ROBERT R. NATHAN
ASSOCIATES, INC.

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Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID Grant 698-0434

Draft Report

May 3, 1988

Submitted by
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

Submitted to
The African Development Bank, and
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID/REDSO)

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PREFACE

The Team would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance it has received from Mr. Deo Mutulemwa of the African Development Bank and Ms. Nancy Nolan, of AID/REDSO, the day-to-day managers of the project. Their knowledge and insights furnished much of the basis for this report. The RRNA Team assumes full responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations presented in this report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project Description

The objective of the Project is "the strengthening of the African Development Bank Group's (the Bank) capacity to develop and manage projects within an enlarging and improved portfolio." The Project Agreement was signed on April 15, 1985. It provides technical assistance in incremental funding, for a total of $15 million over six years. The project has several distinct components:

Long-term technical assistance

Short-term consultancies, especially to assist with the preparation of Terms of Reference and pre-implementation studies

Commodity and technical assistance for the Bank's Computer/ADP installation

Training assistance for staff of the Bank and of affiliated member institutions

Major Findings

1. Most of the Log Frame's basic assumptions have proven correct and set a positive climate for the attainment of project objectives.

2. Several project elements are running behind the originally projected time table. However, it would be premature to invalidate output targets, since straight line projections could lead to erroneous conclusions.

3. The slow implementation of the Project is linked, in varying degrees, to one or more of the following factors:

- Last minute budget reductions forced a switch from the institutional mode to Personal Service Contracts (PSCs) for long-term experts.
- Source/origin restrictions exist for U.S. and Ivory Coast firms/nationals.
- The Bank has had a problem with availability of funds for TORs and pre-feasibility studies for the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARDN) sector, which is also targeted by the Project.
- The Bank's failure to present a global annual budget at the beginning of the year with zero-based packages leads to time-consuming, ad hoc project requests and approvals.

4. The responsibilities imposed on the Bank by the host country contract format are not accompanied by matching authority: "Host Country" contracting therefore takes on the appearance of a cosmetic label.

5. There is a divergence between the Bank's and AID's technical assistance philosophies. The Bank's system does not provide for systematic, planned transfer of expertise. This system can result in

- Technical advisers working at the operational rather than the policy level
- Recruitment of over-qualified, overpaid experts for journeyman positions
- Thwarting the Bank's objective of filling positions with permanent staff, as the planned phase-out/phase-over transfer of experts' functions is lacking

6. The effectiveness of long-term experts is limited: two-year tours are too short. Experts require nine months to become fully

operational, and efficiency declines during the last six months. Thus, full effectiveness is limited to nine out of 24 months, a poor cost/benefit ratio.

7. Pre-feasibility studies have just gotten underway; their possible contributions to augmenting and speeding up loan volume cannot be appraised for some time to come.

8. Few TORs have been completed; the Bank is researching data indicating whether any TORs will be followed up with feasibility studies. However, at this time our sample base will be too small to draw conclusions.

9. The Bank has conducted some very significant short-term studies with Project funds: the Hay Group Management study, for example provided the implementation plan for the Bank's ongoing major reorganization.

10. Project-funded computer/ADP purchases have endowed the Bank with essential hardware permitting automation of all major financial, programming, and records systems. Further implementation will require

- Large-scale, systematic training of staff in computer/ADP disciplines to exploit the systems' potential, which has significantly outrun user's technical skills (level of effective use is estimated between 40 and 60 percent).

- Additional hardware and software acquisitions. Top Bank management has now been sensitized to sine qua non of computerized systems to manage the Bank's expanding operations. Presumably the Bank's budget will reflect these priorities.

- Continued support by the Bank's top echelon for the very able management of the Computer Operations Division, including additions to the professional staff.

- Selected short-term consulting services in specialty areas may be required.

11. The Training Center has conducted 26 seminars with the assistance of the Project. It has proven its ability to plan and organize training sessions, including the complex logistical arrangements that are vital to the success of training activities. At the same time, because of lack of adequate impact evaluations, insufficient information is available to present 1988 training needs in the context of a global plan, and to determine whether past training has met Bank and project objectives.

These shortfalls appear to be part of a larger problem area:

- Inadequate understanding and utilization by Bank management of the Training Center's potential role in developing human resources
- Lack of clear definition of the Training Center's mission as a staff (service) function rather than a line (action) function
- Laxity of pedagogical and managerial systems within the Training Center

12. On a day-to-day basis, the project is competently managed by one staf member each at the Bank and at AID/REDSO.

The Project Pipeline (January 29, 1988) looks excessive at first glance. However, deducting unliquidated balances of long-term obligations/ commitments reduces the undisbursed total by 50 percent.

Major Recommendations

1. Match Bank (Host Country) responsibilities with authorities:

- Waive the need for AID/REDSO pre-approvals of minor steps by limiting approvals to larger elements of sub-grants.
- Rely on the reimbursement method that became effective January 1, 1988, i.e., using the Bank's funds -- not project money -- until and unless the Bank's actions have met established financial AID/REDSO procedures/documentation and program parameters.

2. AID/REDSO should insist that the Bank, in the future, submit an annual program submission in "decision packages" form, in the context of the Bank's evolving program planning/budgeting system. This should result in PILs for major portions of prioritized activities under the Grant early in the fiscal year and avoid the time-consuming communications involved in continuous ad hoc actions.

3. Employ the 1987 Continuing Resolution definition to broaden the present definition of rural development to include rural health, education, farm-to-market roads, etc. to expand the range of TORs and pre-investment studies that are eligible for FY 1988 funds.

4. Change the source/origin code from U.S./Ivory Coast to U.S./Africa Regional, lifting present discrimination against non-Ivorian citizens/firms, and advancing the objective of promoting African development (with a mandated focus on private enterprise/entrepreneurs as opposed to government/parastatal agencies).

5. Assuming that the Bank will not introduce systematic and planned counterpart training into technical assistance, deemphasize the use of long-term experts in operational slots. Focus on short-term consultancies for precisely defined, sharply focused tasks.

6. Require detailed position phase-out/phase-over plans for technical assistance positions in strict compliance with Section 4.2a of the Conditions Precedent of the Grant Agreement (which have not been complied with by the Bank nor insisted upon by USAID/REDSO).

7. If/when supplying experts for operational positions (OPEX), consider only candidates who have potential for later conversion to Bank staff in these positions. This includes using the Bank's salary classifications for

specific positions rather than AID's formula, which stresses past earnings and experience. Candidates must show interest in long-term commitment to the Bank and to African development.

8. a) Temporarily suspend assistance to Training Center activities pending

- Clarification of its role
- Submission of a 1988 training plan with priorities and justification
- Establishment of an impact evaluation system (possibly with the assistance of the Bank's Operations Evaluation Office or a consultant)
- Creation of a financial system that permits evaluating the cost effectiveness of Training Center operations

b) AID/REDSO should respond positively to short-term assistance requests from the Training Center.

c) AID/REDSO should give ad hoc approvals for existing long-term commitments when suspension of ongoing or planned programs would be counterproductive to Project objectives.

9. a) Assure that the Bank places priority on computer/ADP training to permit the fullest exploitation of the project-funded potential for computerization of vital Bank operations to overcome the present under-utilization of equipment. Senior-level Bank management should determine the respective roles of the Training Center, Office of Human Resources Management and Computer Services Department in the systematic, planned training of Bank staff.

I. THE MID-TERM EVALUATION

Terms of Reference

To the extent that certain issues or observations may be generic or apply to several of the subjects in the Scope of Work (SOW), they have been consolidated to avoid repetitions.

Methodology

The RRNA team members defined the issues and possible problems in the evaluation areas specified in the contract. A number of these areas overlapped or developed to be two sides of the same coin. To avoid duplications and unnecessary impositions on the time of Bank staff, the Team, whenever possible, consolidated its questions to permit joint interviews. This approach was particularly important because the Team's evaluation coincided with a program audit of the Project by the AID Inspector General's (IG) office. The terms of reference of the audit group partially paralleled those of the Mid-Term Evaluation Team. Consequently, in its Bank contacts, the RRNA team pointed out that the evaluation was conducted under a Bank contract whereas the IG group was working under U.S. government auspices. This explanation appeared to mollify Bank officials who, understandably, had tended to view visits by two American teams with apparently identical purposes as somewhat excessive.

The interview phase was preceded by a review of literature, files, and documents followed by continuous analyses of materials gathered throughout the Team's stay. However, the bulk of information was gained through interviews and discussions. Some gaps were unavoidable because of absences of officials, both at the Bank and AID/REDSO, and the occasional unavailability of potential sources for a variety of reasons. Similarly, some documents that could serve as baselines for the assessment of progress became available only late in the Team's stay and could not be fully integrated into the draft. Overall, the Team is satisfied and most appreciative that the joint efforts of the Bank and REDSO succeeded in providing basic documentation and access to the key sources of information needed for adequate responses to the terms of reference for the Mid-Term Evaluation.

The African Development Bank Group

The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is a regional financial institution which was founded in 1963. Its membership today consists of 50 regional members (all African States with the single exception of the Republic of South Africa) and of 25 non-regional members, principally OECD Nations, including the United States.

The AfDB comprises the African Development Bank (ADB), which provides relatively hard loans to its African members, the African Development Loan Fund (ADF), a soft-loan institution, and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF), a smaller, low-interest loan facility. The latter two are also referred to as the "Special Funds." The three organizations are administered by a single staff and share the same facilities. Collectively, they are commonly referred to as "the Bank."

U.S. participation in the AfDB group began in 1976. To date, the United States has subscribed approximately $1.7 billion of the Bank Group's capital and provided grants of close to $30 million for various categories of technical assistance.

The Bank, as an African institution, sees its basic mission in providing funds and expert assistance to its regional members. Within this field, it expects to become a center of excellence based on expert knowledge and commanding insights into the continent's development problems. Vagaries of international economic conditions and problems stemming from difficulties peculiar to the African continent, such as recurrent droughts, have changed the Bank's emphases from time to time. At this writing, the principal goals enunciated by Bank President N'Diaye in 1985 still hold

- Increasing food production/supply
- Energizing agricultural production through investments by both the public and private sectors
- Improving member states' infrastructure
- Stemming the ravages of drought and desertification
- Promoting the role of women as a vital element in the African development process
- Mobilizing resources required to respond to the foregoing needs
- Upgrading the organization and efficiency of the Bank to a level that will enable it to respond to these goals

AID/REDSO Project No. 698-0434 (The Project)

Overview

The Project Agreement was signed on April 25, 1985. Its purpose is stated as follows: "The Project will assist the Bank to strengthen its capacity to develop and manage projects in an enlarging and improved portfolio." This objective (again quoting from the Agreement) is to be achieved through

Long- and short-term technical assistance in general management, project work, and country/sectoral studies

- Assistance in training needs and training programs for Bank staff and officials of regional member agencies
- Provision of commodities, especially in the computer area
- Funding of pre-investment studies, terms of reference (TORs), and project evaluations to accelerate loan programs in agriculture and rural development

The project completion date (PACD) is April 24, 1991, six years from the signing of the agreement.

U.S. Contribution

The total U.S. contribution projected in the Agreement amounts to $15 million. Of this total, $7.7 million was to come from FAA section 106 (Selected Development Activities/SDA) with the balance of $7.3 million to be funded from the Section 103 account (Rural Development and Nutrition/ARDN). Incremental obligations, to date, add up to $__ (REDSO Controller will supply) figure).

Bank Contribution

The Project Agreement does not quantify the Bank's contribution. Instead it states in general language that the Bank will provide any residual requirements, including funds, to implement the Project. This is to include a number of specific logistical and support services, "in conformity with Bank procedures and regulations." The Project Paper (PP) in very cursory fashion, estimated the value of the Bank's contribution at $3.3 million over the life of the project. The subject of the Bank's contribution is discussed in greater detail in report sections that follow.

Evaluation of the Project

The evaluation covered the Project goals and objectives, and their relevance to the institutional development of the Bank:

- The basic project goal is directed at helping the Bank to carry out its mandate to contribute to the economic and social progress of its regional member states. This goal was reaffirmed when the Administration and the Congress approved a 200 percent capital replenishment for the Bank and subscribed an additional $692 million to the Bank's capital resources for the period 1987-91, plus $315 million to the ADF for 1988-90. Thus, over the years, the United States has paid in the form of cash or pledges, a total of nearly $1.7 billion to the AFDB Group.

- The Project Paper (PP) suggests as objectively verifiable indicators that the loan projects achieve at least 95 percent of their economic and social objectives. The PP refers to Bank and other report and project evaluations as means of verification. At the time of this writing, no pre-feasibility studies have been completed under the Project. The Bank is still reviewing project-financed TORs to determine whether any have resulted in or may lead to loans. However, even in the absence of such documentation it is clear that any sample base would be much too narrow to allow drawing any conclusions. The time since the inception of project activities has been too short to permit an assessment of economic and social benefits flowing from any undertakings that might conceivably be linked to project-funded activities. Clearly, the jury is still out and will not return before the end of the Project, which is two years away. However, the Team noted a general consensus among Bank watchers, based on their personal observations and analyses of the Bank's reports, that the Bank is making progress in the discharge of its mandate: the loan volume is rising, the Bank's internal organization is getting stronger, and the quality of studies is improving. Overall, the principle of U.S. assistance to the Bank remains justified. This is not to say that the form, at least of certain elements of technical assistance, should not be reviewed and possibly modified.

