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DEMOCRACY PROGRAM
ELECTION ASSISTANCE PROJECT

PHASE I
MAY 1986

SUBMITTED
BY
EDDIE MAHE, JR. & ASSOCIATES INC.

Foreword

Eddie Mahe, Jr. and Associates, Inc. was awarded a grant on September 25, 1985 from the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), No. OTR-0086-G-55-5199-00, to develop a program of election assistance.

The principals of Eddie Mahe, Jr. and Associates, Inc., Ladonna Y. Lee and Eddie Mahe, Jr., together with principal subcontractor, Stephen J. McCarthy of Oxford Management Services, directed and undertook the activities necessary to complete the grant requirements and develop a plan to achieve the long range goal established by the Director of A.I.D.:

To strengthen democracy around the world
through improving the election process.

The assistance from within A.I.D., State, NSC and other government agencies added to the principals' understanding of Third World elections and is greatly appreciated.

Steve Dunkel, Melissa Williams, Christine Stumpf, Fairy Cogswell, Debbie Mahe and Jane McCarthy provided invaluable assistance in completing the project and producing this report.

This document is the final report and fulfills all requirements as defined by the terms and conditions of this grant.

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The United States and other democratic nations are engaged in a continuing struggle around the world aimed at expanding and sustaining the forces of democracy against strong opposition from extremists of the far left, the far right or from the totalitarian regimes of the Eastern Block.

While for some number of years, leaders of countries striving to establish or maintain a democracy could call on the Adenauer Institute, the British government or other European sources for assistance, the United States Government has had no organized program to provide any meaningful election assistance.

The one notable exception to this has been the American Institute for Free Labor Development of the AFL/CIO which has been active internationally for 25 years primarily assisting labor organizations and political parties.

In June, 1982 speaking to the combined Houses of Parliament in London, President Reagan advised the world of his commitment to democracy and his intention that the United States government take a more active role in this regard.

"No, democracy is not a fragile flower. Still it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy."

President Reagan's very strong belief in democracy has frequently been the topic of his remarks. Earlier this year he reiterated this country's commitment to the democratic process in the Philippines. On February 11, 1986, after the return of Senator Lugar and the other members of the election observer team, the President commented on his concern about the reports that the election was flawed by fraud,

"This concerns us because we cherish commitment to free and fair elections ...".

"Our task for the future is to help nurture the hopes and possibilities of democracy".

An even more dramatic example is when the President committed America's armed forces to remove the military threat from Grenada and to re-establish a democracy that had been lost. His comments on the occasion of the December, 1984, election that restored democracy to that country particularly reflects his personal commitment to freedom and the right for free people to choose their own leaders.

"The election represents an achievement of historic importance, the first occasion in which a nation has returned from marxist leninist rule."

"The United States is proud to have played a part in the return of democracy to Grenada..."

"We applaud the Grenadian people for their peaceful, orderly and genuinely democratic exercise of popular sovereignty on December 3rd."

While the federal government has a recorded involvement in the elections of other countries stretching back to the early years in this century, much of that involvement has been keyed to the immediate self-interest of the

United States government or to powerful private interests who could persuade the government to act on their behalf.

In the years immediately following World War II, there were genuine efforts to establish or re-establish democracies in some Eastern European countries. Since then, up until the early years of this decade, American assistance was very scattered and often covert in nature.

This support undertaken during the last decade has generally been provided, or at least coordinated, by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D). However, because there was no comprehensive election assistance program in place to provide this aid, nor anyone specifically trained to administer such a program, the economic and administrative burden for A.I.D. has been substantial.

A.I.D. personnel in Washington and in the field where the projects have been run deserve much credit for the success that has been realized to date. Notwithstanding their efforts, the lack of experience and expertise and the lack of a defined program with a supporting data base often resulted in excessive expenditures, a lack of timeliness, or assistance that was ineffective in achieving the desired results.

The learning curve for each new effort generally started with zero. Many of the necessary decisions always had to be made with no information on the alternatives, if there was even an awareness that alternative existed.

However, even with these problems, it is clear that the support of the United States government as administered by the Agency for International Development has been a critical factor in the establishment, or re-establishment, of a number of new democracies and the subsequent conduct of free and fair elections.

By the spring of 1985, the Director of the Agency for International Development wisely had determined that the provision of foreign election assistance was going to continue and that it would most likely remain A.I.D.'s responsibility under its human rights mandate. Thus he determined that a new mission, a new goal, needed to be consciously added to those for which the Agency already carried the responsibility:

To strengthen the democratic process around the world by improving the quality of elections.

He determined it was necessary to develop a program with the capacity to provide election assistance in an effective, timely and cost efficient manner.

However, since this activity was far removed from the normal functions of A.I.D., or of any federal agency, A.I.D.'s professional staff did not possess the requisite knowledge and experience in elections that would be necessary to develop such a program. Therefore, the decision was made to recruit some individual or group from outside A.I.D. who had the experience required and would be

willing to take the assignment. The specific criteria deemed most relevant were:

Extensive experience in elections at all levels in all roles so as to assure in-depth knowledge of all aspects of the election process;

Involved politically for sufficient time in various national roles to assure knowing and being known by a wide range of political activists from both parties. This should include elected officials, governmental and congressional staff members and campaign experts in every phase of the business and from all across the country; and

Sufficient foreign election involvement so as to understand the needs of the program and the cultural sensitivity that must be built into it from the very beginning.

Eddie Mahe, Jr. & Associates, Inc., through its principals, Eddie Mahe, Jr. and Ladonna Y. Lee, was deemed by the Director of A.I.D., to have the experience and attributes needed and accepted the challenge of designing and putting in place the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.

Following extensive discussions, two memorandums dated July 17, 1985, and July 18, 1985, were submitted to the A.I.D. Director by Eddie Mahe, Jr. & Associates, Inc. outlining the agreed upon goals, objectives, and activities required to develop the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Program.

The goal of the program as discussed and agreed upon in those earlier conversations was specifically reiterated in these memos:

To strengthen the democratic process around the world by improving the quality of elections.

Additionally, the primary and secondary objectives as had also been discussed with the Director were fully

developed in these memorandums. These objectives were seen as the minimum that must be met if the goal is to be achieved.

Objective

To establish the capacity to have a wide array of talents and services available to the Agency for International Development that could be used to provide election assistance, either in response to requests from other nations or, perhaps, for A.I.D. to initiate such efforts.

Secondary Objective

That the program, over time, establish such a fine reputation that it can be involved in any country without any sustainable charges that the United States government is meddling in another country's election.

To accomplish the objectives and thus make the goal an ongoing reality, consensus had been reached during the discussions on the basic operational approach to the program and how it could best be administered after it was established. It had been determined that a three phase effort would be necessary with Phase III being the ongoing availability and administration of the program. It was the premise of the Director that a 501(c)3 research and education foundation would be the best choice to actually administer the program. The final decision though, was left to be determined during the initial research.

The first phase, as defined in the memorandums and restated in the grant, was designed to undertake the necessary research, to define how a program could be created to achieve the goal and the objectives and then to develop a plan for putting it in place. This report reflects that

research and the resulting plan and thus marks the completion of Phase I.

Phase II, which is now ready to be undertaken, was defined by the Director as being the execution of that plan including the establishment of a foundation to administer the program if the research determined that was the best choice to administer the program.

The understandings which were reflected in the July memorandums became the basis for a grant to Eddie Mahe, Jr. & Associates, Inc. to undertake Phase I of the program. The language of the grant defining its purpose and the activities to be undertaken were as follows.

Purpose

"The Grantee will develop a program of election assistance, leading to the setting up of a core group of election experts to be available to A.I.D. and other organizations upon request. The program will focus on: (1) the mechanics of the election process itself, and (2) evaluating the integrity of targeted elections through the use of trained observers. The long range goal of the project is to strengthen democracy around the world through improving the election process."

Activities

"The program activities will specifically include: a review of pertinent literature, debriefing "experts" both here and abroad and observing actual elections in countries that would be considered typical of those in which projects might be undertaken. The objective being to develop a list of possible election assistance activities and individuals to be trained as election specialists."

"Phase I of this program will include the research and planning phase. Research would include a review of any pertinent literature, debriefing various "experts" both here and abroad both within and outside of government, observing actual elections in countries that would be considered typical of those where projects might be undertaken, all towards the objective of initially developing a list of possible activities that could be undertaken. In the process, each item on the list would be analyzed as to the good it might do, how many alternative ways it could be done and the potential cost and impact of each. Therefore, when any particular election project was being considered, the planning process could build on this base, thus reducing both the cost and the time necessary to create specific election plans."

As is clear from the grant language, much of the emphasis in Phase I was to be on research. But there was one fact that did not have to be researched, namely that every country and every government is different.

It is these differences that define the need for the program, because as the countries are different so must their elections be.

Each election will reflect the totality of the society in which it is being held, the nature of the government, its history and its leaders, the cultural norms and mores of the people, the education, the lifestyle, the material possessions of its citizens, the geography, the climate, the size of the country, all these factors and more which makes each country unique unto itself. In totality, these factors define what the election process will be in a country. Because every conclusion, every proposed step in this report is qualified by this reality, for ease of communication the umbrella reference to this point will be the 'culture and environment' of a country.

In the next section of this report following this introduction, a full description of all the research undertaken and the results of that research is presented.

First, as with all such projects, it was determined that it was necessary to develop a series of base assumptions about the real world in which the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project was going to function.

Secondly, while there is no mystery to the process of holding an election, and the principals involved in the project are totally familiar with that process, it was deemed essential that this process be closely re-examined in the context of this assignment involving Third World countries.

It was anticipated, correctly as it turns out, that this examination would isolate some elements of the election process that, while fairly routine in more advanced democracies, have the potential to virtually destroy the integrity of an election in Third World countries if not properly planned and executed.

Thus, determining if a foundation should be established to administer the program, developing the series of assumptions, and examining the election process by elements in the context of Third World countries, were the major objectives of the overall research effort.

Additionally, two other areas were researched, commodities and the individuals necessary to provide the election assistance. Previous experiences by A.I.D. in providing election materials i.e. commodities have not

always been cost efficient. For this reason, considerable research was done on these items which, by their very nature, involved numerous topics and a vast volume of detail.

One of the problems A.I.D. has confronted in providing election assistance has been paying excessive costs for election commodities. The lack of detailed information together with extremely short timelines has left A.I.D. with few options. Therefore, previous purchases of materials has too often been on a "who or whatever was available basis" without the opportunity to realize any cost savings.

Thus it was determined that a comprehensive data base on commodities was needed. A.I.D. personnel should have readily available such information as a listing of basic alternatives that will fulfill each particular need, choice of suppliers from around the world for each of the commodity items and some general pricing information of these alternatives.

Considerable emphasis in both the objectives and the activities as defined by the grant is placed on the identification of qualified individuals to provide assistance to the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.

A full accounting of this effort is contained in this report together with an initial list of 235 individuals identified to date as potential program participants.

As a consequence of the total experience of doing this research, and the study and travel particularly in Latin America, two unexpected findings were isolated that the grantees believe deserve special consideration. These findings are presented in connection with a separate and special presentation on Latin America because it was the unique experience in this region that identified their importance. Because of the calendar of elections, it was possible to document many of the other findings by specific research efforts in Latin America. This segment also describes the considerable progress beyond just the basic research that was made in this region.

Following this extensive presentation of the research undertaken and the findings of that research, Section III outlines the planning process and the subsequent eight point plan necessary for putting in place the Democracy Program worldwide.

This optimum plan is then reduced to a five point interim approach to be consistent with available resources. While it will not result in the completion of Phase II as originally defined, it will move the program in that direction, expand its capacity into other regions of the world and most importantly, put in place the foundation to administer the program in the future.

Section IV is a short summary of all that was learned and demonstrates the underlying viability and need for the program. It underscores that the results of the program can

already be utilized by the Agency for International Development and the State Department toward achieving the goal of strengthening democracy around the world and that it can be done in a timely, efficient and effective manner.

This introduction was prepared to outline for the reader the flow and content of what is to follow.

The total report following this introduction is broken into four sections; research, plan, summary. The addendum includes:

- Individuals identified as being potential globalists or specialists;
- Commodity reports;
- Country reports; and
- Resource documents collected.

It should be noted that although much of the material contained in the addendum was used as a basis for this report, this is not written as a formalized research presentation, but rather to incorporate the findings of Phase I and to serve as a planning document for Phase II and III.

Additionally, beyond the material specifically listed in the addendum, this report and the recommended actions is also based on numerous conversations with literally hundreds of people both in this country and in the various countries that were visited. These were evaluated based on an accumulated 40 years of election experience brought to this project by the principals. It is this experience that uniquely equipped them to undertake the Democracy Program.

Their experience, however, was complemented by one of the documents listed in the bibliography, which deserves special attention:

U.S. Assistance to Elections to the Third World
by Marilyn Anne Zak.

This study prepared by Ms. Zak for the National War College should be considered a necessary supplement to this report. Her help and assistance in this entire project was invaluable.

It provides a valuable overview of the history of United States' involvement in foreign elections and a comprehensive analysis of just what that involvement can and should be, neither of which were within the purview of this grant.

The completion of Phase I is the first step of a process that when complete, will result in the world's greatest democracy having the capacity to assist other peoples around the world to put in place and sustain their own democracies, a valuable and worthwhile undertaking on the part of all those involved.

SECTION II

RESEARCH

The goal of the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project is to strengthen the democratic process around the world by improving the quality of elections.

The principals involved in planning the activities and conducting the research for this project, Eddie Mahe, Jr., Ladonna Y. Lee and Stephen J. McCarthy, brought two comprehensive bodies of knowledge to these tasks.

1. An indepth understanding of the election process, and;
2. A vast amount of experience working and functioning in foreign cultures, particularly those that could be characterized as Third World, the obvious focus of the Democracy Program.

The specific research activities that were undertaken during Phase I included the acquisition and interpretation of data resulting from country visits, observation and analysis of foreign elections, briefings by U.S. and foreign government personnel, interviews with election and government officials and other individuals, and a survey of literature and election material. In addition to the traditional resource documents, election codes from various countries, election personnel training materials, voting instructions, registry information and commodity samples were acquired and cataloged.

One of the early planning activities resulted in the creation of a comprehensive questionnaire. These questionnaires were filled out by numerous individuals probing all areas where it was felt information was needed to either develop base assumptions or analyze elements of the election process. This comprehensive questionnaire was then adapted to specific activities and circumstances such as on site research efforts.

The activities undertaken produced the following results:

1. Identified and examined numerous assumptions/facts that defined the reality and the environment for planning purposes.
2. Analyzed the total election process and then isolated ten elements for particular attention for the Election Assistance Project.
3. Developed a comprehensive data base with extensive information gathered worldwide on each of these ten election elements.
4. Assembled extensive information on election commodities and vendors, and gathered a considerable volume of country specific reference material.
5. Identified a comprehensive list of individuals with expertise in every aspect of elections.
6. Verified the premise that a foundation should be established as the best approach to administer the project.

A more detailed understanding of the volume of activity that was undertaken is needed though, to fully appreciate these findings.

In addition to the literature and material surveys which resulted in approximately 250 items being listed in the resource documents for this report, project participants also observed five elections:

- Guatemala, November 3, 1985;
- Honduras, November 24, 1985;
- Guatemala Run-Off, December 8, 1985;
- Costa Rica, February 2, 1986; and
- Philippines, February 7, 1986.

During each of these five to six day trips, meetings were held with A.I.D. and State personnel, election officials, party representatives and election workers from that country, members of the press corps and U.S. and international observers. Registries were visited. On election day, polling places were visited in diverse locations of the country to analyze the implementation of the election process.

These experiences provided specific data needed to assist in planning the Democracy Program. A detailed questionnaire was filled out on each election. A comprehensive country report was written following each trip. These country reports are in the Addendum.

Visits to two countries outside the parameters of the grant, Japan and El Salvador, were made which resulted in acquiring additional material and data on elections.

With the exception of Costa Rica, grantee participants took part in the U.S. Observer Program and were included in all those activities in addition to their own unique schedule.

In Costa Rica, where there was no formal United States observer program activities, the grantee designed and implemented a free standing program as a model to be used for training purposes. Using independently established contacts from previous trips to Costa Rica and other Latin America countries, the grantee arranged a four day visit to test and refine the proposed in-country training program. This visit resulted in training four United States election experts in Third World elections. These four individuals were:

- Bob Buzinski, Republican consultant;
- Don Fowler, Chairman of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, Chairman of both the Democratic Rules Committee and the Fairness Commission for the Democratic National Committee, Communications Consultant and Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina;
- Ralph Murphine, Democrat political consultant with United States and international expertise; and
- Clifton White, Republican strategist and Director of John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland College, Ashland, Ohio.

Briefing books were provided to the team prior to their departure for Costa Rica and on their arrival, in-depth briefings were provided by the grantees, by Mrs. Sonia Picada and by Mr. Charles Moyer of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights in Costa Rica. Ms. Marilyn Anne Zak served as an informal advisor on this trip.

Activities undertaken by the group during the visit included four separate visits to the Supreme Election Tribunal

including an initial two hour briefing and tour conducted by the senior staff of that organization.

On election day, trip participants visited no less than 30 polling places throughout the country and received in-depth briefings from poll workers at several of these sites. At the close of the day the group returned to the Tribunal and had the opportunity to observe the actual processing of the returned ballots as well as the vote tabulation.

The participants on this trip benefited from the fact that the Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL), created by the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights on January 14, 1983 to give technical advice and to promote elections, is based in Costa Rica. CAPEL has the capability of providing election assistance to most parts of the Latin America/Carribean region and can be used as a model for other regions.

This organization can be a valuable asset to the Democracy Program and has thus far supplied program participants with invaluable data and assistance.

A full record of this trip together with reports filed by each participant in response to the questionnaire can be found in the addendum.

In addition to elections attended in the cited countries, election related activities were evaluated in Columbia, Bangladesh, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Liberia, Portugal, Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Guyana, Sudan, South Vietnam, Ecuador, Kampuchea and Malta.

All the data and information acquired as a result of these research activities have been cataloged according to country, election process element, or other subjects. The data in the file provides both the basis for the following conclusions and the basis on which the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project can grow in the future.

REFINED OBJECTIVES

The first conclusion reached as the total accumulated research was analyzed is that while the objective and secondary objective as initially stated remains valid, both needed to be reworked for greater precision and to better reflect what can be accomplished.

(The objectives were developed in the spring of 1985 and are reiterated in the Introduction of this report.)

Refined Objective

To gather and maintain in a centralized repository in-depth data on all elements of the election process and alternatives as to product and source on needed commodities. Identify, recruit and train individuals from around the world to participate in the program who have an intimate understanding of the total election process or one or more of the separate elements. With this information available, A.I.D. will be positioned to respond to requests from Third World countries for election process assistance in a cost efficient, effective and timely fashion, or for any other use A.I.D. may wish to make of the data.

Refined Secondary Objective

To assure that the program is fully credible and has the resources to be utilized whenever the need or desire arises on the part of A.I.D. by:

- Achieving full involvement and support of leaders in both parties in the United States.
- Involving leading election process experts from other countries, particularly Third World countries.
- Carefully avoiding any involvement in any foreign election that would appear to be favoring one candidate or party over another.

- Protecting the integrity of the program by assuring its utilization directly by A.I.D., or as a resource to those who are directly working with A.I.D. whenever any project involving A.I.D. in a foreign election is underway.

These restated objectives neither add to nor subtract from the original language. They simply define with a great deal more clarity what is intended.

FOUNDATION

Particular attention was focused on the stated secondary objective in determining the best approach to administer the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project on a continuing basis.

During initial discussions with the Director in 1985, the expectation was that a 501(c)3 not for profit, tax exempt education and research foundation would be the most appropriate and the best option to administer the Democracy Program.

Within the context of this refined secondary objective and the overall needs of the program, a considerable amount of directed research and study was done to determine if this in fact would be true.

The first question was what other alternatives might exist that could be utilized to administer the program in the future. Basically only two such alternatives would seem possible, administer the program within A.I.D. or utilize some existing group outside A.I.D. Both of these options were explored.

There was some merit in both but in the final analysis as discussed below, the concept of an independent non-governmental foundation seemed to be the best choice.

There is no question that gathering the factual data on such topics as election elements and commodity costs could be undertaken within A.I.D.

It is possible that the personnel requirements could be met by some ad hoc 'call names on a list' approach but this would not result in the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project achieving the objectives as defined. Further, as will be discussed, one of the real benefits of the program is the 'hands-on' training that election experts from Third World countries can receive by participation in the Democracy Program. This would probably not be possible if the program is totally operated internally within A.I.D.

A more logical choice clearly seemed to be having the program adopted by some existing foundation or other appropriate organization or even have it administered by an outside group on a contract or grant basis.

There are numerous national and international organizations whose goals include the promotion of democracy throughout the world. Some of these organizations are governmental or quasi-governmental, some are education foundations and some are private entities. Many of these organizations' interests and experience equip them to legitimately seek a role in providing election assistance. These outside organizations have their own power and support structures which allow them considerable influence in determining their role and activities in providing election assistance. Many are privately funded and thus outside the control of A.I.D. Others are controlled by other governmental agencies.

The National Endowment for Democracy, (NED), recently created by Congress at the President's request, seemed particularly suited to fulfilling the objective of this mission. This is evident in its Statement of Principals and Objectives:

"To strengthen democratic electoral processes abroad through timely measures in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces."

As part of the legislation that established NED, four additional foundations were provided for, one to be operated by each of the two major political parties, plus funding was included for the Center for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the United States Chamber of Commerce and the Endowment for the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute.

While as noted, language in the enabling legislation would seem to make NED the organization of choice to take on this assignment, there are several reasons why that option may not be as attractive as it appears.

- Only five of its seventeen board members are appointed by the President and thus might be directly responsive to the Administrations' desires.
- NED receives its own Congressional funding and thus is not dependent on A.I.D. for any of its funding.
- Because at least two and probably all four of its affiliated organizations are partisan in their involvement, it will be difficult for NED to sustain the perception necessary to be trusted by all parties in a Third World country.
- The make-up of the organization is totally American and thus the strength that could be gained from international participation is denied.

- NED has been most visible working on election observation projects and as will be noted in Assumption 9, that is not consistent with a highly visible role in assisting with the election process.
- Since being established in 1983, NED has fairly well developed its agenda and it just does not include what is needed to provide election process assistance.

While all other existing organizations might not be ruled out for exactly the same reasons, all would seem to be sufficiently burdened as to make them less than a satisfactory option.

Brief consideration was given to the idea of maintaining the program through some type of contract or grant approach but there would seem to be real questions as to how permanent such an organization could be.

But, much more was considered than just the fact that no other option appeared practical.

In analyzing the alternatives, considerable attention was also given to two additional facts.

1. United States interest and involvement in free and fair elections is likely to occur anywhere in the world anytime.
2. Many individuals and institutions from other countries have a great deal of knowledge and experience in foreign elections.

These two facts, coupled with the unfortunate reality that America and Americans are not always the most loved in some countries, strongly suggests that this program should have a major international presence associated with it.

One way of doing this, if a new independent education and research foundation was established, would be by

including citizens of other countries as founding board members.

These should be individuals with an understanding of the election process, a proven commitment to democracy and sufficient experience in emerging democracies to understand the program and relate to its needs.

This single step may do more than any other thing to establish the program worldwide.

Beyond the need to provide an international basis for the program, other reasons also argue in favor of an outside entity being established, specifically ownership, control, direction and use of the data base.

To fully explain this reasoning, two topics need to be discussed, the nature of how the entity is envisioned to operate and the difference between it and other similar organizations.

As has been noted, the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project is designed to enhance the democratic process by providing assistance for the actual conduct of the election process. Therefore, by definition, once the activities identified as being part of Phase II are completed, the ongoing overhead costs between projects will be the requisite continual updating of the data base which is not a major expense.

Therefore, to avoid having heavy overhead costs take on a life of their own, it would seem advisable to establish a policy in which all necessary activities and support roles

would be provided through various contracts with outside organizations.

The other advantage of this approach is that it would put the focus on the officers and members of the board rather than on paid staff positions. If the individuals recruited for the board provided the desired access and respectability for the foundation it should be much easier to assure the continuity of the program with ongoing funding. Because many basic questions are yet to be answered about the proposed foundation and its board, it was deemed inappropriate at this time to recommend specific individuals to be recruited.

For all these reasons and more, it is strongly recommended that, as per the initial discussion, and as supported by the research completed during Phase I, a unique foundation be created for the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.

This foundation should meet the following criteria:

- International representation on the board;
- All services and support should be provided through contracts with outside groups with no staff or other fixed overhead;
- A policy of full support and cooperation with any entity whose current efforts support achieving the program goal, and;
- Total commitment to maintaining the research base as a continuing resource.

Such a foundation would truly make achieving the goal much closer to reality, while not being competitive with any existing organization.

No known organization has as its primary activity the creation and maintenance of a data base as described. Other organizations are concerned with observing elections, training leaders, exchange visits to broaden the experience and knowledge of various individuals, and many other facets of democracy. However, there are none whose primary concern is purely with the election process itself. The proposed foundation would fill that role.

ASSUMPTIONS

For any project to be undertaken, or plan written, the basic assumptions/facts on which it is going to be based must first be developed. Identifying and developing these assumptions were assigned first priority even as the research activity was underway.

The term "assumption" is used throughout this report in its campaign sense of defining the prospective reality of the world at whatever time the contemplated activities or program is going to be undertaken. Even though the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project would be a continuing program, defining the reality that exists and would be existing at the time the program was being formulated and established was seen as vital to its successful establishment.

Indeed the project itself must reflect the reality of these assumptions if it is to survive and if it will achieve the goal set for it.

Many other assumptions and possible facts were considered but rejected as not being as basic as these. However, the experience of isolating and considering them had the obvious benefit of developing a sensitivity to each which was then reflected in the plan.

As will be readily noted, these assumptions vary considerably as to their thrust but each will, and does have, a very significant impact upon the reality on which the Democracy Program must function.

The text fully develops the reason why the item is felt important enough to be given separate treatment, and where relevant, the particular research or experience that precipitated this decision.

ASSUMPTION ONE

THE UNITED STATES, THROUGH THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OR THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ELECTION ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE EITHER PLANNING, OR CONDUCTING, FREE AND FAIR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.

For the past several years, the foreign policy under both Democratic and Republican administrations has provided for direct election assistance to other countries.

This statement is not only true as a consequence of the policies of this administration, it reflects a reality that has been re-occurring throughout this century. While much of the involvement during this entire period has been focused in Latin America, the U.S. has provided election assistance to countries around the world.

The pattern of assistance being focused on Latin America has again been evident since 1980. A.I.D. has spent significant funds to provide election process support to three countries in the region, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala plus provided other assistance to this region.

Additionally, during this period, A.I.D. has provided direct assistance to no less than five other countries around the world including the Philippines. Therefore, because of this demonstrated commitment historically, and unless there is a drastic change in United States foreign policy, it is assumed that the provision of election assistance will be an on-going fact.

Further, the manner in which this election assistance is provided must reflect United States laws and Congressional intent. Congress has frequently included provisions in legislation that made free and fair elections a condition upon which the flow of aid would be based.

The expenditure of election assistance dollars, however, must be sensitive to direction from Congress contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1978 which controls the expenditure of A.I.D. Human Rights Fund.

"funds may not be used directly or indirectly to influence the outcome of any election in any other country."

Thus the policy reflected by both Congress and the Administration is to encourage and assist Third World countries to have free and fair elections, but do so under the absolute rule of not influencing the outcome of these elections.

ASSUMPTION TWO

THERE MUST BE A GOOD FAITH COMMITMENT TO FREE AND FAIR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES RECEIVE ELECTION ASSISTANCE AND ACCEPT UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION.

Elections can be held for many reasons. In some countries elections are held to justify and consolidate the power of a revolutionary government or dictator. In recent times elections have been held to try and pacify the United States or other democratic nations so as to assure a continued flow of foreign aid dollars or other assistance. However, these elections can not always be characterized as free and fair.

But because free and fair elections are a foreign policy objective of the government, a good faith commitment and demonstrated effort toward this goal should be a part of any package that includes election assistance.

The Democracy Program can be a resource for the United States government to achieve this foreign policy objective. A country selected to receive election assistance through the Democracy Program will receive significant direct, and indirect, benefits.

- Considerable funds to assist in the mechanics of holding an election;
- Expertise to assist with the various elements of the election;
- Higher probability of having an election that observers will adjudge to have been free and fair thus perhaps causing other more traditional aid funds to be made available or to remove Congressional restrictions on funds already authorized; and

- Greater international acceptance and thus increased assistance from other free world sources.

These benefits, coupled with a desire on the part of people all over the world to live in a democracy, will result in the Democracy Program being a major stimulant for the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

ASSUMPTION THREE

THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IS NOT THE MASTER OF ITS OWN DESTINY IN DETERMINING THE EXTENT, IF ANY, OF ITS ELECTION INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Political pressure from within our government as well as externally can dictate a course of action which A.I.D. officials are obligated to follow.

In reality this may sometimes mean that A.I.D. will be forced to try and function as a positive influence in situations where its officials realize that that is a near impossibility. In other instances, when they would believe that the opportunity exists to have a very positive impact, political reality might dictate a decision that A.I.D. have no involvement.

Because these realities cannot ever really change, A.I.D. must devise options and plans that allow it to execute whatever decision might be made by those with the power to heavily influence, if not in fact dictate such decisions. These decisions could range from full and total visible involvement in a country's election to no involvement or support of any kind directly or indirectly to virtually every degree between these two extremes.

ASSUMPTION FOUR

THE ABSENCE OF ANY CENTRAL REPOSITORY FOR DATA AND INFORMATION ON FOREIGN ELECTIONS HAS RESULTED IN A LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY. THEREFORE, EACH ELECTION PROJECT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH MINIMUM BENEFIT FROM PAST EXPERIENCES, NO ACCUMULATED DATA AND LITTLE CAPACITY TO LEARN FROM PREVIOUS MISTAKES.

This means that A.I.D. officials are forced to make decisions or evaluate proposals with little or no knowledge or information. Situations have developed where A.I.D. has found itself having to depend on entities or individuals whose credentials were very weak for the activity to be undertaken, but no list existed of others who had the required expertise.

This same lack of a central repository goes to an even more basic problem, having the information and the data available to provide specific assistance needed when A.I.D. does get involved.

This problem is magnified by the fact that while the election process is always basically the same, as each country has different laws and customs, each also has a different election process.

For A.I.D. to fully realize its goal of strengthening democracy, A.I.D. officials need to have available (to them) total and complete information to understand these differences. These files must be aggregated and assembled by people who understand elections so that whatever the need or problem, the best answer, the most relevant example can be quickly retrieved.

ASSUMPTION FIVE

NO SINGLE ORGANIZATION WILL SERVE AS AN EXCLUSIVE FOCAL POINT OR VEHICLE FOR ALL OF A.I.D.'s, OR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS' INVOLVMENT IN DIFFERENT WAYS IN DIFFERENT ELECTIONS AROUND THE WORLD. THIS INCLUDES THE PROPOSED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATAION. THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF THIS ASSUMPTION IS A COMPANION ASSUMPTION THAT SUCH A MULTIPLICITY OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH THE SAME SHARED OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING DEMOCRACY MEANS THERE WILL ALWAYS BE SOME CONFUSION AND OVERLAP OF ACTIVITY.

It will not always be A.I.D., or even the State Department, that is the driving force behind our government's involvement in foreign elections.

Because of these two facts, no single organization and the assurance of multiple organizations with independent funding sources, clearly impacts how the following plan was designed. Acknowledging that no one entity will always be the vehicle through which A.I.D. channels its involvement, however, is not the same as saying there should be no entity that is the primary focus of this type of involvement.

While optimally it might be most efficient and effective if all A.I.D.'s involvement could be channeled through one entity, even if that entity then sub-contracted significant portions of the work, political reality is that that will never be the case.

Outside organizations have many friends in Congress and in government; various individuals and entities have access to decision makers or 'pressure generators' that virtually dictates some role for them. Many others have non-government provided resources available for this effort that assures they will be playing a role whether or not they have

a direct relationship with A.I.D.

Thus, at any given time on any given project, A.I.D. may be forced to deal with multiple outside organizations in order to provide election assistance, a situation which leads to confusion and overlapping jurisdictions as well as to inadequate and ineffective assistance.

Realistically there may well be instances when the only way sufficient control can be obtained, is for A.I.D. to be directly involved with a number of entities. This might be necessary to assure the maximum effectiveness of all the resources being allocated to a specific election from all sources.

