one most important factor in the region, and below-"normal" levels are a frequent occurrence. However, several strong national early warning and market information systems, along with a regional center at AGRHYMET, and careful coordination and review have helped avoid crisis situations, which contributes to enormous savings in human life and reducing the need for emergency resources. Rainfall in the 1996 crop year was below average in some areas, which has generated calls for modest increased food aid imports for Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. The requests for increased food aid were anticipated well in advance, the necessary additional aid was readily available from donors through normal distribution channels and hence any possibility of a crisis in these countries was avoided. The other Sahelian states are not expected to face any significant food availability problems this year.

B. FACTORS AFFECTING THE SAHEL REGIONAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

The major event affecting the Sahel Regional Program in 1996 was the military overthrow of the democratically elected government of Niger. This led to a down-sizing of the mission and restrictions in programming in Niger.

- The direct impact of the post closing was to force the Sahel Regional Program to triple the amount of program funds expended to support liaison and accountability functions in Niger, site of the CILSS early warning and environmental monitoring and training center, AGRHYMET. This trebling reduces available resources for direct support to results achievement by reallocating funds formerly granted to West African partners to management functions. The approximately 30% of a FTE in USAID/Niger that was devoted to management oversight has also been eliminated.
- Uncertainty about Agency policy concerning activities in close-out countries, such as Burkina Faso, and in countries where missions have, or will soon be, closed, such as Niger and The Gambia, has caused intraAgency conflict about what activities regional programs may support through regional organizations whose membership includes administratively or legislatively mandated close-out countries. This uncertainty did not cause specific problems in FY 1996 for results achievement, but put pressure on already-downsized management time and capacity to ascertain and make the effort to conform to the ever-changing guidance. If it continues more direct impacts may be seen in FY 1997 and beyond, because by the end of FY 1997 seven of the nine CILSS countries will be in close-out status. In addition, the U.S. continues to have difficult diplomatic relations with Nigeria, the major economic power in the region.
- The Gambia is scheduled to assume the lead coordination role for CILSS in 1997, which raises additional policy issues for the Agency. Effective African-led coordination, both within the CILSS States and with donors, requires active participation in regional discussions, some of which will surely take place in The Gambia and most of which will include high-level Gambian government officials.

Resolution and consistent application of the parameters for support to truly regional results requires a clear policy statement with one voice in the Agency. A policy which limits or conditions USAID support to activities of regional organizations that lead to desired results would call to question the relevance of this, or any other regional program.

Although USAID policy will determine the longer-term validity of regional programs in general, the political consequences of the coups in The Gambia and Niger also cause some longer-term concern in and of themselves. From the point of view of regional economic growth, continued political instability in Nigeria and Cameroon will also have a substantial, negative long-term impact. On the positive side, both The Gambia and Niger remain full members of, and participants in, CILSS. Politically, CILSS has brought some pressure to bear for a return to elective government, particularly

in The Gambia. More broadly, the emphasis which CILSS and its donor partners place on local participation in decision making and decentralization will contribute to long-run stability in the region.

Secondly, reengineering and downsizing have had a significant impact on the shift of program resources away from the SRP's West African partners and toward internal liaison and accountability requirements.

- The reengineered bilateral strategy in USAID/Mali focuses on results achievable exclusively through bilateral actions. Coupled with the imposition of ceilings on total FSN and PSC positions in the mission, it was determined that USAID/Mali no longer had the manageable interest or personnel ceilings to continue its day-to-day management of two vital Sahel Regional Program projects. The SRP has thus had to make arrangements to put an institutional contractor in place in Bamako, with the former USDH oversight in Mali shifted back to be the responsibility of the lone USDH position in AFR/WA, and to the REDSO/WCA/WAAC.
- The reduction in force among civil servants took effect in September 1996. As an operating unit, the SRP benefitted from a half-time program operations assistant and a half-time project development officer. Those functions are now being filled by a program-funded RSSA, thus further reducing available funds for the direct achievement of results with our West African partners.

SECTION II: PROGRESS TOWARD OBJECTIVES

Strategic Objective 1: Assist national governments, regional institutions and private sector associations to identify, clarify, and implement policy options which promote trade and investment in the West Africa Region.

The targets for this SO were fully achieved in 1996.

More than any other donor, USAID has been a consistent supporter of private sector-oriented approaches to trade and monetary policy supported under this SO. The West Africa Enterprise Network (WAEN) was created with largely USAID technical and financial support. The Livestock Action Plan (LAP), now coordinated by the CILSS regional trade policy activity (French acronym; FERAP), originated as a USAID private sector support activity. Both of these activities were designed and have been implemented with sustainability in mind -- by the end of 1996 the WAEN supported all of its operating costs, and the LAP relies on local participants and resources for most of its activities.

The approach taken in implementing SO 1 is to help private and public/private groups to apply the strategic management method developed by the G/DG Implementing Policy Change (IPC) Project. The method emphasizes a pragmatic, action- and results-oriented process in which the stakeholders develop action plans that lay out concrete steps; assign responsibility for taking the steps; assess progress and define next steps in an iterative manner. Measurement of achievements of this SO occurs in a wider geographic zone than the other two SOs of the Sahel Regional Program, because trade with the non-CILSS states is vital to sustainable growth in the Sahel.

Achievement of this SO is measured by the number of countries which demonstrate that the concept of comparative advantage is included in their trade policies, and by reductions in marketing costs. The first is a measure of improving potential for regional trade and the second is a measure of achievement in eliminating costly trade barriers (formal).

A. Performance Analysis

A combination of activities of varying duration are used to support this SO. The LAP, being commodity-specific, is a short-to-medium term activity which is able to focus on specific changes needed to improve the efficiency of the livestock marketing system. This approach has been very successful as a way of capturing and retaining both private and public sector commitment to achieving a shared agenda. Building a sustainable private-sector network is a medium-to-longer term effort which focuses on more general goals aimed at influencing both internal West African and external approaches to doing business in the region. A medium-term activity supported by the Sahel Regional Program is a three-year CFA devaluation impact assessment activity, which is now in its third and final year. It has produced an exceptional body of analysis of the changes in (and impact on) the economies in the region since the devaluation.

It cannot be said that any country in the region has a fully open economy, but on the basis of market liberalization, absence of import and export taxes, and elimination of state monopolies, we judge that at least six countries have formulated trade policies and regulations which generally reflect national comparative advantage, especially with respect to livestock, fruits, vegetables and cereals. The non-CFA-Sahelian countries tend to tax imports less, while the three major CFA countries (Mali, Senegal, and Niger) tend to tax imports the most. These policies will soon be "harmonized" because the two CFA-economic/monetary unions

Four Major Accomplishments in 1996

- *Lobbying efforts of the Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire coordinating committees prevented an attempt by a private group to obtain a monopoly on livestock health certification along the northern border of the Cote d'Ivoire.*
- *The Mali national coordinating committee successfully publicized and lobbied against illicit charges for export declaration documents by the national Chamber of Agriculture.*
- *A national federation of livestock traders with the express goal of protecting members from extortion*

in the region are committed to the suppression of tariff and non-tariff barriers to internal trade (generally by January 1998). They plan to create a common external tariff, which means that commodity-specific dialogue on barrier reduction, such as is done under the LAP, will remain an important vehicle. between CFA and non-CFA countries continues.

Trade and Investment Policy and Regulation

Results under this part of the SRP were outstanding in 1996. Major achievements ranged from direct impact on the trade environment, to the production of important new, highly policy relevant analyses.

Livestock: The Livestock Action Plan started with three countries (Mali, Burkina Faso and the Cote d'Ivoire). At their request, Ghana and Togo were formally added to the original three states in 1996. Since activities in Ghana and Togo are just beginning, present reporting is largely in terms of the LAP achievements in reducing livestock marketing costs in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Cote d'Ivoire. The estimates of LAP impact discussed below are conservative, because other commerce will also profit from reforms achieved through the implementation process.

The reduction in livestock marketing costs is conservatively estimated to be 7% in 1996, which is the planned level for the year. Maintaining the 7% gain in the face of increases in transportation and other material costs due to the devaluation is a substantial achievement. Most of this cannot be claimed as direct Program effect because each country reduced or eliminated import taxes on fuels and set maximum prices for such things as fuels, lubricants, water, electricity, etc., which helped keep marketing costs from increasing too much. As an example, total marketing costs for cattle from Mali (Mopti) to Abidjan increased only about 6% between 1991 and 1996, while transportation costs increased by over 24%, which means an 18% increase in marketing costs due to transport -- because transportation accounts for 75% of total marketing costs. In other words, other marketing costs (largely duties and fees) must have fallen by around 14%. We are claiming only one-half of this decrease as program impact.

Horticulture Crops: The SRP sponsored a series of studies on status and problems of the horticulture sector which were presented at a workshop for horticulture producers and traders in the region which the SRP sponsored (with REDSO/WCA) in Abidjan. Participants asked that similar coordinating meetings be held in the future and suggested that they are more in need of a mechanism through which they can establish and maintain contact and share information than they are of a direct assistance for identifying and implementing policy change -- largely because they accepted that activities already underway would address their major concerns. Their general concerns are much the same as those of the private sector in general, i.e. cross-border trade barriers, transferring money across borders with different monetary systems and transportation infrastructure. These issues are being reviewed jointly by FERAP (and its national collaborators) and the WAEN and will form the basis for the policy change action plan with West African institutions to include UEMOA and ECOWAS. Simultaneously, the SRP is taking steps to assure that the policy fora offered by the commodity groupings become self-sustaining and deliver results to their participants.

