

PD-ABA-921

A.I.D.

PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)

Reference Center
Room 1656 NS

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1. PROJECT NO. 504-11-710-037	2. PAR FOR PERIOD: FY 1970 to Nov., 1971	3. COUNTRY GUYANA	4. PAR SERIAL NO. FY 1972-2
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5. PROJECT TITLE PUBLIC SAFETY	152 66218
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6. PROJECT DURATION: Began FY 1965 Ends FY 1972	7. DATE LATEST PROP Aug. 13, 1970	8. DATE LATEST PIP None	9. DATE PRIOR PAR None
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10. U.S. FUNDING	a. Cumulative Obligation Thru Prior FY: \$ 1,172,000	b. Current FY Estimated Budget: \$ 70,000	c. Estimated Budget to completion After Current FY: \$ 0
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11. KEY ACTION AGENTS (Contractor, Participating Agency or Voluntary Agency)	
a. NAME	b. CONTRACT, PASA OR VOL. AG. NO.
PSA (Donald Harrison)	
USAID	
AID/W (OPS)	

I. NEW ACTIONS PROPOSED AND REQUESTED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION

A. ACTION (X)			B. LIST OF ACTIONS	C. PROPOSED ACTION COMPLETION DATE
USAID	AID/W	HOST		
X			The present project design assumes that Project 504-11-710-037 will be terminated at the end of FY 1972. Because of the overall success in reaching targets, and the evidence that the project purpose has been achieved it is recommended that this plan be adhered to. It is additionally recommended that the present phase-out plan remain in force. This phase-out plan envisages the departure of the Public Safety Advisor on or about December 1, 1971, with other Mission staff and TDY personnel monitoring the remaining commodities to be delivered and participants to be sent for training.	NA
X			Of all the elements of the project, it appears that the weakest area is with regard to the police's vehicle maintenance and repair facility. Although performance here has been as expected, in future discussions with the GOG it is recommended that it be vigorously pointed out that improvement is possible, and that a strong argument be presented to the end that the Government should seriously consider entering into a contract with a reliable automotive repair and vehicle maintenance establishment to service police mobile units, both land and riverine. This would result in disbanding the police's own in-house vehicle maintenance and repair operations. Alternatively, the police could employ full-time civilian mechanics rather than policemen. In this same connection it is recommended that should for some reason a Phase III be initiated in the future that the USAID not provide either a vehicle repair and maintenance advisor or additional vehicles until appropriate corrective action is taken.	When convenient and appropriate.

D. REPLANNING REQUIRES	REVISOR OR NEW:	<input type="checkbox"/> PROP	<input type="checkbox"/> PIP	<input type="checkbox"/> PRO AG	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	E. DATE OF MISSION REVIEW November, 1971
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PROJECT MANAGER: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS AND DATE Donald C. Harrison Nov. 22, 1971	MISSION DIRECTOR: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS AND DATE Robert C. Jancy, Director 11/22/71
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II. PERFORMANCE OF KEY INPUTS AND ACTION AGENTS

A. INPUT OR ACTION AGENT CONTRACTOR, PARTICIPATING AGENCY OR VOLUNTARY AGENCY	B. PERFORMANCE AGAINST PLAN							C. IMPORTANCE FOR ACHIEVING PROJECT PURPOSE (X)					
	UNSATISFACTORY		SATISFACTORY			OUT-STANDING		LOW	MEDIUM		HIGH		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	
1. PSA (Donald Harrison)						X							X
2. USAID						X							X
3. AID/W (OPS)						X							X

Comment on key factors determining rating
With regard to the PSA, the following factors are rated as superior: planning & management, understanding of project purpose, relations with host nationals, local staff training and utilization, adherence to work schedule, technical qualifications, responsiveness to AID direction, management of commodities. Effective administration of participants, and candor and utility of reports are rated satisfactory.

With regard to the USAID, internal communications are superior. Definition of responsibilities and authorities, and ability to mobilize Mission staff is satisfactory. With regard to AID/W, technical backstopping and the provision of commodities are superior. The provision of personnel is satisfactory.

