


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# EVALUATION



**PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM**  
520-11-710-077

**USAID  
GUATEMALA  
December 1971**

Group 1 - Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

**OFFICE of PUBLIC SAFETY  
Agency for International Development  
Department of State Washington, D.C.**

# **EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM USAID - GUATEMALA**

**DECEMBER 1971**

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S. Morey Bell, AID/ARA**

**GROUP 2 - Downgrade at 3 year  
intervals; declassified after 12  
years.**

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## INTRODUCTION

On September 21, 1971, a hearing was held before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, chaired by Congressman Dante Fascell, during which U.S. assistance to the Guatemalan Police was discussed. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Hurwitsch, the principal witness, commented that the Department was looking for ways in which to reduce the U.S. involvement with assistance to these forces (Annex A). To facilitate decisions as to the exact nature and extent of assistance that the U.S. should provide to the Guatemalan police in the furtherance of U.S. interests in Guatemala, the Department and A.I.D., including A.I.D.'s Office of Public Safety, prepared to conduct a professional evaluation of the Public Safety project in the field.

The evaluation started on November 21 and continued through December 1. The terms of reference for the study, concurred in by the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, were as follows:

- A. Purpose of study is to (1) review objectives of Public Safety program since inception, analyze performance and determine successes and short-falls, and (2) determine what remains to be done in light of U.S. interests in order recommend plan of sequential steps toward definite phase-out date.
- B. To make this assessment, the study will embrace:
  1. Examination of objectives of Public Safety program since inception and progress toward these objectives including: (a) performance of U.S.A.I.D. in project planning and implementation, and (b) performance of GOG in meeting its commitments and undertakings (given major assumptions made in PROP) necessary to success of joint program.

2. Analysis of major deficiencies in abilities of civil police elements which still remain since program initiated including reasons therefore.
3. Analysis of relationship of levels and kinds of future U.S. Public Safety assistance to U.S. political, economic and security interests as documented by the Ambassador and Country Team together with analysis of extent to which U.S. Public Safety objectives are shared by GOG leadership.
4. Based on conclusions (1), (2), and (3) above, preparation of plan to form basis of revised PROP showing specific year-by-year progression of project to phase out together with plan for increased assumption of project costs by GOG.

The Evaluation Team was composed of Mr. Lauren J. Goin, Chief, Operations Division of the Office of Public Safety and Mr. S. Morey Bell, Deputy Director, Office of Central American Affairs, ARA, Department of State. The Team received valuable guidance in the conduct of the study from Ambassador William Bowdler; consulted with various members of the Country Team; held conversations with some members of Guatemalan society; discussed subjects of mutual interest with the Minister of Government, the Director General of the National Police and the Director of the Treasury Police and members of their staffs; and held extensive discussions with Mr. Herbert Hardin, Chief Public Safety Advisor, and members of his staff.

While the Team has drawn extensively on observations and comments made to it by members of the U.S. family, for which the Team is grateful, the conclusions and observations given herein are those of the Team.

Attention is invited to an evaluation of the Public Safety program conducted in 1964, "Report of the Evaluation of the Public Safety Division, USAID, Guatemala", November 1964, Lauren J. Goin and Theodore Brown, Office of Public Safety. For the most part, the current report will not deal with the earlier years of the project covered by the Goin-Brown study.

Readers may also wish to read a report of the Inspector General's Office in memorandum form from Inspectors William T. Briggs, Edward Markey and Bruce Clark to Mr. Anthony Faunce, dated October 8, 1971.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Of the fourteen-year life span of the Public Safety program in Guatemala, the police forces have existed at a bare subsistence level for ten, in terms of both financing and motivation. It is not surprising, then, that the program did not make great gains. But, along with the Arana Administration in July of 1970 came a governmental commitment to improve the police. The United States responded with a "Rapid Police Development Program".

The Evaluation Team's judgment is that the "rapid development" has proceeded to a level such that we may now turn to a "Police Self-Sufficiency Program".

The specifics of it we outline elsewhere. Mostly it centers around construction and operation of a Police Academy to be completed in August 1973 (if not, as the Ambassador hopes, before). We propose that our Advisors give the highest priority to getting the Guatemalans ready to operate this facility with effectiveness the day they move into it--in terms of administering it, training recruits and other police, and maintaining vehicles and communications. In the interim, we will support a temporary academy which the government agreed to operate as of January, 1972.

There are other aspects to assisting in the self-sufficiency process, however. We wish to help the police patrols and investigators become more effective--by improving the records system; by drawing up and funding a vehicle replacement plan; by establishing a Planning-Research Unit to undertake basic reforms in the police structure, including reorganization; by creating a true police force for the rural areas; and by retraining of riot control units in the capital city.

In executing such a program, the Team believes, the United States must carefully tailor its inputs. Chiefly that means getting the Guatemalans not only ready to do things entirely on their own, but also doing them before the program is concluded in FY-75. And that implies a progressive reduction in both our commodity support and our technical assistance in the remainder of FY-72 and through FY-74. Our training of police, largely at the International Police Academy in

Washington, should continue throughout that period at roughly the same level as now holds. Specific plans for reduction of U.S. commodity and technicians resource inputs are discussed elsewhere. To assure that they are implemented properly, and to gauge the Guatemalans' progress toward self-sufficiency, we are proposing another evaluation of the Public Safety program at the time the academy is opened.

While the Team recognizes it is essential that the police have adequate and reliable weapons of the right type in order to protect themselves, we believe that such equipment had best be procured by the Guatemalan Government. We are so proposing in this evaluation. We are also proposing that the Advisors promptly arrange to professionalize a cadre of instructors for firearms training so that our Advisors may exit from that activity--an activity badly needed, we should add, in that the Minister of Government reports there are today a significant number of Guatemalan policemen who have either never fired a gun or, at least, fired it no more than once a year. A lack of sufficient ammunition is the cause.

Specifically, the Team recommends:

1. That the United States Government, through a Project Agreement, provide an increasingly lesser share of funds for the procurement of commodities needed by the civil security forces.
2. That present activities to modernize the police weaponry be continued, involving the procurement by the GOG of 2,000 revolvers to replace obsolete and unreliable police weapons.
3. That a Planning and Research Unit be established in the National Police.
4. That a study of the compatibility of the National Police, Treasury Police and Mobile Military Police radios in the rural areas be undertaken to determine how to insure that a compatibility can be guaranteed.

5. That a detailed action plan be prepared for the development of the institutional element of the police responsible for vehicle maintenance--and well in advance of the time when a vehicle maintenance facility exists as a part of the new police Academy.
6. That the Guatemalan Government be urged to establish a firm vehicle replacement program beginning with its FY-1973 budget.
7. That the Country Team encourage the GOG to accord the Treasury Police the responsibility for providing daily law and order services in rural areas.
8. That a detailed action plan be prepared for developing the communications maintenance institutional element in preparation for the new facility to be built in conjunction with the new Academy.
9. That advisory assistance be provided for the development of a seminar for patrol commanders to improve the overall performance of the urban patrol force.
10. That an immediate refresher training program be undertaken in the capital city for riot control.

The U.S. resource implications of these proposals are reflected in the following table.

PROGRAM RESOURCE NEEDS, FY 1972-75

	FY-72	FY-73	FY-74	FY-75
Technicians	221 (7)	176 (5.3)	112 (3.5)	32 (1)
Local Hire	30 (4)	50 (4)	50 (4)	25 (2)
Participants	89 (30)	100 (35)	84 (30)	47 (15)
Commodities	60	200*	100	-
Other Costs	7	15	10	6
	407	541	356	110

\*See discussion regarding commodities, page 101

## PART I

### U.S. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN GUATEMALA

In accord with the Terms of Reference, the Country Team prepared a statement of these interests which is given on the following pages. For ease of reference, the Evaluation Team prepared a simple synthesis of that statement. It is as follows:

- By virtue of geography, Guatemala is important to our security. It follows that our basic interest is a security one: retention of Guatemala in our camp.
- Retaining Guatemala in our camp is best accomplished by assuring its political stability.
- Assuring that stability is best accomplished by providing the Guatemalan people with:
  - increasing participation in a free political process, and
  - increasing access to the country's economic wealth.
- It follows that our primary effort must be to assist in providing those benefits, through
  - discreet support of adherence to free political processes, and
  - active support of socio-economic reform and development.
- But the provision of those benefits has been constrained by extremism, largely of the Left.

- Thus our secondary effort must be to assist in removing the constraint.
- In so assisting, we have two purposes:
  - retain our influence in the security establishment, the position of which is preeminent in Guatemalan life, and
  - help the security forces become fully capable of coping with the extremist threat.
- That threat is not now significant. Yet the potential for a resurgence of it exists. Thus, it constitutes some constraint on providing the benefits for the people which lead to political stability and, hence, to the retention of Guatemala in our camp.
- Thus far, the actions of the present Government have been consistent with our purpose of helping the security forces, notably the police, become capable of coping with the threat--or, better said, the potential for its resurgence.
- They have been so consistent, indeed, as to create a rare opportunity for us--an opportunity to press for swift development of the Guatemalans' own capability for coping and, it follows, an opportunity for us to reduce the high level of advisory and commodity support furnished to the police in recent times.
- Primarily we must press for completion of the Police Academy. That institution, with its facilities for training and for repair and maintenance of vehicles and communications, will make the Guatemalans capable of coping with the foreseeable level of the threat. It will also justify a progressive reduction of our assistance.

All evidence available to the Team has led it to concur in the Country Team's expression of the United States' interests in Guatemala.

Yet there is another way to express how those interests may be served: relating the role of the police in this society to the free and peaceful changes we seek therein.

The police are responsible for guaranteeing that measure of internal stability which is essential for the orderly progress of economic and social and political gains. Central to attaining that measure of internal security, in our view, is a professional police institution that can respond to the changing needs for police services as society advances in technological age. Such an institution is able to proceed with its own development momentum without the need for help from foreign governments. If the institution is not firmly established and populated with trained manpower, experience has shown, regression to older ways will occur, and the capability for professional growth will gradually diminish until it is gone.

THE COUNTRY TEAM STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL  
INTERESTS IN GUATEMALA

Guatemala and the other four isthmian countries by virtue of their geographic position in relation to the Caribbean are important to the security of the United States. The basic United States interest in Guatemala is hence a security one: i.e., in assuring that Guatemala remains friendly and cooperative or, conversely, that is not hostile and will not permit its territory to be used as a base for direct or indirect aggression against its neighbors or the United States.

A friendly and cooperative Guatemala is best assured by continued political stability. Such stability in the long run is best achieved by governments which respect constitutional norms, practice democratic procedures and actively promote fundamental reforms in the economic and social structure of the country combined with far-reaching development programs. Only by providing the people with an ever-increasing measure of participation in the political process and in the economic wealth of the country will Guatemala remove the underlying causes of instability.

The process of peaceful change in Guatemala is strongly opposed by elements of the extreme right as well as the extreme left. In dealing with this opposition, which includes violent action, the Government has been more successful in checking the actions of the right, with which it is at least partially allied, through threats and persuasion. The same does not hold true for the extreme left, whose activities have had to be countered with direct police and military action. The Government must, therefore, continue to develop its capabilities to maintain internal security against these elements, as well as against an unusually high level of common criminality, not entirely divorced from the extremism of both right and left.

The main thrust of the United States effort in Guatemala is to assist the government in achieving continued stability by: (a) discreetly supporting adherence to the norms and procedures established in its Constitution, and (b) encouraging a deeper commitment to economic and social reform and development. Progress will admittedly be slow given the present strength of elements opposed to basic change. But as long as the Government shows a willingness and the ability to pursue these two objectives, we should continue our support.

United States assistance to the security forces (armed force and police) finds its justification exclusively as a supplement to United States efforts in the political, economic and social fields. It should be designed to achieve two purposes:

- A. to assist the armed force and police to achieve as rapidly as possible internal security capabilities sufficient to deal with the threat posed by the violent opposition.
- B. to enable the United States to maintain influence in the military establishment which occupies such an important position within the political structure of Guatemala.

The guerrilla movement has been active in Guatemala for the past ten years. It is both urban and rural based, with the concentration of activities moving from one front to the other depending on the pressure applied by the government security forces. The movement peaked around 1966 with a considerable measure of success in rural areas, especially Izabal and Zacapa Departments. A hard-hitting government campaign forced them to shift forces to urban areas which has been the focal point of their operations for the past three years. Pressure by the Arana Government during the past twelve months has seemingly persuaded the guerrillas to move back to the rural front, largely in the Peten. The experience of the Government in combatting insurgency has demonstrated its capacity -- the army in rural areas and the police in the cities -- to deal effectively with this threat. While the guerrillas have not been eliminated, they have been weakened and prevented from consolidating their position. They do not constitute an immediate threat to the Government.

The United States has been conducting a public safety program in Guatemala since 1958. During this period considerable progress, although slow and sporadic, has been made in consolidating separate and often competing law enforcement agencies and improving the capabilities of the police force. This has been particularly true since the present Administration came to power. The support given by the Arana Government to greater unification and professionalization of the police coupled with additional financing, provides the opportunity for the United States to press for rapid development of capabilities to become self-sufficient in training, communications and transport, thereby enabling the United States to reduce the high level of advisory and commodity assistance it has been furnishing in recent years.

The focal point of this effort should be the Police Academy staffed by Guatemalans which is scheduled to open in temporary quarters in late January 1972 and to move into permanent headquarters by the following year. Establishment of this center, which in addition to training facilities will also include vehicle maintenance and communications shops, will give the Guatemalan Government the means to meet its police training requirements commensurate with the foreseeable level of the subversive threat and will justify a progressive reduction in the level of United States assistance.

## PART II

### THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS

There is a temptation to persist in speaking of a grave threat to Guatemala's internal security and, accordingly, to American interests there.

The temptation derives from an appreciation of that country's history: one grave threat after another, most fulfilled. It derives from an appreciation of this society: for much of the non-Indian population, violence is routine. It derives from an appreciation of the special problem for North Americans: one Ambassador and two Army officers assassinated, one Attaché kidnaped, two or more A.I.D. officers seized and held for hours--all at the hands of Leftist insurgents who continue still to menace our personnel. Finally, it derives from a recollection that not so many months ago, the rate of assassinations, kidnappings, robberies and bombings in urban Guatemala was such as to threaten the stability of the society.

Yet it is important to resist the temptation.

At this writing, the threat to internal security is far from grave. Some observers--Guatemalan and American--characterize it as negligible. The Minister of Government, in talking with the Team, said "There is really very little problem of Leftist insurgency in Guatemala these days, urban or rural." The President of the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, talking with one Team member: "Insurgency? Finished, done with. Now and then a kidnapping, or a robbery, or the settlement of an old score. Less, probably, than you have in Rhode Island."

Observers in the Embassy conclude that the degree of threat posed in recent years by the urban terrorists, and in earlier years by the rural guerrillas in the Izabal and Zacapa regions, has diminished to the point that the Government can turn to other concerns. Yet they note that while the FAR leadership has been hard hit, and the "middle group" of the PGT/FAR arrested or killed by the Government, both retain a capability for isolated acts of terror. Presumably, these groups will attempt to recuperate, perhaps drawing on persons trained in

the Soviet Union and Cuba, and there is no indication that their strategy--ultimately to cause the overthrow of the Government--will alter.

Perhaps it is well to place in some perspective the overall "threat state", as the Team views it.

First, some history. On assuming office in July of 1970, the Right-of-Center Administration of General Carlos Arana sought simultaneously to pacify the country, by obliterating the Leftist insurgency of the two "Rebel Armed Forces" groups, and to improve the desperately poor quality of rural Guatemalan life, by executing a massive 5-year "National Agricultural Development Plan." But, by November of that year terrorism in the capital had reached intolerable proportions, although it was not judged to have represented a direct threat to governmental stability. It had so demoralized the middle-to-high income classes, however, that the Government feared disintegration of the society. What appeared to be a sharp rise in common criminality and delinquency, attributed to unemployed migrants from rural areas, accentuated that fear. Thereupon the Government imposed a state of seige.

Using its security forces to the hilt, and not pre-occupying itself excessively with the niceties of law nor discriminating too finely as between Leftists, the Government slowly killed off rebel leaders and troops and seized rebel weapons, funds and equipment. By July of 1971, Arana could announce that his Government had "broken the back" of urban insurgency. By late November he was confident enough of his gains in this regard to be able to lift the state of seige and declare amnesty for political prisoners.

Thereupon it was expected that the FAR and/or the PGT/FAR would have to make some showing in the following months to maintain their credibility with disaffected elements of society. Urban riots, bombings, kidnappings (probably for money) and killing of policemen were expected to continue to be their style.

As of late January, that showing had not materialized clearly. Those of the rebels who escaped the Government's campaign have either fled into the rural areas, including the wilderness of the Peten area, or are lying very low indeed

in the capital. As the Vice President of the Guatemalan Agricultural Association explained, "The fear of the rebels in the city is just about gone."

As for those in the countryside, they have constituted themselves into five or six bands, apparently isolated from each other, on the run from the Army, unsupported by the populace, probably low on funds and weapons and medicines. Yet they are not impotent. Recently a band ambushed and destroyed an Army patrol.

There is some belief that the bands in the Peten are largely criminally motivated, but the Army believes that practically all the elements of the FAR are now in that region. It has dealt with the problem mainly through its Mobile Military Police (PMA) although at this writing it has put regular Army resources, including intelligence collection, to work on it.

In any case, no one believes the rural insurgency is such that the Government cannot handle it with ease. As the Government Minister explained to the Team, "They are not even much of a nuisance."

With respect to other possible sources of a threat to internal security in Guatemala the Team has collected these views:

The Communist Party. It is well organized but small (500 members, 1,000 sympathizers, reportedly), and dedicated to coexistence and the long-run victory of Marxism. The Party as such is at its lowest ebb ever, according to the Embassy's Political Officers.

Labor Unions. There is no tradition of significant labor violence in Guatemala; no illustrations of violent action in recent years; no evidence that either organized or unorganized labor might depart from what has been a pattern of quiescence--despite the fact of considerable Communist infiltration in the railroad and other unions.

Left-of-Center Political Activism. Neither the primary opposition party (PR-Revolutionary Party) nor the Christian Democrats, appear to be coup-minded. The revolution they propose is almost certain to be peaceful. It is notable that Arana has begun an informal dialogue with opposition groups -- a technique which should do much to calm any troubled waters.

Social Discontent. To say that there is massive unemployment in Guatemala, and that the unemployed are deeply discontented, would be a triumph of pessimism over proof, of which there is none. About all that can be said is that most of the poor, the unemployed and underemployed in this country are Indian in direct or indirect origin, and the Indians are distinctly non-violent and not political activists.

Common Criminality. The judgment of the police officers, Embassy officers and private Guatemalans and Americans with whom the Team has talked is that the level of criminality is high, but probably not at a point that represents a serious threat to the economic well being of the country....in other words there are no indications of a flight of capital due to this factor. One of the problems in quantitatively assessing this factor is the lack of pertinent crime incident records and statistics.

Castroism. There are reports, unconfirmed but persistent, that Cuba has participated in Guatemala's insurgency by means of a relatively minor degree of funding and weaponry, some in-country advisors, and training for FAR members in Cuba itself. The reports indicate that such participation, if it exists, may be declining. In any case, there are no reports of Castroist activity in the country apart from activity with the rebels.

Turning now to the potential for threat resurgence, the Team has these views:

- A. It is possible that, if the remnants of the rebels in the cities are able to mount enough kidnapping and robbery operations, they could obtain sufficient funds to recuperate in terms of weapons and recruits over time.
- B. It is still possible, writing in late January, that the rebels will use all the resources remaining to them to commit disruptive acts following the lifting of the state of seige, in an effort to embarrass the Government. They might well attempt to stimulate University students, with whom their contact has been considerable in the past, into violent actions with the same objective. They might also attempt to destroy the calm with which the March, 1972 municipal elections are now expected to be conducted.
- C. It is possible that the isolated bands of rural rebels could come together in some degree, and constitute a force in one locale reminiscent of the rebel force in the years of high rural insurgency, notably 1966.
- D. It is possible, but not at all likely, that the extra-legal activities of Rightist groups--quasi-vigilantes in the plantation areas, the congressional bodyguards, the thugs attached to some provincial chieftains, and some elements of the security establishment itself--might reach a magnitude such as to disturb domestic tranquility. In this connection, we understand that Arana, having reduced the insurgency to a level he considers tolerable, is now moving the security forces into a campaign against "common criminal" elements inside the Government as well as outside it. In such a campaign, extra-legal methods might conceivably be applied.

- E. It is possible the Arana Government will begin maneuvering, in the coming months, for its continuation in power beyond July 1, 1974. The Government could contemplate a constitutional amendment permitting presidents to succeed themselves, thereby permitting Arana to participate in the March, 1974 elections; or it could contemplate putting forward a patently puppet candidate for those elections; or it could contemplate a palace coup. Since there are many sectors of Guatemalan society, particularly in the capital and other urban areas, who would likely oppose such maneuvering vigorously, we should not rule out anti-governmental actions in the 1972-March 1974 period which would be destabilizing to the society.

These possibilities, some more distinct than others, make for a "threat potential" difficult to define, more difficult to measure, and more difficult still to relate to American policy formulation. Perhaps the most we can say is that, in the aggregate, and when they are coupled with the natural bent toward violent action of the non-Indian society, they constitute some measure of menace to orderly political activity, to the exercise of constitutional government, and to the prospect for success of socio-economic development.

We view the menace as being of a magnitude sufficient to warrant continuation of the efforts at improving the professional character and effectiveness of the police forces.

## PART III

### OBSERVATION AND CONCLUSION

Assistance to the Guatemalan police is at least a provocative subject among some of those Americans attentive to our relationships in Latin America. Provocative in two senses:

- From its inception in 1957 through roughly July, 1970, the program had accomplished little. That being so, why should we continue with a program which, in terms of American technicians and commodities supplied, is one of the largest in this hemisphere? Is there any real proof, to warrant such a continuation, that the program has accomplished anything since July of 1970, and will accomplish anything in the future?
- In its campaign to obliterate the Leftist insurgency, initiated shortly after it took office in July of 1970, the Government has engaged in some repressive action against legitimate left-of-center individuals, and has condoned other repressive action by private extremist groups. By assisting the police, we identify ourselves with the repression, perhaps even contribute indirectly to it, and the American public will not stand for that.

These contentions, and others that follow from them, commanded the Team's constant attention during its sojourn in Guatemala. Our analysis and findings follow.

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That the Public Safety program did not make great gains in Guatemala for the first 13 1/2 years of its existence is indisputable. To be sure, some specific objectives were accomplished. But many could not be, nor could the overall objective of moving the police forces into a state approximating self-sufficiency.

Throughout those years, the program was subject to spasms from three causes. Perhaps the most injurious was the on-again-off-again attitude of successive Guatemalan Governments. As we document elsewhere, one Government built up the security forces, another tried virtually to dismantle them, a third sought to build them up modestly, a fourth allowed them to lapse into desuetude, and so on. At times, accordingly, our Advisors found that the police forces has resources and motivation with which to implement the Advisor's counsel. But the successes of the program were largely undone at other times.

A second cause has been the incessant change in the command structure of the police. In the tenure of the present Chief Public Safety Advisor, for example, there have been four different Chiefs of Police, each with his own lieutenants, and each of those with their's. Some of these, over the years, have been good men, but most have not. In any case, the changes themselves, and the changing attitudes which accompanied them, did much to preclude the police forces from absorbing the American technical assistance.

To these two phenomena, the United States reacted: we built up our Public Safety program in terms of men and money, then reduced it, then built it up again, and so on, to correspond to what there was to work with in Guatemala. These shifts did little for continuity and regularity of programming and, hence, for accomplishing objectives.

The third cause of the lack of accomplishment has been the absence from the program of regular supplies of commodity inputs--times of famine followed times of plenty. For differing reasons, the Guatemalans occasionally received large chunks of weapons and equipment, and it was difficult for them to absorb the chunks readily. Indeed, some equipment from the 1967-68 deliveries remains in the Advisors' hands still because of Guatemalan unreadiness to use it properly. And such deliveries were often succeeded by periods in which the Guatemalans received little or nothing, again for differing reasons.

Apart from the foregoing, there was another reason why the Public Safety program did not make the progress hoped for. Even during periods when the police forces were being built up, the process was only relative. The Guatemalans have never put great amounts of funds and other resources at the

disposal of the police. Traditionally, the Army has always been loath to permit a significant rise in police effectiveness, chiefly because it has not wanted a competing force in the security field. And the politicians have tended to reflect, in their resource allocations, the heretofore basic antipathy of the Guatemalan populace to the police. In any case, the Team would note that successive United States Ambassadors and Country Teams have determined how far they could go, for reasons of overall policy, in pressing the Guatemalans for allocations of greater resources to the police. In the absence of significant resource allocations by the host country, the efforts of the Public Safety Advisors have been notably hampered.

Fortunately the past is not always prologue. With the advent in July, 1970, of the Arana Administration, the program began moving forward. That is because Arana and his Government Minister have committed themselves to improving the police forces, and because the commitment has taken the form of inputs of material resources and psychological encouragement in a magnitude such as those forces have not enjoyed in the thirteen-year life span of the program.

Initially the commitment derived from Arana's need for a police force capable of coping with the urban insurgency. Yet when that insurgency, or at least the urban portion of it, reached the point of being pretty much under control in, say, November of 1971, the Government's commitment to the police was not relaxed. For then Arana initiated a campaign against common criminality--inside the Government as well as outside it. Recently he reiterated to our Ambassador his intent to move against criminal elements of rightist as well as all other persuasions. In this campaign the police forces are of course the primary tool and they are continuing to benefit from governmental efforts to upgrade them.

More specifically, Arana has taken decisions--each implying modest increases in funding over previous levels--to unify the disparate elements of the police establishment for the sake of economy and efficiency; to professionalize them with fairly intensive training; and to equip them properly. (In each of these areas, the funding increases could be greater still, the Government Minister explained to the Team, were it not for Arana's hesitancy in diverting funds from his socio-economic development program, a diversion unwise in itself and unwise also in the sense that left-of-center elements would

charge Arana with having diverted funds from development uses to repressive uses). These decisions are documented specifically elsewhere in this evaluation. But we would point out here a prime illustration: using extra-budgetary funds, in late November the Government Minister purchased commodities needed by the police, for a total amount (in US FY-72) exceeding the American commodity input.

It would be too much to hope that the Guatemalan police will be transformed overnight by the Arana Administration. The funding increases will continue to be modest; there will continue to be deleterious personnel changes dictated by politics and personality clashes; and all things in Guatemala move slowly. What can be hoped for is a gradual consolidation of gains already achieved, over the remaining two years of the Arana Administration. That is to say that, at Arana's initiative, the police have already been improved to the point where they were able effectively to frustrate urban terror. And that is saying a good deal when one reviews police ineffectiveness against insurgency in the pre-July 1970 period. That effectiveness derived primarily from the timely infusion of U.S.-supplied vehicles and radios for use in patrolling the capital, and the "quick study" the Guatemalans did at becoming adept in using such equipment. Now, with Arana's decision to press forward with building and equipping the Police Academy, we would expect slow but steady refinement, over time, of the improvement already noted. Moreover, additional improvement can be expected to occur as the police seek the technical expertise of our advisors in the course of the anti-crime campaign. In short, the signs are good.

They are good enough, in the Team's view, to warrant a continuation of U.S. assistance for a few more years. In this connection we share the Country Team's view:

"The support given by the Arana Government to greater unification and professionalism of the police, coupled with additional financing, provides the opportunity for the United States to press for rapid development of capabilities to become self-sufficient in training, communications and transport, thereby enabling the United States to reduce the high level of advisory and commodity assistance it has been furnishing in recent years."

This self-sufficiency--one in terms of contemporary Guatemalan, not American, realities--is a condition precedent to being reasonably assured that our interests in Guatemala can be protected. We have, of course, the potential for a resurgence of the internal security threat in mind. (We should add that, while the menace to the well-being of official Americans in Guatemala at insurgent hands has not formed a formal element in our considerations, the Team has never been able to forget that everything we do to help improve the police forces has the effect of reducing that menace.)

Those who have interested themselves in the Public Safety effort in Guatemala will recall that we have heretofore been executing a "Rapid Police Development Program". The Team believes that the "rapid development" has proceeded to a level such that we may now turn to a "Police Self-Sufficiency Program"--one intended quickly to complete the developmental process over the next three years.

As previously mentioned, during its sojourn in Guatemala the Team had constantly in mind the contention that the United States should not participate longer in improving the Guatemalan police forces, on the grounds that they have been in some measure repressive and that the United States cannot risk being identified with such repression. To that contention and associated ones, we now turn.

There is no question but that in the course of the campaign against the leftist terrorists, counter-terror occurred, some at the hands of government security forces, some at the hands of private extremists linked to the government. For a time, prominent personages were victims, but for a variety of reasons that phase ended, and there remained a phase of counter-terror against leftist students, minor politicians and the like. That phase, too, seems now to have all but ended. To be sure, killings continue in Guatemala, but these are settlements of disputes in the traditional way.

There is also no question, however, but that the United States was not identified, directly or indirectly, with the repression.

In our extensive conversations with private Guatemalans, and with private Americans who are resident in the

country and reasonably keen observers, the Team discovered no evidence of identification. Three leading Guatemalan businessmen to whom one Team member talked had never heard of the Public Safety program. A fourth had heard of it, vaguely, but believed it to be a civic action undertaking. A fifth believed it to be an INTERPOL project. The most renowned economist in the country, high in the councils of the preceding Government and rather bitterly opposed to the present one, said, "The project has had a 'low profile'. We do not think of you in connection with it--and we believe it is a needed program".

In its investigations, the Team found that the Public Safety project has escaped the attention of the Guatemalan press; that our Advisors refrain from attending police ceremonies and from public entertaining of police officials, and in other ways conduct unobtrusive lives; and that the one Advisor who erred in the matter of identification is no longer employed by the Office of Public Safety.

Indeed, in its investigations, the Team encountered only two references to allegations of that identification. One involved a discussion between a leader of the Christian Democrats and a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the other a discussion between a U.S. official and a former Foreign Minister of Guatemala.

A related contention is that our police assistance program has enhanced the ability of the security forces to engage in repressive acts. Of that, again, we found no evidence. Proof in such a case is naturally hard to come by. We would, however, cite the fact that the weaponry we have provided the police has been in the form of .38 calibre pistols, carbines and shotguns, and that neither a .38 calibre slug, a carbine projectile, nor shotgun pellets have been found during autopsy in the body of a person who might conceivably have been the victim of repression.

Naturally there will always be a possibility, over which the U.S. has no control, that some U.S.-provided equipment or training could in some fashion become connected with the more unprofessional police operations.

Then there is the contention related to the foregoing ones, that our Advisors engage, willingly or not, in actual police operations, some of them "repressive". Once again,

no evidence. The advisor mentioned earlier was sent home because he appeared to the Chief Advisor to be on the borderline between advising and operation. Our advisors work closely with counterpart officers in the development of supervisory, planning, and management skills. In such work they discuss the use of police manpower to effect the best use of resources. They do not engage in police operations and are precluded from doing so by a long-standing policy of the Office of Public Safety and regularly enforced by direct instructions from the U.S.A.I.D. Director and the Ambassador.

The Team believes, then, that the writings in the American press, to the effect that Guatemalan repression and the American Public Safety program have been closely linked, have been an exercise in journalistic imagination. That sort of journalism has naturally attracted the attention of elements of the Congress concerned with Latin-U.S. relations, and the imagined linkage has grown. But there is no evidence.

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More than A.I.D. programs generally, the Public Safety programs in particular, seem to invite attack in the United States. But much of the unfavorable commentary is based on hearsay, as we have noted above with respect to the "identification" contention.

One of the comments is that our assistance over the past 13 years has become a narcotic to which the police forces and, more generally, the governments have become addicted. But there are fair pieces of evidence that our advisors resist the development of this dependency. In April of 1970, a new young and top-notch Chief of Police went to our advisors and asked that they virtually take over the whole police show; that they demonstrate to him what to do and how. At the not inconsiderable risk of offending a high official of the then Government, our advisors declined. Then there is the evidence provided by the conversations we have held with police and Government officials: clearly they have their own fundamental ways, and adhere to them despite our advice. For one example, they buy pistols which we tell them are obsolete and dangerous and may well not fire, because those pistols are cheap and they would prefer that a foot patrolman be seen carrying a gun which may not fire rather than no gun at all. The logic is faulty, but not to a Guatemalan.