General Trade and Investment: The WAEN now has over 300 members who are second-generation African entrepreneurs organized into 12 national units, each with an action plan aimed

at improving the trade environment in West Africa and enhanced business partnerships within the region. These units are assisted and coordinated by a regional "committee", which has a regional action plan. Regional headquarters is based in Accra, Ghana. USAID collaborates with France, Canada, and Germany in supporting the WAEN. The SRP support to the WAEN is limited to technical support for help in developing and implementing action plans; all operating costs are paid by the WAEN itself.

Most of the activity of the WAEN to date has been advocacy and business development. One example is a major regional meeting in 1996 by the regional unit. This included presentations by major international businesses (such as AT&T and IBM). This was a major publicity event for the WAEN in terms of gaining international credibility. Several joint ventures have been developed between members in different countries. For example, bananas between Senegal and the Cote d'Ivoire and fertilizer between Togo and Chad. Several of the national units (and the regional center at Accra) are developing web pages to aid in communicating both concerns and opportunities. The Network also continues to produce the regional publication "The Networker" and the monthly "Trade Flash," which provides members with commodity prices, information on port and other costs, and business opportunities.

The regional unit of the WAEN has initiated several potentially important dialogues with UEMOA and ECOWAS on the issues of illicit charges at border crossings, monetary transfers, and transportation. Since these are also issues identified by the livestock and horticulture sectors, they and their concerns will be included in the development of recommendations to be presented to regional organizations (such

Impacts of the CFA Devaluation

- **Large positive changes in profitability for commodities with little or no state intervention**

<u>Country and Commodity</u>	<u>% Change in real profitability</u>
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Mali rice:	+77% to +935%
Mali millet/sorghum	+24% to +34%
Mali corn	+250%

Senegal fish:	+42% to +160%
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Niger Onions:	+1400%
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- **Small or negative changes in profitability for commodities with substantial state intervention**

<u>Country and Commodity</u>	<u>% Change in real profitability</u>
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Mali cotton:	+12%
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Senegal Cotton:	0%
Senegal peanuts:	+23%

Chad cotton:	-17%
Chad peanuts:	-32%
Chad rice:	-22%

Niger cotton:	-39%
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Source: INSAH/PRISAS devaluation monitoring reports, 1996.

as UEMOA and ECOWAS) after the three sector review studies have been completed. The WAEN has also started discussions with UEMOA and ECOWAS on collaboration to develop an ECOWAS-wide investment code. All of these activities are underway. Definitive results will not be seen until at least 1997.

Monetary Policy and its Application

The impacts of the devaluation and the private sector's preoccupation with financial transfers show very clearly that monetary policy and its application are fundamental determinants of the health of any economy. It is truthfully said that the exchange rate is the single most important "price" in an economy, especially in a developing economy. This is forcefully reinforced by the analyses undertaken by the CFA devaluation impact monitoring effort.

Although the INSAH/PRISAS devaluation monitoring effort will continue for another year, it has already produced and begun disseminating valuable information. The real profitability of several primary production activities has increased substantially. Changes in profitability varies by country and commodity, but increases are generally in the range of 6% to over 900% for commodities with little state intervention in the production and marketing systems, and were very low or negative for commodities with heavier state intervention in production and marketing (see text box for examples). These impacts are generally from higher farm prices due to more efficient marketing systems and better market-to-farm price transmission when the markets are permitted to operate without excessive state intervention. The work being done by INSAH/PRISAS has already produced some important policy options to be considered by decision makers in the region.

Lessons have also been drawn from Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, for example, the CFA zone gained exports for only about nine months after the devaluation because the Ghanaian currency (the cedi) also devalued rapidly during this period (because of high inflation). The lesson for the CFA zone is that nearby currencies must be considered. We expect the policy and public information impact of this activity to accelerate in 1997, as the activity comes to a close and the debate/dissemination work begins. Rumors of a second devaluation are already circulating in some countries.

The WAEN has been most active in promoting easier transfers across monetary borders, an objective it pursues by signing protocols with banks having branches in countries with different currency systems. The effectiveness of this solution has yet to be systematically monitored. As mentioned several times, the facilitation of monetary transfers is a major issue with the private sector. A more in-depth review with solid recommendations will be produced in 1997.

B. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions

There are several activities now underway which will help to accelerate the achievements under this SO in 1997 and through 1999. As this SO is fully on track for meeting its objectives, no specific change in management actions is required. The only issue (discussed in Section III) is whether adequate resources will be made available to continue investment in this SO, which is the first one slated for deletion should program resources continue to diminish.

The WAEN has started discussions with UEMOA and ECOWAS on collaboration to develop an ECOWAS-wide investment code. We expect a plan of action to be developed in 1997, with a draft code available by the end of 1998, and adoption by three or four countries by the end of 1999.

We are working with CILSS to insure that the methodological approach used to implement the Livestock Action Plan is transferred to FERAP, both to insure the viability of the LAP and to insure that future action plans have a similar participatory approach and a similar private-sector focus. We expect a cereals action plan to be completed for Mali, Mauritania and Senegal by the end of 1997, and the first action to reduce trade barriers taken by the end of 1998. By the 1999 there will be a measurable increase in cereal grain flows between these countries.

UEMOA has set January 1, 1998 as the date to complete creation of a "common market" for the seven countries in the union. This will eliminate all taxes and non-tariff barriers on trade of raw products (agricultural products) within the union. July 1997 is set as the date when quantitative restrictions on trade within the union will be eliminated. Implementation of the new agreements will take some time (aided by the WAEN and activities such as the LAP), so we do not expect this to lead to identifiable results until the end of 1998.

C. Performance Data Tables

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective 1: Assist national governments, regional institutions and private sector associations to identify, clarify, and implement policy options which promote trade and investment in West Africa.</p>			
<p>APPROVED: DD/MMM/YYYY COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Sahel Regional Program</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: SO 1 indicator 1 - Countries using comparative advantage as a basis for setting trade policy.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number of countries.</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: number</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: Based on data from CILSS, USAID and other donor research, and network activity reports.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of countries which have policies and implement regulations which do not restrict trade (imports and exports) of inputs and primary commodities.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: 1996 based on a CILSS/FERAP review of agricultural policy in the Sahel. Includes a review of import and export taxes, import, export and market monopolies, controlled prices and import and export subsidies. No single country was absent some form of price control, monopoly, or tax on imports or exports. Cotton was the most controlled commodity. Cattle and millet/sorghum were the least controlled commodities.</p>	<p>YE A R</p>	<p>PL A N N E D</p>	<p>ACT U A L</p>
	1993 (B)	--	0
	1994	3	3
	1995	4	5
	1996	6	6
	1997	7	
	1998	8	
	1999	8	
	2000	8	
	2001	8	
2002 (T)	8		

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective 1: Assist national governments, regional institutions and private sector associations to identify, clarify, and implement policy options which promote trade and investment in West Africa.</p>			
<p>APPROVED: DD/MMM/YYYY COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Sahel Regional Program</p>			

RESULT NAME: SO 1 indicator 2 - transactions cost for regional trade of major commodities reduced 20%.			
INDICATOR: Percentage change in transactions costs.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent reduction in costs. <hr/> SOURCE: Based on data from CILSS, USAID and other donor research, and network activity reports. <hr/> INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Indicator is a measure of change in marketing costs associated with regional trade of major commodities. <hr/> COMMENTS: This indicator is intended to show improvement in market efficiency as formal and non-formal barriers to trade are removed and as trade volumes increase.	YE A R	PL A N N E D	ACT U A L
	1993 (B)	--	0
	1994	4.5%	4.5%
	1995	5%	7%
	1996	7%	7%
	1997	11%	
	1998	11%	
	1999	12%	
	2000	15%	
	2001	18%	
	2002 (T)	20%	

Strategic Objective 2: Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development.

This SO has exceeded its targets for 1996.

The baseline indicator for this SO is set in the year before the successful realization of the CILSS/Club Praia Conference on Land Tenure and Decentralization held June 21-24, 1994. Previously-excluded groups were actively involved in the preparation and conduct of the five-day meeting and were able to successfully press their agenda with the CILSS (as the representative of its member state governments). The pace of activity in this SO has accelerated beyond expectation, because demand for greater voice and power in Sahelian society has exploded in the last several years. It was conservatively estimated that there would be at least two regional meetings a year, and that some, but not most stakeholders would be represented at these meetings. In fact, the number of regional meetings in 1996 was eleven, and most relevant stakeholders were represented in each of the meetings. The reasons for the accelerated pace of achievement are several: the improved flow of information with the proliferation of private press outlets, the pressure from Bretton Woods

institutions for decentralization of state functions, the loss of the alternative model of a centralized state at the end of the Cold War, the experience of participating in free and fair elections and the demand-pull effect that these factors generate in a populace that is gradually being empowered and expanding its demands to be consulted. It is very difficult to measure the qualitative aspects of the dialogue on the role of civil society and government, but the quantity, which can be captured, has expanded well beyond the modest expectations that were set for this SO two years ago.

A. Performance Analysis

Creating a Rural "Voice" In 1996, the *Farmers' Platform*, a regional network of representative farmer organizations that will strengthen the problem-solving and lobbying capacities of the Sahelian rural populations, was officially created and launched. Attended by farmers' delegations from seven of the nine CILSS countries, as well as government officials, the press and donor representatives, the constitutive forum concluded with the adoption of a charter and by-laws, and the creation of a leadership council, comprised of two delegates from each country, one of whom is, by statute, a woman. The newly chartered forum then went on to adopt its first year work program. That work program was refined at mid-year with concrete objectives: solidifying the national constituent platforms, increasing the level and quality of communication among the national platforms, reinforcing collaboration with government structures and other partners and the creation of a technical commission.

