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# EVALUATION



## PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

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
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**USAID  
PHILIPPINES**



**OFFICE of PUBLIC SAFETY  
Agency for International Development  
Department of State Washington, D.C.**

CLASSIFIED BY: Byron Engle, Director, OPS  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1980

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# **EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM PHILIPPINES**

**APRIL 1972**

**Thomas M. Finn AID/OPS**

**James L. McMahon AID/OPS**

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Terms of Reference

Following the A.I.D./W Fiscal Year (FY) 1973 Budget Review of the Philippine Internal Security Project on August 17, 1971, and further discussions between the Director of the Office of Public Safety, Byron Engle, and U.S.A.I.D./Manila Director Thomas C. Niblock, it was agreed that an evaluation of the Philippine Internal Security Project should be undertaken as early in Calendar Year (CY) 1972 as possible.

This evaluation of the Philippine Internal Security Project then, the first conducted outside of the U.S.A.I.D., was accomplished by Office of Public Safety representatives Thomas M. Finn and James L. McMahon between March 31 and April 25, 1972. The terms of reference governing the team's evaluation activities were set out in State cable 229216 dated December 22, 1971, and are as follows:

1. Review the role of the Public Safety Program as it is related to U. S. objectives and interests in the Philippines.
2. Review the current and anticipated threat to internal security and the roles and missions of the civil security forces for dealing with them.
3. Examine specific objectives of the A.I.D. Public Safety Program and related project activities since its inception and measure in quantitative terms. This will include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the various project resources such as technical advisory assistance, commodity inputs and participant training. It will focus on an analysis of those aspects of the project which have received major emphasis, such as establishment of police training centers, community police improvement, modern personnel selection standards, telecommunications networks and the record and identification system.

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4. Assess degree to which the Government of the Philippines has utilized U. S. assistance effectively and measure GOP contributions, in funding particularly, to achievement of project goals.
5. While the team will not undertake a survey of the civil security forces, it will assess abilities of civil police agencies to carry out their assigned mission and roles. In addition to those aspects of the project listed above, the assessment will include, but not necessarily be limited to, organization, administration, budget, deployment, operations, and equipment maintenance capabilities of civil police agencies to carry out assigned mission and roles. Additionally, the team will review plans that have been prepared on narcotics control in the total context of program efforts.
6. On the basis of its finding above, the team will evaluate the need for future U. S. assistance to the civil police agencies, suggest any changes, improvements or modifications in the present assistance program which may be warranted and make recommendations as to the scope and dimensions of such aid. Any recommendations and suggestions developed as the result of the above evaluations will not be discussed or made known outside U. S. official channels, without the concurrence of A.I.D./W and the Philippine Mission.

B. Conduct of the Evaluation

During the course of the evaluation, the team had meetings with various Embassy, U.S.A.I.D. and JUSMAG officials including Ambassador Henry Byroade and Mission Director Thomas Niblock. Also, Republic of the Philippines officials having close associations with project activities were contacted.<sup>1/</sup>The team is grateful for the excellent support offered by these people. During its stay in the Republic of the Philippines, the team conducted on site observations of project activities at Zamboanga City, Bacolod in Negros Occidental Province as well as activities in the metropolitan area of Manila. Also, at the Ambassador's request, the team visited the cities of Olongapo and Angeles which adjoin the Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base.

<sup>1/</sup> See Annex A for complete listing.

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The team wishes to particularly compliment the members of the Public Safety staff for the exceptionally dedicated manner with which they assisted the team in this evaluation.

While the findings, assessments, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report reflect the team's own views, much of the narrative concerning project activities was obtained from data provided by the Public Safety staff.

### C. Backdrop for Project Activities

This brief summary of information concerning the Republic of the Philippines is intended only to provide the reader with a perception of in-country conditions which relate to the activities of the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety program.

Detailed information concerning the Republic of the Philippines is, of course, readily available from a variety of sources one of which is the Area Handbook for the Philippines, DA PAM No. 500-72 dated February 1969, available from the A.I.D. Historical and Technical Reference Center.

The Republic of the Philippines was established in 1946 after the country underwent eleven years of commonwealth status with the United States and nearly four centuries of rule by Western civilizations. It consists of a group of tropical islands numbering 7,100 located about 500 miles off the coast of Southeast Asia with an estimated population of about 37,000,000. The political hierarchy resembles closely the Federal structure of the United States and its subdivisions include 67 provinces, 1,421 municipalities and 61 chartered cities.

Despite the fact that the constitution provides for a strong executive branch, a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary, the political subdivisions enjoy a great deal of political autonomy. Political activity is centered around the family and friends and permeates almost every aspect of life in the Republic. Therefore, in attempting to mount an effective assistance program at the national level designed to bring about local change, many problems can be encountered in the process.

This is particularly true as it relates to an overall countrywide police improvement effort since there is no one national police force as such, with strong centralized administration.

The pattern of the Philippine police machinery generally parallels the governmental structure. This means that with the exception of the provincial government, the national, city, and municipal governments each operate their own separate and distinct police service.

At the national level, the government maintains two independent national police bodies, namely: (1) the Philippine Constabulary, under the Department of National Defense which is militarily oriented; and (2) the National Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which is primarily an investigative body. Both entities perform police functions and have nationwide jurisdiction. In addition, the national government also maintains a police administrative agency called the Police Commission, and a number of independent special police agencies in several departmental bureaus which are charged with the enforcement of the provisions of special laws.

At the local level, there are two types of police agencies, namely: (1) the city police department which is established in each city; and (2) the municipal police department which is maintained and operated by each town or municipal district. Their powers and functions relate to their respective jurisdictions in the cities or municipalities and are limited to the subdivisions' territorial boundaries.

This is the milieu within which the Public Safety effort has carried out its activities with the Philippine law enforcement agencies. In its initial stages, beginning in FY 1957, its activities were confined to assistance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). While working basically through the National Headquarters of the NBI, U.S. assistance also reached down to the various NBI field offices located in the municipalities and chartered cities.

In July 1964, a survey was conducted of the Manila Police Department (MPD) by OPS/W representatives and as U.S. assistance to the NBI phased down in

FY 1965, a program directed toward improving the effectiveness of the Manila Police Department was established in FY 1966. In the meantime, lawlessness was on the increase and President Marcos, shortly after taking office in 1966, asked for additional U. S. assistance in combating the deteriorating crime situation. As a result of the President's expressed interest, a survey of law enforcement in the Philippines was conducted from July to October 1966 by a team from the Office of Public Safety, A.I.D./W and field representatives, representatives of the U. S. Bureau of Customs, and the U. S. Department of Defense. The survey report entitled Survey of the Philippine Law Enforcement was released in February 1967 and served as the basis for the establishment of the current Public Safety Internal Security Project. While the earlier Public Safety activities will be touched upon in this report for historical purposes, the focus of the report is the evaluation of the current Internal Security Project which began in FY 1969.

D. BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC SAFETY ACTIVITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Public Safety assistance to the Philippines was initiated in 1957 and was predicated upon a survey of the police service of the Philippines completed in 1955.<sup>1/</sup> The program, developed jointly by the Government of the Philippines and the U. S. Government, was directed and channeled through the National Bureau of Investigation. During the period from 1957 to 1966, the emphasis of U. S. assistance was directed toward increasing the operational and training capabilities of the NBI, including records and identification and crime records procedures. In 1966, a program was initiated with the Manila Police Department which lasted until 1968. These projects were carried out through technical assistance inputs of Public Safety Advisors from a

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<sup>1/</sup> "Survey of the Philippine Police Service", Jeter L. Williamson. U.S. Government Police Consultant, December 1955 (CONFIDENTIAL)

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minimum of one to a maximum of eight at various times during the period of 1957 to 1968. Total costs for the 11 year program amounted to \$1,845,800, broken down as follows:

Technical Assistance	518,100
Commodities	971,000
Participants (209 U.S. and Third Country)	356,700

Though the average annual input was less than \$170,000, meaningful improvements were effected in the NBI's operational capability. The NBI records system was reorganized, new reporting procedures were implemented, and updated records techniques were adopted. The result has been to substantially advance its Central Records and Statistical Division toward a goal of providing nationwide criminal identification service. The NBI laboratory was improved to the degree that, at the termination of the project, it was considered one of the best in Southeast Asia. NBI regional offices were established in 13 locations in the country to afford nationwide coverage. NBI/U.S.A.I.D. ambulatory teams conducted training courses, although they were limited in scope and reached only a small percentage of the personnel of local police departments. U.S.A.I.D. assistance to the NBI enabled it to increase its operational capability so that, at the end of the project, it was regarded as the most effective investigative arm in the Philippines and among the best in Asia.

During the time the Public Safety project with the NBI was in being, the project with the Manila Police Department was developed. This project developed from an in depth survey of the Manila Police Department conducted by OPS/W personnel in 1964.<sup>1/</sup> As a result of the recommendations formulated in the survey report, a project agreement was signed in 1966 and by September 1967, a staff of eight Public Safety advisors was in place. The

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<sup>1/</sup> Survey of the Manila Police Department  
Frank Walton and others, Office of Public Safety,  
October 1964

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accomplishments of this sub-project include the following: The MPD was substantially reorganized to provide increased functional efficiency; a teletype communications system was installed by U.S.A.I.D. technicians, utilizing excess property, tying in headquarters and the precincts; and a training course was initiated to provide basic recruit training for all department personnel. In spite of its accomplishments, the project was prematurely terminated in June 1968 because of a serious breach between the Manila Police Chief and the Mayor of the city which limited productive contact by Public Safety advisors.

Also, during this period in 1966, President Marcos requested that a comprehensive survey of all law enforcement agencies in the Philippines be conducted. This was carried out between July and October 1966 by OPS/W representatives and a survey report<sup>1/</sup> entitled Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement was presented to the President in February, 1967.

Little action was taken by the GOP on the recommendations contained in the 1966 report until 1968 when, as a result of public pressures, the GOP directed the Peace and Order Coordinating Council (POCC), which had been created in March of 1968, and the Police Commission (PolCom), which had been created by the Police Act of 1966, to coordinate the efforts of all law enforcement agencies in a concerted drive against lawlessness. Parallel with this, the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety Program thrust was redirected from the NBI to the Police Commission in order to develop and implement a five-year (FY s 1969-1973) Internal Security Project, targeted on the improvement of local police forces. This project was designed to meet four major objectives: Training - development and implementation of regional training programs designed to provide maximum instruction in basic, supervisory, in-service, and specialized courses to the local police forces. This action would be accomplished

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<sup>1/</sup> Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement  
Frank Walton and others, Office of Public Safety,  
December 1966

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through the establishment of 10 regional training centers. Police Improvement - the development of a number of local forces into efficient and professional departments to serve as models to other departments and to serve in a supporting role to Regional Training Centers for on-the-job training. Communications - the development of civilian law enforcement communications systems with priority on provincial and municipal systems. Records and Identification - the development within the municipalities of effective records systems capable of meeting local and national needs and the development of a uniform nationwide crime reporting system. The implementation measures, accomplishments, and problems encountered in the Internal Security Project are covered in subsequent chapters dealing specifically with those aspects of project activities.

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## II. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS

The team was impressed with both the scope of the Internal Security project activities and the degree of success that surrounds the total effort. This point becomes clear in reviewing the proposed program drawn up in November 1968<sup>1/</sup> that called for a three phase implementation plan spread out over five years and encompassing a total of 16 advisors. With the exception of certain activities planned for Rizal Province during phase three implementation, many of the other activities originally described are being met with the phase one staff level of eight technicians.

The team believes the exceptional degree of accomplishments in each of the four project activities, i.e., training, communications, police improvement and records, can be attributed primarily to three factors: (1) good U.S.A.I.D. and Public Safety project management that insured maximum utilization of all project resources, (2) the high impact of the technical assistance component of the project, and (3) the positive and dynamic attitude on the part of GOP counterpart officials. Of these three factors, perhaps the technical advisory assistance inputs has provided the greatest return in terms of investment.

The technical and commodity inputs directed at both the province and headquarters level, has enabled the development of a police training system that is presently capable of providing training at the grass roots level for over 4,000 patrolmen per year plus advanced and specialized training. The communications activity soundly conceived, and implemented, stands out as one of the project's outstanding achievements. Police improvement activity embracing both the training and communications efforts was geared into the provinces where its impact is felt in eight chartered cities strategically located throughout the country. Professional police standards for all ranks of police have been established and this, in the long term, should provide the foundation for building a more

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<sup>1/</sup> Manila TOAID A-1487 dated 12/10/68(UNCLASSIFIED)

effective law enforcement capability throughout the country. Participant training has experienced a good pay off factor since 24 of the 56 civil police returned participants now hold key positions in 7 of the 9 regional training academies, 5 of the top 10 PolCom staff positions are encumbered by former participants and the Chief of Police of 12 major cities or municipalities are also former participants.

Commodity inputs, while considered as secondary in importance to the accomplishments of technical assistance, have been of significant help in implementing all phases of project activity. Commodity inputs have been neatly tailored to project goals and a recent Auditor General report indicated all project commodities are being utilized for the purposes intended.

Probably the most gratifying observation that the team noted was the high degree of support rendered to the project activities by the host country. The Government of the Philippines, working through the PolCom, has contributed some 23,400,000 pesos, 6.38 pesos = \$1.00, (\$3,667,700) since 1968 to this project. The contributions include capital investment (land, buildings for the police academies, and office equipment). Manpower contributions, which includes salaries, wages, per diem, transportation expenses of officers and employees, amounted to 11,990,900 pesos (\$1,879,451)<sup>1/</sup>

It is apparent to the team that the Public Safety effort has received strong support from all echelons of the GOP from the President's office down to the patrolman on the beat. On several occasions, the team has had the opportunity to discuss police matters generally and public safety specifically with representatives of the private sector. Members of a ladies social club and a restaurant man in Zamboanga and civic leaders in Bacolod for example were all most laudatory in their comments about the recent increase in effectiveness of their respective police forces and also about the communications and vehicle patrol improvements which they noted were possible through U. S. assistance.

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<sup>1/</sup> Police Commission report dated April 13, 1972.

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Crime rates, based upon available statistics, decreased 5.12%, 1969 to 1970 and 17.24%, 1970 to 1971, or a total decrease of 22.36% while clearances of cases by arrest increased from 67.9% in 1969 to 74.1% for both 1970 and 1971 in the eight model cities chosen for project activities. This indicates that the project has had a significant impact even on the little man far removed from the seat of government in the Manila metropolitan area.

While the Internal Security Project in the four years of its existence has contributed substantially toward professionalization of various Philippine law enforcement agencies by the achievement of project goals, a great deal more remains to be accomplished in both the provincial and metropolitan areas. The recommendations contained in this report for a partial redirection of the existing project takes into consideration the degree of accomplishments of the Internal Security project to date, the self-sustaining capability built into the project activities and the expressed GOP attitude that it is willing to continue to commit its resources in a joint effort with the U. S. toward ameliorating the peace and order situation which threatens the political and economic stability of the country.

In considering the question as to the future of Public Safety assistance in the Philippines, the team has also been guided by its findings in its evaluation of the present project, the U. S. interests in the Philippines, both security and economic, the desire on the part of the host country officials, to support a continued program and the availability of U. S. resources that may be committed to support continued project activities.

The major impact of the Internal Security Project has been made at the local level in the areas of training, communications, police improvement and records. The thrust of these activities has been directed toward a regional concept and the team is confident that this was the proper direction for the program to take at the time of its implementation.

Police improvement had to be effected at the local level in order to bring the project resources to the regions and, consequently, reach down to help

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the little man, far removed from the Manila metropole. The team's view is that the priority should now be shifted toward assisting the police forces in the Manila metropolitan area. This view is dictated by the high crime rate and adverse economic conditions in this area and the high degree of receptivity on the part of the political leaders and the police that now prevails in the area.

B. PEACE AND ORDER SITUATION IN THE MANILA METROPOLITAN AREA

The greater Manila area is a metropolis consisting of four chartered cities and nine municipalities. This is an area of less than one percent of the land mass of the Philippines in which about 11 percent of the population resides and that accounts for more than 50 percent of the reported crime. While the nation's capitol is officially located in Quezon City, in actuality, many of the National Government entities are still functioning within Manila proper. The metropolitan area encompasses approximately 192 square miles and is characterized by ill-defined boundaries separating commercial and residential areas, the exceptions being the suburban residential areas of affluence.

The City of Manila itself, though comprising only 14.8 square miles, has a known population of over 1.5 million persons. Additionally, there is a daily influx of over 500,000 workers and students into the city. The city has a high degree of commercial/industrial operations crammed into its limited space. It is the location of many major national government installations including the Halls of Congress, the Supreme Court, Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Palace, and about 35 or the bulk of the recognized colleges and universities located in the metropolitan area.

The metropolitan population, based on the 1970 census, is now estimated to be 3,329,200 with a probable annual growth of over 6%. A significant part of this increase continues to be represented by those who leave the rural/agricultural life of the provinces seeking fulfillment of the promise

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of the "good life" in Manila. Unfortunately, most of these migrants end up in so-called "squatter" areas and become an additional burden on the already over-taxed social services of the communities involved. Thus, these slums are, as a natural result of the lack of employment opportunities, fertile breeding grounds for crime and criminality. Not only are adult offenders produced from these areas, there are many groups of juveniles who literally live by their wits on whatever they can steal. The problem of juvenile delinquency stemming from overcrowding and low employment presents new and perplexing dimensions to an already overtaxed system of law enforcement and social services currently available in the metropolitan area. The problems are not exclusively related to the poor. The 1960's saw marked growth of delinquency among the more affluent elements of society. This has been attributed to many factors including a weakening of the traditional Filipino family ties and controls, influence of the news media and television and emulation of the counter culture youth of the United States.

The bulk of the manufacturing facilities are concentrated in the metropolitan area. This manufacturing capacity, however, has not been able to absorb the potential labor force generated by the natural increase in population much less the migration of rural dwellers to the urban areas. As a natural reaction, there has been an increase in crime and criminality due to lack of employment to generate minimum funds needed for subsistence, frustrated ambitions and inadequate official programs designed to cope with the problems inherent in such situations.

Manila and Quezon City are the cultural and educational centers of the Philippines having over 40 recognized colleges and universities with a student population in excess of 425,000. This results in unusually large numbers of young people from the rural provinces being placed into a cultural medium which is radically different from their home areas. This cultural shock has made fertile ground for sowing seeds of student unrest and discontent, a fact which has not passed unnoticed by those who would exploit the situation.

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This is evidenced by such major incidents as the January 30, 1970 incident at the Congress and Presidential Palace which resulted in 4 deaths, scores injured and a considerable amount of property damage. The March 12, 1970, Feati University riot of 3,000 students that caused extensive damage to the university. In September 1970, one student was killed and 10 injured as unrest again broke out on the university campuses in Manila. In December 1970, a student, Francis Santillana, was killed in a demonstration while marching with 1,000 students. He died as a result of a homemade bomb, known locally as a "pillbox", being thrown at him.

In January 1971, the most effective jeepney strike in the history of the country occurred. On January 13, at the height of the strike, 5 persons were killed and 40 more injured. In the 13 month period ending in February 1971, 11 persons died as the result of demonstrations or strikes.

On May 1, 1971, three more demonstrators were killed as violence erupted shortly before 5:00 P.M. In all, the toll was 3 dead, 18 wounded. In October 1971, in two separate incidents in Caloocan City, 34 people were wounded and 4 killed. This series of demonstrations was one of the most serious in recent history.

#### C. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

There is almost a plethora of law enforcement agents in the metropolitan area from a quantitative point of view. For a population of an estimated 3,329,200, there are approximately 11,631 enforcement officers or about 1 for each 286 persons. They are distributed by agency as follows:

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<u>City/Municipality</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Number of Police/Agents</u>	<u>Ratio per 1,000 Pop.</u>
Manila	1,582,000	2,868	552
Caloocan	206,600	298	693
Pasay	183,500	286	642
Quezon	585,100	885	661
Las Pinas	22,400	74	303
Makati	162,600	423	384
Malabon	106,700	137	779
Mandaluyong	101,700	222	458
Marikina	56,400	102	553
Navotas	68,700	62	1,108
Paranaque	87,100	121	720
Pasig	87,000	163	534
San Juan	<u>79,400</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>580</u>
TOTAL POPULATION	3,329,200	5,778	576
NBI		343	
PC - Metro Area Only		3,710	
METROCOM		<u>1,800</u>	
		11,631	286

The NBI, METROCOM, and the PC have concurrent jurisdiction as national agencies with each city/municipality for enforcement of all laws except local ordinances. In actuality, routine enforcement activities are in the hands of the 5,778 city and municipal police departments.

Although each political entity, enforcement-wise, is limited by its boundaries, there has been some progress in inter-agency cooperation. As an example, in the field of civil disturbances or crowd control, there now exists an agreement for mutual assistance in time of need. This agreement has been put to the test during some of the student demonstrations and has proved to be a workable arrangement. Additionally, on August 20, 1968, a Memorandum of Agreement between the Commanding General, PC Metropolitan Command (METROCOM) and the Chiefs of Police of the Metropolitan area established and defined the relationship between METROCOM and the police agencies concerning mutual cooperation. Briefly this memorandum establishes the principle that:

1. As a general rule, local enforcement is the primary responsibility of city and

- municipal police departments within their respective jurisdictions;
2. The PC Metropolitan Command shall basically be an augmentation force which shall assist or supplement the local police forces in the maintenance of peace and order within the metropolitan area; and
  3. The Chiefs of Police of the city/ municipality to which patrol elements of the PC Metropolitan Command are attached shall have command, control, and direction of such patrol elements.

This arrangement has been generally successful. However, according to a Municipal Police Chief, prior to the 1969 national elections, a significant number of the METROCOM command were detailed to other tasks which caused a dilution not only of manpower but also of transport capability which, in turn, effects the response time of the elements still remaining available for duty. Most of these men are still on special detail.

The PC Metropolitan Command (METROCOM) was created pursuant to an Executive Order of the President on July 14, 1967, to complement and supplement police forces within the Greater Manila Area in their campaign against all forms of criminality.

METROCOM is a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Constabulary, and is considered on the same level of a constabulary zone command. The strength of the unit is currently one thousand eight hundred (1,800) officers and men.

In assessing its capabilities, the fact that it supplements and not supplants the local police force must be taken into consideration. In its supplemental role METROCOM resources tend to be dissipated because of its heavy involvement in Malacanang activities such as providing protection for the physical properties of the Presidential residence and protecting the President and visiting dignitaries. Its patrol role in the Manila metropolitan area has low priority since it appears to prefer a static posture in keeping with its military

orientation. The evaluation team was unable, for instance, to ascertain any operational plans which would indicate regularly scheduled and programmed civil police activities on the part of METROCOM. It appears not to be involved in joint traffic control or investigation activities on a regular basis with the metropolitan police agencies. Its greatest asset, however, is in its potential for supporting the police agencies with significant numbers of disciplined men to be used in controlling large crowds. This, in itself, is a significant factor in the potentially explosive atmosphere in the greater Manila area.

#### D. PROBLEMS

Although there are 13 separate and distinct police departments involved in the Metropolitan area, there are, nevertheless, many problem areas and shortfalls which are common to all. Included in these are:

1. Lack of adequate radio and land line communications within the city/municipality. This also involves point to point communications between headquarters, police posts, mobile units and foot patrolmen. Additionally, an interdepartmental teletype system interfaced with PolCom is lacking thus seriously inhibiting these agencies from tapping the resources of the National Computer Center at Fort Aguinaldo. PolCom will have a terminal point which will become operational late in the summer of 1972. The statistical data available from the Peace and Order Program would be of great operational benefit. Each agency would be at once both a customer and contributor.
2. The dynamics of modern law enforcement require the rapid exchange of information. Current procedures and equipment limitations do not now allow this requirement to be met. Data that should be available to the metropolitan area should include; crime incidence and location analysis to enable selective placement of assets to counteract known trends, wanted and missing persons data, wanted and stolen vehicle information, and

vehicle registration data to allow registration checks in a matter of minutes. These and other types of information can be stored and retrieved from the computer data banks through an integrated tie-in with the PolCom terminal.

3. Inadequate capability for the humane handling of civil disturbances and incompletely integrated multi-unit control procedures. Although basic training in the United States was offered a group of officers from the Metropolitan area in 1963 and subsequent local training was organized under NBI/U.S.A.I.D. sponsorship, there was never a uniform level of performance achieved throughout the area. Personnel transfers and lack of training and equipment are primary reasons. Also, although cities and municipalities respond to requests for assistance from outside their primary jurisdiction, clear-cut operating procedures have not been established and tested.
4. Traffic, in all phases; enforcement, education and engineering is seriously deficient in the metropolitan area. The problem grows worse each year with the increase of commercial and private vehicle registration. Problems do not stop at a political boundary and long range solutions need to be developed and implemented on a regional basis.
5. Interagency cooperation in criminal investigations, for the most part, is lacking with each agency suspicious of the motives of another. Since crime and criminals do not confine themselves to any single political subdivision, it is imperative that some accommodation be forged at the policy as well as the working level.
6. In-service, specialist and roll call training has been given a very low priority. Supervisor training, both first line and command level, must be given increased emphasis if continuing and growing needs in these areas are to be met.
7. All departments are seriously deficient in the preparation of annual budgets. Often requests

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are on a lump sum basis rather than on an itemized presentation which adequately shows fixed and operating costs, plans for expanded facilities or additional replacement equipment and the like.

8. Management of assets, both manpower and material, is poor. This limits the service available to the community and strains limited resources unnecessarily.
9. There is a general lack of vehicles for transport and patrol operations. As an example, the City of Manila often can field only 6 to 8 mobile patrol units at any given time. The bulk of the vehicle fleet is 8-10 or more years old and there has been no programmed replacement. This condition exists in varying degrees in all agencies.
10. There is a lack of basic police equipment which is needed for everyday police service. Often the professional skill available is diluted through lack of adequate tools of the trade.
11. Salaries and allowances, although much higher in many instances than those in outlying provinces, are nevertheless not keeping pace with rising costs in the metropolitan area.

The team realizes that many of these problems will plague the Manila metropolitan area police agencies for years to come and that some of these problems may, in the long term, prove to be insoluble. At the same time, however, we believe that given adequate U. S. and GOP resources, much can be done to develop an indigenous self-sustaining capability on the part of the Manila metropolitan police agencies that will allow them to make significant inroads against the rising rate of criminality that pervades the area. On this assumption, the team offers the following recommendations.

#### E. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

That the U. S. Government, beginning as soon as possible in FY 1973, agree to enter into negotiations

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with the GOP for implementation of a five year police assistance program with the four chartered cities and the nine municipalities that form the Manila metropolitan area. This project would have as its objectives the general improvement of law enforcement leading to a reduction of crime, a smoother flow of traffic, an increased communications capability, a more effective patrol, better specialized training opportunities and increased investigative capability within the Manila metropolitan area. The theme behind the Manila metropolitan area police improvement proposal embraces the concept that through the combined contributions of the 13 police agencies their individual overall operational effectiveness will be strengthened. To achieve the objectives of this project in the five functional activities noted above, namely, traffic, communications, patrol, training, and investigations, U. S. inputs of technical assistance, commodities and participant training would be required. The magnitude of the project resource is described in figure 1. The team spent considerable time in assessing the various options available for project implementation, keeping in mind that any meaningful program in the Manila metropolitan area would, in all probability, require inputs both in technical assistance and in commodities in addition to the level committed to the current Internal Security Project. Our task then, as we saw it, was to develop a plan to permit maximum possible achievement of project objectives with an absolute minimum input of U. S. project resources consistent with U. S. objectives in the Philippines and our own judgment as to what is needed to get the job done.

F. INTRA METROPOLITAN POLICE ASSISTANCE CONCEPT (IMPAC)

The proposed plan, termed IMPAC (Intra Metropolitan Police Assistance Concept), addresses itself to the complexities of dealing with thirteen separate police entities which is further compounded because of the pragmatics of political life in the Philippines. This being the case, the plan also provides for project integrity in the event one or more of the municipalities were to pull out of the project or declined to participate because of political

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PROJECT RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
<u>TECHNICIANS</u>						
TOTAL	330/11	390/13	360/12	300/10	300/10	300/10
IMPAC	240/8	300/10	300/10	300/10	300/10	300/10
A/O	30/1	60/2	60/2	--	--	--
Internal Security	60/2	30/1	--	--	--	--
<u>COMMODITIES</u>						
TOTAL	330	315	265	265	265	265
IMPAC	50	255	265	265	265	265
A/O	50	50	--	---	--	--
Internal Security	230	10	--	--	--	--
<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>						
TOTAL	60/20	60/20	60/20	60/20	60/20	60/20
IMPAC	44/14	48/16	54/18	60/20	60/20	60/20
A/O	6/2	6/2	6/2	--	--	--
Internal Security	10/4	6/2	--	--	--	--
<u>TOTAL</u>	720	765	685	625	625	625
IMPAC	334	603	619	625	625	625
A/O	86	116	66	--	--	--
Internal Security	300	46	--	--	--	--

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considerations. Figure 2 schematically presents a chart depicting the IMPAC proposal.


At first glance, it may appear that the number of organizational groups being proposed in the IMPAC plan could prove to be an inhibiting factor in the speedy implementation of project activities and, indeed, this may be a potential problem. Precedence has been set, however, by the mayors of the 13 political subdivisions in the Manila metropolitan area with the establishment of the Metropolitan Mayors Coordinating Committee (MMCC). This is a group organized in 1970 to address such common problems as pollution, flood control, and peace and order. Beyond this there is currently under discussion a plan to form a traffic council composed of the 13 metropolitan police traffic bureau chiefs. The publisher of the Manila Times and several other prominent business groups are reportedly sponsoring this plan and intend to support the cities and municipalities in procuring traffic signal lights.

Step one in implementing the IMPAC proposal would be to effect an agreement among the 13 mayors, the Governor of Rizal Province, and the Police Commission and the National Economic Council, for the purpose of achieving a greater degree of police effectiveness in the Manila metropolitan area. The agreement would spell out the implementing actions necessary to effect change in the five functional categories of police activity noted above which have implications within each of the 13 police agencies. This group could be identified as the Policy Group. The mechanism the team envisions for actually implementing the project activities, however, is below this level and is identified as the Administrative Group.

The Administrative Group is composed of the 13 chiefs of police, the Public Safety staff and a PolCom representative organized for the purpose of coordinating and giving guidance to the next lowest echelon which would be the functional groups identified as IMPAC staff. The functional groups would, also, have representation by the 13 police entities, the Public Safety staff and the PolCom with one group for each specific project activity; communications, patrol, training, investigations and traffic. This would be

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# IMPAC ORGANIZATION (PROPOSED)



INTRA  
METROPOLITAN  
POLICE  
ASSISTANCE  
CONCEPT

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the level where coordination, plans, programs and actions are actually carried out, and the focal point for U. S. technical assistance efforts. The Public Safety advisor would work on a day-to-day basis with his respective counterparts in what is termed a Sector, which reflects a geographical distribution of the cities and municipalities in the IMPAC area. Each Public Safety advisor would be responsible for assisting in implementing all five project activities within the police agencies identified in his sector, and would also assist in implementing a series of individual recommendations developed for the specific departments in his sector. The IMPAC plan would have a two-pronged approach designed to: (1) improve the individual police department, and (2) improve the police capability in the total metropolitan area in five primary areas: patrol, investigation, communications, traffic and training. Secondary targets, however, may also be dealt with as required. These may include: (1) Organization/Management, (2) Records/Criminal Information Systems; (3) Jail Administration; and (4) Auxiliary Activities.

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G. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS - IMPAC PROJECT

As noted earlier, the proposed IMPAC plan is designed to obtain maximum results from minimum U. S. resources and the focal point to successful implementation of the proposed program is the Public Safety advisor. The advisors must be broad generalists with a depth of skills in a variety of police disciplines such as patrol, traffic and investigations. They must be experienced in imparting their technical skills and be sensitive to the nuances of working in an overseas environment with indigenous police agencies. The key then to a successful program in the Manila metropolitan area is an adequate and highly competent technical advisory staff. On balance and given the successful nature of the present ongoing Internal Security Program, the team does not believe that major shifts could or should be made in the present program's direction prior to its scheduled termination date at the end of FY 1973. The training and police improvement programs in the Mindanao Region are just getting started and, in the team's view, the presence of the Regional advisor in that area will be required beyond the phase out date, possibly until the end of FY 1974. The advisor in the Luzon Region is equally committed through FY 1973 in rounding out the police improvement programs in the cities of Baguio and Legazpi, as well as providing continued support to the Baguio and Legazpi Regional Training Academies. Twenty-five provincial Law Enforcement Communications Systems (LECS) have been installed to date while ten more are in the early implementation stage. Twenty additional systems are being planned for FY 1973 which would round out the LECS communication activity in 55 provinces. Of the remaining 20 LECS systems, 14 areas have been identified for installation on a priority basis while six remain as yet unidentified. FY 1972 communication PIO/C's have been submitted to A.I.D./W amounting to \$300,000 and \$150,000 is planned in FY 1973 for completion of the remaining systems. Of these amounts, \$100,000 is firmly committed to 10 PROVLECS activities and cannot be diverted for IMPAC purposes. With the installation of this equipment scheduled for early FY 1973, the total number of PROVLECS in operation will be 35. This leaves 20 systems to be installed to meet the stated goal of 55 PROVLECS. Assuming the feasibility of diverting the

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
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\$200,000 not yet firmly committed to PROVLECS into the IMPAC project immediately, the installation of the remaining PROVLECS could be spread out over a four or five year period. In the team's view, this is a feasible concept and has the added advantage of providing an immediate, highly-visible effort of \$200,000 in communications equipment for the greater Manila area.

In view of the ongoing nature of the current program, one question that the team has given considerable thought to, is how to effect the transition of the project from the regional approach to one concentrating its resources in the Manila area without compromising the integrity of the current project or renegeing on existing project commitments. To delay the implementation of the proposed IMPAC program until current commitments are fulfilled at the end of FY 1973 would not, in the team's view, be consistent with the exigencies of the peace and order situation in the Manila metropolitan area which are most critical at this time. Also, new Mayors, most of whom campaigned on a strong peace and order platform, have been elected in eight of the 13 political subdivisions comprising the greater Manila area, including the core city of Manila. Requests for U. S. public safety assistance have been received from the new Mayor of Manila and the Vice-Mayor of Quezon City. Also, Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor, often referred to as the "little president", in discussions with Mission Director Niblock, on July 28, 1971, made a strong plea for continuance of public safety assistance. These initiatives of the GOP coupled with the present limited capabilities of the metropolitan area police forces and the frightening crime picture in the area leads the team to strongly support the views of the city administrators and police personnel when they express great concern about the peace and order situation. The team also noted, particularly, that the city officials and police officers have tangibly followed-up with requests for U. S. assistance and they have also indicated more than a willingness to contribute significant financial support to any U.S. effort through the police subsidy program. The political climate is now right for effecting project activity with the Manila metropolitan area.

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## PERSONNEL STAFFING



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Notwithstanding the U.S.A.I.D.'s funding allotment in FY 1972 and FY 1973, the team believes adjustments should be made in both these critical areas to permit a very modest increase in both the staffing and funding levels for public safety during the period FY 1973 through FY 1978.

#### II. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - IMPAC


To permit ongoing project activities in the provinces of Mindanao and Luzon to continue to their logical conclusions and yet phase in the IMPAC program during FY 1973, an increase above the current staff level of eight advisors will be required for the life of the project. (See figure 3). The staff level would rise to a high of 12 advisors during mid FY 1973, drop to 11 at the end of FY 1973, to 10 at the end of FY 1974 and remain at 10 for the remainder of the IMPAC project. The reduction of staff at the end of FY 1973 and in FY 1974 coincides with the completion of the current Internal Security Project activities in Mindanao and Luzon and the elimination of the two positions. It is proposed, therefore, that four Generalist positions be established early in FY 1973 in order to effect early implementation of the IMPAC project while still maintaining current program initiatives in Mindanao and Luzon. The rationale for the addition of the four advisors is based upon the sector concept of IMPAC implementation (see figure 4).

The sectors are organized according to geographic, population and police distribution within the greater Manila area. Using this formula, a minimum of five sectors have been identified. Manila, as the core city, is identified as Sector I and, because of the variety and complexity of its law enforcement problems, it would require the attention of two full-time advisors to provide technical assistance in the five areas of project activity, i.e., patrol, investigations, traffic, training and communications.

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Figure 4

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Quezon City, San Juan and Marikina, included in Sector III, cover an extremely large geographic area and also have complex police problems which would require at least a two-man advisory input. The remaining three sectors, each requiring the full-time services of one advisor are broken down as follows: Sector II includes Caloocan, Malabon and Navotas; Sector IV includes Pasay, Makati and Mandaluyong; Sector V includes Pasig, Paraque and Las Pinas. Therefore, a total of seven public safety advisors, generalists, are needed to implement and carry the identified project activities, complemented by the on board communications, training and Chief Public Safety Advisors for a total of 10 IMPAC project technicians. With two of the regional training advisors committed through FY 1973, the remaining six on board direct hire staff could begin the implementing actions to allow transition into the IMPAC project in the first quarter of FY 1973. The four additional technicians should be on board as early in FY 1973 as possible in order not to lose the momentum of interest expressed by city and police officials for police assistance in the greater Manila area.

I. POLICE IMPROVEMENT ANGELES AND OLONGAPO

1. Resource Implications - During the team's initial meeting with U. S. Ambassador Byroade on April 4, 1972, he expressed his concern about the peace and order situation in the cities of Olongapo and Angeles which are contiguous to the Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. His desire, as the team understands it, is to ensure that the U. S. Government is doing all it reasonably can to maintain the best possible relationships between the American and Philippine communities, particularly, as it relates to the peace and order situation. The bases, of course, are the metropole around which flows the daily happenings within the adjoining communities and there is constant contact between American and Filipino personnel both on and off the bases. It is hard to imagine any significant activity within these areas that does not have a direct interrelated impact on both our houses. Narcotics, thefts of government property, large scale pilfering, allegations of

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violations of individual civil rights on the part of Philippine authorities, antagonistic social contact and strike actions against the bases are just a few of the constant irritations that hamper Philippine and American relationships. Most of these type irritants directly involve the civil police agencies in the cities adjacent to the bases and the civil police agencies in the two cities are hampered in professionally responding to these situations because of organizational, training and equipment deficiencies. In the past, politics in Angeles City was also a major factor inhibiting close and meaningful rapport with Clark Air Force Base security personnel. The team believes, however, that much can be accomplished now toward enhancing the relationship between base personnel and the civil police authorities if a limited technical assistance program having a small commodity input and participant training component was established for the cities of Angeles and Olongapo. The project would have a three year life span beginning in FY 1973 and have, as its objectives, the overall improvement of the civil police forces in those cities by (1) implementing modern administrative and management practices, and (2) developing a comprehensive specialized training program leading to improvements in investigation, patrol, communications, traffic, community relations and civic action. It is recommended, therefore, that the U.S.A.I.D. ceiling be increased by two to allow for the establishment of one generalist position for Angeles and one generalist position for Olongapo to carry out developed project objectives. (See figure 3). Thus, the total number of Public Safety advisors recommended for FY 1973 is 14 which includes 12 for the IMPAC Program and two for the Angeles and Olongapo project.

#### J. COMMODITIES

In arriving at the proposed commodity inputs required to support the ongoing activities of the current Internal Security Program, the expanded Manila metropolitan area IMPAC Program and the Police Improvement Program for Angeles and Olongapo in FY 1973, the team has attempted to carefully tailor the commodity

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components to meet minimum program essentials. It is designed also so that in future years the U. S. can be the catalyst leading to the GOP assumption of an increasing share of this burden. The FY 1973 U.S.A.I.D. planning figure for the commodity component for the Internal Security Project is planned at \$280,000 to meet project commitments as follows: \$125,000 - communications; \$110,000 - police improvement for Davao including \$10,000 for excess property; \$35,000 Records and Identification and \$10,000 for training; Total \$280,000. To permit transition into the IMPAC Program, it is proposed that \$50,000 be shifted from the FY 1973 planned police improvement activity and that \$50,000 in additional funds be allocated to implement the police improvement program for Olongapo and Angeles cities for a total of \$330,000 for commodities during FY 1973.

