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THE SARHAD RURAL SUPPORT CORPORATION: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW NGO IN NWFP

Volume 1 of 2: Main Report

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PREFACE

This proposal on the Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC) is the result of a long series of joint efforts by the Government of NWFP (GONWFP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP). The proposal to establish SRSC as an NGO for small farmer development in NWFP was first brought up officially by GONWFP in a working paper circulated by the Chief Secretary in February 1988. The NWFP Government's interest in SRSC reflects: (a) its demonstrated willingness to experiment with new, farmer-oriented approaches to agriculture and rural development; (b) its desire to engage local initiative and resources through community participation; and, (c) the possibility of mobilizing donor resources earmarked for development through NGOs.

From the beginning, the SRSC initiative has had the support of USAID, AKF and AKRSP. USAID supports institutional innovation in the management of rural development, and has a policy of seeking private sector and community participation in development; it is also required by U.S. Congressional legislation to spend a portion of its development funds through NGOs. AKF and AKRSP represent substantial expertise in small farmer development through NGOs; they also have an interest in wider experimentation and testing of the principles that have been used effectively by AKRSP in northern Pakistan.

The purpose of this report[1] is to: (a) serve as a proposal that can be used to raise initial funds for SRSC; (b) explain the basic principles for small farmer development that should be employed by SRSC management; (c) propose an institutional framework for village organization, the structure of SRSC, and linkages between SRSC and existing institutions; and, (d) anticipate some of the interventions that might be undertaken by SRSC.

The purpose of this report is not to provide a blueprint for implementation by SRSC management when it becomes operational. The initiative that is to be promoted through SRSC requires integrity of management, flexibility of approach, flexibility in procedures, and willingness to experiment and innovate. The development agenda of each project area village would be identified through village dialogues and other means: this cannot be accomplished in a short-term consultancy. The refinement of the institutional framework and the identification of a package of suitable interventions is best left to the SRSC's operational phase.

This study was undertaken at the request of the Planning and

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[1]The complete scope of work for this consultancy is given at Annex A.1.

Development Department (P&D) of GONWFP; it was funded by USAID. DRMS (Pvt.) Ltd., a research and consulting firm based in Islamabad, were asked in March 1989 to work with GONWFP to prepare the design, work plan and outline budget for the first three years of the SRSC. The team started its work in Peshawar on 15 March 1989 and submitted its final report to USAID on 4 September 1989.

The principal team members fielded by DRMS were:

Tariq Husain, Team Leader, Managing Director of DRMS; Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago; five-and-one-half years' experience at AKRSP; four previous short-term assignments in NWFP; specialist in rural development strategy, farming systems research, farmer-managed irrigation systems, and monitoring and evaluation.

Tariq Banuri; Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University; five years' experience in civil administration and planning in GONWFP; teaching experience at Harvard University and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst; research on development approaches and environmental management at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University.

These principal consultants were joined for 2-3 weeks each by: Khusro Hasan Mir, Engineer; Agha Imran Hamid, Credit and Marketing Specialist; and Shamoon Sadiq, Statistical Analyst. Socio-economic village profiles for Kohat were developed by Iqbal Niazi.

The team has been assisted and counselled by a large number of experienced officials, elected representatives and ordinary villagers.[2] The consultants wish to record their deep and sincere appreciation to all those individuals (listed at Annex A.2) who gave freely of their time and advice. We are grateful to GONWFP and USAID for asking us to work on a subject that is close to our hearts, and for allowing us free reign in expressing our thoughts.

Tariq Husain Tariq Banuri

[2]A list of individuals consulted by the team is attached at Annex A.2, while the team's itinerary is at Annex A.3.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Annual Development Programme - annual plan showing development activities and budgets of government agencies
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation, a private, non-denominational, philanthropic foundation, headquartered in Switzerland, with branches and affiliates in eight countries, including Pakistan.
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, a private, non-sectarian, rural development programme operating in the Gilgit, Chitral and Baltistan Districts of northern Pakistan.
ARI	Agricultural Research Institute, Tarnab
CADP	Chitral Area Development Project, a seven-year development project being implemented by GONWFP with the assistance of IFAD and ADB, and following the "AKRSP approach" to village development.
CCRI	Cereal Crops Research Institute, Pirsabak
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
DAE	Directorate of Agricultural Extension of the Department of Agriculture and Cooperatives
DOFWM	Directorate of On-Farm Water Management of the Department of Agriculture and Cooperatives
EADA	Extra Assistant Director, Agriculture
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas, containing seven tribal Agencies and four Frontier Regions
GONWFP	Government of North-West Frontier Province
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IPHED	Irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Project/Programme
KIDP	Kalam Integrated Development Project (Pak-Swiss)
LG&RD	Local Government and Rural Development Department
MER	Monitoring, Evaluation and Research Section of the proposed SRSC

MNA	Member of the National Assembly
MPA	Member of the Provincial Assembly
NCA	National Commission on Agriculture, 1987-88
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
O/ARD	Office of Agriculture and Rural Development of USAID/Pakistan
P&D	Planning and Development Department
PCSIR	Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
SCARP	Salinity Control and Reclamation Programme
SDO	Sub-Divisional Officer
SOU	Social Organization Unit of the proposed SRSC
SRSC	Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (proposed)
T&V	Training-and-Visit system of agricultural extension, sponsored by the World Bank in Charsadda District, Mardan Division and Dera Ismail Khan Division
TIPAN	Transformation and Integration of the Provincial Agricultural Network, a USAID-sponsored project with the University of Agriculture, Peshawar
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VO	Village Organization, an assembly of all adult villagers to be established under the proposed SRSC
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WUA	Water Users' Association established under the NWFP Water Users' Association Ordinance, 1981
WID	Women in Development
XEN	Executive Engineer

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Background

This proposal presents the institutional, programming and funding frameworks for the establishment of the Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC), a new NGO that will operate in selected districts of NWFP. The proposed SRSC will be a private company, limited by guarantee, and established with the assistance of GONWFP, AKF, AKRSP and USAID. Its resources are likely to be drawn from several donors and commercial institutions, and through linkages with government agencies and the private sector. Its philosophy is that of development based on the institutions, resources and activism of rural communities.

The general objective of SRSC is to provide and promote institutional, programming and financial assistance to villagers, so that they may themselves manage their development agenda in the future. SRSC will address this mandate as a small, flexible catalyst, by organizing institutions and resources rather than by duplicating what already exists.

The Rationale for SRSC

The rationale for SRSC is based on two major observations about existing programmes for rural development in NWFP: (1) that existing approaches are dominated by technical managers or community representatives: they are not approaches through which ordinary villagers can participate to identify and implement their own priorities; and, (2) that existing organizational forms are either too rigid or too weak to respond with continuing innovation to the challenges of a rapidly-changing environment.

Perhaps the most important institutional need in NWFP to which SRSC will address itself arises out of the absence of effective institutions of development at the community level. While most development resources are expended through line agencies and other technical/managerial approaches, the limited community involvement in development is through elected local representatives. However useful they may be for some purposes, managerial and representative approaches are not substitutes for community participation. Moreover, representative approaches are more often than not divisive and political rather than consensual. There is an urgent need to develop grassroots community institutions with broad-based participation that nurture and depend on consensus rather than divisiveness. The systems of local government, development administration and resource mobilization are all incomplete without participatory community institutions.

SRSC can begin to demonstrate more effective, sustainable and equitable models of development administration and resource

mobilization through village organization. This will open up the possibility of marrying SRSC's participatory approach with existing line agencies and representative institutions.

Overview of the SRSC Concept

The business of SRSC is to demonstrate improved ways of organizing resources for development. It will work in two broad directions - institutional development and programme development. The distinctive characteristic of SRSC's institutional development mandate is the establishment and support of broad-based participatory Village Organizations. The distinctive characteristic of its programme development is the identification of village priorities through dialogues with villagers. Its initial programme focus is likely to be on income generation; social sector activities will be organized subsequently. Broad-based income generation is the preferred entry point because experience indicates that villagers can be organized (and they stay organized) around common income-generating projects: income generation provides a tangible and immediate benefit to villagers, and it quickly establishes the credibility of a new project.

The SRSC has no blueprint of operations. It will start with an institutional framework and an approach to programme development. It will then develop its own organizational and technical models in each geographical area and programme activity.

SRSC's institutional framework is based on one major premise - that equitable and sustainable rural development is not possible without self-sustaining participatory village institutions. A complete institutional framework within which such institutions can be created and nurtured needs three essential components:

- A model of village organization;
- A model of a support mechanism for Village Organizations, i.e., the SRSC itself; and,
- A model of organizational linkages to other agencies in the public and private sectors.

These three models represent the three main directions of institutional development through SRSC.

It is recommended that the SRSC adopt this three-element institutional framework for agricultural and rural development.

Philosophy of Institutional Development: Formalism versus Incentives

Routine attempts at institutional development tend to focus on the form of the institutional arrangement. The formalism takes the shape of registration of village associations, incorporation or registration of support agencies, and coordination committees

for inter-agency linkages. Such arrangements remain *pro forma* and do not accomplish much.

Sustainable institutional development requires continuing incentive to obtain the voluntary association and commitment of the participants. In the case of SRSC, this kind of effort requires continuing incentives for: (1) villagers to organize themselves; (2) SRSC to organize and staff itself; and, (3) SRSC and collaborating agencies to undertake joint programmes and share resources.

In the existing environment of heavily subsidized rural development and widespread cynicism about institutions, SRSC will be hard pressed to find adopters of its institutional models. In order to establish credibility rapidly, SRSC has to recognize that it will be operating in the "buyer's market". It will need the resources with which to sell its approach to villagers, new staff and institutional cooperants: it will need to subsidize the demonstration of new approaches. Such subsidies are investments in institutional development at all levels. With these subsidies, SRSC would be aiming to bring about behavioural change. It would seek to create public goods - institutions that can benefit all those segments of society that choose to use them. But subsidies are not sustainable; so SRSC will have to phase out its subsidies over time as its approach becomes acceptable, as it enters the "seller's market".

The institutional arrangements developed by SRSC will have to compete on their own merits with available alternatives in the public and private sectors. In the long term, the Village Organization will have to demonstrate its utility to villagers and development programmes: the VO will survive only as long as it has functions to perform. After the first grant for an income-generating project, continuing incentives to collective effort will have to be in the shape of new functions (and new models) in the income-generating and social sectors. Continuing incentives cannot be provided in the shape of continuing subsidy: that is an unsustainable approach, and one that is contrary to the philosophy of self-help and community mobilization proposed for SRSC. Thus, unlike many present development programmes, SRSC would seek to use subsidies only to establish credibility with villagers and test new approaches, not as a continuing mode of financing.

It is recommended that SRSC adopt the general approach to incentives described above, i.e., (1) subsidize the creation of appropriate institutions at the village, project area, and inter-agency levels; (2) withdraw subsidies as some of the new institutions begin to acquire credibility and acceptance; and, (3) identify new functions and models that would serve as continuing incentives for villagers to work together.

Village Organization:
Participation versus Representation

The organization of ordinary villagers is the key to the proposed approach; it is essential because there is an institutional vacuum at the village level. While traditional institutions have become weak or disintegrated, new community institutions to manage natural resources, community infrastructure and common problems have not emerged. Many development programmes and projects have realized the importance of community participation, but they often mistake representation for participation. There are existing institutions for participation by the government and by community representatives, but there are no village institutions for participation by ordinary villagers. All agencies would benefit from the creation of an effective institutional base at the village level. Agricultural and rural development requires the participation of all actors - government agencies, community representatives and community organizations. While line agencies and community representatives have an important role to play in the development process, they are not substitutes for participatory village institutions.

The proposed model of village organization is that of broad-based participatory organizations whose membership consists of all adults in a village[1]; decision-making is by the general body of the organization, rather than by executive committees or elected or nominated representatives. Self-help is redefined as the villagers' willingness to organize themselves, generate their own capital, and acquire new skills. The identification, implementation, maintenance and monitoring of development activities is undertaken by the Village Organization, with the technical and financial assistance of SRSC and established development agencies. This model differs from the managerial model (in which decision-making is by line agencies or project management) and the representational model (in which the decision-making powers of members of cooperatives, Water User Associations, communities, etc. are vested in committees or representatives).

Village organization is partly a matter of organizing principles, and partly one of leadership by village activists. Local activists lead villagers in the transformation from petitioners to managers of their manpower, skills and capital.

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[1]Effective social organization is compatible with more than one Village Organization per village, as long as everyone in the village can participate in the development process. Multiple VOs may be needed in large or socially differentiated villages, sometimes even if there is a single project of common interest, or a single VO may decide to divide after completion of a project. SRSC would have the flexibility to promote participation with this kind of flexibility to social organization.

These village activists may or may not be drawn from the village's traditional and political leadership. They will be recognized by their actions. They will be acclaimed by fellow villagers. They will be pampered and nurtured by SRSC. Progress in social organization will not be forthcoming without the emergence of village activists.

It is recommended that SRSC adopt the participatory model of village organization outlined above.

The Organization of SRSC:
A Small, Flexible Catalyst

Effective village organization requires institutional support to community groups until they can become managerially and financially self-sustaining. This kind of support is a normal part of development programmes executed by line agencies and elected representatives; it is also essential to provide this support to Village Organizations. Without this support, the quality and credibility of Village Organizations and their development efforts would be diminished considerably.

In performing its support functions, SRSC has to be a small, flexible catalyst: it should not be a super-agency dealing with all rural development activities with its own staff, vehicles and funds. The range of rural development activities is such that SRSC will never have its own resources for addressing the priorities of the villagers in all fields. It will need to respond with imagination to share resources with other agencies and facilitate access to them by the VOs. SRSC can best promote these goals by developing and nurturing new participatory institutions, starting with the Village Organization, which would serve as the fulcrum for coordination with other agencies, and would also promote small farmer access to these agencies.

It is recommended that, instead of attempting a wide range of interventions itself, SRSC should concentrate on the task of building the Village Organization and facilitating access to the VO by other agencies, projects and programmes in the public and private sectors.

Organizational Linkages:
Formal and Informal Coordination at Three Levels

SRSC's institutional development function, based on village organization, is unique. The question of duplication does not arise in this context. SRSC's programme development function, however, appears similar to what many other development programmes are sponsoring (e.g., infrastructure, credit, extension, etc.). There is potential for both conflict and cooperation. Conflict cannot be eliminated, but it can be minimized (and replaced by cooperation) if the ground rules suggested below are followed.

The SRSC approach to inter-agency linkages has to be a combination of institutional incentives, formal coordinating mechanisms, and informal links fostered by individual staff members.

Institutional incentives can be provided through a Buy-in Option. Under this option, some of the SRSC funds would be used to offer collaborating agencies the means to overcome critical constraints (e.g., lack of operational resources in reaching villagers). SRSC would subsidize new models of rural development in a few areas of priority; it will not fund routine programmes. Formal coordinating mechanisms can be established at the corporate (Board of Directors), district (planning and review committee) and village levels. And informal links can be promoted if staff recruitment is based partly on the basis of individual *entree* to government agencies and the private sector.

Part of the institutional rationale for SRSC is that it should complement local government institutions: the SRSC approach to village organization is complementary to the local government system in the long run. Attempts and recommendations have been made in the past to link community-level organizations to local government institutions; there are also ongoing attempts in some of the participatory projects in Pakistan. There is no working model of such linkages that SRSC could adopt as a blueprint. While SRSC may have to develop and test several options over time, it may find it useful and productive to concentrate initial efforts at the Union Council level, particularly in planning for inter-village physical infrastructure.[2]

The preceding premises, read in conjunction with the proposed SRSC approach to participatory development, lead to a number of important recommendations for nurturing organizational linkages.

It is recommended that formal coordination between SRSC and other agencies be conditional on the acceptance of the participatory approach to village organization. Those private and government agencies that accept this approach should be represented on district planning and review committees and the Board of Directors of SRSC.

It is recommended that staff recruitment by SRSC be based partly on the need to build informal links to the government and private sectors.

It is recommended that SRSC collaborate actively and share resources with those agencies that agree to test the idea that the Village Organization is a contractor for village level projects and services.

Although there will be many opportunities for inter-agency linkages, it is recommended that SRSC should consider at least five examples of joint planning

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[2]This observation is elaborated in Sections 7.2 and 10.5.

with other agencies: (1) collaboration with the Directorate of Agricultural Extension in demonstrating and diffusing new varieties, promoting plant protection, and training farmers; (2) cooperation with the Animal Husbandary Directorate for disease control and training of para-veterinarians; (3) cooperation with the Fruit and Vegetable Development Board for pest control and farmer training, including training of women; (4) proper Union Council planning for physical infrastructure, particularly inter-village projects; and, (5) rehabilitation of civil canals, possibly in collaboration with the Irrigation Department. The village level implementation mechanism in all cases should be the Village Organization.

It is recommended that the SRSC budget include provisions for implementation of selected activities (such as those outlined above) through line agencies and local government, provided that these activities are based on the participatory model of village organization.

Considering the value of AKRSP's approach and experience to SRSC, it is recommended that SRSC move at an early stage to formalize a technical assistance agreement with AKRSP. It is believed that AKRSP would be receptive to such an initiative from SRSC.

Interface with Local Government

Within the general issue of organizational linkages, the matter of SRSC's interface and coordination with local government is of over-riding concern to GONWFP. While SRSC may find it possible to respond to the government's concerns, its efforts will be constrained by two objective conditions:

- Representative local government and participatory village organization represent two distinct and opposite cultures of development administration; and,

- There is an extreme paucity of working models of collaboration between local government and participatory village institutions.

Notwithstanding these constraints, examples from other projects are discussed in Section 5.4 as possible approaches to SRSC collaboration with local government. The thrust of the discussion, however, is speculative rather than prescriptive.

Selecting the Project Area:
Regional Poverty and Programme Replicability

Two sets of concerns were considered in proposing a project area for the SRSC. The first of these may be called the Poverty Criteria, according to which preference should be given to regions that are poor, remote and largely bypassed by official development assistance. The second set of concerns relates to the ease with

which a new NGO could develop, demonstrate and replicate institutional and technical models in a given area. These concerns may be called the Replicability Criteria. Both sets of criteria reflect legitimate concerns and should be reflected in the choice of project area. However, the over-riding interest of GONWFP and donors is that SRSC should have the potential for replicability, rather than being a unique, one-time experiment.

Keeping in view the Replicability Criteria, a project area should be characterized by territorial integrity, i.e., it should be composed of well-defined administrative units (preferably districts), and it should be manageable in size, with a relatively narrow range of social institutions and technical issues confronting the future management of SRSC. At least four such potential development zones (or potential project areas) can be identified in NWFP (map on next page): (1) the districts of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu in the south; (2) the districts of Karak, Kohat, and Charsadda, and the Nowshera Sub-Division of Peshawar District in central NWFP; (3) the districts of Abbottabad and Mansehra in the north-east of NWFP; and, (4) Kohistan District in NWFP and Diamer District in the Federally Administered Northern Areas.

It is recommended that SRSC initiate its operations in Kohat District, a district that is "average" for NWFP by most measures, but also represents considerable diversity. The potential project area for SRSC, defined by manageability and ease of replicability of technical and institutional approaches, should be restricted to the adjacent administrative units - Karak and Charsadda Districts, and Nowshera Sub-Division.

The proposed project area for SRSC includes three administrative units identified by GONWFP and donors as areas that deserve attention on the basis of their poverty. Taken as a whole, the proposed project area would rank below average on most indicators for economic and social development in NWFP. (Further discussion in Section 2.4.)

Two major factors will determine the pace of expansion of SRSC - credibility among villagers, and the availability of donor resources.

It would be extremely important for SRSC to make a sound start in Kohat before expanding to additional districts. This is essential to build confidence within the project, train staff, test the institutional and technical approaches, and establish credibility with villagers and donors. If SRSC can come up to the expectations of villagers and donors, there will be both pressure and the resources to expand operations within Kohat as well as to additional districts.

If SRSC "succeeds", government, donors and NGOs would have two broad options for "going to scale" - either to extend the project

NWFP AND NORTHERN AREAS

POSSIBLE NGO DEVELOPMENT ZONES



area of SRSC, or to establish other such organizations. In the first option, SRSC itself would go to scale; in the second option, the idea of participatory development would go to scale. To retain manageability and preserve its impact and momentum, SRSC should confine itself to the one compact project area recommended in Section 2.4 (i.e., the central zone from Charsadda to Karak).

It is recommended that any additional districts outside the proposed project area should not be managed by SRSC, but may be taken up by future NGOs or area development projects: care should be taken that SRSC does not become an extended provincial bureaucracy.

Outline Plan and Planning Methods

The overall objective of the first three years of SRSC is to organize small farmers into broad-based, participatory Village Organizations that can undertake development activities with the technical and financial assistance of SRSC and collaborating agencies.

The SRSC mandate requires it to combine suitable organizational forms and development activities so as to maximize the impact of both. Progress will be achieved if SRSC develops and replicates a series of packages that strengthen institutions and improve the welfare of small farmers. Institutional and programme development is required of SRSC at two levels - the village level and the inter-agency level.

SRSC's entry point for village organization should be Productive Physical Infrastructure (PPI) projects. The PPI is a subsidized catalyst for (investment in) social organization: it galvanizes villagers into working together on a project that would increase the incomes of all or most of them. The subsidized PPI programme, however, cannot be a continuing incentive to sustain the interest and organization of villagers. Thus, SRSC will need to design follow-on programmes that increase farm incomes without continuing subsidies. In time, SRSC may play a facilitating role in linking VOs to social sector programmes; this role would have particular value in organizing and benefitting women.

Just as the PPI is an effective entry point for village organization, physical infrastructure is an effective entry point for inter-agency institutional development. SRSC should use physical infrastructure programmes to motivate new approaches to development through collaborating agencies. One useful entry point that could have an early impact on inter-agency institutions is Union Council planning for physical infrastructure. Other possibilities for inter-agency collaboration and sharing of resources are listed in Part B of this proposal.

The likely specific objectives for SRSC are outlined in Part B of this proposal for each of the major programmes anticipated at

this stage. Once on the ground, however, SRSC will need to validate these suggestions through its own diagnostic approaches. Methods through which SRSC may develop programme packages are suggested in Part B.

It is recommended that the Board of Directors of SRSC approve a budget for SRSC to establish and support 150 Village Organizations in the first three years.

Staffing, Costs, Phasing and Funding

SRSC is an extra-ordinary venture: it needs extra-ordinary men and women. It needs staff with personal integrity, demonstrated professional competence, and *entree* into the public and private sectors. In key positions, it needs people for whom development is not just a job but a vocation.

It is recommended that SRSC recruit key personnel from among those for whom development is a vocation rather than only a source of livelihood. In all cases, the criteria of personal integrity, professional competence, and entree into the public and private sectors should be followed.

SRSC's overheads will be watched with interest by those who contemplate replicating its approach. Sceptics have to understand that SRSC's mandate for institutional development requires a high quality, management-intensive programme. SRSC's management has to be cautious that this mandate is not perceived as a license for high overheads.

It is recommended that: (a) the Board of SRSC should approve a three-year, multilateral fund-raising effort for programmes, staff positions and support anticipated in this report; (b) the Board should approve annual budgets according to the availability of funds; and, (c) the Chief Executive Officer should undertake programme expenditure and staff recruitment based on the management's assessment of project needs, within the approved budget.

Outline budget estimates have been prepared to assist SRSC with its initial fund-raising. These figures are indicative, and are subject to the assumptions made in Sections 18.1 and 18.2 of this report.

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	TOTAL
		million Rs		
Programme Expenditure	11.3	15.1	15.7	42.1
Recurrent Expenditure	9.6	10.9	11.0	31.5
Capital Expenditure	9.4	3.3		12.7
GRAND TOTAL	30.3	29.3	26.7	86.3

It is recommended that the SRSC start its fund-raising efforts with these budget figures.[3]

Considerable interest has been expressed in the SRSC venture. Funding prospects, however, will depend on donor assessment of some of the major milestones that SRSC will pass through.

Initial reaction to SRSC requests for funding will depend substantially on donor assessments of its corporate entity, its Chief Executive Officer and senior staff, and the quality and priorities of funding proposals prepared by SRSC. On the basis of these assessments, donors may be willing to contribute small amounts to help SRSC establish its presence in Kohat and start a small programme.

SRSC will have to treat fund-raising as a specialist activity, and be prepared to pay the costs of fund-raising. The burden of fund-raising may ease over time as SRSC establishes credibility, but it will always remain a significant burden on management.

SRSC will need to attempt fund-raising through both windows - bilateral and NGO. While senior SRSC staff will doubtless have the means to effectively pursue fund-raising within the country, fund-raising from donor NGO windows will require institutional linkages with foreign NGOs.

Long-term Institutional and Financial Viability

An early requirement (but one with lasting impact) for the financial viability of SRSC is for it to register formally to fulfill the requirements of various donors.

In terms of its development programmes, SRSC would need to move increasingly from grants to loans, user fees, and other mechanisms for cost recovery. SRSC is advertised as a non-routine catalyst whose subsidies are meant to encourage the testing and adoption of new ways of organizing resources. Once appropriate models have been established, the case for subsidies becomes untenable on these high grounds. Financial viability has to be attained by making the models pay for themselves - by making sure that the models that are devised can be supported by those they are meant to service.

Long-term financial viability is linked closely to the long-term institutional development of the Village Organizations.

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[3]Programme Expenditure corresponds to the government's ADP concept. For comparison, the 1988-89 ADP of District Council, Kohat, was Rs 15 million; and that of the Public Health Engineering Department in Kohat was Rs 12 million. The 1988-89 Provincial ADP for Kohat was Rs 107 million.

In the long term, there are at least three possibilities for formalizing and federating the VOs:

- As cooperatives, provided that existing legislation can be made to conform to the principles of a participatory rather than a representational model;

- As owners of one or more joint stock companies set up by SRSC and the VOs; or,

- As the primary tier of local government, if the government and SRSC can work out the appropriate mix of responsibility for participatory Village Organizations and representative local councils.

These options will have to be considered carefully in conjunction with their financial implications for the long term. What limited experience there is in Pakistan suggests that there are no ready-made answers.

Replicability

Discussions on SRSC have been influenced by the AKRSP approach in Gilgit, its organizational approaches at the village and project levels, its leadership, and its perceived costs. This report examines in detail the question of what can and cannot be learnt from ARKSP, and what can be replicated within NWFP as a result of SRSC. This replicability issue is of much more than academic interest, since donors and government are interested in initiatives such as AKRSP and SRSC because of their potential contribution to more effective, equitable and sustainable development.

The AKRSP experience suggests that a complete framework for rural development should have three elements (as proposed above). The fundamental element of this framework is participatory village organization, for which ARKSP can serve as a model with which SRSC could start. A second element of the institutional framework is the NGO status of the support mechanism (in this case, AKRSP or SRSC). The need for and effectiveness of NGOs seems to be widely accepted, provided that a third element of the institutional framework - that of inter-agency linkages - is articulated. This is the biggest challenge for SRSC, and this report suggests ways in which SRSC could begin to address this challenge.

AKRSP cannot be copied as a blueprint for programme development. The AKRSP experience suggests, however, that programmes should be identified in collaboration with Village Organizations. This requires that SRSC learn various diagnostic techniques with which it could involve villagers in identifying location-specific development programmes. These programmes cannot be identified through a distant planning process.

Doubts about the replicability of AKRSP approach are expressed on various grounds. One criticism is that most communities in NWFP represent intractable forms of social organization that could prevent functioning Village Organizations to emerge. This is a myth: there are informal groups and development projects in many parts of NWFP that are making progress in organizing farmers for rural development.

Another objection is that ventures such as AKRSP and SRSC are too expensive for routine replication elsewhere. These ventures may be more expensive, but they are also more effective. The burden on SRSC should be to demonstrate how it will work effectively at non-routine tasks that are not being undertaken by other (routine) programmes.

A third objection to AKRSP and SRSC is that such ventures depend on committed individuals, or charismatic leadership. It is assumed that such individuals are so rare as to make SRSC-type ventures non-replicable. The experience in Pakistan (including AKRSP) suggests, however, that charismatic leaders are everywhere - all they need is the environment in which to flourish.

Part A:

The Institutional Framework

SECTION ONE
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NWFP AND THE RATIONALE FOR A NEW NGO

1.1. The Starting Premises of the Report

This report is based on one major premise - that equitable and sustainable rural development is not possible without self-sustaining participatory village institutions. The basis of this premise is the following observations and conclusions:

- In a society that is subject to powerful forces of social fragmentation and political polarization, there is a desperate need to replace divisiveness with consensus and compromise. The participatory approach is the only way to create and enlarge social consensus on development issues.

- Traditional rural institutions (e.g., feudal authority, and the *jirga* and *ashr* systems) for the management of common property (including forests and irrigation infrastructure) have become weak. New broad-based village institutions are needed to manage common assets on a productive and sustainable basis.

- Government resources are scarce relative to the human and financial investment that is needed for sustainable rural development. Government needs to accept the farmers as partners in development. Effective village organization is a mechanism for mobilizing resources for agricultural and rural development on a continuing basis.

- Rural development programmes cannot be effective if identified and directed by a distant planning process. Village organization should be the basis for micro-level planning, starting with the identification of local projects.

- Government has no delivery mechanism at the village level for small farmers. It cannot reach a large number of small farmers on an individual basis, given existing managerial and financial constraints. Farmer organization provides an effective and cost-efficient mechanism for government agencies to reach small farmers.

- In those cases where private and public sector provision of goods and services is remote or non-existent, farmer organization conveys economies of scale to small farmers in purchasing, selling and transporting inputs and produce, and in the division of labour through specialization in services.

- Government agencies concerned with the supply of goods and services are usually motivated and evaluated by quantitative measures of inputs. Villagers demanding and receiving these goods and services are concerned by both quantity and quality. Organized villagers can serve to channel the demand for quality to concerned agencies.

- The monitoring and evaluation of development activities cannot be effective without the input and evaluation of intended beneficiaries. Village organization is the vehicle for monitoring and evaluation by intended beneficiaries.

The operational premise of this report is that there is no blueprint for meeting the challenges faced by the proposed SRSC. There are, however, sound organizational principles that have been utilized in Pakistani projects and could serve as guidelines for SRSC.

1.2. The Environment for NGO and Farmer Participation

In recent years, there has been growing awareness among government and donors of the effectiveness of NGOs in organizing communities and delivering development inputs. Among the provinces of Pakistan, the Government of NWFP has had the greatest exposure to farmer organization programmes, both in the public and NGO sectors. The Government of NWFP has collaborated with refugee-oriented NGOs, and with AKRSP in Chitral, for several years; it has participated in the Pak-Swiss Kalam Integrated Development Project and the Pak-German IRDP in Mardan; it has encouraged and approved an important implementation role for AKRSP in the ADB/IFAD Chitral Area Development Project (CADP); and it has itself started implementation of a participatory approach under the CADP.

Such initiatives, rare in Pakistan so far, are receiving greater attention from policy makers now. In 1988, the National Commission on Agriculture, influenced by the AKRSP model, recommended the establishment and continuing support of grassroots organizations for agricultural and rural development. In 1989, the National Conservation Strategy Secretariat is considering how best to support grassroots initiatives that link up with line agencies and NGOs. There have also been official indications of interest in using NGOs for part of the implementation of the new People's Works Programme. The November 1988 Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party devotes considerable attention to the themes of devolution of authority and people's participation. It advocates (in Chapter 3) devolution of "maximum authority of government to the smallest functional unit," and it recommends, "Give people the power to decide issues relating to their own

social welfare."[1]

There is a new but unmistakable national trend towards more participatory development approaches. Both the government and the donors are keen to see greater participation by NGOs and village communities in agricultural and rural development.

1.3. Three Approaches to Rural Development

Three broad approaches to rural development can be observed in NWFP.[2] These approaches may be described as:

1. The managerial approach, in which programmes are designed and managed by technical experts, often according to pre-determined blueprints.

2. The participatory approach, in which villagers establish their own institutions, identify their priorities, organize their resources, manage their development agenda, and forge the necessary links for ongoing technical and financial assistance by outside agencies.

3. The representative approach, often mistaken for community participation. In this approach, elected or nominated representatives of a community determine the development agenda, interact with the development agencies, and otherwise represent their community's interests as best as they can.

The managerial approach is followed by most of the line agencies and development projects in NWFP. The participatory approach is followed by the Pak-German Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) in Mardan and Swabi, and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) in Chitral and the Northern Areas.[3] It has also been initiated by the government in the IFAD/ADB-assisted Chitral Area Development Project. The AKRSP approach represents the oldest existing working model of the participatory approach in NWFP. The representative approach is followed in: (a) all programmes that depend on public representatives (including Union Councillors, District Councillors, MPAs, and political party office-holders); and (b) all models of organization (including official cooperatives

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[1]Relevant extracts from the Pakistan People's Party manifesto are reproduced in Annex B.1.

[2]These approaches are discussed in detail, with examples, in Annex B.1.

[3]Similar attempts are also being made, for specific programmes in irrigation and forestry, by the Pak-Holland PATA Irrigation Project and the Pak-Swiss Kalam Integrated Development Project.

and Water User Associations) in which decision-making powers are vested not in the general body but in executive committees, management boards and the like.

Each of the three approaches mentioned above has a function in development, and neither can replace another. There is a consensus, however, that SRSC should not follow a managerial approach. Beyond this consensus, opinion diverges in two directions - the participatory and the representative. The most forceful argument in favour of the representative approach is that local level development should be carried out by local government. Thus, continuing efforts should be made to strengthen local government and its financial and technical capacity to undertake development programmes.

In principle, it is not necessary for local government to be representative rather than participatory in character. Indeed, several theoretical as well as practical arguments suggest that it should be based on participatory type of arrangements. We leave the detailed discussion of these arguments for Annex B.1. Here, it may suffice to mention the following points. First, the areas of social decision making which normally fall within the purview of local government institutions are largely of a consensual rather than a divisive nature, and a participatory environment is better suited to the handling of these responsibilities. Second, direct political participation is essential for the maintenance and strengthening of democratic institutions in a society; these are feasible only at the level of local government. Third, successful local government institutions have invariably been of the participatory type.

Fourth, the desirability of direct people's participation at all possible levels of government is being recognized increasingly by political parties as well as technical experts.[4] In many instances this recognition has led to a call for an additional tier of local government at the village level, where the possibilities of direct participation are the most pronounced. Finally, for various historical reasons, the concept of local government has been severely constricted in Pakistan. It has come to mean only a representative body, but one which is ineffectual and without any of the powers or responsibilities normally associated with the task of government. The desirability of this definition is also being increasingly questioned.

In addition, participatory institutions are the most appropriate for attending to issues which are non-controversial in nature, such as those which contribute to all-round increases in

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[4]As witness the references to people's participation in local government in the PPP Manifesto and the report of the National Commission on Agriculture.

productivity and income. Representative institutions may similarly be better suited for efficient decision making on controversial issues. Making both consensual and controversial issues the responsibility of representative government makes it difficult to pursue either one set efficiently: the result is that consensual issues are unnecessarily politicized, while representative government is overloaded by the burden of the extra decisions thrust upon it.

There is, indeed, considerable scope for expanding the capacity and authority of all tiers of local government in NWFP. Representative local government, however, is not a substitute for participatory village-level institutions: it does not fill the institutional vacuum at the village level, nor does it have the capacity to act as the support mechanism for Village Organizations. In the present circumstances, the role envisaged for SRSC cannot be performed by existing local government or other representative institutions: SRSC should not be held hostage to the historical under-development of local government and local finance, and the government's evolving policy on local government. In the long run, however, the local government system and broad-based village institutions organized under SRSC may become complementary to each other[5].

For an enterprise such as SRSC, the participatory approach needs to be defined in terms of institutional development and programme development models (corresponding to the institutional and programme development functions of SRSC described below). Some programme development opportunities for SRSC will be indicated in subsequent chapters of this report. The nature of the participatory approach, however, is such that programmes can only be identified by the villagers themselves once SRSC is actually operational at the field level. In this report, the emphasis is on the institutional framework for SRSC. The proposed framework has three aspects - social organization at the village level; the organization of SRSC itself; and organizational linkages between SRSC and other development activities. These three aspects are discussed below.

1.4. The Rationale for SRSC

The proposal on SRSC circulated by the Chief Secretary [GONWFP, 1988] requires that SRSC must have a "role, function and

[5]This was envisaged in the report of the National Commission on Agriculture, which recommended village committees as the third tier of local government, below the Union Council and District Council levels [Ministry of Food and Agriculture, National Commission on Agriculture, 1988].

approach" distinctive from government[6]. Considering the large number of existing programmes in agriculture and rural development, SRSC's role and functions have to be complementary and catalytic, not duplicating the "routine management of programmes." The SRSC should be a small, flexible catalyst, rather than a large corporation providing additional inputs for routine management.

In order to articulate the role and function of SRSC, it is helpful to think of two broad catalytic functions for SRSC - institutional development and programme development.

There is widespread agreement among analysts and senior GONWFP officials that:

- There is, at present, no effective village-level institution for rural development in NWFP: there is an institutional vacuum at the village level, and a need to develop the organization, skills and capital of small farmers so that they may one day themselves manage their common resources and problems.

- Institutional development at the village level requires a support mechanism that would help small farmers establish and develop their own self-sustaining institutions over time.

- This support mechanism should not be a super agency undertaking all rural development functions itself, but rather, it should establish effective organizational linkages (for itself and its village clients) with existing programmes in the private and public sectors.

Thus, the institutional development thrust of SRSC would be at three levels: (a) the creation and support of Village Organizations (VOs); (b) the establishment of a support mechanism (initially the SRSC itself) for these VOs; and, (c) the establishment of organizational linkages between SRSC, the VOs and agencies willing to support them.

SRSC's programme development function derives from the observation that:

- Existing efforts in agriculture and rural development are

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[6]The proposal on SRSC circulated by the Chief Secretary [GONWFP, 1988] also states that, "The overall objective of SRSC would be the stimulation and support of productive, equitable and sustainable rural development in those areas of NWFP that wished to enter into partnership with the new company."

backed by large numbers of staff responsible for a wide range of development inputs; but,

- o They are often hampered by a shortage of operational resources, and they do not have a small-farmer orientation.

Thus, SRSC's programme development thrust would be towards: (a) facilitating small farmers' access to the development activities of government agencies, the private sector and NGOs; and (b) helping develop new programme packages for small farmers.

SRSC's institutional development function should be understood as a continuing long-term process. Its programme development function can be identified with more divisible activities with short-term payoff.

Many other programmes and projects exist that are cited as performing the same activities that SRSC might perform. Most of these efforts are categorized as "soft" (i.e., heavily subsidized) programmes, thus raising questions about SRSC's rationale and likely impact. It is true that most existing programmes are soft. But it would appear that they are soft only for those (usually large and influential) farmers who have access to subsidized resources: they bypass small farmers. The SRSC is envisaged not only as an infrastructure programme, but also as a service organization; most small farmers do not have access to support services.

Stated directly, the compelling rationale for SRSC is that there is no institution in the proposed project area that is undertaking village organization, following a participatory approach and implementing development activities as efficiently as can be done with the organization and participation of villagers. There is no formal initiative to promote a consensual approach to development.

The centre-piece of the SRSC mandate is its emphasis on village organization. In NWFP, wherever Village Organizations have been formed in recent years, there has been a strong, positive response from the villagers. This has been the experience not only in AKRSP-sponsored Village Organizations in Chitral, but also in: the Pak-German IRDP in Mardan Division; the Chitral Area Development Project; and in Kohat, where the local administration has been encouraging the formation of a small number of Village Organizations with the assistance of LG&RD. All these examples are of projects implemented by the GONWFP. With the flexibility of procedure and funding implied by a private company such as SRSC, it is more than likely that development activities sponsored by SRSC through Village Organizations will be supported enthusiastically by most villagers.

SECTION TWO
PROPOSED PROJECT AREA

2.1. Two Sets of Concerns

The choice of project area for a new NGO depends on two sets of concerns.

One set of concerns revolves around the development status of a region. The usual perception of development status depends on a region's level of poverty, its remoteness, and lack of access to official development resources. These criteria were mentioned by most of the individuals (particularly GONWFP officials) who were consulted for this report. These criteria may be referred to as the Poverty Criteria.

Another set of concerns revolves around the potential for successful model-building and replication. These concerns may be referred to as the Replicability Criteria. Like a researcher developing a new product, the new NGO should look for a favourable environment for model-building. Like an extension agent demonstrating a new variety, the NGO should seek an accessible site and manageable unit for the initial demonstration. If the initial demonstration acquires credibility, it should be demonstrated in a cluster of neighbouring units. This cluster should be characterized by territorial integrity, i.e., it should be manageable, and it should have a relatively homogeneous clientele for whom the demonstration has immediate relevance and, thus, potential for adoption.

Both sets of criteria[7] reflect legitimate concerns and should form the basis for informed dialogue and judgement about the project area for SRSC. The over-riding interest of both donors and GONWFP is that SRSC should have the potential for replicability, rather than being a unique, one-time experiment. Thus, the first step in the process of selecting a project area is to define and identify regions within each of which a relatively homogeneous environment represents a potential for replicability. The second step is to select one of these regions as the potential project area for SRSC. The third step is to propose one unit within that region that would form the nucleus for the rest of the region (i.e., the starting point for SRSC).

The distances and terrain found in NWFP, the diversity in social conditions, and the management-intensive nature of

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[7]The working paper circulated by the Chief Secretary [GONWFP, 1988] also lists several criteria for the selection of the project area of SRSC.

institutional development imply that one NGO such as SRSC would be able to perform effectively only within one compact zone. At least three (and possibly four) such zones in the settled districts of NWFP are identified below. Each zone is the potential project area of a future NGO.

2.2. Defining an NGO Development Zone, or Cluster for Replication

An NGO Development Zone, or a cluster for programme replication, may be defined with reference to the Replicability Criteria.

In administrative terms, an NGO Development Zone is a group of administrative units. The basic unit of development administration at which day-to-day decision-making and inter-agency coordination takes place is the district. An NGO Development Zone is defined as a cluster of districts within which one NGO could replicate the institutional and technical programmes devised by it for a nucleus within the cluster.

An NGO Development Zone would be characterized by territorial integrity. The requirements for territorial integrity are:

1. Manageability, i.e., closeness and contiguity of project area districts to each other;

2. A relatively narrow range of technical challenges within the zone as a whole;

3. A relatively narrow set of social institutions, and tribal and linguistic groups within the zone as a whole.

2.3. Four Possible NGO Development Zones

Possible zones for NGO activity may be identified with reference to a list of possible project areas that has been drawn up by GONWFP. This list is based on the Poverty Criteria. After nearly two years of discussion on SRSC the following list of prospective project areas has emerged:

Kohistan District
The Batagram Tehsil of Mansehra District
The Alpurai Tehsil of Swat District
The Nizampur area in the Nowshera Tehsil of Peshawar District
Kohat District
Orakzai Tribal Agency
Karak District.

In addition, Bannu and Charsadda Districts have also been

mentioned in recent discussions as possibilities.