The regional *Farmers' Platform* used its voice as an official delegate to several regional and international fora this year, including the statutory meeting of the CILSS Council of Ministers, the regional seminar on donor cooperation in the Sahel (Cooperation 21), the workshop to launch Sahel 21 (see S.O. 3 discussion), the general assembly of the West African Enterprise Network, the *Comité de Liaison des ONGs de l'Union Européen* and the U.N. World Food Summit. In each forum, *Platform* representatives have effectively presented an advocacy message for greater rural economic and social empowerment and greater responsiveness by state authorities.

The *Platform* reached agreement with the U.N. FAO in 1996 on a program of support to farmers' organizations, aimed at "strengthening their aptitude to analyze changes in their environment (natural, economic and institutional) and enhancing their capacity to formulate and negotiate agricultural and food security policies and programs." The program will be launched in four countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal.

At the national level, the *Platform* is building its support structure, and identifying the issues for its advocacy from the bottom up.

- As of October 1996, national farmers' platforms had been officially established in **Senegal, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso**.
- Support to national platform activities with the assistance of CILSS was offered in several countries. Support was provided to: a national meeting of rural organizations in **Senegal**; a grass-roots information campaign in **The Gambia** covering all five districts; regional "antennae" to coordinate the platform in **Mali**; the creation of a bridge group between two large farmers' movements in **Burkina Faso** and a program

of information and consolidation in **Chad** covering eight of 13 prefectures and involving farmers' organizations and NGOs.

- Comprehensive inventories and analyses of rural organizations were launched in **Mali** and **Burkina Faso**.

Creating a Private Sector "Voice" The West Africa Enterprise Network coalesced originally to foster a better business environment, but it also has an important civil society development aspect as reflected in its dual objectives of enhancing trade linkages and advocating for a business-friendly policy environment. In 1996 the WAEN strengthened its role in civil society by: implementing a dialogue with the national Assemblies of **Senegal** and **Mali**; participating in national conferences on economic reform in **Nigeria** and **Benin**, lobbying the governments of **The Gambia** and **Niger** to increase transparency and for a return to democratically-elected government; participating in a roundtable private sector development in **Mali** and participating in policy-setting for privatization in **Niger**. Its general assembly in Abidjan in October 1996 allowed Network members to share information on activities and on approaches to effective advocacy both formally and informally, as do the increasingly sophisticated communications methods that the Network is using with USAID assistance.

Decentralization After years of resistance by central governments in many Sahelian states, the tide has turned, and a number of states have formally decentralized as a policy and programmatic approach. The demand for information on successful experience, on legal frameworks for local development (especially in the francophone and lusophone countries) and on approaches to enhancing capacity for local management is nearly insatiable. In 1996:

- Four case studies each on decentralized management of natural resources in **Mali**, **Burkina Faso** and **Senegal** were completed.

**Decentralization:
The Power of an Idea**

The case of Burkina Faso illustrates the value of exchanging experiences among different countries in the region, the power of the demand for information in a single country and the way that regional and bilateral objectives can work synergistically to meet that demand

National commissions were formed in each country to bring the results of the CILSS Praia Conference home. In Burkina Faso, a national conference was held in 1995. Over 300 copies of the final conference papers were handed out, and more were requested.

The national discussion generated an immediate demand to repeat the discussions at the sub-regional level. A request for funds was made to USAID/Burkina, then in its final months of operation, and a small grant was made to the GOBF. Three workshops were held in Bobo Dioulasso, Koudougou and Ouahigouya with rural organizations, NGOs, traditional leaders, government technicians and administrators participating in each site.

To illustrate the type of information shared: The experience of a region in Burkina that convened a two-day meeting of agriculturalists and livestock owners to craft a local solution to the competition for use of land for livestock transit was recounted. An initial agreement was made on the spot among

- A report analyzing **Cape Verde's** decentralization experience was completed.
- A study (PADLOS/Education) carried out in communities in **Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger** and **Senegal** was completed. The study identified measures to help community associations, local businesses and citizens' groups acquire the new skills and knowledge they need to take over the economic, social and political functions heretofore monopolized by government or left undone.
- A regional workshop on the role of women in decentralization was held in Bamako, Mali. The workshop was attended by representatives of several national decentralization offices, of African associations of female elected officials, of NGOs and of the *Farmers' Platform*. A regional work program to expand and improve the role of women in decentralization was drafted and approved.
- A regional workshop for journalists was held in Ndjaména, Chad to develop strategies for improving the involvement of the press in promoting decentralization and local development. A work program for the Sahelian media (newspapers, radio and television) was established to prepare for the celebration of the 1997 "CILSS Day" around the theme of decentralization.
- A regional meeting was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso to review and summarize the results of the above-cited PADLOS/Education country case studies.

Land Tenure Security Land tenure arrangements in the Sahel have been state-dominated, and a significant obstacle to individual investment in natural resources improvements and agricultural productivity. A slow, but steady evolution of law and policy toward forest and rural codes that create incentives for investment in better resource management practices has been underway since the early 1990s. However, this evolution has brought to the fore the lacunae in tenure policy, including the relationship of modern to customary tenure security authorities, and the importance of exchanging information on effective conflict resolution mechanisms. In 1996, discussions of the roles of civil society

Conflict Management: Resource Tenure

The workshops on alternative conflict management in which CILSS played a major role in 1995 and 1996 spurred the formation of two specialized regional organizations for conflict management:

- *l'Organisation des Chefs Traditionels, which is waging a campaign for official recognition of the legitimacy of certain decisions that traditional chiefs take to manage resources and resolve conflicts. They have held two meetings in the region.*
- *l'Observatoire sous-régional sur la gestion alternative des conflits, whose mandate is to promote understanding of the causes of conflicts and traditional mechanisms for managing them. It is financed by a Geneva-based NGO, housed in a Dutch-supported facility and is intended to establish cooperation among NGOs and*

and various levels of government in assuring tenure security took place in:

- national seminars organized in **Chad** and **Mauritania** on alternative management of conflicts among natural resources users,
- a week-long visit by **Nigerien** officials and USAID/Niger's ASDG II Project staff to **Burkina Faso** to examine land tenure and natural resources management experiences in the latter country, and
- a regional workshop on Alternative Management of Conflicts, held in Niger, with the joint sponsorship of CILSS, the U.N. FAO and the Pan African Development Institute.

In 1996, Niger drafted an amended *Loi Forestière*, inspired to a considerable degree by conclusions and recommendations emanating from CILSS fora, notably the Regional Forest Codes Workshop of 1992 and the Praia Conference of 1994.

B. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions

Based on experience between 1987 and 1994, the Sahel Regional Program had modest expectations for progress in decentralized natural resources management and land tenure security improvement, leading to food security increases. Improved conditions for private sector operations through dialogue on the role of government were equally modest. The demand for decentralization of authority in all areas of governance has caused the SRP to revise upward the number of regional encounters it anticipates. It is expected that in FYs 1998 and 1999 there will be five such meetings, attended by a broad range of stakeholders. The quality of the advocacy by stakeholders should improve, allowing SRP to verify that the consensus at the end of each regional meeting takes into account the positions of the principal groups of stakeholders 75% of the time. At least one regional meeting in each year will focus on the problems or issues of a "special group" (women, pastoralists, youth, etc.) and specific solutions will be proposed.

A continuous stream of demand-driven studies and reviews of experience will be available for use and exchange by 1998. By 1999, training tools developed for enhancing the competency that rural organizations have in local administration will be disseminated to all nine CILSS countries and in use by three countries.

Teaming with Leland Initiative resources, the SRP expects that CILSS case study materials will be used in an electronic training course and "conference" on decentralization in five francophone West African countries. If this experiment is successful, the SRP expects by the end of FY 1998 to enable the CILSS to move part of the dialogue into the electronic sphere and have its decentralization and land tenure studies available on the World Wide Web.

The SRP will continue to track results that are beyond the program's manageable interest but are projected outcomes of the regional dialogue: changes in rural and forest codes in the nine Sahelian states; changes in land tenure laws; and whether the National Action Plans to combat desertification use participatory approaches and devise participatory plans.

