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EVALUATION REPORT
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS PROJECT

II - Legislative Enhancement

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Foreword

USAID/H believes that readers of this evaluation would benefit from information on the historical context in which this project began implementation, an update on activities that have developed under the project since the evaluation was conducted, and additional background on several issues raised in the evaluation.

The August, 1987 signing of the Project Agreement was followed by an unusually complex process of awarding and negotiating the project's primary contract with Georgetown University (GU). The Honduran presidential campaign was in full swing when the GU contract was finalized one and a half years later. As a result of the campaign, politics permeated the Congress's decision-making process and greatly hampered the implementation efforts of both USAID and GU in many areas of the project. The relationship between USAID and GU, initially strained by implementation delays suffered in early stages of the project, is now harmonious.

The project designers considered passage of career legislation a cornerstone of the project out of recognition that professional career civil service personnel are essential to de-politicizing democratic institutions. The law authorizing establishment of the Legislative Information Center (CIEL), passed December 15, 1989, contains the desired merit employment procedures for the CIEL.

Since the evaluation was conducted in August of 1990, the Honduran Congress has accepted a design drawn up by GU and a congressional committee for the CIEL and is laying the groundwork for its development.

In closing, the Mission adds its own lesson learned from this project, that of the need for Democratic Initiatives project designs to be flexible enough to allow project implementation to keep step with changes in the political environment.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADAI	El Ateneo de la Agro Industria, a Honduran consulting firm
AID	U.S. Agency for International Development
AID/W	Washington headquarters of Agency for International Development
CAPEL	Affiliate of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights for providing electoral advisory assistance
CD-ROM	Compact disk read only memory, a computer disk physically similar to the compact disks now widely in use
CIEL	Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos (Center for Informatics and Legislative Studies)
CIPRA	The office in Georgetown University which oversees the unit in charge of supporting the SDI project in Honduras
DA	Development Associates, Inc. (a consulting firm)
GEMAH	Gerentes y Empresarios Asociados de Honduras, a Honduran management consultant firm
GOH	Government of Honduras
GU	Georgetown University
GU/H	Honduras office of Georgetown University
HRD	Human Resources Development office of USAID
INCAE	Instituto Centroamericana de Administracion de Empresas (Central American Institute of Business Administration)
IRM	Information Resources Management office of AID/Washington
LAC/DI	The Democratic Initiatives office of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
MB	Megabytes--storage space in a computer
MBO	Management by objectives
MOU	Memorandum(a) of Understanding
PACD	Project Agreement Completion Date
PC	Personal Computer
PP	Project Paper (an AID document)
SDI	Strengthening Democratic Institutions project
TA	Technical Assistance
TNE	Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones (National Elections Tribunal)
TNE/RNP	Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones/Registro Nacional de Personas (National Elections Tribunal and its affiliate the National Registry of Persons)
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Honduras

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

On September 20, 1987, a Grant Agreement between the Government of Honduras (GOH) and the U.S.A.I.D. Mission (USAID) was signed to initiate the Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) project. One of the four components of this project was the strengthening of the Honduran National Congress.

On August 27, 1990, A.I.D. signed a contract with Development Associates, Inc. (DA) to undertake a mid-course evaluation of the SDI project (See Annex A for the scope of work). The DA evaluation team met in Washington, D.C. September 5-7 to meet with A.I.D. officials and representatives of the prime contractor (Georgetown University). Members of the team were in Honduras from September 10 to October 2 reviewing documentation (see Annex C) and interviewing senior officials of the Congress, other GOH officials, USAID officers, and personnel from the Honduran office of Georgetown University (GU/H) and GU sub-contractor Clapp & Mayne (See Annex B). Part of the team also visited Costa Rica where they met with people from the National Assembly and the University of Costa Rica.

A draft report was submitted to USAID on October 2, 1990. Comments on the draft report were provided by the contractor on October 16 and by USAID on December 7. Comments are reflected in this final report as appropriate.

Project Objectives

The objective of this component is: "to improve the effectiveness of the Honduran Congress in formulating and passing laws and to increase contact with the public."

To accomplish the foregoing, priority was to be given to two areas:

- (1) establishing a National Center for Legislative Support Services designed to provide legislators with more and higher quality information; and
- (2) improving the functioning of the Congress by:
 - (a) enhancing the current administrative structure;
 - (b) streamlining the legislative process; and
 - (c) strengthening the committee system of the Congress.

Project Progress

1. Findings

- a. On December 26, 1989, the President of Honduras signed the legislation creating the Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos (CIEL) -- Center for Informatics and Legislative Studies. Passage of the law was at least a year later than

planned; this reflected primarily delays in USAID's hiring of the prime contractor. By the time the contractor could undertake needed studies and submit reports, the country was in an election campaign and that took priority for all concerned (Congress, USAID, and contractor).

- b. The law passed was much weaker than the draft law proposed by the experts, which had been structured to isolate the center from politics. Nevertheless, Congressional leaders say there is bipartisan support for a professional Center.
- c. GU consultants submitted a revised plan in August 1990 for equipping and staffing CIEL. The plan calls for a mainframe computer for CIEL. The evaluation team took issue with the proposals and recommended that the Information Resources Management (IRM) office of AID/Washington review the GU proposal (for reasons given in Annex E). The IRM team submitted its recommendations in November and they are now being reviewed by USAID and the Congress.
- d. The contractor submitted in 1989 proposals for improving Congressional organization and functioning, including the functioning of committees, but no action had been taken by the Congress at the time of the team's visit and none appeared to be in the offing. Priority was being given almost exclusively to CIEL.

2. Conclusions

- a. Overall, implementation performance has been minimal, primarily due to the delays within USAID in contracting the prime contractor.
- b. The passage of the legislation for CIEL, although delayed, is the most important accomplishment of this component. USAID should accept CIEL in its present form as meeting the spirit of the MOU, even though it is not a separate institution as called for in the MOU.
- c. There is still no technical analysis that justifies the hardware configuration planned for CIEL as a least cost solution. The team recognizes, however, that using the Brazilian software provides a means of eliminating the need for an extended and detailed technical analysis. Given that, and the general delay in project implementation already encountered, the IRM proposal appears reasonable under the circumstances.
- d. There appears to be within the Congress too much faith in computer hardware and too little appreciation for what it takes to build and utilize data systems (see discussion in Annex E).

- e. The Holt recommendations for streamlining Congressional operations offer possibilities for improving the effectiveness of Congress comparable to those afforded by a functioning CIEL and could probably begin to show results in less time.
- f. Training activities to date under the project have been minimal, but they should become very important for the rest of the project life. (Annex F discusses the need for training collaboration and coordination.)

Policy Issue

Conditions Precedent and Covenants in the MOU have not been complied with; yet, they have not been changed and the team found no official correspondence with the Congress on its compliance.

Condition Precedent g.(2) of the Memorandum of Understanding provides that no assistance, or commitment documents for assistance, other than technical assistance, can be provided after December 31, 1988 unless the Congress has provided USAID with evidence that:

- (1) enabling legislation has been passed and guidelines approved to allow for the implementation of an administrative career service and a career service for CIEL; and
- (2) enabling legislation has been passed to permit the creation of a career service for the National Registry of Persons.

With regard to (1), a career service for the administrative service and other administrative reforms appear not to have been addressed. USAID will need to address this issue with the Congress before procurement can go forward.

The inclusion of Condition Precedent g.(2) (2) relates to the Conditions Precedent in the MOU with the TNE/RNP which require, inter alia, that proposed legislation be submitted to the Congress to create a career service in the National Registry of Persons. Thus, overall success of the SDI project depends upon Congressional action on behalf of the TNE. Nevertheless, the Condition Precedent is in conflict with the stated intent in the Project Paper to insulate each component from delays in the others.

The team concludes that Condition Precedent (2) (2) is not appropriate; it would be better stated as a covenant -- with an appropriate target date in 1991 for implementation.