The settled districts of NWFP can be divided into four broad agro-ecological regions: (1) the mountainous valleys of Hazara and Malakand Divisions in the north; (2) the canal irrigated valley area of Peshawar and Mardan Divisions, and part of Kohat District; (3) the rainfed area of Kohat Division and part of Nowshera Tehsil; and, (4) the semi-irrigated southern plains of Dera Ismail Khan Division. Combining this regional classification with the list of prospective project areas, we can identify four well-defined NGO Development Zones (see attached map), each of which may be taken up by an NGO as its potential project area.

One possible zone for NGO activity is in central NWFP, comprising the districts of Karak and Kohat, the Nowshera Tehsil of Peshawar District, and the Charsadda District.[8] This is equivalent to regions (2) and (3) identified above, with the exception of Mardan Division and the Peshawar Tehsil of Peshawar District. Nowshera Tehsil is treated separately from Peshawar District because: (a) it is consistent with the territorial integrity of the proposed zone; (b) it is less developed than the rest of Peshawar, and has a large rainfed area; and (c) because its population and area are larger than those of some districts. Indeed, it may have the characteristics to qualify as a separate district in the near future. Mardan and Swabi Districts are excluded on the basis of the Poverty Criterion for availability of official development resources: the Pak-German IRDP operates with a participatory approach in the rainfed areas of Mardan Division; the Mardan SCARP project operates in the command area of the Upper Swat Canal; and the Swabi SCARP project is proposed for the command area of the Lower Swat Canal. Peshawar Tehsil is excluded on the basis of the Poverty Criteria for poverty levels and remoteness.

The central NWFP zone is formed by (present or potential) districts that are physically contiguous. The natural nucleus of this zone is Kohat District. The administrative headquarters of Charsadda, Nowshera and Karak are within 2-3 hours driving time of Kohat. The physical area would be manageable for an NGO core team based in Kohat.

The zone is inhabited by settled Pakhtun tribes. The Yusafzai dominate Charsadda and Nowshera up to the left bank of the Kabul River. Khattak territory starts in Nowshera across the Kabul River, and continues through eastern Kohat into Karak District. Western Kohat is inhabited by the Bangash.

Agriculture in the central NWFP zone is dominated by

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[8]Irrigated and rainfed regions are grouped together in the central zone because it is impossible to separate them in Kohat District and Nowshera Tehsil.

sedentary farming that depends on rainfall and irrigation from government and civil canals. Charsadda is almost completely irrigated; Nowshera and Kohat have agricultural systems that are partly rainfed and partly irrigated; Karak is almost completely rainfed. Most of the rainfed part of the zone lies in Khattak territory, in a tract along or off the right bank of the Indus River, although rainfed agriculture is also present in the higher areas of Charsadda and Kohat. In both Charsadda and Kohat, irrigation by civil canals is important.

The second and third possible zones for NGO activity lie in the two clusters of districts in northern NWFP (the first agro-ecological region), one comprising the contiguous districts of Abbottabad and Mansehra lying along the left bank of the Indus River, and the other including Kohistan District and a similar part of the Northern Areas.[9] Dir and Swat are excluded from the reckoning because they benefit from substantial (present and proposed) development assistance (Re: Poverty Criterion on donor assistance). Chitral is excluded because it is within an existing NGO's project area, and because it is the location for a major IFAD/ADB-assisted project, part of which is using a participatory approach to village development.

Northern zone-1 is a compact potential project area that could be managed by a core NGO team based in either district headquarters. It is inhabited by the Hindko language groups. There is no dominant tribal group, although the Gujjars are found in substantial numbers.

Northern zone-2 would comprise the district of Kohistan in NWFP and Diamer District in the Northern Areas. These districts are inhabited by the Kohistani and Shina language groups. Forest-harvesting is a dominant economic activity, and livestock are of substantial importance.

The Karakoram Highway, part of it lying along the Indus River, is the main artery of commerce in the northern zone. The area is mountainous, and supports both irrigated and rainfed agriculture (the latter dominating Mansehra). The rural economy is agro-pastoral, and the settlement pattern is transhumant rather than sedentary. The zone is part of the fragile catchment area of the Indus and is subject to seismic shocks.

The fourth possible NGO Development Zone is region (4), i.e., Dera Ismail Khan Division in southern NWFP; it includes the districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. It is divided from northern districts by a mountain range. The Dera Ismail Khan Division is a compact administrative unit for possible NGO

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[9]It is possible to think of a larger northern zone that would include the Alpurai Tehsil of Swat District.

activity.

The area is inhabited by Pakhtun tribes in the north and west, and Siraiki language groups in the south-east. The major tribes are the Marwat and Bannuchi (dominant in Bannu), and the Gundapur and Bhittani.

Traditional agriculture in the Dera Ismail Khan Division is mostly rainfed or rod kohi-irrigated. The Chashma Right Bank Canal in Dera Ismail Khan District is opening up large tracts for controlled irrigation, not only through canals but also through tubewells as the water level rises. Parts of Bannu District are also reported to be in a region of rising water tables. The economic and social transformation accompanying the development of the region's water resources is a phenomenon probably comparable to the opening up of the north of Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway.

2.4. Proposed Project Area for SRSC

Since SRSC is a pioneering venture - the first rural development NGO with a primary focus on NWFP - the choice between the four possible project areas described above should be based on the Replicability Criteria. It is recommended that:

- The central zone consisting of Kohat, Karak and Charsadda Districts, and Nowshera Sub-Division of Peshawar District, be designated as the potential project area of SRSC; this would ensure ease of access and visibility;

- Kohat District, which includes poor *barani* lands as well as richer canal-irrigated areas, should be the nucleus of SRSC operations - its first project district; and,

- Expansion to Charsadda and the rest of the project area should be considered in the second or third year of SRSC.

These recommendations are subject to the following qualifications:

- When two or more districts are included in the project area, each district should have a full-fledged District Support Office.

- SRSC should operate only in those districts whose people and administration genuinely welcome the programme and demonstrate a commitment to SRSC's goals and approach.

The proposed project area includes three administrative units - Kohat and Karak Districts, and the Nizampur area of Nowshera - that were identified by GONWFP and donors as deserving special attention on the basis of their poverty. Kohat District

is "average" on most indicators of development for NWFP. Karak District and rural Nowshera Sub-Division are below average, i.e., poor compared to the rest of the NWFP. Charsadda is above average in economic terms, but below average in terms of several indicators of social development (health, education, etc.). Taken as a whole, therefore, the proposed project area would rank below average on most indicators for economic and social development in NWFP.

A detailed description of Kohat District is contained in Annex D.1. It would appear that Kohat District is, in many ways, a "typical" district of NWFP. In terms of rural incomes and agricultural value added, it ranks as average, but this probably obscures significant variation, especially between irrigated and *barani* areas. Its agriculture depends on both rainfall and irrigation. Its irrigated lands are commanded by open wells, and government and civil canals, the latter fed from springs. Its topography is a mix of hills and plains. The district has about 250,000 Afghan refugees. Its main sources of non-farm income are remittances from overseas employment and service in the armed forces. As a test case for SRSC, Kohat provides both opportunity and challenge.

As the first district selected by SRSC, Kohat would serve as a laboratory for developing models and as a demonstration district for other areas interested in the approach. It is removed from the provincial centre, yet accessible. Because of its location and agro-ecological conditions, it would be the nucleus of SRSC's potential project area in central NWFP. Most importantly, Kohat offers some promising points of departure for an innovative project.

The overwhelming majority of farmers in Kohat are small land owners. There are local traditional institutions for the management of civil canals in Kohat, but these have become weak.[10] The district's natural resources seem to have suffered considerably from the pressure of Afghan refugees in recent years. Some new village institutions are appearing for the protection of forests and grazing lands, and for community uplift. These trends in natural resource management would imply a potential for effective social organization in managing common resources in a more productive and sustainable manner. Remittances from overseas employment are substantial, particularly in Hangu Tehsil.[11]

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[10]One manifestation of this is the poor condition of civil canals, the largest single source of irrigation in the district.

[11]The 7 hamlets of Nariab Union Council collect as much as Rs 300,000 per year in a *qaumi* (common) fund from requisitioned donations from overseas workers. A large part of this currently appears to be spent on litigation against neighbouring villages or the government.

Extensive contact with the "outside world" through employment in the merchant navy, the armed forces and the Middle East, would indicate exposure to new ideas and organizational functions. Kohat has a good supporting infrastructure on the government side, as well as good communications locally. It has a supportive district administration that has been encouraging the replication of the Pak-German IRDP approach in a small number of Union Councils. Informal discussions with government officials, villagers and Union Council members indicate that the SRSC approach will elicit a good response in Kohat.

The other administrative units in the central zone (Karak on one side and Charsadda on the other) are more "extreme" versions of Kohat. While Karak is representative of a small part of NWFP, Charsadda is representative of the highly fertile and important irrigated Vale of Peshawar. It is one of the two newest districts in NWFP.[12] Its administrative machinery and development plans are still evolving, but it is well-served by the private sector. Most of Charsadda (particularly Tangi Tehsil) is served by the Lower Swat Canal, which is now being remodelled and expanded as part of the Mardan SCARP. There are also several civil canals that take off from River Swat. Villagers have traditional institutions for irrigation management; new village societies are also in evidence. The district is one of the five districts in the province where the World Bank sponsored T&V system of agricultural extension is in operation. Provincial agricultural research institutes in Mardan and on the GT Road are easily accessible.

2.5. Programme Acceptability

There is a large gap between local needs and the development inputs that are being currently provided in the proposed project area. Many unmet needs have been identified in the programme development sections in Part B of this report; many others will be identified as SRSC carries out a diagnostic survey of the area once it becomes operational. In this section, some general statements are made regarding the scope for intervention in two major development activities proposed for SRSC - village level productive infrastructure and agricultural development. Productive physical infrastructure is proposed as the entry point with which SRSC can organize villagers on a sustainable basis. Agricultural development, broadly defined, would be the major continuing activity with which SRSC would sustain villager interest.

It has been argued throughout this report that the absence of village institutions for the management of common concerns is a critical constraint to sustainable development. At

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[12] A concise description of Charsadda is contained in Annex D.2.

present, there is no organization or programme in the proposed project area that is helping form and nurture participatory village institutions. The result of this institutional vacuum was observed directly in the proposed project area as:

- Low level of investment in and poor maintenance of village-level physical infrastructure; and,

- The small farmer's lack of access to critical inputs and credit for agricultural development.

Village meetings and the records of local government reveal a substantial demand for productive village infrastructure projects such as irrigation facilities, link roads, etc. This demand is being met in a partial and very perfunctory manner by local government institutions. While District Council funds are used for large (supra village) projects, Union Councils do not have the resources with which to undertake complete projects: their meagre funds are allocated according to a notional revenue sharing formula, rather than project requirements. At the same time, local government does not have the technical staff and operational resources with which to undertake proper surveys, costing, monitoring and supervision of hundreds of village projects in each district.

Other than local government, only the Department of On-Farm Water Management (DOFWM) is active in promoting income generating village-level physical infrastructure projects. DOFWM has a large programme of watercourse renovation in Charsadda under the Mardan SCARP, but it has only a token programme in Kohat and no interventions in Karak and Nowshera.

SRSC can respond to the felt needs of villagers in the field of productive infrastructure, by providing a grant and proper technical assistance. Experience shows that if this package were offered to villagers, it would take root immediately: villagers hardly ever turn down a subsidy that will benefit all or most of them.

If SRSC can engage the enthusiasm of villagers by sponsoring village infrastructure projects, it would begin to foster a sustainable mechanism for the maintenance of village projects in all fields. Village visits to completed physical infrastructure projects (including renovated watercourses) reveal that lack of maintenance is a major gap left by existing development programmes. This gap can be filled only by the proposed Village Organizations, since: (a) government is unable to increase its recurrent costs because of resource constraints; and, (b) local government does not have the organizational maturity and financial resources to look after the maintenance of thousands of village projects.

The grant for village-level infrastructure is proposed as a one-time subsidy to social organization (further discussed in Part B). After that, SRSC has to devise income generating packages that would attract the continuing interest of villagers because of their benefits. Perhaps the major continuing activity that would sustain farmer interest is agricultural development, broadly defined. Literature review and field visits to the proposed project area show that the focus of existing agricultural development and resource management programmes is extremely limited relative to the potential. There is a wide range of agricultural development activities in which existing systems are deficient, with respect to effective extension and location-specific R&D.

The general observation (from Annex C.2.) is that the Department of Agricultural Extension and other agencies (including the research establishment) are very effective at supporting large farmers. Small farmers, however, are almost uniformly neglected. The result is that the vast majority of the farmers in the proposed project area benefit from new technology after a substantial time lag, only when they pick up what they can from large farmers and the market. Annex C.2. on Agricultural Administration and Extension in NWFP concludes that, "if one had to make a guess about the impact of various agricultural programmes on farmers, the guess would be that these programmes directly serve a maximum of 15-20% of the farmers. The T&V system [in Charsadda, for example], with its intensive efforts, probably performs no better than the older system of extension in NWFP."

Village meetings throughout Kohat, Charsadda and Nowshera confirmed the inadequacy of existing agricultural development efforts. During the preparation of this report, perhaps the most instructive insight into unmet needs in agricultural development was provided at a field day organized by the Directorate of Agricultural Extension in Karbogha Sharif, in the Hangu Tehsil of Kohat District. This meeting was attended by the local MPA, senior government staff and village influentials. As is customary in the relationship between petitioner and officer, villagers read out a list of five demands having to do with irrigation, fertilizer supply, pest control and production loans. Citing various reasons, <u>all</u> the representatives and officers present responded that they were unable to help the villagers. This response was neither surprising nor isolated: it represents the standard equation between small farmers and agricultural development agencies in the proposed project area.

In addition to the isolation of small farmers from agricultural extension, supplies and credit, the proposed project area suffers from the absence of new technologies for rainfed (*barani*) conditions. Of the administrative components of the proposed project area, Karak District is completely *barani*, as also are large parts of Kohat District and Nowshera Sub-Division. Discussions with research and extension staff revealed the almost

complete absence of new technology packages for *barani* areas. In some instances, varieties developed for irrigated conditions are being used in *barani* areas, and this is, at best, a second best solution. Farmers in *barani* villages are conscious of their extremely low levels of agricultural productivity, but there is no ready made package of advice and inputs that could be extended to them. To address the needs of the *barani* parts of its project area, SRSC would need to conduct location-specific research in collaboration with research establishments in Pakistan and overseas.

The development agenda that could be taken up by SRSC is lengthy and diverse. Much of it appears to be more of what is offered to villagers by existing programmes, often with subsidies. The reality, however, is that most existing programmes operate for the benefit of influential and large farmers, since they have no mechanism with which to reach and engage the majority of the small farmers. Numerical data on the population covered by agricultural development agencies, and field observation of infrastructure projects, confirm that large development resources are devoted to the benefit of a small number of people, while the needs of small farmers are neglected. In contrast, SRSC and the Village Organization are proposed, in essence, as full-service contractors for small farmers, following a methodology that will develop programmes greatly (though not exclusively) in response to felt needs.

SECTION THREE
VILLAGE ORGANIZATION: THE BASIS OF THE SRSC APPROACH

3.1. The Missing Link

Village level institutions constitute the missing link between resource availability and sustainable development, and between ordinary villagers and higher-level organizations. A system of development administration is incomplete without village organization. It is proposed that participatory village organization be accepted as the basis of the SRSC approach. A Village Organization is defined as a mass coalition of all those villagers whose common interest is best served by working together.

The participatory approach to village organization that is proposed for SRSC is a non-ideological organizational model. It can be observed in some capitalist countries (e.g., the Scandinavian countries, West Germany, South Korea, etc.), and has also attracted the attention of socialist countries. Elements of this model have been incorporated in various projects and programmes in Pakistan, with varying degrees of success. Examples from Pakistan include: the Comilla and Daudzai rural development projects; the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in northern

Pakistan; the Pak-German IRDP in Mardan; and efforts by small donors in Baluchistan and NWFP.[13]

Many of the principles distilled from these experiences are found in the relevant project literature, but a few of them need to be emphasized in the context of SRSC:

- Development requires coordinated collective effort and a social contract through which individuals can understand and enforce their rights and obligations; development cannot be based only on the action of individuals acting in isolation.

- Small farmers must work collectively to overcome the handicaps of their socio-economic position: they must organize themselves into broad-based local institutions with the financial and managerial capacity to undertake local development.

- Effective organization requires that ALL the beneficiaries of a programme should be active and participating members of the organization, and make decisions as a general body as frequently as a project requires. Committees and community representatives cannot take the responsibility for a participatory development process. Decision-making at the Village Organization has to be exercised by the general assembly of the organization.

- Villages are best organized around the common interest of a homogeneous group of people. It has been found that investing in community infrastructure attracts the interest of most or all members of the community, especially if it is a source of income generation. Thus, productive infrastructure projects represent an investment in village organization, quite apart from their value as physical assets.

- Since productive physical infrastructure requires continuing management for operation and maintenance, it offers a permanent incentive for villagers to stay organized.

- While productive infrastructure is the entry point for broad-based organization, Village Organizations also need to build their own capital and improve the managerial and

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[13]In urban development, the Orangi Pilot Project (an NGO) is the pioneer in the participatory approach, with influence on the Hyderabad Development Authority's low-income housing scheme called Khuda ki Basti.

practical skills of their members.

- Villagers must be allowed to resolve their own conflicts without outside intervention. They must devise their own procedures and sanctions to organize the cooperation of members. Outside agencies should only be advisors, not decision-makers or arbitrators - they must respect the sovereignty of the Village Organization. This is the only way for allowing a consensual space to emerge and grow.

- These principles need to be adopted and internalized by villagers themselves. Village activists committed to consensus-building and village development must provide the essential leadership and direction to the Village Organization.

Put briefly, the diagnosis is that social organization at the village level is the missing link between resource availability and sustainable development. The prescription is that Village Organization should be the implementation vehicle for all the activities of SRSC and collaborating agencies. The major note of caution is that there is no blueprint for a participatory process - the process has to be nurtured by SRSC in collaboration with the villagers.

3.2. Self-Help Redefined

In community participation programmes, the conventional concept of self-help is often found to be prevalent. This concept goes back to the feudal notion of *begar* (forced "free" labour) that was executed under the coercive force of feudal authority. It was taken up by the British administrator F. L. Brayne in the implementation of his rural reconstruction programme in the 1930s in India. The conceptual justifications of "free" labour are diverse; they include the assertions that:

- Villagers must contribute something in order to appreciate their sense of ownership over the infrastructure they are constructing;

- Villagers are under-employed and their time cost is zero or nearly zero.

The problem with these assertions is that:

- The infrastructure for which the SRSC would be providing assistance to the villagers actually belongs to the villagers, and they might have been owning and managing it for many generations;

- Villagers have a seasonal pattern of agricultural work,

but they often find off-farm employment to supplement their incomes in the slack season; this is particularly true of small farmers.

There is strong evidence that "free" labour is not a recipe for effective social organization: it is merely a form of regressive taxation. In practice, the requirement for "free" labour is a procedural matter in most conventional self-help programmes: it is shown in planning documents simply as a convenience. Where it is actually enforced, the results may be particularly inequitable: the poor contribute "free" labour for projects that may benefit the rich more than the poor. Thus, conventional self-help translates into *begar* - the provision of labour that is not particularly free, usually by poorer villagers, often for richer villagers.

The SRSC should not equate self-help with the provision of "free" labour by villagers. Instead, it should pursue its institutional development approach at the village level by investing in sustainable social organization. It would be trying to bring about behavioural change in an environment characterized by farmer expectations of grants and subsidies. It has to change these expectations gradually. This change cannot be brought about by undermining social organization by insisting on "free" labour. The SRSC has to establish credibility and provide incentives to villagers to believe in the SRSC message.

The message of self-help that SRSC should propagate is based on the instructive examples of successful self-help organizations in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world - that self-help means that villagers should organize themselves, acquire new skills, and accumulate their own capital. They must improve their capacity to manage their own development. This concept of self-help is more demanding than a one-time provision of "free" labour. It requires radical changes in expectations, and this will take time and perseverance.

3.3. The First Steps in Village Organization

How can SRSC organize villagers on a sustainable basis? Why should villagers organize themselves? What's in it for them?

The key is continuing incentives for collective management.

The first incentive to village organization that SRSC can offer is a Productive Physical Infrastructure (PPI) project. This has to be a project:

- That can increase the incomes of all or most of the villagers in a short time. Common village infrastructure can benefit all or most villagers; thus, common property

makes for effective PPIs..

- That can be identified, implemented, completely managed, and maintained on a permanent basis by villagers, with the technical and financial assistance of SRSC.

- That can be funded on a grant basis by SRSC in all the villages of the project area.

The PPI is the entry point for social organization. The grant for a properly costed PPI (restricted to one per village) is an investment in organization. It is a concrete way for SRSC to establish credibility, and demonstrate the first payoff to cooperative endeavour among villagers disillusioned with the formalism of cooperatives. It galvanizes villagers into collective action because: (a) it is visible; (b) everyone benefits from improvements in common property; and, (c) villagers are called upon to take full responsibility for the project, instead of depending on contractors or line agencies. Thus, the PPI has value as a catalyst for social organization, quite apart from its value in increasing the physical resource base of villagers.

The first steps by SRSC would entail the simultaneous initiation of village organization and PPI. The two components - organization and infrastructure - have a symbiotic relationship: each supports the other and depends on it.

If the PPI has to be SRSC's social organizer, it has to be selected so as to maximize its economic and organizational impact on the intended beneficiaries. The identification, preparation and appraisal of a portfolio of PPI projects do not lend themselves to a distant planning process. PPIs have to be identified through village dialogues in each and every village of the project area: there is no substitute for this kind of diagnostic survey.[14]

The PPI, however, is only a subsidized catalyst: it is not a continuing incentive for village organization. Once a village completes its PPI, there is a danger that its Village Organization might become dormant or dead - unless new incentives for collective action can be found that do not depend on subsidies. The challenge for programme development at SRSC would be to find income-generating and social sector activities in rural development that can sustain the interest and organization of villagers on a continuing basis.

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[14]The diagnostic survey for PPI is described in Section 7, together with other diagnostic approaches for SRSC.

SECTION FOUR
THE ORGANIZATION OF SRSC

4.1. The Need for a Support Mechanism

An important lesson drawn from experiences in Pakistan and elsewhere is that the kind of behavioural change required for this organizational model to take root has a long time frame. It requires long-term commitment to a process of establishing village institutions and nurturing them to the point where they can become financially and managerially self-sustaining. A key element of such commitment is commitment to a support mechanism, in this case, the organization of SRSC.

The proposed SRSC will be required to provide sustained support for motivating and organizing local communities, for facilitating small farmers' access to available development inputs, and for helping develop new programme packages to respond to small farmers' needs.[15] The importance of SRSC providing this kind of support to Village Organizations on a regular basis cannot be over-emphasized. Without this support, broad-based organization on sound principles will be impossible to achieve; and the quality of both village organization and development projects will doubtless suffer.

As a support mechanism for village organization, SRSC will be defined by its organizational principles and exceptional management. Among the organizational principles, the following are particularly important:

- The basis for SRSC's approach to rural development is participatory village organization;
- The SRSC itself would have to be a small, flexible and efficient catalyst, supplementing rather than displacing existing effort; and,
- SRSC will need to forge effective organizational linkages with programmes and agencies in the private and public sectors.

To acquire exceptional management, SRSC will need to emphasize professional competence, integrity, commitment, and

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[15]Every development programme implemented by line agencies and local government is designed with the necessary technical expertise. Community programmes, too, need an NGO structure in support of community organizations: it is naive to suppose that communities can implement development activities without organized technical and financial assistance.

personal links to the private and public sectors.

While there is a strong and well-defined need for SRSC to act as a flexible catalyst in support of Village Organizations, there are concerns in many quarters that it may start off as, or become a large semi-official bureaucracy. It is proposed that SRSC be established with that minimum of staffing and funding which will enable it to rapidly establish credibility with villagers and donors. Once SRSC has achieved the requisite level of credibility, the management of SRSC would be responsible for mobilizing additional resources from donors, existing development programmes, the private sector, commercial institutions, and villagers. All these are possible sources of future funding, and NGOs all over the world depend on a combination of such sources.[16]

The proposed SRSC will be incorporated in NWFP as a private company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital. It will have a Board of Directors; the composition of this Board is under discussion. The Board will be responsible for broad policy and oversight functions. The Board will also recruit the key personnel for day-to-day management of SRSC.

4.2. Composition and Functions of a Management Group

The day-to-day operations of SRSC will be undertaken by a small Management Group headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The Management Group should be recruited from among experienced Pakistani professionals who have demonstrated the capacity for innovative and entrepreneurial approaches to development. The Management Group would have the responsibility for:

- Proposing to the Board an overall development approach suitable for the project area;
- Proposing priorities for development activities to the Board;
- Proposing annual budgets and medium-term projections to the Board;
- Mobilizing resources for SRSC from donors, government departments, commercial institutions, and the private sector;

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[16]There is a mistaken belief among some quarters that a self-sustaining NGO is one that mobilizes resources only from participating villagers. This is an overly restrictive interpretation of self-reliance or self-help. Objectively, the NGO sector world-wide is a legitimate claimant to tax revenues, as are the private and state sectors; its claims and legitimacy are likely to grow in the future.

- Implementing the development approach and programmes approved by the Board;

- Organizing linkages between Village Organizations and development agencies in the public and private sectors;

- Facilitating research and development on technical and institutional innovations for small farmers.

While the Board of Directors is expected to make the final choice, it is proposed that SRSC start with a Management Group consisting of a small number of outstanding professionals to cover the following fields:

Social Organization
Women in Development
Physical Infrastructure and Appropriate Technology
Agriculture and Resource Management
Rural Finance and Commerce
Human Resources Development
Monitoring, Evaluation and Research
Administration, Accounts and Personnel.

The organizational structure of SRSC should be direct and flexible. There is no need to establish an elaborate hierarchy within the organization. Staff should be encouraged to think of themselves as a team, rather than as different units or divisions. The Chief Executive and his colleagues on the Management Group should function as a small and cohesive team, backstopping each other as needed, rather than insisting on new staff for each addition to the original job description.

Staffing should follow a cost-effective strategy that is consistent with the expectations from a small, flexible catalyst. Staff should be hired as needed, rather than as approved in the budget. For fund-raising and planning purposes, SRSC Board may create the necessary positions at the beginning of the financial year, or for each three-year period. But these positions should be filled only when it is so decided by the Chief Executive Officer.

4.3. District Offices and Field Units

The lowest level of development administration for SRSC is the village, at which the proposed Village Organization will be the programme implementation mechanism. Keeping in view the administrative set up of NWFP, it is proposed that the District be the highest level of programme administration for SRSC.

If and when SRSC expands beyond the first district, it should establish a District Support Office based at the district

headquarters of every additional district to which it expands. The first district of the project area would be used to train a core of staff who could extend the SRSC approach to additional districts. Like the Management Group, the District Support Office would represent a range of disciplines, but at a lower level of expertise. As long as the SRSC operates in only one district, its Management Group should be expected to perform the functions of a District Support Office. This is important not only to keep the costs low in the initial stages, but also for the Management Group to have the opportunity to develop and directly implement their own approach to rural development.

Between the village and the District Support Office, it is proposed that SRSC start with two field units in each district of operations. These field units, called the Social Organization Units (SOUs), would be based at the tehsil headquarters. Given the approach of organizing villagers through productive physical infrastructure as an entry point, each SOU should, as a minimum, have a Social Organizer and an Engineer. In its later stages, SRSC may wish to rotate the Engineers to new areas of operations, or add another specialist to the SOU.

Sufficient time for staff orientation should be allowed after SRSC's establishment. It may be possible to find several individuals, particularly at the SOU and district levels, experienced in participatory and representative approaches to rural development. Staff orientation in participatory rural development must, however, precede full-fledged operations.[17]

Once the initial phase of the creation of Village Organizations is underway, SRSC will face a growing and increasingly complex set of challenges in both social organization and the development of appropriate packages for small farmers in the project area. How it responds to these challenges will depend, in part, on the relationships it establishes with existing development agencies. These relationships will also determine SRSC's cost-effectiveness: if SRSC can effectively engage the interest and resources of existing agencies, it will be able to perform its functions at a lower cost than otherwise.

SECTION FIVE
ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES

5.1. What is the Basis for Collaboration?

Three guidelines have to be accepted at the outset:

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[17]Such orientation can be provided at AKRSP and the Pak-German IRDP.

- That a small, private organization such as SRSC will never have the staff and resources to meet all the demands that villagers will make upon it: if it has to survive and flourish, then it has to be a catalyst, a facilitator, on behalf of villagers and other development agencies.

- That institutional linkages between Village Organizations, SRSC and other agencies will not be meaningful and lasting unless there are institutional incentives for collaboration.

- That the basis of inter-agency collaboration has to be in the willingness of all parties to test and develop the idea of the Village Organization as the contractor for village level development.

The main incentive for villagers to collaborate with SRSC and other agencies is the development programmes they will obtain as a result of such collaboration. For SRSC - a new organization - the main incentives for establishing inter-agency linkages are the requirements of survival and credibility. But what is the incentive for established line agencies, local government, financial institutions, and commercial enterprises to come to the aid of SRSC, an institutional upstart? Why should they test and develop new approaches as alternatives to their established methods? Why should they risk their resources and reputations on new-fangled ideas of village organization and "a small, flexible catalyst"?

5.2. Approach to Organizational Linkages

The SRSC approach to inter-agency linkages has to be a combination of institutional incentives, formal coordinating mechanisms, and informal links fostered by individual staff members.

Institutional incentives can be provided through a Buy-in Option. Under this option, funds would be provided to SRSC to help collaborating agencies overcome critical constraints (e.g., lack of operational resources). Formal coordinating mechanisms can be established at the corporate (Board of Directors), district (planning and review committee) and village levels. And informal links can be promoted if staff recruitment is based partly on the basis of individual entree to government agencies and the private sector.

Under the Buy-in Option SRSC would be given the resources to buy into existing programmes in order to sell its institutional models. In the case of line agencies, for instance, it is often found that they have large manpower and statutory authority, but

they lack operational resources. SRSC would not have the staff to duplicate that of line agencies. It would provide the operational funds to line agencies, local government, etc. for selected activities that address village priorities, provided that those agencies agree to test the alternatives proposed by SRSC. The idea that is to be tested is that the Village Organization is a contractor for village level projects and services, and that it is a contractor not only for villagers and SRSC but also for local government and line agencies. On this basis, SRSC and cooperating agencies have the option to buy into each other's approaches and complement each other's resources.

To effectively manage institutional incentives, there is a need for both informal and formal links between SRSC and collaborating agencies. Formal mechanisms, however, should not be considered as substitutes to institutional incentives: they become effective only in the presence of institutional incentives. And informal links are largely a function of personal background and personality.

Formal coordinating mechanisms can be constructed at three levels, but their final shape and scope will doubtless evolve with experience. At the highest (corporate) level, the SRSC Board of Directors includes Provincial Secretaries of relevant departments. The Board would be responsible for policy and oversight functions. At the district level, SRSC should explore the establishment of a planning and review committee comprising the heads of relevant nation-building departments and the Chairman of the District Council. This committee should have responsibility for joint planning of specific collaborative programmes between SRSC, line agencies and local government: it must not be a forum for academic dialogue and critique.

At the lowest and most important level, the coordinating mechanism is the Village Organization. Collaborative programmes have to be implemented by the Village Organization according to the proposed participatory methodology of SRSC. What is needed is willingness on the part of all cooperants to test and develop the idea that the Village Organization is the contractor for village level development. It can implement projects and provide services on a continuing basis. It is a construction contractor as well as a service contractor. It is a contractor not only for the villagers, but also for SRSC and other agencies. Agreement to test and develop the notion of the Village Organization as contractor is fundamental to institutional collaboration between SRSC and other agencies.

These formal mechanisms of institutional collaboration have been found workable at AKRSP and the Pak-German IRDP (some more easily than others). Experience in Mardan and the Northern Areas also indicates that there is a value in involving elected officials in the process of village dialogues on development

priorities, provided that decision-making over the development agenda of SRSC is recognized as the exclusive domain of the Village Organization.[18]

In order to link up with technical expertise in its fields of activity, SRSC should consider forming panels of advisors who will respond seriously to SRSC requests for assistance to its Management Group or Village Organizations. These advisors should:

- Undertake to visit the project area regularly;
- Interact with SRSC staff who visit their offices or institutions; and,
- Assist SRSC in obtaining the collaboration of their respective institutions.

5.3. Opportunities for Sharing Resources

The business of SRSC requires access to a vast range of financial, technical and organizational resources. By one count, at least seven sets of institutional partners can be identified for SRSC. These are:

1. Government line departments;
2. Other development institutions in the project area;
3. Elected and political representatives;
4. Financial institutions;
5. Commercial institutions;
6. Resource bases outside the project area;
7. Development projects outside the project area, either as resource bases or as clients for orientation and training.

As far as direct implementation is concerned, SRSC should carefully examine the possibilities of collaboration with the following programmes and departments at an early stage:

- Union Council planning for physical infrastructure;
- Other programmes implemented by the LG&RD Department:
- The programme of watercourse renovation being implemented by the Directorate of On-Farm Water Management of the Department of Agriculture;

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[18]Local council representatives invite and introduce project management to their constituencies, propose projects, and play a continuing motivational role on behalf of the project; but they cannot be allowed to "represent" the objectives and choices of villagers.

- The Directorate of Agricultural Extension of the Department of Agriculture, particularly its programmes of seed production for new varietes and the provision of sprayers for plant protection;

- The Fruit and Vegetable Development Board, particularly its programmes for pest control and women's training;

- The Animal Husbandry Directorate, for its vaccination and treatment programme;

- The Research and Outreach programmes of the TIPAN Project sponsored by USAID at the University of Agriculture of NWFP;

- The Irrigation Department, for assistance or implementation of efforts for the rehabilitation of civil canals;

- The Public Health Engineering Department's programmes for rural water supply and sanitation;

- Institutions and programmes for the promotion of appropriate technology; and,

- Financial and commercial institutions engaged in rural credit and agricultural marketing operations.

This is not an exhaustive list, and there will be many more opportunities for inter-agency linkages. As a priority, however, it is recommended that SRSC should consider at least five examples of joint planning with other agencies: (1) collaboration with the Directorate of Agricultural Extension in demonstrating and diffusing new varities, promoting plant protection, and training farmers; (2) cooperation with the Animal Husbandry Directorate for disease control and training of para-veterinarians; (3) cooperation with the Fruit and Vegetable Development Board for pest control and farmer training, including training of women; (4) proper Union Council planning for physical infrastructure, particularly inter-village projects; and, (5) rehabilitatation of civil canals in collaboration with the Irrigation Department. The village level implementation mechanism in all cases should be the Village Organization.

For access to resource bases and technical experts, the SRSC should consider advisory panels in the fields of:

- Social organization, community participation, and cooperative management;

- Women's organization, income-generation and social sector

activities;

- Cost-effective diagnostic approaches, including applied farming systems research, agroecosystems analysis, case studies, etc; and,

- Appropriate technology, especially for women;

- Technology development for the entire range of agricultural and resource management issues;

- Rural credit and finance; and,

- Office management, information systems, and office automation.

Like SRSC itself, these and other advisory panels will have to be built up over time as needed: there is no point in appointing staff or advisors merely to give them the luxury of enforced idleness.

5.4. Linkages with Local Government

Within the general issue of organizational linkages, the matter of SRSC's interface and coordination with local government is of overriding concern to GONWFP. While SRSC may find it possible to respond to the government's concerns, its efforts will be constrained by two objective conditions:

- Representative local government and participatory village organization represent two distinct and opposite cultures of development administration; and,

- There is an extreme paucity of working models of collaboration between local government and participatory village institutions.

Notwithstanding these constraints, an attempt is made in the following lines to propose experimental approaches to SRSC collaboration with local government. The thrust of the discussion, however, is speculative rather than prescriptive.

At present, local government in most places is an organizational closed shop, in which decision making is the preserve of local councillors; there are no public hearings; accounts are not rendered to the general public in open meetings; and interaction with development officials takes place in offices, *havelis*, *hujras* and the like. In addition, the lowest level of local government - the Union Council - has to date been unable to use its statutory authority to impose local taxes and user charges to mobilize revenues for the construction and maintenance of local projects. In terms of the mobilization of community manpower and

capital, local government's capacity for promoting sustainable development is extremely limited.

By contrast, the proposed Village Organization is meant to nurture an open process of dialogue and consensus; decision making by the General Body (i.e., all adult villagers); financial and progress monitoring by each and every ordinary villager acting through the forum of the Village Organization; and interaction between development officials and ordinary villagers in open village assemblies. The Village Organization is expected to be responsible from the very beginning to ordinary project beneficiaries, not leaders and outsiders. And, from the very beginning, it is expected to generate collective capital that will form the basis of an effective and equitable programme of savings and loans, upon which financial and organizational sustainability can be built over time.

It is clear that participation and representation are two distinct and opposing cultures, between whom collaboration can be nurtured only with great care and commitment to participatory objectives. If and when SRSC begins to experiment with linkages to representative local government, it has to do so by protecting the autonomy of the Village Organization and its participatory base. Effective models of collaboration will have to be designed for specific needs identified locally. Some examples of how this collaboration has been approached in other projects are given below.

In the Pak-German IRDP in Mardan, the Union Council member is invited by the project to introduce project teams to his constituents. He explains project objectives and methodology, and he may point out local needs and circumstances. The project, however, will undertake only those activities that are identified by the common assembly of villagers, regardless of the needs identified by the Union Councillor. Implementation is by the villagers, not by committees headed by Union Councillors. The Union Councillor who understands the participatory approach can facilitate interaction between the project and his constituents; but he who seeks to impose his will over the village assembly is rejected by the villagers and the project.

A similar approach has been used by AKRSP in Gilgit, Chitral and Baltistan. AKRSP management regularly invited members of the Northern Areas Council, and the District and Union Councils, to accompany them on a series of village dialogues to each village. Political representatives were also invited to monthly conferences of village specialists and managers. Those who understood the AKRSP approach became facilitators for both AKRSP and the VOs.

In its new strategy paper for 1990-1992, AKRSP is proposing new forms of linkages between VOs, the District Council and the Local Bodies and Rural Development Department (LB&RD). It

has been proposed that AKRSP may offer to supplement District Council funds and LB&RD technical expertise for inter-village infrastructure, provided that the District Council agrees to look after the maintenance of these projects. The projects, however, would have to be identified by the VOs, and also implemented by them, rather than by contractors. On the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation project proposed for the Northern Areas, it has been proposed that the Village Organization should be designated the implementing agency, LB&RD should be the executing agency for the project, and AKRSP should provide support services in social organization and engineering. Under this proposal, project implementation and maintenance would be undertaken by the VO, since the Union Council does not have the organizational and financial capacity to do so.

A different model of interfacing with local government is being tested in the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi. OPP has proposed to the area's local councillors that they should: (a) identify projects through the community organizations; (b) have them technically supported by the staff of OPP, even if: (c) projects are implemented by contractors nominated by local councillors. This process has been proposed for projects that are normally funded from local council budgets.

There are certain common elements in these examples:

- Projects are always identified by community organizations like the VO, not by elected or nominated representatives.
- Most (but not all) approaches require that implementation and maintenance be undertaken by the community organization.
- Proper technical support, monitoring and social organization is undertaken by the supporting project or NGO.

5.5. The Question of Duplication and Conflict

SRSC's institutional development function, based on village organization, is unique. The question of duplication does not arise in this context. SRSC's programme development function, however, appears similar to what many other development programmes are sponsoring (e.g., infrastructure, credit, extension, etc.). There is potential for both conflict and cooperation. Conflict cannot be eliminated, but it can be minimized (and replaced by cooperation) if the ground rules suggested above are followed.

There are numerous government and private agencies involved in agriculture and rural development in NWFP, and it would be pre-mature to speculate how they might relate to SRSC's operations in the coming years. It has to be assumed and ensured

that SRSC does not duplicate existing programmes. At the same time, like other programmes, SRSC will be expected to work according to its own approach to village development.

SRSC appears to some to be in possible competition with local-level development programmes in NWFP, particularly those implemented through public representatives at the union, district and higher levels. The following programmes are often mentioned in this context:

1. The Union Council Programme, under which each Union Council receives a grant of Rs 100,000 per year.

2. The District Council Programme funded from the District Council's income and grants-in-aid.

3. The MPAs and MNAs/Senators Programmes funded by Special Grants from the Provincial and Federal Governments, respectively. These programmes, now suspended, allocated Rs 2 million to each MPA and Rs 5 million to each MNA and Senator.

4. The Rural Works Programme (mostly for roads), which constitutes the Annual Development Programme of the LG&RD Department.

5. The People's Programme that is being implemented by political leaders appointed by the Federal Government.

None of these programmes seeks to create or support a participatory village institution for a continuing process of agricultural and rural development. *A priori*, therefore, there is no question of competition or duplication: the objectives and approaches are different. In fact, the common feature of these programmes is their reliance on political representatives for the identification of infrastructure projects. There is also the expectation that representatives will mobilize village resources for construction and maintenance. Neither of these characteristics is compatible with the approach being proposed for SRSC. Thus, the question of duplication does not arise.

There is, however, a potential for both conflict and collaboration. Every new programme comes with the potential for inter-agency rivalry and conflict. The SRSC can minimize conflict by adopting some of the mechanisms suggested above, namely, institutional incentives, formal coordination, and informal linkages through staff members. Clearly, the tone of SRSC's relationships with other agencies will be set by its Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer.

SECTION SIX
THE ISSUE OF REPLICABILITY

6.1. No Blueprint for Replication

The decision on the establishment of SRSC has been clouded by a debate on the replicability of the AKRSP approach to NWFP. Critics and admirers alike have quoted the features and performance of AKRSP to argue whether it is desirable and possible to replicate it. This debate has served the useful purpose of drawing attention to important strategy issues, organizational structure and linkages, and financial implications of the SRSC proposal. At the same time, it has led the discussion into the sterile area of the uniqueness of AKRSP, and away from the underlying problems and issues which make initiatives like AKRSP and SRSC so necessary in the contemporary situation. These issues have to be disentangled and clarified before proceeding further.

What does replicability entail? In the case of SRSC and AKRSP, it does not entail replicating a blueprint: SRSC cannot expect to transfer a working model from one region to another without changing it according to local conditions. The business of SRSC is the business of organizing resources. Its mandate is to develop organizational capacities and programmes. Replicability requires that SRSC have a clear understanding of the overall objectives of the programme, of the successful organizational principles involved in the pursuit of these objectives, and an uncluttered view of what is useful and what is irrelevant from the AKRSP experience.

6.2. Towards a Definition of Success

To look at these issues objectively, we need to take a step backwards, and ask what do we mean when we say that AKRSP has been successful? What is meant by the word "success" in this context? and by implication, what is the ultimate objective of initiatives such as the AKRSP or SRSC? Once this is clarified, we can talk about SRSC's goals in more objective terms, instead of getting hung up on AKRSP's uniqueness.

Most observers who have written upon the subject seem to identify two different types of objectives, and therefore two distinct definitions of success. The first, which can be called a "short-term" definition, refers to the efficient implementation of infrastructural projects in the target villages. This corresponds to the "programme development" component of the AKRSP activities.