C. Performance Data Tables

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective 2: Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development.</p> <p>APPROVED: DD/MMM/YYYY COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Sahel Regional Program</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: SO Indicator 1 - Meetings on the role of civil society and governance in improving management of natural resources, public services delivery, and food security.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Number of meetings</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: number</p> <hr/> <p>_____</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
<p>SOURCE: CILSS, USAID and other donor research and reports</p> <hr/> <p>_____</p>	1994(B)	0	0
	1995	1	1
<p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of meetings with multiple countries represented in which the focus is on civil society and governance in the above mentioned subject matter areas.</p> <hr/> <p>_____</p>	1996	2	11
	1997	5	
	1998	5	
<p>COMMENTS: Meetings counted are confined to those organized and initiated by West African entities that USAID supports. When the numeric targets were set initially, it was assumed that there would be one, or at most two, major regional meetings, on the scale of the Segou meeting of 1989 and the Praia meeting of 1994. In fact, the demand is so great that the meetings are more topically specialized, and occurring in parallel. Hence, the numeric target has been raised from 2 meetings each year to 5 to reflect the reality and the changing nature of the regional fora.</p>	1999	5	
	2000	5	
	2001	5	
	2002(T)	5	

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective 2: Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development. APPROVED: DD/MMM/YYYY COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Sahel Regional Program</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: SO Indicator 2 - Relevant stakeholders are included in planning, implementing and follow-up of discussions.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: qualitative</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: qualitative</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: CILSS, WAEN USAID and other donor reports and personal observation.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Estimate of the proportion of regional meetings that are inclusive in all phases of activity.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: This measure includes meetings organized by West African Entities supported by USAID and by other entities world wide in which Sahelian civil society is represented and/or issues are discussed.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1994(B)	Some	Some
	1995	Some	Some
	1996	Some	Some
	1997	Most	
	1998	Most	
	1999	Most	
	2000	Most	
	2001	Most	
	2002(T)	Most	
<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective 2: Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development. APPROVED: DD/MMM/YYYY COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Sahel Regional Program</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: SO Indicator 3 - Decisions reflect positions put forward by various stakeholders.</p>			

INDICATOR: Percent of decisions			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent	YEAR	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
SOURCE: CILSS, WAEN, USAID and other-donor reports and personal observation. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This is a measure of effective participation in regional dialogue. COMMENTS:	1993(B)	NO	NO
	1994	<50%	<50%
	1995	<50%	<50%
	1996	<50%	
	1997	<50%	
	1998	<50%	
	1999	<75%	
	2000	<75%	
	2001	<75%	
	2002(T)	<75%	

Strategic Objective 3: Decision makers have ready access to relevant information on food security, population and the environment.

The targets for this SO were fully achieved in 1996.

The CILSS regional system has proven to be one of the most successful African-donor institutional arrangements in Africa. Originally created as a mechanism to coordinate food aid and other emergency resources in the Sahel. The system has evolved to become a source for environmental monitoring and early warning information (AGRHYMET), for research and policy and strategy development in the areas of population and development, agricultural research, economic and sociological research (INSAH) and for policy analysis and planning (CILSS headquarters). After an extensive restructuring in 1994, CILSS produced its first long-term programming document, which defined and focused the system's program for 1995-1997. CILSS and the donor organizations that support the CILSS programs began to review and refine the Three-Year Plan in early 1995, and by mid-1995 CILSS had begun to implement the Plan. In 1996, CILSS made great progress toward achieving its mandate to improve **food security** and combat desertification to attain **ecological balance** in the Sahel. This SO captures USAID's contribution to the multi-donor/multi-state support to CILSS, and to the companion activities of the Club du Sahel.

A. Performance Analysis

Since achieving direct impacts on national and regional policy is beyond the manageable interest of the SRP, this SO seeks only to insure that people who make decisions have relevant and sound information on which to base their decisions. However, we use a measure success that is slightly higher than the SRP's manageable interest because the best indicator of the availability of information is its actual use in policy formulation. This measures the CILSS/Club's success in providing support and guidance to member countries' development of policies and programs. Hence, the indicator is an assessment of the extent to which member countries include regional concerns on food security, population, and natural resource management in their own policy formulation and planning processes. It is also an assessment of the degree to which CILSS is able to provide relevant, demand-driven information and analyses to its clients (the member-states), and the Club to theirs (the CILSS member-states and the donor partners). The indicator is measured as the percent of countries whose policies are sensitive to regional factors and trends. The program target is that all CILSS countries will have achieved regional awareness in all three policy statements by 2001, with 60% reaching this status by 1997 (the end of the first Three-Year Plan) and 75% achieved by the end of 2000 (the end of the second Three-Year Plan)⁵.

- Based on 1996 reviews of agricultural, population and natural resource management policy in the region, we estimate that, in aggregate, CILSS member states have covered 55% of the distance toward achieving regionally consistent policies in the three focus areas of food security, population and natural resource management.
- With the revitalization of the CILSS and the emphasis in the donor community to assure African leadership in African development on the one hand, and the many more fora for donor consultation and coordination on the other, the Club is also in the process of re-thinking its niche, and the U.S., the Dutch, Canadians and the French collaborated during 1996 in an external evaluation (originally suggested by USAID and the Dutch) of this mechanism. The final conclusions and a plan for implementing recommendations from this evaluation will be discussed by Club members in late March of 1997.

People level impact A quantitative evaluation of the impact of this SO is difficult. In a broad context, the continued avoidance of food crises in the Sahel translates into substantial savings of money and life. The successful execution of the CILSS Three-Year Workplan will contribute to more open trade; improved food security via both improved resource management and better coordinated and focused agricultural research; and better, more rational national population policies, all with more strategically-placed donor assistance. It is extremely difficult to place a dollar value on these items, but in the face of decreasing donor resources to support national and regional investments in development, better, more coordinated management and planning controlled and executed by Sahelians may be the only way to assure long term sustainability of the achievements of the last 20 years.

The presentation of this indicator has been changed from last year. In the past this was reported as the number of countries. We have converted this to a percentage measure which allows us to better aggregate progress in each of the three areas (food security, natural resource management, and population).

A major step was taken toward consolidating these gains when CILSS decided in 1995 to develop a long-term strategy for the Sahel (see Box below). Sahel 21 is the vehicle through which strategic planning moved into full operation in 1996 and includes a general strategic review of development prospects and options, and a specific long term statement on agricultural transformation in the Sahel. Their "vision" is being constructed with full participation by stakeholders at all levels of Sahelian society. Stakeholders, including Sahelian civil society, the CILSS institutions, donor partners and the public sector in each member state, have participated in vision development, which will be completed in mid-1997, in time for the 20th anniversary of the Club du Sahel and the triennial meeting of the CILSS Heads of State. Sahel 21 will make the next Three-Year Plan for CILSS and the future work of the Club demand-driven. This is a major and unique achievement and it is entirely Sahelian-led.

It is difficult to emphasize enough just how far-reaching the implications of Sahel 21 will be in terms

Sahel 21: A Sahelian Vision of the Future

Sahel 21 was launched following a regional brainstorming session in Niamey in November, 1995. It has progressed rapidly, and all nine CILSS countries are actively engaged.

Purpose: *Develop a Sahelian vision of the future of the Sahel:*

- *based on lessons from the past - an evaluation of constraints, opportunities and current trends;*
- *based on stakeholder desires, ambitions and expectations;*
- *one which identifies priorities set by stakeholders and which establishes strategies and roles for different actors in Sahelian civil society (the State, youth, women, NGOs, the rural and urban populations) and at which level - local, national or regional - these priorities should be attacked.*

The process is participatory at all levels of society. Five of the nine countries have already initiated decentralized discussions - the others are in the process of identifying stakeholders and organizing discussion fora:

- *Guinea Bissau has organized discussions in four different parts of the country (which include individuals, NGOs, womens' and other associations, and religious, business, government and traditional leaders);*
- *Senegal organized meetings in four parts of the country which included NGOs, various associations and local leaders -- the debates were held in local languages and were video taped and recorded on cassette for later dissemination;*
- *Cape Verde organized similar meetings on the various islands, and there was a direct recognition of the importance of Sahel 21 by the President in his year-end message to the nation;*

of achievement of the mandate given CILSS by its member states. It virtually assures the success of the Sahel Regional Program. While CILSS and its specialized institutions still require technical assistance from time to time, the system has matured to the point where it is capable, itself, of determining what and when assistance is needed. We expect that by the end of the next three-year plan it will no longer be necessary to provide long-term technical assistance to any part of CILSS, except for that needed to meet the arcane requirements of the US assistance process. At its current pace of development, sustainable financing of the system is rapidly becoming the major issue. CILSS, with assistance from USAID, is investigating the possibility of establishing a foundation or endowment to help achieve the financial sustainability goal.

We did not include a discussion of the intermediate results for the other two SOs, but we believe that in the case of SO 3 they are sufficiently important to warrant individual attention. A discussion of the three IRs for this SO follows.

Intermediate Result 3.1: Maintain and improve food security monitoring and disaster mitigation systems. The Sahel is subject to periodic pest attacks and shortages in rainfall, with resultant variations in food and pasture production, but the region has been able to avoid famine for most of the last 20 years -- attributable to coordination through the CILSS/Club mechanism. The principles behind this coordination are imbedded in the Food Aid Charter, a semi-formal agreement between CILSS states and the donors which calls for improved food aid coordination, joint preparation of food balance sheets, improved monitoring and evaluation procedures, encouraging local and regional market development and avoidance of creating consumption habits dependent on imported food aid. Success in application of the Charter is reviewed at the annual meeting of the Food Crisis Prevention Network, which includes the donors, CILSS and multilateral agencies such as FAO/GEWS and the World Food Program. Information provided at the 1996 meeting of the Network suggests that the application of the Charter remains in the same range as in the past -- fair-to-good. In order to better understand and consolidate knowledge about the impacts of food aid to the Sahel, the Network, in collaboration with CILSS and at USAID urging, decided in 1994 to undertake a major review of the impacts of food aid to the region. The study was started in 1996, and will be completed in 1997. The Sahel Regional Program and CDIE agreed in 1996 to produce a review of USAID experience in providing food aid to the Sahel as an extension of CDIE's world wide review of American food aid programs. This study will be finalized in 1997 and will be shared with CILSS and the Club.

AGRHYMET is the primary CILSS institution involved in the regional famine early warning system. It provides technical support, monitoring, and reporting services to CILSS member states. The institution produces and transmits country-specific greenness maps during the rainy season so progress can be monitored; accumulates and reports rainfall data on a ten-day cycle; and reports pest infestations and other problems. CILSS, FAO and the World Food Program are all now placing greater emphasis on early warning systems, which will heighten AGRHYMET's role and responsibility in regionwide early warning reporting.