While the concept of one more foundation whose primary agenda is to administer the Democracy Program may not eliminate the confusion and duplication, it will definitely decrease it. A.I.D. officials will then have accurate data and facts on which to base their decisions when deciding what roles are needed and which organization is best equipped to fill each.

ASSUMPTION SIX

WHILE MANY ELECTIONS CAN BE ANTICIPATED (SUCH AS IN GUATEMALA, HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR RECENTLY) THE GREATEST CHALLENGE AND THE GREATEST EXPENSE TO A.I.D. WILL BE THOSE WHICH OCCUR OUTSIDE THE NORMAL FLOW OF EVENTS AND USUALLY ON AN ABBREVIATED TIME SCHEDULE, SUCH AS THE RECENT ELECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.

This assumption is related to how the data base must be compiled and the need for the entity that is charged with maintaining it to have a continuous flow of resources. While the situation in the Philippines called for an election in just weeks, that did not present an impossible burden because a history of elections exists there.

In other circumstances when a country is moving towards a first election, or even a first election for a decade or more, even a year's notice is marginal.

But reality is that countries will continue to request assistance at the 11th hour and decisions will be made and imposed on A.I.D. that these requests be honored.

Therefore, even though more costly and more difficult to complete, because the luxury of preparation time will not always be available, the data base must be created and maintained on an ongoing basis as defined in the next assumption.

ASSUMPTION SEVEN

THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED GLOBALLY AND AS ONE FOR THE PURPOSES OF PLANNING AND FUNDING. HOWEVER AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL BOTH IN TERMS OF DATA AND PERSONNEL, IT MUST FUNCTION ON A REGIONAL BASIS

As stated in Assumption Four, the fundamental underlying premise of the Democracy Program is that while in the simplest context all elections are the same, in fact the elections of each country are substantially unique. Each will reflect the totality of the society in which it is being held, the nature of the government, its history and its leaders, the cultural norms and mores of the people, the education, the lifestyle and material possessions of its citizens, the geography, the climate, the size of the country, all of which makes each country unique unto itself. As noted in the introduction, for ease of communication in this report these collective items are simply referred to as the 'culture and environment' of a country.

While, as stated each country is different and must be treated as such for basic operational purposes. The Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project can be broken down into the three broad regions of the world which are consistent with the internal organization of A.I.D.: Latin America/Carribean, Africa, and Asia/Near East.

Elections are at best very difficult experiences for countries not steeped in a tradition of democracy and the regular conduct of same. Therefore, when this excruciatingly difficult experience is going to be undertaken, it is absolutely essential that any assistance which is offered be

consistent with the culture and environment existing and, equally important, be managed by individuals who are sensitive and knowledgeable about both.

As will be reflected in the plan, this requires some duplication both in the area of recruiting expertise in various of the election elements as well as in the refinement of the data base on those elements.

The advantage of this though, coupled with the separation of the election process into ten elements, is that there will be considerable flexibility as to the timing of the development of each region and each element. This will allow the program to both go forward in smaller units and to reflect any needs that A.I.D. might anticipate.

ASSUMPTION EIGHT

THE ELECTION PROCESS MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A SUM OF ALL ITS PARTS EVEN WHILE ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON ITS VARIOUS SEPARATE ELEMENTS.

This assumption is very important. The focus of the entire research effort vis a vis the election process is on the ten elections elements earlier mentioned.

These elements are seen as the core of the process and in fact in most circumstances the involvement of A.I.D. will be with only a few of the elements and not the entire process.

The result of this could easily be too much attention being paid at the micro level and too little on the total election process itself. In fact, if any aspect of the process from the establishment of the election commission, to the handling of the ballots after the count is complete, has been flawed then the desired objective of furthering the democratic process may not be realized. This means that the involvement of A.I.D., directly or indirectly, must be based on a knowledge and assurance that all aspects of the election process are in place, or are going to be in place, to ensure a free and fair election. Even if A.I.D.'s involvement is limited, if the potential exists for a suspect result because some aspect of the election process was not adequately dealt with, United States involvement can then be tainted by association. It may not be possible for A.I.D. or its agent and thus the United States government to stand apart from any resulting problems.

Having the expertise available to be able to evaluate the total process may well be one of the most significant assets A.I.D. realizes from the Democracy Program.

ASSUMPTION NINE

THE FUNCTION AND THE NATURE OF A PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ELECTION PROCESS ASSISTANCE OPERATES FROM A TOTALLY DIFFERENT BASIS THAN DOES A PROGRAM WHICH PROVIDES ELECTION OBSERVERS.

While both programs might be involved in the same election and could in fact be mutually supportive, the underlying premise of the two programs is fundamentally different.

The Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project is set up to assist Third World countries with the process of having free and fair elections. Those organizations sponsoring observer programs are concerned with the result, not in assisting with the process.

Observers, by definition and by the nature of the time limits on the assignment, generally have minimal involvement with election officials; conversely those working on the election process can only be successful if they have a close and supportive working relationship with local election officials.

There can be no confusion on this point. If observers in any way become, or are seen as being involved in the process, then their credibility to judge the final process must of necessity be suspect.

While individuals recruited and trained to work on the Democracy Program will also be uniquely qualified to function as election observers, and probably most will have done so at various times, it would be essential that none

who were involved with an election assistance project in a given country have any involvement in an observer program for that same election.

As contrasted with research activity and providing the "hands on" expertise that is needed to put the mechanics of an election process in place, there are a number of organizations and individuals who have developed expertise in the setting up and running of observer programs.

While the case might be made that these programs would benefit by having someone or some organization available to them to provide more detailed information about the election process itself which they are observing, the fact is this country can and does put in place quality teams that are capable of making reasoned judgement about the election being observed.

A.I.D. has been and will continue to be involved in both functions.

To achieve maximum impact from both, however, it should be recognized that two totally separate activities are involved and that they need to be treated that way.

ASSUMPTION TEN

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK OF ESTABLISHING AND OPERATING A PROGRAM AS PROPOSED BY THE DIRECTOR OF A.I.D. TO HAVE A WORLDWIDE CAPACITY TO ASSIST IN THE ELECTION PROCESS IS EXCEEDED ONLY BY ITS VALUE. THUS, WHEN THE PROGRAM IS FULLY OPERATIONAL, A.I.D. WILL HAVE AT ITS DISPOSAL A TRULY UNIQUE AND VALUABLE RESOURCE.

This assumption must be given the status of absolute fact.

As previously noted, there are many organizations and individuals in the United States and around the world that profess some interest, some expertise in the matter of elections in newly established or struggling democracies in Third World countries. They all have some knowledge about some piece or another of the process in different countries or circumstances.

The simple fact is though, that if a question on such a topic emerges, it is more likely easier to do the research and discover an original answer than it is to track down the one organization or individual in the world who has previously addressed that question.

There is no comprehensive project or program that consolidates all the requisite expertise and specifically focuses it on the election process, its elements, and how direct assistance can best be made to Third World countries seeking to successfully conduct an election.

The consequence continues to be a sporadic, unfocused program sponsored by the United States in an area that has a

high priority within this Administration, support for people and countries who want to have a functioning democracy with freely elected leaders.

The Democracy Program, as envisioned by the Director of the Agency for International Development if properly developed, funded, and implemented would possess the attributes needed to provide the support for A.I.D. to achieve its goal of strengthening democracies by improving the quality of elections.

As earlier stated, many other assumptions were considered and rejected for this list. While the ultimate selection of the items included was very arbitrary in nature, the point remains that these 'truths' must be factored in as the Democracy Program goes forward.

Together, they substantially define the reality under which the program must exist and if that is done it will go a long way towards assuring that the goal will be realized.

ELECTION PROCESS

An election is both a series of separate and identifiable actions and, at the same time, a single process resulting in a collective decision by a country's citizens as to whom they wish to have as their leaders.

That collective end result cannot happen if those separate actions do not occur in a timely, effective and credible fashion, but equally those actions are meaningless if the end result is not achieved.

Generally, in examining the election process, the focus is rather simplistically on registering and voting. Registration is commonly seen as an overwhelming undertaking with many potential problems. But in new and struggling democracies, the total process from registration of voters to certification of winners is all fraught with problems.

The various steps or elements of the election process can be identified and segmented in many ways.

One of the objectives of the research undertaken for this project was:

"To identify and segment the total election process into specific elements most relevant to the election process in Third World countries."

Each of the identified elements could then be studied with the aim of determining how to either improve its operation and implementation or how to duplicate it in any country or region when an election project was being considered by A.I.D. If this were successfully done, it

would mean both lower costs and less time necessary whenever A.I.D. undertook such a project.

Each element was thoroughly analyzed and alternative approaches and considerations developed. Because the elements are closely integrated, it was necessary to research and analyze each as unique processes and then as a part of the total election.

The fold-out chart at the end of this introduction graphically demonstrates this. The sequence of the election process is arranged across the page and then identified both with the elements and over the time when it actually impacts the system. For example, on election day, no less than eight of the elements come into play. However, as can readily be seen, some are only a factor on that one day, while others literally are a part of the process from beginning to end.

The capability exists to provide assistance for any one or any combination of these elements. However, to maximize the assistance provided to any election, the first step should be an analysis of the total process. After this analysis, a recommendation can be made as to what types of assistance will most directly improve the election, and then decisions made on how to best deliver that assistance.

For example, to undertake an election assistance project of training polling officials without a comprehensive understanding of the law and the counting and tabulation process, would undoubtedly result in a flawed

program. Or, as is more probable, to respond to a request for creating or updating a registry without a full analysis of the resources allocated for the total election and the management system that is in place, may result in providing election assistance for the wrong project.

After considerable research and study on improving the quality of elections in Third World countries, ten separate actions/steps/elements were determined in this analysis as having sufficient separate identity and impact to deserve unique focus.

These ten election elements are briefly outlined to explain why they were selected as the critical elements and why others that might have been listed are not.

- A. Establishment of the body of laws and regulations necessary to hold free and fair elections and the creation of the entity which will administer these laws and oversee in its entirety the conduct of the election process.

The law and the entity obviously exists in any country that has had in place any type of an election process. But where such has not been the case, or the laws have proven inadequate or structurally the entity has been too weak to perform, then this must be the first matter addressed.

- B. Development of and/or updating voter registration lists.

When the determination is made that there is going to be a list of voters, it is a commitment to a major undertaking.

C. Development of the mechanics of the process and procedures for use at the voting stations.

The process must comfortably work for each voter while being easily administered.

D. Recruitment and training of poll workers.

This is a critical step towards achieving a smooth functioning process at the voting table.

E. Development and provision of election day transportation.

The right to vote is meaningless if the voters cannot reasonably get to the polls.

F. Acquisition, distribution and collection of voting materials.

This is a major logistical effort that while it may be considered routine, can be extremely difficult to complete in some situations.

G. Planning and implementation of a security system to protect the voter and the integrity of the vote.

The voter must feel safe and also believe that the vote he or she casts will contribute to the outcome of the election.

H. Developing the process for counting, reporting and certification of votes.

This element covers several actions within the process completed at different times, but all are part of determining the winner after the votes have been cast and the polls have been closed.

- I. Development and oversight of the management and operational systems necessary to put a total election day process in place.

In countries with any history of conducting reasonably successful elections, this expertise should already exist. For new or very tentative democracies, it is an area of major concern that must be addressed very early in the process.

- J. Establishment and/or fashioning the environment that allows democracy to flourish by educating the citizens on the voting process and encouraging the continued commitment of the citizens and their leaders to maintaining a democracy.

This element would include efforts to stimulate voter turnout, but also programs designed to create an expectation that the democratic process will work for the betterment of the country and all its citizens.

Each of these election elements is thoroughly discussed in the following pages. Clearly other distinctions could have been made, some of these consolidated, or even in the case of the latter two, ignored entirely. Equally, some of these could have been broken down even further or some concepts added which have been omitted entirely.

Notable amongst those omitted would be the elements of candidate selection and ballot access. Most assuredly any election process that does not allow for reasonable ballot access by aspiring candidates cannot be characterized as a real, functioning democracy. However, because this step in the process can get very close to being perceived as attempting to influence the results, it was decided that

it not be included as an element in the Democracy Program. Those who are making the decisions on providing support based on whether a real democracy is in place and functioning need to be sensitive to this element. Although not included as an element, the data-base of election laws and regulations would include examples of applicable laws and regulations on this issue as it does on many others not specifically separated as elements.

The point being very simple, other elements could be included, some of these could be excluded or combined and each approach defensible. However, after considerable research, the use of these ten elements seems to result in sufficient separation and identification to provide measurable assistance while not fragmenting the process in such a way as to cause so much diffusion and overlap as to prevent effective implementation.

These ten election process elements are defined and then discussed both in the context of their importance to the election process and relevancy to the Democracy Program.

Again, it should be remembered that although each element is listed separately, they are interdependent and must be understood as part of an integrated process.

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DEMOCRACY PROGRAM/ELECTION ASSISTANCE PROJECT

ELECTION ELEMENTS

Election Elements Key

Commitment to
maintaining J
the democracy

Winner sworn in I & J

Winner declared H, I & J

Count certified G, H & I

Ballots and other C, D, F, G & I
materials collected

Count reported C, D, G, H & I

Votes counted C, D, G, H, I & J

Voting R, C, D, E, F, G, I & J

Polls open C, D, G & I

Materials distributed to C, D, F, G & I
polling places

Intense effort undertaken to encourage voter participation I & J

Poll workers C, D & I trained

Ballots printed C, F, G & I

Election day transportation E & I
system designed

Poll workers D, I & J recruited

All necessary commodities for F & I
election day ordered

Security system for total C & I
process designed

Voters registered B, I & J

Voter registration B, C & I
system designed

Process, rules and regulations A, C & I
adopted for holding elections

Election authority A established

Effort ongoing to establish positive environment for maintaining a J
democracy

Democracy established and A
elections called .

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BODY OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS NECESSARY TO HOLD FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AND THE CREATION OF THE ENTITY WHICH WILL ADMINISTER THESE LAWS AND OVERSEE IN ITS ENTIRETY THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION PROCESS.

In countries where elections have been held, whether democratic or not, the constitution provides authority and sometimes the process for elections. The constitution and electoral laws, codes or regulations, in combination with local customs and traditions, govern the election process.

The first priority of those involved in creating a democracy is to establish the constitutional authority and legislative provisions for holding elections.

In countries which are contemplating or being encouraged to hold election, a full examination of existing election laws should proceed announcing the election if at all possible, in countries which are contemplating or being encouraged to hold elections.

If the election laws need to be changed, the process of developing and recommending appropriate and requisite changes must be handled in an extremely sensitive manner. These changes can become an issue if they threaten the integrity of the election process. For example, in Honduras, the adoption of the Uruguayan election system five months prior to the election resulted in charges that President Suazo was attempting to manipulate the system.

The actual implementation of the voting process cannot overwhelm bad law (e.g. just because a citizen votes does not mean that the law or election regulations assured that the vote was accurately counted.) Equally true is that while good law can protect the election process against incidental abuse and make flagrant violation easier to detect and punish, good law does not automatically produce a good process (e.g. proper counting procedures can't count a vote never cast because of a lack of transportation).

A country's election laws must reflect its culture and environment. For example, there is virtually no provision in Japanese election law to deal with illiterate voters. Illiteracy is not a common problem in Japan. However in Guatemala where the illiteracy rate is fairly high in some areas, the entire election process has been devised to accomodate such voters.

Perhaps the most important component of the election law is setting up the entity that is going to administer the law and control the total election process.

While the election laws and regulations may provide for free and fair elections, it is the administration and implementation of these laws that will determine whether or not the election becomes a reality.

Each and every element of the election will be impacted by the rules and decisions made by the election commission.

If, as is the case in Costa Rica, the election commission is held in the highest regard, then the integrity and result of the election will have a high degree of credibility. In Costa Rica, the Supreme Election Tribunal is unofficially considered the fourth branch of the government and thereby is seen as validating the entire election process.

Conversely, when the administering entity is seen as a tool of a corrupt administration, then it is virtually impossible for the election results to be seen as valid by anyone. This was most obviously the case in the recent Philippine election where the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) became an issue in the election. The fact that this occurred attests to the importance of the election laws and how the election administration entity (i.e. commission or tribunal) is established.

In developing and implementing an election, careful consideration must be given to at least the following factors if credibility is to be achieved.

How will the members of the election commission be selected and appointed? What level of independence will the system have from the incumbent government, particularly the head of that government? What will be the openness of the appointment process to outside inspection and evaluation? What ability will party and/or candidate observers or the press have to inspect the actions of the election commission?

Three examples of the establishment of the entity to administer the election system are Guatemala where the members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal are appointed by the Supreme Court, Venezuela where the Supreme Electoral Council members are elected by Congress, and the Philippines where the members of COMELEC are unilaterally appointed by the President.

Obviously, when a regime is under attack as was the case with President Marcos of the Philippines, an election controlled by his appointees is unlikely to have any credibility with the voters or the world. Or conversely, in the Dominican Republic, two of the members of the Central Electoral Commission resigned when the governing party's presidential candidate, Jacobo Majluta, claimed victory even though the official results showed him in second place.

In addition to the commission membership, consideration must be given to the staffing and funding requirements to administer each election.

Even with outside expertise for planning and oversight, the day to day implementation of the election plan must be administered by the commission and/or staff. Thus, in addition to specific election related costs and personnel needs, an internal operations plan and overhead budget must be incorporated into the total election plan.

The selection of the key staff is critical to the success of the election. Disruptions in staffing either because of resignations or firing can seriously impair the election implementation.

Less than one month prior to the December 3, 1984 election in Grenada, the Supervisor of Elections and 25 staff members were fired creating considerable turmoil.

If operational control rests with a paid staff person, adequate checks and balances by the commission must be established.

The commission must be set up to ensure a good working relationship with various governmental entities, private organizations and political parties.

In countries with recently established democracies, the involvement of and assistance from other experienced election officials of similar cultures can be of tremendous benefit to commission members attempting to set up a total election process. The Association of Electoral Institutions of Central America and the Caribbean, established in September, 1985, provides for the exchange of information on electoral procedures and the development of elections between its members.

The Democracy Program has the capability to assist with exchanges of information in other regions between election commissions or to assist in developing similar organizations.

As a result of the research undertaken to date, it is clear that the Democracy Program will need to have readily available a comprehensive file on election laws and commissions from around the world. Considerable data has

already been gathered as a result of Phase I research activities. Additional supplemental materials may be obtained from the Association of Electoral Institutions which has compiled a library of election codes, regulations, etcetera from its member countries.

This data will require further analysis keyed to both the cultures from which it originated and the success of its application.

Ultimately, the files of election laws must be computerized and key word coded so that any specific election law can be quickly identified then cross-referenced back into a master file for access by any election element or country/region.

Experts for drafting and/or analyzing election law need to be identified in every region to provide assistance if it is not available locally.

This data base and these experts provide the basis for the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project to assist in establishing new democracies and strengthening existing ones.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF AND/OR UPDATING OF VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS

The creation and maintenance of the comprehensive list of eligible voters is a major element in the election process. There are few situations more complex than creating and maintaining a voter registry. This is equally true whether the list must reflect all adult citizens in those countries with mandatory voting or where registration is voluntary and serves merely as registration for voting purposes only.

In either instance, the system achieves the best results when the fact of being registered is keyed to some other collateral benefit or need. Examples of this can be seen even in the United States where in the State of Alaska the voter registration list is used as one of the base lists to determine eligibility for the "dividend" paid to all the state's residents each year. And in Vermont, the Governor has proposed combining the voter and auto registration lists.

The development of a registry involves a three step process:

1. Identifying the voters either from existing lists, a total canvass, a voluntary registration effort, or from some other data;
2. Compiling these names into a master list.
3. Verifying the validity of the list through inspection by parties, candidates, and voters.

The costs incurred in just creating a registry can be enormous and can be the largest single cost item in establishing a democracy.

Each country has different attitudes and sensitivities as to what information should be included in its registry. The registry may be as simple as name, address and polling station or as complex as including various demographic data not critical to the voting process. In some countries there has been concern that a detailed registry could potentially be used against the citizenry by a hostile government. Therefore, in designing a registry, as with all the election process elements, it must be adapted to that country and its particular culture and environment.

There must also be sensitivity to the role of individual citizens, the entity controlling the registration activities, and the country's political parties. If the process to develop a registration system involves all of these entities, it will also help to ensure the integrity of that process.

It would generally be the case that those countries in the world where there is some possibility of a new democracy coming into existence are countries where the literacy level is fairly low, the government is only marginally adequate at the administrative and execution level and generally the standard of living is very low. Therefore, just the challenge of designing a registration system that can be effectively assimilated by the electorate is no small undertaking.

Due to the complexity and costs of establishing a registry, some countries have chosen not to use a registry. Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia (1979) and Gabon and Mozambique (1978) did not use a registry for their elections. And, to this date in the United States, North Dakota does in only a few towns. However, without a registry, the process of determining who is eligible to vote and preventing voter fraud is more difficult for both the voter and the polling officials. Therefore, generally a registry should be used unless the entire population is largely geographically contained and thus the costs and effort are not justified.

Because the world is what it is today, most often the development of a new registry will be keyed to some level of computerization. The costs involved can be very great because there is generally an expectation in the country that a gift of the necessary computer equipment from the United States government should somehow be part of the deal. This is especially true in Latin America where that precedent has been set.

Before any hardware is purchased or software designed, agreement must be reached on many items. What information on each voter will be included in the registry? How many voters will the system include? How many names will be printed for each polling place? How and when will updating occur? Will the computer system be used for tabulating the results?

Decisions must also be made if the registration system is to serve needs other than providing a list of eligible voters for election day. Will it also be used as a civil registry? Will the equipment be used to directly input names of eligible voters in the field? Will the system be used to provide voters by phone with the location of their polling station? Will the equipment be used to tabulate the election results?

Unless these questions and others are answered, the computer hardware and software selected may prove to be unable to handle the entire process.

Beyond the sheer problem of trying to introduce some level of computer sophistication, the more traditional problems of putting in place a system that effectively makes it possible for all citizens to register still exists.

The decision must be made as to whether there will be a census or voluntary registration or some combination. The size of the country, both by population and geography, the existence of any registry, available manpower, etcetera, will help determine the most effective method of registration. It is equally important that the process for registering does not inhibit the citizens' ability to vote. In the recent Philippine election, new voters were required to submit four recent pictures during the registration process, a burden for most. In the province of Tarlac, only 400 of the 5,000 individuals eligible submitted pictures. An

additional 200 later provided the photos. Thus, just over ten percent were able to meet this requirement for registration.

In 1984, William Kimberling designed a comprehensive plan for creating a voluntary system of registries in Liberia. The Liberian system would have resulted in each elector in Liberia receiving a voter registration card and his or her name being placed in a registry.

The contractor involved in developing the registry in Honduras used a less sophisticated method than the one proposed by Kimberling. The results, while still very costly, elicited considerable confidence from the electorate.

However, even if a registry has been recently established as in Honduras, there is often an immediate and real need to undertake major efforts to revamp and update the system. As demonstrated by a recent request to undertake such a project in that country, this can involve as much expense as the original registration project. Recent analysis of the El Salvador registry addressed the same problem.

The registration process must contain time for the political parties and voters to examine the registration lists prior to the election to ensure their accuracy. Time should be scheduled for challenges and/or a re-registration period which will then require more computing time prior to the distribution of the final lists.

In developing the process for voting, the forms and procedures should be developed to allow for updating the registry with new information. For example, in Honduras if the voter's name was not on the registration list but he had a valid registration card he could vote. If these voter lists were used to update the registration list post-election, the names of those individuals recorded manually during voting could be used to update the registry.

Because the registry process involves such tremendous sums of money to be implemented, it needs particular attention. There is no other area where such tremendous cost savings are possible by keying future efforts to what has been learned in the past. Some types of computer hardware work better than others and some vendors perform better than others. Computer software has been developed which, even if it needs modification, still can provide at least a model. Even having the identity of those who have developed such software packages could be immensely valuable.

Completing the research on the various systems, identifying vendors and suppliers, providing a collection point for registry experience gathered from around the world will result in a resource that can save innumerable dollars in the future.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MECHANICS OF THE PROCESS AND PROCEDURES FOR USE AT THE VOTING STATIONS

The importance of the exact process that occurs as the voters cast their ballot cannot be overstated because for most voters it is the part of the election process which most intimately and most personally touches them.

The experience of casting their ballot will tend to influence them most as they decide what level of confidence to place both in their democracy and in the capacity of their government to run a democracy.

For the voting experience to have a positive impact, the voter should be able to:

1. Vote in a calm and perceptively well organized environment;
2. See the list of eligible voters and see that his or her name is on it;
3. See that the process is controlled enough to have confidence that only those who are legitimately entitled to do so will be allowed to vote;
4. Know with absolute certainty that his or her vote strictly reflects a secret ballot; and
5. Know that he or she will be free of harrassment while at the polling place.

If all these factors and many more are to a greater than lesser extent present at the polling place, then the individual voter is going to believe that in fact a democratic system is working. This is not easy to achieve because thousands of volunteers will be working as poll workers, many of them for the first time even in countries with a history of elections.

As discussed in the next element, the training of poll workers is critical to the voting experience. A poorly trained poll worker will almost inevitably result in the voter having a bad experience.

Election codes vary dramatically in terms of controlling activities in and around the voting area on election day. In some systems all campaigning ends days before the election, while in others such as the United States and Costa Rica, considerable activity outside the polls is permitted on election day. Perhaps as a consequence of this, in both these countries all the voting places are inside buildings whereas in Guatemala, where no election day campaigning is allowed, many of the voting tables are set up on the sidewalk in full view of the citizens who are able to sit across the street and watch everything that happens.

Clearly in systems such as the latter, especially when a clear plastic bag is used as a ballot box, it is excruciatingly difficult for any fraud to be practiced during the actual voting itself thus the electorate would tend to have more confidence in the results.

However, as has been stated, when dealing with elections and the election process the system must reflect the culture and the environment of the country. The following types of questions are examples of those that need to be answered prior to the development of the actual voting procedures to assure that result.

How will voters identify themselves at the polls i.e. are they going to be issued voter registration cards? Do the voters need to be marked to avoid multiple voting if the method of identification or registry itself is fairly weak? What provision is made to assist the illiterate voters, e.g. using pictures or symbols on the ballot?

There are a host of other questions that must be given critical consideration. Registration cards are often ruled out because of a variety of problems such as re-issuing cards when they're lost. In countries with a high percentage of illiteracy, such as in Sierra Leone, Bangladesh or amongst the Indian population in the uplands of Guatemala, then every aspect of the balloting procedures must reflect that problem.

Many additional decisions must be made about how the ballots are going to be controlled, where the ballot box is going to be located, how the voting booth will be erected to assure the sanctity of the secret ballot and numerous others.

In addition to these precise questions of procedure, the role of election observers, be they party, candidate or independent, needs to be defined and procedures developed to assure that the rules are followed.

The role of such observers is so important that in 1986 the role of NAMFREL in the Philippines was hotly debated in the world's press.

The instructions and rules governing the balloting process must be written and distributed to each polling location. These procedures must be written and available in time to be used in the training of poll workers and party observers. Examples of these written procedures have been collected from several countries and from a number of jurisdictions within the United States.

In addition to clearly written instructions, it is desirable that in each local area an election official be available to the voters on election day to settle any challenges. Most obviously, how this person is appointed and trained is critical if there is to be a free and fair election.

However, in spite of the tremendous amount of detail necessary to develop voting procedures, the final process itself must be fairly simple to understand and use. If it is not, training and written instructions notwithstanding, the poll workers will have difficulty administering it, the voters may face delay or difficulty in casting their votes, and the result may be an election process that is perceived as flawed.

The voting process incorporates most of the election elements, the culmination of a highly coordinated, diverse effort occurring in the 3 or 4 minutes it takes each voter to cast his or her ballot. It is a complex undertaking that must result in each voter easily casting his vote for the party or candidate of his choice.

D. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF POLL WORKERS

For the democratic process to be strengthened in any country, the people must have confidence that the election was real, that their vote counted and that the results reflect the will of the people.

An integral component of a successful election, in fact and perception, is the quality of the election experience of the individual voter. The quality of this experience is to a considerable extent determined by how well the official poll workers and observers have been trained. They must understand the physical voting process, know the requirements for eligible voters and know how to handle challenges.

Beyond the obvious point that the poll workers represent the only actual contact the average voter will have with the system, they also carry a considerable amount of the burden for the integrity of the election process.

From the time the polls open, with all observers satisfied that the ballot box starts the day empty, until the counting process is completed and the vote reported hours later, how well this group performs defines the success of election day.

Poll workers must be capable of handling the full assignment, unaided, from opening the polling place to completing the count and be able to do so in such a way as to generate confidence amongst their friends and neighbors.

The need for well trained poll workers is even greater in many of the countries where the Democracy Program will be functioning. Due generally to a lack of adequate transportation or communication systems in these countries, quite often the poll workers will have little or no support available to them.

The argument could probably be made that, for example, failure to deliver the election day supplies to the polling places could have a more disastrous consequence than a poorly trained poll worker. This argument is true, and probably the election might even be held if all the poll workers were poorly trained. However, as stated, the quality of the experience at the polling place has a major impact on the confidence each individual voter has in the election results. The quality of this experience is a direct consequence of the mechanics and procedures used at the polling place and of how well the poll workers have been trained.

This training can only be planned and executed after all the mechanics and procedures for use at the polling stations have been developed.

While the focal point of this element is the actual training, the process begins with the recruitment of these workers. The recruitment of election workers from each party helps ensure a balanced and fair effort. In countries where there have been elections in fairly recent times such as Venezeula, the process is made easier because there is at least a list from which to begin.

In some countries there is no cadre of trained workers at all, either because this is the first election ever, or the first in a very long time. In 1980, because of a shortage of available workers, 581 British police officers were flown to Southern Rhodesia to serve as Assistant Election Supervisors.

Recruiting and training a sufficient number of workers to the level of skill necessary to assure the desired positive experience on election day is a major challenge. The politics of the selection and training, the mechanics of the recruiting process and the setting up and implementation of the training systems represent massive undertakings.

Even the smallest countries will require thousands of such poll workers in hundreds of locations. The numbers can be doubled or tripled if the voting period extends over a series of days as in India.

For these reasons and more particular attention needs to be given to the infrastructure that is put in place. There must be sufficient organizational levels to assure that those supervising the actual poll workers have manageable workloads given distances, roads and communications in the area where they will be working.

As stated, the first step towards a positive election day experience is the recruitment of poll workers and it is here that oftentimes ultimate success is determined. If the election has been presented positively by the government and the media, then the more able individuals may be attracted

to serve as poll workers. Conversely, recruitment of poll workers can be complicated if the election climate is such that prospective poll workers would have reason to be concerned about violence.

Each worker recruited must be trained to carry out a wide variety of tasks on election day, to answer numerous questions, while at the same time exuding a feeling of confidence and control.

Following recruitment, who does the training and how and when it is accomplished, are all very touchy questions. In many instances the parties are the mechanism through which the training is done. This can result in inadequate training across the board. While some parties may have the capacity to train virtually all their workers, other parties may not have the resources to make any effort.

Thus if the parties are responsible for training, the effort to provide the election workers with complete and easily understood written instructions is critical. Poorly or non-trained workers can result in a slow and laborious process or, at worst, the disenfranchisement of eligible voters.

Beyond the training needed for the official workers in the polling place, there is also a need to train party, candidate or quasi-official poll watchers such as the NAMFREL watchers in the Philippines. These individuals, if properly trained, can provide considerable reinforcement to the case that a free and fair election was held and their role in observing the counting process can be critical to

the integrity of the results.

If considerable time has passed since the last election, it might be desirable to utilize trainers from other countries. However, any such effort must be handled with extreme sensitivity. When such out-of-country assistance is needed, the use of an organization indigenous to the region may well offer the best chances for success.

A model for such an organization exists in Latin America, the Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL). Because it is a multi-national effort and indigenous to Latin America it was able to provide effective training for election day workers in Guatemala by working with the Center for the Study of Politics, (CEDEP), a Guatemalan non-partisan organization. However, it is worth noting that in Honduras, because one of the Presidential candidates had previously served on CAPEL's board, its assistance was deemed as too political and thus not acceptable.

In 1986, the Asia Foundation received a \$369,000 grant from A.I.D. for educational materials and the training of poll watchers in the Philippines, even though that country has a long history of elections.

