AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT DATA SHEET

1. TRANSACTION CODE: A (A = Add, C = Change, D = Delete) — Amendment Number: _____

DOCUMENT CODE: 3

2. COUNTRY/ENTITY: RWANDA

3. PROJECT NUMBER: 696-0133

4. BUREAU/OFFICE: AFR — 06

5. PROJECT TITLE (maximum 40 characters): Democratic Initiatives&Governance

6. PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION DATE (PACD): MM 09 DD | YY 97

7. ESTIMATED DATE OF OBLIGATION (Under 'B.' below, enter 1, 2, 3, or 4)
A. Initial FY 92 B. Quarter 4 C. Final FY 96

8. COSTS ($000 OR EQUIVALENT $1 =)

A. FUNDING SOURCE	FIRST FY 92 B. FX	C. L/C	D. Total	LIFE OF PROJECT E. FX	F. L/C	G. Total
AID Appropriated Total	4,000	700	4,700	9,000		9,000
(Grant)	(4,000)	(700)	(4,700)	(9,000)	( )	(9,000)
(Loan)	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Other U.S. 1.						
Other U.S. 2.						
Host Country		-0-			640	640
Other Donor(s) CCADI, RPC		-0-			362	362
TOTALS	4,000	700	4,700	9,000	1,002	10,002

9. SCHEDULE OF AID FUNDING ($000)

A. APPROPRIATION	B. PRIMARY PURPOSE CODE	C. PRIMARY TECH. CODE 1. Grant	2. Loan	D. OBLIGATIONS TO DATE 1. Grant	2. Loan	E. AMOUNT APPROVED THIS ACTION 1. Grant	2. Loan	F. LIFE OF PROJECT 1. Grant	2. Loan
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									
TOTALS									

10. SECONDARY TECHNICAL CODES (maximum 6 codes of 3 positions each)

11. SECONDARY PURPOSE CODE

12. SPECIAL CONCERNS CODES (maximum 7 codes of 4 positions each)
A. Code
B. Amount

13. PROJECT PURPOSE (maximum 480 characters)

To facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

14. SCHEDULED EVALUATIONS
Interim MM 01 YY 95 | MM 06 YY 96 | Final MM 06 YY 97

15. SOURCE/ORIGIN OF GOODS AND SERVICES
☐ 000 ☐ 941 ☐ Local ☒ Other (Specify) 935

16. AMENDMENTS/NATURE OF CHANGE PROPOSED (This is page 1 of a ____ page PP Amendment.)

Greg Hemphill, USAID/R CONTROLLER

17. APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: Dirk W. Dijkerman, Acting Director, USAID/Rwanda
Date Signed: MM 09 DD 18 YY 92

18. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED IN AID/W, OR FOR AID/W DOCUMENTS, DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
MM DD YY

AID 1330-4 (8-79)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Setting

Over the last two years, beleaguered by war and persistent economic recession, Rwanda has continued to move forward with a tandem reform program to liberalize and restructure its economy and to democratize its political order. It has appealed to the international donors for assistance in both realms. The World Bank and the IMF began in 1990 to assist with a structural adjustment program and the GOR has begun to adopt measures to reduce the role of the state in the economy, restrain public expenditure and encourage private initiative in a market economy. In April 1992, a multi-party transitional Government was formed to guide the nation toward a just peace settlement, toward national elections and into a new order based on democratic pluralism. After years of one-party rule, government by multi-party consensus is bridging the space until an elected, constitutional government can take power. So far the donors have provided limited and selective assistance to aid with the political reform agenda: Germany and Canada on the electoral law; the UNDP on election planning; the Swiss and the US on a free press; and German foundations and USAID on private associations in civic action to name a few.

The Government of Rwanda's Request for Aid

In December 1991, President Habyarimana's government asked Rwanda's principle development partners for assistance in furthering the democratization program. Shortly thereafter, USAID initiated an assessment and design process to respond to this appeal. In its presentation to the joint donor roundtable held in Geneva on July 2 and 3 of this year, as this project design was in its final stages, the GOR repeated its appeal for donor help to continue the march toward democracy. In early August, as this project design was nearing completion, USAID staff and the project design team members met with senior officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to review the proposed strategy. The program was warmly welcomed by the Ministry officials.

General Objectives

The Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project (DIG) provides USAID/Rwanda and the government with a flexible tool for promoting substantive citizen participation in the nation's unfolding democratization process. It will do so through four principle means. By strengthening the outreach of private associations in civic education and action, it will broaden citizens' knowledge of the opportunities to shape the evolving social contract and of their rights and duties as electors. By assisting in shaping a new strategy for local governance and decentralized development, it will enlarge the role of individuals and groups in making the government nearest them more responsive to their needs and more accountable to them. By enhancing the capacity of the National Assembly as a proactive power of the State, it will increase citizen access to representative government and enlarge the role of the people in setting the national agenda and in making government more transparent and

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accountable. By reinforcing the free press and a more open information regime, it will strengthen the means by which people know and understand events and thus can decide when and how to act in both a free and open market economy and in a democratic polity.

Goal and Purpose of the Project

The project goal is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda that provides for sustainable, self-renewing democratic governance. The contributions that the project can make toward this goal are necessary but by no means sufficient to its achievement. There are many other constructive participants contributing to its realization. USAID will actively coordinate with other donors as they and the Rwandan actors join in pursuit of the goal. It is, of course, the practice of democracy, over time, that builds, brick by brick, a lasting structure of just laws, a broad and diverse civil society engaged in constructive civic action, and a responsive, accountable, transparent government.

The project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out. To this end, the project concentrates on building Rwanda's civil society, that diversity of non-state actors through which the people find voice for their aspirations, their demands, and their political will. This includes the broad array of private associations engaged in social, economic and political development as well as the free press. The project also addresses a process of institutional change at two levels of governance: the commune where government should truly be of the people and most responsive to them and the National Assembly where representative, elected government by the people's deputies should be in closest touch with their interests and should make government more open to their oversight and control. Strengthening the Assembly will help bring balance between the Executive and the Legislative branches. Strengthening decentralized government strengthens citizen engagement in and control over governance and will help to offset any centralizing tendencies of a national regime.

How the Project Will Work

The DIG Project will be managed by a competitively selected US non-profit organization. A US PVO or university will sign a four-year Cooperative Agreement with USAID Rwanda based on the project agreement with the GOR. US policy guidance to the Project will come from the Post Democracy Coordinating Committee and operational guidance will be given by the USAID Rwanda DIG Project Committee. The USAID Project Officer will have close and regular working relations with the resident Institutional Project Manager (IPM), the US non-profit organization selected to implement the Project. USAID, the MINIPLAN as the GOR ministry designated as its official representative for the Project, and the IPM will form a regular project management and oversight committee to review progress of the component elements of the project and the institutions that are carrying them out.

The four project components covered by the Cooperative Agreement will be executed under sub-agreements between the IPM and a corresponding host country institution. Assistance to non-governmental organizations will be provided through the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI), a new association formed by the NGOs for this purpose. Support to the free press will be through the Centre de Press Rwandaise (CPR), itself a new non-governmental organization formed by Rwandan journalists for mutual aid and professional development. Local government assistance will be executed through a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Interior (MININTER) and in close cooperation with local officials. A similar agreement with the officers of the National Assembly will be the means of providing resources for legislative development. A fifth component of the project is a general support fund that will be managed directly by USAID with the concurrence of the GOR to carry out audits and evaluations and to fund training and technical assistance in response to special targets of opportunity.

Early Assistance Arrangements

After project obligation through the jointly signed GOR/USAID project agreement by September 30, 1992, it will take at least six months to complete recruitment, selection and mobilization of the IPM's field staff in Rwanda. During these intervening months, important project-associated activities will be initiated by USAID, subject to the availability of assistance from the AID/Africa Bureau. The Africa Regional Elections Assistance Fund (AREAF) is expected to provide a resident manager/advisor to USAID/Rwanda who will coordinate these activities for the Mission. Before the end of 1992, AREAF will send a team to assess the UNDP coordinated effort to assist the GOR with elections preparations and to determine specific ways that this regional A.I.D. fund can channel US support to the elections program. Current plans call for AREAF to provide support for pre-electoral training assistance, in coordination with other donors, for candidates for national offices, for candidates for commune offices, and for NGOs doing pre-electoral civic education and for NGOs prepared to serve as neutral election monitors and observers. The plan calls for AREAF to provide workshops for journalists on election reporting and to advise the GOR on policy and programming for pre-electoral access to the government radio.

The AREAF coordinator will also assist the Mission with early start-up activities of the project. This will include a PD and S-funded survey of local government and the GOR's decentralization strategy, a project-funded training program for National Assembly staff, a project-funded strategic planning mission for the new Ministry for Family Affairs and the Promotion of Women, and a legislative analysis mission to assess a planned legislative information management system and staffing to support Assembly operations.

The Project in Operation

After USAID has awarded the four-year Cooperative Agreement with GOR concurrence, the selected Institutional Project Manager will set up a Project Management Unit (PMU) in Kigali. The PMU will be composed of a US Chief of Party, widely experienced in

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democratic development programs, an experience expatriate financial and administrative systems advisor and a Rwandan professional staff plus support personnel. The IPM will immediately set to work with the counterpart institutions to develop the first of the annual work plans that will be used throughout the life of the project, the joint work-plans for carrying them out, and then finalize sub-agreements for the operations of each of the project components. They will be implemented once approved by the GOR and USAID. The IPM may engage technical advisors in specialized areas to assist in this setting-up period and in helping the counterpart agencies with their start-up operations.

Day-to-day assistance to each of the project components will be provided by the PMU staff, US and Rwandan. However, each component has programmed for provision under the CA of specialized technical assistance to systematically develop the capacities of the agencies and to complete studies, execute plans and train local staffs. The IPM will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of each sub-agreement, for the timely provision of technical assistance as well as for the procurement of all commodities and the disbursement of funds to meet local costs.

The Project Components

The Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives, under management by its member non-governmental organizations, will work with the IPM and IPM-provided advisors to provide services and support to its members. It will be equipped under project funding with a locale, training facilities, communication and printing capacity, and transport for use by the NGO members in their civic development programs. The Center will design and develop common-use educational materials and through extension services will offer workshops to member groups and will promote the organization and development of NGO groups in communes throughout the national territory. As Center management develops experience, and as its operational and financial systems are proven, the IPM will incrementally turn over resource management tasks until it can fully certify Center management capability to USAID. At that time, the Center management will be given funds management responsibility directly by the IPM. Through a special facility of the Center, under its NGO membership-elected Board of Directors, Rwandan NGOs will apply for and be awarded program grants that will further their outreach, program development, and membership services in civic action. By the end of the project, through membership fees, fees for services and through other donor grants, the Center will be able to sustain its continuing operations in support of the expanding NGO community engaged in the civil society.

As provided for in the USAID/GOR project agreement, the IPM will prepare, with the designated senior officer of the Ministry of Interior, a joint memorandum of understanding (MOU) for all assistance regarding commune government development and decentralization. Support for local officials' training, development of a Burgomasters' Association, and possible funding of pilot commune development projects through the Fonds de Solidarite Communal will be jointly planned and carried out under the MOU. Timely technical assistance will be provided to develop these activities. By the end of the 18th month of work

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under the Cooperative Agreement and the MOU, this component of the project should be completed. The project evaluation at that time will determine what, if any, additional USAID assistance might be considered, based on the progress that will have been made, the activities of other donors in the sector, and unmet requirements for further aid.

The National Assembly officers will sign a similar memorandum of understanding with the IPM which will lay out the joint program to support the legislature and its resources development plan. This MOU will designate the Secretary General of the Assembly as its project manager and he, in turn, will work with the IPM to prepare each annual work plan under the project. Under these plans, the IPM will procure for the Assembly the computer hardware and software to set up its new legislative information management system. He will deliver timely technical specialists to assist with staff training and operations for the information system, for developing a compendium of Rwandan law and a legal research staff, for setting up a fiscal and budgetary data system and a fiscal/budgetary analysis staff, and for instituting an expanded legislative research and archival operation along with the expanded library. With USAID, the IPM and the Secretary General will develop and carry out US orientation training for Assembly officers, for deputies in party leadership roles and for key professional staff members in new support functions. These activities should have been completed by the end of the third year of the Cooperative Agreement. A project evaluation will assess accomplishments and recommend any further actions.

The executive board of the Centre de Press Rwandaise (CPR) will execute its agreement with the IPM. Operations will be initiated once the joint work plan signed. The Cooperative Agreement will provide that the IPM will fund the CPR's building rental, staff salaries, and all the support equipment for use by the journalist membership. This will include typewriters and word-processing equipment, desk-top publishing and printing services, FAX and wire services, and a reference center with journals, newspapers, data files, reports, etc. The director of the center, selected by the CPR executive board, will work with the IPM to set up all operations, hire staff to maintain services, and to establish the fees schedule for the use of the various services. From the outset, the IPM and center director will establish a close working relationship with the Public Affairs Officer the US Embassy. A journalism training expert will assist in drawing up a comprehensive, modular training plan for execution in collaboration with USIS and other donors. Technical assistance will be provided to assist the center in developing a national press distribution system, a national news gathering operation, and other common use services. An electronic media expert will conduct a feasibility study regarding expanded radio services under either public or private auspices. As the center director and staff become capable, the IPM will turn over funds management responsibilities to them. Evaluations at the 18th and 36th month of the project will assess general progress and will make specific recommendations regarding financial sustainability based on fees for services and other donor support.

USAID will use the Project Support Fund, in joint agreement with the MINIPLAN, to conduct annual independent audits of the Cooperative Agreement and all sub-grants under the agreement. It will also engage the evaluation teams to conduct progress evaluations at the

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18th and 36th month of the four-year program managed by the IPM and the counterpart agencies. To establish project impact, USAID will engage AFR/ONI and CDIE from A.I.D. Washington in a joint initial base-line study during the project's first year which will be used in a project close-out evaluation of impact during the project's fifth and final year after the Cooperative Agreement has been concluded. During these years, the USAID Support Fund will be drawn upon for special targets of opportunity, providing training and technical assistance as special needs in the justice sector, fiscal management and public auditing, public administration reform, and other areas are identified.

Anticipated Achievements at the End of the Project

Democracy is always in a state of becoming. Inherently it is, therefore, more a process than a state of being. At the end of this five-year project Rwanda's institutional framework for democratic governance will still be taking shape based on shared learning in the enterprise. The key indicators that the project is achieving its purpose will be markers on a process line, not end points that can be precisely fixed in advance of the journey. Progress will have been made, however, and it will be clearly seen.

- **A diversity of independent free associations** will be flourishing, shaping a pluralistic civil society through civic education, by action on issues in the public interest, and in undertaking tasks of local self-governance. Association representations to deputies and committees of the National Assembly will be influencing public policy and legislation on judicial reform, civil rights, issues of social equity and other matters. The CCADI Support Center established through this project will continue to operate, under the management of its members, with its own resources and other donor support, building new and better links between the governed and the governors in Rwanda.

- **Local governments will be assuming a more important role** in the lives of the Rwandan people as a first line of self-governance and in the provision of public goods and services under authorities and resources devolved to them by the central government. Diversified local public economies will be emerging.

- **The National Assembly will be acting as a co-equal branch of government** in law-making, in the oversight of public agencies, and in maintaining transparency and accountability in the government. Responsive to constituents and constituent groups, it will be taking a significant lead in setting the policy agenda, reforming the judiciary and unjust or ill-conceived law, and thus contributing to an increasing general respect for law and the rule of law in the society.

- **An energetic free press**, including the electronic media, uncensored by government but increasingly disciplined by its own ethics and rising standards of reporting, will be providing more timely and reliable information and a broad variety of viewpoints on the social, political and economic life of the nation. The CPR initiated under this project will be

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operating through its own generated income, members dues and other donor support as a valued resource for professional training and services to the media.

Rwanda's progress toward democratic governance will be much more than the sum of these DIG project impacts. It will include the impacts of other donor efforts and most importantly, the work of thousands of Rwanda citizens in community groups, at voting tables, in market places and in the public administration. The larger sum of it all will be the functioning social contract - reflected in an elected government that has the consent of the people, a people actively holding the government accountable to their trust, heightened respect for the rule of law, and continuing progress toward a more just, equitable and peaceful society.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABSL	Assocaition Sans But Lucratif
AID	Agency for International Development
AREAF	Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund
AWP	Annual Workplan
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CCADI	Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Education
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République (Coalition for the Devense of the Republic)
CESTRAR	La Centrale des Syndicats des Travailleurs du Rwanda
CFRC	Centre de Formation et de Recherche Coopératives IWACU
CIDC	Centre d'Information, de Documentation, et de Counseling (Information, Documentation, and Counseling Center) Project
CND	Conseil National du Développement (National Development Council)
CPDFP	Centre de la Promotion du Développement et de la Formation Permanente (Center for the Promotion of Development and Continuous Education)
CPR	Centre de Presse Rwandaise
CPSP	Country Program Strategic Plan
CRADEP	Centre de Recherche, Analyse Documentaire, et Etudes de Projet
CSI	Civil Society Institutions
D/G	Democratic Governance
DAA	Development Assistant Act
DIG	Democratic Initiatives and Governance
Duterimbere	Association pour l'appui au crédit pour les femmes
GOR	Government of Rwanda
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INADES	Association for Trainers and the Training Rural Workers
IPM	Institutional Project Manager
ISAP	Superior Institute of Public Administration
JOC	Jeunesse Ouvirère Chrétrienne (Young Christian Workers)
JOCEF	Jeunesse Ouvirère Chrétrienne-Femmes (Women's Branch)
LOP	Life of Project
MDR	Movement Démocrat Républicain (Democratic Republican Movement
MIJEUMA	Ministry of Youth and Associative Movements
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Herding
MINEPRISEC	Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education
MINIAFFET	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
MINIFAPROFE	Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women
MINIJUST	Ministry of Justice

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MINIMART	Ministry of Industry, Mines and Artisanry
MININFO	Ministry of Information
MININTER	Ministry of the Interior and Communal Development
MINIPLAN	Ministry of Planning
MINISANTE	Ministry of Health
MINITRASO	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MIS	Management Information System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRND	Mouvement Revolutionnaire Rwandaise pour le Developpement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	Non Project Assistance
NPC	National Press Center (Rwanda)
ONAPO	Office Nationale de Population (National Population Office)
ORINFOR	Office Rwandaise d'Information
PAK	Project Agricole de Kibuye (Kibuye Agricultural Project)
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PDC	Parti Démocrat Chrétien (Christian Democratic Party)
PID	Project Identification Document
PL	Parti Libéral (Liberal Party)
PMU	Project Management Unit
PP	Project Paper
ProAg	Project Agreement
PSD	Parti Social Démocrat (Social Democratic Party)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RF	Réseau des Femmes Ouvrant Pour le Développement Rural
RFP	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCC	Service d'Appui à la Coopération Canadienne
SNV	Service Néerlandais des Volontiares
TA	Technical Assistance
TAACS	Technical Advisor in Child Survival
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
URAMA	Organisation des Femmes Rwandaises Pour le Développement
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIS	United States Information Service
WID	Women in Development

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ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING USAID/RWANDA MISSION DIRECTOR

FROM : Claudia Cantell PDO

SUBJECT : Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project

DATE : September 9, 1992

Action Requested: Your approval is required to authorize the $9 million Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project and the obligation of $4.7 million planned for FY 1993.

Discussion: The DIG Project is a five-year, $9 million project whose goal is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda that provides for sustainable, self-renewing democratic governance. The Project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

The Project will be implemented by either a U.S. PVO, non-profit, or University through a Cooperative Agreement. The Cooperative Agreement Recipient will manage the Project through the Project Management Unit (PMU).

Project Components

Of the five components that comprise the DIG Project, four involve assistance to Rwandan institutions; the fifth, the USAID Project Support Fund, is designed to respond to "targets of opportunity" that may emerge in this rapidly evolving setting. The following four sections: 1) NGOs and the civil society; 2) local government; 3) the National Assembly; and, 4) the independent press, correspond to the four basic components which together define the DIG Project.

1. Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI)

This project component will enhance the role of citizen participation in promoting democratic governance in Rwanda by strengthening Rwandan NGOs as civil society instrumentalities engaged in civic education, information dissemination and political advocacy. This will be accomplished through assistance to establish a "Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives" (the Center or CCADI), a new ASBL "umbrella" organization made up of and serving NGOs, aimed at increasing NGO outreach to vulnerable and minority groups, particularly women, youth and the rural population in general. It is primarily here that the concepts of democracy and governance become practice. It is also at this interface that the components of the DIG Project are linked practically as well as conceptually.

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2. Local Government

The approach of the DIG project strategy for improving democratic governance at the local level is to build on the on-going donor efforts and the positive GOR initiatives that would mobilize citizens to take "ownership" of local government; to help MININTER assess the initiatives now in course and with local participation to develop a coherent and comprehensive framework for a more decentralized democratic order; to use training to encourage democratic pluralism and better local government; to build support for the formation of dynamic local public economies; and to foster inter-communal mechanisms for cooperative planning and action.

3. National Assembly

The DIG Project strategy is to help make the National Assembly become an effective vehicle by which the people, through their deputies, can influence the nation's agenda, hold administrative agencies to account, make their demands and grievances known, and state their preferences on remedies sought. It will do so by supporting those initiatives of the National Assembly's leadership that will enhance its capacity to perform its full role in the new democratic order. The evolving role of the Assembly in the new polity requires that the project retain flexibility so that it can respond to unfolding opportunity and need.

4. Rwandan Press Center

To help meet the immediate information needs of Rwanda's citizens, and to lay the basis for a dynamic, open and independent information regime over the longer term, the DIG project, through the establishment of the Rwandan Press Center, will concentrate on training and providing resources that print journalists need to do their jobs effectively and on the public policy changes needed to make public radio a better servant of this new democracy. Alternatively, private radio options will be examined.

Expected End of Project Status

By September, 1997, Project assistance is expected to have resulted in the following achievements:

- In the Civil Society:

  A diversity of independent free associations will be flourishing and contributing to the life of the nation;

  More community-level associations will be undertaking tasks of local self-governance in natural resource management and conservation, health, education, and social affairs;

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More joint efforts and cooperative relationships between commune officials and these active vectors of the civil society will be forming;

More women will be in leadership roles in local government and the status of women will have shown marked improvement as a result of on-going action on these fronts;

Association representations to deputies and committees of the National Assembly will be influencing public policy and legislation on judicial reform, civil rights, issues of social equity and other matters;

The NGO Support Center will continue to operate, under the management of its members, as a point of collaboration and mutual support in civic affairs;

An energetic free press, uncensored by government, will be providing more timely and reliable information and a broad variety of viewpoints on the social, political and economic life of the nation; and

The Rwandan Press Center will be operating through its own generated income, members dues and other donor support as a valued resource for professional training and services to the media.

- <u>In the Public Institutions Addressed</u>:

Local governments will assume a more important and responsive role in the lives of the Rwandan people;

The central government will have begun to devolve to the communes both authority and resources to fuel their capacities as engines of local development;

The quality of local government will have improved over earlier years as evidenced in citizen's observations and in their willingness to share in communal labor, pay their local taxes, and respond to the leadership of local officials. The officials of central government agencies will be providing guidance and support to local authorities while respecting their spheres of autonomy and independence; and

The National Assembly will be demonstrating its capability as a co-equal branch of government in law-making, in the oversight of public agencies, and in maintaining transparency and accountability in the government.

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Expected Project Outputs

Project outputs are as follows:

- A Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI) which will have:

  - An increased capacity within the NGO community to influence the legislative agenda as demonstrated by laws enacted which represent common NGO developed policy prepared and advocated by CCADI;

  - A significant decrease in the number of human and civil rights abuses by the military and law enforcement agencies as a result of NGO monitoring and reporting activities;

  - A significantly increased capacity by local organizations to influence local communal decision making as a result of CCADI member training and mobilization interventions;

  - A significantly increased management and technical capacity of NGO members of CCADI to initiate and sustain civic action and education activities at the national and local communal levels as measured by the number of NGOs providing such assistance;

  - A significant strengthening of the management and technical capacity of local, democratically-organized institutions to initiate and sustain civic action and education activities;

  - An increase in the number of Rwandans participating in communal-level decision making as measured by attendance at communal government meetings;

  - Increase in the numbers of minority, including women, candidates who stand for elections at both national and local levels;

  - An increase in the legitimacy of communal government as measured by an increase in tax revenues and voluntary labor;

  - Increased accountability of elected officials at both the local and national level as demonstrated by the lobbying, advocacy, and pressure of CCADI-supported NGOs and local organizations for complete disclosure of financial data related to revenue collection and public expenditures;

  - Increased responsiveness of public officials at the national and local levels to citizen requests for improved public services as demonstrated by the lobbying, advocacy and pressure of Center-supported NGOs for quality public services;

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- Decreased instances of corruption by government officials at national and local levels as a result of Center-supported NGOs monitoring executive, judicial and legislative actions and policy.

- Local Government support through the Ministry of Interior will have helped:

  - Candidates for local offices carry out responsible campaigns, respecting the rights of others and appealing to the higher values of their constituencies;

  - Elected officials base their concepts of local governance in citizens' interests with broad popular participation; respect the rights of the opposition; encourage diversity in the local public economy with NGOs and other groups;

  - Citizens show increased confidence in their communal governments, pay taxes, contribute labor, and support non-governmental groups as well as the commune in community action and development.

- National Assembly:

  - Functional and substantive independence from the strong executive as demonstrated by significant legislation initiated, responsible scrutiny and modification of executive initiated law and the public operational and investment budgets; and, by achieving financial and operational independence from the executive branch with separate budget, staff and administrative operations;

  - Efficient and effective internal parliamentary operations as demonstrated by an efficient organization of committees with staff research and analysis services; and, by the quality of law introduced and passed;

  - Relevance in its attention to constituent demands and to public policy as demonstrated in legislative action in many of the following areas: to improve the status and rights of women and marginal groups; to reform the inefficient judicial system and establish its independence from the executive power; to sustain a liberal economy and the free market system; to resolve national social problems, ethnic conflicts and refugee problems; to empower local governments and local groups and to support the civil society, basic civil rights, press freedom, free assembly, and the rights of minorities under majoritarian rule; and

  - Increased transparency and accountability in governance through its own openness in operations such as instituting public hearings on legislation, its oversight of government

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operations, its promotion of fiscal integrity in government agencies (auditing systems, fair competitive procurement procedures, etc.), and new means provided by deputies to be accessible to constituents.

- Independent Press

  - Rwandan journalists will have an operating center that is serving their needs for on-going professional development and will be using it to meet many of their operational needs in providing timely, reliable, and relevant information to a wide reading public;

  - Citizens are receiving accurate, timely, and comprehensive coverage that affords them open access to government policy debates, accounts of public officials performance, timely information on the economy, and opportune information for participation in the civil society and in the political life of the nation;

Financial Summary

9.8 mil

The total cost of this five-year project is estimated at $9 million. The Government of Rwanda will not be required to contribute the usual 25 percent toward the total Project cost. However, the GOR and local NGO institutions who benefit from the project's activities will have to contribute a share of the cost of their activities. The GOR institutions will contribute 25 percent of the total activity's cost and the NGOs will contribute on a sliding scale as they are being created with A.I.D. support.

Based on the illustrative project budget summarized below, it is expected that USAID monies of US$ 9.0 million will be matched by up to the equivalent of US$~~1,002,029~~ from the four participating institutions detailed above. 642,000 [illegible]

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ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT BUDGET AND MATCHING CONTRIBUTIONS, IN US$ MILLIONS

Component	USAID Contribution	GOR Contribution	NGO Contribution	TOTAL PROJECT
Cooperative Agreement (CA) Project Management Unit (PMU), and Local and International Consultants (a)	2,612,943	0	0	2,612,943
CA Project Components	3,869,094	480,254	361,689	4,711,037
CCADI (b)	1,361,937	0	212,195	1,574,132
CPR (c)	586,140	0	149,494	735,634
National Assembly (d)	968,065	242,016	0	1,210,081
MININTER (d)	952,952	238,238	0	1,191,190
Audits, Unallocated Costs, Contingency for CA	1,017,964	0	0	1,017,964
Support Fund, Evaluations, Audits, Contingency	1,500,000	0	0	1,500,000
TOTALS	9,000,000	480,254	361,689	9,841,943

(a) This amount funds the two long term Technical Assistance, all the local-hire staff working the PMU, the supplies and equipment for the PMU, as well as training and short-term technical assistance consultants.
(b) Of the component's total cost, the CCADI will contribute 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% in Years 2,3,4, and 5 of the Project.
(c) Of the component's total cost, the RPC will contribute 10%, 25%, 50% and 50% in Years 2,3,4 and 5 of the Project.
(d) Of the component's total cost, the GOR will contribute 25%.

Socio-Economic, Technical and Environmental Description

The Project Paper demonstrates that the project is (1) technically, socially, environmentally, and economically sound and administratively feasible; (2) the technical design and cost estimates are reasonable and adequately planned, thereby satisfying the requirements of Section 611 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended; (3) the timing and funding of project activities are appropriately scheduled and the implementation plan is realistic and establishes a reasonable time frame for carrying out the project; (4) adequate provision has been made for evaluation and audits; (5) the economic analysis provides a cost effectiveness analysis which shows that increased efficiencies during the life of the project are expected to increase by the end of the project; and, (6) the financial plans developed for the project are adequate to ensure proper implementation to meet the requirements of the FAA Section 611 (a).

Conditions Precedent

The Project Agreement shall include the following condition:

- Prior to the first disbursement under the Grant, or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which such

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disbursement will be made, the Grantee will, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D. in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D.:

(a) A statement of the names of the persons holding or acting in the office of the Grantee specified in Section 8.2. and of any additional representatives, together with a specimen signature of each person specified in such statement; and

(b) A document acceptable to A.I.D. that designates by name the person at the Ministry of Plan who will serve as the MINIPLAN Project Coordinator and Chair of the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee.

Covenants

The Project Agreement will have the following covenants, as detailed below:

A. The Parties agree to establish an evaluation program as part of the Project. Except as the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the program will include, during the implementation of the Project and at one or more points thereafter:

(i) a base-line survey that documents the state of democratic practice and citizen engagement/benefits in national and communal civic life (This survey will be used in monitoring the progress of the project components and in the final evaluation of project impact as indicated in the following.);

(ii) evaluation of progress towards attainment of the objectives of the Project;

(iii) identification and evaluation of problem areas or constraints which may inhibit such attainment;

(iv) assessment of how such information may be used to help overcome such problems; and

(v) evaluation, to the degree feasible, of the overall development impact of the Project.

B. The Grantee covenants that none of the funds made available under this Grant may be used to finance any costs relating to the campaign for public office of any one individual or any one political party in exclusion of others. The principles of open, equal access regardless of party affiliation shall be practiced in all training, technical assistance and other services provided under the Grant during any electoral period.

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C. The Grantee covenants that none of the funds made available under this Grant may be used to finance costs related to training or counselling of police, military, or para-military personnel.

D. The Grantee covenants to designate by name the following individuals as soon as possible after the signing of the Agreement:

(i) at the Ministry of Interior the person who will coordinate activities under the project to promote local government development;

(ii) at the Ministry of Family Affairs and the Promotion of Women the person who will coordinate activities under the project to assist that ministry in the formulation of policy and programs;

(iii) the person who will serve as coordinator of assistance to pre-election planning and programming and election administration; and,

(iv) in agreement with the officers of the National Assembly and by their determination and certification, the person who will serve as the National Assembly project component manager.

E. The Grantee covenants to facilitate the legal recognition of the two new Associations Sans But Lucratif (ASBLs) identified in Annex 1 of the Project Agreement as sub-grantees under the project.

F. The Grantee covenants to accord to the officers of the National Assembly (NA) timely support to their program of legislative strengthening and to honor their program for staff development involving statutory and contract employees of the Ministry of Civil Service on assignment to the NA, thus acknowledging the NA as a direct beneficiary under this project.

G. The Grantee covenants to convene a meeting of the DIG Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee at least once each three months or upon the request of the USAID Project Officer designated by the USAID Mission Director or upon the request of the PMU Chief of Party. That Committee, as indicated in Annex 1, will be composed of the Grantee's designated project coordinator, the USAID representative and the PMU representative.

H. The Grantee further covenants that to encourage sustainable NGO operations, membership dues and fees for services rendered by the new ASBLs to their members and other reasonable measures for income generation, so long as they do not profit any individual and are used solely for the programs of these agencies, shall not jeopardize their status as ASBLs under Rwandan law.

Procurement Under the DFA

The funding source for this project is DFA. Although DFA gives Missions flexibility to purchase commodities from Geographic Code 935 countries without obtaining a waiver, this project is designed to maximize purchases from the USA, whenever possible, and to comply with the intent of the DFA.

Responsible Officer

The Officer in USAID/Rwanda responsible for the project is the Program Officer. The responsible officer in AID/W is the Rwanda Desk Officer in AFR/EA.

Project Review

The Project Review Committee reviewed the project paper on September 15, 1992, and recommended approval.

Notification to Congress

A Congressional Notification (CN) was submitted on June 29, 1992, and expired on July 14, 1992, per State (92) 234399, Project Paper Annex L.

Human Rights

There are no outstanding human rights issues with respect to the U.S. bilateral assistance program to Rwanda.

Recommendation

That you sign below and the attached Project Authorization and thereby approve the life-of-project funding of $9 million grant funds for the Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project and the initial obligation of $4.7 million in FY 1992, subject to the availability of funds.

APPROVED _____
Dirk W. Dijkerman
Acting USAID Director

DISAPPROVED _____

DATE 9/18/92

Attachments:
(1) Project Authorization
(2) Project Paper

Cleared: PRM:LDouris (Draft) Date: 9/15/92
PRM:BJoergensen: Date: 9/18/92
CONT:GHemphill: Date: 9/18/92

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PROJECT AUTHORIZATION

Name of Country: Rwanda

Name of Project: Democratic Initiatives and Governance

Number of Project: 696-0133

1. Pursuant to Section 496 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby authorize the Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project for Rwanda ("the Cooperating Country") involving planned obligations of not to exceed Nine Million United States Dollars ($9,000,000) in grant funds over a five-year period from the date of authorization, subject to the availability of funds in accordance with the A.I.D. OYB/allotment process, to help in financing foreign exchange and local currency costs for the Project. The planned life of the Project is five years from the date of initial obligation.

2. The goal of the Project is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda that provides for sustainable, self-renewing democratic government. The Project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

3. The Project will work through a Cooperative Agreement with either a U.S. PVO or University to help Rwanda's citizens build their civil society. There will be five components that comprise the DIG Project, four involve assistance to Rwandan institutions: (1) a center to support NGO democratic education activities; (2) the National Assembly; (3) a center for press; (4) and the Ministry of Interior to help with studies and training. The fifth component is a Project Support Fund managed by USAID, whose purpose is to respond to "targets of opportunity" that may emerge in this rapidly evolving setting.

4. The Project Agreement which may be negotiated and executed by the officer to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with A.I.D. Regulations and Delegations of Authority, is subject to the following essential terms, covenants, and major conditions, together with such other terms and conditions as A.I.D. may deem appropriate.

5. <u>Source and Origin of Commodities, Nationality of Services</u>

Except as A.I.D. may otherwise agree in writing, disbursements will be used to:

(a) finance the costs of goods and services required for the project having, with respect to goods, their source and origin, and with respect to suppliers of goods and services, their

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nationality in Code 935 of the A.I.D. Geographic Code Book as in effect at the time orders are placed or contracts entered into for such goods or services, except as provided in the Project Grant Standard Provisions Annex, Section C1(b) with respect to marine insurance ("Foreign Exchange Costs"). All reasonable efforts will be made to maximize U.S. procurement whenever practicable. Air travel and transportation to and from the U.S. shall be upon certified U.S. flag carriers to the extent possible.

(b) finance ocean transportation costs under the Grant only on vessels under flag register of the countries included in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935 and the cooperating country, except as A.I.D. may otherwise agree in writing. This requirement is subject, however, to the 50-50 shipping requirement of the U.S. Cargo Preference Act and to regulations promulgated thereunder which apply to the ocean freight furnished by A.I.D. without regard to whether the shipping itself is so financed.

6. <u>Conditions Precedent to Disbursement</u>

The Project Agreement shall include, in substance, the following condition:

> Prior to the first disbursement under the Grant, or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which such disbursement will be made, the Grantee will, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D. in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D.:
>
> (a) A statement of the names of the persons holding or acting in the office of the Grantee specified in Section 8.2. of the Project Agreement and of any additional representatives, together with a specimen signature of each person specified in such statement; and
>
> (b) A document acceptable to A.I.D. that designates by name the person at the Ministry of Plan who will serve as the MINIPLAN Project Coordinator and Chair of the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee.

7. <u>Covenants</u>

The Project Agreement will have seven covenants, as detailed below:

A. The Parties agree to establish an evaluation program as part of the Project. Except as the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the program will include, during the implementation of the Project and at one or more points thereafter:

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(i) a base-line survey that documents the state of democratic practice and citizen engagement/benefits in national and communal civic life (This survey will be used in monitoring the progress of the project components and in the final evaluation of project impact as indicated in the following.);

(ii) evaluation of progress towards attainment of the objectives of the Project;

(iii) identification and evaluation of problem areas or constraints which may inhibit such attainment;

(iv) assessment of how such information may be used to help overcome such problems; and

(v) evaluation, to the degree feasible, of the overall development impact of the Project.

B. The Grantee covenants that none of the funds made available under this Grant may be used to finance any costs relating directly to the campaign for public office. The principles of open, equal access regardless of party affiliation shall be practiced in all training, technical assistance and other services provided under the Grant during any electoral period.

C. The Grantee covenants that none of the funds made available under this Grant may be used to finance costs related to training or counselling of police, military, or para-military personnel.

D. The Grantee covenants to designate by name the following individuals as soon as possible after the signing of the Agreement:

(i) at the Ministry of Interior the person who will coordinate activities under the project to promote local government development;

(ii) at the Ministry of Family Affairs and the Promotion of Women the person who will coordinate activities under the project to assist that ministry in the formulation of policy and programs;

(iii) the person who will serve as coordinator of assistance to pre-election planning and programming and election administration; and,

(iv) in agreement with the officers of the National Assembly and by their determination and certification, the

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person who will serve as the National Assembly project component manager.

E. The Grantee covenants to facilitate the legal recognition of the two new Associations Sans But Lucratif (ASBLs) identified in Annex 1 of the Project Agreement as sub-grantees under the project.

F. The Grantee further covenants that to encourage sustainable NGO operations, membership dues and fees for services rendered by the new ASBLs to their members and other reasonable measures for income generation, so long as they do not profit any individual and are used solely for the programs of these agencies, shall not jeopardize their status as ASBLs under Rwandan law.

G. The Grantee covenants to accord to the officers of the National Assembly (NA) timely support to their program of legislative strengthening and to honor their program for staff development involving statutory ("direct-hire") and contract employees of the Ministry of Civil Service on assignment to the NA, thus acknowledging the NA as a direct beneficiary under this project.

H. The Grantee covenants to convene a meeting of the DIG Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee at least once each three months or upon the request of the USAID Project Officer designated by the USAID Mission Director or upon the request of the Project Management Unit (PMU) Chief of Party. That Committee, as indicated in Annex 1, will be composed of the Grantee's designated project coordinator, the USAID representative and the PMU representative.

8. <u>Gray Amendment</u>

The Project will, whenever feasible, utilize contracts with small business concerns, small disadvantaged business concerns, and women-owned small business concerns.

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9. Host Country Government's 25 Percent Contribution

The Assistant Administrator for Africa approved a waiver of the requirement of Section 110 of the FAA for a Host Country contribution of at least 25 percent of project costs on September 11, 1992. A copy of the approved waiver is attached to the Project Paper as Annex E.

Dirk W. Dijkerman
USAID/Rwanda
Acting Mission Director

Date 9/18/92

Cleared:PRM:LDouris: (Draft) Date: 9/15/92
PRM:BJoergensen: Date: 9/15/92
CONT:GHemphill: Date: 9/16/92
PDO:CCantell: Date: 9/15/92

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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT DATA SHEET

1. TRANSACTION CODE: A (A = Add, C = Change, D = Delete) — Amendment Number: _____

DOCUMENT CODE: 3

2. COUNTRY/ENTITY: RWANDA

3. PROJECT NUMBER: 696-0133

4. BUREAU/OFFICE: AFR — 06

5. PROJECT TITLE (maximum 40 characters): Democratic Initiatives&Governance

6. PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION DATE (PACD): MM 09 DD _ YY 97

7. ESTIMATED DATE OF OBLIGATION (Under 'B.' below, enter 1, 2, 3, or 4)
A. Initial FY 92 B. Quarter 4 C. Final FY 96

8. COSTS ($000 OR EQUIVALENT $1 =)

A. FUNDING SOURCE	FIRST FY 92 B. FX	C. L/C	D. Total	LIFE OF PROJECT E. FX	F. L/C	G. Total
AID Appropriated Total	4,000	700	4,700	9,000		9,000
(Grant)	(4,000)	(700)	(4,700)	(9,000)	( )	(9,000)
(Loan)	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
Other U.S. 1.						
Other U.S. 2.						
Host Country		-0-			640	640
Other Donor(s) CCADI, RPC		-0-			362	362
TOTALS	4,000	700	4,700	9,000	1,002	10,002

9. SCHEDULE OF AID FUNDING ($000)

A. APPROPRIATION	B. PRIMARY PURPOSE CODE	C. PRIMARY TECH. CODE 1. Grant	2. Loan	D. OBLIGATIONS TO DATE 1. Grant	2. Loan	E. AMOUNT APPROVED THIS ACTION 1. Grant	2. Loan	F. LIFE OF PROJECT 1. Grant	2. Loan
(1)									
(2)									
(3)									
(4)									
TOTALS									

10. SECONDARY TECHNICAL CODES (maximum 6 codes of 3 positions each)

11. SECONDARY PURPOSE CODE

12. SPECIAL CONCERNS CODES (maximum 7 codes of 4 positions each)
A. Code
B. Amount

13. PROJECT PURPOSE (maximum 480 characters)

To facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

14. SCHEDULED EVALUATIONS
Interim MM 01 YY 95 MM 06 YY 96 Final MM 06 YY 97

15. SOURCE/ORIGIN OF GOODS AND SERVICES
☐ 000 ☐ 941 ☐ Local ☒ Other (Specify) 935

16. AMENDMENTS/NATURE OF CHANGE PROPOSED (This is page 1 of a ____ page PP Amendment.)

Greg Hemphill, USAID/R CONTROLLER

17. APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: Dirk W. Dijkerman, Acting Director, USAID/Rwanda
Date Signed: MM 09 DD 18 YY 92

18. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED IN AID/W, OR FOR AID/W DOCUMENTS, DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
MM DD YY

AID 1330-4 (8-79)

I. PROJECT SETTING AND CONTEXT

A. Project Setting

Over the last two years, beleaguered by war and persistent economic recession, Rwanda has continued to move forward with a tandem reform program to liberalize and restructure its economy and to democratize its political order. It has appealed to the international donors for assistance in both realms. The World Bank and the IMF began in 1990 to assist with a structural adjustment program and the Government of Rwanda (GOR) has begun to adopt measures to reduce the role of the state in the economy, restrain public expenditure and encourage private initiative in a market economy. In April 1992, a multi-party transitional government was formed to guide the nation toward elections and democratic pluralism after years of one-party rule. So far the donors have provided limited and selective assistance to aid with the political reform agenda: Germany and Canada on the electoral law; the UNDP on election planning; the Swiss and the US on free press; and German foundations and USAID on private associations in civic action to name a few. This project will afford the US with a strategy and the means to focus its assistance on selective areas of the political reform process over the next five years. The heart of the strategy is citizen education, mobilization and participation in the political process. It takes into account the role of other donors as well as the need for great flexibility in a constantly changing environment.

The government's approach to political liberalization was recently summarized in a official paper on the Socio-Political Situation in Rwanda. The Minister of Plan presented the document on July 2 and 3, 1992, at the formal round-table held in Geneva to discuss Rwanda's medium-term investment plan and economic prospects. It gives a reasoned perspective on the key events in Rwanda's political history and their import as the nation moves toward a new era of political maturity. Drawing from it, the setting and context for USAID/Rwanda's Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project can be briefly framed.

The Minister describes the feudal order under the Tutsi monarchy through the German (1890-1916) and Belgian (1917-61) colonial periods until the monarchy was overthrown by the Hutu majority in the violent 1959 revolution. He argues that Rwanda's democratic heritage was born in those transforming years (1957-61) as governing power was passed from the Tutsi minority to the Hutu majority, albeit at considerable social cost. Several political parties briefly flourished in those transitional years, playing their roles in the electoral processes that ended in abolishing the monarchy, forming a presidential regime and confirming the popular demand for an end to colonial rule. The experience with the local and national elections in 1960 and 1961 shaped the republican form of government taken at independence in 1962. The Minister explains that the First Republic, 1962-72, neglected this democratic heritage with its de facto "monopartyism" leading to a bloodless "Moral Revolution," by the armed forces. In July 1973, President Juvenal Habyarimana took power and launched the Second Republic under a single legalized governing party, the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND).

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Now, after 30 years, world and regional events present new opportunities for a return to Rwanda's brief democratic experience. This "political up-dating" (aggiornamento politique) began on January 15, 1989 with President Habyarimana's presentation of the government's program calling for "political correction." Momentum began to build only after July 1990, when the president opened a "national debate" on political liberalization and multipartyism. This led to the formation of a "National Commission of Synthesis" which prepared a liberalized "political charter," which was submitted to the comment of a wide spectrum of public opinion. The Commission then drew up a new constitution - shaped by gathered consensus. Undaunted by the outbreak of war in October 1990, the National Assembly adopted a revised version of this constitution on June 10, 1991.

A new law on political parties followed a week later. Since then 16 parties have been registered. At the same time new private journals have begun to spring up, contributing to the democratic opening and widening popular participation in political life. With help from a German electoral expert financed by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation a draft election law was prepared to allow for multiple parties and a system of proportional representation. After review by the parties, it was reexamined by a Canadian expert who recommended certain revisions aimed at providing for an independent electoral administration mechanism that could assure greater transparency and efficiency to the entire electoral process. This is now under consideration by the government. Meanwhile, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been officially requested to coordinate and mobilize donor assistance for these coming elections, which have been tentatively targeted for early to mid-1993.

To explain the outbreak of war, the Minister analyzes the historical problem of Rwanda's refugees arising from the Tutsi-Hutu cleavage in Rwandan society. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), there are some 450,000 Rwandan Tutsi refugees in neighboring Burundi, Zaire and Uganda. (Other sources estimate the number may be as high as 700,000.) The vast majority fled during the Hutu revolution of 1959. Over the years, efforts at repatriation have been unsuccessful. Ultimately this led to the October 1990 invasion of northern Rwanda by the mostly Tutsi forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RFP). Armed forces numbering from 4,000 to 7,000, many former soldiers of the Ugandan army, occupied several rural villages. Since then, between 250,000 and 350,000 people, mostly agro-pastoral Hutu families, have been displaced from their homes. Tens of thousands are without shelter and means of livelihood. The International Red Cross and a number of donors, including the United States, are engaged in a relief effort to mitigate their hunger, lack of shelter and exposure to disease. In the wake of war, domestic insecurity and lawlessness have plagued parts of the country. Incidents of civil disorder and violations of human rights by some zealous officials have occurred. Following the invasion, numerous citizens were incarcerated as a security measure. Since then, an official amnesty has been proclaimed and detained persons released. The war did not stop, however, in spite of international efforts at meditation. After months of intermittent conflict and a military stalemate between the forces of the RFP and the Rwandan army, a negotiated truce was concluded and took effect on August 1, 1992. At this writing the truce holds. Negotiations

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between the government and the RFP are expected to continue for weeks or even months until agreement is reached and a political modus vivendi is found.

In spite of the war, the "political updating" initiated in 1990 has continued. The president rejected calls for a sovereign national conference, arguing that the framework of the new constitution of 1991 should be respected. He conceded, however, that until elections could be held to bring it into full force and effect --- following peace and an inter-party agreement on the electoral law with its calendar and its provision for independent administrative machinery --- some form of multi-party power sharing in governance would be acceptable. After months of negotiation, in April 1992 the multiparty transitional government was put in place. The president remains as the Chief of State and principal executive. Public administration is now headed by a Prime Minister of the opposition Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) - who was named by the president. "The Government" is composed of 9 ministers of the president's MRND party and 10 from four "opposition" parties. There are three ministers from each of the MDR, the Parti Social Democrate and the Parti Liberal with one ministry held by the Parti Democrate Cretien. This transitional government has taken on the charges to negotiate the peace; to assure the nation's security; to evaluate and clean up ("assainir") all levels of public administration including communal government; to reinvigorate the economy under the structural adjustment program; "to organize a national debate to decide if a 'National Conference' should be convoked"; to resolve the refugee problem; and, to organize general elections.

Concluding his presentation in Geneva, the Minister of Plan appealed to all of Rwanda's neighbors to cooperate in shaping a new order of peace and mutual understanding. He appealed to the donors to assist with Rwanda's social and economic development agenda and to cooperate in furthering its democratic political renewal.

The official view presented in Geneva presents the new liberalization of the political order as an "up-dating" --- a return to known democratic practices. In so doing there is the danger of minimizing the serious social and political re-education task that lies ahead. Those two or three years of experimental multi-party politics in 1958-61 did not shape a national democratic culture. A century of monarchy, reinforced by a colonial paternalism, deeply imprinted social practice. The thirty years of state-centric, authoritarian, one-party rule that followed after independence allowed for little change in the civic culture. The heartening fact is that in spite of this heritage a new social dynamic is clearly emerging. Herein lies the promise for building Rwanda's new civic culture based on citizen activism in the civil society.

The foundation for this optimism lies in the significant and very rapid increase in professional, civic and other private associations during these years of fast-moving change. Five human rights organizations have formed and are actively monitoring alleged civil rights violations by the security apparatus. Women's associations are extending their activism to aggressively shape the national debate on female legal rights, equity in family law, and the woman's role in the political order. More traditional NGOs - cooperatives, labor

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organizations, professional associations - are engaging in civic education for their membership. The non-state publics in Rwanda are finding their voices. With the blossoming of a diverse and increasingly free press, a civil society composed of these non-state publics is emerging.

Furthermore, in the rural communes, the political opening and flourishing multipartyism are precipitating major change. In protest against their Burgomasters --- the centrally appointed head of the commune government --- people are refusing to pay taxes or to do their customary day-per-month of civic labor on public projects. In some communes, Burgomasters have been locked out of their offices. The transitional national government has changed 5 out of the 11 Prefects to include persons from the parties recently seated in government. In turn Burgomasters are being replaced to restore order and popular confidence until local elections can be held. Reform laws to strengthen local government are currently under consideration.

The people of Rwanda are engaged in a daunting task. Their leadership has chosen a course of political and economic reform that per force must alter long-standing patterns of social practice. Peace cannot be had without ethnic reconciliation. Economic recovery cannot be had without profoundly redefining the role of the state and energizing hundreds of new private ventures and communal initiatives. Political democracy cannot be realized without the willing and wise participation of the people in new, more apt institutional relationships. Yet the conviction that all of this is not only possible but necessary is evident in the fact that Rwanda, for two grinding years, has stayed the course. USAID's DIG Project is a response to an historic opportunity. Joined with the aid of other donors, this remarkable enterprise has more than a modest chance of success.

B. Conformity with Government of Rwanda (GOR) Strategy

With the establishment of the multiparty transitional government in April of 1992, the Habyarimana regime unmistakably confirmed the commitment that it had made nearly two years earlier to a systematic program of political liberalization. Power-sharing is real and substantive among the parties as reflected in the authoritative way the new ministers are taking control of personnel appointments and programs in their sectors. This power-sharing is fairly rapidly being extended from the national to the provincial level with the appointment of new Prefets and to the commune level with new Burgomasters.

Clearly, the GOR's strategy is to effect a form of representational, democratic rule during the transition to an elected government. It is working. Negotiations with the RPF are going forward and are expected to yield another power-sharing agreement which, by the end of the year, will include all sides in the government. Then decisions can be made on the administration of national elections and the electoral calendar.

Piece by piece the process has unfolded over the last two years in spite of war and economic difficulty. There is little doubt that the request for donor financial and technical help is

genuine. The government is anxious that the UNDP coordinate a plan with firm donor commitments that will assure the means for carrying out the pending elections as well as the means for assuring a fair and impartial result.

The assistance that is outlined in the following sections of this Project Paper has been vetted with GOR officials. They assure that it is consistent with and fully supportive of the government's overall democratization strategy. They welcome the emphasis on building broad citizen participation in the civil society and the role that non-governmental organizations can play in that process. The current policy environment encourages free association and the process of civic education. They also welcome assistance to the independent press, noting the importance of training and the value that the government places on responsible journalism and reliable reporting on the fast-unfolding events in national life. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINAFFET), in a letter to the US Ambassador in December 1991, specifically mentioned the need for assistance to the national parliament as well as assistance to the Ministry of Interior (MININTER) to further the government's policy of decentralization and strengthening local authorities. On August 6, this fit between the DIG Project and the GOR's strategy was warmly reconfirmed by a senior officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation following a USAID/PP design team briefing on its contents. Finally, on August 10, the government, in a meeting with senior staff of the Ministry of Plan (MINIPLAN) and MINAFFET, reaffirmed this support for this program to the Mission Director.

C. Conformity with Congressional Mandates and Africa Bureau Strategy

The USAID/Rwanda Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project (DIG) is perhaps one of the best examples of first generation Democracy/Governance (D/G) activities to arise out of and be designed under the Africa Bureau's Democracy and Governance Program. It operationalizes, under one project, a number of strategies and concepts of governance and democracy which have been recently developed for and promoted by the Bureau[1]. At the same time, the project is consistent with, and, indeed, promotes Congressional mandates as detailed in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), and, specifically, Development Fund for Africa (DFA) Legislation (Section 496); DFA-enhancing legislation Sections 102(a) and 281(a) promoting inter-alia broad-based participation, decentralization and equity; and FAA Section 116(e), Human Rights, under which the DIG Project is jointly authorized with Section 496.

The fundamental issue addressed by the D/G Program, and to which the DIG Project responds, is the relationship between sustainable long-term economic development, the purpose of DFA legislation, and the concept of "democratic governance." Simply put, the achievement of economic growth is most likely to occur in an "enabling environment" which

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1 See, "The Concept of Governance and its Implications for A.I.D.'s Development Assistance Program in Africa," Prepared for the A.I.D. Africa Bureau under the Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance Program, Associates in Rural Development, June 1992.

promotes a free market in parallel with democratic values, process and structure and practices of "good governance" (e.g., transparency, accountability and responsiveness). The underlying notion of democratic governance is that of broadly shared responsibility in the governance of a country's affairs. The promotion of a "Civil Society"[2] made up of individuals acting through their institutions, themselves outside of the formal organs of government, provide "countervailing" centers of power to those state institutions.

Strengthening civil society institutions (CSI), then, increases the number of centers of decision making within a country and ultimately has the effect of broadening the base of participation by the governed in political, social and economic affairs. There is, thus, a far greater likelihood that outcomes favorable to these groups will result from this broadened decision-making process than through one which is primarily restricted to state-affiliated institutions. Non-governmental organizations (NGO), in particular, among CSIs, are important as representatives and advocates of their client-member interests, but within the framework of democratic governance they are also subject to acting as responsive, transparent and accountable members of an expanded decision-making structure. In this role, they are equally obliged to increase the understanding of their members in terms of their obligations, as well as their rights, as citizens in a democratic polity.

The purpose of the DIG Project is "to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out." Only a few years ago, broadening popular participation would have been discussed in "developmental" not "political" terms and the role of civil society institutions would have been defined in relation to mechanisms used to channel and articulate popular participation in areas of development planning, implementation and evaluation. Today, however, democracy has become a valued good in its own right, and increased participation in the political process as a condition of democratic pluralism. Setting the two objectives against one another is a spurious intellectual enterprise. A stable democratic system based on the rule of law, capable of adjudicating in a fair and transparent manner between competing economic interests, in which the governed and governors have agreed upon the terms and conditions of their relationship, is a necessary condition for long-term, sustainable economic development.

U.S. foreign policy, as a general principle, promotes democracy everywhere. The Foreign Assistance Act, and its several amendments, including DFA legislation, mandate support to long-term sustainable economic growth. It is Africa Bureau's Democracy and Governance Program which conceptually links the two policies, and USAID/Rwanda's Democratic

2 The relevant literature on democracy and governance tends to be less than precise in defining the concept of civil society. The tendency has been to discuss it in terms of what it is not, i.e., the non-state public, rather than what it is. In this Project Paper, civil society refers to the full range of actors, both individuals and their democratically-organized institutions, which contributes to democratic governance from without not with the institutions of government, i.e., the executive, judiciary or legislature. Civil society reflecting this concept in the affirmative can be considered to include the institutions of the independent press, the for-profit private sector, the church and the generic category commonly referred to as non-governmental organizations.

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Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project which will proposes to be a concrete as well as a measurable demonstration of these policies and concepts during its execution.

D. Conformity of Project to USAID/Rwanda Program Strategy

Initial design steps of the DIG Project chronologically paralleled and contributed to the development of USAID/Rwanda's newly approved Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP). In formulating the overall program goal of **Increasing Participatory Economic Growth**, the Mission made the decision to explicitly link political liberalization and movement towards democratic pluralism with economic reform as an essential component of its program strategy. As a result, **improving democratic governance** was designated as a CPSP subgoal, equating it with **decreasing population growth rate** and **increasing real incomes in the private sector**, thus indicating its importance in the achievement of participatory economic growth. In short, support for the process of Rwandan democratization and governance was considered too important to the success of this new country program strategy to be relegated to the status of an "assumption" in a future project logframe.

The new CPSP also signifies a break with past USAID development assistance to Rwanda. The traditional program focus on agriculture production no longer seemed to offer a realistic strategy for dealing with the unprecedented problems --- and historic opportunities --- facing this country; nor did they build on the comparative advantage which USAID, among other international donors, brought to this unique setting. In looking to the "twenty-first century," and the set of constraints that has defined its parameters of action, the Mission chose a strategy that has placed increased emphasis on private sector development and the nascent entrepreneurism of the Rwandan people. Building on the GOR's implementation of a major structural adjustment program (SAP) and far-reaching economic reforms, the DIG Project supports corresponding GOR moves towards political pluralism, itself an indication of the government's understanding of the inextricable linkage between economic and political policy reforms in creating an enabling environment for individual initiative and broad-based sustainable economic development.

The DIG Project is the principal vehicle through which the Mission will attain its second strategic objective: **Increasing the Accountability of Government on Economic and Social Policies.** It will directly complement and reinforce other Mission-funded project and non-project assistance (NPA) activities designed to strengthen Rwanda's emerging private sector. One of three new projects currently in design under the new CPSP, DIG will directly complement the PVO Support Project which is to be the principal project assistance effort geared towards "increasing real incomes in the private sector." Both projects build on a successful but limited history of USAID involvement with Rwandan NGOs. Specifically, the DIG Project looks to Rwandan NGOs to play the principal role in the promotion of an enhanced "civil society" in which the governed have the opportunity to engage their government, at the local and national levels, in the evolving process of governance and democratization. After decades, if not centuries, of authoritarian rule and dirigiste policies that limited citizen involvement in state affairs, Rwanda needs to create a political culture

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which promotes and reinforces individual, particularly women's, rights and social responsibility. A major role, therefore, of NGOs in the promotion of a civil society will be the provision of civic information and education services to their members to initiate the social learning process which must take place to shape this new culture and its citizens.

With a newly independent and strengthened press (also a subject of DIG Project assistance), NGOs and democratically-organized local institutions, they can help ensure that government remains responsive, transparent and accountable to its citizens in the exercise of its authority. In this regard the project will provide additional support to the NGO community in Rwanda in order to reinforce its diverse and pluralistic character and to ensure that its individual members demonstrate in their actions the democratic values and good governance they are being assisted to promote. In a similar vein, there will be situations when individual NGOs should consider joining together in a coherent movement of advocates for greater civil involvement in public affairs, oversight of state institutions, and adherence to the rule of law in a pluralistic society. NGOs, in their role as civil society institutions, will serve as intermediaries between their members and state institutions in defining the new social contract, especially in lobbying the National Assembly for legislative action. The political and social structures and processes arrived at in this collaborative effort will provide the context in which economic development takes place. Thus, the proposed project contributes directly to an enabling environment for the success of other elements of the USAID/Rwanda program.

E. Relation of Project to USG Interests in Rwanda

The DIG Project supports overall United States Government (USG) interests in Rwanda defined by the Post Democracy Coordinating Committee (i.e., Embassy, USIS, USAID, Peace Corps) as the following four policy components 1) supporting the democratic process; 2) supporting economic development and structural adjustment; 3) ending the war between the GOR and the rebels in the north; and 4) encouraging respect for human rights and a solution to the regional refugee problems. In this regard, the project will build upon previous USAID-funding of a number of USIS-organized and Embassy supported-programs for National Assembly staff and journalists of the emerging free press. It will also reinforce several complementary initiatives such as the new A.I.D. centrally-funded Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) Project and Section 116(e) funded activities jointly programmed with the Embassy. DIG thus offers all U.S. agencies working to support Rwandan progress in political and economic reform a focal point for their individual activities.

F. Relation of Project to Other Donor Activities

International donors have sustained a long-term commitment to Rwanda's social and economic development. In 1989, total foreign aid amounted to $285 million or 11.4 percent of GDP. Of this total 35 percent came from multilateral sources, 49 percent from bilateral and 16 percent from non-governmental organizations. Under the lead of the World Bank and the IMF, donors are supporting a broad program of structural adjustment and economic

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liberalization. At the same time, they have used their considerable influence to encourage the regime to move forward with political liberalization. In various ways, they are supporting the transition to full democracy.

The approach of the USG in the area of democracy and governance is consistent with our approach in other sectors. We encourage other donors to take the lead, and provide support where appropriate. Clearly, in the justice sector, the Belgians and French, and, to a lesser extent, the Canadians and Germans are more familiar with Rwandan practice within the traditions of the civil law and the Napoleonic Code. The French are assisting with improving the administration of justice and the Belgians in law enforcement training. The Canadians and Germans have assisted with recent revisions of the electoral code and the law on multiple parties. For some time, the Germans, through the Adenauer Foundation, have provided training for commune officials and recently financed a local government study by the University of Rwanda's Superior Institute of Public Administration (ISAP). The UNDP has assisted in drafting reform legislation to reorganize communal government and is working on general public administration reform.

USIS has collaborated with the Neumann Foundation and the Swiss, as well as the French and Belgians, in support to the nascent free press through training and workshops. Several donors have for years worked with local NGOs: cooperatives, communal self-help groups, and others. None has focused directly, as in this project, on the NGO role in civic action and general political development.

In the arena of national elections, the donors have agreed with the GOR that the UNDP is best positioned to coordinate all donor assistance to this vital undertaking. Although the project itself does not fund elections assistance, the US Mission and AID will draw upon the AREAF to provide substantial US support as the electoral process moves forward. In late 1991 the US Ambassador invited his colleagues to a joint discussion of what each might do -- not only for elections but in support to the general movement toward democratic practice. Since then the process of consultation on these questions has been continued by the Belgian Ambassador. There is a clear consensus that the donors will share costs, not only of the elections, but also in the general domain of political reform. They are agreed that informal consultations will continue. As this project was designed, the donors were consulted in substantial detail. The means of coordinated action in each of the initiatives were discussed with them. In each area the USAID approach was welcomed as a needed and valued contribution. As the project is implemented, the Institutional Project Manager (IPM) and the technical advisors who work within the project components will liaise with relevant donors. Members of the US Country Team, through the Post Democracy Coordinating Committee and the USAID Mission Director, will keep the IPM informed of any new donor policies relating to the democratization process that could affect the project. By emphasizing the comparative advantage of each donor in Rwanda within an ongoing process of collaboration and flexible response, a multi-donor effort will be sustained to support and institutionalize democratic governance.

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II. PROJECT RATIONALE

A. Opportunities Addressed and Constraints

Since President Habyarimana announced the regime's new policy of political liberalization there has been a veritable explosion of social activity to participate in the process. Five new human rights organizations formed and registered themselves under the law of private associations. In 1990 and 1991 some 60 new weekly or bi-weekly journals began to publish. New associations of professionals, women, laborers, peasants, and journalists have formed and have gained legal recognition. Sixteen parties are now registered under the new law on political organization and are actively organizing. Communes are rising up to oust burgomasters they considered incompetent, corrupt or abusive. In a variety of ways a new civil society is taking shape to influence the substance of the emerging social contract. Pieces of that new contract are now coming into place, at least transitionally. But the fabric is fragile. These pieces need immediate reinforcement to survive the multiple stresses of economic recession, armed conflict and, perhaps most importantly, inexperience with majoritarian rule restrained by respect for minority rights. The process that has just begun will take years to mature and take form.

