

**EVALUATION OF PROJECT 0016
TRAUMA AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

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PVOs	Mike Miller, Tia Pausic (ADF) Jack Maarkand, Mike Chommie, Mary Picard, Louise Griep, Rod Campbell (AICF/USA) Maya Mihic (CAH) Lynne Bensarghin, Frank Disimino (CRS) Claudia Crawford, Jill Benderly, Lael Stegall (Delphi) Barbara Smith, Mirela Despotovic, Annie Foster (IRC) Frank Catania, Jim Nuttall, Anne Nixon (SCF)
Harvard University	Richard Mollica, John Woodall
Subgrantees	numerous persons at 32 sites: physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, teachers and professors, art therapists, lawyers, agricultural extensionists, forestry managers, hospital managers, commercial fish farm managers, trainers, researchers, women community laundry managers
Beneficiaries	children at four SCF preschools, at an IRC dance center, on a hospital cancer ward, at an AICF/USA-funded art therapy class, an IRC collection center and a school-based playroom; beneficiaries of a Merhamet distribution center (AICF/USA-assisted); and members of two support groups (CAH)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADF	America's Development Foundation (grantee)
AICF/USA	Action Internationale contre la Faim/USA, International Action against Hunger (grantee)
BiH	Bosnia (and) Herzegovina
CAH	Center for Attitudinal Healing (grantee)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services (grantee)
DP	Displaced Person
HPRT	Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma
IFOR	International Forces (NATO military)
IRC	International Rescue Committee (grantee)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization (herein used to refer to indigenous Croatian and Bosnian organizations)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization (herein used to refer to US-based international grantees)
SCF	Save the Children Federation
SPA	Society for Psychological Assistance (subgrantee)
STAR	Strategic Training for Advocacy and Reconciliation (Delphi program)
UG	Umbrella Grant, IRC (grantee)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose. The purposes of the evaluation were 1) to assess the implementation of the organizations implementing the Trauma and Humanitarian Assistance Project (USAID Project No. 180-0016) in Bosnia and Croatia and 2) to assess USAID’s management and monitoring of Project 0016.

Methodology. A two-person evaluation team undertook a month-long evaluation of eight grantees. One, AICF/USA, operates only in Bosnia while three (ADF, CAH, and HPRT) operate only in Croatia. SPA, CRS’s Croatian counterpart, conducts training in Croatia with some participants coming from Bosnia. Delphi operates in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia; IRC and Save the Children operate in Croatia and Bosnia.

Seven of the eight grantees covered in this evaluation are private voluntary organizations. One, the Harvard University School of Public Health, is a university program. The acronym PVO is herein used to refer to US-based international grantees. The acronym NGO is herein used to refer to indigenous Croatian and Bosnian organizations.

The methodology for the evaluation included the development of logic models prepared by the grantees to elucidate their perception of the linkages among project components. Further, the evaluation generated a set of diagrams showing how Project 0016 activities contribute to peaceful reconstruction of healthy civil societies in Bosnia and Croatia.

The evaluation team visited 32 project activity sites, 11 grantee field offices, five grantee home offices, and three USAID offices (Zagreb, Zenica, and Sarajevo).

The analysis of the evaluation team was expanded and refined by contributions from USAID and grantees.

Achievements. The combined efforts of the eight grantees and their various partners have produced tangible results in the form of repaired buildings and facilities. Local NGOs have been created and enabled to acquire offices and equipment and to build their organizational capacities. Grantees can point to clear evidence that the beneficiaries they have reached through a variety of interventions have been helped to some degree.

Grantees have achieved significant coverage and outreach. Some programs have operated as “seed planters” through the training of individuals who have carried new concepts and techniques back to their home organizations. A variety of new ideas—concepts, procedures, practices, and approaches—to providing help to trauma-affected persons is taking root as a result of Project 0016 interventions. These include various types of support groups and therapeutic approaches, including rapid techniques for symptom reduction.

The grantees have faced constraints to their work, including host government hostility, shifting donor program interests, and changing needs of the affected populations. The grantees have operated in

an environment of deep divisions between ethnic groups, where rapid efforts to ensure equity among beneficiary groups may exacerbate intergroup resentments. Different perceptions exist among expatriates and local persons concerning the prospects and readiness of ethnic groups to begin the initial steps toward tolerance and reconciliation.

Although there has been sharing, cross-fertilization, and collaboration among the grantees and subgrantees, more could occur. In particular, grantees should identify and pursue opportunities for sharing those experiences, techniques, and interventions that have had success. Grantees should open their training to participants from other organizations. Training modules and case studies can be more widely shared by use of video.

In considering goals, objectives, achievements, and problems, the evaluation stresses the importance of fine-tuning grantee self-evaluation plans, with particular focus on “ownable objectives.” Seven of the eight grantees are now at an important milestone in the project. (Harvard University began its program approximately one year after the other grantees.) The remaining grant period is a time to replicate successful models, nurture new ones that provide opportunities for a multiplier effect, and increase greatly sharing of documents, ideas, and training.

Management. USAID’s management effort for Project 0016 has been characterized by frequent project officer turnover in Washington and a division of management responsibilities between USAID/Washington, the Budapest-based controller’s office, and USAID/Zagreb (and more recently, USAID/Sarajevo). PVOs have experienced some difficulties in obtaining timely guidance from USAID and some have experienced budget and funding problems.

Most PVOs have achieved a satisfactory working relationship with their headquarters. The local offices enjoy the necessary decision-making authority to manage their project activities. PVOs in general have established sound working relationships with their local NGO subgrantees.

Most PVOs consider the governments of both Croatia and Bosnia to be hostile to their efforts, with Croatia possibly more readily positioned to act on its antipathy. Despite these tensions, particularly over salaries and benefits given to PVO personnel, some government officials recognize that their countries benefit from a skilled group of experts.

PVO/NGO internal management—record keeping, personnel administration, funds control, and physical property utilization—were judged to be satisfactory. The PVOs have established basic systems in limited office space available and have attracted well-qualified and committed individuals—both local and expatriate—to serve under war zone conditions. Burnout and turnover of staff is occurring, but is expected under the high stress living and working conditions and the mental toll of working with traumatized victims.

Generic Recommendations for PVOs

- C PVOs need to make a concerted effort to share with one another the materials they develop or otherwise acquire and that they deem beneficial to the overall goals of Project 0016.
- C All eight grantees require training in planning, evaluation, and other important support topics.
- C PVOs need to specify with greater clarity the extent of their achievements.
- C PVOs need to be constantly on the lookout for opportunities that permit them to extend Project 0016 benefits through the multiplier effect.

Recommendations for USAID/Washington

- C In wartime or emergencies, speedy startup is essential. Organizations do not have the luxury of on-the-job training, institutional development, and on-site capacity building. Accordingly, in wartime or emergencies, the selection of potential grantees should be based, at minimum, on
 - an established track record in the field in the specific country or countries with similar characteristics;
 - the availability of a Project Director with intimate knowledge of and experience in project management in the specific country; and/or
 - the in-country USAID mission's ability to provide the minimum level of assistance necessary to expedite startup of the projects.
- C PVOs are not routinely or formally informed of new USAID directives, priorities, and staff assignments that can have an impact on their project operations or reporting procedures. Accordingly, standard communications format should be established to impart information, particularly matters of significance to project directors, in a timely manner by fax or e-mail on a regular and/or ad hoc basis from USAID/Washington and USAID/Zagreb.
- C Project management responsibilities in USAID/Washington should be apportioned to permit sufficient and timely attention by Project Officers to implementation issues.

Recommendations for USAID/Zagreb

- C To expand knowledge of Project 0016 activities among project directors and staff toward the end of greater sharing of information and resources, synergy of effect, and reduced expenditure of resources, the mission should support the establishment of an association of Project 0016 Project Directors. Support would take the form of convening the first

organizational meeting and providing space if necessary for periodic meetings of the association.

Recommendations for PVO Management Improvement

- C PVOs on the ground, particularly in emergencies, must have the authority to make immediate decisions within the guidelines of their authority and responsibilities. Accordingly, PVO headquarters should hire staff in whom they have personal and professional confidence, give them guidelines, and assign broad areas of authority and responsibility for making and implementing decisions in the field.
- C PVO and NGO staff turnover and lack of overlap in on-the-job training result in loss of institutional memory and capability. In addition, many PVOs and NGOs attract staff with good experience in some areas but insufficient experience in others, particularly in organizational and supervisory matters. Accordingly, rather than each PVO trying to provide modest and sporadic amounts of training for staff and subgrantees, the proposed PVO association, with input if requested from the USAID Missions, should develop a comprehensive training plan and investigate the pooling of resources to hire high-quality consultants to provide training to all PVO and NGO staff.
- C NGOs and some PVOs appear to lose focus on their objectives as they become interested in or distracted by immediate problems or isolated issues. Accordingly, to keep NGOs (and PVOs) focused on their objectives, PVOs should assist NGOs in designing activity reporting documents that are tailored to reflect progress toward objectives.
- C The practice among service-providing NGOs of relying on the chronological entry of client names and problems in large bound notebooks makes it difficult to follow client progress or to prepare unduplicated statistics. Accordingly, card file systems should be instituted as soon as budgets allow; NGOs should be trained in the value and ease of their use.
- C PVOs provide training to NGOs and community groups on the subject of burnout. Nevertheless, burnout is a pervasive problem among their own staff. Accordingly, PVOs should provide staff training on methods of avoiding or reducing symptoms of burnout and conduct periodic refresher courses on the same subject. Some Project 0016 PVO and NGO projects could provide resource persons for this purpose.

I. PURPOSE

The purposes of the evaluation were 1) to assess the implementation of the organizations implementing the Trauma and Humanitarian Assistance Project (USAID 180-0016) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; and, 2) to assess the USAID management and monitoring of the Trauma and Humanitarian Assistance Project (180-0016). Implementation progress will be assessed by reviewing project goals, strategic objectives, activities, performance indicators, and means of measurement. Key government officials, private sector officials, beneficiaries, and selected target populations were interviewed.

II. METHODOLOGY

Under ENI/HR's support contract with BHM International, a two-person evaluation team undertook a month-long (February 1996) evaluation of the eight Project 0016 (Trauma and Humanitarian Assistance) grantees and selected subgrantees or collaborating partners in Croatia and Bosnia. According to the Request for Application (RFA), the grantees had submitted proposals in either of two categories: trauma training or community development.

Of the eight grantees, one (AICF/USA) operates only in Bosnia while three (ADF, CAH, and HPRT) operate only in Croatia. SPA, CRS's Croatian counterpart, conducts training in Croatia with some participants coming from Bosnia; CRS also works under a separate Project 0016 grant in Macedonia. Delphi operates in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia; IRC and Save the Children operate in Croatia and Bosnia.

Seven of the eight grantees covered in this evaluation are private voluntary organizations. One, the Harvard University School of Public Health, is a university program. The acronym PVO is herein used to refer to US-based international grantees. The acronym NGO is herein used to refer to indigenous Croatian and Bosnian organizations.

The evaluation team began its work by obtaining some key documents from USAID, and, in a few cases, the US headquarters of the grantees. The team subsequently secured additional documents in the field at USAID/Zagreb and from various grantee and subgrantee sites visited.

In January 1996, the evaluation team leader suggested and discussed with USAID and BHM various scopes of work. The concerned parties accepted a proposed work plan that was to be organized around the PVOs' development of logic models of their perception of the linkages among project components. In early February, representatives of the eight grantees met with the evaluation team at USAID/Zagreb for a discussion of the evaluation's approach and logistics.

Immediately following the early February meeting, the evaluation team began its work by visiting grantee headquarters in Croatia (ADF; AICF/USA, whose headquarters is in Split, though projects are all in Bosnia; CAH; CRS; Delphi; Harvard; IRC; and SCF) and Bosnia (IRC). In addition, the evaluators observed CRS trainees in Bosnia (Zenica and Sarajevo) and once in Croatia (Split).

Subgrantee sites visited included the following:

- C Four ADF sites—Medical Committee for Human Rights in Zagreb, members of the Coordinating Committee for Human Rights in Pakrac, the Dalmatian Solidarity Council in Split, and the Committee for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights in Osijek;
- C Six AICF/USA sites—the Bugojno suboffice; a hospital in Gornji Vakuf; a commercial fish farm in Bugojno; a Merhamet distribution organization and nine of its elderly beneficiaries in Bugojno; representatives of a beekeeping society, a fish farmer, a reforestation agency, and an agricultural extension administrator; and an art therapy class;
- C Three CAH support groups—Zagreb support group facilitator trainees, Rijeka Vukovar displaced person support group facilitator trainees, and counseling for children with cancer in a Zagreb hospital;
- C One CRS site—the offices of SPA and one of its Advanced Trauma Recovery training sites (as well as 12 former trainees);
- C Five Delphi STAR Project sites—the Advisory Council and Women's Laundry Project in Pakrac, Infoteka (associated with Medica women's clinic in Zenica), *Zena 21* magazine, and the women's advocacy group “Tara” in Rijeka;
- C Three Harvard sites—a psychosocial support team at University of Rijeka Hospital, the Merhamet Muslim refugee association, and a Ruke survey of the Varazde refugee center;
- C Six IRC sites—Zagreb multipurpose center, Zenica adolescent counseling center, Stari Vitez children's dance group, Sarajevo displaced children's playroom in a displaced person collection center, school-based playroom and tutoring program for displaced persons also in Sarajevo, and “Duga” adolescent program in Daruvar; and
- C Four SCF sites—preschools in Zadar, Benkovac, and Gornji Vakuf, Bosnia.

In addition to the 32 sites listed above, the evaluation team observed or visited three CRS/SPA trainee focus group meetings, 11 grantee field offices, five grantee home offices, and three USAID offices (Zagreb, Zenica, and Sarajevo).

The evaluation plan was for one team member to conduct an “evaluability assessment” while the other conducted a management assessment of both donor and grantees (not, it should be noted, an audit or comprehensive review). An evaluability assessment often leads to the conclusion that a program or project is, in the strictest sense, “unevaluable.” That is, if the key players cannot clearly delineate objectives, an evaluator cannot assess whether a program has achieved its stated objectives. (This does not mean that the evaluation is terminated; rather, it proceeds as a process evaluation rather than as an impact evaluation.)

The team used several approaches to draw out grantees (and, in a few cases, subgrantees) concerning their perceptions of where their activities might lead. Not surprisingly, the different layers of a single organization often expressed markedly different perceptions of overall program direction. Moreover, the team leader explicitly indicated her interest in evaluating the grantees both in terms of the various projects' stated goals and objectives and the productive use of U.S. foreign aid dollars in supporting trauma and humanitarian assistance. The latter perspective intentionally provoked respondents into recognizing that the U.S. interest in the former Yugoslavia focuses on such broad-based goals as stability in the Balkans (a product of peace in Bosnia and Croatia) and that America's willingness to fund a wide range of trauma assistance activities is linked to higher-order goals.

III. OVERVIEW

A. Goals and Objectives

The evaluation team developed the accompanying “pathway” charts (see Figures 1 through 4) after examining the text of the Request for Application (RFA); talking with stakeholders at various levels, including Tamara Sterk and Tom Yates at USAID/Zagreb and headquarters project managers/directors at ADF, AICF/USA, CRS, and Delphi; and examining key project documents. The discussions with stakeholders were enlightening; most respondents were enthusiastic about the opportunity to discuss their projects. Only one reacted as if the exercise were an unjust imposition “from outside.” In one case, a subordinate created a chart that, according to the supervisor, was not at all representative of what the organization is attempting to do. In another case, the respondent found herself with an “orphan objective” that could not be linked to other objectives—until she reinterpreted the objective as related to training NGO members in advocacy techniques.

The evaluation team did not intend to impose the charts on the Project 0016 grantees; rather, the team views the charts as a guide for further discussion. While one master chart could have been created from Figures 2, 3, and 4, the result would have been an overly complex depiction of Project 0016. Instead, the team suggests that the reader start with Figure 1 for a schematic view of the RFA and its underlying concept. Figures 2, 3, and 4 then detail the path of progress in reaching Project 0016’s overall goals.

Not included in Figures 2 through 4, of course, are the other major interventions: the IFOR military effort, the work of the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, and macroeconomic reconstruction. Further, at the time of the evaluation, the USAID re-engineering work was underway at USAID/Zagreb, and only a draft set of strategic objectives was available. Nonetheless, it is the team’s impression that Project 0016 fits well into the objectives as they now stand in USAID/Zagreb; the “fit” is less clear in the new USAID/Sarajevo office, although the team attempted to defend the need for humanitarian and psychosocial interventions to complement both the military and macroeconomic assistance underway and planned.

PATHWAYS TO PEACE

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5 STABILITY IN 5

5 THE BALKANS 5

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* Peace in Bosnia * * Peace in Croatia *
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* civil society * * healthy society *
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* ethnic reconciliation *
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* peaceful coexistence *
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* active tolerance *
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* reluctant tolerance *
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* guided/facilitated *
* reassociation *
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Figure 2

PATHWAYS TO A HEALTHY SOCIETY

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* ethnic /))1 "healthy" * +)))1functional /)) ,
* tolerance/peace * * communities * * * families * * *
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* demobilized * * returnees * * refugees * * reduced * * * *reduced *
* soldiers * *reintegrated * * integrated * * teenage * * * *domestic *
* reintegrated * .))))0))))))- * into local * * delin- * * /)))1violence *
.))))0))))))- * * communities* * quency * * * .))))0))-
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* livelihood* * safety * *reduced childhood * *reduced adult* * women's *
* security * * assured * * trauma * * trauma * * shelters *
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* enterprise* *mutual confidence * .))))0))))))-
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* fish farms, **guided/facilitated * *art, music, dance, chess, *
* beekeeping ** reassociation * * sports, support groups *
* knitting etc.*.))))0))))))- .))))0))))))-
.))))0))))- * *
+)2))))2))))))2))))))2)))))) ,
* training, networking, communication (newsletters, *

* magazines, e-mail, meetings), professional and *
* nonprofessional exchange of ideas and support *
*
.))-

Figure 4

B. Achievements

1. The combined efforts of the eight grantees and their various partners have produced numerous tangible results. Otherwise unusable buildings, including hospitals, schools, public meeting places, and offices, have been rendered functional following the installation of windows and gutters and the repair of roofs and walls.
2. Less tangible but no less important, NGOs have been created and enabled in various ways to acquire offices and equipment, develop policies and procedures, design organizational structures, and acquire planning and other managerial and administrative skills (monitoring, evaluation, supervision). To various degrees, NGOs have been trained in measures of fundraising techniques and strategies to ensure their sustainability. Some have received instruction in advocacy skills (e.g., lobbying). Some (mainly ADF) have even provided legal advice and leadership in promoting universal acceptance of basic human rights concepts. Some can point to clear evidence that the beneficiaries they reach directly or indirectly through a variety of interventions (group therapy, support groups, individual therapy, dance, art, music, chess, sports, ceramics, occupational training) have been “healed” to some degree; where trauma stress symptom lists have been used to test beneficiaries before and after treatment, the results are impressive. It is difficult to assess achievements in psychosocial programs because needs are longer-term and individual.

