

UNCLASSIFIED
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TERMINATION REPORT

USAID / CAMBODIA

BOOK II of III

HISTORICAL SUMMARY
NON-PROJECT AND PROJECT PROGRAMS

JUNE, 1964

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II. INTRODUCTION

The following non-project and project program sections are based on the record available in the files of the USAID Program Office, the USAID Controller's Office, the files of the Cambodia Desk, AID/W, in several cases certain files made available by other offices in AID/W, and on the experience of the writers in Cambodia.

In some program areas the record is more complete than in others. This is reflected in the varying degree of detail and evaluation included in the different discussions. In all cases the writers drew heavily from many technician's end of tour and project completion reports.

The preparation of this report, in particular the section on the project program, was handicapped by the condition and content of the available record. The record was markedly lacking in documentation of previous evaluations, making a final evaluation more difficult. The available record was deficient also with regard to the year-to-year historical development of the program, and the files with which the writers worked, with certain notable exceptions such as the Office of Public Safety, AID/W, were not only incomplete but seriously lacking in organization.

There was, in addition, a significant degree of unreliability with regard to individual project sections of Master Program Books and Country Assistance Program submissions, which appeared to stem mainly from omission which resulted in distortion and from the tendency to write of plans as accomplished fact. It would appear that omission was due in very large part to the lack of continuity in personnel, in part to the stress in the programming procedure on justification, which was interpreted in the field as insistence on success stories, and in part to pressure to meet deadlines. There was also an apparent assumption by the field of a lack

of appreciation or sympathy for project implementation problems on the part of AID/W, and a resulting apparent tendency to set goals and report progress with a view to AID/W's anticipated reaction rather than what was actually possible or the actual status of plans or progress. In some cases there was, in addition, an apparent assumption that problems should not be discussed in official documents. It would seem highly desirable to disabuse the field of this approach wherever it exists and whenever possible.

A very large factor contributing to the state of the files is believed to have been again, the lack of continuity to personnel coupled with the lack of an agency-wide filing system.

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A. NON-PROJECT PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

From the inception of a separate U.S. economic aid program to Cambodia in 1955 until its termination on November 20, 1963, the non-project element constituted 78.5 per cent of the dollar value of the total program. Net New Obligations for non-project activities totalled \$236 million for this almost nine year period (both these figures include customs duties (\$25.7 million) and other aid totalling 47.5 million). At the time the separate program was established in January, 1955, an additional \$7.4 million in local currency equivalent was transferred from the previous program covering all of Indochina increasing the non-project total available for this period to \$243.4 million.

Of the total non-project program \$196 million or 81 per cent was provided through the Commodity Import Program (CIP), by far the largest portion through commercial channels.

1) Commodity Import Program (CIP)

The basic rationale and justification for the CIP in Cambodia was to generate local currency in order to meet U.S. commitments for military budget support and economic development projects. While this local currency was in fact generated over the life of the program it was done so at an artificially low rate of riel/dollar conversion and by the importation of quantities of CIP goods in excess of balance of payments requirements until 1962. In addition, on two occasions local currency release requirements developed faster than generation and there were not sufficient funds in the Counterpart Special Account (CPSA) to meet program needs.

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The Cambodian CIP was purposely not viewed and programmed by AID as balance of payments support but rather as support of specific activities. Presumably this approach was favored in order to avoid implied longer range and potentially increasing aid level commitments at a time when the U.S. desire was to reduce over a period of time the size of the Cambodia program. Given the abrupt termination of the program before this reduction was fully carried out this approach probably resulted in a greater expenditure of U.S. aid funds in Cambodia than would have been the case if a balance of payments criteria had been used. From the inception of the program in 1955 until June, 1961, reserves rose from \$50 million to \$114 million, a reflection of the fact that amounts provided under the CIP exceeded the balance of payments deficit after allowing for the contributions of other aid donors.

The problem was compounded by the fact that the rate of riel/dollar conversion was maintained at 35 to 1. This was the official rate for all of Indochina in 1951 when the aid program was started for the associated states and became the rate for Cambodia at the time of independence. Presumably it was not so far out of line with cost-price relationships when the aid program was initially established. It became so, however, with the result that the CIP was generating local currency at a rate roughly half of the Hong Kong or Bangkok "free rate". The RKG in fact employed a multiple rate scheme which included in addition to the 35 - 1 official rate (at which considerable foreign exchange other than CIP was also licensed), certain foreign exchange retention schemes based on percentages of export as

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well as special provisions for replacement of capital equipment and investment in the rubber plantations. Another complicating factor arose due to the fact that the Franc-riel rate arose from financial differences with France due to the settlement of accounts at the time of the dissolution of the Associated Indochina States and subsequent Franc devaluations.

Unfortunately the U.S. took the position of accepting the official rate coupled with urging the RKG to join the International Monetary Fund with the idea that this would lead to the eventual establishment of a more realistic official rate. In retrospect a better policy would have been to press for a more favorable CIP rate irrespective of Cambodian overall monetary policy actions. In fact, had this relatively large segment of import been financed at a more favorable rate the pressure for a change in the official rate might well have been greater. The net result was in fact to increase markedly the cost to the U.S. of meeting U.S. local currency commitments and at the same time permit the buildup in Cambodian foreign exchange reserves as indicated above.

Another aspect of the CIP that was not fully exploited in terms of reducing the cost to the U.S. was the treatment of customs' duties arising from the CIP. The joint agreement provided that these revenues be deposited to the CPSA and the equivalent of \$25.7 million equivalent of such duties levied on CIP goods was so deposited and counted as a portion of U.S. assistance. However, these funds were not used to meet U.S. commitments but rather simply applied (in theory) to the military budget over and above specific military budgetary support commitments for pay and allowances and military construction. Hence they became simply "wash" transactions.

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Despite the U.S. substantial CIP imports into Cambodia there were two periods during the life of the program that actual generation did not keep pace with release requirements. This occurred first in 1958 and appeared to be due primarily to a rapid drawdown of the uncommitted balance heretofore used as a margin to maintain an adequate position. This draw down resulted from a desire to finance a number of activities for which no new funds were available but which were considered to be an essential part of program objectives. In this first instance the USAID formally obtained a loan from the RKG in 1958 of \$3 million which was repaid by 1960 as sufficient local currency was generated.

At the time of the termination of the program the USAID had again found itself in a short cash position. In this case the solution was more informal. Releases for military pay and allowances were allowed to lag by six months, which caused no great inconvenience since the Ministry of Finance continued to release funds to the Ministry of Defense on schedule and subsequently the Ministry of Finance was reimbursed from the CPSA.

The reasons for the second tight cash position were two-fold. First of all the limitations on world-wide procurement eliminated a number of the more rapid generating imports from Japan and secondly the restrictions on deobligation-reobligation authority further reduced the uncommitted balance and in fact threatened to reduce potential generation below actual commitments since commitments were made on the basis of non-project fund allotments rather than actual licenses or proceeds.

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In both instances of short cash position, one cause was the programming procedure that balanced a given year's local currency requirements against the same year's funds although the local currency was not actually generated until 9-12 months later. This was particularly relevant to the funds for Military Budget Support as payments were made against this commitment regularly by the Ministry of Finance.

The six months delay in releases for military pay and allowances caused some problems at the time of the program termination. The issue was raised as to whether the U.S. was responsible for meeting commitments only through the last release (October 29, 1963) or whether local currency should be provided to cover actual troop pay periods through November 20, 1963. The October 29, release covered troop payments only through May, 1963. The final settlement was in fact a compromise. The U.S. recognized no obligation past the last release in October since the primary reason for the lag between releases and actual pay periods was due largely to a slowness by the RKG and local importers in utilizing CIP funds. In addition the RKG had officially requested that the aid required to generate additional local currency be terminated. On the other hand it was agreed that the net final balances on hand in the CPSA be applied to the pay and allowances for the June 1 - November 20, 1963 period.

A secondary but important objective of the CIP was the support and development of the Cambodian economy, particularly the private sector. It was hoped that the composition of the CIP program would provide essential goods necessary for the daily operation and some

measure of capital growth. In fact essential commodities for daily operations accounted for the bulk of CIP goods. Petroleum products (fuels and non-fuels) alone were \$45 million and Textiles (all prior to 1960) \$31 million. Foodstuffs, fertilizers and chemical products, drugs, jute manufactures and paper pulp products accounted for a total of \$33 million.

Of the goods more appropriately classified as capital goods a good portion were transport and building materials. Industrial machinery plus motors, engines and turbines and electrical apparatus including parts did account for \$23 million. Agricultural and construction machinery accounted for \$9 million. The growth of the commercial and construction sectors assisted by the CIP no doubt did stimulate some small industry, and CIP machinery was incorporated directly into a number of small manufacturing establishments. While Cambodia's capacity for industrial growth even on a small scale was far from fully realized the CIP did make a contribution to such growth as did occur. Had the Cambodian Government been more interested in taking the appropriate steps to encourage small industry the CIP could have made a considerably greater contribution in this regard.

Another secondary goal of the CIP, particularly after 1960, was to assist in the creation of a market for U.S products. A large measure of success was achieved in developing markets for commercial vehicles and construction equipment. Less success was achieved with industrial machinery due to the availability of lower priced Japanese and European manufactured machinery since the RKG also made some of its own foreign exchange available for this purpose at the favorable 35 - 1 rate.

A further possible subsidiary goal of the CIP was to encourage private U.S. investment. This was not realized for reasons apart from the CIP program with the exception of two American Oil companies, Esso and Caltex. These two companies, along with Shell (British), imported practically all their petroleum products through the CIP.

Lastly the existence of such a substantial import program in the relation to the total import activity led to the desire if not goal of bringing some degree of order and organization into the commercial importing community which was highly fragmented and included a large number of firms with little capacity to do more than sell the allocations they obtained to more bonafide importers.

2) Commodity Import Procedures

AID's persistent efforts over several years to persuade the RKG to a) establish commodity import procedures which would make a more effective contribution to the economy of the country, and b) comply with AID's regulations, having met with only indifferent success, AID took the drastic measure in July, 1963, of suspending Procurement Authorizations until such time as the RKG would agree to at least certain minimal concepts and practices. Negotiations culminated in August with an agreement by the Minister of Economy, the most important elements of which were a) establishment of a procedure to comply with the small business provisions of Regulation 1, b) fixing a \$25,000 minimum value for AID-financed import licenses, and c) the promise to seek means to reduce the number of importers to a more reasonable level. These negotiations took place immediately following the appointment of a new Minister of Economy of substantial

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stature and there was some optimism in USAID over the prospect of a more meaningful commodity import program.

At the same time AID promulgated Policy Determination No. 21 together with implementing measures which had the effect of restricting the source of AID-financed imports to the U.S. Since the U.S. is neither an historical nor a normal area for exchange of trade with Cambodia, the RKG was presented with an additional revolutionary feature in the adjustment of its administration of the commodity import program.

The new procedure was slow in getting under way because, as may have been anticipated, there were administrative difficulties in adopting new procedures and widespread resistance to the new concepts on the part of hundreds of so-called importers who would lose windfall profits, and even legitimate importers who would be required to import new products from new sources at higher prices.

In order to facilitate the utilization of funds the RKG requested and the USAID agreed to delay implementation of the agreement to the subauthorization of FY 1964 funds, except for the small business procedures, with which the USAID demanded full compliance.

In addition to the foregoing, problems arose in connection with other AID regulations including: a) AID payment of transportation on U.S. flag vessels only, b) prohibition of commingling of U.S. and Bloc country aid, c) financing soft drink concentrates, air-conditioners, and the like, d) financing surplus agricultural commodities only through P.L. 480 agreements, e) objections to the terms of the proposed P.L. 480 agreement, f) rendering ineligible for AID financing all firms included in the Treasury List.

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Although the RKG and many importers found themselves handicapped in trying to do business in the traditional manner in the face of AID insistence on compliance with these regulations, full compliance was expected with all regulations and with a good share of AID's procedural proposals. During the two months preceding mid-November, the commodity import program was proceeding reasonably well.

3) Refunds

The regulation which perhaps aroused the most resentment on the part of the RKG was the one concerning claims for refunds. Over the years the RKG consistently resisted making refunds. Out of total claims submitted amounting to \$2,079,617.79 only \$61,534.97 had been collected at the time aid was terminated.

In 1960 continuous efforts on the part of the Mission resulted in an agreement by the RKG to refund \$554,247, on the condition that the refunds would be made available for the Cambodian program. Due to the loss of deob/reob authority in the Mutual Security Act of 1961, the USAID delayed accepting the refunds until AID/W confirmed that the funds could be reprogrammed. By the time confirmation was received in June, 1961, the RKG government had been changed and although the USAID made repeated requests for the refunds that had been agreed to, the latest on November 6, 1963, no action was ever taken by the RKG.

The USAID had initiated claims amounting to approximately \$824,000 and AID/W had initiated claims valuing approximately \$530,000 prior to November 20, 1963. After November 20, additional claims of \$724,000 were made by the USAID and AID/W, bringing the total of all claims filed through December 30, 1963, to approximately \$2 million.

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4) P.L. 480

a. Title II

A severe drought occurred in Cambodia in 1954, followed by torrential rains and floods in 1955, causing a shortage in the supply of rice. At the request of the RKG, 10,000 metric tons of rice was shipped from the United States for distribution to the people of Cambodia under the provisions of P.L. 480 Title II. Of the total shipped 9,920 M/T was received of which 8,256 M/T were distributed free and 1,630 M/T were sold for approximately \$135,000 in local currency. The local currency proceeds were deposited to a special account in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Action. In 1958 the Ministry and the USAID initiated a project to aid flood victims. In 1960 the project was modified to provide emergency relief to fire victims at a village near Phnom Penh. The USAID conducted two audits of the project and while the objectives of the project were substantially attained over 50 per cent of the expenditures were not supported by documents. Documentation was requested by the USAID and there were indications that the RKG was attempting in 1963 to comply, but had not done so when the program was terminated. It is doubtful that they would have been able to provide satisfactory records.

The audit found the entire transaction under Title II to have been satisfactorily implemented. The total dollar expenditure was \$2,343,000.

b. Title I

The possibility of initiating a P.L. 480, Title I, or Food for Peace Program, in Cambodia first arose in 1958 and discussions

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and negotiations for a program for the importation of tobacco were held in 1958-1959. The negotiations were unsuccessful, due both to inability to reach agreement on how the local currency reserved for U.S. uses would be employed, and a general lack of interest in the commodity.

Another program was proposed in FY 1962 as a possible replacement for the discontinued Section 402 surplus agriculture availability under the Mutual Security Agency. Initially, a \$3.0 million program was suggested, to be composed of dairy products - \$1.5 million, wheat flour - \$1.2 million, and coffee - \$.3 million.

The local currency that would have been generated by the \$3.0 million program was to have been used as follows: completing previously Country Team approved Military construction, \$.7 million; completing newly approved military construction (Ream Naval Base), \$.5 million; meeting the anticipated shortfall in CY 1962 Military Budget Support, \$1.1 million; U.S. uses to finance fill for proposed Embassy property and part of local costs of the new chancery and staff housing, \$.3 million; agricultural market development purposes, \$.150 million; educational exchange activities, \$.05 million and assistance to the Institute of Technology or National School of Agriculture projects, \$.2 million.

In December, 1961, the proposed program was presented to the Interagency committee in Washington for initial consideration. In March, 1962, the third country negotiations on the program were completed, and the Mission was authorized on March 30, 1962, to begin negotiations for a Food For Peace Program in Cambodia of \$1.8 million,

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a reduction of \$1.2 million from the original proposal. The program, as approved for negotiation, would be composed of; wheat flour - 13,000 MT, market value \$1.0 million; sweetened condensed milk - 3.4 million lbs., market value \$.5 million; and ocean transportation charges, estimated to require the remaining \$.3 million.

The local currency proceeds from the approved program would be used for Military Construction, \$.7 million; Military Budget Support to meet the 1960 and 1961 cumulated pay and allowances shortfall, \$.9 million; and U.S. uses (undetermined), \$.2 million.

The program was first mentioned to the RKG in the presentation of the USAID FY 1962 program to Prince Sihanouk on May 16, 1962. A diplomatic note formally proposed the program to the RKG on May 24, 1962.

During the negotiations that followed the RKG was reluctant to agree to what they saw as an unnecessary duplication requiring an additional administrative structure. They were informed that it had become U.S. policy to provide agricultural products in surplus in the U.S. only through the P.L. 480 program and that the milk previously provided through the CIP would not be supplied if they did not accept the P.L. 480 agreement.

The RKG continued to take exception to almost every condition in the proposed standard P.L. 480 agreement, submitting counter-proposals on which they insisted even after it was pointed out that the conditions, such as the ten per cent for U.S. uses clause, were a matter of statute and not subject to negotiation.

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After almost 18 months of discussions and negotiations, the point had been reached where a specially established sub-committee of the RKG Ministry of Commerce and the USAID had agreed to a draft to be discussed by the Minister of Commerce and the USAID Director prior to its submission to AID/W for review. The USAID had obtained, meanwhile, an extension on a previous deadline imposed by Washington, to December, 1963. Due to the program termination the discussion never took place.

5) Initial Non-Project Cash Transfer

When the program was first established in Cambodia there was an immediate requirement for local currency, particularly for Military Budget Support, but the commodity import program was not yet functioning. In order to establish a local currency fund for the program, a cash grant of \$12 million was made to the RKG which placed, in the counterpart special account, the equivalent in local currency at the rate of 35 riels to one dollar. The generation of local currency in this manner had the effect of the RKG making an advance deposit to the Special Account for which it was reimbursed through the sale of the dollars to importers.

The RKG were to use the \$12 million to purchase mutually agreed upon commodities, essential to Cambodia's economic development. According to an audit made in 1956, the Mission in practice had very little voice in the utilization of the dollars and no satisfactory accounting of their use was ever obtained.

6) Admin Local Currency

In order to provide local currency for the costs of local

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personnel and the local expenses of U.S. personnel paid from administrative funds, allocations were made from the Technical Assistance Trust Fund (TATF). In 1963, there were 21 local staff positions and 26 direct-hire personnel in this category.

The cash paid included the salaries of the local personnel and the office and residential rents and travel expenses of the U.S. personnel.

CAM's

CAMs were arrangements with the RKG for the use of counterpart funds to construct or expand housing facilities for USAID personnel. The Counterpart Special Account was reimbursed from the Technical Assistance Trust Fund for all but one small apartment building which was partially paid for by funds from the RKG National Budget. These facilities were the property of the Cambodian Government on lease to the USAID and all reverted to RKG control at the termination of the program.

The construction of two buildings of 36 apartments, called the Pochentong apartments; thirteen apartments at the Hotel Royal; a third group of apartments called the Vaddey Apartments (used by Embassy personnel); the improvement of two villas at Kep on the Gulf of Siam for use as a place for rest and recuperation by the American community; and five other smaller apartment houses or individual homes were financed in this way. In all there were nine CAM leases.

COMMERCIAL IMPORT PROGRAM As of November 20, 1963

<u>CODE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>1959 & Prior Years</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>TOTAL ALL YEARS</u>
0102	Wheat flour	2420	1244	983	750	0	1	5398
0404	Wheat and rye products	50	0	0	0	0	0	50
0701	Sugar, raw and refined	2920	399	0	0	0	0	3319
090	Dairy Products	647	787	986	500	0	1	2921
0901	Milk, evapored and condensed	1097	0	0	0	499	3	1599
0902	Milk, whole dried	144	0	0	0	0	0	144
0909	Other dairy products	43	0	0	0	0	5	48
230	Nitrogenous fertilizers	77	0	0	0	0	0	77
235	Phosphates & phosphatic fertilizer	295	0	0	0	0	0	295
236	Pesticides & agricultural chemical specialties	0	0	0	0	50	0	50
370	Medical & pharmaceutical preparations	5372	917	336	50	375	0	7050
3702	Medical & pharmaceutical biologics	0	0	0	0	375	0	375
390	Chemicals & chemical preparations	2207	286	374	476	1050	0	4393
400	Jute manufactures	1932	1039	0	994	2200	0	6165
540	Yarns, thread & man-made textile fibers	27081	0	0	0	0	0	27081
541	Textile fabric	1373	2514	0	0	0	0	3887
542	Miscellaneous textile products	161	0	0	0	0	0	161
570	Lumber & sawmill products	15	0	0	0	0	0	15
591	Pulp, paper, & paper products	859	0	0	0	0	0	859
592	Newsprint	90	0	0	0	0	0	90
620	Petroleum fuels	16357	4245	5067	6046	4800	3014	39529
621	Petroleum non-fuels	0	0	1268	1992	1850	0	5110
622	Petroleum asphalt	0	0	54	0	50	0	104
640	Non-metallic minerals	7789	1000	0	0	0	0	8789
6401	Hydraulic cement	0	0	0	1000	0	0	1000
660	Iron & steel mill products	8069	1322	279	1980	0	1000	12650
680	Misc. iron & steel manufactures	1069	0	0	0	0	200	1269
692	Copper and copper products	83	0	151	0	0	0	234
697	Zinc & zinc base alloys & products	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
700	Industrial machinery & equipment	0	2682	3148	2904	621	14	9369
710	Generators, motors, & parts	1842	0	0	0	0	0	1842
720	Electrical apparatus & parts	3472	0	0	0	0	0	3472
730	Engines, turbines & parts	883	25	0	0	(-) 1	1	908
740	Construction, mining, conveying equipment & parts	589	8	3	0	0	0	600
750	Machine tools & parts	294	0	0	0	0	0	294

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COMMERCIAL IMPORT PROGRAM As of November 20, 1963

(continued)

<u>CODE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>1959 & Prior Years</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>TOTAL ALL YEARS</u>
760	Metal working machinery & parts	54	0	0	0	0	0	54
770	Agricultural equipment & parts	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
771	Parts for agriculture machinery & tractors	86	0	0	0	0	0	86
780	Industrial machinery, accessories & parts	6237	391	0	0	0	0	6628
820	Motor vehicles, engines & parts	5979	2081	2804	1919	2144	906	15833
822	Miscellaneous vehicles, parts, accessories	0	0	124	208	350	101	783
830	Tractors, track laying type	63	0	0	0	0	0	63
832.1	Tractors wheel-type except ind. & const. type	0	136	0	0	0	0	136
833	Tractors & parts	0	93	606	1454	500	500	3153
840	Aircraft, parts & accessories	350	0	0	0	0	0	350
858	Vessels & equipment	936	150	162	0	0	0	1248
880	Scientific & professional instruments	253	0	0	0	0	0	253
890	Miscellaneous commodities	287	0	0	0	40	0	327
891	Rubber & rubber products	3786	266	0	583	497	4	5136
892	Miscellaneous vehicles, parts & accessories	1002	175	0	0	0	0	1177
930	Technical services	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
940	Inland transportation	62	0	0	0	0	0	62
950	Ocean transportation	11482	0	0	0	0	0	11482
M. P. A. 's		0	0	0	0	20	0	20
TOTAL		117827	19760	16345	20856	15420	5750	195958
		=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====

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NON-PROJECT AND TOTAL PROGRAM
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
(Expressed in Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1964

	Position at 7/1/63	Obligation/ Commitment	Deobligation/ Decommitment	Position at 11/20/63	Obligation/ Commitment	Deobligation/ Decommitment	Position at 3/31/64	FOOTNOTES
Military Pay and Allowance	122,288			122,288		14,970	107,318 /3	1) Represents net amount
Military Construction	11,845			11,845		1,512	10,333 /4	2) Amount inflated because no commitment reflected against FY 64 PA's
Economic Projects - L/C	58,214		973 /1	57,241		10,497	47,744 /5	
TATF	14,099	2,361		16,469			16,460 /9	3) Reduced to actual expenditures. However, per agreement with RKG remaining counterpart after adjustments for refunds to importers will be utilized for military pay and allowance
Admin. Local Currency	1,886	142		2,028			2,028	
Special Budget Project	888			888			888	
CAM's	386		66	320		320	/6	
Custom Duties	25,210	523		25,733	202	725	25,210 /7	4) Represents actual expenditures plus amount due contractors still to be paid.
P.L. 480 Title II	2,343			2,343			2,343	
Emergency Disaster Relief	16			16			16	5) Represents actual releases to Ministry of Plan
Project Dollars	65,201	1,110	27	66,284	355	2,447	64,192	6) Decommitted since CAM's cancelled
Uncommitted Balance - Net	<u>243</u>	<u>4,053</u>		<u>4,296</u> /2	<u>20,411</u>		<u>24,707</u> /8	
	<u>302,619</u>	<u>8,189</u>	<u>1,066</u>	<u>309,742</u>	<u>20,968</u>	<u>30,471</u>	<u>300,239</u>	7) Reduced to actual expenditure level. Difference between receipts and expenditures will remain in the Counterpart Special Account and utilized after adjustment for refunds to importers for military pay & allowances

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8) Represents a clearing acct. As future deobligations are effected this amount will automatically be reduced
9) Will be reduced in the future by amount returned to Counterpart

TOTAL PROGRAM
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
(Expressed in Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1964

	<u>Position at 7/1/63</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Deobligations</u>	<u>Position at 11/20/63</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Deobligations</u>	<u>Position at 3/31/64</u>
<u>Project Aid</u>							
Technicians	8,399	1,005	(1) /2	9,405	343	4	9,744
Commodities	28,862	28	(46) /2	28,936	-	2	28,934
Contract Services	22,531	-	63	22,468	1	2,436	20,033
Participants	2,706	55	6	2,755	11	5	2,761
Other Costs /1	2,703	22	5	2,720	-	-	2,720
	<u>65,201</u>	<u>1,110</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>66,284</u>	<u>355</u>	<u>2,447</u>	<u>64,192</u>
Non-Project Aid	<u>190,441</u>	<u>5,750</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>195,958</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7,613</u>	<u>188,345</u>
<u>Other Aid</u>							
Cash Grant	12,000	-	-	12,000	-	-	12,000
Custom Duties	25,210	523	-	25,733	202	-	25,935
Indochina PA's	7,408	-	-	7,408	-	-	7,408
P.L. 480 Title II	2,343	-	-	2,343	-	-	2,343
Emergency Disaster Rel.	16	-	-	16	-	-	16
	<u>46,977</u>	<u>523</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>47,500</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>47,702</u>
TOTAL ALL AID	<u>302,619</u>	<u>7,383</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>309,742</u>	<u>557</u>	<u>10,060</u>	<u>300,239</u>

/1 Includes support services

/2 Represents increase in prior year obligations

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A. MILITARY BUDGET SUPPORT

1. Introduction

The maintenance of internal security was considered a prerequisite if progress was to be made in the economic development efforts discussed below. This maintenance of internal security required, among other things, sufficient armed forces properly trained and adequately equipped to counter insurgency and to safeguard the Cambodian frontiers against possible incursion and transits by communist guerrilla and regular units from Laos and Vietnam.

Cambodia's capacity to defend itself from external attack, quell insurgency, and maintain law and order was, and is, limited. If the Viet Minh or other major forces were to attack Cambodia in strength, the forces the U.S. assisted and equipped would not be adequate to mount effective resistance. The aid program was based on the assumption that 1) Cambodia would resist, by guerrilla operations if necessary, any armed efforts -- internal or external, and 2) the principal external threat would continue to be from Viet Cong and perhaps Pathet Lao seeking to use Cambodia as a safehaven, base of operation, or transit area. There is no significant organized armed group in opposition to the government in Cambodia. Police and military forces help to insure that such a group will not be formed and are prepared to combat such elements should they arise.

Cambodia's internal security forces consist of two major elements: 1) the military forces, and 2) the police. As discussed below, the aid program provided assistance to the police in the form of advisors,

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participant programs, commodities, and equipment. There was a Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) in Cambodia which provided equipment as well as technical guidance and training in its use to the Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) military forces (FARK). In addition, the aid program earmarked the major portion of the local currency generated from the Commodity Import Program for military budget support, including pay and allowances and military construction projects. The U.S. was providing this assistance on a Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff established force basis of a 31,000 man regular force, the minimum level agreed in 1955 as necessary to meet the internal security requirements of Cambodia. The 31,000 included 28,400 Army, 1,300 Navy, and 1,300 Air Force.

2. Military Advisory Assistance Group Program

The MAAG program was limited to the provision of equipment for regular FARK forces and limited technical training necessary to insure efficient utilization of material of U.S. origin. Of a total of \$98.2 million grant aid programmed, including equipment from surplus stocks, from the start of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1955 through termination in Fiscal Year 1964, \$83.9 million was delivered as indicated below (the figure for FY 1956 includes the "Indo-China roll-up" amounts):

Fiscal Year	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	Total
Value of Equipment and Services Delivered	23.7	20.9	7.9	3.9	2.9	5.4	8.7	10.3	.2	83.9

The French Government maintains in Cambodia a military mission consisting of approximately 25 officers and men. This mission provides

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organizational and tactical advice to the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff of FARK, as well as to the various service schools in FARK. Except for one officer at the Parachute Demi-Brigade, no troop advisors are provided. Although no definitive information is available as to future changes in this group, particularly in light of recent political developments, it was expected to decline in numbers as FARK became more self-reliant. No information as to the amount and value of military equipment furnished by the French is available.

3. The AID Program - Summary

The purpose of the aid program's military assistance activities was to provide budgetary support to the Cambodian Government in maintaining its armed force at a level considered adequate for internal security and protection of Cambodian borders from small scale incursions. This support provided for: 1) pay and allowances for armed forces personnel, and 2) military construction. A third activity, assistance to Civic Action, had not materialized when the program was terminated.

a) Pay and Allowance Support

An agreement with the RKG called for pay and allowances support, which began in 1955, on the basis of a fixed formula which provided an annual decrease: a reduction each year of ten per cent of the contribution made the previous year, calculated on the maximum amount the U. S. would provide if the FARK strength were maintained at the 31,000 man level approved by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The actual amount contributed each year was proportional to the ceiling amount and depended upon the average force level actually attained

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by FARK for the year in question. This contribution to FARK forces in a given calendar year was financed out of U.S. funds for the corresponding U.S. fiscal year. The average force levels each year were from nine per cent to three per cent below the ceiling figure, typically within the range of 28,000 - 30,000 men. Also, the annual reduction in the U.S. ceiling contribution varied from the ten per cent norm. The reduction from \$16.5 million in 1958 to \$14.4 million in 1959 represented a reduction of some 12.5 per cent. On the other hand, the FY 1961 reduction at the special request of the RKG amounted to five per cent. (The request was accompanied by a threat to turn to the Communist Bloc if additional assistance was not forthcoming. Additional equipment was provided both the FARK and the Police as well as the additional pay and allowances support.)

Conversations had been held between the RKG and the MAAG concerning the possibility of a force level increase from 31,100 to 34,184 and no reduction in pay and allowance support from FY 1963 to FY 1964. It had been decided to respond positively on both counts should the RKG make formal requests. An additional \$2 million were initially included in the FY 1964 program, one million for the cost of a force increase of 3,184 men and one million to cover a suspension in the annual ten per cent reduction formula. When no requests were forthcoming by the time the FY 1964 budget was revised during the first quarter of FY 1964, it was decided to delete the provisional \$2 million and provide them from the contingency fund should the need arise.

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The following table shows: 1) the commitment ceiling based on 31,000 men through FY 63 for the years 1958-1963; 2) the projected commitment ceiling from FY 64-70; 3) the annual percentage reduction in the commitment ceiling; 4) amounts actually paid (final obligation) 1958-62 based on actual force levels; 5) savings or shortfalls; representing the difference between the commitment ceiling and the final obligation in the case of savings or the final obligation and the programmed amount in the case of shortfalls.

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U. S. Contributions to FARK Pay and Allowances
(Dollar Figures in Thousands)

<u>Year</u>	(1) <u>Program Ceiling</u> (31,000 men)	(2) <u>Annual Reduction</u> %	(3) <u>Programmed Amount</u>	(4) <u>Final Obligation</u>		(5) <u>Savings</u>
				<u>Amounts</u>	<u>Force Level</u>	
FY 1957 and prior	-	-	\$51,713	\$49,667	-	\$2,046
1958	\$16,500	-	\$16,500	\$15,403	28,931	\$1,097
1959	\$14,430	12.5	\$14,430	\$13,044	28,006	\$1,386
1960	\$13,000	10.0	\$12,000	\$11,838	28,257	\$ 162
1961	\$12,350	5.0	\$11,400	\$11, 28	28,937	(128) <u>1/</u>
1962	\$11,115	10.0	\$10,300 <u>2/</u>	\$10,809	30,200	(509) <u>1/</u>
1963	\$10,003	10.0	\$10,003	-	31,000	-
Projection FY 64-70						
1964	\$ 9,000	10.0	\$ 9,000	-	31,000	-
1965	\$ 8,100	10.0	\$ 8,1000	-	31,000	-
1966	\$ 7,290	10.0	\$ 7,290	-	31,000	-
1967	\$ 6,561	10.0	\$ 6,561	-	31,000	-
1968	\$ 5,905	10.0	\$ 5,905	-	31,000	-

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<u>Year</u>	(1) Program Ceiling (31,000 men)	(2) Annual Reduction %	(3) Programmed Amount	(4) Final Obligation		(5)
				<u>Amounts</u>	<u>Force Level</u>	<u>Savings</u>
1969	\$ 5,315	10.0	\$ 6,495	-	31,000	-
1970	\$ 4,784	10.0	\$ 5,846	-	31,000	-

1/ Represents shortfall in FY 1961 carried over to FY 1962 and hence included in the FY 62 shortfall funded by advances from the uncommitted balance.

2/ Difference between commitment ceiling and programmed amount initially scheduled to be funded from FY 1962 PL 480 agreement. If the agreement were not signed this would have represented an unfunded shortfall. This commitment had been met from the uncommitted balance and a delay of FY 1963 payments.

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b) Military Construction

The Military Construction Program, which also began in 1955, was designed to provide the military facilities necessary for logistical support for the 31,000 man military establishment. The Country Team had approved a program totaling \$13.5 million. Of this Country Team approved program, Washington had approved \$12.6 million including \$.5 million for the Ream Naval Base and \$.7 million for projects in process, the latter to be generated by the \$1.8 million PL 480 Agreement discussed above. Of the \$11.8 million which had actually been provided, \$9.7 million had been expended. Included in the \$11.8 million were \$.390 million provided in FY 63 for the Ream Naval Base from the uncommitted counterpart balance; the additional \$110 thousand was obtained by shifting certain activities programmed within the \$11.4 million to the \$700,000 in shortfalls. The remaining \$1.7 million (of which \$1.0 million were not yet approved by Washington) were planned to come from funds generated by future PL 480 agreements. Future agreements would, of course, have been dependent upon the satisfactory negotiation of the initial one which, as indicated in Section I, was not certain, leaving the advisability of continued reliance on this source of funds for the Military Construction Program doubtful. These facilities, the construction of which had been approved by the Country Team, are discussed below:

Project

- Ordnance Depot Lovek--a complete ordnance depot installation to provide for repair, maintenance, and storage of ordnance material required for a 31,000 man force.

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- Quartermaster Depot Lovek--a complete quartermaster depot to provide for a 31,000 man force. Includes parachute renovation facility.

- Petroleum-Oil-Lubricants (POL) Depot Prek Phnou--Bulk storage facility for 15,400 barrels of POL including docking facilities and a drum storage handling facility. Depot was completed with dollar funding.

- POL Dispensing Stations--countrywide POL retail-type dispensing facilities (service stations) at selected areas of high military vehicle population.

- Refrigerated warehouses for signal dry batteries.

- Military infirmaries.

- Naval Base Chruai Chagvar--administration housing and shop buildings, warehouses, dispensary, roads, utilities, marine railway, POL storage and docking facilities.

- Regimental Training Center Romeas--army garrison to accommodate 3,000 troops.

- National Firing Ranges.

- Airfield Improvement--hangar, parking ramp, interior roads, utilities, aviation gas (AVGAS) storage, base utilities, and facilities.

- Chom Chao Engineering Depot--construction of shop and storage facilities.

- Communications facilities--buildings to house radio-relay and telephone carrier equipment to be employed in military telecommunications system.

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- Engineer Regional Shops.
- Ream Naval Base--total construction--marine railway, shop buildings, and utilities.

- Miscellaneous projects:

- MAAG facilities

- POL

- Transportation

- Miscellaneous Projects (budget support, FY 1956)

- Construction projects planned for FY's 1963-66:

- Airfield Improvement--Phase II

- Military Infirmeries

- Engineering Regional Shops

Following is a local currency funding summary of the Military Construction Program in table form. (See next page.)

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PRIOR YEARS AND FY 63 - 68 MAP PROGRAM

LOCAL CURRENCY FUNDING SUMMARY
(thousands of dollars)

	<u>Prior Years</u>	<u>FY 63</u>	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66-69</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Basis for Estimate</u>
1. Lovak Ordnance Depot	3667					3667	Contract prices
2. Lovak Quartermaster Depot	1170					1170	Contract Bid Prices & Final Design Estimate
3. Parachute Renovation Facility	80					80	Final Design Estimate
4. POL Depot Prek Pnau	235					235	Final Design Estimate
5. POL Dispensing Stations	87					87	Contract Price
6. Signal Refrigerated Warehouses	70					70	Contract Bid Prices & Contingencies
7. Regional Military Infirmaries	425		110		110	645	Contract Bid Prices & Contingencies
8. Romeas Training Center	1245					1245	Contract Bid Prices & Final Design Estimate
9. National Firing Ranges			75			75	Budget Estimate
10. Chom Chau Engineer Depot	178		25			203	Contract Bid Prices & Budget Estimate

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	<u>Prior Years</u>	<u>FY 63</u>	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66-69</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Basis for Estimate</u>
11. Communication Facilities	105		35	35		175	Preliminary Design Estimate
12. Engineer Regional Shops			250	210	110	570	Preliminary Design Estimate
13. Chruai Changvar Naval Base	1150		50		230	1430	Contract Bid Prices & Final Design Estimate
14. Ream Naval Base	110	390				500	Final Design Estimate
15. Airfield Improvement	800		155	200	95	1250	Contract Bid Prices & Budget Estimate
16. MAAG Facilities	410					410	Contract Bid Prices & Design Estimate
17. POL	266					266	Actual Cost
18. Vehicle Rebuild Program	83					83	Actual Cost
19. Military Budget Support	1374					1374	Actual Cost
PROGRAM TOTAL	11415	390	700	445	545	13535	

Note: The first three projects combined to make up the Lovok Logistical Complex totaling 4,917.

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4. Nature of Cooperating Country Contribution

The RKG contribution to maintaining its armed forces consisted of budgetary provisions for its Ministry of Defense. The budget allocations covered all costs of the FARK not specifically assumed by the United States whether as military budget support or as direct MAP contributions.

Under the U. S. aid agreement in Cambodia, the RKG earmarked for military budget support customs duties paid by Cambodian importers on U. S.-financed commercial imports. The amounts paid and channeled into military budget support were as follows:

	\$ Equivalent (000's)
Prior Years	24,633
1963 & 1964	1,100
	<hr/>
TOTAL	25,733

These revenues did not constitute a part of the U. S. support of the RKG military budget inasmuch as they were derived from Cambodian resources. However, since they were included in RKG budget revenues derived from regular customs activities, they did not constitute an additional RKG contribution over and above the regular budget.

The following table shows RKG budget allotments for both its military and paramilitary (police) forces in relation to a) U. S. contributions, and b) RKG current budget revenues, for the six year period 1957-63. (The 1963 figure of \$10 million for U. S. contribution reflects the planned amount.) (See next page.)

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\$1 = 35 riels

RKG MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY BUDGET AND EXTRABUDGETARY OUTLAYS
(Millions of Dollars, except as noted)

<u>RKG Budget and Extrabudgetary Items</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
1. U. S. Military Budget Support (P&A) ^{1/}	15.5	15.4	13.0	11.8	11.5	10.3	10.0
2. RKG Contribution to Military Budget	10.0	10.1	15.1	21.8	24.7	27.9	29.5
3. Total Military Budget Expenditures	25.5	25.5	28.1	33.6	36.2	38.2	39.5
4. RKG Police Budget	8.3	8.7	8.6	8.9	9.8	10.1	10.5
5. Total Military & Police Budget Expenditures	33.8	34.2	36.7	42.5	46.0	48.3	50.0
6. U. S. Aid to RKG Police Program	-	0.9	0.4	1.8	1.4	0.3	0.6
7. U. S. Aid to Military Construction	-	-	1.8	-	0.5	-	0.4
8. U. S. Direct Military Aid (MAP)	11.2	5.9	4.8	5.8	7.2	9.8	10.4
9. Total Outlay - Military and Police	45.0	41.0	43.7	50.1	55.1	58.4	61.4
10. RKG Current Budget Revenues	64.3	75.7	88.2	96.0	107.4	102.9	119.5
<u>Significant Ratios</u>							
11. $\frac{\text{Net RKG Military \& Police Budget Expenditures}}{\text{RKG Current Budget Revenues} \frac{(2+4)}{10}}$	28.4%	24.8%	26.9%	32.0%	32.1%	36.9%	33.5%
12. $\frac{\text{Total Military \& Police Budget Expenditures}}{\text{RKG Current Budget Revenues} \frac{(5)}{(10)}}$	52.6%	45.2%	41.6%	44.3%	42.8%	46.9%	41.8%
13. $\frac{\text{U. S. Military Budget Support (P\&A)} \frac{(1)}{(3)}}{\text{Total Military Budget Expenditures}}$	60.8%	60.4%	46.3%	35.1%	31.8%	27.0%	25.3%

^{1/} U. S. military budget support for FARK pay and allowances is incorporated into the RKG budget.

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The percentage figures shown in lines 11 and 12 were prepared to indicate the actual and potential burden upon RKG current budget revenues of the regular costs of maintaining its military and police establishments. Line 11 shows that the RKG was devoting 33.5 per cent of its estimated current budget revenues for this purpose in 1963 (final figures are not available). Line 12 shows the burden upon RKG budget revenues which will exist in the absence of U. S. Military Budget Support (P&A). For 1963 complete assumption by the RKG of its military and police budget expenditures would have required 41.8 per cent of its current budget revenues, assuming the planned U. S. contribution for FY 1963 had been made. No reduction in regular budget outlays can be made without impairing the regular personnel and operating requirements of the military and police establishments.

Line 13 reveals that the U. S. contribution to military pay and allowances, as a percentage of total RKG military budget expenditures, declined from 60.8 per cent to 25.3 per cent over the period 1957-63. During the same period, regular military budget expenditures rose by 55 per cent, from \$25.5 million to \$39.5 million. The steadily rising burden upon RKG budget revenues thus derived from two factors: 1) increases in military budget expenditures; 2) reduced contributions by the U. S.

At the same time it should be noted that planned RKG current budget revenues have risen by 86 per cent during the period 1957-63. If this favorable trend had continued, and actual budget receipts materialized as planned, and if only nominal increases had henceforth been made in the military and police budgets, the RKG would have eventually outgrown its present heavy burden of defense expenditures.

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RECORD OF FUNDS COMMITTED AND PAID
November 20, 1963
(Expressed in Thousands U.S. Dollars)

A.
MILITARY BUDGET SUPPORT (Military Pay & Allowances)

	Original Program	Savings or Short fall	Final Commitments	P a y m e n t s		Unliquidated
				Counterpart	Section 402 Currency	
FY 1955	16,500.0	-	16,500.0	16,500.0	-	-
FY 1956	17,680.0	-	17,680.0	17,680.0	-	-
FY 1957	17,533.0	2,046.5	15,486.5	12,906.2	2,580.3	-
FY 1958	16,500.0	1,097.0	15,403.0	14,645.8	757.2	-
FY 1959	14,430.0	1,386.2	13,043.8	11,646.3	1,397.5	-
FY 1960	12,000.0	162.1	11,837.9	10,237.9	1,600.0	-
FY 1961	11,400.0	(128.0)	11,528.0	8,790.6	2,737.4	-
FY 1962	<u>10,300.0</u>	<u>(509.1)</u>	<u>10,809.1</u>	<u>10,809.1</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-</u>
	116,343.0	4,054.7	112,288.3	103,215.9	9,072.4	-
FY 1963	<u>10,000.3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>10,000.3</u>	<u>4,109.7</u> ^{1/}	<u>(10.4)</u>	<u>5,901.0</u>
Total	<u><u>126,343.3</u></u>	<u><u>4,054.7</u></u>	<u><u>122,288.6</u></u>	<u><u>107,325.6</u></u>	<u><u>9,062.0</u></u>	<u><u>5,901.0</u></u>

^{1/} In the final settlement agreement with the Cambodian Government made in February, 1964, provision was made for the attribution to Military Pay and Allowances to any balance remaining in the Counterpart Special Account after payment of all outstanding claims. The amount of 4,109.7 shown here represents payment of pay and allowance support through May, 1963.

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RECORD OF FUNDS COMMITTED AND PAID
November 20, 1963

A.
MILITARY BUDGET SUPPORT (Military Construction)

	<u>Commitments</u> <u>11/20/63</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Releases 11/20/63</u>	<u>Unpaid Commitments</u> <u>11/20/63</u>
Lovek Logistical Complex	4,917.0	4,688.5	228.5
Romeas Training Center	1,245.0	1,049.9	195.1
P.O.L. Dispensing Station	87.3	87.3	-
Military Infirmaries	425.0	300.5	124.5
Refrigerated Signal Warehouse	70.0	37.6	32.4
POL Depot Prek Phnau	235.0	-	235.0
Chan Chau Engineering Depot	178.0	127.8	50.2
Chrui Chang Var Naval Base	1,150.0	1,029.8	120.2
Airfield Improvement	799.6	708.1	91.5
MAAG Facilities	410.0	385.7	24.3
P. O. L.	265.6	265.6	-
Vehicle Rebuild Program	83.2	83.2	-
Military Budget Support	1,374.3	1,374.3	-
Communications Facilities	105.0	-	105.0
Ream Naval Base	500.0	-	500.0
Total	<u>11,845.0</u>	<u>10,138.3</u>	<u>1,706.7</u>

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Bk. III - II-A-2

B. AGRICULTURE1. Introduction

The basic generator of Cambodian income is agricultural production which accounts for almost 50 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) of Cambodia. Almost 80 per cent of Cambodia's exports are accounted for by three agricultural products: rice, rubber and corn. If livestock is added the percentage is raised to 86 per cent (1961). Given the lack of mineral resources Cambodia's economic development is dependent upon a major expansion and qualitative improvement in Cambodia's agricultural output.

The limited available data on the Cambodian economy reveals that approximately 85-90 per cent of its people derive their livelihood from agriculture and that on the national level the country derives practically all its foreign exchange from the export of agricultural products. As the economy has expanded, the balance of payments deficit has increased over four fold since 1955, reaching its highest point thus far of \$48 million in 1962. (The major portion of this deficit was made up by the non-project aid program until 1960.) Agricultural exports have not been able to keep up with steadily increasing imports and agricultural productivity thus far has been slow to respond to efforts directed toward increased production.

Some of the major factors impeding an increase in agricultural production are inadequate (traditional) techniques, inadequacy of governmental administrative capability, lack of technical knowledge, inadequacy of government institutions to carry technical assistance to farmers, lack of commercial outlets for needed farm supplies,

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absence of entrepreneurs to engage in large scale forestry and fisheries exploitation, insufficient credit capital and the lack, for most farmers, of short term credit at reasonable rates. In addition, there is a lack of physical vitality, health, and general education on the part of the farmers. Poor crop varieties, absence of good crop rotation practices, little irrigation, poor quality livestock, infestations of rodents, insects, crop diseases, and inadequate marketing facilities compound the problem. Still further, the culture and religion of Cambodia are decidedly non-materialistic and, as such, do not provide an environment conducive to strong incentive for improved practices which have as their ultimate goal material gain.

Crops

Present agriculture may be classed under two general categories i.e., major money crops of rice and rubber, each representing about 40 per cent of Cambodia's exports, and minor crops chiefly for domestic consumption. Within the first category rubber production is relatively stable from year to year and has shown a gradual annual increase over the long run. There is no possibility, however, of any sudden jump in production. Newly established plantations may be expected to contribute a moderate increase in production within a decade, but present lower price trends would tend to lower its value as the production of synthetics increases.

The question of rice production is entirely different and presents a challenge worth noting. Current yields, although good in some areas (about two tons per hectare), on an overall average are

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still considerably below yields in most other countries and could be markedly increased. Rice production, therefore, offers the best prospect for quickly improving the livelihood of Cambodia's farmers as well as the economy of the country.

Minor crops could share an almost equally important position with rice, in that they could provide necessary variety in nutritional needs and on a long range basis should become more important in support of agricultural industries. Sugar and jute are good examples of sound possibilities for future development.

Land

In Cambodia's early history, all land was under the control of the ruler, hence the evolution of the idea of King's Domain and now public domain. Today, all non-private land belongs to the Royal Government and is made available to private owners through grants, concessions or sale. In general, the ownership or availability of land is not a problem for Cambodian farmers and most agriculturally productive land is privately owned. Forestry reserves in remote mountain areas are owned and controlled by the Royal Government.

No accurate statistics are available on the precise average of land holdings in Cambodia. The Ministry of Agriculture estimated that there were 2,073,000 hectares of land under cultivation during the 1962-63 crop season. During the same period an estimated 900,000 farm families were cultivating the land. With an average farm family of 6 persons, the rural population now totals about 5.4 million persons or 90 per cent of the total population. A reasonable estimate of average farm size is just over two hectares. In the area of Central

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Cambodia, the average farm is slightly less than this. This includes the Provinces of Kandal, Takeo, Kampot and Kg. Speu, Kg. Chhnang and Kg. Cham. Relatively larger land holdings are found in the better rice-producing areas of the country, which include the Provinces of Battambang, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng. Truly large land holdings are rare in Cambodia, and only some 1,500 units of property comprise more than 20 hectares. Land along the major rivers is more intensively cultivated and is divided into smaller units, anything over 10 hectares is rare.

Farmers who have no land are rare in Cambodia, but do exist. The percentage of this category of farmers varies from region to region, with some areas as low as two per cent of the farm population and others as high as nine per cent.

With the overall availability of new land for the relatively small population of Cambodia there have been no serious problems of land tenure, and it is unusual to find such a thing as absentee landlordism. There are frequent cases, however, of a sharecropping system. The general rule of payment for a sharecropper is 50 per cent of production. Agreements are usually oral contracts between farmers. Landowners who participate in sharecropping are mostly older people, military personnel, or landowners living near cities who prefer to find part-time work in town. There are some cases where the owner of a team of oxen will contribute his labor and animals to agricultural production on a piece of land owned by someone else. There are some agreements between landowners and sharecroppers obliging the sharecropper to sell all of his production to the landowners at a price named by the latter.

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It is estimated that less than five per cent of the farm population works on a sharecrop basis.

Although during recent years land holdings of state enterprises have become more significant in the cotton and rubber production programs, there is no significant contribution to other agricultural productivity on state land holdings. In the Province of Battambang the Royal Office of Cooperation (OROC) owns a mechanized rice enterprise comprising 2,188 hectares. OROC produces improved seed on 25 per cent of this land and the remainder is leased to neighboring rice farmers. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture operates a rice improvement station which encompasses 645 hectares. The Office of State Enterprises (OFENET) controls several thousand hectares in Kg. Cham in conjunction with their cotton production program. A new rubber plantation of 4,000 hectares is being developed in Ratanakiri Province, under the administrative control of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Foreign land holdings are significant only in the red land area, of which about 44,000 hectares are devoted to rubber production. These were developed by French companies, mostly in Kg. Cham Province, and are still owned and controlled by the French. Although land may not be acquired by foreigners, according to existing laws, long term concessions for agricultural exploitation may be granted.

Statistics on the distribution of income in rural areas in Cambodia are not available. The following estimates pertaining to farm income are, however, considered to be representative for four-fifths of the population of Cambodia. Farm income is very closely tied to the price of rice and is variable from harvest to harvest.

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It was estimated in 1958 that average farm income per person per year was \$49 (in local currency), excluding farmers engaged in fishing and forestry. Annual farm income per person in 1962 was about \$63 (in local currency), chiefly due to the increased value of rice.

AID Program - Summary

The USAID's agriculture program in Cambodia began in 1952, a time of unusual strain on the Cambodian economy caused by dislocations resulting from war and guerrilla actions, which further aggravated the conditions discussed above.

The first assistance given by the USAID in the agriculture sector was largely devoted to the rehabilitation, improvement and repair of war damaged facilities, and renovation and construction of irrigation projects. These efforts, though designed to bring immediate improvements by supplying equipment, commodities and supplies were not designed to have any immediate or measurable impact on total agricultural production.

At the time of Cambodia's independence there was no Ministry of Agriculture as it is known today. It was largely a paper organization and was neither organized nor staffed to provide any service to farmers to aid them in increasing production or improving marketing facilities. Functions of the Ministry in 1954 were for the most part limited to controlling timber and fisheries concessions and making a half hearted effort at livestock disease control and carrying out limited research in rice varieties. The total trained staff of the Ministry consisted of two agronomists, one entomologist, one engineer and perhaps a dozen foresters. Forestry was and to a large

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extent still remains a favorite field for Cambodians because of the easy graft in connection with timber concessions.

With Cambodia's independence the need to increase agricultural production was understood by Cambodia's political leaders and by U.S. agricultural advisors sent to Cambodia. Cambodia's farmers on the other hand were, and in fact still are for the most part, engaged in subsistence farming and are only mildly if at all interested in the economic development of Cambodia as a nation. They find it difficult to believe that they can, or understand why they should, contribute by making greater efforts to increase production.

Recognizing that Cambodia lacked all of the means required to induce and assist the mass of the farming population to increase agricultural production, the agricultural section of the program was changed, beginning in 1958, to emphasize the creation of institutions and the training of technical and administrative personnel. Emphasis on actual increase in agricultural production did not begin until 1961, and gradually became the overall ultimate objective of the agriculture program. During the years from 1958 to 1961 most planned institutions had been developed to some degree, some becoming partially effective such as the Credit and Cooperative organizations and a nucleus had been created for others, such as the agricultural extension service.

In the effort to increase production, the emphasis of U.S. assistance more directly to farm families. Though it was never expected that these and other institutions would become fully effective before 1969-1970, at which time at least minimum staffs would have been trained, it was decided that a beginning could be made toward changing

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the U.S. assistance program to emphasize rural development programs. This last emphasis was becoming increasingly important in the plans of the USAID toward the end of the program.

In this connection, a contract with the International Voluntary Services, Inc., initiated in 1960 with a five man team to assist in the development of a livestock farm, was ultimately expanded to a planned three teams totalling 45 volunteers. Of these, 25 men were to be assigned to village level rural development programs working directly with farmers in demonstrating improved practices and while so doing train and stimulate their Cambodian counterparts. Another 10 man team was to assist in the development of the agricultural university. At the termination of the aid program there were 14 volunteers in Cambodia working in the agricultural program. Most of them were engaged in village level demonstration programs.

It appears from the record that at first the goals of increased production were not realistic in terms of the problems to be overcome and became progressively less so each year until FY 1963, when a peak of unrealistic expectation was reached in the FY 64 program submission to AID/W. This submission set as the major goal of the agriculture program a 19 per cent increase in production by 1964 (from 1961) and a 32 per cent increase by 1969. Those directly engaged in implementing the assistance program were aware that many years were required to bring about any significant increase in agricultural production and the ambitious goals appear to have been the result of pressure brought to bear during the programming process to quantify the goals of the Program. The unrealistic nature of such expectations was

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ultimately undeniable, however, and the FY 1965 CAP set forth the more modest goal of a "substantial" increase by 1969 and associated the percentage of increase to the overall goal of an increase in per capita income in Cambodia of three per cent per year.

Unfortunately the many changes in organization leading to AID were reflected in Mission operations and resulted in apparent, but not always real, changes in individual project objectives. A combination of numerous changes in Mission personnel and Congressional pressure on the predecessors to AID resulted in the writing of unrealistic objectives and project reports which tended to portray that greater progress either had been or could be achieved than was the case.

At the termination of the program most of the desired institutions had been established and had begun operating, but no significant increase in Cambodia's agricultural output had been achieved (although it had been amply demonstrated in pilot trials, especially in 1963, that such an increase was possible).

In spite of their being no significant increase in overall production, the program can claim success in establishing the requisite institutions, particularly in view of their virtual non-existence in Cambodia in 1955. An important lesson learned in Cambodia with regard to agricultural development is the length of time required to effect change in agricultural methods in a society based on subsistence agriculture wherein a change in farming practices is in fact a change in the farmer's way of life. Such efforts may have to be measured in decades instead of years.

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While the numerous changes in Mission operating procedures resulted in some 50 individual agricultural projects during the history of the aid program, there were actually only eight major agricultural activities in which the USAID was engaged: 1) Irrigation and Flood Control; 2) Livestock Improvement; 3) Agricultural Education; 4) Crop Development and Protection; 5) Development of an Agricultural Extension Service; 6) Forestry Resources Development; 7) Fisheries Resources Development; and 8) Development of Agricultural Cooperatives and Credit.

The USAID's Agriculture Program developed, more or less, on all these fronts simultaneously. All of the individual projects could be said to be in support of an eventual increase in agricultural production and therefore related, but each was implemented as a separate activity prior to FY 1961. During that year a move toward consolidation of the more closely related projects began. This direction gained momentum during FY 1962 and FY 1963 and was to have seen its fulfillment in FY 1965, wherein the agricultural program would have been concentrated in two projects: 1) the University of Agriculture; and 2) the Development of Agricultural Cooperatives and Rural Demonstration Centers (an evolution of the Development of Agricultural Cooperatives and Production Credit project). For purposes of clarity, the discussion that follows is organized around the eight major activity areas mentioned above. In fact, two of the activity areas (Extension, and Crop Development and Protection) became sub-projects of one overall project in FY 1963 - Development of Agricultural Resources - and, as already indicated, all but the Cooperative project were to be completed or joined with the University of Agriculture activity by the end of FY 1965.

2. Irrigation

a) Introduction

The Irrigation and Drainage Project is one of the oldest active projects in Cambodia, having been started in 1951 under the Saigon STEM office. Projects activities were absorbed into USOM/Cambodia when the Mission was established in 1955.

In the early days of the project, almost total emphasis was placed on the construction of irrigation projects. The main objective was to complete, in the shortest time possible, a number of projects for which plans had already been drawn by French experts in the belief that provision of irrigation systems was the quickest way of effecting an increase in agricultural production. To this end, considerable amounts of heavy construction machinery and earth moving equipment were furnished by the U.S. to replace the traditional slow hand methods of construction normally employed.

After the construction program of the system planned by the French had been well established, attention of the USAID was turned to the equally important aspect of training the Cambodians in planning and designing new systems. This phase was originally begun as a separate project known as "Studies of Soils and Water Resources". This project was incorporated in the overall Irrigation and Drainage Project in 1958 as part of an effort to reduce the number of projects within the program. While this portion of the project progressed satisfactorily in most respects, it did so slowly because of the greater length of time required to train personnel for this type of work.

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b) Construction of Irrigation Projects

The construction of useful irrigation projects in order to provide the means of increasing production was the main objective of the project. All other objectives represented the means by which this main objective could be accomplished.

An estimated 87,000 hectares of land were brought under systems of irrigation or flood control through the efforts of this project. Had the Bovel Dam been completed, the total would have been 102,000.

The following projects were undertaken and, with the exception of the Bovel, completed:

<u>Project</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Area (ha)</u>
1/ 1. Colmatage canals	Kandal	1955	20,000 ha.
1/ 2. Cheung Prey Dike System	Kompong Chan	1956	6,000
3. Kompong Sne	Prey Vent	1957	1,000
4. Bar Rokar	Takeo	1958	1,000
5. Lom Chang	Takeo	1958	1,000
1/ 6. Prey Nop Dike System	Kampot	1958	12,000
7. Barai Occidental	Siem Reap	1958	13,000
8. Bovel (canals)	Battambang	1959	16,000
9. Prey Chhor	Kompong Chan	1960	5,000
10. Misc. Repair	Various	1960	12,000
2/ 11. Bovel Dam	Battambang	--	15,000
1/ Flood Control			
2/ Not Completed			102,000 ha.

These systems are of several types. The most simple systems are those of the "colmatage canals" constructed in the earlier days of the

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project. These are actually nothing more than canals excavated laterally from the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers to facilitate the movement of flood waters between the river and the adjacent land. The canals are generally uncontrolled, but a few have gates which provide some measure of control of flows either to or from the river.

Dike systems such as those of the Choeng Prey and Prey Nop Projects are another type of system. These consist of a network of low dikes enclosing large basins which vary in size according to the terrain, but which may have an area of over 1,000 hectares. During the rainy season the natural rainfall is normally sufficient to flood the basins to considerable depth. The water so accumulated can often be supplemented with runoff from higher lands or with flood waters from adjacent rivers. The depth of water in the basin is controlled by means of gates installed in the dikes. In the coastal area of Prey Nop, the dikes also prevent the intrusion of sea water onto the lower lying lands and considerable areas of tidal flats have been reclaimed.

Where the terrain is suitable for their construction, dike systems provide an excellent means of holding flood waters and natural rainfall at the desired depths and for the desired period of time. Vast areas can thus be provided with a dependable supply of water at a minimum cost. There is much land in Cambodia susceptible to this type of improvement.

The third type of project is the more conventional system of diverting stored or natural flows of rivers and streams into canals for conveyance to the lands in need of water. Only one project, the Barai Occidental, uses stored water to any significant degree and this

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is used for a supplemental supply during the rainy season. The other projects of this type, such as Bovel and Prey Chhor, do not have storage. These divert natural river flows only. In the case of Prey Chhor, the water supply is from springs which maintain a small flow even during the dry season so a limited amount of dry season irrigation is possible on this project. Bovel has no supply of water during the dry season.

Projects constructed by the USAID were, for the most part, constructed according to plans prepared by the French many years ago. An exception is the Prey Chhor which was planned by Genie Rural with the assistance of a USAID advisor. These plans were not supported by the usual investigations of water supply, soils and economic feasibility. The need for construction was so urgent that the projects were implemented with the full knowledge that proper data was lacking and that there was some risk of failure should the data prove wrong. Results to date have shown that the risk was justified. While some of the projects are considered marginal in value, these could be greatly improved. Others have proven to be excellent projects, and none can be considered failures with regard to the objective of providing and utilizing irrigation water. An audit report, prepared by the USAID Controller in 1963 judged the Irrigation Project unsatisfactory, primarily because the water, according to information then available, was not being fully utilized. This was thought to apply mainly to the Barai Occidental Project. Further investigation by the Agriculture Division revealed that the farmers had extended laterals themselves and were using the system to capacity. The true failure of the project

lies in the assumption that provision and utilization of irrigation water alone would effect an increase in agricultural production.

Experience has shown that increased production requires the employment of improved practices, methods, seed, fertilizers and, above all, incentive in addition to increased availability of water.

c) Establishment of Central Repair Shop for Heavy Equipment

With the introduction of heavy construction equipment, it became necessary to establish a facility for the maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the equipment and a training program for the Cambodian personnel who would operate and repair it. In order to accomplish this, a modestly equipped machine shop and repair center was constructed in Phnom Penh by the USAID, and an agency within the Ministry of Agriculture, called Genie Rural (Rural Engineering), was established at the urging of USAID to operate the shop and the equipment. Filipino technicians were brought in under contract to serve as instructors. In the beginning, the Filipinos themselves did much of the repair work as well as operate the equipment at the job site, but at the same time they gave on-the-job training to Cambodian understudies. As the trainees gained in proficiency, more and more of the actual work was turned over to them and the Filipino technicians were able to devote a greater amount of their time to more formal types of training, including classroom instruction.

The first Filipino technicians were assigned to the project in 1954, and some were still being used in 1963. The greatest number in the country at any one time was 19 in 1956 and 1957. In 1959 the number was reduced to 10, and in 1960 it was further reduced to

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six, the number at the end of the program.

The central repair shop program has been quite successful, and is a good example of technical assistance. Starting from nothing, the shop was developed into an organization with tools, equipment, and Cambodian personnel trained to repair and overhaul any type of mobile and heavy construction equipment. The Cambodian Government supported the project fully, and to the initial supply of USAID tools and shop equipment they added with their own funds many new tools and additional equipment. Among the items purchased by the RKG were two large universal machine tools, a crankshaft grinder, a cylinder boring machine, and a testing and calibrating machine for diesel fuel pumps and injectors.

The Filipino technicians were being used in responsible administrative and technical advisory capacities. One served as assistant to the Chief of the Central Shop and was responsible for assisting in overall administrative functions, one was in charge of all training operations, one supervised work in the machine shop and on special equipment, one was in charge of general overhaul and repair operations, and the other was in charge of field operations.

About 400 men were trained in one or more fields in the shop. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the program in terms of personnel trained, since the program has been a continuous process and many men have been trained in more than one field. For example, the operator of a bulldozer may have also been trained to operate a crane or shovel, and machinists may have also been trained in engine overhaul, or in some speciality such as electrical or

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hydraulic systems. Training was placed on as broad a base as possible, and in a sense, no person ever "graduated" from the school. When a piece of equipment, for example, was returned to the shop for a major overhaul the operator of that particular piece of equipment generally returned to the shop to serve as a helper to the mechanics doing the repair work.

