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USAID/Senegal  
Agricultural Production Support  
Project No 685-0269

**PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION REPORT**

USAID/ADO  
March, 1991

Prepared by: David Diop, ADO

Approved by: Julius E. Coles  
Mission Director

Julius E. Coles

Date of Approval:

6/11/1991

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

Date

June 11, 1991

Daniel Drip

6/11/91

This project completion report was very well written and provided a clear explanation of what happened under the project. It was a pleasure to read. Congratulations on a job well done!!! Julius E-Coles

**REMARKS**

This project completion report was very well written and provides a clear explanation of what happened under the Project. It was a pleasure to read. Congratulations on a job well done!!!

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Julius E. Coles, Director, USAID/S

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

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# LE SECTEUR AGRICOLE VOUS INTERESSE ...







**LE PROJET DE SOUTIEN A LA PRODUCTION AGRICOLE  
VOUS AIDE A BENEFICIER D'UNE LIGNE DE CREDIT  
AUPRES DES BANQUES.**

**PROJET  
APS** POUR  
LE SECTEUR  
PRIVE



# BONNE SEMENCE BONNE RECOLTE!



CACHET DU DETAILLANT



Projet de Boutten à la Production Agricole

PROJET  
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## I. BACKGROUND

### GOS Policy Framework

Two major policy statements issued by the Government of Senegal (GOS) in 1984 form the basis for the current policy dialogue between the GOS and USAID. These policy statements also form the backdrop against which the APS project was designed. The first major policy statement was the New Agricultural Policy published by the Ministry of Rural Development in March-April 1984. The second was the Medium and Long-term Economic and Financial Adjustment Program of October 1984, which was presented by the GOS to the December 13-14, 1984 Paris meeting of the donor's consultative group for Senegal.

### New Agricultural Policy (April 1984)

The New Agricultural Policy (NAP) presented five policy themes:

- Reform and redynamization of the Cooperative;
- Readaptation of the mode of operation of the extension services and reorganization of the rural development agencies (RDA);
- Improvement of the system of supply of agricultural inputs: fertilizer, seed, and agricultural equipment;
- Pest control and protection of stocks, and
- environmental protection.

USAID assistance under the Agricultural Production Support Project was designed primarily to support the third theme, improvement of the system in the context of accelerating the reduction of the public role of the RDAs.

Reform of the system for supplying agricultural inputs entails major institutional changes. In the case of fertilizer, the NAP quoted a theoretical requirement of 285,000-300,000 MT per year, but it was noted that the highest figure ever reached in Senegal was 190,000 MT. The stated GOS target was to get fertilizer distribution back up to 120,000 MT, by 1987-88.

The NAP specified their possibilities for financing farmers' purchases of fertilizer inputs: withholdings on receipts from sales of outputs; cash purchases; and credit. The option chosen by the GOS was to purchase for cash

with limited credit extended through existing institutions such as the National Agricultural Credit Bank of Senegal or CNCAS. The document set CFA 90/kg as the target maximum price at which fertilizer should be sold to the farmer.

The NAP goal for the cereals sector was food self-sufficiency. The strategy was to promote the production and consumption of local cereals by putting on the market processed cereal products that meet consumer tastes at prices competitive with those of imports.

The target proposed for irrigation development was the addition of an average of 500 hectares per year up to the year 2000; 3,500 hectares in the Senegal River Basin; 1,000 in Casamance and Senegal Oriental; and 500 hectares around wells. The target for rainfed agriculture, which was the primary concern of USAID's Agricultural Production Support Project, was an average net increase of 10,000 hectares per year in area devoted to cultivation of cereals: a reduction in regions receiving less than 400 mm of rainfall, and an increase in regions receiving more than 700 mm of rainfall (Casamance and Senegal Oriental). However, the Mission believed that substantial increases in production could still come from yield increases (intensive farming) as opposed to opening of new lands for cultivation.

The NAP, and the liberalized input provision and cereals marketing policy, had created a favorable context for greater privatization under the USAID Agricultural Production Support Project. The cereals marketing policy outlined in the NAP, and put into place in October 1985, leaves the purchase, sale, and movement of cereals to the private sector, and restricts the role of the State to supporting producer floor prices. (The State would intervene to support prices with major purchases in the event of a bumper crop.) The Village sections and the cooperatives would be responsible for a program of farmers-owned stocks to be financed by their own resources, bank credit, and/or the GOS.