The current formal order is clearly transitional. Though the changes have been rapid they have mostly been purchased by negotiation, largely by peaceful means, and by an emerging social consensus supporting the forward momentum toward participatory democracy. There are dangers, however. Peace must be made between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the regime. For that peace to hold, meaningful power-sharing will have to be effected in a transitional arrangement that is acceptable to the parties and is workable as a framework of governance. Then peace must be extended internally to the level of rural communities in the form of new sets of working rules of mutual tolerance among citizens of every ethnic group. Over time, these arrangements must pass by law into a constitutional order that is broadly perceived as a just framework to govern the interactions of persons and groups. Fortunately, the rich array of Rwandan actors contributing to this new democratic framework affords a unique opportunity for prudent, discrete external support to facilitate positive outcomes. It is to a sub-set of these opportunities that this project is addressed.

B. Project Goal and Purpose

1. Project Goal

The project goal is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda that provides for sustainable, self-renewing democratic governance.

The contributions that this project can make toward this goal are necessary but by no means sufficient to its achievement. There are many other constructive participants contributing to its realization. The African states and the major donors are supporting the peace process. Negotiations to end the war and to arrive at political terms for power-sharing in a democratic

framework, and to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees are underway. Meanwhile a multi-party transitional government has been formed to work with the presidential regime, within the framework of a working constitution, on immediate administrative reforms and on the rules and calendar for national elections. The donors are positively supporting this process. Individually, Rwanda's development partners are providing assistance to improve the administration of justice, to liberalize and energize the economy, to support the rights of women and marginal groups, and to support general social and economic development. Each of these contributes toward the goal. The likelihood of its achievement lies in the new spirit of openness in the regime and the emergence of Rwandan social forces with manifest determination to bring a just democratic order to their society.

2. Project Purpose

The project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

The underlying rationale of this project is that reaching the goal of democratic self-governance in Rwanda will require time for both the governed and the governors to make, learn and apply new rules for working together. Outside actors, like willing foreign donors, cannot or at least should not try to impose institutional blue-prints --- the terms of that internal contract. They can, however, encourage and facilitate the social learning process. They can help to orient the Rwandan people on values and practices that, through trial and application elsewhere, have proven their merit in making democracies work.

To this end, the project concentrates on helping Rwanda's citizens build their civil society, that diversity of non-state actors, as individual citizens and as groups, through which the people find voice for their aspirations, their demands, and their political will. Under past authoritarian regimes there has been only limited opportunity for civil society to take form and play its vital role in the polity. Both the new free press and the diversity of new private associations are the critical actors in shaping the new pluralism, in building tolerance for diversity of views, and in maintaining the dialogue between governors and the governed. Learning to play their roles responsibly, under reasoned rules of fair play, with outreach to all sectors of the society is new in Rwandan social practice. Thus, the project aims to assist with the fast learning track these actors must follow as shapers, arbiters, and signatories to the emerging social contract.

The project also addresses a process of institutional change at two levels of governance in order to make both more responsive to citizen wants and needs. First, it will support measures to give the people more direct responsibility for primary self-governance at the local level. It will encourage efforts to devolve centralized authority and resources to the local level and corresponding measures to improve the quality of locally elected and serving officials. Its aim is to support those initiatives that will make local government more accountable and responsive to the people. It also means to help local groups, working within

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their communes, to bring citizen action to community life. Second, it will support measures, already underway, to enhance the legislative branch of government --- the representative house of the people --- as a coequal power in the affairs of state. Traditionally marginalized by an overpowering executive, Rwanda's National Assembly has not developed the capacity to shape the policy agenda, initiate just laws, and demand both transparency and accountability in the public's business. It has not been open to constituency demands, attuned to the people's needs. This project will assist that body in a self-managed process of institutional development to fulfill these roles.

It would be simple, and inaccurate, to view the DIG Project as solely an exercise in institution building. While the bulk of funding under the Project Cooperative Agreement provides support to the four institutions noted above and discussed below, they are as much "instrumentalities" as they are ends in a strategy with a larger purpose. The DIG Project is equally about people, their personal growth and the individual benefits they achieve from joining together in common enterprise around a set of shared values and aspirations. The project is about people and their institutions. It is about how people participate in the shaping of democratic institutions which will in turn shape and serve them; and how institutions transcend momentary preference while preserving time-tested truths. It is about how democracy, continually in a state of becoming, depends on the dynamic interaction of people and institutions to keep it relevant to the needs of individuals and society as they evolve over time.

C. Beneficiaries

The most direct beneficiaries of project activities will be the people participating in the institutions targeted --- both the state agencies and the citizen groups. The long-term beneficiaries will be a large segment of the Rwandan population. They will benefit through empowerment: by a more open information regime, by a better understanding of democratic principles and how to exercise group pressure, by entry into parties and the electoral process, by presenting demands to elected officials and administrative agencies, and by direct acts of association, communal, and neighborhood self-governance. Outcomes, such as more just laws and honest tribunals, fair and just officials, and improved public services follow. In a liberalized economy this all contributes to economic growth, rising incomes, and better standard of life for all.

The incorporation of women's associations into the ensemble of non-state entities which will be promoting civic awareness of democratic principles and understanding of the rule of law is especially relevant. Through aid to these associations, by highlighting women's rights and interests in its assistance to local governments and to the legislature, the project will give high priority to improving the status of women in Rwandan social and economic practice. By strengthening cooperation among these associations, the legal community and human rights organizations, the project will serve to encourage legal reforms in favor of all marginal groups including women. It will encourage the reform of the justice system and the shaping

of new conflict resolution measures that use statutory law to leverage change in the unequal and unfair aspects of customary practice.

The project centers on people and the tools they need in that citizen- managed process called democracy. To work, it must remain flexible in a period of highly unpredictable developments. Over time, it will help citizen groups to institutionalize important dynamics in the civil society based on a free press and free associations and the in the formal polity based on a new order of local government and an energized and responsive legislature. Both the institutions and the people who form them to serve their ends will benefit. When coupled with the new force of a free and open market place, the practice of democracy will mean growth and a fair sharing of all in that growth.

Citizens in localities all over Rwanda will benefit as central government agencies, especially the Ministry of Interior, are reoriented from a command and control posture over local governments to a support and servicing function toward independent local authorities. As local officials are better trained, they will function more efficiently in a decentralized administrative structure. As the elected servants of the commune, they will build consensus among citizens rather than command obedience to distant powers. The deputies elected to the National Assembly will learn to use a well-trained staff and its support system to make that body an effective branch of representational democracy. As they attune themselves to constituency groups and citizen associations, they will make the legislative process more accessible and responsive to the people and their interests.

Among the non-state publics, including the press, the project will strengthen the institutional capabilities of presently evolving citizen organizations which, during the transition toward democracy, will maintain pressure on the regime for tangible progress and provide balance among one another's interests. Support for these groups will produce widespread civic understanding of orderly democratic processes, and their role in them. This understanding, together with the improved capabilities of broad-based non-state public groups --- farmers, women, laborers, the church, the bar, ethnic minorities --- will help insure that the regime promotes the rule of law in all its affairs: administrative, judicial, political, social and economic.

D. End of Project Status

Democracy is always in a state of becoming. It is a process far more than a defined state of being. At the end of this five-year project Rwanda's institutional framework for democratic governance will still be taking shape based on shared learning in the enterprise. The key indicators that the project is achieving its purpose will be markers on a process line, not end points that can be precisely fixed in advance of the journey. Most important among those markers are those described below. The impact indicators for each of the below are detailed in each of the section on the Project's components. As CDIE has noted in its recent review of the literature, differences of opinion continue on what constitutes "good" impact indicators for democracy and governance.

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1. **In the Civil Society**

- **A diversity of independent free associations** will be flourishing and contributing to the life of the nation. Their outreach throughout the national territory will have increased in numbers of members and in populations served with civic education, popular mobilization efforts on issues of association and public interest, and in services provided. More community level associations will be undertaking tasks of local self-governance in natural resource management and conservation, health, education, and social affairs. More joint efforts and cooperative relationships between commune officials and these active vectors of the civil society will be forming. More women will be in leadership roles in local government and the status of women will have shown marked improvement as a result of on-going action on these fronts. Association representations to deputies and committees of the National Assembly will be influencing public policy and legislation on judicial reform, civil rights, issues of social equity and other matters. The NGO Support Center established through this project will continue to operate, under the management of its members, as a point of collaboration and mutual support in civic affairs.

- **An energetic free press**, uncensored by government but increasingly disciplined by its own ethics and rising standards of reporting, will be providing more timely and reliable information and a broad variety of viewpoints on the social, political and economic life of the nation. A diversity of opinion on issues of public policy will be reasonably argued in the media. Increasing numbers of people will be informed by increasing numbers of responsible, objective investigative reports on the performance of public officials, agencies, and institutions. More citizens groups, professional and civic associations, will have their activities reported on through both the press and through radio. Their influence in the community will expand thereby. There will be regular coverage of legislative and judicial affairs on radio and in print including both fact and opinion regarding these affairs. Information on the economy, public finance, factor prices, and emerging demands for goods and services will be more fully and regularly reported by radio and by the press thus reinforcing the liberalizing economy. The Rwandan Press Center initiated under this project will be operating through its own generated income, members dues and other donor support as a valued resource for professional training and services to the media. Public radio will be providing greater access to alternative viewpoints and more regular and reliable information on a wide variety of public affairs, economic developments and matters of civic interest.

2. **In the Public Institutions Addressed**

- **Local governments will be assuming a more important role** in the lives of the Rwandan people. More responsive to their needs, this first line of self-governance will provide many public goods and services gravely lacking at present. The central government will have begun to devolve to the communes both authority and resources to fuel their capacities as engines of local development. The quality of local government will have improved over earlier years as evidenced in citizen's observations and in their willingness to

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share in communal labor, pay their local taxes, and respond to the leadership of local officials. Pluralism, diversity in these communities will make it possible for local public economies to grow. Not only government, but many private groups and associations will be producing more public goods and services. The officials of central government agencies will be providing guidance and support to local authorities while respecting their spheres of autonomy and independence.

- The National Assembly will be demonstrating its capability as a co-equal branch of government in law-making, in the oversight of public agencies, and in maintaining transparency and accountability in the government. Responsive to constituents and constituent groups, the Assembly will show leadership as it puts citizen's concerns into the national policy agenda, as it reforms the judiciary and unjust or ill-conceived law, and thus contributes to an increasing general respect for law and the rule of law in the society.

The sum of these indicators will be greater than these parts. It will include the impacts of other donor efforts, intimately and purposefully coordinated with the project activities. In fact that sum will be the functioning social contract --- reflected in an elected government that has the consent of the people, a people actively holding the government accountable to their trust, heightened respect for the rule of law, and continuing progress toward a more just, equitable and peaceful society.

III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. General Project Strategy and Overview

1. The Strategy

Each component of this project, detailed in sections C.1 through 5 below, as well as the project as whole must be seen in the context of a larger strategic effort involving many actors --- internal and external. The setting for this strategic effort was given above. The donors have been informally united around a strategy of democratization through incremental but accelerated change in Rwandan political practice. Initially, in the late 1980s, they pressed the regime to adopt broad policies supporting general economic and political liberalization. As momentum increased, they encouraged and facilitated policies and legal reforms to allow for multiple parties; to shape the framework for elections; to improve civil and association rights, press freedoms and respect for basic human rights; and, as armed conflict broke out, to negotiate a just settlement of long-standing refugee demands and the underlying ethnic/regional conflicts. The Rwandan multiparty government of transition has embraced the broad outlines of this strategic effort.

The DIG Project channels USAID assistance toward one primary and one secondary objective within the larger context noted above. The first is to strengthen the civil society, in its diversity, as the underpinning of democratic practice and the true guarantor of the social

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contract. Enabling and broadening participation in the groups that form the civil society, and facilitating their programs of civic action are the substance of the project. A free and open information regime is an essential part of that mix. The second strategic objective is to link pluralistic social action to two key institutional components of the democratic order: the legislature and local government, and within this linkage, to operationalize improvements in both of these institutional components to make them more effective as means for popular self-government.

2. Overview of Project in Operation and Its Means

The DIG Project seeks to promote principles of democratic governance in Rwanda through the strengthening of key public sector institutions and of a number of newly established and existing civil society institutions including non-governmental organizations and the independent press. The project will be obligated through a Project Agreement (ProAg) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation that designates the Ministry of Plan as the GOR implementing authority. A waiver for the GOR's host country contribution to project activities was sought and approval received (see Annex E). Each of the targeted beneficiaries will be expected to contribute to the particular component or subgrant activity being financed by the Project. The exact amounts will be determined prior to the commencement of the particular activity.

This five-year, $9.0 million project will be primarily implemented through a four-year Cooperative Agreement (CA) with a competitively selected U.S. PVO, Non-Profit Organization or University. The selected CA Recipient will become the Institutional Project Manager (IPM) and will set up a resident Project Management Unit (PMU) to manage day-to-day project activities. The IPM will make subgrants and provide assistance to the several public and private institutions stipulated in the ProAg in order to advance project objectives as detailed in section C.1-5 below. This assistance will be provided either through Subagreement or Memoranda of Understanding instruments corresponding to the private or public nature of the institution financed. Additional NGOs will be identified during project implementation and awarded subgrants with the approval of USAID and MINIPLAN.

The following sections in Part III provide an in-depth discussion of the modalities, structure and components that define the DIG Project.

B. Project Management Structures and Assistance Instruments

The multi-component nature of the DIG Project, as well as the fluidity and sensitivity of the rapidly evolving Rwandan political scene, call for an overall approach to project management which combines and demonstrates elements of simplicity and flexibility. Furthermore, given the number of key institutional actors participating in project implementation, contractual arrangements, as well as administrative and management structures, must provide a degree of clarity that facilitates an understanding of the relationships, roles and responsibilities of each party during project implementation. Finally, the project management structure has been

designed to reflect and promote the collaborative nature of this undertaking. For when all is said and done, promoting democratic values and good governance require large doses of tolerance and understanding --- especially among those managing this complex activity. This section provides a discussion of the contractual arrangements and management structures which will be utilized during DIG Project implementation.

1. Project Agreements and Implementation Mechanisms

USAID/Rwanda will enter into two basic agreements (ProAg and Cooperative Agreement) to obligate the DIG Project and to ensure that required assistance is effectively provided in furtherance of project objectives. The Institutional Project Manager, responsible for overall project management, will enter into four implementation agreements which will define its formal relationship with the direct beneficiaries of project assistance. Project component implementation will be guided by the review and approval of workplans and budgets submitted by the IPM and the individual subgrantees financed under the Cooperative Agreement to a USAID-GOR committee. Each of these agreements are detailed below.

a) Project Agreement

The DIG Project will be obligated through a Project Agreement (ProAg) signed between USAID and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINAFFET). The Ministry of Plan (MINIPLAN) will serve as the GOR "Tutelle" or "implementing authority" with technical responsibility for the DIG Project. The ProAg will specifically note that overall DIG Project monitoring and oversight will be conducted by a Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee (PMOC) composed of MINIPLAN, USAID and the IPM. The PMOC is also an important forum, if not the key forum, through which the Project can present and coordinate its activities with other donors working in democracy and governance. The ProAg will[3]: i) establish the GOR's concurrence with the underlying philosophy, purpose and strategy of the project as well as its specific operational components; (ii) confirm the principle that USAID/Rwanda will provide, either directly or through a collaborating U.S. development agency, assistance to specified public institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations; and (iii) stipulate that a "Support Fund" to be jointly managed by USAID and the GOR will be used to finance "targets of opportunity" in relation to the evolving process of Rwandan democratization not covered under other project components (see Section III. C.5).

The ProAg will also state that the GOR accepts USAID/Rwanda's right to engage the services of a U.S. Non-Profit Organization (NPO) such as a U.S. Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) or University to serve as the DIG "Institutional Project Manager" (IPM), providing technical and financial grant assistance to the range of public and private organizations specified in the ProAg, or to be jointly determined during project implementation. Finally, the Project Agreement will refer to the right of USAID/Rwanda

3 Part VIII provides the specific provisions which will be included in the DIG Project Agreement.

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through the selected IPM, to enter into subordinate agreements with those beneficiaries specified in the ProAg. The terms and conditions of these subordinate agreements as well as their legitimacy are derived and flow from the Project Agreement itself, and will detail the specific assistance to be provided to each of the direct recipients.

b) Cooperative Agreement

USAID/Rwanda, with GOR concurrence, will select a Cooperative Agreement (CA) Recipient to serve as the Institutional Project Manager, responsible for the provision of financial, management and technical assistance to the public and private institutions targeted as direct beneficiaries of the DIG Project. The CA Recipient will be selected (solicited) through restricted competition (Invitation for an Application for a Cooperative Agreement) from among U.S. Non-Profit Organizations, including PVOs and Universities, that have previously demonstrated capacity to manage the range and type of activities called for under the project. The CA entered into between USAID and the selected Recipient will stipulate the terms and conditions under which the Recipient will receive and utilize funding made available through this "collaborative" development assistance instrument. Specifically, the "substantial involvement" clause of the CA will detail those areas in which USAID/Rwanda will involve itself in the Recipient's management of the project in order to maintain its mandated responsibility for project outcome. This is especially relevant to the review and approval, with MINIPLAN, of all workplans and budgets prepared by the IPM. The IPM will incorporate into its plan the specific plans of the four beneficiary institutions financed under the CA.

c) Subordinate Agreements

The Institutional Project Manager will enter into subordinate agreements with host country institutions that are 1) specifically identified in the ProAg as beneficiaries of project assistance and/or that 2) meet selection criteria approved by USAID and MINIPLAN for the award of subgrants to Rwandan NGOs and that fall within the IPM's "threshold" funding authority. The terms and conditions of these (sub)agreements will flow from those previously defined in both the Project Agreement and Cooperative Agreement and the Annual Work Plans, as previously noted.

Thus, with the two public institutions -- the National Assembly and the Ministry of Interior (MININTER) -- the IPM will sign Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) to detail the amount and nature of the assistance, and the corresponding set of responsibilities of the recipient as regards the receipt of this assistance.

For the NGOs that are currently targeted, i.e., the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI) and the Centre de Press Rwandaise (CPR), Subagreements will be entered into with the Institutional Project Manager which stipulate the terms and conditions of corresponding "subgrants." Activities to be financed under the NGO Subgrant Fund

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jointly programmed between the IPM and the CCADI will be obligated through Subagreements entered into between the IPM and the concerned Rwandan NGO.

d) Management of the Project's Support Fund

Activities to be financed under the USAID Project Support Fund will be jointly approved with the Ministry of Plan based on a set of criteria to be detailed in the Project Agreement. Activities which take place with public institutions, such as the Judiciary or other GOR Ministries, will require MINIPLAN clearance. These clearances and approvals may be simply shown by signature on the Project Implementation Order (PIO) which provides for that specific activity.

e) Life-of-Project and Annual Workplans, and Quarterly Progress Reports

Life of Project (LOP), Annual Workplans (AWP), and Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR) will be required documentation for both the Cooperative Agreement Recipient and the several subordinate agreement recipients (subrecipients) financed under the project, unless otherwise agreed in writing with USAID. The workplans and corresponding budgets will detail the inputs required by the recipients to undertake a specified set of activities and achieve a comparable level of outputs and outcomes for the period covered. Each of these project recipients will prepare an initial Life of Project workplan (including the annual workplan for year one) and subsequent yearly workplans). These workplans will be submitted to USAID and MiniPlan in a consolidated form by the IPM for the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee's review and approval. The yearly workplans will be submitted within 60 days of the end of the IPM's fiscal year. Within the framework of the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee (PMOC), the IPM will have the opportunity to directly discuss the contents of these workplans with the two concerned parties. Once approved, these documents will serve as the basis for the IPM to begin the release of services, commodities or funds, for monitoring the performance of each of the implementing agents, and eventually for evaluating the impact of their individual activities. The basic philosophy in the preparation and review underlying these workplans is that of "negotiated contracts." (See VI., Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for a more detailed discussion.)

The Quarterly Progress Reports will be the mechanism through which the IPM will present progress to the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee (PMOC). It will be the responsibility of the IPM to prepare and submit these reports to the PMOC. A meeting will be schedule to review and comment on these reports within 60 days.

2. The Approach and Structuring of Project Management (roles and responsibilities)

As noted above, the approach used in project management design incorporates 1) characteristics of simplicity in the overall structure including streamlining of management

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systems and procedures and 2) the need for flexibility of project managers, at all levels, to respond to and make decisions in a rapidly changing environment. Additionally, it was felt that each of the five project components (discussed below), while designed to contribute to overall achievement of project purpose, should be able to stand alone as discrete activities in the event that other components are unable to be executed. Finally, as the DIG Project is above all an effort to build institutional capacity within key state and civil society organizations, the emphasis has been to ensure continuity in the provision of technical assistance through a single project management unit that serves all of the recipient institutions. Moreover, it places the responsibility for overall project support, management, implementation and monitoring in the IPM, thus reducing for USAID its management burden during project execution. The following sections provide a discussion of the key institutional actors and a summary of their principal management and technical assistance responsibilities during project implementation (see Attachment 1, Annex I for DIG Project Structure Flowchart):

a) Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee (PMOC)

The PMOC, composed of a representative from USAID, MINIPLAN and the Institutional Project Manager, will serve as the overall mechanism developing policy and coordinating and guiding DIG Project management. In addition to these three institutions, members of other concerned GOR ministries and interested donors will be invited to participate in discussions of project progress for informational purposes and as a means to coordinate project activities with those of these other agencies. The PMOC will meet at least twice per year during the LOP. The first meeting in the year will take place during the month of September to review and approve consolidated workplans and budgets submitted by the IPM and covering the four beneficiary institutions funded under the CA as well. The IPM also will have submitted a consolidated annual progress report with the workplan. The second meeting will take place in the month of March to review the semi-annual report submitted by the IPM and covering the first half of its previously approved workplan. Both meetings will provide USAID and MINIPLAN with the opportunity to discuss project implementation progress and issues, including problems, and offer feedback and guidance to the IPM on a scheduled basis.

b) The Institutional Project Manager

Primary responsibility for project management, including each of the components except that of the USAID Project Support Fund, rests with an A.I.D.-registered U.S. PVO, NPO, or University, selected through restricted competition for receipt of a Cooperative Agreement. The Institutional Project Manager selected to manage the CA will establish a Project Management Unit (PMU) in Rwanda for 1) management of subgrants made available to a number of public and civil society institutions to enhance their capacity to support democratic governance in Rwanda; 2) to provide and/or coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training for the institutional development of these public and civil society institutions; 3) monitoring and evaluation of project components including the establishment of a management information system to track component progress and overall project impact; and

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4) conducting periodic studies, seminars and research in areas of democratic governance identified by Project participants as contributing to a better understanding of this field.

The PMU will be composed of two long-term expatriate advisor/managers (i.e., a Chief of Party/Senior Democracy Advisor and a Financial/Administrative Manager) and a small number of Rwandan professionals and support staff who will be responsible for carrying out overall project management and technical assistance activities. One of the most important responsibilities of the PMU is the financial management and oversight of project funding made available under the CA to subrecipients through either Subagreements or provisions made in specific Memoranda of Understanding. The IPM will take fiduciary responsibility for subgrant funding made available to any of the approved NGO subrecipients including both of the Centers discussed above. Funds designated for services, commodities, and training for the two public institutions as detailed in the ProAg and two MOUs will be managed directly by the IPM.

Approximately $2.6 million of Project funds will be used to finance the PMU, including the long-term technical assistance, the local-hire staff, equipment and supplies, rental of building and utilities, training of local staff, and international and local consultants to help the PMU on general issues having a bearing on the Project. Additional details can be found in the Project's illustrative budget and associated financial tables.

c) USAID/Rwanda

USAID/Rwanda will exercise "substantial involvement" in the execution of the Cooperative Agreement including overall guidance to and supervision of the IPM and its resident Project Management Unit. The DIG Project Committee, set up during the design phase to review and approve relevant documentation, will continue to provide input into the formulation of internal Mission D/G policy. It will provide guidance and recommendation to the USAID DIG Project Officer in the review of (a) the IPM LOP and annual workplans and reports, (b) assisting in the identification of "targets of opportunity" for funding under the USAID "Project Support Fund," and (c) the review and approval of subagreements to the four main recipients of the Project's assistance, e.g., National Assembly, CCADI, RPC, and MININTER). Other possible subagreements, such as those funded out of the Civil Education and Action Fund, will not be reviewed and approved in advance, as these subagreements will all be limited to $20,000 or less. The Program Officer has been designated as the DIG Project Officer; however, the Mission Director will be directly engaged as he meets with donors and as s/he coordinates key policy issues with the Ambassador and other concerned Embassy personnel on the Post Democracy Coordinating Committee. In addition to the monitoring of IPM/PMU performance under the CA, the Project Officer and Director will play an important role in identifying, securing and coordinating other A.I.D. resources (regional and centrally-funded projects and buy-ins) that can compliment and advance DIG Project objectives.

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d) Post Democracy Coordinating Committee

The Post Democracy Coordinating Committee, made up of designated members of the full Country Team, is the established mechanism for developing an overall USG policy for D/G activities in Rwanda. It will provide program guidance and inter-agency coordinating functions related to DIG Project implementation. Periodically, the PMU Chief of Party will meet with this committee to report on project progress and to be informed on other related activities being carried out by concerned USG agencies. The IPM and USIS will maintain close working ties on all Press Center activities. Members of this Committee, including the Ambassador, will be invited to participate in the semi-annual meetings of the PMOC as a means of further demonstrating US commitment to this project.

e) Government of Rwanda (GOR)

Outside of the GOR's general commitment to the intent of the DIG Project and its agreement permitting a direct USAID role in the process of Rwandan democratization, GOR involvement during DIG Project implementation will parallel that of USAID as discussed above: 1) concurrence in the selection of the Institutional Project Manager; 2) review and concurrence of LOP and annual workplans and reports prepared by the IPM's PMU; 3) review and concurrence of subagreements to the National Assembly, CCADI, RPC, and MININTER; 4) development of the scopes of work for Project evaluations, as well as, 5) concurrence in all activities identified as targets of opportunity which USAID/Rwanda will finance under its Support Fund.

As noted earlier, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINAFFET) will sign the Project Agreement obligating the project. However, the Ministry of Plan (MINIPLAN) will serve as the host (Tutelle) ministry to the DIG Project and will represent the GOR the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee. The IPM will enter into Memoranda of Understanding with the Ministry of Interior and with the National Assembly detailing the terms and conditions of USAID assistance provided to these state institutions under the Cooperative Agreement.

f) Direct Beneficiaries

Under each of the four project components, except the USAID Project Support Fund, there is one primary designated beneficiary institution. These are: 1) The Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI); 2) the Centre de Press Rwandaise (CPR); 3) the National Assembly; and, 4) the Ministry of Interior. The CCADI and the CPR will receive subgrants to establish and maintain support services for their members. In addition, CCADI and the IPM will receive NGO applications for small subgrants to finance their activities, thus increasing significantly the number of direct beneficiary institutions under the Project. Finally, USAID, through its Project Support Fund, will directly finance a number of studies, seminars and TA/training activities which will directly benefit a state or civil society institution. In each such case, beneficiaries will be responsible for specified management and

administrative tasks related to their financed activity. Chief among them will be the monitoring, evaluation and reporting of ongoing implementation in terms of their institutional development and/or progress towards specific programmatic objectives.

For Rwandan NGOs requesting subgrant assistance (including the two Centers discussed above), registration as an Association Sans But Lucratif with the GOR's Ministry of Justice will be an eligibility requirement. As the Institutional Project Manager will be an A.I.D-registered PVO or NPO, it will not be necessary for Rwandan NGOs to be registered with A.I.D./Washington to be eligible for project grant assistance. All subgrants made under the Project CA will be made through a subagreement instrument or MOU, the terms and conditions of which flow from the CA itself and are consistent with the overall Project Agreement.

C. Project Components

Of the five components that comprise the DIG Project, four involve assistance to Rwandan institutions; the fifth, the USAID Project Support Fund, is designed to respond to "targets of opportunity" that may emerge in this rapidly evolving setting.

The following four of five sections: 1) NGOs and the Civil Society; 2) Local Governance; 3) The National Assembly; 4) The Free Press, correspond to the four basic components which together define the DIG Project. The fifth section presents the USAID Project Support Fund. The common theme which runs through all four sections is the dynamic of people shaping and in turn being shaped by their institutions. As each component is essentially a discrete project activity in and of itself, the structure of each section has been developed to provide the same design sequence and logic as the larger Project Paper, but in summary form. The details of implementation and financing for these discrete components will be found in the concerned project analysis in the annexes. Equally important, the expected end-of-project status and associated impact indicators are detailed in each component. These indicators should be viewed as the third-round effort (the first being the CPSP and the second being the DIG PID) by the Mission and others (e.g., AFR/ONI, MSI, etc.) to identify and focus in on meaningful indicators of democracy and governance activities. As the Project is implemented and as the Mission undertakes the AFR/DP-supported MER exercise, these indicators can be expected to be refined further. If the CDIE work to date has one message, it is that there is no agreement on how best to design, implement or measure the impact of democracy and governance activities.

1. Non-Governmental organizations and the Civil Society: the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI)

a) Setting and Rationale

At the heart of a democratic polity is the citizen. In countries with a tradition of democratic governance, individuals become citizens through a process of social learning that takes place

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throughout society, at all levels and from generation to generation. Rights, obligations, and responsibilities of citizenship are learned in the family and in school, through the media and involvement in political parties, and by participation in civic associations organized around democratic principles. It is through the continuity of democratic institutions, those of the state and civil society, that values of democratic governance are transmitted to new generations of citizens who, in turn, fine tune the workings of those institutions to keep them responsive and serve them better. In a functioning democratic polity, the political, social and economic systems are mutually reinforcing of democratic values and individual rights. There is, in short, a political culture that promotes notions of democracy and good governance while providing individual citizens with the means to exercise their civic right to participate in the political decision making process.

Rwanda has neither a history of democratic governance nor the institutions and educated citizenry to ensure that democratic values are established, maintained and transmitted to new generations. The effects of centuries of a highly centralized and traditional social system coupled with decades of colonialism and one-party government present formidable impediments to the diffusion of democratic values and the development of representative institutions. While the democratic opening of the past two years offers evidence of the good intentions of the government, it would be a mistake to assume that the process of political and economic reform will continue apace without a massive shift in citizen attitudes to shape a new culture of citizen oversight and participation. Donors can encourage democratic thinking and good governance but only the people themselves can make it work.

The DIG Project rests on the fundamental principle that it is only through an informed and involved citizenry that democratization and good governance will prevail in Rwanda. The corresponding strategy underlying this principle is the need to develop a vigorous civil society composed of a wide range of independent, democratically-organized and managed institutions, grouping together and representing people with common interests, as the means to achieve broad-based civic education and action.

During the past two years the new liberal environment has permitted a previously unknown freedom of expression and association. The spontaneous emergence of a polyglot of newly independent associations and organizations has paralleled the rapid growth of new political parties and the independent press. Scores of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), including civic organizations, trade unions and professional societies, as well as, women's groups, human rights organizations and peasant associations, have blossomed. They represent a nascent capacity to shape Rwanda's civil society when taken with an existing community of Rwandan NGOs which has been working in a variety of developmental sectors promoting the social and economic welfare of its members.

While the Rwandan NGO community has existed for many years, only a few strong church-related service delivery agencies and several very successful donor-backed organizations have developed the institutional strength of sustainable, independent, development agencies. The

majority of NGOs can be characterized[4] as weak, including financially strapped, particularly in comparison to state institutions including government supported or party-affiliated ASBLs. A collective capacity and commitment for these NGOs to serve as the core catalysts in promoting civic education and popular participation is only now forming. This component of the DIG Project will nurture both this collective capacity and the individual growth and independence of the institutions and organizations that shape and constitute the emerging civil society. Through them, it will serve to ensure that the voices of the governed are heard and considered in the calculations of the governors --- leading to decisions which ultimately benefit the democratic polity as a whole.

b) Component Strategy

NGOs group citizens with shared interests and values and permit them to act in concert to achieve what they could not individually. The NGO community in Rwanda is relatively inexperienced in the arena of civic action and education. Individual NGOs lack adequate management skills and financing to effectively represent and advocate their members' interests to state institutions at the national and local levels. As the majority of Rwandan NGOs were started to promote economic and social development, their experience is primarily in relation to that "development" mission. Only now are they taking on tasks related to civic education and political advocacy, dealing with such issues as civil and human rights or civic duties and obligations. The notion that there is and should be a distinction between the economic and political lives of people and nations is an artificial one. Economic progress and political evolution are handmaidens on the journey to national development. Rwandan NGOs have taken the first tentative steps towards making this linkage and therefore in addressing the democratic aspirations of their members. It is a courageous step and merits further assistance.

This project component will enhance the role of citizen participation in promoting democratic governance in Rwanda by strengthening Rwandan NGOs as civil society instrumentalities engaged in civic education, information dissemination and political advocacy. This will be accomplished through assistance to establish a "Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives" (the Center or CCADI), a new ASBL "umbrella" organization made up of and serving NGOs. During extensive and in-depth discussions, leaders of several dozen NGOs, NGO consortia and local-level democratically-organized community associations expressed a need for an organization that will help them develop strong programs for civic education and action. The Center is especially important for increasing NGO outreach to vulnerable and minority groups, particularly women, youth and the rural population in general. By mobilizing such groups among the majority of Rwandans living at the local level, it will enhance citizen activism and self-governance in civil society institutions in the communes thus building the interface between community-based organizations and formal communal

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4 According to a 1987 study conducted by INADES/Rwanda for the World Bank, and a 1991 survey by the Centre IWACU, there were some 3,000 to 8,000 NGOs including cooperatives and other community-based, democratically-organized associations. Both reports identified a lack of management capacity and adequate resources as the primary constraints to their effectiveness. For a more detailed discussion including profile and capability analysis of the NGO community, see Annex I, Social Soundness Analysis and Annex P, Institutional Analysis.

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government. It is primarily here that the concepts of democracy and governance become practice. It is also at this interface that the components of the DIG Project are linked practically as well as conceptually.

The governance of the Center itself will be based on shared responsibility and commitment. Its own sustainability, accountability, responsiveness, and effectiveness will rest upon the same principles and values which it is set up to promote, i.e., democratic governance. Social learning, civic education in this context, will best take place within the NGOs themselves as well as in the institutions set up by local people to meet their everyday needs. In short, practitioners of democratic governance are best able to teach its principles and values to others, if by no other means than example.

The services which the Center will provide NGOs are summarized as follows:

Technical Assistance and Training - The Center will provide: 1) organization development and management training for NGO officers and staff so as to increase their capacity to serve their members; 2) a core body of training material in the field of civic education including human rights, and advocacy and pressure group strategies; 3) training for trainers in the use of these core materials with their own members/clients; and, 4) assistance to new groups on the official registration process as ASBLs, on fund-raising and on other such areas as project identification and appraisal and proposal development. Wherever appropriate, members of local NGOs will be engaged to provide these services to their sister organizations.

Representation and Advocacy - The primary purpose of the Center is to increase the individual capacity of NGOs to provide civic education for and promote civic action among their members. In short, the Center seeks to ensure diversity and pluralism among its membership in particular and within the civil society in general. It can also serve as a venue to engage one another and government institutions in dialogue concerning democratic governance issues. Here members can form common strategies for advocacy and action. The Center will also provide government agencies and interested donors with a central point to learn about NGO activities in this field and will assist members in fund-raising activities.

Administrative and Logistical Support - The Center will provide administrative and logistical support services including communications (fax, phone), photocopying, computer use and printing, and transportation to all member NGOs. The Center will also have one or more meeting rooms for training activities, seminars and workshops. User fees will be charged for some services so as to generate revenues that will over time achieve a significant degree of financial sustainability in Center operations.

Information Collection, Analysis & Dissemination - The Center will provide networking and information services to its members in the areas of civic action (e.g., human and civil rights) through the publication of a quarterly newsletter. It will set up a resource center with publications and documents of local and international import. The Center will

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also undertake periodic research and studies on issues relevant to members' needs. These could include the status of women in Rwandan society, the civil rights of minorities and involve opinion surveys and polls on current policy issues.

Extension and Outreach - In order for the Center's services and resources to be made available at the communal (and "colline") level, it will work through and with its more established members with extensive networks and physical infrastructure that link their national and/or regional operations to the local level. The Center will build on their experience and work to strengthen similar networks in civic education and action. This will be extremely relevant to the role of these local organizations as countervailing centers of civil society authority vis-a-vis the Communal administration. As the Center becomes established, it may decentralize some services by posting Center staff to several of the larger Prefectural headquarters in cooperation with member NGOs.

Grant Subventions - A special facility will be set up by the Conseil Executif (Board of Directors) of CCADI to screen, review and recommend grant applications to the Institutional Project Manager. Such grants will be for the purpose of financing modest institutional support needs of NGOs (e.g., staff salaries, computer equipment, office rental) and discrete interventions that promote civil action and democratic governance (see Annex F, for further discussion including illustrative selection criteria). Special consideration will be given for grants to action groups at the communal level. One of the most tangible and potentially effective ways of extending and decentralizing Center assistance to the local level will be through such grants to groups in rural areas. These subgrants (and associated subagreements) are expected to be for amounts less than $20,000 each. These will be planned in the Annual Workplans, approved by the PMU, and reported upon by the PMU in Quarterly Progress Reports. Once this grant mechanism is operating, the Center will be expected to attract funds for additional grants from other donors and sources.

c) Implementation Arrangements and Calendar

The ProAg will stipulate that the IPM may enter into a direct (sub)agreement with the Center without further approvals relating to its eligibility for project assistance. By means of LOP Workplans, Annual Workplans, and Quarterly Progress Reports developed between the Center and IPM, USAID and MINIPLAN will be informed, as provided in the ProAg, of component progress.

The following summarizes activities which will take place during Phases I and II of this component (a more detailed activity calendar is provided in Annex I):

Phase I: Project Initiation (October 1, 1992 - March 31, 1993)

Principal activities to take place during Phase I are those needed to get the organization legally registered as a Rwandan non-profit organization and a draft proposal prepared for use in Phase II discussions with the Institutional Project Manager concerning Center funding.

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The activities planned under this phase have been deliberately designed to place as little administrative burden as possible on the Mission. The following are the specific activities to take place during this period:

- All actions (e.g., election of board of directors and preparation of constitution and by-laws) required to register the Center as an ASBL with the GOR; and,

- In addition to sensitizing NGOs to their role in the running of the Center and mobilizing internal resources that can be used to undertake initial D/G activities, Center officers will assist the AREAF representative to organize training for NGOs in the following areas:
  - pre-electoral civic education training for NGO trainers;
  - training of human rights organizations and other interested NGOs in election monitoring and observation skills and techniques.

Phase II: CA Operations (April 1, 1993 - March 31, 1997)

This phase begins with the arrival of the Institutional Project Manager and the signing of a four year Subagreement with the CCADI. The end of the period coincides with the Cooperative Agreement Completion Date (CACD). Phase II is broken down into four distinct stages. The following is a brief summary of activities under each stage:

Stage 1: CCADI Startup (April 1993 - September 1993)

The activities which take place during this stage will be undertaken in close collaboration between the DIG PMU and CCADI Board and Center Director. Until the IPM has certified that the Center's financial management and accounting systems are adequate to ensure proper utilization of project funds, it will make all disbursements. All conditions required to ensure financial accountability will be detailed in the Subagreement. The intention is to make this certification a priority task to be completed as soon as possible. In addition to establishing an operational office, the primary activity to be completed during this period is the preparation of the LOP and First Annual Workplan and Budget.

Stage 2: Shakedown (October 1993 - September 1994)

Stage 2 begins with the approval of the Center's first Annual Workplan. At month 18 the Project, including its components will be evaluated. This will be the "shakedown" phase designed to evaluate the hypotheses and assumptions upon which this component was designed. It will also look at the functioning and performance of the Center including the services it is to provide. During this stage, the Center will begin implementation of technical assistance and training activities; develop and implement a research/study agenda; setup the administrative and logistical operations support to NGO members; initiate resource center and newsletter; and invite grant applications from member NGOs. The Shakedown evaluation (the first of two progress evaluations) will take place at the end of Stage 2.

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Stage 3: Full-scale Operations (October 1994 - March 1996)

Lessons learned from the shakedown stage will be incorporated into the second AWP. With improvements in services and operations listed above, the Center will expand its outreach and extension services to the local level; it will begin to set fees-for-service at or near the market value and will be exploring new sources to diversify its revenue base including other donors. The relationship between the IPM and Center will be maturing so that the IPM's "substantial involvement" in Center activities can be greatly reduced as there is a corresponding increase in its institutional capacity. At an appropriate point the subagreement will be renegotiated to reflect major changes in the evolving partnership.

Stage 4: Project Phase-over/CCADI Sustainability (April 1996 - March 1997)

The second and final "progress evaluation" to take place during Phase II (month 36 of the CA), will assess the impact that this component has had on promoting the Rwandan civil society as part of the larger Project's goal of promoting democratic governance. Specific services that the Center has provided will be evaluated as will the success that the Center has had in achieving overall autonomy of its operations including financial sustainability. The final evaluation will be used by CCADI to prepare its final report to the DIG IPM/PMU. The close-out activities called for in the Subagreement will also be completed during this period prior to the 48th month and the end of the CA.

d) Component Inputs and Outputs

The total budget for this project component is approximately $1.4 million. The principal inputs into this component are those related to 1) supporting the establishment and operations of the Center, 2) the delivery of the specific set of services that will be provided by the Center, and 3) the funds for consultants and for training/subgrants, to be jointly managed with the IPM. The following is a summary of the specific inputs by category that will be required during the four year life of subproject (see Annex H, Detailed Analysis of Project Input Requirements, for a detailed breakdown of inputs).

Institutional Support - CCADI Management & Direction

Over the four year life of this component, inputs necessary for the startup and maintenance costs for the Center's administration and operations will funded by the Project on a decreasing basis as the Center is expected to attract funds from other sources. Costs which will be covered by the Project include expenditures on commodities, technical assistance, and other direct costs such as office rent, staff salaries, travel and transportation, etc.

As a result of these inputs, expected outputs will result as follows: 1) Fully established and functioning institution including Board of Directors and Secretariat capable of delivering a quality set of services to its members; 2) representation and advocacy undertaken vis-a-vis

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GOR and donors; and, 3) training of NGO members in organizational development and management training for their staff.

CCADI-Delivered Services

As discussed above the Center will operate a Service Center for NGOs providing office space, equipment and transportation, where feasible and appropriate, for members. Inputs required for providing these services are essentially related to commodities, other direct costs such as staff salaries, facility rental and operating costs. A second major source of assistance to be provided by the Center is its "Outreach and Extension" service. Primary activities and, hence, inputs will center around training and technical assistance. Finally, the Center will provide NGO members with information collection, analysis and dissemination services. Inputs are primarily commodities for the resources center, related costs for its operations, and technical assistance for required studies.

As a result of these services to be provided over the four years of project support it is expected that the following outputs will result: 1) newer and weaker members able to access administrative and logistical support at affordable costs; 2) development of training materials in various areas of civil action, human rights, etc.; 3) access by members to training materials, resource materials, documentation including studies; 4) training of NGO trainers in areas of civic action, human and civil rights, and pedagogy; 5) studies conducted on issues which members decide are relevant to the mission of CCADI; 6) dissemination of information relevant to member needs through preparation and distribution of a quarterly newsletter for members; and, 7) increased number of NGOs providing training to local organizations in civic education, community mobilization.

The Civic Education and Action Fund

The Center will jointly manage with the IPM a Civic Education and Action Fund to which NGO members may apply for implementation of discrete civic action and education activities. The major input is a contribution of $240,000 from project funding. It is expected that 15 to 20 subgrants will be made to NGOs at both the national and communal levels for such activities. After these funds have been disbursed, the Center will be expected to attract funds from member organizations and/or other sources (i.e., donors).

d) End of Component Status

By March 30, 1998, DIG Project assistance provided to this subproject component should have resulted in the following achievements by the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives and its NGO members:

- An increased capacity within the NGO community to influence the legislative agenda as demonstrated by laws enacted which represent common NGO developed policy prepared and advocated by CCADI;

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- A significant decrease in the number of human and civil rights abuses by the military and law enforcement agencies as a result of NGO monitoring and reporting activities;

- A significantly increased capacity by local organizations to influence local communal decision making as a result of CCADI member training and mobilization interventions;

- A significantly increased management and technical capacity of NGO members of CCADI to initiate and sustain civic action and education activities at the national and local communal levels as measured by the number of NGOs providing such assistance;

- A significant strengthening of the management and technical capacity of local, democratically-organized institutions to initiate and sustain civic action and education activities;

- An increase in the number of Rwandans participating in communal-level decision making as measured by attendance at communal government meetings;

- Increase in the numbers of minority candidates, including women, who stand for elections at both national and local levels;

- An increase in the legitimacy of communal government as measured by an increase in tax revenues and voluntary labor;

- Increased accountability of elected officials at both the local and national level as demonstrated by the lobbying, advocacy, and pressure of CCADI-supported NGOs and local organizations for complete disclosure of financial data related to revenue collection and public expenditures;

- Increased responsiveness of public officials at the national and local levels to citizen requests for improved public services as demonstrated by the lobbying, advocacy and pressure of Center-supported NGOs for quality public services;

- Decreased instances of corruption by government officials at national and local levels as a result of Center-supported NGOs monitoring executive, judicial and legislative actions and policy.

2. Local Government

a) Setting and Rationale

Local government in Rwanda is in the midst of revolutionary change. Where power-sharing at the national level has been negotiated and formalized in the multiparty government of

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transition, it is being forced at the local level by a populace impatient with the old order. At the base of that order is the commune. There are 145 (13 urban and 132 rural) communes in Rwanda, each with about 50,000 inhabitants. It is the "government" closest to the people. At it's head is the burgomaster, who is appointed by the president of the Republic. Above the commune is the prefecture; there are 11 country-wide. The prefet, also a presidential appointee, oversees the finances and operations of the 14-15 communes in his jurisdiction and reports to the Minister of Interior. As the lowest level of this centrally directed administrative hierarchy, the commune is responsible for collecting taxes, keeping order, registering civil status, maintaining basic infrastructure, and facilitating the work of the technical ministries, such as agriculture, education and health.

The Old Order: GOR doctrine since 1975 has been to regard the commune as the "basic unit of development." The commune has been expected to carry out social and economic development activities in addition to its basic administrative and political functions. It is expected to pay for them through a head tax and a cattle tax, imposed nationally but collected locally. Its development responsibilities are de facto obligations of policy rather than de jure with defined mandates and means. They are, therefore, highly variable commune to commune. To maintain primary schools, health centers and roads, the commune imposes additional taxes and fees, both monetary and through "voluntary" labor levies. The umuganda, one-day-a-month labor service, has been a norm in most rural communes. Modest additional revenue may come from commune assets, such as forests and quarries, or from communal commercial activities. Some communes which have partnerships with towns in the German Rheinland-Palatinate benefit from occasional gifts and volunteer service. Direct support to individual local development projects with NGO and donor funding is common and may be linked to the local government. With very limited resources and little central government support, the communes strain, hard-scrabble, to meet ill-defined but heavy responsibilities.

This decentralization of development responsibility without corresponding means and clear authorities amounts to a recipe for chronic frustration and insolvency, a problem even during the relatively prosperous 1980's. Some communes have balanced their books, but only at the cost of additional taxes, often arbitrarily imposed, which sometimes dampened local economic activity. In many communes, poorly planned and mismanaged development activities have produced no visible results but an increasingly cynical populace. A 1987 World Bank study documented the growing alienation between the people and local authorities as well as the people's resentment at attempts to burden them with projects generated by local officials in whom they had lost confidence. The worsening economic situation of subsequent years impoverished the communes, further reducing public services.

As practiced for the past twenty years, local governance has not been rooted in the consent of the governed. The burgomaster was once an elected official. Since 1973 he has been appointed by the president on recommendation of the Minister of Interior through the prefet. As the local agent of the central authority, he has answered to a line of command at once administrative and political in the one-party system. The communal council, which he

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chairs, is made up of councilors elected by sectors, of which there are usually 10 to a commune. This communal council supposedly represents the will of the people in decisions on tax levies and use-rights to communal property. More often than not, the councils have been composed of party loyalists who have acquiesced in the burgomaster's decisions and helped as his enforcers.

Women play a limited role in local government. Of some 1,400 communal councilors, only 18 are women. No woman serves as a burgomaster. Not surprisingly, issues of special import to women are virtually never brought to the council table.

The Changing Political Environment: The long-standing inadequacies and contradictions in local government are now being brought to a head. Over the past two years, as political parties developed, NGOs flourished and newspapers sprouted, people felt freed of the constraints of single-party control and began openly to question the legitimacy of local authorities. In many communes, people are refusing to obey the burgomaster, have locked him out of his office, and are asking that the Ministry of Interior replace him. Since April 1992, the national multiparty government of transition has started a house-cleaning operation for local authorities under a formal review commission. It has replaced five of the 11 prefets with officials from among the new parties. Burgomasters are being replaced, some in response to popular demand, others by decision from above. In virtually all communes, people have stopped doing the obligatory labor service and in many they have refused to pay their taxes. In some localities, people have forcibly retaken lands that they had once controlled but that had been re-assigned by communal authorities to others. They have been able to do so only because of wide-spread dissatisfaction with poor governance and lack of accountability at the commune level.

The rejection of local authority poses serious risks in a country plagued by a current war and a long history of communal conflict. The return of multi-partyism is being taken by some as leave to renew ethnic conflict. In a few localities, hate groups have used young people --- mostly poor and unemployed --- in organized gang-attacks on members of rival parties. Overall there is evidence of wide-spread dissatisfaction with poor governance and lack of accountability at the commune level.

Elements of a New Order: The GOR's evolving policy on local government has several aspects. The new constitution and electoral law provide that burgomasters will once again be elected, as will sector councilors and some new councilors at large. Meanwhile, during the transition, the Burgomaster review commission is at work, making replacements. Before the multiparty transition began, with assistance from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), a study of the communes by University of Rwanda scholars of the Superior Institute of Public Administration (ISAP) was undertaken. Its results are now before officials of the Ministry of Interior. For well over a year, the MININTER, with assistance from a UNDP-funded Algerian regional planner, has been drafting a law to reorganize communal government. In 1991, an old central fund for local social and economic development was restructured. The new fund is called the Fonds de Solidarite Communale (FOSOC).

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Though not yet operational, a board of ten burgomasters from those then sitting was elected to serve as FOSOC's governing board. The notion is that its core funding will come from the communes themselves through a levy of 5 percent on their revenues. Donors would then be solicited for grants for its project financing operations. As of now, all of these disjointed initiatives --- electoral laws, the study of the communes, the draft law, the new FOSOC fund --- have not been set within a coherent local government development strategy. Though there is much discussion in the government and among donors about "decentralization," a strategy is by no means yet apparent.

Donors at the Local Level: Several donors have, over the years, assisted communes and local non-governmental organizations. The KAF is supporting training for burgomasters through a five-year (renewable) grant to ISAP. KAF also funded the recent study of communal government by ISAP. The UNDP is continuing its regional planning advisor in the Ministry of Interior to work on communal law reform. The Rhein-Palatinate program continues to "twin" German towns with Rwandan communes and is now offering to fund a pilot program in one commune in participatory planning. The Swiss provided the expert who helped redesign an old central project fund into the new FOSOC. Canada's International Development Agency supports some 65 discrete local development projects, largely with NGOs but some with communes, that have an annual pipeline of five million Canadian dollars. Numerous other local NGOs, supported by Dutch, Scandinavian, EEC, Belgian and US sources, are engaged in natural resources management, cooperatives, health and education projects at the local level.

b) Component Strategy

The approach of the DIG project strategy for improving democratic governance at the local level is to build on the on-going donor efforts and the positive GOR initiatives that would mobilize citizens to take "ownership" of local government; to help MININTER assess the initiatives now in course and with local participation to develop a coherent and comprehensive framework for a more decentralized democratic order; to use training to encourage democratic pluralism and better local government; to build support for the formation of dynamic local public economies; and to foster inter-communal mechanisms for cooperative planning and action.

The strategy requires careful work with the MININTER to assure that citizens through their associations and the local authorities --- official and non-governmental --- have at least parity with central authorities in shaping the strategy. The project will supplement, support and coordinate with other donor efforts, not supplant them. Meant to be executed during the first two years of the DIG project, this component will require flexibility to allow for self-correction during implementation.

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c) Implementation Arrangements and Calendar

Phase I - Before the IPM Arrives

The initial assistance that will guide the USAID/Rwanda DIG Project's local government activities will be a comprehensive assessment of the sector. Given the fast pace of events in Rwanda, the Mission will try to quickly mobilize a technical team to undertake this assessment using a PD and S funded buy-in to the REDSO/WA's Municipal Training Project or to the centrally funded Decentralization and Financial Management Project. The assessment will be carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, ISAP and local authorities to inventory and evaluate the needs of the communal governments, their current capacities, and the existing legal, financial and institutional framework in which they operate. It will carefully take into account the embryonic reform structures (the draft laws, the new FOSOC, the pilot planning efforts, etc.) and the transitional character of all governmental authority --- local and national. It will assess the role of local NGOs and citizen groups in the local public economy, in providing public goods and services, and their relationship to formal local authorities. With the data in hand, the assessment team of expatriates and Rwandans will suggest a strategic framework for local government development, into which the remaining assistance described here will be placed. It will also develop suggestions to improve ISAP's on-going training for local authorities with a new emphasis on how they can steer their communes through the uncertainties of this transitional period and prepare for elections and the orderly transfer of authority. The assessment contract will include funds for follow-up work with ISAP to enhance its current training for local authorities.

If possible, the Mission will use the AREAF regional project, in cooperation with the KAF, to help train candidates early in the electoral process on their expected roles and responsibilities for local offices. In this volatile environment with episodes of local violence, this activity could be critical for helping achieve a peaceful and orderly transition to elected government. The candidate training should be planned in full cooperation with the political parties, and conducted soon after party nominees are known, before formal campaigning begins. It's aim should be to school candidates on Rwanda's public order and the responsibilities of office. Most important, it should challenge candidates to exemplify principles of democratic tolerance, fair dealing with their opponents, and a commitment to an orderly, lawful process. It should also address post-electoral behavior --- how winners still respect minority (opposition) rights and how losers play the positive role of a "loyal opposition."

Phase II - The Component under the IPM and Agreement with MININTER

Soon after arrival in-country, the IPM will negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding with the MININTER. The MOU will detail anticipated project activities and will assign corresponding responsibilities. This agreement will draw on the results of the early assessment and its recommendations. The IPM may use a short-term local government specialist to assist in this process, and in developing a initial life-of-project work plan.

While allowing for adjustments, the following activities are considered most likely for carrying out that agreement and work plan.

- Following local elections, a TA team will conduct a post-election survey leading to revised training for the new local officials. With MININTER and ISAP, advisors will help prepare simplified operations manuals and abstracts of legal codes for use in training. Organized regionally, real-time issues in local decision-making should be worked through in workshop fashion. The role of NGOs in the local public economy should be highlighted, if possible with NGOs participating. The workshops must include women with women's legal issues on the agenda. Trainers should capture substantive feedback for future project orientation.

- Using this feedback, and in line with the work-plan with MININTER, two short-term advisors will review the communal law-reform agenda and will point up remaining structural issues (i.e., the draft law now before the MININTER), issues regarding functional decentralization, communal finance and other priorities. During this consultation, the role of the FOSOC will be reexamined and, if apt, a strategy laid out for its capitalization with the assistance of the donors, the central government and the communes. If warranted, the Project may consider providing a small sum of funds for the FOSOC from the contingency line item. However, given that it is a currently-operating fund, the Project is not expected to provide funds, but financial and other management training and support.

- In this sequence, the feasibility of establishing a **National Association of Burgomasters will be examined.** Its possible roles could be: 1) To act as a collectivity to promote local government autonomy and commune development; 2) To provide a forum for airing common local problems, sharing solutions and setting an agenda for legal reforms and desired shifts in central policy; 3) To set up inter-communal cooperative arrangements for joint development efforts, resource pooling (e.g., equipment pools, shared employment of technicians, etc.); and 4) To address common institutional development needs for training, personnel recruitment, NGO and donor cooperation, etc. Two technical assistance missions are included herein to develop this option and to assist with the Association's start up costs and initial meetings.

This local government component of the DIG Project is planned to conclude by the time the "shake down" evaluation is carried out at the end of the first 18 months of overall project operations under the CA. Recommendations in that evaluation should address what further USAID assistance might be useful.

d) Component Inputs and Outputs

Total funding for this component of the DIG Project is approximately $953,000. The main emphasis of this component is on training. Over 18 calendar months, it funds for short-term

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technical assistance, training for Rwandan counterparts in all TA surveys and studies, and other training for local officials. Additional details are found in the Project's illustrative budget.

Outputs include the strategic framework that the GOR and local authorities will use in promoting decentralization and participatory local government; trained candidates and elected officials who will improve the democratic electoral process and the quality of governance; a new, functioning Burgomasters Association; a pilot program for testing the FOSOC as a local project finance mechanism.

e) End of Component Status - Impact Indicators

Though purposely limited to a tight two-year effort (six months of the startup period and 18 months under the CA) this project component will impact communal governance in at least the following ways:

- Candidates for local offices will carry out responsible campaigns, respecting the rights of others and appealing to the higher values of their constituencies;
- Elected officials will root local governance in citizens' interests with broad popular participation; they will respect the rights of the opposition; they will encourage diversity in the local public economy with NGOs and other groups;
- The new FOSOC will begin to operate with a few promising pilot projects; the Burgomaster's Association will promote inter-communal cooperation and sound decentralization policies which MININTER will support as it reorients its own approach to strengthening, rather than directing and controlling, the commune; and
- Citizens will be showing increased confidence in their communal governments, will be paying taxes, contributing labor, and supporting non-governmental groups as well as the commune in community action and development.

3. The National Assembly

a) Setting and Rationale

The Rwandan legislature has never been genuinely representational, never rooted in popular constituencies. Under the First Republic (1962-72) monopartyism was de facto; under the Second Republic it was the law. Deputies in the unicameral assembly, the Counseil National de Developpement (CND) as it was called, owed their position not to the people, whose quinqennial vote was an obligatory function, but to the party and thus to the president. With the new multi-party order, with 16 registered parties contending for offices, all this is subject to radical change.

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There are 70 seats in the National Assembly (as the CND is renamed in the 1991 constitution). The electoral law provides for 51 electoral districts. From each, one deputy will be elected. The remaining 19 Assembly seats will be distributed among parties based on a proportional share in the nation-wide vote. Thus a party may win no district but with a 5 percent share of the national vote it would still have an Assembly seat. These at-large deputies will be party-beholden, but the deputies from the 51 districts will owe their position to citizen constituents who can demand direct accountability for their performance. Citizen groups, exposed to civic education programs sponsored under the DIG Project, will be learning to exercise their right of access to their deputies and their due from deputies in constituency service and responsiveness. As this happens, the Assembly must change.

In the past, the CND has been a relatively passive instrument. The 1991 Rwandan Constitution, as the old, affirms the "separation and collaboration of the executive, legislative and judicial powers ... " It does not, however, provide for full equality and independence of the latter two branches. Measures to separate and balance the three powers of government remain to evolve, likely in laws initiated by a more proactive Assembly --- perhaps by constitutional amendment. The president and the Assembly do have concurrent authority to initiate legislation. In historic practice, with rare exception, the president has made the law and the Assembly has loyally approved it. It is unlikely that the new multiparty legislature, with deputies under close observation by groups, will be so docile.

A new elected Assembly, with deputies from many political parties, must first organize itself. For the first time, allowance must be made for party caucuses, party-based committee assignments, and rules of order and debate based on party diversity. Then the Assembly must take on fundamental legislative functions that the monoparty CND never performed. These include such critical tasks as performing independent legislative oversight of the administration and of public finance, demanding program accountability for public investments, critically examining the executive budget and its legislative proposals, and initiating new laws as well as the reform of existing law on civil, economic and social affairs including women's rights. Only as it does these things will it begin to provide the restraining or proactive balance to executive power so vital in democratic governance. Failing to do them, it cannot serve the people.

Modern parliamentary bodies need certain instruments for effective action. The first is the means for getting reliable and timely information about the political economy of the nation, the performance of the state agencies, and indispensably, the people's needs and priorities. The second is an analytical capability to interpret the data and to sort alternative policies and legislative remedies to national problems. The third is the means of getting these things together in records of proceedings and debate, in the legislative journal, and in well-crafted law. The key to all of this instrumentation of information and service is the legislative support staff and, in turn, the infrastructure that it mobilizes to support the members of the house.

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At present, all CND staff are employees of the executive branch. This fact simply underscores the gross asymmetry between the powers of state. The CND has no independent budget and no hiring authority. The staff, under its Secretary General, is all detailed from the Ministry of Civil Service. At present there are 11 professionals with some 30 secretaries to serve the Assembly, its commissions and officers. There is no research service, no economic/fiscal analysis capacity, and no professional law-drafting assistance for the CND's five legislative commissions. Proceedings are taped and transcribed by ancient manual typewriters. Documents are published by mimeograph. An embryonic library stocks journals and proceedings, but little else. The Secretary General and his colleagues are eager to develop the operational skills and the systems needed to modernize the services they now perform and to build new capacity to better serve the legislature.

b) Component Strategy

The DIG Project strategy is to help make the National Assembly become an effective vehicle by which the people, through their deputies, can influence the nation's agenda, hold administrative agencies to account, make their demands and grievances known, and state their preferences on remedies sought. It will do so by supporting those initiatives of the National Assembly's leadership that will enhance its capacity to perform its full role in the new democratic order. The focus of the assistance is primarily on building the capacity of the support staff for producing and managing services and information required by the law-makers. The evolving role of the Assembly --- and its support staff --- in the new polity requires that the project retain flexibility so that it can respond to unfolding opportunity and need.

The project's operational strategy is to work through four primary modalities: Staff training and development, a modern computer-based information system, training for deputies, and technical assistance. Most of the latter will be to assist in establishing more effective operations in general, but specifically in new areas of legislative research and analysis, financial oversight and fiscal analysis, and in publications and library/archival management.

Staff Training and Development: In October 1991 the CND requested US assistance to help it prepare for the anticipated transition to a freely elected, multiparty National Assembly. In response, USAID financed a 30-day orientation tour in the United States for five of the 11 CND staff professionals. In their report on visits to the US Congress and State Legislatures, they urge action to adapt the working dynamics of Rwanda's Assembly to the kinds of modern democratic parliamentary practices that they observed. To consolidate these new perspectives on modernizing legislative operations, USAID will --- shortly after project authorization --- send the remaining six CND professional staff on a similar orientation tour. Additional staff training will be programmed both in-country and abroad on information systems management and applications. When the Assembly leadership agrees to add staff for legal research and for policy and fiscal analysis, the project will provide specialized visitor tours or attendance at seminars for their training.

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Modern Information Management Systems: In late 1991, at the CND's request, the Ministry of Plan's National Data Services staff analyzed the existing information services needs of the legislature. In an excellent technical report (see Appendix 1 to Annex F), the Service analyzed the work of the CND and its turgid manual system, recommending that it be replaced by with a relatively low-cost, computer-served, word-processing and information retrieval system which can be subsequently enhanced. The project will finance the procurement of this basic system following an assessment by a qualified systems expert. An expert organization and management analysis of support staff and operations, taking into account the impact the new information system, will provide early recommendations to the Secretary General for redeploying current personnel, for training, and for recruitment. Space allocation will also be assessed.

Training for Assembly Candidates and for Elected Deputies: Separate from DIG Project funding, but within its plan of action, the Mission will try to have the AFR regional AREAF project provide pre-electoral candidate training in cooperation with the Adenauer Foundation. The Mission will also try to use AREAF to assist with post-election training for new deputies. The latter will cover principles of parliamentary order; rule making and modes of organizing for business; the roles of committees, parties and party caucuses and women's caucuses; and, the various roles the support staff plays and the services they provide. It will cover the Rwandan constitution, the structure and operations of government as well as an overview of the economy and public finances. During the course of the project, advisors with assist the support staff in organizing other seminars for deputies using local and international experts. Seminars may cover such areas as the GOR's structural adjustment program, the trends in the liberalizing economy, the state of public finances or current public policy issues such as women's rights, government decentralization, and refugee resettlement. Soon after taking office, the new Assembly officers and minority party leaders will be provided an orientation visit to the US Congress and to selected state legislatures to observe these bodies at work. Women deputies will be specifically targeted in this training both to strengthen the women's caucus in the Assembly and to bring women's issues into focus.

Technical Assistance: Timely technical assistance will be provided to design and to implement improved or new services: to install and operationalize the modern computer-based Information System; to develop data base linkages to executive agencies and to the University; to establish a legislative research and reference service; to develop, in cooperation with the University law faculty, a computer-based compendium of Rwanda's civil, criminal and administrative law for use by a new legal research and law drafting staff supporting the Assembly committees; to develop the Assembly's archival and library system for official and public use; to install a capacity for fiscal/budgetary analysis; and, to continue on-job staff operations improvements and skills development in these and other areas.

c) Implementation Arrangements and Calendar

This component of the DIG project, as are others, will be under the overall management of the IPM under a cooperative agreement with USAID. As provided in the AID/GOR project agreement, the IPM will develop a separate MOU with the leadership of the National Assembly in which all activities will be jointly agreed upon, contributions of the parties defined and key roles established. It is that the Assembly leadership will designate the Secretary General of the Assembly as the IPM's counterpart and as day-to-day project manager for the Assembly.