Although government salaries are low for trained mechanics and operators, there was a relatively small turnover in personnel. A few men were lost to private employment after finishing their training and a few were hired away to work in other government construction activities, but most remained with Genie Rural.

d) Training Conductors of Rural Works

Inasmuch as there was no engineering or technical school in Cambodia until very recently, it was necessary for engineers to receive their training abroad. There is a great need for engineers in Cambodia, and an equally great need for the "sub-professional" engineer or engineering assistants. In order to supply this type of personnel, a special technical training program was established within Genie Rural in 1958. Although the program was nominally under the auspices of the National School of Agriculture, it was actually administered directly by Genie Rural. The curriculum was prepared by the USAID, and the USAID supported the course by providing supplies and a per diem allowance for the student. In addition, the USAID financed Filipino technicians assisted in teaching the course. A selection of 15 students was made, and formal classes were conducted over a period of about 2½ years. Following the

formal classroom instruction, the students spent about a year in on-the-job training at various projects of Genie Rural. To date 30 men have completed this training. These men have had sufficient training to enable them to assume responsible positions in the organization, and their graduation from their course of study greatly relieved the shortage of trained technicians in Genie Rural.

e) Establishment of Soils Survey Program

In 1957 a project known as "Studies of Soils and Water Resources", mentioned above, was initiated by the Mission to supplement the Irrigation Project. As discussed above, at that time only the most cursory investigations of soils and water resources were being made for irrigation project planning. It was judged that if the planning of such projects was to be done properly, it would be necessary to establish a soils and water program in Genie Rural. The concept of the program was based on the practice of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation which makes detailed land and water investigations of proposed projects. These investigations, along with others, are necessary to properly plan a project and to ensure its economic and engineering feasibility. Two technicians, a soils scientist and a surface water hydrologist, were assigned to the activity.

As originally conceived, the soils program was to be relatively modest. Its purpose was to train Cambodian personnel to make land classification and land capability surveys of existing and proposed irrigation projects. These surveys would be used to determine water

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requirements, benefits to be realized from irrigation, land development costs, and to some extent the types of crops best suited to the land. All this information would be considered along with other factors to determine the benefit-cost ratio of proposed projects, its economic feasibility, and for other purposes. In conjunction with the surveys, a small laboratory was to be established for performing the necessary routine tests to support the field work. A soils technician from another USAID was brought to Cambodia for a short period to draw up a list of needed laboratory equipment and supplies. These supplies were subsequently purchased. At the same time, plans for a simple laboratory were incorporated in the new headquarters building of Genie Rural which was designed by the USAID Public Works Division and financed with counterpart funds.

The program did not develop along the lines of its original conception. It is difficult at this time to trace all the many actions and factors leading to its modification, but the program as it had developed by 1960 bore little resemblance to original plans.

The first major change occurred in early 1958. At that time there were also plans for establishing a soils laboratory in the Agronomy Division of the Ministry. Some laboratory equipment had been furnished for this purpose by the Colombo Plan, and other items were being furnished by the USAID. It was the opinion of the USAID that Cambodia could not properly support two separate laboratories with personnel and funds, and that the two facilities

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should be combined until such time as separate facilities could be properly supported. The RRG officials and USAID technicians concerned with the two laboratories reluctantly agreed to their combination, and since Genie Rural had laboratory space more readily available, it was decided that the combined laboratories should be in the building of that organization. Unfortunately, no clear understanding as to the furnishing of laboratory personnel and the administration of the work was ever obtained. Various suggestions were made from time to time by the technicians, but the Ministry was not pressed to make the necessary decisions in this regard.

Other problems also arose with the expansion in the scope of work planned for the laboratory, the originally planned space was considered inadequate by the soils technician, and substantial changes were made in the installation. In addition, more supplies and equipment were needed to properly equip the larger laboratory. These were brought in under the Irrigation Project.

No permanent full time counterparts were assigned to the soils technician for training in field surveys. He had from one to six men assigned to work with him from time to time but none were ever assigned for a long enough period to enable him to accomplish much field work or to provide proper training. Although the technician was actually under the Irrigation Project, there was need for his services in other projects and in different agencies of the Cambodian government. This led to complications particularly in the use of personnel and equipment of one agency in doing the work of another agency. This lack of coordination along with no clearcut

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line of responsibility and lack of counterparts seriously handicapped the work of the technician.

In January, 1960, a soils laboratory technician arrived in Cambodia under the Agronomy Project. After surveying the situation, he decided that the laboratory was not properly constructed and equipped to handle all the contemplated work. Consequently, additional construction work, and the purchase of additional equipment and supplies were approved by the Mission. Because construction work moved slowly, and all project commodities had not arrived, he had time to work with other technicians on various field surveys. His work at the laboratory was handicapped much in the same manner as was the first technician, but was further complicated by his being the technician responsible for the Agronomy Project while the laboratory was still technically under Genie Rural.

As work progressed towards installing the laboratory the Cambodian Chief of the Genie Rural began taking a stronger stand against sharing the laboratory with other agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture and particularly the Division of Agronomy. A strong personality conflict between the Cambodian directors of Genie Rural and the Division of Agronomy, compounded the problems, and in effect prevented their resolution.

While the Minister of Agriculture agreed to a single National Soils Laboratory his subordinates openly sabotaged this decision and the Director of Genie Rural successfully delayed the installation of the laboratory equipment. The Soils laboratory technician departed Cambodia in January, 1963, without having been able to

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complete installation of the laboratory. His replacement did not arrive until early 1963, and during the year 1962 a continuous battle was fought concerning the future of the laboratory.

A new Minister of Agriculture was appointed in and a decision was finally agreed upon whereby the laboratory would ultimately be moved to and incorporated into the new University of Agriculture. Until the University was sufficiently developed for its incorporation the laboratory was to be operated by Genie Rural.

With this decision and the arrival of a well qualified U.S. soils laboratory technician the laboratory equipment was installed in the Genie Rural building in the spring of 1963, and the laboratory was put into operation. Personnel were assigned by the RKG and were given training by the U.S. technician.

The soils survey was finally completed under the agronomy project and is discussed under that portion of this report.

f) Establishment of Hydrological Program

A program of investigations of surface water resources was also included in the soils and water studies project. This program was considered important to the proper development and exploitation of Cambodia's water resources. Although hydrological studies of the Mekong River were being made by ECAFE, there was no organization in Cambodia for performing similar studies on other streams and rivers of the country. Since Genie Rural had the responsibility for the development of irrigation systems and had the most immediate need for hydrological information, the program was established within that agency.

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This program was beset with the same problems as were faced in the soils program, the main one being the lack of qualified personnel to work with the U.S. surface water hydrologist. However, he did have men assigned to him on a permanent basis throughout his entire assignment; five men were originally assigned, but this number was later reduced to three. Although these men had no technical training and an inadequate educational background for this type of work, they were the best available and were willing to learn. While it is extremely doubtful that any of them will ever develop to the point where they can be considered qualified hydrologists, they are capable of performing the necessary field and office operations for the collection and compilation of basic streamflow data. Even though they may not be able to properly interpret the data collected, they were nevertheless collecting much valuable data that would be useful later on to engineers and planners.

Upon recommendation of a consultant, a small network of 11 stream gages was installed. It later developed that the surveys of the Mekong River being conducted by ECAFE were being extended to include several of the larger tributaries of the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers which were included in the program of Genie Rural. In order to avoid duplication, the program was modified to eliminate the installation of gages on streams which were to be included in the Mekong surveys. The Harza Company, representing the Mekong Committee, also eliminated certain installations from their program and relied on information obtained from gages which had already been installed by the Genie Rural. The Ministry of Public Works

became increasingly involved with the work of the Mekong Project and the responsibility for the continuation of the Mekong Project studies was assumed by the Ministry of Public Works. USAID assistance was terminated in 1962 and all hydrological functions were transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Public Works.

g) Establishment of Operation and Maintenance Program

Although the Genie Rural is responsible for the construction of irrigation works for the RKG and for any major construction activities on the project once it is completed, it does not have funds or personnel for proper day to day operation and maintenance activities of the project. In fact, operation and maintenance in the generally accepted sense of the term is virtually non-existent on all projects. One exception to this is the Prey Nop Project where a small permanent staff is stationed for this purpose. This project requires considerable continuous maintenance work on dikes and was being well managed. Associations of water users, or other organizations composed of the project farmers themselves, are unknown. As a consequence, most projects were not being properly utilized, water was being wasted, deterioration of project works was very high, and the entire effectiveness of the project was considerably reduced by the lack of proper operation and maintenance control.

A U.S. Operation and Maintenance technician was assigned to the project in January of 1959. Because the Barai Occidental Project had just been placed in operation and because operation and

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maintenance problems on the project were numerous, the technician was stationed in Siem Reap for full time work on the Barai Project. (It is of interest to note that the Barai irrigation system was originally built during the Khmer Empire which reached its peak in the 14th century. The work discussed was rehabilitation of this old system.) Here again, there had been no clear understanding and agreement on the amount of support to be furnished by the RKG. Although the RKG was cognizant of the need for work in this line, they were either not aware of the amount of support required or were not prepared to give it at that time. The counterpart of the U.S. technician was the Agricultural Sector Chief who was responsible for all activities of the Direction of Agriculture in the entire province. He could devote only a small fraction of his time to work with the technician and did not have the authority nor the means to carry out any but the most minor work on the project. Although the Cambodian counterpart was very cooperative and tried to do his best, he did not have the support of the Ministry necessary to initiate and carry out a proper program. As a result, the technician accomplished very little and the program was a failure. Upon the death of the technician in June, 1960, the position was not refilled.

The need for an operation and maintenance program is as great today as it ever was. Before a successful program can be initiated, considerable groundwork would be necessary. The first requirement would be for the RKG to designate an agency to be responsible for this work, and to furnish the necessary staff and

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funds. In addition to technical assistance to the operating staffs of each project, an informational and educational program among the project users themselves would be required. No project can operate successfully without the full cooperation of the users of the water, and neither can full project benefits be realized unless the farmers know how to effectively use and conserve the water supplies. It has been suggested that perhaps the best approach to the problem would be from the bottom to the top rather than from the top down. First efforts should be concentrated on the farmers themselves along with other extension type activities. In any event, a water-users association of some kind would be highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary. Much of the maintenance work should be accomplished through contributions of labor by the farmers in the off season.

While this objective was never reached under this project, a similar program was initiated under the Credit and Cooperative Project in January, 1963, with the assignment of two IVS technicians to live and work in the irrigation area. Those activities are discussed below under the Credit and Cooperative Project.

h) Training Operators of Rural Works

The term "Operator" is more of a job classification level than it is a description of duties. In this case, an operator of rural works is a surveyor or topographer. Surveyors are needed by Genie Rural for mapping, setting line and grade for roads and canals, staking out buildings and structures, setting concrete forms, etc. No school for training such personnel exists in

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Cambodia, so the training must be done by the organization itself. The Ministry of Public Works also conducts a similar training program.

Although this training was originally scheduled to begin in 1960, it was deferred until 1961. The course ran for about one year and included classroom work along with considerable amounts of laboratory and field work. A supply of surveying and mapping instruments and instructional materials was furnished by the USAID and the cost of the program was supported by the USAID in the same manner as the training course for conductors of rural works. As of November 1963, 20 men had completed this training and were assigned to field positions.

3. The Development of Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives

a) Introduction

The problems of inadequate agricultural credit, marketing facilities, and inadequate sources of supplies result in inadequate incentive for increased production. These problems will have to be solved before agricultural production can make a more significant contribution to the Cambodian economy.

Cambodian farmers are traditionally subjected to borrowing money for credit capital at exorbitant rates of interest from money lenders. Interest rates charged are from 36 - 240 per cent per year. The farmer is often required to repay the lender in kind for which he is credited something less than a fair market price. Another factor is that the farmer has virtually no choice of where or to whom he can sell his surplus production, and is at the mercy of the buyer, who is, in many cases, the money lender.

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Another requirement for increased agricultural production is the use of better varieties of seed, improved livestock breeds, control of insects and diseases with insecticides, pesticides, fertilizers, etc. However, there are no regularly established sources of supply or established channels to make the materials readily available to the farmer, and only a fledgling extension service to assist him in this regard.

Under the period of French administration and influence some efforts were made to organize groups or to develop institutions to meet certain economic needs: marketing by "The Fresh Water Fishing Cooperative of Cambodia" chartered in 1944, and "The Kandal Corn Cooperative" organized in 1938; furnishing of supplies such as silver bullion through Khmer Arts Cooperative organized in 1952; and providing rural credit through 11 Provincial Banks of Mutual Agricultural Credit, organized between 1929-1954. However, none of these organizations and operations had the characteristics of a true cooperative in the form of continuing participation in capital, participation in management, sharing of profits or losses by the members, and, above all, education of the members in their responsibilities and duties. These organizations have passed into oblivion except the credit units, which were reorganized in 1956 to function along more truly cooperative principles.

With a predominately agricultural population living largely on a subsistence basis, the RKG reorganized the need for a system of cooperatives whereby credit could be obtained by farmers at reasonable costs, consumer goods could be sold to them at fair prices,

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and the product of their labor could be sold to the best advantage, as an essential element of the agricultural and economic development of the country. To meet this need, a Decree issued on June 15, 1956, authorized the creation of the Royal Office of Cooperation (OROC). This decree gives wide administrative latitude to this office for the organization of cooperatives and the issuance of rules and regulations, and generally sets out a broad plan for the implementation of an organization to accomplish the stated objectives which are:

- To organize cooperatives among the various agricultural and economic elements of the country with respect to credit, production and consumption.
- To supervise and coordinate all activities of affiliate cooperatives.
- To make available physical and financial facilities to cooperatives in order that they may operate efficiently.
- To conduct procurement, sales, and export and import transactions in the interest of the affiliate.

To capitalize the program, the RKG allocated \$5,714,286 in local currency and transferred 10 administrative officials from other ministries to this new agency. The OROC then organized itself into three operating divisions - Credit, Production and Consumer. Credit continued to be handled through the already established provincial credit offices as in the past. These were increased to thirteen units. Production cooperatives were organized to assist in getting farm supplies, such as gunny sacks for 11 corn production

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cooperatives, and also to develop a central marketing system. Some credit capital was advanced by the OROC to the production cooperatives and to a large extent these cooperatives could be termed multi-purpose. Most of the emphasis, though, to the new cooperative program was given to the formation of consumers cooperatives. A total of 292 units involving nearly 90,000 rural families were organized in the short space of two years.

This growth was too rapid to permit adequate training and education of cooperative personnel and for the development of membership relations. Surprisingly, though, these coops have been making net operating profits of \$92,857 to \$228,571 (in local currency) annually and, furthermore, 75 per cent of them are still solvent and operating. However, these consumer coops are not true coops in that they are managed by the central OROC management and the only right the farmers have is to purchase. The USAID had nothing to do with this.

Realizing that this structure, as it was being developed, was failing to meet the original objectives, the RKG in the forefront of 1960 endorsed, at the urging of the USAID advisors, a new approach. This new approach, which was promulgated in the FY 1960 Project Agreement, was centered on the formation of local rural groups into units who, by their interest, attitude and in many instances investment of money and business in an already organized production cooperative, consumers cooperative, or domestic rice mill association, had evidenced the elements needed for a cooperative cohesion. This approach concentrated all the economic-social forces of a group

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of people into one unit - a multi-purpose type of cooperative organization.

b) Aid Program

The first USAID project activity was the Prey Chhor Rice Mill Cooperative in Kompong Cham Province. This project was designed to demonstrate how a cooperative could perform several functions, viz credit, collecting, warehousing, processing, marketing and supplies. Shortly thereafter a similar rice mill unit was organized at Banam, Prey Veng Province. Operations were started by both cooperatives in 1954 but were suspended five years later in 1959 because of pyramiding financial losses. Characteristically, the failure of these two cooperatives is attributable to several factors, but principally the scale of operations and size of the mill-units were beyond the financial and technical capabilities of OROC and its predecessor, Office of Credit Populaire.

Kandal Corn Marketing Cooperative was initially organized in 1938. It became inactive in 1950 because of country insecurity. A rehabilitation project was started in 1954, which provided \$40,000 in local currency for credit capital to the members and \$15,000 for a mechanical corn drier unit. The coop operated for two years and folded in 1956 because of inadequate management. (The project was reactivated in 1960 by OROC and the USAID, and the corn dryer, which had lain idle in the AEA warehouse, was finally assembled.)

First approved in 1953 and extending to 1955, \$857,000 in local currency were provided to expand the credit facilities of the Provincial Banks of Mutual Agricultural Credit. These funds

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plus approximately twice as much from the RKG stimulated a rapid expansion of credit. Between 1952 and 1956, the number of borrowers increased by 300 per cent and loan volume expanded by 600 per cent, that is, from 16,000 to 118,000 farmer-borrowers, and from \$485,714 to \$3 million (in local currency) in volume. These funds continue to be used as revolving capital for the making of loans to 55,000 farmers.

It should be noted here that these numbers of borrowers include second and third loans to the same borrower. It was necessary to have title to land in order to obtain a loan and as a result many farmers were unable to obtain them. Although nearly all Cambodian farmers have title in fact, many do not have the appropriate documents. Given the inadequacy of cadastral service obtaining documentation was difficult and very time consuming.

The second era of project support began in 1957 when full-time technical assistance was added to financial assistance. It was recognized by both the OROC and the USAID advisor that the critical need was for trained professional personnel required for the implementation of any large scale program.

Beginning in 1957 the project was addressed to two areas:

- 1) assistance to the development of Cambodia's first land settlement project north of Battambang to resettle veterans of the war with the Viet Minh, and
- 2) the training of professional personnel to work in OROC.

The land settlement project provided opportunities to demonstrate the application of cooperative principles. The project began

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in 1957 and the first rice was harvested in 1958. The number of participating families was expanded from 100 to 128 in 1958, and a multi-purpose cooperative was organized on May 22, 1959. Total project costs were approximately \$200,000 (in local currency), of which the USAID provided \$71,429 (in local currency) in counterpart funds, and the remainder came from the OROC.

Personnel training in 1957 included a five week observational tour for three officials of the OROC in the Philippines and Japan, and a pre-service training program for 60 cooperative assistants.

The Project Agreement for FY 1958 centered principally on expanding the revolving credit capital fund for 13 provincial credit units. Counterpart funds in the amount of \$750,000 (in local currency) were budgeted. Of that total, \$600,000 (in local currency) were allocated as supplemental capital for the provincial credit units and the balance was to be used for the development of several marketing cooperatives and for participant training. The OROC allocated an additional \$685,714 (in local currency) from its own budget.

One-half of the \$600,000 (in local currency) for credit was released to the OROC in mid-1958. It was distributed to the 13 provincial credit units for loans. However, the loan volume at the end of 1959 was down and no additional funds were released to the OROC at that time. Subsequent requests from the OROC for the release of the balance of the funds could not be justified because the OROC could not move the funds quickly enough. This was a result of their policy instituted in 1958 to try to get payments on

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long-past-due loans and to limit the extension of new credit to a conservative basis since many loans formerly had been renewed annually for up to ten years without any reduction by the borrowers of their indebtedness. This policy was strongly supported by the USAID because it had the effect of decreasing loan delinquencies, and it also resulted in some replacement of the capital previously advanced by the OROC to the provincial credit units with 1958 counterpart funds. As collections were made the money was not re-used in the making of new loans, but was instead returned to the OROC.

Activities in FY 1959 were principally concentrated on fulfillment of uncompleted objectives of earlier projects. No counterpart funds were budgeted except for participant training. Two participants received training in Malaya and East Pakistan for five weeks, and one participant received training in the United States and Europe for five months. Small commodity expenditures were principally for demonstration materials such as insecticides for stored grain and simple moisture testing units.

In FY 1960 the project was concerned with developing a multi-purpose type of rural cooperative organization at the village level. This had the effect of reversing the direction of the cooperative movement in that the fostering forces would be generated by the people themselves, rather than from a national government source. This did not, of course, reduce the importance of having expert national and regional guidance since the capabilities of the local people were not sufficiently developed to assure successful operation of an organization as complex as a cooperative.

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Counterpart funds, brought forward from FY 1958, were used to broaden the services of the provincial credit units, to establish several pilot multi-purpose cooperatives and to make the marketing function of four operating corn cooperatives more efficient and profitable by constructing storage facilities. Provision was also made for an intensified professional training program, and a beginning was made on the development of an Education and Information Division of the OROC.

Progress made in this project to 1960 included provision of loans to 53,000 farmer members. A total of \$3,428,571 (in local currency) was loaned out at reasonable interest rates which, had the farmers borrowed from the traditional sources, would have cost them ten times the amount for interest than it did.

Little had been done to facilitate the marketing of crops. As with credit, marketing facilities were highly controlled by a small group. Previous attempts at collective marketing were unsuccessful. In 1959, however, the 128 members of one cooperative in Battambang Province sold their rice at almost a 50 per cent profit during the pre-harvesting season by utilizing storage facilities of OROC.

In an attempt to counteract unnecessarily the high prices that most rural people had to pay for vital goods such as sugar, salt, soap, oils, textiles, and home supplies, a country-wide consumers cooperative plan was launched by OROC in 1956. This was built around the village store cooperatives which had grown to nearly 300 with memberships in 89,000 families.

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The program continued after 1960 to be directed almost entirely toward the development of rural multi-purpose cooperatives on the village level, which would provide the foundation of the total cooperative structure.

Institution building continued with assistance being given to the training of OROC personnel since the lack of skilled people remained the largest handicap to the successful accomplishment of OROC's goals. In-service training had been given to 20 high level personnel by 1960 and 18 more were recipients after that. In 1961 the education program was broadened to include the employment of 14 cooperative propagandists. To organize and direct its program of personnel training, education of cooperative members and information to the public, OROC created in 1961 a Training and Information Division. It also established a Technical Agricultural Assistance section which works with farmer-members of cooperatives to improve their farming practices -- in short an OROC extension service. Training given included short courses for 225 cooperative managers, 35 secretaries and presidents of multi-purpose and marketing cooperatives, and 33 cooperative assistants and managers of provincial credit cooperatives. All training was done by OROC personnel.

By 1961, there were 108,800 members of provincial credit cooperatives; paid up capital stock amounted to \$191,429 (in local currency); almost 57,000 loans totaling \$3,974,286 (in local currency) had been made. In addition to the credit handled by provincial credit cooperatives, the production and multi-purpose

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cooperatives made loans to farmers, which by 1961 had amounted to \$257,143 (in local currency). Short term money (one year) was loaned at a cost of one per cent per month (12 per cent per year) and medium term money (one to five years) was loaned at a cost of nine per cent per year. Approximately 85 per cent of all loans made were of the short term variety. The provincial credit cooperatives paid five per cent per year for credit capital advanced to them by OROC and the local agricultural cooperatives paid six per cent. However, the total credit available from cooperatives did not meet more than approximately 15 per cent of total country requirements in 1963.

Some experience was gained in cooperative marketing of rice, corn, jute, cardamome seed, and cotton. Farmer members averaged a net gain of approximately \$1.14 (in local currency) per 60 kilos of produce over the prevailing market rates in 1961.

As stated elsewhere, a supply of seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, pesticides, together with application equipment such as farming tools, processing machinery such as rice mills, cotton gins, decorticating machines, scales, and grain driers, is essential if agricultural production is to be increased. OROC's Agricultural Technical Assistance Division's primary responsibility is to assist cooperative members with problems of production. The division is active in getting the required chemical fertilizers, insecticides and improved seed corn to the farmers. The USAID assisted in this endeavor in FY 1963 by providing commodities, and setting up demonstration plots in seven provinces.

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During 1963, a farm demonstration center was put into operation in the Barai Occidental Irrigation perimeter at Siem Reap with an International Voluntary Service (IVS) technician who lived at the local cooperative center, and advised on the utilization of irrigation water in the production of rice. A second center was set up in Chrui Dang with another IVS technician advising on corn production. And a third was being established at Lomphat (capital of Ranikiri Province) where an IVS technician was assigned in September, 1963. Several other centers were planned to assist farmers in the more remote areas of Cambodia. All these activities were interrupted by the termination of the program.

Another phase of the farm demonstration program was initiated in 1963 under the OROC production division with individual farmers. With the assistance of the USAID Agricultural Advisor assigned to the OROC, 46 individual cooperative farmers in scattered parts of the country were persuaded to put some of their land into a demonstration program designed to show improved crop production methods. It was expected also that the demonstrations would have a multiplier effect on other farmers and increase the number of farmers within the cooperative movement. This program, though interrupted by the termination of the AID program, already demonstrated the soundness of its approach through double and even triple yields on the demonstration plots, and, as a direct result OROC ordered several thousand tons of fertilizer in 1963. This was the first time OROC had ordered any fertilizer for use in the production of rice. (Previous purchases of fertilizer had been only for cotton.)

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The credit revolving fund of the OROC was approximately \$4,457,143 (in local currency) and membership totalled 113,720 at the end of 1962. As more farmers are assisted by the OROC and become self-sufficient the greater the credit capital should become, thus providing capital to still more farmers.

Summary of USAID Assistance

By the end of 1963, the organization and operation of the OROC had been assisted by the USAID through the provision of out-of-country training for 40 administrative officials; extensive in-country training for 68 cooperative assistants; and short courses for 20 information agents and 225 cooperative managers; 46 rice production demonstrations and 14 corn demonstrations had been started with USAID assistance. The cooperative movement had been explained to over 60,000 farm families in hundreds of meetings, and over 100,000 pamphlets had been distributed to farmers. A publication first published in 1962, called Our Cooperative was being issued three times monthly in French and Cambodian, and by the end of FY 1963 had a circulation of 2,500. A motion picture film entitled "Cooperative Spirit - Cambodia" was completed in 1962 and was being shown regularly by two OROC mobile film units; the 13 credit cooperatives were capable by 1963 of providing loans to 60,000 farmers from a revolving credit capital fund of \$4,457,143 (in local currency) to which the USAID had contributed \$1,342,857 (in local currency) from 1953 to 1962. It was expected that further expansion of credit services would be through local, multi-purpose and production cooperatives.

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Multi-purpose cooperatives numbered 20, and expansion of these cooperatives was expected to continue. Most of the 30 production cooperatives and 214 consumer cooperatives were expected to be eventually integrated into the multi-purpose framework.

Organized cooperative marketing had demonstrated the possibility of from 25 per cent to 30 per cent higher returns than if products are sold at harvest time through regular market outlets.

With respect to physical facilities such as offices, warehouses, stores, and headquarters buildings for cooperatives, much had been accomplished. From the period 1956 to FY 1963 cooperative members had constructed eight multi-purpose and production headquarters, 27 consumer cooperative headquarters, four credit cooperative headquarters, five rice and two cotton warehouses. The national office of OROC had constructed seven stores, 14 salt, four rice, eight corn, one fertilizer, and five consumer goods warehouses. OROC remodeled and enlarged its Phnom Penh headquarters, and plans were underway when the program was terminated for the construction of a new three-story building training center to be financed by the USAID and OROC on a 50/50 basis. Construction had not begun as of November 1963, and it is not known whether or not OROC will build the center on its own.

The national federation of all local cooperatives was planned to begin with a pilot demonstration in 1965, which would have been the forerunner leading to the completion of the organization of the cooperative movement; as of the end of FY 1963, only the preparatory work had been accomplished.

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The cooperative movement in Cambodia was still in its formative stages, and had been operating for only a relatively short period of time when the aid program ended. There have been recorded successes in the program, which would lend weight to the judgment that given sufficient time, money, materials and trained personnel, the OROC would be able to fully explain and demonstrate the obvious advantages to all Cambodian farmers in belonging to the organization.

4. Development of An Agricultural Extension Service

The first step toward establishing an agricultural extension service was taken in 1956 when the RKG announced their intention to create an extension service as a section under the Direction of Agriculture. The RKG requested U.S. assistance and a project was initiated in FY 1956.

The establishment of the extension service under the Direction of Agriculture was not considered desirable by the USAID but was accepted as a temporary expediency in the face of RKG insistence and with the knowledge that a small beginning was necessary. The Direction of Agriculture is one of the major service organizations of the Ministry of Agriculture and concerns itself mainly with crop production and related activities. By placing the extension service organizationally within the Direction of Agriculture the unit was automatically excluded from engaging in activities in the field of livestock, forestry or fisheries.

From 1956 thru 1960 there was no agreement between Ministry personnel and USAID advisors as to the basic concept of an agricultural extension service. During this five year period there is

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little evidence of real intent on the part of the RKG to actually establish an effective extension service which would provide any significant assistance to farmers. The RKG was eager to sign project agreements but in retrospect it seems clear that their true interest was to obtain commodities, particularly vehicles.

For this same period the available record contains optimistic reports about the success of the extension project, including statements to the effect that there were already hundreds of agents assigned to field posts. This was misrepresentation of the facts. In reality the extension service consisted only of a few technicians assigned to the National Office in Phnom Penh.

The facts can be briefly summarized as follows:

The Direction of Agriculture, as a major service of the Ministry of Agriculture, is composed of several Divisions and Bureaus:

- Division of Rural Engineering (Genie Rural)
- Division of Tropical Agronomy
- Division of Agricultural Statistics
- Food Inspection Service
- Plant Protection Service
- Agricultural Extension

At the provincial level the Director of Agriculture is represented by a Sector Chief who serves on the staff of the provincial governor. The Sector Chief is responsible within his assigned province for all functions assigned to the Direction of Agriculture and, depending upon the agricultural activities in that province, has varying number of staff assistants, usually graduates from the

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Prek Leap Agricultural School (a junior high school level institution). The Sector Chief and his staff are generally assigned administrative responsibilities far beyond their capabilities both in terms of training and size of staff. Typical of underdeveloped countries, Cambodian employees of the Ministry of Agriculture have a high degree of political consciousness and spend the greater part of their time reporting success stories to the central government leaving little or no time, or desire, for contacts with the farmers. Needless to say the success stories are either grossly exaggerated or pure fabrication.

These Sector Chiefs and their field staffs were reported by the USAID in its reports to Washington as the agricultural extension service established with USAID assistance. By 1959 the USAID had even added a rural youth advisor and a home economist to assist the "growing" extension service in expanding its activities to youth clubs and home improvement programs. The youth advisor completed his tour of duty in late 1960 without any visible accomplishments and the home economist was transferred to a position in the Education Division of the USAID (see Section E below) at about the same time, having been unable to get a home improvement program started. Both of these technicians were brought to Cambodia prematurely and their services were never requested by the RKG.

Until this time commodities and vehicles ostensible purchased for the extension service were largely, but not all, diverted to the sector chiefs and thus supported the overall objectives of the

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Direction of Agriculture but did not support the objective of creating an agricultural extension service.

Early in 1961 the extension project was reviewed by the USAID and RKG officials. These discussions resulted in the FY 61 Project Agreement being reduced to support the few true extension type activities being implemented and the RKG was given the option of making definite plans to create an extension service which the U.S. would be willing to support or face termination of U.S. assistance.

This re-orientation was accomplished during 1961 and beginning in December of that year actual progress towards the establishment of an agricultural extension service first began.

The National Extension office was assigned more space, commodities were returned to the control of the extension director and personnel who previously had spent only part of their time on extension work were assigned to the extension service on a full time basis.

During 1962 and 1963 two groups of Ministry of Agriculture employees (totaling 35) were brought to Phnom Penh from the provinces for intensive training conferences in agricultural extension techniques organized by the USAID technician. The course was taught jointly by technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture and several USAID technicians.

Beginning in 1962, at the conclusion of the first training course, the first Cambodian extension technicians, 13 in all, were assigned to field positions. This was a pilot program and the

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agents were instructed to live in each of the 13 villages to which they were assigned. In 1963 another seven agents were added in seven additional villages. Another 15 had completed training by the time the program ended and were scheduled to be assigned to villages in December, 1963.

The extraordinary success of the first 13 agents assigned to live and work in villages in 1962 stimulated the RKG to make plans for a rapid expansion in the coming years.

Not yet satisfied with this limited progress, the USAID continued to press the RKG to make plans for a more effective extension service which could carry improved production techniques developed by all of the services of the Ministry of Agriculture to the farmers. A "break-through" came in May, 1963, when the Minister of Agriculture agreed to the land grant college concept for the new agricultural university to be provided by the USAID. It was agreed that upon completion of the physical facilities for the new university (scheduled to be completed in 1965) extension, research and education would be combined under one unified service. Personnel and commodities assigned to extension activities under the Direction of Agriculture would be transferred to the University.

Though there was a good deal of resistance to this on the part of a few ministry officials it appears almost certain that it would have come about had the aid program not been terminated.

In spite of difficulties cited above there were a number of valuable individual accomplishments during the life of this activity which are worthy of mentioning:

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During 1962 over 1,000 farmers cooperated directly with the first 13 agents assigned to villages and received a direct benefit through measurable increases in their agricultural production.

- Seven officials received training in the U.S. of which three were still attending U.S. universities at the time of aid termination.

- A modern darkroom and a recording studio were completed and put into operation.

- Intensive in-service training was conducted for 35 extension technicians.

- Three mobile audio visual units were provided and used throughout the country.

- Over 2,000 on-farm demonstrations were carried out successfully.

- With U.S. assistance excellent 15 minute radio programs were produced weekly.

- Each year four to five brochures were published including information on corn, jute, kenaf, ramie, seed selection, green manure, composting, chemical fertilizers, safe use of insecticides, etc.

- A monthly extension newspaper now reaches over 400,000 farmers or roughly 50 percent of the farming population.

- Nearly 150,000 copies of posters prepared with the assistance of U.S. technicians were distributed throughout Cambodia.

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5. Development of Agricultural Resources
 (Crop Improvement and Plant Protection)

The title of this project was changed several times during its history and most recently, in 1963, the agronomy, plant protection and agricultural extension activities were consolidated into a single project entitled "Development of Agricultural Resources." This discussion covers the activities of that project with the exception of extension which is discussed under a separate heading above.

The major aim of the project was to develop institutions within the Ministry of Agriculture to provide the necessary "tools" for the RKG to assist farmers in increasing agricultural production. Emphasis throughout was given to the establishment of effective agronomy and plant protection divisions. The establishment of institutions, both organizationally and to some extent through brick and mortar construction was to be done primarily through the technical and administrative training of personnel. It was hoped that this phase would have been completed by 1970 and that thereafter greater efforts would be possible in using the institutions to bring about increased agricultural production.

a) Agronomy Development

The objectives of the agronomy activity were to assist with the progressive development of a system of agronomic research with emphasis on organizing and establishing an experiment station system with strong branch station support and on the training of operational personnel. The system was to consist of four branch and one central stations.

1) Central Station

As indicated under the agricultural education project a central experiment station and the national agronomy headquarters were to be integrated with the new university project as agreed in the revised 1963 project agreement. Plans for the central station were 90 per cent complete and construction and development was scheduled to start in early 1964.

2) Kauk Trap Station near Svay Rieng

Construction of this station, located in one of the major soil groups of Cambodia, began in 1962 and was virtually completed in 1963. Though some minor work remained to be done, full operation of the station could have begun in 1964. Though primarily a rice station, crop diversification was to be an important activity.

3) Kok Patry Station near Siem Reap

This station is located within the Barai Occidental Irrigation project. It was originally completed in 1960 and expanded during 1961 and 1962. This station, constructed and equipped with a U.S. contribution of approximately \$45,000, had already in its brief period of operation since 1960 made valuable contributions.

Excellent work had been accomplished in improved rice production and revealing successes were achieved through introduction of new vegetables and green manures. Numerous visits to the station were organized for hundreds of Cambodian farmers.

4) Chamcar Mon Station at Phnom Penh

Though too small to serve as the central experiment station, this station, located adjacent to the central offices of the

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Direction of Agriculture, was successfully developed and utilized to introduce new crop varieties under the direct supervision of senior Ministry of Agriculture technicians in Phnom Penh. Significant accomplishments were made both at this station and the Prek Leap Agricultural School in introducing and multiplying new corn varieties.

5) Chamcar Krauch Station near Kompong Cham

This station was located on the red soils of Cambodia. It was developed by the RKG primarily with its own resources. The station was designed for upland crops and has been operating effectively for several years. U.S. assistance was mainly for a water supply — well and pump — and technical advice from U.S. advisors. In 1963 an IVS technician closely supervised and advised on a large corn improvement and seed multiplication program.

b) Plant Protection

The objective of this activity was to assist in the development of an effective plant protection division including training of operational personnel. Very little was done towards establishing an effective plant protection program until the arrival of a U.S. technician advisor in 1961. The Director of Agriculture at this time was trained in France and appreciated the importance of plant protection activities and gave full support to the U.S. technician and his recommendations. The U.S. technician, in this very unusual instance, served as the chief of the plant protection service until immediately before the termination of the aid program.

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A Cambodian recently returned from the U.S. after earning his M.S. at the University of Florida to direct the activities of the plant protection service.

A small laboratory was installed in 1962 with a minimum of equipment necessary to carry out basic research and field trial programs.

During 1962 and 1963 ten intensive field trials were conducted in six provinces for control of pests on rice, corn and peanuts.

A survey of crop pests in Cambodia was made and specimens were sent to Beltsville for identification and later placed in an identified national collection in the RKG Plant Protection Laboratory. In March, 1963, a "Report on Agricultural Entomology in Cambodia" was prepared by the U.S. advisor. This compilation of all information available to date on the pests of 25 crops was the first such book available in Cambodia.

A systematic survey was made of plant diseases. Collections of more than 700 diseased specimens were made; causal organisms identified, and representative specimens placed in National Herbariums in Beltsville and Phnom Penh.

c) Related Activities

In addition to the Agronomy and Plant Protection activities, there were other related activities undertaken through the Development of Agricultural Resources Projects, as follows:

1) Crop Diversification

The objective of this activity was to assist in the development of a program of crop diversification and the use of improved

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cultural practices. The activity involved all of the divisions of the Direction of Agriculture and was intended to complement functioning demonstrations used to teach improved practices to farm families.

By late 1963 over 850 improved crop varieties had been tested in the experimental stations through the efforts of the U.S. technician. The varieties are too numerous to mention but include all categories of fruit, vegetables, corn, cane sugar, jute, ramie, etc. Of these 850, approximately 50 were selected as suitable for cultivation in Cambodia. Two examples are jute and sugar. When the program was terminated, there were 100 hectares at the Battambang experimental station planted to a tested variety of jute. There were enough plants ready for distribution to thousands of farmers had the effort to establish a jute mill ever materialized. The same was true of a tested variety of sugar cane (see below).

Increases in the variety and quantity of available fruits and vegetables -- some completely new to Cambodia -- had already been accomplished through the introduction of new varieties. As most of the increased production went into domestic consumption (the population increased substantially during this period, 1955-1963) no particular increases in exports were noted. However, the increases permitted decreases in imports of vegetables and in other instances a marked lack of increase in imports that might have been expected with the large population growth. Unfortunately few reliable statistics are kept on commodities consumed locally and therefore little proof can be offered. However, those who visited the markets in Cambodia during this period could not fail to note the significant increase in availability of improved fruits and vegetables.

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Efforts of increasing rice production through on-farm demonstrations were not undertaken until the 1963 crop year. While total production for the country was hardly affected the 2000-odd cooperating farmers doubled and in some instances tripled their yields when following prescribed practices of using green manures, improved seeds and fertilizers.

Regional Uniform Trials comparing varieties and soil fertility improvement were conducted during the period 1957-1963.

Significant progress was made in the field of corn improvement. A synthetic "Camsyn 60" corn was developed by the U.S. technician and had gained wide acceptance by Cambodian farmers by 1962.

Two manuscripts were prepared by the U.S. technician and were ready for publication at the time of aid termination. One presented needed information on fertilizers and their use in Cambodia and the second gave cultural practice recommendations for 150 different field and garden crops adapted to Cambodia.

2) Soil Testing and Survey

A U.S. technician soils advisor, working with various counterparts, completed a soils reconnaissance survey of Cambodia (begun under the Irrigation project) during 1961 and 1962. The survey was made through the use of arial photographs and actual field surveys which carried the technician to the far corners of Cambodia. A soils map was printed (3000 copies) in 1963 and a detailed report was prepared in both French and English. Unfortunately the report had not been published at the time of aid termination.

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3) Agro-Industries Development

Encouragement was given to the establishment of a copra processing plant to be in operation by 1965, since by that time production was expected to begin from the recent extensive private planting of coconut palms. Economic studies were prepared by the USAID and information on equipment requirements was secured and provided to interested Cambodians.

Continued encouragement and assistance was provided through the USAID Industry Program to RKG agencies to improve interest and climate for the establishment of a jute mill and a sugar refinery. The most recent RKG efforts with respect to the jute mill were to form a mixed company. Twenty million riels were made available for this project from the national budget, but the company had not been formed in spite of many months of trying when the program was terminated.

High sugar content cane varieties were introduced, tested, multiplied and distributed to farmers. Loans from the Caisse National d'Equipment (CNE), supported by the USAID Industry Program, were made to two private farm enterprises for commercial production of unrefined or brown sugar. Two small raw sugar mills were recently imported for demonstrational purposes by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1964. One mill was to have been located at the experimental station where sugar cane research was to be centered and the other was to be at a model village where sugar cane would be profitably grown the year round such as would be possible at Prey Chhor Project or east of Phnom Penh on the south bank of the Mekong River. The capacity of the smaller demonstrational mill is 10 tons per day.

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Other local agricultural industries which were assisted as requested by private enterprise or the RKG were coffee (production loan assistance, disease control and introduction of leaf-rust resistant varieties), coconut palm for copra (production loan assistance and cultural practices) and Cambodian rock phosphate fertilizer for rice (qualitative analyses and comparative fertility studies).

4) Participant Training

While there is a separate section in this report on participant training special mention should be made under this project as participant training (academic training in the U.S. leading to BS and MS degrees) constituted a major element of this project. A total of 26 young men were sent to the U.S. for academic training. The first few have returned to Cambodia to assume responsible positions and hopefully will insure that the institutions which were created with U.S. assistance will continue to grow and become increasingly effective in assisting farmers to increase their production and thereby improve their standard of living.

6. Fisheries Development

United States assistance to Cambodia in the field of fisheries began in 1952 with the furnishing through the STEM of six patrol boats purchased from Japan at a cost of \$33,000 for the then combined Forestry and Fisheries Service of the Ministry of Agriculture. The boats were intended for use on the Great Lake and Tonle Sap River, but fell into disrepair through neglect and improper handling and were withdrawn from service. One of the boats was given to the Ministry of Education and one to USIS/Phnom Penh. The four remaining boats were scrapped and their engines salvaged for future use.

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Also in 1952, STEM provided the RKG with four refrigerator trucks for use in hauling fresh fish products from Phnom Penh to Saigon. The Ministry of Agriculture did not operate the trucks but rented them out to a private company. The operation was not a success. The private company did not use the trucks as was originally intended, and they were subsequently confiscated by the Ministry of Agriculture and later sold at auction.

Twelve outboard motors were also furnished by STEM for installation on wooden boats which were to be used in patrolling. After installation the motors did not receive proper maintenance, however, and were soon inoperable.

In 1954, STEM provided funds for the construction of four demonstration fish ponds. The ponds were completed in 1957 at a cost of \$4,000 in local currency, but because of lack of trained people to operate them they fell into disuse.

No further U.S. aid was programmed for fisheries development in either 1956 or 1957.

It was reported in 1958 that there was an alarming decline in the production of fish which had dropped to 75 per cent of the 1954-1956 level. It was believed that the causes included overfishing of the inland waters, illegal fishing during the spawning season, heavy silting of the Tonle Sap and Great Lake, reclaiming of lands which were the natural spawning grounds of fish, lack of utilization of large areas of inland waters to achieve maximum sustained production, lack of extensive use of pond culture to increase the supply of fish,

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lack of research in fish breeding and full utilization of fish products, and lack of experienced fisheries technicians.

While it was no doubt true that some of the foregoing reasons did contribute to a lowering of fish production for export, the basic reasons, discovered by a fisheries expert brought in by the USAID to do research on the problem in 1958, were two: 1) an increase in consumption of fish by the growing population; and 2) there were foreign exchange problems and strained relations with Cambodia's best customer, South Vietnam, which precluded legal exports.

The fisheries project, as resurrected in 1958, was designed to conduct research on the decline in numbers of fish as well as to provide assistance to the RKG in the expansion and construction of a national fisheries headquarters; to provide for training of fisheries personnel; to assist in the survey and delineation of the boundaries of fishing concessions; and to furnish laboratory and surveying equipment to the Fisheries Service.

By the end of FY 1960, the survey had been completed; the final plans for the Fisheries Service headquarters building were in process; the USAID-proposed plan of separation of the Forestry and Fisheries Service into separate services had been accepted by the RKG, and USAID technicians were providing technical advice and guidance in its administration; demonstrations on the delimiting of fishing areas had been conducted in Prey Veng and Kandal Provinces; two participants had been selected for training in the United States; and five fisheries patrol boats were planned.

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In connection with the delimitation of the fishing grounds in the Tonle Sap River over 300 acres were surveyed and marked off, and approximately 900 acres were remaining to be surveyed. As stated above, the four ponds constructed in 1957 were in need of repair and plans were made to remodel and restock them. An additional 12 ponds were planned for demonstration, training, and research.

The USAID was able to convince the RKG to put into effect three laws which were designed to facilitate the conservation of fisheries resources. The most important of these was the law establishing the Fisheries Service and prohibiting destructive commercial fishing.

A survey of fisheries resources, including the training of personnel in the collecting, identifying and preserving of specimens, was planned; a survey of the domestic market to provide an index of domestic production was planned but was never accomplished due to the lack of personnel.

For reasons that are not given in the available record the fisheries project was to have been phased-out in FY 1962. A re-examination of its potential to the Cambodian economy was made in mid-1962, and it was decided to continue the activity but with changed emphasis to provide greater impact. The purpose of the project as re-designed in 1962 (the FY 1964 CAP) was to increase the total fish production in Cambodia by 25 per cent or by 30 thousand metric tons by 1970. In order to realize the objective, emphasis was placed on the establishment of a central fish culture experiment station, which was to have been built by FY 1964; to conduct training and demonstrations in the

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transfer of fingerlings from central stations to ponds and reservoirs and the operation and management of such hatcheries.

It had been proposed to make a basic survey of marine fisheries in FY 1963, to develop an export market. This element of the project did not progress beyond the conjectural stage, and was finally dropped because of the limited administrative capabilities of the RKG. As a result, the target of the project, now confined to fresh water fish culture, was modified in the FY 1965 CAP to increasing production by 10 per cent or 10,000 metric tons by 1970.

A fish culture experiment station subsidized by the RKG was deemed necessary in order to find out which species of Cambodian fish are most adaptable for fish culture. It was planned to have the experiment station built and in operation by August, 1963. Delays due to the selection of a site, administrative problems with the local authorities in the site finally selected, and problems of squatters were not solved in time to do more than prepare the plans for the station and erect some fencing around the area before the program was terminated.

The schedule had called for having 1,000 hectares of ponds under intensive management by 1970 which, it was believed, would produce 7,000 metric tons of fish at an average of 7,000 kilograms per hectare per year. In addition, it was planned that 6,000 hectares of reservoirs would produce 3,000 metric tons annually at an average yield of 500 kilograms per hectare. The combined increase in fresh water fish production would have amounted to a 10 per cent increase of the present annual yield of 100,000 metric tons.

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It was expected that, through education and demonstration, the extension of the techniques of pond culture would have added impetus to existing interest and an increase in the number of hectares of ponds would result. Initial assistance by the USAID was to have been the provision of incentive to prospective businessmen to venture into what was hoped would be a profit-making enterprise. Also, it was hoped that additional interested parties such as army camp supply officers and school officials who had asked for assistance in establishing fish ponds to alleviate supply problems could be helped.

The Fisheries Service continued to have a dearth of trained people on its staff. No one had any academic training in fisheries. The management of fisheries resources for high-level, sustained yields requires a thorough knowledge of aquatic biology, statistics, and economics. There can be no increase in production without an understanding of the basic relationships involved. Although planning had progressed for the training of fisheries personnel, only three participants were in the United States for academic work by November, 1963.

It was planned to phase-out the fisheries project as a separate activity after FY 1964 with the University of Agriculture project absorbing the remaining participant training, research, and extension activities of the project.

Despite its possibilities, the fisheries project accomplished very little over the years of its activity beyond making some initial steps toward the establishment of a potentially self-sustaining fisheries production institution in the RKG.

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In summary, the accomplishments at the end of the program worthy of note are as follows:

- Problems outlined and recommendations made.
- Fisheries Service separated from Forest Service by law.
- New law passed prohibiting destructive type fishing in the Great Lake and Tonle Sap.
- Law introduced to revoke anti-catfish raising law.
- Delimitation of fishing concessions for better management.
- Training: Short course in ichthyology at National Agricultural School, three students to U.S.A. for four years university training in fisheries, four RKG officials to Japan for four months and seven fisheries students to Indonesia for one month. In-service seminar in Phnom Penh for Fisheries personnel (1959).
- Twelve outboard motor boats and motors provided by USAID, built locally. Four large wooden craft built as fishery guard stations. One steel patrol craft (9.5 meter) completed and turned over to RKG.
- Central Headquarters building in Phnom Penh and Division Headquarters building in Banam completed.
- Overall plans and program for the development of fish culture were completed. A site for the fish culture experiment station had been selected. The site had been surveyed and a topographic plan drawn as a basis for layout for ponds, water supply and distribution system. The detailed plans and specifications for the house and the laboratory and

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office building were completed by USAID/PWD. A detailed estimate of construction costs for the station was made by the RKG and USAID and submitted to the Ministry of Plan for approval. No actual construction was begun; although \$20,857 in local currency were released, none had been spent.

7. Forestry Development

Approximately one-half of Cambodia's 18 million hectares is timbered. Established forest reserves total about $3\frac{1}{2}$ million hectares. The annual growth rate has been estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) at about 1 million cubic meters with a potential annual export value of about \$4,000,000. The production of timber in Cambodia is less than one-third of the annual rate of its replenishment.

USAID assistance in Forestry began in 1951 as a response to RKG's request to provide the equipment for a sawmill. The USAID furnished a circular saw, power units, tractors, logging trucks and trailers, road building equipment, chainsaws and other equipment. The purpose was to establish a model sawmill and logging operation for training sawmill and logging operators. The sawmill was established at Balaing, and operated, unsuccessfully, until 1958 when the establishment was handed over to the Ministry of Plan for manufacturing prefabricated houses for resettlement areas. The mill is still in operation although it was designed for cutting pine at Kirirrom but has been used only with hardwood timber.

In 1954, slightly more than \$57,000 in local currency was made available by the USAID for the construction of a Forest Guard School

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at Kompong Cham. The school was completed in 1957 and now graduates an annual class of 35 guards. The school operated entirely from RKG budget funds after 1957; over 200 guards had graduated by 1963.

In 1955, funds were made available for an inventory survey of the 17,000 hectare Chereay Meang timber reserves in Kratie Province. The survey was completed in 1957 and the reserve was divided into concessions and sold.

These forestry development activities were separate efforts until 1957 when they were consolidated into one project - Forestry Development. The project objectives were to increase the national income of Cambodia through expansion of forest exploitation consistent with sound forestry practices. The first step was to complete the forest survey begun in 1957 and to expand this to include a forest survey of the entire country.

The project was planned for termination at the end of FY 1962, except for the forest survey of Cambodia and for some participant training which were to be incorporated in the project of agricultural resources in FY 1963. As a result of a program review stimulated by current developments which indicated a prominent, immediate market for timber and forestry products, the Mission decided to continue the project as a separate activity until FY 1965, when the elements of extension and research would have been continued under the Agriculture University project. The project as continued included the completion of the forest survey, following it up with timber management planning, and developing a forest fire control plan.

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Activities undertaken by the USAID between 1960 and 1963 included demonstrations of re-forestation and silvicultural practices; fire prevention and educational programs devised to protect over one million hectares of forest area.

During 1962, 3322 hectares of rubber seedlings were planted on 1,230 small holdings in Kompong Cham Province, bringing the total distributed to about 4,700 hectares among 1,600 small holders. About two-thirds of the financing of the program came from USAID funds, and one-third from the RKG. Three one-hectare nurseries were established in 1961 at Bos Svay, Mimot and Prek Kak, and a three-hectare nursery had been established in Chamcar Loeu previously. In all, five rubber tree nurseries were in production in 1963.

By 1963, a total of 310 kilometers of firebreaks had been constructed; over 200 kilometers of access roads had been built; and 460 meters of bridges had been completed, thus opening large areas of forest reserves enabling the granting of more and larger timber concessions.

The general practice of the RKG, however, was to limit timber concessions to small areas, usually not exceeding 2,000 hectares, and for short periods of time, up to two years, which limited any extensive exploitation. The USAID continually stressed the importance of increasing concession areas and lengths of time, and in 1962 a mixed company was formed with RKG and private capital to exploit an area of 90,000 hectares for a period of 20 years. But by the end of FY 1963, almost no private capital had been subscribed and no foreign bids accepted.

Taken as a whole, the forestry project cannot be viewed as having had a large impact on the economy of Cambodia. There is, however,

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reason to believe that if the forest survey and the management plan had been completed, they would have increased the potential for revenue from forestry products to a significant degree. In addition to the accomplishments mentioned above, the following was achieved:

- Forest Survey: A "Forest Inventory Manual" for Cambodia was published in French and English. A report was published summarizing the results of the survey of about one-fifth of Cambodia: Forest and Land Use Statistics - Cardamome Area. This report is receiving world-wide distribution. Five RKG technicians were trained as well as 26 forest guards. Data on the land area covered by forests, by types, and the area of all other land uses were compiled for all provinces except three. These three were partially completed.

At termination the photo interpretation of aerial surveys was 90 per cent complete, field work was 87 per cent complete, and compilation was on schedule. Cartography work was completed on all the base maps delivered by the Army Map Service.

The Cambodian technicians can complete the survey. The country-wide survey could be completed within two to three months except for IEM tabulations and compilation. This, and report writing, could be completed shortly thereafter.

- Management Plan: The country-wide survey was to be followed by an intensive inventory and management plan of an area big enough to support a large timber products industry. Nothing was done except the development of a plan of action. The trained technicians and the photo interpretation and maps are available from the survey project.

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The Cambodian Forest Service was already using the information developed above in preparing small timber concessions. Discussions were underway for the UN Special Fund to undertake this activity.

- Fire Control: Nothing has been done on the fire control project except for the completion of a fire prevention movie, "Forest Fire".

- Farm Woodlot: Project plans were developed in the field for the farm woodlot project. Nursery expansion and seed collection was not begun.

- Participant Training: Seventeen participants were given short training tours in six different third countries and one in the U.S. Six students are now in the U.S. for four year training at Universities.

- Plantations: Teak, koki, chhouteal, and pine were planted on about 800 hectares as demonstrations. Several small and four large nurseries were established.

- Promotion of exploitation, manufacturing, and markets: Twelve species of Cambodian woods were sent to Japan for testing as to their paper making qualities. Four were reported good, two excellent. Twelve commercial wood samples were sent to the U.S. for testing moisture content so that a wood moisture meter may be used to improve lumber quality.

Manufacturing and use of wood pallet and containers used in warehousing was successfully demonstrated.

In 1958 there were 30 mechanical mills and 300 hand-saw mills in Cambodia. Today there are 134 mechanical mills and 80 hand-saw mills. Timber concessions were let in 1961 totalling 434,000 m³ and close to 500,000 m³ in 1962 compared to only 150,000 m³ in 1959. More than 114,000 m³ of timber was exported in 1962 compared to 78,000 m³ in 1959 and only 10,000 m³ in 1958.

8. Livestock Improvement

It is roughly estimated that the livestock population of Cambodia consists of: two million cattle, 300,000 buffaloes, one million hogs, six million chickens, and 1.5 million ducks. Approximately 150 thousand cattle, 40 thousand buffaloes, and 300 thousand hogs are exported per year. The livestock population is not large in relation to the approximate 900,000 Cambodian farmers and is distributed in the areas where agricultural production is greatest, i.e. adjacent to the Mekong River, around the Tonle Sap River-Lake complex and in areas where rice production is heavy. Cattle and buffalo are kept mainly as working animals.

Early USAID assistance in the livestock sector began under STEM/Saigon in 1952 and until 1957 was designed primarily to overcome livestock diseases, which were decimating the livestock population. The major diseases included rinderpest, hemorrhagic septicemia, anthrax, foot and mouth disease, blackleg and numerous poultry diseases.

a. Rinderpest

Efforts at eradication of rinderpest in Indochina have been underway for almost 50 years. Before the separation of the Indochina States, all vaccine and serums were produced in Vietnam and France and only stocked for use in Cambodia. After separation, the RKG thought it necessary to seek a locally made supply, and a contract was entered into with the Pasteur Institute in Phnom Penh. The Institute received assistance from the French, the United Nations (FAO) and the USAID, and by 1959 was producing enough vaccine for the country.

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Attempts at regional control of rinderpest were begun in 1957 and agriculture officials of Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos were brought together to develop plans for the regional control of rinderpest. Overall plans were prepared, but it was left to the individual countries to implement the control. The only part that was carried out in its entirety was the reporting of rinderpest outbreaks and vaccinations within infected areas.

Cambodia was slow in starting its rinderpest elimination campaign. The chief reason being the lack of transportation, refrigeration, and the availability of only Jacatot tissue vaccine, which was very expensive. In 1956, the USAID provided four jeeps, four refrigerators, and other supplies. In 1958, a program was drawn up to vaccinate all animals in a 50 kilometer wide zone on Cambodia's borders. After the vaccination program had begun, many complaints were received from livestock owners because the type of vaccine used was causing edema (swelling) at the point of inoculation. Only 30-40 per cent of all animals were being vaccinated. It was also difficult to know which animals had been vaccinated since many Cambodians object to marking the vaccinated animals with brands or ear tags on religious grounds.

Inactivated virus vaccines were relied upon principally until 1959. These were of the Jacatot and Delpy types. The inactivated virus vaccines were found to be useful in the tropical climate of Cambodia because they need no refrigeration and continue to confer immunity with subsequent vaccinations. The disadvantage of these types of vaccine are that an area of edema is often produced at the site of the injection in the animals immunized, thereby interfering with their

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use as draft animals, and the period of immunity is much shorter than that produced by the modified live virus vaccines.

A significant advance was made in eradication efforts in Cambodia in 1959 with the introduction for general use of the Nakamura lapinized virus vaccine. Beginning that year, a country-wide campaign was organized by the RKG. Meetings were held with srok (county) chiefs and the program explained, dates were set for the visits of vaccination teams. The educational meetings with srok chiefs did much to get the farmers to bring out their animals for vaccination. A total of 162,000 animals were vaccinated that year, and incidence of the disease in Cambodia fell to a low of 11 outbreaks in 1960. This encouraging situation along with the loss of the U.S. veterinarian, evacuated because of illness, brought about a premature relaxation of eradication efforts during 1961, and USAID funds allocated for continued vaccine purchases were diverted to other uses. Within a five-month period in 1961, large outbreaks occurred primarily in buffalo. There was not enough Nakamura vaccine available to control the spread, and animals vaccinated earlier with the Nakamura vaccine were also victims. New lots of Nakamura vaccine were procured and kept under refrigeration before use, and the outbreak was nearly brought under control in 1963 with the vaccination of about 1,000,000 animals.

As of 1960, the USAID had furnished 26 jeeps and Landrovers for transportation of vaccinators and supervising officials. Twenty refrigerators were purchased for the production and storage of vaccines and serum. Twenty-seven vaccinators were trained for three mobile vaccinating units.

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It had been planned to eradicate rinderpest by 1962 and USAID assistance in disease eradication was to have terminated in 1961, however, as stated above, a new outbreak of the disease in 1961 stimulated renewed RKG and USAID efforts in this field and assistance in rinderpest control continued until termination in 1963, at which time, the rinderpest problem had been brought under partial control. The program was scheduled to be completed, this time, during the 1964 dry season.

b. General Livestock Improvement

General livestock improvement programs began in 1957 and represented a shift in the USAID's major efforts in its assistance to livestock. It was generally recognized that the greatest single problem, other than disease, confronting livestock and poultry development in Cambodia was inadequate nutrition. To remedy this situation it was necessary to institute proper feeding programs as well as to overcome a lack of sufficient feed. The RKG had tended to place too much emphasis on the eradication of disease and very little, or no, work had been done on the improvement of animal nutrition, pasture or roughage programs.

At all the existing RKG livestock stations land was available only for buildings and for limited cultivation of forage or pasture crops, which followed the pattern of farmer practice. USAID technicians worked with the RKG on the development of improvement of poultry and hogs, and planned programs for cattle and buffalo improvement. The Livestock stations developed or improved by the USAID are discussed below.

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c. Poultry

The USAID assisted in the development of poultry by helping establish poultry stations in four areas: Pochentong, Stung Mean Chey, Svay Rieng, and Kompong Cham. The first USAID contribution in this area began in 1954 when some small poultry houses were constructed at Pochentong and Svay Rieng, and 3,000 chicks were imported from Thailand as a foundation flock. Because of poor feeding practices and disease, the majority of the flock was lost.

Eleven poultry houses were constructed in 1958 and 1959, which were designed to house 5,000 layers. In addition to the laying houses, 21 other buildings were constructed for poultry, including brooder houses, two 11,800-egg incubators and egg cooling rooms, and range shelters for developing pullets.

In order to establish poultry production on a sound basis, it was necessary to give training to the people responsible for the program, and in 1958 the Chief of the Veterinary Service was given a short term of observation training in Japan. As a result of his trip, the RKG requested USAID assistance in setting up improved poultry flocks, and 5,000 baby chicks of White Leghorn, Rhode Island Red, New Hampshire, and Bar Red Plymouth Rock breeds were purchased. With an improved balanced ration devised by USAID technicians, and using all locally available feeds, with the addition of vitamins, minerals, and antibiotics provided by the USAID, the RKG was able to raise and develop good breeding flocks for their stations.

A small feed mill was put into operation at the Veterinary Service in 1959. Training of the staff was carried on by the USAID technician

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and covered all phases of construction and operation. The feed mill was a success and could not fill all the orders placed for the balanced livestock feeds it was producing. During the first year of operation, over 1,000 tons of feed were processed. Rations were prepared for all the RKG and provincial livestock stations. Equipment for a larger plant (50 ton daily capacity) was ordered in 1960 and was installed in a new feed mill, completed in 1963 by the USAID, at the Stung Mean Chey Livestock station.

The poultry program developed quickly and many farmers who were the recipients of improved chicks were able to develop commercial laying flocks. One commercial poultryman constructed houses for 12,500 layers and was exporting the majority of the eggs produced to Hong Kong.

One participant was sent to the United States in 1960 to study nutrition and feed plant operations. Three participants were sent to the Philippines for six months in 1957 and were being used by the Veterinary Service to develop poultry programs.

d. Swine

To improve the quality and feeding of local hogs, 50 Berkshire and 50 Yorkshire pigs were imported from Japan in 1958. They were distributed to the livestock stations at Svay Rieng, Kompong Cham and Battambang. By 1960, swine stock numbering 1,320 were available for distribution to farmers. Rice mill operators in Battambang province started their own breeding herds and were also distributing stock to farmers in order to sell the rice bran and broken rice remaining from milling operations, which does not have an otherwise ready market.

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Major problems of feeding, management and marketing had not been worked out by the end of 1960, but a beginning had been made from which the RKG could continue without further USAID assistance.

e. Stung Keo Livestock Station

The development of a livestock station at Stung Keo in Kampot Province was undertaken in 1960; the design of the station and its construction were a joint USAID-RKG venture. The project was primarily designed to assist the RKG Veterinary Service in developing 1,800 hectares of virgin jungle into a modern research station. The station was to be used to train RKG personnel and to demonstrate improved animal husbandry practices. From this station improved breeding stock of cattle, hogs, and poultry were to be distributed to farmers throughout Cambodia. The facilities of the station were also to be used to provide practical training for the students at the National School of Agriculture.

The International Voluntary Services (IVS) through a contract with the USAID provided five technicians (later expanded to 10 technicians) to assist in the establishment of the station.

The layout of the station consists of 15 houses for the Cambodian personnel on the station. These were completed in 1961 and are now occupied. These are complete with outdoor toilet facilities and water.

Three cattle barns were constructed for six breeding herds of 50 cattle; each has been completed. Two feed storage sheds of ample size to care for feed produced on the station and feed that will be purchased; one 10 x 50 meter machine shed that will store all equipment; and a training center with all needed facilities for 30 trainees were completed.

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An office with suitable space for station personnel and classroom space for trainees; two hog houses for herd of 24 breeding sows; and a poultry house for 1,000 laying hens were completed.

A farm shop repair building with ample storage space for tools, spare parts and electric generators for lighting system was completed. Three generators were in place ready for operation as soon as the distribution system is completed. A contract had been let for this element, but work had not started.

A manager's residence with two bedrooms for visitors was completed.

A grass nursery was established in 1960 with 80 grasses and 24 legumes. A study of growth, habits and yields was made. These were kept under irrigation in 1961 and under dry conditions in 1962. One hundred fifty hectares of land were cleared and planted to adapted grasses.

Six kilometers of road were constructed and surfaced. In addition to this, roads around buildings, building sites and approaches were constructed. Five kilometers of 4-wire fence constructed around 150 hectare pasture area.

A water supply and distribution system was developed. Water from wells was not available, so a filtration well system was developed from under the Stung Keo river. A pump with both electric motor and diesel motor was installed.

Three crawler type tractors and three wheel tractors were used in developing the station. Staff for care and operation of these and other related equipment was trained.

The IVS group lived on the station from the time it was started

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until termination. Much of the work done can be attributed to the excellent work this group accomplished. One of their chief problems was that the RKG Veterinary Service never furnished sufficient counterparts for technicians. This was brought to the attention of Veterinary Service officials monthly, and they always promised to send additional controllers, but this never happened. They were able to train farmhands in tractor care, maintenance and various other skills needed in farm equipment operation. Their services would have been much more effective if they had been working with officials who would carry on projects after withdrawal of IVS technicians.

After considerable delay due to plan changes, poor construction practices and lack of adequate supervision (see the discussions on construction problems in the Education section) all construction and other developmental activities were essentially completed in 1963, and the station was ready to commence full scale operation in 1964. A program of developing forage and grain crops for improved diets for the animals was underway, and pasture areas had been planted with varieties suitable to the soil and climatic conditions. About 400 acres had been developed for pastures and 50 acres produced forage crops.

f. Stung Mean Chey Livestock Station

Stung Mean Chey Livestock Station located on the outskirts of Phnom Penh contains 39 hectares of land of which only nine hectares are above flood stage. A dike was made around the low area but it has never held.