Medium and Long Term Program (PAML) (December 1984)

The Medium and Long Term Economic and Financial Adjustment Program, (PAML) incorporated the earlier themes of the NAP. Cereals policy elements

specified in the section on agriculture included: 1) provision of an adequate supply of inputs (the focus of the USAID Agricultural Production Support Project); 2) establishment of incentive prices for producers, which was essential to cover the costs of modern inputs; 3) creation of a market for local cereals; 4) progressive (upward) adjustment of the price of imported cereals (which has already occurred), and 5) adjustment study of a national cereal policy. No mention was made of liberalizing the marketing and movement of cereals, which has since been decreed in conjunction with the 1985 Title I Agreement. The Action Plan also called for clarification of the price equalization and stabilization role of the Caisse de Péréquation et Stabilisation des Prix. The PAML has been the official basis for the GOS-donor dialogue either expanded the scope of the PAML or went beyond some of the general statements in the PAML.

#### APS Background

As authorized with the Ministry of Rural Development (MDRH) on December 31, 1986, the Agricultural Production Support (APS) Program was designed to facilitate the transfer of agricultural input distribution and cereals seed multiplication from the GOS to the private sector.

APS was to have supported the New Agricultural Policy initiative launched by the GOS in 1984 by providing Technical Assistance, a revolving credit fund, participant training and commodity procurement to facilitate privatization of key cereals production inputs (such as fertilizer, quality seed, agricultural equipment and crop protection materials). The APS also was to facilitate the privatization of cereals marketing and transformation.

The \$20,000,000 five-year project was authorized and initial funds were obligated in February 23, 1987.

Project Assumptions: The following key assumptions were made during the design of the APS Project.

1. Farmers are sensitive to price signals and would intensify crop production rather than continue with low input, extensive production.

2. Intensive crop production, higher yields, and increased income would expand demand for high quality seed, fertilizer, equipment and pesticide.
3. Increased market demand for certified seeds, fertilizer, crop protection products, and farm equipment would lead to an increased need for credit for private sector input marketing firms.
4. A private sector network of Senegalese business entrepreneurs could distribute and market production inputs.
5. Private sector seed production would expand to meet increased demand for certified seed.
6. Commercial banks, if given access to additional loan funds, would provide credit to input traders and assume 100% of the credit risk.
7. Project investments and interventions would generate an internal rate of return equal to 16%.

## II. PURPOSE OF PROJECT

The stated purpose of the APS project was to facilitate privatization of agricultural input distribution and seed multiplication activities in Senegal. It was anticipated that by 1992, the private sector should produce 60% of the cereal seed requirement and distribute 75% of all fertilizer, chemical and equipment requirement. Approved in early 1987, the five-year project was being implemented through a host country contract and financed through a \$20 million grant from USAID/Dakar. GOS counterpart funding was estimated at \$2,077 million in GOS funding. In fact, the GOS has disbursed a total funds of only \$200,000 which represented salaries of the APS Director and Deputy Director and estimated operating costs (gas, vehicle maintenance, etc..).

### III. OBJECTIVES OF PROJECT

The project had four output objectives:

- a. Privatization of input supply and seed production,
- b. Expansion of input supplier credit,
- c. Collection of agricultural statistics, and
- d. Implementation of an educational media campaign.

In support of these output objectives, the project was to have provided the flexible resources needed to support growing private sector responsibility for agricultural input marketing and seed multiplication. Project targets were that seventy five percent of the crop production input supply and sixty percent of the seed multiplication activities should be handled by the private sector by the end-of-project. The project was to have resolved key supply and demand issues impeding private sector involvement in input distribution activities.

The project was intended to strengthen GOS-private sector capability to expand the supply of critical crop production inputs, as well as restructure the seed sector and focus adaptive research on crop production needs. Demand for inputs and services were to have been stimulated through an educational media campaign providing vital information on products, supplies and services needed to increase crop yields.

Another component of the project was intended to improve the collection and analysis of agricultural statistics which in turn should have enabled the GOS, the other donor community, and numerous private enterprise managers, to more efficiently match the supply of production inputs with the demand.