The commodity profile for the following years FY 1974 through FY 1978 was arrived at by using a formula based upon the Internal Security Project police improvement experience during the years 1968 to 1972. In each of the eight model cities included in the police improvement project, an average of \$15,000 was expended for commodities each year over the five year life of the project. The commodity package provided to each of the cities is considered by the team to have been well conceived and consistent with project activities. Of the 13 political subdivisions comprising the Manila metropolitan area, eleven approximate in size and police strength, the eight model cities assisted under the Internal Security police improvement program. Therefore, the team recommends that each of the eleven political subdivisions in the Manila metropolitan area be allocated \$15,000 per year for five years for a yearly commodity input of \$165,000. Manila and Quezon cities, because of the complexities of the peace and order problems within those cities, would require greater commodity support and the team has considered \$60,000 per year for Manila and \$50,000 per year for Quezon as appropriate to stimulate program initiatives and encourage additional procurement of major commodity items by the respective city governments. The police subsidy program, which is described elsewhere in this report, should generate sufficient local currency for the administrations to make major commodity procurements using the U.S.A.I.D. Trust Fund procedures.

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Manila, for example, has on hand ₱500,000 (\$78,400) that can be made available for the purchase of police equipment. These funds were generated through the police subsidy program during 1970 and it is expected that more than ₱1,000,000 will be available annually for the procurement of police equipment by the Manila Police Department.

In the team's view, the cities of Olongapo and Angeles would require \$25,000 per year for two years for the procurement of necessary equipment needs. Thus, the total commodity requirements for the three separate activities for FY 1973, i.e., the present Internal Security Program, the IMPAC Program, and the police improvement program for Olongapo and Angeles cities amounts to \$330,000. Figure 5 offers a breakout by Fiscal Years of all U. S. costs for technicians, commodity and participants over the five year life of the proposed project activities.

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## K. PARTICIPANTS

The team believes that one of the most constructive low cost contributions that A.I.D. can make is in the area of participant training. The past Public Safety participant program has proven to be highly successful with several former participants now holding key positions within the PolCom and as Chiefs of Police in various cities. It has also been effective as a program instrument in that 7 of the 9 chief training officers at the Regional Training Academies are former participants. The team, therefore, believes that continued U.S.A.I.D. support should be given to this important aspect of project activity and proposes that a total of 20 officers be trained each year at A.I.D.'s International Police Academy. The rationale for this figure is based upon acceptance of one participant each year from the 13 IMPAC project cities and one each from Angeles and Olongapo for a total of 15. One participant slot should continue to be allocated to PolCom and the continuance of the current project activities in the cities of Zamboanga and Davao should be supported by two slots each. As the current project activities terminate, the allocated training slots should be absorbed by the IMPAC Project. (See figure 5).

## L. NARCOTICS

The team considers the actions taken by the U. S. community to date in the area of narcotics to be exceptionally forthcoming to U. S. Presidential directives in this regard. A great deal of concentrated effort went into the development of the Mission's Narcotics Plan, the organization of the internal Mission task force, the coordination with the private sector that have a key role to play in any such endeavor, and the development of the Mission's Project Paper (PROP) recently submitted to A.I.D./W. The team wishes to add its endorsement to this exceptionally fine effort and hopes that A.I.D./W will view the PROP review process with the same degree of dispatch and urgency it was afforded at the Mission level in order that implementation actions can be initiated as soon as possible in consonance with the exigencies of narcotics problems in the Philippines.

FIGURE 5

PHILIPPINE  
PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING  
OBLIGATIONS  
(\$000)  
As of April 1, 1972

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Techni- cians</u>	<u>Partici- pants</u>	<u>Commo- dities</u>	<u>Contract Services</u>	<u>Other Costs</u>
1957 <sup>1/</sup>	120.7	17.3	8.4	95.0	-	-
1958	196.4	17.7	32.0	146.7	-	-
1959	64.4	19.8	44.6	-	-	-
1960	137.7	14.4	53.5	69.8	-	-
1961	52.8	26.6	22.2	4.0	-	-
1962	57.3	34.2	17.7	5.4	-	-
1963	169.0	29.4	47.9	91.7	-	-
1964	102.5	44.9	33.6	24.0	-	-
1965	83.3	42.3	23.2	17.8	-	-
1966	124.6	57.7	26.6	40.3	-	-
1967	155.6	69.3	22.5	63.8	-	-
1968	<u>581.5</u>	<u>144.5</u>	<u>24.5</u>	<u>412.5</u>	-	-
Subtotal	<u>1,845.8</u>	<u>518.1</u>	<u>356.7</u>	<u>971.0</u>	-	-
1969 <sup>2/</sup>	543.3	137.7	45.4	360.2	-	-
1970	743.7	188.6	11.9	543.2	-	-
1971	898.5	212.2	31.8	653.1	-	1.4
1972	<u>650.0</u>	<u>176.7</u>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>435.6</u>	<u>6.7</u>	-
Subtotal	<u>2,835.5</u>	<u>715.2</u>	<u>120.1</u>	<u>1,992.1</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	<u>4,681.3</u>	<u>1,233.3</u>	<u>476.8</u>	<u>2,963.1</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>1.4</u>

<sup>1/</sup> 1957 through 1968 project title was Public Safety.  
<sup>2/</sup> 1969 to date project title is Internal Security.

### III. SECURITY SITUATION

#### A. INSURGENCY

The following information was provided by Colonel Steven T. Clark, Deputy Chief Ground Forces Division during an oral briefing at JUSMAG Headquarters on April 13, 1972.

In January, 1972, in the State of the Nation message, President Marcos stated peace and order was the country's number one problem. Weapons smuggling is obvious and there are all types of organized and unorganized criminal activity. There is a fundamental lack of peace and order.

The dissident problem of the Philippines is home grown. There is no evidence, at this time, to support a theory that the Philippine dissidents are receiving outside assistance. There is, at this time, no external threat. The Defense Intelligence Agency classified the internal threat as One Bravo which is the same level designated to the Northern Ireland situation.

There are three basic dissident groups in the Philippines: (1) the HMB (Huk), (2) the AB or Peoples Army, and (3) the NPA or New Peoples Army. The HMB is the oldest activity, however, it has now generated into a Mafia-style crime group. The following are the statistics of this group.

	<u>Hard Core</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Mass Base</u>
1968	150	530	22,945
1969	270	190	42,700
1970	130	190	25,500
1971	106	774	20,510

The Peoples Army has the following:

	<u>Hard Core</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Mass Base</u>
1969	100	130	37,000
1970	50	140	33,000
1971	84	3,349	34,010

The New Peoples Army is currently considered to have the greatest threat as its people are disciplined and well-organized. The following are the statistics for the NPA:

	<u>Hard Core</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Mass Base</u>
1969	390	390	41,000
1970	260	550	35,900
1971	379	3,721	43,190

In all, there are approximately 600 hard core dissidents in the country. While they represent a small group, their exploitation of the social issues is causing considerable problems for the national government.

In 1970, the government took credit for forcing the NPA to move to Isabela Province. The NPA, however, using Isabela Province as a base, has dispatched ten to fifteen man teams composed of about 150 hard core and 300 students from Manila throughout the country. The NPA is attempting to demonstrate that they can better govern than the national government. They do not expropriate supplies nor do they steal from the population. They collect taxes, are running farms for their own use and collecting materials. Where the local government will not cooperate with them, the NPA will attempt to discredit the mayor and chief of police in the eyes of the populace. After an area has been "pacified", the team leaves a group of five people behind for follow-up activities such as collection of taxes and the seizure of weapons and ammunition. They have penetrated many barrios and, in some cases, have a much better reputation than the Philippine Constabulary who have been cited for stealing, intimidating and taking what they need without reimbursement.

Two dissidents, Lieutenant Victor Corpus, an Army deserter from the AFP Military Academy and Tagalo Manilo, are now believed to be in Isabela Province. Corpus is now considered the leading tactician in the NPA. On March 14, 1972, Lt. Bacaquin was arrested for attempting to persuade Philippine Military Academy students to defect. The NPA is found in Samar, Laguana, Baguio, Isabela and Manila. It is a continuing threat.

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The Nationalist Youth Organization KM (Kabataang Makabayan) is a Maoist oriented group. It has 253 chapters with a base of 15,000 members. At one time, it nearly controlled all student body activities in the metropolitan Manila area. However, a concerted effort has been made recently by other groups and the KM strength has been reduced somewhat in the student organizations. Since 1966, the level of demonstrations has significantly increased. The following table represents the number of demonstrations by year. The figure in parenthesis represents those described as violent by the PC. The 1972 figure is as of the end of February.

Demonstrations

1966	7
1967	9
1968	14
1969	106
1970	300 (20)
1971	311 (26)
1972	172 (13)

The KM today apparently is running out of issues as it does not seem to be able to stimulate mass activity as it did last year. The following chart shows enemy incidents for the period 1968 - 1972 and the number of Armed Forces of the Philippines and dissidents killed.

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Incidents	81	173	215	136	3
Killed	82	196	248	77	0
(AFP)	(18)	(28)	(31)	(14)	(0)

There have been a number of weapons smuggled in the country - everything from M16 to AK47 assault rifles. There have also been a number of thefts from both U. S. and Philippine military installations throughout the country which further adds weapons to dissident forces. There is also an increase in incidents by NPA against Philippine military installations.

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During the month of March, 65 NPA surrendered, 3 AFP were killed and 5 wounded. The MAP assistance has been a significant factor in deterring the dissident action. The helicopter capability has been a key element. Three helicopters have been lost to dissident action and one crashed due to mechanical failure killing General Tanabe's son who was the pilot. In all, 4 helicopters have been lost. MAP, in recognizing the need for helicopters, has moved deliveries forward and there are now 22 units available in country.

Barrio defense units have been established at the lowest political subdivision in strategic areas of the country. They are composed of groups of 5 to 12 people with anywhere from 2 to 5 AFP noncommissioned officers, usually PC, assisting as training cadre. These units are in place because there are no barrio police. Most barrio people seem to believe the Government is not primarily interested in their welfare. For this reason, the barrio defense units have been established. There are 425 units with 4,481 people armed with 3,643 weapons. Ammunition continues to be a serious problem. There are no more than 5 to 8 rounds available for each weapon. The following is a table showing the number of units by province:

	<u>Units</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
Isabela	25	352	263
Pangasinan	7	65	58
Nueva Ecija	18	149	111
Zambales	6	85	85
Tarlac	193	1,676	1,385
Pampanga	154	1,955	1,544
Bataan	<u>22</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>197</u>
	425	4,481	3,643

Cotabato Province, for example, is singled out by the NPA because this province has a number of significant problems. (1) Cultural/Religious, (2) Politics, (3) Agrarian Reform, (4) Loose firearms, and (5) Illiteracy. Currently, there are more than 2,000 troops in Cotabato attempting to control the situation. The AFP has committed 6 task forces to various parts of the country to control dissident problems. Task Force Palama is assigned to Cotabato Province, for example, and is composed of the following elements:

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Marine	200
Rangers	30
CC Hq.	52
145 PC	119
146 PC	119
147 PC	78
148 PC	<u>78</u>

676

Task Force Banahaw is in Cavite Province with 600 men. Task Force Lawin is in Isabela Province with 139 officers and 1,150 enlisted men as of January. Task Force Bulasan, Bicol Region, is composed of 38 officers and 361 enlisted men. Task Force Pagakasia is in Cotabato with 110 officers and 1,720 enlisted men. Task Force Pagari is in Lanao del Sur with 91 officers and 1,540 enlisted men.

Civic action is receiving a high priority within the PC, primarily, because General Ramos, the commander of the PC, was the senior civic action man for the AFP prior to his assignment to the PC.

It is considered essential that the Philippine Government be encouraged to focus its resources on maintaining the internal security of the country since the cost to the U. S. to protect its interests, both security and economic, would be significantly increased if U. S. military personnel were required to assist in this function. JUSMAG has observed that the AFP today is competent to plan its activities with minimal U. S. advisory assistance and that a good dialogue now exists between JUSMAG and the AFP. The AFP is receiving five million dollars worth of Japanese reparations goods annually which consists mostly of communications equipment, however, its impact is somewhat diminished by the lack of a comprehensive communications plan for integration of the existing networks. JUSMAG advises that there is a need within the AFP for both modern air and sea transportation and three U. S. Navy LST's, six sixty-five foot boats and two Coast Guard cutters will be made available in FY 1973 to alleviate this situation.

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The AFP is, also, in need of equipment modernization and JUSMAG indicated there is a need for 30,000 M16 assault rifles to improve basic firepower capabilities. Currently, there are 10,000 M16's available in country. Since its vehicle fleet is 9 to 12 years old, mobility presents a problem to the AFP.

While no single dissident group is considered capable, at this time, to overthrow the government, increased activity by the KM and the NPA, and the fact that the PC is too widely dispersed, could cause a serious problem in the future. If the internal security of the Philippines should break down, however, there would be serious repercussions for the U. S.

B. U. S. INTERESTS: ASIA<sup>1/</sup>

As the major world power bordering on the Pacific, the United States appears locked in common orbit with the nations of the Western Pacific. United States Asian policy seems currently in such a fluid state, however, that it would be difficult to state with precision how implementation of U. S. interests may change in the next several years. It seems obvious, nonetheless, that certain U. S. goals in Asia will endure over the next generation despite whatever evolves out of the winding down of the Vietnam war and the possibility of a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Stated in summary form, these goals seem to be:

- to be able to deploy United States Armed Forces in the Western Pacific flexibly and effectively;
- to support the continued development of a stable environment in which presently weak states will be able to achieve political and economic modernization while becoming more self-reliant;
- to promote a climate conducive to U. S. economic activity;

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<sup>1/</sup> Extracted from Manila A-319 dated September 11, 1971  
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- to be able to conduct relationships with all of the states of the Western Pacific area in a manner which will ensure the attainment of our array of interests;
- to create and maintain peaceful conditions and avoid the outbreak of general war, in short, to localize to the maximum extent feasible conflicts between nations.

In seeking to attain these objectives, the U. S. has a number of assets including carefully built relations with a number of key strategic nations in the area. The Philippines is a particularly important nation in this respect, as underscored by the nature of the U.S.-Philippine relationship.

C. U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS

U. S. goals for and interests in the Philippines closely parallel our regional aims. These, in brief, are as follows:

- to maintain base rights so long as they serve our national purposes;
- to assure the ability to use these bases in times of stress;
- to assist the Philippines toward greater stability, effectiveness and self-reliance in national security affairs;
- to promote and assist continued development of economic and social programs conducive to the well-being and orderly progress of the Philippine people;
- to avoid injury to established U. S. enterprises, i.e., to foster an orderly transition from the special relationships embodied in Laurel-Langley, and to promote to the maximum feasible extent the continued participation of American enterprise in Philippine economic activity and growth;
- to assist the Philippines toward realization of effective political and economic roles in regional affairs.

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D. MAINTAINING OF U. S. BASE RIGHTS

One of the principal interests of United States policy in the Philippines is the retention of American military bases at a level and under circumstances consistent with requirements of our strategic posture in East Asia. We believe that as American withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland continues and as the usefulness of military bases, e.g., in Japan and Taiwan, may be reduced in light of possible changes in U. S. policy towards the People's Republic of China, the importance of American military bases in the Philippines will increase.

Thus, if we put aside for the moment whatever political and economic factors define our need for the Philippines and focus only on the issue of U. S. security, how valuable are U. S. base rights? In the time frame of the late 1970's, how important will Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base be? Putting the question differently, if unimpeded U. S. base rights in the Philippines cannot be maintained through the 1970's, where else in WestPac will the U.S. have viable bases? In Taiwan? Okinawa? Japan? Thailand? Vietnam?

In terms of U. S. security, the difference between the Philippines and all countries just mentioned is that, for a complex of reasons, it is possible to say, within fairly broad limits, that the U. S. can have Philippine base rights in 1980 if it is prepared to meet a rising but still tolerable cost.

The Philippines and the United States seem linked, therefore, in a symbiotic relationship in which they want us to be with them -- it matters to them whether we are with them and they with us. We, in turn, need the Filipinos with us in order to assure that our economic and strategic interests are served.

There is an undeniable connection between the retention of base rights in the Philippines and the security assistance program. It is, indeed,

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at least a form of "base rent" even if we do not deign to call it such. However, the Philippine Government is well aware of the fact that there is a preambular reference in the Military Bases Agreement for the provision of military assistance by the United States. While we have studiously tried to avoid the implication that the MAP program is a quid pro quo for our base rights (which the MBA Preamble states are granted "free of rent"), most Filipinos clearly believe it is. The point is underlined by recent requests from the Philippine Government for increased military assistance, requests which come at a time when the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended, is being renegotiated.

We cannot identify a segment of the security assistance program as the "base rent" component any more than we can say all or none of the program contributes to retention of the bases. We can and must, nevertheless, emphasize that security assistance to the Philippines cannot be looked at without due weight being assigned to (a) the importance to the United States of the bases and (b) the importance to the Filipinos of our recognizing in ways serviceable for them the value of the service they render.

Given that U. S. national security interests require Philippine base rights, it is important to sustain a relatively stable Philippine environment in which the Filipinos support a strong U.S.-Philippine relationship. The key issue in this context is the ability of Filipino leadership to assist in keeping the bases useful to us under conditions of stress. Distributions of power among key interest groups in the system now is favorable to the achievement of U. S. interests. Their reasons are much more heavily practical than ideological; these groups are also interested in maintaining stability and access to the rewards of power.

The Philippine Army and Constabulary are important among these groups. Neither the PC nor the Army is unsullied politically. Politics swirl all about them and senior officers must be politically deft.

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However, military political involvement to date has been a distasteful requirement rather than a necessity or a Napoleonic solipsism. MAP has kept the Philippine Armed Forces largely out of political competition as an interest group, and MAP played a direct role in keeping the barracks-room free of partisan politics. There have been no military coups in the Philippines.

While these things are true, we have had, as Washington is well aware, recent losses of access to Clark Air Force Base due to labor troubles. Such impairments of access raise the ante to the Philippine Government in terms of the political energy needed to keep the peace around U. S. bases. They are also temptations if, as appears the unspoken case, strong Filipino feelings exist that we have been enjoying these rights too cheaply.

E. U. S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

U. S. economic interests also require that the Philippine economy develop in a manner favorable to continued foreign participation in trade, investment and financing. Perhaps the most important objective in this area is moderating Philippine economic nationalism. The scheduled termination of the Laurel-Langley Agreement should help reduce some of the nationalistic criticism of the United States, but the United States will remain the predominant foreign participant in the Philippine economy and a natural target of critics. In this vein, the lack of significant Filipino participation in such critical sectors as petroleum carries great risk for the United States.

The United States should seek to cooperate with the Philippine Government in its efforts to approach the task of ensuring that foreign investment in the Philippines serves Philippine interests in as rational manner as possible.

Another important objective in regard to U. S. economic interests is the sensible management of the Philippine economy. Given the already high debt-service ratio of the Philippines, the extensive controls on imports and the past history of election

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spending, continued favorable conditions for international participation in the Philippine economy will require steady strengthening of the voice of trained professionals, "technocrats", in the making of Philippine economic policy.

In all of the areas just reviewed, the lack of political stability generates severe economic burdens. It diverts the attention of government from the main tasks of development. It diffuses and in critical ways confuses authority and responsibility for economic decisions. It thus exacerbates the frustrations of the many through demonstrations, at least valid psychologically, of the ineptitude and insensitivity of the few. No less important to us, the products of instability increase the exposure of Americans and U. S. facilities to criticism and attack. In sum, economically rooted political instability in the Philippines becomes a problem in need of both direct and symptomatic treatment.

Direct treatment, insofar as we can play an effective role, lies through our economic aid and investment efforts. Security assistance must help to deal with immediate symptoms in order to buy time for other processes to work.

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#### IV. PHILIPPINE CIVIL POLICE SYSTEM

##### A. THE PATTERN OF THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL POLICE SYSTEM

The pattern of the Philippine police machinery generally parallels the governmental structure. This means that, with the exception of the provincial government, the national, city and municipal governments operate their own separate and distinct police service.

At the national level, the government maintains two independent national police bodies, namely; (1) the Philippine Constabulary under the Department of National Defense which is military oriented; and (2) the National Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which is primarily an investigative body. Both entities have police responsibilities with nationwide jurisdiction. In addition, the national government also maintains a police administrative agency called the Police Commission, and a number of independent special police agencies in several departmental bureaus which are charged with the enforcement of the provisions of special laws. No attempt, however, will be made to discuss the powers and functions of these special police units as they are only concerned with the enforcement of special laws.

At the local level, there are two types of police bodies: (1) the city police force which is established in each city; and (2) the municipal police department which is maintained and operated by each municipal government. Their powers and functions are similar to those of the two national police forces except that the jurisdiction of the city and municipal police forces is limited within the territorial boundary of their respective towns or cities.

In view of the multiplicity of Philippine police bodies, it may be said that the police "system" is a collection of police services having distinct similarity in authority but without any systematic relationship to each other. While the Philippine local police system closely parallels the U. S.

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local police "system", there is not nearly the degree of integration of common police services within the separate forces. It should also be noted that the entire land mass of the Philippines lies within either a chartered city or a municipality. There is no territory within the provincial boundaries that is not committed to either of these political subdivisions.

While the Philippine Constabulary, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Police Commission are discussed in some depth elsewhere in this report, the following background and assessment of the local police "system" is provided for information purposes.

B. THE CHARTERED CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS

The growth of city police forces can be traced as far back as the early part of the 19th century when the Spanish Government felt the necessity of creating distinct agencies, separate from the Army, that could police the rapidly increasing urban areas in the Philippines. In order to meet this need, the Guardia Civil Forces were organized. Prior to that period, the maintenance of peace and order in the country was carried out by the military establishments, assisted by rural police bodies known as the Guadrillos.<sup>1/</sup>

These police bodies, however, were deactivated when the control over the sovereignty of the Philippines was transferred from Spain to the United States after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. It was not until after the termination of the Philippine-American War in 1901 that civil police forces were again reestablished pursuant to the instructions of President William McKinley to the Philippine Commission. The reason behind this move was to hasten the restoration of peace and order so that rehabilitation of the ravaged areas could immediately be undertaken. Thus, the first police force, organized under the American

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<sup>1/</sup> Emmanuel A. Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, Book I, Manila: 1933, pp.29, 30 & 50

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regime, came into being in 1901. The first body to be organized was the Manila Police Department which was officially inaugurated on August 1, 1901. Since then, each city in the Philippines started to organize a separate police department of its own. These departments derive authority from their respective city charters. Members of these forces are peace officers and are authorized to serve and execute all processes issued by the municipal courts in their cities as well as criminal processes originating from all superior courts throughout the country. They are also vested with the power to arrest persons who have committed or are about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law or ordinance; and to avert danger or to protect life and property within the territorial limits of their respective cities.

In general, city police departments are under the control of the city mayors.

#### C. MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Section 2258 of the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines provides that in each municipality there shall be a chief of police and such number of policemen as the council, with the approval of the provincial board, shall determine. All members of said force are peace officers. It is their duty to preserve order and exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses. They exercise the general power to make arrests and seizures according to law. They also serve as firemen in municipalities having no fire departments.

The municipal police forces are under the general supervision of the municipal mayors, and derive their authority to enforce the law within their territorial limits from the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines.

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D. SALARY SUBSIDY

The Police Subsidy Act was passed by the Seventh Congress of the Philippines on September 17, 1970, for the purpose of processing revenue to finance activities and functions of the Police Commission. The funds generated are allotted to the PolCom to support local governments in improving their police forces in order to attain the objectives set forth in the Police Act of 1966. Funds for this special account are generated by two sources:

1. A tax on stock transactions in the amount of 2% of the gross selling price.
2. An additional tax on international travel of ₱300 per first-class passage fare and ₱200 on all other fares

The taxes collected are turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines and released quarterly to the Police Commission for distribution to the local police, according to the law. Money collected as a result of this Act is dispersed as follows:

1. For payment of direct salary subsidy to city and municipal policemen whose minimum salaries are below those established by the Police Commission;
2. For payment of hospitalization, death and disability benefits;
3. For training of local police forces; and
4. For the purchase of police equipment.

The Police Commission has developed a minimum salary scale for policemen by class of city or municipality. There are five classes of cities and three classes of municipalities for salary subsidy purposes. Municipalities Class 3 through 7 are grouped as one. The base salary for patrolmen ranges from a minimum of ₱240 to a maximum of ₱333.33. The salary subsidy is based upon the minimum number of policemen

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specified by the Police Act, and the current salary paid by the local government. Payment is based upon a subsidy of 1/2% of the minimum salary specified by PolCom.

<u>Salary Paid by City</u>	<u>Salary Subsidy</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Minimum Adj. Salary</u>	<u>Surplus</u>
₱250.00	₱166.66	₱416.66	₱333.33	₱83.33

For example, if the patrolman base salary in the city is ₱250.00, to this is added ₱83.33 by the subsidy program to give him a minimum salary of ₱333.33. ₱83.33 is then surplus and the surplus funds can be accumulated by the city and used to hire additional personnel or purchase police equipment as prescribed by the law.

The ultimate goal of the salary subsidy is to provide all policemen with a minimum salary by class of city or municipality nationwide and provide the municipalities with a revolving fund which can be used either to hire new policemen or police equipment.

Since the inception of the program to March 31, 1972, ₱34,830,310.00 have been collected and ₱8,112,774.40 released to 52 cities and 1,020 municipalities. This output was the subsidy for the months of October, November and December, 1970. Plans now call for the Commission to pay both the 1971 and 1972 subsidy in 1972 so that all subsidy payments should be current by January 1, 1973. The City of Manila has received ₱500,000 in subsidy monies which it intends to use for the procurement of equipment through U.S.A.I.D. Trust Fund procedures. It is estimated that more than one million pesos annually will be available for the purchase of police equipment for the cities comprising the greater Manila area as a result of surplus salary subsidy funds.

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E. ASSESSMENT1. The Police Population and Area Ratio<sup>1/</sup>

The Philippines has a total land area of 115,600 square miles, and a population of about 37,000,000. It is policed by two national police agencies and has 61 city police departments, 1,442 municipal and municipal district forces in 67 provinces, whose aggregate strengths are as follows:

Philippine Constabulary	25,711
National Bureau of Investigation Agents	343
Local Police Departments	<u>37,188</u>
Total	63,242

Correlating the total number of peace officers with the total land area policed and the population served, it would mean that every peace officer ought to patrol an area of about 1.8 square miles and to safeguard the lives and property of slightly less than 600 inhabitants.

This police population ratio is not out of proportion compared to some Western countries like the United States, England and France which have a police population ratio of approximately 1:500. Japan has a ratio of about 1:700. Yet, the police forces in those countries are generally considered to be among the best trained and equipped forces in the world.

Most of the developing countries in Southeast Asia have a higher police-population ratio than the Philippines. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have an average ratio of about 1:350.

This would indicate that the police system in the Philippines is not keeping pace with the population expansion. In spite of rapid urbanization and a 3.4% annual population

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<sup>1/</sup> Monograph prepared by the U.S.A.I.D./Philippine Public Safety staff dated 4/7/71 and updated by the evaluation team.

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growth, the police strength has not increased appreciably over the years. This is one of the reasons why police performance, even at its best, is far from being favorable.

It is considered that the greatest weakness in the Philippine police system is the local police forces. The reasons for this may be found because of deficiencies in (1) organization; (2) personnel selection; (3) training; (4) facilities and equipment; and (5) salary scale.

## 2. Organization

Most police departments continue to function according to the patterns laid several decades ago. Initially, they were organized as small police bodies because they served only small populations and there was no need for specialized organizational disciplines to carry out the various police functions.

As the cities started to rapidly urbanize and the police strengths increased, the police forces did not reorganize to meet the increased demand for police services. The patrolmen, in most cases, still run the whole gamut of the police service. In others where the police forces did undergo some changes, the organizational restructuring was usually dictated by political considerations without regard for professional police standards. The Police Commission, in a report to the President dated May 3, 1968, made the following observation:

"Most of our police agencies on the local level are organized and administered without any concept in modern police administration and organization but dictated only by personal convenience and the whims and caprices of municipal mayors and chiefs of police who lack the proper background and training for police work.

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"More often than not, distribution of manpower does not depend upon workloads or studies of times and places, of occurrence of criminal offenses, but on whatever obsolete concepts have previously prevailed. Thus, the administration lacks the flexibility that is essential in meeting the constant changes that are inherent in policing."

### 3. Personnel Selection

The weaknesses of organizational structuring is further magnified by poor personnel selection and staffing.

Under the present system, the qualifications of applicants to the police service are dictated by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations and Republic Act No. 4864 otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966. The qualifications include such formal matters as citizenship, civil service eligibility, and the applicant's health, physique, age, character, education, and intelligence.

However, while the law sets the qualifications of applicants, the selection process is dictated mostly by political considerations. The result is that many unqualified personnel are being absorbed into the police service.

Such practices, of course, result in inferior police service, poor quality of leadership and the ultimate decline in police prestige. The Police Commission, in the same report submitted to the President on May 3, 1968, cited the effect of this problem by stating that:

"Undoubtedly, one of the most serious deterrents to the professional growth of our local police forces is the misuse of political power or the undue interference of politicians in purely police matters. Such influences are mostly felt in the selection, promotion, assignment and transfers of policemen

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where they are effected not in consideration of merits of the officer concerned but for purely selfish, personal interest of both the politician and the officer.

"This state of affairs has resulted in double loyalty of the police officer -- to his political backer and to his profession, with the former holding sway in case of conflict."<sup>1/</sup>

This defect in the recruitment process has ramifications reaching to the corruption issue. While the law requires that applicants must possess good moral character, most departments do not go beyond a name check and personal interview to determine the suitability of the applicant. No thorough background investigation of the applicant is conducted. Thus graft and corruption can seep into the system and the prestige of the police department as a whole can suffer.

4. Training

The Police Commission, in an effort to increase the police capability, established a training program for local police forces in 1967. The immediate objective was to train the 19,822 policemen that had no relevant police training whatsoever. Initially, the Police Commission encountered numerous problems in the implementation of its training program. Foremost among them were: (1) lack of funds for the establishment of regional training centers; (2) absence of training facilities in almost every province; (3) inability on the part of the local governments to support the training needs of their policemen; and (4) the difficulty of generating adequate number of competent instructors. Few city or municipal governments have had police training programs in operation. The burden of training local policemen then fell entirely on the shoulder of the Police Commission.

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<sup>1/</sup> Police Commission, p. 40  
Report to President, May 3, 1968

In 1968, the Police Commission embarked on a crash training program. This program was intended to provide basic training to new recruits and policemen who had not undergone any previous basic training. The program had, as its goal, the training of about 3,800 policemen a year. In the meantime, plans moved forward for the establishment of nine regional training academies discussed in the body of this report.

#### 5. Facilities and Equipment

The lack of facilities and equipment of the police force is due primarily to low budgetary allocations provided by the local governments. For example, during the fiscal year 1968-1969, the total funds appropriated by the local governments for the 1,478 police departments amounted to ₱70,076,900.00<sup>1/</sup> (\$10,983,840). Out of this amount, ₱37,997,197 (\$5,955,673) was appropriated by chartered cities and ₱32,079,703 (\$5,028,167) by the different municipalities and municipal districts.

If the total amount of ₱70,076,900 is divided by the number of population, it develops that each citizen contributes only about ₱2.00 per year for police protection. However, considering the fact that about 90 percent of this amount goes to the payment of personnel services, only ₱0.20 year is, therefore, used for the purchase of supplies and equipment.

The situation of the police forces in metropolitan Manila is better. The contribution of the metropolitan Manila residents is ₱8.56 a year, while the contribution of the provincial residents for police work is only ₱0.97 a year. As a result of this, the police forces in metropolitan Manila are somewhat better equipped than the provincial police forces.

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<sup>1/</sup> These figures made available to U.S.A.I.D./PSD by PolCom were the most recent available in April 1972. Conversion rate figured at ₱6.38=\$1.00

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6. Salary Scale

The basic salary scale for policemen is described in some detail in the section of this report dealing with the Police Subsidy Program. It should be noted, however, that while the police salary subsidy program goes a long way toward easing some of the inequities in the system, the basic salary for the policeman has not kept pace with the cost of living. The natural consequence of the low salary scale is reflected in the fact that most police departments are undermanned.

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F. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

## 1. History

The Philippine Constabulary came into being on August 8, 1901, immediately after the termination of the Philippine-American hostilities. The cessation of hostility between the two countries, however, did not altogether terminate the chaos in the Philippines. Insurrections, brigandage, lawlessness, and even pestilence and epidemic continued to plague the country. Under these conditions, the United States-Philippine Commission, therefore, found it difficult to carry out the instructions of President William McKinley which called for "an early establishment of municipal governments throughout the country and to afford the natives the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, subject to the least degree of United States supervision and control."

In furtherance of this objective, the United States-Philippine Commission passed Act No. 175 on July 18, 1901, creating an insular police force known as the Philippine Constabulary.

The primary mission entrusted to the Constabulary was to maintain peace and order. However, in order to hasten the rehabilitation of the country, it was also called upon to perform a variety of service tasks. These tasks included public work, health inspection, pest control work, relief work, adjudication of cases in the peace courts, sanitation service, mail service, census taking, and building trails in remote areas. Because of the numerous roles it played in nation building, it later earned for itself the distinction of being called "nation builder".

Since its organization in 1901, the mission of the Philippine Constabulary remained substantially the same. However, when it became one of the major services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1950 by virtue of Executive Order No. 389 of President Elpidio Quirino, its mission was expanded

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to include home defense responsibility in rear areas during a national emergency. As a service organization, it is also called upon to assist other governmental agencies in the enforcement of a variety of special laws and executive orders. Included in these special duties is its responsibility to oversee police forces in certain circumstances. PC control of police forces can be assumed over any police department at the direction of the President. There are several reasons for PC takeover. However, they are so broad that almost any excuse could be utilized to justify this takeover. The following table represents the number of towns and cities under PC control by zone.

<u>Zone</u>	<u>Municipalities</u>	<u>Cities</u>	<u>PC Officers- Enlisted</u>
I	66	2	8-198
II	19	-	13-181
III	26	1	7-124
IV	<u>38</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>17-252</u>
Total	149	6	45-755

By law, the PC is required to enforce such rules as those of the Land Transportation Commission, Fisheries Commission, Wildlife and Alien Control. Each of these is at the direction of the President. They are also required to enforce laws relating to entertainment such as the prohibition of pornographic films. The PC, also, has a defense mission which is mainly to provide rear area security in the event of an exterior attack.


It supervises private guard services. The following table represents the total number of licensed agencies and guards in the greater Manila area and in the four PC zones:

	<u>Greater Manila Area</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>Total</u>
Licensed Agencies	221	24	4	19	17	285
Guards	27,449	1,943	434	3,126	1,048	34,000

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2. Organization

The FY 1973 budget calls for the following: 2,061 officers and 22,439 enlisted men, for a total of 24,500. It is organized into four geographic zones. The typical zone is composed of the following elements:



The following is a listing of companies and provinces by zone:

I	20/39
II	14/26
III	16/24
IV	<u>18/42</u>


Provinces--68/131--Companies

The typical company is composed of three officers and 75 enlisted men with approximately nine detachments to a company. The Metropolitan Command is treated as a separate zone. See figures 6 and 7 for the PC Organization Chart and for PC Zone Distribution.

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Figure - 6


# HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY



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# CONSTABULARY MAJOR INSTALLATIONS



Systematically arranged, the present tasks of the Philippine Constabulary are as follows:

3. Duties

a. General Police Duties

- (1) Preservation of public order and enforcement of the law;
- (2) Crime prevention and suppression; and
- (3) Enforcement of the Criminal Law.

b. Special Police Duties

- (1) Administration of Firearms and Explosive Laws; and
- (2) Inspection and control of local police forces.

c. Miscellaneous Duties

- (1) Enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Law, Fishing Law, Games Law, anti-dummy law, and Nationalization of Retail Trade Law;
- (2) Enforcement of the Tenancy Law, Law on Scrap Iron, Metal and Gold, and Carabao Ban Law by direction of the President of the Philippines;
- (3) Enforcement of the Immigration Law, Customs Law, Forestry Law, Quarantine Law, Election Law by deputation;
- (4) Enforcement of the Labor Law, Amusements Law, and Uniform Units of Volume or Weight Law on Rice and Palay upon request by proper agency;
- (5) Assistance to other agencies during disasters or calamities;
- (6) Civic actions.

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d. National Defense Duties

- (1) Home defense duties in near areas during a national emergency; and
- (2) to carry out other defense duties assigned to it by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The maintenance of internal security of the nation is a responsibility and function that is assigned to the Constabulary. Campaigns against subversion, insurgency or dissidence and criminality in general and anti-civil disturbance operations are undertaken by the Force. In some situations, they are reenforced by the Philippine Army, Air Force or Naval units. The PC played an important role in controlling the strikes and demonstrations in January and February of 1971.

The PC is supported by JUSMAG and both technical advice and commodity support is provided to enable the Force to carry out its mission in every province of the country. See figure 8.

While the PC is under the command of a West Point graduate, General Fidel Ramos, a major problem exists in the command structure since the constabulary commander changes frequently -- the normal tour is less than two years. There is little continuity and operational policies frequently change. Also, while charged with the responsibility for performing police duties in many instances the constabulary is basically "military" oriented. The field operational unit usually does not meet the educational standards of a city patrolman (minimum of two years college) and in depth police training is lacking.

There is legislation pending before Congress which would create a civilian national police but it is not given much chance to pass and, no doubt, the constabulary will continue to be the primary enforcement arm of the national government. Therefore, the

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MAP SUPPORT OF PCFY 1969 THROUGH FY 1974

(in millions \$ U.S.)

<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
.3 - I	.4 - I	.03 - I	.02 - I	.02 - I	.03 - I
1.3 - 0	1.3 - 0	1.30 - 0	1.50 - 0	1.50 - 0	1.50 - 0
<u>.2</u> - Tng	<u>.2</u> - Tng	<u>.20</u> - Tng	<u>.20</u> - Tng	<u>.20</u> - Tng	<u>.20</u> - Tng
1.8 M	1.9 M	1.53 M	1.72 M	1.72 M	1.73 M

+ 10% of each years total for packing, crating, handling  
+ indirect support

I - investment funds - new items, construction, etc.

O - operating funds - attrition replacement, repair parts,  
batteries + bulk allocated items, etc.

Tng - training costs - school support, CONUS training, etc.

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greatest enforcement dividends can only be obtained by working for greater coordination and cooperation between the Philippine Constabulary, the National Bureau of Investigation and the local police.

4. Coordination of Law Enforcement Agencies

There are several means whereby Philippine law enforcement agencies coordinate their activities and work for improved peace and order conditions. A representative of the Philippine Constabulary and the National Bureau of Investigation, for example, are ex officio members of the Police Commission.

Also, the Peace and Order Council which was created on March 11, 1968, has representatives of the major enforcement agencies. This council is chaired by President Marcos; however, most of the responsibilities are delegated to the Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor. The committee, as a whole, now meets at least once a month. The day-to-day operations are handled by Colonel Crisostomo, representative of the Department of National Defense.

The Council has attempted to coordinate national program efforts, e.g., the campaign against loose firearms and the adoption of a standard police reporting system. To date, the Council has had only limited successes but it does provide an official avenue for communications between agencies.

At the local level, the Confederation of Chiefs of Police of the Philippines is one means whereby the Philippine police officers work together to improve their capabilities as an enforcement arm. It is patterned after the International Association of Chiefs of Police in the United States. The organization has as its purpose:

- "a. To advance the science and art of police administration and crime prevention;
- "b. To develop and disseminate improved administration and technical practices and promote their use in police work;

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- "c. To foster police cooperation and exchange of information and experience among police administrators;
  - "d. To bring about enlistment and training in the police profession of qualified persons;
  - "e. To encourage adherence of all police officers to high professional standards of conduct;
  - "f. To support the activities of the national government agencies such as the POLICE COMMISSION, Philippine Constabulary, National Bureau of Investigation, Civil Service Commission, AND THE LIKE, in the realization of making the police service as a real profession and other activities relative to the effective fight against criminality consistent with law; and
  - "g. TO ORGANIZE AND OPERATE MUTUAL AID PROGRAMS, CREDIT UNIONS, CONSUMERS COOPERATIVES, AND OTHER SUITABLE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES THAT WILL PROMOTE THE WELFARE OF THE CONFEDERATION AND ITS MEMBERS."
5. MAP Support - FY 1969 through FY 1974
- a. Total MAP support of Armed Forces of the Philippines for the years FY 1969 through FY 1974 is programmed to a dollar ceiling of 20 million per year. The PC portion of this total is slightly less than 10% per year. It should be recognized that the Constabulary has 42% of the AFP strength but its percentage cut is low because the PC has no large investment items in their direct inventory such as planes, ships, or heavy engineer equipment. The funds allocated for direct support of the Constabulary by the AFP are approximately 40% of the total funds available to the AFP.
  - b. The PC is considered by JUSMAG personnel to have sufficient investment items, as provided

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by MAP, in the inventory in order for the Constabulary to have minimum essential equipment to perform the peace and order mission at this time.