Project Design Validity

The team concludes that the design of this component remains valid. The indicator at the purpose level ("increased number of bills initiated in Congress") is inadequate and inappropriate. The types of bills introduced by Deputies and the quality and review of the bills under consideration would be more relevant.

Recommendations

Category I

1. Settle all MOU issues so that CIEL and other procurement can go forward, with the procurement of CIEL computer hardware being spaced as the capability develops to use it.
2. Initiate review of, and take action on, recommendations for improving committee operations and other functions of the Congress.
3. USAID should request the contractor to add a systems expert to its in-country staff to coordinate the system development work in all components and arrange for training of systems personnel and potential users of the automated data systems.
4. Undertake a systematic analysis of the need for and cost of obtaining the various data bases that have been proposed for inclusion in the Congressional automated system; this is needed to establish priorities for data development.

Category II

1. Recommendations on Training (VI.C. below) -- timing will depend on actions in Category I.
2. Recommendations on Impact on Women (VI.D. below).

Lessons Learned

1. The three components of the SDI project are really three different projects, with little inter-relationship -- particularly between the extremely time-sensitive election support and the other components. It is questionable whether the umbrella concept really reduced project management workload in relation to what it might have been with two or three projects. In any case, the cost in implementation difficulties hardly seems worth maintaining the umbrella concept.
2. There is a need for more systematic sharing of information about programs and actions being taken to deal with fairly common problems in the SDI area in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Both of these are discussed further in the main text.

I. INTRODUCTION

The A.I.D. Project Paper (PP) for the Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) project was approved August 12, 1987. The initial obligation of funds took place with the signature on September 20 of a Grant Agreement between the Government of Honduras (GOH) and the U.S. AID Mission (USAID). One of the components of this project was the strengthening of the Honduran National Congress.

According to the terms of the Grant Agreement, there were to be evaluations of the project, including a mid-course evaluation. On August 27, 1990 AID signed a contract with Development Associates, Inc. (DA) to undertake the mid-course evaluation. See Annex A for the scope of work for the evaluation. DA fielded a five-person team to carry out the evaluation:

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| * James L. Roush | Team Leader--Economist, Evaluation Specialist |
| * Mitchell Seligson | Political Scientist, Latin American Specialist |
| James Rowles | Specialist in Comparative Law and Latin American Law and Legal Systems |
| * Joseph Alessandro | Educator, Training Specialist |
| Carlos Ferro | Commodity Procurement Specialist |

- * = Principal evaluators for the Legislative Enhancement component.

Mr. Roush visited Honduras August 28-31 to obtain preliminary briefings from USAID, to prepare a work plan for the work of the team, and to make logistical arrangements for the team's visit. The team (except for Mr. Ferro) met in Washington, D.C. September 5-7 to study the scope of work for the evaluation, review documentation, and meet with A.I.D. officials and representatives of the prime contractor (Georgetown University -- GU).

The team arrived in Tegucigalpa Sunday September 9 and started work on September 10. The team met with senior officials of the Congress September 11. Drs. Seligson, Alessandro, and Rowles visited Costa Rica September 12-15, contacting officials of the National Assembly and the University of Costa Rica. In Honduras, the team interviewed officials from USAID, the Congress, the Honduran office of Georgetown University (GU/H), and GU subcontractor Clapp & Mayne (see Annex B for a list of people contacted). The team reviewed documentation in USAID and GU/H files (see Annex C for a list of published documents reviewed).

The team reviewed the progress made against targets established in USAID's Project Paper (PP), analyzed policy issues and implementation problems, reviewed the basic design of the project

component, and made recommendations for improving the chances of achieving a successful outcome for the project component. A draft report was submitted to USAID on October 2, 1990. GU provided comments on the draft report on October 16; USAID's comments were received December 7 and 14. Their comments are reflected in this final report.

II. PROJECT AND COMPONENT OBJECTIVES

The USAID Project Paper (PP), which set forth the basic design of the project, was approved August 10, 1987. The Logical Framework for the project is appended as Annex D. The Grant Agreement, which provided the initial obligation of funds for the project, was signed August 12, 1987 by the President of Honduras and the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras. The project purpose is to:

"improve the capability of key democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress, and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry of Persons), develop local leadership and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process."

To implement the project, separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed with the three participating agencies. The MOU was signed with the Honduran National Congress (hereafter Congress) October 16, 1987. The objective was stated therein as:

"to improve the effectiveness of the Honduran Congress in formulating and passing laws and to increase contact with the public."

To accomplish the foregoing, priority was to be given to two areas:

- (1) establishing a National Center for Legislative Support Services designed to provide legislators with more and higher quality information; and
- (2) improving the functioning of the Congress by:
 - (a) enhancing the current administrative structure;
 - (b) streamlining the legislative process; and
 - (c) strengthening the committee system of the Congress.

A third activity was to provide an orientation workshop for the legislators that would be elected in 1989.

III. PROJECT PROGRESS

A. Findings

1. Center for Legislative Support Services

To assist Congressional leadership in deciding the type of legislative center it wanted, the SDI project funded four observational visits:

1. Three members of Congress spent 10 days in Albuquerque, New Mexico and Sacramento, California in January 1988.
2. Six members of Congress visited Mexico City for five days in July 1988.
3. While viewing the electoral process in the U.S. in November 1988, five Deputies visited information centers in the Washington, D.C. area.
4. Six members of Congress visited Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay for 13 days in August 1989.

The prime contractor selected for providing the USAID-funded support to this project component was not selected until July 1988 and, because of extended contract negotiations, did not initiate activity until January 9, 1989. The first draft of enabling legislation for the Center was prepared May 1. This went through various interactions until its presentation to the Congressional leadership September 10, 1989. It was subsequently presented to the Congress which, after some revision, passed on December 15 the enabling legislation for the Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos (CIEL)--Center for Informatics and Legislative Studies. The President of Honduras signed the bill into law December 26, 1989.

The draft law prepared by GU made provision for the isolation of the new Center for politics, but the law as passed makes major modifications in those provisions. The major changes are these:

Article 4 of the draft provides for the selection and removal of the Director by two-thirds vote of the Junta Directiva of the Congress; the approved law eliminates the two-thirds requirement.

Article 6a in the draft stipulates that the Director will determine the policies, methods and programs of the Center; the law says that approval from the Special Administrative Committee of Congress is required for all of these activities.

Article 6b in the draft provides that the Director of the Center will select, name, promote, organize, direct, supervise and dismiss the staff of the Center. The law provides that the Director will select the staff, but propose to the Special Administrative Committee the naming, promotion, and firing of the staff.

Article 6c in the draft authorizes the Director to create all the regulations for the operation of the Center; the law provides that this authority is subject to a veto by a two-thirds vote of the Special Committee.

Article 8 in the draft provides for job security (after 12 months of service), with appeals to the decisions of the Director only to be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Junta Directiva. The law provides for the establishment of regulations that would provide job security, but those regulations are to be developed by the Junta Directiva of the Congress and not the Director.

Article 12 of the draft gives the Center the right to receive donations and economic assistance, as well as enter into financial obligations. Article 14 of the law states that such actions are required to have the approval of the Junta Directiva of Congress.

Article 15 of the draft requires that the new Director be selected and appointed by the Junta Directiva within three months of the effective date of the passage of the law. The law itself provides for the same three month rule, but selection and appointment is to take place by the Special Administrative Committee.

The net effect of these changes is to remove from the new Center the protection from politics envisioned by the Project paper and the MOU signed with the Congress. The MOU specifically requires (p. 2, item i) that the Center will "be a separate institution" and "enjoy administrative autonomy." It is clear from the provisions enumerated above that autonomy has not been granted to CIEL.

The First Vice President of the Congress told team members that Hondurans had had a bad experience with totally autonomous agencies. Therefore, the Deputies were unwilling to allow CIEL to be beyond the control of the Congress. Nevertheless, there is a bilateral consensus to make the Center a professional and effective institution. Even under the current legislation, he said, CIEL will play a valuable supportive role.