Assistance to the National Assembly will be carried out in two phases: The first covers assistance before the arrival of the IPM in Rwanda. The second covers all assistance under the IPM's cooperative agreement.

Phase I - Before the IPM Arrives

In October or November 1992, with funds provided in this project, USAID will arrange with USIS an orientation, like that mentioned above, for the remaining six CND staff professionals, including the Secretary General.

Following their return from training, in January 1993, with project funds, USAID will make a buy-into the AFR regional Law Project for a 30-day consultancy by a US legislative analyst. The analyst will perform a rapid appraisal of current staff services to identify changes that should be made based on elections and based on the installation of the new information management regime. A first step staff re-deployment will follow.

Meanwhile, USAID/Rwanda will arrange for the AREAF, under its own funding and in coordination with the Adenauer Foundation, to develop training for candidates for deputy (and to assist the political parties in conducting the training).

Phase II - The Component under the IPM & Agreement with the National Assembly

Upon arrival of the IPM, the MOU with the National Assembly will be negotiated with the assistance of the Secretary General. They may be assisted by a short-term legislative systems advisor. The LOP work-plan will be developed and in it the calendar of project operations. Immediately after elections, AREAF funded and preplanned training for deputies will be conducted.

The IPM will provide a systems expert to evaluate equipment and software for the legislative MIS, its final specifications, and the placement of delivery for the order. Staff for training in systems management will be identified, training sites selected and training initiated.

When the MIS equipment is delivered, a systems advisor will arrive to assist a local contractor in installation and in training CND operations staff on start up operations. The local contract will provide for periodic follow-up training.

Under annual work-plans, at appropriate moments, specialized TA will be provided: To design the legal compendium sub-activity and to assist in contracting with the University law faculty for its completion for introduction to the legislative MIS; to set up the legislative analysis function and to hire/train a Rwandan lawyer in the legal research and law drafting function; to set up the fiscal/budgetary analysis function and to hire/train a Rwandan economist in this function; to develop data base links to the University of Rwanda system, to the executive agencies for rapid information retrieval and open legislative access to data on development projects and the investment budget and on administrative operations, and specifically to fiscal and budgetary data banks; to plan the archives, archival and library management system, and to assist in implementing the plan including space location and rehabilitation under a local contractor; and, to advise on proceedings transcription systems and legislative publications. Other technical assistance will be programmed as needs are identified.

Two evaluations will be done in Phase II: one at 18 months for a shake-down of the project design and another at 36 months for progress assessment and final year adjustments. This project component, depending on progress, may be completed by the time of the 36-month progress evaluation. Even so, it too will be covered by the final evaluation which is noted following.

The project will be closed out by April 1997 with a final evaluation to determine the impact it has had and to form recommendations to USAID and the GOR.

d) Component Inputs and Outputs

Total funding for this component of the DIG Project is approximately $970,000. As detailed in the illustrative budget, the Project will fund short-term Technical Assistance ($260,000), commodities, primarily for the computer-based information system including capacity for a law compendium, research and library service, and all word-processing of debates and the journal, law preparation and publication, and other services, ($50,000). Training abroad for 10 Deputies, 6 senior staff members, 3 systems analysts/managers, a fiscal analyst and a legal analyst and other are costed at $485,000. Other costs include funding for the local training of operational personnel on the computer-based information and publications system, seminar materials for deputies, and materials to rehabilitate and modernize the library and research service operations.

Outputs will include a fully functioning, modern, computer-based legislative information and service system with key systems managers and capable operating personnel; information links with government agencies and Rwanda University data banks; a compendium of Rwandan law, programmed into the information system for computer retrieval, in use by the legislative

analyst and others for law development; an operational fiscal/budgetary analysis capacity; a research service and library available to deputies, staff and, as possible, to the public; seminars for deputies (and staff); timely processing and publication of debates, the journal, draft and final legislation, etc.; better functioning general support services to all deputies by the support staff.

e) End of Component Status and Impact Indicators

By the end of the project the National Assembly should demonstrate in its ongoing legislative operations the following capacities and indicators:

- **Functional and substantive independence** from the strong executive as demonstrated by significant legislation initiated; responsible scrutiny and modification of executive initiated law and the public operational and investment budgets; and, by achieving financial and operational independence from the executive branch with separate budget, staff and administrative operations;

- **Efficient and effective internal parliamentary operations** as demonstrated by an efficient organization of committees with staff research and analysis services; and, by the quality of law introduced and passed;

- **Relevance in its attention to constituent demands and to public policy** as demonstrated in legislative action in many of the following areas: to improve the status and rights of women and marginal groups; to reform the inefficient judicial system and establish its independence from the executive power; to sustain a liberal economy and the free market system; to resolve national social problems, ethnic conflicts and refugee problems; to empower local governments and local groups and to support the civil society, basic civil rights, press freedom, free assembly, and the rights of minorities under majoritarian rule; and,

- **Increased transparency and accountability in governance** through its own openness in operations such as instituting public hearings on legislation, its oversight of government operations, its promotion of fiscal integrity in government agencies (auditing systems, fair competitive procurement procedures, etc.), and new means provided by deputies to be accessible to constituents.

4. The Independent Press: The Rwanda Press Center

a) Setting and Rationale

For Rwanda's new democracy to flourish it needs an informed and politically awakened public. The literate half of the populace should be able to look to a free and responsible press to inform itself. The other half of the population that does not read should be able to

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get information from the first half by word of mouth, but more directly and immediately by radio. Rwanda has a long history of a centralized and government-controlled press, and the only radio in the country is government owned.

Now, the Rwandan press is awakening. Since late 1989, with the first winds of political liberalization, private publications exploded on the scene. Over the next two years, 60 odd weekly, bi-weekly and monthly journals --- with news and opinion of every sort and of very uneven quality --- began to be published. At the present, about thirty journals continue to struggle, offering news of the fast moving political and social events, as well as informed and not-so-informed opinion. Survival for these journals is very precarious. At the start of the information revolution, untried journalists tested the limits of the old censorship culture. At least 24 journalists were arrested. A few were brought to trial for articles considered subversive of national security or defamatory toward government officials. The new press law, issued in December 1991, still retains so many repressive and threatening features that it has been denounced not only by private journalists but by the union of government journalists as well. Its revision is no small issue in political debate today.

Besides political risk, these experimental journalists face considerable financial burdens to publish. Few can afford even typewriters. Imported paper is expensive. There is as yet no effective demand for advertising space, thus no revenue but from sales. Sales are haphazard, by street vendors of marginal reliability. There is no distribution system from Kigali to the provinces. Not surprisingly most independent journals are published at a loss.

Even with these handicaps, these print entrepreneurs are eager to learn the craft and survive the test. The donors have tried to encourage them in various ways. Recent USIS seminars and workshops for journalists have been oversubscribed, as have similar programs offered by the Frederick Neaumann Foundation and by the Swiss. There is a sincere hunger for professionalization among these mostly young and unschooled practitioners. Their access to training, however, is hit and miss. Most urgently, they need material support to overcome the cost of entry into the information market. They have no access to wire services, except the government's own summary reports. They use short-wave radio for current world news, as the international press is costly and late in arrival in Kigali. Library sources are scant. The habits of an opaque, one-party regime limit access to public records. Grapevine gossip is often grasped as printworthy news. The survival of a diversified, independent press remains precarious.

The government radio, managed by ORINFOR (Office Rwandaise d'Information), has begun to provide a small opening to unofficial news and opinion. Each registered political party gets 15 minutes per week to air a tape of its positions and commentaries. The parties accuse ORINFOR of re-editing their tapes before broadcast. A policy of equitable radio access has yet to be articulated for government to weigh against its stated program of multi-party openness. Proposals for an independent, private station are afloat.

Certainly there are still many groups who have almost no voice in public life. For example, there is a single woman's page in Kenyamateka (the major Catholic bi-weekly paper.) Less than 20 percent of Rwandan journalists are women. The women's organizations who want to create a newspaper lack the financial means and know how to do so. Lacking access to an internal news collecting network, journals give little coverage to interior events where the rural masses live. Journals that do trickle through to the provinces are late with news and clearly reflect an urban bias.

In summary, the concrete obstacles that need to be overcome are the following:

- Journalists need low-cost access to production equipment: typewriters, word-processing facilities and PC desk-top publishing tools, printers, copiers, etc.

- They need access to current news sources and references: international wire services, current newspapers and journals, economic data on factor prices and market actors and the trends, public documents and operational reports on programs and projects, and basic biographical and encyclopedic references.

- They need to form a pooled approach to product distribution throughout the national territory as well as a pooled approach to internal news-gathering to cover the events and issues in the provinces. This would require, among other things, a market survey in rural areas and other towns.

- They need systematic training to increase skills, to develop the know-how of running news businesses, to become responsible investigative reporters holding public officials and corporate practices to public scrutiny, to deal ethically with sources, colleagues and their publics.

- They need collegial feedback on their practice as well as the support of their fellows in establishing a free and open information regime in relation to government authority and possible political party pressures.

b) Component Strategy

These difficulties faced in fostering a reliable, open, independent, diverse information regime in Rwanda are tractable. What is needed is a "jump-start" mechanism that can help to reduce short-term costs to the journalist-entrepreneurs; to improve access to training that will raise professional standards and thus the quality of information produced; to facilitate broad and reliable distribution of product; and, to increase information access for journalists through wire services, references, and a systematic collection of documentation on national affairs. With such assistance, a stronger, diversified and more professional press can more fully meet the information needs of Rwanda's citizens. The participation of Rwanda's citizens in the new democracy and in a free market economy hinges on knowledge to inform their action.

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To help meet the immediate information needs of Rwanda's citizens, and to lay the basis for a dynamic, open and independent information regime over the longer term, the DIG project is undertaking a two pronged strategy. One concentrates primarily on resources that print journalists need to do their jobs effectively and the other primarily on the public policy changes needed to make public radio a better servant of this new democracy. Alternatively, private radio options will be examined.

To provide a vehicle through which donor assistance can be effectively channelled to support the free press, a group of 30 journalists --- individuals from both the private Association of Journalists and from the government's Union of Journalists --- are now forming a not-for-profit center. This organization, soon to be registered as an Association Sans But Lucrative (ASBL) under Rwandan law, will be open to membership by all professional journalists. Preliminarily, the organization is being called the Centre de Press Rwandaise (CPR). With support from the DIG project, USIS, and other donors, the CPR will act as a "business service center" to its members and at the same time a vehicle for training and professional development.

Resources from this component of the DIG Project will equip the CPR with those basic tools of the trade that the working journalists can ill afford yet need to keep operating during this "information critical" period of the new democracy. These tools include: typewriters and computers for composing articles, printers for running camera-ready copy, a reference and documentation service, access to international wire services, FAX and copy making, a small dark room/photo lab, and working space. From the outset, the CPR will be managed by a Rwandan director, responsible to the Board elected from among the members. Basic membership dues plus fees-for-services-used will be charged. Start up rates will be low, increasing over time to achieve an income level that can establish the CPR, over time, as a self-sustaining operation. In addition, the CPR director will plan and coordinate a professional development program for the membership. This will include seminars, workshops and roundtables using USIS, Neaumann Foundation, Swiss, French, Belgian and other experts focusing on investigative reporting in social, political and economic affairs, on writing skills, on the business management side of journalism including advertising, distribution and sales, costs of production, etc., and on professional ethics and the role of the press in democratic society.

- To increase skills and professional capacity among Rwandan journalists, the CPR will develop and carry out a comprehensive, modular training program -- supported by USIS, Swiss, Neaumann Foundation and other donors as well as by project-funded specialists;

- To increase the outreach of the press as well as returns from sales, the CPR will establish or assist in establishing a cost-effective, nation-wide system of journal distribution and sales;

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- To increase news coverage for the great majority of Rwandans, 90 percent of whom live in rural provinces, the CPR will establish or assist in establishing a cost-effective internal news-gathering service;

- To encourage public response to the press, the CPR will hold open fora for citizens to interact with journalists and vice versa, including civic associations and public officials in the program of criticism and commentary.

- To assist women's groups, civic organizations and others who feel the lack of a means of direct public communication, it will instruct groups on how-to-start-a-journal and how-to for getting news in the established media.

Finally, with expert assistance under the project, the problem of citizen information access through radio will be examined. Initially, as part of the pre-electoral assistance provided through the regional AREAF project, an advisor will review with the political parties and ORINFOR the current access policy and programming system. The purpose of this assistance will be to advise the GOR and ORINFOR on means of programming for fair and equitable use of the national radio during the campaign period. At the same time, the expert will assess the longer-term policy framework regarding radio access in Rwanda. A follow-on technical expert will build on this initial assessment to examine alternatives including GOR policy and the feasibility of expanding public radio, of establishing one or more private radio services, and the roles donors might play in these options.

c) Implementation Arrangements and Calendar

This project component is divided into two phases. The first phase, from October 1992 through March 1993, is intended to bridge the current period of transitional government through preparations for national elections, by which time the full resources of the project will be on line. The second phase, April 1993 through March 1997, includes an 18-month operational shake-down period with substantial expatriate oversight and input to the Center's operations while services are established and fee schedules put into effect. This will be followed by a turning-over period of another 18 to 30 months. At the end of the overall project (Phase III) a final evaluation will assess the impact of this component.

<u>Phase One - Before the IPM Arrives</u>

USIS, through the resident Public Affairs Officer of the US Embassy, will continue to assist the journalists as they form the new CPR as an ASBL under Rwandan law. USAID, with the assistance of a resident AREAF coordinator and in cooperation with USIS, will draw on AREAF to offer a workshop on the press and the political campaigns. AREAF will also provide an expert to assess the policy framework for radio access and the programming approach for the campaign period.

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Phase Two - The Component under the IPM and Agreement with the CPR

The Institutional Program Manager (IPM) hopefully will have signed the Cooperative Agreement and be in Rwanda in April 1993. The IPM will execute a detailed agreement with the CPR Board for funding the CPR including building rental and rehabilitation, initial staff salaries, equipment procurement, maintenance and operations. With the CPR Director, the IPM will develop a LOP work-plan and the first annual work plan for AID and MINPLAN review and approval. Technical assistance will be provided to the CPR as programmed in the work plans to train staff and to conduct workshops with journalists. It will also assist the CPR in establishing an efficient common-use, self-financing, journal distribution system throughout the national territory and an internal news gathering service for subscribers. The IPM will also arrange for a follow-on study of radio for recommendations to the GOR and to USAID. By the end of the first 18 months, the CPR Director and staff will have assumed full management responsibility for the CPR and all of its services from the IPM. It will be effectively coordinating all donor inputs to the media. The shake-down evaluation will include a review of membership dues and fees-for-services to assess the probably the CPR can reach a sustainable income level by the end of the project. Recommendations will be made for future technical assistance, other donor assistance, and project funding. Based on this the IPM will draw up a revised LOP work plan with the CPR and, in annual increments, they will jointly implement the program through the end of the Cooperative Agreement in April 1997.

A second "progress" evaluation will be conducted before the beginning of the fourth and final year of assistance under the CA with the IPM. If warranted direct assistance to the CPR could be phased-out then or modified in various ways to fit the circumstances. As a separate project concern, this evaluation could include specific recommendations regarding radio, based on developments with the electronic media.

After completion of the Cooperative Agreement in April 1997 a final evaluation will assess success, document the impact of the project on the Rwandan information regime and the evidence that the citizens' information needs are or are not being realized.

d) Component Inputs and Outputs

Total funding for this component of the project will amount to $590,000. As detailed in the Project illustrative budget, the Project will provide funds for short-term technical assistance, training and on-job advice to the CPR staff; and commodities to equip the CPR as a business service center to journalists. Other costs to be funded by the Project include the rental of a building for the Center, the salaries of staff and recurring supply and maintenance costs until income is sufficient to meet these obligations.

Estimates of membership fees and fees for services during the life of the project are difficult to estimate and will be subject to review during the shake-down evaluation 18 months into

project implementation. However, all parties agree that the center should not expect Project funds beyond its third year of existence.

The primary outputs will be: a critical mass of trained journalists working in the profession; the CPR itself, functioning as a training center, resources and service center and as a hub of professional interaction and interchange, and the CPR-generated commercial services: the national journal distribution system, the national internal news gathering service and others.

e) End of Component Status - Impact Indicators

At the end of the project, Rwandan journalists will have an operating center that is serving their needs for on-going professional development and will be using it to meet many of their operational needs in providing timely, reliable, and relevant information to a wide reading public. Samples of journals will demonstrate that citizens are receiving accurate, timely, and comprehensive coverage that affords them open access to government policy debates, accounts of public officials performance, timely information on the economy, and opportune information for participation in the civil society and in the political life of the nation.

Radio coverage will have improved in this same sense either because government radio policy and programming has been expanded to meet the citizen's needs (project impact) or because alternative radio has been established (other than project impact). Listener sampling will validate these improvements as well as the relevance of the electronic media's coverage to the needs of an informed and participating public.

5. USAID Project Support Fund

Project resources authorized in the foregoing four elements of the project will be managed by the Institutional Project Manager under a cooperative agreement with USAID/Rwanda. This element of the project authorizes funds necessary for USAID/Rwanda's direct utilization. They are necessary for two major purposes: First, to finance project evaluations and audits as discussed briefly in section d. below and more fully in Part VI. Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Plan and second, to give the Mission Director a limited reserve to respond to rapidly unfolding targets of opportunity in support of emerging democratic practice. The criteria for uses of these funds and the areas of probable action are discussed in some detail below.

a. Setting and Rationale

The four elements of this project detailed in III. C. 1-4, above, were selected by USAID/Rwanda because each represents a definable area of action for which the time is ripe and the actors are in place, or will soon be in place with some assistance, to achieve a significant and measurable contribution toward democratic governance. In this rapidly evolving political environment, however, there will be occasions where timely external

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assistance is needed that cannot be provided within the framework of these project elements, from other donor portfolios of proffered aid, or within the scope of AID's existing regional and centrally funded instruments. As targets of opportunity, they will likely require very quick responses such as to leverage a reform initiative, to orient a key decisions maker's strategy, or to cement an agreement for immediate action. The purpose of this element of the project is to provide USAID with a flexible instrument to respond quickly to these targets of opportunity. The limited funds provided for this purpose will be used for short-term technical assistance (studies, strategic advice, operational guidance) or brief training inputs that will clearly contribute to the overall project purpose. They will be limited in number and cost as indicated below. The likely sectors of action are also described in the examples given.

Criteria and Procedures for Selection of Sub-Activities:

Obviously, the cost and scope of each discrete activity that might be undertaken during the course of the next five years cannot be predefined here. However, in compliance with Section 611 (A) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act, it is stipulated that the total amount to be utilized for these purposes is not expected to exceed $700,000 and will be consistent with the examples given in Section b. below and within the budget limits provided.

In the case of technical assistance provided, any contract for services or purchase order for a deliverable will be limited to a discrete and clearly definable output such as an analytical report with recommendations for action by a host-country body or decision-maker. Before such TA undertakings are approved by the Mission, they will be vetted by the PMOC and by the Mission Democratic Initiatives Project Committee to determine that other expeditious mechanisms or sources --- including other donors --- are not available and that the undertaking has both priority and significance to the overall Mission strategy for enhancing democratic governance.

In the case of substantive training, travel to conferences for policy orientation and related purposes, long-term, degree-orientated initiatives will not be considered. Before approval by the Mission Director, proposals will be vetted with the Mission Project Committee for recommendations on relevance and appropriateness. In each case the training will be clearly targeted on building knowledge, orienting policy, changing attitudes, and consolidating commitment for a specific element of democratic practice in the Rwandan polity and society.

b) Illustrative Targets of Opportunity:

The Administration of Justice: One of the areas in need of profound institutional reform in Rwanda is the corrupt, inefficient, and maladministered system of justice. The gravity of its short-comings is well documented in recent studies by foreign experts. Unfortunately, the regime's inaction on recommendations to undertake urgently needed reforms is equally well documented. Until presented with clear evidence that the GOR is prepared to take direct and significant steps toward reform in this sector, USAID's strategy

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is to support an incremental, indirect approach to reform through the action of non-governmental change agents such as the human rights organizations and the private association of jurists and lawyers. Their efforts, and those of other NGO groups, to mobilize support for reform legislation and to lobby the parliament for action can and will be supported through the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives. Hopefully momentum will build as these citizens groups take real responsibility for promoting the rule of law. On the other hand, should the transitional government or the new leadership soon to be elected take steps to overhaul this system, USAID will be prepared to join with other donors in providing immediate assistance. The French are currently providing an advisor who is working to improve training for magistrates, legal publications and documentation of jurisprudence, selected laws, and to improve the impoverished system of prison administration. Clearly the French and Belgians, and even the Canadians, have a comparative advantage as donors to a legal system based on the Napoleonic/Civil Law tradition. The US Mission will encourage them to continue to take the lead in this sector. On the other hand, there are areas in which US judicial administration is highly apposite. Considerable interest in US judicial practice was recently generated among Rwandan jurists and lawyers by the visit and public lectures of US Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. A momentum is building.

USAID/Rwanda anticipates that the Ministry of Justice, or the Supreme Council of Magistrates, may request discrete technical assistance directed toward reform of the Rwandan justice system. This could be in such areas as measures necessary to assure judicial independence, modern case management systems, simplified procedures for small claims courts, reforms in contract or commercial law and related areas where US experience and American expertise would be highly valued. A quick response to a request for such assistance could cement a major commitment to reform in this sector.

Audit and Fiscal Accountability: Another likely area of potential USAID rapid assistance is related to the first. The Rwandan fiscal system, patterned after the French and Belgian model, places responsibility for auditing public sector agencies with a "Court of Accounts." Formally in the "judicial sector," these institutions function best when they have considerable independence of action, and are well trained and equipped to serve the function of watchdogs over the fisc. That is not the case in Rwanda today. The public accounting system here is opaque. The Court of Accounts "magistrates" are not professionals in public accounting/auditing and, moreover, they are subordinated to the executive branch by budget and through their service at the pleasure of and appointment by the president. Neither the parliament through budget examination nor the Court of Accounts through timely auditing performs the oversight necessary to assure transparency in public financial practice. Reform in this arena would be a major contribution to democratic governance.

USAID/Rwanda anticipates that key executive officials in an elected government will decide to initiate reforms in this system. While some initiative for reform may be supported through the project element with the National Assembly, as discussed above, USAID will be prepared, in collaboration with the World Bank, the IMF and other donors, to respond

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quickly with timely and effective technical resources to an executive branch request to push such reform from its side.

Women's Rights and the GOR Strategy: (Please see ANNEX J, Social Soundness Analysis, Gender Considerations for further details.) The recently established transitional government included, for the first time, a Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women. During project design, the gender specialist on the team met with the new Minister to explain the scope of the project and USAID's desire to assure that women's concerns and needs would be carefully addressed in it. Intended support through women's NGOs, through women deputies in the Assembly, through the free press, and in local communal affairs was explained. The Minister welcomed this, but she indicated that assistance was needed now to help formulate a program strategy within her own new ministry including an approach toward field services to address women's needs for legal aid and other remedies to discrimination in the society. To provide a rapid response to this request, which is outside the scope of the four foregoing project elements, the Mission will --- following project authorization and obligation, using funds provided herein --- authorize a buy-in, probably using PD&S funds, to the Genesys project or other AID on-line resource for a strategic planning expert on women's affairs to help this ministry shape its program strategy. Early assistance could help in developing positive working relationships with women's NGOs and respect for other non-state actors working in the sector.

Other Areas of Potential Assistance: Additional areas of high-impact, short-term assistance might be associated with selected reforms in the civil service system; the devolution of key central authorities in health, education, natural resources management, etc., to local government control; creating ombudsman-like authorities to increase administrative responsiveness to citizens and to reduce bureaucratic abuse; major reforms in women's status under the law, and special initiatives for small and disadvantaged businesses.

c) Implementation Arrangements

The Project Agreement with the GOR will provide that once the USAID, in consultation with MINIPLAN, has selected a target of opportunity for special assistance USAID present documentation for official sub-obligating clearance. It is anticipated that most technical assistance will be provided by means of quick response mechanisms such as IQCs, buy-ins to regional or central projects, and purchase orders for personal service deliverables. The Mission Project Officer will keep the IPM informed of these special initiatives so that they may be coordinated, as needed, with other activities under the project. In the case of training activities, such as visitor tours, USAID may arrange them jointly with USIS or through regional or central AID mechanisms. Conference attendance may be provided for by direct mission travel orders. Training activities, as in the case of technical assistance, will be appropriately documented for MINPLAN's approval.

d) Component Inputs and Outputs

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Total funding under the USAID Project Support Component is $635,000. It includes technical assistance in as many as 10 separate consultancies with 12 person months of US TA and 6 person months of Rwandan counterpart TA. Training programs for as many as 20 Rwandan participants in orientation tours, seminars and conferences. In addition to this amount, additional funds are programmed for a base-line survey, two evaluations of the cooperative agreement at 18 months and at 36 months and a final evaluation, four annual audits. These are expected to total some $790,000. Additional details are found in the project's illustrative budget.

Outputs will include the baseline survey, two progress evaluations and a final evaluation using the baseline for impact assessment; four annual audits of the cooperative agreement and subgrants under that agreement; no less than six reports on technical advisory missions that provide specific recommendations on the individual targets of opportunity; and 20 Rwandan leaders trained on a specific target of concern for democratic development.

e) End of Component Status

At the end of the project it will be demonstrated that the evaluations and audits made it possible for the USAID Mission to correct the project design to fit changing circumstances and to adapt it to unanticipated developments. It will also be demonstrated that the targets of opportunity assistance as well as the training assistance each made a clear contribution to a dimension of democratic governance in Rwanda. Lasting benefits to citizens, citizens groups and institutions will be documented in the final evaluation.

D. Implementation Alternatives Considered

A number of alternative procurement mechanisms and management structures were considered during the design phase for use in DIG Project implementation. The final model chosen -- an Institutional Project Manager selected to manage a Cooperative Agreement through which a range of services will be provided to a number of Rwandan public and non-governmental organizations -- responds to a several basic programmatic and management requirements which are described below.

1. Timeliness of Support to the Rwandan Democratization Process

General elections could take place as early as April 1993. New political parties and emerging civil society institutions, including the free press and non-governmental organizations, are at a critical point in their evolution. There is an urgent need to maintain these and other positive trends of the political opening, especially as the forces arrayed against maintaining this momentum are still formidable. The support that the DIG Project brings to the rapidly unfolding democratization process is not only relevant but has the potential of contributing to this positive direction, thus mitigating against the factors that could derail it. Following normal A.I.D. procurement practices would take a minimum of

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ten months before a contractor could be selected and at least another two months before it could mobilize a technical assistance team and get it in place. Given a project authorization date of September 30, 1992, the soonest a contractor team could be in place is October 1993.

This Project Paper has chosen to undertake procurement of an Institutional Project Manager through a Cooperative Agreement instrument which will restrict competition to a selected group of U.S. PVOs, Non-Profit Organizations and Universities that have demonstrated capabilities to manage similar activities. It is estimated that such a procurement process would take one-half the time of a fully-competed contract while not diminishing the overall quality of institution selected, including the TA personnel assigned to the project. The Mission has thoroughly satisfied itself that there will be no loss of technical or management capacity by restricting competition to the category of organizations noted above and inviting a short-list of such organizations to apply for the Cooperative Agreement.

2. USAID Management Considerations

Keeping USAID management responsibilities to a level commensurate with its current staffing, while ensuring overall accountability for project outcome is in fact enhanced by the selected procurement instrument. Operating under a CA rather than a contract provides USAID with a means to selectively choose those areas of project management in which to involve itself in order to ensure its mandated accountability for project outcome. The CA is mid-way between a contract and a Handbook 13 Grant within the available A.I.D. procurement options in terms of the amount of management oversight required by Mission personnel during project implementation. With the "substantial involvement" provisions of the CA, the Mission can stipulate the specific set of conditions, approvals and concurrences that the CA recipient must fulfill or seek prior to executing certain critical actions including moving from one phase of implementation to another. Given the sensitivity and potentially high profile of this project and the fact that Mission staffing levels will not be increased in the foreseeable future, the CA mechanism offers the best means for ensuring project success.

3. Increased Accountability (Including Financial), Effectiveness and Flexibility

The simplicity of a single Institutional Project Manager working through a resident Project Management Unit, responsible for overall project management and administration including the provision of all technical assistance, is more flexible, provides greater accountability, and is likely to be more effective including cost than a number of contractors providing TA to one or more components. This is especially true for the DIG Project with multiple components, a varied and demanding clientele, and a rapidly changing and volatile situation. For USAID, the opportunity to interact with only one management entity, which it can as well hold responsible for all aspects of project implementation, increases its own effectiveness in project oversight and management. Taking this relationship as a collaborative effort as implied by the choice of a Cooperative Agreement instrument, provides the IPM with a degree of flexibility that would not necessarily come through a

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contract and is highly desirable in the Rwandan context. Finally, with one Project Manager there is a far greater likelihood that the project will be viewed as it was designed, i.e., as a set of discrete but inter-related activities each with its own logic and internal consistency but leading to the achievement of a common purpose.

4. Appropriateness to the Rwandan Context

Earlier design phase efforts considered placing long-term expatriate advisor-managers in several of the targeted institutions for the purpose of providing overall management oversight and technical assistance to the particular component. The final design however, opts for a centralized management/technical assistance capacity which can serve the technical and management needs of each institution while ensuring financial oversight of funding made available to each recipient. The reasoning goes deeper than economies of scale and cost effectiveness which are evident from this "umbrella" management model. The DIG Project is to a significant extent an effort to create or improve institutional capacity in three of the four targeted institutions, and it can be argued in that of the fourth as well, i.e., the development of the institution of Local (Communal) Government. As a principle, and one made very clear by the NGOs themselves during PP design, building institutional capacity or maintaining oversight does not require the presence of an expatriate sitting in close proximity to the recipients of donor assistance. This is particularly true in the context of this somewhat politically sensitive activity with a likely high profile.

5. Success is Finally an Issue of the Personnel Provided

The key to DIG Project success will finally hinge on the quality of the technical assistance personnel, both the long-term PMU team and the short-term consultants provided by the Institutional Project Manager. The issue is not, therefore, whether it is a for-profit contractor or a U.S. PVO that manages the project but the capacity of an organization to attract and field qualified and experienced personnel. It is USAID's position that the category of non-profit organizations specified for this procurement is capable of this action. USAID intends to maintain this principal in the evaluation criteria for the award by weighting "key" personnel at 50 percent of the total award.

IV. COST ESTIMATE AND FINANCIAL PLAN

A. Total Life of Project Contribution from all Sources

While the Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project is jointly authorized under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and Section 116(e), Human Rights of the FAA, its funding comes solely from the DFA. The total five-year Life of Project (LOP) cost from all sources of the DIG Project will approximate $9.8 million of which A.I.D. contributions will be $9,000,000. Four million seven hundred thousand dollars will be obligated in FY 1992.

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The next increment of one million dollars will be added in FY 1994 and additional increments will be provided in FY 1995-1996. Approximately, $7.2 million of total project funding will be obligated through a Cooperative Agreement with a U.S. PVO, Non-Profit Organization or University to be competitively selected to serve as the DIG Institutional Project Manager.

The Government of Rwanda (GOR) will not be formally required to provide a host country contribution to the project (see, Annex E). The Institutional Project Manager (CA Recipient), will not be required to provide a contribution[1] to the project as it is essentially providing services to USAID/Rwanda and not carrying out its own program in Rwanda. It is expected that the four identified beneficiaries of project assistance (two government and two non-government institutions), as well as NGOs to be identified and awarded subgrants under the CCADI component, will contribute to the total component cost of each activity either in-cash or in-kind. As presently budgeted the NGO contribution equals approximately $362,000. While it is intended that DIG will leverage funding from other bilateral and multilateral donors, both for current operations and future self-financing of the beneficiary institutions, the prospect and likely amount of this collateral funding is too remote to be included as part of this presentation. USIS will make a major contribution to the Press Center, but the dollar value could not be determined during this design.

An amount of $357,000 has been allocated to a contingency/reserve line item under the Institutional Project Manager's budget. This fund will be used by the IPM to fund unforeseen costs of one or more of the four components to be funded through the Cooperative Agreement. During the startup stage, the IPM and each of the four beneficiary institutions will refine cost estimates arrived at during the design phase. While each of the component costs and budgets discussed in this section and expanded upon in Annex H, "Detailed Cost Estimate and Budget Analysis," have been prepared through a careful analysis of corresponding input requirements, it is strongly felt that final determinations should be made jointly between the IPM's resident Project Management Unit (PMU) and officers of the respective institutions. This will also allow for a more detailed review of specialized commodity and technical assistance requirements by experts in each of the technical areas supported by the project. In the event that any funds remain in the reserve fund after the individual subordinate agreements have been negotiated, they will be transferred to the subgrant fund under the NGO Center component. Finally, an inflation factor of 5 percent per year has been built into each of the component budgets as well as that of the IPM beginning in FY 1994. This does not include the subgrant fund in which individual proposals will be expected to include a line item for inflation.

In addition to funding authorized through the Project Agreement, USAID will provide funds from its own PD&S budget and seek assistance from the centrally-funded AREAF Project to

1 Applicants for the Cooperative Agreement may however be requested to demonstrate their commitment to the DIG Project by providing concrete examples, in their Applications, of their institution's willingness to contribute to the project. As part of the evaluation for the award of the CA, this willingness to contribute may figure as part of the Recipient selection criteria and evaluated accordingly.

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undertake a series of Phase I or pre-CA activities in support of the overall project. These non-project funds are integral to project success.

B. USAID Cost Estimate

Table I summarizes the Project costs by funding source. Table II, summarizes the cost estimates for A.I.D. financing for the project. Project costs met are broken down into three major categories as follows:

1. Institutional Project Manager & Its Project Management Unit

The budget covers all the costs of the IPM. This includes all home office costs and the entire cost of supporting its resident Project Management Unit (PMU) (e.g., operational, equipment). Adequate funds are budgeted for technical assistance and training needs for use by the PMU in providing institutional strengthening assistance for those beneficiaries requiring it. Although jointly programmed, the PMU will also manage the subgrant fund budgeted under the NGO component. Finally, each of the subordinate agreements entered into with the four beneficiary institutions will detail the specific costs under their individual budgets that will be directly managed by the PMU on their behalf.

2. Beneficiary Institutions and Capacity Strengthening

All of the costs associated with the strengthening of each of the four institutional beneficiaries discussed in III.C.1-4 above and to be financed under the Cooperative Agreement will be committed through subordinate agreements between the PMU and the concerned beneficiary. As noted above, these agreements will stipulate those costs under each budget which will be managed by the PMU. In the case of the two public institutions, the National Assembly and the Ministry of Interior, the PMU will manage all funding under both jointly-developed budgets. For the two newly established civil society support centers, the PMU will manage their budgets until such a time as it can certify that their financial management and accounting systems are adequate to properly manage approved funding.

3. USAID Project Support Fund

Outside of the Cooperative Agreement, USAID will maintain a Project Support Fund to cover overall project external evaluation and audit costs and to finance which will be jointly programmed with the Ministry of Plan to finance "targets of opportunity" not covered under other project components. Commitments for each action related to either of the functional uses of the Support Fund will be made through the relevant Project Implementation Order (PIO), i.e., technical assistance or commodities.

Table III below provides annual expenditure projections for the A.I.D. contribution by project element. Each of the three project elements is broken down into major subcategories or in the case of the Beneficiary Grants into project components.

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TABLE I.

ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT BUDGET AND MATCHING CONTRIBUTIONS, IN US$ MILLIONS

Component	USAID Contribution	GOR Contribution	NGO Contribution	TOTAL PROJECT
Cooperative Agreement (CA)				
Project Management Unit (PMU), and Local and International Consultants (a)	2,612,943	0	0	2,612,943
CA Project Components	3,869,094	480,254	361,689	4,711,037
CCADI (b)	1,361,937	0	212,195	1,574,132
CPR (c)	586,140	0	149,494	735,634
National Assembly (d)	968,065	242,016	0	1,210,081
MININTER (d)	952,952	238,238	0	1,191,190
Audits, Unallocated Costs, Contingency for CA	1,017,964	0	0	1,017,964
Support Fund, Evaluations, Audits, Contingency	1,500,000	0	0	1,500,000
TOTALS	9,000,000	480,254	361,689	9,841,943

(a) This amount funds the two long term Technical Assistants, all the local-hire staff working the PMU, the supplies and equipment for the PMU, as well as training and short-term technical assistance consultants.

(b) Of the component's total cost, the CCADI will contribute 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% in Years 2,3,4, and 5 of the Project.

(c) Of the component's total cost, the RPC will contribute 10%, 25%, 50% and 50% in Years 2,3,4 and 5 of the Project.

(d) Of the component's total cost, the GOR will contribute 25%.

TABLE II.

DIG PROJECT ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Line Items	Year 1 of Project	Year 2 of Project / Year 1 of CA	Year 3 of Project / Year 2 of CA	Year 4 of Project / Year 3 of CA	Year 5 of Project / Year 4 of CA	TOTALS
PMU						
LONG TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE						
Salaries						
Chief of Party		45,000	46,800	48,672	50,609	191,081
Financial Mgt/Admin. Mgr.		40,000	41,600	43,264		124,864
Sub-total		***85,000***	***88,400***	***91,936***	***50,609***	***315,945***
Indirect (30%)		**25,500**	**26,520**	**27,581**	**15,183**	**94,784**
Allowances						
Chief of Party						
Post Differential		11,250	11,700	12,168	12,655	47,773
COLA		1,970	1,970	2,060	2,060	8,060
Storage		3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	12,000
Shipment (HHE)		40,000			45,000	85,000
Shipment (UAB)		6,000	12,000		6,000	24,000
POV Shipment		7,500			8,500	16,000
Consumables		15,000	7,500			22,500
Educational Allowances		12,600	11,000	11,500	12,000	47,100
Financial Mgt/Admin. Mgr.						
Post Differential		10,000	10,400	10,816		31,216
COLA		1,800	1,800	1,880		5,480
Storage		3,000	3,000	3,000		9,000
Shipment (HHE)		40,000		45,000		85,000
Shipment (UAB)		6,000		6,000		12,000
POV Shipment		7,500		7,500		15,000
Consumables		15,000				15,000
Educational Allowances		12,000	10,000	10,000		32,000
Sub-total		***192,620***	***72,370***	***112,924***	***69,215***	***467,129***
Indirect (30%)		**57,786**	**21,711**	**33,877**	**26,765**	**140,139**
Travel						
Chief of Party						
Assignment to Post		10,000				10,000
Travel Per Diem		1,000	1,100	1,200	1,300	4,600
R&R		16,000				16,000
Home Leave			16,000			16,000
Repatriation					16,000	16,000
FM/AM						
Assignment to Post		10,000				10,000
Travel Per Diem		1,000	1,100	1,200		3,300
R&R		16,000	16,000			32,000
Home Leave						
Repatriation				17,000		17,000
Sub-total		***54,000***	***34,200***	***19,400***	***19,300***	***126,900***
Indirect (30%)		**16,200**	**10,260**	**5,820**	**5,790**	**38,070**
Fringe Benefits						
Chief of Party		11,250	11,700	12,168	12,655	47,773
FM/AM		10,000	10,400	10,816		31,216
Sub-total		***21,250***	***22,100***	***22,984***	***12,655***	***78,989***
Indirect (30%)		**6,375**	**6,630**	**6,895**	**3,797**	**23,697**
Local Staff						
Program Officer		10,485	10,904	11,340	11,794	44,523
Chief Accountant		10,485	10,904	11,340	11,794	44,523
MSI/M&E Specialist		5,268	5,479	5,698	5,926	22,371
Training/TA Spec.		4,875	5,070	5,273	5,484	20,702
Secretary		4,250	4,420	4,597	4,781	18,048
Driver/Mech.		2,641	2,747	2,857	2,971	11,216
Driver/Messenger		1,443	1,501	1,561	1,623	6,128
Day/Guard/Gardener		1,400	1,456	1,514	1,575	5,945
Sub-total		***40,847***	***42,481***	***44,180***	***45,948***	***173,456***

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DIG PROJECT ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Line Items	Year 1 of Project	Year 2 of Project	Year 3 of Project	Year 4 of Project	Year 5 of Project	TOTALS
		Year 1 of CA	Year 2 of CA	Year 3 of CA	Year 4 of CA	
Benefits (25%)		10,212	10,620	11,045	11,487	43,364
Sub-total		51,059	53,101	55,225	57,435	216,820
Indirect (30%)		15,318	15,930	16,568	17,231	65,046
Other Direct Costs						
Home Rental COP		10,000	10,000	11,000	11,000	42,000
Home Rental FM/AM		10,000	10,000	11,000		31,000
Home Utilities COP		2,500	3,750	5,000	6,240	17,490
Home Utilities FM/AM		2,500	3,750	5,000		11,250
Office Rental		12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	48,000
Office Utilities		2,500	2,750	3,025	3,275	11,550
Office Supplies		6,000	6,200	6,400	6,600	25,200
Guards Office and 2 Houses (6 guards)		18,000	18,000	19,845	16,538	72,383
Communications		7,000	7,000	7,500	7,500	29,000
Vehicle Maintenance		2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	8,000
Radio, 1		2,000				2,000
Computer Repairs		1,000	1,200	1,400	1,600	5,200
Copier Repairs		1,000	1,200	1,400	1,600	5,200
Office Maintenance		2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	8,000
Home Maintenance (x2)		6,000	6,000	6,000	4,000	24,000
Household Furniture (x2)		100,000				100,000
Household Appliance (x2)		30,000				30,000
Sub-total		***214,500***	***85,850***	***95,570***	***74,353***	***470,273***
Indirect (30%)		64,350	25,755	28,671	22,306	141,082
Equipment and Supplies						
Vehicles, 4x4, 2		50,000				50,000
Desktop computers, 4		15,000				15,000
Printers, 2		3,000				3,000
UPS, 4		2,000				2,000
Computer Software		5,000		3,000		8,000
Photocopier, 1		3,500				3,500
Electric typewriter, 1		500				500
Fax, 1		750				750
Telephone system, 10 ext.		5,100				5,100
Duplicating machine, 1		3,000				3,000
Office Desks, 8		2,400				2,400
Office chairs, 30		3,000				3,000
File cabinets, 8		1,600				1,600
Bookshelves, 8		1,700				1,700
Conference table, 1		600				600
Computer tables, 4		750				750
Office supplies		6,000	6,200	6,400	6,600	25,200
Sub-total		***103,900***	***6,200***	***9,400***	***6,600***	***126,100***
Procurement Fee (10%)		10,390	620	940	660	12,610
Training						
Local Staff		10,000	10,000	15,000		35,000
Sub-total		***10,000***	***10,000***	***15,000***		***35,000***
Indirect (30%)		3,000	3,000	4,500		10,500
Consultants						
Int'l		72,100	72,100			144,200
Local		24,000	24,000			48,000
Sub-total		***96,100***	***96,100***			***192,200***
Indirect (30%)		28,830	28,830			57,660
SUB-TOTAL PMU		1,056,177	607,578	547,291	401,897	2,612,943

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DIG PROJECT ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Line Items	Year 1 of Project	Year 2 of Project / Year 1 of CA	Year 3 of Project / Year 2 of CA	Year 4 of Project / Year 3 of CA	Year 5 of Project / Year 4 of CA	TOTALS
CCADI						
Local Staff						
Ctr. Dir./Mgr.		10,485	10,904	11,340	11,794	44,523
Ext/Trg Coord.		5,266	5,479	5,698	5,928	22,371
Chief Accountant		10,485	10,904	11,340	11,794	44,523
MSI/Research Coord.		5,266	5,479	5,698	5,928	22,371
Secretary		4,250	4,420	4,597	4,781	18,048
Driver/Mech.		2,641	2,747	2,857	2,971	11,216
Driver/Messenger (2)		2,886	3,002	3,122	3,246	12,256
Ser. Ctr. Secretary		4,875	5,070	5,273	5,484	20,702
Ctr. Day Guard/Gardener		1,400	1,456	1,514	1,575	5,945
Ser. Ctr. Day Guard/Gardener		1,400	1,456	1,514	1,575	5,945
Sub-total		***48,958***	***50,917***	***52,953***	***55,072***	***207,900***
Benefits (25%)		12,240	12,729	13,238	13,768	51,975
Sub-total		**61,198**	**63,646**	**66,191**	**68,840**	**259,875**
Indirect (30%)		**18,359**	**19,094**	**19,857**	**20,652**	**77,963**
Other Direct Costs						
Office Rental		12000	12000	12000	12000	48000
Office Utilities		2500	2750	3025	3275	11550
Sub-total		***14,500***	***14,750***	***15,025***	***15,275***	***59,550***
Indirect (30%)		**4,350**	**4,425**	**4,508**	**4,583**	**17,865**
Equipment and Supplies						
Vehicles, 1		22,000				22,000
Desktop computers, 4		14,000				14,000
Printers, 2		3,000				3,000
UPS, 4		2,000				2,000
Computer Software		5,000		3,000		8,000
Photocopier, 1		3,500				3,500
Electric Typewriter, 1		500				500
Fax, 1		750				750
Telephone system, 8 extensions		4,100				4,100
Duplicating Machine, 1		3,000				3,000
Office Desk		2,100				2,100
Office chairs, 26		2,600				2,600
File cabinets, 7		1,400				1,400
Bookshelves, 7		1,540				1,540
Conference table, 1		600				600
Computer tables, 4		750				750
Office supplies		6,000	6,200	6,400	6,600	25,200
Sub-total		***72,840***	***6,200***	***9,400***	***6,600***	***95,040***
Procurement Fee (10%)		**7,284**	**620**	**940**	**660**	**9,504**
Training/Subgrant Fund						
Development of training materials		30,000	50,000	60,000	60,000	200,000
Training of staff as trainers		10,000	15,000	15,000	10,000	50,000
Civil Education and Action Fund		50,000	60,000	65,000	65,000	240,000
Sub-total		***90,000***	***125,000***	***140,000***	***135,000***	***490,000***
Indirect (30%)		**27,000**	**37,500**	**42,000**	**40,500**	**147,000**
Consultants						
Int'l		21,630	21,630	18,540		61,800
Local		33,600	33,600	28,800		96,000
Sub-total		***55,230***	***55,230***	***47,340***		***157,800***
Indirect (30%)		**16,569**	**16,569**	**14,202**		**47,340**
SUB-TOTAL CCADI		**367,330**	**343,034**	**359,463**	**292,110**	**1,361,937**

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DIG PROJECT ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Line Items	Year 1 of Project	Year 2 of Project / Year 1 of CA	Year 3 of Project / Year 2 of CA	Year 4 of Project / Year 3 of CA	Year 5 of Project / Year 4 of CA	TOTALS
CPR						
Local Staff						
Ctr. Dir./Mgr.		10,485	10,904	11,340		32,729
Chief Accountant		10,485	10,904	11,340		32,729
Resource Ctr. Mgr.		8,484	8,823	9,176		26,483
Secretary		4,250	4,420	4,597		13,267
Driver/Mech.		2,641	2,747	2,857		8,245
Guard/Gardener		1,400	1,456	1,514		4,370
Sub-total		*37,745*	*39,254*	*40,824*		*117,823*
Benefits (25%)		9,436	9,814	10,206	0	29,456
Sub-total		47,181	49,068	51,030	0	147,279
Indirect (30%)		14,154	14,720	15,309	0	44,184
Other Direct Costs						
Office Rental		12,000	12,000	6,000		30,000
Office Utilities		2,500	2,750	1,513		6,763
Sub-total		*14,500*	*14,750*	*7,513*		*36,763*
Indirect (30%)		4,350	4,425	2,254		11,029
Equipment and Supplies						
Vehicles, 1		22,000				22,000
Desktop computers, 3		10,500				10,500
Printers, 2		3,000				3,000
UPS, 3		1,500				1,500
Computer Software		5,000		3,000		8,000
Photocopier, 1		3,500				3,500
Electric Typewriter, 1		500				500
Manual Typewriter, 20		3,000				3,000
Fax, 1		750				750
Telephone system, 6 extensions		3,000				3,000
Duplicating machine, 1		3,000				3,000
Wire Services		4000	4200	4400		12,600
Library Resources		2000	2100	2200		6,300
Office desks, 6		1,800				1,800
Office chairs, 34		2,400				2,400
File cabinets, 6		3,000				3,000
Bookshelves, 6		1,200				1,200
Conference table, 1		600				600
Computer tables, 3		563				563
Sub-total		*71,313*	*6,300*	*9,600*		*87,213*
Procurement Fee (10%)		7,131	630	960		8,721
Training						
Computer Training for Staff		5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	20,000
Sub-total		*5,000*	*5,000*	*5,000*	*5,000*	*20,000*
Indirect (30%)		1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	6,000
Consultants						
Int'l		57,680	72,100	43,260		173,040
Sub-total		*57,680*	*72,100*	*43,260*		*173,040*
Indirect (30%)		17,304	21,630	12,978		51,912
SUB-TOTAL CPR		240,113	190,123	149,404	6,500	586,140
CND						
Equipment and Supplies						
Desktop computers, 8		28,000				28,000
Printers, 5		7,500				7,500
UPS, 8		4,000				4,000
Computer Software		5,000		3,000		8,000

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DIG PROJECT ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Line Items	Year 1 of Project	Year 2 of Project	Year 3 of Project	Year 4 of Project	Year 5 of Project	TOTALS
		Year 1 of CA	Year 2 of CA	Year 3 of CA	Year 4 of CA	
Fax, 1		750				750
Duplicating/Stencil, 1		3,000				3,000
Sub-total		*48,250*		*3,000*		*51,250*
Procurement Fee (10%)		4,825		300		5,125
Training						
Staff training		30,000	35,000	35,000	30,000	130,000
Candidate/elected deputy training		50,000	50,000			100,000
Follow-up Study Tour to US for 6 NA staff		175,000				175,000
MIS trg for NA staff local/abroad		80,000				80,000
Sub-total		*335,000*	*85,000*	*35,000*	*30,000*	*485,000*
Indirect 30%)		100,500	25,500	10,500	9,000	145,500
Consultants						
Int'l		72,100	72,100	72,100		216,300
Sub-total		*72,100*	*72,100*	*72,100*		*216,300*
Indirect 30%)		21,630	21,630	21,630		64,890
SUB-TOTAL NA		582,305	204,230	142,530	39,000	968,065
LOCAL GOV'T						
Training						
Communal Unit Trg for Gov't officials		50,000	70,000	70,000	70,000	280,000
Training for MININTER officials		50,000	50,000			100,000
Development of Training Materials		30,000	50,000	60,000		140,000
Sub-total		*130,000*	*170,000*	*130,000*	*70,000*	*500,000*
Indirect 30%)		39,000	51,000	39,000	21,000	150,000
Consultants						
Int'l		86,520	86,520			173,040
Local		30,000	30,000			60,000
Sub-total		*116,520*	*116,520*			*233,040*
Indirect (30%)		34,956	34,956			69,912
SUB-TOTAL LOCAL GOV'T		320,476	372,476	169,000	91,000	952,952
Audits of Subgrants						
Audits		50,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	350,000
Indirect (30%)		15,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	105,000
Local Currency Costs – Other, Unallocated						
Gasoline and maintenance (4 vehicles)		10,000	12,000	14,000	12,000	48,000
Per Diem, in-country		20,000	30,000	30,000	25,000	105,000
Sub-total		30,000	42,000	44,000	37,000	153,000
Indirect (30%)		9,000	12,600	13,200	11,100	45,900
TOTAL FOR C.A.R.		2,670,402	1,902,041	1,554,[illegible]	1,008,607	7,135,938
	71359	71359	71359	71359	71359	
					CONTINGENCY (5%)	356,797
					TOTAL	7,492,733
					ROUNDED TO:	7,500,000

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DIG PROJECT ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Line Items	Year 1 of Project	Year 2 of Project	Year 3 of Project	Year 4 of Project	Year 5 of Project	TOTALS
		Year 1 of CA	Year 2 of CA	Year 3 of CA	Year 4 of CA	
SUPPORT FUND						
Consultants						
Int'l	43,260	28,840	43,260	28,840	28,840	173,040
Local	14,400	14,400	14,400	14,400	14,400	72,000
Training						
20 Participants, regionally and in U.S.	50,000	60,000	80,000			190,000
Studies						
Various TBD	60,000	70,000	70,000			200,000
LOP TOTAL FOR SUPPORT FUND	167,660	173,240	207,660	43,240	43,240	635,040
MISCELLANEOUS OTHER PROJECT COSTS						
Baseline Study	100,000					100,000
Project Audits		60,000	60,000	70,000	150,000	340,000
Evaluations			100,000	110,000	140,000	350,000
LOP TOTAL FOR MISC.	100,000	60,000	160,000	180,000	290,000	790,000
TOTAL SUPPORT FUND & MISC	267,660	233,240	367,660	223,240	333,240	1,425,040
	14250	14250	14250	14250	14250	
					CONTINGENCY (5%)	71,252
					TOTAL	1,496,292
					ROUNDED TO:	1,500,000
					GRAND TOTAL:	9,000,000

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Table III. Expenditure Projections by Foreign Exchange and Local Currency Costs

	Year 1			Year 2			Year 3			Year 4			Year 5			
	LC	FX	SUB	LC	FX	SUB	LC	FX	SUB	LC	FX	SUB	LC	FX	SUB	TOTAL
Technical Assistance	14,400	43,200	57,600	163,000	914,004	1,067,002	155,101	707,616	862,916	59,425	638,057	694,002	71,835	269,383	341,218	3,004,748
Training	0	60,000	60,000	208,000	638,000	691,000	345,000	348,000	693,000	208,000	67,000	422,000	240,000	72,000	312,000	2,178,000
Commodities	0	0	0	70,353	285,500	355,853	0	38,770	38,770	3,000	37,940	40,940	0	21,139	21,139	422,703
Other Costs	60,000	165,010	345,010	208,000	175,004	491,404	179,159	141,045	320,205	111,700	134,000	245,728	60,000	112,499	165,000	1,469,353
Local Costs	0	0	0	147,379	32,514	179,892	167,314	33,314	201,128	174,421	35,166	209,588	110,040	27,652	137,692	728,300
Audit and Evaluation	0	0	0	0	125,000	125,000	0	200,000	200,000	0	310,000	310,000	0	428,000	428,000	1,145,000
Total	74,400	270,670	360,270	848,200	2,080,061	2,928,261	846,565	1,568,745	2,356,310	712,554	1,151,163	1,863,738	511,880	915,683	1,427,499	9,868,665
																9,868,665

Table IV. Methods of Implementation and Financing – A.I.D. Inputs(US$ 000)

Type of Assistance	Method of Implementation	Method of Financing	Total Costs in US$ 000
1. Technical Assistance	PIO/T Direct A.I.D Contract	Direct Payment Reimbursement	3,025
2. Training	Institutional Contract	Direct Payment	2,179
3. Commodities	Institutional Contract	Letter of Commitment Direct Payment Reimbursement	423
4. Other Costs	Institutional Contract	Direct Payment Reimbursement	1,489
5. Local Costs	Institutional Contract	Direct Payment Reimbursement	728
6. Evaluations & Audits	PIO/Ts Direct A.I.D Contracts	Direct Payment Reimbursement	1,145
Total USAID Financing(including inflation and contingency)			8,989
ROUNDED TO:			9,000

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TABLE V

PLANNED YEARLY OBLIGATIONS & EXPENDITURES(US$ 000)

	Year1	Year2	Year3	Year4	Year5	Total
LOP Funding						9,000
Planned Obligations	4,700	0	1,000	1,900	1,400	9,000
Planned Expend.(Table 4)	353	2,989	2,535	1,864	1,428	8,989*
Projected Mortage (LOP Obligations)	4,300	4,300	3,300	1,400	0	
Mortage/LOP	0.52	0.52	0.37	0.16	0	
Projected Pipeline	4,419	1,368	1,077	787	0	
Pipeline/Obligation	0.94	0.29	0.19	0.10	0	
Total GOR Contribution						480
Total NGO Contribution						361

* Rounded to: $9,000

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Tables II and III above assume DIG Project activities will commence during the first quarter of FY 1993 or the beginning of the second quarter in FY 1993 and continue through the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) of September 30, 1997. The Cooperative Agreement, however, will commence on or about April 1, 1993 and continue through March 30, 1997.

C. Methods of Implementation and Financing

Table IV above, presents the implementation and financing methods to be used for the project. All proposed financing methods for the dollar assistance are preferred methods. It is anticipated that the CA Recipient will undertake and execute all subordinate agreements through procurement actions with each beneficiary (sub)recipient either through a Memorandum of Understanding (public/state institutions) or Subagreements (NGOs). Terms and conditions for the receipt of these (sub)grant funds will follow those contained in the CA itself, as relevant USG provisions, regulations and procedures pertaining to the IPM (CA Recipient) will flow through the CA to the subrecipients as well. In the case of the two newly created NGO institutions and the numerous organizations to be financed from the NGO subgrant fund, the IPM will conduct pre-award surveys of the concerned institutions in order to determine their implementation and financial capabilities. Disbursements to subrecipients will thus be conditioned by a positive assessment.

D. A.I.D. Obligation Schedule

USAID/Rwanda plans to obligate the funds required to make this contribution as per the schedule summarized below in Table V above. Planned obligations should be sufficiently timely to meet the project's expenditure requirements. Planned Obligations by Project Component are proposed as follows:

TABLE VI: Planned A.I.D. Obligations by Project Component

Fiscal Year	Total Planned Obligation	Cooperative Agreement	Support Fund
1992	4,700	4,400	300
1993	-		
1994	1,000	500	500
1995	1,900	1,400	500
1996	1,400	1,600	200
1997	-	1,600	-
	9,000	7,500	1,500

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E. Sustainability

While the objective of sustainability of the four beneficiary institutions has been addressed during project design, it has been assessed within the framework of ensuring that the concerned institutions are able to serve each of the component purposes and strategies during project implementation. Enhancing democratic governance in Rwanda requires providing the individual citizen with both the information to knowledgeably participate in the decision-making process as well as the instrumentalities through which the forthcoming response can be made known and have significance. Establishing and strengthening these institutions as ways of empowering citizen participation in the democratic context are therefore means rather than ends in this process. However it is a project objective to assist these institutions towards financial sustainability by the end of the project. This will involve mobilizing other donor resources, fees-for-service to members and possible income generating profit centers in their operations. The following discussion points to the strategy that the project will promote in respect to institutional sustainability.

Of the two public sector institutions, the National Assembly and Ministry of Interior - Communal Government components, the sustainability of the former is to a large degree dependent on the newly elected legislators establishing budgetary adequacy vis-a-vis the executive branch to maintain a budget sufficient to sustain operations. A covenant in the ProAg will address this issue. As the local government component essentially involves a number of early assessments and analyses followed by one or more pilot activities, it is too early to discuss the possible impact of this component other than to say that project-financed activities would certainly be looking at ways to increase the institutional capacity including financial sustainability of communal government.

In the case of the two civil society institutions, CCADI and CPR, the aim of financial sustainability has been thoroughly reviewed during the design phase. While both Centers are set up to provide services for fees, it far likelier that the Press Center will be able to generate a level of funding sufficient to cover its recurrent costs than the NGO Center. In both cases, the IPM will be encouraging these two institutions to seek outside funding and thus diversify their revenue base. In this respect, the interest of donors in Rwandan NGOs offers real promise.

In each of the subgrants to be made, under the NGO component, a plan for financial sustainability of the activity will be required with the proposal submission. Overall selection criteria set up for the evaluation of subgrant proposals will include sustainability as one of the criteria.

The point to be made, however, is that resources made available to all institutions discussed in this Project Paper are provided to "jump start" or "ignite" institutional development for democratic change. What should be measured in terms of the sustainability of each of the project-financed institutions should be similar to that of the project as a whole --- the degree to which increased institutional capacity has led to an increase in democratic governance as

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measured by the empowerment and hence increased participation of individuals in the political process.

V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Part V serves as a summary of the overall project implementation plan, including sections providing an implementation schedule, a discussion of implementation arrangements, and the procurement plan for engaging the Institutional Project Manager and securing project management and component commodity requirements.

A. Implementation Schedule

DIG Project implementation is broken down into three principal phases and a number of internal stages within phases. The following presentation summarizes and consolidates the major implementation actions under each phase as relates to the principal actors and the overall project. Annex I, "Administrative/Implementation Analysis," provides a detailed implementation schedule including each of the project components by phase and stage for the full five-year Life of Project (LOP).

For purposes of this implementation schedule, it is assumed that the DIG Project is obligated by end September 1992 and has a Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) of September 1997. The main project activities will take place under a four-year Cooperative Agreement entered into with and managed by an Institutional Project Manager. It is anticipated that the CA will start and the IPM's resident Project Management Unit will be in place within six months of the signing of the Project Agreement, hopefully no later than March 31, 1993. Thus project implementation is defined by three phases which correspond to the periods prior to, during and following the signing of the Project CA.

1. Phase I: Project Initiation (October 1, 1992 - March 31, 1993)

As noted in preceding discussions, Phase I begins with the signing of the ProAg and ends with the signing of a Cooperative Agreement and IPM mobilization. While this represents the "fast-track" procurement option, there are numerous activities which must take place prior to the full CA Operations Phase if momentum is not to be lost and USAID strategy is still to remain relevant to the rapidly evolving democratization process in Rwanda. Thus, until the arrival of the IPM team, USAID has provided for required activities to be undertaken through a combination of technical assistance provided under the centrally-funded AREAF Project, through Mission PD&S-funded studies and assessments, and a few early uses of project funding. This is much more than a transition or bridge period. The activities that will take place not only prepare the ground work for the individual components but are in and of themselves necessary to the unfolding democratic process. The following are the key implementation actions that will be executed during the Project Initiation Phase.

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- Procurement of Institutional Project Manager including competitive selection process and negotiation and award of Cooperative Agreement;

- AREAF assigns a resident Coordinator to USAID/Rwanda to oversee and manage Initiation Phase activities including the following principal actions funded under AREAF:
  - elections assessment team in collaboration with UNDP refines election assistance needs and timing and develops plan;
  - candidate training to be undertaken with Adenauer Foundation for both national assembly and communal level elections;
  - design training plan for elected deputies including development of training materials for use in areas of parliamentary rules and procedures;
  - training of human rights organizations and other interested NGOs in election monitoring and observation skills and techniques;
  - training of NGO trainers in pre-election elector civic education;
  - training of press in election coverage skills; and
  - assessment of radio access policy and programming for election campaign purposes by parties and for public services access.

- AREAF resident coordinator works with USAID/DIG Project Officer to assist in arranging for the following assessments, studies and training using PD&S and project funds to engage short-term TA:
  - local government assessment and development of strategic implementation plan (PIO/T), i.e., buy-in to DFM or AFR Municipal Training Project;
  - training for six National Assembly senior support staff in U.S. legislative orientation program in collaboration with USIS (PIO/P);
  - assessment of legislative operations and management of support services (PIO/T), i.e., buy-in to AFR Law Project or to DFM; and
  - assessment and development of a strategic plan for newly created Ministry of Family, Children and Women's Affairs (PIO/T), i.e., buy-in to GENESYS or to Policy Project.

- Formal establishment of the Rwandan Press Center and the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives;

- IPM holds team planning meeting in the U.S. and develops startup stage workplan and orders initial list of commodities including vehicles, computers, etc., for PMU use with arrival in Rwanda arranged for; and

- Overall project baseline data collection exercise for primary purpose of developing/refining indicators for both project and individual components to be carried out in conjunction with ONI/AFR-DG and CDIE.

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2. Phase II: CA Operations (June 1, 1993 - March 31, 1997)

Phase II is delineated by the four years of the Cooperative Agreement and effectively commences with the arrival of the IPM's TA team and ends with the completion of the CA in March 1997. The CA Operations Phase is composed of four distinct "stages" which correspond to defined implementation actions as follows:

a) Stage 1: Start-up (June - September 1993)

- Arrival of IPM's expatriate TA team in Rwanda and commencement of administrative and management activities as follows:
  - Hiring of PMU local staff and establishing fully equipped and operational project office;
  - Establishment of inventory control systems, financial management systems and controls, and preparation and submission of administrative/finance manual grouping internal financial and administrative systems and controls which will be used during project implementation (requires USAID approval);

- PMU contracting short-term TA to undertake initial assessments of TA/training and commodity requirements for each of the component activities either directly with local consultants or through home office for international recruitment;

- Negotiating and signing Memoranda of Understanding with Ministry of Interior and National Assembly and Subagreements with Rwandan Press Center and the Center for Civic Action which include for submission to and approval by USAID and MININTER the following:
  - comprehensive LOP workplans and budgets jointly developed;
  - commodity procurement lists;
  - training and technical assistance requirements;
  - with CCADI, joint development of selection criteria and grant application process for selection of NGO subgrant recipients;
  - monitoring and evaluation plans.
- Preparation and submission of Life of Project workplan including annual workplan and budget for year one;

- PMU, either through home office or with USAID Project Support Unit, begins component commodity procurement;

- PMU makes first direct disbursements to CCADI and CPR in order to get their initial operations off the ground (e.g., core staff hired, office rented);

- PMU provides direct TA/training to CCADI and CPR staff to develop and institute financial management and accounting systems and procedures leading to independent pre-award financial assessment and possible certification.