Virtually every training approach imaginable has been used. Many countries including Malaysia and Rhodesia have used film or videotapes; India, Uganda and Guatemala have used booklets; and Mexico produced a 2'x3' colored flip chart that was keyed totally to pictures. In most countries

some type of group training is also attempted but very often that is not universally accomplished.

Thus a total training package that can adequately provide instruction even without a formal training session should be designed. The dissemination of the materials should be timed to allow for questions and clarification but not so early that the information is forgotten or misplaced.

The recruitment and training element is absolutely critical to the election process. Therefore, considerable effort must be expended in researching all possible approaches to developing and implementing a recruitment and training program. An inventory of the local organizations that could be partners in the training process is essential in any country in which this assistance is needed. It is also important that a large number of individuals from a multitude of countries and political backgrounds be identified and recruited to be part of the Democracy Program. This will ensure that someone is available to assist who would also be acceptable to all the key players in any country requesting or needing the assistance.

The recruitment and training element is vital to the success of an election and it is not easily, rapidly or inexpensively put together. Therefore, it is recommended in the election assistance plan that a separate and ongoing project line be established to uniquely deal with this element.

E. DEVELOPMENT AND PROVISION OF ELECTION DAY TRANSPORTATION

Some citizens of Guatemala walked for a day and a night in order to cast their ballot; many in the Costa Rican highlands traveled hours to be able to cast their ballot; numerous voters in Grenada missed a full day's work in order to travel back to their home district to vote. In the United States, where most trips to the polling place is measured in blocks, nearly half choose not to make the trip.

If the desire and the will are present, voters will make every sacrifice to cast their ballot in spite of the transportation hardships they may encounter. However this should not be considered as the norm.

An accessible transportation system is an integral part of the voting process. This is especially true in those countries where many voters live in rural areas and where reality forces fairly tight control of the number of voting places, and thus some fairly long trips to the polling places.

The definition of fairly long trips in most instances might only be 25 or 30 kilometers. However, in an environment where many individual citizens own no form of transportation, neither bicycle nor donkey, let alone a motorized conveyance, and the road infrastructure and public transportation is minimal, this distance can represent a significant hurdle to overcome.

Beyond the need for a transportation system just to assure reasonable access for all citizens to be able to vote, the failure to provide such transportation could also cause considerable skepticism about the election results. If, for example, the losing candidate had greater strength in the rural areas and only narrowly lost, and it was reported that the rural citizens had a very low turnout because of their inability to reach the polls, then surely the lack of a transportation system may cause skepticism concerning the results of the election.

Creating an election day transportation system can involve considerable costs whether utilizing government owned vehicles or leasing privately owned buses and cabs. Beyond these costs, the sheer mechanics of organizing a transportation system can represent a major undertaking.

In many countries, the responsibility for transportation is left to the political parties. For example, in Costa Rica, the two major parties effectively tied up all forms of transportation on election day and aggressively worked to assure that all identified supporters were taken to the polls.

It should be noted that the management problem still exists even when a party assumes the responsibility. On election night in Costa Rica and Honduras, the parties' transportation systems broke down with the result that thousands of voters were stranded in cities and towns miles away from their homes.

While the objective should probably be that the government not be actively involved in providing election day transportation, the fact is that the denial of transportation can in some circumstances be a denial of the right to vote. Therefore, the Democracy Program must be prepared to offer assistance in this most critical area to ensure that transportation has been addressed in the overall plan for the election.

In developing a transportation program, there are a number of separate components that need to be analyzed and then planned for. While they can be listed separately, all the pieces are interdependent e.g. who drives the vehicle is closely related to the source of those vehicles. Also while the transportation system is largely independent from most of the election elements, it is closely tied to the establishment of the voting stations in relationship to the voters residences.

The first and most fundamental decision in developing a transportation system is whether the responsibility for election day transportation is going to be assumed by the government, provided by the candidates and the parties, or by the voters themselves, which is not a real option in many Third World countries. Because these other options represent such fundamentally different systems with wholly different problems and concerns, the pattern of analysis and development differs greatly based on this initial decision.

If it is to be a government provided system, then the immediate concern must be whether the current government will not only allow but assure that the system is equally available to all voters wherever needed throughout the country.

Even if equal access to transportation proves not to be a problem, another point of concern is who is driving the vehicles. At the very least, these individuals may have the last opportunity to influence the voter which in some situations could well turn into intimidation. Even if these concerns are not a problem, there still remains the sheer mechanics of putting a system in place.

A comprehensive analysis of the voting residences of the population must be done in those countries such as Grenada and Honduras where citizens primarily vote in the locale of their birthplace and not where they now reside. Therefore, in addition to whatever transportation demands may exist on election day, consideration must also be given to the problem that a significant percentage of the population will be attempting to return to their ancestral homes before the election and then back to the cities immediately after.

To set up the election day system itself, a full analysis must be completed that reflects the number of individuals who will be needing transportation, the routes that will be traveled, the number of vehicles that will be needed, together with much logistical detail such as fuel availability, etcetra all keyed to each and every polling place in the country.

Since the transportation system must cover the entire country, there are many potential problems in setting up its administration. The ramifications of a poorly planned command structure may not come into play until the end of the day when the system breaks down and the voters are not returned to their homes.

The individuals who have the responsibility for the transportation system must understand logistics and have extremely good managerial skills.

A transportation system developed and administered by the government besides facing both major logistical and managerial challenges, must also guard against the opportunity for abuse during its execution.

If the government is not involved in providing transportation, as is most commonly the case, then the analysis has to focus on different problems. A major consideration from the perspective of the Democracy Program is that the ability to directly impact the process may be limited or nonexistent since the program should not be directly involved with a candidate or party. Thus, if assistance is needed in this area, the manner in which it is provided must be carefully set up and closely monitored to assure that no charges of influencing the election by favoring one party or candidate can be made.

There are other potential problems as well when the responsibility is left totally to the political structure. First, and the most obvious amongst these, is that the smaller parties which have less resources than the major parties and

thus are unlikely to be competitive in getting their voters to the polls. Secondly, assuming that even the major parties or candidates have some limit on their resources, voters in the more rural areas where the assistance is most needed are quite likely going to have to fend for themselves.

In Honduras, the political parties provided the transportation, but it was largely funded by the candidates. The two major parties, the Liberal Party and the Nacional Party, both had extensive transportation systems covering much of the country.

In many of the rural areas, the minor party supporters were riding on the Nacional or Liberal buses because their parties did not supply transportation. Voters walking to the polls would flag down the first transportation available notwithstanding if it was from their party.

In the bigger towns, the buses and trucks would bring the voters to a central staging area. They would then be taken by car or truck to their polling location within the town. (These staging areas were often also the sites for the parties' food centers.)

In any country, the interest of parties and candidates is fairly one dimensional, to get their voters to the polls. However, their level of concern for returning the voter to their homes may be marginal, which can result in considerable inconvenience for a lot of citizens.

Providing transportation for thousands of voters can be extremely expensive. Ideally, the Democracy Program/ Election Assistance Project would only provide the expertise to put the system in place and the actual transportation costs would be borne by the parties, candidates or government.

In the initial assessment of a country's election needs, a determination of the transportation problems and opportunities must be made. If history or current reality dictate that such transportation will or must be provided by the government, then the advice and counsel on how to implement the system in the most effective or efficient manner can be provided by the program.

If the determination is that the government will have no direct role in the voter transportation system, then it must be determined how this might impact the final election results. If the conclusion of the analysis is that the election could be significantly impacted, then numerous and various alternatives must be pursued, such as including assistance from local non-partisan organizations, ear-marked grants to the parties, extended and frequent service for public transportation, outside support from other sources, etcetera, in an attempt to ensure that everyone can, with a reasonable effort, exercise the r right to vote.

F. ACQUISITION, DISTRIBUTION AND COLLECTION OF VOTING MATERIALS

In the United States, the responsibility for the conduct of national elections is delegated to local officials. In countries where the democratic process is much more recent or just now being put in place, most often this option does not exist.

Thus, a central authority usually controls the process of distributing in a timely fashion the necessary election day materials to the polling stations and assures the security and integrity of these materials. This burdensome responsibility can be exacerbated by the fact that usually the transportation systems are very marginal to non-existent.

Many basic questions on the mechanics and the procedures must be resolved in order to determine the specific materials and forms needed for each polling station.

What is the voting process? What will be used as ballot boxes? Will ink be used to prevent multiple voting? What is the comprehensive list of materials needed for the voting process? Can the ballot box be used to hold the election materials during distribution and collection? What location can be used to assemble and pack the materials? If the registration lists are distributed with the other voting materials, how will the boxes be marked to assure that each

specific box gets to the right location? How will the boxes be sealed? Can it be determined if the voting materials were tampered with?

These and other questions provide the basis for a comprehensive plan that defines all the materials necessary for the operation of each voting station. Each and every item required should be listed and the decision made as to how sufficient quantities of each can be obtained.

In Honduras, along with 19 other items, candles were provided for each polling place. 8,000 candles required more than a trip to the local store.

Because the quantities are so large in even relatively small countries, each and every item should truly be required for the voting process. Additionally, the list should be scrutinized to determine if any materials such as tables can be supplied from within the locale of the voting station. If so, these needs must then be communicated to the local poll workers through the training and instruction materials.

The provision of commodities is addressed in detail in the Commodities Report contained in the Addendum. The comprehensive plan for acquiring these materials, sources, timing, etcetera, is all necessary before the distribution plan can be finalized. Adequate lead time must be allowed for ordering and assembling the voting materials.

When rigid ballot boxes are manufactured and/or stored centrally, the distribution plans must allow for the

shipment of containers that require approximately eight cubic feet each. Therefore, the number of boxes that can be shipped on any one truck or helicopter is limited.

The "invention" of the plastic bag to substitute for the traditional ballot box can represent significant easing of the transportation and logistical problems. No longer is it necessary to haul numerous boxes when perhaps the materials can be distributed in containers requiring only a fraction of that space. However, this solution has not yet been seen as acceptable in some countries, including Honduras and the Philippines.

The distribution process is oftentimes complicated by the fact that the military controls the only reasonably dependable transportation capability and yet the use of it may well not be practical if there are any concerns about the military's role in the election.

After the polls close, the same problems exist in reverse, except now the system must assume the additional burden of protecting the ballots against fraud and skulduggery.

In most instances, the vote count is certified on a form signed by all polling station officials and observers. This official vote count is delivered to the local municipal or national election entity and the marked ballots subsequently collected by various means.

In an optimum system such as Costa Rica, the poll workers have personal control of the voting materials including the ballots from the time the polls open until both the marked

and unmarked ballots are actually returned to the Post Offices which are used as collection centers.

In Grenada in 1984, even though the national counting center at most was only hours from the farthest polling station, the marked ballots were locked in local jail cells overnight.

In Honduras, specific provision had not been made to collect the marked ballots immediately following the election. This became of some concern when a potential challenge to the election developed. However, the military undertook this task the day following the election.

It is not unusual in many Third World countries for the marked ballots to be collected in the back of open trucks because that is the only transportation available.

By having individuals available who understand transportation and logistics, the Democracy Program can be in a position to provide assistance with one of the more mechanical needs but one that must be dealt with in holding an election.

The acquisition of commodities is an extremely expensive undertaking in any election. The information accumulated by the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project to allow alternative processes and/or competitive bidding should lower these election costs. And, because this is an area in which A.I.D. has provided much support, the costs for its election assistance should be correspondingly reduced as well.

G. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY SYSTEM TO PROTECT THE VOTER, AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE VOTE

The security system for conducting an election must include everything from ensuring that the ballots cannot be duplicated, to making sure the voter is protected from intimidation while voting, to an honest vote count accurately reported, plus much more -- the total of which produces a feeling of great confidence in the election.

The security procedures developed in each country must reflect its culture and environment, and any unique potential for abuse. Setting up a security system for an election entails a great deal of awareness, effort and coordination by all parties involved.

In some instances the totality of the process may provide an aura of security that decreases the need for absolute measures. For example, in Costa Rica there is an excellent, well organized and accurate voter registry, but each voter's finger is still marked with indelible ink and a thumbprint is placed on the ballot. Since there is a good registry, this procedure is more of a tradition than a necessity, but the end result is that the entire voting process is seen as being fraud free.

The entire election process must be analyzed in order to determine what safeguards may be needed against fraud or voter intimidation. Then, the recommendations for security provisions must reflect the needs of the total election process.

In countries with no history of elections or those in which the election administration is controlled by a party seeking to succeed itself, the opportunities for charges of vote manipulation or fraud are great.

Many security devices can be built into the election commodities to prevent fraud and abuse. These measures individually can be very expensive.

However, the totality of the election process can be reasonably secured against fraud without incorporating a 100% security measure into each individual element.

For example, in Honduras the process initially proposed included purchasing ballot paper outside the country with a unique watermark, printing and distributing the ballots under 24 hour guard, signing each individual ballot with a signature machine, signing each ballot when handed to the voter, and punching a hole in the ballot after it was cast. (The ballot punching was not done.)

There is little doubt that counterfeit ballots were not a problem in this Honduran election. However, there is also little doubt that the security of the ballot process could have been maintained for less expense.

Protecting against such things as duplication of ballots, multiple voting and protecting the ballots before the count is certified are all very necessary and critical measures. However, the greatest deterrent to voter fraud is well educated voters, poll officials and observers.

The voters must be aware that first of all there are security measures to protect against fraud and manipulation,

that irregularities can be reported without reprisal and that those who abuse the system will not go unpunished.

The poll workers must know what security measures are in place to prevent fraud and then enforce these measures. They must know the procedure to deal with challenges and be able to communicate by phone or radio with election officials if assistance is needed.

Even the most sophisticated security devices and techniques can be only marginally effective in protecting the integrity of the process from fraud and corruption if those in control wish to abuse the process. This has been seen in some major cities of this country as well as in other countries.

Thus, the leadership of the country, the military leaders, the parties, the candidates themselves, must all reinforce the need for a fair election. This commitment, together with adequate security provisions, will provide the opportunity for the system to work. If the expectation of a fair election is not reinforced, then the perception of fraud may well become a reality.

This fact was dramatically illustrated by the recent election in the Philippines where charges of fraud in virtually every element of the election process eroded any confidence in the final result.

By contrast, in Japan and Minnesota the entire election system is put together and predicated on an assumption of total honesty on the part of the voters, candidates,

political parties and the election and government officials. Only minimal protection is built into the system to protect against fraud and these measures are present more for ease of operation than for security purposes.

Beyond the security requirements of the voting process, in some instances the security of individual voters and poll workers must also be considered. This security requirement may be complicated by the fact that political considerations dictate that the military be kept totally removed from the process and the police possess little training or capacity to provide the security needed. For example, in most Latin American countries military personnel were restricted to their quarters on election day. In Honduras, however, some military were assigned to protect polling stations with the balance restricted to their quarters.

In most instances, the Democracy Program will be involved in very fragile democracies where either the fact or the appearance of fraud can be particularly destructive to the process. Therefore, prior to undertaking an election project, careful analysis is needed to ensure the integrity of the process. This analysis must also determine if the electorate, after observing the election process, will be predisposed to have confidence in the results when they are announced.

The Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project will have both an in-depth data base and a cadre of security specialists to provide the needed expertise.

The greatest assistance will be in determining what particular composite of measures for the entire process will provide adequate security. This approach will undoubtedly result in maximizing the integrity of the system within reasonable cost parameters.

H. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCESS FOR COUNTING, REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF THE VOTES

No matter how well the voting process works, if an accurate count of the vote cannot be completed, communicated to a central location in a timely fashion and reported to the voters, then the election is flawed.

While there were many problems with the integrity of the recent election in the Philippines, the failure of COMELEC to implement a 'Quick Count' mechanism even while the official volunteer observer group, NAMFREL, was able to do so undoubtedly contributed to the loss of confidence in the integrity of the process and in the election results.

The successful execution of this element is dependent upon a number of others, most notably election day procedures and the training of poll workers as well as providing total security for both the voting and counting process.

Perhaps more than any other, the counting and certification process is first and foremost influenced by the laws that control the election process.

Who conducts the count using what procedures? Who can be present to observe the count? How is the count certified in the polling place? How is the count communicated to the national counting center... and to the voters? How is it certified that it was recorded and tabulated correctly at election central? How is the integrity of the ballots maintained? If a recount is necessary, what is the process for recounting, tabulating and verifying the results of the election?

All of these questions are very process oriented but they represent almost endless opportunities for those who are so inclined to fraudulently impact the voting and election results.

In analyzing or planning for the counting process, consideration should be given to the role of party or candidate observers. The local, regional and/or national election entities involvement must be determined. Finally, the role of outside observer groups and the role of the press must be determined. Each has a critical role. If they are allowed to inspect and/or be involved in the process, fraud is far less likely to occur.

The count, tabulation and certification process, considering all possible scenarios, should be detailed in writing and distributed to all interested parties.

In Honduras there was the possibility of a challenge but the process for securing the ballots and then recounting was not available upon request prior to election day.

In many countries the winner is not declared for two or three days because of the time required for all the certified count forms and/or ballots to be returned to a central location. This necessitates far greater security and can undermine confidence in the counting and reporting process.

In the United States, the results of most elections are known within hours of the polls closing, or in the extreme case of 1980, President Reagan was declared the victor by the news media before the polls closed in California. With

accurate quick reporting of the vote tallies by the media or other organizations, it is far more difficult to manipulate the results.

In developing the counting process, consideration must be given to integration with the ballot collection system and the security process. An area large enough for the collection and storage of the marked ballots should be available in the event of a recount. Measures must be in place to secure all marked ballots and records immediately if any problems occur in the counting process.

During recent election in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Bangladesh the tally reporting was suspended for long periods of time. In these instances, the question always exists if the results are being manipulated.

It is understandable and expected for the count from rural areas to be delayed. This is very common even in rural areas of the United States. However when the count, polling place by polling place, is suspended in the more populated areas, apprehension quickly mounts as happened in Tegucigalpa, during the November, 1985, Honduran election.

If for any reason the reporting is suspended, it is critical that election officials quickly and truthfully describe what is happening.

Whether through quick count operations, unofficial reports by the media, or party tallies, an outside source validation that parallels the official count will do much to foster a sense of faith in the reported results.

In many countries, because of sheer size and logistical considerations, the opportunity for fraud at this level is greater because of the time necessary to secure the official count documents.

Because any concern about the counting process can quickly destroy the integrity of the outcome, it is critical that trained and experienced individuals be available to assist in a recount or challenge.

If there is any question about the validity of the counting operation, measures should immediately be implemented to secure all count forms, records and marked ballots.

There are numerous tested systems and techniques which may be used to address this area to assure the integrity of the counting process. Whatever methods are utilized, they must reflect the culture and the environment of the country where the election is being held.

The Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project can provide the expertise for evaluating and planning this process. Free and fair elections are dependent upon the accurate counting, tabulation and certification of the votes cast.

I. DEVELOPMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO PUT A TOTAL ELECTION DAY PROCESS IN PLACE

A successful election is more than the sum of its parts, which, when each is examined and explained individually, appear to be fairly definable and manageable tasks.

The challenge is to have each piece fall into place at the exact time and in the exact way that is necessary in order for the total process to function smoothly. Unlike the management of most other big systems or big projects, an election has an absolute timeline that must be met.

In the United States this year approximately 62 million Americans will show up to vote on November 4, and the system must be ready to function. It will this year, as it has repeatedly for the last 200 plus years, and that is why it will this year.

The reason the election system in the United States will be ready to function on November 4, is due to the assistance of over three thousand local officials who actually have the primary responsibility for everything from registering voters to compiling the results. There is no mechanical involvement at the national level and not much more at the state level.

In October of 1985, when the Guatemalan electorate went to the polls, the challenge of having the entire system in place and ready to go was a massive undertaking.

In many Third World countries election responsibilities and activities must be undertaken on a country wide basis with little or no support from local officials.

Therefore, the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project, even as it is focusing on the various elements of the election process, must also develop information and be in a position to provide assistance to assure that the totality of the process is being put together as well.

Analyzing, or actually providing the expertise to ensure that an integrated plan and management system exists is one of the most critical roles for U.S. election assistance. Without the assurance that the total election process is well planned, any election assistance provided may be wasted or less than effective.

If the need for assistance with oversight activities exists, it will be immediately evident in the initial assessment of any country's election system. If, as was the case in the Philippines, the basic structure for personnel, experience and knowledge is in place, even if it is a bit rusty from disuse, then the concern with this element can be correspondingly reduced. However, if it has been a decade or more since the last election and the responsible officials have little or no previous experience in putting together a total election effort, then this needs to be a top priority in the early planning.

It is necessary that the individuals with the responsibility for administration of the election clearly understand the totality and complexity of the project they

have undertaken. They must understand each individual element and the interrelationship and interdependency of all of the various elements.

While in some sense, the people who can best provide such assistance may be thought of as globalists, in fact they should be considered specialists and recruited from the ranks of those who recently have been involved in successfully conducting a "first" election in a new democracy. Solid management ability is also necessary.

As with any project as involved and complex as holding a national election, much of the success is directly related to the quality of planning that is done at the very beginning. Such planning activity needs to include the following: detailed descriptions of all the functions that need to be undertaken; timelines coordinating activities against key dates to keep the process moving; a personnel organization chart with job descriptions; and a detailed budget to efficiently allocate available resources.

Assistance from the Democracy Program in analyzing and/or providing the complete planning process may be essential for a free and fair election.

The methods by which the program might provide this assistance will vary according to what is needed and who is available. It must be noted that the area of oversight assistance through the utilization of globalists and specialists from similiar Third World countries is seen as most necessary and desirable.

To be truly understanding and maximally helpful, possession of an instinctive understanding of what is available and what will really work and not work in a country would be a tremendous advantage. While Americans and Europeans would without question possess the requisite knowledge of what is needed, unless the individual involved also had truly extraordinary experience in very similar circumstances, it is highly unlikely that he or she could possess the instinctive knowledge that results from working in a totally familiar environment.

Thus, when the responsibility for the management of the election process rests with someone without the total environmental familiarity, it is very important that a local individual be recruited to operate in tandem.

The involvement of A.I.D. for this responsibility may not be front line because of available local expertise, sensitivity to the political situation, or other equally valid reasons.

However, if any election assistance is being provided by A.I.D., it is critical that the capacity of the overall management effort be evaluated. If the individual(s) and or the plan developed are inadequate in any way, the probability for major problems is great.

And, once the management system errs, the dollar and people costs multiply rapidly as "fix-it" solutions are put in place. Thus, to protect the investment of U.S. election assistance and to increase the probability of a free and fair election occurring, the plan and management system must

be evaluated in the initial analysis.

True, elections are rarely, if ever, cancelled because the system is not in place, or seemingly so. However, a system that is poorly put together and poorly run can have so much impact on the final results that the goal of a free and fair election may never be met.

**J. ESTABLISHING AND/OR FOSTERING THE ENVIRONMENT THAT
ALLOWS DEMOCRACY TO FLOURISH BY EDUCATING THE CITIZENS
ON THE VOTING PROCESS AND ENCOURAGING THE CONTINUED
COMMITMENT OF THE CITIZENS AND THEIR LEADERS TO
MAINTAINING A DEMOCRACY.**

In Costa Rica, the pride in their democracy and commitment to elections is prevalent from small children to the leaders of the country. The belief in elections is so strong because the children are encouraged to actively participate in the electoral process. The Tribunal provides assistance for school elections and on election day, children cast their ballots at special 'mock election' locations. The percentage of eligible Costa Ricans that voted was 98.35%.

In countries where the Democracy Program is involved however, democracy will generally be very fragile. This fragility must be overcome by creating an environment where each citizen feels both a commitment and a freedom to cast his or her ballot.

An election is not a democratic election if no one votes, or if too large a percentage of the electorate for whatever reason does not, or feels it cannot, participate.

While there may or may not be valid arguments in favor of mandatory voting, the fact is if significant numbers of voters choose not to participate because they are directly boycotting the process, or they don't believe that the results will be fair, or because they question their own physical or financial security, then democracy may not survive.

In addition to the attention and resources that must be directed towards the election process itself, the strengthening of democratic ideals and behavior between elections must also be a top priority. A single election, or even two or three, do not so thoroughly implant democratic systems that they cannot be quickly overthrown.

A people that have lived under an authoritarian rule of one type or another, perhaps all their lives, cannot be expected to understand, or for that matter fully support, the concept of a democracy just because the United States believes they should.

If after an election, times get lean, difficult circumstances become more difficult, domestic violence appears to increase, a belief that the people will continue to support the concept of a democracy just because it's better for them may represent fairly simplistic thinking.

Maintaining an embryonic democracy requires ongoing and massive efforts involving education, how elected leaders position themselves, how they communicate with the people, and how the mass media treats those leaders, the opposition and current affairs. All play a vital role in the maintenance or destruction of a democracy and therefore require special consideration.

This election process element incorporates two rather separate items into one: the enforcement of the concept of democracy between elections; and then immediately prior to the election, encouragement to vote including actual education about the voting process itself.

While very separate and very different in terms of training and message, these concepts must be viewed as one in attempting to assure the ongoing active support of a democracy by the citizenry.

Much material has been gathered during Phase I which was used in various countries to educate voters on the election process, how to cast their ballots and what the total experience would involve.

Such education is critical, especially when dealing with an electorate that has had very limited, if any, experience with actual voting. These problems are magnified if a significant percentage of the electorate is also illiterate.

The basic lifestyle of the country dictates to a considerable extent how such voter education programs can be conducted. In countries that have a fairly high percentage of television households, much can be accomplished through this medium.

In every instance, printed educational material can be developed, both for wide distribution prior to the election, as well as for prominent use around the polls on election day.

A wide array of these educational materials has been gathered including video tapes, printed materials, handbooks, etc. However, much more is needed from countries in every region before the file could be considered reasonably complete and truly global in nature.

More critical than the format of materials used is the sponsoring groups or entities. To be truly effective, non-partisan organizations must have a major role in this effort so that it is not viewed as merely propaganda.

A.I.D. gave a \$75,000 grant to La Federacion De Asociaciones Femeninas Hondurenas, a non-partisan women's organization in Honduras, to provide voter education via television and posters in the weeks prior to the election.

The ultimate success of this educational undertaking in any country is when voting is no longer viewed as a novelty but a way of life.

The reinforcement of embryonic democracies between elections is an area of equal importance. Considerable effort and attention by numerous groups has been devoted to this concern in Latin America. However, no comprehensive summary of the results of these efforts could be located nor any evidence that such programs were generally being pursued in other areas of the world.

What is known is that worldwide democracies seem to disappear nearly as quickly as they are established. Because the creation of new democracies is so difficult for the people involved, costly both financially and in the credibility of the United States, this election process element has been isolated as a separate project line in the plan in the next section of this report.

GLOBALISTS AND SPECIALISTS

In the final analysis, the Democracy Program can be no stronger than the individuals who are providing the election assistance.

While the mere existence and availability of the data base as described will have tremendous value to A.I.D. as a resource to be called on, that resource cannot be converted to effective and cost efficient projects in countries unless trained personnel are available to undertake those projects.

For ease of discussion it was determined that two basic types of individuals would be needed by the program, specialists and globalists. As the term implies, a specialist knows a great deal about a particular element e.g. ballot security or voter registration or recounts. Obviously a person may well be, and probably most are, specialists in more than one election element. The exception to this will generally be individuals with technical skills which are not particularly unique to the election process, such as computerization of lists.

To qualify as a globalist, an individual must have been involved in numerous elections in multiple roles in different physical environments. Only if an individual has such broad experience can there be some level of confidence that the person will not be a captive of limited experience and perceptions about how an election can and should work.

Globalists will be used to assess the overall situation in a country and determine what is needed to make an election possible, or to work with in-country A.I.D. personnel to

oversee the execution of an election project involving a number of the elements.

It should be noted that anyone who is qualified as a globalist almost without question will also qualify as a specialist in most of the campaign elements where unique technical training is not required.

Therefore, even though the distinction must be made particularly because of the occasional need for some types of technical skills, the fact is most of the need and most of the involvement will be characterized as globalist in nature.

One objective for Phase I was to identify the maximum number of individuals who had the requisite skills to participate in the Democracy Program.

Because the number of individuals qualified to be listed as globalists is limited and those who do qualify are involved and active people, it was determined that efforts should be undertaken to identify and solicit all for participation who might be qualified.

Individuals with national and international election expertise were briefed on the program and asked to recommend individuals with the requisite expertise. Individuals were also identified through interviews during country visits and through recommendations from members of international observer teams. Finally the list was supplemented by the grantees' familiarity with election experts in the United States and abroad.

The expectation that not everyone would be interested in participating proved to be correct. Some just have no interest in any foreign activity at this time. Others when made aware that there would be some continuing obligation to be available if they were chosen and given the benefit of the training, determined that they just cannot or will not accept such an obligation.

Throughout this process considerable effort was made to identify and contact individuals in foreign countries who were qualified to be on either of the lists. This effort must be expanded with particular emphasis on Third World countries.

Utilizing individuals from these countries yields a double benefit. First, because they come from a country that is more likely to be comparable to the project country than is the United States, they are more likely to understand and have an empathy for it than is someone from the United States or a European country.

Secondly, even though these individuals must have the requisite skills and experience to perform the assigned role, the fact is it also represents an opportunity to expand the knowledge of Third World election experts for use in their own country.

No attempt was made in Phase I to inventory A.I.D. personnel with election experience or expertise. This will be undertaken in Phase II.

Finally, during this research phase, some considerable effort was also undertaken to define the type of training that would be necessary to assure that these individuals were properly equipped to take on their assigned tasks.

It was determined that this training should consist of three separate components, a foreign election experience, a one or two day seminar and an A.I.D./State Department briefing prior to foreign travel.

There will be no language nor any kind of political or election training involved in the program. Rather the training will be designed to accomplish two objectives. First to provide information and examples on how to adapt participants' knowledge and expertise to Third World elections. Secondly, while people cannot be trained to be "sensitive" to one's fellow human beings and their customs, mores and lifestyle, it is possible to make one aware of the need for that sensitivity and in some instances, particular items to which this sensitivity must be shown.

However, the most important component of any training program must ultimately flow from the full cooperation of A.I.D. and the State Department.

Because a tight screening process will be utilized with the full involvement of A.I.D. officials before anyone is asked to participate, it is unlikely that anyone will ever be involved who is not only willing but anxious to do everything possible to avoid offending local sensibilities or customs. However, if they don't know what these are, it sometimes can be very difficult to avoid the problem.

Therefore, the A.I.D./State Department briefings set up prior to each trip will provide the final critical knowledge necessary for each program participant.

The individuals listed in the Addendum as potential globalists or specialists are recommended for participation in the Democracy Program. Following initial A.I.D. screening and approval, they will be contacted during Phase II and requested to participate in the program.

When that is done, there will be a cadre of individuals from around the world available to the Democracy Program who are committed to free and fair elections and who have the expertise and training to help towards that objective.

COMMODITIES

In planning for an election, a government expends considerable effort procuring the right commodities, especially those commodities used in the voting process such as ballot paper, ink, locks, and ballot boxes. The provision of these materials is no small undertaking and involves a substantial portion of any election budget and has a major impact on the integrity of the election.

Therefore great care must be given to the proper selection of election supplies. The list of supplies needed in any election is fairly precise and uniform regardless of the country in which the election is being held.

In first time election situations for many developing countries, as well as other countries with more recent election experience, the government may attempt to develop the "ideal" and most costly alternatives in an effort to legitimize the process. While every effort must be made to assure the integrity of the election, few if any nations including the United States have the resources to provide the maximum, most ideal solution which is often the most expensive, for every election need.

Beyond the consideration of costs however, the proper selection of commodities can also play a major role in the integrity of the election, both real and perceived.

Alternative approaches are available for many aspects of the election process. The final determination of the specific commodities needed for any election should be determined by an analysis of the total election process.

If, for example, the official ballots were to be printed on paper that could be purchased at any paper supply house in any quantity desired, counterfeited ballots could be printed and distributed on a wholesale basis throughout the country.

The election officials in El Salvador, sensitive to the perception of the outside world, made the decision to use plexiglass ballot boxes. Obviously this decision was made to send a message that the El Salvador election would be open, fair and available for the world to see.

However, the boxes were manufactured in one piece and thus had to be crushed to gain access to the ballots. Obviously this was not a wise decision regardless of the noble objective. It precluded the boxes from being used in future elections and secondly, after the boxes were destroyed, there was no secure place to store the ballots.

Other Central American countries, such as Guatemala and Honduras, wanted to duplicate the boxes used in El Salvador, or use ones similar to it. However alternatives were found that were cost effective and achieved the same result. In Guatemala for example, the government used poly bags as "ballot boxes" the voters could see the ballots deposited and

at the same time costs and distribution problems were reduced substantially. In Honduras, the boxes were made of masonite with one plexiglass side.