The staffing and equipping of CIEL was the subject of reports prepared by GU consultants and submitted to USAID in July 1989. These were passed on to the Congress by USAID in July and October 1989 (the automation plan at the later date). No action or decision was taken before the new Congressional leadership was chosen in early 1990.

Based on discussions with the new First Vice President of the Congress, the contractor revised the reports on the staffing and equipping of CIEL and brought them together in a single report: "Implementation Plan for the Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos, A Report for the Congress of Honduras" dated August 1, 1990. This report provides options for the computer hardware for CIEL and staffing and budget implications for those options. These options were discussed in a series of meetings and a decision was imminent at the time of the evaluation team's visit.

Because of questions raised by the evaluation team about the GU recommendations for computer hardware, USAID requested a team from the Information Resources Management (IRM) office in AID/W to review the hardware proposals. The IRM submitted its report in late November 1990; a final decision is expected soon.

The evaluation team found that the hardware recommendations were not supported by a detailed requirements analysis which justified the hardware being proposed. Furthermore, the statements of the legislators interviewed about the potential use of the CIEL automated system reflected unrealistic assumptions about the availability of data and a lack of understanding of the complexities of analyzing and utilizing data. The team's concerns are spelled out in Annex E.

The enabling legislation for CIEL provides for the Director of CIEL to be appointed within three months of the effective date of the passage of the law. The effective date was May 25, 1990, the date the law was published in La Gaceta. Although recruitment was in process when the team was in Honduras in September-October, no appointment had been made by the end of November.

2. Improving the Functioning of Congress

Two management training workshops were given to members of Congress in April 1988. The training was of a general nature with little specific focus on Congressional operations. Although the project provides for additional training of this type, there has been no follow-up by the Congress. See Annex F for more information on this activity and other training activities initially planned for the project.

GU, once its contract was in effect (January 1989), brought a number of consultants to Honduras to prepare recommendations for improving Congressional operations. Pat M. Holt assisted

in developing draft legislation for CIEL and prepared a report providing recommendations for strengthening the committee structure and legislative procedures of the Congress. His report was submitted to the Congress in July 1989, but there appears to have been no follow-up on the part of either the previous or current Congressional leadership. In an effort to kindle Congressional interest, the principal elements of the Holt report were included as Appendix G to the Implementation Plan for CIEL mentioned above.

Mr. Limardo of Clapp & Mayne submitted a report to USAID at the end of June 1989 recommending actions to strengthen the organizational structure for the administrative support offices and functions of the Congress. It is unclear whether this report was ever forwarded to the Congress by USAID; the contractor believes that it was not.

Dr. Tirado of Clapp & Mayne prepared recommendations for automation requirements for the Office of the Secretaria and the Office of the Pagaduria. These were included with the automation plan for CIEL mentioned above. No action had been taken on them, pending a decision on CIEL automation.

Other than the two workshops, it appears that no action has been taken to improve the administrative functioning of the Congress, at least in relation to activity under the project. Furthermore, Congressional leadership does not appear to be interested in the subject at this time. The priority within the project seems to be exclusively on setting up CIEL.

3. Work Retreat for New Deputies

New Deputies were elected in November 1989 and installed in January 1990. A work retreat for them was held in March 1990. The Liberal Party Deputies walked out at the beginning of the retreat for reasons unrelated to the purpose and organization of the retreat. The retreat was held anyway; the Liberal Party subsequently held a similar retreat not funded under the project. See Annex F for further information.

B. Conclusions

1. Overall, implementation performance has been minimal, primarily due to the delays within USAID in contracting the prime contractor. By the time the contractor could undertake needed studies and submit reports, the country was in an election campaign and that took priority for all concerned (Congress, USAID, and contractor).
2. The passage of the legislation for CIEL, although delayed, is the most important accomplishment of this component. USAID should accept CIEL in its present form as meeting the spirit of the MOU, even though it is not a separate institution as called for in the MOU.

3. There is still no technical analysis that justifies the hardware configuration planned for CIEL as a least cost solution. The team recognizes, however, that using the Brazilian software provides a means of eliminating the need for an extended and detailed technical analysis. Given that, and the general delay in project implementation already encountered, the IRM proposal appears reasonable under the circumstances.
4. There appears to be within the Congress too much faith in computer hardware and too little appreciation for what it takes to build and utilize data systems (see discussion in Annex E). Exaggerated and unrealistic expectations can turn very quickly to disillusionment and non-use.
5. The Holt recommendations for streamlining Congressional operations offer possibilities for improving the effectiveness of Congress comparable to those afforded by a functioning CIEL and could probably begin to show results in less time.
6. Training activities to date under the project have been minimal, but they should become very important for the rest of the project life. Neither the Congress nor the contractor is organized and/or staffed to meet the expected needs for training collaboration and coordination. This is discussed further in Annex F.

IV. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND CONSTRAINTS

A. Implementation Issues

1. Findings

- a. The most significant delay in project implementation has resulted from the time taken to get the prime contractor on board -- from October 1987 to January 1989. This led to delays in submitting to Congress the draft legislation for CIEL and proposals for operational and administrative reform. Thus, the CIEL legislation was passed at least a year after it had been anticipated in the MOU, two and a half years into the project.
- b. Conditions Precedent and Covenants in the MOU have not been complied with; yet, they have not been changed and there is no official correspondence with the Congress on its noncompliance.

Condition Precedent g. (2) of the MOU provides that no assistance, other than technical assistance, can be provided after December 31, 1988 unless the Congress has provided USAID with evidence that:

- (1) enabling legislation has been passed and guidelines approved to allow for the implementation of an administrative career service and a career service for CIEL; and
- (2) enabling legislation has been passed to permit the creation of a career service for the National Registry of Persons.

Furthermore, the MOU states that USAID shall not issue any commitment documents for such assistance until USAID is satisfied that the Conditions Precedent have been fulfilled.

Condition Precedent (2) (1) has only been partially implemented and (2) (2) not at all. Further, as discussed above, the CIEL legislation does not create the independent institution called for in the MOU. The MOU issues must be settled before CIEL and other procurement can proceed.

USAID officers said they planned to deal with these issues and up-date the MOUs after they had the benefit of the evaluation team's recommendations.

2. Conclusions

- a. The delay in the initial contracting of the prime contractor has been more costly in time than the contracting delay itself because that delay caused the results of the contractor's initial efforts not to be available before the start of an intense election campaign. This meant the loss of an additional year: first, all parties focussed on the election; then, a new team in the Congress had to get organized and oriented about the project.
- b. USAID has been remiss in not either obtaining compliance with the Conditions Precedent in the MOU or agreeing with the Congress on revisions.

B. Policy Issue

1. Finding

Condition Precedent (2)(2) also raises a policy issue: should this project component be held up until legislation is passed affecting another GOH institution? The team understands the logic of C.P. (2)(2), i.e., USAID assistance to the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry is under the same project and such assistance is unlikely to have lasting effect without assured continuity of personnel in that organization. However, the Condition Precedent is in conflict with the stated intent in the Project Paper to insulate each component from delays in the others.

2. Conclusion

Condition Precedent (2)(2) is not appropriate; it would be better stated as a covenant -- with an appropriate target date in 1991.

C. Impact on Women

The potential impact of the project on women was not discussed in the Project Paper or the MOU, and the team found no indication that it had been considered during the implementation of the project up to mid-1990. In the evaluation scope of work, however, USAID asked the team to suggest mechanisms that could be incorporated into the project to measure the impact on women. Such suggestions are provided in the Recommendations section (VI.) below.

Based on information GU obtained for the team, 10 women were elected to the 134-person Congress in 1985 and 15 were elected as alternates (Suplentes); in 1989, the figures showed a small increase: 13 and 17. During the 1986-89 Congress, women served on 10 of the 27 committees, but never as an officer. They were in the majority on the Education Committee and had two representatives on the Labor Committee. There is one woman on the seven-person 1990 Executive Committee (Junta Directiva) of the Congress.