If this is assumed to be the key objective of the programme, the argument that AKRSP has been successful in its assigned tasks will generally make three points: (a) that the

overall costs of each development project, including the visible plus invisible overhead expenses attributed to it, are lower than those of comparative activities undertaken by existing government agencies; (b) that the projects which were identified, implemented and operated through the initiative of AKRSP, namely village level projects, were such that no existing governmental agency was willing or able to undertake them; and, (c) that the manner in which AKRSP's projects were implemented, namely through the self-management activities of the vilagers, provides for externalities and benefits in the form of training of villagers, increased savings, etc., which would justify the project even if its direct costs were higher than those of governmental programmes.

However, many admirers of AKRSP suggest that there is a second, more important definition of success. They believe that the ultimate goal of this endeavour is not merely to obtain the assistance of local villagers in the identification, implementation, and maintenance of developmental projects in order to lower the cost of such an endeavour. Rather, its objective is the creation of a permanent and sustainable institutional arrangement through which villagers can identify their needs themselves, marshall local and external resources for the satisfaction of these needs, and follow up these actions with arrangements necessary for the maintenance and operation of the infrastructure created as a result. In other words, the objective, ambitious as it is, is to promote sustainable local self-management, and relieve the over-extended administrative machinery of the government of some of its extra burden. This is a long-term definition of "success", and corresponds to the goal of "institutional development" in AKRSP's agenda.

No one questions the desirability of either of the two objectives. Observers are agreed upon the need for more efficient and cost-effective implementation and maintenance of developmental projects, particularly at the relatively neglected village level. There is also agreement over the desirability of building up the capacity of villagers to manage their own development, and as a corollary, the need for a support mechanism to help develop such local capacity. Doubts, however, have been raised whether NGOs such as AKRSP and SRSC can accomplish or lead in the directions required by these objectives. The argument that AKRSP has been successful in accomplishing some of these goals is only a partial response, because it still leaves unanswered the question of whether SRSC or other agencies would be able to emulate this success.

So now we get three questions. First, is AKRSP, or other similar approaches[19] successful? Second, can SRSC replicate this success? and, Third, if SRSC turns out also to be a success, could

[19]Such as the Pak-German IRDP. See Annexure B.1.

that success be replicated elsewhere?

6.3. AKRSP's Performance

Several points emerge from this discussion. First of all, it is clear that only the short-term performance of AKRSP can be evaluated at this time. It is still too early to judge its long-term "success" or "failure". The long-term results will depend on the fate and longevity of the local institutions that AKRSP has tried to nurture.

Second, it can be argued that if long-term success is a realistic possibility, it may be desirable to pursue the programme even if it is "unsuccessful" in the short-term; in other words, even if it is costlier than other provincial programmes in the implementation of developmental projects. If, however, the possibility of long-term success is viewed as being too remote or costly, then the programme will have to be judged only on the basis of its short-term costs and benefits. AKRSP's performance so far provides room for hope in the sense that it has created great enthusiasm for the activity, its institutional efforts have a great deal of legitimacy, and that the village organisations created by it have not disappeared as soon as the grant period was completed. To this must be added the fact that AKRSP is the only agency engaged in promoting institutional development of a type which is generally recognized as being an urgent need of the Pakistani society, indeed of most Third World societies.

Third, abstracting from long-term issues for the time being, it can be suggested that various evaluation reports, including one by the World Bank, indicate that AKRSP has been a success even in the short-term, since it has successfully and inexpensively implemented local schemes, especially those which government agencies were unwilling or unable to undertake. On the issue of overheads as well, it is important to recognize that once the wastage due to centralization, inefficiency, corruption, and other forms of leakage from normal government programmes is taken into account, the real overhead costs of AKRSP would turn out to be no higher, and probably much lower, than those of normal developmental programmes of the federal, provincial, and local governments in Pakistan. This, however, is only an educated guess at this time, informed by well known guesstimates of large-scale leakage from developmental programmes (World Bank figures on the extent of the leakage have consistently been above 20%). More reliable statements will have to await a proper study of the visible as well as well invisible relative costs.

6.4. Is AKRSP Replicable?

We now come to the second question on our list, and look for the reasons behind AKRSP's success, with a view to establishing whether this success can be emulated elsewhere. Generally

speaking, the debate has been between sceptics, who assert that AKRSP's success was essentially due to some very unique circumstances which cannot be reproduced anywhere else, and admirers, who argue that while each experiment is unique and irreproducible in a very important sense, AKRSP's uniqueness does not detract from the sound organizational principles developed during its operation. It may be instructive to begin with the objections made by the sceptics.

Sceptics argue that AKRSP's success was due to several extremely special circumstances not found elsewhere; these can be grouped into three categories: (a) territorial characteristics of the target area; (b) social characteristics of the population involved; and (c) characteristics of the organization and personnel of AKRSP. It is argued that special features of the Northern Areas accounted for a certain type of hospitality for innovative initiatives like the AKRSP. These features include, first, the remoteness of the area, political and bureaucratic vacuum, intensity of developmental demands; and second, a society characterized by the absence of strong rivalries or conflicts, and more importantly, one which is susceptible to the tremendous weight of the Aga Khan's word because of the significant Ismaili population. Lastly, it is argued, AKRSP was fortunate in benefitting from an exceptionally gifted leadership, which was able to bring together a group of highly talented individuals and to establish a unique and extremely efficient management style; these factors are unlikely to be present in another similar organization, and can simply not be reproduced on a mass scale.

Admirers of the programme, including those who have been associated with AKRSP over the last six years, argue generally that while the actual programmes are not necessarily replicable - depending, as they did on the villagers' perception of their situation - the methodology of the project is certainly replicable in other areas. This methodology is seen to include the formation of Village Organizations, the reliance on continuous and sustained dialogues between villagers and AKRSP activists, flexibility in procedures, and a trial-and-error approach. Indeed, many admirers take an even more cautionary stance, and argue that even AKRSP's methodological lessons cannot be utilized in other areas through a blueprint approach, and that success in other areas will depend critically on the imaginative effort, sincerity, and enthusiasm of the programme functionaries.

6.5. The Myth of Intractable Social Characteristics

Another set of objections is applied to the AKRSP model of social organization. This critique rests on citing the real or imaginary characteristics of Pakhtun society, with the argument that these are so fundamentally different from Northern Areas communities that the AKRSP approach to village organization simply

will not be accepted by the villagers of NWFP.[20] In other words, it is asserted that Pakhtun (or, for that matter, Hindko, Siraiki, Gujjar, or Kohistani) society is characterized by inherent cultural intractability.

The following indicators of intractability have been cited by critics:

- The Pakhtun is a great individualist - he will not cooperate with fellow Pakhtuns;
- Pakhtun society is dominated by *tarboor wali* and this promotes blood feuds over generations - thus community organization is a dream;
- Pakhtuns and others in NWFP have been exposed to external commercial influences for too long - they are not as innocent as Gilgitis, Chitralis and Baltis, and not as willing to work with each other;
- Many parts of NWFP are dominated by *khans* and *maliks* - this would make participatory organization a joke;

and so on.

The preceding observations about NWFP society may be valid, but the conclusions drawn from them are not. There are successful programmes of small farmer organization in South Asia, Japan, South Korea, and in NWFP itself. Village Organizations were established in Peshawar District under the IRDP of the 1970s. They have been established in Mardan Division by the Pak-German IRDP. They have been formed in Kohat under government partonage. And they are being promoted as part of a government project in Chitral District. There are also numerous traditional and new informal village organizations in NWFP.

All these experiences leave no doubt that failures to organize small farmers should be attributed, in the first instance, to flawed organizational models rather than to the unobservable Pakhtun psyche. If sound organizational principles are followed, village organization can be nurtured in NWFP as successfully as anywhere else.

Thus, the short-term question is whether SRSC will be able to implement a selected number of projects at low unit costs.

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[20]In recent years, social and cultural factors have also been cited to assert that democracy will not work in Pakistan, that poor farmers do not respond to economic incentives, and so on. The critique of the AKRSP approach to social organization belongs in this general category of social mystification.

The answer to this question must be that some parameters of replicability - such as organizational approaches and programme development - are within the control of management. Others are heavily influenced by external or procedural factors. If the personnel of SRSC have the kind of enthusiasm, energy, and motivation which is generally viewed as the distinguishing feature of the AKRSP outfit, then the programme will have a fair chance of success even in the short term. This is a crucial point, and has an even greater import for the long run question. It means that in order for SRSC to be a success, it must have a management style quite different from that observed in routine-oriented government agencies. The question is whether this is feasible.

6.6. Charismatic Leadership and Replicability

Sceptics argue that even if the territorial or social characteristics of the Northern Areas were to be ignored, there are several reasons why AKRSP could not be replicated on a mass scale. First, AKRSP's success is attributed to the charismatic quality of its leadership, including not only the Aga Khan's personal charisma in an area with a significant Ismaili population, but also the exceptional leadership qualities of the General Manager, Shoaib Sultan Khan, who was able to assemble and train a team of highly talented, enthusiastic, and motivated individuals in a very short time. Charisma, as we know well, is simply not reproducible even on a small scale, much less on a mass scale.

Other special features of ARKSP are cited as well. The management of AKRSP is distinguished by its flexible style, with a great deal of discretion at the local level for hiring, salaries, accounting practices, and other procedures. Such discretionary authority was justifiable in the case of AKRSP because of its exceptional leadership; but it may not be desirable in more routine programmes. In particular, it cannot be awarded to government functionaries, who are expected to follow prescribed rules of behaviour. Lastly, it is believed that AKRSP personnel enjoy very high salaries and benefits which result in excessive overhead costs. This may be justifiable for a very special programme, but not for other routine programmes, and certainly not for programmes funded by the provincial governments.

These objections are well taken. The fundamental point is that just as the task set for the SRSC is non-routine in nature, so must its internal organization and functioning be non-routine in nature. This issue can be illustrated with reference to the distinction made by Max Weber, the father of modern sociology, between bureaucratic authority and charismatic authority. The former refers to the legitimacy of government by rules and procedures, one where anybody (or almost anybody) can perform a given function, and order is maintained simply by blind obedience to prescribed procedures. The latter refers to the legitimacy of government by leadership of an exceptional quality, one in which

the governed place their trust in the system of governance because of their loyalty to a charismatic individual.

Modern bureaucratic systems have been built upon the belief that the only legitimate authority is bureaucratic authority. While such systems have often been successful in managing routine tasks, they have never functioned properly in the administration of matters of a non-routine nature - such as development! In contrast, systems built around charismatic individuals have performed well in these areas provided, and this is crucial, that the system allowed charismatic individuals to rise to the top. Where the system did not permit this, the results were generally terrible.

Now we come to a well-kept secret of the Pakistani system of management. Although it is believed to be based on bureaucratic authority, in actual fact the system assumes the existence of charismatic authority of individuals in key places who would be able to maintain control over their areas of responsibility. As long as such individuals were being produced and were able to rise to the top, the Pakistani system of management succeeded in accomplishing its assigned tasks fairly well. Over the last four decades, however, there has been a gradual decay because we have neither been able to set up proper bureaucratic systems, nor succeeded in maintaining a steady supply of charismatic leaders in government. This decay is most pronounced in the area of development, which by its very nature requires flexibility, initiative, and imagination, rather than strict adherence to rules and procedures.

The long-run objective of SRSC, namely the establishment of new village institutions is, if anything, even more a task of a non-routine nature than most development interventions. It makes even the normal tasks of development, such as the construction of buildings and infrastructure, appear routine and straightforward by comparison. It requires a fundamentally different orientation. These are extraordinary tasks, and they need extraordinary people. The question is whether such people exist.

The history of initiatives such as AKRSP suggests that such extraordinary people are everywhere. All they need is an environment which allows them to express their extraordinary talents. It shows that there is still a potential for systems built around charismatic leaders to undertake exceptional tasks, and that such leadership can be carefully nurtured and produced in a congenial environment. If such leadership can be produced in SRSC, then success is more likely.

It must be interjected as a warning, however, that charisma by itself is not sufficient. In fact, the main problem with charismatic leadership, as the psychologist Carl Jung taught us years ago, is the sin of hubris, or pride. If the SRSC

leadership comes into the field believing that it has all the answers, because AKRSP has answered all questions, then it is very likely that the programme will fail.[21]

6.7. Operational Recommendations

Turning from these philosophical questions to more practical matters, what guidelines can be established to help SRSC in pursuing its non-routine tasks, and in replicating AKRSP's success?

The first point is that institutional development is first and foremost a matter of political commitment and honest management. SRSC must have both. If these conditions are met, other important issues of replicability are within the control of project management.

It will be crucial to the success of SRSC to have the full support of the provincial government. Once selected, the SRSC management will have to be given complete discretion in handling their tasks. This means that the personnel selected to head the outfit must not only have the full confidence of the provincial government, they must also be seen as individuals above reproach.

Second, while AKRSP did have a lot of support and was therefore able to develop its specialized brand of leadership, it benefitted from a vacuum of leadership in the area. SRSC will have to compete with other leaders in the area - politicians, bureaucrats, commercial and other entrepreners, religious leaders, and so forth. In this sense, greater demands will be placed upon the social skills of the SRSC leadership. On the other hand, SRSC might have an easier time in dealing with technical or logistical questions than did AKRSP in the inhospitable northern terrain in which government support systems are undeveloped.

It is very difficult to say clearly whether the leadership of SRSC will be able to cope with this situation or not. It is certain that they will have to put their heads down, and to try to earn the respect of the local communities. One factor which will go in their favour is that almost all the other leadership groups are focussed on extremely short-run issues, and that the spirit of disinterested service is quite rare. If SRSC can demonstrate this spirit, it will have a great chance of success. Moreover, this brings out the fact that it will be the SRSC's

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[21]Indeed, one can suggest a bit of Sufi wisdom here: If you believe that AKRSP is replicable, then it is not; if you believe that it is not replicable, then it is. Moreover, whichever part of AKRSP is believed to be replicable will turn out not to be replicable; whatever aspects are considered to be non-replicable will surprise you by replicating themselves in SRSC.

responsibility to establish linkages with other institutions and centres of leadership in the project area. Some guidelines with this objective in mind have been suggested in Section 5 above.

Third, many observers have commented on AKRSP's continuing attention to innovation, trial and error, and learning. This approach to development has to be internalized within SRSC. An important guideline that has to be internalized and accepted as an article of faith is that SRSC staff must always respect the sovereignty of the Village Organization. They can advise villagers, but villagers must decide for themselves, no matter how great the temptation to impose technical solutions and judgements about on conflict resolution. This is also the only way to ensure the emergence of the ethos of reciprocity and compromise among the villagers.

The basic organizational framework outlined in this proposal can be replicated wherever there is political commitment to a long-term process of institutional development for small farmers. Once these conditions are met, it is up to project management to develop, test and replicate the specific organizational models required in a given project context. Specific development programmes, however, are highly location-specific and cannot generally be transplanted from one location to another. Appropriate programmes have to be identified for each project location. In order to design such programmes, SRSC staff would have to learn appropriate diagnostic approaches through which agricultural and rural development packages for small farmers would be identified.

To summarize, the success of SRSC will depend on some conditions external to the project, but once these preconditions are in place, it will be its own responsibility to create the framework and programmes necessary for building up its respect and legitimacy. The set of tasks needed for replication can be summarized in the following check-list.

<u>EXAMINE:</u>
<u>Conditions External to the Project</u>

1. Is there political commitment?
2. Are intended beneficiaries mostly small farmers?

<u>Conditions to be Managed by the Project</u>

CREATE:

A. The Organizational Framework

1. Village Organization.
2. Support Mechanism (SRSC).
3. Links with Other Development Programmes.

B. The Programme Development Function

LEARN:

1. Diagnostic Approaches for identifying small farmer priorities: Village dialogues, rapid appraisal, farming systems survey, etc.

IDENTIFY:

2. Programme Elements through diagnostic approaches: e.g., physical infrastructure, increased productivity, resource management, women-in-development, etc.

Part B:

Programme Development

SECTION SEVEN
OUTLINE PLAN AND PLANNING METHODS

7.1. Strategic and Operational Assumptions

Part B of this proposal is built around the strategic assumptions that:

(a) The strategy for organizing villages and inter-agency linkages will be based on institutional incentives, as proposed in Part A of this report;

(b) The basis for programme development will be continuing dialogue with villagers;

(c) Specific programmes, mechanisms and inputs identified below may be reviewed and revised by SRSC management once it becomes operational;

(d) SRSC needs a limited initial grant for start-up operations that will provide it the opportunity to establish credibility; and,

(e) Fund-raising beyond the initial seed money will be on the basis of SRSC's experience in the field.

The following operational assumptions are also part of this proposal:

- That SRSC will start its operations in Kohat District, with one Management Group.
- That SRSC will not duplicate the functions being performed by existing institutions; rather, it will collaborate with existing agencies which agree to test new approaches to rural development with SRSC.
- That SRSC will establish and support 150 Village Organizations (VOs) in its first three years.
- That these VOs will need support for a range of development activities. To provide this support, SRSC will require two Social Organization Units (SOUs) to start with. A third SOU will be added in Year 2.

The overall objective of the first three years of SRSC is to organize small farmers into broad-based, participatory Village Organizations that can undertake development activities with the technical and financial assistance of SRSC and collaborating agencies.

The likely specific objectives for SRSC are outlined in the following pages for each of the major programmes anticipated at this stage. Methods through which the SRSC may develop programme packages are also suggested.

7.2. Types of Programmes and Entry Points

SRSC will undertake institutional development at two[22] levels - the village level and the inter-agency level. Organization is one aspect of institutional development; development activities are another. Organization and activities are linked symbiotically: they support and depend upon each other. The SRSC mandate requires it to combine suitable organizational forms and development activities[23] so as to maximize the impact of both. A programme is a package, equal to institutional arrangements plus development activities (or technical inputs). Progress will be achieved if SRSC develops and replicates a series of packages that strengthen institutions and improve the welfare of small farmers.

The main disciplines in which SRSC will need to formulate programme packages are reflected in the composition of its Management Group:

Social Organization
Women in Development
Physical Infrastructure and Appropriate Technology
Agriculture and Resource Management
Rural Finance and Commerce
Human Resources Development
Social Sector Activities (through coordination).

In each of these disciplinary areas, SRSC needs effective entry points. An entry point should have a quick impact on the welfare of villagers and, thus, on the credibility of the institutional arrangements proposed by SRSC at the village and inter-agency levels. Thus, the choice of entry points is crucial to effective programme development.

Experience in Pakistan and elsewhere has shown that village level Productive Physical Infrastructure (PPI) is an effective entry point for organizing villagers. It energizes villagers, establishes the credibility of the sponsor, and opens up the opportunity for introducing less dramatic interventions in other fields. A subsidy to PPI is an investment in village organization. The package that SRSC would be promoting through PPIs is phyysical infrastructure plus village organization.

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[22]three, if one includes SRSC itself.

[23]or technologies, or inputs.

The PPI, however, is only a subsidized catalyst: it is not a continuing incentive for village organization. Once a village completes its PPI, there is a danger that its Village Organization might become dormant or dead - unless new incentives for collective action can be found that do not depend on subsidies. The challenge for programme development at SRSC would be to find income-generating or social sector activities in rural development that can sustain the interest and organization of villagers on a continuing basis.

A quick examination of possibilities in Kohat District suggests that there are many ways of building upon the enthusiasm that might be generated by PPIs. SRSC has to undertake its own diagnostic survey to devise appropriate packages. The following suggestions can be made at this point:

- The possible entry point for horticultural extension in Kohat Tehsil is pest control to reduce the large losses to the substantial guava crop. The SRSC package might include nomination and remuneration of village specialists by the Village Organization, training of village specialists by SRSC and the FVDB, and provision of inputs at cost by SRSC or FVDB;

- The entry point for agricultural extension might be the provision of improved varieties;

- In resource management, the entry point might be the development of *mazri*[24] plantations and processing;

and so on.

In each case, SRSC has to: (a) identify the priority through village dialogues or other farmer-oriented methods; (b) identify the inputs that are needed; and, (c) design suitable institutional arrangements.

Just as the PPI is an effective entry point for village organization, physical infrastructure is an effective entry point for inter-agency institutional development. Physical infrastructure inspires the interest and support of line agency and elected officials as little else does. SRSC should use physical infrastructure programmes to motivate new approaches to development through collaborating agencies.

One useful entry point that could have an early impact on inter-agency institutions is Union Council planning for physical

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[24]A palm resource found in large parts of the district that provides for several domestic and cash needs.

infrastructure, particularly at the inter-village level.[25] Each Union Council member has an annual budget of Rs 10,000 - 20,000: little can be accomplished with such amounts. SRSC can offer its technical and financial assistance to help design and implement a properly-costed Union Council plan. Within this plan, Union Council members may implement village-level projects initially with their conventional methods, but additional inter-village projects may be funded by SRSC and implemented by the Village Organizations.[26] SRSC can demonstrate the payoff to planning and implementation through Village Organizations in a limited number of Union Councils. For such demonstrations, SRSC should be in a position to provide grants to the Union Council for inter-village projects. It should not, however, take up Union Council planning until there are functioning Village Organizations in the target Union Council, and until SRSC has worked out the institutional arrangements with Union Councillors and LG&RD. In any event, SRSC can only offer to promote such a plan: acceptance has to be forthcoming from elected and government officials.

The examples given above are only few of the possiblities that can be pursued by SRSC management once it becomes operational. In its initial stages, SRSC would need to train its staff in diagnostic approaches through which they can identify and sift through a wide range of possibilities.

7.3. Diagnostic Approaches for Programme Development

The purpose of the diagnostic approaches outlined below is to enable SRSC to incrementally build up its development agenda on the basis of the needs of the villagers. Much of the detail has been left out, since it has been documented elsewhere.[27] Such diagnostic approaches, however, have to be an integral part of the training and repertoire of SRSC staff.

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[25]One model of Union Council planning through Village Organizations was developed at the Comilla Project in the 1960s. Another version of this model was examined by AKRSP in its first years, but it could not be implemented.

[26]In the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, several local councillors have agreed to have projects identified by community organization, surveyed and supervised by OPP technical staff, and implemented by contractors selected by the councillors. This represents another model for collaboration with local government.

[27]AKRSP's First Annual Review [1983] describes the Diagnostic Survey for PPI. Husain [1987] summarizes the various diagnostic approaches used in Gilgit, including school mapping, farming systems research, agroecosystems analysis, and rapid rural appraisal applied to livestock and forestry development.

The entry point for village organization is PPI. A portfolio of PPI projects for all the villages of the project area can be built up through thr Diagnostic Survey for PPIs. This survey has to be undertaken by SRSC staff in each and every village of the project area: effective entry points cannot be identified through a distant planning process.

The first step of the PPI Diagnostic Survey may be called the First Dialogue.[28] SRSC management has to physically visit every village, hold several dialogues in open village meetings attended by all or most of the villagers, explain the objectives of SRSC, and ascertain the one over-riding priority for income-generation on which villagers will work together.

In the Second Dialogue, SRSC engineering staff will work with social organizers and knowledgeable and respected villagers nominated by the villagers themselves, to survey and cost the project identified by the villagers. The alignment and other aspects of the project have to reflect the social and technical situation on the ground: the technical blueprint has to reflect the needs of village organization. Costing has to be based on a proper survey of local conditions and local price data.

In the (last) Third Dialogue, SRSC management have to take the plans and cost estimates to the villagers for discussion with them. SRSC has to clearly and openly explain the basis for the costs; it has to explain how it will provide the necessary technical and financial assistance; it has to make sure that ALL villagers understand their obligations; and it has to determine whether the project will benefit all or most of the villagers.[29] The proceedings have to take place in a general village meeting, and all technical and financial matters must be made completely transparent. The villagers have to agree to the SRSC approach to village organization. If they don't, SRSC has to accept their decision and proceed to the other villages - no project must be forced upon unwilling villagers.[30]

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[28]In practice, each dialogue may be a series of dialogues.

[29]This assessment of the beneficiary base is critical to the success of the project. Such assessment cannot be made *a priori* through sample surveys or formal methods; it has to be made by consulting everyone in the village through the three dialogues.

[30]There cannot be targets set for SRSC in the first few years, since the acceptance of its message will depend on the villagers.

In this way, a large portfolio of PPI projects will be built up over the years.[31] This portfolio is only one of the several packages that SRSC will have to offer villagers. With the completion of the PPI in a village, SRSC will find itself hard pressed to find a continuing motivation for villagers to sustain their Village Organization.

In the process of the PPI Diagnostic Survey and follow-up visits, SRSC management will begin to identify the non-infrastructure priorities of villagers. These will likely pertain to the entire range of agricultural and rural development activities. Some of these priorities will be clear enough to warrant the preparation of programme packages with little additional diagnostic work; others will need to be examined through a combination of informal and formal surveys.

One approach that combines informal and formal survey for diagnosing farmers' priorities is that of Farming Systems Research (FSR). FSR can have an academic or applied orientation; SRSC would be interested in parsimonious, cost-effective versions of FSR, with results expected between one season and the next, rather than large and elaborate surveys with delayed results. The results that SRSC would be looking for would entail one or two simple interventions that could have a quick impact on a large number of farmers in the project area. Like some other specialized agencies, SRSC faces the daunting task of identifying suitable agricultural technology for both irrigated and *barani* areas. It may find it useful to associate provincial and Federal research establishments in its diagnostic work.

In cases where village-level PPIs open up large tracts of land for development, SRSC would need to assist villagers with land use planning. Additional assistance might be required in livestock development, range management, forestry development, water management, etc. In many such instances, SRSC management would find it useful to adopt existing or innovative versions of Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA). There is a range of RRA techniques and applications, and SRSC staff will need orientation in some of these at an early stage.

Diagnostic approaches such as those outlined above will yield the programme packages that SRSC would take to villagers. The emphasis in the remainder of this proposal is on mechanisms and key inputs, and on the likely first steps in programme development, rather than on technical programmes. Although Part B and Part C of this report assume certain functions and programmes for SRSC in

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[31]Those who are familiar with the conventional project cycle will recognize that the three dialogues of the PPI Diagnostic Survey correspond to the first three stages of the project cycle, namely, identification, preparation and appraisal, respectively.

order to prepare staff and budget estimates, nothing that follows should be construed as a blueprint for programme development.

SECTION EIGHT
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

8.1. Abstract

The general objective of Social Organization is to demonstrate the idea that the organization, skills and capital of small farmers can be the basis for self-sustaining development institutions.

The specific objectives of Social Organization would include the following:

- Identify the development priorities of the villagers;
- Formulate and replicate, with the assistance of other staff, appropriate institutional and technical responses by SRSC and other agencies to address village priorities; and,
- Establish, motivate and train Village Organizations and their activists to manage the means and programmes for village development.

The principal institutional mechanisms for Social Organization are the Village Organizations and the Social Organization Units (SOUs) proposed for the SRSC. At the start of operations, there will be one SOU based in each of the two tehsils of the district. A third SOU will be added in Year 2. The SOUs will be expected to establish an average of 50 Village Organizations each year over a three-year period.

Each SOU will be headed by a Social Organizer and include an Assistant Engineer or Sub-Engineer. Each SOU will be provided with a four-wheel vehicle.

The SOUs will identify development priorities through diagnostic surveys of the project area. They will formulate suitable responses to village needs with the help of regular interaction (including monthly workshops) with their colleagues in SRSC and other development agencies. They will motivate VOs by staying in the villages, attending VO meetings, and facilitating VO access to resources outside the village.

8.2. The Basis of Social Organization

The basis of social organization is village leadership

and the principles of village organization.

Much of what needs to be said about the principles of village organization has been said in Part A of this proposal. The operational distillate of that presentation is the proposed concept of self-help, namely, the villagers' acceptance of three basic elements:

- Organization: Villagers should organize their manpower in broad-based self-help groups to work together on matters of common interest.

- Skills: Villagers should improve their managerial and practical skills. Among other things, this requires the Village Organization to nominate, remunerate and support a cadre of village specialists.

- Capital: Villagers have to pool their equity and loan capital to provide for individual and collective needs.

All SRSC programmes have to be anchored firmly in this concept of self-help.

The relevant concept of village leadership is that of village activists.[32] These activists are produced and nurtured as a result of giving responsibility to Village Organizations. They motivate and manage villagers in the direction of participatory development. They help villagers realize their own potential as a collective entity. They lead villagers in the transformation from petitioners to managers of their manpower, skills and capital. These village activists may or may not be drawn from the village's traditional and political leadership. They will be recognized by their actions. They will be acclaimed by fellow villagers. They will be pampered and nurtured by SRSC.

Progress in social organization will not be forthcoming without the emergence of village activists.

8.3. Mechanisms

Motivating villagers towards self-help, and identifying and supporting village activists are two of the primary goals of the Social Organizers who head the SOUs. The SOUs are the cutting edge of SRSC, the immediate "owners" of the Village Organization. They are placed in a central position between the villagers and the management. They have to:

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[32]This is similar to the notion of charismatic leaders discussed in the context of the replicability debate in Section 6 above.

- Assess the nature of issues confronting villagers, and convey that assessment to the rest of SRSC;

- On the way back, as it were, they have to bring in the solutions identified by SRSC;

- The solutions have to be introduced, tested, monitored and replicated in the villages through the SOUs.

The SOUs are the mobile, field-based two-way channel of communication and dialogue between villagers and the management.

Other channels of communication will be needed over time. They may include:

- Monthly meetings for village activists at the SRSC offices, in which villagers will discuss their experiences with each other, provide feedback to SRSC, and begin to outline new priorities and new models of management for their resources;

- Published extension material from SRSC;

- Written resolutions of the Village Organization on all decisions pertaining to the SRSC programme;

- Mobile audio-visual units for motivation and extension work.

SRSC will have to experiment with these and other ways of keeping in touch with villagers and their priorities on a continuing basis.

Social organization is the only function of SRSC on which the issue of duplicating what someone else is doing does not arise: there is no line agency, development project or private group in the project area that is engaged in social organization.[33] At the same time, it is the one function that accompanies everything else that SRSC might plan to do. Thus, SOUs have to be in the vanguard of SRSC's collaboration with other agencies. In particular, they will be called upon to use their discretion to associate elected officials with the process of dialogue and

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[33]The only possible exception might be the small number of Village Organizations that have been formed in recent months with the support of the civil administration and LG&RD in the Billitang area outside Kohat Town. These have not yet implemented any projects, and the civil administration is willing to merge this approach into the SRSC when SRSC appears on the scene.

discussion in the villages.[34]

8.4. The Process of Institutionalization

The first step in social organization will be the formation of informal Village Organizations. These VOs should not be registered until they have attained organizational maturity as participatory organizations. Nor should they be encouraged to think of electing or nominating committees and representatives. They need activists and specialists - functionaries of the Village Organization accountable to the general body of the VO.

The VOs will need Presidents to call and preside over meetings, and Managers to record minutes and maintain the accounts. VO members will assign other functions to one of these two functionaries, including dealing with outside agencies, obtaining supplies, collecting VO savings, etc. As the number and range of functions increases, VO members will have to devise ways of compensating their functionaries for their time and effort; this, rather than voluntary service, is the sustainable approach in the long term.

In addition to the President and Manager, VOs will recruit VO specialists who could perform certain services for all the members. These specialists will need training under SRSC sponsorship, but they will have to be supported by the VO. Over time, this cadre of specialists will begin to emerge as the VO's management team, representing, perhaps, skills and services such as plant protection, livestock disease control, fruit marketing, seed treatment, water management, basic health care, rural water supply maintenance, etc.

In time, institutional and financial viability would require that SRSC address the questions of formalizing and federating the Village Organizations. As with the informal primary tier - the VO - so with formal and higher-order institutions, SRSC will have to evolve its own path. The process cannot be started with any confidence until the primary units are strong and viable. Perhaps, a first step in creating higher-order institutions may involve informal clusters of neighbouring VOs.

In the long term, there are at least three possibilities for formalizing and federating VOs:

- As cooperatives, preferably under revised legislation;
- As owners of one or more joint stock companies set up by

[34]It has been suggested that SRSC should use elected leaders to gain entree into villages. This is a double-edged sword: defeated candidates may oppose SRSC if elected leaders support it.

SRSC and the VOs; or,

- As the primary tier of local government, if the government and SRSC can work out the appropriate model.

SECTION NINE
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

9.1. Abstract

The general objective of WID would be to promote productive, equitable and sustainable participation by women in agricultural and rural development activities. WID will be a coordinating programme for the technical functions performed with SRSC sponsorship, rather than a parallel programme for women. It would include the following specific objectives:

- Review SRSC activities for their impact on women;
- Identify and develop, with the help of Social Organization, organizational models that are suitable for the norms of the project area for women's participation in SRSC programmes;
- Lead SRSC staff in promoting income-generating activities for women[35]; and,
- Using appropriate organizational models, facilitate access by villagers to existing social sector programmes in the project area[36].

WID will have a small staff of female coordinators to work with the SRSC's technical staff and project area villagers; it will not have a parallel programme of organization development or technical interventions. Female staff are essential, however, to establish dialogue and promote communication with village women.

9.2. Initial Steps and Phasing

Programmes for women in NWFP cannot be effective without the sanction of men. The first step is for SRSC to achieve credibility with the men. When the men and women see what can be achieved, they will themselves request for SRSC assistance on behalf of rural women.

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[35]Particularly, activities in the agricultural sector.

[36]For example, the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation programme.

In many instances, requests made by men for women's programmes reflect their, rather than the women's perceptions of priorities.[37] Responding to these requests may simply reinforce existing stereotypes,[38] rather than integrating women in the process and management of rural development.

SRSC should have the means and the will to diagnoze women's priorities through a process in which women can participate freely and actively. If it cannot do this, it should not attempt to start a programme for women.

The diagnosis of women's priorities would be the major function of the member of the Management Group charged with responsibility for WID issues. The WID coordinator on the Management Group should be recruited at the same time as other senior staff. Even if SRSC does not implement any WID programmes in its initial stages, the WID coordinator should be part of the experience of getting SRSC started, organizing VOs, diagnozing priorities, interacting with government agencies, etc. Much of this experience and learning will be lost if the WID coordinator is appointed only when SRSC feels ready to start implementing women's programmes.

Simultaneously with diagnozing women's priorities, SRSC should contract out a small assignment to document other projects and innovative activities for women in NWFP. There is an abundance of such projects and activities, and there are also people who can quickly write up existing efforts. Much can be learned from the failures and successes of past and existing initiatives in WID. Much could be accomplished by linking up with existing efforts.

9.3. Approaches to Organization and Communication

In theory, the Village Organization consists of all adults in the village. In practice, the full participation of women in the VO is likely to be problematic. Three organizational options are possible:

- Attendance by women in VO meetings - this is highly unlikely, unless *purdah* arrangements can be organized (and accepted) at the venue of meeting every time;

- Separate women's organizations, with their own functionaries, bank accounts and meetings, but linked in specific ways to the VO for task sharing;

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[37]The demands for sewing machines and training in handicrafts are two such examples.

[38]For example, the sewing machine syndrome.

- Separate male and female sections of the VO, with representatives of one attending meetings of the other, but one set of accounts and functionaries.

A priori, there is little basis for choosing between these options at this stage. SRSC will have to find its own specific organizational approaches to women's organization.

Whatever organizational models emerge, there is a need for a special effort to communicate with women, since they are secluded, and since most (if not all) of the SRSC senior management are likely to be men.[39] Experience all over the world suggests that women project staff are essential for communicating with women beneficiaries: women will not talk freely to men, nor will men understand the priorities of women as clearly as women. SRSC should, at an early stage (perhaps starting in Year 2), recruit female technical coordinators for its WID programme. SRSC must not make the mistake of assuming that the male SOU is a substitute for female field coordinators.

SECTION TEN
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY

10.1. Abstract

The initial objective of Physical Infrastructure and Appropriate Technology (PIAT) is to develop village-level productive physical infrastructure (PPI) through Village Organizations so as to have an immediate impact on village incomes. Its subsequent objectives include:

- Facilitating the implementation of a small number of key major projects that would have downstream benefits for particularly deprived villages;
- Promoting new approaches to infrastructure development through line agencies, local government and Village Organizations;
- Adapting, testing and demonstrating appropriate mechanical and electrical devices for improved resource management, and playing a supportive role in private

[39] Special efforts will also be needed in the field of women's training, since village women may not leave the village for training.

sector development of such technology; and,

- Facilitating access by VOs to technical and financial resources for infrastructure projects in the social sector.

The implementation mechanism for PPIs would be the Village Organization, supervised and assisted by the Social Organization Unit. The mechanism for identifying village-level PPI projects would be a Diagnostic Survey of every village. This survey would cover the identification, preparation and appraisal of every project through village dialogues. It is currently expected that this survey would result in the identification of suitable irrigation and communications projects.

Starting in Year 2, PIAT could facilitate the implementation of a small number of major works that are critical to the well-being of downstream villages but cannot be undertaken by the VOs themselves. SRSC would have the flexibility to fund feasibility studies for such projects, or implementation by government agencies, VOs, local councils or contractors. Major projects may include the construction of weirs and the rehabilitation of civil canals.

Also starting in Year 2, PIAT could begin to develop Union Council infrastructure plans in collaboration with Union Council members and LG&RD. These would involve inter-village projects that are beyond the capacity of individual VOs acting by themselves. The emphasis on Union Councils (rather than the District Council) is appropriate for SRSC because: (a) the Union Council operates closer to the village level than the District Council; and, (b) it has no revenues of its own, and its grants-in-aid are highly inadequate for proper implementation of projects.

10.2. The Value of Productive Physical Infrastructure

The village-level PPI is the catalyst for village organization; the Village Organization is the implementing vehicle for PPI. A well-chosen PPI is a social organizer; effective social organization increases the payoff to PPIs. The PPI programme is a combination of two components - the infrastructure component and the institutional arrangement. Each depends on the other. Each supports the other.

These simple truths have been mentioned above in several contexts. They are repeated here because a good lesson deserves to be repeated.

10.3. Existing Infrastructure Programmes

Out of a total cultivated area of 82,100 hectares in Kohat, only 23,756 ha is irrigated; the remaining 58,344 ha is

barani.

The Irrigation Division of the Irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department maintains the government canals (commanding 7,435 ha); the civil canals (commanding 11,298 ha) are supposed to be maintained by the land owners according to the *riwaj-e-abpashi*, i.e., irrigation and management practices established by custom. The Irrigation Division has, however, a meagre allocation of Rs 400,000 for annual emergency repairs of civil canals which are beyond the capacity of the farmers. All these channels (both perennial and inundation), along with diversion weirs, are reported to be in a state of acute disrepair, affecting irrigation at large. The total length of the civil canals is about 200 kilometers, varying from 1 to 15 kilometers, and the discharges are generally 2 to 5 cusecs of perennial channels, with some over 10 cusecs.

The Directorate of On-Farm Water Management of the Department of Agriculture is active in watercourse renovation on a small number of watercourses. Its activities in Kohat District are supported by the World Bank under the On-Farm Water Management Project Phase II.

The *barani* area is almost double the irrigated area, with acute scarcity of water even for drinking and for use by cattle. The options are limited. There can be irrigation by tubewells but each tubewell costs from Rs 500,000 to Rs 700,000, according to the depth of boring. This requires detailed analysis regarding economic benefits; besides, these tubewells cannot be constructed and maintained by the villagers. In some areas, there is even no electricity. As regards drinking water supply, this is the responsibility of the Public Health Engineering Division of the Irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department.

In the communications sector, the major portion of the access roads programme involves shingling, which is but a temporary measure; the average cost is about Rs 30,000/km. Black topping is done in some cases at an average cost of Rs 200,000/km. This involves use of heavy machinery which is not easily available to villagers. The National Transport Research Council, a federal agency located at Islamabad, has developed a model of village access roads which does not involve use of heavy machinery. Crushed aggregate is spread over a cushion of sand and covered over with *khaka* (stone dust), which binds the aggregate on watering. The surface is reported to be durable and many such roads have been built by the NTRC. Besides, it involves mostly manual work, which generates employment in the village; the average cost is Rs 100,000/km.

Based on a preliminary understanding of existing infrastructure programmes and needs, SRSC should be provided funds for two kinds of infrastructure programmes, both of which have institution-building functions. The first, and more important one,

is village-level PPIs. The second type of programme would entail catalytic support by SRSC for larger projects, including inter-village projects that could involve the Union Council.

10.4. Opportunities for Village PPIs

Irrigation Canals

SRSC could take up initially the remodelling of the smaller channels with the help of villagers. According to existing indications based on estimates prepared by LG&RD, the cost may average Rs 20,000/km, but further investigations would be needed by SRSC engineering staff.

Barani areas

Villagers interviewed during the field trip indicated a demand for construction of ponds, to store rain water for use by humans and livestock. Livestock ownership is one of the main occupations. The SRSC could carry out surveys and construct such ponds. In general, development of water resources in *barani* areas is likely to pose enormous challenges for SRSC.

On Farm Water Management

The existing programme of lining and renovation of watercourses under the World Bank's OFWM-II represents a potential area of collaboration between SRSC and DOFWM. If a common methodology can be worked out, this project could benefit from implementation by VOs. SRSC could conserve resources and demonstrate an alternative organizational model for watercourse renovation. If collaborative arrangements are not possible, SRSC could undertake watercourse improvement according to its own criteria on the large number of watercourses that do not fall in the OFWM-II project area. Local water management staff has indicated that costs for various watercourses range from Rs 60,000 to Rs 200,000.

Communications

Judging from the plans of various agencies, there would appear to be a major demand for access roads that connect villages to nearby roads. Coordination with concerned agencies would be vital in preparing SRSC's portfolio of communications projects. There is also potential for integrated planning at the Union Council level.

Cost Estimates

A large number of estimates from all the concerned departments were examined during this study. Every department has

its own criteria for costing and implementation. Thus, it is not possible to get very reliable estimates of what PPI projects would cost under the proposed SRSC methodology. The best guess that has been made on the basis of various second-hand estimates (including those from AKRSP and local departments in Kohat) leads one to propose an initial average cost of Rs 200,000 per PPI (i.e., Rs 200,000 per Village Organization). With the two SOUs proposed initially for SRSC, it is estimated that 50 PPI projects can be initiated each year, at a total cost of Rs 10 million.

10.5. Catalytic Support for Key Major Projects and Inter-Agency Programmes

Two areas of irrigation might require particular attention from SRSC at a fairly stage - civil canals, and water resources for *barani* areas. In both cases, there is opportunity to strengthen the VOs and their agricultural resource base indirectly and over a period of years rather than months. In particular, rehabilitation of civil canals could be an entry point for supra-village institutions that build upon fast-disappearing traditional institutions. A rough, preliminary survey of civil canals has been conducted by the Irrigation Division. Actual work on major channels and weirs would, however, depend on a more thorough survey of existing conditions and preparation of detailed estimates.

In the *barani* areas, a focussed water resources survey may have a high payoff for farmers whose present condition is one of extreme poverty and deprivation. SRSC may find it useful to fund a feasibility study with the help of relevant agencies. The implementation of such a programme would depend on the gradual evolution of a policy as experience is gained in the field.

Inter-agency programmes can be initiated under PIAT with a large number of organizations engaged in infrastructure and appropriate technology programmes. Two priorities in the area of water resources have been mentioned above. Union Council planning could be a third priority in a small number of Union Councils.