- c. Certain "indirect" costs programmed for the Armed Forces of the Philippines as a totality, or to specific services other than the Constabulary, find their way in support of the PC. Examples are: U-17 aircraft; Philippine Army employment in the anti-dissident drive in Central Luzon and the PA involvement in PC activities in the Visayas and Mindanao; Philippine Navy coast-wise employment in the anti-smuggling, anti-piracy and anti-dissident campaigns; medical/dental equipment and expendable supplies that are brought in and distributed by GHQ; PC use of other service schools which come under MAP support; certain POL products which are funded through Navy Section and Air Force Section, JUSMAG and which end up being used by the Constabulary. It is virtually impossible to pin this support down directly, or place a dollar value on it, but it does represent a considerable significance in collateral support/assistance made available to the Constabulary.

Advisory assistance to the PC provided by JUSMAG is limited to logistics and staff support.

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G. THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is a national police agency under the administrative control and supervision of the Department of Justice.

Patterned after that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States, it was initially organized in 1936 as a Division of Investigation in the Department of Justice by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 181. Its original functions included crime detection, prosecution of offenders and maintenance of criminal identification records. However, after World War II, the need for strengthening this Division was felt because of the rising tide of criminality, dissidence and subversion brought about by the social disequilibrium created by the war. Thus, in 1947, the Division of Investigation was enlarged and its status elevated to that of a Bureau. It was redesignated as National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to Republic Act No. 157. Its expanded functions include the following:

- (1) Investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require;
- (2) Rendering assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and other offenses;
- (3) Serving as a national clearing house for information concerning criminals and other information for the benefit and use of all prosecuting and law enforcement entities of the Philippines, maintaining identification records of all persons without criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership of possession of all firearms as well as of test bullets fired therefrom;
- (4) Giving technical aid to all prosecuting and law enforcement officers and entities of

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the government as well as to the courts that may request its services;

(5) Extending its services, whenever properly requested, in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil nature in which the government is interested;

(6) Undertaking the instruction and training of a representative number of city and municipal peace officers at the request of their superiors along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties;

(7) Establishing and maintaining an up-to-date scientific laboratory and to conduct researches in furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation; and

(8) Performing such other related functions as the Secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.

It currently has a total complement of about 1,500 persons, of which 343 are agent personnel assigned throughout the 17 regional field offices and the national headquarters in Manila. The organization chart of the NBI is reflected in figure 9.

The initial Public Safety project with the Government of the Philippines was directed toward improving the overall capability of the NBI. This project was initiated in 1957 and phased out in 1968 and had the following among its general objectives:

#### Crime Laboratory


To assist in modernizing and thereby increasing the capability of the NBI Scientific Crime Laboratory. With U. S. commodity and advisory assistance, this laboratory has since developed into one of the leading crime laboratories of its type in Southeast Asia. In addition to serving NBI interests, the laboratory also serves all law enforcement, prosecutive and judiciary agencies of the Philippine Government. The laboratory is

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Figure - 9

# NBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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adequately equipped, well-staffed by competent professional personnel, and enjoys an excellent reputation among the law enforcement and other government agencies utilizing its services.

### Training

To provide training opportunities for NBI and local law enforcement personnel. This activity was highly successful but, with promulgation of the Police Act of 1966 which gave the Police Commission the responsibility for the training of local law enforcement agencies, the NBI curtailed its nationwide training responsibilities. Since 1968, the training activity of the NBI has concentrated mostly on training NBI personnel and conducting some ad hoc specialized training programs such as in the area of narcotic investigations. See the training section of this report for information concerning the carry over of the training activity with the Police Commission.

### Records

To establish a national clearing house for criminal records and information by providing specialized training in this activity for NBI personnel and developing a plan for the integration of all existing criminal records. This effort, which began in FY 1966, had both a commodity and advisory input. The project met with much initial success and ultimately led to the establishment within the NBI of the Central Identification Records Statistics Division (CIRSD).

The CIRSD is now the cornerstone of the national criminal identification system; however, it is not now receiving the necessary support from the NBI administration to achieve its full potential. There is an increasing backlog of fingerprint cards submitted by local police waiting to be processed. The problem, it seems, is in the demand upon the NBI resources for NBI civilian clearances to the detriment of the criminal records processing activity. Each job applicant seeking government employment or large scale

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private sector employment is required to obtain a current clearance. The present civilian clearance applicant level is at about 800 to 1,000 per day, which ties up almost the total NBI capability for servicing incoming requests. Each civilian job applicant is required to submit a completed fingerprint card and an application form and, at any given time during the day, long lines of applicants can be observed around the NBI headquarters building waiting to submit their applications.

It appears that resolution of the problem now lies within the NBI administration to assign sufficient priority to the CIRSD activity of processing fingerprints on a current basis and furnishing local police agencies with any criminal record information that may be stored in the system. The CIRSD is an ongoing entity within the NBI and all that appears to be necessary for it to be responsive to its mandate is for the NBI to provide sufficient manpower and financial resources.

#### Motor Maintenance

To increase the operational effectiveness of the NBI which was seriously impaired because of its almost nonexistent vehicle maintenance and repair capability. At the time this activity was initiated, numerous NBI vehicles were dead-lined which otherwise could have been salvageable since there were only limited facilities and maintenance capability within the NBI to service or repair its vehicles. Through the U.S.A.I.D. input which consisted of (1) commodities including shop equipment; (2) training in the U.S. for two master mechanics; and (3) technical advisory input in assisting the NBI in setting up a physical plant, the NBI now has an adequate capability for maintaining its mobile fleet.

The motor maintenance equipment provided under this project is still in use and has been used consistently over the years to keep the NBI

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rolling stock in good operating condition. Concomitantly with the motor vehicle maintenance technical advisory input, the maintenance advisor spent considerable of his time in establishing a responsive logistics system within the NBI. The innovations implemented during the advisor's tenure, 1967 to 1969, form the basis for the present logistics system.

#### Print Shop

To assist the NBI in developing a printing facility in order for it to send out wanted notices, crime statistics, annual and other reports on a continuing and regular basis. The U.S.A.I.D. provided spare parts for equipment the NBI had on hand, as well as limited amounts of new printing equipment. The equipment provided by U.S.A.I.D. is still in use and is the backbone of the NBI printing facility. The U.S.A.I.D. provided equipment has since been supplemented by a sizable input of Japanese printing equipment as a part of the overall Japanese reparations program.

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H. MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT

In 1964, at the request of the GOP, a survey of the Manila Police Department was conducted by representatives of the Office of Public Safety, A.I.D. The results of the survey were published in a report which described and evaluated the organization, administration and operations of the MPD.<sup>1/</sup> The findings and recommendations contained in the survey report were enthusiastically received by the Mayor of Manila and staff of the MPD and formed the basis for a Public Safety assistance project with the MPD which began in FY 1966.

The overall goal of the Manila Police Improvement Project was to increase the proficiency and effectiveness of the Manila Police Department. Specific project targets were:

- (1) to build a modern and efficient records and identification bureau;
- (2) to establish, equip and staff a scientific crime detection laboratory;
- (3) to improve the communications system of the MPD in order to facilitate rapid dissemination of information and effective coordination of activities within the MPD and between the MPD and other law enforcement agencies within the metropolitan area;
- (4) to develop a well-trained MPD force and to build within the MPD the capability for maintaining on a self-sustaining basis, high levels of proficiency and competence;
- (5) to improve the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic within the city of Manila; and
- (6) to institute an efficient maintenance system for the motor vehicles of the Manila Police Department.

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<sup>1/</sup> See footnote page

1. Project Resources Employed

Technicians (1)*	\$ 35,749
Commodities	57,721
Participants	162,283
GOP Contribution	₱ 35,795
(₱3.90 = \$1.00)	
Total U.S.	255,753
Total GOP	₱ 35,795

\* - The costs of five of the six technicians associated with this project were carried under the project agreement then in existence with the NBI and subsequently identified under the Internal Security Project with PolCom, the successor project to the NBI.

2. Accomplishments

Coincident with the inception of the Manila Police Improvement Project, a reorganization of the MPD was effected by the Police Chief that resulted in the reduction in the number of bureaus from ten to six and also realigned certain functions and responsibilities of the bureaus. Also, the NBI system of uniform crime reporting, initiated by the Public Safety Advisor, was adopted by the Police Chief.

With this start and inputs by the Public Safety project, the fingerprint filing system patterned after the Henry system was expanded at the Central Identification Records Division of the MPD. To maintain this system, additional employees were hired and trained and filing cabinets and card files procured. MPD's crime detection services were upgraded with the installation of additional laboratory equipment and a darkroom facility. Laboratory technicians were provided on-the-job training in modern crime detection techniques. Other improvements in the crime detection laboratory included a general cleanup and a more efficient layout of the laboratory facility.

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Tangible improvements in the MPD communications system were accomplished. With surplus, but still serviceable teletype machines, a system connecting all MPD precincts by teletype was installed. A teletype service shop was set up so that the system could be adequately maintained and most of the equipment is still in excellent operating condition.

Twenty-six key personnel of the MPD underwent U. S. training in the specialized fields of: police administration and operations, telecommunications management, radio communications, records management, firearms identification, traffic administration, automotive maintenance and penology and corrections. Police refresher courses for junior officers and a detectives' training course were initiated at the MPD. Recruits were given formal and on-the-job training. The military phase in the former training program was reduced from eight to three weeks, as recommended in the survey report. Moreover, the training program for MPD recruits was streamlined to include eight new subjects and field trips.

Public Safety assisted actively in the preparation of a new training curriculum for traffic officers and an operational manual for effective traffic control. To alleviate traffic and pedestrian congestion in Manila, one way streets were introduced, traffic lights were installed and more traffic policemen were made available to enforce traffic rules and regulations.

In line with improving MPD's logistical operations, improved procurement and maintenance procedures were adopted. The motor vehicle maintenance section of the MPD was finally authorized to stock two months' supply of motor vehicle replacement parts. Prior to the adoption of this procedure, spare parts were ordered only when the actual need arose and bureaucratic procedures prolonged the procurement of spare parts. Thus, it was not unusual to have a large number of MPD vehicles inoperable because of the lack of spare parts.

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The MPD maintenance section was cleared of vehicles and equipment declared surplus. The Public Safety Project also provided some surplus trucks and maintenance equipment. All MPD mechanics were required to undergo training at the Philippine College of Arts and Trade. Moreover, additional mechanics were hired, pay adjustments were made and division of work was effected in the MPD maintenance section.

Although an MPD reorganization was implemented prior to the implementation of the Public Safety project, there was still a need to update organizational procedures. Consequently, Public Safety assisted in the planning and implementation of procedures to strengthen supervision and administrative control of the various MPD divisions and to streamline the flow pattern of communications, in order to more effectively utilize its limited manpower and facilities.

In summary, the Manila Police Improvement Project accomplished the overall target of strengthening the capabilities of the Manila Police Department. A more efficient communications network within the MPD and an inter-connecting system between the MPD and other law enforcement entities in the greater Manila area were established. In the Criminal Identification and Records Division of the MPD, procedures were updated, equipment was installed and personnel were trained. The training program under this project involved several levels of the MPD staff - bureau chiefs, junior officers, laboratory technicians, detectives, clerks, recruits and mechanics. Likewise, MPD training curricula were updated. These training accomplishments enhanced the capability of the newly established MPD Police Academy. For more effective organizational coordination and control, new procedures complementary to the MPD reorganization were introduced. Lastly, the maintenance system was rehabilitated to provide more efficient logistical support to the MPD.

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While substantial accomplishments, as noted above, were made in enhancing the operational capabilities of the MPD, the short life of the project did not permit sufficient time for development of an indigenous self-sustaining capability necessary to ensure the ongoing viability of project initiatives. The project, begun in FY 1966, was prematurely phased out early in FY 1968 because of a combination of unusual circumstances that strained relations between the three principle parties involved, the Mayor, the Police Chief and the U.S.A.I.D. Specifically, the intractability of the then Mayor, Antonio V. Villegas, concerning assignment of U.S.A.I.D. supplied project commodities led to the early phase out of the project. Mayor Villegas has since been replaced by Mayor Ramon C. Bagatsing who was elected on a reform peace and order platform. Mayor Bagatsing is strongly behind upgrading the Manila Police Department and has stated his intention to increase its capability to service the populace of Manila. In this regard, Mayor Bagatsing, in a letter to U.S.A.I.D. Director Niblock dated January 11, 1972, specifically requested U.S.A.I.D. assistance in upgrading the MPD.

The recommendations section of this report addresses itself to the critical need for improved police service in the metropolitan Manila area and proposes a plan for implementing a Public Safety Program to assist the GOP in this endeavor.

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I. THE POLICE COMMISSION

From the time of the establishment of local police forces in the Philippines in 1901, little attention had been afforded the systematic development of these forces. Errors, springing from the creation of the first police establishment, were never corrected but allowed to continue to grow in complexity with the passing of years until the police forces found themselves engulfed with a variety of problems undermining both their prestige and effectiveness. Almost everywhere people were complaining about the inefficiency of the police and their complacency to halt the rising rate of crime.

It was not until the middle 1960's that the government realized the need of improving the local police system. Thus, in 1966, a law (known as the Police Act of 1966) was approved which was intended to improve the organization, administration and operation of the local police agencies. This law provided for the creation of a Police Commission under the Office of the President of the Philippines whose powers and duties are as follows:

- "(1) To advise the President on all matters involving local police administration;
- "(2) To examine and audit, on a continuing basis, the performance, activities, and facilities of all local police agencies throughout the country;
- "(3) To prepare a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for the efficient organization, administration and operation of the local police, including their recruitment, selection and promotion;
- "(4) To conduct surveys and compile statistical data for the proper evaluation of the state of efficiency of all local police agencies;
- "(5) To study, prepare and recommend to Congress the passage of appropriate legislations defining

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questions of jurisdiction between the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine Constabulary and the local police agencies;

- "(6) To recommend to the President, after due investigation conducted by the Police Commission, sitting en banc, the placing of the local police agency under Philippine Constabulary control. When the President of the Philippines has placed a local police agency under Philippine Constabulary control, the Police Commission shall thereupon undertake the necessary investigation and make the necessary recommendations;
- "(7) To approve the appointments of confidential agents, security agents, special agents and informers by the governors or mayors which positions are not permanent in the plantilla as provided for in the annual budget;
- "(8) To submit to Congress a study on the feasibility of organizing a national police agency which shall be non-military and civilian in character;
- "(9) To organize and develop police training programs and to operate police academies;
- "(10) To establish a system of Uniform Crime Reports;
- "(11) To recommend within sixty days before the commencement of each fiscal year, a crime prevention program;
- "(12) To recommend in consultation with the Secretary of Finance, the release of funds as are herein or may hereafter be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this Act;
- "(13) To render an annual report to the President and to Congress of its activities and accomplishments during the calendar year with an appraisal of the conditions of peace and

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order prevailing in the cities, provinces and municipalities throughout the country with recommendation of appropriate remedial legislation; and

"(14) To prescribe the minimum standard of arms, equipment, police uniform, insignia of ranks, awards, and medals of honor for all local police agencies after due consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission."

Since the passage of the 1966 Police Act and the establishment of the Police Commission, much has been done to correct the many long standing defects in the organization, management and staffing of local police forces noted previously. The Police Commission has been concerned with professionalization of local police services and the development of an overall police system that is responsive without being oppressive. See figure 10 for an organization chart of the PolCom.

#### 1. PolCom Assessment

The Police Act, in creating the Police Commission, stated that its purpose is to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization, administration and operation of local police agencies with the end in view that peace and order may be maintained more effectively and the laws enforced with more impartiality. It is also a stated object of the Act to place the local police service on a professional level.


The Police Commission has proven to be an effective instrument in carrying out its responsibilities in upgrading and assisting in the professionalization of the Philippine police service.

Specifically, it has proved itself particularly able in developing standards for police selection, appointment, and promotion; and is looked to more and more as that element in the law enforcement hierarchy which exercises surveillance over the conduct of departments as well as individual

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# POLICE COMMISSION ORGANIZATION CHART

As of April 1, 1971



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policeman. It is diligent in investigating and adjudicating complaints against departments and policemen and has maintained a strict integrity in this aspect of its operations.

As the regulation channel for the payment of salary subsidies, it is performing well despite the fact that revenues have not been collected at the rate initially anticipated.

It has also developed well as a repository for, compiler of, and distribution center for crime statistics and other data pertinent to local police activities.

These areas of excellence are probably due to the fact that the Police Commission is almost exclusively staffed with attorneys who, by training and predeliction, are adept at administration and adjudication. There is a breakdown, however, in the more practical aspects of the Police Commission's support of the local police forces. For instance, its handling of logistic support to the police improvement cities and the training academies could be greatly improved. There are long delays in the distribution of funds and commodities destined for the cities and academies. Cumbersome internal paperwork contributes to this as does a lack of initiative on the part of some subordinate staff members.

The PolCom, also, has been handicapped by the fact that the full three Commissioners authorized have never been assigned. It had two until October 1971 and then, through expiration of term of one, had only the Chairman until March 1972. Once again, it has two Commissioners but there is no indication as to when or even if the third member will be appointed. This marks a particular hardship in that, by the Police Act, all decisions of Commission to be official must be majority decisions of the Commission sitting "en banc".

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V. INTERNAL SECURITY PROJECT

In 1966 President Marcos, alarmed at the wave of criminality that infected the country, asked the United States for assistance in increasing the police capability to combat this threat to the economic and political stability of his country. The United States responded by sending a team of police experts to the Philippines to study the peace and order situation and to examine the police capability to cope with the situation. A team composed of representatives of the Office of Public Safety, U. S. Bureau of Customs, and the U. S. Department of Defense conducted its study of the status of law enforcement in the Philippines between July and October 1966. The team findings were expressed in a report known as the Walton Report which was submitted to President Marcos in February 1967.<sup>1/</sup> This report, which contained 408 recommendations, served as the basis for the later development of the Internal Security Project. With the submission of the survey report to the President, he called for the immediate implementation of many of the reports' recommendations, however, little was accomplished until late in 1968. In FY 1969 concomitantly with the phase out of the Manila Police Department and National Bureau of Investigation projects, the efforts of the Public Safety Staff were redirected toward assisting the Police Commission in carrying out its commitment toward increasing the capabilities of the local police forces. The Internal Security Project then was implemented in FY 1969 and had, as its goal, the improvement of the effectiveness of law enforcement and the improvement of the administration of justice in the Philippines.<sup>2/</sup> Initially, the project proposal envisioned the eventual assignment of 16 Public Safety Advisors phased in over the projected four year life of the project. The advent of BALPA I, BALPA II, OPRED and the restraints of the PHILRED ceiling, however, precluded achievement of the projected staffing level beyond the initial input of eight advisors.

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<sup>1/</sup> "Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement", Frank Walton, Office of Public Safety, December 1966

<sup>2/</sup> MANILA TOAID A-1487 dated 12/10/68 (UNCLASSIFIED)

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The principal job functions of the eight advisors proposed for the project were described as follows in TOAID A-1487:

"Chief Public Safety Advisor - To supervise and direct the Public Safety staff and coordinate U. S. peace and order activities with the Embassy, JUSMAG, Police Commission, NBI and other Government of the Philippine agencies. He will develop programs of assistance to national, regional, and local law enforcement agencies and advise and assist the Director of USAID. He will outline policies and procedures necessary to implement the Internal Security Program. He will also conduct periodic inspections of the program to insure maximum results in conformance with U. S. activities and objectives.

"Public Safety Advisor(Records/Identification) - To provide technical guidance and assistance in police records management and increase the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to maintain adequate crime reports, fingerprint cards, and personal identification in conformity to a uniform nationwide standard. He will analyze requirements, set up systems, determine needs for record storage and retrieval, and give advice and assistance to police records employees in coding, indexing, filing and related duties. His primary objective is to promote centralization of national criminal records and coordinate the proper input of local data to the national clearing house in order that meaningful and vital information will be accessible as required.

"Public Safety Advisor(Communications) - To survey law enforcement communications requirements at national, provincial, municipal levels including tactical when applicable. He will then formulate suitable communications networks, write specifications, program equipment, supervise installations, assist in the selection and training of technical, operational and administrative personnel. His duties will require extensive in-country travel including extended temporary assignments throughout remote areas of the Philippines.

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"Public Safety Advisor(Training)(5)- To provide technical assistance to the National Police Commission and selected urban police agencies throughout the Philippines on the implementation and maintenance of a continuous, comprehensive police training program. He will initiate training programs for basic training, specialized training, supervisor training, command training and in-service training. He will have a wide range of police experience that will enable him to provide generalist law enforcement advice as well as the specialized service of training. His primary objective is to enhance the law enforcement capability through training in order to provide adequate internal security for sustaining the democratic character of the Republic of the Philippines."

The initial proposal identified four targets for project activity as follows:

"Training - Public Safety's input is based on the GOP program of developing a national training program which will include the regional training concept.

"Public Safety Division and Police Commission plans call for the erection of six regional training centers throughout the Philippines. The centers are to be located geographically so as to best serve each of the five major regions of the country as follows:

1. Cagayan de Oro - Mindanao and Sulu
2. Cebu - Eastern Visayas
3. Bacolod - Western Visayas
4. Legaspi - Bicol
5. Manila - Central Luzon
6. Baguio - Northern Luzon

"The Police Commission is constructing the centers from previously allocated pre-fabricated school buildings. The Police Commission is utilizing portions of their present budget allocation to construct and equip the centers. The center at Manila is operational, the facilities at

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Cagayan de Oro and Cebu are under construction and land has been acquired for the Legaspi site.

"USAID input entails commodity, technician and participant training support. Commodities will be provided in the form of a police reference library, audio visual equipment, crowd control equipment, demonstration equipment, and weapons, ammunition and reloading equipment as a basic package for each training center.

"Effective with the implementation of the Regional Training Centers U.S. in-residence technicians will be required to fill a multiple role at each site. These advisors will provide technical assistance to the training center as well as to the contiguous municipal police department and other police departments throughout the regional area.

"Participating municipal police departments will make their facilities and personnel available for "on the job" training of the Training Center student group.

"The training centers will provide a Basic Police Science Course of three months duration for a class of one hundred students with concurrent classes being conducted in specialized courses, first-line supervisors and senior officers courses and annual in-service training. The students will be housed at the center with transportation and per diem costs to be borne by the respective municipalities of the students.

"The current National police training priority requires many instructors. Ten participants are currently in training at the International Police Academy in AID/Washington. Each has been carefully selected for his proven ability to achieve in the academic atmosphere, his desire to teach and his ability to speak well and efficiently in public, his proven expertise and interest in a field of police knowledge, e.g., criminal investigation, and his proximity to the training center.

"Originally 22 such slots were planned for FY 69 but were reduced to 12 in keeping with a mission directive

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issued early in this fiscal year. In view of the present situation the participant level of 22 slots should be restored in order to meet the training objective.

- "Police Improvement - This program is to develop efficient and professional police departments that will serve as models to other departments and also function in a supporting role to the Regional Training Centers for "on the job" training for police trainees.
- "Public Safety will provide the service of a resident technician who will provide assistance to the Regional Training Center and to the local police department which is contiguous to the center.
- "The activities of this program will include an in depth survey and analysis of the department. Upon completion of the study, recommendations will be made to the department for improving its operating efficiency and effectiveness.
- "Major input will be in the fields of organization/administration, patrol operations, criminal investigation, traffic management, records, communications and training.
- "Commodity support for the model department will include vehicles, communications, firearms and equipment for the records and identifications, traffic, crowd control and criminalistics functions. The recipient municipality or city will provide adequate facilities for the proper support and maintenance of said equipment.
- "The municipality or city will implement modern police administration and operational concepts in conformity with national standards and as recommended by USAID and Police Commission advisory personnel.
- "Technician support and input will be as follows:
1. Provide technical assistance and support in organization and administration.

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2. Establish a records and identification program.
3. Improve traffic management in areas of traffic direction and control, accident investigation and traffic engineering.
4. Improve and upgrade the efficiency of the criminal investigation function.
5. Improve the tactical operations of supporting groups and divisions of the departments.
6. Render assistance and guidance in the field of criminalistics.
7. Render assistance in supply and logistical support.

"The police improvement program is a major adjunct to the training academy. Regardless of the effectiveness of the classroom instruction, opportunities must be afforded the trainees to gain a more thorough understanding of the implementation phase. The "on the job" problem approach serves to test whether the student fully understands and can apply his newly learned expertise to situations encountered in the field.

"Thus the training program and the police improvement program will be developed concurrently. The police training and operational phases are as follows: Basic, Specialist, and Advanced. The program is directed toward teaching the man how to be a policeman and the policeman how to function within a squad, platoon, department, province and nation. The criteria for the program will be one of "operating efficiency." Therefore, the program is concerned with the quality of action at all levels of the police operation.

"Communications - The majority of law enforcement agencies in the Philippines are without communications capability. The lack of communications hampers swift response to threats against internal security and must be considered a major deficiency.

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"Phase I will be programmed to provide communications between adjacent communities - Manila to provinces, provinces to municipalities, municipalities to each other. The individual departments require communication between police headquarters and their outposts and mobile units. Also, tactical units of the "handie-talkie" type are needed to conduct raids and direct riot control activities.

"Communications equipment developed by OPS is ideal for the local conditions as A.C. power is not needed to maintain communications.

"Major communications input is as follows:

1. Integrate to the fullest extent possible existing long range communications network (LECS).

LECS is a single, long range communications system which will interconnect all law enforcement agencies. This will remove the duplication of limited parallel systems and provide adequate facilities for radio and teletype communications and insure a means whereby civil law enforcement agencies can communicate with national agencies.

2. Improve liaison capabilities between civil and national law enforcement agencies.

The system will be designed to provide communications at the field operational level between agencies to ensure the relay of vital law enforcement data so essential for police operations.

3. Establishment of a National Law Enforcement Teletype System (LETS).

Teletype equipment will be installed at local levels. The first phase will include an installation at Cagayan de Oro on northern Mindanao, a high frequency area of

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smuggling and piracy. This system will provide a vital communications link in a strategic area.

4. Establish provincial law enforcement communications system.

A communications system will be developed in selected provinces to provide inter-department communications. This capability does not exist today except in Manila.

5. Establish city, town and municipal communications system.

A communications system will be established in selected police departments. Base station, mobile and foot patrol communications equipment will be provided in order that police personnel can respond immediately to calls for police service.

6. Support the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at the regional level as LECS expands.

The program will provide limited communications equipment at the regional level as LECS expands.

7. Establish repair and training facilities.

Maintenance facilities will be developed to provide adequate service support to the Communications Systems.

Project Support Cost Commodities - FY 69

Regional Training Centers	\$128,200
Community Police Improvement	40,000
Telecommunications	140,000
FY 68 Pricing Deficit	52,000
TOTAL	<u>\$360,200</u>

Summary of Funding Requirements

Technicians (8)	\$137,700
Commodities	360,200
Participants (22)	45,400
TOTAL	<u>\$543,300"</u>

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The project proposal was implemented by the execution of a formal Project Agreement (ProAg) between the U.S.A.I.D. Philippines and the National Economic Council on August 5, 1968. This and succeeding ProAg's, while modifying some of the objectives stated in the initial project proposal, directed the project activities into the four areas of police improvement, communications, training and records. While project activities in each of these project areas are discussed in depth in succeeding sections of the report, a succinct summary of project accomplishments follows:

Police improvement assistance has been designed to develop efficient and professional police departments in eight cities to serve as models to other departments and support contiguous Regional Training Centers by providing training for police trainees. Assistance has been concentrated on organization and administration, patrol operations, criminal investigation, traffic management, records, communications and training. Programs have been initiated in the cities of Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Tacloban, Cebu, Baguio, Legaspi, and Zamboanga, while Davao, the eighth city, was surveyed in February, 1972, and assistance should start in the fourth quarter of FY 72. Accomplishments associated with this sub-activity have been substantial. Crime rates in the project cities, for example, have decreased 5.12% from 1969 to 1970 and 17.24% from 1970 to 1971, for an overall decrease of 22.36% during this period. It is evident these trends have continued through 1971.

Other accomplishments include conforming organizational structures of police departments to the regulations of the Police Manual, a 50% reduction in police response time to citizen calls, improved morale, better acceptance by the public of the police, and greater job security for qualified officers.

Police training activities have led to the establishment of eight regional police centers, and a ninth is now under construction in Davao City. These academies are used for training in the Basic

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Police Science course for local police. Including those to be trained in the last quarter of FY 1972, 8,000 policemen will have received this basic course of instruction since mid FY 1969. By the end of FY 1973, 11,000 policemen should have completed this training. Also, during this period, 8,192 policemen have been given specialized training in subjects such as criminal investigation, supervision, and traffic control. Participant training in the United States has been provided to key members of the police, particularly those assigned instructional responsibilities at the training centers. Fifty-three officers will have been trained by the end of FY 1972. Four are projected for FY 1973.

Records and identification activity has involved establishment of a computer based crime statistics program and an administrative information system to provide data on policemen and police departments for planning purposes, development of a police selection program and the microfilming of personnel and administrative case files. A uniform crime reporting system has been established and is fully integrated into the National Computer Center (NCC) system. The NCC also provides to the Police Commission profiles for individual police officers and police departments for long-range planning purposes. As a result, standards for selection, retention and promotion have been developed and are being used to eliminate unqualified personnel. An Inspection and Audit Unit has been established within the Police Commission and maintains scrutiny of all local police administrative and operational activities.

Communications assistance has resulted in the establishment of a Manila Metropol system and 25 integrated provincial law enforcement communications systems (PROVLECS) servicing a total of 573 municipalities. An additional 10 systems are scheduled to be operational by the end of CY 1972. Seventeen city/municipal police radio systems have also been established. By the end of FY 1973, an additional 20 provincial systems are planned bringing the total for PROVLECS to 55.

The Manila Metropol system ties nine municipalities and four cities into a consolidated police radio

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network. Tactical equipment has been provided to the National Bureau of Investigation. Concurrent with the establishment of each system, maintenance facilities have been established and training of technical and operational personnel has been accomplished.


The total value of the U.S.A.I.D. grant assistance for the Internal Security Project for the five-year period, FY 1969 - FY 1973, will be \$3,365,500 for technicians, commodities and participants. The FY 1973 planning level for the Public Safety project is \$530,000, and involves 8 direct-hire U.S.A.I.D. technicians and 5 local employees. See figure 11 for a schematic of technical advisory assistance and Annex B for a commodity profile. In depth information concerning the scope, accomplishments and assessment of each of the four project activities follows in succeeding sections of this report.

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Figure - 11

## PHILIPPINES PUBLIC SAFETY MAN YEARS 1956-1973



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A. TRAINING

As with other project activities, the training inputs are initiated through Police Commission (PolCom) which carried out its training responsibilities through its Training Department which is responsible to the Chairman, and is headed by an Assistant Commissioner for Training, Attorney Constante U. Tavanlar. The PolCom Training Department is broken down into three divisions: Training Plans and Research Division; Training Services Division; and Regional Police Academies.

The Training Plans and Research Division is charged with determining what types of training are to be given during a specified period, how many people are to be trained, where training is to be conducted, what resources will be used, and what personnel will be utilized to conduct the training. It is also responsible for maintaining, analyzing, and collating records of the training accomplished, and for utilizing the results of these activities to develop, modify, change, and improve the training process.

The Training Services Division has the tasks of providing material and manpower support to the training activity. It schedules the appearances of guest instructors at the various academies, and provides the handout materials, audio-visual materials, and housekeeping supplies necessary to operate the nine training academies. It is also the channel for the monthly transmittal of operating funds to each academy.

The Regional Police Academies Division has responsibility for the academies themselves and the staff assigned to each. They are responsible for actually housing, feeding, training, supervising, and caring for the classes of trainees while in residence at the centers.

There is, of course, support provided to the Training Department by other departments of the Police Commission. The Financial Management Department provides it the funds it uses to operate the academies; the General Services Department receives

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and processes all goods procured by or furnished to the Police Commission and turns over to the Training Department that part due it for its operations; the Plans, Inspections and Statistics Department provides statistical support service and, finally, the Administration Department assists it through assignment of personnel in the first instance and maintenance of annual and other consolidated type records for the training activity.

1. Training Objective

The objective of this sub-project is to assist the PolCom in developing and implementing a uniform and comprehensive nationwide police training program to contribute to increasing the police capability to enforce the law and maintain public order throughout the Republic.

At the programs inception in Fiscal Year 1969, 66% of the police force had not received any type of training while 34% had received some training, but on an ad hoc basis, using borrowed facilities, and consisting of a maximum course length of two weeks.

The program for correcting this situation and meeting the training objectives was designed to provide the basic essentials necessary to support the Police Commission in its efforts towards centralizing control and in the administration of a meaningful and professionally administered series of training courses. The basic essentials necessary to move this project were to assist the PolCom in establishing regional training centers, developing standardized programs of instruction and supporting materials, providing minimal equipment needs, and providing adequate local training staffs.

The Plan called for the establishment of ten regional academies located in the three major geographical regions of the Republic (Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao). The dates of the

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accomplishment towards this goal are provided below. The construction and staffing costs of the regional academies have been borne by the GOP while the U.S. contribution consisted of minimal training materials. (See page 113 for commodity inputs).

	<u>Initiation of Construction</u>	<u>Completion of Construction</u>
Ft. Bonifacio	5/68	12/68
Cebu City	6/68	1/69
Cagayan de Oro City	7/68	1/69
Tacloban City	4/69	8/69
Bacolod City	7/69	12/69
Baguio City	1/70	12/70
Legaspi City	9/69	1/70
Zamboanga City	7/70	12/70
Davao City	2/72	6/72
Rizal Province	5/71	6/72

The initiation of construction of the Davao academy was complicated and delayed due to lack of cooperation of the City Mayor and administration in office until the end of Calendar Year 1971. With the advent of a new administration in January 1972, agreements were reached and construction begun. It is projected that this academy will open to receive trainees by the end of June 1972.

The Rizal Province Training Center located in the city of Marikina, while supported under the Internal Security Project, is not formally considered by the Police Commission as one of its project academies. This center, due to strong provincial and city support and the presence of an aggressive and able local police chief and National Economic Council officer assigned as Acting Superintendent of the school, has been most active in training policemen from the local departments in Rizal Province. Using temporary facilities borrowed from the Philippine Constabulary, it commenced its first class in May 1968 and has since then graduated ten classes totalling 658 trainees.

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During the interim, it has moved into other facilities provided by the City of Marikina adjoining its police department headquarters. The team visited Marikina and observed an excellent facility under construction that will house the Academy operations hopefully by June 1972.

Public Safety assistance has led to the development of curricula consisting of programs of instruction, lesson outlines, supporting handout materials, and audio-visual aids for a basic police science course and for a number of specialized courses of instruction at various levels. In addition a book on Training Rules and Regulations has been developed, promulgated, and now serves as a standardized basis for conducting training at all academies.

Initially it was anticipated that 20,000 policemen, at the rate of 4,000 per fiscal year during the period 1969 - 1973 could be trained in basic skills. This was apparently a mathematical computation which did not take into consideration the fact that at the beginning of the period no academies were in existence and that phased construction would require a minimum of two fiscal years. The projection thus was unrealistic and targets have not been met. Nevertheless, as the academies have been completed there has been increasingly satisfactory progress in training as reflected below:

FY 1969 - Four centers completed at middle of FY - 911 trained  
FY 1970 - Three more centers completed by middle of FY - 1,907 trained  
FY 1971 - Two more centers completed by middle of FY - 2,116 trained  
FY 1972 - 2,748 trained at end of third quarter of FY and 1,048 to be trained in the fourth quarter.  
Total that will have been trained during FY 1972 will be 3,526.

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The total trained to date is thus 7,412 with a projected total at the end of FY 1972 of 8,460. Training in FY 1973 should increase considerably as all ten academies will be in full operation, and expansion of facilities now going on at the Ft. Bonifacio Center will increase that establishment's capacity by 400.

2. Specialized Courses of Instruction

The target for specialized training was geared to handle 4,000 policemen in four years in various specialized courses, each of one month duration and in such areas as Criminal Investigation; Records Management; and Instructor Training. In actuality, within a three year time frame, 11,507 policemen have received specialized training. The fact that so many more were trained than was projected is accounted for by determination of priority needs dictated by actual or impending local situational changes. As needs became evident, course materials were developed, classes scheduled, and men trained. The breakdown of training accomplished under these categories is as follows:

A. Crowd Control	4,574
B. Security Officers	210
C. Criminal Investigation	394
D. Board of Investigators	2,049
E. Records Management	69
F. Instructor Methods	17
G. Radio Voice Procedures	3,777
H. Police Supervision	201
I. Traffic Law Enforcement	<u>216</u>

11,507

In FY 72, no further specialization courses have been conducted as emphasis has reverted to increasing output of the basic police science course trainees.

a. Senior Officers Course

During FY 1969 and 1970, 1,481 chiefs completed this course of training.

b. In-Service Training

An annual two week refresher course designed to upgrade and update performance of police officers was established in FY 1969. The initiation of this phase was to commence upon completion of the basic police science course by 60% of policemen requiring that training. As this plateau will not be reached until the end of FY 1973, the implementation of this training has not yet begun. This is commensurate with present priorities which, as previously stated, are to maximize Basic Police Science Course training and reactivate specialized training courses.

c. Participant Training

It was agreed that 72 officers would receive U. S. training at the International Police Academy and other selected locations in the U. S. and upon completion of the U. S. training they would be utilized to staff the regional police training centers and to act as regular guest instructors if assigned to departments or positions other than directly associated with the centers. See figure 12 for participant training summary.

<u>FY</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
69	22	21	
70	20	6	Moritorium declared by GOP due to anticipated internal disorder.
71	15	13	Above moritorium remained in effect during first quarter of this FY
72	10	7	Four more programmed by end of FY for total of 11.
73	5		

Of the ten regional academies, eight are headed by graduates of the IPA or recipients of other participant training and the chief

SUMMARY  
PHILIPPINES

FIGURE 12

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY

	FY 1963	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971	FY 1972 (thru 2/4)	TOTAL
I. INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY											
A. SENIOR COURSE	--	1	2	1	7	3	--	--	5	4	23
B. GENERAL COURSE	<u>--</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>89</u>
Sub-Total		5	18	7	18	11	16	15	17	5	112
II. POLICE EXECUTIVE	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	1	2	5	9
III. TECHNICAL SPECIAL- IST TRAINING	5	15	6	4	11	1	1	--	1	1	45
IV. FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY	<u>--</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>11</u>
Grand Total	5	23	25	13	31	12	19	16	22	11	177

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of one more is currently being processed for attendance at the IPA General Course starting June 5, 1972. The other participants trained, are either serving in the Police Commission or in responsible positions in local departments and are in regular service as instructors at the regional police training centers.

3. Commodity Support

The target for this action was to identify and procure for each training center a commodity package necessary to the effective accomplishment of the training objective. Action in this respect is essentially completed. A basic package consisting of audio-visual aids, reference library, weaponry, ammunition, reloading equipment, photographic and laboratory training material, and minimum office equipment was developed. Procurement phased to the completion of academies was initiated and each was equipped prior to opening for instruction. Equipment for the last center (Davao) has been procured and awaits installation upon completion of construction of the academy. Out of FY 1972 funding for training commodities, a package of basic laboratory equipment is being procured to equip a criminal investigation training laboratory in the newly constructed addition to the center at Ft. Bonifacio. Books for use in conducting various specialized courses are under procurement.

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STANDARD EQUIPMENT PACKAGE FOR ONE  
REGIONAL TRAINING ACADEMY

The following is the listing of the standard package of equipment and books procured for and provided to PolCom for each of its Regional Police Training Academies.