In the Agreement, the immediate purpose of the Project is defined as "strengthening the capacity of the Bank to develop and manage projects in an enlarging and improved portfolio." The PP listed a set of indicators in the form of end-of-project achievements. Their attainment can not yet be predicted. The Project, given the lead time required to reach full speed, does not lend itself to straight-line projections.

However, the outlook is positive to the extent that the underlying assumptions listed in the PP have generally been validated at the Project's mid-term point:

- The Bank has successfully raised its investment capital to meet its lending targets for the 1980s.
- Similarly, replenishments are adequate for this time frame.
- The Hay Group report confirms that the Bank's compensation package, on the whole, is now competitive.
- AID and Bank priorities remain as projected during the period 1985-89. The Project's sectors of preoccupation are essentially unchanged. The addition of new emphases on environmental and Women in Development (WID) aspects reflects recent AID concerns. The Bank's recent focus on structural adjustment loans in the context of IMF/IBRD efforts, as opposed to project lending, also conforms to AID priorities.

The Bank's Capability to Use Project Resources

The picture to date is a mixed one. There are strong indications that some resources are not being fully exploited. As the following discussion will show, this may not necessarily be the Bank's fault. Some of the causes may be linked to different development philosophies or the weaknesses in AID'S methods of making Project resources available. The following sections address the different project components in the order of the contract's Terms of Reference.

Long-Term Technical Assistance

The Project Agreement provides for the funding of eleven long-term technical assistance experts. Of these eleven, six were to serve in "general management (core) adviser/expert" positions, while five would be assigned as "project technical experts." The former were to serve under three-year contracts, the latter for two-year periods. Three positions were hold-overs from the preceding project. The remaining eight individuals were to begin work "approximately six months from the effective date of the Project Agreement," i.e., by the end of 1985. In fact, none arrived before January 1987. At the time of this evaluation, there were nine experts aboard. Three more are being recruited (environmental expert, micro-computer adviser, and industrial engineer) and should begin work within the next 90 days or earlier. In addition, AID/REDSO and the Bank have agreed to charge two AID/REDSO program assistants immediately concerned with the administration of the Project to the long-term technical assistance component. This move reflects AID/REDSO budget stringencies. One American expert (whose case is mentioned in the computer/ADP chapter of this report) will convert to Bank direct-hire status within the next 60 days. This will leave 13 people on the Project's rolls.

There are a number of reasons cited for the delay in recruiting American experts (it should be noted that the distinction drawn in the Grant Agreement between technical advisers and technical experts has been abandoned in practice). All long-term contracts were written for a duration of two years with the possibility of selective one-year extensions.

Originally the provision of technical experts was to be implemented through an institutional contract. Under this arrangement, a single entity, such as a consulting firm or a university/consortium, would have assumed responsibility for the entire recruitment process and all subsequent backstop actions. Budget reductions forced abandonment of this contracting mode because of the high overhead charges involved. By that time, considerable time and effort had already been expended on obtaining preliminary expressions of interest from prospective contractors. The change in direction made it necessary to switch to the recruitment of individual experts under Personal Services Contracts (PSC). The point has been made that direct AID contracting would have been faster than Bank/Host Government contracting. However, quite aside from possible considerations of principle, in the case of individual PSCs, American candidates (source origin 000) usually insist on "arms-length" contracts for tax reasons. Thus, it might have been more difficult to find qualified candidates willing to contract directly with AID/REDSO.

A reconstruction of events indicates that the ensuing delays were a mixture of procrastination, partly linked to the need for meshing the Bank's recruitment system with AID's requirements, and some bad luck. Several candidates, after time-consuming selection procedures, did not qualify when they were interviewed in Abidjan. Others were no longer available by the time the Bank formalized its employment offer. The complicated recruitment steps are set forth in a 100-page manual, issued by AID/REDSO as PIL No. 67. Although it is very explicit and couched in simple, direct language, it cannot reduce the time-consuming complexities of the mandated procedures.

The Grant Agreement (Section 4.2 a) stipulates that: "Prior to disbursement of funds by AID, the Bank shall furnish to AID for each technical assistance position, a detailed justification including an explanation for the need for external assistance, a detailed scope of work and a plan for continuing or eliminating the position at the end of the Project." With the exception of job descriptions (some are considerably more comprehensive than others), this Condition Precedent has not been met. The Bank's Human Resource Development Department fully acknowledged these shortcomings. It is presently engaged in a major effort to bring all position descriptions/ classifications up to date by the end of this year. The Training Adviser's job description can serve as a prototype. It clearly shows that the functions are advisory and systems-oriented rather than concerned with ongoing operational tasks.

The Bank and the American experts define "technical assistance" in different ways. The very essence of technical assistance according to the AID definition is the training element: a planned, systematic transfer of the experts' knowledge to individuals assigned to work with them, their so-called "counterparts." By passing on their knowledge, the experts -- in accordance with this theory -- literally work themselves out of their jobs. Their functions will be progressively assumed and carried on by their counterparts. Upon the experts' departure, the former counterparts, in turn, will become the trainers of their counterparts, thus assuring a continuous multiplier effect. In contrast to this approach, the Bank uses experts for operational functions. This is what the UN system calls operating executives (OPEX). These are positions on the Bank's "shadow" staffing pattern for which no appropriate candidate could be recruited, or for which no funds were available. None of the nine American experts on board are performing in the classic AID mode of an adviser who has one or more counterparts. However, several are working on assignments that should result in strengthened Bank policies. Good examples are the preparation of an operations manual and of a comprehensive training plan. If and when they become part of official policy, they could have far-reaching effects on both Bank policies and Bank procedures long after the experts have completed their present assignments. However, this assumes that by the time of the expert's departure, somebody will have been trained or recruited and designated to carry on the function, keep documents such as manuals current, and use prototype plans and forms for new work cycles. This would require that the Bank systematically assure the continuance of these efforts. Neither such a philosophy nor such a system is in place. Thus, there can be no guarantee that AID's large technical assistance investment will meet projected end-of-project targets.

Several Bank supervisors do endeavor to use the experts assigned to them to the best advantage of their organizations notwithstanding the lack of a pervasive and systematic Bank doctrine. And, of course, in the nature of office and human relations there is a transfer effect, at least through "osmosis" when an expert's technical preparation, performance, attitude, and work ethics become a role model for others. From interviews and its own observations, the Team gained the impression that the present American expert complement consists of a group of highly competent individuals with policy-level advisory qualifications. The effectiveness of an individual adviser is necessarily also a function of the adviser's interpersonal skills. The nuances that would be found in any group of nine persons who must interact in a cross-cultural, educational, and administrative system are, of course also found in the American team. This makes some members more effective than others when operating in the context of the Bank's technical assistance philosophy.

Another problem area is the subject of salaries. The Bank classifies each position with a grade and a pay range (in steps). Candidates chosen to fill a staff vacancy are compensated in accordance with this scale. In the case of American experts recruited under the Project, AID/REDSO for all practical purposes sets the candidates' salaries. The PIL in which USAID approves the recruitment of a candidate proposed by the Bank provides a precise salary figure that the Bank is to use for negotiations. AID/REDSO determines this amount on the basis of the candidate's resume, particularly the candidate's earnings record in earlier assignments. The job description itself, the level of the position, and the salary of permanent staff members occupying comparable positions are, at best, secondary considerations.

In other words, American experts are paid on the basis of their previous earnings, their experience, and their total potential. To the extent that their basic duties are largely operational without systematic counterpart interaction, they are only partially utilized. The cost-benefit ratio of the assignment is commensurately reduced.

The high, USAID-set salaries of the American experts virtually preclude their conversion to permanent staff on termination of their assignments. (The Bank closely follows the position classification system of the United Nations. The entry salary for the most highly paid professional supervisory position is below $50,000). Thus, two to three years' experience with the Bank will have been lost as well as the opportunity to acquire a proven employee without the renewed expenditure of time and recruitment efforts.

Both Bank officials and experts serving under the Project agree that tours of two years duration (some say even three years) are too short. There is a consensus that it takes three months to locate housing and get settled. During the subsequent six months, the expert continues to become familiar with the Bank's organization, policies, procedures, and projects. There follows a period of nine months of effective operations. However, starting at the 18-month point, the average expert must give a good deal of attention and time to planning for the future. Thus, the remaining months, especially the last 90 days, are marked by diminished efficiency. In other words, the two-year period is limited to nine months of full effectiveness (especially when two months of vacation are taken into account). This represents a low cost/benefit ratio.

One American expert suggested that technical advisers serve their first year in an operational position to become familiar with the Bank's modus operandi. The rest of the tour should be spent at a policy level, where the advisers' knowledge of problems and issues at the operational level could be used to formulate recommendations and programs.

Discussions with various supervisors indicate that most consider the use of experts under donor sponsorship as an open-ended proposition. If the current expert were not to be extended, the presumption is that he/she will be replaced by another one, possibly under a different donor's assistance program.

As mentioned previously, the Grant Agreement provision calling for a specific plan for the elimination or continuation of each position at the termination of the Project was not implemented.

The lack of specific planning for the phase-over of functions to permanent Bank staff leaves the Project's technical assistance element without the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. Open-ended willingness by the donor community to furnish experts or operational functions relieves the Bank of the need to recruit permanent regional or non-regional staff.

As pointed out in other parts of this report, the Bank is a full-fledged international organization with its own institutional procedures and regulations. It has some 450 professional staff members on its rolls including approximately 45 experts who are funded by various donors. Of this group, 9 are currently sponsored by the Project. Regardless of the perceived merits and advantages of AID philosophies and procedures, it would seem illusory to expect the Bank to revamp its system to accommodate 9 (or 11) out of 450 experts. Its adaptation to AID's different ways should be limited to those statutory and mandatory procedures that govern AID assistance. Donor support would turn into a heavy burden, were the Bank obliged to observe the miscellaneous rules of each of its benefactors (Swiss, Scandinavian, Belgian, Canadian, etc.).

Recommendations

1. To the extent that the Bank's organization and style of operations cannot accommodate AID's technical assistance philosophy, future projects should address specific, well-defined problem areas that can be solved through short-term interventions.

2. Long-term experts should only be used exceptionally when the assignment of counterpart(s) guarantees a transfer of knowledge or when the task itself is a one-time, self-contained intervention, such as the writing of computer application programs. The length of any such assignment discussed above should consider that the expert will need approximately one year to become fully operational.

3. AID/REDSO should insist on compliance with the Conditions Precedent of the Grant Agreement. No staff accessions or any possible extensions of the present cadre of experts should be agreed to before such action.

4. If AID/REDSO decides to respond to future Bank requests for operational technical assistants, their qualifications and salaries should reflect Bank criteria and standards. Specifically, the compensation of candidates should primarily be based on the level of functions to be performed at the Bank and as classified by the Bank. A candidate's potential in excess of job requirements and his/her earnings in earlier positions should be, at most, secondary considerations.

5. Candidates should be chosen for their commitment to African development and long-term service with the Bank, in order to qualify for possible conversion to staff on termination of the AID-funded assignment.

6. Given the shortage of qualified and motivated Americans who wish to enter into long-term careers with the Bank, project source/origin restrictions should be modified to include Code 941 Africa Regional. This arrangement should be linked to an agreement with the Bank to convert professionally suitable

individuals to staff at the end of two years. Such an approach will assist the Bank to make the transformation to in-house autonomy, advance the recruitment of suitable (non-regional) American staff, and reduce the trial-and-error expense of identifying viable candidates.

Integration of U.S. Experts into Bank Operations

If anything, most American experts feel that they have been integrated too much by being used, as explained above, in operational work. Thus, they are not treated as advisers but as "one of the boys." Looking at this issue from the Bank's point of view, the integration has succeeded well. None of the technical experts felt that he was treated differently from permanent staff. The single exception was a repeated complaint that staff members received preference in being detailed to missions (TDY assignments in AID parlance). The Bank's own funds for TDY travel are extremely restricted. For this reason, the Team finds it plausible that Bank managers wish to maximize the experience level of their permanent staff in preference to that of temporarily assigned workers. Also, to the extent that missions are considered desirable, it would be understandable if managers provided incentives and awards in the first instance to their regular employees rather than to generally higher paid expatriates. This issue of being disadvantaged in the context of Bank missions was also voiced by experts serving under the auspices of other donors.

The Team concluded that there are no basic problems of staff integration with the exception of the pervasive issue of adviser versus operational functions.