Since timely communication is essential to early warning reporting, AGRHYMET has established an electronic communication system between the regional center and its correspondents in the member states. Information transmission rates have been reduced from a week in 1994 to a matter

of minutes in 1996. The electronic communication system helps collaborating national institutions improve their own reporting capabilities. All of the nine CILSS states now produce at least a monthly bulletin, based in part on databases and other information accessible at AGRHYMET Regional Center (ARC). Some countries are more advanced than others in terms of full utilization of the materials, technologies and training provided by the ARC. As of the end of 1996, five of the national correspondents of the AGRHYMET system were judged to be fairly well advanced in the use of early warning materials and data, including the use and maintenance of databases and the use of GIS technologies. In 1997, the ARC, at the request of its collaborating national units, will intensify training of national units so they are better equipped to use the information and technology which is now available to them.

Intermediate Result 3.2: Support the development and application of an environmental planning and monitoring system to coordinate NRM interventions on a systematic basis in ecological contexts. This IR is largely focused on completion, acceptance and implementation of the Africa Annex to the International Convention to Combat Desertification, including establishment of impact monitoring systems. The Annex itself was drafted in June 1994 and discussions on early actions were held in October 1994. The United States signed the Convention that same year. All OECD countries have signed and indicated that they expected ratification by the end of 1996, and all of the Sahelian countries have ratified the Convention. A key theme of the INC-D is participation by affected peoples.

CILSS has been designated to represent the West African states in the INC-D negotiations and plays a major coordinating and technical support role in helping CILSS member states develop action plans and early start programs. While it cannot be said that the early start programs have been developed at the pace originally expected, donors in seven of the nine countries have been identified in a donor-coordinator role known as *Chef de File*, and plans are being developed. National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs), which are the first stage of implementation of the Convention, have been developed by five Sahelian states. Three more were expected to be completed in 1996, however, in Niger and The Gambia the NEAP/NAP process has been stalled by regime changes. A National Action Plan (NAP), the second stage, was developed in one of the nine CILSS countries (Mauritania) in 1995, and four more were expected to be completed in 1996. At the request of ECOWAS, CILSS embarked in 1996 on the development of a sub-regional action plan which encompasses 17 West African States. A proposed methodology and preliminary inventory of necessary regional actions was completed in 1996. The sub-regional action plan will be completed in 1997.

The responsibility that CILSS has accepted for the monitoring/impact analysis portion of the Convention is shared by AGRHYMET and INSAH. A first-year program for this unit was developed in 1995 and it is now well into implementation.

- The first stage was to develop a regional knowledge base of existing resource management activities in the member states, including types of data and kinds of analyses and impact assessments already done. Information collected by this work was exchanged and discussed at a regional meeting in early 1996. The participants decided that the issues were sufficiently complex that additional time and effort was needed before they could set parameters for a

collaborative regional system for analysis, monitoring and information exchange on resource management practices.

- A second meeting was held in Dakar in February 1997. It established the process for developing a framework for national, regional, and international cooperation. Specifically, INSAH and AGRHYMET (both the agro-socio-economic and population components) and their national "focal points" in each member state, with assistance from a variety of expatriate collaborators will develop a consistent information collection, analysis and dissemination system.

This is the first time a concerted effort has been made to develop a regional forum for consistent collection and evaluation of the socio-economic impacts of resource management programs in the region. The efficiencies to be gained from the exchange of experiences across the region should go far toward advancing the state-of-the-art in African understanding and African controlled implementation of resource management programs.

Another program at INSAH also linked with the resource management activity, is implemented by the agricultural research unit of the agro-socioeconomic research *Programme Majeur*. This program is also supported by USAID from both SRP and AFR/SD/PSGE resources. It aims to improve the efficiency of agricultural research programs in the CILSS member states. Recognizing that some countries in the region are much farther advanced in strategic planning than others, this activity has concentrated on helping the least advanced (often smaller) countries improve their strategic planning capabilities. This is accomplished by helping the smaller research systems share experiences from the larger, more experienced systems and by insuring that relevant research is transferred rather than duplicated. A second and equally important activity carried out by this unit has been the production of several analyses of the impact of agricultural research. Analyses have accomplished two goals: training of national researchers in assessment techniques, and accumulation of vital information on the cost/benefits of agricultural research in the region. It is difficult to place a quantitative value on this work, but the information it provides is an invaluable input into determining how member states will allocate their increasing scarce resources. The analyses have shown that agricultural research has extremely high rates of return (generally in the range of 30-130%, depending on assumptions - higher rates are for production increases which replace food aid). The implications of studies on returns to agricultural research completed in Burkina Faso, Senegal, Niger, and Mali were discussed at a regional meeting which was hosted by INSAH in 1996, with researchers and decision makers attending. In 1996, four meetings and training sessions were held under this activity.

These efforts have produced numerous significant achievements and impacts:

- Training of 32 regional scientists in impact assessment methodology;
- In 1996, Sahelians developed and discussed (at regional meetings) seven separate reports on the impact of agricultural research;
- Cape Verde (because it has so little arable land) has accepted the recommendation that it rely on the international research structure as its source of technology;

- Guinea Bissau accepted a recommendation that it revise its plan for establishing a large, financially insupportable, network of research stations to a smaller, more focused, more sustainable system;
- Chad, which had developed a research strategy with World Bank support, was languishing because the Bank finally opted to support extension rather than research. Following INSAH recommendations, the GOC reordered its priorities to implement critical parts of the research strategy.

The contribution to food security is substantial. For example, short-season groundnuts, rice, cowpea, maize, millet and sorghum varieties have made it possible for farmers in the Sahel to adapt to shorter and/or more variable growing seasons, which has definitely contributed to stabilizing food security and reducing the need for food aid in the Sahel. These successes are part of the reason that there has not been a food crisis in the Sahel in recent years.

While better weather patterns are perhaps the most important factor, agronomic research, better resource management, better food policy, and more open markets have meant that less and less food aid is needed in the Sahel (Figure 1)⁶.

Intermediate Result 3.3: Population policies and action plans are based on analyses of demographic variables underlying regional population dynamics, including the determinants of fertility, mortality and migratory trends and levels. The program to achieve this intermediate result is carried out through the SRP's support to the Population and Development Programme Majeur is implemented by the CILSS/INSAH Center for Applied Research on Population and Development (CERPOD). CERPOD is the part of the CILSS institution which provides regional research and analysis on demographic and health issues; population policy, planning, and strategy development assistance; and training in population and health policy analysis to CILSS states and selected other West African states.

Within the panoply of activities that CERPOD implements, the SRP focuses on those with regional implications. Thus, its measures of performance for the SRP include the number of studies at regional and national levels that include a regional dimension; assurance that the results have been disseminated and hence have a higher probability of having impact on national policies and programs; and the number of member state population policies and action plans written and adopted, along with a measure of whether the action plans are being implemented. This gives the SRP an indication of whether CERPOD, with its regional perspective, has had an opportunity to work with the member state population, health and planning and service delivery entities - public and private - and to bring the regional perspective to bear. CERPOD has many other impressive and important achievements, but these three indicators allow the SRP to measure progress toward its broader objectives of regional ecological balance. These indicators are somewhat more refined than those we use for CILSS headquarters and the other *Programme Majeur* at INSAH because CERPOD's program is more mature and has had a longer history.

Data source: UN/WFP/INTERFAIS (Special issue for the CILSS/Food Crisis Prevention Network 10th Annual Meeting (11/95))

As indicated above, CERPOD executes an ambitious research effort, much of which is fairly long term in nature. For example, CERPOD had a total of 65 activities on its books for the 1995/96 year; 53 of which were part of its three-year action plan and 12 which were initiated outside the plan. As of December, 1996, 13 of the planned activities had been completed, 25 were still underway and 15 had not yet started. Of the unplanned activities, 10 were completed and 2 were still underway. These activities range from specific, non-regional "contracts" to truly regional demographic and health studies and technical assistance to member states. **Partially at USAID insistence and with the strong support of the "Technical and Management Committee" that CILSS has created for each *Programme Majeur*, CERPOD has prioritized its 1997 program and reduced the number of activities to a manageable level, consistent with the level of human and resources available.**

In 1994 we reported that the study, "Regional Adolescent Fertility and Medical Barriers to Contraception" had been initiated. Analysis and report preparation was completed in 1995 and a plan for dissemination in cooperating countries was completed. No dissemination was done in 1996. A seminar is scheduled for Burkina Faso in late March, 1997. Mali and Senegal are not yet scheduled, and Niger's is in abeyance because of the post-coup restrictions. A second study on migration and urbanization in eight countries in West Africa also advanced during 1996. All eight country reports and one for the Cote d'Ivoire were completed. A regional summary is to be completed in 1997. Mali and Cote d'Ivoire held seminars in October and November, 1996, respectively. Niger is preparing for its seminar (using other donor resources). A third, major new research effort on AIDS and public health was started in 1995, and is still underway.

The operations research unit at CERPOD is a vital means of providing technical support for the development of country population policies and action plans, and for improvement in the monitoring of outcomes and achievements in terms of changes in population growth rates. CERPOD, in collaboration with the CILSS member states, has made considerable progress in this area: by the end of 1994 CERPOD had assisted seven of the nine CILSS states to develop population policy statements. An eighth country was added to the list in 1995, and a ninth (Guinea Bissau) was added in 1996, although two countries have yet to officially adopt the policy statements. Population Action Plans are now being developed. To date Chad has developed an action plan. A vital underpinning to the development of policies and plans are accurate and efficient health information systems. In 1996, CERPOD provided support to Mali, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Mauritania and Cape Verde to strengthen their systems.