The objective of Union Council planning would be to demonstrate an alternative to the present system of dividing the annual grant of Rs 100,000 equally among the 5-10 members of the Union Council. The alternative might require that: (a) priorities for a four-year period[40] be identified by Union Council members in consultation with VOs; (b) identified projects be surveyed by SRSC or LG&RD engineers; (c) funds be committed by SRSC and the Union Councillors for most or all of the cost of the portfolio; (d) in case available funds do not match the cost estimates, the Union

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[40]Corresponding to the term of office of local councils. If the plan is started in mid-term, its implementation horizon should be the period remaining before the next elections.

Councillors should decide on the final portfolio; (e) they should also decide on annual portfolio corresponding to the four-year plan; (f) implementation should be by the VOs in the Union Council, according to work sharing agreements drawn up in advance.

Other inter-agency programmes are also possible, though SRSC should not be expected to subsidize the routine functions of existing departments. Its mandate is to demonstrate new management methods for rural resources. Additional examples are possible in the fields of watercourse renovation, rural water supply, education, etc.

A block allocation of Rs 3 mn per year may be provided in Years 2 and 3 to enable SRSC to assist with inter-agency programmes and major projects that cannot be undertaken by individual VOs. For such projects, SRSC could: (a) fund feasibilities (e.g., for water resources and small dams); or (b) assist implementation (e.g. of canal rehabilitation) by the Irrigation Department, VOs, local councils or contractors.

10.6. Appropriate Technology

In a Pakistani village, appropriate technology is that technology which ordinary villagers can understand and internalize - socially as well as technically. What that technology is will depend on the particular situation, and will have to be discovered by trial and error.

The important step in the development of appropriate technology is the initiation of this process of trial and error at the village level. This will include attention to the problems of the villagers which call for technological responses, and equally to their base of technical and social knowledge, around which the technological response will have to emerge. At the moment it is difficult to predict where this process will lead in each particular village. However, the following checklist of ideas may prove useful for SRSC to examine[41]:

Use of agricultural implements
Domestic energy saving projects
Equipment/devices which help reduce the burden of household chores
Use of low cost domestic latrines
Water pumps development by PCSIR for use on open service wells
Agricultural processing
Equipment used in handicrafts for cottage based industry.

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[41]A longer discussion of appropriate technology is contained in Annex C.3.

A budget allocation of Rs 200,000 per year is proposed for demonstration purposes starting in Year 2 of SRSC operations.[42] A mechanical engineer is recommended.

SECTION ELEVEN
AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

11.1. Abstract

The general objective of Agriculture and Resource Management (ARM) is to improve the productivity and sustainability of agricultural resources by helping Village Organizations acquire access to existing research and extension networks. Specific objectives include:

- Promotion of productive, environmentally-sound practices in crop cultivation, forestry, and livestock and pastures;
- Organizing concerted action to promote the use of improved crop varieties, particularly in the rainfed areas;
- Limited amount of adaptive research and verification trials for new cultivars and breeds that might have potential for the project area; and,
- The training of farmers and field professionals who service the project area's Village Organizations.

Given the abundance of research and extension systems in and around the potential project area of SRSC, the characteristic mode of operation of ARM would be collaborative and catalytic, rather than that of direct implementation of research and extension activity. It should have the capacity to engage and strengthen existing efforts by providing key inputs. But it should also have the flexibility for direct action on needs that are not being addressed by existing institutions.

11.2. Existing Programmes

The Department of Agriculture (DOA) has two large directorates operating in Kohat District - the Directorate of Agricultural Extension (DAE), and the Directorate of Agricultural Engineering. The Directorate of On-Farm Water Management (DOFWM)

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[42]SRSC should not get into the habit of giving away free inputs, other than for demonstration purposes for a limited time, and with continuous monitoring.

is also part of DOA, while the Fruit and Vegetable Development Board (FVDB) has been constituted out of the DAE as an independent entity.

DAE has three main activities:

- Agricultural extension through demonstration plots, fairs and festivals.

- The Barani Seed Farm in Hangu, spread over 19 ha. Wheat seed (mostly Pak-81, but also some Pirsabak-85) is produced on 12-13 ha. Pre-basic seed is obtained from CCRI, Pirsabak. Basic seed is sold to the ADA and registered growers. Some groundnut seed is also produced.

- Supply of spray pumps tp farmers at 60% of cost, for spray mostly on vegetable and orchards. During 1984-89, DAE sold 297 hand compression pumps, 12 shoulder-mounted power sprayers, and 5 trolley-mounted pumps.

A non-traditional oilseeds project funded by USAID is reported to be close to initiation.

DAE has 9 Agriculture Officers (AOs), 22 Field Assistants (FAs), and one pickup truck that is not operational. There is one FA for 800-900 farmers, and one AO for 2,500-3,000 farmers.

The Agricultural Engineering Directorate has more than 100 staff in all categories. It has 18 bulldozers and 2 tubewell drilling units (which bore 3-4 wells each year). It has two budgetted activities, while the third activity remains suspended pending evaluation. Its major activities are:

- Tubewell Drilling: Tubewells are bored for farmers and operated by them after completion. The private sector charges Rs 350-400 per rft. Agricultural Engineering charges Rs 17/rft. Cost per tubewell averages Rs 100,000 for 300-ft wells with discharge of 0.5 cusec (12,000 gallons per hour) to irrigate at most 10 ha.

- Reclamation of Wasteland: by hiring out bulldozers. Subsidy is 54% and there is a long queue for the 'dozers.

- Training for farmers: (a) in tractor driving; and (b) use of farm implements. Programme has been stopped because there is an ongoing evaluation for which the report has not yet been completed. Course duration of 3 months. Stipend to trainees: Rs 500/month. Plus residence and food in dormitories on site. Trainees included students, mechanics, etc.

The FVDB has a small presence in Kohat. They are promoting the use of pheremone traps for fruit fly control, but the demand far outstrips the supply.

The Forest Department is engaged in a UNHCR/World Bank income-generating project for refugees, as well as a social forestry project sponsored by USAID. Under the social forestry project, private nurseries grow eucalyptus and pulai for purchase by the Forest Department and subsequent sale to the general public.

11.3. Initial Steps

The first step for SRSC would be to identify farmer priotities through village meetings or surveys. Some approaches for diagnostic work have been noted in Section 7 above. As an aid to planning, SRSC will need to zone the project area into broad recommendation domains, within each of which it can concentrate on a specific menu of interest to farmers.

There would appear to be a demand for plant protection and new crop varieties that can be met with the assistance of existing programmes. Similarly, existing programmes can be tapped for activities in the fields of fruit and vegatable development, livestock disease control, forestry development, training in the operation and maintenance of agricultural machinery, and improved water management.

In the field of agriculture and resource management, perhaps the biggest challenge for SRSC would be to devise improved technological packages for *barani* areas. There are few ready-made solutions among existing programmes and projects. While new crops and crop varieties may be hard to find, the *barani* areas have a livestock orientation that can be an early target of SRSC efforts.

11.4. Mechanisms for Inter-Agency Programmes

Some early examples of inter-agency programmes will enhance the impact of SRSC on VOs and help establish its credibility with existing agencies and the villagers. The preceding section has identified some possibilities for collaborative programmes.

The mechanisms for inter-agency programmes would revolve around SRSC providing the critical inputs that are needed by line departments in order to expand and extend their activities in areas of immediate concern to the VOs. Some examples are:

- If the diffusion of new varieties has to be improved for an enhanced impact on small farmers, SRSC might provide additional land or inputs to DAE; or, it might facilitate contracts between VOs and DAE/ADA for increased seed production; it might engage the services of DAE staff in

providing training in seed treatment to VO representatives.

- Given the small presence of FVDB, and the apparently large demand for fruit-fly traps, SRSC might help with increased production and distribution of these traps.

- Since not all villages are covered by veterinary dispensaries, SRSC might engage the services of the Animal Husbandry Department to train para-veterinarians nominated and supported by the VOs.

- There would appear to be potential for increased production of *mazri* and its improved marketing and processing. These aspects need to be examined, and VOs can be assisted in developing this resource in collaboration with the private sector.

In order to obtain technical assistance and technology, SRSC should consider establishing links to provincial, national and international resource bases. Some of these links will, of course, be informal; however, advisory panels drawn from resource bases could be useful, as well. International centres could provide assistance with improved technological packages for *barani* areas.

SECTION TWELVE
RURAL FINANCE AND COMMERCE

12.1. Abstract

The long-term objective of Rural Finance and Commerce (RFC) would be to promote approaches for the productive and equitable integration of smallholders in the markets for capital and agricultural goods. Short-term objectives would include:

- Promoting access by small farmers to credit, input supply and marketing systems;

- Training Village Organizations in basic accounting with reference to the activities of the VOs;

- Creating incentives for the accumulation of cooperative capital by Village Organizations; and,

- Facilitating investment in the project area's resource base by the private and public sectors.

RFC would endeavour to link small farmers with lines of credit from existing financial institutions. But it would also have its own resources for initiating a credit programme for short-

term and medium-term loans for Village Organizations.

12.2. The Existing Situation

While relatively recent data is available from lending institutions, information for non-institutional (informal) credit is derived from the 1980 Census of Agriculture. This information is obviously considerably dated and is more likely to be useful in the determination of patterns of indebtedness than as an indication of the magnitudes of the sums involved.

According to the 1980 Census of Agriculture, of the total number of 74,777 indebted farm households in Kohat District in 1980, 79% were owners, 16% were owner-tenants and 5% were tenants. This distribution is not markedly different from that of the distribution of land in the district (see Annexure D.1.). However, indebted tenants or owner-tenants were predominantly those with relatively large landholdings.

The above picture is for both non-institutional and institutional credit combined. Institutional credit, however, forms a very small fraction of the total. Only 5% of the indebted households had access to institutional credit, and the proportion was truly miniscule, 1% in the under 1 hectare category, rising to 2% in the 1-2 hectare group.

Even these data are likely to overstate rather than understate the real access of the small farmer to credit institutions. On a series of field visits to Charsadda District, not a single farmer in the category below 5 hectares was found who had managed to obtain a loan from any of the banks, although many had tried. The invariable complaint was that the expense of obtaining a bank loan - the cost of running around, of getting documents signed and attested, commissions for those who fill out forms, and probably some form of bribery - was too high and the probability of receiving the loan too low to be worth the trouble. Farmers from four different villages gave out the same approximate amount for expenses incurred, of Rs 600-700 regardless of the volume of the loan, which suggests that it is probably a reliable figure. Similarly, in Kohat no small farmer (in this case, holding less than 8 hectares) interviewed during the field visits had managed to obtain a bank loan. Indeed, small farmers complained that they seldom even got to the position of clearing their papers with the revenue *patwari* for applications to banks. Interestingly enough, ADBP officials and bankers as well as Agriculture Department functionaries conceded that rates of default on loans were very much higher for wealthier and bigger farmers than for smaller ones. There was, however, considerable reluctance on the part of bankers to quantify this information or even to generally disclose average sizes of loans.

The prospects of tenants with small land holdings are

even worse because the tenant's right of occupancy is not considered an adequate collateral for bank loans. Although bank rules allow tenants to obtain loans on the guarantee of their landlords, we did not find a single instance where this rule had been effectively invoked. Indeed, many interviewees suggested that this device was made operative only when a landlord wished to obtain a large number of "tenant" loans. (No hard data was available on this point, although some bank officials admitted this to be a common practice.)

The pattern of existing lending by banks in Charsadda showed the largest category to be seed and fertilizer. Tractors are a consistent second with dairy farming and farm implements competing for the next two positions.

In Kohat by contrast, two-thirds of the agricultural loans given out by banks in 1987-88 were for tractors and only 15% for seed and fertilizer. This pattern reflects the higher demand for agricultural machinery in Kohat (see Annexure D.1.). The low level of fertilizer use in Kohat (with urea providing over half of the total) is less surprising than the fact, elicited through enquiries in the field, that even smaller farmers on semi-irrigated land (using open wells) tended to use some (albeit very little) fertilizer.

The 1980 Agriculture Census data show that for the majority of farm households in Kohat, informal sources were not only the most important source of credit, they were for most, the only source. This appears to be the case even now. A pattern did emerge from enquiries made of small and medium farmers during the field visits to both Kohat and Charsadda; broadly:

- Loans from informal sources were generally of smaller amounts and of shorter duration than those that were in theory available to small farmers from institutional sources.

- While institutional loans were generally advanced for specific agricultural applications, informal loans were often also obtained for social uses such as marriages. While this may seem illogical or wasteful to the outside observer, the community recognizes such needs as being integral to the individual's social existence within itself, much as credit for fertilizer or tractors.

- Given the relatively small amounts of funds that many poorer farmers were able to mobilize from informal sources, these individuals were often unable to muster the resources necessary for even simple infrastructural improvements such as brick-lining a *kutcha* irrigation well to conserve scarce water.

- Disparate informants were insistent that there was no rate of interest involved in these informal loans. This would be consistent with the observation that the amounts involved are generally small and the duration short. However, even small short duration loans generally take place within a system of mutual obligations, which would merit further observation, since neither the Pakhtun social code nor the feudal *jajmani* system of obligation between landlord and tenant or small cultivator has survived unscathed in the present day.

12.3. Initial Steps and Options

Rural finance has to be anchored firmly in the savings of the villagers, rather than being taken over by the race for cheap capital.

Regular meeting and saving is a fundamental element of the proposed self-help concept. Every week (or twice each month), all members of the VO should meet to review their plans and projects, and contribute their savings to the common VO saving account. The habit of thrift has to be developed from the very beginning. SRSC, particularly its SOUs, have to insist on it repeatedly in their village visits.

SRSC has to propose procedures to safeguard the collective savings as the trust of villagers. This would include public transactions, announcement of individual deposits to the VO account, maintenance of passbooks, etc.

Bank branches have to be convinced to facilitate deposits by villagers, so that they do not have to depend on distant town branches. SRSC should use the leverage of its own and VO deposits to extract the maximum concessions from banks for villagers.

From the beginning of the PPI project, villagers should be educated in putting away some of their incomes into collective savings. The SRSC grant for the PPI represents windfall income. SRSC's Social Organizers should insist that villagers save a portion of it in their joint account.[43] This saving needs to be augmented over time by savings from other income.

SRSC is quite likely to face a demand for credit from farmers soon after it starts. The mechanism of the Village Organization will enable it to provide loans at a small transaction cost to itself and the farmers. With time, it will need to respond to credit for several uses, with both short-term and long-term

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[43]The AKRSP suggests that villagers may put away 25% of their PPI wages into the common VO account; over time, this proportion rises to about 50%.

loans. From its inception, SRSC will be confronted with vexatious issues regarding credit, including:

- The question of duration of loan for each purpose;
- The question of interest rate, not only its level, but also its religious interpretation;
- The question of collateral, given that VOs will be informal entities.

As with much else, SRSC will have to gradually discover what makes sense in the context of its project area. Experiences with rural credit suggest that:

- It is often not the level of the formal interest rate that constrains borrowing by farmers, but the timely availability of loans without a long series of costly transactions;
- Suitable collateral and security can be provided by small farmers through group liability and collective cash deposits;
- The duration of a loan can be linked to easily observable cycles of production, development and sales, depending on whether the loan is for inputs, development or marketing and processing.

In order to raise capital for on-lending to small farmers, SRSC should have its own funds from donor grants, as well as arrangements with existing financial institutions. The SRSC budget for the first three years should provide a sum of Rs 3.0 million for small farmer credit for various purposes. In addition, SRSC should also begin negotiations with the scheduled banks and specialized institutions.[44]

Since SRSC will provide its own loans to the VOs, and will also assist them in obtaining loans from existing institutional sources, it will need two types of resources, one to provide a revolving fund for its own credit programme, and another to underwrite the loans contracted by the VOs from banks and credit institutions. The separation of these two types of fund seems desirable.

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[44]Such as the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, the House Building Finance Corporation, the Regional Development Finance Corporation, etc. These institutions have made occasional departures from their routine lending in order to reach small farmers and other low-income groups.

The revolving fund could be set up with contributions from domestic as well as foreign donors. Funds would be required for its initial formation and for periodic replenishment. The domestic donors could include the Government of NWFP and such federal bodies as the RDFC.

For the VOs to be able to obtain credit directly from ADBP and commercial banks, institutional arrangements as well as a system of guarantees will need to be evolved. If the entire amount is to be underwritten by SRSC, it will require additional financial resources, raised from donations. Alternatively, guarantees could be provided by GONWFP, for which modalities will have to be worked out. It is desirable, in any event, that there be an element of risk sharing between the lending institution and the guarantor, so that lending can proceed on a sensible and cautious basis.

12.4. Marketing and Commerce

SRSC can encourage the involvement of VOs in a range of activities aimed at increasing productivity, reducing loss due to pest attack and wastage, improving access to major markets for farm produce and protecting its members from middle men. In Kohat, where fruit and vegetable production is sizable and distances to markets are considerable, VOs can play a definite role in all these activities. Two markets are of special interest in this district, the market for Kohat's most important fruit crop, guavas, and that for *mazri* and *mazri* products.

There are two guava crops a year in Kohat, a winter crop and a more copious summer crop which however, is more prone to spoilage and pest attack. Prices are generally higher for the winter crop. Enquiries in the Kohat market suggested that at the height of each season (given an average to good crop), approximately Rs 40,000-50,000 worth of guavas passed through the market each day, but at the same time two or three times that amount was sent directly from the growing areas to Peshawar, some no doubt for onward trans-shipment, and to Parachinar ! (This last doubtless includes a proportion that finds its way over the Afghan border, since Parachinar itself is hardly a major market.)

The crop is marketed in the following ways:

1. The growers themselves bring it to the Kohat market;

2. The local merchants buy the crop from the farmer and bring it to the Kohat market.

3. The crop is purchased by buyers for direct shipment outside the district.

4. In a few cases involving the largest growers, the farmers

themselves export the crop from the district to other markets.

In cases (2) and (3) there are instances of standing crops being purchased well in advance of ripening for later delivery. While there is an element of risk here for the buyer, there is also the prospect of a rock bottom price, particularly when he is dealing with small growers in need of money before the harvest.

The guava crop is particularly prone to attack by the fruit fly which can devastate an entire crop. Birds such as the parrot, usually a voracious spoiler of guavas, are said to be a far lesser problem. VOs can be effective in all stages of plant protection, from disseminating extension advice to purchase and distribution of pesticides. Links with the Agriculture Department's programme for controlling the fruit fly would be essential. For this purpose, the department introduced, on an experimental basis, a very effective bottle-trap which uses a small amount of an expensive imported chemical. However, after distributing the trap free for one year, the department discontinued the programme, and advised individual farmers to purchase the trap from the market. The problem is, however, that the chemical was unavailable in NWFP.

In the marketing of fruit and vegetables, time is of the essence, although in the absence of cold storage facilities, there is little possibility of holding back part of the crop for the off-peak season; it is speed that is essential in getting to the right market well before spoilage threatens.

VO involvement should extend from the all-important activity of plant protection against fruit flies, through collective picking, grading and packing to transportation to markets where better prices can be obtained. At several stages of this activity there would be a requirement for credit, both short and long term, which the VOs can arrange with the appropriate lending agency, the overall terms having been negotiated with the assistance of SRSC. In the long run, these measures should be considered interim, pending the formation of a Fruit Marketing Board or Growers Cooperative through which the VOs or growers could act collectively.

Besides guavas, the other major tree crop in Kohat is *mazri*. This is a spear-like arid zone plant that after retting yields a useful fibre which is twisted into rope. This is then used in *charpai* beds, stools, and other furniture, mats, ropes and for binding applications. Kohat is a large producer of *mazri*, but more importantly, it has a large cottage industry for processing *mazri* leaves, and the largest national market for the product.

The bulk of production of the raw crop is reported to

come from Baluchistan with a smaller quantity from nearby tribal agencies. The processing and finishing is done in both the urban and rural areas of Kohat. The initial processing of *mazri* is a wide-scale cottage industry that already shows signs of becoming something bigger. A simple machine has been devised that is most efficient at twisting the fibre but has not so far been able to achieve the smooth strong knot that is wrought manually.

SRSC needs to examine the following aspects of *mazri* production:

- The possibility of assisting with *mazri* plantations within the district. This would involve examining the technical feasibility in the first instance and subsequently facilitating credit as with any cash crop.

- Assisting in the development of a better *mazri* machine, and facilitating credit for purchase by VOs and individuals.

- The possibility of VOs with larger volumes rather than individuals with small volumes marketing the *mazri*.

- Assisting in the development of cottage industries using *mazri* in the district so as increase value added and generate income and employment. These already exist in Kohat but the bulk of the *mazri* rope at present is exported outside the district.

Kohat also produces a range of vegetables and fruit including aubergines, okra, *karela*, *tindas* and other squashes, cucumbers and oranges. The VOs can perform a range of marketing functions for whichever of these commodities are of local importance. In Kohat, as in many another part of the country, off-season vegetables and fruit can rise in price by as much as eight times as when the district's own crop of that particular commodity is in. The possibility of a group of VOs arranging the purchase of vegetables in areas with lower prices, and transporting it for sale to members could be considered.

12.5. Long-Term Issues

In the long term, SRSC would be looking to create an integrated system of savings and loans to sustain a continuing cycle of capital accumulation in the countryside. It will be confronted with significant financial and legal issues relating both to its savings programme and its lending.

If SRSC has to depend on existing financial institutions for its loans, it will be expected to provide security to these institutions. SRSC may be asked to:

- Provide its own security for part or all of the borrowed amount. Since it is a company limited by guarantee, not having a share capital, it is not certain whether institutional lenders will accept anything short of a third-party guarantee (e.g., by GONWFP). Or,

- Organize a collateral (such as cash deposits) from the the VOs. Or,

- Organize a conventional security (such as land) from individual farmers.

If SRSC succeeds in mobilizing substantial VO savings, it may be in a position to suggest that these be used as the collateral for institutional borrowing. This would be least complicated from the point of view of SRSC; whether it is also palatable to prospective lenders remains to be seen and negotiated.

The importance of generating VO savings cannot be overstated. Regardless of their utility as collateral with institutional lenders, these savings are an essential part of the cycle of capital accumulation and investment that SRSC and the VOs need to sustain over the long term. SRSC will have to be imaginative in providing continuing incentives for VO savings: it is competing with assets (even in rural areas) on which the returns may be much higher than on VO savings deposited in banks. Its major hope lies in assessing the nature of the small farmer's needs for capital accumulation, and devising strategies (or instruments) that can address these needs. It may find, for instance, that the level of returns is being traded off against security, ease of deposit, liquidity, maturity period, cash flow, etc. It would be difficult, but possible, to find ways of mobilizing savings in VO accounts even when the external environment provides higher-return alternatives.

SECTION THIRTEEN
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

13.1. Abstract

The general, long-term objective of Human Resources Development is to develop the skills and knowledge needed to manage rural resources through participatory institutions.

The major clients for Human Resources Development may eventually include:

- Ordinary villagers, village specialists and VO functionaries;

- SRSC staff; and,
- Staff of collaborating agencies and project similar to SRSC.

The kind of training given under Human Resources Development may extend to:

- Practical skills for villagers and technical staff in fields such as engineering, agriculture, education, etc.;
- Organizational skills to plan for, mobilize and manage resources in a changing environment;
- Communication skills with which to operate effectively within the prevailing framework of administration, development and business activity; and,
- Exposure that expands the individual's vision of possibilities for his own environment.

The techniques for providing this kind of training may include: formal lectures and group discussions as part of classroom training; participation in workshops; study tours to innovative projects; visits to markets and farms; case studies; audio-visual techniques; etc.

There is a large potential for human resources development, and priorities will be identified over time. SRSC has to respond to changing perceptions of village priorities. At the same time, it is easy to waste resources on training programmes that are not monitored and evaluated for their effectiveness and impact. Thus, SRSC's training programme should, from the very beginning, devise rigourous systems for assessing its programme, eliminating what is not effective, and improving that which has potential.

13.2. The First Steps: Institutional Arrangements

The training of village specialists has to be anchored in a support system based on the Village Oganization and SRSC's role as a facilitator.

SRSC has to identify a small number of farmer priorities for training. It is likely that this could be accomplished through informal meetings with villagers soon after the beginning of the PPI programme. Based on a brief tour of Kohat, it would appear that the first priorities will be in the fields of plant protection and other agricultural and livestock functions.

In these and other fields in which there is existing expertise for providing training, SRSC should work through

collaborative arrangements rather than creating its own in-house capacity for all the required resources. If prospective instructors are available in the project area, they should be paid honoraria for specific inputs into the SRSC training programme. If hostel facilities are available elsewhere, SRSC may not need to rent its its own premises. If study tours are organized by national and provincial academies and institutes, SRSC should try to get nominations to these for its trainees. The emphasis should be on conserving resources and building institutional linkages.

The SRSC's role as a facilitator may extend to the provision of supplies at cost in order to support village specialists. Alternatively, this role may imply arranging direct contacts between VOs and suppliers in the public and private sectors. The emphasis should be on creating access, rather than becoming a supplier.

The VO's role is to select and support VO members for training in a wide range of functions - in essence, to promote and reward specialization in work. It has to select trainees who will take an interest in their training, return to their villages to work, and provide regular services on payment to all VO members. The VO has to organize the schedule of work for trained specialists. It has to pay the specialist promptly for his services and for the cost of supplies, transport, etc.

It is not necessary that every VO should have specialists in every field. If convenient alternatives are available in the public or private sector, the VO can organize the provision of services from these sources.

SRSC would have to be provided a budget for the training programme that requires some assumptions about the scope of the programme. In addition to the overheads, it would have to provide for: farmer training allowance; farmer training kits; honoraria to trainers; etc. Based on these assumptions, a line item of Rs 1.3 million is provided for programme activities for the first three years.

13.3. The Medium-Term Agenda

The medium-term agenda for Human Resources Development by SRSC may eventually extend to include:

- The identification of training needs in a systematic manner, in terms of subject matter, clients and levels;
- The preparation of training calendars (and, perhaps course catalogues), both for villagers and SRSC staff;
- Definition of selection criteria for trainees, given that many individuals and institutions tend to treat training

as a paid vacation;

- Design of effective utilization strategies for returning trainees, both for villages and SRSC;

- Curriculum development according to the interests and expertise of trainees, rather than in pre-determined packages;

- Pedagogical approaches, especially other than the conventional lecture format, and particularly for illiterate villagers;

- Continuing monitoring and evaluation, given that many training programmes soon appear to be driven by numerical targets rather than assessments of needs, priorities and impact; and,

- Networking and institutional linkages, given that SRSC will not be able to address all the training needs on its own.

This is a vast and challenging mandate, and requires an understanding of several, related but different fields of expertise. It requires that the Human Resources Development function at SRSC be performed as a broad entrepreneurial function, rather than as a matter of routine.

SECTION FOURTEEN
SOCIAL SECTOR PROGRAMMES

14.1. The First Steps: A Facilitating Role

SRSC's immediate mandate is in the income-generating sectors. This reflects the experience that villagers organized aroung income generation stay organized, since the nature of the intervention implies a continuing incentive to work together (e.g., in matters relating to PPI maintenance, loans, inputs, marketing, etc.). Social sector interventions, though essential, do not make good entry points for the organization of small farmers: they do not require farmer participation on a week-by-week basis, for years at end.

Once viable Village Organizations have been formed, however, they provide the forum through which outside agencies can implement social sector programmes on an equitable and cost-effective basis. SRSC can and should play a facilitating role in bringing social sector programmes to the VOs.

Since social sector programmes will be brought to the VOs

by agencies other than SRSC, they would have to explained directly to the villagers by concerned agencies. These agencies would have to understand the SRSC concepts of planning and partnership. They would benefit from adopting an appropriate version of the PPI Diagnostic Survey proposed for SRSC. This process would clarify the expectations and responsibilities of the VO and collaborating agencies, and minimize mis-understanding.

14.2. Early Opportunities

The early opportunities lie in combining existing programmes with perceived village needs. Ongoing efforts in rural water supply and primary health care are probably good starting points, provided institutional arrangements can be worked out to the satisfaction of all parties.

The *barani* areas of Kohat suffer from acute shortage of drinking water, and may be most receptive to early links with existing and planned rural water supply programmes. The World Bank Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) Project has the stated objective of working through Village Development Organizations in NWFP. Kohat District is a natural meeting point for SRSC and the RWSS Project.

Refugee-oriented NGOs operating in Kohat have primary health programmes that could provide conceptual or material inputs for a VO-based primary health care system. The district health establishment is another potential institutional partner.[45]

Both rural water supply and primary health are programmes of particular to rural women. They will have a positive impact on reducing women's workload and improving the health of the family.

SECTION FIFTEEN
MONITORING, EVALUATION AND RESEARCH

15.1. Abstract

The overall objective of MER would be to help the organizational and technical staff in formulating, documenting and assessing replicable institutional and technical models for sustainable rural development. Its specific objectives would include:

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[45]District health authorities in Mardan are collaborating with the Pak-German IRDP in providing health care through Village Development Organizations. In Gilgit and Chitral, the Aga Khan Health Services are collaborating on a pilot project with AKRSP.

- Collaboration with SRSC and other relevant professionals to identify opportunities for investing in the organizational and physical resources of the project area;

- Assistance, guidance and reporting to SRSC on monitoring and assessing programme activities, particularly in the light of the response by villagers;

- Examination of alternative approaches to programme activities; and,

- The development of medium-term strategy and proposals for investment.

MER would perform its functions in such a way as to help SRSC staff internalize simple approaches to monitoring, evaluation and applied research. It would engage available expertise from agricultural and social science institutions. Where necessary, it would organize selected data collection efforts to complement available information.

15.2. Integrating M&E into Management

In much of Pakistan and other developing countries M&E is viewed with suspicion: it is often equated with surveillance and policing. A major challenge for SRSC will be to sensitize staff to the role of M&E in better decision-making by management. For this to begin to happen, the head of M&E has to understand the processes and approaches that SRSC would be promoting, and he has to appreciate how others within SRSC view these.

The systems of monitoring and reporting that are eatablished in the early stages should be built from the bottom up, and eventually incorporate the activities and/or concerns of VOs, field staff, the Management Group, the Board of Directors, and the donors. SRSC should be concerned, most of all, with the movement or trends in the villages; these are sometimes quantifiable, but often require careful documentation and qualitative analysis. Many simple indicators of SRSC and VO activities can be found in the relevant literature, and these will not be listed here.

Monitoring of inputs is essential, but it needs to be complemented by evaluation of impact as a continuing exercise. Impact, however, usually cannot be observed in the short run. Interim assessments of likely impact are necessary. The SRSC approach lends itself to a set of rigourous criteria that can be considered as indicators of likely impact. These criteria are based on the response of villagers to various SRSC programme packages: the working hypothesis is that villager response is an indicator of likely impact.

Each SRSC programme package is a model of institutional arrangements plus development activities or inputs. These models will be offered to VOs; not all models will be adopted by the villagers with equal enthusiasm. Some models will spread rapidly as proposed by SRSC; others will need to be reviewed and altered; still others will have to be discarded. Following the adoption of specific models by VOs is a simple way of assessing programme performance and likely impact.

SRSC progress reports should, in essence, be reports on the progress of an idea: that organized villagers can manage their own resources in a productive, sustainable and equitable manner. Thus, reporting on programme activities should also reflect the process through which SRSC introduces, tests and replicates its models. The burden of reporting at all levels should be minimized: nothing alienates the "doers" as much as a constant flow of papers filled with tables and activity reports.

15.3. Integrating Research into Management

The MER's agenda for research would be derived from the practical concerns of VOs and management. Its main theme should be alternative ways of organizing resources at the village and project management levels. This kind of research puts a premium on extensive knowledge of the project area and the resources available to it. As with M&E, the mechanisms for research have to be consultative and collaborative, and have to draw upon the expertise available within and outside SRSC.

Diagnostic research to identify the priorities of the project area is an appropriate starting point for MER's research efforts. Many opportunities for this kind of work have been identified in the preceding pages; others will emerge with experience on the ground. These opportunities imply multi-disciplinary research undertaken by MER in cooperation with others in the management who represent technical expertise in engineering, appropriate technology, agriculture and resource management, WID, human resources development, rural finance, etc. They provide a natural avenue for MER to integrate research into the business of SRSC and the VOs.

Part C

Staffing, Costs, Phasing, and Funding

SECTION SIXTEEN
STAFF RECRUITMENT AND PHASING

16.1. Suggested Guidelines for Staffing and Expenditure

SRSC is an extra-ordinary venture: it needs extra-ordinary men and women. It needs staff with personal integrity, demonstrated professional competence, and entree into the public and private sectors. In key positions, it needs people for whom development is not just a job but a vocation.

It is recommended that SRSC recruit key personnel from among those for whom development is a vocation rather than only a source of livelihood. In all cases, the criteria of personal integrity, professional competence, and entree into the public and private sectors should be followed.

SRSC's overheads will be watched with interest by those who contemplate replicating its approach. Sceptics have to understand that SRSC's mandate for institutional development requires a high quality, management-intensive programme. SRSC's management has to be cautious that this mandate is not perceived as a license for high overheads.

It is recommended that:

- The Board of SRSC should approve a three-year, multilateral fund-raising effort for programmes, staff positions and support anticipated in this report;
- The Board should approve annual budgets according to the availability of funds; and,
- The Chief Executive Officer should undertake programme expenditure and staff recruitment based on the management's assessment of project needs, within the approved budget.

16.2. Estimates and Phasing of Staff Recruitment

The following estimates of staffing and their budgetary implications have been prepared only to facilitate initial fund-raising for SRSC. The SRSC's Board of Directors will make the final decisions on staff recruitment and budgetary allocations.

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
Professional Staff			
Chief Executive Officer	1	1	1

Social Organization			
Senior Social Organizer	1	1	1
Social Organizers	2	3	3
Women in Development			
Programme Coordinator	1	1	1
Technical Coordinators	2	1	2
Physical Infrastructure & Appropriate Technology			
Senior Engr. (Irrig.)	1	1	1
Asst. Engr. (Mech.)		1	1
AEs/SEs (Civil)	2	3	3
Agriculture & Resource Management			
Senior Agriculturalist	1	1	1
Livestock Develop. Spclst.	1	1	1
Rural Finance & Commerce			
Finance Manager	1	1	1
Accountant	1	1	1
Human Resources Development			
Training Specialist	1	1	1
AV Specialist	1	1	1
Monitoring, Evaluation & Research			
Economist	1	1	1
Soc. Scientist/ Monitoring Officer	1	1	1
Marketing Analyst	1	1	1
Administration, Accounts & Personnel			
Admin. Officer	1	1	1

Supporting Personnel

Draftsman	1	1	1
Estimator	1	1	1
Cashier	1	1	1
Typists/Secretaries	2	3	3
Peon/Watchman	2	2	2
Drivers	11	16	16

SECTION SEVENTEEN
PROGRAMME PHASING

17.1. Assumptions

The phasing assumed in this report derives from the assumptions made in Section 7.1. The most important assumptions are that SRSC will start its operations in one district (i.e., Kohat) with two Social Organizations Units at the field level with which it may initiate up to 50 small-scale PPI projects each year, over a three-year period. In the first two-three years it is likely that other programmes (in credit, agriculture, etc.) will follow the PPI programme's progress in terms of number of villages covered.

17.2. Expansion

Two major factors will determine the pace of expansion of SRSC - credibility among villagers, and the availability of donor resources.

It would be extremely important for SRSC to make a sound start in Kohat before expanding to additional districts. This is essential to build confidence within the project, train staff, test the institutional and technical approaches, and establish credibility with villagers and donors. If SRSC can come up to the expectations of villagers and donors, there will be both pressure and the resources to expand operations within Kohat as well as to additional districts. SRSC should, in any event, confine itself to the one compact project area recommended in Section 2.4 (i.e., the central zone from Charsadda to Karak).

SECTION EIGHTEEN
OUTLINE BUDGET

18.1. Key Assumptions

The outline budget given below is an indicative budget prepared to facilitate initial fund-raising efforts. The Board of Directors of SRSC is expected to have the final say on staffing, overall costs and specific line items.

While specific needs have been anticipated and costed in preparing the following budget, only major and exceptional line items are identified individually. The level of detail has been deliberately minimized; as much as possible, budget figures have been shown as block allocations. This has been done so as to

provide the Board and management of SRSC with a great measure of flexibility in decision-making on programme and recruitment priorities, personnel policies, etc.

The estimated budget assumes staffing and support levels for an immediate, full-fledged start, which is highly unlikely. It also assumes that programme expenditure will be available for limited support for only 150 Village Organizations that could be formed in the first three years. It is likely that SRSC will find additional resources for programme expenditure; this would imply a higher level of programme activity with essentially the same overheads.

It is understood that SRSC may require special consulting expertise that is not available in the country. No budget has been estimated for this purpose: it is expected that SRSC's management will identify its needs and seek funds as and when it becomes operational.

It is possible that SRSC may obtain loans from existing financial institutions. Neither these loans nor any security required against them have been budgeted in this report.

18.2. Budget Estimates

In preparing the following estimates, no provision has been made for inflation or exchange rate changes affecting imported equipment. The estimates are based, as much as possible, on current market rates.

The following figures are in million rupees.

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	TOTAL
		Programme Expenditure		
Physical Infrastructure & Appropriate Technology				
Village level projects	10.0	10.0	10.0	30.0
Major/Inter-Agency Projects		3.0	3.0	6.0
Appropriate Technology		0.2	0.2	0.4
TOTAL	10.0	13.2	13.2	36.4
Agriculture and Resource Management				
Block allocation	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6
Rural Finance & Commerce				
Marketing	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3

Small-farmer Credit	0.5	1.0	1.5	3.0
Human Resources Development				
Block allocation	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.3
Monitoring, Evaluation & Research				
Surveys	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5
TOTAL PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE	11.3	15.1	15.7	42.1
Recurrent Expenditure				
Staff Recruitment	0.2	0.1		0.3
Staff Salaries	6.1	6.9	7.1	20.1
Consultancy	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.5
Other Expenses	2.8	3.4	3.4	9.6
TOTAL RECURRING EXPENDITURE	9.6	10.9	11.0	31.5
Capital Expenditure				
Vehicles	8.3	2.7		11.0
Computers and Office Equipment	0.5	0.5		1.0
AV and Field Equipment	0.3			0.3
Other Assets	0.3	0.1		0.4
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	9.4	3.3		12.7

18.3. Summary of Outline Budget

With the assumptions made above, the estimated outline budget for SRSC is as follows:

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	TOTAL
		million Rs		
Programme Expenditure	11.3	15.1	15.7	42.1
Recurrent Expenditure	9.6	10.9	11.0	31.5
Capital Expenditure	9.4	3.3		12.7
GRAND TOTAL	30.3	29.3	26.7	86.3

SECTION NINETEEN
FUNDING PROSPECTS

19.1. Donor Expectations

Considerable interest has been expressed in the SRSC venture. Funding prospects, however, will depend on donor assessment of some of the major milestones that SRSC will pass through.

SRSC has been conceived as a small, flexible NGO that can chart its own course within the policy set by its Board of Directors. The expectation is that:

- SRSC will be a true NGO, rather than an extension of the government;
- At the same time, it will work with existing organizations, rather than displacing them;
- SRSC will be a small catalyst, rather than a bureaucratic organization undertaking routine development programmes;
- SRSC will be managed by individuals with professional competence, integrity, and *entree* into the private and public sectors.

Initial reaction to SRSC requests for funding will depend substantially on donor assessments of its corporate entity[46], its Chief Executive Officer and senior staff, and the quality and priorities of funding proposals prepared by SRSC. On the basis of these assessments, donors may be willing to contribute small amounts to help SRSC establish its presence in Kohat and start a small programme.

Subsequently, funding prospects will depend on the progress achieved on the ground. While the idea of SRSC will continue to exercise tremendous attraction for donors and development professionals for a long time, this attraction will rapidly turn into disillusionment if SRSC fails to live up to its billing.

19.2. The Mechanics of Fund-raising

If donor requirements and the AKRSP experience are any indication, SRSC should prepare itself to pay a significant cost in management time for fund-raising activities. Every donor will

[46] including the composition of its Board of Directors.

have its own requirements for submission of proposals, approvals, disbursement, and financial and physical reporting. In addition, SRSC will be subject to Government of Pakistan rules for NGO funding. All of this suggests that SRSC will have to treat fund-raising as a specialist activity, and be prepared to pay the costs of fund-raising. Morever, the burden of fund-raising may ease over time as SRSC establishes credibility, but it will always remain a significant burden on management.

The large opportunities for obtaining donor assistance are either through bilateral allocations or through the donor's "NGO window." Bilateral allocations are guarded jealously by the Government of Pakistan. The more approachable NGO window, however, often opens through NGOs located and registered in the donor country. SRSC will need to attempt fund-raising through both windows - bilateral and NGO. While senior SRSC staff will doubtless have the means to effectively pursue fund-raising within the country, fund-raising from donor NGO windows will require institutional linkages with foreign NGOs.[47]

SECTION TWENTY
LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY

20.1. Financial Viability

An early requirement (but one with lasting impact) for the financial viability of SRSC is for it to register formally to fulfill the requirements of various donors.

In terms of its development programmes, SRSC would need to move increasingly from grants to loans, user fees, and other mechanisms for cost recovery. SRSC is advertised as a non-routine catalyst whose subsidies are meant to encourage the testing and adoption of new ways of organizing resources. Once appropriate models have been established, the case for subsidies becomes untenable on these high grounds.[48] Financial viability has to be acquired by making the models pay for themselves - by making sure that the models that are devised can be supported by those they are meant to service.

From an early date, SRSC has to introduce cost-recovery mechanisms across a wide range of its activities. This guideline

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[47]In the case of AKRSP, such linkages were provided by the Aga Khan Foundation network in donor countries.

[48]Subsidies can still be justified on political grounds, or for poverty alleviation, but those are not the special objectives for which SRSC is being proposed.

does not apply to demonstrations of new technical and institutional approaches. Goods and direct services provided by SRSC, however, should be supplied at cost. Over time, the indirect costs of some of the support services should also be charged to Village Organizations, as they acquire the maturity and resources to pay for these services. The sooner the villagers can pay for their programmes, the sooner they will attain the goals and privileges of genuine participation.

Long-term financial viability is linked closely to the long-term institutional development of the Village Organizations.

20.2. Long-term Institutional Options

In the long term, there are at least three possibilities for formalizing and federating the VOs:

- As cooperatives, provided that existing legislation can be made to conform to the principles of a participatory rather than a representational model;[49]
- As owners of one or more joint stock companies set up by SRSC and the VOs; or,
- As the primary tier of local government, if the government and SRSC can work out the appropriate mix of responsibility for participatory Village Organizations and representative local councils.[50]

These options will have to be considered carefully in conjunction with their financial implications for the long term. What limited experience there is in Pakistan suggests that there are no ready-made answers.

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[49]There are precedents for cooperatives to be registered under laws that expand the role of the general body of the cooperative, rather than assigning decision-making to the executive committee.

[50]One can envisage village-level projects being managed by the VO and inter-village infrastructure, irrigation resources, forests, pastures, and user charges as the responsibility of the Union Council.