Finally, by means of a revolving credit fund funded under A.I.D. Direct Contracts, the project was to have increased the liquidity of the private sector suppliers of agricultural inputs and services, as well as private enterprises active in marketing farm output. Equally important, the project was to have supported the development of an economically viable agricultural credit program.

IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE:

a. Contractor Selection:

During the first two and a half years, the project implementation suffered from a series of delays. The Host Country Contract competitive selection and approval process for an American firm to provide technical assistance took longer than planned. The preparation and issuance of the Request for Proposals was completed in late November 1987. The host country selection of the contractor was completed in June 1988. By this time, several long-term technical assistance candidates had taken work elsewhere, as their period of commitment under the terms of the contractor's proposal had expired. MDR host country contract negotiations with Chemonics, the selected firm, were completed in November 1988. The GOS approved MDR-Chemonics Host Country Contract No. 1 in July 1989 and MDR-Chemonics Host Country Contract No. 2 in August 1989, a total of 15 months after initiating the request for proposals.

b. Contract Administration:

The need to negotiate two separate contracts resulted from inflexible GOS contracting procedures which limited the first contract to financing for technical assistance costs only. The two contracts provide AID funding of \$8.9 million over the life-of-project for technical assistance, participant training, commodities, and other costs. The \$9 million for the credit program was to have been deposited directly into the fiduciary bank by USAID; thus the \$9 million was not included in the MDR-Chemonics host country contracts. As agreed in the host country contracts, Chemonics and the University of Arizona negotiated an \$800,000 subcontract for the management of the participant training program and the provision of short-term technical assistance. Drafting, clearing, negotiating and signing two separate contracts, and amending and administrating these two separate documents was a burden upon the GOS, the contractor, and the Mission.

c. Technical Assistance:

Difficulty in filling the five technical assistance staff positions created a gap in the technical assistance and slowed such implementation. Although the Chief of Party arrived in December 1988 under a pre-contract agreement, three other technical assistance specialists did not arrive until April and May 1989, too late to plan and implement interventions in all four components for the 1989 growing season. Moreover, the agricultural statistician who arrived in early May departed post permanently in mid-july for medical reasons. In sum, the process of technical assistance selection was slow and further delayed by the Contractor's inability to present candidates considered viable by MDR and USAID. Further delay ensued when the Mission had decided to place on hold two technical assistance positions: The seed quality specialist and the agricultural statistician -- for which staffing had already been delayed.

Thus, start-up delays plagued the project early on. More importantly, however, serious flaws in the original project design combined to seriously limit the project's chances for success. The most serious flaw concerned the willingness of banks to lend for agricultural credit.

d. Agricultural Credit:

As a result of the project's vigorous discussions with banks to initiate credit activities, we now better understand the complexity of private sector agricultural credit and the concerns of the Senegalese banking system. We believe that flawed assumptions in the design resulted in unrealistic expectations for a credit program that could deliver the type and amount of credit envisioned to the project's target beneficiaries.

That being said, with a note of caution, some small tangible progress on the agricultural credit front occurred late in the project as discovered from discussions with the BIAO. The BIAO indicated interest in conducting a test credit program for lower risk clientele, such as vegetable

production enterprises with irrigated cropping schemes and private sector traders of production inputs that service and support irrigated vegetable production enterprises. Based on the BIAO interest, the Mission agreed with the MDR that the APS Project could conduct a test credit program limited to \$300,000 of credit disbursement to finance a limited number of irrigated vegetable enterprises and input traders that service those enterprises. The test would assess the feasibility of engaging commercial banks in lending to groups within the agricultural sector which the bank believes to be less risky. It would also test the soundness of a strategy to diversify the project's credit disbursements. This diversification could have led to an expansion of the credit market and improved the financial attractiveness of agricultural credit for private sector production input and output market development.

Credit disbursements from the fiduciary bank's APS account under the test program were to have been confined to a 12 month period that would have ended on November 1, 1990. The duration of each loan, the interest to be charged the clients and the interest on capital available from the fiduciary bank would be defined in a credit protocol negotiated by the APS Banking Committee, which is composed of representatives of Ministry of Rural Development (MDR), Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and AID. The repayment of the credit was to have been deposited in the fiduciary bank's revolving account number two. The APS Banking Committee would then have monitored future credit disbursements from APS revolving account number two under the guidelines defined in the approved credit protocols with each participating bank.