Another comment is that our advisors are urging the Guatemalans into technology, both in terms of commodities and training, years beyond their mental sophistication and physical capacity to handle. One has only to inspect the crime laboratory, the fingerprint section or the communications maintenance shop, to witness roll call procedure, to walk through urban and rural police stations, to examine police vehicles and weapons, in order to rest assured that what we are doing is what was done in the U.S. many years ago, and is fully within the Guatemalan's grasp. For example, the patrol vehicles we have provided are pick-up trucks around the bed of which wire has been placed to form a cage, and are less sophisticated than what rural American dogcatchers use. The crime laboratory equipment is rudimentary, the police records system unautomated.

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Finally, the Team wishes to comment on several other aspects of the security situation in Guatemala of great importance - but aspects with which the United States cannot assist or at best to a minimal degree at the present time: the courts, the "personal bodyguards", and the Corps of Detectives.

It is widely recognized that the Guatemalan courts are hopeless in their capability of dealing with subversives. In talking on this point, Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Hurwitch, in testifying before the Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 21, referred to the official Guatemalan perspective of the courts, saying that "they have seen that the Guatemalan judicial system cannot be relied upon to bring FAR terrorist to justice". On one occasion recently a terrorist was arrested by the police and had in his possession a machine gun believed to be the one that killed Ambassador Mien. The terrorist was brought before the court and the FAR threatened to kill the judge should the terrorist be convicted. The judge made it known that he would not be intimidated and was murdered. The picture of his body, which was produced in the press, was sent to the judge's successor as a clear indication of what he might expect should the terrorist be convicted. He was set free.

It does not take much imagination to view this kind of problem from the perspective of the government. It is trying to suppress subversive violence and sees the option of using violence itself as an attractive one. As long as the present situation exists, the possibility of getting the government to use only the constitutional methods in dealing with violent activist is lessened. It is not known how much influence Americans would have on the Guatemalan Government to try and grapple with this problem. Indeed, there is little that the U.S. can do in assisting them should they wish to deal with it. In discussing the subject with the U.S.A.I.D. Mission Director, he was less pessimistic and believed that the problem should be dealt with head-on, with some possibility of the U.S. providing expertise to the Guatemalan Government. Such a course of action might have success providing only that the Guatemalan Government sincerely believed that it wished to make adequate reforms.

The proliferation of bodyguards by private individuals, industrial firms and fincas, banks and members of the Congress, contributes to the problem rather than provides a means to solve it. At the present time, the National Police, while theoretically having control over who is hired for such positions, actually exercises little or no control over whether who is hired or over their capability to handle firearms. Most of the people hired are former military personnel who have had some training in the use of firearms. However, a principal problem as expressed to the Team by the Chief of Detective Corps was that of dealing with the guards in the use of their weapons in an unauthorized manner.

As mentioned elsewhere, the Team was unable to determine the degree of the effectiveness of the Detective Corps. Their responsibility for the collection and analysis of information and its storage and retrieval regarding subversive elements in the country is a key one. This is a potential chink in the armor of the government's ability to deal effectively with subversive elements. The National Police can function only as a preventive force, but the Detective Corps must take on the conventional burden for criminal intelligence, including that relating to subversives.

At the present time, the Public Safety program does not make contact with the Detective Corps except most indirectly. It is conceivable that at some time in the future opportunities will be presented wherein technical assistance can be provided in assuring that the effectiveness of the individual member of the Detective Corps is upgraded. It is planned at the present time that some training courses will be established and incorporated in the training provided in the new Police Academy.

## PART IV

### GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES

At the present time there are two civilian security forces under the Minister of Government and the military forces, including the Mobile Military Police (Policia Militar Ambulantes) under the Ministry of Defense. (Figure 1). These forces are discussed in varying detail below. Additionally, municipalities maintain police personnel whose function it is to enforce city ordinances, such as weights and measures, sanitation, and the like. Fire protection is also the responsibility of the municipalities and is supported by voluntary contributions.

As mentioned elsewhere, other groups exist in a quasi-legal state who are armed and represent factors, which in many cases contribute to disorder and violence. These are private guards hired by individuals, the most notable being those hired by Deputies in the Congress and those hired by business institutions, farmers with large holdings, and banks. In many cases, these personnel have received little or no training in the use of firearms they carry. The Director General of the National Police is required to maintain some control in the selection process, but is generally ineffective in this regard as far as the congressional guards are concerned. No training in the use of firearms is provided to the private guards.

There is no gun control law for the country and many of the citizens carry arms or have them in their automobiles. In spite of the violent history of the Guatemalan society over the past ten years, there has been only spasmodic vigilante activity.

#### The National Police

The role of the National Police is the protection of life and property, the preservation of peace and order and the enforcement of laws and regulations. It is essentially a preventive police force with its members assigned to populated areas. The National Police organization now includes a "Detective Corps", formed after the transfer of the Judicial Police to the National Police in December, 1970.

# ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY FORCES




Figure 1

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The authorized strength of the National Police is 5,569 as shown in Figure 1. The actual strength is reported to be 4,888, less the detectives. In conversations with the Minister of Government, the latter told the Team that he intended to add two hundred personnel for urban patrol in the capital city and that he had the necessary funds from the CY-1971 budget to bring on the first one hundred.

The organization of the National Police is given in Figure 2. The Director General plans, at the suggestion of the Public Safety Advisors, to reorganize the force and to streamline its administrative procedures and modernize supervisory methods thereby. This move will be in the general direction of establishing three major and subordinate elements under his command comprised of one each for operations, administration, and technical support functions.

At the present time, the effectiveness of the force can be said to be fair by Guatemalan standards and greatly improved in the past two years. Administratively, much needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of the administration and management of the forces resources. For example, the reorganization of the force now planned will do a good deal to delineate administrative and operational responsibilities and lessen the burden on the top leadership. Little is done in supervisory control over the operations of the force, although the third chief of police is designated as the Inspector General. There is no institutional element that will allow the identification of needs for improvement within the force and the design of courses of action for consideration by the leadership. Also, management and administration procedures incident to the preparation of the budget are weak and improvement is required to improve fiscal management and to allow detailed justification for budgetary requests.


### Budget

The National Police budget for CY-1968 was the highest afforded the force by the government, (See Table I). Allocations for 1969 and 1970 show a decline from this base of roughly 8 and 2.5% respectively. Taking into account the absorption of the Judicial Police into the National Police at the end of the last budget year, the fiscal year (CY) 1971 budget

# ORGANIZATION CHART OF NATIONAL POLICE – GUATEMALA

Figure 2

•CHIEF IS IPA GRADUATE.  
•SECOND CHIEF IS IPA GRADUATE.



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**TABLE I**  
**POLICE BUDGETS**

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971*</u>
National Police	3,974,795	5,608,100	5,148,240	5,561,202	6,404,731
Judicial Police	568,625	732,455	599,520	679,040	-----
Treasury Police	<u>902,276</u>	<u>1,142,762</u>	<u>996,240</u>	<u>1,138,334</u>	<u>1,138,334</u>
TOTAL	5,445,696 (4.05%)**	7,483,317 (4.57%)	6,744,000 (2.81%)	7,378,576 (5.73%)	7,543,065 (5.47%)

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\* Source: GOG National Budget (FY-1971)  
October 31, 1971

\*\* Percentages reflect % of total GOG budget.

represents an increase over last year of about 264,000 Quetzales (on a par with the U.S. dollar). The revenue increase in recent years for the government is repeated at about the rate of 9%. It can be seen that the relative amount of money allocated for the police almost doubled in 1970. The actual increase in funds over that provided in 1969 was Q634,576 or 9.4% and the present (CY-1971) budget called for a small increase over that provided in 1970, but a slight decrease in the percentage of the total GOG budget.

The practices used in the preparation and submission of the budget do not lead to a detailed presentation to the Ministry of Finance, with line item definitions and justifications. It is certain that such a presentation, with fully justified line item requests, would fare much better.

For those funds given it, the police use 92% for personal services and have the remainder for operational expenses, procurement of materials and equipment. Table II presents a general categorical breakdown of the purposes for which the funds are used.

Note is taken of the fact that Q150,000 is available in the 1971 budget and will be used for the interim police training facility in part and other costs incidental to the construction of the new academy.

### Patrol

Emphasis is given to motorized patrol in the capital city and approximately forty patrol cars are used for this purpose. Vehicles used for the most part are those provided by the program during the second phase of the Rapid Police Development Project. The impact of the provision of these vehicles and other steps taken to improve urban patrol has been significant.

The time lapse, representing the amount of time from a call for assistance by a citizen until a police unit arrives, is judged to be about five to seven minutes on the average. This is in contrast to a situation just a year or so ago when police response was measured in terms of hours in many cases.

**TABLE II**  
**NATIONAL POLICE BUDGET**

	<u>1969</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>%</u>
0 Personal Services	5,153,880	92.7	5,153,880	92.7	5,883,360	91.9
1 Non-Personal Services	52,954	.9	52,954	.9	60,975	1.0
Materials and Supplies	316,713	5.7	315,906	5.7	348,234	5.4
Machinery and Equipment	8,462	.2	8,462	.2	8,962	.1
9 Miscellaneous Costs	<u>30,000</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>30,000</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>103,000</u>	<u>1.6</u>
TOTAL	5,562,009	100.0	5,561,202	100.0	6,404,531	100.0

No statistics were or are being kept on this measure of activity, however. The present time lapse can be reduced even more through the use of simple supervisory and administrative steps.

The present degree of patrol afforded by the mobile units has a deterrent effect on violence and criminality. One subversive is reported to have stated after his arrest that the action in the city on the part of subversives is much more difficult and acts are fewer because the police are everywhere. In one case, the patrol arrested an individual in the act of painting the letters "FAR" on walls with paint from a spray can. Interrogation of this man led to information of members of the FAR and of the location of "safe houses" used by them. Subsequent raids led to the arrest of several active FAR members and the confiscation of weapons, ammunition, explosives, including Claymore mines, communications equipment and records of FAR operations and other information.

In conversation with the Minister and with the Director General of Police, each stated that the police patrol was a most important action that the government must take to prevent the resurgence of subversive violence in the city and to prevent criminal activity. Each also judged that the number of police personnel on duty at any given time devoted to patrol was insufficient. There are about 400 men utilized in the patrol operation with approximately 150 of these assigned to fixed posts, such as at Embassies, key residences and police posts. As mentioned, the Minister plans to add one hundred additional police "agents" to bolster the urban patrol from the current year funds.

#### Transportation

The National Police vehicle inventory includes 183 vehicles of various kinds and is made up of our makes: Chevrolet (23), Ford (80), Dodge (50), and Willys (30). Many of the patrol vehicles are relatively new, but are used twenty-four hours each day and it can be expected that their utility is going to drop off. The ages of vehicles in the police inventory are given in Figure 3. The police do not

**CIVIL POLICE VEHICLE INVENTORY  
BY AGE**

	1960 or Older	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	TOTAL
<u>NATIONAL POLICE</u>	26	1	3	8	1	10	10	37	14	1	48	25	184
<u>TREASURY POLICE</u>	42	-	20	7	2	3	2	5	7	2	5	3	98

Inventory as of 29 Nov. 71

FIGURE 3

have a vehicle replacement plan and in the past the U.S. has procured vehicles as its contribution toward the improvement of police effectiveness (eight of the vehicles in the inventory have been procured by the GOG).

Vehicle maintenance has been an area which has limited the effectiveness of the police. The vehicle repair facilities for the National Police are situated in the ground floor of the main police headquarters building and are entirely inadequate to support a fleet of 183 vehicles. As mentioned elsewhere, it is planned to construct new maintenance facilities as a part of the new academy construction which will provide adequate space. At the time of the Team's visit, 15 vehicles were in the shop for repair. Because of the time used for repair of the vehicles, the police have started a separate and smaller repair facility at the rear of the Third Precinct (Cuerpo) station. For repairs of vehicles assigned to the interior, the practice has been to send them to local garages if the repairs can be conducted there and to pay for this from budgetary funds. No information is available as to the yearly cost for this. If there is major work needed, the police haul the vehicle to the main garage in the capital. Some thought was given to the establishment of a mobile repair capability, but it was decided that the repairs can be performed more economically in the manner currently being employed.

#### Communications

A countrywide departmental system is comprised of a network of twenty-one VHF-FM, base stations and is operated and maintained by the National Police. Communications from the capital city of each department is made by voice to headquarters in Guatemala City. Only the capital city of Totonicapan is currently without a radio on the department network. The department of Peten was administered by another agency (FYDEP), but is currently under the jurisdiction of the Mobile Military Police. For more distant stations in the interior, radio information is received at a highsite (San Pedro de Sac.) and voice relayed to Guatemala City.

The city of Puerto Barrios uses a single-side band HF radio for voice contact with National Police headquarters in Guatemala City. The same type of equipment and frequencies are also employed in the Guardia de Hacienda system which allows radio liaison with that agency.

The National Police Department frequency is 39.86 MHz. Operating schedules are from 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. The stations report in once per hour during this period.

The Mobile Radio Patrol (Radio Patrulla) utilizes VHF-FM radios which are operated by and distributed among GOG and National Police officials, general service and radio patrol sections. Approximately eighty mobile units of all types are inventoried as being in service. About 40 vehicles are used for actual radio patrol functions, with other general service vehicles pressed into service when required.

The majority of police vehicles are equipped with two-channel mobile sets. One channel is designated for city-wide, radio patrol operations (39.64 MHz) and the second channel is for liaison with department base stations (39.86) when vehicles are dispatched to the interior. There are no permanently assigned radio-equipped vehicles in the interior.

Four National Police sub-stations (garitas) are also equipped with fixed base station sets on the mobile frequency for liaison with patrol vehicles.

The National Police headquarters received an Erikson Private Branch Automatic Exchange (PA BX) telephone plant in 1966, formerly used by the U.S. Embassy. This updated the old equipment used by the police earlier. Five independent non-switched lines are available for incoming subscriber calls to the telephone console operator and number "10" has been set aside for this purpose. Telephone extensions are available to the Judicial Police and the complaint center, although the majority of extensions are employed for National Police offices within the main police building. Individual sections or agencies such as Detectives, Traffic, Radio Patrol, 1st., 2nd., and 3rd. Cuerpos, etc. also have standard subscriber lines from the city exchange. Citizen inquiries or requests for assistance are usually made directly to the section or agency concerned with the case.

The National Police are presently constructing a new and modern communications operations dispatch center to improve coordination and efficiency of their police communication organization. This facility, due to be completed in January, 1972, will combine all police radio and telephone networks under one centralized authority in the National Police headquarters building.

The National Police Maintenance Section maintains all base, mobile and portable units for the National Police and Detective Corps. Only two of the ten personnel assigned to radio maintenance activities are reasonably knowledgeable for a radio technician position. Both are former U.S. participants trained in a six-month, radio maintenance course. Essential improvements are still required in maintenance and test techniques, equipment and spare parts inventory procedures, and general administration of the radio maintenance shop.

The key to continued ability to maintain radio units in the police inventory is continuity of the trained manpower in the maintenance laboratory. At the present time, the chief of the laboratory is an able technician and several others working with him are able to do the job. However, should he be moved or should his assistants be reduced in number, the effectiveness of the laboratory will be seriously affected and the reliability of the communications networks achieved to date will deteriorate. The chief of the laboratory is a key man also in the development of the administrative and supervisory machinery needed for the new laboratory to be established as a part of the academy complex.

#### Criminal Investigation

Until December, 1970, this function was the responsibility of the Judicial Police. U.S. Advisors had counseled the Guatemalan Government for a long period of time that the most effective manner to organize its resources would be to join the Judicial Police and the National Police. This has now been done. The budget for the Judicial Police in recent years is given in Table III and the manpower authorization and distribution for the force is given in Figure 1.

TABLE III

JUDICIAL POLICE BUDGET

	<u>1969</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1971</u>
0 Personal Services	599,520	84.5	569,280	83.8	*
1 Non-Personal Services	3,157	.4	3,157	.5	*
2 Materials and Supplies	32,328	4.6	32,328	4.7	*
3 Machinery and Equipment	500	.1	500	.1	*
6 Transfer Accounts	575	.1	575	.1	*
9 Miscellaneous Costs	<u>73,200</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>73,200</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>*</u>
Total	709,280	100	679,040	100	

Incorporated in the National Police Budget

The present organization, called the Corps of Detectives, is commanded by Jose Alberto Barrios Martinez. In conversations with him, the Team learned that the present strength of the Corps of Detectives is about 350, of which 22 are civilian employees (below the authorized level). He stated that one of his problems is that he can not pay his agents enough. Consequently, he is planning to reduce his force by about 100 men and has hopes of using the funds saved thereby to increase the salaries of the remainder. He also reported a lack of transportation capability that presents a problem. Otherwise it is his judgment that the Detective Corps has the ability to meet the present level of threat.

The Cuerpo de Detectives operates a two-channel VHF-FM base station, mobile and portable radio system (voice) on its own assigned frequencies. The principal base station is in the Cuerpo headquarters building. An identical base station is located in the National Police radio operations center for liaison purposes. Eight vehicular radios, twelve portable units and the two base stations were provided to the Judicial Police by A.I.D. Public Safety in 1965. The quantity of mobiles and portables now in service is currently unknown. The Cuerpo radios operate on 154,580 and 154,410 MHz. The system has a coverage throughout Guatemala City and its suburban areas. A base station on the National Police Department frequency is also operated by the Cuerpo. This permits liaison with the National Police as well as a contact with and operational use of several National Police mobile radios provided to the Judicial Police earlier.

The Team was unable to determine whether or not the criminal investigative capabilities of the newly formed detective element of the National Police are indeed adequate to meet the need as judged by its commander. It is obvious that any police force must have an able and professional criminal investigative organization and it must be able to acquire, analyze, store and retrieve information regarding criminals and subversives and their actions. The Public Safety Advisors are not maintaining contact with the members of the Cuerpo at the present time because of the allegations made against them that they have been using extra-legal methods in the performance of their duties. Consequently, little information was available from the Public Safety staff as to the capabilities of the force. It is suggested that when the

time is propitious, the U.S. obtain information as to the actual effectiveness of the force and, if needed, provide assistance in the form of training at least to assure that they are able to carry out their duties professionally and effectively.

#### Crime Laboratory

Modest criminalistics facilities have been developed within the identification bureau of the National Police. The laboratory is staffed with one technician who has been trained in the examination of various kinds of evidence and one firearms examiner. From conversations with the laboratory technician (Major Sergio Lima), it appears to the Team that the laboratory has the capability to conduct most, if not all, of the required examinations as requested by the courts. From these discussions, it is likely that the investigative elements of the police probably do not avail themselves of opportunities provided through the examination of physical evidence. But, to the degree that they do, the laboratory can respond to their needs.

The laboratory conducts only those examinations requested by the courts and if the court is not satisfied with the information provided by the laboratory it will turn to an outside laboratory for confirmation or further study. It is apparent that additional training for investigators on the appreciation and limitation of physical evidence in criminal investigation and in the examination of crime scenes would be helpful.

U.S. technical assistance towards the development of National Police criminalistics capability has been previously provided through TDY assignments (September 1965, December 1966, June 1967). In addition, non-technical assistance has been provided on a limited basis by the resident Public Safety Advisors. 1/

In terms of training and commodities, the Public Safety Division has contributed over \$17,000 (See Tables). Of this

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1/ See also "Criminalistics Operations of the National Police, the Republic of Guatemala: A Summary and Followup Report", November 1970, A.W. Jee, OPS

total, over \$15,000 has been provided to equip the laboratory and mobile crime scene investigation unit with the necessary basic equipment (such as microscopes; weighing and measuring instruments; glassware, porcelain and metal-wares; portable electric generator; photographic equipment; casting and field investigative kits).

Two National Police officers received third-country training at the crime laboratory of the El Salvador National Police. The first participant was the present Chief of the Identification Laboratory Division. The second participant, Carlos Ramirex, had been and is still employed in the Fingerprint Section. (Two other participants from the Treasury Police had also been trained along with the National Police officers but are not serving now as laboratory technicians).

The National Police has contributed over \$2,000 in material, labor, air fares towards the improvement of their laboratory and the development of a mobile crime scene investigation unit (See Table IV).

**TABLE IV**  
**PUBLIC SAFETY COMMODITY INPUT**

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Microscopes (Chemical, Bullet Comparison, Stereoscopic)	\$ 5,000 (EST)
Van-type vehicle with VHF-FM mobile transceiver	4,800
Stereoscopic microscope, weighing balance, centrifuge, plus laboratory apparatuses and supplies; crime scene investigation equipment	5,000
Fingerprint comparator, document examination plates	<u>300</u>
Total	\$15,000

PUBLIC SAFETY TRAINING INPUT

<u>Student's Name, Organization, Duration of Training</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Sergio Lima M., National Police, 14 weeks	\$ 1,100
Carlos Ramirex D., National Police, 16 weeks	<u>1,150</u>
Total	\$ 2,250

In comparison with the criminalistics facilities in 1965, today's laboratory represents a marked improvement and reveals a much greater potential in growing and developing as an investigative aid.

At one time the laboratory had entirely inadequate working accommodations characterized by no water, drainage or appropriate furnishings. However, during the last five years the National Police had moved the laboratory to different quarters where there was at least a sink and running water. Their carpentry shop then built the necessary work benches and cabinets. As it now exists, the overall layout of the laboratory is certainly more functional and will be adequate for at least the next five years, if not longer.

All the required basic instruments, apparatuses and supplies for a criminalistics operation have been furnished to meet the National Police's current as well as foreseeable future needs. The laboratory is equipped to adequately examine physical evidence related to firearms, prints/impressions of all types, body fluids, documents, narcotics and the more common trace materials. (For example, paint, glass, hairs, fibers).

Any further expansion, such as into toxicology and the general chemical analysis fields, will require considerably more sophisticated instrumentation and technical capability. This increase of responsibilities is not warranted.

However, the laboratory is not supplied with the full array of expendables such as chemicals and blood testing sera required to examine key types of physical evidence adequately. For instance, for the lack of sera the laboratory is presently unable to perform tests on blood to identify its specie and, if human, to determine the blood group. By the same token, the laboratory with its very limited supply of chemicals is not able to carry out new or improved tests, such as the acid phosphatase reaction for seminal stains or the ninhydrin technique for developing latent prints on paper.

#### Records and Identification

The functions and organization of the Identification Bureau are discussed Annex B. Identification records for the police have been greatly improved through the conversion of the

fingerprint classification system from the older, inflexible, Vucetich System to the universally used Henry System. This conversion is in the process of being made with about half of the files on hand (numbering about 300,000 at best estimate) now classified according to the Henry System. The older files will be converted (reclassification of the fingerprints where adequate prints exist) and the balance will be allowed to become obsolete and will be destroyed. Consequently, a total conversion of files on hand will not be accomplished, where no Vucetich files are used, for ten to fifteen years. This is not a problem since the recent and therefore most useful files will employ the Henry System.

Photographs are used in connection with identification records for persons arrested in the capital city and rarely in the interior. This is a distinct weakness of the overall identification effort. Interior police stations are instructed to submit one copy of the Henry fingerprint card on persons arrested (except for minor offenses such as drunkenness) to the Identification Bureau. But, photographs are not included in almost all cases.

The principal weakness of the police records system used by the National Police is the recording of crime incidents and the maintenance of criminal arrest files. In any police force, these files represent the storage of information of crimes committed and of people who are suspected of committing them. It represents the subject with which the police investigator must be concerned daily. The police files in this regard must be so as to allow rapid retrieval of information to facilitate police criminal investigations and must be organized so as to allow statistical analyses to be conducted. The National Police are unable to do either of these with any regularity or effectiveness at the present time.

Proper statistical analyses of crime incident reports is particularly important in allowing the most effective use of the preventive patrol force. To perform these studies, the crimes committed must be recorded as to the day, time and location within the city to facilitate the preparation of incident spot maps, which will identify peak crime areas or locations in terms of day of the week and time of the day.

Administrative records represent another kind of record that the police institution must keep effectively.

At the present time, it is understood that personnel files are in the process of being reorganized and that there are adequate files with regard to the expenditure of funds, including audit methods. The matter of property accountability files is one that might benefit from a thorough study, however. The Team observed property files in the communications laboratory and found it to be entirely adequate for the purpose. The same is not the case in the vehicle maintenance garage.

### Treasury Police

The Treasury Police (Guardia de Hacienda), at one time under the Ministry of Finance, is now one of two civil police organizations under the Minister of Government. It is a separate force from the National Police and has responsibility for patrolling the country's border and for protection against smuggling and illegal entry of aliens - a function it shares with the Immigration Service. Most of the force is employed in pursuing its revenue producing functions; however, these include the confiscation of contraband and the enforcement of liquor tax laws. In areas where neither National Police nor Mobile Military Police exist, the Guardia performs regular police duties.

The organization of the Treasury Police is a relatively simple one as seen by Figure 4. The Treasury Police budget is reflected in Table V and shows that 89% consistently is devoted to salaries and allowances. The strength of the force is reported to be 1,058 with 351 stationed in the capital city at the force headquarters and in assigned duties.

The Public Safety program has provided relatively little support to the Treasury Police, but has been of assistance in the development of training programs from time to time for recruits. This subject is discussed further under Part IV.

There are 98 vehicles in the force inventory and repairs are conducted at the force headquarters. Sixty-two of these are ten years of age or older (see Figure 3) and a high percentage of these are inoperable. The Director of the Treasury Police said that one of his deficiencies in being able to carry out his functions was in the area of transportation. Several officers have been given training in weapons maintenance repair and maintenance.

**TABLE V**  
**TREASURY POLICE BUDGET**

	<u>1969</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>%</u>
0 Personal Services	996,240	89.0	1,013,400	89.0	1,013,400	89.0
1 Non-Personal Services	47,526	4.2	47,286	4.2	47,286	4.2
2 Materials and Supplies	55,008	4.9	57,248	5.0	57,248	5.0
3 Machinery and Equipment	12,000	1.1	12,000	1.1	12,000	1.1
9 Miscellaneous Costs	<u>8,400</u>	<u>.8</u>	<u>8,400</u>	<u>.7</u>	<u>8,400</u>	<u>.7</u>
TOTAL	1,119,174	100.0	1,138,334	100.0	1,138,334	100.0

# TREASURY POLICE ORGANIZATION




Figure 4

\*Radio Equipment Stations

59'

### Communications

A network of twenty-four single sideband base stations is operated and controlled by the Guardia de Hacienda from their headquarters at Los Cipresales. The base stations of this voice network are located in Guardia de Hacienda at key border crossing points and select towns within the interior. Any one of four radio channels on the equipment can be selected for transmissions.

Radio-equipped vehicles are used in the San Marcos area and some posts are without communications equipment of any kind.

Radio operating hours in the interior are normally from 8:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. with an hourly check in by each interior station. Interior base stations are turned off after the hourly check in.

The Guardia de Hacienda operates a small radio maintenance shop to support this network as well as other electrical/electronic needs of the organization. A small quantity of basic test equipment is available within the maintenance shop in which are employed two U.S. trained radio technicians.

The Guardia commander reported that the principal problem with which his force is concerned is smuggling across the borders contiguous with Guatemala. He reports that coffee, liquor, luxury items, ammunition and arms are items coming across the Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras borders and into the sea ports of the country, particularly Puerto Barrios. With regard to arms and ammunition, he reports small, but steady shipments, with large truckloads sporadic.

With regard to narcotics, the commander reports that marijuana is the principal kind that is smuggled into the country passing from Mexico through Guatemala on to El Salvador. He reports that there is a growing use of marijuana in Guatemala and that the use of barbituates and LSD is increasing. He estimates that Guatemala may be a transit point for hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin into the U.S., although there are no known incidents to support this yet. He is more pessimistic in this regard than other Guatemalan officials with whom U.S. Mission officers have talked (See page L-3 )

### Immigration Service

The Immigration Service is under the Ministry of Government and has 113 authorized personnel spaces. The function of the service is to control the movement of persons in and out of the country and its main efforts are concentrated at airports, ports and on the borders. In 1965, the Guatemalan Government requested the assistance of the United States in improving the Immigration Service and a survey was conducted at that time. The survey recommended certain improvements in administrative practices, records, maintenance, inspectional techniques and employee training. No U.S. resources were provided to pursue these recommendations and relatively frequent TDY assignments of an immigration specialist from OPS/Washington has been the principal input.

Progress in the improvement of the Immigration Service has been frustrated through the frequent change in its directors and, at the present time, the overall effectiveness of the service is judged as low. In May 1971, additional recommendations relative to passenger control at the international airport, a better alien control program and an improved record system were made. At the present time, the service has improved slightly through a tightening of security at the airport and through the initiation of a training program for its employees. The Immigration Service maintains a "lookout list", but functions for the most part to prevent the departure from the country of those who have not paid income taxes. By and large, it has minimal effectiveness in preventing the entry of wanted persons, and procedures used on the borders in the examination of passports and other immigration documents are perfunctory at best.

### Mobile Military Police

The Mobile Military Police (Policia Militar Ambulante, PMA) is an element of the Guatemalan army, under the Ministry of Defense. The PMA has been provided essential responsibility for dealing with rural guerrilla violence and have had some success in this regard principally in the Zacapa and Esquintla areas. At the present time, the PMA are authorized a total of 1,140 officers and men, with 400 of these assigned to cantonments in the capital city. The Mobile Military Police recently has also been given the responsibility for enforcing the law in the Peten, relieving the generally ineffective special police that were stationed there.

The Mobile Military Police are not to be confused with the Military Police of the Guatemalan army proper. The PMA has responsibility for dealing with the public in a security situation, whereas the military police of the army has classical police responsibilities as they relate to army personnel. The PMA is given very little, if any, training in civil police operations and functions essentially as a soldier in the conduct of the rural security tasks. In the execution of these tasks, the PMA utilizes transportation and communications equipment of the type assigned to the Guatemalan army.

## PART V

### THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

Public Safety assistance was first provided to the government of Guatemala at its request in 1957. Its progress, and the degree of achievement, has been interrupted by a series of events and conditions which have frustrated the development of the country's civil police agencies. In November of 1964, the Office of Public Safety conducted an evaluation of the program <sup>1/</sup> which described the degree of achievement of the program from its beginning to that date. The discussion of the Public Safety program in this report will deal with the progress of the program dating from the conclusion of 1964.

Various events in Guatemala have impeded the expected progress toward the development of responsive civil police agencies. The first, the assassination of President Castillo Armas on July 26, 1957, was followed by a period of uncertainty until the election of Ydigoras Fuentes early the following year. Ydigoras took little or no interest in the development of the police, and used them mostly for his personal political advantages. The police, consequently, were corrupt and ineffective. After Ydigoras' ouster in April 1963 by a military coup, the Peralta regime reduced the police to a very low level in terms of personnel, budget and authority. The army was given responsibility for law enforcement and the civil police were pushed aside. During that period, Peralta supporters alleged that this was necessary to rid the National Police of the corruption which certainly existed. With the installation of the Mendez Montenegro Administration in 1965, the police budget and strength were gradually restored, somewhat above previous levels. However,

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<sup>1/</sup> "Report of the Evaluation of the Public Safety Division, U.S.A.I.D. to Guatemala, Office of Public Safety, L.J. Goin and T.R. Brown, November 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL)".

development of the police institution continued to be irregular and uncertain. All Agencies, especially the National Police and the Judicial Police, were considered corrupt and repressive and had a very bad public image.

The general malaise in the civil police situation was attributed to such factors as:

- a) A low educational level of the police officer.
- b) Inadequate support on the part of the government reflected in inadequate budgets, low salaries, a lack of fringe benefits and a lack of operational funds for the procurement of needed police equipment.
- c) A constant personnel turnover at the top management level, particularly with respect to the Director General and his immediate subordinates.
- d) A lack of a comprehensive and a continuous police training program and the institutionalization of training within the police forces.
- e) A pervasiveness of corruption.
- f) A cultural and environmental lethargy and inertia.
- g) Poor public image and operational methods which discourage public cooperation.
- h) A corruption of the court system and an intimidation of the judges by criminal and subversive elements.
- i) The military domination of the police at the top and a simultaneous lack of interest on the part of military leaders in the development of a professional civil police institution.
- j) A military opposition to the development of a strong, effective police institution which they would regard as competition for power if not for funds.

At least one of these foregoing factors requires some additional comment since it has been a predominant one in impeding the progress of the Public Safety program toward the development of the police institution. Army officers assigned to command the National Police have had as an average length of tenure something on the order of six months. Their individual abilities to command the civil police force have varied as well as has their interest in assuming such a task. Since any reforms in police organization, management, or operations must flow from the top leadership, the Public Safety staff has consistently endeavored to work through such leaders. The first order of business was in each case to familiarize the newly designated Director General of Police with the basic precepts in civil police administration and operation. This required considerable time; and in most cases no sooner was some headway being noticed than the Director General was replaced.

