


PD-ABN-727

Report of Audit

Audit of USAID/CAR's Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act for Democracy-Civil Society-Activities in Kazakstan

**Audit Report No. 8-115-97-005-P
February 26, 1997**



Regional Inspector General for Audit Frankfurt

**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

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February 26, 1997

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ms. Patricia Buckles, Mission Director, USAID/CAR

FROM: RIG/A/F, John P. Competello 

SUBJECT: Audit of USAID/CAR's Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act for Democracy-Civil Society-Activities in Kazakstan (Audit Report No. 8-115-97-005-P)

This is our report on the subject audit. In preparing this report, we considered your comments to our December 18, 1996, draft report and have included these comments as Appendix II. Based upon actions taken, we consider audit recommendations numbered 1.1, 1.2 and 2 as having received a final management action. Therefore, no further action is needed on these recommendations.

I appreciate the cooperation and courtesies extended my staff during the course of the audit.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Office of the Inspector General's worldwide effort to assess USAID's adherence to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), we audited USAID/Central Asia Republic's (USAID/CAR) implementation of Agency reengineering and GPRA requirements as they related to the Mission's Civil Society activities in Kazakstan.

For its Kazakstan Civil Society Activities, USAID/CAR had generally implemented the Agency reengineering and GPRA requirements in accordance with Agency directives and the Bureau for Europe and New Independent States (ENI) guidance. For its Civil Society activities in Kazakstan, USAID/CAR-

- developed a Strategic and an Annual Plan which was consistent with the ENI Bureau's Strategic Framework,
- developed performance indicators which were consistent with ENI Bureau Objectives,
- developed portions of a system for collecting and reporting accurate performance data, and
- planned to use performance information to enhance program effectiveness. (See page 6.)

The audit noted, however, that one USAID-funded Civil Society activity was not included in the Mission's Results Framework. In addition, other activities were included under the Mission's Civil Society Strategic Objective (SO), although these activities are within another Bureau Objective. We recommended that the Mission obtain guidance from the Bureau on these matters. The Mission requested guidance and was advised to include the one activity in question under cross-cutting programs in its Results Review and Resource Request Report and focus the other activities, identified as falling within another Bureau objective, under the appropriate Strategic Objective. The Mission demonstrated that they had adopted this advice, which is acceptable to us. (See page 8.)

The audit also found that the Mission needed to complete its performance monitoring plan and stress accuracy in reporting results. The audit found that the Mission had completed most elements of the required performance

monitoring plan, but had not identified the timing and method of data collection. Also, the Mission's reported results contained some misstated facts and imprecise wording, and included results outside of the reporting period. We recommended that the Mission complete its performance monitoring plan and stress accuracy in reporting. The Mission, subsequent to the audit field work, completed this plan. The plan was in accordance with guidance for such plans. (See page 14.)

In addition, the audit identified the following--

- While the Mission was reporting results and requesting resources by Strategic Objective as required, they were receiving funding levels, which are approved by the ENI Bureau and the Department of State Coordinator for the New Independent States, by project. This has led to some Mission officials questioning the need for the new system if this new system is not used to determine program funding levels. (See page 7.)
- Although USAID/CAR developed performance indicators which were consistent with ENI Bureau Objectives, the audit raised the question as to whether there should be performance indicators for measuring citizen participation in political decision making and economic decision making and media functions at the SO level. (See page 10.)
- Although USAID/CAR is utilizing its Results Framework and "results tree" in managing activities, it is too early in the reengineering process to determine if program effectiveness has been enhanced due to collected performance information. (See page 16.)

For selected civil society activities in Kazakstan, namely Internews and American Legal Consortium activities, the audit found that they were making satisfactory progress toward achieving their intended results. Furthermore, the audit found that USAID/CAR ensured accountability for the funds provided for Internews and American Legal Consortium activities in Kazakstan. (See pages 18 to 21.)

Office of the Inspector General

Office of the Inspector General
February 26, 1997

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Glossary of Terms Used in Report

The following definitions of terms used in the report are to be found in USAID's Automated Directives System Number 203. These terms are listed in alphabetical order and not in the order as they appear in the report.

Intermediate Result (IR): A key result which must occur in order to achieve a strategic objective.

Management Contract: The management contract consists of the strategic plan (including a strategic objectives and supporting results frameworks) together with official record of the guidance emerging from the review of the plan. The management contract provides: a summary of agreements on a set of strategic and other objectives; confirmation of estimated resources over the strategy period; delegations of authority; and an overview of any special management concerns.

Operating Unit: USAID field mission or USAID/W office or higher level organizational unit which expends program funds to achieve a strategic objective, strategic support objective, or special objective, and which has a clearly defined set of responsibilities focussed on the development and execution of a strategic plan.

Output: The product of a specific action, e.g., number of people trained, number of vaccinations administered.

Partner (Development Partner): An organization or customer representative with which/whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives and intermediate results, and to secure customer participation. Partners include: private voluntary organizations, indigenous and other international non-government organizations, universities, other USG agencies, U.N. and other multilateral organizations, professional and business associations, private businesses (as for example under the U.S.-Asia Environmental Partnership), and host country governments at all levels.

Performance Baseline: The value of a performance indicator at the beginning of a planning and/or performance period. A performance baseline is the point used for comparison when measuring progress toward a specific result or objective. Ideally, a performance baseline will be the value of a performance indicator just prior to the implementation of the activity or activities identified as supporting the objective which the indicator is meant to measure.

Performance Indicator: A particular characteristic or dimension used to measure intended changes defined by an organizational unit's results framework. Performance indicators are used to observe progress and to measure actual results compared to expected results. Performance indicators serve to answer "whether" a unit is progressing towards its objective, rather than why/why not such progress is being made. Performance indicators are usually expressed in quantifiable terms, and should be objective and measurable (numeric values, percentages, scores and indices). Quantitative indicators are preferred in most cases, although in certain circumstances qualitative indicators are appropriate.

Performance Monitoring Plan: A detailed plan for managing the collection of data in order to monitor performance. It identifies the indicators to be tracked; specifies the source, method of collection, and schedule of collection for each piece of datum required; and assigns responsibility for collection to a specific office, team, or individual. At the Agency level, it is the plan for gathering data on Agency goals and objectives. At the Operating Unit level, the performance monitoring plan contains information for gathering data on the strategic objectives, intermediate results and critical assumptions included in an operating unit's results frameworks.

Performance Target: The specific and intended result to be achieved within an explicit timeframe and against which actual results are compared and assessed. A performance target is to be defined for each performance indicator. In addition to final targets, interim targets also may be defined.

Result: A change in the condition of a customer or a change in the host country condition which has a relationship to the customer. A result is brought about by the intervention of USAID in concert with its development partners. Results are linked by causal relationships; i.e., a result is achieved because related, interdependent result(s) were achieved. Strategic objectives are the highest level result for which an operating unit is held accountable; intermediate results are those results which contribute to the achievement of a strategic objective.

Results Framework: The results framework represents the development hypothesis including those results necessary to achieve a strategic objective and their causal relationships and underlying assumptions. The

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framework also establishes an organizing basis for measuring, analyzing, and reporting results of the operating unit. It typically is presented both in narrative form and as a graphical representation.