Unique and far ranging research was undertaken into each of these commodity requirements, the full results of which have not yet been received in all instances.

For example, each major computer hardware manufacturer in the country has sent a letter to its state and local government divisions to determine the experience each has in working with voter registration lists.

In developing the necessary information to compile the ink report, numerous conversations were held with the chemists at the Rockville, Maryland facility of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. This group plus some private chemists provided the data for this report.

In the process of developing each report, no one supplier or source was accepted for any relevant or significant information. All prices and specifications were checked and double checked.

The results speak for themselves.

Reports on these and lists of commodity vendors is included in the Addendum. Through the use of this vendor list, A.I.D. and developing countries can save considerable time and money. It will no longer be necessary to "re-invent the wheel" for every election and competitive bidding processes will now be possible.

The supplies and suppliers reflect only products available from American sources. During Phase II this list will be expanded to identify suppliers of these commodities from around the world. This will have the advantage of reducing the United States presence in any election as well as shipping costs.

If a country in Asia holding an election contracts to have its ballot boxes constructed locally, purchases ink from Sweden, paper from America and locks from Japan, there can be little criticism that "America" is forcing itself on that country. That criticism is even less likely when each of the vendors chosen was done through a competitive bidding process.

Further when vendors who have traditionally supplied commodities realize that other options have been identified and competitive bidding is a fact of life, significant savings will probably be realized either by the countries directly, or by the governments which provide financial assistance for the process.

While it is not possible to identify more than exists, the objective of the Democracy Program should be to have ten to fifteen sources from throughout the world for each commodity that is used in the election process.

LATIN AMERICA EXPERIENCE

Because of the incidence of elections occurring in Latin America immediately preceding and during Phase I, unique knowledge was gained in this area and some limited progress was made toward achieving Phase II objectives for this region.

The opportunity to analyze these elections provided the ability to evaluate the similarities and differences between countries within one region.

The first Guatemalan election on November 3, was followed by a run-off election on December 4, 1985. CAPEL provided the training for the election day workers.

The election in Honduras on November 24, 1985, was the first transfer of power between elected civilian Presidents in 60 years. A.I.D. provided a majority of the election assistance.

Costa Rica's election in February was a demonstration of a thriving democracy. Many aspects of the election were state of the art.

These were all very unique elections occurring within a short time span within one region.

The availability of these elections allowed for testing by field observation and study of various hypothesis developed as a consequence of the initial research efforts thus improving immeasurably the quality of that research.

The focus on this one region must be viewed as an opportune chance and not as a re-focus of the Democracy Program. As stated in the grant and as reflected in this final report on Phase I, the program is envisioned as having worldwide application and the plan outlined in Section III is designed to achieve that objective.

This Latin American experience reinforced the belief that for optimal effectiveness the program should be operated at the regional level.

Additionally, the opportunity of analyzing the election elements in several different countries within one region resulted in isolating two elements that have extraordinary potential to impact the ultimate goal of strengthening democracy.

The effort and investment in these two elements both in terms of resources and credibility is substantial.

The first of these is the need for citizen education, not just at the time of the election but on an ongoing basis in very shaky embryonic democracies. The second deals with the problem of recruiting, and even more specifically, training poll workers in countries which have no recent history of elections. Both of these elements are addressed in greater detail earlier in this section.

The initial focus on the first item was in post trip analyses following the Honduran and Guatemalan elections. In both these elections, effort and attention was focused by the government on "educating" the citizenry as to the process. An analysis of these messages quickly revealed

that beyond just the educational message about the process itself, there was also considerable reinforcement on the importance of the process. This experience coupled with subsequent stories out of the area as to the fragility of the institution of democracy, El Salvador for example, resulted in a study of this entire concept.

The power of this study was enhanced by subsequent trips to Costa Rica where the hypothesis could be tested both by observation through in-depth interviews with a number of individuals from around the region.

As a consequence the decision was made that this need/problem was of sufficient importance to deserve special attention as reflected in the plan.

The second item that ultimately was focused on as a consequence of this extensive exposure to Latin America elections is the recruiting and training of poll workers.

Through the Guatemalan election it was possible to observe the results of CAPEL's training of election day workers. A few weeks later the results could be seen in the Honduran elections when no real training had been provided to poll workers. The differences were immense, and in fact, it was probably only because the commitment to the democratic process was so great on the part of the citizens that the Honduran elections did not break down at the polling place.

Later inquiry revealed that CAPEL's services had been available to the Honduran officials but could not be accepted because of political complications that would have resulted. It was then determined that this element of the election process also needed very special attention.

Therefore, as will be noted in the optimum plan, a separate project line is reflected for this need. However because other organizations are also addressing this problem e.g. CAPEL, although seeking U.S. resources to assist in doing so, this project line is folded in with others for the initial effort of Phase II.

The simple fact is that while the Democracy Program is worldwide and the plan reflects that, this initial exposure to Latin America in such depth, an area where a major part of the Election Assistance Project effort will always be concentrated in any event, was a tremendous plus.

SECTION III

THE PLAN

There must be continuity from Phase I to Phase II and then from Phase II into the permanent structure and operation of the program. The following plan provides that continuity while establishing the operational framework to put in place the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.

The assumptions identified in Section II are the basis upon which this plan was formulated. It will be noted that each segment of the plan is dependent upon all of these assumptions to some extent.

This plan is based on the premise that an educational foundation will be established to take responsibility for the program. If, for whatever reason, a decision is made not to create such a structure, then much of this plan would have to be re-thought and re-designed around whichever of the other two alternatives as earlier discussed were going to be utilized to maintain the program.

Phase II was originally intended to focus primarily on recruiting and training the necessary personnel. These two activities remain, but as a consequence of the in-depth research completed in Phase I and described in Section II of this report, the following plan will reflect changes and

additions to what was anticipated in the formative stages of the project. These additions and changes are fully explained. Also addressed is the need for the permanent maintenance phase of the data bases to be even now ongoing. This is very important if much of the work already completed is not to become prematurely dated.

Because a project involving elections, even if it is just the election process as is the case with this one, is ultimately about government, and politics, and people, the only constant is the fact of change. This means that each day the data base is not being updated, be it with an amended election law, information on a registry updating project or an address change for a globalist, it is becoming less usable and less valuable. This maintenance requirement is combined with the acquisition of unique data apart from the needed expansion of the data bases.

As a consequence of the research undertaken, two additional components have been incorporated into the plan.

The first is a major expansion of the data base, which necessitates the second, a major computerization effort.

These additions are seen as necessary if sufficient data on each of the ten critical election elements is going to be available and accessible for each of the major regions of the world.

Beyond these two additions, creating the foundation in which to house the project is also listed as a separate

component. As has been noted, the research totally verified the need for this foundation and it is treated as a separate effort.

Beyond these project lines which are directly derived from the original premise for Phase II, two of the election process elements are seen as so important that it is recommended that initial activities beyond just more research be initiated in both.

The two areas being recommended for such special treatment are:

1. Recruitment and training of poll workers; and
2. Establishing and/or fostering the environment that allows democracy to flourish by educating the citizens on the voting process and encouraging the continued commitment of the citizens and their leaders to maintaining a democracy.

In both instances, the focus after research had been completed and programs developed, would be very new democracies. When developing the specific activities for these two areas, consideration would be given to the existing training programs and structure within A.I.D.

In countries that have a history of elections, no matter how sporadic or chaotic, there is some cadre of experienced poll workers available and citizens who believe in democracy and who expect to be able to vote for their leaders.

In countries that have not had an election for years, if ever, such experienced poll workers are not available. All must be recruited and trained.

As noted in the full discussion of this element in Section II,

"The quality of this experience (i.e voting) is to a considerable extent determined by how workers have been trained."

The capacity to assist with this requirement, be it directly or indirectly through other organizations, cannot be as easily created as can most of the other elements. This is particularly true if, as would be preferred, outside groups indigenous to the area are utilized to provide the necessary training.

To do this, such groups as CAPEL and the Asian Foundation must be nurtured and assisted to become strong enough to perform this task. In areas where such groups do not exist, they need to be founded.

The following paragraph stated in the assumptions defines why the second element is separated for special treatment.

"Because democracy will generally be very fragile in the countries where the Democracy Program is involved, this fragility must be overcome by creating an environment where the average citizen feels both a commitment and a freedom to cast his or her ballot."

This project line is fully developed later but an analogy to explain the importance of this concept might be found in the field of economic development. When a state or a city invests all its capital and resources in trying to attract new business and none in keeping what it already has, the bottom line might end up being not a lot of improvement.

Thus, the total plan for implementing the Democracy Program is seen as having eight components or project lines.

1. Expansion of the data base to worldwide dimensions as related to the ten election elements;
2. Computerization of that data base;
3. Continued identification and recruitment of globalists and specialists;
4. Design and implementation of a training program for globalists and specialists;
5. Maintenance of the existing data base plus other unique data gathering;
6. Establishment of a foundation to administer the Democracy Program;
7. Creation of the capacity to assist new democracies in the recruitment and training of poll workers, and;
8. Research programs that could assist in establishing and/or fostering the environment for democracy.

All these project lines are based first on the stated assumptions, and secondly on the implicit understanding that even while the process can be broken down into separate elements, in point of fact, it is a total integrated process. Success is not achieved unless it all works.

For example, on election day no less than eight of the elements come into play. However, some elements are only a factor on that one day while others literally are a part of the process from beginning to end.

A full discussion of each of these project lines follows providing detail on both what is needed and how it can best be undertaken.

1. **Expansion of the data base to worldwide dimensions as related to the ten campaign elements.**

During Phase I, it was determined that the best way to categorize specific elements for election assistance is as follows:

- A. Establishment of the body of laws and regulations necessary to hold free and fair elections and the creation of the entity which will administer these laws and oversee in its entirety the conduct of the election process.

The law and the entity obviously exists in any country which has had elections but where such has not been the case, the laws have proven inadequate, or structurally the entity has been too weak to perform, then this must be the first matter addressed.

- B. Development of and/or updating voter registration lists.

When the determination is made that there is going to be a list of voters, it means a commitment to a major undertaking.

- C. Development of the mechanics of the process and procedures for use at the voting table.

The process must comfortably work for each voter while being easily administered.

- D. Recruitment and training of poll workers.

This is a critical step towards achieving a smoothly functioning process at the voting table.

- E. Development and provision of election day transportation.

The right to vote is meaningless if the voters cannot reasonably get to the polls.

- F. Acquisition, distribution and collection of voting materials.

A logistical process that can be extremely difficult to complete in some situations.

- G. Planning and implementation of a security system to protect the voter and the integrity of the vote.

The individual voter must not only have confidence that their personal safety is protected but also that their vote contributes to the selection of their leaders.

- H. Development of the process for counting, reporting and certification of the votes.

This element covers several actions completed at different times during the process but all are part of determining the winner after the polls close.

- I. Development and oversight of the management and operational systems necessary to conduct a national election.

In countries with any history of conducting reasonably successful elections, this has to already exist. For new or very tentative democracies, it has to be an area of major concern.

- J. Establishing and/or fostering the environment that allows democracy to flourish by educating the citizens on the voting process and encouraging the continued commitment of the citizens and their leaders to maintaining a democracy.

Voter education on the process and importance of voting must also be expanded to encourage citizens to actively protect their right to vote.

The objective of Phase II when complete would be to have data on each of these elements that reflects the worldwide requirement of A.I.D. For several elements, such as dealing with the body of laws and the operation of the central election authority, this will mean gathering constitutions, election codes, and voting rules and regulations from dozens of representative democracies to supplement those already gathered. Some study will then have to be made of the effectiveness and workability of each.

In other elements where laws and regulations have less impact than systems, such as the security and transportation elements, other sources of information will need to be developed. In the case of commodities, this will involve identifying suppliers and developing product specifications on a wide variety of materials needed to conduct elections.

The point is, each of these election elements requires its own project line and its own data base. In most instances, these basic files will need to be divided regionally but for maximum utilization, greater refinement is necessary.

It would be a most unusual situation that would require A.I.D. sponsored support for every element on this list. However, because this is true, the data base and delivery system for each element must be established so that the assistance available can either be merged or used to support some other source. The data also needs to be maintained so

that it can always be available to A.I.D. to develop specifications for proposals or evaluate incoming proposals. Considerable progress has already been made on the data base, including the Latin America refinement. Thus, the system is now available for use by A.I.D. should the need arise.

2. Computerization of the Data Base.

Because the information acquired will constantly be changing and expanding and must be accessed by topic, by region or country, by expertise, or by other specifics, computerization is necessary.

Furthermore, since the focus of the project is keyed to the ten election process elements, the data base must be segmented along the same lines.

In some instances this will mean nothing more than direct data entry. In other instances segmentation will require key word coding of more omnibus documents such as a country's election code. However, even with this requirement it is anticipated that fairly standard software can be adapted to meet the needs of the data base once the file requirements have been defined and designed.

A prodigious amount of data has already been gathered and the process of coding and inputting this data is going to be fairly substantial. This will be true even if, as it should be, a fairly rigorous screen is designed to assure

that only the most relevant and probable useful data is entered into the system. Obviously this project line must continue until all the basic files have been completed, at which time it would be folded into the maintenance program.

3. Recruitment of Globalists and Specialists.

A comprehensive list of individuals was identified during Phase I as potentially qualifying as either a globalist or specialist.

Globalists are defined as election experts with experience in all phases of the election process, but in fact they may also be a specialist in one or more areas. Specialists, as the name implies, have a particular expertise in one or more of the election elements. In some of these instances, e.g. the registration process, more than one kind of specialist/expert may be needed.

During Phase II, the individuals who have been identified and approved for participation by A.I.D. officials, must be made aware of the program and then recruited. To assure an adequate supply of both globalists and specialists for each of the three broad regions of the world, plus involving the maximum number of individuals from within each region, considerable ongoing recruitment efforts will be necessary.

To assure that the highest quality individuals agree to participate in the program, unique materials will have to be developed and a targeted communications program put in place utilizing phone, mail, and personal contact. Neither

globalists proficient in every region nor specialists capable of handling each item need to be on line instantly for the program to have immediate value.

However, because of the inevitable changing of individual circumstances, e.g. change of employment, this component will need to be ongoing.

4. Design And Implement A Training Program.

The focus of this training program is to provide the election professionals with the ability to adapt their expertise to the realities of Third World elections together with specific information about the countries. The training program will also familiarize them with A.I.D.'s objectives and goals.

As has been noted, the program must be operationally separated by regions of the world if it is to reflect the culture and environment of each region and each country. Further, to achieve one of the stated objectives of the program, i.e. being welcome in any country, any possibility of the "ugly American" must be absolutely ruled out. Participants must be forcefully screened by this training process to assure that only the highest quality and most sensitive individuals actually are sent into countries on behalf of A.I.D. and the program.

Much of this training, particularly for the globalists, will consist of travel to and involvement in election related activities in countries similar to those in which they might

be active. These trips would be as part of a team under the direction of someone experienced, trained and approved to function as a globalist in that region.

The foreign training component would then be supplemented by additional seminar training keyed to assisting in the adaptation of the participant's skills and expertise to Third World countries. For this training to have maximum impact though, A.I.D. must set up in-depth country briefings for anyone who is traveling into any country on behalf of the program.

Again, because recruitment will be ongoing, the training must be also if skills are to be kept fresh and if there is to always be a sufficient supply of trained globalists and specialists ready to respond whenever called upon by A.I.D. officials.

5. Maintenance of the existing data base plus other unique data gathering.

There will be a constant flow of data into the project files. Some can simply be compiled, stored and easily retrieved when the situation calls for it such as samples of training materials.

However, most of the data being gathered will need to be continually updated. The files where this updating would be most important would include:

- The body of election law including any applicable constitutional provisions;
- Expected dates of elections;

- Current addresses, etc. on individuals who have been recruited and trained as globalists and specialists; and
- Identify potential suppliers worldwide for all basic commodities. (It would not be necessary to try and stay current on prices. Such prices can always be quickly obtained if the list of potential suppliers is current.)

A variety of programs ranging from the regular review of various periodicals to questionnaires to debriefing individuals who have travelled in various countries will all be necessary to keep the files current. Additionally, other types of information need to be gathered which, while not important enough to deserve their own project line, must be built into the workload. One of these is the gathering of information on the wide variety of organizations around the world involved in election oriented activities.

There are numerous organizations with many different sponsors operating with a wide variety of agendas that are participating in Third World elections. Some of these organizations are concerned with who wins and loses the election, many are concerned about the process but with a fairly limited agenda. Still others focus primarily on providing the opportunity for political and government leaders to travel outside their own countries to broaden their experiences. By and large, all of the organizations are seeking funds and an expanded role whenever the opportunity presents itself or can be created.

A compilation of the various organizations with background data was not originally envisioned as a part of

this project and thus most obviously was not part of Phase I. However, unless and until these groups are catalogued, their interests and expertise identified, and their potential to assist or the contrary is determined, the project really cannot be considered complete.

The reason that this is so important is many of these organizations have in the past, and will in the future, be soliciting A.I.D. funds. If the organization is one which is identified with a particular party or philosophy, A.I.D. should at least be aware of that if the request is for a grant to be involved in the election process.

An effort to identify organizations involved in election related activities will be completed primarily by questionnaire and interviews as Phase II moves forward. Additionally it is anticipated that there will be other areas where data needs to be gathered but which do not fit any of the other project lines. One example of this might be the use of multi-member districts versus single member districts in the democratic process.

6. Establish a foundation to administer the Democracy Program.

The exact structure for this organization must be determined and established according to existing legal requirements. A 501(c)3 tax exempt research and education foundation is the probable vehicle. However, the first step that must be done is to complete the legal research to assure that this is the best approach.

The foundation and its officials must be accountable to A.I.D. and all data fully available to it. This must be assured both by how the foundation is created and then how it will be run in its day to day operations.

Once this foundation is established and operating, A.I.D. will realize on an ongoing basis some very precise and measurable benefits from the Democracy Program.

It will be able to react with precision and timeliness whenever an election related request or need occurs. Whenever A.I.D. provides election process assistance anywhere in the world, significant cost savings will be realized as a result of the centralized repository of data, technology, and expertise available through this organization.

Finally, such an organization with the ability to analyze all aspects of the election process, would help prevent embarrassments by identifying potential problems in providing election assistance.

Establishing the foundation will be a two step process.

1. Selecting a name and then filing for corporate status in whatever jurisdiction is desired, most likely the District of Columbia in this instance; and
2. Preparing and submitting to the Internal Revenue Service the paper work necessary to obtain the status of a tax deductible, not-for-profit entity.

It is possible that 501(c)3 status is not that important if it is anticipated that total funding would flow from the federal government through A.I.D. A 501(c)4 or one of the other not-for-profit designations might work as well.

However, if it can be envisioned that this entity might ever desire to receive money from some other source, the 501(c)3 status could be critical. For that reason, it is recommended that the 501(c)3 status be sought subject to a final recommendation from attorneys, and that the necessary efforts to acquire this designation be undertaken.

Once the incorporation paperwork has been filed and the tax status applied for, approval should be fairly automatic since the nature of the organization and its stated goals and objectives are totally consistent with the sought after status. Once the status has been obtained, the process of actually establishing the organization as a working entity should commence.

This would include selecting individuals to serve both as officers of the foundation and on the board. (It should be noted that the matter of liability insurance for board members has become a problem even for this type of organization.) As noted originally in the July 17th document and referenced since then, the board should be international in scope.

This probably means that before those who would be most desired will agree to serve on the board, a fairly comprehensive document describing both the expected activities of the foundation and the role of the board members would need to be prepared. This Phase I final report might suffice for that purpose. At the

initial board meeting, programs consistent with the foundation's charter would be presented for adoption by the board.

It is envisioned that the foundation will at least initially operate through a series of contracts with vendors to provide all necessary services and support. The foundation is discussed earlier in this document with the detailed reasoning why this is seen as the best alternative.

7. Creation of the capacity to assist new democracies in the recruiting and training of poll workers.

As has been stated, the capacity to recruit and train poll workers is absolutely critical if the newest and most fragile democracies are to have successful elections. Unfortunately these democracies are the ones where the capacity to do that is least likely to exist.

While implementing all of the other elements of a successful election can be fairly well centralized, the actual voting is done at hundreds or thousands of locations all across the country. Therefore, there must be teams of poll workers in place which are trained and ready to function on election day in each location. (While it is true that registration is also done in the field, there is no one day when it must be done or the system fails.)

Due to the importance of this element and the need to be able to provide this very sensitive assistance whenever

and wherever it is needed, the following activities are recommended.

- Develop the best possible file of alternative approaches, materials and techniques on training.
- Identify the individuals from around the world who could provide training assistance.
- Explore the possibility of utilizing and providing support for existing organizations e.g. CAPEL and the Asian Foundation to provide training assistance.
- In regions where such organizations do not exist, persuade existing groups to broaden their agenda or stimulate the creation of new ones.

Beyond just this limited role, the relationship with CAPEL should be strengthened, both as a source of support in Latin America, and also as a model for other organizations around the world.

Trained poll workers are critical on election day and the Democracy Program's emphasis on this element can help fill this need.

8. Research programs that could assist in establishing and/or fostering the environment in new democracies.

The need for and importance of this project line as it relates was underscored by two events.

- The tremendous involvement of young people in the Costa Rican election. This would seem to assure that a democracy will be maintained by the citizens in that country. In 1948-49, their democracy was lost for a brief period and it is the recollection of this experience that seems to be driving the populace so hard to assure that it never is lost again.

- Comments reported out of El Salvador in March of 1986, attributed to various leaders and informed observers in that country which questioned how long the elected leadership would survive. These articles underscore the history of the region which has seen democracies emerge and fail repeatedly for over a century.

There are many countries around the world where at one time or another an election has been held and a democracy has been in place for a period of time. Altogether too often though, the democracy is overthrown and another dictator is ensconced in power and no one seems to be able to do anything about it. Furthermore, in too many of these instances, an apathetic population doesn't resist.

Establishing a democracy is a very tough process. Therefore, a commitment should be made to invest resources to maintain it at the same time the resources are being committed to establish it. By resources it is not meant the "normal" forms of aid that flow into a country but in fact help and assistance precisely designed to help keep a democracy in place.

The preliminary research for a program to accomplish this might reflect the following approach.

Working with A.I.D. personnel, several countries would be selected for very specific research projects.

- Countries which established democracies only to soon revert back to dictatorships e.g. Panama;
- Countries where democracies existed for a fairly long period of time and then failed e.g. Argentina;
- Countries that tend to revert back and forth e.g. Columbia;
- Countries that seem to be struggling along but making it as a democracy e.g. Singapore;

- A couple of countries that have a democracy now but have lost it and then regained it fairly recently e.g. Venezuela; and
- One or two countries that are on the threshold of becoming a democracy e.g. Korea.

(These are in no way absolute recommendations for the best countries to study or even necessarily the best variables to be considered.)

The objective would be to identify and isolate factors that appear to always be present when a country makes democracy work and what factors seem to be missing from those that fail. This research effort is not seen as including unique travel.

Beyond this straight research component, a more active field oriented research effort should be undertaken keyed to the Central America region. There are currently three fragile democracies in the region, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In addition there is one country losing the struggle, Panama; one country which is lost for the moment, Nicaragua; one country perhaps on the threshold of making it, Belize; and finally a solid rock in the middle to serve as a model, Costa Rica.

Efforts should be made to document and analyze the various programs designed and ran in these countries and the Caribbean. What was done, how much was spent, were there any measurable results and a host of other questions need to be explored.

If this research reveals any direction that seemed to offer merit, some efforts and resources should be expended to further test or actually implement them.

This would be done by approaching the leadership in the first three countries to determine what level of cooperation might be obtained for such a program. If some cooperation was forthcoming in even one country, then perhaps a communications package could be developed and tested where some measurement of the results achieved might be possible. It is unlikely that much can be accomplished on this project line during the initial effort of Phase II, but a body of data should be established for ultimate use in other regions of the world where little or nothing has been done with these programs.

The foregoing eight project lines are the activities necessary to complete Phase II in its entirety so the Democracy Program total resources are directed toward fulfilling the election assistance requests of A.I.D.

The timeline necessary for completion is for a period of 18 months which was determined to be the time frame that would be most timely and efficient if the implementation of Phase II was undertaken as a single step. Such a timeline is at the end of this section.

Acknowledging that sufficient resources are not and will not be available during this period to implement Phase II in its totality, the research and the eight project lines were re-analyzed to develop the best approach for commencing Phase II consistent with the available resources.

This analysis reflected that the list of eight project lines could be redefined, reprioritized and concentrated in five project lines.

1. Establish the foundation to administer the Democracy Program;
2. Continue the focus on the Latin America/Caribbean region;
3. Identify and research countries in which the potential for democracy and project activities exist;
4. Expand the data base both in terms of election assistance elements and identification of individuals; and,
5. Undertake the research and analysis required for development of a citizen education program that could be implemented in emerging democracies.

While the relationship of these five items to the optimum plan is clear, it is equally clear that there are two significant omissions, computerization and the expanded program for recruitment and training of the poll workers.

While clearly both of these are important needs and definitely need to be addressed, some flexibility in timing is possible with both.

The data does have to be computerized and while that could begin with the data already gathered, not doing so does not prevent it from being utilized. When the funds are available the project can be done. Until then, the system will work.

Training poll workers is a vital component of a well functioning democracy and the efforts to provide same needs special attention. As previously noted though, both CAPEL and the Asian Foundation are available for this role so it is being addressed. Obviously more effort is needed. But, as will be noted, special reference is made to expanding the relationship with CAPEL even in this more limited approach. Depending on how this is done, training poll workers might well be at least partially addressed. Not doing so though, will not result in the lack of a program of any kind which would be the case with some of the other project lines.

All the other project lines are incorporated in this plan for Phase II initial efforts even though some such as recruiting and training globalists and specialists are more restricted in their scope.

Because each of these project lines has already been dealt with in considerable detail, the only additional comments on each will be to reflect the modifications necessary because the initial effort of Phase II will be less than the optimum Phase II plan.

- 1. Establish the foundation to administer the Democracy Program.**

This project line remains unchanged: the completion of all of the requisite legal research necessary, and then the establishment of an education foundation with the mission and capacity to assume the responsibility for the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.

All necessary legal steps will be taken to create the foundation and application made to the Internal Revenue Service for the necessary tax status. Included in the coordination efforts will be selecting a name for the newly created organization and selecting and recruiting individuals to serve as officers and on the board of directors including members from other countries.

Considerable sensitivity to the accountability and availability to A.I.D. must be assured, both in the initial development as well as in developing the day to day operating parameters for such an entity.

An operational plan reflecting the basic relationship with A.I.D. and taking advantage of all the work completed on the program up until that time will be developed and submitted to the Board at its initial meeting. This plan will be predicated on the previously stated premise of contracting for virtually all services. There will be no provision for any staff slots in the initial stages of the foundation.

The envisioned organization will be designed to minimize operational costs while providing the election assistance required by A.I.D. in the most cost effective, cost efficient and timely manner.

- 2. Continue the focus on the Latin America/Caribbean region.**

The United States government and A.I.D. have a big investment as well as a vested interest in supporting democracies in the Latin America/Caribbean region. The Democracy Program will reflect this focus during the initial Phase II effort by expanding the Latin America/Caribbean data base.

This will include completing the acquisition of information from the region on the election elements, setting up a maintenance program to keep this new data plus that already gathered current. Efforts to recruit and train globalists and specialists for the region will continue.

Because CAPEL is headquartered in this region and as previously discussed, has the potential to serve as a model for regional organizations which could carry much of the in-country training burden for the Democracy Program, special effort will be made to expand and improve relationships between the program and that organization.

Because this region will continue as a primary focus of the program, any opportunity to utilize the program in Latin America or the Caribbean should be taken full advantage of by A.I.D.

Numerous benefits would result if this were done.

- AID would realize substantial savings because of the data acquired by the Election Assistance Program.
- The work could probably be done more effectively because of the expertise available to undertake the assignment.
- The quality of the data base would be improved as a natural consequence of its utilization.

- The legitimacy of the program would be greatly enhanced resulting in the likelihood of being able to attract more substantive individuals to serve as officers and on the Board of the foundation.

In summary, while ultimately the project must be world-wide in scope, a continued focus on this one region for another few months may yield considerable benefits.

3. Identify countries in other parts of the world in which the potential for democracy and project activities exists and begin initial research in them.

To continue progress towards the stated long range goal of the project

"...to strengthen democracy around the world through improving the election process..."

preliminary research in selected other countries will be initiated.

The selection of these countries could be as a consequence of a "survey" undertaken with and under the auspices of A.I.D. The purpose of the survey would be to evaluate the current political environment in Third World countries where the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project might conceivably have some future application.

Upon completion of the survey, a collective decision could then be made to determine what countries should have priority keyed to expected opportunities to expand or strengthen democracies. These efforts could include generic research, in-country research or analysis of current election processes and resources depending upon what

direction it is determined the project might take. Full advantage would be taken of any opportunities for training in any of these countries.

This project line assures that A.I.D. will have the capacity to utilize the project anywhere in the world during this initial effort.

4. Expand the data base both in terms of election assistance elements and identification of individuals.

A comprehensive data base on the election elements coupled with a list of dozens of specialists and globalists trained and on call to use this data anywhere in the world is what the Democracy Program is all about.

Beyond the results from project lines two and three additional effort for the necessary expansion of these data bases should also be ongoing. Such efforts would include interviews with individuals in the United States and gathering of additional printed material.

Identification and recruitment of specialists and globalists will continue with particular focus on individuals with significant Third World election experience. Any travel and research undertaken by individuals working on or cooperating with the project will be utilized to add additional data to the files as well as for training purposes.

Also, because computerization is not yet being undertaken, particular efforts need to be made to establish systems to assure the maximum retrievability and usability of the material that is gathered.

Finally, since it is not established as a separate project line, the maintenance requirement for these data bases must also be addressed here. The file as it exists will be evaluated and specific programs put in place keyed to mailings, personal visits and the regular monitoring of various dailies and specialized periodicals to assure that the data bases are as current as such a system will allow.

5. Undertake the research and analysis required for development of a citizen education program that could be implemented in emerging democracies.

The final component to be undertaken during this period will be the initial research for the development of citizen education efforts for utilization in emerging democracies. The citizen education effort is considered critical even under this limited approach. However, because of the limitation of funding, the full research effort outlined in the optimum plan is not possible at this time.

Because of the focus on Latin America that will be ongoing during this period, this project line will be keyed to active field oriented research in that region with the intention of developing a specific communications package for testing there. While it is unlikely that testing can be completed during this period, it should be possible to make

considerable progress toward that objective if cooperation is forthcoming from the leadership of any of the new democracies in the area.

The planning for this effort would be closely coordinated with A.I.D. training programs.

It is recognized that this is an extremely sensitive undertaking, but the frequent rise and fall of democracies around the world surely underscores the need to identify ways to strengthen those that are struggling but alive.

In summary, at the end of the initial Phase II effort, a number of significant steps will have been taken to enable the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project to achieve the refined objectives and realize the ultimate goal.

- An education foundation will have been established with an international board of directors. The board will have met, adopted specific programs to continue expansion and more importantly, assured the long term legitimacy of the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.
- The Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project will be fully operational in the Latin America/Caribbean region.
- Initial research will have been undertaken in some additional countries in other regions of the world where A.I.D. anticipates a potential need for election assistance in the reasonably near future.
- There will have been continued expansion and maintenance of the data base and more specialists and globalists will be identified, recruited and some additional training will have been accomplished.
- Focused research for the development of a citizen education program for Latin American application will be underway and perhaps some testing will have been done.

The execution of the project lines to be undertaken in the initial effort for Phase II is represented on the timeline at the conclusion of this section.

These initial activities are totally consistent with the complete plan for Phase II. In fact, as can be readily noted, significant progress will have been made toward completing Phase II.


Additionally, the capacity exists as Phase II is being implemented, to provide analysis, planning or assistance for the election process at A.I.D.'s request.

The importance of this plan that must be fully understood is that this is not a program that can be turned on and off at will, if it is to provide any worthwhile service. It must be implemented in a continuous, coordinated manner. To be useful, the data from sources to facts to people must be current, the expertise must be available, and the training must be complete. Otherwise, all that will have been accomplished is another entity added to those that already exist and the expenditure of funds and time without result. And, the election assistance needs will continue to be met on a case by case basis.

The continuation of the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project will provide the Agency for International Development with the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to election assistance needs worldwide.