V. PROJECT DESIGN VALIDITY

The team's conclusions regarding the validity of the project design as set forth in the Project paper are as follows:

1. The basic design assumptions that achievement of the outputs specified will result in an improvement of the effectiveness of the Congress appear valid.
2. The indicator at the purpose level of an "increased number of bills initiated in Congress" is inadequate and inappropriate. The types of bills introduced by Deputies and the quality of the analysis and review of such bills would be more relevant.
3. The institutional analysis of the Congress in the Project Paper remains valid.
4. The recurrent cost analysis in the Project paper projects an increase in recurrent costs from \$650,000 to \$1 million annually or two to four percent of the then current Congressional budget. The level of additional recurrent costs will depend considerably on the size of CIEL and on the nature of the computer hardware provided to it. Present indications are that CIEL alone will have recurrent costs of over \$1 million. The First Vice President told the

evaluation team that Congress would be able to appropriate whatever sum was needed. This begs the question of whether the expansion in the Congressional outlays would be the best use of the limited budgetary resources. The team found little in the Project Paper to justify the claim that the "potential increase [in the Congressional budget] is minimal as compared with the benefits that will accrue to society by improving performance of the Congress."

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Mid-Course Adjustments

1. Increased attention should be given to improving committee operations and other functions of the Congress, while maintaining a high level of priority for the establishment and functioning of CIEL.
2. USAID should agree to converting MOU Condition Precedent (2) (2) to a covenant with target dates for implementation in 1991; however, it should insist on detailed plans and targets to meet Condition Precedent (2) (1) and Covenant (1) before agreeing to go ahead with procurement for CIEL.

B. Development of Data Management Systems

1. USAID should request the contractor to add a systems expert to its in-country staff to coordinate the system development work in the Congress, the Court, and possibly TNE/RNP and arrange for training of systems personnel and potential users of the automated data systems.
2. Hardware procurement should be stretched out over the remaining period of the project, being spaced as the capability develops to use it.
3. Priority should be given to undertaking a systematic analysis of the need for and cost of obtaining the various data bases that have been proposed for inclusion in the Congressional automated system; this is needed to establish priorities for data development.

C. Training

1. USAID should encourage the Congress to establish a training position, as covenanted in the MOU; in the interim, the Congress should establish a training committee to work with the contractor and others in developing a training needs assessment for the balance of the project and carrying out the large amount of training that will be needed.
2. Assuming that the logjam in activity in Components I and II is now broken, USAID should authorize the contractor to add a

training coordinator to its staff in Honduras to coordinate the extensive training that will be needed by the Congress and the Court and to provide quality control over the contracted trainers and the training programs.

D. Impact on Women

There are two issues related to women that should be of concern by USAID. One relates to the openness of the political system to women who may wish to run for Congress; the other relates to whether women will have equal access to employment possibilities in the career systems being established with project assistance.

1. USAID should fund a study to ascertain the degree of openness of the electoral and party system to women participation and evaluate any obstacles encountered.
2. USAID should monitor the hiring policies established for the career service of the Congress.

E. Priority of Recommendations

A complete ranking of all recommendations (e.g., 1,2,3, etc.) does not make sense because some are contingent on other recommendations or actions, the timing of which the team cannot determine. Nevertheless, there follows a categorization of priorities which should help give the team's perspective if it is not already obvious from the text above.

Category I

1. Settle all MOU issues so that CIEL and other procurement can go forward, with CIEL hardware being procured per Recommendation B.2.
2. Initiate review of, and action on, recommendations for improving committee operations and other functions of the Congress.
3. Recommendation B.1. -- add a systems development expert to the contractor's in-country staff.
4. Organize a detailed requirements analysis to establish priorities in the development of the CIEL and administrative data bases.

Category II

1. Recommendations on Training -- timing depends on actions in Category I.
- 2 Recommendations on Impact on Women.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

A. Scope of the Project

The SDI project was essentially an umbrella project composed of three separately identified components: one to work with the Judiciary, one to work with the Congress, and one to work with the Elections Tribunal and the National Registry of Persons.

Each of the three components of the project were supposed to be self-contained, and problems in one were not supposed to cause delays in the others. It is doubtful that this can ever be guaranteed, but a minimum condition to achieve such a situation would be the provision of separate USAID project officers for each component. Having separate contractors for each component would further increase the insulation.

Even if it were not possible to have separate project officers for each component, it seems clear that support for the election should have been separately administered. The election component had less to do with the other two components, and it had a deadline by which a large amount of project action had to culminate. Thus, it was bound to have overriding priority for USAID and contractor action for nearly a year. This adversely affected implementation of the Legislative Enhancement component.

Aside from wanting to insulate the different components from problems in the others, having a separate contractor for the individual components makes sense on other grounds. The three components have very little in common, and most potential U.S. contractors will not have expertise in all three activities. While this can be dealt with by forming a consortium or through sub-contractual relations, these arrangements diffuse authority and responsibility, complicate control of personnel, and are usually more expensive -- e.g., by adding overhead on to overheads.

In sum, these three components are really three different projects. It is questionable whether the umbrella concept reduced project management workload in relation to what it might have been with two or three projects. In any case, the cost in implementation difficulties and delays does not seem worth maintaining the umbrella concept.

B. Information Sharing

The evaluation team found that neither USAID nor contractor personnel were well informed about similar activities being carried out by A.I.D. in other Central American countries. There appears to be a need for more systematic sharing of information about programs and actions being taken to deal with fairly common problems.

Either the AID/Washington LAC/DI project or the Central American regional project should take responsibility for developing a system for sharing information, including periodic regional meetings of USAID project officers, contractor personnel, and host country counterparts.

USAIDs should require that contractors have a process for ensuring that their experts are current on relevant activities in other countries in the regions. Contract experts should join host country personnel when they go on observation tours to other countries. The expert can help ensure that the participants receive maximum benefit from the visit. This process should also result in improved communications in subsequent project implementation.

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EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

OBJECTIVE

To provide a team which shall evaluate the progress made to date under the project and to provide guidance for any midcourse adjustments that may be necessary. This objective will be achieved in a four-part process:

For each of the four project components:

1. A comparison of accomplishments to date against the planned outputs;
2. An analysis of problems and constraints that have impeded project implementation and achievement of planned inputs;
3. An analysis of the continuing validity of the original project logical framework and assumptions;
4. Recommendations for midcourse adjustments, if any.

STATEMENT OF WORK

The contractor shall conduct an evaluation which addresses the following areas:

A. Overall Project Progress

For each of the project components, the evaluation will provide answers to the following questions:

1. What are the project accomplishments to date?
2. How do these accomplishments compare to planned project outputs?
3. For planned outputs not yet realized, what are the prospects of achieving the outputs by PACD?
4. What achievements or accomplishments occurred that are beneficial toward achieving project objectives but that were not envisioned in the original design?
5. The cost effectiveness of supporting each component should be reviewed and compared against results and planned outputs.

6. What mechanisms should be incorporated into the project to measure the impact on women?

B. Analysis of Problems and Constraints

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

1. What have been the principal constraints to achieving the planned outputs in a timely and cost effective manner?
2. What factors, if any, have constrained the ability of contractors and subcontractors to achieve the targets established for their work.
3. Is the balance between contractor responsibilities and Mission Project backstopping appropriate for timely and cost effective implementation? If not, why not?
4. Is the overall project management appropriate for effective project implementation? If not, why not?

C. Project Design Validity

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

1. To what degree are the logical framework and Project Paper analytical assumptions still valid?
2. Is the institutional analysis contained in the Project Paper still valid for each component? If not, why not?
3. Where assumptions and analyses are no longer valid, will there be a negative effect on achieving planned outputs? If so, in what way?
4. Is the recurrent cost analysis contained in the Project Paper still valid? If not, how will this impact the project?

D. Midcourse Adjustments

Based on the analyses in Sections A, B, and C above, the evaluation will describe what, if any, midcourse adjustments are necessary to achieve the project outputs by the Project Assistance Completion Date.