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b) Stage 2: Shakedown (October 1993 - September 1994)

With the rapidity of change in the Rwandan political environment and the complexity of each of the individual components, project management must have the means to periodically assess direction and, if necessary, redirect activities to ensure achievement of project and component objectives. The Shakedown Phase is designed to provide project participants with a defined period of time in which to test overall project and individual component hypotheses and assumptions developed during project design and refined in the LOP and first AWP and budgets. During this stage administrative and financial management systems and procedures will be developed and put into place to provide project managers at all levels with the means to monitor the effectiveness of their ongoing operations. During Stage 2, each of the individual components will commence the set of activities (e.g., training, research and assessments, and provision of services to members) approved in their AWPs.

The shakedown phase will last only one year (18 months from the signing of the CA), and during its last quarter there will be an internal project review with representatives from USAID, the IPM, beneficiary institutions and the GOR taking part. External evaluators will assist project participants to review the appropriateness of design strategies and approaches but not to conduct a full evaluation of project or component impact. The results of the shakedown review will be incorporated into the Annual Workplan for the second full year of project and individual component operations. It is entirely possible that this evaluation, or that which follows eighteen months later, will recommend the termination of a component, a redesign or a new project being spun-off altogether. The principal activities during Stage Two will be:

- Ongoing PMU-provided TA and training for the two Centers and other NGOs as requested in the areas of organizational development and management training;

- PMU contracts TA for training, assessment and study requirements detailed in MININTER's AWP for Local Government and the National Assembly's workplan;

- USAID and GOR/MINIPLAN will jointly agree on activities to be funded from the USAID Democratic Initiatives fund as identified and authorized by way of jointly approved sub-obligations;

- PMU and CCADI review the first subgrant applications from NGOs wanting to develop or improve programs in the area of civic education and action and make awards for those not exceeding established threshold level of authority;

- Each beneficiary institution carries out set of activities as per its approved AWP and budget;

- Ongoing monitoring, evaluation and audit of project and component activities by each of the concerned project managers as required;

- Reporting requirements fulfilled as follows:
  - PMU comprehensive financial and quarterly progress reports to USAID;
  - PMU quarterly reports tied to USAID PIR and API reporting requirements and PMU submission of AWPs to USAID and GOR through the PMOC;
  - Beneficiary institution financial reports monthly and quarterly consolidated report with brief progress summary to PMU (as part of the quarterly reports);
  - Beneficiary institution semi-annual and annual program performance reports to PMU.

- Shakedown evaluation conducted, impact indicators refined and report issued;

- Second AWP and budgets prepared by PMU and individual beneficiaries.

c) Stage 3: Full-scale Operations (October 1994 - March 1996)

Having incorporated lessons learned from the shakedown stage into the second AWP, the Project and each of beneficiary institutions it supports will enter full-scale operations with refined organizational strategies and approach and a steadily improving institutional capacity to provide services and assistance to their clients. Activities included in this phase will include all those listed in the shakedown phase plus the preparation of a third AWP in September 1995. In March 1996, one year before the end of the Cooperative Agreement, and 18 months after the shakedown evaluation, there will be a second "progress" evaluation. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide all parties with an up-to-date assessment of the progress that the project and its components are making towards achievement of stated objectives. The purpose is to make a final set of recommendations including necessary redirection of existing activities or modification to one or more design strategies; and specifically, what course should be contemplated for the project as a whole as well as its individual components as the end of the CA approaches. Recommendations could range from terminating the project or one of the components before the Cooperative Agreement Completion Date (CACD) to amplifying the project and extending the length of the CACD itself including the IPM's presence in Rwanda.[2] A major issue to be looked at during this evaluation will be progress made towards sustainability by each of the beneficiaries supported by the Project. The following new activities will take place during Stage 3:

- Preparation and submission of the third AWP and Budget by beneficiary institutions to the PMU and by PMU to USAID and MiniPlan;
- Last of the NGO subgrants awarded; and
- Second "progress" evaluation with recommendations.

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2 A distinction is made between the end of the Cooperative Agreement and the Project. The DIG Project will be obligated through a ProAg with the GOR for a period of five years. Assuming the ProAg is signed on September 30, 1992, the Project Activity Completion Date (PACD) would be September 30, 1997. The CA signed with selected Recipient will be signed for a period of four years. Assuming the CA is signed on March 31, 1993, the CA Completion Date (CACD) would be March 30, 1997, or six months before the PACD.

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d) Stage 4: Sustainability (April 1996 - March 1997)

A fourth and final AWP will be prepared covering the last six months of the CA. Recommendations made during the "progress" evaluation will be incorporated into both the remaining activities under the third AWP and those to be undertaken in the fourth. If no extension of the CA is recommended, the PMU will begin close-out activities as stipulated in the CA including a final report and recommendations. The attempt will be made to complete all major implementation activities of each of the project components including NGO subgrants by the end the third AWP, i.e., September 30, 1996. This would allow each of the four beneficiary institutions to complete close-out activities including reporting requirements stated in their Subordinate Agreements with the IPM by the CACD of March 30, 1997.

3. Phase III: Project Close-Out & Redesign (April - September 1997)

During the last six months of the project a final evaluation will take place. This external evaluation will use the set of indicators developed in Phase I, and refined in the course of project execution in order to determine project impact. Ideally, those agencies (AFR/ONI-DG and CDIE) which participated with USAID/ Rwanda in the baseline survey and impact indicator development will participate in this final evaluation as well. In these last six months, USAID will complete any activities which were financed through its Democratic Initiatives fund and other required close-out activities. The final evaluation report will serve as the final project report.

B. Procurement Plan

1. Procurement of Technical Assistance and Training

During the full five years of the DIG Project, USAID will obtain technical assistance using project-obligated funding, funds from its other resources, i.e., PD&S funds, and deliverables from centrally-funded or regionally funded programs such as the African Regional Elections Assistance Fund (AREAF). Under this section, however, only project-funded procurement will be discussed.

a) Cooperative Agreement Recipient

An Institutional Project Manager will be chosen to implement the Cooperative Agreement under which the majority of project-funded activities will be executed. The USAID Program Officer will coordinate the solicitation, evaluation and award of the CA with both the DIG Project (Proposal Review) Committee and with REDSO/EA Legal and Contracts Officers. Specific responsibilities will include issuing the required PIO/T, along with a precise project

description and a statement of "evaluation factors for award[3]." "Mandatory Standard Provisions for Non-Governmental Grantees" identified in Handbook (HB) 13, App. 4C (page 4C-7), as appropriate, will constitute the provisions controlling the DIG Project. The IFA, and the CA itself, will include an explicit statement of the nature, character and extent of anticipated USAID involvement in the DIG Project. A.I.D. will invite applications by eligible organizations[4] to receive a competitively-awarded Cooperative Agreement for up to four years. The Invitation for an Application (IFA) will be sent to a short-list of U.S. PVOs, N.P.O.s and Universities prepared by the Mission in conjunction with ONI-DG/AFR and FHA/PVC based on a demonstrated capability to undertake similar D/G Projects. The Regional Contracts Officer will issue the Invitation for Applications to the short-listed organizations noted above. Applications received in response to the IFA will be reviewed by the USAID Proposal Review Committee. The Regional Contracts Officer will then begin negotiations with and (if these are successful) award the Cooperative Agreement to the organization offering the most advantageous application to the U.S. Government.

Gray amendment entities will be encouraged to participate in the competition for this Application. In any case, pending finalization of revised Gray Amendment contracting procedures, the IFA will contain a provision requiring at least 10 percent subcontracting to Gray Amendment firms.

b) Short-term TA and Training Requirements

Under the USAID Project Support Fund, the Mission will be managing external audits and evaluations as well as jointly programming "targets of opportunity" with the MINIPLAN. The Project Officer, in conjunction with the Project Development Officer, will prepare necessary PIO/Ts for these several Mission-managed responsibilities as well as PIO/Ps for participant training provided through the USAID Project Support Fund.

2. Procurement of Commodities

a) Cooperative Agreement Funded

Procurement of all commodities to support the Institutional Project Manager (or Cooperative Agreement recipient) and its resident Project Management Unit as well as those for the four beneficiary institutions and the numerous NGO grantees will be the responsibility of the Institutional Project Manager. Whether the IPM will choose to undertake this procurement directly, through contract with a U.S. firm, or the USAID Project Support Unit, will be a decision made by the IPM. As procurement capability is a major Cooperative Agreement function, Applicants for the CA should be requested to detail and demonstrate this capacity.

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3 The IFA will specifically indicate that quality of personnel for resident assignments to the PMU and for short-term TA in substantive areas will constitute a 50 percent weight in the award evaluation.

4 To be eligible, an Applicant must be a Private Voluntary Organization (PVO), Non-Profit Organization (NPO) or University, duly registered with A.I.D./ Washington.

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Each of the agreements with beneficiaries and grantees will stipulate that the IPM will undertake approved procurement for their individual activities.

The Institutional Project Manager will undertake procurement using its own procurement policies as long as they conform to the relevant Standard Provisions governing the CA. However, to ensure compliance with these regulations, the IPM will be requested to submit a commodity procurement plan for the Mission's review and approval before initiating any procurement actions. The authorized Geographic Code under the DIG CA is 935.

b) USAID Project Support Fund

Although no commodity procurement is now planned under the Support Fund, should such occur the USAID Project Officer will prepare the necessary PIO/C for execution by the USAID Support Unit.

VI. MONITORING, EVALUATION AND AUDIT PLAN

The complexity of the DIG Project argues for a simplified framework in which to monitor ongoing project progress, evaluate overall project impact and ensure proper utilization of project resources. At the same time, this is not a project in which traditional methodologies and approaches to these elements of project management can be readily applied. Finally, DIG is one of the first projects to be implemented under the Africa Bureau's D/G Program and thus there is good reason to commit adequate funding as well as thought to the development of relevant tools and techniques for assessing impact, performance and accountability. The following sections look at the overall framework and approach as well as the specific techniques to be employed in this plan.

A. Project Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

The purpose of this framework section is to provide an approach and context for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the DIG Project. This is especially important in a project where impacts are as much concealed in the attitudes of individuals and blurred by the dynamics of a rapidly evolving process as they are manifested in behavior of people and the practice of institutions. Monitoring and evaluating DIG Project impact will take place at both the people level and the institutional level. In addition, and to the extent practicable, the M&E system will also look at the potential impact that the project may have on the larger picture of the Rwandan polity in terms of the broad standards that have been defined for democratic governance. This schematic is consistent with 1) the DIG Project purpose, which explicitly makes the linkage between people and institutional-level impact 2) current A.I.D./W guidance that requires projects and programs to base monitoring and reporting systems on informational needs for specific decisions and to demonstrate "people-level" impacts and 3) the standards (and thus indicators) of democratic governance that have been developed under

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Africa Bureau's D/G Program for the purpose of measuring the "polity-level"-impact of country-specific D/G programs.

As noted above, it is at both the institutional and individual level that project impact will be monitored and evaluated. A primary project objective is to empower Rwandans by enhancing their capacity to participate more fully in the governance of their evolving democracy. Project assistance is aimed at 1) educating and informing individual Rwandans about their roles, responsibilities, rights and obligations as citizens in a democratic polity and 2) providing them with a means to effectively make their individual voices heard in the political decision-making process. In both cases, institutions provide the means by which these objectives can be carried out. The National Assembly, Communal Government, the Center for Civic Action and the Rwandan Press Center are the direct beneficiaries of DIG Project assistance. In the framework developed for this monitoring and evaluation plan, these institutions are not only ends in themselves, but equally so, the instrumentalities by which a major project objective --- promoting individual empowerment and civic education and action --- is attained.

There is currently a point of view which suggests that D/G projects are unable to demonstrate people-level impact and are, therefore, inconsistent with DFA legislation. There has also been for many years a notion that institution-building projects not only do not demonstrate people-level impact but have little if any impact at all --- at least in a developmental context. The framework developed for this Project Paper takes the position that 1) institutional development must be tied to an objective of strengthening individual capacity if it is to have any demonstrable impact and 2) people-level impact in democratic governance projects can be best demonstrated through the workings and nature of the institutions which people themselves shape. People act through their institutions to effect change in their political environment and are directly benefitted as individuals by the consequences of these systemic changes. In short, people and their institutions are inextricably linked in a democratic polity and they both take on meaning and relevance through their interaction.

The DIG monitoring and evaluation plan is based on being able to measure change, quantitative and qualitative, in both institutions and individuals through changes in their behavior, practice, attitudes and benefits. As discussed in section II.C, Project Beneficiaries, both institutions and individuals, as well as the overall Rwandan polity, including civil society and state institutions, are engaged in a dynamic process of change and transition. Part of the challenge in developing the M&E system, and its corresponding MIS, is defining starting and ending points in this process and where Rwandans and their institutions fall at various points in time along a continuum of democratic governance. To do so will require specifying the characteristics or standards found at either end of this continuum of democratic governance. In doing so, a set of indicators will have been developed which can be used for measuring project impact on individuals, their institutions and ultimately on the larger polity.

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B. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan and Rationale

The Project's integrated M&E plan will be composed of five interlocking elements. One will address the evaluation of impact on individuals and institutions resulting either directly or indirectly from project inputs. A second will consider the evaluation of project progress. A third element in the system will evaluate the performance and impact of component (beneficiary institution) activities. The fourth element will look only at the impact of individual subgrant activities funded under the NGO component of the project. The fifth and final element will monitor the progress of the project and each component activity towards stated objectives. Factors in each of these four elements will intersect at different points within the total system. A brief description of the purpose and function of each is given below.

1. Evaluation of DIG Project Impact

This element consists of (a) conducting a comprehensive baseline study to develop "people-level" and "institutional-level" indicators to be undertaken during the first six months, i.e., Phase I, of project activities; this study will set the stage for (b) a parallel final project impact evaluation, scheduled during the last six months, i.e., Phase III, of the project. A rationale for collecting and measuring "people-level" and institutional-level indicators for D/G projects, briefly discussed above, is expanded upon in Annex I. Because this D/G project is one of the first of its kind in Africa and because the survey design will be innovative in character, adequate time, resources, and expertise must be foreseen. In this regard, it is strongly encouraged that both the baseline study and the final evaluation be a collaborative undertaking between USAID/Rwanda and AID/Washington: AFR-ONI/DG and CDIE.

Quantitative and qualitative methodologies will be used during the baseline study, combining observation/participation with focus groups discussion, guided interviews and standard surveys. Close attention will be paid to replicability in order to ensure comparative results with the final evaluation. It should also be noted at this point that the two evaluations of the Cooperative Agreement, the shakedown and project progress, will look at the relevancy of indicators developed during the baseline study and refine them for use in the final evaluation.

The baseline study will relate to other project elements and surveys. For example, it will furnish a pool of indicators from which periodic beneficiary impact studies may be undertaken by individual component activities. In addition, it may be correlated in part with similar socio-economic data-gathering efforts taking place in the context of other projects, e.g., the M&E unit to be established under the PNAS, the National Social Action Program funded by the World Bank, UNDP, and other donors. A major attempt will be made by the survey team to elaborate a set of "polity-level" indicators based on standards of democratic governance that are either universally accepted (e.g., a free press, civil and human rights), or are embraced by a sufficient number of functioning democracies and adherents to be

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considered standard (e.g., periodic elections, a balance between central and local government power, and the separation of the powers of the state).

2. Evaluation of DIG Project Progress

The final impact evaluation discussed above is tied to the baseline survey. Separately, two evaluations of the Project CA will be carried out to (a) assess the progress of implementation including institutional, structural, and financial aspects and (b) test basic assumptions and hypotheses upon which project design was based. A "shakedown" evaluation will be carried out at month 18 of the Cooperative Agreement in order to identify areas required for restructuring, course correction, addition, or termination. The second evaluation, a full progress assessment will take place 18 months later (month 36 of the CA) and will have the same purpose. The final evaluation takes place after the close-out of the CA to assess overall project impact and progress.

While the purpose of these periodic progress evaluations is not to assess project impact, their undertaking may provide opportunity to refine impact indicators identified in the baseline study. These two "in-progress" evaluations will be critical for USAID and the project participants in assisting concerned decision makers at all levels to adjust to rapidly changing circumstances.

3. Component Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation of each of the CA-funded components will be the responsibility of the PMU. It will regularly monitor the use of component funds provided to each of the beneficiary institutions in accordance with annual workplans schedules. Output monitoring will be the primary means for measuring ongoing component progress and its periodic reporting. Output indicators will be established for each component during the overall Project baseline study and refined by the PMU and concerned beneficiary institution during the joint development of LOP and annual workplans. Monitoring reports will take the form of PMU Semi-annual and Annual Reports to coincide with USAID Project Implementation Reporting (PIRs) and Annual Program Impact (API) reporting requirements. Each beneficiary institution will submit quarterly progress reports to the PMU which will then be incorporated into the PMU's reporting to USAID. The PMU may choose to track a select group of beneficiary or institutional-level output indicators (e.g., numbers of journalists using the Press Center, or the number of policy initiatives from the public at local government level) as a means for providing illustrative or anecdotal evidence of component progress for use in its own reports or USAID API reporting.

Although each of the four component activities has a different duration (as noted in III.C.1-4), individual evaluations are planned to coincide with the two project-wide Phase II evaluations scheduled at eighteen and thirty-six months into the CA. As discussed above, these evaluations will be looking more at component performance and progress towards a sets of objectives and indicators defined in annual workplans rather than at actual component

impact. The object is to provide a means for verifying project premises in a timely manner permitting early and mid-course design corrections. As the component evaluations are part of the overall project evaluation plan, USAID will be responsible for arranging and coordinating these evaluations with the IPM and individual beneficiary institutions.

In addition, the Project will seek to support a gender impact monitoring unit through a subgrant to a capable NGO (for example, Réseau des Femmes) served by the CCADI. The unit will collect annual data on selected gender indicators, which will be further disaggregated by abode, age, region, and class. Examples of output indicators may include proportion of girls enrolled in school, bank loans awarded to women, number of women's associations created, discriminatory laws reformed, and so on. These data will serve as an ongoing resource to all interested institutions concerned with the advancement of women and their rights.

4. Project and Component Performance Monitoring

As part of its internal M&E plan, the PMU will develop an overall set of project performance indicators with its LOP workplan and yearly performance indicators with its yearly workplans. Its performance in the discharge of its Cooperative Agreement functions and responsibilities will be monitored internally, as well as by USAID, through a comparison of actual performance to planned activities and stated indicators as detailed in required reporting documents (as detailed below). Internal PMU administrative and financial management requirements will be monitored through periodic reports generated from the project's management information system (MIS).

Each beneficiary institution (the two Civil Society and two State institutions) supported by the project will develop performance indicators as part of its own LOP and yearly M&E workplan requirements. The development of performance indicators whether between the PMU and USAID, or beneficiaries and the PMU, are negotiated as part of the whole workplanning process. Once accepted by both parties, they then serve as "performance contracts." For USAID/Rwanda this principal will be rigorously adhered to as a mean of holding the Institutional Project Manager accountable for actions stipulated in the Project CA. For the PMU and USAID, monitoring performance of beneficiary institutions will be one way of measuring the development of institutional capacity, an intermediate objective of each component purpose. The information collected will also have to satisfy USAID's needs for its Annual Program Impact (API) report to AID/Washington, and its internal Project Implementation Reviews (PIR).

5. Subgrant Monitoring and Evaluations

Each NGO funded by the Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives will develop an M&E plan for that funded (sub)grant activity. As part of each subgrant, a baseline D/G study of "people-level impact" among targeted beneficiaries will be undertaken by the concerned NGO in collaboration with PMU and Center staff. In addition, a final impact

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evaluation for each subgrant will be carried out jointly by the PMU and the Center, paralleling its baseline study. In the event that areas of NGO involvement are identified during the overall Project baseline study, concerned NGOs will be requested to participate in the study, and relevant data collected will serve as baseline information for a possible subgrant. Subgrant evaluations will take place at the end of each of these discrete activities.

C. Audit Plan

As indicated in the Monitoring/Evaluation and Reporting Schedule shown below, financial reviews and audits will occur at two levels, i.e., the project and component levels. At each level, both USAID and the IPM have a different set of responsibilities relating to their involvement in the management and oversight of DIG Project resources. The following provides a summary discussion of audit issues and responsibilities. Annex I, provides a more detailed explanation of the financial management responsibilities of the different project actors.

1. Project Audits

An initial review of the financial controls and accounting systems and procedures of the applicants for the Cooperative Agreement will be undertaken during the selection process. The Institutional Project Manager awarded the CA may be requested to provide additional financial information, such as copies of any previous audits of A.I.D.-financed activities, including copies of A-110 audit reports.

Once the IPM has established its Project Management Unit in Rwanda, it will be required to submit to the USAID Controller an Administrative/Financial Management Manual as part of its LOP/First Annual Workplan. The Manual will include a complete report on all aspects of the PMU's proposed financial controls and accounting procedures to be used in its internal operations and monitoring beneficiary financial awards. The Manual will be submitted with the LOP/First Annual Workplan during Phase II, Stage 1, and must be approved by USAID/Rwanda prior to the PMU's move into Stage 2, Shakedown.

As per A.I.D. requirements, overall project activities will be audited once every year. Audit responsibilities will be the responsibility of USAID/Rwanda and adequate funding for these financial and compliance audits are contained within the USAID Support Fund budget and thus outside the project CA. As there are no RIG-certified audit firms resident in Rwanda, RIG will arrange for an independent CPA firm to be contracted externally to undertake the yearly audits. In order to keep costs of audits within reason, each of the four component activities funded under the CA as well as the USAID Support Fund will be audited on a yearly basis by the same firm that is contracted to audit the project. Thus the Institutional Project Manager, all five project components and the NGO subgrant fund will be simultaneously audited once a year.

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2. Component Audits

The IPM will directly manage all funding for the National Assembly and Local Government components of the DIG Project. Until it has reviewed and certified the financial systems of the CCADI and CPR, the IPM will manage and make all disbursements for the approved expenditures of these two project components. When the IPM has certified that the systems and procedures set up by the two Centers meet minimum standards of financial management and accountability, funding will be disbursed by the IPM to separate bank accounts set up by each organization for this purpose.

One of the advantages of working through a Cooperative Agreement with a PVO or NPO Recipient is that it can make subgrants to NGO subgrantees that are neither registered with A.I.D./W nor able to meet registration, including financial management, criteria. With an IPM willing to take fiduciary responsibility for project funding, subgrants can be made to organizations that would not normally be eligible to receive A.I.D. financing. For subgrants made to NGOs from the CCADI NGO fund, the IPM will be required to certify that each of the NGOs awarded subgrant funding have adequate financial systems in place to adequately manage subgrant funding. In the event that certification is not immediately received, the NGO may elect to authorize the IPM to undertake all subgrant disbursements until such a time as it has adequate controls in place.

As noted above, component activities will be audited at the same time as the overall project. Each subgrant which is in excess of $25,000 will also be required to undergo an audit once a year. To the extent that NGO activities will be funded under this fund, they will be kept under $25,000.

D. Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Requirements

The foregoing monitoring and evaluation plans and related reporting requirements will be met through the following approximate schedule:

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Study/Report	Implementing Agency	Timing/ Frequency
Baseline Study/Indicator Development	USAID/R-ONI/DG	1st 6 months
CA IPM LOP/First AWP & Budget	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	Year One
Beneficiary LOP/First AWP & Budget	Beneficiary-PMU	Year One
IPM Annual Workplans and Budgets	PMU to USAID PMU to MinPlan	Yearly
Beneficiary AWPs and Budgets	Beneficiary-PMU	Yearly
Specific Baseline Studies	PMU-Beneficiary PMU-Subgrantee	Ongoing
Special Studies and Reports	PMU-Beneficiary PMU-Subgrantee	As Needed
Project Progress & Performance Reporting	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	Semi-annually & Annually
Beneficiary & Subgrantee Progress & Performance Reporting	Beneficiary to PMU	Quarterly
Financial Report (SF-269)	IPM to AID/W	Quarterly
Financial Report	PMU to USAID	Quarterly
Financial Report	Beneficiary-PMU	Quarterly
"Shakedown" Evaluation (Project & Components)	USAID-IPM-GOR Beneficiaries	Month 18
"Progress" Evaluation (Project & Components)	USAID-IPM-GOR Beneficiaries	Month 36
Final Evaluation (Subgrants)	PMU-Subgrantees	End of Subgrant
Final Evaluation/Progress & Impact (Project & Components)	USAID/R-ONI/DG GOR/MINIPLAN	Year Five Last 6 Months
Audit (Project & Components)	USAID-REDSO/IG	Annual Years 1-5
Audit (Subgrants)	IPM-PMU	Yearly

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VII. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ANALYSES

A. Overview

Rwanda's political economy and underlying social structures are being profoundly, rapidly and unalterably changed. The analyses in the attached Annexes all demonstrate that dynamic process and identify the key issues and actors in each sector. There and in the body of the PP, the linkages between project strategy and the social, political and economic dimensions of the process of Rwanda's transformation are discussed. The purpose of these analyses is to give context and a sense of the strategy; the paper itself focuses on the proposed spheres of action and on the set of interventions selected.

This section briefly summarizes and restates the findings in the Annexes in terms of project strategy and expected outcomes.

B. Institutional Analysis

As summarized in Annex F, "Institutional Analysis," Rwanda's institutional dynamics were examined in three dimensions. The first dimension is that of the constitutional order. The second is the more operational dimension of communal governance. The third is the cross-cutting dimension of the institutions that compose the civil society. The key findings in the analysis, and their relationship to the project, are summarized here.

1. The Constitutional Level of Analysis

At Rwanda's constitutional level where the powers and functions of the State are defined in a series of rule-ordered relationships that shape the overarching political economy and the underlying social contract, change is rapid and significant. A process of political liberalization has been started that involves major shifts in power relationships within the state and in the definition of the role of the state in the society as a whole. The old order based on a highly centralized and presidentially dominated republican structure under the management of a one-party regime is being transformed. The state's dirigiste role in the economy is being attenuated by a donor-supported structural adjustment program aimed at liberalizing practice and revitalizing a free market economic system.

A revised written constitution approved in 1991 represents only a marker on the path toward a new pluralistic and democratic polity. Major political actors see that document as being far from a definitive restatement of the operative political rules. These rules --- and therefore the underlying "social contract" --- are still under intense negotiation by actors at all levels. Since April 1992, the "government" is itself an "extra-constitutional" product of these on-going negotiations. In a transitional arrangement, the presidential regime is sharing power with four of the 16 newly legalized parties. With no electoral mandate, this government of consensus is working its way toward a negotiated peace settlement with the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and a new transitional power-sharing relationship with them to

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move from hostilities to a durable political modus vivendi. This should then lead to national elections, again under rules that are still to be negotiated among the actors. Meanwhile, the transitional government uses rules-in-place to govern.

The calculus of the project is that these circumstances warrant selective interventions that have the best chance of influencing the evolving institutional order --- at the constitutional level --- toward a stable, sustainable, pluralistic democracy. It proposes four very different means of leveraging the process. The first is to offer assistance, largely with non-project funding and in consort with other donors, to keep the momentum going toward elections and toward their institutionalization in the constitutional order. The ad-hoc transitional government represents major progress and a necessary interim measure of reform. Should it delay elections for too long, the entire process could be put in jeopardy. (Precipitous, ill-prepared elections with questioned results could, however, be even worse.)

The second project lever is to stimulate a reordering of powers within the state over a longer term by enhancing the capacity of the legislative branch of government. The revised constitution of 1991, with little alteration, reaffirms the traditional preponderant role of the executive and the dependent roles of the judiciary and the legislature. The weakness of these two vital functions has ill-served Rwanda since independence. A passive parliament leaves the state with inadequate capacity for internal self-correction, open to the misuse of executive power, without a means to assure internal and external accountability and with insufficient popular access to and oversight of government. By strengthening the legislative branch during the transition and by readying it for a proactive role in the affairs of state following elections, the project can make a major contribution toward a major shift in the institutional balance within new constitutional order without an invasive, direct assault, by external means, on the constitution itself.

The third means of influence is to encourage non-state actors to address constitutional level issues by demanding action on more proximate concerns that relate to the balance among the powers of the state. The project will do this through the education and mobilization of citizen groups which will, in their turn, demand legislative action. Legal reforms should follow. These reforms need not directly address the balance of power among the branches of government, but simply by prodding the legislature to act, the incremental effect of its action in response to popular demands will strengthen that branch's power. Furthermore, among the reforms that will undoubtedly be demanded will be actions to overhaul the system of justice. The people of Rwanda want an effective, independent, honorable judiciary capable of resolving conflict and of maintaining the rule of law.

The fourth and final lever for constitutional-level reform is the free press. As discussed below and in the annex itself, the emerging free press is vital to the information flows that will keep government open and accountable. The project's assistance to the emerging free press is a vital part of the institutional reform dynamic.

2. Communal Governance Level of Analysis

In many respects the division of power between the central government and local governments is also a constitutional-level issue. For the sake of clarity in analysis and in approach communal government is examined as a separate level of institutional analysis. The intensive review discovered that popular forces are already demanding changes in communal governance. The analysis revealed that the current communal government structure is not responsive to local needs. It also discovered that while "decentralization" is a much-touted value among many of the political parties and even within the current regime, there is no substantive strategy, except for the anticipated electoral process, to carry it out. People in Rwanda's rural localities want much more from their local governments as instruments of social and economic development. They also want greater accountability from local officials for their resources and their trust. The election of local authorities is important but it is not sufficient to create the changes needed. The project involves a two-phased approach to institutional change in this area. At the policy level it will work with the Ministry of Interior to formulate a strategy --- with local participation --- for promoting and improving "decentralized government." An early sector assessment should lead to a sequence of follow-on missions to get a strategy in place. Also, the project will offer assistance, largely though local training, to improve the capacity of local officials to work within the evolving structure. In parallel, its assistance to non-governmental groups will add to the momentum as they demand local government reform and also as they offer themselves as co-participants in governing the commune.

3. Institutions of the Civil Society

The project design team built upon several previous USAID/Rwanda analyses of non-governmental organizations and their roles in Rwandan society. It confirmed that especially over the last decade their numbers and diversity have been increasing. Earlier their growth was as socio-economic development groups: cooperatives, savings associations, community action groups for health and education, etc. During the past two or three years new groups have become important actors, concerned largely with human and civil rights, the legal rights of women, and with labor and associational rights. The analysis of this rich and diverse group of organizations demonstrates that there is a desire among them to play a direct and positive role in shaping the polity and in promoting broad citizen participation in the new democracy. Some groups have already initiated civic education programs to instruct citizens on their rights and duties as electors in the emerging multi-party system. Some, including women's associations, are already agitating for legal reforms to improve both economic and political rights.

The makings of a diversified, pluralistic, energetic civil society are at hand in this rich array of non-governmental organizations and in the new free press, which is discussed below. The analysis shows that most of the NGOs are institutionally weak, have limited outreach, and are new at political and legal advocacy, civic education, and at lobbying or confronting government authority for redress of grievances or with demands for accountability. Perhaps

the most important of all the project's components is the intervention to energize these NGOs as institutions of the civil society. The strategy is to build the institutional capacity of these non-state actors, through shared resources in a common service center, that will support them in playing their new civic roles. They will form the nexus between citizen and government at all levels. Learning to mobilize citizen action around issues, they will move the parliament for legal reform. Local groups will be schooled to take part in commune affairs, shaping the local agenda and sharing in the local public economy. By teaching electors their rights and duties, they will encourage responsible, involved citizenship. In short, they will shape the institutional fabric of the civil society, assuring its pluralistic character and that it will be citizen driven. To carry out these responsibilities, the NGOs themselves require the institutional development aid that will be given.

In addition, the analysis documents the emergence of a new "fourth estate." An explosion of news journals is bringing to Rwanda information access that it has never had before. The analysis shows that the new journalism is largely untrained and lacking in depth and consistency of coverage and, most certainly, lacking in national outreach. There is, however, a great vitality in this awakened journalism. The "institutionalization" of a free, diverse, and sustainable information regime has yet a ways to go in Rwanda. It faces important political and economic obstacles. With the modest help proposed in the project through a non-profit association of journalists some of those obstacles can be overcome to assure that a responsible media will be in place to undergird the evolving democratic political system and a free national market place.

C. Economic Analysis

As detailed in Annex G, "Economic Analysis," the economic analysis responds to A.I.D. concerns about the relationship between support for democracy in general and the effects this may have on economic and social development. It points out that Rwanda's leadership shows no concern for this issue, if indeed it is a real issue. The GOR has chosen to pursue a dual, in-tandem strategy of economic and political liberalization, linking the two in their policies and in their programs. This course means that maintaining the structural adjustment policies, with their inevitable "pinch" on broad segments of the population, must be made politically palatable if not popular. The annex argues that to maintain these tough policies of fiscal restraint and controlled imports, a devalued currency and higher prices in a democratic environment will require board popular understanding of the long-term payoffs. The project's role in this connection is through its support of pre-electoral candidate education with AREAF and through its on-going support to responsible civic education through NGOs. Through these means demagoguery can be attenuated by fact and reason to benefit the vital debate of the issues.

The analysis further points out that many of the same NGOs engaged in civic mobilization are also engaged in social and economic development. Most donors are only focusing on the latter role of the NGOs to the neglect of the former. The DIG Project, however, makes the linkage between the two functions. By helping NGOs associate responsible civic action and

responsible self-managed economic activity, the strategy builds synergy between political practice and developmental goals particularly at the local level.

The role of the press as a source of information vital to economic life in a free market environment is also discussed. The analysis points out that Rwanda lacks a tradition of economic journalism and that through training and material support to the press this void may be filled. Political and economic information access is essential to citizens in their roles as market actors and as electors.

Improving the legislature's capacity is discussed in the economic context as well. The analysis points out that the transparency of fiscal affairs at the level of policy and program operations will depend significantly on a more capable and pro-active Assembly. An informed Assembly is more likely to support the structural adjustment policy framework; an executive branch of government under effective legislative oversight is more likely to restrain fiscal excess, control corruption, and stick to its legislatively approved budget; a legislature pressed by constituency groups for equity in public dealings is more likely to see that economic benefits are fairly distributed. A new democratic legal environment will contribute to stability and certainty, both essential factors for economic actors as they calculate risk and opportunity in the market place.

The analysis concludes that in the sum, these developments associated with the DIG project strategy when joined to the work of other donors will help to shape a new "enabling environment" for entrepreneurial action in the market place. The longer-term results will benefit individual citizens as sustained growth across the economy follows from the sum of these effects.

D. Social Soundness Analysis

As the Social Soundness Analysis annex (Annex J) documents in some detail the social context in which the DIG Project will be undertaken. It points out both opportunities and constraints. The constraints include civil unrest and displaced populations, ethnic cleavage, rising poverty, faltering social services, and inequity for women and other marginal groups. The opportunities include a strong associative movement, formation of groups supporting human and women's rights, liberalization of the press, economic support to the poor, and growing interest in multiparty democracy.

It argues that in view of these contextual forces, several overarching strategies are incorporated into the project design at various points.

- Affirmative action through the NGOs and by strengthening the press. A number of social groups risk exclusion from the democratic process. Women, the poor, social marginals, and the displaced require strong affirmative support through these means.

- Participatory training in democratic governance, again through the targeted NGOs, through the commune governments, and through the training of political candidates. Small groups --- whether associations or communities --- offer the greatest potential for learning about democracy in practice. Behavioral change requires conscious and continuous nurturing; without it the new social contract risks remaining at the level of an ideal.

- Fostering networks among associations. Most of Rwanda's estimated 8,000 associations are homogenous groups, but their "nesting" tendencies encourage pluralistic dialogue and exchange. By understanding the natural structure of the "associative dialogue" the Project may set in motion positive social processes with very little input.

- Channeling information about economic opportunity, through the expanded press and through the NGO support system. Economic stress is a preoccupation of all Rwandan men and women facing the long, hard effects of failed policies and unfavorable market forces. The Project will gain credibility and will empower its beneficiaries by encouraging their productive effort through support to NGOs both nationally and at the commune level.

The conclusion of the analysis is that the project is socially sound. It addresses many of the most urgent needs in the society and provides instrumental, if not direct remedies to a number of these needs.

E. Detailed Cost Estimate and Budget Analysis

Annex H, "Detailed Cost Estimate and Budget Analysis," demonstrates that the financial resources that have been allocated for the DIG Project are sufficient to achieve its overall purpose and the specific objectives of the individual components which define its parameters. As previously discussed under Part IV., and expanded upon in this analysis, the planned obligation schedule will be sufficient to cover the project's costs.

The cost estimates and budget analysis are built upon a detailed analysis of input requirements for both the Institutional Project Manager and the five components. These requirements have been analyzed with a view to the potential ability of each of the beneficiary institutions to sustain corresponding recurrent costs. The analysis concludes that sustainability for public institutions will largely be a function of adequate government resources being made available to either a higher level of effort (The National Assembly) or through reallocation to a lower level of government (Local Government). Financial sustainability of the two NGO Centers established and supported with project assistance will depend to a significant degree on 1) the ability of members and clients of the two organizations to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of services being provided to them and 2) whether other donors that have initially expressed support for the objectives of these organizations will in fact provide funding as project assistance phases out. There is however

a clear understanding that the institutions supported by the DIG Project are ultimately providing goods and services that a financial analysis can not adequately capture, or assess using conventional approaches or methodologies. "Jump-starting" democratic governance in Rwanda implies a certain risk in relation to covering of future costs of newly established or reoriented institutions that are the instruments of an untested process.

F. Administrative/Implementation Analysis

The focus of Annex I, "Administrative/implementation Analysis," is the appropriateness of the proposed structures of project management, and the arrangements and relationships between the principal institutional actors involved during project implementation. The conclusion of this analysis is that the structure of the DIG Project, including its management, offers the most effective and efficient means for managing this extremely complicated, multi-faceted project. Arrangements between the concerned institutions are governed by a series of agreements (i.e., Project, Cooperative, and Subordinate) which clearly define individual organizational responsibilities in project management and the terms and conditions of their relationship during project implementation. The strategy of centralizing project management responsibilities in a single Institutional Project Manager and its resident Project Management Unit provides economies of scale in relation to the availability of costly input requirements, particularly those of technical assistance. The selected management structure and the specific instrument which defines implementation arrangements, reduces USAID's administrative burden by 1) providing it with one entity with which to interact during the life of project and 2) allowing it to selectively choose only those areas of project management in which to involve itself to ensure its mandated responsibility for project outcome. Finally, the entire structure permits a necessary degree of flexibility and responsiveness to a political environment that is rapidly and unpredictably changing. In short, the structure, instruments and arrangements of project management promote needed collaboration among the several partners in this effort which above all calls for tolerance and participation.

VIII. CONDITIONS AND COVENANTS

The Government of Rwanda in its project agreement with USAID will agree to the following conditions and convents:

A. Grantee's Contribution to the Project

The Grantee will provide, on an in-kind basis, the salaries of the Ministry of Plan staff members who will:

1. participate in the selection of the U.S. Non-Profit Organization, a U.S. PVO or University, which will be the Project's implementing agent (Institutional Project Manger - IPM and Cooperative Agreement Recipient);

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2. serve as the Chair of the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee;

3. participate in the review and approval of the agreements that the IPM executes with each of the Rwandan institutions directly responsible for carrying out a component of this project (referred to herein as "sub-grantees"), and in the review and approval of the Life of Project Workplan and each Annual Workplan; and,

4. facilitate the contribution of counterpart staff, working space for short-term technical advisors, meeting and training locations, and all other institutional support necessary from the Ministries other than Plan and other agencies of the Government of Rwanda which may be called upon to participate in the project;

5. participate in Project evaluations both formal and informal so as to assure the effective execution of these undertakings.

B. Conditions

1. Conditions Precedents to First Disbursement

Prior to the first disbursement under the Grant, or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which such disbursement will be made, the Grantee will, except as the Parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D. in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D.:

a. A statement of the name of the person holding or acting in the office of the Minister of Plan or his or her designee(s);

b. A document acceptable to A.I.D. that designates by name the person at the Ministry of Plan who will serve as the MINIPLAN Project Coordinator and Chair of the Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee;

C. Covenants

1. Evaluations

The Parties agree to establish an evaluation program as part of the Project. Except as the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the program will include, during the implementation of the Project and at one or more points thereafter:

a. a base-line survey that documents the state of democratic practice and citizen engagement/benefits in national and communal civic life; (This survey will be used in monitoring the progress of the project components and in the final evaluation of project impact as indicated in the following.)

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b. evaluation of progress towards attainment of the objectives of the Project;

c. identification and evaluation of problem areas or constraints which may inhibit such attainment;

d. assessment of how such information may be used to help overcome such problems; and

e. evaluation, to the degree feasible, of the overall development impact of the Project.

2. Prohibition of Support to a Single Political Party or Candidate in Exclusion of Others

The Grantee covenants that none of the funds made available under this Grant may be used to finance any costs relating to the campaign for public office of any one individual or any one political party in exclusion of others. The principles of open equal access regardless of party affiliation shall be practiced in all training, technical assistance and other services provided under the grant during any electoral period.

3. Police and Military Training

The Grantee covenants that none of the funds made available under this Grant may be used to finance costs related to training or counselling of police, military, or para-military personnel.

4. Additional Covenants

a. The Grantee covenants to designate by name the following individuals as soon as possible after the signing of the Agreement:

(i) at the Ministry of Interior the person who will coordinate activities under the project to promote local government development;

(ii) at the Ministry of Family Affairs and the Promotion of Women the person who will coordinate activities under the project to assist that ministry in the formulation of policy and programs;

(iii) the person who will serve as coordinator of assistance to pre-election planning and programming and election administration; and,

(iv) in agreement with the officers of the National Assembly and by their determination and certification, the person who will serve as the Assembly project component manager.

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b. The Grantee covenants to facilitate the legal recognition of the two new Associations Sans But Lucratif (ASBLs) identified in ANNEX 1 as sub-grantees under the project.;

c. The Grantee further covenants that to encourage sustainable NGO operations, membership dues and fees for services rendered by the new ASBLs to their members and other reasonable measures for income generation, so long as they do not profit any individual and are used solely for the programs of these agencies, shall not jeopardize their status as ASBLs under Rwandan law;

d. The Grantee covenants to accord to the officers of the National Assembly (NA) timely support to their program of legislative strengthening and to honor their program for staff development involving statutory and contract employees of the Ministry of Civil Service on assignment to the NA, thus acknowledging the NA as a direct beneficiary under this project;

e. The Grantee covenants to convene a meeting of the DIG Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee at least once each three months or upon the request of the USAID Project Officer designated by the USAID Mission Director or upon the request of the PMU Chief of Party. That Committee, will be composed of the Grantee's designated project coordinator, the USAID representative and the PMU representative.

ANNEX A

ACTION: AID INFO: AMB DC.

VZCZCGB0009
RR RUEHLGP
DE RUEHC #8483/01 1722130
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 202131Z JUN 92
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLGP/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 8375
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 9193
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 198483

ACTION COPY
Action taken .....
.....
No action necessary
(Initials) (DATE)

LOC:217 55
23 JUN 92 0742
CN: 57888
CHRG: AID
DIST: AID

DATE REC'D 06-23-92
SUSPENSE DATE 07-30-92
ACTION TO PDO-CC
Dir
PRM
DDO
AED
FMD
CONT
EXO
CFRM ✓
TRO
LEG
PDO ✓
CHRON ✓

AIDAC NAIROBI

E.O. 12356: N/A

NAIROBI FOR RESO/ESA RLA

SUBJECT: PID GUIDANCE CABLE FOR RWANDA DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE (DIG) PROJECT (696-0133)

SUMMARY: THE PID REVIEW COMMITTEE MET ON MAY 18, AND WAS CHAIRED BY THE CDO FOR RWANDA. REPRESENTATIVES OF AFR/EA, AFR/DP, AFR/ONI, GC/AFR, R&D/WID, STATE AF/C AND STATE/AF/RA ATTENDED. THE COMMITTEE COMPLIMENTED THE MISSION ON A WELL-WRITTEN DOCUMENT.

THE PID WAS APPROVED AT A LEVEL OF DOLS 9 MILLION AND THE MISSION MAY EXERCISE ITS D A 551 AUTHORITY TO APPROVE THE PP. THE ONE OUTSTANDING ISSUE DISCUSSED WAS WHETHER THE PROJECT AS SUBMITTED REQUIRED BOTH DFA AND 116(E) AUTHORIZATION TO ADDRESS BOTH THE SPECIFIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOCUS AND THOSE ACTIVITIES LESS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE PROPOSED PROJECT. DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE FOLLOWS BELOW. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PP, AS APPROPRIATE, ARE STATED BELOW.

1. APPROPRIATENESS OF PROJECT FOR DFA AUTHORIZATION. A DISCUSSION ENSUED AT THE PID REVIEW MEETING AS TO WHETHER THIS TYPE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR DFA AUTHORIZATION OR WHETHER IT SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED JOINTLY UNDER SECTION 496 (DFA) AND SECTION 116E OF THE FAA. IT WAS FELT BY GC/AFR THAT SEVERAL COMPONENTS SUCH AS GENERALIZED LEGISLATURE STRENGTHENING AND ASSISTANCE TO JOURNALISTS MAY NOT BE LINKED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT LEGAL INTERPRETATION, D/G ACTIVITIES THAT ARE QTE LINKED UNQTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED UNDER THE DFA (SECTION 496). HOWEVER, ACTIVITIES NOT ANALYTICALLY QTE-LINKED UNQTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED UNDER SECTION 116E OF THE FAA. PLEASE NOTE THAT SECTION 116E IS ONLY AN

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AUTHORIZATION AND IS NOT AN APPROPRIATION NOR IS THERE A SEPARATE 116E FUND FOR BILATERAL PROJECTS. PLEASE SEE 91 STATE 164030 DATED MAY 16, 1991 FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THIS DISTINCTION.

COMMITTEE DETERMINED THAT MISSION HAS TWO CHOICES: (A) INCLUDE IN THE PP A STRONG FACTUAL AND ANALYTICAL LINK BETWEEN GENERALIZED STRENGTHENING OF THE LEGISLATURE/ASSISTANCE TO JOURNALISTS AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT; OR (B) AUTHORIZE THE PROJECT JOINTLY UNDER BOTH SECTION 496 AND SECTION 116 E (SEE PARA 4, CATEGORY III DESCRIPTION IN 91 STATE 164030).

AFR/W RECOMMENDS THE SECOND OPTION, PARTICULARLY SINCE THIS WOULD ALSO ALLOW THE MISSION MORE FLEXIBILITY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROJECT, ESPECIALLY THE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY ELEMENT SO THAT YOU WOULD NOT HAVE TO ANALYTICALLY LINK EACH FUNDED ACTIVITY TO LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH. HOWEVER, EVEN IF YOU DO AUTHORIZE THE PROJECT UNDER BOTH SECTIONS 496 AND 116E, THE PP SHOULD STILL STRONGLY SHOW THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROJECT ELEMENTS AND BOTH YOUR OVERALL STRATEGY AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS IN RWANDA.

PURSUANT TO FAA SECTION 624(F)(2), AFR/W HAS CONSULTED WITH LA CONCERNING THIS PROJECT AND HA HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE. MISSION THEREFORE HAS OPTION IN PP TO EITHER AUTHORIZE JOINTLY SECTIONS 496 (DFA) AND 116E OR ONLY SECTION 496.

2. SECTION 611(A) CONSIDERATIONS.

- TO MEET THE ADEQUATE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 611(A)(1) FOR THE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY ELEMENT OF THE PROJECT, THE PP NEEDS TO CONTAIN CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES

FOR SELECTION OF THE ELEMENT'S SUBACTIVITIES, TOGETHER WITH AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF SUBACTIVITIES, COSTED OUT TO AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE TOTAL LINE ITEM.

- SECTION 611(A)(2). IS ENACTMECT OF ANY LEGISLATION, SUCH AS THE DRAFT ELECTORAL LAW, NECESSARY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES? IF SO, TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 611(A)(2), THE PP NEEDS TO EXPLAIN, WITH SUPPORTING FACTS, THE BASIS FOR THE MISSION'S BELIEF THAT THE LAWS WILL BE ENACTED ON A TIMELY BASIS TO PERMIT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES.

3. PROJECT PURPOSE. THE PID FACESHEET AND THE PROJECT

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SPECIFIC POLICY POSITIONS TAKEN BY COMPETING CANDIDATES OR PARTIES.

AGRI NGOS. THE PP SHOULD HIGHLIGHT THE FOCUS OF PROPOSED ASSISTANCE TO NGOS AND HOW PLANNED ACTIVITIES WILL AFFECT WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION. THE PP DESIGN SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK OTHER POTENTIAL POINTS OF ACCESS FOR WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, E.G., LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT ARE MORE ACCESSIBLE TO A WIDER COMMUNITY OF WOMEN THAN THE CENTRAL LEVEL. THE STRENGTHENING OF COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE COMPONENT RECOMMENDS A SERIES OF IN DEPTH STUDIES - ONE OF THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED COULD BE THE EXTENT OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AT THIS LEVEL, AND IF T RE ARE SPECIFIC LOCATIONS OF OPPORTUNITY. THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE SOW FOR THE GENESYS BUY-IN FOR THE PP DESIGN.

P. SECTION 110 WAIVER OF 25 PERCENT GOR CONTRIBUTION. A WAIVER OF THE 25 PERCENT HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION NEEDS TO BE APPROVED BY THE A-AA/AFR. THE WAIVER SHOULD STATE WHAT THE GOR WILL CONTRIBUTE, RATHER THAN JUST WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT. IN PREPARING THE WAI ER, PARTICULAR ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE PAID TO EXPLAINING WHY THE GOR IS COMMITTED TO THE PROJECT, DESPITE ITS LACK OF FULL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION. THE CONTRIBUTION THAT WILL BE MADE SHOULD BE REFLECTED ON THE FACESHEET, AS WELL.

Q. CONTRACTING. AN AID GENERAL NOTICE DATED APRIL 8, 1982 (TOUCHED TO USAID ATTENTION L.A. DOURIS), PERMITS

A.I.D. DIRECT CONTRACTORS TO MAKE (SUB) GRANTS, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS#AND WITH THE PRIOR COMMENT OF FA/PPE. THE PTI PROPOSES A VARIATION ON THIS, IN THAT A SUBCONTRACTOR WOULD MAKE THE GRANTS. THE MAJOR CONCERN WITH EVEN A PRIME CONTRACTOR'S MAKING GRANTS IS THE LOSS

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LOGFRAME CONTAIN TWO DIFFERENTLY STATED PURPOSES. THE AID FACESHEET PURPOSE, QTE TO FACILITATE AND BROADEN POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN SHAPING TERMS OF THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE INSTITUTIONS THROUGH WHICH THAT CONTRACT WILL BE CARRIED OUT, UNQTE, BEST CONFORMS TO DFA PRECEPTS. USAID SHOULD restate PURPOSE ON PROJECT LOGFRAME IN DEVELOPING THE PP.

4. PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT. WHILE THE COMMITTEE RECOGNIZES THAT DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE PROJECTS ARE RELATIVELY NEW IN THE AFRICA BUREAU AND THE BUREAU ITSELF HAS HAD DIFFICULTY IN ARTICULATING PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT FOR THESE TYPES OF PROJECTS, THE PROJECT SHOULD, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, SPELL OUT WHAT INDICATORS IT WILL USE TO DEMONSTRATE PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT. INDICATORS WILL BE FURTHER DEFINED DURING THE PP EXERCISE. AFR/ONI/DG STANDS READY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO USAID IN DEVELOPING INDICATORS. TEAM SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE-LEVEL INDICATORS IN THE PP.

5. PROJECT MANAGEMENT. SOME CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED BY THE COMMITTEE REGARDING PROJECT MANAGEMENT, THE NUMBER OF PROJECT COMPONENTS AND THE DIFFICULTY THIS MAY CAUSE FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. GIVEN THE NEWNESS OF THIS SECTOR FOR USAID INVOLVEMENT, AND THE ENORMOUS WORK TO BE DONE TO ASSURE PROJECT SUCCESS, THE PP SHOULD FOCUS ON THE BEST WAY TO MANAGE THE PROJECT WITHOUT CAUSING UNDUE BURDENS ON THE USAID STAFF AND HOST GOVERNMENT. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT USAID PROJECT MANAGEMENT BE VESTED IN A MISSION STAFFER WITH STRONG PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKILLS.

- COORDINATING COMMITTEE. DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND WHO IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROJECT MANAGEMENT. THE COMMITTEE NOTES THAT THERE IS A D/G INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE. PROJECT MANAGEMENT, HOWEVER, IS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AID PROJECT MANAGER. THE AMBASSADOR WILL PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON POLICY MATTERS. ALL PROJECT FUNDS ARE TO BE ADMINISTERED BY AID AND THEREFORE AID IS ULTIMATELY ACCOUNTABLE.

6. POLITICAL PARTIES. FOLLOWING ARE AID GUIDELINES REGARDING POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR ACTIVITIES AND FUNDING:

- SECTION 116(E) PROHIBITS THE USE OF FUNDS UNDER THAT AUTHORIZATION TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF ANY ELECTION, AND THIS RESTRICTION SHOULD BE APPLIED TO FUNDS AUTHORIZED OTHER SECTIONS AS WELL.

- ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT SUPPORT TO CAMPAIGNS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

- WHERE AID-FUNDED ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED TO POLITICAL PARTIES OR GROUPS IN CIVIL SOCIETY THAT HAVE POLITICAL MISSIONS, IT MUST BE COMPLETELY NON-PARTISAN, IMPARTIAL, AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTIES OR GROUPS COMMITTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, AND PROVIDED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO

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OF AID CONTROL OV R THE GRANTS, AND THIS WOULD BE EXACERBATED BY AN ADDITION L LAYER. THUS, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT USAID CONSIDER MAKING THE PVO THE PRIME CONTRACTOR RATHER THAN SUBCONTRACTOR. IN ANY CASE, IF GRANTS ARE PROVIDED AND MANAGED THROGH A CONTRACTOR OR A SUBCONTRACTOR, THEN APPROVAL TO USE THIS CONTRACTUAL PROCEDURE MAY BE MADE BY THE USAID DIRECTOR AND/OR REDSO/ESA RCO AFTER FA/PPE COMMENTS AND JUSTIFYING MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN CLEARED BY REGIONAL LEGAL ADVISOR. BECAUSE THIS PROCEDURE IS NEW, INFORMATION REQUESTED IN THE ARTI 8 NOTICE SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO FA/PPE FOR COMMENT AT AN EARLY POINT.

10. IEE. IEE HAS BEEN APPROVED BY BUREAUENVIRONMENTAL ADVISER AND GC/AFR. ORIGINAL POUCHED TO USAID FOR L.A. DOURIS.

11. PLEASE ADVISE AID/W THE DATE OF PP APPROVAL AND PROJECT AUTHORIZATION AND SEND COPIES OF APPROVED PP TO AFR/EA AND AFR/ONI/DG. BAKER
BT
#8497

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ANNEX B

USAID/RWANDA DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT

GOAL:	INDICATORS:	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
The project goal is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda that provides for sustainable, self-renewing democratic governance.	Successive elections have been held. Peaceful transitions between elected Governments accomplished. Responsible opposition parties represented & functioning at national and local levels. Constitutional framework broadly accepted and functioning as rules of polity Military and security forces depoliticized - under control of civil authority. Ethnic violence ended with peaceful conflict mechanisms in place and functioning. Refugee resettlement arrangements working. National Assembly functioning as independent branch Justice System functioning as independent branch Local governments working as first line of socio-economic development with clear authorities and control over local resources Diverse local public economies functioning with many NGOs providing "public" service and governance functions in collaboration with local/National elected governments. Media operating without government censorship	- Direct observation by USAID and US Embassy - Annual human rights reports - Other donor observations - UNHCR reports - News journals reports	GOR continues to collaborate with international donors in social, economic and political development efforts. Peace negotiations result in Tutsi/Hutu power-sharing arrangements that resolve major issues and make peaceful coexistence in constitutional arrangement possible. Majoritarian governments both local and national protect minority rights. Judicial reforms have incrementally improved cantonal courts and disputes at local level are peacefully resolved through adjudication/ rule of law respected. Free market in operation and economy growing with equitable distribution of benefits.

PURPOSE	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS END OF PROJECT STATUS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
The project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.	<u>STATE INSTITUTIONS:</u> 1. Local Government Consensus strategy for devolution of power to communes reflected in new law on communal government and in operations of MININTER. Elected commune governments are functioning with majority respecting minority rights and conflicts peacefully settled in councils or local courts. Regular training for commune officials (ISAP &/or others) offered with operating manuals and legal abstracts in use. Burgomaster Association is formed and operational. FOSOC is operational with pilot projects started in selected communes. 2. National Assembly New Legislative MIS operating effectively: data banks in place; law research and fiscal analysis being performed for functioning committees of Assembly. Legislative initiative taken in major areas: budget review and approval, oversight of agencies, reforms in justice system, women's legal rights, minority civil rights, major policy areas in support of market economy including small enterprises. Assembly establishing independence from Executive in own operations: personnel and finance and open to publics.	Final Project Evaluation compares status of each project element with the base-line established in the initial year of project. Final report of IPM provides data on operations of National Assembly and on MININTER coordinated program for local government development. Consultant reports on TA provided to commune training an to National Assembly document progress in each case. Assembly journal reflects timely reports of debates, legislative hearings, laws passed. Press reports of communal affairs and legislative actions document activities in each case. NGO reports show work with communal governments and reflect constituency advocacy with Assembly and results of these efforts. radio coverage and report on access. US Embassy political officer reports confirm Assembly activity and operations within multiparty framework. World Bank/IMF reports confirm Assembly role in fiscal oversight and budget authorization. Burgomaster Association reports reflect activities and FOSOC reports document pilot finance operations. ISAP and other training agent reports show records of participation in programs and evaluations of training confirm relevance and results.	Multiparty transitional Government will succeed in reaching political modus vivendi with RPF. Under this agreement constitutional framework for transition accepted. Elections are held and widely seen as fair, and objective. Transition to elected governments at all levels takes place peacefully. Hostilities and civil violence cease with new civil authorities respected. Ethnic violence at commune level gives place to peaceful conflict resolution. Training of local officials plus general atmosphere of reconciliation supports respect for minority rights. Opposition parties take up positive roles at local and national levels in commune councils and in National Assembly. National Assembly successfully accommodates rules and procedures to multiparty operations within committee system and in overall management. Project training assists in this transition. Executive branch accommodates to legislative initiative and cooperates in major moves toward coequality of branches under new laws. Executive does not veto legislation in this regard or if veto, it is peacefully and constitutionally overridden. Assembly initiates judicial reforms.

OUTPUTS	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<u>Institutional Project Manager</u>			
IPM Office is established with fully functioning staff. Sub-agreements with CCADI and CPR negotiated; MOUs with MININTER and National Assembly negotiated. Regular services are being provided to counterparts and timely delivery of commodities and technical advisors is taking place in accordance with annual work plans. Periodic reports are produced and annual workplan negotiated with the counterpart agencies.	USAID Project Officer receives copies of all agreements/MOUs, and in joint reviews with the MINIPLAN approves them, along with LOP and annual work plans. Commodities, TA arrives as scheduled. PMU staff is hired and working. Periodic reports are delivered on time and show that PMU is functioning as planned. IPM/USAID/MINIPLAN meeting in Project Management & Oversight Committee confirm IPM operations.	IPM reports. LOP Work Plans. IPM/counterpart agreements and MOUs. Physical observation by USAID Project Officer. Reports of NGOs. Copies of studies to USAID. Copies of grants and grant monitoring by IPM to USAID. Minutes of meetings of the Project Management & Oversight Committee (IPM/USAID/MINIPLAN) If IPM contracts with USAID's PSU for services, PSU or other commodity delivery reports will verify deliverable orders and arrivals.	During start-up phase of project operations, AREAF has provided a resident advisor/coordinator to USAID Rwanda and that advisor has worked with Nos, journalists and USIS along side USAID Project Officer to get new ASBLs established. AREAF other inputs are provided in a timely manner as outline in the PP. (See outputs in specific areas for AREAF deliverables.) A.I.D. Washington, REDSO/EA and USAID Rwanda are able to complete competitive selection from a short list with no delays and IPM sets up operations in a timely manner. IPM personnel posted are of the quality and experience needed to establish and maintain PMU operations in all respects. GOR is fully cooperative under terms of the Project Agreement and supports project fully through customs clearances and other official means. CCADI and CPR are established by their members as ASBLs and that each forms an effective executive board for agency operations. Each executive board selects a capable and willing Executive Director who works collaboratively with the IPM in all operations. Local staff hiring and training meets no serious obstacles. Other donors continue to support NGOs with resources and TA and the journalists/free press with training & other support.
<u>CCADI</u>			
CCADI Board signs agreement with IPM and operations start.	Agreement received by USAID.		
Center locale, staff, commodities for services, etc. are established with IPM direct assistance and funding.	Physical operations on-going.		
Member NGOs accessing services at Center at affordable costs.	NGOs are using Center.		
Common use training materials are produced and in wide use in training programs by NGOs throughout nation.	Training takes place. Materials are produced/used.		
Training of trainers ongoing.	Trainers trained.		
Program monitoring ongoing with NGOs cooperating, reporting.	NGOs monitor programs.		
Studies on common issues are completed and used by NGOs.	Studies produced.		
Extension services of CCADI and NGO members is reaching all communes and generating new groups.	Activity of Nos increases throughout Rwanda.		
Grants facility established and NGO grants made, monitored.	Grants made.		

OUTPUTS	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Local Government			
PD&S funded sector assessment is completed before arrival of IPM, providing data and recommenations needed for IPM/MININTER discussions.	Assessment team arrives, completes field work.	Report of PD & S funded assessment team.	Buy-in to Decentralization and Financial Management or to Regional Municipal Training Project completed by AID/W in a timely manner and assessment team arrives and does work.
MININTER MOU with IPM is signed and with LOP work plan provides an operational program for assistance for strategy and for program services.	MOU is negotiated with MININTER and submitted for approval.	MOU submitted for USAID/MINIPLAN approval with LOP Worplan.	GOR continues to support the general concept of improving local government and wants to decentralize. MININTER is wholly cooperative in effort and welcomes efforts to include on equal basis commune officials in studies and strategy.
IPM arranged TA team develops strategic framework for decentralization and devolution actions.	MININTER designates program counterpart.	Annual reports and new year Work plans.	
	TA missions arrive in Rwanda and make arrangements for local collaborators from communes and from MININTER.	IPM reports of TA missions.	
Training conducted with AREAF for candidates for commune offices and ISAP or others provide training for elected officials. Manuals of operations and legal abastracts are produced for local authorities and distributed in training programs.	Burgomasters and counselor training program take place.	IPM reports on Burgomaster Association work.	Commune officials are elected and positively receive TA and training. Burgomasters want to have a National Association and actively participate in forming it.
Burgomaster Association is formed and is operational.	Burgomaster Association is formed following meetings.	IPM reports of TA findings regarding FOSOC as feasible agent for commune project financing.	Other donors, especially Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Rhine-Palatinate Partnership Program continue to provide commune support.
FOSOC study is completed and decision made to put in project funding. Pilot grants to communes from FOSOC are monitod.	FOSC evaluation is done.	Observation visits by USAID Project Officer to communes.	End of hostilities nationally is extended locally and multi-party system results in post-electoral working relations to support orderly communal government with a "loyal opposition" well represented.
	Communes are operating.	Reports of ISAP and/or other training institutions.	Collaboraion among Burgomasters and Counselors is effective across party lines among themselves and with MININTER.
18th month evaluation is completed.	ISAP and or others are functioning in training of local authorities and materials are produced including operations manuals and legal abstracts.	18th month project evaluation.	Phase-out is feasible at end of 18th month or based on evaluation a separate commune development project is considered.