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THE SARHAD RURAL SUPPORT CORPORATION: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW NGO IN NWFP

Volume 2 of 2: Annexures

Submitted to O/ARD, USAID/Pakistan, pursuant to:

Project Name:	Project Design and Implementation Fund
Project Number:	391-0470
Contract Number:	391-0470-C-00-9516-00
Completion Date:	September 3, 1989

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Development Research and Management Services

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ANNEX A:

DETAILS OF THE CONSULTING ASSIGNMENT

SCOPE OF WORK FOR CONSULTANTS

I. BACKGROUND

The Planning & Development Department, Government of NWFP, has requested USAID to obtain the services of M/s DRMS, Consultants, Islamabad, to prepare a proposal that will facilitate the establishment of a Non-Governmental Organization called the Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC). This activity is based on community participation. The objective of this corporation will be to promote agriculture and rural development in selected areas of NWFP. This proposal will include the design, preliminary work program and outline budget of the SRSC for the first three years or operation to be placed before interested donors.

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

II.1 Social and Administrative Background for Rural Development

The consultants will review rural social dynamics and the administrative machinery that is engaged in rural development in NWFP, with a view towards identifying areas of potential conflict and complementarity with SRSC, and addressing these in II.2-II.4 below.

The consultants will be expected to analyze existing patterns of participation by rural dwellers and the government in resource mobilization and resource allocation for rural development. This analysis should include an examination of: (a) rural social organization; (b) the role of elected officials; and, (c) government initiatives in rural development. Under (b) and (c), specific attention should be paid to the Local Government and Rural Development set-up and other existing mechanisms for government-sponsored projects and programs.

II.2 An Assessment of Rural Development Needs in NWFP

The consultants will review the overall rural environment in NWFP with a view towards providing the justification for the guidelines and options proposed by them in their report.

It is expected that the consultants will broadly review: (a) the state of agricultural and rural development in NWFP; (b) the adequacy of the technical, financial and human resources currently engaged in rural development in the Province; (c) the potential that is indicated by the major trends in the region's development; and, (d) the kinds of interventions that could be undertaken by the

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SRSC to attain the potential that is indicated by the preceding analyses.

II.3 Overall Strategy for Rural Development

The major objective of this part of the assignment will be to develop conceptual guidelines for rural development, and corresponding options that could be implemented by SRSC either itself or in collaboration with other entities.

The consultants will examine different approaches with which the non-governmental SRSC could engage the ingenuity and resources of the villagers, government agencies and private sector entities with whom it might be working. In specific terms, there is a need to articulate a set of conceptual guidelines with which the SRSC could organize itself and its clients, so that villagers may be better able to utilize available resources and manage their own development agenda in the future. These guidelines may be drawn from the experience of Pakistan and other countries, but should suitably reflect the realities of NWFP. It is expected that these guidelines will address: (a) issues of village organization; (b) possible organizational models for SRSC's management and its links to government efforts; and (c) the potential for program development linkages between SRSC and other public and private sector entities working in NWFP.

II.4 Criteria for Selection of Program Area

Within the overall objectives and approach of the SRSC, and given the overall availability of funds over a three-year period the consultants will develop criteria for the selection of initial and subsequent locations for the SRSC's activities.

Without prejudice to the criteria developed in the final analysis, it is expected that the consultants will approach this part of the assignment with reference to: (a) the probability of success of the SRSC initiative; (b) the assessment of the poverty and the potential for development of different regions; (c) the need to retain the physical and conceptual integrity of an innovative approach; and, (d) any other factors that the consultants may find to be of relevance. While many of the criteria for selection will be subjective, the consultants will present and justify ranked options for the initiation and expansion of the SRSC based on criteria developed by them.

II.5 Outline of Likely Program Elements

Corresponding broadly to the options for selecting the program area, there will be a preliminary identification of the program elements likely to make up the bulk of the SRSC's activities in the first three years.

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The consultants will identify the functional 'package' of development needs in each of the following disciplines/ categories: (a) social and women's organization; (b) agriculture, livestock development and sustainable resource management; (c) physical infrastructure; (d) commercial and industrial development; (e) savings and credit; (f) human resources development; and, (g) social sector activities (e.g., primary health care, education, child care, etc.). In addition, the consultants will identify the monitoring, evaluation and research that might be needed to support and develop the preceding program elements.

II.6 An Assessment of Targets, Mechanisms and Inputs

The consultants will assess the broad numerical targets (e.g., numbers of villages and projects) that could be attained by the SRSC in its first three years, and will suggest inputs and mechanisms for achieving those targets.

While SRSC is expected to respond flexibly to the needs of its clients, GONWFP and collaborating donors require an understanding of the commitment that is needed to sustain three years of effort in the likely programme elements. The consultants will: (a) assess the targets that could be achieved over time in each of the likely programme elements; (b) identify the mechanisms through which the SRSC could achieve these targets, including cooperation with provincial and local government and other agencies; and, (c) identify the inputs required of the SRSC, including offices, equipment and the number and kind of staff in various categories.

II.7 Indicative Budget

GONWFP and colloborating donors require indications of the budget that might be needed to sustain the SRSC through its first three years.

The consultants will prepare an indicative budget, broken down by various program and supporting functions, and phased over the first three years. Whenever possible, the budget should identify the likely sources of funding by broad category, e.g., bilateral donors, commercial banks, local government, villagers, etc.

III. COMPOSITION OF THE CONSULTING TEAM

It is envisaged that the consulting team will consist of up to five Pakistani development professionals with experience in the management of rural development. The team is likely to consist of a core of two economists/social scientists, one of whom will be the team leader. In addition, up to three professionals may be required for shorter assignments, one each in engineering, the agricultural sciences, and finance or business development. The

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consultants will also provide their own supporting staff (except drivers).

Each member of the team will be expected to contribute to any or all of the assignments identified above, and the final report will be a team effort. In broad terms, the two social scientists are expected to be responsible for much of the background and strategic phases of the assignment, as well as for overall coordination, while the other members will provide inputs during the program development phase in matters pertaining to their disciplines; the three phases of work are outlined in Section IV below.

The team, as a whole, should be characterized by the following desirable attributes:

(a) ability to synthesize the lessons from rural development, particularly in Pakistan, into an operational, multi-disciplinary program design and program of work for the SRSC;

(b) sensitivity to the environment for rural development in NWFP, and a demonstrated ability to design a program with approaches that are in consonance with the local milieu;

(c) willingness to engage in sympathetic dialogue with professional colleagues at all levels in the public and private sectors;

(d) demonstrated ability to design innovative solutions to overcome rural development contraints in varied settings; and,

(e) adequate backstopping at the professional and administrative levels for the duration of the assignment.

IV. METHODOLOGY

The consultants will work interactively with each other and with the officials of P&D, GONWFP, so that all those involved in the exercise may develop a shared vision of objectives and approaches for SRSC.

The assignment will be undertaken in three broad (and possibly overlapping) phases. The first phase, corresponding roughly to parts II.1 - II.2 of the Terms of Reference, will analyze the social, administrative and development background to rural development in NWFP. The second phase, corresponding to parts II.3 - II.4 of the TORs, will focus on issues of strategy. In the third phase, the consultants will explore the nature and scope of likely program elements and targets, and implications for the type and magnitude of inputs required by SRSC; this phase corresponds to parts II.5 - II.7 of the TORs.

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It is expected that the consultants will:

(a) review secondary data available on NWFP, and carry out any statistical analysis that may be required;

(b) meet with concerned government officials and private sector representatives;

(c) undertake field visits to rural areas to engage villagers and their representatives in dialogues on development; and,

(d) where necessary, carry out limited diagnostic surveys to assess the potential for development.

ANNEX A.2

INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

Government of North-West Frontier Province

Mr Omar Khan Afridi, Chief Secretary

Chief Minister's Secretariat

Mr Saeedullah Jan, Secretary

Planning and Development Department

Mr M. Azam Khan, Additional Chief Secretary
Mr Suleman Ghani, Secretary
Mr Zia ur Rehman, Chief, Special Development Programme

Finance Department

Mr Abdullah, Secretary

Local Government and Rural Development Department

Mr Inayatullah Khan, Secretary
Mr M. Ihtesham Khan, Director General
Mr A. Rashid Kausar, Divisional Director, Kohat Division
Mr Ghulam Habib, Assistant Director, Kohat District
Assistant Engineer, Kohat District
District Council Secretary, Kohat
Mr Parvez Khan Khalil, Planning Officer, Kohat District
Mr Mohammad Yusaf, Assistant Director, Charsadda District
Mr Qismat Khan, Assistant Engineer, Charsadda District
Mr Sarmad Khan, Planning Officer, Charsadda District
Assistant Director, Rural Development, Peshawar District

Department of Agriculture and Cooperatives

Mr Khalid Mansur, Secretary
Mr Aziz Mohammad Khattak, EADA, Kohat District
Mr Mohammad Tahir Piracha, Agriculture Officer, Kohat
Mr Siraj ur Rehman, EADA, Charsadda District
Mr Inayat ur Rehman, Agriculture Officer, Charsadda
Mr Mohib Ali Shah, Assistant Agricultural Engineer, Kohat
Mr Behram Jan, Water Management Officer, Kohat
Mr Javed Khattak, Water Management Officer, Kohat

Department of Forestry and Fisheries

Mr Mahmud Khan, Secretary

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Mr Saad ud Din, Divisional Forest Officer, Kohat

Home Department

Mr Rustam Shah Mohammad, Secretary

Irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department

Mr Anwar Hayat, SDO (Irrigation), Kohat
XEN (Public Health Engineering), Kohat
XEN (Public Health Engineering), Peshawar
SDO (Irrigation), Charsadda

Civil Administration

Mr Khalid Aziz, Commissioner, Kohat Division
Mr Mohammad Shehzad Arbab, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat District
Mr Ziarat Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Charsadda District
Mr Adalat Khan, Resident Magistrate, Shabqadar, Charsadda District
Dr Syed Sohail Altaf, Assistant Commissioner, Nowshera Tehsil
Mr Javed Majid, Deputy Commissioner, Chitral

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dr Pat Peterson, Chief, O/ARD, Islamabad
Mr Frank Pavich, Rural Development, O/ARD, Islamabad
Mr Yusaf Mahmood, O/ARD, Islamabad
Mr John Tucker, Deputy Chief, Rural Development, O/ARD Peshawar
Mr Tariq Durrani, Project Officer, O/ARD, Peshawar

Elected Representatives

Haji Abdul Rehman, Member, District Council, Kohat
Mr Tariq Khan, Member, District Council, Kohat
Malik Shahnawaz Khan, Chairman, Union Council, and Members of Union Council Nariab, Hangu Tehsil, Kohat District
Mr Shamsher, Chairman, Union Council, and Members of the Union Council Bori Shakardara, Kohat Tehsil, Kohat District

Non-Governmental Organizations

Dr Akhter Hameed Khan, Director, Orangi Pilot Project
Mr Shoaib Sultan Khan, General Manager, AKRSP
Dr Michael Wallace, Program Officer, Winrock International
Mr Robert Shaw, Director of Special Programmes, Aga Khan Foundation, Geneva

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Pak-German IRDP, Mardan

Mr S. Iqbal Shah, Project Director
Mr Ikramullah Jan, Social Organizer
Mr Martin Umbach, Advisor, Social Organization

Pak-Holland PATA Groundwater Irrigation Project

Dr J. D. Heijnen, Chief Technical Advisor

Pakistan Academy for Rural Development

Mr A. Qayyum Khan, Director
Mr Hasan Mehdi Naqvi, Field Research Specialist

Appropriate Technology Programmes

Mr Ashiq Hussain, Assistant Director, Manpower and Training, PCSIR, Peshawar
Mr Arbab Abdul Wakil, Assistant Director, Agro-based and Rural Technology Development Division, PCSIR, Peshawar
Ms Desiree, Assistant Manager, Pak-German Domestic Energy Saving Project, Peshawar
Engr. R. S. Hayat, Training Officer, Pak-Holland Metal Project

Villagers of Kohat District, from:

Ghulam Banda, Kohat Tehsil
Rehmanabad, Kohat Tehsil
Nariab, Hangu Tehsil
Karbogha Sharif, Hangu Tehsil

Villagers of Charsadda District, from:

Zarbab Garhi, Tangi Tehsil
Muftipur, Tangi Tehsil
Sarfaraz, Tangi Tehsil
Kharakai, Charsadda Tehsil
Hariana, Charsadda Tehsil

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RECORD OF ACTIVITIES OF THE CONSULTING TEAM

Monday, 13 March 1989
EFFECTIVE DATE OF START OF CONTRACT.

Tuesday, 14 March 1989
3:30pm Team Meeting with Frank Pavich, O/ARD, USAID Islamabad

Wednesday, 15 March 1989
HUSAIN AND BANURI DEPART FOR PESHAWAR.

7:00am Depart for Peshawar
10:00am Meet John Tucker and Tariq Durrani, USAID/RAO, Peshawar
11:30am Meet Suleman Ghani, Secretary P&D and Zia ur Rehman, Chief, SDP
1:30pm Meet Abdullah, Secy. Finance

Thursday, 16 March 1989
SHAMOON SADIQ, STATISTICAL ANALYST, JOINS THE TEAM.

8:15am Meet H.M. Naqvi, PARD
8:30am Publications Unit, PARD
10:00am Meet Inayatullah Khan, Secy. LG&RD
1:00pm Meet Tariq Durrani, USAID/RAO
7:30pm Dinner with Secy. P&D

Friday, 17 March 1989
10:00am Team Meeting on Background Statistics, to 4 pm

Saturday, 18 March 1989
9:30am Meet Secy. P&D
10:30am Meet M. Ehtisham Khan, DG LG&RD
12:00pm Meet M. Azam Khan, ACS
1:00pm Meet Mahmud Khan, Secy. Forests

Sunday, 19 March 1989 END OF WEEK 1
DELIVER WORK PLAN.

9:00am Meet Omar Khan Afridi, Chief Secretary
9:45am Meet Rustam Shah Mohammad, Home Secy.
1:00pm Meet Khalid Mansur, Secy. Agric.

Monday, 20 March 1989
8:30am Depart for Pak-German IRDP, Mardan
9:45am Meet Martin Umbach, Social Organization Advisor, and Ikramullah Jan, Social Organizer
10:30am Meet S. Iqbal Shah, Project Director

12:00pm Depart for Islamabad
3:30pm Meet S. Cromer, Chief, Contracts Division, USAID
4:30pm Meet Akhter Hameed Khan

Tuesday, 21 March 1989
WORK ON STRATEGY & BACKGROUND, 21-24 MAR.

9:00am Meet Yusaf Mahmood, O/ARD, USAID, Islamabad
1:00pm Return to Peshawar
8:00pm Team Meeting

Wednesday, 22 March 1989
9:45am Team Meeting
10:30am Meet A. Qayyum Khan, Director PARD
11:45am Meet M. Ihtesham Khan, DG LG&RD
12:45pm Meet S. Ghani, Secy. P&D
1:45pm Meet Saeedullah Jan, Secy. to Chief Minister

Thursday, 23 March 1989
PUBLIC HOLIDAY: PAKISTAN DAY.

Friday, 24 March 1989
8:00pm Meet Shoaib Sultan Khan, General Manager, AKRSP

Saturday, 25 March 1989
DELIVER DRAFT ON OUTLINE STRATEGY.
KHUSRO MIR, ENGINEER, JOINS THE TEAM.

6:00pm Team Meeting

Sunday, 26 March 1989 END OF WEEK 2
START FIRST ROUND OF FIELD VISITS.

8:30am Depart for day-trip to Nizampur.
9:30am Meet Dr Syed Sohail Altaf, AC Nowshera; and AD, RDD, Peshawar
11:45am Meet Union Council Nizampur in Nizampur
2:00pm Depart for Peshawar
6:00pm Team Meeting

Monday, 27 March 1989
8:15am Depart for Kohat. Night stay in Kohat.
10:00am Meet M. Shahzad Arbab, DC Kohat
10:15am Meet Saad ud Din, DFO Kohat
10:30am Meet M. Tahir Piracha, AO; Behram Jan, WMO
12:30pm TJB/HKM Meet District Council Staff; TH Meet DAE Officers
1:45pm Meet Plan. Offr., Dist. Engr., Chairmen Union Councils
3:00pm Lunch with Plan. Offrs. Kohat & Karak

Tuesday, 28 March 1989

9:00am Meet at DC's office
9:30am Start field visit with AO (Ag. Extn.), AD (RDD), WMOs (DOFWM)
9:45am Visit Ag. Extn. Demonstration Plot
10:00am Meet Mohib Ali Shah, Asstt. Ag. Engr., at Ag. Engg. Workshop
11:00am Meet VDO members in Ghulam Banda
12:00pm Visit renovated watercourse in Kharmatoo
1:00pm Meeting at office of Ghulam Habib, AD, RDD
3:00pm Depart for Peshawar

Wednesday, 29 March 1989
8:25am Depart for day-trip to Charsadda
9:15am Meet Mohammad Yusaf, AD and AE, RDD
10:45am TH to Ag. Stats. Officer; HKM to site visit with AE, RDD
11:00am TH to EADA's office with AO Inayat ur Rehman
12:45pm Team Meeting with Ziarat Khan, DC Charsadda
1:45pm Depart for Peshawar
7:00pm Team Meeting

Thursday, 30 March 1989
11:00am Meet Frank Pavich O/ARD, and John Tucker, RAO, USAID

Friday, 31 March 1989
AGHA IMRAN HAMID, CREDIT & MKTNG. SPCLST., JOINS THE TEAM.

Saturday, 1 April 1989
9:30am Depart for Charsadda
10:30am Meet RDD Officers
11:00am Meet EADA Siraj ur Rehman and 2 AOs
12:15pm Meet Adalat Khan, RM Shabqadar
1:00pm Visit Munda Headworks on River Swat
2:00pm Visit head of civil canal Katiala Nau
3:00pm Depart for Peshawar

Sunday, 2 April 1989 END OF WEEK 3

9:00am Team Meeting
10:15am Depart for Charsadda
11:15am Visit AD, RDD; EADA; ADBP
12:00pm Village Meeting at Muftipur
2:30pm Village Meeting at Sarfaraz
4:45pm Village Meeting at Zarbab Garhi
5:45pm Depart for Peshawar

Monday, 3 April 1989
1. CHARSADDA VILLAGE STUDIES BY SHAMOON SADIQ, 3-6 APR.
2. KOHAT FIELD VISIT BY REST OF THE TEAM, 4-6 APR.

11:00am Team Meeting
1:00pm Debriefing with Secy. P&D

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5:30pm Meet Ikramullah Jan, Social Organizer, Pak-German IRDP

Tuesday, 4 April 1989

8:30am Depart for Kohat
10:00am Meet Khalid Aziz, Commissioner Kohat
11:00am Meet AD RDD and EADA
11:45am Depart for Hangu
1:15pm Meet Union Council and Elders of Nariab
3:30pm Attend Farmers' Day at Karbogha with EADA and Ghani ur Rehman, MPA
5:15pm Depart for Kohat

Wednesday, 5 April 1989

8:45am Meet A. Rashid Kausar, Divisional Director, LG&RD
9:30am Depart for Shakardara
10:45am Meet Union Council Bori Shakardara & Dist. Council Member
1:30pm Visit Indus right bank opposite Makhad
2:30pm Village Meeting at Rehmanabad, UC Shakardara
5:30pm Kohat: Office of AD RDD

Thursday, 6 April 1989

END FIRST ROUND OF FIELD VISITS.

8:30am Visits to: Kohat Fruit Market; Agric. & RDD Offices
10:30am Meet A. Rashid Kausar, Divisional Director, LG&RD
11:00am Depart for Peshawar

Sunday, 9 April 1989 END OF WEEK 4

Monday, 10 April 1989

12:00pm Meet Pat Peterson, Chief, O/ARD, John Tucker and Tariq Durrani, RAO, USAID

Thursday, 13 April 1989

DELIVER FIRST INFORMAL DRAFT INCLUDING OVERVIEW, SELECTED ISSUES, AND LIKELY PROGRAMMES FOR SRSC.

Saturday, 15 April 1989

SELECTED REPEAT FIELD VISITS TO PARTICIPATORY PROJECTS: 15-30 APR.

Sunday, 16 April 1989 END OF WEEK 5

Sunday, 23 April 1989 END OF WEEK 6

Thursday, 27 April 1989

HUSAIN AND BANURI VISIT AKRSP, GILGIT, 27 APR.-4 MAY. (FLIGHTS CANCELLED/ROAD BLOCKED 1-5 MAY.)

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6:20am PK 401 to GLT.
8:30am Meet with AKRSP Staff.
11:00am Call on DC and Administrator, Northern Areas.
4:00pm Visit Kargah Hydroelectric Power Station.

Friday, 28 April 1989
8:00am Depart for Soust in Upper Hunza.
12:15pm Visit Soust Irrig. Channel and Land Development.
4:00pm Visit Karimabad.
6:30pm Return to Gilgit.

Saturday, 29 April 1989
10:00am Meeting with AKRSP Management Group on NGO Strategy.
4:00pm Meet Men's and Women's Village Organizations, Oshikhandass.

Sunday, 30 April 1989 END OF WEEK 7

10:00am Second and Third Flights Cancelled.
7:00pm Dinner with Deputy General Manager, AKRSP.

Monday, 1 May 1989
7:00am All Flights Cancelled.
7:00pm Dinner with AKRSP Staff.

Tuesday, 2 May 1989
7:00am Both Flights Cancelled.

Wednesday, 3 May 1989
7:00am Both Flights Cancelled.

Thursday, 4 May 1989
7:00am Both Flights Cancelled.
11:00am Meet Shoaib Sultan Khan, General Manager, AKRSP.
4:00pm Banuri departs for ISB on AKRSP helicopter (one seat available).

Friday, 5 May 1989
9:00am All PIA Flights Cancelled.
10:00am Husain returns to ISB on Army-chartered C-130 Flight.

Saturday, 6 May 1989
DELAYED BREAK, 6-17 MAY.

Wednesday, 17 May 1989
KHUSRO MIR AND IQBAL NIAZI DEPART FOR KOHAT.

Friday, 19 May 1989 END OF WEEK 8

Sunday, 21 May 1989
DELIVER SECOND INFORMAL DRAFT, INCLUDING BACKGROUND, MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND ISSUES; PLUS ANY REVISIONS IN LIKELY

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PROGRAMMES.

Thursday, 18 May 1989
11:00am Meet Michael Wallace, Program Officer, Winrock

Friday, 26 May 1989 END OF WEEK 9

Saturday, 27 May 1989
12:15pm Meet Robert Shaw, Aga Khan Foundation

Friday, 2 June 1989 END OF WEEK 10

Wednesday, 7 June 1989
DELIVER COMPLETE DRAFT REPORT.

Monday, 19 June 1989
9:00am Meet USAID Project Staff to receive comments on draft.

Tuesday, 26 June 1989
10:00am Visit of Frank Pavich, Chief, RDD, O/ARD USAID, to contractor's offices in Islamabad.

Sunday, 2 July 1989
DELIVER FINAL REPORT TO USAID PENDING GONWFP COMMENTS.

Thursday, 10 August 1989
COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM GONWFP.

11 August - 14 August, 1989
WEEKEND AND PUBLIC HOLIDAYS.

Monday, 4 September 1989
FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO USAID, ISLAMABAD.

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ANNEX B:

APPROACHES TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT

MANAGERIAL, REPRESENTATIVE, AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES

1. DEFINING THE THREE APPROACHES

Three broad approaches to rural development can be observed in NWFP. These approaches may be described as:

- The managerial approach, in which programmes are designed and managed by technical experts, often according to pre-determined blueprints.
- The participatory approach, in which villagers establish their own institutions, identify their priorities, organize their resources, manage their development agenda, and forge the necessary links for ongoing technical and financial assistance by outside agencies.
- The representative approach, often mistaken for community participation. In this approach, elected or nominated representatives of a community determine the development agenda, interact with the development agencies, and otherwise represent their community's interests as best as they can.

The managerial approach is followed by most of the line agencies and development projects in NWFP. The participatory approach is followed by the Pak-German Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) in Mardan and Swabi, and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) in Chitral and the Northern Areas.[1] It has also been initiated by the government in the IFAD/ADB-assisted Chitral Area Development Project. The AKRSP approach represents the oldest existing working model of the participatory approach in NWFP.

The representative approach is followed in: (a) all programmes that depend on public representatives (including Union Councillors, District Councillors, MPAs, and political party office-holders); and (b) all models of organization (including official cooperatives and Water User Associations) in which decision-making powers are vested not in the general body but in executive committees, management boards and the like.

All three approaches - managerial, representative and participatory - have a role in development. For many purposes, however, it is important to question *ab initio* the rationale for

[1]Similar attempts are also being made, for specific programmes in irrigation and forestry, by the Pak-Holland PATA Irrigation Project and the Pak-Swiss Kalam Integrated Development Project.

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preferring one or the other approach. This is particularly important in the case of SRSC, which is expected to be a non-routine, innovative project.

2. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH

In an important sense, the arguments for participatory as well as representative approaches are based on three main critiques of the managerial approach. First, outside managers may not be able to identify critical problems of a particular community or to select the most appropriate intervention, with the result that the disaffection of the beneficiary community often persists, or is even intensified, despite the resolution of problem after problem through managerial action.

Second, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for these managers to utilize inexpensive local technology or cost-saving local information for the implementation and operation of development programmes (in particular, the construction and maintenance of infrastructural facilities). The result is that implementation and operation through managerial arrangements is generally far more costly than that through local initiatives.

Third, the tendency of distant managerial systems to translate qualitative goals into more manageable quantitative targets to facilitate centralized supervision and control, leads to a deterioration in the quality of services provided through such methods. Perhaps it is best to illustrate these objections by means of a concrete example.

Take the case of the primary educational system in a country like Pakistan. This is a service provided to remote rural areas of the country, through a large bureaucracy, in which decision making has gradually become highly centralized. The difficulties encountered by this organization are quite well known, and can readily be summarised. First, there are problems with the location of educational institutions, because optimal decision making about location depends upon the effective processing of information available with local communities, but often not with the upper level managers.

Second, the government spends roughly Rs 200,000 to construct a primary school, consisting of a two room building in a village, which the villagers could construct with local materials and technology at a fraction of the cost. Of course, the cost difference is explained, in part, by the greater willingness of villagers to substitute abundant labour (for maintenance) for scarce capital (for construction).

These two points, however, are relatively minor in nature. The fundamental issue is the third one, that distant managerial

systems are much better equipped to enforce quantitative or mechanical goals, than qualitative or ultimate objectives of a particular service. In most cases, this means that the organization will evaluate its own performance in terms of the (easily measurable) inputs provided, rather than in terms of the ultimate service to the community.

To go back to our example of the educational system, its output consists of the skills and values which it imparts to the school children, while inputs consist of the number of schools, teachers, and school equipment and facilities. There is no instance of senior officials of the Ministry of Education being called to account because Pakistani children go through the system without learning to read and write properly, or without imbibing the core cultural and social values of the society. On the other hand, in a properly functioning department someone will have to answer if, say, a school does not exist, a teacher does not show up, or if school facilities are inadequate.

The point is, however, that this problem is not peculiar to the educational system. Health systems assess their performance in terms of the number of doctors, nurses and hospitals, not of better health and hygiene; law and order institutions measure arrests made or cases decided, not law or order necessarily; agriculture departments evaluate the inputs distributed, not the overall output produced; and defence institutions cite the number of personnel and armaments, not the level of security or insecurity.

There are very good reasons for this pattern. The first one has already been mentioned, that it is easier to measure inputs than outputs. Second, a permanent organization based on hierarchical authority and chain of command can only be created by training people to respect internal procedures and clearly defined, if mechanical, targets. If the targets are complex or incommensurable, it will be necessary to have a decentralized organization with effective discretionary powers delegated to local managers. (In terms of the concepts popularized by Max Weber, the father of modern sociology, this is the difference between bureaucratic and charismatic authority).

But here's the rub. The success or failure of a decentralized type of organization will depend critically upon the ability, vision, and leadership qualities of the local managers, in other words, upon their charismatic abilities; but, as is well known, it is easier to train people to follow rules of procedure than to train them to possess charismatic qualities. An example may be useful here.

It is well known that military officers who are good at staff responsibilities (i.e., those who are disciplined and can follow laws and procedures) are, in many cases, not the best field

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commanders (i.e., those who win battles). If we consider discipline to be an input, and winning battles an output, it is immediately obvious that military training and practice focusses invariably on the input, because you cannot train an army of soldiers by telling each recruit to go and win battles: you train it by instilling discipline and obedience among the soldiers. Only in wartime, which is (fortunately) relatively infrequent, is the normal system of rules and rewards suspended, so as to allow the different breed of soldiers to rise to the top.

The problem is that in the educational system, which we have chosen as an example, there is, as it were, a permanent state of war - against ignorance, illiteracy, and superstition, and therefore a need for an organization which will always be geared towards winning the war, rather than towards following rules and procedure. This is what creates the quintessential managerial dilemma: whether to have a 'predictable' and 'controllable' organization whose personnel will be accountable to their superiors; or to opt for an autonomous and flexible organization whose personnel would, in a sense, be accountable mainly to themselves. Proposals for managerial re-organization and effective decentralisation often assume that the latter is a feasible alternative. For obvious reasons, however, the results of such initiatives have been relatively uneven and sporadic.

Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that the problem could be even more intricate than this. The Mexican philosopher, Gustavo Esteva has argued that modern (managerial) systems end up by creating a scarcity of the very good or service they are supposed to provide: The educational system creates a scarcity of knowledge in society, the health system of the knowledge of healthy and hygienic practices, the system of agricultural extension and research of the knowledge of productive agricultural practices, and so on.

Esteva's insights have been supported by some research done independently, by the renowned Mexican anthropologist, Lourdes Arizpe. Arizpe discovered that although unschooled Mexican-Indian children knew the names and properties of five times as many roots and plants as did the schooled children, it is the former who are considered ignorant, not only by others but even by themselves. In other words, as the schooling system provides knowledge, it also destroys and renders illegitimate the knowledge of local communities, and thus creates a 'scarcity' of knowledge in society which only schooling can satisfy. If this criticism is taken seriously, it would be next to impossible to measure the impact of the educational system upon a community, because the knowledge which is being de-legitimized and destroyed in the process cannot be measured at all.

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3. REPRESENTATIVE AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES

To return to our argument, where possibilities of managerial success are not considered promising, there are two broad options. One is the imposition of accountability and responsiveness upon the bureaucratic system through the authority of electoral or representative leadership. Failing that, the only recourse is the direct involvement of the beneficiaries into the decision making process.

In terms of the earlier example, the Education Department may not be able to identify problems and solutions of local communities; its solutions may be costly and ineffective, and it may not be in a position to evaluate its teaching programme in terms of the output of the system, but these problems can be overcome by relying on the members of the local community themselves. Members of the community will be aware of their problems as well as of inexpensive methods of solving them; they will also know whether the system is delivering education or ignorance. This knowledge can be introduced into the system either by incorporating elected leadership at the higher decision making level, or by decentralizing decision making functions, and handing them not to managers from outside, but rather to organized village communities.

The first solution has been tried in various rural development initiatives in Pakistan, such as the Rural Works Programme, the District Councils Programmes, the MPA/MNA/Senators Programme, the new Peoples Programme, and the Union Councils Programme. It also forms the basis for such initiatives as the Water Users Associations of the provincial DOFWM, and the Cooperatives movement in the country. It is worth noting, though, that the original design for the Rural Works Programme of the 1970s called for implementation by assemblies of *all adults*. In practice, however, this important organizational principle was not followed.

The 1988 Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Peoples Party picks up the themes of decentralization and community participation in its Chapter 3, "Devolution of Authority." The last four points of this chapter and the concluding sentence are reproduced below:

> 3.7 Devolve maximum authority of government to the smallest functional unit. Whatever can be done in tehsil must not be handled at the district. Involve local bodies actively on a day to day basis with rural development programmes and with community development in the urban areas.
>
> 3.8 Improve the total system of running government, streamline and decentralise it, to serve the needs of the people efficiently, effectively and with speed. Give people the power to decide issues relating to their own

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social welfare. Institute a proper system of checks and balance [*sic*]. Reward merit and make them fully accountable. Reform the system to obtain maximum direct participation of citizens in all local government bodies.

3.9 Fund the local government by delegating the provincial governments to collect taxes.

3.10 Take decentralization to its logical conclusion and blend it with the overall uplift of socio-economic conditions and expansion of social and political consciousness. The Party is beholden to this ideal and will work to translate it into a practical, dynamic and realistic programme.

We believe that only when political and social authority is transferred to the people, provincial autonomy will bear fruit, people will gain confidence and the Federation shall be strengthened.

It is important to recognize that community participation is fundamentally distinct from the representative approach. The participatory approach is based on organizing those disadvantaged members of society who cannot compete effectively in economic life as individuals. This was the motivation behind the Raiffesen cooperatives established for small farmers in Germany in the nineteenth century. The Raiffesen cooperatives served as the inspiration for the Indian cooperatives legislation. In transplanting the Raiffesen idea, however, this legislation ignored the primacy of the general body of the cooperative, and conceded management control and powers to the executive committee of the cooperative. This transmuted version of the cooperatives was inherited by Pakistan as well as India after independence from colonial rule. When the Indian government under Jawaharhal Nehru appointed a commission to inquire into the causes of failure of cooperatives, the commission concluded that it is the executive committee that undermines the spirit of cooperative action and hijacks the benefits provided under the legislation and programmes for cooperatives.

This alienation of public from private interest is the fundamental critique of the representational solution to managerial ineffectiveness. This has many implications. First, the representatives, like the outside managers, may have their own private financial as well as political goals, which may not necessarily be consonant with the shared objectives of the local community. Representative institutions could, in the worst case, become corrupt as well as inefficient versions of purely managerial institutions.

Second, while reliance on electoral representation could lead to tolerance, negotiation, and compromise, it could also lead to

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polarization and conflict. Indeed, if all political powers are assigned to elected leaders, it could happen that issues which are, in a sense, part of the shared values of the society, and therefore not the subject of political struggle, end up with a lower priority, if the energies of political leaders remain focussed on immediate political objectives.

Third, as a corollary of the last point, a cooperative decision making arrangement would be appropriate and beneficial when it came to matters which are part of the shared social and cultural values of a population. Keeping these within the political arena could end up transforming them into bargaining counters for instrumentalist political leaders. The result could only be the degeneration of the quality of service.

The above criticisms are as relevant for representational solutions of national development questions or rural development initiatives which replace the authority of local communities with those of elected bodies, as for cooperative institutions which replace collective community participation with autonomous executive committees.

Notwithstanding the historical role of executive committees, recent legislation and programmes in Pakistan have continued to give primacy to the executive committee over the general body. Thus, provincial ordinances for Water User Associations, and several other development projects, tend to equate community participation with the formation of committees. In effect, *representation is mistaken for participation*. The result is that community participation remains a distant hope, while influential members of the committees benefit hugely from government funds.

Local community participation in development is being increasingly recognised as an important goal in its own right. [Rondinelli et. al., 1983, Gran, 1983, Hirschman, 1984, Marglin, 1984]. The preceding discussion indicates that there is also an "efficiency" argument for supporting it, because only local communities are in a position to identify problems, present solutions, implement cost-effective responses, and to evaluate and judge the "output" of these responses and programmes on an objective basis.

One of the advantages of participatory approaches is that they are capable of pragmatic and flexible decision making methods. In other words, as the situation on the ground changes, so can the decisions or even the mode of making decisions. Consistency and responsibility is enforced not through some mechanical adherence to rules of conduct, but rather by a commitment to the outcome of the decision making process. Lastly, the dimensions of managerial responsibility are sought to be kept in consonance with the capacity of a certain level of management. The central importance of the output of decision making ensures, further, that "experts"

become providers of service rather than defenders of expertise or protectors of an insular priesthood.

4. REPRESENTATIVE APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT IN NWFP

At the moment, there are several rural development programmes in the NWFP, which have a representative orientation. These include the Rural Development programme of the GONWFP, the Union Councils programmes, the District Councils programme, the defunct MPAs/MNAs/Senators programmes, the newly established Peoples Programme, and the On-Farm Water Management Project.

4.1. Rural Development Programmes

The Annual development Programme of the LG&RDD is approved by the Director-General LG&RDD, in consultation with political representatives and the district administration. The surveying and costing of the approved schemes is done by the technical staff of LG&RDD, and schemes are implemented through project committees formed at the local level.

A new district level initiative in rural development has been launched by the Federal government, under the title of Peoples Programme. This programme is administered by a newly created outfit, staffed mainly by political activists of each region. Its functioning and progress are still evolving, and cannot be evaluated at this stage.

Whereas, the rural development programme has a block allocation, the Union Council programme works on the basis of Rs 100,000 for each of the 526 Union Councils in the province. Each Union Council has between 5 and 10 members, who identify development schemes for their areas. The total allocation for a UC is divided equally between its members, and the amount allocated to the schemes identified by them. The estimates of the schemes are prepared by the engineering staff of the LG&RDD, and final approval of schemes is accorded by the Director General, LG&RDD.

The concerned member of the Union Council who is to execute the scheme, appoints a Project Committee. The technical staff is supposed to see that work is done according to specifications. The rural works programme and Union Council programme are run independently. It is a peculiar feature of the programme that funds are distributed on a pro-rata basis instead of on an integrated priority programme. The result is that part of the schemes are completed and no one project is taken up for its entire completion. There is also no provision for maintenance of the completed works. In the programme for roads most of the schemes consist of shingling which is spreading loose shingle mixed with earth without any consolidation. These works do not last for a long time unless subsequently metalled and black topped.

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4.2. The District Council

District Councils in NWFP are autonomous bodies, with their own revenues and their own technical staff. Each Council is headed by a Chairman, and consists of a certain number of members elected from wards formed on the basis of population. The Council Secretariat has a Chief Officer from the Local Council Services, his clerical staff, and an engineering staff consisting of one District Engineer and 4 or more Sub-Engineers.

Each member of the District Council submits a prioritized list of developmental schemes in his area to the Chairman. Estimates are prepared by the engineering staff, and the technical personnel prepare an annual development programme, for approval by the District Council, in which high priority schemes from each constituency are selected in such a way that the funds get distributed roughly equally between the members. The schemes are implemented by project committees headed by the respective members of the District Council, under the supervision of the technical staff. The quality of actual works is said to be quite variable.

4.3. On Farm Water Management

This programme is present in all the four provinces of Pakistan. In Kohat, it is funded by the World Bank, and locally administered by an Assistant Director of DOFWM, who supervises an agricultural and an engineering section. The following projects are implemented under this programme: i) Improvements of water courses; ii) Precision land levelling; and iii) Storage Tanks.

The water courses are fed by government canals (reservoirs), and civil canals. The improvements generally consist of lining 20% of the courses near the head reaches, and cleaning, desilting, etc of the remaining portions. It is estimated that these improvements reduce the water losses from 48% to 15 to 20 % and more area can be brought under command with the same quantity of water. The length of a water course is generally from 2500 meters to 3000 meters and area of command 100 to 150 acres.

The World Bank fund picks up 80% of the cost of the project, while the remaining 20% is provided by a local contribution for the labor component of the scheme.

The users association of farmer beneficiaries executes a proper agreement, on Rs 4 stamp paper. After 2 years of completion the 10% of the expenditure from World Bank 'fund' is recovered from the users over a period of 5 years.

The NWFP Water Users Associations Ordinance, 1981, stipulates the following rules for WUAs:

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- Criteria for membership: Membership is open to all irrigators, including owners, tenants and renters.

- Participation required for formation of WUA: Approval from at least 51% of the irrigators/water users is required for an application to be made for registration. At least 75% of the irrigators must approve the formation of the WUA.

- Meetings required of the General Body: The General Body is required to hold at two meetings every year.

- Executive/management powers: A Board of Directors of at least five members is elected by secret ballot for a term of two years.

- Federations of WUAs: Distributary and Canal Federations are provided for in the Ordinance.

5. PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN NWFP

NWFP has the distinction of introducing a large number of innovative projects in the area of rural development, many of which have a larger or smaller participatory component. The following is a brief list of some prominent participatory initiatives in the NWFP and in the Northern Areas of Pakistan.

5.1. The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)

AKRSP was initiated in December 1982 in Gilgit district in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. The programme was subsequently extended to Chitral (1983) and Baltistan (1985). Initially, the main body of funding was provided by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), but significant funds were subsequently contributed by official aid agencies of various countries, including Canada (CIDA, and Alberta AID), the United States (USAID), United Kingom (ODA), the Netherlands, European Community (CEC), and philanthropic organizations such as OXFAM and the Ford Foundation. From Pakistan, grant funds have been contributed by the Government of Pakistan, Women's Division, while loans have been provided by Habib Bank Ltd. and the Regional Development Finance Corporation.

The main objective of the programme is to promote active participation of local people in the development process, by providing financial, technical, and institutional support to village organizations (VOs) through which collective management of common property resources can take place. This is approached through a continuing dialogue between the villagers (in common assembly) and the management group (MG) of the AKRSP, in which AKRSP provides funds for a Productive Physical Infrastructure project (PPI), subject to the condition that the villagers participate in the formation of the VO, which will identify,

execute, and maintain the development project, and guarantee other terms of the agreement - e.g., establishing a system of wage savings - by entering into a formal partnership with AKRSP.

AKRSP's experience is generally viewed as an outstanding success. Leaving aside the longer term objectives, in the short-run alone, it has succeeded in establishing 585 VOs, and implementing an equal number of PPI projects in the Northern Areas, with an average outlay of Rs 164,000. The indications are that the VOs have begun to take root in society, and have created the basis for self-sufficient pursuit of development objectives by local communities. The project also succeeded in raising awareness of such pressing developmental concerns as environmental sustainability, appropriate technology, and women's role in development.

AKRSP also has a credit programme for village communities. Of the production loans, 69% was spent on buying fertilizers. This amounted to Rs 13.55 million since the inception of the programme. The credit has reached 88% of the VOs, even to distant villages in high elevation where the infrastructural base was very weak. In fact, the major accomplishment of AKRSP's credit programme is its accessibility to small farmers.

5.2 The Pak-German Integrated Rural Development Project

The Pak-German IRDP began formally with the signing of an agreement in 1982, but actual work began in 1984. Originally, the target area of the programme was Swabi Tehsil (now a district), but it was extended to the entire Mardan District (now Mardan Division), and to parts of Baluchistan Province. The project is funded to the tune of Rs 50 million, including a grant of Rs 38.5 million from the German Development Fund (GTZ), the balance of Rs 11.5 million being provided by the Government of NWFP through its developmental budget.

The main object of the programme is to help establish farmers' organizations, so that local communities can pursue developmental activities more effectively. In this context, the project has tried to cooperate with the local rural development agencies, as well as with elected officials, particularly in the implementation of the MPA/MNA/Senators programme for rural development.

In the first phase of the project, the aim was to involve local communities in the identification, design, and implementation of development schemes undertaken by government departments and elected officials. In the second phase, greater emphasis was given to institution-building, especially the establishment of Village Organizations (VOs), through which all subsequent activities are undertaken.

IRDP provides material, technical assistance and wages for the

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project while the VO's main responsibilities includes the implementation and maintenance of the schemes. The VOs maintain close contact with local government institutions, which also provide a link to other government agencies.