DEMOCRACY PROGRAM/ELECTION ASSISTANCE PROJECT
 PHASE II
 18 MONTH TIMELINE

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DEMOCRACY PROGRAM/ELECTION ASSISTANCE PROJECT
INITIAL PHASE II
TIMELINE

	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.
1. Establishment of Organization	Legal Research--->		Determin- ation of Type of Organization	Legal Filing of Tax Status				
		Identification of Leadership			Recruitment of Leadership			
						Development of Plan for 1987		
								Board Meeting
2. Completion of Latin America/ Caribbean Region	Dominican Republic Election							
		Monitor Haiti Development----->						
		Travel----->						
		Research----->						
3. Identification of Additional Countries	Develop Preliminary List	Survey AID Personnel	Analyze Results	Determine Countries for On-site Research Activities				
					Initiate Travel----->			
4. Expansion of Data Base								
		Research----->						
		Travel----->						
5. Citizen Education Program								
		Research----->						
				Analysis----->				
						Develop Program Outline----->		

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SECTION IV

SUMMARY

GOAL: TO STRENGTHEN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AROUND THE WORLD BY IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF ELECTIONS

A noble and powerful goal, with a powerful benefit and a satisfying result:

More people in this century will be living in countries governed by leaders chosen in free and fair elections, and thus

The officials of A.I.D. both in Washington and at missions around the world, will have the satisfaction of knowing that to a considerable extent their efforts made that possible.

The essence of the foreign policy of this country will continue to be driven by a commitment to the democratic process and free and fair elections; and the Agency for International Development will continue to have the front line role for making this policy a reality. Thus, the question is how will the Agency for International Development meet this responsibility, by utilizing the Democracy Program as it is envisioned or through continued ad hoc arrangements.

Because the foreign policy objectives are unlikely to change, and elections are always expensive, it is probable that only through a reasonable ongoing financial commitment to the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project will A.I.D. be able to meet its responsibilities in foreign elections while living within the realities of its budget.

The full involvement and support of A.I.D. officials, in Washington and in its missions, the Democracy Program will result in the necessary data bases being developed, and election experts being provided the necessary training and exposure to Third World elections.

The result of this would be that A.I.D. could provide the highest quality assistance at the lowest possible cost with the least amount of difficulty whenever the leadership of a Third World country asked for help to assure a free and fair election.

Even before this ultimate goal is achieved though, A.I.D. officials will receive tremendous benefit. The expertise of dozens of experts on all aspects of the election process will be continually available to them together with one of the most comprehensive data bases in Third World election information and materials available.

No longer will it be necessary, when confronted with a request for a specific commodity, for A.I.D. personnel to desperately seek suppliers just hoping that somehow the supplier that is located can even find and fill the order let alone at the lowest cost.

In short the Democracy Program can be a tremendous asset for the Agency for International Development, and for achieving the foreign policy objectives of the United States Government. However, three paragraphs in the

aforementioned July 17, 1985 memorandum suggest certain cautions to which the program must be sensitive.

"While the envisioned program(s) would be most responsive to A.I.D., it must be recognized that they must also pass careful scrutiny from the State Department as well as Congress. Any program must be sensitive to the existing legislation, that expressly forbids any efforts on the part of the United States Government to attempt to influence the outcome of any other country's election in any fashion whatsoever.

Therefore, guidelines and operating parameters for such programs must be clearly and tightly drawn, so that both the objective and the reality are indisputable that only the process itself is impacted. The results should not be affected, except to the extent that honest and open elections will do so.

Such program(s) have a function only when a country with a weak or undeveloped electoral process asks for, or is willing to accept, assistance. Therefore, they must be designed to be held in readiness at a minimal level of continuing costs with significant expenditures for either activities or personnel occurring only when a project in a given country is underway."

The experience gained in Phase I underscores how very true each of these foregoing points are and attests to the tremendous sensitivity that must be present if the program is to contribute anything more than rhetoric toward actively achieving the goal.

It is because of this sensitivity that it is believed that only an entity that provides some insulation from the United States Government can really gain the necessary access and influence to be able to make a significant contribution to the goal on a worldwide basis.

The simple point is, the United States Government, even after this first tentative step, is better equipped than it has ever been to provide meaningful and effective assistance to countries struggling with the democratic process. The provision of this assistance can now be done in a more timely and cost efficient basis than was remotely possible even a short time ago.

However, this capacity can soon be lost if the program is not made permanent by:

Creating an organization that will provide both a permanent identity and its own cadre of advocates for the program which will assure continued funding for maintenance and upgrading of the data already collected; and

Legitimizing the program by utilizing its resources whenever election process related activities are being undertaken.

The plan, while global and generic rather than specific, is designed to bring about this end result.

The flexibility reflected can accommodate the flow of resources to assure that expansion of the program is clearly keyed to:

- The specific needs and/or objectives of United States foreign policy, including supporting free and fair elections.
- Taking advantage of any opportunities for training or expanding the data base.

The actual pace at which the program will go forward as a result of limited resources, means that the implementation will have to be sensitive to current and expected elections in which the United States may have an interest in providing assistance.

Finally, when Phase III is achieved, A.I.D. will have the capacity to provide experienced effective election assistance anywhere in the world whenever called upon, and be able to do so with the least impact on A.I.D.'s budget, both to maintain and to use the program.

And, A.I.D. through the Democracy Program, will have the expertise available to analyze each request for election assistance to determine the short term needs; and to determine which types of assistance will provide long term institutional growth for a country's election process even while meeting those immediate election needs. This sensitivity to long term institutional assistance over time should strengthen democracies thus reducing the reliance upon United States election assistance as countries improve the quality of their elections.

Exciting and ambitious - yes - but as indicated throughout this report, difficult to achieve. The final point though might again be the simple derived restatement of Assumption Ten and the conclusion derived from it.

The magnitude of the task of establishing and operating a program as proposed by the Director of A.I.D. to have a worldwide capacity to assist in the election process is exceeded only by its value, thus when the program is fully operational, A.I.D. will have at its disposal a truly unique and valuable resource.

This assumption must be given the status of absolute fact.

The program is now very nearly a reality. The continued commitment to it on the part of the Agency for International Development, as demonstrated by the Director when he initially inspired the program will assure that democracies around the world will more likely endure, and that more people will live in a society where they have had some role in the selection of their leaders.

ADDENDUMS

COUNTRY REPORTS

GUATEMALA
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 3, 1985
SUBMITTED BY
STEPHEN J. MCCARTHY

**GUATEMALA
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 3, 1985**

The election held on November 3, 1985, was the second in a series of three elections held in a period of six months in Guatemala. After more than 15 years of military rule, and a record of human rights violations, the Guatemalans finally determined that the nation should proceed in a more democratic path, but not without severe self-examination. Years of suppression and violence from both right and left wing elements brought the country into international focus and close scrutiny, by not only human rights groups, but neighboring countries, trading partners, and the world community. The continued subjugation and genocide of the indigenous population, coupled with gross human rights violations, had driven a schism between Guatemala and its traditional benefactors, resulting in massive cutbacks in economic and military aid. This occurred at a time when Central American countries were being hit hard by diminishing markets for their exports and huge debt servicing obligations to lending institutions worldwide. It forced the Guatemalans to rethink their responsibilities and realities to themselves and the world community, effecting a serious adjustment in how and where to proceed. It was obvious the only real semblance of significant progress and show of intent was through credible elections. Thus, Guatemala embarked on a process of effecting change through this process, intended to be as free and fair

possible.

The road back to democratic rule actually started in March 1983, when the state of siege was lifted and political activity was once again allowed. By January 1984, the military kept its promise and called for Constituent Assembly elections to be held on July 1, 1984. The elections were to select the delegates to a Constituent Assembly who would in turn write a new Constitution to govern Guatemala, and put forth the procedure as to how elected officials were to be chosen.

On July 1, 1984 the elections were held and over 72% of those eligible to vote cast their ballots. It was the largest turnout ever, and it astounded not only the Guatemalans, but others in the world community watching. International observers, although still somewhat skeptical, characterized the election as free and open. The Assembly was inaugurated on August 1, 1984, and on May 30, 1985, the drafting was completed and a new Constitution written. General elections were called for on November 3, 1985, and the constitution was to go into effect January 14, 1986.

Of the fourteen eligible parties formed, eight presidential candidates ran representing single parties as well as coalitions, while the others participated in the elections for congressional, mayoral, and municipal county seats. To be elected, a candidate had to receive over 50% of the votes cast, something very difficult with such a large number of candidates. No one did receive a majority of the votes, and thus forced a run off of the

two top presidential candidates, which was held December 8, 1985.

The Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca Party (DCG) candidates were Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo for president and Roberto Carpio Nicolle for vice-president. The Partido Union del Centro Nacional (UCN) Party had Jorge Carpio Nicolle as their presidential candidate and Ramiro de Leon Carpio for vice-president.

The election process was by in large extremely efficient and showed that the Guatemalans (and especially the election tribunal) had worked tirelessly to carry out a well planned and highly organized logistical election procedure. The July, 1984 Constituent Assembly election had actually acted as a dry-run, so the November third election overall atmosphere was peaceful and appeared to have relatively few technical difficulties. Of the 2.75 million registered voters, roughly 1.66 million voted, a participation of just under seventy percent.

This first of the two presidential elections was unique in that there was tremendous interest in how Guatemala would handle the human rights issue, and if it would have a direct effect on the conduct and outcome of the elections. This concern and the following it attracted became an event in itself, outside the actual election. There were of course the perennial international observers and election groupies, but there was also an enormous contingent of human rights activists and the accompanying media presence which gathers for events which may expand beyond what is normally anticipated. This alone exuded a high degree of speculation and anticipation, giving the hotel

headquarters of the tribunal, which was the gathering point for most everything, a carnival like atmosphere. It should be remembered that this was before the Philippine election experience, and was at that point a highly visible test of a country with a dreadful human rights record, as to whether there could indeed be any semblance of free and fair elections.

The U.S. sent a Presidential Mission headed by Senator Richard Lugar, the chairman of "The Senate Foreign Relations Committee". There was reported to be no contact with any of the parties which heightened what the observers role was actually to be.

What happened was an election with every indication that it was well planned, no major incidents, and no great evidence of fraud. The observer groups certainly helped to insure that there was enough outside pressure to at least seemingly add to the goal of having a fair election. Observer groups obviously can have an immense impact on the outcome of an election as we saw in the Philippines and this also happened to some degree in Guatemala. But in Guatemala, we also sensed that there was a high degree of motivation to create a whole new government with a new constitution and new electoral procedures. Economically and morally, the country was bankrupt and the only way to keep from further sliding into anarchy was by creating a new way. Whether Guatemala will continue to progress along a democratic path, only time will tell, but what was invaluable to our project was the fact that we were able to trace the electoral process from its

recent beginnings, to a freely elected government.

Unlike the elections in Honduras where AID had someone working with the Tribunal to assist with the elections months in advance, the U.S. government had no involvement other than providing money for ballots in Guatemala. The U.S. was extremely sensitive about having any State or AID officials involved in any way with the Election Tribunal. Therefore, the easy access we had found in Honduras and Costa Rica was not found in Guatemala.

The fine details of the election were not available and information was difficult to obtain.

Initially, the sensitivities and suspicions did make it more difficult for us to penetrate the veneer to more fully understand the intricacies of the total electoral process. Fortunately, there was a runoff election and this gave us a better chance to observe their procedures and there have been subsequent meetings and conversations with the Guatemalan Tribunal while attending other elections in Central America.

This was the first election to be covered by the election project and it was made extremely productive for us by having Ms. Marilyn Zak guide us through the formalities, and a whirlwind on the job, baptism by fire training course. It was also extremely helpful, if not essential, that we were included in the unofficial party of the "Special Presidential Mission" sent to Guatemala to observe the election. Without this assistance, it would have been virtually impossible to cover election day in the length and breadth that we did. (Schedule attached).

We have divided the election process into eleven components. The following pages discuss these components as we were able to observe them in Guatemala.

1. Administration of the Election Commission and Laws Regulating the Election Procedures

Of the ten Tribunal members, five serve on a permanent basis and all are appointed by the Supreme Court. In 1985, the Tribunal proposed laws to govern the November election. The executive constituency approved these laws and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was charged with the election process.

The present election tribunal grew out of Guatemala's slow, but steady step back toward democracy after 12 years of military rule. As a result of a coup in 1982, Guatemala was ruled temporarily by a three man junta. General Efraim Rios Montt emerged as the leader and named an advisory "Council of State" to assist him in returning the nation to a more democratic path. In March 1983, a series of electoral laws were drafted and the state of siege was lifted; political parties once again were permitted. Less than a year later, the government formally convoked Constituent Assembly elections for July 1, 1984. This was the first step in a series of elections where the Guatemalan people chose their own representatives by casting a ballot. On July 1, 1984 delegates were elected to a Constituent Assembly; on August 1, 1984 those duly elected were inaugurated; and nine months later, after much debate, a new constitution was adopted.

The constitution was to go into effect on January 14, 1986, after the election on November 3, 1985 would be held for president, congress, mayor and municipal council members.

The laws governing the conduct of these elections, and the formation of an election tribunal, were a part of the newly formed constitution and were decreed on June 3, 1985, five short months before the elections were to be held. It is obvious the tribunal preformed their task quite admirably, for two elections were conducted without a hitch and Guatemala had a new president, elected freely by the people. Having met the members of the tribunal, they have not only been a wealth of information, but a genuine source of inspiration for the work they preformed in making those elections possible.

2. The Registry

Voting is a law in Guatemala, although non compliance results in a nominal fine of about one U.S. dollar. Theoretically, one may not receive a drivers license or any other type of government permit unless they have voted. All those over 18 are eligible to vote, however, personnel on active duty in the military and members of the police force cannot vote. Out of approximately 3.95 million people eligible to vote, there were 2.75 million registered as of the last election. There was a vigorous effort to register as many people as possible for the last election, but there is no simple way to register now. One must either wait for a new registration push, which will probably

not be launched until the next election, or go to the the capital of their district to register or re-register. The national registry is the basis for the electoral registry.

3. The Balloting Process

The mechanics of the election itself are specified in the Election Decree Law No. 47-85, June 3, 1985 and are the results of rewriting the new constitution. There is a booklet published explaining all the duties and responsibilities of election officials.

The balloting process is the citizen's opportunity to express himself in the election. The ease in which this is accomplished is a direct reflection on how he will view the election. The July election was a "practice" and there were extensive television "spots" explaining how to vote. The polls opened at 7:00AM and closed at 6:00PM. There were 5142 mesas, as many as 100 mesas could exist in one area, for example in a school. Six hundred and fifty votes could be cast at each table.

There were four official poll workers at each table. Most of these workers began at 5:00AM and remained until 8:00PM. Money was allocated so food could be brought to the workers. Observers from the respective parties also sat at these tables. In outlying areas, where smaller parties did not have enough people, other parties would represent them in a poll watching capacity. One poll worker was assigned to keep the line in order.

Outside the large polling areas, there were trained people from the Tribunal and party representatives to aid voters in going to the correct mesa.

At each table, there was a voting list (a computer print-out), in alphabetical order according to the last name. The voter would show an ID (usually a cedula) which was compared against the list at the table. When the person's name was located on the list, the voter was handed three ballots signed on the back by the members at the table. (The three ballots were a white one for the Presidential, blue for Congressional, and Yellow for Municipal candidates). The voter then went to a simple plywood voting booth (see TSE book), marked and folded his ballots, returned to the table, and placed it in the "box". The "box" was a clear plastic bag that hung down beneath the table and was sealed with special tape. The voter then dipped his index finger in a solution of gentian violet mixture. His ID was returned to him and he was finished voting. Most of the voting was completed by noon.

At 6:00PM, the polls closed, and the ballots were counted and certified in front of the poll workers and party observers. Any unused ballots were marked and returned for full accountability. The ballots and tabulation forms, signed by each official, were sealed in a clear plastic box and sent on to municipal headquarters, and forwarded to Guatemala City. A copy of the tabulation sheet was communicated to Tribunal headquarters by telex in most instances.

Any voter problems were handled by the local Tribunal headquarters. The problems of not being on the registration list or not having an ID were solved there.

Election day was peaceful and orderly with no guerrilla activity as thought. The process went smoothly without major problems. There was a good turnout with the people happy and excited and every indication that the process had worked.

4. Training

The training of poll workers for the elections was done in somewhat of a unique way, and was in part organized by "CAPEL". This is an election assistance organization formed by Latin American countries as a united step toward the promotion of democratic elections. A multi-national staffed organization, it is located in San Jose, Costa Rica. The Guatemalan election was one of its first tests and it fared quite well for it assisted in the training of some 410 persons, who in turn trained 21,000 people to act as poll workers election day. It was a huge task, but from the two elections viewed, each polling place or mesa was extremely well run. Each was well organized, there was little confusion, and the process was made simple and easy for the voter.

5. Commodities

The commodities needed for the elections themselves were procured from various places. Everything except the ballots were

produced in Guatemala. The ballots were a special water marked paper produced by Portals Inc., in Georgia and paid for by the U.S.. However, because of the extreme sensitivity of the election itself, the money was given in the form of a grant from the U.S. to the election tribunal, who in turn ordered the paper themselves. Otherwise, everything else was funded by the the election tribunal. The voting tables, the ballot boxes (clear plastic bags), the ink (Gentian Violet - a chemical used in veterinary medicine with good staining qualities) to mark the voters, and the security tape, were all manufactured in Guatemala and distributed to the district.

6. Transportation

Transportation was arranged for the most part by the parties using buses and trucks. The government supplied some of these vehicles, but industry and the ranches supplied the bulk. The election was held on Sunday, November 3rd. The preceding day, as well as the day following the election, were national holidays, thus enabling people to go to the district where they were registered and return. It also should be noted that Friday, November 1st was "All Saints Day", a Catholic holy day, and in Latin America, that means a holiday. The Guatemalans actually had four days off. This meant that for those who lived far from where they had to vote, it was a good excuse to not only vote, but to take the family with them to visit relatives, and for those from the country, a chance to visit the city nearest them for supplies

and holiday.

In Guatemala City, there weren't any great problems voting, but in the country many had to travel many miles over very difficult terrain. It was quite amazing, the parties had organized very efficient transportation operations where they would truck people in from remote areas to party headquarters for a particular area. The groups were then broken down to get them to the proper voting "mesas", take them back to party headquarters, feed them, and truck them back out to homes. It all seemed to work, and the feeding operations were just as amazing. Women prepared large kettles of beans and stacks of tortillas over huge barbecue pits as just another indication of the enormous effort which went into getting out the vote. All of this was occurring in a festival atmosphere. It was a big event, and to miss it was the exception rather than the rule.

On the more practical side, transportation will always be a great problem because of the country itself. The only way the problem will be solved is by enabling the voter to cast his ballot closer to where they live. That may be far in the future, since the more the districts are split, the less control exists.

7. Distribution and Collection of the Voting Materials

The distribution and collection of the voting materials was the responsibility of the "TSE". All ballots, plastic ballot bags, tape, marking instruments, etc., were sealed in plastic cases and distributed to the districts where they were further

passed along to the 5,142 mesas all over the country. At the end of the day, the votes were tallied, and those tallies entered on a form. One form went back into the clear plastic case with the ballots, etc., and sealed. Both were then transported back to the municipalities. The results from the tally sheets were wired on to "TSE" headquarters and the ballots followed over a period of several days with military and municipal assistance.

Distribution and collection in Central American countries are always difficult because of the demographics of the countries and the need to transport materials to and from remote areas, while still insuring the integrity of the contents of the ballot boxes and corresponding reporting materials.

Unlike Honduras, the military did not play a large role for fear of perceived intervention. The military is also not organized for this type of task and was confined to barracks.

It should also be noted that since an election had been held in July, the voting booths and tables were already in place to be used for future elections. For the November and December elections, simply bags, ink, and ballots needed to be distributed.

8. Security in the Voting Process

The security for all aspects of the election, while not the best, seemed to work, but did leave some questions in a number of areas. The biggest concern was the fact that there was no access to the registry. The manipulation of the registry and

vote counting are the areas where the greatest fraud can occur. This is not to insinuate that any fraud occurred, but these two areas are of great concern. Since the workings of the registry were not seen, it is hard to tell where such problems, as a voter being listed multiple times, or a deceased voter still listed, occurred. The registry is all a product of its ability to keep up with the changes in the population.

The positive things observed were the close scrutiny given each voter at the mesa by the poll workers. The information the voter presented in the form of his national "cedula" card was carefully compared against the voter registration list. Each mesa was also given only enough ballots for the number of voters registered for that particular mesa. All ballots not used had to be accounted for, were stamped void, and sent back with the rest of the ballots. Also, the fact that the ballots were of a special weight and had a watermark on them, made it close to impossible to copy. Each voter dipped their finger in ink to mark them after voting. The ink was a chemical called Gentian Violet used for medical purposes, particularly in veterinary medicine. It stains very well, but with a little hard work with soap and water or solvents, it can be removed. Still, it created the illusion of a safeguard and that may have been enough in some cases. The point is, they tried, planned, and trained their poll workers well, and anyone there who thought there was no pride in the people and a seriousness about their vote, had to be a terrible cynic.

The physical security of the voting locations was the responsibility of the local police done in an unobtrusive way, so their presence was hardly noticed. In guerrilla contested areas, some military were on alert, but the anticipated violence did not materialize. Whether the threat of guerrilla activity kept people from voting in rural areas is not clear, but it did not effect urban voting.

9. Counting and Security

The counting started the night of the election, but it was not until the next night (Monday) that they had a sufficient number of votes to announce the two winners for the runoff election.

The tabulations were telexed to an area containing at least forty telex machines in TSE headquarters where they were entered into a computer and citizens received the results over television and radio as the night progressed. It was not until twenty-four hours later that the results were known. The plastic cases themselves arrived over a two day period because of the remoteness of some areas. As a precaution, the cases were opened and verified at TSE headquarters as a cross-check against erroneous figures. There were enough checks and balances to deter wide scale fraud.

10. Management of the Electoral Process

The management of the electoral process is in place in the

form of the "TSE". They have been tested by three elections in a very short time, and accomplished the task in very fine fashion. These men are very dedicated and persevered through some very rough going. They are held in high regard by their peers in the tribunals of other Latin American countries. This sort of success and encouragement from the others in the area has acted as a catalyst to drive them on further to refine their electoral process in the time between the elections. We should do everything in our power to encourage and support them. Save a general junta which is always a possibility, the best safeguard to keep these tribunals functional during off years is by keeping them busy upgrading their system.

The Guatemalans through their election tribunal ran these elections on their own. They received training assistance for poll workers from CAPEL, otherwise, the tribunal ran the elections.

11. Psychology of the Election Process

The elections were well organized and well run. There was maximum coverage of the campaign and election by the press in television, radio, and newspaper media. The best documented promotional medium used by the Guatemalans were the spots done on television and radio sponsored by TSE and CEDEP, in which well known Guatemalan personalities, i.e., soccer players, religious leaders, comedians, actors, etc., promoted voting. These films were produced by McCann Erickson advertising agency in New York.

They were played often in the two month period preceding the elections. There were also excellent television spots on the mechanics of voting and what to bring to vote. We have these videos as part of our library of information.

The Central American people are very outward in their expressions of all public events and the same holds true of the elections. There were bands, banners, posters, rallies; the whole family and whole country involved themselves in a festival atmosphere declared as a holiday.

Guatemala has just been through a heightened two years of intensive election involvement; there is bound to be a let down and apathy. It also is very clear that Guatemala's problems were not solved by holding elections, and the fact that these elections were held not purely for the sake of democracy, but in part to bolster up their image and restore the lost capital investments and foreign aid they so badly need. This may be cause for some disillusionment and worse internal upheaval. Therefore, there must be in a country such as Guatemala with its new found democracy, a constant reminder and continued education, that citizens can make changes through their vote. Very lofty goals, but to keep what has been accomplished in place, there must be a continuous re-education program.

Conclusion

The Guatemalan elections were crucial for us to observe for many reasons and added an important understanding to what our

goals were in our overall project.

1. It was an election process newly in place and we could better trace and follow some of these new beginnings as they unfolded. It was an opportunity to watch the new found freedom of the people work and see for ourselves the efforts of their planning.

2. Because Guatemala was a country under close scrutiny by the outside world, we could also watch the influence exerted by these groups and observe how they effected the operation of the election itself. We were later able to observe this in the Philippine Election which obviously was effected very profoundly by outside pressure. Obviously, Guatemala was quite different, but it was important to note that, if allowed, outside pressures can and will have a direct effect on how the election is run.

3. The excitement and enthusiasm generated in the heat of the campaign and election day, can only last for a short period of time; in Guatemala it lasted over two years. The post election blues can have a far greater effect on these new democracies than it does on the U.S. Their expectations are high and their internal problems are great; there is bound to be disillusionment as it becomes apparent that elections are not answers, but steps in a long process. It therefore should be a high priority to ensure that interest in the process continues between elections. This means continued efforts to register and educate

the population and a constant effort to keep improving on the system itself, whether it be computerization, refinement of the registry, or new methods of security. The important thing is to keep the electoral process constantly in the forefront of attention if at all possible.

GUATEMALA
PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF ELECTION
DECEMBER 8, 1985
SUBMITTED BY
STEPHEN J. MCCARTHY

**GUATEMALA
RUNOFF ELECTION
DECEMBER 8, 1985**

The election held December 8, 1985 was the runoff election between the two candidates who received the most votes in the November 3, 1985 elections. Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, presidential Candidate and Roberto Carpio Nicolle vice presidential candidate of the "Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca" (DCG); And Joege Carpio Nicolle, presidential candidate and Ramiro De Leon Carpio, vice presidential candidate of the "Partido Union del Centro National" (UCN).

Stephen J. McCarthy, of Oxford Management Systems, and Eddie Mahe, of Eddie Mahe Associates, both attended the election and were in Guatemala from December 6, through December 11, 1985. Fortunately, through the good auspices of AID officials, we were able to again join the Special Presidential Mission sent to observe the election. The mission was co-headed by Senator Mark Hatfield and Congressman William B. Richardson. The remainder of the group was made up of other politicians, academicians, and businessmen. (see attached schedule)

The December 8th election was the last in a long, drawn-out democratization process. From the lifting of the state of siege which meant the resumption of political activities in March 1983, Guatemala had written and adopted a new constitution and held three elections. After over two and a half years Guatemala had persevered and now they had finally elected a president. The

new President was Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo of the Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) who won with 68% of the electorate.

The election was a far cry from the first round for it was thought the results were a forgone conclusion which turned out to be correct. None of the hoopla surrounding the first election and close scrutiny by the human rights groups were evident and there was a very placid feeling throughout the whole process. There had apparently been very little campaigning because of the supposed lead by Cerezo and there was none the television, radio and newspaper blitz of the first round. Neither was there the abundance of the banners on the streets nor the cars driving around carrying the flags of their respective parties. Yet election day, 65% of the registered electorate voted which was only about 5% less than the turnout for the first round on November third. The weather was better than during the first round, but it was also harvest time for the coffee crop and people had migrated to the areas to do the harvesting. So it made it all the more impressive that the parties and the government (particularly the TSE) were able to turnout the number people they did.

The voting procedures were the same as both the Constituent Election and the Presidential, Congressional and Municipal Election except that this time they had but one ballot to mark. The voting process itself went smoothly; there was little or no guerrilla activity; and the majority of mesas we visited indica-

ted that most of the people voted in the morning. The day before and the day following the election were holidays as they had been previously, to allow the people to get to and from their polling places.

We were able to observe voting in Guatemala City. Helicopters also enabled us to visit polling areas around Chichicastenango and Totonicapan.

The counting also appeared far quicker this time and soon after the first returns were in, the losing candidate Jorge Carpio conceded defeat.

Since mechanically the election was a carbon copy of the first go around it is not necessary for us to go through the eleven components as we have in our other country reports. What was significant for us was that we were further able to understand the process better the second time. There had also been rumors circulating indicating that there would be a coalition formed and no election would have been necessary resulting in an extremely low turnout. Both proved wrong, speaking highly for the Guatemalans, and also the TSE to be able to complete the task they had set out to do two and one half years before. It was also of extreme importance because it enabled us to continue to nurture our contacts with the other Latin American Election Tribunals whose knowledge and friendship helped us immensely in further understanding the problems faced by third world countries in their attempt to hold free and fair elections. It has also served as the catalyst in our effort to recruit both globalists and specialists for further election projects.

HONDURAS
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 24, 1986
SUBMITTED BY
LADONNA LEE

**HONDURAS
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 24, 1985**

Ladonna Y. Lee of Eddie Mahe, Jr. & Associates, Inc. and Stephen J. McCarthy of Oxford Management Systems were in Honduras from November 20 - 26, 1985 to analyze the election for the Democracy Program/Election Assistance Project.

On Thursday and Friday, November 21st and 22nd, 1985 they were briefed on the election and then they began analyzing the election process. In addition to analyzing the support A.I.D. provided, they interviewed individuals responsible for various aspects of the election, including meetings with officials of the National Election Tribunal (TNE).

On Saturday and Sunday, November 23 and 24th, 1986 they were included in the schedule for the official United States Observer team. (Schedule attached). The grantees visited several mesa's in each of the towns of Juticalpa, Choluteca, Ojojona, Sabragrande, Talanga and Tegucigalpa, thereby seeing the voting process in diverse areas of the country.

Following the election, they observed the election counting process, met with the press, election officials, A.I.D. personnel, and other individuals.

This on-site experience, subsequent conversations with A.I.D. personnel Bob Murphy, Marilyn Zak, Travis Horel and Roma Knee, together with the analysis of contracts and grants for the

election assistance provided to Honduras, is the basis for an indepth understanding of this election and A.I.D.'s role in providing election assistance. And, it provided the grantee the opportunity to see the tremendous cooperation necessary between the country, its election officials and military, U.S. State and A.I.D. personnel, and vendors of election services.

Ken Martin and Bob Murphy from the Honduras A.I.D. mission are commended for their tremendous cooperation with the grantee and also for their outstanding success in providing U.S. A.I.D. election assistance under very difficult time constraints and circumstances.

The election held in Honduras on November 24, 1985, for President, Congress and Municipal offices, represented the first transfer of power between democratically elected civilian Presidents since 1927. This fact, together with the political realities throughout Central America, resulted in tremendous support for the election from within Honduras and Latin America, and from the United States.

However, the election was not without controversy. Article 236 of the Honduran Constitution states that the President is elected by a simple majority of the vote. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the electoral law. Five Justices are appointed by the Congress.

A split existed within the Liberal Party which resulted in two factions holding separate conventions and nominating different Presidential nominees. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision on this matter which was viewed as favoring

President Suazo's faction. The Congress then voted to dismiss all five justices. A new President and four members of the Supreme Court were sworn in.

Following the arrest and subsequent release of the new President of the Supreme Court, Congress restructured the Court and adopted the Uruguayan System in June, 1985 as the governing law for the elections.

Under the Uruguayan System the voter casts his vote simultaneously for the party and for the candidate within the party. The party receiving the most votes is declared the winner and then the candidate within that party who receives the most votes becomes President. Thus, in effect, both a primary and general election are held at the same time.

It was said that President Roberto Suazo Cordova forced this change to prevent his arch rival within from his own party, Mr. Jose Azcona Hoyo, from becoming President.

The election went forward with the Constitution and the Election Law decreeing opposing methods of selecting the President. This controversy continued until election eve at which time the National Election Tribunal (TNE) met and upheld the Uruguayan method on a four to one vote. All the Presidential candidates had committed to abide by the new electoral law but the National Party continued to state it would challenge the outcome of the election.

There is very little question that General Walter Lopez Rayes, Chief of the Armed Forces, receives much credit for the election occurring.

Various rumors circulated in Honduras citing General Lopez as the steadying force that kept President Suazo from postponing or manipulating the election. Three weeks before the election, a special session of Congress was held with primarily President Suazo's faction of the Liberal Party in attendance. The purpose of the session was to change the election law. It was rumored that General Lopez called and told the deputies to go home. No changes were made in the law. He is also credited with bring about the TNE decision to uphold the Uruquayan System.

The United States government through A.I.D. provided great support for the election both in terms of financial support and through the day-to-day assistance of Bob Murphy, A.I.D. Human Resources Deputy Director in Honduras.

The U.S. provided over \$6,335,000 in support of this Honduran election:

- \$5,000,000 for updating the registry;
- \$75,000 for voter education;
- \$60,000 signature marches;
- \$600,000 for commodities; and
- \$300,000 for the observer program.