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The objectives of the Livestock project with regard to Stung

Mean Chey were:

- To develop the station into an intensive swine and poultry station with a feed mill, and with facilities for feeding trial and nutritional studies.
- To develop teaching and training facilities for the National School of Agriculture.
- To distribute improved breeding stock of poultry and swine.
- To establish hatchery with capacity of 1,000,000 chicks per year.

Swine and poultry breeding stock was purchased for this station in March, 1958. After this it was determined that Chinese Aid money was to be used to construct a hog house, fence and diking; no further work was done here until 1962. Before any additional work was done a letter was received from the Ministry of Agriculture indicating that no other foreign assistance would be used if the USAID would assist in developing the station. This was discussed and approved by the Country Team before work was started on the feed mill in April, 1962. It was completed and all equipment in place by July 14, 1962. However, due to lack of agreement as to the responsible party for making electricity available it was not until one year later (May 18, 1963) that the mill was actually in operation.

The station was to be used for the development of improved breeding stock (poultry and swine) which would then have been distributed in large numbers to farmers. Three swine shelters, one for gestating sows, and one each for developing male and female pigs were designed

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and would have been constructed on a site already prepared. Two additional laying houses and one large brooder house were to be built for poultry. The hatchery was to be moved into the building now used as a brooder house.

Three IVS technicians were to have been stationed at Stung Mean Chey, one to work with swine, another with poultry, and the third to supervise the operation of the feed mill and work on nutrition projects.

The station was to have been integrated with the University of Agriculture and its facilities used for student's practical training as well as a research facility.

In December, 1960, three Santa Getrudis and three Brahma bulls were imported to be bred with a number of local cattle in the Stung Mean Chey area. In addition to these bulls, 23 head of Murrah buffalo, a special breed developed in India for milk production, were brought to Stung Keo in May, 1961. In addition to the cattle, poultry and hogs from the U.S. were brought to the station.

g. Participants

The lack of trained personnel was the basic weakness in the development of sound livestock production programs. To help ease this situation, the USAID by the end of FY 1963, had sent 16 participants to the U.S. for training in animal husbandry and veterinary medicine, and had scheduled an additional four to be sent in FY 1964.

All residual activities in livestock development were to have been incorporated into the University of Agriculture project beginning in FY 1965.

9. Development of Agricultural Education

There are two agricultural schools in Cambodia, the Prek Leap Agricultural School and the National School of Agriculture. Both were created by the French before Cambodia gained her independence and were designed to meet the agricultural education requirements of Cambodia and Laos at that time. It is interesting to note that after her independence Cambodia continued to accept students from Laos in both schools.

The French established the Prek Leap Agricultural School in 1948. The school is operated by the Direction of Agriculture for the purpose of training agricultural agents to staff field positions of the Direction of Agriculture. It is a two year school with some practical training at the vocational level. Entrance requirements are essentially eight years of elementary education.

The National School of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Forestry and Fisheries was established by the French in 1951 and was designed to provide supervisory personnel for each of the Divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture, as opposed to the Prek Leap School which trained lower level personnel for the Direction of Agriculture only. There was one exception which is discussed under the irrigation project. Though nominally under the direction of the National School of Agriculture the Division of Rural Engineering in fact conducted its own school to train personnel in the field of irrigation and engineering at about the same academic level of the National School of Agriculture.

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At the same time the Forest Service and the Veterinary Service conducted their own school at the Prek Leap level to provide vocational training for their respective field personnel.

AID Program
U.S. assistance to agricultural education began in 1952, and until 1956 consisted of the provision of supplies, generators, vehicles and some third country training.

With the establishment of a separate Mission in Cambodia and the arrival of a U.S. technician agricultural education advisor in 1956, increased U.S. assistance was provided to both the Prek Leap School and the National School of Agriculture in the form of limited construction of facilities.

During the years 1957 to 1960 considerable assistance was provided to the Prek Leap School in the form of construction of physical facilities and the provision of teaching aids and equipment. Assistance in improving curriculum and teaching methods was flatly refused by the Direction of Agriculture. Further assistance for the construction of additional physical facilities was requested in 1961. The USAID indicated its willingness to provide additional facilities only if assistance in curriculum improvement and the improvement of teaching methods were also included. This was again rejected by the RKG and consequently the USAID refused to assist in the construction of the additional facilities.

In 1956 the RKG requested U.S. assistance to improve the level of instruction at the National School of Agriculture. This request, which was for teachers only, was modified at the USAID's suggestion.

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to include a request for U.S. assistance to construct modest facilities for a larger school at its present site. The RKG plan at that time called for 10 classrooms, a dining room, dormitory and other facilities for 250 students.

The USAID then requested the Washington office to secure the services of a land grant college to conduct a survey and subsequently enter into a contract to implement whatever program the survey proved feasible.

About one year later arrangements were complete for the University of Montana to send one of its top agricultural staff members to make the initial survey.

The more important recommendations of the Montana report were as follows:

- One of the major recommendations was that the school should be relocated some distance from Phnom Penh on at least a 500 hectare plot close to a river which would provide irrigation. The existing school was located within Phnom Penh.
- Experimentation projects be started on the new site; as the projects developed they would form a Central Experiment Station; once the Station was established, facilities for housing the professors directing the station could be constructed; once the existing school had expanded to where its facilities were no longer adequate, they could be moved to the new school.

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- That the American professors could assist their Cambodian counterparts in the preparation of scholastic material, in the techniques of education and in research.
- That the students must engage in practical work everyday (suggested they assist in building the school).
- That the school should be co-educational and that the curricula include courses in human nutrition, domestic science and home management.
- That the school eventually become a college and grant a diploma equivalent to the French License in science.

In addition to these specific recommendations, the Montana report cautioned that the project should be developed slowly, with the Americans moving no faster than the available resources permitted.

An important provision of the Montana College report was the preparation, after studying the report, of a proposed plan for implementation by the Cambodians outlining just what the objectives were to be.

The Montana report was given to the RKG in January, 1958. In March, a member of the USAID Program Office met with the Director of the National School to discuss the project. (Throughout the entire period from 1956 to termination in 1963 the Director was the same Cambodian official, which provided an unusual degree of continuity from the RKG side.) Although they discussed the recommendations of the Montana report, no mention was made of the proposal for the RKG to prepare a plan giving the objectives and as far as the available record indicates this provision was never referred to again. In this

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conversation, the Director of the school indicated his anxiousness that the contract team arrive before any implementation decisions were made, and that the project move slowly and deliberately with each step well considered. While he apparently agreed that the school should be moved (the existing acreage was not being utilized due to the part-time nature of his staff), he did not think good land along a river could be easily or quickly found and was convinced the school should begin its expansion in a more modest, inexpensive manner. He did not agree that construction of the school buildings should come last, but thought they should come first: did not agree that the curricula should include nutrition and home science and improvement courses; agreed with the recommendation on the uses of the American professors; practical work for the students and the granting of a diploma equivalent to the Licence.

There is conflict in the record as to why Montana College was not contracted for the project, between the story that Montana decided against it because of failure of the RKG to evidence through any action any real desire for their assistance and indications in the record that the USAID preferred a Southern University whose climatic experience would be more similar to the tropical conditions of Cambodia. The indications are stronger for the latter version.

In any event nothing was accomplished until two years later when AID/W found an interested school acceptable to the USAID, and a second survey team was sent to Cambodia in March, 1960 - this time from the University of Georgia. Due to changing conditions and a lack of sufficient detail in the Montana report, it was decided that a new

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comprehensive survey containing program recommendations and a budget of estimated costs would be required prior to entering into an advisory contract with the University of Georgia.

The required survey was the purpose of the initial contract between the Agency for International Development and the University of Georgia College of Agriculture (UGA), signed on February 20, 1960. Under the terms of this contract, UGA was required to send one or two faculty representatives to Cambodia to study problems involved in planning and developing staff training programs at the National College of Agriculture, to recommend a plan of operations, a list of equipment needs and an estimate of the time and cost required for each program.

Based on the recommended plan of operations submitted by the UGA representative, A.I.D. and UGS entered into a second contract on June 15, 1960.

The latter Contract specified that UGA was to provide a group of advisors in specialized fields of Agriculture, specifically an agronomist, horticulturist, forestryman, animal husbandryman and veterinarian. They were to work with the staff of the National College of Agriculture in improving its curriculum and instruction program so that academic training would be raised to a level comparable to a two-year accredited agricultural college in the United States. Thus, it would be possible for graduates of the National School to enter a U.S. land-grant, college-type institution to complete the Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture in two academic years and pursue graduate study towards advanced degrees.

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The UGA advisory group was also to assist and advise: 1) in the administration of the National College of Agriculture; 2) the teaching faculty on teaching materials and methods of classroom and laboratory instruction; 3) prospective staff members on teaching materials, instructional methods and participant training programs; and 4) the staff in developing the College farm for use in instruction and demonstration.

The University of Georgia staff arrived promptly in August and September of 1960. Unfortunately, none of the UGS staff members possessed any usable proficiency in the French language. The Cambodian Director of the school speaks English but most of his staff (part-time) do not.

Several months after the arrival of the UGA team and following repeated complaints of the team members that their services were not being utilized, the USAID sought the advice of the Director of the School, who expressed his disappointment that the UGA team members could not speak French. The Director stated that what he had requested and what he needed were not advisors but French speaking teachers because his real problem was a lack of teachers. When he was reminded that the contract specified "advisors" rather than "teachers" it developed that he had never seen the contract and had never been consulted on its provisions. (The contract was made between AID and the University of Georgia and no one signed for the RKG. There are indications in the record that the RKG had agreed to the contract being between AID and UGA.) The Director of the School again reiterated that he had expected the U.S. to provide French speaking teachers

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until such time as his future teaching staff could be trained in the U.S. and in France. He was not then and in fact never did become very interested in the construction of new physical facilities.

The work of the contract team proceeded very slowly, due in part to the language barrier but more importantly to an inability to establish satisfactory working relationships with the Cambodian officials and faculty. This was believed to be due to the leadership of the team. Reports indicate that the team's performance improved after a visit to Cambodia by the President of the University of Georgia in 1961, but they also indicate that the University agreed with the USAID in its request to replace the team with new personnel at the end of the first team's tour in 1962.

There was also lack of clarity in just what the project objectives were and what role the contract team was intended to play. In February, 1960, the RKG was informed by a letter to the Minister of Plan that future plans for U.S. assistance in FY 1960 included: 1) additional teaching materials 2) a dormitory for 150 students 3) living quarters for members of the faculty of the National School of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Forestry 4) a contract with an agricultural school in the United States to furnish five or more professors 5) agricultural implements for a new school farm, and 6) training of students in the United States. All for the existing school. The letter stated that the USAID had learned of the designation of an area of Phnom Penh then under development as University Center and asked if this meant the movement of the National School of Agriculture.

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The FY 1960 project agreement, signed in April, 1960, gave the role of the contract as that recommended by the UGA survey and incorporated in the advisory contract as noted above.

During 1960, it was learned that the RKG was planning to move the National School of Agriculture to a new location and, apparently (the record is incomplete) the proposal for the U.S. to provide a complete new institution developed as a result. In any event the FY 1961 project agreement was for the construction of a new campus with physical facilities for a student body of 500 with counterpart funds; the development of a nucleus of a permanent faculty through participant training and the provision of demonstration plots for use in agronomy, livestock, forestry and fisheries (presumably in lieu of the separate school farm previously planned).

By December of 1961, preliminary plans for the new school had been prepared, eight participants had been sent to the University of Georgia and a new curricula had been prepared which was considered inadequate and requiring further work by the USAID Agriculture Division. The RKG had designated a new site which required flood protection involving the construction of dikes, and this work had not begun. There was considerable uncertainty as to what size institution the Cambodians could or should afford as well as differing concepts and ideas as to its scope and the nature of the associated demonstration farm, which had by now replaced the demonstration plots in the plan once again. The lack of certainty in the planning for the new school is evident in the FY 1962 program submission prepared in December, 1961, which included four alternate plans reflecting different size.

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In March of 1962, the Dean of the University of Georgia visited Cambodia and meetings were held with the RKG, USAID, and the UGA team to discuss the objectives and problems of the project. It was decided in the course of these meetings that the existing National School of Agriculture would continue apart from the new school which was to be created by law as the Royal University of Agronomy. The contract group would henceforth concentrate on the development of the new school. It was agreed that the Royal University would be designed to accept 180 new students annually with a total enrollment of 500-600 students. The future faculty would be selected for training in the U.S. from current and previous graduates of the National School of Agriculture including any other of those Cambodians then studying in the U.S.

The contract team was reduced to a Chief, Administrative Assistant, English language instructor and secretary and all present personnel were to be replaced in the summer of 1962. The permanent members of the team were to remain until the new school was in operation when additional teachers would be provided by the UGA. In addition, provision was made for short term consultants as required. The reduction and replacement of personnel was accomplished but with no overlap between the different teams thereby resulting in an additional difficulty in establishing and maintaining relations.

The FY 1962 project agreement was signed in May, 1962. In this agreement the U.S. committed itself to finance total construction costs of a new school and school farm, including furniture, laboratory and farm equipment, teaching aids, a library, training a teaching staff

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and advisory services of the University of Georgia. The total U.S. commitment was estimated at \$7,500,000. The RKG committed itself to provide a 100 acre site in new Phnom Penh. The RKG commitment included the protection of the site against flooding and the provision of access roads and utilities to the site. The total cost to the RKG for the site, (including topographical survey, roads, utilities and flood protection) salaries of additional staff for the University to be recruited between 1962 and 1964, and other costs would total \$10.7 million or more than twice the cost of building and equipping the school. It should also be pointed out that this site, which was flooded to a depth of 12 feet in 1961, was on a direct line with and less than a mile from the jet runway of the Phnom Penh international airport and was thus not an ideal site for a school.

There are indications that it was realized in the Mission shortly after signing the 1962 agreement that it had been consummated prematurely and that the RKG's signature was the result of USAID pressure to accept plans prepared unilaterally by U.S. technicians, but, once again the record is not complete.

In July, 1962, Prince Sihanouk ordered a twenty per cent reduction in expenditures under the National Budget, and the mission was informed by the Secretary of State for Agriculture that the work on the dike to protect the site for the new school would not be completed in 1962. (Work had stopped soon after the signing of the Project Agreement.) It was decided in the Mission that an alternate plan should be developed utilizing land already in possession of the Ministry of Agriculture. This was seen as realistic in terms of the capabilities of the RKG,

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the long delays in preparing the site (for which the USAID learned unofficially from the Ministry of Plan, there was no money) and, not least, presented an opportunity for scaling down the project to a more reasonable size.

After long and sometimes difficult discussions within the USAID between the USAID and the UGA, a proposal of three alternatives to the plan agreed to in the FY 1962 Project Agreement was sent to the Secretary of State for Agriculture October 16, 1962. (A new Secretary had been appointed October 6.) All three alternatives involved using land owned by the Ministry of Agriculture. The proposal cited the reason for suggesting a revision as being first the recent reduction in the availability of National Budget funds and second the failure thus far of the RKG to provide and prepare a site for construction. The Secretary's response was to publish an article in a local newspaper October 20, (which he controlled) stating that the RKG officials had considered the three alternatives and had decided, in view of the importance of Agriculture in Cambodia, to proceed with the existing agreement. The Director of the USAID wrote the Secretary the same day stating that in view of the failure of the RKG to provide and prepare a site, the situation would have to be reviewed prior to proceeding.

A meeting was held between the Mission Director and the Secretary on October 31, and the Director reviewed the consistent failure of the RKG to live up to its commitments under the project. The Secretary stated it was essential that the National School be moved as the present site was soon to be required by Prince Sihanouk (whose residence is next door). He would make every effort to acquire and prepare the

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Pochentong property and if that was not possible would attempt to get land elsewhere. In a subsequent meeting the Secretary stated that the Royal Delegate for Phnom Penh had informed him he could not say when the Pochentong site could be prepared. The Secretary then suggested another site which was ultimately accepted and acquired.

The obtaining of a new site facilitated the renegotiation of the project and a new agreement for a smaller school was signed in June, 1963.

As a result of the downward modification in the scale of the school, cancellation of the University of Georgia contract was recommended by the USAID. Termination had previously been recommended by an AID/W Program Review Team that visited the Mission in October-November, 1962. After discussions with AID/W and the UGA, it was agreed to again revise the scope of the contract instead of canceling. This was done and the new contract called for the UGA to continue training the future faculty at the UGA; provide advice on the physical plant development; and provide short term consultants on curriculum and organizational matters as required. The team Chief would continue until August, 1963, (the end of the current Chief's tour); the English instructor would continue until the end of his tour in April, 1964.

Although the new agreement still committed the U.S. to a large project it represented considerable immediate savings to the U.S. with respect to the 1962 agreement and an even greater saving to the RKG both in immediate costs and particularly in annual recurring costs of operation and maintenance.

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The 1962 agreement had called for impressive facilities for a student body of 500 and a small school farm with functions limited to teaching with only limited research in direct support of the instructional program. Costs of all construction on the site, not only buildings, but also roads and school farm development were to be borne by the U.S. The 1963 agreement was for facilities for a student body of 300 and provided a more equitable sharing of the costs between the RKG and the USAID, through an increase in the RKG commitment to site development.

The USAID had all along been trying to convince the Cambodians of the value of the U.S. land grant college concept wherein teaching, research and extension are combined in one institution, but had met with no success until now. The new Secretary was receptive and papers had been presented to him arguing for the integration of all the services of the Direction of Agriculture into the new school. The RKG accepted this concept in the 1963 agreement, which foresaw the complete integration of all teaching, research and extension activities including the regional experiment and livestock stations into the new University.

The new site, far superior to the old one, was located some six miles south of the city of Phnom Penh and contained about 1400 acres of which 60 acres, adequate for all building construction, is above flood waters. There was adequate land for an excellent school farm as well as sufficient land of the correct soil types to provide for a central experiment station.

The central research station previously included under the "Crop Improvement" (Agronomy) project and the funds previously committed for

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a separate installation were shifted to the education project. These funds were adequate to cover most of the costs of the school farm and the central station.

The Livestock stations of Stung Mean Chey (nearly adjacent to the new school site) and Stung Keo were to be transferred to the new school as research and student practical training facilities.

The administration building for the school and school laboratories were planned to provide office and research space for the school staff who would have combined responsibilities for teaching, research and extension. This permitted the canceling of other agreements to construct separate buildings for a headquarters for the agronomy staff and a national headquarters for the agricultural extension service.

The soils laboratory presently located in the Rural Engineering Division was to have been transferred to the school permitting a more orderly operation of the laboratory for country wide needs and simultaneously saving the U.S. the cost of purchasing additional laboratory equipment for the school.

The 1962 agreement called for the training of 31 future staff members at the University of Georgia under the terms of the UGA contract. Ten students had already been sent to the U.S. The combination of teaching research and extension made it possible to recruit from among the 60 odd students already in the U.S. studying in the various fields of forestry, fisheries, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, agronomy and extension who would for the most part automatically be assigned to the school under the new concept and thereby reduce the need for sending additional students to the UGA and permit a more rapid recruitment

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of the school staff as most of these students had already been in the U.S. for two and three years.

In the 1963 agreement all engineering and earth moving operations for site development and school farm development were entrusted to the Rural Engineering Division of the Ministry of Agriculture. Beginning

in May, 1963, the entire engineering staff of that Division was assigned the task of making the necessary engineering studies which would be subject to the approval of the USAID. By the Fall of 1963

nearly all heavy equipment of the Rural Engineering Division had been moved to the school site and site preparation operations and the construction of an access road had begun. The costs of the access road were to be borne entirely by the RKG, and all other earth moving operations to be met 75 per cent by the RKG and 25 per cent by the U.S.

This represented another potential savings to the U.S. of about \$500,000 in local currency.

While there was opposition to the new concept, especially by the

Ministry of Agriculture employees serving as part-time teachers at the

present school it appeared that the project would have at last moved ahead as planned had U.S. assistance not been terminated. (The

objection of some of the teachers who felt that the new concept would reduce their income was understandable as many of the present teachers of the National School of Agriculture receive twice as much income from their part-time teaching job than from their regular full-time jobs in the Ministry.)

Throughout the life of the project a number of accomplishments were made and are worthy of noting.

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- A general understanding was reached for integrating the agricultural education, agricultural research and agricultural extension activities with the negotiation of the 1963 project agreement. A fairly detailed plan was worked out with respect to Livestock Activities and agreed to by the Director of the Veterinary Service. Similar plans were worked out for agronomy and agricultural extension activities but did not yet have the full support of the Director of Agriculture.

- The RKG provided a site for the University. Plans for irrigation and flood control were 90 per cent complete and some earth moving operations had been carried out by the Rural Engineering Division of the Ministry of Agriculture. The USAID Public Works Division had completed plans for 31 units of faculty housing. The Rural Engineering Division had begun site preparation work under USAID supervision and a contract was about to be let calling for the completion of construction by April, 1964. A contract was signed with a U.S. A & E firm to design the main university buildings. The A & E team was scheduled to arrive in November, 1963.

- Suggested curricula and course descriptions for academic and practical programs in agronomy, animal husbandry, forestry, fisheries, agricultural engineering, agricultural economics and vocational agricultural teacher training were developed by USAID direct hire technicians, reviewed by the UGA contract team and sent to the RKG for consideration. Work on standards of achievement would have of necessity come later.

- A program of research and practical training in Livestock production was worked out and given to the Cambodians for their study just prior to termination.

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- Though not yet complete, a selection of library material was provided by the USAID and put into use in the present school. Similarly, considerable quantities of teaching aids, agricultural equipment and a selection of improved breeds of livestock were provided in 1957-58 by the USAID and were being utilized by the present school.

- International Voluntary Services, Inc. were contracted to assist in establishing the school farm and to assist Cambodian instructors in giving student practical training as well as teaching the English language. The IVS contract called for ten technicians to arrive by February, 1964. One IVS technician had arrived by September, 1963.

- While the performance of the UGA contract with regard to its purpose of assisting in the development of the school was very disappointing, and was judged unsatisfactory by a USAID audit of the period from its beginning in 1960 to 1962, there were some accomplishments:

Demonstrations and Instruction

Corn was planted and grown on approximately one-half hectare of college ground. This was used in demonstrating the bunker type of ensilage called the trench silo, illustrating a way to provide feed for cattle on the small Cambodian farms during the dry season.

The use of a garden tractor was demonstrated and a rotary motor tractor was assembled before groups of students.

The UGA team supervised the planting of plots of vegetables and field and forage crops to provide the students with some practical laboratory work.

Breeding chickens were placed in a new pullet house and hogs were placed in pens erected on the college grounds. The livestock was

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later transferred to Stung Mean Chey veterinary livestock station and used for various demonstrations performed by the UGA team. A model of an advanced type hog unit, fences and temporary buildings to house livestock were built at Kompong Kantuot by the UGA Agricultural Engineer advisor and Cambodian staff members.

Fifteen students were given general instruction in management practices and preventive medicine.

The UGA veterinarian gave demonstrations on performing post-mortems and treated several species of ailing animals to provide the National College staff with an opportunity for first-hand observation of the various techniques involved.

Teaching Materials

Numerous Cambodian horticultural plants were classified and 45 different species of Cambodian woods, important in the manufacture of furniture and for general construction purposes, were collected. Microscopic slides were made of each of these for use as teaching aids in the National College.

Samples of some of the feed mixtures in use have been sent to the University of Georgia Nutrition Laboratory for analysis and a program was recommended and plans prepared for the construction and operation of modern hog pens, turkey houses and pullet houses.

Study of Agriculture Problems in Cambodia

The UGA Contract team traveled through various parts of Cambodia with the students, staff members from the National College when available, and RKG officials from various departments within the Ministry of Agriculture. The group observed farm structures, implements,

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machinery and equipment and studied some of the problems in the various fields such as forestry, animal husbandry, veterinary, agronomy and horticulture, and where possible made recommendations for resolving them. Twelve students spent two weeks in the Province of Kratie and vaccinated 400 buffalo under the direction of USAID and RKG technicians, after receiving some training from the UGA veterinary advisor.

In addition, the UGA horticulturist made detailed studies of Cambodian fruits and vegetables and prepared a paper entitled "An evaluation of Cambodian agriculture with particular reference to horticulture plants and to educational needs". A paper was also prepared for commercial hog production in Cambodia.

Summary

Though ultimately this project might have become one of the most beneficial of all assistance programs to Cambodia in the field of agriculture, it most certainly had not achieved that status when the program was terminated.

Perhaps the greatest progress was achieved during 1963 when for the first time there was a meeting of minds between U.S. and at least one senior Cambodian official which resulted in the signing of a detailed and seemingly sound project agreement and the assignment by the RKG of an excellent site for the establishment of an agricultural university.

Discussions, throughout the years beginning in 1957 and following the arrival of the UGA team in 1960, generated a great deal of interest among Cambodians for the school which the U.S. was going to give Cambodia but did not reach the point where the responsible RKG officials showed any desire to contribute their energies until 1963, when the

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project was revised and an acceptable site was secured. Beginning in the spring of 1963 the Rural Engineering Division of the Ministry of Agriculture diverted nearly all of its resources towards designing the school farm, including site preparation for construction and the design and construction of an access road.

An impartial review of the history of the development of this project leads to the conclusion that the project was largely master-minded by the U.S. The Cambodians requested U.S. assistance to improve their existing school including some additional facilities and the U.S. response was to offer an American type land grant university, without sufficient regard for what was needed in the Cambodian situation or what the Cambodians in fact wanted.

In any event, after six years and one million dollars expended (almost half of the UGA contract), the project had not achieved its objective.

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RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

B. SECTOR Agriculture (All Years)

	DIRECT DOLLARS							LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar equivalent)					
	Total \$	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodities \$	Other Costs \$	Total Rials	Total C/P	Total TAIF	Technicians TAIF	Part TAIF	C/S TAIF	O/C TAIF
ALL YEARS	6849	1731	823 (405)	1676	2606	13	13555	12444	1111	551	215	337	8
FY 64	154	117 (10)	9 (2)	0	28	0	28	0	28	28	0	0	0
FY 63	775	224 (13)	162 (27)	223	165	1	3209	2951	258	68	27	159	4
FY 62	1078	251 (15)	144 (14)	548	135	0	625	467	158	118	18	20	2
FY 61	680	308 (18)	248 (36)	16	108	0	1346	1089	257	149	37	69	2
FY 60	956	274 (14)	143 (67)	339	200	0	350	152	198	100	44	54	0
FY 59	679	224 (11)	63 (101)	167	225	0	689	526	163	88	40	35	0
FY 58	665	145 (8)	36 (98)	115	369	0	1757	1721	36	0	36	0	0
FY 57	559	108 (8)	16 (47)	140	295	0	1047	1037	10	0	10	0	0
FY 56	864	50 (4)	2 (13)	65	747	0	719	716	3	0	3	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	439	30 (2)	0	63	334	12	3785	3785	0	0	0	0	0

Total \$ 6849

Total LC 13,555

Total \$ + LC 20,404

Total Technician Man/Years (estimated) 103

Total Number of Participants 405

C. TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC WORKS

As indicated in the Summary Statement (BOOK I), the major effort of American aid to Cambodia in the first years after its inception in 1951 was twofold: (1) to assist Cambodia in maintaining its newly won independence and internal stability; and (2) to assist in repairing the physical damage to its transportation system and infrastructure caused by neglect during World War II and destruction during the war with the Viet Minh. This emphasis was continued through Fiscal Year 1957, when the direction of the economic portion of the program was changed to emphasize the development of social institutions as a prelude to increased educational and health facilities and agricultural production. Through FY 1958 the Transportation and Public Works sector constituted approximately 55 per cent of the total economic program. In FY 1959 the obligation of new funds for the Transportation and Public Works sector accounted for approximately 30 per cent; in FY 1960 approximately 8 per cent. The amount of funds included in the program for transportation increased in FY 61, 62 and 63 due to the need for rehabilitating the Khmer-American Highway, discussed in full below. The highway rehabilitation project was an exception, however, and no major transportation or public works construction projects other than construction related to technical assistance provided for economic development were begun after FY 1958.

The U.S. aid invested in the five years from June of 1954 to June of 1959, the sum of \$41 million, including the Khmer-American Friendship Highway and other roads, bridges, airfield extension, dredges and dredging, railroad improvement, and a variety of other public works in Cambodia. Of this sum, \$25 million were direct dollar expenditures, and another \$16 million came from the USAID counterpart riel funds. From inception to November, 1963, the USAID obligated over 56 million for transportation

and public works which constituted 21 per cent of the total aid program and 42 per cent of the project program from beginning to termination. Forty three million dollars were for the Khmer-American Highway and its rehabilitation alone. The Cambodian Government also invested \$2.5 million toward these projects, in addition to the much greater amounts spent on projects in which the U.S. was not involved.

Of these financial investments in public works, by far the greatest share was used to reconstruct and improve Cambodia's transportation network. Neglect during World War II years and later Viet Minh destruction during the period of Cambodia's struggle for independence had left the road system in very poor condition.

1. Bridge and Highway Repair

During the war and shortly thereafter, bridges had been destroyed all over the country by the Viet Minh. One of the first reconstruction efforts of the Cambodian Government in conjunction with U.S. aid was to provide equipment, supplies, and a large part of the financing for getting the road system once more in working order. By 1959, two thousand kilometers of road had been repaired and sixty-six bridges constructed or rebuilt.

The U.S. contribution included the purchase of dump trucks, concrete mixers, compressors, asphalt pots, rock crushing plants, asphalt, corrugated metal pipe, reinforcing steel and cement, and provision of the services of experts in engineering, where required.

There were a total of ten projects in bridge and highway repair, not including the Khmer-American Friendship Highway, costing a total of \$2 million and \$6 million equivalent in local currency of AID funds, to which the Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) added the equivalent of \$321 thousand from its National Budget. Unfortunately, the records available at present

are not sufficiently clear or complete to permit a more detailed discussion of individual activities undertaken during this period, with the exception of the Khmer-American Highway project discussed below.

2. Dredging

The general purpose of this project was to assist the RKG in the creation of a self-sustaining dredging organization capable of operating and maintaining dredging equipment needed to keep open primary and secondary navigation channels in the inland waterways of Cambodia, and to provide fill for low-lying areas around Phnom Penh for industrial, commercial and residential purposes.

Two twelve-inch and two eight-inch hydraulic suction pipeline dredges and auxiliary equipment and spare parts, including small boats and shore pipe, worth approximately \$2.3 million were provided as a gift to the RKG in 1955 and 1956. An additional \$49 thousand worth of commodities, mainly spare parts, were provided over the life of the project.

The Office of Dredging was established as an autonomous body in 1956. The USAID assistance in the field of administration was to provide a technician to assist in the development of the operational, financial and maintenance aspects of the organization, including the establishment of management guidelines, training programs and sound financial operating procedures.

In 1957 a non-interest bearing loan of \$514 thousand in local currency was made to the RKG to permit operations of the dredging office to continue, and to give them time to collect outstanding bills from the beneficiaries of the dredging work done previously. The loan was to be repaid in ten years, beginning in 1957, at the rate of \$51.4 thousand in local currency per year. To date \$205.7 thousand in local currency has been repaid, leaving an unpaid balance of \$308.3 in local currency. The last payment was made in 1962.

With the termination of the USAID program it was mutually agreed that the balance of the unpaid loan be used by the Office of Dredging to undertake activities similar to those for which the loan was initially made.

Dredging in the Phnom Penh area was for the purpose of keeping the harbor open on a year-round basis. Obstructions downstream, mainly sandbars, were likewise cleared. The initial clearance work, which must be carried out every year, provided the opportunity for training the Cambodian crews. The following operational and support personnel were trained by the end of 1961:

12 Dredge supervisors

8 Field supervisors

10 Shop foremen

4 Bookkeepers

4 Field Surveyors

1 General Engineer

The Office of Dredging has successfully kept the port of Phnom Penh open for ocean-going vessels up to 3,500 tons and concurrently used the silt to change over 700 hectares from swamp to habitable and commercially valuable land. However, there have been problems arising from the fact that the Office of Dredging has not been able to collect bills due particularly from the Municipality of Phnom Penh. The dredges are in serious need of overhaul and may be inoperable next year if not repaired.

3. Aid to The Royal Cambodian Railway

This project furnished a loan of \$829 thousand in local currency to the Royal Cambodian Railway for construction and repair work. The funds were used to replace 25 kilogram rails and wooden cross-ties (installed during the Japanese occupation and badly damaged) with 30 kilogram rails and steel

cross-ties between Mongol Baurei and Poipet, the Thai border town, a distance of approximately 50 kilometers; to purchase railroad cars; to construct and equip a railway station at Poipet capable of handling anticipated international rail traffic between Thailand and Cambodia; and to improve the station at Sisophon. The equipment for the station at Poipet included lay-by tracks, freight platforms, customs areas, police areas and passenger areas.

A cash grant of \$57 thousand in local currency was made early in 1955, as well as the first installment of what was originally intended to be a \$714 thousand in local currency loan. The loan was later increased to \$828 thousand in local currency, making total aid funds available to the project, \$886 thousand in local currency. The terms of repayment of the loan were: (1) no interest to be paid; (2) the loan was to be repaid over a 25-year period based on a percentage of profits of the railway. It was stipulated that not less than 10 per cent, nor more than 25 per cent of profits were to be used as repayments during any one period. The first loan repayment was made in April 1958, although no starting date was stipulated. In all \$103 thousand were repaid from profits, leaving an outstanding balance of \$726 thousand in local currency. (An average amount to have been repaid annually over a 25-year period would have been \$33 thousand in local currency. They were behind on November 20, 1963, using that criteria, by \$63 thousand in local currency.) With the termination of the USAID it was agreed that the remaining balance would remain with the Cambodian Railway to be used for purposes similar to those for which the loan was initially made.

4. Air Field Improvement

The majority of Cambodia's airfields, at one time estimated to total 20, were constructed by the Japanese during World War II, and, in the past

were usable only during certain seasons of the year. To satisfy what was a growing need for better air communication, the USAID, through a project initiated in 1956, supported the rehabilitation and improvement of airstrips at five provincial capitals: Siem Reap, Battambang, Kompot, Kratie, and Stung Treng.

In 1956 the airfields at Siem Reap, Battambang and Kratie were not able to accommodate aircraft larger than a DC-3, and these only during the dry season. The fields at Kampot and Stung Treng were equipped to receive only light planes. The initial objectives of the project called for strengthening and lengthening the runways at Battambang and Siem Reap to provide all weather surfaces suitable for medium size military and commercial aircraft, and to strengthen the runways at Kratie, Stung Treng and Kampot to provide all weather surfaces suitable for light planes. In addition, drainage systems were installed or improved at all five fields. This work was completed in FY 1961. Battambang, Kratie, Kampot and Stung Treng can now accommodate C-47 aircraft, and Siem Reap can accommodate C-54 and C-124 aircraft.

Prior to completion of the work originally planned, it was decided to expand the project to include the furnishing and installation of essential navigational and communication equipment at the Phnom Penh and Siem Reap airports to improve the safety, orderliness, and efficiency of air movement in and over Cambodia. The project was extended once again in FY 1962 to provide for the installation of a high frequency omni-directional range (VOR) system at the Phnom Penh airport and to provide training for Cambodian personnel in the operation and maintenance of this equipment. The training was accomplished both on-the-job and through a participant program that sent four Cambodians to the U.S. for short-term training in air traffic control.

The five airports mentioned above are important not only for national defense purposes but also for rapid and economical commercial travel to areas not otherwise readily accessible. The Siem Reap airport, because of its proximity to the tourist attraction of Angkor Wat, has a commercial importance second only to that of the capital, Phnom Penh. In addition, the supplemental communications and navigational aids supplied the Siem Reap field considerably increase the safety of flight on international airways between Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Manila, which pass over the northern portion of Cambodia.

Some of the important features of the program to improve the Siem Reap and Phnom Penh airports and the status of the activity on November 20, 1963, follows.

Phnom Penh: A VOR (very high frequency omni-directional radio range) system was installed and tested. A 36-inch, double-ended rotating light beacon was installed and placed in operation. Two signal light guns were installed. Equipment for a 300-watt radio beacon also was installed. English-language electronics training aids, contributed by the USAID, were in use in the Royal Cambodian Aviation School. On-the-job training in electronics maintenance was in progress.

The improvement program was completed in FY 1963. All equipment installed was in operation, with the exception of a 50-watt and a 3000-watt NDB (non-directional beacon). These two units had been stored outside by the RKG and were damaged. The RKG built two structures to house this equipment and is now overhauling the two NDB's preparatory to installation.

Phnom Penh-Siem Reap: Point-to-point SSB radio telephone service between Phnom Penh and Siem Reap was established during the second phase of the project.

Siem Reap: VHF air-to-ground equipment and a 12-line switchboard were installed in the terminal building and are in operation. Equipment for a 36-inch, double-ended rotating light beacon was ordered, received and turned over to the RKG. It could not be installed until a control tower was built. Construction of the tower is not anticipated in the near future. Installation of the equipment is the responsibility of the RKG.

The project was successfully completed in FY 1963. Its total cost was \$1.4 million , of which \$759 thousand was in the form of riels from the counterpart account which were for construction costs. The majority of the direct dollar aid was for commodities (\$508 thousand).

5. Khmer-American Friendship Highway

The most significant transportation project undertaken by the aid program was the construction of the Khmer-American Friendship Highway. The road covers the 217.2 kilometers (approximately 135 miles) from 12 kilometers southwest of Phnom Penh to the port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand. Construction began in October 1956 and was completed in May 1959 at a total cost (including local currency) of \$30.9 million, excluding a \$699 thousand in local currency contribution from the RKG. The cost to the U.S. constituted 30 per cent of the total expenditures under the project program from its inception to termination. During the construction, American engineers trained the Cambodian workmen to operate the heavy construction equipment, and as the highway approached completion, the Cambodian employees were operating nearly all of the cranes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, and other machines. Another program to train mechanics to maintain and repair the equipment was begun while the highway was under construction. The equipment provided to the RKG at the end of the construction provided the basis for the establishment of

the Office des Engins Mécaniques (ODEM) the major road building agency of the RKG.

During the year 1960, deterioration of the surface and settlement of the base of the road was observed. Field observations were undertaken and it was apparent that deterioration had occurred between kilometers 100 and 180, with other smaller sections showing need of some attention. In early 1961 an agreement was entered into with the Bureau of Public Roads for that agency to undertake the rehabilitation of the road. Initial investigations indicated the probability that the base course beneath the surface of the highway had not been constructed in accordance with the original contract specifications. On the basis of preliminary cost estimates prepared by a Bureau of Public Roads engineer, AID/W, in FY 1961, authorized the use of \$2.7 million for the work of rehabilitating deteriorated sections of the road. Nine subsequent investigations disclosed that deterioration between kilometers 100 and 180 was major and that these 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the central portion of the highway would require extensive rehabilitation. The major items of work included furnishing, placing and compacting the sub-base and bituminous pavement according to approved specifications on the section between kilometer 100 and 180. The remainder of the highway would require an additional thickness of bituminous pavement in order to meet the increased standards for this project. A seal coat would then be applied to the new pavement on the entire project. Refinements to the original cost estimates were made and the total cost for the repair program, extending over three years (1961-1964) was estimated at approximately \$15 million direct dollars including counterpart dollar equivalent.

All rehabilitation work performed to November 1962 on the highway was by Force Account method; i.e., by a group of American construction personnel under the engineering and administrative supervision of the Bureau of Public Roads. In December 1961 at the request of AID/W, the Bureau of Public Roads prepared estimates for accomplishing the rehabilitation by the Force Account method, by an American construction contractor, or by a combination of construction contractor and Force Account. The contract method was decided upon by the Bureau of Public Roads and AID/W as the most expeditious method for accomplishing the rehabilitation.

Pending the contractor's arrival, the group of American construction personnel continued to maintain the highway open to traffic, and repair and maintain the equipment being used in the repairs. In addition to continuous road and equipment maintenance, this group, under Bureau of Public Roads engineering supervision, accomplished the major work of relocating the roadway at kilometer 102, Pech Nil Pass, where two previous fill slides had made the roadway unusable, and also provided a protective seal coat to the surface on the less-deteriorated sections of the highway for its protection during the rainy season. The RKG provided most of the equipment required for the work, as well as the basic labor force.

Sampling and testing of the component parts of the existing road bed (pavement, base, sub-base, etc.) was accomplished by Bureau of Public Roads technicians. The data obtained from this program served a twofold purpose: (1) as basic data for the preparation of plans and specifications for the rehabilitation of the highway, and (2) as legal data for the determination of compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the contract for the original construction by the contractor, A.L. Dougherty, Inc. of New York,

and/or the consulting engineers, Michael Baker, Jr., Inc., of Pennsylvania. The BPR prepared and published a report entitled: "Final Report of Engineering Investigation, Causes of the Failure of the Khmer-American Friendship Highway, Cambodia, January, 1963." The case is presently under investigation by the Department of Justice.

A contract for \$6.6 million was signed with Vinnell Corporation in September, 1962, with BPR the supervising agency, and the contractor began work in November, 1962. As of November 20, 1963, the total project was approximately 33 per cent complete. Grading was approximately 46 per cent complete. Culverts were approximately 60 per cent complete. The base course was approximately 42 per cent complete. The bituminous concrete pavement was approximately 36 per cent complete. Shoulder surface treatment had not been started. The bituminous binder course had been placed from km. 12 to km. 101 + and from km. 204 to km. 226. The base course had been completed from km. 164 + 500 to km. 226 + and partially completed between km. 157 + 300 and km. 164 + 500. Between km. 101 and km. 157 +, the entire work remaining to be accomplished consisted of special ditching, grade raises, 9" of base course and shoulders for 56 kilometers, and 3" of bituminous concrete pavement for 56 kilometers. It is estimated that the unfinished section of the highway will be passable until the middle of the next rainy season, e.g., approximately July-August, 1964. It is now deteriorating daily and if no remedial action is taken by that time in 1964 it will be passable only with difficulty.

6. The Khmer-American Highway and Its Effect on the Cambodian Economy

The impact of the port highway upon certain areas of Cambodia was evident shortly after construction of the highway commenced in 1956 and had become increasingly so since its formal opening in May, 1959. Economic activity along the length of the road accelerated upon completion of the port of Sihanoukville; the road being the only direct link between the capital city of Phnom Penh and Cambodia's only deep water coastal port.

Obviously, not all the new economic activity evidenced can be traced directly to the road, nor can all the benefits derived from the construction of the road be analyzed apart from all other factors. The road and the port of Sihanoukville are linked inseparably as an economic whole. The one depends upon the other for the full economic benefits of both to be realized. Besides aiding Cambodia with a direct outlet to world markets, the road opened up large areas of previously unpopulated plateau land, low-lying fertile rice land and large areas of commercially exploitable forests.

In the port area of Sihanoukville, in what was only an uninhabited area grown thick with jungle, there is now a fair-sized town with a population estimated at 30,000. The port of Sihanoukville (officially opened early in 1960) was built under the auspices of the French Aid Program and handled over 19,500 tons of merchandise in 1960 in less than six months of operation. By comparison, in the first seven months of 1963 over 230 thousand tons of goods moved through the port, being 37 per cent of the total during that period. This level of activity compares, in turn, with the 143 thousand tons of goods exported and imported through Sihanoukville (17 per cent of total foreign trade) in the 12 months of 1962. In other words, the port of Sihanoukville handled over twice the percentage of foreign trade in the first seven months of 1963 as for all of 1962 and over ten times the tonnage handled in the first six months of 1960. In 1960, 53 ships called at the port; in 1961, 89 ships; in 1962, 162 ships. The tonnage handled by the port of Phnom Penh, by comparison, dropped from 1,064 thousand tons in 1960 to 921 thousand in 1962. Almost all of the goods imported via Sihanoukville in this period and a large part of the goods leaving the port used the highway.

There are four established freight companies who offer service between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville besides the many independent trucking lines. To carry the increasing load, large numbers of new trucks were bought, the number of new trucks and busses registered in 1963 was 1836, more than three times as great as the 575 total for 1960.

Facilities at the port are being expanded to handle the increasing amount of commerce. Four ships of 10,000 tons can now berth at one time at the port. Recently built warehouses, in addition to the previous small sheds, give over 300 thousand square feet of storage space. The recent proposal by two oil companies to build terminal facilities at Sihanoukville would mean an increasing amount of traffic carried over the road. Development plans envision the growth of the city to a population of over 50 thousand by the end of 1964. Provision is being made for water and power facilities. The port area, however, is only one small part of the total area benefitting from the Friendship Highway.

In the area around the port it is estimated that there are one million hectares of commercially exploitable timber. Several concessions totalling over 70 thousand hectares have already been let. The potential average annual output from this region is estimated to be 100 thousand to 200 thousand cubic meters per year. In 1962 over 115 thousand tons of lumber valuing \$1.3 million (35:1) were exported through Sihanoukville as compared to 6 thousand tons for six months of 1961. In addition to the lumber concession, large areas of land have been cleared for rubber, coffee, coconut, and pepper plantations. The rubber plantation, when it reaches full production, would be able to move its product over the road for a short distance to the deep water port.

Rice, corn and other large bulk items destined for European or African markets are now being shipped cheaper via truck to the port than by the alternative route of transshipment at Saigon. During 1960, just under 20,000 tons of imports were shipped; in 1962 the total grew to 143,000 tons and 369,000 tons in 1963.

SUMMARY OF FUNDING
for
THE REHABILITATION OF KHMER-AMERICAN HIGHWAY
As of October, 1963

	<u>ESTIMATED*</u>	<u>ANTICIPATED</u>
1. Interim Maintenance	\$ 2,311,871	\$ 1,984,936 **
2. Preparation of Report of Causes of Failure, Including Testing	127,678	127,354 **
3. Design of New Construction and Procurement, and Supervision of Construction Services	292,075	222,406 **
4. Rehabilitation and Contract Supervision	1,780,905	1,411,207
5. Contract Construction (Vinnell)	9,000,000	8,690,027
6. Government-furnished Spare Parts and Equipment Purchased Under Rehabilitation and Furnished Contractor at no cost to Contractor	1,186,947	935,801 ***
7. Maintenance Program	328,234	857,455
GRAND TOTAL	\$ 15,027,710	\$14,229,186

* Per BPR Report of Rehabilitation dated September 21, 1962.

** Complete Costs as per June 30, 1963.

*** This figure represents an inventory turned over to the contractor of \$603,643 plus new equipment valued at \$382,000, likewise turned over to the contractor, less a figure of \$49,842 for amortization on new equipment charged to Interim Maintenance.

7. Various Projects

As is clear from the above, the main U.S. Aid contribution to Cambodia's public works program has been concerned with improving roads and building the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville highway, improving waterways, transforming airports into all-weather installations and financially assisting the Cambodian Royal Railway.

In connection with the restoration of the transportation system and other construction work, the USAID program furnished the funds and equipment to bring the Baphnom Quarry, near Prey Veng, back into operation. A sum of \$14 thousand in local currency was invested in reinstalling the equipment at the quarry, which had been removed and stored for safe keeping during the period of unrest and conflict before Cambodia's independence was fully assured.

Electric generating plants were supplied to a number of communities to replace worn out ones or those damaged in the war. A USAID investment of \$150 thousand was made to which \$50 thousand in local currency was added by the RKG reinstallation costs.

The U.S. also assisted the RKG in studies for the development of a water supply system at Sihanoukville on the Tuk Sap River which would have included a limited amount of hydroelectric power. Four experts of the Kennedy Engineering firm under contract to the USAID, assisted by regular USAID technicians from Phnom Penh, made the preliminary survey and prepared plans and specifications at a cost of \$200 thousand and \$77 thousand in local currency. The project began in 1960; the plans were completed in June, 1963. The plans were never turned over to the RKG and there are indications that they were not feasible, although this is not documented by the record.

Also invested was \$2,060,000 in FY's 1956-1958 from regional funds in participation in the regional survey of the Mekong River Development Project.

In addition, the USAID provided in 1959 two 40-ton ferry boats (worth \$167 thousand without the engines which were bought by the RKG at a cost of \$42.8 thousand in local currency) for use on the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers; equipment and construction costs in 1957 for a materials-testing laboratory for testing strength and other properties of construction materials; constructed and equipped in 1959 a garage workshop in the Tuol Kork section of Phnom Penh for the Ministry of Public Works costing \$52 thousand and \$129 thousand in local currency; gave financial assistance in 1956 (\$286 thousand in local currency; total cost \$867 thousand) to the construction of the Municipal Auditorium (Salle de Conference) in Phnom Penh; and provided technical assistance to the Division of Town Planning and Housing in the RKG Ministry of Public Works.

RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

C.
SECTOR Transportation and Public Works (All Years)

In Thousands of U.S. Dollars

	DIRECT DOLLARS								LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar Equivalent)						
	Total \$	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodi- ties \$	Other Costs \$	Total Riels	Total C/P	Total TATF	Technicians TATF	Parts. TATF	G/S TATF	Other Costs TATF		
ALL YEARS	35614	1305	42	(27)	16354	17913	0	21062	18009	3053	274	22	2032	725	
FY 64	398	398	(13)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
FY 63	373	373	(16)	0	0	0	1192	3	1189	109	0	978	102		
FY 62	6330	267	(14)	18	(3)	5945	100	0	1196	142	1054	52	3	799	200
FY 61	1915	55	(3)	1	(2)	267	1592	0	1061	353	708	77	0	208	423
FY 60	69	56	(3)	13	(5)	0	0	0	63	37	26	19	7	0	0
FY 59	1706	38	(3)	3	(5)	1642	23	0	1148	1080	68	17	4	47	0
FY 58	6605	44	(2)	3	(1)	3932	2626	0	4755	4753	2	0	2	0	0
FY 57	8693	29	(2)	4	(11)	701	7959	0	3336	3330	6	0	6	0	0
FY 56	8759	13	(1)	0		3235	5511	0	2401	2401	0	0	0	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	756	32	(2)	0		632	102	0	5910	5910	0	0	0	0	0

Total \$ 35614
Total LC 21062
Total \$+LC 56676

Total Technician Man/Years (estimated) 59

Total Number of Participants 27

In Book II - II-C-17
In Book III - II-C-1

II-C-17

D. HEALTH AND SANITATION1. Introduction

Subsequent to the war in Indo-China and independence from France, Cambodia was left with the formidable problem of trying to provide medical care and essential health services to fill the void created by the departure of most of the French colonial medical staff. The general health of the people was poor and over half the country was malarious; 10-30 per cent of the people had yaws; over 5 per cent of the people had active tuberculosis. Small pox was prevalent, dysenteries and intestinal parasitism were universal and the level of sanitation and public knowledge about health was extremely low. The French had done little community public health work and although they had built a network of provincial hospitals between 1910-1920, these were now outmoded, poorly equipped and in poor repair. Most of them were without water supplies and only some had electricity. None had laboratory, x-ray or other modern diagnostic facilities. Even more critical was the almost complete lack of trained Cambodian physicians, nurses and auxiliary medical personnel and local institutions in which to train a health staff.

2. AID Program from Inception

The earliest health programs initiated by the Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM) between 1952-1955 were aimed at the control of certain highly prevalent public health diseases, notably malaria, small pox and yaws, the improvement of community water supplies and the creation of the infrastructure needed to train doctors, nurses and midwives. Most of these early activities were initially developed by the World Health Organization (WHO), American assistance being largely limited to supplying

commodities and helping with local operating costs.

a) Malaria

The WHO started a malaria control demonstration project in August of 1951 and in April 1952 the United States agreed to help through the STEM by supplying imported commodities such as insecticides, sprayers and vehicles and defraying local operating costs. No provision was made for the U. S. to technically participate in the planning or implementation of the work; this was delegated to the WHO, who had a malarialogist and a sanitary engineer in Cambodia. Until 1955 anti-malaria work was limited to preliminary studies and demonstration malaria control for about 50,000 inhabitants in regions "recently liberated". By 1955 it had been determined that more than half of the country was malarious and about 1,000,000 people lived in these areas, covering about 120,000 sq. km. In many of the peripheral areas neither the status of malaria transmission nor the principal vectors had been adequately determined; nevertheless, in 1955 the WHO demonstration project was converted to an eradication program, with the goal of eliminating malaria transmission in the country by fiscal year 1958. Looking back, this was certainly an over-optimistic appraisal. At the time, however, A. minimus, an anopheline mosquito unusually susceptible to residual DDT spraying, was thought to be the only serious vector. The anti-malarial campaign was rapidly expanded thereafter, as shown by the following table:

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>
No. of villages sprayed	96	556	1,216	2,667	3,433	3,816
No. of houses sprayed	11,503	40,028	92,530	145,597	197,342	189,212
Population protected	49,150	180,589	411,842	715,226	946,601	958,895

In spite of this apparent progress, the WHO in 1958 began to note certain difficulties. These were:

Spraying operations were being poorly supervised. coverage was far below 100 per cent and many houses, and even whole villages, were being missed.

In many areas the principal vector was not A. minimus, as anticipated, but A. leucosphysus balabacensis, which was exophilic, did not remain long in houses and was not readily susceptible to DDT residual spraying.

Many areas in the periphery of the country were inaccessible except during the dry season. Villages were often unstable and did not remain in the same locale year to year. In the northeastern regions the "montagnards" practiced seasonal migration to temporary farm huts (chamcars) during the wet season because of their custom of "ray" dry land rice cultivation. Spraying their permanent houses was pointless and the "chamcars", because of their very flimsy construction, did not lend themselves to traditional methods of spraying.

Beginning in 1959, studies were made to determine the most effective method of malaria eradication. Many of these were carried out at Smol, in Kratie Province. Although there was some conflict of findings and opinions, it became evident that transmission of malaria in the A. balabacensis areas could only be interrupted with two carefully executed DDT spray cycles per year supplemented by anti-malarial drug distribution to certain populations, particularly the montagnards. The Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) felt it was impossible to carry out these stringent measures and continued to depend upon single country-wide spray cycles during the dry months.

In 1959 a pilot project was set up by the WHO in the Pailin region of Battambang to study the feasibility of interrupting malaria transmission by the use of medicated salt; this proved to be a failure. The malaria parasite quickly became resistant to pyrimethamine that was first tried, and chloroquine, which was later substituted, was not well-tolerated because of its bitter taste. Many problems were also encountered in making salt distribution during the wet months, when it was most needed. Other problems encountered in the Pailin medicated salt project were:

The unexpected low dietary intake of salt per se in the local dist. A good deal of salt is taken indirectly in the form of salted fish; fish sauce and other prepared foods. Very little is added directly at meal time.

A large number of migrants come to the Pailin area during the wet season to search for precious stones. It was difficult to control this group.

Presence of magnesium chloride contamination in the local-made sea salt caused a severe hygroscopic action during the wet season. This liquification made the drug dose unpredictable. This was eventually controlled by issuing the salt in plastic bags sealed during the dry season. This, however, required additional labor and expense.

The population in the Pailin area was highly saturated with ethnic Burmans, who are the principal buyers and exporters of the precious stones (sapphires and rubies) found in this area.

This group did not have the customs or cultural mores character-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

istic of the rest of Cambodia and did not feel itself subject to Cambodian authority; therefore cooperation from this group was not always good.

In short, unfortunately, the area and population selected for this Pilot Study were not suitable or representative.

In September, 1963, the following summary of the malaria situation was made in the Country Program Book (CAP):

"In the more remote areas and principally in those areas where Anopheles Balabacensis is prevalent, it is apparent that DDT residual spraying failed to control transmission; malaria infection rates although somewhat decreased, still continue at alarming rates as high as 10-20 per cent in many regions" and "at the present time active transmission of malaria continues in two-thirds of the original malarious regions and it is estimated that about 400,000 of the original 1,000,000 malarious population is still at risk."

In July of 1960 the USAID Public Health Division met with officials of the Western Pacific Regional Office of the WHO in Manila, to discuss the malaria situation in Cambodia. The WHO was told that unless prospects improved and unless the program was better conducted, the USAID would have to reconsider its prior decision to support the project. The WHO officials agreed that the program was not being well-managed and promised a change of the WHO advisory staff, which was due early in 1961. At about the same time the WHO Geneva Director of Malaria Eradication issued a document, "New Nomenclature for Country Malaria Eradication Projects", requiring the reclassification of all the WHO country malaria programs. According to the criteria of this scheme,

the Cambodia program was then categorized (by the WHO) as a "Pre-Eradication Program", which was defined as "a preliminary operation undertaken in a country whose general communication and health services have not yet reached a level which would enable it to undertake a malaria eradication program and in which, therefore, the necessary basic foundations for this kind of coordinated, thorough and time-limited activity have first to be laid. The operation must be planned and adapted to the socio-economic conditions and general developmental status of the country concerned." With this conceptual change, the WHO would no longer support a country-wide malaria eradication program but required a plan for retrenchment. Subsequently, in 1961, it was decided that the program would have to substantially start over again with a limited pilot project. In 1962, after an evaluation of the program by the USAID's Washington and Regional Malaria Advisors, U.S. assistance to the project was stopped, on the basis that WHO did not require help on a pilot project. The USAID was prepared to assist should the project reach eradication scope again.

As of the time of this writing, only limited anti-malaria work is being carried out by the RKG and malaria transmission remains unchecked throughout most of the original malarious areas.

b) Small Pox and Yaws

The disease control programs for smallpox and yaws, fortunately, were more successful. Under the STEM, and later the USAID, vaccines, transportation and local salary support were provided from 1954-1958 for attacks against these two important and easily controlled contagious diseases. Equipment was also contributed to the Pasteur Institute in Phnom Penh to help them produce smallpox vaccine within the country.

The progress made in controlling smallpox is seen from the drop in

the number of cases reported annually between 1954 and 1959 (Source: Report of the Director of Health Services of the RKG, 1959):

ANNUAL TOTAL OF CASES OF SMALL POX
1954 to 1959

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>
Cases	609	400	512	107	14	4
Deaths	117	126	74	12	1	0

At the present time sporadic cases do occur but small pox is no longer a serious public health problem. About 80-85 per cent of the population is vaccinated and mass vaccination has been continued annually. A survey made in March-April of 1961 revealed a vaccination rate of only a little better than 50 per cent among the people living in house boats in the lake areas. The Ministry of Health, however, has set up a program for a sanitation boat to travel among these people to improve the vaccination rate of this specialized population group.

The Pasteur Institute produces adequate stocks of small pox vaccine at an inexpensive price and has surplus vaccine for export.

From 1953 through 1958 the USAID provided help for the eradication of yaws in the form of Penicillin, syringes, needles and other needed supplies and vehicles. The campaign was carried out by the provincial health officers with considerable success. From 1959 till the present the RKG has continued the anti-yaws campaign with the help of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Today, the transmission of yaws is relatively rare in most of the country but foci of endemicity exist, particularly in the northern areas about the Great Lake (Siemreap, Battambang and Kompong Thom). The eradication of yaws in the country appears both feasible and probable.

c) Training of Health Personnel

At the time of Independence and ever since, the shortage of trained health personnel has been one of the most important factors in limiting the development of health services. The Royal School of Medicine was first established in 1946 but in the early years it was little more than a school to train health aides. In 1954, the USAID helped in creating a new School of Medicine. The U.S. bore the largest burden (\$143,000) of the cost of construction and almost the total cost of equipping the school. The French Economic Mission, however, contributed quarters and furnishings for the students. Unfortunately, in spite of this substantial contribution, the U.S. has never been able to have much say in the curriculum or training of the medical students. Medical ideology had always been French and professors at the Royal School of Medicine are supplied by an agreement with the University of Paris. Curriculum has been based on Paris medical qualifications. Little emphasis has been given to local public health problems. In recent years, however, the Cambodian medical leaders have been increasingly dissatisfied with the dominant French orientation of their school and at the time that the USAID assistance was stopped they were considering a more international outlook in their medical training.

In spite of many limitations and considerable faults, the Royal School of Medicine must on the overall be considered quite a successful accomplishment. Through 1959 the school graduated 140 *Officiers de Sante* (sub-professional physicians). Admittedly their training was not the best but they have filled the void and provided the basis to date for the development of health services. In 1960 a higher professional

course in medicine, aimed at producing locally qualified M.D.s, was begun. These students are considerably more promising and in time, standards should become reasonably acceptable. The WHO has also been able, in recent years, to implement technical assistance in the basic medical sciences, an area in which considerable improvement is needed.

From 1954 till 1960 the USAID supported the School for Nursing and Midwifery in collaboration with the WHO. Assistance comprised, in the early years, temporary prefabricated buildings and miscellaneous teaching equipment. In 1956, the USAID helped in building and outfitting a modern, well-equipped school for the training of nurses and midwives, with a capacity of 300 nursing students and 100 midwives at a cost of \$56,000. Teaching staff and technical guidance were furnished by the WHO, who have supplied an excellent group of nursing instructors of mixed nationalities and nursing backgrounds. As of 1963, two American nurses were actively working in this program with the WHO. In the early years, curricula and instruction were admittedly poor and graduates could only be considered as auxiliaries. In 1961, a 3-year professional nursing program was instituted and the quality of the graduate nurse has improved considerably in the last three years. There is still, however, a lack of sufficient qualified nurses to meet staffing needs. The paramount future need is public health nursing training for the development of provincial health services.

In order to provide better facilities for ward teaching of doctors, nurses and midwives, the USAID has helped in various ways to improve the hospitals in Phnom Penh. At the large, but very old, 1000-bed Preah Ket Mealia Hospital, \$100,000 was spent in the early years in renovations

and extensions. The USAID provided a new surgical block with an observation gallery for the medical students as well as improvements in the water supply, sinks, and lighting in the teaching wards.

The U.S. contributed about \$57,000 in local currency out of a total cost of \$340,000, for the construction of a 200-bed chronic disease hospital in Phnom Penh for the Bonzes and supplied from military supplies the equipment for a 100-bed hospital. From 1957-1959, the USAID constructed and equipped a 130-bed pediatrics hospital and child out-patient clinic adjacent to the Preah Ket Mealia Hospital, at a cost of \$78,000. In addition, the USAID made many contributions to the adjunct services of the Preah Ket Mealia Hospital, including a morgue with autopsy and student observation area, x-ray units and miscellaneous equipment and medical supplies.

Realizing the need for emphasizing public health concepts in the training of medical personnel, the USAID, in collaboration with the WHO, created in 1957-59 a teaching health centre at Takhmau, 15 kilometers from Phnom Penh. The WHO advisors, including a public health physician, public health nurse and a sanitarian have, since 1959, been teaching student nurses and doctors in public health concepts at this unit. Unfortunately, the provincial medical facilities were not integrated with the preventive medicine activities, and this, together with its suburban location have somewhat limited the usefulness of the Takhmau Health Centre. It has, however, been important in demonstrating the concepts of community health services to the undergraduates. The cost to construct the centre was approximately \$85,000.

d) Early Rural Health Work

From 1954 through 1958 there were a variety of small STEM-initiated projects aimed at improving the health and sanitation of the rural people. These ranged from simply augmenting medical supplies in provincial areas to the actual building of pit privies and dry wells in the villages. In general, these were emergency type activities with little planned coordination. Most of them failed to produce any long-felt results because there was an almost complete lack of provincial health personnel to follow up. They can only be justified on the basis of the urgency felt at the time to bring some relief and benefits to the rural people who had been disrupted so recently by war and insurgency. A total of approximately \$650,000 was spent in these activities. By 1957 and thereafter, these miscellaneous activities were organized under Health Education. Beginning in 1958 through 1960, the USAID established and equipped a central office and shop for Health Education and trained a cadre of six nurses in the concepts of health education of the community. This training was carried out by observation tours in Thailand and the Philippines followed by direct in-service training by the USAID Health Education Advisor in Cambodia. This cadre subsequently trained 25 additional health education assistants and a few specialists were trained in graphics, photography, etc. This unit has survived to date and the Ministry of Health depends upon it in carrying out its health education campaign in the country.

e) Rural Health Development

In 1961, after a joint survey of most of the health facilities of the country, it was decided to create the rural health training area in the southwestern part of Kampot Province, a region with about 150,000 rural people. The plan was to build an elaborate health center at Kompong Trach, the largest village in the region, and to anticipate two sub-centers at Tuk Meas and Tani later. The health center would contain 40 beds for general medical care, out-patient and public health clinics, the usual diagnostic facilities and adjunct services and quarters for 36 recently graduated health personnel including doctors, nurses, midwives and auxiliary workers. The USAID would provide a public health physician, public health nurse, medical administrator and health educator to work with a Cambodian staff of 27. Students would rotate through the center for in-service training.

The total cost of the project was expected to be approximately \$2.1 million including local currency by the projected phase-out date of 1970. Of the total, approximately \$700,000 was estimated for construction, including construction commodities, and \$1.4 million for all other costs including equipment, participants and technicians.

In FY 1961 and 1962 the Chief of the Public Health Division, the Public Health Physician and the Health Educator participated in the planning of the base unit at Kompong Trach. In these activities the Public Health Physician was replaced by the Health Administration Advisor in FY 1962. Completion of the plans was delayed by problems in obtaining a clear title to a desirable site being provided by the EKG, questions in regard to adequate water and electricity, and the workload in the Mission

Public Works Division. However, these problems were resolved by July 10, 1963, and construction was begun on that date. The structure was 17 per cent complete when the USAID activities ceased in November 1963. An access road to the site was provided by the RKG and joint U.S./RKG effort provided an adequate water supply.

The RKG renovation of the Tani and Tuk Meas sub-stations was 50 per cent complete at the termination of the project.

Equipment for the Kompong Trach unit, Tani and Tuk Meas sub-stations and for assistance to Kampot Provincial Hospital was purchased from FY 1961, 1962 and 1963 funds, and about 80 per cent of initial requirements were in Cambodia at project termination. FY 1963 procurement was cancelled except for the power generators already purchased from the Phnom Penh U.S. Trade Fair in late FY 1962.