The 1996 calendar year saw a number of positive management steps taken toward focusing the generation of policy-relevant information produced by CERPOD. However, dissemination remained weak. Moreover, given the high levels of unmet demand for birth spacing, the low contraceptive prevalence rates, the high fertility and mortality rates and high rates of population growth in the region, the population experts must revisit the assumptions on which the work of CERPOD and its partners has been based. For example, the assumption has been that having a family-planning-friendly population policy would make a difference in at least raising contraceptive prevalence rates, but there is no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis in the Sahel. In fact, there is very little evidence that targeting policy decision makers with policy analysis has had a measurable impact in national human or financial resources allocated to population and health programs, or that donor resources are being used in ways that effectively alter behavior. During 1997 and beyond, we intend

to encourage the population and health expert community to re-examine its assumptions with respect to the linkage between improved understanding and effective interventions on the part of policy-makers.

B. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions

Overall, we expect the CILSS countries to make significant progress toward planning and implementing rational policies, based on objective criteria such as comparative advantage and insuring grassroots participation. By 1997 all nine of the CILSS countries will have operational national early warning information systems which are well integrated with the regional system. By the end of 1997, the CILSS system will have completed its first Three-Year Plan and will have developed the second plan. The Second Three-Year Plan will be based on a strategy document (Sahel 21) which is now being prepared. The Strategy and the Plan will be highly participatory with intense bottom-up collaboration with groups and associations in the member countries. National population policies will be in place in all nine countries and the process of designing and executing action plans will underway, although, as noted above, this path to reduced fertility has been thrown into some question by the stubborn statistics on fertility in the Sahel.

Given experience gained under the restructuring of CILSS, and experience to be developed by the process of developing Sahel 21, it will be necessary to revise the indicators for this SO (the SO will not be changed). The SRP will add new indicators for this SO in at the end of 1997 and will begin reporting them in 1998. We expect the new indicators to tie outputs from the CILSS programs more closely to measurable results on national policies and people in the member states. They will be closely tied to CILSS's next Three-Year Plan.

The U.S., the Dutch, Canadians and the Germans collaborated during 1996 in an external evaluation of the Club du Sahel and its secretariat (originally suggested by USAID and the Dutch). The final conclusions and a plan for implementing recommendations from this evaluation will be discussed by Club members in late March of 1997 and will be implemented over the 1997-1999 period.

C. Performance Data Tables

<p>OBJECTIVE: Strategic Objective 3: Decision makers have ready access to relevant information on food security, population and the environment. APPROVED: DD/MMM/YYYY COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Sahel Regional Program</p>			
<p>RESULT NAME: SO 3 indicator 1 - Sahelian countries use consistent information in developing NRMS, food security and population policies and programs.</p>			
<p>INDICATOR: Progress toward region wide use of consistent information in policy and program development</p>			
<p>UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent of countries</p> <hr/> <p>SOURCE: CILSS, USAID and other donor reports and analyses.</p> <hr/> <p>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Indicator is the percentage of all countries meeting achieving the indicator. Maximum indicator is 100%. Indicator is [(countries meeting NRMS policy criteria)+(countries meeting food security policy criteria)+(countries meeting population policy criteria)]/27.</p> <hr/> <p>COMMENTS: The indicator is targeted for 1997, 2000 and 2002, which is consistent with the CILSS three-year planning cycle. Intermediate results will be used to report between reporting years. See Annex B for a summary table of the IR's. Note that the target for 1997 and 2000 have been increased to account for achievements as of 1996.</p>	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1993(B)	0	0
	1994	na	na
	1995	na	na
	1996	na	55%
	1997	60%	
	1998	na	
	1999	na	
	2000	75%	
	2001	na	
2002(T)	100%		

SECTION III: STATUS OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

The SRP Strategic Plan was reviewed and the three SOs were approved in January 1995. The issues raised during the review related to implementation or to measurement. After the second full year of implementation, we do not find it necessary to change or modify any of the Strategic Objectives. We have, however, modified the Intermediate Results in SO 2, collapsing the former IR 2.2 and IR 2.3 into a unified new IR 2.2, "Promote fora for developing problem-solving strategies at the community, local, national and regional levels."

However, the continued ability to support SO 1 (promotion of regional trade and investment), given the factors discussed below, remains an issue. In every program document submitted since strategy approval, the SRP has indicated that with reduced resources, it would chose to suspend implementation of SO 1, rather than try to restrict performance of all three SOs. The proposal for FY 1999 reflects the actual requirement to sustain all three strategic objectives, and a reduced level will result in the suspension of SO 1.

As reflected in the Overview and Factors Affecting section of this report, USAID rightsizing and reengineering and the political instability in certain Sahelian states present challenges to effective program management. While reengineering has brought recognition of the SRP as an operating unit and an effective core team has begun to operate, it has had the opposite effect on forging virtual teams. Missions located in countries that co-manage SRP activities have taken the manageable interest criterion seriously and determined that SRP activities are not in their manageable interest, and thus should receive low priority attention. In order for the SRP to be managed effectively with minimal U.S. direct-hire resources (up to 1994, approximately 3 FTEs in AFR/WA and 1 FTE in Paris), the program had conventionally relied upon an implicit "contract" with field missions in countries where the CILSS institutions were located. That implicit contract and the capacity to manage the program with minimal staffing are called into question by the rightsizing that closed USAID/Burkina Faso and the legislatively-driven closure (for all practical purposes) of USAID/Niger mission, and the reengineering that produced new strategies and a tighter focus on delivering bilateral results. The larger issue of shared responsibility and sense of purpose between regional and bilateral programs, when the regional program is not a field-support, but a stand-alone program with separate objectives, was one of the issues highlighted during the discussions on regional programs held in AFR/Washington January 29-30, 1997.

The SRP is experiencing some significant difficulties in supporting achievement in each of its three Strategic Objectives, given the pressure that its program resources have come under in the last three years, and the shift in the allocation of those resource required by the reengineering and rightsizing outcomes. Consider the following:

- The SRP budget for FYs 1997 and 1998 is a 20 per cent reduction from the average obligation level of FYs 1992-1995.
- The post closure/separation from bilateral program management has driven the program-supported management costs through the institutional contract to \$1.4 million per year (FY 1999-2002) from a cost of approximately \$500,000 per year prior to FY 1996. The new cost represents over 25 per cent of the SRP budget at the FY 1997 level, whereas in the years

prior to FY 1996 the cost was approximately eight per cent. Heretofore, the SRP benefitted from use of Mission PSC and FSN ceilings, which helped to hold costs down. In two of the three field sites, this is no longer an option. Even at the FY 1999 requested budget level, the management support costs represent 27 per cent of program resources.

- The Civil Service RIF eliminated the 50 per cent of a USDH program operations assistant and 50 per cent of a USDH project development officer's time devoted to supporting the SRP. This has been replaced by a **program-funded** USDA RSSA FTE.

The net effect of these reductions in overall budget and reallocations to compensate for downsizing and reengineering, is that we are no longer able to meet our commitments at the level that will lead to full achievement of the three SOs. These reductions and reallocations come at a time when the capabilities and absorptive capacities of the CILSS and the WAEN, our principal African partners, are growing, and we are expanding to new partnerships, as with UEMOA and ECOWAS. Most of the partners want USAID to support relationships with U.S. centers of excellence, which is often a higher priority for them than direct assistance to their work programs. The SRP has been creative in seeking collaborators within USAID -- principally with AFR/SD and the G Bureau -- but finds itself less and less able to respond to the demand, given the reductions and reallocations.

SECTION IV: RESOURCE REQUEST

A. Financial Plan

A summary of the 1997-1999 Resource Request is presented below, detailed tables are on pages 32-34.

Year	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	Total
1997	890,000	300,000	2,611,000	\$3,801,000 ¹
1998	774,000	677,000	3,418,000	\$4,869,000
1999	947,000	638,000	4,451,000	\$6,036,000

¹With re-obs, the total is \$4,868,000.

B. Prioritization of Objectives

In the event that the level of resources necessary to support the full program are not available, the SRP will retain strategic objectives in the following order:

1. SO 3: The elimination of SO 3 would mean the complete destruction of the SRP strategic plan. This SO must be retained.
2. SO 2: This SO is cross-cutting, and it would be nearly impossible to extract its support from the SO 3 support. Contribution by the U.S. to the results would be greatly diminished, but the objective would be retained and results reported.
3. SO 1: Support to this SO has already been reduced. If resources fall below current levels it will be eliminated.

Thus, the order of priority for funding the SOs would be as follows: SO 3, SO 1, SO 2.

C. Linkage of Field Support, Non-Emergency Title II and Title III

The SRP does not make use of either Title II or Title III resources. The detailed SRP request for field support is show in the table on page 28. It is summarized as follows:

Year	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	Total
1997	441,000	200,000	235,000	\$876,000
1998	175,000	150,000	400,000	\$725,000
1999	75,000	175,000	500,000	\$750,000

D. Workforce and OE

1. Workforce Requirements

Workforce for the SRP continues its downward spiral with the elimination of the USDH position in Paris at the end of FY 1998. This leaves one USDH FTE and two USDA RSSA FTE positions in AFR/WA.