3. Categories of Achievement by Grantees

Significant coverage. Project 0016 has either reached and addressed or has the potential to reach and serve a large proportion of the population identified as in need. For example,

- C SCF will facilitate the creation of 770 community-run preschools. If successful, SCF’s plans for replication will extend coverage even further. After at least one year, 60 percent of the schools are expected to be self-sustaining.
- C IRC has served more than 10,000 beneficiaries in a variety of programs under its Umbrella Grant.
- C AICF/USA distributed seeds to 377,000 persons in Travnik Canton during 1995.

Significant outreach (the potential for affecting large numbers) is illustrated by the following:

- C CRS with SPA has trained over 600 professional caregivers and, over time, will spawn support groups and second-generation training.
- C Delphi’s STAR project, emphasizing communication (e-mail, magazines, newsletters) and wide-ranging networking has the potential to reach huge numbers of women and their families in three countries.

C Harvard’s program promises considerable “spread effect” potential but has yet to become fully operational.

Seed planters (those who attempt to bring about far-reaching changes by working within existing structures) are to be found in ADF’s legal assistance and advocacy programs as well as among some SPA trainees who have, for example, altered the nature of secondary and university teaching styles. In addition, various trainees who introduce group therapy, short-term therapy, and support groups under the tutelage of CAH, Delphi, and IRC should be considered seed planters.

Contributions to peace via *the civil society pathway* are most evident in Delphi’s and IRC’s advocacy work and, most particularly, in ADF’s advocacy, legal aid, and human rights work.

Contributions to peace via *the healthy society pathway* are most evident in the “healing” work of SCF, IRC, CAH, Delphi, Harvard, and CRS/SPA.

Contributions to peace through *ethnic reconciliation* are meager to date, but the most deliberate efforts thus far are attributable to ADF, AICF/USA, and IRC.

4. New Ideas and Practices

A variety of new ideas—theories, concepts, procedures, practices, approaches—is taking root in Croatia and Bosnia as either a deliberate or serendipitous effect of Project 0016. Some of these may have far-reaching effects, particularly

- C the less didactic approaches to teaching explored in participatory workshop settings;
- C group therapy through therapeutic community approaches;
- C various types of support groups such as peer counseling, nonjudgmental acceptance groups, professional burnout prevention support, specific disease- or problem-related support groups;
- C a wide variety of therapeutic approaches (art therapy, dance not just as recreation but as therapy, sports, games);
- C several rapid techniques for symptom reduction (e.g., desensitization through eye movement techniques);
- C concepts of citizen action as a means of overcoming passivity; and
- C women as actors, not just as victims.

C. Constraints

1. External Contextual Constraints

Changing needs. All of the grantees are painfully aware that the Dayton Accords did not put an automatic end to war-related suffering and psychosocial problems. In some instances, it is the nature of the problems that has changed (from refugees to returnees, for example). In other instances, problems have escalated in response to refugees and displaced persons returning to familiar environments after three and four years and demobilized soldiers returning home to cause increased delinquency and domestic violence.

Host government hostility. Some host governments have demonstrated overt hostility to NGOs. For example, neither corporations nor individuals receive a tax break for charitable contributions, but NGO staff, like all employees, are required to pay usurious taxes ranging from 120 percent to 170 percent of their salaries. The process of registering NGOs is an obstacle course. Some government authorities fear NGOs and the eventual power of citizen action. In some instances, government agencies found fledgling NGOs to be arrogant, demanding, and threatening.

Shift in program interest. Program interest has shifted from Croatia to Bosnia. NGOs working in Bosnia feel that the tougher Bosnian work environment remains unappreciated and unacknowledged.

2. External Donor-Related Constraints

Mixed messages. One frequently heard complaint alleges that Washington sends mixed messages to USAID/Zagreb, which, in turn, forwards those messages to the Project 0016 grantees. The grantees then send the messages to their subgrantees. The result is that efforts in the field are crippled by conflicting information.

Donor pressures. Donors have been pressuring grantees to report measures or verification of effects on beneficiary populations that go beyond activity levels to outputs and achievement of objectives. Most grantees have experienced difficulty responding to requests and see the requests as changing the rules of the game at midpoint.

Funding uncertainty. The uncertainty of continued funding has put some Project 0016 grantees in a difficult position with respect to planning future programs and activities.

Pressure to demonstrate impact. Grantees have come under considerable pressure to demonstrate “impact” and to devise “impact indicators,” yet few have received helpful advice in this regard.

3. PVO-Related Internal Constraints

- C Some PVOs, in their efforts to assist certain beneficiary groups, may have inadvertently exacerbated ethnic tensions.
- C Different perceptions exist among expatriates and local persons concerning the prospects and readiness of ethnic groups to begin the initial steps of reaching out toward tolerance, cooperation, and, perhaps eventually, genuine reconciliation.
- C Given that two of the PVOs had no previous experience with USAID and that one had no experience in the Balkans, some of the eight PVOs experienced greater startup difficulties than others.
- C Because of the pressures of startup and the manifold difficulties of moving almost anything forward in a changing and hostile environment, the grantees and subgrantees (as noted repeatedly throughout this evaluation report) understandably have tended to focus on the embryonic aspects of their programs rather than on achievement of project goals. As a result, most of the PVOs have concentrated on their client populations' vulnerabilities and needs, to the neglect of their capabilities and the region's preexisting resources.
- C Given that grantee support appears open-ended in some cases, subgrantees are likely to be caught unprepared when they discover that donor support is scheduled to come to an end.
- C High staff turnover is expected, particularly in Bosnia, but equally high turnover in U.S. headquarters offices is less understandable and can be highly disruptive.

D. Missed Opportunities for Cross-Fertilization and Spread Effects

1. Cross-Fertilization

A fair amount of sharing, cross-fertilization, and collaboration is already evident among the grantees and subgrantees, but more could conceivably occur.

- C Grantees might benefit from agreeing informally on a common set of terms and definitions for compilation into a Project 0016 glossary. The glossary would cover such terms as goal, objective, purpose, aim, strategy, activity, input, output, outcome, effect, impact, indicator, benchmark, milestone, target of opportunity, monitor, evaluate, assess, audit, and review.
- C Without a Bosnia office, Delphi misses the opportunity to attend monthly security meetings held by Terry Leary. The meetings are useful not only to discuss the security situation but also to exchange information and ideas on technical matters.

- C Harvard should share its trauma symptom lists (especially adapted by Merhamet) with other grantees.
- C Grantees say that the U.S. public does not understand that the Dayton Accords have not brought an end to problems in the former Yugoslavia. To keep the U.S. public informed, the grantees could jointly compose a letter from Bosnia and Croatia for publication on the editorial page of major newspapers. IRC's award-winning Sarajevo Information Officer is enthusiastic about coordinating ideas from all grantees and compiling such a letter.
- C Nearly all grantees complain about the NGO tax situation.
- C Some grantees have deliberately fostered improved NGO-host government relations through lunches and other strategies and by including government employees in their training courses. Their approaches and successes should be shared with others.
- C Trainings and case studies (successful and unsuccessful) can be more widely shared by use of video.
- C When grantees undertake ministudies, they could use various incentives to encourage either the return of written questionnaires or respondents' participation in an in-person interview.
- C CRS could share its monitoring and evaluation guidelines.
- C Grantees could share their various fundraising ideas such as auctions of donated paintings, community dances, competitions, contributions from corporations, and in-kind contributions of materials, equipment, and labor.
- C Given that the grantees have already learned many valuable lessons, they need to identify appropriate channels for sharing experiences, techniques, and interventions, especially with respect to which groups (according to residence, education, age, gender) are more or less likely to accept the notion of forming support groups and discussing their problems openly with others, how to deal with refugees and returnees, and how to address domestic violence and delinquency.
- C Delphi underscores the importance of using modern means of communication (networking, e-mail) in sharing information with others.
- C Grantees should open their training to other participants. Alternatively, back-to-back training can accommodate several participants, particularly when an expensive outsider is brought in to deliver training. Several organizations could share the trainer's travel expenses. All grantees identified the need for training in the following topic areas: planning, project design, monitoring, supervision, evaluation, conflict resolution, fundraising, and advocacy.

- C Both Delphi and IRC are working with women's groups in Pakrac. Are the groups exchanging information on these similar efforts? Is there any opportunity for synergistic effects through collaboration and joint meetings?
- C Several organizations, including Delphi and IRC, have consciously considered the issue of viewing women not only as victims but also as strong survivors, family caretakers, peacemakers, income-earners, and leaders. Can this shift in perception be more widely shared?

2. Accidental and Deliberate Spread (Multiplier) Effects

- C Support groups can, with media assistance, firmly plant the notion of support groups in the public psyche. Once support groups are recognized as helping people with particular problems (cancer, post-trauma stress disorder, caregiver burnout, military demobilization) any of a number of other specific problems, diseases, and conditions can be addressed with this technique.
- C Informal, low-cost newsletters can be circulated among former trainees to keep them in touch with each other and to share ways in which they have applied their new skills.
- C All grantees should know more about these models for information sharing so that as occasions arise, they can also be catalysts for replication or idea-borrowing.

E. Improving Evaluability

In considering goals, objectives, achievements, and problems, the evaluation stresses the importance of fine-tuning self-evaluation plans in conjunction with the refinement of "ownable objectives." Ownable objectives, in turn, are related to the strong recommendation that all eight grantees clarify their own organizations' pathways to peace and the point along those pathways at which they are willing to be evaluated.

To assist in this effort, all grantees need additional training. A monitoring and evaluation plan should be drawn up for each program, with at least the following elements:

- C Who needs what kind of information for what purpose? (Don't collect information whose eventual use is not determined in advance just because you're doing a study and it might be nice to collect a few more bits and pieces of information.)
- C How often do they need it, at what intervals? (Do they need it every day, every week, month, quarter, year, or once in a project?)
- C Where is the information to come from—existing data sources, monitoring forms, supervisory reports, special ministudies, one expensive comprehensive study?

- C Who will collect it? Who will analyze it? Who will write it up?
- C Who will receive it? What is the mechanism for a feedback loop to those who initially provided the information? How much of it, in what form, should be shared with the donor?

The team frequently found that whether the treatment or assistance provided was legal, medical, psychological, or social, the care providers' forms almost uniformly were designed with columns to record presenting complaint or problem, diagnosis, and treatment or intervention. The forms did not, however, include a column in which to record outcome. Was the patient cured? Did the evicted tenant succeed in returning to his apartment? Did the depression continue even after a certain number of treatment sessions?

Records indicating "lost to follow-up" would even permit home visits to a small percent of those whose outcome is unknown, making possible extrapolations from the data thus obtained to round out the picture of the extent of change presumably achieved by the treatment interventions.

F. Suggestions

Although the preceding text contains many suggestions to achieve broader impact through spread effects and cross-fertilization, the recommendations below are few. They should all be eminently feasible for all grantees.

The eight grantees are now at an important turning point. Some of them realize the importance of the current juncture; others do not. The remaining grant period is a time for them to do the following:

- C Keep one's eyes on the prize. The ultimate goal is stability in the Balkans. Grantees need a clear vision of how their program fits into one or more "pathways to peace" through contributions toward a more civil society or a more healthy society.
- C Focus and consolidate gains to date. Grantees must build on successes already achieved and adjust to changing needs without diluting their focus.
- C Search for and seize opportunities to realize greater short-term effects and long-term impact. Grantees should deliberately replicate successful models or create and nurture new ones that provide opportunities for a multiplier effect.
- C Increase greatly interagency sharing of documents, ideas, training, problems, etc.
- C Improve evaluation skills and devote greater attention to evaluating effects that go beyond the level of project-specific activities (networking, communicating, publishing, training).

C Adopt the following five-phase sequence:

- Refine one or more of the suggested “pathways” so that it adequately describes current Project 0016 interventions as well as the route to the combined achievements of all grantees.
- Draw a horizontal line across the finished diagram to indicate level of program responsibility and therefore program evaluability.
- Determine how to measure (or verify nonquantifiable) effects at the level of “ownable objectives.” Grantees should not attempt to measure achievement at the level of “stability in the Balkans,” “peace in Bosnia/Croatia,” or “ethnic reconciliation.” But PVOs should verify achievement at a level higher than their day-to-day activities (e.g., training, setting up communication networks, and strengthening local NGOs).
- Aggregate, analyze, and clearly and briefly write up the results for dissemination to the donor and the data providers, subgrantees, and other Project 0016 grantees. If ongoing discussion of findings seems beneficial, the grantee can rely on e-mail, Project 0016 meetings, etc.
- If a ministudy has been found to provide useful information, grantees might adapt the routine monitoring system to capture similar information at more frequent intervals.

Rather than proof of causality, the grantee—and the donor—should be content with demonstrating plausible association. Is it reasonable to suppose that positive changes in the target population/beneficiaries are completely or partially attributable to the project intervention or could they have occurred merely with the passage of time or in response to some other intervention? Are so many factors potentially accountable for the changes that attribution becomes completely impossible?

Most grantees will need help in developing ways to measure and/or verify achievement of objectives. All grantees could probably benefit from training in focus group investigation and other participatory, low-cost techniques.

IV. MANAGEMENT

A. Observations and Conclusions

It should be noted that because of the time constraints imposed on the site visits and interviews and the fact that each grantee's Project Director was frequently involved in program-related activities, most of the information collected for this section of the report came from the Office Manager and/or Finance Officer. In nearly all cases, however, PVO offices are small and relationships are close so that most staff usually have knowledge of the generic daily activities of other staff members. Any missing information is usually related to confidential relationships with PVO headquarters, potential plan revisions, and personnel matters. Follow-up telephone calls to the Project Directors helped further clarify issues.

This report should be in no way construed as a management or fiscal audit. Most meetings totaled less than an hour and often were not conducted in the project office, where needed documents are stored. Interviews were conducted to clarify roles and responsibilities in project implementation and to look at management as a two-sided coin: the expectations of the manager and the managed, and the relative achievement of those expectations. Budget reviews looked for consistency with program objectives and local conditions, the institution of appropriate record keeping controls, the overall competence of PVO staff assigned to the function, and staff ability to train NGOs in financial reporting.

B. Management Overview

1. USAID/Washington

Project 0016 is managed by the Project 0016 Project Officer in the ENI/HR/EHA Division of USAID/Washington. The current Project Officer is the fourth or fifth person holding that position in the past 18 months. Each change has caused some shift in program direction. Therefore, USAID/Zagreb staff are unclear about the project's overall mission and have experienced difficulty in providing appropriate guidance and technical assistance to the PVOs. Conversely, because of the limitation of OE travel funds, the current Project Officer still has not visited the Project 0016 programs in the field. She is dependent on visits of PVO staff and communication from USAID/Zagreb, which has not been extensive.

Discrete sections of USAID, all housed in different locations, carry out different administrative aspects of Project 0016. This arrangement is a carryover from the operation of the European Bureau, in which projects were managed primarily out of Washington with periodic in-country visits by Project Officers. Some modifications to the current arrangement, especially with reference to the procedures, roles, and responsibilities of USAID/Washington and the overseas mission staff, have clouded the issue of budget control. The lack of clarity is frequently a source of delay and confusion to the USAID/Zagreb staff in terms of advising on program implementation. For example, a budget request from a PVO must be reviewed in sequence by the USAID/Zagreb Humanitarian Assistance Advisor or Humanitarian Assistance Project Specialist, the USAID Country Representative for

Croatia, the Budapest Controller's Office, the Project 0016 Project Officer, and “about 20 other persons” before it can reach the Contracts Office for approval and response. USAID/Zagreb and the PVOs report that they submitted annual work plans as requested in fall 1995 and have not yet received a response from USAID/Washington. USAID/Washington received the work plans over a five-month period. Responses were delayed so that results from the evaluation could be incorporated. However, because of the lack of funds, short continuing resolutions, and government furloughs, this evaluation took place five months after it was originally planned.

Even though PVO grantees are expected to work through the USAID Country Office, several reportedly maintain close communication directly with the Project Officer. This arrangement is usually the product of a long-term relationship with the Project Officer and USAID and/or the personal assertiveness of the Executive Director or staff of the PVO. Cooperative Agreement grantees report that they receive varying degrees of support from USAID/Washington. At the same time, though, they experience frustration. Two PVOs in particular have experienced serious delays in implementation of their programs because of underbudgeting problems. The PVOs claim that USAID/Washington failed to make them aware of local tax laws. The other problem pertains to the PVOs’ unfounded expectation of their ability to purchase foreign vehicles. (Local tax and vehicle licensing problems have not been as onerous for the Harvard program because of its status as a university-based program.) USAID/Washington’s response is that these are factors that the PVOs should have known and figured into their budgets.

2. USAID/Zagreb

USAID/Zagreb employs two Personal Services Contractors (PSCs) charged with providing technical assistance and monitoring to the eight Project 0016 PVOs. The PSCs also advocate on behalf of the PVOs and provide information to their own office, USAID/Washington, and any other interested party regarding the status and accomplishments of the PVOs and NGOs.