Partly because of this factor and also because of the fact that the program has endeavored to be responsive to the Guatemalan Government interests in developing its police forces, the Public Safety program has risen and fallen successively in terms of the amount of resources supplied. Figure 5 reflects the amount of resources applied to the program by the United States since FY-1967 and political events.

Some eight years ago, subversives, some of which were the action arm of the Guatemalan communist party, launched a tactic of murdering police officers. The strategy apparently was to destroy the confidence of the people in the government's ability to protect them and their property. As this confidence became destroyed, the strategy was for a military coup which would be counted on to be repressive. It was seen that a repressive military government would facilitate the movement of the masses to the leftist cause and that a general uprising would ensue with the result that power would fall to the subversives.

While failing in their overall strategy, the impact of their tactics has been considerable. For the first half of calendar year 1971, 28 police officers were killed in the line of duty, most of them in connection with encounters with the subversive elements. The casualty rate, considering the strength

# U. S. A.I.D. GUATEMALA PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT ACTIVITY FY 1957-FY 1975




Figure 5

of the Guatemalan National Police, is the highest in the world, surpassing by three times that experienced by the South Vietnamese police. If the United States police forces were to experience the same casualty rate, 3,560 American policemen would be killed in a year's time rather than the 110 experienced in calendar year 1970. It is no surprise that a casualty rate of this kind has a deteriorating effect on the morale of the Guatemalan police. They are reluctant to be assigned to exposed fixed posts and in some cases show a tendency of unwillingness to engage in a firefight. It also leads to difficulty in recruiting high quality personnel and a relatively high rate of attrition.

This bleak situation was the one facing the Arana Administration when it assumed the offices of government in July of 1970. The first National Police General Director appointed under the Arana Administration cooperated with the Public Safety program, but only begrudgingly and because he had been ordered to do so. He was replaced in January 1971 by another Army Colonel, Genaro Alvarado Robles, a level-headed, cooperative individual who has spent 18 years in police and prison assignments. The Public Safety program has made more gain since the beginning of this year than it has over many of the past years. This can be attributed not only to the quality of leadership that the Director General Alvarado is providing, but the fact that he has continued in his position for nearly a year. The prospects for his remaining are good. The Team inquired into this point in a conversation with the Minister of Government, who responded by saying that there is no intention of replacing Colonel Alvarado.

Less corruption is now apparent in the National Police than ever before; discipline and morale have improved markedly among the uniformed elements; and the public image has also improved according to U.S. Mission observers. The Army, which has always held the police in disdain, appears to be gaining some semblance of respect for them according to Colonel Robert Munding, Chief of the Military Group.

The investigative arm at the National Police, or the Detective Corps, has had a reputation for corruption and repression, as the Judicial Police. Prior to its transfer to the National Police in December 1970, there was no training program. At the beginning of the Arana Administration, a professionally qualified U.S. trained police officer, Lt. Colonel Vicente Morales Monterosso, was named to head the Detective Corps. For

more than a year, the Detective Corps appeared to be making considerable progress toward professionalization and its effectiveness against subversive elements was remarkable. Morales resigned on July 31, 1971, however, because, as he stated to Public Safety staff members, political appointees with no professional qualifications had been thrust upon him. It is understood that Morales' successor, Barrios, also feels constrained by this same factor.

The Team considers it important to note that once the Guatemalan Government leadership took serious steps to improve police performance in meeting threats to internal order, the Public Safety program progress accelerated. Indeed, the forward momentum that is currently enjoyed by the program should continue through the balance of the Arana Administration providing that there is not a change of the Director General and providing that certain other key personnel in the civil police forces are not transferred and assuming appropriate U.S. support.

In commenting on the amount of success that the Public Safety program has had over the years, the Embassy stated recently 2/

"It is unrealistic to expect that the goal of assisting Guatemala in the development of modern, professional police organizations could have been met within the relatively short term time-frame involved, particularly in light of the wide variations and the quality of the several administrations Guatemala has had to suffer through and under the constant pressures of the insurgency situation. Agricultural, education, and health programs have suffered as well as Public Safety, and real progress in all these development fields, including civil order will require strong efforts by the GOG, with our assistance. The Arana government has shown interest in advancing in all these fields and is putting a considerable portion of its resources into them. With regard to Public Safety, it has substantially improved its performance and its input into such items as spare parts, maintenance, and supplies that previously were neglected while in very short supply."

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2/ Embassy airgram A-173, September 10, 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL).

## A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT

The evaluation of the Public Safety program conducted in November 1964 3/ states that the objectives of the program had been recast to concentrate on improving the ability of the civil police forces to control civil disturbances, provide effective services to the people, criminal investigation, and the development of police resources to participate in a regional control of the movement of goods and peoples. Project objectives as set forth in the Project Agreements are set forth in Annex D. In September of 1971, the Public Safety staff conducted an analysis over the past five years of the degree to which the Public Safety Program had achieved objectives set forth in Project Agreements. This report is included as Annex E.

Since then, the objectives of the program have been set forth in Project Agreements dating from 1965 which pursue those general goals and focus the efforts of the Public Safety program on the following targets: .

- 1) Improve and strengthen the National Police, Judicial Police and Treasury Police in order to provide efficient civil law enforcement services to the people.
- 2) Improve capabilities of these forces to control urban disturbances and riots.
- 3) Increase the effectiveness of civil police operations.
- 4) Improve the capabilities of civil police forces in criminal investigations.
- 5) Provide for adequate and reliable police communications.
- 6) Improve the use and maintenance of police vehicles.
- 7) Improve police services in rural areas.
- 8) Develop a capability for effective police training.

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In the course of time, each of these objectives as stated has been modified to be responsive to demands for development as well as to recognize advances that have been made in each case. Each of these is discussed below with a note as to the modification of the objective and a final comment on the degree to which the objective has been achieved.

Efficient Law Enforcement Services to the People - This general objective has subordinate targets which consist of the following, with the year in which the modification appears in the PROAG indicated in parenthesis:

- 1) Reorganize and modernize the National Police (1966).
- 2) Improve personnel administration procedures and seek the establishment of a career service (1967-1968).
- 3) Develop a model police precinct in Zone 5, Guatemala City (1967-1968).
- 4) Establish a uniformed system of crime reporting and records. (1967-1968), including the adoption of the Henry System for the classification of fingerprints.
- 5) Intensify patrol coverage, both urban and rural (1970).
- 6) Integrate identification and records facilities (1970).
- 7) Undertake administrative reforms for more efficient management of police resources (1970).
- 8) Establish a Planning and Budget Office in each of the civil police agencies (1971).
- 9) Improve the effectiveness of purchasing procedures for establishing a petty cash fund (1971).
- 10) Prepare a plan for financing the replacement of police equipment (1971).

- 11) Establish standardized records including basic photographic laboratories in key cities (1971).
- 12) Assign United States trained police officers to responsible positions for a period of at least two years (1971).

In a general sense, the National Police have improved considerably the degree of the police services provided to the people largely by virtue of the fact that a more pervasive mobile radio patrol has been instituted for the city. This has been a direct product of the "Rapid Police Development Plan" instituted by the program which is discussed separately below. With regard to the reorganization of the National Police, the present Director General desires to undertake this step and suggestions have been made to him by the Public Safety staff. No progress has been made to date and it should continue to be an actively pursued goal of the program.

Some minor improvements have been made in general personnel administration, particularly as this concerns the development of an awareness on the part of the various echelons of police leadership for the maintenance of recruitment standards. No progress has been made in the direction of a career service.

In considering the status of the National Police abilities to provide police services in the capital, in 1967 the demonstration project referred to as the "pilot modern precinct" was planned. This proved not to be successful largely because the government perceived the idea as an American plan and did not embrace the concept. The activity realized some progress for demonstration purposes but must be considered unsuccessful overall.

Project attention was directed in 1967 to the status of police criminal records and an effort was begun, which is still continuing, to develop necessary incident and arrest files that concern the force as a whole. Little progress has been made in this particular area. In 1968, a shift was started in the classification system for fingerprints from the inflexible

and limited Vucetich System to the universally used Henry System. This shift has been largely accomplished and requires only limited project attention for the next few months. There are about 300,000 fingerprint cards in the National Police identification files with practically all of the more recent and significant cards classified according to the Henry System. Where possible, the older cards will be converted, but in many cases will be allowed to fall into obsolescence. The program has had no opportunity to become familiar with or to assist in the improvement of criminal records maintained by the former Judicial Police, now called the Detective Corps.

Technical assistance provided by the program concerning the improvement of administrative procedures has had some success. National Police officers concerned with the budget process have been a principle target in this effort and assistance has been provided for the preparation of requirements for the purchase of spare parts perennially needed by the forces and for the replacement of capital equipment items. The use of a petty cash fund has demonstrated its facility in being able to respond to procurement needs of low cost items.

However, the degree of progress realized to date has been inadequate in relation to the steps that must be taken. The reorganization of the National Police provides an excellent opportunity for a thorough review of administrative and management procedures now in use and for the development of an action plan, incorporating reforms that will act to streamline and modernize procedures used by the force in the administration and use of its resources. A planning and research unit should be established for this purpose and to provide a focus for intensive technical assistance to be provided by the Public Safety program. (See Recommendation No. 3).

U.S. trained police officers are assigned to key positions in the present National Police Organization. Figure 2, showing the National Police organizational structure, indicates those positions now occupied by officers trained at the International Police Academy in Washington.

Riot Control - As recommended in the earlier evaluation, the program began the development of National Police and Treasury Police capabilities to control civil disturbances in 1965, continued it as an objective through FY-1967, and repeated it in the Project Agreement for FY-1969. As time passed, Project Agreements subsequent to that of 1965 specified objectives of this program in the areas as follows:

- 1) To improve and accelerate training for forces designed to maintain control over civil disturbances, (1967 and 1969).
- 2) While continuing the objectives of the improvement of the riot control capability, the Project objective was expanded to include the development of a capability to deal with urban terror activities, especially in the capital city.
- 3) The FY-1969 PROAG continued the scope of this activity as indicated above and specified the objective as equipping and training 100 men in the capital city and smaller groups elsewhere for riot control.
- 4) The scope of the objective was broadened to include the use and maintenance of police weapons, (1969).
- 5) To improve employment of civil disturbance units, (1970).

In addition to the foregoing, the Public Safety staff has worked with the Chief of the U.S. Military Group and his staff in urging the Guatemalan Defense and Government ministries respectively to work together in the coordination of police riot control capabilities with those that can be provided by the military services. In discussions with the Military Group Commander and the Public Safety staff, the Team was advised that the Military and Police leaders have consulted as to the best means of working together under urban disturbance situations. In recent instances, they have been deployed effectively wherein properly equipped police have been on the front lines in riot control and military personnel have been held in reserve.

This particular activity of the Public Safety Program has yielded considerable improvement in the police ability to control urban disturbances and riots. Past performances of the police have shown that they used proper methods in controlling riots, employing the minimum use of force and a liberal amount of tear gas. A problem exists at the present time in that police personnel who have been given riot control training have been given internal reassignments so that there is no cohesive trained group or element within the police that can be called on at the present time for riot control duty. The program has provided an adequate amount of tear gas which is now on hand, and other items of equipment such as helmets and shields and batons, are in adequate supply. The requirement at the present time is refresher training for all police personnel who would be called upon for riot control duty. This should be accomplished as soon as possible. (See Recommendation 10).

Effective Police Operations Through the Use of Modern Methods - The statement of this objective in 1965 represents an unspecific definition of a project goal. The language is obviously subordinate to that described above relating to the improvement of police ability to provide effective services to the people. This objective first appeared in 1965 and was restated in 1968. Many of the activities of the Project that are discussed herein obviously are directly related to the objective as it is stated here. An example is the Rapid Police Development Plan executed by the project in FY-1970 and FY-1971.

Criminal Investigations - The initial objective stated that it was a goal of the program to improve the capabilities of the National Police, Treasury Police, and Judicial Police in criminal investigation procedures. This was expressed in 1965 and in succeeding years through the FY-1970 PROAG. It was broadened or modified in years subsequent to 1965 in the following manner:

- 1) To improve and expand the police crime laboratory and the photographic laboratory (1968).

- 2) The coordination of investigations facilities of all civil police agencies and the improvement in the identification and apprehension of criminals (1968).
- 3) The establishment of a professionally staffed photographic laboratory in the National Police headquarters - note that this is a rephrasing of the modification above - (1971).
- 4) To establish basic photographic laboratories in key cities (1971).

Initial efforts to work with the Judicial Police and improve their criminal investigation capability were moderately successful. The principal input of the program consisted of the provision of training on basic procedures in criminal investigation and in the provision of some technical assistance on organization and administration as well as in a development of training curricula. Some commodities of a conventional police nature were provided to facilitate in the development program. The Judicial Police, however, did not have the manpower quality that provided the best opportunity for developing professional capabilities within the force. In earlier years, these personnel were largely political appointees. Within the National Police a central complaint center was established at the suggestion of the Public Safety Advisor and this provided an excellent channel for the transmission of request for police services to various elements forces.

Through program assistance and the provision of a TDY specialist from OPS/W, the crime laboratory facilities for the National Police were refurbished and training was provided in the conduct of crime laboratory examinations. Given the present level of criminal investigations sophistication, the crime laboratory is able to provide the services needed and this objective is essentially completed. A photographic laboratory has been established as a part of the Identification Bureau of the National Police and this objective is completed. However, with respect to the establishment of photographic laboratories in other cities, it has been found that the overall criminal identification record file procedures of the National Police

are very unsophisticated and the value of identification photography is not clearly seen by police leaders as yet. The Director General has indicated to the Chief Advisor that he has an inadequate number of officers that can be assigned to newly developed photographic laboratories in the interior. As a consequence, this objective has been abandoned. At the present time, photographs are taken of persons arrested outside of the capital city in some cases. The negatives used for this purpose are then forwarded to the central laboratory in the Identification Bureau in the capital. The Public Safety staff believes that this procedure will suffice for the time being and that additional input of U.S. equipment for such photographic facilities should not be made. As a matter of fact, photographic equipment procured by the program under the 1971 PROAG obligation has been made available to other Missions as being surplus to Guatemala's needs.

Police Communications - The first objective of this nature as set forth by the Program (1966) concerned the participation of Guatemalan civil security forces in a regional telecommunications network which was established to bring together regional resources to deal with the movement of subversives and contraband between the various countries and Central America. This objective continued through FY-1969, and the Public Safety staff resources consisted principally of a regional telecommunications advisor stationed in Guatemala as well as a provision of training of police personnel and of the provision of appropriate commodities. As the program proceeded, the Project turned to the development of the institutional element of the police regarding communications and was modified as follows:

- 1) The establishment of communications maintenance facility and capability.
- 2) Development of procedures for coordination of police and military communications during emergencies.
- 3) The development of a national communications network for the National Police and the Treasury Police.
- 4) The establishment of a central communications dispatching control center.

The development of communications facilities in order that the police can exchange information with neighboring countries in the Central American area was accomplished and manpower trained for its maintenance and operations. The Government has established a relatively small force (not more than 50 people) directly related to the telecommunications center which is given operational responsibilities in dealing with security problems within the country. This group has allegedly been involved in extra-legal procedures in dealing with subversives. The Public Safety staff does not maintain a contact with this unit nor with the telecommunications center's technical personnel at the present time.

Program efforts have been focused on the development of the telecommunications networks for the National Police both internationally and also the technical network used for mobile patrol in Guatemala City. As reported elsewhere, the Police have the capability of communicating with their stations throughout the country and within the city. The Mobile Patrol is adequately equipped with reliable radio equipment. The second major effort of the program has been in the development of an effective and responsive communications maintenance and repair facility. Much has been done in this regard and at the present time, it is able to assure that approximately 90% of the force's radios are in service. Work must be still done to establish the administrative and procedural requirements for the new institutional facility that is to be constructed.

A major step has been taken in the development of a central dispatching control center for Guatemala City. During the Team's visit, the center was under construction with an estimated completion date of January 1972. At the present time, citizens may call for police services by dialing 10. The center is designed so as to receive these calls and to dispatch radio patrol units in response to the needs for service. This function is being performed at the present time with partial effectiveness in cramped quarters in the Police Palace. Earlier program efforts had been focused on the improvement of these procedures to the extent possible under the circumstances with considerable success. The new facility should further increase the effectiveness of the Mobile Patrol in the city.

Vehicle Maintenance - The program adopted an objective to develop the vehicle maintenance capability of the Treasury and National Police in FY-1967. In the absence of an apparent responsiveness on the part of the Guatemalan Government, the objective was dropped the next year, but reinstated in FY-1969 and has continued to be an objective of the program. This objective has been modified in consecutive PROAGs as follows:

- 1) To establish a single service facility which would include vehicle and communications maintenance shops.
- 2) Establish standards for the administrative procedures for vehicle maintenance including intimate schedules, spare part procurements and stock and tool control (1970 and 1971).

The present shop facilities for the National Police are situated on the ground floor of the National Police Palace building in the center of the capital. The facilities are fully lighted, crowded, and provide inadequate space for the repair of the numbers of vehicles necessary. In spite of this, considerable achievement has been realized in the development of stock control methods and in the securing of spare parts and tools to protect them from pilferage. Trained manpower has been provided through the efforts of the program and the capability of the garage to perform the necessary maintenance of the vehicles is considered to be adequate. At the time of the Team's visit, there were 15 vehicles deadlined of the total inventory of 183 vehicles.

The Treasury Police garage facilities are less well-organized although more space is available for vehicle repair. Some capability has been developed on the part of the mechanics. Overall, the Team would assess the vehicle maintenance capability of the police as having been greatly improved in the past several years, but headed for trouble. The spare parts available for the vehicle repair have been contributed through an initial input on the part of the program when new vehicles are provided (normally one year's supply of spare parts is provided with each vehicle). The police budget has not included a specific line item for the procurement of vehicle (or communications and weapons) spare parts. Therefore, until an adequate

supply of spare parts is assured, the garage staff will be forced to turn to cannibalizing the vehicles within the inventory for spare parts. Obviously, this results in a very uneconomical use of vehicles and debilitates the fleet over a period of time.

The Team was unable to make a thorough assessment of the amount of money that the National Police and the Treasury Police should set aside in their budgets for the procurement of spare parts. However, from discussions with Public Safety staff members, the National Police could probably meet its needs if Q100,000 per year were earmarked for vehicle, communications and weapons spares. This amount is included in the estimated GOG commodity input for FY-1972 and FY-1973, shown in Figure 8.

Further, the administration and supervision procedures for the vehicle maintenance garage will have to be developed in an anticipation of the establishment of a new facility in connection with the new police academy. (See Recommendation 5).

Rural Policing - The Public Safety Program adopted an objective of the improvement of police services in rural areas in 1967. It undertook, at that time, assistance efforts with the Treasury Police in an attempt to improve its capabilities in performing its functions assigned to it by law. While rural policing is not a specifically assigned role of the Treasury Police, it does perform these services under some circumstances. In FY-1969, the program proposed that the National Police undertake the responsibility for rural policing in the Department of Esquintla. It was the intention of the program that police responsibilities of rural areas and the organization, administration and procedures for executing these effectively in response to the needs of the people could be demonstrated in one of the departments having a high need for police services. Esquintla was a department that met these requirements and planning went forward. The plans developed were essentially those of the Public Safety staff, however, and it did not involve the Guatemalan police in any of the details. The Guatemalan Government and the police embraced the concept in the idea of a demonstration project of this kind, but in effect did not respond with the necessary manpower and other resources to make the project work. As a consequence, the demonstration rural police project has been set aside and this objective has not been repeated in subsequent Project Agreements.

In the FY-1968 and FY-1969 Project Agreements, in the restating of the objective, it was stated that all of Guatemala should be provided with a mobile rural patrol. This has not been accomplished and this objective has not been repeated in subsequent Project Agreements.

As stated elsewhere, the Government of Guatemala has chosen to assign the responsibility for rural security to the mobile military police. This force has as its basic responsibility the maintenance of security and not the enforcement of the law. National Police representation is found in small cities throughout the country, but the smaller villages and hamlets do not have a police presence. Treasury Police, in exercising their responsibility for border control and for the enforcement of tax laws, will be found in areas contiguous with the borders and also in certain other areas wherein illegal manufacture of liquor is a problem. The net effect is that there is no one providing a regular rural police patrol for the entire country. No one agency present has the responsibility for maintaining a contact with the people at the village level in order to provide them with police services.

The Team was informed that it is the intention of the Minister of Government to attempt to have a Decree passed which will assign to the Treasury Police the responsibility for rural policing in collaboration with the mobile military police. It is not his intention that the Treasury Police become a part of the National Police, but that its name would be changed to the "Rural Police" and would remain as one of the two civil police forces under his jurisdiction.

Training - Police training has been an activity of the Public Safety Program since its inception and has been a means by which other objectives set forth in the Project Agreements have been moved forward. A specific training objective was first set forth in the FY-1968 Project Agreement which stated that it was an objective to establish a police academy, (1968 and 1969). An additional dimension was given to this objective in the FY-1970 PROAG wherein it was stated that a target of the program would be to develop a roll call training program for the five capital city precincts.

The program has been able to accomplish a great deal in the development of training capabilities within the National

Police and to some extent within the Treasury Police. A training facility has existed in the National Police Palace and recruit training is now being conducted there. In the move toward establishing a police academy, considerable delays have ensued in this entire activity as discussed elsewhere. The Team considers that the fact that the academy may be established at all to be an accomplishment. It represents a long sought commitment on the part of the Guatemalan Government. The incorporation of communications and vehicle maintenance facilities in this building project will also provide a major step forward in the institutional strengthening of these elements.

Through technical assistance and training, the roll call objective had been reached in the judgment of the Public Safety staff. However, the Team in some very limited observations during its visit, did not observe any examples of roll call training being conducted. Therefore, it is probable that patrol supervisors will have to exercise much closer supervisory control over this kind of training program as well as other matters concerning the effectiveness of the patrol.

#### **1. RAPID POLICE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY**

In March of 1970, the Public Safety Program produced a plan to develop the National Police, Treasury Police and the then Judicial Police to appoint where they could cope effectively with an emergency which was identified at that time. The plan also called for certain improvements over a longer period of time which would sustain a higher level of performance on the part of these police agencies. Mid-1970 saw a high point in urban terror and the killing of policemen and preceded the election which was expected to have been particularly violent.

The plan was developed in three stages to provide for (a) immediate activities that could be supported using present U.S. and Guatemalan resources that were available at the time, (b) crash-type projects to be implemented within the shortest possible time, requiring a considerably expanded input of A.I.D. in Guatemalan resources and (c) longer term projects for continued development of the police agencies after the "crisis" had been dealt with.

For those activities in which resources available at the time were to be used, the plan called for the following: (For detailed plans under each functional heading, see Annex C)

- (a) Intensified Patrol Coverage - Reorganize the National Police patrol coverage plans for Guatemala City and outskirts, including mustering into service all available personnel, vehicles, and radio equipment.
- (b) Investigations (Complaint Section of National Police and Judicial Police) - Implement a well-rounded, comprehensive training program to cover all investigative operations. Organize and train special bomb disposal, counter-terrorist, and surveillance squads, and increase fire power where necessary.
- (c) Task Force Operations - Utilizing the best of personnel trained in riot control in recent months, create combat squads in five strategic parts of the city which can also serve as saturation foot patrol squads.
- (d) Records and Identification - Urge and support formation of a central records and identification unit in the National Police, with full participation of other agencies.
- (e) Training - Intensified in-service training to meet immediate problems confronting city. Move full speed on police academy project.
- (f) Mobility - Urge administrative approval for drastic revision of existing National Police vehicle maintenance facilities and muster all available motor vehicles into service.
- (g) Communications - Urge and assist in overhaul on a temporary basis of the National Police communications center to provide centralization of incoming telephone calls and more efficient dispatching of patrol vehicles. Install radio equipment on hand to provide communications for police operations to be supported as above.

"Crash" type activities designed by the plan called for:

- (a) Intensified Urban Patrol Coverage - Adapt and deliver to National Police 52 patrol vehicles and support immediate development of "aggressive" mobile patrol system.
- (b) Investigations (Complaint Section of National Police and Judicial Police - Urge screening of personnel in both organizations for fitness, and augmentation with qualified personnel. Continue intensified training in investigative and surveillance techniques. Provide tactical communications equipment from existing stocks for National Police Investigations Division.
- (c) Task Force Operations - Continue organization and formation of the task forces to be employed in riot control and "saturation" foot patrol.
- (d) Records and Identification - Continue development of central records and identification unit, drawing its operations into closer coordination with those of the criminalistics laboratory, the investigative units, and communications. Screen personnel for fitness and augment with qualified personnel. Procure additional filing equipment. Standardize forms.
- (e) Rural - Support strengthening of patrol and investigative capabilities in rural areas, replacing the vehicles diverted to urban patrol in Guatemala. Urge expansion of the Treasury Police to 4,000 over a five year period.
- (f) Mobility - Press for an early completion of central maintenance facility and institution of adequate fleet management procedures.
- (g) Communications - Provide radio equipment for modernizing the dispatch center in Guatemala, including three-channel dispatching for radio patrol and console equipment. Urge National Police to integrate emergency telephone answering with radio dispatch. Continue development and expansion of rural nets with existing equipment.

- (h) Armament - Bring TDY arms specialist for countrywide survey of arms for three police agencies. Send at least six specialists to Canal Zone or other facility for arms repair training.
- (i) Training - Further intensification of training in patrol and task force operations, investigations and intelligence, and records and identification. Participant training is to be continued at about the same level as previously planned.
- (j) Public Relations - U.S.A.I.D. will urge expansion of the present public relations programs in each of the three police agencies, attempting to ensure that words will be followed up by appropriate actions in all areas of police operations in an attempt to win public approval and cooperations.

On a longer term, activities were designed to continue work in those development areas indicated above. The plan took note of the intention that if the proposal for the expansion of the role and size of the Treasury Police was accepted by the Guatemalan Government, then heavy emphasis would have been placed on this activity by the program to make the Treasury Police an effective instrument for rural security. Specifically, the longer-term plan focused on police mobility, communications, training, police weaponry and investigations.

Figure 6 provides a chart indicating the specific sub-activities under the Rapid Police Development program and the degree to which they have been achieved.

As can be seen, training activities undertaken at the outset of the Rapid Police Development Plan required the modification of or the initiation of training courses of various kinds. These courses have continued and should continue to meet the requirements of the National Police and the Treasury Police. As indicated on the chart, urban patrol, driver training, training and equipment maintenance, and rural training courses will be continuing activities. Additionally, efforts to bring about the reorganization of the National Police and of the Treasury Police and in the administration of the resources of the respective forces will be a continuing activity as well.

# PUBLIC SAFETY RAPID POLICE DEVELOPMENT PLAN




Figure 6

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Certain of the activities intended to be accomplished as the plan was drawn up in the spring of 1970 were not accomplished for varying reasons as indicated below:

(a) Bicycle Procurement (Reference I, E) - It is intended that the Guatemalan Government would be required to buy additional bicycles required for patrol. An initial "pump-priming" procurement of 16 bicycles was effected by the program. These bicycles were initially assigned to the Esquintla Project. It was found that the Guatemalan police were not prepared to utilize bicycles to a maximum extent and that the number of bicycles on hand then were adequate for the purposes of bicycle patrols to the extent that the Guatemalan police would use them. As a consequence, additional pressures were not brought to bear to encourage the Guatemalan Government to buy more bicycles.

(b) Records and Identification (Reference IV, D, E) - The plan called for the development of the capability for the taking and developing of photographs of arrested persons and for the submission of these along with the ten-finger fingerprint cards to the Central Records Identification Bureau at National Police Headquarters. This would have required the establishment of modest photographic laboratories in ten urban centers and the development of appropriate forms. It was found in the process of working in this activity that it was less expensive for the photographers outside of the capital city to send the undeveloped roll of film to the capital for developing rather than to establish independent photographic laboratories. As a consequence, this aspect of the plan has been modified to omit this as an objective. The development of photographic facilities for this purpose in Guatemala City has been accomplished (IV F) and has not, as mentioned above, been done outside of the capital city.

(c) Training (Reference V, B) Police Academy Project - This subject, and the vehicle and communications maintenance facility projects, are discussed below.

(d) Mobility (Reference VI, C) Procurement of Spare Parts by the Guatemalan Government - The Guatemalan Government agreed to procure some of the spare parts in the past year or two. But this procurement has not been through budgetary line item identification of the requirement and an allocation of

funds but through the use of funds allocated for the purposes toward the end of the fiscal year. It will be noted that the team recommends that a line item be included in the National Police budget for the procurement of spare parts on a continuing basis.

(e) Administration (Reference IX, A, B), Planning and Budget Office, Public Relations - The initial efforts to establish a Planning and Budget Office met with very little success in fiscal year 1971. However, Colonel Alvarado, the present Director General of the National Police, is very receptive to the idea of establishing a Budget Office to deal more realistically with the preparation of the police budget each year. The formation of a planning and research unit was not contemplated at the time the Rapid Police Development Plan was developed in early 1970. But, as is noted elsewhere, the Team believes that it is an important move that can be made at the present time to institutionalize the National Police and to place an appropriate emphasis on the bringing about of appropriate reforms using a National Police initiative. The present Public Safety project planning includes a continuation in the efforts to establish the administrative machinery to deal with the preparation of the budget, given Colonel Alvarado's currently favorable view. With regard to public relations, the activity, as far as the plan is concerned, was accomplished with the establishment of the Public Relations Office and the training of an officer to head it in the United States at the International Police Academy. However, the Team is certain that this unit is not used to the maximum extent possible and that greater effectiveness can be realized by placing more emphasis on this element's functions and its activities by both the National Police and by the Public Safety project. At the same time, the Team does not believe that a great deal of technical assistance time would be required.

(f) Rural Policing (Reference X) - Several months ago, the legislature considered a Bill which would have converted the Treasury Police to a "Rural Police" and which would, as the Bill was written, place the Treasury Police under the National Police leadership. In a discussion with the Minister of Government, the latter stated that he believed the reason that the legislature did not pass the Bill at that time was that there was a fear of enlarging the National Police manpower and authority to the point where it would become a political liability. As a

consequence, Minister Arenales now plans to resubmit the Bill at the next session of the legislature in a form which would omit the requirement for placing the Treasury Police under the National Police organization. The Bill would change the name of the police to the "Rural Police" and will make the new Rural Police force responsible for the provision of regular police services to rural areas throughout the country. Consequently, the objective set forth in the Rapid Police Development Plan for rural policing has not been accomplished although some significant improvements have been made in the Treasury Police organization and its institutional elements as well as its ability to conduct its business in the field. With respect to the plan, the continuing activity will be in Rural Police training, and training courses have been conducted fairly regularly at the Treasury Police Headquarters at Cipresales. These training courses will be absorbed in the new police academy curriculum.

The implementation of the Rapid Police Development Plan in FY-1970 with the provision of \$378,000 through the contingency fund for the procurement of commodities has the effect of mobilizing National Police resources in the capital city to deal with urban crime and subversive terror. The Team, in its conversations with the members of the U.S. family and others, clearly obtained the impression that the pervasiveness of the police mobile patrol in the capital city is a contributing factor to the success of the Arana government in dealing with subversive violence. The establishment of this patrol can be said to be the major achievement of the Public Safety program in the last two or three years as well as the principle achievement of the Rapid Police Development Plan.

In March of 1971, the Office of Public Safety provided a member of its staff at the request of the U.S.A.I.D. to examine the National Police Radio Patrol activity. <sup>4/</sup> One of the conclusions of the study stated that -

"The rapid development planning has accomplished a major feat in the upgrading of the Radio Patrol Force that now possesses better weaponry with mobility and excellent communications. The most significant accomplishment has been an awareness of the need, better selection of radio patrolmen and provision of specialized training with subsequent in-service training sessions."

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<sup>4/</sup> See "Report of the National Police Radio Patrol Force for Guatemala City", Caesar P. Bernal, Office of Public Safety, A.I.D., April 1971.

Bernal made some significant recommendations to which the Team subscribes, as follows:

- (1) Radio Police Force should have an effective strength of 425 officers and a vehicular strength of 60 vehicles. 5/
- (2) Ten Radio Patrol field supervisors should be given training at the International Police Academy with a specialization in patrol operations.
- (3) A concerted effort should be made to minimize the number of fixed posts but manned by uniformed personnel for precincts and substations. (Bernal suggests that many of these responsibilities could be transferred to the Guatemalan military forces).
- (4) There should be a uniformity of basic police weapons and the 12 gauge shotgun should be substituted for the carbine now being carried in many cases.
- (5) The feasibility of using short-range portable transceivers by foot patrolmen in selected patrol beats should be explored.