At the end of FY 1994, a year before the first post closure directly affecting the management of the SRP, the workforce configuration for the SRP is estimated to have been as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>FTE</u>	<u>Position</u>
AFR/WA	3	Regional Development Officer (2) Program Ops (50%) PDO (50%)
USAID/Burkina Faso	25% of 1	USAID Rep (15%) Controller (10%)
USAID/Niger	25% of 1	Director (5%) PDO (5%) GDO (10%) Controller (5%)
USAID/Mali	25% of 1	Director (2%) ADO (10%) HPNO (8%) Controller (5%)
Paris	1	U.S. Representative/Club du Sahel

All but one Regional Development Officer USDH position associated with the Sahel Regional Program will have been eliminated by the beginning of FY 1999. The controller functions have been assumed by REDSO/WCA/WAAC, but all other oversight functions now accrue to the one RDO ins AFR/WA, since the position at the Club du Sahel does not allow for involvement in USAID program management. Although a substantial amount of work has been shifted to program-funded support mechanisms, the workforce reduction is striking.

2. Operating Expenses

The SRP currently operates with two USDH positions, one of which will be eliminated in September 1998. OE needed to support that position will be eliminated, but additional OE for oversight visits by AFR/WA staff to field sites will be required with the elimination of the position at the Club du Sahel, and with a more activist USAID role in implementation of the International Convention to

Combat Desertification, which, for West Africa, will be monitored by AFR/SD at the request of AFR/WA. Since the INC-D is a formal treaty signed by the U.S. Government, official USAID representation is sometimes required, and will be provided by AFR/SD using travel funds allocated by the SRP operating unit.

Estimated Travel Budget: Regional Program USDH

Travel	Trips/Year	FY 1998 (\$000)	FY 1999 (\$000)
Washington-West Africa and Return - Burkina - Mali - Niger - Cote d'Ivoire Per diem: 2 weeks each trip @ \$190/day	6	12 16	12 16
Washington-Paris & Return Per diem: 1 week each trip @ \$260/day	3	3.5 5.3	3.5 5.3
GRAND TOTAL	9	36.8	36.8

E. Environmental Compliance

The activities we support under this program are largely analyses and dialogue. Thus, we anticipate no 22 CFR 216 issues to emerge as we transition to results packages. We will consult with the Bureau environmental officer as we get closer to a definition of our results packages to verify this expectation.

ANNEX A
General Indicators

Table 1: Selected Development Indicators for the Sahel

(Continued on next page)

Indicator	Burkina Faso	Cape Verde	Chad	Gambia	Guinea Bissau	Mali
Human Development						
Rank of 174(1993)	170	122	163	162	161	171
H. D. Index(1980)	0.151	n/a	0.151	0.148	0.148	0.146
H. D. Index(1992)	0.203	0.474	0.212	0.215	0.224	0.214
H. D. Index(1993)	0.225	0.534	0.291	0.292	0.297	0.223
% change (93/92)	11%	13%	37%	36%	33%	4%
Relative Gender Development Index(1993)	0.247	0.605	0.322	0.322	0.329	0.251
Population						
1993 (millions)	9.8	6.0	7.3	1.0	1.0	10.1
% of regional total	18.2%	11.1%	13.5%	1.9%	1.9%	18.7%
% rural	83.1%	70.0%	66.2%	76.2%	79.2%	74.9%
Population Growth Rate						
Average (1980-1992)	2.6	2.1	2.4	3.0	1.9	2.6
Expected (1992-2000)	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.1	3.1
Most recent (1990-1994)	2.9	2.3	2.5	3.9	2.0	3.0
GNP/Capita						
1994(\$/capita)	300	930	180	330	240	250
1993(\$/capita)	290	920	210	350	237	270
Growth Rate(%/year)						
Actual(1980-1993)	0.8	3.0	3.2	-0.2	2.8	-1.0
Expect(1992-2000)	2.5	2.7	2.5	1.0	2.1	2.0
Most recent (1994)	3.4	1.1	-14.3	-5.7	1.3	-7.4
Est. 1995	1.4		3.0		2.2	2.8
Poverty						
UNDP Poverty measure(% population, 1993)	60	n/a	61	38	57	59
Relative Poverty (% below 2/3 national avg.)						
% of total population	56	44	n/a	44	54	n/a
% of rural population	65	n/a	n/a	73	65	n/a
Literacy						
Total (% of population >15 yrs, 1970)	8	37	11			8
Total (% of population, 1985)		47		20	30	
Total (% of population, 1992)				27	36	
Total (% of population, 1993)	18		46			28
Annual improvement (% of pop.)	0.4	0.7	1.5	1.0	0.9	0.9
Female (% of females>15yrs, 1993)	8.4	59.6	32.4	23.1	40.1	20.8
Natural Resources						
Land Area (000 km2 in 1993)	274.2	4.0	1,284.0	11.3	36.1	1,240.2
Ag. Land (% of total)	49.5%	15.9%	38.3%	27.0%	50.5%	26.3%
Ag. land irrigated (%)	0.2%	3.1%	0.0%	4.4%	0.4%	0.6%
Arable land (% of total area)	13.8%	10.7%	2.5%	15.9%	8.3%	2.0%
Arable land irrigated (% of arable)	0.6%	7.0%	0.4%	8.3%	5.7%	3.1%
Forest & Woods as % of total area	50.4%	0.2%	25.2%	24.5%	29.6%	5.6%
Deforestation rate 1980-89 (annual %)	1.7%	0.0%	0.6%	2.4%	2.7%	0.5%

Sources: 1) UNDP 1996 Human Development Report; 2) World Bank, World Development Report, 1995, 1996; 3) World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, 1994, and database; 4) based on 1996 SPA documents.

Table 1: Selected Development Indicators for the Sahel (Continued)

Indicator	Mauritania	Niger	Senegal	Sahel	Source	Notes
Human Development						
Rank of 174(1993)	149	174	153	164	1	Unless indicated otherwise, the Sahel aggregate is weighted by total population.
H. D. Index(1980)	n/a	0.163	0.233	0.167	1	
H. D. Index(1992)	0.254	0.209	0.322	0.258	1	
H. D. Index(1993)	0.353	0.204	0.331	0.288	1	
% change (93/92)	39%	-2%	3%	12%		
Relative Gender Development Index(1993)	0.395	0.225	0.367	0.321	1	of female/male equity with a maximum value of 1.0.
Population						
1993 (millions)	2.2	8.6	7.9	53.9	1	
% of regional total	4.1%	16.0%	14.7%	100.0%		
% rural	50.4%	79.1%	59.2%	72.1%	1	
Population Growth Rate						
Average (1980-1992)	2.4	3.3	2.9	2.7	1	
Expected (1992-2000)	2.8	3.2	2.7	2.9	1	
Most recent (1990-1994)	2.5	3.2	2.7	2.8	2	
GNP/Capita						
1994(\$/capita)	480	230	610	386	2	
1993(\$/capita)	500	270	750	418	2	
Growth Rate(%/year)						
Actual(1980-1993)	-0.8	-4.1	0	0.1	2	
Expect(1992-2000)	2.0	1.0	1.6	2.0	2	
Most recent (1994)	-4.0	-14.8	-18.7	-7.9	2	
Est. 1995	2.0	-0.3	2.3	1.6	4	
Poverty						
UNDP Poverty measure(% population, 1993)	61	72	51	60	1	
Relative Poverty (% below 2/3 national avg.)						
% of total population	n/a	38	55	49	3	
% of rural population	n/a	43	78	61	3	weighted by rural population
Literacy						
Total (% of population >15 yrs, 1970)		4	12	13	1	
Total (% of population, 1985)	27				3	
Total (% of population, 1992)	34				3	
Total (% of population, 1993)		13	31	29	1	
Annual improvement (% of pop.)	1.0	0.4	0.8	0.8	1	
Female (% of females>15yrs, 1993)	25.3	6.1	21.5	22.7	1	
Natural Resources						
Land Area (000 km2 in 1993)	1,025.5	1,267.0	196.7	5,339.0	3	
Ag. Land 6 11.76 Tf0.0324t. 199550racy						

ANNEX B: Table 1: Status of the Desertification Convention, National Environmental Action Plans (NEAP) and National Action Programs (NAP) in Sahelian Countries as of 2/97.

Country	Convention Ratified	Chef de File (CdF)	Status of NAP
CILSS	NA	NA	<p>The CILSS PASP activity (at Headquarters) will help coordinate NAPs at the regional level and provide assistance to help create the fora necessary for local participation mandated by the Convention.</p> <p>6/95(Dakar) CILSS mandate to guide the sub-regional action plan. 2/96(Lome) strategy for elaboration of sub-regional action plan. 3/97 (Niamey) regional meeting to finalize sub-regional AP.(17 ECOWAS countries).</p>
Cape Verde (complete)	YES	France	<p>NEAP /NAP, 96). Coordinating unit (95) Fora created (95) Fora meetings (96)</p>
Mauritania	YES	None	<p>No actual NEAP /NAP-like program started in 95) No coordination unit</p>
Senegal	YES	US and Dutch still deciding which country will serve as CdF	<p>NEAP/NAP (started 96, expect completion May ,97) Coordination unit created (93) Fora created with NEAP</p>
Gambia (complete)	YES	None (because of the coup, no donor will participate)	<p>NEAP completed (92) Coordination Task Force created (95)</p>
Guinea Bissau	YES	None	<p>NEAP completed (93) Coordination unit created (1990) but has not been operational</p> <p>CILSS/Club du Sahel will visit in 1996 to see what can be done to stimulate more coordination</p>

Mali	YES	Germany	NEAP (95), NAP (started 96, not yet complete) Coordinating unit created Fora organized (95) Fora meetings (planned, 96, started, ??)
Burkina Faso (complete)	YES	Dutch	NEAP completed (91) Coordinating unit created Fora created (95)
Niger	YES	US (after US withdrawal, UNDP has taken the role)	NEAP/NAP (started 96, not yet completed) Coordination unit created Fora to be established
Chad	YES	France	NEAP/NAP (not started) Coordination unit created

Source: USAID, Club du Sahel, World Resources Institute, World Bank. Note: The Desertification Convention mandates participatory development of NAPs. Most of the early NEAPs were top down, so separate NAPs had to be developed. Later NEAPs included the necessary "fora" for participatory development, so the NEAP/NAP is developed jointly.