The Humanitarian Assistance Advisor, an expatriate, was hired by the mission three years ago to oversee projects in Croatia and Slovenia. The Humanitarian Assistance Project Specialist, a local psychologist, was hired in March 1995. In summer 1995, oversight responsibility for the eight PVOs was divided between the Humanitarian Assistance Advisor and the Humanitarian Assistance Project Specialist, with the latter assigned to projects with a training focus. Despite the definition of responsibilities and the implicit responsibility of the PVOs to address all communications to their assigned person, the PVOs never received a formal announcement of oversight assignments. Partly as a result, communications, reports, and questions are frequently addressed arbitrarily to either of the PSCs or the USAID Country Representative, who takes an active interest in the program. Since the office is small and relationships are open, information and communications are shared with and between all parties. Although this lack of adherence to appropriate lines of communication has the potential of causing problems in some situations, in this case it operates to the PVOs’ advantage. Armed with comprehensive background information, either the PSC or the Country Representative can provide TA to all PVOs when visiting in their geographic area.

Both PSCs express difficulty in fulfilling their responsibilities as a result of the changes in direction and the delays in retrieving information and decisions from USAID/Washington. This problem is reflected in part in concerns voiced by PVOs regarding lack of follow-through on requests for information and definition of policies from the PSCs at USAID/Zagreb. Some PVOs modified their criticism with statements acknowledging the limitations placed on USAID/Zagreb by USAID/Washington, but they nevertheless feel compromised. Perceptions of the competence and dependability of the PSCs appear to be influenced by personal relationships, areas of mutual interest, previous knowledge, and some acceptance of the vagaries of USAID procedures.

At present, USAID/Zagreb has oversight responsibility for Project 0016 PVOs and sites operating in Bosnia, although the USAID/Zagreb representative has never visited the Sarajevo sites. Given that the USAID mission in Sarajevo is just beginning operation and has limited staff, it is in no position to implement or oversee Project 0016. At the same time, Bosnia projects cannot be readily managed from Croatia without additional staff to deal with differences in legal, cultural, economic, and political aspects between the two countries. Moreover, transportation within Bosnia is particularly difficult and time-consuming because of the lack of infrastructure.

3. PVO Headquarters—Field Relationships

Most PVOs have achieved a satisfactory working relationship with their headquarters largely because of Project Director assertiveness, their established track record, and the level of professionalism of the parties concerned. The local offices of the grantees enjoy the necessary decision-making authority and receive encouragement to carry out their responsibilities in the field. However, Delphi's dissolution and the possible entry of a new grantee to assume the STAR Project could leave STAR in limbo for a period until relationships are formalized with its new headquarters. PVOs state that the most valuable asset of association with their parent office, in addition to periodic technical assistance, provision of staff training, and fundraising, is that headquarters "runs interference" for them with USAID/Washington when other modes of communication do not achieve results.

It should be noted that the PVOs are in frequent telephone and fax communication with their headquarters for information updates, policy decisions, and, depending upon the level of comfort, soliciting reaction to new ideas. The relationships between the in-country and headquarters finance officers appear to be particularly close. In most cases, the in-country and headquarters finance officers demonstrate mutual respect for each other's ability and responsiveness to their needs.

It should also be noted that whereas PVOs complain about the difficulties of dealing with the ripple effects of turnover in USAID/Washington, some PVOs also report that they must confront headquarters staff turnover and problems related to working with new headquarters staff.

4. PVO—Subgrantee Relationships

PVOs in general have established sound personal and professional working relationships with their NGO subgrantees. In most cases, when the PVO received its grant, it held an informational meeting for potential subgrantees that were already functioning either as NGOs or groups of volunteers

providing a specific service. The PVO informed the potential subgrantees of the purpose of Project 0016 and invited them to submit concept papers. The PVO project director then worked individually with potential subgrantees to help them develop their proposals. Upon funding, the PVO assisted the NGO in startup.

PVOs are committed in varying degrees to providing NGOs with formal and/or informal technical assistance and training based on current need and/or capacity building. One possible problem is that an NGO may not know what it does not know and therefore what it needs. Accordingly, the PVO monitoring function requires use of a specific checklist to permit closer supervision and a focus on areas of need.

5. PVO—Local Government Relationships

With the exception of the Harvard program, the prevailing assessment is that the governments of both Croatia and Bosnia are PVO/NGO-unfriendly, with Croatia possibly more readily positioned to act on its antipathy. PVO Project Directors believe that Croatia's less-than-enthusiastic reception of the PVOs stems from the belief that the PVOs and NGOs are less likely than private enterprise to contribute financially to government coffers. Further, some PVOs believe that Croatia has historically suspected grantee organizations of conducting subversive activities, particularly given that the involvement of the international community provides a channel for reporting on human rights violations. In addition, PVOs resent the difficulties associated with licensing NGOs and the government's refusal to expedite the importation and licensing of hard goods, vehicles, and washing machines, whose delay impedes implementation of PVO/NGO programs.

Although the government in Bosnia has not taken as negative a position as Croatia's government, most Project Directors in Bosnia anticipate a similarly difficult situation. Harvard's Project Director recently discovered a Bosnian government document dated May 1994 that grants PVOs and NGOs broad privileges, eases the process of registering for special status, exempts PVOs and NGOs from taxation, and enables them to claim the highest bank exchange rate. Local officials claimed no knowledge of the document, perhaps because it is printed in English and cannot be found in Bosnian translation.

In general, the PVOs believe that the negative actions and attitudes of local governments may indicate envy at the specialized training provided PVO employees and at the salaries paid to PVO employees. In Croatia, PVO salaries are reportedly approximately 50 to 400 percent higher than those paid by the government. In Bosnia, the percentage difference is estimated to be even greater. However, it is important to note that government salaries include payment of contributions toward health insurance, pensions, and welfare. Despite tensions over salaries and benefits, some government officials recognize that, with the departure of the PVOs, both countries will profit from the presence of a more highly skilled labor pool. IRC is trying to deal with these and related issues by inviting ministers to attend or send staff to the training offered to IRC staff.

6. PVO/NGO Record Keeping and Reports

In all cases, PVOs have provided subgrantees with training in the guidelines and parameters of record keeping for their activity and financial reports. NGOs are required to submit activity and financial reports to their respective PVOs monthly and/or quarterly for review for consistency between activities conducted and expenses claimed. The PVOs then compile the NGO reports for forwarding to headquarters. Headquarters then submits the aggregated quarterly financial reports to the Office of Financial Management and the Project 0016 Project Officer. Copies of the quarterly activity report are sent to USAID/Zagreb. In-country PVO staff and particularly Finance Officers stand ready to give additional telephone advice to NGOs to help ensure accuracy in first-level reporting.

NGOs maintain internal records regarding their activities and expenses for use in reports to their respective PVOs. Theoretically, record keeping should help the NGOs keep focused on the activities that advance their objectives. In projects with a direct service component, chronological records related to client intake, situation presented, and assistance provided are entered into large bound notebooks, with a new entry made each time a client appears. Rarely do records refer to outcome or follow-up. The record keeping system offers no convenient method of following client progress other than depending on the memory of the caregiver. Introducing the use of file cards or, at a minimum, dividing the bound notebook into alphabetical sections would expedite the organization of data as related to the individual client.

C. Project 0016 PVO Grantees—Generic Characteristics

Project 0016 has funded eight grantees, of which six already had some active presence in Croatia and/or Bosnia. An additional two PVOs hired Project Directors with extensive in-country experience. These PVOs enjoyed a distinct advantage over the complete newcomers in expediting the design and implementation of realistic work plans and budgets. Knowledge of local and regional differences in culture and politics, the legal system and its labor and tax laws, police oversight, ethnic issues, and the prewar educational and economic systems was extremely helpful in expediting efficient project implementation.

Those working in the more established venues or positions in development sometimes characterize PVO field employees, both expatriates and local hires, as transient, immature, and inexperienced although well-meaning individuals—an observation they also apply to those working in PVOs in Croatia and Bosnia. USAID/Washington is aware of this characterization of PVO employees. In any event, statistics regarding frequency of employee turnover and duration of on-the-job tenure were not available for Croatia and Bosnia. Nonetheless, the consensus among those involved in expatriate personnel placement is that PVO expatriate staff most frequently resign their position because of burnout and usually need a recuperation period of several (unpaid) months before being able to return to the labor force. In addition, some expatriates with family ties to the country return as “saviors of their family's heritage” only to leave when they become disillusioned by the politics, inconveniences, and reality of daily living under stress.

With the exception of CRS/SPA, IRC, and SCF, PVOs in Croatia and Bosnia operate with a limited staff that usually ranges from two to four employees. In almost all cases, expatriate and local hires bring with them the required level of educational training and professional experience. In a few cases, staff brought with them a basic skill level and then applied themselves assiduously to achieving additional capabilities with the aid of the Project Director and training provided by PVO headquarters and USAID/Zagreb. One of the most common needs satisfactorily met through training relates to the use of computer programs and e-mail.

It should be noted that Croatia and Bosnia are blessed with a well-educated, well-trained, and highly experienced labor pool. The PVOs have successfully tapped this pool and, fortunately for all concerned, have been able to offer highly competitive salaries to attract the most qualified employees. However, as will be described in the following section, the local staff lacked managerial and supervisory training and experience.

D. PVO Project Management

1. Human Resources

Organization Charts. All PVOs and, with three exceptions, all NGOs visited by the evaluation team either possessed or stated they had possessed but could not find an organizational chart. Many of the NGOs did not, however, understand the chart's purpose beyond identifying the person in charge and showing employee names. Those organizations that had no chart as well as a few that did possess a chart stated emphatically that their group was there to do what needed to be done, not to be an organization just for the sake of being an organization. As noted above, most of the PVOs and NGOs are small and enjoy extremely cooperative working relationships. Therefore, formal lines of communication and reporting responsibilities are not an issue because all employees report directly to the Project Director. However, the larger PVOs, particularly CRS/SPA, IRC, and SCF, have more complex organizations and take seriously the statement of responsibilities implicit in the organization chart. In fact, IRC has recently revised its chart to reflect a shift in some program responsibilities and reporting relationships as well as the changes in staffing of the Bosnia office and a small staff contraction in the Croatia office.

Although an organization chart indicates reporting and supervisory responsibilities, the chart is not an end in itself. Understanding its design and use can help prevent personality and power struggles by clarifying and depersonalizing formal working relationships.

Supervision. Staff of the smaller PVOs, i.e., those with fewer than four professional persons, report directly to the Project Director and are usually assigned to clearly defined, discrete responsibilities. Larger PVOs such as IRC and SCF are structured with supervisory responsibilities at several levels. Most people are not comfortable with the demands of supervisory roles, which require them to provide support, coaching, remedial assistance, and disciplinary action as needed. From the evaluator's limited view of project activities, most supervisors observed in Project 0016 programs

neither understood the supervisory role nor exercised the authority associated with supervisory responsibility.

Policies and Procedures. All grantees have developed Policies and Procedures Manuals (P&Ps). The larger PVOs such as IRC and SCF keep their P&Ps near the work space of key personnel to ensure their availability for frequent use. For the most part, PVOs have two types of P&P manuals: the first conforms to the headquarters P&P for use with expatriates while the second conforms to local laws and regulations for use with local staff. SCF has received permission from its headquarters to rewrite its P&Ps in a way that enables the PVO to react more efficiently to in-country needs, particularly as related to hiring practices. SCF reports that it frequently updates its P&P and therefore refers to it as a living document. SCF has also written a Program Operations Manual (POM) to guide municipalities and other organizations that assume responsibility for the child care centers that “graduate” from SCF support. AICF/USA has a POM in development.

Job Descriptions. All grantees report that they have developed job descriptions for all staff positions, although they are quick to add that some descriptions need updating to conform to the task changes that accompany program evolution. Local law mandates all local employees to sign a contract with their employer. The contract outlines the conditions of employment, including salary scale, hours of work, responsibilities, etc., and thus contains the rudiments of a job description. Some PVOs have expanded the contract language depending on the complexity of the job.

Salaries and Taxes. In Croatia, local governments have developed salary scales for each class of job based on the education and experience required to fulfill the responsibilities of the job. Salaries are based on the applicant’s qualifications as shown on the scales. Local and city taxes are extremely high and linked to earned income. In addition to taxes, the employer or employee must pay a high level of “contributions” toward coverage for health insurance, pension, and the child welfare fund. These contributions are also based on salary level.

Until mid-February, perhaps because of the disintegration of the government infrastructure, Bosnia had leveled no taxes or contributions against salaries. However, as of mid-February, the government issued an order stating that employed persons were responsible for paying 10 percent of their monthly salary in taxes. Even though the government has yet to issue a subsequent edict regarding contributions, it is likely to do so shortly. It is instructive to note that no formal mechanism is in place to transmit this type of information nationwide; accordingly, many people reported not knowing about it.

Use of Volunteers. PVOs and NGOs use volunteers where possible and appropriate; however, most of the work carried out by PVOs and NGOs is highly specialized and requires professional training and experience. Those with the required expertise have or are seeking paid employment and thus have limited availability to serve as volunteers. Yet, under standard operating procedure, “volunteers” receive “compensation” that varies with the amount of time contributed. The maximum is about US \$50 per month unless a higher rate is negotiated. Some PVOs recognize a fine line in determining the level of compensation. On the one hand, the PVOs want to assist in paying for expenses incurred and to acknowledge the volunteer’s contribution; on the other hand, they do

not want to encourage economic dependence on the PVO or change the nature of the volunteer relationship.

2. Resource Management

Office and Program Supplies. As already stated, most PVOs employ a limited staff and maintain a small office outfitted with a modest amount of comfortable furniture and basic office equipment such as desks, file cabinets, bookshelves, and space for meetings. All, with the exception of CAH and Harvard (at the time of the field visit), have a telephone, fax machine, computer—some with e-mail capability—and a copier. Neither CAH nor Harvard has a copier and thus use the telephone/fax for that purpose. The total equipment in the Harvard office is a telephone/fax and a borrowed table and four chairs. Although the field office did have the monetary resources available in Croatia to purchase the necessary furniture, equipment, and other supplies at the time of the evaluation, there were delays in acquiring these materials due to the Project Director's focus on retaining the appropriate local permanent staff to secure these items and due to delivery delays in getting the items that would meet Harvard University and USAID regulations in Croatia. The larger offices with larger staff such as CRS, IRC, and SCF have more extensive equipment, computer terminals at all key positions, a well-equipped finance office, several copiers, at least two telephone lines, and a comprehensive assortment of working supplies. All projects have designated a specific person to assume responsibility for maintaining and controlling inventory. Since Harvard has no support staff, inventory control is the responsibility of the Project Director. At SCF, the extent of the responsibility is so broad that inventory control has its own small department. Most frequently, inventory purchases and disbursements are the province of the Finance Officer, who is responsible for invoice documentation for all purchases and, for the most part, appears to “count the paper clips” daily.

Vehicles. The selection, cost, purchase, registration, and maintenance of vehicles present PVOs with a multitude of problems. Vehicles are necessarily a large part of the program budget; particularly during the war, conditions demanded a rapid response to calls for the movement of materiel and people. As per USAID provisions, projects are limited to purchasing American-made cars, which are more expensive than European-made cars. In addition, projects must confirm the availability of in-country service for any vehicle purchased. Further, under Croatian law, projects must pay taxes on imported cars, although the bilateral agreement removes the requirement to pay taxes. With the assistance of USAID/Zagreb, Delphi fought this issue and, after six months, prevailed. In the meantime, it incurred the additional cost of a rental car—above and beyond the cost of the vehicle in question.

Early in the war, UNHCR awarded one-year contracts to some PVOs to enable them to use specific cars and trucks free for the life of the contract. Even though the contracts have been renewed each year, the PVOs do not know if and when the vehicles may be recalled. Therefore, it behooves any PVO operating with vehicles under contract with UNHCR to prepare an emergency budget for the purchase of replacement vehicles.

There is a standing joke, totally out of proportion to reality, that the PVOs are supplying the various armies of the former Yugoslavia with vehicles. With regard to “auto theft,” IRC has lost one vehicle to a collision, CRS has seen one vehicle “commandeered” at a Serbian checkpoint during the war, and SCF has reported five vehicles stolen. Through insurance coverage, SCF and IRC have replaced their vehicles. The CRS headquarters emergency fund replaced the one CRS/SPA vehicle. Under these circumstances, the issue now is the cost of premiums for renewing the insurance.

3. Finance Management

For the most part, the Finance Officers (FOs) of the PVOs appear to have excellent training and experience. The FOs at ADF, AICF/USA, IRC, and SCF hold university degrees in economics and have extensive experience either in private industry or with PVOs. The FO at CRS has been in her position for three years and feels she received excellent training from her predecessor, from the CRS auditor sent by headquarters, and from her participation in CRS financial and accounting training seminars in Cyprus. In addition, she is free to fax any questions to the Baltimore headquarters and knows that she will usually receive a response the following day. The Administrative Assistant at Delphi was formerly a bookkeeper for a commercial firm. Since being hired at the inception of the project, she and the Project Director have worked diligently to develop the necessary formats and software and now feel confident of their ability to produce the required reports. The Office Manager at CAH is a sociologist who performed a variety of managerial tasks in her work at a senior citizens’ home before joining CAH. She has successfully assumed the responsibility of organizing and instituting financial reporting systems in the office. She received on-site training from the Executive Director during his visits from California as well as during her visit to headquarters in California. She is justifiably proud of her systems and records. As a recent arrival, the Harvard Project Director had no on-site support staff at the time of the field visit.

In addition to maintaining financial records and making disbursements, the Financial Officer is usually responsible for training the financial staff of NGOs. Many NGOs receive short-term grants from PVOs so that new grantees are frequently entering the PVO portfolio. Since NGOs are noted more for hands-on, direct service to clients and less for organizational knowledge and skill, training NGOs in financial record keeping becomes a year-round responsibility.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Generic Recommendations for PVOs

- C PVOs need to make a concerted effort to share with one another the materials they develop or otherwise acquire and that they deem would be beneficial to the overall goals of Project 0016.
- C All seven PVOs require training in planning, evaluation, and other important support topics.
- C The PVOs need to specify with greater clarity the extent of their achievements.
- C PVOs need to be constantly on the lookout for opportunities that permit them to extend Project 0016 benefits through the multiplier effect.