Besides the listed items, a small package of Riot Control Equipment, Weaponry and Munitions was provided to each academy. These items, however, were furnished under a special \$75,000 allotment of funds in 1969 and 1970 and were not originally intended for or provided to the academies. The riot control material was procured and provided to a number of cities at a time when civil disorder was anticipated and was intended for operational use of the cities. When the disorders failed to materialize, the equipment was provided to the cities wherein an academy was located was turned over to the academy to hold for possible future use and for training.

	<u>Category</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1.	Firearms & Marksmanship Training equipment	\$ 1,909.10
2.	Photographic - cameras, accessories, films and developing equipment	634.71
3.	Training aids - Traffic, criminal investigation, fingerprint	976.65
4.	Audio-visual - recorder, projectors, PA system	1,602.99
5.	Reloading equipment	443.15
6.	Office equipment - type- writers, duplicators transformers	1,596.75
7.	Transportation - vehicle	3,200.00
8.	Books	<u>707.33</u>
9.	Sub-total raw cost of materials	11,070.68
10.	GSA Surcharge and Transportation	<u>2,989.08</u>
11.	Grand Total	<u>\$14,059.76</u>

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4. Funding Recapitulation

<u>Fiscal</u> <u>Year</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Participants</u>	<u>Total</u>
1969	42,000	45,000	87,000
1970	78,000	12,000	90,000
1971	90,000	32,000	122,000
1972	38,000	31,000	69,000
1973	<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>20,000</u>
Total	258,000	130,000	388,000

Figure 13 provides a breakdown of the numbers of police officers that have received training in the basic police science course since inception of the project in FY 1969.

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FIGURE 13

BASIC POLICE SCIENCE TRAINING COMPLETED  
INTERNAL SECURITY PROJECT

<u>TRAINING CENTER</u>	<u>NUMBER TRAINED</u>				<u>TOTAL TO DATE</u>
	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	
Fort Bonifacio	174	447	367	835	1,823
Cebu	236	146	318	215	915
Cagayan	113	305	204	225	847
Bacolod	58	249	261	234	802
Tacloban	--	174	194	214	582
Legaspi	--	125	268	214	607
Baguio	127	283	212	234	856
Zamboanga	--	--	132	190	322
Rizal	<u>203</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>658</u>
Grand Total	911	1,907	2,116	2,478	7,412

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5. Regional Training Activities

a. Northern Luzon Region

A Public Safety technician is directly involved with the Northern Luzon Regional Training Academy (Baguio City) and the Bicol Regional Training Academy (Legaspi City). The technician works with the regional Police Commission staff in the development and implementation of the basic police science course. He also serves as a consultant to the Chief Training Officers on the total operation of the training centers, audits U.S.A.I.D. provided commodities to insure proper utilization, and is actively involved as a member of the instructional staff.

Northern Luzon Regional Training Academy - Baguio City -- The regional training center construction commenced early in 1970 and is about 95% complete. The training center is located in Baguio City at the Teachers' Camp (Bureau of Public Schools) on one hectare site of land. The training center has full access to the facilities of the Teachers' Camp such as; use of the auditorium and athletic fields. There are a total of three two-story buildings that make up the facility.


The regional training academy at Baguio City held its first basic training course on January 4, 1971. To date, the school has graduated 856 students (FY 69 - 127; FY 70 - 283; FY 71 - 212; FY 72 - 234). At present, 80 students are enrolled in the basic course at the Baguio academy.

The Baguio training academy provides training for the fifteen northern provinces of Luzon Island (See figure 14). These provinces have a total police strength of 5,378 police officers.

In accordance with the Police Commission standards, each regional training academy should have a complement of ten permanent

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# POLICE COMMISSION NORTHERN LUZON REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER BAGUIO CITY



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staff with additional support provided by PolCom guest lecturers and instructors provided by the police department in the immediate area of the academy. The Baguio academy has 10 positions encumbered and this staff is supported by four PolCom IPA returned participants and seven members of the Baguio Police Department.

The basic police course curriculum covers sixty five police science subjects or related subjects for a total of 563 hours of instruction. In addition, the Chief Training Officer is allotted 85 hours to utilize as required, for a total of 648 hours of instruction.

Two specialized courses have been developed beyond the basic curriculum utilizing part of the Chief Training Officer's time: (1) Family Planning; and (2) Police Comparative Tour. The Police Comparative Tour involves an over-night trip for visits to other departments in close proximity to Baguio and each trainee is required to prepare a paper on his observations during the trip.

The total commodity input in support of the training academy at Baguio amounted to \$14,000. Contribution on the part of the Government of the Philippines has amounted to:

Capital Investment

Land	2,000,000.00
Construction	225,996.00
Operational Cost (Est.)	150,000.00

Manpower Distribution

Personnel	<u>50,000.00</u>
Total	2,425,996.00

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b. Bicol Regional Training Academy - Legaspi

Construction for the Bicol Regional Training Academy started in July of 1969 and is now estimated to be 80% completed. The present status of construction is: (1) Administration, classroom and barracks building - completed; (2) gymnasium - 50% completed; (3) mess hall - 95% completed; (4) additional barracks - not yet under construction. All the buildings now under construction are being utilized even though not completed. This training academy is located in Legaspi City on a one hectare of land that was given to the Police Commission by the Philippine Army for the training academy. The training center is centrally located within the region, transportation is readily accessible which is of particular importance to the island provinces of Masbate, Catanduanes and the province of Northern Samar located on the island of Samar.


The regional training center held its first basic training course on January 19, 1970. To date, the school has graduated 607 students (FY 70 - 125; FY 71 - 268; FY 72 - 214). This total does not include 28 students that graduated from a special crowd control course in FY 1970. At present, the school has a total of 139 students enrolled in the basic course which over burdens the facility since the buildings were designed for a maximum of 100 students at any one time.

The regional training center provides training for the seven provinces of the Bicol Region and one province of Samar (see figure 15). These provinces have a total police strength of 2,015 policemen.

The administrative, operational and instructional staff is composed of ten permanent positions and all are presently encumbered. The permanently assigned instructional staff is supported by five IPA returned participants which represents the total IPA graduates in the Bicol Region and six members of the Legaspi

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# POLICE COMMISSION BICOL REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER LEGASPI CITY



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Police Department that are utilized as instructors. It is estimated that 80-85% of the course curriculum is conducted by using instructor resources from the immediate area.

As is the case in all the academies, the basic police course curriculum covers sixty-five major police science subjects or related subjects that amount to 563 hours. The Chief Training Officer is allotted eighty-five hours to utilize as required, for a total of 648 hours of instruction.

As in the case of the Baguio academy, two specialized courses have been developed beyond the basic curriculum utilizing part of the Chief Training Officer's time: (1) Family Planning; and (2) Police Comparative Tour.

The total commodity input in support of the training academy amounted to \$14,000. Counterpart funding provided by the GOP amounted to:

Capital Investment

Land	1,600,000.00
Construction	75,381.00
Operational Cost (Est.)	215,000.00

Manpower Contribution

Personnel (Est.)	<u>81,000.00</u>
Total	1,890,381.00

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c. Visayas Regional Training Academy - Tacloban

The Tacloban Regional Training Academy which covers the Eastern Visayas region began operation in FY 1970. It is located near the center of Tacloban City which has a population of 78,000. The facility was built on 1.8 hectares of land that was donated by the provincial governor for this purpose. The buildings as well as construction costs were also borne by the provincial government.

This academy services four provinces: Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar, and Southern Leyte. These provinces represent 1,685 policemen. To date, 582 of these policemen have received training at this academy as follows:

<u>FY 1970</u>	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>
174	194	214

Within the Eastern Visayas, there are three cities and ninety-four municipalities. Graduates of the Tacloban Training Center represent all three cities and ninety of the municipalities.

Five of the ten authorized staff positions are now filled but it has had four Chief Training Officers since it began operation. The present Chief Training Officer is an ex-chief of police of Pardo, Leyte and he has been selected by PolCom as a possible participant to be sent to IPA during 1972.

The U.S.A.I.D. commodity input to this training center consisted of the "standard regional training academy equipment package" which totaled approximately \$14,000.

Host country contributions have been primarily capital investments, administration and manpower. The following peso figures, while not exact, reflect the best information available:

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Capital Investment

a) 1.8 hectares of land	1,000,000
b) two pre-fab buildings	56,084
c) operating costs	240,000

Manpower contributions

Personnel staffing (5)	54,000
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This figure is based on an average monthly salary cost of ₱1,500 over the life of the project

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Total Host Country Contribution	1,350,084
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The training academy has provided guidance and assistance to many police agencies in its area particularly the Police Improvement Project with the Tacloban Police Department. Such guidance and assistance has been mainly in the area of in-service, roll call and firearms training.

The Public Safety advisor's input has included: training lectures at the academy, approximately 20 hours each class, preparation and use of training aids, curriculum preparation, test preparation and academy management.

(1) Cebu Regional Academy (Central Visayas)

This training facility is located in Cebu City, the second largest city in the Republic and the capital of Cebu province with a population of 357,400. The Cebu academy serves three provinces: Bohol, Cebu and Siquijor, which represents a total of 2,886 policemen.

This facility began operation in FY 1969 and is located on 2.5 hectares of land

belonging to the Philippine Army. The site is next to Camp Lapu-Lapu, the army headquarters for the region, and about five miles from the city proper.

To date this academy has trained 915 policemen. The yearly breakdown is as follows:

<u>FY 1969</u>	<u>FY 1970</u>	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>
236	146	318	215

Training has primarily consisted of the Basic Police Course, but several specialized courses have also been given such as: Police Chiefs Course, Crowd Control, Criminal Investigation, Arson Investigation and Radio Operations.

Within the Central Visayas there are nine cities and ninety-nine municipalities. Policemen from the nine cities and seventy-nine of the municipalities have been trained at the Academy.

The academy is authorized a staff of ten and seven of these positions are presently filled. The same chief training officer has been assigned to this academy since it was built. He is an experienced officer with several years as an NBI agent and he was also an IPA participant.

As at all the training academies, the U.S.A.I.D. commodity input consisted of the basic academy package which totaled approximately \$14,000.

Host country contributions for this training academy total ₱1,490,381.00 as follows:

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Capital Investment

a) 2.5 hectares of land	1,000,000.00
b) buildings and construction	75,181.00
c) operating costs	300,000.00

Manpower Contributions

Academy staff (7)	<u>115,200.00</u>
Total	1,490,381.00

In addition to the training assistance this academy gives to police departments in its area, it has implemented an outstanding "on-the-job" training program with the Cebu Police Department.

The Public Safety Advisor has been able to devote more time to this training center than to the others in the region since he resides in Cebu City. Technical assistance has been provided in such matters as: class lectures on various police subjects (average 40 hours per class), preparation of training aids, development of lesson plans and curricula, administering tests and assistance in academy management.

The Cebu Training Center is the largest in the Visayan Region with a total of three pre-fab buildings plus a large gymnasium. It can comfortably handle 100 students, but has had as many as 155 while conducting two classes simultaneously.

(2) Bacolod Regional Academy (Western Visayas)

This training facility is located in Bacolod City, the capital of Negros Occidental Province, with a population of 193,400. This academy trains police from six provinces with a total of 4,160 policemen. This academy draws from the largest area in the region.

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The Bacolod Academy began operation in FY 1969. During the first year of its operation, however, it was housed in temporary quarters belonging to the Philippine Constabulary. The permanent facility is located on 1.5 hectares of land which was donated to the PolCom by an individual. The academy consists of four pre-fab buildings which house the business office, one classroom, student quarters, mess hall, library and exercise room.

To date this training center has trained 802 policemen from eight cities and 122 municipalities. The yearly breakdown follows:

<u>FY 1969</u>	<u>FY 1970</u>	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>
58	249	261	234

Training courses offered to date include the Basic Police Course, Chiefs of Police Course, and the Board of Investigators Course.

The academy has a staff of eight, but is authorized ten positions. The training center is well administered by Chief Training Officer Guillermo Enriquez who has filled this position since the academy opened. Chief Training Officer Enriquez is a former PC Major with no civil police background. It is planned, however, that he be selected as a participant to attend the International Police Academy.

The commodity input by U.S.A.I.D. has been the standard training package with a total value of \$14,000.

Host country contributions for this training academy total ₱1,380,767.00. Breakdown follows:

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Capital Investment

a) 1.5 hectares of land	900,000
b) building and construction	66,567
c) operating costs	300,000

Manpower Contribution

Academy staff (8)	<u>114,200</u>
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Total	1,380,767
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The academy has developed an integrated training program with the Bacolod Police Department which includes in-service training, roll-call training and on-the-job training. The training academy has received the full support of the city government, including a ₱10,000 contribution for construction of the facility.

Technical assistance by the Public Safety Advisor has included: class lectures on varied police subjects (average 20 hours per class), preparation of training aids, lesson plans, curricula, administering tests and assistance in academy administration.

The physical facility consists of four pre-fab buildings which house the office, one classroom, sleeping quarters, mess hall, library and small gymnasium.

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d. Zamboanga Regional Training Academy - Zamboanga

Construction for the academy facility began on June 30, 1970, on four hectares of land located about five miles from the city business district.

The academy became operational on January 4, 1971, and has since graduated 308 trainees in the basic police science course. Presently, 100 trainees are in attendance representing five provinces, six cities and 47 municipalities located within the Zamboanga region.

The academy complex is composed of two buildings. The main facility and a series of several structures joined together forming one long building are divided into areas which are used for barracks, classroom, gymnasium and business office.

An adequate firearms range is also located on the property with both 25 and 50 yard firing positions and a basketball court was recently constructed for student recreation.

The ten positions for the academy operation are all encumbered. These include three instructors, one bookkeeper, three clerk-typists, a janitor, a groundman and a driver.

e. Cagayan de Oro Training Academy

Cagayan de Oro City is the provincial capital of the province of Misamis Oriental and is located on the northern coast of Mindanao. The city has a land area of 160 square miles and a population of 128,319 based upon a 1971 census.

Cagayan de Oro City serves as a trade center for the provinces of Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon.

Academy construction commenced in July 1968. It is located on approximately three hectares of land, four miles from the central business district.

The first class began training on February 10, 1969, and has since graduated 880 trainees.

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There are currently 80 recruits enrolled in the ongoing training cycle representing nine provinces and three municipalities.

This academy is composed of two buildings; the main building is divided into six rooms to form the barracks, classroom, gymnasium, store-room and office for the staff while the mess hall is a separate building close to the main facility easily accessible to the students.

Seven persons are employed at this academy as follows:

- 1 - Instructor Specialist
- 3 - Clerk Typists
- 1 - Physical Training Instructor
- 1 - Maintenance Man
- 1 - Driver

The academy offers the standard 648 hours of instruction as shown below:

	<u>Hours</u>
General Instructions	64
Laws & Legal Procedures	5
Criminal Investigation	
Tech. & Procedure	55
Investigation of Specific	
Offenses	30
Scientific Aids in Criminal	
Investigation	46
Police Operations and	
Procedures	78
Civic-Action Subject	22
Physical Training	120
In/Out Processing	56
Training Officer's Time	85

Selective courses are offered in Family Planning and gardening. The time for these courses is taken from the 85 hour segment assigned to the training officer.

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Even though it was one of the first academies to commence operations under PolCom control, it did not become associated with the Cagayan de Oro Police Department for on-the-job training purposes until 1970. The Police Improvement activity with the Cagayan de Oro Police Department began in 1969 and it took several more months before the survey recommendations were finally implemented.

The U.S.A.I.D. commodity input totaled \$14,000 and consisted of the standard equipment requirements previously determined for each training academy. At the time of the team's evaluation, Philippine Government contributions to the academy were not available.

f. DAVAO Training Academy

Construction for the Davao Regional Academy did not begin until March 1972 because of earlier problems between PolCom and the Davao City administration involving the acquisition of property for the academy site. Land acquisition has now been effected and ground has been broken. It is expected that the academy will be able to accept its first class of trainees before the end of 1972. The U.S.A.I.D. commodity input has been programmed at \$14,000 and procurement should be effected in time for the opening of the academy. The advisor assigned to the Mindanao Region has been working closely with PolCom and the Davao city officials in efforts to expedite completion of the academy facilities and initiation of training courses.

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B. POLICE IMPROVEMENT

General Description

The Police Improvement Project, which began in FY 1969, is designed to develop efficient and professional police departments in eight cities to provide increased police services to the community and to serve as models to other departments within the region.

<u>Project Cities</u>	<u>Initiated FY</u>	<u>Estimated Termination FY</u>
Bacolod City	1969	1972
Cagayan de Oro	1969	1972
Baguio City	1970	1973
Legaspi City	1970	1973
Tacloban City	1970	1973
Cebu City	1970	1973
Zamboanga City	1971	1973*
Davao City	1972	1973*

A factor in the selection of the above cities is that they are adjacent to the training academies and, thus, can serve as laboratories and workshops for police students undergoing basic, advanced and specialized training at the regional academies. Additionally, as the cities were centers of population they lent themselves well to making maximum use of limited assets available from U.S.A.I.D. to provide improved police services to the greatest number of citizens.

Under a joint Project Agreement of May 20, 1969, entered into by the National Economic Council, the Peace and Order Coordinating Council, the Police Commission and U.S.A.I.D., this activity had its beginning. Cities selected to participate were, with minor exception, eager to begin. To ensure proper use of assets and to establish a

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\* - In order to insure proper utilization of U.S.A.I.D. assets and reasonable achievement of project objectives, some sort of support should be continued after the projected phase out at the end of FY 1973. See Recommendations.

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basis for measuring progress, each police agency was subjected to a comprehensive survey by a joint PolCom/U.S.A.I.D. team of experts. Published results of findings and recommendations were presented to city governments with the understanding that participation in the Police Improvement Program was dependent upon substantial compliance with recommended changes.<sup>1/</sup> In most cases, prior to initiation of each survey, this arrangement was formalized by the signing of sub-project agreements between PolCom and the local governments involved wherein it was agreed the recommended changes would be initiated. In each instance, joint resolutions of support passed by city councils were also required to insure full cooperation and local funding in implementing project activities.

A series of conferences with local city and police officials were conducted to monitor progress of implementation of recommendations. In each instance, U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety advisors found encouraging results; however, the first priority for implementation of survey recommendations was given to those which did not involve additional local money appropriations. Such things as new or more adequate buildings, equipment purchases and hiring of additional personnel present city governments with real problems, the resolution of which takes time as well as additional allocation of funds. Once committed, however, wholehearted support was forthcoming. A particularly interesting fact is the degree of local support and interest generated within the private and commercial sectors of the community. Interested citizens donated such items as paint, building materials, office furniture and the like to demonstrate their concern and support for police improvement and training activities.

To date, seven city sub-projects are fully operational. Four cities have progressed to a midway point representing 50 to 66% in implementation of the survey recommendations. These are Baguio, Legaspi, Tacloban and Cebu. Further progress in Cebu City, however, is dependent upon the resolution of

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<sup>1/</sup> Copies of surveys on file at U.S.A.I.D./PSD

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differences between the incumbent police chief and the new Mayor. Bacolod City and Cagayan de Oro City sub-projects, initiated in FY 1969, have progressed well enough that a phase out is foreseen at the end of FY 1972. Zamboanga City is now in its first year of activity. It is currently concentrating on the first one-third of its programmed tasks as recommended in the survey. If this activity is phased out at the end of FY 1973, this means there will have been less than three years input of technical advice and guidance. This is not really considered a long enough period to develop a self-sustaining system, particularly where massive introductions of new management and supervisory techniques are made.

The Davao Police Department has been surveyed. The report is in final drafting stages by U.S.A.I.D. technicians. Also pending is the PolCom team members input. The report should be finished, approved by R1Com, and in the hands of the city government for implementation by July 1, 1972. This means, under the terms of the current Project Agreement, U.S.A.I.D. will have a resident advisor in place to monitor implementation of survey recommendations for only one year prior to phase out at the end of FY 1973. This could have serious implications and limit the degree of success that can be expected. To insure any degree of success, there should be some form of technical guidance and assistance provided for an additional period beyond the end of the FY 1973 project termination date.

Each model city project involves a major reorganization effort and the introduction of modern methods of administration and operation. The official document used as the guideline for implementation of survey recommendations is the Police Manual of the Philippines. This manual is published as an official document under Executive Order 113 and contains twenty-three rules covering such things as organization, administration, personnel selection and training, promotion and assignment, uniforms, arms, insignia and equipment, records, crime statistics and reporting, and standard forms. It is a

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comprehensive document and implements provisions of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864).

Funding

A Regional Public Safety advisor has been assigned to each regional area - Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

From FY 1969 through FY 1972, the Police Improvement Project has supplied \$672,000 worth of police commodities to project police departments. These commodities have consisted of vehicles, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, photographic equipment, civil disturbance control equipment and other selected items of civil police equipment. A limited amount of excess property has been obtained as available, and police personnel have been trained in the operation and maintenance of all U.S.A.I.D. provided equipment.

As regards funding of the Police Improvement Project, the following is a breakdown of dollar costs from FY 1969 through FY 1972. Inputs have been: Commodities, communications, participant training and technicians.

Technician cost is based on the percentage of each advisor's time devoted to the Police Improvement Project.

Participant training cost is based on an approximate cost figure of \$3,000 per participant for ten police improvement participants.

Police Improvement (commodities)	\$ 575,000
Communications (commodities)	97,000
Training (P.I. participants)	30,000
Technicians	<u>221,625</u>
Total	\$ 923,625

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### Achievements

Within each model city, specific improvement has been noted in such areas as records and identification, traffic management, criminal investigation, development of support groups and tactical operations, criminalistics and communications.

Policies outlining proper authority and control have been developed, and assistance has been given in preparation of manuals of procedures and regulations.

Through the Internal Security records sub-project and the PolCom, a complete program of personnel management to include selection, training, operations, supervision and command functions has been implemented.

Progress in varying degrees has been made in establishment of a central records and identification program. Participating departments do have basic central records and identification systems. Filing and classification of fingerprints has improved through in-service training programs. Statistical information is being more accurately compiled and used in some cases for the first time.

Reporting, both internal and national, is more accurate and punctual.

Overall capabilities have been improved through commodity support consisting of file equipment, classification equipment, typewriters and training material.

Traffic management programs have been developed and training has been given to improve accident investigation operations and procedures and compilation and use of traffic statistical data.

Modern methods and techniques of traffic direction, control and engineering have been introduced.

Sound and realistic traffic law enforcement programs have been initiated and appropriate in-service training developed.

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U.S.A.I.D. assistance has helped in the development of special investigative skills of police personnel. This assistance has been in the form of training, training material, survey/recommendations, and improved equipment resources.

The activity has emphasized the concept of crime prevention. Programs of crime prevention have been developed and implemented covering the full spectrum of police operations.

The reorganizations of participating departments have included the development of special tactical forces as required, e.g., mobile tactical units and civil disturbance control units. Policies and procedures have been developed to afford increased departmental coordination and effective use of these units. In-service and PolCom training has also been given to these special tactical units.

Modern methods of patrol operation have been implemented. This was accomplished through compliance with survey recommendations, extensive training in PolCom training centers as well as in-service training, and improved resources, e.g., vehicles and radios.

The project has improved the investigative skills of project department personnel. Assistance and training have been concentrated on crime scene search and identification, collection and preservation of evidence. The concept of preliminary investigation by the patrol officer has been emphasized. PolCom training centers have presented several specialized courses in criminal investigation. A basic photographic laboratory facility has been established and equipped in each department. Each department has at least one trained photographic technician.

Of all the items provided under a modest commodity component, the team believes the basic communications capability developed at the provincial, city and municipal level has had the most immediately visible and beneficial impact. Individual government and police officials have offered unsolicited praise and specific examples of positive

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achievements in law enforcement not previously possible. A serious weakness in the basic operational structure has been at least partially corrected through provision of this basic radio net. An awareness of the value of this asset continues to grow on the part of all members of the affected police agencies. The current police improvement project began in 1969 but had its earlier roots in the Rizal pilot project described below.

### Rizal Pilot Project

#### Description

During the month of October, 1967, officials of U.S.A.I.D. met with President Marcos' representatives to discuss ways and means by which A.I.D. could assist GOP efforts to reduce lawlessness. Later, Director Haraldson of U.S.A.I.D. agreed to participate in a pilot project that would involve the concentration of U.S.A.I.D. technical assistance and limited commodity support into a few municipalities of one province, in order to test the effectiveness of this type of assistance.

Following this agreement, President Marcos selected Rizal Province as the best location in which to undertake a pilot law enforcement program. The purpose of this pilot project was to upgrade the law enforcement capability of selected municipal police departments in Rizal Province, and to encourage and support other community activities that would improve internal security and peace and order.

Governor Isidro Rodriguez (Rizal) strongly endorsed the recommendation that the proposed pilot law enforcement project be organized in Rizal Province and to facilitate its operations organized a Rural/Urban Public Safety Committee. This committee was made up of representatives of the Governor of Rizal, the Police Commission, the Philippine Constabulary, the National Bureau of Investigation, the National Economic Council, the Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group and the U.S.A.I.D. The Governor also selected

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the municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Malabon, Makati and Paranaque as the best ones to participate in this project.

Surveys were initiated by U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety technicians in these municipalities to determine needs and courses of action. By March, 1968, it was evident that the "climate was not right" in Makati for successful implementation, so the Governor selected Marikina to replace it in the pilot project. In November, for the same reason, he also replaced Malabon with Navotas.

#### U. S. Technicians

Eight public safety technicians assigned to the Rizal pilot project were experts in traffic, communications, logistics, criminalistics, training, criminal investigation and administration and organization. These men had experience as law enforcement officers in police agencies in the United States and served in line, service and staff positions for many years. Many of them had years of overseas experience which gave them greater insight into the problems of law enforcement in developing nations. These specialists worked with their counterparts in each of the municipalities on a daily basis.

#### Funding

During the life of the Rizal pilot project, U. S. funding contribution was as follows:

Technicians	\$ 137,500
Commodities	161,100
Participants	<u>15,000</u>
Total	\$ 313,600

#### Training Academy

Fiscal Year 1968 saw the inception of the first Provincial Training Academy in the Philippines. This unique training venture was the first three-month police training course established in the country. It had wider participation and support than any prior effort. Funding, technical assistance, lectures and commodity support were provided

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by the joint efforts of the Police Commission, National Economic Council, National Bureau of Investigation, Philippine Constabulary, the Provincial Governor and Municipal Mayors. Two classes, totaling 141 heretofore untrained policemen, were graduated during calendar year 1968.

### Achievements

Given the short life of this project, 1967 to 1969, limited but identifiable progress was made. Police salaries were increased an average of ₱20 per month; police budgets were raised; facilities enlarged; personnel added; and equipment and supplies were procured. All municipalities participating were in various states of implementation of the reorganization of their departments in conformance with the Police Manual (Executive Order 113, Police Act of 1966). Centralized records systems were completed by May, 1969, with the exception of Paranaque whose new facilities were under construction. Redistribution of criminal investigators, plus additional training in investigative techniques, resulted in a higher clearance by arrest rate as was shown in statistical data. Specialized units for crowd control, vice, juvenile and intelligence were established to augment efforts of regular forces. Mobile patrol activities were augmented with vehicles funded by both U.S.A.I.D. and the municipal governments. U.S.A.I.D. funded basic photographic laboratories were installed in each municipality. The Rizal Training Center was established, initiating for the first time in the Philippines a three-month basic recruit training course in conformance with PolCom standards.

The degree of success varied from municipality to municipality and reflected the spirit of cooperation and quality of leadership of those municipal and police officials involved. The greatest level of achievement was shown in Marikina and San Juan.

Although project activities were formally terminated in 1969, some of the participating municipalities continue to maintain frequent contact with U.S.A.I.D./PSD seeking technical advice and guidance.

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They also make available, on a continuing basis, their police departments as "on-the-job" training facilities for students of the Rizal Training Center.

With minor exceptions, direct U. S. input to this project terminated in calendar year 1969. Major commodity inputs were in place by mid-1969.

The consensus was that the basic objective of this project, testing the effectiveness of this regional approach for providing assistance, had been met. Further, that efforts and assets could now be redirected to a national level approach. Thus the current Internal Security Project was developed in conjunction with PolCom with major emphasis on training, communications, records and police improvement.

#### Marikina

As a positive indication of the acceptability of well-founded technical advice, the team took note of the continued U.S.A.I.D./PSD assistance to Marikina. This is provided at the request of the municipal government officials and a dynamic police chief who is a former participant.

These officials credit our continued support to their departmental improvement which was recognized when the Marikina Police Department, in August 1971, was selected as "Most Outstanding Police Force of 1971". This is a yearly award based on the findings of the Philippine Constabulary inspection of police departments. The plaque of distinction and citation were presented by President Ferdinand E. Marcos to Chief of Police Carlos C. Javier during the 70th Anniversary ceremonies of the Philippine Constabulary.

#### Setting

Marikina's recorded history commenced with the founding of a mission by the Jesuit Fathers in the 1630's. The area was a somewhat mountainous wilderness, crisscrossed by carabao and foot trails.

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The war between Spain and the U. S. brought American rule to the Philippines in 1900. The Americans improved the health and educational facilities of the town, and great strides were made in communications and public works.

The second World War came and the progress being made by the town, particularly in the shoe industry, was halted and the town itself, for the most part, was reduced to ashes. Marikina has since rebuilt to its present level of development.

Industrialization came in 1959 and the population increased dramatically. Shoemaking is a multi-million-peso industry, with more than five hundred shoe factories. Other industrial concerns manufacture textiles, tires, plastics, dairy products, candies and cigarettes.

The traces of the more than 300 years of Spanish rule still predominate in architecture. There are a number of narrow roads, typical of the Spanish colonial period. The "calesa" (horse drawn carriage) still plies the main streets of the town.

The climate is hot during summer and wet during rainy season; rainfall and sunshine being equally distributed.

Marikina is in close proximity to the city of Manila and other centers of commerce and trade. Good transportation and communications have quickened her economic development. Marikina has a population of 113,400. The municipality is composed of 25 square miles of land.

#### Project Activity

One U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety technician who arrived in country in July 1969 was assigned to the greater Manila area to assist with police improvement projects in Marikina, Paranaque, San Juan, Mandaluyong, and Navotas, Rizal. In January 1970, this technician was reassigned to the Bicol Region (Southern Luzon). Even though the Rizal pilot project was phased out in FY 1969, the technician continued to provide periodic technical guidance when requested by the municipal

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mayor and police officials. The Chief of Police and the U.S.A.I.D. technician were instrumental in initiating a reorganization of the department which gave it new direction and dimension. As specified in the Police Manual, the department was divided into an Administrative and Services Bureau and an Operations Bureau. Under the Operations Bureau are the Uniform Division and the Criminal Investigation Division, while under the Administrative and Services Bureau are the Administrative Division and the Service Division. Due to the new organization structure, the standard operating procedures were rewritten for the department and a pocket size police officer's handbook was developed and issued to each member of the department. This reorganization included establishment of a Community Welfare Section which works with the people and special problems of the community plus a redirection of the Marikina Junior Police with an increase in its membership to help the department in traffic control and the task of keeping order in the schools. The Marikina Junior Police are a strong force towards helping reduce juvenile delinquency.

The department is highly mobile with fifteen patrol cars provided through municipal funding plus three Scout Jeeps (U.S.A.I.D. provided). All vehicles are equipped with U.S.A.I.D. provided radios. Presently, the municipality has a policy of replacing their police vehicles every two years. (1971 - purchased ten vehicles).

During 1970-1971, the Municipal Hall complex of buildings was built, which included the Police Department. Within the new Police Department building are a well-equipped radio room, photographic laboratory, evidence and crime investigation room, police library, police museum, and staff conference room

The following are the police and municipal budgets for the past four fiscal years:

<u>FY</u>	<u>Municipal</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	₱1,696,490.60	₱302,195.00	17.75
1970	₱2,077,683.00	₱363,622.00	17.50
1971	₱2,364,088.69	₱461,355.70	19.50
1972	₱3,330,000.00	₱550,977.12	16.50

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The following reflects crime statistics for: (1) Total offenses reported; (2) number of offenses cleared by arrest; (3) percentage solved; plus (4) amount of recovered property.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u> <u>Jan-Mar</u>
Total				
Offenses	2,344	2,495	3,403	785
Cleared				
by Arrest	2,081	2,213	2,730	681
Percentage				
Solved	88.7%	88.8%	80.2%	87.6%
Property				
Recovered	₱21,494.00	₱23,235.00	₱26,513.00	₱6,627.00

In 1968, the police department had a strength of 78 policemen, of whom 71 were civil service eligibles. In FY 1972, the department has a strength of 124 policemen with 121 civil service eligibles. Salaries for the department have risen in a five year period from ₱2,400.00 annually in FY 1968 for patrolman to ₱3,120.00 annually in FY 1972. Members of the department have been receiving the police salary subsidy from PolCom since 1971. Since 1968, of the total 124 policemen, 99 have received basic training at the Rizal Training Center and 37 have received specialized training from the National Bureau of Investigation, the Police Constabulary Training School and the PolCom Regional Training Center, Fort Bonifacio. Two Police Academy staff members are graduates of the International Police Academy, Washington, D.C.

Municipal funding, to date, in support of the project is as follows:

Capital Investment

Land	----
Construction	
New Police Department Building	₱200,000.00
Remodeling old Police Department building	10,000.00
Operational Costs	150,000.00
Manpower Contribution	
Personnel (Est.)	<u>134,160.00</u>
Total	₱494,160.00 = \$77,454 (₱6.38 = \$1)

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Input of U.S.A.I.D./PolCom commodities required the municipality to remodel a number of areas within the old Police Department Building. The new police building had been programmed for some years. The additional police commodities and technical assistance provided were the needed stimuli to bring the building construction plan to a reality.

The manpower contribution reflects salaries of those personnel directly affected through participation in project related activities.

Duties of the U.S.A.I.D. Regional Public Safety Advisor

In order to implement project planning and delineate areas of responsibility in conducting day-to-day work in regional activities, specific duties were developed. They are as follows:


Under the supervision of the Chief Public Safety Advisor, the regional advisor shall --

1. Supervise the U.S.A.I.D. Police Commission projects within the region of assignment;
2. Serve as a consultant to the Police Commission Regional Training Center Chief who implements Police Commission policies;
3. Serve as a consultant to the Chiefs of Police of cities/municipalities who participate in U.S.A.I.D./Police Commission projects;
4. Assist in the implementation of joint U.S.A.I.D./Police Commission projects in training, police improvement, communications and records in the assigned region, as directed by the Chief Public Safety Advisor;
5. Assist the training academy staff in the selection of participants to be considered for nomination to the International Police Academy under the sponsorship of U.S.A.I.D./Police Commission training grants;
6. Determine in consultation with the Chief of the training academy the equipment needs of that organization, both new and excess property

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- and submit listings for review and approval by U.S.A.I.D. and the Police Commission.
7. Determine in consultation with the Chiefs of Police of participating cities/municipalities the equipment needs of that agency, new and excess property, and submit listings for review and approval by U.S.A.I.D. and the Police Commission.
  8. Develop programs in his area of law enforcement speciality for use in joint U.S.A.I.D./Police Commission projects.
  9. Develop technical materials of particular applicability to the Internal Security Project as mutually determined by the U.S.A.I.D. and Police Commission staff.
  10. Maintain liaison with municipal and provincial law enforcement communications staff and the Public Safety project manager for telecommunications. Inspect and evaluate systems performance.
  11. Maintain liaison with other U.S.A.I.D. projects, e.g., Rural and Urban Development, to insure maximum project coordination and efficient utilization of U. S. investment.
  12. Conduct periodic inspection and audit of new and excess commodities furnished by the U. S. Government.
  13. Provide technical review of U.S.A.I.D. supported projects for Mission and A.I.D./W audit requirements, and forward periodic recommendations for project improvement.

# POLICE IMPROVEMENT LUZON



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## NORTHERN LUZON

### Setting

The region of Northern Luzon is composed of fourteen provinces which include the four island province of Batanes located 125 miles north of Luzon Island. The entire region of Northern Luzon is subject to extremely stormy weather during the typhoon season.

Central Northern Luzon rises to an elevation of more than 8,000 feet which results in very cool weather year round. The provinces fronting the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea have a warm climate with a moderate rainy season.

The first Spanish exploration into the region of Northern Luzon in 1572 found the people hostile and unfriendly. Its history from early Spanish times to the first decades of the 19th century is dotted with many uprisings which were caused mainly by imposed tributes and forced labor. Most of Northern Luzon was directly involved in revolution in the late 1800's. Civil governments were established within the provinces in the early 1900's.

American rule came to Northern Luzon in 1901. The influence of American rule brought stronger civil government, growth of commerce, development of public works and an ever increasing mining industry.

The 1940's brought World War II and the occupation forces of the Japanese. The people resisted until, on the return of the American forces, the Japanese were beaten and the Japanese surrender was signed in Baguio City in 1944.

Following the war, the area of Northern Luzon was gradually rebuilt. The growth rate up to the present date has been moderate. Coast provinces have increased their tobacco crops; the plains provinces main products are rice and sugar cane; and the mountains rely on mining, agriculture and wood products.

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### Baguio City Setting

The city of Baguio, a summer capital of the Philippines since 1904 is predominantly a resort city. The city is situated in the province of Benguet, 156 miles north of Manila by road, or fifty minutes by air. Baguio City is 5,100 feet above sea level; the area is very mountainous and due to the altitude has a very cool climate year round. Baguio City has a permanent population of 84,538 but, during the summer months and holiday seasons, the population soars to 200,000.

Baguio became a chartered city on September 1, 1909. The principal products of Baguio City are vegetables, wood carvings and silver filigree. The major sources of income, other than tourism, are agriculture, mining, forestry and commerce from the surrounding area. Located in Baguio is the official summer home of the President of the Philippines. It is also the site of the Philippine Military Academy and the John Hay Air Base (U.S.), which was the location of the formal surrender of the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II.

The city has a mayor-council type governmental structure. The mayor has direct control of local executive departments while the council is the legislative body.

### Project Activities

One Public Safety Advisor is directly involved on Luzon Island with police improvement which consists of two specific sub-projects; Baguio City and Legaspi City. As a carryover from the Rizal pilot project, limited technical assistance is also offered to the municipality of Marikina. In an effort to strengthen and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the police improvement cities and to professionalize the work of law enforcement, the regional advisor works with the Police Commission Chief Training Officers, Mayors, Chiefs of Police, and staff and departmental personnel in development and fulfillment of these objectives.

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	<u>Initiated</u> FY	<u>Estimated</u> <u>Termination</u> FY
Baguio City	1970	1973
Legaspi City	1970	1973

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

From February 2 through 4, 1970, a survey was conducted by a joint survey team composed of representatives of the Police Commission and the Public Safety Division of the United States Agency for International Development. The survey was predicated under the terms of a Project Agreement entered into by the National Economic Council, the Police Commission and U.S.A.I.D. on September 25, 1969.

This same pattern was followed for each of the project cities involved in the Police Improvement Project, i.e., a survey was completed prior to the initiation of any project activity. The survey report submitted contained concepts, general proposals and recommendations considered by the survey team as practical, realistic and achievable and served as the basis for follow on project activities.<sup>1/</sup>

The police improvement survey report was submitted to the Baguio City government for consideration on August 24, 1970. The report identified correctable weaknesses and recommended 170 changes in 10 areas of operations. Subsequently, the sub-project agreement for police improvement was signed between the Police Commission and the city of Baguio.

U. S. Inputs

The Regional Public Safety Advisor has been providing technical assistance, as has the Police Commission, through the Chief Training Officer of the Regional

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<sup>1/</sup> Survey Report on file at U.S.A.I.D./PSD

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Training Center. Working with a cross section of departmental staff and using the survey recommendations as a guide, priorities were established and courses of action set, resulting in a major restructuring of the department. This was generally a coordinated effort between the Public Safety Advisor and the PolCom Chief Training Officer, who is concurrently the PolCom representative in the police improvement project.

A basic police improvement commodity package was developed by the Public Safety Division and provided to the police department in increments by U.S.A.I.D. through the Police Commission. The basic police improvement commodity package consists of the following:

- Vehicles
- Revolvers
- Shotguns
- Carbines
- Handcuffs
- Traffic Signal Lights
- Camera Equipment
- Photographic Laboratory Equipment
- Criminal Investigation Equipment

One city police officer has received training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D.C., FY 1969.