Results Review and Resource Request (R4): The document which is reviewed internally and submitted to USAID/W by the operating unit on an annual basis. The R4 contains two components: the results review and the resource request. Judgement of progress will be based on a combination of data and analysis and will be used to inform budget decision making.

Stakeholders: Individuals and/or groups who have an interest in and influence USAID activities, programs and objectives.

Strategic Framework: A graphical or narrative representation of the strategic plan; the framework is a tool for communicating the development strategy. The framework also establishes an organizing basis for measuring, analyzing, and reporting results of programs.

Strategic Objective (SO): The most ambitious result (intended measurable change) that a USAID operational unit, along with its partners, can materially affect and for which it is willing to be held responsible. The strategic objective forms the standard by which the operational unit is willing to be judged in terms of its performance. The time-frame of a strategic objective is typically 5-8 years for sustainable development programs, but may be shorter for programs operating under short term transitional circumstances or under conditions of uncertainty.

Strategic Objective (SO) Team: In general, a team is a group of people committed to a common performance goal for which they hold themselves individually and collectively accountable. Teams can include USAID employees exclusively or USAID, partner, stakeholder and customer representatives. An SO team is a group of people who are committed to achieving a specific strategic objective and are willing to be held accountable for the results necessary to achieve that objective. The SO team can establish subsidiary teams for a subset of results or to manage a results package.

Strategic Plan: A plan for providing development assistance; the strategic plan articulates the mission, goals, objectives, and program approaches.

INTRODUCTION

Background

In August 1993, Congress enacted Public Law 103-62 called the "Government Performance and Results Act of 1993" (GPRA). Among the purposes of this Act are to:

- initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;
- improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction; and
- help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with information about program results and service quality.

The Act requires Federal agencies to develop at least a five-year strategic plan and annual performance plans beginning in September 1997, and beginning in 2000, report annually on actual performance compared to goals. However, in 1994 the USAID volunteered, and the Office of Management and Budget accepted, itself as a pilot agency for conforming to the Act by the end of fiscal year 1996.

This audit is part of the Office of Inspector General's worldwide assessment of this process. The audit reviews USAID/Central Asia Republic's (USAID/CAR) implementation of ENI Bureau guidance on Agency reengineering and how the Mission's actions address specific requirements of GPRA and the Agency. This audit is limited to reviewing just one area being reengineered, that is, Civil Society. USAID/CAR, like other operating units in the Agency, had to mold ongoing activities into the new process.

The Reengineering Process

In USAID's efforts to conform to GPRA and "reengineer" itself, it developed an Agency Strategic Framework, approved September 18, 1995, which represents a graphic presentation of USAID's development strategies. The transmittal

memorandum for this document stated that the Agency would use this Framework in reviews of operating unit strategic plans, and to report on results and examine Agency performance; and that all operating units should describe how their Strategic Objectives contribute to Agency Objectives. This was to allow the Agency to aggregate its results by Objective.

Following suit, the ENI Bureau developed reengineering guidance which: 1) adopted those Agency reengineering principles that would make them more efficient or effective, 2) adapted other principles to ENI needs, and 3) exempted themselves from those reengineering elements which did not contribute to ENI's planning logic.

On February 15, 1996, the ENI Bureau published the ENI Strategic Framework to provide a common point of reference for the Missions in developing their Results Frameworks and to conform with USAID policy and GPRA requirements. This ENI Strategic Framework was considered central to all of the reengineering innovations being made, that is to plan and manage for results. The ENI Strategic Framework outlined three Strategic Assistance Areas (SAA) where ENI development efforts would be concentrated:

1. **Economic Restructuring:** Foster the emergence of a competitive, market-oriented economy in which the majority of economic resources is privately owned and managed.
2. **Democratic Transition:** Support the transition to transparent and accountable governance and the empowerment of citizens through democratic political processes.
3. **Social Stabilization:** Respond to humanitarian crises and strengthen the capacity to manage the human dimension of the transition to democracy.

Under SAA 2–**Democratic Transition**–ENI established three objectives:

- 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making;
- 2.2 Legal systems that better support democratic processes and market reforms; and
- 2.3 More effective, responsible, and accountable local government.

According to ENI Bureau officials, the first objective (ENI 2.1) is consistent with the Agency's Objective-Civil Society. For reporting purposes, we refer to ENI

Objective 2.1: "Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making" as "Civil Society" rather than by its full title.

One of the components of the USAID's reengineering initiatives, which the ENI Bureau adopted, was the creation of a new reporting and resource request process, called the Results Review and Resource Request or R4. The R4 process pertains to all of ENI's operating units that manage program funds. In using this process, operating units created Strategic Objective teams and assigned members. These teams developed a "results tree" for the assigned Strategic Objective and a Results Framework with sub-objectives, intermediate results, performance indicators, baselines and annual targets (spanning up to 5 years). The R4 report was to segregate program funds and resource requests by Strategic Objective (SO) and is to be submitted on an annual basis by each operating unit. The Results Framework represents the development hypothesis and results necessary to achieve a Strategic Objective. It is this Framework which provides an organized basis for measuring, analyzing, and reporting results of an operating unit, such as a Mission, on an annual basis. Finally, the R4 is the basis for a management contract between the Mission Director and the Bureau for the results envisioned.

USAID/CAR used the ENI Strategic Framework as a menu for developing its Mission Strategy and Results Framework for Civil Society activities in Kazakhstan and created a SO 2.1 team. According to the April 1996 Kazakhstan R4 and Mission officials, there are nine USAID-funded organizations involved in implementing USAID activities related to SO 2.1-Civil Society. As of June 30, 1996, ENI had reported cumulative obligations and expenditures for these activities as \$12.6 million and \$8.5 million, respectively. These activities can be segregated three ways: 1) activities which support SO 2.1 and are managed by the SO 2.1 team, 2) activities which support SO 2.1, but are managed by other SO teams, and 3) activities which support SO 2.1, but which no reporting is done by the Mission. The following table illustrates these activities and their obligations and expenditures at June 30, 1996:

**USAID/KAZAKSTAN FUNDING FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2.1
BY ORGANIZATION**

As of June 30, 1996

Organization	Cumulative Obligations ¹	Cumulative Expenditures ¹
SUPPORTS SO, AND MANAGED BY SO 2.1 TEAM		
American Bar Association (ABA)	\$ 1,036,437	\$ 954,547
Chemonics/American Legal Consortium (ALC)	2,110,000	1,588,598
Counterpart Consortium	3,453,000	1,574,656
Int'l Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)	908,320	747,586
Internews	1,072,419	685,699
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	788,998	583,991
Sub-Total	\$ 9,369,174	\$ 6,135,077
SUPPORTS SO, BUT MANAGED BY OTHER SO TEAM		
Institute of Soviet American Relations (ISAR)	\$ 612,000	\$ 394,931
Overseas Strategic Consultants (OSC)	2,113,026	1,542,437
Sub-Total	\$ 2,725,026	\$ 1,937,368
SUPPORTS SO, BUT NO REPORTING IS DONE BY MISSION		
Eurasia Foundation	\$ 510,400	\$ 410,400
TOTAL	\$ 12,604,600	\$ 8,482,845

¹ These unaudited amounts were obtained from ENI/PD's Detailed Pipeline Report for Kazakhstan as of 06/30/96. However, the Mission commented that some of these amounts are overstated for Kazakhstan because some amounts charged to Kazakhstan were for regional (Central Asian Republic) activities. For example, the Mission knew that for Counterpart Consortium, \$3.0 million was for regional activities, and only \$453,000 related to Kazakhstan alone.