Short-Term Technical Assistance

The Grant Agreement projects 15-person months per year to "perform analytical tasks in policy and project analysis." The Project Agreement distinguishes between pre-investment studies and terms of reference studies (TOR) and miscellaneous and evaluation studies. The Agreement intended to fund eight major pre-investment studies. Preliminary studies and TORs were mainly intended to encourage the development of project-specific pre-investment studies (not necessarily to be financed under the Project).

As of the end of January 1988, approximately 30 miscellaneous technical assistance studies, including some post-evaluations, had been approved. Unfortunately, as of the writing of this report, it has not been possible to obtain copies of the evaluation studies, nor data on any follow-up actions resulting from project-financed activities. Within the time available, it was not feasible to review contracts and vouchers needed to calculate the person-months that these short-term studies represent. Also, the team lacked the technical expertise to review the professional quality of technically oriented studies. However, an assessment of two studies shows that they have made major contributions. One is a demographic analysis, which is discussed in the computer section of this report. The other is a review of the Bank's organization and management, together with a reorganization blueprint and implementation recommendations, known as the Hay Group Report. The Bank has adopted most of the study's proposals and has undertaken a major reorganization effort, which will not be concluded until 1989. An American expert, funded under the Project until now, has been designated by Bank management as the key person for the implementation of the Hay Plan. He is in the process of being converted to a Bank staff member.

There has been decidedly less progress to date in moving ahead with TOR and major pre-investment studies. The recent Pipeline Report shows a bare handful of TORs, in various stages of development, for rural development (ARDN) oriented projects. Some may have been completed since the last

Pipeline Report and any such information will be reflected in the final version of this report. Similarly, at the Team's request, the Bank is reviewing its files to determine actual or projected follow-up actions to the studies, i.e. the prospects for subsequent pre-investment studies and possible loan approval. In any event, the sample bases will be too narrow to permit drawing well-based conclusions. If any relevant information is received in time, it will be incorporated into the final report.

Two major studies that could serve as pre-investment appraisals have been initiated recently. One concerns Ugandan animal health and disease control (the Pipeline Report shows $900,000 earmarked for the undertaking) and an agricultural sector study (approx.$700,000). Subsequently, the Team understands, AID/REDSO - Bank agreement was reached to earmark $285,000 for a major coffee study to assess production, marketing and possible crop substitution aspects. These studies have not yet produced any documentation so that it is not possible to offer any comments in the context of this evaluation.

The slow utilization of ARDN funds for TORs and pre-investment studies ordinarily could lead to the conclusion that these components do not constitute a critical resource margin within the Bank's priority objectives. However, the Team suggests that judgment be withheld pending the results that the Bank expects to achieve through its restructured program planning process.

The delay in moving ahead with pre-feasibility and TOR studies seems to be due to three principal factors, discussed in the following sections.

1. Initial Restriction of Funds to ARDN

The ARDN category was defined to exclude health and education activities but was recently broadened to include women in development and environmental orientations. The Bank's technical departments receive their budgetary allocations at the beginning of the fiscal year. These grant (as opposed to loan) funds also focus primarily on the agricultural and rural development sectors. Thus, there are -- at least early in the year -- competing availabilities for the financing of studies. In the case of the U.S. funds, the technical division cannot plan within a budgetary framework. Requests for foreign assistance funding must be submitted to the Bank's Cooperation Department which, in turn, decides which project to submit to which donor. The technical division is confronted with a number of unknowns. In addition, U.S.-funded contracts particularly involve a number of procedures that deviate from the normal Bank modes with which the technical divisions are familiar. As a result, the Bank's technical divisions prefer to use their own funds before appealing for donor assistance.

U.S. Foreign Assistance legislation, subsequent to the signing of the present Project, has abolished earmarking of funds by category (continuing resolution, Fall 1987). This should permit a modification of the Grant Agreement to permit the use of FY 1988 funds (and possibly, subject to legal interpretation, the use of Deob/Reob funds) for additional development sub-sectors (e.g., rural health and education, farm-to-market roads) within ARDN.

By broadening the permissible range of studies, the Project could help the Bank to spread scarce grant funds over a wider area and possibly involve a broader stratum of U.S. contractors in Bank activities.

2. Restriction of Source/Origin to U.S. and Ivorian Contractors

To be eligible for short-term contracts under the Grant, individuals and firms must be U.S. or Ivory Coast nationals or be legally domiciled within these jurisdictions. The rationale for limiting the source to a single African Bank member -- while excluding the rest of the continent -- is not documented. It may have been considered an unavoidable courtesy gesture toward the Ivory Coast in its dual capacity of host to the Bank and to AID/REDSO. The intent of the clause is to use the Grant to leverage U.S.

suppliers into the Bank's procurement of good and services. Interviews established that the Bank is naturally inclined to use American contractors in technical areas where the United States is leading (e.g., office automation/software development, O & M, private enterprise). These are specialties where the Bank may turn again to such U.S. services, using its own funds, even after the end of the current project. The Bank, however, cannot be expected to use its own money to hire U.S. firms with non-competitive rates and language limitations (a common complaint) when qualified private sector African firms and individuals can be contracted at lower cost. Permitting such firms and individuals to compete under the Grant, at least for certain types of studies, would advance another U.S. objective -- developing the Bank to the point where it can stand alone, without the need to rely on outside technical assistance -- and AID's sub-objective of encouraging and emphasizing the role of the private sector in African development.

A bank official pointed to the coffee study as an example of a project study for which no other funds were available but where the United States has limited expertise. In his opinion, the U.S. firm would have to sub-contract non-U.S. experts who are thoroughly familiar with the problems and issues of coffee production and marketing in both anglo- and francophone Africa. Normally the Bank would not consider American firms in this field. Looking to the post-project era, it would seem more profitable to use grant funds for the many areas where American firms are competitive than for "one-shot" tasks.

3. *Lack of Coordinated Long-Range Planning by the Bank*

AID/REDSO does not receive a comprehensive annual planning proposal from the Bank that would permit the systematic programming of resources. Requests for allocation of funds for studies are received on an irregular, ad hoc basis. Bank officials recognize the inadequacy of the present system. They point out that the Bank is presently embarked on a major revision of its program/project/planning cycle and predict that this will greatly alleviate the current difficulties. As the availability of AID/REDSO funding fluctuates from fiscal year to fiscal year, the Bank's annual proposal should be presented in "Decision Packages" that prioritize activities under various funding hypotheses.

Recommendations:

1. Amend the Project Agreement to permit procurement of consulting services from both U.S. and Africa region-wide sources (Codes 000 and 935 Africa Regional) subject to the stipulation that present competitive standards be maintained to assure continued bidding access by U.S. contractors on equal terms. Code 935 Africa Regional should be further limited to private sector individuals and firms, i.e., exclude individuals and entities belonging to the governmental or parastatal sectors.

2. Use the 1987 FAA Continuing Resolution to broaden the range of projects/programs for which TORs and pre-feasibility studies, funded with new money, may be used. It should be possible to redefine the term rural development by written agreement without formal amendment of the Agreement as provided in Article 2, Section 2.1.

3. Avoid use of Project funds for study areas in which American contractors have limited qualifications. The objective of drawing down the Grant should be a secondary consideration.

Buy America vs. Untied Bank Fund

It seems at times that the Project is trying to champion two conflicting objectives simultaneously. On the one hand, the Project wants to contribute, to the maximum extent possible, to the Bank's and to Africa's speedy advancement. On the other hand, the Project wants to direct business to American contractors. Every American will applaud and support measures to promote U.S. exports of goods and services. It seems fair, though, to ask whether an activity such as a project to assist an African institution is the proper vehicle to serve as a wedge for American business in cases when the use of American technicians and services under the Foreign Assistance Act becomes, de facto, an export subsidy operation. Of course, American contractors and suppliers should have every opportunity to compete for business under the Project and be awarded the contract, quality, experience, and price being equal. It is not suggested that American aid be untied for free world suppliers. The Team only urges that private sector African suppliers be permitted to compete in a project that has the basic purpose of helping African development.

Technical Assistance Fund (TAF)

Within the Bank, a draft proposal for the establishment of a Technical Assistance fund (TAF) is circulating. Donors would pool their resources in an untied account. Competition for all Bank awards of goods and services would be open to nationals of all regional and non-regional members. Thus, donors would be participating in Fund-sponsored activities by attribution in proportion to their contribution.

While the idea of a totally untied fund would frighten many Americans, the U.S. Executive Director is of the opinion that American contractors and suppliers, on balance, would benefit by being able to participate in any and all offers. The Team has no opinion on the subject but is fully prepared to defer to the judgment of the senior U.S. representative to the Bank who must have spent many hours examining the viability of the TAF proposition.

Bank officials who are immediately concerned with bilateral donor cooperation are far less favorably disposed to the TAF concept. Looking at the Fund from their vantage point, they are concerned that the pooling of resources would diminish bilateral contributions to the Bank. This judgment may, of course, also reflect certain bureaucratic considerations.

Bank Coordination

The coordination of the Grant with AID/REDSO is the responsibility of the Bank's Cooperation Department. The Cooperation Department is headed by a director who coordinates a Bilateral and a Multilateral Division, each dealing with its respective donor community. The Bilateral Division, in turn, is sub-divided into several sections. One of these is almost exclusively concerned with the Bank's relations with AID/REDSO. For practical purposes, it is a one-person operation. The incumbent has been in this position for several years and is thoroughly familiar both with Bank policies and procedures in his field and all aspects of the American aid system as it relates to the Project. Any change in the staffing of the liaison function could be a major set-back to the Project, since it would take a replacement considerable time to acquire the knowledge and efficiency of the officer who is presently assigned to liaison with AID/REDSO.

Within AID/REDSO, the Project falls under the Office of Project Development and Regional Implementation (PDRI), which is divided into those two sections. The Project is assigned to a two-person sub-section in the Regional Implementation Division. Only one position is presently filled. The incumbent, under a Personal Service Contract (PSC), has been with the Project and its predecessor activity for five years. She is totally familiar with the history of the two projects and is an ideal source of information on the AID Grant, the Bank, and the interrelationship of the two organizations. The office maintains excellent files permitting reconstruction of past events, even if there ever were changes in the organization and staffing of the office. However, just as in the Bank, loss of the incumbent would be at least a temporary set-back for the Project. Within the limitations imposed by U.S. government and AID rules and regulations on the activity and responsibility that can be exercised by PSCs, the present Project Assistant is the de facto manager of the Grant within AID/REDSO. Because of frequent changes in the direct hire complement, the long-standing association of the incumbent with the Project is a valuable asset to AID/REDSO's management of the Project, providing institutional memory and continuity. Filling the second position will even out the excessive work load.

A number of Bank officials advocate that the role of the Cooperation Department, with respect to the Grant, be diminished. It is felt that once the Department has reached agreement with AID/REDSO on a specific project, further liaison for the activity should be vested in the Bank's technical divisions. At present, the technical offices must address all correspondence to the Cooperation Department which, in turn, forwards the communication under its letterhead to AID/REDSO. The technical divisions consider this a time-consuming process, since intra-Bank communications tend to be tardy and the retyping of correspondence frequently is slowed by bottlenecks in secretarial services. AID/REDSO addresses its replies to the Cooperation Department. According to Bank officials, it may take considerable time before these communications reach the technical divisions concerned. They feel that direct communications with AID/REDSO would be much faster, would expedite project actions, and would be more efficient all around.

AID/REDSO concedes that time might be gained on occasions through direct contacts. But they also point out that the technical divisions frequently are unresponsive or laggard in dealing with AID/REDSO requests. Officials travel often or have other priorities. Moreover, they lack the Cooperation Department's familiarity with AID-specific requirements. Their work load includes projects sponsored by the Bank itself as well as by the various bilateral and multilateral donors. Thus, it is important and, on balance, more expeditious for AID/REDSO to have a single counterpart office to which all problems can be routed and which, in turn, becomes responsible for follow-up action.

The Team has considered the merits of the arguments and concludes that the Project can be more efficiently managed through the present type of AID/REDSO-Bank counterpart relationship than through communications with the Bank's technical action offices. The present system, very importantly, assures that there is something like a central record depository for the Project within the Bank.

Recommendations:

Preserve the status quo of the AID/REDSO relationship and continue to use the Cooperation Department as the central communications channel.

Project Implementation Letters (PILs)

Some 150 PILs have been issued for the Project since its inception. The large majority of PILs is preceded by inquiries or requests from the Bank. The PILs generally represent AID/REDSO's concurrence, sometimes with modifications, to the Bank communication. Time and typing efforts might be saved by agreeing on a format that would note AID/REDSO's (non)concurrence in routine matters, by endorsement on Bank requests. The original would be returned to the Cooperation Department; AID/REDSO would retain two copies: one for the PIL file, the other for the subject file. Since the great majority of PIL communications are simple "tennis ball" type back-and-forth exchanges, such a system should expedite the flow of communications.

Recommendations:

Simplify the PIL system by agreeing on a format that permits replying by endorsement on the original communication in routine matters.