The total U. S. contribution through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

Technicians	\$ 30,000
Commodities	68,000
Participants	<u>2,500</u>
Total	\$100,500

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

The Police Commission Chief Inspector and the Regional Public Safety Advisor conducted a project evaluation of the Baguio Police Department from January 31 through February 3, 1972, to determine the extent of compliance of local officials and the police department

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in the implementation of the survey recommendations and the adherence to the sub-project agreement.

The following is a summary of the findings of the joint team with respect to compliance with the terms of the sub-project agreement and implementation of survey recommendations:

Briefings of subordinate city and police staffs had been conducted by city and police officials concerning proper implementation of the terms and conditions of the Project Agreement and the survey recommendations.

Adequate funds were provided by the city for the shipment and handling of U.S.A.I.D. provided police commodities received through the Police Commission. Police commodities are now being used exclusively by members of the Baguio City Police Department in connection with the performance of their official duties. The department now maintains a records and accounting system for the police commodities, as prescribed by the commission. No commodities have been transferred, encumbered, disposed of or diverted from their programmed use.

The City Council has not enacted any ordinance or resolution which is contrary to or inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement.

The local training facilities of the department have not been totally integrated with the PolCom Regional Academy in Baguio City; however, on-the-job training is provided for by the department for academy trainees prior to their graduation.

The U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey team had developed a total of 170 recommendations embracing ten fields of police activity. Substantial compliance

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with these recommendations would result in an increase of efficiency and effectiveness in police service and professionalization of law enforcement. Tabulated below is the degree of compliance with the survey recommendations as found by the joint evaluation team.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>No. of Recommen- dations</u>	<u>Complied</u>	<u>Partial Com- pliance</u>	<u>Non Com- pliance</u>
Personnel	25	19	6	1
Organization	22	11	7	4
Patrol	12	7	2	2
Traffic	18	14	2	2
Central Records & Identification	10	7	1	2
Investigation	22	17	3	2
Juvenile Delin- quency Control	25	14	9	2
Police Building	3	-	2	1
Jail Division	24	17	2	5
Training	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	170	113 (66.5%)	36 (21.2%)	21 (12.3%)

It will be noted from the above that full compliance with the survey recommendations accounts for 113 or 66.5% of the total 170 recommendations. There is partial compliance in 36 or 21.2% of the recommendations, while no compliance or action was taken on 21 recommendations or 12.3%. Objectively viewing the city's efforts to improve its police capability and performance, it is seen that there are 149 recommendations positively acted upon with either full or partial compliance which is 87.7% of the total.

The percentage of compliance with the survey recommendations is considered more than satisfactory and is sufficient to keep the project ongoing through its scheduled phase out date. Police commodities and the technical assistance should be continued by the Regional Public Safety Advisor and the Chief Training Officer of the Police Commission. The city officials should, however, be advised to exert a

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concerted effort to comply with the remaining 21 recommendations, most of which were not acted upon due to lack of logistical support or funding.

There has been a significant improvement in response time to citizens calls for police assistance. Prior to the police improvement program, it usually took a minimum of eight to ten minutes to respond. With the installation of U.S.A.I.D. provided radio equipment, the average response time has been reduced to two and one-half minutes. The addition of more mobile units for patrol work, restructuring of patrol beats and basic training provided by the PolCom regional academy has also contributed to this reduction.

The department has been reorganized in accordance with survey recommendations and guidelines set forth in the Police Manual, Executive Order 113. Improvement in operations and management was immediately noticeable after the reorganization.

There is a growing awareness of the narcotics and dangerous drug problem. With this in mind, utilizing U.S.A.I.D./PSD technical advice, the Baguio police have established a narcotics section. Members of this section are currently undergoing specialized training.

The Baguio police, taking advantage of the U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Trust Fund Agreement, purchased over \$7,000 worth of communications equipment to augment the equipment provided by U.S.A.I.D. This was an encouraging development and additional purchase of police equipment by this method is anticipated.

In conjunction with the joint evaluation, an opinion poll of a cross section of the inhabitants of Baguio City was conducted to determine the attitude of the people toward the police. Because of his knowledge of the community, the determination of the cross sectional representation of the city's inhabitants was entrusted to the Chief Training Officer of the PolCom Regional Training Center in Baguio City.

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The multiple choice questionnaire was provided to a true cross section of the community, such as jeepney drivers, attorneys, both political parties, etc. Persons completing the questionnaire had no obligation to sign their names or identify themselves. In substance, the questionnaire reflected that the people recognized and acknowledged the fact that the Baguio Police Department has improved discipline and behavior. A majority (68.2%) indicated that the policemen are more attentive to the people's problems; 60.8% of the people questioned felt that police respond faster to emergency calls. It was indicated by 81.7% that the police merit their respect. The general feeling was that traffic flowed in an orderly manner. It was believed by 55.6% that "vice" is not tolerated by the police department.

City-Police Budgets

FY	<u>Police</u>	<u>City</u>	Percentage
1969	₱ 867,497.98	₱ 8,615,200.49	10.7%
1970	982,498.00	8,196,718.82	11.9%
1971	1,241,198.00	11,670,198.00	10.6%
1972	1,008,923.00	10,351,981.34	9.7%

The figures indicate that the police budget basically has increased at a similar rate with the city budget; the exception is FY 1972 when both budgets had a down trend but this same down trend was reflected in all other departmental budgets.

Crime Statistics

The following crime statistics reflect: (1) total offenses reported; (2) number of offenses cleared by arrest; (3) percentage solved; and (4) amount of recovered property.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Offenses Reported	4,251	4,416	4,126
Cleared by Arrest	2,080	1,861	1,869
Percentage Solved	48.9%	42.1%	45.2%
Property Recovered	₱116,109.15	₱290,201.55	₱202,392.65

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The Baguio Police Department "Percentage Solved" figures are low in comparison to other police improvement cities. It is the regional advisor's judgment that the Baguio Police Department has a more stringent police reporting policy that directly affects the "Percentage Solved" statistics. It should be noted that a marked increase in property recovered is shown in 1970 and 1971 in comparison to 1969. For detailed statistics see Annex D.

Personnel

In 1969, the police department had an actual strength of 170 and an authorized strength of 177. The on board strength in 1972 has risen to 198 with an authorized strength of 203. One hundred and ninety-one of the policemen in the department have civil service eligibility. Salaries for the police department have risen since 1969. A patrolman in 1969 was paid ₱2,452.00 per annum (₱243.50 per month), while he is presently paid ₱3,300.00 per annum (₱275.00 per month). Members of the department have been receiving the PolCom police salary subsidy since 1971. Since the opening of the PolCom Northern Luzon Regional Training Center (Baguio City) in January 1971, forty-three policemen have completed the basic course and eight members of the department are currently in training. The police department supports the training center by providing instructors, on-the-job training for each class, and transportation on an as needed basis. The following shows the departmental manpower breakdown by rank:

<u>Rank</u>	
Chief of Police	1
Deputy Chief of Police	1
Police Captain	6
Police Lieutenant	2
Police Sergeant	14
Police Corporal	9
Patrolman First Class	29
Patrolman	133
Patrolwoman	<u>3</u>
Total	198

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City Project Support

U.S.A.I.D./PSD has programmed a commodity input of \$68,000.00 to support the Police Improvement Project. City provided funding, to date, is as follows:

Capital Investment

Land (Est.)	₱ 2,225.00
Construction	
Outpost	5,350.00
Remodel offices	2,000.00
Communications Equip- ment (Trust Fund)	45,000.00
Operational Costs	51,734.00

Manpower Contribution

Personnel (Est.)	<u>84,000.00</u>
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Total	₱190,309.00=\$29,828 (₱6.38 - \$1.00)
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Presently, the city of Baguio is in the process of acquiring one and one-half hectares of land for the construction of their new police building. The land is estimated to cost ₱80,000 with the new police building to be constructed at a cost of ₱200,000 (\$43,887).

THE BICOL REGIONSetting

The region, made up of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate and Sorsogon, lies at the southernmost tip of the island of Luzon.

Except for an extensive plain stretching from Camarines Sur to the southwestern part of Albay and several smaller coastal plains, the region is generally mountainous and hilly. It is dotted by several dormant volcanoes dominated by the perfect cone of Mt. Mayon in Albay. Three lakes, Buhi, Bato and Bulusan are found in the region.

The provinces of Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate and Sorsogon are exceedingly rough and mountainous.

There are many rivers in the region; however, with the exception of the Bicol, Quinala and a few others, most of them are small, short and fast flowing.

The western and southern parts of the region along Camarines Norte and part of Camarines Sur have the type of climate generally characterized by no dry season and no pronounced maximum rain period as rainfall is more or less evenly distributed throughout the year. The climate of the eastern and northern parts of the region is characterized by a definite absence of a dry season, with a very pronounced maximum rain period from November to January. The region lies within a typhoon belt which seriously affects the area through typhoons generally occurring in the months of May, September and November.

The six provinces consist of two chartered cities and 111 municipalities. The population of the region in 1970 was about 2,967,000.

The major resource of the region is its fertile land, most of which is planted in abaca and coconut. Grazing lands in the region are substantial but undeveloped. Other major resources in the area are forestry, minerals and fishing.

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Legaspi City Setting

Legaspi City is located in the southern portion of Albay Island. The city is situated at the foot of Mayor Volcano overlooking Albay Gulf on the Pacific Ocean. A city of colorful history, it was founded in the 14th century as a tiny settlement of fishermen and farmers. In 1587, the first Spaniards came to Legaspi. In 1872, a royal decree made Legaspi an open port for world trade and it became a thriving port of call for European vessels.

American rule began when American forces entered the city in 1900, during the Philippine American War. Legaspi City is the only chartered city in Albay Province and has a land area of 58.3 square miles.

It is the hub of trade and commerce of the Bicol Region, with the local economy being supported by copra, abaca, cottage, and tourist industries; however, the city income is small compared with other first class cities in the Republic. Legaspi City's current budget is ₱2,337,000.00 and its population is 84,090 by the Bureau of Census of 1970. Inhabitants are composed of Bicolanos, with about 10% belonging to other ethnic groups.

The local government is a Mayor-City Council form, with the Mayor directing the executive arm and its attendant offices.

Project Activities

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

From January 19 through 21, 1970, a survey of the police department was conducted by a joint survey team staffed by representatives from the Police Commission and the Public Safety Division of the United States Agency for International Development. The survey was carried out under terms of the Project Agreement entered into by the National Economic Council, the Police Commission and U.S.A.I.D. on September 25, 1969.

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The survey was conducted utilizing a team approach to obtain current information on the city of Legaspi and its Police Department. The survey report, as prepared and submitted, was based on concepts, general proposals and recommendations considered by the survey team as practical, realistic and achievable. It identified weaknesses in administration, management and operations. It made 127 recommendations for change in ten areas of police activity. The survey recommendations envisioned utilization of modern administrative and organizational practices.

The joint survey report was submitted to the city government for consideration and on August 4, 1970, a sub-project agreement between the Police Commission and the city of Legaspi was signed. The regional advisor, along with PolCom, city and police representatives developed a plan of action for implementation of the survey recommendations. Action was almost immediately taken in putting the plans into effect.

U. S. Inputs

Technical advisory services have been provided to the department since August 1970 by the Regional Public Safety Advisor and also by the Police Commission through the Chief Training Officer of the PolCom regional training academy.

A basic police improvement commodity package was developed by PSD and commodities were provided in increments to the police department by U.S.A.I.D. through the Police Commission. (See the Baguio section for the basic police improvement package).

One city police officer has received training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C., in FY 1969.

The total U. S. expenditure through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

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Technicians	\$ 52,000
Commodities	57,000
Participants	<u>2,500</u>
Total	\$111,500

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

The Police Commission Chief Inspector and the regional advisor conducted a project evaluation of the Legaspi Police Department from January 27 to 28, 1972, to determine the status of the Police Improvement Project. Its objectives were to assess the degree of adherence to the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement and the extent of compliance of the city with the survey recommendations.

Findings

The following is a summary of the findings of the U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey team with respect to compliance with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement.

Briefings of subordinate city and police staffs were conducted by city and police officials in respect to proper implementation of the terms and conditions of the project agreement and the survey recommendations.

Adequate funds were provided by the city for the costs of custom's clearance, delivery from Manila to Legaspi City of the U.S.A.I.D. provided police commodities, also for operation, maintenance and installation, as needed.

Police commodities were assigned for use by members of the Legaspi City Police Department in connection with the performance of their duties and functions.

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The department training unit is integrated fully with the PolCom regional academy under the Chief Training Officer as exemplified by the ongoing riot control training conducted at the academy site using departmental instructors.

"On-the-job" training at no cost is provided by the police department for training participants of the regional academy.

Eighty-five members of the department have graduated from the regional training academy with only seven still untrained.

Record and accounting procedures have been established in the department by U.S.A.I.D. funded police commodities as prescribed by the Police Commission and the commodities were inspected in May of 1971 by a combined U.S.A.I.D./ PolCom Audit Team.

None of the commodities have been transferred, encumbered, disposed of, or diverted from their intended use.

No directives have been issued by the Mayor and no resolution or ordinance has been enacted by the City Council which is inconsistent with or contrary to the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement.

An appraisal was also made of the extent of compliance by the department and the city government and is presented in the following table:

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<u>Survey Area</u>	<u>No. of Recom- mendations</u>	<u>Compliance</u>		<u>Non- Compliance</u>
		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	
Personnel	8	4(50%)	3(38%)	1(12%)
Administration & Organization	23	17(74%)	6(26%)	-
Patrol	16	10(63%)	6(37%)	-
Traffic	16	7(44%)	7(44%)	2(12%)
Investigation	15	7(47%)	4(27%)	4(26%)
Records	15	8(53%)	6(40%)	1( 7%)
Jail	19	6(32%)	6(32%)	7(36%)
Logistics	5	2(40%)	1(20%)	2(40%)
Communications	5	4(80%)	1(20%)	-
Training	5	2(40%)	2(40%)	1(20%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>67(53%)</b>	<b>42(33%)</b>	<b>18(14%)</b>

The survey report contained a total of 127 recommendations in ten areas of activity. It will be noted from the above that out of the 127 recommendations, 67 or 53% were fully complied with and 42 or 33% partially complied with, to give a total of 109 or 86% of the survey recommendations duly acted upon leaving 18 or 14% unacted upon by this project city.

An appraisal of the above shows that as Legaspi City has satisfactorily complied not only with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement but also with the greater part of the survey recommendations, continuation of the Police Improvement Project until its scheduled phase out date in FY 1973 is warranted.

The U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey team has taken into consideration that not all the recommendations could be implemented immediately as a considerable portion thereof involved additional financial support. It has been noted, however, that those recommendations involving the desired changes in the administration, organization, patrol, communications, traffic, investigation and personnel have been substantially carried out as reflected in the above table.

The Chief Training Officer of the regional academy has been authorized by PolCom to continue assistance

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in coordination with the Reigonal Public Safety Advisor so that the remaining survey recommendations can be implemented.

The U.S.A.I.D./PolCom evaluation team also noted that the significant gains made in the upgrading of police services may be largely credited to the active role that the city Mayor has taken in giving assistance to the Chief of Police.

A poll of public opinion of citizens of Legaspi City was conducted by the evaluation team for the purpose of determining their attitudes concerning the Police Improvement Project in that city. A cross section of that city's inhabitants were given questionnaires by the Chief Training Officer of the PolCom regional academy in Legaspi City with specific instructions to answer frankly and truthfully the questions asked and with no obligation to sign their names or identify themselves unless they so desire.

In substance, the responses to the questionnaire reflected that the populace are aware of and have an appreciation for the Police Improvement Project. They also indicated police services have improved as well as individual conduct, behavior and discipline of the policemen, and the police seemingly enjoy an increasing trust of the people.

City-Police Budget

The following are the police and city budgets for the past three fiscal years:

<u>FY</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	₱267,748.00	₱1,676,389.93	15.9%
1970	267,748.00	1,676,389.93	15.9%
1971	409,800.00	2,337,000.00	17.5%

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Crime Statistics

The following reflects crime statistics for: (1) total offenses reported; (2) number of offenses cleared by arrest; (3) percentage solved; (4) amount of property recovered.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Offenses Reported	460	403	785
Cleared by Arrest	289	394	451
Percentage Solved	51.4%	63%	73%
Property Recovered	₱2,430,000	₱4,620,000	₱5,450,490

FY 1972

	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>
Offenses Reported	67	72	89
Cleared by Arrest	38	51	67
Percentage Solved	50.9%	70.6%	79%
Property Recovered	₱255.00	₱14,000.00	₱840 .

An analysis of the above figures indicates an improved performance paralleling the implementation of survey recommendations, improved basic training and provision of technical advice, and the U.S.A.I.D. funded commodity input.

Personnel

In 1969, the police department had an authorized strength of 87 with 79 positions filled. This has risen in 1972 to an authorized strength of 95 with 92 positions filled. During this same period, the patrol strength has grown comparatively. Seventy-seven of the policemen in the department have civil service eligibility. Of the total police force, 85 have completed the basic police course. The following shows the departmental manpower breakdown by rank:

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<u>Rank</u>	
Chief of Police	1
Deputy Chief of Police	1
Police Captain	1
Police Lieutenant	3
Police Sergeant	8
Police Corporal	11
Patrolman First Class	13
Patrolman	53
Chief, Secret Service	<u>1</u>
Total	92

City Project Support

U.S.A.I.D./PSD has provided a commodity input of \$57,000.00 (See Baguio City commodity package) to support the Police Improvement Project. City project support, to date, is as follows:

Capital Investment

Land	₱ 10,000.00
Outposts Construction	
Rural Outposts	9,000.00
Urban Outposts	
Fire Department	12,000.00
New Police Department (30% completed)	35,000.00

(NOTE: ₱95,000.00 additional required for completion)

Operational Cost 47,000.00

Manpower Contribution

Personnel (Est.) 28,000.00

Total ₱141,000.00 = \$22,100  
(₱6.38 = \$1)

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
Presently, the new police department building is under construction and the department is located in temporary quarters. The previous police building had 1,400 square feet of floor space. The new police building will have 4,200 square feet which increases the available space threefold.

The city has established and constructed two rural outposts which have given a new dimension to policing the entire city. In 1971, the input of U.S.A.I.D. funded radios and police vehicles and the city's construction and manning of the two rural outposts made it possible, for the first time, to provide rural police service on a 24-hour basis.

A combined urban police post and fire department was also completed in 1971.

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# POLICE IMPROVEMENT VISAYAN REGION



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THE VISAYAS

Setting

The Visayan Region is located in the center of the Philippine Archipelago. The region consists of forty-six islands in an area about 240 miles by 400 miles which are geographically grouped as: Western, Central and Eastern Visayas.

Within the region there are: 12 provinces, 20 chartered cities, and 330 municipalities with a total population of 8,911,975.

In the Visayan Region, six Filipino dialects are spoken as well as English, Spanish and Chinese. The region experiences wet and dry seasons; however, the only area within the typhoon belt is the Eastern Visayas. The region has an agricultural economy, but light industrial development is beginning in several areas. The primary crops of the Visayas are sugar, rice, copra and corn. Negros Occidental Province is the sugar capital of the Republic.

Police Improvement

There are three Police Improvement Project departments in the Visayas Region: Bacolod City, Cebu City and Tacloban City.

<u>Project City</u>	<u>Initiated FY</u>	<u>Estimated Termination FY</u>
Bacolod	1969	1972
Cebu	1970	1973
Tacloban	1970	1973

A U.S.A.I.D. Regional Public Safety Advisor was assigned to the Visayas in August 1969, with residence in Cebu City.

The Visayan regional project includes three regional training academies in addition to the three police improvement programs.

The Visayan region is approximately 400 miles, east to west, and 240 miles north to south. The number of pro-

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ject activities and the distance involved has necessitated that the assigned Public Safety Advisor travel three weeks out of every month. All travel is by commercial aircraft. In addition to the regional activities, the advisor has been required to lecture at PolCom training centers throughout the Republic as well as to participate in joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom project surveys on a nationwide basis.

With this schedule, the advisor has been able to visit each academy and police improvement city at least once a month.

WESTERN VISAYAS REGION

Bacolod City Setting

Bacolod City, founded in 1770, is the capital of the province of Negros Occidental. The 1971 Police Commission Annual Report indicates a population of 193,000. Located in the northwestern part of the province, it became a charter city on October 19, 1939. This area enjoys a cool and invigorating climate and rainfall is abundant. The city sits on a level area, slightly sloping towards the sea, thereby permitting the city to expand in all directions, as is evidenced by the twenty subdivisions within the city limits.

The city has a total land area of 32 square miles. Major industry within the city includes two sugar refineries, two gasoline depots, a Coca-Cola bottling plant and a slaughter house.

There are 209.43 miles of streets in the city. There are approximately 30,000 registered vehicles. There is a harbor facility and an airport, which is serviced by two airlines, handling approximately 300,000 passengers per year.

The city is governed by a Mayor and City Council. The politics and administration of the city are greatly influenced by the rich sugar industry which has traditionally played a key role in national government and politics.

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Project ActivitiesJoint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

A joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom team conducted an in depth survey of the Bacolod City department in September 1969. This survey identified weaknesses in nine areas and recommended courses of action for improved operations and administrative procedures. The resulting survey report included 83 recommendations and was the basis for a sub-project agreement entered into by PolCom and the city in January 1970.

The survey was conducted using a team approach as was the case of all other Police Improvement sub-projects. The survey report submitted contained concepts, general proposals and recommendations considered to be practical, realistic and achievable.<sup>1/</sup>

U. S. Inputs

The Regional Advisor, with residence in Cebu, has been providing technical assistance to the Bacolod police department and concurrently to the Western Visayas Regional Police Training Academy. The U. S. advisors, working with a cross section of departmental staff, established priorities and courses of action which resulted in a substantial restructuring of the department. This was done in coordination with the PolCom Chief Training Officer at the Academy who is also the PolCom representative in the Police Improvement Project using survey recommendations as a guideline.

A basic commodity package was developed and provided by U.S.A.I.D. to the department in increments through established PolCom distribution procedures. Quantities were tailored to meet project requirements and included vehicles, weapons, traffic signal lights, photographic equipment, darkroom equipment and criminal investigation equipment.

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<sup>1/</sup> Copies on file at U.S.A.I.D./PSD

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Two city police officers have received training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C., one in FY 1969 and one in FY 1971. The total U. S. expenditure through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

Technicians	\$30,000
Commodities	50,000
Participants	<u>5,000</u>
Total	\$85,000

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

The Regional Public Safety Advisor and a PolCom Inspector conducted a joint evaluation of the Bacolod sub-project February 23 through 26, 1972, to determine the extent of compliance by local government and police officials in implementation of survey recommendations and terms of the sub-project agreement.

The following is a summary of the findings of the joint team. The evaluation revealed that the department has implemented 51 of the 73 recommendations representing 70%. This is considered to be the most successful project in the Visayan region. Following is a table showing the degree of compliance in the various areas of the survey:

<u>Area of Survey</u>	<u>Total Recommendations</u>	<u>Implemented</u>	<u>No Action</u>
Patrol Div.	11	8 (72.7%)	3
Traffic Div.	10	9 (90%)	1
Vice Control Div.	3	1 (33.3%)	2
Juvenile Control Div.	1	0 (1%)	1
Records & Ident. Div.	14	8 (57.1%)	6
Communications	5	4 (80%)	1
Transportation & Maintenance	4	2 (50%)	2
Jail Div.	13	8 (61.5%)	5
General	<u>12</u>	<u>11 (91.7%)</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	73	51 (70%)	22

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There are many reasons for non-implementation of the 22 recommendations thus far not acted upon. Among them are:

Lack of funds. Eight recommendations could not be implemented because they required substantial additional appropriations. To date, such financial support has not been forthcoming from the city government.

Operationally not feasible. Three survey recommendations were considered by the department to be operationally not feasible at this time.

Official apathy. Eight recommendations were not implemented principally due to the lack of sufficient interest to support necessary action on the part of the police and city government officials.

Not police responsibility. Three recommendations were beyond the domain of the police department involving one or more other city department.

The Bacolod Police Department has been commanded by Lt. Colonel Arcadio S. Lozada, P.C.Ret, since June 17, 1964. He is a very dynamic man and considered to be one of the ablest administrators and most progressive police officials in the Philippines.

The Bacolod Police Department has provided substantial leadership to many police agencies in the Western Visayas. The full support that it has given the Police Commission Regional Academy, including provision of on-the-job training for each class as well as carrying a substantial guest instructor load, has made a significant contribution to the academy's success. Also, this is the only department in the region that operates joint police/PC patrols. An annual "police week" is held in Bacolod during which the activities include radio and TV shows, displays in the city plaza, open house at the police department and PolCom academy. Several professional seminars are also conducted.

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As a part of the joint evaluation conducted in February 1972, an opinion poll was taken regarding attitudes of the public towards the Bacolod police. Two hundred questionnaires were distributed to all levels of society. The replies rated the overall performance of the police as satisfactory. Most replies stated the police were substantially reducing the time needed to respond to calls for services. The public also indicated they believed that police operations were more effective now than in the past.

Bacolod has been the most successful of the police improvement programs in the Visayan Region and is scheduled for an early phase out at the end of FY 1972.

U.S.A.I.D./PSD technical advisory efforts have had significant effect in improving overall capabilities of the Bacolod Police Department. Major accomplishments include establishment of a Tactical Patrol Unit which has been concentrating operations in high crime areas. This highly mobile unit has been a major factor in reducing crime through application of saturation patrol tactics.

The Juvenile Division was reorganized and special in-service training was given to the selected officers. For the first time, the Juvenile Division is operating on a 24-hour basis and emphasizes crime prevention over apprehension.

A new radio room has been constructed at headquarters to house U.S.A.I.D. provided equipment. This communications center is coordinated with the local Philippine Constabulary network as well as the provincial Law Enforcement Communications System (LECS).

Bacolod is the only police department in the Republic that has provided uniforms for city jail prisoners; and has an on-going work program for prisoners such as, gardening and carpentry.

Bacolod Youth Residences (Boys and Girls Homes) are in the third year of service as an integrated institutional child welfare program which has been

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recognized by national and international organizations as a valid and effective rehabilitation program for delinquent youth and children in distress. This program is one of not only police department involvement but of total community.

The incumbent Chief of Police is probably the first police chief in the Philippines to recognize the power of community relations and police public relations. The police department has strengthened its community relationships through numerous projects; such as "Police Week" which enables the community to know the police department through tours, special police programs which are presented to the local schools, and symposiums which result in the community coming closer together with the police department and the police personnel who provide service.

Bacolod is the first police department to establish a counseling and rehabilitation clinic for drug users. This clinic is located in the provincial hospital and has a full-time physician in attendance.

The Bacolod Police Department was selected as the "Outstanding Police Department of 1970" by the Philippine Constabulary. This award was earned, in part, as a result of the leadership ability within the police department, the implementation of U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey recommendations, ready acceptance of technical advice, and outstanding city government and community support.

The City Mayor has created positions and appointed nine civilian jail guards who have been trained by the police department training staff. The course of instruction was of four weeks duration and technical assistance in its preparation was provided by the U.S.A.I.D./PSD Regional Advisor. This action released nine police officers from jail guard duty for use in regular police assignments.

To date, Bacolod is the only police improvement department that has established a Philippine Constabulary/Police joint patrol within the city. These patrols function as routine police patrols covering assigned beat areas. This practice has led to the best PC/Police relations in the region.

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City-Police Budget

The following are the city and police budgets for the past four years:

<u>FY</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	8,052,462	1,635,243	20.3%
1970	9,557,442	1,481,128	15.5%
1971	9,419,486	1,635,243	17.4%
1972	10,000,000	1,500,000	15%

Crime Statistics

The following crime statistics reflect: (1) total offenses reported; (2) number cleared by arrest; and (3) percentage solved.

During the current police improvement program, reported crime in Bacolod increased in 1970, then decreased slightly in 1971. Arrest and clearance ratio increased in 1970, then decreased in 1971.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Offenses Reported	6,635	7,712	7,383
Cleared by Arrest	5,541	6,524	5,867
Percentage Cleared	83.5%	84.6%	79.5%

For detailed statistics see Annex E.

Personnel

At the time of the September 1969 survey, the Bacolod Police Department had an authorized strength of 330 men. Actual on-board strength was 303 of which 244 were civil service eligibles. Currently, the department has increased its actual strength to 344 sworn personnel with an additional 17 civilian employees. The following shows the departmental manpower breakdown by rank:

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Rank

Chief of Police	1
Deputy Chief of Police	1
Police Captain	3
Police Lieutenant	13
Police Sergeant	27
Police Corporal	25
Patrolman First Class	83
Patrolman	188
Policewomen	<u>3</u>
Total	344

City Project Support

Approximate city funding inputs related to this program have been:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1. New Police Radio Room	₱ 3,000.00
2. Crime-Photo Lab	10,000.00
3. Shipment of U.S.A.I.D. Commodities	2,000.00
4. Maintenance of equipment	13,000.00
5. Ammunition	<u>10,000.00</u>
Total	₱38,000.00=(\$5,956.11)

(₱6.38=\$1.00)

Additionally, the city of Bacolod has appropriated ₱200,000 or \$30,769.23 to initiate construction of a new police headquarters. Total cost is estimated at ₱400,000 or \$61,538.46. Planning assistance, design and floor layout schemes have been provided by the Regional Public Safety Advisor. Currently the City Architect is finalizing the plans. Construction will probably not begin before late 1973.

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CENTRAL VISAYAS REGION

Cebu City Setting

Cebu City, capital of Cebu Province is known as the "Queen City" of the south and the cradle of Christianity in the Orient. It is the oldest city in the Philippines, having been founded by Miguel Lopez de Legaspi in 1565. Cebu is the second largest city in the Philippine Republic.

The area of Cebu City is 206.25 square miles. As of 1971, the population was estimated to be 357,400.

Hundreds of factories and industrial plants are dispersed in the city and suburbs. There are at least 60 foreign ships calling at Cebu City each month while inter-island ships make 820 calls per month. The main products of Cebu are copra, corn, oil and sugar.

It has become the educational center of the Central Visayas, as attested by the increasing number of educational institutions and student population. The total enrollment for private universities, colleges and vocational schools is 80,000, and for public schools, 55,000.

Cebu has 30 labor unions. The medical needs of Cebu's population are taken care of by 18 hospitals or clinics. The official count at the end of 1968 listed 20,000 registered motor vehicles with 15,000 drivers' licenses issued. Cebu also has 600 push-carts, 3,200 bicycles, and 2,500 animal drawn vehicles. There are over 90 bars and restaurants located in the city as well as 25 motion picture theaters.

Project Activities

Up to the time the Cebu Police Department entered the Police Improvement Program in FY 1970, it had operated through the years without the benefit of adequate planning and, in fact, had never operated within the framework of an established table of organization.

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Department personnel had, however, displayed considerable initiative in carrying out their responsibilities in spite of severe resource limitations.

#### Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

In March 1970, a U.S.A.I.D./PolCom team conducted an in depth survey of the department. The survey identified weaknesses and suggested change or improvements in twelve areas of activity. The resulting survey report made 247 specific recommendations affecting reorganization, improved operational procedures, improved management practices, adherence to requirements of laws and rules governing appointments, training, improved facilities, equipment requirements, mobile capability, communications and salary adjustment in conformance with PolCom recommendations.

The sub-project agreement was signed between the PolCom and Cebu City in September 1970. The program moved very slowly at first due to a strained relationship between the department and the Police Commission. This situation gradually improved, however, until full cooperation was ultimately given by both agencies. The U.S.A.I.D. police improvement project and the U. S. technicians acted as catalysts in bringing the two together.

#### U. S. Inputs

One U. S. technician has been in residence at Cebu since August, 1969. This advisor had responsibility for the entire Visayas region and found it necessary to divide his time between three police improvement cities and three regional training academies. Considerable negotiating skill was required to successfully bring together elements of the police department and the Police Commission in order to move the project activity forward.

A basic commodity package was provided by U.S.A.I.D. through established PolCom distribution procedures. Since Cebu is, in effect, the second city of the Philippines and leading commercial and educational center in the South, a somewhat larger commodity input was developed to support the 805 man depart-

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ment. This consisted of the standard types of items including vehicles, weapons, traffic signals, photographic and darkroom equipment and criminal investigation equipment.

One city police officer received training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C., in FY 1969; however, he is now deceased.

The total U. S. expenditure through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

Technicians	\$ 30,800
Commodities	124,600
Participants	<u>2,500</u>
Total	\$157,900

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

In February 1972, the Police Commission and Public Safety conducted an in depth evaluation of the Cebu Police Department to assess the progress made in implementing the survey recommendations and degree of conformance with the sub-project agreement.

It was found that the department had implemented 126 of the 247 survey recommendations, or 51%. Percentagewise, this was the least successful project in the Visayan region.

The following presents, in tabular form, the findings of the joint survey team. Twelve areas of police activity were covered in the survey recommendations:

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<u>Area of Survey</u>	<u>Number of Recommendations</u>	<u>Number Implemented</u>	<u>No Action</u>
Personnel Division	22	10(45%)	12
Organization & Administration	42	38(91%)	4
Patrol Division	20	4(20%)	16
Traffic Division	34	15(44%)	19
Investigation Division	29	19(66%)	10
Plans & Training Division	9	7(78%)	2
Community Services Division	13	8(62%)	5
Records Division	14	5(35%)	9
Property & Supply Division	5	0	5
Communications Division	12	9(75%)	3
Police Building	12	2(17%)	10
Jail Division	<u>35</u>	<u>9(26%)</u>	<u>26</u>
Total	247	126(51%)	121

An analysis of the recommendations that were not implemented revealed that 6 or 2.4% in light of the current situation were not operationally feasible, 17 or 7% could not be carried out because funds were not made available by the city, 93 or 38% are sound, practical suggestions that, to date, have not been acted upon by the police leadership, and 5 or 1% pertained to other government agencies areas of responsibility.

Reasons for non-implementation could be summed up as follows:

1. Absence of effective and cohesive leadership.
2. Lack of adequate funding by the city government.

The opinion poll (200 questionnaires) that was conducted as a part of the evaluation revealed that the people felt that the behavior and discipline of the Cebu department was better than in previous years.

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The respondents indicated that the effectiveness of police operations had improved.

Major project accomplishments to date include the following:

The Cebu Police Department has the most modern and effective communications system of any police department in the country. This system includes a "direct dialing" system, an intercommunications system linking command personnel and the communications center which coordinates three city police zones as well as the provincial Law Enforcement Communications System. Also included is a modern electronic map indicating location of all police mobile units and their availability. This center monitors a silent alarm system linking banks with the center. The new communication center is the primary factor in reduced response time and increased police service to the public. To support communications activity, a well-equipped maintenance facility is fully operational. U.S.A.I.D. provided major items of tools and test equipment.

In 1971, the city appropriated ₱19,000 or \$2,923.08 for construction of a new jail facility which was needed to house sixty to one hundred misdemeanor offenders. This facility, recommended in the survey report, is scheduled for completion in mid-1972.

The new Community Relations Division now presents three daily radio programs of 15 minutes each. These shows are designed to inform the public about their police department activities and educate them concerning laws and ordinances. U.S.A.I.D. technical advice was solicited in initial planning and development of this activity.

In order to further the implementation of survey recommendations, the city purchased six new vehicles for the police department. All of these vehicles are being used for patrol operations.

Based on survey recommendations, a traffic flow plan has been developed for Cebu City, resulting in new parking legislation and designation of one-way

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streets. Traffic control has been improved with the installation of four U.S.A.I.D. provided traffic signals at major intersections.

This department has organized and fielded a tactical patrol unit which has had a very favorable impact on the local crime situation. This is a small highly mobile unit of 25 men which concentrates its activities in high crime areas. This unit was instrumental in reducing waterfront burglaries and robberies. The high arrest rate of this unit emphasized the need for the newly established night court.

Significant progress has been made in the areas of organization, training and communications. The department organization now conforms to that prescribed by the Police Commission as set forth in the Police Manual.

The Cebu Police Department has a departmental training unit which provides PolCom approved training in various specialized subjects.

This department also provides in depth on-the-job training for PolCom Central Visayan Regional Academy trainees.

The program with the Cebu Police Department was making fair progress until January 1972 at which time the newly reelected Mayor, Sergio Osmena, Jr., aired publicly his differences with the Chief of Police. The department is currently headed by Chief Abundio Gultiano, a retired Army Colonel.

Since January, 1972, the Mayor has taken overt actions effecting police operations. He has detailed 40 policemen to his personal staff, including one Deputy Chief. He has assigned six police vehicles, including one U.S.A.I.D. provided vehicle to this staff, and has attempted to remove firearms from the department. The department has been disrupted and factionalized because of this politically motivated feud and there is little possibility of early resolution of the crisis; therefore, this project activity has been temporarily suspended.

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City-Police Budget

<u>FY</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	21,919,675	3,138,227	14.3%
1970	24,628,511	3,669,949	14.9%
1971	24,528,500	3,669,950	14.9%

Crime Statistics

An analysis of statistical data shows a marked trend in that reported crime in Cebu has declined during the life of the project. The clearance rate has decreased since 1969 and now seems to be leveling off. This is attributable, in part, to more accurate reporting. The arrest rate has also dropped markedly.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Offenses Reported	9,306	8,551	5,473
Cleared by Arrest	7,576	6,275	4,343
Percentage Cleared	81.4%	73.4%	79.3%

For detailed statistics see Annex F.

Personnel

At the time of the Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey, March 1970, the Cebu Police Department had an authorized strength of 904 positions. This included 99 civilian employees. Actual on board strength of sworn officers was 741. In April 1972, the strength had risen to 805.

The following shows the departmental manpower strength breakdown by rank:

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Rank

Chief of Police	1
Deputy Chief of Police	1
Police Captain	21
Police Major	8
Police Lieutenant	55
Police Sergeant	61
Police Corporal	48
Patrolman First Class	81
Patrolmen	528
Police Lt/Colonel	<u>1</u>
Total	805

City Project Support

The city's contributions related to the Police Improvement Program through April 1972 total P101,495.00. These are reflected as follows:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1. Construction of radio room	P 22,000.00
2. Construction of library	895.00
3. Purchase of six new vehicles	57,600.00
4. Construction of new Jail	19,000.00
5. Transportation and handling of U.S.A.I.D. commodities	<u>2,000.00</u>
Total	P101,495.00 = \$15,908.31 (P6.38=\$1.00)

In addition to the above costs, the department provided an office for the Public Safety Advisor.

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## EASTERN VISAYAS REGION

### Tacloban City Setting

Tacloban became a chartered city on June 12, 1953. It is a port city situated on the northeastern side of the island of Leyte, has a population of 78,700, and encompasses 110 square miles. As a hub of commercial activity for the Eastern Visayas, this city is served by three airline companies and its busy port is visited frequently by local and foreign ships. The city has: 50 public and private educational institutions accommodating some 29,000 students; eight banks; three local newspapers; one radio station; and eighteen active civic, professional and religious organizations. Although lying within the typhoon belt, Tacloban City has advanced steadily in its economic, social and cultural development.

Tacloban City first attracted worldwide attention when the allied liberation forces led by General Douglas MacArthur with President Sergio Osmena, Sr., and General Carlos P. Romulo stepped ashore on its beaches on October 20, 1944. Two days after landing, President Osmena and General MacArthur reestablished the Philippine Government in the Provincial Capitol Building located in Tacloban City.

### Project Activities

#### Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

Although a Project Agreement was signed between PolCom and Tacloban City in May of 1969, it was not until January 1970 that a joint PolCom survey was conducted of the Tacloban Police Department. The survey report contained 170 recommendations and was presented to city officials in June 1970, at which time a sub-project agreement between the city and PolCom was signed.

As in other joint surveys, the team developed a series of recommendations designed to improve effectiveness in administration and operations. The 170 recommendations covered nine areas of

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activity. Upon receipt of the report by city and police officials, briefings by U.S.A.I.D./PSD and PolCom representatives were given them to explain the plan for project implementation. City and police officials in turn held meetings with their staffs to present the findings of the survey and to assign roles to key staff personnel for planning and implementation.<sup>1/</sup>

U. S. Inputs

Technical advice and guidance in project implementation was provided by the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety Advisor for the Visayan Region to the city department, however, his time was also divided between Cebu and Bacolod in addition to Tacloban.

A basic commodity support package was provided by U.S.A.I.D. It was carefully tailored to complement survey recommendations and facilitate implementation. It included vehicles, weapons, photographic and darkroom equipment and criminal investigation equipment.