Because of A.I.D.'s extensive role in the Honduran election, the grantees were provided a unique view of this election and A.I.D.'s involvement. All areas of the election process were examined and analyzed. This experience provided the basis for determining the isolation of the process into the election components.

Administration Of The Election Commission and Laws Regulating The Election Procedures

As noted, the electoral law was in conflict with the Constitution regarding the election of the President. Ultimately, on election eve, the Electoral Law was upheld by the TNE and there were no subsequent challenges from the parties or candidates.

The National Election Tribunal (TNE) is composed of five members, one from each of the four parties, and a fifth named by the Supreme Court. Only the Christian Democrat representative had any previous election experience.

The TNE is established by Electoral Law and has the full responsibility of administering the election. The TNE has no permanent staff however five staff members were funded for the election period. The members of the TNE worked virtually around the clock for several months. Bob Murphy had the daily responsibility for A.I.D.'s assistance for the election. He worked closely with the TNE in preparation for the election.

Departmental Election Tribunals exist for each of the 11 districts and a Local Election Tribunal functions in each city or town.

Without prior election experience or professional staff the TNE, together with logistical support from the Armed Forces and A.I.D., put in place an election process that allowed Honduran citizens to exercise the democratic right of voting.

The Registry

All citizens over the age of 18 are eligible to vote. The registry is the responsibility of the TNE and is only an electoral registry. The 1983 municipal elections were postponed until 1985 so a new list of registered voters could be established. The Honduran registry was developed by the TNE with a grant from A.I.D. of \$5,000,000. The computer system put in place to update the registry was manufactured by Wang.

During the registration period, the voters were photographed and provided a registration card with their picture, name, address, sex, and a numerical code that gave their district number and mesa number. The registration card did not carry party designation. These names were entered into the computer for the registry list. A second registration card was produced with the voter's picture which was used as an accessory registry on election day but was not mandatory for voting.

The voters are registered at their birth place. During the registry period they could change their address and voting location if they so desired. However, a high percentage of the voters retained their voting address as their birthplace.

The registration period initially closed on August 26, 1985, and was then re-opened later and extended to October 26th. The registry was to have been completed and the lists distributed to the parties 30 days prior to the election, by October 24th. However, because of the re-registration period and necessary computer work following that period, the lists were finished and available only four to five days prior to the election.

Balloting Process

The measurement by which the citizens judge an election is their individual experience at the voting place. If their ability to cast their ballot is unrestricted and if they feel that the secrecy of their vote is protected and that their vote was not tampered with, then and in fact the election is undoubtedly judged as free and fair.

In Honduras, with relatively few exceptions, the voters experienced very few problems. The official poll workers for each mesa were representatives from each of the four parties. Additionally, each of the candidates and parties could have observers at each mesa.

In some areas where the minor parties did not have adequate workers to cover all the mesas, they contacted another party to provide workers for each position.

The instructions provided by the TNE to the officials for each mesa were very comprehensive. The process for opening and closing each mesa is fully described in the procedures.

The actual voting process as observed is described below.

Each mesa consisted of approximately 300 names. Within each voting area the voters were assigned by mesa alphabetically according to family name. Men and women voted at separate mesas.

As soon as the registration lists were available, the parties operated 'warehouses' 24 hours a day so their voters could confirm their polling place. The newspapers also published lists giving the first and last name voting at each mesa together with number and location.

As many as 157 mesas existed at a single location in the more populated areas.

Because the registry designated gender according to masculine or feminine names, one man was assigned to a mesa for women but was allowed to vote when his registration card matched the list.

The majority of the voters voted early in the morning and in many instances lines of 50 and 100 people existed when the polls opened at 6:00 a.m.

There were delays in opening the mesas in many areas because officials did not believe the ink solution worked. The solution was colorless and without sunlight took in some instances 20 minutes to produce a visible mark. The dark cool rooms at 6:00 a.m. did not provide ideal condition for the solution to immediately work. This resulted in many mesas not opening for 30 minutes to an hour while the officials 'tested' the solution.

The voter handed the table officials his registration card upon entering the mesa. The number next to the name was called out as soon as it was found on the registration list so that it could be marked on the official list and so the observers for the parties could mark their lists. The picture on the registration card was matched with a duplicate registration card in a box at the table (this was an accessory registry and not a requirement for voting.)

A ballot was then signed by the President and Secretary of the mesa and handed to the voter. Because of the high rate of illiteracy, the ballot was a picture of each party's flag with the Presidential candidates' pictures under their respective flag. The voters were directed to the voting area, primarily a corner of the room with a small table or shelf concealed by a sheet or cloth stretched across the corner to provide secrecy, to mark his or her ballot. They placed a mark under the picture of their choice for president.

After the individual marked his ballot he folded the ballot and personally dropped it into the ballot box. The little finger of his left hand was dipped in a silver nitrate solution to prevent duplicative voting and his registration card was then returned to him.

If the voter's name was not on the list they were allowed to vote provided they were at the correct table according to family name and sex. The table officials recorded the names of the individuals who had an official registration card but whose names did not appear on the list.

There was no systemized method for recording the names of these individuals whose names were missing on the registered voter list. Each table appeared to adopt its own method and in many areas only their names were recorded, not their addresses or assigned registration numbers. These names were to be turned into the TNE for updating the registration list.

(The TNE officials stated funds were not available to update the registry but it was their intention to request assistance from A.I.D. to update the registry following the election.)

The voting process took a minimum of 3 to 4 minutes per vote. And, because the entire process is completed for each voter before the next begins long lines existed into the early afternoon. However, at many of the locations visited, the voting was virtually completed by mid afternoon long before the 6:00 p.m. closing deadline.

Because the voters were so committed to participating in the election there was no observance of voters leaving without voting or even any disgruntlement.

It was stated that some voters standing in line had walked for six kilometers or traveled on trucks for 16 hours, had arrived at the polling places by 6:00 a.m. and had then stood in line three or four hours waiting their turn to vote.

Only two instances were observed by the grantee of voters being denied the opportunity to vote. In Choluteca, a woman was at the table after standing in line twice. She had been denied voting because her card with picture was not in the

box even though her name was listed on the registration list. The President of the table had sent her to the Local Election Tribunal for clarification. On her second attempt she told the President that the Local Election Tribunal representatives had told her that the card was not a requirement, to read the instructions and that she could vote. The President again read the procedures and erroneously interpreted that it was required and the woman was sent back to the local Election Tribunal.

In the second instance, in Sabragrande, a man was denied the right to vote because his name was not on the registration list but he did have a valid registration card. The TNE had sent telegrams to each Local Election Tribunal the night before the election clarifying the voting procedures stating that the Uruguayan System was upheld and that voters with a valid registration card and no ink marking could vote even if their name was not on the registration list.

The President of the mesa denied this individual the right to vote and was unaware of the telegram that had been sent out clarifying the procedures.

The balloting process could have been improved if adequate training had been provided for the polling officials. The questions that did occur, the irregularities in procedures, would have been reduced.

Overall the voting process was handled fairly and without any suggestion of fraud or manipulation. The

process could undoubtedly be expedited and the long waits in line reduced. However, in this particular country there appeared to be no resentment of the waiting period.

Training

The training of election workers and party observers was a function of the parties.

CAPEL was originally considered for the training, however, because Carlos Roberto Reina had resigned from the Board of CAPEL upon announcing for President, CAPEL's involvement was suspect, and thus not accepted.

The Nacional Party trained 20 'teachers' who in turn trained 800 table workers. Thus the Nacional Party only had about 10% of the mesas covered by a trained party representative.

Adequate information on the training by the parties was not available during this trip due to the party officials being involved in the election process.

Commodities

The election commodities were primarily supplied and coordinated by U.S. Aid.

The ballots were printed on paper obtained in the United States. The printing was done in Honduras by three printers. Printing could not begin until October 7th when the Party slates were finalized. One printer was relieved of responsibility after 600,000 ballots were 'erroneously' printed.

Security measurements for the ballots included a unique watermark, and after printing, each ballot was signed by a signature machine for the President of the TNE. The ballots were guarded by the armed forces from the time the paper arrived in Honduras through printing, storage and distribution.

The indelible ink, a silver nitrate solution to prevent duplicate voting was purchased in the United States by A.I.D. and shipped to Honduras.

Eight thousand 2 ounce bottles of silver nitrate were purchased. United States law requires that this solution be labeled 'Poison' when it is distributed. Because the decision was made to order the ink in bottles for each table instead of bulk, A.I.D. personnel spent many hours removing the labels before the ink was distributed.

Styrofoam containers were purchased to hold the ink at the polling tables. However, the containers were rarely used election day.

Because of the experimentation at the mesas with the ink solution, some polling places ran out of ink and voting was held up until additional bottles could be secured.

Ballot boxes were constructed of masonite with one plexiglass side to ensure that no ballots were in the boxes prior to the opening of the station.

The plexiglass was bought in Costa Rica and the boxes constructed locally using 3 firms.

The lids were not attached until after the voting materials were packed in the box for distribution. One problem that did occur is that the boxes had not been delivered clean and thus before the boxes could be packed they first had to be cleaned, a momentous task for over 8,000 boxes.

Beginning on November 13th, all voting materials (20 items) were packed in the box and the ballot boxes sealed with for distribution.

Because of the size of the boxes the storage before distribution was a consideration.

Transportation

Election day transportation of the voters was a responsibility of the parties and the candidates. The campaigns spent a major portion of their budgets on this effort. Most public transportation, primarily buses, was tied up on election day. Additionally trucks, taxis and private vehicles were used.

Both the Liberal and Nacional parties had extensive transportation organizations. In Choluteca, the Nacional Party used the fairgrounds for a staging area. Buses and trucks brought voters from outlying areas traveling for as long as 6 to 8 hours each way and in the farthest areas for 16 hours one way. Upon arrival at the staging area, they were put in other transportation and transported to their

designated mesa. After voting they used the party transportation to return to the fairgrounds. The parties also provided food for the voters at these transportation centers.

Throughout the day, transportation returned the voters to the outlying areas. However many voters did not want to leave when the transportation did so voters were left without return transportation at the end of the day.

Although the Christian Democrat (PDCH) and Innovation and Movement (PINU) parties did not have as extensive or well organized transportation systems, (and in some areas none at all) voters did not appear to be denied transportation from a rival party. And thus, the major parties in essence provided the transportation system for the entire population.

Distribution and Collection of Voting Materials

The distribution of the voting materials (packed in the ballot boxes) was coordinated centrally from the TNE. This was a massive undertaking. Each box was designated for an individual mesa because of the registered voters list included, a total of 8,000 individual boxes.

The materials were distributed by the armed forces from the warehouse in Tegucigalpa to the Local Election Tribunal. The mesa officials then picked up their specific box.

The distribution by the armed forces was complicated by 2 logistical factors: (1) The lack of an adequate road structure required some distribution by air; and (2) The sheer size of each ballot box, almost 8 cubic feet, limited the number any truck or helicopter could carry.

However the distribution was completed in 5 days between November 18th and 22nd, 1985.

One area of possible breakdown in the election process, particularly because of the controversy over the method of designating the President, was that no exact procedure was in place to recover the ballot boxes after the election. If a recount had been required, the quick control of these boxes could have been essential. However, it was learned that the armed forces began collecting the ballot boxes with ballots immediately following the election.

The manpower and actual costs of the armed forces were not available to the grantee.

Security

Security was provided by the armed forces. In addition, the armed forces were responsible for providing security for the ballots while being printed for distribution and collection of the voting materials and for security on election day.

The election commodities were gathered and prepared for distribution at the TNE operational headquarters which was a huge 3 story warehouse. This facility was guarded 24 hours a day by the armed forces.

The military and police were confined to their barracks on election day with the exception of those providing security for polling stations. The armed forces were required to stay 100 meters from the voting table. During the morning and early afternoon they observed this requirement. However in the late afternoon in some locations they were much closer.

It was also reported that a member of the military was present at each Local Tribunal of Elections on election day.

Because it was fairly well known that General Lopez was supporting the election there appeared to be little apprehension of the military involvement.

Actual numbers of armed forces and cost for their involvement in providing security was unavailable.

Count and Security Certification

The process of counting the votes at each mesa was described in great detail in the polling station procedures document. Each ballot was examined by the teller, the President and then shown to the observers before it was tallied by the secretary.

It should be noted that the officials must certify not only the marked ballots but all unmarked ballots. Thus every ballot distributed is accounted for during the counting process.

Following the count and closing act of the mesa, the certification of the vote was delivered by the President of each mesa to the Local Election Tribunal including the number of blank ballots. This document was certified by all members of the mesa as well as party and candidate observers.

The Local Election Tribunal reported the results of each mesa to the TNE count center in Tegucigalpa and to the candidates' headquarters. Because of the distances and lack of speedy transportation, the ballot results from some of the outlying areas were not received for 48 hours.

The TNE had a computerized count center. The press and observers could access the results by candidates, party or geography.

Because of the uncertainty over whether the new Electoral Law was going to be challenged, the certification process was critical to the outcome of this election. There were no challenges and thus no problems. However if the outcome had been challenged, the election could have been jeopardized because recount procedures were not spelled out.

Additionally on Sunday evening after 70 mesas in Tegucigalpa were counted, the Nacional candidate, Rafael Callejas, was winning the popular vote but the Liberal Party was ahead in the total vote. The mesa by mesa reporting was suspended on both television and at the computerized count area until the results were finalized on Monday evening. There were concerns that the controversy between the Constitution and Electoral Law was being debated.

Management of the Electoral Process

The management and coordination of a process to first register all eligible voters and then to put in place the system for each voter to cast his ballot is a massive undertaking.

The TNE, together with Bob Murphy and Ken Martin of A.I.D., provided the management and administration of the election.

United States involvement through A.I.D. was on a very difficult timeline because the Honduran government did not request assistance until a few months before the election

Psychology of the Election Process

Because this was the first transition between elected civilian Presidents in sixty years, the citizenry and public officials were very supportive of and interested in the election.

Several organized efforts to encourage voter participation were observed. The TNE sponsored television jingles encouraging voting. The La Federacion de Asociaciones Femeninas Hondurenas, an organization similar to the League of Women Voters, received a grant of \$75,000 from A.I.D. to provide voter education. The funds were not available until October, however, they mounted a particularly effective program in just six weeks.

Their program consisted of television spots and posters describing the voting process. The posters were distributed throughout the country and were observed posted outside polling places in virtually all areas of Honduras.

Television spots encouraging voter participation were sponsored by an insurance company that is owned by the Army. Other 'encouragement to vote' ads were sponsored by many businesses.

All official campaigning was prohibited 48 hours before the polls opened. The candidates' advertising during this period, both in print and on television, consisted of the candidate's picture and name together with a message to be sure and vote.

Rumors constantly circulated about violations of the voting process, cancellation of the election, attempts by President Suazo to retain power, etc. However, there was little doubt or concern that the election would not occur.

The attitude of the voters was festive and friendly. Many homes and most vehicles sported the colors of their party. Each campaign had its own particular horn signal and on the two evenings before the election the streets were crowded with caravans of cars supporting their respective candidates.

Beyond the willingness of the voters to travel for 6 and 8 hours in the back of a cattle truck and to stand in line for

3 or 4 hours to exercise their right to vote, the real test of their commitment to the practice of democracy was shown following the election.

Summary

A total of 1,597,841 voters participated in the election, representing an 83.6% voter turnout. This represented an increase of 400,000 votes from 1981 when President Azcona was elected with 52% of 1.2 million votes.

Jose Azcona Hoyo won because the Liberal Party received 51% of the total vote and thus retained the Presidency.

Rafael Callejas won the popular vote by over 200,000 votes but because of the new electoral law lost the race.

The New Congress is controlled by the Callejas' faction of the Nacional party with 63 deputies to Azcona's group of 46 deputies. (The number of deputies increased from 82 to 132, at this election because of the increased population.)

The next Presidential election is scheduled for 1989.

HONDURAN ELECTION RESULTS

PARTY		
Liberal Party	51.01%	786,594
National Party	45.49%	701,406
Christian Democratic Party	1.69%	30,173
Party of Innovation and National Unity	1.54%	23,705
Null and blank votes	--	<u>55,963</u>
Total vote count	100%	1,597,841

CANDIDATE		
Rafael Leonardo Callejas (National)	41%	656,882
Jose Azcona Hoyo (Liberal)	27%	424,358
Oscar Mejia Arellano (Liberal)	16%	250,519
Efrain Bu Giron (Liberal)	.04%	64,230
Carlos Roberto Reina (Liberal)	.03%	43,373
Hernan Corrales Padilla (PDC)	.02%	30,173
Enrique Aguilar Cerrato (PINU)	.01%	23,705
Fernando Larizabal (National)	.01%	22,163
Juan Pablo Urrutia (National)	.01%	20,121
No Preference Liberal Party Votes	--	4,114
No Preference National Party Votes	--	2,240

Source: National Election Tribunal

COSTA RICA
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
FEBRUARY 2, 1986
SUBMITTED BY
DEMOCRACY PROJECT DELEGATION
FOREWORD BY
STEPHEN J. MCCARTHY

**COSTA RICA
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
FEBRUARY 2, 1986**

The Costa Rica Election country report will be handled somewhat differently in this section. During the first phase of the grant, it was determined to include other qualified individuals in the election research and observations. Those chosen were the beginning of a core of individuals whose knowledge and talents could be drawn upon to assist the Democracy Program. The first group to be integrated into election observations and research were of a political bipartisan persuasion; two individuals each from the Democratic and Republican parties. All four had a strong political background, some experience in international politics and one also was bilingual.

The question was when to integrate these individuals and to what election. Obviously, since there were a limited number of elections to choose from in the time frame of the grant, this further complicated the matter. This, coupled with the diplomatic sensitivities of both our country and a prospective host country, made the choice of the right country critical. It was with great fortune that Ms. Marilyn Zak was available from the very beginning of the project for guidance and assistance. Following the Guatemalan election

(November 3, 1985), a trip was made to Costa Rica to look at their registry and meet with the staff of CAPEL. Ms. Zak was in Costa Rica at the time and was able to greatly assist in introducing the grantees to the election officials and add to the knowledge of elections in general and Central America in particular. It was because of this, and the warm reception received from the Costa Ricans, that it was decided that the Costa Rica Presidential election in February, 1986, would be the perfect place to start the program integrating potential globalists.

Costa Rica is a unique country, totally different from any other in Central America. It does not have a standing army and places great emphasis on abiding by the wishes of its people. This has manifested itself in a free and fair electoral process not equaled by many in the world. Voting procedures are taught early in their education and the children participate in assisting at the polls on election day. The Costa Ricans are extremely proud of their country and their electoral process. They are pleased to have other countries not only observe the process, but have a steady stream of election tribunals calling upon them to study their successful techniques and methods to aid in the refinement of their own electoral process.

Costa Rica is also the headquarters of CAPEL (Center

for Electoral Promotion and Assistance), a Latin American organization with a multi-national board, whose sole purpose is to aid Latin American countries in their struggle to hold free and fair elections.

During this first trip, many contacts and friends were made and all were explained the purpose of the grant and work being done. Later, after talking with the members of their tribunal at other elections in Central America and through the intercession of Ms. Zak the details were worked out for taking a delegation to the Presidential election held February 2, 1986.

The Costa Ricans were extremely helpful and cooperative and through the good auspices of Lic. Sonia Picado of the Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos and her staff, arrangements were made to take the delegation into Costa Rica without the need for support from the United States embassy. A schedule equivalent to a White House Advanced trip was set up. The delegation was briefed by the tribunal, shown the registry, entertained at a luncheon by the tribunal, kindly included in a cocktail party given by the American Ambassador, able to cover many areas of the country on election day, and witness the count election night. It was a very positive experience for the delegation and a good step toward the program goal of integrating others into the

expanding base of election expertise. Particular appreciation is expressed to those who made this very successful trip possible.

The country reports submitted by the members of the delegation, Ralph D. Murphine, Clifton White, Don Fowler, and Bob Buzinski follow this introduction. These reports summarize their observations of the Costa Rican elections and serve as the total reports on this trip.

COSTA RICA ELECTION

Submitted by:

Bob Buzinski

Memo to: Eddie Mahe, Ladonna Lee

From: Bob Buzinski

Re: February 2, 1986 Costa Rica election observations

I am going to make my observations by various categories and conclude with some overall comments.

PARTY ACTIVITY: The professionalism of the parties was clearly one of the most impressive of all the items observed. There are few political organizations in the US that have the discipline and skills demonstrated in this campaign.

The voter identification and turn out program was as sophisticated as any I have seen. Voter list were acquired by the parties from the Tribunal (what would be our Board of Elections) and the voter was contacted by either phone or in person to determine his or her preference. Then on election day the voters who did not vote by 10:00 A.M. were contacted by phone (if possible) or in person. This same procedure was followed up at 1:00 and again at 3:00. This is a relatively simple operation in municipal San Jose but it showed great organization when we visited the rural areas. They had people on motorcycles and just plain bicycles on call to get their voters to the polls.

The parties also showed great ability in distributing the various flags and other campaign material. It is not an over exaggeration to say that at least 25 or 30 % of the cars and houses had a flag of some size on it. In the US yard signs and other such items may or may not be much of an influence on the electorate but it was clear that is not the case in Costa Rica. I would not want to attempt to afix a figure as to the percentage this activity has but I was convinced it had maybe 5-6% or so.

The two campaigns also demonstrated their professionalism in being able to produce large and enthusiastic rallies. Supporters were transported to the site of the events and all the details were well accounted for. Music, signs, lighting, speaker systems, platform and staging, etc. were as good as we do.

TRIBUNAL: One of the pre-conceptions I had when originally requested to be a part of the observation team is that the entire election process was filled with fraud and corruption. NOTHING could be further from the truth!

I do not feel it necessary for this report to go over the actual details of how the Tribunal functions but there are a few general comments I would like to make.

I was impressed with the fairness of entire operation. Both the major parties are treated equally as far as I could determine. I

did hear comments that they were biased and in fact were not neutral but I dismissed that as comments from party activists of both sides. (I am not naive enough to think there is not some way to subvert the process but I don't know how.)

The Tribunal has full control of the militia and police forces during the election period. Again, if there was any favoritism I did not observe it.

Finally, I found the status of the voter's list truly impressive. I cannot recount the number of times I have tried to acquire a current voter list in the US. It doesn't exist, it is in written form and not on computer, or the registrar simply will not give it to you. In Costa Rica everything is on computer at the central headquarters of the Tribunal in San Jose. Voters who did not know where they were supposed to vote simply called in and in seconds were told where their mesa was. Also, complete copies of the entire list were given to the parties by the government. Oh, how I wish we could do that!!

YOUTH: I am not sure who said it first, the Jesuits or Karl Marx, but someone once said that give me a child of 4 or 5 and I will have his mind for life. If there is any truth in that then the principles of democracy are safe in Costa Rica.

I was amazed at the amount of young people carrying campaign flags and other campaign items. However my lasting memory of Election Day itself is the participation of the young people at the mesas. Voters seeking assistance were aided by young party people. I don't necessarily mean teenagers either. Some of these kids were 8 or 9! Also, these young people served as "runners" to get the voters who hadn't voted to do so.

I could see in their faces their exuberance about being able to be a part of this important day.

FINANCING: If there was one area I was disappointed is that I was unable to get complete answers as to how these campaigns get the necessary funds to operate. We were told the government contributes a certain amount of their gross budget to any political party that qualifies. However, I never was able to ascertain what the formula is. Also, the total amount contributed by the government was not determined.

Private contributions are legal but I never did find out how much each party had collected.

OVERALL: Law requires that every person 18 or over must vote. However, it was very evident to me that even if such a law didn't exist the percentage of people who would participate would be extremely high. The small part of the country we were able to see in our few days there was totally engulfed in the process. Everything that did not concern itself directly with the campaign was irrelevant. People took off work days in

advance to work for the candidate of their choice by either distributing materials, making phone calls, knocking on doors or making sandwiches for other party workers. It didn't matter how old you were--5 or 80!

The atmosphere reminded me very much of a carnival but along with that a seriousness that could not be overstated. The entire population had a good time but also demonstrated a keen awareness that they were selecting their leaders for the next four years.

My final comment is that whatever the US can do to assist other Third World countries to copy the Costa Rica system will be greatly beneficial to not only the country involved but with democracy in general and the United States specifically.

COSTA RICA ELECTION

Submitted by:

Don Fowler

ITEM ONE
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

This analysis will address a number of features of the Costa Rican electoral process from the standpoint of judging their potential for transfer to other nations and systems. In reading this analysis it is important to understand that many cultural, economic and political factors affect the feasibility of transferring a feature of an electoral system from one nation to another; what looks good in one system will not necessarily work in another system, and before a transfer is attempted a very careful analysis should be made to determine its acceptability in a different society with different social, political and cultural values.

The one overriding feature of the Costa Rican system that makes it work as well as it does is the broad, massive public support which it enjoys. Remove or change this factor and the system simply would not work as well as it does. Conversely, one can say that because the Costa Rican people are committed to an open democratic process other mechanisms for registration and voting would probably work there. The essential ingredient in the Costa Rican system is the support of the people and not the individual components of the organizational and instructional mechanism.

I. Registration. Using the regular system for registration works in Costa Rica because there is a feeder system of birth certificates, death certificates and similar documents that permits computerized updating of the system. If this automa-

tic feeder process of official documents were not available, the sophisticated computers used by the National Registry would be ineffective in keeping accurate records of those eligible to vote.

The Costa Rican system is highly centralized in a single office in the capital city. If Costa Rica were larger in terms of population or geography, it is doubtful that the high degree of centralization would be feasible.

As the system currently works, a citizen must physically go to the Registry office in San Jose to change any material information that is kept in the regular system.

Specifically, changing voting places, requires a trip to San Jose. This clearly is an imposition and a discouragement to people to change their voting place, and requiring people to travel long distances in order to vote is clearly a discouragement to voting.

In any system without the broad level of public support that exists in Costa Rica this highly centralized system would actively work to discourage people from voting.

It seems obvious that modification of the Costa Rican system is in order. Such a modification should involve establishing offices in the provinces and permitting people to change essential elements of information about themselves.

Technologically, this is entirely feasible and would increase the convenience of the registration system substantially.

In assessing the transferability of the Costa Rican registration system to other countries, one should be cautious about the high degree of centralization if the country is as large or larger than Costa Rica. Otherwise, its mechanism is good and efficient and should be useful to other nations.

II. Staffing of the Voting Places and Mesas. It is fairly remarkable that the Supreme Elections Tribunal and its subordinate elements have been able to enlist the support and goodwill of so many active party members to work at the voting places and to be members of the juntas at the mesas. In most systems interjecting such an extensive level of partisan representation in the operation of the voting process itself would be disruptive. In most systems a greater degree of objectivity and non-partisanship is required to maintain order and avoid confusion and conflict at the voting places. At best it is difficult to avoid prejudice and even cheating -- someone must, however, run the polling places and it is desirable to have objective people doing so. Interjecting the high level of partisanship found in Costa Rica would not be acceptable or workable in most systems.

One feature of the Costa Rican system that should be considered by other countries is the large number of personnel who work in the voting places and the mesas. (This does not refer to the Party workers who escort voters to the mesas, but to the people who actually operate the mechanics of the voting operations.) By having a large number of workers at each voting place and five people as members of each junta,

and by limiting the number of voters at each mesa to 255, voters are assured of being able to vote in an orderly process and one that does not require standing in lines for long periods of time.

In less stable systems, reducing the pressure of many people waiting in line and clogging the voting facilities would have a significantly beneficial effect and reduce the chances of fraud. One way to achieve this is by using more people to staff the voting places.

III. Campaign Financing. Providing duly qualified parties with funds for campaigning works well in Costa Rica and is a feature that should have application in other systems. Public funding of campaigns does have the tendency to proliferate the number of parties and candidates, but in emerging systems where parties are ill-defined and not fully formed, public funding should be a healthy feature.

Requiring parties not achieving a minimum level of support at the polls to repay the public funds that are provided them discourages irresponsible and cavalier use of public money for political purposes, and tends to reduce the number of parties that would qualify.

Permitting parties to raise private money to add to the money received from public sources works well in Costa Rica, but would probably not be desirable for many emerging nations. It offers too great an opportunity for the incumbent govern-

ment to put pressure on private individuals and businesses to contribute to the incumbent party, and not to contribute to challenging parties. Should this kind of abuse occur, the incumbent party would enjoy an overwhelming advantage to the point of making effective challenges infeasible.

IV. Secrecy of the Voting Process. The Costa Rican system of insuring secrecy of the voting process is as good as I have ever seen. It is effective because the procedures that are provided are enforced by the members of the juntas. Other systems might describe a process of maintaining secrecy of the ballot that are theoretically as effective as the Costa Rican system, but what makes the Costa Rican system work is the degree to which it is enforced by the junta members. A major contributing factor is that only one person is permitted in the voting place at a time, which, in turn, is possible because there are an adequate number of mesas with relatively small numbers of registered voters. It follows that one way to increase the secrecy of the ballot is to arrange an unhurried and private circumstance in which to vote.

Marking the ballot with one's fingerprints is subject to abuse and suspicion. While it works in Costa Rica it probably would create so much suspicion in many systems that it would not be feasible.

V. Ghost Voters. In addition to the registration system using the regular system the requirement for voters to dip their finger in indelible ink is an excellent means of preventing

procedures at each mesa. The members of the junta and the other officers at each voting place are trained by the Supreme Elections Tribunal, or a subordinate tribunal. The poll watchers are there to assist voters in voting for their candidates and to insure security of the electoral process.

2. These are made up of a number of mesas, each of which is presided over by a junta composed of five members who are appointed by the Supreme Elections Tribunal from the various parties. All of the materials and logistical support is provided by the Supreme Elections Tribunal. All of the voting places that I saw were in school houses and I assume that all voting places are in schools.
3. Each voting place has a "fiscal official" that has communications with the Supreme Elections Tribunal or one of its subordinate elements through telephone and other means and, of course, each junta can communicate with the fiscal officer. Effective communications between the fiscal officers, the juntas and other appropriate people was no problem on election day.
4. The Supreme Elections Tribunal distributes the lists, ballots and other materials to the voting officials (fiscal officers and junta members) well in advance of election day (approximately a week). They are distributed by agents of the Supreme Elections Tribunal and are kept in secure places in each location.

voters from voting more than once. For substantial numbers of ghost voters to affect the election would require collusion by members of the junta. Although some individuals might object for esthetic as well as reasons of personal rights to discoloring their fingers, it is a method that works.

For large numbers of non-appearing people (or names) to vote in Costa Rica would be impossible without collusion among junta members, which is unlikely because they are members of different parties.

Both of these methods can be transferred to other systems, although more nonpartisan objectivity in the part of those actually operating the voting places (mesas) would be desirable in other systems.

IV. Role of the Supreme Elections Tribunal. One feature of the Costa Rican system that enhances public respect and support is the role of the Supreme Elections Tribunal. Its membership is carefully prescribed; qualifications for members are high; it is treated with deference and dignity in the media; it is given substantial powers, not only to run with near absolute authority the operations of the elections but also to insure public safety and order in the general community at election time; and it is given a prominent role of dignity and respect in announcing the results of the elections on election night and for a period of time thereafter. Over time the Supreme Elections Tribunal and its subordinate

elements have acquired substantial status and respect in the general community.

While it is not possible to transfer in full force the prestige of and respect for the Supreme Elections Tribunal, this model can be followed and with the right kind of cultivation over time the same results can be obtained.

ITEM TWO

RESPONSES TO THE MAHE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION ONE

Before getting into the substance of this report it is worthwhile to make two points. First, while I have experienced a great many elections, as an active campaign worker, as a party official, and as an observer, they have all been within the United States -- none have been outside of the United States until this one. There is, of course, a great variety of elections in the United States, but they all take place in the American culture, with all that that implies.

Second, a simple analysis of the mechanics and procedures of the Costa Rican process is insufficient to convey an understanding of what makes it work. There is no doubt that the electoral mechanism in Costa Rica is a good one, but what makes it work so well is the wide comprehensive support and participation on the part of the Costa Rican people. Without this exceptionally broad base of support, enthusiasm and participation the same electoral mechanism -- good as it is -- would not work as well as it does.

SECTION TWO

In this section I will work through the Mahe questionnaire and respond item by item. For ease of matching questions and answers I will use the same numbering system as does the questionnaire.

I. Registration.

1. The registration system used in Costa Rica takes advantage of a highly efficient cedula system that captures at

birth all Costa Rican citizens. It is a permanent record that has a number of uses other than voter registration. It was not created uniquely for this election but it is continuously used for all elections as well as for other matters.