The fiduciary bank contract was in place to permit disbursement of APS credit upon demand by eligible participating banks. AID contracted with a local accounting firm to provide the inspection, monitoring and tracking services for the credit program. Unfortunately, despite early indications of interest, no credit demands were ever made to the fiduciary bank by the eligible banks.

The MDR staff and Chemonics chief of party, however, were in regular contact with members of Senegal's commercial banking system to encourage their involvement with agricultural credit opportunities. In spite of

their best efforts, the commercial banks appeared uninterested in the available capital under the APS project. The banks believed that the risk of agricultural sector lending was too high. The basic project hypothesis, that the commercial banks would be an effective vehicle to deliver credit to the project's beneficiary group, remains seriously open to question.

V. PROJECT EVALUATION:

Critical to the future of the project was the mid-term evaluation done by a multi-disciplinary evaluation team for February-March 1990. The section below highlights the findings of the evaluation.

Technical Assistance and project administration:

a. Team Building:

Although three of the five Chemonics T.A. professionals were working in-country, they took longer than originally planned to become a functional team with effective channels of communication.

Unfortunately, project efforts to bring together the MDR and Chemonics staff to form a cohesive project team largely consisted of sporadic coordination meetings at the MDR technical offices and a coordination meeting with Chemonics, USAID, and MDR advisors, the Direction de l'Agriculture, the Direction de Production et Contrôle des Semences (DPCS), and ISRA Directors and their technical staff. This effort was considered ineffective in building an effective team.

b. Co-Management:

In August 1989, when the Chemonics contract became active, the MDR APS project director changed the project management from joint MDR-Multi-Services International (MSI) operations under the 1987-1989 Interim Work Plan, to joint operations under the MDR-Chemonics Host Country Contract. The transition involved two major actions.

1. Closing the joint MDR-Multi-Services International local currency

account and the opening of a joint MDR-Chemonics local currency account; and

2. Closing the administrative management and training link with Multi-Services International and opening a similar link with Chemonics. While co-management of funds was a necessity, it created tension between MDR and contract team personnel as can be imagined.

c. Staff Training:

In August and September 1989, Chemonics conducted in-country management and financial training that strengthened the APS staff's capacity to use computer systems to manage project finances, monitor procurement, and maintain commodity inventories. As recommended by the non-federal audit of the local currency account, APS staff upgraded the management of the local currency account, expanded control of project vehicles, enhanced commodity inventory control capacity, and upgraded project administrative procedures.

d. Participant Training Management:

Five long-term participants were accepted by U.S. universities and have made solid progress. Of these five, four started academic training in early January 1990. The final participant started academic training in September, 1990. As a result of the review of the 1989 MDR-Chemonics Annual Work Plan, the Mission decided to delay the selection and training of the remaining four positions until after the results of the upcoming evaluation were available.

## VI. PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Very little progress was achieved under the APS project. There were basic flaws in the original project design, particularly about the assumptions relating to credit. There were also delays in the delivery of technical assistance and training. The combination of these two factors contributed to slippage from the original timetable. The combination of design flaws and to an extent, implementation delays led to the need for a rigorous outside evaluation of

the APS. The evaluation team made a number of recommendations designed to "over haul" the project and correct the deficiencies.

These recommendations included:

- A. The suspension of the project and a re-design. The objectives of the re-design was to narrow the scope and re-focus the project objectives;
- B. Re-direction of a portion of the funds allocated for credit to fund all agricultural credit including large and small agri-business firm and small to medium scale commercial farming operations.
- C. Using other than the formal banking system to deliver the credit (however, the evaluation team did not identify what type of mechanism would be most appropriate);
- D. Separating three of the projects activities (breeder seed production, seed -related extension activities, and agricultural census/agricultural statistics) from the APS project and finding alternative means of financing these activities;
- E. Terminating support to rice seed production quality control activities at this time.

However, after careful review, the Mission decided that the project should be terminated. Negotiations began with the GOS in August 1990. Project Implementation Letter (PIL) No. 16 dated September 12, 1990 officially notified the GOS of USAID's decision to close the project.