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

HONDURAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

RODOLFO IRIAS NAVAS	President
TEOFILO MARTEL	First Vice President
RAFAEL PINEDA PONCE	Former Second Vice President
JORGE ARTURO REINA	Deputy
HUGO ALFARO MUÑOZ	Deputy
NICOLAS CRUZ TORRES	Deputy
JORGE CARRANZA	Deputy
ADILIA ZELAYA	Secretaria Adjunta
VIVIAN RODRIGUEZ	AID/GU/Congress

OTHERS IN HONDURAS

MARCO ANTONIO SIKAFFY	Director, Centro de Desarrollo Integral Alternativo
BESSY VAQUERO DE PAZ	Dirección General de Estadística
MARIO PONCE	Executive Director, ADAI
CARLOS AVILA	Former Head of GEMAH

AID/COSTA RICA

CARL CIRA	Director, Regional Project
LYN HAMMERGREN	

ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA/COSTA RICA

HUGO ALFONSO MUÑOZ	Diputado
LILIAN FALLAS	Servicios Técnicos

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JORGE ROVIRA M.	
MIGUEL GOMEZ B.	Departamento de Estadística

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NORMA PARKER	Former Director of LAC/DI, AID/W
ANTHONY VOLLBRECHT	Former Project Officer, USAID/H
KAREN OTTO	Administration of Justice Officer, LAC/DI
JOHN FASULLO	Former Project Officer, USAID/H
LINDA ANDERSON	General Counsel Office
LOUIS MACRAY	Honduras Desk Officer, LAC/CAP/H
WILLIAM SCHOUX	Director, LAC/DI
MARIA MAMLOUK	LAC/DI

USAID/HONDURAS

JOHN SANBRAILO	Director/USAID
GEORGE WACHTENHEIM	Deputy Director
MICHAEL WILLIAMS	Regional Legal Advisor
JAMES ATHANAS	Contracting Officer
CONSTANCE PARASKEVA	Special Projects Division
ROBERT MURPHY	Formerly w/USAID/H
ROBERTO FIGUEREDO	Special Projects Division
CLAY EPPERSON	Special Projects Division
EMILY LEONARD	Director, Human Resources Dev. Office/USAID
EUGENE SZEPESY	Director, Office of Development Programs
EMIL FALK	Agriculture Division
MELISSA STEPHENS	Formerly in Special Projects Division
MARGARET KROMHOUT	Project Backstop Officer
CARMEN ZAMBRANA	Evaluation Officer

GU/WASHINGTON

GERALD PAGANO	Deputy Director, CIPRA
IRWIN LEVY	Project Manager
RICHARD BARRET	Assistant Project Manager
RAY GARUFI	Former Chief of Party in Honduras

GU/HONDURAS

STEVE LIAPIS	Former Chief of Party
DOUGLAS ROBERTSON	Acting Chief of Party
SONIA QUINONEZ	Training Support Officer
MARGARITA ARIAS	Comptroller

GUILLERMO PEREZ CADALSO

Legal Advisor

CLAPP & MAYNE

EDIBALDO SILVA
CARLOS RUIZ COX
JORGE TIRADO
LARRY POSNER

President, C&M Puerto Rico
Consultant, C&M Puerto Rico
Consultant, C&M Puerto Rico
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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (FIU)

MARK ROSENBERG

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ALLAN KELLUM

Computer Expert

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LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
(522-0296)

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Goal			
To strengthen Honduran democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - continuing open elections - public's confidence in the system - increased access and participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of elections - Central Bank Statistics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional political stability - stabilized economy - Continued political will to consolidate the democratic process
Purpose			
To improve the capability of key democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry) improve local political leadership, and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - universal suffrage - increased number of bills initiated in Congress - reduction in time for court case processing - separation of power enhanced in accordance with the constitution - relative increase in the number of participants in the system and awareness of the democratic process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - project reports - surveys - evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - political acceptance of targeted institutions to change - maintenance of internal political stability

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Outputs			
<p>1. Administration of Justice -- to strengthen the court system making it more efficient and responsive to the Honduran populace in matters concerning civil and criminal justice and better able to mediate intra-governmental conflicts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - judicial career implemented - 40 law school graduates participating in experimental justice of the peace; public defender system consolidated - strengthened administrative system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- improved planning, programming and budgetary capability -- organizational and procedural manuals written -- financial, management and personnel system functioning -- procurement capability established -- information system strengthened and utilized - 400 judges trained - 20 administrative staff trained - public information program initiated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - project reports - surveys - site visits - evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - enhanced elite political commitment to rejuvenated judicial process - appropriate human resources available - increase in allocation of national budget to 3% for the judiciary by 1990.
<p>2. Legislative Enhancement -- to improve the effectiveness of the Honduran Congress in formulating and passing laws which govern the country and to increase contact with the (SIC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish a National Center for Legislative support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- permanent staff -- reference service functioning -- policy research service functioning -- career service established for congressional administrative staff and employees of the National Legislative Support Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Reports - Surveys - Evaluations 	

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Creation of the Congressional administrative office<ul style="list-style-type: none">-- improved planning, programming, budgeting-- organizational and procedural manuals written-- financial, management and personnel systems functioning-- improved information systems- legislative process streamlined<ul style="list-style-type: none">-- calendar established-- debates scheduled-- deadlines maintained-- tracking system developed- committee system strengthened and utilized- 134 legislators trained in orientation session- 120 trained in committee procedures- 150 administrative staff trained- 23 congressmen partake of observational trips- public information program functioning		

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p>3. Voter Registration/ Elections improvement - to assist in the improvement and professionalization of the TNE and the RNP; enhancing their ability to manage an effective registration process and guaranteeing the Honduran people universal suffrage and fraud free elections.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Registries from 1880 - 1983 updated, verified and microfilmed - 45,000 registries including 20,000,000 documents and over 2,000,000 identity cards - establishment of a career service for the RNP - an improved administrative structure for the RNP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- financial, management and personnel systems functioning -- improved programming, planning and budgeting -- organizational and procedural manuals written -- information system improved - department and municipal register activities enhanced and linked better with the National Registry - 30 administrative support officers trained - 620 National Registry employees trained - 1000 local registry employees trained - improved conduct elections - strengthened administrative office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project reports - Site visits - Evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multi-partisan support - human resource availability

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
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- 80 administrative support officers trained
- 52,000 election workers trained
- 1989 Presidential elections carried out
- public information program functioning.

ANNEX E

COMPUTER HARDWARE FOR THE HONDURAN CONGRESS

In early August 1990, after a visit from its team of consultants in June, Georgetown University (GU) delivered its final report on the CIEL automation plan. This plan varies strikingly from the original estimates prepared by Mr. Tirado of Clapp and Mayne. The latest plan provides three separate options for the automation of CIEL, the least costly of which is for the purchase of \$500,000 in computer equipment.¹ This figure contrasts with \$148,652 for this component in the Tirado report.

The evaluation team, after talking to Congressional representatives, understood that the position of Congress was that the only acceptable computer hardware option was option 3, the one with a large 370 type system (actually an IBM 390) and the use of PC-based terminals as intelligent work-stations. This estimates from the original Tirado report.

It was explained in the CIEL Implementation Plan that the Minister of Informatics (actually Minister without Portfolio Roberto Arguetta Reina) had made a decision to standardize all computers on the IBM 370 architecture. The team confirmed with the contractor's expert that this information was taken as a given.

The evaluation team was unable to contact Minister Arguetta because he was out of the country, but it was difficult to imagine that the Minister had stipulated that "all new computer applications" (p. 31 of the CIEL Implementation Plan) in the public sector of Honduras must use the 370 architecture because there was obviously going to be many (probably most) computer applications that will require other computer solutions.

The team had other concerns about the proposed system. It seemed to be based on older systems developed in the 1970s and was not making use of the latest technology. It would remain dependent upon a computer solution developed in the 1970s, namely the software developed in Brazil that is to be donated to the project for the full-text retrieval of legislation. It would not be taking full advantage of computer hardware and software designed in and for the 1990s.

A central factor in the selection by the Congress of option # 3 appeared to be based on assumption that it was the only option that could handle full-text search and retrieval of Honduran legislation.