In conversations with police officials, it was apparent that the National Police is not utilizing mobile foot patrol to any great extent. Foot patrol is used to some degree in the downtown areas by ex-post assignments or utilized in most of the precinct areas of responsibility. The authorized manpower level for the National Police in Guatemala City (2,611)

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5/ At the present time, the 300-man Radio Patrol Force is being expanded by 100 officers and men according to comments made to the Team by the Minister of Government. Forward year planning regarding police vehicles, given on page 111, reflects the need for expansion of the present number of patrol vehicles, which is now 40.

may be reduced by as much as half in some precincts because of "special assignments". These special assignments represent provision of guard services to embassies and government officials, both to the Guatemalan Government and those representing foreign nations. Accordingly, the actual number of police available during any one watch for the provision of police services is drastically reduced. For example, there are no more than 100 police officers devoted to mobile radio patrol at any one time.

The Team believes that there is a definite need for an improvement in patrol supervision and in the assessment of requirements for police services in various parts of the capital city. The National Police do not have a capability for using the crime incident report as a planning tool for the effective deployment of its personnel. A thorough survey of the need for police services should be conducted for each patrol zone. The character of such a survey and its management and supervision should be undertaken by the Planning and Research Unit of the National Police, which the Team recommends herein.

The Public Safety Program, as mentioned elsewhere, has maintained its distance by and large from the Judicial Police, now called the Detective Corps. Some assistance was provided to the Judicial Police during the early phases of the Rapid Police Development Plan, but little assistance is now being provided except that it is intended to have training programs incorporated into the Police Academy curriculum.

Other activities of the Rapid Police Development Plan are receiving the attention of the Public Safety Program and should continue to do so. For example, records and identification, firearms training, civil disturbance refresher training, administration and organization, and rural policing should continue to be areas of concern of the Public Safety Program. In the final analysis, it is fair to say that the Rapid Police Development Plan served well the purposes set forth for it. It identified specific courses of action for focusing police resources on a problem and brought about major improvements in specific functional areas to allow the National Police to deal with the problem. As shown in Figure 6, many of these specific activities have been completed, and it is also true that a number of the activities should be continuing factors in the Public Safety program.

## 2. THE NATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY

For years, such training as was conducted by the National Police for recruits and for in-service training has been conducted in a single room on the fourth floor of the National Police Headquarters building; the police palace. This was then an unsatisfactory arrangement from the standpoint of space and suitability of the location. Almost from its inception, the Public Safety staff has urged that new facilities be obtained for the development of an appropriate police training institution that can meet the needs of the force. These urgings have in the past been met with an agreement in principle, but lack of action in fact. Additionally, the Guatemalan Government has been slow to act due to the fact that the National Police would have to buy land for the purpose of a new academy. A review of Public Safety monthly reports over the past five years reflects a continuing effort on the part of the U.S.A.I.D. Mission and the Public Safety program to move toward the development of a National Police Academy. (A brief synopsis of the information provided in these reports is given in Annex F).

It is clear that there has been a great deal of delay in moving forward on the construction project of the academy. The grant agreement was signed and the funds were available by mid-May of 1970. In July, the implementation letter to the Minister of Government was sent to him asking that he immediately appoint a project supervisor. In accordance with the agreement, a project supervisor had to be appointed prior to the time that action could move forward. The Minister of Government delayed an appointment until the 1st of January 1971 stating that the reason therefore was due to a lack of funds for fiscal year (calendar year) 1970. The past calendar year was a period characterized by the development of the construction plans, attempts to procure land, hiring of a consultant engineer, the resignation of the project supervisor, and the appointment of a new one. At the end of the year, the U.S.A.I.D. and the Guatemalan Government agreed that delays had had a serious impact on the ability of the Public Safety program to move forward in this particular activity and that it was of mutual interest to undertake training at the earliest possible moment even in temporary quarters. In November of 1971, Lt. Col. Gildardo Ranferi Alvarado, a graduate of the International Police Academy

in Washington, was named as the Director of the new National Police Academy. The Public Safety Advisors began immediately to work with him and his staff in the development of the curriculum for recruit, and in-service training courses will be given in the new police academy.

A large house was selected, which is situated in downtown Guatemala City near the U.S. Embassy, as the temporary academy with one-third of the rent to be paid by the U.S.A.I.D. The Team visited these facilities and found them to be entirely adequate for the temporary quarters of the academy. But, the Team would caution that while these quarters are a great improvement over the single classroom in the National Palace that has served as the training facilities for the National Police, they should not be embraced as the solution to the training requirement. All must push forward to the completion of the new National Police Academy building on land that has now been acquired at Cipresales.

The Public Safety Program Advisors have been working for some period of time in the development of automotive maintenance capabilities and of communications repair and maintenance abilities of the National Police. They also have been working in this area with the Treasury Police in the past two years. Considerable improvements have been realized in this area, particularly as this relates to communications maintenance. The new National Police Academy building project includes provision for the construction of automotive maintenance and communications maintenance facilities as well. These various facilities will be part of a complex for which the United States has provided \$410,000 in Supporting Assistance grant funds in fiscal year 1970.

According to current estimates, the final contract for consultant services having been signed in late November, it is expected that an invitation for bids for construction can be prepared and published by the end of March of 1972. Should this be the case, the following is the chronological order of events:

- (a) Bids on construction open....May 15, 1972.
- (b) Construction contract presented to U.S.A.I.D. for approval....June 15, 1972.

- (c) Construction contract approved by U.S.A.I.D.....June 30, 1972.
- (d) Construction contract approved by the Guatemalan Government....June 30, 1972.
- (e) Construction starts....August 15, 1972.
- (f) Construction completed....August 15, 1973.

On the basis of these estimates, the academy would be completed and ready for operation by the 15th of August, 1973, or some one year and nine months hence. The Team has used this date in the development of its proposed Public Safety program for the near term as given under recommendations.

At the conclusion of the Team's visit and during oral briefings given to the Ambassador concerning the Team's findings and recommendations, the Ambassador commented that the August 15, 1973, date was too long to wait for the academy to be constructed, and he was very confident that the academy would be completed in much less time than that.

## **B. PROGRAM RESOURCE**

From fiscal year 1966 onward a total of \$3,064,000 has been devoted to the Public Safety program. This represents 4% of the total U.S. dollar costs for A.I.D. activities in such areas as agriculture, industry, education, health, public administration and community development. The U.S. funding during this period for the U.S.A.I.D. was \$70,335,000, of which \$15,962,000 was in grant funding. Since the beginning of the Public Safety program in fiscal year 1957, the total obligations for the program were \$4,427,000 and total expenditures were \$3,787,000. Table VI presents program funding obligations in relation to the purposes for which the funds were used and with regard to the kinds of funds provided.

**TABLE VI**

**PROGRAM FUNDING OBLIGATIONS**

FY 1966 through FY 1971 1/

(\$000)

	Alliance Grant	Contingency Fund	Supporting Assistance	TOTAL
Technicians	872	-	73	945
Participants	405	-	74	479
Commodities	290	702	180	1,172
Other Costs	45		423	468
	1,612	702	750	3,064

**1. TECHNICIANS**

A total of 23 Public Safety Advisors have been assigned to the Public Safety program since its inception in fiscal year 1957. Figure 7 presents the actual time for each of these advisors during which they were assigned to the project and reflects the man-years, per fiscal year, of technical assistance contributed toward the achievement of project goals. It will be noted that from the beginning of the program through fiscal year 1969, there was an average of 3.11 years of technical assistance provided. Also given is the authorized position level for the program by fiscal year. It can be seen that actual technical assistance inputs for the Public Safety program rarely matched the number of authorized positions in terms of numbers. This is attributable to the lead-time in filling positions and the actual arrival and departure times of the respective advisors. Figure 7 does not take into account home leave periods and absences from post on temporary assignments or on rest and recreation leave. Details

# MAN YEARS




Figure 7

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regarding the present Public Safety staff are presented in Annex G.

Since fiscal year 1966, or more precisely the beginning of the calendar year 1965, 804 days of technical assistance through temporary duty assignments (or 22-man years) was provided to the project by the Office of Public Safety, principally by Public Safety officers stationed in Washington. Of this number, 178 man-days (or 22%) represented temporary duty assignments of specialists connected with the Central American Telecommunications network activity. 6/

Information regarding the actual TDY assignments during this period in terms of advisor, purpose and length of assignment is presented in Annex H.

The effectiveness of advisory services during the course of the police assistance program has varied considerably depending upon the receptivity to such aid on the part of Guatemalan officials. This receptivity has been conditioned by the fact that, historically, the police have been dominated by the military forces. Army officers, retired or on active duty are appointed as Directors General and others frequently fill key positions at lower levels. Few of the officers appointed to head the police have any understanding of police operations and administration. At the most, they have remained in charge for six months, some a few days. They assume a disinterested attitude toward the job, regarding themselves as temporary caretakers to be relieved shortly and, according

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6/ During this period of time, the Office of Public Safety provision of TDY services to all Latin American posts rose from 73 man-days per year to over 600 man-days for fiscal year 1971. At the same time, the Office of Public Safety authorized position level for Latin America dropped from 103 in fiscal year 1967 to 58 for fiscal year 1971. The net effect of the latter has been the erosion of the Office's capability to provide TDY services of Spanish speaking specialists to meet field requirements for technical assistance wherein the needed direct-hired advisors are not assigned to the program.

to Embassy observers, some have regarded it as a means of improving their personal economic situations. Also, Ministers of Government have been changed frequently.

Military influence does not extend to police operations, but the military contrives to exercise control over the civil police functions at the highest level. All basic decisions affecting the police are made by the president and the military hierarchy. These are generally administrative in character and do not interfere with the overall operational activities or in the lower echelon police ranks except during a state of seige.

It is a rare military officer who has the interest in the development of a professional, more effective police force at the outset of his term of assignment as Director General of the National Police. In any case, the military officer so assigned, even should he have the interest and initiative, remains in his assignment for too short a period for him to learn the basic principles and concepts of civil police administration and the tenets of professional police operations. The concept of the provision of service to the people with the minimum use of force has to be learned. Public Safety advisors, consequently, have constantly been in a position of tactfully training the Director General in these concepts, with a degree of success that has varied considerably.

The size and progress of the Public Safety Program have risen and fallen successively, but the most consistent and appreciable progress has been apparent during the past year, and principally during the last nine months. The first National Police Director General appointed under the Arana administration cooperated with U.S.A.I.D., but only begrudgingly, because he had been ordered to do so. He was replaced in January 1971 by another Army Colonel, Genaro Alvarado Robles, a level-headed, cooperative individual who has spent 18 years in police and prison assignments. The prospects of his remaining are good.

Embassy observers comment that less corruption is now apparent in the National Police than ever before. Discipline and morale have improved markedly among the uniformed elements, and the public image has also improved. The army, which has always held the police in disdain, appears to be gaining some semblance of respect for them.

At the present time, the current Director General of National Police has been in office just more than a year. There has been greater success in the application of technical assistance during this past year, and particularly the latter part, than had been experienced in earlier years of the program. Part of this is attributed to a continuity that Colonel Alvarado now is providing and also to the fact that he has had considerable years of police experience in earlier assignments. For forward planning, one must assume, and hope, that Colonel Alvarado will be retained in his present position.

U.S. Public Safety advisory assistance appears to be well received by Guatemalan counterparts and in most cases the Guatemalan officers search out the U.S. Advisor for advice and counsel. The Chief Public Safety Advisor obviously has the confidence of the Director General of Police as well as the Minister of Government. The Team had an opportunity to talk with each of the latter, and not in the presence of the Chief Advisor, and they were consistent in their high regard for his professional ability and his value to them in providing counsel and advice relative to matters of mutual interest.

In commenting on the Public Safety staff activities, the Embassy recently stated: 7/

"Public Safety Advisory personnel restrict their activities to technical advice and training exclusively directed to the upgrading of professional skills of the police. Our men have achieved an impressive following among a growing group of police personnel who are actively interested in professionalization of their service.

The Public Safety Advisory staff maintains a very low profile in the country, avoiding all possible publicity and urging its counterparts to focus on GOG-National Police accomplishments in making news releases."

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7/ Guatemala Embassy airgram A-173, "The Public Safety Program in Guatemala", September 10, 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL).

\*Two participants arrived for General Course training but did not complete the program and graduate.

**TABLE VII**  
**PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM**  
**PARTICIPANT TRAINEES, GUATEMALA**

\*\* One participant arrived for General Course training but did not complete the program and graduate.

FY-63 FY-64 FY-65 FY-66 FY-67 FY-68 FY-69 FY-70 FY-71 7/1/71 to TOTAL  
10/31/71

**I. INTER-AMERICAN POLICE ACADEMY  
(PANAMA)**

1. General Course	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
2. Riot Control	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
3. Miscellaneous	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Sub-Total	<u>26</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>31</u>							

**II. INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY**

1. Senior	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
2. General Course	-	4	*57	33	27	**27	36	36	33	11	264
3. Police Executive	-	-	1	-	2	1	-	-	-	1	5
4. Technical Specialist											
a. Communications	-	-	4	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	8
b. Riot Control	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
c. Motor Transport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
d. Criminalistics	-	-	-	-	8	1	2	4	1	5	21
e. Traffic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
f. FBI National Academy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
g. Audio-Visual	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
h. Para-Military Training	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
i. Technical Investigation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	10
j. Prison Architecture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	4
SUB-TOTAL	<u>4</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>326</u>

**GRAND TOTAL**

30	12	62	33	39	29	39	45	46	22	357
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## 2. PARTICIPANTS

A total of \$578,000 has been spent for the training of 357 participants in the United States since the inception of the program and approximately a dozen police officers in Puerto Rico and in third countries. An additional 20 officers were trained in various courses at Fort Gulick in Panama making a sum total of 389 participants trained. Of this number, 250 remain in service representing 64.3%. The remainder have been discharged, resigned or retired, or died in service.

The character of the participant training program is reflected in Table VII, which represents the training provided to participants at the International Police Academy since the Academy opened in fiscal year 1963. Participant training prior to that time was provided at the Inter-American Police Academy, operated by the Office of Public Safety in the Canal Zone in Panama.

Participant training has proven to be an effective program instrument in orienting senior police leaders and middle management personnel toward civilian police concepts. The character of training provided at the International Police Academy is precisely that required for the Guatemalan police officer. It allows him to obtain a perspective of police organization and management problems generally and to acquire essential tools for problem solving within this framework. The participant program has had significant impact in that several of the key leaders now in the National Police force have received training in the United States (See Figure 2). Additionally, many of the participants contribute to in-country training programs on their return to Guatemala from training in the United States to carry forward with the multiplier concept embraced by the program. The character of this kind of training and the numbers of students trained is given in Annex I.

For fiscal year 1972, to date 22 police officers have been engaged in participant training programs or have graduated from the International Police Academy. Five currently are attending the Inter-American General Course No. 57 assigned to VIP Security Specialization. Others have been trained in traffic, border patrol and customs, criminal security, fingerprint classification, and in the academy's technical investigation course.

The emphasis of participant training programs in the coming year should focus on the need to develop an appropriate man-power resource for the communications maintenance facility for the vehicle maintenance facility, and for the new police academy. It should also emphasize the activities as proposed by the Team. (See page 99), which in addition to the foregoing are police records, rural police development, weapons, maintenance, administration and organization and urban police improvement. The Team estimates that approximately 35 students per year at an annual cost of approximately \$100,000 should be sufficient to meet this need.

### 3. COMMODITIES

Since the inception of the program in FY-1957, a total sum of \$1,886,000 has been contributed by the Public Safety program for the procurement of standard and conventional police items in the United States. Since the program was last evaluated, or since FY-1965 and through FY-1971, a total of \$1,278,000 has been utilized for the purpose of commodity procurement. This procurement has involved vehicles, telecommunications equipment, conventional police weapons and miscellaneous police items of equipment. Table VIII gives the funding provided for each of these general categories since FY-1965. The details of commodity procurement since the beginning of the program and a breakout by categories of commodity procurements since FY-1965 (data supporting the figures in Table VIII) are given in Annex J.

The provision of commodities in the Public Safety program has been a conventional instrument in support of technical assistance since the program's inception. In examination of the funding provided for commodities since FY-1957, Figure 8 reveals that of the fourteen years of the program's life, ten of these included funding for commodities at a bare "subsistence level". This has ranged from \$0 to \$88,000. In four of the years greater amounts were contributed for commodities and reflected opportunities seen by the Embassy and the U.S.A.I.D. to move forward in the development of the police institution. Two relatively major commodity inputs were in FY-1967 and in FY-1970 during the Mendez Montenegro regime and just before the assumption of power of the present president. (See Figure 5).

**TABLE VIII**  
**GUATEMALA**  
**COMMODITY PROFILE SUMMARY**

FY-65 - FY-71

(\$000)

	FY-65	FY-66	FY-67	FY-68	FY-69	FY-70	FY-71	TOTAL
1. Vehicles	500	4,800	92,964	2,700	75,200	200,523	34,425	411,112
2. Telecommunications	22,500	29,223	60,500	9,800	62,000	95,919	4,925	284,867
3. Weapons	36,900	20,000	186,160	12,771	21,300	45,318	9,918	332,367
4. General	8,600	8,000	110,620	10,792	16,000	24,320	600	178,932
<b>SUBTOTALS</b>	<b>68,500</b>	<b>62,023</b>	<b>450,244</b>	<b>36,063</b>	<b>174,500</b>	<b>366,080</b>	<b>49,868</b>	<b>1,207,278</b>

As can be seen elsewhere, the character of the Public Safety program has been designed to facilitate and insure the effective use of commodities provided by the program. Key assistance efforts have been in the fields of vehicle maintenance, communications maintenance, and weapons use and repair. The Team took note of the degree to which the equipment provided by the United States was being used appropriately by the police and found no instances where it had been misappropriated or misused. It should be noted that the police are not completely prepared to maintain police vehicles, radios or weapons and this continues to be an element of the Public Safety program and its objectives.

The preliminary U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety budget request of \$643,000 for FY-1972, submitted to OPS/AID/W by memorandum, included a commodity component of \$252,000, including automotive, communications, and maintenance equipment, small arms, ammunition, and \$49,000 of equipment for the new police academy and consolidated maintenance shop. It was anticipated that this quantity of commodities would be the first half of a two-year input aimed at putting the Guatemala security forces on a satisfactory level of sufficiency by the end of FY-1973 to adequately carry out their internal security mission while giving GOG time to arrange replacement from its own resources of worn-out equipment, thus terminating the U.S. commodity input at the end of FY-1973.

At a July 22 conference between the Ambassador, U.S.A.I.D. Director and Deputy Director, and the Chief PSA, it was agreed that the commodity request would be reduced to \$195,000 for FY-1972 and \$193,000 for FY-1973, to include the same categories of equipment, but in reduced amounts. This was submitted to AID/W in TOAID A-180, dated July 30, 1971.

It was agreed in the conference that negotiations would be undertaken to encourage more substantial GOG budgeting and investment for replace and expansion of police equipment and related items, and that the amount of A.I.D. commodities provided would be related directly to the amount of self-help on an approximately matching basis to which GOG would agree. The same approach was planned for FY-1973.


# GUATEMALA

## COMMODITY PROCUREMENT PROFILE

### AID vs HOST COUNTRY

#### FY 57 / FY 74

(\$000)



**SOURCE:**  
 - FY 57/FY 62 Guatemala Evaluation Report, Nov 1964  
 - FY 63/FY 71 U-203 Reports  
 - FY 72 Estimated Level.  
 - FY 73/FY 74 Proposed Levels.

Figure 8

The \$195,000 level of funding for commodities was reduced to \$67,000 by AID/W. This represents almost 75% of the amount needed by the project to achieve accomplishments for the Program in FY-1972 in areas of records, Rural Police, Urban Police, weapons, maintenance, communications, and related activities. The net effect of this reduction is to stretch out the program and delay reaching project goals. Most of the commodities needed, as set forth in Mission plans, represent the final phase of the Rapid Police Development Plan.

#### 4. OTHER COSTS

Under this category, U.S. project funds are provided for the purpose of paying for in-country travel and per diem of U.S. Advisors and for the local procurement of items in support of the administration of the program. This has amounted to approximately \$5,000 per year and has totaled \$29,000 since FY-1965. In the past two years, the funding made available for the program for this purpose has been at the \$15,000 level. A total of \$63,000 has been utilized for other costs since FY-1965.

#### C. **PUBLIC SAFETY COORDINATION WITH THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

The Team had some helpful meetings with Colonel Robert Mundinger, Chief of the Military Group and learned that he and Mr. Hardin, Chief Public Safety Advisor, worked quite closely together in the conduct of their respective activities. Hardin has given briefings to Mundinger's staff and sees to it that members of his staff are familiar with the content of the military assistance program and the MILGRP activities.

Colonel Mundinger provided a Fact Sheet on the objectives of the Military Group and this is reproduced as Annex K. The MILGRP has provided certain of its resources to some police officials. For example, classes on civic action have included some police officers from time to time. Further, during the initial days of the state of seige, established in November 1970, Colonel Mundinger and Mr. Hardin worked closely together to facilitate military and police coordination. Colonel Mundinger stated that he believed that the coordination between military

and police officials is much better than it had been in the past and that the military have a better image of the police officer. In discussing the value of the Public Safety program, Colonel Munding stated that he believed that the police are the first line of defense against criminality and subversion and that the government must rely on the police to deal with the problem. He stated that "it would be criminal if they were not prepared to do so". The present military assistance program will have 20 advisors, down from 26 last year.

#### D. NARCOTICS ABUSE

With the emphasis given to control of illicit narcotics traffic in foreign countries by President Nixon in his message to Congress of June 1971, the Embassy was asked to assess the degree of the narcotics abuse problem in Guatemala. The Embassy submitted two reports in 1971 which, along with memoranda of conversation with Guatemalan officials concerning the subject, are reproduced as Annex L.

These reports conclude that there is no known serious drug abuse problem in Guatemala. According to government estimates, the two most widely used "drugs" are marijuana and synthetic drugs dispensed without prescription in local pharmacies. The use of hard drugs is reported to be exceptionally rare, with known incidents involving foreigners rather than Guatemalan citizens. Guatemalan authorities, further, do not believe that Guatemala is used as a transshipment point for cocaine or heroin in any significant quantity.

At the present time, the responsibility for enforcement of Guatemalan narcotics laws rests with the INTERPOL section of the National Police. The Embassy reports that this section is relatively ineffective and that the control of narcotics use and trafficking is not seen as a significant priority by the Guatemalan authorities. There is little coordination between the four ministries (Treasury, Government, Defense, Public Health) involved in drug prevention, detection and prosecution. The security forces have no unit which functions as a narcotics section, and the government does not have an office primarily responsible for the drug problem. The Embassy estimates that it is unlikely that the Guatemalan Government will take steps

in the near future to remedy its shortcomings. The Minister of Government feels that he has resources at the present time which are adequate to deal with the problem. The Arana administration is assigning a top priority in the allocation of its limited resources to social development program, pacification efforts and civil police improvement designed to curb the current high level of political and common criminality of which drug abuse presents a small part.

Nevertheless, the Team believes that the Public Safety staff should vigorously pursue the subject of narcotics abuse control with top police leadership with a view to (1) obtaining accurate information and statistics regarding narcotics abuse within Guatemala and the transit of narcotics substances into and out of the country; and (b) development of appropriate resources within the National Police, incidental to the reorganization of the force, which can prevent the development of an internal problem concerning narcotics abuse and also deal effectively with any trafficking problem that may arise. One must be impressed by the fact that Guatemala City is one of the transit points for air traffic between Latin American countries and the U.S. Should current efforts be successful in combatting narcotics trafficking through presently used transit points, such as Panama, it is logical to assume that traffickers will search for alternate routes.

## PART VI

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### A. GENERAL

Based on observations and conclusions derived from its studies, the Team recommends that the structure of the Public Safety program and the manner in which it is conducted be modified to reflect the recommendations below. In order for the civil police forces of the Government of Guatemala to achieve self-sufficiency at the earliest possible time, it is recommended that:

NO. 1 - Commodity Procurement - that the United States Government, through a Project Agreement, provide an increasingly lesser share of funds for the procurement of commodities needed by the civil security forces.

The Team believes it is feasible for funding of commodities which heretofore have been carried by the United States to be shared on a one-to-one basis in FY-1973, on a one-to-two basis in FY-1974, and to be entirely borne by the Guatemalan Government in FY-1975.

As for FY-1972, in the course of developing his program proposal the Chief Public Safety Advisor discussed in general terms with the Minister of Government the fact that A.I.D. commodity assistance for the Guatemalan police would be conditioned on the amount of commodity self-help to which the Guatemalan Government agreed, and on an approximately matching level. Minister Arenales replied that he saw no problem in this approach, and that he would talk with the Minister of Hacienda and take immediate action to assure that the Guatemalan Government would respond on a one-to-one basis. Late in the calendar year, Minister Arenales advised that, as a partial response along the lines of this formula, the Guatemalan Government was buying some vehicles (2 sedans, 12 motorcycles and 12 jeeps) which will cost approximately \$85,000. It should be noted that the funds for this procurement were uncommitted ones, identified as the Guatemalan fiscal year was drawing to a close, and do not cover items which had been justified and requested by the Ministry in the police budget.

To fulfill the pledge inherent in the one-to-one formula accepted by the Minister, the Team considers it vital that an additional allocation of \$18,000 be made to the U.S.A.I.D. for Public Safety procurement prior to the close of FY-1972.

The Team also recommends, however, that AID/W consider the following argument in support of a still larger additional allocation for FY-1972.

Clearly, it is strongly in the interests of the U.S. for the Guatemalan Government to establish a line item in the police budget presentations for capital expenditures. This has not been done heretofore and such expenditures made by the Government have been with funds found available at the end of the fiscal year. As mentioned earlier, the Minister of Government has agreed verbally with a one-to-one sharing arrangement for FY-1972 (U.S. time frame). To proceed with the agreement on our side and to achieve the level of input overall believed required (Table IX), the U.S. should be able to make the necessary commitment to the Guatemalan Government at the proper time so that the leverage will be available for them to do likewise.

The Guatemalan fiscal year corresponds with the calendar year. The Ministries begin with their budget preparations in May and June of the preceding year and by the fall of the year, the Finance Ministry has submitted its proposal to the President and thence to the Assembly. Consequently, for the Guatemalan fiscal year 1973 planning will begin just prior to the end of the U.S. FY-1972.

The U.S.A.I.D. has proposed to the Team that the necessary leverage should be provided by means of allocating \$200,000 to the program for commodity procurement in May of 1972. It would then negotiate the FY-1972 Project Agreement, incorporating the formal agreement to share equally commodity expenditures. The U.S.A.I.D. would authorize a delay in the issuance of subobligating procurement documents for procuring the U.S. share of the commodities for about six months to determine whether or not the line item figure for commodity procurement in the GOG budget survives and the funds are provided the police by the President and the Assembly. It points out that should such funds not be available to them, the prospects of getting the Ministry of Government to include this item in the budget as a line item are slim.

**TABLE IX**  
**CIVIL POLICE COMMODITY NEEDS PROGRAM AND GOG PROCUREMENT PLAN**

	FY 1973		FY 1974	
	US	GOG	US	GOG
<u>NATIONAL POLICE</u>				
<u>Automotive</u>				
55 ea. Sedan Patrol Vehicle	(25)	68,750	(10)	27,500
22 ea. Bronco or equal	(11)	40,000	(10)	27,500
10 ea. Motorcycle, Harley-Davidson			( 5)	18,000
			( 6)	21,600
<u>Arms and Ammunition</u>				
2,000 ea. Cal. .38 Revolvers			(1,000)	69,750
Ammunition, .38 Cal. and .12 Gauge				15,000
Training Reload Supplies		10,000		10,000
<u>Communications</u>				
40 ea. FM-1	(20)	5,500	(20)	5,500
20 ea. FM-5	(10)	4,000	(10)	4,000
Spare Parts				10,000
<u>Investigation and Crime Laboratory Equipment</u>				
		1,000		1,000
<u>Riot Control Supplies (Tear Gas)</u>				
			1,000	5,000
<u>TREASURY POLICE</u>				
<u>Automotive</u>				
19 ea. Bronco (or equal)	( 7)	25,200	( 2)	7,200
			( 5)	18,000
			( 5)	18,000

TABLE IX (continued)

CIVIL POLICE COMMODITY NEEDS PROGRAM AND GOG PROCUREMENT PLAN

	FY-1973		FY-1974	
	US	GOG	US	GOG
<u>Arms and Ammunition</u>				
200 ea. Revolver, Cal. .38		(100) 6,975		(100) 6,975
20 ea. Shotgun, 12 gauge		(10) 1,020		(10) 1,020
<u>Communications</u>				
8 ea. Base Station, 100 Watt	( 4) 5,000		( 4) 5,000	
14 ea. FM-5	( 7) 2,800		( 7) 2,800	
<u>Office Equipment</u>				
1 Metal Filing, Cabinet	( 6) 500		( 6) 500	
<u>IMMIGRATION</u>				
12 ea. Metal File Cabinets, Letter Size	(12) 1,000			
	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>		<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	
	163,750	162,445	82,300	174,845
GSA	11,462.50	11,623.15	5,768	12,239.15
Freight Insurance	24,562.50	24,906.75	12,360	26,226.75
	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>		<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	
	199,775.00	198,974.90	100,428	213,310.90

The Team endorses this approach as one having practicality in the attempt to move the Guatemalan Government toward complete responsibility for commodity procurement. At the same time, it is aware of the difficulties this move presents to AID/W. It is apparent that A.I.D. generally will be receiving less money than expected from Congress for its FY-1972 activities and that the programming and funding cycle inherent in the U.S. split fiscal year cycle makes it difficult to march in step with the Guatemalans in a matter of this type. However, it is urged that efforts be made to seize upon funds that might be available from other deobligations as the fiscal year draws to a close.

In FY-1973, a U.S.A.I.D. allotment of \$100,000 for Public Safety commodities would be used to induce GOG to maintain or increase the \$200,000 equipment item in its budget, and at the same time insure maintaining program impetus at its required level. It is believed that a joint US-GOG commodity input of this level over the two-year period would put the civil police agencies on a solid footing equipment-wise and GOG would be prone to leave at least the \$200,000 item in its annual budget in future years for equipment replacement.

The U.S. should assist in the first two years of the GOG procurement by means of the establishment of a trust fund - the GOG would provide the funds and the U.S. would utilize its procurement machinery for procurement of items mutually agreed upon by the GOG and the U.S. Thereafter, regular GOG foreign procurement procedures should be used to relieve the U.S. of the need for this kind of administrative support, and to move toward the points at which the Public Safety staff would not be available to assist in the trust fund process.

Forward year planning (for FY-1973 and FY-1974) with respect to commodity requirements of the National Police and the Treasury Police is reflected in Table IX. Equipment needed for the National Police represents those vehicles, radios, and weapons required to complete the Rapid Police Development Plan. The equipment needed for the Treasury Police represents those items needed to upgrade their capability to a minimal extent as set forth in the project agreements and does not represent the kinds or quantities of equipment that would be needed should the Treasury Police be reorganized into a National Police and be given a broader mission.

It will be noted in Table IX that the Team proposes that the Guatemalan Government itself buy the arms and ammunition proposed, such crime laboratory and investigation equipment as will be required, and a resupply of riot control supplies. Otherwise, it proposes that the needs in communications and transportation equipment be shared between the United States and the Guatemalan Governments. The Team also proposes a caveat in this overall plan in that should the Guatemalan Government fail in providing for necessary funds for the procurement of the equipment as set forth above, the United States Government should then consider whether to provide some or all such funds for the procurement of these items, after a consideration of the degree to which the United States interests in Guatemala can be satisfied thereby.

NO. 2 - that present activities to modernize the police weaponry be continued, involving the procurement of 2,000 revolvers to replace obsolete and unreliable police weapons.

The procurement of police weapons is a continuation of the Rapid Police Development Plan and also an activity that was undertaken following an evaluation of police weaponry by Sobotta. <sup>8/</sup> This procurement would be at the GOG's expense. An inventory of police weapons is given in Annex M.

Additionally, a comprehensive training program in the use of firearms should be undertaken promptly. The objective of the program would be to train initially, or to retrain, all the members of the force in the use of standard police weapons. This would include the .38 caliber revolver, the carbine and the shotgun. A detailed firearms training program has been designed by the Public Safety staff and is given as Annex N.

Essentially, this plan calls for the prompt training of 17 firearms instructors by the U.S. Public Safety staff, some

<sup>8/</sup> "Survey of the Guatemala Police Forces Weapon System", Joseph Sobotta, Office of Public Safety, A.I.D., October 9, 1970. (LOU)

of whom would be formed into a mobile training team. The police reloading facility would be looked to for the provision of reloaded .38 caliber ammunition for training purposes. The United States should consider the procurement of brass casings to support this training program, at least initially. It would be expected that the Guatemalan Government would also have to contribute additional supplies and manpower for this training program and should make a commitment to consider such training in the use of firearms as a high priority matter.