B. Recommendations for USAID/Washington

- C In wartime or emergencies, speedy startup is essential. Organizations do not have the luxury of on-the-job training, institutional development, and on-site capacity building. Accordingly, in wartime or emergencies, the selection of potential grantees should be based, at minimum, on
 - an established track record in the field in the specific country or countries with similar characteristics;
 - the availability of a Project Director with intimate knowledge of and experience in project management in the specific country; and/or
 - the in-country USAID Mission's ability to provide the minimum level of assistance necessary to expedite startup of the projects.
- C Grantees are not routinely or formally informed of new USAID directives, priorities, and staff assignments that can have an impact on their project operations or reporting procedures. Accordingly, a standard communications format should be established to impart information, particularly matters of significance to Project Directors, in a timely manner by fax or e-mail on a regular and/or ad hoc basis from USAID/Washington and USAID/Zagreb.
- C Project management responsibilities in USAID/Washington should be apportioned to permit sufficient and timely attention by Project Officers to implementation issues.

C. Recommendations for USAID/Zagreb

C To expand knowledge of Project 0016 activities among Project Directors and staff toward the end of greater sharing of information and resources, synergy of effect, and reduced expenditure of resources, the mission should support the establishment of an association of Project 0016 Project Directors. Support would take the form of convening the first organizational meeting and providing space if necessary for periodic meetings of the association. This association could perform a number of functions and activities such as

- advocacy for PVOs and NGOs;
- establishing working committees to research and update members on issues of mutual interest;
- planning joint training programs and pooling money to hire high quality trainers; and
- facilitating the establishment of local NGO staff associations on a city or regional level.

D. Recommendations for PVO Management Improvement

C PVOs on the ground, particularly in emergencies, must have the authority to make immediate decisions within the guidelines of their authority and responsibilities. Accordingly, PVO headquarters should hire staff in whom they have personal and professional confidence, give them guidelines, and assign broad areas of authority and responsibility for making and implementing decisions in the field.

C PVO and NGO staff turnover and lack of overlap in on-the-job training result in loss of institutional memory and capability. In addition, many PVOs and NGOs attract staff with good experience in some areas but insufficient experience in others, particularly in organizational and supervisory matters. Accordingly, rather than each PVO trying to provide modest and sporadic amounts of training for staff and subgrantees, the proposed PVO association, with input if requested from the USAID Missions, should develop a comprehensive training plan and investigate the pooling of resources to hire high-quality consultants to provide training to all PVO and NGO staff in such topics as

Organizational Development
Supervisory Skills
Planning
Board of Director Responsibilities
Computer Training and E-mail

Conflict Resolution
Monitoring and Evaluation
Time Management
Prevention of Burnout

This process would build a critical mass of persons who use and understand the same vocabulary and concepts and reinforce one another. In addition, it could save on overall transportation costs by piggybacking on expatriate trainers.

- C NGOs and some PVOs appear to lose focus on their objectives as they become interested in or distracted by immediate problems or isolated issues. Accordingly, to keep NGOs (and PVOs) focused on their objectives, PVOs should assist NGOs in designing activity reporting documents that are tailored to reflect progress toward objectives.
- C The practice among service-providing NGOs of relying on the chronological entry of client names and problems in large bound notebooks makes it difficult to follow client progress or to prepare unduplicated statistics. Accordingly, card file systems should be instituted as soon as budgets allow; NGOs should be trained in the value and ease of their use.
- C PVOs provide training to NGOs and community groups on the subject of burnout. Nevertheless, burnout is a pervasive problem among their own staff. Accordingly, PVOs should provide staff training on methods of avoiding or reducing symptoms of burnout and conduct periodic refresher courses on the same subject. Some Project 0016 PVO and NGO projects could provide resource persons for this purpose.

ANNEX A
SCOPE OF WORK

[Not Supplied By Originating Office]

ANNEX B

PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)

A. OVERVIEW

As an effort of America's Development Foundation (ADF), the Legal Assistance and Human Rights Programs Benefiting Refugee and Displaced Populations in Communities in Croatia is designed to promote peaceful coexistence and interethnic reconciliation in the region. More specifically, the program's purpose is to strengthen the capabilities and resources of Croatian non-governmental organizations engaged in legal assistance and human rights activities that benefit displaced populations and other vulnerable and minority groups in Croatia. The effort is organized around the following objectives: to improve collaboration and coordination among NGOs providing human rights, advocacy, and legal assistance to refugees, displaced persons, minorities, and other vulnerable groups; to strengthen the skills and knowledge base of human rights and legal assistance groups; and to improve the capabilities and resources of Croatian NGOs that deliver services on a sustaining basis to refugees, displaced persons, minorities, and other vulnerable groups.

B. LOGIC MODEL

As noted earlier, the centerpiece of the evaluation process calls for the development of logic models that demonstrate key staff members' perceptions of a project's purpose; guiding principles; hierarchy of goals, objectives, and their interrelationships; and strategies. The logic model constructed from ADF documents by ADF at its Alexandria, Virginia, headquarters did not lend itself easily to visual representation but rather is better expressed in list form as discussed below.

As for purpose, ADF designed its program to

1. Support constructive responses to problems that are a source of trauma;
2. Establish new NGO programs in outreach and services;
3. Strengthen NGOs;
4. Provide legal aid to communities; and
5. Provide legal aid to refugees.

The guiding principles that informed project activities called for


1. Building on existing experience;
2. Sharing resources;
3. Increasing NGO skills and knowledge;
4. Increasing NGO service delivery capability;
5. Providing a forum for community dialogue and action;
6. Improving inter-NGO collaboration; and
7. Demonstrating democratic processes.

ADF headquarters articulated no goals but did specify the following objectives:

1. Reconciliation, peaceful coexistence, interethnic cooperation;
2. Peaceful coexistence;
3. Interethnic cooperation;
4. Social normalcy;
5. Social and economic recovery;
6. Integration of refugees and displaced persons into society; and
7. Recovery of the war-traumatized.

To support the above purpose and objectives, ADF planned to deliver technical assistance and training, make grants to subgrantee NGOs, and develop resource centers. ADF did not identify specific activities.

In Zagreb, the Project Director drew up the following simple diagram:



C. ACHIEVEMENTS

ADF has succeeded in training nine subgrantees in program development, proposal preparation, and accountability—all crucial for sustainability. In addition, approximately 30 organizations received training in proposal writing in ADF’s orientation workshop held in February 1995. Over 20 organizations received training in ADF’s workshops on lobbying and advocacy in December 1995. ADF has also seen subgrantees increasingly recognize the need for further training (even more important than additional funds).

With ADF assistance, the Zagreb-based Medical Committee for Human Rights has expanded its services from medical to legal assistance (beyond trauma counseling) and has assisted the War Crimes Tribunal by locating and preparing witnesses. Legal cases are still pending.

ADF has provided financial assistance to the Zagreb- and Osijek-based Serbian Community in Croatia Croatian Committee for Human Rights. At present, the association is involved in human rights monitoring and providing legal assistance. It also successfully lobbied Parliament to encourage liberalization of the terms under which fleeing Serbs can return and reclaim property. The association will play an increasingly important role in reintegration in Sector East.

With ADF financial assistance, both the Dalmatian Solidarity Council and the Osijek-based Center for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights expanded their client base and client services. Where the two organizations previously handled only citizenship cases and evictions, increased staff and volunteer specialization have enabled them to add conscientious objection cases and family law to their list of services.

An ADF-assisted group in Pakrac provides legal, humanitarian, and moral support to those who have remained in this troubled area and those who have begun to return. The group has distributed firewood and succeeded in obtaining citizenship documents for many (exact numbers unknown). In general, the Pakrac group is an important non-governmental source of information on social and legal services.

D. CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

ADF and its subgrantees are operating in politically sensitive environments. At the same time, they are dealing with clients and communities that evidence multiple needs—both legal and otherwise—and therefore may be trying to do too much with the available resources.

ADF is assisting local Croatian human rights organizations in shifting from informal, volunteer structures to more formal structures with greater donor accountability. Those interviewed found the change painful but welcome and helpful and do not seem to resent it.

E. MEETING THE NEED

The evaluation team was unable to meet with any clients who had received legal assistance, but ADF subgrantees have received some unsolicited feedback from beneficiaries who returned to express their appreciation.

It is clear that ADF and its subgrantees cannot begin to meet the existing need for services. For example, in Osijek alone, 14,000 eviction cases are pending. The Center for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights handled 94 cases in 1994 and 90 in 1995. Given that class action suits are not permitted in Croatia, each case must be handled individually. As a result, ADF and its subgrantees are equipping themselves with the skills necessary to meet the changing needs of refugees-now-turned-returnees and thus to deal with a wider range of issues.

F. EVALUATION

After meeting with subgrantees and discussing their record keeping practices, the evaluation team urged ADF's adoption of new forms that would permit NGOs to record outcome, complaint, and treatment (action taken). Even if several clients are lost to follow-up, a small sample could constitute a ministudy based on home visits to ascertain outcome, followed by careful extrapolation to round out the overall outcome picture.

One suggestion is that ADF and its subgrantees should give all clients a self-addressed, stamped envelope that contains a short evaluation form to be returned within six months. "Payment" for this cooperation is the promise of receiving a report on the overall picture, not just the respondent's own case.

G. MANAGEMENT

ADF's professional staff are well educated and trained and approach their work with a high level of enthusiasm. Staff relationships with USAID and the U.S. Embassy are highly cordial and cooperative, with extensive and frequent discussions on matters of policy and program direction.

The ADF staff also enjoys the confidence and support of its headquarters, which initiates communication on matters of interest to the project and sponsors training for the subgrantees as requested. A course in institutional development for the NGOs is planned for the near future.

The Project Director manages the office and staff, determines program policy and direction, and works with the Training Coordinator to provide technical assistance, support, and monitoring to the nine subgrantees. The Project Director and/or Technical Coordinator visit subgrantees approximately once every six weeks. For purposes of internal management, a File Note Diary keeps staff updated on specific issues. The diary also monitors individual staff members who might be overburdened or require assistance.

The extremely able Finance Officer trains NGOs to fulfill their financial reporting responsibilities and responds to requests from other Project 0016 PVOs and NGOs regarding local labor laws.

The Project Director perceives training as one of the most effective vehicles for achieving sustainability and, to this end, provides individual training to subgrantees in proposal writing. ADF also plans to provide board of directors training to all NGOs to ensure the continuity of organizations on which communities have come to depend.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

C ADF should calculate the percent of still-pending subgrantee-assisted legal cases by type of case (i.e., evictions, citizenship).

- C Of those pending, ADF should make an approximate determination of the average length of time for each type of case since the PVO's intervention.
- C ADF should alter its client record keeping forms to include an outcomes column.
- C Of those clients who do not return after a predetermined, reasonable period of time, ADF should follow up by sampling at least a subset, if not the entire population, of clients whose case outcomes remain unknown.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

A number of highly diverse achievements may be credited to the project. For example, AICF/USA assisted in the successful formation of beekeeping societies in nine municipalities with 400 participating households. In addition, while the evaluation team did not visit a newly operating pasta factory with a workforce of 15 employees (the largest number of jobs created by a single subgrantee), it did visit a commercial fish farm whose postwar production exceeds that of the prewar years despite a smaller staff.

In other examples of program achievements, 7,153 household beneficiaries received fruit tree saplings, over 377,000 individuals were the recipients of seeds, 200 students and one teacher benefited from the environmental education program, and more than 5,000 beneficiaries participated in social reintegration activities as members of social clubs or music groups. In addition, the Gornji Vakuf hospital, which had been severely damaged by mortar attacks, was extensively rehabilitated.

The evaluation team visited a psychologist trained to use art therapy in dealing with severely traumatized children. The psychologist pleaded for support and more training and, if not frequent supervision, then at least contact with a colleague engaged in similar work. About 200 children, many of whom are enrolled in regular classroom programs, participate in various therapeutic art activities.

D. CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

Among the eight Project 0016 grantees, only AICF/USA is working solely in Bosnia, which, obviously, is a high-risk zone. At the same time, the in-country staff perceives its extremely wide diversity of undertakings as “no problem.” For its part, the evaluation team would have liked greater assurance that the “community” speaks with one voice in selecting the various activities in support of overall project aims, especially given that some individuals receiving support for an income-producing activity are already gainfully employed.

E. MEETING THE NEED

The evaluation team found all beneficiaries with whom it met to be extremely satisfied. Further, while the AICF/USA project documents frequently mention ethnic reconciliation, every beneficiary or subgrantee visited by the evaluation team was Muslim—an individual fish farmer from Gornji Vakuf, the chair of the Beekeeping Society for the Muslim side of Gornji Vakuf (who did not appreciate the nuance in inviting the much smaller Beekeeping Society on the Croatian side of Gornji Vakuf to join the society and in jointly organizing a merged, multiethnic society), the manager of the municipal fish farm in Bugojno (who said the director was also Muslim), the Gornji Vakuf hospital manager, and others. Owing to time constraints, the team visited sites only in two of the six municipalities in which AICF/USA operates—Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, the former being Muslim-dominated and the latter being split down the middle with Croats on one side and Muslims on the other at the end of the war. The ethnic cleansing committed by the war meant that AICF/USA was more restricted at the municipal level in promoting ethnic cooperation; it would have to be done at

the regional level, cutting across “ethnically cleansed” municipalities, as illustrated by the 1994 Travnik Region agricultural conference, which was the first meeting of Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians on agricultural activities since the outbreak of war.

F. EVALUATION

AICF/USA, more than any other Project 0016 grantee, is involved in a particularly broad range of activities, thus making the delivery of technical assistance for self-evaluation particularly challenging.

G. MANAGEMENT

For historic and communications reasons, AICF/USA’s administrative office has been located in Split, although project activities are centered in Central Bosnia. Accordingly, the Project Director’s off-site locus necessitates frequent trips. Long-distance control creates a level of frustration for a highly motivated staff that reacts sensitively to a constantly changing environment. In addition, the project’s ambitious level of effort and the need to deal with external directives places an extra burden on the project staff. Beyond the problem of staff burnout associated with the particular conditions under which the project functions, the fact that field staff live together in a staff house might contribute to staff stress levels. Even though the house is large and comfortable and provides a meeting place for staff from other geographically dispersed development organizations, the living arrangement may intensify potential problem relationships.

Staffing in the administrative office appears competent and stable. The Finance Officer, who was formerly an accountant with a local firm “on a par with DuPont,” maintains control of the records and necessary back-up invoices. The field staff are well aware of and follow through on the need for maintaining accurate ordering and delivery records, bills of lading, etc., for all materials delivered or received from the field projects. At the same time, AICF/USA has provided technical assistance in computer training, computer consultation, and support for the Finance Officer in end-of-year reporting. Headquarters staff is reported to be responsive to requests for advice.

One of the strengths of the staff comes from its involvement in the community. Everyone in the community and local government seems to know and respect the project staff members. When the Project 0016 grant was awarded, the then-Project Director made personal calls on political and community leaders and invited all groups to a public meeting to inform them of the project’s purpose. As a result, AICF/USA received 50 proposals and funded 14; to date, 16 programs are in operation.

The expatriate staff enjoys an open and easy relationship with its counterpart local staff so much so that local staff, which includes a former doctor, journalist, musician, and manager now serving as drivers and translators, have put democracy into action by assuming an integral part of project operation. A redesigned organization chart reflects their assignment as Program Assistants working directly under the tutelage of one of the Program Officers. In addition, the assistants will receive computer training.

Given the considerable geographic distances covered by the project, discussions are focusing on eliminating the “circuit rider” coordinator in favor of opening a suboffice in Zenica, Tuzla, or, possibly, Sarajevo. The opening of a suboffice would necessitate the reconfiguration of project management to ensure staff and program coordination and sufficient oversight to achieve objectives. It would also be wise to consider relocating the main office to Bosnia.

The Senior Program Officer in Bugojno is coordinating the development of a field operations manual for mid-April release.

The lack of budget to replace vehicles presently under contract from and perhaps subject to recall by UNHCR is a problem needing resolution.

The budget provides no line item for evaluations, although funds might be available under the Consultants Fee category.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

- C AICF/USA should dramatically narrow the focus of its Bosnia project for the remaining period of the grant to ensure the most productive deployment of resources, appropriate management control both geographically and operationally, the greatest likelihood of success, and cost-effective and practical opportunities for self-evaluation.
- C AICF/USA should revisit project goals and objectives and its activities in the field to ensure alignment of program aims with ethnic reconciliation. Expatriates should more frequently seek the inputs of local staff members, who often have a better sense of opportunities for cooperation, such as the day-long, nonviolent, collaborative Croat-Muslim farmers’ meeting.
- C AICF/USA should not count as beneficiaries the thousands of people who use the facilities repaired by them. AICF/USA should count as beneficiaries the direct recipients of tangible goods (e.g., seeds, saplings) and the direct participants in various activities and services offered by the project (e.g., beekeeping, fish farming). AICF/USA should also demonstrate the benefits of project participation by linking such participation with higher-order ethnic reconciliation.
- C AICF/USA should clarify that its support to groups and individuals is short-term and limited, discouraging a sense of entitlement among beneficiaries and reducing tensions when assistance finally ends.
- C AICF/USA should not press facilitated reassociation on target populations, yet it should encourage cooperation, particularly in a highly divided municipality such as Gornji Vakuf whose ethnic composition is literally split down the middle with Croats on one side of the community’s main street and Muslims on the other. It is important to identify opportunities for considering the benefits of cooperation, as in the case of Muslim and Croatian beekeeping societies.

C AICF/USA should consider strategies to mitigate the effects of stress and resultant high staff turnover. Strategies might include stress reduction seminars.

C AICF/USA should further develop logic models that reflect project activities, which, in turn, flow upward to such goals as civil society, healthy society, and/or ethnic reconciliation. AICF/USA should then identify the level at which the project is evaluable.

With the construction of new logic models, AICF/USA should discard its working draft of indicators and develop a new set of obtainable, verifiable indicators that fit within the context of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan. Once AICF/USA has identified the ultimate result of the project, it should devise indicators linked to the appropriate outcome stream (civil society, healthy society, ethnic reconciliation). For example, if trauma recovery of children is the desired result, then indicators should relate to the healthy society stream and the project should not be expected to produce ethnic attitudinal or behavior change on the part of beneficiary children.