4. PARTICIPANT TRAINING						X								X
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Comment on key factors determining rating
Orientation and the relevance of training are superior. Most country funding, supervisory receptiveness, employment of participants, and facilities for return participants are satisfactory. In some instances participant availability and training selection have been negative, although in most cases these have been satisfactory.

5. COMMODITIES						X								X
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Comment on key factors determining rating
Timeliness of procurement, timeliness of delivery, storage adequacy, use, availability of maintenance and spares, and record and control methods have been satisfactory. The appropriateness of commodities to project use has been superior.

6. COOPERATING COUNTRY	a. PERSONNEL				X									X
	b. OTHER				X									X

Comment on key factors determining rating
With regard to personnel, all factors considered were deemed to be satisfactory, with the exception of three factors pertaining to motor vehicle maintenance and repair (ability to implement project plans, technical skills of project personnel, and technical man-years available) which were deemed to be negative.

With regard to other elements, all factors considered were deemed to be satisfactory, with the exception of three factors: legislative changes (traffic) relevant to the project, negative; maintenance of vehicles, negative; maintenance of communications equipment, superior.

7. OTHER DONORS				NA								NA		
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(See Next Page for Comments on Other Donors)

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IV. PROJECT PURPOSE

A. 1. Statement of purpose as currently envisaged. 2. Same as in PROP? YES NO
 To develop a modern, effective and mobile police force sufficiently well trained and equipped to be able to cope with (a) the first stages of subversion, and (b) crime in all of its manifestations.

B. 1. Conditions which will exist when above purpose is achieved.	2. Evidence to date of progress toward these conditions.
1. Crime is reduced to tolerable levels 2. Public demonstrations and strikes are carried out peaceably. 3. Armed insurgency is no longer considered to be a practical alternative to the use of normal processes of government to obtain political power.	1. Over the interval 1966-1971 indictable and summary crimes increased at an average rate of 6%, considerably less than the 10% for the U.S. 2. The number of times that police presence has been deemed necessary over the past three years has steadily decreased, from 57 times in 1969 and 31 times in 1970 to 24 times so far in 1971. 3. Since the Rupununi uprising in early 1969 there have been no subsequent armed actions to interfere with the GOG.

V. PROGRAMMING GOAL

A. Statement of Programming Goal
 The maintenance of a stable civil environment that will facilitate Guyana's economic and institutional development.

B. Will the achievement of the project purpose make a significant contribution to the programming goal, given the magnitude of the national problem? Cite evidence.
 Yes. Achievement of the project purpose will achieve three of the seven indicators that the goal will have been met. Other indicators only indirectly related to the project are: containment of graft and corruption at tolerable levels; acceptance of the view that the security forces are apolitical; containment of racial animosity at a tolerable level; and acceptance and use of an equitable system of criminal and civil justice.

USAID/GUYANA PROJECT NO. 504-11-710-037

PUBLIC SAFETY

This paper contains the complete assessment of Project 504-11-710-037, which was summarized in a PAR forwarded to AID/W in November, 1971. Participants in the evaluation were: Donald Harrison, Public Safety Advisor, and Robert Klein, Program and Evaluation Officer. The paper was reviewed and concurred in by Robert Hamer, USAID Director and Lawrence Petersen, Assistant Director.

The genesis of this project in its present form was a report prepared by Ambassador Tobriner and Mr. Peter Ellena of OPS in the fall of 1969. This report proposed that the Public Safety project initiated in 1955 be revised and redirected toward different objectives. In thinking about the Public Safety project, therefore, one must differentiate between the project before and after the Tobriner-Ellena report. The project that existed before this report should be referred to as Phase I, and the project thereafter as Phase II. The project evaluation described herein is based on the Tobriner-Ellena report, and thus is for Phase II only.

This paper is in four parts, as follows:

- I - Project Design
- II - Overall Project Performance
- III - Performance Analysis Of All Input Agents
- IV - Recommendations

PART I -- PROJECT DESIGN

While the following project design is based on the Tobriner-Ellena report it should be noted that this report was not prepared in the context of the official AID evaluation format (i.e. PLOP), and hence the evaluators had to employ some extrapolation. Additionally, this project design reflects the appropriate policy statements laid down in the CASP.