NO. 3 - that a Planning and Research Unit be established in the National Police.

The Team believes that the Public Safety program should start to develop a Planning and Research Unit, reporting to the Director General, within the National Police force. This unit should have the task of reviewing the functions of the entire police institution and of making recommendations to the Director General for reforms. It would also be responsive to the Director General's direction for the conduct of special studies related to police operations.

The vital need at the present time is to strengthen the police institutional structure and to develop within it a mechanism for initiating and bringing about needed reforms. Once such a unit is developed and is successful in bringing about these reforms, the National Police will find it much easier to proceed in making changes within its structure which will be responsive to the needs for police services as time passes. This would create a self-sufficient means to assure continued development after the withdrawal of U.S. Advisors. A Planning and Research Unit would be a primary contact for the Public Safety Advisors on the matters of the preparation and review of proposals for changes seen as being important and significant on the part of the U.S. Public Safety staff.

Matters that might very well concern such a Planning and Research Unit would be as follows:

- (a) Reorganization of the National Police Force.
- (b) Planning and budget procedures and analyses.

- (c) Review of the Police Record System and the formulation of recommendations for improvement.
- (d) The identification of the adequacy of management of police resources within the police organization, the development of job descriptions for the new police organization, the definition of information flow within the organization, the improvement of property accountability, the identification of the manner in which property is used, the appropriateness and adequacy of supervisory practices, surveys concerning the need for police services and many others.

Some of the most pertinent studies for such an effective Planning and Research Unit are considered to be a statistical examination of modernized crime incident and arrest files in order to provide a means for a more effective deployment of police personnel; an examination of all public relations activities and the design of an imaginative public relations program; and a thorough review of possible police efforts in a modernized and imaginative police community relation program.

The United States resource inputs for the establishment of such a unit would be limited to the provision of technical assistance and the training of appropriate officers at the International Police Academy in Washington.

NO. 4 - that a study of the compatability of the National Police, Treasury Police and Mobile Military Police radios in the rural areas be undertaken to determine how to insure that a compatability can be guaranteed.

As mentioned elsewhere, the responsibility for rural policing is fragmented with very little cohesion in the use of government resources in dealing with rural law and order problems. At times of a security threat such as posed by subversive guerrillas, there is a need for joint operations including a capability by the representatives of the various police departments for talking with one another.

NO. 5 - that a detailed action plan be prepared for the development of the institutional element of the police responsible for vehicle maintenance - and well in advance of the time when a vehicle maintenance facility exists as a part of the new police academy.

Significant steps have been taken by the present Public Safety staff to develop the vehicle maintenance facility, which now exists on the first floor in the National Police Palace. Elements of the plan proposed should specifically include the development of supervisory responsibilities and administrative procedures, including appropriate records and budgeting procedures. All possible action on the part of the Public Safety staff should be undertaken to assure that at the time the maintenance facilities are ready, both the National Police and the Treasury Police will be in a position to step in and operate the new facility effectively and economically.

After the new facility has been opened, it is recommended that the Public Safety Advisor work with the staff in the new facility, with the utilization of newly designed procedures, to be sure that these procedures are appropriate when tested under actual conditions and that the institutional development steps that have been designed take root. It is expected that six months will be required for this purpose. During this period of time, the U.S.A.I.D. may wish to consider the advisability of urging the Guatemalan Government to hire a contract garage specialist who would be able to carry on a monitoring activity after the Public Safety Advisor departs. This should be adequate since the development requirements for such an institutional element should have been met by that time.

NO. 6 - that the Guatemalan Government be urged to establish a firm vehicle replacement program beginning with its FY-1973 budget.

It is too late to urge the Guatemalan Government to take this step for its FY-1972 budget. The cost for this program should amount to about \$230,000 each year which would be for the procurement of 20 urban patrol vehicles and 25 support vehicles of other kinds. An additional \$100,000 should be included in the Guatemalan budget each year for the procurement

of vehicle and radio communication for spare parts. These costs would be continuing costs and are not included in the commodity procurement requirements for the Guatemalan Government as set forth in Table IX.

It is proposed that the Country Team consider the feasibility of a loan to cover the first two years of the replacement program as a transitional step between U.S. grant funding as a means to meet the transportation needs of the police and the full procurement of these items by the Guatemalan Government.

NO. 7 - that the Country Team encourage the GOG to accord the Treasury Police the responsibility for providing daily law and order services in rural areas.

It is proposed that the Embassy, the U.S.A.I.D. and the Public Safety staff urge the Guatemalan Government to give the Treasury Police the responsibility for the provision of police services to rural areas generally. It is not recommended at this time that the responsibility of the Mobile Military Police be assumed by such a force, nor that such a force be incorporated into the National Police force itself. It is noted that such a proposal was placed by the Guatemalan legislature and was turned down. This latter proposal included the provision that the Treasury Police would be incorporated into the National Police. In discussions with the Minister of Government, the Team was advised that he intends to pursue this matter again, but will not include the provision that the Treasury Police be included as a part of the National Police organization.

Should the Minister of Government be successful and the president sign a decree broadening the responsibilities of the Treasury Police (the name under these circumstances would probably be changed to that of Rural Police), it is proposed that a detailed plan of assistance be developed for this new course, assuming once again that the Guatemalan Government will provide adequate funding for its reorganization and the conduct of its business. Care will have to be taken to see that the new "Rural Police" resources and those of the Mobile Military Police are used in mutually supported roles and that

they are not competitive. The Team believes that the United States should concentrate on assisting the Rural Police in its continuing Border Patrol and Contraband control activities as well, particularly as these may include the smuggling of narcotics. The Team believes that it is extremely important that such a change be made in the Treasury Police role in order to overcome what it sees as a serious inadequacy in the ability of the Guatemalan Government to deal with civilian law and order problems in the rural areas. The present methods for maintaining peace and order in these areas can only lead to inadequacies on the part of civil forces, requiring the use of military forces in addition to the Mobile Military Police after these initially civil problems escalate to the point where they must be dealt with by military forces.

If the Guatemalan Government does not take this step to expand the role of the Treasury Police, the Public Safety Program should concentrate on developing only those aspects of the Treasury Police which will be incorporated into the new police academy facilities that will be built.

NO 8 - that a detailed action plan be prepared for developing the communications maintenance institutional element in preparation for the new facility to be built in conjunction with the new academy.

The Public Safety program has been successful in making gains in this area to date and more so than in the case of vehicle maintenance. But, the services of a Public Safety Advisor (communications) will be required for a time. Adequate administrative and supervisory procedures will have to be devised and appropriate budgeting methods will have to be used to assure a constant availability of funds for the procurement of spare parts. The Team estimates that the advisor should be able to complete his technical assistance efforts in moving the telecommunications maintenance element to the point where it will be ready to move into the new laboratory facility sometime before that facility is actually ready. Therefore, theoretically he could depart post for a new assignment at that time, but he should be available to return at the time the new facility is open for a relatively short period to assist in the installation of the institutional element. He should remain for a

month or so to ensure that the institutional steps that he has been instrumental in designing in fact take root. The Team believes that the present Chief of the Communications Laboratory is an able officer and that if he should be changed, a serious problem with respect to accomplishing this task would result.


NO. 9 - that advisory assistance be provided for the development of a seminar for patrol commanders to improve the overall performance of the urban patrol force.

The Public Safety staff should concentrate on developing human resources of the patrol, particularly the supervisory officers. Emphasis in the seminar training should be given to manpower utilization, preventive maintenance for vehicles, radios and weapons; police community relations and roll call training including the provision of roll call training handouts. A closer advisory contact should be maintained with the patrol commanders on the maximum use of resources and on inspection procedures. An overall assessment should be made by the Planning and Research Unit along with the patrol commanders (with U.S. advisory help) on the use of foot patrol supported by mobile units as a means of providing the most effective preventive police coverage of the city.

Other recommendations made herein bear on the above such as the vehicle replacement program, firearms training and the establishment of a Planning and Research Unit.

NO. 10 - that an immediate refresher training program

# PROPOSED PROGRAM ACTIVITIES



DEC. 1971

ESTIMATED  
COMPLETION  
OF POLICE  
ACADEMY  
15 AUGUST

Figure 9

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During one occasion recently when the police and the military were called out on the street in anticipation of a civil disturbance, it is reported that police were well-equipped and disciplined and that the military forces were held in reserve and out of sight in accordance with the accepted practice. The problem is that of those police officers who have been trained earlier; many of them are by now in assignments which would not make them available for riot control duty in a short period of time.

## **B. THE PROPOSED PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM**

The major thrust of activities of the Public Safety Program will continue to be toward rapid development of the National Police Academy and its maintenance facilities. Some of the recommendations above deal with the manner in which the Team believes program resources should be used in the near term in order to prepare the Guatemalan Government for the time that the academy is ready for operation. Additionally, the program will continue to bring about greater improvements under the Rapid Police Development Plan, and carry forward an emphasis in the improvement of the organization, administration and management of police resources.

The Team identified 12 functional areas in which the Public Safety Program should be active for the next several years and estimated the time periods for each of these activities. This is schematically presented in Figure 9. As mentioned earlier, the Team used the estimated completion date of the academy as August 15, 1973. The Ambassador is confident that the academy can be opened earlier and the Team would hope so. The scheduling of Public Safety project activities, presently closely related to the opening of the academy, should undergo frequent review by the Public Safety staff, the U.S.A.I.D. and the Embassy.

### Resources Implications

With respect to Public Safety Advisors needed to carry forward the plan and assuming that the Guatemalan Government will assign significant rural police responsibilities to the

Treasury Police, the present seven-man staff can be reduced by one by the end of FY-1972. The staff would remain at the six-man level until approximately the end of the first quarter of FY-1973, at which time the Communications Advisor should have developed the communications resources of the National Police adequately. A five-man staff should be sufficient through the balance of FY-1973, after which one advisor would leave. The four-man staff would then be needed through the first 3/4ths of FY-1974, having provided the necessary degree of technical assistance to the National Police Academy. The Training Advisor and Motor Vehicle Advisor would then depart. Of the two remaining advisors, one could leave shortly thereafter, which would leave a one-man program for FY-1975 and onward.

This time schedule is obviously subject to a number of qualifications. The first of these is whether the Treasury Police is given broader responsibilities by presidential decree. If this does not happen, one advisor could leave earlier, since the program would be providing less assistance to the Treasury Police as it is presently constituted. Also, as time passes, the practicality of disengagement of technical assistance will be dependent upon the actual degree of self-sufficiency of civil police forces in the respective functional areas in which the program is engaged. Accordingly, the Team strongly urges that the Public Safety Program be reevaluated no later than approximately six months after the new National Police Academy has been established.

The past success in participant training leads the Team to recommend that a fairly constant level of training 35 police officers at the International Police Academy each year be incorporated into each year's plan. The character of training provided should be consistent with the major thrust of the program in training, equipment maintenance, and patrol operations and should continue to include, where appropriate, the training of selected officers in equipment maintenance schools in the Canal Zone.

Commodities to be procured under the proposed Public Safety Program are discussed under Recommendation NO. 1. The

estimated dollar resources for each fiscal, beginning in FY-1972, are given in the following table. (See also Figure 5).

**TABLE XII**

PROGRAM RESOURCE NEEDS, FY-1972-75

	FY-72	FY-73	FY-74	FY-75
Technicians	221 (7)	176 (5.3)	112 (3.5)	32 (1)
Local Hire	30 (4)	50 (4)	50 (4)	25 (2)
Participants	89 (30)	100 (35)	84 (30)	47 (15)
Commodities	60	200*	100	-
Other Costs	7	15	10	5
	407	541	356	109

\* See discussion regarding commodities,  
Page 110

As the Public Safety project moves toward the point where the National Police Academy completion date becomes more certain, the Team would suggest that the Ambassador consider the advisability of advising the president of plans for the reduction of police assistance as implied in the recommendations set forth herein, which are accepted by him and approved by Washington.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. HURWITCH,  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, BEFORE  
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN  
AFFAIRS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, SEPTEMBER 21, 1971

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you current political developments in Guatemala, and the status of U.S. Guatemalan relations. I believe it would be useful to set the backdrop for this discussion by touching briefly on some of the salient facts in the history of the terrorism which Guatemala now suffers, on U.S. interests in Guatemala, and on some of the current developments and problems in the U.S. Guatemala relationship, specifically as they relate to the four questions which Congressman Rosenthal has posed.

Taken as a whole, the Guatemalan society is poor, illiterate, culturally divided, and has a long history of resort to violent means of settling disputes. Only about a quarter of the five million population, in and around the cities, lives what can be called a modern life. Fully one-half of the population is Indian, descendants of Mayan tribes speaking one of some 14 Indian languages, and only fragmentary Spanish. The links of this group to the Spanish speaking and more modernized sectors of Guatemala are, at best, tenuous. In the main, however, this division has not to date been a significant cause of political dissension since the Indian population in Guatemala is still oriented inward, highly resistant to change.

Concomitant to this cultural and economic division is a serious political split among those sectors of the society that are articulate, and participate actively in the political life of the nation. The major issues dividing the political forces during the 50's and 60's have concerned the degree and pace of acceptable reform and the means to achieve it. This conflict has left a continuing legacy of enmity. This deep distrust between Left and Right combined with habitual report to violence contribute the basic ingredients of violence in Guatemala.

Violence on the part of a small minority will impose severe strains on any society, but its effect on a country as divided as Guatemala has been to increase polarization of the society and charge the political atmosphere with tension. The existence of the two Left-extremist, Cuban-supported groups seeking to exploit the present divisions, to exacerbate the tensions and accelerate polarization, has resulted in the acute level of violence that has attracted the attention of the international press. These two groups are the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (PGT/FAR) -- the action arm of the Communist Party.

The Rebel Armed Forces has no long-range program beyond the violent overthrow of the existing order. Aside from shop-worn Marxist cliches, its leaders express no commitment to specific programs or social reforms. Their attempts to develop popular support among the Guatemalan lower classes have not been successful. In the main the FAR is composed of young people simplistic in their view of world affairs and national problems, as well as fanatic in their hatred of their own government and of the United States. They have displayed some operational sophistication, but not on a level with that of the Tupamaros of Uruguay. Although most of the original leaders are dead, the FAR continues to stress brutal acts of terror as a means of gaining its goals--its brutal killings of U.S. Ambassador, John Gordon Mein, German Ambassador Von Spreti, and Guatemalans from all walks of life are among its achievements.

The links the FAR has with Castro's government are important factors in its aggressiveness, morale and ability to survive. A number of Cubans are currently in Guatemala training, advising, and in some cases directing the activities of

the same time it also uses violence as a revolutionary method through its action arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (PGT/FAR). Through this instrument the PGT is responsible for killings of police officers and kidnappings of wealthy Guatemalans for ransom.

From time to time the FAR and the PGT/FAR cooperate in joint acts of terror posing an added threat to the stability of the Guatemalan Government.

All Guatemalan Governments since 1961 have been plagued by FAR and PGT/FAR-inspired violence; the efforts to cope with it have met with only limited success. Consequently, the dominant issue of the 1970 presidential elections was the issue of the restoration of public order and peace. In elections which were widely recognized, even by the losing candidate to have been free and fair, the Guatemalan people chose Carlos Arana, an Army Colonel who had pledged to combat the terrorism and end civil strife.

Upon assuming office, President Arana dedicated his term to a dual attack upon violence in Guatemala both by improving the lot of the "marginal man" in Guatemala through socio-economic reform, and by emphasizing higher professional standards in law enforcement.

In his inaugural address President Arana rallied genuine support from his countrymen when he said:

"While the peasant masses continue without land, without assistance, without adequate credit, with misery and sickness as their sole patrimony, all the rest of us Guatemalans will suffer the frustrations of the poorest."

"It is indispensable that those who have more recognize the necessity that others have something."

"We all agree that Guatemala needs peace and the people elected us precisely because they want from us the pacification of the country."

One of his first major acts was to adopt the 5-year \$143 million Rural Development Plan developed by the preceding government.

The FAR and PGT/FAR, at first thrown off balance by Arana's reformism and insistence upon a legal battle against subversion, returned to their conviction that a repressive government best served their purposes and set out to stimulate repressive action. They resumed terrorist activity, concentrating on murdering easy targets such as low-level police. The Government had little choice but to meet this renewed challenge and Guatemala once again was thrown into civil strife and violence.

In accordance with the Constitution, President Arana established a state of seige, which continues to this day. The Guatemalan security forces energetically pursued the FAR, and its allies. Some success has been achieved: about 15 of the leadership and numerous rank and file members of both the FAR and PGT/FAR have been eliminated; numerous safehouses were disclosed, arms caches confiscated, and FAR documents detailing the structure and some membership of a sophisticated clandestine network were captured. The effectiveness and morale of both the FAR and PGT/FAR have been damaged by these losses and these terrorist groups have been forced to suspend many of their activities.

The Arana Government's success in limiting the insurgents capability has not been without cost. Common criminals have exploited the atmosphere of heightened violence; kidnappings for ransom, as well as murder today account for a large part of the high level of violence in Guatemala. Moreover, the situation of insurgency and counterinsurgency, indeed, President Arana has frankly called it a "civil act", has brought with it a hardening of positions on both sides, a circumstance that increases the risk that mistakes will be made and excesses will occur. Many Guatemalan officials are convinced that they are engaged in a war against a clandestine, ruthless enemy who would kill them if given the chance. They have seen that the Guatemalan judicial system cannot be relied upon to bring FAR terrorists to justice. Publicly uttered threats to kill the family of any judge who finds a FAR member guilty have been effective; findings of "not guilty" have insured the safety both of the judges and of the terrorists, while increasing the danger to the police who originally apprehended the terrorist.

In short, the judiciary is intimidated; and the fact of a clandestine "war" makes extremely difficult the task of

the police organization to produce hard evidence. The law enforcement examination in turn is discouraged over seeking necessary evidence by the judiciary's record in treating the terrorists; another factor is that they are insufficiently trained. The U.S. Public Safety program by working on the latter problem seeks to correct at least one of the elements of this circle.

It would be well, Mr. Chairman, to turn at this point to the question of U.S. interests and objectives in this complex of circumstances.

Although Guatemala is a small country, U.S. interests there are important, and derive principally from these considerations: its key location in Central America; its important role in the Central American integration movement; approximately 10,000 U.S. citizens reside there; and some \$230 million of U.S. investment. All of these considerations make it in our national interest that Guatemala not fall under the control of a regime hostile to the U.S. If forces hostile to the U.S. won control of the country, we could not protect our interests there; our interests in neighboring countries -- i.e., Mexico and Central America could also be endangered. Because in Guatemala the subversive threat is not potential but rather in being, the interest of the U.S. in assisting a constitutionally-elected government, which has the backing of its people and requests our help is correspondingly high. Consequently, the U.S. Government has maintained programs to assist in the economic and social development of Guatemala; to assist the military in building a counterinsurgency and civic action capability; and to support the government's efforts to create a professional law enforcement agency. In the main, these programs reached significant levels during the term of President Mendez and have continued in the term of the current president.

With this background in mind, Mr. Chairman, I would in concluding my statement like to turn to the four questions posed by Congressman Rosenthal in his letter to you of June 8, 1971.

1. Is the Department of State aware of and in agreement with the tactics being pursued by the Arana Government?

The United States Government is aware of the efforts of the Government of Guatemala to combat urban and rural terrorism which is in part inspired and aided by Cuba.

President Arana's announced policy is to use legal measures to achieve his goals. The U.S. Government is aware that departures from this policy have occurred in its implementation, and when such instances have come to our attention we have expressed our belief that such excesses were counter-productive. We believe our forthright expressions have been helpful in limiting excesses.

2. Define precisely how U.S. security could be adversely affected by events in Guatemala.

I have already touched on the important interests which the U.S. has at stake in Guatemala. Although a violent overthrow of the present Guatemalan Government by the Cuban-supported terrorists, does not appear to be likely in the near term, the prolonged continuation of the violence they cause will eventually polarize the nation and result probably in a more repressive and less representative government, with adverse consequences for U.S. interests.

3. Whether the United States provides logistical or other support--directly or indirectly--to the government's counter-terror operation, and if so, on what basis?

Neither the Public Safety Program nor the Military Assistance Program, contemplates the provision of logistical or other support--directly or indirectly--to counter-terror operations of any type. To the best of our knowledge no assistance by the United States has been used for such purposes. U.S. Public Safety assistance has been designed to improve standard legitimate police operations in combating terrorism as well as common crime by producing training and technical assistance in such areas: training of the policeman on the beat, vehicle maintenance, communications, patrol techniques, and the like.

4. Whether the Public Safety Program should not be terminated forthwith because of its inevitable association with this terrorism no matter what the intended purpose of the program.

Mr. Chairman, this is, indeed, a reasonable question that we also ask ourselves. We are aware of the considerations of our image at home and abroad of being associated with repressive governments. As we look at it, a freely-elected government is trying to bring peace and prosperity to its country and is impeded in part by externally supported extremists who are bent upon destroying it. This government has asked for our assistance. On balance, we believe that providing such an assistance better serves our interests. We are nevertheless cognizant that excesses are damaging and we therefore keep the situation in Guatemala under close and constant review, with particular attention to exploiting opportunities where we may exercise a moderating influence.

The National Police  
Identification Bureau

The Identification Bureau is a branch of the Headquarters of the Guatemala National Police. It was established 5 December 1922.

A. Functions

Its function is to provide technical assistance in criminalistics by scientific methods in the investigation of the various delinquencies and crimes that are committed in the country.

It furnishes this assistance to the security forces as well as the courts of justice.

B. Sections of the Bureau

Fingerprint Section - Henry  
Fingerprint Section - Oloris Vicetich  
Fingerprint Section - Single print and "Modus Operandi"  
Photographic Section  
Planimetric Section - (plans and drawings)  
Field Investigations  
Penal Records Section

C. Personnel Assignments

1. Chief of the Identification Bureau:

- a. Performs as an expert for the courts of justice of the Republic in the criminal field, and is appointed to the office at the request of the judge, to give opinion in the case of disputed proof, doubtful evidence, identification of persons, etc.

Prescribes means whereby the personnel under his command are present at the crime scene or where a disaster had occurred in order to collect proof or evidence for the solving of the same.

- b. Furnishes the Detective Corps, Complaint Section, Internal Investigation Section, etc., of the National Police information on the technical investigations performed and how they can contribute to the best performance of the assigned tasks of the solving of crimes.

His contributions are solely technical in reference to scientific investigations.

- c. He has charge of the criminalistic technical work for all of the courts of justice of the Republic, the agencies of the Headquarters of the National Police, and other agencies of the State, with the objective of solving unlawful acts in all of the national territory.
- d. Reviews and signs all correspondence sent to the various agencies.
- e. Through his methods cadavers are identified, and he has charge of checking and processing various analyses, such as the blood testing (locating, typing, and certifying) examination of seminal stains, comparison of hairs; narcotics; identification of arms; parafine tests; powders; tattoos; projectiles; cartridge cases; incendiaries; handwriting; identification by means of fingerprints; plants and palms; physical marks; cipher series; paints; protection and packing of all classes of evidence which is found or collected at the place of the happening by members of the Bureau or the National Police.
- f. Controls all subordinate personnel and advises directly those who work in the agency or sections of the same; controls the records which are kept in the Bureau or its sections.
- g. Is vigilant concerning the security of the sections that compose the Bureau and of the analysis and expertise of those who accomplish

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the same, applying modern techniques in keeping with the latest advances of the science.

- h. Sets up disciplinary guidelines for the personnel under his command, correcting irregularities in order to give better service to the public.
- i. Maintains careful and strict control of the identifications that are made in the Republic, with personnel assigned to all departments to set up fingerprint files of those detained in the jails of the country.
- j. Sets up strict control of delinquents by means of fingerprints; formulates the methods of operating the same; and maintains the records which are considered necessary for the good operation and functioning of the Bureau.
- k. Through his own effort or through any means that he considers proper, gives instruction to the personnel assigned to his section, such as short courses and subjects at the Institution in keeping with the scientific advances of other police organizations of the Hemisphere.

## 2. The Secretary

- a. In the absence of the Chief of the Bureau of Identification, the Secretary will assume his position and all the personnel and officials of the same, should respect and obey him in the performance of his duty.
- b. Has charge of the reports to the courts of justice on the identification of cadavers made by means of post-mortems, and of robberies; answers correspondence from other agencies; establishes hours of duty for the officers of the Bureau; and performs the other duties assigned.

3. Officials in charge of field investigation and fingerprinting

- a. Their responsibilities consist of going to the place of the crime and establishing the causes and gathering all types of evidence for the Crime Laboratory.
- b. Establish fingerprint files and post-mortem records in order to identify people, or to enlarge or improve the records.

4. Officials in charge of the Penal Records

In charge of preparing reports of the penal backgrounds for those persons who request the same.

5. Chief of the Photographic Laboratory

As the name indicates, this person is in charge of this Section and besides taking photographs, enlarges and reproduces the same.

6. Photographer

His responsibilities are: take photographs of cadavers at the scene of the crime, of criminals, and other photographic work as is assigned.

7. Clerk in the Photographic Section

Has charge of the filing of negatives of photographs and other work of the Section.

8. Planimetry (Plans and Drawings) Section

Its work consists of making plans and drawings to scale of the place where an act of violence has occurred, the same to serve as a supplement to the photograph, with the idea of giving the judge a clearer picture of the place and of the area where the event occurred.

9. Chief of the Henry Fingerprint Section

- a. As the name indicates is in charge of said section, having the responsibility for the good operation of the same; reviews the records, correspondence, etc.
- b. Maintains control of the personnel in his care in order to keep all of the assigned work moving, and to keep the Bureau Chief informed of the quantity of work occurring in the Section.

10. Clerk in the Henry Fingerprint Section

Has charge of the correspondence, maintaining control of the forms that are received and sent, as well as the fingerprint charts.

11. Officials in the Fingerprint Section

These are located in the Henry fingerprint section and the departmental headquarters; their function is the taking, the classification and the filing of the fingerprint charts.

12. Chief of the Chemical Laboratory and the Ballistics Section

Prepares all of the analyses which are requested to be made by the Chief of the Identification Bureau and his scientific opinion of it.

GUATEMALA

PRO-AGS - LISTED TARGETS/OBJECTIVES

1965 (Pro-Ag #65-7)

1. Improve and strengthen National Police, Judicial Police and Border Patrol to provide efficient civil law enforcement services to people.
2. Improve capability of National Police and Border Police to control mob actions, riots, and other civil disturbances.
3. To develop effectiveness of police and security agencies in utilizing modern technical methods and resources in operations.
4. Improve capabilities of National Police, Border Patrol and Judicial Police in criminal and special investigative techniques.

1966

1. To reorganize and modernize the National Police.
2. To improve the administrative and investigative capabilities of both it and the Judicial Police.
3. To greatly strengthen regional police telecommunications.
4. To increase the effectiveness of precinct patrols and improve the crowd and riot control capabilities of the capital police forces.

1967 (Pro-Ag #67-1)

1. Improvement of general personnel administration to establish a career system.
2. Improve and accelerate training program for existing personnel of National Police, Judicial Police and Border Patrol in controlling mob actions, riots, guerrillas, terrorists, subversives and other civil disturbance situations.

3. Adopt an improved program to service and care for police vehicles.
4. Establish uniform system of crime reporting and records.
5. Improve and extend communications system.
6. Improve capability of police agencies in criminal and special investigative techniques.
7. Improve police services in rural areas.

1967 Pro-Ag #67-1 Revision No. 1 objective - to demonstrate improved police methods and organization by implementing a pilot model police precinct in Zone 5 Guatemala.

1967 Pro-Ag #67-1 Revision No. 4 - to improve and strengthen the capability of the civil police to handle terrorist and guerrilla activity, especially in urban areas, and support plan to eliminate insurgency.

1968 Pro-Ag #68-10 - to improve and strengthen organizations and administration of National Police, Border Patrol, and Judicial Police to provide more effective law enforcement services to the people in following areas:

A. Administration: more formal planning, better communication, career service, more effective use of personnel and equipment, and expansion pilot model precinct to all of Guatemala City.

B. Training: including establishing Police Academy.

C. Communications & Transportation: to determine needs, develop procedures for coordinated use with military in emergencies, establish single facility for maintenance.

D. Records: improved system of reporting, adoption Henry system, more accurate recording and accountability of property.

E. Laboratory: improve and expand use of Police Lab and improve photo lab.

UNCLASSIFIED

F. Investigations: to coordinate facilities and efforts of all civil police units, improve basic procedures and improve method of identification and apprehension of suspected criminals.

G. Rural Services: to demonstrate improved police methods in rural areas, to implement the Esquintla Rural Mobile Patrol plan in all of Guatemala.

1969 Pro-Ag #69-5

1. Pilot Model Department and Rural Mobile Patrol - Esquintla
2. Communications: National Police communications organization. Extension of primary network.
3. Riot Control: organize, train and equip group of 100 men in Guatemala City and smaller groups elsewhere.
4. Police Academy: site to be acquired and preliminary plans and cost estimated prepared.
5. General Police Operations: improve investigations and crime control techniques, inaugurate counter-guerrilla and counter-subversive methods, upgrade patrol practices, reorganize and modernize vehicles, communications and armament maintenance divisions and assist in organizing training programs.

1970 Pro-Ag #70-13 (Administration and Training) - increase capacity for roll call training within the five Guatemala City police precincts, and Pro-Ag #70-14, to:

A. Upgrade technical proficiency of local mechanics and technicians to level of full competence in vehicle and communications equipment repair and maintenance.

B. Establish standardized administrative procedures for maintenance schedules, spare part procurement and stock/tool control, and in the

1970 Pro-Ag #70-22 to do the following:

A. Intensification of patrol coverage, both urban and rural.

B. Expansion and improvement of investigative capabilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

C. Diversification in employment of civil disturbance control units.

D. Integration of identification and records facilities.

E. Institution of adequate automotive fleet management procedures.

F. Institution of administrative reforms which will result in more efficient management.

1971 Pro-Ag #71-18

1. Administration and Organization (077.1)

A. Establish in each police agency a Planning & Budget Office.

B. Establish professionally staffed photographic laboratory.

C. Improve purchasing section within each police organization by establishing a petty cash fund.

2. Mobility and Communications (077.2)

A. Set up communication Dispatch & Control Center.

B. Develop sufficient administrative and technical capability in vehicle/communications repair and maintenance whereby 50% of vehicles and 90% of communications units are in daily use.

C. Prepare and adapt financing plan and schedule for replacement of vehicles and communications equipment by GOG.

3. Rural (077.3)

A. Place in operation all telecommunication nets in all departmental capitals plus certain selected towns in interior.

B. Establish standardized police records and criminal investigation system, basic photo labs, and photographic centers in Escuintla, Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu, and San Marcos Departments.

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4. Training (077.4)

A. Expand roll call and specialized training to point where at least 50% of police are receiving minimum of one hour training weekly.

B. Assign to responsible positions for a minimum of 2 years, at least 45 qualified police officers who have been given US/IPA for Fort Gulick training.

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX   D  

RAPID POLICE DEVELOPMENT PLAN DETAILS

Immediate Activities

Reorganize patrol coverage for Guatemala City area by:

- A. Revamp master patrol plan for the capital area, providing for motorized and foot coverage as determined by priority need and providing for "staggered" shift changes so that the city will remain partially covered by patrol during the hours of changes.
- B. Establishing a more effective supervision plan over patrol personnel and revamping shift changes, making additional personnel available in accord with number of patrol vehicles which can be made available to them.
- C. Place inservice shotguns, flashlights, megaphones, handcuffs, gas equipment, and first aid equipment already on hand.
- D. Determine whereabouts and assignment priority of all patrol vehicles. GOG must be urged to increase budgetary allocation supply of 30 gallons of gasoline daily plus needed oil and other lubricants for each vehicle in order to keep patrols in constant movement. Maintenance must be upgraded to ensure maximum number of the 35 existing patrol vehicles in service and moving at all times.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- E. Provide proper communications support by rearranging dispatch center for more efficient operation and moving the "10" incoming emergency telephone line from the investigation (complaints) division to the dispatch center.
- F. Conduct in-service training for patrol personnel as follows:
1. Care of individual, automotive and communications equipment.
  2. Pursuit tactics, road blocks and searches.
  3. Emergency bomb discovery procedures.
  4. Preliminary field investigations (arrival at scene).
  5. Arrest and movement of prisoners.
  6. Public relations.
  7. Any developing requirements.