C The evaluation team recommends that, for the remaining months of the project, the implementation team focus on solidifying the impact of the project and its link to the other recommendations.

ANNEX D

PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION CENTER FOR ATTITUDINAL HEALING (CAH)

A. OVERVIEW

The Center for Attitudinal Healing's (CAH) Croatia Project is an intensive training program designed to establish a mental health organization in Zagreb and, from that Zagreb-based organization, to create a network of psychosocial services throughout the former Yugoslavia. The program is structured to support people in their emotional recovery from catastrophic events, including but not limited to war; to train and manage a cadre of volunteers—both lay and professional—in psychosocial support skills and the delivery of support and care to those in need; and to provide workshops and training focused on mental health issues. More specifically, the project is a collaboration between CAH's California-based headquarters and CAH/Zagreb. The latter began operations in Zagreb in 1992 and is intended to serve as a model community-based mental health agency.

Several objectives guide CAH's work in assisting in the development of CAH/Zagreb. The following are among those objectives:

1. To develop programs for the training, support, and use of peer support volunteers in providing psychosocial support;
2. To organize and implement a service delivery system to the general public in hospitals, schools, refugee camps, and hotels;
3. To promote the implementation of offshoot service and training programs in other parts of Croatia;
4. To create linkages with established mental health systems in Zagreb and other trauma and humanitarian projects; and
5. To serve as a national demonstration project of peer support and as a resource to other humanitarian agencies engaged in responding to social and health problems.

B. LOGIC MODEL

CAH/Zagreb experienced difficulty in undertaking the central task of the evaluation methodology: providing a graphic or visual depiction of the purpose and components of the project and their interrelationship. The Director began with an ultimate goal "to promote democratic values" in connection with women's groups but was unable to work the logic model downward to reflect CAH's current activities in training and peer counseling. The Director, however, recognized the

connection between individual empowerment and social awareness, which might, in turn, lead to citizen action and political advocacy and thus democracy.

When requested to build the model again from an endpoint other than “democratic values,” the Director worked from the bottom up, starting with the support groups that are at the core of CAH’s training activity. The Director then moved up to “provide emotional support” and to “develop peer support skills,” which could (possibly) lead to the emergence of volunteer-based community organizations and empowered groups and individuals. Such groups and individuals might then take initiative and responsibility to help build a “democratic society.” As a practical matter, however, CAH’s focus is still largely limited to the bottom of the model. To its credit, though, CAH attempts to keep abreast of various sources of help such as legal and financial assistance for purposes of referral. Furthermore, CAH cites significant accomplishments in establishing its center in Zagreb and in training nearly 1,500 people during the project’s first year of operation; these trainees are intended as a pool of potential volunteers. In its second year, the project intends to build volunteer participation, for which the center will serve as a national model.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

In the first year, the Croatia Project conducted 66 trainings, public lectures, and workshops in nine different locations in Croatia. These workshops generated a total of 1,477 participants. Of that number, 331 were professionals. Another 530 trainees were refugees or displaced persons, 404 were from the general public, and 212 were unidentified. From these, 39 have volunteered in Zagreb, with a similar number in Osijek and Rijeka. A volunteer participates in six two-hour sessions while a facilitator is trained in one or two days (level one, advanced, or staff trainers). Volunteers also take facilitator training. Thus far, one former trainee is independently facilitating a spin-off support group. Six additional trainees cofacilitate other groups.

From a modest beginning at the end of 1993, the project has grown as a result of publicity and word-of-mouth endorsements from peer group participants. (The Osijek peer group includes staff and volunteers at the ADF-supported Committee for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights—a legal assistance and human rights advocacy group.) A variety of groups representing hospices, veterans, multiple sclerosis victims, and caretakers now requests the services of CAH/Zagreb.

Because of her contact with a Serb member of Parliament, a CAH board member also active in Helsinki Watch (a human rights group) arranged meetings between female Serb and Croat war victims across the border in Mohacs, Hungary. Helsinki Watch has expressed interest in forming a support group and endorses the CAH concept of tolerance based on commonalities by emphasizing loss rather than blame and by removing ethnic labels.

Like most other grantees, CAH is struggling to keep up with changing needs, e.g., maintaining contact with returning Bosnians to support them in new stressful circumstances. A Bosnian physician said that the CAH support group helped her make the decision to return to Sarajevo. Others in the group, however, have relocated to the United States or Canada.

Recently, CAH has started collecting testimony from refugees and displaced persons whose participation in support groups proved helpful. To date, CAH has tape recorded about 15 interviews.

D. CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

Because of a lack of experience in Croatia, CAH did not know where to get accurate information on the country's tax structure. Therefore, CAH did not budget adequately to cover high Croatian taxes. Consequently, the organization hired only four rather than eight employees in Croatia without scaling back its planned activities.

In addition, insecurity about the need for ever more training has made it difficult for group members to feel confident and to take on new groups on their own.

CAH staff and volunteers in Zagreb have identified a range of needs that they would like to address, including the inculcation of democratic values, the formation of sewing classes, and the continued delivery of mental health services. At the same time, they are eager to bring a broad array of groups and institutions under the purview of their activities—hospices, human rights activists, those suffering from multiple sclerosis, a Zagreb Jewish community center, and the elderly. Further, they are enthusiastic about the proliferation of NGOs in a formerly passive society. They are considering a refocus of their activities to train trainers (and thus hasten the multiplier effect) but remain highly dependent on trainers from California.

E. MEETING THE NEED

The evaluation team observed part of a support group session conducted by a CAH trainer from California. At one point in the proceedings, participants expressed how they felt. All 15 said they were highly satisfied (“I'm feeling very much better tonight”). The evaluation team also talked with three displaced persons from Vukovar who had been living for several years in Rijeka. They also were enthusiastic about the benefits of participation in the groups, e.g., “the training has helped me cope with the difficulties of being a displaced person.”

The CAH effort is a small-scale undertaking. As a result, it has established only a few small groups, though clearly CAH's effort is expanding. Publicity about CAH in particular or various forms of support groups in general may eventually cause a larger number of groups to sprout and spread in Croatia and Bosnia. For the moment, CAH is focused on “seed planting” (creating a pool of potential volunteers), with the stated objective of “sprouting” (deploying volunteers in direct service) in its plans for its second year.

F. EVALUATION

Although the recent effort to collect testimonials is commendable, it is capturing only success stories. CAH is not yet certain of its purpose in assembling the “how I benefited” tapes and written stories. When the evaluation team asked if CAH had systematically attempted to ascertain why some people benefit from the groups and others do not, the Director responded that the project is still at the

hypothesis stage. Nonetheless, education is one factor that might determine success. Peer support groups are less successful with peasants, who, as generally highly religious people, are suspicious of what may appear to be “cult” practices and therefore are uncomfortable with a secular approach to healing. Peasants also experience difficulty articulating their own psychosocial well-being or lack thereof.

In Rijeka, the evaluation team interviewed three displaced persons from Vukovar and found them divided on the question of education as a determinant of success. All three were highly educated professionals who had participated in ten sessions with a group of rural people. The rural participants wanted lodging and sewing machines, not “talk.” As a result, the group disbanded.

The CAH Director noted that Bosnian Muslim culture appears more open to the idea of forgiveness; Serbs, on the other hand, are expected to be proud and thus to justify their behavior. The Director was quick to add, however, that Serb women meeting with Croat women in Mohacs, Hungary, expressed a desire to live in peace with their neighbors.

The Director then added gender as a factor—almost all members of support groups are women. In fact, the group of 15 observed by the evaluation team included only two men, although more men are involved in a group in Slavonia than in Zagreb.

In an effort to ascertain the training that participants have taken rather than what skills they acquired, the CAH staff in Zagreb has now begun to distribute questionnaires to group members. The questionnaire, however, can be confusing because questions for both volunteers and facilitators are included on a single form.

Group participants receive ceremonial rather than official certificates at the conclusion of their training. The nature of the certificate creates uncertainty as to whether participants are permitted to facilitate other groups.

G. MANAGEMENT

During the program’s first year of operation, six round trips were made to Croatia by eight different Sausalito specialists for stays totaling 32 weeks. Three of the Croatia staff traveled together to Sausalito in August 1995 for intensive training, staying two and a half weeks (18 days). In the second year of implementation, five round trips are planned to Croatia by five different Sausalito specialists for stays totaling 23 weeks. No trips to Sausalito by Croatia staff will be made. When asked when the field staff would graduate from the parent organization, both the Executive Director of CAH and the Director in Zagreb responded independently that CAH/Zagreb could possibly be weaned of the parent organization’s direct involvement by the end of the third year, assuming an extension to the two-year grant. Despite the absence of indications suggesting an extension, the Director is operating on this assumption.

The CAH Executive Director believes that the project would have progressed more rapidly if it commanded the funds to hire the full complement of staff as itemized in the original budget. As

already noted, CAH was a newcomer to Croatia and unaware of the high taxes on salaries, which consume a considerable portion of the salary line item and have precluded hiring the full component of on-site staff planned.

The Croatia staff is currently conducting training, facilitating support groups, and preparing curricula and projects. However, the staff demonstrates an apparent lack of knowledge and confidence regarding program implementation. Even though staff was reportedly involved in such tasks as preparation of a proposed plan for a third-year extension (due two days after the evaluation team's visit) and the development of a manual for use with displaced persons, staff could not articulate process and content.

The confusion in process and goal is also reflected in the small sample of three individuals referred by CAH/Zagreb to the evaluation team as having completed the facilitator training in Rijeka several months earlier. The individuals continue to meet as a support group on a regular but less frequent basis for "continuing education." When asked if they felt ready to facilitate new groups now that they had completed their training, they were in a bit of a quandary and said they did not know whether they had completed the training since they had not been so informed. The evaluation team learned that the three individuals would be willing to lead a group if someone else took responsibility for finding a meeting space, organizing the group, and providing their transportation to and from the venue.

As for record keeping, the office manager, in conjunction with a part-time professional bookkeeper, keeps internal reports in excellent order. Activity and financial reports are sent to CAH in California monthly. The Director is responsible for reporting her activities to headquarters every two weeks.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

- C CAH headquarters in Sausalito and CAH/Zagreb need to collaborate as soon as possible in formulating a specific and focused plan that will enable the latter to acquire at the earliest opportunity the skills needed for independent operation, thereby permitting it to achieve project goals.
- C CAH/Zagreb needs to reassert its primary project focus and resist the temptation to address needs that go beyond its mandate. Dispersion of energy into various new directions could ultimately undermine the organization's efforts. Fortunately, the staff seems to recognize the importance of consolidating its activities and focusing on a single, overarching end.
- C CAH staff in Zagreb needs to devote greater attention to gender balance in support groups, encouraging, where possible, higher levels of participation by men.

- C CAH staff in Zagreb needs to develop separate, independent questionnaires for volunteers and facilitators.
- C CAH should seize opportunities in the coming months and encourage qualified facilitators to organize their own support groups.

ANNEX E

PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)

A. OVERVIEW

Catholic Relief Services designed a program to promote the recovery of refugees and host communities from trauma, displacement, and loss resulting from war and to strengthen local capacity to foster community empowerment and social reintegration. To this end, CRS committed to provide technical assistance, training, and funding to the Society for Psychological Assistance (SPA) to expand its capacity for training mental health workers and local NGO staff working with refugees and displaced persons and to support SPA's ongoing activities.

More specifically, CRS has organized its effort to enhance the existing skills base of mental health providers in Croatia through a trauma assistance training program, to improve the coping skills of mental health care providers working with traumatized refugees and communities, to provide support for SPA's ongoing trauma assistance activities in Karlovac and Zagreb, and to impart lessons learned in Croatia to U.S. mental health providers through professional journal publications, seminars, reports, and materials. The five types of training offered under the CRS project include trauma awareness and referral, leadership and program-building training, mental health training, basic trauma and recovery training, and advanced trauma and recovery training.

B. LOGIC MODEL

As noted earlier, central to the evaluation methodology is the development of logic models that characterize various key actors' perceptions of project purpose and structure. The charts prepared by the CRS Project Manager and SPA Project Director show some differences. The former (page E-2) demonstrates the institutional strengthening of both CRS and SPA and of unnamed institutions in the United States as a primary activity that, in the end, permits the delivery of help to the traumatized. The SPA model (page E-3), on the other hand, reflects a broader mental health concept than that depicted in the CRS model. The CRS model is somewhat more focused on war-related mental health problems and provides for CRS's own increased interest in and capacity to replicate the project elsewhere and to share information abroad. Despite differences in perception, the two logic charts reveal no conflict. Both start with institutional strengthening as their premise and end with individuals and communities better equipped to deal with stress and trauma.

CRS LOGIC MODEL

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*   to help traumatized individuals and *
*   communities address their psychosocial *
+)))1      needs resulting from the war *
*   .))))))))))))))))))0))))))))))))))))))-
*   +))))))))))))))2))))))))))))))))),
*   * training of professional, para- /))))))))))),
*   * professional care providers *
*   .)))0))))))))))))))))))))))0))))))-
*   * +))))))))))))))2))))))))))))))))))*,
*   * * using training **
*   * * activities to address issues of **
*   * * reconciliation and resettlement **
*   * * of refugees and displaced persons **
*   * .))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))- *
*   * .))))), +))))))-
+))2)))))))))))))))))), +)2))))))))))))))))), +))))))2))))),
* interacting with * * training of and at * * meeting needs*
* mental health * * various levels of * * of care pro- *
* community and * * expertise & compre-* * viders who *
* Ministry to in- * * hension * * have them- *
* troduce new * .))))))0)))))))))))- * selves been *
* concepts regarding * * * * traumatized *
* trauma recovery, * * * .))))0)))))))-
* mental health, etc.* /)))))))))))))))))))-
.)))))))))))))))))))- +))))))-
+))))))))))))))))))))), *+))))))))))))))))), +))))))))))))),
* increase institu- /)- * strengthen CRS * * knowledge *
* tional capacity of * * interest and * * transfer *
* SPA to provide * * capacity to im- * * to US via *
* training services * * plement this type * * consultants, *
* to local mental * * of program else- * * attending *
* health community * * where * * meetings, *
.)))))))))))))))))))- .)))))))))))))))))))- * presenting *
* papers, *
* visiting US, *
* working with *
* other PVOs in*
* Croatia, etc.*
.)))))))))))))))-

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SPA LOGIC MODEL

+)))))))))
* strengthened capacity of the *
* local community to deal with *
* mental health threats *
.)))))))))
+)))))))))2)))))))))
counseling provided to *mental health service *
+))))))1clients in need * *provided nationwide *
* .)))))))))0)))))))))- .)0)))))))))-
* +)))))))))2))))))))) *
* * community health /)))))))))- *
* * services organized /)))))))))
* .)))))))))0)))))))))- *
* * +))))))2)))))))))
* * * increased awareness *
* .)))))))))
* * * of the need for com- *
* * munity mental health *
* * services *
.)))))))))
* * .))))))0)))))))))-
* * +))))))2)))))))))
* * * advocacy for mental *
* * * health programs *
* * .))))))0)))))))))-
+))2))))))2))))))2)))
* care providers empowered to *
* meet the needs of vulnerable *
* groups in the postwar period *
* and facilitate social recon- *
* struction and reintegration *
.))))))0)))))))))-
*
+))))))2)))))))))
*increase knowledge, skills, and *
*mutual support of care providers *
.))))))0)))))))))-
+))))))2)))))))))
*training of care providers (pro- *
*fessional, paraprofessional, *
*nonprofessional, volunteers) *
.))))))0)))))))))-
+))))))2)))))))))
* increase SPA capacity to provide *
* quality services to people under *
* stress and in crisis *
.))))))0)))))))))-
+))))))2)))))))))
* organizational and administrative *

* strengthening of SPA, including *
 * fundraising *
 .))-

The activities associated with the SPA logic model include networking with local and international NGOs and ministries; education and dissemination of information to various beneficiary groups such as schools; publishing (working materials, manuals, newsletter, other instruments); creation of a library; delivery of public lectures; television appearances; and the development of assessment methodologies and evaluation procedures.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

CRS has made the decision to focus on only one major course of action, training, and to deal with only one subgrantee, a Croatian NGO known as the Society for Psychological Assistance (SPA). SPA was founded by several university-based psychologists who volunteered in refugee camps before the availability of CRS support. CRS support has enabled SPA to organize courses designed to improve the ability of Bosnian and Croatian caregivers to assist trauma-affected persons. The courses range in level and intensity from four days for the helping-the-helper course, directed at preventing and reducing caregiver stress, to a series of eight week-long sessions provided over a two-year period. The courses provided by SPA with CRS Project 0016 assistance follow:

<u>Course Title</u>	<u>Number of Trainees Completing or Still Taking the Course</u>
Trauma Awareness and Referral	303
Mental Health Training	187
Basic Trauma and Recovery Training	72
Advanced Trauma and Recovery	37
Leadership and Program Building	19
Total	618

End-of-course participant evaluations have been exceptionally positive. The accolades from trainees interviewed by the evaluation team confirmed the participant evaluations. Most of the 12 trainees interviewed by the team had completed the helping-the-helpers course. In a typical comment, one participant stated, “I had thought of quitting, so worn out was I, ‘til I took this course. It gave me the strength, the courage, the confidence to go on, and to share that with my colleagues.”

The evaluation team did not meet with any trainees from the basic trauma course but did learn that seven of 70+ employees in a large social services center in Osijek had attended the SPA course. In an unsolicited comment, the director of the center reportedly remarked, “I can feel the impact of the SPA training on the entire organization.”

It is too soon to tell how successful the advanced trauma recovery trainees will be with their clients. They have completed only two out of eight of their week-long seminars. Nonetheless, the highly

qualified U.S. lecturer captured the undivided attention of his trainees in the short time a member of the evaluation team sat in on a training session. When asked which particular skills they found

most useful during client contact, participants remarked that brief techniques (e.g., eye movement desensitization) were most useful.

D. CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

Given that many of the trainees are university-based, the CRS program operates on the assumption that trainees who have completed courses will pass on to their students the skills they acquired through training. Regrettably, the transfer of information does not appear to be occurring. It is unreasonable, however, to think that the transfer of information will occur immediately.

Trainees in SPA courses are not physicians and therefore cannot administer medications. At the same time, though, some trainees and prospective trainees under the Harvard project are physicians. Both SPA and Harvard are already collaborating and enjoy a collegial relationship that will, over time, enable them to address mutual training responsibilities.

E. MEETING THE NEED

The 12 beneficiaries of the training (five in Split, two in Zenica, and five in Sarajevo; ten of the trainees had completed the four-day course and two had partly completed the eight week-long Advanced Trauma Reduction training sessions) were unanimous in their enthusiasm for the course, with only a few minor suggestions (noted below) for improvement. Their enthusiasm, however, focused almost entirely on their own appreciation of the courses rather than on benefits conferred on the clients they serve. The one exception was a young teacher (Sarajevo) who was emphatic in saying that many of her students (in teacher's college) had missed a year of school because of the war and were therefore obliged to take her course a second time. Thus, they were able to compare her teaching style and effectiveness before and after the SPA training. Modesty prevented her from saying directly that she had been greatly complimented by many of her students.

Even though CRS has distributed postcourse questionnaires that demonstrate a high level of satisfaction among trainees, the evaluation team did not have the opportunity to meet directly with clients of the trainees. However, if CRS undertakes the miniresearch suggested by the team, the degree to which the training is meeting client needs will be shortly ascertained. By contrast, a population-based survey to determine the degree to which SPA trainees provide community "coverage" for psychological assistance would be prohibitively expensive. Nonetheless, trainees should be encouraged to share their knowledge within their own circles of influence.

To the degree that clients of SPA trainees are self-selected and seek out treatment because of their perceived needs, then SPA is able to provide needed services to affected persons. In one instance, a center was moved from a medical setting to a neutral environment to permit client anonymity and reduce the stigma associated with a visit to a medical institution. The move should help minimize the numbers of needy unserved in a community.

CRS and Harvard have voiced some concern that they might soon exhaust the pool of potential trauma trainees. To the contrary, the evaluation team received assurance that Croatia accounts for

an enormous pool of primary care physicians (Harvard's target group for training) and a large, still-untrained pool of psychologists. To date, few Bosnians have participated in trauma training. Indeed, group therapy, burnout counseling, and war trauma recovery are all relatively new types of services in both Croatia and Bosnia.

CRS and SPA, well aware of the increasing need for both burnout assistance and new skills to cope with individuals' transition from refugee to returnee status, have adapted courses accordingly. The evaluators found the burnout courses so valuable to SPA's trainees that they would like to see them made available to a much wider group, including staff of the seven other grantees and their subgrantees.

F. EVALUATION

Questionnaires administered at the start of each course collected baseline information on trainees' knowledge and feelings of confidence as counselors. The same questionnaires administered at course's end measured the acquisition of knowledge and improvement in self-confidence.

While evaluating the impact of training sessions on trainees is a necessary and important component of the evaluation, measuring changes in the quality of life of clients is similarly important but raises several challenges. In recognition of the problems associated with "healing a wounded society...[and] reconstructing the psychic infrastructure," the evaluation team suggested a three-phase procedure that might provide some evidence of the impact of the training sessions on the client population. The procedure calls for a mini-evaluation that focuses on support groups, client trauma symptoms, and former trainees as cotrainers.

G. MANAGEMENT

The relationship between CRS and SPA can best be characterized as a marriage of equals. CRS provides the professional and organizational guidance that supports SPA in satisfying USAID grant requirements while SPA devotes itself to developing a high-quality training program.

The CRS Project Director has considerable experience working with USAID grants as have other personnel in CRS/Zagreb and the CRS headquarters in Baltimore. The finance office staff appears well trained, conscientious, and competent and has put into place exacting financial management systems. Nevertheless, the Project Director alerts the finance staff each month to upcoming report deadlines. The Project Director verifies the financial reports against the activity report before authorizing their transmittal to Baltimore.

At the time of the evaluation team's visit, the Project Director was careful to note that the project was almost at the midpoint (minus two months) of its original grant of \$1,927,460. The grant balance as of December 31, 1995, showed \$1,378,639. The Project Director was concerned that the inaccurate balance would motivate USAID to reduce funding on the basis of unspent funds. In fact, the Project Director had obligated \$245,392 to NICRA, \$14,571 to capital equipment through CRS

headquarters, and \$20,000 to a final evaluation. The balance, therefore, is a more realistic \$1,098,676 or 50.1 percent of the original budget.

With regard to SPA, the subgrantee concludes that it has benefited from CRS's management, particularly with respect to training in administrative procedures and maintaining accountability. Furthermore, USAID and CRS assistance has enabled SPA to demonstrate to the government, international training institutions, and other NGOs that it can produce and deliver a high-quality product. SPA's newly acquired expertise will permit the subgrantee to enhance its own sustainability as it markets itself to other governments and institutions worldwide.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

- C The CRS/SPA helping-the-helpers course should be offered to all organizations receiving Project 0016 funds as a means of reducing stress and burnout.
- C CRS/SPA should work with Harvard to identify the two projects' respective targeted training audiences to ensure that they are providing complementary services and to determine if a university-based project offers a comparative advantage.
- C CRS/SPA should undertake a mini-evaluation of the effects of the CRS/SPA effort on trainees' client population as suggested by the evaluation team.
- C CRS/SPA should review their objectives to ensure that the sum of their activities leads to higher-order results.
- C CRS/SPA should facilitate former trainees to set up support groups once they conclude their training. CRS/SPA should prepare and distribute to trainees a "Start Your Own Support Group" brochure at the conclusion of training.
- C CRS/SPA should go beyond formal training of trainers to institute a system of cascade training.

ANNEX F

PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION DELPHI INTERNATIONAL—STAR PROJECT

A. OVERVIEW

The Delphi Strategic Training for Advocacy and Reconciliation (STAR) is a project aimed at resolving interethnic conflict in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia by building the leadership capacity of independent women and emerging women's NGOs. The program delivers technical assistance and training in four specific areas: conflict resolution/organizational development, media/communications, advocacy for women's health, and microenterprise development. The project brings together women of all ethnic groups and fosters a growing spirit of cooperation among the women leaders of NGOs. The NGOs, in turn, enable women to take action to influence public policy and to become advocates for interethnic reconciliation in their communities and region.

STAR is not a psychosocial healing project but rather, at its highest level, a conflict resolution effort whose empowering activities lead up the pathway toward citizen action and a civil society. At a more practical level, the project responds to the need for connectedness and provides women with ways to communicate with one another to share ideas, support, and information.

B. LOGIC MODEL

The accompanying charts (on pages F-1, F-2, and F-3) represent the logic models drawn up by two of the three Project Codirectors (one in Washington, the other in Zagreb) and by an advocacy subgrantee. The advocacy subgrantee, it should be noted, was funded for planning only.

Women's NGOs consistently explore
independent leadership
and transition
options

Civil Society

Building Inter-Ethnic
Relationships
among Women's NGOs

Advocacy Strategies/
Policy

Capacity Building
for NGOs

Successor Leadership

NGO Sustainability
(Income Generation)

NGO Articulates
Violence as a
Health Issue

Financial Accountability

NGOs Use Conflict
Resolution/
Problem-Solving Skills

Partnership
with
local NGOs
Drives
STAR
Process

Guiding Principles



Subgrants

Computers

Training

Use of
Media and
E-Mail to
Put Out
Messages


**CIVIL SOCIETY
GOALS:**



¹ "capacity" = leadership, advocacy (e.g., reproductive rights), finance, plan, M&E

² income generation; grants

“TARA,” PULA (DELPHI STAR PROJECT)



The respondent did not insert strategies into the above chart but is nonetheless involved in forming coalitions and using the media for advocacy purposes and relying on e-mail to form coalitions.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

Despite the staff's lack of experience with USAID funding and reporting requirements, project personnel have achieved remarkable local-level organizational development. To date, the project's greatest strength lies in its enormous potential for reaching large numbers of ultimate beneficiaries through various media channels, including the Infoteka newsletter and clearinghouse, *Zena 21* magazine, e-mail, and training sessions. Further, STAR is the strongest among the eight grantees in asserting that women should be viewed and treated not only as victims but also as survivors, family and community leaders, and, eventually, policy makers.

As is the case with most other grantees, STAR continues to struggle with the early stages of NGO creation and strengthening and the difficult but apparently successful nurturing of an advisory council (which rotates its meeting place and provides a strong example of “democratic” leadership and group problem solving).

In Pakrac, one of the most challenging work environments owing to its former front-line position, the STAR staff has what it describes as both its worst and best project—the women’s laundry. An intentionally ethnically mixed group of women has managed to set up a laundry to serve the ethnically mixed town. The venture is not yet intended to be a genuine source of income—the donor still bears most expenses. Workers put in time on a volunteer basis, clients pay little or nothing, and records are nearly nonexistent. For the moment, though, the project serves as a focal point that enables women to empower one another. Formerly frightened, passive women have taken charge of a small “business” and now gradually reach out to others.

The time is not yet ripe for bringing women “customers” of various ethnic groups together to talk and heal, but the laundry committee is considering how best to bring that about. In the meantime, the women have reached at least reluctant tolerance and, in some ways, active tolerance. The members of the committee have gone beyond tolerance to ethnic cooperation and may be able to bring the rest of their community on board in the long run.

Much of the STAR project is devoted to creating and strengthening effective means of communicating, networking, and exchanging ideas (mainly among women and women’s groups). The primary communication vehicles are Infoteka (an information service that offers a clearinghouse and newsletter; Project 0016 funds Infoteka, which is attached to a women’s medical center) and *Zena 21*, a magazine published in Sarajevo by a group of experienced journalists. The magazine already enjoys wide circulation, with reader mail-back surveys indicating that each issue reaches ten to 30 readers. To date, the magazine has been distributed free, but plans are well underway to sell subscriptions at partial cost to promote sustainability. The magazine provides entertainment but is primarily educational and inspirational.

D. CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

The STAR project’s focus on women’s empowerment and its relationship to ensuring a leadership role for women in the new Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia is clear to the Project Managers, though not necessarily to the outside observer who might be unfamiliar with the notion of empowerment. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the STAR staff to continue to articulate the project’s focus and direction in terms of the logic pathways created in Washington and Zagreb. Ongoing refinement and discussion should help clarify project purpose.

The drastic understaffing of the STAR project should be more crippling than it is. Yet, the two-person Zagreb staff has been able to manage projects in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. To complicate matters, NGO development is even less thoroughly understood at the local level in Bosnia and Macedonia than in Croatia.

STAR staff believes that USAID should have provided more “hand-holding” at the project’s outset, especially in regard to developing a sufficient budget. For example, the line item for evaluation provides no funds. Other staff concerns center around STAR’s receipt of conflicting messages from various USAID staff members; USAID’s nonresponsiveness, particularly with respect to STAR’s second-year work plan; and the turnover among Washington Project Officers.

E. MEETING THE NEED

Given the nature of the project, STAR—in contrast to the other Project 0016 efforts—holds great promise for providing “significant coverage” of the target population through reliance on various media channels. Indeed, STAR is a media-oriented project that could eventually reaching out to the women of Bosnia, Macedonia, and Croatia through such channels as radio and television, print materials, and electronic communications. At this juncture, however, the coverage is more potential than actual. Nonetheless, that the various components of STAR are meeting individual needs was abundantly evident from the evaluation team's site visits. For example, a clearly “empowered” woman in Pakrac delivered an emotional speech at the previously described laundry. In another instance, the highly professional women at *Zena 21* reported that they were delighted to be employed again and gratified to know (via reader surveys) that ten to 30 persons read each issue of the magazine.

F. EVALUATION

The evaluation team discussed at length the question of “communication for WHAT?” The evaluator suggested that staff should, at the very least, focus on the messages they hope to deliver to the women who read *Zena 21* and Infoteka's newsletter and the women who receive e-mail. At the same time, it is important to document through readership surveys how the messages affect readers’ lives in terms of attitude changes or actions taken. Current readership questionnaires do not ask how messages influence readers’ behavior. Yet, staff should identify a handful of frequent and deliberate messages delivered by the various communication channels and then measure one or more levels of the messages’ effect.

G. MANAGEMENT

The STAR project operates with an in-country Project Director and an Administrative Assistant. The project’s severe understaffing is reportedly the result of naivete on the part of the person who originally drafted the budget. Beyond the strain caused by understaffing, the Project Director has been highly satisfied with the assistance she has received from Delphi headquarters. Headquarters has handled all project-related financial matters, made contacts with and for her in the PVO community, conducted fundraising campaigns, provided training and support as needed for PVO staff and NGOs, and, perhaps most important, handled negotiations with USAID. The Project Director has been less satisfied with the overhead-type services provided by Delphi, namely, accounting and travel services. The problems may be a moot point as the STAR project may seek

transfer into the portfolio of another organization. By virtue of its track record, STAR would provide any organization with a foothold in the Balkans.

The Project Director is a dynamic, energetic, and enthusiastic leader who catalyzes and motivates the people around her. The project's Administrative Assistant has followed the director's lead and appears always prepared to expand her range of skills. She maintains records in excellent order, including subgrantees' quarterly financial and activity reports. The Project Director reviews the reports for consistency, aggregates them, and then forwards the documents to headquarters. The Administrative Assistant assists the Project Director in the field when she attempts to visit sites monthly or at least bimonthly. A close and trusting relationship has obviously developed between NGOs and the Project Director. To ensure that the office is always covered, the project has installed a telephone recording machine.

The Project Director is aware that the budget contains no line item for evaluation and, like some other directors with similar concerns, would like to see USAID/Washington take note of such budget oversights when reviewing proposals. Perhaps the funds available under Consultants Fees could be used for an evaluation.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

- C The STAR project should focus on what it is doing now for the remainder of the grant period rather than seeking ever-new horizons for additional projects and interests.
- C The process of women's empowerment should continue and be expanded by, for example, increasing even further the readership of *Zena 21* and relying on other media channels to provide women with a source of support and information sharing.
- C The women's laundry project in Pakrac should either become a genuine microenterprise, with properly kept books and an effort to become profitable, or it should focus on its multi-ethnic mission.
- C Although the Pula-based advocacy subgrantee "Tara" receives very little money from the STAR project, it is potentially a powerful organization and deserves serious evaluation.
- C STAR should reexamine its logic models with a view to determining the level at which staff members assume responsibility for project activities and thus project evaluability.
- C If STAR can work with its subgrantees to delineate the ultimate aim of activities and then make an effort to verify achievements, it can make a far more important contribution to the overall success of Project 0016.

ANNEX G

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION HARVARD UNIVERSITY

A. OVERVIEW

The Harvard University School of Public Health's Program in Refugee Trauma (HPRT) in the former Yugoslavia is designed to promote ethnic reconciliation and peaceful coexistence by strengthening the ability of former Yugoslav professionals and community group leaders to address the effects of trauma across generations and ethnic groups. Specifically, HRPT's Project Create is aimed at ameliorating the conditions of suffering and disability of highly traumatized populations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by enriching and developing existing community mental health resources through training and technical assistance. The project is organized around the following objectives:

1. To work with local community groups, educators, and the professional mental health community to develop a coordinated system of evaluation and referral for refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by conflict to ensure that psychosocial needs are addressed at three levels of need: the entire population, a more deeply traumatized group of individuals, and the few individuals who have been so severely traumatized that they require long-term medical care and/or psychosocial support and intervention;
2. To develop a training program aimed at teaching community group leaders, volunteer trainers, elementary and secondary school teachers, and mental health and other health professionals appropriate and innovative mental health and population-based interventions;
3. To develop and implement a "train-the-trainer" model to develop professional trainers from the community at large, the PVO community, and the international community (as appropriate and desired);
4. To identify and provide technical assistance to mental health providers, educators, and organizations throughout the region; and
5. To document lessons learned and to foster exchanges between local Bosnian, Croatian, and American mental health providers and other health professionals, educators, and community leaders.

Overall, Project Create focuses on training and certification, national demonstration projects, and public education.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

The Harvard program started much later than the other seven programs. Harvard-based staff were successful in negotiating agreements and registration with the government of Croatia, establishing an office in Rijeka, and completing several key needs assessments. The newly arrived Project Director has unbounded energy, an ability to develop creative ideas, and the facility to develop an excellent rapport with subgrantees.

D. MEETING THE NEED

If need is defined as the need for a large cadre of trained health professionals, then Harvard (together with CRS/ SPA) will make a major contribution to fulfilling that need. The evaluation team did not have access to data on the numbers of professional mental health care providers, but was assured that Project Create is in no danger of exhausting the pool of potential trainees.

Relations between the Project Director and Merhamet (a group of Bosnian refugee health and mental health professionals) are excellent. The group has painstakingly adapted an international symptom list to Bosnian culture, with careful explanations for each change in Bosnian and English.

HPRT will be introducing new ideas and approaches for training and certification of mental health professionals through its training programs. Postgraduate credit will be provided to the training participants from their respective national governments. For example, the data generated by the Ruke surveys will provide scientific data for government and UN repatriation policy. The data specifically addresses the relationship between trauma, psychological distress, disability, and the economic needs of these communities as they prepare to return and begin the reconstruction process.

E. EVALUATION

The management aspects of the grant should and will be subject to close scrutiny along a continuum ranging from allocation of resources to bringing the Rijeka-based Project Director's authority to act in line with the responsibility he bears for results.

F. MANAGEMENT

At the time of the field visit, the HPRT Rijeka-based Project Director had only been in the field for one month. Major field work during the previous seven months of activity had been conducted by the Principal Investigator (Dr. Richard Mollica) and the Director of International Programs (Mr. James Lavelle). HPRT's Project Director was still becoming familiar with his duties and responsibilities during the evaluation period. Although at the time of the team's visit the Project Director was working without staff, local staff positions have subsequently been filled.

The Project Director believes that the Harvard project offers promise for addressing the psychosocial problems facing the people and communities of Croatia and Bosnia. He also believes that Harvard,

with its resources and access to academic institutions, can develop the infrastructure needed for program sustainability.