2. The system of using the cedula system as the basis for voter registration works exceptionally well. Because all birth and death certificates are routinely submitted to the National Registry that has responsibility for operating the cedula system, persons are automatically enrolled in the system when they are born and automatically deleted when they die. This provides an adequate purging process to keep the lists current. If a person moves and does not notify the Registry of the move, the person must go back to the location where they previously lived in order to vote. They are not disqualified from voting; they just have to make the trip to the voting location where they previously lived. We visited two polling places in Liberia, a small town of about ten thousand in Guantaguste Province, and the system worked there as well as it did in San Jose. We also visited a small voting place of only three mesas in a very rural area of Guantaguste (it was on a dirt road) and the system worked there.
3. The system is entirely computerized.

4. The hardware system is Burroughs. I do not know what the software system is but it was done specifically for Costa Rica.
5. The format of the list is simple, orderly, and inadequate. It lists the voters' names, the cedula numbers, and the name of the voting place. It is quite adequate.
6. . The following tells us how clean the list is.
 - A. Most people are automatically registered by birth certificates. People who are naturalized citizens must provide evidence of citizenship and residency and must go to the Registry in San Jose to register.
 - B. Because removing people from the list is automatically triggered through death certificates and other public documents, such as court records indicating a conviction for a felony, the system works quite well.
 - C. There is little or no chance that the Costa Rican system does now and will in the future tolerate ghost voters. Even if ghost voters' names somehow appeared on the mesa lists, it would be difficult to vote them because of the requirement that voters' pictures appear on the cedula. The requirement for voters to dip their fingers in ink the first time they vote would also work against ghost voters. To use ghost voters would require collusion between junta members, and since they represent different parties, this is highly unlikely.

D. The cegula system is a permanent record (a national I.D. card) that is maintained by the Registry. It is used for many things other than voting, although voting is one of the most important uses of the system. It is as good a registration system as I have ever encountered. I would suggest that the period of time between the cut-off date for making changes in citizens' addresses, etc., and the time of elections be shortened. No changes in data on any individual can be made after October 1 of the year preceding the election. The election is in early February. This is four months and with the sophisticated computer systems that they use, the time could be shortened.

II. Voting.

1. Voters identify themselves with their cegula. It has each voters name, cegula number (which is all important), picture, and address.
2. When voters have completed the voting process, they are required to dip their finger in an ink that temporarily discolors it. It is easily visible because of its purple color and requires a day or so to wear off. It works very well.
3. There was a transportation system for voters.
 - A. Each party sponsors its own transportation system -- at least the major parties do.

- B. It was very efficient. Because the campaign system in Costa Rican is financed by the Government, there was plenty of money for transportation and a great deal of money was spent. We visited the Liberacion Party transportation system in Liberia. Drivers were well organized. Communication systems between the voting places and the transportation point were open and clear. Schedules were posted. Buses and cars moved back and forth between Liberia and a number of other cities in various parts of Costa Rica. It was indeed very efficient.
4. We asked if the members of the security forces can vote.
- A. They vote in their home areas using the address on their cedula, just as other citizens do.
- B. Not applicable.
5. The level of participation in the election is very high. It was about 80 percent, which is the customary level in Costa Rica.
- A. Women vote in approximately the same percentages as men -- perhaps slightly less.
- B. Ethnic populations constitute a relatively small part of the total in Costa Rica -- consisting primarily of native Indians and Balcks from the Carribbean. Their level of participation is slightly below that of the general population.

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- C. In rural areas participation is comparable to that found in cities.
- D. Voting is compulsory in Costa Rica. A small penalty is prescribed but rarely is enforced. Requiring voting provides a strong moral impetus to participate in the system.
6. The Costa Rican voting system that combines strong popular support with an efficient registration system results in a high rate of voter participation. The mechanics of the voting process are simple, orderly and unhurried. Voting is a pleasant, uncomplicated process.
7. Absentee balloting is permitted under very limited circumstances. Only if one is out of the country, in the hospital, or completely indisposed physically can one vote by absentee ballot. Simply being at a distant location from the voting place and mesa where one is registered does not qualify one for an absentee ballot, as is the case in most states in the United States. Absentee balloting is used sparingly.
8. The sanctity of a secret ballot was assured. Each individual is required to mark his or her ballot in a secret booth, fold the ballot so that the mark cannot be seen, show the signatures of the junta members that are on the ballot to the junta members, and then place the ballots in their appropriate boxes. In this way the secrecy of the ballot is preserved.

9. The polling places were exceptionally well staffed and free of confusion. While there was clutter and a lot of people in and around the voting places, the rooms in which the mesas were located were presided over by the junta members who insured order in the process. In none of the four voting places and ten mesas that I visited was there any confusion or disruption in the process.

10. All parties had access to the media during the campaign. Public funds are used to provide support for all parties that qualify -- and it is relatively easy to qualify as a certified party in Costa Rica. If the party does not receive 5 percent of the vote in the election, the party must repay the public funds. Parties can raise money privately and spend as much as they can raise. This process assures even minor parties a minimum level of financial ability to purchase time in the media, but gives an obvious advantage to larger parties. Media is purchased on a commercial basis. In addition there is extensive coverage of the campaign as news, but quite naturally the major parties receive more "news" coverage than do the minor parties.

III. Election Day Poll Workers Security.

1. "Poll watchers" are extensively trained by the parties. In Costa Rica the "poll watchers" are not as important as in other systems because the parties have officially sanctioned representation on the juntas that control the

5. Immediately after voting is terminated at 6:00 P.M., the junta of each mesa counts the ballots, goes to the local post office and sends a telegram to the Supreme Elections Tribunal in San Jose. The telegrams are received in the post office in San Jose and are physically carried by civil gurads from the post office to the office of the Supreme Elections Tribunal. As soon as this process has been completed, the ballots and all other voter material are physically brought to the office of the Supreme Election Tribunal in San Jose. This process just described constitutes a semiofficial or unofficial tabulation. The official tabulation is performed by the Supreme Elections Tribunal in San Jose beginning on Thursday after election day. Each and every ballot is counted in San Jose under the supervision of the Supreme Elections Tribunal. This constitutes the official results. Customarily there is little or no discrepancy between the unofficial and the official results.
6. There are no unique security systems in place for the process in Costa Rica. The process enjoys a very high level of support and is held in such high regard by citizens, party officials and others that no unique security systems are required.
7. All ballots are printed under the supervision of the Supreme Elections Tribunal using special paper and ink. Protection against the use of unauthorized ballots is found at the voting place by, one, required signatures of

all members of each junta; and, two, by requirement that each voter show to junta members their signatures prior to placing the ballots in the voting boxes.

8. Poll workers are given thorough instructions on how to operate the polling place. In addition, simple written instructions are given to them for the performance of their duties on election day. Voters are provided with written instructions which are posted outside the room in which each junta sits. The instructions are clear and concise. In addition junta members provide instructions for the voters if instruction is required.
9. Party workers constitute the membership of the juntas. Other party workers or watchers are permitted in the voting place but their participation is almost exclusively pointed toward improving the turn out of their supporters and not toward the conduct of the election process itself.
10. Ballot boxes are uniform throughout the system and are provided by the Supreme Elections Tribunal. The voting booth is a simple cardboard enclosure in which each voter goes to mark his or her ballot. Complete cedula lists are provided to each junta as is the ink that is used by each voter to dip his or her finger in so as to guard against duplicate voting. All of these materials are provided by the Supreme Elections Tribunal.

11. Results of the voting in each mesa are reported by telegram to the post office in San Jose and from there physically transported by civil guards to the Supreme Election Tribunal. Ballots and other remaining paraphernalia are put in plastic bags and transported on election night to the headquarters of the Supreme Elections Tribunal in San Jose.

IV. General.

1. The single biggest problem that I detected was the requirement to transport so many people over long distances to vote. This of course, was the result in most instances of the individuals desire to continue to vote in one particular place while living in another.
2. The entire process worked exceptionally well. Perhaps the outstanding feature -- the best feature -- of the process was the wide public participation in the process. Everybody from grandparents to little children participated. They also hold the process in high regard. These two social and attitudinal factors contributed not only to a large turnout but to an effective, secure and open process.
3. The operations of the electoral system in Costa Rica were self-contained and required no monitoring or subsidy from outside sources. There were a great many observers, however, from a good many different countries.

- A. No help or interference was needed or evident from other countries.
 - B. There were a number of observers from the United States -- semi-official and private. There were also observers from a good many other countries.
 - C. Some private foundations and organizations had observers.
 - D. Observer groups were from a variety of countries and organizations -- the United States, Venezuela, the Organization of American States, and others. The Costa Rican elections attract a great deal of attention.
4. The election was covered extensively by Costa Rican media. Except for the public broadcasting systems, which is similar to the one in the United States, electronics media are privately owned and participate with the same spirit that permeates the entire population.
5. United States media coverage was quite limited.
6. The host country was exceptionally cooperative.

COSTA RICA ELECTION

Submitted by:

Ralph Murphine

REPORT ON COSTA RICAN ELECTIONS

February 20, 1986

TO: Eddie Mahe, Jr. & Associates, Inc.

FROM: Ralph D. Murphine
Observer
A. I. D. Project

This report follows the format suggested by the "Costa Rica Questionnaire" provided on January 22, 1986, a copy of which is attached.

I. Registration

A registration list was in existence before this election and, in fact, appears to have been in existence for some substantial number of years.

The voter registration system has been computerized, but the system appears not to be 100% complete. Random name selection using the computer bank available at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in San Jose produced records which contained incomplete address and/or voting location for a significant number of voters. While there is no evidence of error or mis-use of this kind of incomplete file, experience in the United States demonstrates that such a file is more open to error or mis-use. Since the system appears to be well constructed, and to be complete for the majority of voters, it is assumed that the Tribunal is moving rapidly to assemble complete records for each voter in the file.

The registration system seemed to work well for the majority of voters, but it seems unduly cumbersome to require all voters who wish to make a change in their record to appear, in person, at the Tribunal central office in San Jose. This cannot be convenient for voters who live in remote areas. Given the need to maintain a system which minimizes the possibility for error or fraud, and, therefore, the desirability of the kind of centralized operation in use by the Tribunal, it seems that some form of mobile registration amendment facility would be a good investment. One of the political parties has already reduced the voter registration file to disc for use in local election centers manned by party volunteers on election day. Perhaps the Tribunal could also reduce

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the file to regional or local sub-sets to allow for more convenient amendment by voters.

Since the registration system is linked to the national "cedula" of identification, and the linkage is run, during the election period, by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, there seems to be a strong bias toward completeness, accuracy, and minimal opportunity for fraudulent voter identification and/or registration. Nonetheless, we encountered some charges of fraudulent activity in the issuance of "fake" cedula for Nicaraguan refugees. No evidence was produced, however, to substantiate the charges and it is noteworthy that they were voiced by party members whose candidate was not victorious in the election. Nonetheless, having had some experience of similar problems in Venezuela, where allegations of similar fraudulent identification of Colombian refugees have surfaced in recent elections, it is possible that A. I. D., or some other appropriate agency may want to look into the growing problem of refugee separation from the electoral process. Indeed, the problem of Mexican immigrants in the southwestern United States is not dissimilar.

The registration list is made available to polling places in hard copy in what appears to be a convenient, book, format.

Since the identification system in use for registration is linked to the national ID card it would seem that, with the possible exception noted above, that the system is not only relatively "clean", but that it is almost certainly "cleaner" than many parts of the United States.

The system is linked to the Ministry of Health records so that deaths are apparently recorded with relative speed and the list purged appropriately.

"Ghost" voters, it would appear, could only be produced through the development of a fraudulent national ID system. Since it is possible to counterfeit United States Passports, money, and other documents, it does not appear to be impossible to produce a "fake" cedula, but, again, there did not appear to be widespread complaint on this ground. One thinks that even if some substantial number of "fake" IDs were issued many election officials would detect the presence of a large number of strangers in their polling place.

It is, at least theoretically, possible to upgrade the country's national identification system, and therefore, its voter registration, by instituting the kind of microchip ID card now in use by some American credit card companies, but, barring some external indication of widespread fraud in ID

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production, which does not now exist, it is not clear that the expense would be readily justifiable.

It does seem almost inevitable, however, that in a country which is undergoing a substantial influx of new non-citizens, whose physical appearance, language, and socialization all make it difficult for citizens or outside observers to distinguish them from those actually qualified to vote, there is certainly some opportunity for fraud. Further study of this phenomenon, especially since it appears to exist in a number of countries (Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador also come to mind), might be profitable.

II. Voting

Voters identify themselves at the polls with their national cedula of identification. Those who have already voted may be identified in two ways: by matching the cedula against the record maintained by election officials at the polling place, and by requiring voters to dip a finger into indelible ink after they have cast their vote. It is certainly possible that a creative person bent upon election fraud could devise a system which would outwit these safeguards and allow certain citizens to vote more than once, but there did not seem to be any such system in operation at the centers which we visited, nor did we hear of complaints of this kind of fraudulent activity.

Both parties sponsored elaborate transportation systems for voters, offering bus and automobile service to voters' home districts, sometimes hundreds of miles away. If volume of use, and resource commitment are any measure of effect the system worked well.

Perhaps the most impressive element of the election process was the inescapable sense of broad participatory interest at all levels of the community. Since the group did not visit remote indian villages, it is not clear that these ethnic sub-groups participated at a rate similar to the broad base of the population, but, given the natural social development of the country, it is also not clear that remote and poorly integrated sub-groups participate well in any country, including the United States.

The level of enthusiasm, both partisan political and for the democratic system itself, seems very high in Costa Rica. There was demonstrable pride in the country's long history of democratic elections. I was interviewed by a local television reporter who asked, more than once, whether foreign election observers were impressed with the technology of the system and with the level of voter interest. My response, personal, of course, and not as an official spokesperson, was that both were impressive and that other countries, including the United States had much to learn from the Costa Rican experience.

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(3)

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As a demonstration that these responses were not hyperbole, the Costa Rican practice of naming school children to posts as "election guides", working at each polling place, seems a brilliant method of educating young people not only in how the electoral process works, but also in its immense importance. By making young non-voters an official part of the electoral process at an early age, Costa Rica may be setting the stage for a higher level of voter participation when they reach adulthood.

It would seem that there is also a "critical mass" level of voter interest which was apparent not only in San Jose, but also in the small, more rural, communities we visited. By holding the election on Sunday, by encouraging broad voter interest at an early age, by diligently guarding the integrity of the electoral process (the Tribunal virtually runs the entire country in the days preceding the election), Costa Rica has produced an impressive level of interest, not only in the outcome, but in the process itself.

In one party headquarters near a polling place groups of volunteers diligently recorded voters who had cast their ballot, checked these against the computer-based list of registered voters, and sent other volunteers to urge the remaining non-voters (previously identified as supporters) to come to the polling place to vote. While the system was very similar to systems in use in the United States, the level of management skill and volunteer diligence was substantially higher than many similar operations observed over twenty years in the USA.

The sanctity of the secret ballot appeared to be well assured, given the constant potential for problems with paper ballots. Again, while it is not impossible to devise systems to disrupt honest electoral process, and some citizens spoke of "chain" balloting in past elections (in which a voter accepts a blank ballot from an election official, secretes it upon his person, places a blank piece of paper in the ballot box, leaves the polling place with the unmarked ballot, marks it in the presence of an interested third party outside the polling place, gives the marked ballot to the next voter who, in turn, takes it inside, accepts a blank ballot from the election official, casts the previously marked ballot, then leaves the with unmarked ballot to repeat the process) there appear to be adequate safeguards, including polling official signatures on each ballot cast, to avoid this possibility. The presence, inside the polling place, of partisan observers from competing parties also serves to reduce the likelihood of fraud, barring wholesale collusion.

(5)

The polling places appeared to be well staffed, and, to the degree possible in a free and open election in which partisan fevers may run high, free of confusion and clutter.

Although the observers were not present in the country during the actual campaign, there were no charges of massive media bias or lack of access and the country does provide for legal redress through the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones in the event that one party or candidate feels that mass media access or fairness is being denied.

III. ELECTION DAY, POLL WORKERS, SECURITY

Training for poll watchers was performed by the respective political parties. As in the United States, it did not appear that all poll watchers were highly skilled and it is certainly possible that this could have contributed to sloppy or fraudulent practice. We encountered no charges of this nature, however.

The level of support for poll workers on election day seems to be relatively high; it is provided, for the most part, by the partisan organizations.

Poll workers, in some cases, had no communication facility other than their own ability to move and to speak with election officials or partisan supporters in case of need. In other cases, however, parties provided more elaborate telecommunications devices (car radios, walkie-talkies, computers).

The election materials are delivered by hand, via officials of the Tribunal, on the day preceeding the election (in remote areas) and/or on the morning of the election. The ballots are returned by Tribunal officials to the central Tribunal office, as well.

Poll workers receive elaborate instructions in printed form and instructions to voters were prominently posted outside each polling place. Party watchers were permitted and they appeared to take an active interest in the integrity of the process. Watchers, and all election officials, are allowed to note any discrepancy or objection, in writing, in a special column to the left of the voting list, in the official mesa record of the vote.

Results of the voting were tabulated, officially, by the Tribunal, at its central office, and were announced, by mesa, beginning within an hour of the close of the polls. Ballots are maintained by the Tribunal until the election results can be certified to be correct.

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IV. GENERAL

It is not clear that there were any significant problems in the conduct of the election. Less than 100% participation, of course, is always sad, to those who believe in the democratic process. Requiring voters to travel substantial distances to amend their registration, and to travel substantial distances to reach their voting place, undoubtedly worked to make the process less than totally convenient for many voters. In all, however, the process appeared to work well at all levels.

Outside factors in the election could be said to be significant. Other than the normal interest of allied countries in the democratic process of sister states, Costa Rica has undergone several types of outside influence which may have had some impact on the electoral result.

One factor is the addition of non-Costa-Rican political consultants and advisors. Professional political consultants from the United States and Venezuela both aided Costa Rican political candidates in the election. Indirect assistance to the major parties was also obtained via American political party friendships and/or relationships of an informal nature.

Perhaps a more important non-Costa-Rican factor was the constant presence of a less than totally friendly neighbor next-door to the north. Recent military activities in Nicaragua, combined with Costa Rica's lack of any military force, combined to make the "Nicaraguan question" a complex factor in the electoral equation. American interest in the region, the fact of the birth of one Presidential candidate on Nicaraguan soil, the presence of a high ranking aide to a prominent United States Senator during the closing days of the election in one Presidential candidate's camp, all increased the potential for outside influence on the electoral outcome.

International ideological groups (social democratic, Christian democratic, Marxist, and others) also demonstrated an interest in the electoral process. The number of observers of the election, including those from Europe, and the OAS, was impressive. Fortunately, the demonstration of electoral efficiency was impressive, and some observers, from countries newer to the process (like Guatemala) were impressed, both with the well-run event, and with the Costa Rican's obvious sense of process control. From the standpoint of future A.I.D. activity in the region, it may well be a good idea to "joint venture", to the degree permitted by law and custom, electoral process assistance to countries in need, for the obvious value of the Costa Rican cultural advantage in this area.

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For a variety of reasons United States media did not give particularly prominent coverage to the election, but television and newspaper coverage which did take place appeared to be fair, unbiased, based upon a good factual knowledge of the electoral circumstances, and up-to-date.

In-country media coverage was also impressive. It was somewhat more restrained than, for example, Venezuela. The newspaper election-day insert was a very impressive document, filled with information of value to voters, including a complete, step-by-step, set of instructions on how to exercise the franchise. Television coverage drew from American media techniques, including elaborate computerization. Local law prohibits exit polling, but television stations did produce independent election counts. Stations refrained from making unfounded predictions of outcome and, in general, demonstrated suitable respect for the position of the Tribunal and its obvious desire to provide complete, accurate, results as quickly as possible. The losing candidate conceded less than five hours after the polls closed, and coverage of both victory and concession speeches was both complete and in keeping with the general good taste exhibited in media coverage throughout the few days observers were in the country.

Costa Rican officials, to a person, were uniformly polite, helpful, friendly, interested in observer impressions, anxious to provide complete and accurate information. Observers were allowed to visit the vaults in the basement of the Tribunal, to fly to remote polling places, to examine local polling officials and voters, to visit with the media freely, and to interact with leaders of both major parties. To be perfectly frank, I can think of some number of jurisdictions in the United States which would be far more hostile to American election observers, much less those from outside the country. In all, it was a most impressive demonstration that democracy is not a unique product of the United States.

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SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS

1. Complete voter registration records on file, including voter address, telephone number (if available), and voting location.
2. Allow for remote, or mobile, voter registration amendment.
3. Study methods of prohibiting refugee voting and the degree to which such voting exists.
4. Study technological problems and costs associated with microchip identification cards.
5. Study voter participation by remote and ethnic subgroups of the electorate.
6. Document the "election guide" program which involves children in the electoral process, for export to other countries, including the United States.
7. If a unique and fail-safe voter identification procedure (like microchip ID) is implemented, consider allowing voters to vote at any polling location convenient.
8. Require more complete public disclosure of sources of funding and technical assistance to parties and candidates provided by individuals, firms, or organizations outside the country.
9. Develop a program of education on how to conduct an election suitable for export to other Central and South American countries.
10. Continue this kind of A.I.D. effort to devise an easy to implement methodology for holding free, open, honest elections in democratic nations.



COSTA RICA QUESTIONNAIRE

I. REGISTRATION

1. Was a registration list in existence before this election?
Was it created uniquely for this election?
2. What voter registration system is utilized and how well does it work, particularly in outlying areas?
3. How much, if any, of the system is computerized.
4. If any, what is the hardware and software and the source of both that is being utilized?
5. In what format is the list made available to the polling places?
6. What is your sense on how clean the list is i.e.:
 - A. What identification is necessary for someone to register?
 - B. How good a job is done removing people for cause e.g. death?
 - C. Is there any sense of a lot of 'ghost' voters, and if so, how did they get there?
 - D. Generally describe the system and any changes that you believe could improve its efficiency or integrity.

II. VOTING


1. How must voters identify themselves at the polls?
2. What system if any is used to identify voters who have already voted?

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Costa Rica Questionnaire
January 22, 1986

3. Was there a transportation system for voters?
 - A. Who sponsored it?
 - B. Was it effective?
4. Can members of the public security forces vote?
 - A. If so, do they vote in their home area?
 - B. If on the base, are the controls the same?
5. Generally what level of participation was realized?
 - A. Women
 - B. Ethnic
 - C. Rural
 - D. Other
6. How, if at all, did the system contribute to any differences in voter participation?
7. What provisions if any are made for absentee ballots?
8. Was the sanctity of a secret ballot reasonably well assured?
9. Were the polling places well staffed and free of confusion and clutter?
10. Did all parties and candidates have equal access to the voters through the media during the campaign?

III. ELECTION DAY, POLL WORKERS, SECURITY

1. What training was done for poll watchers?
 - A. By whom?
2. What is the level of support and where does it come from for polling place workers on election day?
3. What form of communications is available to these poll workers on election day?
4. When and how are the lists, ballots, etc. delivered to the polling places?
5. How are the ballots counted and secured following the election and how and where are the returns tabulated?
6. What unique security systems were put in place to assure the integrity of the process in each step?
7. How and where were the ballots printed and what was done to insure they would not be duplicated, nor extras distributed outside the official system?
8. What printed materials were available to poll workers? Voters?
9. Were party watchers permitted and if so, what participation did they have?
10. What type ballot box and other voting paraphernalia was used and what was the source of same?
11. How was the results of the tabulation reported, what happened to the ballots following the count?



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Costa Rica Questionnaire
January 22, 1986

IV. GENERAL

1. What was the single biggest problem encountered?
2. What part of the election process worked the best?
3. What organizations/individuals from outside participated in election, i.e.
 - A. Help from other countries - (interference).
 - B. Our (U.S.) involvement.
 - C. Private foundations, organizations.
 - D. Where were observer groups from and who sponsored them.
4. How did in-country media cover the election?
5. How did U.S. media cover the election?
6. How cooperative was the host country?



Eddie Mahe, Jr. & Associates, Inc.

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COSTA RICA REPORT

Submitted by:

F. Clifton White

COSTA RICAN REPORT

The election process in Costa Rica is one we should all strive to emulate. It was a wonderful experience. I am sure my colleagues will be dealing in detail with many of the technical aspects of the election campaign and process. I would like to make a few comments on the basic requirements for an honest election process and indicate how I felt they were achieved in Costa Rica, then conclude with more of what I believe to be basic fundamental cultural aspects of the election.

First, with regard to the basic requirements for an honest and fair election,

Number 1: supervision and provision of materials for the election process itself. An independent Supreme Electoral Commission with authority is essential. Costa Rica has this as completely as any country I have observed. The Supreme Electoral Council has complete and total control over the election process. Its' members are considered very, very distinguished and prestigious, and they in effect, have the capacity to run the country if any conflict arises during the election process itself.

Number 2: An accurate list of eligible voters is essential. If you can have the terminal list of who's going to vote, you can probably determine who's going to win. The Costa Rican lists are again under the complete control of the Supreme Electoral Council. They are computerized for the whole country,

and it seemed to me from observing and listening to the reports, that they were as complete and as accurate as human beings have the capacity to make them.

Number 3: The voting process itself must be secret and honest. This is achieved by regulations providing for facilities under which secrecy can be maintained and by eliminating the potential for multiple voting. Plus, I believe one of the most important things is the opportunity for competitive partisans to watch each other during the voting process itself.

Costa Rica has provided those within the framework of their society and culture with all of the safeguards that I believe are necessary to insure that the voting process is secret and is honest.

Number 4: Who counts the votes or how are the votes counted? Here again the regulations provided for in the above voting procedures are in force, thus creating the circumstances that insure an honest and fair process. Thus, I think Costa Rica has done an outstanding job in providing those technical requirements to insure democratic processes which will prevail in a fair and honest manner.

However, from the point of view of establishing democracy, making democracy work, promoting democracy in countries that are emerging or trying to secure a democratic form of government, I think there are some very valuable lessons to be learned from Costa Rica.

First, their voting participation is outstanding especially when compared with the United States. Between 75% and 80% participated in the election of 1982.

Their election process is a national civic event, I believe some of the reasons for this are worth noting. Culturally, there is pride in the process. Everyone is proud of their democracy. They take pride in the participation. They understand that it is something that they want to do, like to do and should do. And because participation is on the basis of parties who select candidates, they then become active, very active in the campaigns.

One of the most interesting and exciting things is that it is a family process. During the campaign they carry the flag of their party as they parade in their cars around town. You see families with their children in the car and you also see young people driving cars in the parades. They fly the party flags from their houses. My one great image of the election was of fathers. This didn't happen just once, but I saw fathers holding children by the hand going to the polling place. There were lots of mothers, but that you tend to expect. The thing that impressed me was the fathers. The full family was involved in this process.

I think one of the keys to this involvement is that the family and children are made aware of politics and election in a very realistic way.

Number 1: The Supreme Electoral Council, the body which has respect from all the people in the country, sets up a procedure for an election to take place by the youngsters in the schools. They have particular schools where the students vote for the regular candidates.

I heard one campaign worker chastising a woman who was late coming in to vote. The woman's response was that she was late "because my daughters insisted that they had to go vote before I did".

When the incumbent president went to vote, he had two little children, one by each hand. These were provided by the two major candidates so that he wouldn't show partisanship. But the significant thing is that they were involving everyone in the election process.

The educational system is involved in teaching and providing for the participation. The teaching and participation is in the election process, not the governmental process. I think this is an important key.

In the United States, we do a fair amount of the governmental process. We have Boys States, Girls States and we have a mayor for a day and a city councilman for a day, but I am not aware that we do a great deal in the election process itself. And in Costa Rica, from the one basic institution of education, we have a key part of that being devoted to training, teaching and involving the youngsters in the educational

process. I think it is also worth noting that one of the key things again is that the Costa Ricans are very proud of their education system and their high rate of literacy. Thus, the prestige of the educational institution is coupled with the importance of democracy at the elementary and secondary school level.

Number 2: I believe the actual participation in the real election process by youngsters is exciting and interesting to watch. The voting places are all voting tables or mesas, as they are called, in the schools and they have several tables located in one school so there are fairly large crowds. As one approaches the polling place there are young people, 13 or 14 years old, standing with lists of voters' names to be checked so that they can escort the person to the proper room in the school where he is supposed to vote. Again, this is a real involvement. They are making the process work.

With regard to the actual participation, the partisan tables are set up outside the polling place where people keep track of who has voted and who is voting. Most of these that I observed were manned by young people, again, 13, 14, 15 years of age, and were supervised by an adult. The campaign headquarters for each particular polling area or district was supervised by an adult, who did much of the checking there.

In summary, in terms of making democracy work, everyone involved, a family affair, making it meaningful and real for the children in the educational system and at home is a key to making participating democracy work.

There is no violence, they don't shoot at each other. They have learned that their ballot boxes work and they have learned how to work them.

We should be aware that the establishment, by the society, of the cultural value of democracy, i.e., the electoral process, is a fundamental in its' success.

**PHILIPPINE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
FEBRUARY 7, 1986
SUBMITTED BY
STEPHEN J. MCCARTHY**

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**PHILIPPINE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
FEBRUARY 7, 1986**

The Philippine Election was the fifth election we were able to observe during the first phase of our "Election Grant". The election was unique in so many ways and brought vividly into focus, the myriad of exponents which influence an election. It was immeasurably important that we were able to observe this election at such an advantageous time in terms of the development of our experience and expanding knowledge within the scope and time frame of the first phase of this project.

Appearing on American television in what seemed to be an impetuous move, President Ferdinand Marcos called for a "snap" election to be held in January, 1986. Because of the enormity of an election involving 27 million voters, it was pushed to February seventh. It was amazing the elections were held at all since it was such an enormous project. That combined with the politics, it was doubtful even up until February sixth that they would be held.

The dynamic forces working on the Filipino people, their rulers, and challengers, thrust them to center stage status of world awareness. Literally the whole world watched as enormous pressures and tensions exerted themselves, fluctuating daily making the situation more volatile and ever fluid. This attention in turn exerted more pressure and further exacerbated the situation. We as observers were very aware of the role we were

playing in this high stakes political showdown and it had a marked effect on us. The expectations and perceptions of our role in the electoral process also was cause for a great divergence of supposition, ranging from high almost unrealistic goals to strong suspicion. Our role, as it turned out, was just part of a combination of extraordinary factors which eventually led to the will of the majority of the people being served.

We observed the election, but only in a very superficial way. There were very stringent rules imposed on us as observers, and it did impede our ability to fully examine and understand their electoral process. What was the norm in observing elections in other countries, was simply not the case in the Philippines. It was actually a promise exacted from the Marcos government after very heavy pressure was applied, that there were observers at all. The feeling that we were treading on thin ice was apparent and the feeling that we were also being used as pawns was what struck us the most. This is not meant as a direct faultfinding, but merely a fact, for our physical presence rather than what we were able to ascertain was probably of greater impact than anything else. It was what we represented that posed the biggest threat to the Marcos government.

Therefore, the intricacies of the electoral process itself were hard to come by and the effectiveness of the system was impossible to evaluate. In truth, the system worked, but for all the wrong reasons.

The fact that we were able to see this all transpire was

invaluable. It showed the realities of dealing with a very large electoral voting population (approximately 27 million voters), and the cold hard fact of trying to verify any comprehensive information of the electoral process from a government which has no intention of making that easy. But what was of great interest was the fact that there seemed to be a fairly comprehensive base for what could be a good election process. It definitely calls for further investigation on the part of our government. If there is a semblance of a solid election infrastructure, now is the time to approach the new government and encourage them to seek to refine that system so that it can be used in the future with some feeling of confidence. It can be argued with some confidence that we should be mindful of addressing the problems now, rather than later.

The following are the components in the electoral process as relative to the Philippine election. Because of the nature of their election, and the inaccessibility of either election officials or good documentation, some of the answers to the eleven election elements will be difficult to clarify.

1. Administration of the Election Commission and Laws Regulation

The Election Procedures

The Commission on Elections is known as "COMELEC" and they are charged with the responsibility of administering all the election apparatus, from regulating the campaign activities to counting the ballots. The commission consists of nine members

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appointed by the President. Up until seven days before the election, there were two vacancies on the board. Marcos under pressure filled these two vacancies, one was recommended by "NAMFREL" (the citizens' watchdog organization accredited by "COMELEC" to ensure free and fair elections) and the other recommended by other civic groups. Because the members were all Marcos appointees, everyone questioned its ability to operate independently. Although there was initially a feeling that "COMELEC" was committed to ensuring a fair election as the election approached, those optimistic feelings faded.