The four project activities originally envisioned in the APS project were (1) privatization of input supply and seeds; (2) expansion of input supplies credit (3) collection of Agricultural Statistics; and (4) implementation of an educational media campaign.

a. Privatization of Input Supply and Seeds:

The mid-term evaluation conducted on May 28-July 6, 1990 concluded that the project was irrelevant to privatization. Significant progress has been made in privatization of the fertilizer retail trade since the project was initiated in 1987 but the APS project played no role in this development. Cereal seed production and marketing has been slow. Generally there is inadequate genetic materials to generate significant demand for millet and sorghum seed. The project did, however, make a start in improving the quality of rice seed in the Fleuve Region of Northern Senegal.

b. Credit

Flawed assumptions in the original design appear to have generated unrealistic expectations for a credit program capable of delivering \$9 million to traders via commercial banks at interest rates acceptable to the project's target beneficiaries. Interest rates, credit diversification and duration of loans remain as issues. The evaluation concluded that the project's intended clientele was incongruent with the structure and practices of the commercial banks which were to participate in the project. At the end of the project, no credit was ever disbursed. Future prospects do not look any better; commercial banks have refused to participate in agricultural credit program without a guarantee scheme to share 50 percent of the credit risk with them.

c. Collection of Agricultural Statistics

During the 1988 Campaign, the project supported a National Statistics seminar and subsequent data collection and analysis. The Project suffered a major setback with the medical evacuation of the Technical Advisor. She had been in country for only two months and had started drafting a preliminary workplan. The recruitment for a replacement was suspended pending results of the APS Evaluation.

d. Media Campaign

The Project, through a local media development firm, conducted an integrated promotion focused on seeds, fertilizer, credit, agricultural equipment and crop protection products (see photocopies examples of two posters developed). The Campaign has broadcast specific promotional messages in French and five local languages via National Radio and appropriate Regional Radio stations. The media campaign also helped to organize meetings at the Village level and the district level with crop producers, inputs traders, credit agents and extension agents.

Technical bulletins and manuals in French and Wolof on agricultural input use were distributed. The promotion campaign also created a new film on demonstration plots to show farmers the difference (crop production response) gained when agricultural inputs were correctly and incorrectly used.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

The following section highlights lessons learned from the USAID Foreign Service National project assistant who worked with the APS project from the beginning and had extensive first-hand experience with project implementation difficulties.

USAID Project Assistant's Assessment: The APS Project had many components and the linkages between these components made project implementation extremely difficult. USAID Project management noted many conflicting responsibilities between the Directors of the various components (DA, ISRA, Seed Service) and the APS Project Directorate. It would have been better if the various project components had been financially autonomous vis-à-vis the APS head office which should have played only an overall coordinating role. Coordination could have been effected, for example, by signing an annually renewed Memorandum of Understanding with each component Director in accordance with the project workplan.

The absence of a socio-economic study in the project paper may also have been a major constraint to a good design. The Mission should have conducted a socio-economic study during the selection of a team for the project paper design. This socio-economic study would have highlighted to the Mission that the design team didn't have adequate information on the percentage of the population which consumes cereals (in this case, millet and sorghum).

In Senegal most of the population consumes rice, yet all the requests for credit funds received during this project implementation were for cereals for livestock feeding only but not for human consumption. A better design effort would have picked up apparent contradictions and this would have showed us that increasing millet or maize production may not have been the key solution which could help Senegal to be largely self-sufficient in food consumption.

On the overall need for credit, does Senegal really need a cereal credit project, or an integrated agricultural credit project which would cover livestock, cereals, vegetables and cash crops such as peanuts? It seems that cash crop production credit is required in order that farmers first solve their domestic food consumption problems. Cereal crop production cannot be increased in this country without a linkage to the cash crop production, and a credit program focused entirely upon cereal crops which are rarely marketed for cash, cannot generate income required to make loan payments. The urban population, the consumer market for local cereal production, eats millet only once or twice a week. There is thus little demand to stimulate local production and make profitable increased cereal production. It is questionable, therefore, if it is really necessary to have a cereals credit project. Would a shift from a cereals-specific focus to an integrated focus have been a better objective for this project, or be limited only in a rice credit project with an integration of other cash crop to meet farmer financial situation?

The project should have taken also into consideration the new situation of Senegalese agriculture. The New Agriculture Policy, which the project was designed to address in 1984, was totally out of date and should not have been a reference point for the development of a viable agriculture project in general and a credit project in particular.