PROGRAM GOAL

The broader objective to which this project contributes is the maintenance of a stable civil environment that will facilitate Guyana's economic and institutional development.

Indicators that this goal will have been met are as follows:

1. Graft and corruption is contained at tolerable minimum levels.

2. The Government and the people of Guyana subscribe to the concept that the security forces are apolitical, that is, loyal to the legally constituted government and prepared to serve and protect the people of Guyana under the terms of their Constitution;
3. Racial animosity is contained at acceptable levels;
4. An equitable system of criminal and civil justice is understood and accepted by the people of Guyana, and is employed.
5. Crime is reduced to acceptable levels,
6. Public demonstrations and strikes are carried out peaceably, and
7. Armed insurgency is not considered as a practical alternative to the use of the normal processes of government to obtain political power.

Achievement of this goal rests on the assumption that the government in power is able to strike a balance between nationalistic aspirations and short-term political gains.

PROJECT PURPOSE

The purpose of this project is to develop a modern, effective and mobile police force sufficiently well trained and equipped to be able to cope with (a) the first stages of subversion, and (b) crime in all of its manifestations.

Conditions that should exist after completion of the project, assuming it to be successful, correspond to items #5, #6 and #7 noted under the Program Goals:

1. crime is reduced to acceptable levels,
2. Public demonstrations and strikes are carried out peaceably,
3. Armed insurgency is not considered as a practical alternative to the use of the normal processes of government to obtain political power.

Achievement of the project purpose rests on the following additional assumptions:

1. That the GOC continues to give high priority to the development of the police force, and
2. That a workable liaison is developed between the Guyana Police Force and the Guyana Defense Force.

PROJECT OUTPUTS

Planned outputs are as follows:

1. Institutionalization of modern management and administrative practices in utilizing police resources and manpower;
2. Development and systematic use of modern police training programs,
3. Institutionalization of effective and efficient police patrolling operations in both rural and urban areas;
4. Development of an effective criminal records system and a modern system of criminal identification;
5. Installation and use of a reliable police radio communications network which will provide rapid communication between police establishments countrywide;
6. Expansion of police mobility, on land and riverine;
7. Development and use of repair and maintenance facilities in order to efficiently maintain and operate all mobile units; and
8. Establishment of a narcotics unit within the C.I.D. (this output was not included in the Tobriner-Ellena report, but was subsequently added).

Achievement of these outputs is dependent on the following assumptions:

1. That there exists strong leadership in the police force; and
2. That the GOC continues to budget sufficient funds for the development and maintenance of the force, including new obligations associated with the procurement of additional equipment, installation of modern methods and procedures, and assumption of new functions.

Specific targets for the achievement of these outputs are as follows.

<u>Output #1</u>	<u>Situation at Beginning of Phase II</u>	<u>Cumulative Thru FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>	
			<u>1st Half</u>	<u>2nd Half</u>
US trained executive staff	25%	75%	75%	75%
Utilization of manpower staffing assignments to reflect existing situations	60%	70%	80%	90%
Utilization of personnel administration methods (recruitment, training, discipline, promotions, compensation, transfers, assignments, retirements)	70%	70%	75%	80%
Utilization of public relations	50%	70%	80%	85%
Coordination with the GDF	75%	80%	80%	80%

	Situation at Beginning of Phase II	Cumulative Thru FY 1971	FY 1972	
			1st Half	2nd Half
Legislation (traffic)	30%	40%	40%	40%

Note: With the exception of 'Legislation' these percentages are based on the FSA's estimate of GPE executive performance compared with what is theoretically possible. The percentages for 'Legislation' are based on recommendations made in the Gunaris report.