G. RECOMMENDATIONS

- C To date, Project Create’s selection of partners does not appear to be informed by application of a consistent set of criteria and objectives. Project personnel need to develop and rely on consistent measures of appropriateness to ensure that potential partners hold promise for program success.

- C The Varazdin refugee research project is currently headed by a clinical psychiatrist with insufficient research experience. In order to achieve the project’s objectives successfully, HPRT will need to provide additional scientific and epidemiologic support.

- C The Project Director should be routinely involved in all decisions for which he must assume responsibility. In addition, he should routinely receive copies of communications that relate to the project and/or are sent to USAID/Zagreb.

ANNEX H

PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)

A. OVERVIEW

IRC was founded in 1933 at the request of Albert Einstein to assist anti-Nazi opponents of Hitler. Since then, IRC has become the leading American nonsectarian, voluntary organization serving refugees worldwide. From the outset, IRC's mission has been to assist the victims of racial, religious, and ethnic persecution and people uprooted by violence in their efforts to survive and rebuild their lives. In addition, IRC's work has expanded to include assistance to displaced people within their own borders and to refugees during repatriation.

Under the Umbrella Grant for Trauma and Reunification, IRC has designed a project to assist Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in developing local capacity to address the psychosocial needs of civilian victims of atrocities and horrors. To this end, the Umbrella Grant (UG) is focused on helping NGOs achieve organizational and financial sustainability and increasing their capacities to meet the psychosocial needs of war-traumatized women, children, and other vulnerable groups. As of October 31, 1995, 22 organizations in Croatia and 16 organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were involved in the project.

B. LOGIC MODEL

In keeping with the required evaluation methodology, a logic model created by the Zagreb-based Assistant Project Manager differed in concept from that developed by the Sarajevo-based Project Manager; they planned to discuss these differences at a later date.

IRC's first-year work plan included the following goals and objectives:

1. To strengthen the mental health component of funded NGOs by completing the staffing of the Umbrella Grant (UG)

Objective—hire four mental health administrators

2. To improve the effectiveness of the UG by assisting in the management and coordination of subgrantee activities

Objective—recruit additional local personnel

Objective—hire additional personnel

3. To anticipate and increase the understanding of the needs of locally funded NGOs and potential subgrantees

Objective—design and implement a strategy for a needs assessment of local NGOs

The first-year plans followed the above goals and objectives and focused on 13 startup activities relating to development of a comprehensive psychosocial program, increasing the organizational capacity of subgrantees, refining program objectives and priorities, maintaining a consistent and fair system for funding approval, minimizing conflict between the UG and the subgrantees, providing clinical support to local NGOs, supporting the organizational capacity of local NGOs, strengthening the fiscal capacity of local NGOs, preventing UG staff burnout, and collaborating with USAID in Zagreb.

By the program's third year (February 1995-December 1995), the work plan's goals and objectives had shifted as follows to focus on organization strengthening, the most productive use of remaining funds in Croatia, and program expansion in Bosnia:

1. To clarify focus and strengthen the management of the UG;
2. To expand and strengthen the UG program in Bosnia;
3. To develop and implement a strategy for best use of remaining Croatia resources (identifying priority beneficiary groups and geographic locations of those most in need);
4. To increase subgrantee staff psychosocial skills;
5. To improve subgrantee sustainability potential;
6. To strengthen local capacity to trace and care for exiled, unaccompanied children; and
7. To strengthen subgrantee financial skills and accountability.

IRC has not yet formulated a third-year work plan for the UG, although it had developed an April 1995 strategic plan. That strategic plan has reduced the objectives to four (three of which are organizational NGO organizational capacity to address psychosocial needs, financial sustainability, professional skills, and programmatic capability to address psychosocial needs), while the fourth addresses the next level by decreasing the psychosocial effects of war through the work of local NGOs.

The evaluation focused on the last four goals and demonstrated encouraging results. In overview, the evaluation team (see Recommendations section) urges continued focus on the last of the four goals, possibly using a wider range of participatory (and often rapid) appraisal techniques.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

During the most recent reporting period (August 1995-December 1995), 18 programs in Croatia reached 6,232 beneficiaries from all ethnic groups (implemented by 17 subgrantee organizations), and 17 programs in Bosnia reached 4,300 beneficiaries, for a total of 10,532 beneficiaries, exceeding the objective of reaching 10,000 beneficiaries.

The IRC Umbrella Grant staff has made important strides in moving beyond institutional strengthening of their subgrantees to examining closely the effects of the activities carried out by the newly strengthened NGOs.

The UG has also made considerable progress (especially since the November 1994 Creative Associates mid-term evaluation) in assisting subgrantees in achieving financial sustainability. The UG organizations are now using a wide range of techniques to ensure their financial self-sufficiency. For example, they have succeeded in auctioning donated paintings by well-known artists; securing corporate contributions (including a contribution from INA, the large petroleum concern); obtaining donated labor and materials for renovation of space and the acquisition of furniture and school supplies; planning benefit performances and a community dance night (organized by the 90 Muslim children of the Stari Vitez Latin competition dance group; the children live in an encircled enclave in Croat-dominated Vitez); and soliciting contributions from UNICEF, UNESCO, and other international donors.

In Croatia, Duga (in Eastern Slavonia), a multiservice support center, has focused on the difficult integration of Croats from less-developed Kosovo into Eastern Slavonia. In addition, Duga successfully raised over \$20,000 in the week before Christmas through a combination of fundraising activities.

Eleven of the 17 Croatian subgrantees received \$350,000 in cash contributions plus \$236,000 in in-kind contributions; Bosnia subgrantees received \$100,000 (for one NGO) and \$70,000 in in-kind contributions as well as unspecified amounts from other foundations and donors. Clearly, the IRC subgrantees, for the most part, are mastering techniques for short-term support. Their fundraising capability suggests that some subgrantees are likely to survive over the long run.

In recent months, IRC has paid particular attention to the sustainability issue. Sarajevo-based UG Director Annie Foster believes that subgrantees that manage to obtain continued funding from other Project 0016 grantees following their year of IRC support are performing exactly as expected. In fact, if an IRC subgrantee shifts to another USAID-funded program, the shift should not undermine IRC's efforts to wean local NGOs from its support. Indeed, IRC's efforts to enhance sustainability appear to be yielding results.

IRC has also invested considerable resources in other NGO organizational issues, including financial management, organizational structure, personnel policies and procedures, volunteer board development, strategic planning, and self-evaluation techniques. Regrettably, the evaluation team was not able to explore these organizational issues in any detail.

IRC has paid closer attention to the effects of subgrantees' activities on their respective client populations. It would have been useful to know how the Sarajevo Be My Friend Playground program (a school-based playroom and tutoring program) concluded that 34 percent of the children diagnosed with "moderate trauma stress" showed a significant decrease in symptoms after three months.

The apparent success of Project "Sanya," taken only as an example, seems to rest on several factors: enlisting a strong personality from the target population; periodically delivering appropriate support from IRC; supplementing the paraprofessional playground organizer with professional support; providing attention to the physical (as well as psychosocial) environment of war-traumatized children; and ensuring the flexibility needed for program adaptations as target populations change—from displaced children only to displaced persons and local children, from children only to children and their parents (mostly mothers), and from a given prearranged discussion topic to another. Three examples of adaptability in one program speak well for the management capabilities of IRC as well as for the sensitivity of the NGO personnel to the needs of the community.

D. MEETING THE NEED

Of the eight grantees, IRC is one of three organizations demonstrating a high level of concern for reaching large numbers of beneficiaries without sacrificing the quality of its service. That IRC is the most experienced of the Project 0016 grantees in terms of delivering services to Croatia and Bosnia is evident in its capacity to carry out broad-based outreach.

E. EVALUATION

IRC, as most other grantees, can point to both exemplary and troublesome subgrantees and showed no hesitation in discussing the latter. One less-than-successful subgrantee visited in Zagreb is clearly unable to focus its energies. Indeed, the inability to define and support program direction is a problem experienced by many fledgling NGOs. Yet, it is to IRC's credit that the organization is attempting to assist unfocused NGOs by finding the right balance between responding to multiple local needs and developing organizational capacities to ensure the eventual achievement of measurable goals and objectives.

During 1995, IRC turned some of its attention to self-evaluation and has provided training seminars to its subgrantees on evaluation techniques. Both the evaluation team and IRC found it helpful to examine the progress reports and achievements of each subgrantee.

IRC's initial efforts to move beyond organizational strengthening toward measuring effects of the services provided by local NGO subgrantees are encouraging and should be expanded, possibly by using additional participatory and other evaluation techniques (matched pairs, focus groups, "mapping," etc.).

F. MANAGEMENT

Possibly the most telling reflection of IRC's sound management practices is the spirit of the staff and the sense of staff ownership of the project. Staff members never speak of "the project" but rather identify and refer constantly to themselves as the Umbrella Grant or UG.

Management is in a dynamic mode and is poised to capitalize on opportunities as they arise. For example, when the Program Manager transferred her location from Zagreb to Sarajevo, she was able to promote a local person from within to fill the Project Director position in Zagreb. The IRC staff is extremely pleased with the new Project Director, who appears competent, knowledgeable, and has a dynamic approach to leadership.

As another example of action-oriented management, the former staff configuration called for two Program Officers linked to one Project Officer. Theoretically, the Project Officers were to work together on prescribed projects and to fulfill prescribed responsibilities. The arrangement did not succeed because of coordination difficulties across projects. As a result, projects were receiving messages from too many sources—from the Program Officer, Project Officer, and specialists visiting the project independently. Therefore, as soon as one Program Officer resigned, the second was made Team Coordinator and charged with directing the work of the two Project Officers, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing the number of information carriers to the NGOs.

The Finance Manager (FM) fulfills a critical function in the UG by participating in group decision-making activities regarding the selection of subgrantees. He reviews subgrantee budgets for consistency with local salaries and benefits, checks staffing numbers to ensure consistency with program needs, reviews facility rental costs, confirms equipment needs, and verifies the capability of the subgrantee bookkeeper or finance person. In addition, IRC has issued guidelines to help the NGOs comply in preparing monthly and annual narratives as well as financial reports. The FM or his staff provides training workshops for all NGO bookkeepers and visits each NGO quarterly to check the books and work with the NGO Finance Officer (FO). As follow-up, the FM or his staff prepares a needs assessment of problem areas for the agenda of the next FO workshop.

As with most FOs encountered, they husband their resources carefully as if the funds were their own. They try to find ways of economizing without compromising program activities. The UG-FM has set up a bank account in New York (near IRC headquarters) with in-country branches and insists that all NGOs use that same bank so that they are all relieved of multiple bank charges. The FM hopes that the NGOs will know how to manage their own finances in the near future.

The UG portfolio is in constant flux as new grantees join the project and others receive new grants or graduate. The selection criteria for new NGOs include staff experience, management capability, and the ability to articulate future plans—all of which point to the potential for sustainability. To ensure coverage of the span of management responsibilities, NGOs often appear to employ a disproportionately large staff. In fact, their staffs are lean compared to the range of assigned responsibilities.

The UG provides training to its staff as needed and to subgrantees in the areas of organizational structure, financial planning, service delivery, organizational development, and counseling. One area of training that would be particularly helpful to UG staff involved in monitoring NGOs is supervisory skill training. Most staff have difficulty understanding that supervision means support, coaching, and consulting as well as taking disciplinary action when necessary. The monitoring function requires all these talents. Further, to protect the monitor who needs assistance in dealing with a difficult, possibly health- or life-threatening situation, the monitor should be given direct access to the Project Director for consultation and action.

G. RECOMMENDATIONS

- C IRC should share its monitoring checklist (as well as other management instruments) with other grantees and PVOs through workshops, and seminars.
- C IRC (as well as other PVOs) should open its seminars and workshops to other grantees or at least make available its sources of expertise, possibly covering the airfare of foreign consultants.
- C IRC should continue to focus its evaluation efforts on the fourth of its four objectives (effects on beneficiary populations).
- C As IRC satisfies its three other objectives, it should share its successful approaches and techniques with other grantees. If IRC has not already done so, it should consider training a group of individuals in systematic small sampling and in focus group facilitation.
- C If it has not already done so, IRC should work with Harvard, CRS/SPA, and others to apply uniform trauma symptom lists.
- C Given that both IRC and Delphi are assisting women's support groups in the troubled town of Pakrac, the grantees should regularly exchange ideas on how the still-separate Croat and Serb groups can eventually communicate (and, still later, integrate).
- C IRC should place special emphasis on the evaluation team's generic recommendations concerning focus (consolidation of successes to date from now until the end of the grant), sustainability (IRC has already paid serious attention to this issue), verification and sometimes measurement of effects on beneficiaries, identifying and capitalizing on opportunities to bring about multiplier or spread effects, deliberate replication, collaboration and cross-fertilization (among its own subgrantees and with other Project 0016 grantees), sharing lessons learned (video exchange of showpiece programs, problem programs, and discussions of reasons for success and failure), sharing lists of categories of in-kind contributions, and creating local service agency referral lists.

ANNEX I

PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION (SCF)

A. OVERVIEW

Save the Children Federation (SCF) is a nonprofit, nonsectarian organization that operates in 38 countries and nine states in the United States. SCF was originally established to provide disaster and refugee relief but has since evolved into a development organization with programs in agriculture, education, small-scale enterprise and credit, population, health, and nutrition. To build sustainable programs for administration by primarily local professionals, SCF operations are directed from the field, with technical and administrative support provided by the headquarters office in Westport, Connecticut.

B. LOGIC MODEL

While the evaluation team had no opportunity to discuss a logic model with SCF headquarters, the Split-based project staff eagerly produced the accompanying pathway chart (page I-3). The chart, integral to depicting key participants' perception of project aim and structure, illustrates SCF's intention of eventually supporting 770 preschools as a means of promoting ethnic reconciliation and peaceful coexistence at the community level in the Balkans. The schools provide three hours of high-quality activities on a daily basis at a relatively low cost that will decline further with the realization of economies of scale and economies of practice.

The goals guiding SCF are as follows:

1. To assist in developing 770 community-based educational activity sites;
2. To ensure the sustainability of 60 percent of the schools nine months after SCF support comes to an end;
3. To provide 560 teachers with 15+ training hours;
4. To produce teaching materials; and
5. To form state and regional associations.

One critical factor in SCF's program is a deliberate shift in emphasis toward greater parental involvement. Schools provide parents with neutral ground for initiating broad-based community cooperation. In fact, the evaluation team noted that the sequencing of actions and interventions toward parental involvement appears eminently logical given SCF's progress in addressing the considerable details associated with vehicles, customs, staffing, experimentation, the rapid assessment of various models, periodically disseminating lessons learned, modifying approaches in view of those lessons, and distinguishing among the five population groups served (Croats displaced, Croats native to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnians native to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croat refugees in Croatia but originally from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bosnian refugees in Croatia).

To its advantage, SCF had already established a presence in Croatia at the time of the award of the Cooperative Agreement and was well practiced in information dissemination. SCF has been continuously refining and building its database to be able to track—and therefore modify—its activities. Most recently, the organization has been focusing more energies (including staffing) on the sustainability of the preschools and hence has turned to the appropriate role of parents.

Initially, the preschools were intended to provide children with a safe haven from the surrounding turmoil and to offer beleaguered and often traumatized mothers a few hours of respite from child care. As events have unfolded, SCF now views mothers less as victims in need of a daily respite and more as potential actors who will eventually bear a major role in sustaining the schools and assuming a wide variety of civic responsibilities. Nonetheless, even as the children receive school-based instruction in ethnic tolerance values, they see those lessons contradicted at home by their parents' behavior. Until parents agree to reassociate, many children will experience little reinforcement of their school lessons in the home.

PATHWAYS TO PEACE—SAVE THE CHILDREN

+))))))))) , +)))))) , +))))))))) ,
* Civic * * Healthy /))))))1 Ethnic *
* Participation * * Society * * Reconciliation *
.))))))0)))))))- .))))0))))- .)))))))))0))))))-
* +)))))))))2))))))))) , *
* * Large Proportion * *
* * of Young Children * *
* * Receive Normal * *
* * Education (psycho-, * *
* * social well-being, * *
* * cognitive, and physi-* *
* * cal development) * *
* .)))))))))0)))))))- *
* * * * *
* +)))))))))2))))))))) , *
* * large numbers of * *
* * preschools are * *
* * opened & sustained * *
* .)))))))))0)))))))- *
* * * * *
* +)))))))))2))))))))) , *
* * methodology for * *
* * replication is * *
* * developed * *
* .)))))))))0)))))))- *
* * * * *
* +)))))))))2))))))))) , +))))))2)))))) , *
* * many (60%) preschools* * guided/ *
* * continue without SCF * * facilitated *
* * assistance * *re association*
* .)))))))))0)))))))- .))))))0))))))- *
* +)))))))))2))))))))) , *
.)))))))))1 community control * *
* .))))))0)))))))- *
* +))))))2))))))))) , *
* * parental involvement /))))))- *
* .)))))))))0)))))))- *

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

Save the Children has demonstrated a gradual, deliberate evolution in moving from the specification of goals and objectives, to the development of strategies, to the delivery of particular interventions and even resources. Specifically, SCF successfully moved its central first-year goal of creating a replicable model to third place among its second-year goals. Furthermore, the addition to staff of a full-time “sustainability” officer underscores the importance of devoting attention to the long-term viability of project activities.

Save the Children continues to demonstrate a well-honed ability to focus on preschool support despite the demand for a wide range of interventions that require multiple skills. The result is that SCF can now devote itself to engaging in more deliberate efforts to generate replication of its preschool model without SCF support and to spurring the critical involvement of parents and communities. In addition, by effectively distinguishing between types of populations and their program needs, SCF has amassed useful knowledge about potential sustainability in various types of environments. That knowledge takes into account such factors as refugees’ or displaced persons’ economic capability, the presence of a municipal government in exile willing to assume responsibility for preschool education, group apathy or energy, and willingness to undertake self-help activity.

The most recent monthly report (December 26, 1995-January 25, 1996) lists the following achievements in measurable terms: 280 preschool sites opened to date and 370 community groups formed (including 14 on break, 77 closed, 77 now self-supporting, and 202 open); the difference between site and group is not clear.