UNCLASSIFIED

To Increase Police Investigation

- A. Increase the number of vehicles assigned to the "Complaints" Division in the National Police by urging assignment of National Police vehicles not in police use to the Complaints Division.
- B. Improve communications capability by installing on-hand mobile radio equipment in above vehicles and providing hand-portable equipment now available for tactical operations.
- C. Increase and diversify from existing stocks small arms firepower for operational improvements and to repel attacks.
- D. Assist in development of bomb disposal capability by training and adaptation of equipment to transport explosive devices.
- E. Prepare and administer a well rounded and complete in-service training program to cover all phases of investigations.

To improve effectiveness of National and Treasury Police task force operations:

- A. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps and the Prevention Guard of the National Police as well as two squads of Treasury Police are now well trained in riot control. The function of these squads must be expanded to provide manpower in various emergencies, especially to saturate any given area with foot patrol.
- B. Mass transportation for task force personnel can be provided to any area in the city through use of A.I.D. provided trucks already delivered for that purpose.
- C. The operations of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd National Police Corps must be individualized to allow each to function as an independent unit until the need occurs for reinforcement. The 4th National Police Corps, located in lower risk areas, must develop a similar force which, along with the Treasury Police squads, can be moved to any of the first three zones as backups.

146.

The Central Records and Identification Facilities

The Central Records and Identification facilities should be improved whereby suitable space for a central records and identification unit where offense reports, arrest records, and criminal identification records from the entire country will be filed for availability to any authorized agency or official. The following steps are necessary in the beginning:

- A. Screen all personnel for fitness, eliminating the unfit and replacing them with qualified personnel.
- B. Institute a preliminary training project in records management.
- C. Place in use filing and index cabinets (A.I.D. provided) already on hand.
- D. Devise standard multi-copy forms for recording offenses, arrests, criminal history, and indexing.
- E. Establish an interim system for ensuring that persons arrested in the various corps areas are fingerprinted and photographed until facilities can be established in each corps.

UNCLASSIFIED

The following are things which should be done immediately to "shore up" police mobility"

- A. Get administrative approval to reorganize National Police Vehicle Maintenance Shops along functional lines.
- B. USAID should employ a local contract technician to work full-time in maintenance, supervising reorganization and carrying on in-service training for mechanics. Cost: \$7,300 per year.
- C. Urge GOG to make priority procurement of needed repair parts to put patrol vehicles back in operation.
- D. Contribute to a strengthened radio patrol operation in the city and a more highly mobile investigations group (Complaints) by urging GOG administrative evaluation of vehicle assignments, putting back into police service those police vehicles serving non-police functions and putting most in patrol service and assigning an adequate number to "Complaints".
- E. Expand driver training program to provide sufficient drivers.
- F. Issue USAID provided shop equipment on hand to improve maintenance practices.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

G. USAID request priority delivery of 22 pickup trucks, originally intended for rural use, to be used in strengthening the urban mobile patrol, and allocate approximately \$9,000 for adapting those to urban patrol needs.

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

Police communications capabilities should be imposed in several ways:

- A. Support and complete any "crash" or emergency radio communication requirements as needed to complement the activities of other advisors. This includes rural, civil disturbance, etc. networks consistent with good radio system design practices and the ability of the security organizations to absorb and support new inputs.
- B. Equip any available working police vehicles with mobile radios which can be assigned for patrol purposes. 28 VHF-FM mobile sets are currently in A.I.D. stock for this purpose. To be coordinated with vehicle advisor and Chief of Radio Patrol.
- C. Place the existing GOG high-level security coordination network in a two-channel basis among security officials. Channel one for liaison with ordinary operations of National Police (also same as Escuintla frequency) and channel two exclusively among GOG security officials as currently arranged. Terrain features eliminate radio traffic congestion between Escuintla and Guatemala City.

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

D. Work to establish modern communications operation center to include centralized radio and telephone operations. This is a longer-range project requiring periodic discussions with Director General of National Police and other officials. Location acceptable to police must be firmed up. Minimal police radio operations needs are barely met by existing radio patrol communications center.

UNCLASSIFIED

"CRASH" PROJECT DETAILS

The following measures are recommended to upgrade the effectiveness of urban patrol in Guatemala City in order to deal with the crisis.

- A. Have a minimum of 35 serviceable motor vehicles on patrol at all times, crewed by well-trained and supervised police personnel.
  - 1. Adapt per attached diagram the 22 pickup trucks now on order - additional cost approximately \$9,000.
  - 2. Provide 30 additional vehicles, radio equipped and adapted as in 1. above, to make a patrol fleet of 52 vehicles, the number considered necessary to keep 35 in operation at all times. Cost with radios-\$135,000.
- B. Urge GOG to purchase additional bicycles to increase non-motorized patrol coverage and at same time maintain close police contact with the public.
- C. Have six months TDY technician to spend about half his time working with key National Police officials on development of patrol plan and in-service training program. Cost of TDY technician - approximately \$15,000.

UNCLASSIFIED

D-11

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UNCLASSIFIED

RURAL POLICE DEVELOPMENT

- A. Recognizing that basic changes in roles and missions of the Treasury Police would be needed, the USAID would continue to press for them. If successful, it would be at least 18 months from date before any appreciable effect can be felt from expansion of the Treasury Police. In the meantime, some efforts must be made to provide rural police services through whatever National or Treasury Police personnel are available in the rural areas. USAID should concentrate on the departments where priorities are most urgent, i.e. Escuintla, Suchitepequez, Retalhulau, San Marcos and Huehuetenango.
- B. USAID is prepared to support in-service training in the field in rural police patrol and tactics, criminal investigations, rendering or miscellaneous services, etc.
- C. Twenty-five radio equipped vehicles, for rural police operations, should be purchased to replace those recommended for diversion to urban patrol. Approximate cost with radio - \$105,000.

UNCLASSIFIED

D-13

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Urgent steps are needed in the communications area. These are:

- A. Procure console equipment and urge GOG to install 6-10 position emergency telephone answering facility in juxtaposition to dispatching consoles, as well as doing necessary building alterations to accommodate efficient receipt of calls from public and dispatch of urban radio patrol units. Cost of Console Equipment - \$45,000.
- B. Use 55 ea. 5 watt FM radios and 25 ea. 1 watt radios on a highly flexible basis to establish tactical urban and rural nets in support of specialized police operations.

ANNEX E

FIVE YEAR ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM - GUATEMALA, 1967 - 1971 INCLUSIVE.

September 1971

USAID/GUATEMALA

E-1  
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FY 1971

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

A. Mobility and Communications

1. Place in operation a central dispatch and radio control center at National Police Headquarters designed to provide more intensified patrol coverage and more rapid response to calls for police assistance.

2. Upgrade vehicle/communications repair and maintenance capabilities to level where 50% of vehicles and 90% of their radio units in operation on a daily basis.

3. Prompt GOG to adopt financing and schedule plan for replacement of vehicular, radio and other non-expendable equipment.

1. Central dispatch and control center under construction, scheduled for completion 15 October, 1971.

2. At least 75% of vehicles and 90% of radio equipment operational on daily basis.

3. Verbal GOG commitment received ministerial level to match dollar for dollar U.S. commodity grants with GOG equipment purchases. It is believed that after FY 73 GOG can be self-sufficient in this respect.

1. Slow workmanship may retard completion by 2 months.

2. Need for better auto shop organization and leadership, training of personnel, and concentration on repair of police vehicles.

3. USAID awaiting approval FY 1972 funding to arrive at firm agreement, work up detailed purchase plan with GOG.

B. Training

1. Expand roll-call and specialized training to provide at least 1 hour's instruction per week for 50% of the policemen in radio patrol operations, riot con-

1. Roll-call training in police subjects is now being given at all Corps headquarters and stations in the capital. Correspondence training in these subjects

1. None at this time.

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FY 1971

OBJECTIVES

trol, crime laboratory operations, firearms, and criminal and traffic accident investigations.

2. Assign at least 45 personnel trained in U.S. or Canal Zone to key positions in the National and Treasury Police for a minimum of 2 years.

C. Rural

1. Have radio net completed linking National Police in capital with all departmental headquarters and the latter with important towns and villages.

2. Establish standardized police records and investigation systems, basic photographic laboratories and centers in high prior-

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

to supplant roll-call instruction is being given by the National Police Academy section to personnel in the departments.

2. At least 63 U.S.-trained officers now occupy key positions in the National and Treasury Police, including the Acting 2nd. and 3rd. Chiefs of both organizations, National Police Corps Commanders in the capital, 12 Departmental Commanders, as well as the Director of the National Police Academy Section, and various officers in important positions at subordinate levels in both agencies.

1. National Police now have communications between capital and all departmental headquarters. Eighteen towns and villages, considered high risk, are tied in.

2. No progress to date.

PROBLEMS

2. None at this time.

1. Technical difficulties such as deficient antennas, etc., must be remedied.

2. Lack of necessary police personnel of sufficient capacity in these areas, along with departure Rural Public Safety Advisor

-157-

FY 1971

OBJECTIVES

ity departments of Escuintla, Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu and San Marcos.

D. Administration and Organization

1. Establish planning and budgeting office in National and Treasury Police, staffed with qualified officers, serving as special advisory units to the Director General of each agency.

2. Establish petty cash fund in each police agency to enable purchases of local services and small value commodities of joint USAID/Police project activities.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. A rudimentary planning and budgeting office has now been established in the National Police. It performs research for purposes of budgetary planning, but lacks necessary sophistication to engage in operational research and planning.

2. Petty cash fund has been centralized in National Police and is functioning satisfactorily with adequate controls. It is believed that GOG will be able to assume a greater share of this responsibility by FY 73, and entirely by FY 74.

PROBLEMS

have prevented implementations.

1. Lack of personnel sufficiently experienced and developed to comprehend concepts of operational research and planning.

2. No problems at this time.

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FY 1971

OBJECTIVESACCOMPLISHMENTSPROBLEMS

2 Training Advisors\*

1 Rural Advisor

1 Telecommunications Advisor

1 Logistics and Auto Maintenance Advisor

Local Staff

1 Assistant Public Safety Advisor

1 Administrative Assistant

2 Secretaries

F. AID Funding

	Total FY 71	\$416,679
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Technicians		230,479
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Participants		87,300
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Commodities		50,200**
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\* 1 vacant since early April 1971; replacement ETA 15 October.

\*\* Includes 4 excess school type buses, 22 excess jeeps, 96 police shotguns, communications and automotive maintenance tools, and audio-visual and photographic supplies and equipment.

FY 1971

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

Other  
(GOG contribution Q.153,000)

G. General Remarks

1. A major portion of USAID Public Safety Division time and effort was devoted to implementation of the Rapid Police Development project, to be discussed in greater detail under FY 70.
2. Wide spread corruption at all levels has relatively disappeared from the National and the Treasury Police during the past year. The task of eradicating it completely is never-ending.
3. Police response to USAID efforts increased markedly during FY 1971, especially in the latter half year.
4. Judicial Police integrated into National Police as Corps of Detectives by legislative enactment. A new, professionally trained chief was appointed. A USAID-supported training program, first in the history of the institution, was initiated November 1970.
5. USAID commodity input sharply reduced for FY 1971 to allow for phase in of commodities programmed during last quarter FY 1970.

FY 1970

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

A. Administration and Training

1. Increase capacity for roll-call training within 5 police precincts (Cuerpos) of Guatemala City so that continuing classes may be held for groups of 40 agents at a time in each precinct.

1. Fully implemented.

1. All training suspended indefinitely in Treasury Police because of internal security situation in country.

2. Expand audio-visual capabilities at central training facilities of the 3 civil police agencies (National, Judicial and Treasury Police).

2. Audio-visual capabilities expanded at National Police Academy by provision of equipment by USAID, U.S. training for one audio-visual specialist who now heads the Audio-Visual Section. Limited equipment was provided the Treasury Police.

2. Lack of interest on part of Judicial Police to develop training discouraged U.S. assistance for time being.

B. Maintenance and Communications

1. Upgrade technical proficiency of local mechanics and technicians to a level of full competence in repair and maintenance of all police vehicles and telecommunications equipment.

1. Progress has been steady with respect to radio communications maintenance personnel in the National Police. However, Treasury Police capabilities are deficient and slow developing, mostly because of poor leadership in that area. Competence in the Judicial Police is clearly lacking and no interest in improvement is apparent.

1. Lack of appreciation for importance of adequate, well controlled maintenance system.

1/6/70

OBJECTIVES

2. Establish standardized administrative procedures for maintenance schedules, spare parts procurement, and stock-tool control techniques for all vehicular fleets and communications equipment.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In motor vehicle maintenance 1 participant each from the National and Treasury Police was sent to a Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic's Course (Spanish) in the Panama Canal Zone. National Police efforts to upgrade qualifications of personnel have been irregular and unreliable. Treasury Police garage personnel have shown steady improvement. None apparent in Judicial Police.

2. Progress has been most visible in the National Police Radio Repair Laboratory where radio equipment is now regularly maintained, spare parts are being procured by GOG, with adequate, systematized control established over spare parts inventories. Progress in Treasury Police is limited, and none is apparent in the Judicial Police.

In the National Police garage a spare parts inventory control system and a tool crib have been established. However, administrative controls vehicle repairs have yet to be established. All controls in Treasury Police garage are

PROBLEMS

2. Lack of qualified and effective leadership in garages, and radio maintenance at Treasury Police and temptations which exist with respect to a diversification of materials and labor to non-police purposes.

REMARKS

162.

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

considered inadequate but improving since change of leadership under new GOG. There is no semblance of control in the Judicial Police garage.

C. Rapid Police Development Project

1. Intensified urban patrol coverage to repress terrorist and criminal activity.

a. Commit more budgetary resources to support patrol operations.

b. Add 52 plainly marked patrol vehicles, radio equipped.

2. Upgrade quality of investigative personnel by effective screening methods followed by intensified training in investigative and surveillance techniques. Provide additional automotive and communications equipment.

1. Radio patrol coverage in capital has been strengthened to provide greatly improved police services. Adequate gasoline and lubricants have been provided and an average of 40 patrol vehicles are on the streets at any given hour.

2. Investigative function was concentrated into newly established Detective Corps of the National Police, and the old Criminal Investigations Division was eliminated. Ten per cent of the investigative personnel, termed inept and corrupt have been removed. The first training in history of this institution is in progress. Eight radio equipped sedans, as well as portable tactical

1. None at this time.

2. Lack of control by Chief of Detectives over all personnel assigned to his corps. Assignment of personnel unqualified morally and technically. Lack of training for majority of investigative personnel. Lack of good administrative support, especially for automotive, radio and firearms maintenance.

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FY 19.

OBJECTIVESACCOMPLISHMENTSPROBLEMSREMARKS

3. Continue formation, organization and training of task forces to be employed in riot control and saturation foot patrol.

3. Task forces have been formed, organized, and trained in each police corps of the capital, as well as in the cities of the country. Equipment consisting of plastic shields, tear gas, and helmets has been provided.

3. Continuous transfers of personnel in corps creates difficulty in maintaining task forces intact and at satisfactory training level.

4. Continue formation of central records and identification units, drawing them into closer cooperation and coordination with criminalistics laboratory and investigative units, and communications.

4. The identification section of the National Police has been improved by training of 32 fingerprint technicians and addition of 20 fingerprint cabinets. The records section has been reorganized and has been restaffed. The crime laboratory is under new leadership and a TDY Technician from AID/W has provided technical advice as well as on-the-job training for the staff. These units are now serving all operational arms of the police.

4. Lack of personnel and space to make adequate checks on criminal records of subjects fingerprinted. Continued lack of uniform record forms. Failure of operating arms of National Police to utilize identification records and laboratory facilities.

5. Support strengthening of patrol and investigative capabilities in rural areas.

5. At least one new rural type patrol vehicle has been provided the

5. Lack of personnel in sufficient numbers to provide adequate police

164.

FY 1970

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

6. Press for early completion of central maintenance facility and institute adequate fleet management procedures.

7. Modernize dispatch center in Guatemala, including 3-channel dispatching for radio patrol. Integrate emergency phone answering with radio dispatch.

8. Continue to develop and expand rural communications nets, using existing equipment.

National Police in each department. The Treasury Police have received a number of vehicles from U.S. excess property. Training has been extended to police personnel in the outlying departments.

6. Pre-construction activity for the central maintenance facility is proceeding. Both the National and the Treasury Police have appointed fleet management chiefs, and new control procedures are in operation.

7. Construction of the new central radio dispatch center is well along--estimated completion date is 15 October 1971. All incoming telephone calls will first be answered in the center. An emergency telephone number "10" has been adopted and is in use.

8. Rural communications have been expanded and strengthened per rural communications accomplishments in FY 71.

services in rural areas. Maintenance of vehicles in rural areas is difficult.

6. Lag in GOG activity has placed construction about 8 months behind schedule.

7. Slow and inadequate labor supply at National Police.

8. Some technical difficulties, such as insufficient antenna height, making transmission difficult at certain period

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FY 1970

OBJECTIVES

9. Upgrade armament by having TDY Arms Specialist make survey of arms in 3 police agencies. Provide small arms repair training for at least 6 personnel.

10. Intensified training in patrol and task force operations, investigations, and records and identification work. Continue participant training at same level as planned.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

9. The small arms survey was completed in September 1970. It was followed by an in-country small arms repair course given by the same TDY Technician to 16 personnel from the National and Treasury Police. Small arms repair shops, equipped with USAID-provided tools, have been established in both police agencies, and an armaments officer has been designated in each to ensure adequate arms maintenance country-wide.

10. Intensified training was provided in task force operations, patrol tactics including use of police shotgun. Criminal investigation training initiated and now in progress. Participant training proceeding at planned level with improved selection methods instituted.

PROBLEMS

of day. Need for technical improvements such as alternate power supplies.

9. Insufficient serviceable sidearms for all operating personnel. Lack of transportation to transport arms to capital for repair and return to respective units.

10. Inadequate physical facilities for training.

REMARKS

1/66.

<u>OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHMENTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
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D. Guatemalan Police Academy and Consolidated Maintenance Shops

Constructing, equipping, staffing, and utilizing a police school and maintenance facilities intended to strengthen the capabilities of the National Police and the Treasury Police.

Supporting assistance funds amounting to \$410,000 (FY 70) have been allocated for constructing and equipping the facility. GOG has provided land valued at \$160,000 and has appointed a project director. The bid for a consulting engineer firm has been awarded to a reputable firm. GOG budgeted \$150,000 to the project for 1972.

Lag on part of GOG in meeting conditions precedent to disbursement, as provided in Grant Agreement, has delayed initiation of construction.

TOTAL FY 70 \$1,128,853

Technicians	209,000
Participants	95,000
Commodities	401,000*
Academy	410,000 (SA)
Other Costs (GOG Contribution 0.451,915)	14,000

\* \$378,000 SA funds for Rapid Police Development Project.

G. General Remarks

The Rapid Police Development Project was a high impact activity whose overall objective was to assist the new Arana Government in increasing the capabilities

FY-1969

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

of the National Police, and to a lesser extent the Treasury Police in the shortest length of time to the extent that they can more effectively combat terrorism and maintain law and order. It was implemented simultaneously with the ongoing FY 70 and 71 projects. There has been almost 100% initiation of planned activities.

A. Pilot Model and Rural Mobile Patrol, Escuintla

To improve the organization, training and equipment of the police forces in the Department of Escuintla, including organization of a new mobile patrol force of civil police to serve rural areas and cities of less than 5,000 population. A maintenance facility for police vehicles in the department will be constructed at Escuintla and equipped and staffed with competent personnel. The concept will be similar to that employed at the Pilot Model Precinct project in the capital city. The department of Escuintla will be used to test and develop a program which may be subsequently expanded to all departments.

USAID continued to furnish technical advice and assistance to the Pilot Model Department police post and to the Rural Mobile Patrol project at Escuintla, which was begun in late FY 1968. This provided for the first time mobile police protection in rural areas. Equipment and spare parts were provided the Rural Mobile Police Patrol. Training programs for rural police were inaugurated. Patrol cars and bicycles were provided the Escuintla police. The best result was establishment of the police radio net in the area.

The plan suffered from unrealistic planning and from lack of GOG response. Limited success was achieved.

E-17  
1/68

<u>OBJECTIVES</u>	FY-1969 <u>ACCOMPLISHMENTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
B. <u>Communications</u>	Telecommunications activities of preceding years were maintained in FY 1969 and improvements consisted primarily of several new National Police rural radio installations made during the period.	A fulltime telecommunications advisor was not assigned to USAID/Guatemala during this period.	
A National Police communications organization will be established along general lines recommended in the <u>OPS Survey Report on Communications for the Police Forces of Guatemala</u> . Extension of the primary radio network to include the capitals of 20 departments will be completed and a secondary network will be placed in operation in the Department of Escuintla. Radios will be installed at approximately 16 locations in the department and both urban police vehicles and rural patrol units will be furnished with two-way communications. Radios will also be provided for Treasury Police and riot control units. Maintenance capability will be improved and expanded through the acquisition of additional equipment, spare parts and trained personnel.			

FY-1969

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

C. Riot Control

A riot control group of 100 men will be organized equipped and trained in Guatemala City. Training is to be provided for smaller groups in other major cities. Such especially trained, properly equipped units will be capable of controlling civil disorders efficiently and with a minimum of force.

USAID provided modern technical method of instruction to build up police counter-guerrilla and riot control capabilities. In-country training was continued, in riot control techniques.

Frequent transfers of rank-and-file personnel.

D. Police Academy

GOG acquisition of a site for the proposed construction will be ac-

GOG Public Works architects assisted in developing detailed

Progress was slow.

FY 1969

OBJECTIVES

quired by the Ministry of Government and preliminary designs and cost estimates will be prepared along with detailed plans for construction and operation of the Academy.

E. General Police Operations

1. Improve investigation and crime control techniques.

2. Inaugurate modern technical methods in counter-gerrilla activities, subversion control and investigations.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

██████████ the installation. Negotiations were initiated for procurement of the site of the proposed construction of the Academy. Negotiations were also started with the GOG regarding construction of the Academy, staffing and operation of the entire facility.

1. The investigative capability of the police was markedly improved by in-country training programs for which USAID provided training, technical advice and limited commodity support.

2. Modern technical methods in counter-guerrilla activities and subversion control were improved by technical advice and in-country training programs. Selected Guatemalan police officers were sent to the U.S. for special training in these fields.

PROBLEMS

1. None

2. None

REMARKS

3. Upgrade patrol practices and improve organization and operational methods at all levels of police management.

3. Technical advice was provided on further improvements in police organization and use of resources. Assistance was furnished to help upgrade patrol practices and improve all levels of police management.

3. Slow GOG response

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FY 1969

OBJECTIVES

4. Assist in reorganization and modernization of vehicle, communication and armament maintenance division.

5. Assist in organization and operation of such training programs as are necessary.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4. Police garage plans were revised to accommodate a central repair facility for the three police agencies. The Joint Maintenance Facility was planned to include radio, carpentry, tailoring, etc. Police mobility was improved through procurement of four 1 1/2 ton trucks, five carryalls for rural service, two panel trucks for hauling prisoners, and two wreckers. Maintenance was improved by clearing junk from both National and Treasury Police garages. Parts and tool-room controls were established. On-the-job training was started for garage chiefs and mechanics. Limited quantities of new tools and equipment were provided.

5. A total of 41 personnel from the three police agencies was trained under AID-sponsored

PROBLEMS

4. Lack of adequate budgetary support for maintenance. Slow procurement of repair parts. Frequent changes in operating personnel. Lack of adequately qualified administrators and mechanic personnel.

5. No per diem for Police instructors. Lack of adequate training funds.

REMARKS

programs at IPA, Ft. Gulick in Panama and elsewhere during FY 1969. In-country training in the Henry fingerprint system and audio-visual techniques was continued and expanded. Training in the following fields was continued during FY 1969: riot control, laboratory and photo tech-

Little or no training equipment. Inadequate transportation. Insufficient numbers of instructor personnel. Frequent transfers. Lack of sufficient and adequate firearms. Lack of adequate training facilities.

1/24/69

FY 1969

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

niques, driver training, roll-call training, pilot model training, recruit training, basic courses, officers' advanced training, instructor training, firearms, radio patrol and border patrol.

Staffing

Public Safety Advisors

1 Chief Public Safety Advisor

1 Training Advisor

1 Investigations Advisor

1 Rural Advisor

Local Staff

1 Administrative Assistant

1 Training Assistant

2 Secretaries

AID Funding

TOTAL FY 69

\$411,000

E-25

175

<u>OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>FY 1969</u> <u>ACCOMPLISHMENTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	Technicians (U.S. direct-hire and local)		\$133,000
	Participants		90,000
	Commodities		182,000
	Other Costs (GOG contributions Q.696,000)		6,000

OBJECTIVES

FY 1968  
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

A. Administration

To accomplish further improvements in the organization, coordination and administration, coordination and administration of the abovementioned civil police agencies through:

1. More formal planning and budget allocation.

2. Better communication and coordination of law enforcement activities and reporting among the three agencies.

3. Establishment of a career service, including a central personnel unit in the National Police responsible for establishing improved procedures in personnel selection, training, promotion, etc.

1. Limited progress.

2. Based on USAID recommendations, a Central Complaint Center was established within the National Police to provide better service to the public and to increase police effectiveness in solving reported crimes.

3. In an attempt to bring about changes in recruitment, selection and management of personnel, a personnel management survey was completed by USAID. A revised training course outline covering a 17-week course was prepared.

1. Slow GOG response

2. None

3. Slow GOG response.  
Limited GOG participation in survey.

4. More effective utilization of personnel and equipment.

4. Slow GOG response. One of the principal USAID aims was consolidation of the National and Judicial Police agencies to end completion and duplication of effort. An organization plan

4. Frequent changes in administrators (military) who showed little interest in seriously trying to improve the National and Treasury Police. Also frequent changes in Key personnel and rank-

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARK

5. Expansion of the Pilot Model Precinct to all areas of Guatemala City.

5. A procedures Manual was begun to be tested first in the model precinct of Guatemala City.

and-file employees. Improvements further hampered by small budgets, little or no job security for personnel, poor working conditions in most of the metropolitan corps, low salaries, etc. Limited GOG participation in planning.

5. Slow GOG response. GOG did not participate in USAID planning.

B. Training

1. To bring about more general application of modern police techniques through the continued use of the International Police Academy and other U.S. and third-country facilities available through the participant training program; and the continuation of

1. A total of 28 police personnel from the three agencies was trained abroad at IPA and elsewhere under AID-sponsored programs during FY 1968. In-country training in crowd control was carried further into the field to personnel of the

1. The following problems were encountered which affected in-country training programs:

a. Lack of classroom space, per diem for

17

<u>OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHMENTS</u>	<u>PROBLEMS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
E-30 the in-country training program designed to provide additional in-service, recruit and specialized training in areas such as routine patrol, crowd and riot control, weapons use, investigative techniques.	National, Judicial and Treasury Police. A lesson plan of 227 pages was prepared and translated. Three mobile training teams of two men each started training personnel in various departments. The basic course was presented in 17 departments to over 1,000 men. In progress during the period were training programs for both National and Treasury Police in	instructor, adequate numbers of instructors. b. Frequent transfers of trained personnel in Key positions. c. Lack of transportation. d. Inadequate funds to support police training programs. e. Frequent transfer of commanders; and personnel.	

180.

FY 1968

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

2. To take the initial step in providing a permanent police training institution by formulating specific plans for the establishment of a National Police Academy, which will provide training for the three police agencies.

control, auto driving, basic recruit training, roll-call training and specialized training course. Also in progress was training in the following fields for National Police personnel only: Firearms, advanced officers' training, English instruction, criminal investigation, crime laboratory techniques, radio patrol, pilot model training and the Henry fingerprint system.

f. Lack of GOG participation in planning.

2. Planning on construction and equipping of the Police Academy was started but progress was slow.

2. Slow GOG response.

C. Communication and Transportation

1. To determine the best communication and transportation equipment and facilities required to improve, extend and coordinate

1. Advised on public sale of old vehicles, with utilization of proceeds to purchase new ones.

1. Legislation required to permit public sale. Lack of GOG interest.

1/81

the communication and transportation systems of the various civil police agencies throughout the country.

2. To develop procedures for

2. No progress.

2. Reluctance of  
two GOG

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FY 1968

OBJECTIVES

the coordinated use of communication and transportation equipment with the military forces during emergency periods.

3. To develop procedures for more efficient use of telecommunications facilities.

4. To establish a single facility for maintenance of the vehicles, weapons, communications and other equipment of the three civil police agencies.

D. Records

To improve overall efficiency through establishment of:

1. An improved system of reporting and recording crime, including the establishment and up-to-date maintenance of a central

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

3. Completed plan outline for design and equipping of consolidated police garage and satellite shops, surveyed possible sites.

4. No progress

1. Limited progress

PROBLEMS

agencies to come to terms.

3. Slow GOG response.

4. No USAID Telecommunications Advisor assigned.

1. Slow GOG response although in-service and participant training is bring-

REMARKS

records unit in the National Police.

2. Adoption and implementation of the Henry fingerprint classification and filing system by all police agencies.

2. The National and Treasury Police are converting to the Henry fingerprint system from the antiquated Vucetich

ing more qualified personnel into the National and Treasury Police records sections.

2. Progress has been achieved but by its very nature, complete adoption of the Henry system is a long-term operation.

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FY 1968

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

3. More accurate recording and accountability of property.

system. Progress has been achieved but it will take a considerable time to adapt completely to the new system.

3. Some progress.

3. Mild GOG interest.

E. Laboratory

1. To improve the facilities and expand the use of the National Police Laboratory to service all police agencies.

1. A limited amount of lab. equipment and commodities was provided; in-country training was conducted.

1. Progress was limited during this period because of lack of cooperation and antiquated ideas of the then Chief of the laboratory.

2. To improve the National Police photo development and picture processing section and have this facility service all police agencies.

2. This was the initial period of construction for the present modern photo laboratory. Training for photographers was conducted.

2. Work was sometimes delayed by lack of sufficient qualified labor force. Project also suffered from lack of funding by GOG.

F. Investigations

1. To coordinate the investigative facilities and efforts of all civil police agencies.

1. Based on USAID recommendations, a Central Complaint Center was established within the National Police to provide better service to the public and to increase police effectiveness in solving reported crimes.

1. Plan not properly integrated into National Police structural scheme.

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FY 1968

OBJECTIVES

2. To improve the basic investigative procedures.

3. To improve methods of identification and apprehension of suspected criminals.

G. Rural Services

1. To demonstrate, through the Escuintla Department project, improved police methods and organization in the rural areas of Guatemala.

2. To implement the Rural Mobile Patrol Plan in Escuintla and plan its expansion to all departments in the interior.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

2. In-country investigative training was expanded. Technical advice and limited commodity support were provided to help the GOG police build up their investigative capability.

3. Methods of identification and apprehension of suspects were improved by in-service training and by participant training as well as technical advice by U.S. technicians.

1. The principal accomplishment of the Escuintla Department project in FY 1968 and later was establishment and functioning of the rural police radio network in that area. Some patrol cars and bicycles were provided and a small crime laboratory was established at Escuintla.

2. Planning for the Rural Mobile Patrol Plan was initiated but little progress was realized.

PROBLEMS

2. An investigations division grew onto this unit, creating duplication and conflict with the Judicial Police.

3. None.

1. The Escuintla Department project suffered from unrealistic planning and lack of response by the GOG.

2. The Rural Mobile Patrol Plan likewise did not receive GOG response. Plan was unrealistic in terms of GOG resources.

REMARKS

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FY 1968

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

H. Staffing

Public Safety Advisors

1 Chief Public Safety Advisor

2 Training Advisors

1 Investigations Advisor

Local Staff

1 Administrative Assistant

1 Training Assistant

2 Secretaries

I. AID Funding

TOTAL FY 68

\$218,000

Technicians (U.S.direct-hire and local)

125,000

Participants

52,000

Commodities

36,000

Other Costs

5,000

(GOG Contribution Q.596,500)

FY 1967

OBJECTIVES

A. Improve general personal administration to establish a career system, involving adoption of appropriate standards for selection of recruits, improvement of training (pre-service, in-service, specialized, career and roll-call), promotion and tenure.

B. Improve and accelerate a training program for existing personnel of the three police agencies to control mob action, riots, guerrillas, terrorists, subversives and other civil disturbance situations.

C. Adopt an improved program for servicing and care of police vehicles.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

A. A series of studies was conducted by USAID and a master reorganization plan for complete modernization of the National Police was presented to the GOG. During CY 1967 the semi-autonomous civil police agencies were reorganized under the Ministry of Government and much competition and duplication of service were thereby diminished.