Audit Objectives

As part of the Office of the Inspector General's planned worldwide effort to assess USAID's adherence to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and measure results in Civil Society, we designed this audit to answer the following questions:

- 1. Did USAID/CAR, for its Kazakstan Civil Society Activities, in Accordance with Agency Directives and ENI Bureau Guidance:**
 - a) Develop a Strategic Plan and an Annual Plan Which was Consistent with the ENI Bureau's Strategic Framework?**
 - b) Develop Performance Indicators Which Were Consistent with ENI Bureau Objectives?**
 - c) Develop a System for Collecting and Reporting Accurate Performance Data?**
 - d) Use Performance Information to Enhance Program Effectiveness?**
- 2. Were USAID/CAR's Internews and the American Legal Consortium Activities Making Satisfactory Progress Toward Achieving the Intended Results in Kazakstan?**
- 3. Did USAID/CAR Ensure Accountability for the Funds Provided for Internews and American Legal Consortium Activities in Kazakstan?**

See Appendix I for a complete discussion of the scope and methodology used to conduct this audit.

REPORT OF AUDIT FINDINGS

Did USAID/CAR, for its Kazakhstan Civil Society Activities, in Accordance with Agency Directives and ENI Bureau Guidance:

- a) Develop a Strategic Plan and an Annual Plan Which was Consistent with the ENI Bureau's Strategic Framework?**
- b) Develop Performance Indicators Which were Consistent with ENI Bureau Objectives?**
- c) Develop a System for Collecting and Reporting Accurate Performance Data?**
- d) Use Performance Information to Enhance Program Effectiveness?**

For its Kazakhstan civil society activities, USAID/CAR, in accordance with Agency directives and ENI Bureau guidance— a) developed a strategic plan and an annual plan which was consistent with the ENI Bureau's strategic plan; b) developed performance indicators which generally were consistent with ENI Bureau Objectives; c) developed portions of a system for collecting and reporting accurate performance data; and d) planned to use performance information to enhance program effectiveness. While the audit found that the ENI Bureau had modified some Agency reengineering directives to meet its specific needs, ENI Bureau guidance was generally consistent with Agency directives. In addition, the audit identified several issues concerning the Mission's monitoring, reporting and evaluating of its Civil Society activities in Kazakhstan.

Conforming to ENI Bureau Guidance-Issues and/or Problems

ENI Bureau guidance on strategic plans, dated February 21, 1996, stated "Through a phased submission schedule, ENI intends to have approved strategic plans in place for all operating units within three years..." Until that time, approved Results Frameworks would serve as strategic plans. Since USAID/CAR had not been tasked with preparing a strategic plan, in

September 1995 it began preparing an R4 for the region. As part of preparing individual R4's for Kazakhstan and the other four countries in its region, Results Frameworks for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were developed.

The Results Framework for Kazakhstan linked targets to strategic objectives and served as a strategic plan or "results tree" for the Mission's activities in the area of Civil Society. Targets were generally developed on an annual basis which constituted the Mission's annual plan. The Results Framework for this SO, along with the frameworks for other SOs, was submitted to the ENI Bureau in April 1996 and was accepted and approved in May 1996. Upon discussing this process with Mission officials and reviewing the Kazakhstan R4 and Results Framework for SO 2.1, we identified the following three concerns:

Resource Request Was Linked to SO, While
Budget Allocations Were Based on Projects

During the audit, USAID/CAR received preliminary funding information for its fiscal year 1997 activities, including those for Civil Society. The funding levels were by project and not by SO. While the correspondence indicated that the funding levels were preliminary, the Mission was to begin planning to allocate these levels to its strategic plan. The funding levels had been approved by the Department of State Coordinator for NIS (S/NIS/C) and the ENI Bureau. Several USAID/CAR officials questioned why they were required to submit the R4, and invest so many staff hours, if the funding allocations through the S/NIS/C and the Bureau continued to be structured around the "old" regional projects. These officials said it was frustrating to maintain two sets of objectives and duplicate reporting.

Mission officials stated the S/NIS/C played an important role in setting the funding levels for the region as well as individual countries. In response to S/NIS/C's role, the Mission involved the respective U.S. Embassies in the region in all funding and policy decisions. Mission officials stated that while S/NIS/C is involved at the funding and policy levels in the past, it has not directly instructed the Mission to follow a specific course of action or change its strategy in a specific area. Officials wondered if they should not go back to a project driven system and drop the SO Results Framework if this new process is not used in determining funding levels. This issue was also identified during a recent audit of USAID/Moscow's R4 process². In response to both audit findings, we plan to discuss S/NIS/C's role in setting funding

² Audit Report No. 8-118-97-004-P, dated November 22, 1996.

levels and its effect on reengineering during a future audit at the ENI Bureau level.

Results of Eurasia Foundation Activities Should Be Included in the Mission's Results Framework

While funding for all activities in its region is included in their management contract, USAID/CAR is not collecting and reporting results for all such activities in its Results Framework. For example, the Eurasia Foundation is funded—\$500,000 for Kazakhstan through fiscal year 1996—under a separate regional project bearing its name. Its activities in Kazakhstan, for the most part, related directly to USAID/CAR's SO 2.1; however, the Mission was not collecting and reporting results of Eurasia Foundation activities because the Eurasia Foundation was considered an “independent” entity. The Mission considered the Eurasia Foundation to be a “stakeholder” in achieving the intended results, not a “development partner.” The primary difference in this treatment under reengineering is that for “development partners,” the Mission includes their activities in its Results Framework and assesses performance against the established performance indicators and targets. Stakeholders are recognized as having an interest in the final results and may be contributing to the results, but their influence is not measured under the Mission's process. We believe that if funding for the Eurasia Foundation is in USAID/CAR's management contract, it should include its activities as appropriate under its SO.

In our aforementioned audit on USAID/Moscow's R4 process, we found a similar situation. In that report, we recommended that USAID/Moscow provide the ENI Bureau recommendations of actions necessary for full integration of Eurasia Foundation activities in USAID/Moscow's Results Framework. USAID/Moscow agreed with our recommendation and has submitted its recommendations for integrating Eurasia Foundation activities in its R4 and Results Framework. Because USAID/Moscow has already made recommendations for including Eurasia Foundation activities into the R4—in essence taking the lead on this issue—we believe that USAID/CAR should obtain guidance from the Bureau as to how they should follow suit.