Recruitment for additional U.S. and contract hire personnel to be used upon completion of construction was suspended in the months of strained relations prior to termination.

The RKG staff members and trainees for the Kompong Trach Unit were not required prior to termination, but the RKG project director was appointed in October, 1963, and opened a pilot Maternal and Child Health Unit (MCH) in Kompong Trach. He was also compiling such basic statistics as were available. One possible future weakness of the project was the uncertainty of obtaining trainees of the requisite number and qualifications.

Two local hire interpreters were given basic training in basic laboratory technique and served well, if briefly, in the school health program. They were also invaluable in assisting the U.S. Embassy Clinic in departure physical examinations for all U.S. Government personnel at termination of the USAID assistance.

Training activities at the Kompong Trach Unit were awaiting completion of construction anticipated in July 1964.

However, the Health Education Advisor in cooperation with the USAID Education Division and the RKG Ministry of Health assisted in organizing and conducting training institutes for health education workers, school teachers and monks in FY 1961, 1962 and 1963. In preparation for the School Health Program to follow, health education programs were established in the 14 model rural primary schools and first aid kits supplied to them.

The Health Educator was on home and educational leave at project termination.

f. Urban Water Development

In 1956, the program responded to requests of the RKG to rehabilitate old water-supply systems and build some new ones by initiating a project "...to provide adequate water supply and distribution systems to all the major provincial cities in Cambodia...by the end of FY 1958." The U.S. was to provide dollars for imported commodities and counterpart for local supplies and costs, including labor. The project was to be administered and supervised by the Cambodian Ministry of Public Works in conjunction with the Public Health Division of the USAID.

After some changes in the original work plan, two water treatment plants and distribution systems were planned in FY 1956 in Kampot and Siemreap and three in FY 1957 in Kompong Thom, Svay Rieng, and Kratie. During this period, commodities were ordered from the U.S. and plans were drawn by the RKG for the plants. An amount of \$18,000 was provided in FY 1956 to drill a well at Kompong Chhnang in an effort to locate a new source of water, enabling expansion and improvement of the system there.

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The RKG later decided that Kompong Speu was of greater importance and the proposal was dropped.

It was then proposed to engage an American consulting engineer firm to study and make plans for an American-type water plant at Kompong Speu and the Mission suggested that Michael Baker Engineering Company, working in Cambodia, be given the contract, waiving the normal procedures.

AID/W did not approve the suggestion and much correspondence followed between the Mission and AID/W over the next three years in an attempt to determine the scope of the survey. By 1960 the RKG had apparently lost interest and the proposal was cancelled February 28, 1960, by mutual consent.

In 1958, it was determined that no further assistance would be given beyond the five treatment plants. By then, the concrete work at Siemreap and Kampot had been finished and a contract was let in March 1958, to install the piping and fittings. The remaining water treatment plants were awaiting supplies ordered from the U.S. In 1959, it was discovered that certain supplies and fittings to be purchased by the RKG had not been ordered nor budgeted. These commodities were then ordered by the USAID, incurring an additional year's delay. In late 1959, the plans were reviewed by a USAID engineer and found to be incomplete still more supplies were ordered.

The status of the project at the end of 1959 was as follows:

Svay Rieng: The elevated water tank was constructed without piping. The distribution system laid, but had no connections and no source of water.

Siemreap: Concrete work had been completed for treatment plant. The distribution system was not started.

Kompong Thom: Nothing was done.

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Kampot: Treatment plant concrete work was finished. No piping or distribution system was started.

Kratie: Nothing was done.

Beginning in 1960, the USAID gradually assumed a more active role in the project. The USAID technicians re-evaluated the needs for water at Siemreap, Kompong Thom, Kampot, Kratie and Svay Rieng. New plans, specifications, and bills of materials were completed. Implementation of the plans continued to be very slow and erratic, however, due primarily to the awkward construction and contracting procedures in use by the RKG. The problems resulting from these procedures, and how they were finally overcome by the USAID, are discussed in full in the Education section.

As a result of new contracting procedures negotiated with the RKG during FY 1963, new contracts for each water system were let and consistent and rapid progress in completing the project was finally being made. When the program was terminated, the status of the project was as follows:

Kampot: Construction of upriver supply line, distribution system, treatment, tanks, pumping station, water tower, and general rehabilitation of settling tanks, filters, river intake and pumping station and demolition of old pump house and storage tanks; 53 per cent completed.

Kompong Thom: Construction of distribution system, 2 filters, settling basin, river intake and pump house and demolition of old pump house; 64 per cent completed.

Siemreap: Construction of distribution system, treatment tanks, pumping station, river intake, clear well, water tower and fence; rehabilitation of settling tanks and filters, and demolition of old pump house; 54 per cent completed.

Svay Rieng: Construction of distribution system, two wells, pumping station and water tower; 100 per cent completed.

Kratie: Construction of distribution system, two wells and pumping station completed. Water tower and treatment plant design plans and specifications were completed; construction was waiting delivery of off-shore materials. Reports were that the pipes already laid were clogged, but the RKG had agreed in the FY 1963 Project Agreement to make necessary repairs.

Implementation of this project was, obviously, extremely slow and any evaluation must call it unsatisfactory until FY 1963. The project began in 1956, but by 1960 less than 30 per cent of the work had been completed and because of bad design and faulty construction, both attributable to the lack of technical competence and adequate supervision from either the RKG or the USAID. Not one of the five systems was workable. In addition to the lack of supervision and technical ability, the RKG provided little real support and the U.S. assistance was not coordinated and suffered from a lack in continuity of technicians.

g. Village Water Development

The urban water activity was expanded in 1958 to include the drilling of wells. This had been done on a small scale in two former projects--Sanitary Wells in Rural Areas and Health Support to Basic Education, Wells Section, beginning in 1954. There were 55 wells drilled in 1954; 51 in 1955; 82 in 1956; 113 in 1957; and 95 in 1958. The locations of most of these wells are unknown. Of those located and checked, most were found

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to be unsatisfactory. Although some training was accomplished in 1958-1959, it was not significant, and there was no organization capable of drilling wells in 1959. In FY 1960, the well drilling program was established as a project separate from Urban Water Development. It had two objectives, which remained the same to termination:

- To train an organization capable of drilling 1,000 potable village wells per year and
- To conduct a groundwater study to determine the water potential in Cambodia.

Specifically it was intended to:

- Train a supervisory and administrative staff.
Train drillers, welders, mechanics, and other specialists needed in such a program.
- Develop well drilling techniques consistent with the economic and technical development of Cambodia.
- Develop a level of competency and efficiency in the organization to drill 1,000 wells per year.
- Compile drilling records and cuttings from which a Groundwater Geologist could extract necessary data to be used in the preparation of his report on the Groundwater resources of Cambodia.

Progress was normal during 1960 and 1961 as the rigs, equipment and supplies arrived in Cambodia. In 1960, 36 wells were drilled, all by large machines, and in 1961, 212 wells were drilled, 114 by the large rigs. Meanwhile, the auxiliary personnel such as warehousemen, mechanics and welders were being trained. By the end of 1962, most of the technical

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problems had been worked out and training of field personnel was at the point of rudimentary competence. Also in 1962, 368 wells were drilled, 133 of which by the seven large machines. During the first half of 1963 a total of 487 wells (productive and non-productive) were drilled in spite of the problems enumerated below. Of the total wells drilled to date, about 300 are without hand pumps (which the RKG was obligated to purchase, in accordance with Project Agreements).

In spite of this apparent potential success, the well drilling project was destined for failure, for reasons other than technical competence or financial ability. A listing of these problems and their ultimate effect on the project follows:

Lack of Coordination:

The RKG spent \$286,000 in 1959 and \$343,000 in 1960-1961 in local currency for the water program (city and ground water), chiefly for imported commodities. These purchases were not, however, coordinated with the USAID, and resulted in duplication, waste, and shortages of badly needed equipment. In 1962 the USAID with RKG agreement terminated all local currency support to the program. It was agreed that the RKG would furnish local currency for salaries, POL and locally available supplies while the USAID would provide the imported commodities necessary for the program, pro-rated on the number of wells actually drilled. This was done in an attempt to coordinate the joint financing and to require the RKG to fully provide the funds agreed upon.

Lack of RKG Financing:

As stated above, the RKG provided adequate funds in 1959 and 1960 but these were unwisely spent. In 1961 the RKG agreed to provide \$143,000

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in local currency. None of these funds were provided except to support the salaries of government personnel. In 1962 the RKG agreed to provide \$240,000 in riels. After ten months the RKG spent slightly more than \$86,000 or about 36 per cent of the total. As a result of this lack of money, drilling progress was seriously impeded, wells were drilled but lacked hand pumps, and the morale of the workers declined. Well production fluctuated from a low of 6 in August to a high of 133 wells in December. This extreme variation was caused by periodic shortages of locally purchased supplies (2-inch pipe, POL, etc.) to a degree that drilling crews often had to lay idle. Shortages and delays were attributed to lack of funds but responsibility for the financial problem was difficult to place inasmuch as the Ministry of Plan said the money was available, and the Ministry of Public Works said the money was not available.

Commingling:

In September 1961, four Russian-manufactured drill rigs arrived in Phnom Penh and subsequently three more arrived. These were purchased by the RKG with local currency, apparently from the Russian Commodity Import Program. There was no attempt to use these rigs until the beginning of 1963. Since then two or three rigs have been put into operation and U.S.-purchased commodities have been commingled despite our objections.

Division of Materials:

In March of 1963, the project technicians asked for a USAID audit to confirm their suspicions of irregularities in the RKG administration of the program. This audit was necessarily superficial because only a

few documents were made available to the auditors. The RKG was providing all the local currency and was sensitive to a thorough scrutiny of their own expenditures. However, the Audit (No. 63-11) substantiated (1) commingling, (2) diversion or short shipments of materials, (3) questionable RKG procurement procedures, (4) charging the Village Wells Program for commodities used in other RKG programs, and (5) questionable "loans" of equipment for other purposes.

Subsequent Events:

Despite these deficiencies it was apparent that the program could operate effectively if the RKG Ministry of Public Works would take firm action towards administrative and policy reforms. This was confirmed by the drilling of 487 wells in the first half of 1963, in spite of the mismanagement of the project. Also, the program of well drilling is considered vital to the well-being of the rural people. If properly executed it could have substantially contributed to the U.S. image in Cambodia.

On April 11, 1963, the Director of the USAID discussed frankly with the Minister of Public Works the principal deficiencies of the program, as set forth in a memorandum prepared by the project technician. Although the Minister expressed his concern and said he would investigate the operations of the program, no effective subsequent action was taken. Therefore, on May 10, 1963, a formal letter was sent to the Minister of Public Works, under the signature of the Acting Director of the USAID, which again summarized the problems and pointed out that "truly significant changes will have to be made if the ground water program is to achieve its potential." The question was also posed whether the RKG

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was truly interested in continued U.S. assistance in spite of the commitments it would have to make. No written reply was received but the Minister of Public Works agreed that a Project Agreement for 1963 be drawn up by the USAID project technician in consultation with the RKG National Director of Water and Electricity as a basis for discussion. This Project Agreement carefully spelled out the terms and conditions under which the USAID would continue support to the program with FY 1963 funds. A number of subsequent meetings were held between the Director of the USAID and the USAID project technicians on one part and the Minister of Public Works and the Director of Water and Electricity on the other part, to discuss the terms of the 1963 Project Agreement. The Ministry of Public Works objected to several provisions of the Project Agreement, particularly those pertaining to:

- The firm commitment of RKG funds to purchase locally procured supplies and materials (pump parts, POL, cement, sand, etc.) in advance.
- The USAID review of all RKG expenditures for the program and other provisions that would permit the USAID to be fully informed on all aspects of the program.
- More active participation of USAID technicians in the actual operations and decisions of the program.
- The restriction of money, equipment, materials and proscribed personnel entirely to the activities of the USAID-RKG well drilling program and the correlative prohibition of commingling project equipment, material or personnel in drilling operations where bloc-made equipment was employed.

Negotiations were involved and tedious, with apparent agreement in one meeting but no agreement in a later one. It appeared the RKG would agree only to very generally worded provisions which the USAID was concerned would later be misunderstood or possibly disregarded; e.g., a general phrase restricting the use of project equipment, personnel, and material provided by either the RKG or the U.S. to work performed within the U.S./RKG well drilling program was acceptable, however, the specific defining of the numbers and types of personnel, equipment or supplies (as in Annex A of the FY 1963 Project Agreement) was objectionable. A second example: The USAID could review (and possibly approve) the RKG expenditures and procurement for the program but not all expenditures or procurements.

It was apparent that the Ministry of Public Works was not willing to be firmly committed by tight, enforceable provisions that would require substantial reforms in the management of the project. The RKG's principal objection to the increased participation of the USAID technicians was the question of sovereignty, although there were indications that resistance to substantial reforms was equally important. Unfortunately, the negotiations were not always amicably conducted and following continued differences of opinion antagonism between the Cambodian counterparts and USAID technicians developed.

On June 20, the Director of the USAID in a letter to the Minister of Public Works again set forth the USAID's position in regard to the program, including the statement that "to date, none of the various proposals made by your Ministry permit effective participation of USAID technicians in the program in a manner that would assure us that the deficiencies and irregularities would be corrected." The Director of the USAID expressed his regret that at a time when the program was capable of making substantial contribution to the economic and social well-being

of Cambodia, a workable agreement could not be reached. He said he could only hope that the Ministry would be able to offer a suitable proposal before June 25th because of the deadline posed by the end of the U.S. fiscal year. The Minister failed to offer an acceptable proposal.

Having exhausted the possibility of further meaningful negotiations with the Ministry of Public Works, the Director of the USAID, on June 26th, discussed the problem with the recently appointed Minister of Plan, who expressed his feeling of personal responsibility and interest in the continuation and success of the program, and assured the Director that if the USAID entered into agreement for continued FY 1963 assistance, he would personally intervene, if necessary, should the Ministry of Public Works not fully comply with the terms of the Project Agreement. It is believed that it was only through the intervention of the new Minister of Plan that the RKG, on June 29, signed the FY 1963 Project Agreement, in spite of the "objectionable" provisions mentioned above.

Although the agreement was signed, and there was verbal agreement during subsequent meetings, the RKG did not comply with the provisions and in fact obstructed implementation. At a first working meeting on July 5th, Mr. Chann Pech, the Director of Water and Electricity, asked if the USAID technicians intended to enforce all the points set forth in the newly signed Project Agreement. When told "yes" - he stated that if that was so, "nothing would be accomplished --- because he could block every action the USAID would take." In spite of this blatant admission of his intention not to cooperate, he then proceeded during the course of the

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meeting to agree on most of the points that stemmed from the new provisions. However, in spite of this apparent agreement, his subsequent actions were clearly obstructive.

It became clear that in spite of the terms of the new Project Agreement, the USAID could do nothing further to correct the known irregularities in the program. Therefore, the Mission Director suspended USAID participation in the Village Wells Program by letter personally delivered to the Minister of Plan on August 3, 1963. A prior notification of this action was personally delivered to the Secretary of State for Public Works, on August 1, 1963.

The Minister of Plan reaffirmed the RKG's interest in continuing the project and expressed interest in reviewing the overall problems with the intention of still proposing a workable basis for lifting the USAID's suspension. The Director of the USAID stressed to the Minister of Plan that in considering the possibility of lifting the suspension, he would require complete assurances that the program would not falter in the future.

When the program was suspended there was a sufficient number of drillers trained to operate all of the equipment, as well as assistant drillers in training. These drillers were not fully competent by U.S. standards, but nevertheless they could handle 95 per cent of the drilling problems in a minimum fashion, and two drilling supervisors

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were trained who could be considered satisfactory by U.S. standards.

Mechanics, welders, one machinist, warehousemen, were also trained,

with assistants in training for continuity. The total staff was com-

posed of 183 men divided into the different specialties.

The early phases of the program accentuated training, at the

expense of production. As the training progressed the production

improved until the program was suspended, the level of production

was greater than 1,000 wells per year. In fact, it was the opinion

of the USAID technical staff that 200 wells per month was a feasible

and practical objective with the same crews and equipment. After the

U.S. technicians withdrew from the program, the Cambodians have been

drilling from 50 to 70 wells per month, although pumps have not been

installed because of the failure of the RKG to provide funds.

The Groundwater Geologist reported to post November 12, 1963, during

the period of suspended operations. He has had the opportunity to

review some of the data collected and cuttings from wells drilled since

1960. It is his opinion that with this data and additional drilling,

he would have been able to prepare a report on the ground water resources

of Cambodia, had the program continued.

Although the suspension of the project was lifted in late October,

after the RKG agreed in writing to the conditions set forth by the USAID

and AID/W, the activity never regained operational status before the

termination of all USAID assistance in November, 1963

Basic Studies of Rural Health Problems and Testing of Control Techniques

As discussed in the section on Education, in FY 1961 a test physical examination program was conducted at the Kompong Thom Model School. The

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trial program included trachoma evaluation. Conclusions from this trial were made the basis for additional programs in the 1962 school year. It was also decided to initiate trachoma treatment programs by teachers in schools of high trachoma incidence. Scheduling difficulties with the Ministry of Education, which was very sensitive about visits to schools by foreigners, restricted the scope of the program in FY 1962. However, methods were refined in programs at Model Rural Primary Schools in Kompong Thom, Kompong Trach, Prey Veng, Pursat, and Kompong Chhnang. Children at the Kandal Stung school were examined in the 1963 program.

Of 1595 students in the six schools, rates of trachoma infection were from a low of 27 per cent to a high of 83 per cent, averaging 47 per cent.

Following experience in FY 1962, methods were refined for a program in all 14 model schools for the 1963-64 school year and a complete schedule was worked out with the School Health Department of the Ministry of Education. Trachoma treatment programs were scheduled for ten schools on a six months' interrupted schedule instead of three months in the previous year. General examinations were set up for 14 schools.

Much more difficult procedural problems were encountered in the Ministry of Education and a second and delayed schedule had to be worked out. However, the program was begun on September 3rd at Kandal Stung Model School, but was abruptly terminated on the last day's visit to that school by the Minister of Education; supposedly on technical objections by the Minister of Health. A trachoma survey at Kompong Trach was also done on September 6.

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Much later it was determined that the real objection was because of trachoma statistics published in a USAID publication about examinations done in FY 1962. Following lengthy negotiations and vigorous intercession on behalf of the program by the Director of School Health Services, a new, more delayed year's schedule was worked out with a new starting date of October 21.

Additional procedural delays by the Ministry of Education required another schedule beginning October 27. Due to the long Fete d'Eau holiday and the beginning of the long series of anti-American speeches by the Chief of State, all negotiations stopped and remained so until U.S. program termination.

Pilot Military-Village Trachoma Programs proposed by the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) for the Public Health Division technical supervision were never approved by the Royal Khmer Armed Forces (FARK).

Basic studies in the Kompong Trach area which were to be conducted from the base unit were awaiting completion of the unit and U.S. and RKG staffing at the time of termination.

Advanced Training Abroad for Teaching and Leadership Personnel

Prior to FY 1963, 53 participants were sponsored in this project as follows:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TO U.S.</u>	<u>TO 3rd COUNTRY</u>	<u>NURSING</u>	<u>P.H. ADM.</u>	<u>ACAD. MED.</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Prior to 1958	8	1	7	4	3	0	1
1958	9	0	9	5	4	0	0
1959	15	2	13	4	6	0	5
1960	14	2	12	0	5	0	9
1961	3	3	0	0	1	2	0
1962	4	4	0	0	0	4	0
	<u>53</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>

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In FY 1963 two additional participants began long range training (in Medicine, Ophthalmology) a group of five Health Educators attended a regional conference on malaria. FY 1963 trainees sponsored were reduced by assumption of responsibility for two qualified candidates by the French Economic Mission.

RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

D. SECTOR Health & Sanitation (All Years)

	DIRECT DOLLARS							LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar equivalent)					
	Total \$	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodities \$	Other Costs \$	Total Riels	Total C/P	Total TATF	Technicians TATF	Part TATF	C/S TATF	O/C TATF
ALL YEARS	3866	541	223 (55)	17	2994	91	4824	4473	351	179	66	98	8
FY 64	69	68 (3)	0	0	0	1	13	0	13	13	0	0	0
FY 63	401	105 (5)	20 (7)	0	276	0	798	706	92	41	6	44	1
FY 62	550	85 (5)	36 (4)	0	429	0	203	139	64	36	7	18	3
FY 61	441	91 (5)	36 (3)	7	307	0	402	340	62	32	5	21	4
FY 60	458	82 (4)	26 (10)	10	340	0	351	300	51	30	6	15	0
FY 59	435	70 (4)	42 (15)	0	323	0	250	209	41	27	14	0	0
FY 58	520	38 (2)	34 (9)	0	358	90	200	184	16	0	16	0	0
FY 57	404	0	12 (3)	0	392	0	520	513	7	0	7	0	0
FY 56	432	0	8 (2)	0	424	0	845	841	4	0	4	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	156	2	9 (2)	0	145	0	1242	1241	1	0	1	0	0

Total \$ 3866

Total LC 4824

Total \$+LC 4680

Total Technician Man/Years (estimated) 28

Total Number of Participants 55

In Book II - II-D-30
In Book III - II-D-1

E. EDUCATION

1. Introduction and Background

The number of children in public elementary school increased over seventeen times from 1936 to 1956, and doubled from 1956 to 1963. While there were fewer numbers of students involved, the public secondary school enrollment increased by an equal percentage from 1936 to 1956 and sixfold from 1956 to 1963.

In 1936, the Cambodian public education system was equipped with 117 primary schools attended by 14,337 children; two secondary schools attended by 338 students; two technical schools attended by 257 students; and no institutions of higher learning. In addition to the Cambodian teaching staff of 381, which were at the primary level only, there was a total of 44 French and other foreign professors and instructors or about one teacher per 35 students. The population of Cambodia at this time is recorded at 3,046,000. Twenty years later, in 1956, the number of primary schools had increased better than tenfold to 1317 for 252,238 students; secondary schools sixfold to 12 for 5,965 students; technical schools to eight for 570 students; and there was one institution of higher learning, The Institute of Judicial, Economic and Political Studies, with 134 students. The French and other foreign staff totaled 139. The Cambodian teachers and instructors brought the total teaching staff to 3,476, or about one teacher per 70 students. (This ratio varied considerably at the different levels as did the ratio in 1936. In 1956 the ratios were: 1 to 140 in the secondary schools; 1 to 80 in the elementary schools and 1 to 19 in the technical schools. The French teachers were primarily in the secondary schools.) The population was recorded at 4,359,000 in 1956, and 5,750,000 in 1962.

In spite of this phenomenal expansion of opportunities for education in Cambodia, approximately 43 out of every one hundred adult males

and 80 out of every one hundred adult females were illiterate in 1956. Fewer than two-fifths of the estimated 1,025,000 children of school age could attend school. Concrete evidence of the dedication of the Government to the expansion of education and training can be seen by the increase in the education portion of the National Budget from \$219 thousand in 1946 to the amount of \$9.5 million in 1956. The details of this yearly increase can be seen in the following table:

National Budget for Education in Cambodia: 1946-1956

Year	Thousands of US Dollars
1946	219
1947	394
1948	950
1949	1593
1950	2227
1951	3654
1952	4732
1953	4595
1954	5736
1955	7733
1956	9498

The budgetary increases had not, however, contributed to an equal development at all levels and all phases of the educational system. Most of the budget increase had been for expansion at the primary level, and for both primary and secondary education most of the budget allocations for each year went to meet the costs of the increased teaching personnel required to staff new schools and classes. In 1953, \$3.5 million of the \$3.7 million elementary budget went for personnel; in 1956, \$7.7 million of a \$8 million budget went for personnel; in secondary education the ratio was similar; in 1953, \$429 thousand of a \$486 thousand budget for personnel; in 1956, \$914 thousand of a total secondary budget of \$1.3 million.

a) Elementary Education in Cambodia

The primary education system experienced the most favorable development during his period. Students attending public schools and temple schools (renovated pagoda schools) partially subsidized by the government increased from an enrollment of approximately 92,280 students in 1946 to around 358,000 in 1956. The progress in all provinces of the country and in all schools had not been uniform, however, and approximately four-fifths of the primary schools offered programs up to the level of the third grade only.

Apart from the problem of financing, the most serious problem was the quality of teaching provided at the primary school level. Each year the government was increasingly obligated to engage personnel who had had only six weeks or two months training for their roles as teachers. There is a certain benefit to the country which results from turning back to the countryside numbers of young persons and their talents even though hurriedly trained as teachers. Due to their inadequate preparation the contribution of the approximately 8,000 hastily trained primary school teachers toward development of the nation was not as great as it might have been but this activity evolved into one of the most widespread of all governmental activities and the only one reaching down to the village level on a national scale.

Although teacher improvement conferences during the summer months served to improve the situation, the fact remained that until the country could have better teachers in adequate numbers, the primary system would be handicapped. It was necessary for the government to continue to engage in emergency training of teachers to satisfy the clamor on the

part of the village population for teachers for the classrooms they themselves were providing. The Government gave 200 teachers emergency training in 1948. In 1951 the number was raised to 500. In 1954, 453, and in 1955, 1350. This training continued and it is estimated that 6,000 teachers or instructors trained in this manner are now teaching in the Cambodian elementary schools. The AID program assisted in training approximately 3,000 of these. The total elementary teaching staff numbered 12,000 in 1963.

Due to the village populations providing classrooms for primary schools (albeit many times totally inadequate) without any central direction, the enrollment at the primary school level increased completely out of proportion to the expansion of opportunities at the secondary school level. Correspondingly, the percentage of students who took the examination for the primary school certificate and who passed the examination tended to be much lower than one would have expected.

b) Secondary Education in Cambodia

There were 12 public secondary schools enrolling 5,965 students in 1956. Only one of these schools offered the full Lycee program; two others offered the equivalent of eleventh grade; four offered the equivalent of tenth grade; two offered instruction up to the eighth grade; three offered instruction in the seventh grade. There were 56 foreign and two Cambodian qualified teachers teaching in these schools. There were only 54 students out of an estimated school population of one million at the equivalent of the college freshman level.

For the reasons mentioned above, the secondary school students' chances for advancing from one grade level to the next decreased by more or less 50 per cent at each level. There were 2,307 students in the seventh grade; 1,570 in the eighth grade; 1,138 in the ninth grade; 551 in the tenth grade; 200 in the eleventh grade; and 79 in the equivalent of the twelfth grade. It is clear, then, that the expansion in secondary education from an enrollment of 338 students in 1936 to 5,965 in 1956 was mainly an increase in the lower grade levels of the secondary school system.

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The number of successful candidates for the first cycle secondary education diplomas did not, however, rise in proportion to the enrollment. In 1951 109 diplomas were granted out of 362 candidates; in 1954 only 127 were granted out of 597 candidates. The number of students receiving the 1st or 2nd Baccalaureat was even lower. In 1951, forty-seven students were candidates for the 1st Baccalaureat; twenty-two were successful. There were 189 candidates in 1954, of which 40 succeeded. There were no candidates for the 2nd Baccalaureat in 1951, but in 1952 thirteen 2nd Baccalaureats were awarded out of a group of 34; in 1954, 22 out of 134.

With regard to curricula, the Cambodian educational system can best be characterized as academic. The focus is on enabling a small minority of the students at each level to pass the entrance examination to the next higher level. Instruction is by rote-memory; little or no attempt is made to relate the subject material to actual life, and there are no pre-vocational courses. As indicated above, the people of Cambodia have made great sacrifices to build their educational system, but in terms of preparation for the opportunities available, their children do not benefit beyond a basic ability to read and write.

There are two basic reasons for the academic rote-memory character of the system. First, the serious shortage of trained teachers and teaching materials prevents a more sophisticated type of instruction. In the primary schools, many of the teachers have had little beyond an elementary education themselves and for the vast majority the only pedagogical training consists of an emergency six week course. Because the children do not have textbooks, the principal classroom activity is copying the material the teacher has written on the blackboard. Secondary

schools lack the library or laboratory facilities which could enable the students to relate their academic training to real life interests and problems. There had been no trained teachers or equipment to teach pre-vocational subjects and, further, there had been no significant realization of this need, until some of the activities of the USAID Education program began to bear fruit.

The second reason for the academic orientation of the system is that for a long time the expanding Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) civil service was able to hire all the graduates of the first and second cycles of secondary education who did not go on to higher studies. Secondary education thus came to be considered as a guarantee of employment as a functionary. This helped preserve the tradition, already strong in Cambodia as in most underdeveloped countries, that an educated man is not supposed to work with his hands, which of course has hindered the development of more practical curricula.

Thus Cambodia's educational system at independence was inadequate in many respects but primarily in its lack of adequate physical facilities, trained teachers, and in its possession of outdated, academic curricula inherited from the French colonial administration that were inappropriate to the needs of Cambodians in a rural society. The educational portion of the AID program, once started in earnest in 1954, addressed itself over the years to these needs: to the need for guidance in establishing the required physical facilities; to the training of teachers; and to the need for a reorientation of the curricula to provide a more practical, useful education.

The French orientation of Cambodia's educational system must be kept in mind. The French contribution after independence has been largely confined to secondary education, specifically the provision of secondary teachers, but the basic orientation of the senior personnel in the Ministry of Education was, and is, toward French methods as a result of their study in France and their previous experience under French colonial rule; the curricula and examination system are French; and the language of instruction in most secondary schools is French. The USAID efforts discussed below were made in this climate.

c) AID Program from Inception--Summary

The AID program began assisting Cambodian education in 1952, through the Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM), with the provision of equipment and an additional building for the Battambang secondary school, which was one of three in all of Cambodia at that time and served the students of the provinces of Pursat and Siem Reap, in addition to Battambang. The AID program provided assistance in 1953 through three separate projects which included financing the printing of 90,000 textbooks written by the RKG Ministry of Education personnel; providing equipment and furniture and the construction of one supplementary building for the Technical College and the School of Cambodian Art; and providing equipment and supplies for secondary and elementary schools.

The first project of future significance, however, was not initiated until February of 1954 when a project for expanding and improving elementary education was approved to provide construction materials and equipment for three model elementary schools to be built in three provinces by the

people, and which ultimately provided 14 model schools in the then 14 provinces. Other projects initiated in 1954 provided counterpart funds for equipment and one truck for a Fundamental Education Center being established by the RKG and UNESCO at Tonle Bati, near Phnom Penh; and provided emergency relief to the needy.

In 1955 other projects were undertaken or continued which, influenced the future content of the program.

The expansion of elementary education facilities referred to above, largely through the efforts of the people themselves, created a critical shortage of elementary teachers at the same time the secondary education facilities were being rendered increasingly inadequate by the rapidly increasing numbers of applicants graduating from elementary schools. The Cambodian Government requested U. S. assistance in both these areas and the USAID responded in 1955 with projects addressing both the short and long range problem of teacher training. Projects were initiated to provide a six-week intensive training course for 280 prospective elementary teachers and a course in the U. S. for two participants to enlarge three buildings at the Normal School in Phnom Penh to facilitate the accelerated elementary teacher training program; and to assist in improving the school supervisory system which had not grown with the increase in facilities and enrollment. The Fundamental Education project, begun in 1954, provided additional funds in 1955 for the development of a Fundamental Education system which now foresaw model centers providing fundamental and adult education courses in five provincial capitals. Most important, however, was the initiation in 1955 of a project to develop a Rural Education Demonstration and Training

Program with a Center to train elementary teachers to be established at Kompong Kantuot. The Center was to be established through a contract with the Unitarian Service Committee.

The emphasis on lack of facilities and trained teachers continued in 1956 with the initiation of a project to finance the construction materials for four new provincial secondary schools and the enlargement of secondary school facilities in six additional provinces; and with an increase from three to four in the number of model elementary schools for which construction materials were to be provided. Both these activities were described in 1956, for the first time, as being closely associated with the activities in Fundamental Education, the Rural Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot and the improvement of the school supervisory system. The elementary schools were clearly described as models of practical education, while the secondary schools were more loosely associated and were primarily for the purpose of increasing the available facilities at that level.

There were other activities undertaken in 1956, and others, begun earlier, that were continued, notably the textbook production effort which supported the preparation of 750,000 books, and the continued development of the Fundamental Education project which committed additional funds in 1956 to train 56 new "leaders" (the project now foresaw a total of ten provincial centers) and additional funds for Kompong Kantuot. Four other activities were undertaken in 1956, but were essentially peripheral to the main program that was developing. These four were: (1) provision of equipment for a rattan cane making shop at the Phnom Penh prison; (2) a four-month participant course in the U. S. for nine

Fundamental Education Leaders to study health and nutrition. (3) assistance to Cambodian craftsmen in developing and adopting new techniques designs and materials to existing handicrafts in order to increase their commercial value. (4) a project intended to aid the RKG in developing low cost cement block housing and small public buildings by the purchase of 48 cement block pressing machines and the defraying of local costs. "The RKG was to provide the cement labor and other local materials. While some housing was built in one of the three intended villages, the project did not succeed due, apparently, to lack of full financial support from the RKG and interest of the villagers in living in this type of housing, which was poorly designed for the Cambodian environment. In addition to the provincial housing, the project provided funds for the construction of 10 - 20 houses in the Tuol Kork section of Phnom Penh. The houses were sold, and the funds were to be used to build more. Available records do not indicate to what extent this was actually done."

While, in retrospect, the future direction of the program began in 1955, the above projects remained separate activities until 1957, when the fundamental, elementary and secondary education activities were combined in one project called Rural Development Through Education, and the small assistance to technical education was superseded and absorbed by the initiation of major assistance to the National Vocational-Technical School. Rounding out the program, was the initiation in 1957 of a project in English Language Instruction.

From 1952 through 1956, the AID program committed a total of 455,000 U.S. dollars and \$2,272,000 in local currency for education. Of this total \$895,000 in local currency (33 per cent) were committed for school construction; \$414,000 in dollars and \$635,000 in local currency (38 per cent) for teacher training; and \$23,000 in dollars and \$371,000 in local currency (15 per cent) were committed in support of textbook production. Elementary Education received the most attention, 37 per cent of the total commitment going to that sector, while Secondary Education received 13 per cent of the total funds committed for education during this period.

As indicated, the education program was concentrated in three projects in 1957 i.e., Vocational Industrial Education, Rural Development Through Education, and English Language Instruction. The program continued to develop around these three activities with the addition of a project to provide an engineering school at the university level in 1961 and a special secondary school in Phnom Penh with English as the language of instruction in 1962, both at the request of the Cambodian Chief of State. In 1962 a sixth project was added to provide, at Siem Reap, a second teacher training center, instead of an additional 12 model secondary schools. The center was initially intended for both elementary and secondary (1st cycle) pedagogical training, but was later limited to training for elementary teachers.

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By 1963, the program was considered ready for a shift in emphasis in planning future projects from construction of needed physical facilities to increased concentration of improving the quality of instruction and the content of curricula. Efforts in this area had been a part of the program since 1957 but had been largely overshadowed by old construction activities. Although existing commitments for new construction projects for special institutions, which included the Khmer-American School, the Siem Reap Teacher Training Center, and possibly a modified Institute of Technology, were substantial, the completion of the old construction projects was expected to enable increased attention to purely technical assistance activities. This evaluation was supported by Prince Sihanouk's call during the 14th National Congress in 1963, for an educational reform program which would reorient the Cambodian educational system from its academic nature to one affording a more practical education. The Rural Development Through Education project had sponsored the successful introduction of a course in practical activities at the elementary level, and the development of a program to introduce industrial arts, including pre-vocational agricultural education and practical activities at the secondary level was begun. Concurrently, the Rural Development Through Education project (known as the Public School Education project after 1960), the English Language Instruction, and the Siem Reap Teacher Training Center projects were combined in a project called Teacher Education and Curriculum Development, leaving the education program in 1963 concentrated in a total of four projects providing curriculum development, pre-service and in-service teacher training and specific

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institutions: 1) Teacher Education and Curriculum Development; 2) the National School of Arts and Trades; 3) the Khmer-American Friendship School; and 4) the Institute of Technology. In addition the first steps in a project providing a University of Agriculture were being implemented; discussed in the Agriculture section.

As this summary indicates, the USAID's Education Program went through a number of transitions and was changed in direction and emphasis several times from its inception to its last revamping in Fiscal Years 1962 and 1963.

In spite of continuing intention and attempts to effect concentration and coordination of the education program, the net result until FY 1962 was an overemphasis on construction versus technical assistance; and a loose grouping of projects conceptually related but implemented as distinct activities.

The Education program was delayed for years by a large number of uncompleted construction projects and long delays in starting planned ones. These construction activities encountered seemingly unending delays, plan changes and escalating costs, and ended by overshadowing to a major extent the technical assistance activities.

Greatly intensified efforts in 1962 and 1963 had resulted in the substantial completion of the old projects and elimination of unproductive activities and by, 1963, the Education program was marshalled around the central elements of educational reform, teacher training, and the provision of special institutions. The pressure of unemployed graduates of the academic educational system was providing impetus to

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the USAID's efforts in reorienting the curricula to emphasize practical education. The implementation of the National School of Arts and Trades project was gaining increasing momentum and the English Language Instruction project had been expanded and reoriented in 1962 to include IVS personnel. The National School of Arts and Trades project included a strong technical assistance element in that the future faculty of 100 was already in the U.S. for training. The majority have thus far elected to remain to complete their studies.

The engineering school, called the Institute of Technology, was not begun and had become involved in complicated negotiations leading to its substantial modification and possible cancellation. The initial phases of the Siem Reap Teacher Training Center were being implemented at the time of termination, with expectations of lasting impact and of a success similar to that experienced with the Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot. The technical assistance aspect had been included to a significant degree in the planning of the institutions by planning the training of the faculty in the U.S. and the presence of an American contract team.

Implementation of the Khmer-American School was also beginning, after difficult negotiations in 1963 had appeared to overcome the efforts of leftists in the Ministry of Education to obtain the buildings without U.S. influence in the development of the institution. The same elements of technical assistance had been included in this project as in the Siem Reap Center, but all the problems of resistance to American influence had not been definitively resolved.

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The Education program was handicapped from the beginning by the influential position of the French and a strong preference for French educational methods. This was due both to the French presence for ninety years during which they installed a French oriented system, and to the fact that many of the top Ministry of Education officials were educated in France. The preference for the French system was not true of all the Ministry officials — some were actively interested in the USAID Education Reform program, and the USAID was successful in starting an institution to provide educational services to the provincial schools in addition to the course of practical activities at the elementary level. In addition, the National School of Arts and Trades received consistent RKG support as did the successful Kompong Kantuot elementary teacher training center.

The Education program's major contributions were the provision of new, and enabling the improvement of old, school facilities, the teacher training center at Kompong Kantuot and, potentially, the participant training program which is being continued. The Kompong Kantuot Center, in terms of inducing change, was by far the most important.

There was promise in the Education program, particularly as the construction activities were brought under control and the ideas of practical education seemed to be taking hold, but this promise was largely unfulfilled at the time of termination. The participant training aspect of the Education program, which is continuing with over 100 students presently in the U.S., holds out continued promise for influencing the thinking of Cambodia toward American education, and the U.S. in general.

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2. AID Program by Major Project

a) Introduction

The detailed discussion that follows is organized around nineteen major projects and sub-projects in order to view the complexity of the program from 1957, when its first major project was initiated, to 1963, in a coherent manner. In fact many of these projects overlapped, absorbed, or grew out of each other.

The projects chosen as reference points in the following discussion are:

Rural Development Through Education (1957-1959)

Public School Education (1960-1962)

Teacher Education and Curriculum Development (1963)

- Fundamental Education
- Elementary Education
- Rural Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot
- Secondary Education
- Arts and Crafts
- Pre-Vocational Education
- School Health
- Bureau of Technical Services
- Textbooks
- Audio Visual
- Industrial Arts
- Home Economics
- School Rehabilitation Project

Siem Reap Teacher Training Center

English Language Instruction

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Khmer-American Friendship School

National School of Arts and Trades

Institute of Technology

The detailed discussion of the Education program from 1957 to termination by project and sub-project follows:

b) Rural Development Through Education (1957-1959);

Public School Education (1960-1962);

Teacher Education and Curricula Development (1963)

While the Rural Development Through Education project was changed in emphasis, name, and number since its inception, it can be considered as the beginning of a coordinated effort in assistance to elementary and secondary education on the part of the AID program. Its most important predecessors, (which it absorbed), Expansion and Improvement of Elementary Education, the Rural Education Demonstration and Training Center at Kompong Kantuot and Fundamental Education, as well as other projects undertaken from 1952 to 1957 discussed above, were still separate, essentially unrelated activities. The project Rural Development Through Education was an attempt to launch a coordinated program with its principal concentration on the development of rural areas-- community development--and its successors constituted the major project of general scope in the Education field from its inception to termination of the AID program. Further, it incorporated the major educational construction activities until 1961. It was, obviously, a broad project, calling initially for training several teams per province of research, arts and crafts, and home and family life specialists. A Rural Education Demonstration and Training Center, a Village Improvement Center, and a

Fundamental Education Center were to be built to serve as the training ground on the national level; and model elementary schools and community centers were to be constructed in each province and existing elementary schools were to be ameliorated to serve as the nuclei of pilot blocks for the community development program on the provincial level. In addition, there were a number of activities for improving the quality of primary and secondary school teaching, teacher workshops, classroom aids, and the establishment of a Bureau of Technical Services. The following excerpt from revision #1 of the FY 1957 Project Agreement dated April 23, 1957, presents the basis of the project as conceived at that time:

"There is to be a training ground on a national basis and provincial points of adaptation. The national training ground encompasses the geographic limits within Kandal province, which bound the National Fundamental Education Training Center at Tonle Bati, the Rural Education Demonstration and Training Center at Kompong Kantuot, and a Village Improvement Center. The provincial points of adaptation include model community schools in the rural areas and a Provincial Education Center in the provincial capitals--one of each in each province. The national centers will receive trainees from all over the country, and whatever is good or being developed within the national training ground area, will be adapted to the needs of the individual provinces at the Provincial Centers. Functionally, the national, as well as the provincial centers, will be training centers. Thus, this project proposes to: 1) Develop a training ground area with three national training centers; 2) Develop model community schools and provincial educational centers in each of the

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14 provinces; 3) Assist the Ministry of Education in the development of a Technical Bureau which, in the execution of its function, will assist in the coordination of the various aspects of the general education program, while helping the general educational system to improve qualitatively."

The community development plans never materialized due, it is believed, to the fact that there was never a firm plan for concentrating the limited amount of manpower available. There were additional problems for U. S. participation in the RKG's Community Development Program (see below), and by 1962 it had become clear that continued assistance in community development was not the best use of the resources available to the program and that element of the project was dropped.

In 1960, the title of the project was changed to Public School Education, and the principal activities within the project had by then become the construction of the Rural Demonstration and Fundamental Education Centers, the Bureau of Technical Services and the model schools, and providing technical assistance in instituting practical activities and general curricula improvement at the elementary level. The beginning activities of providing construction materials for first three and then four elementary and four secondary schools to be built by the local people had by then expanded to completely financing the construction of fourteen elementary and two secondary model schools, practical arts buildings for three other model secondary schools, and the amelioration of nineteen existing elementary schools.

From 1960 to 1963 efforts were intensified to complete the remaining construction and increasing emphasis was being given the

introduction of practical activities, improving the quality of instruction, and general curricula improvement.

As this project was essentially a grouping of inter-related activities, it lends itself to detailed discussions by sub-project, which follow:

1) Fundamental Education (Community Development)

During 1952 Cambodia established within the Ministry of Education a National Directorate of Fundamental Education. A rural site at Tonle Bati, 20 kilometers from Phnom Penh was chosen for a training center for 26 fundamental educators. Working in teams, these educators were established in four provinces (Kompong Thom, Kandal, Siem Reap, and Battambang) to work with villagers to solve problems in agriculture, health, handicrafts, and literacy in order to improve their living condition.

The AID program initiated a project in 1954 which provided U. S. assistance in the further development of fundamental education in Cambodia by financing, with counterpart funds, boarding school equipment, furnishings, carpenter tools, gardening tools and one truck to the Fundamental Education Center at Tonle Bati. In 1955 the project provided additional funds for the RKG's Fundamental Education program which at that time foresaw the establishment of model centers of six classrooms in two provinces in 1954-55; in three provinces in 1955 and in three more in 1956. Two provinces had been chosen for experimental courses in adult and community education--Kandal and Siem Reap. The RKG program was being jointly supported by the AID program and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO was

providing the advisors and one was in Cambodia in 1955. A total of five UNESCO experts were planned.

Funds were approved in 1956 for the procurement of equipment and materials to be used in the training of 56 new fundamental education leaders, for training of 90 adult literacy teachers, for fundamental education activities at the four provincial locations, for adult literacy activities, and for audio and manual arts training equipment. Six new provincial centers were planned at Kompong Cham, Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, Prey Veng, Kompong Speu, and Kampot. In fact, 63 additional educators were trained at the Tonle Bati Center in 1956 and assigned to work with adults in rural areas, allowing for the extension of fundamental education to four new provincial centers instead of six, bringing the total to eight. Equipment and material was provided for training the fundamental education leaders at the Tonle Bati Center. Training was also given to "monitors" who assisted the program by conducting literacy classes for adults. About 50 sewing machines were delivered for use by the National Office, the Center at Tonle Bati, and the provincial centers. Records and information studied do not reveal the types or quantities of audio-visual equipment and materials provided.

In 1957 the Fundamental Education project was absorbed by the Rural Development Through Education project which, as explained in the Introduction, was originally conceived as a community development activity. In 1957, additional funds were made available for participants, equipment, and commodities for the Fundamental Education Program. The overall project, Rural Development Through Education, sent 81 participants to the U. S. and third countries (mainly the latter and the vast majority for short terms).

The Fundamental Education Center at Tonle Bati was initially constructed by the RKG and consisted of temporary type, pailote structures. As stated above, the U. S. provided supplies and equipment for its operation beginning in 1954. Funds were subsequently provided by the AID program for the expansion and improvement of the Center, and the temporary structures were replaced with the more permanent facilities in operation there now. The Center was essentially completed in its present form in FY 1962, although some rehabilitation work, discussed below, was undertaken in FY 1963.

The last of 14 community centers, one in each major province, was turned over to the RKG in FY 1963. The USAID provided funds for the construction and equipping of these buildings in FY 56, 57, and 58. Once constructed, United States Information Service (USIS) assumed responsibility to assist in their administration. Previous plans to build Community Centers at Stung Treng and Kratie were cancelled by mutual agreement between the Ministry of Education and the USAID as the conference halls provided in the model elementary schools in these localities were judged sufficient to meet the community's needs in this regard.

This sub-project is considered a failure as a technical assistance activity. From its inception until 1960 its principal role was the supplying of commodities, equipment and funds for construction to the RKG Fundamental Education Program, which looked to UNESCO for technical advice. Although the purpose of the project was to provide guidance in curricula development and training of both a faculty staff at Tonle Bati and of provincial teams, in addition to financial support, the technical assistance provided prior to 1960 was primarily concerned with the construction of Tonle Bati and an active participant program. The

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latter sent large numbers of participants to the U. S. and, mainly, third countries for short terms. The best estimates available indicate, however, that the program did not benefit from this training as the vast majority of trainees did not apply any lessons learned.

In 1960, a review of the sub-project was conducted by the Program Office and the Education Division in an attempt to reorient it to emphasize the technical assistance element. The advisor until 1960 had been a technician with experience in educational publications rather than community development and a qualified advisor was recruited and arrived in 1960. In spite of the considerable efforts of the technician from 1960 to 1962, the reorientation of the project was never accomplished and the only tangible result of the USAID's assistance to the RKG's Community Development Program is the Fundamental Education Center at Tonle Bati. Further, experience would indicate that the Center itself will not, in all probability, be maintained properly.

The following excerpt from an assessment of the sub-project in May of 1962, by the Community Education advisor reveals the range of problems encountered:

"Developments within the last year point to the increasing deterioration of the program; a loss of key Community Development (CD) personnel to other programs; an exodus of two out of every three graduates from Tonle Bati to other employment; barely enough applicants to supply a year's training class of 70 for Tonle Bati (and these at a sub-academic level); lack of women applicants and trainees and complete disorganization of the woman's training program; the complete impossibility of eliminating weak and unsatisfactory personnel either during or after training; a

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training institution which has always operated at less than 50 per cent efficiency of the potential of its physical facilities; plus the most damning indictment of all: a rural development program that doesn't have one person who actually lives in a Cambodian village. These developments would justify the restriction rather than the expansion of CD program, in order to set their house in order."

The failure of the U. S. effort in community development reflects the failure of the RKG Fundamental Education Program. Apparently the program was originally designed somewhat like the Indian program, based on multipurpose village level workers through whom all education, health, and agriculture extension activities were to be funneled. The program was to begin in limited pilot blocks of villages. The village level workers, called Educators, were to be trained at Tonle Bati.

There was never, apparently, a firm plan of concentration of limited manpower in the RKG or USAID program. The basis of the Indian and other successful community development programs is to concentrate enough trained manpower and material in a limited area to get the people moving at a self-sustaining rate of development. The idea of community development is based on the hypothesis that only by concentration on limited areas and limited goals can the basic inertia of underdeveloped areas be overcome. Instead, the graduates of Tonle Bati were widely scattered and given, it appears, far too many goals. Finally, the multipurpose workers of the RKG Direction of Fundamental Education were disregarded by numerous other agencies which initiated their own extension activities. The Ministries of Agriculture and Health devised extension programs of their own, and the Sangkum (the political party

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of the RKG and Prince Sihanouk) and the Royal Khmer Socialist Youth (JSRK) became deeply involved in community development activities, generally disregarding the Direction of Fundamental Education. The result was too many separate programs in the RKG effort, which tended to draw the USAID's efforts in the same direction, and a continued unproductive budget burden for the RKG.

As stated above, Tonle Bati was finished, with a capacity of 200 students. The facilities include four dormitories, classrooms and administrative offices, faculty housing, power house, maintenance shop, garage, and water tower. In 1963 it had only 60 students and no permanent faculty. Most of the graduates have left the Direction of Fundamental Education for more lucrative fields. There were 287 left, as of the end of the 1961-62 school year. They have headquarters in 36 out of 100 sroks in Cambodia. What they have accomplished is very difficult to evaluate, since it is almost impossible to determine who was actually responsible for many community development-type projects. The 1961-62 annual report of the Ministry of Education claimed that Education de Base has "developed" 197 villages in the past year. This would seem simply villages that have been affected in one way or another by Education de Base programs of one sort or another. Specifically, they claim, among other things, to have dug 100 wells, built two granaries and five libraries. With about 10,000 villages in Cambodia, the impact is relatively small.

The USAID spent over \$800,000 on community development. Tonle Bati cost about \$350,000 in local currency, the 12 Salles Communes cost \$120,000 in local currency, and additional material aid and technicians

probably cost at least \$100,000. The remainder, approximately \$400,000, was for training programs and local supplies.

2) Elementary Education

This sub-project embraced all the activities initiated under Rural Development Through Education concerned with the model elementary schools and their use as experimental and demonstrational centers for the development and introduction of better curricula, teaching methods, and community education programs.

A large part of the efforts of the USAID in elementary education was concentrated on the model school program. The main goal of the overall program was to create a curricula and methodology sufficiently functional and pragmatic to prepare students to earn a living in the Cambodian environment. Because in many cases the physical plants were barely finished, the model schools were only beginning to be effective as demonstration centers when the program was terminated.

The sub-project began in 1952 as the project entitled Equipment for Primary Schools, in response to a request from the RKG which stated that the rapid increase in elementary schools, being built in large measure by villagers without referent to the National Budget, had outstripped the budget's ability to provide equipment. In its first year, the project provided equipment and furnishings for primary schools throughout Cambodia, and the construction of a three-classroom school building at Battambang.

In 1954, the title of the project was changed to Expansion and Improvement of Elementary Education, and provided construction materials and equipment for three model elementary schools in three provinces. In 1956, the number of schools was increased from three to four with the provision of more foreseen in future years.

The project proposal presented by the RKG foresaw the creation of four such schools in 1956; five more in 1957; and five additional in 1958 for a total of 14. The proposal indicated the USAID would provide local currency in the amount of approximately \$80,000, the RKG over \$27,000 and an additional \$7,000 would come from other sources for a total provision in 1956 of approximately \$115,000 in local currency. The proposal anticipated a future requirement of approximately \$230,000, but did not specify the sources. The following excerpt from an Education Division memo presenting a summary statement and recommendations (the program review system in use at that time) states the purpose and design of the project:

"Purpose of Project - The creation of the model schools proposed in this project seeks to be fundamentally Cambodia's beginnings toward a Community Development program through rural education. The facilities are to be established on a self-help basis, with the local inhabitants assuming the responsibility for all labor and building costs other than costs of materials of construction. The schools will be centers for the community, serving adults as well as children, with not only classrooms but also space for school and community health care, manual arts, community meetings, rural library, school gardens, and the raising of animals."

The quote given above emphasizes Community Development, and, in fact, heralds the coming of the project's successor, Rural Development Through Education. In 1957, the latter project absorbed the model school activity and provided approximately \$286,000 in local currency for the creation of an additional ten model elementary schools. By the spring

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of 1958, construction in three provinces was well advanced and the remainder were considered in the final planning stage. The FY 1958 Project Agreement committed an additional \$200,000 in local currency for the construction of a total of fourteen elementary schools. By the spring of 1959, four of the schools were almost complete and already in use, and plans had been approved and contracts let for the remaining ten. The FY 1960 Project Agreement committed \$285,714 in local currency for the unfinished schools. By the spring of 1961, three schools had been completed and the remaining eleven required the addition of a conference hall wing. The FY 1961 Project Agreement committed still another sum--\$314,000 in local currency--which completed the financing of the model elementary schools. The last school was turned over to the RKG in FY 1963. As can be seen from this brief accounting of the construction and financing history of these schools, difficulties were encountered and their completion took considerably longer and cost considerably more than initially estimated. These difficulties, which included and perhaps revolved around lack of engineering competence, on the Mission, RKG, and private contractor staffs, are discussed in full under the Rehabilitation Project below.

In addition to the construction of the model elementary schools, nineteen existing elementary schools were renovated and improved through the provision of materials by this activity. The actual renovation was accomplished by the local people. Initial plans called for improving more, and the FY 1959 Project Agreement foresaw the amelioration of twenty schools per year through FY 1963. Funds were first provided in the FY 1957 Project Agreement and additional funds were committed in the

FY 1959 Project Agreement for the improvement of 20 schools, but were decommitted in FY 1960 when the decision was made to discontinue the activity due to a request from the RKG to ameliorate several secondary schools instead. This request eventually led to the addition of practical arts classrooms to the five model secondary schools.

As indicated in the opening paragraphs of this discussion, the efforts of the USAID program in elementary education, while concentrated in construction, were not limited to that type of assistance. The Community Development orientation initially conceived did not develop as planned, and technical assistance was provided to improve the training of elementary school teachers, including assistance in learning modern teaching methods, and to introduce revised curricula better suited to the needs of elementary students. The technical assistance objectives were to be accomplished by using the model schools as demonstration centers.

The elementary education advisor arrived December 31, 1958, and terminated her second tour in April of 1963. Initially the technician spent a large part of her time inspecting and supervising school construction. The last of the 14 model schools was only opened in July 1962.

During her second tour she managed to schedule three visits a year per school plus repeated visits to certain schools where special problems or programs were being handled. Among the special programs stressed were reading, art, science, teaching, agriculture, health, and school cooperatives. Long before the agriculture education advisor arrived, some of the model schools had programs of school gardens, although no

courses in agriculture were included in any curricula. The school health examination and treatment program, described below in the section on School Health, was started largely at the initiative of the elementary education advisor. The model schools were the first to organize school cooperatives to obtain school supplies for the children at substantially lower prices than in ordinary retail stores. These cooperatives were organized and operated by the school children themselves.

On her trips the technician spent much time with provincial inspectors trying to get them to use the schools as demonstration centers. She was successful in Siem Reap and Battambang, where all the teachers of the province were brought in during the year for a full day of classroom observation. In other provinces, teachers from the county in which the school is located have visited the model school. Generally, every province has a regular program of teachers' conferences but only on a county level.

During both tours the technician conducted workshops providing training to about 100 directors and teachers of the model schools at each. In between trips and workshops, the technician collected books for the school libraries. Seven of the schools had received books at the time of termination.

Under the participant program the National Director of Model Schools was sent to the U. S. for seven months of observation. This program was considered necessary because the directors had had either no pedagogical training or brief, classic French training many years before. Yet they had to supervise teachers who had received recent, relatively good, pedagogical training at Kompong Kantuot.

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At the time of termination fourteen schools had been built and were ready for expanded use, visible evidence of American aid in every province. In the model schools the teacher-student relationship had begun to change from a rigid one to one that is more relaxed and genuine as a result of training at Kompong Kantuot and the workshops. Some children were being taught by the experience method rather than rote chanting. Teaching aids of all sorts had been shown to be desirable and they were being used in other schools. Demonstration classes as an application of modern methodology were being accepted as a successful device to provide continuity in updating teachers. Finally, bloc influence had been kept completely out of elementary education.

The chief problem had been the lack of continuity or, put in another way, the high rate of turnover among school personnel. The schools were supposed to be staffed completely by graduates of Kompong Kantuot. About 95 per cent of the first teachers from Kompong Kantuot transferred out of the model schools after one year. The turnover rate has since dropped to 33 per cent, but many of the schools are now staffed heavily with teachers who are not graduates of Kompong Kantuot. The principal cause of the high turnover is housing. Teachers who must live in remote areas, in very sub-standard housing, often paying very excessive rents, have sought positions where they could live in provincial capitals or with their families.

A second problem was the lack of contact between the advisor and her counterpart, the Director of the Model Schools. During the advisor's second tour, the National Director of Model Schools spent only 1½ days in visits to the Model Schools together with the technician. During the

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workshop of the summer of 1962, he was only present half of each day.

This was partly due to the fact that he also had the more important portfolio of Chef de Cabinet of the Ministry of Education.

Other problems were overcrowding, some classrooms designed for thirty students were holding fifty; and under-age or over-age children in school. A serious problem for many schools was lack of water. This prevented the development of school gardens and some parts of the home economics program.

While the model elementary schools held promise for an important role as demonstration centers of modern teaching methods and curricula, particularly in association with Kompong Kantuot and the future Siem Reap Teacher Training Center, they cannot be said to have played a significant role up to November of 1963. One important factor in the limited contribution of the project to the time of termination in this regard was the location of the model schools. Many were located far from population centers, lines of communication, and sources of water and electricity. The effects on a demonstration program are obvious.

The most lasting contributions of the AID program to Cambodian Elementary Education are the fourteen new and 19 improved schools, and the Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot. While the latter was an integral part of the elementary education activity, it is discussed separately below because of its marked success and importance.

3) Rural Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot

Kompong Kantuot had its origin in 1955 when the project entitled Rural Education Demonstration and Training Program was established to provide the initial funding for a contract with an American educational institution for the development of a center for such a program. The following excerpt from the original project agreement presents the concept of the center at that time:

"Cambodian villagers are building many more rural primary school classrooms than there are elementary school teachers to staff them. The momentum of these mass efforts for expanded educational opportunities in rural areas, amounting to something like 600 to a thousand new classrooms a year, makes the whole problem of the adaptation of the school system to the needs of Cambodia decidedly more urgent.

"This project is aimed at the development of a Rural Education Demonstration and Training Program which in the process of training rural school teachers for primary schools of Cambodia would be an experimental center for:

- a. The preparation and testing of textbooks, reading material, teaching manuals, and visual aids.
- b. The development of changes in curriculum and teaching methods.
- c. The improvement of programs for: (1) the in-service training and up-grading of teachers now in practice; and (2) the pre-service practice teaching for Normal School students.
- d. The development of school programs in health, gardening, home economics, manual arts, general community education, and communications.

"The Rural Education Demonstration and Training Center is to be located in a rural area approximately 20 to 26 kilometers from Phnom Penh. The Center itself and the adjacent primary schools in the rural villages would constitute a training ground for teachers. The students to be trained and the professional staff for carrying out the training are to be located at the training site. The facilities of the center will consist of staff and student housing, training and demonstration classrooms, and probably a small laboratory school.

"The Rural Education Demonstration and Training Center would be under the direction and supervision of American specialists and their Cambodian counterparts. The American staff, consisting of teacher training curriculum, textbook, school health, vocational training, and instructional aids specialists will give guidance to the training staff of Cambodian educators according to their particular specialties in the development of activities for the actual training of approximately 200 student-teachers. Both American and Cambodians will have the responsibility for coordinating the training function of the school with the programs of established educational institutions such as the Normal School. Through the Ministry of Education the benefits of the experimental work of the Rural Education Demonstration and Training Center will be made available to the provincial school authorities and to all services and agencies in the educational and training field."

A contract was signed with the Unitarian Service Committee, Inc., (USC) December 28, 1955, for the development of the center, "for the specific purpose of training elementary school teachers and for the general purpose of improvement of elementary education. . . ."

The first USC staff arrived in April 1956, and construction started that year. A four-year program of secondary education, plus teacher training, admitting students from the sixth grade was established. Textbooks and materials in science, mathematics, social science for the students and instructional guides for the teachers were prepared. Audio-visual aides, agriculture and arts workshops were set up. The first class was admitted in December of 1957.

The center grew steadily after December of 1957. The director was sent to the U. S. for extensive study, and a member of the faculty went to the U. S. to observe teaching methods. In 1961 the first class of 160 was graduated, and the first full graduating class of 200 completed their studies in 1962. Enrollment is now at its maximum of 800. The facilities include twelve houses for Cambodian faculty members, one infirmary, two classroom wings, four dormitories, one administrative building, one generator shack, one water tower, and one garage. The total cost of the sub-project to the U. S. was \$878,000 and \$1,738,000 in local currency.

The center is considered as perhaps the nearest to an unqualified success of any single activity the AID program undertook in Cambodia. By graduating 200 elementary teachers every year, the school raised the total number of teachers graduated each year in Cambodia by 36 per cent. Plans were underway in 1963 to change the program to a three year one, taking students from the 10th grade and giving more intensive teacher training. If carried out, the change would enable the school to graduate 33 per cent more teachers without increasing its enrollment from the present 800.

The center is one of few schools in Cambodia that selects its student body on the basis of competitive examinations; further, it has the largest number of applicants of any school in Cambodia.

The graduates of Kompong Kantuot are generally considered by most Cambodian primary education inspectors to be the best in Cambodia. Although young, with the equivalent of only a 10th grade education, they devote 25 per cent of their studies to pedagogy for four years. The academic workload is substantially heavier at the Center than any other comparable school. The curricula includes the full course of a normal lycee plus pedagogical training. The Center teaches American-type methodology, and the graduates seem to apply imaginative methods enthusiastically. By November 1963, the Center and its graduates had already had considerable impact on the Cambodian educational system and it is felt its influence will continue despite termination of the program, for as long as Cambodia remains free of communist domination. One of the principal factors making this project a success was the unusually high quality of the Cambodian Director of Kompong Kantuot. His energy and dynamic personality have played, and still play, a key role in the school's development.

4) Secondary Education

The rapid expansion of the Cambodian elementary education discussed above placed its secondary system under increasing strain. The number of students granted certificates for secondary education was 821 in 1948; in 1954-55 the number had increased to 3,245. In 1953-54, out of 3,461 students receiving the certificate, only 1,546 (less than 50 per cent) were actually able to enter secondary schools.

U. S. assistance to Cambodian secondary education began in 1956 when a plan d'action submitted by the RKG, entitled Expansion of the Secondary System, was approved to provide construction materials for four secondary schools of ten classrooms each in four provinces: Kompong Thom, Kompong Chhnang, Prey Veng, and Takeo. The schools were to be built by the local people themselves. The 1956 Plan d'Action provided \$130,000 in local currency for the four schools, but in addition committed the U. S. to provide approximately \$99,000 in local currency for the enlargement of secondary school facilities in six additional provinces. The schools were to serve as models of a more practical education and were to be a part of the overall educational improvement effort including Kompong Kantuot; Tonle Bati; and the improvement of the system of supervision of primary schools.

The FY 1958 Project Agreement stated that the construction of the schools was well advanced, and provided approximately \$57,000 in local currency for this purpose. The FY 1959 Project Agreement planned for a total of \$139,500 in local currency for secondary education construction, including the construction of four buildings to house practical arts courses and science laboratories at Kampot, Kompong Thom, and Kompong Chhnang; the construction of one 10-classroom building at Pursat; completion of the schools at Kompong Thom and Prey Veng.

During FY 1960, the decision was made to construct an additional 12 model secondary schools bringing the total to 17. However, during FY 1961, the decision was made to construct, at Siem Reap, a second elementary teacher training center similar to Kompong Kantuot, in lieu of the 12 additional secondary schools. The plan of the USAID program in assisting

secondary education in FY 1961 was, then, improvement and expansion of existing secondary schools at Prey Veng and Pursat, including addition of practical arts classrooms, and also for construction of three practical arts buildings, one each at Kampot, Kompong Chhnang, and Kompong Thom. The FY 1961 Project Agreement provided approximately \$211,500 in local currency for the practical arts buildings and approximately \$171,500 in local currency for the Pursat Secondary School. (An additional wing was later approved for the Pursat school, bringing its total number of classrooms to 22).

The purpose of the project as it finally evolved, therefore, was to enable the five model schools to serve as demonstration centers in plant development, administrative organization, and modern methods of instruction and use of materials. Modern methodology and curriculum revision was to receive the greatest attention, since the 1958 RKG Program of Secondary Education, which is basically the pre-World War II curricula, prevails. From FY 1962 to November 20, 1963, increasing emphasis was placed on completing the model secondary school construction. It was not, however, until FY 1963 when the Public Works Division of the USAID was reorganized that sustained progress was made in this direction. The construction activity in the field of secondary education had experienced, in even greater degree, the same problems mentioned above in the elementary education field. The problems are discussed in detail below, in the sub-section entitled School Rehabilitation Project, which itself was one direct result of these difficulties.