Emphasis has also been given to other welfare organizations, such as Youth Development Organizations (YDOs), and Women in Development. The main aim of the YDOs is the mobilization of young people for social welfare tasks, and the development of leadership and organizational skills in the future generation.

The programme has covered 71 villages in 12 Union Councils, and helped in the formation of 50 VDOs, 36 YDOs, 9 Women's Groups, and 16 Farmers' Groups. Many schemes which were initiated in the first project phase have been completed. These include:

- Infrastructural Schemes: Irrigation or water supply; pavement of streets and drains; road construction; public health - latrines; flood protection.

- YDO Schemes: Small schemes completed by YDO's are in the area of: Construction of sewerage drain; pavement of streets; village library.

- Social Forestry Scheme: This was initiated in five villages. The project provided them free saplings of suitable species, and the plantation was done on communal *ashr* basis. The project also provided support for the construction of fences. Small nurseries were also established.

- Agriculture Programmes: Demonstration plots for rainfed and irrigated crops; distribution of fruit trees; demonstration and distribution of improved farm implements in co-operation with Pak-Swiss ALEP; supply of agricultural inputs on loan basis; training in horticulture, bee-keeping and crops.

- Women's Programmes: Support of small scale poultry; health programmes, e.g., midwife training.

6. OTHER INTERESTING PROJECTS IN NWFP

6.1. PATA Irrigation Project

Background

The project was initiated on 1st July 1986. The main target area is the Malakand Agency but it also covers partial areas of other districts in Malakand Division: Buner Sub-division in Swat District; Pukki Khail area in Swat District; and Adinzai, Talash and Jandool areas in Dir District.

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The project is funded by a Dutch loan mainly for machinery, equipment and execution of development work and schemes; a Dutch grant for Technical Assistance, primarily to meet the cost of consultancy; and a local budget to pay for staff salaries, allowances and other running costs.

The project organization includes participation by the Planning and Development, Irrigation and Agriculture Departments of the GONWFP, and the WAPDA directorate of Hydrogeology, Peshawar.

The objectives of the project include an increase in agriculture production in the project area by providing alternative supplies of irrigation water to the land along with an integrated approach to extension in the field of agriculture, water management and farmer organization.

Two different strategies have been implemented, one for Tubewell Schemes and the other for Dugwell Schemes.

Tubewells

The central feature of this programme is the direct coordination between line departments and the farmers. After the identification of a potential site, the farmers of the area are taken into confidence, and the potential benefits of the project explained. If they agree in principle to the conditions of the project, they are asked to submit a formal application to the Planning and Development Department for the installation of tubewells. From here onwards, the line departments involve themselves directly in the implementation of the project.

Before taking any concrete steps, certain terms and conditions are required to be fullfilled by the applicants, like the formation of Water Users Association (WUA), which have many organizational responsibilities besides the construction and operation of tubewells, including: collection of finances, communication with appropriate departments, and establishment of a system of water distribution.

Dugwells

The central theme of this programme is the direct relationship between Planning and Development Department and the farmers with minimum involvement of the line departments. Farmers, under the supervision of the respective Union Councils, are responsible for planning, constructing and operating the scheme.

It is only through the consultation with the Union Council that a farmer may apply for development assistance. To pursue the project, certain terms and conditions are required such as:

o Limitations on the size of land in the scheme.

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- Formation of an organization of farmers which directly works under the supervision of Union Council, and which is responsible for the collection of finances and for communication with appropriate departments. Once the conditions have been accepted, the project people send their necessary support (financial and technical) for its implementation.

Other activities of the project include: the establishment of demonstration plots for maize (24), tomatoes (8), mungbeans (4), and maize seed multiplication (6). A 14-day training workshop was also held in Mingora/Swat for extension purposes. So far tubewells have been constructed at Katkla, Bunir, Palay. Many others are under construction.

6.3. The Malakand Social Forestry Project

The project commenced in 1987. The target area is the Malakand Agency. The project is financially and technically assisted by the Government of the Netherlands. The total project cost is Rs 53.6 million, of which the Government of the Netherlands contributed Rs 51.2 million as loan/grant. The residual local financing of Rs 2.4 million is provided by the Special Development Programme of the GONWFP. The project is assisted by three Dutch experts and two local consultants in the field of Community Development.

The objective of the project is to mobilize village communities in Malakand Agency to implement and maintain afforestation projects and to develop other extensions such as fruit trees raising, defence against soil erosion, and the establishment of nurseries.

This project involves local peoples participation as an integral part of all schemes and activities. This also includes landlords as there is no distinction made over land tenure. This is accomplished through the formation of Village Development Committees (VDC), which are involved in planning and implementation of the project activities. These committees are fully responsible for the protection and management of plantations and distribution of benefits. These activities are not limited to afforestation; they also seek to help people to improve range land and increase their incomes. The central theme is to increase peoples capacities for self-development and reduce their dependence on outside help.

Training and reorientation is given to Forest Department staff by the project people so that they can work hand in hand with the people of local areas. The project has promoted the following activities so far: afforestation, linear plantation, communal afforestation, shelter belts, live spurs, forest nurseries, fruit and fodder nurseries, fruit and fodder plantation, grassland management, soil conservation, and energy-saving stoves.

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6.4. Kalam Integrated Development Project

KIDP was started in July 1981. The project area is the Swat district of NWFP. It is a joint venture between the Governments of Pakistan and Switzerland. The implementing agencies from GOP are the Agriculture, Forestry and Cooperatives Departments. The Swiss contribution includes the services of technical advisers and consultants. Both parties contribute 50% of the expenses.

The objectives of the project include the improvement of socio-economic conditions of the population through the development of forestry and local infrastructure, taking into special consideration the judicious use of natural resources to attain a sustainable ecological balance.

In order to sustain the vast resources it is important to co-operate closely with the local population. This cooperation was only possible if their pressing needs were addressed. Hence the project extended from just forest development to rural development project by including agriculture and village development.

To pursue their development objectives, the farmers are assisted in forming Village Organization (VOs) which are responsible for all development at the village level. A central committee comprising of the presidents of certain VOs is established to deal directly with the Integrated Extension Units (IEU), a branch of KIDP. The central committee may include members of Union Councils, Tehsildars and influential elders to make the project more effective. The IEU, with the help of KIDP, perform many different functions, such as protecting the forest, looking after nurseries, educating through publications, videos, lectures, and staff training. However, most of the activities are pursued with close association of VOs.

6.5. Forest Cooperative Societies in Hazara Division

The experiment was initiated in 1981. The target area is Hazara Division of NWFP. The project is sponsored by the Government of NWFP. The objectives of the project include the protection and development of forestry and local infrastructure through the management of the forest owners under the system of co-operatives.

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BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE AND LEARNING: THE DYNAMICS OF THE AGA KHAN RURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME

1. A SNAPSHOT VIEW OF AKRSP

The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) operating in the districts of Gilgit, Chitral and Baltistan is often cited as a model of rural development worthy of emulation. While such sentiment is a well-deserved compliment to the project, it invariably creates the impression that AKRSP's approach and programmes represent a blueprint for replication. This impression is strengthened by descriptions of AKRSP that take a "snapshot" view of the project at a given time. The snapshot often reveals:

- Functioning institutional models of farmer participation in a range of organizational, financial, managerial and technical tasks;
- A large number of completed infrastructure projects, and technological innovations in agriculture and appropriate technology that have been adopted by the villagers;
- Working relationships between AKRSP and government agencies, and practical links between Village Organizations and government agencies;
- A successful record of fund-raising from multiple sources in the international donor community and from Pakistani institutions; and,
- A competent and confident professional staff, including field staff recruited entirely from the project area, supported by microcomputers, jeeps and helicopter service.

A snapshot view does not, however, explain the process through which AKRSP got to the present stage. It does not illustrate the processes of learning, adjustment and behavioural change through which AKRSP, villagers, and collaborating agencies worked to establish relationships, develop organizational models, and identify, adapt and diffuse new technology. For those who are interested in "replicating the AKRSP approach", the evolution of the AKRSP experience over time is as important as its present situation. What this experience indicates is how farmer attitudes were changed, cooperation from other agencies was obtained, and objectives and programmes refined in the light of new experience.

A complete understanding of the dynamics of AKRSP would require documentation on changes in:

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- Farmer expectations and village institutions;
- The perceptions and roles of other development agencies;
- AKRSP's attempts to devise a "production model", i.e., a set of programme packages suitable for the project area; and,
- The evolving structure of AKRSP itself, and its staffing.

This Annexure focuses on farmer expectations. It describes the initial conditions faced by AKRSP and some of the important changes that took place in the attitudes of intended beneficiaries over time.

The following pages are written in the first person by a participant-observer.

2. THE VILLAGERS: FROM PETITIONERS TO PLANNERS

When we started our first set of village meetings in Gilgit, we were faced by villagers with lists of demands - as elsewhere in Pakistan, the villagers were expecting to start a development process with petitions. AKRSP was selling a new idea, but it was in the buyer's market. The only - repeat only - way to change expectations was and is the cheque book solution - the grant-funded PPI to persuade the villagers into working collectively for their common good.

When the grant-funded PPI programme started, the critics said that AKRSP was dropping money from the helicopter. Villagers thought they were on to a gravy train.

They thought the PPI was the big thing about the AKRSP idea. We kept insisting on village organization as the objective. They bargained for AKRSP funds for project repair and maintenance. We insisted that they deliver on their promise to maintain their projects. They bargained for payment from AKRSP for land compensation in link road projects. They threatened to complain to His Highness the Aga Khan that AKRSP was not giving the allocated funds to the poor villagers. We conveyed their complaint to His Highness on his May 1983 visit. His Highness told the villagers to follow AKRSP's principles.

They came to us with wish lists - schools, hospitals, huge bridges and major power generation schemes. We emphasized the value of immediate income generation. Their political spokesmen came to us with their own wish lists. We suggested that these be discussed in VO meetings.

Some of them thought that electing office-bearers for the VO

was a joke - they drew lots for these positions. We watched as their VOs decayed.

Again and again, they brought their disputes to AKRSP management. We took them to the Village Organization. They offered hospitality in the form of elaborate meals. We accepted only tea, and nobody minded!

At first, they had no idea of Village Organization. But they completed their projects in record time, with immediate impact on the communities. They mobilized their will and manpower, and completed marvels of engineering. Those whose fathers had bored into rock with the horn of the ibex, blasted channels and roads across the face of mountains with muscle, drills and dynamite. Four, five hundred of them tied up heavy compressors and dragged them up steep 300-ft. slopes. Retired army soldiers planned and completed tunnels that expert engineers had forsaken. Neither registered contractors nor the Pharoah's soldiers here.

They started their meetings to review and monitor projects and funds, and to save a few rupees at a time in the VO account. A few of them nominated VO members for training in plant protection and para-vet functions. Almost all the VOs started taking interest-free short-term loans for fertilizer. Where new channels were built, the villagers carefully regulated the discharge, increasing it measure by measure with each passing year as the bedslopes stabilized and sealed with the sediment of the glaciers. Where new land was opened up, they built terraces and planted alfalfa. And they planted trees by the thousand - one, two hundred per household, every year, according to the decision of the Village Organization.

While most of them were still talking about grants for PPIs, we started talking about loans for marketing, land development and farm machniery. The first land development loans were taken by three VOs in November 1984, less than two years after AKRSP started in Gilgit. These loans carried a service charge of 5% per year (simple interest) on outstanding balances. From the beginning of the third year, VOs were regularly talking about getting loans from AKRSP - the expectation of grant-funded development was beginning to change. Marketing, land development, and machinery loans became a regular feature from the third year. The service charge began to rise, first to 7.5 %, then to 10% per year.

AKRSP entered the seller's market. We began to insist on numerous pre-conditions that the VO had to fulfill before getting a grant or loan.

The villagers began to show us models of organization that AKRSP had never envisaged when it started. They showed us variants of collective management for land development - how private ownership of land could be combined with the collective management

of the investment required. Some VOs hired permanent *chowkidars* to irrigate and protect the new land; others did this by rotation among VO members. Some put all land in collective ownership for the development phase; others divided it up immediately as the water became available. All of them took out group loans with a collective guarantee.

When we wanted five-year village plans, the villagers showed us the futility of our endeavour. They belaboured the point that land development was a long and expensive process, and would the economist please revise his cash-flow projections. They protested that the new land was not really a single farm, and would the experts please stop insisting on optimal land use. They explained why most but not all new land could be divided equally among village residents, and would he who preached equality please respect traditional property rights. They demonstrated how the division of land was adjusted for land quality. They patiently explained why short, high-yielding wheat varieties were not favoured. They laughed at the idea of bringing Swiss goats to Nagar - "Bring us the Swiss fodder first".

Women's organizations proliferated, first to imitate the men in expectation of grant-funded PPIs, and then to articulate their own specific concerns. They met and saved regularly, and they proposed one project after another. Appropriate technology became a major intervention for women. Some villages became showpieces for appropriate technology, and others became the graveyards of inappropriate technology. We made occasional mistakes and we had the occasional luxury to laugh at them!

The VOs were no different. They bought tractors, hired drivers, nominated responsible committees, and generally demonstrated the dignity of a new tractor-lord. But some of them kept their accounting records in shoe-boxes, while others forgot to buy spare fan-belts. Ten VOs opted to maintain semi-exotic cattle, and some of them could never live it down.

In the fifth year, groups of VOs began to organize to protect and regulate the use of forests and pastures. They devised rules for household use of fuelwood. They banned commercial exploitation of juniper forest. They enforced the rules with fines. Other groups of villages began to from clusters of VOs for cost-effective input purchases and marketing.

Increasingly, the villagers began to set the agenda for village development - land use priorities, forest protection, pasture regeneration, community health workers, etc. It began to appear that they would always be a few steps ahead of us.

ANNEX C:

AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NWFP

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

PREAMBLE

The discussion of possible avenues of rural development is intimately connected to the nature of local government institutions in the country. Many observers believe that rural development should become the responsibility of representative local government; they suggest, therefore, that initiatives like the SRSC should either be merged with the local development effort, or be discouraged lest they harm the potential of budding local government institutions.

We have argued in this report that participatory village organization and representative local government are complementary in character, but they are not substitutes for one another. We believe that much of the disagreement in this debate stems from an underlying confusion over the definition and meaning of local government. This note is intended as a corrective for this confusion.

1. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

Traditionally, in our society it has meant institutions like the *jirga* or the *panchayat* through which village society managed its collective responsibilities; more recently, it has acquired a more formal definition, covering union councils, district councils, town committees and municipal committees. In all instances, it has suggested a distinct tier of responsibility, different from the federal or the provincial government, but one which is weaker and less effective than the other two tiers, with minimal fiscal powers, no executive authority, and responsibility only for maintaining civic services - "construct the drain and keep it clean", as one of our interviewees suggested.

In Western countries, while the responsibilities of local governments also include the provision or supervision of civic services, their ambit of authority is much wider, encompassing the policing of neighbourhoods; local taxation, development, and spending; and the provision of education and health, and other social welfare activities.

2. THE FORMAL SYSTEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The local government system in Pakistan has undergone frequent changes at the hands of different governments but remains under-

developed in terms of its organization and financing.

In rural areas, local government consists of two tiers - the Union Council and the District Council. In urban areas, there is one council in a given urban area; depending on the size of the population, this may be a Town Committee, a Municipal Committee, or a Municipal Corporation. In theory, local councils have substantial statutory authority to raise revenues from the public and undertake development work. For technical assistance, they depend on the staff of the Local Government and Rural Development Department.

The staff of the Local Government and Rural Development Department also help implement some other representational programmes, if requested by representatives or the government to do so. These programmes include:

- The Union Council Programme, under which each Union Council receives a grant from the Provincial Government or District Council.
- The District Council Programme funded from the District Council's income and grants-in-aid.
- The MPAs and MNAs/Senators Programmes funded by Special Grants from the Provincial and Federal Governments, respectively. These programmes, now suspended, allocated Rs 2 million to each MPA and Rs 5 million to each MNA and Senator.
- The Annual Development Programme of the LG&RD Department.
- The People's Programme that is being implemented by political leaders appointed by the Federal Government.

None of these programmes seeks to create or support a participatory village institution for a continuing process of agricultural and rural development.

District Councils in each province raise most of their revenues from one or two major sources, while the Union Council in most instances depends on grants from higher-level governments. The meagre development funds are distributed equally among members of the local councils, rather than with reference to properly costed plans and projects. The result is that only small parts of small projects are implemented at a given time. The identification of projects is at the discretion of local council members, rather than by explicit consent of their constituents. There is no forum at the local level for discussing development priorities and implementation of projects. Once elected, a local council is a closed shop; it does not inspire a development process in which ordinary people can participate to choose and implement their agenda.

The main institutional limitation of the present system of local government is that it has no local institution at the village or neighbourhood level in which ordinary villagers and city dwellers can participate. Political representation is essential for many purposes, but it is not a substitute for participation by ordinary citizens in the process of sustainable development. Political representatives cannot plan and implement the day-to-day economic priorities of communities. Representatives cannot substitute for ways in which farmers can improve the organization of production, marketing, input supply, credit, and community resources and infrastructure.

While there is considerable potential for more effective local government (some of it reflected in existing legislation), this potential is severely limited by the absence of the primary tier at the community level.[1] At the same time, financial and managerial matters that might best be managed by local government are currently managed by line departments and other parts of the Provincial and Federal government. There is, at present, an institutional bias in favour of managerial or bureaucratic decision-making. The full potential for local government will be achieved when decision-making is carried out not only by line agencies and representatives, but also by participatory community institutions.

3. PARTICIPATION AS THE BASIS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Western local governments as well as traditional systems in our own society had a very important core of participatory arrangements, which are missing in contemporary institutions in Pakistan. Neither the *jirga*, nor the *panchayat* were formally elected or appointed bodies in traditional society, although they did acquire a formal shape under colonial rule. Even then, they retained a sense of popular participation in decision making, through the institution of an informal village assembly in which the deliberations would take place. Moreover, many other decisions with larger social implications, such as *warabundi* or mutation, continued to take place in common village assembly through consensual agreement.

In the West as well, while local governments were elected bodies, the constitutions of most cities required these bodies to deliberate and to make decisions in open assembly of town folk. Moreover, continuous and sustained participation of citizens was sought in specific matters, such as school committees, highway

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[1]The National Commission on Agriculture, 1988, recommended that Village Development Organizations be constituted as the lowest (third) tier of local government.

projects, and so forth.

The point which is being made here is that local government institutions in most places are built around the concept of popular participation. The absence of popular participation in the Pakistani notion of local government is then an anomaly, which probably owes its existence to the deprecatory attitude of colonial rulers towards the ability of local citizens to manage their own affairs. This attitude seems to have trickled down, unconsciously, to many indigenous thinkers and policy makers when discussing the issue.

There are good reasons why local government should have a participatory core. Indeed, without direct political participation at some level, democracy is quite unthinkable. (The decline of popular participation, and the erosion of local government institutions in the United States in the postwar period is often cited as the reason for the increased centralization of the government, its alienation from the needs and concerns of citizens, and the problem of the declining legitimacy of the state in that country). Aristotle, one of the earliest thinkers on formal political systems, once suggested that the optimal size of the state was one where you could see all citizens at one glance, implying the need for common assembly in the optimal working of the state.

The issue was posed starkly by the famous French philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, when he asserted that representation is the end of participation, and presumably of democracy itself. Rousseau's entire discussion of the problem of the "general will" and the "particular will" stems from the preoccupation with representative democracy.

To go one step further, let us focus on the task of governance. It consists of the ability of the society to decide matters of collective social importance. The problem with this is that people never agree on one decision, and so some mechanism has to be discovered for arriving at satisfactory solutions to collective problems. One of the solutions proposed is that of majority voting. However, as the Nobel Laureate, Kenneth Arrow has taught us, this leads neither to consistent or optimal outcomes, nor to an appropriate weighting of individual preferences. As a result, most societies have experimented with alternative systems.

These systems can be divided into four broad categories: consensus, authority, force, and convention. Since the last two are self-explanatory, we shall focus attention on the first two. "Consensus" refers to an ethic of reciprocity and compromise, in which decisions are not made until a consensus is discovered. The operative process in this case is <u>persuasion</u>.

"Authority", refers to the case where people voluntarily cede

their sovereignty to an individual or group of individuals. This may include representative institutions, where authority is ceded to the representatives; majority voting, where the decision of the majority is accepted as binding by the minority; expert authority, where people abide by the decisions of experts because they consider these decisions to be superior to those of uninformed individuals; and bureaucratic authority, where the rules of business determine who shall make decisions, and everyone else abides by them. The operative process in this case is legitimization.

Now, in all societies, all of these processes are always at work. Even in parliamentary politics, there is reciprocity and compromise; there is the ceding of authority to experts of all types; there is coercion or the threat of coercion from those who are in a position to intimidate others, whether by the use of state power or street power; and there is also the acceptance of rules and procedures for voting, the elimination of some questions from discussion, and other elements of faith. Similarly, national debates over major political questions are important not as means of claiming victory for one or the other side, as they are often represented as being, but rather as sophisticated social attempts to grope towards a consensus.

Indeed, all the processes are necessary. No society could function if it had to reach all its decisions through only one of the four processes mentioned above. Yet, it can also be said that the definition of social progress would be the increase in the area of consensual decision making, and a concomitant reduction in the decisions made through authority, force, or convention. If this is accepted, modernity would seem to be taking us away from social progress rather than towards it.

In modern societies, there belief has grown that all decisions have to be made only through the legitimization of authority. There are three reasons for this. First, because this method of decision making is seen as being the most efficient of all; second, because it is the one most consistent with majority voting; and third, because it does not involve attempts to influence anybody's preferences. The result is a shrinking of the core of consensual values in society, with inevitable consequences for the stability of social contract.

Indeed, one can make a stronger argument. Where consensus and compromise are actively discouraged, the ability of society to discover newer syntheses, newer bases of consensus, and newer modes of reciprocity and compromise will also erode over time. The situation will lead, inevitably to a polarized confrontation between groups who have lost the ability to speak to each other, to understand each other, and therefore the willingness to live with each other. The fragmentation, alienation, and violence of modern life is attributed by many psychologists to the shrinking

of this consensual core in society.

This problem is much more profound in post-colonial societies like Pakistan, because the modern sectors of these societies include a large number of individuals who lack the ability, the will, and perhaps even the interest to speak to, understand, or even acknowledge the members of the non-modern or traditional society. As a result, the dominant attitude has been one of the discouragement of participation; this attitude extends from government bureaucrats to military officials to westernized intellectuals to elected political leaders even to students and trade unionists.

One consequence of this perspective is the gradual centralization of many of the functions of government, even of the provision of civic services. Why there should be one WAPDA in the country, one Railways, one airline, one curriculum, one language, and so on and so forth, God only knows. Why should primary schools and rural dispensaries be run by distant provincial governments rather than by the beneficiaries themselves, again God only knows. The only reason which can be identified is the pervasive belief that people at large are illiterate and ignorant, and therefore cannot take care of their needs themselves. A distant government will have to do it for them.

Everyone will agree that the above picture, though harshly drawn, is an accurate portrait of our society. It has had extremely adverse consequences. The denial of participation to people has led to, among other things, the erosion of the ethic of reciprocity and compromise, and to the creation of the "petition culture", in which the solution to social problems is not concerted social action, but rather a petition to the bureaucratic or political bosses.

An important reason why it is necessary for local government functions to be handled through participatory arrangements is the urgency of restoring the culture of reciprocity, and therefore creating a sense of mutual obligation and responsibility, restoring the basis of social harmony, and giving people the confidence to manage their affairs themselves.

In all societies, there are some issues which can be handled through compromise and consensus. Others are essentially insoluble, and can only be managed by some form of legitimate authority, whether elected or selected, yet others require sanctions, either temporal or divine. If all issues are dealt through force, the society is brutalized. If all actions are handled through the polarizing processes of authoritarian states or even of electoral politics, the society can become hopelessly divided unto itself. It is necessary for the harmonious functioning of societies, that each process be used where it is most appropriate.

The process of consensual agreement is most appropriate when it comes to matters which are part of a society's core of shared values. In Pakistani society, particularly in village communities, this includes the problem of development itself. However, as development is being made a part of the politics of polarization, it is gradually drifting out of the consensual core. Moreover, as fewer and fewer decisions are made through consensual processes, peoples' ability to agree, to listen, to understand each other is also diminishing.

For all of these reasons, it seems essential that participatory political institutions be restored urgently. If the SRSC experiment succeeds, it will open up the option of according the Village Organizations legal status as the third tier of government.

AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION AND EXTENSION

1. MAJOR RECENT CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION

The Department of Agriculture (DOA) in NWFP has gone through extensive reorganization in recent years.

The first step entailed separating the supplies function and handing it over to the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA). In Pakistan, as in many other countries, it has been found that whenever the extension and supplies functions are combined in one organization, the input supply function swamps the extension function. As a result, extension efforts suffer. The handing over of input supplies to ADA, an autonomous public sector agency, was expected to help DOA concentrate more on extension. A limited amount of seed distribution (and some provision of plant protection equipment) is still managed by the DOA's Directorate of Agricultural Extension (DAE).

Another major change was the creation of the Directorate of On-Farm Water Management (DOFWM) within DOA. This was done in order to deal efficiently with the specialized task of improved water management in irrigated agriculture. The main function of DOFWM is to construct and renovate watercourses; secondary priorities include precision land levelling, demonstration plots, and improved water management techniques. In order to enable DOFWM to renovate and improve watercourses, the provincial government requires that DOFWM work with Water User Associations (WUAs) established under the 1981 NWFP Water Users Association Ordinance. Almost the entire DOFWM programme is donor-funded, mostly by the World Bank (although the Asian Development Bank will fund the proposed Swabi SCARP).

With the arrival of TIPAN, a major USAID-sponsored research project in NWFP, the DOA's research functions have been handed over to TIPAN. This project is managed by the University of Agriculture, Peshawar, and is modelled after U.S. land grant universities. TIPAN has three directorates, one each for teaching, research and outreach. The Research Directorate now controls all the provincial research institutes. The Outreach Directorate has a limited presence in the field - one officer each in four of the Civil Divisions of NWFP.

The most recent major change at DOA involved the setting up of a Fruit and Vegetable Development Board (FVDB), carved out of DOA. The FVDB is a new entity, and is in the process of building up staff and infrastructure. It has also started a small programme for training women in fruit and vegetable development, with the

assistance of the Netherlands Government.

2. REFLECTIONS ON THE EXTENSION SYSTEM

It is possible that high-level bureaucratic reorganization will have a positive impact on agricultural development in due time. Making this happen, however, requires movement in new directions at the lower (community) levels. Unless mechanisms are found to "connect" the top with the bottom, the creation of new organizations will have a limited impact in NWFP. This is particularly true of small farmers.

DAE has many critics who point to the small impact of this large organization. The reality may be more mixed. After going through the various evaluations of extension work in NWFP (including evaluations of the T&V system), and undertaking field visits in Kohat, Charsadda , Mardan and Swabi, one is left with the following mixed picture:

- That DAE and other agricultural agencies (including the research establishment) are very effective at supporting large farmers. Although large farmers still complain about the inefficiency of DAE staff, most of these complaints are really complaints about not getting subsidized inputs any longer, now that input supplies are generally in the private sector. Most large farmers are well-served by a system whose field workers have little choice but to depend on the large farmers in order to achieve their numerical targets.[2]

- Small farmers, however, are almost uniformly neglected by DAE and other agricultural agencies. That they benefit at all is due, in great measure, to the technology they can pick up, after a time lag, from large farmers. Studies of the diffusion of new technology have found that the time lag in adoption between large and small farmers is perhaps the most important source of income inequalities from technological change.

Based on evaluative studies and field visits, if one had to make a guess about the impact of various agricultural programmes on farmers, the guess would be that these programmes directly serve a maximum of 15-20% of the farmers. The T&V system, with its intensive efforts, probably performs no better than the older system of extension in NWFP.

At least two broad sets of constraints affect small farmer access to new technology and other agricultural services. One of

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[2]The same is true for other agricultural agencies such as DOFWM and the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan.

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these concerns institutional issues and other relates to technical issues.

The first big constraint is that there is no institutional link at the village level that could make it easier for extension staff to work with small farmers. Extension agents, with scarce resources, enjoy tremendous patronage and economies of scale by working with large farmers. Only a village organization of small farmers can help them compete with large farmers for the advice and assistance of extension staff.

Extension departments often point to the large number of farmers who have to be covered by each field worker. They point out, correctly, that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for one person to service so many farmers. But then, the solution is not (as extension staff often suggest) to increase the number of field workers. The financial reality is that Pakistan, NWFP and DOA cannot sustain an ever-increasing army of extension workers. Increasing the size of extension departments - with or without T&V - is an unsustainable approach. Ways have to be found for farmers themselves to take up the management of extension activities, with selected input from existing extension staff. There are numerous models for this in Pakistan and abroad.

The second major constraint in the way of reaching small farmers has to do with the technical orientation of research and extension efforts. These efforts are diffuse, and they have little focus on small farmer priorities. DAE typically proceeds with a shotgun approach - scattering literally dozens of recommendations for every crop, several stages of the crop cycle, different soils, and various crop rotations. There is a desire to have the farmer do everything in a technically perfect manner, rather than to identify and push a small number of key changes that would have the greatest impact on farmer incomes. There is a need for research and extension efforts to concentrate on the expected payoff, in terms of incomes and the number of farmers affected. In this way, both productivity and equitability concerns can be addressed.

The next section describes the T&V system operating in Mardan Division and Charsadda District. This description shows that the DAE, particularly its T&V system, represents a large resource in terms of staff numbers and organizational linkages. This resource, however, is under-exploited, in terms of its links to and impact on small farmers. The challenge for experiments such as SRSC is to demonstrate how the considerable resources of organizations such as the DAE can be linked effectively to village organizations for small farmers.

3. THE T&V SYSTEM [3]

3.1. Description of the T&V System

The T&V system was introduced in 1981; it operates in Dera Ismail Khan Division, Mardan Division and Charsadda District. The system was introduced under World Bank sponsorship after having been evaluated favourably for its performance in India. Mardan and Charsadda make up the project areas of major donor-funded SCARP programmes.[4] It is expected that the T&V system may be extended to other parts of the province if it proves effective.

The T&V system in the Swabi and Mardan SCARP areas is headed by a Deputy Director of Agriculture (DDA), working with the following professional staff at his office in Mardan:

1 Senior Subject Matter Specialist,
3 Subject Matter Specialists (SMS),
1 Assistant Plant Protection Officer (APPO).

Following the recommendation of the PARD evaluation of T&V by Naqvi, Hamid and Aminullah, there has been a proposal to add a Subject Matter Specialist in sociology.

The three SMSs and one APPO prepare a fortnightly message according to the requirements of the season. This message is given to the Field Assistants (FAs) in fortnightly meetings (Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday are allotted for District-level meetings with FAs). Each FA is responsible for an area covering 600-800 farmers, but each is expected to work with 80 contact farmers within a fortnight (at the rate of 10 per day, 5 in the morning and 5 in the afternoon, on each of 8 working days). Every FA is expected to lay out one demonstration plot on one *jareeb* (0.2 ha), per season.

Every FA has a bicycle, and every Agricultural Officer (AO) has a motorcycle. An FA covers 5-8 villages that usually fall within a Union Council; an AO is responsible for a Circle of about 5 Union Councils. In each district, the T&V system is headed by an Extra Assistant Director, Agriculture (EADA), with the following field staff:

60 FAs and 9 AOs in Mardan District;

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[3]This section is based on work undertaken by one of the consultants for the Swiss Development Cooperation, Islamabad.

[4]The World Bank and CIDA have funded the Mardan SCARP, most of those project area is actually in Charsadda District, and the Asian Development Bank and the Swiss Government are considering funding the Swabi SCARP, most of whose project area is in Mardan District.

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47 FAs and 6 AOs in Swabi District; and,
52 FAs and 8 AOs in Charsadda District.
159 FAs and 23 AOs in all.

These figures may have changed slightly in recent weeks.

Extension messages are prepared after consulting with the various research organizations in the province. Senior T&V staff visit these organizations and bring back information (including literature), and incorporate it in their messages. They depend mostly on the Cereal Crops Research Institute at Pirsabak, the Agricultural Research Institute at Tarnab, the Tobacco Research Station at Khan Garhi, and the Sugar Crops Research Institute in Mardan. There is also occasional contact with the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council. DAE also has links with the Pak-German IRDP, through an AO posted at the project and through demonstration plots organized in project villages.

T&V staff report that they have no contact with the Outreach Directorate of TIPAN, the provincial agricultural research and teaching network. (Outreach has only one person posted at each of four divisional headquarters.) The Fruit and Vegetable Development Board (FVDB), carved out of DAE in 1984 also has a weak presence in Mardan Division. There is, understandably, some resentment among extension staff at the creation of the FVDB.

The DDA's office appears to have regular contact with the agricultural broadcasts section of Radio Pakistan. The DDA himself gives a lecture on the radio every month. These broadcasts are recorded at the Peshawar studios of the Bureau of Agricultural Information of DAE. The DDA's office also helped organize two face-to-face meetings in the last six months between "progressive farmers" and government officials. A field officer from Radio Pakistan travels all over the province and organizes such meetings.

DAE also serves as the contact agency between farmers and a large number of public and private agencies. T&V staff select and nominate contract seed producers for seed multiplication by the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA). The ADA provides pre-basic seed to DAE, which is multiplied on DAE's Jamra Farm in its Takht Bhai Circle. The multiplied (basic) seed is purchased by ADA and given to its registered growers. The ADA then purchases the seed from the registered growers and sells it as certified seed.

DAE coordinates the annual aerial spray campaigns with the Central Plant Protection Organization. DAE also receives the expected output targets for tobacco from tobacco companies, and conveys this information to farmers through T&V.

3.2. Evaluations of the T&V System

An evaluation of the T&V system conducted by Naqvi, Hamid and

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Aminullah (1988) for PARD examined the socio-economic characteristics of equal numbers of contact and non-contact farmers. Among the T&V's 64 contact farmers, 65% operated landholdings of less than 4 ha. In this sample, 44% of the farmers were owner cultivators, and 16% each were lease-holders and owner-cum-tenants. 86% of the contact farmers had been selected by the Field Assistants.

Contact farmers reported that the most common method of communication used by the Field Assistants was lectures; only 16% of the sample cited demonstrations. Almost all these farmers reported (or perhaps knew) that the Field Assistants visit their villages 2-3 times every month. 86% of the non-contact farmers also knew the frequency of visits.

Among non-contact farmers, more than 90% knew the names of their Field Assistants, and almost all of them knew the names of their contact farmers.

The SCARP Mardan Baseline Study (Freedman et al., 1986) conducted in 1984-85 found that "between 80 and 90% of all farmers appear to have had no effective contact with the T&V system." It also found that the numbers of farmers rejecting recommendations coming from the extension system is very small. The report concluded that "the system ... has directly affected the operations of less than 5%" of the farmers. It also found that access to T&V advice was highly correlated with farmer literacy, landholding and income.

APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY

1. DEFINITIONS OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY

The term "appropriate technology" can be defined in at least three different but complementary ways. The most common definition is that appropriate technology is the kind of technology which utilizes surplus resources and economizes on the scarce resources of a region; for example, a labour-abundant, capital-scarce economy would find labour-intensive technology to be appropriate and capital intensive technology to be inappropriate. A second definition derives from a compatibility with the needs of a particular society: technology which promotes self-sufficiency in production and consumption is appropriate, and that which obstructs in the achievement of this objective would be inappropriate.

A third definition pertains to the appropriability of the technology. Appropriate is that technology which can be appropriated by a society, given its social, cultural, and political background. Here, "appropriated" refers to the ability of people at large, not a select few, to be able to understand and operate a particular technological system. This ability goes much farther than simple technical know-how, and includes also the need for social organization to accommodate the technology. To give a simple example, the appropriateness of using automobiles for transportation would depend upon whether people at large in a particular society: (a) have the technical knowledge of operating automobiles; (b) have the technical knowledge of maintaining and repairing automobiles; (c) have, or are able to construct the infrastructure needed for the use of automobiles; and, (d) most importantly, have the social knowledge (e.g., courtesy, order, patience, cooperation) needed for the safe operation of this technology. In Pakistan, irrepective of the level of education of the individuals concerned, the last item is missing, and it would seem that the automobile is perhaps not an appropriate device for our society.

In general, though, in the Pakistani context, these definitions would indicate a preference for small scale technology, given the political and cultural obstacles to the use of large scale technology. Likewise, in a Pakistani village, appropriate technology will be that which people can understand and internalize - socially as well as technically. What that technology is will depend on the particular situation, and will have to be discovered by trial and error.

The important step in the development of appropriate technology is the initiation of this process of trial and error at

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the village level. This will include attention to the problems of the villagers which call for technological responses, and equally to their base of technical and social knowledge, around which the technological response will have to emerge. At the moment it is difficult to predict where this process will lead in each particular village. However, the following checklist of ideas may prove useful:

2. POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADOPTION BY SRSC

Efficient Use of Resources

The most common need is fuel for cooking. Energy resources are depleting at a rapid pace. In rural areas, there are only two sources of energy for domestic consumption - fuelwood and cow dung (also agricultural residues to a smaller extent). The rate of renewal is considerably less than its increasing consumption. Conservation of this energy source is essential to overcome the anticipated energy crisis. Domestic energy conservation problems are being investigated in two ways.

- Modernization of cooking appliances.
- Alternate methods of using biomass, in non-traditional form.

Cooking stoves have been developed by the Appropriate Technology Development Organization of the Government of Pakistan. Basically these are of two types - portable stoves made of metal sheet, and earthen stoves made in the homes. The earthen stove is believed to be very successful; its cost is less than Rs 50. The cost of a portable metal stove is Rs 200. The saving in fuel consumption is estimated to be 40-50%.

In using biogas, combustible gas is generated from cow dung and crop residues. Detailed information is available about the process of generation, and manufacture and installation of plants. These are of two types:

- Masonry digester/termination chamber with metal drum top to hold the gas. Cost of a family size biogas unit masonry type is Rs 3,750.
- Portable Type. Cost Rs 5,000.

Health and Hygiene

Human waste in rural areas is a great health hazard. Practices for its proper disposal are almost totally absent. According to government statistics for 1989, only 1% of the population of NWFP will have sanitation coverage. One major

bottleneck in widespread use of sanitary latrine in rural areas is its cost:

- The cost of single ventilated pit latrine, where the soil is stable and lining is not required, is Rs 4,000.
- Double ventilated pit latrine, where the soil is unstable and lining is required costs Rs 5,600.
- Surface ventilated latrine, for waterlogged areas costs Rs 7,200.
- Flush latrine with soakage pit costs Rs 57,671.

The costs involved cannot be afforded by the rural poor. More cost effective technology is required.

Drinking Water

There are two sources of water supply - ground water and surface water sources. In rural areas there are no facilities for purification of surface flow water, and water impurities are the most common cause of diseases, posing great health hazard. This aspect is under investigation by the appropriate technology cell, and PCSIR has developed a filtration bag filled with chemically treated sand for filtering water. The cost is reported to be Rs 15 and one bag lasts for six months; more research is needed.

PCSIR has developed water pumps which can be driven by cattle, or manually. It can pump water up to 150 ft. The cost is reported to be Rs 5,000 for drinking water supply and Rs 8,000 for irrigation supply. This excludes the costs of suction pumps, delivery pipes, and installation charges.

Articles of Common Domestic Use

Literature is available on:

Soap making
Detergent powder
Candle making
Match making

The use of these technologies in rural areas in not very promising, because it is likely to increase the workload of the women folk - they are probably better off buying these goods from the market.

Equipment for Cottage Based Industries

... such as carpet and tapestry weaving machines, and spinning wheel, has been developed by PCSIR. This can be used wherever

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centres for cottage industries are established.

De-hydration for Preservation of Fruits and Vegetable

One technique has been developed by ATDO. It is, however, doubtful if this can be adopted in villages. Other techniques have been employed with success in the project area of AKRSP. Fruit and vegetable dehydration and preservation could be an important new source of incomes for small farmers.

Reduction in Women's Workload

There is a need to undertake a short study of women's allocation of time in various domestic and agricultural activities, particularly with a view towards identifying bottlenecks. Often, the greatest burden on women, in addition to their normal household chores of cooking, washing, cleaning and upbringing of children, is collection of fodder and stocking water for household use. Whatever the case, there are several biological and mechanical technologies available for testing that could help reduce the workload of women.

3. EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND PROJECTS

Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

PCSIR has a branch at Peshawar, which has a rural technology wing. It is engaged in the following projects:

Development of water pumps.
Biogas plants.
Articles of daily household consumption (soap making, etc.)
Drinking water purification.
Equipment used in cottage industries.

Appropriate Technology Development Organization

ATDO is located at 1-B, St.47, F-7/1, Islamabad. It is a federal agency. A branch office has also been established at Peshawar. Its projects in appropriate technology include:

Cooking Stoves.
Biogas Plants.
Micro Hydel Plants.

The last is a very significant development, which can contribute to the development of rural areas with hydro potential. So far, 40 schemes are reported to have been completed, with installed capacity ranging from 5 to 30 kw. Another 20 schemes are under construction. The estimated costs are as under:

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Plant capacity	Cost (Rs)	Fixed Cost (Rs/kw)
5 kw	37,800	7,560
12 kw	59,460	4,955
20 kw	78,170	3,908
40 kw	123,875	3,097

(The costs are specific to site conditions only.)

This cell is also engaged in developing fast growing tree plantations (Ipil-Ipil K-8 variety).

Domestic Energy Saving Project

This is sponsored jointly by G.T.Z. (German Agency for Technical Co-operation) and UNHCR.

The main objective has been reduction of dependence on fuelwood as a domestic energy source, and providing the means for income generation, primarily among Afghan Refugees. Project activities include the development of community bakeries (*tandoors*) and family ovens. The project has developed a type of *tandoor* oven that saves up to 70% of wood for baking *nan* bread compared to the traditional oven. Over 480 community bakeries have been established since March 1985. Over 7,000 family ovens have also been distributed. This project has been discontinued, pending development of an improved design.

Agricultural Light Engineering Programme

This is a Pak-Swiss venture, based in Mardan. ALEP works on the research and development of new and improved designs of agricultural implements (both manual and mechanical).

4. CRITERIA FOR APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY DESIGN

For rural areas, the criteria for appropriate technology development include the following obvious list:

- Cost.
- Availability of raw materials.
- Minimum and simple maintenance requirements.

Cost is of primary concern, as for instance, the average rural household cannot afford installing a biogas plant. Besides, few possess enough animals to yield the quantity of cow dung required for the plant.

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Other considerations are technologies which help meet the basic needs of the rural population, and contribute to women's development. Increased efforts are indicated in the provision of cheap drinking water, and sanitation measures, especially human waste disposal.

LIST OF ONGOING DONOR PROJECTS IN AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Agricultural Research

1. Transformation and Integration of the Provincial Agricultural Network. Donor: USAID. Executing Agency: University of Agriculture, Peshawar. Area: NWFP.

Agricultural Extension

2. Training-and-Visit System of Extension. Donor: World Bank. Executing Agency: Department of Agriculture, Directorate of Agricultural Extension. Areas: Dera Ismail Khan Division, Mardan Division and Charsadda District.