One city police officer received training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C., in FY 1969.

The total U. S. expenditure through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

Technicians	\$ 30,800
Commodities	58,100
Participants	<u>2,500</u>
Total	\$ 91,400

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

An evaluation of this police improvement program was conducted in February 1972 by a joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom team. It was found that of the 170 recommendations, 98 have been implemented, or 58%, the second best performance in the region.

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<sup>1/</sup> Copies on file at U.S.A.I.D./PSD

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The only portion of the sub-project agreement that has not been fully complied with is that dealing with adequate funds for transportation of U.S.A.I.D. provided commodities. On at least two occasions, the Chief of Police had to personally pay for such transportation from Manila to Tacloban.

The extent and areas of compliance with survey recommendations are shown as follows:

<u>Area of Survey</u>	<u>Number of Recommendations</u>	<u>Number Implemented</u>	<u>No Action</u>
Personnel Division	20	8(40%)	12
Organization & Administration	25	14(56%)	11
Patrol Division	15	12(80%)	3
Traffic Division	20	12(60%)	8
Investigation Division	24	19(79%)	
Records & Identification	11	9(82%)	2
Police Building	12	9(75%)	3
Jail Division	33	8(24%)	25
Training Division	<u>10</u>	<u>7(70%)</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	170	98(58%)	72

The most progress has been made in the areas of patrol, criminal investigation, records, police facility and training.

Preventative patrol has been extended to the entire community for the first time. With the addition of vehicles, radios and training, the police response time has been reduced by at least 50%. For the first time, the city is divided into police "beats" for patrol purposes.

PolCcm provided specialized and on-the-job training has improved the efficiency of the Investigation and Records Division.

The Department has constructed a new police headquarters, a complete communications center and three new outposts.

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Based on Police Improvement Program survey recommendations, this department has established an on-going "roll-call" and in-service training program which has been approved by the Police Commission. The department has also fully supported the local PolCom regional academy and sends members to every class given. It provides on-the-job training for each class undergoing basic training.

In part, the reasons for non-compliance with 56 (32.9%) of the survey recommendations were lack of understanding of the principles of modern law enforcement and lack of administrative skills within the police leadership both of which are correctable through additional training. Thirteen (8%) were not implemented due to lack of needed increased financial support on the part of the city government. Two (1.2%) did not properly pertain to the police department.

As part of the evaluation, a public opinion poll was conducted to measure public attitudes relating to the Tacloban Police Department. A sampling of a cross section of the city population was taken and revealed the following:

The department enjoys increased degree of confidence and respect by the populace. Discipline has improved steadily the past two years. Policemen appear to be more attentive and receptive to needs of the people. With the advent of mobile patrol activities, police response to calls for assistance has been more rapid. A 75% initial response time improvement was noted with a further significant reduction anticipated. Traffic enforcement is stricter, more uniform, and the overall traffic flow is much smoother and more rapid.

The Tacloban Police Improvement Program has been more successful than was expected. Progressive change has taken place in spite of some serious handicaps. Such progress can be attributed directly to the enthusiasm of the police personnel to learn, improve, serve the people and be truly professional.

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With limited resources, this department has done a very satisfactory job.

In 1971, the Tacloban Police Department completed construction of their new police building. The police building was designed in compliance with a U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey recommendation. The building was constructed with technical assistance of the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety Advisor. Many policemen voluntarily worked on the building during their off-duty hours and the majority of the building was funded through community support rather than city resources. Community involvement in the Tacloban project has been a significant factor in its success.

The Tacloban Police Department completed the last of six rural police sub-stations in January 1972. These sub-stations are equipped with U.S.A.I.D. provided radios and are manned 24-hours a day thus providing police service to the entire city for the first time.

#### City-Police Budget

The following reflects the city and police budget for the past three years:

<u>FY</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	2,930,000	335,773	11.5%
1970	3,024,000	372,442	12.3%
1971	3,002,000	415,159	13.8%

#### Crime Statistics

The incidence of reported crime in Tacloban has increased slightly during the life of the project. This is, in part, attributable to the improved training and increased mobility as well as increased public confidence. The following shows the basic statistics for FY 1969 through FY 1971:

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Offenses Reported	2,337	2,496	3,461
Cleared by Arrest	2,118	2,112	2,995
Percentage Cleared	90.6%	84.6%	86.5%

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For detailed crime statistics, see Annex G.

Personnel

As of April 1972, the authorized strength level was 120 with 112 actually on the rolls. The following is the departmental breakdown by rank:

<u>Rank</u>	
Chief of Police	1
Deputy Chief of Police	1
Police Captain	1
Police Lieutenant	4
Police Sergeant	5
Police Corporal	11
Patrolman First Class	17
Patrolmen	71
Chief, Secret Service	<u>1</u>
Total	112

City Project Support


The Tacloban city government inputs for this program include the following

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1. New police headquarters	₱50,000.00
2. New communication center	4,000.00
3. Transportation of commodities	2,000.00
4. Three new outposts	<u>3,000.00</u>
Total	₱59,000.00 = \$9,247.65 (₱6.38 = \$1.00)

The adverse financial condition of Tacloban city has precluded any significant cash input over the above expenditures. The cost of the new police building includes an estimate of the extensive free labor donated by members of the department which made possible the successful completion of the facility.

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# POLICE IMPROVEMENT MINDANAO



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## MINDANAO REGION

### Setting

Situated at the southernmost portion of the Philippine archipelago, Mindanao is the second largest island of the group. Except for a narrow connecting neck of land near the north central area, Mindanao would be two islands. The eastern portion extends about 235 miles east and west and 330 miles north and south. The western portion comprises a peninsula some 185 miles long and 65 miles wide. The Mindanao region, however, extends beyond the western peninsula about 250 miles over the Sulu Sea to the more than 2,000 islands comprising the province of Sulu, and the island of Basilan City, a separate political entity. The total land area is approximately 37,000 square miles with a population of approximately 7,433,900.

Mindanao has a significant Moslem population (1,600,000) well established for several hundred years. Largest concentrations are in Cotabato Province and the Lake Lanao area. The interface of the Moslem and Christian cultures, mores and codified laws have caused serious problems for government administrators. Recently, armed clashes have occurred in Cotabato province sparked by religious differences. Significant assets of the government, including a PC task force numbering 110 officers and 1,720 enlisted men, have been assigned to restore peace and order.

The area has all the ingredients necessary for an agricultural base and industrial development. There are variations in rainfall and altitude that combine to make possible the profitable growth of a wide range of agricultural products for both food and commercial use. In various areas, two, three or even four crops a year are possible. Vast timber areas hold the raw materials for a major wood products industry. Known mineral resources include massive deposits of iron and nickel ores, and in varying degrees, coal, chromite, copper, lead, zinc, gold and silver.

The entire area is outside of the typhoon belt, and there is a minimum of disturbance from storms of any sort.

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Project Activities

U.S.A.I.D./PSD provides the services of a resident Public Safety Advisor, currently based on Davao, and a commodity input to police departments of the three largest cities of this island region. These are:

	<u>FY</u> <u>Initiated</u>	<u>FY</u> <u>Estimated</u> <u>Termination</u>
Cagayan de Oro	1969	1972
Zamboanga	1971	1973
Davao	1972(June)	1973 <sup>1/</sup>

Complementing these police improvement projects are three PolCom sponsored Regional Training Academies.

The advisor works directly with the Police Commission Chief Training Officers, Mayors, Chiefs of Police, staff and departmental personnel in the implementation of the joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey recommendations and the establishment and operation of the training academies.

The program in Cagayan de Oro has met with substantial achievement of project goals and recommendations set forth in the joint survey. A phase out of the U.S.A.I.D. project in this city can be accomplished by the end of FY 1972.

Due to the late initiation of both the Zamboanga and Davao activities, it appears that some provisions should be made for continued assistance after the scheduled FY 1973 termination.

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<sup>1/</sup> This is the termination date for the Internal Security Project. However, in order to ensure proper utilization of U.S.A.I.D. assets and reasonable achievement of project objectives, some sort of support should be continued after the projected phase out date of June 30, 1973.

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### Cagayan de Oro Setting

Cagayan de Oro, the capital of the province of Misamis Oriental, is located in the northern part of Mindanao.

The city is outside the typhoon belt. Rainfall occurs throughout the year, broken by a dry season of one to three months duration, primarily in March and April.

The city proper is on level land. However, there are rugged lands bounding the southern side of the city. The western side of the city across the Cagayan River is beginning to show signs of life for future expansion. The hilly terrain of the city is already being worked by developers, and modern subdivisions are emerging within the city boundaries.

Cagayan de Oro has a total land area of 159.3 square miles, much of which is rural in nature.

There are forty-three elementary schools, two high schools, and six private schools serving the city.

Within the city limits there are major commercial firms which include the Del Monte Packing Company, the Esso and Caltex gasoline depots, the Mindanao Motors Corporation, the Coca-Cola and the Pepsi Cola bottling plants, an ice plant, three sawmills, the Firestone Tire plant, the Maria Cristina Power Sub-station, the Southern Motors, and the Coffee de Oro Industries.

### Project Activities

#### Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

In November, 1969, a survey of the Cagayan de Oro City Police Department was conducted by a joint survey team composed of members from the Police Commission and the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety Division. Findings and recommendations were contained

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in a survey report, copies of which were furnished the city authorities for implementation.<sup>1/</sup> Subsequently, a sub-project agreement between the PolCom and the city was signed January 17, 1970.

As in other model city surveys, the team approach was used. Recommendations were made that were considered practical, realistic, and achievable.

Copies of the survey report were received by the city for review, approval and implementation in March 1970. A detailed briefing concerning the report was presented by the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety staff to acquaint city and police officials with the scope of recommendations made. After approval by the city government, briefings relative to the implementation of recommendations contained in the survey report were conducted by the Chief of Police for his officers. Courses of action were established with positive action immediately initiated. The report made 103 recommendations covering eight areas of police activity.

#### U. S. Inputs

One Public Safety Advisor resided in Cagayan de Oro from November 1969 to August 1971. In addition to his police improvement project activities, he was responsible for assisting in the establishment and operation of the Regional Police Training Academy. He worked closely with the PolCom Chief Training Officer both on the physical installation and on curricula refinement.

U.S.A.I.D. has provided the department with a standard police equipment package including vehicles, communications, office equipment, photographic and darkroom equipment, and weapons. Periodic inspection of these items by U.S.A.I.D. personnel disclosed they were being used as intended and were properly cared for. Commodities intended for the police were received beginning April 1970 and continued to arrive throughout 1971.

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<sup>1/</sup> Copies on file at U.S.A.I.D./PSD

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Two city police officers received U. S. training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C. The total U. S. contribution through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

Technicians	\$ 52,500
Commodities	49,700
Participants	<u>5,000</u>
Total	\$107,200

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

On February 15 and 16, 1972, an evaluation was conducted by a joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom team to determine the extent of compliance by the city and police department with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement and compliance with the recommendations contained in the survey report.

The following reflects the findings of the team:

Adequate funds were provided for custom's clearance, shipment of commodities to the city from Manila, installation, operation and maintenance of equipment.

Commodities have been used exclusively by the department as programmed and in the performance of official duties. None have been transferred, encumbered, disposed or diverted to use other than that intended. As recommended, a records and accounting procedure has been established in the department for equipment. This is under the responsibility of the department's supply officer.

Neither the City Mayor nor the Municipal Board has issued any directives or passed any resolutions which are inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement.

The department does not have an active training unit. Personnel staff are sent to the PolCom Regional Academy for training. At the time of the joint evaluation, 39 members of the force were undergoing training at the regional academy.

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"On-the-job" training is provided by the department to all participants undergoing police training at the academy. Transportation is provided by the city at no cost to the Academy or trainees. In conducting this training, there is good coordination between the academy and the department.

The Survey report contained a total of 103 recommendations covering eight different areas. Of these recommendations, 74 or 71.84% were fully implemented while 20 others or 19.41% were only partially complied with. Nine or 8.8% have not yet been acted upon.

The following table shows the extent of compliance with the survey recommendations:

<u>Area</u>	<u>No. of Recom- mendations</u>	<u>Implemented</u>		<u>No</u>
		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Action</u>
Organization & Administration	25	21	3	1
Patrol	8	8	-	-
Criminal Investigation	18	9	5	4
Training	6	4	1	-
Records & Communications	17	13	3	1
Jail	5	3	-	2
Logistics	4	2	2	-
Traffic	<u>20</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	103	74 (72%)	20 (19%)	9 (9%)

The Police Department has been reorganized in accordance with the Police Manual.<sup>1/</sup>

The department has satisfactorily complied with the survey recommendations. This is largely due to the fact that a majority of the recommendations involved police operations not requiring additional funding.

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<sup>1/</sup>R. P. Executive Order 113 with Police Act of 1966

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Twenty recommendations have been only partially complied with as their full implementation depends on the availability of additional funds, men and equipment. Thus, recommendations for the procurement of office and operational equipment and the providing of secure storage of arms, ammunition and other types of equipment could not be fully implemented. While some additional funds were provided, they were still inadequate.

Some recommendations have not yet been acted upon because they are not within the department's area of responsibility. For instance, the passage of an ordinance empowering the department to supervise security agencies, repairs of streets and a formulation of maintenance program, the hiring of civilian employees to do the clerical work in the department, and the procurement of prisoners' uniforms more properly belong to other offices such as those of the City Mayor, the Municipal Board, and the City Engineer. However, the department, for its part, has already made representations with the offices concerned for the implementation of these recommendations.

A public opinion poll was taken in conjunction with the evaluation. The following are attitudes concerning the police department as indicated by citizen response:

Questionnaires distributed during the evaluation show that city residents, generally, are aware of the Police Improvement Project through information in the news media. They note the positive changes it has caused in the police department. Of the 113 interviewees, 105 or 93% said that they believe the project has been beneficial to the people of Cagayan de Oro City and that it should be continued.

Regarding the present image of the city policemen, more than 75% of the interviewees observed that the city policemen are now better disciplined than before; quicker in responding to emergency calls; wear uniforms properly; appear less tolerant of vice in the city; and maintain a neutral posture when policing local rallies and demonstrations. Many of the interviewees said that they would now cooperate

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with the police by furnishing any available information that may help solve crimes because they believe some sort of positive action would be taken. The City Mayor himself commented favorably on the project stating that he and his office would continue to support it to insure its success.

From the foregoing, it is concluded that the performance of the department insofar as compliance with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement and with the survey recommendations, has been satisfactory. It has shown a genuine interest to improve police service in the city by substantially complying with the recommendation. In a span of two years, the police department has fully implemented approximately 72% of the total number of recommendations.

City-Police Budget

The following reflects the city and police budget figures for the past three years:

<u>FY</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	4,174,238	652,624	15.6%
1970	4,204,725	751,586	17.9%
1971	4,204,725	751,586	17.9%

Crime Statistics

The following reflects the overall Cagayan de Oro City crime statistics for a three year period:

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Offenses Reported	3,240	4,138	2,849
Cleared by Arrest	Unknown	3,551	2,344
Percentage Cleared	Unknown	85.8%	82.3%

For detailed statistics see Annex H.

When comparing figures recorded in 1970 to those of 1971, a sharp drop of those crimes reported to police is most apparent. The Chief and members of his staff state the reduction in the reported crime rate is partly attributable to the police recruit basic training course given to their policemen at the PolCom Regional Academy.

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In conjunction with training, the equipment provided by U.S.A.I.D. is also considered to be an important factor. Specific comments were expressed relating to patrol vehicles and the police communications system. The resulting impact on crime reduction is believed to be directly related to training, extended patrol system and radio contact with field units and distant outposts.

#### Personnel

At the time of the joint survey, the department had an authorized strength of 161 personnel with 148 actually on board. At the time of the evaluation, the authorized level had increased to 201 with an actual strength of 197.

#### City Project Support

The Cagayan de Oro City Government has contributed the following sums in support of project activities:

Equipment purchases	₱ 36,812
Personnel Salary	
Increases	110,000
Building Improvements	<u>4,220</u>
Total	₱151,032 = \$23,673 (₱6.38 = \$1.00)

The salary contribution represents sums provided to raise basic pay levels to those established under the Police Act of 1966.

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### Zamboanga City Setting

Zamboanga, "City of Flowers", was founded on June 23, 1635, when the Spanish authorities laid the cornerstone for what is known today as Fort Pilar.

Spain transformed this city into a seat of Spanish culture, the capital of the "Gobierno-politico-militar", imposing both the Catholic religion and her language. Nowhere else in the Philippines is Spanish, together with English, better understood or spoken than in Zamboanga.

Zamboanga is a modern city having churches, hotels, banks, schools, and commercial establishments in abundance and is a busy and progressive seaport. It has a fine harbor, airport and many asphalted roads.

It covers 550 square miles making it more than thirty-eight times larger than the City of Manila. It has a population of 203,323. The student population is 60,397. There are four commercial radio stations and five local newspapers.

The waters of the Sulu Sea, Basilan Strait, and Moro Gulf along the western and eastern coasts of the city abound in fish, shells, and other marine products. The area is one of the richest fishing grounds in the Philippines. The city exports logs, sawn lumber, plywood, veneer, copra, copra cake, coconut oil, abaca, rattan, dried fish, cattle, fruits, salt, seashells, and other marine products. Zamboanga is outside the typhoon belt and enjoys a pleasant year round climate.

Zamboanga became a Chartered City in 1937. The city is administered by a Mayor, a Vice Mayor, who is concurrently the chairman of the city council, and eight councillors - all chosen by popular vote for a term of four years.

### Project Activities

#### Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Survey

The sub-project agreement for police improvement was signed on August 19, 1970, between PolCom and the

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City of Zamboanga. A joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom survey was conducted on September 7, 1970. The survey report, however, was not received for implementation until one year later, November 16, 1971. This delay was due, in part, to an unusually long period of time required to draft the report. Also, the PolCom, dissatisfied with the lack of civil service eligibles employed by the department, delayed approval of the report for more than six months after it was prepared in final form.

The survey made 232 recommendations for change to improve overall operations and administration in ten areas of police activity. Copies of the report along with a detailed explanation of the recommendations were presented to city and police officials by U.S.A.I.D. and PolCom representatives. Subsequent to this, city and police officials briefed their respective staffs concerning the survey recommendations. Courses of action were set for implementation.

#### U. S. Inputs

Members of the U.S.A.I.D. Public Safety Division staff have been providing technical advice to the department on an ad hoc basis since the initiation of the survey in September 1970. This arrangement became more formalized at the time of the acceptance of the report by the city government. Since November 1971, U.S.A.I.D./PSD has worked closely with the department implementing survey recommendations. Additionally, the technician had concurrent responsibility for assisting the Regional PolCom Chief Training Officer in establishment of the regional training academy which is now an ongoing institution.

U.S.A.I.D. provided the department with a standard police equipment package which included vehicles, weapons, communications, office, darkroom and photographic equipment and investigation equipment. Initial deliveries were made in late 1971 and the first months of 1972.

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One city police officer is currently undergoing training at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C.

The total U. S. expenditure through FY 1972 is estimated as follows:

Technicians	\$ 52,500
Commodities	78,900
Participants	<u>5,000</u>
Total	\$136,400

Joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Evaluation

An evaluation of the police improvement sub-project was conducted February 18 through 20, 1972, to determine the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement and the recommendations contained in the survey report. It should be noted that, up until that time, the city and police department had no more than ninety days to initiate action on recommended changes.

The following reflects progress during this brief time span:

The first increment of previously ordered project commodities was received by the city in late 1971. Among the items delivered were vehicles, weapons, photographic and darkroom equipment, and office equipment.

Adequate funds were provided for custom's clearance and delivery of the commodities to the city from Manila. Since the arrival of the commodities, they have been used exclusively by the police department on official business. None has been diverted to use other than that intended. A records and accounting procedure for these commodities has been established in the department. The use of index and ledger cards has been introduced.

Neither the City Mayor nor the City Council has taken action which is inconsistent with or contrary to the terms and conditions of the sub-project agreement.

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The department does not now have its own training unit. Staff members attend police training at the PolCom regional academy. Eighty-seven members have been trained through March 1972.

Currently, there is no "on-the-job" training by the department for participants attending police training at the PolCom academy. To correct this situation, the Chief of Police and the Chief Training Officer of the academy have asked PolCom for approval to send the trainees to the department for "on-the-job" training. Approval is anticipated in the near future.

The following table shows the extent of compliance with the recommendations in each area of activity:

Area	<u>No. of Recom- mendations</u>	<u>Implemented</u>		<u>No</u>
		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Action</u>
Organization and Administration	40	22	12	6
Personnel	10	3	2	5
Training	13	2	3	8
Patrol	26	13	4	9
Traffic	28	16	6	6
Investigation	23	8	7	8
Juvenile Control	25	-	-	25
Vice Control	16	3	2	11
Records and Identification	34	7	16	11
Police Building	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	232	91 (39%)	52 (22%)	89 (39%)

One of the principal reasons for a relatively high degree of non-compliance (39%) is due primarily to the time element plus the lack of trained staff officers to program courses of action to implement survey recommendations. Additionally, several key staff officers are approaching retirement age. Other reasons are:

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Lack of funds - a number of recommendations call for an additional appropriation of city funds for such things as: increase of salaries, acquisition of office equipment, purchase of operational equipment, improvement of records and communication services, and training of personnel.

Manpower limitations - recommendations covering the composition of some units could not be implemented for lack of trained police personnel. The proposed change in operational procedures of some divisions could not be implemented for the same reason. Unfortunately, some members of the force are used exclusively for clerical work. The number of civilian employees detailed with the department is still inadequate to permit full relief of policemen from this type of task.

Lack of basic equipment, both office and operational, also deters the implementation of some recommendations particularly, those designed to improve police methods and procedures.

In conjunction with the evaluation, a public opinion poll was conducted to gauge attitudes concerning the Zamboanga Police Department. Although only a brief period of time elapsed since the initiation of project activities, there was nevertheless a degree of awareness of the activity. Based on responses to the questionnaires distributed, public opinion regarding the Police Improvement Project in the city is highly encouraging. Of the 79 interviewees, 64 or 81%, believe that initially the project has been beneficial to the city and should, therefore, be continued. Most noted some improvement in discipline and deportment. The high visibility of communications equipment and increased mobile patrol capabilities provided by U.S.A.I.D. have had a substantially favorable impact on public opinion.

From the data gathered, it appears that the department has thus far exerted considerable effort in the implementation of recommendations. Of the total of 232 recommendations, 91 or about 39% have already been fully complied with. This does not include the

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52 other recommendations, or about 22%, which are only considered partially implemented. Altogether, a total of 143 recommendations, or about 61% have already been partially or completely implemented.

Among the achievements noted up to the time of the joint evaluation were the following:

Following the receipt of the survey report, November 16, 1971, the Police Department was reorganized functionally into two main bureaus, administrative and services bureau and operations bureau. Some anticipated and expected problems of adjustment were experienced; namely, fitting old key personnel into a new streamlined organizational structure. Initially, this resulted in an attitude that the changes would be temporary in nature.

However, on March 6, 1972, a new Police Chief was appointed. He is a retired Army Colonel with a distinguished military career. He possesses the confidence of the community which he claims as his home city.

Discussions with individual policemen of the department give the impression that now common belief in the ranks is the Chief intends to continue to effect needed changes and these will be permanent in nature.

Although in office only one month, the Chief has strengthened the patrol staff by cutting personnel from the headquarter's staff and reassigning them to precinct commanders with instructions to get them on the street.

He insists all personnel wear the proper police uniform while on duty. He personally followed through on the distribution of newly received equipment to assure that it would be issued first to precincts, where needed, and then to headquarters staff.

Selective traffic enforcement is being tried now in the business district on principal streets and at busy intersections. A concerted effort by the patrol and traffic divisions is being made to jointly enforce traffic laws at peak hours at specific locations.

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A training information seminar program was commenced in March 1972. These seminars are designed to instruct operators of public conveyances on the proper use of the city streets. Traffic regulations and laws are discussed and presented. This has resulted in the beginnings of better understanding between the police and drivers. As of April 1, 1972, 465 drivers have attended this driver-education program.

A U.S.A.I.D. provided radio communications net became operational mid-February 1972 and has had a definitely positive and favorable effect on the entire department. A communications room was constructed and is staffed 24-hours per day. Telephones were installed, and a large control map is being constructed.

With five far distant outlying precincts and police outposts having no previous means of communicating with headquarters, it is easy to understand the initial high rate of impact. The most distant outpost is over 45 miles from the city center. In the past, it often took several days to send a message and receive a reply. With the new U.S.A.I.D. provided equipment, it is now possible to accomplish this in minutes. Several noteworthy incidents occurred where the new communications system was utilized to apprehend criminals who might have otherwise avoided arrest.

1. On April 1, 1972, at 4:00 p.m., a woman was a victim of armed robbery at her business establishment. Witnesses described the two armed men fleeing the scene on a motorcycle. Police were notified; all stations were alerted and appropriate instructions and descriptions were given. The radio message was received at an outpost approximately 10 miles from the scene and a roadblock was established. When an alert patrolman observed two men riding on a motorcycle approaching his checkpoint, he moved to halt them for questioning.

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On seeing him the men stopped the motorcycle some distance from the policeman and ran into a coconut grove. He chased them and subsequently caught one of the suspects. The suspect named his partner who was taken into custody the following day. The weapon was found and ₱200.00 of the stolen ₱800.00 was recovered.

2. A separate case occurred a few days later. About 11:00 p.m., a small boy came running into a precinct station 12 miles from police headquarters reporting a multiple rape was being committed in a nearby barrio. Nine men were reported raping a young girl.

A police radio call was made from the precinct station requesting assistance. Policemen were dispatched to the scene and had three suspects in custody by 5:00 a.m. the following morning.

In addition to headquarters and precinct installations, radio equipment has been placed in two U.S.A.I.D. furnished sedans, plus three old jeeps used by patrol and detective divisions. This provided the first radio patrol operation in the cities history.

The tone and attitude of the city administration is most favorable towards supporting the development of an outstanding police organization. The Mayor and Vice-Mayor are sincere in their desire to provide funding and other needed support for the police.

The U.S.A.I.D./PolCom Trust Fund Agreement has been explained to the Mayor by the Regional Advisor. He indicates the city will consider use of this medium to further equip the police with needed commodities complementing the Police Improvement Project.

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City-Police Budget

The following is the city and police budget for the past three years:

	<u>City</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1969	6,629,046	907,210	13.7%
1970	8,020,000	1,032,214	12.9%
1971	8,567,529	1,083,014	12.1%

Crime Statistics

Due to the lack of adequate uniform crime statistics reporting prior to U.S.A.I.D./PolCom activity with the department, complete data is not available. The only statistics available concerning reported crime are shown below:

(From July 1, 1970, to December 31, 1971)

<u>Period Covered</u>	<u>Offenses Reported</u>	<u>No. Cleared by Arrest</u>	<u>Percentage Cleared</u>
July - Dec. 1970	2,821	1,466	51.9
Jan. - Dec. 1971	4,669	2,706	57.9

Personnel

At the time of the survey, the department had an authorized strength of 230 sworn members. Actual onboard strength was 207. However, at the time of the joint evaluation, the authorized strength level had increased to 248 with 238 actually on board. An authorized strength of 298 men is in the planning stage. The following is a breakdown of departmental manpower by rank. Augmenting this level are ten civilian employees:

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Rank

Chief of Police	1
Deputy Chief of Police	1
Police Captain	5
Police Lieutenant	7
Police Sergeant	16
Police Corporal	19
Patrolman First Class	32
Patrolman	<u>157</u>
Total	238

City Project Support

The City of Zamboanga provided the following sums to support project activity:

Equipment Purchases	₱ 3,357
Personnel Salary	90,762
Building Improvements	<u>30,000</u>
Total	₱124,119 = \$19,454) (₱6.38 = \$1.00)

This sum was committed during the first 90 days of formal project activity and is a visible example of the serious intent of the city and police department to improve police capabilities.

Davao City Setting

Davao City is said to have the largest area of any "city" in the world, and it is probably unique among the cities of the world in having "unexplored" areas within its borders. The population today is approximately 392,475.

Davao City has the large nearby hinterland of intensive agriculture in the Davac River valley and logging operations in the forests.

Though Davao City has the largest number of industrial establishments and employees on the island of Mindanao, the industrial base is comparatively small.

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The city has grown very rapidly and there has been a heavy population influx without adequate measures to provide for the increase. Many of the new arrivals move into low-standard squatter facilities, and large sections of the city today display this characteristic. Some of these squatter sections are slowly being transformed by the building of more permanent structures.

Some of the downtown commercial areas are heavily congested; crowded factories and slum tenements are housed in low-standard buildings with the result that several disastrous fires have occurred. Some of these areas are being rebuilt with new and modern buildings. The establishment of an enlarged industrial sector will considerably augment the employment opportunities of the community.

The lack of an adequate highway system severely handicaps local and regional transportation within Davao City and throughout Mindanao. Davao City, with a total land area of 7,387 square miles, has at present only 75 miles of first class roads of which only 12.5 miles are concrete paved. Large portions of the city are totally inaccessible by automobile.

Davao City has one of the three trunk line airports in Mindanao,<sup>1/</sup> as designated by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which is a major termination point for flights from Manila to the south, and is the hub of local flights within south-central Mindanao.

Davao City is a major shipping center for both inter-island and oceangoing vessels.

Major export items include logs, copra, coconut oil, hemp, ramie, plywood and veneer.

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<sup>1/</sup> The others are Zamboanga and Cagayan de Oro

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### Project Activities

This activity is in its infancy. Difficulties were encountered by U.S.A.I.D. and PolCom in negotiating terms of the program with the City Mayor who was replaced only in January of 1972. Since August 1971, a resident advisor, servicing the entire Mindanao Region, has been in place in Davao City. In addition to the regional police improvement activities, he is concurrently working closely with the PolCom Chief Training Officer in the establishment of the South Mindanao Regional Training Academy. Ground has been broken and hopefully the facility will be operational by mid-1972.

A sub-project agreement between PolCom and the city was signed on January 18, 1972, and the survey of the department conducted the following month by a joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom team. Observations made during the survey are presently being documented and drafting of the report is currently underway.

### Administration and Organization

To project a better understanding of the police climate and what problems face the police improvement program in this city, a brief comment on the office of the Chief of Police is offered.

The Police Department has experienced extreme difficulty establishing itself as a competent and respected law enforcement agency. A contributing factor is the fact that twelve police chiefs have held this office over the past 20 years. The resulting fragmentation of command and inherent weaknesses in supervision of the organization are easily understood. The Davao police have thus suffered serious and continuous setbacks in terms of professional progress. Since January 1972, two persons have occupied the office of Chief, and it is anticipated that a third will be named by June 1972.

The current and newly elected city Mayor occupied the office of Chief of Police for two years (1968 through 1970). He was succeeded by a man who

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apparently was a close friend of the previous Mayor (1970 - 1972). In February 1972, the new Mayor appointed the Deputy Chief to this position. This is a known interim appointment and was made on a sentimental basis in recognition of 34 years service.

City Mayor Luis Santos indicated his intentions of appointing, as permanent Chief of Police, Major Virgilio Javier, formerly Chief of Digos, Davao del Sur and currently Chief Training Officer, Pol/Com regional academy, Davao. Major Javier may well be the required ingredient to pull this department together. He is a graduate of the International Police Academy, Washington, D.C., possesses good administrative leadership ability, is well-qualified and career minded. Further, he is a no-nonsense type of man.

Presently, the department is handicapped by lack of an effective organizational structure. Although the Chief states the department is organized according to PolCom concepts, this in actuality is not the case. In effect, the Chief does not have an organization. There exists a hodge-podge system of every division, bureau and numerous small unit police commanders reporting directly to the Chief. This effectively prevents any progress that could be brought about through sound administration, operation and management practices. It also results in these subordinate commanders competing across the board for funds and manpower on a personal basis rather than one of need.

The present Mayor is a very strong-willed individual and apparently does not tolerate corrupt police methods. He enjoys a good reputation of being an outstanding supporter of peace and order and the area's number one crime fighter which has followed him from the time he was Chief of Police. He will probably play a most significant role in the development of the future police improvement project.

The Mayor, Vice-Mayor and city council are most anxious to modernize and professionalize the police and clean up Davao. Presently, there is a total of

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430 police personnel. Funding arrangements are being finalized to allow the hiring of 50 additional men.

In summary, given the favorable climate that now exists within the city government and the police department, U.S.A.I.D. and Pol/Com should move forward, as rapidly as possible, in completing the survey report. It should be placed in the hands of city officials without delay so that the implementation of recommendations can begin.

There is a great deal that needs doing to bring the Davao Police Department up to a satisfactory level of performance. Serious consideration should be given to continuance of this sub-project activity beyond the end of FY 1973.

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## C. COMMUNICATIONS

### Background

The telecom efforts of the Public Safety Division, U.S.A.I.D., actually began in 1957 at which time 20 SSB radios were procured for the NBI to establish an inter-provincial network. Between 1957 and early 1966, the communications input to the Philippines by the U.S.A.I.D. appeared, principally in the form of excess property. In the latter part of 1966, the U.S.A.I.D. supplied nine UHF radios to the Manila Police Department in order to establish a "Metropol" network linking specific cities and municipalities within the greater Manila area. During the period 1957 - 1966, the PSD staff did not include a full-time direct hire communications advisor. Several TDY's were required to conduct surveys and supervise installations. They were performed by draw-downs on OPS/W and other mission assets. Total commodity support throughout this period did not exceed \$40,000.

In 1966, a team of Public Safety specialists assembled from other Missions and OPS/W staff conducted an in-depth survey of "Philippine Law Enforcement" and published a report so entitled.<sup>1/</sup> In summary, serious communications shortages were found to exist at all levels of police activity. It was recommended that a permanent advisor be assigned and that specific program objectives be targeted. (See Project Objectives). A permanent Communications Advisor arrived in September, 1967, however, at that time no budget existed for commodities.

During early 1968, considerable effort was expended in the area of integration of all existing law enforcement facilities into a single system but it soon became obvious that the most serious communications problems in the Republic could be divided into two areas:

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<sup>1/</sup> Walton, Frank et al

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1. Intra-provincial networks which would link isolated municipalities within specific provinces.
2. Intra-municipal police radio systems consisting of mobile, portable and point-to-point communications.

It was decided that PSD would concentrate on the above and in late 1968, the first significant budgetary support to the Public Safety Program in the Philippines was secured. With this support, a group of radios was purchased which helped establish the "Rizal Pilot Project". Seven municipalities within the greater Manila area were selected as project sites, and therein, basic municipal police communications systems were built. Between 1969 and 1972, ten additional city/municipal networks have been established. (Annex I)

Additional budgetary support was secured and with it began the Provincial Law Enforcement Communications System (PROVLECS) program, which since 1969 has been given top priority within the PSD telecom efforts. PROVLECS are basic radio networks in which a transceiver is placed in each municipality of selected provinces. Included is a single radio at the Office of the Provincial Governor, the Provincial PC Command, and the regional Office of the National Bureau of Investigation.

To date, 25 PROVLECS have been established, which collectively serve more than 573 city and municipal police departments throughout the Philippines. Each PROVLECS is self-sustaining with maintenance facilities and technicians. (Annex J).

#### Project Objectives

The virtual non-existence of intra-provincial and municipal law enforcement communications facilities has seriously limited the effectiveness of local police forces. As late as 1969, throughout the entire Republic, there was not a single province in which a responsive, dependable, law enforcement communications system had been installed, commercial

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facilities, if available at all, were totally inadequate. Urgent communications were accomplished by courier. Equally serious was the lack of mobile, portable and outpost communications facilities. In the greater Manila area alone, police departments in municipalities adjacent to one another experienced inter-agency communications problems. As the telecom project was originally conceived in 1966/1967, the following tasks were targeted:

1. Integration of all existing long-range Law Enforcement Communications Systems (LECS).
2. Improve liaison and information exchange between civil and national law enforcement agencies.
3. Establish a single nationwide law enforcement teletype network (LETS).
4. Establish provincial law enforcement voice communications nets.
5. Establish municipal/city/strategic barrio/communications in selected areas.
6. Establish coast watch networks in strategic locations.
7. Improve NBI communications capabilities at provincial level.
8. Establish provincial maintenance and training facilities.
9. Conduct operational training seminars. Law enforcement radio operations.
10. Train maintenance personnel.

However, it soon became obvious that too many adverse factors affected the probability of achievement of all ten objectives. U.S.A.I.D./PSD and the Philippine Government both faced personnel and budgetary limitations, also; the Philippine Government expressed

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intense interest in several stated objectives and only minimal interest in others. It was determined that a realistic revision of project objectives should be undertaken which would allow maximum emphasis to be placed on resolving the most critical communications shortages. Program objectives were, therefore, revised as follows:

1. Establishment of Provincial LECS.
2. Establishment of Provincial/Municipality/city LECS.
3. Establishment of maintenance facilities.
4. Training of technical and operational personnel.

Since FY 1969, virtually all of U.S.A.I.D./PSD's communications budget and efforts have been in support of the above-mentioned four tasks.

#### Project Management

Ten steps in project implementation are set forth in figure 19. Action on the part of U.S.A.I.D./PolCom or the local government is required as indicated. An overall time frame limitation of 90 days is used during which the first eight steps must be completed prior to the first input of U.S.A.I.D. provided commodities, step nine.

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FIGURE-- 19

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>ACTION AGENCY</u>		
	<u>U.S.A.I.D.</u>	<u>PolCom</u>	<u>Local Govt.</u>
1. Conference	*	*	*
2. Board Resolution			*
3. Project Agreement		*	*
4. Technical Survey	*	*	
5. Radio Technicians Recruitment/Examinations	*	*	
Appointment/Contract			*
Training	*	*	
6. Training - Operational		*	
7. Antenna Masts Manufacture			*
Installation			*
8. Storage Battery Procurement			*
Charging			*
9. System Installation	*	*	
Evaluation	*	*	
10. Turnover	*	*	*

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The serious intent of the participating provinces, cities and municipalities is shown by the fact that there were only three instances of the deadlines not being met. These provinces were rescheduled and are now on target. There have been consistently more local government entities requesting to participate in the LECS sub-project than could be accommodated by the limited U.S.A.I.D. funds available since the inception of the Internal Security Project.

### Achievements

As relates to the proposed integration of existing long-line facilities and establishment of teletype capability, little evidence of progress exists except that a comprehensive report including a multiphase implementation plan was compiled by U.S.A.I.D./PSD and forwarded to the President of the Republic for review and action. The integration concept was wholeheartedly accepted but for a number of reasons, this plan was never implemented. In fact, most of the Law Enforcement agencies mentioned in the 1966 Walton Report still operate separate long line systems. It appeared that integration of these was not possible in the foreseeable future, thus, PSD redirected its attention to other project activities, especially municipal and provincial LECS.

U.S.A.I.D. has not supported further duplication of existing long lines, but rather concentrated in areas in which local level communications were virtually non-existent.

#### 1. Provincial LECS

Twenty-five integrated Provincial LECS have been established. A total of 573 city and municipal police departments are being served by these networks. By mid-1972, this figure will reach the mid-30's Subject to availability of funds, a total of 55 PROVLECS will have been established by July 1973.

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2. Municipal/City

A total of 17 basic municipal police communications have been established. A project is presently underway with Olongapo City<sup>1/</sup> and Davao.

3. Personnel

Operational - More than 3,500 men and women have attended a three-day operational training seminar which precedes the installation of provincial and municipal LECS.

Technical - More than 75 technicians have completed six weeks of intensive training designed to prepare them to maintain specific types of radios utilized in the U.S.A.I.D. program.

4. Maintenance Facilities

Twenty-five provincial service depots have been established. An additional six have been established in municipalities which received sufficient commodity support to warrant a self-contained maintenance facility.

5. Greater Manila Area

The Metropol network, established in 1966, has been improved and expanded to include the capitals of six provinces surrounding the greater Manila area.

The following, figure 20, lists Province and City/Municipal LECS completed, underway and planned for the life of the sub-project activity.