Because USAID/CAR Included Legal Systems
Activities Under Civil Society, ENI Bureau May
Not Be Able to Aggregate Legal System Results

In following ENI Bureau guidance, USAID/CAR defined its activities under SO 2.1–Civil Society–to include some activities which normally are in support of ENI Bureau Objective 2.2–Legal Systems or Rule of Law. This appears acceptable in light of Bureau guidance which stated that:

The ENI Bureau Strategic Framework provided a common point of reference for ENI management in conformance with USAID policy and the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. Missions were to use this ENI Strategic Framework as a menu in developing Mission Results Frameworks. Missions were to select applicable SOs and could reword SOs more narrowly to fit the particular country circumstances. However, Missions could not create new SOs or broaden ENI objectives.

For its Kazakstan Civil Society activities, USAID/CAR, for the most part, combined activities related to ENI Bureau's Objectives 2.1 "Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making" and Objective 2.2 "Legal systems that better support democratic processes and market reforms" under just one SO–SO 2.1. Where an activity concerning ENI Objective 2.2, legal reforms, related to market reforms, USAID/CAR placed that activity under its SOs relating to market reforms. The remainder of activities related to legal reforms were placed under Kazakstan SO 2.1. However, some of these pre-existing activities cannot be closely linked to this SO.

According to several USAID/CAR SO 2.1 team members, this issue has been extensively discussed both within the Mission and with the ENI Bureau. This discussion is continuing and the decision to combine activities into one SO may be revisited. Team members mentioned that given the conditions in Kazakstan at the time of developing the Results Framework, the team did not believe that they needed a separate SO on legal systems and thus divided those aspects related to market reforms and shifted those to the SO teams dealing with market reforms. They listed the activities under SO 2.1, but realized that some of the specific activities did not fit well within the Framework. Discussions were held as to whether the team wished to be held accountable for these dangling activities. It was decided, that given time constraints and that these activities were funded to the end of the budget cycle, to revisit the question after the team had experience in the process.

Although the SO team and USAID/CAR decisions are logical and within the scope of the ENI guidance, the team did not complete the Results Frameworks for these "dangling" activities, i.e., baselines, intermediate results, performance indicators and targets were not established. For the activities themselves, USAID had scopes of work, budgets, work plans, and progress reports. The USAID/CAR SO team acknowledged that these activities were producing what was expected under the activity agreements, but the team did not believe that they could assess the impact of these activities on Civil Society.

Another issue relates to how the ENI Bureau can aggregate results for its Democratic Transition SAA if Mission Results Frameworks do not measure all of the results by Bureau Objectives. For instance, how can the Kazakhstan results be linked to the ENI Bureau Objectives 2.1–Civil Society and 2.2–Legal Systems, if USAID/CAR reports all of its results under SO 2.1–Civil Society? Also, since USAID/CAR has not established intermediate results or performance indicators for the legal system activities, how can performance be measured? Because ENI is to take the results of all its operating units and report results against its Objectives, we doubt that ENI can capture the results against its Objectives if Missions do not report results which can be directly linked to the Objectives of the Bureau.

Recommendation No. 1: We recommend that USAID/CAR obtain guidance from the ENI Bureau as to whether it should:

- 1.1 include the Eurasia Foundation in its Results Framework; and**
- 1.2 separate activities closely related to Legal Systems from its Civil Society Results Framework and establish a new Results Framework for these activities.**

Performance Indicators Need Further Refinement

While the Mission did not use the performance indicators described in the Agency's Strategic Framework and Indicators 1995-1996, their indicators are generally consistent with the Agency's guidance. During the audit, USAID/CAR was in the process of reviewing its "results tree" and Results Framework for this SO (see Appendices III and IV, respectively). That is, USAID/CAR was refining and revising some of the performance indicators and targets at certain levels of the Results Framework. However, the Mission needs to further refine some of its performance indicators and targets to ensure that these are measuring the desired outcomes.

Mission personnel stated that SOs and intermediate results are outcomes of USAID activities. Performance indicators can be outputs themselves, but are used in aggregate to measure if a particular outcome or result is being achieved. For measuring the results of its Civil Society activities, USAID/CAR established 27 performance indicators as shown in the following table. Appendix III contains USAID/CAR's "results tree" for Kazakhstan Civil Society activities.

Number of Results Statements and Number of Performance Indicators by Level for Civil Society Activities

<u>Level</u>	<u>No. of Results Statements</u>	<u>No. of Performance Indicators</u>
SO 2.1	1	3
Intermediate Results	3	5
Sub-Intermediate Results	<u>7</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	<u>11</u>	<u>27</u>

As required by the process for each level, USAID/CAR had defined the performance indicator, defined the unit of measurement and the source for the measurement information, and determined the baseline for each performance indicator. Also, USAID/CAR had established annual targets, as appropriate, for each performance indicator. Most of the indicators were quantitative. The SO team informed us that they found establishing meaningful indicators to be difficult and chose quantitative indicators because these were easier to define than qualitative indicators. The team also said they frequently review the indicators to determine if they are appropriate and if the measurement information is attainable at a reasonable cost.

In setting the performance indicators and baselines, USAID/CAR involved its development partners in the process. The development partners whom we interviewed told us that they were involved in the process and generally believed that the performance indicators and measurement units were realistic. A few partners pointed out, however, that the performance targets tended to be too quantitative and thus may not reflect the progress made or the conditions which actually exist.

During the audit we noted additional issues with the performance indicators and targets. For example, the primary performance indicator at the SO level

centers around creation of NGOs and increase in their membership. While these actions can be quantified, that is easily measured in terms of the major outputs, these indicators do not seem to measure an "Increased, better informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision making." The Mission did establish an indicator at the SO level for measuring "if citizens feel more informed over time", but it did not have a performance indicator for measuring "citizen participation in political and economic decision making". Also, **current** indicators, at the SO level, cover only NGO and political activities and **do not** measure the results of media outcomes. Media results and **activities** are a major facet in the effort to achieve the SO. Thus, it seems **necessary** for the SO team to refine the performance indicator at the SO level to **capture** the outcome of the media programs in Kazakhstan.

Further, in reaction to some development partners' concern that the **performance** measures are too quantitative and did not reflect the progress **made or the** conditions which actually exist, it seemed to us that the SO team **should address** these concerns when it reviews the performance indicators. **Because** reengineering and GPRA stress quantifiable indicators, we suggested that the SO team consider creating a quantitative performance indicator **measuring** citizen participation in political decision making and economic decision making. Such a quantitative indicator could be, the percentage **increase of** citizens polled who state that they have more information on which to **base their** economic decisions. However, if the team did not believe that a **reasonable** quantitative indicator could be developed, we then suggested that the **team** consider developing a qualitative indicator—which measures citizens' **opportunity** to participate in political decision making and economic decision making.

Another concern noted was in the use of percentage-of-change when the baseline was small, e.g., less than 10 items. The use of percentage-of-change can be misleading. For example, one of the performance indicators is the percentage increase in the number of draft laws and policies with input from NGOs. The baseline number is 2 and the target for the next year is a 200% increase, which represents only a total number of 4 new laws and policies with NGO participation. If the NGOs participated in drafting 6 new laws the reported increase might be 300%, but the actual number would only be 6 new laws. We agree that the increase may be considered dramatic given the political conditions in the country, but we feel that the use of percentages in these cases overstates the result.