Output #2

Renovation of training buildings and classrooms	80%	90%	100%	100%
Curriculum modernization	70%	80%	90%	95%
Modernization of training techniques	60%	75%	85%	85%
Restructuring advanced training course for sergeants and inspectors	0%	70%	80%	80%
Installation of visual aids equipment and replacement of textual materials	10%	10%	90%	90%

Note: These percentages are based on the FSA's comparison with the performance of other LDC's.

Output #3

Development of crime patterns, establishment of patrol areas, installation of adequate equipment for patrols	60%	70%	80%	95%
Expansion of police force (terms: people on board)	2300	2300	2540	2840
Construction of dog kennels (terms: units)	0	0	9	9

Output #4

Establish modern criminal records system (Soundex)	65%	75%	85%	100%
Provision adequate space for criminal records section	50%	50%	85%	85%
Existence adequate trained staff for criminal records section	100%	100%	100%	100%
Establish crime laboratory	10%	90%	95%	100%
Provision adequate space for crime lab	0%	100%	100%	100%
Existence adequate trained staff for crime laboratory	40%	65%	80%	90%

Output #5

Replacement of obsolete communications equipment with modern equipment (SSB & VHF)	70%	80%	90%	95%
Equip police vehicles for patrol with communications equipment	60%	55%	45%	45%*

	Situation at Beginning of Phase II	Cumulative Thru FY 1971	FY 1972	
			1st half	2nd half
Establish joint communications system with GDF (3 channels)	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Reduced percentage reflects inflow of additional vehicles.

Output #6

Increase vehicular units (terms. units)	71	62*	95	107
Increase boat units (terms. units)	37	34*	41	41 +
Increase motorcycle units (terms. units)	71	48*	60	72

*Decrease reflects retirement of worn-out equipment.

Output #7

Establish production line maintenance system	0%	100%	100%	100%
Replace obsolete equipment with new equipment	50%	50%	80%	95%
Establish spare parts control system	0%	80%	100%	100%
Revise spare parts procurement procedures	0%	80%	100%	100%
Establish maintenance records system and install associated commodities	0%	70%	90%	100%
Existence of adequate trained staff	20%	30%	30%	30%
Provide automotive wreckers (terms: units)	1	1	2	2

Output #8

Establish narcotics unit	0%	0%	100%	100%
Existence adequate trained staff (5 men)	0%	0%	55%	100%
Provision of narcotic and identification kits	0%	0%	0%	100%

PROJECT INPUTS

Inputs needed to achieve these outputs are as follows:

USAID

1. 18 man-months of Public Safety Advisor all outputs
2. 2 man-months of TDY Public Safety communications advisors Output #5
3. Training:
 - Police Executive training (1 man) Output #1
 - International Police Academy (3 men) Output #1
 - Technical Investigations. Explosives (1 man) Output #4
 - Advanced Police Photography (3 men) Output #4

- * - Traffic Management & Operations (3 men) Output #3
- * - Criminalistics (2 men) Output #4
- * - Narcotics (4 men) Output #8

* Still to be done.

This training is additive to training provided under Phase I,

as follows:

- Police Executive training (2 men) Output #1
- International Police Academy (15 men) Output #1
- FBI National Academy (1 man) Output #1
- Traffic Administration (1 man) Output #3
- Radio Communications (2 men) Output #5
- Telecommunications Management (1 man) Output #5
- Records Management (1 man) Output #4
- Questioned Document Analysis (1 man) Output #4
- Automotive Repair (mechanics - 5 men) Output #7
- Mechanical Maintenance (1 man) Output #7

4. Commodities, as follows:

- Visual aids equipment & text material Output #2
- Chemical batons & dogs Output #3
- Laboratory equipment Output #4
- SSB & VHF and test equipment Output #5
- 10 Jeeps Output #6
- 5 Jeep Pickups Output #6
- 6 Ford Sedans Output #6
- 7 Fiber Glass Outboard Patrol Craft Output #6
- 1 Automotive Wrecker Output #7
- Shop equipment and tools Output #7
- Narcotic Kits Output #8

GOG

1. Capital budget support -- renovation of buildings, provision of space;
2. Current budget support -- maintenance and equipment replacement costs;
3. Self help labor (in association with capital budget support);
4. Commodities (in association with capital budget support):
 - 12 Honda 450 cc motorcycles
 - 12 Austin Maxi patrol sedans
 - 2 Toyota sedans
 - 6 Commer Vans
 - 24 Land Rovers (currently on order; to be phased into operation over a 2 year period)

PART II -- OVERALL PROJECT PERFORMANCE

PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT PURPOSE

Evidence to date of achievement toward the Project Purpose is indicated below.