"COMELEC" had planned to mount an effort to establish a "Quick Count" providing election results faster, and hopefully eliminating fraud in the tabulation process. Because of high costs and little time to prepare, this was abandoned. "NAMFREL", however, possessed this capability and "COMELEC" threatened to disenfranchise them and revoke their accreditation if "NAMFREL" did not agree to share their information on a partners agreement. In the end on election night, and the following day, "NAMFREL" used its "Quick Count" ability to publicly announce election results well ahead of "COMELEC". "COMELEC" was accused of withholding these results, and it seems clear that they did. It wasn't until the next day that "NAMFREL" was contained by "COMELEC" and the figures shared. By then the damage had been done and it seemed that watching election returns that night on both the government and private channels, that the tide had turned and the bewilderment and groping government announcers

belied what was soon to be a reality.

It is clear that "COMELEC'S" influence and creditability was strongly eroded the closer the election approached, and finally was ultimately responsible in part for the manipulation of the vote tabulation which gave Marcos the election.

1A. The Philippine Election Code permits a "citizen's arm" to help ensure free and fair elections. "The National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections" or "NAMFREL" is that organization accredited by "COMELEC", the governments official election commission . In the 1984 election, "NAMFREL" was able to mobilize over 100,000 volunteers which essentially served as poll watchers. It received accreditation on December 24, 1985 for the election that was held February 7, 1986 and under the dynamic leadership of Jose Concepcion, "NAMFREL" was thought to mobilize over 500,000 volunteers to help monitor the election. "NAMFREL" was accused of being arrayed against the the government and in point of fact it was. "NAMFREL" was able to develop a "Quick Count" system which "COMELEC" could not. This was but one area in many where the watch dog group excelled in its duties to serve the citizen to help conduct a fair election. The feelings ran high all throughout the Philippines and "NAMFREL" volunteers where subjected to some rough treatment in some of the polling areas visited. It should be clear that "NAMFREL" played a significant role in the events leading up to the election, as well as the days following which led to the capitulation of the

Marcos government.

2. The Registry

As in most countries, anyone over the age of 18 is eligible to vote. There are approximately 27 million eligible voters. Those who had registered for the 1984 elections were not required to re-register. New voters could register on the 28th and 29th of December 1985. Two significant problems arose from the process. The first was the requirement that the registrant had to have four photographs, making it extremely difficult in many cases. Second, was their great concern as to fraudulent registration by those who had registered in more than one district or constituency, the so called "flying voters". While even "COMELEC" agreed this was a serious problem in the end, it is doubtful that this did or could have thrown the election either way.

Nevertheless, there are obviously problems with the registry and it should be re-enforced that the time to refine and clean up that registry is now.

3. The Balloting Process

Since the observers were technically not allowed within 100 yards from any voting area, it was somewhat difficult to fully grasp what was actually happening (the areas observed were in Manila and the surrounding areas). There was also a dearth of any written procedures or comprehensive briefings in this area, partly because we were walking such a thin line as it was. What

we could tell was that the polling areas were extremely crowded and quite chaotic. The voters, party workers for both sides, and "NAMFREL" volunteers, were all present and active, and every polling place visited was filled with frustration and tension. The biggest single problem seemed to be the inability to locate names on the voter registration list; there seemed to be no way to adequately handle the processing of these problems. Many of the voting areas we visited were in schools and each class room was an individual voting area. Although we were not permitted into the actual rooms, it was enough to get a flavor and sense of what was happening and what we saw was not a festive like atmosphere as we had experienced in other countries.

The actual balloting seemed to follow a similar process as observed in other countries. The voters were led individually into the polling place, presented an ID, which was matched against the computerized registration list. The voter walked to an enclosed area where he wrote in the candidates' names, both president and vice president, as they were tallied separately. The ballots were then placed in the box, the voter dipped his finger in indelible ink and they were finished.

4. Training

With our access limited at the polling locations, and the lack of dialogue with election workers, it was difficult to establish a clear picture as to any evidence of well organized and comprehensive training of election workers. It seems,

however, that the training is done by the parties themselves with some help and direction from "COMELEC". It was obvious they were under a great deal of pressure election day, but seemed to stay with their jobs, even under some of the difficult situations we witnessed.

5. Commodities

It must be said that given the geographic diversity of the Philippines, "COMELEC" did a very impressive job of getting the voting commodities to approximately 85,000 precincts. The ballots were a very simple format made of a plain bond paper with no security devices such as water marks, etc. It would have been relatively simple to copy the ballots and in this case, there was every chance that it was done, but again it would be difficult to determine that.

The ink that was supposed to be used was the best combination of chemicals devised to mark the voter. (We spent a considerable amount of time researching the indelible ink problem during "Phase I" of our project. We made several trips to the "Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco" laboratory and tested several samples of inks used in other elections. We also tried our own concoction and discovered that the formula the Philippines were reported to be using, was by far, one of the best combinations of ingredients: Silver-nitrate and Coomassie Brilliant Blue. If in fact the Filipinos used this, it would have been a very effective marking system. However, there were

reports by observers that the voters were wiping the stain from their finger. This could only mean that the solution was not what it was claimed or that it was watered down. There were no bottles available to bring back to have analyzed.

The ballot boxes we saw were made of metal and glass, with a padlock to secure it. They were old and had obviously been used in other elections. Whether this was what was used throughout the country, we were unable to determine. Some weeks before the election, Eddie Mahe & Associates had been approached by the U.S. government to aid in obtaining some 70,000 ballot boxes. Apparently, "COMELEC" could not locate its inventory of ballot boxes. They were finally located we presume, for we were informed that the crisis had been handled. It does point up the day by day feeling of crisis this election produced, and there were the constant feelings that because of all these problems, the election as planned for February, would never take place.

All in all the fact that the commodities did get to the precinct, except in several cases, was an amazing feat in itself. With the short notice "COMELEC" had, and the extreme pressures being exerted by all forces, they preformed well. If this type of organized distribution can be held together and some quality control applied, it will again be of great use in the future elections. This is why the time to work on the refinement of the electoral process is now.

6. Transportation

The transportation was arranged by the political parties. How these networks actually worked was unclear. It was obvious that both parties were very active in making it understood to the voter that they should get to the polls any way they could.

7. Distribution and Collection of the Voting Materials

As explained in the Commodity section, the distribution was quite good and went relatively smoothly. The collection of the election materials was another story and in some cases it was the cause for near rioting. Both parties and "NAMFREL" were fearful that the election might be stolen in the process of the transfer of the ballot boxes. In many cases, that was precisely what happened. Generally, the ballot boxes were returned to "COMELEC" in the same way they had been distributed. With 85,000 precincts, what happened to the ballots on their return to "COMELEC" is pure speculation.

8. Security

The question of security was obviously one of the greatest preoccupations of the election and with good reason. "NAMFREL" and the Aquino people were possessed with the notion that the election was going to be stolen because of a lack of security in handling the voting process. At the same time, they were concerned the over protection of the process would exclude them from being able to monitor what was actually happening. It was a bad

situation and the extremely high tensions and forces at work made it evident that no-one trusted anyone, therefore there wasn't any organized effective security.

The military was confined to barracks, while government police were present to cover security. However, there were many reports of the military in force in rural areas to protect against guerrilla incursions and quell riots.

9. The Counting and Security

This was in essence the largest single component of the election which spelled the down fall of the Marcos regime. This is where the election was stolen. Much of this has been explained in sections on "COMELEC" and "NAMFREL". The most important tool the opposition possessed was the "Quick Count" run by "NAMFREL". This gave them the ability to tabulate the returns quickly, hoping that this would at least reduce the possibility of fraud. This worked initially, and the results clearly showed Aquino ahead. "COMELEC" had the final word on the counting, and they were the ones who certified the ballots. In the days that followed, "COMELEC" was able to manipulate the vote count in such a way that Marcos was declared the winner. They stole the election and everyone knew it.

10. Management of the Electoral Process

Actually the title to this section should be manipulation of the electoral process. The Philippines seems to have at least

the remnants of a good electoral system, but the conduct of its officials seemed to be the one factor which corrupted and betrayed that system. As stated earlier, the momentum and the tide which made this election a happening, rather than anything else, also carried out of control the normal working infrastructure that was in place. The management of "COMELEC" was confused and the more the possibility of an upset appeared, the more the election commission began to unravel to the extent of "walkouts" at the "COMELEC" counting headquarters.

11. Psychology of the Election Process

There was obviously a great need for each of its parties to get their own people out to vote. To alert the general public was a non-issue. The Filipinos were consumed by the election, it was a highly emotional preoccupation, and everyone knew that no matter what happened, everything could rapidly deteriorate into civil war. The normal procedures were not applicable in this situation. We witnessed huge rallies in Manila for both candidates, as well as television, radio, and newspaper coverage. There was an enormous imbalance in time allotted Aquino. Not until several days before the election was she given any time on television, radio, or newspaper.

Conclusion

As previously stated, the Philippine election was of indispensable importance to our project. It gave us a unique

insight into an election which was a world event of immense proportion first, and second an election where the system was not unlike the others we had both attended and studied. There were two major thoughts and findings which came out of our experience.

The first, was that when dealing with a very large voting population such as the Philippines (which was estimated at 27 million), while it was not surprising the election components were very much the same as the other elections we had studied, the costs were staggering. The cost may well be percentage wise the same or lower than those of smaller countries, but the aggregate figure is enormous. The concern that this leads to is that all countries seeking a democratic way for the people be able to choose their leaders by free and fair elections must constantly refine their system to insure its integrity. This is not easy in the less developed countries where illiteracy, transportation, communication, education and a host of other problems make even the simple tasks, which we take for granted, very time consuming and difficult. Yet, unless great care and maintenance is performed on the components of the electoral process, the process will not accurately reflect the true wishes of the people, which in turn can lead to dissatisfaction and unrest. In a country we have observed with a voting population of 2 million voters, revamping their registry costs upwards of three to five million dollars. Comparing those figures to a country with the voting population the size of the Philippines, and one

can only begin to estimate the cost. This presents a problem for all the free world countries who are supporting free and fair elections in third world countries. The costs are staggering, and how to support these costs and who is willing to help is the one great question.

The second, thought we came away with was that of the almost surrealistic atmosphere which surrounded the election. The tension and apprehension was almost all consuming, carrying everyone along on a tide of expectations and an almost compelling feeling that one had to be part of that which was happening. This obviously is a very dramatic explanation, but it is important in the context of the breadth of what emotions are brought out by an election and how they are interacted with the actual election process. We have all experienced that here, but in the Philippines there was a real air of urgency about the election. The feeling was that some how, some way, something could explode. It was a place full of tension and anger, and one knew that everyone was pinning all their hopes on the election. It was clear that the elections meant a beginning to a struggle no matter who won, and the people were nervous and anxious to know how to react. We saw many things; vote buying, intimidation, frustrated poll watchers, and large numbers of voters disenfranchised because of massive registration foul-ups. Election night, we witnessed angry crowds in parts of Manila. On the government television channel, with its U.S. coverage format, the announcers rolled on about an impending Marcos victory and the

fraud being committed by his opponents. It was amazing to watch knowing what everyone sensed what everyone knew. Then at "COME-LEC" headquarters it was like visiting a tomb, nothing was happening, all the people sitting at their work stations in a vast studio- like a t.v. telethon, but no phones were ringing. By midnight, they had only tabulated one half million votes. When we reached "NAMFREL", the operation was exciting and it was difficult to enter because of the crowds. They had well over a million and a half votes tabulated early in the evening, and the counting was proceeding at a rapid pace. It was there that many of us felt that the system had worked, and that it was just the beginning, a beginning we thought would be far more protracted and bloody than it was.

GLOBALISTS AND SPECIALISTS

POTENTIAL GLOBALIST AND SPECIALISTS

The individuals listed are the core group from which the election experts will be recruited for the Democracy Program.

The list is not conclusive and will continue to be expanded.

It is important to note that some individuals, because of their current position, would not be appropriate or available at this time. However, the decision was made to include them in the data base for future availability.

This list does not include A.I.D. personnel with election experience. During Phase II, a process to identify and include those individuals will be developed.

It is important to note that these individuals have not been recruited. In Phase II, after consultation with A.I.D. personnel, they will be contacted.

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COMMODITIES

PAPER

Security paper for ballots that cannot be reproduced or counterfeited is one of a number of steps that can be taken in the election process to prevent fraud.

The paper should not be prohibitively expensive. However, security measures within the ballot paper itself should be apparent so the voters are aware that security measures were provided to ensure the integrity of the ballots.

Additionally, measures should be taken to protect the paper while in country to avoid theft and thus the possibility of bogus ballots.

The research undertaken on this commodity focused on paper producers that manufacture cotton fiber and security paper. These are the same companies that produce paper used in Social Security cards, lottery tickets, paper for the government printing office, government stationary and even currency itself.

On the attached vendors list are the names and addresses of security paper manufacturers. A contact person for each company is also included.

There are numerous security features that can be utilized to safeguard against the unlawful reproduction or

counterfeiting of official government ballots. These security measures can either be used individually or in combination with each other. Some are very obvious while others are invisible and can only be seen through the use of ultraviolet light, or if exposed to an organic solvent, water or chlorine type ink eradicator. Still others can be seen only if the paper is torn.

The use of colored or multi-colored paper is the most obvious use of a security feature. This can be made even more secure by adding colored threads, fibers or planchettes to the paper. Planchettes are small blotches of color, resembling tiny confetti-like tissue disks, that can appear throughout the paper or in a specific area of the paper. They can be single or multi-colored, and iridescent, fluorescent, or electronically sensitive. While most planchettes are quite small in size (1/16" in diameter), they can be larger and more pronounced.

Most colored fibers are produced from 100% cotton rag which is cut and dyed prior to paper production. The fibers are then incorporated into the paper during its production in the quantity and the color(s) prescribed by the customer. Fibers, just like planchettes, can be localized or can appear throughout the full sheet of the paper. Fibers can also be fluorescent in addition to standard and can be made in most colors.

Security threads can be localized and can be microprinted, metallized and even chemically treated to react to ultraviolet light.

Perhaps one of the more common visible security markings is the incorporation of a watermark into the paper. Watermarks are created using a highly specialized technique of engraving in wax. This image is then transferred to a dye and then to a fine mesh wire screen. Watermarks are applied to the paper itself during production via a wire brush roll called a "dandy roll". Dandy rolls can be customized to incorporate a design unique to the country holding the election such as its coat of arms, official seal, design of its flag or printed message such as "official ballot" or "Government of Honduras."

Individual dyes for watermarks can be fashioned, ranging in price from \$5,000 upward depending on detail. A considerable leadtime is required for a custom design. Watermarks can appear at random throughout the paper or be placed at a set location. The latter is referred to as a "localized watermark" or "registered watermark." Because of the extra time required to localize the watermark, it is somewhat more expensive to produce than the random watermark. Generic watermarks are in stock by every paper producer. It is therefore not necessary to have a unique watermark design.

One paper producer has a unique feature referred to as "Customark Watermark". This resembles a watermark, but is a chemical application applied after the paper is manufactured. This process shortens the lead time necessary to have a watermark produced. This "customark" can be prepared and ready within a two week period.

Several security features can be incorporated into paper that are not readily detectable and visible to the naked eye. Paper can be treated with chemical reactants which will produce a stain if solvent chemicals are added such as a bleach type ink eradicator in the event someone tried to change the markings on the ballot. Water security features become noticeable only when the paper is wet. And as stated earlier, fluorescent threads, fibers and planchettes can be incorporated into the paper. Some manufacturers produce security paper with exceptionally long fibers so that when the paper is torn, they extend well beyond the edge of the paper. Obviously, these are security measures only to be used in the extreme, but they deserve mentioning as possible alternatives.

Paper manufacturers have suggested a paper weight of 70 to 85 pounds on a 3,000 square ft. basis as a good weight for the production of paper used for ballots. Standard office weight paper used in photocopy machines or in typing

is 50 lb. paper on a 3,000 square ft. basis. The industry standard in determining paper weight is to take 500 sheets of paper measuring 24"x36" and stock them on top of each other. The total weight of the stack provides the paper weight on a 3,000 square ft. basis.

In every instance, the paper manufacturer indicated that the first step necessary in order to produce the paper (to be cut at the printers without any waste) is to determine the size of the ballots to be used.

Costs are determined by the type of paper, weight, size, and types of security measures. An example of one million, 12"x12" ballots with one security feature would cost in the range of \$224,000.

Shipping is a major consideration because of weight, time, and cost. Provisions can and should be made when ordering paper to ship it to its destination.

Great care must also be given in making the selection of a printer to print the ballots. The printer and size of the ballots must be determined prior to the time the paper order is placed, so the paper can be manufactured in rolls, or cut to a specified size to run on the printer's equipment. Sufficient planning must be undertaken to confirm that the printer has the capacity to print the ballots within a time frame specified by the government.

Ballots can be printed with multiple colored inks which also serves as a security feature.

The ballot paper must be guarded to ensure that it is not stolen and used by counterfeiters. Since every paper order will include a small overrun for printing waste, it is important that security be provided and that all the paper be accounted for when the printing process is complete.

In making the final determination, consideration should be given to anticipated needs based upon previous experience, lead time available prior to the election and overall costs in production. By so doing, each country should have security paper sufficient for its needs and at the most competitive price.

BALLOT BOXES

Regardless of how well the rest of the election process is put together, if there are no containers in which to deposit the ballots when they are cast, the election will fail. Additionally, the quality of those containers can significantly add to, or detract from, the overall quality of the election.

Very clearly, the ballots should remain in a secure enclosure until they are counted, and then in a secure location until the election is certified. Therefore, a well constructed ballot 'box' with a secure locking system should be a requirement in every election.

Obviously each box must be large enough to hold the maximum number of ballots which might be placed in it. The materials used in its construction should be wood, heavy gauge metal, masonite, plexiglass or a combination of the above. The cost of construction will vary depending on the materials used and on the price of labor in the country where they are made. Because ballot boxes are bulky and difficult to transport, they should be produced if possible by vendors in the country where the election is being held.

Having at least one panel of the ballot box constructed from transparent material provides the observers with the opportunity to see that nothing was in the ballot box when

the voting began. It also enables the voter to see his/her ballot deposited and thus feel more confident about the process.

The costs of construction plus the difficulties in transporting traditional ballot boxes can be a problem but other alternatives are available. The most notable of these is the clear 'poly' bags such as was used in Guatemala in 1985. These plastic bags permit the voters to see the ballots deposited and at the same time reduce costs substantially.

Each bag is securely fastened to a wooden platform so that it hangs freely in clear view for everyone to see. At the end of the day, the ballots can be removed, counted and then placed in a secure container along with a tally sheet and securely sealed.

These bags can be produced from polyethylene or poly vinyl chloride. The vinyl chloride bags are substantially heavier than the polyethylene bags and can be reused. They are also substantially more expensive because they are produced from a dye.

The vinyl chloride bags can be produced in a satin finish or crystal clear. Polyethylene bags are transparent, but cloudy. Both kinds can be produced in thicknesses of one to ten millimeters. They can also be almost any size

with gussets running down the sides or across the bottom giving shape to the bag.

If desired, numbers or letters can be imprinted on the bag. However, this causes the production time to be greater, and obviously adds to the cost of the bags.

Bags of six milimeter thickness measuring 18"x8"x36" cost approximately \$300 per thousand in quantities of 5000. This is a cost of \$.30 per bag as compared to a cost of \$.27 per bag when purchased in quantities of 10,000.

A custom designed bag will require the cost of a dye which is approximately \$500. Using the vinyl chloride bags only once would not be practical because not only are they strong, they are correspondingly expensive. While polyethylene bags can be produced in about two or three weeks, vinyl chloride bags take twice as long.

Bags can be shipped in quantities specified by the customer. A quantity of 100 eight milimeter bag, 18"x8"x38" in size, would weigh approximately thirty five pounds.

Plastic bags can be a more realistic option than ballot boxes, particularly if there are built in safeguards against fraud in the electoral process, such as making ballots from special paper. However, the choice which is right for one country will not necessarily be the best choice for another.

In summation, bags and boxes can both be utilized as a container for ballots. The determination of which system to use should not be made without careful consideration given to the needs of the country in question.

LOCKS

Without the use of quality, tamper-proof locks, the outcome of any election would be subject to question and the likelihood of vote fraud increased.

Criteria considered in determining the best locks to use include:

1. Secure locking mechanisms;
2. Security features such as consecutive numbering, and words or symbol imprinting; and
3. Cost.

Time was spent researching both traditional style padlocks and the less conventional locks that do not require keys for entry. This was done because keys are often lost, stolen or misplaced. Also, if those in control of the process chose to tamper with the results, there is nothing to prevent them from having duplicate keys made to gain access to the ballot boxes.

The most secure padlock is made by Medeco, a company used by the White House and many security firms. (The only way to duplicate keys to the locks is by contacting the Medeco Company with the serial number of the lock, which must then be verified and authorization received before a duplicate set is made.) The price of each Medeco lock is approximately sixty to seventy dollars.

There are a myriad of other key locks on the market, Yale, Master, Kwikset and American, but their keys can all be easily copied.

Special attention must be focused on the overall security of the lock with specific detail to body construction, multi-pinned tumblers and case hardened steel shackles. One quality lock produced by American is the Shrouded Shackle 747. This padlock features a hardened steel case formed into a protective steel shroud. It is specifically designed to prevent the most powerful boltcutters from reaching the hardened steel shackle. It has a six pin tumbler which is recessed to protect against drilling and pull out. Such secure locks command a very substantial price. The wholesale price of this lock, even in quantities of 5,000, is \$37.03 each. In quantities of 5,000, the wholesale list price of an average padlock is anywhere from \$2.50 to \$6.00.

There are other alternatives to conventional locks such as the one-time use plastic and wire locks used by airlines on galleys. This would require three locks per polling place. The first locks the ballot box going to the polling place; that lock is broken and the ballots removed from the box, then a second lock is used to secure the box during the voting; after the polls close, that lock is broken, the

votes are tabulated, placed back in the box and the third lock is then used to seal the box.

The advantage of this system is that it is inexpensive, can be multicolored, and can be lettered or numbered for easy control.

The lock that appears most suitable is the E.J. Brooks Plastic Padlock Seal. This unique lock is patented by Brooks and is the only one of its type. The lock features a plastic body made from polypropoylene. It is available in multiple colors.

The hasp on the plastic bodies are available in galvanized or stainless steel wire. The wire hasp is provided in two gauges (.047 and .055.) After the hasp has been pushed into the body of the seal, the lock cannot be opened without breaking. These locks can only be opened in one of two ways. The wire hasp can be scored so that it will break when twisted, or unscored and cut by a wire cutter (only .047 galvanized steel wire can be scored).

Each lock provides two additional security measures. The first security system is a consecutive number, up to seven digits in length. No two locks would contain the same number, and every lock issued could be assigned by its unique number to a specific ballot box.

The second security element can feature either the

"seal" of the country, design of the flag or wording on 1-3 lines. Letters can be imprinted in four sizes:

Both the consecutive numbering and letter imprinting can be cold stamped or hot stamped. (Hot stamping is much more pronounced and readable at a distance because of the inlay of white tape in the stamping area.)

Price breaks are provided at levels of 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 10,000 and 25,000. The cost of 5,000 with .047 scored galvanized wire hasps would be approximately \$850 if hot stamped and \$530 if cold stamped.

At these costs of approximately \$.11 to \$.17 a lock, the use of three locks for each polling place is still significantly less expensive than one of the traditional padlocks.

The Bureau of Engraving currently uses the Brooks plastic padlock seal on bundles of currency. The E. J. Brooks Company also produces several other lines of locks that could satisfactorily serve the needs of A.I.D. Their "numbered lead and wire" seals are used by the United States Post Office for "registered" mail sacks, especially for those shipped abroad as they are light weight, strong and easy to use.

Thus lightweight, affordable locks are available that can be consecutively numbered, have the name of the country imprinted on them, and without any concern for the loss or replacement of keys.

INK

In Third World developing countries that do not have a comprehensive voter registry, alternative methods need to be developed to enhance the integrity of the election and reduce the probability of voter fraud.

An effective ink or stain that can provide immediate short term discoloration of the skin (to the tip of a finger) can be used to identify individuals who have already voted. This system will substantially reduce the probability of vote fraud via multiple voting by the same individual. Even where registries exist and function well, inking fingers is still recognized as an important form of security and is an integral part of the process to prevent fraud.

The two major problems with inks are their cost and indelibility. There are no truly indelible inks, but there are solutions that produce better results. Unfortunately, in most cases, better results means a higher cost.

A standard 20% silver nitrate solution will not always cause immediate discoloration. Also because the solution is clear, many may have trouble believing it is really an ink.

A 10% silver nitrate solution with a photographic developer will speed up the coloration process and also substantially reduce the cost.

However, this option would mean each polling place would have two bottles of chemicals, one silver nitrate, one developer. Obviously, election officials will have to be well trained in order to use the solutions properly. If they are not, it could lead to chaos and confusion.

Dyes and pigments can also be added to the silver nitrate solution to provide immediate coloration and give it the appearance of ink, but must be done carefully as most dyes contain chlorides which will replace the nitrates.

One protein dye - "Coomassie Brilliant Blue" produced by Eastman Kodak, does appear to be effective for this use.

Still, silver nitrate solution does provide the longer lasting stain and is less easily removed through repeated washings than other alternatives. However, silver nitrate is heavy and there are federal regulations regarding the shipment of chemicals e.g. 100 pounds is the largest amount that can be shipped in any containers by air.

The cost of silver nitrate ranges greatly with the price of silver and is substantially more costly than other chemicals though, such as Gention Violet or Potassium Permagonate, especially in a mixture of 20 to 30%.

Significant savings can be realized through competitive bidding. In 1985, the purchase price of a 20% silver nitrate solution used in the Presidential election in Honduras was \$85,000. During this research the Ricca Chemical Company in Texas quoted \$33,000 for the same product with the same specifications as the ink used in Honduras. This represents a savings of \$52,000. A 10% solution quoted by the same company would have increased those savings by another 41%.

A variety of fluorescents with colored dyes can also be used for the same purpose where silver nitrate is not practical because a black dye is not as visible on darker skin.

Fluorescent ink requires the use of a long or shortwave light. Discotheque and large rock concerts use this method to mark attendants. With a colored dye added to the fluorescent, it will visibly mark a voter. It is difficult, but not impossible, for a voter to remove the stain.

Several different colors of pigments with various bases were obtained from companies specializing in inks, dyes and stains. Some contained fluorescent materials, while others did not. After several applications of soap and water, methanol, pyridine, ethanol, or Clorox, many of the stains were nearly removed.

However, those pigments that had fluorescent qualities were still visible under ultraviolet light in spite of the repeated washings. It was truly the only effective dye.

A problem with this approach is the cost of \$5.00 to \$10.00 for each ultraviolet light needed at each polling place. Obviously problems with breaking the lamp or wearing out the batteries would also have to be dealt with. Fluorescents are relatively inexpensive and truly the only fool proof method we found and should be considered in some future election.

In elections where a mechanism is needed to ensure against multiple voting, the ink stained finger has been proven effective. Fluorescent dyes, inks and powders represent some of the best choices, but again require the used of additional equipment.

COMPUTERIZATION

The biggest single expenditure of dollars for election assistance will be in creating computerized registries.

Because every country is different and unique unto itself - its size, its population, culture, level of education, degree of sophistication, availability of census data, whether or not a registry of some type currently exists, etc., it is difficult at best, and most likely impossible to devise a standard computerized registry program for all developing countries.

However some clear lessons can be learned from earlier experience in this area. Computers oversized or undersized for the requirements of the project; systems with inadequate protection against surging power systems; sophisticated software programs requiring too high a level of skill on the part of operators; these and other problems can be protected against by using the accumulated experience to develop a very tight set of specifications prior to any expenditures.

There are many sources for both the necessary hardware and software to develop a voter registry. The names of many of these are included in the vendor list.

As noted, there are many questions that must be answered before the hardware is ordered, but most significant, is knowing what the software package will be designed to do.

Many software packages have been created for list development and maintenance, lists of every conceivable type keyed to ever conceivable use.

Numerous individuals have tremendous experience in dealing with lists, both in creating and maintaining them. Any effort to create a computerized voter registration project should be based on this cumulative experience and not undertaken as though such a program has never before been done.

BALLOT PAPER VENDORS

Crane & Company, Inc.
Dalton, MA 01226
413/684-2600
Tom White

Eastern Fine Paper Company
P.O. Box 129
Brewer, ME 04412
207/989-7070
Gene Laughlin

Fox River Paper Company
P.O. Box 2215
Appleton, WI 54913
414/733-7341
Gene Shannon

Gilbert Paper Company
Division of Mead Corporation
430 Ahnaip St.
P.O. Box 260
Menaska, WI 54952
414/722-7721

James River Paper Corporation
P.O. Box 2218
Richmond, VA 23217
804/649-4496
Burton Bailey

Parsons Paper Company
84 Sargrist St.
Holyoke, MA 01040
413/532-3221
Ralph Schmidt

Stressmore Paper Company
Sub. of Hammer Mill
Southbroad St.
Westfield, MA 01085
413/568-9111
James Murphy

LOCK VENDORS

American Lock Company
3400 West Exchange Rd.
Crete, IL 60417
312/534-2000

E.J. Brooks Company
164 North 13th Street
P.O. Box 7070
Newark, NJ 07107
201/483-0335
Michael R. Bither

Kwikset Hardware Group
516 East Santa Ana Street
Anaheim, CA 92803

Master Lock Company
2600 North 32nd Street
P.O. Box 1036
Milwaukee, WI 53210
414/444-2800

Medeco Security Locks, Inc.
P.O. Box 1075
Salem, VA 24153
703/387-0481
Ron Aiken

Schlage
2401 Bayshore Blvd.
P.O. Box 3324
San Francisco, CA 94119
415/467-1100

Yale Security Group
P.O. Box 25288
Charlotte, NC 28229
704/283-2101

INK VENDORS

Anderson Laboratories, Inc.
5901 Vitzbugh
Fort Worth, TX 76112
817/457-4474

EM Science
P.O. Box 5018
111 Woodcrest RD.
Cherryhill, NJ 08034
609/354-9200
John Fosnacht

J.T. Baker Chemical Company
222 Red School Lane
Philipsburg, NJ 08865
201/859-5411
Debbie Smith

Mallinckrodt, Inc.
675 McDonnell Blvd.
P.O. Box 5840
St. Louis, MO 63134
314/895-2335
John Canavan

Ricco Chemical Company
448 West Fork Drive
Arlington, TX 76012
817/461-5601
Paul Ricca

VWR Scientific, Inc.
P.O. Box 8188
Philadelphia, PA 19101
609/467-3333

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BALLOT BAG VENDORS

ABAR Plastics, Inc.
10799 Tucker St.
Beltsville, MD 20705
301/937-5530

4-Star Plastic
6733 Mid-Cities Ave.
Beltsville, MD 20705
301/595-4626

COMPUTER HARDWARE

Digital Equipment Corporation
8301 Professional Place
Landover, MD 20785
301/459-7900
Uday Kumaraswami

International Business Machine Corporation
1801 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
202/807-4020
Jerry O'Shaw

Sperry Corporation
8008 Westpark Drive
McLean, VA 22102
703/556-5896
Carl R. Mauri

Systems Development Corporation
7925 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, VA 22102
703/847-2346
Brad Leane

Wang
One Industrial Avenue
Lowell, MA 01851
617/459-5000
Mary Harris

320'

COMPUTER SOFTWARE VENDORS

Campaign Software
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Suite 490
Washington, D.C. 20002
202/547-7855
Dan Frahm

Digital Equipment Corporation
8301 Professional Place
Landover, MD 20785
301/459-7900
Uday Kumaraswami

Hannibal
300 North Washington Street
Suite 406
Alexandria, VA 22314
703/684-5633
John Brady

International Business Machine Corporation
1801 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005
202/897-4020
Jerry O'Shaw

Inqalls Associates, LTD.
3110 Mount Vernon Ave.
Suite 807
Alexandria, VA 22305
703/548-1989
Robert Inqalls

Sperry Corporation
8008 Westpark Drive
McLean, VA 22102
703/556-5869
Carl R. Mauri

Systems Development Corporation
7925 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, VA 22102
703/847-2346
Brad Lenane

Q Systems Research Corporation
478 Morris Ave.
Summit, NJ 07901
201/522-1774
Henry Kasaba

Wang
One Industrial Avenue
Lowell, MS 01851
617/459-5000
Mary Harris

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