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<sup>1/</sup> Scheduled for completion, Mid-April, 1972

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PROVINCIAL LECS

<u>Completed (25)</u>	<u>In Process (10)</u>	<u>Proposed Through CY 1973 (20)</u>
Albay	Abra	Aklan
Agusan	Davao N.	Antigue
Bataan	Davao Or.	Batanes
Batangas	Ifugao	Bontoc
Benguet	Mindoro Or.	Cagayan
Bulacan	Misamis Occ.	Capiz
Camarines N.	Palawan	Catanduanes
Camarines S.	Pampanga	Cotabato
Camiguin	Pangasinan	Davao Sur
Cavite	Sorsogon	Ilocos Sur
Cebu		Isabela
Cotabato S.		Leyte Sur
Ilocos N.		Masbate
Iloilo		Mindoro Occ.
Laguna		Nueva Viscaya
Lanao N.		Samar Norte
La Union		Samar Eastern
Leyte		Surigao N.
Marinduque		Zamboanga N.
Misamis Or.		Zamboanga S.
Negros Occ.		
Nueva Ecija		
Rizal		
Tarlac		
Zambales		

CITY/MUNICIPAL LECS

Completed (17)

Bacolod City	Las Pinas	Paranaque
Baguio	Legaspi	San Juan
Cagayan de Oro	Mandaluyong	Silay City
Cebu	Marikina	Tacloban
Iligan	Navotas	Zamboanga
	Olongapo	
	Pasig	
Davao*		

\* Initiated

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The following are a representative cross sample of improved law enforcement reactions which are directly attributed to the LECS nets established utilizing U.S.A.I.D. provided communications equipment:

ZAMBALES

Susy Butler kidnapper apprehended by search teams which coordinated search through LECS.

Disaster relief team utilized LECS to organize aid stricken areas. Food and medical supplies flown in.

Carnappers - Many cases have been reported wherein LECS has been instrumental in recovery of stolen vehicles, often within minutes.

LEYTE

Stolen Property subject apprehended in nearby municipality, while in act of selling items. Elapsed time, two hours.

Accident - Several persons injured in bus accident. Flash alert summons rescue vehicles and ambulances from three municipalities.

Fire - Municipality of Dulag, requested and received fire fighting equipment from adjacent municipalities. Help arrived in time to prevent a conflagration.

Typhoon - Remote municipalities warned of typhoon. Following typhoon LECS coordinated activities of relief teams.

Stolen Pump Boat - returned to owner, having been located in municipality in other side of province.

NEGROS

1400 police and public safety related messages handled in 1971.

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Hit and Run - Witnesses describe auto, alarm flashed through LECS. Driver apprehended speeding through nearby municipality.

Dissidents - LECS accredited with major role in coordinating activities of anti-dissident teams who captured several suspects.

Robbery - Suspects apprehended within thirty minutes of committing crime. Articles returned to owner.

Carnapers - Flash alarms, notify all municipal police departments throughout province. Numerous vehicles recovered.

### BULACAN

Cattle rustling - Many cases reported wherein stolen cattles reported through LECS, have been returned. Special cattle description has been designed and is utilized in reporting cattle thefts.

Fresh water fish farms - suffered extensive losses due to theft. Radio equipped police patrols reduced losses to near zero.

Provincial Development - Prior to LECS, official correspondence and/or messages required couriers. Provincial Governor reports LECS saves his government thousands of pesos annually.

Hi-jacking - Virtually eliminated on main roads, due to radio equipped patrols.

### Training

Early in 1968, PSD and PolCom undertook the task of preparing within the PolCom Communications and Electronics Division (CED), a cadre which would, in turn, train the operational and technical personnel required to support the various telecom projects that would follow. At least half of CED's staff of 24 are now utilized as instructors. Though this figure may appear inadequate in view of the training accomplishments listed below, it should be pointed out that the

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services of a wide variety of instructors from other Philippine Government agencies, technical institutes, ex-participants and the private sector are utilized regularly. As of March 31, the following have been trained:

Operators - 3,500                      Maintenance Technicians - 75

Since 1968, all training has been conducted in the Philippines. The most recent participants to attend training in the U. S. were one man each from the National Bureau of Investigation and Manila Police Department. These men attended a Telecommunications Management Course which terminated in early 1968. Both regularly assisted in CED's training efforts. Except for possibly a single telecom management slot, no participant training program is anticipated in the near future because the present local training program produces a sufficient quality of highly capable repairmen. CED course content can be seen in Annex K. Technical training requires six weeks and is held in PolCom's CED facility at Fort Bonifacio.

Provinces/cities recruit at least two qualified communications maintenance technicians. They are required to execute a two-year service contract before being sent to Fort Bonifacio for specialized training related to the equipment to be installed. Training offered is practical. Students assemble needed test equipment from kit form so that when items are placed in the repair facility the technician will know how to service and maintain his equipment. During the six weeks period technicians conduct complete inspection and alignment procedures on the actual radio equipment he will be required to install. Thus technical personnel return to the province with confidence and full knowledge of equipment he is expected to maintain. Emphasis is placed on practical experience.

Operational training is conducted locally, generally in the provincial capitol. It is required that each municipality within the province send at least three uniformed men to attend the three-day seminar. Two identical three-day seminars are held in succession in order to allow small municipalities to accomplish the three-person minimum.

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### Counterpart Activities

The fact that there is no single national civil police force in the Philippines necessitated the establishment of a Communications and Electronics Department (CED) within the Police Commission (PolCom), the U.S.A.I.D./PSD's counterpart agency in order to administer this project. CED is headed by an Assistant Commissioner for Communications who also functions as direct counterpart to the U.S.A.I.D./PSD Telecom Advisor. Additionally, a staff of 23 technical, administrative and training personnel perform the duties of training operational and technical personnel, supervising the actual installations of LECS and numerous other details.

CED's average annual budget represents the total national government support required to administer the LECS project. All other costs, installations, local technician's salaries, physical facilities, etc., are borne by the local governments who participate in the LECS project.

### LECS Funding

A noteworthy factor in the telecommunications sub-project is the financial contribution of participating Philippine governmental agencies at the provincial, city and municipal level. Annexes L and M show, by location, the funds provided to support the system installation by both U.S.A.I.D. and the cooperating agencies. Included is a percentile figure for the counterpart contribution. The percentages range from a high of 68% for Agusan to a low of 12% for Marikina. Overall, the average for provincial and PolCom contributions is 40.2% or \$134,923.12 as opposed to the U.S.A.I.D. contribution of \$328,316.28. City/municipal and PolCom contributions represent 24% of the overall cost or \$24,195.73 while U.S.A.I.D. provided \$98,111.08.

The higher percentage factor reflected for provincial contribution is principally due to the fact that cities generally do not have a capital outlay for the maintenance facility. In actual practice, the shop established at provincial level is used

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for maintenance service by cities. However, a selected few of the larger cities, where work load warrants, are beginning to establish their own facilities.

#### Trust Fund

In addition to the provincial/city expenditures cited above, there is an increasing interest in the use of a Trust Fund Agreement. This fund is established with the PolCom as the focal point for all provincial/city requests for participation. When it is determined that the request has merit, the local government deposits a sum of pesos or dollars with the PolCom who, in turn, deposit it with the U.S.A.I.D. in a special trust fund. PIO/C's or purchase orders are then prepared citing the fund as source of payment. PolCom receives the commodities and distributes them to the recipient for ultimate use. To date, five provinces/cities have participated in the trust fund purchasing \$24,484 worth of communications commodities in the United States.

Annex N lists the total A.I.D. financed commodity input by item for fiscal years 1968 through 1971. Annex O reflects dollar expenditures for these items.

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#### D. RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION

##### Records Sub-Project

The purpose of this sub-project is to assist the GOP in the establishment of a series of law enforcement information systems. Key among these is the computer based information processing system that will provide the basis for long-range planning and decision making for the Police Commission.

The sub-project includes Technical Support under which priority is given to development of a computer based management information system for effective planning and implementation of the law enforcement program for the government; increased responsiveness of the Police Commission service-oriented systems to the needs of its customers, the police; information being made available to national and local police agencies requiring it; and the Police Commission developing a management approach to problem solving utilizing contemporary management techniques, i.e., Management by Objectives or GPOI. (Goals, purposes, objectives, indicators).

Commodity support under the sub-project has consisted of fingerprint card filing cabinets, index card filing cabinets, key punch machines, IBM type punch cards, Burster/Collator, imprinter and selected auxiliary computer equipment, collator, microfilm equipment, and limited office equipment to the PolCom for use at the National Computer Center.

Statements that follow, in regard to each sub-project, reflect the goals and objectives for each sub-project, past activities, current status, accomplishments, problems and recommendations for future action.

##### Crime Statistics Sub-Project

Purpose - The purpose of this sub-project is to develop a single nationwide crime reporting system that will enable national and local law enforcement entities to measure and analyze the volume and trends of crime within the Philippines.

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Progress to Date - Prior to 1966, the National Bureau of Investigation collected from each police department in the Republic a series of listings of persons arrested. From this information, national crime statistics were developed. Through discussions with the NBI statistician, it was determined that a great deal of summation at the NBI was required to make the statistics meaningful. A committee composed of personnel from the NBI was drawn together to review the needs for a uniform crime reporting system. The committee prepared, and the Director of the NBI approved, a series of forms that would:

1. Report the total volume of all crime, municipal ordinances, special laws and Revised Penal Code;
2. Briefly analyze selected offenses; and
3. Report, by sex, all arrests.

The series of forms and a manual on crime reporting and arrest statistics were prepared by the NBI and distributed to all contributing law enforcement agencies throughout the Republic. The forms were then incorporated in the Police Manual of the Philippines, Chapter 15. Approximately six months later, a second system was begun by the Philippine Constabulary. This program canceled the Police Commission case report, a supplemental report and a continuation page, however, it did not cancel the former NBI Uniform Crime Reporting System. The net result of this has been confusion in the presentation of nationwide crime statistics.

Today, the NBI no longer provides nationwide crime statistics. The Police Commission is now preparing national and metropolitan Manila crime statistics as is the PC national crime statistics section. The PC program, however, is in need of operating funds which has inhibited its operations.

An agreement was reached in 1970 between the PolCom and U.S.A.I.D./PSD to produce 10,000 copies of the original NBI crime statistics manual. The reprint was revised as a PolCom document and the reissuance of this document to local police departments has

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enabled the PolCom to provide base line national crime statistics information.

Before a truly professional crime reporting system can be fully developed, one single agency must be designated by the national government as the reporting agency for all nationwide crime statistics. The current system is highly complicated and one chief of police reported the system has increased his paper work load by 100%. It would appear that the present system is too complex for the current reporting capability and should be modified to provide a more pragmatic law enforcement oriented approach to the collection of criminal statistics. The records advisor is currently working with the PolCom to refine the present reporting system.

Future technical support will be primarily for the production of forms to be sent to the 1,500 police departments throughout the country. An evaluation should be conducted prior to the scheduled termination date of June 1973 to determine whether or not the statistics collected are effective for the purpose designated.

#### Police Selection

Purpose - To provide a continuing flow of qualified persons available for employment in all ranks of the police service.

Progress to Date - A basic police selection system has been developed and approved by the Chairman of the PolCom. Minimum qualifications for all police ranks have been developed and approved. To date (March 1972), 34,500 persons have applied to take the police service examination. Of this group, 21,000 persons qualified of which 8,000 have been certified as police service eligibilities.

A research project is now underway to determine whether or not the right people are being selected for employment. The examination given in May 1970 has been selected to determine whether or not immediate supervisors believe those persons employed as a result of the May examination are performing above or below expectations.

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### Police Commission Administrative Information Systems

Purpose - To develop a system which will enable the Police Commission to analyze and review the activities of 1,500 police department and 3,600 policemen.

Progress to Date - Profile documents for police departments and police personnel have been designed by the National Computer Center as management tools for the Police Commission. To date, some 21,000 individual policemen profiles and 900 police department profiles have been punched, processed and are available to the PolCom through the computer.

Future - It is anticipated that profiles for all policemen and police departments will be available through the computer by the end of 1973 even though data is being added to this system at a rate somewhat slower than anticipated.

### Administrative Document Processing

Purpose - To assure that all correspondence being received by the Commission will receive appropriate and expeditious action.

Progress to Date - A system has been designed to process correspondence through the Commission and implemented by a PolCom memorandum dated August 3, 1972.

The system provided for by the office memorandum must now be implemented and the working level personnel shown that this system can effectively aid them in processing internal and external correspondence.

### Microfilming

Purpose - To reduce the number of individual personnel jackets, administrative records, and other documents in order to reduce floor space requirements and yet provide immediate access for available information.

Progress to Date - Microfilming had been underway since November 1971 and an average of 1,000

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individual jackets are being microfilmed monthly. It had been estimated that 50% of the project could be completed by June 1972. Current levels of processing, however, indicate some slippage in achieving this objective.

### Research and Evaluation Program

Purpose - To provide a series of continuing reports which will evaluate the goals and effectiveness of specific programs and endeavors within the Police Commission.

Progress to Date - A series of projects have been developed for evaluation. Among these has been an evaluation of the PolCom training activity. This study indicated that there was a sufficient difference between urban and rural police activity to indicate that the emphasis should be somewhat different. An evaluation is also scheduled for the 1970 Patrolman examination.

Future - It is expected, by the end of the project, that evaluation reports will be prepared on the following subjects:

1. Retirement
2. Salary Subsidy
3. Training Requirements
4. Eligibility
5. Police Structure
6. Total Police-Personnel Salary Structure

Also, a series of monographs will be prepared on training, test development, police improvement, and communications for follow on evaluation activities.

### National Computer Center

The National Computer Center was formed in 1969 as a result of the joining of a Presidential Economic Staff computer with a building belonging to the Department of National Defense. In 1970, as a result of a law requiring the Police Commission to

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test for police service eligibility, the National Computer Center and the Police Commission began a police testing program. Today, the Computer Center is providing information systems to the Police Commission in the following areas:

- Crime Statistics
- Departmental Profile
- Salary Subsidy
- Police Testing

The Police Commission through A.I.D. has provided \$82,350 in commodity assistance to the Computer Center. The Computer Center has, in turn, provided computer time and technical assistance for the above listed programs. During 1970, approximately 120 hours of computer time was used. In 1971, 200 hours and in 1972, 90 hours has been used during the first two months. In all, 410 hours have been utilized since the program's inception. Calculated at \$400.00 per hour, \$164,000 of computer time has been made available. This is exclusive of analysts and programmers time. Since its inception, the computer operation has enabled the Police Commission to process 34,500 applications for police positions, testing 20,000 and passing 8,000 applicants.

Through the assistance of the National Computer Center, police test results have been consistently available 90 to 120 days following an examination and the Director of the Computer Center states that this time can be reduced to 30 days with the installation of a new computer in August 1972. The Civil Service Commission, however, which is responsible for testing all other applicants for Civil Service positions has a lead time on most of its administered tests from two to six years.

The Computer Center is also helping to develop long-range planning for the Police Commission through the analysis of both departmental profiles and individual policemen profiles. These analyses are intended to provide minimum standards for policemen and increase the professionalism of the police service nationwide. The following is a

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listing of the auxiliary computer equipment that has been made available to the Police Commission by U.S.A.I.D. assignment to the National Computer Center:

- 1,500,000 Universal Cards
  - 5 Key Punch Machines
  - 100 Magnetic Tapes
  - 15 Filing Cabinets for Universal Cards
- 60,000 IBM Score Sheets
  - 32 Magnetic Tape Storage Cabinets
  - 1 Burster
  - 1 Decollator
  - 1 Imprinter (Check Signing Machine)
- Miscellaneous Auxiliary Equipment.

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## VI. NARCOTICS SITUATION

### Drug Abuse

Drug addiction is believed to be a relatively new problem in the Philippines. The opium poppy is not grown in the Philippines, therefore, opium, morphine and heroin must be smuggled into the country. There have been recent reports of clandestine heroin laboratories operating in the Philippines, however, no successful raids have yet been made.

In the Manila area, most packets of heroin contain 1 to 3% pure heroin; however, in the Subic Bay area, heroin strength has been rated as high as 70 to 80%.

Amphetamines and barbiturates are readily available throughout the Philippines and marijuana is available in almost unlimited quantities and has a distribution system rated as good as the Coca Cola Company. The quality is not as good as that grown in Thailand or Mexico.

There has been increased activity among the youth particularly among the student youth. The use of drugs has spread rapidly from college to grade school level. A recent survey revealed that approximately 60% of the college students occasionally use marijuana and approximately 10% of the students use it on a regular basis, i.e., at least once a week. There has been widespread drug usage at the International School, also, where most of the diplomats', foreign businessmen and affluent Filipinos' children are enrolled.

It is reported that approximately 3% (of 1,700 students) have been dismissed and 3% are on probation. It is also reported that two deaths have been caused by drug usage although this has not yet been confirmed by the school officials.

Drugs are relatively cheap throughout the Philippines. The market prices, as of March, 1972, were as follows:

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Opium	₱8.60 per gram of 5% purity
Morphine	₱60.00 per gram of 24% purity
Heroin	₱35.00 per gram of 5% purity
Marijuana	
Plants	₱50.00 per plant
Marijuana	
Leaves	₱2.00 per stick
Mandrax	₱1.00 to ₱3.00 per tablet
Seconal	₱0.80 to ₱2.00 per tablet

GOP officials now estimate that there are 100,000 drug users in the Philippines with about 10,000 persons addicted. Of these, approximately 70-75% are addicted to heroin.

In April, 1972, the Seventh Congress of the Philippines passed an Act known as the "Dangerous Drug Act of 1972". This Act was immediately signed into law by President Marcos who also, at that time, called for strong enforcement measures against violators of the law. The law is quite comprehensive and calls for up to the death penalty for "pushers" administering drugs that cause death to the receiver.

#### Enforcement

President Marcos has directed that all law enforcement agencies increase their efforts against the trafficking and use of narcotics and dangerous drugs. However, at the present time, little enforcement capability exists within the law enforcement agencies.

The following is the NBI enforcement record:

1963	31 cases
1964	39 cases
1965	183 cases
1967	190 cases
1968	96 cases
1970	146 cases

The Manila Police Department records reflect the following arrests for narcotics violations.

1968	344
1969	387
1970	365
Total	<u>1,096</u>

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The Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary arrests records reflect the following:

1968	22
1969	18
1970	<u>20</u>

Total 60

#### Local Police

The Manila Police Department is increasing its narcotics investigative unit from 30 to 100 officers and many other city and municipal police departments are expanding their total enforcement efforts. Selected officers from local police departments will attend a specialized two week narcotic investigation course scheduled for early in June 1972. The course will be a cooperative effort between the Police Commission, U.S.A.I.D./PSD and BNDD representatives from Washington. BNDD training staff officers will conduct the course. NBI, Customs, PC and other national agencies will have officers in attendance.

#### National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

The Bureau has five officers assigned full time to the Narcotics Investigation Unit at headquarters. Agents assigned to the seventeen field offices also enforce the narcotic statutes. Early in 1971, two agents of the Bureau were killed in action as they raided a marijuana plantation. The Bureau needs to greatly increase its enforcement arm and become more aggressive in combating production and trafficking.

#### Philippine Constabulary

Until recently, the PC had no particular section to handle this enforcement activity. It had only a few men knowledgeable in narcotics enforcement until February 1972 when a 100 man narcotics enforcement task force was organized. The task force personnel underwent a comprehensive four-week investigation course in March 1972 and it is anticipated that field operational equipment will be procured for the task force in the near future. The Constabulary also plans

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a national educational campaign to inform the public about the dangers of drug usage and abuse.

Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC)

ASAC was created by executive order on February 24, 1966. The President directed ASAC to organize the National Action on Anti-Smuggling Activities. ASAC has two task forces and three border crossing stations in the south. The border stations serve to gather and disseminate information on suspected vessels and routes used by smugglers in infiltrating into the country from Southeast Asian areas. To further strengthen anti-smuggling activities, the Philippine Constabulary created a unit known as Constabulary Off Shore Anti Crime Group (COSAC) in the greater Manila area to patrol the coastline of the Manila Bay and to enforce the anti-smuggling laws.

In the past five years, ASAC has arrested 140 persons on narcotic violations, however, only 12 were convicted.

Smuggling is a very profitable enterprise and enforcement agencies find few people who are willing to risk their life to inform on smugglers. An effort is being made, however, to develop a reward system whereby informants receive money based upon the importance of the case.

Today, throughout the Philippines, there is great concern about the drug abuse problem. In the area of narcotics, perhaps more than in any facet of law enforcement, people appear to be willing to work together to eradicate this menace to society.

The official U. S. community has taken an aggressive role in response to President Nixon's initiatives in the war against narcotics. The U. S. Mission organization brings together all elements of the community in a concerted effort to bear on the problem. The Chief Public Safety Advisor has been designated by the U. S. Ambassador as the U. S. Mission Drug Coordinator and, as such, he spends about 80% of his time on narcotics matters. The U.S.A.I.D. has responded with a proposed program

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to support the local police in their drive against narcotics abuse. The proposal also provides for assistance to those GOP agencies concerned with drug education and rehabilitation of offenders. The U.S.A.I.D. submitted its Non-Capital Project Paper (PROP) to A.I.D./W on March 22, 1972, and it is still under consideration in A.I.D./W as of this writing.<sup>1/</sup>

The Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs PROP addresses the problem and is directed especially toward the enforcement phase. Cooperation among government, business, civic and religious organizations is excellent. A concerted effort should lessen the local and international problem.

The team considers the positive action taken by the U. S. Mission in this important matter as commendable and wishes to record its support for early implementation of the courses of action proposed in the PROP.

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<sup>1/</sup> A copy of the Narcotics PROP is on file in OPS/W

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## VII. CONCLUSIONS

In arriving at its conclusions, the team drew upon its observations of on-site project activities, conducted extensive analysis of file data and held numerous discussions with both United States and Government of the Philippines (GOP) officials. These activities gave the team the perspective from which the following conclusions are made.

As noted earlier, the present Public Safety Project with the GOP began in 1968 and is scheduled to phase out in June 1973. The project's focus was directed toward the improvement of the police capability in four basic areas of police activity; namely (1) training, (2) general police improvement, (3) communications, and (4) records. The project activities, while coordinated at the National level, reached out into the provinces where they touched the grass roots policeman and thus the average citizen far removed from the national Manila metropole are the beneficiaries of much improved police service.

The team believes that the project to date has been quite successful, and that the high degree of accomplishment of project objectives is directly related to (1) the judicious application of good management techniques throughout the life of the project by both the Public Safety and U.S.A.I.D./Philippines staffs, (2) the fine quality of the technical advisory inputs, and (3) the high degree of receptivity on the part of the GOP which is exemplified by its inputs of significant amounts of financial and human resources.

Essentially, project accomplishments in the four mentioned disciplines have been as follows:

### Training

Nine police training academies have been built by the Philippine Government and are now going institutions capable of providing basic police training for about 4,000 police officers each year. The academies are strategically located throughout the Philippines in order to be most responsive to the training needs of the local police forces.

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While providing training at the basic level is the immediate goal, it is only one of several objectives of the training activity. Specialized training programs are now being developed, geared to investigations and supervisory and command personnel, as well as in-service training for all police officers on a regularly scheduled basis. The development of this indigenous training capability has been made possible largely through the application of skills learned at the Office of Public Safety International Police Academy by key police officers now assigned to the police academies. Seven of the nine chief training officers at the academies are returned participants.

#### Police Improvement

Eight of the nine planned model city police improvement programs have been implemented. The ninth project with the city of Davao is just now getting underway. Each of the cities chosen for the police improvement activity are contiguous to the location of the police academies. This plan was based upon the concept that the model cities would provide on-the-job training opportunities for police officers in attendance at the academies. Prior to any implementation activity, each of the model cities was surveyed and its strengths and weaknesses identified. Survey reports on each of the cities have been prepared, and these serve as the basis for follow-on implementing actions.

#### Communications

Provided a reliable means of communications, where none previously existed at the intra-provincial level. This essentially tied in the provincial government capital with all the police agencies within the province. Using the low cost Office of Public Safety designed VHF/FM family of tactical communications equipment, vital communications links between all civil law enforcement agencies are now in existence in twenty-five provinces. Additionally, ten provinces are now in the implementation stage for installation of communications equipment. They should be completed by June 1972.

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Twenty more provincial systems, for a total of 55, are planned for completion by the end of June 1973. Seventeen city/municipal systems are also fully operational.

### Records

The thrust of the activity has been directed toward a general improvement of law enforcement information systems encompassing both local and national police agencies. A series of forms and a manual on crime reporting and arrest statistics has been prepared and distributed throughout the Philippines resulting in a uniform system of crime reporting. The advisor of this project also has been most effective in establishing improved personnel records and introducing good records management practices at the national level. For instance, the Police Commission is able to advise the results of police eligibility/promotion examinations within a 90 to 120 day period while the Philippine Civil Service Commission has a lead time on most of its administered tests from two to six years! The Civil Service Commission is now studying the Police Commission method of administering the test results with a view toward adopting the Police Commission system recommended by our advisor.

In short, the team believes the scope of the project activities and accomplishments, when weighed against the minimal United States inputs in terms of technical assistance and funding, have been most impressive. Only eight advisors have been assigned continuously to this project and their activities have touched most of the 1,482 local law enforcement agencies through the training and communications activities.

On the funding side, the total United States obligation figure since 1968 for technicians, commodities and participants is \$2.8 million while the GOP contribution has amounted to \$3.7 million. The GOP figure includes capital investment for the academy buildings, land, office equipment and associated manpower inputs.

While much has been done to improve the Philippine police capability, much remains to be done, particularly in the Manila metropolitan area. This area which has about 10 percent of the population accounts for over 50 percent

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of reported crime in the Philippines. This has a severe adverse impact on the economic and political situation in the area. Tourism is greatly affected and the rate of foreign and domestic economic investment is being inhibited. Most of the thirteen police organizations within the greater Manila area are woefully equipped to shoulder this burden in terms of equipment and technical know-how. Requests for United States assistance have been received from city officials of Manila and Quezon City (two of the core cities in the metropolitan area).

The team's recommendations, reflected later in this report, contain a proposal designed to assist the police agencies of the greater Manila area. The proposal takes cognizance of the fact that U. S. financial resources are limited and thus calls for most of the proposed U. S. expenditure to be for technical assistance while encouraging the GOP to finance most high cost commodity inputs such as vehicles and communications equipment.

Although the team concludes that the Internal Security Project has achieved a high degree of success in upgrading and professionalizing the Philippine police service, accomplishments were not attained without the development of problem areas. In the team's view, the problems noted below protracted the time frame required to accomplish the project activities and, if not corrected, may tend to inhibit the viability of initiated improvements within the police service.

#### Training - Problems

1. The authorized level of ten positions for each PolCom regional academy is considered inadequate to perform the tasks associated with each academy's operation, and several of the academies are not even staffed up to their authorized level.

The consequence is that the quality of the training received at the basic level can be suspect and the academies have been unable to provide regularly scheduled training courses for supervisory and command level personnel. The fault, it appears, lies with PolCom since it has the responsibility for ensuring an adequate staff at each training

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location.

The physical facilities, with the exception of Fort Bonifacio, also inhibit an expanded training effort into specialized and advanced training programs. The academy facilities are taxed to their limits and overcrowding is evident at each site. It is not the team's impression that the PolCom considers this problem high enough on the priority list to give it much attention and little, if any, long range planning is evident for either increasing the size of the facilities or increasing the authorized strength levels. It is also perceived that PolCom may be more interested, at this time, in training large numbers of people than in the quality level of the course presentations. It was not clear to the team that the personnel selected for assignment to the academies are selected on the basis of their potential or experience as teachers or whether expedience in most cases was the motivating factor.

2. The selection of participants for U. S. training presently rests with the PolCom with little or no influence exerted by the Public Safety staff. As a consequence of this, some police officers that are apparently logical choices for participant training are not being selected and there is a general feeling within some police circles that the selection process is being manipulated by the PolCom. The Public Safety staff are sensitive to this criticism and have taken steps to formalize their participation in the selection process by including the appropriate language in the FY 1973 ProAg.
3. Specialized and advanced training programs are not now being offered on a regularly scheduled basis. This has caused adverse comment from some superior officers since they feel they are being denied proper consideration by PolCom for training opportunities. At the present time, competing pressures for training

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opportunities has caused some disequilibrium in the system since PolCom has apparently decided it must concentrate its resources at the basic police science course. The team can't fault the PolCom reasoning since the basic course offers the most training to the largest target group, the policemen. The team has suggested, however, that a more equitable balance could be struck by the elimination of one of the four basic thirteen week courses offered each year at each academy and then substituting short term, hard impact specialized and advanced training courses.

2. Police Improvement - Problems

Given the pragmatics of negotiating project activities between U.S.A.I.D., the PolCom, and eight city governments, it becomes obvious that the successful initiation of each sub-project is subject to many inhibiting factors. These, in each instance, had to be overcome and the conditions precedent met satisfactorily. This is evident when examining the starting dates for the joint U.S.A.I.D./PolCom police department surveys. The first, Bacolod City, was initiated in September 1969 while the last, Davao, was not initiated until February 1972. The formal initiation of the Zamboanga sub-project was delayed almost one year from the date of the survey, September 1970. The survey report was not placed in the proper city/police hands until November 1971. Circumstances surrounding these last two incidents are set forth in the section of this report dealing with the police improvement project. It suffices here to note that, in each instance, where delay was experienced, personal or politically motivated differences between concerned Philippine government entities were the causative factors.

Due to a combination of circumstances, the sub-project activity at Davao was not initiated until February 1972 at which time the joint

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survey was conducted. Completion of the report of survey and approval by PolCom and the city government will probably not occur prior to June. This means that the U.S.A.I.D./PSD technical advisory input will be limited to one year of formalized support. If the activity is terminated at the end of FY 1973, the team believes it is doubtful that an acceptable level of achievement of project goals will be reached. The proper utilization of U.S.A.I.D. assets will be diminished and the development of institutionalized change will be minimal.

The same situation, to a lesser degree, exists with the Zamboanga sub-project activity. Formal relationships have existed only since November 1971. This means that by the programmed phase out date of June 30, 1973, only 18 months of technical guidance will have been provided by U.S.A.I.D./PSD.

Implementation of change in organization, administration and operation has been hampered somewhat by the lack of adequately trained staff officers. Thus the ability within each department to properly plan and implement change based on modern police administration concepts is limited. With the exception of Bacolod City and Cagayan de Oro each of which has had two officers trained, only one man from each police improvement city has received U. S. training at the International Police Academy. The team believes that additional participants from police improvement cities should have been programmed in preference to other police departments to provide needed human resources.

The "Philippine Political Climate" directly affects project activities. Where favorable, such as in Bacolod City, meaningful progress can be made with changes and improvement efforts receiving full support. However, in the case of Cebu City for example, where politically inspired differences existing

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between the City Mayor and the Chief of Police reach such proportions that intervention by placing the department under Philippine Constabulary control is considered, for all practical purposes, project activities must be suspended. The team is well aware that this type of situation is not new in the Philippine scene and that the United States Government has reluctantly learned to live with it.

During the course of discussion with various police officials, the team gained the impression that the authority of the PolCom is not universally recognized nor accepted by some of the participating city governments and police departments. Under the terms of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Police Act of 1966, PolCom was created as the national agency charged with carrying out the objectives of the act "to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization, administration and operation of local police agencies." This attitude was most noticeable in matters concerning appointment of policemen and civil service eligibility requirements and promotion. The team notes that these areas are still subject to "political considerations".

### 3. Communications - Problems

The team noted that the communications sub-project has had to revise its goals and reach a compromise as relates to scope due to funding limitations. In each LECS net established subsequent to the initial installations, the quantity of radio units provided has been reduced to the bare minimum. As an example, provision of the OPS/FM-1 hand-held transmitter was deleted from all city and municipal nets. This, in effect, denied these departments the chance to experience operating from a fixed base station to a mobile or foot patrol within its jurisdiction. The provision of even one unit, in the teams estimation, would have provided valuable experience and served

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as a catalyst for future procurement, by local governments, of additional equipment to augment the "bare bones" system provided by U.S.A.I.D.

4. Records - Problems

The team noted the lack of progress that has been made toward the achievement of a national consolidated criminal record system. Presently the NBI, the PC and the PolCom all maintain separate criminal records relating to the occurrence of crime throughout the Philippines. It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an accurate profile of crime in the Philippines because of the inter-agency nature of the present crime collection system. While it is difficult to obtain accurate data on crime in the country, there is no paucity of information available on this subject. The topic is on everyone's lips, the large metropolitan newspapers devote considerable space usually on the front pages and in the editorial columns to this subject; the NBI, PC, PolCom and Manila Police Department all have records that can be used, it seems, to support almost any thesis intended. It is not the team's intention to question the integrity of the individual police agencies reporting crime statistics but rather to point out the necessity for the development of one standard system within one national agency that will give the same values for all of the inherent variables associated with the collection, collation and analysis of criminal statistical data. The possession of accurate crime data by the police administrator is an invaluable management tool which is too important an item to leave to the haphazard nature of the present multi-agency system. Despite the present confusion resulting from different reports emanating from police bodies at the national level, i.e., NBI, PC, PolCom and MPD, there is no doubt in the team's view that crime against persons and property in the Philippines, particularly in the greater Manila area, is rising and at an alarming rate. One inherent problem in the present system concerns crime reporting from

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the local police to the national agencies which runs the range from excellent to poor. There are cities and municipalities that refuse to follow the procedures set down under rule 15 of the Police Manual in reporting crime. Some consider the paperwork too burdensome to bother with while others are lost in attempting to comprehend the instructions for reporting. In any event, PolCom must take stronger initiatives in the total spectrum of crime reporting and analysis and forcefully exercise its prerogative encompassed in its mandate to set standards leading to the professionalization of the entire Philippine police body.

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## VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Internal Security Project

As noted throughout this report, the team has acknowledged that significant accomplishments have been made in all activities associated with the Internal Security Project. The report also identifies some inhibiting factors that may mitigate against the continued viability of project initiations. Many of the improvements noted simply have not had sufficient time to reach full maturity and a premature curtailment of U. S. inputs to these police improvement activities could cause a regression in the time frame expected for total project accomplishment. The team, therefore, recommends that project activities continue as currently planned but that a reassessment of each project activity be made by the U.S.A.I.D. at least six months before the planned phase out at the end of FY 1973. One thing is certain in the team's view and that is there can be no reduction in the present staffing level of eight advisors if it is expected that the overall project goal can be reached by the scheduled phase out date.

On balance then and given the successful nature of the present ongoing Internal Security Program, the team does not believe that major shifts could or should be made in the present program's direction prior to its scheduled termination date at the end of FY 1973. It is also considered realistic to anticipate that certain project activities will not be completed by the planned phase out date. For instance, the training and police improvement programs in the Mindanao Region are just getting started and, in the team's view, the presence of the Regional Advisor in that area will be required beyond the phase out date, possibly until the end of FY 1974. The advisor in the Luzon Region may equally be committed through FY 1974 in rounding out the police improvement programs in the cities of Baguio and Legaspi as well as providing continued support to the Baguio and Legaspi Regional Training Academies. Twenty-five provincial LECS have been

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installed to date while ten more are in the early implementation stage. Twenty additional systems are being planned for FY 1973 which would round out the LECS communication activity in 55 provinces. Of the remaining twenty LECS systems, fourteen areas have been identified for installation on a priority basis while six remain as yet unidentified. FY 1972 communication PIO/C's have been submitted to A.I.D./W amounting to \$300,000 and \$150,000 is planned in FY 1973 for completion of the remaining systems. With the installation of this equipment scheduled for early FY 1973, the total number of PROVLECS in operation will be thirty-five. This leaves twenty systems to be installed to meet the stated goal of 55 PROVLECS. The team feels this schedule may be overly optimistic and that the scheduled communications activities will probably not be completed by the end of FY 1973.

B. The Proposed Public Safety Program

While the Internal Security Project, in the four years of its existence, has contributed substantially toward professionalization of the various Philippine law enforcement agencies by the achievement of project goals, the team believes a great deal more can be accomplished within the police agencies in both the provincial and Manila metropolitan areas.

The major impact of the Internal Security Project has been made at the local level in the areas of training, communications, police improvement and records. The thrust of these activities has been directed toward a regional concept and the team is confident that this was the proper direction for the program to take at the time of its implementation. Police improvement had to be effected at the local level in order to bring the project resources to the regions and consequently reach down to help the little man, far removed from the Manila metropole.

The team recommends that a priority now be given toward assisting the police forces in the greater Manila metropolitan area. This recommendation is dictated by the high crime rate which has exacerbated this adverse economic condition in the greater Manila metropolitan area. The team gave

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considerable thought to the problem of the availability of U. S. resources in order to maintain the momentum of the present project and still have some immediate resource input in the Manila area without compromising the integrity of the current project or renegeing on existing project commitments. To delay the implementation of initiatives to increase the capabilities of the greater Manila police agencies until current commitments are fulfilled at the end of FY 1973 would not, in the team's view, be consistent with the exigencies of the peace and order situation in the Manila metropolitan area. Also, new Mayors, most of whom campaigned on a strong peace and order platform, have been elected in eight of the thirteen political subdivisions comprising the greater Manila area, including the core city of Manila. Requests for U. S. public safety assistance have been received from the new Mayor of Manila and the Vice-Mayor of Quezon City. Also, Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor, often referred to as the "little president", in discussions with Mission Director Niblock on July 28, 1971, made a strong plea for continuance of public safety assistance. These initiatives of the GOP indicate strongly that the time for the initiation of actions to assist the Police forces in this area is most propitious. In discussions the team held with city officials and police officers of Manila, it was noted that they indicated more than a willingness to contribute significant financial support to any U. S. effort to assist in upgrading the Manila police.

Notwithstanding then the U.S.A.I.D.'s direct hire personnel ceiling and the reducing nature of the U.S.A.I.D. funding allotment in FY 1972 and FY 1973, the team recommends that necessary adjustments be made to permit a modest increase in both the staffing and funding levels during the FY 1973 through FY 1978 period.

The team recommends that the U. S. Government, beginning as soon as possible in FY 1973, agree to enter into negotiations with the GOP for implementation of a five year police assistance program with the nine

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municipalities and the four chartered cities that form the Manila metropolitan area. This project would have, as its objectives, the general improvement of law enforcement leading to a reduction of crime, a smoother flow of traffic, an increased communications capability, a more effective patrol, better specialized training opportunities and increased investigative capability within the Manila metropolitan area. The theme behind the Manila metropolitan area police improvement proposal embraces the concept that through the combined contributions of the 13 police agencies their individual overall operational effectiveness will be strengthened. To achieve the objectives of this proposal in the five functional activities noted above, namely traffic, communications, patrol, training, and investigations, U. S. inputs of technical assistance, commodities and participant training would be required. The magnitude of the anticipated resources is described in figure 1. The team spent considerable time in assessing the various options available for early implementation of the proposal, keeping in mind that any meaningful program in the Manila metropolitan area would, in all probability, require inputs both in technical assistance and in commodities in addition to the level committed to the current Internal Security Project. The team conceived the following plan to permit the maximum possible achievement of proposal objectives using an absolute minimum input of U. S. project resources.

The proposed plan, termed IMPAC (Intra Metropolitan Police Assistance Concept), addresses itself to the complexities of providing police assistance to the thirteen separate police entities that comprise the greater Manila area. The task is further compounded because of the pragmatics of political life in the Philippines since one or more of the municipalities could decline to participate because of political considerations or pull out after initial involvement. Figure 2 schematically presents a chart depicting the IMPAC proposal.

At first glance, it may appear that the number of organizational groups being proposed for involvement

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in the IMPAC plan could prove to be a barrier to the successful implementation of project activities and, indeed, this may be a potential problem. Precedence was set, however, by the mayors of the thirteen political subdivisions in the Manila metropolitan area with the establishment of the MMCC (Metropolitan Mayors Coordinating Committee). This is a group organized in 1970 to address such common problems as pollution, flood control and peace and order. Beyond this there is currently under discussion a plan to form a traffic council composed of the thirteen metropolitan police traffic bureau chiefs. The publisher of the Manila Times and several other prominent business groups are reportedly sponsoring this plan and intend to support the cities and municipalities in procuring traffic lights.

Step one in implementing the IMPAC proposal would be to effect an agreement among the thirteen mayors, the Governor of Rizal Province, the Police Commission, and the National Economic Council for the purpose of achieving a greater degree of police effectiveness in the greater Manila metropolitan area. The agreement would spell out the implementing actions necessary to effect change in the five functional categories of police activity noted above which have implications within each of the thirteen police agencies. This group could be identified as the Policy Group. The mechanism the team envisions for actually identifying the specific project activities, however, is below this level and is identified as the Administrative Group.