Groundwater and On-Farm Water Management

3. PATA Groundwater Irrigation Project. Donor: The Netherlands. Executing Agency: Project Management Unit from the Directorate of On-Farm Water Management, the Directorate of Agricultural Extension, and WAPDA. Areas: Malakand Agency and parts of Swat and Dir Districts.

4. On-Farm Water Management Phase II. Donor: World Bank. Executing Agency: Directorate of On-Farm Water Management. Areas: Swabi District, Dera Ismail Khan District, Kohat District, and parts of Hazara Division.

5. Mardan SCARP (On-Farm Component). Donors: World Bank and Canada. Executing Agency: Directorate of On-Farm Water Management. Areas: command area of Upper Swat Canal in the Mardan and Peshawar Divisions.

6. Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project Stage II (On-Farm Component). Donor: Asian Development Bank. Executing Agency: Directorate of On-Farm Water Management.

7. Command Water Management Project. Donor: USAID. Executing Agency: Project Management Unit. Area: command area of Warsak Lift Canal in Peshawar District.

Forestry

8. Social Forestry Project. Donor: USAID. Executing Agency: Forest Department. Areas: Kohat District, Hazara Division.

9. Malakand Social Forestry Project. Donor: The Netherlands.

Executing Agency: Forest Department. Area: Malakand Division.

10. Afforestation of Refugee-affected Areas. Donors: World Bank and UNHCR and World Food Programme. Executing Agency: Forest Department.

Horticulture

11. Malakand Fruit and Vegetable Development Project. Donor: Switzerland. Executing Agency: Fruit and Vegetable Development Board. Area: Malakand Division.

12. Women's Training for Fruit and Vegetable Development [?]. Donor: The Netherlands. Executing Agency: Fruit and Vegetable Development Board. Area: NWFP.

Integrated Rural Development

13. Kalam Integrated Development Project. Donor: Switzerland. Area: Kalam Tehsil of Swat District.

14. Integrated Rural Development Project. Donor: Federal Republic of Germany. Executing Agency: Local Government and Rural Development Department. Areas: rainfed areas of Mardan Division.

15. Aga Khan Rural Support Programme. Donors: Aga Khan Foundation, United Kingdom, Canada and others. Area: Chitral District.

Area Development Projects

16. Chitral Area Development Project. Donors: International Fund for Agricultural Development and Asian Development Bank. Executing Agencies: provincial line agencies. Area: Chitral District.

17. Tribal Areas Development Project. Donor: USAID. Executing Agency: FATA Development Corporation. Area: FATA.

18. Gadoon-Amazai Area Development Project. Donor: USAID. Area: Gadoon-Amazai Region of Swabi, Abbottabad, and Swat Districts.

Barani Agriculture

19. Barani Agriculture Research and Development. Donor: Canada. Executing Agency: Department of Agriculture, Barani Areas Directorate. Areas: Haripur Tehsil of Abbottabad District, and Dera Ismail District.

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ANNEX D:

BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSED PROJECT AREA

KOHAT DISTRICT

PREAMBLE

This annexure shall deal with three aspects of the characteristics of Kohat District. Section 1 gives a broad overview of the physical, economic, and social features of the district, followed, in Section 2, by a brief description of the major development programmes currently in place in its rural areas. Section 3 builds upon these details to argue for the selection of Kohat as the preferred site for the initiation of SRSC's activities.

The descriptive parts of the annexure rely on the sources listed below. Official documents were made available for the study through the good offices of the Planning and Development Department, GONWFP, and the District Administration, Kohat.

District Population Census Report, 1981.
Naqvi, 1986: pp. 18-21.
1987-88 Annual Administration Report, EADA Kohat.
Detailed Note on Irrigation Channels, SDO Irrigation Kohat.
Perwaiz, 1988.
Office Records, AD Rural Development, Kohat.
ADP, 1988-89, District Council Kohat.
ADP, 1988-89, GONWFP.
Interviews with elected representatives, government officials, and villagers (Re: list at Annex A.2).

1. PROFILE OF KOHAT DISTRICT

1.1. General

Kohat District is located in Kohat Division, NWFP, and surrounded by Darra Adam Khel (Kohat and Peshawar Frontier Region) and Orakzai Agency in the North, by Kurram Agency in the West, by Karak District and North Waziristan Agency in the South, and by Attock and Mianwali Districts of the Punjab province in the East. The river Indus also flows along the Eastern boundary of the district. Kohat District is sub-mountaneous in topography, the main area consisting of a series of broken hills whose general trend is east to west, between which lie open valleys, 5 to 7 kilometres in width. The altitude, which ranges between 500 to 1700 feet, decreases gradually from east to west towards the Indus, but in the south-west the fall is towards the west into the Kurram river.

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The soil is sandy loam with or without gravel. The average annual rainfall ranges from 375 mm to 500 mm, but is very irregular, and is unevenly distributed across the district. The summers are very hot (maximum temperatures of 40 degrees C in June), and the winters fairly cold (minimum temperatures of 6-7 degrees C in December-January) especially in the western parts of the district.

Administratively, Kohat District is divided into two *tehsils*, Hangu in the west and Kohat in the east. It is inhabited by the Bangash, Orakzai, Khattak, Afridi, and Awan tribes, of which the first two are concentrated almost entirely in Hangu Tehsil. In 1985-86, the district had an estiated population of 593,000, living in 375 *hadbast* villages in 26 Union Councils, and 5 urban concentrations (Kohat, Hangu, Thal, Lachi, and Shakardara).

The outstanding feature of the demography of Kohat District is the large incidence of out-migration. It is said by most villagers and observers that there is hardly a household in Hangu tehsil which does not have at least one person working in the Middle East. Similarly, there is hardly a household from the rural areas of Kohat Tehsil which is not represented in the armed forces. It must be interjected here that these assertions do not appear to be borne out by census statistics, in which the level of migration from Kohat is roughly equal to the provincial average. Nonetheless, the good money is on the impressionistic data, rather than on the carefully collected government statistics.

The majority of the resident population are Sunni Muslims, but there is a significant number of Shia Muslims living in various towns and villages in Hangu Tehsil, mainly along the Kohat-Thal road. The district also hosts an estimated 250,000 Afghan refugees in various camps in Hangu Tehsil. There have been occasional conflicts between local residents and refugees over access to local resources. These conflicts have, in some instances, taken on a sectarian colouring as well.

Politically, Kohat District has a significant presence of all the major political parties and groups. However, the elected positions are divided between the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam, Fazlur Rahman group (JUI-FR) (Table 2).

1.2. Irrigation and Agriculture

The total geographical area of Kohat is 305,700 hectares, of which 82,100 (27%) is cultivated. Of the cultivated area, 34% or 27,800 hectares is irrigated by government canals taking from the three dams in the district; a traditional irrigation system of civil canals, which supply 11,298 hectares; and 41 tubewells and 993 open wells, which irrigate an area of 5100 hectares. Only

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5,800 hectares, or 1.9% of the total area is covered by forests. (In this respect, the district is not dissimilar to the plains districts of the NWFP; the high concentration of forests is in the lower Himalayan mountain region, i.e., Hazara Division and Swat and Dir Districts of Malakand Division).

The major source of irrigation is the Kohat Toi river, which meanders through the district, and its biggest tributary, the Khanki Toi from Tirah hills. Besides these, there are numerous perennial (with meagre discharges) and non-perennial dry hill torrents. The two large rivers running at a tangent to the eastern and western boundary of the district, the Indus and the Kurram, are unable to provide irrigation, because of their low contours. Government canals, mainly around the Kohat Toi, cover an area of 7,435 hectares, and take off from three dams - Tanda, Darozai, and Kandar - all in Kohat Tehsil. Tanda Dam, the largest of the three, feeds the area around Kohat City. Some villagers complained of income losses due to irregular supply of water from Tanda dam in recent years.

The traditional system of civil canals includes 16 perennial weirs with off-taking channels, 23 flood weirs and channels, and numerous perennial channels. Most of these were constructed before independence, and have traditionally been managed, under the local riwaj-i-abpashi, by the local land owners with occasional help from the Provincial Irrigation Department. In recent years, however, some of these have been abandoned, as local communities found themselves unable to maintain or repair them after unprecedented rainfall or subsequent floods. Most of the remaining channels too, are in a state of disrepair, owing to the erosion of the system of colective management systems, and the paucity of funds in the Irrigation Department.

It is understood that the Irrigation Department is in the process of obtaining approval for an improvement and extension project, costing Rs 49 million, which will help ameliorate the situation. Nevertheless, unless some sustainable system of maintenance and improvement is instituted, this solution will provide only a temporary relief. SRSC may be in a position to help restore local management arrangements, and institute a viable system of maintenance and operation. In addition to the maintenance operations, there is a great scope for construction of additional small water training works, including flood weirs and channels or storage tanks.

As for other agricultural inputs, Kohat has the distinction of having the highest per capita availability of tractors in the province (and perhaps in the country), in addition to a disproportionately high amount of other farm machinery. (This anomalous statitstic is generally explained by reference to the excess income generated by the exceptionally high out-migration of villagers from Kohat, particularly Hangu Tehsil, to the Middle

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East. Fertilizer use, however, at 40 kg/ha, is well below the provincial average of 58.2 kg/ha, expalined, in part, by the higher proportion of rainfed lands in Kohat (Table 7).

The main agricultural commodities of Kohat District are wheat (57% of total cropped area in 1986-87), maize (11%), pulses (10%), oilseeds (3%), and fruit (mainly guava, apricot, and persimmon), although small quantities of vegetables, sugarcane, and sorghum are also grown. Oilseed production accounts for 11% of the total provincial output. (Table 6). The common agricultural cycle in irrigated areas is wheat-maize-wheat or wheat-maize-vegetables; and in the *barani* areas, Rabi Crop (wheat/groundnut)-fallow-Rabi Crop, or Kharif Crop (maize/sorghum)-fallow-Kharif Crop. Besides agricultural crops, a major income source is provided by *mazri* leaves, which are woven into baskets, mats, and ropes. Kohat is supposed to be the largest market for *mazri* leaves in the country.

The yields of wheat and maize are about two-thirds of the provincial averages (Table 6) on irrigated as well as *barani* lands, a testimony to the quality of the soil rather than the paucity of inputs such as water or fertilizer.

A significant feature of the agriculture system in Kohat is the high level of owner cultivation. Only 6 percent of the agricultural land in the district is managed by tenants, as opposed to an average of 18 percent for the entire province. Furthermore, land distribution is much more equitable in Kohat. One figure should suffice: only 10% of the area is held in parcels of over 25 acres, the comparative figure for NWFP being 31 percent (Table 7).

1.3. Other Indicators

Kohat District, like much of the NWFP, has very little industry. The statistics of the Census of Manufacturing Industries show Kohat ranked behind Peshawar, Abbottabad, Charsadda, Mardan, and Bannu Districts, with 10 industrial units in the district with capital assets of Rs 775 million and total employment of 3,877 workers. Yet, even these figures give an inflated picture of the level of industrialization in the district. In fact, there are only two major industrial units in the district - Kohat Cement Factory, and Janana de Maloocho textile mills - scarcely sufficient to categorize Kohat as a hub of industrial activity. However, Kohat does produce a sizeable amounts of a few mineral products, notably gupsum, limestone, and shale.

One indicator of the low level of industrialization is the failure of the Small Industries Estate, Kohat (SIE), established by the Small Industries Development Board (SIDB) to attract investors. Out of the 134 plots in the Kohat SIE, only 13 (9%) have been colonized so far, less than the rate of colonization in all the other estates - Peshawar, Mardan, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Abbottabad, and Swat.

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In terms of social indicators, Kohat District presents a fairly average picture. With 4.6% of the province's population, it has 4.9% of the medical institutions, 4.5% of the hospital beds, and between 4 and 5 percent of the schools of various levels. School enrolment levels also range between 4 and 5 percent of the respective provincial totals. There are a few exceptions, but they are not very extreme. The per capita availability of doctors is somewhat above the provincial average; the district literacy rate, at 19.4%, is higher than the provincial average of 16.7%, and is exceeded only by Peshawar and Abbottabad Districts; and the number of intermediate and degree colleges (four), places the district in the upper half of the distribution of higher education facilities.

Other social indicators, such as electricity consumption, number of motor vehicles, or the rate of urbanization, are not significantly out of line with the population ratios. One figure which stands out is the per capita availability of television sets which, at 7.5 per thousand, is the highest in the province, probably due to the high rate of migration to the Middle East (Table 8).

2. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN KOHAT

At the moment, there are several agencies active in the field of rural development in NWFP, and in particular in Kohat District. These include the Local Government and Rural Development Department (LG&RDD), which administers the rural development programme of the GONWFP as well as those of various Union Councils in Kohat, the Kohat District Council, the On-Farm Water Management Project, and the provinicial departments of agriculture, irrigation and public health engineering, and construction and works. The last two departments are active in urban areas as well. Funding levels for the various programmes are provided in Table 4. Brief descriptions of the programmes are given below.

2.1. Local Government and Rural Development Department

The main responsibility of the LG&RD is the administration of the provincial Rural Development programme which has a (revised) allocation Rs 2.4 million for the fiscal year 1988-89. This is locally administered by a Divisional Director and an Assistant Director, and an engineering staff consisting of two engineers and three sub-engineers.

The Annual development Programme of the LG&RD is approved by the Director-General LG&RD, in consultation with political representatives and the district administration. The surveying and costing of the approved schemes is done by the technical staff of LG&RDD, and schemes are implemented through project committees formed at the local level.

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Besides this programme, the LG&RD Department also administers or provides technical assistance to the following programmes:

- MPA Programme
- MNA/Senator Programme
- Union Council Programme
- World Food Programme Assistance

The first two of these have been discontinued after the November 1988 elections, and a new district level initiative in rural development has been launched by the Federal government, under the title of the Peoples Works Programme. This programme is administered by a newly created outfit, staffed mainly by political activists of each region. Its functioning and progress are still evolving, and cannot be evaluated at this stage.

Whereas the rural development programme has a block allocation, the Union Council programme works on the basis of Rs 100,000 for each of the 26 Union Councils. Each Union Council has between 5 and 10 members, who identify development schemes for this programme. The total allocation for a Union Council is divided equally between its members, and the amount allocated to the schemes identified by them. The estimates of the schemes are prepared by the engineering staff and final approval of schemes is accorded by the Director General.

The concerned member of the Union Council who is to execute the scheme, appoints a Project Committee. The technical staff is supposed to see that work is done according to specifications. The rural works programme and Union Council programme are run independently. It is a peculiar feature of the programme that funds are distributed on a *pro rata* basis instead of on an integrated priority programme. The result is that parts of the schemes are completed and no one project is taken up for its entire completion. There is also no provision for maintenance of the completed works. In the programme for roads most of the schemes consist of shingling which is spreading loose shingle mixed with earth without any consolidation. These works do not last for a long time unless subsequently metalled and black topped.

2.2. The District Council

The District Council is an autonomous body, with its own revenues, and consists of 32 elected members and a Chairman. The budget for the fiscal year 1988-89 is given in Table 5. The Secretariat has a Chief Officer from the LCS and his clerical staff. The LCS Engineering Staff has 1 District Engineer and 4 Sub-Engineers.

Each member of the District Council submits a prioritized list of developmental schemes in his area to the Chairman. Estimates

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are prepared by the engineering staff, and the technical personnel prepare an annual development programme, for approval by the District Council, in which high priority schemes from each constituency are selected in such a way that the funds get distributed roughly equally between the members. The schemes are implemented by project committees headed by the respective members of the District Council, under the supervision of the technical staff. The quality of actual works is said to be quite variable.

2.3. On Farm Water Management

This programme is funded by World Bank, and locally administered by an Assistant Director, who supervises an agricultural and an engineering section, with the following staff strength:

Engineering		Agriculture	
Water-Management Officer		Water management officer	
Engineer	1	Agriculture	1
Sub-Engineer	2	Field Assistants	2
Rodmen	5	Clerical Staff	

The following projects are implemented under this programme: improvements of watercourses; precision land levelling; and storage tanks.

The watercourses are fed by government canals (reservoirs), and civil canals. The improvements generally consist of lining 20% of the watercourse near the head reaches, and cleaning, desilting, etc. of the remaining portions. It is reported by the concerned department that these improvements reduce water losses from 48% to 15-20 %, and more area can be brought under command with the same quantity of water. The length of a watercourse is generally from 2500 meters to 3000 meters and area of command 100 to 150 acres.

The World Bank project fund picks up 80% of the cost of the project, while the remaining 20% is provided by a local contribution for the labour component of the scheme.

The Water Users Associations of beneficiary farmers executes a proper agreement on Rs 4 stamp paper. After 2 years of completion 10% of the expenditure from the World Bank 'fund' is recovered from the users over a period of 5 years.

The annual target for watercourse improvement is 10-14 watercourses. So far, 44 watercourses have been improved. As regards precision land levelling, a 3-acre demonstration plot has been prepared to train farmers in levelling of fields. The proposal for the construction of storage tanks in *barani* areas is still in the planning stages.

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2.4. Agriculture Department

The Department of Agriculture (DOA) has two large directorates operating in Kohat District - the Directorate of Agricultural Extension (DAE), and the Directorate of Agricultural Engineering. The Directorate of On-Farm Water Management (DOFWM) is also part of DOA, while the Fruit and Vegetable Development Board (FVDB) has been constituted out of the DAE as an independent entity.

DAE has three main activities:

- Agricultural extension through demonstration plots, fairs and festivals.

- The Barani Seed Farm in Hangu, spread over 19 ha. Wheat seed (mostly Pak-81, but also some Pirsabak-85) is produced on 12-13 ha. Pre-basic seed is obtained from CCRI, Pirsabak. Basic seed is sold to the ADA and registered growers. Some groundnut seed is also produced.

- Supply of spray pumps tp farmers at 60% of cost, for spray mostly on vegetable and orchards. During 1984-89, DAE sold 297 hand compression pumps, 12 shoulder-mounted power sprayers, and 5 trolley-mounted pumps.

A non-traditional oilseeds project funded by USAID is reported to be close to initiation.

DAE has 9 Agriculture Officers (AOs), 22 Field Assistants (FAs), and one pickup truck that is not operational. There is one FA for 800-900 farmers, and one AO for 2,500-3,000 farmers.

The Agricultural Engineering Directorate has more than 100 staff in all categories. It has 18 bulldozers and 2 tubewell drilling units (which bore 3-4 wells each year). It has two budgetted activities, while the third activity remains suspended pending evaluation. Its major activities are:

- Tubewell Drilling: Tubewells are bored for farmers and operated by them after completion. The private sector charges Rs 350-400 per rft. Agricultural Engineering charges Rs 17/rft. Cost per tubewell averages Rs 100,000 for 300-ft wells with discharge of 0.5 cusec (12,000 gallons per hour) to irrigate at most 10 ha.

- Reclamation of Wasteland: by hiring out bulldozers. Subsidy is 54% and there is a long queue for the 'dozers.

- Training for farmers: (a) in tractor driving; and (b) use of farm implements. Programme has been stopped because there is an ongoing evaluation for which the report has not yet been completed. Course duration of 3 months. Stipend to trainees:

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Rs 500/month. Plus residence and food in dormitories on site. Trainees included students, mechanics, etc.

The FVDB has a small presence in Kohat. They are promoting the use of pheromone traps for fruit fly control, but the demand far outstrips the supply.

The Forest Department is engaged in a UNHCR/World Bank income-generating project for refugees, as well as a social forestry project sponsored by USAID. Under the social forestry project, private nurseries grow eucalyptus and pulai for purchase by the Forest Department and subsequent sale to the general public.

2.5. Irrigation Department

The Irrigation Department is a regular line department of the provincial government and functions according to department's rules and regulations. The department is represented by an Executive Engineer and a Sub-Divisional Officer for the Kohat Engineering Division, which includes Karak District as well.

The Irrigation Department is responsible for maintaining government canals and allocating irrigation water from the three dam systems in Kohat District - Tanda, Darozai, and Kandar - and to monitor the status of the numerous civil canals and civil irrigation works. The latter are supposed to be maintained by local communities, who also regulate the distribution of water from these works in accordance with the traditional *riwaj-i-abpashi*. However, the Irrigation Department has often provided maintenance funds in the event of exceptional damage due to floods. In recent years, the erosion of local management systems has led to a progressive deterioration in the level of maintenance of these works. In government canals, too, there are problems. Tanda Dam has silted up rapidly, which has created problems of water reliability.

2.6. Public Health Engineering Department

The PHED is also a regular line department (merged with the Irrigation Department while this report was being written) of the provincial government and functions according to department's rules and regulations. Its main function has been the construction of drinking water supply schemes in the province, of which a large chunk has been allocated to rural areas. In Kohat District, Rs 12 million were allocated to rural water supply schemes in fiscal year 1988-89, as against Rs 3 million for urban schemes. The latter may be something of a misnomer, since much of the amount is allocated to small towns which are different from rural villages only in name.

This department is particularly important in Kohat because drinking water is major problem in the south-east of the district,

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which is an area of brackish sub-soil water. People in this area, particularly women, often have to walk for miles to obtain drinking water.

2.7. Other Donor Assisted Projects

Besides the On Farm Water Management project, there is very little donor assisted developmental activity in Kohat. The USAID Social Forestry project for NWFP, which has a presence in Kohat, seeks to establish nurseries on private lands for eucalyptus and *pulai*. The Forest Department has purchased plants from nurseries for sale to the general public.

In addition to this, there is a UNHCR/World Bank income-generating project for Afghan refugees, which aims to introduce eucalyptus plantation through food-for-work. USAID has also proposed a project for the development of non-traditional oilseeds crops, but that is still in the planning stage.

3. KOHAT AS SRSC'S PROJECT AREA

There are several reasons for selecting Kohat as the initial base for SRSC activities. First, probably because of its proximity to Peshawar, Kohat seems to have been bypassed in most earlier developmental efforts. Development allocations for Kohat District have typically fallen below its population share. While its income level would be near the average for the province as a whole, the fact there is considerable variation between irrigated and *barani* lands suggests significant pockets of poverty in the district. In other words, it has a claim on the Poverty Criterion for site selection (re: Section 2.1 of Volume I of this report).

Second, it is easily accessible by road from Peshawar as well as Islamabad, and there is also an airlink to Islamabad. This would place it high on the list for the Replicability Criterion.

Third, the district is a mixture of *barani* and irrigated agriculture. This means that a development programme in Kohat can generate lessons for both types of areas for future replication. Kohat can be seen as a linear combination of Karak (*barani*) and Charsadda (irrigated), and by that token, similar to Nowshera.

Fourth, there is a history of collective management of civil canals and watercourses, even though the systems are deteriorating. This tradition can be built upon to strengthen local management capabilities.

Fifth, the district has one of the highest concentration of people with exposure to living conditions in alien cultural environments, either in the military (Kohat Tehsil), or in the Middle East (Hangu Tehsil). This experience can be very useful:

it provides a readily available cadre of local managers; and it could help in creating an environment where new ideas can be assimilated more easily.

Sixth, there are no major sectarian or political feuds in this district. While differences do exist, as they do everywhere, they have not led to the type of polarization witnessed in some other regions of the province.

Seventh, there are some clearly identifiable problems in this district which provide a scope for both income-generating and social sector interventions. These include: water channel renovation and improvement, storage tanks, *mazri* industry improvement and marketing, drinking water, and livestock management.

Eighth, although this point is not intrinsic to this district, it must be mentioned that at the moment (when SRSC is likely to be introduced) senior officers of the Divisional as well as District administration are keenly interested in the development of the region.

Lastly, there is hardly any donor assited projected in Kohat (unlike Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, Malakand, Dir, Chitral, Swat, or Dera Ismail Khan); indeed, even Kohistan had a major developmental project in the 1970s in the form of the Kohistan Development Board. The donor-aided projects which do exist - OFWM, Social Forestry - are relatively abbreviated versions of provincial programmes, not programmes which seek to cater to the special characteristics of Kohat District. Furthermore, none of these projects seeks to involve local villagers in decision making, such as, say, in the Pak-German IRDP Mardan, the Pak-Holland Malakand Social Forestry Project, the Pak-Holland PATA Groundwater Irrigation Project, the IFAD/ADB-assisted Chitral Area Development Project, the Pak-Swiss Kalam IDP, Hazara Forestry Cooperatives, and so forth.

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TABLES FOR ANNEX D.1

TABLE 1
KOHAT DISTRICT: POPULATION AND AREA

	TOTAL	% OF NWFP
Population, 1985-86	593,000	4.56
Area (hectares)	305,700	4.08
Cultivated Area (hectares)	82,100	4.70
Irrigated Area (hectares)	27,800	3.71
Forest Area (hectares)		

TABLE 2

KOHAT DISTRICT: ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES

Senator

Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gilani (PPP)[1]
Federal Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs

Member of the National Assembly

Haji Naematullah Khan (JUI-FR)[2]

Members of the Privincial Assembly

Masood Kausar (PPP) - Kohat Town
Speaker of the NWFP Assembly
Iftikharuddin Khattak (Independent) - Kohat/Lachi
Advisor to the Chief Minister on Education
Pir Sanaullah Banoori (JUI-FR) - Kohat/Gumbat
Ghani ur Rehman (PPP) - Hangu

[1] Pakistan People's Party.

[2] Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, Fazl ur Rehman Group.

TABLE 3
KOHAT DISTRICT: IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

Total Area	305,700 hectares
Cultivated Area	82,100 hectares
Irrigated Area:	27,800 hectares
Government canals	7,435 hectares
Civil canals	11,298 hectares
Tubewells	1,744 hectares
Open wells	3,279 hectares

TABLE 4
KOHAT DISTRICT: ADP ALLOCATIONS, 1988-89
(Rupees millions)

1.	District Council Programme		15.0
	(Roads)	(8.2)	
	(Drinking water supply)	(2.2)	
	(Flood control/Irrigation)	(1.4)	
	(Buildings)	(0.5)	
	(Contributions towards matching grant)	(0.1)	
	(Miscellaneous)	(2.6)	
2.	Union Council Programme		2.6
3.	Rural Works Programme		
	Original	3.1	
	Revised	2.4	
4.	World Food Programme		2.6
5.	Local Contribution (on self help basis)		0.4
6.	Provincial ADP for Kohat District including:		107.38
	(Agriculture)	(3.86)	
	(Rural Development)	(5.74)	
	(PHED)	(12.00)	
	(Irrigation Department)	(2.50)	
	(Primary Education)	(10.45)	
	(Rural Health)	(10.09)	

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TABLE 5
KOHAT DISTRICT: DISTRICT COUNCIL PROGRAMME:
(million Rupees)

1.	INCOME SOURCES		
	Export Tax	17.0	
	Property Tax (Mutation fees)	2.5	
	Cattle Fairs	1.4	
	Bus Stands	0.4	
	Total		20.3
2.	EXPENDITURE PROGRAMME		
	Roads	8.2	
	Drinking water supply	2.2	
	Flood control/Irrigation	1.4	
	Buildings	0.5	
	Contributions towards matching grant	0.1	
	Miscellaneous	2.6	
	Total		15.0

TABLE 6
KOHAT DISTRICT: CROP YIELDS AND OUTPUT

	YIELD kg/ha		OUTPUT	
	Kohat	NWFP	000 tonnes	% of NWFP
WHEAT				
Total	808	1204	43.5	5.0
Irrigated	1519	1716		
Barani	630	897		
MAIZE	1080	1437	13.5	2.3
SUGARCANE				0.5
OILSEEDS	681	640	3.2	11.0
FRUIT (value)				5.3
VEGETABLES (value)				1.4

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TABLE 7
KOHAT DISTRICT: AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS

	KOHAT	NWFP
Population/Cultivated ha	7.2	7.4
Population/Irrigated ha	21.3	17.5
Percent Tenants	6	18
% of Landholdings 10 ha+	10	31
Fertilizer kg/cult. ha	40.2	58.2

TABLE 8
KOHAT DISTRICT: SOCIAL STATISTICS

	KOHAT	NWFP
Literacy Rate	19.4	16.7
TV/10,000 population	74.5	26.5
Electricity Consump (kw/cap)	0.23	0.24
Population/Motor Vehicle	97.3	98.8
Doctors/10,000 pop	1.3	0.9
Hospital Beds/10,000 pop	6.4	6.4

ANNEX D.2

CHARSADDA DISTRICT

PREAMBLE

This annexure has two objectives. The first is to provide a brief impressionistic picture of socio-economic conditions in Charsadda District; and the second, to help the future SRSC management group in negotiating around potential obstacles to the success of the programme in Charsadda. The descriptive parts of this note rely on the sources listed below. Official documents were made available through the good offices of the Planning and Development Department, GONWFP, and the District Administration, Charsadda.

District Population Census Report, 1981.
Jim Freedman, Lokkey Wai, C. Gregory Morley, Ake Blomqvist, and Mahmood Hasan Khan, SCARP Mardan Evaluation: Baseline Study, A report prepared for CIDA, Islamabad, July 1986.
Office Records, Assistant Director, Rural Development, Charsadda.
ADP, 1988-89, District Council, Charsadda.
ADP, 1988-89, GONWFP.
ADP, 1988-89, LG&RD Department, Charsadda.
Interviews with elected representatives and government officials.
Interviews with the villagers of Muftipur, Sarfraz, Kharkai, Haryana, and Zarbab Garhi.

1. A PROFILE OF CHARSADDA DISTRICT

Charsadda District is located in the Peshawar Division of NWFP, and is surrounded by Mohmand Agency in the west, Malakand Agency in the north, Mardan District in the east, and by the Kabul River, which separates it from Peshawar District, in the south. The Swat River runs more or less through the middle of the district. The district is a flat alluvial plain, which is almost 100% irrigated and very densely cultivated.

Charsadda is one of the newest districts in NWFP. It was formed, in July 1988, by separating the old Charsadda Tehsil from Peshawar District, and by creating a new tehsil from the northern half of the new district with headquarters in Tangi. One consequence of the recent birth is that most development statistics for Charsadda are available only as part of overall figures for Peshawar District. This is not an insurmountable difficulty, however, since the socio-economic characteristics for the rural areas of Charsadda and Peshawar show a strong degree of similarity. Indeed, with the outstanding exception of the barren and hilly area

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lying south of the Kabul River in Nowshera Tehsil of Peshawar District, the entire area is characterized by highly productive lands, intensive cultivation, and almost 100% availability of irrigation facilities. The region is inhabited by Yusufzai tribes practicing settled agriculture, with a high incidence of sharecropping, and a striking degree of economic differentiation and political tension.

The total population of the new district, according to the 1981 census, was 630,811, of which about 500,000 or 79.2% was characterised as rural. The total geographic area of the district is 996 square kilometres, yielding a population density of 633 persons per square kilometre which, for a population that is largely rural, is one of the highest levels of population concentration in the country.

The figures on rural and urban distribution of the population of Charsadda are likely to be somewhat misleading, in the sense that, notwithstanding the existence of a few proto-urban settlements, the overall character of the entire district remains rural. One reason for this is that unlike most other districts in Pakistan, there are no cantonment areas in Charsadda which, during the colonial period, served as centres for the development of urban culture. The result is that Charsadda lags behind other districts of NWFP in terms of social statistics as well as the level and quality of its social services. The literacy rate is well below the average level for the NWFP; drinking water is obtained mainly from open wells and even irrigation canals; sewerage facilities are highly inadequate and less than five percent of the household have flush toilets; cooking fuel is mainly wood (80%) and dung cakes (15-20%). However, the proportion of households with access to electricity ranges from 55% for poor income groups to 70% for more affluent households.

Charsadda District is mainly agricultural in nature. It is a flat plain irrigated by water from the three tributaries of the Kabul River - the Shah Alam, the Nagoman, and the Adezai - and by the Swat River and the Lower Swat Canal. Of Peshawar and Charsadda Districts taken together, only 9% of the farm area is *barani*, and almost all of that 9% is in Nowshera Tehsil, south of the Kabul River. The irrigation system, which covers practically the entire cultivable land in the district, consists of government canals, civil canals, tubewells, open wells, and lift pumps (*jhalars*). The areas commanded by these sources of irrigation are the following:

Government Canals	42105 hectares
Civil Canals	18718 hectares
Tubewells	201 hectares
Open Wells	928 hectares
Lift Pumps	1367 hectares

There are 47 government tubewells, and 344 private tubewells

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in the district, of which only 9 private tubewells are run on diesel, while the remaining are electrically operated. Other farm machinery is also found in abundance in Charsadda, including an estimated 279 tractors, 251 threshers, and 10 rice husking machines, all but a handful being in private ownership.

The production system revolves around three crops, sugarcane, wheat and maize, although significant areas are also allocated to the production of animal fodders, tobacco, and vegetables, and rice production has also begun, mainly in some of the waterlogged areas. Sugarcane is the main cash crop and is grown on about two-fifths of the cultivated area; much of the production is sold to the three sugar mills in the area, Khazana, Charsadda, and Takhtbhai, and the rest is used for making *gur*. Wheat and maize are primarily subsistence crops, the bulk of the production remaining within the village if not within the household. The proportion of land allocated to grain production drops sharply with the size of the holding. There is significant intercropping, particularly with wheat and sugarcane, partly because of the presure on land, and partly because of the perceived ecological complementarity between the two crops.

For all practical purposes, there are no forests in Charsadda District. However, there are tree plantations along the roadsides as well as the canal banks, in addition to fruit orchards and scattered trees under private ownership and control. A significant potential exists for growing trees, perhaps for environmental rather than economic purposes, in the very large areas reserved for graveyards. While we have not been able to come up with hard data on the area covered by graveyards in Charsadda, some anecdotal evidence suggests that it is very large. In trivia contests, Charsadda is occasionally mentioned as the site of the largest graveyard in the country. Folklore has it that the entire district was a graveyard at one time, from which the land has only gradually been extracted for human settlement; people point to many of the newer settlements as having been erected on graveyard sites within living memory. Attempts have occasionally been made to plant commercially valuable trees in these areas, but they have always foundered upon the reluctance of villagers as a community (not as individuals) to violate the sanctity of grave sites. An innovative effort, built around emerging ecological concerns, could conceivably be launched to start a protected plantation drive on a collective social basis. This, however, is probably not feasible for an organization like the SRSC except at a later stage in its life.

Economically, Charsadda District is part of the rural hinterland of the main urban concentration in Peshawar. There is almost no part of the district which is more than two hours away by road from Peshawar City; the district headquarter itself is only 32 kilometres from the bigger metropolis. Charsadda has an excellent network of rural roads, mainly along canal banks, which

connect every village to the larger towns. While the roads are narrow, the vast majority are blacktopped and of adequate quality. Charsadda City is also connected to Peshawar, and through Peshawar to the rest of the country, by a rail link.

Government development programmes in the district are undertaken along five different heads: the provincial ADP, the Rural Works Programme (RWP), the recently introduced Peoples Works Programme, the District Council programme, and the Union Council Programme.

RWP allocation for 1988-89 was Rs 2.7 million, later reduced to Rs 2 million. Earlier, the programme was approved by the District Development Advisory Committee, an appointed body comprised of elected and official representatives; more recently, the procedure has been the approval of schemes directly by the Provincial Minister for Local Government. The programme consists mainly of the blacktopping of farm-to-market roads.

The District Council programme is normally prepared by the staff of the Council at the suggestion of the elected Councillors, and approved by he entire Council in session. This year, however, it is being handled directly by the officials because of the anomalous situation created by the division of the old Peshawar District (and the old District Council) into two new ones. This programme, too, consists almost entirely of the construction and blacktopping of rural roads and the construction of irrigation drains and retaining walls.

The Union Council programme, at Rs 100,000 for each of the 35 Union Councils, is prepared by the staff of the Rural Development Department, on the basis of suggestions made by the Chairmen of the Councils. In 1988-89, the programme consisted mainly of small drainage works, construction culverts on farm roads, and the construction of shingled roads. Construction of rural works is often under the supervision of a project committee formed from local influential people. While there may be instances of the wastage of resources in this arrangement, it is often claimed that the costs are lower than for similar projects constructed by provincial departments.

In addition to the development efforts organized and initiated by the government, there are a few initiatives which stem from traditional institutions for collective social action. A traditional practice of social cooperation, commonly known as *ashar*, is applied mainly to the cleaning of irrigation channels and repairs of an emergency nature. While the practice varies from village to village, the most common form is where a local notable takes charge of the operation and induces others through economic, social or political pressure to contribute to the collective effort.

Where Charsadda is distinguished from Peshawar District, or even the rest of the country, is in terms of its social statistics. The literacy ratio for the district in 1981 was 13.3%, which compares with the ratio of 21.8% for the entire old Peshawar District (i.e., including Charsadda District). While this is explained, in part, by the lower level of urbanization in Charsadda, even that explanation is not adequate. The literacy rate for the rural areas of Charsadda was 11.7% compared to 13.1% for Peshawar. Female literacy is almost non-existent in Charsadda, at the level of 4.2% (compared to 10.9% for Peshawar). These figures are set out in detail in Table 1.

In addition to the low literacy rates, Charsadda District is also characterized by a low level of achievement at higher educational levels. A study of two villages in Charsadda found that 57% of the literate males had no more than a primary school education, and that the district was proportionately deficient in the number of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and college graduates [Freedman et al., 1986, p. 41]. These statistics cannot be explained simply as the result of a lack of access to educational facilities, since Charsadda has not only a full fledged network of schools, it also benefits from the proximity to centres of higher education in Peshawar. A more likely explanation is the absence of an urban culture which, during the colonial period, provided the basis for accepting the value of state-sponsored institutions of education.

It may also be mentioned here that many writers have discovered a strong and significant correlation between the concentration of income and wealth and such social and economic variables as the literacy rate and the effectiveness of agricultural extension efforts [Freedman et al., 1986, p. 206].

Indeed, Charsadda is unique in terms of the relatively high level of inequality of income and wealth, and a somewhat greater degree of political mobilization and polarization. The inequality is reflected not only in the distribution pattern of agricultural land, but also in the tenancy pattern in the district. Fully 41% of the land in the district is held by pure tenants or owner-cum-tenants, as opposed to 18% for all of NWFP, and only 6% for Kohat District.

Tenancy contracts are mostly in the nature of sharecropping arrangements in which the tenant and the landlord share equally the cost of inputs and the value of output. An estimated 84% of the landowning households lease 78% of their lands on a sharecropping basis. Cash leases are rare, and are generally restricted to high value crops, such as fruit or vegetables.

In terms of political orientation, the district seems to be divided between the two dominant political parties in the NWFP, the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)

[Table 2]. This development is relatively recent; historically, the various incarnations of the ANP - the Khudai Khidmatgars in the pre-independence period, later the Awami League (AL), then the National Awami Party (NAP), and lastly, the National Democratic Party (NDP) - were almost unchallenged in the area. The opposition between the two dominant parties mirrors and is mirrored by differentiation and polarization at the local level along clan, kin, and agnatic rivalry on the one hand, and along competing patronage arrangements on the other hand.

2. CHARSADDA AS SRSC PROJECT AREA

As a possible project area for SRSC's operations, Charsadda District presents both opportunities and constraints. It is one of the richest agricultural regions in the province, with a high potential payoff from social cooperation, and therefore bright prospects for development; this leads to the expectation that it might be easier to mobilize people behind cooperative efforts. Moreover, given Charsadda's prominence in the social and political life of the province, it may also be asserted that success in this area would have greater visibility and greater legitimacy for other similar endeavours. "If SRSC can make it here," to paraphrase the old refrain, "it can make it anywhere".

On the other hand, there are obstacles as well. The most daunting of these relates to the nature of the socio-political system which has developed in this area over the previous two centuries. Among other things, as mentioned earlier, this is reflected in the relatively high degree of economic differentiation and political polazisation at the village level, built along competing patron-client groupings of the "traditional" as well as the "modern" type.

For purposes of understanding the SRSC's role in an area like Charsadda, it is important to distinguish between the latter two types of polarization and conflict. The first refers mainly to patron-client relationships and a system of allegiance and loyalty built around kinship and clan networks, in which the economic subordination of the client to the patron is secondary (and often non-existent). The "modern" types of allegiances and loyalties, on the other hand, are organized purely around economic relationships, such as between tenants and landlords, or between landless labourers and potential employers; in this case, the kin or clan relationships between patrons and clients acquires a secondary importance.

Before we proceed further, it is important to point out that in Charsadda District, while kin-based affiliations continue to be important, the dominant form of allegiance and grouping as well as the basis for social differentiation is along economic lines. For example, Freedman et. al. [1986] discovered, in their evaluative

survey of the Mardan SCARP Project (which covers the districts of Charsadda and Mardan) that as many as two-thirds of the factions in the two villages of Charsadda District examined by them were based on non-kin affiliations. Even within the relatively homogeneous Mardan SCARP area, these two villages reflected an above average degree of hierarchical patron-client relationships. The existence of such relationships across the different sample villages was highly correlated with the prevalence of tenancy (as opposed to owner-cultivation) relations.

There are good reasons to believe that this pattern has matured only recently, with the gradual encapsulation of traditional Pakhtun society by social forces set in train by the process of colonialism and modernization.[3] The transition was particularly rapid and far-reaching in Charsadda, which registered an extremely rapid increase in the levels as well as the degree of inequality of income and wealth during the colonial period, due precisely to the introduction of canal irrigation in the area. Also, a degree of political differentiation was added to the emerging income inequalities because of Charsadda's proximity to the centre of colonial influence in the province, and the disproportionate access enjoyed by the people of this area to the patronage of colonial rulers.

The distinction between "traditional" or kin-based rivalry and "modern" or economic rivalry, is significant because of its relevance for the prospect of participatory development. It is brought home very well by Freeedman et al. [1986] in their discussion of the socio-political dimensions of the Mardan SCARP project:

> Villages where kinship relations dominate tend to feature, in both intra-faction and intra-village affairs, <u>an ethos of reciprocity and compromise</u>. In villages where factions are constituted principally of households whose allegiance to a leading household is based on an economic or political subordination ... [suggest] a greater likelihood of conflict between factions, and within factions, a tendency towards economic differentiation between households [Freedman et. al., 1986, pp. 191, emphasis added].

In our own survey of four villages in Charsadda District, we found that those with a more egalitarian distribution of income, also exhibited relatively greater social harmony and willingness

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[3]For a sophisticated argument on the transition in the NWFP from an ideal state of kin-based social system, towards a more corrupt form in the settled areas influenced by the colonial as well as the post-colonial state, see Akbar S. Ahmed, <u>Pakhtun Economy and Society</u>, Oxford University Press, 1981.

to compromise in the larger social interest. Zarbab Garhi, with a high proportion of middle income farmers (20-25 acres) was the only place where people talked about setting up a welfare committee for undertaking collective works, such as irrigation works maintenance, resolution of disputes, or informal tuition of village students. Sarfraz village,[4] with the most unequal income distribution, appears to be deeply polarized. The large number of smallholders (2-5 acres) are intensely opposed to the biggest Khan of the area (150 acres) as well as middle income "kulaks" (50 acres); the collective works in this village are anarchically organized - whoever notices a problem makes an announcement from the village mosque, and people contribute to the social effort if they feel like it. Lastly, Muftipur village[5] has most of its land held in parcels of 10-15 acres by the tenants of one major landlord, Abdul Karim Khan. Collective works are organized by the "foreman" Haji Shahzad Gul, who seems to be highly respected by the villagers, and this has helped introduce a willingness to participate in such efforts.