Bank Contributions

"What are the Bank's contributions to the Project?" is a fair question. As mentioned previously, the Project Agreement does not quantify the Bank's obligations. Section 3.2 states "the Bank agrees to provide or cause to be provided for the Project all funds and all other resources, in addition to the

Grant, required to carry out the Project effectively and in a timely manner. This includes providing logistical and other supporting services in conformity with established Bank procedures and regulations." Training events and activities are organized and implemented by permanent bank staff, and most training materials and facilities are provided by the Bank. In addition, AID-financed pre-investment studies, TORs, and evaluations require the input of permanent Bank staff, i.e., project officers, loan administration officers, and financial analysts to verify and process all expenses to be reimbursed by AID."

The PP (Table 4 on page 29) arrives at an estimated total bank contribution of $3,300,768. The basis for some of the figures in the break-down is not clear. In any event, it must be remembered that PPs, although supposedly developed in close cooperation with the beneficiary, are unilateral AID documents. They are neither signed nor formally approved in any other way by the host country (in this case, the Bank). As a matter of fact, the PP's executive summary, in the paragraph "Authorship," credits the document to three AID/REDSO officials and makes no mention whatsoever of any Bank participation.

The cited table contains a significant disclaimer: "because this is a regional project, and there is no host country as such, the ADB is not obliged to make any financial contribution to the Project. The above (Table) is for illustrative purposes only. And although this is a serious estimation, it would not be practical under current bookkeeping practices of the Bank to isolate precisely these expenditures and contributions attributable solely to AID-financed activities."

In the absence of specific figures for each of the cost categories mentioned in the Project Agreement, it is, of course, impossible to estimate the contributions that the Bank has made. However, there is no indication that the Project has been handicapped by a lack of Bank support. The experts financed under the Project have affirmed that they are receiving the benefits set forth in their contracts. For training activities, the Project provides only partial financing. Residual costs are defrayed by the Bank or other donors (Section 3.2. states that the Bank will "provide or cause to be provided" certain contributions). The inadequacy of financial data for the training sector is discussed in the report section on training. Other elements, as presaged in the cited PP note, cannot be traced without a major accounting exercise to reconstitute the specific expenditures that the Bank has made, directly and indirectly, for each expert. General overhead figures (estimated in the PP at 45 percent) would be difficult to calculate. As Bank staff pointed out, if detailed figures had to be kept for every foreign expert, involving a dozen donors, the Bank's accounting operations would need to be expanded to such an extent that it would greatly reduce the value of these donor contributions.

The Team believes that with the exception of what is discussed in the Training Section of the report, it would not serve any constructive purpose to have the Bank document contributions to and for each expert and study. Moreover, the Grant Agreement imposes no such obligation on the Bank. There are specific provisions in the Project Agreement under which the Bank will grant access to all records that relate to the Project. This would enable AID/REDSO to pursue the matter of Bank contributions to the extent required.

Recommendations:

The Bank's contributions to the Project should be evaluated through a "negative exception" approach. This concept assumes that the Bank is living up to its commitments unless and until a project activity is impeded by a lack of Bank support, financial or otherwise.

Reimbursement of Bank Advances

Under a recent agreement (PIL No. 137), the Bank has engaged itself to advance all expenditures under the Project. AID/REDSO reimburses these advances on a quarterly basis, upon receipt of a consolidated Bank voucher and subject to the requirements and procedures of the AID/REDSO controller.

Reimbursement of insufficiently documented sub-claims, items not conforming to agreed-upon accounting procedures and formats, or program parameters, will be suspended until and unless required documentation is received and/or corrective action is taken. Bank officials are willing to give this system a six-month try. They are concerned about the impact of advances on their liquidity position and, of course, the simultaneous loss of interest. Quite likely, the decisive issue will be whether AID/REDSO will be able to make reimbursements within 30 days, i.e., whether the Bank's records and documentation will be adequate to forestall the need for suspensions of payment by the Controller's Office. The vital aspect of this system is the shifting of immediate responsibility for expenditures under the Grant to the Bank.

Host Country Contracting

It would seem commensurate to match Bank responsibilities under the Host Country Contracting mode by vesting authority in the Bank to act within agreed-upon scopes.

In this perspective, the recruitment of long-term experts might take the form of a request by the Bank setting forth the types of experts to be recruited together with job descriptions and phase-out/over plans, as stipulated in Section 4.2 of the Conditions Precedent. AID/REDSO would reply with a PIL setting forth its agreement together with CDB advertising requirements, maximum salary scales, etc. And, to the extent necessitated by U.S. statutes, sample forms of contracts to be employed (as shown in PII No. 67). Thereafter, implementing actions would become the responsibility of the Bank. The Project Agreement stipulates that the Bank will submit virtually any and all documents relevant to the Grant to USAID for approval. It seems difficult to reconcile this step-by-step approval/monitoring stance, with its unavoidably patronizing by-play, with the concept of host country implementation.

Over the 25 years of its existence, the Bank has hired several thousand employees and executed hundreds of contracts. The Bank's recruitment system, patterned on the UN's though somewhat different from AID's, clearly is functional and works for the Bank. Yet AID/REDSO staff pointed out that recruitment delays (more than one year behind projections in the Project Agreement), in many cases because of the slowness of Bank actions, had, in fact given rise to additional AID/REDSO intercessions. For example, preparation and placement of advertising copy for the CBD, and solicitation of references by phone or letter were handled by AID/REDSO. It is true that in the tradition of AID and other donor agencies, the draw-down of obligated funds is a vital priority which validates the need for the Project in the first place. However, an outside assessment, such as this Mid-Term Evaluation, must conclude that protracted delays in Bank follow-through would indicate that this project component evidently was not one of the Bank's overriding priorities. If these actions indicate greater concern on the part of AID/REDSO with project implementation than on the part of the Bank, it could be interpreted as a somewhat paternalistic attitude with AID/REDSO superimposing its priorities on the Bank. The Bank, a mature, $18 billion institution with 1,100 employees, should be credited with knowing its priorities whether or not these coincide with those of AID. If need be, the parties to the Grant Agreement, reflecting a project design that began in 1981, should review present priorities and make commensurate modifications rather than insist on the past.

The preceding argumentation should also apply to short-term contractors. The Bank has ample experience in procuring services. To the extent that modifications in its rules are necessary, AID/REDSO should point out in a PIL, statutory/regulatory provisions (not already included in the Project Agreement's standard provisions) that need to be complied with to permit reimbursement and then rely on the Bank's own system to carry through. In earlier periods, prior to the development of mature African institutions with technically competent staffs, AID frequently was guided by the assumption that developing countries/institutions were anxious to adopt its proven procedures.

Thus, the application of AID's contract and procurement manual orders was intended to help fledgling countries/institutions develop effective systems of their own. Clearly, this need does not apply to the Bank. Nor would it be reasonable to believe that the Bank, when dealing with American contractors on its own in the post-grant period, would not apply its own procedures. It would follow that REDSO/AID should insist on deviations from the Bank's own systems and procedures solely in cases where U.S. rules and regulations make this mandatory and exclude all optional applications of AID procedures inconsistent with Bank norms.

Recommendations:

Upon agreeing with the Bank on actions to be taken, e.g., expert recruitment, operational follow-through should be the responsibility of the Bank and be conducted according to its procedures, except when these deviate from U.S. statutes and AID regulations/formats that must be complied with for reimbursement approval.

At the time of approving a Bank request (e.g., TOR), AID/REDSO should point out in a PIL the specific requirements not covered in PIL 67.

AID action should reflect that U.S. funds are not engaged unless and until the Bank has met the (minimum) requirements of the AID/REDSO Controller and PDRI needed for reimbursement approval.

Procurement of Commodities

AID/REDSO has acted as authorized agent for procurement actions with the exception of minor shelf items. The most important item (percent of commodities funded under the Grant) was the acquisition of a mainframe IBM computer. Direct procurement by AID resulted in considerable savings since the order could be placed at the GSA contract price.

The Project Pipeline (January 29, 1988) looks excessive at first glance. However, deducting unliquidated balances of long-term obligations/commitments for fully funded two-year PSCs ($2.4 million), two to three major new studies ($1.8 million), and recently delivered commodities (mainframe IBM system -- $.6 million) reduces the undisbursed total by 50 percent, to which should be added approximately $.2-.3 million for recently planned training activities.

II. TRAINING PROGRAM EVALUATION

Background

The Project allotted approximately $1.7 million to various types of training activities. Roughly two-thirds of this amount is allocated for member country institutions and private sector enterprises that are, or will be, involved locally in Bank-financed projects. These funds are intended to defray about one-eighth of the Bank's total training plan for professionals. The remaining third ($.6 million) supports seminars and participant training for the Bank's staff.

The report evaluates the Project's training component in terms of overall objectives and accomplishments. More specifically, it examines activities intended to benefit institutions and establishments in member countries and the operations and management of training by and within the Bank through its Training Center. Organizationally, the Center is a division within the Bank's Cooperation Department. This reflects the donor community's heavy involvement in training.

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation called for a two-stage approach. The first phase consisted of a field trip to four member countries to review the conduct and results of training on site. The second part of the evaluation concerned training operations at the Bank's Abidjan headquarters, mostly at the Training Center.

Bank Member Country Field Trips

The countries visited by the Human Resources Development specialist were Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, and Ghana. The member country trips are summarized in the table below.

Location	Work days	Number of persons ADB list	Rectifi-cation	Number of persons at work	visited	percent
Senegal	4.5	24	21	17	15	88
Guinea-Bissau	.5	3	3	1	2	100
Cameroon	4.5	9	11	10	9	90
Ghana	2.0	41	28	20	12	60
TOTALS	11.5	77	63	48	38	79

Unfortunately, the list of contact persons provided by the Bank to the Consultant was frequently incomplete or inaccurate. The "rectification" column reflects the actual situation found compared to the original list furnished by ADB. For example, in Dakar two organizations had moved, two were unknown, and three persons did not work where listed, while in Ghana, 32 percent of the names had never been Bank seminar participants.

The "number of persons at work" column refers to the number of persons who were available for interviews after accounting for people on travel, on leave, or unavailable. In Ghana, these factors affected 24 percent of the persons in the rectified column.

The information obtained through questionnaires and structured interviews furnishes a valid basis for drawing conclusions and making recommendations on the Bank's training program in the member countries. The questionnaire was explained, item by item, to each person interviewed to assure that the questions were fully understood. The following section explains the methodology used in the information-gathering process.

Methodology of the Member Country Participant Evaluation

The basic methodology used consisted of an objective questionnaire and a guided interview. The questionnaire employed a simple system of cross-checking information and minimizing abstractions. It was presented at the very beginning of the interview to ensure that no prior conversation would affect the objectivity of the answers. The questions required the seminar participants to

Evaluate the various pedagogical aspects of the seminar

Grade the general quality of the seminar

Provide three concrete suggestions for seminar improvements

Explain specifically how the seminar has (or has not) has a favorable impact on the participants, their jobs, and their sponsor organizations

The anonymity of the questionnaires was guaranteed. The only identification was the name of the country on each form, to pinpoint any tendencies peculiar to any one of the four countries visited. (There were none.)

The second phase of the interview was the structured question interview. The resultant information clearly identifies the actual impact of the training seminars. The interview notes were compared with the information in the questionnaires to check for consistency.

The participants interviewed represented all professionals and levels of administrative responsibility. All seminar topics were represented among the participants. Some of the participants were training professionals who had taught Bank seminars.

An evaluation matrix using a basic input-output criterion is included in the annex. The matrix was the basic guideline for the information gathering and evaluation process and will graphically illustrate how the evaluation was conducted.

Standards for Evaluation

The following standards for evaluation were used throughout the report on the Training Center:

The Project statements of objectives and goals

ADB 1986 Annual Report

ADB Administrative Memorandum No. 17-81, "Concerning the Second Language Policy"

ADB Administrative Memorandum No. 03-87, "Concerning the Functions and Responsibilities of the Organizational Units of the Bank," reference Annex 14, "Training Center," pages 1-2

Universal techniques for organizational training needs assessments and training programs evaluations, reference American Management Association

Terms of Reference -- Robert R. Nathan Associates contract

Training Objectives and Goals of Project

The overall objective of the AID Grant is to "strengthen ADB capacity to develop and manage projects in an enlarging and improved portfolio." Over the five-year life span, the Project seeks to provide "sufficient management improvement, technical staff development, and acceleration of loan appraisal and supervision processes" within the Bank.

More specifically, the Project seeks to achieve

Significant improvement in quality of operations

An increase in the rate at which resources are transferred to member countries

Improvement in Bank linkages in the region

A number of specific activities and requirements are mentioned for achieving these goals:

ADB must improve the quality of preparing projects.

ADB must improve inter/intra-departmental communications.

ADB must improve the scope and depth of project evaluation needs.

ADB must influence institutional and national policies.

ADB must place more emphasis on the country and sector analyses.

Training will be a primary means for achieving the objectives. This effort will be supported by a long-term adviser who will be assigned to the Training Center.