B. Personnel from the three police agencies received extensive local training in such fields as riot control, special investigations, radio patrol, basic and specialized police practices and traffic control. The development by USAID of the anti-terrorist training programs in-country was an outstanding public safety accomplishment during this FY.

C. A PSD Technician on TDY made a mobility/maintenance survey in May 1967 and recommended the following:

1. Construction and equipping of an adequate maintenance garage for the National Police

PROBLEMS

A. Upgrading the police administration/organization capabilities was slowed because of insufficient personnel, lack of transportation facilities and firearms, insufficient numbers of training instructors and technicians, lack of maintenance facilities. GOG participation in master plan was limited.

B. Scarcity of riot control equipment. Lack of trained personnel. Frequent transfers of personnel.

C. Inadequate shop organization. Lack of spare parts and financial support for vehicles maintenance, including insufficient gas, lubricants, oil, etc., to maintain patrol vehicles on the street or in rural areas. No fulltime USAID Automotive Maintenance and Logistics Advisor on duty until May 1969.

REMARKS

OBJECTIVESACCOMPLISHMENTSPROBLEMSREMARKS

2. Expansion of both urban and rural motorized patrol.

3. Establishment of satellite repair shops in three outlying communities.

4. Establishment of an organized functional vehicle replacement program by the GOG.

5. Adequate GOG financial support for operation, maintenance and replacement of vehicles.

6. Participant training for officials and mechanics in vehicle maintenance shop, organization, operations and controls.

During FY 1967 plans were developed for construction and equipping of a National Police garage. Requirements of countrywide transportation were prepared. Plans for establishment of rural patrols and improvement of urban patrol were developed.

D. Establish a uniform system for crime reporting and records.

D. Steps were taken to improve the deficient National Police records system. Modern equipment and methods were introduced. The USAID provided the National Police

D. Some progress was realized.

FY 1967

OBJECTIVES

E. Improve and extend the communications systems through better systems planning and implementation, coordination and maintenance.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

with commodity and advisory support to implement this project.

E. Advisory and commodity assistance was provided to establish independent radio network operation between the National Police urban radio vehicles and the rural department radio base stations. The urban radio patrol and the rural base stations now operate on independent frequencies without interference to each other's messages. It was also planned to extend the National Police rural radio network to include additional department capital cities; additional radio stations were placed in operation to coordinate with nearby department capital cities as well as the National Police Communications Center. Efforts were made to initiate a radio network to interconnect high-level police/military security officials for national emergencies within the metropolitan area. As a result, the National Police, Treasury Police, Judicial Police (since December 1970 the Corps of Detectives within the National Police), Ministry of Government, Presidential headquarters and the Ministry of Defense now operate on

PROBLEMS

E. Some additional tower heights were needed at selected locations to increase transmission ranges.

REMARKS

FY 1967OBJECTIVESACCOMPLISHMENTSPROBLEMSREMARKS

<p>F. Improve the capability of the police agencies in criminal and special investigation techniques, involving:</p>	<p>their own special network for coordination on high-level security matters during emergency or tense periods within the city.</p>	<p>F. Payment of per diem by both National and Treasury Police for instructors. Lack of sufficiently trained and qualified instructors in some areas of police subjects. Lack of adequate space for training. Little or no GOG funding for training. Frequent changes of commanders and personnel. Lack of visual aids and training visual-aid technicians.</p>
<p>1. Training in crime detection techniques.</p>	<p>F. The investigative capability of the police agencies was improved with USAID advisory, training and commodity assistance.</p>	<p>G. Lack of adequate training facilities in the departments, such as classrooms, firing ranges, etc.</p>
<p>2. Training especially selected groups in taking, classifying and filing fingerprints.</p>	<p>1. Training in modern crime detection techniques was introduced.</p>	
<p>3. Training especially selected groups in crime laboratory techniques.</p>	<p>2. Special training in the Henry fingerprint system was provided as part of the overall program to convert from Vucetich to the Henry system. 3. Training in crime laboratory techniques was provided. The National Police crime laboratory was expanded.</p>	
<p>4. Specialized training in counter-terrorist methods.</p>	<p>4. Special in-country training was provided for riot control, anti-guerrilla activities and special investigations.</p>	
<p>G. Improvement of police services in rural areas.</p>	<p>G. A model police post was established at Escuintla designed to improve rural police services.</p>	

FY 1967

OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

H. Demonstrate improved police methods and organization by implementing a pilot model police precinct in Zone 5, City of Guatemala.

H. The pilot model program for a capital city precinct was started in Zone 5 of Guatemala City where a high crime rate existed. Some progress was realized.

Lack of sufficient radios for better communication in rural areas. Lack of sufficient transportation, adequate personnel and sufficient firearms. Little or no training material. No funding by GOG for Treasury Police department personnel. Frequent changes of commanders and personnel. Limited GOG participation in planning.

H. Little progress because of lack of GOG response. Limited GOG participation in planning.

I. Improve and strengthen the fingerprint and photograph identification system of the civil police of Guatemala by training selected personnel, in-country training programs, adoption of the Henry Fingerprint system, expansion of urban and rural fingerprint and photograph capabilities.

I. The participant training program became substantial during FY 1967. A total of 48 Guatemalan police from the three agencies was trained under AID-sponsored programs at IPA, Puerto Rico, Ft. Gulick in Panama and elsewhere. Domestic training in audio-visual techniques was started. Driver training was also commenced. Police personnel also received in-country training in the Henry fingerprint system, photography, radio patrol, traffic control and patrol operations.

I. Lack of trained personnel and equipment.

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OBJECTIVES

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROBLEMS

REMARKS

J. Staffing

Public Safety Advisors

- 1 Chief Public Safety Advisor
- 1 Telecommunications Advisor
- 1 Investigations Advisor
- 2 Training Advisors

Local Staff

- 1 Administrative Assistant
- 1 Training Assistant
- 2 Secretaries

K. AID Funding

	TOTAL FY 67	\$644,000
Technicians (U.S. direct-hire and local)		118,000
Participants		80,000
Commodities		438,000
Other Costs (GOG Contribution Q.551,798)		8,000

Chronological Development of the National Police Academy/  
Maintenance Center Project, Guatemala 1/

- Nov 66 USAID Engineer conducted survey of the Guardia Hacienda hangar at the Cipresales section in Guatemala City. The site is being considered for a police school.
- Dec 66 ROCAP Architect estimates a cost of about \$100,000 to remodel the existing wood structures at the above site.
- Jan 67 GOG interest is generated towards establishment of a central police training school. Military may take over the site and an alternate location would be near the Aurora airport.
- May 67 MinGov requested estimate of cost for a police academy, a central vehicle maintenance shop and a central records center. ROCAP Architect responded: Police academy - \$250,000; with assembly hall - additional \$75,000; maintenance shop - \$100,000. GOG may request a loan from AID.
- Jun 67 PSD presented plans to GOG for a new police academy, maintenance facility and a multi-purpose weapons range. All officials present at the meeting were interested. GOH contemplating a request for a loan.
- Jul 67 Main topic at a meeting with GOH was the plan to obtain a loan. GOG interested in a new police academy to include an auditorium, 10 classrooms, sleeping facilities and mess accommodations for 300 men; plus a weapons range and a large vehicle maintenance center.
- Aug 67 MinGov informs PSD that an acquisition of the land at Cipresales has been agreed to by MinDef. So far, neither Ministers have brought up loan matter to MinFin.

/Synopsis of information transmitted by the USAID to AID/W via the Public Safety Monthly Report, U-127, and from other information in OPS/LA files.

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USAID estimate of \$917,713 for the building and equipment. Facilities would include 10 classrooms with 50 student capacity each; sleeping and dining accommodations for 300 persons; study/recreation areas; weapons range for 54 positions; auditorium for 300; plus maintenance facilities for cars, radio, weapons, carpentry, building and tailoring.

MinGov indicated he will bring up loan matter at the next Cabinet meeting to obtain GOG approval to request such loan.

- Sep 67 Loan proposal submitted by MinGov to Cabinet. No word received on Cabinet action.
- Oct 67 Loan proposal now with GOG Planning Council for review. MinGov will try to expedite loan matter.
- Nov 67 Loan proposal still being discussed internally. Action by GOG is expected by Jan 68. Reason for delay is that President wants this loan to be submitted as a part of the entire external loan request.
- Mar 68 MinGov talked with President concerning loan and was advised to go ahead with loan request procedures.
- Apr 68 MinGov brought up loan matter at Cabinet meeting. President wants GOG to request this loan from AID.
- May 68 GOG deferred loan consideration pending further study of the plan which will have to be scaled down in magnitude.
- Jun 68 A MinGov/MinEcon committee reviewed the Police Academy plans and advised they cannot ask for this loan. Reasons were that it was not self-liquidating, too big and too expensive to support with on-going budget.

National Police have accepted idea of a new academy on a smaller scale but with capability of expansion in the future. Director of National Police is seeking a suitable site. Treasury Police Director is interested in cooperating. MinPublic Works has offered architect-engineering services.

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- Aug 68 Min/PubWorks completed study and survey for police school at three different sites, having guideline of cost \$3000 per room.
- (Note: Aug thru Oct 68 - State of Seige as result of assassination of US Amb on Aug 28; Nov 68 - State of Alert)
- Nov 68 GOG architects estimated cost of police academy construction at \$352,000. Facility to include 8 classrooms; sleeping/feeding accommodations for 100 students; a vehicle maintenance facility with 20 stalls; an area for other maintenance/service; plus three satellite vehicle maintenance facilities at Zacapa, Escuintla and Quezaltenango.
- MinGov forwarded application for loan of above sum to MinFin. It was returned for more detailed cost estimates and also for engineering plans for each structure. Application will be re-submitted.
- Dec 68 The acquisition of the land at Cipresales is still not resolved. However, no problem of transfer is expected, since a government bank was holding title.
- Jan 69 GOG request for \$400,000 loan was received by USAID. (U-127)
- Feb 69 A meeting was held between PSD, USAID Engineer and GOG Architects. A new set of plans is to be prepared to incorporate changes suggested by USAID Engineer.
- Mar 69 Loan proposal was made to LA Capital Assistance Executive Committee by USAID. (LA-CAEC/P-69/29)
- Apr 69 OPS/W meeting with Ambassador Davis and Dick Breen was held on the 10th. General view of the Police Academy loan package was that we should get on with the project as quickly as possible. OPS indicated that there was no support by LA Bureau for loan financing, but rather for seeking Supporting Assistance Grant funds. Amb. and Breen agreed with SA Funds which would be quicker to obtain and more appropriate for the nature of the project. (MemCon April 14, 1969)

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- May 69 David Powell, OPS/LA, visited Mission where a meeting was held with USAID officials to review and discuss terms of reference and conditions for Police Academy construction, etc.
- Jun 69 Efforts by GOG is being made to obtain land at Cipresales (Value \$160,000) by exchanging with other land owned by GOG.
- USAID acknowledges the informal rejection of the loan proposal. (Guat 2257)
- Jul 69 Request for FY-70 Supporting Assistance funds (\$410,000) is submitted to the Administrator. (Action Memo to the AID Administrator).
- Aug 69 Supporting Assistance funds approved, under condition that all the Capital Assistance Grant requirements per FAA Section 611 be met before Jan 70 or funds will be de-authorized. (State 145314)
- No new development re land at Cipresales. GOG architects are preparing more refined preliminary plans for the academy.
- Sep 69 A detailed budget requirement for the academy/maintenance center operations was submitted by PSD to USAID for their presentation to the GOG.
- Granting of funds by AID is predicated on the acquisition of clear title to the land and the inclusion in the national budget of sufficient funds for operating the facilities.
- Oct 69 Financial arrangement to acquire the land at Cipresales has not yet been completed. The difficulty of getting funds for the down payment on the land purchase has presented an additional problem.
- Dec 69 MinTreas issued a decree transferring funds to MinGov for down payment. The President then authorized the use of these funds for the proposed purpose. The transfer of the land title was effected also this month.

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A status report from USAID acknowledges that doubtful all requirements under FAA 611 will be met prior to end of CY. (TOAID A-414)

USAID requested 45-day extension on the grant authorization. (Guat 5336)

Jan 70 Preliminary plans were finished and signed by all three police chiefs. Work on detailed plans and specifications initiated by GOG architects.

USAID notifies AID/W that all requirements under FAA 611 have been met by GOG. (TOAID A-36)

Feb 70 AID/W requests USAID submit Capital Assistance Grant application. (State 24515)

ProAg for the academy/maintenance center construction is still under study by ROCAP legal counselor. Preliminary work has begun on preparing the CA Grant application.

Mar 70 CA Grant application is under final review at Mission. ProAg is still under review by ROCAP counselor.

Apr 70 CA Grant agreement in draft is submitted to MinGov for review and comments.

May 70 Grant application is submitted to AID/W on/about the 5th. (LACAEC/P-70/44)

Grant is authorized on the 15th. Grant package is signed by both USG and GOG officials.

Jul 70 PSD emphasized urgency of GOG appointment of a project supervisor for the NPA/Maint Center construction.

Aug 70 The naming of a project supervisor is still under GOG consideration.

Oct 70 MinGov is considering two candidates as project supervisor, one of whom was recommended by both MinPubWorks and MinComm.

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(Note: Nov 70 State of Seige declared, as result of recent killing of police and military personnel)

Nov 70 Jorge MENCOS Z. was named as the Ministerial representative for the project. A staff member of MinPubWorks was appointed to review and then advise above representative on construction plans, specs and cost estimates.

Delay in above nomination was due to lack of funds to pay salary. As a result, construction estimate had been set back. An attempt by MinPubWorks to have President declare this construction as a "maximum priority" project failed. Such a declaration would make up for lost time by eliminating the usual 45-day period for bid solicitation.

Jan 71 USAID noted that the delay of appointing a project supervisor has placed all grant disbursement in an unrealistic time frame.

Feb 71 USAID stressed to project supervisor the necessity to solicit bids through open advertisement and hence to assure that MinPubWorks plans and cost estimates are accurate.

Mar 71 A draft of suggested steps which would satisfy USAID accounting procedures was submitted to MinGov through project supervisor. Bid procedures was agreed to by project supervisor and USAID. Draft bid documents were turned over to MinGov and MinFin for action.

Apr 71 A redraft of the solicitation for bids will be reviewed by GOG representatives and USAID Engineer.

Jun 71 It was mutually agreed that MinPubWorks having completed the final designs and specifications would have no further role in the project. Advertisement for bids will be made. When a consultant is selected and his negotiated contract approved, the review, revision and any recommendations will be submitted to USAID.

Jul 71 MinGov requested that the project supervisor be dropped in order to avoid delays in NPA construction. USAID informs

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him that the supervisor is part of agreement. MinGov also informed that any USG commodity input must be matched by GOG, dollar-for-dollar and that a reasonable estimate of input would be \$200,000 maximum.

- Aug 71 MEMCOS resigned as project supervisor and Pedro CARDON S. named to succeed him.
- Sep 71 A private consulting engineer firm was contracted.
- Nov 71 A USG-GOG meeting was held and mutually agreed that temporary quarters for the academy would be obtained. Lt. Col. Gildardo Ranferi ALVARADO, IPA graduate, was named as Director of the NPA. PSA/Tng and PSA/Rural were assigned to assist the NPA operations. Training curriculum is being developed jointly between PSD and NP. A large house was selected as the temporary academy; one-third of the rent will be paid by USAID.

PRESENT PUBLIC SAFETY STAFF

NAME	TITLE	POSITION NO.	GRADE	HLE	TOUR
HARDIN, Herbert	Chief P.S. Officer	073	FSR-2	6/72	1st
BROWN, Gerald	PSA/Training	196	FSR-4	11/72	1st
FORCEY, Jack	PSA/Proag. Analyst	236	FSR-5	8/72	1st
GUZMAN, Charles	PSA/Training	157	FSR-4	11/73	2nd
LABRUZZA, Louis	PSA/Auto. Maintenance	233	FSR-4	6/73	2nd
SALSEDA, Michael	PSA/Generalist	208	FSR-3	11/73	1st
NAUROCKI, Alfred	PSA/Communications	235	FSR-4	12/71	1st

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ANNEX HTDY's to Guatemala  
(8/64 to present)

<u>NAME &amp; TITLE</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>LENGTH OF TDY</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DAYS</u>
David Greig PSA/Records	Records Survey	8/13/64 to 8/18/64	6
Andy Mosser PSA/Customs	Conference	10/26/64 to 10/30/64	5
John Caldwell PSA/Immigrations	Conference	10/26/64 to 10/30/64	5
David Powell CPSO/Costa Rica	Conference	1/26/65 to 1/29/65	4
John Caldwell PSA/Immigrations	Immig. Survey	4/11/65 to 4/24/65	14
Andy Mosser PSA/Customs	Contraband	4/12/65 to 5/3/65	22
Arthur Russell PSA/Records	Records Consult.	1/2/66 to 1/23/66	22
Ted Brown OPS/LA Chief	Consultation	3/3/66 to 3/9/66	7
Sid Rucker PSA/Training	Riot Control	3/11/66 to 4/11/66	32
Byron Engle Director, OPS	Consultation	3/17/66 to 3/17/66	1
Arthur Russell PSA/Records	Consultation	8/11/66 to 8/21/66	11
L. Santana PSA/Program	Consultation	10/1/66 to 11/1/66	32
John Caldwell PSA/Immigrations	Consultation	4/11/66 to 4/16/66	6
Arlen Jee PSA/Criminology	Consultation	11/30/66 to 12/30/66	31
Arthur Russell PSA/Records	Records Consult.	1/7/67 to 1/19/67	13
Louis LaBruzza PSA/Logistics	Motor Maintenance	4/23/67 to 5/26/67	34
Arlen Jee PSA/Criminology	Lab Consultation	6/26/67 to 7/3/67	8
James Scoggin PSA/Training	Training	8/16/67 to 9/16/67	32
Dave DeLatorre PSA/Training	Training	8/16/67 to 9/16/67	32
Arthur Russell PSA/Records	CAP Program	8/13/67 to 8/26/67	14

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<u>NAME &amp; TITLE</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>LENGTH OF TIME</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DAYS</u>
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	ROCAP Consultation	9/25/67 to 9/26/67	2
Al Naurocki PSA/Commo.	CAP Program	11/7/67 to 11/8/67	2
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	Immigration Review	12/4/67 to 12/7/67	4
Arthur Russell CAP Records Adv.	Records Review	1/15/68 to 1/24/68	10
Byron Engle Director, OPS	Internal Security Situation Review	1/22/68 to 1/24/68	3
John Longan OPS/LA Chief	Internal Security Situation Review	1/22/68 to 1/24/68	3
Louis LaBruzza PSA/Logistics	Vehicle Maint.	3/3/68 to 3/31/68	29
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	CAP Program	5/6/68 to 5/8/68	3
Al Naurocki PSA/Commo.	CAP Telecom.	5/13/68 to 5/19/68	7
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	CAP Program	5/19/68 to 5/22/68	4
David Powell OPS/LA Dep. Chief	Cover for Chief while on home leave	5/23/68 to 7/16/68	55
Arthur Russell PSA/Records	Records Program	7/26/68 to 8/5/68	11
Al Naurocki PSA/Commo.	Commo. Center Implementation	9/15/68 to 9/19/68	5
Paul Katz PSA/Commo.	Commo. follow-up	12/9/68 to 12/18/68	10
David Powell OPS/LA Dep. Chief	Program Eval.	1/10/69 to 1/14/69	5
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	Immigration Eval.	4/17/69 to 4/19/69	3
David Powell OPS/LA Chief	Consultation (Funding Program)	5/9/69 to 5/12/69	4
Al Naurocki PSA/Commo.	CAP Review of telecommunications	5/1/69 to 5/3/69	3
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	Immigration Eval.	6/4/69 to 6/6/69	3
Al Naurocki PSA/Commo.	Commo. Survey	7/2/69 to 10/2/69	93

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<u>NAME &amp; TITLE</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>LENGTH OF TDY</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DAYS</u>
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	Immigration Eval.	11/8/69 to 11/12/69	5
Jess Ojeda PSA/Training	Narcotics Control	11/3/69 to 12/5/69	33
Byron Engle Director	Program Evaluation	3/11/70 to 3/13/70	3
Ken Youngs Prog. Asst.	Program Evaluation	3/11/70 to 3/13/70	3
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	Immigration Prog. Progress	7/23/70 to 7/29/70	7
Joseph Sobotta AID/W	Sm.Arms Maint.	9/2/70 to 9/14/70	13
Joseph Sobotta AID/W	Implement Trng.	11/13/70 to 12/13/70	31
Arlen Jee PSA/Criminology	Criminalistics Survey	10/30/70 to 11/30/70	32
Samuel Posacreta Prog. Off/VN	Helicopters Use	11/13/70 to 11/27/70	15
Al Carpenter PSA/Commo.	Telecom Survey	3/16/71 to 3/20/71	5
Caesar Bernal OPS/LA Dep. Chief	Patrol Consult	3/26/71 to 4/9/71	15
John Caldwell PSA/Immigration	Immigration Survey	4/18/71 to 5/1/71	14
Mario Vasquez PSA	Visual Aids	5/2/71 to 5/18/71	16
Arlen Jee PSA/Criminology	Crime Lab Survey	5/21/71 to 6/21/71	32
Robert Hernandez PSA	Traffic Survey	6/30/71 to 7/9/71	10

IN-COUNTRY TRAINING COURSES\*

<u>Previous Training (before January 1, 1966)</u>	<u>10,092</u>
Riot Control Training	4,327
Bomb Disposal Training	38
Pilot Model Precinct Training	937
Weapons Training	8,285
Radio Motor Patrol Training	1,339
Driver Education Training	685
Use of Reloading Equipment Training	6
Patrol Techniques Training	504
Recruit Training	751
Border Patrol Training	47
Fingerprint Training	133
Body Guard Training	20
Instructors Training	47
Traffic Training	40
School Patrol Training	4,111
Cultural Development Course for Capts. & Lts.	43
English Training	1
Health & Hygiene Training	500
Criminal Investigations Training	1,410
Immigration Basic Training	6
Swimming Training	68
Typing Training	20
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* As of April, 1971	Total 23,318

NOTE: Many police officers have been given training in more than one of the above courses and are therefore counted more than once.

COMMODITY RECAP FOR GUATEMALA

ANNEX J

ITEM PROVIDED	(*cr prior) FY ITEM PROVIDED										CURRENT TOTAL
	FY 63*	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	
TELECOM EQUIPMENT											
VHF-FM (FM-1)							25				
VHF-FM (FM-5)							55				
VHF-FM (Mobile)				10	49			65			
VHF-FM (Base)				4	7	2	1	4			
VHF-FM (Portable)				20	10	6			1		
HF-SSB (Mobile)											
HF-SSB (Base)											
HF-SSB (Portable)						2	2				
Generator, Electric				6	6			1			
Towers								1			
Installation Access									1 LT		
Spare Parts, Electron	1 LOT			1 LOT	1 LOT	1 LOT	1 LOT	4LTS	1 LT		
Audio Equipment											
Hand Tools								2LTS	1 LT		
Test Equipment							1 LOT				
Terminals, Radio											
Teletype Machines											
Megaphones				8			4				
P. A. Sets					9*						
GENERAL											
Camera				2			1	21			
Photo Enlarger											
Photo Dev. Equip.					1						
Photo Developing Supp									1 LT		
Photo Printer											
Photo Copier											
Safe lights											
Projector Movie					3			4			
Projector Still							1				
Projector Overhead								4			
Movie Screen								6			
Training Films											
Reference Material					1 LOT						
Fingerprint Kit											
Fingerprint Supplies								1			
Fingerprint Cabinet											
Typewriter											
Duplicating Equipment	1				1						
Office Equipment						1 LOT	1 LOT				
Office Supplies						1 LOT	1 LOT				
Photo Supplies							1 LOT	1 LOT			
Tape Recorder				1							
Microscopes											
Mouflage Kit											
Clothing											
Individual Equipment											
Binoculars					60						
Parachutes											
Misc.											

\* Telephone

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COMMODITY RECAP FOR GUATEMALA

ITEM PROVIDED	(*or prior) FY ITEM PROVIDED											CURRENT
	FY 63*	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	TOTAL	
<b>TRANSPORTATION</b>												
Sedans	81				20		4	8				
Carryall												
Patrol Van												
Jeep 1/2 ton	89	8			12					24		
Trucks and trailers	17			1	10	1	23	55				
Buses	2				4					1		
Ambulance	2				2							
Motorcycle	51											
Aircraft												
Aircraft engine												
Boat	5											
Outboard motor	3											
Fire Engine												
Auto Shop Eqpt & tools					1 LOT	1 LOT	4 LTS	4 LTS	1 LT			
Engine Spare Parts	4 LTS											
Armored Vehicles												
Wreckers												
Fork Lift												
Misc												
<b>WEAPONS</b>												
Revolver .38	325		5	100	1250	25	25					
Pistol 22 Cal. Pellet					10		20					
Carbine Rifle					1300							
Shotgun				2	35		30	55	95			
Machine gun												
Mortar												
WPN Repair parts												
Reload Equipment					2							
Tools												
Cleaning Supplies												
Ammo	40MX		6 MX	38MX	510MX		10 M	40MX				
Gun Powder						330LB						
Targets												
Gas Gun (Pellet)			3	3		60		10				
Chemical Dispenser						60	125	4				
Tear Gas Grenade			400	1000			288	3000				
Tear Gas Projectile			400	50				245				
Fog & Chemical Sup												
Helmet							650					
Safety Shield							20	250				
Gas Mask			200	100			50	250				
Gas Mask Cannister							50					
Armor Vest												
Handcuff			100		600		250					
Baton (Nightstick)	200											
Mace												
Misc												

\* Bicycle

GUATEMALA

Commodity Profile

FY 57	\$295,000	Boats and equipment Electrical equipment Vehicles, engines and parts White patrol belts Laminating equipment Commo equipment Projector, film screen Mimeograph machine Miscellaneous commodities
FY 58	\$107,000	Vehicle, engine and parts Electrical equipment Generator and motors Engines and turbines Vessels and equipment Rubber products White patrol belts
FY 60	\$ 8,500	Excess U.S. Government property
FY 61	\$280,000	Electrical equipment Vehicle, engine and parts Small arms, ammo and parts Police batons Misc. Commodities
FY 62	\$ 15,000	Misc. Commodities
FY 63	\$ 88,000	40,000 rds. cal. .38 ammo 8 vehicles 325 revolvers, cal. .38 Misc. spare parts, radio Misc. equipment spare parts
FY 64	\$ 14,000	Additional funds for FY 62 procurement Communications equipment for CAP Network 8 jeeps
FY 65	\$ 68,500	(\$500 additional funds for FY 62 commodities) Office furniture and equipment 5 revolvers, cal. .357 5 revolvers, cal. .38 100 handcuffs 6,000 cartridges, cal. .38 Pistol powder 100 projectiles, practice 3 guns, tear gas 200 masks, gas 100 grenades, CN, practice 500 pellets, CN 400 projectiles 1,400 grenades, CN

Commodity Profile (cont.)

FY 66 \$ 62,023

4 VHF-FM base stations  
10 VHF-FM mobile stations  
20 VHF-FM portables  
6 Generators  
1 Wattmeter  
1 Truck van  
8,000 rds. ammo. cal. .30  
3 gas guns  
50 Projectiles, CN  
100 Cartridges  
2 Shotguns 12 gauge  
100 Revolvers .38 cal. spl.  
Lot Misc. Crime lab. equipment  
Lot telecommunications spare parts  
6 Portable searchlights  
8 Megaphones  
8 VHF-FM transceivers  
100 Gas masks  
1,000 Tear gas grenades  
30,000 rds. cartridges, cal. .38  
2 Cameras  
2 Rangefinders  
1 Tape recorder

FY 67 \$450,244

1250 Revolvers, Cal. 38 spl.  
1300 Carbines, Cal. 30 MI  
400,000 Rds., ammo. cal. .30  
110,000 Rds., ammo. cal. .38  
2 lots ammo reloading equipment and supplies  
110,000 primers - pistol  
1 lot misc. equipment - commo  
20 Sedans  
49 VHF-FM mobile radios  
7 VHF-FM base stations  
9 Telephones  
1 AC power supply unit  
5 modules; power supply units  
5 modules; SSB  
10 - 22 cal. pellet gas guns  
256,000 pellets for gas guns  
600 handcuffs  
4300 holsters  
2 prison vans  
2 ambulances  
4 trucks  
2 tow trucks  
2 pick-up trucks  
10 portable radios FM  
Vehicle maintenance tools  
35 shotguns, 12 gauge  
4 busses (excess)  
6 generator sets  
1 lot photo equip. (Ident.Bur.)  
1,000 Tear gas grenades  
37 Finger print sets (cabinet)  
Maintenance Aids (visual)

SECRET

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Commodity Profile (cont.)

FY 68	\$ 36,063	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Truck, Panel</li> <li>6 Mechanical Tool Sets</li> <li>1 lot ( <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Battery Charger</li> <li>8 Jack Stands</li> <li>1 Air Compressor</li> <li>Miscellaneous auto repair equipment</li> <li>2 VHF-FM (Base)</li> <li>2 SSB (Portable)</li> <li>6 FM-5A's</li> </ul> </li> <li>1 lot telecommunications spare parts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Carbine Mock-up</li> <li>25 Revolvers .38 cal.</li> <li>60 Tear Gas Guns</li> <li>60 Tear Gas Dispensers</li> <li>1,773 Tear Gas Cartridges</li> <li>309,000 Pellets</li> <li>636,000 Primers (Pistol)</li> <li>22 Kegs Powder</li> <li>Miscellaneous Office Equipment and Supplies (Excess Property)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
FY 69	\$174,500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4 Megaphones</li> <li>250 Handcuffs</li> <li>18 Stretchers</li> <li>30 Gun holders</li> <li>1 lot miscellaneous police equipment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 Fingerprint kits</li> <li>100 Recording tapes</li> </ul> </li> <li>1 lot auto maintenance equipment</li> <li>2 lots auto hand tools <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4 M School patrol safety belts</li> <li>2 P.A. Systems w/Sirens</li> <li>20 Red warning lights</li> <li>12 Pulsator sirens</li> <li>200 Pr. Traffic Glasses</li> </ul> </li> <li>1 lot miscellaneous photo supplies</li> <li>1 lot miscellaneous office supplies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(15 desks</li> <li>lot ( <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2 Office tables</li> <li>(56 Filing cabinets</li> <li>(76 Chairs</li> <li>39 Standard sirens</li> <li>1 Camera w/case</li> <li>1 Slide projector</li> <li>650 Construction helmets</li> </ul> </li> <li>1 lot auto shop equipment</li> </ul> </li></ul>

Commodity Profile (cont.)

FY 69 (Cont.)

40 Spotlights  
 10 M Shotgun shells  
 20 Pellet guns, 22 Cal.  
 200 Saf-T-Cones  
 25 38 Cal. Revolvers  
 96 Grenades, T.G. CN  
 96 Grenades, Blast  
 96 Grenades, Mult discharge  
 50 Gas Masks  
 50 Canisters  
 30 Shotguns, 12 gauge  
 20 Safety shields  
 125 Tear Gas dispensers  
 1 VHF-FM Base  
 1 Antenna  
 2 HF SSB Portables  
 lot test equipment  
 lot spare parts  
 25 FM 1B  
 55 FM 5B  
 1 VHF-FM Repeater  
 1 Police Call Box  
 4 Sedans  
 23 Pickup Trucks

FY 70 - Vehicles \$200,523  
 Telecom 95,919  
 Weapons 45,318  
 General 24,320  
 \$366,080

2 Lift, Automotive  
 1 50 Ton press  
 2 Sling, 2,000 lb.  
 1 Gear Puller  
 4 VHF-FM Base  
 13 Antenna  
 2 lots spare parts (VHF-FM)  
 2 lots radio crystals  
 1 lot teaching aids, electronic/commo  
 2 lots tools, electronic/commo  
 8 projectors  
 6 screen projection  
 1 lot spare parts - projector  
 1 lot fingerprint equipment  
 8 Sedans  
 55 Pickup Trucks  
 3 lots automotive tools  
 250 riot shields  
 10 gas guns, 37 MM  
 3,000 tear gas grenades  
 245 tear gas projectile

Commodity Profile (cont.)

Y 70 (Cont.)