As with Elementary Education, this project was pervasive and was intended to cut across most of the education projects. Elementary level

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graduates go to the secondary level; the future Siem Reap graduate teachers would have had a modern curricula to teach; the textbooks provided by the textbooks project would have also affected the secondary level. This program was related to the Khmer American Friendship School, the purpose of which was to provide a model curricula and education at the secondary level. The results and experiments made through the model secondary schools undoubtedly would have helped to launch and guide the Khmer American Friendship School program. It was also directly related to the Industrial Arts program at the secondary school level.

Once again evaluation of the effort made is difficult. Efforts to revamp the secondary school curricula (as well as all other curricula) along modern and practical lines suited to the needs of Cambodia at its current stage of development have been implicit in all education projects. Essentially, the plan to introduce modern elements into the curricula was based on close personal contact with Ministry officials by the USAID advisor. This effort was considerably handicapped by the lack of continuity of technicians assigned. The secondary advisor position was vacant at one period for 19 months. Much of this work would have been done through workshops and seminars, the first of which was planned for the spring of 1964.

The overtures made to RKG secondary level officials to revise their curriculum were not very warmly received. The first inroads occurred after the Chief of State's address to the National Congress in January 1963, in which he cited the lack of employment opportunities for school graduates at all levels, especially the secondary. All were hoping to become fonctionnaires, as this was the tradition. This problem was

further accentuated through failure to give secondary graduates practical and commercial training, occupations largely held by Vietnamese and Chinese minority groups. The USAID prepared a proposal for revising the Cambodian curricula, which included courses in industrial arts and pre-vocational agricultural education at the secondary level. These programs are discussed separately below.

In conjunction with the Chairman of the Oregon University Contract Team for the Siem Reap Teacher Training Center and Khmer American Secondary School, both discussed below, and the education and industrial arts advisors, it was hoped that the secondary education advisor could have exercised this particular function with reasonable success. It must be recognized, however, that although a foundation finally had been laid whereby the technician could attempt a coordinated influence on Cambodian secondary education, such attempts were consistently limited by the preference for the outmoded French approach to education and a strong reluctance to change.

In secondary education, as in Fundamental Education, with the exception of the Arts and Trades School, the major contribution of the program at the time of termination would appear to have been the provision of physical facilities, plus a minor participant program (nine Ministry of Education administrators were sent to the U. S. and third countries for short term observation/training trips). Although there had been limited success in influencing change in curricula and methods of instruction when the program was terminated, there were indications that Ministry officials were becoming aware of the need for a reorientation of the system to one providing a more useful education. Higher officials,

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and many lower ones, had been aware of the need for some time, and the achievement of this goal would have undoubtedly been facilitated by the recent increased concern of the RKG to make secondary education more practical and functional, itself a result of the Chief of State's public statements on the subject.

There was promise of overcoming this lack of lasting impact in secondary education through the Industrial Arts sub-project which was preparing a program for introduction into the secondary curricula. This activity is discussed in full below.

Construction activities at the last two model secondary schools, Kampot and Pursat, were 94 and 96 per cent complete, respectively, November 20, 1963.

5) Arts and Crafts

This sub-project began in 1957 as a part of the Rural Development Through Education project and called for introducing a practical activities course into the elementary schools and for training multipurpose workers in arts and crafts. A technician came to the Mission in March 1959, and the first Project Agreement outlining the program was signed with the RKG in FY 1960. As a first step, an administrative program was established as the section for the Promotion of Practical Activities within the Ministry of Education. Supervisors and special teachers were then trained through in-service programs and summer courses. The USAID provided basic hand tools for 50 provincial school shops at a cost of \$14,000 while the RKG provided approximately \$57,000 in local currency to expand the program to other schools. The sub-project is now completely phased out, but it was of importance as the prototype for the other practical activities efforts.

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The Prince himself had been concerned that the increasingly large numbers of people being educated disdained working with their hands. He himself called for a program of Travail Manuel in 1957, to develop respect for working with the hands, both in and out of school. An additional reason for the program was the lack of basic mechanical skills in many villages. Children did not have an opportunity to use tools and materials at an early age, and consequently were not acquiring the basic manual dexterity to develop further skills. To some extent, and in some areas, farm income was limited as a result, because farmers could not supplement crops with "artisanat rurale" as is done in some parts of Cambodia.

Eight provinces with two-thirds of the population had a total of 176 school shops in 1963, indicating a total for the entire country of about 270, or about 25 per cent of the students in six-year schools. This would indicate that the RKG had contributed approximately \$57,000 in local currency to equip 200 schools, the number they claimed, from 1961 Five Year Plan funds, but none since. This means that about 20 per cent of the 1200 six-year schools now have the program in all six grades. The geographic distribution of these schools which have the program is very irregular. It is most widespread in provinces such as Pursat and Kratie, where opportunities for secondary education are most limited and least developed in provinces such as Takeo and Kandal where secondary schools are most widespread.

The course is taught one to one-and-a-half hours a week. The first through third grades work with paper and clay, mainly with the object of developing dexterity. This program is probably found in most

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schools, whether or not they have shops. The program of the fourth through sixth grades varies widely, depending on the availability of materials. If they have a shop, and if wood is available, they make increasingly difficult items out of wood. They generally start with a wooden hanger and work up to items of furniture. The quality varies widely, depending on the ability of the teacher. They also work in bamboo and rattan. The program calls for sheet metal work in the sixth grade, but this is rarely found outside of Phnom Penh and Kandal province. In a number of schools, however, they have made small oil lamps.

One impressive aspect of the Arts and Crafts program is the work students do in repairing and maintaining the school themselves. This is generally done outside of classroom hours. They repair windows, broken chairs and thatch siding. At one school they built a substantial pigsty and chicken coop.

While the sub-project is considered a success in introducing a practical activities course in elementary schools, the course does not count in any way toward credit for graduating from primary school or getting into secondary school. As a result, the course tends to be ignored in schools where the pressure is great to qualify the children for secondary school. Teaching arts and crafts does not carry the prestige associated with academic subjects. An additional problem is the teachers, who are still not adequately trained. Often they are not capable of quality woodwork themselves. Their lack of training reflects itself particularly in the disorganization of very many classes, with several students standing around to use one tool. This problem has been solved in Kandal Province, where an able supervisor has gotten all the

teachers to break their classes up into five groups, each working with a different material. But it will take many more summer training sessions before supervisors and teachers are adequately organized.

Finally, there is the problem of allocation of funds. On the basis of 200 shops, equipment for one shop costs about \$285 in local currency per year. With the elimination of Five Year Plan funds and the reduction of the Ministry of Education material budget in 1963 from the original 1962 budget, there is no apparent source that this money will come from, unless some material expenditure is cut back. By simple projection it will require about \$28,500 in local currency a year for ten years to equip all the schools. In addition, working materials must be acquired, and in many provinces wood is expensive. Unless the course is given a more important place in the whole school program, it is not likely that funds for expanding Arts and Crafts will be forthcoming. It is felt that failure to make funds available would reflect more a lack of sustained interest than financial inability.

6) Pre-Vocational Agriculture

The bulk of the graduates of elementary schools will be farmers. Khmer farmers could increase their incomes by growing a greater variety of crops and by better farming practices. The purpose of this project was to establish a course in the primary schools that would teach students the basic techniques of good farming, how to think about their farming practices, how to obtain and use technical help, and how to vary their crops and practices intelligently.

The USAID project had its origin in a letter from the Minister of Education on 16 October 1961. In this letter he asked that the USAID

expand the Practical Activities Program to teaching Agriculture and Home Economics in the primary schools and to teaching Industrial Arts in the secondary schools. A memo from the USAID Director set up the initial financing from FY 62 funds for Practical Activities. The Project Agreement for Practical Activities for 1962 called for a technician, who arrived at the Mission in June 1963. The first commodities, \$4,000. worth of seeds and hand tools, were ordered in February 1963.

Many elementary schools already have gardens, in which the students work two hours a week. In addition, as part of the science course, students visit the fields at various times of the year. However, no teachers have any training in agriculture. A large number of the gardens have failed because of lack of water or because they were poorly managed. The technician selected 50 schools, two to four in each province including the model schools, where a pilot program would be introduced in the fall of 1963. Before the fall of 1963 teachers would have been trained and the schools would have received tools.

Shortly after the technician's arrival, three teachers were assigned by the RKG as demonstration specialists for the section. Their in-service training was begun immediately, about two hours a day, and they began studying English at the Bi-National Center. They accompanied the technician on all field trips, and had started to make trips themselves to pilot schools. The technician visited all the pilot schools at least a second time, giving them guidance on the preliminary development of their garden.

An administrative-supervisory office was provided within the already established section for practical activities. A national curriculum for

agriculture education had been developed and adopted by the Ministry and basic instruction in agriculture had begun in the elementary schools. Small amounts of equipment were supplied by the USAID to supplement that provided by the RKG. During the summer of 1963, an intensive six-week summer training session was given 15 provincial supervisors, 3 teacher trainees and 20 selected teachers under the sponsorship and supervision of the USAID technician.

It was still very early in the sub-project when the AID program was terminated. However, several of the gardens had shown considerable improvement and had demonstrated the results of good farming practices. Also, in the district containing the model school in Battambang Province, in an area of predominant monoculture, a number of families had started gardens with plantings the children took home from school.

Water was one of the biggest problems for the demonstration program in the model schools. Many schools were so devoid of adequate water sources that gardens were impossible. In particular, several of the model schools were totally without water. This problem was one of those addressed by the Rehabilitation Project, discussed below. As usual, money was expected to present an additional problem. It was anticipated that smaller 1963 budget as compared to the original budget for 1962 would force a curtailment of equipment procurement and training courses by the RKG for Agriculture Education.

7) School Health

In 1962 the director of the model school at Kompong Thom informed the Elementary Education Advisor that he was looking for some kind of special program that could have an impact on the entire community. The

advisor suggested a school health survey, and contacted the Health Education Advisor of the USAID Public Health Division. After an initial examination of the students of the Kompong Thom School, they decided to extend it to all the model elementary schools. In addition, they instituted a trachoma treatment program. The project was implemented by the Public Health Division of the USAID, and is discussed in detail in the Health section.

Ultimately the purpose of the project was to induce community level health action. It was using simple health programs that could obtain results and yet be managed by the village itself. A good example is trachoma treatment. It costs only 10 cents per person, and a reasonably intelligent person can be taught in a few hours to identify the disease and administer the treatment correctly. The results would be evident to everyone in the community. It was hoped that local committees, such as those formed by the village for the building of a school, would undertake such programs themselves.

The survey was also obtaining essential basic data for future RKG public health programs. This was the first time that a survey of the general health of a large segment of the population had been made in this country. With a sampling of 6,000, the results would have been statistically valid for all school children and may have been significant for the population as a whole. In particular, the survey was checking indices of general health, hemoglobin, chest measurement, etc., and diseases such as trachoma, head lice, hookworm and other intestinal parasites, skin diseases, and diet deficiencies. The survey was trying first to ascertain what diseases actually are the most debilitating to school children in Cambodia. The

second step was to determine what inexpensive, easy-to-administer treatment could be used to combat the most heavily debilitating diseases. Testing the treatment would have followed to determine its effectiveness in Cambodia without major environmental changes.

8) Bureau of Technical Services

U.S. assistance in establishing an organization capable of providing the greatly needed support services to Cambodia's educational system can be said to have started with the Survey of National Resources, discussed under the Public Administration sector, which the education officials of the RKG and the USOM participated in and which was expected to provide valuable demographic information which would guide the development of the educational system. The FY 1957 Project Plan for Rural Development Through Education specifically provided for assistance to "...the Ministry of Education in the development of a technical bureau which, in the execution of its function, will assist in the coordination of the various aspects of the general education program, while helping the general education system to improve qualitatively." That year's Project Plan provided funds for six participants to go to the U.S. and local currency for educational, economic and social studies as a beginning in the formation of such an organization.

The FY 1958 Project Plan for Rural Development Through Education stated that the service was functioning as to the educational survey and foresaw the activation of audio-visual services, an enlarged Textbook Development Bureau, and a general educational statistical service in the fall of 1957. In addition the FY 58 Project Plan provided for the construction of a building to house these services. Additional funds were

provided in the FY 1959 Project Agreement for Rural Development Through Education. Funds were also provided for textbook and audio-visual services.

In FY 1960, the Bureau of Technical Services was established as a sub-project of the Public School Education project - successor to the Rural Development Through Education project - and the Project Agreement for that year outlined the program as follows:

- The construction of an adequate physical plant for the Bureau to contain administrative offices, a materials distribution center, a library, an arts and crafts center, an audio-visual production center and an educational tests and measurements laboratory. Construction will be completed before FY 1962.
- The development by FY 1964 of an educational library having approximately 5,000 volumes and headed by a trained librarian.
- The development by FY 1964 of an educational tests and measurements laboratory for measuring child growth and development, skills and achievements under a trained staff member.
- The analysis of accumulated statistical data for the purpose of planning a school program to meet primary educational needs consistent with the budgetary resources of the country.
- The development of an audio-visual center to evaluate and produce audio-visual aids by CY 1961.
- The development by FY 1962 of an office within the Bureau for efficient purchasing, storage and distribution of education supplies, books and equipment furnished the public schools by the Ministry of Education.
- The production and distribution of elementary textbooks according to needs expressed by the Textbook Commission of the Bureau working with

U.S. educational technical advisors. The plan is to produce one or two textbooks each fiscal year, 1962 through 1964, to meet the need for arithmetic and science books in particular and others as required. The preparation of this number of textbooks over this period of time will enable the Cambodian writers with the Commission to continue producing texts without U.S. assistance after FY 1964.

- Participant training in the U.S. and Third Countries to prepare Bureau personnel for their particular specialty, i.e., textbook writing, audio-visual production, etc.

The FY 61 Project Agreement for the Bureau and its revisions provided funds for the addition of second and third floors to the Bureau building; for basic furnishings for the building; for the salaries of two artists, one script-writer and two typists and for financing the publication of 20,000 teacher's manuals for the textbook service; for participants; and equipment to enable the audio-visual service to increase the production of sound films.

In FY 1962, the textbook and audio-visual activities remained as one sub-project with the title changed to Textbook Production. The textbook production and audio-visual activities are discussed immediately below.

9) Textbooks

One of the greatest impediments to the effectiveness of primary education in Cambodia is the fact that no children have any textbooks. Much of the classroom time is wasted while the teacher writes class material on the board and the children copy it in notebooks. Moreover, without textbooks and proper accompanying teachers' manuals, it is impossible for the teachers to get away from ineffective rote learning methods. There are no suitable

texts available, only scattered uncoordinated books without accompanying teachers' guides. The RKG must start from nothing, train the textbook writers, and then write new textbooks in Cambodian, with teachers' guides. Since Cambodian teachers generally do not have the training to develop lesson plans from textbooks, they must have very detailed teachers' guides, telling them exactly what to do throughout the class.

U.S. assistance to Cambodia in the area of textbooks began in 1953 when STEM provided for the reprinting of old textbooks and publication of some new ones in the Khmer language. The texts were for the elementary grades and included 50,000 geography, 40,000 arithmetic and 20,000 civics books. Supplementary funds were provided in 1954.

In 1955 the RKG appointed a Textbook Commission composed of ten representatives from various agencies of the Ministry of Education. The Commission was organized to write and evaluate textbooks for use in elementary schools. The FY 56 Project Plan provided dollars for participants (2 to the U.S.) and educational training supplies; and \$343 thousand in local currency for printing 750,000 textbooks and for some training. The texts included, for the most part, Readers for Grade I, 100,000 copies; arithmetic, science, and health books for Grades I - 100,000 copies, II - 75,000 copies, and Grade III - 75,000 copies; spelling and language books, Grade I - 100,000, II - 75,000, III - 75,000; and manuals for teachers, 7,500 copies. The texts were written and illustrated by the RKG Textbook Commission. The project as conceived in FY 1956 had an increasingly long range aspect and was concerned with the training required to enable the Cambodians to develop the Textbook Commission into a permanent institution. In fact, the project could have

become self-sustaining with the funds provided at that time, had suitable consideration been given to distribution and future use of the books thus far produced. Instead, the books were simply given away. The FY 57 and FY 58 Project Plans indicated a technician was being requested. Additional commitment of funds in FY 59 was to be used for a summer school workshop concerned with the educational resources and materials to purchase paper and other materials necessary for the production of books and other education materials, and to print (1) a teacher's manual - approximately 25,000 copies and (2) a first book to read - approximately 75,000 copies. The FY 1959 Project Plan foresaw the local acquisition and production of teaching materials continuing through FY 1964 and technical assistance continuing to FY 1969.

By 1960 the U.S. had provided \$397,000 mainly in local currency for the textbook project. A report prepared in 1960 on the Bureau of Technical Services, of which the Textbook Commission and the USAID project was a part at that time, indicates that there had been no effective technical assistance provided and further, that none was requested by the RKG. There were indications, however, that an advisor would be accepted and the decision was taken that the textbook advisor position, then vacant, should be continued and a technician recruited. Although the records are very sketchy, all evidence points to the conclusion that the funds provided to 1960 had been utilized by the RKG with little or no reference to the USAID. A bookmobile and 2,500 textbooks in English and French for teachers and students had been furnished and were still available for use. The only technician provided thus far had prepared an 8-page health booklet for the second grade and

the USAID financed the printing of 125,000 copies, which were distributed to all second grade teachers and to about 50 per cent of the second grade pupils.

Two Cambodians had been provided training in textbook preparation by the USAID. One served on the teaching staff at Kompong Kantuot and is now in the Office of Cultural Relations, Ministry of Education. The other, after completing two years study at the Institute Nationale Pedagogique to increase his professional rank, is working with the Textbook Section. The Director of the National Office of Educational Services spent three months during 1961 in the U.S. to study modern methods of textbook planning and writing as well as school supply distribution programs. Commodities supplied had included a bookmobile, English and French references for the Library Section of the Office of Educational Services; and photographic equipment, tape recorders, and French and English films for the Audio-Visual Section. In FY 1961 small amounts of booklets, filmstrips, films and recording equipment were ordered.

The technician was not assigned until FY 1962 when increased attention was given to the technical assistance aspect. The purpose of the sub-project as seen then was to assist the RKG to plan and develop a functional program for the preparation and production of textbooks in the Cambodian language for elementary school children by: (1) establishing an adequate section for the preparation of textbooks in the Office of Educational Services under the direction of the Ministry of Education, and (2) preparing a series of textbooks in each of four major subject-matter areas, arithmetic, science and health, social studies, and the language arts.

During FY 1962 the major part of technical assistance was devoted to

training personnel in techniques and procedures for writing textbooks. Careful study of teaching objectives, principles, and methods was made with counterparts to give them opportunities to increase their knowledge and understanding of more modern educational practices. A basic study was made by the technician and Cambodian officials of the course of study for elementary schools, textbooks that were available, textbooks that had been purchased by RKG and distributed to schools since 1958, staff and organization for textbook development, and procedures for preparing textbooks. Training materials were prepared by the technician and discussed with the Director of the Office of Educational Services to provide understanding of the textbook situation and to furnish bases for planning a functional program. In addition, the technician visited schools with counterparts to observe and study teaching methods and materials in relation to textbook needs and preparation. Four additional counterparts were employed by the RKG in July 1962 to work with the technician. The Director of the Office of Educational Services appointed an Acting Chief and an assistant for the Section. With regard to preparation of texts, the Ministry of Education agreed that the Textbook Section give priority to the development of arithmetic textbooks. Subsequently, the official course of study for arithmetic in grades one through six was studied with counterparts. The Textbook Section wrote, in Cambodian, a guide for teaching arithmetic in elementary schools, and a manual with instructions for use with the arithmetic book. The Section also wrote a manual on how to make and use simple aids for teaching arithmetic. The Audio-Visual Section of the Bureau of Educational Services provided the artwork; the Section for the Revue de l'Instituteur Khmer, a periodical inspired by

the USAID, has published portions from the textbook. A special library for the Section was started by the technician and counterparts. The staff uses these materials to study selection and organization of subject matter content, illustrations, and general techniques of presenting subject matter.

The FY 1962 Project Agreement provided for printing three books to be prepared by the Textbook Section under the guidance of the USAID advisor. The expense was to be supplemented by the RKG. The guide for teaching arithmetic in Cambodian schools was published, as were 30,000 copies of the arithmetic text for the first grade.

The contribution of the project's early years toward improving Cambodian education was limited to the financing of reprinting and publication of textbooks and assisting in the development of the ability to prepare texts. The problems of production and distribution had been recognized but not resolved, although the idea of renting the books was being entertained. It was believed, however, that the project, as reoriented in FY 1962, was slowly but surely gaining momentum and would have had significant results and played an important role in the overall effort of the program toward improving both the elementary curricula and the quality of instruction.

10.) Audio-Visual

This activity's predecessor was the Mass Communications project discussed below. In FY 1961 that program was reduced in scope and its residual activities were included in the Bureau of Technical Services sub-project.

As already indicated, it was decided in 1960 to add a third floor to the Bureau of Technical Services building to house an audio-visual

production center. The center consists of three sections: (1) Motion Picture Production; (2) Radio (magnetic sound recording); and (3) a photographic dark room. Equipment, including sophisticated electronic gear, was ordered in FY 1961 and FY 1962. This equipment cost a total of \$18,500.

The FY 1961 Project Agreement indicated that, as a part of the technical assistance in the preparation of textbooks and educational materials, one objective would be to increase the production of sound films through the provision of required equipment. It was not until FY 1962, however, that training in the use of the equipment was included in the activity. Actual training did not begin until FY 1963, and was being conducted at the time the program was terminated. The equipment, with the exception of a film washer and dryer installed in the photographic dark room in FY 1963, was being held in the AEA warehouse pending the completion of training. It was turned over to the RKG when the program was terminated.

The activity had not accomplished its objectives when the program was stopped. Further, there was considerable doubt as to when and if it would successfully "increase the production of sound films...". The last Communications Media Officer thought the project was inadequately designed, particularly with regard to training and generally with regard to scope. He had prepared a more comprehensive program, but the program terminated before it could be considered.

Fourteen RKG employees were given some training and the Chief of the Bureau of Educational Services went to the U.S. on a three-month study tour on preparation of education materials and administration of educational services.

The project as designed would have required outlays from the RKG budget that exceeded, from all indications, the government's interest in the activity. This factor had already resulted in the underutilization of the staff in training, whose salaries were costing the RKG over \$57.1 Thousand in local currency annually.

11.) Industrial Arts

As already discussed in several sections, certain levels of the Cambodian Government had long been interested in seeing a change in the Cambodian educational system, particularly at the secondary level, which was graduating increasing numbers of young people trained only for a life of government service or administrative work. The problem had been recognized for some time, but during the past few years the number of secondary school graduates had been much greater each year than the number of government jobs open. The result was that in 1963 the number of unemployed secondary school graduates was estimated to be between 3 and 4,000. With over 11,000 students entering public secondary schools each year by 1963, the number of this group was expected to grow several times over the next few years. The Chief of State had spoken publicly of the problem in the past, but never so forcefully as in a speech to the National Congress on January 8, 1963. In this speech he asked for educational reforms that would enable the educational system to prepare students for private employment and relate their academic learning to actual life. The speech was followed by a series of general meetings of top education officials which set up a permanent Education Reform Committee to take decisive steps to change the orientation of the educational system from academic to pre-vocational.

As discussed above, the USAID had already implemented a successful Arts and Crafts project which introduced a course in Practical Activities at the elementary level, and had been planning to introduce practical activities courses at the secondary level since 1958. In FY 1961 the RKG requested assistance in establishing an Industrial Arts course at the secondary level. Practical activities classrooms were added to three of the model secondary schools and equipment for such a program was ordered in 1962. The Chief of State's call for reform, and the subsequent actions of the Ministry of Education, provided an impetus to the project that had previously been lacking, and the USAID Education Division began developing a preliminary plan prior to the arrival of the technician requested earlier. This plan served as the basis of discussion with members of the Education Reform Committee, which resulted in a request for assistance from the Committee. The technician arrived in March of 1963 and began immediately to prepare a complete program for presentation to the RKG. The program was presented by the technician to his counterpart who accepted and signed it in June 1963, indicating his approval.

The program as presented included the following:

- Initiating the Industrial Arts program in 6 secondary schools, preferably in the 5 model schools and another school selected by the RKG.
- The purchase of additional Industrial Arts equipment so as to offer skill training in a minimum of 5 basic trade areas, woodworking, metals, electricity, power mechanics and drafting.
- Receiving and inspecting and warehousing Industrial Arts Equipment ordered in 1962.

- Planning and organizing a production for learning program, operators of this program were to be the 9 recruit Industrial Arts Teachers. They would have been improving their skills in woodworking and at the same time, producing the furnishings such as work benches, tool cabinets, drawing tables, stools, chairs, bins, shelving and bulletin boards for the six pilot schools.
- The planning of a teacher training course consisting of a series of units of instruction and teaching methods which was to be presented to the Recruit Industrial Arts teachers previous to their teaching assignment.

The teacher training program would have two phases. During the initial pilot phase, graduates of the School of Arts and Trades would work under the direction of an International Voluntary Services (IVS) volunteer graduate Industrial Arts teacher in each of the three schools. Their status would be that of contract teachers. Beginning in September 1965, the School of Arts and Trades would conduct a two to four year university level training program for Industrial Arts teachers. The length of the course would depend on the future level of teaching.

The course would have given all boys in the seventh and eighth grades exploratory training in junior shops in five areas: woodworking, metal-working, power mechanics, electricity, and drafting. Those showing adequate performance in their two years in the junior shop would have been allowed, in the ninth and tenth grades, to specialize in one of these fields for two more years, in the senior shops. Thus, the pilot schools were to be initially equipped with junior shops only; when the students who started the course in the seventh grade were ready to move into the senior shops

in the ninth grade, the senior shops would have been installed.

The RKG regarded this as a pilot program. It set up a special committee to study the problem of introduction of pre-vocational courses in the secondary schools and appointed an Assistant Director of Secondary Education to work full time on this matter. It had, further, authorized up to five hours a week of class time for the course in the schools in which it was to be introduced. Because of the very heavy investment required to establish the course in a school - about \$29,000 in equipment and furnishings and about \$40,000 in building space - the Ministry of Education planned to observe the pilot shops in operation before establishing the course as a permanent part of the secondary curricula and before committing funds for equipment. Once the shops had been in operation, by FY 1966, further obligation of new USAID funds for equipment and new contract personnel would have been considered, dependent on the RKG acceptance of the course and investment of its own funds in equipment.

This activity then, was the major effort of the USAID together with the RKG to achieve the specific educational reforms requested by the Chief of State in his speech to the National Congress of January 1963. Its ultimate purpose was to introduce a course in Industrial Arts into all public secondary schools over a ten year period, thus enabling all students to obtain some kind of employment involving manual skills upon terminating their secondary education, at any level from the eighth grade on.

The project was on the verge of the first stage of implementation when the AID Program was terminated. Public recognition of the USAID's part in the RKG's efforts to effect reforms occurred after termination, and the decision was made by the Ministry of Education to continue the project as designed.

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12). Home Economics

The first activities of the AID Program in Home Economics were considered a part of the Fundamental Education project. Aside from some participant training, it would be difficult to differentiate the initial home economics activities from the overall Fundamental Education Project. Later, after the change in emphasis in the general education project away from Fundamental Education, Home Economics was considered one element of the Practical Activities sub-project (discussed in this report by its separate activities - Arts and Crafts and Home Economics). The technician ultimately provided by the activity came to the Mission in 1959, initially in connection with the Agriculture Extension Project. She was transferred to the Education Division in 1960, when the USAID was providing assistance to the Tonle Bati Fundamental Education Center and she consequently placed primary emphasis on that activity. It was not until 1961 that the technician actually began working with the Practical Activities sub-project. In attempting to implement a Home Economics program, the technician encountered persistent difficulties: (1) poorly trained and little experienced personnel assigned to teach and the inability, or refusal, of the RKG to provide permanent staff to be trained; (2) lack of a supervisor counterpart; and (3) a general lack of comprehension of Home Economics as a field of work.

The technician developed a program and conducted training programs, and began the job of persuading the Ministry of Education officials of the need to overcome the problems mentioned above. She was thought to have made sufficient progress to warrant her return for a second tour in 1962. It was soon clear, however, that the kind of Home Economics activity the AID

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program was equipped to offer would not be successful in Cambodia for some time to come.

All the elementary model schools already had Home Economics courses teaching sewing and cooking from one to two hours a week and in certain provinces, such as Kratie and Kandal, girls in Grades 4 - 6 were already taking Home Economics whenever the boys were in the shop taking Arts and Crafts. The model schools and a few others had Home Economics rooms, which were sometimes equipped with sewing machines. The provincial inspectors generally admitted that it should be more a course in health, but were unable to do much more than teach sewing and some cooking, because the teachers were totally untrained.

Home Economics, as it is taught in the U.S., is very different from what the RKG appears to want, for two reasons: First, American public health environment is vastly different; the housewife does not have to provide a one-woman public health service, as in Cambodia. She does not have to worry about water pollution, sewage disposal, or tropical diseases, and these matters are never taught in Home Economics. Secondly, the heavy emphasis of American Home Economics on such things as baking and machine sewing would be almost entirely out of place in Cambodia. To a great extent, the competence of the technician would have to overlap that of the Health Education Advisor. Moreover, unless the technician had previous experience in tropical, underdeveloped areas, she would have a great deal to learn before she would be ready to advise on the matters in which the RKG is most interested, or to appropriately train teachers.

After the technician departed post in August of 1962, the Mission deleted the position and no further projects in Home Economics were planned.

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The only continuing activity in Home Economics was a participant program for two Cambodian ladies in the U.S. They departed in the spring of 1963 for one year with the possibility of an extension for an additional year.

13) School Rehabilitation Project

Due to the Cambodian educational system's lack of physical facilities, the AID program's construction activities in the field of education constituted an unusually large portion of that program, and clearly out-weighed the technical assistance element up to 1963. It is believed the reasons for this, indeed the necessity of it, are made clear in the preceding sections. It was recognized that the physical plants alone would not make the kind of long term contribution desired, and technical assistance was provided concurrent with the construction activities, but it was not receiving primary attention, and was greatly overshadowed by the construction requirements.

The first educational construction project was initiated in 1954. All but the Bureau of Technical Services of the major educational construction projects were initiated, either partly or wholly, by 1956. The construction of the Bureau was initiated in 1958. None were initially expected to take more than two years to complete. Only Kompong Kantuot took less than five years to finish and only it was sufficiently completed to enable the Center to open close to its original opening date - 1957. Tonle Bati was considered complete in 1962 - six years after the decision to assist in construction was made; the

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last of the model elementary schools was completed in July 1962 - six years after the original plan foresaw the completion of the last one; the last two model secondary schools, Kampot and Pursat, were not complete in November 1963 - seven years after the project began; the Bureau was turned over to the RKG in 1963 - five years after the first funds were provided. Even the National School of Arts and Trades project, considered the best conceived and implemented project in the education field after 1960, had been in existence for six years by 1963, and it was not complete. Meanwhile the technical assistance element was playing a secondary role.

The ultimate expense to the U.S. of these construction projects was as far from the original estimates as were the completion dates. Kompong Kantuc was originally estimated in 1955 at from \$300 thousand to \$600 thousand; its final cost commitment was \$1.7 million in 1961. The model elementary schools were initially expected to cost approximately \$30 thousand each; the ultimate cost was about \$70 thousand each, with the individual cost ranging from \$60 thousand to \$110 thousand. The model secondary schools were expected to cost approximately \$60 thousand each. The final cost was not known since they were not all completed, but a very close average is \$230 thousand each. The final cost of Tonle Bati - \$340 thousand - came closer to the original estimate of \$285 thousand.

These costs do not include the expenses of another construction type project found necessary in 1963 - The School Rehabilitation Project. In connection with a general review of the Mission's construction activities undertaken in 1962-63, discussed more fully below, a survey was made of all

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educational construction activities, as well as certain agricultural and public works projects. The survey revealed that many of the schools built or, in some cases still being built, already needed rehabilitation due to poor construction, no maintenance, and the long construction time that had been involved. This project undertook that rehabilitation under the direct supervision and operation of the Mission's recently reorganized and re-staffed Public Works Department. The project was 70 per cent complete, had cost thus far \$83 thousand and was expected to have cost \$120 thousand if completed.

As good an explanation for these developments as exists is found in the report to AID/W on the reorganization of the Public Works Division, and the corrective measures and procedures implemented in 1962-63 by the then Chief of that division. Following are those excerpts considered pertinent to this discussion:

"Under the initial construction inspection arrangements with the Cambodian Government for joint USAID/RKG projects, the RKG Ministry of Public Works was responsible for on site inspection. In the fall of 1962, a USAID inspection team visited all construction sites, both of completed projects and of projects then under construction. It was readily apparent that the RKG inspection services were inadequate and insufficient. To correct deficiencies in previous construction projects, a rehabilitation program for schools and agriculture stations was established. Maintenance crews under the supervision of the Public Works Division began in January 1963 and will complete their work in December 1963 repairing roofs; replacing inadequate hardware; repairing windows, doors, toilets and utilities, and accomplishing site grading. On all projects then under construction, the reorganized Public Works Division

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began performing, in conjunction with the RKG Ministry of Public Works, direct daily or semi-weekly detailed inspection control to insure adequate construction work.

In re-establishing good construction management controls over USAID/RKG projects, it was deemed necessary to not only establish strong on site construction surveillance, but also to modify the previous contract award procedures. Under the initial contracting procedures previously utilized for joint USAID/RKG projects, the following sequence of operation existed:

- Based upon the scope of work outlined by the EI and subsequent Project Agreement, the Public Works Division prepared the construction plans. Only in the cases of the Khmer-American Friendship Highway, the Khmer-American Friendship School, and the Development of Kompong Som Water and Power Supply were the services of U.S. Architect Engineers utilized. Otherwise all plans were prepared by the Public Works Division personnel. (In this connection, it is important to note that during this period, the Public Works Division was inadequately staffed both in size and technical competence. The resultant plans produced were usually quite inadequate and very often incomplete.
- The plans were then turned over to the RKG Ministry of Public Works who prepared the contract documents and the technical specifications. (In this connection, it is noteworthy to remark that the RKG Ministry of Public Works based their contract and specifications on the French-Indo-China construction code procedure of November 1929. The technical specifications produced were quite vague and incomplete. In addition, the unit price system employed was unrealistic in item breakdown and invariably the estimated quantities placed in the contract were much

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higher than the actual quantities necessary to complete the work.)

- A contract award commission was then appointed by the RKG Ministry of Public Works consisting of representatives from the RKG Ministry of Public Works, the RKG Ministry of Plan, and the RKG Ministry involved in the project (i.e. Agriculture, Education, Public Health) and the USAID. Any contractor licensed in Cambodia was permitted to bid. Since the unit prices were established in advance by RKG, the contractors' bids were based on offering to do the work at a percentage above or below the total amount developed from multiplying the fixed unit prices by the estimated quantities. Thirty days were provided between advertising the contract and the bid opening, and the low bidder was normally awarded the contract. However, it was necessary to have the approval of each Ministry involved before the contract was awarded. The notice to proceed with the work was subsequently issued by the Ministry of Public Works RKG after obtaining the approval of all members of the commission. Normally a minimum of six months was involved from the time Public Works USAID provided the plans to the RKG until the notice to proceed was issued.
- As previously mentioned, inspection of the work was then provided by the RKG Ministry of Public Works. To execute partial payments to the contractor, a very cumbersome procedure was involved. The contractor first submitted his pay estimate to the RKG Public Works field representative. Then the pay estimate was submitted in turn to the RKG Ministry involved in project, to USAID, to the central office of the Ministry of Public Works RKG, and finally to the Ministry of Plan RKG. Each RKG agency involved was quite insistent that pay estimates pass

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through their offices. In actual operation, the contractor was obliged to wait often two to four months before partial payment was effected.

- When change order drawings were needed, these were provided by Public Works USAID, but again the involved approval procedure as on the initial contract was required with resultant time delay.
- Upon completion of the project, an acceptance commission was again appointed by the RKG Ministry of Public Works, consisting of all involved governmental agencies, who visited the site to make provisional acceptance. It was necessary to obtain the approval of all agencies; and if deficiencies existed, as they usually did, it was necessary to again convene this commission. Considerable delay was always encountered in securing provisional acceptance.
- In the actual operation of this previous contract system, considerable delay was experienced in awarding the contract, making payments to the contractor, processing change orders, and securing final acceptance. Due to limited pre-qualification requirements for contractors and normal award to low bidder, the quality of contractor capacity and performance varied from fair to unsatisfactory. Of a much more serious nature, and due to the fact that very little direct inspection control was maintained by USAID, numerous cases were uncovered where the unit quantities submitted for payment were much greater than the actual quantities installed. However, these payment estimates were approved by RKG officials."

Obviously, strong corrective measures were needed immediately. Again the report by the Chief of Public Works' report is the best source:

"One of the major areas of concern confronting the present Mission Director upon assumption of duties was the apparent need for close

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surveillance of the USAID construction program which, considering the size of Mission, was quite large and extensive. Immediate steps were taken to institute greater construction management controls. These steps consisted of:

- In December 1962, the USAID issued construction Policy Order No. 32-2, copy of which previously furnished AID/W, assigning the Public Works Division the responsibility for implementing the Mission construction program. One of the specific requirements of this Mission Policy Order was that a continual follow through would be made on all projects to insure that plans and specifications are followed and that corrective action, when required, is taken promptly. In addition, construction report requirements were established which provided additional management controls within the Mission to insure compliance with Mission inspection control objectives.

- Within the Public Works Division, the staffing pattern was adjusted to provide greater emphasis in this vital area.

The SPAR description for the Division Chief position was modified to include requirements that incumbent be a graduate engineer with professional registration desired. A personnel reassignment within the Division accomplished this. The Highway Engineer position, SPAR CA-83, whose services were not being adequately utilized, was changed to Construction Management Engineer. Three U.S. contract hires, recruited locally and approved by AID/W, were made, providing skilled construction inspection and supervisory personnel to implement a strong inspection program. Several local hires were also made providing additional construction inspectors with many years of experience in local construction practices.

To more adequately control construction contract award procedures, monthly construction partial payments, and project supervision, arrangements

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were made with the RKG so that new USAID construction project contracts are being handled by a direct contract procedure as provided in the Mission Construction Policy Order 32-2. The new contracting system involves the following procedures:

- Based upon the scope of work outlined by the E-1 and subsequent project agreement, the Public Works Division prepares complete plans and specifications. (In this connection, considerable reorganization has been made within the Public Works Division to improve its engineering capability. Several of the previous local employees lacking technical skill were discharged. Utilizing several experienced U.S. Engineer technicians, and several third-country nationals with engineering or architectural degrees, available within the Mission, the quality of work has been materially improved. A SPAR was prepared and forwarded to AID/W for one additional U.S. technician (structural engineer) to assist in this work. The extent of this engineering work has been confined to projects already undertaken or to very small projects. It is neither the desire nor the intention of the USAID to maintain a large technical and supervisory force permanently on the Mission staff for future construction projects. The present staff has been recruited, largely by utilizing forces presently available within the Mission, to provide the necessary controls for the present construction program. All major projects involving major construction, such as the Khmer-American Friendship School, the University of Agriculture, and the Khmer-American Superior Institute of Technology, carry provisions in the Project Agreement and the PIO/T for providing adequate design and supervision of construction by competent U.S.

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Architect Engineer firms. The liaison within the Mission with these Architect Engineer firms, in accordance with the Mission Construction Policy, is to be provided by the USAID Public Works Division.

- The project plans and specifications are then submitted for the approval of the USAID and the RKG agencies sponsoring the project, the RKG Ministry of Public Works, and the RKG Ministry of Plan.
- The USAID Contract Board then selects a limited number of qualified contractors to bid on the construction project. The selection of contractors is based on advertisement, financial and performance submittals, interviews with contractors, and liaison with the RKG officials. Contracts are out for bid for thirty days, and are primarily lump sum except for special features such as earthwork or pile which are unit price. In some instances, contract prices are negotiated with the contractor by the Contract Board; but generally, since contractors are closely prequalified to bid, award is made to the low bidder. Bank guarantees are required from contractors guaranteeing contract performance. The Cambodian Government is given the right to veto, if it deems necessary, any selected contractor.
- The administration of the contract including provisional acceptance is entirely handled by the USAID and under the direct construction supervision of the Public Works Division. Only the concurrence of the Public Works Division and the Ministry of Plan RKG is necessary to effect monthly contract partial payment for work performed. These payment requests are field checked for accuracy by the Public Works Division. The RKG has the right to visit the site during construction and make any appropriate recommendations to the Mission.

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Although it is too early to make a final judgment as to the overall effectiveness of this new procedure, there is already much evidence that the interests and influence of the U.S., in all phases of construction management in Cambodia, have been improved.

Through utilizing daily or semi-weekly detailed written inspection reports; systematic on the job schooling of inspectors by Public Works Division direct hire personnel; preparing adequate change order drawings and specifications; establishing tight control on partial payments and overall project costs; combining all data received including up to date project photos into monthly construction progress reports; and maintaining close daily liaison with the RKG construction counterparts; the Mission is achieving, it feels, good field supervision of construction over its present quite large and varied construction program.

The Mission continues to take strong measures, at all management echelons, to maintain and improve its construction program. In this connection, the Public Works Division is currently upgrading its Monthly Construction Progress Report format (copies of which are currently being forwarded to AID/W) to provide more effective construction management control. The Mission will continue to keep AID/W informed of its actions in implementing a sound construction program."

As already indicated, the accomplishments of the reorganization of the Public Works Division and the new procedures were significant. All but two of the uncompleted education construction projects were brought to completion by 1963, and the last was all but done - the last two model secondary schools were 94 and 96 per cent complete. As discussed elsewhere, progress was being made in the City Water project, and the old agriculture construction

activities were completed.

14.) Summary - Teacher Training and Curriculum Development - 1963

By 1963, the principal construction activities begun by the Rural Development Through Education and Public School Education Project - the fourteen new model elementary and nineteen improved elementary schools, the five model secondary schools, the Fundamental Education Center at Tonle Bati, the Bureau of Technical Services, and the Rural Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot - were complete. In addition, a new intensified program for the English Language project, which would have an effect on the secondary curricula, was ready for implementation, and the preparatory activities for the second teacher training center, at Siem Reap, were underway. Efforts to influence changes in thinking toward educational systems, curricula and methods of instruction had been increasing and, with the reinforcement of the Chief of State's remarks about the need for reform, the USAID's educational program was ready to move from its preoccupation with construction to concentration on technical assistance and the change, when successful, such assistance brings. To give added concentration and sharper focus to these efforts, the previous Public School Education Project, the English Language Project and the Siem Reap Teacher Training Center Project were combined in FY 1963 to form the Teacher Training and Curriculum Development Project. The emphasis of the new project was to be educational reform. The following excerpt from the FY 1965 Country Assistance Program (CAP) reveals its design:

"The reorientation of the public school system will be undertaken through an integrated program of institutional and curriculum development, currently involving six activities. It should be understood that each

individual activity of this project is dependent for its success on other activities within the project, and certain of the personnel will be involved in two or more of the activities.

The principal activity of the project is the Siem Reap Teacher Education Center, which will require the bulk of the funds. Without this institution the RKG will not be able to meet its requirements for trained teachers in less than a generation. Much of the value of the Siem Reap Teacher Education Center will be lost, however, if the graduates of that institution must go forth to teach an outdated curricula without the benefit of the basic tool of modern education, the textbook. Therefore, plans for the revision of the curricula and publication of new textbooks based on the revised curricula call for their accomplishment during the same period as the development of the Siem Reap Teacher Education Center, so that, by the time American assistance to that institution is completed, materials for good teaching will be in use in about half the elementary schools.

The university contract team to be furnished by USAID to the Siem Reap Teacher Education Center, as well as the faculty of that institution, will be actively involved in the revision of the elementary curricula and the demonstration of the textbooks and the new teaching techniques to teachers in service. Likewise, the Kompong Kantuot Teacher Training Center, built under a previous activity of this project, will also be involved in the in-service teacher training program. The centers of demonstration for in-service teacher training will be the fourteen model elementary schools, also built under a previous activity of this project.

The institution with the primary responsibility for educational reforms, however, is the Direction of Pedagogical Services, which has been largely

equipped and trained by an activity of this project. The institution has the responsibility, in addition to others, for drafting new curricula outlines, writing and publishing textbooks, furnishing teaching aids to the schools, and introducing skill-training courses into the curricula. A section has been established within the Direction of Pedagogical Services for each skill training course and is charged with equipping all shops, publishing the curricula outline, administering in-service training of teachers, and supervising the program in general.

The permanent source of teachers for each course introduced under activities of this project will be a major institution developed by the USAID. The teacher training centers of Siem Reap and Kompong Kantuot will have courses to qualify teachers for elementary arts and crafts and agriculture. The teachers of industrial arts will be graduates of the National School of Arts and Trades. The permanent source of new English teachers will be the National Institute of Pedagogy's two-year course for teachers of English, which was established with American aid.

One further institution built under a previous activity which plays a role in the current activities of this project, is the group of five model secondary schools, which the secondary education advisor, funded under the Khmer-American Friendship School, will utilize as centers of demonstration of modern educational methods."

c) Siem Reap Teacher Education Center

This activity proposed to develop a teacher training center at Siem Reap which would provide advanced secondary education and pedagogical training at the level of grades 11 through 13 for 800 students, graduating 266 teachers a year.

The activity was first funded in FY 1962. At that time the U.S. decided to support the development of a second teacher training center similar to that built by the USAID at Kompong Kantuot, in place of a previous program to build more secondary schools, due to the severe shortage of trained teachers. The initial plan called for the center to train both elementary and first cycle secondary teachers. The enrollment was to be composed of 70 per cent elementary teacher-students and 30 per cent secondary. This was later changed to confine the student body to elementary student teachers. This change was at least partially the result of the provision by France of 200 secondary teachers

The two sources of trained teachers now in existence are the National Institute of Pedagogy, which graduates about 500 teachers a year and the U.S.-built Kompong Kantuot Teacher Training Center, which graduates 200 a year. By changing the Kompong Kantuot program from four to three years, covering grades 11 through 13, the number of teachers it will graduate will be raised to 266 a year. The addition of the Siem Reap Teacher Education Center, which would have followed a similar program, would thus raise the number of trained teachers graduated each year to about 1100. In less than a decade from the time the first teachers would have graduated from Siem Reap, most of the teachers in the elementary schools would have been graduates of the three above

institutions, two of which would have been developed with American aid.

The teacher training centers at Kompong Kantuot and Siem Reap were to form the institutional backbone of the Teacher Education and Curriculum Project, as it related to elementary education. Not only would they have been the institutions where the teachers were trained, but the faculty and advisors of these institutions would have had a major role in curricula development.

A university contract was to provide American teacher education for the future faculty and a contract team of advisors and teachers.

Twenty-nine of the future faculty were to be given four years of education leading to a B.A. in Education. Ten were to depart for the U.S. in FY 1964, ten in FY 1965 and nine in FY 1966. In addition, two administrators were to be sent each year in FY 1965 and FY 1966 for one year of training and observation.

A contract team chairman and secretary arrived in September 1963, scheduled to be followed by four professors of education in February 1965, five teachers in July 1965, and three more teachers in July 1966. The chairman and secretary, half of whose cost was to be charged to the Khmer-American Friendship School Project, were to be located in Phnom Penh in quarters charged to the contract; the professors and teachers were to live at the school in quarters built as part of the school and maintained by the RKG. The chairman and professors would have been responsible for jointly developing the curricula and administrative procedures of the school, together with the RKG direction and faculty of the Center. They would also have been responsible for in-service training of the permanent faculty members, and for preparation of equipment lists and

specifications for procurement from Counterpart funds and with dollars. The contract teachers, who were to receive intensive training in French (the language of the school) prior to departure, would have insured high American standards of instruction in key subjects until the return of the participants from U.S. training. The total cost of the center to the U.S. was anticipated to be \$2,336,000 dollars and \$1,914,000 in local currency. The largest items would have been the university contract costs (including participants), \$1,574,000; construction costs, \$1,660,000 in local currency. All operating costs, student maintenance and stipends, and faculty and staff salaries and expenses were to be provided by the RKG. It was estimated that these costs would have been \$515,000 in local currency per year by 1969.

d) English Language Instruction

Cambodia must graduate substantial numbers of students each year who have a working knowledge of English, in order to carry on its necessary economic relations with most of Asia and the rest of the world, which uses English as its "lingua franca". It also has to graduate men who are able to acquire essential skills and professions in English speaking universities abroad. At present, however, although over 20,000 students are studying English in the public secondary schools alone, very few are graduating with an ability to read or speak more than a few phrases. Only the very exceptionally ambitious graduates could read even unsophisticated English. Yet this totally inadequate English teaching program is expensive for the RKG. It is paying about 135 teachers. The 25 Frenchmen who are teaching English cost the RKG about \$50,000 a year. A wide variety of foreign agencies are helping

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teach English in Cambodia, but the country's needs are nowhere near being met.

The reasons for this failure are threefold. First, the hours assigned to English are very inadequate, 2 hours a week for five years. Second, books and methods are grossly out of date. English is taught in French before the students have mastered French. English classes thus become, to a great extent, advanced French classes. The vocabulary and idiom taught are archaic, and much time is wasted on grammatical points that have no meaning in English. Third, there are not enough adequately trained Cambodian teachers.

This project was originally started by a direct request from Prince Sihanouk. After the Bandung Conference of 1957, the Prince told the USAID Director that he found the Cambodians were at a great disadvantage in international relations because of inadequate English. He, therefore, wanted the Mission to set up a program of training enough teachers of English to enable graduates of Cambodian secondary schools to speak adequate English. Accordingly, a project plan was drawn up in 1957, providing funds for equipping three language laboratories, plus funds, never used, for a contract to install the equipment and train Cambodians in its use.

The Ministry of National Education requested a teacher of English for the National Institute of Pedagogy (Secondary Teacher Training College) (NIP), and the Elementary Rural Teacher Training Center at Kompong Kantuot.

To insure that the student-teachers would get the best instruction in English, the Education Division requested that two English Language Tape Laboratories be established at each institution and a third be

reserved for future use. A contract was signed with the Military Advisory Assistant Group to provide an English teaching officer to set up the two laboratories for the USAID while waiting for the teacher training advisor to arrive. He reported on October 16, 1958 and taught at the National Institute of Pedagogy for a full two-year period. Afterwards he did part-time teaching, so as to devote more time to working in an advisory capacity with all secondary teachers of English in the country through in-service training courses.

Summer workshops for Cambodian teachers of English were held over a four year period. These ranged from two to six-week sessions. A total of 187 teachers received the training program in the four-year period. Thirty-two teachers became proficient enough to become eligible as student-teachers at the NIP. Twenty-nine teachers were sent to the University of Michigan to receive a one-year training program.

More than 25,000 English texts were supplied to teachers and school libraries over the six year period. Other commodities (audio-visual aids, laboratory machine parts, equipment, etc.) were also provided.

By FY 1962 it had become evident that in spite of these efforts the program was not producing secondary students with an adequate knowledge of English. The technician, therefore, organized a Coordinating Council on English Training, which brought in a group from the Southeast Asia Regional English Project (SEAREP) in Bangkok, to make an independent survey. Meanwhile, the USAID prepared a complete revision of the project.

It was determined that a more intensive teaching schedule, a more intensive program of training teachers, and new textbooks would be necessary to make English an effective pre-vocational subject in the

secondary schools; the teachers, the textbooks, and the two hours a week over five years allotted to the subject at the time were not adequate to give a graduate a usable knowledge of English. A four-year program of technical assistance and curriculum reform which would improve the English course in the secondary schools to the point where it could produce from 1,000 to 3,000 graduates a year with a usable knowledge of English was planned.

The program that was developed to meet this need was as follows:

A special certification for teachers of English was to be established by the Ministry of Education. Thirty-four participants who had been sent to the University of Michigan for a one to three year course for teachers of English would be able to qualify for this certification, as would the seven to fifteen graduates each year from the course, established by this project, at the National Institute of Pedagogy. However, these two programs would only produce eighty-one certified teachers by 1967. Therefore, seventy-two teachers already in service, who could not qualify for certification, plus forty-seven new candidates, would be given an intensive twenty-two week course at the English Language Center in Phnom Penh, to raise their fluency in English and their comprehension of teaching techniques to the level required for certification. It was proposed that the thirty teachers in the intensive course at the English Language Center each semester be paid 80 riels a day per diem from counterpart funds in FY 1964. After FY 1964, the cost of per diem would have been assumed by the RKG. To enable the RKG to release teachers from the schools to take the intensive course, and to give the other teachers of English in selected schools additional

training in English, International Voluntary Services (IVS) was to furnish ten volunteer teachers. Dollar funds for this were obligated in FY 1963. It was planned that the remaining funds required would be provided in FY 1964 and FY 1965:

New textbooks were to be introduced. Textbooks in use taught English in French, using very archaic techniques. The McGraw-Hill English for Today series had been selected as the most suitable basic series of texts. This was to be supplemented later by a text on commercial usage, in order to make the pre-vocational aspects of the course more effective.

In addition, a lending library of 200 volumes was to be furnished to each of 20 lycees, to enable the better students to broaden their knowledge of English. The first libraries were to be organized by the IVS volunteers.

The RKG recently increased the number of hours of English instruction per week from two to three, thus giving a total of fifteen year-hours from grades eight through twelve. The USAID had recommended that the schedule be changed to provide five hours a week of English in grades ten through twelve, thus affording greater concentration. However, the new schedule would have afforded sufficient time to complete Book IV of the English for Today series and a portion of a book on commercial usage.

The RKG had also agreed verbally to revise its examination system to include native speakers of English on the examination board and to give the examination entirely in English. Efforts were being made to obtain this agreement in writing.

The two-year course for teachers of English established previously by this activity at the National Institute of Pedagogy would graduate

from seven to fifteen qualified teachers a year, enough to provide for replacement and expansion of the English teaching program in the secondary schools. To teach this course, two men had been sent to the University of Michigan for a three year program of studies leading to a master's degree, from FY 1963 to FY 1965.

At the time the program was terminated, the IVS team of ten volunteers had arrived and begun their training preparatory to going out to five provincial secondary schools in January 1964. There were good indications that they would have had considerable impact.

e) Khmer-American Friendship School

As indicated by its request in 1957 for assistance in teaching the English language, the Cambodian Government had early recognized the growing importance of English as an international language and that there were few Cambodians capable of communicating in English on a professional level. In addition to its request for U.S. assistance, and in addition to the courses in its schools taught by French teachers, the RKG established a school in Phnom Penh wherein all subjects except Cambodian history, literature, art, and the Khmer language, are taught in English. The school first opened in 1959 with 80 pupils at the fourth grade level. In July 1960, a new fourth grade group of 85 were admitted. In 1961, the school had two fourth grade classes, two fifth grade classes, a total enrollment of 165 and a faculty of seven, four of which were trained by the USAID advisor in English language instruction.

In November 1961, a meeting was held between the USAID and the Minister of National Education to discuss the request of the Ministry

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for U.S. assistance in the development of the Khmero-Anglais School into a secondary school with English as the language of instruction. Agreement was reached to have the USAID submit proposals for the development of such an institution. Proposals were made providing for the construction of new and separate facilities for 900 students capable of graduating 80 to 90 students a year, thoroughly competent in English. The school would have grades four through thirteen. On April 21, 1962, the Ministry informed the USAID that Prince Sihanouk had accepted the proposals and desired the new institution to be named the Khmer-American Friendship School.

The 1962 Project Agreement spelled out the salient features affecting this special school: (1) development by contract with an American university; (2) English as the language of instruction in all subjects (except the French and Cambodian languages) in both cycles of the secondary school; (3) training of at least 24 Cambodians in the U.S.; (4) continued curriculum development and refinement by the American teachers and the secondary education technician in close collaboration with the Cambodian staff; (5) the absorption of the Lycee Khmero-Anglais students by the new school, and (6) the site of the school on Boulevard Norodom, the principal thoroughfare of the city.

Implementation of this project had been experiencing difficulty - primarily political in nature - for some time prior to 1963. The Directress of the Khmer-English School was quite openly anti-American and uncooperative. During the negotiating of 1963 Project Agreements, the difficulty became acute, and continuation of the project was in serious doubt. After difficult and protracted negotiations an understanding was reached with Ministry of Education officials that the Directors would not be in charge of the new school and the Project Agreement was signed.

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The 1963 Project Agreement changed two features. The Khmer-American Friendship School would be a new school separate from the Lycee Khmero-Anglais, with a separate director and the latter school would continue to exist rather than be absorbed by the Khmer-American Friendship School. All the students, estimated to number 630, by the August semester of 1965, would be transferred to the new school, the construction of which would be completed by February 1965. The establishment of the Khmer-American School distinct from the Khmer-Anglais School, with separate facilities and directors, was a bureaucratic device for overcoming the obstructions of the Directress of the Khmero-Anglais School, who would have been left without a student body when the transfer was effected.

Secondly, because all secondary schools are to switch to Khmer for instruction of history and the social sciences, these subjects would be taught in Khmer rather than English.

The plans for construction were drawn by Bourne Associates, approved and put out to bid. On October 25, 1963, bids were received by the USAID and were still under study on November 20. Bourne Associates had been engaged for construction inspection and supervision services.

Contract negotiations with an American university had been completed and the Team Chairman arrived in September 1963. Three to five of the subject field teachers were tentatively to arrive in July 1964, to begin work in the Lycee Khmero-Anglais to prepare the students for their eventual transfer to the Khmer-American Friendship School in the fall of 1965.

The first group of 12 participants had been selected and had arrived at the American university for the 1963 fall term, for a specialized two year period of study.

40 f) National School of Arts and Trades

There were 9,000 automobiles and trucks registered in Phnom Penh in 1955. This number increased to 29,800 in 1962 and it is reasonable to presume that this rate will continue in future years. There were 40,937 motor scooters and motorcycles competing for driving space with 29,800 automobiles and innumerable bicycles on the streets and highways in 1962. All of these require the attention of skilled mechanics to keep them in operation; primarily the occupations of Vietnamese rather than Cambodians.

The situation in other trade areas is equally critical. The use of radios, record players, modern plumbing, office machines, and motor boats is increasing daily.

In 1955 there were few air conditioners or refrigerators in use in Phnom Penh. In 1963, many offices and homes in Cambodia were equipped with air conditioners. The large commercial type air conditioner is being installed in office buildings and theatres. The use of electric refrigerators was a luxury available to the foreign resident in the recent past, but today they are in considerable evidence in Cambodian stores and homes. Many of the food stores have display type refrigerators and the offer of frozen foods for sale in quantity is but a matter of time.

All of the foregoing requires the availability of skilled technicians for installation and maintenance.

Vocational Education was first introduced into Cambodia under the French colonial system in 1906. A school was built at that time to provide skilled and semi-skilled workers for the shipyards that were then

in operation in Indo-China. The school was named Ecole Pratique d'Industrie. The students who entered this school were boys who could not qualify for the college or Lycee because of their low academic standing in grammar or primary schools. These boys ranged in age from 13 to 18 years. The student body was about 40 per cent Cambodian, the remainder were Vietnamese, Chinese and Eurasians. The school was intended to provide skill training and not an academic education.

A few years later, about 1916, the school was expanded to provide training for drivers to operate the first motor vehicles which were being introduced in Indo-China at that time. This situation existed until 1937. The school was then reorganized to provide an academic education as well as skill-training. The school was moved to the present site, an abandoned rice mill, in 1939, and re-named the College Technique. The name was changed again to Ecole des Arts et Metiers in 1957.

At the request of the Royal Khmer Government, USAID assistance to Technical-Vocational Education began in 1953. This assistance was limited to providing equipment supplies and a revolving fund for the College Technique and the Ecole des Beaux Arts et Metiers in Phnom Penh. The College Technique at that time trained mechanics and skilled technicians and also trained teachers of industrial arts for the elementary schools.

The Ecole des Beaux Arts et Metiers was to train people for the expanded commercial development of traditional Cambodian artisan production and the growth of cottage industry.

The project was financed in 1953 and 1955 and provided a total of \$124,000 for personal services, contractual services, supplies and materials, land and structures. The objectives of this project were achieved by late 1956. There was no participant training under this project and the USAID did not have a Vocational Industrial Advisor until after this project was completed in 1956.

In 1956, the USAID program undertook a more ambitious project of assistance to the Ecole des Beaux Arts et Metiers, called Vocational Industrial Education for Economic Development. The purpose of this project was to assist Cambodian craftsmen to develop and adopt new techniques, designs and materials to existing handicrafts in order to increase their commercial value. To accomplish this, the USAID entered into a contract with Russel Wright Associates who provided long and short term experts, procured equipment and established training activities. Specifically, the project was to (a) assist the "Ecole des Beaux Arts" to develop new designs for handicraft products. (b) provide technical assistance in the use of fast dyes for textiles. (c) provide instruction in techniques of silk screen reproduction. (d) provide technical assistance in improving methods of silver and goldsmithing and provide the initial hand tools and machines necessary to accomplish desired results.

The project accomplished the following:

- A basic survey of existing designs and metal work and weaving was made along with a collection of craftwork which was sent to the U.S. for reactions and comments by commercial interests.
- Attempts were made to introduce the teaching of modern designs in the "Ecole des Beaux Arts".

- Modern dyes were purchased and their use demonstrated to teachers at the Beaux Arts and to home craftsmen.
- Training in silk screen reproduction was given to one teacher at the school.
- Another was given detailed training in modern methods of silver and goldsmithing, and a shop was established.
- Cottage craftsmen were visited and given instruction in production of silver work and in weaving and dyeing.
- Methods of using the rubber mold in casting were taught instructors at the school.

Commodities including 1 lathe, 1 welder, 1 combination sander, machine tools, scientific equipment, and chemicals cost approximately \$19,000. The contract with Russel Wright cost approximately \$73,000.

Funds for construction were first provided in 1957, and in 1958 an agreement was signed with the RKG to provide the buildings and equip a Technical Vocational School with facilities for 1500 students from grades seven through thirteen. To implement this agreement, an order for additional equipment for the existing machine shop, auto-shop and wood-shop was placed in 1958. This equipment was delivered in late 1959 and early in 1960.

Another phase of the project carried out at this time was the construction of a 12-unit apartment building for faculty housing. This building was constructed on the new campus, which is located to the rear of the present school.

The new campus was low land, covered by water during the rainy season, and had to be filled. The fill was provided by dredging the Tonle Sap River

during low water periods of the year. The land to be filled was divided into three parts; the first section was filled during the dry season of 1958-59. The second part was filled during 1959-60

An industrial survey was conducted, financed with counterpart funds and carried out by the teachers of the school and the USAID technician.

In November of 1959, the second technician was transferred to Cambodia. Curricula were established by the USAID technician and the RKG Project Manager and an analysis of requirements, based on the curricula was accomplished in January 1960. The analysis provided for an enrollment of 1500 students in grades seven through thirteen. This was the first time there had been complete planning to determine the requirements for the Trade School, which the USAID had agreed to build with the signing of the project agreement in FY 1959. The analysis prepared in January 1960 has been the basis for all of the planning and work since then.

The purpose of the activity as determined at that time, was to assist the RKG in the development of a functioning, professional, self-sustaining national system of technical-vocational education to meet the critical shortage of skilled labor in many fields, and to enable Cambodian nationals to qualify in many trades traditionally dominated by foreigners. This was to have been accomplished by building and equipping 4 three-story classroom buildings, and a 23-shop laboratory structure, and by training the faculty for the National School of Arts and Trades which would, by 1968, have 2800 students enrolled in pre-engineering, terminal-technical and special occupational curricula.

A second important target of this activity was to provide for the continuing introduction of the best American industrial techniques applicable to Cambodia. This was to have been accomplished through a participant training program which, by special contractual arrangements, would have provided the faculty not only with pedagogical training in the U.S., but also with special training in depth in each teacher's special subject field and through the project operated Production for Learning (see below) which would have provided skill training and new techniques to the members of the existing faculty.

The architectural and engineering work began in FY 1960, and continued until interrupted by the abrupt closure of this project. The salient feature other than modern schoolhouse planning was to use American manufactured materials for the plumbing, electrical, hardware, doors and windows in the construction of the classroom and shop laboratory buildings.

The four 3-story classroom buildings were nearing completion in July and have subsequently been sufficiently completed to have been accepted and placed in use. The overall status of the construction work when the program was terminated was as follows:

- The construction of the warehouse, water tower and miscellaneous utilities was completed in 1962.
- The replacement order for the plumbing fixtures broken in shipment was not delivered. Thus, fifty per cent of the washroom facilities in the otherwise completed classroom buildings were not available for use.
- The science laboratories had not been supplied with furniture or equipment.

- Approximately 40 per cent of the other classroom furniture was completed and already in use.
- The architectural and engineering plans for the foundations of the 23 shop laboratory complex were completed and the contract was let for this work. Work on this contract was 20 per cent complete.
- The architectural and engineering plans for the other structures had not been completed.
- The electric wiring diagrams and installation data for the 23 shop buildings were 50 per cent complete.
- The landscaping work around the four three-story classroom buildings was not completed.

The training of the future faculty to replace the present one had been assured by the negotiation of the Coordinated-Cooperative Participant Training Contracts with the Los Angeles and Long Beach State Colleges in California. Teacher Education was being provided for 103 Cambodians; the first of whom would have completed their training and received their degrees in June 1965.

The in-service teacher training program was functioning as a built-in feature of the "Production for Learning Program", which, as an on-going activity, had already produced 400-tablet armchairs; 175 drafting tables; 220 drafting stools; 25 teachers' chairs and desks, as well as numerous other work projects involving machine shop, sheet metal, welding, electrical and wood working skills.