Staff Training: Staff training is to be composed of in-house seminars and participant training ($610,000 over five years). It focuses on four primary areas:

Technical and professional development

Management development

Orientation

French/English language training

Training for these areas is to be given in seminars. The courses will advance the Bank's professional staff to higher levels of expertise and responsibility in order to replace grant-financed technical assistance experts in accordance with project objectives.

Member Country Training: Member country training takes place in seminars ($1.085 million over four years). Currently operating at a rate of about 13 seminars per year, this program will continue under the Project if the seminars are successful. AID/REDSO will support about eight seminars per year The seminars have been useful in the past. They should become even more useful as training methodology and materials are further refined to address specifically the paramount problems facing the Bank and the member countries.

Specific goals of the training component are

A viable long-term training program

Effective training and pre-investment studies that result in successful loans

The 1986 ADB Annual Report presents clear institutional objectives and goals that coincide with those of the United Nations General Assembly, presented in the Special Session of May-June 1986 and mentioned in the U.N. Program for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) for 1986-90.

One of its five objectives is "human resources development with emphasis on planning and efficient utilization." In this context "emphasis will continue to be accorded to project lending as the most effective way of increasing economic output by capacity creation and modernization" (page 41).

The Bank recognizes the many training requirements in the sectors of agriculture, health, and education. Most of these training needs do not fall specifically within the Training Center's domain.

"The main objective of the training program for senior officials from regional member countries is to improve the capacity of borrowing countries to administer Bank Group assisted projects and accelerate disbursement and project implementation. In particular, development banking seminars are designed to impart the various analytical techniques for project appraisal and policy analysis" (ADB Annual Report 1987, page 78).

The Role of the Training Center

The "definitive statement" of the Bank's objectives and goals for the Training Center is found in the Bank President's referenced Memorandum 03-87:

The Training Center, by Presidential Directive, is charged with the following responsibilitics:

Propose and implement training programs and curricula for staff and member countries

Develop programs in cooperation with other organizational units, and maintain in-house capability for training

Develop appropriate training tools

Mobilize external supplementary resources for training purposes

The Directive continues to specify that the Training Center will

Have internal Bank staff, language, and orientation courses, which will be designed in collaboration with the human resources department

Design and implement member country programs at request of Country Programs Departments and/or other relevant bodies within the Bank

Prepare and implement staff training programs in management and technical "refresher" courses at request of other organizational units within the Bank

Collaborate with Cooperation Department to initiate, develop, and maintain contacts with bilateral and multilateral financial sources and technical assistance funds for training to supplement the Training Center resources

At the request of other departments, develop and conduct seminars and workshops, as well as policy seminars to assist member countries in developing more appropriate policies

Compile and make available information on external training programs

The Directive notes that the Training Center may make up its own organization to fit its own functional needs, but that it will have no divisions.

The Bank's Annual Report describes activities required to achieve these objectives, but is couched in somewhat vague terms. It states that the activities of the Training Center will center on banking development seminars.

The more important Bank document is the Administration Memorandum 03-87 contained in the Bank's most recent operations manual. It is the Bank management's directive setting forth the objectives and functions of the Training Center. In reality, the memorandum does not set forth objectives for the Training Center, but functional responsibilities. The memorandum states that the Training Center will respond to requests of other functional units and organizations, thus defining the Training Center as a service organization.

It is also important to note that the directive mentions that policy seminars will be organized by the Training Center. This type of seminar goes beyond "training" in the traditional sense, even though policy seminars and policy dialogue are clearly referred to in the Project documents. The point is that the Center is responsible for performing tasks that are not "training" and the name Training Center is, therefore, somewhat of a misnomer.

It is necessary to understand these definitions of the Training Center's role, since the following sections of the Evaluation Report also take them into account. Therefore, the performance level of the Training Center will be weighed (1) against the project-specific objectives and activities for the Training Center, and (2) within the Bank-specific environment/directives for the Training Center.

Member Country Visit for Training Program Evaluation

The following section discusses various details of the Training Center's member country seminar program. However, the observations and recommendations are not restricted entirely to the member country training, since some of the issues also concern the Training Center.

The Evaluation

The field trip to four countries to evaluate the member country seminar program was intended to distinguish between surface impressions and facts. In the following presentation, therefore, the numerical data reflect one image of the Bank's member country seminar training program, while interviews may reflect a different one. The numerical information of the questionnaire is basically restricted to the "reaction level" of the participants. In contrast, the interviews seek information at the more complex measurement levels of "productivity" and "developmental improvements in organizations."

Following is the breakdown of information gathered during the member country visits. It is presented by the subject areas used in the questionnaire (Q = Questionnaire; I = Interview).

General Information

Were your expectations fulfilled by the seminar?

Q: Yes: 85 percent Partially: 15 percent

I: Only 32 percent of the persons interviewed mentioned that their expectations had been related to improving their on-the-job skills, increasing productivity, or performing their jobs more effectively and efficiently. When those who did relate to these aspects were asked to give concrete examples, the answers were general: "My boss sends people to me if there's a problem." The great majority of persons -- 63 percent -- said their expectations were met because the seminar subject matter was pertinent to their jobs.

Not a single person expressed expectations of learning skills that would lead to increased responsibilities and professional promotions or salary increases. Even if they had, not a single seminar participant has received a promotion or salary raise through attending the seminars or through upgrading their job skills by taking the seminars.

The small population that was partially satisfied in their anticipations noted that they really had not known specifically what to expect from the seminars.

Teaching Techniques

Was there an adequate balance between theoretical and practical aspects in the seminars?

Q: Adequate: 59 percent More Practice Required: 50 percent

NOTE: The ideal response to this question would be 80 percent adequate, with an acceptable 20 percent seeking more practice.

I: This imbalance points out a number of problems inherent in the general member country seminar program. Basically, the problem is that the Training Center does not design or even directly choose the pedagogical inputs into the seminars. The Center relies on the trainers' own materials and on World Bank materials that are sometimes dated, over-used, or not Bank-specific. This dependency on outside materials causes the Center to lose control over the design of course programs as well as over their timing and contents.

There is a serious shortage of Bank staff and of practice time for Bank-specific training in the application aspects of a course curriculum.

Instructor Teaching Skills

How did the instructors handle their subjects? Did they cover the key points? Did they cover course objectives?

Q: Satisfactory: 46 percent Highly Satisfactory: 47 percent

I: Lack of good teacher mix weakened the overall satisfaction level of the seminar participants. There was often an incorrect balance of academics and experienced professionals. Bank-specific trainers are generally under-represented in the practical areas of the courses and too often seemed to perform their assignments without conviction and interest. However, the problems were not serious enough to detract from the overall high rating given by interviewees to the seminar instructors.

Instructors' communication skill, ability with groups, and knowledge of subject?

Q: Satisfactory: 61 percent Highly Satisfactory: 35 percent

I: The previous comments also apply here, with particular mention that the courses require more Bank-specific and Africa-specific instructors.

Pedagogical Materials

Visual aids and texts and written materials.

Q: Satisfactory: 50 percent Highly Satisfactory: 36 percent
Unsatisfactory: 14 percent

I: Curiously enough, the "unsatisfactory" stems from an over-abundance of written materials. Participants complained of too many materials that could not be utilized and absorbed during the course. This was a general complaint by 50 percent of all participants and re-emphasizes the fact that the Training Center does not directly control the pedagogical inputs into the seminars.

Overall Evaluation of Seminars

Q: Good-Average: 21 percent Good-Excellent: 79 percent
(Overall grade of 15 on scale of 1-20.)

Seminar Usefulness to the Job

What has been the real impact of the training seminars on the trainees, their jobs, careers, and organizations, and on the goals of the Bank and the Project?

This aspect of the member country training evaluation is not only the most important, it is also the area where the question of image and reality become crucial. The image is that 97 percent of the participants have found the seminars useful (and in some cases, highly useful) to their jobs.

The interviews showed that, in reality, the participants had not given much thought to these questions. Their supervisors and the heads of the sponsor organizations were not even informally measuring training impact on participants after they return. The Bank itself has not conducted any follow-up studies with any of the participants or their organizations. Even in the case of Yaounde, Cameroon where there is a Bank representative, there is no Bank contact with seminar participants.

Therefore, the ratings given by the participants are changed in their meaning, because nobody is making a systematic, meaningful measurement of on-the-job impact. There is no way, beyond participant appreciation level, to know whether the terms of reference are being addressed adequately, and are still appropriate, whether the training is having a career impact or resulting in technology transfer, or whether the member country training should be modified in any way.

In terms of the Project's emphasis on member country capabilities to formulate loans and projects capabilities, the lack of follow-up training impact evaluations by the Training Center constitutes a serious weakness within the Training Center. It should also be an issue for Bank management. Without this information, the Bank cannot determine the value of the training programs which are to address needs in the member countries. (Furthermore, this also raises the question of how to measure improvements, if any, in project evaluations and increased capacity to handle loans. These benchmarks must be established even before an attempt is made to gauge the extent to which training was responsible for any improvements.)

The seriousness of the total lack of training impact evaluation is further illustrated by the following figures: (Reference "Statistics of Yearly Trained Personnel from Member Countries"; ADB Training Center. Annex. Information provided by the ADB Training Center.)

	Total Number Seminars	Loan/Project Seminars	Percent	Total Number Trainees	Loan/Project Trainees	Percent
1986	13	05	38	460	133	28.9
1987	13	05	38	368	162	44.0

While the number of events stayed static over 1986-87, and the total number of persons trained in member countries dropped by 8 percent in 1987, the number of trainees for loan and project related seminars rose dramatically by 71 persons or 24 percent; and by 15.1 percent comparatively from 1986 to 1987.

In addition to the Training Center not performing training impact evaluations, the Training Center also does not conduct formal, systematic training needs assessments, nor has it a short-term or long-term calendar of training events. Yet, even in the absence of all these measuring and evaluation tools, there has been a relatively large increase in training for a specific target group. This has occurred with no data to show that the increases are required or justified by Project or Bank objectives or needs.

Some cost figures for member country seminars have been provided by the Center; such figures should be utilized for determining some of the cost/benefit indicators at least for this priority target group.

General Conclusions from Member Country Training Evaluation

The Project

The Training Center outputs, which are to assist the member countries to keep up to date, quantitatively and qualitatively, with the Bank's project management, are not realistically measurable at this time, since there have been no training impact evaluations or any other follow-up to the training programs for the member countries. Specifically

> The participants are not tracking any of their outputs in a systematic or statistical manner whereby it can be learned if they are in line with the quantitative and qualitative standards of the Bank.
>
> Neither the participants nor their directors, nor the heads of the sponsor organizations know what the Bank standards are concerning project and loan management improvements. Indeed, are there any benchmarks? The sponsor organizations also comment that tracking and evaluating results of their employees' training are too time consuming and costly, and that it cannot be done.
>
> The Training Center is not tracking post-training impact, and, thus, cannot provide information on whether or not the member country program is meeting Bank and Project standards.
>
> Participant and sponsor organization "reaction-level" information says that there is an improvement in the quality of preparing projects as well as in the scope and depth of evaluating project needs. However, this level of appreciation is informal and insufficient to meet what the Bank and the Project would probably establish as minimum evaluation standards for determining if requirements are being met. (Again, even if there are benchmarks for determining that projects are "better," how will the causal relationship of training to the improvement be measured?)
>
> As mentioned in Project Paper, "Seminars should be even more (useful) as training methodology and materials are further refined and made specific to paramount problems facing the ADB and the member countries."

The Training Center does not develop and provide its own materials for the seminars it operates and does even less for the seminars for which it acts as joint operator. Most seminars depend on materials provided by the instructors, some of whom are Bank staff members. The participants' opinions reflect that these inputs are generally of sound quality. To a great extent materials come from World Bank publications. Many of the participants have commented that materials for case studies should be more specific to the Bank and Africa. The Training Center staff agrees with this reaction and further notes that the seminar participants have often brought this fact to their attention.

Apparently, the Training Center has not acted to date to address these observations. The conclusion on this point must be that the Training Center is not meeting the mandate of refining training methodology and teaching materials. A further observation to be made here is the lack of methodology changes in the seminar program since its conception prior to the AID Grant program. In fact, the question arises whether "seminars" are the proper forum for "skill training." If it were decided that they are not, a modification to training methodologies would have to be made. At present, there is no "Programs and Studies" operation within the Training Center that could keep abreast of new, dynamic materials and methodologies best suited to the seminars. Such a pedagogically oriented function has recently been proposed to Training Center management by members of the staff.

The Bank Standard

According to Bank management, defining what is of paramount importance is not the responsibility of the Training Center. Apparently in accordance with the Bank management's guidelines, the Training Center should provide training in response to what the Country Program Departments would establish as priority. The assumption here is that the Training Center will accept that these departments have done their homework concerning member country needs. But, without a training impact evaluation and a systematic needs assessment, there is no accurate way to determine if the Center's faith in the information it receives from the other departments is well placed or not.

Member Country Seminar Selection

For purposes of this section, the terms "selection processes" and "procedures" are defined to include selecting courses (i.e., seminars and seminar topics); selecting seminar participants; selecting seminar instructors (both Bank staff and non-Bank staff); and selecting the locations and times of the seminars.