The other point which made the project more difficult to manage, was the use of a Host Country Contract which took a year to be signed and the co-management of local currency system which created many a conflict between the Project Director and the Chief of Party. The practice of host-country contracting in Senegal should no longer be done.

The project staff sincerely tried to actively implement the credit component. The credit component was the key to all other components for if it did not move no other component could move. The main constraint was that no agriculture credit program could be developed without associating a cash crop production (such as vegetables production) into the program to generate sufficient cash to pay back the loan. No producer will accept credit focused only upon non profitable production enterprises such as millet or sorghum. Also, the restrictions on the fertilizer importation was a big handicap to decreasing the fertilizer price because the access to production credit for the purchase of fertilizer should have increased competition. SENCHIM, however, had a strict monopoly on fertilizer inputs. This situation should have been better analysed during the design stage.

Summary: Despite best efforts on the part of U.S. and GOS personnel, poor project design, particularly assumptions about agricultural credit needs and delivery systems, coupled with a cumbersome technical assistance contracting procedure, doomed this project from the start. The early termination of the project was a correct, if painful, decision which was fully warranted given the project's chances of success.

VIII. ANNEXES

SIGNIFICANT PROJECT EVENTS AND DATES

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
INITIAL PID SUBMISSION	OCTOBER 3, 1985
REVISED PID	MARCH 18, 1986
PROJECT DATA SHEET	NOVEMBER 22, 1986
PROJECT PAPER	FEBRUARY 19, 1987
PROJECT AUTHORIZATION	FEBRUARY 19, 1987
GRANT AGREEMENT SIGNATURE	FEBRUARY 23, 1987
INITIAL COMMODITY PROCUREMENT	NOVEMBER 20, 1987
REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP) & ADDENDUM	JANUARY 26, 1988
TA CONTRACT SELECTION	AUGUST 30, 1988
HOST COUNTRY CONTRACT NO 1 SIGNATURE	MARCH 21, 1989
HOST COUNTRY CONTRACT NO 2 SIGNATURE	JUNE 7, 1989
CONTRACT WITH FIDUCIARY BANK	AUGUST 26, 1988
NON FEDERAL AUDIT	APRIL 27, 1989
PROJECT EVALUATION DATE	MAY 28-JUL 6, 1990
PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT	OCTOBER 1990
RED RICE SEMINAR	NOVEMBER 1990
APS MANUAL OF ADMINISTRATION	
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL PROCEDURES	AUGUST 1990
SEED QUALITY CONTROL	
AND CERTIFICATION FINAL REPORT	DECEMBER 1990
SEED PRODUCTION	
FINAL REPORT	DECEMBER 1990
PROJECT TERMINATION DATE	DECEMBER 31, 1990

Project Inputs

a. Commodities

With Competitive Selection

Amount

- 5 sets of Household Furniture to Technical Assistance	\$ 120,000	
- 5 sets of Household Appliances for Technical Assistance Members	\$ 50,000	
- Office Equipment and Technical	\$ 50,000	
- Two years of Fertilizer Promotion	\$ 180,000	
- Computer Procurement	\$ 19,000	⚡
- Lab Equipment	\$ 202,000	.
- Vehicles	\$ 230,000	
- Motorbikes	\$ 26,000	
- Office Equipment	\$ 17,000	
- Calculators	\$ 5,000	
	<u>\$ 899,000</u>	
<b>TOTAL</b>		

**b. Technical Assistance: Sequence of Events**

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
Prequalification	March 8, 1988	Five Firms Submitted
	May 3, 1988	Two were prequalified
Invitation for BID issues	May 20, 1988	
Awarding of BID	June 9, 1988	Chemonics
Chief of Party Arrival	Dec 8, 1988	Pre-contract arrival
Seed Certification Expert	March 3, 1989	Pre-Contract
Seed Production Expert	April 9, 1989	Pre-Contract
Statistics Expert	May 9, 1989	Departed from Post after two months for Medical evacuation
Host Country Contract NO. 1 Signature	March 21, 1989	
Host Country Contract NO. 2	June 7, 1989	
TDY on Red Rice Seminar	Nov-Dec, 1990	