A further issue noted concerns the accuracy of the baselines and targets used to measure results of media activities. While the baselines and targets were developed by the development partner—Internews, they were not based on verifiable information. According to an Internews official, the baselines and

targets were educated guesses or estimates. Now, while estimates would be acceptable if the methodology for arriving at the estimate was documented and reviewed for reasonableness, this was not the case for media activities.

To illustrate our concern, consider sub-intermediate result 2.1.2.1 (Appendix IV, page 5). In order to measure whether USAID media activities resulted in “increased technical capabilities of independent electronic media”, one of the performance indicators was the average number of employees per station and the baseline was set at 10. The actual result in the first year was 20 and in the second year it was 25. However, since the baseline and targets were not based on verifiable information, we could not determine whether there was any correlation to the media activity and this change. Another performance indicator used to measure this sub-intermediate result, deals with the average monthly revenue. Here, the baseline was \$1,000, but in the first year the actual number was \$6,000. The target for the second year was \$5,000 and the actual was \$7,000. Because these baselines were not based on any study or agreed-to methodology, the results are not reflective of the media activities. On another note regarding this indicator in particular, we found that even if this data is collected and recorded, its reliability is questionable. We found that local independent media organizations are reluctant to provide this information, and either the organizations do not provide the data requested, or what is provided is based on how the organization feels the information will be interpreted by others.

Furthermore, USAID guidance³, in recognizing the difficulties in developing performance indicators and targets, requires SO teams to identify and evaluate assumptions/hypotheses inherent in the program’s activities and in the Results Framework. Reengineering requires all operating units in their strategic plans to establish performance targets for all performance indicators used to measure progress towards each strategic objective and intermediate result. Accordingly, we believe that USAID/CAR should further refine its performance indicators—particularly at the SO level—by considering the use of more qualitative indicators, capturing media functions, avoiding the use of percentage increases where the baseline is small, and determining the reliability of the estimates for measuring progress for media activities.

At the time of audit, the SO 2.1 team was using the ENI Monitoring and Reporting System to collect some performance information and they were in the process of updating the information. In addition, the Mission was conducting a mid-cycle results review for all its objectives, including SO 2.1. Mission officials stated that they addressed the concerns that we identified, as

³ ADS Section E202.5.2a(2)

well as other similar issues, on a continuous basis and will focus on these areas during their review process. This being the case, we are not making any recommendations to USAID/CAR related to performance indicators. However, we will consider these issues at the ENI Bureau level during a future audit.

Performance Reporting and Monitoring Can Be Improved

USAID/CAR, for its Kazakhstan civil society activities, in accordance with Agency directives and ENI Bureau guidance, developed portions of a system for collecting and reporting accurate performance data. However, USAID/CAR should complete the required performance monitoring plan. Further, USAID/CAR needs to ensure that reported results are not misstated or exaggerated.

USAID/CAR was utilizing the SO team to collect and report performance data and this team was using ENI's Monitoring and Reporting System (MRS) as the collection point for this information. The MRS, in the form of Activity Monitoring Reports (AMRs) allows for reporting performance against targets and intermediate results.

USAID/CAR had not fully developed the reporting system as described in Agency and ENI Bureau guidance. For example, according to Mission officials, the Mission was in the process of finalizing its "performance monitoring plan." ENI Bureau guidance⁴ states that a table defining the performance monitoring plan is one of four parts to a Results Framework and it is to specify for each performance indicator, the data source, method and timing of data collection, and action offices. At USAID/CAR, all this had been added to SO team 2.1's latest Results Framework—as revised for the Mission's November 1996 mid-review—except for the method and timing of data collection. In addition, the AMRs prepared thus far, did not link reported performance against targets and intermediate results. The SO team was utilizing performance reporting from its development partners for performance data and was using site visits and statements from other organizations, such as Embassy and other development partners, to confirm the accuracy of performance data.

We tested the reported results in the R4 of April 1996 and found that the information was generally accurate. However, according to the Agency guidance⁵, the results information should be for the immediate past fiscal year,

⁴ Guidance on Strategic Plans, dated February 21, 1996

⁵ ADS Section 203.5.9a

in this instance fiscal year 1995 or as of September 30, 1995. We noted, and confirmed with Mission staff, that the Mission was not aware that the results information was to be as of the end of the prior fiscal year and therefore reported results collected up to the date of their submission in March 1996. Thus, some reported results occurred in fiscal year 1996 rather than fiscal year 1995. For example, a major conference on human rights was reported as occurring in the fall of 1995, which is accurate, but actually occurred in the October/November 1995 time frame. Also, the results of a public survey were reported as being concluded in April 1996, which was correct, but should not have been included in the report if the established cut-off date was followed.

In addition we noted some misstated facts and imprecise wording in describing the results. For example, USAID/CAR reported—

- **"All 38 Kazakstan independent TV stations had received training." According to the development partner's records, 18 TV stations had received training as of September 30, 1995. As of April 1996, 31 TV stations had received training. And, at the time of audit and according to Internews records, there were 49 "contacted" TV stations in Kazakstan and 32 of them had received Internews training.**
- **"...one conference stimulated a 20 percent increase in membership in an indigenous Central Asian media association." According to reports by the development partner, the amount of increase in membership was 15 percent not 20 percent.**
- **"...a legal library/center established was to be "self-sustaining" by the end of the year." However, according to the development partner, ALC, this library/center will not be "self-sustaining" because it has not been able to become a for-fee institution. Nonetheless, according to ALC it will be "sustaining" at the end of the year, because other donors are interested in seeing it continue and have pledged support.**
- **"...a development partner had developed an "extensive" partnership between a U.S. organization and a local organization." According to the development partner, the choice of the word "extensive" may not accurately describe the situation. However, it may be accurate to say that the partnership was created, that there was an exchange of information, and that the local organization has made use of information shared and has become an advocate for its members.**

According to Mission officials, they did not intentionally misstate the results reported in the R4. The Mission was collecting information from the development partners and its own records and during writing and editing some

errors occurred. In addition, the Mission was not made aware of the reporting cut-off date. One Mission official pointed out that the Mission does plenty of results reporting. For example, there is a weekly report to the ENI Bureau which highlights any recent results achieved and there are various requests from the Bureau for information on results.

We believe that the Mission needs to complete the required performance monitoring plan. Also, the Mission needs to pay more attention to the accuracy and time frames for reported results.

Recommendation No. 2: We recommend that the Mission complete the performance monitoring plan, which in addition to the required elements, establishes the reporting cut-off for any reports, particularly the annual Results Report, and stresses that all information should be accurately reported.