The annual plan (ending September 1995) indicates that 84.4 percent of sites (211 of the first year’s target of 250) had been established in contrast to 117 percent of the expected number of children enrolled (7,490 enrollees versus 6,417 planned). Schools were operating in 98 towns and villages in 42 municipalities/cantons in all five regions. The average cost per child per month at that time was \$47, but the amount is declining and is now believed to be around \$20.

D. CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

Save the Children notes that the organization does not necessarily view often-difficult circumstances as problems, but merely as critical factors endemic to the environment in which it functions. SCF operates on the belief that circumstances are better acknowledged than ignored. While too numerous to mention here, 11 such circumstances directly related to the first objective received special note in SCF’s first annual report on its Project 0016 activities. Circumstances included military events, the challenge of locating usable space in war-damaged communities, uncertainty about the residence of refugees and displaced persons, a lack of heating, unanticipated expenses (such as carpeting for drafty rooms), and difficulty in recruiting qualified staff. Other obstacles are associated with the second through fifth objectives, although SCF has been able to realize objective four and the local association formation portion of objective five.

On another issue, the second-year work plan refers to “child impact studies” to be carried out according to the methodology described in the annual report; a quick reading of the report revealed no such methodology. Nonetheless, “plausible association” is about as stringent a standard to be applied as is reasonable in measuring the effects of the preschools in terms of psychosocial well-being and cognitive and physical development. Applying “proof of causality” would require research beyond the scope of work of any PVO.

E. MEETING THE NEED

Among the eight grantees, SCF’s program is the most expansive in terms of sites, with over 200 completed and more than an additional 500 to go before the end of the project. Sustainability is built into the program and is receiving increasing emphasis through the design and implementation of models that are intended to serve as examples for wider replication. In terms of numbers of beneficiaries, the evaluation team did not ascertain the proportion of total preschool-age children served by SCF.

F. EVALUATION

The large database made possible by the magnitude of SCF’s efforts suggests that it should be possible to undertake ministudies of each of five population groups (named earlier) by relying primarily on indicators available from the start and end of the first year of preschool. Given that cognitive “examinations” are not administered in preschool, such indicators could include teacher or parent observations on physical development and carefully structured focus groups that gauge before-and-after psychosocial well-being based on existing “symptom” lists.

In fact, SCF has already used a survey instrument concerning stressful individual life events within the family and expects to correlate the results with traumatic symptoms in the child as noted on a two-page UNICEF-compiled list. The research expertise needed to conduct a scientifically reliable study with statistically significant correlations is beyond SCF and should not be attempted. Instead, SCF used the survey instrument on stressful life events as a starting point for discussions with families. Previously apathetic parents “came alive” once SCF staff read aloud specific stress-producing events and specific trauma symptoms. If SCF combined use of the instrument with the focus group approach, it would generate sufficient information to assess changes in the preschool-age target groups.

Regarding SCF’s second objective, it should be noted that many of the nonsurviving schools closed not because of insufficient community support and interest but rather because the enrolled children returned to a former residence. As population shifts continue to occur, SCF might find it prudent to alter its sustainability objective.

The absence of a monitoring form or even a supervisor’s checklist became apparent when the evaluation team visited what SCF had candidly pointed out as its “worst” preschool (Gornji Vakuf).

G. MANAGEMENT

The nature of SCF's program is such that personnel and equipment must move quickly to inform and solicit input from the community; identify and negotiate sites; select, train, and place playroom leaders; equip the preschools; attract children and their parents; and establish preschool operations—all before starting the process over again in another location. The integration of activities and the associated logistics require organizational mastery. SCF is deft in making the required elements fall into place.

The organization is well endowed with extremely competent, well-trained, seasoned staff who, for the most part, know what needs to be done and do it with grace. Of particular note are the Director, the Assistant Director of Programs, and the Assistant Director of Operations, but then not more than the remainder of the highly involved staff. The organization is divided into working units whose definition of roles, responsibilities, and points of decision making appear to be clearly articulated. The staff is large by local PVO standards, but observation of office dynamics indicates that personnel are working at close to capacity.

SCF is a responsive PVO that appears to be fine-tuning its organization and methods as it progresses through its work plan and confronts issues. The Assistant Director of Programs is writing and updating the Program Operations Manual, which in part follows a “lessons learned” approach for the benefit of other projects in similar startup circumstances. In addition, SCF has written its own Policies and Procedures Manual to conform with local needs. It has also simplified forms to make them more user-friendly and compiled curriculum books for playroom leader training and for use by the leader in lesson planning. Given that SCF has committed to supporting preschool centers for nine months, staff is also involved in outreach to both the community and local government in an effort to guarantee sustainability at project's end. SCF continues to bring in consultants to improve the delivery of services to the children and those who work with them.

It is difficult to judge the success of the operation in the field and how effectively the field coordinators, supervisors, and consultants perform. Nonetheless, it appears that the key to the success of each preschool center lies in the playroom leader. In recognition of the central role of the leaders, SCF has established systems that permit consultants, coordinators, and supervisors to support the leaders. The evaluation team's visit was too short to permit a full evaluation of the role of the visiting staff.

Some fine points about the program gave rise to additional concerns. For example, although the teacher said that parents are supposed to bring the children to the preschool, children usually arrive unaccompanied by an adult. Similarly, if a child arrives sick, the leader said she calls the parent to come get the child; yet, the preschool center lacks a telephone. Obviously, the logistics of arrival, departure, and unplanned dismissal have yet to be fully addressed.

Asking to see one of the least desirable sites, the evaluation team visited a preschool center in Bosnia in which attendance was low, the toilet facilities were in disrepair, the uncovered portion of the floor

was very cold, the few available toys were broken, and the teacher had no lesson plan for the day. The consultants and supervisors at the site said that they all knew about the center and that the problems had persisted for a long time. One field supervisor or coordinator said she knew of another available, more suitable site. The consultant suggested a teacher in the area who could be assigned to serve as a mentor for the playroom leader. At issue is the delay in instituting needed improvement.

The incident in the Bosnian preschool center points to the need for delivering training in supervisory skill development to program field staff, consultants, and anyone charged with visiting preschool centers. Most staff have difficulty approaching the subject because they view supervision as disciplinary. It is not. It involves support, coaching, consulting, and, only when necessary, taking disciplinary action. Further, it is central to the monitoring function. Without adequate program supervision, the program and the children will suffer.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

At this stage of the project, it is important to identify and implement opportunities for increasing the broader-scale impact based on a carefully defined and successful approach to working with preschools. One possible method would be to use SCF's database on the preschools it is working with to access parent teacher associations (PTAs) affiliated with the preschools. SCF could explore how PTAs can reinforce among parents the message of ethnic reconciliation that is being taught to their children. Such reinforcement could also be used to engender community outreach and further augment the impact of the SCF program.

ANNEX J

CONTACTS, PERSONS INTERVIEWED, SITES VISITED

I. IN THE U.S.

A. By Telephone

Harvard, Richard Mollica, Boston, MA
IRC, Barbara Smith, Bosnia backstop, Project 0016, New York, NY
SCF, Frank Catania, Westport, CT

B. In Person

ADF, Michael Miller, Alexandria, VA
AICF/USA, Jack Maarkand, Mary Picard, Mike Chommie, Washington, DC
CAH, Don Goewey, Sausalito, CA
CRS, Lynne Bensarghin, Eurasia Desk Officer, Baltimore, MD
Delphi, STAR Project, Claudia Crawford, Codirector, Washington, DC
USAID/Washington, Rita Hudson, ENI/HR, Washington, DC

II. IN CROATIA

A. USAID

Charles Aanenson, Representative
Tamara Sterk
TomYates

B. ADF

Tia Pausic, Project Director

C. ADF Subgrantees

Committee for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights, Osijek
Coordinating Committee, Pakrac
Dalmatian Solidarity Council, Split
Medical Committee for Human Rights, Zagreb

D. AICF/USA

Louise Griep, Acting Country Representative, Split

E. CAH

Maya Mihic, Executive Director, Zagreb

F. CAH Project Sites

Rijeka, three Vukovar displaced persons trained as peer support group facilitators
Zagreb, peer support group

G. CRS

Frank Disimino, PTRT Project Manager, Zagreb
Dubravka Stenger, Chief Accountant, Zagreb
Karel Zelenka, Country Representative, Zagreb

H. CRS Croatian Counterpart SPA

Dragan Jusupovic, Project Director, PTRT
Dean, Zagreb

I. CRS/SPA Trainees

Five in Split, five in Osijek, two in Zenica
37 observed during Advanced Trauma Recovery Training

J. Delphi, STAR Project

Jill Benderly, Codirector, Program
Zvijezdana Schultz, Administrative Assistant
Lael Stegall, Codirector, External Relations

K. Delphi Subgrantees

“Tara,” Miriam, Pula
Women’s Advisory Council, Pakrac
Women’s Laundry Project, Pakrac

L. Harvard University

John Woodall, Project Director, Rijeka

M. Harvard Subgrantees

Merhamet, five-person psychosocial team, Rijeka
Ruke refugee collection center, Narcissa, psychiatrist-researcher, Varajde
University of Rijeka, five-person psychosocial team

N. IRC

Mirela Despotovic, Umbrella Grant Manager, Croatia Program, Zagreb
Javed Sheikh, Financial Officer, Zagreb
David Shimkus, Program Officer, Zagreb

O. IRC Subgrantees

Duga teen program, Osijek

P. SCF

Anne Nixon, Assistant Director for Program, Split
Jim Nuttall, Split

Q. SCF Project Sites

Preschool BP (Boris Patafta, Director), Benkovac
Preschool Punta Skala, Zadar

III. IN BOSNIA

A. USAID

Craig Buck, Representative, Sarajevo
Terry Leary, Zenica

B. AICF/USA

Rod Campbell, Senior Program Officer, Bugojno
Mike, Program Officer, Bugojno
Tad, Program Officer, Bugojno

C. AICF/USA Subgrantees

Commercial fish farm, Manager, Bugojno
Hospital manager, Gornji Vakuf
Individual fish farmer, Gornji Vakuf
Muslim beekeeper society, President, Gornji Vakuf

D. CRS

SPA trainees—five in Sarajevo, two in Zenica

E. Delphi, STAR Project

Infoteka newsletter (Medica clinic), Zenica
Zena 21 magazine, Sarajevo

F. IRC

Annie Foster, Sarajevo
Marcia, Sarajevo

G. IRC Subgrantees

Laban children's dance group, Stari Vitez
Refugee collection center, Project Sanya playroom, Sarajevo
School-based playroom and tutoring program Be My Friend Playground, Sarajevo
Teen center, Zenica

H. SCF

Dutch coordinator, Gornji Vakuf
Two playrooms, Gornji Vakuf

ANNEX K

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)

1. Annual Implementation Plan Narrative, Year One, Oct. 14, 1994
2. Annual Implementation Plan, Year Two, Oct. 16, 1994
3. Annual Report, Year One, Oct. 16, 1995
4. Background Information, working draft, Jan. 1996
5. Codex of the Coordination Organization for the Protection of Human Rights, Republic of Croatia
6. Dalmatian Solidarity Committee, Knin Guidance Centre, Oxfam-supported project description
7. Duga, Children and Youth Aid Center, Daruvar, project description
8. Monthly Activity Reports, Sept., Oct., Nov. 1995
9. Monthly Financial Report, Sept. 1995
10. Notes to the file (USAID)
11. Project overview listing goal, purpose, objectives, accomplishments, and deliverables
12. Subgrantee Cooperative Agreement with Medical Committee for Human Rights
13. Technical Proposal, April 14, 1994
14. USAID response to Annual Implementation Plan Narrative, Year One, Nov. 11, 1994
15. Workshop Agenda, Program Development and Planning and Government Advocacy, Dec. 1995, with CV of facilitator Janelle Diller
16. Year One Implementation Plan, letter proposing adjustment, Jan. 10, 1995

INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST HUNGER (AICF/USA)

1. Attachment A to Cooperative Agreement, Statement of Work
2. Fact Sheet, April 1995
3. First Annual Report, Sept. 1994 to Sept. 1995
4. First Year Work Plan, Sept. 1994 to Aug. 1995
5. Proposal, project to run from July 1994 to June 1996
6. Quarterly Report, July to Sept. 1995
7. Second Year Work Plan, Sept. 1995 to Sept. 1996
8. Summary Report, Community Rehabilitation, Sept. 30, 1995
9. Summary Report, Income Generation Program, Sept. 30, 1995
10. Summary Report, Reforestation
11. Trip Report, Tom Yates, memo to the file, July 1995
12. USAID comments on First Annual Report and Second Year Work Plan, Nov. 17, 1995

CENTER FOR ATTITUDINAL HEALING (CAH)

1. Attachment 2 to Cooperative Agreement, Program Description
2. Correspondence concerning project concept and indicators, Sterk to Franklin, Jan. 5, 1996, Franklin to Sterk, Jan. 18 and 19, 1996
3. First Annual Report, Oct. 27, 1995
4. Notes to the file, July 10 and July 18, 1995
5. Preprimary Project, Instruments, Oct. 1993
6. Proposal, April 15, 1994
7. Response to USAID's Questions and Concerns, July 6, 1994
8. Summary of Proposed Project
9. Year Two Work Plan

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)

1. Cooperative Agreement, Sept. 28, 1994
2. CRS letter to L. Long and T. Yates concerning comments on USAID letter to CRS of Nov. 11, 1994
3. Draft letter from L. Long to T. Reilly, CRS/Baltimore, Feb. 3, 1995, concerning project manager appointment
4. First Annual Report, Oct. 17, 1995
5. First Year Implementation Plan, Nov. 9, 1994
6. Letter from Disimino to Joshi, Johns Hopkins, re: collaboration, July 21, 1995
7. Letter from Disimino to Yates re: Quarterly Report, July 24, 1995
8. Letter from Johns Hopkins to CRS re: possible affiliation, June 23, 1995
9. Letter from T. Yates to Disimino, Notes on CRS Quarterly Report, April to June 1995
10. Memorandum of Understanding (CRS, Society for Psychological Assistance, and International Catholic Migration Commission) July 20, 1995
11. Modification of Cooperative Agreement, increasing funding, May 24, 1995
12. Note to the file, Jan. 23, 1996, re: reporting and indicators
13. Post Trauma Recovery Training Project, description by Society for Psychological Assistance
14. Response to Review Committee's Questions, July 5, 1994
15. Second Year Work Plan, Sept. 20, 1995
16. Speech by Hillary Clinton re: NGOs and humanitarian relief (CRS and IOCC), Jan. 29, 1996
17. Technical Proposal, April 14, 1994
18. USAID comments on First Year Work Plan, Nov. 11, 1995
19. USAID comments on Second Year Work Plan, Sept. 29, 1995
20. USAID internal memo from USAID/Zagreb to L. Long re: CRS correspondence, Feb. 13, 1995

DELPHI, STAR PROJECT

1. Additional Work Plan, Oct. 1995
2. Annual Report
3. Cooperative Agreement, Sept. 25, 1994
4. Modification of CA, May 1995
5. Monthly Reports, Nov. and Dec. 1994, Feb. 1995
6. Proposal 15, April 1994
7. USAID reaction to Work Plan, Nov. 11, 1994
8. Work Plan, Oct. 25, 1994
9. Work Plan, June 1995

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1. Cooperative Agreement, May 12, 1995, plus Executive Summary
2. Fee for Service Agreement with Ruke
3. HPRT's second quarterly report, Feb. 1, 1996
4. Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian Versions
5. Letters and memos in late 1995 concerning CA and work plan
6. Modification of Cooperative Agreement, May 23, 1995
7. Monthly Reports for Sept., Oct., and Nov. 1995
8. Patient Evaluation Questionnaire (Revised Jan. 5, 1996)
9. Project CREATE (Coordinated Rapid Evaluation, Assignment, Training, and Education)
10. Proposal, March 24, 1995
11. Telcon notes, Sterk, regarding project goals and reporting, Jan. 24 to 26, 1996
12. USAID Response to First Year Work Plan, Dec. 29, 1995
13. Work Plan, June 1, 1995 to May 31, 1996

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)

1. Activities Report, Aug. to Dec. 1995
2. Bi-Annual Report, Dec. 1993 to July 1994
3. Cooperative Agreement, June 1995
4. Creative Associates International, Umbrella Grant for Trauma and Reunification, A Midpoint Evaluation, Nov. 21, 1994
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6. Croatian Society for the Protection of the Rights of Children, Families, Foster, and Adoptive Families, Monthly Report, December 1995
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8. Fact Sheet, Be My Friend
9. Financial Management Training Workshop for Subgrantees, Nov. 1995
10. IRC Strategic Plan, April 1995
11. IRC Umbrella Grant, Final Report Guidelines

12. IRC Umbrella Grant, Mid-Point Report Guidelines
13. Mid-Point Program Evaluation REPORT, Telephone for Psychological Help, Oct. 1994 to June 1, 1995
14. Mid-Point Report, Croatian Society for the Protection of the Children and Families, Aug. to Oct. 1995
15. Monitoring Check List
16. Monitoring Forms
17. Monthly Reporting Requirements, Narrative Portion
18. Monthly Reports, Oct. and Nov. 1995
19. Organization Charts
20. Pipeline Analysis, Oct. 31, 1995
21. Telephone for Psychological Help, Monthly Project Chart and Report, Dec. 1995
22. Umbrella Grant, Semi-Annual Report, Aug. 1994 to Jan. 1995
23. Umbrella Grant, Semi-Annual Report, Feb. 1995 to July 1995
24. Work Plan, Dec. 1993 to Dec. 1994
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2. First Annual Report, Sept. 16, 1994, to Sept. 30, 1995
3. Guide to Implementing Community Playrooms
4. Monthly Report, Dec. 26, 1995 to Jan. 25, 1996
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6. Proposal, April 14, 1994
7. Request for Cost Amendment, Dec. 5, 1995
8. Sparks, Bulletin No. 7, Feb. 1996
9. USAID response to Year 1 Work plan
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11. Work Plan, Year 2, Oct. 1, 1995 to Sept. 30, 1996