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The first equipment for the school was provided during the STEM program and consisted mainly of machine shop and sheet metal machines. Some additional equipment was furnished in the fiscal years of 1957, 1958 and 1959; however, the selection and purchasing of this equipment had not been guided by any definite plan of action and unfortunately the utilization of third country sources for the material did not always provide the type, design or quality that should have been the guidelines for a USAID sponsored project. In FY 1960 the equipment needs of the school were determined through the use of the curricula analysis that had been prepared. The decision to supply U.S. manufactured building materials, i.e., doors, windows, plumbing and electrical materials, greatly increased the FY 1960 estimate of the direct dollar costs for the project; however, the high quality of the construction work in the completed four classroom buildings had more than justified this expenditure.

The general cost increase for machine products in the U.S., together with other factors, stimulated efforts to utilize the Federal excess property sources for equipment, materials and supplies. This phase of the procurement program had been very successful with surprisingly few items being of a type or condition not suitable for school use.

The overall equipment program is estimated to have been 48 per cent complete at the time work was stopped.

g) Institute of Technology

The 1960 request of Prince Sihanouk for the U.S. to establish an American-type engineering school in Phnom Penh was soon followed by an offer of an Institute of Technology from the USSR. Despite his acceptance of the Soviet offer, the Chief of State renewed his request to the U.S. Mission, and it was agreed (by an exchange of letters in May and June of 1961 between the

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Ambassador and the Acting President of the RKG Council of Ministers) that the American institution should offer civil, mechanical, and electrical engineering, while the Russian school would operate in other fields -- architecture, textiles, mining, "hydro-bonification", and "electro-techniques". It was expected by this agreement to avoid duplication of courses except in electricity, in which the RKG judged there was room for both to provide instruction. It was also agreed that the institution would be called the Khmer-American Superior Institute of Technology (KASIT).

Arrangements were made for a survey to provide the technical data and cost estimates for the project. The Emerson-Flowden-High Survey Report was completed in March 1961, and was used in delineating the scope and nature of the KASIT project. The FY 1961 Project Agreement provided \$700,000 in local currency for construction and \$700,000 to finance the first two years of a technical assistance contract with an American university. It also required the RKG to provide a suitable site, to establish the institution legally, and to determine the level of employment of the future graduates. During construction of the permanent plant, KASIT was to be housed in the new classroom buildings nearing completion at the National School of Arts and Trades.

Ohio University was invited to consider a USAID technical assistance contract for a "turn-key" type of project, and to send a team of educators from the Schools of Engineering and Education to Phnom Penh to prepare detailed budget estimates for KASIT. The contract was to provide the initial faculty of American professors, educational specifications for the Architectural and Engineering (A&E) contract, equipment for laboratories and shops, and training in the U.S. for the permanent Cambodian faculty.

The FY 1962 Project Agreement provided additional funds for the project

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as follows: \$1.8 Million for the Ohio University contract, \$1 Million in counterpart funds for construction, and \$275 Thousand in Trust Funds for contract support, topographical survey, school operation, and participant travel.

The original site selected for KASIT is under several feet of water each rainy season. When it became evident that it would be quite impossible for the RKG in any reasonable period of time to complete the necessary dikes, fill, drainage canals, access roads, electric power and water lines, the USAID offered to build on a new site adjacent to the National School of Arts and Trades and to finance half the cost of the fill required at this location. This proposal was not acceptable to the RKG Ministries of Public Works and Education.

In the meantime, it was learned that concurrent with negotiations for two institutes of technology, the RKG had legalized its own Public Works School (PWS) and submitted a request to the United Nations Special Fund (UNSF) for assistance to this school. The UNSF agreed to assist and set aside a fund of approximately \$800 Thousand to finance both technical and some equipment. Furthermore, after signing the FY 1963 Project Agreement, it became clear that there was no acceptance of the original plan to merge the PWS with KASIT when the latter should become operative. Without this merger, Cambodia would eventually have had three schools of engineering competing for financial support and for qualified students - engineering educational facilities far in excess of the needs and the resources of the country.

Despite the lack of coordination between ministries concerning the merger of the PWS with KASIT, and the failure of the RKG to meet its

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commitments under the Project Agreements, the USAID sought to avoid the appearance of renegeing on its commitments. During the latter half of FY 1963, continuing discussions were held between the USAID and the RKG at Ministry and higher levels, including Prince Sihanouk himself, and between the USAID and AID/W. Out of these discussions evolved the proposal for transferring U.S. assistance from KASIT to the FWS. This alternate proposal called for a tripartite cooperative project to be based on two closely coordinated aid agreements - one between the RKG and UNSF, the other between the RKG and the USAID. The UNSF would provide a team of experts for the first five years to supplement the present part-time Cambodian faculty operating in the Ministry of Public Works building, and some supplementary equipment. The U.S. would provide new buildings, equipment, and training in the U.S. for the future Cambodian faculty. Instruction would be in French with English as a required subject in the curricula. Both the USAID and the UNSF team would be represented on a technical advisory committee to an Administrative Board or Board of Regents, which would also include a USAID representative.

At the beginning of FY 1964 the proposed course of action remained tentative, subject to agreements yet to be negotiated. Following the preliminary discussions mentioned above, an assumed sequence of events had been listed but no definite time schedule was indicated. The initiative remained with the RKG, or more precisely with UNESCO, the Executing Agency for the United Nations Special Fund. The assumed sequence of events was as follows:

- UNESCO would appoint a Project Manager who would proceed to Phnom Penh under the UNSF Preparatory Allocation to participate in the joint development of the UN Plan of Operations.
- At the same time, the USAID would provide invitational travel funds to

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bring a representative of an American (possibly Ohio) university to Phnom Penh to participate in the planning of the project.

- Representatives of the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education, the PWS, the USAID, and the American university would meet with the UN Resident Representative and the Project Manager to consider the UN Plan of Operations, the curricula for civil and mechanical engineering, the type and number of specialists needed on the initial foreign faculty, the recruitment of these professors, the site, building, and equipment requirements.
- An amendment to the KASIT Project Agreement or a new PWS Project Agreement would be negotiated to transfer U.S. assistance to the latter school, dropping electrical engineering and technician training from the plan, but retaining U.S. training of the future Cambodian faculty, the use of counterpart funds for construction of new buildings, and the use of dollar funds for supplementary equipment.
- A technical assistance and participant training contract would be negotiated with the American university.
- The proposed site on the Bassac River in Phnom Penh would be reviewed and, if found mutually acceptable, prepared by the RKG or jointly by the USAID and the RKG for the necessary topographical survey and architectural design of the new buildings. The USAID might undertake to provide the fill required for the initial counterpart-financed construction, and the RKG the fill for future construction.
- An architectural and engineering contract would be negotiated with an American firm of architects to prepare the plans for the new buildings.
- The required number of participants (between 35 and 50) acceptable to

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the American university, would be selected and sent to the U.S. for five years of training to become the permanent faculty of the PWS.

- A contract would be let by the USAID for construction of the new plant.

The conditions under which the U.S. would be able to participate in this tri-partite project had been clearly set forth both orally and in writing to the RKG Ministries involved, and to the personal advisor to Prince Sihanouk. Special reference, for example, had been made to the development of an acceptable Plan of Operations including an approved curricula; the training in the U.S. of the future permanent faculty for the Public Works School; the provision of an adequate interim faculty; and the selection of an acceptable site.

The general plan to cancel KASIT in favor of U.S. assistance to the PWS had been declared fully satisfactory by Prince Sihanouk. The retention of funds previously budgeted for KASIT and, dependent on an acceptable Plan of Operation, their transfer to support of the PWS had been approved by AID/W.

The UNSF had approved the RKG request for aid to the PWS during the initial five-year period.

A preliminary plot plan and cost estimates for the new PWS buildings had been prepared by the USAID Public Works Division and submitted to the RKG and the UN Resident Representative.

A list of American standard course descriptions for civil and mechanical engineering, based on the Emerson Survey and the Ohio University Study, had been submitted to the RKG and the UN Resident Representative.

A tentative schedule for the selection and departure of participants, for A&E services, for construction, and for the return of participants was prepared and submitted to the Ministry of Public Works and the UN Resident Representative.

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The budget for a five-year program of UNSF aid to the PWS approved by the Governing Council is as follows:

Experts - 25 man/years	\$601,000
Fellowships - 12 man/years	60,000
Equipment	40,000
Miscellaneous	<u>35,800</u>
	\$736,800
Executing Agency Overhead Costs	<u>77,500</u>
	\$814,300

The following table gives the preliminary tentative estimate of what the cost to the U.S. of supporting the PWS would have been:

	<u>\$</u>	<u>L/C</u>
Participants - 250 man/years	\$ 1,100,000	\$ 75,000
University Contract - Chairman and secretary on post	110,000	40,000
Equipment and Furnishings	600,000	50,000
Construction	<u>300,000</u>	<u>1,306,000</u>
TOTAL	\$ 2,110,000	\$ 1,471,000
Amounts obligated for KASIT in Prior Years	\$ 2,488,000	\$ 1,711,000
Trust Fund Reserves		465,000

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F. PUBLIC SAFETY (Civil Police Assistance)

1. Introduction

Cambodia accepted the status of a colony of France in 1863, and in the same year the French established a colonial police force there. In this police system, the Cambodians were allowed only very minor roles in the enlisted grades. This was later modified somewhat and a few Cambodians acquired officer rank, although orders of Cambodian officers were always subject to countermand by French sergeants.

The first completely Cambodian police force was not established until 1945, by the Japanese. When the French returned, they permitted the Cambodian police force to continue but set up an additional force known as the Federal Police which was French controlled and staffed by French, Cambodians and Vietnamese. The Federal Police had jurisdiction over both Cambodians and foreigners while the Cambodian police were limited to arrests of Cambodian citizens. A dual court system was also established, one set of courts for Cambodians and one for French and other foreigners.

In 1953, when the French transferred police authority to the Cambodian government, the Federal and Cambodian Police were combined into what is now known as the National Police. The new Cambodian Police administration began immediately to purge its ranks of Vietnamese and Cambodians who were pro-French or had been active on behalf of the French against the Cambodians.

Until 1953, then, police authority and administrative had been dominated by the French with very few Cambodians gaining any experience

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other than at low levels. Further, the French had provided no training to the Cambodians other than very limited on-the-job training and the sending of a select few to France, more for political reasons than to train future police administrators. When the French transferred authority they left no French personnel (although the RKG requested and obtained the services of five French junior officers until 1955); and the Cambodians were faced with the necessity of placing inexperienced and untrained personnel in senior positions. The problem was further compounded by the purge of personnel associated with the previous French regime.

AID Program - Summary

At the time the RKG prepared its 1955 National Budget, the Surface Defense or Provincial Guard Budget was reduced from approximately nine million dollars to approximately six million, and the Ministry of Surface Defense requested the U.S. to make up the difference. The Cambodian document reporting this request to the Council of Ministers indicated the request was to make up the deficit "... and enable it (the Surface Defense) to accomplish its projects for improving Provincial Guard pay scales and providing building construction...."

In June, 1954, the Surface Defense forwarded a status report to the American Embassy on its material and armament requirements. The report dealt principally with armament, ammunition, optical equipment, transportation equipment, equipment for the repair and maintenance of vehicles, communications equipment, quartermaster, medical and engineering equipment.

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In order to determine the magnitude of this job and the extent of assistance which might be provided by the USAID, a survey of the existing police forces was undertaken by two U.S. police advisors employed as consultants to the aid program. This was the first project undertaken by the U.S. to assist the Cambodian police.

The findings of the survey, which were presented in an unclassified version of the report submitted to the RKG April 1, 1955, formed the basis for the future design of the Civil Police Assistance Program, and is the major source of information concerning the Cambodian Police Forces at that time.

By 1955, the responsibility for the internal security of Cambodia was shared by three organizations, all responsible to the Minister of Interior: The National Police; the Municipal Police; and the Provincial Guard (also called the Surface Defense). The National Police had 1012 officers and men, 635 assigned to Headquarters in Phnom Penh and 377 to the Provinces; the Municipal Police had 787 officers and men in Phnom Penh and 576 in the provinces; and the Provincial Guard had 66 officers, 5,500 regulars, 6,675 auxiliaries and approximately 27,000 volunteers (Forces Vives) of which 13,309 were considered active. All of the Provincial Guard, with the exception of a small contingent in Phnom Penh, were in the provinces.

The National Police were responsible for the investigation of major crimes, including espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout Cambodia; Officers of the National Police served in executive positions in the Municipal Police and there were National Police in every Provincial Capital.

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The Municipal Police were responsible for the maintenance of public safety and, in general, the investigation of minor crimes and administrative offenses. There were 15 Municipal Police departments, one in each provincial capital.

The Provincial Guard had three responsibilities: 1) police operations and maintenance of public safety in rural areas; 2) guarding sensitive points, routes of march, surveillance of controlled areas and assisting civilian administrative authorities; and 3) relieving the Royal Army of its responsibility for static defense, thus freeing it for combat operations. The Provincial Guard had a General Staff located in Phnom Penh and 15 Provincial Brigades which were commanded by the Provincial Governors. There were over 1,000 Provincial Guard Posts located throughout Cambodia.

The survey referred to above concluded that the police forces of Cambodia as they existed in 1955 were incapable of maintaining public safety or of effectively combatting communist infiltration and subversion. It estimated that a minimum of 2 to 5 years of effort would be required to make the Cambodian police into an efficient organization. The major causes for the deficiencies of the Police organization were listed by the Report as follows:

- A need for trained police administrators and trained police personnel.
- An inadequate training program, both pre-service and in-service, and inadequate training facilities.
- A need for improved leadership, direction, discipline, morale and ethics.

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- Too frequent change of personnel occupying top administrative positions; and as chief, division, and section chiefs of the National Police, with too frequent transfer to police administrative positions of persons from other Government bureaus who had no previous police experience or training and the transfer of experienced police personnel to other Government bureaus resulting in the weakening of the Police Force as a career service and a lack of continuity of police enforcement effort.
- Operation by the Police on a concept of suppression rather than prevention of crime.
- Lack of a central records system, statistics, or coordination of information.
- An inadequate radio and communications network.
- A lack of transportation facilities (motor car, truck and bicycle).
- Poor administration, organization and distribution of personnel.
- Duplication of effort between operating sections of the National Police and between the National Police and the Municipal Police.
- A need for delegation of additional responsibility and jurisdiction to the Municipal Police and for strengthening of the Municipal Police through delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility.

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- There was no single section or department in the National or Municipal Police responsible for coordination or direction of police operations against the Communist effort in Cambodia.
- Inadequate facilities including space and office equipment.
- A need for standardizing the caliber of police firearms and ammunition.

The survey report recommended that the U.S. grant material and technical assistance to the RKG for the purpose of improving and strengthening its internal security forces on the condition that assurance was obtained from the highest government level that the problems to be overcome were understood and that a willingness to undertake a long-range program existed; this assurance to be obtained prior to the provision of any assistance. The assistance recommended by the survey report included in-service and pre-service training; improvement and expansion of communication facilities; increased mobility; the establishment of a central records system; improvement in the flow and coordination of information; expansion and improvement of training facilities; simplification of the administrative and command structure through reorganization and the expansion and training of the Forces Vives as a reserve potential.

The report went on to make more specific recommendations including the establishment of a Provincial Guard and Police Training School; the limitation of initial material assistance to transportation and communications equipment and standardization of the weapons of the Police.

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The recommendations of the survey report were accepted and \$774,000 were obligated in June of 1955 for contract services and commodities. It should be noted here that while the U.S. had apparently assumed the Cambodian's request for assistance had included a request for technical advice and guidance the available record does not substantiate this and, in fact, indicates otherwise. In the same report to the Council of Ministers of its negotiations with the American Embassy concerning U.S. assistance quoted from above, dated June 9, 1955, the Ministry of Surface Defense explains the nature of the assistance being offered and requests the Council's opinion regarding acceptance. The report then points out to the Council a problem, as follows: "However, he (the Director of Technical Services, Surface Defense Staff) wishes to point out to the Council that conditions affecting the recruitment of American technicians mentioned in the U.S.A. Embassy project constitute a political obstacle to acceptance of the offer in question. He proposes, therefore, a pure and simple cancellation of the following clause which appears in the American project: "granting of technical aid in the field of training, maintenance of files, inter-communications of information and control, the technique of public administration and simplification of procedures." (Underlining as in the certified true copy from which the quotation is taken.)

There is no specific record of the Council's reaction or subsequent negotiations but the initial Project Agreement of June, 1955, included only the phrase "and necessary technical aid." In addition

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to the Project Agreement, a Project Proposal and Approval document was signed in Washington including the provision of eight U.S. advisors in the fields of police administration, para-military and guerilla warfare, police training, police records and communications, counter-intelligence and clerical and linguistic personnel. The latter document was not signed by the RKG.

It was originally intended to implement the project through contract technicians, but this concept was changed to the use of direct hire employees and in September of 1955 the contract services element was dropped and made available for commodities.

During the course of the project the U.S. was to furnish training, communications, transportation and other types of equipment considered essential to raise the police forces to a satisfactory level of operating efficiency.

It was contemplated in 1955 that two years would be required to accomplish the main purposes of the project. Implementation was delayed from the beginning, however, because of resistance on the part of certain Cambodian officials to accept U.S. technical assistance in connection with the proposed improvement plan and along with the material assistance envisioned.

Procurement of material and assignment of personnel was held up by the USAID and AID/W until the situation clarified. From 1955 until 1957 there were only one technician and two program assistants in Cambodia in connection with the Police program. This initial delay extended over a two-year period in spite of constant efforts of the USAID to obtain agreement during which only \$55,000 of the

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obligated funds were expended (for vehicles). The delay was due, in part, to repeated political crises and changes of government; in part to the opening of Communist Bloc embassies in Phnom Penh and Cambodia's recognition of Red China which necessitated a review of U.S.-Cambodia relations in Washington; in part to the fact that the Cambodians had not developed a reorganization plan for the Police forces and were having difficulty in deciding what it wanted to do with the Provincial Guard; and in part to the difficulty involved in negotiating with three agencies rather than one, with varying degrees of success.

An additional problem that affected the USAID police program throughout its history, but especially during the early years, was the tendency of the Cambodians to request aid for the same projects from several donor countries. They had requested French assistance apparently around the same time as they had requested U.S. assistance and would later request aid from England and consider a request to India. This tendency was of course disruptive to any attempt toward rational planning and complicated the U.S. position since it had no desire to support financially and with equipment a program planned and run by other countries' advisors.

As was true in other areas of the USAID program, the Cambodians accepted technical counsel from the French when they would not from the U.S. The French police advisor worked in their Ministries and exerted much more influence than the USAID, although even his advice was seldom acted upon. The best example of this situation was the development of a reorganization plan and long range program for the

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Police, including equipment requirements to be provided by the U.S., by a special Police Commission made up of Cambodians and advised by the French. The USAID was not even notified officially that such a commission existed until after the reorganization plan had been approved by the Council of Ministers and they were ready to submit their equipment requirements to the USAID for fulfillment.

It had been understood that the RKG would submit a proposal for the improvement of its Police Forces to implement the FY 55 agreement and in mid-1956 the RKG Ministry of National Security submitted a Plan of Action of Surface Defense to the USAID in the first meeting of the Police Planning Commission the U.S. advisors had been invited to attend. The Plan combined the equipment requests submitted by each of the Police Services to the Commission and was extremely ambitious and completely beyond the resources available. In the Plan the Minister stated that the Provincial Guard had been reorganized into the Urban Guard, Rural Guard, and Mobile Guard, in other words, three separate forces. There was no figure given for the strength of the Urban Guard, but its figure would be probably around 500 officers and men. The Rural Guard had a table of manpower of 4,177 officers and men. The Mobile Guard comprised "22 mobile squadrons of 107 men each and one motorized squadron of 161 men, or a total of 2,515 men". In addition to the above, the volunteer force called the Forces Vives was proposed to have a strength of 86,500. A reserve force in addition would be made up of 7,000 armed men from urban centers called Urban Troops. Finally, 8,646 armed men selected partly from among the peasant troops (volunteers) and partly from

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among the urban troops would be counted upon to form the Auxiliary Troops, which, in case of mobilization, would be amalgamated with the 22 mobile squadrons of the Guard and become 22 groups of five commandos of 110 men each, or a total of 11,000 men in addition to the 86,500 Forces Vives. Central and Regional Staffs would increase the Guard by another 559 men. In summary then, the Minister of National Security proposed a force as follows:

Guard

Rural Guard	4,177
Mobile Guard	2,515
Central Staff	227
Regional Staffs	332

Total Guard 7,251

Forces Vives

Peasant Troops	86,500
Urban Troops	7,000
Auxiliary Troops	8,646

Total Forces Vives 102,146

Total Guard and Forces Vives 109,397

The equipment necessary to support the above would have cost over fifteen million dollars and in the RKG proposal included 521 vehicles, 51 boats, 102,392 weapons from mortars to pistols, 648 radios, 433 cameras, 1,483 field glasses, barrage balloon anchoring equipment, field and medical equipment and office equipment. Also requested was the construction of two police training schools (the Royal Police Academy and the Kompong Chhnang Basic Training School). The lists of equipment were fantastic. The absence of spare parts,

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munitions and ancilliary equipment was remarkable. The program was beyond the capabilities of RKG in terms of both financial and human resources. The Chief of the USAID Police Division commented on the proposal as being "excessive to the point of absurdity" and observed "as has been apparent for several months now, it appears that the Cambodians continue to look upon us merely as a source of supplies and are giving no consideration to requesting American assistance in fulfilling their other needs for improvement."

The U.S. refused to include the projected 102,146 man force of voluntary Forces Vives in the police program to be supported by American aid. The RKG, during meetings of the Cambodian Police Planning Commission, accepted the position of the U.S. (possibly due more to pressure from the Royal Khmer Army who were opposed to such a large force -- over 3 times that of its own force level) and in July requested that American aid in FY 57 be directed toward the following priorities which were based on the recommendation of the USAID advisor made in an earlier meeting: 1) assistance in the police training program, including the construction of an advanced training center in Phnom Penh; 2) improvement of communications by establishing police radio networks; 3) improvement in mobility by providing vehicles, including 41 jeeps, 36 trucks, 35 motorcycles and 2 patrol cars; 4) improvement in identification and records systems, including the furnishing of office and laboratory equipment.

By August 1956, the Chief of the Civil Police Assistance Division (CPAD), was able to write, "the Cambodian planners have agreed with me that our efforts should be pooled to perfect the full-time members

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of the Rural Guard and Mobile Guard, as a relatively small but effective mobile striking force capable of dealing with armed bands of dissidents, and to eliminate the Forces Vives from consideration now, insofar as material equipment is concerned." The Rural Guard, which would be scattered thin in the villages of Cambodia for the performance of normal civil police functions in rural areas, was planned as a force of 4,017 men, with detachments in each province. There would be a Central Headquarters at Phnom Penh, and regional staffs in five locations for coordination with provincial and army authorities. The central and regional staffs were planned to require 598 men. Thus, the force with which American aid to Surface Defense was concerned, would be approximately 7,300 men, about 2,000 less than their current strength in the Provincial Guard and the Provincial Guard Auxiliary.

While the problem raised by the presentation of their unreasonable shopping list had been solved, at least for the time being, the problem of acceptance of U.S. technical assistance remained. It was felt, that if the RKG accepted the U.S. position with regard to technical assistance, the general outline of the RKG request for FY 57 could be followed. Shortly after the presentation of their aid priorities, however, there was a governmental crisis and the entire cabinet resigned August 8, 1956, causing still another delay until September, when a new government was formed. However, the new Minister of National Security, for internal bureaucratic reasons, decided there would be no more meetings of the Planning Commission.

On October 22, 1956, the new Minister of National Security submitted the plan for utilizing American aid that had been established

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in July at the last meeting of the Police Planning Commission. It outlined a proposed reorganization and modernization of all the police services in Cambodia and requested that USOM furnish only the equipment required. The "technical conditions for proper implementation" of the program, according to the Minister, had been met or were being met by his proposed reorganization. The cost of the equipment requested approximated the amounts available since FY 1955.

In discussion with Police personnel concerning the U.S. position on technical assistance, they stated U.S. technicians would have to stay under cover because of political considerations and only, over a period of time, gradually reveal their presence in Cambodia. Earlier in October, the Minister of National Security had expressed this same problem and approach to the American Ambassador and added that it was because of Prince Sihanouk's suspicion that they couldn't openly accept U.S. police advisors.

The position of the USAID was that this type of management would be totally unacceptable and that if agreement wasn't forthcoming on the provision of U.S. technical assistance as part of a comprehensive police program the U.S. should abandon the project.

It appeared that the Cambodians had the impression that the U.S. advisors would be physically located in Police offices, would exert "control" over Police units and would attempt to displace the French. In spite of repeated explanations of the intended function of the U.S. police advisors the RKG remained suspicious and refused to accept the technical assistance element of American aid to the police. This situation continued until April of 1957, when a letter was written

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to Prince Sihanouk in his capacity as Minister of Plan, stating that the funds previously made available to the RKG police would not be available after June, 1957, unless agreement was reached on this point. This brought immediate results and a revision to the original agreement was signed in June, 1957, providing for technical assistance. The USAID agreed to provide \$100,000 of interim equipment and school supplies immediately to the Provincial Guard School in Kompong Chhnang, which the Cambodians were building themselves.

Since the Cambodian police service was made up of three agencies an arrangement was established whereby the funds made available in 1955 were committed for specific activities for the separate agencies through "sub-project agreements", which were in fact revisions to the basic Project Agreement signed in 1955. The sub-project agreements were to be based on Plans of Action to be prepared and submitted by the RKG. The first revision was that referred to above, in FY 1957, and was designed to provide the technical and material assistance needed to implement the desired training program. The FY 1957 agreement stated, for the first time, the goals of the project as being the establishment of improved systems relating to police administration and organization, a national communication system, a records and criminal identification bureau, training programs and facilities, improved transportation, traffic control and standardization of arms. The agreement made available \$669,000 for equipment for the different goals, to be allocated specifically by sub-project, and \$200,000 in local currency for the construction of a police training center plus \$50,000 in dollars for equipment and training aids.

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As the program developed over the years, some of the objectives established in the FY 1957 agreement (based on the 1955 survey) received more attention than others, but they were substantially the same at the time of termination in November, 1963.

Under the revised project agreement, progress was made in planning for the construction of the police training academy and determining realistic commodity requirements, although procurement of major items was held up pending the RKG legislation needed to establish a unified civil police force; agreement on the organization and equipment requirements for the Provincial Guard; agreement on the type of communication equipment best suited for the service; and the establishment of an adequate training program to assure effective utilization and maintenance of equipment.

The sub-project agreement implementing the construction of a police academy was signed in March, 1958. During the latter part of calendar year 1958, several political upsets within the RKG restricted U.S. technicians contacts with Cambodian police officials and seriously impeded program progress. This continued until March, 1959, in spite of the efforts made to maintain the momentum that had been generated in previous months.

The following accomplishments of the Police Program were cited in April of 1959: construction of the Police Academy had begun; agreement had been reached on the initial commodity increments to implement the planned arms and ammunition standardization program and on the transportation items needed to equip 48 mobile units (called the Mobile Guard) of the Provincial Guard; orders had been placed for

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transportation equipment, armament and ammunition for the National and Municipal Police, and plant equipment for the police academy; and plans had been made for the establishment of a central identification and police records facility at the National Police headquarters.

The RKG promulgated the Police Unification law on May 38, 1959, creating, in theory at least, the long sought RKP.

In June of 1959, the political climate improved and normal official contacts were reestablished.

The FY 1959 agreement was signed in June and provided an additional \$465,000 and \$18,000 in local currency. New elements in this agreement included the provision of adequate water and electrical supplies, training aids, cargo and personnel transport (one truck), and fire protection equipment to the Provincial Guard Basic Training School at Kompong Chhnang; special training for Mobile Guard Units in the care and maintenance of the weapons and equipment being provided; and the construction of an outdoor firing range. The majority of new funds were for commodities, mainly transportation equipment, and the cost of technicians with a smaller amount for the participant program.

In 1960, the USAID began receiving indications that the RKG was going to request increased military and police assistance. Unofficial information indicated that Prince Sihanouk was impatient with the slow delivery of American equipment (a justified impatience) and the small amount of aid being given Cambodia in comparison with Vietnam and Thailand. The threat was made publically that if the U.S. did

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not radically revise its anti-communist military aid to SEA Cambodia would seek military and police assistance from Bloc countries, and a press campaign began belaboring the inadequacy of American aid to the Cambodian Military and Police, comparing it unfavorably to that given Cambodia's neighbors. The U.S. responded by stating that it would be interested in knowing specifically what the RKG had in mind in the way of increased aid.

A special commission was established to discuss the question with the USAID and at the first meeting a list of equipment was presented by the RKG representatives of the Police which, it was estimated, would have cost approximately \$25 million dollars. Equipment requested included 1,429 new vehicles, radios for 1,687 separate operating stations, and 7,752 weapons - all in addition to the substantial amounts of equipment in these categories already on order. When written justification for so much equipment was requested the Cambodians at first flatly refused. In fact they seemed honestly perplexed that there should be any question about their requests. They had apparently interpreted the U.S. request for information as willingness to provide anything asked. In two subsequent meetings the Cambodians admitted their requests had been deliberately inflated with the idea of getting all they could.

The additional aid requirement was finally pared down to a total of approximately \$2 million to be furnished over a three-year period. The USAID recommended to AID/W that this be granted. After review, and discussion with the Chief of FARK who traveled to Washington in late October for this purpose, AID/W approved an additional \$500,000

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for FY 61 with no commitment for future years. The basis of AID/W's decision was that it did not consider an expansion of the RKG police forces necessary at that time, but, if required to do so on political grounds, AID was prepared to implement an additional \$500,000 equipment program from contingency funds.

By 1961, the Mission Director had become concerned that the program had deteriorated into one of supplying equipment without adequate planning, training and implementation on the part of the RKG, in spite of all efforts of the USAID to avoid just such an eventuality. By this time approximately 2.5 million dollars worth of equipment had been delivered to the Police and another \$1.5 million was on order. The Director and the Chief of the Civil Police Assistance Division of USAID (CPAD) had meetings with the Minister of Interior and the Secretary of Surface Defense in August and September of 1961 during which the purposes of the USAID police program were explained. In addition, a conference was called in August at the Ministry of Plan where again the concerns of the USAID were discussed. None of these meetings had any significant result.

The Director then instructed the Chief of the Civil Police Division to make a thorough investigation and written report. In October of 1961, the Chief of CPAD reported that the Director's worst fears were unfortunately true. He reported that CPAD could not determine where all the equipment thus far provided was; that they had no idea what records were kept by the RKG; that the RKG was not equipped with facilities or personnel to service all the equipment; that once material arrived in Phnom Penh the Cambodians took it and

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the technicians found it almost impossible to obtain any information about it from then on; that it was almost impossible to make contact with counterparts and that the RKG was not interested in training in Cambodia or the participant program. He recommended the program be discussed with the Minister to determine whether or not the RKG wanted the program of technical assistance and equipment emphasizing they must be accepted together; if no commitment was given by the Minister, the program should be discussed with the Prince and if he showed no interest it should be terminated and equipment on order canceled or diverted to other countries.

The Director agreed with the Chief's findings and, since actions taken regarding the police program might affect U.S.-Cambodian relations, he requested approval of the Ambassador in October of 1961 to do the following:

- 1) Seek an interview with the Minister of Plan to explain the situation.
- 2) Seek an interview with the Minister of Interior (acting at that time) to explain the concern and dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Police Program.
- 3) Confirm 1 and 2 in writing.
- 4) Suspend procurement on all equipment on order. With the exception of equipment for the Municipal Police (who were cooperating more than the other forces) until procedures could be worked out assuring the U.S. of proper utilization of all equipment supplied.

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The available record is silent as to the Ambassador's reaction, but the events that followed indicate that he approved at least of the approach to the RKG. In any event, it should be kept in mind that this was a particularly tense and difficult period politically during which Cambodia broke relations with Thailand and Prince Sihanouk threatened to stop American aid.

In November, 1961, a new Secretary of State for Internal Security and Surface Defense was appointed, apparently changing slightly the Director's approach as no meeting with the Minister of Plan is recorded. In a meeting with the new Secretary the Mission Director and Chief of CPAD reported on the program to date, and gave him a copy of the Project Agreement and a list of the problems needing resolution. The Secretary asked that he be given several weeks to review the material after which he would call another meeting.

A month later, another meeting was held and the new Secretary presented his views on the program and requested that the program be continued. He expressed some disappointment over the fact that there were no funds for commodities for the next year as he felt there were a number of things that they needed. The Chief of CPAD asked that the Secretary present his request for assistance in writing. He stated that he would submit it after conferences with his staff.

The request subsequently received was to continue the program in Firearms standardization, to provide a National Bureau of Identification, complete the Radio System, and provide uniforms for the police and additional vehicles. The Secretary did not agree with the idea of the 48 mobile platoons, but stated he would submit a plan for the organization and equipping of several mobile units for the Provincial

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Guard. The USAID replied that it would be necessary for the U.S. technicians to visit all the provinces and inspect all of the equipment that had been delivered and determine how it was being used and maintained. In order to do this, identification passes were requested for all CPAD personnel. The Secretary later decided that this was not possible.

The USAID began to hold up the release to the Police of the vehicles and spare parts that were arriving. There were two reasons why this was done; (1) CPAD had no Logistics and Supply technician to supervise the use and handling of these items (a Logistics Advisor had been requested in October, 1961) and (2) CPAD technicians were not being permitted to see the fleet already in the possession of the RKG.

During this period, the installation of the basic radio net was completed and the communications control center finished. The Central Records Bureau of the Municipal Police was installed, and firearms training and riot control training were being given to members of the Municipal Police. Although the police had stated their desire to have the National Identification Bureau established, additional firearms training and some type of Mobile element established, there was no further action on their part to implement these plans. Although progress as indicated was made during this period, it was disappointing. The new Project Agreement was presented and signed, but a number of reservations were made in a letter from the RKG accompanying the document. It was evident by these reservations that the Cambodians were very sensitive about their sovereignty and they

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constantly referred to the fact that a number of the items in the Agreement were the "sole prerogative" of the RKG.

By the time of the signing of the FY 1962 Project Agreement in June, 1962, the project's accomplishments were cited as follows:

- The Police academy had been completed and was in operation.
- Improvements had been made at the Kompong Chhnang Basic Training School.
- Personnel of the Municipal Police had received basic training in modern fingerprint techniques and records and identification.
- The primary communications network had been installed and was in operation; equipment for the maintenance shop had arrived and work had begun on the transmission and control center at National Police Headquarters in Phnom Penh. Installation of the secondary net was expected to be completed during calendar 1962.
- All vehicles were expected to be delivered and a central police garage building (being constructed by the RKG) completed by the end of CY 1962 and equipment for the garage (being given by the USAID) was expected by February 1963. A review of present vehicles was to be required prior to ordering any more.
- 65% of the arms and ammunition standardization program was expected to be completed by the end of CY 1962 and advance training for instructors was planned.

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The FY 1962 Project Agreement provided additional funds for the contract through which the communications system and communications training were being provided, and a small amount for commodities.

While this much progress had been made since 1955, the police remained suspicious and reserved in their relations with the USAID and the U.S. technicians still played no part in the development of the plans for improving the Police forces. The overall program for the police, requested so long ago, had still not been given to the USAID and the latest Secretary of State reportedly had submitted to the RRG a comprehensive reorganization plan for the police which the USAID had never seen. Although the new Secretary seemed the most interested and cooperative to date, he repeatedly refused to discuss details until his plan had been approved and the prevailing attitude toward American aid continued to be that of supplier of equipment. It had now been seven years since the survey and first agreement in 1955 and the U.S. had provided over \$3 million worth of equipment. There had been more than fifteen changes in government since 1955. The law integrating the different forces into one organization had still not been fully implemented, although partial, formal steps had been taken.

In accordance with prior agreements which provided for the establishment, training and equipping of 78 mobile platoons for the Provincial Guard, the U.S. had supplied some 300 vehicles only to discover that the Mobile platoons did not exist and that the USAID knew nothing about the disposition, use or condition of the vehicles.

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The primary communications system had been installed but there were no trained personnel to maintain it and the RKG had not provided sufficient trainees for this purpose.

During the summer of 1962, the Police initiated a policy whereby no one could enter any of the police posts unless he had been granted permission by headquarters in Phnom Penh.

As a result of the growing problems in the Civil Police Assistance Program, the USAID began taking an increasingly firm position and a meeting was requested for the Mission Director with the Secretary of State for Internal Security and Surface Defense. In the meeting the Mission Director reviewed the history of the deficiencies in the program, emphasizing the continued lack of cooperation on the part of the RKG and the requirement that they accept technical assistance and training with the equipment being provided. It was repeatedly emphasized that before any additional equipment could be provided, the USAID would have to be assured there were personnel adequately trained in its use, repair and maintenance, and, further, that a full accounting of the whereabouts, use and condition of equipment already provided would have to be made to the USAID.

In spite of the direct presentation of the U.S. position, the Secretary seemed not to believe it and, after hearing the Mission Director out and making some references to the political nature of the problem, asked when the USAID would turn over the 25 jeeps then being held. The Director replied that they would be released when the USAID had been assured that the drivers had been properly trained. A discussion followed concerning the Secretary's previous

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assurances of the driver's competence; the fact that the drivers had been trained by the Military at Kompong Chhnang; the USAID's lack of opportunity to view the training program there; the Secretary's inability to request permission from the Military for the USAID technician to visit the training program; the question of why the Military was relied upon for training where the USAID had people qualified to train; the Secretary's response that training was an internal matter to be decided by the RKG; the Director's reply that the U.S. has its internal matters also, one of which being the decision not to supply equipment if not assured of its proper use; and the Secretary's conclusion that he would have to refer the matter to the Council of Ministers. This exchange is presented as an illustration of the problems faced by the USAID in negotiating the Police Program.

Identification cards were obtained for the technicians to visit the provinces as a result of this and other meetings, but when the technicians made their trips the provincial police personnel would not permit them to see any U.S. provided equipment except vehicles and would answer no questions regarding anything but vehicles.

The Logistics advisor requested in October, 1961, arrived in November, 1962, and began immediately to inspect the vehicle fleet. The immediate result of the inspection was the confirmation of fears in the discovery that approximately 50% of the vehicles inspected were inoperable. It was also discovered that requests from some provincial posts for spare parts were being refused on the grounds that none were available although a two year supply had been provided by the USAID.

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The problem was approached by holding to the firm position taken in the meeting discussed above and, through subsequent meetings and exchanges of letters, what appeared to be a major "break through" was accomplished toward the end of 1962.

Discussions on the FY 1963 project agreement were begun in January of 1963 and accord was reached with the Secretary without substantive problems even though the agreement provided for the withholding of commodities by the USAID until it was assured of their proper use, repair and maintenance. The new Secretary appeared to be the most cooperative to date, and RKG police personnel actually began coming to the USAID and calling for discussions. Whenever a problem arose, it was taken to the Secretary and in most cases satisfaction was received.

The improvement in relations with the Police continued as USAID technicians began establishing contacts in the provinces, and implementation of the project progressed once again. During this period the following progress was made on the program.

1. The Central Garage was established, equipped and people were being trained.
2. All A.I.D. furnished equipment was inspected.
3. A vehicle maintenance program was established.
4. A spare parts specialist was obtained and a proper system installed.
5. The Central Municipal Police Identification and Records Bureau was established and equipped.

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6. Further improvements were made at the Kompong Chhnang Basic School by the furnishing of cement and paint. The Cambodians did the work.
7. Motor maintenance facilities in the provinces were being constructed by the Cambodians with the USAID supplying the cement.
8. The percentages of deadlined vehicles was reduced from 47% to 22%. (The reduction would have been greater except for the lack of spare parts and the problems encountered in getting parts for Japanese-manufactured vehicles.)
9. A weapons repair shop was completed and a training program was being prepared.
10. The participant sent to the U.S. for weapons training was placed in charge of firearms and designated as the counterpart to the U.S. technician.
11. The equipment for the secondary radio net had arrived and plans for its installation were being discussed.
12. Plans were being completed for the Central Communications Repair Shop and Warehouse.
13. The FY 1963 Project Agreement was signed with no reservations, and it specifically defined each party's responsibilities and set up the basis on which commodities would be furnished.

This situation continued until early Fall of 1963 when there were indications that the pendulum had once again begun to swing the other way. There was hope, however, that the problems of decreasing

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cooperation were not the result of high level attitudes and that the Secretary's position remained cooperative and the problems thus surmountable but the project's history was not reassuring. The progress experienced during this period and the problems beginning toward the end of it (just prior to the termination of aid) are covered in detail in the discussions of the major activities which follow below.

As is illustrated by the above and is revealed in more detail in the sub-sections that follow, the Civil Police Assistance Program in Cambodia was extremely sensitive to the political situation in Cambodia and suffered seriously as a result from constant vacillation on the part of the RKG, which reflected, to perhaps an exaggerated degree, every whim and mood of Prince Sihanouk. From the very beginning technical assistance was rejected and was never accepted in fact, only in principle, in order to obtain more equipment. Training programs were agreed to when it became clear the delivery of commodities was contingent on such agreement, and then, on one pretext or another, the training with few exceptions was never carried out. The only exception to this worthy of note was the relative success of the traffic control and identification and records activities carried out with the Municipal Police of Phnom Penh. In the traffic control activity, apparently because of its non-political nature, technical assistance was accepted and utilized. Many of the traffic arrangements existing in Phnom Penh today, such as one way streets, one way circular traffic around the Independence monument and the hill for which the city is named, plus the major four lane

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Norodom Boulevard, are the result of USAID advice and support. The identification and records activity was much more successful with the Municipal than with the National Police.

In consideration of the U.S. political objective of pre-empting the Police field from the Eloc, the USAID time and time again accepted the assurances of Police officials and signed agreements in the hope that "this time," the RKG meant it and would cooperate. It was with this objective in mind that the FY 1965 Country Assistance Program emphasized that the Police Project was designed to provide Cambodia with an internal security capability beyond the ability of the RKG to finance for the foreseeable future and that, consequently, the project could have no realistic phase-out date. It is clear that the original estimates of the time required for completing of the project were unrealistic.

Because its objectives remained the same throughout its eight year history, the police program lends itself more readily to evaluation of its accomplishments as compared to its objectives than the other program areas whose objectives changed and evolved over the years. For this reason the Police Program stands in sharpest relief as not having achieved its objectives at the time of termination, although there were promising indications toward the end that the last Secretary would have continued to cooperate and achievement of long sought objectives seemed at least feasible. The Program had clearly not achieved the objective of an efficient police force capable of maintaining internal security and controlling subversion, primarily because the necessary training and technical guidance were

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not desired by the Cambodians, due either to the political situation to which the police program was so sensitive, or to lack of realization of their needs in this respect. Contributing to a large degree to this failure, however, were the constant changes in government, the lack of sufficient technical personnel, due primarily to gaps in recruitment, in the USAID for long periods and the slow delivery of commodities.

With regard to the political objective of pre-empting the police field from the Bloc, however, the program can be considered to have been a success until the termination of American aid.

The sub-sections that follow discuss the Civil Police Program in more detail by major activity i.e. Support of the Provincial Guard, transportation, communications, firearms, and identification and records.

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2. Support of the Provincial Guard

a) Introduction

The Provincial Guard is the largest element of the Royal Khmer Police (RKP). In early 1955, the strength of the various civil police agencies in Cambodia, excluding the Force Vive, (today called the Chivapols), was reported as 14,626 officers and men, of which 12,241 were assigned to the Provincial Guard. As of November 1963, available figures indicate a slight reduction in the Provincial Guard to around 11,000 members. The Chivapol strength was reported in 1955 as approximately 27,000 men, of which 13,309 were considered active. In November 1963, this force had grown to a reported 50,000 members, of which 25,000 were active. In general, the Chivapol is under the direction of the Provincial Guard, but the operations of the Chivapol and Provincial Guard are under the control of the local provincial governor.

The Provincial Guard has undergone some organizational changes since the initial report on Cambodian police was prepared in 1955. It was separate in 1955 from the other two police organizations (National and Urban Police) but in 1957, after some urging by the USAID, the three police organizations were technically brought together by law as the Royal Khmer Police. Implementation of the law, however, was only partially accomplished when the program was terminated in 1963. The USAID also recommended further improvements in organization, training, communications, mobility and armaments.

The mission of the Provincial Guard has remained the same over the years and includes normal police operations and maintenance of

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public safety in rural areas, population control and surveillance, guarding sensitive points, assisting civilian administrative authorities, and collecting information. It appears that the Provincial Guard has become somewhat more proficient in performing its mission through improved training of personnel, an enlarged cadre of trained officers, more centralized control of the provincial brigades, more reliable and faster communications, greater mobility, and standardized armaments.

The Provincial Guard is currently made up of a General Staff and Central Brigade in Phnom Penh, a basic training school in Kompong Chhnang and seventeen provincial brigades (one for each province) ranging in size from 200 to 1,000 men. The few facilities that exist for repair and maintenance of equipment are located at the Central Brigade in Phnom Penh. Provincial Guard detachments and posts which numbered over 1,000 in 1955 appear to have been reduced to slightly more than 600 in 1963, but this may have come about through a different definition of terms.

As discussed above, in 1956 the RKG requested of the USAID various types of equipment sufficient to arm and equip approximately 100,000 men. During the discussions that followed, the USAID contribution in the rural police field was limited to equipment for a mobile guard, training and technical assistance. Though the RKG willingly accepted the equipment and some limited training, it continually balked at accepting technical assistance, which has resulted in an unsatisfactory knowledge of operation, maintenance, and repair requirements, and thus a rapid deterioration of the equipment issued.

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b) AID Program

The long range objectives for the Provincial Guard as set forth in the FY 1959 Project Agreement follow:

- a. Arming, strengthening and training the Provincial Guard for rural internal security action.
- b. Providing the Provincial Guard with transportation facilities and the Mobile Guard with special armament with which to quell local and rural disturbances.

The time estimate of 2-5 years in the survey report for accomplishment of the program proved unrealistic. Even had the program received complete cooperation from the RKG, it could not have produced the trained personnel needed in sufficient numbers to properly utilize and repair the delivered equipment and bring the Provincial Guard to the desired level of proficiency in the length of time originally given. The established objectives called for a long range program and a fundamental requirement for success was the obtaining of cooperation from the RKG. It appeared that the latter was being very slowly accomplished in the last year before the termination of the program. The following discussion of the aid program's support of the Provincial Guard is in general terms; the sub-sections on transportation, communication and firearms discuss the respective elements of that support in more detail.

1) Mobile Guard

The establishment of the mobile element was programmed by the USAID to consist of 48 platoons and to be fully operational by 1964. Although the equipment was provided and the Provincial Guard

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claims to have mobile platoons in each province, the equipment is actually being utilized by the entire Provincial Guard and the platoons are actually reserve forces at each provincial brigade headquarters. There is no consistency of organization or training. At no point was the USAID permitted to undertake the training of the personnel to be assigned to the platoons and only limited training was permitted to the personnel who were to utilize the equipment. In spite of the USAID's intention, the RKG obtained the equipment without accepting the training. By early 1963, it was determined that the mobile platoon concept would not work until after the entire Provincial Guard had received sufficient training to permit it to perform its mission with greater efficiency.

2) Transportation, Firearms and Communications

It is interesting to note that in 1955, when the initial survey of the Provincial Guard was conducted, it had 137 various types of vehicles of which 63 were condemned and repair and maintenance on the remainder was extremely poor. In the weapons field there was a wide variety of French and other weapons, mostly old, in poor repair and with limited ammunition. These weapons were sufficient to arm approximately 33,000 persons. In the communications field there were 70, fifteen and twenty-five watt stations passing a limited amount of traffic, all by voice.

By November 1963, this situation had improved somewhat. Approximately 12 vehicles purchased by the Provincial Guard were in running order and approximately 200 of the 266 vehicles provided by the USAID were running. Thus, the mobility of the

Provincial Guard had been increased approximately threefold by November 1963.

In the armament field, the USAID undertook a weapons standardization program, providing over 8,000 weapons with over 3 million rounds of ammunition. Thus, the majority of the Provincial Guard units are now equipped with standard weapons though they continue to utilize many of the old French weapons.

The radios noted in 1955 are no longer functioning and in their place the USAID installed 21, 110W SSB stations, 50 CA 12 AM portable transceivers and 50 mobile 100W SSB transceivers. In the AEA warehouse at the time of termination were 485, two to twenty-five watt transceivers without ancillary equipment for the secondary and tertiary nets.

Thus in the equipment field the USAID made a significant contribution. However, as discussed immediately below, the lack of training in the use, repair and maintenance of the equipment provided, will, in all probability, effectively nullify this contribution.

3) Training

In the training field, very little was accomplished with the Provincial Guard. There is not a single member of the Provincial Guard fully trained to repair the equipment provided. In the weapons field very few personnel are adequately trained to utilize the weapons effectively. Though training was provided to a limited number of personnel in the use, maintenance, and repair of the equipment, it fell short of the desired program and did not

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produce a fully trained technician who is assigned to the job for which he was trained.

Training programs in effect in November 1963, had they been permitted to continue, would have produced a number of adequately trained personnel. As discussed elsewhere, the RKG was resistant to the acceptance of training programs which would improve the technical level of its personnel or improve their efficiency. The RKG's major interest in the USAID's assistance has been obtaining equipment, and it appears the RKG either did not recognize the need for training or it had fears of American influence becoming too great within the police forces. The fact that training conducted at the two police schools discussed below under French direction has been far more acceptable to the RKG would seem to support the latter of these two possibilities.

The USAID constructed a Police Academy in Phnom Penh, primarily for the Provincial Guard although the student body of 210 is drawn from all the RKG police services. The academy consists of a seven classroom building and its curricula is designed to train commanding and junior officers. The curricula include: 1) preparatory courses prior to candidate examinations; 2) advanced and refresher courses in critical subjects; 3) recruit courses and; 4) specialized courses as required to train police personnel in such functions as traffic control, criminal investigation, counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Construction of the school began in the summer of 1958 and the first class began in March, 1960. Two classes of second lieutenants had graduated as of November 1963, which reduced

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greatly the shortage of qualified officers at the junior level and provided a more uniform standard of leadership. Although the USAID constructed the Royal Police Academy in Phnom Penh, and provided training aids, it was never permitted to assist in the instruction of the students.

At the Kompong Chhnang Basic Training School the USAID provided material and equipment assistance in its construction as well as training aids for instruction but again, was not permitted to participate in the training.

There continues to be serious shortcomings in the organizational structure of the Provincial Guard with direction and command not properly centralized, although, compared to 1955, improvement was made. The, at least formal, reorganization of the various police forces into the Royal Khmer Police marked the accomplishment of an important first step, but still the provincial brigades appear to lack coordination and direction at the national level. The lack of a central records system was noted in 1955, and is still noted, but with the formation of the Royal Khmer Police some uniform reports are prepared by the various Provincial Guard Brigades to the National Police, especially in the investigative field.

The reasons for the lack of success in improving the proficiency of the Provincial Guard, when viewed over the eight year period, was the reluctance of the RKG to permit technicians to work in the field with the various brigades, to organize and conduct courses of instruction which would produce a cadre of personnel qualified to continue training at the brigade level, and to follow with their

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counterparts on a day-to-day basis the routine functioning of the brigades and central headquarters so that recommendations could be formulated for improving organization, administration, and records. Thus, the USAID program with the Provincial Guard met with only limited success; this primarily in the commodity field, and, as already noted, this "success" is at best temporary.

The reluctance of the RKG to grant permission to conduct any training programs and the delays encountered in obtaining personnel to train was such that only a minimum number of Provincial Guard personnel received training on the equipment issued. This resulted, by 1962, in fifty per cent of the vehicles provided by the USAID being deadlined, the majority of the weapons poorly maintained and major repairs of communication equipment being done only by a USAID technician. Not even a minimum of training by the USAID to meet other deficiencies noted by the survey team in 1955 was possible.

In late 1962, training programs were under consideration by the RKG in automotive maintenance and repair, communications and armaments. These programs with USAID technicians and third country specialists began in 1963 and were slowly making headway. The USAID, while conducting in-service mechanics training, brought the deadlined vehicles down to 22 per cent in October 1963. Maintenance facilities for armaments and communications had been constructed and were in the initial stages of operation.

Summary

In the accomplishment of any set of objectives, it is helpful to have continuity and cooperation. The repeated changes of senior

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police officials and ministers made the police program for the Provincial Guard one of continued frustration. To add to this, cooperation by the RRG had long periods of chill, if not hostility. Much of this can be summed up by the following statement in the July 1958 Monthly Report: "...in the light of Sihanouk's only dependable tendency—unpredictable emotional behavior—and the fact that, for all practical considerations, he constitutes the Cambodian Government, very little, if any, positive assurance can be felt regarding continuing good program progress in the months to come." Five years after that statement was made it was still true and though the USAID was developing plans for improved maintenance facilities in the Provincial Brigades, weapons training in the provinces and a pilot community development program to be undertaken by the Provincial Guard, the reaction of police officials had at no time given the USAID assurance that these plans would ever get any further than the planning board.

3. Transportation(a) Introduction

The purpose of the transportation sub-project was to provide adequate transportation and mobility for the police, with adequate maintenance and repair facilities, and trained personnel to operate the equipment and facilities; and to assist in the development of a supply and inventory system with the requisite records for determining operating costs and budget estimates for present and future operations.

Prior to the receipt of American aid vehicles to Cambodia, the vehicular fleet of the Royal Khmer Police (RKP) (consisting of the National, Urban and Municipal Police and the Provincial Guard), and its condition, was as follows:

TABLE OF VEHICLES - PROVINCIAL GUARD
March, 1955

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Condition</u>
Renault Lt. Truck 2-T 500	41	13 - Fair 28 - Condemned
Renault Lt. Truck 1-T 800	1	Condemned
GMC Heavy Truck 1-T	1	Condemned
Pick Up Truck	1	Good
Citroen Lt. Truck T-23	18	Good
Personnel Carrier 4x4	4	2 - Fair 2 - Condemned
Jeep	20	11 - Fair 9 - Condemned
Landrover	8	4 - Fair 4 - Condemned
Citroen 11 CV Auto	1	Fair
Prairie Auto	1	Condemned
Vendome Auto	1	Good
Outboard Motors	35	20 - Fair 15 - Condemned
Motor Boats	3	1 - Fair 2 - Condemned

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MUNICIPAL POLICE

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Condition</u>
Jeeps	6	2 - New 1 - Good 3 - Poor
Ford Sedan	1	Poor
Citroen Sedan	1	Poor
Motorcycles	10	8 - New 2 - Poor
Jeeps	14	2 - New 2 - Fair 8 - Bad 2 - Condemned
Sedans	4	2 - Fair 1 - Bad 1 - Condemned
Light Trucks	9	8 - Bad 1 - Condemned
Motorcycle	1	Bad

The first vehicles provided by the AID program were six landrover pick-up trucks procured for the Provincial Guard from counterpart funds in July, 1955. An additional 21 landrover pick-up trucks were released in February, 1956, 12 to the National Police and 9 to the Provincial Guard for distribution primarily to their units in the provinces. From 1955 to November, 1963, the USAID, in response to the requests of the RKG discussed above, provided the RKG police with 27 landrovers, 128 jeeps, 18 sedans, 156 trucks and 17 ambulances for a total of 346 land vehicles plus spare parts and one airboat and 35 outboard motors at the approximate total cost of one million dollars.

With regard to maintenance and repair facilities, the USAID designed and equipped a Central Garage in Phnom Penh for the police, in 1959 and assisted in inventoring spare parts and setting up a spare parts central system. Other advice was provided on the importance of maintenance and repair and how to establish an effective

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system. A seven man participant team was sent to Hawaii for a four month course in automotive maintenance and repair in 1959 with the intention that they return to operate the garage. The assistance provided, other than the participant training, was apparently on an ad hoc basis, however, and there was no specific technician for this purpose during this time. As it developed there was considerable over-estimation of the RKG's ability and desire to maintain and repair the vehicles being provided without more intensive and continuous technical guidance and influence.

It was not until October of 1961 that a request was made to AID/W for a supply and logistics advisor to provide guidance in coping with this vehicular fleet. He did not arrive until November, 1962.

(b) The Aid Program From November 1962 to Termination in November 1963

The Logistics Advisor arrived at the time the USAID was taking a firmer position with the RKG with regard to technical assistance, as discussed above, and he was able to begin a survey and technical inspection of the police motor fleet and existing facilities throughout Cambodia shortly after his arrival. The survey revealed that by January, 1963, 48 per cent of the entire Police fleet was inoperative and no system of priority in making repairs was in evidence.

The Logistics Advisor visited detachments, spoke with commanding officers and motor personnel and inspected vehicles through late March of 1963.

A physical inventory and survey was made of certain USAID-furnished inoperative vehicles at the Central Garage parking area.

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It was discovered that a total of sixty-seven (67) vehicles were in this category with no provision made for repairs, consisting of:

15 M-37 Dodge 3/4-ton Trucks	Average Mileage 8,000
12 Landrovers	Average Mileage 20,000
40 Trucks, 1/4-ton	Average Mileage 17,000

Ninety per cent of the vehicles were in need of third echelon repairs, e.g., starter motors, clutch, brake system, steering and alignment, rings and valves and in one instance a transfer case was required. However, due to the long period of time which the vehicles had been left unattended and exposed to inclement weather, wind, dust, etc., with gas caps, spark plugs and oil filters removed considerable foreign matter had entered the engine and fuel systems. This compounded the problem of repairs and what had once been a routine third echelon repair job had developed into a major engine and fuel system overhaul due to one simple cause - negligence.

In many cases batteries had not been removed. As a result, acid had attacked metal, various moving parts and wiring. Tires had been left intact and deterioration had set in.

No attempt had been made by the RKG to effect repair; vehicles remained in position exposed to the inclement weather and rusted away. Dependent children of various police played in vehicles and removed items for play-toys. Eighty per cent of all headlights, mirrors and gear shift knobs ended up as playthings. When the motor officer was approached on the subject of restoring vehicles to an operative state (some had been in place for two years), his comment was that the vehicles did not operate, were no good, and should be replaced by new USAID-furnished vehicles.

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Approximately 1/3 of the combined police motor fleet consisted of Japanese-manufactured vehicles - the Toyota 2FQ15L 3/4-ton military design, FEC. 79-M-38A1 Jeeps (military, combat type, 24-volt system) designed for underwater fording, which was totally unnecessary and complicated the problem of re-supply and repair. In addition, twenty Dodge M-37, Combat Military 3/4-ton trucks, along with the M-38A1 were on hand. These last two types were no longer in production and parts were in short supply. However, previously ordered parts for the M-38A1 had been arriving piecemeal from various Army Ordnance Depots for two years. It was impossible to establish what parts had been received and what parts were still due. This was the result of the lack of precision with which the USAID had requisitioned the parts, e.g., "sufficient spares for one year supply". Vehicle density as against maximum allowables for operations in this part of the world had not been considered.

A brief inventory of the Central Garage parts room disclosed that there were insufficient parts on hand for the next six months for the Toyota vehicle. Few parts for the M-37 were found, although available listing showed approximately \$18,000 worth of repair parts were shipped. The RKG files were incomplete; general confusion and a no-care attitude existed. Further, 14 of the twenty 3/4-ton M-37s were inoperative with a speedometer reading of less than 12,000 miles. The below listed tools and equipment were on hand at the Central Garage for a fleet of 346 USAID-furnished vehicles and 50 RKG-purchased vehicles:

1 Hand Air Pump	3 Pair Pliers
1 Grinding Wheel	10 Screwdrivers
6 Socket Wrenches	6 Assorted Wrenches

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USAID FURNISHED ITEMS

- 1 Steam Cleaner (not installed)
- 1 Hydraulic Press (inoperative)
- 1 Cluth Rebuilder (not installed)
- 1 Paint Mixer (in crate since 1959)
- 4 Engine Stands
- 1 Brake Drum Lathe (not in use)
- 2 Hoist Blocks with Chains
- 1 10-Kilowatt generator

Further, there was not one trained or qualified mechanic. No technical reference library, no system for echelon repair and no scheduled maintenance. Parts supply was in a chaotic state and identification of parts with reference to make and models was nearly impossible. One enlisted man was acting parts dispatcher and had limited knowledge of what was required. He was further handicapped by the administrative channels from above and general lack of supervision.

Budgetary restrictions definitely limited the amount of support which went toward maintaining the combined police motor fleet. This applied to the National Police, Municipal Police and the Provincial Guard. Reasonable estimates indicated that an average of \$6.00 per year per vehicle was being expended for maintenance and repair. This figure was based, by the Logistics Advisor, on his conversations with various police officials, the admission of the Central Garage Motor Officer and available records. Of all the USAID provided vehicles, it is estimated that 99% of all spare parts were furnished by the USAID. Essential items, i.e., engine oil, chassis grease, wheel bearing grease and replacement oil filters were neglected to the point where oil was being changed at eight month intervals,

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lubrication was performed once a year on a hit and miss basis and the oil filters themselves were never cleaned nor replaced.

Many vehicles were inoperative for months and months due to a lack of funds to buy a needed battery, spark plugs, carbon brushes or other common parts. Replacement of major items such as tires and tubes, as far as purchasing by the RKG was concerned, was out of the question. The only exceptions were for vehicles used by various high police officials and their staff. Replacement tires and tubes were unobtainable for the field detachments and city patrol vehicles unless the USAID furnished them. Other items such as jacks, lug wrenches, air hand pumps and common hand tools could not be purchased by the RKG.

The Logistics Advisor began immediately to take corrective actions. The need for third country mechanics was realized, recruitment commenced and three Filipino mechanics were employed by mid-March 1963. Steps were immediately taken to expedite the procurement of a shop set, organizational, field maintenance and metric tools, precision instruments and other items for a machine shop. Contact was made with the U.S. Army and other agencies in order to locate and freeze wanted commodities for the General Garage. A shop set was located at the Air Force Material Command in Sacramento, California, and other tools, surplus property, etc., were found at U.S. Army Logistical Depot, Japan. The advisor proceeded to Japan and the United States, and verified the general condition of items and expedited their movement to Cambodia.

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In order to establish a stock level and make approaches for a systematic re-supply source for needed parts for the Toyota vehicles, which, as stated above, constituted 1/3 of the Police motor fleet, several important aspects were evaluated and plans set into motion as follows:

- 1) Source of supply and parts for Japanese-manufactured vehicles.
- 2) Interchangeability of parts, Military Model M-38A1 and commercial-type jeeps.
- 3) Availability of parts and substitute parts locally.
- 4) Extent of modification possible by the USAID mechanics in order to reduce deadline and prolong the life of vehicles.

With reference to 1) above, the Logistics Advisor obtained Country Stockage Lists and Electrical Accounting Machine Run-Offs in order to ascertain what parts were on hand in Japan; unit price and Ordnance allowances based on vehicle density; delivery as against production and availability dates; lead time, etc. Direct communication was made with the U.S. Army Washington Ordnance Testing Boards and the U.S. Army Logistical Depot along with the Toyota Motor Company, Japan. It was found that the USAID could not purchase parts for the Toyota vehicles which were designed for the U.S. Army and were not in commercial channels. Approved channels would have to be followed from the Army Procurement Agency, Japan. The Logistics Advisor went to Japan in April 1963, and conferred with depot authorities and the problem of re-supply was discussed fully. The advisor was informed that parts could be supplied from Ordnance Stock provided an interservice agreement was signed and responsibility

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for payment worked out. An agreement was drafted, but was not approved by G-4, U.S. Army, Japan because of legal complications.

A request for a waiver to the excluded sources regulations in the amount of \$45,000 was submitted to AID/W in mid-May. Approval for the purchase from Japan and for the Logistics Advisor, along with the spare parts specialist, to visit Japan for the purpose of expediting parts shipment was received in late August. On arrival in Japan the technicians were advised to proceed direct to the Logistical Depot to obtain the items needed immediately from ordnance stocks. The balance of other items would be furnished through contractual services, since Toyota had discontinued the production of the 2FQ15L. On arrival at the Logistical Depot, however, the advisors were told by the commanding officer that no parts could be supplied due to Cambodia (Civil Police vehicles) not being in their country stockage computations and no allowances having been made to supply AID. Bids would have to be obtained by Army Procurement from various firms in Japan to manufacture parts, lead time 180 days. The USAID request for parts was denied and the matter referred to the Army Procurement Agency, who stated action would be taken to obtain bids.

In summary, during the eleven months from December 1962, through October 23, 1963, efforts had been made to obtain a source of supply; an Interservice Agreement; and a waiver to purchase from excluded sources. There is no doubt that all of the delays, administrative red tape, etc., tended to irritate the RKG - simply because it was difficult for them to comprehend: AID furnished the vehicles and

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then could not obtain parts. If the RKG desired to purchase parts (as once was the case), the request was rejected due to U.S. Government policy that it was illegal to sell to any civilian agency or foreign government. The needed parts were not in commercial channels; they were exclusively for the Armed Forces of the U.S. and approved Military Assistance Program (MAP) countries.

At the same time efforts to correct the situation of the motor fleet were brought to the attention of the Secretary of National Defense and various police staff officers, requesting permission for USAID mechanics to begin repairs on the vehicles -- using parts from stock and reclaiming parts from other vehicles which were considered beyond economical repair. A negative reply was received.

By mid-May, after more discussions with the Secretary, he authorized the removal of parts and the green light was given to commence restoration of the vehicles. It was estimated that the cost of repair (average) would be \$585 U.S. dollars, including labor and paint per vehicle with a life expectancy of three years with proper care.