This part of the assessment must take into account the Bank's operating directives for the Training Center. In this context, the Training Center is not fully able to control the selection of seminars and their topics and, therefore, is not fully accountable for the extent to which the seminars organized by the Center address problems of major importance to the member countries.

The member country visits and evaluations, together with extensive interviews with Bank and Training Center staff and management in Abidjan, show that the Center's process and procedure for the selection of seminars is adequate in the mechanical aspect of the operation.

How does the Center "choose" a seminar program for a given year? The Center requests the Bank's operational departments and the ministries and financial institutions within the member countries to indicate their training needs for the coming year. The Center staff use the information to draw up a program of seminars they will present over the year. The program is published in a booklet that lists the application deadlines, a short description of the training programs, and an explanation of the selection and admission procedures.

Considering the problems of African communications, the Training Center has been successful in scheduling its yearly programs and in disseminating its notification bulletins. However, the procedure does not seem to be administered correctly. At the very beginning of this evaluation, both the

Norwegian and USAID missions were in the process of rejecting the Center's requests for training. They held that the requests did not reflect a global program of events for the coming year, nor indicate that the seminars had been selected systematically on the basis of priority needs. In addition, the requests were not submitted according to the agreed-on timetable.

Thus, what should be a relatively straight-forward planning and organization approach is failing to such a degree that the training seminar's requests are being turned down by donors. These shortcomings are the unfortunate outcome of both the Bank management's lack of clear objectives for the Training Center and of the Training Center's own management's lack of awareness of the importance of programmed operations in support of institutional goals and objectives.

As shown above, the problems originate only partly within the Center. In an administrative structure such as the Bank's where management style is top-down, the Training Center occupies a position with relatively little influence. Added to this is the directive which requires that the Center "respond to...on request from."

Unfortunately, the Training Center's top management provides no counter-balance. It has not strengthened and protected its operations through the implementation of management systems and training programs that can be defended in terms of their pedagogical and professional excellence and their proven effectiveness. The absence of these managerial and training systems leaves the Center doubly vulnerable.

Participant Selection Procedures for Member Country Seminars

This procedure is not totally under the direct control of the Training Center. However, the Center indicates the process for each seminar and does have a selection committee procedure that is used for all of the Center's training programs.

Once the Center has scheduled a particular seminar, it solicits participants with very well-specified qualifications. These invitations, together with a general course description and other pertinent seminar data, go out (ideally) some six months prior to seminar start-ups and are addressed to upper management of sponsor organizations.

The organizations in turn then provide a bio-professional sketch of their candidates, together with a supervisor's observations, and the applicants' comments on how the seminar will serve them. The files are reviewed in Abidjan by a Bank selection committee. In the case of a joint seminar (with UNDP, World Bank, etc.), the co-sponsors are invited to participate in the selection process.

Since there are normally far more applicants than available slots, the selection committee has ample quantity from which to select the quality. This process is for the most part quite adequately carried out. Once the sponsor organizations are informed, they, in turn, notify and prepare the participants according to their in-house procedures.

The present participant selection system would seem to be providing reasonable guarantees of obtaining the right participant for the right seminar. Nonetheless, to be sure the right participants are being trained, meaningful post-seminar evaluations are required, and systematic and fully professional training impact studies should be ongoing activities. Since these are lacking, it is not possible to confirm that the right persons are being trained. However, the interviews have given encouraging indications that the seminars are, on the whole, satisfactorily attracting the participants whose professional needs match the seminars.

The principal weak link in the participant selection process lies in the member countries themselves. At times, upper management of sponsor organizations do not fully understand or pay attention to what the Bank is looking for in its Seminar Program. In many instances, therefore, they do not handle the Center's invitation to designate participants with the seriousness it deserves.

The potential for not selecting the right candidate for the right course is bound to exist, especially in a program like the Bank's member country seminar program where distance and non-Bank organizations cause so many variables.

Instructor Selection for Seminar Training

The Training Center has no procedures and no information database for obtaining good instructors on a timely basis. There is no guarantee that a "confirmed" instructor (especially in the case of a Bank staff member) will not become just another no-show, necessitating finding a last minute stand-in, as there are no provisions for back-up personnel.

The problem stems from the previously mentioned lack of good planning and management. It is also due to the way in which the Bank staff are "co-opted" into teaching seminars. Another aspect is the seeming lack of Bank management's commitment to its training programs and to its own training needs. For example, Training Center staff, seminar participants, and Bank staff instructors are unanimous in noting that whenever there is a conflict between a staff member's (and his/her manager's) promise to teach a seminar and an immediate job-related need, the latter always takes precedence (usually to the relief of the staff person whose teaching role represents considerable extra work and no reward).

The total lack of a reliable system for obtaining seminar instructors results in an extreme over-dependance on the old-boy network. Frequently, when this fails, the Training Center management and staff are drafted as seminar instructors. Although this speaks highly of staff motivation in the face of adversity, it is hardly a satisfactory way of utilizing staff efforts in a Center that is already weakly organized.

The Training Center management confirms that there is a lack of sufficient and reliable contacts in international institutions and organizations and that mechanisms for obtaining seminar instructors from non-Bank sources need to be set up.

The Center nonetheless manages to staff its seminars with instructors of adequate quality and sometimes even of exceptional quality. Regrettably, this is achieved only by an excessive demand on staff time and energy.

Selection Process for Seminar Location, Time, etc.

Complete data are not available for determining how well the Center is choosing the seminar locations according to measuring standards that would normally be applied (i.e., cost per participant, etc). The data available show that most training sites were in Abidjan. However, there are no studies to show that this is due to cost, Bank location, instructor availability, etc. It is necessary for the Training Center to make such analyses in order to maximize target-audience impact and cost/benefit ratio. The information will be useful in deciding on future training sites.

Often, the Center does not make decisions concerning the seminar and its location, especially in jointly sponsored seminars which are becoming more numerous. Interviews with management have not been useful in learning to what extent attention is given to cost/benefit factors, audience impact, logistics, etc. No statistical data or "insider knowledge" was available. The Training Center management stated that, in turn, they weigh such factors as target audience in determining when and where a given seminar should be held. Center management also feels they have reasonable input and influence in ensuring that seminars are given in areas where there are adequate resources for such seminar events. Resources refer to instructor availability and proximity, hotel accommodations, international organizations' presence, particularly in the numerous cases where a Bank seminar is being given as a joint event with the World Bank, UNDP, FAO, etc. Training Center management further states that they exercise some authority in determining whether or not a given seminar request is within their competence. The Center is known to have rejected seminar requests.

One factor of site determination, which has received no systematic analysis, is the comparative value of giving target-intensive courses to specific in-country national audiences versus foreign country seminars for "Pan-African" audiences.

Joint Training Seminars: ADB/EDI, ADB/UNDP, ADB/UNTCC, etc.

In 1987, the Training Center organized five of the thirteen seminars in cooperation with other multilateral organizations. This was a sharp shift away from the Bank-specific seminars of previous years. The shift seems to reflect the Training Center directives to "initiate, develop, maintain contacts with bilateral and multilateral financial sources and technical assistance funds for training to supplement the Training Center resources." The "joint venture" seminars add another variable in evaluating some of the above items. Nonetheless, the same basic criteria apply even when the Bank is a joint participant in a seminar. It remains important that the Training Center have in place a needs assessment and training impact evaluation system that can offer reasonable guarantees that joint seminars meet Bank objectives and member country needs.

The question might be raised whether non-Bank-specific seminars are in line with Bank goals and, in the case of Project funds, this should be clarified promptly. This is particularly important since, simultaneously with these new joint-venture courses, nine new topics have been added to the list of Bank seminars. They show an increasing tendency toward policy- rather than skills-oriented subjects, thereby indicating a possible shift in Bank training priorities.

ISSUES

Summary of ADB Member Country and Overall Training Center Issues

As mentioned, the Bank's member country training program deserved specific analysis because it is the largest training effort sustained by the Bank and the Project, both in numbers of persons trained and in terms of money invested by the Grant.

It was also mentioned that specific analysis of the member country program was useful because it disclosed many factors and issues that concern the general Training Center operations.

1. Bank Management Understanding and Support for Training

The Bank seems somewhat unclear on what the objectives for the Training Center should be. As a result, the Training Center operates under directives that would seem to hamstring the Center's ability to function as a dynamic, creative entity that can provide good pedagogical advice and services to the Bank with a clear understanding of what the Bank's goals and needs are and which among those goals should be addressed by training programs.

2. Training Center Management Understanding and Support to the Bank

The Training Center is at present not structured to operate in a more dynamic mode, even if the Bank directives were less "restrictive." General weaknesses in both management systems and concepts for large institutional training programs have historically prevented the Training Center from creating a training function that can both guide and serve the Bank's needs and objectives.

3. Training Center Image

The Training Center has many critics within the Bank, and even within certain circles in the member countries. The Training Center is seen as a banishment ground where management sends Bank professionals with whom they do not know what to do. Therefore, the Training Center has a somewhat negative profile within the Bank.

It is difficult to clearly see where the "image problem" starts. Nonetheless, the obvious conclusion is that this image must be erased by a concerted and selfless effort of all concerned so that the important day-to-day business of operating the Training Center can fully support the Bank's short- and long-term objectives.

4. Training Center Management Skills

The Training Center's management level comprises a variety of skilled and knowledgeable professionals. None of them have had a professional background or experience in training per se prior to their present assignment. In the perception of some of the Center's personnel, top Center management appears slightly insensitive to the importance of some of the most ordinary management and program planning, budgeting, and other monitoring tools. This lack of appreciation and long-standing disregard for these issues has left the Training Center with ad hoc management, the term "crisis management" often being a tempting description of the style.

5. Training Staff Skills

The general lack of hands-on management and planning procedures is being compensated for by the recent addition to the Center of a Deputy Director whose primary skill is planning, and of an adviser and staff members who possess professional skills and experience in Bank-specific areas, as well as teaching and training experience. Overall, however, the Center is weak in numbers of professionals with training expertise. The Center's work load also exceeds what the present staff can adequately handle, perhaps even within a smoothly organized operation. While the number of courses per year has risen to 20 in 1986, the Training Center staff has had no commensurate increases in personnel.

Fortunately, the Training Center management is now in a position to start overcoming a long-standing deficiency in planning and training skills with the utilization of more balanced in-house talents. The acid test will be how the Center utilizes their manpower resources.

6. Training Center Management and Staff Potential

The in-house talent now should be able to tackle the management issues at hand and produce the required results. The important issue here is to ensure that the Center's management is clearly aware of the talent it does possess so as to not waste an opportunity. It must take all necessary steps to use its assets to maximum effect to get the Center rapidly on track in the above training and management areas.

The importance of rational utilization of manpower resources in the Center cannot easily be overstated. Keeping in mind the Bank directive that prevents the Center from having divisions, thereby limiting the Center's staff, the only way the Center can produce a credible training product will be through a management and staff structure that conforms to solid managerial and organizational training concepts. The Center's on-board talent is sufficient to produce the needed organization if allowed to do so.

Full utilization of human talent is particularly important in the case of the advisory position in the Training Center. The time allotted to the position is short for the tasks at hand. Every effort must be expended by the adviser and the Center management to maximize working relations within the Center and throughout the operational areas of the Bank where appropriate, for maximum utilization of the adviser's time to the benefit of the Center and the Bank's training objectives.

7. Training Center Credibility and Viability

The Center must establish a viable training operation. It must analyze what has been done in training, and the training needs; and design specific training programs that can be professionally and pedagogically defended as the best for addressing Bank needs and problems. With a viable, operational organization, the Center can establish credibility within the Bank and immediately begin to improve its standing with multilateral and bilateral donors, including AID/REDSO.

8. Training Center Outputs Under the Project

The various annexes document Training Center activities in the area of training seminars and programs.

a) The seminars that the Training Center has produced through 1987 comply with the number stipulated in the Project Agreement. Nonetheless, at present the Center is essentially limited to quantitative measurements in determining whether the objectives of the Project are being met, whether to respond to changes in Project and Bank goals emphasis and reflect African reality, and whether there should be any modifications or changes.

b) The Project CP calling for an in-depth training needs assessment has not yet been met. The previously noted deficiencies in planning and programming have prompted the training staff to propose to the Center's management that the needs assessment should no longer be the first priority. Rather, the Center should perform first an evaluation of what has been done in order to determine what future training needs are. Center staff has submitted documentation on the subject. It is the Consultant's opinion that the recommendation is valid.

c) Bank Staff Training Outputs. In 1986, the Bank reorganized its structure and the Training Center is no longer within the Human Resources Division. It now reports to the Vice President of Central Operations while Human Resources falls under the Vice President of Administration and General Services. (See ADB Organizational Chart, 9/3/1987, Annex.)