Results Framework And "Results Tree" Are Being Used But It Is Too Early to Tell If the Process Enhances Performance

USAID/CAR was planning to use performance information to enhance program effectiveness. However, according to Mission officials, it is too early in the implementation of the R4 process to state that the new system has improved program effectiveness. Nonetheless, the SO team members told us that the discipline resulting from developing the "results tree" for the SO has greatly focused the team and development partners in trying to ensure that activities are directed towards achieving intermediate results and SO outcomes. The team also said that this process has led to considerable discussions and reviews of performance information to ensure that this information shows that they are making progress and/or conducting the proper activities.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Concerning Eurasia Foundation (EF) activities being included in the Mission's Results Framework for Civil Society, USAID/CAR sought guidance from the Bureau as recommended. The guidance was received on January 10, 1997 advising ". . . please consider moving EF from any SOs it now is linked to, to SO 4.2 in your R4." USAID/CAR stated that it was in agreement with this guidance and reported that in the budgetary exercises for fiscal year 1997 the Eurasia Foundation activities for all five Central Asian Republics are now shown under Strategic Objective 4.2 (Cross-Cutting Programs). USAID/CAR submitted documentation reflecting this change. In our view, the guidance provided to the Mission is acceptable because it clarifies how the Bureau

wishes to treat results for the Foundation. Based on the actions taken, we consider that a final management action was taken on Recommendation No. 1.1, thus no further action is needed on this recommendation.

With regard to separating activities closely related to Legal Systems from the Civil Society Results Framework and establishing a new Results Framework for these activities, USAID/CAR consulted with the Bureau as recommended. The Bureau advised two actions. First, the rule of law activities placed within the SO 2.1 Results Framework should be focused more closely on Civil Society and annual work plans should reflect this focus. Second, USAID/CAR should continue to reflect rule of law activities that are essential to the development of other Strategic Objectives, for instance private enterprise development, within the specific Results Frameworks of these Strategic Objectives. USAID/CAR agreed with this guidance and is taking action to implement it. In our view, the guidance provided by the Bureau clarifies treatment of the results for the activities in question. Based on the actions taken, we consider that a final management action was taken on Recommendation No. 1.2; thus no further action is needed on this recommendation.

Concerning the Mission's need to complete the performance monitoring plan—which in addition to the required elements, establishes the reporting cutoff for any reports and stresses that all information should be accurately reported—the Mission developed and issued a performance monitoring plan. This plan is consistent with the audit recommendation. Based on the actions taken, we consider that a final management action was taken on Recommendation No. 2; thus no further action is needed on this recommendation.

Were USAID/CAR's Internews and the American Legal Consortium Activities Making Satisfactory Progress Toward Achieving the Intended Results in Kazakhstan?

USAID/CAR's Internews and the American Legal Consortium activities were making satisfactory progress toward achieving the intended results in Kazakhstan.

Internews

Internews was awarded a regional grant in 1992 which covered activities in the Newly Independent States (NIS). Subsequently, separate grants were issued for activities in Russia and Ukraine and modifications to the original grant were made. The original 1992 grant was modified to cover the Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus. According to USAID records, at June 30, 1996, \$1,072,419 had been obligated for Internews activities in Kazakhstan. The overall purpose of the activities in Kazakhstan is to aid in the establishment of independent TV news distribution systems and to facilitate alternatives to the state-controlled monopoly of broadcasting. Specifically, the goals are:

- to establish an independent news exchange network in and between regions,
- to provide training for TV journalists and station managers to assist independent news organizations to become effective as sustainable news-producing and news-transmitting institutions, and
- to provide the logistical and administrative support necessary for program activities.

The audit determined that Internews appeared to be on its way to achieving all of these goals. For instance, an independent news exchange network called Sara Arka was established which consisted of 19 independent TV stations in 17 cities throughout Kazakhstan. These TV stations share common programming including a 30 minute local news program produced by the collective effort of all members of the network.

In addition, Internews provided training to journalists and station managers in 32 of the 49 independent TV stations in Kazakhstan, as well as, some radio stations. We interviewed personnel from the network and seven TV stations. They told us that the training had been beneficial and contributed to the improvement of their news programs, if applicable. Also, all those interviewed

stated that they were either going to continue or increase the production of the news programs that they were currently producing.

In terms of providing the logistical and administrative support necessary for program activities, Internews reportedly provided equipment worth approximately \$130,000 to the network and eight TV stations. We interviewed personnel from the network and two TV stations that had reportedly received equipment. All of them had received the items identified by Internews and were using the equipment to produce their news segments. All of the recipients stated that the equipment was beneficial to them and helped improve both the quality of the news programs and the speed to which they could produce it. In addition, Internews reported, and we verified with the network and seven TV stations, that they were providing funds for the transmission of the network news program which was produced by and transmitted to (after combining segments and editing by the network) the member TV stations.

American Legal Consortium

In Kazakhstan, ALC project's overall goal was to strengthen legal knowledge, resources and institutions in order to help the rule of law function as an effective framework and foundation for democratic markets and social transitions. Its dual focus is on Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Development and Legal Information Resources Development. In Kazakhstan, according to ALC, it had awarded 27 grants to newly established indigenous NGOs totaling about \$565,000. The areas of interest and advocacy for these NGOs ranged widely. Some of the areas covered are human rights, independent media, legal societies, consumer interest, farmers/tenants/cooperatives rights, disabled citizens' rights, and publishing NGO materials. Besides awarding grants, ALC provided technical assistance to these new NGOs related to developing business and financial plans, developing organizational structures, setting goals and becoming self-sustaining. Five of the six grantees visited stated that they were involved in providing their organization's opinion on legislation. The sixth grantee was involved in publishing the NGO's papers and documents and was not involved in commenting on laws.

In the area of developing legal information resources, ALC helped establish a Legal Information Center. ALC provided some equipment, training and technical assistance to the Center. This Center consists of a library and legal information network—four law school libraries—and is open to the public. The Center is being funded by various other donors and has support from the private sector as well. While the Center is not self-sustaining, it continues to receive support from the donor community, such as the Eurasia Foundation.

According to Center officials, they have begun talks with the Parliament Law Library to bring it into their network. Since opening in April 1996, the Center has received information requests from 420 customers. These customers included students, lawyers, and private companies.

Did USAID/CAR Ensure Accountability for the Funds Provided for Internews and American Legal Consortium Activities in Kazakhstan?

USAID/CAR ensured accountability for the funds provided for Internews and American Legal Consortium activities in Kazakhstan. Both Internews and ALC had recent audits performed which covered USAID funds. In addition, USAID/CAR ensured accountability for the funds provided for ALC grant activities in Kazakhstan by requiring audits of sub-grantees whose grant award exceeded \$25,000. The Mission worked with ALC to locate an auditor who could perform audits of firms located in Kazakhstan. ALC had awarded three grants in Kazakhstan which were above the \$25,000 threshold for requiring an audit. For the largest grantee—over \$80,000 awarded—ALC had received and reviewed the audit report and was in the process of obtaining the remaining two audit reports.