One condition that should exist after the completion of the project is that crime be reduced to tolerable levels. Evidence of progress toward achievement of this situation is as follows:

The Annual Crime Index for Guyana, 1966-1971, has shown a yearly average increase of approximately 6.0% overall in the number of True Reports of Indictable and Summary Crimes. In a country of somewhat over 700,000 people, over half of which reside in villages or rural areas, this annual increase compares favorably with the crime trends in much larger and more developed countries. For instance, the Crime Index for the U.S. annually indicates an increase in excess of 10%. The performance of the Guyana Police in holding down the annual increase, despite high unemployment in the urban areas, is indicative of police effectiveness. It is expected that this trend will turn downward as a result of police expansion to be completed in CY 72. In this regard it should be noted that there invariably is a time lag between inputs into the police area and results.

A second condition that should exist after the completion of the project is that public demonstration and strikes should be carried out peaceably. Evidence of progress toward achievement of this situation is as follows.

The number of occasions when police presence has been deemed necessary at public demonstrations and/or labor strikes to preserve order over the past three years has been steadily decreasing; i.e. 1969 - 57 times, 1970 - 31 times and 1971 - 24 times (incomplete data). The police have been successful in preventing violence and large scale civil disturbances. In only a small percentage of cases has it been necessary to use force or effect arrests. Labor organizations, and some political groups, frequently take their grievances to the public in the form of demonstrations and mass meetings. In most cases police permits are granted and officers assigned to monitor the gatherings. There is little interference by the authorities as long as the activities are conducted peaceably.

A third condition that should exist after completion of the project is that armed insurgency is no longer considered to be a practical alternative to the use of the normal processes of government to obtain political power. Evidence of progress toward achievement of this situation is as follows.

In January, 1969, Guyana experienced an unsuccessful attempt at armed insurrection. A group of dissident residents in the Rupununi area attempted to secede the ranch lands adjacent to the Brazilian border from Guyana and establish an independent Republic. Isolated police posts came under armed attack and five policemen were killed. The rebellion was short-lived, lasting approximately 40 hours before being completely crushed by the Guyana security forces. The instigators fled into exile in adjacent foreign territory, abandoning their Guyana holdings. Since this abortive attempt in 1969 there have been no subsequent armed actions to interfere with the GOG. The security intelligence organization (Special Branch of the Guyana Police) has apparently established adequate sources of intelligence to preclude any organized armed attempts to overthrow the government by force.

REPROGRAMMING REQUIREMENTS

This project (Phase II) is planned to be terminated by the end of FY 1972. Accordingly, no reprogramming is anticipated. A summary status position for each of the eight outputs for the project is shown below.

	Situation at Beginning of Phase II	Cumulative Thru FY 1971	FY 1972	
			1st Half	2nd Half
<u>Output #1:</u> Institutionalization of modern management and administrative practices in utilizing police resources and manpower	50%	70%	70%	75%
<u>Output #2:</u> Development and systematic use of modern police training programs	45%	65%	90%	90%
<u>Output #3:</u> Institutionalization of effective and efficient police patrolling operations in both rural and urban areas	60%	70%	80%	95%
<u>Output #4:</u> Development of an effective criminal records system and a modern system of criminal identification	45%	80%	90%	95%
<u>Output #5:</u> Installation and use of a reliable police radio communications network which will provide rapid communications between police establishments countrywide	75%	80%	30%	80%
<u>Output #6:</u> Expansion of police mobility, on land and riverine (terms: units)	179	144*	196	230
<u>Output #7:</u> Development and use of repair and maintenance facilities in order to efficiently maintain and operate all mobile units	15%	70%	85%	90%
<u>Output #8:</u> Establishment of a narcotics unit within the C.I.D.	0%	0%	50%	100%

*Reduction reflects retirement of worn-out units.