Annex C:

Indicators for Strategic Objective 1:

Assist national governments, regional institutions and private sector associations to identify, clarify, and implement policy options which promote trade and investment in the West Africa region.

Objective & Intermediate Results and Indicators	Baseline 1993	1994	1995	Planned						
				1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
Indicators for Strategic Objective 1: Countries using comparative advantage as a basis for setting trade policy. Transactions costs for regional trade of major commodities reduced 20%.	0	3	4	6	7	8	8	8	8	8
	0	4.5	7% (5%)	7% (7%)	11%	11%	12%	15%	18%	20%
Intermediate Result 1.1: Dialogue on monetary reform and policy. (Scale of 0 to 10)	0	5	5	6.6	7	10	10	10	10	10
Intermediate Result 1.2: Dialogue aimed at reducing obstacles to trade in the region. (Scale of 0 to 10)	0	3	5	7.3 (7)	10	10	10	10	10	10
Intermediate Result 1.3: Private participation in identifying, establishing, and expanding regional trade potentials. (Scale of 0 to 10)	0	4.5	5	7.3 (7)	10	10	10	10	10	10

Note: Data are from CILSS, USAID, and other donor funded research. Planned levels are shown in parentheses when there is a divergence between planned and actual. Indicators for 1996 are provisional. Targets for 1997 and 1998 have been increased from last year because of better than planned achievement in 1994 and 1995.

Indicators for Strategic Objective 2:

Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development.

Objective, Intermediate Results and Indicators	Baseline	1994	1995	Planned						
				1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
<p>Indicators for Strategic Objective 2: Meetings on the role of civil society and governance in improving management of natural resources, public service delivery, and food security.</p> <p>Relevant stakeholders are included in planning, implementing and follow-up of the discussions.</p> <p>Decisions reflect positions put forward by various stakeholders.</p>	1 ('94)	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	*	11
	NO ('93)	Some	Some	Some	Most	Most	Most	Most	Most	Most
	NO ('93)	<5 0%	<5 0%	<5 0%	<5 0%	<5 0%	<7 5%	75 %	75 %	75 %
<p>Intermediate Result 2.1: Approaches which strengthen problem-solving, advocacy and networking capacities of grassroots and other civil society organizations.</p>										

Objective, Intermediate Results and Indicators	Baseline	1994	1995	Planned						
				1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
Number of CILSS countries which review Praia Conference recommendations	0 ('94)	0	2	3	3	1	*	*	*	9
Informal rural organizations network is formed and participates in fora concerning rural development strategy and policy. (workshops held)	0 ('94)	0	0	5	1	1	1	1	1	10
Mechanisms for local dissemination of successful experiences in local development are developed and used.	0 ('94)	0	0	1	2	1	*	*	*	4
Increased awareness of special problems faced by women and other traditionally disadvantaged groups in obtaining and using natural resources.	0 ('94)	0	1 WS (*)	2 WS	2 WS (*)	1 WS (*)	*	*	*	6 (3)
Intermediate Result 2.2: Facilitate regional understanding of the benefits associated with effective patterns of decentralization and democratization.										

Objective, Intermediate Results and Indicators	Baseline	1994	1995	Planned							
				1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total	
Intermediate Result 2.3: Develop strategies for enhancing the administrative and technical competence of community, local, regional and national government entities.											
Experiences in formulating natural resource legislation sensitive to local needs are shared.	*	*	0 (WS)	WS	WS	WS	3 WS	*	*	6 WS	
Approaches and policy implications of ways of mobilizing resources for local development are disseminated.	*	*	*	WS	*	*	1 WS	*	*	2 WS	
Stakeholders participate in dialogue on legal frameworks for local development.	*	*	*	WS	*	*	1 WS	*	*	2 WS	
Exchanges on local management of tenure conflicts are held.	*	*	1 WS	1 WS	2 WS		4 WS			8 WS	
Training approaches for enhancing competency of rural organizations in critical areas (literacy, planning, management, negotiation, etc.) are identified and shared. (***)											

Data are from CILSS (PADLOS). WS=WORKSHOP. (**) This indicator has been refined, see the Annex for further explanation. (***) This is a new indicator, see Annex for explanation.

**Indicators for Strategic Objective 3:
Decision makers have ready access to relevant information on food security,
population and the environment.**

Objective, Intermediate Results and Indicators	Bas e- line	199 4	199 5							
				199 6	199 7	199 8	199 9	200 0	200 1	200 2 Tot al
Indicators for Strategic Objective 3: Number of country rationales and concerted actions for food security, NRM, population which reflect sound development methodologies and access to regional info. systems NEAPs, pop. policies, and food security policies.	0	*	*	*	3	*	*	6	*	9
Intermediate Result 3.1: Maintain and improve food security monitoring and disaster mitigation systems.										
Food Aid Charter observed	YES	YES	YES	YES	*	*	*	*	*	*
Functioning Food Crisis Network	(93) YES	YES	YES	YES	*	*	*	*	*	*
Timely provision of Greenness Maps by AGRHYMET (days for transmission).	(93) 10	7	1 (5)	1 (3)	7	1	1	1	1	1
Increased application and utilization of Information Management tools, technology and methods for Sahel Early Warning (countries)	(93) 4	4	5 (*)	7						

Objective, Intermediate Results and Indicators	Bas e- line	199 4	199 5							
				199 6	199 7	199 8	199 9	200 0	200 1	200 2 Tot al
Intermediate Result 3.2: Support the development and application of an environmental planning and monitoring system to coordinate NRM interventions on a systematic basis in ecological contexts.										
African Annex drafted	-	Dra ft	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Donor discuss, review and agree on elements of the Annex	-	* 0	Re- vie w	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Early start program in place in member states	0 ('93)	0	3	7	8	*	*	*	*	8
U.S. Government agrees to Convention	-	Sig n	-	-	-	OK 'd	-	-	-	-
Post-ratification program in place in member states	0 ('93)	0	0	0	1	2	5	9	*	9
INSAH managed exchanges about determinants and impacts of agricultural and NRM practices	0	0	9	5	2	2	2	2	2	24
Ag. Research Natural Resource Management	0 ('94)	0	4	5	1	1	1	1	1	14
	0 ('94)	0	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	10

Objective, Intermediate Results and Indicators	Bas e- line	199 4	199 5							
				199 6	199 7	199 8	199 9	200 0	200 1	200 2 Tot al
Intermediate Result 3.3: Population policies and action plans are based on analyses of demographic variables underlying regional population dynamics, including the determinants of fertility, mortality and migration trends and levels.										
National and regional analysts conduct analyses of variables underlying regional population dynamics (studies on fertility, mortality and migration)	1 ('94)	1	1	1						
Analysis results are disseminated via appropriate communications systems (Monthly publication)	YES ('93)	YES	YES	YES	9	-	-	-	-	9
Population policies and action plans completed (number and quality)	5 ('93)	0	1	8(9)	9	-	-	-	-	9
Policies produced	0			*		1	4	8	9	9
Action Plans developed										
Action Plans implemented										

Data sources: data reported for this SO are provided by the Club du Sahel and CILSS and its various institutions (see also Annex B, Table 2). Data in () indicate the target if it is different from actual.

ANNEX D

The Sahel Regional Program (SRP) emphasizes cooperation, collaboration and building African capacity for problem solving within regional organizations. It places particular emphasis on support to the CILSS (Permanent Interstate Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel), the West Africa Enterprise Network (WAEN) and increasingly the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). The CILSS is an intergovernmental organization whose member states include Cape Verde, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso. CILSS has five major organizational components:

- Headquarters in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (activities related to strategic planning, policy and overall administration and donor coordination);
- INSAH/Food Security and Natural Resources, located in Bamako, Mali, which provides research, analysis and dialogue on social and economic topics bearing on regional policy and programs dealing with food security and natural resource management;
- INSAH/CERPOD (Center for Studies and Research on Population and Development, also located in Bamako, Mali) which provides population planning, research and training services at the regional level;
- AGRHYMET located in Niamey, Niger (Agroclimatology, Hydrology and Meteorology Regional Institution) which monitors the natural environment and coordinates food situation monitoring and food early warning information and training at the regional level; and
- CONACILSS (National Correspondent Committees in each member state) which assure coordination and information dissemination at the national level.

The Sahel Regional Program also emphasizes coordination and collaboration among donors active in the region to promote efficient use of aid resources by supporting USAID's participation in the Club du Sahel. Donors who are active in the Club are the United States, France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, the European Union, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Japan, the World Bank and selected U.N. agencies. The same countries are also major supporters of CILSS programs; additional support is provided by agencies in the UN (such as FAO, WFP, UNFPA, UNSO) and several private foundations. In this way, the Sahel Regional Program is able to pursue the USAID policy objectives of cooperation, coordination and regional approaches, where appropriate. Crisis prevention is also a significant part of the program, via support to AGRHYMET, participation in the Club du Sahel's "Food Crises Prevention Network", and through support to the CILSS.