¹See p. 47 of Mulhollan, et al., Implementation Plan for the Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos: A Report for the Congress of Honduras, August 1, 1990.

As far as the written record is concerned, the only estimates the team could uncover of the volume of information that is to be handled by the computer system comes from the Limardo report of April 1989 and the estimates included in the revised Tirado report of May 10, 1989.² Although the Limardo report was not designed to estimate the volume of all Honduran legislation, it does provide a good estimate based upon 1986, a year that seems quite representative of the period 1986-89 that Limardo studies. His estimate shows that in 1986, 201 laws adopted occupied 843 pages, each page containing an average of 53 lines, with an average of 14 words per line. Translating this into computer storage requirements, a single page of laws should occupy about 4k of memory on a PC. The total storage requirements for a year's legislation would amount to about 3.4 MB of disk space.

By these calculations, in order to store all legislation approved since the Congress was reopened in 1982, it would require about 27 MB of storage, easily fitting on the 40 MB hard disk drives that have become standard in the PC world of the late 1980s. It is understood that the Congress wishes not only to have electronic access to the laws it has passed, but prior legislation as well. It is not clear if this would include decrees passed during the long period of military rule beginning in 1972, or if those decrees are to be excluded. Assuming that one would want to include all military decrees as well as civilian decrees, each decade of legislation would occupy some 34 MB of storage space.

Thus, if one were to include all of the legislation accumulated since the outbreak of World War II, and if one insisted on storing it all on instantly accessible disk drives with no archiving facilities for older legislation, one would require about 136 MB of storage, only a small fraction of the 800 MB mini computer (AS 400) recommended in the Tirado report for the Legislative Reference Service.³ If one wanted to store on line the entire past 100 years of Honduran legislation, one would need a hard disk of 340 MB,

²The Tirado report, p.2, gives a figure of 10,450 pages a year in the office of the Secretaria and an additional 4,300 pages per year in the Actas. However, the great bulk of these pages come from the "exposiciones" (700 pages) "proyectos" (7,000 pages) and "dictámenes" (1,750 pages) and not the decrees themselves. While the decrees would need to be stored in the on-line data base being contemplated, the other material might flow through the word processors and be stored in hard copy in the library.

³These calculations make the unrealistic assumption that the volume of legislation approved by the new Congress, the largest in Honduran history, has been constant throughout Honduran history. In fact, a cursory examination of the Gazettes (the official newspaper), shows that as one goes back in time, the volume of decrees declines. After all, the modern Honduran state has grown dramatically since the 1960s, and with each new ministry and parastatal organization, new laws need to be passed and revised.

quite large by microcomputer standards, but available in the marketplace. Hard drives of this size will become common place in the next few years as new technology becomes widely available.

In order to further determine the feasibility of both storing, indexing and retrieving the full text of all Honduran legislation ever passed, the team consulted with Development Associates computer expert in Arlington, Virginia, Mr. Allan Kellum. Mr. Kellum researched the question for the team and determined that current technology would permit the storage of approximately 200,000 pages of information, or about 600 MB of data on a single CD-ROM (compact disk read only memory), a disk physically similar to the compact disks now widely in use in the audio world. Drives to read such disks currently cost in the \$500-\$1,000 range each, but are rapidly dropping in price as they become standard commodities. Tandy Computers (sold by Radio Shack) now sells a model that comes with a CD-ROM drive as a standard feature.

Mr. Kellum also consulted with Crowninshield Software Inc. of Boston Massachusetts [phone (617)-787-8830; fax: (617) 787-3035] which produces software that indexes text stored on CD-ROMs. One of their software products ("Media Base") indexes every word of text and contains a resource file that could be adapted to Spanish. The cost of preparing such an index would be between \$15,000 and \$25,000 plus about \$5,000 to convert the software to Spanish (versions exist now in French, Italian and Swedish, as well as English). This company did the software development for the states of Colorado and Nebraska that led to putting those states' statutory law on CD-ROMs.

Using this technology, any and all PCs in the Congress, as well those in the courts and, indeed those in lawyers' offices throughout the country, could have access to an indexed full text of all Honduran legislation. The cost for preparing "several hundred" copies of the CD-ROM would be only \$2000-\$3000, meaning that the cost per user would be somewhere in the \$10 to \$20 range. As the laws are updated each year by Congress, new CD-ROMs could be released so that all users could have an updated file.

In any event, despite this low cost PC technology for storing and indexing all Honduran legislation ever passed into law, it is unlikely that there would be significant need to maintain on-line the full text of all laws because those that go back to the turn of the century and earlier are unlikely to be referenced in the 1990s. One could easily store pre-1900 legislation on backup tapes, each one of which could handle a decade of legislation.

Another important factor not apparently being fully taken into consideration is the utility of the data base for users other than Congress. It is to be assumed that the legal community of Honduras could benefit greatly from having access to the laws of the country. If the decision is made to adopt a mainframe configuration, the only users who could access the system are those who could connect to that mainframe. While it is possible to add

many ports so that users could call in from remote locations, the reality of Honduras is that phone communication is rather unreliable at the moment. Moreover, serious questions of security will arise as users throughout the country access the mainframe and get tempted to change extant law. Hence, extensive controls will have to be built in.

With a PC system in place, the Congress could offer subscriptions of a legal service to users in the legal community that would provide updated copies of legislation on, let us say, a quarterly basis. Those copies could be in printed form, or on CD-ROMS or both. In short, while it may well be that the 370/390 hardware mainframe for this project may be capable of storing and indexing the full text of Honduran legislation, PCs seem quite capable of doing so at a fraction of the cost and with a great increase in user accessibility.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the evaluation team recommended in its draft report that USAID should bring in an expert team from the Information Resources Management (IRM) office of AID/Washington to review the computer hardware proposals before going ahead with procurement decisions. The IRM team concurs in going ahead with the proposed 390 option, with some adjustments, if it is confirmed that the software in use in Brazil will be donated to the Hondurans.

The IRM does not maintain that the proposed 390 option is the least cost solution for the hardware. Rather, it says that this option, by piggy-backing on the Brazilian software development, permits the Hondurans to avoid a large scale, time-consuming and costly requirements analysis and software development activity. This could save a year in becoming operational, and the saving in the cost of analysis and software development should largely offset the extra hardware cost.

Even granting that the special circumstances cited above can justify going ahead with the 390 option, the evaluation team believes that is very important to put the system in place on a gradual basis as capability is developed. It is also very important that strict priorities be established in the development of data systems for CIEL. Factors which will need to be considered in establishing priorities include:

1. The cost-benefit ratios for developing particular data bases, plus the costs and benefits related to how much full-text of old legislation will be put on the system.
2. The operating costs of the system: personnel, maintenance costs, space requirements, etc.
3. The capacity of the technical staff who would operate this sophisticated system.

The project must ensure that ample funds are provided for initial training and that the Congressional budget includes funds not only for the additional staff that will be required, but also for on-going training and systems improvement.

4. The quality and quantity of the data that will feed the system.

The operating costs and qualifications of the staff are ultimately under the control of the Congress--so long as resources are sufficient. This factor, however, is not under the full control of Congress.

There are three major types of data that are to form part of the automated data base to be developed by CIEL. The first of these is a complete on-line data base of Honduran legislation and jurisprudence (i.e., binding case law) relating to that legislation. Given sufficient resources, it will be possible to develop this system and input the legislation and jurisprudential information. See 1. above for some concerns to be considered.

The second type of data that Congress wishes to have at its command is that which relates to a wide variety of aspects of the Honduran society and economy. For example, Congress wishes to have access to socio-economic, demographic, agricultural and economic data such that they would be able to make their own evaluation of the information they currently receive from the executive branch. One illustration of the kind of data they would like to have is information on taxes and tax structures so that they can measure the potential impact of new tax laws on various strata of the population.