OUTPUTS	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<u>Strengthening the National Assembly</u> CND Officers approve MOU with IPM, LOP workplan and annual work plans follow incorporating TA recommendations on MIS system and staff development. Secretary General manages project for NA and implements program under MOU.	MOU signed and sent to USAID/MINIPLAN for approval with workplan(s).	MOU received by USAID/MINPLAN with LOP workplan, annual plans follow.	ARAEF and Adenauer Foundation train NA candidates and ARRAF follows up with post-election training for deputies.
NA Officers return from US training, implement up-to-date rules & Assembly organization.	MIS commodities ordered received.	IPM periodic reports show TA arrivals, training completions, MIS commodity orders and receipt, MIS installation and operations.	TA provided by IPM will be quality, delivered on time, o meet linked targets for systems and staff training. And local contractor trains well on word-processing, publications, and other applications on time & resolves all ops. problems.
MIS system hardware/software installed and operation. 25 operators trained; 3 systems manager/analysts trained; new legal and fiscal analysts trained and provide staff services to NA commissions.	NA deputies (10) return from US training.	PSU confirms commodity orders.	MIS system is reliable - no down periods that cripple progress in systems work.
Compendium Rwandan law completed with University Law Faculty and installed in MIS.	NA staff (6) return from US training.	Periodic meeting of Project Management and Oversight Committee (IPM/USAID/MINPLAN) confirm key events.	GOR executive will cooperate fully with assistance to NA throughout life of project.
Data base links to executive agencies completed: finance & budget, program operations, ministry program data, plus data links to University.	Legal analyst and fiscal analyst hired by NA return from US training.	NA Journal (equivalent to Congressional Record) documents the body's operations: hearings, debates, legislation passed and published.	GOR executive will not veto NA law making its operations independent or if it does, NA overrides to set constitutional practice for a separate and independent power of the State.
Archival/library system completed and librarian trained with TA and overseas. Library and archival system in operations.	Systems Analysts (3) return from training abroad (Nairobi?)	Embassy Political Officer and USAID Project Officer visits to NA session confirm operational rules and effectiveness of body.	Executive agencies cooperate as data base links to NA MIS tap their budgets and programs.
NA establishes own personnel system and budget - independent from Executive Branch.	NA commission hold hearing, draft laws, NA passes laws.	Project Progress Evaluations at 18th month and 36th month confirm reports: EOPS confirmed by final evaluation against the base-line established during first year of project.	Multi-party relations in NA reflect rule-ordered majority-minority relations that further NA agenda, no legislative deadlock.
Full service staff operations in effect in NA using MIS system. NA journal and other publications systems fully functioning.	Compendium of Rwandan Law completed.		Staff accepts transfer from executive branch to NA hire when change-over is legal.
Efficient multi-party committee systems operating, producing law and government oversight.	MIS operates well showing local operator training done.		Donors continue to cooperate and make contributions to NA development especially in stocking library with French language references and current publications on comparative law and jurisprudence.
	Library is functioning and NA research services on-line.		

OUTPUTS	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
USAID DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES SUPPORT FUND			
1. Evaluations: Base-line Survey 18th Month "Shake-down" evaluation 36th Month "Progress" evaluation End-of-Project Evaluation using base-line and progress data	Evaluations completed.	Evaluation reports received by Mission. Audit reports received by Mission. Reports of each TA Mission received by Project Officer. Trainee reports on program. Where a training agent used (USIS cooperation, contractor, other medium) their reports confirm training given. Trainee vouchers confirm travel and attendance.	Evaluator contracts will be executed under IQCs or other quick delivery mechanism without delay in A.I.D. and quality teams will be recruited. Audit firms will be available and able to do annual audits of Cooperative Agreement and sub-grants in a competent and timely manner. USAID will be able to access quality TA for targets of opportunity and mobilize it through quick delivery mechanisms with full cooperation from A.I.D. Training will be appropriate and all trainees will return to influence democracy development
2. Audits: 4 Annual audits of Cooperative Agreement and all sub-grants made by IPM	Audits completed.		
3. Technical Assistance: 6-8 TA and Study Mission completed on high priority targets of opportunity Early strategy TA to new Ministry for the Promotion of Women.	Each TA mission submits reports, study findings, recommendations per PIO and contract.		
4. Training: Up to 20 individual trainees to orientation, conferences, study tours, seminars.	Trainees return to positions and apply results of learning.		

USAID/RWANDA DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

INPUT SCHEDULE - US Project $	Counterpart contribution
1. Institutional Project Manager	none
Technical Assistance Long-Term Short-Term	
Local Personnel	
Commodities	
Training	
Other Costs	
2. Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives	Members dues and fees plus in-kind volunteer services: civic education, election monitoring, commune development, etc. to be determined.
Technical Assistance Short-term	
Local Personnel	
Commodities	
Training	
Other Costs	
Project Specific · Subgrant Fund	
3. Centre de Press Rwandaise	Journalist members' dues and fees to be determined. In-kind volunteer services to Board to training and other services.
Technical Assistance Short-term	
Local Personnel	
Commodities	
Training	
Other Costs	

Inputs Schedule - (Continued)	Counterpart contribution
4. Local Government Development	Staff time of MININTER & of Commune officials Official vehicles in field during studies, ISAP staff for training services, local training facilities other donors.
Technical Assistance Short-Term	
Training	
Other Costs	
5. Strengthening the Legislature (National Assembly)	Staff counterparts, new hires in legal and fiscal analysis, space for advisors, space and local costs for library & archives, local transport
Technical Assistance Short-term	
Commodities	
Training	
Other Costs	
Component Specific · MIS Operations Trg (Contract) · Rwandan Law Compendium (UofL Contract) · Building Preparations for Library & Archives Center	
6. USAID/Rwanda Support Fund	Salaries of all Rwandan personnel who participate in evaluations, TA missions, training, and conferences. Other donor and GOR contributions.
Evaluations	
Audits	
Technical Assistance	
Training	

5C(2) - ASSISTANCE CHECKLIST

Listed below are statutory criteria applicable to the assistance resources themselves, rather than to the eligibility of a country to receive assistance. This section is divided into three parts. Part A includes criteria applicable to both Development Assistance and Economic Support Fund resources. Part B includes criteria applicable only to Development Assistance resources. Part C includes criteria applicable only to Economic Support Funds.

CROSS REFERENCE: IS COUNTRY CHECKLIST UP TO DATE?

A. CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO BOTH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS

1. Host Country Development Efforts (FAA Sec. 601(a)): Information and conclusions on whether assistance will encourage efforts of the country to: (a) increase the flow of international trade; (b) foster private initiative and competition; (c) encourage development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations; (d) discourage monopolistic practices; (e) improve technical efficiency of industry, agriculture, and commerce; and (f) strengthen free labor unions.	This project will support GOR efforts (b), (c), and (e). It is not expected to have a direct input on (a), (d) and (f).
2. U.S. Private Trade and Investment (FAA Sec. 601(b)): Information and conclusions on how assistance will encourage U.S. private trade and investment abroad and encourage private U.S. participation in foreign assistance programs (including use of private trade channels and the services of U.S. private enterprise).	This project will be implemented by U.S. PVO.

3. Congressional Notification

a. General requirement (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Secs. 523 and 591; FAA Sec. 634A): If money is to be obligated for an activity not previously justified to Congress, or for an amount in excess of amount previously justified to Congress, has Congress been properly notified (unless the notification requirement has been waived because of substantial risk to human health or welfare)? N/A

b. Notice of new account obligation (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 514): If funds are being obligated under an appropriation account to which they were not appropriated, has the President consulted with and provided a written justification to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and has such obligation been subject to regular notification procedures? N/A

c. Cash transfers and nonproject sector assistance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 575(b)(3)): If funds are to be made available in the form of cash transfer or nonproject sector assistance, has the Congressional notice included a detailed description of how the funds will be used, with a discussion of U.S. interests to be served and a description of any economic poolicy reforms to be promoted? N/A

4. Engineering and Financial Plans (FAA Sec. 611(a)): Prior to an obligation in excess of $500,000, will there be: (a) engineering, financial or other plans necessary to carry out the assistance; and (b) a reasonably firm estimate of the cost to the U.S. of the assistance?

(a) N/A

(b) Yes

5. Legislative Action (FAA Sec. 611(a)(2)): If legislative action is required within recipient country with respect to an obligation in excess of $500,000, what is the basis for a reasonable expectation that such action will be completed in time to permit orderly accomplishment of the purpose of the assistance? N/A

6. Water Resources (FAA Sec. 611(b); FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 501): If project is for water or water-related land resource construction, have benefits and costs been computed to the extent practicable in accordance with the principles, standards, and procedures established pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act (42 U.S.C. 1962, et seq.)? (See A.I.D. Handbook 3 for guidelines.)	N/A
7. Cash Transfer and Sector Assistance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 575(b)): Will cash transfer or nonproject sector assistance be maintained in a separate account and not commingled with other funds (unless such requirements are waived by Congressional notice for nonproject sector assistance)?	N/A
8. Capital Assistance (FAA Sec. 611(e)): If project is capital assistance (e.g., construction), and total U.S. assistance for it will exceed $1 million, has Mission Director certified and Regional Assistant Administrator taken into consideration the country's capability to maintain and utilize the project effectively?	N/A
9. Multiple Country Objectives (FAA Sec. 601(a)): Information and conclusions on whether projects will encourage efforts of the country to: (a) increase the flow of international trade; (b) foster private initiative and competition; (c) encourage development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations; (d) discourage monopolistic practices; (e) improve technical efficiency of industry, agriculture and commerce; and (f) strengthen free labor unions.	This project will support GOR efforts (b), (c), and (e). It is not expected to have a direct input on (a), (d) and (f)
10. U.S. Private Trade (FAA Sec. 601(b)): Information and conclusions on how project will encourage U.S. private trade and investment abroad and encourage private U.S. participation in foreign assistance programs (including use of private trade channels and the services of U.S. private enterprise).	This project will be implemented by U.S. PVO.

11. Local Currencies

a. Recipient Contributions (FAA Secs. 612(b), 636(h)): Describe steps taken to assure that, to the maximum extent possible, the country is contributing local currencies to meet the cost of contractual and other services, and foreign currencies owned by the U.S. are utilized in lieu of dollars.	N/A
b. U.S.-Owned Currency (FAA Sec. 612(d)): Does the U.S. own excess foreign currency of the country and, if so, what arrangements have been made for its release?	No
c. Separate Account (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 575). If assistance is furnished to a foreign government under arrangements which result in the generation of local currencies:	No funds will be given to GOR under the project, since c(1), (2), (3), (4) do not apply.
(1) Has A.I.D. (a) required that local currencies be deposited in a separate account established by the recipient government, (b) entered into an agreement with that government providing the amount of local currencies to be generated and the terms and conditions under which the currencies so deposited may be utilized, and (c) established by agreement the responsibilities of A.I.D. and that government to monitor and account for deposits into and disbursements from the separate account?	N/A
(2) Will such local currencies, or an equivalent amount of local currencies, be used only to carry out the purposes of the DA or ESF chapters of the FAA (depending on which chapter is the source of the assistance) or for the administrative requirements of the United States Government?	N/A
(3) Has A.I.D. taken all appropriate steps to ensure that the equivalent of local currencies disbursed from the separate account are used for the agreed purposes?	

(4) If assistance is terminated to a country, will any unencumbered balances of funds remaining in a separate account be disposed of for purposes agreed to by the recipient government and the United States Government? N/A

12. Trade Restrictions

a. Surplus Commodities (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 521(a)): If assistance is for the production of any commodity for export, is the commodity likely to be in surplus on world markets at the time the resulting productive capacity becomes operative, and is such assistance likely to cause substantial injury to U.S. producers of the same, similar or competing commodity? N/A

b. Textiles (Lautenberg Amendment) (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 521(c)): Will the assistance (except for programs in Caribbean Basin Initiative countries under U.S. Tariff Schedule "Section 807," which allows reduced tariffs on articles assembled abroad from U.S.-made components) be used directly to procure feasibility studies, prefeasibility studies, or project profiles of potential investment in, or to assist the establishment of facilities specifically designed for, the manufacture for export to the United States or to third country markets in direct competition with U.S. exports, of textiles, apparel, footwear, handbags, flat goods (such as wallets or coin purses worn on the person), work gloves or leather wearing apparel? N/A

13. Tropical Forests (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 533(c)(3)): Will funds be used for any program, project or activity which would (a) result in any significant loss of tropical forests, or (b) involve industrial timber extraction in primary tropical forest areas? No

14. Sahel Accounting (FAA Sec. 121(d)): If a Sahel project, has a determination been made that the host government has an adequate system for accounting for and controlling receipt and expenditure of project funds (either dollars or local currency generated therefrom)?	N/A
15. PVO Assistance	
a. Auditing and registration (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 537): If assistance is being made available to a PVO, has that organization provided upon timely request any document, file, or record necessary to the auditing requirements of A.I.D., and is the PVO registered with A.I.D.?	Yes
b. Funding sources (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Private and Voluntary Organizations"): If assistance is to be made to a United States PVO (other than a cooperative development organization), does it obtain at least 20 percent of its total annual funding for international activities from sources other than the United States Government?	Yes, except for the U.S. PVO who will be implementing the Projects' Umbrella Management Unit.
16. Project Agreement Documentation (State Authorization Sec. 139 (as interpreted by conference report)): Has confirmation of the date of signing of the project agreement, including the amount involved, been cabled to State L/T and A.I.D. LEG within 60 days of the agreement's entry into force with respect to the United States, and has the full text of the agreement been pouched to those same offices? (See Handbook 3, Appendix 6G for agreements covered by this provision).	It will be sent with 60 days of signing.
17. Metric System (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 Sec. 5164, as interpreted by conference report, amending Metric Conversion Act of 1975 Sec. 2, and as implemented through A.I.D. policy): Does the assistance activity use the metric system of measurement in its procurements, grants, and other business-related activities, except to the	Yes

extent that such use is impractical or is likely to cause significant inefficiencies or loss of markets to United States firms? Are bulk purchases usually to be made in metric, and are components, subassemblies, and semi-fabricated materials to be specified in metric units when economically available and technically adequate? Will A.I.D. specifications use metric units of measure from the earliest programmatic stages, and from the earliest documentation of the assistance processes (for example, project papers) involving quantifiable measurements (length, area, volume, capacity, mass and weight), through the implementation stage?

18. Women in Development (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Women in Development"): Will assistance be designed so that the percentage of women participants will be demonstrably increased? — Yes

19. Regional and Multilateral Assistance (FAA Sec. 209): Is assistance more efficiently and effectively provided through regional or multilateral organizations? If so, why is assistance not so provided? Information and conclusions on whether assistance will encourage developing countries to cooperate in regional development programs. — No

20. Abortions (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Population, DA," and Sec. 525):

a. Will assistance be made available to any organization or program which, as determined by the President, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization? — No

b. Will any funds be used to lobby for abortion? — No

21. Cooperatives (FAA Sec. 111): Will assistance help develop cooperatives, especially by technical assistance, to assist rural and urban poor to help themselves toward a better life? — Yes

22. U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies

a. Use of currencies (FAA Secs. 612(b), 636(h); FY 1991 Appropriations Act Secs. 507, 509): Describe steps taken to assure that, to the maximum extent possible, foreign currencies owned by the U.S. are utilized in lieu of dollars to meet the cost of contractual and other services.	N/A
b. Release of currencies (FAA Sec. 612(d)): Does the U.S. own excess foreign currency of the country and, if so, what arrangements have been made for its release?	No

23. Procurement

a. Small business (FAA Sec. 602(a)): Are there arrangements to permit U.S. small business to participate equitably in the furnishing of commodities and services financed?	No. This is a PVO project.
b. U.S. procurement (FAA Sec. 604(a)): Will all procurement be from the U.S. except as otherwise determined by the President or determined under delegation from him?	Yes
c. Marine insurance (FAA Sec. 604(d)): If the cooperating country discriminates against marine insurance companies authorized to do business in the U.S., will commodities be insured in the United States against marine risk with such a company?	N/A
d. Non-U.S. agricultural procurement (FAA Sec. 604(e)): If non-U.S. procurement of agricultural commodity or product thereof is to be financed, is there provision against such procurement when the domestic price of such commodity is less than parity? (Exception where commodity financed could not reasonably be procured in U.S.)	N/A
e. Construction or engineering services (FAA Sec. 604(g)): Will construction or engineering services be procured from firms of advanced developing countries which are otherwise eligible	N/A

under Code 941 and which have attained a competitive capability in international markets in one of these areas? (Exception for those countries which receive direct economic assistance under the FAA and permit United States firms to compete for construction or engineering services financed from assistance programs of these countries.)	
f. Cargo preference shipping (FAA Sec. 603)): Is the shipping excluded from compliance with the requirement in section 901(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, that at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of commodities (computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners, and tankers) financed shall be transported on privately owned U.S. flag commercial vessels to the extent such vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates?	No
g. Technical assistance (FAA Sec. 621(a)): If technical assistance is financed, will such assistance be furnished by private enterprise on a contract basis to the fullest extent practicable? Will the facilities and resources of other Federal agencies be utilized, when they are particularly suitable, not competitive with private enterprise, and made available without undue interference with domestic programs?	N/A. The procurement of T.A. will be through a Cooperative Agreement with a U.S. PVO.
h. U.S. air carriers (International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act, 1974): If air transportation of persons or property is financed on grant basis, will U.S. carriers be used to the extent such service is available?	Yes
i. Termination for convenience of U.S. Government (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 504): If the U.S. Government is a party to a contract for procurement, does the contract contain a provision authorizing termination of such contract for the convenience of the United States?	Yes

j. Consulting services (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 524): If assistance is for consulting service through procurement contract pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3109, are contract expenditures a matter of public record and available for public inspection (unless otherwise provided by law or Executive order)? N/A

k. Metric conversion (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, as interpreted by conference report, amending Metric Conversion Act of 1975 Sec. 2, and as implemented through A.I.D. policy): Does the assistance program use the metric system of measurement in its procurements, grants, and other business-related activities, except to the extent that such use is impractical or is likely to cause significant inefficiencies or loss of markets to United States firms? Are bulk purchases usually to be made in metric, and are components, subassemblies, and semi-fabricated materials to be specified in metric units when economically available and technically adequate? Will A.I.D. specifications use metric units of measure from the earliest programmatic stages, and from the earliest documentation of the assistance processes (for example, project papers) involving quantifiable measurements (length, area, volume, capacity, mass and weight), through the implementation stage?

l. Competitive Selection Procedures (FAA Sec. 601(e)): Will the assistance utilize competitive selection procedures for the awarding of contracts, except where applicable procurement rules allow otherwise? Services will be through a Cooperative Agreement to a U.S. PVO selected competitir from a short list of qualified PVOs.

24. Construction

a. Capital project (FAA Sec. 601(d)): If capital (e.g., construction) project, will U.S. engineering and professional services be used? N/A

b. Construction contract (FAA Sec. 611(c)): If contracts for construction are to be financed, will they be let on a competitive basis to maximum extent practicable? Yes

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c. Large projects, Congressional approval (FAA Sec. 620(k)): If for construction of productive enterprise, will aggregate value of assistance to be furnished by the U.S. not exceed $100 million (except for productive enterprises in Egypt that were described in the Congressional Presentation), or does assistance have the express approval of Congress? — N/A

25. U.S. Audit Rights (FAA Sec. 301(d)): If fund is established solely by U.S. contributions and administered by an international organization, does Comptroller General have audit rights? — N/A

26. Communist Assistance (FAA Sec. 620(h). Do arrangements exist to insure that United States foreign aid is not used in a manner which, contrary to the best interests of the United States, promotes or assists the foreign aid projects or activities of the Communist-bloc countries? — Yes

27. Narcotics

a. Cash reimbursements (FAA Sec. 483): Will arrangements preclude use of financing to make reimbursements, in the form of cash payments, to persons whose illicit drug crops are eradicated? — N/A

b. Assistance to narcotics traffickers (FAA Sec. 487): Will arrangements take "all reasonable steps" to preclude use of financing to or through individuals or entities which we know or have reason to believe have either: (1) been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation of the United States or a foreign country relating to narcotics (or other controlled substances); or (2) been an illicit trafficker in, or otherwise involved in the illicit trafficking of, any such controlled substance? — N/A

28. Expropriation and Land Reform (FAA Sec. 620(g)): Will assistance preclude use of financing to compensate owners for expropriated or nationalized property, except to compensate foreign nationals in accordance with a land reform program certified by the President?	Yes
29. Police and Prisons (FAA Sec. 660): Will assistance preclude use of financing to provide training, advice, or any financial support for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces, except for narcotics programs?	Yes
30. CIA Activities (FAA Sec. 662): Will assistance preclude use of financing for CIA activities?	Yes
31. Motor Vehicles (FAA Sec. 636(i)): Will assistance preclude use of financing for purchase, sale, long-term lease, exchange or guaranty of the sale of motor vehicles manufactured outside U.S., unless a waiver is obtained?	DFA regulations will be followed.
32. Military Personnel (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 503): Will assistance preclude use of financing to pay pensions, annuities, retirement pay, or adjusted service compensation for prior or current military personnel?	Yes
33. Payment of U.N. Assessments (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 505): Will assistance preclude use of financing to pay U.N. assessments, arrearages or dues?	Yes
34. Multilateral Organization Lending (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 506): Will assistance preclude use of financing to carry out provisions of FAA section 209(d) (transfer of FAA funds to multilateral organizations for lending)?	Yes
35. Export of Nuclear Resources (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 510): Will assistance preclude use of financing to finance the export of nuclear equipment, fuel, or technology?	Yes

36. Repression of Population (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 511): Will assistance preclude use of financing for the purpose of aiding the efforts of the government of such country to repress the legitimate rights of the population of such country contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? — Yes

37. Publicity or Propoganda (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 516): Will assistance be used for publicity or propaganda purposes designed to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress, to influence in any way the outcome of a political election in the United States, or for any publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by Congress? — No

38. Marine Insurance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 563): Will any A.I.D. contract and solicitation, and subcontract entered into under such contract, include a clause requiring that U.S. marine insurance companies have a fair opportunity to bid for marine insurance when such insurance is necessary or appropriate? — Yes

39. Exchange for Prohibited Act (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 569): Will any assistance be provided to any foreign government (including any instrumentality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United States person in exchange for that foreign government or person undertaking any action which is, if carried out by the United States Government, a United States official or employee, expressly prohibited by a provision of United States law? — No

B. CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ONLY

1. Agricultural Exports (Bumpers Amendment) (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 521(b), as interpreted by conference report for original enactment): If assistance is for agricultural development activities (specifically, any testing or breeding feasibility study, variety improvement or introduction, consultancy, publication, conference, or training), are such activities: (1) specifically and principally designed to increase agricultural exports by the host country to a country other than the United States, where the export would lead to direct competition in that third country with exports of a similar commodity grown or produced in the United States, and can the activities reasonably be expected to cause substantial injury to U.S. exporters of a similar agricultural commodity; or (2) in support of research that is intended primarily to benefit U.S. producers?	N/A
2. Tied Aid Credits (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Economic Support Fund"): Will DA funds be used for tied aid credits?	No
3. Appropriate Technology (FAA Sec. 107): Is special emphasis placed on use of appropriate technology (defined as relatively smaller, cost-saving, labor-using technologies that are generally most appropriate for the small farms, small businesses, and small incomes of the poor)?	Yes
4. Indigenous Needs and Resources (FAA Sec. 281(b)): Describe extent to which the activity recognizes the particular needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the country; utilizes the country's intellectual resources to encourage institutional development; and supports civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.	This program supports indigenous needs in that the local PVOs/NGOs will be identifying the specifi activities for funds, henc the project taps into its comparative advantage of PVOs/NGOs in dealing with the people of a country.

5. Economic Development (FAA Sec. 101(a)): Does the activity give reasonable promise of contributing to the development of economic resources, or to the increase of productive capacities and self-sustaining economic growth?	Yes
6. Special Development Emphases (FAA Secs. 102(b), 113, 281(a)): Describe extent to which activity will: (a) effectively involve the poor in development by extending access to economy at local level, increasing labor-intensive production and the use of appropriate technology, dispersing investment from cities to small towns and rural areas, and insuring wide participation of the poor in the benefits of development on a sustained basis, using appropriate U.S. institutions; (b) encourage democratic private and local governmental institutions; (c) support the self-help efforts of developing countries; (d) promote the participation of women in the national economies of developing countries and the improvement of women's status; and (e) utilize and encourage regional cooperation by developing countries.	(a) The project works through PVOs/NGOs, who have a comparative advantage under taking the items listed in (a) (b) N/A (c) See (a) above (d) See (a) above (e) N/A
7. Recipient Country Contribution (FAA Secs. 110, 124(d)): Will the recipient country provide at least 25 percent of the costs of the program, project, or activity with respect to which the assistance is to be furnished (or is the latter cost-sharing requirement being waived for a "relatively least developed" country)?	Waiver obtained from AID/W.
8. Benefit to Poor Majority (FAA Sec. 128(b)): If the activity attempts to increase the institutional capabilities of private organizations or the government of the country, or if it attempts to stimulate scientific and technological research, has it been designed and will it be monitored to ensure that the ultimate beneficiaries are the poor majority?	Yes

9. Abortions (FAA Sec. 104(f); FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Population, DA," and Sec. 535):

a. Are any of the funds to be used for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions?	No
b. Are any of the funds to be used to pay for the performance of involuntary sterilization as a method of family planning or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any person to undergo sterilizations?	No
c. Are any of the funds to be made available to any organization or program which, as determined by the President, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization?	No
d. Will funds be made available only to voluntary family planning projects which offer, either directly or through referral to, or information about access to, a broad range of family planning methods and services?	N/A
e. In awarding grants for natural family planning, will any applicant be discriminated against because of such applicant's religious or conscientious commitment to offer only natural family planning?	N/A
f. Are any of the funds to be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in whole or in part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning?	No
g. Are any of the funds to be made available to any organization if the President certifies that the use of these funds by such organization would violate any of the above provisions related to abortions and involuntary sterilization?	No

10. Contract Awards (FAA Sec. 601(e)): Will the project utilize competitive selection procedures for the awarding of contracts, except where applicable procurement rules allow otherwise?	N/A
11. Disadvantaged Enterprises (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 567): What portion of the funds will be available only for activities of economically and socially disadvantaged enterprises, historically black colleges and universities, colleges and universities having a student body in which more than 40 percent of the students are Hispanic Americans, and private and voluntary organizations which are controlled by individuals who are black Americans, Hispanic Americans, or Native Americans, or who are economically or socially disadvantaged (including women)?	N/A
12. Biological Diversity (FAA Sec. 119(g): Will the assistance: (a) support training and education efforts which improve the capacity of recipient countries to prevent loss of biological diversity; (b) be provided under a long-term agreement in which the recipient country agrees to protect ecosystems or other wildlife habitats; (c) support efforts to identify and survey ecosystems in recipient countries worthy of protection; or (d) by any direct or indirect means significantly degrade national parks or similar protected areas or introduce exotic plants or animals into such areas?	N/A
13. Tropical Forests (FAA Sec. 118; FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 533(c)-(e) & (g)):	N/A
a. A.I.D. Regulation 16: Does the assistance comply with the environmental procedures set forth in A.I.D. Regulation 16?	Yes
b. Conservation: Does the assistance place a high priority on conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests? Specifically, does the assistance, to the fullest extent	N/A

feasible: (1) stress the importance of conserving and sustainably managing forest resources; (2) support activities which offer employment and income alternatives to those who otherwise would cause destruction and loss of forests, and help countries identify and implement alternatives to colonizing forested areas; (3) support training programs, educational efforts, and the establishment or strengthening of institutions to improve forest management; (4) help end destructive slash-and-burn agriculture by supporting stable and productive farming practices; (5) help conserve forests which have not yet been degraded by helping to increase production on lands already cleared or degraded; (6) conserve forested watersheds and rehabilitate those which have been deforested; (7) support training, research, and other actions which lead to sustainable and more environmentally sound practices for timber harvesting, removal, and processing; (8) support research to expand knowledge of tropical forests and identify alternatives which will prevent forest destruction, loss, or degradation; (9) conserve biological diversity in forest areas by supporting efforts to identify, establish, and maintain a representative network of protected tropical forest ecosystems on a worldwide basis, by making the establishment of protected areas a condition of support for activities involving forest clearance or degradation, and by helping to identify tropical forest ecosystems and species in need of protection and establish and maintain appropriate protected areas; (10) seek to increase the awareness of U.S. Government agencies and other donors of the immediate and long-term value of tropical forests; (11) utilize the resources and abilities of all relevant U.S. government agencies; (12) be based upon careful analysis of the alternatives available to achieve the best sustainable use of the land; and (13) take full account of the environmental impacts of the proposed activities on biological diversity?

N/A

c. Forest degradation: Will assistance be used for: (1) the procurement or use of logging equipment, unless an environmental assessment indicates that all timber harvesting operations involved will be conducted in an environmentally sound manner and that the proposed activity will produce positive economic benefits and sustainable forest management systems; (2) actions which will significantly degrade national parks or similar protected areas which contain tropical forests, or introduce exptic plants or animals into such areas; (3) activities which would result in the conversion of forest lands to the rearing of livestock; (4) the construction, upgrading, or maintenance of roads (including temporary haul roads for logging or other extractive industries) which pass through relatively undergraded forest lands; (5) the colonization of forest lands; or (6) the construction of dams or other water control structures which flood relatively undergraded forest lands, unless with respect to each such activity an environmental assessment indicates that the activity will contribute significantly and directly to improving the livelihood of the rural poor and will be conducted in an environmentally sound manner which supports sustainable development?	N/A. The project will comply with A.I.D. Reg. 16
d. Sustainable forestry: If assistance relates to tropical forests, will project assist countries in developing a systematic analysis of the appropriate use of their total tropical forest resources, with the goal of developing a national program for sustainable forestry?	N/A
e. Environmental impact statements: Will funds be made available in accordance with provisions of FAA Section 117(c) and applicable A.I.D. regulations requiring an environmental impact statement for activities significantly affecting the environment?	Yes

14. Energy (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 533(c)): If assistance relates to energy, will such assistance focus on: (a) end-use energy efficiency, least-cost energy planning, and renewable energy resources, and (b) the key countries where assistance would have the greatest impact on reducing emissions from greenhouse gases? N/A

15. Sub-Saharan Africa Assistance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 562, adding a new FAA chapter 10 (FAA Sec. 496)): If assistance will come from the Sub-Saharan Africa DA account, is it: (a) to be used to help the poor majority in Sub-Saharan Africa through a process of long-term development and economic growth that is equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and self-reliant; (b) to be used to promote sustained economic growth, encourage private sector development, promote individual initiatives, and help to reduce the role of central governments in areas more appropriate for the private sector; (c) being provided in accordance with the policies contained in FAA section 102; (d) being provided in close consultation with African, United States and other PVOs that have demonstrated effectiveness in the promotion of local grassroots activities on behalf of long-term development in Sub-Saharan Africa; (e) being used to promote reform of sectoral economic policies, to support the critical sector priorities of agricultural production and natural resources, health, voluntary family planning services, education, and income generating opportunities, to bring about appropriate sectoral restructuring of the Sub-Saharan African economies, to support reform in public administration and finances and to establish a favorable environment for individual enterprise and self-sustaining development, and to take into account, in assisted policy reforms, the need to protect vulnerable groups; (f) being used to increase agricultural production in ways that protect and restore the natural resource base, especially food production, to maintain and improve basic transportation and communication networks,

(a) Yes

(b) Yes

(c) Yes

(d) Yes

(e) Yes

(f) N/A

to maintain and restore the renewable natural resource base in ways that increase agricultural production, to improve health conditions with special emphasis on meeting the health needs of mothers and children, including the establishment of self-sustaining primary health care systems that give priority to preventive care, to provide increased access to voluntary family planning services, to improve basic literacy and mathematics especially to those outside the formal educational system and to improve primary education, and to develop income-generating opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed in urban and rural areas?

16. Debt-for-Nature Exchange (FAA Sec. 463): If project will finance a debt-for-nature exchange, describe how the exchange will support protection of: (a) the world's oceans and atmosphere, (b) animal and plant species, and (c) parks and reserves; or describe how the exchange will promote: (d) natural resource management, (e) local conservation programs, (f) conservation training programs, (g) public commitment to conservation, (h) land and ecosystem management, and (i) regenerative approaches in farming, forestry, fishing, and watershed management. N/A

17. Deobligation/Reobligation (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 515): If deob/reob authority is sought to be exercised in the provision of DA assistance, are the funds being obligated for the same general purpose, and for countries within the same region as originally obligated, and have the House and Senate Appropriations Committees been properly notified? N/A

18. Loans

a. Repayment capacity (FAA Sec. 122(b)): Information and conclusion on capacity of the country to repay the loan at a reasonable rate of interest. N/A

b. Long-range plans (FAA Sec. 122(b)): Does the activity give reasonable promise of assisting long-range plans and programs designed to develop economic resources and increase productive capacities?	Yes
c. Interest rate (FAA Sec. 122(b)): If development loan is repayable in dollars, is interest rate at least 2 percent per annum during a grace period which is not to exceed ten years, and at least 3 percent per annum thereafter?	N/A
d. Exports to United States (FAA Sec. 620(d)): If assistance is for any productive enterprise which will compete with U.S. enterprises, is there an agreement by the recipient country to prevent export to the U.S. of more than 20 percent of the enterprise's annual production during the life of the loan, or has the requirement to enter into such an agreement been waived by the President because of a national security interest?	N/A
19. Development Objectives (FAA Secs. 102(a), 111, 113, 281(a)): Extent to which activity will: (1) effectively involve the poor in development, by expanding access to economy at local level, increasing labor-intensive production and the use of appropriate technology, spreading investment out from cities to small towns and rural areas, and insuring wide participation of the poor in the benefits of development on a sustained basis, using the appropriate U.S. institutions; (2) help develop cooperatives, especially by technical assistance, to assist rural and urban poor to help themselves toward better life, and otherwise encourage democratic private and local governmental institutions; (3) support the self-help efforts of developing countries; (4) promote the participation of women in the national economies of developing countries and the improvement of women's status; and (5) utilize and encourage regional cooperation by developing countries?	(1) The project works through PVOs/NGOs who have a comparative advantage under taking the items listed in (a). (2) N/A (3) See (1) above (4) See (1) above (5) N/A

mothers and young children, using paramedical and auxiliary medical personnel, clinics and health posts, commercial distribution systems, and other modes of community outreach.

22. Education and Human Resources Development (FAA Sec. 105): If assistance is being made available for education, public administration, or human resource development, describe (a) extent to which activity strengthens nonformal education, makes formal education more relevant, especially for rural families and urban poor, and strengthens management capability of institutions enabling the poor to participate in development; and (b) extent to which assistance provides advanced education and training of people of developing countries in such disciplines as are required for planning and implementation of public and private development activities. N/A

23. Energy, Private Voluntary Organizations, and Selected Development Activities (FAA Sec. 106): If assistance is being made available for energy, private voluntary organizations, and selected development problems, describe extent to which activity is: N/A

a. concerned with data collection and analysis, the training of skilled personnel, research on and development of suitable energy sources, and pilot projects to test new methods of energy production; and facilitative of research on and development and use of small-scale, decentralized, renewable energy sources for rural areas, emphasizing development of energy resources which are environmentally acceptable and require minimum capital investment; N/A

b. concerned with technical cooperation and development, especially with U.S. private and voluntary, or regional and international development, organizations; N/A

c. research into, and evaluation of, economic development processes and techniques; N/A

d. reconstruction after natural or manmade disaster and programs of disaster preparedness; N/A

e. for special development problems, and to enable proper utilization of infrastructure and related projects funded with earlier U.S. assistance; N/A

f. for urban development, especially small, labor-intensive enterprises, marketing systems for small producers, and financial or other institutions to help urban poor participate in economic and social development. N/A

24. Sahel Development (FAA Secs. 120-21). If assistance is being made available for the Sahelian region, describe: (a) extent to which there is international coordination in planning and implementation; participation and support by African countries and organizations in determining development priorities; and a long-term, multidonor development plan which calls for equitable burden-sharing with other donors; (b) whether a determination has been made that the host government has an adequate system for accounting for and controlling receipt and expenditure of projects funds (dollars or local currency generated therefrom). N/A

C. CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS ONLY

1. Economic and Political Stability (FAA Sec. 531(a)): Will this assistance promote economic and political stability? To the maximum extent feasible, is this assistance consistent with the policy directions, purposes, and programs of Part I of the FAA?

N/A, This is DA funded.

2. Military Purposes (FAA Sec. 531(e)): Will this assistance be used for military or paramilitary purposes?

3. Commodity Grants/Separate Accounts (FAA Sec. 609): If commodities are to be granted so that sale proceeds will accrue to the recipient country, have Special Account (counterpart) arrangements been made?

4. Generation and Use of Local Currencies (FAA Sec. 531(d)): Will ESF funds made available for commodity import programs or other program assistance be used to generate local currencies? If so, will at least 50 percent of such local currencies be available to support activities consistent with the objectives of FAA sections 103 through 106?

5. Cash Transfer Requirements (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Economic Support Fund," and Sec. 575(b)). If assistance is in the form of a cash transfer:

a. Separate account: Are all such cash payments to be maintained by the country in a separate account and not to be commingled with any other funds?

b. Local currencies: Will all local currencies that may be generated with funds provided as a cash transfer to such a country also be deposited in a special account, and has A.I.D. entered into an agreement with that government setting forth the amount of the local currencies to be generated, the terms and conditions under which they are to be used, and the responsibilities of A.I.D. and that government to monitor and account for deposits and disbursements?

c. U.S. Government use of local currencies: Will all such local currencies also be used in accordance with FAA Section 609, which requires such local currencies to be made available to the U.S. government as the U.S. determines necessary for the requirements of the U.S. Government, and which requires the remainder to be used for programs agreed to by the U.S. Government to carry out the purposes for which new funds authorized by the FAA would themselves be available?

d. Congressional notice: Has Congress received prior notification providing in detail how the funds will be used, including the U.S. interests that will be served by the assistance, and, as appropriate, the economic policy reforms that will be promoted by the cash transfer assistance?

DRAFTER:GC/LP:EHonnold:4/11/91:2169J

ANNEX D.

REPUBLIQUE [illegible]
MINISTERE DES [illegible] ETRANGERES
ET DE LA COOPER[illegible] INTERNATIONALE
B.P. 179 KI[illegible]

N° 1130 /16.03.D1/COOP/
~~DILAT~~

Ang. Response?

TRES URGENT

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise présente ses compliments à l'Ambassade des Etats Unis d'Amérique à Kigali et a l'honneur de lui présenter le mémorandum du Gouvernement Rwandais sur les besoins de financement du processus de relance démocratique dans lequel il est engagé.

Ce mémorandum reprend les besoins des principaux intervenants dans la mise en application des mesures de relance démocratique et de la consolidation, dans le temps, de la démocratie pluraliste, à savoir le Parlement, le Ministère de la Justice et le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Developpement Communal.

Les besoins de ces institutions, représentant les trois pouvoirs, sont repris ci-après:

1. CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEVELOPPEMENT

- Création d'un centre de documentation/recherche
- Acquisition de matériel de bureautique
- Voyages d'étude

2. MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE

FORMATION DE MAGISTRATS :

- Ouverture d'une licence en magistrature à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université Nationale du Rwanda
- Formation des agents de l'ordre au centre de Perfectionnement des cadres de Murambi
- Perfectionnement de magistrats non diplomés
- Création d'une école Nationale de la Magistrature
- Etude sur la conformité des Lois avec les droits de la personne
- Vulgarisation des textes légaux
- Création d'un centre national de formation et d'information

3. MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAL

A. PROGRAMME ELECTORAL

- élections présidentielles
- élections législatives
- élections des Bourgmestres
- élections des conseillers communaux
- élections des responsables des cellules

B. Acquisition de véhicules de supervision:
- 11 camionnettes Toyota Hilux pour les 11 préfectures
- 10 camionnettes Mitsubishi pour le Ministere

C. - Subsides aux partis politiques
D. - Voyages d'étude
E. - Acquisition d'une nouvelle carte d'identité
F. - Publications:
- Elaboration d'un vade mecum pour la vulgarisation des textes légaux
- Rédaction d'un livret éducatif sur le pluripartisme
- Etude sur les rapports institutionnels entre le Ministère de l' Intérieur et du développement communal et les entités administratives sous sa tutelle

G. - Acquisition d'équipements de bureautique pour le Ministère et pour les Préfectures

H. - Equipements et services audio-visuels:
- Cassette vidéo sur la campagne électorale et les élections
- matériel sonore
- matériel de reportage

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise souhaiterait, à l'occasion, inviter l'Ambassade des Etats Unis d'Amérique à Kigali à lui communiquer sa disponibilité quant à la participation au financement de ce programme, et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Kigali le 10 DEC. 1991

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale

Copie pour information à:

- Monsieur le Président de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Président du Conseil National de Développement
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Ministre de l' Intérieur et du Développement Communal
KIGALI
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice
KIGALI
- Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de la République Rwandaise
WASHINGTON.

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A N N E X E I

MEMORANDUM PRESENTE AUX PARTENAIRES DU RWANDA EN VUE D'UN APPUI MATERIEL AU PROCESSUS DE RELANCE DEMOCRATIQUE.

Le processus démocratique relancé depuis le 10 Juin 1991 et la mise en place du pluralisme politique exige la mobilisation d'importants moyens matériels et financiers que le Rwanda, vu le contexte économique actuel aggravé par la situation de guerre ne peut mobiliser à lui seul.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise se propose de faire appel à la solidarité internationale et à la bonne disposition de ses partenaires pour que ces derniers l'épaulent à bien asseoir les préalables au renforcement de la démocratie.

L'objectif visé est de permettre aux instances exécutif, législatif et judiciaire d'accéder à un minimum de moyens leur permettant de bien s'acquitter de leurs fonctions respectives, et en toute autonomie.

Dans ce cadre, la consolidation des capacités de l'actuel Conseil National de Développement, du Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal ainsi que du Ministère de la Justice s'avère capitale pour que la relance démocratique soit préparée et mise en route dans des conditions optimales.

Le présent mémorandum reprend les besoins de chacun de ces trois services, et en fournit les coûts estimatifs.

A. APPUI AU MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAL.

A.I. PROGRAMME ELECTORAL.

A.I.1. Matériel électoral.

Selon les estimations du Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Com...

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Ce montant, pour lequel on peut estimer les imprévus à 10 % porte sur les dépenses suivantes:

- les élections présidentielles : 161.281.871 FRW
- les élections législatives : 88.373.271 FRW
- les élections des Bourgmestres : 68.875.510 FRW
- les élections des Conseillers Communaux : 67.257.071 FRW
- les élections des Responsables de Cellules : 205.439.726 FRW.

Concernant ce programme électoral en vue, le financement requis pourrait intervenir financièrement pour l'achat du matériel électoral comme l'indique les tableaux en annexe:

38.784.381 FRW pour les présidentielles
45.025.081 FRW pour les législatives
[illegible]26.081 FRW pour les élections des Bourgmestres
[illegible]25.081 FRW pour les élections des Conseillers communaux
132.150.486 FRW pour les élections des Responsables de Cellules.
TOTAL : 283.311.109 FRW.

Ce financement pourrait également servir à l'acquisition de nouveaux véhicules pour la préparation et la supervision des élections. En effet, il faudra acheter 11 véhicules (camionnettes TOYOTA Hilux simple cabine) à raison d'un seul pour chaque Préfecture. De même, il faudra 10 camionnettes MITSUBISHI double cabine pour le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal, lesdits véhicules devant aider celui-ci à préparer et à superviser les élections au niveau de tout le pays. L'achat de ces véhicules s'avère nécessaire dans la mesure où le charroi du Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal (y compris les véhicules affectés dans les Préfectures) a été en grande partie réquisitionné par les Forces Armées Rwandaises à la suite de la guerre d'octobre.

Coût correspondant:

11 camionnettes TOYOTA Hilux simple cabine: 2.059.000 FRW x 11 = 22.649.000 FRW.

10 camionnettes MITSUBISHI double cabine: 2.950.000 FRW x 10 = 29.500.000 FRW.

TOTAL : 22.649.000 FRW + 29.500.000 FRW: 52.149.000 FRW.

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Montant total pour l'achat de matériel et véhicules:
283.511.109 FRW + 52.149.000 FRW = 335.660.109 FRW soit
2.622.347 dollars U.S.

A.I.2. Opérations électorales.

L'appui sollicité concerne la prise en charge totale du reste des dépenses, spécialement au chapitre des opérations électorales. Ces dépenses comprennent les postes suivants:

• **Les présidentielles:**	
- frais des scribes	: 7.000.000 FRW
- frais de supervision	: 6.003.750 FRW
- carburant	: 4.500.000 FRW
- Location de véhicules privés	: 9.816.740 FRW
- frais du personnel des bureaux de vote	: 23.028.000 FRW
S/total	: 50.348.490 FRW.-
• **Les législatives:**	
- frais de supervision	: 6.003.750 FRW
- carburant	: 4.500.000 FRW
- location des véhicules privés	: 9.816.740 FRW
- frais du personnel des bureaux de vote	: 23.028.000 FRW
S/total	: 43.348.490 FRW
• **Elections des Bourgmestres:**	
- frais de supervision	: 6.003.750 FRW
- carburant	: 4.500.000 FRW
- location des véhicules privés	: 9.816.740 FRW
- frais du personnel des bureaux de vote	: 23.028.000 FRW
S/total	: 43.348.490 FRW.

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* Elections des Conseillers communaux

- frais de supervision	: 6.003.750 FRW
- carburant	: 4.500.000 FRW
- location des véhicules privés	: 9.816.740 FRW
- frais du personnel des bureaux de vote	: 24.907.500 FRW
S/total	: 45.227.990 FRW.

* Elections des Responsables de Cellules.

- frais de supervision	: 6.003.750 FRW
- carburant	: 4.500.000 FRW
- location des véhicules privés	: 9.816.000 FRW
- frais du personnel des bureaux de vote	: 54.319.750 FRW.
S/total	: 74.319.750 FRW.

Montant total: 256.593.210 FRW soit 2.004.635 dollars U.S.

A.I.3. SUBSIDES AUX PARTIS POLITIQUES.

Description de l'intervention.

La Loi n° 28/91 du 18 juin 1991 sur les Partis Politiques prévoit que les finances de l'Etat ne peuvent pas être utilisées pour le fonctionnement ou les intérêts des Partis Politiques.

Toutefois, précise-t-elle, l'Etat veillera à assurer une répartition équitable des moyens pour permettre aux Partis Politiques de participer aux élections.

Etant donné la conjoncture économique de notre Pays, l'Etat n'a pas les moyens de soutenir les formations politiques qui viennent d'être agréées ou qui vont naître pour leur permettre de se préparer aux prochaines échéances électorales.

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Or, dans un premier temps, ces partis politiques cherchent à s'installer et à recruter les sieptes avec peu de moyens dont ils disposent.

A cet égard, chaque parti devrait normalement disposer d'un secrétariat permanent à son siège, d'un bureau régional au niveau de la Préfecture, d'un bureau local au niveau de chaque Commune.

Il est évident qu'il revient à chaque parti de s'organiser pour assurer la mise en place de ces structures et payer les fonctionnaires mis à la disposition du parti. Pour cela chaque parti doit chercher un financement.

Cependant, l'Etat doit se préparer à remplir ces obligations vis-à-vis des partis politiques, notamment leur faciliter la participation aux préparatifs des élections (conférence des partis ou autres réunions de concertation avec les départements ministériels concernés...) et à la campagne proprement dite car, d'ores et déjà, l'on constate que les forces politiques dans notre pays s'accordent à placer les prochaines élections dans le courant de l'année 1992.

<u>Coût correspondant.</u>

Lors des préparatifs aux élections et de la campagne proprement dite, chaque parti devra envoyer des leaders à travers tout le pays pour des meetings populaires.

Dans ce contexte, chaque parti devra déléguer au moins 5 personnes à chaque chef-lieu de Préfecture et dans certaines Communes qui auront été choisies en raison de leur importance et influence quant à l'issue des élections. A titre indicatif, 5 Communes au moins par Préfecture seront visitées. C'est pourquoi, l'Etat doit supporter les frais de mission pour ces leaders politiques, pour leurs chauffeurs et bien sûr, mettre à leur disposition des véhicules et du carburant pour ces déplacements. A l'heure actuelle, 5 partis politiques viennent d'être agréés et d'autres le seront bientôt. Les prévisions financières peuvent être estimées comme suit si l'on devra donner 1.250 FRW à chaque leader politique par jour et 625 pour

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Ainsi le total des frais de mission pour les 5 leaders politiques de chaque parti et leurs chauffeurs est estimé comme suit:

Au niveau préfectoral.

(1.250 FRW x 5 x 11) + (625 FRW x 5 x 11) = 103.125 FRW.

Au niveau communal.

(1.250 FRW x 5 x11 x 5) + (625 FRW x 5 x 11 x 5)= 515.625 FRW.

S/TOTAL : 103.125 FRW + 515.625 FRW = 618.750 FRW

S/TOTAL pour les 5 parti: 618.750 FRW x 5 = 3.093.750 FRW

MONTANT TOTAL DEMANDE pour les 5 élections:(3.093.750 x 5 = 15.468.750 FRW

soit 120.850 dollars US.

A.I.4. Voyage d'études.

Le Rwanda est entré dans un système politique pluraliste qui sera principalement géré par un Président de la République, un Premier Ministre Chef de Gouvernement et une Assemblée Nationale de Députés.

L'assistance demandée est de permettre à trois hauts fonctionnaires du Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal de visiter, pendant un mois, un des pays qui possèdent une longue expérience dans la gestion du multipartisme. Ledit voyage se déroulerait dans la période du mois de Janvier-Février 1992.

L'expérience acquise à travers les visites souhaitées pourrait permettre aux fonctionnaires intéressés d'identifier les aspects particuliers de la gestion du multipartisme et des conséquences de son développement dans un pays jeune comme le Rwanda.

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Coût correspondant.

Tickets d'avion aller et retour : 174.245 FRW x 2 x 3 = 1.045.470 FRW

Séjour : 19.071 FRW x 3 x 30 = 1.716.390 FRW

TOTAL : 1.045.470 FRW + 1.716.390 FRW = 2.761.860 FRW
soit 21.578 dollars U.S.

N.B. : Le ticket d'avion ci-haut reprend le tarif du Rwanda vers le continent américain. Les coûts seraient moindres dans le cas d'un pays européen.

A.I.5. Acquisition de la nouvelle Carte d'identité.

D'après les estimations du Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal, l'acquisition de la nouvelle Carte d'Identité (sans mention ethnique) devrait coûter 250 millions de FRW, qui correspondent à 60 FRW x 4 millions de cartes (avec une marge de 10 millions de FRW).

Il s'agit d'une Carte plastifiée sur 3 côtés, le 4ème, qui doit reprendre les noms des enfants n'étant pas plastifié.

A.I.6. Publications.

A.I.6.1. Elaboration d'un vade mecum pour la vulgarisation des textes légaux.

L'ouverture du Rwanda au pluralisme politique et le démarrage du processus de démocratisation ont entraîné la publication de nouvelles lois. Celles-ci doivent être diffusées au niveau des autorités aux différents échelons, notamment celles qui sont en contact direct avec les populations.

Les actions prévues sont la collecte, l'impression/reproduction et reliure de 200 exemplaires, à raison de 3.000 FRW la pièce, le financement requis étant donc de 600.000 FRW, soit 4.687 US $.

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A.I.6.2. Rédaction d'un livret éducatif sur le pluralisme politique.

Le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal envisage la publication d'un livret éducatif sur l'horizon politique du Rwanda dans l'ère du pluralisme politique, accessible à un plus grand nombre possible de citoyens.

La confection de ce document requerra le concours d'un expert expatrié et la participation de 5 experts rwandais. Les coûts correspondants sont repris ci-après:

- honoraires des membres de la Commission: 660 FRW x 5 x 60 jours = 1.950.000 FRW;
- reproduction (impression + reliure): 3.000 FRW x 30 = 900.000 FRW.

- TOTAL : 2.850.000 FRW (22.365 US $).

Ce montant ne prend pas en compte la participation de l'expertise extérieure.

A.I.6.3. Etude sur les rapports institutionnels entre le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal et les entités administratives sous sa tutelle.

Il est certain que la consolidation des institutions appelées à gérer le multipartisme exige des attitudes adaptées, dans un cadre bien compris de rapports nouveaux entre les entités décentralisées et l'Administration Centrale.

Le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal qui a dans ses attributions la supervision de l'activité des Préfectures, sous-Préfectures, Communes, etc..., est appelé à se mettre rapidement au diapason du multipartisme en se réorganisant.

Il planifie la réalisation d'une étude de redéfinition des rapports entre le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal et les entités locales sous sa tutelle.

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Les dépenses prévues sont reprises ci-après:

- Honoraires des experts : 6.500 FRW x 5 x 90 jours = 2.925.000 FRW
- Reproduction (pression et reliure) = 3.000 FRW x 300 = 900.000 FRW
- Frais de mission des experts = 6.000 FRW x 5 x 20 jours = 600.000 FRW.

TOTAL : 4.425.000 FRW soit 34.570 US $.

N.B.: Ce montant ne tient pas compte de l'expertise étrangère.

A.I.6.4. Informatisation ou Equirements de traitement de texte et de données.

Afin que l'Administration soit à la hauteur de la gestion du pluralisme politique, il faudra que le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal et les 11 Préfectures soient rapidement dotés d'un minimum de moyens techniques de traitement de textes et de données collectées, étant donné qu'il faudra désormais compter avec plusieurs partis politiques et plusieurs groupes d'intérêt ou de pression aux tendances diverses.

Les besoins, dans ce domaine, sont les suivants: 20 appareils informatiques (4 pour la Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques et Administratives du Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal, 6 pour la Préfecture de la Ville de Kigali et 10 pour les autres Préfectures).

Coût : 20 postes x 800.000 FRW = 16,000.000 FRW.
20 imprimantes x 500.000 FRW = 10.000.000 FRW
12 onduleurs x 1.200.000 FRW = 26.400.000 FRW.

T O T A L = 52.400.000 FRW.

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A.I.6.5. Equipements et Services audio-visuels.

A.I.6.5.A. Réalisation d'une Cassette vidéo sur les élections.

La Cassette à produire couvrira non seulement la période de transition marquée par la Campagne électorale des partis et les élections elles-mêmes.

Du fait que la couverture souhaitée s'étendrait sur les 11 Préfectures du pays, il y aurait mobilisation de 11 cameramen et pour une durée de 3 mois.

Les dépenses pour ce projet sont réparties de la façon suivante:

- Services des cameramen : 2.500 FRW x 11 x 90 = 24.750.000 FRW
- Location de véhicules : 12 véhicules x 90 x 20.000 = 21.600.000 FRW

TOTAL 46.350.000 FRW, soit 362.110 US $.

La supervision de l'opération serait confiée à un technicien expatrié dont les calculs ci-haut ne tiennent pas compte.

A.I.6.5.B. Matériel sonore (Type TOA).

Lecteur de cassettes, amplificateur, lance-voix, amplifier, microphone = 250.000 FRW pour 11 Préfectures
22 sous-Préfectures
148 Communes
} 181

Coût total = 250.000 FRW x 181 = 20.250.000 FRW, soit 158.204 US $

C. Matériel de reportage pour le Ministère de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal.

- 1 NAGRA + 2 Microphones = 2.500.000 FRW
- 1 Melting amplifier avec 2 Microphones : 500.000 FRW
- 1 Lecteur de cassette professionnel: 300.000 FRW

Coût total = 3.300.000 FRW, soit 25.782 US $

Coût total pour les équipements et services

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B. APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL AU PARLEMENT.

La constitution revisée, telle que promulguée le 10 juin 1991 consacre la séparation des trois Pouvoirs, et la création, à terme, d'une Assemblée Nationale.

Point n'est besoin d'insister sur la nécessité pour le Rwanda de renforcer les capacités de l'actuel CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEVELOPPEMENT, pour qu'aux élections à venir, la gestion du système parlementaire soit déjà capable d'être à la hauteur du cadre pluripartite en vue.

L'Assemblée Nationale attendue aura principalement besoin d'un système de documentation moderne du perfectionnement des techniciens permanents, ainsi que d'un meilleur matériel de bureautique.

B. I. DOCUMENTATION/RECHERCHE.

Le Parlement aura besoin d'une bibliothèque plus complète et continuellement mise à jour afin que les parlementaires et les techniciens de l'Assemblée Nationale soient à la hauteur de leurs tâches, puisque les exigeances qui les attendent seront de plus en plus fortes, au regard de la divergence des tendences politiques et de la compétition caractérisant la démocratie pluraliste.

Les coûts liés à ce projet ne seront évalués qu'au moment où il aura été permis aux cadres du Conseil National de Développement de visiter des Parlements Etrangers dont l'expérience peut inspirer l'Assemblée Nationale Rwandaise. Toutefois, le Conseil National de Développement peut, à court terme, disponibiliser une liste de documents dont il aimerait disposer.

B.II. MATERIEL DE BUREAU.

Le travail quotidien des techniciens du Parlement devra impérativement être adapté à la situation future.

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Pour cela, le Parlement doit être doté de matériel de bureautique (traitement de texte et de données) pour permettre une plus grande efficacité des services.

Les besoins à court terme sont des équipements de traitement de texte et de données pour chacune des six Commissions et pour le Secrétariat Général, selon les détails repris ci-après:

- 7 appareils informatiques x 800.000 = 5.600.000 FRW
- 3 ordinateurs x 1.200.000 = 3.600.000 FRW
- entretien et fournitures diverses = 3.000.000 FRW

TOTAL = 11.200.000 FRW.

B. III. <u>APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL.</u>

Si l'on se réfère à l'Histoire du Rwanda, deux faits importants, vis à vis de la démocratie pluraliste et du rôle du Parlement, sont à signaler.

Premièrement, il importe de noter que les Partis politiques nés avant l'indépendance du pays sont disparus l'un après l'autre, jusqu'au moment où un seul Parti gouvernait sans partage.

Deuxièmement, l'Histoire du Parlement Rwandais a montré que ce dernier n'a presque jamais rempli pleinement son rôle de légiférer et de contrôler l'action du Gouvernement.

Nous pensons que le Parlement Rwandais a intérêt à tirer avantage de ce qui fait la force des lois et protège les Partis dans des pays où le multipartisme connaît déjà une longue tradition.

Pour ce faire, le Secrétaire Général et 3 autres techniciens de l'Assemblée Nationale (ou de l'actuel CND) devraient visiter certains pays, à expériences diverses bien évidemment (Amérique, Europe et Afrique).

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L'appui sollicité consiste en un voyage d'études pour deux groupes constitués des cadres ci-haut cités.
Les coûts liés à ces visites portent sur :

- les billets d'avion	2.619.600 FRW.
- frais de séjour	1.344.000 FRW.
TOTAL	3.963.000 FRW.

C. APPUI AU MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE.

Le secteur judiciaire rwandais est handicapé principalement par l'insuffisance criante de ressources humaines qualifiées, mais il a aussi besoin de moyens financiers qui pourraient l'aider à se mettre à jour du point de vue de l'harmonisation des codes et lois à la mouvance pluripartite dans laquelle évolue le Rwanda.

C.I. Formation des magistrats.

Sur 700 magistrats en service, on ne compte qu'une quarantaine de licenciés, et pas nécessairement en magistrature, puisque presque tous les concernés sont des licenciés en droit.

C.I.1. Ouverture d'une Licence en magistrature à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université Nationale du Rwanda.

Il s'agit d'ouvrir une section de magistrature à la Faculté de Droit, au niveau de la licence, le premier cycle étant partagé par les juristes et par les magistrats.

C.I. 2. Formation des agents de l'ordre.

Il y a lieu d'ouvrir des cours de formation des greffiers, secrétaires des Parquets et I.P.J. (Inspecteurs de la Police Judiciaire) au Centre de perfectionnement des cadres de Murambi.

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C.I.3. Perfectionnement de magistrats non diplomés.

Le même Centre de Murambi pourrait mettre au point des programmes spéciaux pour les magistrats exerçant sans qualification académique.

C.I.4. Création d'une Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature.

Les projets repris ci-haut peuvent être réalisés dans le cadre d'une école nationale de la magistrature, qui, elle serait conçue à moyen ou long terme.

C.II. LES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE.

Le Ministère de la Justice a reçu mandat de mener une étude sur la conformité des lois actuelles avec la problématique des "droits de la personne" et ce, dans un contexte universel.

Ce Département aura besoin d'un appui financier et humain qui reste à évaluer.

C.III. VULGARISATION DE TEXTES LEGAUX.

Le Ministère de la Justice voudrait, à court terme, procéder à la traduction et à la multiplication des textes de codes et lois du Rwanda.

C.IV. CREATION D'UN CENTRE NATIONAL DE FORMATION ET D'INFORMATION EN MATIERE JUDICIAIRE.

Le Gouvernement a déjà disponibilisé à Kigali la parcelle où serait érigé ce Centre.

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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ANNEX E.

September 9, 1992

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA

FROM: AFR/EA, A. David Lundberg By Tom Bahl for

SUBJECT: Request for a Waiver of the Host Country's Contribution to the Rwanda Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project, 696-0133

Problem: Approval is requested to waive the requirement of Section 110 of the FAA for a Host Country contribution of at least 25 percent of project costs.

Background: USAID/Rwanda is entering into a project grant agreement with the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to facilitate Rwandan initiatives, both private and public, to broaden popular participation in shaping the new democratic relationship and the institutions through which that relationship will be carried out. The project will provide the inputs necessary to (a) support measures, already underway, to enhance the legislative branch of government as a coequal power in the affairs of state including assistance in developing its capacity to shape the policy agenda, initiate just laws, and demand both transparency and accountability in the public's business; (b) strengthen the capacity of the private associations engaging in civic education for and within the emerging democratic society; (c) provide support to the new Center for a Free and Independent Press that will afford a means for systematically improving the quality and reliability of journalistic practice in Rwanda; (d) provide support to the Government of Rwanda's efforts to delegate centralized authority and resources to the local level and corresponding measures to improve the quality of locally elected and serving officials; and (e) carry out selective training and provide limited technical assistance in areas not specifically included in one of the other components.

Discussion: Section 110 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, provides that: "No assistance under sections 103 through 106 (development assistance accounts) shall be furnished by the U.S. Government to a country until that country provides assurances to the President that it will contribute at least 25 percent of the total costs of the program, project or

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activity to which such assistance is to be furnished, except that such costs borne by such country may be provided on an 'in kind' basis."

Section 124(d) authorizes a waiver, on a case-by-case basis, of the requirement of FAA Section 110 in the case of a project or activity in a country which A.I.D. determines is relatively least developed based on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) list of "relatively least developed countries" or the DAC list of "low income countries." Rwanda is on the UNGA list.

A.I.D. regulations implementing FAA Section 110 and 124(d) are set forth in A.I.D. Handbook 3, Chapter 2, Appendix 2G. With respect to the exercise of the waive authority, Appendix 2G, Section E2b provides that it is reasonable to conclude that granting of a waiver is permissible whenever the initiation and execution of an otherwise desirable project is handicapped primarily by the 25 percent contribution requirements. It has been concluded that the project would be handicapped primarily by the 25 percent contribution requirement.

Appendix 2G sets forth general considerations which should be taken into account in determining when a waiver of FAA Section 110 would be appropriate. Considerations relating to financial constraints, country commitment and the nature of the project are addressed below.

<u>Nature of the Project:</u> The nature of the project argues strongly that, for the Project as a whole, the GOR should be exempt from the 25 percent host country contribution. Specifically, all the A.I.D.-funded project inputs are being provided in support of four entities. They are the National Assembly, the Ministry of Interior, Center for Civil Action and Democratic Initiatives, and the Center for a Free and Independent Press.

The first two are government institutions and firmly established. They will be required to contribute the full 25 percent of the two project components of which they are the beneficiaries.

However, the latter two institutions are being created with Project funds. As they are new non-government institutions, they will not be required to provide the A.I.D. standard contribution of 25 percent at the outset. As they become increasingly viable organizations, they will be required to provide a percentage amount of project costs on an increasing scale over the life of the Project. Once the Center for Civil action and Democratic Initiatives begins operations, it will, among other activities, be making sub-grants to other Rwandan NGOs to undertake civic education action programs throughout the country. When making these subgrants, the Center will be strongly encouraged to have the same percent contribution requirement that A.I.D. uses for NGOs.

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* assumed to average 5 percent in Year One; 10 percent in Year Two; 20 percent in Year Three; 30 percent in Year Four; 45 percent in Year Five.

** assumed to average 10 percent in Year One; 25 percent in Year Two; 50 percent in Year Three, if it is necessary to provide them funds in Year Three. The above figure assumes a 50 percent contribution in Year Three. If no USAID funding required in Year Three, the CPR's total contribution will decline to $73,960 for Years One and Two.

*** Since the Support Fund includes project audits, evaluations, baseline and other studies, a host country contribution will not be required on this portion of the Project.

Country Commitment: The GOR's commitment to the Project is evidenced on two levels. First, it is reflected in its stated priority to promote democracy and open government. Second, and more important, it is reflected in the series of difficult steps the GOR has already taken to create a new democratic society:

-- Revised the constitution to permit a multiparty system;
-- Passed a political parties law under which 16 different political parties were established;
-- Permitted freedom of the press which led to establishment of over 50 private newspapers;
-- Promulgated a new press law;
-- Permitted independent labor unions;
-- Drafted a revised electoral law; and
-- Formed the coalition government containing the four major parties after long interparty negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the waiver of the FAA Section 110 requirement that the Government of Rwanda contribute 25 percent or more of the Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project, provided that it makes the contributions indicated above.