The Administrative Group is composed of the thirteen chiefs of police, the Public Safety staff and a PolCom representative organized for the purpose of coordinating and giving guidance to the next lowest echelon which would be the functional groups identified as IMPAC Staff. The functional groups would also have representation by the thirteen police entities, the Public Safety staff and the PolCom with one group for each specific project activity; communications, patrol, training, investigations and traffic. This would be the level where coordination, plans, programs and actions are implemented, and the focal point for U. S. technical assistance efforts. The Public Safety

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advisor would then work on a day-to-day basis with his respective counterparts in a Sector. The greater Manila metropolitan area has been divided into five geographical groupings known as Sectors each composed of certain cities and municipalities in the IMPAC area. Each Public Safety advisor would be responsible for assisting in implementing all five project activities within the police agencies identified in his sector, and would also assist in implementing a series of individual recommendations developed for the specific departments in his sector. The IMPAC plan would have a two-pronged approach designed to: (1) improve the individual police department, and (2) improve the total metropolitan area in five primary areas: patrol, investigation, communications, traffic and training. Secondary targets, however, may also be dealt with as required. These may include: (1) Organization/Management, (2) Records/Criminal Information Systems; (3) Jail Administration; and (4) Auxiliary Activities.

#### Staffing Implications - IMPAC

To permit ongoing project activities to continue to their logical conclusions and yet phase in the IMPAC program during FY 1973, an increase above the current staff level of eight advisors will be required for the life of the project. (See figure 3). For the implementation of the IMPAC plan, the staff level would rise to a high of twelve advisors during mid FY 1973, drop to eleven at the end of FY 1973, to ten at the end of FY 1974 and remain at 10 for the remainder of the IMPAC project. The reduction of staff at the end of FY 1973 and in FY 1974 coincided with the completion of the current Internal Security Project activities in Mindanao and Luzon and the elimination of these two positions. It is proposed, therefore, that four Generalist positions be established early in FY 1973 in order to effect early implementation of the IMPAC project while still maintaining certain current program initiatives. The rationale for the addition of the four advisors is based upon the sector concept of IMPAC implementation as described in figure 2.

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The sectors are organized according to geographic, population and police distribution within the greater Manila area. Using this formula, a minimum of five sectors have been identified. Manila, as the core city, is identified as Sector I and, because of the variety and complexity of its law enforcement problems, it would require the attention of two full time advisors to provide technical assistance in the five areas of project activity, i.e., Patrol, Investigations, Traffic, Training and Communications.

Quezon City and Marikina included in Sector III cover an extremely large geographic area and also have complex police problems which would require at least a two man advisory input. The remaining three sectors, each requiring the full time services of one advisor are broken down as follows: Sector II includes Caloocan, Malabon and Navotas; Sector IV includes Pasay, Makati and Mandaluyong; Sector V includes Pasig, Parangue and Las Pinas. Therefore, a total of seven public safety advisor generalists are needed to implement and carry the identified project activities, complemented by the on board communications, training and Chief Public Safety advisors for a total of 10 IMPAC project technicians. With two of the regional training advisors committed outside the greater Manila area through FY 1973, the remaining six on board direct hire staff located in Manila can begin the implementing actions to allow transition into the IMPAC project during the first quarter of FY 1973. The four additional technicians should be on board as early in FY 1973 as possible in order not to lose the momentum of interest expressed by city and police officials for police assistance in the greater Manila area.

#### Commodity Resource Implications - IMPAC

In arriving at the proposed commodity inputs required to support the on going activities of the current Internal Security Program and the greater Manila metropolitan area IMPAC program in FY 1973, the team has attempted to carefully tailor the commodity components to meet minimum program essentials. It was considered, also, that the U. S. can be a catalyst

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leading to the GOP assumption of an increasing share of this burden in future years.

The FY 1973 U.S.A.I.D. planning figure for the commodity component for the Internal Security Project was planned at \$280,000 to meet project commitments as follows:

\$125,000	Communications
110,000	Police Improvement for Davao (including \$10,000 for excess property)
35,000	Records and Identification
<u>10,000</u>	Training
\$280,000	Total

To permit transition into the IMPAC program, it is proposed that \$50,000 of these funds be shifted from FY 1973 planned police improvement activity. These limited funds would be used to provide an initial input of project commodities, highly visible in nature, such as vehicles and would, hopefully, stimulate early participation on the part of cooperating police departments in using surplus salary subsidy funds for commodity procurement.

Additionally, it is hoped that excess property could be made available to IMPAC in FY 1973

The commodity profile proposed for the years FY 1974 through FY 1978 was arrived at by using a formula based upon the Internal Security Project police improvement experience during the years 1968 to 1972. In each of the eight model cities included in the police improvement project, an average of \$15,000 was expended for commodities each year over the five year life of the project. The commodity package provided to each of the cities is considered by the team to have been well conceived and consistent with project activities. Of the 13 political subdivisions comprising the Manila metropolitan area, eleven approximate, in size and police strength, the eight model cities assisted under the Internal Security police improvement program. Therefore, the team recommends that each of the eleven political sub-

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divisions in the Manila metropolitan area be allocated \$15,000 per year for five years for a yearly commodity input of \$165,000. Manila and Quezon cities, because of the complexities of the peace and order problems within those cities, would require greater commodity support and the team has considered \$60,000 per year for Manila and \$50,000 per year for Quezon as appropriate to stimulate program initiatives and encourage additional procurement of major commodity items by the respective city governments. The police subsidy program, which is described elsewhere in this report, should generate sufficient local currency for the administrations to make major commodity procurements using the U.S.A.I.D. Trust Fund procedures. Manila, for example, has on hand ₱500,000 (\$78,000) that can be made available for the purchase of police equipment. These funds were generated through the police subsidy program during 1970 and it is expected that more than ₱1,000,000 will be available annually for the procurement of police equipment by the Manila Police Department.

C. Police Improvement - Angeles and Olongapo

During the team's initial meeting with U. S. Ambassador Byroade on April 4, 1972, he expressed his concern about the peace and order situation in the cities of Olongapo and Angeles which are contiguous to the Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. His desire, as the team understands it, is to ensure that the U. S. Government is doing all it reasonably can to maintain the best possible relationships between the American and Philippine communities, particularly, as it relates to the peace and order situation. The bases, of course, are the metropole around which flows the daily happenings within the adjoining communities and there is constant contact between Americans and Filipinos both on and off the bases. It is hard to imagine any significant activity within these areas that does not have a direct interrelated impact on both our houses. Narcotics, thefts of government property, large scale pilfering, allegations of violations of individual civil rights by Philippine authorities, antagonistic social contact and strike actions against the bases are just a few

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of the constant irritations that hamper Philippine and American relationships. Most of these type irritants directly involve the civil police agencies in the cities adjacent to the bases and the civil police agencies in the two cities are hampered in professionally responding to this situation because of organizational, training and equipment deficiencies. Politics in Angeles City is also a major factor inhibiting close and meaningful rapport with Clark Air Force Base security personnel. However, the team believes that much can be accomplished towards enhancing the relationship between U. S. base personnel and the civil police authorities if a limited technical assistance program having a small commodity input and participant training component was established for the cities of Angeles and Olongapo. The project recommended would have a three year life span beginning in FY 1973 and have as its objectives the overall improvement of the civil police forces in those cities by: (1) implementing modern administrative and management practices; and (2) developing a comprehensive specialized training program leading to improvements in investigation, patrol, communications, traffic, community relations and civic action.

#### Staffing Implications - Angeles and Olongapo

It is recommended that two positions be established one generalist position for Angeles and one generalist position for Olongapo to carry out developed project objectives.

#### Commodities - Angeles and Olongapo

In the team's view and based upon the "commodity package" associated with the police improvement project under the Internal Security Project, a total of \$50,000 for each city spread over a two year period would be required for the procurement of necessary project commodities. The commodity package would include such items as vehicles, mobile communications, weapons and riot control equipment. The precise commodity component would be determined by the conduct of a survey of each department by representatives of the U.S.A.I.D./PSD and PolCom.

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Participants - IMPAC, Angeles and Olongapo

The team believes that one of the most constructive low cost contributions that A.I.D. can make is in the area of participant training. The past Public Safety participant program has proven to be highly successful with several former participants now holding key positions within the PolCom and as chiefs of police in various cities. It has also been effective as a program instrument in that seven of the nine chief training officers at the Regional Training Academies are former participants. The team, therefore, believes that continued U.S.A.I.D. support should be given to this important aspect of project activity and proposes that a total of 20 officers be trained each year at A.I.D.'s International Police Academy. The rationale for this figure is based upon acceptance of one participant each year from the thirteen IMPAC project cities and one each from Angeles and Olongapo for a total of fifteen. One participant slot should continue to be allocated to PolCom and the continuance of the current project activities in the cities of Zamboanga and Davao should be supported by two slots each. As the current project activities terminate the allocated training slots should be absorbed into the IMPAC project.

Narcotics

The team considers the actions taken by the U. S. community to date in the area of narcotics to be exceptionally forthcoming to U. S. Presidential directives in this regard. A great deal of concentrated effort went into the development of the Mission's Narcotic Control Plan, the organization of the internal Mission task force, the coordination with the private sector that have a key role to play in any such endeavor, and the development of the Mission's Project Paper (PROP) recently submitted to A.I.D./W. The team wishes to add its endorsement to this exceptionally fine effort and hopes that A.I.D./W will view the PROP review process with the same degree of dispatch and urgency it was afforded at the Mission level in order that implementation actions can be initiated

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as soon as possible in consonance with the exigencies of narcotics problems in the Philippines.

Cooperating Country Funding

The Government of the Philippines is expected to provide significant counterpart funding to support the IMPAC and Police Improvement Projects with Angeles and Olongapo cities. Funding will be provided through the National Economic Council, In-kind contribution of personnel, from the law enforcement agencies and the Police Salary Subsidy. While the figures below are presented as estimates, they are believed to be reasonably accurate. See figure 21.

Direct Support

The GOP provides funds for housing and office space yearly at an average of ₱17,000 per technician; utilities, ₱4,000; and travel ₱5,000. Local staff funding is estimated at ₱10,000 per member per year. U. S. and local hire personnel levels for FY 1973 through FY 1978 are projected as follows:

	<u>U. S.</u>	<u>Local</u>
FY 1973	14	7
FY 1974	13	7
FY 1975	12	7
FY 1976	12	7
FY 1977	10	7
FY 1978	10	7

In-Kind Contribution

It is estimated that during the life of the proposed project, 95 senior Filipino law enforcement officers will be intimately involved with this project. Their involvement or that of their representative will be at such a level as to represent a significant contribution to the project. It is estimated that 10 key people from the Police Commission will be involved in the project. While these people will not donate 100% of their time to the project, it is estimated that their time plus commitments by their associates will equal 10 man years for each year of the project. The IMPAC program will work in five

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Cooperating Country Funding

GOP Support Budget (P000)	Fiscal Year					
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Rentals	238	221	204	204	170	170
Utilities	56	52	48	48	40	40
Travel	70	65	60	60	50	50
Local Staff	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>
	434	408	382	382	330	330

In-Kind Contribution

<u>Salaries</u>	<u>Key Per- sonnel</u>	<u>Average Salary (Est.)</u>						
PolCom	10	10,000	100	100	100	100	100	100
IMPAC	75	6,000	456	456	456	456	456	456
Police Im- provement (AO)		6,000	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>
			616	616	616	616	616	616

Supplies & Miscellaneous

Transportation (U. S. Participants)	130	130	130	130	130	130
Supplies & Other Costs	420	390	360	360	300	300
Computer Time	<u>375</u>	<u>400</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>500</u>
	925	920	940	940	930	930

Police Subsidy  
Trust Fund

	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>
TOTAL (Peso)	2,975	2,944	2,938	2,938	2,876	2,876
TOTAL (\$)	(468)	(461)	(460)	(460)	(451)	(451)

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disciplines in each of the 13 police departments. This will represent 65 key officers involved in the project. Again, though they may not be 100% committed to the project, they and their associates will more than equal 75 man years for each year of the project.

#### Municipal Police - Olongapo and Angeles Cities

The police improvement cities are each expected to contribute five key employees for each year of the project based upon the above rationale.

#### Salary Estimations

The Assistant Commissioners of the Police Commission are salaried at ₱12,000 per annum. It is estimated that the Assistant Commissioners or their representatives will average in input to the project, in kind, of ₱10,000 per year.

#### IMPAC and Police Improvement - Olongapo and Angeles Cities

Government regulations as prescribed in the Police Act of 1966 define the salaries of first-class cities as follows. The salary of a Chief of Police is ₱16,000 per year, Deputy Chief is ₱6,500, and Mayor - ₱5,900. An average of these salaries is ₱6,000. This figure has been used in calculating the funding in kind for both IMPAC and Police Improvement projects.

#### Supplies and Miscellaneous

The Philippine Government provides international transportation to U. S. bound participants. It is planned that twenty participants per year will travel to the United States at a cost of approximately ₱6,380 per participant. Miscellaneous supplies have been calculated at ₱30,000 per technician per year. The following table presents a breakout by category of the anticipated GOP contributions.

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In summary, the team's recommendations call for a three pronged approach toward assisting the GOP in upgrading the quality of police service throughout the Philippines. One prong being the continuation of some of the present Internal Security Project activities at the local level beyond June 30, 1973; the second to provide assistance to the greater Manila metropolitan police agencies; and the third proposes a modest effort in assisting the police departments of the cities of Angeles and Olongapo. These recommendations are supplemental to the Mission's proposal for U. S. assistance to the GOP in its fight against narcotics and dangerous drugs. The PROP for the Narcotics Program has been submitted to A.I.D./W and is currently under review by the Asia Bureau. A PROP incorporating the recommendations cited in this report was in the initial draft stages at the time of the team's departure on April 26, 1972, and should form the basis for follow-on actions concerning the implementation of the team's recommendations.

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IX. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
A/O	Angeles City/Olongapo City (Proposed Project Cities)
AB	People's Army (A Dissident Guerrilla Force)
AFP	Armed Forces Philippines
BALPA	Balance of Payments
CIRSD	Central Identification Records Statistics Division, National Bureau of Investigation
EAC	Executive Assistant Commissioner, Police Commission
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GHQ	General Headquarters, Military
HMB	Hukbalahap (A Dissident Guerrilla Force)
IMPAC	Intra Metropolitan Police Assistance Concept
IPA	International Police Academy, Washington, D.C. (AID)
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
KM	Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth Group)
LECS	Law Enforcement Communications System
MAP	Military Assistance Program (U.S.)
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
METROCOM	Metropolitan Command, Philippine Constabulary
MMCC	Metropolitan Mayors Coordinating Committee
MPD	Manila Police Department
NBI	National Bureau of Investigation
NCC	National Computer Center
NEC	National Economic Council
NPA	New People's Army (A Dissident Guerrilla Force)
OPS/W	Office of Public Safety, Washington, D.C. (AID)
OPRED	Operation Reduction (AID Personnel Staff Reduction Exercise)
PHILRED	Staff Reduction, U.S. Mission in Philippines
POL COM	Police Commission (Established by the Police Act of 1966)
PSD	Public Safety Division, U.S. AID
PROVLECS	Provincial Law Enforcement Communications System
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PROP	Project Paper
U.S. AID	United States Agency for International Development (Philippine Mission)

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CO Naval Investigation Service

Lieutenant Commander Joseph Pelton  
XO Naval Investigation Service

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Director

Mr. Lorenzo Sunico  
Technical Services

Mr. Adriano Dimayuga  
Chief, Records Division

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Mr. Crispino De Castro  
Chairman

Mr. Carmelo Agbayani  
Commissioner

Mr. Constante Tavanlar  
Assistant Commissioner  
Training Department

Mr. Sergio Go  
Executive Assistant Commissioner

Mr. Sixto De Leon  
Assistant Commissioner  
Communications and Electronics  
Department

Major Abelardo Tesoro  
Chief, Inspection Division

Mr. Santiago Mandi  
Assistant Commissioner  
General Services Department

Mr. Benjamin Florentino  
Chief, Records Division

Mr. Evangeline Cruzado  
Chief, Examination Division

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Chief of Police

Colonel James Barbers  
Deputy Chief

Colonel Pedro De la Paz  
Chief of Administration

Colonel Enrique Morales  
Chief of Detectives

BACOLOD CITY

Chief Arcadio Lozada  
Chief of Police

Major Guillermo Enriquez  
Chief Training Officer

Mayor Carlos Benares  
City Mayor

ZAMBOANGA CITY

Colonel Angel Macasil  
Chief of Police

Major Ernesto Cabato  
Deputy Chief of Police

Lieutenant Pedro Francisco  
Assistant Chief of Operations

Mr. Jose Vicente Atilano II  
Vice Mayor

OLONGAPO CITY

Dr. Geronimo Lipumano  
Mayor

Chief J. P. Roxas  
Chief of Police

Major T. L. De Leon  
Officer in Charge, (P.C.)

MARIKINA

Chief Carlos Javier  
Chief of Police

Mayor Osmundo De Guzman  
Mayor

## ANNEX B

COMMODITY RECAP FOR THE PHILIPPINES  
TYPE "5" PROCUREMENT

	FISCAL YEAR ITEM WAS PROVIDED						CURRENT TOTAL
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	
TRANSPORTATION							
Sedans					3	13	16
Truck 2.5-ton							
Truck 3/4-ton							
Truck 1/4-ton			16	7	23	23	69
Trailers							
Buses							
Ambulance							
Motorcycle							
Aircraft							
Boat							
Auto Shop Equip/Tools		Lot			Lot		Lot
Auto Spare Parts							
Misc. Auto. Items				Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
WEAPONS							
Revolver Cal. .38			300	320	410	230	1260
Pistol Cal. .45							
Carbine			10	56	20	18	104
Rifle							
Shotgun				48	30	23	101
Submachine Gun							
Machine Gun							
Weapon Repair Parts							
Reloading Equipment	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
Weapon Shop Tools	Lot						Lot
Weapon Cleaning Sup.						Lot	Lot
Ammunition	Lot		Lot	Lot		Lot	Lot
Gas Gun			5	24			29
Tear Gas Grenade	20	20	140				180
Tear Gas Projectile	10		120				130
Misc. Riot Equipment		Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot		Lot
Helmet, Protective	24		70	330	1506		1930
Safety Shield							
Gas Mask	24		70	330	1502		1926
Cannister, Gas Mask				330	1506		1836
Vest, Protective					28		28
Handcuff	42			440	654	538	1674
Baton							
Misc. Equipment.		Lot		Lot			Lot

COMMODITY RECAP FOR THE PHILIPPINES  
TYPE "5" PROCUREMENT

	FISCAL YEAR ITEM WAS PROVIDED						CURRENT TOTAL
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	
TELECOM EQUIPMENT							
VHF-FM (FM-1)			392		50	20	462
VHF-FM (FM-5)			336	200	210	189	935
VHF-FM (Mobile)						16*	16*
VHF-FM (Base)	8				25		33
VHF-FM (Portable)						6*	6*
HF-SSB (Mobile)						50	50
HF-SSB (Portable)			4				4
HF-SSB (Base)				6		10	16
VHF-FM (FM-10)						50	50
Installation Access.	Lot		Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
Telecom Spare Parts	Lot		Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
Audio Equipment			Lot	Lot			Lot
Telecom Hand Tools				Lot			Lot
Commo. Test Equip.			Lot	Lot		Lot	Lot
Battery Charger						6*	6*
Teletype Machines			4				4
Megaphones	1	1		16	40		58
P. A. Sets			1				1
GENERAL							
Camera, Still Type		1	17	10	15	4	47
Enlarger, Photo		1		2	4	1	8
Photo Developing Eq.		Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
Developing Supplies		Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
Photo Printer			5	2	4		11
Projector Movie		2	2	5	3		12
Projector Still	1	2	1	6	3		13
Projector Overhead	1	2	1	5			9
Movie Screen	3	2	4	6			15
Fingerprint Kit							
Fingerprint Supplies			Lot	Lot	Lot		Lot
Fingerprint Cabinet	88	1	30	105		7	231
Typewriter	2	20	25				50
Duplicating Equipment	Lot	Lot			Lot		Lot
Office Equipment	Lot	Lot	Lot		Lot		Lot
Office Supplies	Lot	Lot			Lot		Lot
Photo Supplies	Lot		Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot
Tape Recorder	1		25	6	3		35
Office File Cabinet	5	31	26		29	28	119
Misc. Items/Supplies	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot	Lot

\*Mission Technical Support items - not procured for program.

## ANNEX C

RATE OF CRIME AS REPORTED BY FIVE CITIES  
POLICE IMPROVEMENT SUB-PROJECT  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969, 1970 and 1971

	<u>Total Offenses Reported</u>	<u>Number Cleared By Arrest</u>	<u>Percentage Solved</u>	<u>Crime Rate/ 100,000 Inh.</u>
1969 Total	25,769	17,315	67.1%	3,477
Bacolod	6,635	5,541	83.5%	4,090
Baguio	4,251	2,080	48.9%	6,090
Cagayan de Oro	3,240*	-	-	3,498
Cebu	9,306	7,576	81.4%	2,706
Tacloban	2,337	2,118	90.6%	3,219
1970 Total	27,313	20,323	74.4%	3,299
Bacolod	7,712	6,524	84.6%	4,109
Baguio	4,416	1,861	42.1%	5,260
Cagayan de Oro	4,138	3,551	85.8%	3,114
Cebu	8,551	6,275	73.4%	2,464
Tacloban	2,496	2,112	84.6%	3,261
1971 Total	23,292	17,418	74.8%	2,730
Bacolod	7,383	5,867	79.5%	3,817
Baguio	4,126	1,869	45.2%	4,769
Cagayan de Oro	2,849	2,344	82.3%	2,081
Cebu	5,473	4,343	79.3%	1,531
Tacloban	3,461	2,995	86.5%	4,397

\*Based on Pol. Com. Form No. 7.

Prepared by: Statistics Division Pol. Com.

## ANNEX D

CRIME STATISTICS IN BAGUIO CITY  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969, 1970 and 1971

	<u>Total Offenses Reported</u>	<u>Number Cleared By Arrest</u>	<u>Percen- tage Solved</u>	<u>Crime Rate</u>
1969 Total	4,251	2,080	48.9%	6,090
Crimes vs. Persons	944	349	36.9%	1,352
Crimes vs. Property	1,665	555	33.3%	2,385
Crimes vs. Chastity	47	17	36.2%	67
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	489	233	47.6%	700
Other Crimes	1,106	926	83.7%	1,584
1970 Total	4,416	1,861	42.1%	5,260
Crimes vs. Persons	996	345	34.7%	1,186
Crimes vs. Property	1,944	507	26.1%	2,315
Crimes vs. Chastity	49	14	28.6%	58
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	504	274	54.4%	600
Other Crimes	923	721	78.1%	1,099
1971 Total	4,126	1,869	45.2%	4,769
Crimes vs. Persons	982	374	38.1%	1,135
Crimes vs. Property	1,783	553	31.0%	2,061
Crimes vs. Chastity	45	22	48.9%	52
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	451	250	55.4%	521
Other Crimes	865	670	77.4%	1,000

## Population:

1969 - 69,800

1970 - 83,952

1971 - 86,500

Prepared by:  
Statistics Division Pol. Com.

## ANNEX E

CRIME STATISTICS IN BACOLOD CITY  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969, 1970 and 1971

	<u>Total Offenses Reported</u>	<u>Number Cleared By Arrest</u>	<u>Percen- tage Solved</u>	<u>Crime Rate</u>
1969 Total	6,635	5,541	83.5%	4,090
Crimes vs. Persons	1,905	1,660	87.1%	1,174
Crimes vs. Property	3,096	2,258	72.9%	1,908
Crimes vs. Chastity	67	64	93.5%	41
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	936	928	99.1%	577
Other Crimes	631	631	100.0%	389
1970 Total	7,712	6,524	84.6%	4,109
Crimes vs. Persons	1,941	1,723	88.6%	1,034
Crimes vs. Property	3,539	2,590	73.2%	1,885
Crimes vs. Chastity	72	70	97.2%	38
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	1,104	1,086	98.4%	588
Other Crimes	1,056	1,055	99.9%	562
1971 Total	7,383	5,867	79.5%	3,817
Crimes vs. Persons	1,796	1,543	85.9%	928
Crimes vs. Property	3,563	2,304	64.6%	1,842
Crimes vs. Chastity	80	76	95.0%	41
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	958	958	100.0%	495
Other Crimes	986	986	100.0%	509

## Population:

1969 - 162,200  
1970 - 187,685  
1971 - 193,400

Prepared by:  
Statistics Division Pol. Com.

CRIME STATISTICS IN CEBU CITY  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969, 1970 and 1971

	<u>Total Offenses Reported</u>	<u>Number Cleared By Arrest</u>	<u>Percen- tage Solved</u>	<u>Crime Rate</u>
1969 Total	9,306	7,576	81.4%	2,706
Crimes vs. Persons	2,580	2,432	94.3%	750
Crimes vs. Property	4,359	2,905	66.6%	1,267
Crimes vs. Chastity	126	117	92.8%	36
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	1,202	1,123	93.4%	349
Other Crimes	1,039	999	96.1%	302
1970 Total	8,551	6,275	73.4%	2,464
Crimes vs. Persons	1,930	1,583	82.0%	556
Crimes vs. Property	4,753	2,879	60.6%	1,370
Crimes vs. Chastity	84	72	85.7%	24
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	996	980	78.4%	287
Other Crimes	788	761	96.6%	227
1971 Total	5,473	4,343	79.3%	1,531
Crimes vs. Persons	1,106	892	80.6%	309
Crimes vs. Property	3,010	2,125	70.5%	842
Crimes vs. Chastity	51	47	92.1%	14
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	785	768	97.9%	219
Other Crimes	521	511	98.1%	145

## Population:

1969 - 342,900

1970 - 346,926

1971 - 357,400

Prepared by:

Statistics Division Pol. Com.

CRIME STATISTICS IN TACLOBAN CITY  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969, 1970 and 1971

	<u>Total Offenses Reported</u>	<u>Number Cleared By Arrest</u>	<u>Percen- tage Solved</u>	<u>Crime Rate</u>
1969 Total	2,337	2,118	90.6%	3,219
Crimes vs. Persons	513	465	90.6%	706
Crimes vs. Property	841	702	83.5%	1,158
Crimes vs. Chastity	90	90	100.0%	1,239
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	574	542	94.4%	790
Other Crimes	319	319	100.0%	439
1970 Total	2,496	2,112	84.6%	3,261
Crimes vs. Persons	669	584	87.3%	874
Crimes vs. Property	968	708	73.1%	1,264
Crimes vs. Chastity	66	58	87.9%	86
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	491	465	94.7%	641
Other Crimes	302	297	98.3%	394
1971 Total	3,461	2,995	86.5%	4,397
Crimes vs. Persons	1,059	993	93.8%	1,345
Crimes vs. Property	1,375	989	71.9%	1,747
Crimes vs. Chastity	75	65	86.7%	95
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	617	617	100.0%	783
Other Crimes	335	331	98.8%	425

Population:

1969 - 72,600  
1970 - 76,369  
1971 - 78,700

Prepared by:  
Statistics Division Pol. Com.

## ANNEX H

CRIME STATISTICS IN CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969, 1970 and 1971


	<u>Total Offenses Reported</u>	<u>Number Cleared By Arrest</u>	<u>Percen- tage Solved</u>	<u>Crime Rate</u>
1969 Total	3,240			3,498
Crimes vs. Persons	1,019			1,100
Crimes vs. Property	1,369			1,478
Crimes vs. Chastity	27			29
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	386			416
Other Crimes	439			474
1970 Total	4,138	3,551	85.8%	3,114
Crimes vs. Persons	1,072	948	88.4%	806
Crimes vs. Property	1,869	1,474	78.9%	1,406
Crimes vs. Chastity	22	20	90.9%	16
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	527	494	93.7%	396
Other Crimes	648	615	94.9%	487
1971 Total	2,849	2,344	82.3%	2,081
Crimes vs. Persons	768	630	82.0%	560
Crimes vs. Property	1,204	855	71.0%	879
Crimes vs. Chastity	24	22	91.7%	17
Crimes vs. Morals/Order	324	315	97.2%	236
Other Crimes	529	522	98.7%	386

## Population:

1969 - 92,600  
1970 - 132,258  
1971 - 136,900

Prepared by:  
Statistics Division Pol. Com.

# CITY/MUNICIPALITY POLICE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM



**SYSTEM COMPLETED**

## RIZAL PILOT

1. LAS PINAS
2. MANDALUYONG
3. MARIKINA
4. NAVOTAS
5. PARANAQUE
6. PASIG
7. SAN JUAN

## POLICE IMPROVEMENT

1. BACOLOD CITY
2. SILAY CITY
3. CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
4. ILIGAN CITY
5. LEGASPI CITY
6. CEBU CITY
7. BAGUIO CITY
8. TACLOBAN CITY
9. ZAMBOANGA CITY
10. OLONGAPO CITY
11. DAVAO CITY

# PROVINCIAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (LECS)



## SYSTEMS COMPLETED

PROVINCE	CITY/MUNICIPALITY	
1. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL	6	25
2. RIZAL	3	26
3. MISAMIS ORIENTAL	2	24
4. LANA O DEL NORTE	1	16
5. LAGUNA	1	29
6. BULACAN	1	24
7. TARLAC		17
8. ZAMBALES	1	13
9. BATAAN		12
10. CAVITE	3	19
11. ALBAY	1	17
12. CEBU	4	49
13. LEYTE	2	49
14. AGUSAN DEL NORTE	1	9
15. ILOILO	1	45
16. ILOCOS NORTE	1	19
17. NUEVA EC IJA	2	40
18. BENGUET	1	13
19. LA UNION		20
20. SOUTH COTABATO	1	17
21. CAMARINES NORTE		10
22. MARINDUQUE		7
23. BATANGAS	1	30
24. Camiguin		5
25. Camarines Sur	2	35

## PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

## RADIO TECHNICIAN COURSE

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Number of Hours</u>
1. Registration and Briefing on the History, Functions, and Organization of LECS	4
2. Human and Official Relationships	2
3. Systems, Operation of the Pol Com Network	2
4. Use of Radio Terms, Message Preparation, Proper Logging Standard	4
Operational Techniques (Calling and Answering; Procedure in Police Communication)	4
5. Message Center and Station Management (Equipment and Records Security)	8
6. Radio Laws and Regulations, Policy Making and Procedures	8
7. AC/DC Fundamentals Review	8
8. Vacuum Tubes	8
9. Frequency and Amplitude; Modulation Theory (Lecture)	4
10. Radio Wave Propagation	4
11. Single-Side Band Theory (Lecture)	4
12. Systems in Communication	4
13. Semi-Conductor Review Theory (Lecture)	16
14. Transistor and Printed Circuit (Lecture)	8
15. Transistor and Printed Circuit (Lab)	8
16. Review and Graded Test	8
17. Circuit Analysis and Transceiver Fundamental (Lecture)	16
18. VHF/FM Transceiver and Circuit Analysis (Lecture)	16
19. Antenna System (Lecture)	4
20. Transmission Line Theory (Lecture)	4
21. VHF/FM Transceiver and Circuit Analysis Graded Test	4
22. Operations and Maintenance of FM-1, FM-5, FM-10 Transceivers (Lecture)	12
23. Operation and Maintenance of FM-1, FM-5, and FM-10 (Lab)	12
24. Educational Field Trips	16
25. Operations and Maintenance of FM-1, FM-5 and FM-10 Transceivers	8
26. Radio Wave Propagation and Site Survey (Lecture)	8
27. "Supply Management" - Reporting, Records Inventory, Filing and Issuance	8
28. Maintenance Procedure and Shop Management (Lecture)	16
29. Commandant's Time	14
30. Critic and Graded Test	4
31. GRADUATION	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>

## ANNEX L

PROVINCIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM  
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTERPART FUNDING  
TO USAID SUPPORT

	<u>Provincial</u>	<u>Pol Com</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>USAID Support</u>	<u>Percen- tage</u>
1. Negros Occidental	\$6,615.38	\$350.56	\$6,965.94	\$21,873.03	31%
2. Rizal	4,615.38	163.82	4,779.20	11,770.26	40%
3. Lanao Norte	4,615.38	350.56	4,965.94	9,963.49	49%
4. Misamis Or.	6,000.00	350.56	6,350.56	19,615.86	32%
5. Bulacan	5,692.31	163.82	5,856.13	15,404.25	38%
6. Laguna	6,461.54	163.82	6,625.36	18,984.94	34%
7. Tarlac	4,615.38	163.82	4,779.20	8,210.40	58%
8. Zambales	4,153.83	163.82	4,317.65	12,763.40	33%
9. Bataan	3,846.15	163.82	4,009.97	8,506.22	47%
10. Cavite	5,384.61	176.89	5,561.50	15,669.59	35%
11. Albay	4,769.23	176.89	4,946.12	16,583.90	29%
12. Cebu	6,923.08	328.12	7,251.20	15,244.90	47%
13. Leyte	6,923.08	328.12	7,251.20	16,605.82	43%
14. Agusan	3,538.46	383.15	3,921.61	5,747.98	68%
15. Iloilo	9,692.30	328.12	10,020.42	21,869.76	45%
16. Ilocos Norte	5,076.92	226.12	5,303.04	10,124.75	52%
17. Nueva Ecija	6,923.08	163.80	7,086.88	18,298.87	38%
18. Benguet	4,153.85	176.89	4,330.74	10,308.44	42%
19. La Union	5,076.23	163.82	5,240.05	13,140.32	39%
20. Cotabato Sur	4,153.85	413.05	4,566.90	7,736.84	59%
21. Camarines Norte	2,307.69	246.12	2,553.81	6,807.77	37%
22. Batangas	6,769.23	203.05	6,972.28	15,846.36	43%
23. Marinduque	3,076.92	163.82	3,240.74	4,649.88	69%
24. Camiguin	1,753.84		1,753.84	3,151.95	55%
25. Camarines Sur	6,016.84	256.00	6,272.84	19,337.30	32%
TOTAL	<u>\$129,154.56</u>	<u>\$5,768.56</u>	<u>\$134,923.12</u>	<u>\$328,216.28</u>	<u>40.2%</u>

POLICE IMPROVEMENT & RIZAL PILOT PROJECT  
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTERPART FUNDING  
TO USAID SUPPORT

<u>City/Municipality</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Pol Com</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>USAID Support</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Bacolod City	\$2,153.84	\$163.80	\$2,317.64	\$6,498.20	35%
2. Silay City	307.69		307.69	2,245.07	13%
3. Cagayan de Oro City	2,153.84	176.89	2,330.73	6,198.54	37%
4. Iligan City	307.69	163.80	471.49	2,701.46	17%
5. Legazpi City	1,230.76	163.80	1,394.56	9,040.87	15%
6. Cebu City	1,846.15	176.89	2,023.04	12,643.08	16%
7. Baguio City	1,846.15	163.80	2,009.95	8,054.96	24%
8. Tacloban City	2,153.84	163.80	2,317.64	8,103.90	28%
9. Zamboanga	2,769.23	176.89	2,946.12	8,976.57	32%
TOTAL	<u>\$14,769.19</u>	<u>\$1,349.67</u>	<u>\$16,118.86</u>	<u>\$64,462.65</u>	<u>24%</u>

RIZAL PILOT COMMUNICATIONS PROJECT

1. Las Pinas	\$461.54	\$615.38	\$1,076.92	\$4,069.00	26%
2. Mandaluyong	153.84	615.38	769.22	2,305.84	33%
3. Marikina	1,846.15	615.38	2,461.53	12,620.08	12%
4. Navotas	153.84	615.38	769.22	2,104.88	30%
5. Paranaque	307.69	615.38	923.07	3,122.31	21%
6. Pasig	538.46	615.38	1,153.84	6,280.52	18%
7. San Juan	307.69	615.38	923.07	3,145.80	21%
TOTAL	<u>\$3,769.21</u>	<u>\$4,307.66</u>	<u>\$8,076.87</u>	<u>\$33,648.43</u>	<u>24%</u>

## ANNEX N

## COST AND COMMODITIES

## SUMMARY OF COMMODITIES RECEIVED (THRU MARCH 72)

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1.	OPS/FM-1 Transceiver, Dual Frequency	392		78	20	490
2.	FM-5 Transceiver, Dual Frequency	336	200	60	181	777
3.	FM-10 Transceiver, Dual Frequency			150	79	229
4.	OPS/AE-1 Antenna (Whip) Flexible	575		178	200	953
5.	AE-2 Antenna Adapter Connector	575	100	128	100	903
6.	AE-3 90° Coaxial Connector	161				161
7.	AE-4 Antenna Ground Plane	204	175	25	30	434
8.	AE-5 Antenna Cutter Bracket	25				25
9.	AE-6 Antenna Mobile Magnetic	2				2
10.	AE-7 RC-58/U Transmission Line		200			200
11.	AE-8 RG 8/U Transmission Line		300	275	540	1115
12.	AE-9 Coaxial Connector Union PL-259	1250	600			1850
13.	AE-10 Antenna Tactical Hy-Gain	20				20
14.	AE-13 Antenna Log Periodic	22				22
15.	OPS/PS/A-16 Power Supply/Charger	45			25	70
16.	PAC-5 Power Supply				10	10
17.	OPS/CC-1 Carry Strap	338			50	388
18.	CC-16 Carry Case	10				10
19.	OPS/AU/A-1 Mobile Mounting Bracket	66				66
20.	OPS/RU-6A Back-to-Back Repeater	4				4
21.	OPS/TS-13 Test Stand	3				3
22.	OPS/PA-20 Power Amplifier	27				27
23.	OPS/CT-2 EXT Battery Cable	50				50
24.	OPS/TS-20 Test Set		15	20	27	62
25.	Antenna VHF Base Station Type Hy-Gain	36	100	95	250	481
26.	Antenna Yagi-Type Model 340				100	100
27.	Antenna VHF H-Band Model PD-150				100	100
28.	Antenna Mobile Hy-Gain	25		245	50	320
29.	Antenna Mobile Unity Gain	50				50
30.	Antenna Telescoping Mast				500	500
31.	HF-SSB Transceiver	4	6		60	70
32.	VHF/FM Transceiver Model CSB-30				25	25
33.	Coaxial Cable RG-58/U 500 FT	18	20			38
34.	Coaxial Cable RG-8/U 500 FT	9	40			49
35.	Connector UHF Reducer	1250			90	1340
36.	Battery Charging Engine Driven	10				10
37.	Battery Charging Wind Driven	10				10
38.	Battery Eliminator	3				3
39.	Generator, Electric	1			4	5
40.	Capacitor Checker Kit		15	20	25	60

## ANNEX N

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
41.	Capacitor Substitution Box Kit	3	15	20	25	63
42.	Load Resistor RF-150 Watts	1				1
43.	Load Resistor RF-25 Watts	3				3
44.	Frequency and Deviation Meter			1		1
45.	Oscilloscope 5" Kit		15	20		35
46.	Probe Low Capacitance			20		20
47.	Resistor Substitution Box Kit	3	15	20	25	63
48.	Signal Generator (Motorola)		3			3
49.	Signal Generator Kit			20	30	50
50.	Signal Tracer Kit	3	15	20	25	63
51.	Transistor Checker Kit	3	15	20	25	63
52.	Soldering Iron Kit				25	25
53.	Soldering Torch Kit	12				12
54.	Volt-Ohm-Milliammeter Kit	3				3
55.	Volt-Ohm-Meter-Solid State	3	15	20	25	63
56.	Wattmeter RF Directional	1				1
57.	Manual FM-1		5			5
58.	Manual FM-5		5			5
59.	Ozolid FM-1		15			15
60.	Ozolid FM-5		15			15
61.	Transistor Trainer		6			6
62.	Desk Microphone RA-56				10	10

## COST AND COMMODITIES

USAID

## SUMMARY

<u>FY</u>	<u>RADIOS PURCHASED</u>	<u>COST</u>
68	732	\$292,000.00
69	206	275,000.00
70	313	187,000.00
71	291	230,000.00
72	<u>*447</u>	<u>300,000.00</u>
	1,989	\$1,284,000.00
73	<u>350</u>	<u>250,000.00</u>
TOTAL	<u>2,389</u>	<u>\$1,534,000.00</u>

Only major items (radios listed above). Cost column includes 55 service depots, tools, test equipment, antennas, spare parts.

\*In procurement pipeline, not yet received.