**c. Training Inputs**

	<u>PIO/P AMOUNT</u>	<u>LONG-TERM TRAINING</u>	<u>UNIVERSITY</u>
FAMARA MASSALY	\$ 42,000	SEED-TECHNOLOGY	MISS. STATE
JEAN PAUL CARVALHO	\$ 42,000	AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS	ARIZONA
KISMA WAGUE	\$ 42,000	SEED-TECHNOLOGY	MISS. STATE
ALASSANE BAKHOUM	42,000	SEED-TECHNOLOGY	MISS. STATE
HAROUNA SOUMARE'	\$ 42,000	AGRICULTURE-STATISTICS	IOWA STATE
	\$ 210,000		

The 5 participants were managed under the Chemonics and University of ARIZONA Sub-Contracts. New PIO/Ps were issued to shift participants from University of Arizona to OIT through the Human Resources Development Assistance as of January 1, 1991 to cover their training funds.

d. Financial Status as of December 31, 1990

<b>AUTHORIZED</b>				<b>ACCURED</b>	
<b>LOP AMOUNT</b>	<b>OBLIGATED</b>	<b>EARMARKED</b>	<b>COMMITTED</b>	<b>EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>PIPELINE</b>
<b>\$20,000,000</b>	<b>\$20,000,000</b>	<b>\$ 5,295,532</b>	<b>5,216,541</b>	<b>\$ 4,013,826</b>	<b>\$15,986,174*</b>

\* On December 19, the sum of \$14,695,000 of FY 1987, 1988 and 1989 funds was de-obligated.

e. SUMMARY OF PROJECT OUTPUTS

<b>!Logframe Target !(Including units) !</b>	<b>!Outputs Achieved !at the time of !project close-out !</b>	<b>!</b>
<b>!1. <u>Input Supply Marketing</u></b>	<b>!</b>	<b>!</b>
<b>!a) Breeder seed selection !&amp; production by ISRA meets !demand for cereal varieties !selected commercial !multiplication. ! !</b>	<b>!Recruitment of !the ISRA long-term !breeder seed !selection was !suspended based on !the APS evaluation !recommendations !</b>	<b>! ! ! ! ! ! !</b>
<b>!b) Foundation seed production !by private contract growers !&amp; certified by DPCS to meet !commercial demand. !c) Expanded private sector !supply &amp; marketing networks !established. ! !</b>	<b>!Seed legislation !proposal ! !Private sector !fertilizer !Marketing continue !to grow without !project support !Meeting w/ MDRH !input working group !</b>	<b>! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !</b>
<b>!d) Encouraged GOS-private !sector dialogue ! !</b>	<b>!</b>	<b>!</b>
<b>!2. <u>Functional revolving !credit fund model accepted !by commercial banks. ! !</u></b>	<b>!Effort suspended !based on the !evaluation !recommendations ! !</b>	<b>! ! ! ! !</b>
<b>!3. Dissemination of info. !via mas media &amp; field !demonstration to stimulate !demand for production inputs !&amp; cereals marketing services. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !</b>	<b>!-500 Technical ! manuals !-Production of a ! film for ! demonstration !-500 Technical ! Posters ! -4 ha of corn ! Field demons- ! trations ! 85 plots co- ! vering a total ! of 20 ha in ! the Fleuve ! Region ! !</b>	<b>! !</b>
<b>!4. MDRH staff capable of !timely &amp; accurate estimates !of area under cereals !cultivation, crop fields per !hectare, overall &amp; crop !Production inputs used</b>	<b>! No expert in place ! No project impact ! but Project has ! supported several ! National Statistics !</b>	<b>! ! ! ! ! ! !</b>

f. SUMMARY OF PROJECT INPUTS

! Logframe Target ! (Including units) !	! Innputs Achieved ! at the time of ! project close-out !
! Techn. assistance ! been consumed. !	! 3 out of 5 planned ! ! LT experts in place !
! Training !	! 5 long-term ! ! participants in ! ! training out of 9 ! ! planned !
! Commodities !	! All commodities ! ! planned wereprocured !
! Project Administration !	! All staff in place !
! Credit funds/mgt !	! None !
! Media Campaign !	! Promotion of Ag. ! ! Input !
! Contingency/Eval. !	! Done !

Drafter: ADO:DDiop:fb D. Diop Date 5/17/91  
Clear: ADO:DDelgado draft Date 4/2/91  
PDO:TMyers Subs Date 5/15/91  
PRM:SCissé [Signature] Date 5/17/91  
DDIR:GNelson [Signature] Date 5/23/91  
DIR:JEColes \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

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