Approved: Alvin P. Adams, Jr.

Disapproved: _____

Date: 9/11/92

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Drafted:USAID/Rwanda/PDO:CCantell:fw:8/5/92:RWANDA\WAIVER.DIG

Clearances: AFR/DP:CReece Date
GC/AFR:MAKlein Date
DAA/AFR:RACobb Date

ANNEX F

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION

The institutions that are targeted in the DIG Project are nested in a complex fabric of Rwandan socio-political, economic and cultural history. This analysis does not attempt to revisit that history, which is summarized in the project paper setting Section A.1. and, in greater detail, is examined in the Social Soundness Analysis found in Annex J. Nor does it pretend to provide anything like a comprehensive inventory of the interrelated institutions that make up the dense and complex web of rule-ordered relationships in Rwanda today. This Annex is purposefully selective. Each of the analysts assigned to develop a project component has, in turn, prepared a summary of the institutional context to which that component is addressed.

Following this introduction, the stage is set with a look at the dynamics at the constitutional level of Rwanda's institutional order. The separate project-component oriented discussions of the institutional context follows. They are presented in a different order than in the body of the PP. First, the National Assembly is examined in its current and evolving role in the constitutional order. Local government is next with a more expansive analysis than PP space permitted. Thereafter, two elements of the civil society are discussed, starting with the non-state actors lumped together under the free association or "NGO" label and then comes an examination of the actors and institutions in the information regime---Rwanda's **Fourth Estate.**

The Annex concludes with a large section on the status and role of women in Rwanda in institutional terms, a special assignment within the PP design meant to provide the context for the project's focus on women and its prospects for improving their lot in the new polity.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER—NEGOTIATING A SOCIAL CONTRACT

The Project Paper frequently uses the metaphor of "the evolving social contract" to characterize the current dynamic of institutional flux in Rwanda's political order. The figure is certainly apt to the case. Since July 1990, when President Juvenal Habyarimana announced the opening of a national debate on reforming the political order, the terms of the new "social contract" have been under active negotiation. They still are as this is written.[1]

At start, it seemed a fairly orderly process. The President appointed a broad-based 30-member "National Commission of Synthesis", which included several Rwandans known to be independent thinkers. The Commission drew up a National Political Charter that laid out a reform agenda built around principles of basic individual human and civil rights, basic freedoms of association and expression, and a concept of representative multi-party democracy in a new constitutional order which would limit, separate and balance the powers

of the state. Seeking substantive participation, the Commission submitted the Charter to 972 groups of diverse opinion both inside and outside the country. It received 1,400 individual and group responses containing 70,500 discrete opinions address to the 36 main points in the Charter. Support for the Commission's position on these main points ranged from a low of 87% on one to a high of 97% for others. Overall the charter propositions rated 95% approval.

Armed with this consensus, the Commission revised the Constitution to provide for a strong president but under a more parliamentary form of elected government with multiple parties and a clearer separation and equality among the powers of the state. Respondents, by 97%, agreed that a new Constitution should be submitted to popular referendum. But by October 1990, with the invasion of the north by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the country was at war and the national economic crisis had worsened. In lieu of a referendum, the draft Constitution was sent instead to the Conseil National de Developpement (CND), the standing parliament last elected in 1988 under the one-party regime.

The Constitution voted out by the CND on June 10, 1991 was more like the old order than what the Commission proposed. While keeping the idea of a President as chief of state with a Prime Minister as head of government, it gave the President sole authority to name the PM and retained all the President's old controls over the judiciary. While respecting the change to multi-party politics, it still requires that elected deputies to the National Assembly swear loyalty to the President. Neither body, Assembly or Judiciary, is assured administrative and financial independence from the executive.

On June 18, 1991, the CND adopted the law providing for the legalization of political parties. Since then 16 parties have registered under the liberal terms that allow for freedom of political association based on political programs but not on ethnic, regional or religious affinities. At this juncture, it was clear that a special law was needed to assure that the elections would be organized in such a way that all parties could accept their results. By March 1992, with German and then Canadian expert advice, draft laws were drawn up to meet this objective and were submitted to the parties for examination and comment.

Meanwhile, some of the newly registered parties vigorously espoused the notion of a National Sovereign Conference. This extra-Constitutional notion, which has been supported and used in other African countries as a bridge device between a one-party regime and the new order, was unacceptable to the Habyarimana regime. In its stead, the President offered another extra-Constitutional measure, that of a transitional multi-party government, under his continued guidance, to steer the nation through the current war crisis toward a negotiated peace with the RPF and through elections the to follow.

A. The Transitional Government

After considerable negotiation such a transitional Government was formed on April 18, 1992. The President remains as the Chief of State and principal executive. But the public

administration is now headed by a Prime Minister of the opposition Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) party - who was named by the President. "The Government" is composed of 9 ministers of the President's MRND party and 10 from four "opposition" parties. There are three ministers from each of the MDR, the Parti Social Democrate and the Parti Liberal with one ministry held by the Parti Democrate Cretien. This transitional government has taken on the charges to negotiate the peace; to assure the nation's security; to evaluate and clean up ("assainir") all levels of public administration including communal government; to reinvigorate the economy under the structural adjustment program; "to organize a national debate to decide if 'a National Conference' should be convoked"; to arrange the refugee problem; and, to organize general elections.

Although officials in the Presidency had discussed a vague target of Spring 1993 for elections, not even a tentative date for them has been proposed publicly since the transitional government was formed. The draft electoral laws are still under contention among the parties that form the current Government. Meanwhile ground is being laid for yet another transitional governing arrangement that will certainly affect the electoral calendar and the evolving "social contract." Under the terms of a truce, arrived at under international mediation in Arusha, Tanzania during July 1992, negotiations are going forward between the Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front for a political settlement. It is broadly accepted that soon after the first of the new year 1993, a new political power-sharing arrangement that includes the RPF will be worked through. That will mean a reconstituted Government of transition with a revised mandate. That could involve the calling of a National Conference to debate the political agenda, including further constitutional reform and the election calendar, or agreement to move immediately to elections under the Constitution of 1991. From now to then, much must be resolved: a national must be governed even as the debate on the form of government continues both by word and deed.

This much is certain as USAID prepares to authorize a mechanism to facilitate the process of political renewal: the formal order today is transitory. Each element of USAID's strategy speaks to a dynamic element in the transitional mix. It is indeed, a process project that aims at arming the actors --- the citizens of Rwanda at all levels --- with knowledge and some modest resources to construct the more lasting institutions that will form the framework of their new democracy.

B. The Judicial System

Although the project does not now propose immediate action in the justice sector, the USAID Support Fund component may be drawn upon should an opportunity for a discrete but significant contribution to its reform occur during the life of the project.

The Rwandan judicial system follows the Napoleonic legal tradition of civil law. At the top of the court hierarchy is the national Cour de Cassation (highest court of appeal) located in Kigali. Immediately below there are 4 Cours d'Appel (Kigali, Ruhengeri, Nyabisindu, Cyangugu) with jurisdiction over the 10 Tribunaux de Premiere Instance. The Tribunals of

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First Instance, one for each prefecture, have opened 13 "second chambers," thus providing a total of 23 judicial venues of first instance in the system. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the cantonal courts located in the 145communes.

At the upper levels, the court system is grievously overburdened and inefficient. Civil cases linger for half a decade. Sometimes those accused of crimes spend longer in jail awaiting trial than they would have spent there if convicted. Of some 750 magistrates (about 650 sitting judges and 100 prosecutors), fewer than 50 are graduated lawyers. In the cantonal courts only a secondary education is the norm. At these lower court levels, those nearest the people, corruption is common and popular distrust drives then to resolve disputes by other means. Rwandans are reluctant to take matters to court not just because of the delay and fear of an unfair judgment, but also because such a resort means the final rupture of social relations between the two parties. They prefer instead to settle matters within the family council (gacaca) if possible and, when they cannot, to turn to local leaders (responsables, councilors and finally the burgomaster) where some semblance of a negotiated solution can be achieved and thus social relations between parties maintained.

The French are providing a magistrate to advise on training for the Rwandan magistrature and on other improvements in the system. But earlier US and Belgian technical missions identifying major reforms needed in the system have produced neither requests for further aid to carry them out nor self-initiated reforms. Vital as this sector is to governance based on respect for the rule of law, the project approach recommended is to encourage its reform indirectly, through the National Assembly and through pressure from the non-state actors in the civil society.

C. The Legislative Branch of Rwandan Government

The 1991 Constitution, as its did its predecessor, affirms the "separation and collaboration of the executive, legislative and judicial powers..." It does not --- as noted above --- provide for full equality and independence of the latter two branches. Neither of these institutions has control of its own budget. Neither has independent hiring authority for its support staffs. These and more fundamental, substantive measures to separate and balance the three powers of government remain to evolve through law and practice within Rwandan's emerging democratic polity. Even now there are strong voices urging constitutional revision toward parliamentary government by making the office of Prime Minister, the head of government, elective by the Assembly, not as now - appointive by the President. Advocates of judicial autonomy are seeking another constitutional change to eliminate the President's control over the Supreme Council of Magistrates and through it control over appointment, assignment and promotion of magistrates. Such changes may demand the immediate attention of Rwanda's first multiparty Assembly when it does convene following elections. Meanwhile, significant work can be done to enable the legislature to take its due place in the governance of the nation.

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In the revised Constitution, as in the past, the executive and the unicameral National Assembly have concurrent authority to initiate legislation. For Presidential legislation to have permanent effect, the Assembly must pass it in its next session following the issuance of such a law. Since 1973, however, during the history of the Second Republic and its single party rule, there have been only four times that the Conseil National de Developpement (the CND is the name given the legislature under that constitution and is still in use pending the elections) initiated law or exercised its authority to reject law presented by the President.

Multi-party elections, whenever they are held, will produce a legislature quite different from the compliant, single party assemblies of the past. Under the draft electoral law now awaiting approval, the country will be divided into 51 electoral districts. Each district will elect one deputy by direct popular vote from among party candidates. The remaining 19 seats will be filled from party lists based on the proportional share of that party's total vote nation-wide. A party that reaches only 5% of the national vote would thus have a seat in parliament. This will assure that small parties, which might not win a majority in any one electoral district, could still have a voice in the affairs of state. There are now 16 registered parties. Perhaps 10 of these parties could achieve at least a 5% share of the nation-wide vote and thus a seat in the Assembly. Although one of these parties may win an absolute majority of Assembly seats, chances are that legislative affairs will be governed by a majority formed through multiparty coalition and alliance.

For such a diverse and probably divided legislative body to function effectively, it will need, early in its first session, to adopt rules of order and an internal organization adapted to the circumstances. It will need a willing and well prepared support staff to carry out these rules of order and to assist in the substantive work of the legislature. Much of this work - the process of parliamentary rule-making, making allowance for party caucuses, setting terms of debate, determining committee assignments, even how to set the order of the day - will be new to Rwandan parliamentarians including those who may have served before in the old one-party CND. In the new order, if the legislature is to serve well its functions in an open and representative democracy, it will have to undertake substantive functions that the old CND did not perform. These would certainly include such critical tasks as performing independent legislative oversight of the administration and of public finance, demanding program accountability for public investments, critically examining the executive budget and its legislative proposals, and initiating new laws as well as the reform of existing law on civil, economic and social affairs within or outside the executive's own program. Failing to do this, it will not provide the restraining or proactive balance to executive power required in democratic governance, nor will it serve well as the people's representatives in setting the national agenda. Learning to respond to constituent demands in the electoral districts will also be new. In the past, the centralized party was the "constituency." In the new order, the parties and their candidates must learn representational politics from the bottom up rather than the directive and paternal politics of old that came from the top down.

The current CND, though compliant under a strong President who also headed the single official party, is not a wholly vacuous or inept body. Indeed, its current members, who

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were formally elected in 1988, have begun to rethink loyalties. Some 15 to 20 have declared themselves to have left the MRND for one of the newly formed parties. The majority of deputies, as is true in much of Africa, are career school teachers - mostly at the secondary level. They are literate and reasonably informed. The CND's five legislative commissions do examine proposed legislation and attempt to improve it prior to final passage. But they do so without the benefit of staff research and authoritative legal advice. They do not conduct public hearings or substantive interrogatories with ministerial officials. Issues are debated in commissions and in plenum, though not with the vigor or the full disclosure that can come with an organized opposition in the house. Proceedings are recorded and published - by outdated manual means, usually quite late and often with attendant inaccuracies.

The personnel that comprise the CND support staff are all executive branch employees on assignment by the Ministry of Civil Service. This staff is headed by a Secretary General who responds to the CND Administrative Committee of three - a President, Vice-President and Secretary elected by the deputies from their members. To serve the 70 deputies, the Secretary General has 11 employees with university graduation. Only two are graduates in law. None is trained in economics, public finance, policy analysis, or public administration. These senior people supervise the 50 some maintenance and service personnel on contract and the 25 "statutory employees," the civil service secretaries who are primarily engaged in producing the record of commission and plenary proceedings. Using long-carriage manual typewriters, secretaries transcribe from tapes. They prepare draft copy which is edited and then laboriously typed on mimeograph stencils for manual multi-copying for the journal. The CND has no computers. It has no research service. It's librarian stocks local journals and few French language periodicals and manages a catalogue of perhaps 250 reference volumes plus the CND's own mimeographed records. The CND does not have a complete and readily accessible archive of Rwanda's legal tradition: colonial and post-independence legislation, jurisprudence, or regulatory and administrative law. Staff is not engaged to research issues before the commissions; what analysis is done comes largely from the members themselves or the executive agencies.

The seat of the CND is a two-storied modern, masonry edifice of imposing Italian design and construction, built in 1983. It's handsomely outfitted great chamber for plenary meetings has a spacious public gallery complete with press balconies. (Important national and international gatherings, symposia and public events are also held in this chamber.) The building also has three meeting rooms serving its five commissions. There are no private offices for deputies, except for the three elected officers of the body. There are working offices for the support staff, some accommodating several people at once. There are no hearing rooms that could be open to public and press. A new Assembly will need to reassess space allocation against new requirements. Additional space for expanded archives and library, for hearing and meeting rooms, for party caucuses and at least some party-leader offices will be required in the near term. Adjacent to the CND building, there is a government owned 85-room hotel which has never been fully operative. It has ample social and meeting rooms where some space could reasonably be obtained and reconditioned for Assembly use. Across the facing avenue is the old parliamentary structure. It is now largely

used as a headquarters for youth organizations; space in this building could be recaptured for the legislature's archives, committee work and other business. In brief, the Assembly's space needs could be met with no additional construction.

The most pressing requirements for an effective legislature in Rwanda's emerging democratic polity are certainly not the physical ones related to office space and meeting rooms. They lie instead in having the critical instruments needed for powerful legislative initiative. Deliberations on vital public policies must be buttressed by relevant analysis fed by reliable and timely information about the political economy of the nation, the performance of the state agencies, and indispensably, the people's needs and priorities. Such analysis has simply not been done in the past, nor is it within the capacity of the Assembly's existing support staff. The assistance to be provided in this project will help to put those instruments at the disposition of the National Assembly. It will assist in orienting the new members on how to employ these instruments for managing their urgent business. The primary instrument serving the Assembly is its support staff and, in turn, the information system that the staff must manage.

Building on an excellent analysis done by the Service National de L' Informatique of the Ministry of Plan, the project will fund a computerized management information system to serve the information processing needs and the research services for the Assembly. This rather low cost installation is meant to empower the deputies with timely information services as they perform their law-making and oversight functions. If it is well employed, it can be a long stride toward empowerment of the body vis a vis the executive.

Fundamental to a change in legislative behavior will be the development of constituency linkages. The project focuses on educating the non-state actors --- the civic organizations, professional associations, interest groups, and community based non-governmental organizations --- on how they can affect the public agenda. One of the means they will be taught is that of using their parliamentary representative. There is no such tradition in Rwanda today. As the project proceeds it may become the norm, leading to major changes in legislative behavior, responsiveness and relevance.

D. Local Government

The local level of government in Rwanda is the commune. A unit of about 50,000 inhabitants, it is here that government intersects the life of the ordinary person - where he or she pays taxes, requests services, votes, registers complaints. The commune is involved --- with the central ministries --- in providing primary, some secondary and adult education, health care, agricultural advice and supervision, and assistance to cooperatives. It maintains local roads, water sources and sanitation and it regulates the market that is the focal point of economic life for the overwhelming rural population. The commune office maintains the civil registry. And communal police are the first line of law and order.

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There are 145 communes, 132 of which are rural, and they are grouped into 11 prefectures. The prefecture oversees commune finance on behalf of the Ministry of Interior. In the one-party state, the Prefet has also been the political commissar for the burgomasters in his jurisdiction. The communes in turn are divided into sectors, usually 10 to a commune. The sectors are composed of cellule, which correspond roughly to the hill, the natural social unit. Although the commune was originally an artificial construct, it has acquired something of a life of its own by serving as the focal point for obligations and services beginning in the colonial period and even more so during the three decades since independence. Most communes have one or more markets where the local farmers and farm suppliers transact virtually all of their business. Thus market linkages, roughly centered on the town where the commune government is located, encouraged the development of these localities as hubs of social, political and economic life. The few communes which have no market are not just poorer but also less cohesive than the others. (There is some discussion of redrawing commune boundaries as part of the local government reform, discussed below, to take into account evolved market relationships.) Through obligatory labor service, the **umuganda**, communes have been able to construct a network of farm to market roads that have also helped to link regional markets and to unify the country.

The commune is headed by a burgomaster who plays many roles. Appointed by the President on the advice of the Minister of Interior, he serves as the local agent for the central administration, enforcing the many and detailed regulations handed down to him. He also chairs the Communal Council, an elected body composed of representatives elected by the various sectors of the commune. The council is supposed to speak for the people, but in practice it is hardly so. The initiative in local affairs is in the hands of the burgomaster, who proposes most actions to the council. The councilors acquiesce in these initiatives and see that they are carried out through the responsables of the cellule within their jurisdiction. In this way, communal government replicates the pattern found at the national level where the executive clearly dominates and, through the single-party structure, can assure compliance in the legislative branch. But at the local level, the burgomaster also adds a judicial function to his multi-faceted role as leader. Burgomasters spend a substantial part of their working hours hearing and attempting to resolve conflicts, especially those concerning land and cases of injury to person or property. Cantonal courts are in such ill repute that even in communes where the burgomaster is held in low esteem people prefer his intervention to that of the court.

In cumulating the executive, legislative and judicial roles, the burgomaster carries on pre-colonial and colonial practice. To this historical pattern of undifferentiated power, the burgomaster added--until the end of the single-party system last year--the additional authority of local party head. Not surprisingly, this most powerful person on the local level expects to be treated with great deference and until recently usually was. Rwandans sometimes referred to the burgomaster as "the one who fell from the sky", a phrase that once was used to describe the Tutsi monarch.

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The burgomaster is aided by a secretariat, local police officers, and a variety of specialized agents. Recently the Ministry of Interior supplemented the communal staff by adding agents called assistant functionaries, usually 3 to a commune. Ordinarily secondary school graduates without specialized training, they are supposed to assist the burgomaster in his supervisory tasks.

In addition to the Communal Council, two other bodies are supposed to play important roles in communal government. One is the Technical Council, appointed by the burgomaster as a kind of elite advisory body. Some of its members are local people with relatively advanced education; others are people born in the region but working at influential posts in the prefectural or national capitals. The group is supposed to provide the commune with the expertise and connections needed to further its development. The performance of the councils varies from commune to commune. In some, the non-resident members take no interest in the role and fail to attend meetings, leaving the body paralysed without a quorum. In others, members have taken the work so seriously that they in effect override the Communal Council, usually to the benefit of the burgomaster and in favor of the actions that he wants to take. The second body encompasses members of the Communal Council and the Technical Council and added to them the central government officials charged with various local services. This Development Council, as it is called, has never operated effectively. The whole 3-part council structure has been unwieldy and inefficient at best, completely unproductive at worst.

By GOR policy, since 1975, the commune is responsible for local social and economic development. Neither the tasks nor the resources to carry out this broad mandate are defined by central authorities. The commune has few resources at its disposal to do the work assigned. It collects taxes, including a head tax and a cattle tax imposed nationally and collected locally, and whatever additional use-fees, service fees and taxes it impose on its citizens. Given the crushing poverty of most communes, the authority to tax has not produced sufficient revenues to pay the basic costs of local government let alone finance development initiatives. Over the years 1980-1985, the communes together showed a deficit in 4 of the 6 years according to a report done by the World Bank in 1987. Some communes also control income-producing assets, such as forests, or various commercial or industrial enterprises. In addition to revenues from these sources, the communes are free to seek outside project aid from international donors or NGOs. Their success in doing so varies from one commune to the next, depending on the skill and connections of the burgomaster and his Technical Council. In the last year of rapid political change, many burgomasters have been so absorbed in maintaining order that they have had no time to pursue potential donors for assistance.

In the last decade, communes have devoted a substantial part of their capital investment to building adequate offices at both the communal and sectoral levels. Communal offices are generally supplied with electricity and some have telephone service. Human resources are still limited with burgomasters and others citing the need for more training for local

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personnel. Communal councilors are generally able to read and write in Kinyarwanda, but that is not necessarily the case for responsables at the level of cellule.

In the last 2 years,the increasing fluidity of political life has resulted in widespread criticism of communal government. People have attacked local authorities for launching development projects that brought little or no benefit to the community, for being personally corrupt, and for being inaccessible to and scornful of citizens in general. With greater freedom of expression, those who felt themselves injured by past communal decisions on such matters as land-holding are taking matters into their own hands to reclaim their rights. People are refusing to do compulsory labor and to pay taxes. They are refusing to listen to the burgomaster and even lock him out of his office or block the road so that he cannot get there. The loss of legitimacy of communal government results from sincerely-felt grievances, but it has been accentuated by local party leaders who play upon genuine grievances to undermine the authority of the burgomaster.

Under the transitional government, the GOR has attempted to control this erosion of authority by removing those burgomasters most violently rejected by their constituents. It has appointed a commission to review burgomaster performance with an eye to the removal of those who aren't meeting minimum job standards. Some structural reforms of local government have been under consideration for some time. A draft law on communal government developed with the aid of a UNDP financed Algerian regional planner is now being considered by the Ministry of Interior. It proposes to streamline the 3-part council arrangement and leave only one body, a Communal Council of 15 members. To be elected under the new multi-party system, 10 of the 15 will be directly elected as party candidates from their sector of origin. The remaining five council seats would be filled from party slates in proportion to the party's share of the total popular vote in the commune. Some who favor this change expect that the slates for proportional seating will be better educated and influential people in the community. The new law would enhance the commune's revenue base for development activities with some measure of decentralization of central government authority.

Most burgomasters welcome the concept of decentralization but are unclear has to how it will in fact apply. A newly revised fund for commune projects called the Fonds de Solidarite Communal (FOSOC) is intended to figure in the enhanced capacity for communal investments. Based on advice from a Swiss expert a pre-existing but ill-used central fund in the Ministry of Interior was restructured to form the FOSOC. Though a group of 10 Burgomasters was elected to serve as its governing board last year, it has not yet become operational. The notion is that operating funds will come from commune contributions but that the capital stock for the fund will be raised from the donors. Examination of its potential utility is proposed under the DIG project.

In recent years there has been an effort to improve the quality of local government through training. The Institut Superieur d'Administration Publique (ISAP), now part of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the Butare campus of the National University of

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Rwanda, has been providing training courses for burgomasters on various aspects of local government for the past two years. Supported by a grant from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), these courses have brought the local officials together in regional groups for a one week seminar each year. Currently a seminar is planned on the effects of multi-partyism on local administration and political life. Unfortunately, in past training programs, ISAP has used a traditional lecture approach with little opportunity for discussion. Future training, sponsored under the DIG Project should be designed for more participatory learning methods, workshop fashion, using case material and audio-visual support. ISAP could be teamed with other training agencies such as the IWACU center and Rescau des Femmes which have experience in training rural adults with little formal education.

In summary, much of the prospect for democratic governance in Rwanda rests on major improvements in government at the commune level. An over-arching strategy for decentralization and devolution of self-governing authorities is lacking even though some steps are underway that lead in that direction. The DIG project's assistance could, indeed, help the GOR shape a coherent strategy and take the initial steps to carry it out.

III. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR THE CIVIL SOCIETY

A. Non-State Actors and the Exercise of Associational Freedom

The corporative impulse, historically very important among Rwandans, has burst forth in the last decade. In the mid-1980's, a study by IWACU estimated that there were 300 cooperatives, 3,000 pre-cooperatives and 30,000 less organized groups formed for mutual economic and social benefit. In addition there are several hundred other NGOs: numerous church-related groups, associations of parents supporting a school, women's groups, professional organizations and labor unions.

Rural cooperatives have long been a part of Rwandan life. Many of them operate with state support, but still produce little if any profit. In 1984 the IWACU center was established to improve the management of existing coops and foster the creation of new ones. In the years since, it has trained hundreds of coop members through programs at its Kigali headquarters. It has also established two field offices, one in Cyangugu and one in Butare, and has fostered a spin-off organization in Gitarama. In October 1991, IWACU began providing a series of 8 week-long training sessions on democracy and human rights, thus translating its expertise in training into a new area.

Small risk-sharing or labor-sharing groups, with an average membership of 12, have often shown greater vitality than the larger, more structured coops. The DAI Rwanda Social and Institutional Profile cites a study that recorded 1,035 such groups in a sample of 5 communes.

In 1988 Rwandan farmers formed a federation of their separate farming groups. Known under the name of TWIBUMBE-BAHINZI, it claims to have 15,000 members. The group seems linked to the anti-Tutsi political party of CDR, at least through a number of personal

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connections. In 1991 a second organization was established called Urugaga rw'Abahinzi-Barozi. Like the first it aims to speak for farmers and cattle-raisers, but it is structured as an individual membership organization instead of as a federation. Originally affiliated with IWACU, the organization is now independent. It is organized through a pyramid of assemblies at the prefectural and national level. Its by-laws prohibit any of its officers from playing leadership roles in any political parties. They also stipulate that at least one third of the leadership positions, including those of Vice-President and Treasurer, be reserved for women. Though non-partisan, the organization hopes to influence the political parties and government policies for more favorable treatment of agro-pastoralists.

The rapid growth of small local associations during the decade of the 1980s, often with fewer than 100 members, came about largely in response to increasing economic distress and in response to a simultaneous decrease in state-provided services. Some have run health centers or organized mutual associations to pay hospital costs; others have initiated economic development activities once planned for communal sponsorship. In one commune, a local association provides upkeep for the road to the hospital, among other services. A large number of parent associations have sprung up to build and run secondary schools. Even though academic secondary education has been viewed as a national rather than a local responsibility, these associations have their greatest impact at the level of the commune.

Since 1989/90 the burst of new associations has been much more clearly related to political rather than economic developments. Among these are five organizations to protect human rights and another to protect the rights of women and children. The first human rights group, ARDHO, was established by a government prosecutor at odds with the abuse of citizens at the hands of law enforcement and judicial authorities. He has enlisted many lawyers, bureaucrats and professional people in ARDHO's ranks. Initially thought to be government-inspired, it has since demonstrated its independence by vigorously opposing government abuses of rights. It counts several hundred members nation-wide. The other group which aims for national membership, ADL, draws on intellectuals, university staff and lawyers. It is somewhat more confrontational in tactics, perhaps because its permanent secretary has no hesitation about acting to investigate alleged human rights abuses and when they are documented to speak openly of the findings. Kanyarwanda, a third human rights oriented association, has been more identified with the defense of Tutsis whose rights have been violated. It has investigated and publicized details of several recent incidents of communal violence against the ethnic minority. It has been joined in this effort by a fourth group AVP. The fifth human rights group, LICREDOR, is distinguished from the others by its clear Christian affiliation and by its regional base in Cyangugu. Recently these five groups have begun meeting regularly together and planning cooperatively. At this time, they are working to field an international inquiry into human rights abuses in Rwanda

B. Rwanda's Information Regime and the Fourth Estate

Around the time of independence, there was a limited growth in press activity. A survey of the Rwanda press compiled in 1981 reported the appearance of 170 different titles since the

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beginning of the century, about half of which were religious publications, and most of which emerged around independence (1962). But this flowering of the press was short-lived. The new PARMIHUTU party government that controlled the country from 1962 to 1972 allowed no opposition views in print and effectively halted free publication.

Since 1973, the Habyarimana single-party regime has also maintained tight controls on the information regime. Throughout these years, the only daily printed news available in Rwanda has been a bulletin issued by l'Office Rwandaise de Press (ORINFOR). It is published in French, and circled mainly to government ministries. Throughout the 1980's only three or four bi-monthly or monthly news journals circulated with any regularity. Of these, Kenyamateka and Dialogue have been run by Catholic authorities, and a third, Invaho, has been published (in Kinyarwandan) by the government.

At the very start of the new spirit of political liberalization, would-be Rwandan journalists were encouraged by events to start up their presses. About 60 new newspapers/periodicals have appeared in the last two years. At the time of this writing, about 30 are struggling to survive.

The difficulties facing journalists in Rwanda are numerous. They include a hostile legal and political climate; a threatening economic environment; and a shakily based structure of professional institutionalization. Rwanda has a history of press intimidation and censorship. Throughout the 1980's, dissenters who published their views faced serious consequences. Former judge Dr. Donat Murego, accused of "distributing documents which advocate the overthrow of the government" was imprisoned in 1981 and was still in prison as of 1988. In 1987, Father Sindabiwe, then editor of Kenyamateka, was harassed and humiliated by security officials for publishing articles detailing government corruption.

In December 1989, the Minister for Justice, acting on orders of the President, summoned journalists from Kenyamateka and Kanguka who had "defamed public officials." The journalists were warned that they could face court actin if their articles were not "toned down." In 1990, authorities seized with concerns over national security seemed to increase their pressure on the press. Vincent Rwabukwisi, editor of Kanguka and Hassan Ngize, editor of Kangura, were both detained in connection with articles they had written. For days, the two were held without trial.

Under pressure to "normalize" the information regime, the GOR issues a new press law in 1991. It precludes detention of journalists without a formal charge, and it forbids detention without trial. An improvement over the previous state of affairs, the law is nevertheless repressive and threatening, retaining references to criminal penalties that can be arbitrarily applied for publishing material critical of the high government officials of injurious to national security. It leaves room for prior restraint.

The Index on Censorship (April 1992) reported that privately owned papers like Kanguka and Ijambo are frequently seized. Their editors have been arrested and taken to court. The editor

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of Isibo, Sixbert Masangamfura, was summoned to court for an offending article just hours after being interviewed by this author (July 21). In the last two years, in fact, at least 24 journalists have been arrested, some tortured, and at least one, Noel Relinyange, founder of Kanguka, died under suspicious circumstances.

Political tensions in the country were exacerbated by the war which has been waged in the north since October 1990. Alleged collaboration with the FPR (Front Populaire de Rwanda) has been a major justification for charges against certain journalists. Despite this very tense political climate, journalists retain an astounding buoyancy. They continue to publish, albeit irregularly, despite harsh economic odds.

Supplies of newsprint are in short supply, partly because of the 40% import duty on paper and because of two recent devaluations of the Rwanda franc. Print runs on the average for private papers have decreased from a high of 5,000 copies to a present average of 2,500 copies. The smaller runs reflect both the increases in the cost of basic printing materials and the decreased demand from a cash strapped reading public.

Printing of newspapers can be troublesome. Most journalists are too small to own and operate their own printing presses. Some too poor to own a typewriter. Most work from their homes. They depend on larger printing facilities, notably the centrally located and most reasonably priced Imprimerie Nationale, for copy runs. It is here that work orders are often delayed, sometimes to accommodate larger and more profitable jobs, but often to provide the security forces with the opportunity to seize and suppress offending copy.

Even when a journalist finally has a stack of printed papers, his troubles are far from over. There is no systematic means of distribution in the country. Each publisher has his own "network" of newsboys who sell the papers within Kigali on consignment. There is little system and individual vendors drop in and out of the business.

Nation-wide distribution is even more problematic. It is particularly difficult to rural areas. Literacy rates in general are about 50% in Rwanda. In may rural areas, of course, it is much higher. Nevertheless, there remains a yet small and untapped market in the prefectures for the press. While some journalists have attempted to organize distribution of their publications through the public transport network, the results have not been satisfactory. A systematic mechanism for rural distribution of newspapers, to say nothing of rural news collection, is yet to be established.

Finally, it could be said that journalism in Rwanda is more of an avocation than a vocation. M. Gregoire Hategekimana, in his unpublished report, Physionomie de la Presse Periodique du Rwanda, (CRADEP) describes journalists as "les hommes a tout faire." (i.e., men who do everything.) He sympathizes with these inexperienced but well intentioned individuals who forge ahead, tirelessly assuming the myriad of roles demanded of one to two person operations. These roles include: the role of reporter, editor, proofreader, layout editor, photographer, graphic artist, advertising manager, business manager, and circulation

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supervisor. His report fails to note that the majority of these journalists have no formal training in either journalism or business administration.

Clearly the press in Rwanda needs help. It needs pressure from international forces so that a right of free expression, and a just and open press law can be promoted and respected. It needs financial and technical assistance so that a sound and systematic schedule of publication and distribution can be maintained. And finally, it needs educational support so that the professional competencies of these courageous printers can flourish and a professional cadre of press men and women can develop and prosper.

The electronic media in Rwanda are even less developed that the printed press. There is at present, only one radio station . It is owned and managed by the government. It operates two channels, one broadcasting in Kinyarwandan, the second broadcasting in French and Swahili. Recently, Radio Rwanda has begun allowing limited access to opposition parties, but opposition parties remain unsatisfied with the access policies of the ORINFOR. Prior to elections, the GOR will have to reexamine its access to radio policies if it hopes to provide anything approximating open air-waves during the campaign period.

A law allowing private individuals (or groups) to establish private radio stations was recently passed. Several individuals and groups are examining the possibility starting radio ventures, either to serve under a non-profit arrangement for public service or for profit as commercial enterprises. Further analysis of the prospects for private radio and the role it might play in a more open information regime require examination and feasibility analysis.

There is no television service in Rwanda. For several years, with assistance from Belgian cooperation, the GOR has been planning to open a national television broadcasting service. Once scheduled to begin in 1993, the investment required exceeds current resource capacity and the start up of the service appears to have been indefinitely postponed. No private, commercial TV project is currently under consideration nor does it appear to be feasible.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: WOMEN'S GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS WORKING IN THE INTEREST OF WOMEN

A. Overview

Of the 8,000 private voluntary organizations now estimated to exist in Rwanda, around 3,000 are groups in which women represent a majority or exclusive membership (URAMA: 1992). The average size of these groups is 18, although many have 100 or more members (OCSD 1991). Some of these organizations are officially registered as ASBL, while others remain small groupements. Their relatively small size masks the "nesting" character of these groups, whereby associations combine into larger, macro entities. The resulting hierarchy of influence holds a valuable potential for touching a large number of women through training and mobilization. It may also provide a much needed channel through which interests and

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concerns common to all women -- of whatever class, abode, or ethnic origin -- are brought to the attention of decision makers.

Mutual self-help associations have long been a feature of Rwandan life. Originally conceived as savings, commercial, or group labor associations, their purpose -- if not their structure -- has changed with time. Women have recently joined the modern associative movement for many reasons, but key has been the quest for easier access to resources and skills training. Until May 1992, when Rwanda's new Family Code went into effect, women were blocked by law from obtaining bank loans, commercial licenses, or even from opening bank accounts without their husband's permission. Associations opened a channel for organizing savings or negotiating credit through a legal cooperative. In addition, women in Rwanda still do not have rights to inheritance under customary law. A women's development group, however, may request the right to exploit a plot of communal land from the burgomaster or the communal council. In these very important ways, then, associations furnish women with rights which they have been denied as individuals.

When an association's power to promote development is added to its potential for training, its appropriateness to foster democracy and governance initiatives is plain. In the minds of most women in Rwanda, democracy is credible to the extent that it links up in practical ways with economic growth. As one social worker in Butare observed, "Democracy is for people who are eating already." Associations having training and income-generation features built in are valuable channels for conveying the notion that access to political decision making leads to improving access to better incomes and welfare.

An extensive analysis of women's NGOs and organizations supporting women was completed very recently by the Service de Coopération Canadienne (Canadian Cooperation Service, SCC). The study contains a good inventory of selected key institutions and programs. Included in its analysis are government programs, projects of internal and external NGOs, and activities supported by multilateral and bilateral agencies (Kampundu: 1992). In addition, a review of women's organization involved in private sector development was recently undertaken for the Women in Development Office of USAID, and it offers a good overview of their capabilities (Lent and Dicker: 1992). A list of major women's or women's support institutions is offered at the end of this section.

To repeat the content of inventories or reviews already undertaken would not be useful. At the same time the fast-changing environment of Rwanda has spawned important changes in the structure, policies, and problems of women and women's groups. With this analytic focus in mind, the purpose and current status of the largest and most influential women's organizations will be discussed below. It will be complemented by a rapid review of existing programs of other organizations in order to identify areas of future support for women-focussed activities in democracy and governance.

<u>URAMA:</u> In 1988 the MRND, Rwanda's only existing party, created the Union des Femmes Rwandaises pour le Développement (Union of Rwandan Women for Development).

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URAMA's purpose was to raise women's consciousness of their rights and responsibilities. In addition, it sought to undertake research on problems facing the female population, particularly in the domain of legal rights. Projects envisaged include legal aid, introduction of farming and small-stock enterprises for women, creation of a training center for schoolgirl dropouts, production of studies and monographs, and so on. URAMA's program was incorporated into the party agenda, where it had an integral place in activities relating to health, commerce and credit, culture, agriculture, and so on.

The advantages afforded by URAMA were three-fold. First, it was a well-funded entity, receiving resources from the MRND, UNDP, and other organizations. Second, it benefitted from the party's statist structure, which extended into all parts of the country through the prefectures and communes down to the level of cellule. Third, and most important, it offered a common structural and political point of reference for all Rwandan women.

In early 1992 URAMA ceased to exist. The executive director, sensing the need in a new multi-party environment to separate the organization from the MRND, sought to continue URAMA's function as an umbrella institution serving women of all parties. The MRND leadership did not agree. Since URAMA's dissolution, a gap is noted by women who recognize that for them a meaningful civil society requires a non-partisan "meeting point" for all women. Women's collective interest is currently challenged by party division, and yet educated women recognize that a unified political analysis is ultimately needed. In July 1992 it seemed likely that a new confederation of major women's organizations was in the making. It can be expected to include the women's organizations described below. URAMA's former executive general has taken active interest in the possibility of a women's confederation, to which she may contribute useful documentation and experience.

Réseau des Femmes Oeuvrant Pour de Développement Rural (RF): The Réseau des Femmes (RF), or Network of Women Working for Rural Development, joins together 143 professional women whose objective is to translate routine contacts with rural women into opportunities for advancing women's development. Its members have diverse national backgrounds, with the vast majority Rwandese. Members work in the areas of development, training, community-level planning, and income-generation activities ... all in rural areas. Each pays 500 FRW annual membership.

RF's objectives include: (a) to promote women's full participation in development, (b) to learn more about the resources and needs that exist in rural areas, (c) to facilitate the creation of services for women, (d) to assist one another in professional and development-related activities, (e) to promote solidarity and autonomy among its individual and organizational members. In order to meet these objectives the RF membership adopts a policy of making the rural woman its beneficiary by applying strategies of information sharing, seminars, and income generation.

Since its inception in 1984 (in 1991 becoming an ASBL), RF has (a) established a permanent office in a central location of Kigali, (b) recruited one permanent documentation specialist, a

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secretary, and a part-time head of consultancies, (c) collected a carefully maintained library, (d) produced an impressive series of seminars and booklets on a range of topics such as polygamy, land, and family planning, (e) published a profile on women, which it expects to re-issue at regular intervals, and (f) has established consulting services to other organizations concerned with women's development in Rwanda. Revenues from this consulting collective, which totalled 1 million FRW in 1991, assist operating costs of the office. Other financial support is provided by NOVIB (5,503,288 FRW in 1991) and PAC/PRODEVA (14,364,032 FRW for three years). Periodic funding is also received from the Swiss Cooperation and from UNICEF.

RF's structure indeed comprises a "network." Three regional centers have been established to serve the central, southern, and northern regions of the country. The philosophy of the organization is to permit the maximum autonomy to regional centers in order to meet immediate and felt needs of local rural women. Overall, centers maintain close contact with women's groups in their regions, to which they provide a variety of services. For example, in Gisenyi (north) a women's bank has recently been created. In Ruhengeri (north) RF has helped to support women members of health center management committees. In the southern region, a series of seminars on democracy and party politics was held in Gitarama. The content of party platforms was discussed in relation to women's concerns, as was freedom of expression and democracy as a mode of management Mukargiliye 1992). Follow-up seminars covering the same topics were later held in other capitals of the region. In Butare, for example, a "role-play" was introduced, in which women were taught to experience the stress of voting for a candidate who was not supported by their husbands.

This "trickle-down" approach to thoughtful, timely reflection, combined with its translation into concrete and personal effects, identifies RF as a serious force in the process of promoting D/G initiatives in Rwanda. In spirit and in structure it resembles the League of Women Voters in the United States, with its emphasis on non-partisan study of the processes of government as they relate to local women. Its potential for becoming a public-interest lobby furthering the concerns of women is indeed strong, provided the organization succeeds in remaining unaligned but viable in a period of intense political polarization.

In an independent evaluation of its activities which RF published in May 1992 (Bugingo et. al. 1992), several external constraints were recognized. First is low demand for printed information among women, whose literacy rate is estimated to exceed 60%. Currently, 10 regular publications are printed in Kinyarwanda, but few women seek access to these information sources. In future RF groups may wish to consider radio as a complementary medium. Second is the relatively low status and value placed on women and the slow progress toward fully legal equality. Third is the reduced pace of economic development in the agricultural sector, in which 97.5% of working women are engaged. Fourth is the absence of viable statistics on women.

The evaluation also pointed out some internal weaknesses of RF, some of which may be overcome by better management, financing, and service support from the Project CCADI.

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Solutions include: (a) improving logistics in order to reach distant prefectures such as Kibuye and Cyangugu; (b) expanding of the RF library facility, which is the only resource of its kind in the country but currently housed ingeniously in a small corner of the RF office; (c) continuing to maintain and expand relations with other women's groups through better communications and publication capacity; (d) encouraging more consistent participation of the membership, about half of whom attend any given training event; (e) organizing organize more national-level seminars on topics of general interest to women; (f) separating individual services (e.g. documentation center or consulting collective) from the direct control of the executive; and (f) expanding the consulting collective, and especially to add an economist. In light of the growing demand in Rwanda for studies and statistics on women, the collective should consider including university professors or other part-time experts in its network of consultants.

Duterimbere: Perhaps the best known of Rwanda's women's organizations among non-Rwandans is Duterimbere, Association for the Promotion of Women. This NGO was created with UNICEF support in 1987. Affiliated with Women's World Banking, its over-arching purpose is to provide economic independence for women.

Duterimbere offers credit to its members through two mechanisms. First, direct credit loans in amounts under 100,000 FRW are granted for the purpose of starting, expanding, or consolidating a business. Second, guaranteed loans are available in amounts of 100,000 - 500,000 FRW from the BPR (People's Bank of Rwanda). Duterimbere raises funds by charging its members (totalling 547 in 1992) 2,000 FRW to join the association and 1,000 FRW per year thereafter. Funds from annual dues now total 1 million FRW. In addition, Duterimbere receives donations from numerous sources, including local ministries, NGOs, banks, OCSD, SNV, UNICEF, UNDP, and USAID.

Funds may be requested for the following types of business: agriculture or food processing, raising small-stock, tourism, crafts, development of new local products, and commerce. Either individuals or groups may apply, and loans are repayable within twelve months. Inquiries at the Duterimbere office in Kigali and in rural capitals suggests that Duterimbere has increasingly favored Kigali applicants and the commercial sector for loans. During 1991, 29 loans totalling 1,816,209 FRW had been awarded for small commercial enterprises, while only 2 for restaurants, and 1 each for sewing, video shop, crafts, transportation, and food processing. Nearly all loans were under 100,000 FRW. Indeed, between January and June 1992, 3,343,014 FRW were lent in Kigali alone, 1,000,000 FRW more than the total amount awarded to the city from 1987 through 1991. During the same period the second-most favored regional recipient was Kigali prefecture. It may also be noted that the 5,649,865 FRW lent in Kigali throughout Duterimbere's lifetime represents 62% of the association's total loans, or 9,185,964 FRW.

In conversations with seven randomly-chosen rural women in Kibuye, Kibungo, and Butare, they concluded -- and it would seem correctly -- that credit from Duterimbere is not for them. Many pay the relatively high annual dues of 1,000 FRW but are discouraged when

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they attempt to complete the very long and complex application form in French. Few women illiterate in French would be likely to apply without considerable assistance. As of June 1992 women were still being instructed in writing to secure their husband's permission in order to receive a loan; that discriminatory legal requirement had in fact ceased to apply to women in the previous month following passage of the new Family Code. Duterimbere had not taken note of this important advance for women or communicated it to its membership (Duterimbere 1992).

In contrast, some appreciation is expressed by rural women for Duterimbere's training programs in small enterprise development. These sessions are open to the public, however, for a fee. They would seem unlikely fora i n which to organize seminars in democracy, governance, or women's rights. Nor would Duterimbere, as presently managed, provide the sort of economic benefit to rural women which a "democracy for development" approach seeks to put across. Finally, if the transparency required by "good governance" is a criterion to be applied to recipients of DIG assistance, a careful examination of Duterimbere's financial and management systems would need to be undertaken.

HAGARUKA: Founded in June 1991, HAGARUKA is a fledgling organization of 27 members which seeks to promote gender equality in law, commerce, political, and the home. It also lobbies for application of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child. According to its program, the organization seeks to actively participate in the elimination of discrimination in all forms against women and children through research, legal assistance, aid to street children, and support to other women's organizations. Its strategies are summarized in the motto "*Formation, Information, Advocacie, Etudes, Assistance Légale.*"

Committed to concrete action and operational research, HAGARUKA has so far distributed copies of a wall poster presenting the notion of shared workload between husband and wife. It was used as a talking point for training 2,000 rural women through the IWACU center in their personal and legal rights. (The poster is well understood and is seen displayed in rural areas.) HAGARUKA has also completed a study with UNICEF funding on the rights of women and children in Rwanda (Ntampaka and Mganzarugamba 1991).

In August 1992 HAGARUKA will expand its operations by establishing a small consulting service with links to legal specialists. In addition, the organization will begin commune-level training on the topic "What Women Should Know About Their Rights." It also hopes to establish an outreach information and training service for teachers, professional women, cell-level *abakangurambaga (family planning workers),* and social workers who may take to women rights message into the workplace. Topics of immediate concern to HAGARUKA are the legal rights associated with AIDS, with employment, and in the working of the court system.

With some management guidance, HAGARUKA has strong potential for serving as a channel for promoting democracy and governance through information and advocacy.

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IWACU: Established in 1984, IWACU supports the rural cooperative and associative movement in Rwanda through research, training, and business counselling. Its target group is the rural peasant farmer and herder. By statute, 30% of participants in IWACU's training activities must be women. This affirmative policy has yielded positive results. Today women increasingly manage their own farming cooperatives, and some have been selected to lead agricultural syndicates.

The IWACU philosophy recognizes the cooperative movement as an opportunity for self-realization, independence, and intellectual awakening. Training ranges from such practical topics as management training, production techniques, approaches to marketing, simple accounting. Special purpose funds given to cooperative groups provides the opportunity to put training into practice.

With a grant from the Konrad Adnauer Foundation, IWACU has begun a series of training modules on democracy and pluralism. Its network offers an ideal ground for planting the notion of "democracy for development."

Young Women's Organizations: For Rwanda's young women, democracy will hopefully become a strong element in their civic inheritance. Many small young women's groups exist, often to support unwed mothers or girls without families. The AIDS epidemic has increased the number of young women in these groups.

Two national organizations have strong reputations for promoting self-reliance and civic values in young women in rural areas. They are the Girl Guides and the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne-Femmes (JOC/F). The Guides are modeled very much on the voluntary Girl Guide and Scout movement worldwide, but with a strong emphasis on collective production and training. Guides will typically save money to plant a small plot provided by the commune; at times they secure funds to build a small house for training and other local activities. The 8,000 members aged 6 to 25 are formed into groups, 6-7 into units, and representatives of these belong to 9 regional teams, which provide oversight to local groups. A national office is sparsely staffed with one full-time staff member. Operational costs and logistics are partially supported by the U. S. Girl Scouts. The groups themselves raise funds by paying dues, selling old clothes donated from overseas, and making crafts for the tourist market of sisal and banana fiber.

The Guides have a long tradition of training programs. In some prefectures selected groups have already received initial training in democratic pluralism. Recognized as a positive force in the community, they offer a strong network for further training in democratic initiatives and civic responsibility.

The JOC/F resembles the Guides but with a religious base. The target group tends to embrace young women who are homeless, uneducated, and without means of survival. As the women's branch of the JOC, the 2,500 JOCEF benefit from the over-arching organizational structure; however, it has a separate president and a somewhat different

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objectives, including separate skills and literacy training, religious education to build morale, and instruction women's rights. Currently, the JOC/F have recognized the danger posed by the AIDS epidemic in Kigali and have introduced family planning education into its program.

Weaving through these mixed conservative and progressive tendencies is a strong belief in the innate power of self-respect and mature problem-solving. Members are formed into teams, much like the Guides. Pooled savings are encouraged, and for some income-generating activities bank credits are made available. Through the Konrad Adenauer Foundation democracy training has begun in some prefectures. Additional instruction in governance, as well as democracy, would be appropriate to these cooperative groups.

ARDI: This association, Action for Rural Integrated Development (ARDI), supports groups and inter-group associations in efforts to promote rural development through the initiatives of the population. Its intention is to stimulate the associative movement and to provide training, technical support, feasibility studies, legal advice, credit searches, and so on. ARDI also encourages the formation of development-related organizations. Although its direct support to women's groups represents a small part of its total 5,000 beneficiaries, the type of assistance it provides, with its emphasis on self-reliance and financing, is especially valuable to women, as is its policy of providing grants to encourage group networking.

Afpadem: The organization Afpadem imbabazi, or Association of Parliamentarians for the Rights of the Mother and Child, was established in 1991 and is comprised of 11 women deputies to the National Development Council. By its statutes the organization is open to all deputies, present and former. It is non-partisan and non-profit in nature.

Afpadem arose from the unsuccessful attempt by women parliamentarians (12 out of 70 deputies) to successfully secure passage of legislation granting married women the right to inherit property from their fathers and/or husbands. Afpadem recognizes that votes count. Under a 116e grant from USAID, this group will soon conduct a cascading training program to instruct women voters throughout the country on women's rights, rules of electoral competition, and pluralistic political systems in anticipation of multi-party elections in early 1993.

Following the formation of a new National Assembly, Afpadem hopes to undertake the following activities: (a) holding quarterly one-day seminars led by selected local or regional experts on general issues of constitutional law, legislative process, local government planning and structure in relation to national policy, etc.; (b) creating and funding a women's consultant and research network for preparing legislative briefs on social, political, and legal topics of importance to women; (c) instruction preparing, presenting, and successfully debating legislative instruments; (d) creation of a Parliamentary women's library collection on cultural, political, and legal issues relating to women; and (e) study tours for women to visit legislatures and parliaments elsewhere.

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Other Organizations: A range of special-interest women's organizations also exist as good environments for democracy and governance training. They include women's professional organizations, (e.g. AFER, Association des Femmes-Entrepreneurs du Rwanda); health organizations (e.g. ARBEF, Association Rwandaise pour le Bien-être Familial or the new Rwandan branch of SWAA, Society for Women Against AIDS); social aid associations (e.g. the new Mafubo, an organization for single, divorced, or widowed women in need); and so on. Such associations are being founded at an accelerating rate, as women recognize the advantages that groups can offer. NGOs in rural areas offer an especially fertile ground for initiatives in democracy and governance.

Ministère de la Famille et la Promotion Féminine: On April 7, 1992, the creation of a new Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women (MINIPROF) assembled under a single ministry support services to families, the elderly, women's development, women's associations, and related IEC. The Ministry expects, in addition, to establish regional centers for family development in the 10 rural prefecture capitals. This network will constitute the first decentralized government structure focussing on women's and children's advocacy. A key objective of the new Ministry is to "propose measures intended to reduce the unequal chances between men and women of achieving access to various levels of education, employment, and material and financial resources" (MINIPROF 1992a).

The new Ministry is currently without adequate resources, lacking even minimal requirements for logistics and communications. Together with the new Ministry of Information it is housed in a building which is officially assigned to the Ministry of Defense. Despite these initial limitations, however, the Ministry holds great potential for establishing strong working relationships with existing women's organizations. Indeed, at a Ministry-sponsored planning workshop held in the last week of July, participants suggested creation of an autonomous umbrella organization for women. It was agreed by the membership that the Ministry and the umbrella could happily co-exist.

Strategic planning in the new ministry is at a critical, initial stage. Likely imminent interventions identified by MINIPROF include economic support to rural women's associations -- an extension of an ongoing UNIFEM project -- and legal assistance to women, particularly in cases of divorce, child custody, and inheritance. The Ministry also requires appropriate technical assistance in designing a detailed planning strategy. So far, no donor has been identified to assist with the MINIPROF's broad strategic planning or to identify its activities at prefectoral level. A timely intervention is required here.

Other Government Structures: Women are targeted by many ministries in their programs. They and other government institutions also provide channels for democracy training and practice. Some are listed below:

1. Ministry of Commerce: supervises projects in women's commercial training and activities.

2. Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education: classroom teaching

3. Ministry of Higher Education: courses in law, social affairs

4. Ministry of Interior: local government structures

5. Ministry of Youth and the Associative Movement: income-generating groups

6. Ministry of Agriculture: women's rural cooperatives

7. Ministry of Health: maternal and child health training; family planning training;

8. ONAPO (National Office of Population): family planning training, organized down the level of cellule.

9. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs: A directorate of the family and women's development

B. Conclusion

Technical assistance needs of women's groups vary according to purpose. For large groups, support priorities should -- in addition to training in democracy -- include (a) publishing and distribution capacity; (b) logistical and communications support, especially vital in rural areas; (c) information/public relations training and support; (d) advice in developing/conducting training programs; (e) identifying and assembling documentation; (f) skills training in democratic approaches to management and management systems, including monitoring and evaluation. In addition, a monitoring unit for gender-related indicators should be established within one NGO (e.g. RF) in order to measure progress in greater democracy for women in Rwanda.

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Selected List of NGOs in Rwanda
Appropriate for Training Women in Democracy and Governance

1. Association des Femmes Musulmanes
2. Association des Femmes pour Rencontres intellectuelles, culturelles, et artistiques (AFRICA)
3. Association des Guides du Rwanda
4. Association pour la Défense des Driots de la Femme et de l'Enfant (HAGARUKA)
5. Association Rwandaise Pour le Développement Intégré (ARDI)
6. Association Rwandaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial (ARBEF)
7. Association Rwandaise des Travailleurs Chrétiens Féminins (ARTCF)
8. Bureau Social Urbain (CARITAS)
9. Centre de Formation et de Recherches Coopératives IWACU (CFRC)
10. Centre de Service aux Coopératives de Gitarama (CSC)
11. Centre Umusumba mwiza, Kigali
12. Comités Diocésains de Développement
13. INADES-FORMATON RWANDA
14. Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique Féminin (JOC/F)
15, Réseau des Femmes Oeuvrant pour le Développement Rural
16. HAGARUKA, Association pour la défense des droits de la Femme et de l'Enfant
17. Afepadem Ibabazi, Association of Women Parliamentarians for Defense of the Rights of the Mother and Child

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ANNEX G

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Introductory Notes: This project is being jointly authorized under the Development Fund for Africa, section 496, and the human rights section, 116e, of the Foreign Assistance Act. This decision is based on guidance provided in State 198483 dated 20 June 1992 which was cleared by HA (see Annex A). The referenced cable, which delegates project approval to the Mission Director, does, however, advise that the PP should "strongly show the relationship between the project elements and both [the Mission's] overall strategy and long-term economic and social development prospects in Rwanda." The relationship of the project to the Mission's overall strategy is discussed in the body of the PP at section I. D. and will not be repeated here. This annex briefly discusses Rwanda's current economy and the project's links to long-term economic and social development. Although discrete activities in this project which support democracy and improved governance may not be clearly and precisely linked to an outcome that is measurable in specific economic gains, the argument is that there are such linkages - mostly long-term in nature - for the project as a whole and with each of the project's major components.

Profile of the Rwandan Economy:

During the early years of the Habyarimana regime, from 1973 to 1980, Rwanda experienced high rates of economic growth, averaging around 5% per year. Agricultural output fueled the economy with an average 7.2% growth rate per annum. Influenced by high coffee prices and a temporary increase in tax revenues in the late 1970s, the Government greatly increased public expenditures. The public wage bill ballooned, demands for imports for both capital and consumer goods rose rapidly. By 1980, led by central government and state enterprise expenditures, the external current account was recording large deficits. In 1983, the brakes were applied. The Government adopted sterner fiscal and monetary policies, and, to restrain demand, it imposed stricter import controls, higher duties, licensing requirements, and quotas. The Rwandan franc was devalued. In the mid-1980s public revenues improved as did the balance of payments, paralleling rising coffee prices, which peaked in 1986. In 1987-88 coffee prices fell, bad-weather reduced agricultural production, and the decline of the early 1980s resumed. The fiscal deficit steadily increased to 11.7% of GDP by 1990, with public borrowing choking out private investment.

Even before war erupted in October 1990, most Rwandans had been suffering from the economic decline. Private consumption per capita fell by 5% each year from 1983 to 1989. Real per-capita income went from US$ 281 in 1986 to about $US 244 in 1990. Although social indicators show improvements in the decades between 1960 and 1980, living conditions for the vast majority of Rwandans, 95% of whom live in rural areas, have in recent years worsened. Life expectancy had increased to only 49 years in the early 1970s. It is no greater today. Twenty percent of children born die before the age of 5. Fifty percent of under-fives who live suffer from malnutrition. Only 61% of primary-age children

are schooled; this drops to 6% at the secondary level. Only half of Rwanda's teachers are qualified. About 50% of the population remains illiterate.

Until 1986, food production increased at rates equal to population growth. Since then agricultural production has remained almost constant while the population continues to increase at over 3% per year. In fact, agricultural output in 1990 was 9% lower than in 1987. Ninety-five percent of Rwanda's 7,500,000 population derives its livelihood from subsistence agriculture and the cultivation of tea and coffee. One of Africa's most densely populated countries, (411 persons per sq. km. of arable land), its average farm holdings have shrunk to half a hectare. Under intensive cultivation, often double and triple-cropping, soil fertility is suffering. Crop yields are declining.

Growing dissatisfaction with state management of the economy and the lack of general social progress was being reported by the party cadres back to the Government leadership. Faced with these hard facts, plus the messages of growing social discontent - reinforced by donor analysis and policy advice - the Government took the decision to change course, both politically and economically. By early 1990, discussions with the World Bank and the IMF began on the terms and conditions for a structural adjustment program to take effect in 1991. Meanwhile, policy initiatives to liberalize the economy, to restrain public expenditures, and to encourage private investment were announced. By mid-1990 the President had engaged a broad spectrum of public opinion leaders in the debate on political liberalization; the rapid transition toward multi-party democracy, now irrevocably underway, was formalized with constitutional and legal reforms. By April 1992, a multi-party transitional government had taken on the task of managing the reform process.

The Structural Adjustment Program and Political Liberalization

Rwanda's decision to promote a more liberal economic regime through a structural adjustment program and its associated commitment to liberalize its political order came in tandem.[1] There is reasonable evidence that the Habyarimana regime believed that it could not do one without the other. Under highly adverse conditions, it is staying the course.

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[1] It has been argued that such associated actions give authoritarian regimes a large measure of maneuver. On the one hand, should economic hardships associated with fiscal austerity and structural reforms hit the masses and cause social unrest, the regime can justify postponing elections or power-sharing actions to restore political order needed to meet its economic commitments to donors. On the other hand, should the new shoe of fiscal restraint and economic liberalization pinch the regime itself too tight, it can insist on flexibility with the Bank/IMF arguing that it must have room to fulfill its commitments to its people and to bilateral donors on the political reform agenda.

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This dual resolve warrants firm support from the donor community. The task has been set as an in-tandem strategy and the challenge is to facilitate both aspects of the process. There is little point here in revisiting the general arguments regarding the cause and effect linkages that may or may not exist between political democracy and free-market economics. Clearly there is evidence that an open, capitalist economy can co-exist with an authoritarian political regime - note Korea, Taiwan, Chile and South Africa. There is increasing evidence, looking at these same examples, that, over time, broad economic growth under such free market regimes generate inexorable demands for political liberalization leading to democratic practice. Only now are we beginning to build case evidence on how both transitions can be effected at once in the context of third world countries. A few successful cases do exist, such as Costa Rica in Central America which, after its revolution in 1948 chose to follow the path of the Western European democracies whose mixed economies blended state intervention and regulation to guide capitalism without destroying entrepreneurial incentives and free market forces. The challenge now, certainly in the case of Rwanda, is to understand the risks entailed and the support required for these in-tandem policy shifts to succeed.

Participatory Democracy - Participatory Economy:

Rwanda's economic reorientation and recovery depends most fundamentally on the productivity of its people, its most important resource. The policy framework for the structural adjustment program (SAP) addresses the macro-issues of incentives for private investment, fiscal constraint and a reduced public sector role, as well as general economic liberalization. Concurrently, the World Bank is working with the UNDP and other donors on a poverty alleviation strategy to mitigate the negative social impacts that are associated with fiscal austerity, constraints on consumption and other key SAP policies. This strategy recognizes that unless the broad population is given the tools and the incentives to mobilize labor and resources for self-managed development, the near-term negative social impacts can impede recovery and generate deep structural inequities.

USAID's DIG Project addresses key human aspects of the political dimension of the political economy nexus. It does so at three levels. The first aspect is the need to build the capacity of the array of non-state actors in the civil society to mobilize broad participation in the political process. Most of these actors, the non-governmental private professional, labor, farmer, and women's associations serve, at the same time vital economic interests of their members. If the SAP policies are to be sustained in a democratic environment, these groups need to understand them and make selective, self-interested decisions about supporting them with their memberships. Without consent of the governed, they will not long hold. With national elections approaching, civic education and action must be linked to these long term economic interests. If candidate orientation and voter education fails to communicate how the government's long-range economic policies will benefit, if the terms of debate are turned to short-term group interests, the risks are evident and serious. The efforts of this project both with the diversity of NGOs and the media to build a civil society that can share responsibly in this debate is essential. The role of the project is not to set the agenda, but it

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will play a pivotal role in encouraging the actors to take the high road in their educational campaigns and in their mobilization of an informed and responsible electorate.

The second level of this engagement of social forces is in local governance and socio-economic problem solving. In their joint Policy Framework Paper, 1991-93[2], the Bank and the GOR emphasize the importance of "decentralized administration at the communal level." To generate dynamic local public economies based on local resource mobilization and management, people must be convinced that their efforts are worth the candle. New communal governments, installed through a credible and accountable political process, can give the people reasonable assurance that elected local officials will govern in their interest. The local citizens, in turn, must understand that the old paternalism is past and a restrained central authority has transferred substantive, defined authority to the commune. In turn, labor and resource contributions - through associations and citizens groups - to vital public works may be expected to resume and increase. It is through the synergism of formal local governments working with the informal self-governing groups that new schools, bridges, and roads will get built and human-scale local governing units will form to manage range lands, common fishing resources, forests and streams on a sustainable basis. The emergence of dynamic local public economies in Rwanda is not only possible but essential for the tandem strategies for political and economic democratization are to work. The networks of non-governmental organizations engaged in civic education and action have, in this regard, a vital role to place to play in fostering the politics of self-governing local development. The DIG Project, therefore, approaches this nexus both in its support to NGOs and in its focus on strategic reform of formal communal government.

The third level in this nexus is the establishment of a new enabling environment for private investment and local entrepreneurship. The lack of confidence government officials, especially in the communes -- uncertainty over arbitrary tax levies on commerce, disrespect for contractual obligations, insecurity of property -- has dampened economic initiative throughout the nation. With rules made in public fora by representatives accountable to the people, a calculus for investment and enterprise can be made. Work under the project will help local people as they learn to shape the rules and the rule-making system so that they can know the transaction costs and the potential returns for their enterprise. Where confiscatory or even meddlesome behavior by authorities in constrained by democratic process, risk is reduced and with it the opportunity is increased.

<u>The Information Regime - Voters, Governance and Market Forces:</u>

Reliable and timely information is essential to a functioning democracy as well as to an open market economy. Lacking it, citizens cannot reach reasoned decisions. As political actors, an informed public can make judgements about the competence of their elected leaders only when they have timely and reliable reports on their performance, the consequences of their

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[2] See, World Bank/GOR, <u>RWANDA, Medium-Term Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper, 1991-93</u>., March 1, 1991, p 22 and passim.