In addition to relying upon audits of its sub-grantees, ALC established an internal review process for all grantees. The grantees were required to submit budgets and requests for financing based on the budget. In addition, funding was to be provided to sub-grantees in tranches. After the initial tranche of funding, ALC required the sub-grantee to provide both a program progress report and a financial report detailing the use of funds before it would release any additional funds. ALC reviewed the progress made by the grantee and offered assistance as needed. Also, ALC made periodic visits to all sub-grantees to ensure that the activities were progressing and to respond to any questions related to financing.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Scope

The Office of the Regional Inspector General for Audit/Frankfurt, audited USAID/CAR's implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act for Democracy-Civil Society activities in Kazakstan, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Audit field work was performed during the period October 15, 1996 through November 26, 1996. At the time of audit, the Mission stated that there were nine USAID-funded organizations involved in implementing USAID activities related to the Civil Society Strategic Objective (SO 2.1). As of June 30, 1996, the Mission had obligated about \$12.6 million and spent about \$8.5 million in support of this SO. However, none of these amounts were audited during this exercise.

To answer audit objectives two and three, we audited the Kazakstan activities of two implementing organizations under SO 2.1—Internews and American Legal Consortium (ALC).

Methodology

To answer audit objective one, we assessed the Mission's management of controls for monitoring, reporting and evaluating its Civil Society activities. For audit objectives two and three, we assessed Internews' and ALC's controls for implementing their USAID-funded activities and their accountability of the USAID funds or commodities provided to them or any sub-recipients.

More specifically, we met with USAID/CAR officials in Almaty, Kazakstan, and seven of the organizations funded under SO 2.1 in Almaty, Kazakstan and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. To answer the second objective, we visited eight recipients of Internews assistance and six recipients of ALC in Almaty and Akmola, Kazakstan. In addition, we reviewed Agency, ENI Bureau, and Mission guidance, as well as ENI Bureau and Mission Strategic Frameworks, progress reports, and reviews thereof. In planning for the audit, we assessed the Mission's risk exposure to be medium.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

APPENDIX II

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UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL MISSION FOR CENTRAL ASIA

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Almaty, Kazakstan
January 30, 1997

John Comptello
RIG/A/F
Frankfurt, Germany

SUBJECT: FY 1997 Audit of USAID/CAR's Implementation
of the Government Performance and Results Act for Democracy-
Civil Society Activities in Kazakstan

Dear Mr. Comptello:

This is in response to your memorandum of December 18, 1996 transmitting the draft report of the subject audit and requesting comments on the audit. The USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia (USAID/CAR) has reviewed the draft audit report and has carefully considered both audit recommendations. The USAID/CAR response to the recommendations in the draft audit report follows.

RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 1: "We recommend that USAID/CAR obtain guidance from the ENI Bureau as to whether it should: 1.1 include the Eurasia Foundation in its Results Framework; and 1.2 separate activities closely related to Legal Systems from its Civil Society Results Framework and establish a new Results Framework for these activities."

1.1 Eurasia Foundation

USAID/CAR sought guidance on January 10, 1997 via e-mail from the ENI/ED Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) for the Eurasia Foundation on the appropriate placement of the Eurasia Foundation in the Results Framework. The guidance was received

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on January 10, 1997 advising ". . . please consider moving EF from any SOs it now is linked to, to SO 4.2 in your R4." USAID/CAR is in agreement with this guidance. In the budgetary exercises for FY 1997 the Eurasia Foundation activities for all five Central Asian Republics are now shown under Strategic Objective 4.2 (Cross-Cutting Programs). USAID/CAR documentation has been updated to reflect this change. Copies of the USAID/CAR Program Overview for Kazakstan (which is based on the Results Frameworks) and the FY 1997 budgets are attached as documentation of the actions taken by USAID/CAR in response to Recommendation 1.1. Based on the actions taken, we request that Recommendation 1.1 be closed upon issuance of the final audit report.

1.2 Separation of Legal Systems activities from Civil Society activities

USAID/CAR consulted with ENI/DG regarding the placement of the rule of law activities currently being implemented and reported under SO 2.1. ENI/DG advised two actions. First, rule of law activities placed within the SO 2.1 Results framework should be focused more closely on Civil Society. Annual work plans are prepared to reflect this focus. Second, ENI/DG advised USAID/CAR to continue to reflect rule of law activities that are essential to the development of other strategic objectives, for instance private enterprise development, within the specific Results Frameworks of these Strategic Objectives. USAID/CAR agrees with this guidance and is taking action to implement it. USAID/CAR has sought and has received guidance from the ENI Bureau as recommended by the RIG/A/F audit team. Based on the actions taken, we request that Recommendation 1.2 be closed upon issuance of the final audit report.

RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 2: "We recommend that the Mission complete the performance monitoring plan, which in addition to the required elements, establishes the reporting cutoff for any reports, particularly the annual Results Report, and stresses that all information should be accurately reported."

The USAID/CAR Office of Program and Project Support (PPS), in consultation with USAID/CAR Strategic Objective teams, developed and issued a performance

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monitoring plan consistent with the audit recommendation. It is attached to this letter. Based on the action taken we request that Recommendation 2 be closed upon issuance of the final audit report.

USAID/CAR appreciated the professional manner and insight of the RIG/A/F staff in conducting this audit.

Sincerely,


Patricia K. Buckles
USAID/CAR Mission Director

Attachments:

USAID/CAR Program Overview for Kazakstan
USAID/CAR FY 1997 Budget
USAID/CAR Performance Monitoring Plan

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USAID/CAR's Kazakhstan Results Tree



KAZAKSTAN PERFORMANCE DATA: BASELINE, TARGETS, AND ACTUAL RESULTS

LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS									
				YEAR	VALUE	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
						Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
SO2.1	Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision making	1. Number of advocacy NGOs	Definition: Advocacy NGOs are those local organizations which focus upon advocating and advancing governmental or civil society attention to means of addressing particular democratic, economic or social needs as objectives, including human rights, women's rights, NGO rights and media rights. Unit of Measure: Actual number of NGOs listed in the Counterpart Consortium database for Kazakhstan on a particular date with advocacy (women's rights, human rights, Media rights, NGO support) as their purpose (covering all known NGOs)SOURCE: Counterpart	1992	0	NA	8 (entry only started in Oct.) total NGOs in database March 96 143	*	149	200		210		220	
		2. Percentage change in NGO membership	Definition: We will use the Farmers Association local partner as a proxy for our impact on citizen participation. Unit of Measure: Actual number of individuals reported as being members of the Taldy-Korgan Farmers Association. SOURCE: CNFA	1992	NA	NA	340	(50%) 525	151	(25%) 651		(10% increase)		(10% increase)	
		3. Percentage of citizens who feel informed.	Definition: IFES survey measures the response to questions concerning the availability of information about political and economic issues. Unit of Measure: % of individuals surveyed who self report that they are informed SOURCE:IFES	1995	50% (POL) 43% (ECO)		50%	55%	58%	60%		50%		62%	52%

USAID / CAR's Kazakhstan Results Framework

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LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS								
						1995		1996		1997		1998		1999
				YEAR	VALUE	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target
IR2.1.1	NGOs engage in strengthening civil society	Increasing number of NGOs that seek to influence the government or get attention/ support for their activities	<p>Definition: contacts with media or government officials reported in grant/contract monitoring documents in response to the questions:</p> <p>Stage one: Fear and lack of public understanding Stage two: narrowly defined advocacy groups emerge Stage three: institutionalize base, and form coalitions</p> <p>1. "Did you have any contacts with media organizations regarding NGOs work or issues during the past year?"</p> <p>2. "Did you have any contacts with government officials regarding NGOs work or issues during the past year?"</p> <p>We assume that all organizations are seeking to increase membership and make people aware in some way of their work.</p> <p>Unit: Percent of total NGOs in Counterpart Consortium database which answer yes to one of the above questions. SOURCE: COUNTERP</p>											
				NA	NA	NA	NA	yes 15%	75%	yes 25%		yes 50%		yes 75%
				NA	NA	NA	NA	yes 10%	35%	yes 15%		yes 25%		yes 40%