At the time of this report, the Bank was still in the throes of the reorganization. The Bank President is apparently desirous of having the dust settle and then fine-tuning the inter/intra-departmental functions and responsibilities. Therefore, the Training Center and Human Resources Division are still in flux concerning the various issues of staff training responsibilities, issues that concern both Human Resources and the Training Center.

The Bank has created a new "technical committee" which will assess the training needs of junior staff personnel and determine what skills upgrading is required. It will also determine organizational responsibility for training of Bank staff.

It seems logical that the Training Center keep their emphasis on training in project analysis and development and loan administration when addressing the question of who should handle management development training. Staying limited to areas familiar to the Center (from its member country programs) seems desirable, especially considering its present organizational weaknesses.

Following are issues concerning the Training Center's performance and role in language teaching and computer instruction. Although language training within the Bank is not a Project area, AID/REDSO expressed an interest in having this issue addressed.

Bank Training Center Language Training Outputs

One person is assigned to operate the Center's language training program. The incumbent has not had sufficient time to establish an adequate language needs assessment for the Bank staff. Despite the importance of bilingualism, as evidenced in Bank Memorandum 17-81, "Concerning the Second Language Policy," the function is inadequately financed and staffed. It is not capable of meeting Bank needs as they are at least informally perceived.

There is justification for an in-depth needs assessment for language training. The volume of requests already far exceeds the Center's course capacity. It is estimated that a full-time person, skilled in needs assessments and familiar with the implications of language training, could probably complete a satisfactory assessment in six to nine months. The money being invested in language training is by no means sufficient for the Bank's needs.

The one-man operation currently in place raises the question of the Bank management's true commitment to language training. It would seem worthwhile for the Training Center and Bank management to determine clearly what the goals for bilingualism should be and invest accordingly. A thorough assessment that specifically addresses the question of how much it will cost the Bank to operate a language teaching operation versus how much it will cost not to operate one should be of high interest to top management. The Bank can not make a proper evaluation until it has a clear assessment of the costs and benefits involved.

A good language training program for the Bank's technical assistants and support personnel merits consideration. Does the Bank know the costs of the down time of personnel who are not functionally bilingual? Even in the absence of precise data, it is clear that the present capacity of the Training Center does not match the needs to be addressed.

Computer Training Outputs of the Training Center

The following observations on computer training will complement those contained in the section on information processing.

The Training Center has one person whose specific expertise is computers. He brings 17 years of mainframe experience to the job. The assignment of a "computer person" to the Center reflects Bank and Project awareness of the need to address computer training and the support role that the Training Center should provide. Computer awareness programs for Bank staff have been supported by Project inputs.

The Training Center has already included computer courses in member country seminars whose participants have a need for computer literacy. To the credit of these courses, all the member country participants gave them high praise during the member country evaluation interviews. However, participants' access to computers in their jobs is still limited or non-existent. The courses were mainly familiarization courses. It is not certain that such courses should continue to be given in the member countries. Clearly a familiarization course that sends a trainee back to a work station without access to a computer is of minimal value.

Between 1986 and 1987, 336 persons were given courses of varying levels. These include 27 member country officials who attended courses and another 78 who were "exposed to computers" (Ref: "Review of Computer 'Training' "; P. Packard, ADB/TC).

The consensus in the Bank and of the consultants is that ACOS should play a primary role in determining computer training needs. The Training Center could continue to play its support role in providing basic skills training for user department employees.

The Training Center has utilized outside Bank sources for computer training. The ACOS expressed the desire that the Center continue giving the beginner courses. ACOS would handle the computer applications courses as user support programs, and would call on the Training Center for assistance in arranging the training programs.

By establishing a solid mutual support effort, ACOS and the Training Center should be able to reasonably satisfy the Bank's immediate and medium/long-term computer training needs. There cannot be the luxury of defending "turf interests" in this subject. Training demands are growing each day and require steady, broad-based support.

The Bank may consider an in-house computer training station, complete with a bank of Wangs and PCs and staffed for daily, ongoing, regularly scheduled courses for the staff. This kind of installation would at least address the constant need for training of new Bank staff training, and of others requiring skills improvement. At the same time, it would minimize dependance on outside training sources that may not be able to respond promptly to the Bank's growing computer training needs.

Training Center Participant Training Outputs

Under the provisions of the Project, certain training may be performed outside (i.e., participant training) of the Bank. The basic selection procedures for candidates for foreign training follow those for staff training.

The selection procedures are adequately implemented. The small volume of trainees and lower urgency of scheduling their programs -- compared to training for member countries -- assures that processing and departure procedures are properly handled.

The basic weakness of the Training Center in this area is the lack of information on schools and institutions overseas that can adequately fill the training needs of employees selected to go abroad. This has not seriously impaired the Center's ability to make selections for training courses overseas. However, access to such information needs strengthening to provide more alternatives for Bank personnel slated for training abroad.

A list of the participant trainees, their courses, and the program costs is included in the annex. It is all-inclusive from 1982-10/87. Unfortunately, the information was made available too late to obtain information pertinent to on-the-job impact or the selection criteria used for authorizing the trainees.

Also, the Bank could not fully respond to requests for data on total costs for the participant training. Therefore, only part of the list shows both Project and Bank expenses.

With an average Project-share cost of slightly more than $5,000 per trainee/ per month, it seems imperative for the Training Center to provide solid feedback concerning trainee and Bank benefits. (The average is taken from the nine participants listed who have trained under the Project.)

When participants return to the Bank, they set up a "training session" to brief a selected target audience on their training. The trainees also provide the Center and the Bank with a full report. This is considered only a partial follow-up since the cost per participant per month demands a more systematic measure of training results.

General Bank Staff Training Outputs by the Training Center

This area of Training Center outputs was elusive, mainly because the Center itself was unclear about the volume of training events, their topics, and which ones it organized and funded (with or without Project funds) as opposed to those that it only organized.

The issue confronting the Training Center and the Bank here is how much responsibility the Training Center should have for training. The new Technical Committee will make this decision. However, the myriad training needs in an institution as large as the Bank simply cannot be addressed all at once. The bulk of staff training should be placed under the Human Resource Division. It is building up a skills inventory list and a job classification system. These will provide more accurate tools for determining in-house staff training needs. A support role for the Training Center would probably be indicated in this area, patterned on the support the Center lends to computer training.

The Human Resources Division is also best placed to implement systems of salary and position incentives within a comprehensive staff training function. If the responsibility for staff training were given to the Center, the tie-in of skills improvements and job classification/remuneration would be diminished.

Thus, overall, the Center's role in staff training should remain limited to its present activities in language, computer, and orientation training.

8. Project Share of Cost of Bank's Planned Training Programs

This item examines whether the share costs for the Project are within the proportions intended by the Grant.

The Bank could provide only limited facts and figures for this purpose. Before the consultant departed on the field trip for three weeks, information requests were left with the Training Center for cost-specific items. None were provided by the time of the consultant's return to Abidjan, and only some were available as the report was in its final phases.

Some non-statistical information is available, however. The item of first importance is that the Training Center is not operating on a planned annual budget concept. Its internal tracking systems are not systematic and its programs do not depend on a cost-benefit analysis of any kind. Accountability or even reporting systems are not systematically organized. In spite of recent improvements, Center staff was never quite sure who had the financial information, if it existed at all, and if not, where to find it. As a result, it was not possible to create a clear picture of yearly budgets, how much was utilized, for which items, and the Bank/project ratio.

The problem obviously must be solved by the introduction of adequate financial tracking systems in the Training Center. The large amounts of money necessary to operate seminars and participant training programs make it absolutely imperative that there be up-to-date financial records systems that itemize all incurred costs against budgeted items.

As in the case of the participant training program, it is almost inconceivable that the project cost share of $12,548.00 for one person to go to the University of Connecticut for two months cannot be supported with Training Center financial documentation, related to Bank share and to total training costs. A similar problem exists in the area of costs for seminar training.

It is essential for the Project to insist that the Center create financial tracking systems and show accountability at both planning and post-execution stages of training programs. The Project must also assure that only costs directly related to training are supported by Grant funds. Expenditures for ceremonies and the like are the most obvious of the non-allowable.

8-a Data Available on Project's Share of Costs of Member Country Seminars and Participant Training

The figures available in the REDSO Pipeline Report (1/31/88) show the combined member country seminar and participant training disbursements to date:

Earmarked	Committed	Disbursed	Unliquidated Oblig/Ear	Unexpended
$1,455,000	$1,020,513	744,142	710,858	710,858

Earmarked Totals	Unearmarked Balance
$1,139,966	315,034

It is difficult to obtain a conclusive picture of the share burden aspects from these data, but the annex chart "USAID Grant-Sponsored Seminars-Member Countries Program," provides some indications.

In 1986, the average Project contribution per member country seminar was roughly $50,000 (high $105,000; low $15,000). The eight seminars for which full cost data exist show that the average share cost for the Project was 51 percent (high 91 percent; low 18 percent).

In 1987, the average Project contribution per member country seminar was roughly $48,000 (high $92,000; low $20,000). The seven seminars for which there are full cost data available indicate that the average Project share amounted to 73 percent (high 100 percent; low 32 percent).

The data for 1986 lack information on four seminars; average Project share per seminar was roughly $58,000 (the same as in 1987). The average share cost for the Project was 51 percent in 1986 and 73 percent in 1987. This is a direct increase of 22 percent and a proportionate increase of 43 percent.

If the trends above are accurate once the full data are obtained, then AID's share of the cost of the Bank's planned training programs for member countries' officials is increasing too rapidly and needs to be modified.

No conclusions can be drawn regarding the participant training program because of a lack of comparative data.

Reference Materials

Several reports by previous consultants served as background reading for the Training Center section of this report, especially the following:

The Skill Inventory System

Frank Fender, "Strengthening the AfDB's Training Capability"

Hay Survey of Management Climate and Issue Identification Report

This Mid-Term Evaluation report has already implied or stated what the Training Center should do to establish a viable training program in line with Bank and Project objectives. It is the Consultant's opinion that the Training Center should "dust off" the consultancy reports mentioned above for specific, useful references on the "what to do's" and the "how to do's." At the least, the consultancies represent carefully weighed feasible action items from which the Training Center should select the most appropriate.

Some good ideas are also coming out of the Training Center staff at this time. The RRNA consultant was given many in-house readings, several of which contain excellent suggestions that should be aired and acted on as appropriate. Those papers are not listed in the bibliography. Since these in-house Training Center papers have not yet been circulated officially in the Bank, it was requested they not be listed as references.

Conclusions

The evaluation of the Bank Training Center has led to the following conclusions:

The Bank Training Center is operating seminar programs for Bank staff and member countries at a quantitative level that attests to the Center's logistical abilities.

The Training Center has not developed an organizationally and pedagogically viable training operation that can address the training objectives of the Bank and of the Project in a qualitative manner that can fully satisfy the standards and goals of the Project.

The observations made in the body of this evaluation should be seen as constructive criticisms. The Training Center should use them to begin restructuring its operations.

The specific recommendations at the end of this evaluation should be understood to be the ones which the Consultant feels are the most important for the Center success in the future. When implemented, they will begin to solve the problems mentioned throughout this evaluation.

It should be underlined that this evaluation of the Training Center finds that the Bank does have problems in the training area, but even more importantly, it has opportunities in the Training Center. These only need to be taken advantage of.

It is the conviction of the Consultant that the human resources in the Training Center, the motivation of the Center's staff, the bounteous information that has been collected in the Center, and the basic awareness on the part of the training staff of what needs to be done and how to do it, are all important opportunities for the Bank and the Center to seize on to move ahead.

Final Recommendations

Because the African Development Bank Training Center has not been able to achieve several of the important goals and outputs that are set out in the Terms of Reference of the Project, it is recommended that USAID/REDSO temporarily suspend funding of Training Center training activities.

This suspension is recommended because the inability of the Training Center to achieve these outputs is further complicated by the Center's lack of cost and impact accountability for activities that consume significant amounts of Grant (and Bank) funds. It is not reasonable to continue to spend on these activities while there is no clear indication that the funds are being spent well or correctly. The suspension of activities and Project funding will provide the Center with time to accomplish the following recommendations.

The Center should restructure and reorganize along functional managerial lines that are tailored to the business of operating a large, institutional training operation. The reorganization should incorporate professional managerial concepts and structures, monitoring systems, and sound pedagogical activities.

The restructuring should not be done in isolation. Top Bank management should be included in the ground floor discussions to establish clear organizational objectives for the Training Center. Meaningful commitments of Bank management to the Center and of the Center to the Bank's objectives should be established.

The Center should be given very clear guidelines from USAID/REDSO of what it is expected to produce in the restructuring effort. There should be frequent discussions to ensure that realistic time limits are set for accomplishing the restructuring, and that the efforts of the Training Center are consistent with those of the Bank and the Project.

The restructuring should also allow for the Training Center's development of a training needs assessment or a training evaluation. This should result in the development of immediate (1989) and long range training programs that realistically address Bank and Project training needs and objectives.

The Center and the Project should jointly determine the extent of a rationale if any, for pursuing "seminar events" as opposed to skill training for Bank staff with project funds.