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policies, and the degree to which their personal and official actions accord with the law and the general social contract to which they are to be held accountable. As economic actors, entrepreneurs, investors, producers, consumers and wage earners must have access to timely and reliable information on factor prices, the trends in supply and demand, the supply and cost of money, and other factors to shape strategies and actions responsive to market signals. At no time since its independence in 1962 has Rwanda benefitted from the invaluable service that an open information regime can provide in both of these realms. Lacking the opportunities for free inquiry and publication, an effective journalistic profession did not develop in the country.

In the last two years the Government of Rwanda has moved uncertainly toward an open information regime. For years only two or three bi-weekly/monthly private journals (two of these closely associated with the Church) survived under the Government's near monopoly of the media and its stern limits on political and economic reporting or commentary. The Government radio and its weekly "news" journals, one in Kinyarwandan and one in French, filtered information to the public and provided "spin," propaganda, and public education that served the regime. Hints at a more liberal government information policy plus the President's formal announcement in July 1990 of his intent to move toward a multi-party democracy were sufficient to encourage an explosion of experimental private publications. Even so, quality and coverage is poor and radio is still a Government monopoly.

Through this project's support to the Rwandan Press Center and its assessment of radio's potential for expanded services, the quality and reliability of information will be significantly increased. While the initial focus may be on "political" reporting and getting the news out to the people in the pre-electoral period, the project will also promote solid reporting on the economy - bringing to people the information needed by them to act as investors and consumers in an open market system. It is often said that the three factors of production - land, labor and capital - require a fourth - information - to make a market. Its importance to democracy and to economic growth is neglected at grave risk to both.

Setting the Rules of the Game: Who Decides on Who Gets What, When, Where, How and How Much?

Development planners and strategists, accustomed to working with strong executives and single-party regimes have been dismissive toward the legislative function in third world governments. With the advent of democratic regimes, seeking to balance the powers of the state, the terms of engagement change. Through elected representatives, people in electoral districts have a new and direct access to the rule makers. Tax policies, commercial regulations, price setting, and public outlays are no longer decisions taken exclusively behind closed doors in the executive agencies. They require open debate, legislative review, and majority consent. In no other institution of modern democratic practice are the dynamics of pluralism more fully engaged. Nowhere else is the question of "who benefits" more transparently examined. The effectiveness of parliamentary bodies depends substantially on access to information and the analysis of that information. The DIG project directly

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addresses the Assembly's need for information about the issues under consideration. Through the project, for the first time, Rwanda's parliament will have a current data bank on the financial operations of Government as well as up-to-date information on the national economy. It will be armed with a staff capacity to perform budgetary and fiscal analysis. Indirectly, the DIG Project will encourage NGOs, acting as constituent groups to let their representative know their interests and needs.

By assisting the Rwandan National Assembly in improving its information access and the quality of analysis it gets, USAID's project assistance will have direct impact on this process. The linkage between legislative performance and Rwanda's economic future is evident. Vital decisions on every aspect of public economic policy from taxation to social welfare will be made here. As in all democracies, some of these decisions will seem more apposite than others depending on the eye of the beholder, the policy preferences of the observer. But dismissing their importance, relevance and centrality in the nation's political economy is inadmissible. The more responsibly the legislative function is performed the more the enabling environment, which depends on fairness, openness, dependability and reasonable certainty under the rule of law, is improved for entrepreneurial endeavor.

The Sum of the Parts - Accountable Political Economics and the Economics of Political Democracy.

The Development Fund for Africa seeks to further the long-term, sustainable growth of economies with broad participation of the population in decision-making, management and benefits. USAID Rwanda's Democratic Governance Project links key elements of a democratic transition to these same outcomes. It energizes the participation dimension by increasing people's understanding of and access to the institutions of the civil society and well as to the institutions of an elective representative polity. By promoting free associations, the people are equipped with tools of learning as well as tools of expression and action. A free information regime is their tool of government oversight as well as their means of understanding the opportunities and dynamics of an open market regime. Learning to control their local governments and to shape the open local political economies of their communes is their means for taking charge of the terms under which their investments will be made for their children's futures. These linkages are not linear; they are dynamic, intersecting and mutually reinforcing. The project does not pretend that its modest interventions are sufficient to shape a mature and fully functioning political economy under impeccable conditions of democratic governance. Yet it contributes necessary elements. At the same time, other donors are making substantial contributions to this process. The best reading from the donors is that over the medium term they will not less in supporting Rwanda's socio-economic development efforts. Several are considering modest increments to support political liberalization. And qualitatively, it appears that donor aid in Rwanda is improving as more of it is linked to the tandem reform agenda of the GOR. It is, therefore, looking at this sum of many parts that one concludes that there are improved prospects, under democratic governance, for long-term economic and social development with increasing benefit to the Rwandan people.

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ANNEX H

INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXAMINATION

OR

CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION

Project Country : Rwanda

Project Title : Democratic Initiatives and Governance

Project Number : 696-0133

Funding : FY 1992 $9,000,000

IEE Prepared By : PDO, Claudia Cantell

Environmental Action Recommended: Categorical Exclusion

Discussion: This activity meets the criteria for a Categorical Exclusion, per 216.2 (c) of Regulation 16, and is therefore excluded from further review. The entire $9,000,000 will be used to support the GOR's democratization process through technical assistance, training and commodities. Section 216.2(c)(1)(i) is recommended on the basis that none of the activities under the proposed Project will have any effect on the natural or physical environment. In accordance with this Exclusion, an Initial Environmental Examination, Environmental Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement are not required.

Clearance: Gary Nelson
Gary L. Nelson
USAID/Rwanda Mission Director

Concurrence: Bureau Environmental Officer

APPROVED: J. Yanulet

DISAPPROVED: _____

DATE: 4/27/92

Clearance: GC/AFR: MAS Date: 5/13/92

Schedule 1

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INPUT REQUIREMENTS

This section provides both a narrative summary of anticipated technical assistance requirements for each of the five project components and project management and a numerical summary of the input requirements for each.

I. COMPONENT SUMMARIES

A. The Institutional Project Manager (IPM)

The IPM will operate through a resident Project Management Unit (PMU) staffed by two long-term expatriate advisor/managers for the four year life of the Project Cooperative Agreement. Short-term TA will be recruited internationally and locally to provide expertise to the PMU in specialized areas (MIS) in which it lacks expertise or lacks the time to provide directly to the four CA beneficiaries. Both local and international TA will be used by the PMU to develop training materials and conduct workshops for one or more of the component beneficiaries in areas of organizational development and management training. In addition, the PMU will be conducting studies and research identified by cooperating agencies which it feels will advance the domain of democratic governance in Rwanda. While the IPM will manage all technical assistance requirements for each of the four components, their specific requirements are shown separately below.

B. The Center for Civic Action & Democratic Initiatives (CCADI)

The Center will be managed exclusively by Rwandan professional and support personnel thus there will be no long-term TA requirement. To the extent possible short-term TA requirements will be secured locally during its four year component life. Primary utilization of this TA will be to 1) provide staff training in specific areas of management and programmatic areas 2) development of training materials in different areas of civic education and institutional development 3) undertake studies and research in areas commissioned by members and 4) engage trainers for the numerous training activities to be undertaken by the Center. The IPM will manage all TA until the Center has received certification that it has adequate financial management systems and procedures in place to manage project funds. All TA requests will have been approved in the annual workplans. Any that have not been will require IPM concurrence. All internationally recruited TA will be undertaken by the IPM in collaboration with the Center.

C. Local Government

The IPM will manage all TA requirements identified by the Ministry of Interior (MININTER) and approved in annual workplans during the 18 month life of component.

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There will be no long-term TA. Short-term TA will be utilized for studies and research identified in the initial local government assessment to take place during Phase I in such areas as 1) post election survey used to design a training program including materials for local officials 2) the role of NGOs in the local economy 3) review of communal law-reform agenda and pinpoint further areas/issues for study including the Fonds de Solidarity Communale and the feasibility of investing project funds in it and 4) feasibility of establishing a National Association of Burgomasters.

D. The National Assembly

The IPM will manage all TA requirements identified by the National Assembly and approved in both life of component and annual workplans over the 36 month duration of this component. There is no long-term TA requirements envisaged for this component. Short-term TA will be used to provide expertise for the following types of activities: 1) MIS (hardware and software) configuration assessment, design and installation 2) training of NA operations staff in use of the system 3) design of legal compendium and legislative analysis for legal research and law drafting functions 4) design and set up fiscal/budgetary analysis capacity including training of NA staff 5) develop data base links to the University of Rwanda system, and executive agencies and 6) to plan the archives, archival and library management system.

E. Rwandan Press Center (CPR)

There is no long-term TA requirement for this project component. Until the financial management system of the CPR has been certified by the PMU, all short-term TA will be managed by the PMU. Thereafter, the CPR will request PMU assistance in contracting for such international TA as needed to undertake approved workplan technical assistance requirements. The following are some of the short-term consultancies identified for this component: 1) a study for establishing a common-use, self-financing, journal distribution system and internal news gathering service 2) to train staff and journalists and conduct seminars in workplan identified areas 3) follow on study to initial radio study done in Phase I and 3) to install and train center staff in the use of various equipment purchased for the CPR. A deliberate decision was made to assist a long-term expatriate advisor to the Press Center. Rather, TA needs related to the establishment of the Center and strengthening its management capacity will be primarily handled by the PMU. Individual consultancies of up to four months each are planned to assist the Center to in specialized areas the expertise of which is not found locally (e.g., increasing skills and professional capacity of journalists including investigative reporting of economic affairs).

F. USAID Project Support Fund

Technical assistance requirements for this project component correspond to those needed to respond to "targets of opportunity" identified during the course of project implementation. There are no long-term TA requirements planned. While project audits and evaluations will

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be funded from this component budget, actual TA requirements are discussed under those headings. As it is too early to precisely define the specific nature of individual consultancies, they will certainly relate to the carrying out of research or studies in such illustrative areas as 1) the administration of justice 2) audit and fiscal accountability 3) women's rights and the GOR strategy and status under the law and 4) civil service reform and special initiatives for disadvantaged businesses.

II. INPUT REQUIREMENTS

A. Long-term Technical Assistance ⌙

POSITION	DURATION OF ASSIGNMENT	COMMENTS
IPM/PMU		
• Chief of Party	48 person months	4/1/93 - 3/31/97
• Financial/Admin Officer	36 person months	4/1/93 - 3/31/96
• Home Office Support	8 person months	(2 pm/yr x 4 years)
Total L-T TA	84 person months	

⌙ Overhead and/or G&A (Overhead at 60% of total salaries and/or G&A at 30% of L-T TA, Personnel, Commodities, Training and Other Costs) need to be calculated as a part of long-term TA requirements.

The following benefits and allowances need to be included as part of the long-term TA input requirements and costed accordingly:

Category	No. of Years	Comments/Remarks
• Fringe Benefit	1 - 4/1 - 3	25 percent of base salaries
• Post Differential	1 - 4/1 - 3	25 percent of base salaries
• Cola	1 - 4/1 - 3	Cola rate at family size
• Int'l Travel	1, 2, 3, 4	Rnd trip tkts x family size + home office
• Per Diem	1 - 4/1 - 3	Local & Int'l + home office
• Transportation	1 - 4/1 - 3	Air, surface, excess, pov, storage
• Temp lodg/Qtrs Allo	1 - 4/1 - 3	Includes utilities, security, maintenance
• Education Allow	1 - 4/1 - 3	2 families x children
• H/H Furniture	1 - 4/1 - 3	2 families
• Overhead	1 - 4/1 - 3	2 expats and home office

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B. Short-Term Technical Assistance

POSITION	DURATION OF ASSIGNMENT	COMMENTS
IPM/PMU		
• International	10 pms/10 trips	years 1 & 2
• Locally Recruited	10 person months	years 1 & 2
CCADI/The NGO Center		
• International	3 pms/3 trips	years 1 & 2
• Locally Recruited	20 person months	years 1 - 3
Local Government		
• International	12 pms/6 - 8 trips	Within 18 months
• Locally Recruited	20 person months	Within 18 months
The National Assembly		
• International	15 pms/8 - 11 trips	years 1 - 3
CPR/The Press Center		
• International	12 pms/4 - 6 trips	years 1 - 3
USAID Support Fund		
• International	12 pms/8 - 10 trips	years 1 - 5
• Locally Recruited	15 person months	years 1 - 5

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SCHEDULE 2

TRAINING INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Each of the four CA-financed components and the Institutional Project Manager will provide training to either their staff or their clients-members. It is likely that significant training will be provided under the USAID Project Support Fund. The order in priority of training activities will be in-country, regional and in the US or Europe. Training will primarily take the form of workshops, seminars, individual consultancies or short-courses. No degree courses are anticipated through project funding. International training activities include study tours, attendance at conferences, and short-courses etc. The following sections discuss the illustrative training activities identified as part of the project design phase.

I. THE INSTITUTIONAL PROJECT MANAGER

Although most training funds under the direct control of the IPM are for use in enhancing the institutional capacity of both the CCADI and CPR, modest funding is reserved for training of local hire Project Management Unit staff. This is often an item overlooked in projects that utilize an external intermediary management unit. It is of particular importance in the case of the DIG Project as there will be few professional staff, numerous and complex activities, and technical or programmatic areas which are not only new in Rwanda but in most democratically-becoming societies. Funds that are designated for beneficiary training activates provided by the PMU are mainly for use in organizational development and management training with the two NGO centers. Training funds will be used for development and production of training materials and administrative and logistic costs of individual training activities. While the PMU will undertake a significant number of training activities itself, the nature of this training will be more in the area of one-on-one consultancies with the staff of the two new NGOs. Primarily it will coordinate and facilitate training and technical assistance actions that it has contracted to individual consultants and firms.

II. CCADI/THE NGO CENTER

CCADI will devote much of its time to developing training materials in various areas of civic education and advocacy including human and civil rights, citizenship and its rights, duties and obligations etc. It will extend its educational messages primarily through the training of NGO member staff as trainers who will then work with their own member-clients in geographical regions where their organization operates. Center staff will also conduct training activities for smaller and weaker NGOs in areas of management where they require strengthening (e.g., financial management and accounting, proposal development). It is anticipated that CCADI and the PMU will work on a series of training modules in organizational development and resource management designed for both NGO needs and also for the newly emerging communal level development associations whether water management associations, cooperatives or health and development committees. This latter aspect of

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training for "self-governance for communal level associations, formal or informal is perhaps one of the most important training actions which the Center will undertake.

III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Training activities are primarily aimed at the communal level both for Burgomasters and other members of communal government. This will be especially important as the true decentralization takes place and the number and kinds of management activities increases for what will be hundreds if not thousands of newly elected local authorities. Training will also be necessary for Ministry of Interior authorities as the nature of their responsibilities change from command and control to support and encourage. Training funds will be used to develop and produce training materials as well as logistical and administrative requirements. It is envisaged that a series of modules will be developed for the Burgomasters that can be used both for training purposes and as stand-alone reference or "how to" manuals on various aspects of resource including financial management.

IV. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Training under this project component includes staff training and development, and candidate and elected deputy training. Specifically, a follow-up study tour in the US for six CND staff will be undertaken in conjunction with USIS. Additional training for all CND staff will conducted locally and abroad in information systems management and applications. Visitor tours or attendance at seminars for training in legal research and policy and fiscal analysis are other areas that have been identified for professional staff. Following elections, new Assembly officers and minority party leaders will be provided an orientation visit to the US Congress and to selected state legislatures. While a number of these training activities are covered by AREAF Project funding, sufficient component funding has been set aside to cover overseas training for 10 Deputies, 6 senior staff members, 3 systems analysts/ managers, and for the individual training of one fiscal and one legal analyst. Additionally, local training of operational personnel on the computer-based MIS is provided for as is seminar materials for deputies.

V. THE RWANDAN PRESS CENTER

Training under the CPR component will be provided for both Center staff and for the journalist-members themselves. Staff training will include computer use and setting up and running of the service and resource center. For the journalists themselves, seminars, round-tables and workshops will focus on such issues as:investigative reporting in social, political and economic affairs; writing skills; and business management including advertising, distribution and sales, costs of production etc. It should be noted that Center funds will only be used to fill gaps not covered from funds leveraged from other donors including USIS, Neaumann Foundation, the Swiss etc. There is not a training line item per se. Should funding be required for journalist training activities, some of the Short-term TA funds noted

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above will have to be used to finance activities not financed by other donors. For the Center staff, training is included in the "personnel" budget discussed below.

VI. USAID PROJECT SUPPORT FUND

While no particular activity has been identified at this point, training programs for as many as 20 Rwandan participants has been provided for in the accompanying budget. Such training would include orientation tours, seminars and conferences in the region and the US. The bulk of training activities are scheduled to take place during the four years of the Cooperative Agreement although the flexibility provided by the Fund will allow USAID fund activities which present themselves prior to and after the arrival of the Institutional Project Manager and the start of full-scale operations. It is also anticipated that the IPM and each of the CA-financed beneficiaries may identify activities during the course of implementation which ~~are~~ do not fall directly within their purview but will contribute to overall project objectives and thus possible activities for financing under the Fund.

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SCHEDULE 3

PERSONNEL (LOCAL HIRE SALARIES) INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Schedule 2 discusses input requirements in terms of the local hire staff engaged by beneficiary institutions and the Institutional Project Manager to implement activities called for under the particular component. In fact, besides the IPM's resident PMU, only CCADI and CPR have local personnel requirements associated with their individual component activities. The following is a brief narrative discussion of each of these three institutions and an illustrative staffing configuration which will need to be refined during DIG Project execution. Equivalent Foreign Service National grades are provided to determine the level of qualifications required for each position.

I. THE INSTITUTIONAL PROJECT MANAGER

To compliment the two long-term expatriate advisor/managers, the IPM will engage five professional Rwandans and a number of support staff to person the PMU. All staff are required for the full four years of the CA. In addition to salaries and benefits, the actual budgets reflect associated overhead and/or General and Administrative costs to be charged by the IPM on long-term personnel. A small number of highly qualified professionals. May require extensive training given the length of project and low level of skills normally found in-country. All professionals will be required to do their own wordprocessing.

Position	Grade/FSN	Remarks/Comments
Program Officer	12 - 11	Well connected & respected; trusted by all
Chief Accountant	11 - 10	Will take over from F/A Advisor; NGO training
MIS/M&E Specialist	11 - 10	For internal PMU and TA to Components
Training/TA Officer	10 - 09	Coordinates all IPM & Component TA/Training
Officer Manager	09 - 08	Admin/personnel officer; takes over from F/A
Secretary/Recep't	06 ~~07 - 06~~	Bookkeeping skills;
Driver/Mechanic	04 - 03	
Driver/Messenger	03 - 02	
Office Assistant	02 ~~03 - 02~~	Operates office equip, answers phone & cleans
Day Guard/Gardener	01 ~~02 - 01~~	Office recommended converted house

Salaries should contain at least 25% benefits factor. Strongly recommended that additional funds be put aside for local training including computer applications.

At least 60% of total staff salaries should be budgeted for overhead to be charged by IPM as part of its indirect costs.

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II. THE CENTER FOR CIVIC ACTION & DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES (CCADI)

In defining CCADI personnel inputs, an eye to its future sustainability including recurrent costs of was used as a yardstick in measuring each position. CCADI will be providing logistical and administrative services as a well as a resource facility from its office. This is in addition to the numerous services of an extension, technical assistance and training nature that will be available to members and through them to their clients at the communal level. In fact, this as an area where strategy and cost effectiveness interface. Asking NGO members to contribute their time, physical facilities, and other resources at the national, regional and local levels are not only cost savings but guarantee that local perspectives and participation will be effectively mobilized and integrated into the overall approach of the NGO community and this project component supporting it. It should be noted that the Center will operate a separate "service" facility providing logistical and administrative support to NGO members. This includes transportation, office equipment, and communications services. Thus staffing inputs noted below reflect needs for both normal Center activities such as representation/advocacy and training/outreach services and the Service facility needs.

Position	Grade/FSN	Remarks/Comments
Center Director	10 - 09	A respected leader w/ extensive ties to NGOs
Extens'n/TrainCoord	09 - 08	Responsible for CCADI outreach & training
Chief Accountant	09 - 08	Will provide training as well as accounting
MIS & Research Coord	09 - 08	Coordinates TA, MIS, and study agenda
Office Manager	08 - 07	Admin, logistics, personnel & Secretarial
Service Center Mgr	07 - 06	Separately run facility to serve members
Secretary/Recept'st	06 - 05	With bookkeeping skills; typing, filing etc
Driver/Mechanic	04 - 03	For Center and Service facility vehicles
Driver/Messengers(2)	03 - 02	For Service Center & NGO member transport
Office Assistant (2)	02 - 01	1 for Center & 1 for service facility
Day Guard/Gdner(2)	02 - 01	For Center and Service facility

At least 25% of salaries are devoted to mandated benefits. An additional amount for staff training should be calculated as an input to this category.

III. THE RWANDAN PRESS CENTER (CPR)

Like the CCADI, the CPR will be a newly established organization by the time of project startup. The differences however between the two organizations is greater than their similarities. The membership and hence clientele of the CPR is limited to a relatively small number of professional journalists. It is primarily concerned with providing a set of logistical, administrative and uniquely technical services from a centralized facility to this group. This comparative profile of the CPR leads to staffing requirements which are

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significantly less than that of the CCADI. An illustrative staffing pattern for the CPR follows.

Position	Grade/FSN	Remarks/Comments
Center Director	09 - 08	Known & respected private journalist; trainer
Office Manager	08 - 07	Strong administrative & Mgt capabilities
Chief Accountant	08 - 07	Experienced in mgt of a small enterprise
Resource Center Mgr	08 - 07	Experienced librarian & archivist
Equipment Operator	08 - 07	Experience computer, desktop publishing etc.
Secretary/Recept'ist	06 - 05	
Driver/Messenger	03 - 02	
Office Assistant	03 - 02	Cleaner, operates office equipment
Guard/Gardner	02 - 01	

It should be noted that either overhead or G&A will be taken on local as well as expatriate staff salaries. An amount of 60 percent of total salaries is used to calculate overhead costs.

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SCHEDULE 4

COMMODITIES INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Commodity inputs are requirements for three of the four CA-financed components (Local Government being the lone exception) and the Institutional Project Manager. There is no commodity procurement foreseen under the USAID Project Support Fund. The IPM will undertake its own procurement and for that of the two NGO Centers and the National Assembly as well. Commodity procurement, primarily office equipment and furnishings, is a necessary input for the IPM, CCADI and CPR in terms of the startup requirements needed to establish operational offices for managing their individual affairs. For the National Assembly, commodity procurement is designed to enhance its capacity to function more effectively as a representative institution of the people and vis-a-vis the executive branch. In summary, commodities are necessary requirements seen in the context of establishing or strengthening important Rwandan institutions. Commodity inputs for the IPM are necessary for it to fulfill its obligations as project manager and provider of technical assistance and training for institutional strengthening. The following sections provide a detailed illustrative list of commodities for the IPM and three beneficiary institutions noted above.

I. INSTITUTIONAL PROJECT MANAGER

Procurement centers around the establishment of the IPM's Project Management Unit including office and two expatriate residences. The following is an illustrative list of IPM commodity input requirements:

Commodity	Quantity	Comments/Remarks
Vehicles	2	4x4; include 10% spares/vehicle/year
Desktop Computers	5	IBM or compatible; w/ server for LAN
Laptop Computers	2	IBM or compatible; part of LAN
Printers	1	1 laser; 1 dot matrix
UPS Battery Backup	7	Individual units or a system
Computer Software	Multiple	WP; spreadsheet; LAN; DTP; DB;etc.
Photocopier	1	Heavy-duty; collator; auto feed
Electric Typewriter	1	Wide Carriage
Fax Machine	1	Plain Paper w/ stabilizer
Telephone System	1	With stabilizer
Duplicating Machine	1	Electric w/ stabilizer
Office Furniture	8	8 sets; conference/training room;
Household Appliances	2	Two sets; US procurement
Household Furnishings	2	Two sets; US/Local procurement

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In calculating the commodity costs, installation costs should be included. While built into the "Other Costs" input requirements, necessary consumables for up to one year should be procured at the same time as the particular piece of equipment.

II. CENTER FOR CIVIC ACTION AND DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES

The CCADI will procure commodities to establish an operational office and a service facility providing logistical and administrative support to member NGOs and their clientele. The equipment requirements detailed below thus include both those for the secretariat and those for the service facility serving member NGOs.

Commodity	Quantity	Comments/Remarks
Vehicles	3	4x4; include 10% spares/vehicle/year
Desktop Computers	6	IBM/compatible; w/ server for LAN
Laptop Computers	2	IBM or compatible included on LAN
Printers	3	1 laser; 2 dot matrix
UPS Battery Backup	8	Individual units or single system
Computer Software	Multiple	WP; spreadsheet; LAN; DTP; DB; etc.
Photocopier	2	Heavy-duty;collator/auto feed;stabilizer
Electric Typewriter	1	Wide Carriage
Fax Machine	1	Plain Paper w/ stabilizer
Telephone System	1	With stabilizer
Duplicating Machine	1	Electric w/ stabilizer
Scanner	1	Stencil cutting; with stabilizer
Office Furnit (Center)	7	7 sets; Reception;
Office Furnit (Facility)		Conference/training/resource facility

Included in the eventual costing of these items should be the cost of installation. The cost of consumables should also be included but under the other cost budget category.

III. RWANDAN PRESS CENTER (CPR)

Some 30 Rwandan journalists have joined together to provide the tools of their trade, further their professional development and lobby for a free and independent press. A new non-profit organization, the Rwandan Press Center is the means by which the journalists hope to advance these objectives. The following is an illustrative list of their commodity requirements for this new Center. Commodity requirements detailed below serve both the secretariat's needs as well as those of the journalist members. All computer equipment i.e., hardware and software must be in French.

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Commodity	Quantity	Comments/Remarks
Vehicle	1	4x4; include 10% spares/vehicle/year
Vehicle	1	Town car w/ 10% spares/vehicle/year
Desktop Computers	3	Macintosh for service facility
Desktop Computer	2	IBM or compatible
Printers	2	1 laser; 1 dot matrix
UPS Battery Backup	5	Individual units or single system
Computer Software	Multiple	For Mac & IBM;WP;Desktop Publish'g
Photocopier	1	Heavy-duty; collator/autofeed; stabl
Electric Typewriter	1	Wide Carriage
Manual Typewriters	20	Reconditioned; From Europe
Fax Machine	1	Plain Paper w/ stabilizer
Telephone System	1	With stabilizer
Duplicating Machine	1	Electric w/ stabilizer
Scanner	1	Stencil cutting; with stabilizer
Office Furnit (Center)	6	6 sets; Reception;
Office Furnit (Facility)	20	Conference/training/resource facility w/ desks/chairs for 20 journalists

When calculating costs for equipment, both installation and consumables should be included. Consumables for at least one year should be ordered at the time of the equipment order.

IV. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

This project component is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the National Assembly by providing TA, training and commodities to the permanent staff of the NA thus enabling them to provide elected deputies with improved services including information, advice and logistical support. Commodity inputs are a major requirement in this regard. The following list of commodities are required for the NA component.

Commodity	Quantity	Comments/Remarks
Desktop Computers	10	IBM/compatible; LAN/Network capability
Printers	3	1 laser; 2 dot matrix
UPS Battery Backup	3	Individual units or single system
Computer Software	Multiple	For IBM; WP; D-TPub'g; Database; LAN
Small Offset Press	1	For publishing CND record
Fax Machine	1	Plain Paper w/ stabilizer
Optical Scanner	1	Transcribing;stencil cutting;w/ stabizr
Modems	2	With software; communicating with UofR
Duplicating/Stencil Mach	1	Electronic with stabilizer

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As noted above, installation costs need to be included in overall budget calculations, and necessary consumables should be ordered at the same time as the individual items.

Upon the arrival of the Institutional Project Manager and subsequently during joint development of component workplans and budgets, detailed reviews of commodity requirements will be undertaken.

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OTHER COSTS INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Other Costs include those input requirements needed to maintain the operational capacity of the beneficiary institutions supported by this project. These mainly include costs related to the operations of beneficiary offices or secretariats. It is only the IPM and the two NGO centers have requirements related to other costs. Other Costs' requirements for the National Assembly and Local Government components are covered by State budgets. There are no Other Cost input requirements anticipated under the USAID Project Support Fund. As these Other Costs are to a large extent recurrent costs, the issue of the future sustainability of these requirements has been thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. Particularly, the two NGO Centers have included fees-for-service as part of their strategy for ensuring sustainability of recurrent (other) costs (see Budget Analysis).

I. THE INSTITUTIONAL PROJECT MANAGER

In addition to normal project operational requirements associated with the PMU's functioning over a four year period, the other input that will be costed is Defense Base Act insurance for all long-term expatriate advisors assigned by the IPM to the PMU. The following are the specific input requirements to be costed for the IPM and its resident project management unit:

Category	No. of Years	Comments/Remarks
DBA Insurance	1 - 4/1 - 3	Two l-t TA; COP @ 4 & F/AO @ 3 yrs
Communications	1 - 4	Courier, fax, phone, postage
Office Costs	1 - 4	Rent, utilities, security, maint/service
Consumables	1 - 4	Office supplies, stationary & printing
Vehicle Operations	1 - 4	Fuel, oil, repairs, maint, service, insurance
Staff Perdiems	1 - 4	Local travel only

II. THE CENTER FOR CIVIC ACTION AND DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES

Other Costs requirements for the CCADI project component relate to inputs for the secretariat and the service facility it is operating on behalf of members. The following are these input requirements for other costs.

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Category	No. of Years	Comments/Remarks
Communications	1 - 4	Courier, fax, phone, postage
Office Costs	1 - 4	Rent, utilities, security, maint/service
Consumables	1 - 4	Office supplies, stationary & printing
Vehicle Operations	1 - 4	Fuel, oil, repairs, maint, service, insurance
Staff Perdiems	1 - 4	Local travel only
International Travel	1 - 4	For secret/member attendance at int'l events

III. THE CENTER FOR PRESS IN RWANDA

The same input requirements as discussed above for CCADI pertain to the CPR. The following are the input requirements:

Category	No. of Years	Comments/Remarks
Communications	1 - 4	Courier, fax, phone, postage
Office Costs	1 - 4	Rent, utilities, security, maint/service
Consumables	1 - 4	Office supplies, stationary & printing
Vehicle Operations	1 - 4	Fuel, oil, repairs, maint, service, insurance
Staff Perdiems	1 - 4	Local travel only
International Travel	1 - 4	For secret/member attendance at int'l events

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SCHEDULE 5

AUDITS AND EVALUATION INPUT REQUIREMENTS

All evaluation and audit requirements will be handled by USAID from within it Project Support Fund. Audits and evaluations will take place as per A.I.D. regulations and the DIG Project Monitoring and Evaluation Plan discussed earlier and detailed in the following Analysis. Audit and evaluation requirements essentially involve short-term technical assistance and related travel and transportation costs. The following are the audit and evaluation requirements for this project:

I. EVALUATIONS

Evaluations scheduled during the project include a baseline survey during Phase I, two progress evaluations to take place of the Cooperative Agreement during Phase II, and the final project evaluation to take during Phase III. The Baseline Study will take place in conjunction with A.I.D./W AFR/ONI-DG personnel and CDIE. Expenses for personnel participating in this study will be covered by their respective agencies. At least three person months of international short-term TA and three months of local TA will be input requirements covered from the USAID Project Support Fund.

The two Cooperative Agreement "progress" evaluations (18 and 36 months) will each require three international long-term TA inputs and three months of local TA inputs. While it is anticipated that the A.I.D./W will participate in the final evaluation as it did in the baseline survey, input requirements are set at five months of long-term TA and 3 months of local TA. The following is a summary of input requirements:

Category	Input Requirements	Comments/Remarks
Baseline Evaluation	3/3 pms	AID/W & CDIE; TA cost, PD loc trans
Shakedown Evaluation	3/3 pms	Fees, perdiem, tickets, local trans
Progress Evaluation	3/3 pms	Fees, perdiem, tickets, local trans
Final Evaluation	5/5 pms	Fees, perdiem, tickets, local trans

II. AUDITS

Project audit requirements are determined by A.I.D. regulations. Because there are no local firms capable undertaking audits at the level required by A.I.D. inputs will involve working with the REDSO IG to find a regional audit firm to undertake the mandated audit requirements. Four scheduled annual audits are called for under the five year DIG Project. Because the audit requirements will involve a review of overall Project and Cooperative

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Agreement objectives, at least three person months of TA requirements per audit will be is foreseen.

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SCHEDULE 6

COMPONENT SPECIFIC INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Two of the five project components have one or more specific programmatic inputs which do not fall clearly in any of the traditional input/budget categories normally used for defining project requirements. The following discussion provides a more in-depth review of these component requirements.

- CCADI - There will be a Civic Education and Action Fund jointly programmed by CCADI and the Institutional Project Manager. Financing for this fund is budgeted under this project component. The intent is that these grants will be modest to help NGOs and communal associations promote values of democratic governance throughout the country. It is expected that there will be some 15 to 20 subgrants made to such organizations. In order to avoid audit requirements on grants made in excess of $25,000, an attempt will be to encourage modest size grants.

- Local Government - Startup funding for a Burgomaster Association has been set-aside to assist this new association's secretariat to get established and operational. The exact nature of inputs will need to be determined during project execution. The second component specific input is for the possible funding of a pilot communal-level development fund (Fonds de Solidarite Communale). Should the project participants determine that such a fund will advance the objectives of this component then funding will be made available to match an equivalent level of resources from several designated pilot communes.

- National Assembly - Local contracts will be made to a specialized firm which can provide MIS operations traning and to the University of Rwanda to develop a Rwandan Law Compendium. Adequate funding will also be provided to permit rehabilitation of a portion of the CND for the housing of a Library and Archives Center.

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ANNEX I

ADMINISTRATIVE/IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

I. RATIONALE FOR PROJECT STRUCTURE

The focus of Annex I, "Administrative/implementation Analysis," is the appropriateness of the proposed structures of project management, and the arrangements and relationships between the principal institutional actors involved during project implementation. The conclusion of this analysis is that the structure of the DIG Project, including its management, offers the most effective and efficient means for managing this extremely complicated, multi-faceted project. Arrangements between the concerned institutions are governed by a series of agreements (i.e., Project, Cooperative, and Subordinate) which clearly define individual organizational responsibilities in project management and the terms and conditions of their relationship during project implementation. The strategy of centralizing project management responsibilities in a single Institutional Project Manager and its resident Project Management Unit provides economies of scale in relation to the availability of costly input requirements, particularly those of technical assistance. The selected management structure and the specific instrument which defines implementation arrangements, reduces USAID's administrative burden by 1) providing it with one entity with which to interact during the life of project and 2) allowing it to selectively choose only those areas of project management in which to involve itself to ensure its mandated responsibility for project outcome. Finally, the entire structure permits a necessary degree of flexibility and responsiveness to a political environment that is rapidly and unpredictably changing. In short, the structure, instruments and arrangements of project management promote needed collaboration among the several partners in this effort which above all calls for tolerance and participation.

Implementation Alternatives Considered

A number of alternative procurement mechanisms and management structures were considered during the design phase for use in DIG Project implementation. The final model chosen -- an Institutional Project Manager selected to manage a Cooperative Agreement through which a range of services will be provided to a number of Rwandan public and non-governmental organizations -- responds to a several basic programmatic and management requirements which are described below.

1. Timeliness of Support to the Rwandan Democratization Process

General elections could take place as early as April 1993. New political parties and emerging civil society institutions, including the free press and non-governmental organizations, are at a critical point in their evolution. There is an urgent need to maintain these and other positive trends of the political opening, especially as the forces arrayed against maintaining this momentum are still formidable. The support that the DIG Project brings to the rapidly unfolding democratization process is not only relevant but has the

potential of contributing to this positive direction, thus mitigating against the factors that could derail it. Following normal A.I.D. procurement practices would take a minimum of ten months before a contractor could be selected and at least another two months before it could mobilize a technical assistance team and get it in place. Given a project authorization date of September 30, 1992, the soonest a contractor team could be in place is October 1993.

This Project Paper has chosen to undertake procurement of an Institutional Project Manager through a Cooperative Agreement instrument which will restrict competition to a selected group of U.S. PVOs, Non-Profit Organizations and Universities that have demonstrated capabilities to manage similar activities. It is estimated that such a procurement process would take one-half the time of a fully-competed contract while not diminishing the overall quality of institution selected, including the TA personnel assigned to the project. The Mission has thoroughly satisfied itself that there will be no loss of technical or management capacity by restricting competition to the category of organizations noted above and inviting a short-list of such organizations to apply for the Cooperative Agreement.

2. USAID Management Considerations

Keeping USAID management responsibilities to a level commensurate with its current staffing, while ensuring overall accountability for project outcome is in fact enhanced by the selected procurement instrument. Operating under a CA rather than a contract provides USAID with a means to selectively choose those areas of project management in which to involve itself in order to ensure its mandated accountability for project outcome. The CA is mid-way between a contract and a Handbook 13 Grant within the available A.I.D. procurement options in terms of the amount of management oversight required by Mission personnel during project implementation. With the "substantial involvement" provisions of the CA, the Mission can stipulate the specific set of conditions, approvals and concurrences that the CA recipient must fulfill or seek prior to executing certain critical actions including moving from one phase of implementation to another. Given the sensitivity and potentially high profile of this project and the fact that Mission staffing levels will not be increased in the foreseeable future, the CA mechanism offers the best means for ensuring project success.

3. Increased Accountability (Including Financial), Effectiveness and Flexibility

The simplicity of a single Institutional Project Manager working through a resident Project Management Unit, responsible for overall project management and administration including the provision of all technical assistance, is more flexible, provides greater accountability, and is likely to be more effective including cost than a number of contractors providing TA to one or more components. This is especially true for the DIG Project with multiple components, a varied and demanding clientele, and a rapidly changing and volatile situation. For USAID, the opportunity to interact with only one management entity, which it can as well hold responsible for all aspects of project implementation, increases its own effectiveness in project oversight and management. Taking this relationship as a

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collaborative effort as implied by the choice of a Cooperative Agreement instrument, provides the IPM with a degree of flexibility that would not necessarily come through a contract and is highly desirable in the Rwandan context. Finally, with one Project Manager there is a far greater likelihood that the project will be viewed as it was designed, i.e., as a set of discrete but inter-related activities each with its own logic and internal consistency but leading to the achievement of a common purpose.

4. Appropriateness to the Rwandan Context

Earlier design phase efforts considered placing long-term expatriate advisor-managers in several of the targeted institutions for the purpose of providing overall management oversight and technical assistance to the particular component. The final design however, opts for a centralized management/technical assistance capacity which can serve the technical and management needs of each institution while ensuring financial oversight of funding made available to each recipient. The reasoning goes deeper than economies of scale and cost effectiveness which are evident from this "umbrella" management model. The DIG Project is to a significant extent an effort to create or improve institutional capacity in three of the four targeted institutions, and it can be argued in that of the fourth as well, i.e., the development of the institution of Local (Communal) Government. As a principle, and one made very clear by the NGOs themselves during PP design, building institutional capacity or maintaining oversight does not require the presence of an expatriate sitting in close proximity to the recipients of donor assistance. This is particularly true in the context of this somewhat politically sensitive activity with a likely high profile.

5. Success is Finally an Issue of the Personnel Provided

The key to DIG Project success will finally hinge on the quality of the technical assistance personnel, both the long-term PMU team and the short-term consultants provided by the Institutional Project Manager. The issue is not, therefore, whether it is a for-profit contractor or a U.S. PVO that manages the project but the capacity of an organization to attract and field qualified and experienced personnel. It is USAID's position that the category of non-profit organizations specified for this procurement is capable of this action. USAID intends to maintain this principal in the evaluation criteria for the award by weighting "key" personnel at 50 percent of the total award.

The Structure for Project Implementation

As presented on the following page, the project structure has the GOR and USAID working with the IPM through a Project Monitoring and Oversight Committee (PMOC). In turn, after haivng obtained PMOC approval, the IPM, who manages the PMU, will sign four subagreements with the four organizations through which the Project works.

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ANNEX I. PROJECT STRUCTURE



II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

A. Detailed Implementation Calendar

DIG Project Implementation is broken down into three different phases and a number of stages within each phase. The following presentation details the key actions scheduled to take place during the three implementation phases and the actors who will be responsible for taking those actions. As there are five distinct project components, each with its own set of activities, as well as those of the Institutional Project Manager (IPM) and its Project Management Unit (PMU), the calendar shown below is further divided into project management and five project components. This Implementation Calendar is summarized in tabular form below. The overall Phases and Stages as discussed in detail below are:

Phase I: Project Initiation (6 months)

- Stage 1: Design and Procurement Actions
- Stage 2: Programmatic Actions

Phase II: Cooperative Agreement Operations (48 months)

- Stage 1: CA Startup (6 months)
- Stage 2: CA Shakedown (12 months)
- Stage 3: CA Full-scale Operations, (18 months)
- Stage 4: CA Close-out & Component Sustainability (12 months)

Phase III: Project Close-out & Redesign (6 months)

- Stage 1: Project Final Evaluation
- Stage 2: Project Close-out or Redesign

For purposes of this Implementation Calendar, it is assumed that the project will be obligated by September 30, 1992 and has a Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) of September 30, 1997. The main project activities will take place during Phase II under a four year Cooperative Agreement (CA) entered into with and managed by an Institutional Project Manager (IPM) through a resident Project Management Unit (PMU). It is anticipated that the CA will start and the IPM's resident PMU will be in place no later than six months after the signing of the Project Agreement (ProAg); that is, by March 31, 1993. Thus project implementation is defined by three phases: (1) the period prior to the signing of the CA; (2) the period of CA operations; and, (3) the period following the completion of the CA.

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1. Phase I: Project Initiation (October 1, 1992 - March 31, 1993)

Although actual Phase I activities start with the signing of the Project Agreement, a Pre-Initiation Stage is presented to detail the design and procurement actions that are scheduled to take place prior to this signing. Phase I is essentially a transition or bridging period to the primary implementation activities which will take place under the CA. The principal implementation agent working with USAID/Rwanda during this period will be the centrally-funded African Regional Elections Assistant Fund (AREAF) representative. The arrival of the AREAF representative will signal the start of the Phase I, Stage 2 programmatic activities. For ease of presentation these two internal Phase I Stages are shown in parallel tables.

Stage I: Design & Procurement Actions (October 1992 - March 1993)

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
PP Completed	USAID	- 30 days	08/92
Project Authorized	USAID	- 20 days	09/92
ProAg Signed/ Project Obligated	USAID/GOR	0 days	09/92
Issue IFA for PMU	REDSO/EA	31 days	11/92
PMU Proposals Received	REDSO/USAID	90 days	12/92
PMU Technical & Business Proposals Evaluated	USAID/GOR	120 days	01/93
CA Negotiated & Awarded	REDSO/PVO	150 days	02/93
IPM TA Team Mobilized & Team Planning Meeting Held	CA Recipient	180 days	03/93
Initial PMU Commodities Procurred	IPM	180 days	03/93

Stage 2: Programmatic Actions (October - March 1993)

Funding for programmatic activities which take place during Phase I come from three different sources as follows:

- (1) AREAF centrally-funded project;
- (2) DIG Project Funding when USAID and GOR approved (PIO); and
- (3) Project Design & Study funds from internal Mission resources (PIO).

Numbers in parentheses above correspond to each of the actions noted below.

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Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Initial Contact AID/W	USAID/ONI-DG	- 60 days	08/92
Discussions with AREAF	USAID/AAI/ONI	- 30 days	09/92
Negotiations Completed Agreement Signed	USAID/AAI/ONI	0 days	09/92
AREAF Representative Arrives Rwanda	AAI/NDI/RNI	30 days	10/92
Nat'l Assembly Ops & Mgt(2) Support Services Assm't	USAID/NA	30 days	10/92
Local Govt. Assessment(3) & Strategic Plan Devlpt	USAID/MinInter ISAP	60 days	11/92
Elections Needs(1) Assessment and Plan	AREAF/UNDP	60 days	11/92

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Training for Candidates(1) Nat'l & Communal Levels	AREAF/Adenauer	90 days	12/92
Journalist Training in(1) Election Coverage	AREAF/USIS	90 days	12/92
Radio Access Policy(1) & Program Assessment	AREAF/USIS	90 days	11/92
Training for Human Rights(1) NGOs: Elect'n Monitoring	AREAF/CCADI	120 days	01/93
Civic Ed Training for(1) NGO Trainers	AREAF/CCADI	120 days	01/93
US Training for National(2) Assembly Support Staff	USAID/USIS	120 days	01/93
Training design & Material(1) Devlpt for Deputies	AREAF	150 days	02/93
MiniFemme Assessment(3) Strategic Plan Dvlpt	USAID/MiniFemme	150 days	02/93
CPR and CCADI Officially Registered with GOR	CPR/CCADI	180 days	03/93
Project Baseline Study/(3) Impact Indicator Dvlpt	USAID/ONI-DG/ CDIE	120 days	01/93

2. PHASE II: CA Operations (April 1993 - March 1997)

Phase II corresponds to the four year Cooperative Agreement and effectively commences with the arrival of the Institutional Project Manager's (IPM) resident TA team and ends with the completion of the CA in March 1997. The CA Operations Phase has four distinct "Stages" as noted above and detailed below:

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Stage 1: CA Startup (April 1, 1993 - September 30, 1993)

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Institutional Project Manager			
IPM TA Team Arrives & PMU Fully Operational[3]	IPM	181 days	04/93
Beneficiary TA/Training Needs Assessments	IPM&PMU Beneficiaries	180 days	04/93
Beneficiary Commodity Needs Assessments	IPM&PMU Beneficiaries	180 days	04/93

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
MOUs Signed with GOR Beneficiaries	IPM/MinInter IPM/NA	210 days	05/93
Subagreements Signed with NGO Beneficiaries	IPM/CCADI IPM/CPR	210 days	05/93
O.D./Mgt TA/Training for CCADI & CPR	PMU/S-T TA	240 days	06/93
Preparation & Submission of Admin/Finance Manual	PMU to USAID	270 days	07/93
Preparation & Submission of LOP Workplans & Budgets[4]	IPM&PMU	270 days	07/93
Approval of Workplans	USAID/MiniPlan	300 days	08/93
Commodity Procurement	IPM&PMU	330 days	09/93
First Disbursements to CCADI & CPR[5]	PMU	330 days	09/93

[3] Includes hiring of local PMU staff, renting and equiping/furnishing project office and residences for TA team; establishing inventory controls, financial management and accounting systems and procedures; and, other logistical and administrative requirements. The PMU will prepare an administrative/financial management manual which groups all relevant systems and procedures for USAID approval.

[4] The LOP Workplan and Budget submitted by the IPM to USAID/Rwanda and MiniPlan consolidates workplans and budgets for all four CA-financed beneficiary institutions as well as its own. Each of the five LOP Workplans will include for USAID and MiniPlan approval 1) annual workplans and budgets for Year 1; 2) commodity procurement lists; 3) Training/TA Plans; and, 4) Monitoring & Evaluation Plans with performance and impact indicators.

[5] Until the PMU can certify the financial management and accounting capabilities of the NGO Center and CPR, the PMU will make all payments for workplan approved expenditures. It is anticipated that by the end of the Stage 1, certification will have been issued for these two

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CCADI/The NGO Center			
Subagreement Signed	CCADI/Board	210 days	05/93
Preparation of LOP Workplan & Budget	CCADI/Board PMU	240 days	06/93
Civic Ed & Action Fund Criteria/Process Designed	CCADI/PMU	240 days	06/93
Workplan Submitted	CCADI/PMU	270 days	07/93
Workplan Approved	USAID/MiniPlan	300 days	08/93
Secretariat Established Fully Operational	Board/Director PMU	300 days	08/93
Admin/Financial System Developed & Approved	Director/ PMU	330 days	09/93
Member TA/Training Needs Assessment	Secretariat	330 days	09/93
Fees-for-Service Analysis	Secretariat PMU/TA	330 days	09/93
Local Government			
MOU Signed with IPM	MinInter	210 days	05/93
Review of Strategic Plan Select Component Actions	MinInter PMU	240 days	06/93
Workplan Preparation	MinInter/PMU	240 days	06/93

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Local Government			
Workplan Submitted	MinInter/PMU	270 days	07/93
Workplan Approved	USAID/MiniPlan	300 days	08/93
Post Election Survey	MinInter/ISAP PMU/TA	330 days	09/93
The National Assembly			
MOU Signed with IPM	SecGen/NA	210 days	05/93
MIS Needs Assessment Training-Hard/Software	PMU/TA	240 days	05/93
Workplan Preparation	NA/PMU	240 days	06/93
Workplan Submitted	NA/PMU	270 days	07/93
Workplan Approved	USAID/MiniPlan	300 days	08/93
Post Election Candidate (pre-planned) Training	PMU/TA	330 days	09/93
Commodity Procurement	IPM/PMU	330 days	09/93

NGOs.

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Rwandan Press Center (CPR)			
Subagreement Signed	CPR/Board	210 days	05/93
Preparation of LOP Workplan & Budget	CPR/Board PMU/USIS	240 days	06/93
Workplan Submitted	CPR/PMU	270 days	07/93
Workplan Approved	USAID/MiniPlan	300 days	08/93
Secretariat Established Fully Operational	Board/Director PMU	300 days	08/93
Admin/Financial Systems Developed & Approved	Director/ PMU	330 days	09/93
Member TA/Training Needs Assessment	Secretariat	330 days	09/93
Fees for Service Analysis	Secretariat PMU/TA	330 days	09/93
USAID Project Support Fund			
No Scheduled Activities			

Stage 2: CA Shakedown (October 1, 1993 - September 30, 1994)

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Institutional Project Manager			
Ongoing TA/Training for CCADI & CPR	PMU/TA	366 days	10/93
Ongoing TA/Training as per Loc Govt & NA Workplans	IPM&PMU TA	366 days	10/93
Quarterly Financial[6] and Summary Reports Submitted	IPM to AID/W PMU to USAID	390 days	10/93

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Institutional Project Manager			
Ongoing Monitoring of Component Activities	PMU	390 days	10/93
Consolidated Semi-Annual Performance Reports[7]	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	540 days	03/94

[6] Quarterly financial and summary progress reports are submitted one month following the end of the period under report. The IPM is responsible for submitting SF-269 reports to A.I.D./W and the PMU will submit financial reports in a form suitable to USAID that consolidate beneficiary financial reports.

[7] Semi-annual performance reports submitted by the PMU to USAID and MiniPlan will consolidate beneficiary reports and are timed to provide USAID with information for compiling

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Shakedown Evaluation CA & Components	IPM&PMU/USAID MiniPlan/TA	670 days	08/94
Non-Federal Audits Project & Components	USAID-REDSO	670 days	08/94
Submission of 1st Annual[8] Report & 2nd AWP	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	700 days	09/94
Approval of 2nd AWP PMU & Beneficiaries	USAID/Rwanda MiniPlan	732 days	09/94
CCADI/The NGO Center			
Accounts Certified Q'ly Disbursement Recieved	Board/PMU	366 days	10/93
Initiate TA/Training for Members	Secretariat S-T TA	366 days	10/93
Develop & Implement Study/Research Agenda	Secretariat S-T TA	366 days	10/93
Service Center Setup & Operational for Members	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Resource Center Setup	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Lobbying & Representation	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Extension & Outreach	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Grant Applications from Members Invited	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Publication of First Quarterly Newsletter	Secretariat	420 days	12/93
Review of First Batch Grant Applications	CCADI/Board PMU	420 days	12/93
Financial & Progress, & Quarterly Reports	Chairman/Director	420 days	12/93
First Grants Awarded	CCADI/PMU	450 days	01/94
Semi-Annual Performance Reporting	Chairman/Director	520 days	03/94
Review Second Batch of NGO Grant Applications	CCADI/Board PMU	520 days	03/94
Grant Awards	CCADI/PMU	550 days	04/94
	Action	**Elapsed**	**Estimated**

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its Project Implementation Reports and Annual Program Performance reporting requirement.

[8] Results and recommendations of the Shakedown Evaluation will be incorporated into both PMUs' and beneficiary's second AWP. Second AWP will be jointly developed between PMU and each beneficiary.

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Action	Agent	Time	Date
CCADI/The NGO Center			
Review Third Batch of Grant Application	CCADI/Board PMU	580 days	05/94
Grant Awards	CCADI/PMU	610 days	06/94
Shakedown Evaluation	CCADI/Board Secretariat	640 days	07/94
Compliance Audit for Center	Board/Secret	670 days	08/94
Submission of 1st Annual Report & 2nd AWP	Board/Secret	700 days	09/94
Approval of 2nd AWP	USAID/MiniPlan	732 days	09/94
Local Government			
TA/Training Initiated with Communal Staff	MinInter PMU/TA	366 days	10/93
TA/Training Initiated with Ministry Staff	MinInter PMU/TA	366 days	10/93
Workshops Initiated at Local & Regional Levels	MinInter PMU/TA	366 days	10/93
Research/Study Agenda Set & Initiated	MinInter PMU/TA	366 days	10/93
First Quarterly Progress Report	MinInter to PMU	450 days	12/93
First Semi-Annual Performance Report	MinInter to PMU	540 days	03/94
Shakedown Evaluation	SecGen	660 days	08/94
Compliance Audit	SecGen	660 days	08/94
Submission of 1st Annual Report	SecGen	690 days	09/94
Recommendations for Future Activity	USAID/ MiniPlan	690 days	09/94
Component Close-out or Redesign	MinInter/PMU USAID/MiniPlan	732 days	09/94

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National Assembly			
Specialized TA/Training to NA Support Staff in: · MIS Installation · MIS Training · Design Legal Compendium · Legal Research/Drafting · Fiscal/Budgetary Analysis · Develop Data-base Links · Library/Archives System · Transcription Systems	IPM & PMU S-T TA	366 days	10/93
Commodity (MIS Equipment) Arrival & Installation	PMU/NA S-T TA	450 days	12/93
Financial & Progress, & Quarterly Reports	SecGen/NA	450 days	12/93
Semi-Annual Performance Reporting	SecGen/NA	540 days	03/94

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
National Assembly			
Shakedown Evaluation	SecGen/NA	660 days	08/94
Compliance Audit	SecGen/NA	660 days	08/94
Submission of 1st Annual Report & 2nd AWP	SecGen/NA	690 days	09/94
Approval of 2nd AWP	USAID/MiniPlan	732 days	09/94
Rwandan Press Center (CPR)			
Accounts Certified-Q'ly Disburesement Recieved	Board/PMU	366 days	10/93
Initiate TA/Training for Members	Secretariat S-T TA	366 days	10/93
Lobbying & Representation	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Service Center Setup & Operational for Members	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Resource Center Setup	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Study/Research Agenda Set & Initiated Including: · Distribution Network · New Gathering Service · Second Radio Study	Secretariat	366 days	10/93
Financial & Progress, & Quarterly Reports	Chairman/Director	450 days	12/93

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Semi-Annual Performance Reporting	Chairman/Director	540 days	03/94
Shakedown Evaluation	CPR/Board Secretariat	660 days	08/94
Compliance Audit	Board/Secret	660 days	08/94
Submission 1st Annual Report & 2nd AWP	Board/Secret	690 days	09/94
Approval of 2nd AWP	USAID/MiniPlan	732 days	09/94
USAID Project Support Fund			
Execution of Activities as Approved	USAID/MiniPlan	366 days	09/94
First Compliance Audit	USAID/REDSO-IG	660 days	08/94
Shakedown Evaluation	USAID/MiniPlan S-T TA	660 days	09/94

Stage 3: CA Full-Scale Operations (October 1, 1994 - March 31, 1996)

All actions initiated in Phase II, Stage 2, will continue in Stage 3, with the following new actions to take place as described below:

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Institutional Project Manager			
Ongoing TA/Training for CCADI, CPR & NA	PMU	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation for Components	PMU	731 days	10/94
Q'ly Financial/Progress Reports	PMU to USAID	731 days	10/94
Consolidated Semi-Annual Performance Reports	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	900 days	03/95
Non-Federal Audits IPM & Components	USAID-REDSO	1020 days	08/95
Submission of 2nd Annual Report & 3rd AWP	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	1050 days	09/95
Approval of 3rd AWP IPM & Beneficiaries	USAID/Rwanda MiniPlan	1095 days	09/95
Consolidated Semi-Annual Performance Reports	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	1260 days	03/96
"Progress" Evaluation CA & Components	USAID/Rwanda	1260 days	03/96

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CCADI/The NGO Center			
Ongoing TA/Training for Members	Secretariat S-T TA	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Execution of Study/Research Agenda	Secretariat S-T TA	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Service Center Operations	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Resource Center	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Lobbying/Rep	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Extension & Outreach Services to Local Level	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Ongong Publication of Quarterly Newsletter	Secretariat	731 days	12/94
Review of Fifth Batch Grant Applications	CCADI/Board PMU	731 days	12/94
Ongoing Financial/Progress Quarterly Reporting	Chairman/Director	731 days	12/94
Fifth Grants Awarded	CCADI/PMU	760 days	01/95
Semi-Annual Performance Reporting	Chairman/Director	900 days	03/95
Review Sixth Batch of NGO Grant Applications	CCADI/Board PMU	900 days	03/95
Grant Awards	CCADI/PMU	930 days	04/95
Compliance Audit for Center	Board/Secret	1020 days	08/95
Submission of 2nd Annual Report & 3rd AWP	Board/Secret	1050 days	09/95
Approval of 3rd AWP	USAID/MiniPlan	1095 days	09/95
Semi-Annual Performance Reports	PMU	1260 days	03/96
"Progress" Evaluation	USAID/Rwanda	1260 days	03/96

Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
National Assembly			
Continued Specialized TA & Training for NA Staff	PMU/S-T TA	731 days	10/94
Q'ly Financial/Progress Reports (Ongoing)	NA to PMU	731 days	10/94
Semi-Annual Performance Reports	NA to PMU	900 days	03/95
Non-Federal Audits	USAID-REDSO	1020 days	08/95
Submission of 2nd Annual Report & 3rd AWP	NA to PMU	1050 days	09/95
Approval of 3rd AWP	USAID/MiniPlan	1095 days	09/95

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Semi-Annual Performance Reports	NA/PMU	1260 days	03/96
"Progress" Evaluation	USAID/MiniPlan	1260 days	03/96
Rwandan Press Center (CPR)			
Ongoing TA/Training for Members	Secretariat S-T TA	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Service Center Operations	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Resource Center	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Lobbying/Rep	Secretariat	731 days	10/94
Ongoing Financial/Progress Quarterly Reporting	Chairman/Director	731 days	12/94
Semi-Annual Performance Reporting	Chairman/Director	900 days	03/95
Compliance Audit for CPR	Board/Secret	1020 days	08/95
Submission of 2nd Annual Report & 3rd AWP	Board/Secret	1050 days	09/95
Approval of 3rd AWP	USAID/MiniPlan	1095 days	09/95
Semi-Annual Performance Reports	CPR to PMU	1260 days	03/96
"Progress" Evaluation	USAID/MiniPlan	1260 days	03/96
USAID Project Support Fund			
Ongoing Execution of Approved Activities	USAID/MiniPlan	731 days	10/94
Second Compliance Audit Project & CA	USAID/REDSO-IG	1020 days	08/95
"Progress" Evaluation	USAID/MiniPlan	1260 days	03/96

Stage 2: Component Sustainability/CA Close-out (April 1, 1996 - March 30, 1997)

During this last of the Cooperative Agreement Operation's stages, the Institutional Project Manager and each of the three CA remaining components (Local Government completed in Stage 2; USAID Project Support Fund in Phase III) will commence close-out activities. At the same time, it is expected that both CCADI and CPR will have attained a degree of financial sustainability assuring their continued survival after the termination of project support. As most actions to take place during this stage are similar for each component, there is no separate detail provided.

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Action	Action Agent	Elapsed Time	Estimated Date
Institutional Project Manager & Components			
Q'ly Financial/Progress Reports (Consolidated)	PMU to USAID	1261 days	04/96
Non-Federal Audits IPM & Components	USAID/REDSO-IG	1380 days	08/96
Submission of 3rd Annual Report & 4th AWP	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	1410 days	09/96
Approval of 4th AWP IPM & Beneficiaries	USAID/Rwanda MiniPlan	1460 days	09/96
Final\Close-out Report[9] (Consolidated)	PMU to USAID PMU to MiniPlan	1640 days	03/97

3. Phase III: Project Close-Out & Redesign (April - September 1997)

During the last six months of the project a final evaluation will take place. The is external evaluation will use the set of indicators developed in Phase I and refined in the course of project execution in order to determine project impact. Ideally, those agencies (AFR/ONI-DG and CDIE) which participated with USAID/Rwanda in the baseline survey and impact indicator development will participate in this final evaluation as well. In these last six months, USAID will complete any activities which were financed through its Democratic Initiatives Fund and other required close-out activities. The final evaluation report will serve as the final DIG Project report.

[9] A distinction is made between the end of the Cooperative Agreement and the Project Agreement. The DIG Project will be obligated through a ProAg with the GOR for a period of five years. Assuming the ProAg is signed on September 30, 1992, the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) will be September 30, 1997. The CA signed with the selected Recipient will be signed for a period of four years. Assuming the CA is signed on March 31, 1993, the CA Completion Date (CACD) will be March 30, 1997, or six months before the PACD.

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III. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

A. Monitoring and Evaluation Issues for Democratic Governance

A project whose objective is to promote democracy and governance (D/G) must make unusual demands on its monitoring and evaluation systems. Whereas monitoring of project progress -- e.g. timeliness of reporting, budgetary discipline, respect for implementation plans -- will be similar to those of other projects, evaluation of project impact presents a genuine challenge. What are the features of "democracy?" By what criteria do we assert that a society or an individual is "democratic?" What tools exist for determining whether these criteria have been met? The notion "governance" raises an additional set of questions. How do we know when a government administration is following its own rules? How much information should it be expected realistically to share with the governed? How do we assess satisfaction and fairness with government in ways that are appropriate and culturally specific? The picture becomes yet more complex when "democracy" and "governance" are combined in the single concept "democratic governance."

As a rule, "democracy" is associated with accountability, competition, responsiveness, policy pluralism, participation, and human rights. "Governance" relates to effective management, responsibility, legitimacy, and consistency. "Democratic governance" is a mode of governance which conforms to democratic values. Social manifestations of democratic governance include policies and acts such as holding free and fair elections, creating an open press, permitting freedom of association, establishing an independent legislature, or promoting a fair and impartial judiciary. These outcomes on the level of whole societies may be described under the following rubrics: Representative Structures, Laws and Human Rights, Public Service, and Civil Society.

Assessing D/G impacts on whole societies fails, however, to consider the distribution of effects. Differences of gender, class, region, or profession may produce severe inequities in the level of benefit which individuals enjoy. Indeed, political and social change begins with transformations in people, both as individuals and as members of groups. For this reason, any monitoring and evaluation system designed to measure the outcomes of efforts in democratic governance must also take people-level indicators into account.

B. People-Level Indicators

Frameworks for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) typically measure project progress by indicators grouped under four categories. They include inputs (provision of human and material resources), process (scheduled carrying out of activities), outputs (quantifiable products), and impact (outcomes or results).

A democracy training program, for example, will count among its inputs educational materials, instructors, and a congenial setting; among its processes training schedules, teaching methodologies, and logistics; and among its outputs the numbers of people trained

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and those among them who performed during the course at an excellent, good, average, or inadequate level. The desired impact
-- attitudes and behaviors promoting a more democratic governance -- is generally assessed at the level of whole nations or institutions. Because nations and institutions are people-driven, personal knowledge and attitudes not only determine individual behavior, but are also preconditions for effecting change in national or institutional political performance.

D/G projects will not readily offer the kind of empirical "people-level" indicators that typically result from, say, medical treatment or an agricultural training program. Social and political change cannot be measured as easily as can the absence of disease or increased maize production. In addition to measuring quantifiable indicators, however, the manager or donor of a project may also seek to learn through more qualitative methods how people's knowledge about democracy has increased over time, how their attitudes toward democracy may have changed, and how both have affected their practices as citizens.

Indeed, social and political change begins with individuals, both in their observable actions (practices/outputs) and in the meaning (knowledge/attitudes) which they ascribe to action. It is precisely at this intersection of "doing" and "making sense of doing" that people-level indicators can be situated. Measuring the interplay between doing and thinking is therefore a vital part of the M&E scheme. For example, an output such as "proportion of population casting votes" has a very different meaning for the electorate in an environment where voting is compulsory than it might in a nation having elections which are free and fair. A scheme relating individual behavior to an M&E framework is proposed below:

Input **Process** **Output** **People-level indicator >** **Impact**

Knowledge ----------> Practice + Attitude = Social Outcome

Indicators for monitoring and evaluating D/G-related activities must therefore measure both (a) quantifiable behavioral outputs (e.g., voting) and (b) qualitative motivations that underlie action (e.g., why vote?).