The most important aid to the Deputies would be a reference library that would contain reports from various government and parastatal organizations. Indeed, that type of service seems to be what the writers of the AID Project Paper (PP) had in mind when they stipulated that the Center would house a library that would contain information of use to Congress (see page 41 of the PP.). Micro-computers used in CIEL could index that library material, and perhaps even abstract it, so that Deputies and CIEL staff could have ready access to it.

The Deputies with whom the evaluation team talked, however, wish to have the raw data from the various institutions directly accessible from their computer terminals. They feel that only in that way can they stand on an equal footing with the Executive branch and be able to make informed decisions.

There are two difficulties with the idea of creating this larger data base for Congress. First, much of the raw data that they seek is simply not available in Honduras. Second, the raw data would require CIEL to hire highly trained statisticians in order to be able to use it effectively.

Regarding the first point, this is a "data poor" country, one in which many ministries have very limited budgets to gather timely data within their scope of interest. The studies that they do prepare are done with a wide variety of data formats and are likely to continue so for some time.

At present, the largest single repository of data in Honduras is the Direcdion General de Estadisticas y Censo. This agency does not have a 370 machine, and is in the process of moving their data processing to PCs. The 1988 Population census, which comprises vital statistics on some 4.5 million individuals, and the Housing census of the same year which comprises information on nearly 900,000 dwelling units, is being processed by PS/2 70 machines with 120 MD hard drives and backup storage tapes.⁴

There are available a variety of small scale studies, often limited to a particular municipality of department. These are available in printed form from a wide variety of institutions, both national and international. Such studies belong in the CIEL library.

Large, nationwide studies do exist. Honduras, like other countries, has conducted regular censuses. Unfortunately, those data are often woefully out of data; the last agricultural census was conducted in 1974, this in a country whose economy is based on agriculture and whose principal policy decisions often revolve around the agricultural sector. Further, as far as can be determined, the 1974 census tape is no longer useable, or if it is, it would have to be laboriously reconstructed to operate on a modern computer.

Newer and very important nation-wide data sets are coming into existence, principally from the National Office of Statistics and Census and the Central Bank. Those data sets are based on carefully constructed stratified probability samples. One such study is the semi-annual crop production survey; another is the household survey that provides unemployment and other key data. While it might seem reasonable to have CIEL import those data bases onto its system, doing so would require adding highly specialized research personnel (ones conversant with survey sample methodology and the intricacies of weighting of cases as well as multivariate analysis).

Absent such personnel, the raw data would at best add nothing to the inferences that can be drawn from the printed reports published by the census bureau, and at worst would produce serious misinterpretations of complex data bases. Even with such specialized personnel, importation of these survey samples would be

⁴The Census for the current census of mainland China, with a population of over 1 billion individuals, is being processed on PCs. See the United Nations report, "Procesamiento de datos del cuarto censos nacional de poblacion: Republica Popular de China," Caracas: Seminar Regional Sistemas Computacionales para el Procesamiento Censal, 28-31 de mayo de 1990. For a complete report on the use of microcomputers for that analysis of the Honduran censuses, see "Las Microcomputadoras en la Direcdion General de Estadistica y Censos," Seminario Sistemas Microcomputacionales para el Proceso de Datos Estadisticos," Quito, Ecuador, septiembre de 1990. The foregoing were provided to GU/H.

a complex and time-consuming task requiring highly specialized computer personnel.

A far more cost-effective method of obtaining desired information beyond that which is available in the printed reports of surveys and censuses would be for CIEL to issue contracts with the organization that gathered the data to provide special purpose analyses as required by Congress. In this way they would be able to "piggy-back" their request on top of the large sunk costs of collecting the data without having to maintain an in-house capability of highly skilled experts in agricultural statistics, bio statistics, econometric analysis, etc.

The GU report (in its Appendix B) is correct when it states, "In the early years of the Center, the library collections and data bases will be modest." The locally available data bases to which they refer are only 10. Of those, 9 are PC based data bases of modest size.⁵

The third type of data Congress wishes to have on its system is that drawn from other countries, especially that from the rest of Central America. At least according to three deputies with whom we spoke, they would be especially interested in obtaining data from the U.S. and Western Europe as well. As is shown in Appendix D in the CIEL Implementation Plan from GU, those data bases are largely available on-line, over phone lines. To access those data bases one only needs a small PC and a modem with total cost under \$1,000 per PC.

The data bases which are accessed internationally generally cannot be obtained in their entirety; they are accessed via specific searches for which charges are levied. Some so-called "portable data bases" are available (see Appendix C of GU report of August 1) in CD-ROM format. But the annual cost of these products is often quite high (e.g., ABI/INFORM currently costs \$4,950 annually; Computer DATABASE/PLUS costs \$5,000). The Implementation Plan budget estimates provide for \$35,000 for data set acquisitions. Such a budget would only allow tapping into a small portion of the data bases currently available.

Moreover, irrespective of cost and budget, it is questionable whether any significant use could be made of these data sets, almost all of which is highly technical and written in English, German, French, and Russian.

⁵The format of the tenth data base is indicated as unknown, but since it was prepared by Alden Rivera Montes, who also prepared the PC-based data set of the Ministry of External Relations treaty files, it is likely to be a PC-based format as well. The actual size of some of these data bases is not specified, but the ones that are, are given as 20-30 megabytes.

5. The level of demand for the information to be contained within the system.

As noted above, much of the information will be so highly technical or, when in raw data form, require such highly skilled technicians to analyze, it is unlikely that there will be a great deal of demand for the data. Library information, however, if well indexed and abstracted, could be of great utility to a professionalizing Congress.

Conclusion

The evaluation team strongly supports the creation of CIEL as a means of professionalizing the way the Congress does its business, which in turn should strengthen Honduran democracy. To fulfill its mission, CIEL must provide needed services to deputies and Congressional committees. In the view of the team, the quality of those services will rest primarily in the professionalism and expertise of the Center's staff rather than on the availability of high powered computer equipment and extensive data bases. Continued care will be needed during the implementation stage to ensure that priority in data base development is given to the most useful data sets. The building of a good library should also be given priority.

TRAINING ACTIVITIES

A. Evolution and Current Status of Training

1. Orientation Retreat for New Deputies

March 5, 6, 7/90

INCAE, with the cooperation of the Congress, planned and successfully implemented a work retreat for approximately 60 Deputies. The specific goal of the work retreat was to improve the capacity of members of Congress and for Congress to play a more significant role in the democratic process. The purposes were:

- o to extend an opportunity to Congress to discuss the role it expects to play in strengthening democracy;
- o to impart to members of Congress basic information required to perform their duties as well as a body of knowledge that will be needed in the future;
- o to give an orientation to new members of Congress;
- o to create an appropriate environment for the identification and solution of both internal and external problems of Congress; and
- o to provide the opportunity for Deputies to know one another and to develop positive working relationships.

The methodological design of the work retreat was to deliver information in an attractive manner as well as to create a climate for working together in an effective manner.

INCAE felt that the planning and implementation of the Congress work retreat was the most difficult and least rewarding activity ever undertaken. From the onset there were a series of misunderstandings which resulted in excessive involvement by the Congress in planning, formulation, and actual implementation of the work retreat.

As early as June/89 INCAE began to plan for this retreat. At this time a planning meeting was held with the principal contractor to select an appropriate list of themes and topics for the conference.

INCAE researched the receptivity of Deputies to a previous work retreat. At least 12 were interviewed relative to their views and interests. INCAE requested a meeting between INCAE and the Liaison Committee of Congress as early as June/89. A meeting was held August 1, 1989 with Mr. Martel, the most important member of the Committee, but a meeting with the full committee was not authorized until five months later.

In accordance with the early meeting with Georgetown, input of the Liaison Committee and the research conducted by INCAE, the program designer formulated a tentative agenda for the Congress.

The meeting with the Liaison Committee in February/90 brought major changes. Speakers from outside the country, who Deputies had previously requested because they felt that local Honduran speakers would not command respect, were rejected. Five different seminar designs were needed to resolve the problem of developing a suitable agenda.

The work retreat took place as planned for approximately 120-150 Deputies. At the onset one of the political parties abandoned the conference, for reasons unrelated to the retreat, leaving a contingent of about 60 participants. The average daily attendance was between 40 and 45.