Inventorying of spare parts was begun by the USAID Spare Parts Specialist, and plans were made to set up a requisition system, parts identification and job work order request for parts. After considerable time and effort had been expended to train and acquaint personnel in parts management, the RKG announced in early June that 30 per cent of all stock on hand would be removed from the Central Garage and transferred into a National Reserve. Efforts

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to stop this move proved futile. The parts room was in chaos and the USAID was no longer in a position to record, document and control the inventorying since selected administrative personnel of the RKG came in and disrupted the procedure.

The RKG announced further that parts would be released only upon approval of the Secretary's office and endorsement from the Chief of Material, Supply and Logistics. The Chief, CPAD, and the Logistics Advisor met with the Police officials concerned, who stated without reservation that such was a decision of the RKG, an internal affair, and that materials were furnished unconditionally. USAID's position in the matter was that removal of parts was unnecessary inasmuch as a minimum stock level of parts was being established on an automatic re-supply system. Nevertheless, the parts were removed and USAID's restoration program for the vehicles was seriously curtailed.

By mid-July 1963, USAID personnel had rebuilt one Jeep and it was agreed that the vehicle would be at the disposal of the USAID mechanics and technicians, inasmuch as they were working approximately three miles from AID Headquarters without a telephone and had to rely upon the USAID motor pool for transportation to and from the garage and for making local purchases. After the vehicle was road tested, it was immediately withdrawn from the USAID technicians and given to the Camp Commander for his personal use.

Meanwhile, mechanical repairs on vehicles were continuing without the 30 per cent of spare parts transferred to a National reserve and the percentile of inoperative vehicles was declining monthly.

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A shop truck, equipped with tools and equipment in order to perform third echelon repairs, was being dispatched monthly to detachments in the field and considerable progress was being made in training, making repairs and acquainting personnel with driver responsibilities, preventive maintenance, etc. Because it was an asset in keeping their vehicles operating, the majority of the field commanders expressed their appreciation for the mobile repair van visits and displayed considerable interest in the program. In addition, training in automotive repairs for Cambodians was started in April. By August they were making limited third echelon repairs at the Central Garage in Phnom Penh.

By the end of July the percentage of inoperative vehicles had been brought from 48% to approximately 29%. The mobile repair van continued to meet with remarkable success until the low point of 22% inoperative vehicles was reached in mid-October 1963.

On 26 August, it was announced by the RKG that plans were underway to dispose of the remaining inoperative fleet by sale. Various staff officers of the RKG were made aware that the proceeds from the sale of any commodities furnished by USAID would revert to the Counterpart Fund. However, Cambodian businessmen continued to visit the inoperative vehicle parking area, making notes and conducting their own estimates and surveys. For a period of sixty days there was no news from the RKG on the matter and whenever the question was brought to the attention of the Central Garage motor officer the reply was that they would not be sold.

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On or about the last week in October, during the absence of the writer, all vehicles except two (2) M-37 Dodge trucks and eight (8) Jeeps were auctioned off and removed from the Tuol Kork, Central Garage area by various Cambodian businessmen. At no time was USAID consulted or advised of plans for disposal of the vehicles. An additional evidence of bad faith and lack of concern for the USAID's role was the Secretary's approval given sixty days previously, to restore the vehicles and return them to various police detachments to increase the mobility of the forces. In view of his approval the USAID had employed two additional mechanics to augment the repair force and had installed special equipment in the Central Garage ahead of schedule for this purpose.

Accomplishments

The following things were accomplished between November, 1962, and November, 1963. Considering the short period of time in which they were implemented as compared to the long history of Cambodian negligence, the prospect that their impact will be lasting is slight.

Installation of one (1) Organizational Field Maintenance Shop Set.

Technical inspection of 342 out of 346 USAID furnished vehicles.

Reduction of inoperative vehicles (percentage) from 48% to a low of 22%.

The employment of five (5) third country mechanics. Each mechanic was assigned as a team leader and instructed three selected Cambodian mechanic trainees. On the job training accounted for approximately 5,855 man hours devoted to technical repairs, trouble shooting, preventive maintenance and proper lubrication.

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The use of a mobile repair van (shop truck) went into effect by early July 1963, and was on a scheduled circuit to all provinces for the purpose of making third echelon repairs in the field, training drivers in first echelon and limited second echelon repairs. Non-commissioned officers and drivers of the RKG Police were given instructions in emergency field repairs, trouble shooting, proper lubrication and use of winches and were taught how to use a parts book in order to requisition from the Central Garage, Phnom Penh.

The establishment of a system in order to project operating costs, budget estimates and the scheduling of repairs.

The repairing, by third country mechanics, and supervised repairs by Cambodians to approximately 240 vehicles in a period of nine months -- or an average of 26.6 vehicles per month.

Organization of the Central Garage with designated areas for repairs with a responsible team leader, equipped with work benches, testing apparatus and essential hand tools.

The development of a simplified procedure for the requisitioning of parts by the mechanic and recording the cost of repairs and replacement parts.

The training of two selected Cambodian mechanics for general work in the machine shop for the operating of machinery, e.g., brake drum lathe, valve refacing, riveting machinery, welding machinery, steam cleaning machine, air compressor, paint and spray gun, various mechanical pullers, feeler gages and torque wrenches.

Some accomplishment was made in the field of parts supply, cost indexes, stock levels and identification of parts as against makes and models of various vehicles.

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Surveys of all police and Provincial Guard motor transport facilities were made with the exception of those in the province of Koh Kong. Plans were developed for the construction of adequate shop facilities and the necessary equipment and tools were requisitioned.

The development, through on-the-job training, of four Cambodian trainee mechanics to the level of Apprentice Mechanic, capable of making third echelon repairs without close supervision. (RKG Central Garage, Phnom Penh).

The establishment of scheduled maintenance for all Municipal Police patrol vehicles and some progress was made in the training of drivers as to responsibility.

Simplified lubrication charts were made indicating grease points and type of lubricants to be used; and distribution was made to all police units.

The purchase of surplus property 608 programs and other surplus bulletins to include engine lathe, portable compressors, lubricating equipment, precision instruments, cleaning compound, steel plate for vehicles, one year supply of GAA grease and lubricants.

Parts conservation -- Development of a Cambodian team capable of repairing fuel pumps, generators, voltage regulators, and carburetors by the use of parts previously discarded.

The training of personnel in the art of wheel alignment, toe in and toe out, which reduced wear and tear on tires. Also, the use of compression gages and relationship with the power and exhaust stroke.

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Considerable progress was made in the training of various personnel in repairing of the brake system and the use of the brake drum lathe.

Progress was made in ten of 17 provinces with various detachment commanders and motor sergeants in the importance of conducting weekly inspections of vehicles and the control over drivers.

Considerable progress was made in acquainting operating personnel with the utilization of available transport for maximum transport efficiency; convoying and the use of march graphs for the mass movement of police to various provinces in the event of an emergency.

All mechanics received instructions in the use of hand tools, shop safety and emergency first aid.

In the provinces of Kompong Chhmang, Mondul Kiri, Kampot and Takeo encouragement and instructions in the construction of a grease-wash rack for vehicles were given.

(c) Summary

Major hindrances in fulfilling the transportation objectives in Cambodia (aside from the premature termination request) were:

- 1) The political sensitivity of the Police
- 2) Lack of technical ability and unwillingness to be taught
- 3) Lack of aggressiveness
- 4) Lack of supervision
- 5) General attitude toward mechanical things
- 6) Lack of support equipment
- 7) Limited budget

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Reports based on personal contact, observation and evaluation state that there is not an officer in the Royal Khmer Police competent to administer and supervise the logistics and maintenance of the motor fleet from a standpoint of economy and efficiency. Insofar as the Provincial Guard units in the field are concerned, the situation is "pathetic." Commanding officers are engulfed in "mission details" and command supervision is exercised over the motor fleet with regard to the conservation and utilization of equipment.

Gasoline and engine oil are rationed and under strict control. For example, the operating allowables as of March, 1963, were as follows:

<u>Vehicle & Type</u>	<u>Ltrs. Gasoline Monthly</u>	<u>Ltrs. Oil Monthly</u>
Trucks, 1/4-ton	55	2
Truck, 3/4-ton	70-80	2½
Sedans (controlled by Staff Officers - no fixed amount)		

It is believed that as the RKG assumes full responsibility for the operation and maintenance of a fleet of this magnitude, these allowables will be reduced considerably. (Especially since the cost of gasoline doubled on January 1, 1964.)

Unless monies far in excess of previous years are made available to the RKG Police, it is estimated that 90 per cent of all vehicles will be inoperative by May 1964, in the following categories:

70% for tires and tubes

20% for repair parts

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4. Communications

According to the survey conducted in 1955, the Police services of Cambodia were virtually without effective radio communications at that time. The primary National Police radio network was composed of three stations: a main station located at Phnom Penh and two others in the provincial capitals of Battambang and Kampot. The Provincial Guard radios were the secondary communication system which totaled 70 small 15 and 25 watt stations, located throughout Cambodia. The Municipal Police had no radio network at all.

The survey found that while there were official hours of operation for the National Police radio network and there were five operators in Phnom Penh, the system was in fact rarely used and most messages were sent through the local telegraph office. The same was true of the Provincial Guard and, of course, the Municipal Police. Of the five operators only one had any kind of training, the other four were able to operate the equipment but had never had any training in its repair and maintenance.

The equipment was faulty, in constant need of repair and the operator seemed never to be on duty.

The FY 1955 Project Agreement for the Civil Police Assistance Program included provision for reorganizing and expanding the communication facilities of the Cambodian Police Services and funds for the needed communication equipment.

The plan for reorganizing, expanding and improving the communications of the Police developed slowly for the same reasons, discussed elsewhere, that the other activities of the Police Program

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began slowly. It was not until 1958 that the general communications plan was set forth. The FY 1958 Project Agreement foresaw a national communications system involving: 1) a primary net connecting the capital of Phnom Penh with each provincial capital, and 2) a secondary net with four stations in each of seven provinces, selected for security reasons, providing contact between the provincial capital and the substations within the provinces. This basic plan did not change through the years except to expand the primary net to include new provinces created by the RKG and to expand the secondary net to include stations in all provinces rather than only seven.

In addition to the two major networks, the system as foreseen was to include a control station in the Central Headquarters in Phnom Penh with four mobile stations and one mobile station assigned to each of the four district police stations of the Municipal Police; one mobile station in each of the 28 provincial stations to be installed in the vehicles to be provided by the transportation activity of the project; and generators at each of the primary and secondary stations.

The Communications Advisor arrived in Cambodia in April, 1958, and spent his first year conducting tests and surveys. Constant efforts were made to negotiate a sub-project agreement with the Cambodians to implement the agreement in principle signed in 1958, in order to proceed with procurement and other implementing measures. Problems were encountered in obtaining assignments by the police for building sites and for the security of the proposed system.

An additional delay resulted from the proposal for a regional telecommunications project which would have provided a national

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primary system for the Police to utilize rather than install their own. Cambodia finally decided against participation, principally for political reasons.

Inadequate Police personnel during this period prevented both the assurance of security of police posts and the accomplishment of the personnel training required to establish a nucleus for a communication organization. In order to resolve this problem, 22 army technicians and 3 officers were transferred from the FARK to the Provincial Guard for training. These men were given a six-month course in radio theory and shop practice by the USAID communications advisor and acquired enough knowledge during the course to repair equipment without supervision.

It had meanwhile been decided that the most efficient and comprehensive method of implementing the communications activity would be to have the supplier of equipment for the system also install it and train the Cambodians in its operation, maintenance and repair.

It was decided further that this method would be best employed through a contract between an American electrical firm and the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA).

In June, 1959, a sub-project agreement for the Police telecommunications network was signed. The Agreement provided funds for the primary net only, stating that the secondary system would not be established until the primary was completed. The primary net was to be installed by the contractor who would also supply the equipment and train the Cambodians to use, maintain and repair the system. The communications plan as set forth in the FY 1959 sub-project agreement was the same as programmed in 1958.

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After the signing of the sub-project agreement, the requisite equipment specifications for the primary net and the job to be performed by the contractor were forwarded to Washington.

A delay developed after GSA sent out the specifications for bid. No American electronics manufacturer was then producing equipment that met the specifications submitted by the USAID and, as a result, an insufficient number of bids were received without exceptions to allow an award of the contract. The communications advisor returned to the U.S. on home leave in early 1960 and while there assisted GSA in evaluating bids and making procurement. A contract was finally awarded to Communications Associated Inc. in July, 1960.

Meanwhile, an additional delay had been encountered in Cambodia when the army men being trained in communications were transferred back to the FARK in December 1959, as the result of a disagreement between FARK and the police. This resulted in the collapse of the Provincial Guard Communications Organization and necessitated the organizing of a new unit with untrained police personnel. Another basic training course was established and given.

The contract with CAI called for two technicians in Cambodia to install the equipment and train Cambodians in radio communications. The two men arrived in October, 1960, and began a training course with the police personnel available in January, 1961. The course was conducted daily for the balance of the year. Twelve students completed the course.

By the end of 1960 the delay in awarding the contract and procuring the needed equipment was already affecting the implementation

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of the project. A major repair shop in Phnom Penh was planned as part of the system but the arrival of equipment in a slow trickle had thus far prevented its establishment for over a year. In addition there had been further difficulties with the training program. A retired army captain had been placed in charge of the Provincial Guard communications and had completely revamped the staffing, transferring all personnel to the field he did not like and replacing them with untrained people.

The contract with CAI had specified that all equipment would be delivered 150 days after the date of contract award, which was July, 1960. This meant that delivery should be completed by November, 1960. The equipment did not arrive until April, 1961, nine months after the contract was signed. This delay caused problems and a great deal of embarrassment to the USAID. In several instances, the Cambodians had constructed the buildings to house the equipment months before it was available for installation. It was later learned that the delay in the delivery of the commodities was due to the CAI being ordered to concentrate on top priority orders for the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) to the exclusion of all other orders. CAI claimed to have informed GSA by copy of the letter from NASA but GSA claimed to have never received it.

In any event the delay was costly and damaging to the U.S. interests in Cambodia and seriously delayed the implementation of the project. It will be recalled that it was in 1960 that Prince Sihanouk and the RKG complained loudly about the length of time the Americans were taking to supply their promised aid and that this

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complaint preceded their inflated requests for additional Military and Police Assistance.

The primary system was installed during 1961 and was in operation by December, 1961. In the meantime the RKG had created several new provinces and these had to be equipped in order to make the system complete. FY 61 funds were used to procure the additional units and to procure the equipment for the secondary system. As a substitute for the ultimate secondary system a tertiary network consisting of 60 portable units was provided and utilized in all provinces in 1961.

By the end of 1961, there were 89 stations of the Police Communications system in operation. Twelve Cambodians, of which five were capable of complete overhaul and repair, had been trained by the CAI contract personnel.

The contract with CAI was extended to June, 1962, to provide assistance to the USAID communications advisor in installing the Control Center in Phnom Penh, testing the installed equipment, training additional police personnel and in initiating the installation of the secondary system.

From January to June, 1962, emphasis was placed on training police personnel to assume the operation, maintenance and repair of the primary system. Concentration was placed on four students, the most promising of the total of eleven made available by the Police in January. The primary system was checked and a small repair shop, communication center and a one-classroom school were established in buildings provided by the RKG.

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By Spring of 1962, it had been judged that the primary system as installed in 1961 could be maintained by the Cambodians, but doing so was the limit of their capabilities and before any further equipment could be installed additional personnel would have to be trained. Attempts were made to increase the training program by the USAID and two additional Filipino technicians were contracted for this purpose but the police failed to provide additional personnel for training. Consequently, in October, 1962, the USAID stopped releasing communication equipment to the RKG.

Although training was resumed in April, 1963, when some personnel were made available by the Police and additional fixed and mobile equipment was installed to expand the primary system, no commodities were released other than those being installed by the USAID technician.

The basic equipment for the secondary net, ordered in 1961, arrived in 1963. When it arrived the RKG stated it wanted to revise the installation plan and to relocate many units. A formal request was made to the police to submit a revised list of locations for installation. This information was never received, and implementation of the second phase of the communications activity was never accomplished. An additional problem delaying installation of the secondary system was a deficiency in the equipment, discussed more fully below.

Municipal Police System

Communications planning for the Municipal Police took the form of a separate municipal system. In June, 1960, the Khmer-American Friendship Highway project relinquished custody of VHF-FM 30 to 50 mc Motorola radio equipment to the Cambodian Government. At this

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time the Public Safety Communications Advisor made a survey of the equipment and observed that all units were well maintained and in excellent condition. The equipment turned over to the Cambodians consisted of fixed 250 watt stations, mobile units, complete test equipment for its maintenance, and tools and spare parts in quantities to sustain it for several years.

The Phnom Penh Municipal Police approached the USAID at this time and asked for a communication system of their own. In response to this request, the Communications Advisor went to the Ministry of Public Works who had received the equipment from the Highway project and obtained fifteen Motorola 50-watt mobiles and one base 250-watt station for the Police. The Advisor personally selected all units to be turned over to the Police after metering and bench testing it. Complete items were obtained including antennae and feeders to install the municipal system.

The USAID technician proceeded to prepare for the installation of this system. It was noted at this time that the police had not obtained any spare parts to sustain the equipment. When queried on the subject, they stated that the RKG telegraph company would hold the parts in custody for them.

Just prior to implementation the USAID technician was informed that Cambodian radio technicians associated with the Chinese Communist radio station would install the equipment and his services were not needed, but that the USAID could procure additional spare parts for them. The Cambodians installed the mobile units in Russian-built jeeps which they had procured in preference to U.S.-built

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vehicles. The Mission therefore refused to be obligated or further involved with the system.

Protests were officially made by the USAID Mission which resulted in the Russian vehicles transfer to other services to ease the situation. The Phnom Penh police system, however, was still maintained by the Cambodian Telegraph Company technicians then associated with Chicom aid projects. This move resulted in almost total loss of the equipment. Improper maintenance and cannibalization by the Cambodians made the system inoperable in less than one year.

The USAID was constantly approached to buy parts and provide funds for Phnom Penh police communications by installing another new system, but was not requested to give technical assistance. In view of the manner in which the previous system was improperly managed, U.S. funding was withheld until agreements could be negotiated permitting full technical support as well as the supply of commodities.

In 1961, agreements were reached and the municipal police agreed to the USAID's terms by accepting both communications equipment and technical assistance. As this agreement was made without reservations, base station and mobile equipment was ordered. It arrived in Cambodia during March, 1963, and was in the AEA warehouse when the USAID was terminated.

In conclusion, it should be noted that problems had been encountered by the USAID technician in the activation of several of the TR-10 units bought by the USAID as portable and fixed supplementary equipment for the Secondary System. The manufacturer had omitted parts in their construction causing operational difficulties which

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had to be corrected prior to utilization. As maintenance and operational training had not been given on these units, it is doubtful if the Cambodians can use them. Further, spare parts for these units, needed to correct the discrepancies, were stopped in the U.S. prior to shipment. One hundred and ninety-seven of these units had been received in Cambodia and were in the AEA warehouse when the program was terminated.

Over \$800,000 of communication equipment was ordered and delivered to Cambodia over the life of the project. In two years well over half of this equipment (worth approximately \$470,000) was installed by the CAI contract personnel and USAID technician.

Based on equipment discrepancies and lack of technical personnel, it is estimated that the police will be unable to activate or effectively utilize 50% of all the communication equipment in the warehouse at the termination of the U.S. aid program. This equipment was for the secondary system and was of a value of approximately \$360,000.

Summary

Primary System

Although at the time of termination 23 fixed stations were operating in this system, it had become necessary to program for the replacement of all wooden antenna masts throughout the Provinces. Models of these metal towers had been fabricated locally and had been programmed for installation in February, 1964. In surveying the sites it was also found that many engine generators needed to be reinstalled on concrete slabs; also, many of the shelters needed

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replacing. This work, in conjunction with the installation of the newly arrived engine generators, was being programmed for later in the year.

Under the CAI contractor training program 9 technicians had been awarded certificates indicating specific ability as technician or assistant technician. Approximately 4 of these technicians are assumed to be now doing radio repair work.

Although this primary system was in full operation in November, 1963, spare parts and tubes were in very limited quantities, and early deterioration can be expected.

Secondary System

Preliminary plans for the areas to be covered by this system were developed jointly by the Royal Khmer Police and the USAID. Predicated on these plans equipment was ordered by the USAID. By late 1963 only the basic equipment had arrived in the country. Frequency assignment grouping and locations data had not been finally determined by the Police.

The USAID requested the Police to submit a firm program of equipment location and frequency assignment in order that antennas and other items of ancillary equipment could be programmed. The Police replied that for reasons of internal security this could not be done; however, they did submit a plan assigning 13 radios to each province and "autonomous city", but gave no installation locations. This type of planning was not acceptable to the USAID advisors and was returned to the Police with a request to list more specific locations. As of the date of aid termination no reply had been received.

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Since the equipment ordered under this project was for the most part completely transistorized, plans were being formulated to conduct classes in basic transistor theory as soon as the new classrooms at Tuol Kork were completed. In order to prepare for these classes the USAID technician had written a "Transistor Testing Guide" containing fundamental theory in both English and Cambodian. This training was never begun.

In view of the lack of technical knowledge, problems in the equipment itself and the lack of ancillary equipment for installation as well as a lack of spare parts, it is the opinion of the USAID advisors that this equipment will, in all probability, never serve the purpose intended.

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5. Firearms Standardization

a). Introduction

In a country's civil police forces, especially those forces maintaining units of a paramilitary nature, there is a definite requirement for a standardized type of armament, consistent with the mission assigned. Without a standardized system, the interchange of armament between units and the supplying of ammunition and maintenance in the event of an emergency or full mobilization becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.

In addition, training, both pre-service and in-service, pertaining to the employment and maintenance of weapons is also vitally important.

Standardization and training are major components in establishing an effective civil police force capable of maintaining the internal security essential to the process of orderly economic development.

The survey of Cambodia's Police Forces discussed above included an assessment of its armament. The survey found some 38 different types of small arms of varied calibers and manufacture, including U.S., French, and British, in use with French arms in the majority. Most of the weapons were obtained from the French. The varied types of weapons in use is illustrated by the following table:

TYPE AND CALIBER COMPARISON TABLE

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>No. of Different types</u>	<u>No. of Different Calibers</u>
Handgun	9	4
Rifle	14	8
Shotgun	5	2
Submachine Gun	7	4
Machine Gun	2	2
Mortars	1	1

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The ratio of ammunition to the number of weapons on hand was haphazard. Large amounts of weapons could not have been used effectively due to shortage, and, in some cases the complete lack of stocks of ammunition, and the deteriorating condition of those stocks available.

The small arms of all services were found to be a motley lot, mostly obsolete, and in a poor state of maintenance and repair. The services depended on the Royal Khmer Armed Forces (FARK) for maintenance and repairs.

The following field firing tests, conducted by a U.S. advisor in the provinces, utilizing Provincial Guard small arms, is indicative of the poor state of maintenance and condition of ammunition. All were French arms selected from armories at random:

Rifle w/ten rounds of ammunition - three rounds functioned properly, seven rounds misfired.

Machine gun w/30 rounds of ammunition - five rounds functioned properly, 23 rounds misfired, 2 rounds hang fire with 10 second delay. Numerous stoppages during firing.

Pistol w/20 rounds of ammunition - 4 rounds functioned properly, 12 rounds misfired, 4 rounds hang fire with 5 to 10 second delay. Numerous stoppages during firing.

These tests emphasized that though the police may have been armed they were defenseless due to the poor condition of arms and ammunition. In numbers, there was a sufficient amount of arms, especially in the Provincial Guard, to arm each man; however, the supply problem in providing ammunition, spare parts and repairs in event of an emergency, was virtually impossible to overcome due to the varied types of arms and calibers.

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The analysis of this great variety of armament in the Cambodian Police Services, representing a haphazard acquisition of used and obsolete arms and ammunition from numerous sources, lead to the conclusion that there existed a definite need for the standardization of armament.

In addition, there was a lack of trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, as a result of inadequate training programs and in many cases no program at all. There was a definite need for improved leadership, training and training facilities. There was a lack of uniform standards, supply distribution and an inspection system.

The correction of these deficiencies would be a major step in increasing the effectiveness of the Cambodian Police.

b) AID Program - Summary

As in the other activities of the Police Project, throughout the early phases there was an extreme reluctance on the part of the Royal Khmer Police (RKP) to accept technical assistance, and they tended to look upon Civil Police Assistance merely as their quartermaster. The proposal prepared by the RKG in 1956, discussed above, included excessive lists of arms desired as indicated by the following:

<u>Small Arms</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Submachine Guns	18,637
Auto-Pistol	4,044
Carbines	67,697
Auto-Rifle (BAR)	2,662
Rifles	9,131
Mortar, 81mm	7
Mortar, 60mm	137
Grenade Launcher	8,114
Machine Guns, Cal. .30	53
Machine Guns, Cal. .50	24
Signal Pistol	4,215

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The request for carbines was three times as many as FARK had at that time. In addition, they requested armored cars and boats with mounted machine-guns, and 7,000 pairs of binoculars, enough to keep every single Cambodian under surveillance if all used at the same time.

After the request was reduced to more reasonable quantities and the RKG had reluctantly accepted the principle of technical assistance to accompany equipment, the FY 1957 Project Agreement was signed, establishing the following objectives of the Firearms activity. These objectives did not change throughout the life of the project:

- the standardization of firearms by types and calibers
- the training of personnel in the proper employment, maintenance and repair of firearms
- the improvement or provision of training, repair and storage facilities and materials
- the establishment of an effective control, supply and inspection system.

The discussion that follows is organized around these objectives.

c) Firearms Standardization

The first firearms equipment was ordered in 1958.

The FY 1959, Project Agreement provided for assistance in training and equipping mobile platoons which the RKG planned to activate. The USAID agreed to arm the Mobile Platoons, National Police, Municipal Police and the Provincial Guard. For the Mobile Platoons

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the U.S. also agreed to furnish numerous items of field equipment. The USAID would continue to supply non-expendable items on the condition that the RKG would supply expendable items.

From 1958, to 1963, the USAID gave the Cambodian Police Forces 6,572 handguns, 6,470 rifles, 90 shotguns, 53 submachine guns, 36 machine guns and 34 rocket launchers for a total of 13,255 small arms. Included in this were various types of Cal. .22 small arms for training purposes, which, although issued to the Provincial Guard, were intended to be made available to any Police unit on a temporary basis for training.

One year maintenance spare parts were furnished on the following basis:

<u>Small Arm</u>	<u>Number</u>
Handguns (all types)	2,923
Rifles (all types)	1,855
Machine guns	36
Rocket Launchers	34

A total of 4,212,625 rounds of ammunition, of all types, in addition to grenades and pyrotechnics, were provided under the program. Replenishment of ammunition reserve stocks and ammunition for training were projected from FY 1963 and FY 1964 funds.

Small arms accessories in the form of ammunition pouches, packboards, bayonets, grenade launchers, tools and cleaning materials adequate to support the arms on hand were supplied.

In addition, a large amount of individual field equipment was furnished. This equipment was originally intended for the Mobile Platoons. However, as these units were never actually organized, this equipment was absorbed by elements of the Provincial Guard.

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Standardization of all Police units was 95 per cent complete at the termination of the USAID program. Completion of standardization for the Provincial Guard was projected for the end of FY 1964, with a pending requirement of 8,000 additional carbines. This would have armed every man in the Provincial Guard with a Carbine, and in addition provided a substantial number in standby reserve.

At the termination of the project, the status of the effort to standardize RKP firearms by types, calibers and Police Unit was as follows:

<u>Police Unit</u>	<u>Status</u>
National Police	Complete
Municipal Police	Complete
Urban Police	Complete
Provincial Guard	60 per cent complete

The survey of 1955 showed small arms originating from numerous sources including the U.S., French and British. All small arms furnished under the standardization program were of U.S. manufacture.

For purposes of comparison with the initial survey report of 1955, the following table is given:

<u>Small Arms</u>	<u>No. of Different Types</u>		<u>No. of Different Calibers</u>	
	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>
Handguns (all types)	9	3	4	3
Rifles (all types)	14	4	8	2
Shotguns (all types)	5	2	2	1
Submachine guns (all types)	7	1	4	1
Machine guns	2	2	2	2

d) Training of Personnel

No comprehensive firearms training was accomplished until the arrival of the Firearms Advisor in 1961. Prior to this, periodic training was conducted as follows:

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During April, 1960, the advisor conducted a brief course for officers and enlisted personnel of the Provincial Guard on the use and maintenance of the Automatic Pistol, Cal. .45.

In 1961, a Police Advisor conducted a brief course for a small group of Provincial Guardsmen on the Automatic Pistol, Cal. .45.

In May-June, 1961, advisors conducted a course for 24 members of the Municipal Police in the use and maintenance of the Colt Revolver, Cal. .38 Special.

From June 15 to August 11, 1961, the Firearms Advisor, assisted by other USAID police advisors, conducted basic courses in the use, care and employment of all weapons furnished to the Provincial Guard under the USAID program. This course was given to 43 Provincial Guardsmen selected from each of the Provinces, who were trained as firearms instructors, and, upon graduation, were to return to their respective Provinces and train other members of the Provincial Guard.

The haphazard organization of the various Provincial Guard Headquarters sections and their indifference to receiving technical assistance had a marked detrimental effect on the start of the last mentioned program, and to some extent, on the conducting of training. Two months were required to coordinate, gain approval and to secure minimum essential equipment for the course.

Although prior approval had been given to conduct a nine-week training course, the Chief of Staff of the Surface Defense subsequently requested that the course be reduced to four weeks, because he felt that his men were quite proficient in all but the automatic weapons. After much discussion, he finally relented and accepted the nine-week

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course. As the course progressed it became clear that the students knew very little about any of the weapons.

Five days of instruction were lost because weapons requested were not issued as agreed. Once the instruction got underway, there were many changes of students, all agreements made prior to these changes were null and void. Four more days of instruction were lost because of unscheduled holidays.

The students themselves were found capable of absorbing the eight-hour day instruction periods, and possessed unusual ability to retain mechanical instruction after one application. They were cooperative, had a desire to learn and responded well to American instruction methods.

As a follow-through on this phase of the training program, the last firearms advisor visited fifteen Provinces during 1962-63, and found that very few of these 43 trained instructors were being utilized as the USAID had intended. This was directly attributed to indifference to the part of their superiors toward an in-service training program.

The last Firearms advisor arrived at Post January 5, 1962. Shortly after arrival, he was informed by Chief, CPAD, that USAID desired to step up firearms training with all units of the Police.

During the latter part of January, contact was made with the Chief of Municipal Police, who had previously requested training for a cadre of firearms instructors. A program of training was presented and discussed with him; he readily accepted and requested that his Second Deputy attend all instruction as he was to be assigned responsibility for in-service training within the Municipal Police.

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February 5 - 16, 1962 - Technique of Instruction Course. This course was given to twenty members of the Municipal Police who were to be trained as firearms instructors.

February 19 - March 2, 1962 - a course in the use and maintenance of the Colt Revolver, Cal. .38 Special and the operation of a firing range. This course was given to the firearms instructors mentioned above.

March 13 - 27, 1962 - Course was given to thirty Municipal Police Trainees. This course afforded the opportunity to utilize the firearms instructors, who had just completed their instructor training, to assist in presenting lectures, demonstrations and practice in operating the firing range.

March 29 - April 7, 1962 - Competition Firing Match Training with the Cal. .38 Revolver and Carbine, Cal. .30, M1. This training was requested by Municipal Police for preparation for their participation in Triangular Matches between FARK, JSRK and the Police to take place during the month of May, 1962. Forty-five members of the Provincial Guard from the Provinces and sixteen members of the Municipal Police received this training for a total of sixty-one (including four policewomen). Elimination matches were conducted on April 4, 1962, and a team was selected to represent the Police in the Triangular Matches. An additional month's training was conducted for the Police team through May 12, 1962. The Matches were held on May 13 - 17, 1962 with the Police making a good accounting of themselves by winning the Revolver-Pistol Matches and placing third in the Carbine Matches. The USAID advisor also assisted in the operation

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of these Matches.

During June, 1962, a one-week course was given to members of Municipal Police on the use and maintenance of the Riot Type Shotgun.

During August-September, 1962, a two-week course was given to thirty Municipal Police Trainees on the use and maintenance of the Revolver, Cal. .38 Special. Firearms instructors from Municipal Police conducted the major portion of this training with the USAID advisor assisting in an advisory capacity.

A comprehensive course of instruction in all phases of the reloading of Cal. .38 ammunition was given to four members of Municipal Police. The Course began in June and continued through September, 1963. The CPAD Training Advisor assisted with the latter phases of this instruction. During the last month of the course, the students accomplished the reloading of 6,000 rounds of ammunition to be used during in-service training courses.

In June, 1963, the USAID offered assistance to the RKP in the form of a twelve-week Small Arms Maintenance and Repair Course to train RKP personnel in the use of hand tools, testing instruments, inspection, maintenance and repair of all small arms and associated equipment furnished to the Police by the USAID. The Police accepted the proposal and the training of eight repairmen was scheduled to begin on September 23, 1962, however, the Police requested postponement of the course until October as they experienced difficulty in obtaining qualified personnel.

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On October 14, 1963, the course began and continued until November 18, 1963, a total of five weeks, at which time, due to termination of the AID program, it was stopped. The conduct of this course was highly unusual, in that this was the first course that actually functioned smoothly with no interference from the Police; absentees were minimal and cooperation was extraordinary in view of difficulties experienced with other training. The eight students displayed enthusiasm and receptiveness and very satisfactory results of weekly written and oral examinations indicated their capacity to comprehend this technical training.

This training was conducted at the USAID-constructed Small Arms Repair Shop, located at the Provincial Guard Central Brigade Camp, Tuol Kork, just outside Phnom Penh. Although this training came under Provincial Guard heading, the shop and repairmen were to service all Police units.

On September 12, 1963, a request was received from the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Surface Defense for the USAID to provide firearms training for Staff Officers of Surface Defense Headquarters. A program of training was prepared, presented and accepted by Headquarters on September 24, 1963, but no training was actually accomplished due to the failure of Headquarters to decide on a date to begin training or to furnish the necessary equipment.

During field trips to fifteen provinces in 1962-63, instruction in the maintenance of U.S. weapons at each installation was provided to armory personnel of the Provincial Guard.

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Firearms Training, Other Police Units

On April 27, 1962, a request for the USAID to provide firearms training at the Royal Police Academy was made by the French Director of Studies. During July, a detailed schedule for firearms training by the current class of ninety students was forwarded for approval to the Secretary of State for National Security and Surface Defense.

After numerous delays and USAID inquiries and urgings to get this training started, the Secretary finally stated that the Police would use Cambodian instructors rather than the USAID technician as he (the Secretary) felt that the training would be too prolonged when presented through an interpreter. He suggested, instead, that the USAID advisor "monitor" the Cambodian lectures (through an interpreter and observation), and critique the instructor upon completion. The Secretary took a firm stand on this despite USAID recommendations, and as this at least presented an opportunity to have USAID representation in the Police Academy, USAID agreed on the condition that the USAID Firearms Advisor first conduct training for the Cambodian instructors who were ill-prepared to conduct training on their own. This condition was not acceptable to the Police and as a result no training was given by USAID at the Academy.

In May, 1963, the French Director of Studies, Royal Police Academy, requested that the USAID Firearms Advisor conduct an orientation and demonstrations of U.S. weapons at the Academy, for a group of Cambodian judicial candidates. This program was held

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on August 6, 1963, and consisted of a quick reaction firing demonstration with the Cal. .38 Revolver and a display and description of U.S. weapons.

During the duration of the project repeated attempts were made to interest the National Police in firearms training. No response to USAID proposals were ever received and they never initiated requests of their own. No information is available as to whether they have any type of program of their own, but this is very doubtful, considering the Cambodian officials' attitude toward training in any form.

The services of a Filipino Small Arms Repairman were obtained on July 29, 1963, to assist in the training of Cambodian technicians and in the operation of the Small Arms Repair Shop. At the time of termination of the AID program, the USAID was in the process of employing an additional Filipino Small Arms Repairman to operate the Small Arms Mobile Repair Van in the Provinces and assist in the shop and Armament Warehouse.

e) The Improvement or Provision of Training, Repair, Storage Facilities, and Materials

The following is a recapitulation of items and facilities provided or improved by the USAID.

1961 - the construction of a twenty-target firing range, patterned after the FBI Practical Pistol Course Range, for the Municipal Police, located at Bac Chan, 19 kilometers from Phnom Penh on the Khmer-American Highway. (In June, 1963, the USAID was informed by the Chief, Municipal Police, that the FARK had taken over

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this range and informed him that they would reimburse the Municipal Police for the cost of the land and construction. As of this writing, no word had been received of a reimbursement. The range is presently being converted to handle international type shooting events.)

1962 - The improvement of an existing structure to house an ammunition reloading facility for the Municipal Police and the furnishing of all necessary reloading machinery, tools, and associated material to make it operational.

1962 - The improvement of armory and armament storage facilities for the Municipal Police, including work benches, spare parts bins, shelving, gun racks and security screens, locks, and doors.

1962 - The furnishing of marksmanship training aids for the Municipal Police to support basic and advanced types of training.

1962 - Construction of equipment for a "Quick Reaction" firing range for the Municipal Police Pistol Range.

1962 - Construction of a Small Arms Repair Shop for the RKP at the Provincial Guard Central Brigade, Tuol Kork, located just outside of Phnom Penh. The shop is attached to the Armament Warehouse and some minor repair work was done and the warehouse was repainted. Items furnished to the Small Arms Repair Shop, in addition to the shop set and special tools from the U.S., included blackboards, tools, storage cabinets and shelves, gun racks, cleaning racks, storage cans, material handling equipment, and office supplies.

1963 - Improvement of armory facilities at the Police Academy, including a work bench, shelving and parts bins.

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1963 - A Small Arms Mobile Repair Van for the Police to be utilized for maintenance and repair of weapons in the Provinces. At the termination of the AID program, a procurement document was being drafted to furnish this van with necessary equipment. The van was originally ordered for the communications branch, but proved unsuitable for communications support and was requested for use in the weapons maintenance program.

Training materials furnished under the project included:

- Preparation and distribution of a training manual on the use and care of the Revolver, in the Cambodian language.
- A comprehensive training folder covering all small arms instruction furnished to the 43 Provincial Guard Firearms Instructors at graduation in 1961.
- Complete training course "handouts" and lesson outlines in French and Cambodian languages furnished to students attending courses in 1962-63.

Due to the termination of the USAID program, the following activities were cancelled:

- A pre-fab steel armament warehouse and small arms shop (the present shop was to be converted to classrooms)
- Three pre-fab steel ammunition storage warehouses to replace the existing, completely unsatisfactory storage facilities.
- An indoor pistol firing range to be located in rear of the Police Academy.
- The improvement or installation of arms and ammunition storage facilities in the Provinces.
- The improvement or installation of firing ranges in the Provinces and at the Kompong Chhnang Basic Police School.

f) The Establishment of an Effective Control, Supply and Inspection System

The Police had no effective system of supply, distribution, control, or inspection. Incoming armament commodities were stored

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in a hodge-podge manner in the armament warehouse at the Provincial Guard Central Brigade Camp located at Tuol Kork. The warehouse was constructed of wood, in poor condition and not adequately secure from break-ins. There was no systematic plan for the issuance of spare parts, accessories or maintenance supplies. In a routine or emergency situation, warehouse personnel could not readily locate items for issuance to the using units; usually consuming many hours, or days attempting to locate items, and in some cases could not locate the items at all although the requested items were in stock.

After repeated urging and offers of assistance to remedy this situation, the Chief of Material requested assistance from the USAID on May 5, 1963. An inventory of commodities at the armament warehouse was begun May 8, 1963. This inventory continued until May 17, 1963, at which time it was halted on the Captain's orders.

In June 1963, the Captain stated that the inventory could continue provided only spare parts were inventoried. This was a difficult situation in that spare parts were commingled with other commodities but the provision was agreed to, in order to keep the inventory moving. The inventory resumed on June 17, 1963. On June 21, 1963, it was again halted on the Captain's orders because he had suddenly discovered that it was against Police regulations to permit "foreigners" access to the armament warehouse, as there were items contained therein that "foreigners" were not to observe.

This matter was brought to the attention of the Secretary of State, who stated that there was a misunderstanding and he would issue the order permitting access. An attempt was made to again

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resume the inventory on July 31, 1963, and access was again denied; finally on August 1, 1963, the USAID was informed that the inventory could proceed and there were no interruptions from then until the termination of the program.

These constant interruptions seriously hampered progress in establishing an effective armament supply and distribution system. Although the physical inventory was completed, no time remained to compile records to prepare storage bins or shelves, due to these delays, and ultimately the termination of the program.

g) Summary Evaluation of Firearms Standardization - Training Project

The goal of firearms standardization would have been achieved by the end of FY 1964 had the project continued at the pace achieved in the summary of 1963. Although the program of training moved slowly in the early stages, substantial progress was being made in the field of firearms maintenance and repair at the close of the program. Had the program continued, it would have eventually been possible to conduct more training for the Provincial Guard units in the Provinces on the employment and maintenance of small arms due to the arrival of an additional Training Advisor.

The urgent need for this training became apparent during field trips to 15 provinces in 1962-1963. In almost all cases, firearms were in a poor state of maintenance and almost no in-service training was being conducted. Responsible officers in all Police units failed to comprehend or were completely indifferent to the necessity for training or for the maintenance of equipment.

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The Police personnel trained as instructors by the USAID were generally well motivated, understood the importance of training and maintenance and possessed a desire to do something constructive. This initiative was usually stifled upon return to their units when they were confronted with superiors who made little or no use of the instructors' newly acquired knowledge and skills.

If past performance is a valid guide, the Police will not take the necessary steps to pick up where the USAID left off and continue training and maintenance programs of their own. This point was well illustrated in the case of the 12-week training course for eight Cambodian Small Arms Repairmen, which was terminated after five weeks. Although the Cambodian in charge is qualified to instruct in this field (he had received one year's training in the U.S.) and desired to continue the course, he received no authorization to do so, and the students were returned to their respective units.

This then points to the fact that as long as a U.S. advisor was present to propel them forward, however slowly, the Police at least accomplished some progress toward self-reliance; when the advisor was removed the Police slid back into its old lackadaisical rut, and were apparently unconcerned.

h) Riot Control

1) Introduction

While riot control was not a major objective of the Civil Police Assistance Program it was a subsidiary activity of the Firearms Advisor.

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By nature, the Cambodian citizen is mildmannered, little inclined toward violence or aggressive crime, and tends to take things at face value assuming the attitude "it can't happen here." However, this view can be badly shaken, as was indicated by the student riots in Siem Reap in 1963, in which several were killed and injured.

At the time of the 1955 survey of the Cambodian Police forces the National Police were charged with the mission of quelling domestic disturbances.

This was accomplished through the establishment of a "Police Station" unit located at National Police Headquarters under the control of the Chief of Criminal Police (Judicial). This unit consisted of two inspectors and thirty-six agents, which functioned as a plain clothes riot or "strong arm" squad. The unit was heavily armed with machine guns and rifles and was supposedly organized for the purpose of quelling domestic disturbances and the suppression of pirate bands. It appeared that this was a waste of manpower as the unit spent most of its time sitting around headquarters and amounted to nothing more than a "strong arm" squad for the police force which was extremely apprehensive of any political opposition to the Government.

It was reported to the survey team that this unit had been transferred to the Special Police Branch of the National Police and had been dissolved just prior to the survey.

As the functions of quelling riots should not and cannot be successfully delegated to a plain clothes investigative unit, the survey stated that such activities fall within the crime prevention

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category and should be rightfully handled by the Municipal Police of Phnom Penh.

Although the Municipal Police were charged with the primary function of maintaining public safety, they confined their activities to minor infractions of criminal and administrative offenses.

Although the USAID had long foreseen the eventual requirement of a riot control unit in the Municipal Police and planned to furnish it with equipment needed to make it operational, it had never been informed by the RKG of its plans in this matter.

In early 1959, when the British proposed that the Municipal Police establish a riot squad unit, the RKG expressed interest and tentatively accepted a British offer to train a Command Team of four police officials in Singapore to head this type of unit.

A general working agreement was then agreed upon between the British Police Attache and the USAID, wherein the British would have the major interest in the training of the riot squad, in view of the readily available training in Singapore, and the USAID would undertake to furnish the necessary equipment.

Upon receiving a firm commitment from the RKG accepting the British proposal for training, the USAID submitted purchase orders for equipment (vehicles, tear gas, shotguns and ammunition). However, at this point there was a period of inaction on the part of the RKG to furnish personnel for training and the USAID urged the RKG to institute the required training in Singapore as quickly as possible in view of the fact that equipment was already on order.

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RKG finally took action and four officers from the Municipal Police were sent to Singapore for a period of training from July 1 - 30, 1960. In May, 1961, an additional unit of six men from Municipal Police were sent to Singapore by the British for eight weeks of riot-squad training.

In addition to the above personnel, the Chief of Municipal Police observed riot-squad training among other police operations during a two-week period while in Singapore. Upon completion of this training and observation, these groups were to be responsible for the training of a Municipal Police Riot Squad of 100 men. Although these men received some training, it was largely ineffective in creating a riot squad capable of performing its assigned mission of controlling riots and public demonstrations.

In addition to the British-sponsored training, some training was and is provided to Provincial Guard Non Commissioned Officers at the Basic Police School at Kompong Chhnang by French military instructors. This, too, appears to have little effect as indicated by their actions in the handling of student riots in Siem Reap.

The USAID did not enter into any formal training of the Municipal Police Riot Squad until 1961. Prior to this, the USAID furnished training course materials including the following:

- In March 1960, a training manual on the handling and tactical employment of tear gas was prepared in the Cambodian language and 1,000 copies were furnished the RKG;

- In August 1960, a training manual on "Police Control of Riots and Demonstrations", was prepared in the French language and 400 copies furnished to the RKG.

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Formal training in riot-control functions was started by the USAID in August 1961, at which time the USAID Identification and Records Advisor presented a course of instruction to Municipal Police personnel in the handling and tactical employment of tear gas.

Shortly after the arrival of the Firearms Advisor in January 1962, he was informed by Chief CPAD that the Municipal Police Chief had requested the USAID to provide technical advice to the Municipal Police Riot Squad. Before beginning any training, a survey was conducted to ascertain the current status of the riot squad, with the following findings:

The riot squad was a part of the Traffic Bureau which was, in turn, under the operational control of the Second Deputy to the Chief, Municipal Police. Periodic training was conducted using the British system, but was largely ineffective due to inadequate supervision by Command personnel. Equipment on hand included a riot van, seventy (70) riot-type shotguns, a small amount of tear gas equipment, gas masks, riot batons and steel helmets, all furnished by the USAID.

Upon completion of the survey, a course of instruction was prepared, and training began on May 23, 1962. This initial training was given to Command personnel, of which nine had previously received the training furnished by the British in Singapore.

The major components of this training included definitions of riots and demonstrations, elements of a riot, police responsibility for riot control, police planning for riot control, preparation for riot duty and operations in riot control. In view of the geographical

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location of the country and the danger of subversion, particular emphasis was placed on the necessity for immediate and decisive action against armed Communist mobs.

The classroom portion of the training for Command personnel was held at Municipal Police Headquarters and field training of the demonstration unit was held at Tuck Lahok Athletic Field just outside of Phnom Penh. This initial phase of training lasted approximately three weeks.

On completion of the staff training of the Command personnel, they in turn began the practical training of a fifty-man demonstration unit, with the ultimate purpose of utilizing this unit in the training of a 100-man riot squad, plus the remainder of police on all shifts of the force.

In early June 1962, the Chief of the Municipal Police Traffic Bureau requested additional refresher training to insure a state of readiness in the event of disturbances during the approaching national elections. A three-day course of training was provided which included a review of procedures for Command personnel and practice of riot control formations for regular members of the squad. General refresher training, lasting for three days, was again provided by the Firearms Advisor in August 1962.

At about this time, a new officer was appointed to head the Traffic Bureau and he displayed little interest in the activities of the riot squad and suggestions or offers of assistance in training from the USAID. No other training was provided by the USAID after this date, and as far as is known very little has been accomplished by the Municipal Police themselves

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The need for greater emphasis on training in riot control for all RKG police forces was pointed up by the Siem Reap student riots in early 1963, when the police showed themselves incapable of suppressing riots by non-violent means. As a result, three students were mortally wounded and one had a shoulder broken by the butt of a police weapon.

This incident led the Secretary of State for National Security and Surface Defense to request from the USAID training and equipment for riot control forces in the provinces. This was tentatively approved and at termination of the project training materials were being prepared along with cost estimates for necessary equipment.

In the field of riot-control participant training in the U.S., nothing was accomplished. The RKG participants were scheduled to undergo training in October 1962, and despite USAID urging, the RKG failed to approve the proposed applicants and the program was canceled. Four RKG participants were approved and scheduled to undergo riot-control training in the U.S. in early 1964, but as a result of the termination of USAID, the program was again canceled.

In an evaluation of the Municipal Police Riot Squad and USAID efforts in its behalf, both in technical and commodity assistance, it can be said that it is the best trained and equipped force for the purpose in Cambodia. However valid the foregoing statement may be, efforts to train and establish an efficient force capable of suppressing or controlling riots barely scratched the surface.

The main deficiency throughout the project was the failure of top administrative personnel to comprehend the necessity for the

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continuity of in-service training. As long as the technician was on the scene, the training and the program would function, but they did not follow through with a training program of their own without the USAID advisor.

Though they requested training advice on several occasions, one is led to believe that this was mainly used as a device to obtain additional commodities, as all training requests were coupled with a request for equipment of some kind, not necessarily limited to riot control.

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6. Records and Identification

a) Introduction

The Cambodian Police have had a system of fingerprint identification and record system since 1913 but there was little integration of police records information. The survey conducted by the USAID in 1955 found various files in many of the police sections and considerable duplication. There was an attempt at a central file system in the Identification Bureau of the National Police, but it was incomplete since it contained only identification information, primarily of a criminal nature. There was no cross-filing between any of the police sections of persons, associates or activity records.

The fingerprint classification used in Cambodia in 1955 was the Pottecher System which is basically the same as the Henry System used in the U.S. and England except the Pottecher system requires more time to locate a set of prints in the file.

The survey report found the identification and records systems, facilities and equipment seriously inadequate and antiquated. In all cases it was necessary to search five different sets of files to determine whether or not the Police had a record on an individual.

On October 12, 1957, the National Police requested the USAID to assist in reorganizing the National Identification Bureau and in establishing a Central Records System. At that time, the RKG reportedly had allocated 4,000,000 Riels to construct a new building to house these activities — the existing building being inadequate.

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(The building was completed in 1960 and taken over by Customs and the Special Police Section.)

A discussion was held on December 13, 1957, between the USAID and the Chief of National Police Identification and Records Bureau (ID Bureau), and his deputy. At that time, considerable apathy on the part of the National Police personnel in charge of the reorganization was evident. The ID Bureau was an appendage of the Judiciary (Criminal Investigation) Police and a depository for the misfits of the Judiciary Police assigned there for punishment (probably with the thought that under-the-table gain would be less—hence their punishment). With the request for assistance in the identification field, a Records and Identification Advisor was requested for the USAID staff. In May 1958, an Assistant Records and Identification Advisor was also requested.

On January 30, 1959, the Assistant Records and Identification Advisor arrived at Post. In March 1959, the reorganization matter was discussed with the Director of the National Police who stated he was not familiar with the situation requested by his predecessor, but suggested details be worked out with his subordinates. (As noted, two years earlier persons acting under this same Director had first requested such assistance.) In June 1959, a survey involving the Fingerprint Bureau was attempted by the Assistant Records and Identification Advisor. Negotiations were found extremely difficult and the survey came to a halt before the central records could be examined. Enough was accomplished, however, to realize that assistance was badly needed in all phases — the Bretillion System

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was still in use and the Pottecher fingerprint files were overcrowded and in an otherwise extreme state of inefficiency.

One participant was selected after six months of negotiation only to be found ineligible after two months of English language training by the Minister of National Security by virtue of low rank.

The Senior Records and Identification Advisor arrived at Post on May 25, 1960, and encountered similar obstacles with the National Police.

Confronted with the lack of desire on the part of the National Police to make any changes, attention was temporarily turned to the Municipal Police of Phnom Penh. On July 12, 1960, a meeting was held with the Chief of the Municipal Police concerning assistance in the identification and records fields and possible adoption of a fingerprint file by classification (no fingerprint cards were retained within their department by any form of classification). The meeting met with success and plans were made to establish a training class in fingerprinting. On August 4, 1960, a Cambodian counterpart was assigned to work with the Records and Identification Advisor and detail planning was begun for the establishment of an identification bureau (hitherto, non-existent) within the Municipal Police. The USAID technician's counterpart was assigned to head the new bureau.

Training manuals were prepared for instruction in fingerprint classification and latent investigation, fingerprint training and photo equipment were ordered. A standard 8 x 8 fingerprint card was adopted and printed in September, 1960, the first of its kind in Cambodia. Classroom instruction started in fingerprint recognition

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and classification on October 17, 1960, with 20 members of the Municipal Police. The National Police were also invited and 23 members attended class until December 19, 1960, when they dropped out reportedly due to their heavy work load. Two men later returned and attended for many weeks. Some difficulty, as anticipated, was encountered in teaching classification through an inexperienced interpreter and due to the lack of prerequisite knowledge by the study group, especially the Municipal Police. The National members appeared more attentive and knowledgeable.

Two areas within the Municipal Police Headquarters were provided at different times for remodeling to house the new Municipal ID Bureau before the third and final area was selected. Each time the rooms provided had to be utilized for other purposes and another site selected. Fortunately the areas became progressively larger. The Chief of the Municipal ID Bureau was transferred to a position outside the Police Department in 1961. The new chief selected the living quarters of the previous one (top floor, Police Headquarters) for the establishment of the ID Bureau.

The first phase of pattern recognition and classification fingerprint instruction was completed in January, 1961. Training continued, however, in other subjects and returned to classification after completion of a Cambodian fingerprint training manual.

An English language training class for the ID personnel was instituted at the Headquarters in January, 1962, and lasted through May, 1962, running two hours a day (one hour a day per group of ten men each).

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Classroom instruction at the Municipal Police was held as regularly as possible from October, 1960, through March, 1961, followed by on-the-job instruction and supervision. Improper working techniques were easily picked up by the ID personnel and were often difficult to break.

Plans for a new classroom, library, and squad room to be located next to the ID Bureau on most of the remaining top floor of the Headquarters Building were canceled when the first Chief of the ID Bureau was reappointed Chief in December, 1961, replacing his replacement. The latest Chief (for the second time) deemed it necessary that he live at the Headquarters as he had previously done (despite the fact that he has several houses about town). Because there was a firm commitment to build the ID Bureau in his old quarters, he moved into the quarters vacated by the traffic inspector. Construction of the ID Bureau began in February and was completed in May, 1962.

A police identity card and police badge were developed for the Municipal Police. The identity card was to be laminated and would have served as a pilot project for the issuance of similar national identity cards. The 6 x 9 cm card and badge were approved by the Governor, but the project was not completed prior to termination.

The ID Bureau's fingerprint file of approximately 2,000 cards was completely renovated and re-indexed in February, 1962, when it was discovered they were being filed incorrectly. The entire re-filing process was again corrected and refiled in August, 1962. Transfers of personnel from the fingerprint section and their lackadaisical attitude was primarily responsible.

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Meanwhile periodic visits were made to National Police ID Bureau concerning their reorganization and changeover to the Henry ID System. The Chief of National Police stated there would be too many problems in making a change and did not wish to do so at that time.

After visiting the National Police ID Bureau Photo Lab and observing its lack of adequate facilities and equipment and observing the quality and quantity of work accomplished, further discussions were held with the National Police Chief concerning USAID assistance in remodeling the laboratory. After verbal agreement, two remodeling plans were drawn for renovating the old facilities. These plans were delivered to the Chief of the National ID Bureau on October 27, 1961. Written permission to go ahead was not received until December 11, 1962, over a year later, and then only after much discussion and several letters. (Construction still did not start until May 26, 1963; it was completed in August, 1963.)

By September 1961, a different impression was being felt concerning the National Police's reluctance to work and cooperate with the USAID technicians. An interpreter at this time characterized this by saying, "They are afraid to work because of fear of becoming involved with the West."

In response to a request by the French Police Advisor at the Royal Police Academy for ID facilities and material similar to that found in a modern police department, some equipment and working facilities were provided at the academy for training purposes. Approval was never granted for regular instruction at the Academy

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by USAID personnel, however, although on three occasions demonstrations were given to groups by the Records and Identification Advisor in the use of investigative fingerprint materials and other investigative aids.

On March 12, 1962, additional information concerning operational procedures and recommendations for the proposed National Fingerprint Bureau were delivered to the Secretary of State in Charge of the National Security, with a copy to the ID Bureau Chief.

In October 1962, the Chief of the National Police ID Bureau was again approached concerning remodeling and changeover to the Henry Classification System. On this occasion he stated that the French system was put into use in Cambodia over a hundred years ago and that any change now would cause too much work and confusion. A similar response was always received whenever this topic was discussed. Letters of explanation of USAID proposals made little difference.

At a meeting in December, 1962, the Secretary of State for National Security verbally agreed to the original proposal of 1957 for the adoption of the Henry System of fingerprint classification and filing. He further agreed to the proposal for the issuance of new plastic laminated identity cards in relation to this project. An outline of action was requested and material similar to that previously submitted was provided on February 4, 1963, for review and discussion. Further response concerning this project was never received. With the verbal statement of the Secretary of State, a SPAR had been initiated requesting an additional Records and Identification Advisor, who arrived at Post October 28, 1963.

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In June, 1963, an Inspector of the Special Police requested training assistance and equipment for their records section. However, the inspector stated he could not deal directly with the USAID without first contacting the Secretary of State for National Security which he would do. In July, 1963, the Chief of the Customs Airport Police spoke of his needs in reorganizing his record-keeping system. Even though these requests were made on a supposedly urgent basis, nothing further developed in this respect from either organization.

In October, 1963, the Chief of the National Police frankly stated that a too friendly contact with Americans could place them in an awkward situation, although their feelings did not coincide with this attitude. Many policemen were afraid of the possibility of losing their jobs and being without support for their families.

Accomplishments with the Municipal Police

Facilities utilizing half of the top floor of the Municipal Police Headquarters in Phnom Penh were remodeled and rebuilt to house the Central Municipal Police Identification and Records Bureau.

All of the essential equipment and supplies were delivered and installed. The premises contain a modern photographic darkroom, records section, fingerprint investigation lab and private office for the section chief, all of which are air-conditioned. The section was provided with steel fingerprint filing cabinets, letter size file cabinets for individual criminal and other necessary records, and 3 x 5 steel file cabinets for alphabetically filed name cards. Many of the necessary report forms were devised and printed for utilization with the present 13 district police stations

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and posts of the Phnom Penh metropolitan area and for filing in the Central Municipal Records Bureau. The new darkroom and photographic work room were equipped for the photographic preservation of all types of evidence as well as situation and identification photos. All essential investigative fingerprint materials were provided for the discovery and preservation of friction ridge evidence along with special fingerprint tables for the correct preservation of inked fingerprints. Police kits with chemicals for the determination of narcotics, differentiation between human and animal blood, restoration of certain types of obliterated writings were furnished, as well as ultra-violet detection chemicals with ultra-violet detection lighting equipment, plaster and moulage casting materials, typewriters, and a Jeep panel truck with special observation rack and cabinets built for the transportation of investigative material, equipment and personnel. Chairs, desks, benches and cabinets were also provided.

Classroom instruction was given twenty men and women of the Municipal Police in methods of fingerprint classification as well as other related subjects such as latent fingerprint detection and preservation, police photography, the execution of police report forms, crime scene investigation and preservation.

On-the-job instruction to the police specialists continued throughout the program in the use of materials provided by the project. Three training manuals were prepared and quantities supplied the police; one in French covering classification and filing of fingerprints by the Henry System, one in Cambodian covering

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classification and print recognition and another in Cambodian concerning the taking of inked impressions and correct methods in filling out information on the fingerprint card and detection and preservation of latent friction ridge impressions.

Two training movies were completed. One consisted of crime scene investigation with emphasis on fingerprint evidence and the other a detailed study in the correct manner of obtaining inked impressions on the fingerprint card.

Accomplishments with the National Police

Instruction was provided twenty-three members of the National Police Identification Bureau in conjunction with the instruction course given the Municipal Police group. However, all but one man dropped out less than half way through the course.

No agreement was ever obtained concerning the adoption of the Henry System of fingerprint classification, and planning for the new fingerprint and records section was never consummated.

The three-room photo lab was completely remodeled and modernized and approximately 70 per cent of the equipment was installed. Instruction in the use of the equipment was approximately 20 per cent complete.

Police Academy

Additional benches and storage facilities as well as some commodities were provided for the darkroom. Benches, tables, fingerprint file cabinets, and ID camera and miscellaneous fingerprint and investigative equipment were provided for a new identification training room. Some familiarization demonstrations were given.

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RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

F.
SECTOR Public Safety (Civil Police Assistance) (All years)

In Thousands of U.S. Dollars

	DIRECT DOLLARS							LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar Equivalent)					
	Total \$	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodi- ties \$	Other Costs \$	Total Riels	Total C/P	Total TATF	Technicians TATF	Part. TATF	C/S TATF	Other Costs TATF
ALL YEARS	4698	910	59 (52)	78	3651	0	842	310	532	274	61	121	76
FY 64	80	80 (4)	0	0	0	0	19	0	19	10	0	8	1
FY 63	717	175 (9)	22 (9)	0	520	0	161	0	161	75	15	55	16
FY 62	191	124 (6)	4 (1)	17	46	0	65	0	65	53	2	3	7
FY 61	1421	132 (6)	1 (2)	0	1288	0	84	0	84	44	3	29	8
FY 60	1071	128 (6)	7 (10)	0	936	0	124	0	124	77	9	26	12
FY 59	357	119 (6)	13 (21)	0	225	0	93	28	65	15	18	0	32
FY 58	96	86 (4)	10 (5)	0	0	0	76	65	11	0	11	0	0
FY 57	37	35 (2)	2 (4)	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	3	0	0
FY 56	31	31 (2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	697	0	0	61	636	0	217	217	0	0	0	0	0

Total \$ 4698
Total LC 842
Total \$+LC 5540

Total Technician Man/Years (estimated) 45
Total Number of Participants 52

In Book II - II-F-105
In Book III - II-F-1

G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION1. Introduction

During the period of the French protectorate Cambodians had little opportunity to participate in governmental administration, and most administrative functions for Cambodia were centered in Saigon. Governmental services performed in Cambodia were executed mainly by French officials assisted by Vietnamese clerks. This situation left the country at independence with almost no trained civil servants. The Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) thus had to develop and staff its public services from rudimentary sources and low educational standards, low salary levels, and a widespread lack of experience in government have made for poor administrative performance.

2. AID Program from Inception

AID assistance in the public administration sector was concentrated on assistance to the Ministry of Finance, and began in 1955. The projects were designed to overcome antiquated financial administration and inefficient administrative practices, in order that the RKG could take full advantage of its scarce financial resources for economic development.

Specifically, assistance given the RKG by USAID provided for improvement in the field of gathering and utilizing statistical data. The first project, Survey of National Resources, was a relatively modest effort designed to supplement French and United Nations (UN) efforts in this field. A total of \$45,000. in direct dollar costs and 23,771 dollar equivalent was expended on the project. Project objectives encompassed improving the production of accurate social and economic data, gross national product (GNP) and foreign trade data, and to improving other

tools of economic planning. Also included were plans for the training of statistical experts and the furnishing of data processing equipment.

Actual accomplishments of this project were few, however, local currency was supplied for the conduct of a demographic survey, some transportation equipment was delivered, and some local training was given.

In fiscal year (FY) 1958 the project Improvement of Government Organizations and Management, later to evolve into Improvement of Financial Organization and Management, was begun. This project had as its goal the improvement of government budgeting and tax administration, the reorganization of the Customs Service and other revenue producing governmental enterprises for the purpose of developing a system which would provide the means for sound policy formulation and decision making by the executive branch of the government over the utilization of the RKG's resources, general administrative management, and administrative and legislative control of appropriated funds.

Primarily working with the National Treasury, Service of Budgets and Control of Obligations and Expenditures, this activity had as its specific objectives:

- Modernizing the RKG budget system by FY 1966.
- Designing and installing an effective control accounting system and financial reporting system by FY 1964 coupled with the installation of International Business Machine (IBM) data processing machines.
- Improving the internal accounting and bookkeeping procedures of various substantive ministries by FY 1965.
- Developing and supporting programs of in-service training for

Ministry of Finance personnel, and maintaining a program of US and 3rd country training of civil servants through FY 1966.

A study in depth by the USAID was made of the existing budgetary and treasury accounting procedures and completed in 1961. The study was used as the basis for extensive recommendations for revised procedures for budget preparation, execution, classification and budget and treasury accounting procedures and operations. The report was accepted in principle by the RKG.

Concurrently, a basic electro-mechanical group of 12 accounting machines, were ordered from IBM-France, and installed at a cost of \$85,950 to the USAID in an RKG built and financed building, designed by the USAID. The machines consisted of:

- 3 Keypunches
- 2 Verifying Machines
- 2 Sorters
- 1 Collator
- 1 Summary Punch
- 1 Tabulator
- 1 Interpreter
- 1 Facsimile Posting Machine

Three operators were trained in France and 12 were trained locally. IBM in Phnom Penh was cooperating on the establishment of a training program for additional operators.

The new accounting system for Treasury receipts and disbursements started officially on January 1, 1963, and during the 11 months of operation to November 1963, the system was running smoothly in keeping with the

abilities and the experience of the operators.

On December 1, 1963 it was planned to integrate Provincial Treasury accounting into the system.