The Bank, the Training Center, and AID/REDSO should agree on a work plan for the Training Center. It should be monitored to ensure that the Training Center achieve its outputs in time to obtain Bank and Project approvals with enough lead time for initiating new programs for 1989.

Finally, it is recommended that the temporary suspension of Project Grant funds for Training Center training activities not be lifted until the parties are satisfied that the Training Center has produced a feasible organization and program to meet Project goals and objectives.

As a fall back position, plans should be formulated for the alternative employment of project funds in case the Training Center cannot produce a credible package along the lines recommended above.

III. DATA PROCESSING

This chapter of the report contains the evaluation of the data processing component of the grant to the African Development Bank.

Consultants Database

The AfDB has maintained a database of consulting firms, individual consultants, suppliers, and contractors since 1977. These data are used to pre-qualify entities to supply goods and services to the Bank. The data was originally kept only in paper form. As the number of entities and cross-reference indices (selection criteria) grew, the manual system became too cumbersome to be effective. Accordingly, in 1982, a project was initiated to computerize the database.

The entry of the consultants database has had three phases. Phase I was the input of basic data: name, address, telex, country, and date of registration. Phase II was the entry of fields of specialization of consultants. Phase III involved the entry of project experience.

Phase III of the entry of data on consultants is now complete, and entry is now limited to new entities and updates. Mr. Kalla of the Bank's procurement division supervised two consultants provided under this project and was extremely pleased with their performance. Although there are no records available on the daily or weekly entry rate, more than 3,600 persons or firms currently reside in the computer file. It is estimated that during the project, 20 to 25 records were entered and verified per day.[1]

The Bank uses the database extensively, particularly the Agriculture and Rural Development and Infrastructure and Industry Departments (I and II). Attachment A shows requests by requesting unit, date of request, and date of response. In the past year, user requests have averaged ten per month.

Although the entry of the data has been completed, some problems remain within the system that reduce its accuracy and effectiveness. These issues are discussed below.

Coding System

The AfDB has developed its own system for skill codes within the database. This system is adequate for AfDB's needs, but its incompatibility with the World Bank skill coding system creates problems. The AfDB accepts World Bank forms as well as its own. Because the World Bank system is much more detailed than the AfDB system, World Bank codes must be translated into the AfDB coding system before entry. The two systems generally correspond, but it takes considerably longer to enter a World Bank form than an AfDB form because of time required for translation.

Although it is not a high priority, the Bank may wish to adopt the World Bank form. It could be done inexpensively. For example, all existing records could be translated into the new coding format with a single computer program. Because the World Bank system has more detail than records currently entered in the system, these records would be entered at, for example, the two-digit level only. New forms could be entered at either the two-digit (AfDB) or the four digit level (World Bank). Requests would generally continue to be made at the two-digit level, permitting retrieval of

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1. The consultant database was not operational for the entire week the computer consultant was at the Bank; thus, this analysis was based on interviews and paper records only. Bank staff stated that it was highly unusual for the database to be inoperable for such a long length of time.

both types of records. Optionally, requests could be made of the system at the more detailed World Bank system level. It would be easier for consultants and the Bank to handle only one type of consultant coding system.

Updating Data

Since the creation of the database, no firms have ever been purged from the file. The Bank requests that firms periodically update the records, but this is only done if the organization remembers to file an update. As a result, there are a number of dead firms, wrong addresses, and outdated skill codes in the existing file. Mr. Kala estimates that as many as 15 percent of the firms on the file are dead or unreachable with data currently in the file.

The system should generate a report every six months, which prints the following for each firm that has not contacted the Bank for two years:

A letter to the firm asking that the records be updated
All data stored in the computer on that firm
A mailing envelope or label

A manager would simply sign and send the letter. Firms would mark directly on the printout any corrections/revisions. Letters returned with address unknown, or firms not responding within three months would be deleted from the database.

Initiating this type of program would be an inexpensive project, and would improve the quality of data available to the Bank for the procurement of services.

Demographic Analysis Project

As part of a continuing program to supply the Bank with demographic analysis capabilities, the Bank contracted with IRD to select appropriate portable computers for field work, develop appropriate software systems, purchase hardware and software and deliver them to the Bank, and train Bank staff on the hardware and software.

The Bank is now satisfied with the performance of the contractor. Two problems were identified by the Bank concerning this project:

> The Bank would have preferred that the person included in the data gathering phase also be involved in the system development and training phases of the project. They felt that the contractor would have been more able to make full use of data collected if the personnel did not change. IRD agrees that it would have been ideal to use the same people in all three phases of the project, but that they were unable to schedule this. The Bank was satisfied with the performance of the consultants who completed the system development and training phases.
>
> A potentially more serious problem arose when the computers did not arrive in time, with sufficient documentation, to clear customs before the training class. IRD appropriately took full responsibility for this problem and offered to keep the consultants on for an extra week of training at IRD expense. The Bank was satisfied with this solution.

Finally, a question arose upon project completion as to the proper location of the portables. ACOS believed that the computers would be located in ACOS, held in a pool to be made available to Bank personnel requiring portables for field work. Agriculture and Rural Development believed that the PCs were to remain in the Department to continue to operate systems developed on them by Agriculture and Rural Development. It has now been determined that they will continue to reside in Agriculture and Rural Development until additional PCs can be made available to the department. At that time, the portables will be moved to ACOS, where they will be kept in a pool of computers available for Bank-wide use.

Everyone involved at the Bank agrees that this confusion could have been avoided by closer cooperation between ACOS, Agriculture and Rural Development, IRD, and USAID. AID should specifically state in all contracts involving computers, software, office automation, or automated information storage and retrieval, that ACOS must be consulted and has final authority over these areas of the Bank.

Personal Computers

USAID has funded 31 microcomputers under the project. The Bank currently has approximately 60 PCs in operation. Major uses of these computers are given below by application.

Number of PCs	Application
1	Investment analysis
4	Billing
2	Budget preparation and commitment
2	Missions and travel
3	Purchase and stock
7	System development (ACOS)
40	Lending operations (spreadsheet and word processing)

In addition, a number of laptop computers are used for in-country mission work (demographic analysis and project management).

The Bank does not maintain statistics on functional utilization of PCs. ACOS feels that, as a financial institution, every professional in the organization should have a workstation at his/her desk. As a result, there is currently no formal procedure to justify PC acquisition. It is believed that the demand for PCs is evident, and that resources should not be wasted justifying demand. Instead, when PCs are purchased, ACOS allocates them to areas of most critical demand. There have been some areas where the use of PCs has resulted in substantial efficiencies. Before automating on PCs, bank disbursements required two to four months turn-around. Today, using PCs, disbursements require only two weeks. Recent projects, such as the Demographic Analysis project, should result in more efficient and accurate information being used on projects, and better project management.

The demand for PCs still is greater than the supply at the Bank. ACOS is allocating its scarce staff resources to put out fires and to attempt to build the infrastructure for future information systems. In this light, it is understandable that little information is available on current PC usage.

However, as the PC user community at the Bank grows, so will support requirements. In order to give the user community effective software, data, and technical support, ACOS will be required to increase its user support services. One important step in this direction is the hiring of Mr. Paul Rezucha as a technical assistant under this project. Mr. Rezucha will be a micro-computer and network analyst in ACOS. In addition to Mr. Rezucha, ACOS plans to add an analyst for large systems and an office automation specialist to its staff. These three persons together will staff the user support hotline for AfDB staff.

The plan to provide user support services is fundamentally sound. The availability and quality of a user support center at the AfDB is the single most important factor determining the AfDB's ability to use additional personal computers effectively. The Bank, possibly with AID assistance, should periodically evaluate its user support services. These evaluations should be considered with needs assessments in determining any future provisions of PCs.

General Automation Support

The project has been very active in supporting data processing activities at the Bank. Without question, AID support has had an important positive impact on the Bank's data processing department, which in turn will improve the efficiency of operations of virtually every division within the Bank. RRNA conducted an office automation consultancy in January 1986. There has been noticeable progress in the Bank's ability to provide automation support in the two years since that project. The major support areas AID has provided are detailed below:

> Equipment: The new IBM 4381 mainframe, provided with project assistance, is the foundation on which future automation plans are built. The decision to purchase this system is amply justified in "Report on ADB Central Computer System Upgrade," and "ADB Information System Strategy Statement." Note that a significant portion of

the input for these analyses came from AID-sponsored studies.[2]

- TA Staff: Two TA positions have been funded under the project. The Manager of Applications Development slot was filled through project funds until March 1987. This position was a vital step in increasing the information systems infrastructure and understanding of computer systems in the Bank. Mr. Norris, who had filled this position, was recently promoted to Director of Organization and Methods. This promotion indicates the personal success of Mr. Norris at the Bank, as well as the success of AID in placing qualified TAs at the Bank. Unfortunately, this promotion has set back the timing, although not content, of some of ACOS' planned activities. When viewed from a more Bank-wide perspective, it is clear that this move will bring other offsetting benefits. It is clear that the Bank believed that Mr. Norris could serve the Bank better in his new position. It would have been useful to the project if AID and ACOS staff had been consulted prior to the decision, and if AID agreement had been requested in accordance with the project's standard operating procedures.

The second TA position in the computer center is the new microcomputer/network specialist. This position was discussed above in the analysis of the Bank's PCs.

- Studies: Several important studies of computer operations have been conducted under the project. Two of these studies, "Draft Final Report ADB Internal Network Study" (IRD Westinghouse August 1987), and "Draft Interim Report ADB Fourth Generation Software Environment Review" (Deloitte Haskins and Sells, September 1987), have been important inputs into the current ADB information systems strategy statement. There have been instances in the past where, for a variety of reasons, studies financed by AID have resulted in no or only minor actions by the Bank. It is encouraging to note that these recent studies will result directly in improved information systems infrastructure. Two other technical assistance

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2. Office Automation Assessment and Recommendations for the African Development Bank (RRNA, January 1986).

ADB Internal Network Study (IRD, August 1987).

ADB Fourth Generation Software Environment Review (Deloitte Haskins and Sells, September 1987).

projects, the demographic analysis project and the consultants database project, are discussed separately above.

- Training: General training issues are discussed in Chapter __ However, several factors make computer training unique. Computer training will play an increasingly important role at the AfDB. The demand for computer training generally increases with the sophistication of the user, the opposite condition from most training areas. Given the increasing reliance on automated information systems to manage Bank projects efficiently, staff training on these systems will become critical. Although the Bank has a training center equipped to handle most needs, only ACOS has the understanding and daily contact with the computer user community to appreciate needs in this area. For this reason, it seems imperative that the computer center determine TORs for training assistance and training programs, even if the program is eventually implemented through the training center. In addition, any outside instructions involved in computer training should include a briefing at project commencement and completion at ACOS, even if the training is implemented through the training center.

Conclusions

- AID support to the Bank's computer operations has been instrumental in the development of the Bank's automation capabilities. Without AID support, it is unlikely that the Bank could have experienced such rapid progress.

- AID support has greatly sensitized the management to the amount of ADP/computer use in the Bank's daily operation. The catalytic effect of the AID input should reflect itself in greatly increased allocations to ADP/computer requirements in future AfDB budgets.

- Existing systems have already increased the efficiency of the Bank's operations. Billing, disbursements, and general office automation (word processing) are important examples.

- Recent investments in the new computer and staff will result in substantially greater benefits to the Bank. The new FLAS loan system is expected to have the greatest Bank-wide impact of any information system to date.

The Bank currently has strong management in the computer department and appears to enjoy support for automation programs from senior management. This environment will ensure that AID assistance is used effectively.

The consultants database has been successfully automated. However, the system could be improved by implementing an automated update system, and considering using the World Bank standard form.

Better coordination between the consultants, ACPU, and the Agriculture and Rural Development Department during the software development training and implementation stages would have resulted in more efficient project implementation.

The Demographic Analysis project was successfully completed. Although the Agriculture and Rural Development Department has benefited from this consultancy, the project could have been designed to achieve greater Bank-wide benefits.

PCs at the Bank are in great demand. There is a gradual increase in the level of sophistication of the user community due to both organized classes and self training. The Bank's ability to use additional PCs successfully in the future will depend on the implementation of a user support center currently planned for ACOS, and effective and timely training programs.

Recent consulting projects financed by AID concerning automation have been successful and have resulted in reasonable action plans currently being executed.

Major investments required for hardware and infrastructure are either completed or currently in the pipeline. Any future AID assistance should be in the form of targeted short-term studies.

Recommendations

Future assistance to support the Bank's information systems should be targeted toward specific studies and training. Possible projects include

- Automated telex study including organizational requirements, hardware and software requirements, and security
- Advanced training on the use of Wang office automation products
- Disaster recovery planning
- Beginner, intermediate, and advanced PC training, including application-specific training (statistics, economic and financial modelling, project management, database creation and management)
- Improvement of the Consultants database through the development of an automated update system

Future training assistance involving computers should involve ACOS in TOR development and training consultants should be debriefed by ACOS at project completion, even if the project is managed by another department.