PART III -- PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ALL INPUT AGENTS

A summary of the performance of all input agents for Phase II follows, which reflects the judgement of the USAIL/Guyana Public Safety Officer and other Mission personnel.

PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISOR

Cumulative Obligations Through FY 1971	Phase I US\$154,000
	Phase II <u>70,000</u>
	Total US\$224,000
Obligations in FY 1972	US\$ 18,000
Estimated Additional Obligations Through Project Termination	US\$ 0
Important Outputs Dependent Substantially on the Performance of the PSA	Outputs #1 - #8
Overall Performance During the Interval (in a scale of 1, the lowest, through 7, the highest)	6
Importance of Performance for Achieving the Project Purpose (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest)	5

Performance Factors:

- Planning and Management	Superior
- Understanding of Project Purpose	Superior
- Relations with Host Nationals	Superior
- Effective Administration of Participants	As Planned
- Local Staff Training & Utilization	Superior
- Adherence to Work Schedule	Superior
- Candor & Utility of Required Reports	As Planned
- Timely Recruiting of U.S. Personnel	Not Applicable
- Technical Qualifications	Superior
- Responsiveness to A.I.D. Direction	Superior
- Management of Commodities	Superior

Action Required: None

COMMODITIES

Cumulative Obligations Through FY 1971	Phase I	US\$683,000
	Phase II	166,000
	Total	US\$849,000
Obligations in FY 1972		US\$ 37,000
Estimated Additional Obligations Through Project Termination		US\$ 0
Important Outputs Dependent Substantially on the Provision of Commodities	Outputs #2, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8	
Overall Performance During the Interval (on a scale of 1, the lowest, through 7, the highest)	5	
Importance of Performance for Achieving the Project Purpose (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest)	5	

Performance Factors:

- Commodities Appropriate to Project Needs	Superior
- Timeliness of Procurement/Reconditioning	As Planned
- Timeliness of Delivery to Point of Use	As Planned
- Storage Adequacy	As Planned
- Appropriate Use	As Planned
- Maintenance and Spares	As Planned
- Records, Accounting, and Controls	As Planned

Action Required. None

PARTICIPANT TRAINING

Cumulative Obligations Through FY 1971	Phase I	US\$62,000
	Phase II	37,000
	Total	US\$99,000
Obligations in FY 1972		US\$15,000
Estimated Additional Obligations Through Project Termination	US\$	0
Important Outputs Dependent Substantially on Participant Training	Outputs #1, #3, #4, #8	
Overall Performance During the Interval (on a scale of 1, the lowest, through 7, the highest)	5	
Importance of Performance for Achieving the Project Purpose (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest)	5	
Performance Factors:		
- English Language Ability		Not Applicable
- Host Country Funding		As Planned
- Orientation		Superior
- Participant Availability		Negative/As Planned
- Trainee Selection		Negative/As Planned
- Relevance of Training to Project		Superior
- Recognition of Degree Equivalency		Not Applicable
- Appropriate Facilities and Equipment For Returned Trainees		As Planned
- Employment Appropriate to Project		As Planned
- Supervisor Receptiveness		As Planned

Action Required: The GOG should take appropriate steps to insure that the persons selected for training are selected strictly on the basis of merit. Additionally, efforts should be taken to expedite the processing of training requests.

GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA

Important Outputs Dependent Substantially on the Performance of the GOG	Outputs #1 - #8
Overall Performance During the Interval with Respect to GOG Personnel (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 7, the highest)	4
Overall Performance During the Interval with Respect to All Other GOG Factors (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 7, the highest)	4

Importance of Personnel Performance in Achieving the Project Purpose (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest)	5
Importance of "All Other" Performance in Achieving the Project Purpose (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest)	5
Performance Factors (Personnel):	
- Competence/Continuity of Project Leadership	As Planned
- Ability to Implement Project Plans	Negative (vehicle maintenance & repair)
- Use of Project Trained Manpower	As Planned
- Technical Skills of Project Personnel	Negative (vehicle maintenance & repair)
- Planning and Management Skills	As Planned
- Technical Man-years Available	Negative (vehicle maintenance & repair)
- Continuity of Staff	As Planned
- Willingness to Work in Rural Areas	As Planned
- Adequacy of Pay and Allowances	As Planned
- Counterpart Acceptance of and Association with Project Purpose	As Planned
- Management of Commodities	
Performance Factors (All Other):	
- Cooperation Within Host Government	As Planned
- Host Government Cooperation with Non-Government Organizations	Not Applicable
- Availability of Reliable Data/Statistics	As Planned
- Adequacy of Project Funding	As Planned
- Legislative Changes Relevant to Project	Negative (traffic only)
- Adequacy of Project-Related Organization	Not Applicable
- Physical Resource Inputs	As Planned
- Maintenance of Facilities & Equipment	Negative (vehicles) Superior (radio) As Planned (all other)
- Political Conditions Specific to Project	Not Applicable
- Receptiveness to Change	As planned
- Actual Dissemination of Project Benefits	Not Applicable

- Intent/Capacity to sustain and/or Expand Project
Impact after U.S. Inputs are Terminated As Planned

Action Required: The GOG should seriously consider entering into a contract with a reliable automotive repair and vehicle maintenance establishment to service police vehicles, and disbanding its in-house maintenance and repair operation.

USAID (Other than PSA)

Important Outputs Dependent Substantially on the
Performance of the USAID Outputs #1 - #8

Overall Performance During the Interval (on a scale
of 1, the lowest, to 7, the highest) 6

Importance of Performance in Achieving the Project purpose
(on a scale of 1 the lowest, to 5, the highest) 5

Performance Factors:

- Responsibilities Defined and Assigned in USAID As Planned
- Authorities Defined and Assigned in USAID As Planned
- Effective Communications within USAID Superior
- Effective Communications with Other Action Agents Not Applicable
- Mobilization of Mission Staff as Needed As Planned
- Coordination with Related Projects Not Applicable
- USAID Performance per Terms of ProAgs/Contracts/PASAs As Planned

Action Required: None

AID/WASHINGTON

Important Outputs Dependent Substantially on the
Performance of AID/Washington Outputs #1 - #8

Overall Performance During the Interval (on a scale
of 1, the lowest, to 7, the highest) 6

Importance of Performance in Achieving the Project
Purpose (on a scale of 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest) 5

Performance Factors:

- Provision of Personnel As Planned
- Provision of Commodities Superior
- Provision of Adequate AID/W Technical Backstopping Superior
- Contract Negotiation Not Applicable

Action Required: None

OTHER DONORS

Not Applicable

PART IV -- RECOMMENDATIONS

The present project design assumes that Project 504-11-710-037 will be terminated at the end of FY 1972. Because of the overall success in reaching targets, and the evidence that the project purpose has been achieved it is recommended that this plan be adhered to. It is additionally recommended that the present phase-out plan remain in force. This phase-out plan envisages the departure of the Public Safety Advisor on or about December 1, 1971, with other mission staff and TDY personnel monitoring the remaining commodities to be delivered and participants to be sent for training.

Of all the elements of the project, it appears that the weakest area is with regard to the police's vehicle maintenance and repair facility. Although performance here has been as expected, in future discussions with the GOG it is recommended that it be vigorously pointed out that improvement is possible, and that a strong argument be presented to the end that the Government should seriously consider entering into a contract with a reliable automotive repair and vehicle maintenance establishment to service police mobile units, both land and riverine. This would result in disbanding the police's own in-house vehicle maintenance and repair operations. Alternatively, the police could employ full-time civilian mechanics rather than policemen. In this same connection it is recommended that should for some reason a Phase III be initiated in the future that the USAID not provide either a vehicle repair and maintenance advisor or additional vehicles until appropriate corrective action is taken.

PSO:DCHarrison/PRM:RMKlöh:eml
November 22, 1971