Methodologies for gathering quantitative, observable output data have a long history in USAID-funded projects. Qualitative methods include the well-known KAP survey approach, which seeks to assess knowledge, attitudes, and practices. Limitations of the KAP to adequately sound out the thoughts and motives underpinning human behavior have recently been recognized. Newer qualitative methods expand and refine the purposes of the KAP through more solidly anthropological approaches. Examples include the RAP (Rapid Assessment Procedure), which chooses a purposive sample of respondents for in-depth guided interviews and focus group discussions. The Beneficiary Assessment method links anthropological participation/observation techniques to project management objectives. When professionally conducted, observation of behavior is particularly well suited to assessing

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whether or not procedures used for decision-making are -- or are not -- democratic. Signs of tolerance, open debate, consistent application of rules are important indicators.

The M&E system for a D/G project, therefore, should be designed to pair quantifiable output indicators (voting) with qualitative people-level indicators (why vote?). Interrelations between pairs sets the stage for the social outcomes which the project seeks to promote (e.g. free and fair elections).

1. Administration of Project and Sub-project M&E Plans

The PMU will be responsible for ensuring that the Project joint M&E Plan is fully carried out. These responsibilities include securing information on its own performance and that of the beneficiary institutions and subgrantees in financial management and accountability, project progress, outputs, and impact, and other data that may be considered relevant for project managers and evaluators. Requirements for beneficiary and subgrantee record-keeping, reporting, M&E, and audit will be established during subordinate agreement negotiations. The PMU will determine the extent of pre-award examination of the financial systems for beneficiary and subgrantee awards in order to identify financial management training needs and the existence of problem areas requiring further scrutiny before a requested sub-grant is awarded. Amount, terms, and timing of funding disbursement will depend on PMU assessment of the financial management capacity, systems, and staff of each recipient.

In order to carry out this task the PMU will design and install a computerized Project management information system (MIS) during the first six months of the Project. For efficiency, the MIS will be keyed to the USAID Mission's M&E system in order to permit data sharing. Beneficiaries and subgrantees will also be encouraged to develop compatible systems, with the project MIS serving as a training center for NGOs. Data generated from the MIS will be used for combined purposes of monitoring and evaluation.

2. Evaluation

In the first six months of the Project, USAID will identify a team including AFR-ONI/DG participants, local and international M&E experts to design and carry out the baseline study. The design will greatly influence the content of the Project MIS to the extent that it identifies "people-level" impact indicators that will be drawn upon repeatedly in M&E activities throughout the LOP. In addition, progress output indicators for the Project and components will be developed for the MIS at this time.

In the measure possible, beneficiary NGOs will also participate in this baseline study. The PMU will ensure that the baseline studies, MIS, and evaluations designed by beneficiary institutions and subgrantees are adequate to measure impact at the people and institutional levels. Although each component will set individual evaluation targets based on its own

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objectives, D/G impacts will guide the selection of indicators. Where needed, the PMU MIS specialist will assist a beneficiary institution develop its evaluation plan.

USAID will also undertake institutional arrangements for carrying out the progress evaluations of project implementation at month 18 and month 36 of the LOP. At this time, the PMU, the Centers and State Institutions, and all NGO Subgrantees will be evaluated. As part of its First (LOP) Annual Workplan, the PMU will select those indicators on implementation progress to be included in evaluations, in the annual reports, and in the quarterly reports sent to it by the beneficiary institutions. In addition, annual assessments of institutional strength and performance of the beneficiary institutions will appear in the annual reports prepared by the PMU for USAID. Performance indicators may include: timeliness and accuracy of reporting, viability of activities managed by the NGO subgrantees, success in meeting budget and planning targets, adoption of strategic planning approaches, etc.

3. Monitoring

The integrated MIS of the Project and beneficiaries will also furnish the basis for regular monitoring and reporting by the PMU to USAID on Project and component activities. These monitoring indicators will be developed at the time the MIS is established, and in close collaboration with USAID. All activities in the PMU's Annual Workplans will be tracked by the MIS, allowing the PMU to provide detailed information about progress, awarding of NGO subgrants, implementation, and interim project outputs and impacts. PMU insistence on the adequacy of beneficiary and subgrantee information systems will enable it to use these systems effectively for compiling reports on overall Project performance.

As part of proposals for NGO subgrants, applicants will present an appropriate M&E plan to the PMU. Subgrantees will regularly provide monitoring data needed by the PMU in their quarterly reports. Because the Project will assist many NGOs in developing these systems, this requirement offers these institutions an opportunity to build their capacity.

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ANNEX I

SOCIAL SOUNDNESS ANALYSIS

I. RWANDA: A NATIONAL MOSAIC

A. Overview

The Republic of Rwanda is a small, landlocked country, whose size approximately equals that of its last colonizer, Belgium. Nestled between Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania, this "land of a thousand hills" has over the last six hundred years been profoundly marked by its unusual topography of fertile and sharply undulating countryside.

1. Land

Ninety-five percent of Rwandans continue to live from agro-herding activities which are set, for the most part, on the backs of small hills. Tiny, individual plots crisscross the landscape. The average Rwandan male or -- very rarely -- female is likely to own several small parcels, giving a total holding of under 0.7 cultivable hectares upon which to support an average household of just under 5 members (GOR 1991).

This ratio of land-to-individuals is barely sufficient for subsistence. Given that a woman is likely to bear on average seven children in her lifetime, the support burden of rural families is often great. Until recently, cattle grazed in the marshy areas lying in the cleavages of hills. Today, these rich soils are increasingly drained and cultivated as part of intensive agriculture schemes. Cattle -- once the pride and wealth of Rwanda's Tutsi lords and their Hutu clients -- are granted a decreasing share of Rwanda's small space. It is no surprise that land is not only Rwanda's most valuable resource but that every scrap available is fiercely contested.

2. History

Hills constitute social as well as geographical units. Household compounds (rugos) are typically located on individual plots, but this visual impression of separateness and individualism belies an elaborate network of social obligations which links most residents of a single hill, or colline, by kinship, historical patronage, and longstanding mutual interest.

These relationships often stretch far back into time, where they are bound up with a set of social, political, and economic forces which came to comprise a system often referred to as "feudal." The active ingredients of this amalgam were human. Streams of migrants entered the region, eventually coalescing into larger groups. In search of water and pasturage ancestors of Tutsi nomadic pastoralists and warlords wandered the hills cultivated by sedentary farmers who came later to assume an identify as Hutu. Small states began in the 14th century and beginning in the 15th were progressively consolidated under a single royal

Tutsi clan. Hutu cultivators pledged labor and loyalty to a Tutsi lord in exchange for protection and the use of land and cattle. The expansion continued into the mid-19th century, by which time a firmly hierarchical, centralized state embracing most of central Rwanda was formed of Hutu clients and Tutsi patrons under the royal figure of mwami.

Two forms of patron-clientage became institutions in central Rwanda. One form, ubuhake, is often described as a contract of mutual convenience, granting Hutu rights to Tutsi cattle in exchange for specified services on demand. A second and later form, ubureetwa, deepened Tutsi control of land by extracting labor from Hutu for more lucrative cash-cropping. It was against this last and more oppressive system that Hutu eventually rebelled.

Meanwhile, Hutu in the northern part of presentday Rwanda began in the 16th century to organize their patrilineages into mutually protective groups which controlled water and land. Wealthy landholders granted tenancy rights to poorer neighbors through the ubukonde system. Resulting corporate groups successfully resisted Tutsi incursion. Hutu independence continued until colonial domination granted Tutsi administrative and land rights to ease the imposition of indirect rule.

German exploration and later Belgian control of central and northern Rwanda ended what had been a flexible system of patronage and clientage. Before their arrival Hutu could be granted cattle and other property from Tutsi in recognition of military or other valued services. A form of social mobility also permitted a person who was "Hutu" by patrilineal kinship to become "Tutsi" through marriage or wealth accumulation. Under the Belgian administration following World War I, a system of indirect rule found it administratively expedient to cast in stone Tutsi monarchist control of privilege, power, and prestige. In consequence, Hutu and the tiny forest hunter minority known as Twa became members of a disadvantaged class. Injustices included the ubureetwa system, which depended on Hutu labor to produce coffee and tea exports. In addition, access to education and prestigious or lucrative employment was generally reserved for Tutsi.

Frustration among the Hutu majority grew. By 1959 it found expression in a genuine popular revolution by which the Tutsi minority, then 16 percent of the population, was eventually forced to relinquish their hegemony on privilege and wealth. Just before colonial rule ended, the Belgian administration switched its support to the Hutu, and by the time Rwanda was granted independence in 1962, the Hutu had overthrown the monarchy and established a republic. It is estimated that 20,000 Tutsi were killed and several hundred thousand were driven into exile. The new republic was now firmly in the control of the Hutu majority. Peaceful political pluralism flourished briefly in the creation of several political parties, but most were ethnically allied. In 1973 Habyarimana executed a military coup for the ostensible purpose of defusing ethnic rivalry. A strong regional bias entered the government, as Hutu from the northern regions gained the greater share of control. Rwanda officially become a single party state under the MRND, thus continuing the monarchist centralizing tradition. Local government through prefectures (now 11) and communes (now

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145) was closely controlled through prefects and communal burgomasters appointed by the Head of State.

3. Politics and Ethnicity

Periodic ethnic conflicts have marked the history of the Rwandan Republic, and many attempts have been made by exile groups in Burundi and more recently Tutsi in Uganda to return to the country by force. Motives for these incursions vary. They include attempts to overthrow the government, desire to negotiate return of traditional lands, or quest for a Rwandan nationality and the right to visit friends and relatives at home. Each exile attack has been met with reprisals and heightened ethnic tension at home. Meanwhile, a deepening economic crisis beginning with the 1987 fall in world coffee prices, eroded the stability of the political system. In July 1990 the President announced a political reform, but his plans were complicated by the attack in October 1990 of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), composed mostly of Tutsi from Uganda. Repeated attacks across the frontier have so far not been quelled by negotiated cease-fires. Meanwhile, multiparty elections are planned for spring in 1993, and the need to negotiate inclusion of the RPF in present or future governments once again raises the question of ethnicity. The key question for Rwanda's political future is the following: will multiple political parties, with their tendency to form around ethnic cleavages, spawn the seed that eventually undermines the multiparty system? (This question, and a tentative response, are further discussed in the section below entitled "Political Parties: Ethnicity and Regionalism.)

Explanatory models of co-existence between the categories called "Hutu" and "Tutsi" have dominated historical discourse about Rwanda. Today it continues to weave through the political analysis of the country's current events. Each attempt is frustrated in some degree by a paradox which comprises, on one hand, the need to reconcile a persisting "otherness" which separates these two groups with, on the other hand, an unshakable bond that drives them together through a shared homeland, history, language, experience, and -- in most Rwandan hearts -- an honest sentiment of fraternity and affection.

Indeed, these terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu" have, throughout Rwanda's linguistic history, assumed changing connotations which paralleled their evolving social meaning. Until the Twentieth Century, they were not universally known or utilized as simple ethnic categories. While the locus of their meaning rests in patrilineal descent, intermarriage and social mobility between groups has always blurred the divisions between them and the meanings of the terms themselves. As Catherine Newbury points out, "the status of 'Tuutsi' is often viewed not merely as a function of descent, but as dependent on the control of wealth (particularly cattle) and power" (C. Newbury 1988:11). Blood relations are only part of a total equation which incorporate such other contrasting concepts as "herder-farmer," "master-servant," "owner-worker," "privileged-deprived," "educated-ignorant," and so on. Norm and reality, however, are very different. To be inscribed as Tutsi or Hutu on one's identity card does not automatically mean that one belongs to a given "caste," "class," or even "ethnic group" having a rigid set of prescribed features. An individual may display to an

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observer characteristics normatively associated with one or another group, with the weight of their relative contributions differing in the final mix. A person in Rwanda, then, is not just "Hutu" or"Tutsi" -- as he might be called "Ibo" or "Yoruba" in Nigeria; instead, people will say quite readily that he is "very" Hutu, or even that he is Hutu but also "somewhat" Tutsi, meaning that -- owing to many factors including descent, wealth, education, profession, and so on -- he matches the norms of his official category in greater or lesser degree.

Undeniably, this paradox continues to inform a good number of socio-political events in Rwanda, but it increasingly does so in association with other and equally powerful forces. A person's gender, abode (urban or rural), status (national or refugee), region, and profession (class) are in constant and delicate interplay with -- what we shall call for convenience -- ethnicity. Taken together, all inform a person's chances and choices in life. All have a profound influence on how the new political order will play out, for the individual and for society as a whole.

B. The Project Explained: Democratic Initiatives and Governance in Rwanda

The goal of the Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda that provides for sustainable, self-renewing democratic governance. The Project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

In social terms the Project seeks to benefit all Rwandans equally by improving their opportunities for political participation. In practical terms any Rwandan woman or man who is of voting age or any young person who benefits from a process of social learning for democratic self-governance may be counted among the project's target population. In operational terms the success of the project rests on a cascade effect, whereby each of five components will channel DIG services and resources to citizens.

A Center for Civic Action and Democratic Initiatives (CCADI) will build the capacity of Associations sans but Lucratif (Non-profit Organizations, ASBL), together with other civic organizations and their members, to participate in the civil society. Estimated to number around 8,000, these associations organize popular support to such social issues as women's and human rights, rural and agricultural development, building labor unions, and promoting the welfare of the sick or indigent. In the management of their own activities, and in the course of assisting their own beneficiaries, the associations will undertake to demonstrate and discuss the value and power of popular participation in government.

The Rwandan Press Center (RPC) will provide support services to a pluralistic press such that publications and broadcasts will be able to offer the reading and listening public a reliable free flow of information about actions which take place in the areas of democracy and governance. The Press may also provide responsible commentaries on these events and

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may educate individual citizens about their rights and responsibilities as participants in the process of democratic governance.

Local Government (LG) will be assisted in order to improve its capacity to undertake local decision making about such processes as revenue collection, planning, budgeting, and equitable administration of services. Training programs will foster strong appreciation in local officials of democratic principles and the processes of democratic governance at local government level.

Support to the freely elected National Assembly (NA) will include an improved working secretariat and information system that will enable its efficient and effective initiation and enactment of laws representing the best interests and aspirations of consitutents.

Finally, funds for direct use by USAID will be reserved for dealing with unfolding targets of opportunity as the democratic process evolves and to audit and evaluate their performance in the four principal areas outlined above.

C. Political Actors in Context

Social outcomes of support to democratic governance may be expected to include free and fair elections, a responsive government, an open press, and so on. However, these broad impacts will not ensure that project benefits are equitably distributed throughout the electorate. That judgement may be made by assessing the outcome on the level of individuals. Men and women, Tutsi and Hutu and Twa, urban and rural, rich and poor must be afforded an equal opportunity to share in project gains. Ideally, each must be granted more equal access to policymaking, better information, a chance to win elective office, and so on. Equal access cannot be guaranteed by the Project, but it may be enhanced (or constrained) in ways which must be foreseen before the Project begins.

The DIG project approaches the individual beneficiary through a dual structure, first through that of the Project institutions (e.g. CCADI, RPC, LG, and NA), and also through that of the total social context. Here, opportunities and constraints of the social context as they relate to individuals will be considered. First the section will assess the level of social welfare in Rwanda as it relates to the quality of life of certain groups. It will then examine some groups more closely in order to identify constraints that must be overcome if the ideal of equal personal benefit for all Rwandans is to be achieved.

2. Population, Nutrition, and Health

Demographic issues underpin many of Rwanda's concerns for its future political, economic, and indeed physical viability. Its very high population density is estimated at 385 people per square kilometer of cultivable land (271 per total km
^{2}). Population growth is provisionally calculated from the 1991 national population census at a rate of 3.0-3.1%. (This figure is somewhat lower than the 3.6% estimate for 1990

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reported by the National Population Office [ONAPO:1990; Futures Group 1990]). The census gives total population as 7.15 million, again lower than estimates of 7.6 offered in numerous prior publications. (Census officials recognize the possibility that some -- but probably not substantial -- underreporting occurred in areas of civil conflict.) Women represent 51% of the population; children under 18 63%; the urban population is 18.2% of the total or 392,000 (GOR 1991). Estimates of total fertility rate for women range from 6.7 to 8.4 Contraceptive prevalence is about 12.6% and slowly increasing (Butera 1992). Despite the apparent trend toward lower population growth rates, the very large proportion of younger Rwandans in the population pyramid will yield a population pressure that continues for several decades to come.

When population growth rates are not matched by economic growth rates they affect health in two ways. First, population increases place added burdens on already inadequate services. In the current economic conjuncture Rwanda spends only 4.2% of its national budget on health (GOR 1992a). Access to health care is poor, and only 27% of the population is estimated to live within a one-hour walk to a health center. Second, population pressures combine with land pressures to yield increased malnutrition. In 1989 only 1985 calories a day were available to the average Rwandan (GOR 1992b). On average 134 children die each day in Rwanda from the combined effects of malnutrition and disease (UNICEF 1992). Child malnutrition is estimated by USAID to be about 30%, and some estimates are higher. No appreciable difference, however, is noted between children from affluent or poor households.

Causes for malnutrition must be found in both the quality and quantity of the food a child consumes, but both are typically related to the mother's own time and health. Busy mothers, for example, prepare fewer meals at home (19.6% 1 meal, 59.9% 2 meals, and 20.5% 3 meals). Moreover, body mass indices show widespread chronic energy deficits in women of childbearing age (UNICEF 1992).

Reproductive health is an area for great concern in Rwanda. Maternal complications cause 63% of deaths in women (OCSD 1991). In addition, it is complicated by increasing incidence in the AIDS virus in Rwanda's urban -- and in less measure rural -- women. Visitors to pre-natal clinics show a seroprevalence rate of HIV virus at 30%. More disturbing, girls aged 14-20 show a seroprevalence rate of about 18.2% in Kigali and 3.8% in rural areas (WHO 1992). Increased transmission to young city girls is associated with the social disruption caused by war and the presence of large military units (OCSD 1991).

This last statistic illustrates only one way in which politics and health intertwine. In a peaceful participatory democracy quality of health may improve through public demand for increased financing and better health services administration. Potential political actors, however, will not participate if they are prevented from doing so by too-frequent births or poor health.

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3. Education

Thomas Jefferson observed that an educated electorate is a pre-requisite for democracy. This notion gives one pause when considering the education sector in Rwanda. Education rates are low. Gross rates of attendance in primary school are currently around 68%, with nearly equal representation of girls and boys. Dropout rates, however, are rising, in many instances owing to family poverty; they reached 10.9% in 1990. Only about 10% of primary school leavers -- that is, 6% of the eligible population -- continue on to secondary school. Girls represent only 38.9% of the secondary school population (GOR 1992b). Overall dropout rates range between 10% and 20%, and for girls it is higher. Less than 1% of the population benefits from higher education; of these 21.5% are women, the majority in education-related subjects. This figure represents an encouraging increase from 1986, when women university students were only 15.1% of total (RF 1991).

Other educational institutions include the all-male religious seminaries -- renowned for the excellence of their education -- and post-primary rural educational institutions (CERAIs), which are designed to offer skills training to unemployed youth. To these options may be added the growing number of private educational institutions. Access to public education, while limited overall, is doubly inequitable to students of small ethnic groups, who are permitted to enrol only in numbers proportional to their ethnic representation in the population. In response to this policy, private schools have become popular in the last years.

About one half of Rwanda's population, and 60% of women, is illiterate; the functional illiteracy rate is likely to be much higher. Programs in adult literacy have been organized in rural areas, but attendance is low.

One may conclude that few Rwandans have received an education that would encourage serious reading about candidates or political issues. A thoughtful training program in D/G for illiterate voters will be extremely important in a multiparty context if all voters are to be assisted in making rational decisions as citizens. For the partially literate it may be complemented by press publications written at a basic reading level and considerable coverage on radio.

4. Agriculture and Labor

Ninety-five percent of Rwandans -- and 97.5% of women -- are engaged in the agricultural sector. Nearly 60% of farming families live on farms of under 1 hectare, and 43% on farms of under the average holding of 0.7 hectares. These holdings are rarely whole lots, but are generally divided into several small plots (RF 1991b). As pastures are gradually being converted into farmland, the cattle population is also decreasing. Less than one-third of farming families own cattle. Men largely control cash crops and cattle; women food crops and small stock.

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While men own most agricultural resources, the average rural woman performs twice as much agricultural labor as her husband. This effort is chiefly devoted to foodcrops (Bucyedusenge et al. 1990). Few women inherit farmland, but recently women's farming cooperatives have offered a new channel for gaining access to this resource denied them by tradition. (See the section "Law and Social Equity" below.)

Returns from the agricultural sector have declined with the fall in global coffee prices, and cash crop substitutes -- pyrethrum and flowers -- have been sought. Government pressure to increase foreign currency earnings continues to foster competition between cash and food in rural areas. Farmers are being forced increasingly to sell unharvested crops early at a heavy discount in order to gain access to badly needed cash to pay for taxes, school fees, and other social services.

Meanwhile, national policies to discourage rural migration to cities has slowed but not stalled urban population growth. Increasingly, men and women are finding work in the industrial, professional, and commercial sectors. At present, however, urban unemployment stands at around 30%.

Implications of low productivity for the viability of democratic rule are great. A faltering micro-economic sector marginalizes the underutilized workforce, often putting it beyong the reach of reasoned, political education and vulnerable to special interests unconcerned with general public welfare.

5. Vulnerable Populations

Distribution of benefits from the DIG Project must take particular account of the poor. Weaknesses in the socio-economic sectors described above weigh most heavily on this growing segment of Rwanda's population, which is presently estimated at one-third of the rural total. Reasons include a fall in GNP per capita of 8.1% in 1991; while inflation has been lower than foreseen, costs of social services have increased sharply under the structural adjustment program; producer prices have remained relatively stable while consumer prices have increased; incomes of salaried workers have decreased, curtailing transfers into rural areas; salaries of agricultural laborers have been drastically cut; finally, social sector expenditures have fallen below expectations to 50-60% of planned levels (GOR 1992b). Finally, the serious famine conditions in the southern part of the country have compounded the effects of economic stress.

The DIG Project will overlap with the National Social Action Program (PNAS), which similarly enlists the cooperation of NGOs in carrying out its program of sustainable, small-scale development projects. Labor-intensive projects, emergency food distribution, agricultural micro-projects, school fee assistance, and a statistical tracking system are included in the PNAS.

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A repeated observation made to the writer across the board -- by rural farmers and by urban intellectuals alike -- was that D/G objectives would gain credibity if they were seen to assist economic growth as well as peaceful political process.

Women are among those Rwandans most concerned about the relationship between democracy and development. As one social worker in Butare observed, "Democracy is for those who already have enough to eat." The challenge of the DIG Project will be to demonstrate in practical terms that access to political desicion making can ease access to resources.

Legal equity for women is discussed in the section "Law and Social Equity" below. Culturally and socially women in Rwanda also face serious and persistent inequalities, and in many ways they exceed those of women in many other African countries. Previous sections touched on the unequal burden of women in nutrition and childbearing, their obstruction from resources such as land or cash crops, their low attendance in secondary school, and their heavy workload, which in rural and urban areas is estimated to average 15 hours a day.

At the root of the Rwandan women's inequality, however, is her lack of bargaining power in the household. That bargaining power, women say, may be increased in two key ways: through education (at secondary level) and through personal income or wealth. It is for this reason that "development" is critically important to women.

Without bargaining power a woman has few choices. Upon marriage she becomes a member of a corporate group in which her life is ruled by a rigidly patrilineal structure in which nearly all power and wealth is concentrated in the hands of her husband and his family. To this condition society offers few alternatives, and the heavy statist structures that have characterized Rwanda's past reach far down into the household. More recently the Catholic Church has played a similar role. Legal age at marriage is prescribed by law. Young women -- and until recently instructors -- who become pregnant while in school are required to terminate their studies. If the young woman is not married, she is socially shunned and risks being driven from her parents' home (ONAPO-GTZ 1989). Arranged marriages are still common in rural areas, and only the most modern and independent of women would choose a single life. To remain unmarried invites strong social disapproval. Yet, by custom a married woman has no legal claim to her children, her husband's wealth, or her own capital accumulation. Indeed, women members of income-generating or savings groups often complain that their husbands appropriate their earnings, and for this reason many tontines, or savings clubs, are secret.

In at least one quarter of Rwandan households a woman must tolerate the presence of one or more wives in addition to herself. Until very recently, as will be developed below, a woman was not granted legal capacity to open a bank account or to start a business without her husband's permission. Although these laws no longer obtain, it is unclear how quickly women will revindicate these rights for themselves.

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Against this model of centralized paternal authority the notion of shared power or individual choice represents a serious challenge. Coupled with this domestic political environment is a woman's burden of children, agricultural labor, tending the sick, fetching water and firewood, and meeting her husband's expectations. Older women have traditionally risen to a status which was quasi-male, and occasionally became members of the gacaca or family council. But where a woman may attempt a change in her position in the "proletariat of the family," as Engels described the lot of women and children, lack of time and energy would work against her. For women, the practice of democracy may justly begin at home. The DIG Project will need to guide her way.

a) Refugees and Displaced

In October 1990 the High Commission for Refugees determined that 441,387 Rwandan refugees live in neighboring countries: 276,455 in Burundi; 75,294 in Zaire; 74,372 in Uganda; 22,300 in Tanzania; and 1,666 in Kenya. (Other estimates of the Ugandan refugee population are as high as 207,000. See Lemarchand 1992.) The current policy to integrate this population into resource-poor Rwanda poses an economic, political, and social challenge. It is economic because of its added burden on land and social services; political because by far the largest number of refugees are Tutsi, some of whom are members of the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front; social because of the ethnic tension which may follow their return.

Officially, the GOR has committed itself to undertake the following: proclaim a general amnesty, sensitize the Rwandan population on welcoming the returnees, identify zones of installation, furnish identify cards, and create a government structure capable of administering to their welfare needs (GOR 1992a). Official pronouncements, however, adopt a tone of reserve when the "welcome" of refugees is discussed. Human Rights groups in Rwanda express doubt that the return of refugees will be peaceful in a context where the local Tutsi population in some communes has suffered attack, arbitrary arrest, job loss, and other injustices. Moreover, Rwanda's history has been marked by external attacks from refugees, from the inyezi (cockroaches) of 1962 to the recent RPF inkotanyi forces. It is uncertain that resettlement will be enough to settle the numerous old scores which have accumulated over time.

The unwelcome specter of future internal conflict may be analyzed against the backdrop of the large numbers of currently displaced in northern Rwanda. Estimates at the close of July, 1992, set their number at 300,000, with 150,000 currently settled in refugee camps. A challenge for the new democratic regime will be to find a mechanism for integrating these groups into the political process. They, too, risk marginalization without representation.

b) Twa

Finally, a discussion of vulnerable groups in Rwanda must also take into account this tiny minority of forest hunters thought to be the original inhabitants of the area. Under the moncarchy this group of potters and craftsmen was ritually outcast. Their beer was drunk

from a separate calabash; they were barred from marrying other groups; they were offered less desirable food. Even separate greetings were reserved for them. Following the change of regime in 1973, a policy of integration was developed, but the process of social change is slow (Godding 1992). Numbering only about 1% of the population, the Twa cannot anticipate large representation in a multiparty government, but they may hope for the elaboration of social policies that protect their welfare.

II. INSTITUTIONS PRESENT AND FUTURE: DIFFUSION AND SPREAD

The previous section offers a profile of project beneficiaries as individuals. It describes social forces that drive and shape the lives of Rwandan men and women quite beyond those forces which the DIG Project expects to create. What can we anticipate about the ways in which these two sets of forces will mix? How will those features of society and culture assist or constrain the development of a new social contact between the government and the governed? This section will discuss beneficiaries in their relation to selected institutions. It will examine four areas in which D/G objectives are typically institutionalized, namely, in the areas of Law and Human Rights, Elections and Representative Structures, Governance, and the Civil Society.

A. Social Equity and the Law

The Rwandan legal code currently in force evolved from the German code of 1895 and was revised by Belgian colonizers in keeping with the Code Civil Congolais after World War I. Expatriates, and later educated elites, were the intended beneficiaries of the code, while the remaining population received the legal protections afforded under customary law. Major legal reform was contemplated but not undertaken following Independence in 1962. However, between 1976 and 1988 a new Family Code was proposed by the Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST), debated, and adopted by the CND (Cyiza 1990). On May 1, 1992, the new Code was signed into law by the Head of State.

Among the strengths of the new Code are improved legal status of women in some aspects of marital and divorce law, banking and commercial rights, and inheritance for unmarried women. The new law remains silent on inheritance for married women or widows, as well as on matrimonial law; it thereby continues to submit these questions to the discriminatory practices of customary law.

Meanwhile, weaknesses continue to be recognized in the new Family Code, as in other laws which are still in force. Three areas of legal reform have been identified by a working group established within MINIJUST. They are family law, rights of minors, and penal conditions. Issues relating to these legal domains are addressed here. In addition, laws related to human rights (ethnic rights, e.g. freedom of movement, expression, association) will also be briefly discussed.

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1. Rwanda's Legal System

The legal system in modern Rwanda has selectively adopted a set of modern judicial codes which continue to leave many elements of customary law in force. Important elements of marital, divorce, and inheritance law are not addressed in written statues; consequently they are governed by traditional practice. Further strengthening the power of customary law is the manner in which most dilutes are settled; for, whatever their complaint, nearly all but the most urbanized men or women will turn first to the extended patrilineal family council or gacaca. Members of this council are in majority male, although women -- usually those who are past childbearing age -- may also be invited to join. If an acceptable judgement is not obtained, usually owing to the complexity of the matter, appeal beyond the gacaca is likely to be made to a superior mediating figure within the existing civil authority such as the burgomaster or members of the commune council. Recent estimates suggest that over 90% of litigations in rural areas are settled outside the purview of the official judicial administration.

The judiciary in Rwanda closely resembles the structure of the French model on which it is based, having a single high court of cassation, four appellate courts, 1 court of first instance in each of 10 (now 11) prefectures, and finally a canton tribunal in each of 145 communes. Despite the scope and size of the judiciary, it continues to have a limited direct impact on most areas of daily life. In fact the substance of traditional law prevails, as does its mode of administering justice. This influence is sanctioned by the new Family Code of May 1992, which recognizes the family council as "an institution within the family which safeguards the interests of the family members" and which is "organized and functions according to customary practice" (Art. 455).

People offer good reasons for choosing a customary approach to the settlement of disputes. The 719 magistrates, of which only 11 are women, are overall poorly educated and often untrained in law. Only 46 have completed legal studies. No magistrate trained in law serves in a canton tribunal, and some have only a primary education. Many judges have difficulty reading French, although the complete legal code is published exclusively in that language (MINIJUST 1992). In addition, the backlog of cases in the courts of first instance and higher courts is great, frequently entailing delays of a year or more. Canton tribunals, in contrast, are rarely frequented, owing to their restricted powers and poor reputation (Stanton 1988). Furthermore, a general belief holds that court judgements, especially at lower levels, are often arbitrary, partial, and poorly deliberated. Moreover, the judicial police are poorly trained and supervised.

A last -- and perhaps best -- reason for preferring a traditional approach to dispute settlement is that a court case admits that an irreparable social rupture between the litigants has taken place. In a society that places high value on social cohesion, the resulting loss of amicable relations is deeply felt, not only by the individuals, but by their friends and relatives.

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2. Women, Children, and Justice

The implications of supremacy of custom within an ostensibly dual legal system are considerable for women, children, and socially disadvantaged groups. Here, the complex interplay of gender, class, abode, ethnicity, and regional origin reign in a system that is likely to reinforce their negative consequences. Women, and in some measure their children, are perhaps the most consistent losers in a system that offers few women access to those progressive laws which may indeed exist. At present Rwanda has no bar, and private legal services are expensive and rare. Legal aid is not institutionalized, although it may be informally offered on an amicable basis. More important, opportunity and financial costs of the court system itself are often beyond the means of much of the population and most certainly those of the unconnected poor.

While the weaknesses of Rwandan law in its application are clear, the last decade has seen some progress in the formulation of the new Family Code and in the evolution of a more enlightened jurisprudence. Further progress may also be observed in Rwanda's Constitution of 10 June 1990, which recognizes the equality of all persons before the law, without discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnic origin, etc. In addition, Rwanda ratified in September 1962 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1966 the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, in 1975 the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in 1980 the United Nations Convention eliminating all forms of discrimination against women, and in 1990 the Universal Convention on the Rights of the Child.

These commitments, which include recognition of a woman's legal capacity -- and hence the right to open bank accounts, establish businesses, and maintain commercial property -- have so far touched a very small number of women. In a country where more than 60% of women are illiterate, those individuals most in need of the protections provided by statutory law are ignorant of the basic rights which it affords. For this reason, many women's groups have taken women's rights as a rallying point for sensitivity training and seminars.

Indeed, some women's groups owe their creation to the women's rights struggle. They include *Afepadem Ibabazi*, the Association of Women Parliamentarians for Defense of the Rights of the Mother and Child, and HAGARUKA, the Association for the Defense of Women's and Children's Rights. Debates of the new Family Code are described at length in Cyiza (1990). They tell the story of efforts by numerous groups to craft a new law that would reverse the inequalities of custom. Owing in part to the small number of women members in the National Development Council (12 of 70), these efforts were thwarted. (For a detailed description of women's organizations, see Appendix F: Institutional Analysis.)

3. Family Law

Family Law reform will be the focus of future efforts to improve women's rights in Rwanda. For this reason the implications of gaps in its provisions will be discussed below.

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Because Rwandan law accepts a framework where customary law and statutory law co-exist, customary law prevails for legal issues not otherwise treated in writing. Even in itself, the written law is contradictory; for, although the Constitution grants equality to women and men, the new Family Code belies its own progress toward increased gender equality by affirming that the husband is the "head of the family" (Art. 206). This provision creates limitations for women in a country where 22% of households are headed by a woman, often a woman who is married but without a husband in the home.

In many legal domains a married woman remains in effect a minor, submitted to the decisions of the "family council" (gacaca), whose authority the Family Code continues to recognize (Art. 455). Once married, a woman becomes a member of the patrilineal corporate group, and her privileges and duties are for the most part decided by the elders of her husband's family. This sense of "belonging" continues to exert great psychological force on women in instances where assertion of individual will may cause social rupture.

Before May 1, 1992, when the Family Code became law, a married woman could not go into business, apply for credit, own commercial property, or open a bank account without her husband's permission. In the event that her husband has abandoned the household, the Tribunal of First Instance could provide the needed authorization. Unless the court ruled otherwise, the woman's commercial property also belonged to her husband. The change in this law constitutes a great advance for women. It will be some time before its benefits are felt by Rwanda's female population. Ignorance, inadequate enforcement, and -- more important -- the sheer weight of habit will exert a countervailing force for some time to come. One example of this last is offered by Duterimbere, a cooperative credit institution committed to economic advancement of women, which in June 1992 continued to include in its official credit policy the requirement that married women must obtain permission of their husbands in order to submit an application for credit (Duterimbere 1992). A more far-reaching example is the role of the Family Council in deciding many legal matters for women; the law applied by this body -- unless contested by the woman -- is customary law. Rural women, then, have little access to statutory law, even if they know that it contains provisions to protect their equality.

Domains not treated in the new Family Code, and which continue in most provisions to be treated by customary law, concern inheritance rights of married women, matrimonial law, and the protection of minors.

4. Inheritance

In customary law a woman inherits neither from her husband or her father. Residence for a married couple is virilocal, effectively distancing the woman from her father's lands. Similarly, the new Code cites the husband's residence as also being the official residence of his wife (Art. 83).
When a marriage is dissolved, the wife has rights only to the impamba or bridewealth which she herself has brought into the union. She has no claim to her contribution to her husband's

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property or wealth. For example, his revenue from coffee remains in his family, although she may have furnished the major part of labor to cultivate the crop. If she is widowed, she traditionally had no right to remain in her deceased husband's house, especially if she had no children. In addition, during her marriage, she is not permitted to accumulate personal wealth separate from that of her husband. Therefore, whatever contribution she has made to the total value of her husband's household must be left behind.

Exceptions to these general rules concerning access to land and property occurred in tradition. For example, gifts of land, cattle, or other wealth from the father's family were not unknown and took place most often at the birth of a daughter's child in order to add to household food production. Today, however, Rwanda's extreme land pressure continues to limit even further a woman's chances of acquiring real property, and it may be anticipated that legal reform in this domain will confront serious practical restrictions in its application.

Overall, the new Family Code continues to leave customary inheritance law intact with the following exceptions. First, the Code now permits unmarried girls or single women who are widowed or divorced to inherit property from their parents if they return to live with them. This change could positively affect unwed mothers or grown unmarried girls whose parents are deceased by granting them access to needed resources. In practice, however, few girls expect to successfully compete with their brothers for rights to precious land; indeed, the effect of the law may be that brothers anxious to safeguard their own inheritance may tend to drive grown, unmarried daughters from their parents' household, obliging them to seek shelter elsewhere.

Second, the Code allows a widow usufruct rights to her husband's property after his death, at least until their children have reached their majority. At that time the children, whether "legal" or "natural," themselves may inherit one-half of the husband's property outright.

5. Marriage

Three types of marriage are possible in Rwanda: a "legal" marriage, a "customary" marriage, and a "de facto" marriage. A legal marriage is bound by statutory law in all domains including marriage, property, inheritance, custody of children, and so on. A customary marriage has been concluded under all obligations of customary law, including payment of brideprice. Simple cohabitation constitutes "de facto" marriage. In Rwanda, no marriage, even under statutory law, is "legal" until the inkwano or brideprice has been paid. In many instances, a customary or de facto marriage arrangement precedes a legal one in order to allow sufficient time to accumulate the payment required.

In its debates over matrimonial law for the new Family Code, the National Development Council took considerable pains to determine a reasonable value for the inkwano. The payment was viewed as burdensome on young couples and their families in time of economic stress. Some deputies considered it a devaluation of the bride. Not wishing to outlaw the custom altogether, however, the CND set the value of the brideprice universally at one hoe.

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An unexpected reaction among women was immediately seen. Women felt the new law demeaned them, and their heated response led to the CND's hasty reversal of its decision. Consequently, the brideprice continues to be paid, among uneducated and educated alike, but at differing rates throughout the country. (Payment of one cow is a common amount for a professional couple.)

The new Code also sets legal ages for marriage: 21 years for women and 25 years for men. Already MINIJUST has received numerous requests for dispensation from this rule, and so far no mechanism for its abrogation has been determined. The custom of arranged marriage is also superseded by the Code, which recognizes the couple's right to consent. Throughout the marriage, husband and wife have the same rights, and the wife exercises parental authority over children in her husband's absence.

Important issues in matrimonial law, however, are not treated by the new Code. No guidance is provided on separation of property upon divorce, and no mechanism for pre-nuptial contracts is foreseen. Some provision for child support is granted, provided the mother retains custody of her children. Two types of divorce are recognized in the law: mutual consent or "grave injury." Adultery of the husband does not necessarily constitute "a grave injury," although it will do if committed by the wife (Art. 134). In general, adultery with "grave injury" to the wife is understood as a euphemism for polygamy (Ntampaka and Mbanzaugamba 1991). Adultery alone, however, remains a punishable offense; the term specified for a woman is six months longer than that of a man, but the latter must also pay a fine. To serve as grounds for divorce, adultery with "grave injury" must be proven to the satisfaction of the court. It is this limitation in the face of arbitrary judgement that frustrates many Rwandan women from obtaining a legal divorce. **In light of growing concern about the transmission of AIDS between spouses, a liberalization of divorce and child custody law must be undertaken in Rwanda.**

6. Laws concerning children

Although the Family Code charges parents with equal responsibility in raising their families, children take their father's name and are inscribed only on his identity card. The father has ultimate legal custody of the children unless the court chooses otherwise. In event of divorce, children under the age of 15 frequently reside with the mother.

One major advance in the new code is that "natural" children are recognized to have legal inheritance rights (Art. 214). At the same time, "natural" children of one or another parent must be recognized by the other. In the event that the child's father is the husband but the mother someone other than his wife, the wife may refuse to accept the "natural" child. In the same way, a husband may also refuse the "natural" child of his wife.

Protection of minors is not ensured in the present Code, which assumes a society built on the bedrock of the family unit. Today, many Rwandan families are torn apart by disease or civil conflict, leaving young children unprotected. The need for a law which ensures

rights of minors in dangerous or criminal circumstances has been selected as a priority area for reform by MINIJUST.

7. Other rights

Freedoms of movement, association, and expression have not been accorded in Rwanda without restrictions. These limitations became most severe after the attack by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October 1990. An emergency rule required all travellers to carry a laissez-passer, which bore a photograph and other identifying information. During this period arbitrary search and arrest was not uncommon, and continuous surveillance restricted other freedoms. Although the laissez-passer rule was rescinded in June, 1992, recent history suggests that the present relaxation may be fragile.

Meanwhile, other limitations on personal freedom continue. Rwanda's penal code does not currently conform to UN conventions concerning the rights of the detained. The condition of women and young children in prison is of general concern. Facilities for baby food, adequate shelter and blankets, opportunities for skills training are very scant indeed. Of concern, too, are young women detained under a law which criminalizes abortion. The attempt to abort, whether or not successful, is justification for arrest and detention.

Rwandan identity cards continue to carry ethnic designations (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, depending upon the father's ethnicity), despite announced plans to eliminate them. The cards continue to serve as a basis for discrimination in employment, education, and other domains. Since 1973 the government has practiced a policy of "proportional" representation of ethnic groups in schools and universities, a practice which has discouraged many Tutsi in their pursuit of education. In recent years, private schools charging the same fees as public schools have become a common means around this restriction.

Finally, one may mention other laws and policies which restrict employment. Women are barred from working at night unless they are in the health profession. In practice, 97.5 % of women continue to work in the agricultural sector. Few women achieve professional employment or government appointments, although they are not barred by law from advancement. A full discussion of the effects of this last policy appears in the section "Political Participation in the Civil Society."

B. Elections and Representative Structures

Policies that favor or restrict human rights are generally the prerogative of the executive. Laws, however, are made in principle made by a body composed of the people's elected representatives.

The structure of Rwanda's government foresees a freely-elected National Assembly (replacing the National Development Council), appointed prefects in each of 11 prefectures, and elected burgomasters in each of 145 communes. The burgomaster will be assisted in his

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duties by an elected commune council, composed of representatives from communal subdivisions known as sectors (usually about 10 for each commune). The MRND has also instituted a non-administrative sub-sectoral division called cellule, each having four or five elected responsables.

Electoral politics constitutes a major advance in democratic governance in Rwanda, where executive appointments of prefects and burgomasters was the rule under the Second Republic. Men and women may participate directly in electoral politics through three channels: by running as candidates for elective office, by voting in the election, and by joining political parties and taking an active part in their activities. Each will be discussed below.

C. Multiparty Politics: An Interplay of Ethnicity, Region, Class...and

1. Gender

Of the 16 parties currently registered by Rwanda's Ministry of Interior since 18 June 1991, six have emerged as strong contenders. Although the Ministry of Interior has stipulated that parties must be demonstrably non-sectarian in its statutes, in practice ethnicity and regionalism have also emerged as critical in the future competition among parties (Lemarchand 1992).

- The MRND[D] is the reconstituted and renamed MRND of the monoparty government. Now, as the Movement Républicain pour la Démocratie et le Développement, it continues to retain a strong northern Hutu constituency.

- The MDR, or Movement Démocrat Républicain, draws the major part of its support from the central part of the country. Its membership is largely composed of Hutus who are committed to a pluralist democracy.

- The PSD, or Parti Social Démocrat, is a somewhat more liberal party which is at present identified with the south-central area of Butare and Gitarama. A number of Tutsi figure among its members.

- The PDC, or Parti Démocrat Chrétien, is a small party of moderates, who present a strong commitment to social welfare. Many of its adherents are found in the western part of the country.

- The PL, or Parti Libéral, enjoys an urban professional constituency, and projects a genuine commitment to a multi-ethnic society free of discrimination. The Party includes in its membership a substantial number of Tutsi elements.

- The CDR, or Coalition pour la Défense de la République, is -- as its name suggests -- a strongly sectarian and exclusivist group strongly committed to a Hutu dominated

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state. Some genuine concern has been expressed about the true motives of the party and its close association with the present MRND-led government.

At the present moment the contest between parties for a share of political control is waged in an environment of terrible uncertainty. As Rwandans gather at their political gatherings, known by the English word "meetings," they do so in full awareness that ethnic and civil strife goes on. As Lemarchand observes, "That the country will never be the same again is perhaps the only point on which there seems substantial agreement between Hutu and Tutsi -- a slender reed on which to build a pluralist democracy" (1992).

No one can doubt that one way in which Rwanda will never be the same is the measure in which women are participating in party politics. In addition to their ethnic, regional, and class tendencies, parties also differ in their degree of commitment to women. Only the PL has a woman in its executive (the current Minister of Commerce and Industry.). The MDR has a woman (the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education) on its council. Some parties have developed a women's wing; others are closely identified with certain women's groups, for example Seruka for the MDR and Komera for the MRND.

An examination of party statutes for their policies toward women's issues is a revealing exercise. Landrada Mukayiranga, currently Director of Administration in the Ministry of Justice, notes wryly, "One might ask oneself if, in the absence of women as participants right from the start, the chief actors have taken them into account in their projects for a Society which they have elaborated with the intent of mobilizing the population around their ideologies." After all, in their sheer numbers women represent a considerable electoral force (Mukayiranga 1992).

In the Kinyarwanda-language journal Umurwanashaka the MRND has spelled out its position on women as follows among its "basic principles": "Concerning the well-being of the population, its education, and its culture, the MRND is committed to the development of girls in Rwanda. This development should take concrete form in an increase in the number of girls in schools, their promotion in the domains of social employment, in the economy, and in politics. The welfare of the Rwandese woman should be the yeast for rapid national development." And further, "Above all, our activities aim toward the development of the Rwandese woman."

The MDR, in its preparatory statute observes, "In the social domain the MDR seeks to ensure that the number of girls in school, at all levels, and especially in secondary and higher education, grants women their just place at all echelons of the administration and to abrogate all laws designed to oppress the women of Rwanda."

The PSD in its statutes calls for the " Complete elimination of all form of discrimination, especially that founded on ethnicity ... and sex." The party intends to establish a commission for "the family and women."

The PL in its statute calls for "Enjoyment of the same rights and freedoms and opportunities for all, without discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, sex ..."

In her critique Landrada calls for party objectives which are more specific in their support for women, for example, setting concrete targets for increased female school enrolment, as the farmer-herder syndicate has done by imposing a 33% rule on female participation in decision making roles. In her view, party pronouncements so far are "not sufficient to serve the cause of women."

Certain conclusions are drawn concerning the future of a nation in which women are not adequately integrated into party politics. "The future business of the country is cast in a multiparty framework. If women are not in the parties, they will be excluded from the affairs of the nation." Elsewhere, "If women are not in the parties, society will not teach its members about women's preoccupations for development." Finally, "If women are not in the parties, the parties will be interested in them only to meet their electoral objectives" (Mukayiranga 1992).

"Only" is perhaps the operative word in Landrada's last commentary. Voter appeal is a fundamental part of electoral politics. A man or woman anxious to win popularity among constituents will throw an occasional beer party to maintain warm relations. In Rwanda, however, voting will likely have as much to do with the party as a group as it has with the individual candidate. As nearly all other institutions in Rwanda, elections unfold against a backdrop of fierce corporate loyalties. To vote for a given man or woman is to pledge one's loyalty to the group which has asked them to stand. Equally important, perhaps, is that one also votes as a group. To assert one's individual will against the "family" candidate or party would be a rare decision indeed.

To illustrate this premise, rural women in several regions were asked individually how they would vote if presented with a choice between a candidate whose policies were very favorable toward women and her husband's candidate who held opposite views. Without hesitation, the women affirmed their loyalty to the husband's choice. When pressed, most added that failure to support the husband would constitute a shame for him and the family. Some women's groups have identified this reluctance to exercise free voter choice as a training opportunity. In a country where voting -- and voting for a certain candidate -- has not recently been a matter of free will, voting by personal conviction is a new behavior that must be learned.

Corporate -- as opposed to individual -- choice also comes into play in the selection of candidates for office. Usually a person does not offer himself or herself for the role, but is solicited by a group of supporters. Whereas most men welcome the notion of running for office, women often to view it with some trepidation. Women past the age of childbearing sometimes served on the family gacaca or "council," and in similar manner may be seen as responsables de cellule, that is, members of the 5-person committee at the bottom echelon of Rwanda's administrative structure. Even at this level, the number of women does not exceed

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5%. Today 18 women figure among the 1400 communal councillors. One woman is a sub-prefect, but none is a burgomaster or prefect. The transitional government has 3 female ministers; 12 out of 70 deputies to the national assembly are women. Their number has risen from 4 in 1984 to 10 in 1988 to the present 12, but the female deputies attribute the increase to an MRND policy aiming toward "one women deputy per prefecture." Although their number is small, they doubt that multiparty rule will offer women even this limited advantage.

When asked the question, "Is it likely that a woman could be elected burgomaster?" a telling variety of answers follow. Older women, especially if they already hold a political office, tend to respond with the challenge, "Why not?" Younger women aver that the likelihood is slim, and often add that the post is burdensome and even dangerous in the present political climate. She may also way that a woman is unlikely to have more than a secondary role in any political office. Besides, they have a household to maintain. Moreover, politics in women's minds is associated with dishonesty, a taint they prefer to avoid (Ntampaka and Mbanzarungamba 1991). Men exhibit a variety of views, but generally find the post of burgomaster a man's job and too heavy a responsibility for a woman. Finally, women face the added constraint that, by custom, they cannot accept a candidacy without their husband's permission. Here, the woman's supporters could play a critical negotiating role.

Just as the MRND chose quotas as a way to increase women in the CND, women themselves recognize that an affirmative effort will be needed to increase their numbers in leadership. At a mini-roundtable held in July, 1992, on women and democracy, those present vowed to form a coalition of women's associations having as its first priority the identification, training, funding, and support of women candidates.

D. Governance

An administration that is consistent, accountable, and transparent is one objective of democratic governance. Today management of government offices is very far from achieving this goal. As in many places, the functionary dictates rather than serves. His office is a safe haven which very few are welcome to enter, and in rural areas business may take place with supplicants who find their only access is through his office window. Bureaucratic irregularities and inattention to duty are commonplace but somewhat aggravated in the current atmosphere of civil unease and economic stress.

Women are increasingly perceived as a viable alternative to poor or inattentive officials. They are often described as conscientious and honest managers. Although exceptions indeed occur, people readily point out how relatively well run women's cooperatives are, how quickly they repay loans, and how carefully they maintain their records. In posts where honesty is vital, women are increasingly considered for appointments. Such strength of character may not be in a woman's favor, however, should politics be overtaken by cronyism.

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E. The Civil Society

Quality in government is attained in large measure by popular demand. Ideally elections should open the way to an ongoing dialogue between the public and their representatives. Rwandans have had a long history of representation. Their spokesmen have not traditionally been elected, but they have in some manner been selected. Usually they ware perceived as persons having a measure of power and prestige.

Representatives do not serve individual interests, but rather those of a group. The corporate family model described in earlier sections finds repetition in Rwanda through the creation of mutual interest groups. Such groups have burst onto the scene in the past ten years as part of a growing associative movement which encouraged the pooling of resources and risk in order to foster economic growth. Nearly 8,000 groups are estimated to exist today, and in 3,000 of them women are majority or exclusive members (URAMA 1992). Their range and nature are given fully description in Appendix F: Institutional Analysis. Here they are discussed as agents of diffusion and change.

Structurally, Rwandan associations work much like traditional kinship groups, beginning with a nucleus of around 15 to 20 members which may then grow but which rarely exceeds 100. Typically, these groups seek others with similar interests and form coalitions with them. For example, an association of 12 people in Butare is composed of unwed mothers and their older women assistants. In a nearby village they have found another group of about 120 unmarried women (unwed mothers, divorced women, widows). Because they have common concerns, representatives of the two groups meet regularly; at the same time, they remain on alert for other groups who share their own concerns. Joint actions which the groups may take in future include a request for a large plot of land as a resource for the girls and their children, skills training in a remunerative activity, and active participation in application of the new Family Code allowing unmarried women to inherit property under some circumstances. Similarly, in Kigali human right groups have formed a common association composed of one representative from each original group. The new association holds regular meetings for information exchange and strategic planning. Eventually this coalition group may at some point begin to seek its own alliances -- for example with women's rights organizations -- in order to pool their resources for a common cause.

The hierarchical "nesting" character of this structure explains its power to lobby for the interests of members at any level. Associations are the foundation of a Rwandan civil society. As has been shown, they operate through pooled interests, representation, and hierarchy. Associations have horizontal as well as vertical links. Many individuals belong to several associations and may be members of political parties as well. In this way power and information flows through and across these corporate groups.

Communication is an important benefit of these horizontal and vertical structures. Internal networks to convey information, usually from person to person. Their capacity for diffusion

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is very great indeed, and to the extent that most Rwandans belong to an eligible association, they will have access to the Project NGO center (CCADI) for D/G training and support.

For those who are not connected by associations, other means of communication may also serve. The very effective, person-to-person approach to spreading innovation may be complemented by the media. As in many places, formal information services in Rwanda are concentrated in the metropole and quickly diminish as one moves into rural areas. The single state-run radio station is heard by much of the rural population, about one-quarter of whom own radios. With the recent liberalization of the press, more than two dozen newspapers have recently come into print, in French or in Kinyarwanda. Distribution networks are weak but growing stronger. Where the media cannot reach, population density fills the void by continuing transmission by word-of-mouth.

At the present time, access to the media is still unequal. Women have few opportunities, for example, to present news from their own perspective. Female journalists are few, and they have typically concentrated on marginal, domestic subjects. Kinyamateka, a popular newspaper in Kinyarwanda devotes one page to women in each issue, but such targeted coverage is rare. Women have little knowledge of how to negotiate for space and have fewer resources with which to purchase it. Meanwhile, political parties have taken rapid advantage of the press to put forward their ideologies and views. The civil society will need to make greater efforts to compete for attention and space.

Because over half of Rwandans are illiterate, and because distribution of print media is incomplete, radio will for them be the medium of greatest importance. Access to the air waves will be critical to the future development of the civil society, and it will likely depend on the creation of additional broadcasting stations and services, together with the promotion of a yet broader, and more regionally focused, press. Here the Rwandan Press Center will have a role to play.

III. SOCIAL IMPACT AND ISSUES

Outcomes of initiatives in democracy and governance on the level of whole societies would include an open press, free and fair elections, an active public lobbying for certain interests through associations and groups, a responsible and transparent government administration. These are only some of the social impacts sought by the DIG Project. Many of the specific initiatives to be undertaken will evolve through beneficiary initiative, most likely through the two Centers established for NGOs and the Press.

Every man and woman in Rwanda is an intended beneficiary of the DIG Project. Moreover, it is the Project's wish to promote democratic governance in Rwanda by empowering every citizen equitably. This moral burden for the Project management is a priority concern where a new social contract between the government and governed is in the process of being forged. Careful consideration, then, must be given to the access to project services by the entire population and to the ensuing distribution of its effects. As was noted in the section

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"Political Actors in Context" above, the socio-economic environment of Rwanda offers unequal opportunities for full participation in the political process. One charge of the Project, then, its to identify ways in which built-in inequities may be attenuated or overcome.

This section will first consider "democracy and governance" in the context of other major issues which confront Rwanda at the present time. It will then review they key socio-cultural and institutional forces which weave through the Rwandan context and consider their implications for equity. Next, it will propose one approach to project implementation that may well hold greatest promise for a peaceful and democratic future in the country.

Democracy: Everyone's Priority?

A great variety of Rwandans -- urban and rural, professional and farmers, men and women, Hutu and Tutsi, Catholic and Protestant, ministers and rebels -- have been asked by the Project Preparation Team about their priorities for their country's future. At the start of our conversation the answer is nearly always the same. Peace comes first, next economic development, and finally democratic institutions and processes.

The statement "Democracy is for those who are eating already" expresses a widespread perception. One challenge of the DIG Project will be to teach, and more important demonstrate, a connection between access to decision making and the promotion of peace and economic growth. Because their association is not absolute, but rather a matter of degree, and because outcomes in politics can never be predicted, the belief in democracy -- or more correctly, the conversion to it -- will necessarily occur over time. On the broad level there are many reasons why the association is tenuous in the short term. Recently, René Lemarchand eloquently described the paradox implicit in Rwanda's multiparty future: that political participation and the moral duty to shape nation's destiny carries with it the seed of ethnic disruption and national disunity (1992). This paradox weighs heavily on the minds of most Rwandans. Economic fragility, meanwhile, is increasingly felt in an environment heavily dependent on agricultural exports which are now in low demand. Poverty is rising rapidly in rural areas. In many contexts poverty breeds political disaffection.

Such macro-level impacts as making peace or improving economies rest beyond the reasonable scope of any project. At the same time, the promotion of democratic governance is altogether possible at the level of individual associations and communes. The Project may offer important opportunities to demonstrate the advantage of democratic governance within the context of small groups in government or in the civil society. Special attention may be focused on those groups having a broad pluralistic membership which cuts across lines of ethnicity, gender, profession, region, and class. Once success at this level have been learned, it may reinforce the same principles at the national level.

Forces: For Change and Otherwise

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Many social tendencies in Rwanda offer a fertile ground for implanting democratic governance. Sophistication in the structures of administration, the strong urge to associate and engage in collective action, rising awareness of the plight of social marginals, action in the area of human and women's rights coupled with the effort to bridge traditional cleavages of ethnicity, gender, abode, and so on. Each of these forces presents a less propitious underside. Each offers a valuable potentiality, but one that is problematic nonetheless.

Centralizing tendencies For the past 400 years at least, Rwanda has been marked by a drive to consolidate power. Pluralism may be expressed, but rarely formally at the level of central authority. Hierarchies tend to reinforce this pattern by encouraging narrow foci of power at all levels of the administrative structure. All through the system debate goes on in the background, but bringing it into the foreground is quite a different matter. The faltline between "debate" and "conflict" is fragile indeed.

Recently, a number of communes ridded themselves of unpopular burgomasters by force. The revolt in most cases expressed a dissatisfaction with policies practices which they could not accept. Democratic governance seeks to foster a process of ongoing challenge and debate; it continues long after the majority during an election has had its say or after one or another individual is "in" or "out" of office. Agreeing to disagree is a perspective learned through practice. Smaller units are more conducive to promoting tolerance and compromise in officials than are larger ones, and for this reason the greatest hope for democracy at present rests at the communal level.

Corporate vs individual The associative spirit is highly developed in Rwanda in part because men and women ally themselves quite naturally to corporate groups. When this force is combined with that of centralizing hierarchy, it spawns the additional cultural habit of representation.
Everywhere in the civil society, the notion of "passing through" a representative is commonplace. Few Rwandans seeking to influence public policy would consider, say, writing a personal letter or making a visit on his own. To do so would leave him exposed and vulnerable; worse, it would be a foolish act because it would likely be ineffective. A man or woman who seeks to effect change will first select an appropriate spokesman and then throw his or her weight behind him.

The power of corporate groups to bring about peaceful change is great. Implicit in their "nesting" and representative character is the power to disempower members by rigid enforcement of the representation rule. In time, these members form other groups. Women who are not permitted to "speak" at home may seize that right by joining a women's collective; prestige and confidence gained from their new association increases their bargaining power at home. Corporate groups are thus in constant interplay with one another by means of the multiple corporate attachments of their members. It is perhaps in this "associative dialogue" -- more than in the communal council or the National Assembly -- that the genuine democratic debate will likely be played out.

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Marginality If one looks to associations as a vital element of the new democracy, the future participation of social marginals must be granted careful thought. This category includes a range of persons in unenviable circumstances -- unwed mothers, the sick, the homeless, the displaced, the outcast. Recently, associations have begun formed to foster self-reliance and economic productivity of these men and women without alternate corporate attachments or means. The effort is one step toward their inclusion in the new "social contract." For, in the measure to which individuals lack a place in society, they are disempowered politically. Special attention may be granted to these new associations in order to draw them more fully into the democratic process.

Poverty, Energy, and Time About two-thirds of Rwanda's population is short of the leisure time upon which political participation thrives. For most, their most valuable resource is their own labor. The average rural woman works about 15 hours per day. It was seen earlier that her energy level is in chronic deficit. Her husband may work shorter hours, but if he figures among the third of the rural population now classified as poor, his opportunities for political action are also curtailed. The rural unemployed have time, but often limited access to knowledge or influence. For these Rwandans, the link between economic growth and political participation is plain. The DIG Project may use its networks of information to channel the poor into other initiatives that offer funds and skills training for improving household income.

Social Cleavage on the Mend

Much has been said about the power of ethnic and regional undercurrents in Rwanda. Encouraging, however, is the recent trend toward improvements in human rights. These organizations taking this cause as their major focus give expression to widespread desire for peaceful coexistence. They, and indeed many associations, offer a ground for peaceful collective action in a pluralistic context.

One remarkable example of how associations strive to overcome the forces that rend society was seen in a Women's March for Peace. Planned in Kigali to celebrate International Women's Day (March 8, 1992), the event marked the first time that women from a wide range of associations took the celebration away from the MRND party and into their own hands. The choice of theme was significant, and indeed a challenge to the political authority. More important, the will to rise above differences of party persuasion, ethnicity and regional origin was an act of vision and courage. The march itself was skillfully sabotaged by political forces who sought to quash the challenge. But the celebration took place nevertheless in a spirit of common effort and good will. Undaunted, the women's groups have reopened the discussion about joining forces for the future. The Civil Society is indeed beginning to take form.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Numerous recommendations are expressed throughout this paper. Several, however, merit reiteration. The social context of the DIG Project suggests that four strategies will encourage equitable political participation for all.

- Affirmative action. A number of social groups risk exclusion from the democratic process. Women, the poor, social marginals, and the displaced require strong affirmative support.

- Participatory training in democratic governance. Small groups -- whether associations or communities -- offer the greatest potential for learning about democracy in practice. Behavioral change requires conscious and continuous nurturing; without it the new social contract risks remaining at the level of an ideal.

- Fostering networks among associations. Most of Rwanda's estimated 8,000 associations are homogenous groups, but their "nesting" tendencies encourage pluralistic dialogue and exchange. By understanding the natural structure of the "associative dialogue" the Project may set in motion positive social processes with very little input.

- Channeling information about economic opportunity. Economic stress is a preoccupation of many Rwandan men and women. The Project will gain credibility and will empower its beneficiaries by encouraging their productive effort.

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ACTION: AID INFO: AMB DCM

ANNEX K.

ZZZZZ
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DE RUEHC #9298 2330156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280157Z AUG 92
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY
[redacted] PRIORITY 8848
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1426
BT
UNCLAS STATE 269298

LOC: 078 593
28 AUG 92 1418
CN: 65184
CHRG: AID
DIST: AID

AIDAC NAIROBI FOR REDSO/ESA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS:
SUBJECT: FY 1992 SS2 ALLOWANCE FOR RWANDA

REF: KIGALI 03394

1. APPROPRIATION 72-112/31014, BUDGET PLAN CODE GSS2-92-21696-KG13 (ALLOWANCE 281-50-696-00,69-21) ESTABLISHED FOR DOLLARS 18,200,000 FOR PROJECT 696-0133, DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES, DOLLARS 4,700,000; 696-0134, RWANDAN INTEGRATED MCH/FP DOLLARS 6,000,000; AND 696-0135, PVO SUPPORT PROJECT (PA) DOLLARS 7,500,000.

2. FUNDS FOR THE ABOVE PROJECTS CANNOT BE OBLIGATED UNTIL PROJECTS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED AND MISSION HAS BEEN ADVISED BY RWANDA DESK THAT CNS WAITING PERIOD FOR THE ABOVE PROJECTS HAS EXPIRED WITHOUT OBJECTIONS.

3. THIS BRINGS THE TOTAL ALLOWED TO DATE UNDER THIS BPC TO DOLLARS 18,200,000.

4. PLEASE ADVISE AFR/DP/PAB BY CABLE WHEN THE ABOVE FUNDS HAVE BEEN OBLIGATED. PLEASE PASS TO MISSION DIRECTOR DP'S APOLOGY FOR SENDING THIS ALLOWANCE CABLE OUT TO THE MISSION SO LATE.

5. ADVICE OF ALLOWANCE FOLLOWS. EAGLEBURGER
BT
#9298
NNNN

281

DIG

ANNEX L.

ACTION: AIT INFO: [illegible]

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RR AJEALG2
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R 22.2392 JUL 92
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI [illegible]
BT
UNCLAS STATE 234398

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS:
SUBJECT: CN STATUS FOR DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT (DIG), 696-2133

SUBJECT CN EXPIRED ON JULY 14. MISSION MAY INCUR OBLIGATION ONCE BUDGET ALLOWANCE RECEIVED. EAGLEBURGER
BT
#4398

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED STATE 234398

DATE REC'D
7-22-92
[illegible]
7-31-92
ACTION
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