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LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS										
				YEAR	VALUE	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		
						Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	
IR 2.1.1.1.	Improved laws/policies enabling NGO formation and operation	Number of laws and policies enabling NGOs to organize and function: Improved quality, based on knowledgeable opinion, of these laws	<p>Definition: In order to function without government hindrance a set of laws and/or policies, including policies in administration, needs to be enacted which is necessary and sufficient for NGO operations.</p> <p>Example Stage one Registration: Stage Two Income Tax exemption Stage Three NGO Income tax deduction contributors Procurement preference Public audit requirements</p> <p>Activities: proposing, drafting, introducing to Parliament, passage.</p> <p>Unit: Number of new laws/policies. 1996 SOURCE: ALC</p>	1992	0.00	0.00	0.00	1	0	1	enabling	2		2		
IR 2.1.1.2	Strengthened NGO capacity	Number of NGOs trained and the number of NGO members trained	<p>Definition: In a transitional society without a history of non-governmental organizations NGOs must be trained in organizational and programmatic sustainability.</p> <p>Skills: Developing proposals Revenues beyond grants Financial Mngt Board of Directors Advocacy</p> <p>Unit: Records of USAID sponsored training for NGOs and for NGO participants, including but not limited to management, media, advocacy, and government relations.</p> <p>DEFINITION: NET/AED, ALC, IFES, Counterpart, NGOs (members)</p>	1992	0	NA	0	AED 18	15 NGO Leader ship	25		15		NA		
						NA	0	IFES 100	(200) citizens							
						NA	C'part Prog Estab NGOs 30 (54)	Full Year C'part NGOs 100	300(447)	Half Year ?						
								ABA	0	1						

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LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS									
						1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
				YEAR	VALUE	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
IR2.1.2	Increased availability of information through independent electronic media addressing democratic processes and issues	1. Average daily local news programming. 2. Average daily broadcasting time for educational, long-format programs, PSAs. 3. Percent of Kazakstanis who can watch daily news from at least one non-governmental station.	1. Definition: Number of broadcasting minutes Unit: number and %	1994	4	NA	NA	10 10%	15	10%		10%		10%	
			2. Definition: Number of broadcasting minutes Unit: number and %	1994	15	NA	30	45 10%	45 (50%)	10%		10%		10%	
			3. Definition: Unit: Percent	1994	15	NA	28	35 10%	35	10%		10%		10%	

LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS									
				YEAR	VALUE	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
						Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
IR 2.1.2.1	Increased technical capabilities of independent electronic media	1. Number of stations using "appropriate" technology (S-VHS or Betacam, computer graphics)	Definition: As indicated	1994	2	0	8	20 10%	23	10%		10%		10%	
		2. Average number of employees per station	Unit: Absolute number and average % increase	1994	10	0	20	25	25 (25%)	10%		10%		10%	
		3. Average number of employees in ad dept. per station.	Number of independent TV/radio stations: 1994 - 18/3 1995 - 35/7 1996 - 45/18	1994	1	0	2	4	4 (100%)	10%		10%		10%	
		4. Average daily broadcasting time per station in hours.	SOURCE: INTERNEWS	1994	2	0	7	12 10%	12	10%		10%		10%	
		5. Average monthly revenue, incl. Congratulations & announcements.	NGO and the Media Evolution:	1994	\$1,000	0	\$6,000	\$5000 10%	\$7000	10%		10%		10%	
		6. Average daily local ad spots sold.	Stage one: public and or government suspicious of NGOs. Public does not understand the concept. Anonymous donations, little or no positive media coverage.	1994	2	0	9	8 10%	10	10%		10%		10%	
		7. Average ad spot price.		1994	\$3	0	\$10	\$10	\$15 (50%)	2%		10%		10%	
		8. Number of TV station employees who've studied in an Internews seminar.	Stage two: Media doesn't cover NGOs, because they are perceived as weak and ineffective. Individual NGOs seek out media.	1994	40	0	70	220	270	10%		10%		10%	
		9. Hours of programming distributed through Internews projects.	Stage three: Increased public knowledge and volunteerism. Numerous examples of good working relationships between national and local governments.	1994	0.5	0	8	31	31	10%		10%		10%	
		10. Number of stations which have participated in at least one Internews project.		1994	9	0	20	35	40 (100%)	10%		10%		10%	
		11. Number of stations broadcasting according to a regular schedule		1994	13	0	20	38		40		43		45	

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LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS									
						1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
				YEAR	VALUE	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
IR 2.1.2.2	Increased ability and willingness of independent electronic media to report on democratic processes, public policy issues	1. Number of stations with daily news. 2. Average number of employees in news dept. per station (where daily news exists).	Definition: Unit: Absolute number and percentage of increase SOURCE: INTERNEWS	1994	5	0	12	20	20	10%		10%		10%	
				1994	3	0	5	9	9	10%		10%		10%	
IR 2.1.2.3	Strengthening Print Media	contractor reports to SO 1.1 /1.3	IR 1.1.3 Source: OSC												
IR 2.1.3	Increased responsiveness of Government to citizens/ciúzen organizations	1. Percentage increase in number of draft laws and policies with input by NGOs considered by the government	Definition: Government is defined to include the executive and legislative branches. Unit: Straw poll at final ALC conference 1996 - How many laws did you discuss with a member of the government? Of those laws, how many did your input effect?	1994	0	0	2	200% (4)		NA		NA		NA	
IR 2.1.3.1	Increased Government transparency	1) Percentage increase in the number of open hearings, forums or consultative processes and information addressing legislative/policy issues and implementation. 2) Number of judges trained	Definition: Government is defined to include the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Unit: 1)As a representative measure, USAID staff will count open hearings on legislative issues as reported to them or in the media. 2) AED Records.	1994	0.00	0	1	200% (2)	0	400%		600%		600%	
						NA	11	*	11						

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LEVEL	RESULT STATEMENT	PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	BASELINE DATA		TARGETS AND ACTUAL RESULTS									
						1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
				YEAR	VALUE	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
IR 2.1.3.2	Increased knowledge by Parliament on effective dialogue between Parliament and NGOs and responsiveness generally	1. Number of members of Parliament or Parliament staff trained on interaction with citizens or citizen groups and other skills	Definition: Direct training to parliament and other workshops focusing on citizen participation and feedback and other areas of responsiveness. Unit: % Members and staff of Parliament who have attended training SOURCE: NDI. AED	1994	AED 13	NA	AED 2	5%		40%		60%		75%	
		Comments/Notes: Based on October 1996 inputs: following extended team review, October 31 prepared for Mission Review on November 6, 1996													

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