250 gas masks  
100 gas mask cannister  
4 pepper fogger  
55 shotgun 12 ga.  
40,000 shot shell 12 ga.  
65 2 CH-LB UHF-FM Mobile  
1 tower 100 ft.  
1 Diesel generator  
1 lot Police lab equipment  
21 Camera and case  
1 Flash gun  
1 lot Photo supplies

Y 71 - Vehicles \$34,425  
Telecom 4,925  
Weapons 9,918  
General 600  
\$49,868

4 Busses  
35 Auto batteries  
24 1/4 ton trucks (Jeeps)  
1 lot Vehicle spare parts  
1 lot Electronic tools  
40 Battery chargers  
4 Transformers  
1 lot Radio components  
1 lot Radio spare parts  
1 VHF Receiver, portable  
95 Shotguns 12 ga.  
1 Bomb disposal unit  
25 Gun holders (Vehicle)  
1 Visual identify kit  
1 lot Photo supplies



FY 66 (continued)

- Weapons - \$20,000

PIO/C 5-60057, \$8,000. 8 M .38 cal. cartridges; 3 gas guns; 2 shotguns, 12 gauge; 100 .38 cal. revolvers.

PIO/C 5-69154, \$12,000. 100 Gas masks; 10 M tear gas grenades; 300 M .38 cal. cartridges.

- General - \$8,000

PIP/C 5-60058, \$6,900. 50 handcuffs; 1 refrigerator, misc. lot supplies

PIO/C 5-69155, \$1,100. 2 cameras and accessories; 1 tape recorder.

- General (Cont'd.)

PIO/C 70014 - \$2,740, Reloading equipment and materials

PIO/C 70101 - \$19,740, Photo equipment

PIO/C 70143 - \$1,620, Pells, powerlets, general police supplies

PIO/C 70144 - \$1,433, Paper binders, loose-leaf notebooks, etc.

PIO/C 70151 - \$21,700, Handcuffs, holsters, etc

PIO/C 70153 - \$9,300, Automotive garage equipment

PIO/C 70154 - \$500, Automotive hand tools and equipment

PIO/C 70166 - \$16,736, Gun cleaning materials, bullet molds, other police materials

PIO/C 70167 - \$5,400, Flashlights, batteries, filing cabinets, desks, etc.

PIO/C 70168 - \$1,000, Photo and other audio visual equipment

68 - Vehicles - \$2,700

PIO/C 80085 - \$2,700, Jeep 1/4 ton

- Telecom - \$9,800

PIO/C 80084 - \$9,800, VHF-FM Desk Top Station, HF-SSB Transceiver Spare Parts, FM-5B Portables

- Weapons - \$12,771

PIO/C 80015 - \$100, Mockup carbine

PIO/C 80037 - \$50, Empty cartridges

PIO/C 80082 - \$10,800, ammunition, films, pellguns, gas cylinders, etc.

PIO/C 80081- \$1,821, Empty cartridges

- General - \$10,792

PIO/C 80064 - \$500, Office equipment

PIO/C 80072 - \$540, Office equipment

FY 67 - Vehicles - \$92,964

PIO/C 70130 - \$16,200

PIO/C 70152 - \$67,500

PIO/C 70164 - \$1,900

PIO/C 70012 - \$7,364

- Telecom - \$60,500

PIO/C 70015 - \$2,700

PIO/C 70018 - \$2,200

PIO/C 70149 - \$55,600

- Weapons - \$186,160

PIO/C 70014 - \$1,960, Revolvers .38 Cal.

PIO/C 70150 - \$59,000, Ammunition,  
1000 revolvers S&W 4", 100 M - 38 sp.

PIO/C 79151 - \$8,200, Revolver .38 S&W

PIO/C 79152 - \$30,000, Ammunition,  
Carbines M-1 (300), 70M M-1 - 20 M-38

PIO/C 79153 - \$87,000, Carbines M-1

- General - \$110,620

PIO/C 70009 - \$1,500, Projectors,  
other audio visual equipment

PIO/C 70011 - \$2,400, Projectors,  
other audio visual equipment

PIO/C 70012 - \$13,736, Reloaders,  
head, primers, etc.

PIO/C 70013 - \$2,975, Handcuffs,  
hailers, traffic cones, etc.

- General (Cont'd)

PIO/C 80083 - \$3,302, File cabinets, index cards, etc.

PIO/C 80099 - \$1,050, Automotive garage equipment & tools

PIO/C 80110 - \$2,200, Automotive garage equipment & tools

PIO/C 80111 - \$3,200, Automotive garage equipment & hand tools

FY 69- Vehicles - \$75,200

PIO/C 5-90089 - \$67,500, Sedans and utility trucks

PIO/C 5-90087 - \$ 7,700, shop tools and office supplies

- Telecom - \$62,000

PIO/C 5-90084, \$62,000, Communication equipment accessories and electronic tools

- Weapons - \$21,300

PIO/C 5-90088, \$12,700, Pellet guns, 12 gauge shot shells, bullet reload supplies

PIO/C 5-90096, \$3,190, 12 gauge shot guns and safety shields.

PIO/C 5-99151, \$4,110. Revolvers 38 Cal. 25 ea; 288 tear gas grenades; gas masks

PIO/C 5-99152, \$1,300. Revolvers. 38 cal. 25 ea.

- General - \$16,000

PIO/C 5-90041, \$200. Office equipment

PIO/C 5-90088, \$7,700

FY 70 - Vehicles, \$200,523

PIO/C 5-09153, \$3,124. Misc. tools

PIO/C 5-09155, \$3,429. Auto shop tools and equipment.

PIO/C 5-09159, \$840. Auto hand tools

PIO/C 5-00080, \$5,130. Auto shop equipment.

PIO/C 5-09154, \$188, 000. Sedans and trucks.

- Telecom - \$95,919

PIO/C 5-00081, \$3,400. Radio spare parts and reference material.

PIO/C 5-09157, \$77,625. Radio and spare parts.

PIO/C 5-09158, \$14,254. Radios and accessories.

PIO/C 5-09151, \$600. Misc. tools

- Weapons - \$45,318

PIO/C -09156, \$44,718. Riot shields; 12 gauge shot guns; gas masks; chemical munition.

PIO/C 5-09162, \$600. Chemicals for pepper fogger.

- General - \$24,320

PIO/C 5-00082, \$10,200. Projectors and photo supplies.

PIO/C -09160, \$3,100. Fingerprint supplies.

PIO/C 5-09161, \$3,500. Cameras and photo supplies.

PIO/C 5-09152, \$7,520. Fingerprint equipment and supplies.

FY 71 - \$49,868

- Vehicles - \$34,425

PIO/C 0-11048, \$8,600 (4 Busses)

PIO/C 0-10019, \$25,000 (25 jeeps  
1 lot spare parts

PIO/C 5-19151, \$825. Vehicle Batteries

- Telecom - \$4,925

PIO/C 0-10069, \$600. Electronic tools

PIO/C 5-10070, \$4,325. VHF receiver;  
radio spare parts; battery chargers.

- Weapons - \$9,918

PIO/C 5-10071, \$5,918. 95-12 gauge  
shot guns

PIO/C 5-10073, \$4,000. Bombsquad  
unit; gun holders

- General - \$600.

PIO/C 0-10072, \$600. Photo supplies

FACT SHEET

1. Purpose: To provide unclassified information concerning MILGP objectives.

2. Facts: a. The mission of the COMUSMILGP is four fold: 1) provide all non-attache military advice to the Ambassador and represent DOD in Country Team deliberations; 2) favorably influence HC Military towards the US and to support its interests; encourage the use of legal, professional military methods to solve counter-insurgency problems; 3) insure that all resources, U.S. and Guatemalan, are utilized to the maximum benefit for improvement of Guatemalan Armed Forces for countering insurgency, within policy guidance, and 4) as a long range objective, to work the MILGP out of a job.

b. US interests and objectives are contained in CASP II and JSOP.

3. Objectives: To accomplish 3) and 4) above, the MILGP, in conjunction with the HC has the following current projects;

a. Joint/Army Section: Improve counter-insurgency capability; establish National Resource Planning System to improve programming and budgeting of available resources; improve planning capability and decision making procedures; Institute the use of a Joint Operations Center, use it for control of natural disaster/emergency relief as well as military operations; and improve staff procedures-coordination.

(1) Personnel: Evaluate/improve internal organization; develop procedure guides for unit S-1 Sections; establish MOS system and evaluate grade structure; formalize officer career planning; improve officer efficiency report system and other actions designed to improve personnel management.

(2) Intelligence: Raise calibre of military intelligence capability required for countering insurgency; insure intelligence positions throughout Armed Forces are filled with qualified personnel; establish intelligence career field and improve operational proficiency of CI Detachments; eliminate non-intelligence duties of Intelligence Staff section, and improve G-2 operations in areas of collection, collation and analysis in order to improve the intelligence product.

(3) Operations/Training: Improve conventional military capability for conducting counter-insurgency operations; develop annual training program to improve combat readiness; improve data base for programming of training spaces in CONUS & CZ; encourage use of U.S. correspondence courses to augment formal training; establish NCO career field and Academy; improve English Language Training; standardization of units (TOE's); improve air/ground operations/coordination; and other related projects to improve counterinsurgency capability.

(4) Logistics/Supply: Encourage procurement of standardized equipment through FMS from US Government; improve logistic accounting procedures; revise unit/organizational Supply Procedures Directives; improve custom procedures to expedite flow of MAP equipment; improve weapons security in MAP Warehouse; identify and dispose of excess MAP equipment; and other projects to improve the country logistic system leading to its internal self-sufficiency and reliance on US purchased parts and replacements.

(5) Maintenance; Work towards establishing an effective Maintenance Management system at all levels. Establish an inspection system by the Army Staff and by Commanders at all levels. Establish SOP's for use at unit level; encourage a unit motor officers course; establish formal authorization

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documents for mechanics, armorers and radio repairmen; adopt and enforce a maintenance management regulation; institute a standardized inspection system; improve procedures for standardization/systematic replacement and responsive salvage; update PLL's; turn-in excess used parts; install Phosphatizing Set; allocate maintenance to proper level of capability; and improve driver training.

(6) Civic Action: Improve awareness of value of Military Civic Action; develop educational/vocational training program for soldiers; assist in professionalization of Medical Service Corps and Medical Corps; assist in the development and use of a National Disaster Relief Plan; improve Medical Journey Program; and reorganize the G-5 Section.

(7) Communications: Expand FM net of battalions; establish an alternate communications center; reorganize the Signal Service; improve communications procedures between member nations of ONDECA.

(8) Schools: Monitor curriculum content and course planning; Encourage adoption of US doctrine; develop eventual training self-sufficiency.

(9) Engineer: Organize, equip, train, and properly employ the third company of the Engineer Battalion and the Engineer Construction/Civic Action Platoon; improve the Engineer platoons of the various Brigades for joint operations; assure maximum utilization of the Engineer Battalion in civic action construction. Plan and assist in the development of a master construction plan. Monitor and advice on-going construction.

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(b) Air Force (FAG): Reorganize FAG to improve managerial concepts and provide better control of resources; develop standard evaluation procedures to upgrade pilot training programs; assist in the development of a FAG Pilot Training School; improve aircraft maintenance shops and FAG capability to repair and manufacture locally; improve FAG materiel control section; assist in identification of MAP surplus and improve supply management procedures.

(c) Navy: Improve counter-insurgency capability of the Atlantic based Navy and its Marine; assist in the establishment of Pacific Coast Naval facility, the construction of Naval haul-out facility (Synchrolift) and assist in selection of appropriate patrol craft for the Pacific Fleet, contracting for the purchase of the craft, and assist in preparation for and deployment of craft from U.S. to Guatemala.

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Airgram A-182

To: Department of State

Info: Amembassy, Managua (Legatt)

From: Amembassy, GUATEMALA

Date: September 24, 1971

Subject: Additional Efforts to Improve Narcotics Control

Ref.: AIDTO CIRC A-1543

JOINT STATE/AID

SUMMARY: There is no known major drug problem in Guatemala and the country is not believed to be a significant transshipment point for drugs entering the United States. The Administration of President Arana has taken major steps in the legislative and law enforcement fields which have been sufficient to keep the local drug problem from increasing. The GOG's capabilities to combat drug abuse could be significantly improved by a general reorganization and improved coordination of the myriad of entities which now devote a portion of their time to the problem. However, given the relatively minor local drug problem, it is doubtful if the Administration will make such major changes, especially in light of the high priority it is allotting to its social development programs and to combatting the overall high level of political and common criminality. Steps the United States Government should consider taking to assist the Government's anti-drug campaign include sending police to the United States for specialized training and improving liaison between appropriate local officials and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. END SUMMARY.

(a) Narcotics Problem: Nature and Extent

There is no known serious drug abuse problem in Guatemala. The two most widely used drugs, according to Government authorities, are marijuana and synthetic drugs dispensed without prescription at local pharmacies. Both are relatively easily obtainable and because of their cost, largely used only by the middle and upper classes. In addition, pegamento, a shoemaker's glue which is inhaled, has become a fad among some youths of the poorer class and is easily obtained from hardware stores and shoe factories. Since death by overdoses of synthetic drugs is very rare in Guatemala, it is assumed that this non-medical use of drugs is minimal. Authorities believe that the limited local supply of hard drugs is smuggled into Guatemala and is principally destined for non-Guatemalans in the country. They do not believe Guatemala is a major transshipment point for dangerous drugs, a view which the Embassy shares based on present information.

(b) Narcotics a Threat to GOG?

GOG leaders are aware of Guatemala's drug problem, have taken a number of anti-drug actions (see below), but view the narcotics abuse as a relatively minor problem which is not a serious threat to Government interests. The current high level of violence in Guatemala, including the assassinations of Government and Government party officials, the kidnappings and assassinations of prominent finqueros and businessmen, and numerous capital city robberies presents a far more serious problem to the Administration's interest and to the nation's internal security. (There does not appear to be any significant relationship between the violence and the narcotics problem.)

(c) Steps Towards a Solution

The Government has demonstrated its concern for drug abuse in a number of anti-drug actions. With President Arana's backing, modifications were made to the 1877 Health Code which revised sections pertaining to drug abuse and stiffened punishments, particularly for cultivators and traffickers. The Government has also increased its emphasis on combating common as well as political criminality. And among other successes, the press has reported a number of police actions against drug users and traffickers, of both Guatemalan and foreign extraction.

With regard to additional steps which the Government might be prepared to take, police authorities discussed the possibility of legislation to control the sales of pegamento.

(d) and (e) GOG Capabilities

The Embassy has no reason to doubt the statement of the Minister of Government that the Government has the capability of dealing with the drug problem as long as it remains within its present limits. The capability of the security forces to cope with the problem is adequate, but untrained personnel, equipment shortages, the lack of a police narcotics section, and other reasons prevent the Government from taking much more effective law enforcement measures.

(f) Multilateral Programs

The Minister of Government is not receptive to UN-sponsored programs because he is not in accord with the UN's philosophy. Nor does he believe that the local drug problem is so serious that it requires any multinational programs.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** Miquel Angel GARCIA Herrarte, Chief, INTERPOL  
Inspector Cristobal MARROQUIN, INTERPOL Official  
Thomas W. Sonandres, Political Officer  
Charles Guzman, Public Safety Officer  
Various other INTERPOL Officials

**DATE:** September 13, 1971  
**AND PLACE:** INTERPOL Office, National Police

**SUBJECT:** INTERPOL and Drug Abuse

**SUMMARY:** Officials of INTERPOL, the National Police office whose responsibilities include international drug abuse, among a number of others, discussed the production, trafficking, and usage of dangerous drugs in Guatemala, a problem which they considered to be a small portion of the overall high level of common and political criminality and budgetary problems which prevented INTERPOL from becoming a much more effective organization. **END SUMMARY**

Drug Abuse in Guatemala

There is no serious drug problem in Guatemala, according to INTERPOL officials. They attribute this fact to the lack of any important internal or external markets for the sale of Guatemalan-produced drugs. The number of people in Guatemala who desire and can afford the habit is small and those in adjacent countries evidently already have established supply sources.

INTERPOL Chief said of the small quantities of drugs consumed locally, marijuana was their most serious problem. He said it was easily obtainable from internal supply centers and was probably grown all over the country. He noted, however, that its relatively high cost largely limited its use to the middle and upper classes.

INTERPOL officials recalled several police cases involving marijuana although INTERPOL itself evidently did not directly participate due to the non-international nature. In one, the police broke up a small marijuana ring in which an old Indian woman prepared and packaged marijuana which her son and an inter-city bus driver transported to the capital. The INTERPOL chief did not know if the woman was aware that she was violating a law, but noted with satisfaction that the other two had been given court sentences. The chief mentioned another case this year in which women were apprehended while carrying baskets with large quantities of marijuana into the El Pavon prison farm (Escuintla Department). And he told of a third, last August in which two armed marijuana traffickers resisting arrest were killed in a shootout with elements of the Detective Corps of the National Police.

They also said synthetic drugs were widely available at drugstores without prescription and were taken for non-medical purposes by some drug abusers. Their relatively high cost also limited their use to the middle and upper classes. (NOTE; Though not mentioned, there is evidence that some small drugstores for a fee will give morphine shots. However, very rarely does anyone in Guatemala die of an over-dosage of either synthetic or hard drugs, which perhaps indicates that their usage has not become a serious problem.)

INTERPOL officials also discussed pegamento, a shoemaker's glue which was inhaled by a small number of lower class youths. They said pegamento sniffing became a fad last year in Guatemala, is widely available in hardware stores and elsewhere, and is sold in quantities as low as 10 centavos (1 centavo = 1 US cent). They noted that saltapericios (a phosphorus based powder used to make firecrackers, and until recently the cause of suicides by lower class Guatemalans) was banned from over-the-counter sales last year and hoped that similar legislation would be passed to control pegamento sales.

#### Hard Drugs

INTERPOL officials said that there were only minimal quantities of dangerous drugs in the country such as heroin, cocaine, and LSD. They opined that what entered Guatemala was smuggled in by foreigners and mainly destined for non-Guatemalans.

Inspector MARROQUIN recalled several INTERPOL arrests. Earlier this year, INTERPOL caught a US citizen in a capital hotel in possession of cocaine purchased in Peru and destined to the United States. He discussed the seizure of a sizable quantity of dangerous drugs including LSD from the boat of three US citizens docked in a South Coast port earlier this year. (In the INTERPOL office is stored a large quantity of drugs seized in these two cases.) The inspector discussed a current case of a German citizen who makes periodic runs from Mexico to Panajachel (Solola Department) where dozens of "hippies" maintain a community. However, he noted that departmental officials were cracking down on foreign "hippies." Those not properly documented were being deported and others would be unable to renew their visas once they expired.

#### INTERPOL Shortcomings

The newly appointed Chief of INTERPOL lamented the forgotten status of his office. With the departure of the old Chief, who had lent his personal automobile to the office, INTERPOL no longer had an official vehicle. The Chief observed INTERPOL was not always brought

into narcotics cases promptly and intimated that his office had largely been shunted aside in the organizational structure of the National Police. He said no one on his staff had received specialized training in anti-drug measures. (NOTE: Several National Policemen trained in this specialty in the International Police Academy are no longer with the National Police.) He also stated that due to a lack of financial and technical support, his office was unable to undertake an anti-drug campaign in the secondary schools where pegamento and marijuana were beginning to catch on. He spoke of the correspondence which INTERPOL maintained with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Mexico City, but requested that an official of that office make periodic visits to Guatemala to lend assistance to INTERPOL.

COMMENT: The overall improvement of the National Police's capability to rapidly respond to "information" and its increased patrolling in the capital has resulted in more detentions of all types of offenders including drug abusers. However, it is obvious on the one hand that INTERPOL, whose international crime functions include drug abuse, has a very low priority in terms of National Police training assignments and equipment and monetary allotments. On the other hand, INTERPOL is not making full use of the excellent police lab for analysis of drugs or the police public relations office which has anti-drug films and literature available.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** Jorge ARENALES Catalan, Minister of Government  
Herbert O. Hardin, Chief Public Safety Advisor

**DATE:** August 11, 1971

1. In keeping with a joint STAT/AID requirement (Joint STATE/AID AIDTO CIRC A-1543) for information on the narcotics problem in Guatemala, I asked the Minister for his views. He commented in substance as follows:

a. Use of confined mainly to the middle and upper classes and consists mostly of marijuana smoking (locally produced), a small amount of imported LSD, and some of the other so-called dangerous drugs like barbiturates which can be obtained in any drugstore without prescription. As far as can be determined, production, importation, and use of the so-called "heavy" narcotics such as opium and coca derivatives are almost or completely non-existent.

b. As long as the drug problem can be contained within its present limits, the threat to the country's limits is minimal. Government leaders are acutely aware of the problem.

c. The present administration requested and received new legislation providing a maximum penalty of 20 years for sale or possession of marijuana, LSD or "hard drugs." Enforcement is vigorous. Discotheques, hangouts, and other places where use is probable are closely and frequently inspected by the police. The places are not closed because they would merely reopen in other places. They are easier to control if left as is. Arrests are given wide publicity, including photos of the accused. This is regarded as a type of social deterrent. Foreign elements are deported after their cases are disposed of and their sentences, if any, are served.

d. The Government is fully capable of dealing with the problem.

e. The police are doing an adequate job of handling the problem from preventive and enforcement standpoints.

f. In view of the relatively small problem in this country, no assistance is needed, ~~especially from~~ the UN whose philosophy and methods are not approved by Guatemala. Guatemala does not want to allocate funds to treat narcotics users as sick people, building hospitals for them instead of the genuinely sick, and letting them off easy. Guatemala regards use of narcotics as a crime and wants to handle it that way.

g. Not asked what steps US should take in dealing with the problem.

(Although writer does not necessarily endorse Minister's conservative thinking with respect to penalties on users and failure to regard drug addiction as a health problem, he does agree that the problem is minimal, that traffic in "heavy drugs" is probably almost non-existent, and that no outside assistance beyond that now provided in the USAID Public Safety Division is needed at this time.)

2. Told Minister that of the 95 shotguns recently received by USAID for the National and Treasury Police, joint planning by USAID and the National Police had to date found places for only 42 in the Guatemala area, and suggested that we begin distributing the remainder to police in the departments. He requested that this not be done yet as they are thinking of opening additional neighborhood police posts and shotguns would be needed by these.

3. Told Minister that USAID had received AID/W concurrence on the National Police Director General's visit to the US and the required time would be 12 days rather than 10. Minister stated he saw no problem.

4. Minister stated he had named Engr. Pedro Cardon Shwank as Project Director for the Police Academy construction project, effective August 15, to succeed Jorge Mario Mencos who had resigned.

5. Minister said he was going to Miami Beach for four days by himself to "sleep, swim, and walk the streets without looking over his shoulder." He said he was so tired he couldn't go any longer without resting.

AIRGRAM A-183

To: Department of State

Info: Amembassy Managua

From: Amembassy Guatemala Date: September 24, 1971

Subject: The Narcotics Situation in Guatemala  
(Requirement No. C-DI-1-56034)

Re: CA-3017; Guatemala A-82

GOG officials state that there is no serious drug problem in Guatemala and that the country is not a main Central American transshipment point for narcotics going to the United States. Of the relatively small amount of drugs used, authorities say marijuana and synthetic drugs available without prescription at local drugstores are most widely consumed. Their relatively high cost largely limits their usage to the middle and upper classes. Authorities note that hard drugs are in very minimal supply in Guatemala and that their use is largely confined to the foreign communities.

Answers to specific questions raised in the referenced CA follow:

#### Marijuana

The Minister of Government told the Chief Public Safety Advisor that drug abuse in Guatemala is confined mainly to the middle and upper classes and consists mostly of the smoking of locally produced marijuana. Other authorities assumed that some quantities could be smuggled into Guatemala from bordering countries, but considered the amount insignificant in light of the ready availability of the drug in the country.

Authorities judged that the traffic and consumption of marijuana was highest in the capital, but they considered it was also high in such population centers as Quezaltenango and Escuintla. However, the National Police are unable to provide any statistics

There is no evidence of alleged police illegal involvement with drug trafficking or drug smuggling to any extensive degree, although the Embassy is not in a position to explore the subject at any great length. The Chief of INTERPOL told Embassy officers of several detentions and court sentencing of drug traffickers and addicts, some of which have availability of drugs through

non-police sources which would appear to rule out any large scale police involvement.

For the record, there is no narcotics section in the National Police nor any GOG office exclusively concerned with drugs. INTERPOL's international crime responsibilities include drug smuggling and non-Guatemalan drug abusers. Other entities who make investigations, detentions, and prepare court cases in this area include the Mobile Military Police (Ministry of Defense), the Detective Corps of the National Police (Ministry of Government), and the Treasury Police (Ministry of the Treasury). Cases are heard by courts under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health which also handles violations of laws affecting prostitution and sanitation.

It is possible that drug smugglers may transit the country's La Aurora Airport which is a Central American air traffic center, but there is no indication of either any local big-time smuggling operations or any significant police protection of smugglers.

#### Cocaine and Heroin

INTERPOL reports the arrest of a U.S. citizen in a Guatemala City hotel earlier this year who was in possession of cocaine obtained in Peru and destined for the United States but states such detentions are rare. INTERPOL did not recall the capture of any opium smugglers in the Puerto Barrios area last year. INTERPOL officials do not believe Guatemala is used as a trans-shipment point for cocaine, heroin or any hard drugs in any significant quantity.

WEAPONS INVENTORY\*

Inventory of the weapons supply disclosed that there are too many different makes, models and calibers. For instance, of the 4,369 hand weapons there are 13 different types of revolvers and pistols in five different calibers. The newest of these weapons are Smith and Wesson Model 10, 38 caliber special, purchased as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Year Purchased</u>
325	1963
10	1964
100	1966
1,250	1967
20	1968
25	1969

The following is a complete inventory of the Police Force's weapons.

<u>Make and Caliber</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
<u>Hand Guns</u>	
Smith & Wesson, 38 cal. special	2,289
Smith & Wesson, 38 cal.	458
Burgo German, 38 cal. special	1,379
Colt, 38 cal. special	198
Ruby Extra, 38 cal. special	26
Astra, 38 cal. special	8
Murkin, 9 mm	4
Smith & Wesson, 32 cal.	1
B-0, 38 cal. special	2
Parker, cal.	1

\* "Survey of the Guatemala Police Forces Weapons System"  
J. Sabotta, October 9, 1970, OPS/W.

<u>Make and Caliber</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
<u>Hand Guns, continued</u>	
Star, 9mm	1
Star, 45 cal.	1
Sinmarca Revolver, 38 cal.	<u>1</u>
Total	4,369
<u>Submachine Guns</u>	
Malden cal. 9 mm	170
Schmeisser cal. 9mm	52
Koko Hand cal. 9mm	8
Walther cal. 9mm	50
Thompson cal. 45	11
Reising cal. 45	35
M-3-A-1 cal. 45	<u>104</u>
Total	430
<u>Shoulder Weapons</u>	
M1 Carbines, 30 cal.	3,050
Remington 12 gauge shotguns	285
Savage 12 gauge shotguns	50
Gas guns, 37 mm.	<u>6</u>
Total	3,391
GRAND TOTAL	8,190

Of the 4,369 hand guns, only 1,730 revolvers are in a "like new" or good condition. Since there are approximately 6,447 police officers on the Force, and it is the concensus of opinion that each officer should have his own side arm, this number is obviously inadequate. The number of M-1 carbines (3,050, 30 cal.) is adequate to meet Force needs, and the total submachine guns (430) exceeds their requirements. There were 285, 12-gauge shotguns listed on the weapons inventory.

FIREARMS PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL POLICE GUATEMALAI. INSTRUCTORS TRAINING

- A. A two-week course (88 hours) including 2 hours on legal ramifications of use of firearms and 1 hour on instructor methods and aids.
- B. A corps of instructors to be trained, seven from the Capital and one from each of the following departments:
  - 1. Quezaltenango
  - 2. San Marcos
  - 3. Retalhuleu
  - 4. Escuintla
  - 5. Chiquimula
  - 6. Mazatenango
  - 7. Puerto Barrios (Izabal)
  - 8. Jutiapa

These are the departments with the largest number of personnel, (in each case exceeding 100 men) and assignment of instructor will aid materially in reducing cost of per diem to GOG. In the Capital, one man will be from each of the four Cuerpos and three additional men to visit and give training in the smaller departments.

- C. One U.S. Advisor assigned to assist in preparation and monitoring of program.
  - 1. Necessary to monitor all firing to maintain control of ammunition (if Mission-furnished).
- D. Training of instructors to be conducted at National Police Academy in Guatemala City.
  - 1. Selected training aids to be prepared by the Academy and presented to each instructor.

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II. FIREARMS TRAINING

- A. Upon completion of Instructors Course, instructors to return to respective posts and theoretical training begins. The three mobile instructors are assigned to begin work in the smaller departments.
- B. Firearms training program to consist of 50 hours of instruction for the three basic police weapons. (See Attachment I for description of course).
  - 1. Revolver 22 hours
  - 2. Carbine 20 hours
  - 3. Shotgun 8 hours
- C. The first phase of the training could be completed within approximately six months if U.S. Advisor is free to devote the majority of his time to the program.
- D. It is recommended that the training be repeated in cycles of once every six months in order to maintain the basic necessary skills and train newly appointed officers.

III. AMMUNITION NEEDED AND COST OF PROGRAM (Costs for first cycle only)

- A. .38 caliber for 5,000 men at 60 rounds  
per man 310,000 rounds  
310,000 rounds reloaded at \$40 per M\* \$12,400  
\* Shell casings must be purchased.
- B. .30 caliber carbine for 4,500 men at  
60 rounds per man 270,000 rounds  
Purchased at \$125 per M \$33,850
- C. .12 gauge shotgun for 4,000 men at  
10 rounds per man 40,000 rounds  
Purchased at \$132 per M \$5,280
- D. Targets needed, 5,000 at \$125 per M \$ 627.50

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## UNCLASSIFIED

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|----|---|-------------|
| E. | Target pasters, black, 600 boxes<br>at \$1.25             | \$ 750.00   |
| F. | Per diem for U.S. Advisor at \$12<br>per day for 100 days | \$ 1,200.00 |

IV. GOG INPUT

- |    |  |             |
|----|--|-------------|
| A. | Lead for 310,000 bullets at \$25<br>per 4,000  | \$ 1,950.00 |
| B. | Purchase of empty .38 shell casings  |             |
| C. | Assignment of two additional men to<br>2nd. Cuerpo armory for reloading of<br>.38 caliber  |             |
| D. | Must agree to payment of per diem to<br>instructors assigned away from official posts.<br>(This has been a major problem in the past). |             |

V. U.S. ADVISORS MAN-HOURS TO PROGRAM

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|----|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| A. | Preparation of Instructors Course | 40 hours         |
| B. | Instructors Course                | 80 hours         |
| C. | 100 days at 8 hours per day       | 800 hours        |
| D. | Travel time                       | <u>100 hours</u> |
|    | Total                             | 1,020 hours      |

VI. FIREARMS NEEDED

- |    |   |           |
|----|---|-----------|
| A. | 10 needed for U.S. Advisor as GOG weapons are<br>unserviceable in many locations. |           |
| 1. | .38 S&W Revolvers at \$53   | \$ 530.00 |
| 2. | .12 Gauge shotguns, at \$58   | \$ 580.00 |
| 3. | Sufficient serviceable carbines in<br>each department for use.                    |           |

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Grand Total \$ 57,167.50\*

\* Not including cost of empty .38 shell casing  
but including GOG input.

VII. PROGRAM NOTES

- A. Inclusion of Guardia de Hacienda in the program would add approximately \$13,500 for ammunition and per diem for U.S. Advisor.
- B. A retraining cycle would be slightly lower in cost due to:
  - 1. Weapons for firing purchased.
  - 2. Shotgun and carbine course could be reduced in half for those having already completed it. The revolver would require the same number of rounds to be effective.

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SCHEDULE FOR FIREARMS PROGRAM

<u>REVOLVER</u>	<u>Total Hours</u>
Legal use of firearms and related laws	2
Maintenance and nomenclature of principal parts	1
Functioning and safety precautions	1
Single Action, theoretical (Stance, grip, breathing, cocking, firing)	1
Practice, dry fire	2
Firing, 2 periods of 15 rounds for total of 30	8
Double action, combat, theoretical	1
Dry fire	2
Practice, live firing 30 rounds, (5 loads of 6 each)	4
TOTAL	22

<u>SHOTGUN</u>	
Maintenance and nomenclature of principal parts	1
Functioning and security precautions	1
Practice with dummy cartridges and dry fire	2
Practice, 10 rounds, load 4, fire one, unload three, load 4, fire two, unload 2, load 2, fire two. Repeat sequence, last two fired from hip	4
TOTAL	8

	<u>Total Hours</u>
<u>CARBINE</u>	
Maintenance and nomenclature of principal parts	1
Functioning and security measures	1
Disassembly and assembly two periods	3
Triangulation	3
Positions and dry fire two periods	2
Zeroing of carbine (10 rounds)	2
Live firing, 2 periods, 25 rounds each	8
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TOTAL	20
GRAND TOTAL	50 Hours
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