It was reported that some of the speakers had problems maintaining the interest of the audience. Those interviewed commented on one of the featured speakers who insisted on delivering his speech in Portuguese refusing the assistance of an interpreter. The lecture was over an hour and made little connection with the audience.

It was difficult to hold speakers to their allotted time period and to control the noise level in the audience. The invited congressional guests from other countries in some instances served as an enrichment dimension to the conference. On the other hand, some local Deputies felt the need to provide opportunities for their invited friends to see different sites in Honduras. In order to provide these services they were constantly requesting transportation and other services. The monitorship of the conference was difficult for INCAE and they were less than pleased with their effort.

Based on the evaluation team's contacts, the retreat received mixed reviews. Some Deputies felt that something was gained, but others seemed to use only a small part of their time attending training sessions.

The conference was planned for 120-150 members. When one of the political parties abandoned the conference, the retreat seemed doomed to failure. However, when the group was reduced to 40-60 it made for a more intimate and participatory atmosphere.

The political party that abandoned the work retreat felt that their clientele had missed out and tried to catch up by staging a mini conference, with its own funds, to bring the same information to their Deputies.

2. "Management by Objectives" Training

April 21-23/88

GEMAH was contracted by USAID to give high level management training ("management by objectives" in the Project Paper) to interested Deputies, and more specifically to congressional committees. These committees, which are responsible for the initiation and the passing of judgment on laws, need training to become more efficient and productive in their work. The first task that GEMAH undertook was to design and conduct a diagnostic study of managerial procedures in the Congress. The findings indicated that there were few, if any, established procedures.

An interpretation of these findings resulted in the development of a high level managerial workshop for two days. About 15 members of Congress and congressional committees attended the first one and about 17 the second--which took place April 28-29/88.

The themes and topics discussed were: (a) working in groups; (b) distribution of responsibilities; (c) writing objectives; (d) follow-up; and (e) decision making.

The reaction to this seminar was positive as reported by some members of Congress in attendance. There was a general feeling that this type of training could be beneficial to Deputies. They indicated that the public does not always have the best image of Congress and that high level training such as this might change this image and the Deputies' way of working. Others felt that this type of training would increase their capacity to be more productive as Congresspersons.

Upon termination of the two workshops it was expected that more would be requested. However, it was never possible to convince the Congress of the need to improve managerial procedures in the Congress, especially in the working of committees. GEMAH thought that Congress might have felt that the training provided was more suitable for private enterprises.

GEMAH did not pursue the continuance of such training and shortly after became involved in collaborating with the National Elections Tribunal in implementing a training program for election personnel. GEMAH feels that if they had gone to political parties for support of the training activity it would have flourished. Deputies have more respect for their party's expectations than those of the Congress.

3. Observational Visits

January/88

Three members of the Congress spent ten days in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Sacramento, California. The purpose of the trip was to provide on-site visits of legislative information centers, libraries, and research centers. The group also went to various municipalities to observe local government officials at work.

The group was interested in parliamentary procedures so special visits were made to observe State Legislatures in both Sacramento and Albuquerque.

The participants indicated that the trip provided them a knowledge of what an information center should be like, and the kind of modern technology and professionally trained personnel needed to make it function efficiently.

July/88

Six Deputies were afforded an opportunity to visit Mexico City for five days to observe information centers. Visits were made to the legislative information center, to the National Library, and to research centers in a number of universities.

The trip was valuable to the participants because of their need to plan for the initiation and implementation of an information center in Honduras.

November 1/88

A group of five Deputies was afforded the opportunities to observe the U.S. elections. The participants visited the electoral process in Washington, D.C. and the neighboring State of Virginia.

In addition, they were afforded the opportunity to visit some information centers and to hear some speakers in the Washington, D.C. area.

August/89

Six members of Congress visited Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay for a period of 13 days to observe legislative information centers. The program was formulated by the Honduran Ambassadors' offices in those countries.

The most impressive information center was in Brazil. Its modern equipment and highly trained staff collect vast amounts of knowledge needed by members of Congress. The participants had an opportunity to meet with the Director of this center and to study each step of the process.

The group journeyed then to Uruguay and Argentina where they were able to observe other types of information centers more within the reality of Honduras. The participants felt they gained invaluable knowledge which would be useful in planning and implementing such as information center in Honduras.

B. Conclusions

1. The benefits of the retreat for the new Deputies does not appear to have been worth the outlay in time and funds to bring it off. The preparation of a manual for Deputies and holding workshops to discuss it with a more limited number of participants would seem more worthy of future support.
2. There appears to have been little interest in the management training provided. This could reflect on the content of the training, but may reflect a "Catch 22" situation: a program of streamlining of Congressional procedures could engender interest in training, but it has not moved forward; if more Deputies had received management training, they might have provided a lobbying group for Congressional streamlining. It was also suggested to the team that the trainer might have been more successful if an attempt had been made to obtain advance political party support of the training.
3. The observational visits were useful in helping Deputies obtain information about legislative information support centers. Such visits might have a greater multiplier effect if the participants were required to submit reports on their visit and present seminars on what was learned that is relevant to Honduras.
4. If the implementation logjam in the project is now broken, there will be an increased need for training--for Deputies and for staff. It appears timely to prepare a training needs assessment for the balance of the project life which would cover in-country training, observational visits, and short-term training programs abroad.
5. With the likelihood of a substantial increase in training activity in both this component and component I, and the elimination of the liaison officer position funded by USAID, the contractor should be in a position to provide more leadership to the development of training needs and the coordination of training programs funded by the project.
6. To ensure the effectiveness of the training, it is important that Congress be totally involved. This suggests the need for the appointment of a training officer as called for in the MOU. In addition, a special committee or sub-committee of the Congress should be involved in the planning and evaluation of training activities.

C. Recommendations

1. The contractor, working with appropriate Congressional officials, should prepare a training needs assessment for the balance of the life of the project.
2. Assuming there is Congressional concurrence with the need for an increase in training activity, the contractor should add a training coordinator to the GU/H staff.
3. The Congress should be encouraged to nominate one or more individuals to participate in the planning and evaluation of project-funded training activities.

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COMPONENT II
LEGISLATIVE ENHANCEMENT

Training Proposed

- February 1990--a three or four day working retreat for the entire Congress shall be provided. Themes: economy of Honduras, foreign relations, agrarian reform, analysis of education problems, demographic trends, the budgetary process, the committee system, administrative and support services and parliamentary rules.
- Provision of one Masters Degree scholarship for the technical staff members selected to run the reference or research system. The curriculum will include library science, bibliographic data bases, legislative affairs.
- 5 initial full-time employees shall be trained to input data, adapt and upgrade software, update and maintain the computerized data base, and provide minor equipment maintenance. Two research experts shall be trained to manage the storage and access of information in the system.
- Congressional Committee training under MBO program conducted by GEMAH.
- Observational trips for up to 23 Congressmen to visit the U.S. or Latin American congresses.

Training Completed

- Congress work retreat was provided for approximately 60 Congressmen.
- None to date.
- None to date.
- Congressional Committee training under MBO management program conducted by GEMAH.
- Four observational visits for Deputies: (1) Albuquerque and Sacramento; (2) Mexican legislative tour; (3) South American tour; (4) US Election tour.

- Congress administrative office holding professional civil service jobs shall receive training. • None to date.
- Long-term training consisting of one two-year scholarship to study Public Administration for the administrative office director or assistant. • None to date.
- Short-term training for up to 24 individuals consisting of short intensive seminars of two weeks duration. • None to date.
- Up to 5 international site visits for congressional administrative staff to observe the functioning of administrative support systems. • None to date.

Mass Media Campaigns

- Two major mass media education campaigns to inform public of functioning and responsibilities of the National Congress. To run for two months and shall use entertaining marketing techniques to make the information accessible, relevant and attractive. Principal target audience, Hondurans with six years or less of primary education. Radio will be the medium using record programming and promotional spots. • None to date.