The existence of the ethos of reciprocity and compromise in kin-based societies is well documented in the anthropological literature. These formed the basis for the self-government arrangements of many local villages and tribes. In the NWFP, this ethos was reflected in the functioning of the *jirga* system in pre-colonial times. Elsewhere in the subcontinent as well, the ethos of the predominant form of local government, namely the *panchayat* system of the Punjab and United Provinces of India, was also that of participation and compromise. Over the years, however, the economic and political changes wrought by colonial rule affected these institutions as well, transforming them in many areas from participatory to hierarchical systems.

In a way, a key objective of the SRSC initiative is the rejuvenation of local institutions of self-government, not necessarily under their traditional names or even on the traditional pattern, in order that a social space be created for the restoration of the disappearing ethos of reeciprocity and compromise. Indeed, as has been mentioned in the text of this report, the very essence of the participatory approach assumes the existence of a shared consensus around a certain core of social concerns; and the social importance of this shared consensus leads to the view that there is a need as well as the possibility to resolve the (relatively smaller) sources of conflict and tension in manner which is not prejudicial to the maintenance of the

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[4]Sarfraz and Muftipur villages were the two studied by Freedman et. al., 1986.

[5]See note 2, above. Our assessment of Muftipur diverges somewhat from Freedman, but this may be because our account is much more impressionistic than theirs.

consensus. Such a consensual core is threatened by the erosion of the ethos of reciprocity and compromise, whether such erosion is due to the changing nature of patron-client relationships within the village, or whether it is due to the subordination of intra-village relationships and intra-village concerns to the dominance of state-centred political or ideological institutions.

This core of shared cultural consensus will have to be extracted from the larger social and political system which is leading at a very rapid pace towards disintegration and polarisation. The optimism that this can be accomplished emanates from two observations. The first is the manifest failure of the larger socio-political system to deliver the goods, as it were; and the second, is the resilience of consensual arrangements in the countryside despite two centuries of attrition at the hands of an aggressive and determined pressure from the expanding colonial state. In order for the initiative to succeed, however, the degree of polarization of a society has to be matched by the intensity of the demand for consensual arrangements. Any attempt to provide it on a platter into a society which is highly polarized and divided along functional or economic lines will lead not only to frustration and waste, but also to the loss of popularity and legitimacy of the government or agency which is seeking to introduce the measures.

The upshot of the above argument is that the initiation of activities into villages which are intensely polarized has to be carefully planned, and preceded by adequate groundwork in the form of the creation of a demand for such initiatives. The best means of creating such a need is the initiation of activities in adjoining areas to create a demonstration effect. While it is true that programmes like the SRSC should not venture into villages or areas unless there is a conscious and articulated demand for such intervention from the villagers, this caveat is doubly important in a situation like Charsadda. The management group has to be willing to wait until the people of a village have been able to find a task or set of tasks over which there is broad and general agreement, in other words which is a part of the shared consensus, and only then agree to provide the assistance demanded by the villagers. Impatience or haste in pushing these services on a divided or reluctant populace will not only prove to be unsuccessful, it will even hurt the legitimacy of the effort in other areas.

It is as a result of the above considerations that we believe that Charsadda District should be monitored carefully by the management group of SRSC for two to three years before extending operations into the area. The extension process should be begun in villages where the groundwork already exists, in the nature of a general agreement as to needs and priorities, and where the demand for the intervention comes from the villagers themselves. Even then, the objective should not be the fullfilment of some

numerical targets, of the number of VOs formed or some such. The object should be to provide good service to the few selected area, and wait for the idea to spread its appeal to other villages in the district.

TABLES FOR ANNEX D.2

TABLE 1

CHARSADDA AND PESHAWAR DISTRICTS: LITERACY RATIOS

	CHARSADDA			PESHAWAR		
	OVERALL	MALE	FEMALE	OVERALL	MALE	FEMALE
Overall	13.3	21.4	4.2	21.8	31.3	10.9
Urban	19.2	30.1	7.0	36.0	46.1	23.3
Rural	11.7	19.1	3.4	13.1	21.6	3.8

TABLE 2

CHARSADDA DISTRICT: POLITICAL PROFILE

Senator

Bashir Khan Matta (ANP)[6]
Hashim Khan (Muslim League)

Member of the National Assembly

Khan Abdul Wali Khan (ANP)

Members of the Privincial Assembly

Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (PPP)[7]
Chief Minister, NWFP
Bashir Khan (ANP)
Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, NWFP
(Resigned recently from the government)
Amir Khisrau Khan (PPP)
Begum Nasim Wali Khan (ANP)
Rehmatullah Khan (ANP)

Administrator Peoples Works Programme

Farmanullah Khan, President, Charsadda District PPP.

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[6]Awami National Party.

[7] Pakistan People's Party.

ANNEX D.3

VILLAGE PROFILES FROM KOHAT

PREAMBLE

Five village case studies in District Kohat (NWFP) were carried out in connection with the proposed Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC). The data were collected through direct observation of the rural infrastructure and open-ended interviews with the village leaders and small groups of villagers. All the fieldwork was conducted in a total of eight days, i.e., May 17 to 24, 1989.

VILLAGE 1. GHULAM BANDA

Near Billitang, Tehsil and District Kohat

Ghulam Banda is a small village in the seven-village suburban union council Billitang, 3 to 12 km from Kohat along the main Kohat-Rawalpindi road. Billitang, the largest village in the union council, is rather a small town with a fairly long bazar, a small mandi (wholesale market) of mazri (a native fibre-leaf), a number of banks and several public facilities. It is situated about 2 km to the south of the main road and linked with it by a metalled side road. The second large village is Togh Bala, situated on both sides of the main road. The third is Togh Payan, a little off the main road towards south. Ghulam Banda, on the other hand, is towards the north along the Darra Adamkhell (Tribal Area) road. It is the last village under the Kohat district administration on this road to Tribal Area.

Ghulam Banda is a medium-sized village with around 200 houses and an estimated population of 2000-2500. But for some reason, its registered voters are only 750, which are not sufficient to form it a separate union council ward (constituency). For this purpose, it is joined with Togh Payan that has 1050 registered voters. The Union Council Member (Councillor) of this ward always elects whoever is supported by Togh Payan; the support of Ghulam Banda does not matter considerably. Consequently, the union council, the district council and other development institutions most often concentrate their efforts (if any) on Togh Payan and the other large villages and tend to ignore Ghulam Banda. So much so that in the whole history of these local bodies (30 years), only one street was brick-paved in 1985-86.

Beside this street, there have been only three other

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development works done in the village in the middle 1980's. A small causeway was constructed in the nullah between the village and the tribal area road by an MPA; one of the five water courses was improved by the OFWM department, and, electric power was supplied but partially to the village. The water course was lined from mogha to a length of 400 meters and 42 more nakkas were installed in the Katcha portion and branches. All the shareholders formed a WUA and participated actively in all the lining and katcha improvement work. The WUA is no more active now. There has been no water in the watercourse since September 1988. The WUA was active when there was water. Its members held meetings, maintained the watercourse properly and cleaned it regularly, even twice and thrice a season. Now all the watercourses are dry and the farmers have been told by the PID that water in the Tanda reservoir is not sufficient to feed these watercourses.

When electricity poles were brought in a few years ago, about 80% of the houses rushed to install internal wiring but the poles were installed by WAPDA in less than one-half of the village and only 40% of the houses were provided connections. The villagers who were lucky enough to obtain connections can use the power only for lighting the houses only when spared by the frequent and prolonged load-shedding. The single phase electric power supplied here is not good for any heavy equipment, even for a refrigerator or an electric iron.

Ghulam Banda is inhabited by two major Pathan tribes, Afridi and Bangash, with about equal populations and ownerships of the village lands. There are only six houses of settlers from Peshawar area who work as tenants and laborers in the village. The village owns about 3200 acres of cultivated land, of which only 150 acres are irrigated. About 100 acres of the latter is under canal irrigation; and about 50 acres under canal plus private shallow well waters. There are five water courses in the village land (now dry) fed by the Tanda Dam main canal; four of which are shared with other neighbouring villages. There are four open wells with small diesel pumps to irrigate the 50 acres when the canal water is not sufficient.

These wells supply water to 18 fruit orchards and some vegetable farms. Guava, Orange and Apricots are major fruits grown in these orchards. All the fruits and vegetables are grown on the well irrigated lands. Most of the fruit and vegetables are taken to Kohat for marketing. The villagers tried to dig three more wells for irrigation but got exhaused resource-wise and could not reach the level of sufficient water. These wells are still lying incomplete. The villagers also grow some fodder for their stall-fed livestock, not for sale. The major crops, grown on the rainfed lands are wheat, mustard and barley in the rabi season and maize, sorghum, mong beans and millet in the kharif season. Rice is also grown by a few farmers but occasionally, on very small fields and for household consumption only.

Among livestock, the villagers keep some buffaloes (0-4), cattle (2-10) and small to medium flocks of goat and sheep (10-100). The buffaloes are kept for milk and are stall-fed; cattle for drought power and milk and are grazed as well as stall-fed; and the small livestock for milk, meat and wool and is grazed in the shamilat and fallow lands around the village. Overall, there are about 200 buffaloes, 700 cattle and 5000-6000 small livestock. The villagers take their dairy products, milk, ghee, wool and animals for sale mainly to Kohat.

Besides agriculture, the villagers go to Karachi for industrial labour, small business and transport operating. There are also some working in Peshawar, Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Lahore. Only 10/12 men have been able to go to work in the Middle East. About 50 men from the village are presently in the military service and a few in the government service.

Among public facilities, the village has a primary school for boys and another for girls. Electricity is there but left incomplete and is insufficient for the village's household needs. There is about a furlong long katcha road from the Darra Adam Khel road to the village mosque. The village has no health facility and no water supply scheme. The villagers have two community wells for potable water which at times dry up and cause inconvenience. A pump with a tank is being constructed for the adjacent tribal area at the village nullah and the villagers have been given some hope of a limited supply of water from this source. But they doubt because they are afraid the tribals may not allow them any water.

The real need of the village is water; water for drinking and water for irrigation. They say, if the canal water is not sufficient or cannot be supplied reliably, why not instal a few (3 or 4) tubewells in and around the village. As regards drinking water, they are somehow surviving. Their first priority problem is irrigation water. The land is mostly alluvial and suitable for growing fruits, vegetables and other crops. They are willing to dig and maintain the water distribution channels and pay water rents for their crops. Another alternative to the problem, as suggested by the villagers is that of supplying three-phase electric power, small credit and technical assistance for installing open well electric pumps for small scale irrigation.

With irrigation water available, the villagers said that they would want technical and financial assistance for crops, vegetables, fruits and livestock. The village is close by the district headquarters, Kohat, and can serve as the major supplier of the farm and dairy products with some assistance from the the government. There is a small cooperative credit society in the village but it could seldom succeed in obtaining any reasonable amount of loan. A Field Assistant has been seen a few times in the village but they do not know why and what for.

The village is like a shadow under a candle. Geographically it is in the suburban union council of Kohat but attention and facility-wise, it is more like a very remote village. It is between the two privileged centers. To one side there are big suburban villages that hold the power and all the development resources to themselves. And, to the other side, there lies a specially privileged tribal agency, Darra Adam Khel. Thus, this village gets ignored most often. The villagers suggest that the development efforts should be made by each community, whether small or big; not by ward or union council. In other words, the unit of rural development should be changed from a union council or a ward down to a community or a village level, whether large or small.

VILLAGE 2. RAHMANABAD

Near Shakardara, Tehsil and District Kohat

Rahmanabad is the major village in a scattered cluster of 33 villages and 10/12 hamlets, collectively known as Dhand Saghiri or Topi and inhabited entirely by Khattak, a Pathan tribe. This area is situated at the south-eastern end of the Kohat district, bordering to the east with Attock district with Indus river in between and to the south with Mianwali district, both in the province of Punjab. The area is predominantly hilly sloping down towards east, the Indus river. These hills are almost barren, with very sparse vegetation at their lower portions, nullah sides and small valleys. The nullahs remain dry most of the year. It is only in the rainy season (July-August) when there is some water flow in these nullahs. Around 20% of the land surface seems cultivable, of which hardly 50% is being cultivated. Farming is all rainfed, except for two shallow wells with small diesel pumps that provide irrigation water to 1.5 and 2.0 acres of land, respectively. Cropping intensity of the cultivated land area ranges between 50% and 75%. People keep cattle (1-6) and small livestock (10-50) by grazing in the valleys and the river side. Similarly, fuel wood is also collected from nearby vegetations and riverside.

There are three large villages in the area. Rahmanabad, being the largest is comprised of about 220 houses and a population of about 2,500. The next is village Bakhtawara, with around 180 houses and 2000 population. The third village is known as Pakka that has about 140 houses and 1500 persons. The other 30 villages are small ones having 30 to 60 houses and populations of less than 1000 persons each. The 10/12 hamlets have 5 to 12 houses and populations between 50 and 150.Over all, the area's total population is estimated to be around 30,000 that includes the men working and staying outside the area.

The greatest majority (80%-90%) of the men-folk works in

military and later in industries in the cities of the Punjab and Sind provinces. Only the school age children, the elderly, the disabled and some well-to-do men stay at home. They take care of the farming activities, livestock grazing, fuelwood collection, as well as the household, biraderi (clan) and community affairs. The men working outside normally come on home leave for a month or so once a year. They also participate in these activities while staying at home. In times of need, for example harvesting season, fuelwood collection for winter, sickness or another mishap of a close relative, most men come home to share the responsibilities with others at village.

The area has a 30 km-long shingle road that links it with Shakardara town and another 8 kms. katcha road towards Makhad (Attock district) across the Indus river. It has also a semi-developed katcha road to link it with Kalabagh (Mianwali district). There are three 1-5 kms. long katcha roads between the villages: the other villages have narrow roads or walking paths. There is one high school and 20 primary schools and maktab (Masjid-Madrassa) for boys and two primary schools for girls (one is likely to be promoted to middle level soon). Some girls also attend the maktabs at village mosques. There is a basic health unit with an LHV, a dispenser and a mid-wife but no doctor. There is also a branch post office, the only means of communication with the outside world. So far, none of these villages have any electric power but according to the Chairman Union Council Bori (Shakardara) they will have it as soon as the grid station at Lachi (a town on Kohat-Bannu road) get completed.

There are 22 shallow potable water wells scattered around in the nullahs, of which only three were government funded through the union council, the others being dug and managed by the villagers themselves. Two villages also have hand-pumps installed in the nearby nullahs; one out of the union council funds and the other by a pious man in the village. The OGDC has recently constructed a water pipeline from Indus river for its oil exploring rigs near Shakardara. It has a tank near Rahmanabad proper for relifting the water. Formerly, the tank was strictly guarded, but only a few months ago they have allowed the villagers to get some water for their household usage.

The water situation in this area, particularly in the three large villages, is so critical that even at midnight time men and women can be seen waiting for their turns at the wells and the OGDC tank. The households that cannot or do not fetch water for themselves have to spend Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 per month on just drinking water. An empty tin is priced at Rs. 15 that does not last for more than two months. The buyers have to provide their own containers (tins) and pay Rs. 2.50 per tin of water; usually two tins of water for Rs. 5.00. Most of the shopkeepers and several households buy the water. It takes a carrier one to three hours per trip by one or two donkeys for a mere distance of one or two

kilometers; he spends most of his time in waiting for his turn at the source of water. This shows how severe is the problem of water in this area; and it worsens as the dry season gets prolonged. When you ask the villagers about their problems or development they would say water; it is their biggest problem and it is the key to all development work in their area. According to them no effort is likely to succeed in the area, untill the water problem is solved.

The Public Health Engineering department has recently surveyed some sites and tentatively selected two sites for digging wells. But the village leaders say, even then the water supply may not be sufficient for the area. They say, the only solution to this problem is to lift water directly or indirectly from the Indus river to a reasonable height and construct a water tank on a hill-top. The villagers are fully willing to construct the distribution channels network on self-help basis. They also promise to take care of the operation and maintenance of the tank and the water channels, and that they would not bother the government in this connection any more.

These people do have a sense of community and they are organized enough to take up collective actions. They usually work collectively or on work-share basis in digging shallow wells, clearing, levelling and at times shingling their village paths and roads and participating in constructing a mosque, hujra (community center) or even a school or a health facility. Mostly, they work on a lower wage rate on public community works. For example, the usual wage rate in the area is Rs. 30-35 per day, whereas several villagers who worked on the Shakardara-Rahmanabad road and/or the water well construction by the union council, agreed to receive Rs. 20 to 25, and they did the same amount of work that they would normally do. Then on several patches of the main road as well as inter village roads, the villagers provided free labor for one or two days each when the union council's funds had been exhausted, and finally the work was completed. Similarly, when the high school and later BHU were being constructed the villagers provided labor at lower wages and towards the end worked free until the completion. Beside potable water, road, school and health facilities which are not directly income generating endeavors, the villagers have some very concrete projects lined up for development, including soil conservation, land reclamation, irrigation and women's activities.

As all these people are of the same tribe, Khattak Pathans and they have blood and marriage relationships, they are socially cohesive. In general, these villagers are peace loving and cooperative in the development works. Thefts, robberies, conflicts are normally very rare in this area. The people are well-disciplined partly because of their military service and partly because of their cultural norms. They themselves want change but of course to some positive direction. They have often and extensively seen the outside world and, thus, they would welcome

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any rural development effort that comes their way. They are more likely to cooperate with than resist the change agents.

VILLAGE 3. NARIAB

Near Doaba, Tehsil Hangu, District Kohat

Nariab is situated towards the north of Doaba Town that is about 20 Kms. from Hangu on the Hangu-Tull road. The union council Nariab is constituted of one large village and 28 small hamlets. All the people of this union council belong to Bangash Pathan tribe. Nariab proper is the largest village in the union council with about 700 houses, 4,000 registered voters and an estimated population of about 10,000. It has three major sections (mohallas), each one itself a village. By population and the public facilities it has, it is no less than a small town, but it does not have a reasonably large bazar. There are about 60 shops that are all scattered around in the streets.

The area has a good metalled road linked with the Hangu-Tull road near Doaba town, with Kahi union council and the road to Kurram Agency (Tribal Area). There are several shingle and katcha roads constructed recently with union council, district council and the MPA/MNA funds. Some of the village streets are brick-paved with sewerage drains on one or both sides but they are not being maintained properly. This village was the first to receive electricity in the whole area around Doaba town, in 1960s. But the poles and wires have now been rusted and cause inconvenience for the villagers. These installations, especially the wires need to be replaced as soon as possible. The village has a rural health center, staffed properly with a male and a female doctor and the lower staff but it lacks X-ray equipment. They were luckly enough to get a telephone exchange lately because a high official of the T&T department belongs to this village.

The area has about 21,000 acres of cultivated land and about 40,000 acres of shamilat land (uncultivable common land). About one-fourth of the cultivated land (5,000 acres) is irrigated with civil canals and private open-well waters, the remaining three-fourths is rainfed. On the irrigated land they grow fruits, particularly guava, orange, apricots and peaches; a great variety of vegetables; green fodder and some grain crops, particularly wheat, maize and some rice. On the rainfed land, i.e., 16,000 acres, they grow wheat, mustard, rapeseed and barley in the rabi season; and maize, mong and other beans, sorghum and sesamum in the kharif season.

The shamilat lands had been of two types: one with natural growth of vegetation used by villagers for grazing their animals, dried grass for winter feeding, fuelwood and small timber

collection for household consumption; and the other with mazri plantations (Mazri is a native fibre-leaf used for basket, rope, matress and roof making). But by the early 1980s, the Afghan Refugees had almost exhausted the village's natural resources, particularly the forest. Just within a few years of their arrival they cut, even uprooted all trees, bushes and grasses. They deforested the shamilats so rapidly and ruthlessly that the green lands turned into brown naked rocks in a period of a few years. The villagers made several attempts to stop them but none of the strategies adopted proved effective. Finally, the Forest Department was approached for assistance and it brought in the community forestry program and established large planations in 1983.

Now the point here is that these plantations are all eucalyptus planatations. By now the seedlings have grown up to a height of one to three meters. When they will be harvested after 3 to 5 years, they will find their way to markets for use in industries and construction works, as it happened in the social forestry programs in many parts of India, particularly in Kerala. If this is to happen, and it is most likely, then where would the villagers get fuelwood? Right now they do have a small piece of their shamilat forest which they have so far been able to protect from the refugees. They still have fairly sufficient forest resources to feed their animals and fireplaces. Even then, 50 to 60 households, in the whole union council area mainly in Nariab proper, have already started using commercial fuelgas for cooking purposes.

The major natural resources of the area are land, water and forest. The local people have been managing them quite successfully since times immemorial. The 21,000 acres of cultivated land is fairly in proper shape and usage; the nullahs, springs and subsurface waters are being utilized to a possible extent; and, the forest resources had been properly managed, until the Afghan refugees arrived. However, they are still managing a small portion of the forest where the refugees could not penetrate.

The villages have three sources of irrigation water: rainy nullahs, natural springs and groundwater. Small groups of farmers had been diverting water from two nearby nullahs through small channels to their fields. But the bunds would get washed away every year in monsoon season, demanding for reconstruction. In the early 1980's the PID was kind enough to construct the bunds strong enough to survive the rainy season floods by spending at total of Rs. 850,000. Now the farmers have just to worry about operation and maintenance of the channel. Some farmers with lands on the lower sides, have installed electric and diesel pumps on their open wells to irrigate small patches of lands. These pumps can hardly irrigate 2 to 5 acres of vegetables or fruit trees. The largest and most efficient irrigation system is that of civil canal, fed by three natural springs on the hill sides. Early this century, the villagers somehow managed to construct a canal to utilize these

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waters for irrigation. But there were seasonal fluctuations in the amount of freely flowing water from the three spings. Whatever amount of water came down to the canal, reached to the fields. In the dry seasons, when the demand for water increased, the springs would supply less; at time they would even dry up. In the rainy seasons, however, the water flow increases considerably, and at times, the villagers would let the water go waste down to the nullahs. In the absence of a storage tank, the freely flowing water was being wasted more than utilized. Thus, when the Village Aid Program was initiated by the Government in early 1960's, the villagers rushed to arrange the construction of a storage tank. With many efforts and active participation, the villagers were able to get a medium size water storage tank constructed.

Now waters from the three springs flow down freely to the old channel that falls into the tank. From the tank there is a common canal, also constructed participatively by the villagers. This canal feeds the distributories and several watercourses. The village elder's council have two hired workers: one water tender and the other maintenance man. Each of them is given a 'Mauood', an agreed upon quantity of grains each season: wheat in rabi season and maize for kharif season. The water tender regulates the main channel from the tank by seasons and the distribution outlets by day and time (Warabandi); and receives 4 to 5 kgs. of wheat grain on rabi harvest and of maize grain on kharif harvest for each brakha (0.5 acres) from each farmer. The maintenance man assists the water tender in regulating the outlets and maintains the old channel and the common channel; and receives 2 to 3 kgs. of wheat and maize, respectively, for each brakha from each farmer. The lower distribution channels are operated and maintained by the farmers themselves. This system has been working quite satisfactorily for the last several decades. This civil canal system, among many others in the area, is the traditional water management system, like 'zanjeras' in the northern Philippines and several other similar irrigation systems in Indonesia (Bali), Thailand (Tank Irrigation), India (Kashmir) and Sri Lanka (Tanks).

Now, the problem with this irrigation system is that the springs have limited supply of water and the tank is not large enough to hold all the water. Therefore, many farmers have been reasoning to some other sources of water to supplement their irrigation needs. The problem is more of the water quantity and the system's efficiency than the system's management. The people want more water to irrigate more lands and to grow more water intensive crops, i.e., fruits, vegetables, rice and sugarcane/sugarbeats. Moreover, a proposal for the Nariab Small Dam, moved by the village influentials for a long time, has recently been accepted by the Government of NWFP. The technical feasibility surveys (topographic, hydrologic, etc) have just been carried out at the site. The villagers hope that the project will get materialized soon. Once the dam and irrigation system is constructed, they would have sufficient irrigation water supply for most of their lands,

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provided the system is managed properly.

The village elders have recently (February 1989) formed a union council level organization, The Nariab Amman (Peace) Committee. All the men and the teenage boys are its members, and it is headed by the Union Council's (elected) leaders and some other elderly and/or influential members. The committee's policies, scope and working procedures are still being prepared by the leaders. However, they have set up the following major initial purposes, tentatively:

a. Forest Management: The still protected portion of the shamilat forest will be managed in such a way that the fuelwood and pasture resources are not depleted rapidly. To do this, they would open a certain piece of the forest for all the people and close the remaining for a specified duration, say, three to six months. When they see that this open portion can no more supply enough fuelwood and/or grazing for animals, this will be closed and another portion will be opened. In this way, one full cycle of the opening and closing of the forest portions may get completed in one or two years, depending on the vegetation growth rate and its consumption. In the meanwhile, they will try their best to regain full control over the refugees depleted and/or replanted forests and manage them in the same way.

b. Village Security and Safety: All the social and economic evils will be stopped by exerting social pressure and/or through social, economic and political sanctions. Initially, these evils have been identified as, kidnapping, theft, firing to threaten others and the like. But this is not an exhaustive list; many other items that come under this category would be added to this list. Two sanctions have already been identified:

(i) A kidnapper and his supporters will be fought against by all the villagers until the person kidnapped is recovered; each of the defaulters will be fined heavily and if decided, handed over to police and a law suit will be filed against him by the whole community. If he is able to flee to the neighboring Tribal Area (Kurram Agency) or somewhere else, all efforts will be made to get him back. In case he is not recovered, his entry will be banned for ever.

(ii) A person who fires for threatening anybody in the area, will be made to pay a fine of Rs. 500 for each fire for the first event and Rs. 1000 for the second time. But if he does it the third time some other more strict measure will be taken to stop him. A

final sanction may be decided to hand him over to the police or even expel him from the area.

c. Community Development: The construction, improvement and maintenance of the village mosques, hujras (community centers), streets and drains, potable water facilities, and even schools, health centers/units, inter and intra community roads, irrigation tanks and channels, etc. will be carried out under this category. The major funding has already been requested by the committee from the village workers in the Middle-East and those who have good incomes anywhere in Pakistan. Some contributions have been received and deposited in the committee's account in the bank. Some funds are being raised locally, too. The amounts of fines to be collected from the defaulters as a sanction will also be included in the committee's development fund.

This is but an initial and a crude sketch of the purposes and functioning of the committee that have been initiated. The future will show how it works actually and how long it stays, develops or weakenes. But, at least, the villagers seem very sincere and determined to keep the commttee alive and active and it is more likely because it is initiated by themselves.

Nariab is a very popular wild bird hunting area since the early British times. In the hunting season several provincial and federal level dignitaries come to the area for hunting. Then, some medium and high officials in both the governments belong to this area. Thus, this area is relatively influential in obtaining public facilities, special projects and programs, and even certain privileges. Thirdly a great majority of the men (60%) are in the military service in Karachi and/or working in the Middle-East and have good cash earnings. Moreover, the people are traditionally used to collectively organized activities and manage their natural and developmental resources satisfactorily. They have informal but fairly effective councils of elders at village, clan and the area levels. This may be in response to or influenced by their interactions with the adjacent Orakzai tribe in Kurram Agency. Or, it may be through their own cultural traits, that they are leading such an organized social, economic and political life.

VILLAGE 4. KARBOGHA SHARIF

Near Doaba, Tehsil Hangu, District Kohat

Karbogha Sharif is situated at about 10 km to the south of Doaba town, linked with a metalled road. It is a large village, with its six large sections and 17 small hamlets, all scattered around in a bowl-like valley and on small hill sides. Karbogha

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Sharif is itself a union council containing six wards.

On the very first sight of the village from the road on hill-top, one notices large fortress-like new houses scattered all around in the valley. Then, one always sees at least one of two cars, pickups and/or tractors passing by on the village road. These two features seem very impressive to a stranger. There are at least fifty recently constructed, tall-walled, big houses, each covering an area of one to three acres of land in the peripheries of the village. And, there are about 30 cars, 50 pick-ups, 80 tractors, 12 mini-buses, etc. owned and used by these villagers. Like Rahmanabad, more than 80% of its men-folk works and stays most of the time out, but not in the military or in-country towns, rather in the Middle Eastern countries. All this apparent prosperity, the houses and vehicles, have appeared in the last two decades with the cash inflows from overseas workers.

The total population of Karbogha Sharif is estimated to be from 35,000 to 40,000. Most of the households are very large, with 20 to 36 members living together and, normally, eating from one kitchen. The management of such large households is certainly a matter of good organization. Usually, two to six elderly brothers live together along with their children and grand children from one to three wives. The internal life in a household is usually well organized and controlled by the old men and women. All the land property and its operation and, even bank accounts in many cases, are joint among the household members. That is why they need to and can afford to construct and maintain such big houses; and can spare two to five men to go to work in the Middle East for years and years, with only one to two months home leave after one or two years. These findings are, of course, based on the overt observation of and informal interviews with the villagers for limited times during the three day visits. Further and deeper studies may come up with somewhat different stories. But for the purpose of this study - an informal brief case study approach for understanding major socio-economic and socio-political systems for launching a rural development program in the area - this much inquiry was considered sufficient.

Karbogha Sharif has most of the public facilities, at least, in kind. There is a high school and eight primary schools/maktabs for boys. A primary school for girls was constructed many years ago but the people did not want to send their daughters to school, thus, it was converted into a boys' school. In mid-1980s, a Nai Roshni School was opened for the village where 15 girls had enrolled in the beginning but soon they reduced to three who are still attending the class.

There is a Primary Health Unit but with no male or female doctors; only one LHV and a mid-wife are posted here but they are often absent and demand very high fees for service. (e.g., Rs. 400 to 500 per delivery to handle, plus a suit each of imported cloth).

Electricity was brought in by WAPDA in 1986 under the then popular Five-Points Program of the Jonejo Government. The poles were installed in the streets but very few connections were actually given. Even in the main village sections, more than half of the houses do not have electricity. If approached, the WAPDA people demand Rs. 5,000 per connection. There is a post office and a telephone exchange with 36 private connections. There are two banks (MCB and UBL) serving the villagers. Karbogha Sharif has three small bazars; the major one is on the matalled Doaba-Karbogha road. The road here is severely damaged by heavy transport mobility and for lack of maintenance.

The Public Health Engineering department has constructed a potable water tank on a hill-top. But the tank is too small to hold or supply water sufficient for even 20% of the houses in the main sections of the village. Two other small diggies (4x4 feet) have been constructed by the District Council, but can hardly supply water to only 14 houses. There are some open private and community wells scattered around in the area where majority of the villagers collect water for household usage. Some people have also installed hand pumps at there houses, but they are not reliable, as most often something wrong happens to the pumps or there is not enough water at the bore level in the ground. There are several natural springs in the western side-hills and there is a lot subsurface water in the valley's alluvium. The need to somehow collect these waters for household and irrigation pruposes. From the springs the water could be collected in tanks and distributed from their to the communities and the agricultural lands.

The ground-water can be pulled up by means of tubewells and supplied for both the purposes. Some farmers have installed small diesel or electric pumps in their open wells that supply more potable water than for irrigation. In total, about 600 acres of land is being irrigated by any of the two types of water. As the irrigation water available presently is insufficient even for the adjacent lands, there are only a few fruit orchards and some vegetables are grown on small patches of the lands. The soil is rich, but it cannot produce much of fruits and vegetables without sufficient water. On the rainfed lands, the villagers grow wheat, mustard and barley in the rabi season and maize, sorghum, mong beans and millet in the kharif season. If the rains are favorable, the soil produces these crops very well. Peaches and apricots are the common fruit trees in the village, and if properly watered, they turn up with good produce. Three of the farmers also grow some rice on their irrigated lands but only for their household consumption.

The shamilat land had been covered with fairly enough vegetation for the villagers' grazing and fuelwood needs. But recently the vegetation has deteriorated, mainly because of Afghan Refugees. In some other areas, the Forest Department has recently reforested such depleted lands. They could be directed to come down

to this area, too. Some shamilat lands have mazri plantations that are strictly controlled by the Forest Department through Forest Guards and the village elders. The refugees have been caught at times cutting even mazri besides trees and bushes in the village shamilat lands. They consume these resources as they are the owners or have equal rights in the lands. When the villagers or the Forest Guards stop them, they begin quarrelling with and shouting bad wishes at them. The villagers are helpless to stop them from destroying their natural resource base.

In Karbogha Sharif, there is very little evidence of community participation, at least, in the recent past. This may be because of the lack of manpower at the village, as well as, heavy inflows of cash money. Though there are some instances whence the villagers did work collectively to dig some water channels or shallow wells and construct katcha or shingle roads between some sections of the village, but that was mainly through hired labor and at times the labor was brought in from other villages. However, some villagers did contribute small amounts of funds particularly for digging a few shallow wells for potable water for the mosque or some households. Fuel shortage is being felt now, and as a consequence, about 25 households have already started using commercial fuelgas in their kitchens.

The major problems of this village and their solutions, as stated by the the villagers, include potable water, irrigation water, deforestation, housing and agricultural extension and advice.

The people of Karbogha Sharif, like many other villagers particularly in Hangu Tehsil of Kohat District, have gathered a lot of money out of their earnings in the Middle-East. They really do not know what to do with their money; how to use it meaningfully. Right now, they are using it, too, but abusing it more. They are building very large houses while at the same time reducing their good agricultural land; buying cars and other automobiles; investing in transport and other business in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi; and spending the hard-earned money very generously on minor law-suits. They could be motivated to form small group or village-level organizations and put the money to a more meaningful usage and benefit the local people for now and in the future.

The Middle-East income may not continue for ever. Some day these people will have to come back home and live there. By then, they may have earned enough to live at the village without working. But for how long? and how about the children and grand-children? This is an opportunity for them to build the village to stand upon its own feet economically through organized and well planned exploitation of the natural resources for agricultural and/or industrial development in and around the village. This aspect of rural development needs special consideration and continued efforts

by various sectors in the government, beside the Rural Development department.

VILLAGE 5. KAHI

Near Katcha-Pakka (Doaba), Tehsil Hangu, District Kohat

Kahi is the largest village in a total of 12 villages in Kahi Union Council, situated to the north of Hangu-Tull road, near Katcha-Pakka, on the Hangu-Orakzai (Kurram Agency) road. This union council was chosen for this study, for three reasons: (i) severe depletion of the forest resources that has caused a widely spread use of purchased fuelwood and commercial fuel-gas on the one hand, and a decline in the livestock population on the other; (ii) majority of the population has access to piped water for household usage; and (iii) relatively loose control of the villagers over the use of natural resources, i.e., forest and irrigation water.

The shamilat forest had traditionally been used by the villagers for fuelwood, small timber and dry fodder (grass) collection and grazing livestock. By 1980-81, almost all the forest vegetation (trees, bushes and grasses) was exhaused partly by the Afghan refugees and partly by the local villagers becuase of ineffective leadership and lack of organization among the villagers. Consequently, some better off households resorted to purchasing fuelwood and commercial fuel-gas and some poorer ones began to sell their livestock for lack of grasses and to earn cash for purchasing fuel. Some influentials approached the Forest Department for assistance. After several requests and repeated visits, they finally got a two-by-one mile piece of shamilat land replanted with encalyptus seedlings in 1982-83. These plants have now grown up from two to four meters tall,still immature for harvesting. But in spite of the strict watching by the Forest Guard and some of the local leaders, there have been several instances of cutting such young plants by the refugees as well as the villagers.

The fuel situation by now is so severe that hardly one-half of the households depend partly on their own farm-trees, for fuel and green leaves for livestock. The remaining half of the households purchase the fuel (wood and/or gas) and dry-fodder (bhusa - wheat straw). In Kahi proper, this situation gets more severe, where around 80% of the households purchase fuel and dry fodder. There are two fuel-gas outlets, five wood-stalls and three bhusa sales points in the whole area. Such a widespread use of the commercial fuels and fodders may have been caused by the increased purchasing power of the villagers, but to a certain extent; there are some who are forced to do so, and at times they have to sell an animal or two to have cash for these necessities. In fact, this situation has been caused more by the mismanagement of the forest

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resources by the local leaders and over-exploitation by the Afghan refugees than by the increased purchasing power of the villagers.

The mismanagement and disorganization regarding the use and maintenance of the common resources are more apparent in case of the PID canal irrigation system. There is a spring water channel that irrigates about 450 acres of the village's cultivated lands. It has no warabandi schedule; nor it has a hired water tender or maintenance man. Any farmer who wants to irrigate his land, diverts the water. If there occurs a damage to the channel, an anouncement is made in the village, and some villagers get together to repair it. Cleaning is needed after the heavy monsoon rains, which is also carried out voluntarily by some or more farmers. In other words, there is no organized system of operation and maintenance of the irrigation channel in the village. Consequently, disputes on the channel's water turns arise every now and then. In the last two years, there have been three major water conflicts in which gun-fires were exchanged and some people got wounded.

However, the mazri plantations are better protected by the Forest Guards in their closing periods. Mazri (the native fibre leaf) is planted on village shamilat lands throughout Hangu Tehsil and protected for a certain length of time. Then the Forest Department holds an open auction every year. A contractor who bids the highest, gets the whole lot. The Forest Department, after deducting a certain percentage as service charges, etc., distributes the amount of auction money among the villagers according to their shares in the shamilat land. Then, the villagers harvest mazri, and some make ropes, for sale to the same contractor. The contractor actually does not bid for the mazri per se, rather for his rights in its purchase, to put a binding upon the villagers to sell all the harvested mazri or its ropes only to him and no one else. That is why, he again pays for the quantity of mazri or ropes to the villagers, on an individual basis. This business is carried out in the same in Nariab, Karbogha Sharif and all other villages in the area. If a villager needs a certain quqntity of mazri for his household usage, e.g., house roofing or ropes for cot-weaving, he requests the Forest Department for a special permit for harvesting that much mazri. Such permits are usually granted free of charge by the Forest Department, but to a limited number of villagers each year.

The area has 10 private cars, 60 pick-ups for private use and hiring; about 80 tractors, 50+ with trollies; and 20 wheat threshers. Overall, about one-third of the total cultivated land area is under some kind of irrigation. Beside the PID irrigqation channel, there is another small channel brought down by a small group of farmers from a natural spring. Then, there are 22 open-wells used mainly for irrigation; 20 of them have electric pumps and only two are with diesel pumps. The villagers grow many fruits, vegetables and other major crops, including some fodders on their irrigated lands. However, they grow only grain and bean

crops on the rainfed lands (about 67%). Until mid-1970's, they had large flocks (50-200) of small livestock (goats and sheep); a reasonable number of cattle per household (2-10); and very few buffalowes. But since then the situation has changed, mainly because of depletion of the forest resources. Now the small livestock flocks and the cattle population have declined considerably, i.e., 10-50 and 1-4, respectively. However, the buffalo population has risen fairly to a range of 1-3. The livestock produces are consumed mainly by the households, and some sold within the Kahi union council; very small quantity of these produces, mainly ghee, reach the Hangu or Doaba towns. But most of the fruits and vegetables are usually marketed at these towns.

About 60% - 70% of working age men work and stay out of the area for most of the time in a year. Formerly, a great majority of the men folk used to go to military service and very few to Punjab or Sind for business or labor work. But since the mid-1970's, that trend has changed greately. Now, majority of them (50% or more of the out-going men) go to the Middle-Eastern countries; many to the in-country large cities for industrial labor work and operating small business or transport; and very few (hardly 10-15%) go to military or civil service. These heavy inflows of money, particularly from the Middle-East, may also have played an important role in disturbing the traditional socio-economic and socio-political systems of the village. There are 30% - 40% of the menfolk, and around 15% of the workage men, left behind at the village to take care of all the social, economic and political activities. They also seem to be waiting for remunerations from their relatives and trying to leave the village for work or business elsewhere, mainly the Middle-East. It is a very wide-spread trend in the area that the teenage boys and work age men are very ambitious in going out for work, rather than stay back at the village and do the farming. The occupation of farming is left mainly to the poorer families and elderly men, with a limited outdoor assistance from women.

Among public facilities, the whole Kahi area has one high school and twelve primary schools/maktabs for boys and seven primary schools for girls, some with no lady teachers. The village leaders are trying to get another high school and a middle school for boys. However, they are on conflict among themselves on raising a primary school for girls to the Middle School level. Most of the villages in the union council have piped potable water but often the supply is insufficient, particularly in the dry seasons, when water is needed more. These pipe lines have recently (1985-86) been brought down from spring water storage tanks, one to two Kms. up in the hills, by means of MPA and the District Council funds. All these funds were aided by the villagers' labor contributions on low wage rates or free work on self-help basis. Similarly, some of the District Council funds were also utilized for constructing a culvert and some cutting and filling work on a major inter-community road and some streets and drains. With the Union Council

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fund which are usually under the World Food for Work Program and cover only earthwork and minor constructions, the villagers have constructed several 1-3 km long shingle roads. At the moment no work is lying incomplete but still some percentage of the funds has not yet been released by the government (RDD). For the main spring water pipeline (potable water), the villagers have a hired chowkidar (care-taker) who was promised 5 Kgs. of wheat and 5 Kgs. of maize each year per kitchen (household) but he hardly receives about half of it. However, the poor man is still doing the job satisfactorily.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION (5 Villages)

A. Observations: Some roads, water wells, schools, health units, electric lines, irrigation channels, banks, bazars, housing, fruit orchards, encalyptus and mazri plantations, Afghan refugees camps, streets and drains, automobiles including tractors, potable water pipelines, etc.

B. Interviews

RDD: 1. Mr. Ghulam Habib, Assistant Director, RDD, Kohat.

PID: 1. Mr. Arbab M.Sarwar Hayat, SDO (Irrigation), Kohat.
2. Mr. Riaz Hussain Shah, Sub. Engr. (Irrigation).

Village 1. Ghulam Banda (Billitang, Kohat)

a. Mr. Ateeq, Chairman, Union Council Billitang.
b. Mr. Ihsan-Ullah, Councillor, Union Council Billitang.
c. A group of 13 villagers at Ghulam Banda.

Village 2. Rahmanabad (Shakardara, Kohat)

a. Mr. Sharif Khan, Chairman, Union Council Bori.
b. Mr. Amir Khan, Vice-Chairman, Union Council Bori.
c. Mr. Sahib Gul, a Village Elder at Rahmanabad Proper.
d. Three groups of villagers (7, 12, 4).

Village 3. Nariab (Doaba, Hungu)

a. Mr. Shah Nawaz Khan, Chairman, Union Council Nariab.
b . Two groups of villagers (8, 6).

Village 4. Karbogha Sharif (Doaba, Hangu)

a. Mr. Sarwar Jan, Chairman, Union Council Karbogha.
b. Mr. Resham Khan, Councillor, Union Council Karbogha.

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c. Four groups of villagers (3, 8, 6, 5).

Village 5. Kahi (Katcha-Pakka, Hangu-Orakzai road).

a. Mr. Zonday Gul, Chairman, Union Council Kahi.
b. Mr. Fazl-ur-Rahman, Vice-Chairman, U.C. Kahi.
c. Two groups of villagers (5, 12).

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