The recommendations regarding improvement of the budget system were approved in principle, and preliminary work was to have been started in the last quarter of 1963 on the application of the system to machine work. However, changes in personnel in the Service des Budgets delayed the work, and as of November 20, 1963, no progress had been made on this part of the project.

In-service training was carried out in the Ministry by the USAID accounting advisor and a French expert attached to the Ministry. U.S. and 3rd country training for Ministry personnel was slow to develop due to the reluctance of key Ministry officials to release personnel for training. By 1963, however, 4 participants were studying in Canada, and plans were made to send 2 groups of 5 and 13 participants, respectively to Canada, the U.S. and Japan and to Europe.

In addition, the Public Administration Division of the USAID prepared and published four research reports on current Cambodian administration of note. They are: (1) "The Civil Service System of the Royal Khmer Government" - which presents a descriptive analysis of the present system plus recommendations for modernizing the system of personnel administration; (2) "The Administration of Local Government in Cambodia" - 13 pages of descriptive reporting; (3) a descriptive report entitled, "Labor Laws and Regulations in Cambodia" and (4) "The Cambodian Economy Commercial Information, Regulations and Procedures for Import-Export Activities".

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A total of \$440,000 in direct dollar expenditures and 178,000 in dollar equivalent was expended on this project from its beginning through November 20, 1963.

To bring the system of public administration to the point where the RKG would be able to make maximum use of its resources for economic development was a long range task just begun. That this goal was not met should not obscure the fact that some of the essential groundwork for the improvement of the public administration system had been accomplished. The project was slow to gain momentum and was, from the beginning, faced with a strongly entrenched French influence and preference on the part of the Cambodians for the French system.

RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

G.
SECTOR Public Administration (All Years)

In Thousands of U.S. Dollars

	DIRECT DOLLARS						LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar Equivalent)						
	Total \$	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodi- ties \$	Other Costs \$	Total Riels	Total C/P	Total TATF	Technicians TATF	Part. TATF	C/S TATF	Other Costs TATF
ALL YEARS	496	269	70 (26)	11	146	0	202	54	148	113	29	0	6
FY 64	31	21 (1)	10 (2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FY 63	86	53 (3)	28 (7)	0	5	0	36	17	19	10	9	0	0
FY 62	59	52 (3)	3 (1)	0	4	0	28	2	26	25	1	0	0
FY 61	61	50 (3)	0	0	11	0	23	0	23	23	0	0	0
FY 60	128	37 (2)	16 (4)	0	75	0	40	8	32	24	4	0	4
FY 59	65	43 (2)	9 (8)	0	13	0	36	3	33	17	14	0	2
FY 58	19	13 (1)	2 (1)	0	4	0	15	0	15	14	1	0	0
FY 57	36	0	2 (3)	0	34	0	24	24	0	0	0	0	0
FY 56	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	11	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Total \$ 496
Total LC 202
Total \$+LC 698

Total Technician Man/Years (estimated) 15
Total Number of Participants 26

In Book II - II-G-6
In Book III - II-G-1

H. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT1. Introduction and Background

Cambodia's basic resources are agricultural. Exploitable mineral resources appear to be almost nonexistent. At present foreign exchange earnings are derived almost entirely from the exportation of rice surplus to domestic consumption needs and natural rubber. Other agricultural products and tourism provide a very small addition to the amounts earned from these two principal crops.

If Cambodia is to obtain the necessary investment for sustained economic growth, the major impetus will have to come from improved and diversified agriculture. Methods of rice production, in particular, are capable of substantial improvement. However, this process can also be assisted by the development of light industrial establishments producing a number of goods now imported for domestic consumption. The advantages would be particularly great for those industries from which the primary raw materials are or could be grown in Cambodia. An excellent, and over the years much discussed, example is the production of jute bags required for the export of rice. Cambodia at present spends approximately one million dollars annually in foreign exchange to purchase jute bags from India and Pakistan. It has been demonstrated that jute of the appropriate quality can be grown in Cambodia. The investment required for the establishment of a jute bag factory is not excessive; and the industrial process of manufacturing the bags is not overly complicated.

Despite this and other examples the rate at which industrial ventures have developed has been slow. This is attributable primarily to a shortage of managerial and technological experience, a lack of long term or even

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intermediate credit, a preference by those who have local capital to utilize their funds for usurious, short term money lending or to invest in real estate and other commercial ventures paying extremely high returns, and most important the lack of any policy and program on the part of the government to clear away the myriad of administrative and procedural obstacles that face any potential entrepreneur, particularly if he be non-Cambodian as most of those who exhibit managerial talent seem to be. The government is long on pronouncements on the value of state-owned, mixed, or even private industry but has done very little if anything to encourage this development. Too many government officials view a private industrial concern as a means of extracting payment for permission to operate. In the case of State-owned factories top and lesser managerial positions too often are given as sinecures rather than on the basis of managerial talent. To date commercial and real estate ventures have brought a return sufficient to withstand the inefficiencies and costs of government license. Industrial concerns, particularly in the formative years generally are unable to meet these costs. There is also opposition to the development of import substitution industrial concerns by organized importers.

Given these factors private industrial development has been limited primarily to very simple and basic concerns such as rice mills, saw mills, brick kilns, small machine shops, automotive garages, and other service industries. One exception has been a fairly large silk weaving and rubber sandal factory located in Phnom Penh. The larger rubber plantations also have limited rubber processing installations. There are three cigarette factories, a match factory, and several soft drink bottling plants. State-owned factories include a large distillery left over from French Colonial days and four factories provided under Communist Chinese aid. Four more factories are being

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built with loans provided by the Czech Government. The Chinese factories have been remarkably unsuccessful. They were poorly planned for the Cambodian situation and have been inexpertly managed.

The climate for foreign private investment has been even less promising and at the present time such foreign investments as do exist in Cambodia, many of them commercial rather than industrial, are retrenching. In addition to the extremely complicated and confusing administrative requirements, the over valuation of riel (compounded by a broken cross rate between the Franc and the dollar) results in unrealistic cost factors which have only partially been overcome by various retention schemes. No guarantees are given against devaluation and at present many concerns are under the threat of nationalization. Local law also requires Cambodian participation of at least 51 per cent. Since such participation seldom involves a commensurate productive contribution on the Cambodian side, this requirement often becomes a form of payment for a license to do business. Despite these factors there are some foreign investments in Cambodia. Three oil companies, two American and one British, have built fairly extensive storage and distribution systems, one of the cigarette factories has British capital, the rubber plantations are largely French and there are a variety of concerns, largely commercial with some French capital. One of the leading commercial concerns, which has also tried to stimulate some small industries, East Asiatic, is Danish.

2. USAID Efforts to Assist Industrial Development

a) Commodity Import Program (CIP)

During the period since 1955 the USAID has imported \$ 22 million in commodities under the category of industrial machinery. Much of this has been utilized in commercial rather than industrial enterprises but none the less

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many small factories that have been developed have obtained their equipment in this manner without having to obtain foreign exchange. The silk weaving and sandal factory employs machinery imported under the CIP. Also many of the commercial vehicles and a great deal of construction equipment necessary for industrial activity has been imported under USAID auspices. From 1955 to 1963 CIP imports under these two categories totalled \$ 20 million. In some instances the raw material required for industrial or semi-industrial concerns were imported under the CIP. Chimi Khmer, a drug processing licensee of Squibb, received much of its raw materials in this manner. The precise impact of the CIP on such industrial and commercial development as has occurred is impossible to measure but it has been considerable.

b) Small Industry Loan Fund

After Cambodia achieved its independence in 1954, among the earliest financial actions of the new government was the organization of the Caisse Nationale d'Equipment (CNE) as a part of the government's Two-Year Economic Development Plan. This is an industrial bank of quasi-independent status created by the Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) under law May 16, 1956. It is a semi-autonomous government organization designed to handle the medium and long-term financing of Cambodia's economic development. The initial funding of the organization was achieved through the budgetary allocation of \$2.9 million, in local currency from the proceeds of a special equipment tax. This governmental capital was made available with the proviso that it was to be reserved for developmental projects under public ownership and management such as hydroelectric, irrigation and highway projects.

It was felt by the Mission that under the original CNE organization form, there would be little benefit accorded industrial development in the private

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sector. American aid assistance was considered essential if at least a part of the industrial development of Cambodia was to be achieved under the principles of private enterprise and private management. As indicated, there exists a presently growing tendency in Cambodia for state ownership or at least participation in industrial ventures. There also seems to be the entirely unwarranted assumption that state management is more efficient and more honest. Thus in order to provide otherwise lacking credit facilities to the private sector, it was proposed to make available counterpart funds to separate branch of the CNE for the support of small private industry. A series of fairly long drawn out negotiations was entered into by the Mission with the RKG continuing during 1956-57 and culminating April 7, 1958, with the signing of the original Project Agreement establishing a project known as the Small Industry Loan Fund (SILF) as the American aid private industry sector of the CNE.

The basic principles under which this fund was to operate were (a) that counterpart funds derived from American aid would be reserved for projects under private ownership and management; (b) the insertion of a commercial bank into the mechanics of management particularly in respect to the financial and credit investigation and the technical servicing of the loans; (c) the retention by the Mission Director (delegated to the Industrial Advisor) of the right of veto of any individual loan proposed; and (d) establishment of the concept that while full responsibility for the initiative and direction of the fund should reside with the CNE, the Mission would be represented on the Technical Committee by an Industrial Investment Advisor collaborating closely with the CNE in an advisory capacity in passing on the merit of loan applications. He was also to stimulate interest in the Cambodian business community in the availability of CNE credit and make available, through feasibility studies and other economic

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information, the best judgment of the Mission as to those industries and companies which might most readily advance the industrial viability of Cambodia. Following this concept the Mission recruited the first Industrial Investment Advisor and charged him with the responsibility for the project.

A total of \$2 million in local currency was provided by the USAID (\$1.5 million in 1958 and \$.5 million in 1960) and administered jointly by the USAID and the CNE. Total funds provided by the RKG amounted to \$3.7 million in local currency (not jointly administered).

The loan fund was designed to be a revolving fund with sixty per cent of the interest payments to be used to defray overhead expenses of the CNE and forty per cent for replenishment of working capital. Interest payments in excess of overhead expenses were to be used to increase the capital of SIIF. The majority of the funds provided by the RKG were used to finance government industrial ventures or to purchase shares in established enterprises. Two notable exceptions were two loans made to the private sector in 1958 before SIIF was fully operative: (1) a \$171 thousand in local currency loan to the ChipTong silk weaving mill and (2) a \$143 thousand in local currency loan to the Chimi Khmer Pharmaceutical Company. Funds provided by the USAID were generally used for private agriculture and agro-industries.

A total of 28 loans were made between February 1959 and October 1963. The amount loaned to that time was \$1.7 million in local currency. Interest rates were very low as compared to those charged by money lenders locally. The rate for a short term loan (1 to 5 years) for investment in agriculture was 3 per cent, for industry 4 per cent. Long term loans (5 to 15 years) were at the rate of 4 per cent for agricultural investments and 5 per cent for industrial investments. While the actual interest rates charged by local money lenders for loans is not known precisely they were considered to be exorbitant.

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The first loan, made in February 1959, was for the expansion of a rice mill. The majority of the loans have been between one half million and two million riels. A list of all loans made during the life of the project is given below.

SMALL INDUSTRY LOAN FUND

Loan No.	Date	Purpose for Which Loans Were Made (Local Currency Expressed in Thousands of U.S. Dollars)		Rate of Interest	Length of Loan
		Amount of Loan Approved	Purpose		
1	2/2/59	28	Establishment of Rice Mill	4%	3 yrs.
2	2/6/59	28	" Comb Factory	4%	4 yrs.
3	3/7/59	17	" Rice Mill	4%	3 yrs.
4	12/30/59	14	" Pig & Poultry Farm	4%	5 yrs.
5	1/31/60	66	" Poultry Breeding	5%	3 yrs.
6	4/28/60	14	" Fish Sauce Factory	4%	5 yrs.
7	4/28/60	56	" Cannery	4%	2 yrs.
8	5/20/60	14	" Elec. Generating Plant	4%	4 yrs.
9	7/29/60	42	" " "	4%	2 yrs.
10	7/30/60	28	" " "	4%	5 yrs.
11	8/26/60	20	" Pig Breeding Farm	4%	5 yrs.
12	9/3/60	34	" Coconut Plantation	5%	8 yrs.
13	9/16/60	23	" Fish Sauce Plant	4%	5 yrs.
14	11/16/60	115	" Sandal Factory	5%	7 yrs.
15	12/8/60	6	" Fruit & Coconut Plant	4%	4 yrs.
16	12/8/60	14	" Charcoal Plant	4%	5 yrs.
17	3/17/61	84	" Dry Cell Factory	4%	3 yrs.
18	3/24/61	120	" Ice Plant	4%	5 yrs.
19	4/17/61	28	Expansion of Pharmacy	4%	5 yrs.
20	4/1/61	56	Establishment of Soup Factory	4%	5 yrs.
21	5/20/61	23	" Citronella Plantation	4%	3 yrs.
22	2/21/62	280	" Coffee & Fruit "	4%	8 yrs.
23	4/13/63	115	" " " "	4%	4 yrs.
24	8/14/63	142	" Brick factory	4%	5 yrs.
25	8/27/63	56	" " "	4%	13 yrs.
26	10/11/63	56	" Coconut Plantation	4%	13 yrs.
27	10/11/63	56	" Textile & Fish Net		
28	10/11/63	123	" Coconut Plantation		

(\$1,700)

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SUMMARY OF LOANS APPROVED AND REPAYMENTS MADE AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1963

Local Currency Expressed in Thousands of U.S. Dollars

Loan No.	Date of Approval		LOANS		REPAYMENTS		DEFERRED	
			Approved	Released	Principal	Interest	Principal	Interest
1	Feb 59	Neang Chung Frang	28	28	26	4	2	.03
2	Feb 59	Mme Son Phuoc Tho	28	28	4			
3	Jul 59	Hua Kuoy Lim	17	17	11	2	7	0
4	Dec 59	Lim Seang	14	14	0	2		.14
5	Feb 60	Yi Boun Hac	66	66	12	5	24	1
6	Apr 60	Neang Ngau Tieu Keo	14	14	6	1	2	0
7	Sep 60	Ste Khmeré de Conserverie	56	46	0	2	13	4
8	May 60	Sot Peng	14	14	3	2	1	.11
9	Jul 60	Not Ming Srun	42	23	0	.17	3	3
10	Jul 60	Mr. Seng Hieng	28	17	0	2	6	.67
11	Aug 60	Tran Xuan Mau, Tan Chuon Mong	20	20	14	2	(3)*	.06
12	Sep 60	Mr. Kol Sithan	34	34	0	5		.34
13	Sep 60	Mr. You Kim Nguon	23	23	3	3	4	.20
14	Nov 60	Mr. Van Thuan	228	228	7	14		1.9
15	Dec 60	Neang Kim Hean	6	6	0	1		0
16	Dec 60	Mr. Sieu Meas	28	14	1	1		.14
17	Mar 61	Neang Tran Hoa	84	84	12	4	17	.71
18	Mar 61	Neang Ung Lovieng	121	121	34	11	0	0
19	Apr 61	Mr. You Chhan	28	28	6	3	0	0
20	May 61	Mr. Thai Chea	56	56	1	4	0	.57
21	May 61	Neang Tan Siv Khim	23	13	0	1	0	.11
22	Feb 62	Plantation de Pailin	280	280	0	16	0	0
23	Feb 62	Sam Seng	115	113	0	2	0	0
24	Aug 62	Lim Ly Huot	142	100	0	.51	0	0
25	Aug 62	Soth Chanroeun	56	14	0	0	0	0
26	Oct 63	Khou You Meng, Kol Sithan	56	56	0	0	0	0
27	Oct 63	Wang Fa Leang	56	56	0	0	0	0
28	Oct 63	Cheng Heng	123	123	0	0	0	0

* Advance Payment

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These loans, however, were only a start in the development of needed industries and have made only a small contribution to the 16 per cent of gross national product (GNP) reportedly derived from industry.

The method of processing a loan involving American aid funds, which was in existence up to the time of the termination of the USAID, was as follows: An application for a loan was submitted to the Caisse Nationale d'Equipment. In due course, which may be anywhere from one to six months, a letter was addressed to the Banque Khmère requesting a financial report on the applicant. If this report were satisfactory, a letter was sent to the USAID suggesting a visit to the applicant's place of business with a view toward assessing the feasibility of the proposed loan. The USAID representative also sat on the technical committee, having both deliberative rights and the power of veto. The technical committee was composed of eight members representing the different ministries as well as the director and one other official of the CNE.

Upon completion of the survey, and if favorable, the application was subsequently presented to the Board of Directors of the CNE. The board was composed of seven members representing financial, administrative, and legislative bodies of the government. It included the Minister of Finance and the Director of the CNE.

If the loan application survived this stage, it was next presented to the Superior Council of Plan and National Development which was composed of fourteen members. These included most of the aforementioned ministries, the Governor of the National Bank, and two high officials nominated by the President of the Council of Ministers.

It is clear from the foregoing that the system was quite unworkable. Many people became discouraged when dealing with the CNE because of the extraordinary

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delays in processing loan applications. Prior to the termination of the program some progress had been made in attempting to streamline these procedures but no modifications had yet been introduced.

At the time of the termination of the USAID program the unloaned balance of the USAID-financed portion of the CNE was \$300 thousand. In settling the final accounts, the USAID initially proposed that this balance be redeposited to the counterpart special account. The RKG indicated that to obtain agreement to do so would involve considerable delay and discussion. On AID/W instructions, it was agreed to leave the balance with the CNE on the written understanding it would be utilized by the RKG for the same general purposes for which the funds were initially made available.

c) Industrial Development Services

In 1960, the project Industrial Development Services Project was initiated by the USAID which absorbed the Small Industry Loan Fund. The purpose of the project was to assist the RKG to develop promising enterprises; train personnel involved with industrial development; assist the Ministry of Plan in the formation of a committee of public and private interests including the Bureau of Mines and Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, private banks and experienced and qualified entrepreneurs; provide experts on a temporary basis who would conduct surveys and provide elemental professional advisory services.

A priority of industries to be started was established; they are listed below. It has been planned that at least one of the industries would begin operations by 1962.

Jute mill

Cane sugar factory

Commercial cattle industry

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Agricultural feeds

Timber products (railway ties, turpentine, etc.)

Can plant (petroleum product containers)

Food processing

Tannery products

Ceramics and porcelain works

The USAID contribution was to be mainly the provision of advisory services, and one technician arrived for a short stay of one month to advise on ways to improve production in a canning factory.

Although efforts were made to encourage the formation of a development committee comprising all interested elements of the economy, no truly effective organization was ever established.

In an effort to create some agro-industry, attempts were made to begin the commercial exploitation of cane sugar at the provincial level, but were unsuccessful.

Another tentative feature of this project was to assist the RKG establish a development bank which could make hard currency loans available to small industrial enterprises. The USAID stood ready to request a short term advisor to assist in this activity. Had a workable plan been devised for a viable institution such a project could have formed the basis for a DLF loan request. The RKG interest proved too minimal and the proposal never arrived at the point where a short term USAID advisor could be profitably employed.

d) External Loans

During the period that foreign exchange reserves were increasing, the RKG exerted little initiative to seek foreign loans despite its apparent ability to service them. The Cambodian development program had not progressed to the

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point where Cambodians saw a need for external loan financing and in addition the Central Bank officials were very hesitant about external involvement or having to reveal and discuss in detail their financial and monetary policy with outside agencies. These same feelings inhibited them from seeking membership in the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The grant aid they received was considered adequate. Beginning in 1962 they became more concerned by the decline in reserves and lessened their opposition to foreign loans. The factories to be built by Czechoslovakia are being financed on a loan basis (referred to as a line of credit). The Russian and Yugoslavia built hydroelectric dams are being financed by long term loans. The USAID received two loan requests from the private sector with apparent government endorsement. One of the requests involved financing textile machinery for a proposed textile mill. The request was turned down in Washington on U.S. domestic policy grounds. The second request concerned the long sought jute mill. The matter of a jute mill for years appeared to be the logical choice for immediate development. Perhaps no other industrial venture in Cambodia ever had such a thorough airing as the proposed jute bag factory. Despite the fact that the U.S. was unable to consider the loan on balance of payments grounds (jute bag machinery is not manufactured in the U.S.) Cambodia interest continued. Tenders were secured from two Scottish manufacturers of milling machinery. Feasibility studies were made and the plans drawn up to the last penny. On four different occasions it appeared about to succeed. At one point the SILF was prepared to extend credit for seven years. Kenaf International went so far as to send their president for discussions. The failure of the matter was due to the lack of follow through by the RKG in accepting and pushing any specific proposal in the private sector. No one family or family group was able to

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manage sufficient capital to retain absolute control, which introduced the element of distrust towards potential partners, including the RKG.

The USAID continued to be prepared to consider any reasonable loan requests from the RKG, but all other aspects of the projects including the provision of a technician, were discontinued in 1963.

RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

H. SECTOR	Industry	(All Years)	DIRECT DOLLARS					Total Riels	LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar Equivalent)						
			Total \$	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodi- ties \$		Other Costs \$	Total C/P	Total TATF	Technicians TATF	Part. TATF	C/S TATF	Other Costs TATF
ALL YEARS			65	56	8 (8)	0	0	1	2036	2005	31	19	5	7	0
FY 64			1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FY 63			18	18 (1)	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	5	0	0	0
FY 62			1	0	0	0	0	1	12	5	7	0	0	7	0
FY 61			2	0	2 (2)	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
FY 60			20	17 (1)	3 (2)	0	0	0	511	500	11	9	2	0	0
FY 59			14	14 (1)	0	0	0	0	5	0	5	5	0	0	0
FY 58			9	6	3 (4)	0	0	0	1502	1500	2	0	2	0	0
FY 57			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FY 56			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FY 55 & Prior			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total \$			65												
Total LC			2036												
Total \$+LC			2101												
												Total Technician Man/Years (estimated)		3	
												Total Number of Participants		8	

In Book II - II-H-14
In Book III - II-H-1

I. COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

1. Introduction

The USAID assistance to the RKG in the field of mass communications passed through four stages during the period 1952 to the closing of the USAID in November 1963.

The first stage, 1952 through 1955, saw the initiation of eight separate projects. They were administered by Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM) in Saigon and were intended to help overcome the almost completely undeveloped state of communications in Cambodia. During this period, radio receivers and generators were distributed to information centers throughout the country and mobile units were procured. A 1-kw radio broadcast standby antenna was installed, and an offset printing plant project was initiated. A total of \$440 thousand were programmed for commodities and services.

2. Improvement of Mass Communications

The second stage, 1956 through 1960, saw the consolidation of all on-going communications activities into a single project entitled "Improvement of Mass Communications", which was administered by the USAID Communications Media Division. The stated objectives of this project were to provide equipment and supplies, and to give technical assistance in the form of training and services, primarily to the Ministry of Information, in order to assist it to serve the broad social and economic needs of the Cambodian people. This was to be accomplished by creating and disseminating technical and educational information designed to help raise living standards and assist the country's economic and social development.

Specific accomplishments of the project included training of Ministry of Information personnel in the fields of graphic arts, photography, film

projection, electronics and film production through workshops and participant training in third countries; the establishment of a printing plant in the Ministry; the purchase of mobile information units and the training of crews; and radio programming assistance. Fifty motion picture projectors were distributed throughout the country and local operators were trained.

One of the early commitments under this project, in addition to the above, was to improve and equip two studios for Cambodia's radio station which is administered by the Ministry of Information. The RKG began in 1959 to construct two buildings to house the two studios which were intended to be used with the radio transmitters then in operation. The equipment, which included air conditioners, microphones, loudspeakers, studio clocks, a recording machine, assorted broadcasting equipment and electrical tools, and a tape recorder with spare parts, was delivered in 1960. A one-kilowatt transmitter was given to Cambodia through STEM in 1953. It is now used by Radio Cambodia as a standby transmitter.

In the spring of 1960, the Mission learned that the RKG was accepting Chinese Communist aid in the field of radio broadcasting. In addition to the provision of three radio transmitters, Communist China promised a broadcast auditorium and three additional studios, raising the problem of possible commingling of U.S. and Communist aid. The problem was reviewed by the Embassy and the USAID, and the decision was made to proceed with the two studios, principally in view of the previous commitment of the U.S. and the fact that the equipment had arrived and legally belonged to the RKG. The only alternative seemed to be to default on a firm U.S. commitment and leave the development of radio broadcasting to the influence of Communist China. The U.S. financed facilities are housed in a separate building from

the facilities provided by Communist China, although they are in the same compound belonging to the Ministry of Information. No U.S. assistance was furnished to Radio Cambodia other than the two studios.

In connection with the training of Cambodian Government employees in film production, and also to produce documentary films for use in support of various RKG and USAID programs, the USAID entered into Films Agreements with the USIS. In all, six annual agreements were signed, from 1956 to 1962. Twelve Cambodians were trained under the agreements out of a planned 17. Nine were trained as cameramen and three as editors. As of September 24, 1962, eight were working, directly or indirectly with the RKG; one had remained with the USIS and three had gone into private business. The production of a total of 32 films was undertaken; 29 were completed by 1962.

A USAID audit report published in October of 1962 rated the accomplishments of the agreements as unsatisfactory in that the number of reels of film actually produced was less than planned for each of the six years with the exception of FY 1959. The audit also found that the USAID had overpaid the USIS by \$74 thousand. The performance under the agreements of both the USIS and the USAID was found unsatisfactory; the USIS performance in meeting production schedules and the USAID in providing the technical support agreed to.

A review of the activity was made with the USIS, who disagreed with the findings of the audit. It would appear that the most balanced judgment would find the major fault in the language of the agreements themselves which was too general, particularly with regard to the division of responsibilities, and resulted in misunderstandings and delays.

The FY's 1957, 1958 and 1959 Agreements were jointly financed by the

USIS and the USAID. The USIS paid all dollar costs for production, sound recording, films processing and salaries of third country technical personnel while the USAID provided the local currency for renting film production facilities, per diem of third country technical production personnel and miscellaneous local production costs.

Beginning with FY 1960 and continuing through FY's 1961 and 1962, the Agreements provided for the USAID to finance all costs except for miscellaneous local costs. The total cost to the USAID was approximately \$230 thousand. The films on hand when the program was terminated were turned over to USOM/Thailand and USAID/Laos.

During the life of the project its scope was expanded to include the training of information cadres in ministries other than the Ministry of Information, i.e. the Ministries of Education, Public Health and Agriculture. The purpose of this was to accelerate the distribution to the people of information emanating from those ministries.

The objective of creating adequate production facilities and trained personnel of the Ministry of Information was reached, and on this basis the project can be judged as having been a success. A total of \$553 thousand in dollars and \$925 thousand in local currency equivalent was expended. Of this amount \$313 thousand was spent on commodities to supply the Ministry of Information with basic production equipment in press, radio and motion pictures. \$20 thousand was used for participant training to provide a nucleus of trained personnel in all media branches of the Ministry.

3. Audio-Visual Assistance

The third stage, 1960 to 1962, began with the initiation of a project called "Audio Visual Assistance" which had as its objectives the coordination,

through the Ministry of Plan, of the production and dissemination of materials directly related to agriculture, health and education; the promotion of cooperation between other ministries and the Ministry of Information for the production and distribution of materials; establishment of the means for ministries to create direct communications between themselves and the people they served using the now adequate facilities of the Ministry of Information.

Specific targets were the establishment of information priorities of the ministries; the creation of media materials; and the training of ministerial information personnel.

The project was not a success. It was found difficult to implement because of the difficulty of obtaining counterparts to train. More important, perhaps, was the determination that any training carried out through the Ministry of Information would not further project goals as conceived by the USAID, i.e. educational-informational programs. The Ministry of Information considered that its primary task was that of the dissemination of political rather than the distribution of technical and other information which would support the economic programs designed to stimulate the growth of the country.

The project was terminated at the end of FY 1961 and the fourth stage was entered, which lasted until the closing of the USAID in November 1963.

Communications activities were drastically reduced in scope, and in FY 1961, residual activities consisted of the provision of equipment for the production of sound films for the Ministry of Education under the project Rural Development Through Education (Bureau of Technical Services). These activities are discussed in full above in the Audio-Visual sub-section of the Education Section. Given this very limited program, the bulk of the

activities of the Communications Media personnel were directed to the support of the USAID technicians and staff offices.

J. PARTICIPANTS

Summary

Between 1951 and 1963 a total of 1,017 Cambodian men and women were sent abroad as participants. Of this total 643 were sent on short observation trips not exceeding six months, 91 to the U.S., and 552 to third countries. A total of 155 were sent to the U.S or third countries on longer, non-degree training programs of six months to a year's duration. A total of 209 were sent to the U.S. and none to third countries to receive training that would lead to a university degree, 206 a B.S., and three an M.S. Of the total number sent 1,004 were directly financed by AID and 13 under contract programs.

At the time of the USAID notice of termination on November 20, 1963, two of the students studying for a degree had returned with a B.S., one with an M.S., and 12 had been terminated due to academic reasons or their own desire to return to Cambodia.

As of November 20, 1963, there were 197 students studying in the U.S., plus four in Canada and one in France, under USAID auspices, of whom 180 were degree candidates. Only eight of these have elected to return home ahead of schedule and four completed their studies in January 1964. Ten more were scheduled to receive their degrees by the end of the 1963-64 academic year. Of the remaining students, 38 are scheduled to receive their degrees in 1965, 30 in 1966, 48 in 1967, and 42 in 1968.

Of the 22 non-degree participants, four have returned to Cambodia ahead of schedule since February. The remaining 18 were scheduled to complete their programs by 1965.

All of the USAID participants presently in the U.S. have been funded through the 1963-64 academic year, in some cases through the summer and in a few cases to winter of 1964. In response to a request from the State Department, AID/W has decided to provide the necessary funds (\$1.6 Million) to enable these participants to complete their academic programs. The entire funding requirement will be met with FY 1964 funds. In addition selected students will be offered the opportunity of continuing their studies for a graduate degree, to be financed by both the State Department and AID. Twelve have been selected from those completing their undergraduate work in June, 1964. A study is in process to determine whether or not the contracts with Long Beach and Los Angeles State Colleges should be kept in force in view of the continuation of the participant program.

Development of the Participant Program

The U.S. economic assistance program in Cambodia, almost since its inception, included a participant element. In accordance with the concept of AID and its predecessor agencies, this program was largely project oriented. That is to say, Cambodians were sent abroad for study or observation in specific fields with the intention that upon their return to Cambodia the knowledge and experience gained would make a specific contribution to joint project activities being carried out by the U.S. and the RKG.

In the early years of the U.S. economic assistance program in Cambodia, the almost complete dearth of trained people or even people who had a clear idea of the problems to be tackled in achieving the first steps toward economic growth, resulted in the sending of large

numbers of Cambodians abroad to neighboring countries on short visits to observe the institutions of development in situations similar to Cambodia. Often these groups were accompanied by a USAID technician who would attempt to assist the Cambodians in translating these foreign situations to Cambodian environment. From 1953 to 1959 a total of 137 Cambodians in 15 groups made such visits. This type of training was designed to supplement the daily on-the-job training, in-country training courses and workshops given with the assistance and under the direction of the USAID technicians assigned to the Cambodian program.

Where it was felt the experience was transferable, the USAID also sent Cambodian officials on similar observation visits to the U.S. These programs tended to be somewhat longer, up to six months, and were designed more for individuals than for sizeable groups. Between 1953 and 1960 a total of 189 Cambodians were sent to the U.S. on this observation and limited on-the-job training program.

While it was important to expose a significant number of Cambodians to developments elsewhere, this program by itself did not solve the problem of insufficient numbers of Cambodians with the academic and practical training required to man the institutions needed for economic development. Those few who did have professional training, largely obtained in France, were in such short supply that most of them were given administrative posts which gave them little or no opportunity to practice their profession. As in most under-developed countries the small educated elite in Cambodia also provide the political leadership.

As the USAID program became more concentrated in the development of specific institutions, particularly in the educational and agricultural fields, the emphasis of the participant program was shifted to send Cambodians to the U.S. to enroll in U.S. Universities in degree programs. This phase of the program was begun in 1959. The first graduate returned in 1963 with a B.S. degree from the University of Florida in Soil Morphology. The first Cambodian to earn an advanced degree under USAID sponsorship also returned in 1963 with an M.S. in Plant Pathology from the University of Florida.

Under usual AID policies, AID financed participant programs are designed for people already employed by the institution being assisted, or if it is a new institution by the host government. If there are a number of people available with undergraduate degrees or their equivalent, then programs for advanced training are designed to provide the supplemental study and experience necessary for added responsibility. Unfortunately in Cambodia there were not many people who already had the undergraduate training and the RKG felt that those few that did could not be spared. Practically all the Cambodians sent to the U.S. for university training were recent high school graduates with no work experience and not necessarily any real prior contact with the area in which they were to study. This was particularly true of agriculture, where most of the high school graduates available for training came from urban backgrounds.

Another problem arose from the fact that Cambodian formal academic standards are modeled on the French system and job classifications in the Cambodian Government are related to French degrees. A problem

that was beginning to face the USAID was the recognition that would be given to holders of bachelor degrees from U.S. Universities. The French University graduate normally receives a "license" which the French and Cambodians tend to equate with a U.S. Master's degree. However, those returning with a Bachelor's degree will be needed in positions normally given to someone with a license and in addition will be as fully qualified in their speciality if not considerably more so than those returning from France. Since at the time the program was terminated only two AID participants had returned from the U.S. with a B.S. (some had also returned under the IES and Asia Foundation programs) the problem had not been fully faced. The solution to that time had been to create special positions just below the license level on a case by case basis. The participant who had returned with a M.S. had been given a position requiring a license.

Evaluation

A full evaluation of the participant program is not possible on the basis of the available data and the experience to date. Only in the last year or two of the program had the USAID attempted a follow-up program and this was only in the beginning stages. The vast majority of those who went on short term visits were not evaluated. Most of the technicians with whom they were working had long since departed the post leaving little if any comment as to whether these visits were in the long run productive and, if so, how.

There are examples of some officials who went on longer observation tours to the U.S. who have attempted to make some application of what they have seen and learned. Some of the enthusiasm for the

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practical activities program in the Ministry of Education stems from these visits, though here again the results are not well documented.

In the case of the degree programs it is too early to tell. The few people who have returned have been reasonably well integrated into the RKG but only on a case by case basis. When they begin to return in large numbers, there may be more substantial problems, particularly now that US-RKG relations are strained and the institutions in which they were to serve, particularly the School of Arts and Trades and the School of Agriculture, are not going forward as planned.

Judging from the available records, the extent to which the participant element was made an integral part in the planning of the various projects varied considerably between projects. In the case of the major school projects such as Arts and Trades and the School of Agriculture, the training of specified numbers and types of future faculty members was a key element in the development of the project. The majority of the Cambodian students studying in the U.S. at the time of the program termination were scheduled to teach in these two schools.

In those cases where the USAID effort was designed to assist the improvement of operating agencies of the RKG the planning of the participant element was far less precise. Additional effort could have been made to ascertain the total trained staff requirement for the organizations concerned, the various in-country and external sources and the appropriate role of the participant program. From the record it appears that too often training was given to a few individuals without full consideration of the overall training

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requirements. In part the responsibility lies with the RKG in not making enough of the appropriate persons available for training or in failing to utilize their training once they had returned.

The Cambodians as students in the U.S. have done remarkably well considering the situation they face. Practically all are quite young with little worldly experience. Their average age is 20-25. Few if any have been outside of Cambodia before and most have few or mistaken ideas regarding the U.S. The problem of race relations causes some anxiety. Most of them arrived in the U.S. with inadequate English despite efforts to prepare them in Cambodia. The fact that only 5.8 per cent returned home prior to the completion of their intended course is rather remarkable.

Problems Facing the Remaining Students

In the negotiations that terminated the USAID the Cambodians early made the point that the participant program in so far as it concerned the students already abroad should be considered as an exchange of persons program which could continue apart from the economic assistance being terminated. The U.S. readily agreed. The motivations of the Cambodians were probably twofold. First they considered the welfare of the students and did not wish to cut them short from this opportunity to obtain an education. Secondly they did not want a sudden influx of 200 disgruntled young men for whom it would be difficult to adequately provide. The U.S. was also concerned for the welfare of the students and in addition hoped that the return of these people over a period of several years might lend a measure of balance to the distorted and negative views of the U.S. currently being expressed in Cambodia.

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Whether the students will find themselves discriminated against when they return will depend in part on the succeeding political events and also the amount of opposition from the holders of French degrees when those with American degrees return in larger numbers. How this will affect the returned students attitude toward the U.S. also remains to be seen.

The present strained US-RKG relations already must be causing some problems for the Cambodian students who may feel compelled to defend Cambodia and Prince Sohanouk. If diplomatic relations are broken the RKG may call all the students home or if not many may feel compelled to return.

PARTICIPANT RETURNS

November 1963 - February 20, 1964

The following participants returned during November 1963,

through February 1964:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PIO/P No.</u>	<u>FIELD OF TRAINING</u>	<u>DATE RETURNED</u>
-------------	------------------	--------------------------	----------------------

A) - NORMALLY:

November 1963 - NONE

December 1963 - NONE

January 1964

Nong Lim Huot	10184	Plant Pathology	1/1/64
Tan Suor	30048	Traffic Control	1/19/64
Uk Sorn	30048	Traffic Control	1/19/64
Suos Huor	40013	Livestock Improvement	1/19/64

February 1964 - NONE

* * * * *

B) IN ADVANCE:

November 1963 - NONE

December 1963 - NONE

January 1964

Kim Sillon	30104	Khmer American Friendship School	1/7/64
Chea Pon	30108	" " " "	1/7/64
Khul Sarin	30114	" " " "	1/7/64
IV Naing	30105	" " " "	1/19/64

February 1964

Keo Chan Ny	20059	Nat. School of Arts & Trades	2/11/64
Ly Sampean	20059	" " " "	2/11/64
Vann Say	30145	" " " "	2/11/64
Loeung Chan Vang	30151	" " " "	2/11/64

CAMBODIAN STUDENTS IN THE U.S.
BY YEAR OF EXPECTED GRADUATION AS OF FEB 10

USAID/CAMBODIA

GRANTEES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>UNIV.</u>	<u>CAND. FOR DEGREE</u>
<u>1964</u>			
1 Kuoch Kyleng	Inst. of Tech.	Ohio U.	M.A. in Educ.
2 Suon Saroeung	Fisheries Dev.	U. Wash.	BS Marine Fisheries
3 Sam ElJulcofy	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Fla	BS Long Veg. Fibers
4 Huon Chhun Huor	Agric. Res. Dev.	Miss. U.	BS Seed Tech.
5 Yeth Kim Srum	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Fla	BS Entomology
6 Kang Keng	Livestock Dev.	Kansas U.	BS Gen. Agronomy
7 Sim Sun Huor	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Fla	BS Horticulture
8 Sau Plin	Rural Health Dev.	Okla U.	BS Sanitary Eng.
9 Ly Chhay Heang	Forestry Dev.	U. Ga	BS Forest Mgmt.
10 Chhun Khan	Agronomy Dev.	Arkansas U.	BS Plant Breeding
<u>1965</u>			
1 Pan Sothi	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	Ohio U.	Ph.D Education
2 In Nhel	Inst. of Tech.	N. Carolina	MS Civil Eng.
3 Thong Sarath	Agric. Res. Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Soil Fertility
4 Saing Hok San	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Ga	BS Soil Morphology
5 Kiet Srang	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Ga	BS Ag. Eng.
6 Tin Taing Heang	Fisheries Dev.	U. Mich	BS Marine Fisheries
7 Kong Sarom	Forestry Dev.	U. Oregon	BS Forest Mgmt
8 Nouth Chantha	Agric. Res. Dev.	L.S.U.	BS Sugar Crop Prod.
9 Meas Sivon	Agric. Res. Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Mech. Farming
10 Som Chieng	Agric. Res. Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Mech. Farming
11 Kem Sos	Agric. Res. Dev.	Miss. U.	BS Soil Fertility
12 Keat Keng Sin	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Ga	BS Ag. Ind. Dev.
13 Ear Kim Nal	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Fla	BS Soil Fertility
14 Keo Saric	Agric. Res. Dev.	U. Ga	BS Crop Breeding
15 Hou Sisavanh	Agric. Res. Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Horticulture
16 Chhay Neth	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Machine Shop
17 Meas Phanna	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Machine Shop
18 Yang Huong	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Auto Mechanics
19 Sean Ell	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Sheet Metal
20 Kuy Heng	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Electronics

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>UNIV.</u>	<u>CAND. FOR DEGREE</u>
21 You Yoeurn	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Electronics
22 Plong Chhath	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Electricity
23 Sie Chhorn	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Electricity
24 Pol Khorn	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Arch. Drawing
25 Yen Kantang	Teacher Educ & Curric. Dev.	New Mexico	BS Arts & Crafts
26 Neal Samroeun	Livestock Dev.	Kansas U.	D.V.M.
27 Lim Lay	Livestock Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Business Mgmt
28 Lim Kheng Lam	Agric. Res. Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Ag. Irrigation
29 Uong Chhonn	Agric. Res. Dev.	Iowa U.	BS Crop Breeding
30 Bou Chhuon Leap	Agric. Res. Dev.	Cal Sta Poly	BS Ag. Journalism
31 It Sareth	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Forestry
32 Duong Sok San	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Horticulture
33 Sin Meng Srun	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Forestry
34 Nouth Bun Chhoeun	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Forestry
35 You Sambath	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Crop Prod.
36 Yim Youvaing	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Food Tech.
37 Uk Tinal	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Forestry
38 Trang Meng Kry	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Gen. Agronomy

1966

1 Tun Sovan	Agronomy Dev.	Tenn U.	BS Ag. Economics
2 Cheam Venghuot	Rural Health Dev.	Okla U.	Pre-Med
3 Say Kanal	Rural Health Dev.	Okla U.	Pre-Med
4 Tan Poly	Rural Health Dev.	Okla U.	Pre-Med
5 Ouch Mau Noral	Hwy. Eng. Adv. Ser.	Ohio U.	BS Civil Eng.
6 Punne Soonthor- npoct *	Agronomy Dev.	L.S.U.	BS Plant Pathology
7 Ghanty Abdoullah	Dev. of Ag. Coops and Credits	Wisc. U.	BS Ag. Coops.
8 Khlok Ly Ngan	Dev. of Ag. Coops and Credits	Wisc. U.	BS Ag. Coops.
9 Uk Solang	Agric. Res. Dev.	L.S.U.	BS Entomology
10 Keo Sokrin	Academic Training for Economic Dev.	Penn U.	BS Banking & Commerce
11 Kheang Lim Hak	Academic Training for Economic Dev.	Penn U.	BS Banking & Commerce
12 Sakou Siphon	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Physics
13 Hang Chan	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Chemistry
14 Ok Hoem	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Physics
15 Thong Mamith	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Chemistry

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>UNIV.</u>	<u>CAND. FOR DEGREE</u>
16 Leng Mith	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Wood Working
17 Meng Hing	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Wood Working
18 Lam Trieu Luong	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Auto Mechanics
19 Chieu Chin Banon	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Auto Mechanics
20 U. Sam Oeur	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Machine Shop
21 Ny Bun Heang	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Machine Shop
22 Nor Savath	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Electronics
23 Cheth Sokhon	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Electronics
24 Houi Huong Vi	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Foundry
25 Prom Sam Ol	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	BS Tech. Drawing
26 Saing Kim Say	Rural Health Dev.	Okla U.	BS Sanitary Eng.
27 Prak Yoeng	Imp. of Water Supply Village Wells	Okla U.	BS Sanitary Eng.
28 Minh Thien Voan	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Ag. Eng.
29 Chhim Sun Him	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Horticulture
30 Sor Savay	U. Ga Contract	U. Ba	BS Livestock

1967

1 Kim Chandaboth	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.A. State	BS Chemistry
2 Lim Lay Sreng	"	L.A. State	BS Chemistry
3 Tuot Neat	"	L.A. State	BS Physics
4 Phok Ell	"	L.A. State	BS Physics
5 Om Sopek	"	L.A. State	BS Physics
6 Ou Samkoeurn	"	L.A. State	BS History
7 Oung Saly	"	L.A. State	BS History
8 Paolim Neurat	"	L.A. State	BS Refrig & Air Cond.
9 Tat Sroeueng	"	L.A. State	BS Refrig & Air Cond.
10 Chak Onn	"	L.B. State	BS Machine Shop
11 Sam Chhorn	"	L.B. State	BS Machine Shop
12 Thor Lan	"	L.B. State	BS Machine Shop
13 Lay Kheng	"	L.B. State	BS Wood Working
14 Phu Ly Seng	"	L.B. State	BS Wood Working
15 Prak Chuh	"	L.A. State	BS Sheet Metal
16 Tran Can	"	L.A. State	BS Sheet Metal
17 Chey Pheany	"	L.B. State	BS Foundry
18 Ek Sareth	"	L.B. State	BS Auto Technology

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>UNIV.</u>	<u>CAND. FOR DEGREE</u>
19 An Vin	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	U.S.C.	BS Eng. Teaching
20 Sieng Lapresse	"	U.S.C.	BS Eng. Teaching
21 Tea Ngeht Chheng	"	U.S.C.	BS Eng. Teaching
22 Dan Sipo	"	L.B. State	BS Radio & Tele.
23 Lu Lay Sreng	"	L.B. State	BS Radio & Tele.
24 Has Chhon	"	L.A. State	BS Mathematics
25 Men Vinsong	"	L.A. State	BS Mathematics
26 Sin An	"	L.B. State	BS Mathematics
27 Sor Damrey	"	L.B. State	BS Mathematics
28 Taing Maryn	"	L.B. State	BS Mathematics
29 Chum Kanyr	"	L.A. State	BS Tech Drafting
30 Kim Cone	"	L.A. State	BS Tech Drafting
31 Srin Chhiv Lim	"	L.A. State	BS Tech Drafting
32 Khieu Savy	"	L.B. State	BS Tech Drafting
33 Try Chheang Huot	"	L.B. State	BS Tech Drafting
34 Hy Sun Veng	Forestry Dev.	W. Virginia	BS Forestry
35 Cheng Guot	Forestry Dev.	N. Carolina	BS Forestry
36 Mak Sony	Agronomy Dev.	U. Fla	BS Ag. Industry
37 Kousoum S Sakhan	Irri. & Drainage Systems	Cal Sta Poly	BS Crop Prod.
38 Seng Try Kheng	Irri. & Drainage Systems	Cal Sta Poly	BS Irri. Crop
39 Chin Bun Sean	Dev. of Ag. Coops and Credits	U Wisc.	BS Ag. Economics
40 Mao Chamrong	Rural Health Dev.	Okla U.	Pre-Med
41 Meas Sam Ay	Fisheries Dev.	Mich U.	BS Fisheries
42 Thuon Sopheasy	Agric. Res. Dev.	Ohio U.	BS Ag. Eco-Mkt.
43 Nou Nilean	Livestock Dev.	Kansas U.	D.V.M.
44 Kreng Ketsarik	Teacher Educ. & Curric. Dev.	Ohio U.	BS Elec. Eng.
45 Kreng Ketviradeth	Teacher Educ. & Curric. Dev.	Ohio U.	BS Elec. Eng.
46 Chhang Song	Livestock Dev.	L.S.U.	BS Animal Husbandry
47 Chap Chamman	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	BS Ag. Eng.
48 Keo Tan	U. Ga Contract	U. Ga	D.V.M.

1968

1 Bun Bak Ly	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L. B. State	Vocational Educ.
2 B.L. Bucy An Binh	"	L.A. State	"
3 Che Yang	"	L.B. State	"
4 Du Thanh Ty	"	L.A. State	"
5 Em Chandy	"	L.B. State	"
6 Heang Chheng Eang	"	L.A. State	"
7 Hen Sarun	"	L.B. State	"
8 Hien Kim Sreng	"	L.A. State	"
9 Hing Naing	"	L.B. State	"
10 Hong Theav	"	L.A. State	"

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>UNIV.</u>	<u>CAND. FOR DEGREE</u>
11 Hor Kong	Nat'l School of Arts & Trades	L.B. State	Vocational Educ.
12 Im Saroeun	"	L.A. State	"
13 In Suvacha	"	L.B. State	"
14 Iv Saroeun	"	L.A. State	"
15 Ken Vath	"	L.B. State	"
16 Ker Bun Han	"	L.B. State	"
17 Khor Sun Heap	"	L.A. State	"
18 Kim Kethavy	"	L.A. State	"
19 Kit Nay	"	L.A. State	"
20 Kong Sam Ul	"	L.B. State	"
21 Lao Bun Eng	"	L.A. State	"
22 Lor Peng Kim	"	L.A. State	"
23 Ly Meng Kheng	"	L.B. State	"
24 Mau Kun	"	L.A. State	"
25 Mean Savy	"	L.B. State	"
26 Meas Phan	"	L.B. State	"
27 Mouy Chhan	"	L.A. State	"
28 Ouk Heng	"	L.B. State	"
29 Pech Kim Green	"	L.B. State	"
30 Pon Ya Yun	"	L.A. State	"
31 Ros Saphan	"	L.A. State	"
32 Sam Or Deng	"	L.B. State	"
33 Seng Try	"	L.A. State	"
34 Slaut Siphat	"	L.B. State	"
35 Som Sun	"	L.B. State	"
36 Uch Thoeun	"	L.B. State	"
37 Um Be	"	L.A. State	"
38 Van Chhorn	"	L.A. State	"
39 Yan Sem	"	L.A. State	"
40 Heng Kim Dan	"	L.B. State	"
41 Yos Ham	"	L.A. State	"
42 You Sam Ell	"	L.A. State	"

SPECIAL - all complete 1965

(2-year program leads towards Certificate of Completion)

1 Sar Savathly	Khmer American Friendship School	Oregon U.	Business Machine and Office Practice
2 O.T. Molyse Thourk*	"	Oregon U.	Home Economics
3 Pech Phoeun	"	Oregon U.	Business Admin.
4 Kuch Sam Ol	"	Oregon U.	Mathematics
5 Sau Vandy	"	Oregon U.	History

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>UNIV.</u>	<u>CAND. FOR DEGREE</u>
<u>NON-ACADEMIC TRAINING</u>			
1 Chan Sonn	East-West Center	Hawaii U.	Middle Mgmt
2 Rauw Hum Theng	East-West Center	Hawaii U.	Middle Mgmt
3 Nam Yon	Eng. Lang. Instr.	Mich U.	English
4 Son Kha	Eng. Lang. Instr.	Mich U.	English
5 Nisay Bunna	Eng. Lang. Instr.	Mich U.	English
6 Yi Seng Long	Eng. Lang. Instr.	Mich U.	English
7 Um Amrong **	Teacher Educ. & Curric. Dev.	Tenn U.	Home Economics
8 Mam I **	Teacher Educ. & Curric. Dev.	Tenn U.	Home Economics

CANADA

1 Kheng Veng Hong	Improvement of Fin. Organ & Mgmt.	Montreal	Public Acc't.
2 Ma Lai Kheang	"	Montreal	Public Acc't.
3 Koet Suy	"	Montreal	Fiscal Admin.
4 Tat Samdy	"	Montreal	Fiscal Admin.

FRANCE

1 Pao Buntuk	Rural Health Dev.	Paris	Ophthalmology ***
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NOTE: * Miss
 ** Mrs.
 *** USAID/Cambodia provides funds for the 1st year study in France, and transportation. The French Aid Economic Mission/Cambodia will finance the additional 2 years of study.

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K. CIVIC ACTION

Cambodia has had a civic action program of its own since April 28, 1958, when the RKG enacted a law authorizing the use of the military forces on public works. Implemented by the Minister of National Defense and supported by the Chief of State, the program has been a classic example of self-help, of which the government is justly proud. FARK's country-wide activities under the program have included a variety of projects such as land clearance, flood control, health and sanitation, and the construction of roads, villages, schools, air fields, sport centers, dams and reservoirs.

Neither the USAID nor the MAAG participated in the planning of the program. To the extent that participating units are equipped by MAP and partially paid by USAID, all civic action projects undertaken by the Cambodian Armed Forces were indirectly supported by the U.S. Aid Program. However, there were no MAP or AID supported projects in the field of civic action per se, and efforts to sponsor such projects met with little success. A case in point was the village kit equipment to be funded by the USAID for use in building villages in the remote frontier areas. Even though the project had been funded, FARK refused it with the explanation that they did not wish to risk incurring the enmity of other ministries by appearing to be using economic-type aid. The Defense Minister informally told the Chief of MAAG that he had declined the offer in order to avoid becoming involved with a civilian minister whom he disliked and distrusted. Neither explanation is completely plausible; it may be that the real reason was that the RKG

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was jealous of the credit which accrues through its much publicized nation-building activities and did not wish to have the program dependent upon, or more closely identified with, foreign aid.

By a letter from the Ambassador to the Prime Minister on August 1, 1963, (which was coordinated by the Country Team) it was also suggested that FARK assist in the USAID's trachoma control pilot study with a view toward eventual extension of the program to the four provinces with military governors as a civic action project. No reply to this letter had been received when the program was terminated.

L. TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

The mission support activities are not sufficiently documented to permit a thorough discussion of their history. It is possible, however, to indicate some of the more general aspects.

The agreement to establish a Mission in Cambodia was signed in November, 1954. The Mission did not begin effective operations, however, until January, 1955 when the counterpart special account was established, and probably, judging from the slowness with which personnel arrived, not for some time after that. At the time of its establishment, the Mission consisted of the Acting Director. By March, 1955, the technical staff comprised a lone Division Chief, a sanitary engineer, and a "roving" roads and bridges engineer, who continued field trips to Vietnam and Laos. By June, 1956, the Mission technical staff numbered 15. By 1960 it had grown to approximately 100 and was 110 when the program was terminated.

The mission support operation was financed by two budgets or funds: an administrative budget which financed the dollar costs of all administratively funded U.S. personnel; and a technical support budget which financed the dollar and local currency costs of all program funded U.S. and local hire personnel whose responsibilities and activities involved more than one of the program's projects, the local costs of the administrative funded U.S. and local personnel, and all other mission support costs.

The administrative budget was relatively small and received its funds from administrative appropriations. The technical support budget was much larger, was funded from program appropriations and is the budget with which this discussion is concerned.

Under a Technical Assistance Trust Fund (TATF) agreement with the RKG, the Mission was permitted to draw on the funds generated by the Commodity Import Program for the Counterpart Special Account to defray the local costs of running the Mission. This agreement was effectively amended whenever the RKG agreed to the use of TATF funds for other uses, by signing project agreements including budgets for such uses.

The local costs of operating the Mission financed by the technical support budget included the salaries and other financial benefits of local personnel, the costs of rent and utilities for technician housing and office space, the cost of operating a vehicular fleet which was provided for to-and-from-work transportation for all U.S. personnel as well as for field trips for the professional staff, for operational travel per diem for technician's travel inside Cambodia, for consultational travel outside Cambodia, for contracts for third country personnel who worked on more than one project (generally in the staff of the Public Works Division) for miscellaneous maintenance contracts on USAID property and the largest single item - reimbursement under the Joint Administrative Support (JAS) account, for services provided the USAID by the Embassy.

USAID/Cambodia not only provided housing and to and from work transportation but also provided furnishings and until 1963, unlimited utilities. (A monthly maximum was established in 1963 for electricity -- the employee paid for amount used in excess of the maximum. Also in 1963 the decision had been made to reduce the vehicular fleet and to gradually discontinue to and from work transportation.)

Aside from the cost of technicians salaries, the largest dollar cost was for commodities which included the furnishing and appliances for all housing, office equipment, vehicles and various equipment items for use by technical divisions which were not attributable to an individual project. In addition, the technical support budget financed, in the last years, the operation of a Communications Media Branch which supported the entire Mission.

In addition to these Mission support activities, the technical support budget financed three other related activities. Soon after the Mission was established an arrangement was made with the RKG Ministry of Plan whereby the operations of a special office, called the American Economic Aid Office (AEA), set up to coordinate and administer American assistance, was supported by counterpart funds (the AEA office also administered Japanese and Colombo Plan aid and received support from them as well). In addition, the USAID financed the construction of a warehouse for the AEA to store project commodities until they could be moved to the project site. A portion of the warehouse, which belonged to the RKG, was used as the USAID warehouse for storage of mission support items. These were separate operations, in effect two warehouses under one roof. The cost of transporting the project commodities from the dock to the warehouse was also paid from the Counterpart Special Account. Until FY 1963 these two activities were budgeted as separate projects. The former was called AEA Committee and the latter Transit Operations. In FY 1963 they were combined as a project called Local Currency Utilization. In FY 1964 they were incorporated into the technical support budget. (The financial summary

in this Report combines the two as the project Local Currency Utilization for all years through FY 63.) The costs of these activities were much higher in the early years than toward the end of the program. Presumably this was due to the cost of getting established, such as building the warehouse, but the available record is silent.

There was a third activity budgeted under technical support which should be noted. As pointed out elsewhere in this Report, the number of Cambodians who spoke English was small, which posed a special problem for the USAID when it began sending participants to the U.S. for academic degrees. In order that the ones selected might develop an ability in the English language, an arrangement was entered into with the USIS to establish an English language center (unofficially called the Bi-National Center which was incorrect since the RKG would not permit the opening of a Bi-National Center in deference to its (RKG) policy of neutrality). Under the arrangement, the USIS provided facilities and supervision and native speakers of English, usually wives of U.S. personnel, were contracted to teach. In addition to participants, RKG Government employees attended the classes.

The annual cost of supporting the Mission naturally rose after 1955 as the Mission grew. The FY 56 budget supported 25 U.S. personnel. The total budget that year, including the AEA office and transit operations, was \$1,128,000. The budget reached its high point of 2,398,000 in FY 1963. It was expected to decrease thereafter as a result of the vehicular fleet reduction and other measures. The number of technicians under the Technical Support Budget in FY 56 and

for some years later is misleading when compared to the last years figures since many, if not all, technicians as well as other Mission staff (there were only 15 technicians in the USAID, according to the available record in June, 1956) were included in the beginning. It was not until later that technicians costs were attributed to the project they were responsible for. The FY 63 Technical Support Budget supported 40 personnel not attributable to an individual project.

From 1955 to 1963 the Technical Support Budget constituted approximately six per cent of the total program. The total administrative and technical support costs from the inception of the Mission through November, 20, 1963, were \$16,393,000 of which approximately 70 per cent were local currency costs. The local currency for technical support was also provided at the artificially high rate for the riel of 35 to 1.

Housing

Every effort was made to lease reasonably comfortable and suitable housing for employees. A total of 25 houses and 120 apartment units in 10 apartment buildings were being maintained in 1962.

For reasons of economy and ease of maintenance, nearly 80 per cent of Mission personnel were quartered in apartment units at that time. Individual houses were normally provided only on the basis of representational or specific family requirements. (Early in the program, no apartment buildings were available and the USAID entered into CAM agreements with the RKG for the purpose of building such units. See the non-project program discussion.)

The following indicates the mission housing and occupancy status in 1962:

One Bedroom Apartments

Occupied by singles	31
Occupied by couples	11
Vacant	<u>11</u>

Total: 53

One Bedroom Villas

Occupied by couples	<u>1</u>
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Total: 1

Two Bedroom Apartments

Occupied by singles	4
Occupied by couples	20
Occupied by families w/children	16
Vacant	5
Occupied by High School	<u>1</u>

Total: 46

Two Bedroom Villas

Occupied by couples	1
Occupied by families w/children	3
Vacant	<u>1</u>

Total: 5

Three Bedroom Apartments

Occupied by couples	4
Occupied by families w/children	9
Vacant	<u>1</u>

Total: 14

Three Bedroom Villas

Occupied by couples (D/D)	1
Occupied by families w/children	14
Vacant	<u>1</u>

Total: 16

Four Bedroom Apartments

Occupied by families w/children 4
Vacant 4

Total: 8

Four Bedroom Villas

Occupied by families w/children 1

Total: 1

Five Bedroom Villas

Occupied by families w/children 1

Total: 1

Grand Total: 145

The lease arrangements for these units varied from 1 to 3 years, and were payable three months and one year, respectively, in advance.

Following is a breakdown on the rental costs for each size of the units maintained:

	<u>Per month</u>	<u>Per annum</u>
One bedroom apartment	\$ 200.00	\$ 2,400.00
One bedroom house	371.43	4,457.16
Two bedroom apartment	328.57	3,942.84
Two bedroom house	342.86	4,114.32
Three bedroom apartment	485.71	5,828.52
Three bedroom house	628.57	7,542.84
Four bedroom apartment	485.71	
Four bedroom house	657.14	7,885.68
Five bedroom house	685.71	8,228.52

Transportation

The USAID had forty-seven (47) vehicles in operation in 1962. Thirty-nine (39) were of the passenger type and were used for daily transportation needs, i.e., work/residence conveyance, field trips.

USAID personnel were transported each work day from work to residence and vice versa. Field trips required approximately ten (10) vehicles each day.

The USAID employed thirty-seven (37) local hire drivers who were assigned a regularly driven vehicle. Field trip assignments were on a rotation basis.

Four (4) dispatchers worked rotating shifts enabling the maintenance of efficient dispatching service on a full time basis and during week-ends.

The USAID also operated a Motor Pool located in the rear of the USAID portion of the AEA warehouse. Three (3) skilled contract Filipino mechanics supervised the shop while instructing an additional twelve (12) local hire mechanics.

Unofficial transportation was made available to all American personnel who did not have a personal vehicle at post. Fees were fixed at 50 riels per hour within Phnom Penh, and 10 cents a mile outside Phnom Penh.

The average acquisition cost for the passenger type vehicle was \$2,500. The lowest acquisition cost was \$1,716 for a 1960 Chevrolet Biscayne sedan; the highest, \$3,535 for the Mission Director's 1961 New Yorker Chrysler. The average monthly maintenance and repair costs for all vehicles were as follows:

<u>Monthly Average</u>				
<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Lub.</u>	<u>Repairs and Parts *</u>	<u>Total</u>
\$592	\$39	\$3	\$ 1,121	\$ 1,756

*Includes Labor

RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED
(Sector Summary)

K.
SECTOR Technical Support (All Years)

In Thousands of U.S. Dollars

	DIRECT DOLLARS							Total Riels	LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar Equivalent)				
	Total *	Technicians \$ No.	Participants \$ No.	Contract Services \$	Commodi- ties \$	Other Costs \$	Total C/P		Total TATF	Technicians TATF	Parts. TATF	C/S TATF	Other Costs TATF
ALL YEAR 1	5595	3340	0	708	1495	52	10798	1390	9408	6770	0	0	2638
FY 64	273	252 (12)	0	13	8	0	467	0	467	88	0	0	379
FY 63	788	518 (40)	0	90	180	0	1610	54	1556	459	0	0	1097
FY 62	764	423 (40)	0	59	282	0	1566	59	1507	1122	0	0	385
FY 61	719	437 (40)	0	0	255	27	1318	51	1267	873	0	0	394
FY 60	569	410 (40)	0	69	165	25	1177	51	1126	914	0	0	212
FY 59	720	370 (35)	0	145	205	0	1040	111	929	758	0	0	171
FY 58	604	326 (35)	0	136	142	0	1200	29	1171	1171	0	0	0
FY 57	500	296 (30)	0	59	145	0	1048	291	757	757	0	0	0
FY 56	416	267 (25)	0	62	87	0	712	249	463	463	0	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	142	41 (2)	0	75	26	0	660	495	165	165	0	0	0
Total \$	5595												
Total LC	10798												
Total \$+LC	16393												
													Total Technicians Man/Years (estimated) 299

In Book II - II-I-9
In Book III - II-J-1

RECORD OF FUNDS OBLIGATED AND COMMITTED PER FUNCTION OF FUNDS AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1963
PROJECT PROGRAM SUMMARY - ALL IN THOUSANDS OF US DOLLARS

	<u>DIRECT DOLLARS</u>							<u>LOCAL CURRENCY (Dollar Equivalent)</u>					
	Total \$	Technicians \$	Participants No.	Contract Services \$	Commodi- ties \$	Other Costs \$	Total Riels	Total C/P	Total TATF	Techni- cians TATF	Parts. TATF	C/S TATF	Other Costs TATF
ALL YEARS	66284	5405	2755 (1022)	23197	30770	157	70660	54884	15776	8529	875	2803	3569
FY 64	1110	1005	(47) 55 (14)	13	36	1	555	0	555	154	13	8	380
FY 63	4583	1615	(95) 722 (129)	511	1734	1	9830	6294	3536	802	182	1305	1247
FY 62	12338	1358	(93) 618 (70)	9093	1268	1	6626	3555	3071	1454	112	870	635
FY 61	6712	1289	(87) 568 (94)	991	3837	27	7160	4555	2605	1287	119	347	852
FY 60	3827	1196	(82) 290 (133)	521	1795	25	3367	1633	1734	1236	101	166	231
FY 59	4514	1071	(71) 186 (197)	2139	1118	0	4501	3022	1479	1026	127	107	219
FY 58	9041	813	(60) 128 (161)	4288	3722	90	10938	9653	1285	1185	95	0	5
FY 57	10727	560	(47) 138 (176)	1008	9021	0	7880	7038	842	757	85	0	0
FY 56	10983	379	(33) 41 (46)	3592	6971	0	6481	5978	503	463	40	0	0
FY 55 & Prior	2447	119	(7) 9 (2)	1041	1268	12	13322	13156	166	165	1	0	0
Total \$	66284												
Total LC	70660												
Total \$+LC	136944												
													Total Technician Man/Years (estimated) 622
													Total Number of Participants 1022

Note: Local Currency funding total differs from total in L/C shown in Controller's 11-20-63 report due to riel/dollar conversion rounding.

Bk. I - II-A-11; Bk. II - II-M-2; Bk. III - II-2